“Either You're with Us or Against Us”

Illiberal Canadian Foreign Aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,

2001 – 2012

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ABSTRACT

No one theory in international relations can fully describe the complicated actions and motivations formulating a state’s foreign policy. Yet the paradigm that best describes the approach taken by Western governments, such as Canada, when supporting peace building between Israel and the Palestinians is neoliberalism. They did this by sponsoring an Oslo Peace Process with Palestinian development aid in a development for peace model built upon precepts of cooperation and free market trade. That approach to peace building failed though because Israel and the Palestinians never altered their behaviour, remaining mired in a state of violence. Still, Western states continue to provide aid funding based upon the precepts of this model after more than twenty years of failure following the 1993 Oslo Accords.

The unique contribution of this research study is to provide insight into why these peace building efforts failed to take hold through an analysis of development aid projects from one Western country, Canada, for a period from 2001 to 2012. Specifically this is done through an account of the experiences of project coordinators from Canadian organisations that ran human rights and poverty reduction projects in that time. By taking the neoliberal paradigm into account, when assessing their experiences we gain insight into the factors that led to Oslo’s undoing, at least via Canada as a sponsor of the Peace Process. In this case failure is built upon a combination of degrees of naivety by aid practitioners and measures taken by Canadian elites to undermine Canadian development aid projects for Palestinians. In particular, from 1993 onward the Canadian government offered unswerving support to Israel, to the point where Canada was either contributing directly to Israeli settler colonialism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, or else helping to obscure it. Altogether this suggests at a theoretical level that, in spite of employing a strongly neoliberal foreign policy adopting progressive principles such as international law, human rights and cooperation, Canada in reality takes a foreign policy track that favours special or national interests, as well as favoured state allies, all at the expense of cooperation in world affairs or the rights of people being oppressed by an ally. The Canadian case suggests that the progressive elements in neoliberalism might only be applied selectively and not universally by a state, depending on its government’s perceptions of its self-interests.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AIPAC – The American Israel Public Affairs Committee
BDS – Boycott, divestment and sanctions movement
CAF – Canadian Arab Federation
CPCCA – Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism
CCF – Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
CCIC – Canadian Council on International Co-operation
CJC – Canadian Jewish Congress
CIC – Canada-Israel Committee
CIC-Canada – Citizenship and Immigration Canada
CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency
CRA – Canada Revenue Agency
DFAIT – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFADT – Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
DI – Distortion Index
EAP – Emergency Assistance Program
EU – European Union
EUMC – European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia
G7 – Group of 7
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GNI – Gross National Income
GNP – Gross National Product
ICCA – Inter-Parliamentary Committee for Combating Anti-Semitism
ICC – International Criminal Court
ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICT – Internet communications technology
IDF – Israeli Defence Forces
IDRC – International Development Research Centre
IFI – International Financial Institutions
IGO – intergovernmental organisations
IJV – Independent Jewish Voices
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INGO – international non-governmental organisation
IR – International Relations
IRFAN – International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy Canada
JNF – Jewish National Fund
MEWG – Middle East Working Group
NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCCAR – National Council on Canada-Arab Relations
NDP – New Democratic Party of Canada
NECEF – Near East Cultural and Education Foundation
NGO – non-governmental organisation
ODA – Official Development Assistance
PEGASE – European Union’s Direct Financial Support to the Palestinian Government
PLC – Palestinian Legislative Council
PNGO – Palestinian non-governmental organisation
PNGO Network – the Palestinian NGO Network
PRDP – Palestinian Reform and Development Plan
NSA – non-state actor
OPT – Occupied Palestinian Territories / Palestinian territories, including Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem
PA – Palestinian Authority
PCBS – Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PNA – Palestinian National Authority
R&D – Rights and Democracy
R2P – Responsibility to Protect
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RLF – Rosa Luxemburg Foundation
RWG – Refugee Working Group
SSHRC – Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
TFPR – Task Force on Palestinian Reform
TIM – Temporary International Mechanism
UN – United Nations
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency
US – United States
USSC – United States Security Coordinator
VAT – Value Added Taxes
WFP – The World Food Programme
PREFACE

Prior to my PhD, I was working within the linear, neoliberal framework of cyclical foreign aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). After spending time in 2002 volunteering with several Palestinian community organisations in the West Bank city of Nablus during the Second Intifada, my reaction to the civilian crisis was to cofound with Palestinians a local non-government organisation (NGO) meant to address the crisis in youth education at a time when schools were closed or access to them limited. Unbeknownst to me at the time youth education is a tragically neglected area of aid funding in times of humanitarian crises, even though that is when children need education more than ever. For us at the community level, without the theoretical knowledge it was just obvious that this gap existed and needed to be addressed. Our contribution toward closing it was to establish remedial education programmes run at neighbourhood community centres that were relatively safe spaces for young people to meet in, as they were otherwise unable to move freely for days, weeks or months at a time due to fighting and Israeli military curfews.¹

Observing that there already existed an infrastructure of buildings and centres built on previous development aid funding in the 1990s, but which lacked funding for programmes in the impoverished and conflict-ridden OPT, we decided to provide activities to dozens of existing Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) on that infrastructure around the city and countryside. This would allow us to maximise our limited resources by working together to reach large numbers of young people on very modest financial resources. Also observing that many – if not most – PNGOs saw each other as rivals for limited aid dollars rather than partners in society, we realised we would maximise our impact by remaining as neutral as possible and working with as many partners as possible. We even encouraged those PNGO partners to show our joint activities to donors to raise funds to cover their operational costs. From our perspective those partner PNGOs were not just serving their community, but at that time they were one of the few ‘enterprises’ keeping people employed and families fed. To reinforce our perceived neutrality we – and imbued with a certain level of youthful naivety

– registered our organisation not as Palestinian but as a foreign entity with the Palestinian Authority (PA), as a Canadian NGO working in the OPT at a time when the image of Canada was still positive in the region.

Even though the need for both humanitarian and development aid was very great in Nablus, which was then under an Israeli military siege encircling the city, donors seemed in our experience to neglect it along with the other more violent regions. Instead they seemed to prefer to congregate and fund in much safer locales like Israeli-occupied Jerusalem, Christian Bethlehem or the PA headquartered Ramallah, a ‘golden triangle’ of financing sitting atop a very uneven topography of aid in the OPT. When aid workers from large international agencies did visit places like Nablus their stay was brief, and when programmes were announced they often appeared poorly thought through and contextually inappropriate, wasteful and/or unnecessary.

All the while our work was not easy. It was thankless, exhausting and at times quite dangerous. Over time we grew frustrated with the challenge of finding funding to support our work, even though our model had proven highly successful in the context of what the community in Nablus wanted. Further, working with Canadian registration we were by far one of the largest and most successful ‘Canadian’ initiatives in the OPT, yet one of the more underfunded by scale. It was not just us in this predicament. We knew of many good local PNGO partners who could barely find funding to get by, all while funding remained concentrated in the golden triangle. The crux of the problem was that there was no money in the impoverished OPT economy for Palestinians to apply their own solutions to address the problems they identified themselves, relying instead on Western foreign donors who had their own complicated perceptions of and complex aims for the Palestinian indigenous other. All the while those donors were working within an aid regime officially dedicated to the promotion of peace and Palestinian economic growth, both of which were regressing rather than progressing from the 1993 Oslo Accord onward.

I carried out this work for eight years. Growing frustrated by a perceived ineffectiveness of foreign aid, and aware of its powerful economic and political position in the OPT, I wanted to explore at a research level the question as to ‘why Palestinian aid was not working’. In my mind at the time, carrying out such
a study might lead to a better understanding of how to navigate aid to make it work better for the Palestinians, and in a way that they might eventually not need to rely on it any longer because they would gain influence over the funding to address their real needs. That would mean aid that assisted them – or at least did not prevent them – in directly addressing the Israeli military occupation and Palestinian rights. Those were issues that in my experience donors preferred to avoid dealing with, instead deferring vaguely to a negotiated peace that was never going to happen give Israel’s settler colonial aims.

By that point I had a great deal of experience running Canadian funded projects and the Canadian charity I had incorporated. I was quite accustomed by then to working in a Canadian environment that was nearly as oppressive as the Israeli over the point of Palestinian rights, and the way in which Canadian regulations or elite actions specifically undermined Palestinian aid work. Given my familiarity with the Palestinian aid scene in Canada, and with the power of a project coordinator’s role in determining Palestinian aid, I felt my biggest contribution could be to contextualise why aid appears to be failing by interviewing fellow project coordinators from Canada to analyse their combined experiences together.

During my eight years, I had split my time pretty evenly between living Canada, Europe and the OPT, working primarily with Palestinian colleagues. So when I set out on my research survey I had in mind their years of complaints that aid was not responsive to their actual needs, that it was wasteful and that far too many stupid projects got funded. They also complained about a phenomenon of entire PNGOs changing their mandate to get funding, because donors were not funding what they needed to address, and how this often led to nonsensical projects. So when I first stated out I had in mind these complaints and was inclined to finding out why donors were funding in this manner, and the overarching question as to why they continued to support the Oslo Peace Process when it had clearly failed to anyone actually living in the OPT.

So at the time I wanted to look at the gap that existed between the actual needs identified by community PNGOs versus donor aims, because this was a point of conjecture where the aid model appeared to be failing. To do this I would be able to draw on the critiques of aid given by international aid observers like
Arturo Escobar, James Ferguson and Norman Long. To do this I had planned to look at several projects through the three stages of the linear model of project management under which contemporary aid projects are run – a linear model that critics feel is too rigid to ever succeed at development. With the benefit of hindsight I must have approached this question about aid efficacy with the simplistic caricature of an unknowing Western project coordinator that was based on the Palestinian’s – and occasionally my own – unsatisfying encounters in the OPT aid sector. To us those Westerners seemed well meaning but naïve and ineffective, never really able to help but welcome to visit because they are trying nonetheless, and funding in the process.

So at first I expected simply to have to critique the neoliberal model of aid project coordinators followed by showing how it influenced the design of their OPT projects and then how they failed because they did not actually address the occupation. Yet the realities of Canadian aid to the OPT was not so simple as I had come to understand it, particularly at the project coordinator level. There were still stupid projects to be certain, and some of my interviewees were quick to point this out in their interviews. Mostly though I discovered my own ignorance, meeting with highly thought through specialists who pushed as hard as they could against the boundaries of aid set around them in a hostile Canadian environment, all while striving to work in solidarity with beleaguered Palestinian colleagues to uphold their rights and address their problems caused by the Israeli occupation.

However, the constraints in Canada proved to be immense, and in many cases insurmountable. As my initial round of research interviews were rounding out a Conservative Canadian government began to brazenly suppress most Canadian civil society engagement with Palestinians. It also became apparent to me that it would be difficult carry out the original survey I wanted, because information was becoming scarce in a country once famous for transparency. People became legitimately afraid of losing work or funding for speaking out on Palestine, the government or providing information about their aid projects. That fear became the centre-piece of my investigation, as I discovered it was not possible to see where in the linear process the projects of these Canadian coordinators went wrong, because the government of Canada was so busy sabotaging their projects before they could get off the ground.
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction

Introduction

When the Oslo Accord was signed in 1993, there was genuine global optimism that Israelis and Palestinians could find peace based on the liberal underpinnings of the accord.  

In order to help nurture the Oslo Peace Process along, countless state and non-state actors (NSAs) from around the world contributed funds toward Palestinian development aid projects. The logic was that this funding would encourage Palestinians to abandon violence and cooperate with Israel on a peace process. The biggest donors funding this Peace Process were state actors that either gave directly themselves, or indirectly through shared multilateral institutions and development aid organisations. However instead of this leading to peace, Israeli settlement building accelerated in the OPT leaving millions of Palestinians living under a greater degree of insecurity and poverty than ever before.

This collapse did not come due to any failure to implement the Oslo Process properly. Rather, it was the philosophical ontology with which Oslo itself was built that guaranteed it would be its own undoing. It is impossible to undertake acts of cooperation and economic development in the context of on-going settler colonialism, because settler colonialism requires the total destruction of one group for the benefit of another. This was and has always been Israel’s state-building relationship with the Palestinians. Yet what Western policy makers, donors and Palestinian aid coordinators did wrong from 1993 onwards was, in an act of reflexive self-denial, to explicitly not craft policy that acknowledged the complex realities of Israeli settler colonialism or the Israeli government policy designed to sustain it. Nor did they prove capable of acknowledging the powerful partisan actors ensconced in Western governments that offer unswerving support for Israel, and thereby its settler-colonial policy.

2 Liberalism is the foundation upon which the modernised theory neoliberalism is based upon in IR Theory, and they will occasionally be used interchangeably.
4 In this thesis, the ‘West’ encompasses Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Western society is based on a set of structures, and shared religious and cultural traditions that are closely related enough that we see them as forming a coherent whole – as is the case for Islamic civilisation. The End of Civilization (In the Bronze Age): Crash Course World History 211, YouTube, Crash Course World History 2, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErOltC7OyHk&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
In fact, it is very possible that Israel’s Western allies wanted to do little other than provide support to Israel, with which they share strategic aims and crucially view as a fellow liberal democracy in a hostile and uncivilised Muslim Middle East.

What policy makers instead did was design development aid policy for OPT Palestinians that specifically chose to ignore the politics of settler colonialism, the violent oppression of Palestinians and the Western governments protecting Israeli policy. They justified avoiding the hard political issues of Israeli-Palestinian conflict by arguing that development aid should be separated from politics in order to build confidence through economic growth, in order for peace to then take hold. By taking this approach they chose a path that expressly ignores a destructive ambiguity that masked large gaps in each major actor’s conceptualisation of what mutual recognition meant in practice for Israelis and Palestinians, and how this fit within Oslo.\textsuperscript{5} They also operated under an assumption that aid can be a neutral, depoliticised component in the conflict, even when research has shown that aid always becomes a political actor in any conflict it is applied to.\textsuperscript{6} Thus development aid projects were designed which were wrong for the actual conditions of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, by the Western governments that permit the occupation to happen. Instead that aid came increasingly to subsidise the status quo of occupation and settler colonialism, relieving Israel of the costs while allowing them to benefit from a captive OPT economy.\textsuperscript{7}

This thesis assesses the way this Western approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace building affected the development aid actors carrying out Palestinian development aid projects meant to contribute to the Peace Process. Specifically it delves into the experience of Canadian organisations running Palestinian aid projects in the OPT – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem – from 2000 to 2012. The underlying structure of this study is built on a series of semi-structured interviews I conducted with sixteen project coordinators from ten


\textsuperscript{7} Read Shir Hever, \textit{The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation: Repression Beyond Exploitation}, 1st ed. (Pluto Press, 2010).
different Canadian organisations that funded either human rights and advocacy, or capacity building and poverty reduction development aid projects. Their experiences are contrasted against reports on the conditions and needs in the OPT at the time, as well as Canadian policy and politics. The overall aim of it is to shed light on the experiences of the people occupying the powerful position of project coordinator running, funding and evaluating projects. In this way we get to see how that aid model fared through the accounts of a group of Western coordinators from one country whose foreign policy has been characteristically liberal/neoliberal in post World War II era.

In order to do explore this phenomenon my research study sheds light on Western and Canadian donor policy and how the donors modelled aid projects for Palestinians, how realistic those models were for the actual problems of Palestinians, the challenges coordinators faced running projects, what they achieved – or failed to achieve – and how these experiences were perceived by aid coordinators. The point is not to look their individual failures, or successes, so much as to use their experiences to get an idea as to why the neoliberal aid process has consistently failed to foster development and peace since 1993. Following the lead of the interviewees this research study pays particular heed to the problems they had dealing with Canadian government and officials, as they often sabotaged, undermined or belittled their work. If it is a critique, it is a critique of neoliberalism as a tool of Israel-Palestine peace building, and Canadian government policy backing the neoliberal Oslo Peace Process.

Canada is not a marginal player in either international affairs or Israeli-Palestinian relations, and is a close ally both of Israel and the Peace Process mediator the United States (US). Into the 2000s Canada wielded a great deal of soft power, such as moral authority, on the world stage and the Peace Process. It also exercised a great deal of hard power as a major financial backer of the Oslo Process. Its position on Israel and Palestine has typically, and not coincidentally, fallen somewhere between that of the US and the European Union (EU) by its official rhetoric. Like the EU, Canada tends to work through multilateral institutions, particularly in tandem with the US and its other Western allies, to project its power and interests abroad.

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While acknowledging that no one theory may adequately describe the complicated actions and motivations of the Western backers of Oslo, even Canada alone, this thesis shows that the foreign policy that continues after more than two decades to sustain the precepts of the failed Peace Process is best described as neoliberal within the lexicon of international relations (IR) paradigms. If proof of power is characterised by the ability to alter the behaviour of others, a fundamental concept to neoliberalism, then the Western approach to the Peace Process clearly failed because Israel and the Palestinians never changed their behaviour to enter into a state of non-violence and cooperation – in fact they have consistently done the opposite. By taking the neoliberal paradigm into account and assessing development aid at the project level through the experiences of Canadian aid actors in the OPT, we get a glimpse into the factors that led to Oslo’s undoing. Doing this reveals the combination of a degree of naivety by neoliberal aid practitioners and countervailing measures by Western (specifically Canadian) elites that help ensure both Palestinian aid and Oslo cannot succeed. It also exposes flaws within the neoliberal paradigm itself, as practiced by Western governments, which undermines more progressive elements within the system of belief itself. In the case of Canada, elites in government offered from 1993 onward unswerving support to Israel, to the point where Canada was either contributing to or else helping to obscure the reality of Israel’s settler colonialism. Altogether this suggests at a theoretical level that, in spite of employing a strongly neoliberal foreign policy that references ideas such as international law, human rights and cooperation, Canada in reality takes a foreign policy track that favours special or national interests, as well as groups or states it is allied with, all at the expense of cooperation in world affairs or the rights of people being oppressed by their allies.

Neoliberal Donor Aid

Western donors have since 1993 disbursed over $27 billion of aid in the OPT by 2015 to support the Oslo Peace Process.9 This process has been dominated politically by the US in an approach that is best described in IR using the

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neoliberal paradigm – developed by Nye and Keohane in the 1970s. Working within that neoliberal framework donor states have publicly backed the Peace Process through the use of traditional coercion like financial inducements in order to shape Palestinians politics and society. However, that traditional form of hard power has been heavily intertwined with soft power elements meant to attract and co-opt Palestinians into the process, reshaping Palestinian OPT society in the vision of the West, particularly through support for the OPT’s now infamously crowded NGO-landscape, ‘developing, democratising and civilising’.

When creating an aid model for the OPT in 1993, Western donors gave the World Bank a lead ‘soft power’ role planning how the development aid model would take shape. Together they optimistically, and prematurely, classified Israel and OPT Palestinians as a post-conflict scenario. A neoliberal cadre of technocratic policy makers then conceived of an aid model that looked at Palestinian poverty as little more than a ‘technical problem’, which could be solved through well-constructed and non-political policy. Emphasising the need to solve that ‘technical problem’ those Western aid actors in the 1990s inverted cause and effect, and came to look at Palestinian poverty as the primary issue that needs to be resolved in order to foster political peace between Israelis and Palestinians – rather than the Israeli military occupation and settler colonialism that was actually causing the poverty. By specifically trying to exclude politics from the development and peace process aid providers chose to ignore the cause of the conflict and poverty in the OPT, when building peace.

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11 The EU for instance, the single biggest donor bloc to the Palestinians in the OPT, has only applied conditionality toward Israel on only limited occasions and has generally opted for constructive engagement. And even though the EU has been much more willing to criticise Israel than the United States, Israel still enjoys an extremely close trade and institutional relationship with the EU, to the point of nearly being considered a member of the union by some high level EU bureaucrats. Bouris, Dimitris. ‘Riding Shotgun: The EU’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’. Dimitris Bouris, ‘Riding Shotgun: The EU’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 17 September 2014, http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/09/17/riding-shotgun-eu-s-role-in-israeli-palestinian-conflict/i2xe.
12 Their classification of Israel and Palestinian being post-conflict situation has remained unchanged since 1993, allowing the original aid and peace models to continue largely unaltered well into the 2010s. CDS-BZU, ‘Public Debate on Alternatives to Aid and Neoliberal Development in the oPt (unpublished)’ (Center for Development Studies, Birzeit University, 2011).
This should not come as major surprise since development experts have a long history of optimistically working with autocratic rulers, which Israel’s military is vis-à-vis the disenfranchised and ethnically different Palestinians. Easterly observed that,

Those who work in development prefer to focus on technical solutions to the poor's problems, such as forestry projects, clean water supplies, or nutritional supplements. Development experts advise leaders they perceive to be benevolent autocrats to implement these technical solutions. The international professionals perpetrate an illusion that poverty is purely a technical problem, distracting attention away from the real cause: the unchecked power of the state against poor people without rights. The dictators whom experts are advising are not the solution – they are the problem.¹⁴

Those technocratic aid providers were optimistic that OPT poverty could be reduced and their approach work relying on the application of good policy that is neutral, rational and objective.¹⁵ They also based this optimism on the belief that it is in the best interest of every government is to adopt ‘good’ policy that provides public goods and open markets for all the people they govern, eliminating poverty in the process. For these technocrats there was and is no hidden agenda to aid, and development policy can largely be taken at ‘face-value’ from official documents, public statements and decision-making records. A claim to neutrality is after all a hallmark of the self-believed ‘impersonal power’ that lies at the heart of the neoliberal state.¹⁶

History has though revealed with great consistency that government does not always have at heart the best interests of all the people it rules, particularly a group of people it has conquered by force and whose land it covets for its own citizens. Further, in spite of its most progressive elements, historical liberalism and its contemporary iteration neoliberalism have been handmaiden to

destructive, autocratic Western imperialism around the world.\textsuperscript{17} Put simply, in their unknowing faith in the defining ideology of the post-World War II Western world these neoliberal technocrats have been unable to cope conceptually with the ‘irrationalities’ of settler-colonialism or ethnocentrism, particularly within a Western and liberal state like Israel where the government actively seeks to deny public goods and open markets to part of the population it rules. They are as blind to Israel’s actual policies as the true nature of brutal Western colonialism in the past, and neo-colonialism now.

It is in a similar vein of conceptual blindness that neoliberal economic planners display an innate inability to apply their theories to conflict situations.\textsuperscript{18} For this reason they actively avoid analysis of conflict situations, which challenge their uniform ‘one-size-fits-all’ frameworks and rigid assumptions. At best these policy makers define conflict situations as temporary and ‘too exceptional’ to deserve a separate frame of analyses. This meant they had to classify Israel and Palestine as being in a post-conflict situation – even though they are not.\textsuperscript{19}

For this reason the instrumentalists responsible for Palestinian aid have treated economic performance during the conflict as a ‘special and temporary phase of irrationality, which does not deserve a comprehensive economic analysis’.\textsuperscript{20}

As a group that resists acknowledging phenomena that challenges their beliefs, neoliberal technocrats managing aid have proven remarkably resilient at sustaining a development for peace model that failed disastrously in both development and peace building. They have notably denied any analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship that is based on the settler-colonial paradigm, even though cases of settler colonisation by other Western states in other regions of the world would offer insight as to how that relationship of exploitation and expropriation works. Further incapable of understanding the


\textsuperscript{18} Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine: Relief from Conflict or Development Delayed? (Routledge, 2010), 42–43.

\textsuperscript{19} For this reason the World Bank has repeatedly provided the same policy recommendations in a plethora of reports it has produced since 1993 about the OPT economy. Alaa Tartir and Jeremy Wildeman, ‘Persistent Failure: World Bank Policies for the Occupied Palestinian Territories’, Economic Issues (Al Shabaka, 9 October 2012), http://al-shabaka.org/node/513.

\textsuperscript{20} Taghdisi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine, 42.
hidden meanings, ethnic cleansing or apartheid inherent to the settler colonialism that characterises Israel’s rule over the Palestinians – indeed characteristic as a propensity within any instance of settler colonialism itself – there should be no surprise that the simplistic aid model the instrumentalists produced for Palestinians has failed, and Oslo alongside it.²¹

A Neoliberal Peace Process

In carrying out this analysis I cover two periods sometimes referred to as the Second Intifada (2001 to 2006) and the Institution-Building period (2007 to 2012).²² Together they encompass a timespan that starts as a crisis due to intense Second Intifada violence that Western donors responded to by providing Palestinians with a large increase in humanitarian aid to sustain them and to keep the Peace Process alive, before donors refocused again on the post-conflict Oslo aid model giving large sums of development aid funding for Palestinian Institution Building under a ‘technocratic’ Palestinian government.

Irrespective of period or conditions Western aid remained wedded to a neoliberal conceptual framework that informed donor expectations that development aid could be an effective policy tool to foster Israeli-Palestinian peace. Through their aid policy they combined financial inducements with soft power tools like culture, political ideals and public policy to draw the Palestinians into the Peace Process with a liberal democratic and Western Israel.²³ At its core the approach was based on the classical liberal’s faith in an innate goodness of the individual, the capacity for political institutions to promote social progress and the idea that states are capable of meaningful


²² Shir Hever, Political Economy of Aid to Palestinians Under Occupation (Alternative Information Center, 2008), 9.

cooperation together. Proponents of this approach extol the virtues of the cooperative element of state interaction, for which reason civilised governments should realise that they have more to gain in absolute terms by working together than they are likely to achieve in relative terms by themselves. As rational state actors come to realise their general well being is inexorably linked together, their interaction will increasingly become distinguished by cooperation through shared (multilateral) international institutions or accords. Within this logical framework both Israelis and Palestinians, each with a state of their own, will realise they have more to gain by working together than they do in conflict or at war.

Ultimately cooperation should lead to a form of interdependence where security and force matter less than the multiple social and political relationships that develop and exist between states. Cooperation will stimulate mutual economic gains, which reinforces peace, and leads to even further economic growth, reinforcing peace yet more. As this process progresses it would begin to make more sense for Israelis and Palestinians to resolve their problems through dialogue and cooperation, than through violence and cooperation. Thus in the case of Israel and the Palestinians, Western donors assumed that mutual recognition would help nullify the ‘zero-sum character’ of their conflict, which as a viewpoint where each side considers economic resources to be limited and control over them coming at the expense of the other. By neutralising this pessimistic outlook donors felt their economic and peace plans would allow the two sides to develop the trust necessary to negotiate a resolution to their conflict, realising they have more to gain by working together than fighting with each other.

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24. This also requires not acknowledging of liberalism’s racialized double-standards and historical accompaniment to Europe’s greatest and most oppressive settler colonial empires, the British and French, both of which established the artificial fault lines plaguing the modern Middle East.

25. Notably Nye and Keohane appear to find it difficult to see the desired outcomes for their theory when applied to the Middle East, the Palestine-Israel conflict in particular. They only touch upon the topic occasionally, while themselves appear to display a deep ignorance toward the Middle East. For example, in their literature they often use Muslim or Arab societies as the antipode when describing what is the opposite of the West’s democracy and freedom: ‘America’s popular culture, with its libertarian and egalitarian currents, dominates film, television, and electronic communications. Not all aspects of that culture are attractive to everyone, for example conservative Muslims’. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, *Foreign Affairs*, 1 September 1998, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54395/robert-o-keohane-and-joseph-s-nye-jr/power-and-interdependence-in-the-information-age.

26. Ibid., 83.
As such the neoliberal policy makers who put the Peace Process in place thought that development aid could act as a catalyst used to stimulate Palestinian economic growth, thereby providing Palestinians with a ‘peace dividend’ that would encourage them to make peace with Israel. To make that peace work though, they assumed Palestinians needed to be ‘caught up’ to Israel developmentally in order for Palestinians to become a true, rational partner in peace. To do that Palestinians would need to be democratised, endowed with modern state institutions and their society remade in the ‘civilised’ image of the West. Further, those policy makers thought that if the OPT’s economic links to Israel were reinforced, and both sides subscribed to a free market system, their strengths and weaknesses would come to complement one another, contributing to the realisation that they had more to gain by working together, much as happened in Europe after World War II. In this way liberal free market capitalism would forge the way forward to peace.

In order to develop the Palestinian state and its economy, Western policy makers turned to the World Bank asking it to create a Palestinian development programme. The Bank set this programme out in a 1993 document called An Investment in Peace. This paper was complemented by subsequent World Bank reports and policy recommendations, notably the Paris Protocol to establish a customs union between Israel and the PA, which together formed the blueprint for Western donors and policy makers building a Palestinian state. In this way donors set into motion a process based on liberal mechanisms for peace building that incorporated regional institutions, economic integration, democratisation, mutual recognition of national rights, and trust building. It was also an example of the use of neoliberal soft power aimed at altering the behaviour of the Palestinians.

Yet their plans and the Bank’s programme led neither to peace nor even growth. Instead, both the Palestinian economy and security declined

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precipitously at a time when the Israeli economy enjoyed mostly robust growth. Rather than flourish like post-war Europe, the OPT bore more in resemblance to the failed economies of other regions transformed in the 1990s by mass neoliberal Western intervention, such as Bosnia and Haiti. Meanwhile as the Peace Process ensued rapid Israeli settlement growth took place in the OPT under its cover. Violence often spiralled out of control, and the Israeli occupation became even more severe. Palestinian territorial integrity was so effectively undermined that many observers began to argue that a two-state peace solution had become impossible.\footnote{Virginia Tilley, The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock (University of Michigan Press, 2005), 1.} In spite of these failures donors chose not to deviate from An Investment in Peace or the Oslo Peace Process. Instead they increased their commitment to the existing aid model with ever-larger aid packages through the 2000s.

The Gap in the Research Literature

Western policy makers determine how aid is disbursed to aid dependent OPT Palestinians, and that money has kept their economy solvent under occupation and through colonisation since 1993. It is a completely asymmetrical relationship of power that was always considered acceptable by the sponsors of the Oslo Process. As a result, those donors have been able to effectively redesign the Palestinian economy and government according to their own vision, guided by neoliberal principals epitomised in the World Bank’s blueprint for Palestinian state building. The structural adjustment policies associated with the blueprint mirrors demands made by the Bank dating back to the 1970s, such as repeated cuts to public services and a reliance on private markets. Just how the World Bank thought that OPT state and economy should look reflects Harvey’s description of neoliberalism as an economic paradigm,

Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well being can best be advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional
framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to be concerned, for example, with the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up military, defence, police, and juridical functions required to secure private property rights and to support freely functioning markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution), then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interests will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.  

In spite of the preponderance of power donors exercise in the OPT and the role they have played reorganising Palestinian society, not enough research has been conducted on the donors and their relationship to the occupation, outside a small number of neo-Marxist critiques by researchers such as Adam Hanieh, Tariq Dana, Khalil Nakleh and Shir Hever.  

To date there is no OPT equivalent to James Ferguson’s critical ethnography of aid and power in apartheid-era Lesotho or carried out for Haiti by Mark Schuller and Timothy Schwartz. 

This is one reason that analyses of development aid in the OPT rarely ventures into the experiences of the project coordinators working from the dominant Western donor countries that define development aid itself. As the personnel most directly responsible for running development aid projects in the OPT they

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are particularly well placed in positions of power, outside the opaque corridors of government and policy-making, to provide information that can be used to assess how Oslo aid went wrong, or why it did not have a positive impact on the Peace Process. Nearly every major aid project starts with a design phase carried out by international staff from a Western organisation that succeeded at securing financing, typically from government, for OPT projects. Regardless of whether language such as ‘grassroots’, ‘bottom-up’ or ‘partnerships’ is used to describe them, the truth is that the international donors dominate the projects, especially from the start, but right through to completion. The Western project coordinators overseeing this process are able to provide valuable information such as their impressions about government decisions, the influences shaping aid policy and how this affected their work, all while describing how they themselves ran, funded and monitored projects in the OPT. Thus project coordinators are particularly rich sources of information about Palestinian aid, and the omission of their experiences in the research literature is striking when taking into consideration how important Western donor aid has been as a political force in the OPT since 1993.

Rather than look at a selection of project coordinators working at aid organisations originating from multiple different Western states, then broadly assessing development aid’s relationship to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, I chose instead to focus on the experiences of project coordinators solely from a single important Western supporter of Oslo where I could compare their experiences with greater consistency against one another. This allows us to get a better impression of a single country’s actual policy, in a way that would not be possible with a selection of project coordinators from multiple countries. Further, as Canada has been fairly devout in taking a neoliberal policy track since developing its own foreign policy independent from Britain in the 1930s, the same IR paradigm that constitutes the underpinnings of the Oslo Peace Process, we then get to better understand Canada’s actual policy versus its stated neoliberal policy, and what that example might mean for the broader neoliberal Peace Process. Ultimately this helps uncover Oslo’s shortcomings with the role development aid played in its collapse, and the connection between the aid providers to the immunity being offered by the West for the Israeli settler colonial project. I will argue in this thesis that this was done
naively rather than intentionally, as aid providers were simply unready for the role government would play in shaping what they could and could not do, and in some cases unaware of the broader interests at play beneath the veneer of progressive neoliberalism offered by the Oslo Peace and aid processes. In the case of Canada this saw government sabotaging and suppressing any aid work that presented even the smallest threat to Israel’s settler colonial policy aims. This ultimately contributes evidence that neoliberal development aid has been used to mask the realities of Israeli rule over the OPT and to sustain the violent status quo of settler colonialism that makes peace building impossible.

Chapters Outline

Chapter 2 of this thesis describes on a conceptual level the neoliberal paradigm that best describes the Canadian, and Western, foreign policy that has sustained both the Oslo Peace Process and Oslo aid model through more than twenty years of failure. It also briefly touches upon the settler colonial paradigm that describes Israel’s occupation of the OPT, but which is consistently ignored by Western state sponsors of the Peace Process. Doing this it exposes some of the conceptual and theoretical gaps in the neoliberal peace model that form the proverbial fault line upon which peace failed to take hold.

Chapter 3 is a methodology chapter where I outline the way in which I conducted this research project, and how the primary data was analysed. In it I describe the Canadian aid coordinators and organisations being examined, the kind of data that was collected, the way it was collected, ethical issues and challenges I faced conducting this research. The chapter also explains how these findings are corroborated against primary and secondary sources found in the context Chapters 4 and 5.

Those context chapters were researched to provide information both about the general case of Western development aid in the OPT, and one specifically about Canada’s engagement with Israel and Palestine. The context Chapter 4 looks at reasons as to why the Oslo Process failed, its connection to development aid, why that development aid is neoliberal and the overall story of deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the OPT from 1993 onwards.
Chapter 5 looks at Canada’s policy toward Israel and Palestine, the internal domestic politics of Israel and Palestine in Canada, aid that Canada has granted to the Palestinians, trends in that aid and the overarching story of Canada’s partisan support for Israeli policy.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 recount and analyse the experiences of the sixteen Canadian development aid project coordinators I interviewed for this research project. The chapters are separated based on the three phases that make up the way linear aid projects are modelled: planning (Chapter 6), implementation (Chapter 7) and outcomes (Chapter 8). I took this approach regardless of whether or not each organisation an interviewee worked at subscribed to the neoliberal paradigm, or a linear process of project management, because ultimately those who did not subscribe were outliers in an overall development aid environment that was characterised as neoliberal during the study period.

Chapter 6 provides information on the way in which the interviewees and their organisations sought out Palestinian partners, and developed and designed projects for the OPT. This provides an idea as to what extent the neoliberal paradigm influenced the design of the project coordinators’ projects, to what extent Palestinian views were taken into account when designing projects and crucially to what extent Canadian organisations took into account the facts on the ground of an Israeli occupation designed to further settler colonialism. It also reveals how official Canadian policy and unspoken government support for Israel influenced Canadian aid projects, and what impact this had in the OPT.

Chapter 7 assesses interviewee reflections on the challenges of carrying out development aid projects in the complicated environment of occupation and settler colonialism, the context of which was described in Chapter 4. However, what is remarkable is not so much the challenges of working in that environment, but that during project implementation all of the interviewees faced greater challenges from officials in Canada than from the Israeli occupation. The chapter becomes dominated by the challenges originating in Canada that monopolised the project coordinator interviews at the implementation stage of their work.

Chapter 8 analyses the project coordinator appraisals of their own work in the OPT. It is dominated by accounts of the way in which unrealistic rules and regulations in Canada undermined their work, and how the Canadian government directly sabotaged their projects for partisan pro-Israel political reasons. In many cases the interviewees had had their projects cut short prematurely during the implementation stage due to political intervention taken against them. The chapter also shares project coordinator reflections on the politics of the Peace Process, Palestinian development aid and their suspicions of a hidden agenda held by the Canadian government. Ultimately many have an appraisal of aid that includes the belief that Canada is working against OPT development aid that might lift Palestinians out of poverty, or build a peace that can uphold their human rights. Instead Canada is providing support for the status quo in Israeli policy, and that equates to supporting occupation and settler colonialism. By 2012 much of the aid Canada was disbursing came to be shaped in such a way that it either works directly toward that aim, or else not to disturb Israeli policy. In this way, Canada appears at the government level far from interested in real peace building between Israelis and Palestinians.

All combined the project coordinators experiences indicate that Canadian aid efforts were cut short or impeded beyond disrepair due to government regulations or it interfering on behalf of Israel, even directly contradicting official policy. This all suggests that unspoken and unwritten aims dominate the Canadian government policy toward Israel and the OPT, and that this has been undermining Canadian development aid efforts in the OPT. Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of these findings compared against the theory, outlined in Chapter 2, and what the implications of these findings mean not just for the way in which Canadian aid has been structured in the OPT, but what the Canadian case study suggests about the broader failure of neoliberal development aid in the OPT. The Canadian case suggests that neoliberalism may only be being applied selectively, and not universally, depending on a government’s perceptions of its interests. The conclusion is that the reality of Canadian support for Israeli settler colonialism, a Western development aid donor contributing toward regional peace building, must be taken into account when assessing development aid and peace building in the OPT. Thus, any accurate assessment of why development and peace failed in the OPT requires
analysis that takes into account the unspoken aims of a Western government and any support it offers for Israel’s politics.
CHAPTER 2 – Theory: Neoliberalism in International Relations and Settler Colonialism in the OPT

Introduction

The matrix of settler-colonial control exercised by Israel over the OPT, in addition to Palestinian lands taken in 1948 to found Israel, has been strategically consistent even if the tactics have adapted over time. This process began when Israel, as a settler colonial project within the British Empire, emancipated itself from the external supervision and control of its métropole (Britain). At that point it established its own sovereign political and cultural forms while terminating the substantive indigenous autonomies of the Palestinians in a process of settler colonial termination and taming, ethnic cleansing and reformation, which continues unabated to this day. Unfortunately for indigenous peoples, within settler colonialism land is life, and contests for land become contests for life, for both the coloniser and the colonised.

Proponents of IR neoliberalism extol the virtues of cooperative interaction between states based on the classical liberal’s enlightenment faith in the innate goodness of the individual, the capacity of political institutions to promote social progress and the idea that states are capable of meaningful cooperation that can lead to positive change (progress). In the case of Israel and the OPT, technocratic policy makers assumed, based on their neoliberal belief system, that these cooperative elements could be enhanced between Israelis and Palestinians, developing ‘integrative elements’ comprised of mutually beneficial economic arrangements. Essentially they were proposing peace by economics, and those economics would likewise be neoliberal in nature. They further believed that the international community could give peace building a boost by engaging in institution building to catch the underdeveloped Palestinians up to their democratic Israeli counterparts. In this way peace would be ‘bought’ by investing in development programmes. The World Bank referred

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37 Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, 387.
38 Technocrat is a term used to give the impression that someone is ‘above’ or ‘unaffected’ by political considerations, but in this context is just a blind adherent to neoliberalism.
to this most explicitly in 1993 when it designed the guidelines for bilateral Palestinian aid, calling the programme *An Investment in Peace*.

The approach Western aid actors took though was decontextualized, ahistorical and ignored the process of Israeli settler colonialism on Palestinian lands that is characterised by ethnic cleansing, apartheid and large-scale human rights abuses. Settler colonialism was the basis for conflict, a life or death struggle, but Western policy makers could not accept that a fellow liberal democracy could be undertaking very illiberal acts of dispossession that are nonetheless inherent to settler colonialism. It is in fact unlikely that Israeli Jews would have to fear Palestinian violence if they were not colonising Palestinian lands. However, the only way policy makers could carry on with neoliberal development projects so ill-suited to conflict situations, especially settler colonialism, was for them to ignore the realities of Israeli settler-colonialism, as well as their own inherent biases about Western superiority and their preference to support Israel. Tackling the real reasons for Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have required those Western policy makers to adopt policy and develop aid programmes that challenged the occupation, not worked around it, and that was something they are still to this date unwilling to conceive of.

Typically the perception put forth by Western specialists and held by Western policy makers has been that Israel is a state forced to exist in a hostile neighbourhood of illiberal, less civilised and more militaristic Arab-Muslim ‘others’. For those policy makers the annexation of additional Palestinian land in 1967 (the OPT) was accidental, a ‘defensive necessity’, and that Israel would ultimately be willing to excise itself from the OPT in a process of decolonisation should it be provided with assurances of security by its neighbours in that hostile neighbourhood. These views were grounded in the Israeli narrative of the conflict, perhaps because Westerners felt more of an affinity to Jewish Israelis than Arabs or Muslims. Israel’s plan to conquer the OPT, for instance,

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40 At one point at the start of the Oslo Process they included Israel as a donor, like any other western European state with its former colony, while often including Israel as a policy coordination committee member supporting Palestinian institution building processes. Rex Brynen, *A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 87.
long predated 1967 back to the very conception the Zionism ideology and had been a policy aim for decades; calling it a ‘defensive necessity’ is as biased an interpretation as arguing that the British Empire was built ‘accidentally’ in a ‘fit of absence of mindedness’, rather than as the effect of aggressive global imperialism. However, Israel resembled after all its liberal European métropole(s), a Western society transplanted into the Middle East, much like Canada in North America or New Zealand in the Pacific, so the West has been willing to prioritise Israel’s narrative over the indigenous one. Meanwhile, the West harboured deep feelings of guilt over the mass murder of European Jewry during the Holocaust in World War II, evoking genuine sympathy from many quarters of society.

Favouring the Israeli narrative required ignoring the Palestinian voice, and devaluing the Palestinian narrative of the occupation. The result was that the West would approach the Peace Process heavily biased in favour of Israel. For this reason it never put equal pressure on the two sides to make peace, ignoring Israeli excesses while emphasising Palestinian mistakes, essentially blaming the victim. Yet then there can be no claim to equality between the participants where one side is the colonized and the other occupier by military force. Above all this preferential treatment was linked to ignoring the actual characteristics of Israel as a land-hungry settler colonial state with a focus on territorially that required the elimination of Palestinians from the land. Instead Western donors remained preoccupied with building a liberal and modern Palestinian state that could live in peace with Israel, by being civilised, distinct from the typical illiberal and autocratic Arab neighbour. The result was a clash between Western perceptions with reality, pitting neoliberal policy against a settler colonialism they chose not to recognise was taking place,

Western peace building in the context of the OPT has attempted to constitute one important part of the equation of colonialism: the mission civilisatrice of ‘developing’ the local population and preparing them for statehood—or at least some version of ‘self-governance’ or conditional autonomy. Simultaneously, the practices of the occupying power, Israel,

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constituted the other part of the equation of colonialism: extracting and controlling resources, and settling its own people.\(^{43}\)

**Neoliberalism**

Western policy makers did not take into consideration Israel’s territoriality, its settler colonial nature, but instead chose to identify with Israel as a fellow liberal and democratic state that would therefore just naturally be predisposed toward peace if conditions allowed it – or at least they liked to believe that about themselves, ignorant of the aggression of liberal/neoliberal states for centuries the world over. On a conceptual level this had a huge impact on the policy they designed to support the Oslo Peace Process, because those same policy makers also worked on an assumption that Palestinians were an underdeveloped people who were, unlike Western liberals, inherently predisposed toward despotism and militancy. Therefore if they were able to reform and develop the Palestinians, transforming them into a liberal democracy as civilised as those found in Israel and the West, they would become naturally predisposed toward living in peace with Israel – a peace that would be cemented upon the twin pillars of cooperation and free market trade. Since Israel already dominated the Palestinians militarily and economically, containing them within the OPT, that meant the West would simply need to use soft power to influence how the Palestinians think and organise their society in order to make them more like the West. This would make the process of decolonisation easier for Israel with a developed Palestinian state to live safely next to.

With one of the two ‘warring’ sides already liberal and democratic, the West under the US’ leadership was adopting an approach to foreign policy and peace making in the region that is best described as neoliberal in IR theory. Neoliberalism is an important Western IR paradigm in that was developed and refined in the US. It is based on liberal theories in world affairs, and philosophically grounded in the European Enlightenment. Theoretically it represented a modernisation of the preceding liberal paradigm to keep pace

with its positivist cousin realism being updated into neorealism. Together the two dominate the foreign policy discourse in North America, informing policy choices.44 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are often credited with founding neoliberalism in the 1970s, along with other influential thinkers such as Michael Doyle, known for his theories on liberal ‘democratic peace’; Bruce Russett, long-time editor of the Journal for Conflict Resolution; Francis Fukuyama, who wrote about the triumph of liberal capitalism over communism as a victorious ‘End of History’; and Richard Rosecrance, one-time member of the US Department of State.

As a paradigm neoliberalism is highly influential in American foreign policy, as well as among its Western allies. One of those allies where neoliberalism is particularly influential is Canada, displayed outwardly with its historical predisposition to engage in world affairs through multilateral institutions, its devotion to international trade and freer markets, and its use of soft power to project influence abroad. Neoliberalism is now so influential and pervasive as an ideology that citizens in Western states, have so fully absorbed liberal principles and institutions into both their domestic politics and foreign affairs that they are no longer even able to perceive that liberalism is distinctly there.45 For them liberalism has become normality and by adopting liberal policy you appear to them to be non-political.

Liberalism, now neoliberalism, has thus become a norm upon which the Western citizen believes ordinary state, and non-state, life should be organised. Bell describes this as a contemporary situation where little stands outside the ‘discursive embrace of liberalism’ in mainstream Anglo-American politics and academic political theory, so pervasive that, ‘most who identify themselves as socialists, conservatives, social democrats, republicans, greens, feminists, and anarchists have been ideologically incorporated, whether they like it or not’.46 Doyle likewise points out as an adherent from within that paradigm that as an ideology, liberalism has, ‘shaped the perceptions of and capacities for foreign

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44 See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
relations of political societies that range from social welfare or social democratic to laissez faire.\textsuperscript{47}

Modern Twentieth and Twenty-First Century Liberal thought has been shaped by its struggle with competing with world views, prominently European fascism and Communism, in the interwar period, during World War II and after during the Cold War. Before liberal theorists like Fukuyama would declare victory with the fall of the Communist Soviet Union as the end of history, liberalism emerged as the most authentic and constitutive ideology of the West. Scholars from across the political spectrum, and from assorted academic disciplines, converged on this new all-encompassing narrative.\textsuperscript{48} It was largely the product of United States human sciences, though mirrored in Britain, and had been profoundly influenced in its evolution by British commentators and German scholars prior to the World Wars.\textsuperscript{49} Its emergence came non-coincidentally with the emergence of the United States as the dominant power in the non-Communist Western world, proffering its viewpoint upon the secondary powers it dominated in the West. Liberalism would even be described by disciples as, ‘our “ideology”, inherited from the past as the liberal tradition, the American creed, the Judeo-Christian heritage of Western civilization or the like’.\textsuperscript{50}

In its modern iteration, updated in the 1970s, Harvey notes that neoliberalism has as a paradigm, ‘become hegemonic as a mode of discourse’ and he says this has pervasive effects on our ways of thought to the point where it has ‘become incorporated into the common-sense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world’, including for both IR and economic theoretical understanding.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, most Westerners are now conscripts of liberalism, in its modern iteration neoliberalism, a tradition and way of thinking that has expanded to encompass the vast majority of political positions regarded as legitimate. So when we describe what is a norm and what mainstream, it is born from that liberal tradition. In this way liberal ideas have invaded the way that the West views how a state should be organised and interact with the world. Yet it

\textsuperscript{47} Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, 206.
\textsuperscript{48} Bell, ‘“What Is Liberalism?”’, 699.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 701.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 702.
\textsuperscript{51} Harvey, ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’, 23.
is not a neutral norm. It is a value-laden way of viewing global society, like any other ideology.

Cooperation and Trade

Progressive elements of neoliberalism are built upon the enlightenment optimism that human beings are rational creatures capable of taking rational decisions. For most neoliberals, war and conflict are not considered rational because much more can clearly be accomplished for every society through cooperation, particularly trade, to create greater wealth for all. Thus rational state actors should realise that they have much more to gain in absolute terms by working together for a ‘positive sum’ gain, than they would achieve in relative terms on their own in a ‘zero sum’ gain. For this reason, it makes more sense for states to resolve issues between themselves through cooperation and dialogue than through confrontation and violence.

For neoliberals economic incentives are fundamentally as important as military concerns, because trade and prosperity based on free market economics are the best antidotes to conflict. 52 Thus, neoliberalism is a particularly strong advocate of the liberal right for the individual to own private property, taking that concept global to the right to trade goods internationally. For them trade constitutes the core element for cooperation in world affairs. When carried out freely, they argue that it has the power to abrogate the need of states to go to war in search of resources. In this way Rosecrance argues that an open trading system offers states ways to transform their positions through economic growth rather than military conquest, and that all states can benefit from enhanced growth for a positive sum gain for all.53 For this reason neoliberal belief is very much rooted in, and promotes, principles of free market capitalism. Many of the neoliberal faithful even think that capitalism – and democracy – are inherently antithetical to conquest and conflict. Thus following a liberal/neoliberal template the US has since the late 1940s operated adopted into its foreign policy the aim of creating an open international economy that will forestall economic depression and sustain peace. In order to maintain that global system a number

of international multilateral institutions were formed, prominent among them the World Bank and UN.

Neoliberal IR theory should though not be misconstrued as one in the same as neoliberal economic theory, even though the two approaches often complement one another owing to IR neoliberalism’s commitment to free trade and capitalism. IR neoliberalism is pre-occupied with cooperation among states in world affairs, arguing that states should be concerned foremost with the absolute gains they can accrue by working together, rather than the relative gains they might make by acting on their own. Meanwhile, as described by Harvey, economic neoliberalism is pre-occupied with the proposition that, ‘human well being can best be advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade’. Even if category specialists are quick to explain that each field is unique, perhaps because they address different realms of human interaction, they are nonetheless completely complementary. For instance, IR neoliberalism is a strong proponent of the economic neoliberal theory, while both are the product of liberalism, informing their world views.

Making the Costs of War Prohibitive

Proponents of neoliberalism argue that open markets and global economic integration make it increasingly costly for states to turn away from patterns of interdependence, and as a result this connectedness helps to preserve peace in world affairs. The base assumption is that international trade will ultimately develop into a harmonious division of ‘labour among equals’ where every participant contributes their strengths to the world economy, and then altogether benefit from the overall gains made in the world economy. Thus, the primary path to prosperity and leadership on the global stage becomes one based in peaceful interaction. Further, because modern advanced weaponry is capable of inflicting such incredible damage on the participants in war, as discovered by Europeans during World War I, this creates disincentives for armed conflict and

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54 Harvey, ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’, 22–23.
55 Keohane and Jr, ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, 84.
the use of hard power as a means of economic gain. After World War II, the cost of war became exponentially prohibitive with the development of nuclear weapons and the threat of mutual assured destruction. Rosecrance described this in 1986 as a major crossroads in international affairs where,

In the past the military-political world was efficient. It was cheaper to seize another state’s territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it.\textsuperscript{56}

Since military expansion begins to be ruled out as a realistic route toward development, international trade appears in the mind of neoliberals to have become the best way for rational states to grow. As the trading system becomes increasingly attractive for those states seeking growth, they become even more disinclined to choose a military-political route to achieve a foreign policy aim.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{A Rational International System}

Since rational states realise that their good fortunes and general well being are inexorably linked to one another, over time their interactions will increasingly become distinguished by cooperation, often carried out through shared international institutions and accords. In addition, even though world politics is dominated by states and only a relatively small number of them play major roles, neoliberals recognise that many other entities, both transnational and national actors, are able to influence on world events.\textsuperscript{58} Thus international affairs can never truly be measured without taking into account NSAs that also influence it, like multinational corporations, religious networks, terrorist organisations, NGOs and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs).\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} Rosecrance, \textit{The Rise of the Trading State}, 32.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{59} Intergovernmental organisations are established by treaty after ratification by the lawful representatives of several governments, and as such are an important object within international law.
Within this system of ‘complex interdependence’ IGOs and NSAs play an important role sometimes rivalling that of states themselves because they are contributing to world affairs through multiple channels of interaction, or linkages, that often work to great effect between and around the state. Combined with culture, international linkages sit within the realm of soft power to achieve foreign policy aims, as opposed to the hard power of military or economic force. By using soft power international actors can make use of their culture, policies and institutions to attract or repel other actors toward a desired end. The US itself exercises an incredible amount of co-optive soft power, where with its influence, Institutions governing the international economy, such as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, tend to embody liberal, free-market principles that coincide in large measure with American society and ideology.60

Meanwhile NSA’s have contributed to building linkages between liberal states and are credited by mainstream scholarship with a decline in the use of hard power. Those linkages, along with international trade, have led to the development of a neoliberal global system of complex interdependence where states have become connected by multiple social and political relationships.61 According to Nye and Keohane that system is defined by three characteristics:

1) State policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies, but are subject to trade-offs; 2) the existence of multiple channels of contact among societies expands the range of policy instruments, thus limiting the ability of foreign offices tightly to control governments’ foreign relations; and 3) military force is largely irrelevant.62 [Author’s underline.]

One of the best ways to maintain relationships in that system is through the use of international law. International law guarantees legitimate rights for states and their citizens, contributing to the free exchange of trade and ideas upon which the liberal state and international peace rely. It is also provides a means for regulating international affairs between states and NSAs, and acts as a stable

guarantor for mutual respect that then fosters growth and peace for the benefit of all. Further, international law can bring together states with differing languages and beliefs, integrating them into a global culture of peace and understanding that supersedes a cynical realist system that is only kept in balance through the capricious balance of power, war and conquest.\textsuperscript{63}

Within this neoliberal system of trade and international law a state will never wholly surrender their own sovereignty, and can be expected to try to benefit as much as possible from their relations in that system while maintaining as much individual autonomy as possible. Some states will also exercise more sovereignty and power than others. From the perspective of the system itself, the problem that it then faces is how to, ‘generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the face of competing efforts by governments and NSAs to manipulate the system to their own benefit’.\textsuperscript{64} In this way neoliberalism retains a positivist preoccupation with the state as the basic unit of analysis of international affairs, still striving for power and benefits to itself, but in a more cooperative and peaceful manner facilitated by trade, NSAs, international agreements and other linkages. In that neoliberal system of world affairs other forms of interaction supersede the state’s preoccupation with security and force, as soft power begins to rival or exceed hard power in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{65}

Based on the evidence they have collected, neoliberals further argue that there exists a significant predisposition toward peace and against warfare between states that are liberal and capitalist.\textsuperscript{66} Since these states are ‘moral’ republics whose authority rests on respect for the individual rights of their citizens, they tend to display a concomitant level of respect for the rights to freedom of other liberal states.\textsuperscript{67} In this vein countless neoliberal theorists have set forth a simple argument – and I would point out a frankly ahistorical argument – that,

\textsuperscript{63} International law can also be used as a co-optive source of soft power by which a state can pursue its interests in international affairs.
\textsuperscript{64} Keohane and Nye, ‘Power and Interdependence Revisited’, 730.
\textsuperscript{65} Nye, ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’, 249.
\textsuperscript{66} Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, 213.
\textsuperscript{67} One of the basic principals to neoliberalism is the idea that states have a right to be free from foreign intervention. Or at least liberal states exercise a right to political independence, because their citizens exercise civic rights and they are morally representative of their citizens. Illiberal states might meanwhile be invaded.
The aggressive instincts of authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties make for war. Liberal states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war... When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace.\(^{68}\)

If they are right though, since the number of liberal states in the world appeared to proliferate after the Cold War – something Fukuyama described as an ‘End of History’ – that would augur well for world peace if liberal states have indeed established a separate and durable ‘democratic peace’ among themselves.\(^{69}\)

Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the “pacific federation” or “pacific union”, has begun to be established among liberal societies.\(^{70}\)

Thus neoliberals are optimistic about a future world inspired by their enlightenment belief that humanity is progressively marching toward world peace.

Faith in non-military forms of inter-state cooperation a tenet central in IR neoliberalism offering the foundations upon which peace should be able to be built, is what then informs the logical framework behind the Oslo Accord and the economic model designed for the OPT by the World Bank.\(^{71}\) Since Israel was already a liberal state, Western policy makers came to the conclusion that they needed only to construct a new liberal Palestinian state that would be a ‘moral’ republic, like Israel, where the state’s foundation of power would rest not on autocracy but the true consent of the citizens it represents. Thus, the Peace Process represented an attempt to extend the pacific union of liberal states

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\(^{69}\) Doyle does though make clear that liberal states are willing, and have often, gone to war with illiberal societies that are ‘different’ in governance than their own, and in particular weaker ones. In spite of this contradiction, he still believes that a peace is being built through the steady expansion of liberal democracy around the world and the peace that those states keep among one another. Thus, by this logic, a democratic and liberal Palestine should by nature be more likely to have peace with a democratic and liberal Israel. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, 213.

\(^{70}\) Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, 1156.

\(^{71}\) Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 10–11.
forward into the Middle East by creating a Palestinian state that was liberal, and predisposed toward peace with Israel. The resulting approach to peace building became built upon economic growth (trade) and liberal mechanisms like regional institutions, economic integration, democratisation, mutual recognition of national rights, and fostering mutual trust (cooperation).\textsuperscript{72}

Soft Power and Palestinian Development

One of the tools states can use to achieve foreign policy aims, and to reinforce cooperation, is ‘soft power’. Whereas neorealists (and classical realists) consider IR to be a zero-sum game where state actors seek out power and influence, using resources such as armed force and economics to coerce one another, neoliberals stress the utility of alternative and nonviolent processes that can be used to achieve foreign policy aims by attracting and co-opting other states and NSAs. Those alternatives include using intangible soft power resources like culture, ideology and institutions.\textsuperscript{73} By using them one country can get another to ‘want the same things’, assimilating the world-views of another like the US has done with its Western allies since World War II. Neoliberals believe soft power is potentially just as powerful as the hard power preferred by realists. Joseph Nye describes it with a patrimonial analogy,

Parents of teenagers have long known that if they have shaped their child's beliefs and preferences, their power will be greater and more enduring than if they rely only on active control. Similarly, political leaders and philosophers have long understood the power of attractive ideas or the ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes others' preferences.\textsuperscript{74}

If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow it.\textsuperscript{75} If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance in attaining its wishes. This co-optive element fosters conditions

\textsuperscript{72} Rynhold, ‘Liberalism and the Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in the Middle East’, 45.
\textsuperscript{73} Nye, ‘Soft Power’, 1 October 1990, 154.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 166.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 167.
where other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with the state that is wielding soft power. Soft power has also allowed actors like the Papal States, Canada and the Netherlands to exercise substantial influence in spite of their hard power limitations. In fact they may exercise more power than other states with similar or greater military capabilities due to their soft power influence. 76

Although the Peace Process includes elements of hard power coercion, where Palestinians are manipulated through the use of financial resources undergirded by Israeli military might, Western funding for Palestinian development aid projects represented the use of soft power where donors were attempting to co-opt Palestinians to behave in a way amenable to Western interests. This soft power was applied to Palestinian state building but also exerted in OPT society through the thousands of NGOs that came to rely on Western sources of funding, through which Western liberal norms such as moral values, culture, policy, economy, governance, civil society, personal rights and free market economics could be passed.

Further, neoliberals believe that it is in the best interest of every government in the world to apply sound policy to provide public goods and open markets for all of the people they govern, eliminating poverty along the way. They hold a highly optimistic view of government and its intentions. For them there is no hidden agenda to aid, and development policy can be taken at face value from official policy, public records and other formal documentation. Taken a step further, those governments can employ policy makers behind Palestinian (and global) aid to carry out development in regions like the OPT, progressively leading towards technologically and institutionally more complex and integrated forms of 'modern' society – a process is set in motion and maintained through increasing engagement with commodity markets and a series of interventions involving the transfer of technology, knowledge, resources and organisational forms borrowed from the more developed world. In this way, a 'traditional' society can be 'propelled' into the modern world. Though not without institutional hiccups often described as social and cultural obstacles, gradually the less developed

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76 Keohane and Jr, 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age', 86.
society’s economy and social patterns can acquire the ‘accoutrements of modernity’. 77

A fundamental neoliberal belief of the Western policy makers is that a strong central authority, in the case of the OPT that would be the PA, should use its power of hierarchy and monopoly to encourage development while making certain to balance its own intervention with free markets. Otherwise the state might stray down the ‘failed’ path of socialist style intervention, a historical rival to the liberal paradigm, risking systemic failure should one monopoly should fail. 78 That concept of balancing free markets with authority is based on the neoliberal’s faith in the power of market forces to correct for inefficiency, incompetence or abuse. It builds on an assumption that in the marketplace enough entities exist, or can be identified, to provide the required goods and services to foster wealth and discourage poverty. 79 For this reason they argue that the state should not be economically monopolistic yet should encourage free market enterprise. 80 Thus, where neoliberalism is the dominant ideology there has indeed been a consistent increase in the ‘relative power of the international and coercive apparatuses of the state’, all done in support of market interests, both internally and internationally. 81

In this way neoliberals see development as something that only comes through government action; and any lack of development, by definition, is the result of government neglect. 82 Whether or not economic growth takes place or the economy shrinks depends only on government policy being implemented properly, but never because of intervention itself. Thus policy and development planning are accorded the utmost importance, with an expectation that the implementing local central authority will be a neutral, unitary and effective

80 Ibid.
national agent that heeds the advice of the Western experts. The bureaucracy, while inconvenient in an underdeveloped country, just needs further training in order to be able to carry out policy in the right way.\textsuperscript{83}

In order to sustain this form of governance balanced between free markets and state intervention, neoliberal technocrats insist on either strengthening existing institutions or the wholesale creation of new ones. They require this in order to establish a ‘good’ government that can properly implement their development advice, using

Implementation networks [that] employ hierarchical structures containing interrelated subunits to establish overarching objectives, planning and resource utilisation procedures, monitoring and evaluation systems, and formal oversight relationships, as in a bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{84}

In the OPT this became the PA that they funded, fostered and helped organise. By introducing hierarchy into implementation through a strong central authority supported by the right institutions, development policy makers can take advantage of the ability of that authority to shape individual actors’ preferences into patterns that are consistent with the neoliberal development paradigm.\textsuperscript{85}

**Economics and De-Development**

Prior to Oslo, there were indications that the OPT economy was suffering as a result of its connection to the Israeli economy. When conducting research on the Gazan economy in the 1980s, Sarah Roy discovered that a popular belief that growth took place in the OPT due to integration with Israel, based on an interpretation of GDP figures, was wrong. Rather, Gaza was becoming poorer because the Israeli occupation of the OPT had been structurally designed for the sole benefit of Israel. Within that structure Palestinians were just cheap labourers used to propel forward Israeli economic growth, using their earnings to buy Israeli goods in a captive Gazan economy. By absorbing Palestinian labour into its workforce, Israel was also able to free Jewish labourers from

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{84} Brinkerhoff, ‘Coordination Issues in Policy Implementation Networks’, 1498.  
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
menial jobs to further develop Israeli advanced industry.  

Palestinians meanwhile could not develop their own economic sectors, as Israeli policy was to undermine Palestinian economic sectors that might compete with any Israeli equivalent. 

Salim Tamari argues that the Israeli government had been integrating the OPT into Israel after conquering it through the use of three main institutional mechanisms – markets, labour and infrastructure – meant to reinforce its rule.

Already by the 1980s the OPT had become Israel's most important export market; a market that was tariff-free, non-competitive and from which Palestinian goods were prevented from entering Israel. With the gross trade imbalance that resulted from this economic relationship, the OPT economy came to rely on external remittances from Palestinian labourers in Israel and family members working abroad in the oil rich Gulf states in the 1970s, and later in the 1980s on ‘sumud’ solidarity funds coming from the Arab world.

At the time of her initial research, Roy’s said that this type of grossly unequal economic relationship between states was often best described through the use of ‘dependency theory’, a paradigm describing the post-colonial relationship that existed between Western countries and the poorer countries of the ‘developing world’ – typically former colonies of the West. Dependency theory had in turn spawned the concept of ‘dependent development’, a condition where growth becomes disarticulated from the needs of the poorer territory and re-orientated to fulfil the needs of an external economy it is oriented toward. In that condition, one economy is forced to work not for its own needs but the benefit of another. Roy argued that those concepts available in development theory were inadequate though, because the necessary preconditions existed at too small a degree in Gaza. There economic development was being suppressed to such an extent that even conditions of dependent development were being suppressed. This led Roy to coin ‘de-development’ to describe the economic

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87 This is an important finding because it undermines, using early analysis, a key argument taken by many donors and researchers, notably at the World Bank, that integration benefits the Palestinians. This misbelief became a foundational element behind the entire model of Western donor aid in the OPT.
88 See Tamari, ‘What the Uprising Means’.
relationship that existed between Israel and Gaza, a ‘deliberate, systematic deconstruction of an indigenous economy by a dominant power’.\(^9\) This process Roy described could also have been described as settler colonialism.

**Settler Colonialism**

European settler colonialism has over the past few centuries been premised on violence carried out against indigenous peoples, such as everyday forms of humiliation, exclusion and racial segregation. Some of this process is carried out informally and some of it sanctioned officially under law.\(^9\) Wolfe argues that the essential feature of this colonialism is ‘a sustained institutional tendency to supplant the indigenous population’.\(^2\) It entails an initial extermination or expulsion of a majority of an/the indigenous populations, followed by the, ‘demographic “swamping” of these territories by settlers from the métropole and/or a variety of other locales’.\(^3\) Two characteristics of that settler society are an exclusionary racial identity and expectations for self-government. It is a potent mix of ‘intra-racial egalitarianism’ but ‘inter-racial exclusion’.\(^4\) Colonists meanwhile are considered always already to be civilised, regardless of their actions, and to be imbued with rights and obligations mirroring the métropole. In this way they are classified to be radically different to the people they conquered and dispossessed. The original inhabitants are in turn considered to be child-like and uncivilised, incapable, immature, lacking in both rationality and in competence. Upon this basis their rights can be reasonably withheld by a state that deems them unworthy of political or social equality. This is a precarious condition because as Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish lawyer who coined the term *genocide* in 1944, argued based on observations of colonialism and the Holocaust, ‘occupations and settlements conducted on terms that neither recognised indigenous rights nor engaged in subsequent

\(^9\) Bell, ‘“The Dream Machine”, 22.
\(^9\) Wolfe, ‘Purchase by Other Means’, 134.
\(^9\) Veracini, ‘The Other Shift’, 27.
\(^9\) Bell, ‘“The Dream Machine”, 20–21.
negotiations were bound to issue in genocide because resistance and its brutal suppression was inevitable'.

Ethnic cleansing is in fact an age-old means to permanently tip a demographic balance in favour of an occupier. Meanwhile, Zionism has consistently operated on a settler colonial logical conceptual framework, deeply exclusionary and racist, where ethnic ‘purity’ ideas have been cornerstone to Zionist policy from the day of its inception. In the case of Palestine, Jewish settlers moved from their European métropole into Palestinian lands under an ideological banner of Zionism, seizing them and reducing the indigenous population through a violent strategy, including mass killings, which led to the mass expulsion of at least 750,000 Palestinians in 1948 and emptied the first lands of non-Jewish inhabitants, which were used to form Israel. Israel overall demographically swamped any Palestinian territories it has taken, and even in the OPT, where it has not been able to expel Palestinians at the same rate with the same levels of violence as in 1948 Israel, they have carried out a process of internal expulsion (exclusion) of Palestinians onto bantustans like those found in Area A of the West Bank or an encircled, besieged Gaza Strip. At its worst such ethnic cleansing is defended as a necessity for the formation of a nation state that embodies the greater end of human progress. With this logic Israeli historian Benny Morris, who had once used archival work to dispel myths surrounding the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in 1948, using the example of United States democracy built upon the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans.

Western supporters of the Peace Process did not recognise these age old processes at play in the OPT when adopting their own conceptual framework of Oslo peace building. As a Western ‘liberal democracy’, torn from the social fabric of the European métropole, the superiority of Israeli values as moral and civilised actors have largely accepted by Western leaders and policy makers, for they were after all representative of ‘civilised values’ in a ‘backward

95 Moses, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and Intellectual History’, 18.
96 Ibid., 10.
99 Moses, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and Intellectual History’, 5.
That Western leadership and policy community have also largely acceded to Israel’s demand to be accepted as one among the community of advanced liberal democracies; yet to be allowed to ignore the norms of international law and human rights conventions in Israel and the OPT based on a peculiar Zionist destiny, ‘as a state in which ethnic nationalism and religious prophecy are enshrined’ as reasons for being.\textsuperscript{101} The technocrats’ judgement was clouded by their own deep internal biases.

In this way, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was able to be conceived of as a confrontation based on religious and nationalist grounds, to the point of explicitly discounting settler-colonialism.\textsuperscript{102} When policy makers in 1993 were designing their development aid programme for the OPT they then classified Israel and the OPT as a post-conflict situation and expected Israel to decolonise from the OPT.\textsuperscript{103} This classification has been maintained ever since. As we will see in Chapter 4, there has been little evidence supporting the assumption that Israel was ready to embark on a process of decolonisation from the OPT. Instead settlement growth accelerated dramatically from the onset of Oslo, entrenching the settler colonial enterprise even further than before. By never setting an actual timetable for disengagement and constantly setting new preconditions to decolonisation, Israel has appeared unwilling to relinquish control of the OPT even though the Oslo Peace Process is premised on a two-state solution where both Jewish Israelis and non-Jewish Palestinians receive land for their own states.

Western donors to the Peace Process needed though starting in the 1990s to classify Israel and the OPT as a post conflict situation, because otherwise they could not have applied neoliberal precepts of development aid and peace to it. This is because the neoliberal approach to development is not able to cope with the irrationalities of war – or settler colonialism. Conflict poses too serious a challenge to their uniform analytical frameworks and rigid assumptions. Instead they prefer to conceive of conflict as too temporary and exceptional to deserve

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Lorenzo Veracini, \textit{Israel and Settler Society} (London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006), 2.
\textsuperscript{103} Veracini, ‘The Other Shift’, 27; CDS-BZU, ‘Public Debate on Alternatives to Aid and Neoliberal Development in the oPt (unpublished)’. 
a separate frame for analysis.\textsuperscript{104} For this reason the policy makers responsible for Palestinian aid, like the World Bank, have treated Palestinian economic performance during decades of occupation as a ‘special and temporary phase of irrationality, which does not deserve a comprehensive economic analysis’.\textsuperscript{105}

Since decolonisation was supposed to commence with Oslo, it seemed only to make sense for Western donors to help establish a local Palestinian government that could in turn help facilitate Israel’s removal of its garrisons while leaving in place some control over local government.\textsuperscript{106} However, Israel was not ‘merely’ engaged in exploitative colonialism exercised like a distant métropole from its overseas colonies.\textsuperscript{107} Rather, Israel had established a settler-colonial entity embedded deeply within the OPT, and which was integrated directly into the métropole. Israel kept pursuing territoriality, expropriating Palestinian land and ethnically cleansing Palestinians from it.

There were plenty of warning signs. Already in the mid-1990s Roy had identified four essential characteristics that defined the Israeli occupation over the OPT as settler colonial: ideological justification (the Zionist mission of the Jewish people in Palestine), legal legitimacy (the Balfour Declaration where Britain gave the Jewish population of Palestine the right to settle the land and form their own national body), land acquisition (by means such as direct purchase, non-use, public domain, state lands, military declarations) and racism used to justify discriminatory policies toward the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{108} Thus she was able to determine that Israel’s goal was to, ‘rob the native population of its important economic resources – land, water and labour – as well as the internal capacity and potential for developing those resources.\textsuperscript{109} Thus,

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Israel never sought to promote the interaction of Palestinian society with its own, and through such interaction, to educate or “enlighten” the
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\textsuperscript{104} Taghdisi-Rad, \textit{The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine}, 42–43.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{106} Under this logic a decolonised polity and the neo-colonial relations it maintains with its former coloniser, the direct socio-political successor of colonialism, redefines a former colony’s relations with its past imperial centre, but often still to the benefit of the latter. Veracini, \textit{The Other Shift}, 33.
\textsuperscript{107} Colonialism requires an indigenous community for its labour, dominated then by a ruling class sent over from the imperial centre like with British rule over India and Nigeria. A settler colonial enterprise by contrast seeks to erase and replace the indigenous population of a land. Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 5.
Palestinians. It did not even seek to exploit the Palestinians for economic gain, although that did occur. Rather, it sought primarily to dispossess the Arabs of their economic and political resources with the ultimate aim of removing them from the land, making possible the realisation of the ideological goal of building a strong, exclusively Jewish state.110

Roy had discovered the logic of elimination inherent to settler colonialism. This is not a master–servant relationship marked by ethnic difference, nor a relationship characterised by the ‘indispensability’ of the labour of a colonised people.111 Land is life’ for the settler colonial project and land itself is the primary good, as opposed to the natural resources or products (i.e. gold, cotton, oil) and human resources (i.e. labour, existing trade networks, convertible souls) intrinsic to colonialism.112 The indigenous person is here quite dispensable.113 Here Zionism chose also to conquer labour, not only clearing Palestinians from the land but boycotting indigenous labour and produce, thereby remaking the modern Jew through a repudiation of dependency on others that progressively deprived those same others of their means of subsistence in that land for life struggle.114 ‘The end goal is to turn the settlers into the indigenous people of the land and for them to cease to be settlers’.115 Settler colonialism destroys and replaces the old, without room even for assimilation of the native inhabitant. Zionism’s founding father Theodor Herzl said of this, ‘If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct’.116

Democracy for Settlers, Dispossession for Natives

A settler colonial state can be both liberal, in the sense of being democratic and capitalist, and simultaneously predisposed towards violence and conflict. This

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110 Ibid., 4–5.
114 Wolfe, ‘Purchase by Other Means’, 152.
characterises the modern state of Israel and this may have confused neoliberal policy makers who might assume that liberal and democratic Israel should be naturally predisposed toward peace, especially a Palestine state that strove to become the same with Western help. However, settler societies have two contradictory desires, which are to have their own autonomous settler government but to exclude the indigenous Native from it with the help of their metropolitan sponsor.\(^\text{117}\) Further, for a neoliberal technocrat the exclusion and elimination of part of a state’s population by their own government does not seem rational. Yet the government of Israel routinely and specifically denies public goods and open markets from Palestinians living in the OPT, even while their own settlers in the OPT agitate for and attain their individual rights. The colonists do this while specifically denying the same rights for the indigenous Palestinian, owing to an underlying belief that their own rights and democracy rest upon the subordination and dispossession of Palestinians.\(^\text{118}\)

From the beginning Israel was meant to be neither a multinational nor a multi-ethnic state, but rather one exclusively for Jews.\(^\text{119}\) From 1948 onward Israeli policy has been governed by a Zionist ideological aim of ‘de-Arabisation’ of any land it conquered.\(^\text{120}\) In Israel that tendency toward Palestinian expulsion has come in different forms.\(^\text{121}\) Whereas genocidal wars historically focused either on butchering most of an enemy population or ensuring their death through the use of famine and disease, the logic of elimination can take on a variety of forms adapted for each settler-colonial situation and contemporary norms in international relations. This has included limited butchery, terror, forced transfer and dispersal to force Palestinians to vacate their homes in 1948-49.\(^\text{122}\) Forced transfer and dispersion, albeit at a reduced speed, remain part of the Israeli strategy to get Palestinians to leave to this day.\(^\text{123}\) Other solutions include the creation of internal borders, small cantons, allocating Palestinians small, ever-shrinking lands to live on, surrounded and excluded from Israeli society.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., 49.
\(^{121}\) Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, 400.
\(^{123}\) Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, 401.
Behind those borders, or walls, the indigenous Native will live not as a citizen of the conquering state. Yet that state will argues that it is justified to control them, because they are backward and uncivilised people. The backwardness meanwhile very much fits the depiction of undeveloped societies assumed in neoliberal development aid. Attempts may be made to educate and culture the indigenous native, yet ideologically they can almost never be accepted as equals by a settler state, even when development and assimilation succeeds in transforming those people in its image, or in this case the Palestinians into a liberal Westernised state.

Porous OPT borders meanwhile offer a way in for Israeli settlers but no way out for Palestinians, all while Israelis and even Western policy makers fret over the demographic ‘threat’ Palestinians represent to Israeli democracy.\(^{124}\) Even when Israel has used the language of evacuation, it has not surrendered control over territory in the OPT to the Palestinians. Instead that language has been used as a tactical measure, a distraction or subterfuge to obscure the growth of its settlements. Thus, when Israeli settlers evacuated Gaza in 2005 that was an explicit attempt to sustain the on going forced transfer of Palestinians elsewhere in the West Bank, while never surrendering control over Gaza itself. This is an example of the settler-colonial ‘non-diplomatic transfer’, where the settler entity retains overall control while claiming to relinquish control from a certain area for the Native, exactly like the reservations indigenous inhabitants live on in the Canada and the US.\(^{125}\)

Only by discriminating against the narrative of the colonised ‘other’ can settler colonialism be successful, because the previous inhabitants of a region must be dehumanised, categorised as savage and their very existence ultimately denied. Once this has been accomplished, any and all acts of horror can be inflicted upon them without recourse, because the stories of the oppressed become irrelevant, just as the Palestinian narrative has less weight than Israel’s among the latter’s Western allies. Meanwhile the concepts and terminology of settler-colonial occupation can perversely be sanitised and repackaged, as they were by Oslo. Previous patron–client relations of occupation were only, ‘discursively repackaged and represented as instances of Israeli-Palestinian

\(^{124}\) Ibid., 404.
\(^{125}\) Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 2010, 45.
“cooperation” when they took place.\textsuperscript{126} Thus, pre-Oslo policies and power relationships were only repackaged with liberal terminology like cooperation, while the actual control and management of resources remained much the same. For example, the Israeli Mekorot water company retained ownership after 1993 over the West Bank’s water infrastructure, as it had since 1982, supplying rapidly growing Israeli settlements while relying on the newly ‘liberated’ Palestinians to act as middle-men to enforce Israel’s discriminatory water distribution and collect bills.\textsuperscript{127} Occupation was recast as liberation.

\textbf{Where Neoliberalism Fails}

With its oppressive settler-colonial occupation of the West Bank coached in the neoliberal’s enlightened language of peace and progress, it was reinforced by soft power intervention funded by Western donors. This all allowed Israel’s settlement enterprise to gain new legitimacy internally and internationally after 1993. Henceforth Israel’s state and non-state institutions, like Mekorot, could more easily transfer away the costs of management of the ruled Palestinians onto the colonised people themselves, made possible by Western aid, even as those Palestinians were themselves being excluded and eliminated, their captive OPT economy drained further by Israel.\textsuperscript{128}

The authority of the sanitised colonial discourse is profound and disturbing, because by normalising the colonial state, ‘the dream of post-Enlightenment civility alienates its own language of liberty and produces another knowledge of its norms’ when applied to a colonised people – separate and unequal as apartheid.\textsuperscript{129} The overriding tendency of Western donors has been to reinforce rather than counter this process, because even though they will use the language of neutrality and mediator in the Peace Process, they attach much greater weight to their relationship with Israel than for concern about Palestinian

\textsuperscript{126} Jan Selby, ‘Dressing up Domination as: The Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations’, \textit{Review of International Studies} 29, no. 01 (2003): 123, doi:10.1017/S026021050300007X.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 128.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 133–137.
human rights.\textsuperscript{130} The contemporary historical record reveals the consistency with which Western leaders, coming from diverse ideological convictions, have ultimately defined their national self-interest in ways that not only rule out criticism of Israel, but also assist directly or indirectly with the occupation and the growth of settlements.\textsuperscript{131} Both the United States and Canada have been particularly strong adherents to this approach.

For this reason, Israel has been able to usurp progressive elements in the neoliberal process of peace building and development aid, instead perverting it to instead reinforce its settler colonial enterprise, redirecting Western development aid and soft power to its own benefit. This perversion of liberal idealism is not surprising though given a long history of liberalism coexisting alongside Western imperialism, limiting its benefits to only certain groups at the head of the march of progress. In fact, some such as Tocqueville and JS Mill and many other great thinkers within the liberal canon even extolled the virtues of imperialism.\textsuperscript{132} With the settler colonial occupation repackaged after 1993 with neoliberal terms of peace and cooperation, Israel’s long-standing policies were legitimised and existing policies came to occupy the middle-space of conventional thinking, leaving any prospect for true decolonisation – and peace – unlikely.\textsuperscript{133} Yet the West did not really object, instead only reinforcing its support for the Oslo model.

The ultimate problem is that the West, countries like the United States and Canada, are close allies of Israel and identify with it as a fellow democratic and liberal Western state. They have proven more than willing to provide cover support for Israel and its existing policy, even though that directly undermines the entire outward rationale for the Oslo Process because Palestinian rights and statehood are incompatible with Israeli settler-colonialism. That settler colonialism destroys and replaces the old, without leaving space even for the assimilation of the native Palestinian inhabitant, even though the West’s

\textsuperscript{131} Numerous scholars and commentators question whether the West’s alignment with Israel at the expense of bad relations with predominantly Arab and Muslim countries is truly worth the cost. Walt and Mearsheimer notably argue that the US national interest is being damaged by unflinching support for Israel. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, \textit{The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy}, 1st Edition Thus (Penguin, 2008).
\textsuperscript{132} Read Bell, ‘”The Dream Machine”; Pitts, ‘Empire and Democracy’.
neoliberal policy called for the development, assimilation and reinforcement of him/her. As we will see with Canada, support for that settler-colonial model can be especially fervent.

By not accounting for the actual context of settler colonialism and Western governments’ support Israel, policy makers created a gaping fault line upon which their neoliberal development aid projects and the entire neoliberal peace plan had no option but to fail. Even if Western policy makers adopted the language of neoliberalism, and Israel did too, this does not necessarily mean that they acted purely in accordance with it. Their policy could not be taken at face value. Instead evidence suggests that behind their neoliberalism were alternative aims that favoured special or national interests that benefitted Israeli settler colonialism at the expense of the Palestinians. As we will see the Canadian case study will suggest that neoliberalism might only be applied selectively by a state and not universally, depending on its tactical aims formulated on its perceived interests. Perhaps this is just a legacy of liberalism’s historical cohabitation with Western imperialism, applied selectively to some groups over others.
CHAPTER 3 - Methodology

Introduction

Understanding Western donors is fundamental to understand how post-Oslo Palestinian development aid was structured, because it is they who determine how aid goes into an OPT economy that has since 1993 been aid dependent. While between 1996 and 2006 the Palestinian economy declined by 27% as a measure of Gross National Income (GNI), foreign aid per capita increased by 14.74% and came to dominate Palestinian economic activity, accounting for 14.42% of economic activity in 1996 and rising to an astonishing 35.34% in 2006. With Israel’s suffocating restrictions on Palestinian daily and economic life rendering the PA leadership dependent on Western aid, the result has been that donors since 1993 have been able to effectively redesign the Palestinian state, economy and society in their own vision. Yet in spite of this gross imbalance in power that favours the donors, research conducted on Palestinian aid has to date predominantly focused on the Palestinian recipient: the way aid is spent in the OPT, aid’s impact on OPT economic development (often statistical and measured as per GDP or GNI) and the relationship of aid vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation. By contrast little has been done looking at the donors themselves, analysing the models that aid is premised upon from their views, interests and experiences. This is a striking paradox given the preponderance in power that donors exercise over daily Palestinian life.

That noticeable gap in the Palestinian aid literature forms a justification for this research project: examining aid projects that are meant to contribute to development and peace in the OPT, run by a Western NGO or even ‘arm’s length’ governmental organisations, in order to better understand the Western donor-actor experience and their overall relationship with the post-Oslo framework. In so doing I chose to focus on project coordinators from one country, Canada, running two types of aid projects between 2001 and 2012: (1) human rights and advocacy, or (2) capacity building and poverty reduction.

134 Hever, Political Economy of Aid to Palestinians Under Occupation, 29.
135 Neoliberal development specialists typically seek nothing short of the mass managed reorganisation of state and society. “The context of intervention has always been defined from outside. Palestinian society was always at the receiving end, and never the initiator of “developmental interventions”. Nakhleh, The Myth of Palestinian Development, 175; Bouris, ‘Riding Shotgun’.
projects. This research was done by interviewing those coordinators about their experiences, structuring them based on the three stages of the linear model of project management that typifies the neoliberal development approach popular in contemporary Western aid: (1) design, (2) implementation and (3) outcomes. I took this approach regardless of whether or not each organisation or project coordinator actually subscribed to the neoliberal paradigm or its linear process, because ultimately those who did not can be considered outliers to aid norms in the period. The point is through their experiences to establish a broader and better understanding as to why post-Oslo Palestinian aid has failed, seeking out gaps that existed between the donor approach and the socio-political realities prevalent in the colonised OPT.

Meta-Theory

In carrying out this research, there a few meta-theoretical notes on how I approached this research. First, reality as we know it may be little more than a social construct that we as individuals can never truly view objectively. That is because our sense of reality is shaped by the society we live in and no matter how hard we try, we will always be products of that society, carrying with us the norms and assumptions of the society we originated out of. That means researchers such as myself always enter a research project with a set of values and expectations. Thus however powerful science and research are, they will be as flawed as the individuals engaged with them.\textsuperscript{136} So although I am quite familiar with Canadian aid to Palestine, I did my utmost to approach my research and each interview with as much of a sense of open curiosity as possible, doing my best to leave aside my assumptions while being fair in my analysis and prompting information from each interviewee. And although I am well informed, I acknowledge that I still only had a general idea of what I was looking for within the social phenomena I was analysing.

Second, capturing social phenomena in the social sciences is a highly complex process. It necessitates any researcher be flexible, which includes avoiding theoretical rigidity. So even though my main concern was with the way in which

the larger neoliberal IR paradigm affected the social phenomena of Palestinian aid and the socio-political realities of Israeli settler colonialism (including the occupation, development and peace building), I acknowledge and make mention to other theoretical frameworks. Thus my approach was to adopt a fluid design and evolutionary strategy that developed throughout the course of conducting this research. Masterman warned that while we may use a single constructed theory to help understand the world around us, we must still acknowledge there could be a multiplicity of paradigms that can each be applied to phenomena in ways that are better or worse than one another.\textsuperscript{137} Thus even though I describe the Oslo Peace Process and Western donor support as neoliberal in nature, it is not the sole paradigm that may describe the phenomena.

\textbf{Description of the Case Studies}

The 16 project coordinators I interviewed worked at 10 different Canadian organisations between 2001 and 2012, running projects that were best classified as either human rights and advocacy projects, or capacity building and poverty reduction projects. Generally speaking each of those categories of projects can be described as developmental, which means that they broadly seek to bring about changes to reduce poverty long-term at a structural level, and bearing in mind that the premise of the Oslo-aid process was meant to bring peace to the region by reducing poverty through the use of development aid.

Although normative moral principles can vary between organisations and individuals, the human rights and advocacy projects generally refer to projects where an organisation either directly advocated for what they considered to be the inalienable rights of Palestinians, and/or supported Palestinian partner organisations to carry out that work on their own. This work is often based in empathy, protecting the disadvantaged and weak, and pushing for an equal application of the rule of law – often making reference to international human

rights law or the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Typically individuals supporting projects in this area of work had a rational motivation as they considered rights a pre-requisite, even necessity, for development and poverty reduction to actually take.

The capacity building and poverty reduction projects took a more technocratic approach to development work and tried to be non-political, for instance not challenging neoliberal norms underlying Western aid, policy and support for the Oslo Process. That being said, since the overarching structural problems Palestinians face are from occupation and settler colonialism, even these organisations could not avoid politics completely and at times found a need to support rights work, while rights work was actually a major aim for some like Organisation 7. As with rights work the way capacity building is interpreted by organisations depends on how they perceive the community and situation they are addressing. However, most of the organisations generally referred to this as improving the capacity of Palestinian organisations and institutions to contribute to a functioning modern (liberal) state, with the ultimate aim of reducing poverty. These projects fit most readily into the neoliberal development model.

The focus of this research study is on the experiences of the ‘project coordinators’ funding those two types projects. Although their exact job title will vary depending on the terminology used at the different organisations examined, the general denominator project coordinator describes their role as integral members of each organisation, responsible for delivering their development projects in the OPT. It is these project coordinators who determine if a project is successful and then find a way to explain to the donors why it was a success. Many of the coordinators chose who would be funded, how a project was designed, implemented and then how its outcomes were framed. It is a powerful position in aid work, and possibly the most powerful since they ultimately are the interlocutors between the field (and PNGOs) with the donors.

In the case of the Canadian organisations interviewed, all worked with a Palestinian partner organisation in order to carry out their project. As is often the case in contemporary aid work, all but one were based in Canada, making just

Likewise organisations supporting human rights and advocacy work sometimes veered into capacity building, such as supporting Palestinian partner organisations develop their capacity for advocacy work.
occasional trips to the OPT to meet with partners for monitoring or planning. Only one coordinator was actually based in the OPT, and felt during his/her period that he/she was the only such coordinator based in the field.

It is worth noting that Canadian charity law and government regulations force Canadian organisations to officially run all projects themselves, as it is not easy to simply grant funds for projects to non-Canadian organisations. Canada's *Income Tax Act* rules apply no matter where a Canadian registered charity operates. The rules allow it either to make gifts to qualified donees, or to carry on its own activities. Few foreign organisations are qualified donees. It is for instance difficult to buy equipment for non-Canadian organisations, in spite of the logical challenges that presents for indigenous project management and buzzwords like bottom-up empowerment. As a result, most Canadian charities operating abroad must do so by actively delivering their own programs.  

**Fear of breaching those norms is especially heightened in Canada owing to the opaque nature of charity law and the heavy politicisation of Israel and Palestine. This challenge of operating under Canadian charity law is described is in greater detail in the Chapters 5 through 9.**

In the case of this research project, the 16 people I interviewed had between them a great deal of experience running aid projects generally and Canadian aid projects in the OPT specifically. Some of the interviewees had worked in this area for decades. A number of them had advanced degrees and some were recognised professionals in their community. Many of them were Arab or Jewish Canadians who were attracted to the region due to their identity, while a number were attracted to the region due to their religious background. The gender background of the coordinators was fairly evenly split, though the rights and advocacy coordinators were mostly female while capacity building and poverty reduction coordinators were mostly male. Meanwhile, the organisations interviewed were split evenly between English and French Canada. Overall the coordinators interviewed represented a wealth of professional experience.

Due to the sensitive politics of anything Palestinian in Canada, and how easily people's careers are unmade when they are seen supporting Palestinians, the

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interviews have been kept anonymous. All names were replaced gender-neutral pseudonyms, while organisations are referred to with just a number. Organisations 1 through 4 and their seven interviewees ran human rights and advocacy projects, while organisations 5 through 10 with nine interviewees were involved in capacity-building and poverty reduction. Some interviewees undertook multiple interview sessions, where a sequential number of the interview is in that case identified beside their name, i.e. Ash-1, Ash-2 and Ash-3. Due to the need to hide the identity of the interviewees, an effort is made not to provide specific details that will give away their work. Some interviewees were concerned about their job security and many likely would not have participated in the interviews without anonymity.

The median interview length was nearly one hour, though several interviews lasted longer or consisted of multiple interviews each of the median length.\textsuperscript{140} Interviewees with multiple interviews were all conducted within the same month. The interviews took place during two periods, in the spring of 2012 and summer through winter of 2014. The six interviews that took place in the spring of 2012 were with Ash and Emory (rights and advocacy), and Sawyer, Kai, Blake and Dallas (capacity building and poverty reduction). The ten interviews that took place the summer to winter of 2014 were: Ryan, Casey, Remy, Hayden, and Taylor (rights and advocacy), Kim, Jamie, Quinn, Alexis and Morgan (capacity building and poverty reduction). In the case of an interview at one organisation, two of the interviewees took part together in the same interview, Blake and Dallas at Organisation 10.

Bearing in mind that all organisations have different structures, and in order to maintain anonymity, the heads of a Board of Directors will be universally referred to as Chairperson, while the heads of the paid staff managing an organisation’s day-to-day affairs will be referred to as the CEO. There were cases of multiple individuals occupying one of those positions for the period a project coordinator’s interview covered. Canada’s government department for foreign affairs had several different official names depending on the period and government in power, so it will be referred to mostly as Foreign Affairs

\textsuperscript{140} Jane Elliott, \textit{Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches} (SAGE, 2005), 32.
throughout the thesis, outside exceptions where a quote or reference requires
the name of the time.\textsuperscript{141}

In a couple instances projects that ran into the early 2000s actually began in the
late 1980s or 1990s, and for this reason are referenced backward outside the
2001 to 2012 period of research in order to provide a fuller analysis. Any activity
that a coordinator funded is referred to as a project, regardless of the technical
name their organisation ascribed to what they were funding. Occasionally
projects working with Palestinians extended outside of the OPT or originated in
a different geographical area, bearing in mind that Palestinians live across the
Middle East as refugees and some communities exist as a minority in Israel. All
sums mentioned can be assumed to be in $CAD, unless mentioned as another
currency like $USD.

As the research involves human subjects, I successfully applied for ethics
approval on multiple occasions from the University of Exeter. As my research
interviews were conducted in Canada that meant taking into account the ‘Tri-
Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans in
Canada’. In foreign aid work, information on the activities of aid projects is
highly protected. Information is often treated at though it were a private rather
than public good, because organisations want to use it to present their projects
in a positive light –a success – to justify existing or further funding. Interviewees
may for this reason fear harming their organisation’s funding health and their
professional career by speaking too frankly about a project. As such, project
coordinators can be sensitive about providing information about a project they
are working on, even without taking into consideration their fear in Canada of
being targeted by the pro-Israel lobby for being honest about their Palestine
work.

\textbf{Data Collection}

The primary source of data I collected were semi-structured interviews with the
16 different project coordinators from 10 different Canadian organisations, who

\textsuperscript{141} For instance being called the Department of External Affairs and International Trade (1982 to
1995), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT, 1995 - 2013) and later
the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD, 2013 onwards)
ran either of the two types of development aid projects. Those interviewees included many of the top Canadian coordinators of OPT aid during that period. They held numerous advanced qualifications and decades of experience running development projects in the OPT, or elsewhere.

A major benefit to keeping the interviewees anonymous was the frankness with which they spoke. Had their identities not been anonymous, they may not have provided such rich information, the likes of which cannot be gleaned from official, publically available project reports. This is because, generally speaking, it is difficult to collect honest data from aid organisations about their projects. This is due to a high degree of self-censorship they apply when writing reports aimed for public or donor consumption, fearing that a bad report will lead to a reduction in financial support – threatening their livelihoods. It is well understood within the aid industry that when an organisation attempts to build an argument for the success of its activities, ‘socialising’ their success for donors, they prefer to present their project in terms that will be deemed successful by the donors they are dependent on. Thus it is not possible to look at an aid organisation’s report as neutral. They are very much subjective social constructs. Those reports are as much a tool in public relations to advertise their work, as a summary of what they accomplished or did not accomplish. Meanwhile, in a country like Canada with a highly repressive political climate towards Palestinian rights, the stakes are even higher and an entire organisation can be put at risk of losing its funding or being shut down when it is seen supporting Palestinians, or providing a frank analysis of their work in the OPT.

Those interviews were not left on their own, but contrasted against a comprehensive assessment of aid and economy in the OPT taken from the research literature. Further, I took into account the policy recommendations and analysis carried out by important international organisations like the World Bank. This is laid out in detail in Chapter 4. The interviews are further contrasted against the context of Canada’s relationship to Israel and the Palestinians, as described in Chapter 5, which includes Israel and Palestine in

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Canadian politics, Canadian foreign policy, government publications, news articles and civil society reports.

**Interviews**

The interviews were semi-structured. When conducting such interviews, some researchers advocate developing a relationship with the respondent such that both the respondent and researcher introduce their ideas and experiences into the data production process in a format commonly called a ‘collaborative interview’. Although I likely had the prerequisite professional experience to conduct such interviews, I shied away from taking such an approach, instead choosing to delve into the challenges and experiences of the project coordinators through a series of probes and prompts meant to elicit information on a semi-structured basis.

Wherever possible participants were contacted directly and discretely, but on occasion indirectly through their organisation or colleagues. Before I spoke with them interviewees were made aware in advance of the research topic and the issues I was likely to raise during the course of an interview. The interviews were then conducted in person, by video Skype or on occasion by telephone. In a singular case an interview was carried out via email. Each interviewee was provided with a copy of my ethics approval for the interview, an information sheet about the research project and a consent form they needed to sign if we went ahead with the interview.

Interviews took place in a quiet setting the interviewees were comfortable in. All audio was recorded with an audio digital recorder. In person, the interviewees were given control over the digital audio recorder, permitted to end the interview at any point and even to request that the data be destroyed – though none chose to. Likewise, when interviews were conducted over Skype or by telephone, interviewees had the same option to terminate the interview prematurely by closing their own device and hanging up. In some cases interviewees asked that especially sensitive points be omitted from the record,

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which was respected. Interviewees were also given my contact information in order to be able to follow up with me after an interview had taken place, and several did. Interviewees were also provided with information about who can hear the recording and when it will be deleted. They were further given the option of requesting that the audio record be destroyed at a later date, while all interview data will be destroyed after a period of seven years. All interviewees were asked to sign a permission form for the interview to take place.

While the golden standard in qualitative research has long held that qualitative research interviews are best conducted in person, I will argue that they were more than adequately replaced by interviews conducted digitally over Skype or by telephone.\textsuperscript{144} For instance, as Nigel and Horrocks point out, by selecting the ‘full screen’ video function on Skype a researcher is provided with visual cues, avoids long silences and creates an experience almost as though the person is in the same room.\textsuperscript{145} That helps mitigate a bias held in qualitative research against distance interviews by telephone, such as a perceived barrier in developing rapport with interviewees.\textsuperscript{146} Those biases further contradicted by research that suggests that there is no significant difference between face-to-face or telephone interviews.\textsuperscript{147} Such findings held true in an even less tech-savvy era, where research conducted in the 1980s found no major difference in the quality of interviews conducted by telephone in lieu of in person.\textsuperscript{148} This is I would argue particularly true for a tech-savvy country like Canada, where people are typically quite comfortable with the technology as Internet Communications Technology (ICT) has long been used to keep people connected and to carry out business in geographically large country. The interviewees were particularly used to employing the technology in their own development work to stay connected overseas, and to get around the physical barriers of the Israeli occupation. Further, modes of interviewing offered me cheaper options to conduct more interviews in a way that was much more

\textsuperscript{145} Nigel King and Christine Horrocks, \textit{Interviews in Qualitative Research} (SAGE, 2010), 85.
\textsuperscript{148} C S Aneshensel et al., ‘Telephone versus in-Person Surveys of Community Health Status.’, \textit{American Journal of Public Health} 72, no. 9 (September 1982): 1017–21.
flexible for our mutual schedules, and which may arguably be better than in-person interviews, defying the expectations of the golden standard.\textsuperscript{149}

All information collected is being kept confidential. Written consent forms are kept separate from the interview data in order to ensure anonymity. All data, including the consent forms, are held in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (United Kingdom) in a secure location in the United Kingdom or Canada. Where other researchers are involved, in this instance my supervisory team, they have agreed to maintain this confidentiality. To protect the anonymity of research participants, a list of names and their corresponding contact information is kept as a word file separately with a numerical key representing each participant, which is linked to the raw data. In a second document those numerical keys are then linked to gender-neutral pseudonyms. Access to the number key and the pseudonyms are available only to my supervisors and myself. They are being kept for seven years from the start date of this research project, before being destroyed. The project commenced on July 2011, meaning that all data must be destroyed in June 2018.

As is common with semi-structured interviews, these interviews comprise a purposive sampling of participants who were chosen because they are familiar with the topic being researched. The semi-structured interviews were pre-supposed to allow me, as the researcher, to do all I can to encourage the participants to talk about the events, feelings and opinions they hold on the research topic, as they reflect on the process and impact of delivering their aid project(s) in the OPT. As much as possible interviewees were allowed to answer questions or discuss the general topic in their own way, in their own words.\textsuperscript{150} That is because human beings are ‘storying creatures’ that make sense of the world around them by constructing narratives to explain and interpret events, both to themselves and to other people.\textsuperscript{151} Through the stories that come from the interviews we learn truths that stay closer to actual life.

\textsuperscript{149} Novick, ‘Is There a Bias against Telephone Interviews in Qualitative Research?’, 394.
\textsuperscript{150} Elliott, \textit{Using Narrative in Social Research}, 32.
\textsuperscript{151} Sikes and Gale point out that, ‘The narrative structures and the vocabularies that we use when we craft and tell our tales of our perceptions and experiences are also, in themselves, significant, providing information about our social and cultural positioning’. Pat Sikes and Ken Gale, ‘Narrative Approaches to Educational Research’, University of Plymouth, (2006), http://www.edu.plymouth.ac.uk/resined/narrative/narrativehome.htm.
events than methods that elicit explanations, particularly through structured questions.\textsuperscript{152}

To point out the narrow scope of questionnaires and methods eliciting explanations I was avoiding, Hart and Lo Forte provide the example of a United Nations survey of local priorities in Gaza following Operation Cast Lead in 2009. In that survey a UN agency tried to ascertain the primary protection needs of children by relying on a narrow list of needs they as the researchers perceived, all while failing to talk with any children themselves. That survey addressed only adults and was constructed in a way that allowed them only to express their immediate needs such as food, play space and schooling. The resulting report claimed that ‘psychosocial support is by far the most important need for children nowadays’, yet a call to end Israel’s blockade of Gaza and the termination of other actions that were directly responsible for the suffering that caused the problem was not included in the questionnaire for respondents to identify.\textsuperscript{153}

So one of the main points to the semi-structured interviews was to avoid a narrow determinative scope of questioning, by prompting for specific information but allowing the interviewees to tell their story and reveal information I might otherwise have missed. Bearing this in mind, my semi-structured interviews followed a set of themes reflecting the three different stages of the linear model of aid projects: design, implementation and outcomes. Questions were introduced in different ways or orders appropriate to each interview based on a guide of prompts. This helped me enable participants to talk about their experience in their own way, while ensuring the same basic areas were covered in each interview. At the same time my emphasis was less on the ‘what’ happened than on the ‘how’ social phenomena happened, to understand what they consisted of and how they were produced.\textsuperscript{154}

From an exploratory perspective, this approach to the interviews was meant for me discover what the participants thought was important about their aid project, the purpose of OPT aid and to discover how they use language to talk about

\textsuperscript{152} Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson, \textit{Doing Qualitative Research Differently: Free Association, Narrative and the Interview Method} (SAGE, 2000), 32.

\textsuperscript{153} Hart and Forte, ‘Mandated to Fail?’, 641.

aid. This opened up possibilities for me to consider different traits about their projects with them, identifying and elaborating on perceived advantages and disadvantages of those social phenomena vis-à-vis the intended goals of aid generally, and their projects specifically. From an explanatory perspective the semi-structured interviews helped me elaborate on why people experienced or understood certain social phenomenon of Canadian aid in the OPT, taking into consideration their experiences, opinions and feelings to better understand their behaviour or attitudes. This approach was meanwhile evaluative in that I was trying to ascertain what the interviewees, as participants, thought about the social phenomenon they experienced. This approach better allowed unanticipated explanations to emerge from the interviewees, allowing them to lead me through their experiences within the framework of my research question. It did not disappoint, as in many ways these interviews changed the direction of my research project in ways I did not anticipate, described in the conclusion Chapter 9.

It is important to bear in mind that the discourse of the interviews was intersubjective, jointly constructed by myself as the interviewer with the interviewee. Due to my shared experience as a project coordinator engaging with similar social phenomena, there is a potential advantage for me to better understand and therefore interpret the experiences of the interviewees, than if I had not. However, for that to be an advantage, I had to do my utmost always to be as fair and objective as possible, bearing in mind that it is impossible to be completely objective as a researcher on shared social phenomena.

Finally, even though the interviews are being kept anonymous, it is important for me as the researcher to make certain to portray the respondents fairly. I do this by giving the reader enough evidence to show the complexities and problems in my interpretation. My goal was to illuminate rather than distort the historical

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155 Ibid., 21.
156 ‘Many social researchers accept a fallibilist epistemology – that is, they hold that there is no absolutely secure foundation for knowledge; hence all claims to know are always in principle uncertain and corrigeable. Fallibilists hold that because knowledge claims never literally mirror or represent an independently given reality, objectivity cannot inhere in the results of inquiry (that is, in the claim itself). A knowledge claim cannot be objective by virtue of the fact that it expresses the way things “really are” because we can never know that for certain. Rather, judging whether a given knowledge claim is objective is a matter of appraising the conduct or procedure of inquiry’. Victor Jupp, The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods (1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road, London England EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom: SAGE Publications, Ltd, 2006), http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-dictionary-of-social-research-methods/SAGE.xml.
record providing a plausible interpretation to connect all the different facts and ideas together.\textsuperscript{157}

\textit{Documentation and Corroborating Secondary Sources}

As the accounts we explored in the interviews do not provide on their own a transparent enough set of data, I contrasted them with other sources of data recording and interpreting the social phenomena associated with Canadian aid to the OPT.\textsuperscript{158} To start, as part of the process comparing and crosschecking the interviews, I carried out an in-depth review of primary and secondary sources providing context for Canadian aid. This included conducting a comprehensive survey of international aid to the Palestinians, of the OPT economy, and the structure of the Israeli settler-colonial occupation, written up in Chapter 4. I further carried out research on Canada’s relationship to the OPT, written up in Chapter 5, which includes: Israel and Palestine in Canadian politics, Canadian foreign policy, government publications, news articles and civil society reports.

For the projects investigated out of the interviews, most had either direct or indirect government funding, and all of the organisations were responsible to report their financial accounts on an annual basis to the Canadian government through the tax agency CRA, or otherwise directly to Parliament if they had been established as an Act of Parliament.\textsuperscript{159} The majority of the organisations were governed as charities responsible to the CRA, which maintains online records about the organisations including their annual filings. Meanwhile, each of the organisations produce some form of reports or accounts of their projects, which might be available to the public, and generally list some form of information on their websites about their OPT activities.

Specific reports for the projects interviewees mentioned were not available with consistency across the organisations. In some cases entire organisations were forced closed by the government of Canada while I was conducting research on them, an important part of the narrative of this research study, rendering

\textsuperscript{158} Hollway and Jefferson, \textit{Doing Qualitative Research Differently}, 32.
\textsuperscript{159} The Aid Transparency Index in 2012 gave Canada a low ranking, even lower in the transparency ranking than USAID and nearly half that of Britain’s DFID. ‘2012 Aid Transparency Index’ (Publish What You Fund, n.d.), http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/index/2012-index/. 
records unavailable. In other cases like Organisations 3 and 8, they did not have project reports readily available. Many of the projects, such as at Organisations 1 and 6, were stopped prematurely due to government interference. So while I did receive a few detailed project reports to compare and contrast with interviews, such as from Organisations 4 and 7, they comprise an imperfect record on their own, yet remain useful tools for cross-checking interviews when combined with other records. That is also perfectly fine because the point of this research study is not to try to measure the effectiveness of specific projects, but to look at the overall experiences structurally of Canadian organisations trying to run OPT aid projects.

Meanwhile, project reports in aid work have themselves to be approached with a great deal of caution. Just because they are written in a structured manner does not accrue toward them any greater value than interviews. When dealing with any form of documentation I bore in mind that documents are ‘social facts’ that are produced, shared and used in socially organised ways. For, ‘Text is context - at once both produced by and productive of the whole social world’.  

They are not transparent representations of organisational routines, decision-making processes or professional diagnoses. Every document is written or produced by someone in a specific context and for a particular purpose, and for aid reporting generally that is typically connected to ensuring current and future funding. 

For reasons of funding aid organisations create optimistic reports advertising their successes while glossing over shortcomings.  

As such we should not use documentary sources as surrogates for other kinds of data, where in the case of this research project the primary data are the interviews. When projects are deemed successful that encourages further funding, helping keep staff

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162 That glossing over also takes account for removing material that could be considered political sensitive. For example, within their research into child protection in the OPT, Hart and Lo Forte discovered that several interviewees declared that the original reports are edited subsequently to remove material deemed too politically sensitive. One agency official stated: ‘unfortunately the oPt MRM reports tend to get quite heavily edited in New York. I am not sure if this occurs at the level of UNICEF HQ or at the SRSG’s office or both. The result is a somewhat watered down or sanitised version of the original. Hart and Forte, ‘Mandated to Fail?’, 638.

employed. It is at that moment that an NGO becomes a business enterprise, with entire organisations being dependent on successful projects to remain funded. This impacts not just on an NGO’s employees, but their beneficiaries and even original granting bodies that need to show they are funding successful works. To show success CEOs and project coordinators need to present projects socially,

Development success is not merely a question of measures of performance; it is also about how particular interpretations are made and sustained socially. It is not just about what a project does, but also how and to whom it speaks, who can be made to believe in it.164

This reality encourages aid organisations to control the message produced by their staff for fear of bad commendations that could sabotage their efforts to make a project look successful. Thus, it is fair to by wary that an aid organisation’s data will be predisposed to tell ‘happy’ stories, while suppressing more contentious ones.165 Further, although most documents can provide a fixed record of something that happened in a particular time, as with any document in any context it is not unheard of for histories to be rewritten, and some electronic documents are more easily subject to alteration or deletion than paper documents.166 Authors regularly rewrite history.167

So it was borne in mind when interviewing employees working on aid projects that their professional careers can be put on the line by being identified in a frank interview. In addition, there is an even greater reluctance in Canada to share too much information about Palestinian aid projects, owing to oppression by the Canadian government, detailed in Chapters 5 through 9. In that case presenting a successful Palestinian aid project in Canada may also bizarrely include keeping it unseen, operating quietly, hidden from pro-Israel advocates at elite levels in Canadian government, public and private institutions. Documents produced by Canadian agencies closely linked to the government were approached with particular caution, bearing in mind that the Canadian

164 Mosse, Cultivating Development, 2005, 158.
165 Matthews and Ross, Research Methods, 287.
166 Ibid., 277.
government may not want them to disclose information it fears could generate bad press.

Finally, when documents are used, for this period of study and type of work electronic documents were particularly helpful. As Matthews and Ross point out, electronic documents have particular uses.\textsuperscript{168} They are readily available and provide copious amounts of information. Despite concerns about alterations, they still provide, in general, a static glimpse into a particular time. Since they are socially constructed, that means they can also tell us more than just the data and information they contain, particularly when used as a crosscheck against the interviews. So while the focus in social research may often be placed on the factual content within a document, I emphasise being cognisant of the why and how of its production, in a particular style or form and its specific context.

The Organisations and Interviewees

A brief description of each of the project coordinators, their organisations and projects they funded follows. The projects listed are not a comprehensive list of their respective organisations’ activities in the research period, but rather are highlighted by the attention the coordinators gave to them in their interviews and their relevance to the research study. It is worth noting that the project coordinators at times funded partners funded by another organisation from Canada I interviewed, either concurrently and/or at a different point in time. Further, in some cases an organisation or interviewee worked on only one specific project in the study period, while some worked on several.

\textsuperscript{168} Matthews and Ross, Research Methods, 278.
Human Rights and Advocacy

Organisation 1

Organisation 1 had for decades worked specifically in advocacy for human rights at the national and international level. Typical of Canada’s neoliberal approach to foreign policy, they advocated human rights from the perspective of an international agreement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet they did this while emphasising what they said was as a Canadian perspective, which meant projecting Canadian normative values and soft power abroad in the process.

The organisation received government funding to cover its budget, but was meant to operate at arm’s length from government. It was a relatively large organisation with typically more than 40 staff and a budget in the millions of dollars. I interviewed two project coordinators working at Organisation 1, Ash and Emory, who oversaw aid projects as project coordinators in the OPT.

Emory’s work began prior to the study period, and laid the foundation for projects during it. He/she began working in the OPT in the early 1990s up until the mid-2000s. The primary projects he/she oversaw began based on a field visit to the OPT just prior to Oslo seeking out projects to fund, and partners to work with. They included: (1) a human rights centre in Gaza, (2) a Palestinian women’s legal aid clinic in east Jerusalem, (3) an Israeli human rights organisation made up primarily of medical professionals and a (4) project at an Israeli human rights organisation where women were tasked with mapping out the demolition of Palestinian homes. Emory also funded during his/her period of work: (5) a Jerusalem-based women’s organisation established between two organisations, one Israeli and one Palestinian, as a dialogue peace building initiative addressing women’s issues, and (briefly) a (6) Palestinian human rights organisation based in the West Bank. There were other smaller projects Emory mentioned funding, which were kept small specifically and often hidden inside broader programmes in order to avoid attracting attention from Organisation 1’s Board of Directors because it included hostile pro-Israel

\[169\] At one point it used government funding to sustain a project supporting a network of Canadian NGOs that lobbied the Canadian government on international human rights.

\[170\] Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 3min01s to 6min59s The 1980s and 1990s were a time Emory felt Canadian NGOs were becoming important politically.
advocates. The projects Emory funded, and also contacts he/she established, provided a basis for some of the later projects run by Ash. One of them, the Palestinian human rights organisation in the West Bank would lead to serious problems at Organisation 1 when funded by Ash.

Ash began around 2005 to take over OPT project coordination from Emory. He/she said that role entailed at first winding down funding for a hotline a Palestinian human rights group had set-up to monitor abuses carried out by Israeli settlers in the OPT. Ash’s work primarily entailed looking after a number of small grants, typically lying between $5,000 to $10,000, that were repeatedly renewed for OPT initiatives, such as: (1) a peace house run by a women’s group in a Palestinian village in the northern West Bank, and (2) a Christian society that carried out advocacy on behalf of Palestinians whose homes were being demolished. The biggest project he/she managed was a three-year $60,000 social justice project run by an OPT youth education organisation from 2007 onwards.171

The final projects he/she funded were three small grants meant to document human rights violations, carried out by either Palestinians or Israelis, following the Israeli ‘Operation Cast Lead’ bombardment of Gaza in late 2008/ early 2009. 172 Those grants were made to: (1) a Palestinian human rights organisation based in Gaza, (2) a Palestinian human rights organisation based in the West Bank (funded previously in the 1990s by Emory), and (3) an Israeli human rights organisation. These would become very important projects to Organisation 1, not because of the projects themselves, but for the ‘civil war’ it would spark between the staff and Board.

For the two Palestinian partners the plan was to equip researchers at each organisation to conduct research documenting human rights abuses reported in Gaza, which included hiring some additional staff. Wherever there had been alleged violations, those researchers were meant to go out and make sure those violations really took place and to document them in a ‘professional way’, triangulating allegations against available evidence.173 Meanwhile, the Israeli

171 That sum was just small enough not to require approval from the Board of Directors, consistent with a strategy at the organisation to quietly fund Palestinian human rights projects in spite their having a Board that was hostile towards Palestinian rights work.
172 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 01min00sec to 03min57sec
173 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 18min10sec to 22min00sec
human rights organisation was meant to hire a European military expert to enter Gaza to corroborate the use by Israel of phosphorous bombs.\textsuperscript{174} Those bombs are an incendiary weapon the burns on contact with skin and is illegal under international law when used in densely packed civilian areas.\textsuperscript{175} However, the European expert was denied entry to Gaza by both Israel and Egypt.\textsuperscript{176} So instead that organisation used the funds for various activities in Israel, hiring as many as twenty people and training them to cross-reference human rights violations.\textsuperscript{177}

Ash was interviewed on 2014 March 21\textsuperscript{st} (Ash 1) and 2014 March 22\textsuperscript{nd} (Ash 2, Ash 3). Emory was interviewed 2012 March 22\textsuperscript{nd}.

**Organisation 2**

Organisation 2 is a small Canadian registered charity run nearly exclusively by volunteers in Canada, which typically worked on a small annual budget in the $10,000s. Its primary aim was to educate Canadians about the Middle East, and Arab World through research and advocacy, as well as to undertake development projects in the region that varied from rights work to capacity building and poverty reduction. Organisation 2 claims to have been the first NGO to concern itself with education and human rights in and about the Middle East.

Their research and advocacy funding to educate Canadians about the Middle East included: (1) cross-Canada speaking tours educating people about Israel, Palestine and the occupation, as well as (2) research projects about Israel and Palestine. They also funded projects such as: (3) an organisation that advocated against the demolition of Palestinian homes, starting with mapping out their destruction, and which Emory had in the 1990s funded a women’s project at; (4) a Palestinian health organisation in the OPT; (5) start-up funding for a youth education organisation, which Ash would later fund a social justice

\textsuperscript{174} This Israeli partner working in the OPT needed to keep maintain a low profile in Gaza, which included keeping their existing channels secret to protect the identities of the Palestinian researchers it would hire.

\textsuperscript{175} ‘Rain of Fire’ (Human Rights Watch, 25 March 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/81760.

\textsuperscript{176} 18min10sec to 22min00sec

\textsuperscript{177} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 35min09sec to 36min24sec
project with; a (6) Gaza-based community mental health programme; and (7) an institute for public health located at a major West Bank university. The funds they provided were small, but used strategically with projects often acting as a seed fund to help a larger initiative get underway. They only rarely received government funding, though as a charity the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) regulated them.\textsuperscript{178}

I interviewed two project coordinators, volunteers who had worked with the organisation. One of the interviewees, Ryan, began work with Organisation 2 in the late 1980s, just prior to its official establishment. Ryan was well known in his/her community among family physicians due to work he/she had done with Latin American refugee victims of torture. He/she was invited by Organisation 2’s founding Chairperson to work with the charity, and they worked closely together over the proceeding two decades. Ryan counted among his/her successes helping Palestinian partner organisations get established, particularly the Gaza-based mental health programme. The other interviewee, Casey, was more engaged with educational aspects of the organisation in Canada and played a key role seeing through a difficult transition period following the 2006 death of their Chairperson.

Ryan was interviewed on 2014 December 2\textsuperscript{nd}. Casey was interviewed 2014 November 20\textsuperscript{th}.

\textbf{Organisation 3}

Organisation 3 is a medium-sized charity with typically fewer than 40 staff and a budget that generally sat around several million dollars per year, but bearing in mind that it faced a major funding cut of a few millions dollars in government grants late in the research period that will play an important part in the story of Canadian aid uncovered in the empirical chapters of this thesis. Although the organisation itself was only founded at the start of the study period out of a coalition of organisations, its work predates the study period having been

\textsuperscript{178} Not long after being founded they got a relatively large grant from CIDA in 1991/1992, but this was a rare case of government funding for them.
carried out by some of the organising members. Further, it operates under the charitable registration of one of the larger organising members.

Organisation 3’s global focus in development is advocacy work promoting a progressive agenda covering issues such as the environment, women’s equality and notably to defend human rights. When carrying out advocacy work they considering lobbying and holding the Canadian government accountable to be in their agenda. While their focus is on rights work in the OPT, they did find themselves on occasion being drawn into capacity building and poverty reduction in their projects.

Organisation 3 worked with a number of partners in Israel and the OPT. As a general rule they try to find partners who are working systemically in human rights and advocacy for social change. Partners they worked with ran projects covering issues such as: women’s rights, conflict resolution and human rights. Many of their projects were run with financial support from CIDA. They included: (1) human rights training) (2) media training, (3) women’s health for refugees in Gaza, (4) water resource development in the West Bank, (5) youth and civic engagement, and (6) community mobilisation addressing the West Bank wall. The human rights training project was carried out with a women’s organisation run by both Israeli and Palestinian women, which was a long-time partner Organisation 3 was particularly supportive of, and which Emory and Organisation 1 had funded in the 1990s. Their health work in Gaza included funding for a time a health clinic that was bombed and destroyed by Israel in 2009 January during Operation Cast Lead. Their support for projects and partners in the OPT could come from several different internal organisational programmes.

At Organisation 3 I interviewed two project coordinators who had overseen OPT projects, Remy and Taylor. Remy had begun work more recently on the OPT starting in 2009. Taylor on the other hand worked on the OPT off-and-on for the organisation, and a predecessor organisation, for about two decades. He/she had a particular concern for gender justice regarding women’s rights, peace and security. Both Taylor and the organisation are particularly concerned with gender justice and at one point used CIDA money to fund a coalition of women’s peace organisations working on economic justice, including
conducting research on where Israeli products are produced. That research provided data on what was produced in settlements, which has informed campaigns concerned with moral investment in Israel and Palestine, such as the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS).

Remy was interviewed on 2014 August 28th. Taylor was interviewed on 2014 September 4th.

**Organisation 4**

Organisation 4 is a medium sized charity with well under 40 staff and a budget that ranged from highs of a few million dollars to lows of several hundred thousand dollars per year, with the lows being linked like for Organisation 3 to a major government funding cut that plays an important part in this research study. The global focus for organisation 4 is advocacy work for human, environmental and democratic rights. Projects they have funded in the OPT included funding a: (1) teacher centre in the OPT that carried out quite a few citizenship projects at West Bank schools, support for (2) an alternative media centre largely by placing interns, and (3) from 2001 onwards running two Canadian government funded women and family empowerment centres. This third project dominated my research interview and was a major project that involved CIDA, a PA Ministry and another Canadian NGO linked to the post-secondary sector. Notably prior to 2000 they had also helped fund the establishment up a well-known Palestinian civil society network.

The initial aim of the project in Gaza was to fund two Centres in Gaza, ‘to empower low-income women and their families in the Gaza Strip, enabling them to improve their economic conditions and enhance their standard of living’.\(^\text{179}\) In spite of Organisation 4’s focus on rights advocacy, the project was very much oriented towards capacity building and poverty reduction. The interviewee from Organisation 4, Hayden described its aim as,

> To create more significant and empowering opportunities for vulnerable women and their families, through the provision of training and other

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\(^{179}\) FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 12)
development initiatives, and to strengthen the capacity of the PA Ministry … to manage such initiatives.\textsuperscript{180}

Organisation 4 would carry out the hiring process and help run the project. After a certain number of years the project was supposed to be transferred back to the Palestinian Ministry.\textsuperscript{181} Close to 85,000 people benefited from the different activities in this programme, and from this number over 90% were women.\textsuperscript{182}

I interviewed Hayden on 2014 August 27\textsuperscript{th}.

\textbf{Capacity-Building and Poverty Reduction}

\textbf{Organisation 5}

Organisation 5 is the case of an organisation I interviewed that worked on only one specific project in the OPT during the study period. It is also the rare case in this list of an organisation that was approached by the Canadian government, through Foreign Affairs and CIDA, to design and put in a bid on a specific-type of project that the then Martin Liberal government identified for the OPT.

Organisation 5 is connected to a Canadian university. The single project coordinator interviewed, Kim, said that they had been approached in 2005 by Foreign Affairs to do a feasibility study about running a 'rule of law' project in the West Bank and Gaza. Organisation 5 proposed working on a project with a Palestinian partner, also connected to a Palestinian university, whose aim would be to develop a new model of judicial education for the OPT.\textsuperscript{183} That would include promoting the principals of an independence of the judiciary and the idea that human rights should be intrinsic to justice in the PA system. This would be carried out by training a core group of Palestinian judges and judicial trainers, who would then disseminate their training into a network of Palestinian judges.\textsuperscript{184} The project was accepted and granted several million-dollars through

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hayden (2014 August 27) 33min03s to 33min24s
\item Hayden (2014 August 27) 22min51s to 27min10s
\item FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 7)
\item In these situations Foreign Affairs could rely on the government Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to provide the funding.
\item DOC 1 CIDA 2012 Organisation 5
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
CIDA, running from 2005 to 2012 with a lot of pauses due for political reasons that are important to the story uncovered in this thesis.

In spite of the budget size that was more significant than some of the total operational budgets of organisations on this list, Organisation 5 ran the project efficiently with a very small staff of just several people in Canada. Further, even though Organisation 5 was technically the lead organisation in the project, they insisted that their Palestinian partner be considered an equal co-partner. With that co-partner, Organisation 5 adopted a group approach where Palestinian judges worked with experts on specific subject matter to develop their own educational materials, training themselves and then training their colleagues. They also took advice from the Canadian judges in their training development. Those Canadian judges were volunteers, not paid experts, further keeping Canadian staffing costs down.

I interviewed Kim on 2014 August 7th.

**Organisation 6**

Organisation 6 is, like Organisation 1, a development organisation that receives government funding, but meant to operate with independence at arm's-length from government. It is a relatively large organisation with over 40 staff and a budget in the range of tens-of-millions of dollars. It is a development organisation that specifically carries out research in order to improve lives and livelihoods in poorer countries. As such, it has had a history of engagement with the Arab world and the OPT specifically.

I interviewed two project coordinators at Organisation 6. One of those interviewees, Jamie, had nearly two decades of experience working on OPT projects at Organisation 6. The projects he/she listed managing included two that began in the 1990s, which (1) supported Canada’s role in the multilateral negotiations of the Oslo Peace Process, including the Track II process, and (2) helped fund Canada’s role as gavel in the Refugee Working Group (RWG). Their contribution to Track II included thinking about solutions for Palestinian refugees, with the idea that offering technical details to inform policy could
contribute to a solution for Palestinian refugees, and peace. Organisation 6 further contributed to the process of thinking out policy solutions by funding a project that quantified all of the assets of settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem, should a two state solution be reached through the Oslo Process and the settlements evacuated in a process of decolonisation.

Other Palestinian aid projects Organisation 6 supported included (3) research from 2004 onward into Islamist political parties in the Arab world, in order to anticipate what would happen to those parties once they joined the formal political process and where Hamas in the OPT was a case study. Another (4) project involving CIDA with some other donors was a university scholarship programme run from 2001 to 2013 for Palestinian women refugees in Lebanon, which placed in excess of 200 students in a wide variety of subject areas. All of the projects were funded jointly by Organisation 6 with CIDA, and all were defunded by 2014, the reason of which will be explained in the empirical chapters. Only remnants of the RWG work continued thanks to external funding.

A final OPT aid project (5) of note for Organisation 6 was one carried out with a respected Palestinian research institute meant to look at electoral strategies used by Palestinian citizens in Israel, ranging from Islamist abstention to mainstream attempts to become a political force. The idea was to analyse the impact of the different strategies and then to provide suggestions on how to make the Israeli system more democratic, based on underlying knowledge that Palestinian citizens are marginalised by discrimination. Even though the project was not run with the OPT directly in mind it will figure prominently in the interviews of both coordinators Jamie and the second interviewee, Alexis.

The second interviewee, Alexis, worked on this final project for nearly two years before it was eventually cancelled through government interference and complaints from Israel. Prior to that Alexis had spent nearly a decade at the organisation working on peace, conflict and development, often in the Middle East region. OPT-specific research projects he/she worked on included

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185 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 09min51s to 11min40s
186 Jamie says that Foreign Affairs during the Harper Conservative government lost interest in Canada’s long-standing policy support work for a two-state solution, even eliminating Canada’s position as gavel in the RWG in 2009/2010. Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 00min00s to 04min20s
democratisation, governance, psychosocial support for adolescents, the impact of checkpoints, and Palestinian movement between Ramallah and Jerusalem.


**Organisation 7**

Organisation 7 was another organisation linked, like Organisation 5, to a Canadian university. The organisation typically had a budget of a couple million dollars every year, but like Organisation 5 had only several paid staff in Canada. The lion’s share of the budget went toward partner NGOs, sustaining a network that connected those partners together and funding a fellowship programme that was intrinsic to capacity building for the partners.

As with Organisation 5, Organisation 7 worked on just one Palestinian aid project. That project began in the late 1990s and was specifically designed in a way meant to contribute to the Oslo model of development for peace, but incorporating into it a strong rights advocacy element aiming to reduce social inequality. This included specifically helping marginalised people to fight for their economic rights, social rights and for services from government. In this way the work of Organisation 7 was overtly political, including because it encouraged Israeli and Palestinian NGOs in its network to work together addressing rights issues.

That network was made up of community NGOs engaged in social work from the OPT, Jordan and Israel. Organisation 7 set up the network as part of the development project. The work carried out by the NGOs ranged from legal rights to home rehabilitation, youth education, youth empowerment, domestic abuse, care and access for the disabled and elderly, referral services, public education and government policy research. This was all done with the ultimate aim of furthering both individual and community empowerment.\(^{187}\) By the end of

187 DOC 1 2015 Organisation 7
the study period the NGOs in the network were reaching upwards of 120,000 people per year in the communities they were working in.\textsuperscript{188}

In order to help partner NGOs carry such work out, Organisation 7 engaged in capacity building by training. The interviewees claimed that this training could be valued approximately at $100,000 per individual, which consisted of their enrolling for two-years in graduate school for training at the university Organisation 7 was connected to in Canada. The second year of the training consisted of a paid placement at the partner NGO each participant came from. Further, each participant had a contract stating that if he/she was offered a job by the sending NGO, he/she had to accept the contract for a period of between two to four years, depending on the location.\textsuperscript{189} By the summer of 2014 some 50 individuals had graduated from the programme and returned to their home NGO, providing those NGOs with highly trained staff in addition to the free staff year in that second year of training. Historically Organisation 7 had relied on government CIDA funding for the project. However, that funding dried up toward the end of the research period under the Harper Conservative government.

I interviewed two of the project coordinators working at Organisation 7. Each of the coordinators I interviewed, Quinn and Kai, had over a decade’s worth of experience working at the organisation. Kai meanwhile had several decades of experience in social work and community organising, having been a civil rights activist as early as the 1960s in the US and in Israel.\textsuperscript{190} Kai said that his/her parents were Holocaust survivors and had taught him/her a message, ‘never again to anybody’ at a time he/she describes when most of kids in the Holocaust community were taught, ‘never again to us’.\textsuperscript{191} Kai’s interethnic community work in Canada, after the US and Israel, allowed him/her to test out concepts combining individual assistance with community organising (structural) that would become a core element to Organisation 7’s Palestinian aid work.\textsuperscript{192}
I interviewed Quinn on 2014 September 5th. I interviewed Kai on 2012 March 26th.

**Organisation 8**

Organisation 8 is a charity with just several staff in Canada and a budget that ranged from the hundreds-of-thousands to lows of tens-of-thousands of dollars. It carried out both development and humanitarian projects overseas for Palestinians since the 1980s. This work was done with local partners primarily in the OPT and Lebanon.

I interviewed just one project coordinator, Sawyer, at Organisation 8. Sawyer had around three decades of experience in Palestinian aid at Organisation 8. He/she said Organisation 8 had run quite a number of projects over three decades. That included a series of community development projects during the height of the Peace Process in the 1990s, such as: (1) training projects, (2) projects that sought to raise awareness among Palestinians about certain issues, (3) eradicating violence among the youth, (4) multi-media projects, (5) funding improvements at medical clinics and hospitals, (5) renovation projects, (6) helping establish organisations that dealt with the psychological consequences of occupation, (7) supporting groups from Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Palestine to work together on the rights of children, and (8) education projects. During the 2000s their focus shifted to the needs of children, including: (9) renovating maternities, (10) teaching swimming safety in Gaza, and (11) helping a specific community NGO in Gaza to expand their activities. The activities of that Gazan NGO included children’s literacy and women’s embroidery, as well as building children’s playgrounds in the OPT.

Funding projects from the early 1980s onwards, their approach was in the early years predicated on providing core funding for Palestinian partners, rather than funding a specific project. That evolved during the 1990s when they began to fund specific projects run by partners. By the 2000s they were taking both approaches, while also fundraising for the occasional emergency humanitarian aid projects.

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(2012 March 26) 10min38s to 10min59s Kai made several derogatory comments about political science and people from the Prairies provinces of Canada, which were clearly at myself.
I interviewed Sawyer on 2012 March 23rd.

**Organisation 9**

Organisation 9 is a large charity with more than 40 employees and an annual budget in the tens-of-millions of dollars. It is dedicated to poverty reduction primarily through development work, but sometimes including humanitarian work. Its aid projects in the OPT included capacity building by placing Canadian volunteers at Palestinian partner organisations. That project was the only focus of research for this case. This project was Canadian government backed, receiving a CIDA grant of nearly $1.5 million for a five-year phase from the mid-2000s onward.\(^{193}\) Meanwhile, the organisation itself received a Canadian government grant of several tens-of-millions of dollars between 2009 and 2014, where the OPT was specifically listed as one of the main regions Organisation 9 worked in, using up between 5 to 10 per cent of that funding.\(^{194}\)

I interviewed one project coordinator at Organisation 9, Morgan. He/she was very experienced in the development aid sector, having nearly two decades of experience in it. He/she was just one of several people who filled the project coordinator function for this specific project at Organisation 9, working on it from 2009 to 2012. Uniquely, he/she was the only project coordinator I interviewed who worked out of the OPT itself, unlike the rest who were based in Canada and only occasionally traveled to the OPT.\(^{195}\)

The primary aim of the capacity building and poverty reduction project was the reinforcement of the capacity of four PNGO partners. Two Canadian volunteers were supposed to be placed at each partner, where they essentially worked as an extra employee. Those partners included an organisation that would provide loans to women who wanted to become small entrepreneurs, a health PNGO based at a major university, a PNGO providing local capacity reinforcement (mostly in the Jordan valley) and a water NGO. A fifth PNGO partner was dropped at the start of Morgan’s placement, because its focus was in rights advocacy work. Cancelling the project because it advocated rights is an

\(^{193}\) Doc 1 CIDA 2011 Organisation 9  
\(^{194}\) Doc 2 Canada Government 2014 Organisation 9  
\(^{195}\) Morgan surmised theirs was the biggest Canadian aid presence in that period.
important part of Organisation 9’s part in this research study. This also ended a rights advocacy element that sometimes snuck into this capacity building project. Of note, in addition to the volunteer placements, Organisation 9 would also finance small projects at partner PNGOs.

I interviewed Morgan on 2014 December 15th (Morgan 1) and 2014 December 18th (Morgan 2).

**Organisation 10**

Organisation 10 was a charity that had an annual budget typically in the millions of dollars, though sometimes exceeding ten million dollars. Like Organisations 5 and 7, Organisation 10 had just several staff in Canada, expending most of their budget overseas on capacity building and poverty reduction projects. Organisation 10 focused almost exclusively on development aid as the interviewees said the organisation specifically avoided humanitarian projects.\(^{196}\)

Meanwhile the interviewees made a point to state repeatedly that their work was completely apolitical, which will play an important part of the story for their case within this research study.

Organisation 10 had a strong base in the Muslim community in Canada, though it was officially not a religious organisation. I interviewed two project coordinators at Organisation 10, Blake and Dallas. Both coordinators had worked at the organisation through the 2000s. While Organisation 10 supported development projects around the world, many of them were carried out in the OPT. In the OPT, Organisation 10 was particularly interested in funding health and education projects, as well as some economic development projects. Unusually the economic projects were more like solidarity projects, not concerned with earning back money leant out, but rather with keeping people occupied to maintain their skills and support their families. This is because Organisation 10 considered the process of implementation and keeping people engaged with activities to be as important as project outcomes themselves.

\(^{196}\) My review of those activities suggests that some of them might technically be considered humanitarian, such as help feeding poorer people or providing Ramadan packages. However, the line between developmental and humanitarian is never exact in aid work, and in particular for the story of Palestinian aid. Calendar 1 2012 Organisation 10
Some of Organisation 10’s projects in the OPT included: (1) sponsoring several thousand orphans to stay with families; (2) scholarships and bursaries given to over two hundred students by 2011; (3) helping universities run projects; (4) contributing toward the construction of an United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) administered girl’s school in the West Bank costing over $1 million; (5) seasonal projects such as helping needy students during Ramadan; (6) support for senior citizens through a partner PNGO; (7) food support for the poor; (8) providing advanced medial equipment to clinics and hospitals; (9) small economic projects of $3,000 to $6,000 for families meant to keep them busy, employed and off the street, without requiring repayment; and (10) employing over a hundred women in sewing and embroidery to provide them with economic security and dignity.

I interviewed both Blake and Dallas on 2012 March 30th.

Before looking though at their experiences providing development aid in the OPT, the following two chapters will provide context for the environment they were entering (the OPT) and working from (Canada).
CHAPTER 4 – Context of Aid: Oslo and an Investment in Peace

Introduction

More than $USD 23 billion in aid has been disbursed in the OPT since Oslo was signed in 1993.\(^\text{197}\) Between 2000 and 2012 alone there were 13,714 Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects registered in the West Bank and Gaza, of which $USD 10,333,275,524 was spent and $USD 19,006,868,237 pledged, all placing the West Bank and Gaza in the top 20 of 154 ODA recipients for that period.\(^\text{198}\) The largest proportion of Oslo aid has been disbursed through three multilateral, international organisations: UNRWA, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Bank.\(^\text{199}\)

The US has acted as the arbiter determining the political parameters of the Peace Process and how aid is disbursed. It is also one of the largest single donors to Palestinians. The US has given more than $USD 4 billion in bilateral aid to the OPT since the mid-1990s: on average $USD 70 million per year from 1994 to 1999, $USD 170 million per year from 2000 to 2007 and $USD 600 million per year from 2008 to 2012.\(^\text{200}\) The US is also the single largest donor to the UNRWA at more than $USD 4 billion since its establishment in 1950.\(^\text{201}\)

The EU is the biggest Western donor to Palestinians, providing €426 million in 2013 alone.\(^\text{202}\) The EU has in particular been aiming build up the PA’s institutions for a future ‘democratic, independent and viable Palestinian State living side-by-side with Israel in peace and security’.\(^\text{203}\) Differences exist between the EU and US approaches to Oslo aid, particularly because the EU is

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\(^{199}\) Hever, Political Economy of Aid to Palestinians Under Occupation, 20.


\(^{201}\) Ibid., 2.


not as close an ally to Israel as the US. The EU is much more likely than the US to reference international law when dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the EU tends to be much less involved than the US on security issues. While the US has negotiated its aid programme for the Palestinians through Israel, the EU has not; and while the EU has supported the PA with direct budgetary assistance, the US has only done so only in exceptional circumstances due to Congressional restrictions. As a result of EU support for the PA from 2008 to 2012 the average number of civil servants and pensioners whose salaries were at least partly paid by the EU rose from 75,502 to 84,320, approximately half the PA’s 170,000 civil servants and pensioners in 2014.

Substantial aid has also flowed in from other Western donors including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. But while these donors and the EU have contributed the largest sum of Palestinian aid funding, it is the US that has determined politically how it is spent within the Peace Process. That aid has helped underwrite the practical costs of Palestinian self-rule and provided the Palestinian leadership with the means to cultivate domestic support. Since the aim of those international donors was to engender economic growth to foster peace, there is now fairly broad agreement in the research literature that this has failed.

Contrary to peace, Israeli settlement building and confiscation of Palestinian land accelerated after Oslo was signed, and Israeli policies of closure limited the ability of Palestinians to enter Israel or move freely inside the OPT. Closure directly contravened the spirit of Oslo, and started almost right after the Peace Process began. It is a primary reason the OPT economy sharply declined.

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after 1993, as it caused an enormous reduction in the number of work remittances sent to the OPT as fewer Palestinians could work in Israel. The loss of income was exacerbated by Israel's sabotage of Palestinian trade and industry. Further, Israeli settlement building broke up OPT territorial integrity, fragmented ever further into isolated communities that by 2012 were governed by rival Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank, and Israel in East Jerusalem.

MAP 1: Decline in Palestinian Territory 1947, 1960, 2015


The combination of closure and settlement building has terminally fractured the Palestinian economy, with its best parts picked at by a voraciously hungry Israeli economy. As a result Palestinians have come to depend heavily, if not completely, on foreign aid for survival. Funds coming into the OPT from aid sustain the PA, pay salaries and purchase basic goods – which come from Israel, thereby enriching the oppressor further.  

While the post-Oslo Palestinian economy has declined, Israel has enjoyed robust growth.  

As described in Chapter 2, there exists a deep rift between the way Western donors want to perceive Israeli-Palestinian relations, and the reality of settler-colonialism. Due to the government of Israel’s pursuit of settler-colonialism, something donors prefer to turn a blind eye toward, Israel and the Palestinians have never moved beyond the interim stages of the Peace Process. That interim stage only brought about some cosmetic changes to an occupation that began in earnest when the OPT was conquered in 1967. Worse, Israel has been able better to maintain its policy thanks in large part to Western donors aid has subsidising the costs of occupation while the Peace Process serves as a metaphorical smokescreen obscuring Israel’s settler-colonial policies of ethnic cleansing and apartheid. 

Even when donors claim that their development aid is non-political, it is an established fact that all aid becomes a political participant to any conflict it is exposed to. This is notable in the case of Israel and the OPT for the way in which Israel has been able to capitalise on aid to subsidise the costs of settler-colonialism. Meanwhile, most Western donors and their policy makers clearly favour of Israel, in spite of their stated neutrality. They blame the Palestinians disproportionately for violence, but largely ignore Israel’s role as the aggressor occupying Palestinian land that mostly ignored its Oslo obligations. It is that favouritism that ultimately undermines donor attempts at peace building.

Read Hever, *The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation*.

Read Anderson, *Do No Harm*.
**Neoliberal Development Plan**

**The Rationale behind Palestinian Aid**

Western donors have been trying to foster peace between Israelis and Palestinians by offering them economic incentives to cooperate together. Contrary to occasional rhetoric, that cooperation was not meant to be one of interdependence between equals, but at its best uneven mutual dependence, an asymmetrical relationship of interdependence. 212 Within such an asymmetrical system Israel would retain a preponderance of power vis-à-vis the Palestinians, but it was assumed at least each side would benefit from cooperation, and ultimately this was expected to lead to peace as they decided they had more to gain from trade than conflict.

In order to get the Palestinians to buy into the Peace Process, Western donors planned to purchase their support with funding to spur Palestinian economic development and provide Palestinians with public goods, labelled a ‘peace dividend’. 213 This was not a novel idea, and had precedent in US Middle East policy. Already in the 1970s the US had been using aid as a way to try separately to buy peace in the Middle East, while simultaneously providing Israel with assurances for its own security. 214 This was a neoliberal ‘security exchange’ where the US was willing to provide different actors in the Middle East with ‘alternative goods’ that would replace concessions the other side was unwilling to offer, and was successful at establishing peace between Egypt and Israel from the late 1970s onwards. 215

While the US Carter administration explicitly left Palestinian rights out from peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt in the late 1970s, it did attempt a ‘depoliticised’ solution to the Palestinian question in 1978 by adopting policy premised on the idea that ‘happy’ Palestinians who had a job, steady employment and a functioning administrative structure would be willing to negotiate for a settlement, even under Israeli occupation. 216

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212 Nye, ‘Soft Power’, 1 October 1990, 158.
215 Ibid.
In the 1980s the US Reagan Administration further attempted to find a peace solution palatable both to Israel and the Palestinians by promoting economic issues in lieu of a political settlement. First proposed as a ‘Quality of Life’ initiative in 1983-4, the US attempted to promote political reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians through economic inducements that were, in theory, separated from politics. The Reagan Administration was attempting to make occupation palatable enough for Palestinians to accept it. That initiative was coached in a type of technocratic jargon that would come to dominate the discourse on Palestinian development a decade later. The Quality of Life initiative was tabled because at the time Israel was wary that any Palestinian economic development would embolden their bid for independence. The initiative failed to gain traction with Palestinians who feared any agreement made without a political resolution would reinforce Israel’s occupation. Palestinians were wary that it was a political ploy meant to substitute economics for peace. Despite dual rejection the logic behind the initiative of trying to separate politics from development survived in US policy circles,

Economics may be politics in the West Bank and Gaza, but the American government can and should attempt to separate the two for policy purposes.

Further, through the Carter and Reagan administrations onwards a connection between aid, development and peace became entrenched determining the way aid would always be disbursed in the OPT.

That Quality of Life initiative had basically been the Reagan Administration’s attempt to maintain the status quo in Israel and the OPT during the 1980s. This changed after the First Intifada erupted in late 1987, when ‘preserving peace’ rather than maintaining the status quo suddenly became the US’ overriding concern. Palestinians were at that time successfully challenging Israel at a mass level, particularly through street demonstrations and confrontations with the Israeli army, but also through economic boycotts of Israeli goods, jobs and

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219 Ibid., 36.
tax payments; all of which had a major impact on Israel’s economy.\textsuperscript{221} Israel responded to Palestinian protests with a policy of ‘force, might, and beatings’, curfews, closing Palestinian institutions, house demolitions, and the arrest of thousands.\textsuperscript{222}

In contrast to the US’ efforts to maintain the status quo in the OPT, after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the early 1980s to target the PLO, wealthy Palestinians had increased funding for Palestinian resistance (\textit{sumud}). Meanwhile, the First Intifada had had disastrous consequences for Israel’s economy and international reputation. That led elements of the Israeli government to conclude that ending the uprising should be a top priority. That finally opened Israel up to the US-led approach of buying peace, which Israel had previously rejected, to contain the Palestinian uprising. This led to Oslo, where the US and its Western allies reintroduced the logic of the ‘Quality of Life’ and ‘happy Palestinian’ initiatives. This formed the philosophical rationale behind the World Bank’s \textit{An Investment in Peace} development aid plan written in 1993, meant to improve the Palestinian standard of living as a ‘peace dividend’ to encourage them to participate in the Oslo Process.\textsuperscript{223} That plan became the basis upon which pledging started for Palestinians at the very first donor conference in October 1993.\textsuperscript{224}

The Aid Model

That World Bank development plan acts as guide for major bilateral donors disbursing aid in the OPT to support the Peace Process.\textsuperscript{225} Economically it can be described as neoliberal and is similar to other programmes created by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for developing world states in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{226} The core normative values informing the Bank’s plan emphasised:

\textsuperscript{221} Neve Gordon, \textit{Israel’s Occupation} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 154–164.
\textsuperscript{223} Le More, \textit{International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo}, 2008, 89.
\textsuperscript{224} As laid out in World Bank, \textit{Developing the Occupied Territories}.
\textsuperscript{225} Neoliberal development aid practitioners are persistently optimistic about the power of policy to solve real world problems. Mosse, \textit{Cultivating Development}, 2005, 3–4.
open markets, economic integration with Israel, regional economic integration, financial liberalisation, ‘good governance’ and support for ‘democracy’. Donors had already flagged Institution building as a key priority as they wanted to turn the OPT into a liberal state that could transform itself into a moral republic, whose power would rest on the true consent of its citizens and be more likely to exist in a pacific union with Israel, since Israel was also a moral republic. The World Bank further prioritised Institution building based on a core assumption in neoliberal development that a strong central authority (government) and stable institutions are necessary preconditions to growth. In this role the Bank also set out the legal framework for Palestinian economic activity and Palestine’s economic relations with Israel. Some aspects of it were even written into Palestinian law, such as a PA Basic Law Article 21 stating that, ‘the economic system in Palestine shall be based on the principles of a free market economy’.

In addition to providing an intellectual framework to Palestinian aid, the Bank has often directly run aid programmes. Many of them have been quite significant, such as the Emergency Assistance Program (EAP) that ran between 1994 to 1996 and provided a framework to channel early donor assistance to Palestinians. Sometimes the World Bank oversaw how the PA itself spent its funds. From 2008 it managed a Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) Trust Fund, which was used by Western donors in the Institution Building period to carry out further neoliberal reforms at the PA. The PRDP relied on a World Bank bank account, through which most bilateral aid to the PA flowed. That meant the PA did not even have actual control over its own bank account to finance its operations. This also meant that aid could, and would, be blocked if the Bank felt the PRDP was not being carried out in the way the West


wanted. That left the PA with very little funding of its own and scant space to develop policy outside Western demands.\textsuperscript{231}

One 2006 estimate is that starting from 1997 the World Bank managed nearly 5\% of all donations directly.\textsuperscript{232} Another 2006 estimate made by the Bank was that it has been involved in 20\% of all donor disbursements since 1994.\textsuperscript{233} Further, those estimates do not even take into account the large sums of money going through the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) and the European Union’s Direct Financial Support to the Palestinian Government (PEGASE), programmes the Bank co-managed routing money to OPT in a way that temporarily avoided the PA following the Hamas faction’s 2006 electoral victory.

The Bank also acts as the secretariat for an Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) formed in October 1993 by leading Western donors who funded the PA. It is chaired by Norway, co-sponsored by the EU and US, and includes non-institutional state members from the West such as Canada, some Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, and both Israel and the PA. Its membership includes other powerful neoliberal institutions like the UN and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Secretariat role is very influential. The Bank submits a report prior to each meeting to update its partners on recent economic and fiscal trends, while also providing economic and institutional analysis. The report helps to set the agenda and frame the discussion of the donor meeting.\textsuperscript{234} The committee plays a key role in determining Western donor policy toward the Palestinians, and how the OPT economy is funded under occupation.

Inside and outside its role as AHCL Secretariat, from the very beginning of the Peace Process one of the Bank’s primary activities has been to provide analytical reports that help the donors frame their aid giving.

\textsuperscript{231} Hanieh, ‘Palestine in the Middle East: Opposing Neoliberalism and US Power: Part 1’.
Praised for their timeliness, quality and thoroughness, those reports shaped the response, agenda and allocation of funds of the entire aid community in a way reminiscent of the impact the initial six-volume study [An Investment in Peace] and [the] EAP had had on building consensus and forging a common donor strategy in the first few years of the Oslo process.\textsuperscript{235}

Starting in 2002, the Bank began to produce a series of yearly reports on the Palestinian economic crises. These assessed the impact of Israeli policies on OPT Palestinians, of international aid and of the institutional response of the PA to the violent Second Intifada. When taken together with two important studies in 2004 about the economic and technical aspects of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, the reports laid out policy recommendations for donors, the PA and Israel with the aim of fostering Palestinian economic recovery at the height of the crisis.\textsuperscript{236} Combined with the Bank’s strong links to UN agencies and other mainstream state agencies or NSAs working in the OPT, the result is that much of the data assessing the Oslo-aid process came from the same institutions responsible for implementation.\textsuperscript{237}

The Politics of Aid

From the late 1970s to the 1980s, Arab donors had provided substantial financial support for Palestinians to survive the occupation and slow the Israeli settler-colonial process. After Oslo, Western donors led by the US came to dominate Palestinian aid. The EU and World Bank played important roles under American political oversight,

If the Europeans were made to underwrite the American–Israeli dominated diplomatic process financially, the Bank underwrote it conceptually.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{235} Anne Le More, International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money (Routledge, 2010), 106.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 105–6.
\textsuperscript{237} Hever, Political Economy of Aid to Palestinians Under Occupation, 7–8.
\textsuperscript{238} Le More, International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo, 2008, 109.


As will be described later in Chapter 5, Canada was likewise a major contributor to any Middle East peace process and a close ally of the US, often taking the lead from the latter in its foreign policy.

In the wake of Oslo, Western donors undertook a technical shift substituting humanitarian assistance for development aid. Intellectually that meant the needs donors prioritised went from lifesaving assistance like food, clean water, emergency shelter and protection from harm, to longer-term assistance meant to help people rebuild their lives, secure jobs and livelihoods, and plan a better future for their families.\footnote{Yezid Sayigh, ‘Inducing a Failed State in Palestine’, \emph{Survival} 49, no. 3 (2007): 9, doi:10.1080/00396330701564786.} It was designed for a post-conflict environment, yet eschewed political engagement even though peace was not yet established.\footnote{World Bank, \emph{Developing the Occupied Territories}, 13.}

This reflected the 1980s logic of trying to separate politics from aid and peace building. As the World Bank stated a,

\begin{quote}
 Political settlement and peace is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for economic development in the OT [OPT].\footnote{World Bank, \emph{Developing the Occupied Territories}, 13.}
\end{quote}
Western donors felt that development aid should target Palestinians living inside Gaza and the West Bank mostly through a PA they would help create. They largely excluded East Jerusalem from this calculus, because it had been annexed by Israel after the 1967 war and its status was politically contentious to their Israeli ally. Other ‘contentious issues’ like final status solutions for Palestinian refugees were largely isolated and excluded by donors. By contrast until the Oslo Process had begun, international consensus had favoured a complete Israeli withdrawal out of all the OPT, including East Jerusalem, and supported Palestinian aspirations to create their own state independent of Israeli rule. This change was part of an ‘alternative peace narrative’ that was set in place after Oslo was signed.

Under this alternative peace narrative borders, Israeli settlements, the status of East Jerusalem and the (re-)settlement of Palestinian refugees were not determined, but instead left for negotiation within a Peace Process sponsored by Western donors who had little appetite for Palestinian political aspirations. The dimensions of Palestinian sovereignty had thus become radically realigned under Oslo and through the aid process. Meanwhile, the Oslo Accord was lauded as a glowing example for what peace making could achieve and Israel was able to re-establish its international legitimacy at a time when much damage had been done to its reputation. 245 Israel was also able to take advantage of the economic and aid arrangements that developed out of the Peace Process, markedly improving its own economic situation.

The West is Best, and Israel is West

Sine qua non to the bureaucratic approach adopted by the World Bank and other Western policy makers, their natural starting point for Palestinian development was to work outward from a central authority that ‘in theory’ represents the people being developed. Their perception of development objectives as a public good contributed to their conceptual belief that a hierarchical central authority, the PA, could structure policy implementation networks outward and downward to deliver those goods to their people. 246 This

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245 Turner, ‘Completing the Circle’, 495.
246 Brinkerhoff, ‘Coordination Issues in Policy Implementation Networks’, 1498.
was premised on a belief that the political provision of public goods requires one centre of authority and responsibility, where the role of that authority is to utilise hierarchy and monopoly to guarantee effective coordination, control and efficient performance.\textsuperscript{247} That really necessitated the creation of the PA.

In the process donors sought to create a completely new Palestinian state remade built on theories of liberal governance that could prepare them for independence from Israel, where they would grow economically rather than decline outside Israeli oversight, and be inclined to live in peace.\textsuperscript{248} To do this donors took existing ideas in Western public policy, built on the unique circumstances of those Western societies, then applying them to the OPT. They adopted this one-size-fits-all approach because their models represented, to themselves, the correct way to govern a modern state. The institutions they set-up for Palestinians would be used to carry out radical changes laid out in the World Bank’s development plan, remaking the OPT in the Western vision.

Neoliberal policy makers are inclined to believe that modernisation requires, particularly in extreme cases like the OPT, nothing short of the managed reorganisation of state and society to deliver development targets.\textsuperscript{249} In this way social life becomes instrumentalised through policy-driven ideas (buzz words) like social capital, civil society or good governance; ideas that theorise about relationships between society, democracy and poverty reduction, extending the ‘scope of rational design and social engineering from the technical and economic realm to the social and cultural’.\textsuperscript{250} In this way donor intervention becomes a total intervention into another society. Yet though they seek to export Western forms of governance and social organisation through their social engineering, those policy makers remain quick to argue that their intervention is somehow non-political – which is untrue.

\textsuperscript{248} This radical redesign of state and economy by Western experts at IFIs are described as incredibly destructive processes in Naomi Klein, \textit{The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism}, 1st edition (Penguin, 2008).
In reality the neoliberal development model being offered by Western policy makers is grounded with a long history of using the excuse of ‘civilising forces’ for a greater good to carry out some other end selfish end, often imperial in nature and rarely in the interest of the afflicted. Thus, Edmund Burke would in the Eighteenth Century excuse British Imperialism not upon aggressive aims, but as helping to civilise the savage, chiefly through prolonged exposure to ‘commerce and Christianity’.\textsuperscript{251} It is a Western political logic articulating a right, or even duty, of self-anointed ‘advanced’ states to remake the world in their own image undertaken in the name of various related ideals.\textsuperscript{252} Those ideals include, ‘to improve, to civilise, develop, modernise, constitutionalise, democratise, and bring good governance and freedom’.\textsuperscript{253} When Western liberals are confronted with a different culture they invariably judge that society through ‘Eurocentric conceptions of what it means to be fully human and/or a legitimate society’.\textsuperscript{254} The result is a preordained order within development where the world is divided into those who possess reason and are capable of self-government, and those who require tutelage to bring them up to the required standard.\textsuperscript{255}

Intrinsically such a world becomes divided into ‘adult’ and ‘children’ societies that matches condescending patrimonial language used by Nye throughout neoliberal IR theory.\textsuperscript{256} The prescribed solution is ‘cognitive, affective, and behavioural transformation’ through expert tutelage by neoliberal specialists – who are the technocrats.\textsuperscript{257} In its most extreme iteration the ‘child-like’ people are the problem, incapable of creating or maintaining a stable and progressive political order, meaning that total transformation, or reorganisation, can be justified, including as humanitarian or developmental aid. This reasoning has been applied to the blueprint to turn Palestinian society into a liberal one.

This is in reality little more than strong governments exercising dominance over and transposing their system of belief upon the weak, something empires have always claimed to do, spreading civilization for the benefit of those subjected to their rule, masking the more crude accoutrements of conquest, plunder and

\textsuperscript{251} Bell, “The Dream Machine”, 15.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{256} Nye, ‘Soft Power’, 1 October 1990, 166.
\textsuperscript{257} Bell, “The Dream Machine”, 33.
In this way it was a moral conquest. Though not necessarily always wedded to imperialism and domination, liberalism with its ‘civilising mission’ can, as in Nineteenth Century Britain and the French ‘mission civilisatrice’, form the imperialist logic of liberal political thought. It remained a central feature of imperial ideology deep into the twentieth century. In this way liberalism could exist alongside state colonialism, at its worst settler colonialism, bound up with violent processes of dispossession including war, slavery, colonisation and extermination of indigenous peoples.

Colonisers meanwhile nearly never, if they have ever, acknowledge the historic wrongs they may have carried out against the oppressed, ‘sustained denial’ cloaked within the pleasant exterior of ideals like a civilising mission. They steadfastly rationalise and justify their actions, even though colonisation ought according to Waziyatawin to be one of the most easily recognised forms of oppression in the world, until eventually they become ‘normalised, acceptable, and even righteous’. That is the effect of the framework for understanding the past when established by what are essentially the very same past (or even current) colonial occupying governments and their legal system, without acknowledging the historic wrongs done to Indigenous people and forgetting that the latter never ceded their sovereignty. Thus neoliberal policy makers could so completely misunderstand Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians, to the point of initially counting Israel as a fellow bilateral donor, assuming that Israel would undertake a benign and post-colonial civilising process of decolonisation with the OPT; even though Israel had long been actually de-developing the Palestinian economy, while simultaneously displacing Palestinians from their land.

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258 Ibid., 35.
259 Pitts, ‘Empire and Democracy’, 296.
260 Bell, ‘“The Dream Machine”, 40.
265 Le More, International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo, 2008, 34.
Paris Protocol and Economic Integration

Meanwhile, two seemingly contradictory goals have played an important function in the World Bank’s policy design for the Palestinian state and economy. Those were to increase Palestinian economic independence, in order for it to become less reliant on the Israeli economy, while simultaneously encouraging deeper economic integration between the two, reflecting the cooperative element of neoliberalism. A key assumption behind the argument for integration was the belief that Israel had a superior economy that had helped the OPT economy to develop. Western economists argued that Palestinian services and infrastructure improved under Israeli occupation, industry developed and the OPT thrived generally.266 This assumption was based on economic data, such as GDP indicators, that appeared to provide evidence for such growth.267 This data corroborated neoliberal belief that a liberal state will naturally develop the economy of an illiberal when in contact. Based on the benefits the Palestinians gained from exposure to Israel, and the belief in economic cooperation for peace, the World Bank argued for greater economic openness between Israel and the PA in order for their economies to benefit from one others’ strengths,

Promoting regional infrastructural networks in electricity, transport, telecommunication, petroleum and gas pipelines and water would offer other opportunities for strengthening interdependence and economies benefitting from complementarities and economies of scale, which may not be available to the OT [OPT] in the absence of such cooperation.268

Thus from the onset of Oslo, Western policy makers argued for a customs union between Israel and the OPT, recasting a deeply unequal trading arrangements into a full-fledged union with misplaced language of peace.269

Donors, Israel and the emerging Palestinian leadership were receptive enough to the Bank’s idea that this union was in place by 1994.270 Called the Paris Protocol, it formalised a union of Israel and the OPT into a single economic

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268 World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories, 14.
269 Ibid.
zone with a common currency. It also created an external border where Israel collects import taxes on goods destined for the OPT, before then transferring those taxes at its own discretion to the PA. Under the protocol, Israel should also transfer to the PA any Value Added Taxes (VAT) collected on goods and services sold in Israel that are meant for OPT consumption. This formalised relationship gave the occupation new legitimacy and left Israel retaining full power over OPT Palestinians and their economy. Israel for instance was given the right to unilaterally determine the tax rates imposed on imported goods and is allowed to take a significant administrative percentage from those funds. The protocol also gave Israel significant leverage over the PA as those taxes comprise a large percentage of the PA’s monthly revenue, which Israel has on many occasions withheld when it felt it needed to punish the PA.

Meanwhile, under the protocol Palestinian trade with other countries would continue to be handled through Israeli seaports and airports, or through border crossings controlled by Israel between the OPT with Jordan and Egypt. In that way Israel could continue to choose what gets in and goes out of the OPT economy. Then in 1995 the Oslo II interim agreement brought about the creation of joint Israeli-Palestinian units that were meant to emulate the post 1945 Franco-German example of institutional and economic integration. Donor countries and the World Bank were encouraging the PA to engage with Israel, reinforcing a grossly unequal relationship.

While Western policy makers envisaged a Palestinian economy that would rely on export-led growth, Israel used control over the OPT’s borders to undermine Palestinian trade. The force of de-development Roy identified was just too strong. This was a natural outcome. In settler-colonialism the aggressor tries to extract as much economic value from a conquered people as possible, before

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removing them from the land. Yet in spite of this the World Bank would repeatedly call for export-led growth for the OPT over the course of decades.

From the onset of Oslo Western policy makers argued that a political solution to the occupation was not a necessary precondition for Palestinian economic growth to take place. Western policy makers were hoping that peace linkages would develop and grow between Israel with the Palestinians thanks to that approach. That depoliticisation became so prevalent that aid actors backing the process sanitised the language they used to describe conditions in the OPT, in part for fear of upsetting Israel, shying away from the use of descriptive and accurate terminology like apartheid or ethnic cleansing that were necessary to understand the actual conditions in the OPT.275 Preferring to appear neutral and apolitical, technocratic policy makers focused on what they considered positive dialogue, avoided deconstructive recriminations about past actions by Israel and side-stepped contentious issues, instead focusing on the benefits both sides could attain by moving forward with greater economic integration.276

Reality and Results

Closure and Settler Colonisation

The initial experience of the Peace Process for many Palestinians was one of declining living standards. By the late 1990s the OPT was in a much worse condition than prior to Oslo.277 The economic situation is so poor, that the post-Oslo years have been the worst since the beginning of occupation in 1967.278 Within the first few years of the Oslo Process unemployment in the OPT rose sharply up from 11% up to 28%, reaching an astonishing 66% for a period in

275 A team of scholars and practitioners of public international law from South Africa, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) and Israel participating in a South African study determined in 2009 that Israel is in fact carrying out settler colonialism and apartheid according to the definitions provided by international law. ‘Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A Re-Assessment of Israel’s Practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under International Law’ (Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, May 2009), http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/targets/third-party-states/236.
277 ‘Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza’ (Government of Japan and World Bank, 2000), 14.
278 Taghdisi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine, 56.
March and April of 1996, and ‘easing’ down to 39.2% in Gaza and 24.3% in the West Bank by June.²⁷⁹ A year later in June 1997 those rates remained high at 25% and 17% respectively, before shooting back up to 60% in August and September 1997.²⁸⁰ Those remarkably high levels of unemployment could be largely attributed to closure, which directly contravened the Paris Protocol and Oslo promise to allow Palestinian workers to enter the Israeli job market.²⁸¹

Closure was especially painful because Palestinian labour had become dependent on employment in Israel during the early years of economic integration in the 1970s and 1980s. When Palestinians were prevented from working in Israel, the resulting loss in income from Palestinian workers in Israel was enormous. The total collapse of the OPT’s economy was only averted due to donor aid substituting for normal economic activities. So instead of that money being used to develop the Palestinian economy, it was used to stave off economic disaster. Palestinians meanwhile continued to have a source of income to purchase goods, and those goods increasingly originated in Israel due to restrictions on Palestinian movement, trade and the de-development of Palestinian industry.²⁸² This allowed Israel to continue to make a financial gain from the captive OPT economy while not having to invest in Palestinian labour.

Job losses were partially absorbed by PA public sector hirings with development aid funding, while Israel made up for the loss of Palestinian labour by bringing in more non-Palestinian foreign workers.²⁸³ At the same time as these sharp drops in employment, private sector investment, once a strength of the OPT economy, declined. In fact, the post-Oslo period has seen a dramatic drop in private investment. The World Bank’s own estimates suggest that prior to Oslo the private sector constituted 85% of economy.²⁸⁴ Manufacturing and production eroded during the Peace Process. In 1993, private investment stood

²⁸⁰ Ibid.
²⁸¹ Israel has even used ‘security reasons’ to deny frequency allocation to Palestinian telecommunication providers, in spite of the Oslo process guaranteeing Palestinians the right to a separate and independent telecommunication networks. Meanwhile, Israeli telecommunications companies with much lower costs can move into Palestinian market share, as an example of de-development sabotaging a Palestinian industry to benefit an Israeli one. Robert Wade, ‘LRB · Robert Wade · Organised Hypocrisy on a Monumental Scale’, London Review of Books, 24 October 2014, http://www.lrb.co.uk/2014/10/24/robert-wade/organised-hypocrisy-on-a-monumental-scale.
²⁸² Hever, The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation.
²⁸⁴ World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories, viii.
at $USD 529 million and was equivalent to 21% of GDP, but by 1995 had dropped to $USD 320 million and the equivalent of 8% of GDP.\textsuperscript{285} Research conducted in 2010/11 found that the business climate was so bad that Palestinian businessmen themselves invested two to four times more in Israel than they do in the OPT.\textsuperscript{286} Meanwhile Palestinian savings were estimated at a small sum of $7 billion, of which $5 billion was invested outside the OPT.\textsuperscript{287}

This all led to a sharp decline in Palestinian economic vitality. Indicators like Gross National Product (GNP) suggested a decline of between 10 and 15% from 1993 to 1997.\textsuperscript{288} By the autumn of 1998 estimates for the actual decline in GNP were 30%, an astonishing collapse equivalent to the Great Depression in the 1930s, despite Palestinians being second only to Israel by the early 2000s as largest per capita aid recipient in the world.\textsuperscript{289} Meanwhile the number of Palestinians living in poverty doubled from 20 to 40% between 1995 and 1997.\textsuperscript{290}

\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{288} Roy, ‘De-Development Revisited’, 69–70.
\textsuperscript{289} Brynen, ‘Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process’, 81.
\textsuperscript{290} Roy, ‘De-Development Revisited’, 76.
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth, 1995-Q1 2015

Source: Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics.
* Data for 2015 is for the first quarter.

Figure 1: OPT GDP figures from 1993 to 2015 Q1²⁹¹

Figure 18: Poverty Incidence Across the West Bank and Gaza

Figure 2: Palestinian Poverty in the OPT²⁹²

As the private sector declined it was replaced with aid dollars to power the OPT economy. Macroeconomic data for the post-Oslo period indicates that growth in aid dependency far outstripped any economic expansion. Although between 1996 and 2006 per capita aid increased by 14.74%, in that same period the Gross National Income (GNI) of Palestinians dropped by a remarkable 27%. Overall dependency on aid increased from 14.42% in 1996 to 35.34% in 2006. In 2002, one of the worst years of Second Intifada, aid dependency stood at 45.1% of GNI. Whereas in 1991 the private sector made up as much as 80% of GDP, by 2009 foreign aid comprised the largest part of the economy at 49% of GDP. The neoliberal model was not working. Rather than grow, the OPT economy had shrunk dramatically creating aid dependency.

Source: As compiled by the Authors based on OECD/DAC Aid Database in 2014 (OECD-DAC 2014).

Figure 3: Aid as percentage of the West Bank and Gaza’s GNI 1994-2012

Meanwhile, Palestinian economic decline contrasted distinctly with Israeli growth, and the economic difficulties Israel had faced during the First Intifada. One estimate is that during the 1990s Israel's per capita GDP increased by 14.3% while Palestinian GDP fell by 3.8%. Israel has also consistently maintained a large trade surplus with the Palestinians, selling goods in the OPT.

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294 Hever, ‘Foreign Aid to Palestine/Israel’, 8.
that, once paid for with earnings by Palestinians workers, were after 1993 paid for increasingly by donor aid. Further, evidence suggests that Israel has been able to take advantage of violence with the Palestinians to market its defence industry products. Its sales of weapons and military systems hit a record $USD 7.5 billion in 2012, up from already strong $USD 2 billion in 2002.\textsuperscript{298} Meanwhile, aid for Israel offset the costs of administering the Palestinians under occupation while contributing positive inputs into the Israeli economy, altogether reinforcing the process of settler colonialism.

These are just a few of the startling indicators of Palestinian decline that accelerates from the start of the Oslo in 1993 up to the Institution Building period, and beyond. The reason for this decline was Israel's rapid appropriation of OPT land and resources, accompanied by practices that made Palestinian daily life difficult and unsafe. Such practices include denying Palestinians access to clean water, deliberate exposure to toxic waste, the demolition of homes, preventing family reunifications, and the destruction of livelihoods.\textsuperscript{299} The effects have been particularly hard on the most vulnerable Palestinians. By 2003, children's malnutrition exceeded 80%, and food insecurity threatened more than 70% of OPT Palestinians, while chronic malnutrition ran between 6.7% and 17.5% that year.\textsuperscript{300}

This all happened under the cover of peace building. Settlement growth has since 1993 been rapid as Israeli citizens are heavily incentivised by government subsidies to move to settlements built on confiscated Palestinian land. Since the onset of Oslo population growth among Israeli settlers has consistently been much higher than population growth within pre-1967 Israeli lands. When Oslo was signed in 1993 there were approximately 110,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza, and another 146,000 in East Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{301} By 2002, the total living in the OPT stood at a much higher 380,000.\textsuperscript{302} By 2013 there were an astonishing 350,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank alone.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[299] Hart and Forte, ‘Mandated to Fail?’, 632.
\item[300] Hever, ‘Foreign Aid to Palestine/Israel’, 7.
\end{footnotes}
with 300,000 living in East Jerusalem (Israel had withdrawn its settlements from Gaza in 2005). In 1972 there had been only a small number of settlers living in the OPT, with just 10,531 combined.

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303 ‘Israel’s Settlement Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.
304 ‘Comprehensive Settlement Population 1972-2010’ (Foundation for Middle East Peace, n.d.).
Map 2: Settlement Growth in the West Bank

That rapid growth in settlements singularly indicates Israel’s unwillingness to disengage and decolonise. Settler colonialism remained the force defining Israel’s relationship with the OPT. Concomitant to settlement growth, Israel enacted policies that took away Palestinian rights such as the freedom of movement. By 2002 movement from one part of the OPT to the other was extremely difficult, with Jerusalem near completely off-limits. As with labour movement, this contradicted Oslo, which specified that there should be free movement. Leaving questions of human rights aside, this had a disastrous impact on the Palestinian economy. Fragmentation of the OPT only became worse from 2003 onward during the Second Intifada. After Israel evacuated its settlements in 2005, Gaza entered a state of siege with people and materials barely or rarely able to move in and out.

Rather than advancing peace, the post-Oslo years became a trap for the Palestinian leadership, with dire consequences.\(^{306}\) When Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon helped spark the Second Intifada (2001-2006) with political provocations at the contested Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, that led to one of the most vicious periods of violence in the history of occupation,

> Whereas the first intifada (1987-1992) was defined by popular protest, general strikes and stones - and to be sure, harsh Israeli counter-measures, including the infamous order by Yitzhak Rabin to break the bones of stone-throwing Palestinians - it was immediately clear that this new uprising was different. Demonstrations were being met with overwhelming force by Israel and it made popular protest impossible.\(^{307}\)

As usual Palestinians suffered disproportionately to Israelis in a conflict where both sides targeted civilians. Thousands of Palestinians lost their lives, tens of thousands were seriously injured and hundreds of thousands confined to their homes during suffocating curfews lasting days or months at a time. Israeli snipers and aerial drones made all the Palestinian cities completely unsafe after dark and much of the Palestinian infrastructure built from development aid was destroyed.


The Second Intifada was used by Israel to seize larger swathes of Palestinian land and build its settlements up in the OPT yet further. Creating a narrative of Palestinian violence and the need for security, Israel consolidated through concrete its control over the West Bank when in 2002 it began construction on a Separation Wall made up of a combination of ditches, trenches, roads, razor wire, electronic fences and concrete. That Wall was built deep in Palestinian land around the Israeli settlements. While the path of that Wall has been developed by a combination of different Israeli ideologies, approaches, concerns and tasks, it always remained true to the underlying logic of settler colonialism and the usurping of Palestinian territory. Palestinian homes and agricultural land were confiscated and destroyed to make way for its construction, and Palestinian water supplies such as the biggest West Bank aquifer seized. The Wall reinforced closure and the cantonisation of Palestinian land into disparate little parts. When completed Israel will have effectively seized nearly half of the land in the West Bank, leaving Palestinians with 12% of the land of the original British colony of Palestine but more than ten times the population when factoring in Palestinian refugees in the diaspora.

Further Decline and Institution-Building

Altogether the Second Intifada decimated the OPT economy and the PA capacity to deliver public goods. By 2006, per capita GDP had fallen by almost 40% from its already reduced 1999 level. At around the same time that the Second Intifada began to come to a close – at least in the West Bank, because it arguably never ended in Gaza – in 2006 January the PA held its first freely contested election for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), also known as the Palestinian Parliament. However, Israel and Western donors opposed the results. This is because the more cooperative Fatah faction they had worked with, since the start of the PA and Arafat Presidency in the mid-1990s, lost to the Islamist Hamas faction. The loss of their preferred candidate in the election led almost immediately to an embargo of the PA by Western donors, starting

309 Rempel, ‘Palestinian Refugees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’.
with Canada. At the same time Israel imposed financial sanctions on the PA, withholding tax revenues collected via the Paris Protocol. Most aid funding that remained flowing in 2006 to the OPT was diverted around a Hamas run PA to NGOs, multilateral institutions like the WFP or otherwise to a PA Presidential office that remained under the control of the Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas, who was backed by the West. In June that year the EU put in place the World Bank run TIM to deliver aid to Palestinians in a way that avoided financial links to the PA.

By mid-2007, Fatah had regained control of the West Bank through a donor-backed coup. Secret documents obtained by the US magazine Vanity Fair indicate that the Bush Administration helped Fatah instigate and fight the conflict, in an attempt to retake full control over the PA. By that time the Abbas-run Fatah government had developed a good working relationship with both Israel and the US, to a point where Palestinian security was sharing with Israel almost all the information it was collecting. In spite of their support, Fatah was pushed out of Gaza by June. From mid-2007 onward the OPT became even more fragmentised with Fatah in control of the PA in the West Bank, Hamas of Gaza, and all the OPT remaining under Israeli military occupation criss-crossed by settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The Fatah-led PA was rewarded by a generous increase in funding when nearly 90 global donors pledged $7.7 billion in development aid to the PA at a conference in Paris 2007 December 17th. French President Nicolas Sarkozy spoke of the ‘urgent’ need to establish a Palestinian state by the end of 2008.

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In the same period US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reinforced the West’s neoliberal vision for a PA that will live in peace with Israel,

Our administration has put the idea of democratic development at the centre of our approach to this conflict, because we came to believe that the Israelis will not achieve the security they deserve in their Jewish state and the Palestinians will not achieve the better life they deserve in a state of their own until there is a Palestinian government capable of exercising its sovereign responsibilities, both to its citizens and to its neighbours. Ultimately, a Palestinian state must be created that can live side by side with Israel in peace and security.318

Democratic development seems a paradox after instigating the PA coup.

While donors rewarded Fatah’s putsch with generous aid packages, more of the Peace Dividend, those donors together with Israel hostilely cordoned off the Hamas-governed Gaza Strip from the outside world. Gaza was put under a punishing siege consisting of a combination of embargos on trade by Israel, and strict limitations on aid by donors. That siege is still in place eight years later in 2015. Gaza would suffer in particular in that time from regular military confrontations with Israeli, the most destructive of which have been a series of three massive bombardments of the Strip between December 2008 and July 2014. Those have levelled the tiny, densely populated territory. Meanwhile the aid and trade embargos were vigorously fortified by a newly installed Egyptian Sissi dictatorship in 2013. All combined the siege makes any rebuilding from bombardment a slow, difficult and nearly impossible process, even for essential services like waste management. All appearances indicate that Gaza is being punished for the government it elected, and which refuses to step down in favour of the West’s preference Fatah.

Through their 2007 aid packages to the Fatah run PA, donors again prioritised state building, but with an increased emphasis on security.319 Abbas’ PA was given support by donors and Israel to govern, including the deployment of PA

318 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World’, *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 4 (1 July 2008): 19.
police to Area A. In addition to security, donors tasked the Abbas government to push forward with reform.\textsuperscript{320} This manifested into a PRDP that committed the PA to pursue ‘good governance, law and order and the delivery of basic public services throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Strengthening the PA security services became a top priority. Secretary of State Rice wrote in 2008 that the onus was on Palestinians to reign in violence,

This state will be born not just through negotiations to resolve hard issues related to borders, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem but also through the difficult effort to build effective democratic institutions that can fight terrorism and extremism, enforce the rule of law, combat corruption, and create opportunities for the Palestinians to improve their lives. This confers responsibilities on both parties.\textsuperscript{321}

To carry out the neoliberal reforms required by Western donors, an economist who had long worked at both the World Bank and IMF was chosen to be PA Prime Minister. By now far removed from the democracy that had allowed Hamas to win government in 2006, Abbas appointed Salam Fayyad as PM on the basis of a national emergency, bypassing the PLC. Fayyad would oversee the implementation of the PRDP, run through a bank account controlled by the World Bank.

The PRDP required a number of cuts to PA public sector spending to reduce the PA deficit. These measures of austerity in a time of humanitarian crisis included reducing the number of workers in the Ministry of Health, implementing pre-paid electricity meters for thousands of Palestinians powering their homes with electricity bought from settlements and reducing pension commitments. However, the cuts did not have a significant impact on the deficit because of a substantial increase in security spending. In 2009, $USD 109 million was committed to expand the training and size of PA security forces. Those forces were supervised by an American General Dayton and had been under Fayyad’s


\textsuperscript{321} Rice, ‘Rethinking the National Interest’, 19.
control already as early as 2005. So while PA government cuts made life even harder for Palestinians, increased security spending created a more repressive PA security apparatus that was used to suppress dissent. Thus in spite of extra donor aid and cost-cutting efforts by the Fayyad government, the PA would increase its debt load to $4.3 billion by early 2014. As a result, even with donor assistance and direct budgetary assistance from the EU, the PA has often been unable in recent years to pay the salaries of the 170,000 public employees that it hires. That hiring keeps the OPT economy solvent and the very high unemployment levels artificially lower than they otherwise would be.

As had happened throughout the post Oslo years, the result for the Palestinian people was further decline and insecurity. Using an income-based definition of poverty, 50% of Palestinians in the OPT (excluding East Jerusalem) were living in poverty in 2009 and 2010, of which 38% were in the West Bank and 70% in Gaza. Meanwhile, the WFP published findings in 2011 that 50% of Palestinian households suffer from food insecurity. Unemployment was stuck at around 30% in 2009, while an official but conservative estimate by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) counted 38.5% unemployed in Gaza in the 4th quarter of 2013, and 18.2% in the West Bank. The unemployment rate for Palestinian youth was particularly alarming, standing at a high 43.9% in the West Bank and Gaza in the 4th quarter of 2013 for ages 20-24. For those who did have jobs, a 2014 report published on labour rights listed the OPT as one of the eight worst countries to work in alongside countries like Somalia and the

326 Ibid.
Central African Republic, just below countries infamous for poor working conditions like Bangladesh, China and the United Arab Emirates.\(^{327}\)

From 2008 onward there began to be a growing dependency on debt to make up for income shortfalls. Loose private lending encouraged a culture of consumption and pushed many people into a debt trap, with individual loans doubling in just four years from $USD 494 million in 2009 to about $USD 1 billion in 2013. That personal debt has been used primarily to finance consumption, such as home mortgages, cars, marriage costs, and electric goods, and rarely invested in productive activities in an OPT economy. A 2014 estimate was that 75% of public sector employees were in debt.\(^{328}\)

**Unchanged Occupation with Western Backing**

The effect of Oslo seems to have done little more than to transform Israeli rule into a donor backed, legally enforced occupation characterised by apartheid and settler colonisation. Israel did not have to amend Zionist settler-colonial policy objectives that have remained pretty consistent, though tactically flexible, pre-1948, post-1948, and post-1967, regardless of which political faction is in power.\(^{329}\) Much of the ‘changes’ that took place after Oslo were more cosmetic than substantive, such as the Paris Protocol or the ‘shared’ West Bank water resource management. In spite of temporary withdrawals in-and-out of major centres of Palestinian population in the West Bank, Areas A and B, or the evacuation of settlements from Gaza, Israel always maintained harsh military control over the OPT.\(^{330}\) With the benefit of hindsight, Oslo may be viewed as less a period of breakthrough than a pause between Palestinian uprisings.\(^{331}\)

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\(^{328}\) Dana, ‘The Palestinian Capitalists That Have Gone Too Far’.


\(^{330}\) Those Areas A and B are fragmented enclaves of Palestinians on just 40% of the total land in the West Bank, with Israel maintaining total control over the 60% of Area C surrounding the enclaves (and sharing jurisdiction over Area B). ‘What Is Area C?’, B’Tselem, 18 May 2014, http://www.btselem.org/area_c/what_is_area_c.

\(^{331}\) Selby, ‘Dressing up Domination as’, 122.
Map 3: Areas A, B and C in the West Bank

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The striking question is if the Oslo Peace Process has failed so badly, why are the same models for peace building still being used more after more than two decades? In particular why is the development aid money meant to support that process through Palestinian economic growth still being funded in a similar manner, when there is strong evidence that Israel has actually warped that aid to offset the costs of occupation to make settler colonialism easier? The answer likely lies in the preference Western states, particularly under US leadership, confer on Israel as a liberal and Western state in the Middle East. This allows them to easily adopt narratives that view Israeli actions in a favourable way, but Palestinians not.

For example, Western policy makers have often worked under the assumption that Israel was naturally inclined to peace with the Palestinians, but the Palestinians less so because they are less developed. Thus when the Peace Process has gone awry they have often accepted Israeli claims of Palestinian culpability that is contextually ignorant of the gross power imbalance between Israel and the colonised Palestinians. An example of this mind-set is a 2006 claim by Grace and Lasensky that it was somehow the Palestinians who provoked closure at the start of the Peace Process, blaming it on their violence.

A rash of Hamas bombings in the mid-1990s resulted in the first systematic Israeli “closure” policies – restrictions on Palestinian movement in the territories.333

That though ignores the context of the gross imbalance in violence meted out by Israel even in the mid-1990s, and how Israel was so quick to adopt an act that completely undermined Oslo. In fact, their justification of Israeli policy appears more akin to an act blaming the victim. Israel has punished Palestinians relentlessly since 1993 with curfews, restrictions on movement, military operations, extra-judicial assassinations, killing civilians and confiscating land for settlements. This violence is disproportionately meted out against the Palestinians, while terrorism is even not the sole preserve of Palestinians.334 Yet in those rare cases where Israeli violence cannot be

334 There were terrorist attacks carried out by Israeli extremists against Palestinians in the 1990s, such as the mass killing of Palestinians praying in a mosque in Hebron just five months
ignored, particularly terrorist acts, Western policy makers tend to blame this on a minority of irrational extremists who are said not to represent the wider Israeli mood – that of a rational and liberal state. Yet it is the Palestinians who are suffer a cynical state sponsored and systemic violence that permeates their daily reality as no extremist could imagine doing. 335

State-sponsored violence cannot be sequestered as a temporary fit of irrationality or the actions of a radical, crazy minority. In fact, from the mid-1990s onward the Israeli public has typically voted in increasingly extreme right-wing governments, and authoritative opinion polls indicate ‘at best’ a preference by the Jewish-Israeli public for apartheid,

55 per cent of Israeli Jews wanted segregated entertainment facilities, while more than 75 per cent said they would not live in the same building as an Israeli Arab.336

Meanwhile, quantifiable evidence points out that Israel typical instigates violence with the Palestinians, not otherwise.


335 Following its defeat in Vietnam in which the US employed these traditional, but highly visible, and shockingly inhumane techniques for destroying or crippling a people, their employment seems to be unacceptable to most Americans and Europeans, and therefore not politically acceptable within the countries of the “civilised world.” For domestic and foreign policy reasons, leaders of countries in that "civilised world" who aim at crippling an entire people through low, medium or high-intensity warfare must now accomplish that objective either by using "uncivilised" surrogates … They must now target infrastructure and they must target the economies of families, the education and the physical and emotional health of the enemy’s children and youth. They must strike at the people through an entire generation of its young. …This is also what Israel did and continues to do in its low-intensity war against its subject Palestinian population in the occupied territories’. Graff and فارغ, ‘Crippling a People’, 46–47.
336 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, 80.
In addition to closure, Israel has revealed no intention to removed settlements from the OPT for the two state solution. Each year since 1993, tens-of-billions of dollars have been sent secretly by the government of Israel to settlements via hidden expenditures by the military, interior ministry and other government departments.\textsuperscript{338} That money has been used to seize ever more Palestinian land. These expenditures are so well hidden that even Israeli Ministers have been unable to discern all the facts, which makes ascertaining the true costs of

\textsuperscript{337} Analysis of killings of Palestinians by Israelis versus killings of Israelis by Palestinians from September 2000 to October 2008 with data from B’Tselem reveals that Israel that mostly kills first after a pause in fighting: 79% of pauses were interrupted when Israel killed a Palestinian, 8% by Palestinian attacks and 13% by both sides on the same day. This pattern is more pronounced after longer pauses. For 25 exceeding a week Israel unilaterally interrupted 96%, and unilaterally interrupted 100% of the 14 pauses longer than nine days. Nancy Kanwisher, ‘Reigniting Violence: How Do Ceasefires End?’, \textit{Huffington Post}, 2 June 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-kanwisher/reigniting-violence-how-d_b_155611.html.

occupation from direct Israeli government expenditure very difficult, if not impossible.\textsuperscript{339} A former PA Prime Minister, Ahmed Qureia, who was a member of the Palestinian negotiation team for Oslo in the early 1990s feels Israel was even insincere at the time of negotiations. He says with the benefit of hindsight that Israel was only buying time while settling the OPT, and only wanted to change the appearance of the occupation with altering its structure.\textsuperscript{340} Negotiations may have had an ulterior motive,

Ever since the Oslo Accords, the basic Israeli strategy has been to negotiate endlessly while continuing to expand settlements, with the number of settlers more than doubling since 1993.\textsuperscript{341}

When the Oslo Accord was reached and Israel almost immediately reneged on its primary obligations, such as Palestinian labourers’ freedom of movement for ‘security’ reasons, this was part of a broader and long-standing Israeli policy of undermining Palestinian sovereignty on murky grounds for ‘security’.\textsuperscript{342} Even the Israeli President Rivlin said in 2015 that the entire Oslo process was unrealistic, based on a fake two-state solution of incredible asymmetry.

With our unrelenting, condescending approach to the Palestinians, we think they could accept a two-state solution in which one state is an omnipotent power and the other is not even autonomous.\textsuperscript{343}

Meanwhile, led by the US, Western states have been highly supportive of Israel irrespective of its commitment – or lack of commitment – to the Peace Process. Between 1949 and 2000 the US has provided $USD134 billion in aid to Israel.\textsuperscript{344} If interest is added to the calculation, the total aid Israel received from the US from 1973 to 2008 exceeds $USD 200 billion (about three times the


\textsuperscript{344} Hever, ‘Foreign Aid to Palestine/Israel’, 9.
annual budget of Israeli in 2008).\textsuperscript{345} Between 2000 and 2009, the US gave Israel $USD 24.1 billion of military aid. With this taxpayer money, the US licensed, paid for and delivered more than 670 million weapons and related equipment to Israel, including almost 500 categories of weapons.\textsuperscript{346} In 2007, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for $US 30 billion of US military aid from 2009 to 2018.\textsuperscript{347} Meanwhile, US public opinion indicates backing for the pro-Israel policy. Even US charity funds are used to generously support the Israeli settlements the undermine peace.\textsuperscript{348}

\textit{Americans' Sympathies in Mideast Conflict}

In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or more with the Palestinians?

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\textsuperscript{GALLUP}\textsuperscript{349}

\textbf{Figure 5: US Public Sympathies towards Israelis or Palestinians\textsuperscript{349}}

If Western donors keep funding a process that is either having no impact on the peace building or even helping sustain Israel’s settler colonialism, a close ally to

\textsuperscript{345} Hever, \textit{Political Economy of Aid to Palestinians Under Occupation}, 32.
\textsuperscript{346} Josh Ruebner, ‘U.S. Military Aid to Israel Policy Implications & Options’ (Washington DC: US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, March 2012), 5.
\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{349} Lydia Saad, ‘Seven in 10 Americans Continue to View Israel Favorably’ (Gallup, 8 February 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181652/seven-americans-continue-view-israel-favorably.aspx.
which they provide billions of dollars in financial and non-financial support every year, then this leaves open the possibility that some, if not all, are comfortable with the status quo. That status quo is completely contradictory to the neoliberal language of trade, law and peaceful cooperation that settler colonialism is the anathema of. It is for this reason that is seems prudent to view with suspicion the motives of Western donors funding Palestinian development aid, and to try to seek out the unspoken or unwritten intentions that may lie behind their policy.\textsuperscript{350} As with development aid generally those unspoken meanings are vital to understand how policy has been constructed, because policy is never a non-political or neutral. Development aid has meanwhile become part of the matrix of control over the Palestinians, helping to cancel elections and install unelected governments.\textsuperscript{351} The truth is that the conventional Western donor is likely more concerned about maintaining its relationship Israel, than Palestinian rights. One such important Western state is Canada.

\textsuperscript{350} Mosse, \textit{Cultivating Development}, 2005, 2.  
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid., 5.
CHAPTER 5 - Canadian Foreign Policy and Aid to the OPT

Introduction

The previous chapter was used to lay out just how badly the Oslo Peace Process and neoliberal aid model has been for Palestinians, the Israeli settler colonial policy that caused their problems, and Western donor support – advertent or inadvertent – for that Israeli policy stemming from Western states favouring the Israeli narrative over the Palestinian. Besides the US, one of the countries where Israel enjoys strong support is Canada. In the Canadian discourse on peace building, the Palestinians are often portrayed as a natural security threat to Israel, and the Israelis even as victims of violence. Therefore, Palestinians need to be developed and civilised in order to coexist with an otherwise peace-willing Israel.

Taking such a position requires Canadians to turn a blind eye toward Israel’s systemic discriminatory violence against Palestinians. Support for Israel by liberals has required a complicated balancing act distorting facts against reality. More illiberal conservatives have been much clearer delineating Israel and Palestine, and Israel’s broader relations to the Middle East as a mythical clash of civilisation, where Israel is ‘a light of freedom and democracy in what is otherwise a region of darkness’.352 All combined these tendencies manifested in the 2000s into a clampdown by government on civil society organisations providing aid to Palestinians. Even though Canada has typically adopted a neoliberal foreign policy that reflects its own internal social organisation as a liberal state, it has had to balance those positions with its support for contemporary Israel’s violent settler colonialism.

Canadian Foreign and Middle East Policy

According to Janice Stein, one of Canada’s most influential IR scholars, there are three interpretations by which Canada’s engagement with the region can be measured. The first is Canada as the quintessential peacemaker among its

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allies, and in the Middle East. The second argument is that Canada has been neither neutral nor even-handed, but rather parochial and partisan in its approach to the region – parochial in its ignorance of Middle Eastern history and culture, and partisan in its sympathy to Israel. The third argument focuses on Canada’s preoccupation with the US, trying to distinguish its policy from its powerful neighbour and showing some independence by joining with its western European allies in areas such as Middle East policy. Likewise, but as a counterargument to that third argument by Stein, Canada’s engagement with the Middle East may be viewed as policy resulting from Canada’s post World War II pre-occupation with supporting and taking cues from Washington, an alliance that helps define Canada’s foreign policy. A fourth argument Stein makes is of a Canada is preoccupied with forging bilateral relationships that have fed into an enlarged network through which Canada, as a liberal trading state, seeks to expand trade and protect its national interest.

Given Canada’s strong inclination towards multilateralism, or neoliberalism, Stein said in 2006 that,

> The most widely accepted interpretation, a central tradition within Canadian scholarship, emphasises the commitment to peacekeeping, mediation, and problem-solving which is characteristically and uniquely Canadian.

With this optimism comes the belief that Canada can, does and should contribute toward peace building in the Middle East. Thus former Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker could argue alongside Bessma Momani in 2008 that,

> There is a near consensus among our practitioners and academics alike that Canada has mattered in the Middle East in the not-so-distant past, that there remain deep wells of respect for Canada among the peoples of

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353 Janice Gross Stein, ‘Canadian Policy in the Middle East’, in Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest, ed. Steven Kendall Holloway (University of Toronto Press, 2006), 374–375.
354 Nearly every military operation the United States has been involved in since World War II has been a joint operation with Canada, and when Canada has opted to stay out of direct conflict it has provided intelligence equipment and personnel. Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State, The Office of Website Management, ‘Canada’, Press Release|Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, (23 August 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm.
355 Stein, ‘Canadian Policy in the Middle East’, 374–375.
356 Ibid., 374.
the Middle East that can be leveraged by our diplomacy, and, in short, that we can make a positive difference.\textsuperscript{357}

Heinbecker and Momani further claimed that, in the Canadian debate surrounding Canada’s engagement with the Middle East, many experts agree it should take a ‘principled’ approach to policy. This matches its own public’s desire for a principled, moral or even-handed approach.\textsuperscript{358} Consensus on just what ‘principled’ means broke down quickly though, with many analysts arguing for outright support for Israel as a fellow liberal democracy faced by chronic danger in a disturbed Middle East, and others advocating a case-by-case approach derived from international law that places less of an emphasis on support for Israel.\textsuperscript{359} Stein argued meanwhile that from early on Canadian policy was more concerned with conciliation and fair deals for all, evidence for her that precludes any accusations of Canadian bias in its Middle East policy.\textsuperscript{360} Rarely if ever is a strong case made though for supporting Palestinian rights.

Finally, often excluded from the mainstream Canadian research interpretation of Canadian foreign policy in is the United States’ role as an \textit{imperial} power in the international system, where Canada is an ally of that Empire, just as it had been to Britain as a colony to the British Empire. When that analysis is offered though Canada is often assumed to be a subordinate ally of United States imperialism, but where Canada’s own interests are typically being advanced alongside the United States.\textsuperscript{361} However, Gordon argues that while smaller and less influential than the United States, Canada is imperialist in its own right and actively supports the international order maintained by the United States. This is not because it is coerced to do so, but because Canada embraces the benefits of that system.\textsuperscript{362} That Canada, ‘both in its historical and contemporary manifestations, [has] an agenda of accumulation by dispossession, in which Indigenous nations are a central target’ inside and outside Canadian state

\textsuperscript{357} Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, eds., \textit{Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice} (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 2.
\textsuperscript{359} Heinbecker and Momani, \textit{Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice}, 3.
\textsuperscript{360} Stein, ‘Canadian Policy in the Middle East’, 379.
\textsuperscript{361} Albo, ‘Empire’s Ally: Canadian Foreign Policy’, 3.
In this way Canada is not so dissimilar from Israel, a fellow second tier power and European settler colony close to the United States in its matrix of power, with Israel's accumulation by dispossession of indigenous Palestinians.

**Neoliberalism and a Responsibility to Protect**

In the 1990s faced with sharp economic constraints and major budget cuts that significantly reduced its capabilities in the realm of foreign policy, Canada and its newly elected (1993) Liberal government embarked on what Allan Gotlieb describes as a mission, ‘to create new norms of international behaviour which, in turn, reflect our values’. This was most clearly expressed in a 1995 review of Canada’s foreign policy that calls for an international system ruled by law, not power – a very neoliberal viewpoint. This review coincided with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a determinable strategic threat. That historical turning point represented for many Western analysts, and political leaders, the final ideological triumph of liberal capitalism over competing ideologies, which Francis Fukuyama famously referred to as ‘The End of History’. At this juncture Canada’s financial deficit coincided with a feeling of strategic safety allowing the Canadian government to increasingly adopt the ‘rhetoric of human security’ while quietly reducing Canada’s overall defence and foreign aid spending.

This post-Cold War, post-Soviet world also seemed to offer Canadian policy makers a less restrictive environment within which they could chart a more distinct Canadian foreign policy. As NATO membership and Canada’s bilateral US relationship faded in importance, the liberal-internationalist norm seemed to accrue strength. The 1995 government statement on foreign policy ‘Canada in the World’ laid out three broad objectives: the promotion of

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363 Gordon, ‘Canada, Empire and Indigenous People in the Americas’, 47.
364 Zahar, ‘Talking One Talk, Walking Another: Norm Entrepreneurship and Canada’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, 46.
368 Ibid., 300–301.
prosperity and employment, the protection of Canadian security within a stable global order, and the projection of Canadian values and culture. Not long after the paper was formulated an ambitious foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (1996-2000) chose to champion the idea of ‘human security’ within those three objectives, projecting of Canadian values abroad. Within this notion of human security the security of the individual was put on the same level as that of the state. As such human security became the centrepiece of Canadian foreign policy and a people-focused approach became the hallmark of Foreign Affairs under Axworthy. In the process Canada reinforced its image as a multilateralist middle power pursuing international peace through the promotion of norms.

The Canadian government and its foreign Minister Axworthy commissioned the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent body that came up with the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) in a 2001 December report. R2P proposed a revolution for conventional norms of state sovereignty in world affairs by arguing that the concept of state sovereignty was conditional upon a state fulfilling its responsibility to protect its citizens. Thus any guarantee on a state’s borders and it sovereignty was nullified when a government proved incapable or unwilling to fulfil their responsibility. In that case of not fulfilling their responsibility, the principal of R2P held that the international community could ‘temporarily’ assume a state’s sovereignty/responsibility in order to save lives. It also held that norms of international law could replace a world of international affairs that is based solely on hard power.

Canada advocated in that period of Liberal government that R2P become a norm for the international community. Such neoliberal Canadian foreign policy framed around intervention and idealism (values) sought to prevent both the collapse of state power or its arbitrary use. When humanitarian intervention

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370 Bloomfield and Nossal, ‘Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture’, 300–301.
371 Zahar, ‘Talking One Talk, Walking Another: Norm Entrepreneurship and Canada’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, 46–47.
373 Allan Gotlieb, ‘Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s Foreign Policy’, Institute for Research on Public Policy, February 2005, 23.
became necessary it was wrapped within social re-engineering aimed at rebuilding ‘functional and responsible’ states. Thus, the international community would become increasingly drawn into nation-building projects that aim to establish or transform state institutions to provide peace, order, and good governance.

By 2004 Michael Ignatieff would argue that ‘peace, order and good governance’ should in fact form the basis of Canadian foreign policy in diplomacy, defence and development work. This would constitute a form of ‘muscular’ multilateralism that combined hard with soft power. He also believed ultimately that Canada’s national interest would benefit most by working through multilateral institutions that can provide it with a voice bigger than its own. In a sense this was an iteration of the 1995 government statement that Canada should project its culture and values abroad.

In 2003 the Canadian government had developed a new foreign policy statement ‘A Dialogue on Foreign Policy Report to Canadians’ written up out of a mixture of public consultations in 2002 and 2003, including town hall meetings and Internet submissions. However, little changed in the fundamental message first laid out in 1995, where Canada would project its values onto the world abroad,

Canada’s foreign policy agenda must reflect the nation we are: a multicultural, bilingual society that is free, open, prosperous, and democratic. The experiences of immigrants from around the world and the cultures of Aboriginal peoples are woven into the fabric of our national identity. Respect for equality and diversity runs through the religious, racial, cultural and linguistic strands forming our communities.... In using our position to champion Canadian values abroad, we are advancing humanitarian concerns that Canadians have long cherished,
and are promoting social models endorsed by many of our allies. At the same time, we are helping to foster global conditions conducive to our own security and prosperity. As we try to realise our social and political values more fully at home, we can benefit ourselves by also promoting these values abroad.\footnote{Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’.}

Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s successor, Paul Martin (2003-6), explicitly embraced the ICISS report that sovereign states had a ‘responsibility to protect’ their citizens.\footnote{Bloomfield and Nossal, ‘Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture’, 301.} His 2005 ‘International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World’ advocated a doctrine of activism in diplomacy, defence, development and commerce aimed at reinserting Canada into international affairs, by targeting an ‘arc of instability’ covering a region of ‘failing and failed states’ stretching more or less along the equatorial regions from Central America across the globe to Southeast Asia.\footnote{Andrew Godefroy, ‘Canada’s International Policy Statement Five Years Later’ (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, November 2010), 1–2, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canadas%20International%20Policy%20Statement%20Five%20Years%20Later.pdf.} Through this approach the government of Canada would seek to make a difference in three main areas: countering global terrorism, stabilising failed and fragile states, and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\footnote{Zahar, ‘Talking One Talk, Walking Another: Norm Entrepreunership and Canada’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, 59.} While supposedly to breaking ‘parochial’ notions of national security, development would be used as a tool able to prevent impoverished states from becoming a source of instability.\footnote{Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ‘Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World’ (Foreign Policy Statement by Government of Canada, 2005), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots783=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=15094.} Development was drawn more closely to security.
Kim R Nossal notes by 2004 after almost a decade of being told by their government that one of the primary aims of Canadian foreign policy was to project ‘Canadian values’ abroad, it would seem that Canadians,

Had grown so accustomed to the idea that they no longer questioned it—much less considered that such a vision of foreign policy might be deeply flawed, or might fly in the face of decades of a particular ‘Canadian way’ of seeing the world and Canada’s place in it.\footnote{Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’, 1.}

Alan Gotlieb refers to this as a ‘feel-good’ foreign policy of ‘norm-entrepreneur’ that was simultaneously characterised by government’s reluctance to even commit enough resources to see it through.\footnote{Gotlieb noted that Canada’s rhetoric in foreign policy was not being backed up by the resources it was allocating toward it: defense spending dropped from 7.3 per cent of GDP in the 1950s to 1.1 per cent by the mid-2000s, and foreign aid expenditures from 0.53 per cent of GDP in official aid in the 1970s to 0.22 per cent. Gotlieb, ‘Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s Foreign Policy’, 23.} While not committing those resources Canada continued to moralise and advocate superior Canadian values abroad.\footnote{Ibid., 18.} Nossal too noted a sizeable gap between Canada’s talk about value-based projection and its actions, noting how Canada would abandon the use of multilateral negotiations in favour of unilateralism when it perceived its own interests were at risk,

If Canadians are so committed to the rule of law internationally, why is the government in Ottawa so quick to embrace unilateral solutions when Canadian self-interests demand it, as occurred in the case of the arrest of the Spanish fishing vessel Estai in 1995 – a move that was in complete defiance of international law, but which garnered the government huge popular support at home?\footnote{Ibid., 24; Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’, 11.}

Internally he wondered,

Why do First Nations in Canada continue to be governed by paternalistic legislation and often anti-democratic practices?\footnote{Nossal, ‘The World We Want.pdf’, 11.}
Meanwhile, Canada’s commitment to R2P seemed hollow when in the 2000s it did not even make the minimum declarations of concern for the fate of civilians when acts of aggression were carried out by friendly Israeli or US governments invading or bombarding Lebanon, Iraq, and the OPT. What Canada was able to do though in its rhetoric was to anoint itself an advanced state with the duty, or right, to try remake the world in its own image in the name of higher ideals, even while forgetting that its foreign policy did not neatly with those ideals.

While the Liberal Martin government increasingly emphasised R2P in its foreign policy rhetoric, it also began to align Canadian foreign policy more closely with an agenda offering support for Israel, drawing considerable attention at the UN for its pro-Israel voting patterns. Simultaneous to providing strong political cover for Israel, it launched a well-coordinated ‘all of government’ approach to providing assistance to Palestinians. This involved a concerted effort to reinforce Oslo by bringing to bear the expertise of between eight to ten Canadian departments and institutions to strengthen Palestinian institutions in key sectors, notably justice and border administration. This was hyper neoliberalism and hyper Oslo, in the midst of the Second Intifada. In many ways Martin’s approach simply put a renewed emphasis on keeping people (especially Palestinians and aid workers) busy while ignoring the core political issues of occupation, settler colonialism and Palestinian rights. The Martin government was re-emphasising an Oslo approach of developing (civilising) the Palestinians in the OPT in order to live in peace with a liberal, democratic Israel, rather than addressing the root cause of their marginalisation.

When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a key actor who sparked the Second Intifada with a dark history overseeing the mass murder of Palestinian civilians, took the decision in 2005 to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza, the Martin government welcomed the move and expressed hope that it would be an opportunity for the PA to establish a state in Gaza and the West Bank, without mentioning East Jerusalem. To support disengagement, he offered Canadian

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388 Zahar, ‘Talking One Talk, Walking Another: Norm Entrepreneurship and Canada’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, 54.
390 This initiative seems to have stopped with the election of the Hamas government in 2006 and was not taken up by the Harper government. Michael Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspectives on Canada - Middle East Relations’, in *Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice*, ed. Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 12.
technical expertise on border crossing management and a few Canadian military personnel to assist the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) in Jerusalem with ‘Operation Proteus’ training Western-backed PA security forces. In effect Canada was helping to improve Israeli systems of control over Palestinians, helping the occupier rather than the occupied.

Harper Conservative Rule

The 2006 January 23rd Canadian federal election brought to power for the first time the Conservative Stephen Harper Government, built out of the former Reform and Canadian Alliance political parties whose strongest base of support was in the petroleum rich province of Alberta. This government would bring to Ottawa the views of the original Western Canadian-based, populist Reform Party, many of whose members were pro-Israel evangelicals who viewed it as an oasis of democracy and civilisation surrounded by dangerous dictatorships and savageness. That election would mark the beginning of a major shift in Canadian foreign policy even closer to Israel.

Those Middle East policies were likely driven by domestic electoral considerations, as will be explained later in this chapter, but may also have been part of an attempt by Ottawa to address the Bush administration’s concerns in the US about Canadian foreign policy, which had been strained by the Chrétien government’s refusal to join the US’ ill-fated 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Harper government adopted tougher rhetoric on terrorism, of which many groups designated as terrorist in Canada are Palestinian. By 2007 Canada published a counterinsurgency field manual that developed its foreign policy.

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392 JTA, ‘What Makes Canada’s PM One of Israel’s Staunchest Supporters?’
393 Bloomfield and Nossal, ‘Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture’, 301.
394 Zahar, ‘Talking One Talk, Walking Another: Norm Entrepreneurship and Canada’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, 58.
policy on a ‘3-D approach’ of security in defence, diplomacy and (still) development work.\textsuperscript{396}

While the Martin government had already shifted Canada’s UN voting patterns perceptibly closer to Israel, the Harper government would take an even harder pro-Israel line.\textsuperscript{397} As noted, Canada was also the first donor to cut aid to the Palestinians following Hamas’ 2006 January 25\textsuperscript{th} election victory, just days after the Harper government itself first came to power. This was an astonishingly resolute decision for a government without experience.\textsuperscript{398} The extent to which this new Canadian government began siding with Israel was put on display when during a 2006 summer war between Israel and Lebanon, Israeli forces killed a Canadian UN peace observer and three other UN soldiers at their station on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Informed speculation suggested that Lebanese Hezbollah fighters were using the outpost as a safe area, but that still did not account for a UN commander warning the Israeli military that Israel would kill their people if it attacked the area. The Canadian government opened an investigation into the events. It resulted in a 2008 public report concluding the deaths were preventable and the Israeli military was at fault for the four UN observers’ deaths. The report later disappeared from the Canadian Defence Department website, with the Defence Department claiming this was done in early 2009 for security reasons.\textsuperscript{399} Harper had already expressed initial doubt that Israel targeted the post, later expressed regret over the deaths but questioned why the UN keeps observer posts in south Lebanon in the first place since it was effectively a war zone.\textsuperscript{400} Harper was giving public support for Israeli policy even when it led to the death of a Canadian soldier who was part of a UN peacekeeping mission.

During the 2006 war Harper also diverged from Western condemnation of Israel to insist that it was defending itself appropriately against terrorism. His

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{398} Yves Engler, \textit{Canada and Israel: Building Apartheid} (Fernwood Publishing, 2010), 81.
\end{thebibliography}
government would do the same during the 2008–09 bombardment of Gaza (Gaza war) war when his Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon solely blamed Hamas for the violence.\(^{401}\) In each case Israel was portrayed as the victim and the voice of reason in a war of civilisation. The Harper government was also the first to withdraw from the second UN World Conference Against Racism, known as Durban II, saying the event would ‘scapegoat the Jewish people’\(^ {402}\). Ever since Benjamin Netanyahu Likud won power in Israel’s 2009 February election the Canadian government has repeatedly and publicly sided with a government dominated by ever more extreme far right parties with openly racist politicians who publicly advocate for genocide against Palestinians.\(^{403}\)

In 2012 November Canada sought to block a UN vote recognising Palestine as a Permanent Observer State, and threatened to cut off aid to the Palestinians in retaliation. On several occasions, Harper’s government refused to criticise the construction of new Israeli settlements in the OPT. By 2013 they went so far as to side with Israel against the US Obama Administration by voicing scepticism about an interim nuclear deal with Iran. In deference to Israeli hostility toward the International Criminal Court (ICC) Canada dropped out of efforts to refer the situation in Syria to that court. It is hard to imagine a stronger alignment of Canadian policy with Israel’s than under the Harper government.\(^{404}\) In 2014 January Harper rebuffed questions about Israeli settlements saying he would not stand in the Middle East and criticise Israel, even though Canada has long had an official policy opposing settlement growth.\(^ {405}\)

The Conservative Government abandoned any use of R2P terminology while accelerating Canada’s drift away from peacekeeping that had begun under the previous two Liberal governments.\(^{406}\) By 2009, Embassy magazine reported that


\(^{402}\) JTA, ‘What Makes Canada’s PM One of Israel’s Staunchest Supporters?’


the Harper government forbade the use of phrases such as human security, public policy, good governance and the responsibility to protect.\(^{407}\) Instead it provided preferred alternatives such as human rights, the rule of law, democracy and democratic government.\(^{408}\) The Conservative government was working hard to disassociate itself from the traditions of the previous Liberal government, particularly liberal internationalism and intervention like R2P, yet not quite abandoning neoliberalism in an anticipated shift toward neorealism.

One of the most important legacies of the Harper Conservative government has been its propensity to use partisan foreign policy for domestic electoral purposes, such as wooing Jewish voters away from the Liberals by taking an even stauncher public stance in support of Israel.\(^{409}\) Nossal goes so far to suggest that Harper’s Conservative foreign policy is neither that ideological nor conservative. He writes that it is determined not by global politics or domestic politics, but by the ballot box, which is primarily based on electoral considerations.\(^{410}\) There is evidence to suggest that this support for Israel has been a successful, winning votes in key urban ridings that were once dominated by the Liberal party.\(^{411}\)

The Harper government has acted without hesitation to provide support for Israel. Not unlike the Liberal government that preceded it, the Harper government argues that it is taking a ‘principled’ position, because Canada and Israel share common democratic values including transparent elections, an independent judiciary, a free press, and human rights.\(^{412}\) This of course requires ignoring the very undemocratic nature of Israeli military rule in the OPT and discrimination against Palestinians in Israel.

Support for Israel reached rhetorical heights by February 2010 when Peter Kent, Harper’s Minister of state for foreign affairs, claimed that, ‘an attack on


\(^{408}\) Ibid.


\(^{410}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{411}\) Sasley, ‘Who Calls the Shots?’

Israel would be considered an attack on Canada’. That was an extraordinary statement since no treaty was in force between the two countries requiring anything close to such a reaction. Harper had said something similar though in 2008 May,

Our government believes that those who threaten Israel also threaten Canada, because, as the last war showed [with Lebanon in 2006], hate-fuelled bigotry against some is ultimately a threat to us all, and must be resisted wherever it may lurk.... In this on-going battle, Canada stands firmly side-by-side with the State of Israel, our friend and ally in the democratic family of nations.

In a 2014 January speech to Israel’s Knesset, Harper reflected on a Jewish Rosh Hashanah prayer and promised, ‘through fire and water, Canada will stand with you’.

For the first time, a Canadian prime Minister unequivocally took a firm position on the Arab-Israeli conflict by siding with one party over the other because he considers it the ‘moral’ and ‘principled’ thing to do. In the case of Israel though, Conservative government rhetoric has been backed by action. Under Harper Canada has sided openly, at times fervently, with Israel in every one of its military operations. Some scholars and diplomats, ‘rank it as the most dramatic shift in the history of post-war Canadian foreign policy’. Greg Albo argues that in Canada’s foreign policy under Harper, there appear to be for Israel no legal or moral limits of acceptable international conduct being able to be breeched.

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414 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
417 JTA, ‘What Makes Canada’s PM One of Israel’s Staunchest Supporters?’
418 Albo, ‘Empire’s Ally: Canadian Foreign Policy’, 9.
Canada’s Aggressive Relationship with Poor Countries & Indigenous Peoples

Then there is the more pessimistic, less self-congratulatory analysis of Canada’s external relations than that offered by Ignatieff, Stein, Heinbecker or even to an extent neorealists like Gottlieb or Nossal. Researchers like Klassen, Albo, Gordon, Webber and McNally describe a Canada that is less the progressively liberal, peace building state that is a ‘humanitarian nation and a model of progressive internationalism’. Rather that Canada is a settler colony with predatory aims of its own aimed at poorer and weaker states, or indigenous communities, benefitting from and participating in an imperatum pax Americana. The national elite of this Canada has an independent interest of its own, and cannot be seen as simply a subservient ‘comprador’ class to US imperial aims. For this reason Canada plays a leading role in multilateral institutions like the World Bank and IMF helping to establish conditions necessary to facilitate its own economic advantages. It certainly was not forced into supporting those IFIs’ aggressive imposition of structural adjustment on poorer countries. This is a neoliberal capitalist imperialism where ‘the creation of new spaces of accumulation’ inevitably involves the forceful and violent reorganisation of people’s lives, such as the economic reorganisation plans of the World Bank and IMF, as they are subordinated to the whims of capital. Viewed from this perspective, Klassen argues that Harper’s foreign policy agenda is best viewed not as a radical shift, but, ‘as a radical extension of Canadian state practices in the neoliberal period’ adopting a neoliberalism designed, ‘as a stepping-stone for Canadian corporate expansion in the world economy, particularly through foreign direct investments’.

This Canada is an advanced capitalist state within a hierarchy of nations operating within the global capitalist economy. The example these researchers

421 Gordon, ‘Canada, Empire and Indigenous People in the Americas’, 64.
often turn to is Canada’s intervention into Latin America. Gordon points out that since the early 1990s, Canadian corporate investments have spread at a considerable pace around the world and into the developing world, supported by whatever party is in power – Liberal or Conservative. He further points out that like other powerful and rich states, Canada’s investments are mired in human rights violations and environmental catastrophe mirrored by its absolute refusal to establish human rights legislation to govern the foreign activities of its corporations, many of which are subsidised by the government in their predatory activities. Canada has even gone so far as to attempt to undermine the UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to free up spaces for accumulation by dispossession corporate ends in regions around the world, such as Latin America.

Canada is itself a state built rich on indigenous dispossession, defended with the same terms of progress espoused by Benny Morris for Israel and the United States. The Canadian state’s historic predatory relationship with Indigenous people provides a sharp example of these dynamics of accumulation by dispossession, serving as a potent reminder of Canada’s imperialist history. Government ministries responsible for Aboriginal affairs have betrayed their economic intentions by being traditionally subsumed within economic ministries like ‘Mines and Resources’ or ‘Northern Development’, where a series of rules and regulations are used to manage Canadian indigenous lives completely and in a totalitarian manner – not so dissimilar from UNRWA’s management of millions of Palestinian refugee lives. Gordon argues that it has been only grudgingly that the Canadian state granted any self-governed land (referred to as ‘reservations’) to some of Canada’s indigenous nations, much like Israel and the international community granting Palestinians limited self rule on Areas A and B in the OPT. Yet like the Palestinians that grudging grant owes largely only to the Indigenous peoples’ absolute refusal to give way to settler colonialism.

426 Ibid.
428 Gordon, ‘Canada, Empire and Indigenous People in the Americas’, 52.
When Canada has ‘offered’ indigenous people’s land it has done so in such a way as to undermine their self-sufficiency and provide itself with the opportunity to carry out closer surveillance of those colonised communities, just like for Israel in Areas A and B in the OPT. Not so dissimilar from the endless Oslo peace talks that donors strong-arm Palestinians to participate in while Israel colonises their land in bad faith, typically the aim of the treaty process negotiating over land in Canada has been, as Gordon observes, ‘to absorb serious political activity into the safer legal realm and bind Indigenous nations into legal arguments and maneuvering’ while the Canadian government buys time and delays decisions inside a system of resolution where anyway the laws are set-out by the settler colonial Canadian state itself.429 Like Israel, even when agreements exist, Canada has often reneged on them, demonstrating that it has no intention of allowing those to interfere with its ongoing settler colonial expansion.430

The Canadian state maintains its nexus of total control over indigenous people’s based on the European imperial defence that the savages need their civilised guardianship.431 In its most recent incarnation as the ‘Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development’, that guardianship remains a neoliberal ‘civilising’ agenda with a pre-occupation toward exploiting Aboriginal labour through market integration, as well of course as natural resources, not far removed from the neoliberal logic of the Oslo aid agenda in the OPT. Just as the efforts of Western donors are presented in the OPT in a flattering light, the Canadian government’s development efforts with indigenous communities in Canada are presented ‘with a charitable veneer’ with developmentalist buzzwords like ‘economic development’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘self-government’ designated to indicate government policy being crafted in the interests of the colonised first and foremost, even when the reality remains that ‘economic development’ of Indigenous communities is premised on the negation of their self-determination. This echoes the motives of donors like Canada supporting Palestinians to keep them quiet under Israeli settler colonial.432 It is from this perspective, observing Canada’s self-denied settler colonial nature and exploitative imperial intentions aggressively predating upon poorer countries

429 Ibid., 60.
430 Ibid., 61–62.
431 Ibid., 52–53.
432 Ibid., 57.
and weaker indigenous communities around the world, by which Canada’s ardent support for Israel might be better understood, regardless of the power of Canada’s Israel lobby and opportunities taken by politicians such as Martin or Harper to harness it.

Pro-Israel Sympathies

Community Voting Patterns

There is a common belief in Canada that the pro-Israel lobby wields significant influence on Canadian foreign policy, and some interviews with former government officials support this observation. Irrespective of this, Pro-Israel Jewish groups have been effective in their mobilisation to promote a narrative that shapes Canadian policy to their preference, at least in the Middle East. Even if Canadians have general views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, they tend not feel to strongly enough about it to actively promote their views to politicians in such a way as to counter the well-mobilised pro-Israel lobby.

As of 2011, Statistics Canada estimated that out of 33,476,688 Canadians those who identified as Jewish made up approximately 1% of the population. Most of those Jewish Canadians held a strong affinity to Israel, particularly since the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In spite of their relatively small numbers, they are a distinct community well established within Canada’s economic and political landscape. Generally liberal in their social views, they do not extend those views on to Palestinian rights, because they are especially ardent Zionists. A large portion of the community lives in Toronto and Montreal, where almost three-quarters have visited Israel, as compared to less than half that percentage for US citizens identifying as Jewish. Further, a 2006 analysis found that 42% of Canadian Jews identify as Zionists, compared with 25% of

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433 Paul Heinbecker et al., eds., ‘Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy’, in Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 188.
434 Ibid., 189.
436 Heinbecker et al., ‘Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy’, 197.
437 Ibid.
US Jews.  The Orthodox Jewish community, which typically votes Conservative in Canada, has been experiencing a population boom.

The Jewish community in Canada is characterised by being highly centralised and their resources concentrated. This may be attributed to the creation of a hierarchical series of authoritative communal institutions, such as the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) and the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC). The CIC acts as the main group lobbying on behalf of Israel, alongside smaller organisations such as the more right-leaning B’nai Brith and other smaller right-wing groups. Meanwhile, there is a small left-oriented Independent Jewish Voices (IVP) that criticises the tenets of Zionism. In spite of a plethora of articles in leftist online or print magazines critical of the occupation, there is no Canadian equivalent of the US liberal Zionist but left-leaning lobby group J-Street. Overall there is a more conservative pro-Israel environment in Canada’s Jewish community.

These Jewish Canadians once voted disproportionately for the Liberals and the socialist CCF-NDP, while Jewish Communists once held seats in the House of Commons and Ontario Legislature. However, during the 2000s Conservative party strategists under Harper targeted the Jewish community as part of their outreach to score supporters in minority groups that typically voted Liberal. This was a new type of Canadian electoral politics similar to the US,

It used to be you won an election in Canada by standing in the middle of the spectrum - I’m not sure that is the case any longer. You win through micro-targeting. Very American in style and substance. Fixed election dates only make that worse. Conservative policy targets specific ridings, and even groups and sub-groups within ridings. By doing that, you have a chance in all ridings that matter. Since the Conservative party’s core constituency of Anglo-Protestant supporters would not be large enough to achieve their goal of forming a majority government on their own in a highly multicultural Canada, Harper appealed to non-traditional Conservatives, such as Jews, on the basis of shared social

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439 Sasley, ‘Who Calls the Shots?’
440 Dr. Ian Roberge, ‘Two Quick Questions - from Your Perspective’, 14 February 2014.
values. Jewish community leaders matched his efforts at a time when a changing political landscape saw a noticeable decline in domestic support for Israel, but also a fear for the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism. Besides displaying a deep-set and genuine personal sympathy for Israel and the Jewish Zionist agenda, Harper and his government were also able to capitalise on a multicultural country where, as Moses describes, a plethora of different ethnic communities, ‘invest “their” groups with ontological status, so that they, and not individuals, are the significant bearers of human rights and memory’ and the Jewish community leadership has sought out both support for Israel and to argue to the public that the Holocaust was unique from the genocide of other people’s, like Ukrainians and Armenians, seeking from that argument to educate the public on the ‘lessons of the Holocaust’ as uniquely terrible. In that type of democratic system political leaders can highlight the experiences of communities in order to court particular electoral constituencies, in a struggle for recognition that is laden with irresistible political temptations, particularly in the contemporary global environment where genocidal intentions against Israel can be ascribed to Iran and remembering the Holocaust thereby becomes enlisted into the ‘war on terror’. The Harper Conservative strategy appeared to have been successful capitalising on these moods changing voting patterns within Canada’s typical Liberal-leaning Jewish community. While many Jewish Canadians remained prominent in the Liberal Party, more than half of Jewish respondents to an exit poll in the 2011 election said they voted Conservative.

In their calculation of minority voting groups, Conservative strategists estimated that 20% of minority voters were not accessible to the party. This figure appears to include Arab Canadians, though the Conservatives have at times

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441 A. Dirk Moses, ‘The Canadian Museum for Human Rights: The “uniqueness of the Holocaust” and the Question of Genocide’, *Journal of Genocide Research* 14, no. 2 (1 June 2012): 217, doi:10.1080/14623528.2012.677762. In this article Moses explores the fascinating dynamic of an inter-group intra-Canadian dispute in which different communities argue over which suffered the most from genocide, and the Canadian Jewish community's consistent attempt to argue that its experience during the Holocaust was uniquely bad above all genocides, all surrounding the establishment of a controversial Canadian Human Rights Museum.

442 Ibid.


made overtures to carefully chosen Muslim groups. Arab Canadians are almost
twice as numerous as their Jewish counterparts, but they are not as well
established and are more reluctant to engage in politics. There are two
organisations that the government of Canada considers official representatives
of the Arab community for Middle East policy. One is the Canadian Arab
Federation (CAF), which was founded in 1967 as an umbrella group of about 40
smaller organisations. The other is the National Council on Canada-Arab
Relations (NCCAR) founded in 1985. However, the community is divided along
national, regional and religious lines that have actively prevented it from
presenting a united front to policy makers. One Arab leader noted that many
Arabs have come to Canada to escape politics because of their experience with
it in the Middle East. Arab community self-isolation was heightened by the
otherness imposed on them after the 2001 September 11th attacks in the US
and subsequent reactions by law enforcement and immigration, making the
community more timid.

Many non-Jewish clergy in Canada have meanwhile supported the Zionist
cause, or the establishment of some kind of Jewish homeland in Palestine for
the survivors of the Holocaust. This helped generate support for Israel and
Zionism in Canadian public opinion and the media. More recently, Christian
evangelical groups sympathetic to Zionist objectives have conducted their own
pro-Israel advocacy work. Surveys indicate that churchgoers and Christians
show the most support for the religious rights of Jews and for Israel.

Meanwhile, a 2012 April opinion poll found about half of Canadians thought
their country’s policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict was balanced. This was
the same figure as a decade earlier, with public opinion barely fluctuating
between those dates. This came despite the different public postures between
the Liberal and Conservative governments on Israel and Palestine, and events
in the Middle East.

445 Sasley, ‘Who Calls the Shots?’
446 Barry, ‘Canada and the Middle East Today: Electoral Politics and Foreign Policy’, 193;
Wiseman, ‘Canadian Policy, Canadian Attitudes, and the Middle East’.
447 Heinbecker et al., ‘Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy’, 197.
449 Wiseman, ‘Canadian Policy, Canadian Attitudes, and the Middle East’.
Political Parties

There are strong links and feelings of affinity for Israel across Canadian political parties and institutions. The most obvious has been the Canada Conservative Party of the 2000s and 2010s. Though, like most of his predecessors Harper had little direct experience of the region, he came to office with strong personal religious beliefs, an inclination to support Israel, very clear views on terrorism and the appropriate response to terrorist activities. Harper’s views in favour of Israel are so strong that Canadian Jewish officials have been taken aback and fear it might undermine their advocacy efforts with the other political parties. However, beyond playing electoral politics and aiming to garner Jewish votes, Harper’s approach also reflects an evangelical Christian viewpoint held by many members of the dominant Alliance/Reform wing of his Conservative party, which has always been quite pro-Israel. Nearly half of the elected Conservative MPs after the 2011 election, up to seventy, could be called evangelical Christians.

During the extreme summer 2014 bombardment of Gaza by Israel, which earned large-scale global approbation, the Conservative Party of Canada released a campaign-style video on YouTube ‘Through Fire and Water’ advertising just how strong their support for Israel was.

Meanwhile the Canadian Liberal Party, Canada’s governing party throughout the 20th Century and a strong proponent of Canadian multiculturalism, has traditionally enjoyed robust Jewish community membership and votes. While it has at times opted to give the appearance of a balanced approach not favouring any side, it and party members have normally been strong allies of Israel. Leading Liberals such as the peacekeeper and former Prime Minister Pearson played a key role in the foundation of Israel. Prior to 1979 the Liberals did not even bother to give the impression of a balanced approach to Middle East issues, choosing simply to side with Israel, while from 2004 onward the Martin government again abandoned the balanced approach. One of the leading MPs for the Chrétien and Martin Liberal governments, as well as

450 Heinbecker et al., ‘Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy’, 189.
452 Ibid.
454 David Taras and David Goldberg, Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (McGill-Queen’s Press - MQUP, 1989), 129.
Martin’s Minister of Justice (2003-2006), Irwin Cotler argued that the core tenets of Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East were protection for the security and legitimacy of Israel. He argued that the main reason Oslo failed has been the unwillingness of the Palestinian and Arab leadership to accept Israel’s legitimacy, that Israel had in 1947 accepted peace based on the UN partition but the Arabs launched a war of aggression against the Jewish state, that Arab states have traditionally been the aggressors against Israel, and that it is the Arab rejection of peace that is responsible for any conflict.\(^\text{455}\)

The third major party in Canadian federal politics is the left-leaning New Democratic Party (NDP), formerly called the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). Though never elected to govern Canada, it has formed a number of provincial governments and played key roles influencing federal policy, particularly the minority Liberal governments of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in the 1970s, who was sympathetic to the NDP’s progressive values. Although initially opposed in the 1930s to the establishment of a ‘European colony’ in the Middle East at Arab expense, after World War II the party moved to support of Israel based on the perception that Israel had progressive socialist policies.\(^\text{456}\) In 1975, NDP MP and former leader Tommy Douglas told Israel’s Histadrut, ‘The main enmity against Israel is that she has been an affront to those nations who do not treat their people and their workers as well as Israel has treated hers’.\(^\text{457}\) Though by the 2000s, the party’s position appeared to become more balanced, Canada’s leading ‘left’ party can still be seen as generally pro-Israel. In May 2008 future NDP leader Thomas Mulcair was quoted in the Canadian Jewish News as saying, ‘I am an ardent supporter of Israel in all situations and in all circumstances’.\(^\text{458}\)


\(^{458}\) Engler, ‘Canada’s “Left” New Democratic Party (NDP) Endorses Corporate, US-NATO War Agenda’. 150
Political support for Israel transcending party lines has manifested itself in multiparty work for Israel on committees such as the highly partisan Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism (CPCCA), formed in 2009 March. The CPCCA was a group of Canadian parliamentarians organised together for the stated purpose of, ‘confronting and combating anti-Semitism in Canada’. 459 Though not an official committee of Parliament, it nonetheless organised itself to conduct hearings and produce a report in the same manner as a Parliamentary committee. It was made up of former and sitting MPs from the Conservative Party, Liberal Party, the NDP and initially the French Canadian separatist Bloc Québécois. A Liberal MP, Mario Silva, chaired it, while Conservative MP Scott Reid was Vice Chair. Prominent members included leading former or current Liberal and Conservative Cabinet Ministers such as Carolyn Bennett (Lib.), Ken Dryden (Lib.), Hedy Fry (Lib.), Peter Kent (Con.), Anita Neville (Lib.), Bob Rae (interim leader of the federal Liberal party 2011-2013 and formerly NDP Premier of Ontario 1990-1995), Jason Kenney (Con.) and Irwin Cotler, as well as MP Pat Martin (NDP).

Following a two-year period of research on 2011 July 7th the CPCCA released a report on anti-Semitism in Canada. 460 The CPCCA recognised anti-Semitism as something antithetical to fundamental Canadian values like multiculturalism, constitutional guarantees against discrimination and human rights as espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 461 It focused on what it considered a ‘new anti-Semitism’ associated with the ‘radical left’, which it considers to be the revival of classically anti-Semitic beliefs in the guise of anti-Zionism. 462 It took note of university campuses, much of which have some type of Palestine rights student group, as particular venues for anti-Semitic behaviour in Canada. Further, they link that new anti-Semitism to the growth of political Islam, an issue with which the Canadian public has been particularly concerned. The CPCCA considers that political Islam to be a violent and

459 The CPCCA website has since been taken down.
potentially genocidal threat to Jews, which they claim is active on university campuses and thereby linked to the radical left of pro-Palestine activism.\textsuperscript{463} Irony was lost on CPCCA members that the university campus has historically been targeted for dissent by educated youth against existing power structures linked to oppression, privilege or an existing social order.\textsuperscript{464}

Recommendations by CPCCA included withholding funds from NGOS that preach anti-Semitism, standardising national definitions of anti-Semitism, increasing laws against anti-Semitism, the pooling of information across Canadian governmental and civil society to track anti-Semitism, having Canadian universities develop procedures to share and report information on campus anti-Semitism (essentially spying on students), and that Canada adopt the Working Definition of Anti-Semitism developed by a European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). Critics of the report note that it selectively discussed testimony; chose pro-Israel, Jewish student, religious and community groups, and academics mainly from the US or Israel to testify; and that it grew out of a 2009 February Inter-Parliamentary Committee for Combating Anti-Semitism (ICCA) in London, which itself was the product of an agency of the government of Israel called the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism. Thus in some way the CPCCA was the product of lobbying work sponsored by the government of Israel.

Critics also note that key assertions of the report were entirely unsupported by the most authoritative testimony of the Inquiry, such as university administrators discussing anti-Semitic incidences on campus. Almost none of the law enforcement testimonials noted a rise in anti-Semitic incidences and no university administrators considered anti-Semitism to be a problem on their campus. Also, the 2005 EUMC Working Definition of Anti-Semitism has no official status, has not been adopted by any government and if incorporated in legislation could effectively ban most criticism of Israel in Canada.\textsuperscript{465} Basically

\textsuperscript{463} Ibid., 19.
the CPCCA report is spurious, unsupported and driven by partisan politics, but was given a veneer of authority by the participation of leading Parliamentarians.

The CPCCA panel also participated in the 2010 Ottawa Conference on Anti-Semitism where the speakers included many members of the Canadian political elite. They included the Governor General of Canada (Canada’s Head of State), the Prime Minister, then Leader of the Opposition Liberal Michael Ignatieff and Deputy Leader of the NDP Thomas Mulcair (who would become leader of the opposition in 2012). Work by the CPCAA and the Ottawa Conference led to the Ottawa Protocol, drawn up by international parliamentarians brought together by the ICCA, which challenges the ‘selective’ and ‘unfair’ criticism of Israel,

Let it be clear: Criticism of Israel is not anti-Semitic, and saying so is wrong. But singling Israel out for selective condemnation and opprobrium – let alone denying its right to exist or seeking its destruction – is discriminatory and hateful, and not saying so is dishonest.

Just as Canada became the first country to boycott the PA in 2006, Canada became first signatory to the Ottawa Protocol in 2011.

Media & Academia

The Canadian media has been accused of being quite pro-Israel, absent of a voice sympathetic to Palestinians. There is some research evidence of this bias. In 2005, the Near East Cultural and Education Foundation (NECEF) published a study on the Canadian print media’s coverage of the Second Intifada. The study analysed their coverage of Israeli and Palestinian deaths looking at the headlines and first paragraphs of articles for two one-year periods: from 2000 September 29th to 2001 September 28th, and from 2004 January 1st to 2004

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December 31\textsuperscript{st}. It looked at three major print newspapers, the Globe and Mail, the National Post and the Toronto Star, at a time when print media was a significant source of news.

The study seemed to confirm perceptions that much of the media adopt a strongly pro-Israel editorial position.\textsuperscript{469} There was a tendency for all papers to report Palestinian casualties at a rate approximating the rate of Israeli deaths throughout the conflict. This occurred despite the fact that the trend line of Palestinian deaths was considerably different than that of Israeli deaths in the periods under review. Such a finding seems to indicate that newspaper editors are more likely to select articles reporting conflict related deaths during periods in which Israelis are being targeted. There was a strong tendency toward under-reporting and downplaying the deaths of Palestinian children’s to the point of a nearly complete omission in National Post coverage. Ad-hoc observations during the data collection process seemed to indicate that Palestinians were generally more likely to be described as combatants than Israelis, despite the fact that a greater percentage of Palestinian civilians have been victims of conflict than Israeli civilians.\textsuperscript{470}

While much of the major Canadian university campuses have since the Second Intifada had at least one student group lobbying for Palestinian rights, Canadian university campuses and academia share in common with the Canada’s media a reputation for maintaining strong pro-Israel biases. Likewise each campus has some form of pro-Israel student group that is better funded, linked to the government of Israel through its embassies and supported by the university administration. Those university administrations, and even major Canadian political parties, often protest advocacy work carried out by the student Palestinian rights groups. Objections by university head’s are often linked to obstacles including room cancelations or other forms of administrative intimidation. Organisers even face physical intimidation by pro-Israel activists.\textsuperscript{471}

\textsuperscript{469} The National Post was bought in 2000 by the wealthy pro-Israeli advocate and owner of the major meida group CanWestGlobal, Israel ‘Izzy’ Asper.

\textsuperscript{470} ‘Media Bias in the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict: Canadian Print Media Coverage of Israeli and Palestinian Deaths’, 58.

Intimidation extends beyond student activism into academic research. In 2009 an academic conference at York University was organised to discuss possibilities for peace entitled, ‘Israel/Palestine: Mapping models of statehood and prospects for peace’. The conference was to be funded by York University, Queen’s University and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). SSHRC is the Canadian government agency that funds postsecondary-based research and training in the humanities and social sciences. Although the agency should in theory operate at arm’s length of government and free from intervention, in a pattern we will see is common for the Conservative government, Minister for Science and Technology Gary Goodyear allegedly contacted the president of SSHRC a mere two weeks before the conference in order to ask him directly to reconsider the peer-reviewed decision to grant $19,700 for the conference.

By contrast to York University, the prestigious Munk Centre at the University of Toronto held a conference in the early years of the Second Intifada mapping the growth of ‘anti-Semitism’. The conference was called ‘Anti-Semitism: The Politicization of Prejudice in the Contemporary World’. The University of Toronto is one of Canada’s leading universities and the Munk Centre one of most prestigious IR research centres. The results of the conference included a book entitled ‘Contemporary Anti-Semitism: Canada and the World’. The book makes an argument that anti-Semitism is a negative force that can be traced consistently from Roman times onward, as a resurgent contemporary force. In the preface it states that,

The conference took place in a heated political climate of international tension and war and was shaped by intense concerns about the revival


474 Michael Robert Marrus, Derek Jonathan Penslar, and Janice Gross Stein, Contemporary Antisemitism: Canada and the World (University of Toronto Press, 2005).
of forms of prejudice that, many thought, had been consigned to the
dustbins of history. 475

A contributor to the volume was former Conservative Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney (1984-1993). A supporter of Israel, he wrote,

Following the Holocaust, the cry of “Never Again” became both
affirmation and promise. We expected that humanity would foreswear
anti-Semitism forever. The founding of the State of Israel in 1948
reinforced this hope. Unfortunately, today, Jewish communities and the
world’s only Jewish state globally confront this re-emergent evil.476

Of course, he ignores the catastrophe that ‘hope’ inflicted on Palestinians living
under Israeli rule, who were killed or were forced into exile. The Palestinian
narrative is often omitted in Canada.

Charity Regulations

Canadian charity law is very important to aid work in the OPT since most
organisations either hold charitable status or aspire toward it. Charitable status
has two key advantages, one of which is tax exemption for an organisation from
their income and second the ability to grant tax credits to donors for
donations.477 A third advantage is the legitimacy offered to organisations legally
sanctioned by the Canadian government as charitable, because that implies
that their activities and financial accounts are being scrutinised by CRA. That
significantly increases an organisation’s ability to apply for large institutional
grants, some of which are only available only to organisations officially
registered as a charity. For Canadians nervous about donating to politically
contentious Middle East causes, the assurance of government backing can be
particularly helpful when fundraising.

Charities fundraising for Israel in Canada have been more successful than their
Palestinian equivalents. Following Israel’s major wars they have proven

475 Ibid., i.
476 Ibid., 16.
477 Federal Court of Appeal Decisions, ‘Canadian Magen David Adom for Israel v. Canada
(Minister of National Revenue)’ (Court Ruling, 13 September 2002), http://decisions.fca-
particularly successful raising large sums for Israel: in the 1948/49 $9.2 million, in 1967 $25 million, in 1973 $54 million with $C50 million sold in bonds, and in the 2006 summer war with Lebanon $42 million.\textsuperscript{478} In the late 1980s, Canadians were the highest per capita foreign investors in Israeli bonds.\textsuperscript{479} In 1990 the Governor General, Canada’s head of state, Jean Sauvé promoted the sale of Israeli bonds during the First Intifada.\textsuperscript{480}

Publically the government of Canada is committed to the two-state solution offered by the Oslo Peace Process. In theory it opposes Israeli settlement building too, even after nearly a decade of Harper government rule,

Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967 (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip). The Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the occupied territories and establishes Israel's obligations as an occupying power, in particular with respect to the humane treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. As referred to in UN Security Council Resolutions 446 and 465, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The settlements also constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.\textsuperscript{481}

Yet in practice Canada does not hold Israel to account with its position, including in its charity regulations.

In 1996 a Toronto Star investigation found that a number of Canadian charities issued tax receipts in order to assist Israeli settlement building, at the height of the Oslo Peace Process.\textsuperscript{482} That meant in effect that the Canadian government was sanctioning settler-colonialism with tax revenue diverted via tax receipts. There are several prominent Canadian charities supporting settler activities in the OPT. These include: Canadian Friends of Yeshivath Birkat Moshe-Maale Adumim, which officially supports settler schools and education infrastructure;

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{478} Engler, \textit{Canada and Israel}, 64.
    \item \textsuperscript{479} Ibid., 76.
    \item \textsuperscript{480} Ibid.
    \item \textsuperscript{482} Engler, \textit{Canada and Israel}, 68.
\end{itemize}
Canadian Friends of Yeshivath Har Etzion, supporting schools and education including the biggest settler school; Canadian Friends of Beit Midrash Elon Moreh, which supports religious organisations including in a radical settlement populated by extremists adjacent to the Palestinian city of Nablus; Canadian Friends of Mekor Chaim Academy, which again supports schools and education; and the Canadian Zionist Cultural Association, which declines to answer questions about what it does or where it works. Meanwhile, the Ne’eman Foundation raises funds on behalf of the Gush Foundation, which supports the settlement of Gush Etzion in the West Bank. Questions about supporting Israeli charitable activities were answered in a 2002 Court of Appeal ruling stating that Canadian charities can donate to West Bank settlements. The Federal Court of Appeal has ruled in the case of ‘Canadian Magen David Adom for Israel v Canada’ that there is no clear public policy prohibiting charitable activities in the occupied territories.

It may be illegal to advocate or raise funds on behalf of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in Canada. The 1985 Foreign Enlistment Act makes it illegal for Canadian nationals to recruit for, or to serve in a foreign army that is at war with a friendly state. Yet the Association for the ‘Soldiers of Israel in Canada’ provides moral and financial support for active duty soldiers. Established in 1971, it cannot itself give tax receipts but has been known to receive donations solicited by a charity that can, the Canadian Zionist Cultural Association. The wealthy philanthropists who control of most of Canada’s bookstores, Heather Reisman and Gerry Schwartz, established the HESEG Foundation ‘as a way to recognise and honour the contribution of Lone Soldiers to Israel, by providing them with an opportunity, through education and career development’.

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Through it Reisman and Schwartz provide up to $3 million per year for post-military scholarships for individuals without family in Israel who join the IDF, encouraging non-Israeli Canadians to join the Israeli army.\textsuperscript{490} The Israel-based Lone Soldier Center borrows Canadian charitable status from the Ne’eman Foundation. Ne’eman has also funded: the IDF Widows and Orphans Organization; Mechinit Keshet Yehuda, dedicated to absorbing and training talented students who aspire to meaningful service in the IDF; Warm Home for Every Soldier, for soldiers who do not receive suitable off duty housing from the army or wait a considerable length of time before obtaining a fitting housing solution; and Yashar Lachayal, which provides for the needs of lower income and at-risk Israeli youth, as well as new immigrants serving in the IDF.\textsuperscript{491} Meanwhile money sent to Disabled Veterans of Israel, or Beit Halochem (Canada), and Canadian Magen David Adom help provide support for the Israeli military in multiple different ways.\textsuperscript{492} In 2010 in Montréal a fundraiser was held for the LIBI Fund.\textsuperscript{493} LIBI is the official IDF charitable foundation. Prime Minister Menachem Begin and IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan established it in 1980 to provide for the educational, religious, medical and recreational needs of Israeli soldiers.\textsuperscript{494} In all of these cases funds are used to supplement the budget of the IDF by covering the expenses associated with putting soldiers to war, and are subsidised by Canadian charitable taxpayers with a deduction if sponsored by a registered charity.

One of the more controversial funds operating in Canada is the Jewish National Fund (JNF). The JNF is a more than century old Jewish agency set-up initially to buy land in Palestine in order to resettle Jews during the early stages of colonisation, pre-1948. The JNF owns 13% of Israel’s land and has little government oversight.\textsuperscript{495} Much of the land the JNF manages was taken from Palestinians after they were forced to flee in 1948, handed over to the JNF by

\textsuperscript{490} Engler, \textit{Canada and Israel}, 62–63.
\textsuperscript{491} ‘Donate and Support Israeli Charities from Canada | Neeman Foundation’.
\textsuperscript{492} Engler, ‘Canada’s Tax-Deductible Support for Israel’s Crimes’.
\textsuperscript{494} LIBI USA, ‘Our Partners - Friendsoflibi’, Charity, accessed 3 September 2014, http://friendsoflibi.org/how-to-contact/our-partners/.

The JNF is supported in its work by charitable fundraising with registered charitable branches found in countries around the world. It was registered in Canada in 1967 with the charitable purpose to,

\begin{quote}
Create, provide, enlarge and administer a fund to be made up of voluntary contributions from the Jewish community and others, to be used for charitable purposes.\footnote{\textquoteleft Fact Sheet - The Jewish National Fund\textquoteright.}
\end{quote}

One of the charitable projects funded by the JNF Canada is Canada Park, a 1,700 acre public park built in the West Bank outside Jerusalem on three Palestinian villages that were destroyed and ethnically cleansed in the 1967 war. The JNF raised around $15 million following the war using tax-exempt donations to build the park, worth around $80 million in 2009 values.\footnote{Jonathon Cook, ‘Canadian Diplomat Honored on Confiscated Palestinian Land’, \textit{The Electronic Intifada}, 18 June 2009, http://electronicintifada.net/content/canadian-diplomat-honored-confiscated-palestinian-land/8303.} Since it is built on occupied Palestinian land the park violates international law and the right of refugees to return. It is technically labelled a closed military zone by Israel to help protect its nefarious status. Israeli scholar and former Member of Knesset Dr. Uri Davis, who specialises in research on the JNF, says,

\begin{quote}
Canada Park is a crime against humanity that has been financed by and implicates not only the Canadian government but every taxpayer in Canada. The JNF’s charitable status means that each donation receives a tax reduction paid for from the pockets of Canadian taxpayers.\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{quote}

In 2007 the JNF launched a $7 million campaign to refurbish the park.\footnote{Yves Engler, ‘Progressive Canadians Must Challenge JNF’s Charitable Status’, \textit{The Electronic Intifada}, 1 November 2010, http://electronicintifada.net/content/progressive-canadians-must-challenge-jnfs-charitable-status/9092.}
The JNF often deceives supporters and donors into believing it does not fund projects in the OPT, which is controversial even with Zionists. Yet a 2012 document obtained by investigative journalist Raviv Drucker reveals a list of projects in the settlements funded by the fund. JNF donations are often used to plant forests of pine trees over destroyed villages like Canada Park. Ilan Pappé argues that the true mission of the JNF has been to conceal, Visible remnants of Palestine not only by the trees it has planted over them, but also by the narratives that it has created to deny their existence.

That includes on pre-1967 Israeli lands. In the early 1980s JNF Canada helped finance an Israeli government campaign to Judaise the largely Arab Galilee region of northern Israel.

Canadian charity law is obligated to operate under the rules of the Canadian Constitution, which clearly forbids discrimination against individuals based on their ethnic or religious background. Section 2(a) of the 1982 Constitution Act guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and religion, while Section 15 (1) guarantees equality for all individuals before and under the law including that they have the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. By barring non-Jewish ownership of land the JNF violates those legal principles. Thus, there is an argument that the CRA should not allow continued operations of the JNF, but a legal challenge to an access to information request suggests the CRA may be protecting it.

Meanwhile, the JNF has supporters at the highest levels. Former Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker (1957-1963), Lester Pearson (1963-1968) and Brian Mulroney (1984-1993) have all spoken at JNF events and leading politicians continue to endorse the organisation. At the provincial level the NDP

504 Pappe, Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 228.
505 Engler, ‘Progressive Canadians Must Challenge JNF’s Charitable Status’.
507 ‘Fact Sheet - The Jewish National Fund’. 
government of Manitoba strengthened its ties to the JNF with a 2010 trip to Israel.\textsuperscript{508} At a 2013 JNF fundraising dinner Prime Minister Stephen Harper played piano and sang for more than 10 minutes as a headline act.\textsuperscript{509}

By contrast to Mr. Harper’s patronage of the JNF, charitable organisations working with Palestinians have faced incredible scrutiny and worked in constant fear. For instance in 2009 the Conservative government took a decision to cut off the progressive aid group KAIROS, made up of a coalition of leading Churches, from federal aid funding. Immigration Minister Jason Kenney (who was a member of the CPCCA) initially told an Israeli audience that the organisation was cut off because the government did not like its views on Israel, and because it took a ‘zero tolerance approach to anti-Semitism’.\textsuperscript{510} Kenney justified this based on accusations made against KAIROS by three right-wing pro-Israel organisations: B’nai Brith, the Canadian Christian College and NGO Monitor. The first two would later nominate Harper for a Nobel Prize nomination in 2014.\textsuperscript{511} The third, NGO Monitor, is an Israeli non-profit linked to the government of Israel. It is dedicated to undermining liberal, peace building and human rights NGOs that criticise Israel. It is noted for its extreme positions and flawed methodology. This non-profit will come up frequently in stories about Palestine aid work in Canada, including the organisations I interviewed.

Minister for International Cooperation Bev Oda was ‘technically’ in charge of the decision to defund KAIROS. She insisted, along with other Conservative government members, that the decision was just a matter of procedure – a fair and routine decision. However, the decision was anything other than routine. Documents surfaced in 2010 that show CIDA’s top officials signed a memorandum recommending $ 7,098,758 of new funding be granted to KAIROS over a period of four years. However, at some point someone tampered with the document inserting the word ‘not’ by hand in order to...

\textsuperscript{508} Engler, ‘Progressive Canadians Must Challenge JNF’s Charitable Status’.
overturn the decision. The Conservative government refused to say who took the decision and Oda was rebuked by the Speaker of the House of Commons for misleading a Commons Foreign Affairs Committee about the affair.

At around the same time as the KAIROS affair, a Canadian human rights organisation called Rights and Democracy (R&D) was forced into turmoil over several human rights grants it made in the OPT. The Mulroney government had established R&D as an Act of Parliament in 1988 to provide non-partisan support for Canada’s foreign policy. The Canadian government would fund the organisation and name its Board of Directors. By the 2010s it received about $11 million per year in government funding, and reported directly to Parliament. It became embroiled in internal discord during the early Harper years as ardently right wing, pro-Israel government appointments to the Board took issue with grants to a leading Israeli human rights group called B’Tselem, and its Palestinian partners Al Haq and Al Mezan.

All three of those organisations are internationally respected human rights NGOs. As a result of those grants the President of Rights and Democracy Rémy Beauregard was subjected to specious accusations by Board members, accused of supporting extremist organisations and terrorism. In 2009 five Board members wrote to then Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon alleging that the Board had become dysfunctional and asked that the ardently pro-Israel Chairperson Aurel Braun be replaced. The Harper government responded by appointing additional pro-Israel members to give the faction a majority. A showdown took place between Mr. Beauregard and the partisan faction at a key meeting 2010 January 7th where the Board voted to ‘repudiate’

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514 Yet in spite of the accusations, the grants had been approved by the Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile prior to these board level accusations, Beauregard had received a positive performance review and a 2009 audit by the Auditor General of Canada had been similarly positive. Ibid.
515 Janice Stein, a long-time Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, was Chair of the Board at Rights and Democracy for several years prior to Aurel Braun.
516 ‘Rights & Democracy’. 
the earlier human rights grants.\textsuperscript{517} Beauregard died of heart failure a day later between tense meetings. Of its 47 staff, 45 signed a letter demanding that three pro-Israel Board members including Braun be dismissed.\textsuperscript{518} A Standing Committee of the House of Commons called for the agency to reconstitute its Board, which the Harper government ignored by reappointing the same Board members responsible for the crisis.\textsuperscript{519} This happened when Harper still had a minority government, prior to gaining a majority in the 2011 election.

Former federal NDP leader and first President of R&D, Ed Broadbent, believes the Harper government wanted the organisation to cut ties with any foreign group that criticised Israel. Broadbent likened the situation to the decision to cut funding for KAIROS.\textsuperscript{520} Broadbent and three other past presidents including Warren Allmand, Jean-Louis Roy and Jean-Paul Hubert asked Harper to address, ‘a subversion of the independence and integrity of the institution’.\textsuperscript{521} During Beauregards’ funeral in Ottawa, which all the R&D staff attended, its offices were mysteriously burglarised and its computers and files stolen. An expensive forensic report ordered by the Braun faction to find something defamatory against Beauregard came up with nothing.\textsuperscript{522} In 2012, the Harper government announced it would close down the beleaguered organisation.\textsuperscript{523}

Many other organisations that criticised Israel, or Canadian government policy on issues like the environment and women’s equality, faced similar difficulties.\textsuperscript{524} After 40 years of continuous federal government funding, the Canadian Council on International Co-operation (CCIC) had its funding cut in


\textsuperscript{520} Clark, ‘Ed Broadbent Defends Rights Agency’s Independence’.

\textsuperscript{521} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{522} ‘Rights & Democracy’.


The CCIC acted as an umbrella organisation for 90 Canadian non-profits monitoring government policy on foreign affairs, foreign aid, trade and peace building. Another charity with a long-standing record receiving funding for 17 years from the federal government via CIDA, called Alternatives, saw its funding cut in 2009 December despite positive evaluations by independent auditors. Alternatives had been founded in 1994 by a coalition of non-profits to foster social justice, participatory democracy and equal relations between richer and poorer countries. They claimed they were denied funding by the Conservative government for speaking out on Israeli-Palestinian relations, costing them a $2.1 million grant for 2009-10 that they had expected receive. A Haifa-based Arab research organisation Mada al-Carmel received three grants from an arm’s-length, government funded ‘Crown’ corporation, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Money was earmarked for a study on the marginalisation of women in Arab-Israeli society and low levels of political participation by Arabs with Israeli citizenship. In the second year of the grant, 2009 March, without good cause the IDRC cancelled grants worth $800,000 that amounted to 40% of the Palestinian partner organisation’s budget. There were allegations of interference by the Israeli and Canadian governments. IDRC President David Malone acknowledged that concern over funding was first brought to his attention by NGO monitor, and the events led to

528 Crown corporations are a special type of Canadian entity wholly owned by a federal or provincial government that nonetheless operates at arm's length from government.
a 2010 April lawsuit by Mada al-Carmel against IDRC.\footnote{As recently as 2007 researchers at Bir Zeit University had perceived IDRC as one of the more progressive western organisations for showing a significant degree of understanding of the needs of researchers. Bessma Momani and Agata Antkiewicz, ‘Canada's Economic Interests in the Middle East’, in \textit{Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice}, ed. Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 164.} An out of court settlement was agreed in favour of Mada al-Carmel 2010 September.\footnote{‘Mada Al-Carmel’, \textit{Voices-Voix}, accessed 9 September 2014, http://voices-voix.ca/en/facts/profile/mada-al-carmel.}

In the wake of the first major bombardment (2008/9) of Gaza by Israel, CAF made public statements in early 2009 critical of the State of Israel, the Canadian government and certain public figures, while advocating Palestinian human rights.\footnote{‘Canadian Arab Federation’, \textit{Voices-Voix}, accessed 9 September 2014, http://voices-voix.ca/en/facts/profile/canadian-arab-federation.} Shortly thereafter, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Kenney instructed Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) to cancel funding worth millions of dollars to CAF used for programmes for incoming immigrants. That effectively undermined CAF’s operational budget.\footnote{Tanya Talaga, ‘Immigration Minister Jason Kenney Made No Apologies Yesterday for Ending the Flow of Funds to the Canadian Arab Federation, Which He Says Has Expressed Support for Terror Groups.’, \textit{The Toronto Star}, 19 March 2009, http://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/2009/03/19/kenney_has_no_regrets_over_cutting_off__arab_group.html.} In a similar case, in 2012 January the Canadian government announced that funding for a Mississauga-based non-profit Palestine House would not be renewed after 2012 March 31 concerns that Palestine House was ‘an extremist institution supporting terrorism’.\footnote{Haroon Siddiqui, ‘Hitman Jason Kenney Strikes Again’, \textit{The Toronto Star}, 15 February 2012, http://www.thestar.com/opinion/2012/02/15/hitman_jason_kenney_strikes_again.html.} Established in 1994, Palestine House had provided language and settlement services to new immigrants, for which it had received substantial federal funding.

In 2011, after a one-year suspension the CRA chose to strip the Palestinian-Canadian charity International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy Canada (IRFAN-Canada) of its charitable status. Its troubles with government included years of tax audits, legal battles and public vilification by prominent Canadian Conservatives, which included a lawsuit and an out-of-court settlement for publicly alleging that the charity was tied to Hamas terrorists.\footnote{Colin Freeze, ‘Mississauga Charity Loses Licence to Issue Tax Receipts’, \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 8 April 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/mississauga-charity-loses-licence-to-issue-tax-receipts/article597379/.
} By 2013 IRFAN suspended its operations after the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce won
court approval to close its bank accounts.\textsuperscript{536} The CRA would later cite findings that IRFAN,

Provided over $14.6 million in resources to operating partners that were run by officials of Hamas, openly supported and provided funding to Hamas, or have been listed by various jurisdictions because of their support for Hamas or other terrorist entities.\textsuperscript{537}

By 2014 April 29\textsuperscript{th}, a week before IRFAN was to launch a Federal Court appeal against the CRA ruling, the Canadian government declared it a terrorist organisation and that the federal Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would launch a ‘terrorist financing investigation’.\textsuperscript{538} IRFAN’s lawyer denied the charges, while questioning the timing of the move just prior to the court appeal. One of the CRA allegations was that IRFAN’s Gaza-based charity partner Ard El Insan dealt with a food importer Israel accused of providing funding to terrorist groups. Yet Ard El Insan is considered to be in good enough standing to in 2013 August partner with the large global charity Save the Children Foundation to combat malnutrition in babies.\textsuperscript{539}

While there have been legitimate questions raised about the partisan nature of Liberal government ties to Israel, the Harper Conservative government has clearly been applying rules and regulations based on a partisan interpretation of Canada’s relationship with Israel. In 2012 the federal government budget launched a $13.4 million programme meant to audit charities for political


\textsuperscript{539} Ibid.
Auditors are looking for any evidence of partisan activity, such as the endorsement of political candidates or the violation of a rule that limits a charity’s political activity to no more than 10% of its resources. It targeted were environmental groups, international aid organisations and social-justice groups, many of which publicly questioned government policy. By 2014 September 1st some 52 charities were affected. The CRA claims that it works at arms-length from government, but the type of charities targeted suggest otherwise. Research by the Broadbent Institute clearly indicates that progressive charities, not conservative ones, were being singled out for punitive audits. For this reason the Broadbent Institute called for an independent probe of the CRA, saying tax auditors are targeting critics of the Harper government while letting right-leaning groups escape scrutiny for their political activities.

Government actions have also prompted a number of international aid agencies to join forces against the CRA audits under the stewardship of the CCIC, which had been itself previously defunded. The CRA in its audits have, for example, required Oxfam Canada to alter its mission statement to no longer refer to the prevention of poverty, just its alleviation. Onerous CRA demands included that a small Vancouver charity, CoDevelopment Canada, translate every Spanish document it receives from its partners in Latin America into French or English, even taxi receipts, which could by administrative overhead render the organisation’s work impossible. Further, new CRA rules under Harper compelled charities to direct and control all projects abroad that are funded by

540 Prior to Harper, Canadian NGOs had a rich history of advocacy work in Canada. NGOs and NGO coalitions have often operated under a dual mandate: promoting the activities of overseas NGO partners in their own countries with the help of the Canadian government and acting as an advocate for the collective interests of these overseas partners within Canada. Paul Kingston, ‘Promoting Civil Society Advocacy in the Middle East and at Home: Non-Governmental Organizations, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Middle East Working Group, 1991-2001’, in Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice, ed. Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 121.
their money, an regulation that is completely out of step with modern aid practices.\textsuperscript{545}

**Canadian Aid to the Palestinians**

By one calculation, Canada implemented 38,917 official development assistance projects between 2000 and 2012, in which $USD 35,301,239,778 had been pledged and $USD 16,839,275,977 actually spent.\textsuperscript{546} Meanwhile, another calculation found that CIDA, gave out more than $1.7 billion for work in the Middle East billion between 1989 and 2008.\textsuperscript{547} Throughout the 1990s, its average yearly expenditure hovered around $65 million for the 21 countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, reaching a height of $97.5 million in 1991/92 in the wake of the Madrid peace conference between Israelis and Palestinians that led up to the Oslo Accord. A spike in disbursements between 2003 and 2007 peaked at $207.5 million in 2003/04 due to an increase in post-conflict reconstruction commitments linked to Iraq, while a sharp decline took place not long after the Harper Conservative government’s 2006 electoral victory.\textsuperscript{548}

\textsuperscript{547} Zahar, ‘Talking One Talk, Walking Another: Norm Entrepreunership and Canada’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East’, 51.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid.
Other estimates hold that between 1993 and 2004 CIDA allocated on average $25 million per year for the OPT, while total disbursements reaching $333 million by the end of 2005 during Prime Minister Martin’s ‘all of government’ approach to OPT aid, covering areas such as PA budgetary support, refugees, child welfare, municipal infrastructure and capacity building, and civil society. After the immediate dip that came with the Harper Conservative government in

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2006, a substantial Palestinian ‘aid’ package of $300 million was allocated for 2008 to 2013, amounting to roughly $60 million per year.\(^{551}\) This was part of Canada’s commitment to the 2007 December 17\(^{th}\) Paris conference that raised $7.7 billion for the PA, making Canada also one of the largest donors.\(^{552}\)

A mainstream interpretation of Canadian Middle East policy by Canadian academics is that for decades, at least until the Harper government, Canada’s politicians, diplomats, and media considered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be the core issue in the Middle East. This is predicated on the idea that solving that conflict would bring regional peace, security, and stability. As described in previous chapters this was done based on an interpretation of Israel and Palestine as a conflict between two sides, rather than settler-colonial occupation. At the same time Canada’s policy in all Middle East negotiations has been to make sure Israel’s Arab neighbours, and the Palestinians, recognise Israel, while not requiring Israel do the same for the Palestinians. Unlike many European states, Canada had also been relatively slow to acknowledge the Palestinian right to self-determination, not actually using the term until after the first Palestinian intifada erupted in 1987.\(^{553}\) Unlike the US, Canada long opposed Israeli settlement building in the OPT considering it to be a serious obstacle to peace and a violation of international law. However, the rhetoric of official policy has not often been matched by action, particularly during the Harper government.

Canada’s main entry in the Peace Process during the 1990s was to work on the issue of Palestinian refugees. Both the US and Israel seemed to be more comfortable with a Canadian, rather than a European, chair of the highly sensitive refugee issue in the Refugee Working Group (RWG).\(^{554}\) Brynen and Tansley argue that this choice came due to Canada’s impartiality in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the issue of refugees.\(^{555}\) However, the historical record had long shown that Canada was not impartial. Rather, its Chairpersonship likely

\(^{551}\) Clark, ‘Harper Pledges Aid to Palestinians, Rebuffs Questions on Israeli Settlements’.

\(^{552}\) ‘Press Release of 22 January 2008 - In the Name of the Chair and the Co-Chairs of the International Donors’ Conference for the Palestinian State’.

\(^{553}\) Brynen, ‘Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process’, 77.

\(^{554}\) Ibid., 75–76.

owed to its long-time role as a close ally and partner for both Israel and the US, with all three holding compatible outlooks on the Palestinian question.

Canada also became a member of the 15-member AHLC established in 1993 to coordinate donor efforts in the West Bank and Gaza.\(^{556}\) Canada contributed to the development of an important civil society network called the Palestinian NGO Network. A low-level diplomatic post, the Canadian Representative Office to the PA, was opened in Ramallah in 1999. Staff came from Foreign Affairs and CIDA. Canada also provided funding and political support for a number of research projects on alternative approaches to peace known as ‘Second Track’ or ‘Track II’ from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. That brought together individuals from academia, civil society and former officials for ‘problem solving workshops’, ‘interactive conflict resolution’, ‘informal diplomacy’, and ‘multi-track diplomacy’ in what became known as the ‘Ottawa process’.\(^{557}\)

Canada’s Track II initiatives involved three concentric sets of activities, including support for sustained, non-public dialogue among a small group of Palestinian and Israeli experts, former officials and current officials. That ‘core group’ ultimately produced a joint paper on resolving the Palestinian refugee issue, while providing input on other Track II activities. That core group’s work had begun with initial Israeli-Palestinian dialogue sessions that had been proposed by two researchers who had close connections to Israel.\(^{558}\) The core group’s meetings and proposals were supported with assistance from IDRC, which as described earlier was one of a number of agencies that later faced difficulties under the Harper government. In 2001, Canada’s foreign Minister John Manley suggested on his first Middle East trip that Canada might even resettle some Palestinian refugees as part of a comprehensive peace agreement. This prompted anger in refugee camps where protest rallies were organised and people were asked to sign pledges not to immigrate under any circumstance.\(^{559}\)

Later, Canada also joined the Task Force on Palestinian Reform (TFPR), yet

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\(^{556}\) It is worth noting that East Jerusalem is often not referred to in Canadian aid work or research on Canadian policy in the Middle East, even though it is a part of the OPT.


\(^{558}\) They were British scholar Joel Peters (of Reading University, and later Ben-Gurion University in Israel) and Janice Stein (of the Munk Centre and University of Toronto). Ibid., 7.

\(^{559}\) Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspectives on Canada - Middle East Relations’, 16.
another international coordinating body running from 2002 to 2006 to oversee donor support for PA reform efforts, at the height of the Second Intifada.\footnote{Brynen, ‘Canada’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process’, 76.}

In the 1990s CIDA attempted to bolster NGOs working on the Middle East by sponsoring the creation of a Middle East Working Group (MEWG).\footnote{During the 1980s and 1990s NGOs began to emerge as more significant players in Canadian foreign and development policy. They were often represented through NGO collectives they formed around specific issues. One area where there had been a noticeable absence of NGO collective was over the Middle East until MEWG. Kingston, ‘Promoting Civil Society Advocacy in the Middle East and at Home: Non-Governmental Organizations, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Middle East Working Group, 1991-2001’, 117.} This was part of an (neoliberal) approach that CIDA saw as part of a broader strategy for nurturing the growth of Palestinian civil society by working with secular, local organisations that adopted the popular lexicon of liberal democracy and sustainable development.\footnote{Ibid., 123.} In the process Canada chose specifically to exclude Islamic NGOs that represented much of Middle East society. The first MEWG event consisted of a 1993 June Ottawa workshop attended by 20 delegates from NGOs in Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and the OPT, and 100 delegates from Canadian NGOs to discuss topics concerning four sectors of overseas development work: human rights, women, education and training, and the environment.\footnote{Ibid.} It is worth noting that explicitly excluding Islamic NGOs sparked significant debate at that meeting.\footnote{Bruce Muirhead and Ron Harpelle, ‘The International Development Research Centre and the Middle East: Issues and Research’, in Canada and the Middle East in Theory and Practice, ed. Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 152.} Some delegates said that it was rooted heavily in stereotyping and ignored the fact that Islamic organisations were much more deeply rooted in Arab society than the more secular and professionalised NGOs CIDA favoured.\footnote{Kingston, ‘Promoting Civil Society Advocacy in the Middle East and at Home: Non-Governmental Organizations, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Middle East Working Group, 1991-2001’, 124.}

The then head of CIDA’s NGO division, the driving force behind the creation of MEWG, further spoke of the group in terms of its utility from a Canadian government perspective. It would have,

\begin{quote}
Compatibility with Canadian post-colonial values of anti-racism, equity, and social justice and suggested that, while a regional initiative, it was
\end{quote}
also clear that the Palestinian issue was implicitly “at the core of it”. Hence, it would also be correct to say that the NGO Division’s approach to promoting civil society in the region had an underlying political edge to it.\textsuperscript{566}

Definitely political since it explicitly excluded Islamic NGOs. All said, the early formation and values brought by Canada to MEWG reflected its 1990s neoliberal interventionist projection of ‘Canadian values’ abroad. It also reflected optimism in the idea that NGOs could be agents of change to ‘develop’ local society to become more like the West/Canada, which was an exercise of neoliberal soft power. The Canadian government believed that bringing in Canadian NGOs would enhance this aim.\textsuperscript{567} MEWG also reflected the view in Canada that Palestine lay at the centre of troubles in the Middle East. This also drew MEWG into a debate over whether or not it should support the Peace Process.

Eventually MEWG was wrought asunder by the politics of the Peace Process. Participating groups argued over what MEWG’s focus should be, what kind of activities it should fund and to what degree it should support the Oslo Process and Canada’s work within the RWG. The controversy became more apparent as the Oslo Process began to fail. Many Canadian MEWG members were concerned that the issue of Palestinian refugees outside the OPT was being ignored, and that refugee voices were being excluded from the Western-backed Peace Process. This eventually brought elements of MEWG into conflict with work being carried out by Canadian representatives in the RWG, and drew the ire of Foreign Affairs officials who became concerned that CIDA was supporting a group like MEWG that was challenging government policy. A push by MEWG members advocating more strongly for the political rights of Palestinians and refugees eventually led Foreign Affairs to lose interest in MEWG and the RWG. That led to a loss in funding, which was transferred to the IDRC and ultimately Track II work as a way of engaging with Palestinian refugees, civil society, regional actors and academics. The end result of MEWG’s relationship with the Canadian government was that when it attempted to better represent the Palestinian voice, the government and Foreign Affairs deliberately weakened it

\textsuperscript{566} Ibid., 125.  
\textsuperscript{567} Ibid., 124.
while CIDA turned to IDRC’s Middle East Initiatives unit organising Track II activities.

Later under the Martin Liberal government, following the 2005 foreign policy statement and other government policy, an increased emphasis was put on the promotion of democracy as a way to reduce terrorist recruitment, alleviate poverty, and foster sustainable development in the developing world. Canada considered itself a legitimate promoter, reflecting ‘Canadian values’.\(^\text{568}\) Around this time some Canadian aid recipients working in the Middle East began to need to sign disclaimers verifying that they had no links with terrorist organisations like Hamas. This added even greater administrative overhead for stretched NGOs and further concern about whom they could work with, since much of Palestinian society could somehow be linked directly or indirectly to the dozens of Palestinian organisations listed as terrorist groups by Canada. This further segmented Canadian aid organisations off from the large sections of Palestinian society they were supposed to be working with to address problems like poverty and terrorism, while choosing for Palestinians who could represent Palestinian society – similar to what happened when CIDA specifically excluded Islamic NGOs from MEWG.\(^\text{569}\) As later seen with the example of IRFAN, the threat of being indicted for working with organisations that might be considered terrorist was real.

**Overall Canadian Aid 2001 to 2012**

During the early 2000s there was a lull in direct or multilateral OPT aid for projects funded from Canada. That excludes Canada’s contributions to operational costs for important international, multilateral organisations like UNRWA that have been intrinsic to Palestinian subsistence under occupation. Thus, in a 2002/3 fiscal year Departmental Performance Report, CIDA did not mention the Palestinians or OPT specifically, for ODA disbursements in an

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incredibly large geographic ‘Africa and Middle East division’ that was said to encompass $335,019,255 or 16.7% of Canada’s total ODA.

This was consistent for a Chrétien Liberal government that took a mostly distanced approach to Palestinian aid, preferring by the early 2000s for its funds to be hidden within larger international, multilateral contributions or by funding Canadian NGOs working in the OPT, in lieu of large, distinctly Canadian contributions. It was a government that was after all close to Israel and Canada’s Israel lobby. All the while Canada publically remained committed to the Oslo Peace Process, while funding work on refugees and Track II peace efforts. This was all consistent with Chrétien’s emphasis on the importance of Canada’s role as, ‘a mediator and partner in the peacekeeping efforts, particularly with regard to the refugee problem’. This happened regardless of Oslo blowing up on its own contradictions into the violent Second Intifada during the final few years of the 10-year Chrétien government.

By November 2003 Chrétien was succeeded by what would be an even more pro-Israel Martin Liberal government, which would take a more direct role in Palestinian aid. In the Spring of 2005 the Martin Liberal government claimed that development aid was central to Canada’s efforts to inculcate a just and sustainable solution to the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, which amounted to reinforcing the Oslo aid approach described throughout this thesis. By the end of the 2004/5 fiscal year ended March 31st it had given a substantial $38.26 million for the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian refugees. This aid excluded mention to East Jerusalem, consistent with Canadian funding for the OPT in the study period. This aid represented a substantial increase in direct project funding from zero under Chrétien.

CIDA described this as the ‘search for peace in the Middle East’, even while the Martin government shifted noticeably to an overtly pro-Israel voting pattern in international affairs. The increased aid package was part of an ‘all of government’ approach to development aid in the OPT, where the expertise of between eight to ten Canadian departments and institutions was lent to

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570 Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspectives on Canada - Middle East Relations’, 22.
strengthen Palestinian institutions in key sectors, notably justice and border administration. What was happening was that Canada under Martin increased its OPT aid funding in order to become more involved in redesigning a neoliberal Palestinian state and PA within the Oslo model, to quell the insecurity of Second Intifada violence that was disrupting both Israel and the OPT.

Following the Martin Liberal government’s ‘all of government’ approach to OPT aid, at first the Harper Conservative government largely withdrew from funding development to the Palestinians, as its own election coincided within two days of the election of Hamas to the PA both late January 2006. CIDA described that election in 2007 as political instability that impeded its work in the OPT.

Political instability can also affect CIDA performance. CIDA programming in the West Bank and Gaza was restructured following the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and the suspension of Canadian assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Canada suspended, terminated or restructured projects that worked directly with the Palestinian Authority. Canada maintained the level of assistance to Palestinians but refocused its support to address humanitarian needs. Support was delivered primarily through multilateral institutions and other partners.

This was just a momentary lull before even great engagement than the Martin government had carried out, in spite of – or perhaps concomitant to – Canada’s deepening public ties to Israel under Harper. By 2009 CIDA’s website stated that as part of Canada’s aid effectiveness agenda the West Bank and Gaza was a country of focus where it wanted to build a more just and prosperous society by improving living conditions for Palestinians – thus yet again ‘happy’ Palestinians like the US Carter administration first tried to create in the 1970s. CIDA further said that, ‘In line with Canadian objectives, CIDA’s program in the

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572 This initiative seems to have stopped with the election of the Hamas government in 2006 and was not taken up by the Harper government. Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspectives on Canada - Middle East Relations’, 12.
573 Notably that aid included CIDA funding to deploy twenty elections observers and two senior experts, to fund voter registration and to provide ongoing support for women’s participation, for the 2006 January 25th PA elections that Canada would disown quickly applying sanctions to the PA after the result.
West Bank and Gaza is intended to contribute to the establishment of a future Palestinian state as part of a comprehensive peace settlement. That approach was taken in conjunction with the PRDP that international donors worked out with a recently installed, unelected PA Fayyad government, which CIDA claimed was a ‘bottom-up policy-making, planning, and budgeting process developed by the PA’ itself.

In its development agenda the Harper government focused on capacity building and construction of the PA judicial system, where it considered the United States to be the security coordinator. Within judicial reform Canada’s main initiatives were to provide assistance by training judges, building courthouses, improving PA forensics and strengthening the PA’s prosecution services (though not defence services). The official hope was that this would inculcate rule of law leading to better business investment, thereby reducing poverty. That fits neatly within Ignatieff’s conception of Canadian development as a product of ‘peace, order and good government’. It is without either irony or coincidence that this mirrored the pre-occupation of Anglo-Saxon settler colonialism in North America where military forts were usually the first structures built on Indigenous territories, and jails shortly thereafter, to quell uprising.

Other Harper government priorities for OPT aid included humanitarian assistance such as food security and support for children and youth. By 2011-12 the West Bank and Gaza were in the top 10 of Canada’s ODA package recipients with $69 million bilateral aid according to OECD statistics. This accounted for nearly half of the paltry package of aid Canada gave to the Middle East in spite of the dire humanitarian and development situation in the region, unravelling ever further since the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq. Harper appears quantitatively to have been even ‘more in’ than Martin’s ‘all of government’ approach to Palestinian development.

576 Ibid.
578 Waziyatawin, ‘Malice Enough in Their Hearts and Courage Enough in Ours’, 175.
That placed Canada in the top 10 of global donors of bilateral ODA in the OPT in the period 2011/12.
Direct Canadian Funding for Projects

Using the Department for Foreign Affairs, Development and Trade website’s ‘International Project Browser’ I was able to put together a list of Canadian funded projects, both developmental and humanitarian in nature, as a singular or multi-country project, funded during the 2001 to 2012 study period. The list excludes projects where a minute percentage of funding within a multi-country project was relevant to the OPT. All projects are listed by start date and reflect, as such, the Canadian government’s propensity to avoid conspicuously funded Canadian projects until the start of the Martin ‘all of government’ approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Fund Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and Skills Development</td>
<td>Information not Available</td>
<td>2005-07-18 — 2016-03-30</td>
<td>$202,680</td>
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<td>Improving the Lives of</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>2006-01-13 — 2011-03-</td>
<td>$12,000,000</td>
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<td>Implementing Organization(s)</td>
<td>Start Date/End Date</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees in Gaza</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid in the West Bank and Gaza - WFP 2008</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>2007-12-12 — 2010-12-31</td>
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<td>World Bank Palestinian Reform and Development Plan Trust Fund</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2008-08-15 — 2011-02-01</td>
<td>$15,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to Public Prosecution Services</td>
<td>Department of Justice Canada</td>
<td>2009-05-06 — 2014-09-30</td>
<td>$19,973,857</td>
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<td>Program Support Unit - West Bank and Gaza Program - 2009-2012</td>
<td>Representative Office of Canada to the Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>2009-07-03 — 2011-12-14</td>
<td>$748,285</td>
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<td>Food Security for Palestinian Refugees - West Bank and Gaza - UN Consolidated Appeal 2009</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>2009-10-26 — 2012-02-13</td>
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<td>2010-03-23 — 2011-02-01</td>
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<td>Assistance to Conflict-Affected Populations - West Bank and Gaza - ICRC 2010</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
<td>2010-03-25 — 2010-12-31</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to Justice</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>2010-03-30 — 2014-03-31</td>
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<td>Courthouses Construction Project</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>2011-01-10 — 2014-03-31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food Security for Palestinian Refugees - West Bank and Gaza - UN Consolidated Appeal 2011</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>2011-01-21 — 2011-12-30</td>
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<td>Export Development in the West Bank</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>2011-03-11 — 2015-12-31</td>
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<td>Psychosocial and Learning Activities for Children and Youth in Gaza - UN Consolidated Appeal 2011</td>
<td>UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund</td>
<td>2011-03-29 — 2012-03-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian</td>
<td>ICRC - International</td>
<td>2011-03-30 — 2011-12-31</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Funded Organization</td>
<td>Start/End Dates</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
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<td>Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td>2011-03-30 — 2012-03-30</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>2011-03-30 — 2012-06-29</td>
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<td>Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) - West Bank and Gaza - 2011-2012</td>
<td>Representative Office of Canada to the Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>2011-04-01 — 2011-12-30</td>
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<td>Assistance to Small Farmers - West Bank and Gaza - UN Consolidated Appeal 2011</td>
<td>CARE Canada</td>
<td>2011-06-30 — 2012-03-06</td>
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<td>Capacity Development in Forensic Science and Medicine - Monitoring</td>
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<td>2011-12-05 — 2018-03-29</td>
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<td>Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance - West Bank and Gaza - UN Consolidated Appeal 2012</td>
<td>OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>2012-03-01 — 2012-03-28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of Farmer Livelihoods - West Bank and Gaza - UN Consolidated Appeal 2012</td>
<td>FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
<td>2012-03-12 — 2014-04-30</td>
<td>$6,000,000</td>
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<td>Improving Household Food Security - West Bank and Gaza - UN Consolidated Appeal 2012</td>
<td>FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
<td>2012-03-29 — 2014-04-30</td>
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<td>2012-03-30 — 2013-06-28</td>
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**Figure 9: Direct Canadian Government Funded Projects**

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Meanwhile Canada’s contributions to funding for projects including the OPT significantly, but also other countries, was for 2001 to 2012 as follows:

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<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Fund</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Networking for Peace</td>
<td>Representative Office of Canada to the Palestinian Authority (OPT covering 80% of fund)</td>
<td>1999-06-30 — 2012-08-17</td>
<td>$2,694,419</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East Program in Civil Society and Peace Building Phase 2</td>
<td>McGill University (OPT covering 55% of fund)</td>
<td>2003-12-12 — 2013-01-11</td>
<td>$9,324,867</td>
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<td>Private Enterprise Partnership - Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>World Bank (OPT covering 3% of fund)</td>
<td>2006-02-20 — 2008-05-16</td>
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<td>Physical Rehabilitation of Landmine Victims in the Middle East</td>
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<td>2007-08-23 — 2011-03-31</td>
<td>$2,131,537</td>
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<td>Regional Economic Empowerment of Women Project</td>
<td>Oxfam-Québec (OPT covering 25% of fund)</td>
<td>2009-03-27 — 2013-12-31</td>
<td>$8,525,067</td>
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<td>Assistance to Displaced Populations in the Middle East and North Africa - UNHCR 2010</td>
<td>UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (OPT covering 12.5% of fund)</td>
<td>2010-03-24 — 2010-12-31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country-Specific Emergency Appeals - ICRC 2012</td>
<td>ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross (OPT covering 6.66% of fund)</td>
<td>2012-03-29 — 2012-12-31</td>
<td>$15,000,000</td>
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</table>

Figure 10: Canadian Funding for Projects in Multiple Countries including OPT

583 Ibid.
Further using data from the *Department for Foreign Affairs, Development and Trade* website I compiled a record of Canadian government spending in the OPT based on data for all Canadian bilateral and multilateral aid for the period 2001 to 2012.\(^{584}\) Of note, the Canadian government fiscal year ends March 31\(^{st}\), so years are listed 2003/4, 2004/5, etc. Amounts are not listed prior to the first full Martin government 2004/5, because for 2000/1 to 2003/4 those amounts are listed as zero in the Canadian government data.

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**2005/6 Total**  
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**2006/7 Total**  
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**2007/8 Total**  
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The above lists are not comprehensive for all Canadian government spending in those periods, not covering all donations to multilateral agencies, but covering much of the projects nonetheless. Rarely did Canada fund anything in East Jerusalem, referring only to West Bank and Gaza in its funding, implicitly avoiding any challenge to Israel’s annexation of the city.

Trends

Contrary to conventional expectations, greater Canadian engagement and larger sums of aid funding for Palestinians may not have represented a net gain for OPT Palestinians. The more overtly pro-Israel a Canadian government was, from quite pro-Israel during the Chrétien years to highly partisan with Harper, the more Palestinian funding seemed to increase. Thus, during the Chrétien years there was relatively little funding for Palestinians, mostly hidden within multinational organisations or Canadian NGOs. Martin changed that with sharp increases in distinctly Canadian funded projects in a trend that climaxed under Harper.

There were qualitative differences in what was funded, with the Liberal governments tending to fund dialogue projects aimed at peace building, or refugee work and capacity building. That capacity building included a lurch toward security, judicial reform, under Martin that ballooned into a security preoccupation under a Conservative government inclined toward building courts and prisons to help the Western-backed PA maintain control and quiet in the OPT, in lieu of Israel doing so with its own military forces. That Conservative engagement included building on Martin’s neoliberal state-building efforts, from economic to public sector reforms, stimuli for business and free trade, and some support for farmers, while responding to periodic humanitarian calls for funding by multilateral organisations. Unlike the Liberal governments, rarely did Canada fund Canadian organisations to carry out projects, seeming to prefer to fund multilateral or even foreign organisations, which we see by the end of this

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Ibid.
thesis is consistent with the Harper government’s crackdown on Canadian NGOs working in OPT aid.

Canada’s aid package to the OPT from 2008 to 2013 was one of its most significant foreign aid commitments. The focus of most of the funding was on PA security reform.586 This approach was supported by Israel, as it reduced Israel’s own military costs in the OPT by outsourcing rule of parts of the OPT, mostly Areas A, to a Western-backed PA where Fatah had recently wrested control of the West Bank from Hamas.587 Within this orientation, Canada joined the US and Britain on a multilateral mission of security reform to change the culture, and hard power capacity, of the PA. Under the supervision of the US General Dayton, they would build a PA force that could patrol the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza. In a 2011 profile of Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Allison, ‘Dayton’s chief of liaison in the West Bank’, it was reported in Allison’s hometown newspaper the ‘Times & Transcript’ that,

The Dayton team was concerned with enhancing security on the West Bank of Palestine and was all geared towards looking after and ensuring the security of Israel.588

Meanwhile former Canadian Ambassador to Israel Jon Allen told the Canadian Jewish News the basis of this Canadian aid was,589

To create a Palestinian security force to ensure that the PA maintains control of the West Bank against Hamas.590

Canada’s government seemed pleased with what it was funding. During a visit to the Middle East in January 2012, then foreign Minister John Baird said he

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587 The Dayton security-training mission was controversial among senior US officers at the Pentagon, because its goal was to create a military force that cooperates with Israel. They argued this will raise serious objections among Arabs and harm United States interests in the region. A US army colonel said in 2009, ‘This is just a stupid idea – it makes us look like we're an extension of the Israeli occupation’. Mark Perry, ‘Dayton’s Mission: A Reader’s Guide - The Palestine Papers’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011125145732219555.html.
589 Jon Allen was, as Ambassador to Israel, among several hundred Canadian Jews to be commemorated at a dedication site in Canada Park, built on Palestinian villages ethnically cleansed in 1967. Cook, ‘Canadian Diplomat Honored on Confiscated Palestinian Land’.
590 Engler, ‘Canadian Aid to Palestinians Serves Israel’.
was, ‘incredibly thrilled by the West Bank security situation, which he said benefited Israel’.\(^{591}\) Citing Canada’s assistance in training Palestinian judiciary, police, prosecutors and correction officers, Baird said, ‘Canada considers this money well spent’.\(^{592}\) An Israeli Embassy spokesman said in a statement that, 

> Israel supports a stable and reliable Palestinian Authority with a dependable security system and an effective judiciary, and Israelis appreciate Canada’s assistance to the Palestinian Authority in these important areas.\(^{593}\)

To what extent Canadian ‘aid’ to OPT was benefitting Israel after 2008 was revealed in heavily censored briefing notes, prepared by CIDA for then International Development Minister Julian Fantino ahead of a PA move seeking recognition as a de facto state at the UN General Assembly in 2012 November. The Conservative government had warned the PA of dire consequences should they push ahead with their initiative, threatening that Canada might stop providing assistance to the PA beginning with $40 million remaining on a $300 million 2008 commitment. The notes revealed that Israeli officials by contrast highlighted the importance of Canadian aid to the PA, urging Canada to maintain its assistance,

> “There have been increasing references in the past months during high-level bilateral meetings with the Israelis about the importance and value they place on Canada’s assistance to the Palestinian Authority, most notably in security/justice reform”, reads the note dated Nov. 2, 2012 and signed by CIDA president Margaret Biggs. “The Israelis have noted the importance of Canada’s contribution to the relative stability achieved through extensive security co-operation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority”. The note is heavily censored, but does go on to state that, “the emergence of popular protests on the Palestinian street


\(^{592}\) Ibid.

against the Palestinian Authority is worrying and the Israelis have been imploring the international donor community to continue to support the Palestinian Authority”.594

Threats against the PA reflected similar Conservative reactions toward any perceived threat or slight against Israel at home. It also echoed past efforts made by some pro-Israel hawks to weaken organisations such as UNRWA by withholding or bypassing funding to it, such as when the US government in the mid-1990s tried to make UNRWA funding conditional on it being spent on projects that promote peace building.595 BADIL, a Palestinian NGO working on the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons, says this was a euphemistic way of saying that its funds should be spent on the US sponsored Palestinian/Arab-Israeli negotiations.596 With similar logic in 2010 January President of the Canadian Treasury Board Victor Toews announced Canada would end support to UNRWA, redirecting funds to other entities that the Canadian government thought would be spent on projects that reflect Canadian ‘values’ while ‘safeguarding Israel’s security’. Those cuts were announced not long after Israel’s heavy 2008/9 bombardment of Gaza left the territory in a severe state of disrepair and acute need of aid typically delivered by UNRWA. Canada had until then typically been providing UNRWA with a very significant sum, up to 4 per cent of UNRWA’s annual budget.597 So just when Gazans and UNRWA most needed funding for a humanitarian disaster, Canada chose to punish Palestinians there further.

Meanwhile, Canada’s close Western allies the US, the UK and the EU donated at higher levels in the wake of further displacement of Palestinian refugees from

594 In 2010 the Canadian government decided to stop providing direct budgetary support to UNRWA. Applauded by some segments of the pro-Israel lobby in Canada, documents obtained by Ottawa-based foreign policy newspaper Embassy in July 2011 showed Israel was among a number of countries that unsuccessfully urged Canada to reverse its decision. Ibid.

595 It is worth noting though that this was not just a Conservative approach. As seen with MEWG in the mid-1990s, when it ran afoul of Liberal foreign policy, this led to their defunding and a shift of funds to the more Oslo and Israel friendly Track II process.


the Syrian civil war, making up for shortfalls exacerbated by Canada. In March 2013, CIDA was shut down and absorbed into Foreign Affairs. The relative autonomy of the 45-year old agency had never sat well with a Harper government averse to autonomy.\textsuperscript{598} Further, by folding it into a new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), Canada’s development assistance work could be more closely linked to the international interests of the Canadian state.\textsuperscript{599}

The 10 Organisations Studied as a Sample of Canadian Aid

Without mention to defendant representation in its funding for the PA judicial system, the focus in Canada’s concern with OPT security seemed very much to be getting Palestinians in prison over actual justice. Further, all Canadian governments ignored the intensifying apartheid taking place under Israeli military rule that undermines any sense of a fair legal system, and which is guarantees business investment cannot work.\textsuperscript{600} As Lloyd points out, in settler colonial rule the rule of law is routinely suspended by the coloniser even though it was already sanctifying racialised dispossession,

The suspension of law in face of the legitimate, violent or non-violent resistance, or, indeed, even the very persistent presence, of the indigenous colonised people, is a given of every colonialism.\textsuperscript{601}

CIDA also worked only in the West Bank with the PA from the spring of 2006 onward, other than some humanitarian projects with what CIDA said were trusted partners, in spite of Gaza’s immense humanitarian needs and thereby reinforcing Israel’s siege over Gaza. Fundamentally, more engagement by Canada meant more support for a fatally flawed Oslo aid model, which as described in this thesis, has ultimately reinforced Israeli settler colonial rule over the OPT.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[599] Klassen, ‘Joining Empire’.
\item[600] Tartir and Wildeman, ‘Persistent Failure’; Alaa Tartir and Jeremy Wildeman, ‘Can Oslo’s Failed Aid Model Be Laid to Rest?’, \textit{Al-Shabaka}, 19 September 2013, http://al-shabaka.org/node/672; Wildeman and Tartir, ‘Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail’.
\item[601] Lloyd, ‘Settler Colonialism and the State of Exception’, 71.
\end{footnotes}
Given the context laid out in Chapters 4 and 5, the following three Chapters will reveal how this impacted on the development projects of the sixteen project coordinators I interviewed from ten Canadian organisations, through the design, implementation and outcome stages of their projects. For those coordinators the ten Canadian organisations I studied carrying out human rights and advocacy or capacity building and poverty reduction projects in the OPT from 2001 to 2012 represented a significant part of Canada’s aid engagement with the OPT for the period. This was especially so during the Chrétien Liberal government years 2001-2003 when there were no uniquely Canadian funded projects and the Canadian government took a more hands-off approach to Palestinian aid.

Of Human Rights and Advocacy work, the four organisations focused on these areas of work had ranges of budgets as follows:

- Organisation 1 was a relatively large organisation with typically more than 40 staff and a budget in the millions of dollars, but which mostly engaged with the OPT on a limited scale with small funds or within larger regional projects. Still, it was ultimately defunded by the Harper government seemingly over that OPT aid engagement.

- Organisation 2 is a small Canadian registered charity run nearly exclusively by volunteers, which typically worked on a small annual budget in the $10,000s devoted primarily to Palestinian aid work.

- Organisation 3 is a medium-sized charity with typically fewer than 40 staff and a budget that generally sat around several million dollars per year for global engagement, including a great deal of OPT engagement. The organisation faced a major funding cut of a few millions dollars in government grants late in the research period, seemingly punished by the Harper government due in part to its support for OPT aid projects.

- Organisation 4 is a medium sized charity with well under 40 staff and a budget that ranged from highs of a few million dollars to lows of several hundred thousand dollars per year in the study period, with the lows seemingly linked to a major government funding owing to ongoing OPT development work.
Of Capacity Building and Poverty reduction work, the six organisations focused on these areas had ranges of budgets as follows:

- Organisation 5 ran a single project for judicial reform running in the OPT from 2005 to 2012 with a significant budget of over several million dollars for that period.

- Organisation 6 is a relatively large organisation with over 40 staff and a budget in the range of tens-of-millions of dollars covering projects all around the world, but where OPT aid work was always an important area of work including support work for peace building during the hands-off Chrétien government years.

- Organisation 7 had just several staff while funding a Middle East capacity building aid project of over ten million dollars in the study period, where the majority of the funding was directed toward the OPT.

- Organisation 8 is a charity with just several staff in Canada and a budget that ranged per year from highs in the hundreds-of-thousands to lows in the tens-of-thousands of dollars, with primary focus was on funding Palestinians in the OPT or regionally in the Middle East.

- Organisation 9 is a large charity with more than 40 employees and an annual budget in the tens-of-millions of dollars, which ran a significant OPT project backed with several million dollars in the study period.

- Organisation 10 had just several staff but an annual budget typically in the millions of dollars, sometimes exceeding ten million dollars, and significant engagement with the OPT including singular development projects that exceeded a million dollars in worth.

Although Canada has a history of global human rights engagement, fundamentally this does not extend to Palestinians ruled by its ally Israel. As such the Canadian organisations I surveyed represented with small budgets much of the Canadian support for Palestinian rights. Meanwhile, as shown in the above figures 9 and 10 a pattern of capacity building engagement took
place under the Martin and Harper governments as part of official foreign policy to reduce OPT poverty, notably by improving rule of law, which did not challenge Israeli rule. Of the less political capacity building organisations I surveyed they had budgets in the millions of dollars and represented a very significant component of the total development aid for this area of work. In this way what is immediately noticeable is that the more overtly political projects had vastly less support from Canada than the more technocratic capacity building and poverty reduction projects, the latter of which could more easily fit within the neoliberal framework of the Oslo Process. This makes sense considering the crackdown we will see takes place against Canadian organisations working in the OPT, especially for engaging in human rights work.
CHAPTER 6 - Project Planning and Design

Introduction

Inequality in the way aid projects are planned in the aid sector is unconcealable. It is a sector-wide issue in the OPT and other regions of the world. Palestinians are rarely included in the development of projects, and even when they are, often they do not fully understand the meanings of the terminology used by donors to design projects. The World Bank even pointed out in a report published on the eve of the Second Intifada in 2000 that PA policy itself was shaped by donor interests, because donors were financing virtually all investments in the OPT. PNGOs can only be expected to operate from a weaker position vis-à-vis Western donors than the PA. In this way Palestinian agency is strictly limited to what Israel and the donors allow, shaped by the inducements of aid, donor views and limited by Israeli force. Though it is beyond the scope of this research study to determine the extent to which the ten organisations I researched determined the agenda for their Palestinian partners, a power imbalance and limitations on Palestinian agency will have existed because it was the Canadians who controlled the money.

This is the first of three chapters looking at the experiences of the sixteen project coordinators I interviewed from the ten Canadian organisations described in Chapter 3. They carried out development aid projects in the OPT in rights and advocacy, or capacity building and poverty reduction, from 2000 to 2012. The purpose of this first chapter is to provide information from those interviews on how they and their organisations sought out Palestinian partners, and developed and designed projects for the OPT. This is done bearing in mind the prevailing tendency in mainstream neoliberal aid to conceptualise projects as linear by nature, with a step-by-step process where policy and projects are formulated, implemented, and then followed by results they can evaluate to see how far the original objectives were achieved. Thus Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are broken up based on three phases, starting with the planning and design stage.

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602 ‘Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza’, 15.
Analysing the interviews from this perspective provides information in this chapter to what extent the neoliberal paradigm influenced the design of interviewees’ projects, to what extent the Palestinian viewpoint was taken into account when designing projects and to what extent the context of Israeli settler colonialism was accounted for. Most important of all, though, this chapter reveals not just the extent to which the neoliberal model was adopted but to what extent the Canadian governments partisan views favouring Israel already undermined projects in the opening stage, and how the project coordinators coped with it. This could mean understanding meanings that were neither spoken nor obvious.

**Criticisms of Neoliberal Aid**

Unlike neoliberal practitioners, critics of development aid do not share a blind faith in the power of policy to bring about positive change. For critics development aid is not neutral policy to be implemented, but rather a form of domination that should be resisted. In fact it is never neutral,

> Various studies highlight the fact that funding, despite its apparently technical and specialised outlook, is never truly neutral, and that behind the noble objectives of “development” lie much more straightforward political (and in some cases economic) interests.

Like some of the realists in IR like Hans Morgenthau, some critics suspect that aid has an elaborate façade that obscures the true aims of a donor that is trying to buy political advantage from the government of another state, which in a sense describes the donor ‘peace dividend’ relationship with the PA. For this reason critics of aid argue that it is essential to understand the unspoken aims that determine how aid policy or an aid package has been constructed, to know why aid is being given in the first place and what it is really meant to achieve.

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Thus, a researcher needs to actively seek out the unspoken and unwritten intentions that lie behind aid.\textsuperscript{607}

This is especially true for critics of Palestinian aid. In contrast to mainstream aid providers, Palestinian aid critics fault the failure of OPT aid (and by extension the Peace Process) not just on Israeli policy, but also the very way in which aid policy has been constructed. They are particularly critical of the neoliberal normative values intrinsic to Palestinian aid. For instance, they argue that plans for an economic integration between Israel and the OPT only benefits Israel at the expense of Palestinian economy and sovereignty, rather than boosting the latter.\textsuperscript{608} Further, they argue that the neoliberal aid model designed by the World Bank is both ineffective and harmful, having led to economic decline, subverted Palestinian civil resistance (within the peace dividend) and even subsidised the Israeli occupation. As a logical extension many of the critics of Oslo aid, say that aid has not only failed, but is acting as a smokescreen that obscures the occupation and helps to sustain a failed Peace Process that is being manipulated Israel’s advantage.\textsuperscript{609} This means that Western development aid after Oslo has not been helping the Palestinians, but rather dominating them politically and socially, all for the benefit of Israel.

Thus critics eschew nearly every aspect of Oslo Process. Echoing a broader critical voice in the development aid literature, they suspect that Oslo aid policy is a rationalising technical discourse that conceals a hidden bureaucratic power, or dominance, which is the true political intent behind Western aid. Take for example the US’ historical attempts to use aid to keep Palestinians quiet but living under Israeli occupation, or Western training of Palestinian police in the Institution Building Period that have been used to quell Palestinian protesters and manage the occupied OPT.\textsuperscript{610}

\textsuperscript{607} Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 2004, 2.

\textsuperscript{608} Hever, *The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation*.


Also in contrast to the neoliberal optimism in policy, critics argue that aid has either harmed or done nothing for the underdeveloped world. For example, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation argues that the aid industry has actually harmed Palestinian society and subverted a Palestinian-owned development agenda. Drawing on concepts found in dependency theory, critics believe that the West dominates its former colonies through relations of asymmetry and dependence – while asymmetry is actually an accepted relationship in neoliberal IR. In conjunction with the West’s hegemonic structure there is a transnational elite anchored in both the business and the NGO sectors, where there is embodied a principle of senior and junior partners, with the senior partners being in the developed West and the junior partners the undeveloped rest. Those senior partners in the West are the decision-makers, while the junior partners in the underdeveloped world taking on the less important management roles. In the case of the OPT, this has contributed to a situation where International NGOs (INGO) and government aid agencies overshadow their junior PNGO and PA partners. This has created the illusion of ‘partnerships’, often with Palestinian elites approved by Israel, where development aid has not been articulated according to the needs of Palestinians but to donor priorities, all within a context where, Israeli control over the receipt of external transfers, the distribution of foreign monies, and the selection of “recipient” institutions, has often served to perpetuate the economic and institutional status quo in the occupied territories instead of transforming it.

Through those senior-junior partnerships Western donors have, irrespective of Palestinian values or priorities, sought to build an entirely new Palestinian state based upon neoliberal values exported from the West. They have gone so far as to call for nothing short of a managed reorganisation of the entirety of OPT

state and society. The context of that intervention has always been articulated from outside the OPT.  

Meanwhile, Canada was very much inclined throughout the post-Oslo years toward accepting a senior role in a development partnership. As described in Chapter 5 official Canadian foreign policy was by then very much based on a neoliberal principle of projecting Canadian values abroad, and in this way making the world better by making it more like Canada. In the case of the OPT this would mean remaking Palestinian society into a democratic, tolerant and liberal state with open markets like Canada. It was in this way that Canadian policy makers approached the Palestinians, along with their deep-set preferences for Israel and the Israeli narrative of their occupation over the OPT.

Seeking Out Partnerships and Projects

Development aid priorities are first conceptualised in Canada before a Palestinian partner is brought in on any development aid project. This is typical of senior-junior partnerships and of the projects run by the project coordinators I interviewed. This also took place in spite of those interviewees, by-and-large, expressing a strong preference to involve a Palestinian partner in designing a project from the very start. That this could not really happen may simply reflect the structural realities of development aid and of Canadian development aid. There is for example the underlying disparity in power that exists between the Canadian organisations that controls the funding vis-à-vis its Palestinian partner that has no control. Then there are the funding structures that exist in Canada behind the donor organisation itself, including CRA regulations and government policy that insists on maintaining that power disparity.

Thus, in numerous instances projects were conceived of first in Canada, such as Organisation 7’s network of community social work NGOs, three human rights projects Ash funded from Organisation 1 in 2009 after Gaza’s bombardment, the rule of law project Kim at Organisation 5 was asked by the Canadian government to create, or in an extreme example the project Organisation 4 ran in Gaza that was designed by CIDA itself. The Canadian

\footnote{Nakhleh, The Myth of Palestinian Development, 175.}
government funded all of these projects according to its priorities, and the latter two were actually developed thematic or structurally by the Canadian government development agency CIDA. Only Organisation 6 could specifically refer to Palestinian partners pitching projects to them, though Sawyer said at Organisation 8 they helped partners design proposals and Organisation 10 had field offices in the OPT monitoring partner needs to determine project funding.

Even though my interviews were semi-structured, allowing the interviewees to emphasise their own thoughts and experiences within a few broad themes, some common ground appeared between them. Some coordinators spoke at length about the way their organisation selected Palestinian partners to work with. Others simply had historical partners they worked with, often a partnership that predated a project coordinator. All of the Canadian organisations working in the OPT relied on their Palestinian partner to implement projects, both because the Canadians lacked the resources and knowledge to implement projects on their own, but also because they shared a genuine aspiration to empower and support Palestinian civil society. At the project coordinator level this was universal. How they chose their partners and the type of projects they would support reveals some information about the boundaries set upon them in their work by the Canadian government and the neoliberal paradigm.

Emory was able to provide background information on the way Organisation 1 selected its partners back to the early 1990s. He/she consciously pushed against the neoliberal and pro-Israeli Canadian government boundaries he/she encountered. Emory said that just prior to the onset of the Oslo process he/she wanted to find some projects that Organisation 1 could invest into in a meaningful way, with a limited budget. At the time Emory believed that the best investment would be PNGOs for the simple reason that there was then a capacity among Palestinians to work within a civil society that was complemented by a vibrant business community, before de-development really accelerated in the 1990s and gutted OPT business. That had been period of richness in civil society should look like, as compared to the years after Oslo.616

Emory selected some early partners by traveling from Canada to Israel and the OPT. Based on that initial field visit, he/she chose to fund PNGOs concerned
with rights work. Even though it was nowhere stated directly that Emory would need to work with Israelis, this was made implicitly clear when the CEO of Organisation 1 said, ‘And what are you doing with the Jewish human rights?’  

For that reason Emory selected two Israeli partners to work with, in order to create the impression of balance, mostly to better be able to defend the Palestinian organisations he/she chose to work with. For similar reasons Emory funded for a time in the 1990s a Jerusalem peace group established by an Israeli and a Palestinian organisation, which would later be funded with more enthusiasm by Organisation 3.

Given the pro-Israel politics in Canada, Emory had felt compelled by his/her CEO to fund some Israeli NGOs working on Palestinian rights. It was not an approach that he/she favoured. He/she felt that PNGOs represented the more important investment and had the greatest need, while he/she did not like having to fund organisations simply on the basis of their being Israeli. Notably, Emory would also fund in this period a West Bank human rights organisation that Ash would later fund, provoking turmoil at Organisation 1 that is described in Chapters 7 and 8.

During Ash’s first years of work after Emory from the mid-2000s onwards, Organisation 1’s staff would support projects in the OPT by making small grants that did not have to be reviewed by their Board of Directors, because there was always a pro-Israel lobbyist monitoring their work from it. In 2009, Ash made small grants after the Operation Cast Lead bombardment of Gaza of around $10,000 each to three human rights organisations to document human rights violations. The three recipients included the Palestinian human rights organisation in the West Bank that Emory funded in the early 1990s, as well as a Gazan human rights organisation and an Israeli one. As with Emory, Ash in part to include an Israeli organisation to create the impression of balance, given both Canada’s politics and the habit in settler colonialism of devaluing the

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617 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 19min57s to 21min37s
618 Those initial five organisations were a human rights centre in Gaza, a Palestinian women’s legal aid clinic in east Jerusalem, an Israeli human rights organisation composed primarily of medical professionals and an Israeli human rights organisation where women were tasked with mapping out the demolition of Palestinian homes.
619 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 39min47s to 50min16s
620 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 4min00s to 4min30s This balance was disrupted for the worse when, according to Ash, a new CEO joined the organisation in 2008. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 05min04sec to 5min15sec
621 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 01min00sec to 03min57sec
narrative of the colonised. All three were chosen by Ash because they were internationally renowned rights organisations he/she was familiar with.\textsuperscript{622}

Organisation 3 was an example of an organisation that had historical partners that had mostly preceded the project coordinators and they would rely when making project proposals. An exception was a West Bank women’s centre they would start to support only from the 2010s. Shared values played an important part in determining whom Organisation 3 would work with. For instance, they preferred to support faith-based OPT organisations working in areas they could agree on, such as human rights. Organisation 3 also worked through a number of coalitions MEWG in Canada. It was in those coalitions that they sometimes got recommendations about Palestinian organisations working in common areas of concern, such as women’s issues.\textsuperscript{623}

Hayden began to work with two existing Palestinian centres in Gaza with Organisation 4.\textsuperscript{624} Those were though not historical partners, but selected by a PA Ministry in a project designed by CIDA. Organisation 4 itself did not even get involved in the design stage, just overseeing implementation with its Palestinian partners.

Organisation 10 did not carry out projects on their own, relying on local Palestinian partners to implement them. They seemed to have one of the most structured processes for selecting partners and projects. Before each fiscal year-end, approximately October, they would ask the field offices they funded in the West Bank and Gaza to look for the most important activities that required funding in the OPT. Those recommendations would then be reviewed at the home office in Canada, where Blake would prioritise the projects, evaluating them one-by-one before presenting them to Organisation 10’s Board of Directors to decide on funding.

The organisations that focused on capacity building and poverty reduction were more easily able to fit their work into the neoliberal donor model. That is

\textsuperscript{622} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) also says that he/she nearly had ‘to beg’ the three different organisations to accept the fund. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 25min45sec to 26min22sec

\textsuperscript{623} When starting a new partnership normally they would start with a sort of test fund. If that worked it would turn into a longer term funding relationship. Taylor (2014 September 4) 24min07s to 27min59s

\textsuperscript{624} They were not really functioning though due to a lack of funding for programs, existing more as buildings with people attached to them.
because they avoided political engagement like Palestinian rights work. Organisation 7 was though an exception because it was directly concerned with supporting rights and advocacy for marginalised people through its network of social work NGOs and their projects. The reason it was able to thrive in spite of this may be because its work included bringing Palestinian and Israeli organisations together, which distinctly fit into the neoliberal Oslo model of peace building with cooperation.

At Organisation 7 Kai believed development could not take place in the OPT unless connected to peace building, politics, which Kai believes can only be carried out when there is communication between both Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, Organisation 7 first worked to identify people and institutions that: shared similar peace building values, the rights people should share and a belief in a progressive civil society. Specifically Kai says he/she approaches the Israeli-Palestinian question with the idea that you cannot believe in Jewish rights if you do not believe Palestinians share the same rights, and he/she believes that is where the conflict starts.

Organisation 7 began work in the late 1990s with four initial regional partners: one Israeli, two Palestinian and one Jordanian. Quinn noted that there had not been a very formal or structured approach to seeking out new partners as the organisation expanded. This is lack of structure is something Quinn said they would address in 2008/9 as part of a government grant request. It is worth noting that none of the interviewees mentioned having a structured process by which they chose partners, while most seem from their interviews to have relied on informal networks, personal contacts and field visits to seek out Palestinian partners. For instance, it was through personal and professional connections that Ryan became acquainted with the CEO of a Gazan mental health programme in the late 1980s that Organisation 2 would support. None mentioned being sought out by a Palestinian partner, though I cannot exclude the possibility this may have occurred at some point. This makes sense, since the Canadian organisations were ultimately the senior partner.

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625 Kai (2012 March 26) 28min14s to 32min43s
626 Kai (2012 March 26) 51min12s to 52min10s
627 Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 35min41s to 41min01s
Government Funding Initiating a Project

The way the Canadian organisations selected projects and whom they worked with often depended on their funding source. Specifically, a number of organisations funded projects after answering a Canadian government call for proposals for a specific thematic area of work. Regardless of the aims of the Canadian organisations in the region, they would have been responding to a government request to carry out a certain type of work, within the parameters of which they would have to operate. The result would be policy makers bearing a great deal of influence over a project.

In the case of Organisation 5 they were approached by Foreign Affairs in the mid-2000s to carry out a feasibility study about Canada contributing to the rule of law in the West Bank and Gaza. This led to the organisation pitching a proposal to CIDA for a judicial education project in the OPT.\textsuperscript{628} Elsewhere, Organisation 6’s projects were typically designed in Canada after a request from government, usually Foreign Affairs and CIDA. In a more extreme case of direct government involvement, Hayden referred to their Gaza project at Organisation 4 as an exceptional one where their organisation had joined a Canadian partner already bidding on a CIDA contract, for a project that had already been designed by CIDA with its junior partner PA Ministry. As will be explained, CIDA would obtrusively interfere with the project at the implementation and analytical levels. Organisation 4 had entered into a development project with very defined parameters.

Even though Organisation 7 was able to access successive multi-million dollar CIDA grants over the course of the three different Canadian governments who ruled in the study period, it was an outlier organisation for CIDA funded project in this study. In the case of this work, its project did not begin with a government call for a specific type of grant, such as social work. Instead it came via their lobbying the government and they felt they received the funding against the wishes of CIDA’s bureaucrats. So in that case Organisation 7 was able to enter into a CIDA grant simply to fulfil its own pre-existing aims and vision, set out by them in Canada, rather than creating a project based around a CIDA call for funding for a certain thematic area.

\textsuperscript{628} In these situations Foreign Affairs could rely on CIDA to provide the funding.
The Canadian Organisations’ Priorities

As seen with the cases of organisations 5 and 6, and especially Organisation 4, the source of funding and specifically Canadian government funding could have a major impact on determining what kind of projects Canadian aid organisations would fund in the OPT. Further, an evolving Canadian political and policy environment would have a major impact on that aid environment. Still, each organisation still had its own vision and agenda for its Palestine development work, while each coordinator also had his/her own ideas and priorities. Some organisations such as Organisation’s 2 and 10 had the advantage of alternative funding sources not from government that let them prioritise their own areas of work, rather than government policy priorities.

Emory tended to fund human rights research and advocacy work generally, seeking systemic political change, over developmental projects that targeted specific types of beneficiaries – with an exception being a women’s legal aid clinic. Ash says the projects they funded in 2009 to document post-conflict human rights abuses were proposed by their partners, though it must be borne in mind that the three partners were chosen by Organisation 1 to work on a thematic area conceived of in Canada.

Organisation 2 was among the organisations least affected by a donor’s mandate, especially the Canadian government, which allowed them to be more dedicated to their vision than finding funding to sustain their operations. When they worked in the OPT they preferred, as Emory tried, to contribute to Palestinian community, social and advocacy work. Ryan said this type of work was pretty natural for a Palestinians, since they had been setting up centres across the OPT for such work, like mental health organisation he/she helped to develop in Gaza. Organisation 2 meanwhile emphasised research and management accountability in the projects and organisations they worked with. This edged their work into the realm of capacity building when working on projects with a Palestinian partner, though the political rights component

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629 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 39min20s to 39min47s
630 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 28min27sec to 28min32sec
remained central to their OPT intervention. As an example, Ryan knew that well-structured proposals could land a Palestinian partner the funding it needed, and this is how he/she helped their Gazan community mental health partner to develop the capacity to apply for large grants. At the same time Ryan pointed out to that partner that, ‘a good research proposal is a very good political instrument’. Over time the Gazan partner managed to produce fantastic papers with international partners from all over the world.

Meanwhile, Ryan believes that good accountability is essential to running a good organisation. He/she said that, ‘as you know’ the world is full of corruption, where even people who are not dishonest by nature face circumstances that compel them to manage money improperly. To help fight that tendency Organisation 2 emphasised accountability. Ryan felt that this played on the strengths of his/her organisation, whose Chairperson he/she said had ‘incredible integrity’; and on the strengths of Canadians, who he/she described as not a particularly creative country but very good at administration.

The projects that Organisation 3 supported in the OPT were almost exclusively partner responses. During the study period 2000-2012 they would typically respond to those requests by including some of them in funding proposals to granting bodies, CIDA in particular, and this led to financial support for projects such as a health centre in Gaza and the peace building initiative in Jerusalem run between an Israeli and a Palestinian women’s groups. Of course, Organisation 3 was still the senior partner in that relationship.

It is worth noting that though Organisation 5 ran a project initiated by the Canadian government, Kim explicitly designed their CIDA funded project to be run in conjunction with a Palestinian partner as co-leader. This was not an arrangement CIDA was comfortable with, as they wanted the Canadian implementing agency to be completely in control of the project as the leader.

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631 Ryan (2014 December 2) 17min29s to 19min02s
632 With assistance from Ryan structuring their grant writing, that Gazan partner soon got a modest first $40,000 grant and within a couple years they would grow to over 50 staff with a million dollar budget. Ryan (2014 December 2) 06min21s to 09min49s
633 Ryan (2014 December 2) 11min44s to 11min48s
634 Ryan (2014 December 2) 17min29s to 19min02s
635 Ryan (2014 December 2) 19min02s to 21min20s
636 Reflecting like Emory on the constraints of a limited budget, Remy felt that they are not a large agency and this loomed in his/her view of how they approached their work.
637 Kim (2014 August 7) 00min00s to 5min17s
(the senior partner). From Kim’s perspective it was necessary to treat their Palestinian partner equally in order to accomplish anything.638 This was not just idealism, but was based on the partner being the people on the ground who would feel the impact of the project. As the project progressed Organisation 5 also came to realise they could not accomplish anything without their Palestinian partner.

Organisation 6 preferred to work on the basis of partner responses. When working with partners Jamie said that they specifically took an approach as an organisation of not dictating how things should be done, seeking instead to engage in a reciprocal negotiation process when first designing a project. Unlike the other organisations I interviewed, they had a lengthy and structured selection process to decide what projects would get funding.639 Several versions of a proposed project would be written up in a lengthy process, reflecting both their and their partner’s perspective.640 The staff in Canada in charge of the assessment would then decide whether or not the project should be funded, passing it on for final approval to a senior manager and the CEO.641 The Palestinian partner would be involved throughout the process, though it must be noted that once again it would be the Canadian organisation deciding what was ultimately worth funding from a Canadian perspective. Further, the entire process usually began with a government offer to fund a specific thematic area of work that reflected Canadian policy priorities.

Sawyer said that nearly all of the time the partners they worked with in the OPT would tell Organisation 8 what they needed.642 Those partners had to be PNGOs, and could never be the PA or government. The challenge he/she said was that those OPT partners mostly do not formulate their needs in very practical terms. While some PNGOs understood very well how to design a project, others did not and needed a lot of coaching. So Organisation 8 would write proposals according to aid industry norms, trying to present those partner ideas in a way that can get funded while involving the partner in the writing

638 Kim (2014 August 7) 5min17s to 9min15s
639 Alexis (2014 October 4) 06min56s to 09min39s
640 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 23min18s to 23min46s
641 Alexis (2014 October 4) 09min39s to 10min39s
642 Sawyer meanwhile expressed disinterest in any project, no matter how well funded, if it did not meet the needs of the people. He/she specifically gave the example that a democracy project was not needed in Gaza since the people had been punished precisely for exercising a democratic right. Sawyer (2012 March 23) 44min55s to 50min04s
Organisation 8 would go through the details of the ideas a partner had for a project, trying to figure out what that partner wanted to achieve, what the nature of the project is and what the anticipated results would be, in order to develop a proposal that could be presented to a donor. Regardless of organisations 8’s best intentions, that gap it filled helping PNGO partners, and itself, to receive funding ultimately meant that it had the advantage of power in finding funding and choosing what could be supported.

Project coordinators Blake and Dallas focused primarily on more technocratic health, education and economy projects. The economic projects they funded in the OPT were not meant to make money, though, but rather fulfilled a humanitarian function keeping people busy and employed, while helping their families indirectly by employing a family member. For Organisation 10 the process of keeping people active and alive was as important as any objective. This resembled in some ways the Arab ‘sumud’ funding of the 1980s that helped Palestinians resist settler colonialism by surviving. It was also more practical than most of the business projects funded or encouraged by donors during the Oslo Process, because on a practical approach it took into account the impossibility of setting up successful business projects under settler colonial conditions.

For each project Dallas and Blake evaluated they took into consideration two key questions: how many people would benefit from a project, and – with an extra emphasis on 2008 onward – if the projects could sustain themselves long-term? With a private fundraising capacity and by not relying on government funding, they could more easily respond to the needs of their partners. Where government still interfered though in their work though was through oversight of Organisation 10’s work via the CRA. This would put a great limitations on their OPT work over time.

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643 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 13min58s to 21min10s
644 C8/C9 18mins00s to 23min30s
Foregoing the Linear Project Model

Quite a number of the project coordinators I interviewed shied away from the linear aid model, and the short-term projects – lasting just months or a few years – associated with it. In those cases, they preferred to try to support a partner in fulfilling its vision as an organisation, reflecting its own community’s priorities. That is, a number of the coordinators said specifically that they were more concerned with the process of keeping people busy and employed, or providing them with funding to remain operational, than meeting the narrow outcomes of a prescribed project. Those project coordinators were more interested in supporting a partner and its vision, than just succeeding at a single project.

Emory, Remy, Taylor, Kim, Quinn, Sawyer, Kai, Blake and Dallas said this outright. Remy for instance said that his/her organisation is most interested in sustaining partnerships and accompanying partners over a long period of time. Organisation 8 took a more mixed approach as Sawyer emphasised that approach in their early years of operations. In the 1980s and 1990s they focused foremost on supporting a partner and people, not specific project outcomes. In later years though they added more linear grant projects that were short term, perhaps reflecting the opening up of CIDA in the 1990s to them for Palestine development projects. Emory’s funding was consciously oriented toward helping cover the operational costs of the NGOs that Organisation 1 worked with, acting like a small core-fund supporting their general operations and vision. Ash began work in the mid-2000s at a time when Organisation 1 was devoted to the linear neoliberal model, limiting what Ash could do to support partners. Even then Ash preferred to provide core funding and claimed to offer it whenever possible via small grants. Meanwhile, Kim believed that part of the rationale behind aid projects is to help keep beneficiary organisations funded, and that that is why you grant projects.

Remy noted in 2014 that over time there came to be less and less space for small and medium-sized organisations to participate in an increasingly onerous
and competitive bidding processes on grants for short-term, linear projects. So if an organisation does not have funding to pay the costs of a bidding process that may result in failure, then they are taking a big risk participating. This prices out many NGOs/PNGOs from participating. Meanwhile, Challand noted in his own research findings in 2008 that funding for small PNGOs is very limited, despite their having a large positive social impact when compared to the amount of money spent. Further, he found that there were too many short-term grants for specific projects that sharply limited the ability of PNGOs to achieve their overall organisational objectives. Those short-term grants also expose PNGOs to a greater degree of uncertainty due to the wild swings that take place in global aid giving trends, undermining their ability to pursue long-term strategic goals for their unique regional needs. That has seen aid run rough shod over indigenous input or participatory agenda setting.

The Politics of Canadian Aid Giving for Palestinians

‘Non-political’ Development and Internal Tension

A theme that came up regularly in my interviews was the struggle project coordinators found balancing development work that included a human rights advocacy element with an overarching political environment that saw both the Israeli and Canadian governments grow increasingly hostile toward Palestinian rights work as the 2000s progressed. Yet project coordinators who did rights and advocacy work were quick to discount any notion that development, or peace, could take hold in the OPT without addressing the political question of Palestinian rights and self-determination. Coordinators like Ash said that it would not occur without advocating Palestinian rights to guarantee they have access to services to allow development to take place. As such, Organisation 2 and Ryan specifically inserted a political element into all of their work. Organisation 4 would go so far as to maintain advocacy engagement even

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649 Remy (2014 August 28) 35min44s to 37min05s
650 Read Challand, ‘The Evolution of Western Aid for Palestinian Civil Society: Bypassing Local Knowledge and Resources’.
652 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 10min45sec to 11min53sec
653 Ryan (2014 December 2) 11min44s to 11min48s
when threatened with the loss of government funding for so doing, as would happen with Organisation 3, too.

Already at the start of the Peace Process their approach had been challenging, because the Oslo Process’ development aid model had been designed specifically to exclude a political element at the peace building stage. In reality that meant sidestepping issues of Palestinian rights work even when the accelerating settler colonial process violated countless human rights and ensured development could not take place. Of all the interviewees, the ones at Organisation 1 found particularly challenging the dichotomy of fulfilling their mandate to carry out rights advocacy works, recognising that the OPT was a major human rights issue, while groping with a political environment and development aid framework that tried to exclude support for Palestinian rights.

This was as true in the 1990s even as it was for 2000-2012. This environment impacted tremendously limiting what kind of projects Organisation 1 was able to support, with whom they could work with and how projects could be designed. In particular engagement with the OPT provoked tensions between a staff concerned with Palestinian rights against a Board of Directors that was limited by a powerful pro-Israel element. That tension with their Board always kept their involvement in the OPT to a minimum, forcing them at most to engage with the OPT only through small grants that did not require Board approval.654 As early as 1992 to 1994, in a less neoliberal aid policy environment, Emory found it challenging to work in the OPT due to opposition toward Palestine work at the level of their Board of Directors. That meant that he/she had to keep their OPT projects low profile, was given only a very limited budget and needed to fund Israeli NGOs that he/she would not otherwise have supported.655 Ash would reflect on that historical reality at their human rights organisation,

We’ve always traditionally had problems with our Board of Directors over any money or doing any projects in the PA, in the Palestinian territories, in Palestine. So to circumvent this, all of our [CEO]’s were very

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654 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 6min59s to 9min22s
655 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 4min00s to 4min30s
conscious of the fact, so they did this behind the back of the board, because legally we were not obliged to report anything over $60,000.\textsuperscript{656}

Meanwhile, problems would often erupt between organisations and the government over the use of terminology and concepts advocating Palestinian rights. Quinn noted that words like advocacy even became ‘evil words’ in certain circles in Canada during the Harper government years.\textsuperscript{657} At the extreme, the Harper government in 2008 appointed Board members to Organisation 1 who outright opposed ‘advocacy’ at an organisation that was specifically mandated to carry out rights advocacy work. Those members went on to create a list of words that staff could not include in any funding proposal, one of which was ‘advocacy’.\textsuperscript{658}

For a human rights and advocacy organisation, eliminating advocacy from its projects undercut its entire reason for being.\textsuperscript{659} So Organisation 1’s staff would try to find other terms to cover for ‘forbidden words’ like advocacy – something Morgan and Organisation 9 would also do after 2009, replacing terms like ‘advocacy’ with ‘communication’ in order to retain their government funding. At the same time Organisation 1’s Board of Directors was more than willing to retain the use of forbidden words they advocacy when used against what they considered to be ‘bad guy countries’ like Burma or Russia.\textsuperscript{660} Ash noted that in later years any statements they made about human rights abuses on their website revealed a pattern where only countries the Conservative government hated were condemned, such as Iran.\textsuperscript{661} Ash noted that this approach to human rights was based not on rational thought, but more on an approach to foreign policy of good versus evil, us against them.

Limitations imposed by the Board at Organisation 1 may have led directly to projects being designed out of frustration by staff to support Palestinian rights

\textsuperscript{656} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 04min30sec to 05min03sec
\textsuperscript{657} Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 12min37s to 13min06s Likewise When Hayden submitted some projects to Environment Canada for funding. A representative from Environment Canada said there were too many uses of the word ‘community’, and that the term ‘community’ is not sustainable. Hayden (2014 August 27) 07min22s to 09min03s
\textsuperscript{658} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 49min38sec to 50min26sec
\textsuperscript{659} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 50min27sec to 51min05sec
\textsuperscript{660} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 51min06sec to 52min21sec
\textsuperscript{661} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 52min22sec to 53min34sec
advocacy. Part of the motivation for Organisation 1 approaching three partners in 2009 to investigate post-Gaza war human rights abuses came after an aborted staff attempt to make a press release at the start of 2009 condemning Operation Cast Lead human rights abuses by both Palestinians and Israelis. They wanted to do something meaningful after the Board prevented them from making that press release.  

Elements of that Board had held the Palestinians, not Israel, responsible for the conflict.

The Normalisation and the Delegitimization of Terms

Mosse pointed out that in development work, ‘long before they meet the livelihood needs of poor people, aid projects satisfy the political needs of Western development agencies’. Most development projects begin as texts, like the World Bank’s An Investment in Peace model. Whatever the rhetoric, the reality is that people participate in agency programmes, and not the other way round. That is, aid programmes are designed to reflect the values of the donor, and not necessarily owing to the needs of the people.

One of the great examples of this were Western donors funding post-Oslo development aid projects that specifically required PNGOs to cooperate with Israeli counterparts, regardless of the political circumstances of ongoing settler colonialism, alternative humanitarian needs pressing in the OPT after decades of occupation and the need to rebuild Palestinian society. Some coordinators were essentially forced to fund Israelis or people of Jewish heritage for political reasons in Canada, because otherwise they might look too ‘pro-Palestinian’. They needed to look politically balanced in an environment that was ardently pro-Israel. This happened especially for rights advocacy organisations such as with Emory at Organisation 1, at Organisation 2 and at Organisation 4. Casey said that Organisation 2 always faced pressure to combine an Israeli voice with a Palestinian (or pro-Palestinian Western) voice when conducting advocacy work, particularly when they conducted public advocacy work at venues such as

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662 Although they were mandated as an organisation to advocate human rights, by early 2009 the Canadian government had been putting pressure on them not to make public advocacy statements about rights. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 22min20sec to 23min38sec.
663 Mosse, Cultivating Development, 2005, 22.
664 Ibid., 21.
665 Ibid., 98.
the United Church.\textsuperscript{666} Organisation 4 would often hire Israeli or Jewish writers to produce articles advocating Palestinian rights, as a way to try to avoid charges of anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{667} Just Organisation 3 enthusiastically sponsored a joint Israeli-Palestinian women’s project it had high hopes for, and Organisation 7 specifically tried to foster cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians in capacity building and poverty reduction projects that adopted a rights element. Kim specifically ruled out cooperation with Israelis as inappropriate to Organisation 5’s rule of law project, rebuffing repeated government attempts to involve Israelis in developing the sector in the OPT. Forcing joint Israeli-Palestinian projects regardless of appropriateness or Palestinians’ immediate needs was an example where donor aid was satisfying the values and politics of Canada as the donor before that of the recipient.

At the level of Canadian government, irrespective of party in power, there was a belief that the Palestinians had much to learn from Israel and that Israel could be a positive force in the development of a liberal Palestinian state. This had been an intrinsic normative value embedded within post-Oslo Palestinian development aid, generally. Thus, Kim said that the Conservative government had tried to encourage collaboration with Israel within his/her rule of law project – with the logic that Israel could help develop the Palestinian judiciary. Had Kim done that, it would have completely destroyed their credibility in the OPT, as it is impossible to have Israelis teaching Palestinians about human rights when Israelis are the ones systematically destroying their society through settler colonialism and a judicial system that legally enforces apartheid.\textsuperscript{668}

Such aid induced cooperation, especially popular in the 1990s, is linked in the OPT lexicon to the concept of ‘normalisation’. It gained popularity in the 1980s when it was used to challenge the status quo of occupation, and grew in importance from the 1990s onwards in the wake of Oslo’s failure and the delegitimization of the cooperative programs set-up by Western donors for Israelis and Palestinians – a cooperative element that was ideologically intrinsic to neoliberalism and the development of an asymmetrical environment of

\textsuperscript{666} Although that was essentially forced upon them, Casey felt the combination was still quite useful as a way to share the views of Organisation 2’s CEO as a speaker. Casey Email 2014 November 20 21:56, pp. 1
\textsuperscript{667} Hayden (2014 August 27) 13min30s to 15min28s
\textsuperscript{668} Coordinator Kim even laughed at the notion. Kim (2014 August 7) 29min13s to 30min22s
peace. Normalisation takes place whenever a relationship or ties are forged between an Arab people and the state of Israel, irrespective of a political solution and an improvement in Palestinian rights. Canada and Canadian organisations have historically been strong supporters of cooperative Israeli-Palestinian projects following the Oslo Accord and some of the organisations I interviewed had supported such activities.

There developed a deep concern among Palestinian rights activists that cooperative projects created the false impression of an Israeli commitment to peace building or Palestinian acquiescence to an occupation whose severity had only intensified after Oslo. That debate about normalisation fit within the larger debate as to whether or not such ‘people-to-people’ projects should take place before, or after, an Israeli withdrawal from the OPT – bearing in mind the opposite of withdrawal had taken place. People increasingly realised that those projects created the impression that ‘normal’ relations existed between Palestinians and Israelis, while falsely implying that the military occupation of the OPT has ended and settler colonialism does not exist. For critics of Oslo and its development aid models the approach represents little more than an attempt to normalise an illiberal system of military violence, legal apartheid and settler-colonial ethnic cleansing. Thus, Palestinian rights activists have in particular from the 2000s onward challenged any attempts to normalise relations with Israel, such as in culture or higher education, without first ensuring Palestinian rights are being protected. This has taken place within the growth of a broader global movement calling for boycott, divestment and sanctions to be applied against Israel until those rights are respected.

Since Organisation 7’s only OPT project had an underlying aim to foster inter-communal cooperation between Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians, they were forced conceptually to grapple with questions of normalisation. From Kai’s point of view sharp polarisation prevents people from working together, especially those who might otherwise be inclined to do so – and in that way

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671 This campaign is modelled on the successful South African divestment campaign that contributed to the end of apartheid there.
everybody loses.\textsuperscript{672} His/her response was that he/she rejected any peace agreement where there would be a ‘normalisation’ of the occupation, but while not believing peace was possible unless the two sides worked together. It was for him/her a delicate ethical juggling act.

Organisation 7’s support for a cooperative work did sometimes lead to disagreements with other Canadian aid actors in the OPT.\textsuperscript{673} Still, Quinn described there being in Canada as late as 2014 a real hunger for joint projects between Israelis and Palestinians.\textsuperscript{674} Where they felt strong pressure against such work was in the Middle East, because the Peace Process had become so delegitimized that some of its key terms were too sullied to make use of any longer. This included the concept of cooperation.

Kim also noted that terms associated with the Oslo Process had become discredited by the mid-2000s. Even though Kim sensed that the government funding call they had responded to sought to project Canadian values abroad, in line with government foreign policy at the time, both Organisation 5 and its partner specifically distanced themselves from Western terms like human rights in favour of indigenous choices. In order to avoid looking like just another group from the West coming to teach Palestinians about human rights’, they specifically adopted terms like 'dignity' in lieu of 'rights'.\textsuperscript{675} Kim said,

\begin{quote}
We focused on the concept of dignity rather than human rights because we didn’t want to be lumped in, “here comes another group of people from the West who are going to be teaching us human rights. And because they don’t know our law, and they don’t know human rights in the Arab context they’re just going to talk to us about international human rights law, and they’re just going to pull us into a room and lecture us about these norms”. So we were very conscious about wanting to distance ourselves from that kind of an approach, which you know in a lot
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{672} Kai (2012 March 26) 32min43s to 33min53s
\textsuperscript{673} Kai (2012 March 26) 28min14s to 32min43s
\textsuperscript{674} Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 10min14s to 11min17s
\textsuperscript{675} Kim (2014 August 7) 10min53s to 13min17s
of ways is the stereotypical approach, but it has a lot of merit to. [Meaning the stereotype is not far from the truth.]

In fact, the Palestinians Organisation 5 worked with neither focused on nor even took Canadian values into consideration in the project. The result was a project Kim felt their Palestinian co-partner genuinely embraced.

For the same reason, Organisation 7 had to drop another key Oslo term, ‘peace’, and change the entire name of their network. He/she said,

Largely because the whole question of peace building is sensitive, not so much here, but there, on our Palestinian partners, Jordanian partners, [they have] never really been able to talk about their involvement in [Organisation 7’s civil society and peace building].

Part of the name change was to protect those partners and their safety. Quinn even noted that one of their Palestinian partners might have left their network for fear of being seen contributing to a normalisation of the occupation.

As Oslo progressively failed the abandonment of words linked to post-Oslo Palestinian development aid also reflected a broader delegitimization of Western and Western-backed aid actors alongside the terms they use. For example, research into health charities and NGOs in the Hebron area of the OPT during the 2000s reveals that there has been a decline in the legitimacy of secular (or secular-leaning) PNGOs that had once flourished in the early 1990s, after years of exposure to Western funding. By contrast during the 2000s there was a revival in more religious Palestinian charitable foundations, particularly Islamist ones long excluded by Canadian donors like CIDA, who were addressing real local concerns like the politics of poverty, rather than the political needs of Western donors. The growing popularity of those charitable foundations may also owe to their use of discourses that resonate more with Palestinians than those PNGOs that adopted fashionable Western terms like

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676 Kim (2014 August 7) 13min17s to 14min4s The stereotypical approach would have entailed bringing in a group of Palestinian professionals, sitting them down and ‘reprogramming them’ with better and more correct views to approach their work with. Kim (2014 August 7) 21min44s to 23min21s
677 Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 11min17s to 11min36s
678 Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 46min04s to 50min34s
679 Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 35min41s to 41min01s
‘empowerment’, ‘good governance’, ‘civil society promotion’ and ‘reform’. Palestinian charitable foundations consciously rejected such terminology, while choosing discourses that represented local culture and tradition. They specifically positioned themselves in opposition to Western models of donor-aid and the asymmetrical ‘senior-junior’ relationship inherent to it, and they gained legitimacy by doing so.

Whatever their best intentions, the Canadian organisations were always the senior partner in their development relationship with a junior Palestinian partner. This was simply a reflection of the neoliberal conceptual values that permeated Canadian and Western development aid to Palestinians. It is for this reason that the aid and policy environment in Canada, and Canadian government interests, had a defining impact on what kind of projects the interviewees could carry out with their Palestinian partners and how those projects would be designed. At best the interviewees could mitigate and shield Palestinian partners from outside influence, but not altogether. Fear of pro-Israel voices in Canada strictly limited what issues they could address and with whom they could work. It also often necessitated adding Israeli or Jewish voices to their work just to create the impression of balance when they engaged with issues like Palestinian human rights that were politically contentious in Canada. This ultimately defined the planning and design stage of the projects that the ten interviewee organisations ran in the OPT. Inequality in the aid relationship ensured that Canada’s agenda, which was skewed in favour of Israel, dominated that aid. As we will see in the following chapters, when interviewees deviated from that support for Israel or advocated Palestinian human rights, they would be punished.

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CHAPTER 7 - Implementation

Introduction

The OPT is an incredibly challenging place to work. Israeli authorities routinely enact policy that is deliberately disastrous for the OPT economy. That policy is often consciously designed to make daily life difficult for Palestinians, in order to encourage them to surrender their claims on land in Area C and willingness to remain in the OPT. This encompasses a highly complex matrix of control that is sustaining a slow motion ethnic cleansing and concentration of Palestinians onto small territories reminiscent of the reservation systems used elsewhere in former British colonies like the US, Canada, Australia and apartheid-era South Africa. Since Israeli policy has been crafted to make daily life difficult and unsafe for Palestinians, it should come as no surprise when aid organisations find it difficult to carry-out development projects in the OPT whose underlying aim is to make life better for Palestinians. Yet in spite of an Israeli settler-colonial occupation that contradicted every notion of development, this would surprisingly prove less problematic for interviewees to content with than pro-Israeli sentiments and government interference from Canada that strove to undermine their work in the OPT. This dominated their discussions about the project implementation stage, and due to that interference many of their projects were halted during implementation.

Challenges from the Field when Implementing Projects

Chapter 4 outlined many of the challenges and failings of the neoliberal Oslo aid model in the OPT, due to that structure of Israeli occupation. Many of the Canadian interviewees reflected in their research interviews on the problems of carrying out projects in that environment. As an example restrictions on mobility, long the bane of development aid in the OPT, often surfaced in the interviews. In this way Organisation 3 faced numerous hurdles implementing projects in the OPT, especially Gaza. Taylor said there are significant mobility and safety

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681 Remy (2014 August 28) 19min23s to 20min40s
questions there, and that their ability to enter Gaza to monitor and support partner projects went from difficult to near impossible over time.\textsuperscript{682}

There is also always a concern for organisations working in the OPT that Israel will not let their employees into the country, potentially undermining a project.\textsuperscript{683} Taylor said in the past their organisation had hired at their office in Canada an Israeli project coordinator who could not get into Gaza to visit partners due to restrictions on Israelis entering there, while in another case they had a Palestinian-Canadian coordinator who faced a great deal of discrimination from Israelis when working in the OPT.\textsuperscript{684} Kim noted that prior to having Canadian government support for his/her project at Organisation 5, which then had some tacit Israeli approval, he/she might be arrested on arrival at the Israeli airport because he/she had an Arabic name, which had happened in the past.\textsuperscript{685} However, CIDA sponsorship did not help volunteer personnel from Organisation 9 to get through the border. Morgan had to be careful not to recruit Canadian volunteers, to be placed with Palestinian partners in their capacity building work, who had Arabic sounding names due to racist Israeli treatment. One time he/she recruited a volunteer who was deported at Ben Gurion Airport due to their Arabic name.\textsuperscript{686} In another case, the Israeli authorities made it so difficult for a Canadian born in Egypt to be in the OPT that Morgan sent him/her back to Canada less than two months after arriving.\textsuperscript{687}

Morgan suffered in other ways with mobility restrictions in his/her work. He/she was responsible for projects in Lebanon and Syria, too, but could never visit them because he/she could not enter Lebanon or Syria while having an Israeli work permit in his/her passport, a document that guaranteed his/her re-entry to Israel.\textsuperscript{688} Meanwhile Morgan found travel to Gaza incredibly difficult, only entering twice in more than two years for three-day trips. This all meant Morgan

\textsuperscript{682} Taylor (2014 September 4) 27min59s to 29min58s
\textsuperscript{684} Taylor (2014 September 4) 48min26s to 50min30s
\textsuperscript{685} Kim (2014 August 7) 28min50s to 29min13s
\textsuperscript{686} Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 09min25s to 11min01s
\textsuperscript{687} Morgan considered this one of the biggest challenges of his/her job. Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 05min58s to 07min16s
\textsuperscript{688} Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 00min00s to 02min23s
was only really able to work in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, despite a regional focus that included Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.\textsuperscript{689}

Running projects in Gaza always proved logistically challenging due to Israeli military offences that compound problems of de-development, closure, siege and embargo. Organisation 4 fought a losing struggle trying to make work their Gazan project, which CIDA had designed in a pre-Intifada context. Meant to run on an initial five-year timeframe, the project launched in the spring of 2002 during the Second Intifada. This caused several delays and a Canadian element of the project was only finally posted in the field in 2003 March.\textsuperscript{690} Due to the deepening humanitarian crisis, at one point the two centres in the project started producing candles to help people deal with frequent blackouts. They also hoped they could export the candles, mirroring the World Bank’s recommendation that Palestinians develop an export-based economy.\textsuperscript{691} Thus the candle initiative could potentially fit the original aims of the project, ‘to empower low-income women and their families in the Gaza Strip, enabling them to improve their economic conditions and enhance their standard of living’.\textsuperscript{692} However, the blockade of Gaza was so severe it became impossible to bring in the materials necessary to produce the candles, let alone export them.\textsuperscript{693} The low buying power of Gazans in the besieged economy combined with a closed border left no paying market for the candles, even in spite of domestic need from power shortages.\textsuperscript{694}

Hayden said that within the centres you would see how the people themselves were affected by the political and economic changes in Gaza, which undermined the neoliberal development aims of the project. He/she noticed this in particular when visiting in 2006 following the imposition of Israel’s Western-backed embargo on the PA after Hamas’ election victory. Hayden said you could feel like there was a prison closing in on people there.\textsuperscript{695} He/she also said that the nature of the project had clearly changed, shifting from developmental

\textsuperscript{689} Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 02min29s to 05min58s
\textsuperscript{690} FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 12)
\textsuperscript{691} Tartir and Wildeman, ‘Persistent Failure’; Tartir and Wildeman, ‘Can Oslo’s Failed Aid Model Be Laid to Rest?’
\textsuperscript{692} FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 12)
\textsuperscript{693} Hayden (2014 August 27) 27min30s to 28min58s
\textsuperscript{694} FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 13)
\textsuperscript{695} Hayden (2014 August 27) 28min58s to 29min44s
to humanitarian.\footnote[696]{Hayden (2014 August 27) 28min58s to 29min44s} This happened in spite of the official aims of the project, because as Chapter 4 described the conventional aims of neoliberal development aid are unrealistic in the context of ongoing Israeli settler colonialism. Thus, at some point the centres began to be used by people simply seeking psychological support to cope with the siege. Extremely popular medical days also began to be arranged there because it was easier for people to get to one of the centres rather than more distant medical clinics in a time of great insecurity.\footnote[697]{Hayden (2014 August 27) 31min01s to 32min20s During Israel's first bombardment of Gaza during 'Operation Cast Lead' in 2008 December - 2009 January, damaging more than half of Gaza's 27 hospitals, destroying two health clinics and damaging 44 others. Clancy Chassay, ‘Under Attack: How Medics Died Trying to Help Gaza’s Casualties’, The Guardian, 23 March 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/23/gaza-war-crimes-medics; ‘Operation Cast Lead, 27 Dec. ’08 to 18 Jan. ’09’ (B’Tselem, 1 January 2011), http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/castlead_operation.} That insecure environment later included many medical clinics being bombed, damaged and even destroyed by the Israeli military. This included a health clinic funded by Organisation 3 with CIDA money, which was bombed and destroyed by Israel in 2009.\footnote[698]{Remy said the bombing seemed nutty and senseless, and that it left them with a feeling of emotional despair. Remy (2014 August 28) 21min10s to 23min24s} At one point even the women and people managing the centres asked Organisation 4 not to focus on the technical and vocational training that was supposed to take place within the project. Instead of meeting the needs of the Canadian donor, they wanted to meet the immediate needs of the people struggling in difficult circumstances in Gaza.\footnote[699]{Hayden (2014 August 27) 41min04s to 42min16s}

Meanwhile, Organisation 3 had had a great deal of hope for the joint Israeli-Palestinian women’s project in Jerusalem. However, it was undermined by a combination of the inconsistencies in those 1990s people-to-people projects with restrictions on mobility and deepening violence.\footnote[700]{This was one of the projects Emory reluctantly funded in the 1990s after being pressured to fund Israeli organisations by his/her CEO. By contrast Organisation 3 saw it as a highly important initiative they genuinely wanted to support believing it had the potential to be a model for peace building in the region, as it brought together Palestinian and Israeli women.} Throughout the 2000s the initiative faced difficulties because restrictions on mobility made it tougher for the women to come physically together. Remy says their work really became untenable starting in December 2008 when the first bombardment of Gaza pushed a deep wedge between the two groups of women, leading to an
unravelling of the project.\footnote{Remy (2014 August 28) 09min31s to 13min22} For Taylor this was a sign of ‘hope lost’ in the Middle East.\footnote{Taylor (2014 September 4) 08min11s to 11min07s}

In addition to these issues of mobility and conflict, the interviewees spoke about issues in reporting and their relationship with their partners. Reporting by Palestinian partners on how project funds were spent is arguably the most important part of their relationship with a Canadian donor. Without it funding will stop. Canadian organisations use that information to report to their own funders and to the CRA to prove their funding was used for charitable purposes, and to verify that none of it was used for terrorism. Reporting to the CRA will prove to be a critical issue for many organisations later audited under suspicious circumstances.

Reporting is also a highly complex and challenging part of development work that is connected to Canadian regulations. An idea of that complexity came out from the interviews. Remy for instance said that reporting was one of the biggest hurdles they faced,

\begin{quote}
It’s almost, if you look at it, crazy that in the places that are the most … struggling, you want accountability, but on the other hand these folks are struggling just to survive, [and] like you’re demanding a report [Remy laughed in amazement].\footnote{Remy (2014 August 28) 20min40s to 20min55s}
\end{quote}

Meanwhile, Emory said that it is often the victims of a conflict themselves who often become the activists organising themselves into an NGO. He/she said that those people already have so many issues to contend with that when you demand reports from them, you as a donor-partner end up asking them to shift their focus to your needs rather than their beneficiaries.\footnote{Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 59min01s to 1h7min00s} In his/her experience reporting expectations force PNGOs to make a dangerous reallocation of time from 10-15% on administration when they are operating on their own, to spending 60% of their time on administration the moment they get big donor support, leaving them with only 40% of the time in their limited schedule to do the actual work they are paid to do.\footnote{Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 59min01s to 1h7min00s} Emory found that very frustrating, and
found some of the donor demands to be unreasonable. He/she decried the
damage being done to the structure and effectiveness of local PNGOs by
reporting.\textsuperscript{706} It is worth noting that this may also have contributed to their decline vis-à-vis the religious charitable foundations recorded by Challand in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{707}

When explaining how challenging reporting can be, Remy noted an example
where Organisation 3 was being audited by the CRA. The CRA was asking for
some specific information about the local partners and in one case a piece of
information was missing. That audit was taking place during escalating violence
in Gaza, and Remy questioned if he/she could legitimately press the partner for
such information at the time.\textsuperscript{708} The CRA could not of properly fathom, and take
into account those conditions. Meanwhile, coordinators Blake and Dallas said in
their experience that all the reports provided by partners had to be provided in
English for reports on to the Canadian government via the CRA, but
Organisation 10 simply lacked the time and resources to translate everything.\textsuperscript{709}
This created a significant administrative burden for an organisation that avoided
expenses on Canadian personnel.

Meanwhile, in the majority of the cases interviewees were happy with their
partners’ work and often with the way in which the projects were progressing.
Kim could point to successes in their work educating Palestinian judges. Organisation 6 felt their project was running well until undermined and shut
down by government. Emory was absolutely impressed with the progress of
some of his/her partners, especially the women’s legal aid clinic. Organisation 7
was buoyant about their project and had hoped it could expand, while Hayden
could see the utility of the centres in Gaza even if they were not developing the
way their CIDA wanted. Morgan was even quite happy with how Organisation
9’s capacity building projects were running, in spite of the challenges he/she
faced with mobility. Ryan was likely pleased with the on going development of
their Gazan mental health partner.

\textsuperscript{706} As a result of the onerous nature of reporting in the aid industry, NGOs have started to ask
you for managerial and English courses, and Emory feels that is so wrong. Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 59min01s to 1h7min00s
\textsuperscript{707} Challand, ‘A Nahda of Charitable Organizations?’
\textsuperscript{708} Remy (2014 August 28) 28min45s to 30min33s
\textsuperscript{709} Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 24min30sec to 32min00s
Only in a few cases did the coordinators face difficulties in the projects they funded owing to operational issues at the partners. Generally coordinators, like Hayden, showed great consideration with the trying circumstances their partners faced overseas, including in their reporting. Emory covered for partners who were not able to keep up with Canadian reporting requirements, while Remy revealed deep concern over his/her having to ask for reporting material from a partner during a time of great turmoil in Gaza. A number of the coordinators questioned the linear model of aid work, which Chapters 6 through 8 of this thesis are structured on. Some like Organisations 3 and 5 preferred to work as equals sharing the experiences of their partners, though as Chapter 6 pointed out this was pretty much impossible given the structure of Palestinian aid. Meanwhile, coordinators like Ash, Remy, Taylor, Jamie, Alexis and Morgan would find their Palestinian partners quite understanding about political problems they would face in Canada, which would hurt the Palestinians.

Challenges From Canada when Implementing Projects

In spite of the incredible challenges associated with managing development aid projects in the OPT, in my interviews I found the project coordinators overwhelmingly spent their time focused on the challenges they faced in Canada. Remy said that of all challenges Organisation 3 faced funding rights projects in the OPT, they found the politics of Israel and Palestine in Canada to be the most challenging issue they dealt with.710 Likewise Blake and Dallas said their greatest challenges were from Canada.711 Jamie said that politics in Canada was always the hardest part of Organisation 6’s OPT work.712

Those challenges were sometimes the result of Canadian regulations that were incongruous to conditions in the OPT. Little issues in reporting could cause enormous headaches, such as the requirement that Organisation 10 keep original receipts for all project expenses in Canada, when PA law required the originals remain in the OPT. Due diligence requirements swamped Organisation 10 with unreasonable levels of work and unclear requirements that they said

710 Remy (2014 August 28) 23min24s to 25min38s
711 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 38min10sec to 38min29sec
712 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 51min57s to 53min50s
hampered their ability to carry out charitable projects. Due to strict expectations that Canadian organisations maintain ultimate financial and managerial control over their projects, CIDA did not want Kim at organisation 5 to offer full financial disclosure of their law project to their Palestinian partner. Yet, that would have undermined Organisation 5’s ethos of full transparency and equality in their partnership, and made working together more difficult. In fact, attempts by project coordinators to be as transparent as possible were all too often undermined by their management and ultimately by government. When the CEO of Organisation 1 refused a request by their Board’s Chairperson to fly the CEO of the right-wing Israeli organisation NGO Monitor to Canada for talks, particularly because that was a personal request not taken by the staff through institutional channels, the CEOs insistence upon transparency helped spark a breakdown in their relationship.

Managing Canadian Regulations and Due Diligence in the OPT Context

There is an incredible incongruity between Canadian regulations and the realities of working in the OPT. They are completely different contexts and one-size-does-not-fit-all. Nearly all of the organisations interviewed operated under Canadian charity regulations. A Canadian charity can only grant funds to qualified donees (described in the footnote), which a PNGO is not.713 A charity can only transfer funds to a non-qualified donees such as a non-profit (that is not registered as a charity), a business or an individual, if they are fulfilling a contract for the Canadian charity, and that leaves the Canadian charity ultimately as the owner of that work. Yet, Canadian organisations with limited budgets rely by necessity on Palestinian partners to get a project done. Overall the system of funding partners on contracts and record keeping complicated the

713 The CRA does not approve of a charity ‘lending’ its charitable number, or directing donations through itself for an unqualified donee. Qualified donees include: (1) a registered charity (including a registered national arts service organisation); (2) a registered Canadian amateur athletic association; (3) a listed housing corporation resident in Canada constituted exclusively to provide low-cost housing for the aged; (4) a listed Canadian municipality; (5) a listed municipal or public body performing a function of government in Canada; (6) a listed university outside Canada that is prescribed to be a university, the student body of which ordinarily includes students from Canada; (7) a listed charitable organisation outside Canada to which Her Majesty in right of Canada has made a gift; (8) Her Majesty in right of Canada, a province, or a territory; and (9) the United Nations and its agencies. Canada Revenue Agency, ‘Qualified Donees Reference Number CG-010’, Government of Canada, Qualified Donees, (10 August 2011), http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/plcy/cgd/qlddns-eng.html.
work of the Canadian interviewees at the expense of their objectives, in an already challenging region. The politics of Canadian government interference only accentuated those problems. There is added scrutiny applied to Canadian organisations working in the OPT, where many of groups listed as terrorist entities by the Canadian government are Palestinian.  

What these regulatory restrictions meant was that, for instance, Organisation 10 would often pay a supplier directly when buying equipment for an institution in the OPT, rather than letting the Palestinian institution buy it for themselves. They did this because from the CRA perspective that was best practice. All in all OPT expenses were covered by contracts that were strictly reported on and monitored with a reporting paper trail. Organisation 10 found that they needed to adopt two types of contracts for every project, too, in order to appease the government. One was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) describing the principles of a partnership, and the second a specific Project Agreement describing how a project they were funding was run. This allowed little flexibility outside the parameters of the original project model, even though conditions on the ground are constantly changing in the OPT. Receipts needed to be collected for every single expense, even though they were not always easy to collect in a region that is often described as not being a ‘paper culture’ (author’s words). Further, all original copies of receipts were supposed to be kept in Canada and of course had to be translated to English for the CRA.

Organisation 10 was one of the organisations I interviewed that faced the most problems being monitored by government, perhaps non-coincidentally because they had a predominantly Muslim membership. Following an audit by the CRA, they were told that they should conduct due diligence checks on all of the people they are working with, everywhere they were working. To do this they were told by CRA authorities to look at a variety of terrorist lists beyond just the Canadian one, such as the UK, the US and the Israeli ones. Yet even if you put a name into those lists and there was no hit, the interviewees said that it might appear on an Israeli list as an ‘alleged’ terrorist, which the CRA would

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714 Public Safety Canada, ‘Listed Terrorist Entities’.
715 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 22min30sec to 24min30sec
716 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 18mins00s to 23min30s
717 They say that at one point the CRA even asked Organisation 10 to visit as many websites as they could from around the world checking the backgrounds of partners and beneficiaries as part of their due diligence. Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 42min35sec to 43min50sec
treat alleged as guilty. Further, they said you can be accused of misdoings in the OPT simply because of your family connection to someone, even if you yourself are innocent. Even a fourth degree connection might imply guilt to the CRA.

The interviewees felt that the CRA relied in particular on the Israeli list, a list questionable by nature since the settler colonial oppressor keeps it. Dallas said,

For example Israel has a list, and all of it says alleged, alleged, alleged, alleged, alleged. Who issued that list? Nobody knows. But it’s issued from some source in Israel, ok? Some source in Israel. They [the CRA] refer to it always. They never refer to the Canadian list. They refer to that list and they dedicated most of their time on that list. And we said, fair enough, why are these organisations not closed then?

The difference between the CRA and Israelis is that even for Israel alleged did not mean guilty, but the Canadians treated it as though it were. Blake and Dallas pointed out that when you travel to the OPT you can find that an alleged terrorist organisation is operational, possibly even working with the western-backed PA, and that it has never been closed in spite of the Israelis closing hundreds of other organisations 2000-2012. They believed that that alone should mean the organisation is still okay. Meanwhile they said that if an organisation did come under Israeli investigation, they stopped working with that group. However, that was still not enough for the Canadian government.

Dallas and Blake were given an impression that Canadian authorities were working on a principle of ‘guilty until proven innocent’, with the onus put on Organisation 10 to prove the innocence of the people they were working with.

Blake further noted that the concept ‘due diligence’ was very opaque and left widely open to interpretation. Since there were not any clearly defined parameters for due diligence they found conducting it quite challenging,

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718 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 40min30sec to 41min15sec
719 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 38min10sec to 38min29sec
720 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 50min01sec to 51min07sec
721 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 51min31sec to 52min07sec
722 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 52min33sec to 53min29sec
723 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 51min14sec to 51min24sec
This word due diligence is an elastic band. You know. The more you stretch it the more it will stretch, you see. The same things as books and records. There’s certain areas where books and records have to be kept, and the books and records and all the originals and invoices have to be in Canada. It doesn’t matter where in Canada. It has to be in Canada, and the originals have to be in Canada. And has to be recorded in an electronic media in a programme which is compatible with revenue Canada’s programs. Now tell me where is that written that you have a list of programmes, which are compatible with, or are to be compatible with. There is nowhere written that it is to be in electronic form. It is written nowhere.  

Dallas said that the CRA’s requirement to keep all originals and invoices for expenses in Canada was completely out of sync with PA law. He/she said, ‘Because of auditing. The auditors in Ramallah would not do auditing without the originals’. This is the law in the PA, yet the CRA did not care. Blake said that Organisation 10 may also have been being scrutinised more than other Canadian organisations working in the OPT. He/she discovered for instance that Oxfam Québec was allowed to keep just the copies of receipts in Canada, while retaining the originals in the Middle East where Israeli and PA law required they be kept. Overall the CRA’s inconsistent and onerous requirements were a tremendous administrative burden for a charity with limited resources. Dallas quipped that the CRA’s requirements would be fine if they paid for two employees just to meet them.

Due in part to CRA requirements, Organisation 5 was expected to act as the executing agency responsible for oversight for all the finances of their justice project, as they were technically the owners of it in their contract with their Palestinian partner. This undermined Kim’s efforts to maintain an equal partnership. So for instance one-way Kim attempted to reinforce the partnership

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724 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 44min02sec to 44min53sec
725 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 45min01sec to 45min07sec
726 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 45min08sec to 45min13sec
727 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 45min28sec to 45min55sec
728 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 43min44sec to 43min55sec
was insisting on their Palestinian partner being at all their meetings with CIDA, which CIDA strongly resisted for financial meetings.  

At the very beginning of the project I wanted to have my co-director involved in discussions about the budget, and CIDA said, “No! You should not show him the budget”.  

Kim said he/she disagreed strongly with CIDA, as he/she wanted to have a relationship that was built on transparency and trust. If that could not happen, then Kim felt that the whole project would not work. Kim said that was because Organisation 5 was there to build a new model and not run things like they used to be run. As a university-linked organisation he/she believed that they should be involved in innovating, not administrating a project on behalf of CIDA.  

Meanwhile politics and intervention by Canadian government bodies seriously undermined the progress of the interviewees’ projects. Morgan claimed it was impossible for Canadians to get anything done in the OPT, because as soon as there was trouble the government would halt a project, ‘because the terrorists are there’. In his/her view when Canada did that this essentially reinforced anything that the Israelis did in the OPT, just like when the CRA relied on Israeli terrorist lists. Nor was Canada alone among donors and institutions reinforcing Israeli policy. For instance, the UNDP joined donors in the international boycott of the PA in the wake of the 2006 election, instating a no-contact policy that specifically excluded the Hamas government and its affiliated NGOs. While quickly boycotting the Hamas-led PA, the UNDP hypocritically continued to say fostering democratic governance was one of the UNDP’s main aims in the OPT. International donors actually encouraged poor governance by boycotting the PA and sending funds to their chosen client PA President Abbas through the President’s Office and his political allies, or money for government services through unelected NGOs. This mirrored a process in the early years of the Peace Process where Israel encouraged bad governance by

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729 Kim (2014 August 7) 00min00s to 5min17s  
730 Kim (2014 August 7) 44min45s to 44min59s  
731 Kim (2014 August 7) 44min50s to 45min33s  
732 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 18min14s to 18min36s  
having money sent to PA President Arafat's personal bank to allow him to buy his position.\textsuperscript{734}

Kim suffered from that approach. Initially in 2005 Organisation 5’s project was supposed to operate in Gaza, but could not continue its work there due to Israeli restrictions on mobility that were reinforced against Gaza by Canadian policy following Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory. Further, the political decision by the Canadian government to put all projects on hold after the Hamas election win, purportedly to make sure there would be no Canadian support for terrorism, meant they were not allowed initially to do any work. This began a pattern of ‘starts and halts’ linked to political events that seriously impaired the overall project. Only eventually after a first pause in 2006 were they allowed to conduct some limited research for the project, and by the time they could begin work they found that most of the competent people for a rule of law project in the OPT were being hired away since all the major international aid actors were by then engaged with law and security projects.\textsuperscript{735}

Organisation 4’s Canadian government funded project in Gaza was also likewise halted after 2006. Hayden said that all the political changes in Canada and the OPT between 2001 and 2008 meant nothing went as planned, as their project always seemed to take two steps forward and one step back – or ‘three steps back’ depending on the period.\textsuperscript{736} The initial 2006 post-electoral stoppage was also near the conclusion date of the project’s initial period of funding. At first Organisation 4 tried to negotiate continued funding from government for the two centres, thinking that it made no sense to close them down, but with no success. They then tried to transfer the centres to another organisation to keep them operational, and the only organisation the Canadian government agreed to was the UNDP. Initially CIDA said that the transfer would take place very quickly, less than a month, but that took a year.\textsuperscript{737}

The delay was because until the re-imposition of a Western-backed Fatah government in the PA, under President Abbas in 2007 June, Canadian policy prevented CIDA officials from meeting PA Ministers, including at the very
Ministry the centres were originally meant to be turned over to. CIDA also underestimated the role and importance of the Palestinian Ministry in the project, which caused several setbacks and delays in the transfer to the UNDP. Organisation 4’s final report for the project states that if communication between CIDA, the Ministry and the UNDP had been more open from the early stages of the project, the transfer would have been carried-out more effectively and efficiently. Yet Canadian policy did not allow that. Hayden eventually oversaw a one-year transition period of the centres to the UNDP, only for them to close down a year later. The UNDP ran out of funding for them.

Another difficulty Hayden faced was that the person who designed the project at CIDA ended up becoming its monitor. The monitor could not understand why their initial results, set out in the design stage for a pre-Second Intifada, were not being met, in spite of rapidly changing conditions. For instance, the monitor could not understand why Palestinian women were not selling the products that they were supposed to be selling, though as the candle project revealed the occupation and siege on Gaza guaranteed that economic projects cannot work there – as has always been the case in the history of occupied Gaza. The monitor was stuck in the linear model where development aid projects are implemented step-by-step from policy (design) to implementation and outcomes, and that monitor’s incapacity to understand changing circumstances made project management much more challenging for Hayden. Norman Long wrote about that linear trap in projects or research,

Like the dominant theoretical paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s, much policy analysis seemed still to cling to a rather mechanical or systems model of the relationship between policy, implementation and outcomes. The tendency in many studies was to conceptualise this as essentially linear in nature, implying some kind of step-by-step process whereby policy was formulated, implemented, and then followed by certain results, after which one could evaluate the process to establish how far the original objectives had been achieved. Yet, as my own field research on

738 FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project (page 15)
739 Hayden (2014 August 27) 09min03s to 11min41s
740 Hayden (2014 August 27) 37min32s to 39min09
742 Hayden (2014 August 27) 30min22s to 31min01s
the Peruvian Land Reform programme had shown - and enlightened planners and development workers will readily appreciate - this separation of 'policy', 'implementation' and 'outcomes' is a gross oversimplification of a much more complicated set of processes which involve the reinterpretation or transformation of policy during the implementation process, such that there is no straight line from policy to outcomes.\textsuperscript{743}

Gaza and the OPT are definitely complicated places to work.

Morgan said in his/her interview that while operational principals are 'nice pieces of paper', once you are in the field you have to make do with 'what and who you have', while making sure that whatever you happen to be doing you get the results expected of you.\textsuperscript{744} By results he may seems to have meant the overall vision for a project. Morgan found the Canadian government to be a major obstacle to his/her work. They would limit what he/she could do, even indirectly threatening him/her through Organisation 9 on several occasions. When Morgan met Canada’s highest ranked diplomat in 2010 at the Canadian Representative Office in Ramallah, he/she was warned not to support advocacy work in the OPT, asking Morgan what value they, ‘put on the financing that they receive from the Canadian government’.\textsuperscript{745} Organisation 9 took the threat seriously and panicked after hearing about it, because it came after a period of scandals where the Canadian government had defunded organisations such as KAIROS over their Palestinian projects.\textsuperscript{746} One immediate result was that Organisation 9 dropped the word ‘advocacy’ from their operational lexicon, instead adopting ‘communication’ to cover for that type of work.\textsuperscript{747} Further, Morgan felt obliged to drop a long-standing Palestinian partner in the West Bank, because that partner engaged explicitly in advocacy. He/she had to tell the partner that Organisation 9 would stop supporting it, saying that if they did not, then the Canadian government would shut down Organisation 9 itself.\textsuperscript{748} It was either the project or organisation. The Palestinian partner was not happy,
but Morgan said they understood the pressure. Following that warning Morgan also did his/her best to avoid meeting Canadian Representative Office and CIDA officials.

The Canadian government also did not want Organisation 9 to work in regions dominated politically by Hamas, such as Gaza and some West Bank communities like Qalqilya. In this way Canadian policy was reinforcing Israeli policies of fragmentation and mass punishment of Palestinian civilians. After a year working in his/her post, Morgan says he/she basically said to management, ‘Fuck the Canadian government I’m going to do what I want to do’ since the government rendered development work impossible. Morgan also said that he/she also refused to stop advocacy work altogether, and would continue to work with partners in Gaza. Further, since there was absolutely nothing threatening about their capacity building and poverty reduction activities, he/she saw no reason to stop any aspect of it.

There is something unique to note about the OPT and project accountability, conveyed by Remy. He/she says that at Organisation 3 they did their best to follow accountability by law, while doing their best to make sure their due diligence requests were reasonable for what were essentially small amounts of money sent overseas to the OPT. Remy said that, quite unlike the CRA, they did their best to try to understand the context their partners were working in within the OPT. There people were struggling just to survive, and Remy felt that might affect their ability to write reports constructed in a foreign language for a foreign donor. Remy felt very bad when faced with the dilemma of asking a Gazan partner for a missing bit of information requested by the CRA during an escalation in violence. Meanwhile even if their Palestinian partners were not always easy to work with from the perspective of reporting paper-work, unlike some other development contexts Organisation 3 was familiar with, they found Palestinians openly wanted people to visit their organisations see their work first-hand and conditions in the OPT. The result was that Remy found

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749 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 24min38s to 29min34s
750 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 29min40s to 30min59s
751 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 27min39s to 28min18s
752 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 27min56s to 28min00s
753 He/she said that if the Canadian government was not happy with their work, ‘Then fuck them’. Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 27min56s to 28min00s
754 Remy (2014 August 28) 28min45s to 30min33s
755 Remy (2014 August 28) 28min45s to 30min33s
monitoring visits to be quite effective. For this reason they also invited their members and people from their networks, along with CIDA, to visit their Palestinian partners.\textsuperscript{756}

Pro-Israel Political Pressure within Canada

A number of interviewees suffered from the effects of political interference by pro-Israel lobby groups in Canada, who support Israel’s settler colonial policy, and genuine Canadian government support for their message. This undermined the projects, organisations and personal lives of the interviewees. For example, Organisation 4 faced a lot of pressure stemming from their human rights advocacy work in the Middle East, but especially for Palestinians. Hayden says they would get a lot of complaints at their office when they wrote about the situation in the OPT. This powerful pro-Israel lobby regularly targeted Organisation 4 them and they would frequently get accused of anti-Semitism over their publications about human rights in the region, which were accusations without basis.\textsuperscript{757} These accusations were what compelled them to hire Israeli or Jewish journalists when writing about Israel and the Palestinians, to prove they are not anti-Semitic.

On top of being linked to anti-Semitism, Organisation 4 was accused of supporting terrorism by NGO Monitor, the radical Israeli non-profit who the Chairperson of Organisation 1 would once try in vain to invite to Canada for talks. In 2006, NGO Monitor listed a number of groups it alleged were terrorist, including an alternative media centre in the OPT. Organisation 4 was supporting some of those organisations using Canadian government funding. Based on NGO Monitor’s logic, that meant the Canadian government was therefore funding terrorist organisations, via Organisation 4.\textsuperscript{758} Those allegations against Organisation 4’s operations likely contributed to it later losing government funding. Organisations 1, 3 and 6 would face similar fates via NGO Monitor.

\textsuperscript{756} Remy (2014 August 28) 30min33s to 32min55s
\textsuperscript{757} Hayden (2014 August 27) 13min30s to 15min28s
\textsuperscript{758} Hayden (2014 August 27) 13min30s to 15min28s
Fomenting Internal Strife and Paralysis

In the case of Organisation 1 issues related to NGO Monitor would play occupy a side position next to a violent fault line that existed between staff who wanted to include Palestinians in their human rights advocacy work, versus a Board of Directors that leaned – arguably hawkish – pro-Israel and subdued Palestinian rights work internally. Already since the early days of Emory’s work at the organisation they had stymied his/her work, such as when his/her CEOs would prevent him/her from producing any organisational statements about Palestinian rights from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Further, while the staff at Organisation 1 would have open discussions and debates about the projects they were funding, Emory’s Middle East projects were always kept out of open discussion to avoid drawing attention to them; and his/her budget to run projects was always kept very small. Emory attributed that to pressure put on the CEO from the Canadian pro-Israel lobby, which always had a presence on the Board. 759

While Organisation 1 did defend the right of Palestinian human rights organisations to operate, Emory wryly noted that this is very different than saying Palestinians have the same rights as anyone else. 760 Fundamentally, Emory knew that his/her support for Palestinian rights in his/her role was sharply limited by Israel and the impact of Israeli politics’ on his/her organisation. Emory said that influence came through lobbying by the Canadian CJC, and pressure from the Canadian government. 761 Emory said that if you work on Israeli-Palestinian issues in Canada, you have constantly to contend with the powerful pro-Israel lobby groups like the CJC. 762 He/she further said that there was always a member from that lobby sitting on their Board keeping tabs on the work of Organisation 1, either from the CJC or the more right-wing B’nai Brith. He/she said this was done with the tacit approval of the Canadian government, and that those lobbyists would liaise either directly or indirectly with the Israeli government. 763
The 2008/2009 Israeli Operation Cast Lead bombardment of Gaza caused mass devastation in the territory, and this galvanised the staff at Organisation 1 to do something to condemn the violence. That led to the three small 2009 projects to document human rights projects. They were designed, as was a tradition for staff at Organisation 1, to be small enough to not have to be reviewed by the Board of Directors. However, Organisation 1’s recently appointed CEO strove for transparency, as had happened in his/her clash with the Chairperson by refusing to sponsor a visit by NGO Monitor. The CEO was also cognisant that Israel-Palestine was a sensitive issue for the Board and being anything other than transparent was totally unacceptable to the CEO.

For this reason the staff at Organisation 1 had to prepare a whole sheet of questions and answers about the projects for the Board. The staff had researched the organisations well and felt they had addressed every possible question. They were sure that the two Palestinian and one Israeli organisations took a balanced approach to human rights, and were confident that they would document abuses regardless if they were carried out by Palestinians or Israelis. As Emory had pointed out in the past, creating the impression of balance, even after such an imbalanced conflict like Operation Cast Lead, was important to Organisation 1. Ash meanwhile argued that the projects were beneficial to Israel, because it promoted free speech and tolerance.

Organisation 1’s staff were not prepared for the reaction their new Chairperson would have. He had just recently been appointed near the beginning of 2009. On being told about the projects, ‘The guy [the Chairperson] went ballistic. He

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764 Following the bombardment, the CEO and staff had tried to release a ‘balanced’ statement condemning the violence. Ash says that his/her ideas was, ‘basically to tell everybody [in the region] to cool down and to sort of keep a humanitarian aid in place, and that was it. It was just a statement’. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 23min39sec to 23min48sec The CEO went to the Board and found a great deal of resistance, where some Board members wanted to blame only Hamas for the violence. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 24min29sec to 24min45sec
765 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 26min28sec to 27min07sec Ash said he/she was a respected bureaucrat who had come in to clean up the organisation after mismanagement by the previous CEO, and, ‘decided to announce everything and be transparent about specifically what we were doing in the Palestinians territories’. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 05min04sec to 5min15sec
766 Those were highly respected organisations known for their unbiased and well-documented approach to abuses of human rights. They had received international awards and been funded by Emory in the 1990s. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 12min30sec to 13min58sec
767 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 36min55sec to 38min12sec
768 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 08min18sec to 14min40s
was like foaming at the mouth.” The problem the staff at Organisation 1 faced was that at the level of their Board there were members, such as that Chairperson, who considered the three human rights organisations to be anti-Israeli. Worse, Ash saw that some of them believed those well-respected Palestinian and Israeli organisations were somehow ‘terrorist entities’,

Ash, “It was a matter of principal that the projects should not have been. You are giving money to terrorist organisations”. I said, “Who are the terrorist organisations again”? Ash then named the two Palestinian organisations, “And [the Israeli organisation] was … They’re not. They’re not on any [terrorist] list”. I asked, “So they’re not considered terrorist organisations”? Ash, “No, No, they’re not. But you never know. That was what we were told”.

As Organisation 10 noted about monitoring of their projects, guilty until proven innocent.

Board members opposed to the grants wanted the staff to denounce the projects they had funded, and to get the money back. When those Board members could not get the request fulfilled, they froze the fund for small grants that the staff would use for the human rights projects. Since the partners were so well established, and the funds quite small, the one in the West Bank simply returned the funds – with bank transfer fees. Ash described the move as, ‘don’t give me shit over $10,000’.

Ash was impressed with how well the partners dealt with the crisis in Canada,

The professionalism with which they handled the crisis and handled the aftermath was commendable. I called them for their reports and they said

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769 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 27min08sec to 27min27sec Ash says the Chairperson seemed unstable and always seemed to go off on tangents about being Jewish, regardless of the topic.
Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 47min59s to 48min45sec At one point the Chairperson called a staff member warning that he is not to be messed with, saying ‘I’m telling you my parents survived the holocaust, and you will not bring me down with this’. Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 47min52s to 47min59s

770 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 38min43sec to 38min12sec

771 The CEO meanwhile pledged to fight against their actions. Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 07min25sec to 08min18sec In addition to freezing the small special projects fund, the Board of Directors stalled other projects in order to undermine them and took away some of the CEO’s authority. They also accused the CEO of funding faith organisations and accused him/her of attending a conference where a Hezbollah member was in the same room. Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 28min29s to 37min10s

772 This was an organisation Emory funded in the 1990s. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 26min23sec to 26min27sec
yes they’re coming. Anyone else would have just said, “screw you”. But they were fine.\textsuperscript{773}

This led to a couple intense Board meetings in spring and summer of 2009, where the CEO’s performance was evaluated – over the three small and very balanced human rights projects.\textsuperscript{774} Ash notes that in the summer meeting the Board would not give the CEO his evaluation, even though they were required by law to do so. So the CEO was forced to make an Access to Information request to see it. The Board was incensed by his exercising this legal right, the Board of a human rights organisation, and falsely claimed that the CEO had had no right to see it.\textsuperscript{775} The Board in response established a committee of four to review the CEO further, which included the aforementioned Chairperson and another highly partisan pro-Israel activist. That committee was meant to rewrite the evaluation by the end of 2009, with an aim of specifically not allowing the CEO to read it. Meanwhile, the Chairperson and partisan ally excluded the other two members of the committee from the process of writing it, prompting one of them to resign and to alert Foreign Affairs about the dubious process.\textsuperscript{776} It was a crude example of a group attempting to exercise the hidden power that critics warn exists behind development aid, in spite of neoliberal claims of neutrality in aid. It also meant that Organisation 1 spent its energy bickering internally, causing paralysis, over several small human rights projects that were meant to support both Palestinian and Israeli rights equally.

\textit{NGO Monitor}

NGO Monitor played a part in Organisation 1’s problems. NGO Monitor’s CEO-founder Gerald Steinberg is a British-born, Israeli Political Scientist who works at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, where he established a ‘Program on Conflict

\textsuperscript{773} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 32min19sec to 34min22sec
\textsuperscript{774} Ash said 2010, but it is likely 2009.
\textsuperscript{775} Ash says they further said something along the lines that they were giving the CEO a bad evaluation and would recommend he not get a bonus. Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 28min29s to 37min10s
\textsuperscript{776} Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 28min29s to 37min10s
Management and Negotiation’. He and his organisation are linked to the Israeli government and specifically the right wing parties. NGO Monitor essentially argues that international aid projects have contributed to Palestinian terrorism and that established international human rights NGOs, such as, ‘Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, Christian Aid, Oxfam and dozens of smaller allied groups have contributed to hatred, rather than supporting peace’ in Israel and the OPT. Steinberg also says that, ‘In contrast to their PR images as peacemakers, the one-sided approach of the NGOs boosts radical Palestinian voices’. Based on this argument, NGO Monitor analyses Palestinian aid projects to find ways to show their biases and then tries to get them defunded. Canada proved a receptive country for their message.

Ash gave an example for how this would work. He/she said that NGO Monitor would go through the reports of the three human rights organisation that Organisation 1 funded in 2009 to see if they referred to the Israeli military as something like ‘occupation forces’, and would point to that use of terminology as evidence of bias. NGO Monitor further accused the three respected organisations of wrong doing in reports that could not be corroborated by any other source other than NGO Monitor. Yet NGO Monitor’s specious claims proved critical to informing the opinions of several Board members at Organisation 1, including the Chairperson. Those Board members who opposed the grants and turned against their CEO seemed to base their evidence solely on the uncorroborated case put forward by NGO Monitor. They would not even accept counter-arguments made by their own management team against NGO Monitor’s claims. The CEO of NGO Monitor also happened to be a very good friend of the then Chairperson, He happened to be a very, very good friend of [the Chairperson], our board member. Our Board member had asked specifically to fly him out

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779 Ibid.
780 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 17min37sec to 18min09sec
781 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 13min59sec to 14min13sec
782 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 32min43sec to 39min47sec
of Israel so that he could talk about the dangers of funding Palestinian organisations. And when my management committee refused that, it was war between [the CEO] and [the Chairperson].\textsuperscript{783}

NGO Monitor and the pro-Israel Board members did not even accept the idea that the inclusion of the Israeli human rights organisation established political balance in the grants. The reason the Board members gave was that the Israeli organisation came from the Israeli left. Ash said that those Board members claimed, ‘They are like, it’s biased, they don’t care about Israel and they’re misleading people’.\textsuperscript{784} NGO Monitor found a group receptive to its message.

NGO Monitor seems also to have had a hand in undermining a rights project Organisation 6 was funding at a well-respected Palestinian research institute. Jamie said it was widely believed by their staff that Gerald Steinberg had identified and singled out their partner because it had signed a document calling for more rights for Arab citizens in Israel. For this reason he objected to Organisation 6 funding that PNGO.\textsuperscript{785} Alexis was even more certain that Steinberg’s involvement scuttled the project.\textsuperscript{786} He/she said the project was scuttled during implementation after Steinberg raised questions about the partner and the project.\textsuperscript{787}

Alexis was told that NGO Monitor had some kind of influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Prime Minister’s Office. For this reason, Organisation 6 took NGO Monitor’s questions seriously.\textsuperscript{788} As a result, Alexis had to put together talking points about the project with his/her team in response to the concerns raised against the project.\textsuperscript{789} In many ways this was an odd question because Organisation 6 had an established and well-thought out procedure for first designing then choosing to fund projects. This was also odd because the project and partner were considered low risk, requiring lighter reporting.

\textsuperscript{783} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 16min11sec to 16min35sec
\textsuperscript{784} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 42min45sec to 43min26sec
\textsuperscript{785} Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 36min18s to 38min00s
\textsuperscript{786} Alexis (2014 October 4) 09min39s to 10min39s
\textsuperscript{787} Alexis (2014 October 4) 14min10s to 15min16s
\textsuperscript{788} Alexis (2014 October 4) 15min16s to 15min44s
\textsuperscript{789} Alexis (2014 October 4) 10min39s to 13min23s
requirements. Further, as described in Chapter 6 they have a thorough vetting and preparation process in the design stage of a project, while their partner on this project was internationally renowned. Meanwhile, Alexis thought they should not even respond to NGO Monitor. His/her response to senior management while helping write out the talking points was to ask, ‘Why are we even responding to NGO Monitor? They’re not a credible sort of organisation’. Ash corroborated that opinion separately in his/her interview from Organisation 1. When asked if NGO Monitor’s reports were credible, Ash said ‘no’,

They have no references. They actually accuse people by affiliation or by hunches. By what they think. There is not one aid organisation to the Palestinians that is accepted by them. Whether it be digging wells or advocating for Palestinian rights. All the same. Everything helping Palestinians is bad. And if you go to their website it’s not even well documented. It’s all on what they think or how they perceive things. I would be very happy if they were like an organisation that kind of dissected things good and bad, and based it on actual evidence. But they have no evidence. It’s just by affiliation.

Hayden said that NGO Monitor seemed to have some form of influence over Canadian policy, because many people at CIDA had been checking to see whom NGO Monitor was monitoring and would become concerned when information came in identifying organisations CIDA might be working with. Hayden says that when CIDA itself was targeted that created great concern at the agency, due to NGO Monitor’s influence in Harper’s government. Even though the legitimacy of NGO Monitor might be questioned, it seemed to be succeeding in Canada. Ash said,
So he [CEO Gerald Steinberg] has been attacking all of these organisations over the years, but I think he’s winning. He’s, like now, he’s been listened to in many circles inclusive of the Canadian government.\textsuperscript{796}

\textit{Canadian Government actions undermining OPT Aid Projects}

The political challenge of working in the OPT caused by the Canadian government cannot be understated, as many aid organisations rely on government for funding and all are ultimately regulated by government. Thus, if it so wanted the government could actively undermine any Palestinian aid project, and this is something that the Canadian government would do, particularly following the 2006 victory by the Harper Conservatives. Just two days after Harper himself won his first election 2006 January 23\textsuperscript{rd}, Hamas won its first 2006 January 25\textsuperscript{th} election and Canada was the first country to put sanctions on the OPT and PA in 2006 March in what was one of that governments first major policy decisions, at home or abroad. Canada was the first of Israel’s allies in the West, most of which would follow, to take this decision. This decision laid the grounds for a decade of Canadian Middle East policy under the Harper Conservatives.

Projects and organisations receiving CIDA funding were affected immediately. Organisation 4 had in 2006 March to halt work on the component of their project comprising the hand-over of the two Gazan centres to the Palestinian Ministry, which CIDA and Canadian officials could not work with due to the boycott on the PA, undermining the key point of sustainability in the project.\textsuperscript{797} This would eventually mark the death knell for a project challenged since the start by a rigid design model not able to adapt to the worsening conditions of settler colonialism. Likewise, Organisation 5 was forced to pause its one law project in 2006 March and fell behind in the implementation of this, in the pattern of starts-and-stops that undermined the entirety of their work.\textsuperscript{798} They also never returned to work in Gaza where Hamas remained in power, fragmentising the project further along the lines of the fragmentation of the three sections of the

\textsuperscript{796} Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 17min37sec to 18min09sec
\textsuperscript{797} FINAL REPORT 2007 Organisation 4 Gaza Project DraftFinalTVTDec13, pp. 12
\textsuperscript{798} Organisation 5 Summative Evaluation Report FINAL 2014 Feb 28, pp. 11-12
OPT – Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem – into different forms of governance and daily life. Morgan meanwhile pointed out that patterns of stops-and-starts in Canadian aid projects made it impossible for them to get anything done in the region, while reinforcing anything that the Israelis did in the OPT. For example, reinforcing Israel’s fragmentation of the OPT.

Notably the Harper Conservative government opposed any criticism of Israel or of its own Middle East policy. This stood against a long tradition of NGOs holding government into account in Canada, such as at the rights and advocacy organisations I interviewed. Organisation 9 was warned to abandon all advocacy work, or become defunded, leading to their dropping a capacity building partnership with an advocacy-oriented PNGO. Organisation 3 may have been defunded due to their own advocacy work questioning Canadian government policy. Organisation 1 was rocked by internal discord over their small OPT rights advocacy work, caused by Harper appointees to the Board. Organisation 6 was forced by government and pro-Israel lobbyists to abandon a project with a partner that had advocated for Palestinian rights in Israel.

In 2009, Organisation 3 was one of a series of organisations that had their federal government funding stopped by the Conservative Party, similar to public cases of other organisations described in Chapter 5. Evidence strongly suggests this was done for partisan pro-Israel purposes, very likely linked in the case of Organisation 3 to their human rights and advocacy work in the OPT. This was completely unexpected because they had had a 2009 fund request approved at every level of CIDA, and this was only awaiting what was considered a formality at that point, the final sign-off by the government Minister responsible. They had expected, like in past years, just to be funded again after having had a good evaluation and audit, while CIDA had even recommended an increase in funding. However, someone in government rescinded approval at the last minute.

Once they were defunded, the result was worst for their overseas partners in the OPT and elsewhere. Organisation 3 suddenly had to transfer a 75% budget

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800 This reinforced the idea that Palestinians are essentially terrorists. Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 18min14s to 18min36s
801 Remy (2014 August 28) 14min10s to 15min45s
802 Remy (2014 August 28) 13min22 to 14min10s
cut on to their Palestinian partners, sharply reducing their capacity to sustain programmes in the OPT.\textsuperscript{803} One immediate casualty was the Oslo-inspired dialogue project in Jerusalem, the organisation run by Israeli and Palestinian women’s groups. With a limited budget they were forced at that point to finally give up on it after well over a decade.\textsuperscript{804}

This may have happened because Organisation 3 was at first confused by government with another organisation. However, that confusion may have become useful for a government seeking to score political points with minority Jewish constituents in key ridings, as well as other pro-Israel advocates. A prominent Canadian Minister even said that defunding Organisation 3 was part of their government’s ‘fight against anti-Semitism’.\textsuperscript{805} Organisation 3 had though a long history of working with partners in Israel, including Israeli peace activists, and dialogue programmes. Their organisational material also very clearly opposes anti-Semitism. Remy was unequivocal in saying that they were not anti-Semitic.\textsuperscript{806}

A member of Organisation 3, not one of the interviewees, described the incident to me in an email by saying that they are big enough of an organisation that they could withstand government intimidation and that they do not scare easily, because they cannot be taken down easily. Further, he/she said that as an advocacy organisation they were used to having arguments. He/she also said that within Organisation 3,

\begin{quote}
We debate constantly what exactly are the motives of this current government vis-à-vis Israel. Many of us are not convinced they’re religious, though no doubt religion fits into the picture somewhere.\textsuperscript{807}
\end{quote}

However, Organisation 3 was big enough and separate enough from government for one of its members to express that opinion. Organisation 1 was completely at the mercy of the Harper government. Not all of its Board members had been opposed to the three 2009 rights projects, just a vocal and powerful

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\item Remy (2014 August 28) 13min22 to 14min10s
\item Remy (2014 August 28) 09min31s to 13min22
\item Remy (2014 August 28) 05min15s to 07min40s
\item Remy (2014 August 28) 07min40s to 08min00s
\item EMAIL 1 Organisation 3 Project Details
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
minority that had been appointed by the Conservative government. That minority was though so biased that they purportedly referred to the West Bank as the Israeli (and biblical) region of ‘Judaea and Samaria’, a strongly ideological stance that acknowledges all Israeli claims to the territory and specifically excludes the Palestinian presence in the West Bank, and the two-state solution that Oslo is premised upon. Ash even heard from the more moderate Board members, who eventually resigned out of frustration, that the partisan members basically had a problem with ‘anything Arab’. That is, they would mean there were overt racists serving on the Board of a major Canadian human rights organisation. Eventually they would gain a majority after further Harper government appointments of Christian fundamentalist and Jewish pro-Israel activists to it.

Organisation 6 faced a similar dilemma of government influence, though they would not suffer in the same way. Alexis was able to ascertain that the Israeli ambassador to Canada had not been happy that they were funding the PNGO identified by NGO Monitor, and that lobbying by the Israeli embassy may have played a key role in their project being cancelled halfway through, too. That ambassador had in particular not been happy with political statements made by the PNGO supporting equal rights for Palestinian residents in Israel. Those objections by the Israeli government representative to Canada and NGO Monitor found a receptive ear in the CEO of Organisation 6.

Officially the CEO argued when cancelling the project that that they could not support the Palestinian partner since the partner was registered in Israel and Israel is a developed country. Alexis’ solution was to run the project through a partner in a developing country instead. The CEO though had said it was too late for that unacceptable option to work, telling Alexis the project should not have been approved in the first place. For Alexis these were excuses and double standards. For instance, Organisation 6 had a history of funding projects

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808 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 03min04sec to 05min14sec
809 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 03min04sec to 05min14sec
810 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 05min15sec to 6min29sec
811 Alexis (2014 October 4) 22min10s to 23min40s At one point when asked about the nature of that meeting by a lawyer contesting the case, the CEO claimed he/she could not answer in the grounds of national security. Alexis (2014 October 4) 26min37s to 26min58s
812 Alexis (2014 October 4) 17min30s to 18min49s
813 Alexis (2014 October 4) 18min49s to 19min57s
with organisations in developed countries, such as the UK, and has funded projects with Israeli organisations.

At a meeting with senior management and the CEO, as the fate of the project on the line, Alexis spoke out strongly against cancellation because there were no grounds for the action.\textsuperscript{814} He/she also argued that cancelling the grant would have a highly negative impact on the partner, undermining its viability as an organisation. This would be unfair because all of the implementation had been done well to that point, and all necessary procedures conducted appropriately.\textsuperscript{815} When Alexis disagreed with its cancellation, the CEO told him/her to, ‘take it on the chin and move on’, or look for work elsewhere; but that it was likely better to look for a job elsewhere as his/her team was going to need new leadership anyway.\textsuperscript{816} So Alexis was basically told he/she was going to lose his/her job for standing up for the project. The Palestinian partner was meanwhile completely shocked by the unprecedented cancellation of a running project that had made it through the careful vetting process.\textsuperscript{817} The debacle did not go unnoticed in the Middle East or OPT, destroying the reputation of Organisation 6 overseas, as had happened to Organisation 1 under similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{818}

Meanwhile at Organisation 3, as a result of the Conservative government Minister’s accusation of anti-Semitism against them, Remy said by the summer of 2014 that they are still linked with the ‘putrid’ accusation of anti-Semitism. Since the exact reason they were defunded is difficult to pinpoint, that leaves their defunding open to interpretation, so when a ‘credible’ source like a prominent government Minister accuses them of anti-Semitism that may seem to be the legitimate reason for their defunding to some people. Remy says they have become part of a group of Canadian organisations that have been together inaccurately characterised as groups contributing to a new ‘anti-Semitism’, just like the leftist student groups by the CPCCA.\textsuperscript{819} He/she says that

\textsuperscript{814} Alexis (2014 October 4) 17min30s to 18min49s
\textsuperscript{815} Alexis (2014 October 4) 18min49s to 19min57s
\textsuperscript{816} Alexis (2014 October 4) 19min57s to 20min55s
\textsuperscript{817} Alexis (2014 October 4) 21min16s to 22min10s
\textsuperscript{818} Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 38min35s to 40min22s
\textsuperscript{819} Remy (2014 August 28) 07min40s to 08min00s He/she said there has been a whole redefinition of anti-Semitism by Harper government, and said, ‘I just don’t accept the notion that criticism of Israel, the state, the policies of the state of Israel represents anti-Semitism’. Remy (2014 August 28) 08min54s to 09min53s
negative association falsely asserted by government is found everywhere and is highly problematic. As an organisation that had a long history of nonviolent engagement and human rights work, so Remy found any accusation that they could support violence or be anti-Semitic to be ‘levelled without any rationale’. At the same time fighting those accusations used up a tremendous amount of time and energy, and affected their operations overseas by straining their office at home in that act of self-defence. This was inching them toward the paralysis in operations that could more effectively be carried out at Organisation 1 through government appointments to the Board of Directors.

In this climate accusations of terrorism or anti-Semitism were being too easily levelled at respected individuals or human rights organisations. Organisation 3 had a prominent government Minister accuse it of anti-Semitism, while Board members linked the CEO of Organisation 1 to suggest he/she was sympathetic to terrorism in a performance review. In the more extreme cases at Organisations 1, 3, 4 and 6 the project coordinators I interviewed provided examples of NGO Monitor undermining their projects by lobbying management, and possibly with support of the Canadian government. There appeared in the case of Organisation 6 even to be Israeli government interference in their halted project. Yet, in spite of these severe problems during the Harper government years, long-serving coordinators at human rights and advocacy organisations like Ash, Ryan and Casey still said it did not matter which Canadian political party was in power. The process of government backed oppression of Palestinian aid and rights work was just more pronounced and less hidden when the Conservatives came to power.

Double Standards applied against Palestinian Aid Work in Canada

Many of the interviewees could point out specific cases of double standards being applied to their work in the OPT or with Palestinians, as compared to their

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820 Remy (2014 August 28) 42min17s to 44min43s Remy said that it is difficult to continually fight a particular narrative that got spun out of control in the public sphere. He/she said that the good news from their perspective is that they fought the accusation in the media and that, other than in extreme pockets, there now seems to be consensus even in parts of the right-wing media that the Conservative government was attacking a particular organisation for criticising government policy. Remy (2014 August 28) 46min54s to 48min20s
821 Remy (2014 August 28) 48min20s to 49min05s
work in other regions. For example, Blake and Dallas described the different standards of due diligence applied by the CRA to their work in the OPT as opposed to Afghanistan. The double standard always worked against Palestinians. Taylor said that Israel and the OPT presents a particularly unique challenge compared to working in other regions around the world. He/she pointed out that if you were to criticise the Columbian government for its human rights record or policies, you will not described as ‘anti-Columbian’. By contrast if you criticise Israel you are labelled anti-Israeli, or anti-Semitic.\textsuperscript{822} Yet Taylor argues that human rights are universal, and he/she cannot understand why standards should be applied differently in different places.\textsuperscript{823} Ryan described the same paradox when serving as the Chairperson of the Board for a charity that often dealt with cases of torture in Latin America. When he/she wanted to support a mental health centre in Gaza, the charity leadership asked that he/she do so on a private basis. They wanted nothing to do with Palestine. Ryan said,

\textit{Why on my own? If when we had gone to Central America I've been fully representing the [the Canadian organisation]? Why not support the [Gazan organisation]? Is torture not the same thing in Gaza as it is in Latin America?}\textsuperscript{824}

It may be in Canada. In 2014, following Israel's third devastating bombardment of Gaza in just six years, Ryan said the CEO of the same Canadian charity wrote a ‘letter of concern’ that omitted the two key concepts that are fundamental problems in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, ‘international law’ and ‘occupation’.\textsuperscript{825} Deliberately leaving out accurate descriptions of the OPT is though the norm in the Canadian discourse, and that represented a serious problem to Ryan. So while ‘terrorism’ is used repetitively to describe

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
822 Taylor (2014 September 4) 35min44s to 37min17s
823 Taylor (2014 September 4) 37min17s to 39min47s
824 Ryan (2014 December 2) 32min09s to 32min30s
825 Ryan (2014 December 2) 33min56s to 38min41s
\end{flushright}
Palestinians, terms that emphasise Palestinian rights are not used and Ryan believes this contributes to a heavily biased interpretation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{826}

Double standards were even applied internally to the way in which Palestine was funded at the organisations. Emory says that funding for work in the OPT was structured different than with other regions they worked in. Each year Organisation 1 would focus on a particular theme, and project coordinators were expected to defend the projects they were funding in a group discussion. There was though never a discussion about the Middle East budget, when it briefly existed for rights work at Organisation 1. Any discussion was kept purposefully quiet and between just the CEO and Emory.\textsuperscript{827} Of the numerous projects Emory ran over the years, it was the Palestine ones with which he/she found people did not ask any deep questions about, until the time came that they wanted to find an excuse to halt a programme. Then he/she says they would ask pointy questions, because they wanted to kill it.\textsuperscript{828}

\textsuperscript{826} He/she said that all the Popes have appealed for international law in the conflict, yet the Canadian government dares not say that. Ryan (2014 December 2) 33min56s to 38min41s
\textsuperscript{827} Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 30min07s to 34min40s
\textsuperscript{828} Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 1h15min25s to 1h18min14s
Given the anti-Palestinian biases described above, some coordinators indicated that being Canadian eventually became a liability in the OPT. Ash said that at one time it was seen as good for an organisation to have support from a Canadian donor, because Canada had had such a positive reputation that this would benefit its organisational CV, helping it to raise more funds. In that way even small Canadian funded projects, such as the ones Organisation 1 quietly offered hidden from their Board, were seen to have had a broader value for a PNGO, because it gave legitimacy to raise additional funds elsewhere in the world. However, Ash noted over time being funded by a Canadian donor came to be seen as a liability. This was recognised in the Canadian government.

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830 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 48min45sec to 54min30s
itself. At one point Kim had someone from Foreign Affairs came to Organisation 5 for assistance with a project, saying bluntly,

> Look our reputation is crap, we need to be able to help out the Abbas government basically. We can’t put through new sources of funding. So is there some way you can work through your project to support the Ministry of Justice in particular.\(^{831}\)

That degradation in Canada’s image over its ardent support for Israel, at the expense of Palestinians’ basic rights, also impacted on Organisation 5’ project. When they finally were able to recommence their law project six months after the delay imposed on them by the Canadian government in 2006 March, many of the actors on the ground had changed and some of them resented Canada for being the first to boycott the Palestinian election results. For instance, there was a new Palestinian Chief Justice in place who had a very bad perception of Canada.\(^{832}\) Janine Clark had warned in the late 2000s that,

> An inconsistency in implementing Canadian-promoted values or an inconsistency in how Canada treats actors only serves to undermine its programs, credibility, and values.\(^{833}\)

### Limited Funding Structures and the Fear of Defunding

Finally, the ability of the Canadian organisations to have an impact in the OPT hinged on their financial capacity to support projects. Most interviewees complained that the scale of their financial contributions to projects was small, and many complained their budget was too limited to be truly effective. Emory says further that it was always a battle for him/her to retain funding for his/her partners in the OPT for rights advocacy projects. Emory said that he/she never

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\(^{831}\) Kim (2014 August 7) 25min07s to 25min40s There was a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that Foreign Affairs would replenish the funds Organisation 5 dedicated to that requested part of the work, but Foreign Affairs never followed through on their part of the bargain. Kim (2014 August 7) 26min41s to 27min06s

\(^{832}\) Kim says that Canada’s bad image in the OPT was also beginning to impact negatively on their work, though they were able to overcome that with time. Kim (2014 August 7) 16min30s to 21min6s

\(^{833}\) Clark, ‘Canadian Interests and Democracy Promotion in the Middle East’, 91–92.
really had a sufficient budget to do much in the OPT. When he/she managed a short-lived Middle East programme at Organisation 1 in the early- to mid-1990s, for instance, Emory had a paltry budget of around $40,000 to 60,000 per year to work with. Yet, that was still better than in later years when his/her engagement with the Middle East had to be packaged within other programmes.\textsuperscript{834}

Fear for the loss of what little funding they had for OPT projects, or even an entire organisation impaired the work of a number of interviewees. Ash for instance perceived an attitude held by the Conservative government that you as an NGO needed to remain quiet, not engaging in any public advocacy that contradicts government policy, doing only what they accepted. He/she said, 'It's just like basically you keep your place where you are, and if you want to be funded you shut your mouth'.\textsuperscript{835} Ash acknowledged that such a ‘conditional funding structure’ at Organisation 1 predated the Conservative government.\textsuperscript{836} There had been problems in particular from Liberal governments over Israel and the OPT, ‘But with the Conservative’s ideology, it’s not about balance, and that’s the scary part’.\textsuperscript{837}

Interviewees such as Kai felt that the way funding was structured impeded on their projects. Organisation 7 relied heavily on CIDA funding for its network of NOG partners in the Middle East, and this limited what they could achieve. For instance, Kai was never able to use Canadian government funding to support the Israeli partners in their network, because Israel as a rich country was not typically eligible for Canadian ODA funding.\textsuperscript{838} So instead Organisation 7 would set aside time and resources to help their Israeli partners raise funds, while the Israeli partners could benefit directly from the free trained staff that came periodically within the programme. Nonetheless, the impact was that the Israeli partners were treated differently and worse than the Palestinian and Jordanian ones. Kai speculated that this inequity might have led to a schism between the different partners, damaging the aims of their peace building exercise.\textsuperscript{839}

\textsuperscript{834}Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 30min07s to 34min40s
\textsuperscript{835}Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 58min02sec to 58min54sec
\textsuperscript{836}Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 59min02sec to 59min32sec
\textsuperscript{837}Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 59min33sec to 01min06sec
\textsuperscript{838}Kai (2012 March 26) 28min14s to 32min43s
\textsuperscript{839}Kai (2012 March 26) 32min43s to 33min53s
Taylor said the Middle East is a very complicated place to work in and that you always want to do more. He/she said there never seemed to be enough resources, which contributed toward a certain level of frustration. Add to that the negative repercussions of their own loss of funding, for political reasons, which meant even less of a capacity to provide support subsequent to 2009. This meant that they could only invest in discrete and specific projects. Dallas likewise felt as though the demand was always so great that,

Whatever you think the demand is, you’re still so small. The demand is so wide, and the supply is so small. So hopefully all those NGOs can a little bit narrow this [need] as much as they can. Will they meet all of the demand? The answer is no. But we [Organisation 10] do our best to help what we call the neediest of the needy.

To be certain the OPT is not an easy place to carry out development aid projects, because settler colonialism is the anathema to development work, as well as neoliberal principles like trade and cooperation. Settler colonialism is a force for destruction and theft, not of building up of. Thus the project coordinators I interviewed faced numerous challenges running their aid projects in the OPT, such as limitations on their movement and the destruction of infrastructure. Limited funding for Palestinian projects, in part due to political reasons, and government regulations also ensured that each of the interviewees could have only a limited impact on the ground. Often the paperwork for those regulations subsumed them, given their limited Palestine aid budgets. Yet, in spite of such severe operational conditions, the biggest challenges they faced in the implementation of their work came from pro-Israel actors who worked in tandem with the Canadian government to suppress and undermine any projects they deemed a threat to Israel, and its settler colonial policy. In many cases this undermined and forced interviewee organisations to halt their Palestine aid projects, and even caused paralysis at the organisations themselves. Fear of appearing too sympathetic toward Palestinians, and then

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840 Remy (2014 August 28) 25min38s to 27min05s
841 C8/C9 49min10sec to 49min15sec
being linked to anti-Semitism, even affected how organisations structured their programmes. Some of those organisations also appear to have been defunded because of their aid work. Rights and advocacy projects in particular seemed to draw ire from the Canadian government and pro-Israel lobby groups. Theirs became a story of oppression by a Canadian government seeking to stifle any work deemed critical toward Israel, a tale that dominates the following chapter.
CHAPTER 8 - OUTCOMES

Introduction

The final stage of the linear model for running aid projects is when donors evaluate the outcomes of their projects. Many of the interviewees had projects that did not survive to that stage of completion once the Harper Conservative government came to power in Canada. Even if a project survived to completion, its value was often questioned and outcomes not understood by government bodies. Those that did survive typically saw their funding lapse, even the rare organisation that might have a reasonable working relationship with the Canadian government.

It is at this stage that the experiences of the project coordinators were dominated by partisan political interference in Canada, of a pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian nature, undermining their projects, careers and organisations. In fact, many of their projects did not escape the project implementation phase, while two of the ten organisations were forced by government to shut down not long after a confrontation it. Reflecting on their projects, there is a clear pattern of government undermining any project that might in any way challenge Israel’s settler colonial policies. By this point the only aid projects that were allowed to take place seemed to be innocuous ones that could in no way challenge the political reality of settler colonial occupation, those that continued to encourage Palestinians to work with Israelis or those that actually reinforced the occupation, such as the training of Palestinian police described in Chapter 5. This all took place in spite of official Canadian foreign policy that technically continued to advocate for a two state solution and the neoliberal measures laid out in the 1993 Oslo Peace Process. This suggests that the Canadian government had a hidden agenda and was, at least in the later years of the study period, using its development aid to dominate Palestinians in pursuit of it. That agenda was to support Israel, even when that meant supporting settler colonialism. The government deliberately attacked any Canadian civil society organisation that got in the way.
The Impact of the Development Aid Projects

Incomplete Projects

Many of the project coordinators I interviewed were not able to complete Palestinian aid projects due to Canadian government interference. Ash could ultimately not assess Organisation 1’s three 2009 rights projects that were supposed to be carried out in the wake of the Operation Cast Lead, due to the tumult that funding them caused in Organisation 1. That tumult led one of the partners, the West Bank-based rights organisation, to return the project funding rather than deal with the hassle of running it. In spite of the problems that the tumult at Organisation 1 caused for the three partners, Ash was struck by the professionalism and support he/she received from them throughout it. He/she was also impressed with what results the two that kept their funding were nonetheless able to produce. For instance, they presented a repertoire of well-documented cases of human rights abuses that contributed to a UN fact-finding mission looking into the 2008/9 bombardment of Gaza. The human rights organisation in Gaza used the data they collected to better talk about the human rights situation with diplomats, the media and the broader international community. Overall, Ash felt the project was worth the money.

In spite of the incredible challenges Jamie faced at Organisation 6 for funding the PNGO partner that was targeted by NGO Monitor, he/she believes that the projects they funded with their Palestinian partners were effective. One advantage was that, in spite of all the problems they faced with political interference and self-censorship that originated out of fear, once they were working with a partner they would be working on their own agenda and able to focus on activities that mattered to each side, not solely the agenda of the Canadian government. He/she said that you would learn a lot in the process with new partners, and could contribute a lot by networking and funding people. In particular, he/she felt fortunate to be able to fund strategic partners over a long period of time with whom they could make a difference. Still, their project

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843 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 51min57s to 53min50s
on Palestinian political rights was terminated before it could produce results, being an exception where they could not follow their own agenda and focus on the activities that mattered to them as an organisation, because it did not match the agenda of the Canadian government.

For Organisation 4’s project with the centres in Gaza, Hayden said they only really succeeded at fulfilling one of three objectives: actually establishing the two centres. Even then the centres did not necessarily develop as planned, because over time they became more oriented towards humanitarian work in lieu of the developmental aims they were intended to pursue. Despite their efforts to create income-generating activities for the centres that were meant to cover their operating costs, the results were poor. The development and vocational training component was the most difficult to pursue under the siege, because after training there was no work for participants and placement at work was impossible. That definitely contributed toward the project moving away from developmental needs. Finally, institutional capacity building at the PA Ministry, which was meant to take over the centres, was cut short because the Government of Canada did not want to work with them anymore after the elections in 2006. Even if just establishing the centres was considered a success, they were shut down prematurely not long after losing their Canadian funding. The programme was designed pre-Second Intifada and simply could not cope with the changes and actual context in Gaza from 2002-onwards, or the political context of the OPT in Canada. They could not survive the Canadian government’s boycott of regions in the OPT not governed by a group deemed acceptable to Israel.

In another type of development project that was not completed, one of the interviewees said he/she wanted to begin working with a Palestinian hydrology association to rehabilitate a couple small springs supplying water for villages in Area C in the north of the West Bank. He/she had wanted to carry out a tangible infrastructure project that would help Palestinians in their day-to-day lives, at a cost of over $100,000 per spring. That coordinator was pleased with the results and decided to follow up with a $250,000 project in the Jordan Valley, an area in the West Bank being heavily colonised by Israel and cut off from Palestinian

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Hayden (2014 August 27) 33min40s to 34min29s
Hayden was really sad after so much work though to see the project shut down. Hayden (2014 August 27) 41min04s to 42min16s
rule. The interviewee said that he/she had to carry out the project secretly so that the Israelis would not see this basic improvement of infrastructure, because improvements to the infrastructure for Palestinians in areas coveted for Israeli settlement defy the logic of settler colonialism. Likewise the interviewee said the project had to be kept hidden from the Canadian government, because the Canadian government did not want anyone challenging Israeli policy. As such, the Palestinians at the site of renovation tried to keep the project hidden, avoiding the use of heavy vehicles that might draw attention from Israeli authorities that did not want to see the development take place. In the end though, the project was discovered and $250,000 in improvements destroyed.

Kim felt there were some great moments of cross-cultural, institutional learning between Canadian and Palestinian members of their respective justice systems during the course of Organisation 5’s law project. For instance, senior Palestinian judges were moved after touring Palestinian prisons and hearing how badly child PA prisoners were treated in court by judges like themselves. As a result, a number of them said henceforth they would avoid the use of prison when sentencing children. Kim regretted that their project was not renewed after the funding period concluded, because a series of stoppages caused by a reluctant Canadian government prevented it from really getting going and being effective. Likewise, Kai pointed out that bane of overseas development was that you could never run a major project involving community development on a few years contract.

Projects that were Hard to Quantify and Non-Linear

Since one of the aims of Organisation 5’s law project was to discuss with the Palestinian members of the judiciary what the role of judges was in society, and then to act on those discussions, it may have been somewhat successful – provided the impact of the project was still being felt after its funding lapsed in 2012. Kim and his/her organisation made sure though to point out that success in the project clearly could not be based on just a simple quantitative measure such as running set numbers of workshops, but would be based on how many

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847 Some began to cry hearing the stories from those kids.
848 Kim (2014 August 7) 50min17s to 51min20s
of the judges they worked with came to believe that their role was to promote human dignity, what that meant for those judges intellectually and how they subsequently used their office to carry out promote human dignity. Its impact could also only be measured over a long period of time to see if that change took place.

Kim was one of a number of interviewees found difficult explaining to their own donors that a project was successful if it did not produce easily accessible statistical data. Project coordinators like Kim actually objected to relying on quantifiable data to measure a project’s outcome, favoured by donors like CIDA. Likewise when asked if his/her projects were well run and provided a good return for the money Organisation 1 invested, Emory responded by saying that they were blessed ‘never to hear those questions’ when he/she worked at Organisation 1 in the 1990s and early 2000s. Rather, Emory was more interested to see if the limited funding he/she provided to partners was spent in a way that helped them to fulfil their own vision as an organisation. Thus, Emory would ask them what they had done with their overall funding, beyond what Organisation 1 provided, to compare what they set out to do that year and with their vision as an organisation.

Questioning quantifiable measures, Emory asked just how one might, ‘analyse quantitatively that you have done good human rights work in Gaza’? In fact, that was an objection Emory says that he/she made when evaluating their work in Gaza. Emory specifically gave an example where Organisation 1’s finance department decided to ‘quantify’ how many human rights violations their money had helped to address. Emory says that he/she said told them that that was not possible to do, and that showing ‘a number of violations’ does not show that you have done good work.

Nonetheless, trying to answer the ‘value for money’ question, Emory concluded that his/her choice of partners and projects were the right choices for the time, and that none of the Palestinian organisations they supported had any

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849 Kim (2014 August 7) 35min48s to 38min05s
850 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 36min14s to 39min20s
851 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 36min14s to 39min20s
852 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 36min14s to 39min20s
853 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 36min14s to 39min20s
difficulties fulfilling their stated goals.\textsuperscript{854} If anything, Emory felt there was more of a problem with overachievement by some partners, and this was a problem because overachievement could lead to exhaustion.\textsuperscript{855}

When asked about the effectiveness of Organisation 3’s projects after being defunded, Remy echoed comments made by Sawyer, Blake and Dallas that, ‘Effectiveness in the Israel-Palestine context is a very difficult thing to talk about’.\textsuperscript{856} Remy proceeded to say what may differentiate them from other aid agencies is that they of course want their work to be effective, but they do not operate under the same time horizons. They are interested in sustaining partnerships, and that means accompanying people even when a specific project is not working, or accompanying partners when they find their own solutions, supporting them with those decisions. Thus, just because a specific project does not look effective on the linear scale that does not necessarily provide a reason to stop funding it, or to stop supporting the partner. Of course Organisation 3 tries to get results and provide ‘deliverables’, or whatever they are being asked for, but a large amount of their work in the OPT and other places around the world consists of accompaniment, presence and bearing witness. So while they do look to incorporate best practices and to strengthen the impact of their work, they believe that being faithful to their overall vision long-term is most important.\textsuperscript{857}

Remy and Organisation 3 specifically eschewed the linear model. He/she said that aid now is too focused on tangible outcomes that you can show, such as a hospital that you can show in a picture.\textsuperscript{858} Remy further pointed out that the contemporary linear, neoliberal model of running aid projects on in the OPT is simply flawed.\textsuperscript{859}

Because the situation is so difficult it’s like running to stay in the same place. In the context of a deteriorating situation the fact the people are

\textsuperscript{854} Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 59min01s to 1h7min00s
\textsuperscript{855} Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 59min01s to 1h7min00s Ryan said if people at NGOs are constantly on a point of burn-out, facing enormous needs they cannot possibly meet and dealing with daily frustrations of having not done the job well enough, the people at those charities often start to blame each other leading to a break-down in their work. Ryan (2014 December 2) 1h14min08s to 1h15min01s
\textsuperscript{856} Remy (2014 August 28) 27min05s to 27min14s
\textsuperscript{857} Remy (2014 August 28) 27min14s to 28min45s
\textsuperscript{858} Remy (2014 August 28) 35min44s to 37min05s
\textsuperscript{859} Long refers to this neoliberal approach as a gross oversimplification. Long, ‘From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented Sociology of Development’, 15.
able to continue their organisation and programmes is probably a sign of effectiveness. As opposed to some kind of linear notion that you’re going to make huge leaps forward and progress.  

Remy and Organisation were taking into account the context of settler colonialism, even if they were not overtly using that terminology.

Taylor emphasised that you have to be flexible. This is the case for all the regions Organisation 3 works in, from Africa to Latin America and the Middle East. He/she said that you have to really trust a partner. Partners may change the activities they are doing based on the context, but you need to accept that so long as their overarching objectives (a vision like Emory supported) remains the same, you should continue to support them. Further, regardless of the challenges of working in the OPT, Taylor said that you always have to bear in mind what it would be like if you were not there. For him/her sometimes just accompanying partners and being present is vital. Taylor believes that that approach of experiencing the occupation with them adds legitimacy to Organisation 3’s work with Palestinian partners in advocacy.

Finally, though categorising his/her project as successful, Morgan said that linear operational principles of project management were ‘nice pieces of paper’ that you can ignore once in the field, needing to focus only on end results. He/she also had cynical view about quantifying results. Morgan had discovered that donors and organisations implementing projects are far too oriented towards statistics (quantifiable results) and spending money. He/she said that with all those projects you have these ‘nice results’, but that ultimately the main goal behind them is to spend the money given for a project, and that the results themselves were less important than the spending. Morgan said they are,

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860 Remy (2014 August 28) 49min40s to 50min11s
861 Taylor (2014 September 4) 29min58s to 31min47s
862 Taylor (2014 September 4) 31min47s to 33min07s
863 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 32min50s to 33min41s
864 Mosse said, ‘in the end it is important also to remember that the arrogance of policy is that it under-recognises its own autonomy from events, and therefore overstates the importance of its pronouncements. In fact, the naked power of donor power is moderated by the structurally determined weakness of donor management in relation to operational work, by the ambiguity of development goals which allow reinterpretation, by the constant need for negotiations across institutional interfaces and by the fact that, in the end, donor agencies need recipients to spend their budgets’. Mosse, ‘Is Good Policy Unimplementable?’, 204.
865 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 32min50s to 33min41s
Very statistically oriented. Very cash oriented. You have a five million dollar project? You have to spend five million dollars. The results are not as important as the spending. The quality of volunteers is not as important as hiring the volunteers.866

In this way Morgan felt that the value for money of a project became just spending the money itself, which it should not be.

Finally, Remy pointed out that that the ‘complexity’ of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship made Organisation 3’s work especially challenging. He/she said it is so highly complex that you need to have some specialised knowledge, and it is almost a case such that unless people have a grasp of that complexity, then they cannot – or should not – be part of that work.867 The complexity of the occupation made Organisation 3’s advocacy work extra challenging, because it was difficult trying to help people in Canada understand the issues Palestinians faced. Canadians had a tough time understanding the complex discriminatory measures that Israel, a fellow liberal democracy, carried out against Palestinians. So they had to look for issues that people could understand, such as comparing the laws and conditions that Israeli and Palestinian children grow up under.868 Likewise it was difficult for them to explain to a donor how a rights project qualitatively succeeded or not.

What is the Long Term Impact of the Projects

Another prompt I managed to fit into the semi-structured interviews was whether the projects the coordinators funded would have a lasting impact beyond the funding period. In some cases the answer was in the affirmative. However, the premature cancellation of a large number of projects mostly excluded those from consideration. Some coordinators, such as Emory, said that his/her funding had had a long-term impact on their partners by helping the Palestinian partners to exist and pursue their organisational vision. To this day each of the partners specifically mentioned in this research study continues to operate and

866 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 34min29s to 34min48s ≈
867 Remy (2014 August 28) 55min05s to 56min47s
868 Remy (2014 August 28) 55min05s to 56min47s
have an important impact on OPT and global society.\textsuperscript{869} Emory was particularly impressed with the ability of the Palestinian women’s legal aid clinic to expand significantly over two decades, all while maintaining an incredibly heavy workload.\textsuperscript{870}

Meanwhile, Ryan and Casey had seen a number of the partners flourish beyond their initial point of support. Organisation 2’s modest support in the early to mid-2000s for the youth education project in the OPT seems to have been a critical investment, where a small seed fund and technical advice from the late Chairperson that helped it get established and expand exponentially by 2014. Likewise, when Ryan visited the Gazan community mental health partner in the early 2000s, he/she was happy to see the people that Organisation 2 had trained were already teaching students from across the region in mental health.\textsuperscript{871}

Kim did not know if Organisation 5’s project would have any long-term benefits, as the rule of law project never really had time to get established. However, he/she said that as a result of the project they and their Palestinian partner planned to collaborate further in the future on projects, while the Palestinian partner’s linked university established the first higher education Research Ethics Board in the OPT in the wake of the project. The head of the Palestinian REB says the concept of dignity that came out of the project sponsored by Organisation 5.\textsuperscript{872} Organisation 4’s project working with the centres in Gaza was cut too early to have an impact, while Hayden noted that in Gaza and OPT generally it takes a long time for anything to have an actual impact due to all the political difficulties.\textsuperscript{873}

For Organisations 1, 3 and 6 the most important legacy of their projects may remarkable have not been in the OPT, but in Canada owing to the scandals that sabotaged their Palestinian aid work. In one of those more extreme cases, Ash said that the damage done to Organisation 1 and its reputation may have been good because it exposed the beliefs of the right-wing government in Canada and revealed that ‘conspiracy is reality’. It exposed the hidden intentions of the

\textsuperscript{869} Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 1h7min00s to 1h15min25s
\textsuperscript{870} Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 1h7min00s to 1h15min25s
\textsuperscript{871} Ryan (2014 December 2) 12min13s to 15min01s
\textsuperscript{872} Kim (2014 August 7) 38min05s to 41min43s
\textsuperscript{873} Hayden (2014 August 27) 40min24s to 41min04s
Canadian government and let people know its ‘actual’ – as opposed to stated – position towards Israel and Palestine. Ash said,

I think in retrospect it was worth it in a way because had you had doubts about the government manipulation, had you had any doubts about the conspiracy theory, and the strength of the Zionist lobby, and all that stuff, which I never bought into before by the way… there you are.\(^{874}\)

The turmoil also generated positive publicity about the Palestinian cause and for the partners it affected, who ended up receiving a lot of support from around the world. The CEO of the PNGO rights organisation in the West Bank, which had returned its project fund to Organisation 1, said,

Thank you for your project because your ten thousand dollars gave me one hundred thousand dollars worth of publicity. So thank you. It’s the best PR project we’ve ever done in our lives.\(^{875}\)

Ash meanwhile felt that by exposing the hypocrisy of people in their government and on their Board this vindicated the value of advocacy oriented human rights work.\(^{876}\) Thus the three small human rights projects in 2009 may have inadvertently had much greater value than their small sums, because they resulted in a form of advocacy in Canada that exposed an ‘either you are with us or against us’ mentality in the Conservative government.\(^{877}\) Ash said, ‘It just shows you that small projects are not necessarily the bad ones’.\(^{878}\)

Meanwhile, the reputation of Organisation 1 was ruined. Many partners lost interest in working with them, while the turmoil also led to changes in the way it funded projects, dictating how they should be run. Since the years of Emory, the organisation had shifted dramatically away from providing core-funding to partners to, by the later years of Ash’s work, foisting upon partners projects that Organisation 1 would be heavily involved in – a similar experience to Hayden’s grappling with an intrusive CIDA monitor. So while partners did not want to be

\(^{874}\) Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 55min47 sec to 58min01sec
\(^{875}\) Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 32min32sec to 32min48sec
\(^{876}\) Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 55min38sec to 56min46sec
\(^{877}\) Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 55min47 sec to 58min01sec
\(^{878}\) Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 32min49sec to 32min53sec
dictated to from Canada, Organisation 1 only wanted to tell them what to do. Even Canadian organisations did not want to work with Organisation 1 in the final years of the study period, before the government finally shut down the damaged organisation.

While Organisation 3 was disappointed at being forced to suddenly cancel projects due their loss of CIDA funding, Remy and Taylor were optimistic that there might be some unintended benefits. After they were defunded publicly (and dramatically) by the Canadian government, Remy said an unanticipated benefit was that they could quit working on development projects they had become involved in because of funding, which were though more oriented towards capacity building and poverty reduction. With their own limited funds they could focus on their priority human rights and advocacy projects.

Remy and Taylor’s belief was reinforced by the reaction of their Palestinian partners to the funding cut. Remy noted that their partners displayed incredible solidarity with Organisation 3, in spite of a sudden budget cut that hit those partners the hardest. Remy said that the overwhelming message from them was that the money was important, but what was more important was the way in which Organisation 3 had worked with them projecting their message from Palestine to Canada and the rest of the world. Nor did those partners want Organisation 3 to step back from its advocacy work, They were able to articulate that and say that this kind of international development, transformative advocacy related to human rights was a really important piece of the puzzle of the broader international development that includes digging wells and … that this part was critical in a kind of broad vision. And I think that we’ve almost lost that sense in aid now in Canada. They felt the loss of government funding might ultimately turn out for the better, because they would now be able to focus more on their own rights advocacy

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879 Thus Organisation 1 began to operate more and more like a conventional aid agency, where the need of the agency comes far ahead of meeting the livelihood needs poor people they work with. Mosse, *Cultivating Development*, 2004, 22.
880 Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 48min45sec to 54min30s
881 Remy (2014 August 28) 23min24s to 25min38s
882 Remy (2014 August 28) 33min55s to 35min44s
883 Remy (2014 August 28) 35min11s to 35min43s
mandate – their vision as an organisation – rather than on what government wanted.

Likewise, Quinn was optimistic that a failure by Organisation 7 to retain funding from the Harper Conservative government for their network of social work NGOs at the end of the study period would accrue to them the benefits of greater focus and clarity of purpose. Further due to their subsequent – frenetic – fundraising efforts, Quinn was upbeat that a long-term benefit of losing Canadian government funding would be that they were able to establish a wider range of stakeholders who are now acting as ambassadors for the programme, all as a result of their expansive fundraising efforts. This should ensure more of a healthy financial picture for the organisation going forward, which is less dependent on one questionable – Canadian government – source. 884 Meanwhile the fact that their partners were able to withstand the withdrawal of Canadian funding seemed to Quinn to point to their success due to their local sustainability. 885

Some interviewees saw only negative outcomes from undermined projects. The premature cancellation of Organisation 6’s project with their Palestinian partner had long-term negative ramifications on the organisation, starting with its reputation. It further led to a great deal of staff turnover. Not only did Alexis quit, having anyways been threatened with removal, but there has since been a high level of staff turnover throughout the organisation. 886 That instability in personnel is never good for an organisation’s operations. Further, the way the organisation designs its projects was changed, as had once happened at Organisation 1, for the worse. For example in a project they planned to partner with a major INGO on following the scandal, Organisation 6 wanted to included the right to have power over what that INGO could research and to cancel the grant if the INGO breached those boundaries. Such an approach marked an unprecedented level of intervention and control by Organisation 6. 887

884 Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 13min39s to 14min32s
885 Quinn did note that their peace building efforts never really extended beyond elites into the broader community. That being said, he also felt nobody else has succeeded at sustaining a culture of peace either. There has been a universal failure at peace building. Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 46min04s to 50min34s
886 Alexis (2014 October 4) 28min40s to 29min59s
887 Alexis (2014 October 4) 28min40s to 29min59s
Value for Money

One of the prompts I repeated in each semi-structured interviews was for interviewees to reflect on whether or not they thought that their OPT aid projects had been ‘good value’ for the money invested into them, for as Morgan pointed out conventional aid – which is neoliberal – is a money business,

I’m sorry if I’m going to be a little bit cynical, but I mean international development is a money business. Yes, it is all about development, but it’s still money business. You have to spend money, you have to hire volunteers, so forth and so on. At one point in time the volunteers realised that it’s a money business, from both ends, either from the funding agency, but also the NGO, because the NGOs live on money and they get very comfortable with money, and that’s what they look after.888

Whether they liked being asked that question or not, most coordinators believed that the projects they had been funding were good value for the money invested. Many of the interviewees objected to that measurement outright, such as Emory, Remy, Taylor and Sawyer. In their cases they were more concerned with just providing core funding in solidarity with good organisations that had a sound vision and ran worthwhile projects. In this way Remy liked to measure their partnerships qualitatively. Rather than just quantitatively ‘counting how many people came to workshops’ to assess value, he/she would prefer to take a more holistic understanding of what people learned in workshops and what impact this had on society in the thematic area of their work.889 Meanwhile, coordinators like Taylor pointed out that in the context of the OPT you need to be flexible and understanding because nothing is simple. Thus coordinators such as Remy, Sawyer, Blake and Dallas explicitly said that effectiveness in the Israeli-Palestinian context is very difficult to measure.890 For that same reason of difficulty, Quinn and Kai argued that their project provided very good value for the investment.

888 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 21min18s to 22min39s
889 Remy (2014 August 28) 32min55s to 33min55s
890 Remy (2014 August 28) 27min05s to 27min14s
Some of coordinators were happy with the projects they funded, irrespective of measurement style. Those included Emory, Ryan and Casey generally. Casey felt that the large youth and volunteer education project they helped found in the West Bank was amazing after having visited it, and was quite happy with the work they supported at an OPT medical association. Casey was particularly happy to have helped the Gazan community mental health programme, but cautioned that he/she had no way off assessing their impact there. Morgan also considered his/her work a great success when compared to his project’s objectives and aid industry standards. Alexis and Ash meanwhile praised the quality of work of their partners’ work on projects that were sabotaged by Canadian officials, for what they accomplished and because of how well they reacted to those unusual circumstances. Some coordinators like Kim, Jamie, Alexis and Hayden simply felt it was though impossible to measure what their projects accomplished on the linear model, because they were so effectively Canadian officials ensured they never really got anything accomplished.

The Canadian Government as the Primary Obstacle

Most likely because so many of the organisations I interviewed saw their aid work undermined and sabotaged by people in positions of government power in Canada who were sympathetic to the Israeli narrative and/or lobbying, or otherwise because their work was so severely impaired by Canadian regulations incompatible with the real conditions in the OPT, most of the interviewees preferred to focus on problems in Canada when assessing the outcomes of their projects. This was the common, overarching and dominant theme between every semi-structured interview. Overall there three main bodies out of which the problems arose: CIDA, the CRA and the Canadian government. A combination of one or all of these three undermined the organisations' OPT aid.

Government interference could be brutally direct, as in the case of Organisations 1 and 3, or indirectly, through the CRA or as a result of fear from government punishing organisations publicly like KAIROS and Rights and

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891 Casey Email 2014 November 20 21:56, pp. 2
892 Organisation 9 in fact attempted to get Morgan to extend his/her stay, but he/she declined largely due to fatigue.
Democracy described in Chapter 5. Regardless of the form, that interference was always carried out for partisan pro-Israeli purposes, in support of Israel’s settler-colonial government policy abetted by pro-Israel lobby groups in Canada. This happened regardless of Canadian political party in power, though the repression was definitely more pronounced during the Conservative Harper government’s rule from 2006 onwards, particularly for those organisations whose projects focused on advocacy for Palestinian rights. Thus the rights and advocacy projects run by Organisations 1 and 2 faced were impeded even prior to Harper, while organisations that ran more technocratic capacity building and poverty reduction programmes like Organisations 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 faced fewer to no problems prior to the Harper government. Emory cynically described the situation as one where organisations and activists working with Palestinians could survive under the Liberals, albeit on limited funding, but the Conservatives did not even want to see them survive.

A number of coordinators bemoaned what they saw as a major shift in Canadian foreign and development policy, and governing style, after 2006. Remy noted that prior to the Harper, Canada had a history of striving for transparency in governance, where it would even fund organisations that were highly critical of government policy. This was seen as a sort of check-and-balance on government, the notion of which completely eroded after Canada’s 2006 election. The Conservative government did not want in any way to be called to account by civil society organisations, or to allow them funding to do so.893 In this way rights and advocacy coordinators, such as Ash, Remy and Taylor, would concur with Hayden’s appraisal that quite crazy events were taking place in the development sector from 2006 onwards.894 Further, many interviewees noted that the Conservatives had adopted a simplistic ‘either your with us or against us’ approach to governance at home and abroad. All could point to a hostile disdain displayed by the Conservatives against Palestinians, owing to their strong ideological and electoral-motivated preferences for Israel. Some coordinators like Ash, Emory, Hayden, Jamie and Alexis even suggested that the extremist Israeli organisation NGO Monitor, which is linked to Israel’s government, had influence in the Canadian government and played a role in sabotaging their Palestinian aid projects.

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893 Remy (2014 August 28) 04min46s to 05min15s
894 Hayden (2014 August 27) 00min00s to 07min22s
CIDA

The interviewees basically never had something positive to say about CIDA, Canada’s one-time government development, if they spoke about CIDA at all. Many interviewees found CIDA employees to be naïve, ignorant and unqualified. Kim even complained about racism and sexism. Those CIDA employees had meanwhile a great deal of power as both donor and monitor when funding an interviewee’s project, which they could label ineffective or unimportant on their own whim. Yet with that power did not necessarily come experience. It seemed to some coordinators as though those powerful CIDA employees did not possess the rights skills or knowledge to assess a project. Some interviewees meanwhile found CIDA’s paperwork and monitoring requirements to be too oppressive, creating an administrative burden that ate up their time and undermined their projects. Their experiences were so bad that most coordinators likely would have preferred not to deal with CIDA or receive government funding altogether. Only Sawyer was ever comfortable working CIDA out of all sixteen project coordinators, while on the opposite side of the spectrum Ryan bemoaned the negative influence government had over NGO projects due to the power funding gave government over their work, while simultaneously allowing government to offload the cost of social service provision to unpaid volunteers.

Unqualified Assessments

Interviewees who received funding from CIDA often spontaneously cited the government development agency as an incredibly difficult organisation to work with. Many resented the extra problems it caused in already challenging OPT aid projects. One of the premier obstacles Kai said that he/she faced in Organisation 7’s development programme was working with CIDA’s ‘bureaucrats’. To start, typically Kai went around CIDA directly lobbying politicians in order to get funding, and he/she felt against the wishes of CIDA. That could have caused resentment. Second, there was a conflict in work

895 Kai (2012 March 26) 54min14s to 57min15s
cultures and Kai found it really difficult to ‘quantify’ Organisation 7’s work for CIDA, which Kai said is very difficult to do from within the realm of social work. Third, Kai speculated that their poor relationship might have its origin in a clash of worldviews, where he/she saw herself/himself as an ‘organiser’ and not from the bureaucratic development world.\textsuperscript{896}

Kai believed that CIDA was far too obsessed with quantifiable data, pointing out that some things can be quantified, while others cannot.\textsuperscript{897} His/her organisation did do their best to quantify what they could, but just like Emory and Kim he/she knew they could not quantify everything. Further, Kai really did not like the approach CIDA took toward its operations. He/she felt they had very low standards for objectives, in part because politics was mixed in with their work and that made them risk averse.\textsuperscript{898} However, he/she had in particular a problem with the way they measured a project’s success, which relates to the question of quantifiable or qualitative evaluations, and the linear and neoliberal approach. Kai said that CIDA took an approach to development aid work where they would establish an outcome before a process would take place, which he/she felt was naïve and would ultimately undermine any project they funded.\textsuperscript{899} For instance, in a peace programme where community leaders are brought together you need time to actually bring them together, to develop relationship bonds between them and to help them figure out their relationship before doing something in very broad terms to advance a common agenda. That is impossible to quantify by numbers, so Kai said,

\begin{quote}
You want to quantify that then good luck. How are you going to quantify it? By how many meetings we have a year? Fuck okay.\textsuperscript{900}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{896} Kai said he/she could not even stand the way they talked at CIDA. Kai (2012 March 26) 40min52s to 43min49s Kai frequently referred to CIDA personnel as bureaucrats, in what seemed to be a derogatory manner, just as he/she made stabbing comments about my being a political scientist and from the western Canadian region the Conservatives are popular in.

\textsuperscript{897} Kai (2012 March 26) 44min28s to 45min26s

\textsuperscript{898} Kai (2012 March 26) 40min52s to 43min49s

\textsuperscript{899} There is incredible pressure to present any project as a success. ‘If “successful” projects are those that resemble donor policy models, then development agencies are made better at managing their upwardly oriented representations, while directing their practical efforts to system goals and preserving identity, neither of which improve the chances of learning or effectiveness in poverty-reducing change’. Mosse, \textit{Cultivating Development}, 2004, 203.

\textsuperscript{900} Kai (2012 March 26) 43min43s to 43min49s
Kai said they can have ‘so many’ meetings per year that are quantifiable, but that does not describe what is going on in those meetings or if they are even talking to each other. So it is an inappropriate form of measurement.\footnote{Kai (2012 March 26) 43min49s to 44min12s} Kai said,

> When you talk about complex social conditions, you talk about empowerment, and how do you measure that. I’ve had students do PhD on that.\footnote{Kai (2012 March 26) 44min12s to 44min28s}

As with Kai, Kim found CIDA obsessed with quantifiable data that was completely inapplicable to a project meant to promote complex social change for long-term benefits for the communities they are working in. However, CIDA wanted numbers like the number of judicial education sessions that had taken place and how many judges were in a room for a workshop. They also wanted Organisation 5 to demonstrate that those Palestinian judges had gained knowledge from their meetings.\footnote{Kim (2014 August 7) 23min21s to 23min42s} So when Organisation 5 put in place working groups that met for up to a year working out ideas and figuring out a common agenda, CIDA could not understand what was taking place. Thus Organisation 5 really struggled with coming up with the type of ‘tangible’ – easy to understand results CIDA expected.\footnote{Kim (2014 August 7) 21min6s to 21min44s}

Ultimately Kim found it just as difficult to work with CIDA as Kai. Kim found CIDA’s appraisal of their project unreasonable and the amount of reporting just incredibly onerous without clear vision,

> It’s incredibly onerous. They don’t know what they want. Their expectations change from officer to officer. They clearly didn’t understand the rule of law sector, yet stood in judgement of. So it was incredibly frustrating. They always thought the project was a failure, and no matter how much they heard the opposite, they couldn’t get it.\footnote{Ultimately Organisation 5 was able to come up with such results, and in the opinion of Kim sometimes they came up with some really powerful things, though CIDA would still not think they were results. Kim (2014 August 7) 23min42s to 26min41s}
Jamie faced challenges in his/her work with CIDA. Organisation 6’s work with refugees was research intensive and meant to provide policy solutions on refugee issues. Jamie noted that working with government is generally challenging, because they do not always understand the value of research, including policy research and the way in which it can inform policy. He/she found that CIDA always thought very naively that development has nothing to do with policy. Further, as in Organisation 5’s experience, Jamie found that CIDA could easily discount the hard work of experts just because they did not understand that work. So in Jamie’s experience CIDA was always much more challenging to work with than even Foreign Affairs. He/she found that Foreign Affairs at least respected their expertise, and treated them as such.

Organisation 3 had also faced problems working with CIDA over reporting requirements prior to defunding. Taylor says that over the decades CIDA reporting became more and more onerous, incorporating trendy techniques such as ‘results based management’ that just added to the administrative workload and detracted from the projects. He/she says that prior to 2000 they had found running projects much easier, because at that time they had a generous donor who required just general reporting from partners.

**Inappropriate Behaviour**

Kim is a senior professional and accomplished researcher. He/she found it difficult to accept judgement by CIDA monitors over Organisation 5’s projects, when those monitors lacked experience in the field of work. What he/she found though especially appalling was the quality of many CIDA staff. For instance, on top of being unqualified for their position, Kim found some CIDA staff to be of questionable personal character, including sexist and racist,

> What I was experiencing day-to-day was the racism of their officers, the sexism of their officers, the ignorance of the people who were supposed to be overseeing this project. I mean they don’t hire international development people anymore. The guy who we were working with, a

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906 Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 15min25s to 18min15s
907 Taylor (2014 September 4) 16min56s to 20min10s
lovely man, had a background in artificial intelligence I think he told me … But he was one of their better people.\textsuperscript{908}

When I asked Kim how you could be racist in CIDA and still succeed at development work, Kim gave a response that belied the inherent feeling of superiority of the Western model that is inherent to neoliberal development aid,

How could you NOT be racist in CIDA and succeed? I mean there are different forms of racism, right? The way the racism that I am talking about played out is in an ocean of, ‘We are developed, we are superior, you are not, you will bow to us’.\textsuperscript{909}

As a Canadian of Arab descent, Kim also found his/her loyalty questioned at CIDA and was asked at times to play into racial stereotypes in his/her work. Kim recalled one of their CIDA overseers saying,

The thing that you’re going to have to understand and remember [KIM] is that you are Canadian. Don’t get lost in your Arab identity. I had a project … in Cairo where the guy was an Egyptian Canadian, and he couldn’t get anything done, until he realised that what he had to do was pound his fists on the desk, and yell and scream, and that’s the only way he was going to get respect. So just remember that you are Canadian.\textsuperscript{910}

Kim’s last contact with CIDA was when they hired someone to do an end of project evaluation, which took a long time to finalise.\textsuperscript{911} That resulted in a very positive report, but nonetheless did not result in a renewal of their funding.\textsuperscript{912} In the end both Kim and his/her Palestinian co-director had had such a bad

\textsuperscript{908} Kim (2014 August 7) 42min49s to 43min30s
\textsuperscript{909} Kim (2014 August 7) 43min48s to 44min08s
\textsuperscript{910} Kim (2014 August 7) 46min05s to 46min45s
\textsuperscript{911} Kim told the project evaluator ‘thanks for giving our dignity back’, after having been disrespected so much by CIDA. Kim (2014 August 7) 51min53s to 52min37s. Meanwhile, Kim does not know CIDA’s response to the evaluation but can say they gave the evaluator a difficult time. Kim (2014 August 7) 52min37s to 53min06s
\textsuperscript{912} They and their volunteers felt their work was just tossed casually aside by CIDA personnel who did not have the capacity to understand the project. Kim (2014 August 7) 51min20s to 51min53s
experience working with CIDA, Kim said neither of them was sure they could work with CIDA again,

    I mean I’ve set a price, right? Everybody has a price. They gave us $4.5 million. To my mind it was like, yes, but you gave me $20 million worth of grief. So if you want to give me $20 million, I’d consider it.  

**Suffocating a Project through Paperwork**

Hayden also found, like Kim, that the paperwork reporting on their CIDA project in Gaza was overwhelming. More than once Hayden referred to it as ‘unreal’,

    Oh yea it was unreal. I’ve never produced so much paperwork in my life. And in just the last year of the project.  

    … I remember like spending nights, like literally nights and like early mornings, basically just writing and writing, and I couldn’t stop writing. There was … and then there was … every three month reports. [AND] … when I got there so many reports were late … and then there were annual reports and then special reports, and all sorts of memos, etc, etc. So I was just writing all the time. 

And just as Emory warned that the entire focus of an organisation can be shifted to reporting by a donor, Hayden said,

    It took most of my time. Even people from CIDA based in Palestine were asking me why I was doing all of this, and like the office in Ottawa … the people were very, very nice at the time … they just kept asking for more, so … [Hayden laughed] … it was a bit insane. 

Hayden faced a particularly tricky situation working with a CIDA monitor who was so invested in the Gaza women and family empowerment centres, having designed the project. Hayden described that monitor as having a vision for the project, being intense, and wanting the objectives to meet the vision. So not

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913 Kim (2014 August 7) 42min05s to 42min26s  
914 Hayden (2014 August 27) 32min30s to 32min40s  
915 Hayden (2014 August 27) 35min08s to 35min31s  
916 Hayden (2014 August 27) 32min45s to 33min03s
only did Hayden have to write lengthy reports, but he/she found they were read in-depth with time-consuming follow-up questions seeking a deeper explanation. He/she could simply not understand why the original design model was not panning out as planned, even though it is a well established fact that development projects rarely proceed as planned once put into motion, especially in such a complicated place to work as the OPT. Hayden thinks the CIDA monitor also represented a sort of conflict-of-interest, saying that you cannot monitor a project that you designed and then evaluate it ‘independently’ because it invariably will not meet your expectations. Thus, Hayden found his/her CIDA monitor to be acting more like a project coordinator than monitor, even going on monitoring missions to the centres, though that should have been Hayden’s role.917

In 2013, Canada’s development agency CIDA was shut down and absorbed into Foreign Affairs. By redefining the structure of its aid agency, the government will have far greater control over the way development work gets done with the aim also of putting aid more in step with what his government considers Canadian foreign interests to be.918 It is worth noting that in some interviews, such as with Quinn and Sawyer, they provided the impression that CIDA personnel leaned pro-Palestinian.

The CRA and Financial Audits

Many of the project coordinators described experiences where Canada’s CRA tax office regulations made it difficult, sometimes impossible, to carry out their OPT aid work. Some policies were simply untenable in the context of the OPT, or required unreasonable administrative oversight. Further, Blake and Dallas found a clear bias in CRA questions about the charitable projects they carried out that depended politically on the region they were working in. Blake said that the questions they were asked with relation to their projects in Afghanistan, where Canada had contributed troops fighting a tough war, were ‘little and light’.

917 Hayden (2014 August 27) 35min55s to 37min32s
918 Mackrael, ‘CIDA’s Sudden Demise Shifts Control to PMO’.
By comparison, the CRA was concerned more about Organisation 10’s work in the OPT.\textsuperscript{919}

Worse, many of coordinators legitimately suspected that the CRA was applying unfair standards or levels of rigour to monitoring their OPT aid projects, because they were working with Palestinians and possibly due to partisan political interference. For instance, Organisation 2 was one of the least conformist organisations researched within the context of the neoliberal aid norm, dating back to the 1990s when Emory was surreptitiously supporting them in advocating Palestinian rights in Canada. Casey was forced in 2006, during a transition from the Martin to Harper governments, to deal with an audit by the CRA at the same time that their CEO died. He/she felt besieged saying that he/she had to deal with a biased auditor who questioned his/her sympathies toward terrorism. Casey also suspected that the audit had been launched under questionable circumstance. By the summer 2014, Organisation 3 and Organisation 4 became two of a large number charities that were also being audited by the CRA under dubious circumstance, the common point being that all were left-leaning organisations with positions critical of the Canadian government.

As of being interviewed in the summer of 2014, Remy said that Organisation 3 had yet to receive proper guidance from the CRA for the onerous process of undergoing an audit.\textsuperscript{920} Using the example of a Latin American partner affected by the audit process, he/she noted that the guidance that partner had received seemed completely unreasonable. That partner was being asked to translate every document they had into English or French, from the contribution agreement down to every taxi receipt.\textsuperscript{921} Remy was not sure what would come out of the audit process, and noted that the CRA seemed preoccupied with the organisation’s political activities. This was new territory for Organisation 3 because they had never been audited before. Remy said that it could be reasonable to be audited periodically, but recent history and the context of the

\textsuperscript{919} Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 50min01sec to 51min07sec
\textsuperscript{920} Remy (2014 August 28) 44min43s to 46min07s
\textsuperscript{921} Remy (2014 August 28) 46min07s to 46min54s
CRA audit just a few years after their high profile defunding made them suspicious that they were being targeted politically.922

For these organisations, each a registered Canadian charity providing the CRA with annual reports on their finances and activities, the audits seemed to be being used unfairly as weapons against them owing to their overseas work in places such as Palestine combined with their advocacy work. Advocacy is a key word here, and theme in my research, where the organisations that advocated Palestinian rights often faced the biggest challenges in their work. Advocacy work would be used as an excuse by government to undermine their work, because according to CRA regulations charities can only spend a small percentage of their funding on advocacy work. Under the Income Tax Act a registered charity must devote all of its resources to charitable purposes and activities. Notwithstanding that rule, they are allowed to allocate a small amount of their resources to political activities. That small amount has been defined as up to 10% of a charity’s total resources, while 90% or more must be devoted to its charitable activities.923 So the overwhelming majority of their funding must be directed toward their charitable purposes. Yet in Canada a lack legislation defining what exactly is charitable has left the courts to interpret common law in order to determine what that encompasses. To do that the courts have relied on a less-than-modern 1891 interpretation of a 1601 Elizabethan Law delineating four types of charitable activities,

1. Relief of poverty
2. Advancement of education
3. Advancement of religion
4. Certain other purposes that benefit the community in a way the courts have said is charitable924

922 Remy (2014 August 28) 44min43s to 46min07s
924 Canada Revenue Agency, ‘What Is Charitable?’, Government of Canada, What Is Charitable?, (30 April 2009), http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/pplyng/cpc/wtc-eng.html; Those purposes are based on a 1601 Elizabethan law, the Statute of Charitable Uses. The Statute of Elizabeth (a.k.a. the "Statute of Uses") of 1601 is widely agreed to be the foundation point of charity in the common law world. It lists categories of needy folks, including maimed veterans, and public projects. The prose has a Shakespearian feel. It was modified by the courts over the centuries with key case (Pemsel) in the Victorian era. That is when the 4 heads of charities was confirmed. Bridge, Richard. 2014 Nov 3 email In Commissioners for Special
Charitable status is highly valuable to non-profit organisations, which eight of the ten organisations researched at one point had. Once registered, a charity pays no income tax and is able to issue tax receipts to donors. Tax receipts are used for substantial non-refundable tax credits or deductions, encouraging larger donations from supporters. A further benefit of being able to issue a tax receipt is assurance given to donors that the government through the CRA has verified the issuing organisation. The significance of that assurance cannot be understated when donating to projects related to Palestinians, where so many Palestinian and predominantly Muslim organisations are listed as terrorist entities – nearly 80% of Canada’s terrorist list is made up of Muslim organisations.\textsuperscript{925}

Meanwhile, according to the \textit{Income Tax Act} and Canadian common law, a charity should not be established for political purposes to,

(1) further the interests of a particular political party; or support a political party or candidate for public office; or (2) retain, oppose, or change the law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country.\textsuperscript{926}

According to the CRA the main reason the courts ruled out political purposes for charities is because a purpose is only considered charitable if it generates a public benefit. The CRA does though allow charities to engage in public awareness campaigns about its work or an issue related to that work, so long

\textit{Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel}, [1891] A.C. 531 (H.L.). ("Pemsel") the Statute of Charitable Uses was broken down into four headings under which a charitable purpose must fall. They are: (1) the relief of poverty; (2) the advancement of education; (3) the advancement of religion; and (4) certain other purposes beneficial to the community. If a charity’s "purpose" does not fall within one of these four headings, the charity cannot receive the benefit (i.e. tax free status and ability to give tax receipts) of being officially registered as a charity under the Income Tax Act. The courts in Canada have strictly adhered to the charitable purpose headings contained in Pemsel (and by implication the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses written in 1601). Hull & Hull LLP, ‘Statute of Charitable Uses - A 17th Century Framework in the 21st Century’, \textit{Toronto Estate Law Blog}, 9 January 2012, http://estatetlaw.hullandhull.com/2012/01/articles/topics/estate-trust/statute-of-charitable-uses-a-17th-century-framework-in-the-21st-century/.

\textsuperscript{925} Of the listed terrorist organisations as of 2015 March 31, 7 were Palestinian and a further 43 of Muslim background, including a former Canadian Muslim charity, out of 54 listed organisations. Public Safety Canada, ‘Listed Terrorist Entities’.

\textsuperscript{926} Canada Revenue Agency, ‘Policy Statement CPS-022, Political Activities’.
as the activity is, ‘connected and subordinate to the charity’s purpose’. For instance, Sawyer pointed out the importance of advocacy for a charity because of the need to raise awareness about an issue, in order to build up support for that issue and then raise funds for. He/she said that people only donate to a cause if they are aware of it. Further, while advocacy does mean demonstrated support for a cause or particular point of view, it is not necessarily a political activity. This only becomes a political activity if it,

1. Explicitly communicates a call to political action;

2. Explicitly communicates to the public that the law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country should be retained, opposed, or changed; or

3. Explicitly indicates in its materials that the intention of the activity is to incite, or organise to put pressure on, an elected representative or public official to retain, oppose, or change the law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country.

When a registered charity makes a representation to an elected representative or public official, this is considered to be charitable provided this falls within the general scope of its charitable activities, even if it is challenging or supporting a law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country.

However, a lack of clarity in the charitable legislation leaves open to interpretation whether a charity is conducting too much advocacy or not. The line between legal and illegal advocacy work is opaque. Thus, this unclear dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate advocacy may have been taken

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927 As a result of the measures introduced in the 2012 federal budget, which came into force on June 29, 2012, a political activity also includes the making of gifts to qualified donees intended for political activities. Ibid.

928 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 00min00s to 5min10s

929 As a result of the measures introduced in the 2012 federal budget, which came into force on June 29, 2012, a political activity also includes the making of gifts to qualified donees intended for political activities. Canada Revenue Agency, ‘Policy Statement CPS-022, Political Activities’.

930 It should though remain subordinate to the charity’s purposes and all representations should: (1) relate to an issue that is connected to the charity’s purposes; (2) be well-reasoned (or where time constraints make this impractical, should be based on a well-reasoned position and such a position should be submitted in a timely manner to the elected representative or public official concerned); and (3) not contain information that the charity knows or ought to know is false, inaccurate, or misleading. Ibid.
advantage of as a weapon against several of the registered charities in this study, as an excuse to file audits by the CRA against them, such as Organisations 2, 3 and 4 carrying out advocacy work. That is if they were not already being audited on some other basis, such as Organisation 10. Meanwhile the single advocacy Organisation 1 that was not audited as a result of the CRA, perhaps because it had an alternative legal structure, instead went through an audit triggered by its ardently pro-Israel Chairperson, who commissioned an independent forensic audit of Organisation 1’s finances as one of the weapons the government appointed Board used in their fight against the organisation’s staff.\footnote{Ironically the auditor hired was at a conflict of interest since it was also the same firm that audited then the three human rights organisations in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel, yet no fuss was made about that. Ash said, ‘they found nothing of course’. Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 30min20sec to 30min49sec} Audits and the threat of losing charitable status seem to have been consistent strategy employed by pro-Israel activists in government against organisations engaged in Palestinian rights work.

**Research Confirmation of a CRA Bias**

Research released in 2014 by the Broadbent Institute seems to confirm this bias and speculation by left-leaning charities, not just Palestine rights work, that the Harper Conservative government has targeted them for political reasons.\footnote{Stephen Harper’s CRA: Selective Audits, “Political” Activity, and Right-Leaning Charities’ (Broadbent Institute, October 2014), http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/sites/default/files/documents/harpers-cra-final_0.pdf.} That report provides evidence indicating a CRA bias against charities that are critical of government policy.\footnote{One of the first groups targeted were environment charities critical of energy and pipeline policies that were also vilified by several Conservative cabinet ministers. The audits later expanded to include charities that promote social justice, poverty reduction and religion. Beeby, ‘Revenue Canada’s Political Activity Audits Biased, Think-Tank Says’.} The report further raises questions about the accuracy of annual filings made by right-leaning conservative charities that claim 0% political activity, citing recent public statements from 10 of them that appear to meet the CRA definition of political engagement. While those charities have not faced scrutiny by the CRA, as many as 52 charities that challenged government policy have been hit with political-activity audits under a special two-year, $8 million programme that was first announced in the 2012
federal budget year. The charities being audited included very well-known organisations in Canada such as Amnesty International, the David Suzuki Foundation and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. Those charities say the audits drain them of limited resources and critics say the audits have led to fears of engaging in advocacy.

Yet even prior to 2012 and the Harper Conservative government, Canadian organisations with a charitable registration running projects in the OPT were dealing with audits they felt might be motivated against them politically. Casey says that the CRA was one of the biggest challenges that he/she faced carrying out OPT aid work at Organisation 2. He/she says that around the time that their Chairperson died in 2006, a CRA auditor grilled him/her during an audit about his/her sympathy toward terrorism and forced him/her to give up their donor's list of the past two years. Their new Chairperson eventually complained about the experience to the CRA, which replaced the auditor. This use of audits even led to Organisation 10, which seemed to be targeted more than other charities, to lose its charitable status in 2011.

**Canadian Politics and Government**

When on the eve of the Second Intifada, the World Bank found in a survey of opinion leaders that donors received mixed marks for coordination with each other and the PA, and for the monitoring and evaluation of aid projects. They meanwhile received poor marks for the identification and prioritisation of projects, expediency in processing proposals, and their fulfilling aid pledges. One of the reasons the opinion leaders identified for this was, The impact of donor politics (both domestic pressures and foreign policy interests) on aid programmes was seen as particularly negative.

As described in Chapters 4 and 5 there were strong pro-Israel domestic pressures affecting that work in Canada.

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934 That programme was later topped up to $13.4 million and made permanent, while the CRA is cutting tax auditor positions internally, and at a time of growing and costly tax evasion involving many billions of dollars. Ibid.


936 Casey Email 2014 November 20 21:56, pp. 2

937 ‘Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza’, 81.
The story uncovered by my interviews with OPT aid project coordinators was one of constant government harassment undermining their projects, especially during the Harper Conservative government. Often this harassment directly contradicted official Canadian policy and the neoliberal paradigm that had long dominated their approach to Middle East politics.

**Government Attacking an Organisation from the Inside**

Organisation 1 was, along with Organisation 10, one of the two organisations I researched who suffered the worst fate of Canadian government persecution over OPT development aid work, because each was shut down by government in my study period. While Organisation 1 faced its toughest days during the Harper government, as Emory pointed out having worked through both Chrétien and Martin Liberal governments as well, he/she felt as though the Canadian government's policy on Israel and the OPT did not depend much on what political party held power. Whether there was a Liberal or Conservative government made no difference. Even though the internal office politics of Organisation 1 became very ugly after Emory left it in the mid-2000s, in the later Martin years he/she says that working in Palestine was never easy for a Canadian.

In particular, Emory felt you had always then to pay attention to the politics of the Canadian government's relationship to the pro-Israel lobby, typically its relationship to the CJC.939 He/she said that was key and always has been.940 For example, when a prominent Palestinian politician from the Oslo Process’ peace-camp was visiting Canada in 1995 and Organisation 1's CEO wrote an article that was critical of the occupation, they were censured from above during the Chrétien government. This effectively scuttled their future work in the Middle East by eliminating any chance they had to run a programme that focuses

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938 Heinbecker et al., ‘Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy’, 197.
939 In 2011 the Canadian Jewish Congress was replaced by the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA).
940 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 9min22s to 11min10s
specifically on the region. Any projects carried out with Palestinian partners could only be funded for limited periods of time on contracts with low probabilities of renewal. By 1997, Emory said that nearly all OPT aid work stopped for a period lasting until the early-mid 2000s. As the Second Intifada raged on Organisation 1’s then CEO decided, in the early 2000s and late in his/her term, to travel to the OPT. That CEO then published an article critical of Israeli house demolitions, a key strategy to settler colonial ethnic cleansing, in a major Canadian newspaper. The result was that one of Organisation 1’s Board members, who was also an important government Minister, reacted angrily and, in the words of Emory, ‘all hell broke loose’ – foreshadowing the serious problems Organisation 1 would face in 2008/9. Emory says that that CEO was essentially summoned to present himself to the pro-Israel lobby to explain his actions, and he/she obeyed.

By the late 2000s when Organisation 1’s CEO attempted to take a very ‘balanced’ approach to the Middle East, Ash thinks that that ‘balance’ may have been his/her undoing. He/she says the government appointed Board members viewed the world not through a lens of individual human rights, but as a highly simplistic black-and-white checkerboard of ‘good guy’ and ‘bad guy’ countries,

[Ash] “So they wanted to work in Cuba. They loved our China programme. Anything that was perceived as us against them, the virtuous right against the bad lefties was a really, really good project. If it’s a leftist dictator, it’s bad. But a right-wing dictator wouldn’t be bad. So doing work in Columbia was tricky. Doing work with First Nations in Bolivia was out of the question.

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941 That also forced Emory have to afterward quietly fund any engagement with Palestinians, in the shadows, covered up within other programmes. Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 11min10s to 14min01s
942 Outside Emory attending some joint meetings, maintaining an interest in the work of Canadian NGOs in the sector and quietly funding a women’s project accompanying Palestinian farmers. Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 14min01s
943 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 11min10s to 14min01s
944 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 11min10s to 14min01s
946 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 45min19sec to 46min43sec
947 Ash-1 (2012 March 21) 46min47sec to 47min05sec
Ash noted that their organisation had always had Jewish and Zionist Board members who caused problems with their projects.\textsuperscript{948} However, the members appointed by the Conservative government were part of the extreme right of the Jewish community, or else were pro-Israel non-Jewish members also from the extreme right who sought to quash all Palestine-related work.\textsuperscript{949} He/she found that for those members anything to do with the Middle East was wrong, inherently bad, undemocratic and potentially terrorist. One of the Board particularly feared Palestinians fighting for their rights through the use of law, as a form of ‘lawfare’.\textsuperscript{950} The pro-Israel Chairperson was so partisan that when his spouse passed away soon after his/her 2009 appointment, he/she asked the staff not to send flowers but rather to make donations to the Israeli army in her memory.\textsuperscript{951} For these Board members being anti-Israel was the same as being anti-Semitic and they seemed to think of Middle East people were inherently predisposed to violence and a desire to kill Jews, reflecting the neoliberal developmentalist, as well as settler colonial predisposition to see the ‘other’ as inherently savage or uncivilised.\textsuperscript{952} These Board members had a very irrational checkerboard approach to rights work that led Ash to compare those Board members to Islamic extremists, except that they were very right-wing pro-Zionist extremest.\textsuperscript{953}

Those Board members were so extreme in their partisan views that at one point the CEO of Organisation 1 was criticised for not having a single Jewish employee. They seemed to have too much time on their hands or were not allocating their time properly to the subject of supporting human rights. Ash says they came to that conclusion by looking at the names of everyone working at Organisation 1. Ash could not understand how that could be a problem, since asking someone what their religion was is not a pre-requisite to hiring. In fact, it contravenes Canadian law as a right not to be judged according to your religion or ethnicity. Ash further pointed out at that time that there were also no homosexuals, blacks, transsexuals or First Nations people working at the

\textsuperscript{948} Corroborated separately by Emory (2012 March 22)
\textsuperscript{949} Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 18min30s to 22min13s
\textsuperscript{950} Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 08min18sec to 14min40s
\textsuperscript{951} Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 25min35s to 28min29s
\textsuperscript{952} Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 22min13s to 25min35s
\textsuperscript{953} Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 25min35s to 28min29s
Another organisation with direct government funding and a similar organisational structure was Organisation 6. Jamie said that the organisation was aware in 2006 that the then minority Harper government had a strong pro-Israel position. As a minority government this was quietly acknowledged, but became public policy once they achieved a majority status on a third electoral attempt in 2011. Since then the government has been unabashed in naming Israel as a main ally and partner. Jamie says that it is through their relationship to Israel that the government views the entire Middle East, and that this drives their policy. It was the same checkerboard good-guy, bad-guy approach to foreign policy taken by human rights Organisation 1’s Board members.

Overall since Harper’s accession to power Organisation 6 is much more careful about what development work they do, and that self-censorship out of fear increasingly impedes their work. This change was also a direct reaction of Organisation 6 seeing what had happened at Organisation 1,

It’s an atmosphere that just … they’ve developed this political culture and this political environment that’s just surreal actually, for all of us.

Meanwhile, Foreign Affairs is now no longer interested in the organisation’s past work with refugees, which was reflected when it killed Canada’s position as gavel of the RWG around 2009/2010. Changes in government policy and fear at Organisation 6 forced Jamie to adopt an approach to Palestine work once adopted by Emory in the 1990s to early 2000s of drawing Palestine into regional projects that are not OPT-specific. This is a sharp departure for an organisation that in the past actively supported projects about Palestine based on the merit of the work, not considerations of Israel-Palestine politics in Canada.
Jamie thinks that self-censorship from fear may be one of the worst symptoms of government and pro-Israeli intimidation afflicting their work. The staff at Organisation 6 constantly ponder what they cannot do, because they are afraid of what the government will say or how it may react. Sometimes their own fears are exaggerated beyond even how government might actually react. For this reason Jamie believes that self-censorship is the worst type of censorship, a challenge and a shame.\textsuperscript{960} You anticipate what the Harper government reaction is going to be, and hence your memos, your notes, your analysis, your proposals and your projects all cater to how somebody may react. He/she said you stop ‘pushing the envelope’ and sometimes you are not even truthful as a result.\textsuperscript{961} He/she adds that the problem is pervasive beyond just Organisation 6 into the public service itself across Canada. People are afraid of speaking out anand contravening government policy. It is a culture of fear in Canada. Jamie says that stress from this definitely has an impact on you as an individual, too.\textsuperscript{962} In the case of the human rights organisation Rights and Democracy mentioned in Chapter 5, that may even have contributed to their CEO’s heart failure in 2011.\textsuperscript{963}

In the case of Organisation 1, Ash was constantly given the impression that right-wing conspirators had for some reason thought Organisation 1 was an effective organisation, and that they wanted to take it over for their own political ends.\textsuperscript{964} Ash says that he/she spoke with colleagues at other progressive Canadian organisations, and detected a pattern of the Conservative government riddling Boards of Directors with certain types of extreme people, changing the Board Chairperson and bringing the organisation’s work to a halt.\textsuperscript{965} This strategy worked at organisations where the government had direct power, such as at Crown Corporations, where they could attack from the inside.

\textsuperscript{960} Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 33min05s to 34min18s Studies of work carried out by aid organisations in the OPT reveal that they are more likely to engage in self-censorship rather than challenge the political status. Hart and Forte, ‘Mandated to Fail?’, 639.
\textsuperscript{961} Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 34min18s to 35min05s
\textsuperscript{962} Jamie-2 (2014 August 25) 49min53s to 51min08s
\textsuperscript{963} Cheadle, ‘The Staff of a Government-Funded Rights Advocacy Group Is Calling for the Resignation of Three Conservative Appointees from Its Board.’
\textsuperscript{964} Yet, Ash did not think his/her organisation was even necessarily effective. Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 37min10s to 42min49s
\textsuperscript{965} One example Ash gave where that took place was at the Canadian Commission on Human Rights. Employees would be driven to burning out, taking sick leave or departing. Ash-3 (2012 March 22) 28min29s to 37min10s
For organisations where they had no direct power, they would use their influence to them from the outside, as happened at Organisation’s 3 and 10.

**Government Attacking an Organisation from the Outside**

Organisation 3 became one of several organisations I examined where evidence suggests they were defunded by the Conservative Harper government, in part related over their OPT aid work. Organisation 3, like many others in this research was pro-peace and pro-human rights, irrespective of ethnic, national or religious background. Unfortunately for them, they felt that the Harper government did not take the same approach. From 2006 onward after the Conservative’s first election victory, Remy said a major problem they faced was from people in power who, ‘see the world in black-and-white’.  

He/she said the simple answer as to why they were defunded in 2009 was linked to their advocacy work, which was critical of government policy. There were a broad set of issues in which Organisation 3 had been critical of government, holding it to account on climate change, tar sands, the Columbia-Canada free trade agreement, mining and Israel-Palestine. The Conservative government does not want in any way to be called to account. Remy speculates that any one might have gotten them into trouble with the government. However, a prominent government Minister did accuse them of anti-Semitism just prior to defunding, so their Israel-Palestine stance must have played a role.

Remy said that the Conservative government not only did not want to fund human rights and advocacy work, but wanted to distance itself from any organisation that engaged with it. Taylor sustained this argument by saying that within the overall context of aid in Canada there is less and less funding for programmes like civil society and local partnerships, part of a general movement by government away from supporting civil society organisations. Hayden noted the same trend saying the Canadian government no longer

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966 Remy (2014 August 28) 39min11s to 40min30s  
967 Remy (2014 August 28) 04min46s to 05min15s  
968 Remy (2014 August 28) 05min15s to 07min40s  
969 Remy (2014 August 28) 04min14s to 04min46s  
970 Taylor (2014 September 4) 44min30s to 45min24s
supports organisations in the global south, breaking with Canada’s long-time foreign policy vision as a mediator between the West and its former colonies – a European-born state that views itself as taking an independent voice without a history of ‘colonial or imperial encumbrances’ and by which ‘constructive mediation and the promotion of international law’ become integral to its diplomatic identity. One of the results of this move away from solidarity has been the devaluation of the narrative of global partners, beyond just the OPT, where Canadian charities now have to send their own people to a poorer country in order to have ‘real, trustworthy accountability’ for projects, with the indigenous narrative devalued. Such an approach further disempowers local management and reinforces hierarchies of control, and the dominance of a richer country over the poorer. Unsurprisingly, Hayden says that the Canadian government does not support solidarity programs in any way whatsoever. This all meant Organisation 4’s style of engagement was problematic for the Canadian government, just like its advocacy work and support for Palestinian rights.

Organisation 4 is certain that the Conservative government is hostile toward them, because of their rights advocacy work. Their work with Palestinians may have been particularly irksome for the Conservative government. Hayden says they for example received a letter from a government Minister in 2013 where that Minister said that Organisation 4 does really good work in many countries, but also works in the OPT and with groups that are very problematic, which the Minister said could, ‘jeopardise their overall work’. With such evidence, Hayden himself/herself believes that the policy position that causes Organisation 4 the most trouble with the Canadian government is Organisation 4’s opposition to the occupation. Hayden said of the Conservatives,

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971 Bell et al., ‘Practitioners’ Perspectives on Canada - Middle East Relations’, 7.
972 In that way rich countries in the West like Canada are able to encapsulate the lives of people of the underdeveloped world, reducing their autonomy and regulating them, and in the end undermining indigenous or local forms of cooperation and solidarity. Long, Norman. “From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case for an Actor-Oriented Sociology of Development.” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies no. 49 (December 1990): 3–24, pp. 5-6.
973 Hayden (2014 August 27) 00min00s to 07min22s
974 Hayden (2014 August 27) 00min00s to 07min22s
I don’t think the Canadian government recognises that there’s any occupation … [laughing in disdain]… I’m not exactly sure. 975

Whether a one-state or two-state solution, Organisation 4 believes that any solution should include an end to the occupation. 976 In the meantime they support the BDS until the occupation stops. Out of sheer frustration Organisation 3, once a strong supporter of the people-to-people dialogue projects, was pushed to back BDS due to Conservative government policies, too. 977

Beyond just blocking or taking away government funding, Hayden noted that the Conservative government was as of 2014 trying to take away the charity number of organisations it disagrees with, such as environmental organisations or charities working with Palestinians. 978 He/she cited the example of the Muslim-Canadian charity called IRFAN that also lost its charitable status in 2011, eventually being listed as a terrorist organisation in 2014. 979 Hayden’s suspicions are not unfounded given a pattern of defunding, audits, the revocation of charitable status and even accusations of terrorism or anti-Semitism being used as tools by pro-Israel advocates and supporters in government to clamp down on Palestinian rights activities in Canada. These suspicions are also widely taken as fact by progressives in Canada suffering from this pattern, whether in OPT aid work or some other thematic area, which the Broadbent Institute seems to have confirmed through its own research. 980

Fewer Attacks on Less Overtly Political and more Neoliberal Projects

A couple of the capacity building and poverty reduction organisations I interviewed faced the fewest problems from the Canadian government or its

975 Hayden (2014 August 27) 16min42s to 16min50s
976 Hayden (2014 August 27) 16min07s to 16min42s
977 Though in a very nuanced position aimed at using economic measures to provide social justice. Remy (2014 August 28) 40min30s to 42min17s
979 Hayden (2014 August 27) 00min00s to 07min22s
980 Stephen Harper’s CRA: Selective Audits, “Political” Activity, and Right-Leaning Charities'.
regulatory bodies, though even then they were not unaffected. One of the longest working project coordinators, Sawyer, said he/she did not face any particularly big challenges from the Israel lobby in Canada, though he/she attributes this in part to their not engaging heavily in political advocacy work in Canada. Whatever advocacy work they did engage in was always done on a small scale, and often consisted of supporting other organisations.\footnote{Sawyer (2012 March 23) 58min25s to 1h06min50s}

Quinn meanwhile felt that Organisation 7 never really faced any major obstacles from the Chrétien, Martin or Harper governments.\footnote{He/she felt that they were never controlled in any way, maybe in part because they were supported via a ‘contribution agreement’ from CIDA, which is different than ‘direct programme’ funding. He/she said that meant the Canadian government was contributing to the programme by providing financial assistance to it, so they had no authority over operational decisions. Quinn also felt excluding government operationally helped the project over its lifespan. Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 14min32s to 18min45s} Kai even succeeded in soliciting government support for its Palestine work, purportedly against CIDA’s objections, for many years. They in particular made active use of connections in the Canadian Liberal party to access funds from CIDA. While Organisation 7 did not have the same poor relationship with the Harper government as the each of the other organisations I interviewed, it would still ultimately face a cut their funding, in spite of assiduous lobbying by Kai that included having the Canadian government’s ally, PA President Abbas, lobby Prime Minister Harper directly on behalf of Organisation 7.\footnote{Kai blamed this in part on the Albertan Christian evangelicals that surround Harper, suggesting they did not share Abbas’ letter with Harper. Kai (2012 March 26) 45min26s to 51min12s} Kai was even able to enlist support from what he/she referred to as Canada’s version of AIPAC, who he/she approached saying, ‘while they do not agree on everything, that lobby needs to show the world that someone in the Canadian Jewish community is doing something progressive’, with the caveat that those lobbyists had to actually believe in the Palestinian and Jordanian components of Organisation 7’s work as much as the Israeli.\footnote{Kai (2012 March 26) 51min12s to 52min10s}

In the end that pro-Israel lobbyist was able only to secure a small fund from the Harper government for Organisation 7, which was more of a holdover grant for 2010 through 2012 – approximately 8% of what it was seeking, or $2 million out of a $25 million dollar request – in order to keep the programme solvent until it...
could find other funds.\textsuperscript{985} So even if Organisation 7 did not face overt hostility from that government, they also could not depend on it for support in spite of impressive networking within that government’s network of allies. Just because Kai believed everyone should be equal in their rights that did not mean the Canadian officials he/she dealt with felt the same way.

Sawyer meanwhile did not share the negative assessment of the Liberal government given by coordinators like Emory and Ryan. Rather, he/she had in his/her experience, like Organisation 6, felt there was a much better development aid environment for the OPT under the Liberals. Sawyer remarked that until the First Intifada took place, leading to a change in perceptions in Canada about Israel and the Palestinians, Canada had simply labelled the Palestinian struggle as terrorism and would not give funds to any groups, including humanitarian ones, working under any umbrella that supported the Palestinians. Palestinians appeared pre-First Intifada to be excluded from a Canadian neoliberal foreign policy that was oriented towards helping people develop their societies with Canadian funding. That changed with the First Intifada when Sawyer said Palestinians were suddenly included, especially he/she felt during the Chrétien Liberal government.\textsuperscript{986}

This does though not necessarily contradict Emory’s observation that the Canadian government consistently opposed Palestine development work, regardless of party in power, because Sawyer did caveat his/her observation with the point that while CIDA personnel seemed to be excited about the chance to support Palestinians, the politicians in power never were.\textsuperscript{987} Further, it is worth nothing that Organisations 6, 7 and 8 that had a relatively good experience with the Liberals were engaged in capacity build and poverty reduction projects that did not directly contradict any of Canada’s neoliberal foreign policy aims or its orientation support for the Oslo Process. By contrast human rights and advocacy project coordinators like Casey, Ryan and Emory who publicly advocated for Palestinian rights and questioned Oslo faced obstacles from the Liberals, much like MEWG when Foreign Affairs abandoned it under the Chrétien Liberal government.

\textsuperscript{985} Kai (2012 March 26) 52min34s to 54min14s
\textsuperscript{986} Sawyer (2012 March 23) 5min10s to 10min17s
\textsuperscript{987} Sawyer (2012 March 23) 10min17s to 13min58s
Finally even though Organisation 7 was optimistic that it could get Harper government funding in the late 2000s, and still by 2014 had not yet felt the averse impact of government oppression experienced by other organisations, Quinn felt from a moral standpoint that he/she would almost feel guilty if they had been funded by the Conservatives. He/she felt that it might ‘rightly’ bring about a lot of questions by other NGOs in the sector of OPT aid work if Organisation 7 were to be funded. Quinn said that the government is so far to the political ‘right’ that he/she prefers to receive financial support from people who actually care about their work and genuinely support it, not the Conservatives.  

A Consistently Pro-Israel Government

Emory felt that Canada historically had a unique position within the Group of 7 (G7) as a sort of ‘middle man’ country between the richer and poorer nations of the post-colonial world. However, he/she said Canada had by 2012 stopped filling that role and is now just one more burden for people trying to have a chance at having a decent society. Perhaps though Emory had fallen prey to what Gordon describes as the mistake of many Canadian leftists in thinking that Canada, ‘is not an imperial power nor has it an imperial ambition’, despite a settler colonial history within its own borders and its status as an advanced capitalist country preying on the poor and weak the world-over. Through that interpretation, contrary to popular mainstream interpretations, it would make sense then that Emory does not see much of a difference between the Liberal Chrétien, Liberal Martin or Harper Conservative governments in the OPT. Emory felt there is a measure of continuance in all their policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. The difference was that the Liberals knew better how to present their policy coated with a ‘more socially progressive veneer’ than the Conservatives. The other difference was that activists in Canada had a better chance of simply existing in Canada under Liberal rule, even if what funding existed for Palestine work was anyways a pittance of what was needed. As

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988 He/she said it was a big eye-opener to see to what extent the government in power really saw things from a ‘different’ angle from them. He/she had tried hard pursuing, but just felt ‘dirty’ engaging with them. Quinn-2 (2014 September 5) 00min00s to 02min27s
990 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 1h34min17s to 01h41min43s
Israeli politics became more and more Conservative during the early 2000s, and lobbying by the CJC became more ferocious, the Canadian government did not want to be bothered with Palestine, especially with fewer principled actors in Foreign Affairs after idealist Ministers like Lloyd Axworthy and Alan Rock in the Chrétien era.  

Echoing Emory’s observation of consecutive Canadian governments, Ryan reminds us that rights and advocacy work has always considered differently with the Palestinians because their oppression was by a friendly government. Not only friendly, but very friendly, and for that reason the Canadian government did not want that situation of Palestinians to be revealed to the public. From Ryan’s perspective for instance torture carried out by Israel in the OPT is not important to the Canadian government, because it is being done by a friendly government – that was very clear. Further, he/she said that you could see many people in Liberal government in the 1990s were very strong Zionists. So even if the presentation was different, Ryan suggested that at its core the Liberal government still had a rather black-and-white view of friendly and unfriendly countries in international relations.

Morgan said the Harper Canadian government seemed to classify all Palestinians as a bunch of terrorists, ‘end of story’. Morgan went so far as to say that he felt the Conservative government considers Fatah to be a terrorist organisation and PA President Abbas a terrorist, while noting that the Canadian government is the closest ally to Israel in the world. Morgan said they are even stauncher defenders of Israel than the US, and that the Canadian government works on the principle that Israel can do no wrong.

Reflections by the Project Coordinators on Palestinian Aid from Canada

At the end of each interview I asked the interviewees to reflect on the aid process they participated in, including what they could have done differently or advice they would have for other people carrying out OPT development aid projects in Canada.

991 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 1h34min17s to 01h41min43s
992 Ryan (2014 December 2) 32min30s to 33min56s
993 Morgan-1 (2014 December 15) 28min18s to 29min40s
A number of coordinators had suggestions for how, with the benefit of hindsight, their funded projects might have been better. Quinn would liked to have found some way to foster even greater self-sustainability for Organisation 7’s partners in its network, which would also have helped them better to cope with the loss of Canadian government funding – though they were at least able to survive the loss. Emory would have preferred not to have been forced to fund any Israeli NGOs operating in the OPT because of Canadian politics, or to force Israeli and Palestinian organisations to work together based on his/her observations of negative results being generated by donor-forced cooperation projects. Emory’s views though on cooperation were very different from Organisations 3 and 7 who embraced cooperation projects. A number of coordinators, particular those funding capacity building and poverty reduction projects like Kim, Quinn, Morgan and Kai felt that they could have done a better job if their projects were just funded in a different way, with less interference, and for all but Morgan for a longer period.

Upon reflection many coordinators were critical of the type of assistance being provided by Canada and other international donors to the Palestinians under the Oslo aid model. Nearly all were critical of the limitations they faced providing aid due to Canadian government restrictions. In part this problem in Canada emanated from a lack of education about the situation in the OPT, and a fear to face reality because of the Israel lobby. Hayden suggested that fear kept many organisations from wanting to face the truth, exacerbated by what Remy said of Canadians being very poorly informed about the actual facts about the occupation. Morgan even suggested that government deliberately kept Canadians uninformed so as to not disrupt its own policy, while Ryan had said that Canada tolerated rights abuses if perpetrated by an ally.

Remy noted that in 2014 in the Canadian media coverage of the third devastating bombardment of Gaza they were still largely characterising the conflict in a decontextualized manner as though there were no occupation, reminiscent of the early failed Oslo years of the 1990s. He/she said that the Canadian government certainly contributed to that perception. He/she said the media and government never use the word occupation and that creates a totally
distorted from reality.\textsuperscript{994} That is though very consistent with the NECEF study on Canadian print media coverage of the Second Intifada.\textsuperscript{995}

Perhaps because of that unwillingness to engage with the reality, coordinators like Morgan said that Canadian OPT aid reflects policies that are taken completely out of context from the actual the situation, leading to stupid or useless projects getting funded.\textsuperscript{996} Some coordinators like Ash, Kim, Sawyer and Morgan said meanwhile that Canadian aid was reinforcing the occupation, which is a premise that comes up frequently in the literature on post-Oslo Palestinian aid with critical researchers pointing out how aid has come to subsidise the costs of occupation for Israel.\textsuperscript{997} The practitioners were confirming the researchers observations. For instance, Sawyer said that Canada was funding Palestinian police who were geared toward confronting people who resist the Israeli occupation, reinforcing Israeli settler-colonialism.\textsuperscript{998} Above all else the story told by the coordinators was about the way in which the Canadian government supports Israel and its occupation. This was the case for all sixteen projects coordinators.

Problems with the Oslo Process and Post-Oslo Palestinian Development Aid – Not really Liberation but renewed Occupation

Reflecting on the Oslo Process and Palestinian development aid, much of the coordinators corroborated the failure of the development and peace model as described in Chapter 4, and how the Peace Process was even warped to strengthen the Israeli occupation of the OPT. Emory claims to have been critical of the Oslo Process from its start because it seemed to him/her to ask Palestinians to work within the framework of occupation, rather than toward their freedom.\textsuperscript{999} One objection he/she had was that any Palestinian from civil society who wanted funding in the early period of the Oslo Process in the 1990s was forced to participate in dialogue projects and joint funds with Israelis. The

\textsuperscript{994} Remy (2014 August 28) 39min11s to 40min30s
\textsuperscript{995} ‘Media Bias in the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict: Canadian Print Media Coverage of Israeli and Palestinian Deaths’.
\textsuperscript{996} Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 17min39s to 17min50s
\textsuperscript{997} Hever, \textit{The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation}.
\textsuperscript{998} Sawyer (2012 March 23) 58min25s to 1h06min50s
\textsuperscript{999} Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 00min to 7min54s
result was that this killed off a lot of possibilities for projects because there were many people who at that point did not want to start working with Jewish-Israelis solely on the basis of cash-incentives, while it was widely acknowledged that donors were injecting funds precisely to encourage Palestinians to work with Israelis as a peace dividend. Further, Emory felt that too much of the Oslo-aid funding went towards dialogue projects that did not provide concrete assistance to PNGOs, which had such different needs than Israeli ones. Eventually those dialogue funds created tensions in the OPT, attracting animosity toward those people and groups that were working with Israelis for payment as Oslo failed and the OPT economy de-developed.

Emory says that in some ways Oslo-aid funding began to undo the work Palestinians had been doing in the OPT among themselves. Palestinian civil society became divided between those social entrepreneurs who were concerned foremost with making money, against those who were not. In Emory’s opinion this stalled any momentum that had been building in the OPT toward establishing a vibrant civil society that existed in the OPT prior to Arafat’s arrival in Gaza to establish the Western-backed PA Presidency 1994 July 1st. Emory believes that this disruption of Palestinian civil society killed off any move toward Palestinian democracy, because democracy needs to come from people with a capacity to organise themselves. When donors told them that the only way to organise was by ‘working with the occupation’, that completely changed the way Palestinians understood and worked with each other. The donors peace dividend may have actually moved Palestinians away from democracy, in direct contradiction to their development goals.

Emory says that a further effect of post-Oslo Palestinian aid was that it increased divisions between Gaza and the West Bank from the early 1990s onward. That is, it contributed to Israel’s divide-to-conquer fragmentation of the Palestinians. The reason was that there was less of a chance for the elite in Gaza to work with Israelis, because it has always been more difficult for them there to have a civil society than in the West Bank. Thus for example Organisation 7 never had a partner in Gaza in their network of Palestinian,

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1000 Emory did say though that those funds were quite useful for the Israeli NGOs, as they could get money from outside their own government. Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 7min54s to 12min57s
1001 Emory-1 (2012 March 22) 7min54s to 12min57s
1002 Emory-2 (2012 March 22) 00min to 7min54s
Israeli and Jordanian partners, in spite of the great need existing there for social work. This is because Organisation 7’s network included Israeli partners. This funding structure also meant that in the 1990s there were actually less funds available to Gazans than Palestinians in the West Bank or East Jerusalem, pushing them further outside the Peace Process.

Emory’s concern about the way Oslo was structured was based in part on feedback from the human rights centre in Gaza that he/she had funded. That partner found the Oslo Accord problematic, as had an Israeli human rights NGO that Organisation 1 was working with. Yet the Canadian headquarters of Organisation 1 strongly disagreed with the Gazan partner’s assessment, as they and Canada backed the Oslo Process and left no room for dissenting opinions. At one point Emory said that he/she felt the need to quit publicly expressing his/her doubts about the Oslo Process, lest that cut off his/her access the already limited resources he/she had to support partners. In the euphoria of the 1990s, there were few observers like Edward Said who could publicly criticise the doomed process and still be taken seriously.

Over time Emory’s optimism about the ability of Palestinian NGOs to effect positive change waned. By the early 2000s pessimism superseded optimism based on his/her observation that in the wake of the Peace Process there came to be much less of an OPT business community, which is consistent with the economic decline of the OPT described in Chapter 4, and one effect of that decline was for there to be less local civil society capacities and fewer PNGOs. Emory also found that the composure of PNGOs changed in the OPT. Religious organisations, many Islamic but also some Christian, grew in importance as secular PNGOs grew weaker during the Oslo Process, a phenomenon confirmed by Challand’s research in the late 2000s. Emory was concerned about this trend because he/she felt that PNGOs oriented toward political Islam act in an authoritarian manner, which further undermined civil society.

Sawyer was much less critical than Emory of Oslo aid and Canadian aid, even giving CIDA’s work a positive assessment in the 1990s during Liberal
governance. However, Sawyer said that as of 2012 he/she no longer felt this way, because there had been a fundamental change in the way foreign aid was being delivered, both through CIDA and as a global process. First, Sawyer felt that CIDA’s priorities were no longer as independent from government policy as they had once been in the 1990s – which would be reinforced by CIDA’s dissolution in 2013 after the interview. During the time of Conservative rule CIDA had become little more than an instrument of Canadian foreign policy. Second, he/she said that global aid priorities had shifted toward justice, democracy and security. Sawyer said that this was unrealistic in the OPT, where people did need security, but security spending was always geared toward security for Israelis and never for the oppressed Palestinians. So when Canada funded the PA special police, funding was structured in such a way that those police were confronting people who resist the Israeli occupation, not protecting Palestinians; and that meant Canada was ultimately funding a security apparatus that would help Israel sustain the occupation by proxy through Palestinian forces. Labelling this as aid to the Palestinians is disingenuous, for as Frantz Fanon said about French colonisation of Algeria that, ‘Goal of liberation is not to just substitute a French policeman for an Algerian one’. It does not help the Palestinians to replace the Israeli soldier with a Palestinian policeman, if the structure of settler-colonial occupation remains the same.

Kai was trying to do exactly the opposite though Organisation 7’s aid project. He/she argued that if Palestinians had the same rights as Israelis that would make the occupation too expensive to sustain. Thus, Kai used his/her Canadian government funded capacity building project to provide mechanisms that would help Palestinians fight for those rights, making the occupation more expensive occupation and Israelis less interested in maintaining it. Their programme was therefore designed in exactly the opposite manner as the security programmes noted by Sawyer, and perhaps that difference in structure is why they also lost Canadian government funding in spite of their lobbying.

1009 Sawyer (2012 March 23) 58min25s to 1h06min50s
1011 Kai (2012 March 26) 14min40s to 16min16s
Reflecting on the Gap between Canadian Development Aid and the Needs of Palestinians

Some interviewees emphasised that development was not possible under occupation, within the framework of Oslo and a neoliberal approach that refused to acknowledge the politics of occupation. For example, Hayden said that development work was not possible for the period 2000-2012 in the OPT, especially Gaza, given the conditions there. He/she said that all aid in that context should be classified as humanitarian only, because development is not possible in that context. Hayden said that donors insisted OPT aid be classified as developmental, because otherwise the neoliberal approach aid model could not be applied to the OPT and because Western donors did not want to tackle the politics of occupation,

We don’t want to classify it as humanitarian because then we would have to act, and the global community and donors don’t want to act.1012

Organisation 4 made an attempt to help reclassify aid to the OPT as humanitarian, but without success. For example Hayden said,

It’s funny there’s a big network of humanitarian workers in Canada, which is called PAGER. And we hardly attend any more. Whenever we would attend, whenever there was a crisis in Gaza we would bring up the question of Gaza … and people would like turn their heads and basically look elsewhere because they were afraid that the government would … hear this and that would threaten their funding …1013

Hayden said that as soon as you spoke about Palestine in Canada people assumed that you are politically biased. Hayden said though that Palestine encompasses an unjust situation, an occupation and a humanitarian situation. He/she said that has nothing to do with being biased.1014 Just like Ryan, he/she did not believe human rights standards should be applied differently around the world. Rather, they should be universal.

1012 Hayden (2014 August 27) 42min25s to 45s
1013 Hayden (2014 August 27) 42min46s to 43min24s
1014 Hayden (2014 August 27) 49min01s to 50min20s
Sawyer felt that more aid should be given to the Palestinians and that donors should adopt a more organised approach, under the umbrella of a Palestinian national strategy. However, even then Sawyer acknowledged that the occupation has to end first before aid can really lead to development. Sawyer also noted that the number of Palestinian NGOs is unbelievably high compared to other societies. He/she felt that this results in a disorganised, uncoordinated approach to the provision of social services, and it is highly inefficient. He/she felt that there also needed to be a national infrastructure to fulfil health, education and cultural needs for Palestinians. He/she said although there is a PA government, it has neither the money nor the means carry out any of this, and instead is fixated on just finding ways to pay wages and meet basic needs such as hospitals, schools and roads. To counteract this and provide the national infrastructure Palestinians need, Sawyer calls for public funds from donors to be made available for the Palestinian community establish that national plan and to develop the OPT themselves without Western oversight.\(^\text{1015}\)

This stands in complete contrast to heavy Western oversight of the OPT development process. Further, the World Bank has already set out the Palestinian national plan followed Western donors, while donors have never shown any interest in allowing Palestinians to be anything other than junior partners. That is consistent with the West-centric neoliberal development aid model.

In contrast with most Western donors and government donors, Organisation 10 did their best to provide as much funding as they possibly could in the OPT, and in support of the PA. In particular Organisation 10 did its best to offset any funding withdrawn by the Conservative government. For instance, in 2010 January the President of the Canadian Treasury Board Victor Toews announced just after the first major Israeli bombardment of Gaza that Canada would withdraw its funding from UNRWA, when Canada had been providing up to 4% of the overstretched agency’s budget.\(^\text{1016}\) Canada was reinforcing Israel’s punishment of Gaza. Organisation 10 doing its utmost to counter that policy by contributing to the humanitarian and developmental needs of Gazans. Perhaps then it should come as small surprise that Organisation 10 was punished so

\(^{1015}\) Sawyer (2012 March 23) 58min25s to 1h06min50s
\(^{1016}\) Palestine Solidarity Network, ‘Action’.
severely by a Conservative government that did not tolerate policy dissent within Canadian civil society.

Morgan observed while in the OPT 2009 to 2012 that there were many bad aid projects. He/she observed that Canadian aid funding seemed to be focused on basically two limited areas of work at that point, which were reinforcing forensic sciences and building up the criminal justice system. Other than that he/she said there were a few poorly thought-through projects such as trying to export products like olive oil and za’ater (a spice) out of the OPT, or investing in maternal milk. Any oil and spice exports would face all the debilitating challenges of running an export business caused by Israeli restrictions that has seen these businesses fail repeatedly and consistently countless times since the early days of closure at the start of Oslo, including the candle project the two centres Organisation 4 funded in Gaza attempted to export.1017 The attempt to develop an export-oriented economy has been a central plank to the World Bank development plan since 1993, and as described in Chapter 4 one of the central failures in neoliberal Palestinian aid.

In his/her interview Morgan lent support to one of the main arguments critics have against neoliberal aid. Those critics harangue a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach conventional aid applies to all situations, saying it is dangerously simplistic and contextually Euro-centric. Such policy models isolate aid intervention from the history, politics and the social realities of poorer countries, bending reality to match the logics of their solutions.1018 Morgan, who by the Winter 2014 had experience working for nearly two decades in the development aid sector across Africa and the Middle East, said that all aid environments are basically treated the same, in spite of the great variety of factors differentiating each poor or war-stricken region. He/she said when comparing work in the OPT with other regions that all of the systems of project management were pretty similar, because, ‘I mean because the job is the same. Whether in Congo, in Haiti, in Burkina Faso, I mean it’s the same frickin’ job anyways’.1019 Yet in reality the OPT, being colonised by Western settlers protected by the same Western

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1017 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 06min07s to 08min45s
1018 Thus critics take for granted that neoliberal aid projects will fail, because they are so divorced from reality. Mosse, ‘Is Good Policy Unimplementable?’, 642.
1019 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 41min32s to 41min42s
states donating to Palestinians, had to be incredibly different than Congo, Haiti or Burkino Faso.

Morgan put an extra emphasis on how stupid the maternal milk project was. He/she said that the Canadian government likes to invest in maternal milk in Africa, too, but that this does nothing whatsoever for development. Morgan said that he/she could understand investing in agriculture, water, democracy projects, but not fringe projects like maternal milk.\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 19min29s to 20min03s}

So what they were doing in fact is that they were coming up with projects, which everybody knew would not work.\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 08min45s to 08min55s}

Generally speaking, Morgan thinks that the way Canadians work reflects policies that are taken completely out of context from the occupation, which is consistent with the history of decontextualized post-Oslo Palestinian aid. For this reason stupid or weak projects tend to get funded.\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 17min39s to 17min50s}

Put it this way, I mean investing in forensic sciences as a development tool, it was useful for nothing.\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 17min50s to 18min02s}

Morgan further said that the courthouses being funded by Canada were useless from a development perspective.\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 18min02s to 18min14s} Quinn had expressed a similar point of view in his/her interview, referring to those ‘courthouses, forensic labs, and all the other crap’ Canada was funding as ineffective.\footnote{Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 41min01s to 43min40s} Of course, as Sawyer pointed out security sector investment broadly benefitted Israel’s occupation.

Hayden found quite remarkable the fear of Canadians had about publicly engaging with Palestine as an issue in overseas aid or rights work. For instance, a couple years prior to his/her summer 2014 interview some schools and a medical clinic in Gaza were bombed. When Organisation 4 fundraised to help rehabilitate them they saw in that campaign the highest number of anonymous donations they had ever gotten – and they rarely get anonymous donations. The point was that Canadians were so afraid of being seen publicly supporting Palestinians, that they did not want even to be seen even donating

\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 19min29s to 20min03s}
\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 08min45s to 08min55s}
\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 17min39s to 17min50s}
\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 17min50s to 18min02s}
\footnote{Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 18min02s to 18min14s}
\footnote{Quinn-1 (2014 September 5) 41min01s to 43min40s}
to rehabilitate schools and medical clinics. So while his/her organisation opts to speak quite openly about the Israeli occupation, most people opt not to, and for this reason Organisation 4 had been blacklisted by the government.

Morgan said that he/she was so fearful of government oppression that he/she even avoided sharing stories on social media like Facebook posts about the occupation, in case that would lead to a visit by the RCMP to investigate him/her at home. Another coordinator, who asked to be left absolutely anonymous, said that he/she discovered that since 2012 a guide has been circulating around Canadian government departments like Foreign Affairs that restricts the language you can use, such as not being allowed to use the word ‘occupied’ when describing the OPT.

As of the summer of 2014, Organisation 4 was one of the over fifty left-leaning organisations being audited by the CRA in a suspicious manner, which could result in the loss their valuable charitable status like happened to Organisation 10. In spite of this, Hayden takes a principled human rights stance and says that he/she finds it incredible that the international community keeps so quiet about the situation in the OPT. He/she believes that serves nothing, that the powerful Israeli lobby serves no real economic interests and that its aims are really in no one’s interest. He/she does not know what justifies that policy of silence provoked by fear.

Morgan said that one of the things that results of not being able to do any advocacy work, due to fear of government oppression, is that you as an aid coordinator could not write about Palestinian rights. This self-censorship contributes to the problem by not getting first-hand information out to Canada while the government and media keep the Canadian population misinformed with a one-sided, pro-Israel view of what is happening in the OPT,

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1026 Hayden (2014 August 27) 43min31s to 44min30s
1027 Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 04min00s to 06min07s
1029 Neorealist scholars like Walt and Mearsheimer would agree. Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy.
1030 Hayden (2014 August 27) 45min30s to 49min01s
And obviously when you get a governmental point of view, particularly with this government, what you get is that you get, “the poor Israelis, they’re always fighting for their lives, they have a right to defend themselves”.  

The may be a reason for public opinion polls in Canada suggesting that Canadians felt their government had a balanced approach to the Middle East.  

The Canadian Government’s Hidden Agenda

Ultimately all of the organisations I interviewed suffered in some way from the Canadian government and pro-Israel lobbyists who were undermining the interviewees’ Palestinian development aid projects in the OPT, though organisations running rights and advocacy projects may have been targeted the most. This all indicates that the Canadian government may have had an ulterior agenda that did not match its official policy toward Israel and Palestine.

Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over territories occupied in 1967 (the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip). The Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the occupied territories and establishes Israel's obligations as an occupying power, in particular with respect to the humane treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. As referred to in UN Security Council Resolutions 446 and 465, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The settlements also constitute a serious obstacle to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.

That agenda would be to ardently support Israel, Israel’s policies and by extension Israeli settler colonialism.

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1031 Morgan 03min47s to 04min00s
1032 Wiseman, ‘Canadian Policy, Canadian Attitudes, and the Middle East’.
1033 Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada, ‘Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’.
Organisation 1 was ultimately shut down as a consequence of staff attempts to run the three small human rights projects after Gaza’s 2009 bombardment, which at one point resulted in accusations of support for terrorism being lobbed at their CEO by Board Members who also instigated an audit of their own organisation in an attempt to discredit the work of its staff. Organisation 2 was forced as a small organisation to go through a hostile audit by the CRA at the time of the death of their CEO, which included an accusation by the auditor that Casey was sympathetic to terrorism. Organisation 3 saw millions of dollars in funding taken away in dramatic fashion by the Conservative government despite a glowing recommendation for funding by CIDA. In this case a prominent government Minister lobbed accusations of anti-Semitism at it and an audit by the CRA soon followed. Organisation 4 saw a government funded project in Gaza cut suddenly in 2006 after a Hamas election victory, a government Minister call their work in the OPT problematic and an audit by the CRA soon followed that could threaten their charitable status.

Some interviewees speculated that the reasoning behind Canada’s Palestinian aid was simply for public relations purposes, creating the impression that Canada was providing assistance to Palestinians. Some project coordinators speculated that the reason for Canadian government support for Palestinian aid projects was even more cynical, which was to provide support for Israel and its settler-colonial policies there.

Whatever the reason, Kim could conclude from his/her experience working with CIDA that Canada’s international development agenda is not meant to address actual development, but rather reflects internal Canadian politics and the impression Canada wants to project of itself abroad,

International development, as I came to learn, [and] most people would have learned this a lot faster than I did, isn’t about the actual development, it’s about Canada, and what the perception is in Canada, so the Canadian government could say, “Look we’ve got this really great project where we’re getting Israelis and Palestinians to work together
rather than fight each other”, that that would make Canada look good. So I think that was what was driving it.\textsuperscript{1034}

Meanwhile, the fringe projects like maternal milk share two traits: they were not political, insofar as they do not challenge the occupation; and they gave the impression that Canada is providing aid to the Palestinians. Morgan agreed that the projects Canada does fund are for public relations.\textsuperscript{1035}

Morgan was unique among the interviewees in that he/she contacted me specifically suggesting a follow-up interview to discuss how Canadian aid to the Palestinians actually reinforces the Israeli occupation, and to discuss what the hidden financial costs of that aid are for Canada.\textsuperscript{1036} Morgan also said that Canada invests a lot of money in national parks in Israel, a developed country Canada/CIDA should not have donated to, and that those parks are also located Area C. They may be built in Israel but infringe on Area C.\textsuperscript{1037} Morgan also said that Canada permits the transfer of funds to build settlements. He/she said that those settlements are built with money from private donors in the US, EU or Canada.\textsuperscript{1038} Further yet, Canada will allow a company to sell expertise and goods to the Israelis to build settlements.\textsuperscript{1039} This in spite of Canada technically supporting the Oslo Process, the two state solution with a Palestinian state established in the OPT on pre-1967 boundaries and Canada never changing its public opposition to settlement growth even under Harper.\textsuperscript{1040} With that in mind, Morgan concluded,

In terms of projects there’s absolutely nothing that Canada does in terms of really helping [Palestinians] to develop, to being able really to develop Palestine, or to be able to give Palestine a voice in terms of doing some advocacy.\textsuperscript{1041}

\textsuperscript{1034} Kim (2014 August 7) 30min22s to 30min58s
\textsuperscript{1035} Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 20min03s to 20min10s
\textsuperscript{1036} Morgan email Mon 2014-12-15 18:54
\textsuperscript{1037} Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 08min55s to 09min56s
\textsuperscript{1039} Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 09min56s to 11min05s
\textsuperscript{1040} Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada, ‘Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’.
\textsuperscript{1041} Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 11min05s to 11min22s
At best, Morgan said that what the Canadians essentially are doing is reinforcing the occupation, or turning a blind eye to what is happening, while claiming, ‘Oh yea well we’re helping, we’re doing this, we’re doing that’, like funding maternal milk and forensic labs.\(^{1042}\) Meanwhile, Morgan says that the occupation is felt by Canadian taxpayers from destroyed development aid projects – as happens to European ones.\(^{1043}\) He/she said that if you get funding for a project, for instance if you are building something in Area C, the Israelis often come in and destroy it. When a project like that is destroyed either it is a loss, money that has been spent and is gone, or one that needs to be built again doubling the cost to the taxpayers.\(^{1044}\) Of course, as described throughout this paper since the OPT is dependent on Israel for goods as a captive economy, purchasing material to build in the OPT typically benefits the Israeli economy, too. Thus destroying and rebuilding in the OPT can be good for Israel.

Further, Morgan said that if your organisation’s project is destroyed you cannot say anything about this because, because the Canadian government will simply justify the Israeli military action.\(^{1045}\) He/she said that a Canadian agency or NGO in the field will never speak up about a project being destroyed by the Israelis, and Morgan said that went for himself/herself too.\(^{1046}\) He/she said that what the Canadian government keeps Canadian organisations silent about the abuse of Palestinian rights and that for this reason nobody in Canada really knows about Area C. When you tell Canadians that the West Bank was divided into Areas A, B and C, Morgan said they will still work under the assumption that if Israel is doing something a certain way, ‘it is okay’ because they need to in order to protect themselves from the Palestinian terrorists.\(^{1047}\) Morgan had observed a Canadian government predisposition to viewing all Palestinians as terrorists.

Ryan considers contemporary Israel-Palestine to be a ‘perversion on history’ with Israel using military force to sustain a colonial situation on the Palestinians.

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\(^{1042}\) Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 21min32s to 21min55s
\(^{1044}\) Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 00min00s to 01min51s
\(^{1045}\) Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 11min22s to 12min23s
\(^{1046}\) Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 12min23s to 13min10s There is strong evidence of the strength and pervasiveness of political pressure on agency officials. Hart and Forte, ‘Mandated to Fail?’, 639.
\(^{1047}\) Morgan-2 (2014 December 18) 39min01s to 39min51s
Meanwhile, he/she said with great pessimism that while progressives thought they had beaten colonialism in the 1970s, a new form of domination in the form of neo-colonialism allows many of the old powers, and new, to retain control over a country without needing an army there. Worse, you had apartheid in the Israel and the OPT.  

Remy noted the irony that in spite of its ardently pro-Israeli actions and positions, in the late summer of 2014 the Canadian government’s official position on its website toward the occupation of the OPT remained: support for a two-state solution, an end to occupation and that Israeli settlements in the OPT contravened international law. Remy said that Organisation 3 itself holds a similar position, yet unlike government meant what it was saying. All the while organisations such as Organisation 1 and 3 were categorised as extreme for acting in the spirit of official Canadian policy.  

Many of the project coordinators found their experience running Palestinian aid projects traumatising. Kim reflected on how hard it is to implement such projects, especially because of the negative interference by partisan Canadian authorities. He/she said to me, ‘We should probably have a therapy session at some point’. At best there can be said to have been a major gap existing between official Canadian government policy and its actions, but at worst it most likely Canada using official policy to obscure its actions and real interests. Dallas said this was a reflection of a situation where there is a lot of political pressure put on governments around the world to put up obstacles toward people working on Palestine or in the OPT. Given this situation and the role of government one might understand why Ryan said he/she thinks one of the most serious flaws with NGOs is that government funds them.
The project coordinators were able to reflect on a number of weaknesses and gaps in the way in which Canada provided Palestinian development aid. However, the overarching problem they had was trying to operate in a staunchly pro-Israel environment like Canada, to find some way to fund meaningful Palestinian aid projects from there, to operate in spite of unrealistic regulations from CIDA and the CRA, and ultimately for most of them to cope with the impact of Canadian government disapproval of their work that could lead to a funding lapse or government interference into both their aid project and the organisations themselves. In the extreme cases this led to premature defunding, CRA audits and forced closures. This took often in contradiction to Canada’s official policy toward Israel and Palestine, supporting the neoliberal Oslo Peace Process. In fact, the Canadian government appeared in the later years of this research project to be funding Palestinian projects that either helped the Israeli occupation or made certain not to threaten it in any way. Thus, the experience of these project coordinators from Canada suggests that in the case of understanding why Palestinian development aid projects have failed, and Oslo, it is vital to understand the unspoken aims and power of government donors. The allegiance of Canada to its ally Israel seems to have determined how it would undermine Palestinian development and the Peace Process.
CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION

While the Canadian government did not officially alter its foreign policy and deviate from the agenda laid out in the neoliberal Oslo Accord, not so dissimilar from the Israeli government’s insincere lip-service paid toward the Peace Process, the Canadian government’s actions deviated from its public rhetoric into a staunchly pro-Israel agenda that equated into support for settler colonialism. That settler colonialism is the anti-thesis of Palestinian development, the pre-requisite to the peace proposed by the Oslo Peace Process publicly promoted by Western states and policy makers. For the Canadian government, particularly ardent during the time of the Harper Conservative government, this meant destroying any development project and attacking any organisation that got in the way of Israeli policy, in particular if they advocated Palestinian rights. This was the experience of the sixteen project coordinators from ten organisations I researched.

This was, as Ryan observed, Canada taking an approach that behind the neoliberal public agenda was a foreign policy where its closest allies could do no wrong and were permitted to carry out even the most severe human rights abuses without Canada objecting, with the Canadian government going so far as to suppress information about those abuses taking place.\(^\text{1053}\) As that approach became increasingly overt with a Harper government that was micro-targeting voters from select communities and constituencies in Canada, notably Jewish Canadians, and taking a hard-line in favour of Israel; the technicalities of official policy that once obscured the real aims and interests of the government were put further aside laying bare real evidence that Canada’s development aid has a hidden agenda, and might indeed be little more than domination that should be resisted, such as its support for PA police training.\(^\text{1054}\) This also provided evidence for Morgenthau’s 1962 observation of aid projects that they are little more than bribes, like the ‘Peace Dividend’, and inefficient forms of political influence buying that require a pervasive system of ‘make believe’ feigning the goal of economic development around them.\(^\text{1055}\)

\(^{1053}\) Ryan (2014 December 2) 27min47s to 31min14s
In my initial, and subsequent, semi-structured interviews the project coordinators did on occasion discuss the obstacles they faced on the ground running projects in an incredibly complex OPT environment of occupation/settler colonialism. For instance, Taylor and Morgan spoke about the debilitating restrictions on entry at the border that restrict or ruin projects, including where people with an Arabic name might be restricted entry at the border by Israel, and the broader problems with border controls that undermine development aid projects in the OPT, such as Organisation 4’s Gazan centres not being able to export products. Remy spoke about the frustration of a medical clinic Organisation 3 funded in Gaza being destroyed in an Israeli rockets strike, Hayden about the psychological pressure put on Gazans as the Strip became as it became ever more closed and Taylor about the way in which the violence of the Second Intifada could terminally undermine the dialogue project they had been running in Jerusalem. Emory spoke in depth about the way aid’s structures could determine and even drown PNGOs under mountains of paperwork, reorienting their organisational aims towards the donor’s aims in the process.

Yet in spite of the difficulties of carrying out development aid projects in the OPT, where development has been failing repetitively since 1993, it was their experience in Canada that the project coordinators concentrated on in each of their semi-structured interviews. This was the story that remained consistent as I expanded my pool of interviewees and organisations outward in order to see how consistent this was. theirs was pretty much a universal experience of frustration stemming from their own government undermining their projects, their organisations and even their careers, simply for running development aid projects that fit within the parameters of official Canadian policy. Government interference could be indirect, such as regulations that were just not congruent with the context of the OPT, but more often than not that interference consisted of direct government sabotage. The latter case became particularly overt during the Harper Conservative government years from 2006 onwards, and part of a general trend of suppression of left-leaning charities in Canada in that period.

The organisations that suffered most tended to be the ones that carried out human rights advocacy work for Palestinians, which might be construed as political, while an organisation that was predominantly Muslim and more
technocratic suffered equally to all. When obstacles erected by government moved from indirect interference toward direct sabotage, there appeared in my research a pattern of oppression that came in several stages. The first was, where possible, government placing pro-Israel advocates in key positions of power in an organisation, where they can sabotage its OPT aid work and bring activities to a halt. The second stage was a process of either defunding a specific OPT project, or an entire organisation. This stage could also consist of the fear that funding might be revoked, such as a threat made against Organisation 9 or self-censorship endured by Organisation 6. The third stage was to launch an audit of an organisation that could lead to an organisation losing its charitable status. The final stage tended to be quite severe. It could include accusations of anti-Semitism or terrorism, and tended to happen around the time an organisation was forced closed.

This affected 15 out of 16 interviewees representing 9 of the 10 organizations. Those techniques consisted of:

1. Placing ardent pro-Israel advocates in key positions of power at an organisation, such as the Board of Directors, where they could sabotage its work and bring its activities to a halt. Those advocates tended to represent the extreme right of the political spectrum, and often could be described as holding racist views towards Arabs, Muslims and/or Palestinians.

2. Defunding a specific aid project or an entire organization. This could include threatening organizations with the loss of funding or offering funding if they abandoned their Palestinian work. Often just the fear of seeing others defunded was enough to scare organizations into debilitating self-censorship. Defunding could also include letting funding lapse on a project that might be renewed.

3. Launching an audit of an organization via the CRA. This could lead to their loss of charitable status and ability to fundraise.

4. Shutting down an entire organization. Typically, this would be linked to specious accusations of anti-Semitism or sympathy for terrorism.
Thus it was that Organisation 1 had its Board of Directors riddled by pro-Israel advocates placed by the Harper government, the first group of which persecuted their own staff for trying to run three small human rights monitoring projects in 2009, contributing to the suppression of knowledge about Israeli human rights abuses in the process. This paralysed the organisation. The Board also instigated an audit while giving its CEO a highly biased and negative review that included accusations of his/her being sympathetic to terrorism, in an opaque process that circumvented the rules of good governance. Ultimately the government closed down Organisation 1 just a few years after the tumult started.

Organisation 2 was one of the first organisations to be audited, taking place in 2006 around the time of the death of their CEO. In a murky process, Casey said he/she was confronted with an auditor who suggested Casey was sympathetic toward terrorism. Organisation 3 was defunded by the government, in spite of a positive recommendation by CIDA, and publicly accused by a Minister of anti-Semitism. As of completing this research it was being audited by the CRA. Organisation 4 was also defunded by the government and told that its stance on the OPT is problematic. As of completing this research it was also in the midst of a CRA audit.

The government never directly sabotaged organisation 5, though Kim’s CIDA funded justice project went through constant stop-and-starts caused by government for political reasons, and those ultimately prevented it from succeeding in its developmental aims. The same political interference also prevented them from working in Gaza after the 2006 PA election. Kim said the CIDA personnel he/she dealt with were not qualified to understand the work they were carrying out, yet were the monitors judging its success and labelling it a failure, in spite of external evaluations to the contrary. Worse, Kim found a number of the CIDA personnel were sexist and racist, and that the CIDA paperwork was overwhelming. Ultimately the project did not receive renewed funding in 2012, even though it was never really given a chance to get going.

Kai likewise felt that CIDA’s monitors of Organisation 7’s project were not qualified for that role. While Organisation 7 had more success than most relying on CIDA to expand its programme in the region, this came primarily by its going
around CIDA to the politicians in charge. This included in the worst times of Harper governance going to Canada’s equivalent to AIPAC and PA President Mahmoud Abbas for recommendations for a fourth funding renewal that ultimately failed. Even then project coordinator Quinn suggested he/she would not have been comfortable receiving funding from the Conservative government given their oppression of other organisations. It might have made Organisation 7 look bad within Canada civil society, too.

Organisation 8 experienced the least suppression, though it preferred the Liberal government and saw funding for projects become worse in structure and availability from the 1990s onwards. A review of its budgets also reveals declining funds as time progresses toward Conservative governance. Organisation 9 continued to function with government funding, but in order to retain this Morgan had to drop a PNGO partner involved in rights advocacy work, following a threat from Canadian officials. Similarly, Organisation 6 had been forced to take the unprecedented action of withdrawing funding, without good reason, in the implementation stage of a project with a Palestinian partner, because of political interference by pro-Israel advocates. The reason was that the partner was a supporter of Palestinian political rights within Israel. This severely tarnished the reputation of the organisation, led to a lawsuit and settlement, led to a negative restructuring in the way their projects are managed, and resulted in a destructive high turnover in personnel. Meanwhile Organisation 10, a predominantly Muslim charity, suffered as severe a fate as Organisation 1. It constantly faced challenges meeting Canadian regulations, finding they faced a double standard in accountability that was more stringent for them as opposed to a non-Muslim organisation like Oxfam. Likewise, they found government standards of due diligence were bizarrely higher for their OPT aid projects than ones they carried out in Afghanistan. They eventually were served with an audit and by 2011 lost their charitable status, being linked to terrorism along the way.

The experiences of these coordinators were consistent with some of the public cases laid out in Chapter 5. The protestant Church coalition KAIROS, a charitable wing of a group of Churches representing millions of Canadians, was defunded in a high profile scandal and accused of anti-Semitism. The Canadian government funded, arm’s-length human rights organisation Rights and
Democracy, was rocked by a scandal that included its being closed down and its CEO dying in his sleep between meetings where he had been harassed by pro-Israel Board members appointed by government. A Muslim charity IRFAN was audited, lost its charitable status, and listed as a terrorist organisation the moment its delisting as a charity was set to go to trial. This was the experience of these Canadian organisations carrying out OPT aid projects. It is already very difficult to carry out good development aid projects in a settler colonial environment like the OPT where the environment is designed to make Palestinian development fail, let alone with a sinister pattern of oppression destabilising your work as an organisation from Canada to.

A Return to Theory

Throughout the Second Intifada (2001 to 2006) and Institution-Building period (2007 to 2012) Canada remained, theoretically in its official policy, committed to the neoliberal Oslo Peace Process. When looking at Israel and Palestine from within the neoliberal lens that Process was meant to establish an asymmetrical peace between Palestinians and Israelis, with Israel remaining the dominant party. In that state of peace, the relationship between each people would come to be redefined upon the economics of free trade, open markets and cooperation. This reflected the confidence of Western intellectuals in the post-Cold War predominance of the neoliberal model, laid out in IR by Nye and Keohane, and the allure of cooperation over conflict in the modern age. When policy makers approached peace building between Israel and the Palestinians, it was with faith in Rosecrance’s 1986 argument that a major crossroads had appeared in international affairs where it was no longer cheaper to just seize another state’s territory than to trade and engage in commerce with it.\footnote{1056}{Rosecrance, \textit{The Rise of the Trading State}.}

Typical of neoliberal development aid, US-led Western donors who championed the Oslo Process assumed that the non-Western Palestinians were the less civilised party in the conflict and that they would need to be dramatically developed to become democratic and more liberal, like Israel and its Western allies, in order for the Palestinians to become less inclined to conflict and more
accepting of peaceful cooperation. The Palestinians needed to become more rational in order to realise that it was better to trade in order to gain wealth, than to engage in conflict. Thus, development aid was meant to act as a sort of ‘Peace Dividend’ creating happy Palestinians with a higher quality of life, so that they would buy into the Peace Process and neoliberal development model Western donors laid out with the intellectual guidance of the World Bank. That investment in peace included a plan for donors to dramatically remake Palestinian society and create a Palestinian state with institutions built in the image of the West. That institution building would be essential to remake Palestinian society and this would be accomplished through the exercise of soft power via development aid. In that way Western experts and Western NGOs getting the Palestinians to think and act like the West.

That exercise in soft power was natural for a neoliberal country like Canada predisposed to using alliances and multilateral institutions to gain influence in world affairs. Regardless of the government in power, Palestinians became wrapped up in a Canadian policy of projecting Canadian values abroad through Canadian soft power. At its most basic level that meant, where it could exercise that soft power through aid via multilateral institutions or its own NGOs, Canada would attempt to remake the OPT in an image of itself. Among the many values the Canadian government claimed to be championing abroad were progressive liberal values such as democracy, free trade, good governance, law and order, and democracy.

What neoliberal Canadian policy makers and intellectuals failed to take into account is that telling other peoples how to live their lives, backed up by real hard power when they fall out of line, is by nature deeply illiberal. Further, unbeknownst to Western neoliberal policy makers, with their deeply biased and decontextualized understanding of Israel and the OPT, Israel was not interested in granting sovereignty to the Palestinians or abandoning its settler colonial project. The Israeli leadership seems to have thought it could pay lip service to a ‘two-state’ solution, particularly when addressing international audiences, while simultaneously operating decisively to prevent its emergence.1057

1057 Veracini, ‘The Other Shift’, 32.
Further, in a process of self-denial endemic to European liberal powers over the past few hundred years, Western donors were unable to take account the impact of their own biases. The problem with their support for the Peace Process was their strong support for Israel as an ally, particularly highly partisan states like the US – the arbiter of the Peace Process – and Canada, who identified with Israel in very deep socio-political ways. As a result of those partisan sympathies they shield, protect and fund Israel, allowing the latter to warp development aid to abet rather than constrain its settler colonial policy, all with the support of Western states like Canada. Thus a lack of reflexivity and partisan behaviour by Western donors has only abetted the Israeli settler colonial project in the OPT further. For now that Israeli settler-colonial state seems unlikely to lose the support of its non-Jewish, but socially similar liberal métropoles in the West, who appear willing to continue to underwrite its state-building project in the OPT. Western states even appear ready to do this if that damages their own position in global affairs, or at least with Muslim countries. The implication is that the international community is complicit with and helping to fund the dispossession of Palestinians, or in its least violent moments apartheid.

As Nossal points out the so-called neoliberal paradigm was never ‘very much liberal’, since it involves Western governments and IFIs telling others how they must live their lives and organise their communities. So when Canada projects its values abroad, by telling others how they should live, think, organise their communities, and practice their politics, it is taking a deeply paternalist and even imperialist approach that Canadians tend to despise when they see it carried out by others. Here he converges with analysis provided by critics of Canadian imperialism like Gordon, Webber, Klassen, McNally and Albo. Thus Canada, through its neoliberal agenda, is echoing previous Western processes of power projection like the European propagation of Christianity by persuasion or coercion, or of the European empires civilising ‘savages’ by maligning indigenous ways and replacing their culture with European values. This maintains the senior-junior development aid relationship that disempowers the indigenous Palestinian, guaranteeing that Palestinian development aid first

1058 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy.
meets the demands and political aims of Canada. It also reflects a Canada with a long history of aggressive behaviour taking advantage of poorer states and weaker indigenous communities internationally, or abroad, defended under the accoutrements of civilisation and progress.

If liberal states have shown a propensity toward establishing peace among themselves, they have shown a remarkable level of aggression toward illiberal states they consider more savage and uncivilised, the ‘other’. That is, their inclination toward peace appears mostly to be only among themselves, and toward states they see as similar to themselves culturally and politically. Kant, one of the intellectual apostles of liberal peace theories, anticipated this centuries earlier when arguing that while liberal states would establish a separate peace among themselves, they might then discover illiberal reasons for aggression toward others.\textsuperscript{1061} So when Western donors assumed that Israel, as a Western and liberal state would naturally be inclined toward peace, they conveniently ignoring a history of Israeli (and Western) aggression starting wars with its neighbours. It also offered excuses for Israel to be the aggressor when it wanted. It seems in Canada that Palestinians were judged guilty until proven innocent. However, it was not the Palestinians that needed to buy into peace, but Israel that needed to be pressed to live in peace with the Palestinians.

\textbf{Either You’re With Us or Against Us}

Western donors have proven all too willing to support, sustain and underwrite Israel’s settler colonial policies indirectly through the Oslo Process and Oslo aid, and Canada is more zealous in providing this support than most other Western governments. Their concern for Israel and support for its policies wrapped within the Palestinian development aid package hints at the hidden intentions behind Canada’s aid. This was exposed on my interviewees with Canadian project coordinators who found that the Canadian government, in spite of its rhetoric, held Israel to different standards than other peoples. While Ryan suspected this due to double standards he/she observed in the way in which the Liberal government of Canada had treated Palestinian human rights, this

\textsuperscript{1061} Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, 1152.
reality became bluntly apparent during a Harper Conservative government that pushed forward a strong alliance with Israel in international affairs. So while Emory noticed that the Chrétien Liberals tolerated and allowed Palestinian rights advocates to exist, just with very little funding, the Harper government persecuted them.

During that drift toward Israel Canada’s official policy did not officially deviate from Oslo Process or the two-state solution. Yet behind the cover of official policy Harper’s government applied a checkerboard view of world relations as between ‘good guy and bad guy’ countries, reminiscent of Huntington’s *Clash of Civilisations*. That government’s approach to human rights and international affairs became one not based not on rational ‘liberal’ thought, but more of good versus evil, us against them; and anyone with ‘them’ is against ‘us’. Since Israel was one of Canada’s closest allies this allowed highly partisan Israeli advocacy groups, such as NGO Monitor or even the Israeli-inspired CPCCA, to help shape the Canadian government’s policies would be toward Canadian civil society organisations running Palestinian development aid projects or advocating Palestinian human rights.

**Filling the Gap**

When I completed my interview with Organisation 10 they asked and told me that it was my role, as the researcher, to find out what exactly was happening in Canada. They felt they were being unfairly persecuted,

[Dallas] “It’s up to you to find out. You know it’s not up to me. You are asking the question.” [Blake] “You know it’s your responsibility.” [Dallas] “It’s your responsibility. We publish what we have. And you have to vindicate that.”

The outcome of this research study indicates that Canada, as a Western state mostly employing a neoliberal foreign policy, has alternative hidden goals.

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1062 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*.
1063 Blake/Dallas (2012 March 30) 52min11sec to 52min27sec
embedded in its OPT development aid agenda. Or at least it reconfirms the ability for liberal progressivism to cohabitate with imperial dispossession abroad. Evidence strongly suggests that those goals are to support Israel, even if that means Israeli settler colonialism. What this research suggests from the Canadian case study is that post-Oslo Palestinian development aid projects have inherent contradictions that doom them to failure. Those contradictions consist of a neoliberal development aid model that is contextually inappropriate to the settler colonial process taking place in the OPT, and a neoliberal approach to peace building equally unable to cope with Western partisan support for Israel.

Ultimately Canada’s ardent support for Israel and Israeli policy, which is settler colonial and eliminatory, is as illiberal as any policy can be. Canadian development aid has even been shaped to obscure and sustain that process, particularly during Harper Conservative rule. The failures of the Peace Process and the neoliberal development aid model there seem to lend credence to Morgenthau’s description of foreign aid as little more than an elaborate ruse that obscures the real political aims of a donor. In Canada’s case those political aims are to support Israel. Meanwhile, the Canadian case suggests that progressive liberal elements within neoliberalism might only be applied selectively and not universally by a state, depending on its government’s perceptions of its interests and of socio-political likenesses to other societies.
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