Creation and God as One, Creator, and Trinity in Early Theology through Augustine and Its Theological Fruitfulness in the 21st Century

Submitted by Jane Ellingwood to the University of Exeter
as a dissertation for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Theology
in September 2015

This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the dissertation may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature: ______________ Jane Ellingwood ________________________________
Abstract

My primary argument in this thesis is that creation theologies significantly influenced early developments in the doctrine of the Trinity, especially in Augustine of Hippo’s theology. Thus this is a work of historical theology, but I conclude with proposals for how Augustine’s theologies of creation and the Trinity can be read fruitfully with modern theology.

I critically analyse developments in trinitarian theologies in light of ideas that were held about creation. These include the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and ideas about other creative acts (e.g., forming or fashioning things). Irenaeus and other early theologians posited roles for God (the Father), the Word / Son, the Spirit, or Wisdom in creative acts without working out formal views on economic trinitarian acts. During the fourth century trinitarian controversies, creation ‘out of nothing’ and ideas about ‘modes of origin’ influenced thinking on consubstantiality and relations within the Trinity. Basil of Caesarea and others also presented ideas about trinitarian acts of creation and the Trinity in hexaemeral works.

I will argue that in Augustine’s views of trinitarian acts of creation, he attributes roles to God (the Father), the Word / Son, and the Spirit. In his mature theology, he attributes the giving of formless existence, differentiated existence, and perfected existence to the three Persons respectively, while depicting shared roles. He also attributes to the Spirit the giving of the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’ to creatures, which gives them agency in continuing their existence. Augustine’s theologies of creation and the Trinity were significantly influenced by his exegesis of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wisdom, and other scriptures, and his ideas resonate with the hexaemeral works of Basil and Philo of Alexandria. I argue that scholars should examine these sources and Augustine’s own hexaemeral commentaries to gain a deeper understanding of his trinitarian theology.
# Table of Contents

Abstract........................................................................................................................................... 2

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. 3

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 7

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 9

0.1 Review of literature and statement of the problem ..................................................................... 9

0.2 Hypotheses, objectives, and organisation of this thesis........................................................... 25

0.2.1 Primary hypotheses: using a new lens, revising historical theological narratives, and doing fruitful readings of Augustine’s theology.................................................................................. 25

0.2.2 Overview of Parts I and II: historical theological ideas about acts of creation, modes of origin, and God as sole creator and Trinity .......................................................................................... 26

0.2.3 Overview of Part III: responsible scholarship on and fruitful theological readings of Augustine ................................................................................................................................. 29

0.3 Additional information on scholarly literature, sources, and methods .................................... 30

0.4 Other contributions to theology and future projects ................................................................. 32

Part I .................................................................................................................................................... 33

Chapter 1: Creation, the One Creator God, and Pre-trinitarian Theology (First through Third Centuries) ................................................................................................................................. 34

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 34

1.1 Philo, Wisdom, and Jewish Hellenised Alexandrian ideas .......................................................... 38

1.1.1 Philo, the LXX scriptures, Wisdom, and Middle Platonism .................................................... 38

1.1.2 The one God as ‘Father and Maker’, good, and Creator ...................................................... 41

1.1.3 Creation terminology and creation ‘out of nothing’ .............................................................. 45

1.1.4 The Logos, the ‘ideas’, the mind of God, and first principles of creation ............................... 49

1.1.5 Problems Philo leaves ‘on the table’ ..................................................................................... 51

1.2 The Word / Son, monogenés (theos), and creation in John 1. 1-18 ........................................... 54

1.2.1 Authorship and sources of ideas for the prologue to John .................................................. 55

1.2.2 Creation, the Word (Logos), and the Father ........................................................................ 57

1.2.3 Questions about ‘monogenés’ in John 1. 14, 18 ................................................................. 61

1.2.4 Problems left ‘on the table’ for trinitarian thinking on God and creation ............................. 65

1.3 Acts of creation, the one Creator God, and pre-trinitarian ideas in second and third century theology ............................................................................................................................ 66

1.3.1 Sources of philosophical, scriptural, and theological ideas ................................................ 68

1.3.2 First principles of faith: the one God as Father, Maker, and Fashioner ............................... 73

1.3.3 Pre-trinitarian views of creation ‘out of nothing’ ............................................................... 77

1.3.4 Creation and God, the Word / Son / Wisdom, and Wisdom / the Spirit ............................... 83

1.3.5 Problems left ‘on the table’ for thinking about creation and the Trinity ............................. 88

1.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 89
Chapter 2: Creation, Modes of Origin, Trinitarian Acts, and the Trinity in the Fourth Century before Augustine

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 92

2.1 Sources of fourth century ideas about creation and the Trinity ................................................................. 96
   2.1.1 Orthodox / catholic, ‘heretical’, and philosophical sources ................................................................. 96
   2.1.2 Potential influences of Philo of Alexandria and Prov. 8. 22 ................................................................. 103

2.2 Creation, modes of origin, consubstantiality, and unity and distinctions within the Trinity

   2.2.1 Athanasius on the Son and Spirit being ‘from’ the Father, creation ‘out of nothing’, and divine simplicity .................................................................................................................................................. 107
   2.2.1.1 Athanasius on the Son’s nature, kind, and mode of origin versus creation’s ........ 109
   2.2.1.2 Athanasius, the 325 creed, creation ‘out of nothing’, and John 1. 1, 3 .............................................. 114
   2.2.1.3 Athanasius, the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, and divine simplicity .......................................................... 115
   2.2.1.4 Closing comments on Athanasius ........................................................................................................ 118
   2.2.2 Case study: the word monogenés and the Son’s mode of origin and substance versus other unique attributes of the Son ........................................................................................................ 119
   2.2.3 Cappadocian-Eunomian debates: modes of origin, substance, and unity and distinctions within the Trinity ........................................................................................................................................... 128
   2.2.3.1 Eunomius on names, simplicity, modes of origin, and generation by ‘will’ .............. 128
   2.2.3.2 Basil on ‘distinguishing marks’ in substance and early views on the Spirit .................. 131
   2.2.3.3 Gregory of Nazianzus on modes of origin, the Father-Son relationship, and the consubstantiality of the Trinity .......................................................................................................................... 135
   2.2.4 Trinitarian principles of unity and distinction in the early 380s .................................................. 139

2.3 Basil’s hexaemeral homilies: acts of initial creation and the Trinity .......................................................... 142
   2.3.1 The roles of the Son, Word, or Monogenés with God in creation .................................................. 144
   2.3.2 The roles of the Holy Spirit in initial creation ...................................................................................... 147
   2.3.3 Basil’s inconsistency on unity of operations for creative acts ...................................................... 150
   2.3.4 Seeing God and the Son from creation: Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 .............................................. 151
   2.3.5 Concluding comments on Basil’s hexaemeral homilies ................................................................. 154

2.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................. 155

Part II .......................................................................................................................................................... 160

Chapter 3: Augustine on Initial Creation, Triadic Aspects of Creation, and Trinitarian Acts of Creation (388-400)

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 161

3.1 Augustine’s early sources and influences on his theology ........................................................................... 168
   3.1.1 Manichaean influences on Augustine’s theology and exegesis ...................................................... 169
   3.1.2 Augustine’s preferred scriptures .......................................................................................................... 173
   3.1.3 Broader views of Augustine’s sources .................................................................................................. 175

3.2 Initial creation, triadic aspects of creation, and trinitarian acts (388-391) ........................................... 176
   3.2.1 Augustine’s exegesis of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wisdom (Gn. adv. Man.) ........................................ 176
   3.2.1.1 Augustine, Philo, Basil, and Wis. 11 and Wis. 13 ............................................................................. 185
   3.2.2 Triadic aspects of creation, ‘ordered abiding’, and trinitarian acts ............................................. 191
3.3 The creeds, Gen. 1, John 1. 1-18, creation, and the Trinity (391-395) .......... 198
  3.3.1 Augustine’s s. 214 on the Latin creed, creation, and trinitarian acts .................. 198
  3.3.2 Augustine’s f. et symb., the Latin creed, and Nicene terminology .................. 205
  3.3.3 Augustine’s struggles with Gen. 1 in Gn. litt. imp. ........................................ 208
  3.3.4 Case study: Augustine’s uses and sources of ‘unigenitus’ and ‘unicus’ ............... 213
3.4 ‘Deus, creator omnium’: creation, beauty, Augustine himself, and the Trinity in Augustine’s conf. ......................................................... 220
3.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 230
  3.5.1 Theology ............................................................................................................ 230
  3.5.2 Scripture ............................................................................................................ 233
  3.5.3 Ontology ............................................................................................................ 235
  3.5.4 Taking broader views of Augustinian sources.................................................. 236

Chapter 4: Augustine in the Fifth Century: From Triadic Aspects and Attributes of Creation to Trinitarian Acts and the Trinity .................. 237

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 237
4.1 Augustine’s fifth century contexts, sources, and methods ...................................... 247
  4.1.1 Polemical contexts and Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5 ........................................ 247
  4.1.2 Augustine’s preferred scriptures and exegetical methods .................................. 250
4.2 ‘Fiat lux’: the initial creation and trinitarian acts of creation ................................ 254
  4.2.1 God’s speech, the Word of God, and the word that ‘abides within’ .................... 255
  4.2.2 Triadic aspects of existence, ‘dynamic abiding’, and goodness ......................... 259
  4.2.3 Initial creation and the Word / Son / Wisdom / Christ ...................................... 270
  4.2.4 Augustine’s questionable interpretations of Gen. 1 ......................................... 273
    4.2.4.1 The creation of angels and their role in creation ........................................ 273
    4.2.4.2 Measure, number, weight / order, and the Trinity ........................................ 277
  4.2.5 Closing analysis on the initial creation and trinitarian acts ................................ 278
4.3 Ongoing existence: ‘dynamic abiding’, creaturely desire and agency, and ‘gifts’ of the economic Trinity ......................................................... 282
4.4 Triadic aspects of the human mind and the ‘simplicity’ of the Trinity .............. 292
  4.4.1 Simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations within the Trinity ............ 293
  4.4.2 Goodness and beauty: attributes of creation and the Trinity .......................... 300
  4.4.3 Analogies and distinctions: the human mind and the immanent Trinity ............ 302
4.5 Conclusions and bridge to Part III ....................................................................... 305

Part III ....................................................................................................................... 312

Chapter 5: Responsible Scholarship on and Fruitful Readings of Augustine’s Theologies of Creation and the Trinity ........................................... 313

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 313
5.1 Where we stand: summative analysis of Parts I and II ........................................ 314
5.2 Responsible scholarship and collaboration on behalf of better historical retrievals of patristic theology ......................................................... 326
5.3 Fruitful theological readings of Augustine with modern ideas .............................. 336
5.3.1 ‘Dynamic abiding’: creaturely existence, agency, and independence ............................ 337
5.3.2 The perfecting role of the Holy Spirit and the roles of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in creation: creating a vision of economic trinitarian acts.................................................. 341
5.3.3 The goodness and beauty of creation and the Trinity .................................................. 344
5.3.4 Concluding comments on fruitful readings .................................................................. 346

Closing words .......................................................................................................................... 347

Appendix A: Key Scriptures for Augustine’s Theological Ideas on Creation and the Trinity .......................................................... 349

Appendix B: Augustine’s Triadic Aspects of Initial Existence or of Creation and Trinitarian Acts of Creation .................................................. 354

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 357
  Augustine of Hippo ............................................................................................................... 357
  Other ancient authors ......................................................................................................... 360
  Secondary sources ............................................................................................................. 365
## Abbreviations

The abbreviations listed here are used in footnote references and the Bibliography. Latin abbreviations for Augustine’s works are in the Bibliography.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AatB</strong></td>
<td>Pamela Bright, ed. and trans., <em>Augustine and the Bible</em>, The Bible through the Ages, 2 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AttA</strong></td>
<td><em>Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia</em>, ed. by Allan D. Fitzgerald (MI: Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BA</strong></td>
<td><em>Bibliothèque Augustinienne</em> (Turnhout: Brepols) <em>Bibliothèque Augustinienne</em> (Desclée De Brouwer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BJS</strong></td>
<td>Brown Judaic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CUAP</strong></td>
<td>Catholic University of America Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CUP</strong></td>
<td>Cambridge University Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCSG</strong></td>
<td><em>Corpus Christianorum</em>, Series Graeca (Turnhout: Brepols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCSL</strong></td>
<td><em>Corpus Christianorum</em>, Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CUP</strong></td>
<td>Cambridge University Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECF</strong></td>
<td>The Early Church Fathers (London and New York: Routledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>English Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUP</td>
<td>Harvard University Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCL</td>
<td>Loeb Classical Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXX</td>
<td>Septuagint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>New City Press (Hyde Park, New York)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPNF</td>
<td>A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRSV</td>
<td>New Revised Standard Version of the Bible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Oxford Early Christian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>Oxford University Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBL</td>
<td>Society of Biblical Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPhA</td>
<td><em>The Studia Philonica Annual</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

In this introduction, I will begin by reviewing the literature and describing the problems in recent patristic and doctrinal scholarship that led to my undertaking this study of relationships between creation theologies and developments in trinitarian thinking. I then will discuss my hypotheses and objectives, the historical theological work I will undertake, and the proposals I will offer for responsible scholarship on and fruitful readings of Augustine. I also will give an overview of my sources and methods, and I will conclude with a statement of my contributions and my recommendations for future projects.

0.1 Review of literature and statement of the problem

Revivals of theological interest in the Trinity began in the twentieth century, with Protestant Karl Barth and Roman Catholic Karl Rahner considered to be the forerunners, and with the interest becoming increasingly ecumenical and global.¹ In the final decades of the century, several trinitarian projects were undertaken which emphasised the three divine ‘Persons’,² with varying perspectives offered on what ‘person’ means³ and also on the relationship between the ‘economic Trinity’ and ‘immanent Trinity’.⁴ Just a sampling of well known projects will illustrate some

² Throughout this thesis, I will use the term ‘Person’ for convenience, even when it is anachronistic or not used by the historical or modern authors under discussion.
³ Ángel Cordovilla Pérez divides projects that emphasise the concept of ‘person’ into four categories, each starting with ‘person is’: relation, communion, reciprocity, and gift. Ángel Cordovilla Pérez, ‘The Trinitarian Concept of Person’, in Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology, ed. by Robert J. Wozniak and Giulio Maspero (London: T&T Clark, 2012), pp. 105-145 (pp. 129, 128-145).
⁴ I will discuss this below, but see the recent assessments of views on the relationship between the economic and immanent Trinity offered by Chalamet and Vial, Renczes, and Phan. Christophe Chalamet and Marc Vial, ‘Introduction’, in Recent Developments in Trinitarian Theology: An International Symposium, ed. by Christophe Chalamet and Marc Vial (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), pp. 1-8 (pp. 4-6); Philipp Gabriel Renczes,
of the major themes or applications of trinitarian theologies, and the diversity of the denominational backgrounds represented by trinitarian theologians.

Protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann’s ‘social doctrine of the Trinity’ is a prominent example that illustrates concepts and potential applications of trinitarian theology. Moltmann’s social doctrine encompasses his reliance on ‘perichoresis’ as the principle of eternal unity among the Persons; his ideas for eliminating monotheistic and monarchistic understandings of the immanent Trinity; and his arguments that applications of these principles should lead to reducing hierarchy, subordination, and lack of freedom in political structures and churches.5

Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas grounds his trinitarian theology on two positions (which he develops based on his reading of the Cappadocian ‘Fathers’): first, on his claim that God’s substance has ‘no ontological content … apart from communion’; and secondly, on his ‘theology of the person’, which entails that God, as Trinity, owes God’s being, or intra-trinitarian communion, to the ‘person’ of the Father.6 In other words, ‘the ultimate ontological category which makes something really be’ is not ‘substance’ but ‘the person’, which, for the Trinity, is the ‘free person’ of the Father.7 Morwenna Ludlow draws out the full implications of these ontological ideas in saying that Zizioulas’s ‘main contention’ is that ‘all being is

---

fundamentally personal’. His ideas also are classified by Ángel Cordovilla Pérez as being in the ‘person is … communion’ category of recent trinitarian theologies.

Zizioulas’s ideas have been influential on others to the extent that Sarah Coakley deems his work to have launched a ‘second wave’, of three to-date, of the renewals of interest in the Trinity; however, the third wave has brought with it criticisms of his historical retrievals of Cappadocian trinitarian theologies. While I will not be engaging directly with Zizioulas’s work, one of my aims in undertaking this thesis was to counter assumptions made about the trinitarian theologies of the Cappadocians and of Augustine, as I will discuss further below.

The late Catherine Mowry LaCugna, who was a Roman Catholic, also offers an ontology of ‘persons in communion’; she combines this with her own arguments that ‘an essential unity’ exists between the ‘economy of salvation’ (‘oikonomia’) and ‘theologia’ (the ‘being of God’). LaCugna is known for not emphasising the immanent Trinity. She held that ‘theologia’ (the ‘mystery of God as such’), can be thought of only in terms of the mystery of grace and redemption. These ideas illustrate dual characteristics of recent trinitarian theology to which my project also responds: priority is given to the economic Trinity, and emphasis is placed on trinitarian acts of salvation, redemption, or eschatology.

The late Colin Gunton, a Reformed theologian, was atypical in looking at the theologies of the Trinity and creation together, and being interested in both the immanent and economic Trinity or in God’s ‘being’ and ‘act’, although he also emphasised redemption and eschatology. Gunton was influenced by some of

[8] Ludlow, Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 55, 84.
[12] LaCugna, God for Us, pp. 2-3, also 211-217.
Zizioulas’s ideas, which he acknowledges were adaptations of ideas attributed to the Cappadocians. These include that God is ‘being in communion’, and the corollaries that God’s substance has no ontological content apart from communion, and ‘there is no “being” of God other than [the] dynamic of persons in relation’.

Gunton also connects his own thinking about communion, relations, and love within the Trinity with his beliefs that the trinitarian God gives creation its own goodness, freedom, and ability to be other than God while being in relationship to God. He thus ‘begins with’ his views on the Trinity and works ‘from’ them in his creation theology. For Gunton, it is because God is ‘a communion of love prior to and in independence of the creation’ that God can freely create a world enabled to be itself, which God loves and gives the ability to be in communion with God.

Pérez describes Gunton’s trinitarian theology as having four ‘fundamental categories’, of ‘person, relation, alterity and liberty’, with ‘person’ being the ‘central one’. However, I contend that what is fundamental to Gunton’s doctrinal or systematic theology is his association of some of these values with the Trinity itself and creation itself, which represents a mix of theological and ontological

---

_Spirit: Essays Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology_ (London: T&T Clark, 2003), pp. xiii-xiv;

14 Gunton, _The Promise_, pp. 9-11.
15 Gunton, _The Promise_, pp. 9-11.
16 See Gunton, _The Promise_, p. xviii, also pp. 9-12; Gunton, ‘Relation and Relativity’, pp. 96-98, 110-111.
18 Gunton, _The Promise_, p. xviii; Gunton, ‘Relation and Relativity’, pp. 96-98, 110-111;
Gunton, _The Triune Creator_, pp. 9-10; Gunton, _Act and Being_, pp. 76-78, 104-108;
19 Pérez puts Gunton’s trinitarian theology in the ‘person is relation’ category. Pérez, ‘The Trinitarian Concept of Person’, pp. 130-131; see also Gunton, _The Promise_, p. 11.
20 Gunton distinguishes between theology and doctrine by saying the latter is ‘what is taught by the church, as the officially agreed teaching of the institution’, and the former is ‘more open-ended activity’ and may include ideas rejected by the church. Colin E. Gunton, ‘Historical and Systematic Theology’, in _The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine_, ed. by Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: CUP, 1997; 12th printing, 2010), pp. 3-20 (p. 4).
ideas. I will criticise his retrievals of patristic theological ideas, but his ideas about the Trinity and creation are of interest to my own pairing of creation and the Trinity, and he will be the primary doctrinal theologian with whom I engage in this thesis.

Some of the recent assumptions about the priority of the economic Trinity, and the perspective that the doctrine of the Trinity should be associated with specific other doctrines (e.g., salvation), may have been influenced by Rahner. Rahner, as is well known, posited that identity exists between the economic and immanent Trinity, an ‘axiom’ that was grounded in his belief that the Trinity ‘is a mystery of salvation’. According to Philipp Gabriel Renczes, Rahner’s axiom has been accepted by some and critiqued by others, and revisions to it have been proposed in order to not limit beliefs about the immanent Trinity to what is revealed through its acts. Christophe Chalamet and Marc Vial suggest that the ‘debate’ is unlikely to be resolved between theologians who accept Rahner’s identification of the economic and immanent Trinity, and those who seek to ‘preserve’ God’s freedom by not limiting what is said about the immanent Trinity to what is inferred from God’s acts. Whether this debate is resolved or not, one result of associating the Trinity with acts of salvation is that creative acts are not given much attention in some recent trinitarian theologies. This is a gap I seek to fill by analysing historical theological ideas about creation and the Trinity together, with a primary focus on trinitarian acts of creation, and then by proposing ways in which these ideas can be read ‘fruitfully’ today in modern theology.

My efforts to look at creation and the Trinity together, both for historical and modern theology, do take support from recent scholars. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering argue that ‘Trinitarian faith’ should not be ‘limited to illuminating the sphere of redemption and salvation’, but also should concern creation. On the

---

24 The concept of doing ‘fruitful’ theological readings of patristic texts read with the ideas of modern theologians is from the essays in Scot Douglass and Morwenna Ludlow, eds., *Reading the Church Fathers* (London: T&T Clark, 2011).
other hand, they say that ‘the doctrine of creation calls for a properly trinitarian consideration’. This represents looking at creation theology in light of trinitarian theology, the opposite of the lens I will employ. Further support for my initiative comes from John Webster’s assessment that these ‘two exemplary loci’ require more emphasis in systematic theologies and retrievals of historical doctrines. These scholars classify acts of creation as economic trinitarian acts (not simply ‘external’ acts) and acts of ‘grace’, as Gunton does. But I will argue that even Gunton, who does so much with the Trinity and creation, does not give enough attention to economic acts of creation in their own right. My theological view, which is based on the analysis I have undertaken of Augustine’s mature theology as well as readings in modern theology and other works, is that trinitarian acts of creation result in gifts of existence and ongoing existence being given to all creatures and all creation. Thus these are economic acts and resulting gifts in their own right, without having to be associated with salvation, eschatology, or other doctrines.

Another assumption that appears in modern trinitarian theology is that placing emphasis on divine unity, especially of substance, or on the immanent Trinity, was part of a Latin, western trinitarian tradition. This tradition often is presumed to have begun with Augustine in the late fourth century and to have been solidified by the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas. For the ‘Augustine end’ of this presumed arc in western tradition, some theologians assume, as patristic scholar Lewis Ayres

29 See, e.g., Gunton, Act and Being, p. 112.
30 I will develop these arguments in Chapters 3 and 4 on Augustine and in Chapter 5.
31 For examples of this assumption appearing in theological works see, e.g., LaCugna, God for Us, pp. 10-11; Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, pp. 16-20.
32 For discussions of this presumed Western tradition, or what I call the ‘arc’ between Augustine and Aquinas, see, e.g., Lewis Ayres, ‘Into the Cloud of Witnesses: Catholic Trinitarian Theology Beyond and Before its Modern “Revivals”’, in Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology, ed. by Robert J. Wozniak and Giulio Maspero (London: T&T Clark, 2012), pp. 3-25 (pp. 3-5); Paul Rorem, ‘ “Procession and Return” in Thomas Aquinas and His Predecessors’, Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 13, no. 2 (1992), 147-163 (p. 161).
points out, that the fourth century Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus (the Cappadocian ‘Fathers’) held more appropriate trinitarian ideas than did Augustine, and that these distinctions are representative of eastern and western traditions. Michel Barnes, a patristic scholar who often collaborates with Ayres, asserts that such assumptions typically are made by theologians who rely, if unknowingly, on a paradigm Barnes attributes to the nineteenth century Théodore de Régnon. Christoph Schwöbel, Coakley, Karen Kilby, and Paul Rorem (who discusses the arc between Augustine and Aquinas) make similar observations or critiques about these assumptions and this paradigm appearing in the fairly recent works of trinitarian theologians.

The trend of claiming that profound differences exist between the trinitarian theologies of Augustine and the Cappadocians has changed to an extent now that

we are midway through the second decade of the twenty-first century. Barnes and Ayres have made considerable contributions to Augustine scholarship and have challenged views held by doctrinal scholars on Augustine. Other patristic scholars as well as doctrinal scholars also have criticised some of the historical retrievals of Cappadocian trinitarian theology or Augustine’s theology. It may be too soon to determine whether these recent assessments of historical retrievals of trinitarian theology will influence future theological works on the Trinity, although in some cases these assessments are undertaken by those who are already applying them to doctrinal work. This can be seen in Stephen Holmes’s work on the Trinity in which he both criticises unreliable historical retrievals, and draws on Ayres’s and Barnes’s research on Augustine in his own chapter on Augustine’s trinitarian theology. Room still exists, however, to offer other critical analysis of both patristic and doctrinal scholarship on Augustine, as I will develop further here.

Rahner, writing in the 1960s, said that ‘today’s theology hardly ever sees any connection between the Trinity and the doctrine of creation’. Gunton and others have worked with these doctrines since then but Rahner’s criticism of western tradition is still of note. He attributes this problem to the western idea, which he claims stems from Augustine, that trinitarian acts are ‘“common” ’ to the Persons, which he further claims resulted in the view that creation cannot tell us anything about ‘the inner life of the Trinity’ or the immanent Trinity.

Robert Jenson, in defending Gunton’s criticisms, which were like Rahner’s, of Augustine’s ideas on the economic Trinity, claims that Augustine ‘did treat the works of God in the economy, in the history of God’s saving work, as “indivisible”, in the sense that any of them could have done by any of the three, thereby destroying the whole basis on which an immanent triunity could be affirmed in the

---


41 See, e.g., S. Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity, pp. xv-xvi, 1-2, 129-139.


first place’. Jenson also claims that the idea that economic acts could have been done by any one of the three has been ‘a curse on Western theology ever since’. However, neither Rahner, Jenson, nor Gunton offers citations from Augustine’s own works to support these claims about his views on economic trinitarian acts.

That some scholars who criticise Augustine’s trinitarian ideas do not give evidence of having read, read carefully, or read enough of his works is an issue identified by Barnes and Ayres. Ayres faults Gunton’s work for his ‘misreading of Augustine’ and lack of ‘in-depth textual study’, not only of his trinitarian ideas, but also of his ‘theology of creation’. These are method and source issues which Ayres argues are made by some doctrinal theologians, when they are researching and constructing the historical ‘narratives’ which underlie their theologies.

A survey of Jenson’s and Gunton’s criticisms of Augustine illustrates not only the substance, but also the polemical tone, of their claims. Jenson uses ‘disaster’ and ‘destructive’ to describe the legacy of Augustine’s trinitarian thinking in the West, blaming Platonist influences for his acceptance of the principles of God’s simplicity and being, which Jenson claims led him away from Nicene thinking. Like Jenson, Gunton blames ‘platonising’ influences for ‘damaging weaknesses’ in Augustine’s trinitarian ideas. Gunton criticises his ‘trinitarian’ or ‘psychological’ analogies’, saying it is part of his ‘baneful legacy,’ which Gunton attributes to Neoplatonic influences rather than biblical teaching, that he believed that the ‘ontological foundations of the doctrine of the Trinity’ were to be ‘found in the

---

44 The italics are Jenson’s. Robert W. Jenson, ‘A Decision Tree of Colin Gunton’s Thinking’, in *Theology of Colin Gunton*, ed. by Lincoln Harvey (London: T&T Clark, 2010; first paperback edn, 2012), pp. 8-16 (pp. 11-12); see also Gunton, *The Promise*, pp. 3-4.
conception of a threefold mind and not in the economy of salvation'.

This is a reference to Augustine’s ideas about the triadic functions of the human mind (e.g., memory, understanding, and will) which he explores in The Trinity (Trin.).

Thus Gunton criticises Augustine for not looking to the scriptures or doctrinal beliefs about salvation in his trinitarian thinking, although one could ask whether Gunton overlooks that the human mind is part of creation, and there may be a connection between Augustine’s ideas about creation and his trinitarian thinking.

Gunton and Jenson also criticise Augustine’s ideas about simplicity, relations, and substance within the immanent Trinity, including his arguments that God’s substance does not have ‘accidents’. Gunton attributes these ideas to Aristotelian influences and claims that Augustine over-emphasised the unity of the Persons.

Jenson claims that Augustine’s ideas about relations and simplicity did not allow for identifying differences between the Persons. Hence, they criticism him for over-emphasising unity both in economic trinitarian acts and within the immanent Trinity.

On the other hand, the trinitarian ideas attributed to the Cappadocians also can be criticised, even when they are preferred over Augustine’s. LaCugna faults the Cappadocians and Augustine in her arguments that fourth century trinitarian thinking diverged from ideas more focused on the economy in earlier centuries, causing a ‘breach’ between ‘oikonomia and theologia’. She argues that this breach led to a ‘de-emphasis on the details of the economy of redemption, and a weakening of the soteriological basis for the Christian doctrine of God’. Gunton criticises her emphasis on the economy of salvation and what he describes as her rejection of ‘any doctrine of an immanent Trinity’ or of an ‘ontological Trinity’. However, Gunton expresses similar ideas to LaCugna’s criticisms of Cappadocian

---

53 Gunton, The Promise, pp. 40-42.
54 Jenson, The Triune Identity, pp. 118-120.
55 See, e.g., LaCugna, God for Us, pp. 9, 24-30, 143.
56 LaCugna, God for Us, pp. 8-9.
57 Gunton, The Promise, pp. xvii-xviii.
contributions to a perceived emphasis on the immanent Trinity. He says he was ‘less tempted than [he] was to run the risk of romanticising the Eastern tradition’, and he, too, says that the Cappadocians contributed to a ‘breach between the being of God and his action in the economy of creation and redemption’.  

LaCugna’s and Gunton’s works share another perspective in that they argue that some Christians before the Cappadocians and Augustine had some things ‘right’ in their trinitarian thinking, even though trinitarian doctrine did not fully develop until the second half of the fourth century. This can be seen in LaCugna’s view that oikonomia was the focus of early theologians, and that prior to the 325 Council of Nicaea, ‘both Greek and Latin traditions’ had understood ‘the economy as the means of access to theologia’ or to ideas about the immanent Trinity. For Gunton, this appears in his citing, throughout his writings, the late second century Irenaeus as a model of thinking on the Trinity and creation, especially because of Irenaeus’s association of these two doctrines with ideas about the incarnation, salvation, redemption, and eschatology.

Given these perspectives on the value of pre-trinitarian thinking from before the fourth century, it is important to examine developments in thinking about creation, God, and the Trinity which took place in earlier centuries in assessing patristic ideas about creation and the Trinity. This will be true for my analysis of the theologies of creation and the Trinity held by the Cappadocians and Augustine.

The doctrine of creation, like the Trinity, also began to receive new attention in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. One period of revival took place, according to Walter Brueggemann, when scholars in the last few decades of the twentieth century began to rethink how this doctrine had been handled earlier by

58 Gunton, The Promise, p. xii.
59 The word ‘right’ comes from Jenson’s analysis of Gunton’s thinking that Irenaeus, and, to a lesser extent, the Cappadocians, had things more ‘right’ than Augustine about the Trinity and economic acts. Jenson, ‘A Decision Tree’, pp. 12-13.
60 LaCugna, God for Us, p. 13.
Barth, Gerhard von Rad, and others.  

Webster also associates renewed interest in creation with recent ‘theologies of retrieval’. He identifies Gunton as one of the theologians who sought to give the doctrine ‘its own Christian integrity’, including by drawing on biblical and historical Christian sources, in the context of dealing with questions raised by ‘modern cosmology and philosophy’. Theological ideas about creation also are of interest in other cross-disciplinary work being done by patristic scholars, doctrinal theologians, and scientists; for example, in looking at intersections between creation, the Trinity, and scientific views of the universe or of life, or in examining theological and biblical ideas about creation in response to ecological issues.

David Fergusson, who cites similar cross-disciplinary interests as reasons for the recent revival of interest in the doctrine of creation, offers two other reasons of interest to my thesis. He observes that biblical scholars ‘have rediscovered how pervasive is the theme of creation throughout scripture’, and that creation is integrated biblically with other themes, including those related to the Trinity. As I will demonstrate in this thesis, interpretations of scriptural passages about creation,

---

63 Webster, ‘Theologies of Retrieval’, p. 595.
64 Webster, ‘Theologies of Retrieval’, p. 595.
68 D. Fergusson, ‘Creation’, p. 72.
primarily Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 but also others, significantly influenced theological ideas about creation and the Trinity. This was especially true for Augustine’s mature theology, as I will argue.

Augustine’s ideas about creation have been criticised, although this may not have received as much attention as criticisms of his trinitarian theology. Gunton and Moltmann, for example, prefer, at times, what they view as Cappadocian views on creation, although Gunton especially values Irenaeus’s ideas about creation, in addition to Irenaeus’s ideas on the Trinity.  

Gunton and others also raise issues relevant to assessing Augustine’s ideas about both creation and the Trinity. These issues, which I will briefly summarise, are with not only Augustine’s doctrinal ideas, but also with his views of the created world itself. These are concerns for investigating theological ideas about creation, given that ideas about creation are both doctrinal and about things which exist; hence they also have ontological content. The criticisms I will cite here also apply to the question of whether Augustine believed that one can know something about the economic or the immanent Trinity from creation. If the answer were to turn out to be ‘no’, which I will argue in Part II that it is not, my attempt to investigate his trinitarian theology in light of his creation theology would not be successful.

First, Gunton says that Platonist influences on Augustine’s thinking on creation led him to view the material or created world as not being ‘truly real’, which thus means, according to Gunton, that creation could not be drawn upon as a source of ‘theological meaning’, even for Augustine’s ‘analogies of the Trinity’. Gunton also attributes what he sees as Augustine’s early perspectives on the lack of ‘goodness’ of the created world, and his ‘revulsion from the material world’, to Augustine’s affiliation with Manichaeism, prior to his return to Christianity in 386. Gunton blames Augustine for not viewing all of creation as good, because of the influences

---


70 That one can see or know the Creator from creation is from Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5.


of Platonist ideas about the insignificance of matter, which Gunton also associates with his interpretations of Gen. 1. 1-2 as indicating a ‘two stage’ creation process: first of matter, then of matter being given form.\(^{73}\) Gunton claims that Augustine’s doctrine of creation was very little ‘informed by trinitarian categories’ because he did not ‘articulate the doctrine christologically or pneumatologically’, and because he emphasised Platonist ‘forms’ rather than Christ in the creation process.\(^{74}\)

In this thesis, I will challenge many of Gunton’s views based on my analysis of Augustine’s ideas about both creation and the Trinity. Moreover, Gunton does not acknowledge Augustine’s broad awareness and use of scriptures about creation or the Trinity, or his exegetical methods. Gunton rarely cites Augustine’s major fifth century commentary on Genesis, *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* (*Gn. litt*),\(^{75}\) in which Augustine employs these methods and arrives at ideas about creation, economic trinitarian acts, and the Trinity which contradict Gunton’s claims.

Secondly, Henri Marrou claims that Augustine’s fourth century ideas about creation were too focused on human beings, especially their souls, to the exclusion of the rest of creation, leaving ‘no room for … a philosophy of Nature and the world’.\(^{76}\) Scott MacDonald makes a similar claim about Augustine’s focus on the soul rather than the ‘external material world’, in the context of Augustine’s ‘thinking about the divine’, and MacDonald attributes this to the influences of Neoplatonism on Augustine, influences implicitly acknowledged in Marrou’s discussion.\(^{77}\)


Marrou’s and MacDonald’s criticisms are valid, this also would mean that Augustine did not value the created world, or at least all of it, in its own right. It also would have implications for my analysis of his ideas about triadic and ontological aspects of creation and economic trinitarian acts, and whether he applies these ideas in ways that give all creation an association with the Trinity.\(^7\)

Also of note, because this criticism is similar to those made about Augustine’s trinitarian ideas, is that Marrou claims that Augustine’s focus on the soul, rather than all creation, sets Augustine apart from ‘the Greek Fathers’, although Marrou does not cite any Greek sources in making these claims.\(^8\)

Henry Chadwick offers another perspective on Augustine’s interest in the soul and the influence of Neoplatonism. In Chadwick’s view, Augustine, in the period between his return to Christianity in 386 and the end of the fourth century, learned to speak about God and the Trinity in more Christian ways, with fewer Neoplatonic themes, but, as he did, moved from ‘seeking evidence of the Trinity in the act of creating’, to suggesting, by the end of his Confessions (conf.), that ‘the right place to look [for the Trinity] is the soul of man.’\(^9\) Chadwick’s points are related to Augustine’s early ideas about creation and economic trinitarian acts of creation. They also reflect an assumption that Augustine was looking either at creation, or later at the human mind, for signs of the Trinity.

Not all the commentary on Augustine’s ideas about creation is negative. He is both credited with, and criticised for, his contributions to the doctrine of creation ‘from nothing’ (ex nihilo). However, much of this commentary is about his ideas about time, theological anthropology, or other matters not relevant to assessing his ideas about creation and the Trinity.\(^10\)

---

\(^7\) 71-90 (pp. 72-73); see also Marrou, *Saint Augustine*, pp. 72-73; p. 73.
\(^8\) Augustine’s ideas on these matters will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
\(^10\) The emphasis is added. Chadwick, *Augustine of Hippo*, pp. 117-118.
Now it is possible to identify, based on my discussions above, themes which appear in recent scholarship about Augustine that are relevant to his ideas about both creation and the Trinity. First, it is claimed that Augustine prioritises unity over distinctions in his ideas about economic trinitarian acts, where my interest is in acts of creation. Secondly, he also is said to give priority to the unity of the Persons, especially of substance, in his ideas about the immanent Trinity, which is of interest where this relates to his ideas about triadic aspects of creation or triadic functions in the human mind. Thirdly, his views about both creation and the Trinity are sometimes deemed to differ from those of the Cappadocians, and the ideas of the latter are sometimes preferred.

Moreover, many of the issues I discussed about the works of doctrinal scholars (e.g., Gunton, Jenson, or LaCugna) who have criticised Augustine’s trinitarian ideas and sources are related to how doctrinal scholars approach the historical theology sections in their works, which otherwise are mainly about doctrinal or systematic theology. Thus, one of the problems to be addressed in this thesis is how these historical theology sections could be improved to offer more accurate information, with fewer assumptions, especially about Augustine’s ideas.

Concerns also can exist with the work of patristic scholars. The methods involved in doing historical theology, which include identifying sources and textual links, in addition to ideas, can result in works that do not offer clear narratives that can be drawn upon in works of doctrinal theology.

Both groups of scholars overlook some of Augustine’s sources for his trinitarian theology and his ideas about creation, especially his use of the scriptures and exegetical methods. Their lack of attention to his scriptural knowledge, and how he uses the scriptures to inform his theology, is the result of their areas of interest, and either their polemical or apologetic agendas at times. For example, Gunton and Jenson criticise Augustine’s Platonist sources, and claim that he does not draw on scripture. Similarly, patristic scholars Ayres, Barnes, and Chad Gerber

---

overlook Augustine’s uses of scripture in their efforts to establish and defend that Augustine drew heavily on Latin pro-Nicene ideas, which were themselves already influenced by Platonist ideas.\(^{82}\)

If scholars gained fuller, more nuanced, appreciations of Augustine’s sources, they might find more grounds for identifying commonalities between Augustine’s ideas and those held by earlier theologians or thinkers in Greek and eastern or Alexandrian traditions, including those who wrote in the hexaemeral traditions.\(^{83}\)

Moreover, they may come appreciate the breadth of Augustine’s knowledge of scriptures, especially those about creation, and how his interpretations of scripture influenced his thinking on both creation and the Trinity.

0.2 Hypotheses, objectives, and organisation of this thesis

My thesis is shaped by three hypotheses, which I put forward in light of the scholarly perspectives that I surveyed above on Augustine’s trinitarian theology and sources, and, to some extent, his ideas about creation. In this section, I will discuss my hypotheses and objectives, and indicate the direction of my research. I also will give an overview of the thesis organisation.

0.2.1 Primary hypotheses: using a new lens, revising historical theological narratives, and doing fruitful readings of Augustine’s theology

My first, and over-arching, hypothesis in this thesis is that by looking at developments in early trinitarian theology through the lens of creation theologies and interpretations of scriptures about creation, one can gain new perspectives on creation, economic trinitarian acts of creation, and the immanent Trinity. I will use this lens throughout my critical analysis in Parts I and II, where my historical

---


\(^{83}\) Hexaemeral works offer interpretations of the six days of creation, according to Gen. 1.
theological work begins with the first century and culminates with Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity in the late fourth and early fifth centuries.

My second hypothesis is that it is possible for patristic scholars and doctrinal theologians to collaborate on behalf of responsible readings of Augustine and the creation of more reliable historical theological narratives about his trinitarian ideas, for use in works about doctrine or systematic theology. This cooperation could lead to broader and more nuanced assessments of Augustine’s theology and sources and comparisons of his ideas to those of the Cappadocians and others in Greek or Alexandrian traditions.

My third hypothesis is that it is possible to do ‘fruitful’ readings of Augustine’s theologies of creation and the Trinity today, read together with the theologies and ideas held by Gunton, other doctrinal scholars, and scientists.

As I will outline here, I will address my first primary hypothesis in the chapters on historical theology in Parts I and II, and the other two hypotheses in Part III.

0.2.2 Overview of Parts I and II: historical theological ideas about acts of creation, modes of origin, and God as sole creator and Trinity

Part I, which includes two chapters, is designed to establish foundations for my analysis of Augustine’s theology and how his ideas and sources are situated within or differ from existing traditions or perspectives. However, my critical analysis and conclusions also contribute to scholarship on creation, the one Creator God, and pre-trinitarian or trinitarian ideas in the first through the fourth centuries.

Chapter 1 will begin in the first century with Philo of Alexandria, a Jewish philosopher, and with the prologue to the Gospel of John (John 1. 1-18). I also will analyse the second and third century ideas of Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen. One of my objectives is to critically assess ideas, principles, and terminology for thinking about creation, God as Creator and one, and roles posited for the Logos, the Persons of the Trinity, or other entities in acts of creation. I will examine interpretations of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, and other scriptures found in Philo’s or early Christian hexaemeral and exegetical commentaries. I also will discuss the early Christian doctrine of creation ‘from nothing’, with a dual focus on how Christians defended the belief that God was the only creator or first principle, and
on Irenaeus’s pre-trinitarian views of this doctrine. But my analysis goes beyond creation ‘out of nothing’ to identifying other theological and scriptural ideas about creative acts, including fashioning or forming. I also will identify problems left ‘on the table’ for later Christian thinking about the one God who is Creator and Trinity.

In Chapter 2, I will focus primarily on ideas about creation and the Trinity held by Athanasius of Alexandria, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus, or which are represented in the creeds from the 325 Council of Nicaea and 381 Council of Constantinople. However, I also will examine some of Eunomius of Cyzicus’s ideas in my analysis of the Cappadocian-Eunomian debates, and I will give some attention to Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose of Milan, and Jerome. One of my two main arguments will be that ideas and terminology about creation ‘out of nothing’ and modes of origin (i.e., ways in which someone or something comes into being) influenced trinitarian ideas about consubstantiality, relations, and unity and distinctions within the Trinity. My second argument is that Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies are a source of understanding his creation theology and ideas about trinitarian acts of creation and the Trinity. Moreover, I will show that Basil’s ideas have some affinities with those held by the earlier Philo and by Augustine.

My analysis in Part II of Augustine’s theologies of creation and the Trinity will be offered in two chapters, divided between his fourth and fifth century works, respectively. I will do close readings of Augustine’s *hexaemeral* commentaries. I also will do critical analysis of his early ideas about the triadic aspects of created things and his mature ideas about triadic aspects of initial existence, and the associations he makes between these aspects of creation and trinitarian acts of creation. I further will examine whether he suggests that one can know something about the immanent Trinity from triadic functions in the human mind. In this context, I will analyse his ideas about divine simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations within the Trinity. In my analysis, I will respond to the claims of his critics that he over-emphasises the unity of the Persons in their economic acts or within the immanent Trinity. I also will argue that he attributes goodness and beauty to creation, to the Trinity in economic acts of creation, and to the Persons and the Trinity as a whole within the immanent Trinity.
There are thus five areas in which I contribute to Augustine scholarship as a result of my research and analysis. First, I will demonstrate that Augustine’s ideas about triadic aspects of creation or initial existence and trinitarian acts are robust and that he attributes differentiated and shared roles to the Persons. Secondly, I will argue that Augustine posits that creatures are given, through trinitarian acts, some agency of their own to seek to continue their existence, and I will label this capability ‘dynamic abiding’ based on his ideas.\textsuperscript{84} Thirdly, I will demonstrate the significant influences of Augustine’s exegesis of many scriptural passages about creation, including, but going beyond, Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wis. 11, and Wis. 13, on his theologies of creation and the Trinity.\textsuperscript{85} Fourthly, I will show that his ideas are similar, at times, to those in Philo’s and Basil’s \textit{hexaemeral} works. Finally, I will identify other influences on Augustine’s thinking, including the Latin creeds and Ambrose of Milan’s hymns and catechetical training.

One of my objectives for my analysis of Augustine’s sources is to show that many of his ideas about the Trinity, viewed in light of his creation theologies, are similar to Greek or Alexandrian ideas that come from Christian or early Jewish traditions. I also will argue that Augustine’s thinking was original and independent in many ways. Thus my use of the lens of looking at his ideas about the Trinity by beginning with creation theology will yield perspectives that challenge patristic scholars or doctrinal theologians who focus on either his pro-Nicene sources or his non-Christian philosophical sources to take a further look at his \textit{hexaemeral} works and his broad knowledge and use of the scriptures in his theological arguments.

My use of this lens is supported by the discovery and analysis I have done of creation passages from across the scriptures that were cited by Augustine and others in their reflections on creation and the Trinity. I will draw on my historical theological interpretations of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-18, and Wis. 13. 1-5, for which I also have consulted the works of many Christian and Jewish commentators.

\textsuperscript{84} See sections 4.2.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4. See also Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{85} See my summary of his use of these scriptures in Appendix A.
0.2.3 Overview of Part III: responsible scholarship on and fruitful theological readings of Augustine

In Part III, which contains a single chapter that is also the thesis conclusion, I will move to the twenty-first century. There, in addition to giving a summative analysis of my primary contributions and conclusions in this thesis, I will address my second and third hypotheses.

First, I will assert and defend my own case for why it is important for patristic scholars and doctrinal theologians to collaborate on behalf of the production of more reliable narratives about Augustine’s theologies of creation and the Trinity and his sources. As a methodological foundation, I will draw on Scot Douglass’s and Morwenna Ludlow’s concepts of doing ‘responsible’ readings of patristic texts, including their questions about to which ‘communities of readers’ scholars may see themselves as being accountable.86 I also will draw on questions that Barnes and Ayres have raised about the responsibilities of patristic scholars toward theologians or theological work.87 I then will offer my constructive proposals for ways in which patristic and doctrinal scholars might augment or strengthen their collaboration, prior to their respective publications of their works, so as to avoid the criticisms that take place of historical retrievals after they have been published.

Second, I will offer proposals for how Augustine’s theological ideas about creation and the Trinity might be read fruitfully together with Gunton’s theologies of creation and the Trinity and with the recent ideas of other scholars. The others whose works I will draw upon, including Stephen Holmes,88 are theologians or scientists who have explored some ideas at the intersection of creation, the Trinity,

and science, and who draw on both patristic and recent theologies. My work here will be theological, but some of my constructive applications are cross-disciplinary. My objective is to propose fruitful readings that go beyond the ideas I build upon and can be added to by others as part of the process of continuous interpretation. I will use as a methodological foundation Douglass’s and Ludlow’s concept of doing ‘fruitful’ readings of patristic texts, and Ludlow’s position that ancient texts possess ‘future’ meanings because of the theological practice of undertaking ongoing interpretations in changing contexts and theological traditions.

0.3 Additional information on scholarly literature, sources, and methods

I have already discussed many of the scholars whose works I will cite, build upon, or challenge in this thesis, and I have discussed some of my sources and methods. I will offer some additional information here, and other information in the chapters to follow.

Ayres and Barnes are the patristics scholars with whom I will primarily engage in this thesis, and I have cited many of their works above. I will draw on and critique their views on Augustine, the Cappadocians, and other matters, and I will build upon their ideas about responsible scholarship. Gunton is the doctrinal scholar with whom I will primarily engage, both because of my disagreements with his historical retrievals and because I will use his theology in my proposals for fruitful readings of Augustine. I also have cited Gunton’s works above.

Given the breadth of my historical theological analysis in Parts I and II, I also will engage with many other historical and doctrinal scholars. My critical analysis in Chapters 1 and 2 will engage with the works of specialists in the theologians or periods my analysis covers. In the introductions to Chapters 3 and 4, I will survey the scholars with whom I will engage for Augustine’s fourth or fifth century ideas. My constructive proposals in Chapter 5 will cite and build on ideas from patristic and doctrinal scholars, including Gunton and Stephen Holmes, and scientists who

have reflected on intersections between creation, the Trinity, and science.

In my chapters on historical theology, one of my methods will be to identify the primary ancient authors and texts I will examine at the beginning of the chapter or of some sections. To enable me to demonstrate or propose ways in which ideas were transmitted, especially through hexaemeral or other commentaries on Gen. 1 and / or John 1. 1-3, I also will provide surveys of known or likely sources of ideas and terminology for these ancient authors. This will allow me to build narratives across chapters.

My selection criteria for the primary texts I will draw upon, which include treatises, sermons, letters, the scriptures, creeds, and liturgical or pastoral resources, are that they must be related in some way to creation and God or the Trinity. These criteria exclude texts that offer insights solely about trinitarian ideas, and I will not discuss many aspects of trinitarian doctrine covered in other works. As I discussed earlier, many recent theologians believe that trinitarian doctrine should be related to the doctrines of salvation or redemption or eschatology. Paul Blowers has shown that these doctrines, as well as christology and teleology, also were related to creation theologies in the early centuries.91 However, my focus will be restricted to creation and the Trinity to enable me to explore areas others do not examine and to offer original interpretations of historical trinitarian theology.

I will employ English translations of primary works, and I will cite Greek or Latin editions in analysing ideas or translation ‘moves’ relevant to my arguments. When I am able to offer proposals, but without certainty, for translations or interpretations of key terms, I will employ a ‘case study’ approach that allows me to present my analysis and to call for further research. This is true for my studies of ‘monogenés’ and the Latin equivalent ‘unigenitum’, which I will argue should not necessarily be translated as ‘only-begotten’.92 Moreover, given that one of my objectives is to propose ways that historical scholarship can be more accessible to broader groups of readers, including systematic theologians and scientists,93 I have chosen to use transliterated Greek words rather than Greek letters.

91 Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, pp. 1-17, and throughout.
92 See sections 1.2.3 in Chapter 1, 2.2.2 in Chapter 2, and 3.3.4 in Chapter 3.
93 See my proposals in sections 5.2 and 5.3 of Chapter 5.
0.4 Other contributions to theology and future projects

Others have written about Augustine’s trinitarian theology, and some have critiqued the works of doctrinal theologians, including Gunton, and their portrayals of Augustine’s trinitarian theology, and, in some cases, his ideas about creation. The originality of my thesis lies in my approach to making my own contributions to the revivals of trinitarian theology, some of which also are relevant to revivals of interest in creation theologies. This I hope to do in four ways.

My first objective is to offer another historical narrative on developments in trinitarian theology, particularly Augustine’s theology, to add to narratives already established by scholars, by viewing creation and the Trinity together. I will critique other views, but my goal is to contribute new or more nuanced perspectives that may not be seen through other lenses.

My second objective is to contribute to both patristic scholarship and doctrinal theology by proposing ways scholars might collaborate on behalf of presenting historical doctrinal information that offers ‘trustworthy insight’ on Augustine and others, which would in turn aid them in continuing to make their own contributions to the revivals of interest in the Trinity.

Thirdly, while I am not able to address the other end of the ‘arc’ of presumed western or Latin trinitarian theology from Augustine to Aquinas, I hope the arguments I offer in this thesis will be used as one source for reevaluating the historical reception of Augustine’s trinitarian theology.

Finally, one of my goals is to contribute to the revivals of interest in the doctrine of creation by spurring further interest in scriptural passages about creation and ontological ideas about creation itself, reflected on in light of ideas about the Trinity and scientific thinking, and the Trinity, creation, and eco-theology.
Part I
Chapter 1: Creation, the One Creator God, and Pre-trinitarian Theology (First through Third Centuries)

Introduction
This chapter is the first of the two chapters in Part I that serve dual historical and theological objectives. In this chapter, I will analyse Jewish and early Christian theologies from the first through the third centuries. My first objective is to critically analyse relationships between, on the one hand, theological and scriptural ideas about creation, and, on the other, reflections on God understood as Creator and ‘one’, and, to an extent, as Trinity. My second objective is to lay foundations for my analysis in Part II of Augustine’s ideas and sources about creation and the Trinity.

Daniel Boyarin’s assessment that developments in trinitarian thinking were influenced by ‘pre-Christian Jewish accounts’ of various entities, including the Logos, which were involved in God’s acts with creation is of great interest here. One does not have to fully accept Boyarin’s view that the existence of these entities in Jewish thinking was a primary driver of the development of trinitarian thinking. However, his analysis supports my hypothesis that theological ideas about acts of and roles in creation influenced developments in trinitarian theology.

My analysis begins with the first century writings, especially his *hexaemeral* commentary, of Philo of Alexandria, a Jewish philosopher and commentator on scripture, and with the prologue to the Gospel of John (John 1. 1-18). My analysis continues by assessing ideas about creation, God, and the ‘Persons’ of the Trinity that appear in early Christian rules of faith and in the second and third century writings of Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen. By employing the lens

---

3 The use of ‘Persons’ to speak of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit came into some Latin usage with Tertullian’s late second or early third century writings. I use ‘Persons’ in this
of examining ideas about creation, including but not only creation ‘out of nothing’, I will identify how creation theology influenced pre-trinitarian reflections.\textsuperscript{4}

I also will begin the process of identifying sources and lines of transmission of ideas, principles, and terminology related to creation and the Trinity that are often overlooked by scholars who study Augustine’s trinitarian theology. As I will show, Christians began commenting on Gen. 1 and / or John 1. 1-3 in the early centuries, and John 1. 1-5 itself is a commentary on Gen. 1. 1-5.\textsuperscript{5} Some early Christians also were aware of Philo’s works. In fact, Philo’s immediate influences were on early Christians, and Christians, especially Origen, preserved, translated, or passed on his works.\textsuperscript{6} Moreover, Philo and early Christians were influenced by concepts that appear in Plato’s \textit{Timaeus} (\textit{Tim.}),\textsuperscript{7} as well as by a mix of theological, scriptural, and philosophical ideas that were ‘in the air’.\textsuperscript{8}

This chapter comprises four major sections.

In section 1.1, I will critically analyse Philo’s thinking on creation and God, also understood as the good ‘Father and Maker’, and the Logos and ‘ideas’, for insights into how well Philo defends the tenet of faith that there is only ‘one’ creator God.

\textsuperscript{4} The expression ‘out of nothing’ is more inclusive than the Latin ‘\textit{ex nihilo}’ for this period.
\textsuperscript{5} I will discuss and argue this in section 1.2 below.
\textsuperscript{8} The expression ‘in the air’ is from Samuel Terrien’s discussion of ideas that may have influenced the prelogue to John. Samuel Terrien, \textit{The Elusive Presence: Toward a New Biblical Theology} (Harper and Row, 1978; Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2000), p. 420.
The question of whether he is successful arises because of the mixture of sources he draws upon, including the Jewish scriptures and faith and Plato’s *Tim*. The question also arises because he posits the involvement of the Logos and the ‘ideas’ in God’s creative acts, and further asserts that the ‘ideas’ were in the mind of God and were the Logos. That such entities are posited in early *hexaemeral* works will be relevant to my other analysis in this chapter and to my later analysis of the *hexaemeral* commentaries done by Basil of Caesarea\(^9\) and Augustine.\(^10\)

Philo’s ideas also reflect Jewish, Hellenised, and Alexandrian influences that are represented in his works and in the first century scriptural book of Wisdom.\(^11\) I will argue here and in Part II that there are clear affinities between ideas in Philo’s and Augustine’s works and Wis. 11 and Wis. 13.\(^12\) I also will examine the varied terminology used for God’s creative acts in Philo’s works, the Greek translations of Jewish scriptures (LXX), and Wisdom. This terminology offers views on creative acts that might offer alternatives to believing in the early Christian doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’. I will then compare this terminology with words and ideas that appear in the prologue to John and early Christian writings.

In section 1.2, I will present an original analysis of the prologue to the Gospel of John (John 1. 1-18) so that this passage, which was so influential in early and patristic thinking on creation and the Trinity, is examined in its own right. I will argue that the prologue is a source of early Christian and Jewish Christian ideas about creation and the Logos / Word / Son / Jesus Christ and the Father. I will demonstrate parallels between terminology in John 1. 1-5 and Gen. 1. 1-5. I also will argue, based on the prologue’s ‘creation terminology’, that its author may have offered some of his ideas, including his use of the word ‘*monogenēs*’, to provide a

---

\(^9\) See section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
\(^10\) See especially section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3 and section 4.2 in Chapter 4.
\(^12\) See section 1.1.1 below here and section 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3.
contrast with Platonist ideas about the ‘Maker’, ‘making’ activities, and the cosmos. My analysis of ‘monogenés’, which has multiple meanings although it is often translated ‘only-begotten’, will underpin my later analysis of how this word, or the Latin equivalent unigenitus, acquired theological meanings in the fourth century that may not be supported by the text of John. I also will establish ways in which the prologue is a source both of theological ideas and of unresolved problems for later trinitarian thinking.

In section 1.3, my analysis will focus on statements about creation and the one Creator God or the Persons of the Trinity found in rules of faith and the writings of Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen. I will argue that some tenets of the rules of faith likely represent a mix of Christian and Platonist ideas that may not be acknowledged by some scholars. I will assess ideas about the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, which emerged as a Christian doctrine in the second century. In particular, I will argue that Irenaeus’s views on creation ‘out of nothing’ are more christological or pre-trinitarian than views of this doctrine which are monotheistic and focus on the attributes of God. I also will show that Christians held other ideas about God’s creative acts besides creation ‘out of nothing’. And I will examine early interpretations of Gen. 1 and / or John 1. 1-3.

I also will assess how well authors are able to defend the idea that there are not two or more gods or first principles. This concern is related to the question of whether God created out of pre-existent matter. It also is relevant to looking at polemical responses to Marcionite views, which held that two gods existed, one a creator responsible for the evil in the world, and the other the good Father of Jesus Christ / the Son / the Word. Early orthodox / catholic defenses of the goodness of God and of the Creator contributed to defending the tenet of faith that there is only one God or first principle. Thus the attribute of divine goodness is related to the ‘oneness’ or unity of God with implications for the Trinity. Orthodox / catholic responses to early dualistic views of creation and God will be relevant again in analysing Augustine’s responses to similar dualistic ideas held by Manicheans that caused them to reject scriptures about creation. Finally, the question of whether

13 I will discuss Marcionite views in section 1.3.
there are one or more gods or first principles also arises in looking at how roles in creation are ascribed to God, the Logos / Word, the Holy Spirit, or Wisdom.

In Section 1.4, I will offer a summative chapter conclusion and will identify problems and opportunities ‘left on the table’ for later trinitarian thinking.

1.1 Philo, Wisdom, and Jewish Hellenised Alexandrian ideas

Philo was active in the first half of the first century, and his works include commentaries on the Pentateuch and philosophical and other treatises. My analysis focusses on ‘On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses’ (Opif.), which includes Philo’s hexaemeral commentary, and other works. I will argue that Philo mixes philosophical and scriptural ideas while he asserts that ‘God is one’ and ‘the creator is one’, tenets of monotheistic faith he attributes to Moses’s ‘creation account’.

1.1.1 Philo, the LXX scriptures, Wisdom, and Middle Platonism

Philo was educated in LXX translations of the scriptures and in philosophy, especially Platonism but also Stoicism, Pythagoreanism, and Aristotelianism. It is common now to see his philosophical thought as ‘basically Platonist’, a position I

---


17 Philo’s hexaemeral commentary is in Opif., ch. 3, 13 – ch. 15, 128.

18 Philo, Opif., ch. 25, 170-172.

accept, in contrast to earlier views that it was ‘primarily Stoic’ or ‘a Platonizing form of Stoicism’. However, I will demonstrate that his ideas reflect influences from the LXX scriptures, Middle Platonism, and Stoicism, as well as general influences from his first century Jewish, Hellenised, Alexandrian context.

Philo had Jewish predecessors who undertook scriptural exegesis, but their works, unlike his, for the most part have not survived. On the other hand, Philo’s ideas, as Jaroslav Pelikan argues, can be seen as reflecting a Jewish, Hellenised, Alexandrian tradition that also is represented by some books in the Greek LXX translations of the Hebrew scriptures and in Wisdom, and these works are extant. The LXX scriptures and Wisdom are attributed to Alexandria and similarities exist among them, and Wisdom was probably written contemporaneously with Philo’s

---


23 Pelikan, What Has Athens ... ?, pp. 67-69, 111-132.

works, so the existence of this tradition is plausible.

Wisdom, like Philo’s works, represents a blend of ideas from Jewish scriptures, Middle Platonism, and Stoicism, and Philo shares Greek terminology with Wisdom and with the LXX Genesis and Exodus. Wisdom was not granted full status as ‘canonical’ scripture by all early Christians, but for those who read Wisdom it was a source of terminology that represented Platonist and other philosophical ideas in addition to tenets of Jewish faith. Ideas that appear in Wisdom and in Philo’s works are relevant to my efforts to trace lines of influence on Augustine, because Wisdom was virtually canonical for Augustine. I will argue in Chapter 3 that clear affinities exist between Wis. 11 and Wis. 13, and Philo’s and Augustine’s writings.

One might ask whether Philo could have had access to Wisdom, but one cannot make this assumption given that it was written contemporaneously with his works. However, I will argue in Chapter 3 that Philo’s ideas about the concepts of God’s measuring, numbering, and weighing things in acts of creation (and other ways),

---


27 Brown asserts that ‘it was in works like Ecclesiastes and the Wisdom of Solomon that Greek philosophic thought and vocabulary made their greatest inroads into the Bible’. Michael Kolarcik says Wisdom is cited by Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Augustine, with Clement considering it canonical, Origen holding reservations about its canonical status, and Augustine believing that ‘the long and venerable reading of [Wisdom] in the liturgy by all Christians revealed its veritable canonical status’. Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to the Gospel of John, ed. by Francis J. Moloney, Anchor Bible Reference Library (New York: Doubleday, 2003), p. 260; see also Kolarcik, ‘The Book of Wisdom’, p. 438; Runia, PECL, pp. 64, 84, 319.

28 See Kolarcik’s statement cited in the footnote directly above. That Wisdom was virtually canonical for Augustine, but not canonical for his contemporaries Jerome and Rufinus, will be discussed in section 3.1.2 in Chapter 3. See Kolarcik, ‘The Book of Wisdom’, p. 438.

29 In Part II, I will demonstrate Augustine’s use of verses from Wis. 11 and his likely and known uses of Wis. 13. In section 3.2.1.1, I will show that affinities exist between Wis. 11, Wis. 13, and Philo’s and Augustine’s ideas. The triad of measure, number, and weight appears in Wis. 11. 20 (LXX) / Wis. 11. 21 (Vulgate). The idea that one can see the beauty of the Creator from the goodness, beauty, and power of creation is from Wis. 13. 1-5.
concepts that appear in Wis. 11. 20 (21), offer early examples of the application of these concepts to creation well before Augustine’s time.\(^{30}\)

**1.1.2 The one God as ‘Father and Maker’, good, and Creator**

With his mix of sources, Philo sometimes introduces ideas that raise concerns about how he defends his stated belief that God is the one Creator. For example, as I will discuss here, Philo describes God as ‘Father and Maker’ (using both words together), and as ‘good’, because he borrows ideas from Plato’s *Tim*.\(^{31}\) I later will ask whether some Christian understandings of God as both Father and Creator, and of the Creator’s goodness, made their way into Christian tradition without the mixture of scriptural, theological, and philosophical ideas (or terminology) being acknowledged.\(^{32}\)

Philo refers to Plato when he writes: ‘If anyone should wish to examine the reason why this universe was constructed, I think he would not miss the mark if he affirmed, what one of the ancients [Plato] also said, that the Father and Maker was good’.\(^{33}\) Philo uses ‘*ton patera kai poiétén*’ for ‘Father and Maker’ here, as in other places.\(^{34}\) In one of those instances, Philo also writes about the goodness of God (‘*theos*’\(^{35}\)) and God’s providential care for creation:

> Those who declare that [the cosmos] is ungenerated are unaware that they are eliminating the most useful and indispensable of the contributions to piety, the (doctrine of) providence. Reason demands that the *Father and Maker* exercise care for that which has come into being. After all, both a *father* aims at the safety of his children and a *craftsman* aims at the preservation of what has been constructed, using every means at their disposal to repel all that is

---

injurious and harmful, while desiring to provide in every way that which is advantageous and profitable.\textsuperscript{36}

Some of these ideas are reflected when Philo summarises the ‘five lessons’ Moses teaches in his creation account.\textsuperscript{37} The fifth lesson ‘is that God [\textit{theos}] also takes thought for the cosmos, for that the maker always takes care of what has come into existence is a necessity by the laws and ordinances of nature, in accordance with which parents too take care of their children’.\textsuperscript{38}

Plato, in discussing the ‘Cause’ for which God, who is good, constructed the cosmos, claims that what God ‘desired’ for what God ‘took over’ and ‘fashioned’ was that ‘all things should be good and nothing evil’.\textsuperscript{39} He speaks of ‘providence’ in asserting that ‘this Cosmos has verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God’.\textsuperscript{40} Philo’s ideas about God understood as ‘Father and Maker’ and ‘good’ thus reflect these ideas.

Plato also made a move that Philo seems to have repeated. Plato, in writing of ‘the Maker and Father of this Universe’ (using ‘\textit{poiétén kai patera}’) refers to the ‘Constructor’ of the ‘Cosmos’ as the ‘\textit{démiourgos}’; thus he associates Maker, Father, and \textit{démiourgos}.\textsuperscript{41} Philo repeats this move in the passage cited above where he speaks of God as Father and Maker and uses ‘craftsman’.\textsuperscript{42} Pelikan claims that Philo conflates the ‘\textit{ho ōn} of Plato’ with Plato’s ‘\textit{démiourgos}’, who is not, Pelikan says, the supreme or one God in Platonist thinking, but Pelikan does not support his claims with evidence of Plato's views on the supreme God nor on the ‘\textit{démiourgos}’.\textsuperscript{43} It is therefore not possible to evaluate the validity of Pelikan’s position here. However, Pelikan also claims that Philo conflated Platonist terminology, including the word \textit{démiourgos} (which, again, did not refer to the supreme God) with Philo’s views of the Father and Maker (whom Philo evidently

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Italic added. Philo, \textit{Opif.}, ch. 2, 9-10; Philo, ‘On the Account’, 9-10, pp. 10-11; see also Runia, \textit{On the Creation}, p. 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Philo, \textit{Opif.}, ch. 25, 170-172.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Philo, \textit{Opif.}, ch. 25, 171; Philo, ‘On the Account’, 171, pp. 136-137.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Plato, \textit{Tim.}, 29d-30c.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Plato, \textit{Tim.}, 30b-c.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Plato, \textit{Tim.}, 28c-29a.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Philo, \textit{Opif.}, ch. 2, 9-10.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Pelikan does not give citations for ‘\textit{ho ōn}’. Pelikan, \textit{What Has Athens ... ?}, pp. 71-72.
\end{itemize}
assumes is the one Creator God of Moses). David Runia’s translation of Opif. lends support for Pelikan’s position. Runia identifies the first place in Opif. where Philo ‘specifically’ applies the ‘Platonic term démiourgos’ to God, and Runia translates this term as ‘creator’: ‘the creator proceeded to make the heaven’. Runia says that from that point on, he translates ‘démiourgos’ as ‘Creator’, which, if the reader did not know otherwise, suggests the Creator God of Jewish and Christian traditions. Moreover, Runia’s translation masks ambiguities in Philo’s terminology in the places, such those I cited here, in which Philo writes of God as theos, patera, poiétén, and démiourgos, using a variety of words that appear in Plato’s Tim. and in the Jewish scriptures.

Philo does not explain how the Creator God he calls ‘Father and Maker’ is the same God he refers to when he states that ‘God is one’ and ‘the creator is one’; thus he does appear to assume that they are the same. One can ask whether this apparent mix of Platonist and scriptural terminology in Philo’s hexaemeral commentary matters: does this terminology represent beliefs about God that are not consistent with Jewish and scriptural ideas about the one Creator God? This question cannot be answered here. But it should be acknowledged, in doing historical theological work on the relationship between creation theologies and ideas about God as both Creator and one, that this mixture of terminology exists, even if it is masked by translations.

One also can ask whether the Jewish scriptures support viewing God as both Father and Maker, where this ‘Fatherhood’ is attributed to God specifically with respect to creation (not in other ways). Pelikan asserts that the idea that the ‘Father’ is ‘synonymous with Creator’ is supported only ‘by inference’ from Hebrew scripture. Pelikan is not entirely right, although his position may be the ‘rule’ for

46 Runia, On the Creation, p. 175.
47 Stead says the question arises as to whether ‘Maker and Father’ refer to ‘two different beings’, another concern about Philo’s monotheism. Christopher Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge: CUP, 1994; transferred to digital printing, 2003), pp. 68-69.
48 Pelikan does cite Ps. 68. 5 and Is. 64. 8, where God is called ‘Father’, and one might argue that Is. 64. 8 would give support for seeing the Father as creator: ‘And now, O Lord,
which there are exceptions. Dt. 32. 6 (LXX) offers a mix of language about God being a father who has made and created human beings: ‘ouk autos outos sou patér ektésato se kai epoiésen se kai ektisen se’. Even so, there is no evidence that Philo was alluding to this passage when he spoke of the good ‘Father and Maker’, while he clearly cites Plato’s Tim.50 One may argue, therefore, that Philo’s pairing of ‘Father and Maker’ in discussing the one Creator God of Moses in commenting on Gen. 1 is more dependent on Plato than on the scriptures.

Philo’s understanding of God as ‘Father and Maker’ and as the one Creator God of Jewish scripture and theology is relevant to my task, undertaken in this and future chapters, of examining words and ideas that do or do not appear in the prologue to John, rules of faith, the creeds from the 325 Council of Nicaea and 381 Council of Constantinople, and early Latin and Roman creeds. For example, the belief that God is ‘Father’ and ‘maker’ appears in the 325 and 381 creeds.51 By contrast, the early Roman and Latin creeds, including those known to Augustine, do not explicitly attribute a role in creation to God, who is called Father.52 Below I will pose the question of whether some early Christians accepted ‘Father’ and ‘maker’ terminology for God without considering the potential mixture of Platonist, Philonic, Jewish, and early Christian ideas.53

you are our Father, and we are clay; we are all the work of your hands’. The inference might also be drawn from Psalm 103. 13: ‘As father has compassion for sons, the Lord has compassion for those who fear him, because he knew our makeup. Remember that we are dust!’ In both examples, that God is creator is only implicit, even with the allusion to the second creation story in Genesis, so Pelikan’s point seems to hold. Runia also says the idea that God is Father is not as common in the Hebrew Scriptures as in the New Testament, and Philo seldom cites the Psalms. Pelikan, What Has Athens ... ?, pp. 73-74; Runia, On the Creation, pp. 114, 256; Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright, eds., A New English Translation of the Septuagint (New York: OUP, 2007), pp. 873, 598.

50 Runia lists only two references to Deuteronomy, 6. 4 and 30. 15-20, in his index of biblical passages for Philo’s Opif. Runia, On the Creation, p. 424.
52 The early Roman or Latin creeds did not attribute roles in creation to God or the other Persons. The first article typically stated belief in ‘deum patrem omnipotentem’. See section 3.3 in Chapter 3. J. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, pp. 172-176, 368-374.
53 Bray says Christians in early centuries drew on the ‘Hellenistic’ understanding that ‘Father’ and ‘Creator’ were ‘often used synonymously’, to show ‘their pagan counterparts that the latter also recognized the God of the Bible’. Bray says ‘[c]reedal usage oscillated
I also will ask whether Platonist or Philonic ideas about the goodness of the Father and Maker influenced Christian thinking on creation and the existence of only ‘one God’, who is the Creator God. This question is posed in light of Runia’s position that it is “an event of enormous significance in the history of ideas” that Philo became “the first thinker to associate the goodness of Plato’s demiurge with the Judaeo-Christian conception of God the creator”. As I introduced above and will discuss in section 1.3, questions about the goodness of the Creator and whether there is only one God, or whether there were two (or more) gods or first principles, arose in early Christian controversies over whether a good God could have created evil. Thus goodness, whether of creation or of God, is related to theological principles about the existence of ‘one’ God who is the creator.

1.1.3 Creation terminology and creation ‘out of nothing’

In this section, I will offer a brief analysis of ‘creation terminology’, a label I use for the overall category of terminology that refers to creating, making, coming into being, and other terminology. My examples are from the LXX scriptures, Wisdom, Philo’s works, and Plato’s Tim. One clarifying point to be made, in beginning my discussion, is that while Philo’s use of the title ‘Maker’ [poiétén] for God may likely stem from Platonist influences, Philo’s ideas about God’s acts of ‘making’ likely represent a mix of scriptural and other influences. The distinction I am drawing is between titles given to God, as the Creator, and terminology used for creative acts. One of my objectives is to establish that multiple ways of speaking of creative acts exist in the LXX scriptures and other sources, although the meanings of some words overlap. Another objective is to suggest that the terminology of ‘fashioning’ or ‘forming’ can be used on its own or with the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, and I will discuss Philo’s views on God, matter, and the ‘ideas’. I also will draw on

between “maker” and “creator,” with the latter emphasizing the origin of matter ex nihilo’. Stead says ‘Christians were concerned to show that the Creator of the world was good, as against Gnostic theories’, and ‘the source of all goodness is a loving, personal Father, not a mere static ideal’. Gerald L. Bray, ed., We Believe in One God, Ancient Christian Doctrine, 1 (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), pp. 60, 93-94; Stead, Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, pp. 106-107.

the ideas I present here about 'creation terminology' in my analysis in this chapter of the prologue to John and other early Christian texts, and I will return to it in my analysis of modes of origin, particularly that of 'coming into being', in Chapter 2.55

First, the words I classify as 'creation terminology' are not necessarily distinct in meaning in the LXX scriptures, although one does not have to assume that there are no differences, including in the influences on the terminology. For example, the Greek verb 'poieō' is used in the Gen. 1. 1 (LXX), 'En arché epoiēsen ho theos' ('In the beginning God made'), and in Gen. 1. 7, 16, 21, 25, 26-27, 31 and Gen. 2. 2-3. This verb can mean making, creating, or bringing into being, and can be a 'multivalent term ... without pointed semantic significance'.56 The Hebrew text of Gen. 1. 1 uses 'bara' for 'created',57 whereas the LXX uses 'epoiēsen' for 'made' (not 'ektisen' for 'created'), and scholars suggest that 'created' ('bara') was used in the Hebrew to refer to the entire creation.58 That LXX translations did not follow the Hebrew text could suggest that the translations were influenced by Platonist words, if not ideas. If so, the LXX would be a source of scriptural, theological, and Platonist 'making' terminology under the umbrella of creation terminology, for Philo or for early Christians. This may suggest that God created from something, such

55 See section 2.2 in Chapter 2.
58 Moltmann says that in Gen. 1, ‘the text makes a clear distinction between ‘creating’ (bara) and ‘making’ (asah).’ He also says that in Gen. 1.1, the Hebrew word ‘create is used for creation as a whole. The ‘making’ begins in v. 2, as it were, and is completed with the sabbath...’ This reason for the use of ‘creating’ terminology in 1. 1 is the same reason given for the use of this terminology in the Aramaic targum cited below in the discussion of the prologue to John. Moltmann, God in Creation, p. 73; see also Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 76; Fretheim, ‘The Book of Genesis’, p. 342.
as ‘formless matter’ as Wis. 11. 17 (LXX) says,\(^ {59}\) or out of material, as a human ‘maker’ does, but this only can be conjectured and may not be true.

Secondly, the LXX uses ‘coming into being’ or ‘becoming’ terminology, based on ginomai or gignomai (e.g., egeneto in Gen. 1. 3, 5, 6), but some meanings of these words also convey nuances of being created or made.\(^ {60}\) Moreover, Gen. 1.1-2.4 (LXX) uses both ‘coming into being’ or ‘becoming’ terminology and ‘making’ terminology, so the text does not choose between these wordings and there may be overlap in meanings. On the other hand, ‘coming into being’ terminology, by itself, does not convey that there is a maker or creator (by contrast to, for example, Gen. 1’s saying that something came into being after God spoke, or John 1. 3’s saying that all things came into being [egeneto] through the Word).\(^ {61}\)

Thirdly, the LXX uses terminology about ‘fashioning’, which can appear with ideas about making or craftsmen, in Plato’s or Philo’s works or in the scriptures. Philo’s use of ‘démiourgos’ (‘craftsman’) in Opif. comes from Plato, as I have discussed.\(^ {62}\) Plato, as I quoted earlier, speaks of God taking over and fashioning or constructing (making) things.\(^ {63}\) In Wis. 13. 1, God is referred to as ‘technitén’ or ‘craftsman’;\(^ {64}\) and in Wis. 7. 21, Wisdom herself is the ‘technitis’ of all things,\(^ {65}\) which can be translated as ‘craftswoman’ or ‘artisan’;\(^ {66}\) or as ‘fashioner’.\(^ {67}\) The concept of God having ‘fashioned’ God’s works also appears in Gen. 2. 7-8 (LXX), which uses plassō, meaning to ‘form’ or ‘mold’.\(^ {68}\)

---

\(^ {59}\) Wis. 11. 17 (LXX) says that God ‘created the world out of formless matter’. This verse is Wis. 11. 18 (Vulgate). Pietersma and Wright, *A New English Translation of the Septuagint*, pp. 706-707; see also Rahlf-Fanhart, *Septuaginta*, II, p. 361.

\(^ {60}\) Danker, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, pp. 196-199; see also Lust, Eynikel, and Hauspie, *Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint*, pp. 120-121.


\(^ {62}\) Runia, *On the Creation*, pp. 119-120; Plato, *Tim.*, 28A.

\(^ {63}\) This was quoted in section 1.1.2 above. Plato, *Tim.*, 29d-30c.


\(^ {66}\) Lust, Eynikel, and Hauspie, *Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint*, p. 612.

\(^ {67}\) This word is in Wis. 7. 22 in this translation. Pietersma and Wright, *A New English Translation of the Septuagint*, p. 704.

Taking these examples of fashioning or forming into account, it is possible that, according to the LXX or Greek scriptures, God fashioned or formed things without first having created the matter of things ‘out of nothing’. Wis. 11. 17 states that God created out of ‘formless matter’. Gen. 1. 1-2 (LXX) says that ‘the earth was invisible and unformed’ in the beginning when God ‘made’ the heaven and earth. It is a matter of interpretation whether Gen. 1. 1-2, whether read by itself or with Wis. 11. 17 and other passages, can be read to say God created ‘out of nothing’. Philo’s writings that I have examined do not represent belief in creation ‘out of nothing’, although he is said to show signs of being inconsistent in his works. In Opif., he speaks as if ‘material’ existed, which God acted upon, which is compatible with the similar passage from Plato’s Tim. that I discussed. On the other hand, Philo elsewhere says that God created ‘material’. Even so, he is credited by Radice with reducing the Platonist causes of creation from three (the ‘Ideas, Demiurge, matter’) to two (‘God and matter’), because of Philo’s belief that the ‘ideas’ are the ‘products’ of God’s ‘noetic activity’ (and thus not distinct from God). This is related to Philo’s concept that the ‘ideas’ are in the mind of God and are the Logos, which I will discuss below.

69 See Gen. 1. 1-2 (LXX) in Rahlfs-Hanhart, Septuaginta, I, p. 1; Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, p. 6.


71 Philo, Opif., ch. 4, 21-23; Plato, Tim., 29d-30c.


However, the creation terminology of fashioning or forming can be associated either with creation ‘out of nothing’, as it will be in some Christian writings that I will examine in section 1.3, or with God’s engaging in creative acts with material that already existed. One does not have to assume, given the varying statements in the Greek scriptures, that God created something ‘out of nothing’ before fashioning it of forming it. Later Augustine would offer multiple attempts at positing a two-step creation process that allowed for the simultaneous creation of form and matter, based on his readings of Gen. 1. 1-2 with Wis. 11. 17 (18), and sometimes also with Sir. 18. 1.\textsuperscript{74} He also attributed roles in the giving of form or differentiation to creation to the Word / Son, which is a trinitarian view of creation.\textsuperscript{75} The concept of forming things or of forming formless matter is thus significant and applies in varying interpretations of whether creation was out of ‘nothing’ or otherwise.

1.1.4 The Logos, the ‘ideas’, the mind of God, and first principles of creation

Philo held many views of the Logos, which were influenced by the mixture of ideas ‘in the air’ in Alexandria that derived from Platonist and Stoic philosophy, the LXX scriptures, and Jewish thinking. Perhaps because of this mixture, his writings about the Logos are not systematic and do not permit easy summary.\textsuperscript{76} Here, I will discuss only a few examples of how he viewed the Logos because of their potential relevance to Christian thinking on creation, God, and the Logos, and to illustrate problems for thinking about the oneness of God and first principles of creation.

The first example of how Philo understood the Logos that is significant for Christian thinking is what he says, in Opif., about acts of creation and the Logos, the ‘ideas’, the mind of God, and first principles.\textsuperscript{77} He says that God, like an

\textsuperscript{74} I will discuss this in Part II. See Appendix A for a summary of these examples.

\textsuperscript{75} Augustine’s various views on the giving of form or differentiation to creation or created things by the Word / Son are depicted in Appendix B and discussed throughout Part II.


\textsuperscript{77} In the early stages of my arguments here I am indebted to Radice’s arguments about
‘architect’ and ‘builder’, first ‘conceived’ and ‘composed’ the ‘intelligible cosmos’ or ‘incorporeal ideas’, and then, in the second step of a two-step creation process, God used them as a ‘model when he completed the sense-perceptible cosmos’. 78 This argument raises the question of the status of the ‘ideas’ with respect to God. Philo also might be seen, as is suggested by Gregory Sterling, as positing more causes of creation, rather than fewer, when he writes, in Sterling’s words, of the Logos as the ‘through whom’ or ‘instrument’ of creation, in passages that illustrate the ‘metaphysics of prepositions’. 79 If this is true, the question of whether there were two causes of creation also would be relevant to Christian views of the role of the Word as the one ‘through whom’ all things came into being (John 1. 3).

Philo also viewed the ‘ideas’ as being in the divine Logos, and he says that the ‘ideas’ may be the divine Logos.80 Philo writes:

Just as the city that was marked out beforehand in the architect had no location outside, but had been engraved in the soul of the craftsman, in the same way the cosmos composed of the ideas would have no other place than the divine Logos who gives these (ideas) their ordered disposition.81

Philo further asserts that ‘you might say that the intelligible cosmos is nothing else than the Logos of God as he [God] is actually engaged in making the cosmos’.82 Philo then says ‘it is plain that the archetypal seal, which we affirm to be the intelligible cosmos, would itself be the model and archetypal idea of the ideas, the Logos of God’.83

Thus Philo asserts that the ideas are in the mind of God, a concept that was later known to Augustine, although he attributed it to Plato.84 Philo also asserts

Philo’s idea that the ‘ideas’ are the thoughts of God. But my arguments about what this means for Philo’s understanding of the Logos and the citations I provide represent my own research and ideas. My citations here are from Philo, Opif., chs. 3-4, 15-25, pp. 49-52. 78 Philo, Opif., ch. 4, 17-19.
80 Philo, Opif., ch. 3, 15 – ch. 4, 25.
81 Italics added. Philo, Opif., ch. 4, 20.
82 Philo, Opif., ch. 4, 24.
83 Philo, Opif., ch. 4, 25.
84 See div. qu., 46, 2. Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions, in Responses to
that the ideas are *in the Logos* and that the intelligible cosmos *is the Logos*. He may be defending the existence of ‘one’ God who is the Creator. He may also, as Radice says, have reduced the number of ‘first principles’ from three to two, by not giving the ‘ideas’ independence from God as distinct or pre-existing entities.\(^{85}\) However, Philo has not articulated the relationships between God and the other entities Philo names, including the Logos and the ‘ideas’. He also does not explain how God is the sole creator given that God works through these entities in creative acts. Even so, it is clear that Philo’s *hexaemeral* commentary offers examples, as Boyarin’s analysis also shows, of Jewish views from one of the early centuries C.E. on the involvement of entities, such as the Logos, in God’s acts.\(^{86}\) This example will be relevant again in my examination, in section 1.3, of early Christian views.

1.1.5 *Problems Philo leaves ‘on the table’*

Another of the questions that Philo leaves open with his assertions about God, the ‘ideas’, and the Logos is whether something in God’s mind is a ‘part’ of God. If so, it would violate one version of the principle of divine simplicity that is attributed to Platonist influences and was held by some Christians, which stated that God does not have parts.\(^{87}\) Philo illustrates this principle in saying:

> God is not a composite, comprised of many parts, but is unmixed with anything else. For whatever is added to God is either superior or inferior or equal to him, but there is nothing equal or superior to God. And no lesser thing is assimilated to him, otherwise he too will be lessened.\(^{88}\)

One could say that Philo believes that the Logos, being in the mind of God, is

---

\(^{85}\) See section 1.1.3 above. See also Radice, ‘Observations’, p. 127.

\(^{86}\) Boyarin, *Border Lines*, pp. 112-119.

\(^{87}\) The fourth century Athanasius held similar ideas on simplicity similar to Philo’s, as I will discuss in section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2. (I will discuss Augustine’s version of divine simplicity in section 4.4 in Chapter 4.) Here see Toom, *Classical Trinitarian Theology*, p. 22; Lewis Ayres and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, ‘Basil of Caesarea’, in *CHPLA*, I, pp. 459-470 (p. 468); Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (New York: OUP, 2006), pp. 280-282.

equal to or is God, or, if Philo does not believe this, that he has violated his own belief that nothing inferior to God should be mixed with God. This also leaves open a question about the Logos’s divinity.

Philo also calls the Logos ‘the second God’, although it is clear, from his use of ‘pre-Logos God’, that there was a time before the Logos existed. This makes the Logos less than God. Philo writes:

For nothing mortal can be made in the likeness of the most high One and Father of the universe but (only) in that of the second God, who is His Logos. For it was right that the rational (part) of the human soul should be formed as an impression by the divine Logos, since the pre-Logos God is superior to every rational nature.

Other questions about the unity of God and the Logos can be raised from Philo’s other writings. He refers to the Logos as God’s ‘First-born’ (ton prōtōgonon autou logon) and ‘invisible image’ (aeidous eikonos), and ‘the Beginning’ (arché), while he also refers to God as ‘the one Maker and Father of all’ and ‘the One’. These descriptions and titles for the Logos suggest a close relationship between the Logos and God, and Philo’s words are similar to words Christians came to use about the Logos, Son, or Jesus Christ.

Philo does not say, in speaking of the ‘pre-Logos God’, that the Logos is coeternal or coequal with God. However, his ideas suggest confusion about the roles of God and the Logos in creation. This can be seen when he calls the Logos the arché and God the one Maker and Father of all, which could represent two first principles of creation. This is the kind of problem late fourth century Christians, including Gregory of Nazianzus and Augustine, would have to address, in thinking about how the Son/Word of God could be the ‘beginning’, arché, or principium of all created things, while God (the Father) was the ultimate beginning, source, or

---


principle, both for all created things and within the Trinity.\textsuperscript{92}

Philo also is inconsistent on whether the Logos is personal. When he views the Logos as ‘God’s instrument’ in creation, the ‘through whom (di’ ou)’ or the ‘with which’ or ‘by which’ God creates,\textsuperscript{93} being an instrument is impersonal although ‘through whom’ is personal. The Logos does have personal characteristics at times in Philo’s writings, including when it performs a mediating function between God and creation,\textsuperscript{94} a role Boyarin asserts is found only in Jewish and early Jewish Christian versions of Middle Platonism.\textsuperscript{95} The ‘Logos’ also will have multiple meanings for early Christians, as I will discuss in section 1.3. However, the Logos of John 1. 1-3 has to be viewed as personal, given that the full prologue to John associates the Word with the Son and Jesus Christ, as we will see in section 1.2.

Philo’s writings left problems ‘on the table’ because of some inconsistencies. What is left unclear is whether there is one God or perhaps two (whether God and the démiourgos or God and the Logos), or whether the Logos is ‘part’ of or an ‘aspect’ of God. Also not clear are how many first principles were accepted by Philo, whether God and matter or God and the Logos and other entities.

Philo’s ideas about the Logos, the ‘ideas’, or other entities involved with God in

\textsuperscript{92} See section 2.2.4 in Chapter 2 on Gregory. See section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3 on Augustine.
\textsuperscript{95} Boyarin says that while the problem of mediation was ‘the central theological problem of Middle Platonism’, the ‘Logos as divine mediator is found only in Jewish (including Christian) versions of Middle Platonism’. Boyarin draws in part on Virginia Burrus when Boyarin suggests that Philo may have been ‘as much a producer as a consumer of Middle Platonism’. Boyarin, \textit{Border Lines}, pp. 114-116, also 288 FN 23.
creation offer first century views, influenced by his Jewish, Hellenised, Alexandrian
custom, that show that acts of creation may not have been undertaken ‘alone’ by
God, who is nonetheless understood to be ‘one’ God and the only Creator. For
trinitarian thinking, it will ultimately need to be demonstrated that there is only one
Creator who is one God while all three Persons work together in acts of creation.

1.2 The Word / Son, monogenés (theos), and creation in John 1. 1-18

If Philo was inconsistent in writing about the Logos, the author of the prologue
to the Gospel of John (John 1. 1-18), writing a few decades after Philo, offers
several declarations in just eighteen verses.96 The author states that the Logos or
Word (ho logos) ‘was’ (én) with God and ‘was’ (én) God ‘in the beginning’ (en
arché) (1-2), and that ‘all things’ (panta) and ‘the world’ (ho kosmos) came into
being (egeneto) ‘through him’ (di’ autou, 3, 10). The author also states that the
Logos ‘became flesh’ (sarx egeneto) and that his glory was seen ‘as of a father’s
only (or only-begotten) son’ (monogenous para patros, 14). Finally, it is ‘God the
only (or only-begotten) Son’ (monogenês theos), ‘who is close to the Father’s heart
(ton kolpon), who has made [God] known’ (18).97

The prologue’s author only hints at his view of creation, referring to God as
‘Father’ but not ‘Maker’, and leaving the Father’s role in creation implicit. He uses
the creation terminology of ‘coming into being’ (egeneto), and he does not use the
‘making’ or other creation terminology that I described above.98

The author also leaves problems ‘on the table’ for thinking about the one God
who is the Creator, as did Philo, for subsequent Christian thinking on the Trinity.
These include the possibilities that there might be two gods or two principles of
creation (the Word / Son and the Father). Questions also arise about what the
author meant by monogenês in 1. 14, 18, which is relevant to how this word would
be translated or understood in the fourth century, as I will discuss here. Despite
these concerns, the author leaves an early Christian or Jewish Christian text about

96 My citations in this paragraph are from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) of
the Bible and Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum Graece.
97 I will discuss variants for ‘God the only Son’ (v. 18) and the word monogenês below.
98 See section 1.1.3 above.
the Father, the Word / Son / Jesus Christ, and creation that significantly influenced early and patristic Christian thinking on creation and the Trinity.

1.2.1 Authorship and sources of ideas for the prologue to John

Many theories exist about the composition and authorship of the prologue and the Gospel of John. I accept Raymond Brown’s argument that the prologue and body of the Gospel were written by different members of a Johannine school, with the prologue possibly written in Ephesus. Many scholars believe the prologue was based on a hymn, psalm, or poem with ideas about the Logos, and that the verses about John the Baptist (1. 6-8, 15) are insertions. Even so, among some who hold these positions, it is argued that the strands are well integrated, and efforts to focus on compositional theories, rather than on the text as it has been received, can detract from understanding the prologue’s theology. My position, for the purpose of doing historical theology, is that the prologue should be read as an integrated text within itself and with the overall Gospel of John, because this is how it was received by early and patristic Christians.

There are many theories on the influences on the prologue’s author, some of which overlap. Moreover, while the author and Philo both write of the Logos, it is considered likely that this was because they may have shared some common traditions, rather than evidence that the prologue’s author knew Philo’s works. Several proposals exist for Jewish influences on the prologue, and these

---


104 Barrett attributes the emphasis on the ‘Jewish background and origin of the Gospel’ to
influences or sources are likely to have been known to first century Christians of Jewish heritage. They include the Wisdom and Word traditions, including of Wisdom setting up her ‘tabernacle’ in Israel (Sir. 24. 8);\textsuperscript{105} the Exodus Sinai and tabernacle traditions, including ideas about God’s Word, glory, and \textit{Shekinah};\textsuperscript{106} some Aramaic targums and liturgical traditions of synagogues in Palestine, especially the use of the word \textit{Memra} (‘word’);\textsuperscript{107} Hellenistic Judaism;\textsuperscript{108} ‘Hellenistic thinking’ on the Logos in first-century Christian and Jewish thinking;\textsuperscript{109} traditions of Hellenistic Jewish biblical interpretation and \textit{speculation};\textsuperscript{110} ‘Greek-speaking Judaism’;\textsuperscript{111} and the use of LXX scriptures.\textsuperscript{112} The prologue’s author was heavily


\textsuperscript{108} Dodd, \textit{The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel}, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{109} Boyarin, \textit{Border Lines}, pp. 92, also 113-119.

\textsuperscript{110} Tobin, ‘The Prologue of John and Jewish Speculation’; also Tobin, ‘Logos’.

\textsuperscript{111} Runia, \textit{PECL}, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{112} Brown says John typically uses LXX translations, but ‘occasionally there is evidence of use of the Hebrew or of another Greek tradition’. R. Brown, \textit{An Introduction}, p. 201, also 202, 136, 278-281; see also Barrett, \textit{The Gospel According to St. John}, pp. 27-30; Sterling,
influenced by and offers an interpretation of Gen. 1. 1-5, as I will argue. He also drew on traditions about Moses, who is mentioned in John 1. 17.¹¹³

For other Christian influences, the prologue’s author may have known the opening verses of Mark and first chapter of Luke,¹¹⁴ the Pauline letter to the Ephesians,¹¹⁵ and 1 John,¹¹⁶ as well as the full Gospel of John.

For philosophical influences, the author is said to have been influenced mainly by the ‘popular Platonism’ of his day,¹¹⁷ or ideas that were ‘in the air’.¹¹⁸ I will argue that he was familiar with, but did not accept, some Platonist ideas.

1.2.2 Creation, the Word (Logos), and the Father

Neither the prologue’s view on creation nor its ideas that might represent early trinitarian thinking are well developed. They primarily take the form of assertions. However, the author makes statements that were drawn upon by later Christians in their writings on creation and the Trinity. Here I will offer a brief commentary on the prologue to illustrate some of the author’s potential perspectives, and to lay a foundation for my subsequent discussions of how his ideas were interpreted.

First, the prologue’s author uses the ‘dia’ (‘through’) terminology (John 1. 3, 10) that is attributed in part to the Middle Platonist concept of ‘the metaphysics of prepositions’, which might suggest the Word was an ‘instrument’, and a cause, of creation, with God.¹¹⁹ This terminology also appears in other New Testament

¹ “Day One”, p. 121; Runia, PECL, p. 64. ¹¹³ Brown says John ‘mentions Moses twice as frequently’ as other Gospels. Evans reads the prologue in two halves, the second reflecting the Moses and Exodus traditions at Sinai. R. Brown, An Introduction, pp. 134-135; C. Evans, Word and Glory, pp. 81-82.
¹¹⁸ As noted above, the phrase ‘in the air’ is from Terrien, The Elusive Presence, p. 420.
¹¹⁹ These are Sterling’s ideas, but he draws in part on Tobin. Sterling, ‘Prepositional Metaphysics’, pp. 226-233; Tobin, ‘The Prologue of John and Jewish Speculation’.
scriptures, and is said to reflect Jewish and Christian liturgical and worship practices, so it is representative of early Christian thinking in addition to perhaps philosophical ideas. The prologue is distinctive, though, from other Christian scriptures and non-Christian Jewish and philosophical traditions, in saying that ‘the Word became flesh and lived among us’ (John 1. 14).

The combination of ideas about the Word being incarnate as Jesus Christ, and the use of the preposition ‘dia’ in statements about the Word’s role in creation, signals that the Word was not an impersonal instrument but rather had personal agency, with God, ‘in the beginning’. This could raise the question, as for Philo’s works, of whether this suggests, if unintentionally, two causes or first principles of creation. In the prologue, however, while the Word’s role in creation, not the Father’s, is emphasised, the preposition ‘dia’ implies that God’s agency is primary.

Second, John 1. 1-5 is an early Christian or Jewish Christian commentary on Gen. 1. 1-5. Sterling points out that the parallels between John 1. 1-5 and Gen. 1. 1-5 (LXX) include the use of the words en arché, én, theos, egeneto, phós, and forms of skotia, in the same order. The most famous commonality is that both

---

120 According to Sterling, the use of the ‘metaphysics of prepositions’ in John 1. 3, 10; 1 Cor. 8. 6b; Col. 1. 15-20; and Heb. 1. 2 represents Middle Platonist influences on ideas about Christ. Rom. 11. 36, 1 Cor. 8. 6a, and Heb. 2. 10 represent the application to God of a similar ‘Stoic formulation’. Tobin, whom Sterling cites, sees both Middle Platonist and Hellenistic Jewish influences on the prologue’s use of prepositions. Sterling says the passages cited reflect Jewish and early Christian liturgical and worship practices, and Brown mentions the ‘quasi-liturgical formula’. These points are worthy of investigation, in light of the known influence of the principle of lex orandi lex credendi on the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. Sterling, ‘Prepositional Metaphysics’, pp. 231-233, 237; Sterling, ‘“Day One”’, pp. 126-127; Tobin, ‘The Prologue of John and Jewish Speculation’; R. Brown, The Gospel, p. 25; Borgen, Philo, John and Paul, p. 78.

121 Boyarin asserts that the incarnation, not logos theology, sets the prologue apart from Jewish thinking. Terrien says ‘the unprecedented character of the statement’ in John 1. 14, in contrast to Wisdom and Shekinah traditions, is seen in that the ‘verb “encamped” … stands in close parallelism with the words “became flesh”’, which means the ‘presence of God was for a time contained in a human person’. Brown says that the logos’s becoming flesh would have been ‘unthinkable’ to Greeks who ‘aspired to be joined with God in His universe’, rather than the other way around. Boyarin, Border Lines, pp. 104-105, 125; Terrien, The Elusive Presence, pp. 419-420; R. Brown, The Gospel, p. 31.

122 Borgen’s list of common words is similar to Sterling’s but does not include én and egeneto. Borgen argues that John 1:1-5 ‘is the basic exposition of Gen. 1:1-5, while John 1:6 ff. elaborates on the terms and phrases from John 1:1-5’. Boyarin, following V. Burrus, argues that John 1. 1-5 is a midrash on the first verses of Genesis, read in light of Prov. 8.
passages start with *en arché* or ‘in the beginning’. A more subtle commonality is that ‘was’ (*én*) is used in John 1. 1, to say the Word ‘was’ in the beginning and ‘was’ God, and in Gen. 1. 2, where ‘was’ can suggest that the earth, which ‘was invisible and unformed’, existed in the beginning.\(^{123}\) Gen. 1. 1-2 is ambiguous about whether both God and matter existed when God began to create in the beginning, but the prologue to John is clear that the Word ‘was’ with God before creation (John 1. 1-3). The parallels between Gen. 1 1-5 and John 1. 1-5 also include the idea that light, in contrast to darkness, came into the world.\(^{124}\)

The prologue and Genesis seem to view creation as having taken place in primordial time. The prologue, though, does not offer a multi-step theory of creation in the philosophical sense, nor a multi-day theory, as in Genesis. It simply says that everything came into being through the Word (John 1. 1-3), without distinguishing between intelligible and sense-perceptible things as Philo did.\(^{125}\) The prologue also left room for varying interpretations, some temporal, some otherwise, because its author did not clarify what he meant by *en arché* (1. 1), which can mean in the beginning, source, origin, principle, or first cause.\(^{126}\)

Further, the prologue does not mention pre-existing matter, which provides a potential contrast to Gen. 1. 1-5 (because Gen. 1. 1-2 can be read to say that matter existed in the beginning). It is possible for all things to have come into being through the Word without creation ‘out of nothing’ being implied. However, I will argue that Irenaeus’s belief that the Word / Son was an agent of creation,

---

\(^{123}\) The English translation of Gen. 1. 2 is from Pietersma and Wright, *A New English Translation of the Septuagint*, p. 6.

\(^{124}\) Dodd sees a ‘real affinity’ between the prologue and Philo because of their shared use of some symbols (e.g., light). Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, pp. 54-55.

\(^{125}\) Sterling argues that the ‘shift’ from the use of *én* to *egeneto* in John 1. 1-5, which is paralleled by a similar shift in Gen. 1. 1-5, suggests ‘plays that Plato made’ that became standard ways for ‘later Platonists to distinguish between the eternal world of the ideas and the sense-perceptible world’. Sterling thinks the prologue’s author considered Gen. 1. 1-5 as ‘textual warrant’ for a similar understanding. Sterling, ‘“Day One”’, pp. 124-125.

which was based on John 1. 1-3 and other sources, added a christological and pre-
trinitarian element to the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’.\(^\text{127}\)

Third, the ‘Father’ is transcendent, because ‘no one’ except the Son has seen
him, and it is the Son who reveals him (1. 18). However, the idea that the Word
who was involved in creative acts became flesh suggests that the Creator(s) and
creation are connected, and the role of the Word goes beyond one of mediation, to
one of participation in creation. The rich interpretations of 1. 14 offered by scholars
who see in ‘\textit{eskénōsen en hémin}’ the influence of the tabernacle traditions also
suggest that the presence of the Word in creation, even for a while, means there is
not a radical separation between Creator and creation.

Fourth, the prologue does not refer to the ‘Father’ as ‘Maker’, nor use the
‘making’ version of creation terminology that I described. That it uses ‘coming into
being’ (\textit{egeneto}), and not also ‘making’, terminology provides a contrast to Gen. 1.
1 – 2. 4 (LXX), which uses \textit{both}.\(^\text{128}\) An Aramaic targum on Gen. 1. 1 – 2. 4 also
alters between ‘creating’ and making terminology,\(^\text{129}\) as does the Hebrew
text.\(^\text{130}\) It is not known whether the prologue’s author knew the Hebrew text, but he
was likely to have known about targum traditions according to many scholars. Thus
his use of only one form of creation terminology provides a contrast to multiple
traditions or texts of Gen. 1.

Given both that John 1. 1-5 is an interpretation of the Gen. 1. 1-5 (LXX), and
that the prologue’s author may have been influenced by traditions reflected in the
targums, my proposal is that the author’s \textit{not} using ‘making’ or ‘Maker’ terminology
was an intentional move. In the prologue’s eighteen verses, the author indicates

\[^{127}\text{See section 1.3.3.}\]
\[^{128}\text{See section 1.1.3.}\]
\[^{129}\text{McNamara’s translation shows this alternating pattern. He says, drawing on B.}
\text{Grossfeld, that when ‘the Hebrew word refers to the creation of the world’, Nf uses ‘create’,}
\text{but ‘made’ is used otherwise. Martin McNamara, translation, apparatus, and notes,}
\text{Targum Neofiti 1: Genesis, The Aramaic Bible, 1A (Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier}
\text{Book, Liturgical Press, 1992), pp. 53-56, including FN 7 on p. 53.}\]
\[^{130}\text{Moltmann, as noted above, asserts that ‘creating’ in Gen. 1. 1 refers to creation as a}
\text{whole, as the targum cited above does. Westermann argues that the Hebrew text uses}
\text{‘create’ and ‘make’ without distinction in some places in Gen. 1. 1-2. 4. Westermann,}
\text{Genesis 1-11, pp. 77-78, 86, 88; Moltmann, \textit{God in Creation}, pp. 72-79; Walter}
\text{Brueggemann, \textit{Genesis}, Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Preaching and Teaching}
that God (the Father of the Son) and the Word (who is the Son and Jesus Christ) were responsible for bringing into being all that exists. This more personal view of the Word as also being the Son of God and Jesus Christ, through whom all things came into being, provides a contrast to the Platonist and Philonic views of God ‘making’ things through the Logos or the démiourgos. It is challenging to put forth a ‘negative argument’ based on an author’s not using certain words. However, that the author did not use ‘making’ or ‘Maker’ terminology but offers a personal view of the Logos suggests that he may have been aware of, and rejected, Platonist ideas. This does not have to entail the author’s having had direct knowledge of Plato’s or Philo’s works. He may have rejected the Platonist ideas that were ‘in the air’.

Fifth, John refers to God as ‘Father’ more often than do the other gospels, and this is said to convey that to know God ‘is to know God as the Father of the Son’, an understanding the prologue’s author may have held. However, it also is possible that the author was offering an alternative view of the Father, alternative, that is, to Platonist and Jewish views of ‘Maker’ and ‘Father’. There is a suggestion of intimacy between Father and Son, when one combines the prologue’s opening and closing verses: the Word was ‘with’ God in the beginning (‘pros’, in v. 1, can mean ‘by, at, near’), and the Son is close to the Father’s ‘heart’ (‘ton kolpon’, in v. 18, can be translated ‘bosom’, as in John 13. 23). This intimacy could be explored for what it suggests about trinitarian relations.

1.2.3 Questions about ‘monogenés’ in John 1. 14, 18

One of the intriguing questions that has ramifications for Greek and Latin terminology used in writings on creation and the Trinity in the fourth century is what the prologue’s author meant by ‘monogenés’ in John 1. 14, 18. Jerome, in his fourth century Latin translations of the Gospels, used ‘unigenitus’ (often translated as ‘only-begotten’) for ‘monogenés’ in John 1. 14, 18; 3. 16, 18, and ‘unicus’ (‘only’) in Luke; some scholars argue that Jerome did this to make the text of John compatible with Nicene credal language and Gregory of Nazianzus’s writings.

---

133 Moody, whose article is the primary source for this information, argues that monogenés
Jerome also is thought to have been challenging ‘the Arian claim that Jesus was not begotten but made’.\textsuperscript{134} I will revisit these perspectives in Chapter 2, in an in-depth study of the understandings of \textit{monogenés} that may have been held by Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and Eunomius, and how these related to ideas about ‘modes of origin’.\textsuperscript{135} There and in my analysis in Chapter 3 of Augustine’s understandings of ‘\textit{unigenitus}’ and ‘\textit{unicus}’, I will argue that Jerome was not the only fourth century Christian to have influenced how \textit{monogenés} was understood, whether in the prologue to John, the creeds, or polemical and theological writings, and that Augustine himself says that \textit{unigenitus} means \textit{unicus} (only).\textsuperscript{136}

Even so, it is of interest here to explore what \textit{monogenés} may have meant in the first century, for the prologue’s author and others, in order to lay groundwork for how the translations and definitions of this word in the prologue and other texts influenced later writings on creation and the Trinity. One of the questions to be asked about the prologue to John, which I will ask again for fourth century writings, is whether \textit{monogenés} was intended to say something about the way in which the Word / Son / Jesus Christ ‘came into being’ or his ‘mode of origin’, or whether it says something else about his uniqueness. A second question to be asked about the prologue’s author is whether he was aware of Plato’s use of ‘\textit{monogenés}’ at the end of \textit{Tim.}, and was rejecting Plato’s ideas about the status of the cosmos while he also was promoting the status of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ.

\textsuperscript{135} See my case study on ‘\textit{monogenés}’ in section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{136} See my case study on ‘\textit{unigenitus}’ and ‘\textit{unicus}’ in section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3.
The word *monogenēs* is understood by many scholars today to mean 'single of its kind, only', 'the only member of a kin or kind', or 'uniqueness of being', and these meanings do not reflect *the way* in which something or someone comes into being (i.e., by or through being begotten, as opposed to being created).\(^{137}\) These meanings stem from *monogenēs* being understood as '“of a single [monos] kind [genos]”', and can refer to an only child or to a person who is unique.\(^{138}\) These meanings, as I will argue in Chapter 2, do not include theological ideas which may have influenced understandings of *monogenēs* in the fourth century, where the word as used in fourth century writings has been translated into English as ‘only-begotten’. That translation, which implies that *monogenēs* means something about how the Word / Son / Jesus Christ came into being, may be wrong and is likely related to fourth century controversies.\(^{139}\) Here it should be noted that some biblical scholars do think of *monogenēs* as having a more ‘heightened’ meaning when it is applied to Jesus, and that in the Gospel of John it does signify ‘only-begotten’ or ‘begotten of the Only One’.\(^{140}\) However, this position too is influenced by theological or doctrinal beliefs being read ‘into’ John.

---


\(^{138}\) This is from Brown, who draws on Moody. Beasley-Murray gives the same definitions Brown says ‘[a]lthough *genos* is distantly related to *gennan*, “to beget,” there is little Greek justification for the translation of *monogenēs* as “only begotten.”’ Brown says, drawing on Moody, that Old Latin translations prior to Jerome used ‘*unicus*’ or (‘only’) for *monogenēs*, and Jerome did too, except when *monogenēs* applied to Jesus. Morris, who also draws on Moody, asserts that *monogenēs* comes from *ginomai* not *gennaō*, and is not related etymologically to begetting. However, Skarsaune says that meanings of being begotten can be taken from ‘*genes*’ and ‘*gennao*’, although he believes the ‘Johannine meaning’ of *monogenēs* is more likely ‘only one of its kind’. R. Brown, *The Gospel*, pp. 13-14; Beasley-Murray, *John*, p. 14; L. Morris, *The Gospel According to John*, p. 93; Moody, ‘God’s Only Son’, pp. 213-215 and entire article; Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, p. 44; see also Kevin Giles, *The Eternal Generation of the Son: Maintaining Orthodoxy in Trinitarian Theology*, with a foreword by Robert Letham (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), pp. 64-65.

\(^{139}\) I will argue this in section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.

Another possibility for understanding *monogenés* is that it is synonymous with *agapétos*, which is usually translated as ‘beloved’. Some scholars support this by saying that the former word can suggest a ‘beloved child’, or, conversely, that the latter can mean ‘only child’. Such connections between *monogenés* and *agapétos* appear in LXX translations of Old Testament books. Connections also appear in a work by an unknown author which is attributed to Athanasius. This author associates words from John 1. 18 about the Son being in the bosom of the Father with Mt. 3. 17’s account of the Father’s saying to Jesus, at his baptism, that he is God’s ‘beloved Son’. I will look at these meanings again in Chapter 2.

The word *monogenés* also could have been taken from Wis. 7. 22, although it is one of a long list of attributes of Wisdom and does not stand out. It also is not known whether the author of the prologue to John knew of the book of Wisdom.

---


145 See the case study in section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.

However, *monogenés* appears prominently at the end of Plato’s *Tim.*, where the dual ideas that the cosmos is *‘monogenés’* and a ‘god’ appear:

For this our Cosmos … it being itself a visible Living Creature embracing the visible creatures, *a perceptible God* made in the image of the intelligible, most great and good and fair and perfect in its generation – even this one *Heaven sole of its kind [monogenés].*\(^\text{147}\)

Similar ideas and words appear in the expression *‘monogenés theos’*, in one textual tradition of John 1. 18, which suggests that the Son is God (and from which one might infer that he is a ‘second God’).\(^\text{148}\) It is worth considering whether the prologue’s author used *monogenés* or *monogenés theos* because he was aware of Plato’s claims about the cosmos in *Tim.*. As I suggested, the author would not have to have had direct knowledge of the *Tim.*; these Platonist ideas about the cosmos and use of *‘monogenés’* may have been generally known. If he had known these ideas, he may have been announcing that it was *not* the cosmos, but the Word / Son / Jesus Christ, who is worthy of being described *both* as one of a kind and as God.\(^\text{149}\) The author does say that *‘ho kosmos’* came into being through the Word (John 1. 10), which implies that the cosmos is not worthy of being called ‘god’. So it is possible that the author was arguing against Plato’s view of the cosmos in *Tim.*, just as I proposed that he rejected Platonist ‘Maker’ and ‘making’ terminology.

1.2.4 Problems left ‘on the table’ for trinitarian thinking on God and creation

The prologue offers challenges for trinitarian thinking because the author does

\(^{147}\) The word *‘monogenés’* is the penultimate word in *Tim.*. Bury’s translation is cited here. Waterfield’s is that the universe is ‘single, the only one of its kind’. This passage is also cited by Pelikan. Plato, *Tim.*, 92c, also 31b (Bury); Plato, *Tim.*, 92c, also 31b (Waterfield); see also Pelikan, *What Has Athens … ?*, pp. 101, 92.

\(^{148}\) Textual variants exist for v. 18. According to Brown, *‘monogenés theos’* (*‘God the only Son’*) is supported by the best Greek manuscripts, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, and *‘monogenés huios’* (*‘the Son, the only one’*) by Athanasius, Chrysostom, and Latin Fathers. Pelikan asserts that ‘only-begotten God’ is ‘so well attested in the manuscripts’ that more ‘critical texts’ have accepted *theos*, but many commentators and translators are reluctant to accept this as the original or better reading. According to O’Day, v. 18 ‘engendered controversy among even its earliest interpreters, because it is sometimes read as claiming that the Son is a second God’. R. Brown, *The Gospel*, pp. 17, 13-14; Pelikan, *What Has Athens … ?*, p. 102; O’Day, ‘The Gospel of John’, p. 523.

\(^{149}\) This is my argument. Pelikan says the prologue’s author might have been drawing on either Wisdom or Plato’s *Tim.* here. Pelikan, *What Has Athens … ?*, p. 101.
not say whether the Word / Son / Jesus Christ is co-equal with God / the Father. One also could question whether two gods are suggested because the Word ‘was’ in the beginning with God and ‘was’ God, and the Son may have been called ‘monogenês theos’ in John 1. 18. One has to read the prologue with the remainder of John to take in the full import of what this gospel says about the relationship of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ with God / the Father: it says, near the end, that the Apostle Thomas called Jesus ‘My Lord and My God (ho theos mou).’

As my later analysis will show, the prologue, with its distinctive words like monogenês, and small words or prepositions (e.g., ‘was’ and ‘through’), as well as its ideas about God, the Logos, and creation, was drawn upon by Christians in the early centuries. The statement that all things came into being through the Word (who is the Son / Jesus Christ) was used by Christians, often in conjunction with Gen. 1, in theological and / or polemical writings about creation, and this included ‘heretical’ Christians. Significantly, and as I will argue in Part II, Augustine’s creation theology and his trinitarian thinking were greatly shaped by ideas in Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 about the roles of God’s words and the Word in creation.

1.3 Acts of creation, the one Creator God, and pre-trinitarian ideas in second and third century theology

Beginning just before the middle of the second century, some Christians undertook apologetic and polemical writings. Three major categories of these works were those against Romans and ‘pagans’, because of their philosophical and religious ideas and persecution of Christians; those against ways of thinking within Christianity that came to be deemed ‘heretical’, and were contrary to commonly accepted Christian tradition, rules of faith, and liturgical practices of the day; and those against Jewish ideas. As will be seen, some of these apologetic

---

150 See John 20. 28. According to Thompson, even without John 1. 18, John 1. 1 and 20. 28 ‘provide the clearest designations of Jesus as God in the NT’. M. Thompson, The God of the Gospel of John, p. 8.
151 See sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 below, and 2.2.3.1 in Chapter 2.
152 On the types of writings and influences of persecutions, see Ludlow. On the concept of early ‘heretical’ ideas, Hill asserts that although doctrine was not fully established at this time, many Christians held tenets of faith in common and recognized deviations. Hill thus says ‘orthodox’ or ‘catholic’ can be used for early Christians. Bray asserts that the early
or polemical writings include ideas about creation and God and early trinitarian ideas, and they also draw on beliefs in one God or the creator from early rules of faith. Among the other writings produced in this period were commentaries or sermons on Genesis and the Gospel of John, including Origen’s commentaries, although Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 also were drawn upon in other works.153

In this early period, some orthodox / catholic thinkers put forth arguments that represent principles of the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and other ideas about creation (e.g., fashioning or forming).154 In this period, moreover, suggesting that there were ‘two Gods’, as the ‘heretic’ Marcion did, raised new questions. In my analysis above, I identified ideas in Philo’s works about the Logos and other entities being involved with God that might suggest there were two gods. I also suggested that this could be a concern for the prologue to John’s views on the Word’s role with the Father in creation. As ‘heretical’ Christian views emerged in the second century in response to the existence of evil, a dual question arose: whether there is only one God who is both the Creator of all there is (including good and evil) and also the Father of the Son / Jesus Christ / Word.155 This is not


Widdicombe calls Origen ‘the most significant commentator on the Gospel of John (and Scripture as a whole) prior to the Council of Nicea’. Young uses Origen’s commentaries and exegetical homilies as examples of ‘the emergence of formal biblical scholarship within the Christian tradition’. Peter Widdicombe, ‘The Fathers on the Father in the Gospel of John’, Semeia, 85 (1999), 105-125 (p. 105); Frances Young, ‘Concluding Review: The Literary Culture of the Third Century’, in CHECL, pp. 172-178 (p. 173, also 174-175); see also Andrew Louth, ed., Genesis 1-11, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, Old Testament, 1 (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), p. xxxix.

As noted above, Hill says ‘orthodox’ or ‘catholic’ can be used for this period. I use ‘orthodox / catholic’ to leave room for Christians in the East, West, or Alexandria. For my analysis of ‘creation terminology’, including fashioning or forming, see section 1.1.3.

a fully trinitarian question, but it is about understanding God as one and Creator, and some early Christians presented pre-trinitarian ideas in their arguments.

The authors I have selected to represent orthodox / catholic thinking and responses to questions such as these are Justin and Irenaeus for second century Greek writings, Tertullian for late second and early third century Latin writings, and Origen for a third century Alexandrian Greek perspective. Irenaeus’s ideas are the most significant to my thesis, because his views on both creation and the Trinity were still considered role models by Colin Gunton in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{156} The ideas of Origen, by contrast, were both influential and controversial, in early and later centuries.\textsuperscript{157} Even so, some of Origen’s ideas, especially those which draw on Gen. 1 or John 1. 1-3, are of interest here. Origen also is credited with transmitting Philo’s works and ideas to early Christians, as I will discuss.

1.3.1 Sources of philosophical, scriptural, and theological ideas

Given my objective in the historical theological parts of this thesis of identifying sources and lines of transmission of ideas about creation and the Trinity, I will begin with a brief survey of the ideas or sources that may have been drawn upon by the authors whose works I will examine. This survey discusses philosophical, scriptural, and theological sources, and I will examine rules of faith in section 1.3.2.

Early orthodox / catholic authors drew on philosophical ideas in their apologetic and other writings, as they were developing their Christian views.\textsuperscript{158} In keeping with my interest in appropriations of Platonism, I will cite specific examples of


Platonist influences in my analysis below. Platonism also underwent significant changes in this period, with Neoplatonism emerging in the second quarter of the third century. Origen probably studied with Ammonius Saccas, a Platonist who taught the third-century Plotinus, who is credited, along with his own student Porphyry, with founding Neoplatonism. The Platonist ideas relevant to the topics I will discuss below come primarily from Plato’s *Tim.* and Middle Platonism. However, my analysis assumes that third-century Christians were also influenced by Neoplatonist ideas that were ‘in the air’.

Philo’s works were known to Origen, and Runia credits Origen for bringing copies of his works to Palestinian Caesarea after Origen left Alexandria. Runia also shows that Origen was the source of a major line of their transmission among Christians, a line to which a priest (Pamphilus) and Eusebius of Caesarea made significant contributions in the late third and early fourth centuries. According to Runia, Origen considered Philo a predecessor in an exegetical tradition that included allegorical interpretations. Philo and Origen also are part of a tradition of undertaking *hexaemeral* commentaries that was continued by Basil of Caesarea, Ambrose, Augustine, and others. However, we have no certain evidence for

---

162 Plotinus, who taught for many years, only began writing around 254. Remes, *Neoplatonism*, pp. 19-20.
163 For Runia’s research on Origen, see Runia, *PECL*, pp. 16-24, 157-183, 212-234.
165 Runia, *PECL*, p. 163.
166 I will discuss Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies in section 2.3 in Chapter 2, and Augustine’s *hexaemeral* commentaries throughout Chapters 3 and 4. On the existence of this
Philo’s influence on Christian reflection on God and creation in this period.\textsuperscript{167}

The scriptures were sources of Jewish and Christian ideas in the second and third centuries, but translations and texts varied. Christians in this period primarily used LXX translations of the Jewish scriptures, but different LXX texts and other translations existed.\textsuperscript{168} By Tertullian’s time in late second century North Africa, some Latin translations of scriptures were available, including of New Testament writings,\textsuperscript{169} and ‘Old Latin’ (‘OL’) translations were made from LXX translations.\textsuperscript{170} Origen was a biblical scholar and commentator in addition to writing theological works, and he had access to some Hebrew texts of the scriptures, as well as LXX translations and the Greek translations of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion; he also was aware of where LXX texts differed from the Hebrew, although Joseph Trigg says Origen primarily cited LXX translations.\textsuperscript{171}

While scholars disagree about the status of the Gospel of John among early orthodox / catholic Christians, Charles Hill makes persuasive arguments about its use not only by ‘heretical’ groups, such as gnostics and Valentinians, who often are said to be the earliest second-century Christians to use John extensively, but also


\textsuperscript{167} Runia shows that some scholars believe that some early Christian authors knew of Philo’s works, but there is no conclusive evidence before Clement of Alexandria. Runia, \textit{PECL}, pp. 132-156; see also Winston, ‘Philo of Alexandria’, in \textit{CHPLA}, p. 256.


\textsuperscript{170} Dines, \textit{The Septuagint}, pp. 10-11.

by early second century orthodox / catholic writers. Justin, for example, the earliest author I discuss here, seems to draw on the prologue if implicitly, as I will show. I will argue that the use of John 1. 1-3 by some authors, especially Irenaeus, adds christological or pre-trinitarian content to the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and other ideas about creation.

The word ‘logos’ continued to have many meanings, which stemmed from a mix of philosophical, scriptural, and theological sources and ideas ‘in the air’, as it did in the first century. ‘Logos’ could refer to spoken expression; reason; a principle of immanent rationality in human beings; a principle of order in the cosmos; a design or plan, whether in God’s mind or the cosmos; a principle of revelation; or the Word of God as expressed through Jesus Christ or the scriptures. Justin, who is known for his ‘logos theology’, thought that the Logos had spoken to the Patriarchs and Plato, which allowed for common ground between the revelations made to them and to Christians. The word ‘Logos’ also was a title for Jesus Christ or the Son.

Moreover, Justin’s writings provide evidence that the assumption that logos theology in this period did not come from the prologue to John is not true. For

---

172 Hill offers extensive arguments about the use of John by orthodox / catholic writers, including Justin. May, by contrast, believes the ‘heretical’ Valentinians were the first to use John ‘widely’, and that Justin did not use John. C. Hill, The Johannine Corpus, pp. 1-10; G. May, Creatio Ex Nihilo, pp. 64-66, 175, also 78, 99, 113.

173 Hill’s primary arguments about Justin’s use of the prologue are on pp. 312-325. Hill concludes that ‘[i]t can no longer be claimed that Justin was ignorant of, avoided, or rejected the Gospel of John’ (p. 351). C. Hill, The Johannine Corpus, pp. 312-351.


177 Chadwick, for example, says there was ‘no real Johannine influence’ discernible on
example, Justin says that ‘Reason Himself’ took ‘shape’ and became ‘man’, and Justin connects this ‘Reason’ with ‘Jesus Christ’. This is a clear allusion to John 1. 1 and 1. 14, and Justin’s words bring together the Logos, incarnation, and Jesus Christ, as does the prologue to John.

Another development in this period is that ideas about the ‘beginning’ and creation were taken from Prov. 8. 22-31, in addition to Gen. 1. 1 and John 1. 1. In Prov. 8. 22-23, Wisdom says: ‘The Lord created me as the beginning (archén) of his ways, for the sake of his works. Before the present age he founded me, in the beginning (en arché).’ Interpretations of these words by Arius and others in the fourth century would contribute to the Arian-related controversies. In the second and third centuries these verses, and verses from the book of Wisdom, were read by Christians to apply to the Son or the Spirit. I will argue that some confusion about the Persons of the Trinity was created as a result, if unintentionally.

Some orthodox / catholic authors in this period had access to the works of other Christians, including works that cited and argued against ‘heretical’ ideas. It is almost certain that Tertullian, in Against Hermogenes, drew upon the writings of the second-century Theophilus of Antioch, whom Gerhard May credits as being one of the founders of the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, and May believes Justin’s thinking, which leads Chadwick to claim: ‘So here we have the strange paradox that the man chiefly responsible for making the Logos idea at home in Christian theology was little influenced by St. John. It is not even certain that he had read Philo.’ Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, p. 4.

178 This is from C. Hill, The Johannine Corpus, p. 317. Cyril Richardson’s translation is: ‘Reason himself, who took form and became man and was called Jesus Christ’. Justin, The First Apology, 5, p. 245.

179 Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, p. 629; Rahlfs-Hanhart, Septuaginta, II, p. 196.


181 For example, Marmion and Van Nieuwenhove say: ‘As agent of creation, and with God in the beginning, the Logos performs the same function as Sophia or Wisdom in the Old Testament (Prov. 8:22-31). As a real personification of the Logos, Jesus embodies God’s wisdom.’ Marmion and Van Nieuwenhove, An Introduction to the Trinity, pp. 42-43, 30-34; see also Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, I, pp. 61, 78, 186.
that Irenaeus may have known one of Theophilus’s works against Marcion.\textsuperscript{182} If this is true, authors who wrote in Greek or Latin, and lived in the West (Irenaeus had moved to Gaul) or in North Africa, had access to emerging orthodox / catholic ideas about creation ‘out of nothing’. They also had access to the ideas of the ‘heretics’ Hermogenes and Marcion from the works of Theophilus, who was in Antioch.\textsuperscript{183} Tertullian is a source for our knowledge of Marcion’s ideas,\textsuperscript{184} and Irenaeus, in \textit{Against Heresies}, for Valentinian ideas.\textsuperscript{185} Thus interchanges of texts and ideas took place among Greek and Latin Christians, in East and in West.

\textbf{1.3.2 First principles of faith: the one God as Father, Maker, and Fashioner}

Another significant source of theological ideas in this period was ‘apostolic tradition’, which represented what orthodox / catholic Christians were said to believe, and was passed on through credal statements or statements of faith.\textsuperscript{186} Ideas about God as ‘Father’ and ‘maker’ are said to have been ‘commonplaces’ of such early Christian confessions.\textsuperscript{187} However, it is possible that early statements of faith, which seem to reflect a mix of Platonist and Christian terminology – if not also the ideas underlying the terminology – about God as ‘Father and Maker’, were passed on in the early centuries as tenets of orthodox / catholic faith without the potential philosophical influences acknowledged. Without further analysis, one cannot conclude, as Gunton and Robert Jenson do, that these tenets of faith are

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textbf{183} This point is partly attributed to May. G. May, \textit{Creatio Ex Nihilo}, p. 159. \\
\textbf{187} Kelly makes this point in arguing that the description of God the Father as ‘maker of heaven and earth’ does not seem to be an addition to earlier credal statements, made in response to ‘heretics’ such as Marcion. J. Kelly, \textit{Early Christian Creeds}, pp. 64-65.
\end{tabular}
exclusively Christian or scriptural. A few examples will illustrate the mix of terminology (and perhaps ideas) about the one God as Father, Maker, and Fashioner that were claimed as part of the apostolic faith.

Justin, in describing mid-second century worship practices, says that ‘over all that we receive we bless the Maker [τὸν ποιήτην] of all things through his Son Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit.’ The word ‘Father’ is not used, but can be inferred from the Son. Justin does use ‘Father’ when he says ‘the president of the brethren … sends up praise and glory to the Father of the universe through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit…’ However, the idea that the Father is Father of the universe could reflect Platonist terminology, such as that in Tim. that I cited above. As I discussed, ‘making’ terminology is common in the LXX as one type of creation terminology. One would have to demonstrate that the title ‘Maker’ (ποιήτην), for God, also was common in the LXX or in early Christian traditions to establish that it was not likely influenced by Platonist terminology. On the other hand, Plato and Philo use ποιήτην for God as ‘Father and Maker’, and Plato speaks of ‘the Maker and Father of this Universe’ (using ‘ποιήτην καὶ πατέρα’).

Irenaeus, later in the second century, also uses words that reflect a mix of influences. In Against Heresies, where he is adding ‘proofs from the scriptures’ to support his arguments against the ‘heretical’ Valentinians, Irenaeus writes:

188 Gunton asserts that Irenaeus was concerned ‘with the theology of creation as an interpretation of the first article of the Christian creed, itself a summary of the teaching of scripture as a whole’ (Gunton does not mention that this is not in the Old Roman or Latin creeds). Jenson says that ‘early rules of faith and baptismal creeds’ speak of the ‘one God’ who is ‘Creator’ and ‘Father’, and he claims that ‘what is thus established as a rule of faith and an essential item of the creed is simply the biblical assertion itself, against the rather straightforwardly contrary views of pagan antiquity.’ Colin E. Gunton, ‘Between Allegory and Myth: The Legacy of the Spiritualising of Genesis’, in The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, ed. by Colin E. Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), pp. 47-62 (p. 48); Robert W. Jenson, ‘Aspects of a Doctrine of Creation’, in The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, ed. by Colin E. Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), pp. 17-28 (p. 18).

189 The Greek is from Thesaurus Lingua Graeca, 67.2. Justin, First Apology, 67, p. 287; see also J. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, p. 71.


191 See, e.g., Plato, Tim., 28c-29a.

192 This word does not appear to used in the LXX to refer to God. See Lust, Eynikel, and Hauspie, Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint, p. 502.

193 See my analysis in section 1.1.2 above. See also Plato, Tim., 28c-29a.
Such are the first principles of the Gospel [by which he means all four gospels]:
one God, the maker of this universe, who was proclaimed by the prophets and
gave the law through Moses. They [the first principles] proclaim the Father of
our Lord Jesus Christ and know no other God or Father but him.\textsuperscript{194}

Here Irenaeus suggests that the ‘one God’, the maker of the universe, and hence
the Creator of all things, is the Father of the Son, but ‘maker of this universe’ also
resonates with Platonist terminology. Irenaeus also is defending that the God of
the Gospels (of the New Testament) is the God of the Old Testament.

In \textit{On the Apostolic Preaching}, Irenaeus speaks of ‘one God’ who is the Father
who ‘made’ and ‘created’ everything, and he uses a variety of creation terminology
that likely comes from multiple sources. He writes:

For it is necessary that things that have come into being have received the
origin of their being (\textit{arché geneseōs}) from some great cause; and the origin of
all is God, for He Himself was not made by anyone, but everything was made
by Him. And therefore it is proper, first of all, to believe that there is One God,
the Father, who has created and fashioned all things, who made that which
was not to be, who contains all and is alone uncontainable.\textsuperscript{195}

He also refers to God (whom he calls Father) as ‘the Maker and Fashioner, who
also bestows the breath of life’, where the latter clause alludes to Gen. 2. 7, and
the former could reflect a mix of Platonist and scriptural ideas about God.\textsuperscript{196}

Irenaeus’s idea, in the citation above, of God containing all, but not being
containable, is adapted from the first commandment, that ‘God is one’, in the
second century \textit{The Shepherd of Hermas}:

First of all, believe that God is one, who created all things and set them in
order, and made out of what did not exist everything that is, and who contains
all things but is himself alone uncontained.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{195} Irenaeus, \textit{On the Apostolic Preaching}, trans. and with an introduction by John Behr,
Popular Patristics Series, 17 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), Part
One, 1, 4, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{196} Irenaeus, \textit{On the Apostolic Preaching}, Part One, 1, 8, pp. 44-45.
\textsuperscript{197} Hermas, \textit{The Shepherd of Hermas}, trans. and ed. by Michael W. Holmes, in \textit{The
Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} edn, ed. and trans. by
Michael W. Holmes (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), pp. 504-555 (pp. 504-
505); see also John Behr, translation and introduction, \textit{On the Apostolic Preaching}, by
Irenaeus, Popular Patristics Series, 17 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press,
Like Hermas, Irenaeus does not mention the Word/Son’s role in creation in the statement I cited above where he alludes to Hermas. However, he writes of the Son’s role (and the Spirit’s) in creation in other places where he cites Hermas’s commandment: in defending creation ‘out of nothing’, and in discussing God working through God’s two ‘hands’. In the passages quoted here from Irenaeus and Hermas, the omission of the Word/Son’s role in creation may be evidence that this role was not emphasised in the apostolic tradition. Further, the idea that God contains all things without being contained is found in Philo’s writings, where he says that God ‘is filled by Himself … filling and containing all other things … but [is] contained by nothing else, seeing that He is Himself One and the Whole’, and also was known in Neoplatonism. Thus it is not unique to Christian thinking.

The concept of ordering, which appears in Hermas’s work, represents one way God is said to have acted in creation. The Greek for ‘ordered’ is from ‘katartizo’, or ‘to prepare for a purpose, prepare, make, create, outfit’, and it suggests that God created things for a purpose, presumably for their good. The ideas of arranging and ordering also appear in Wisdom. In Wis. 7. 21, Wisdom is the ‘technitis’ (‘craftswoman’ or ‘artisan’ or ‘fashioner’) of all things. In Wis. 8. 1, Wisdom ‘reaches with might from one end of the world to the other and orders all things well’. However, ‘orders’ in Wis. 8. 1 is from ‘dioikeō’, which means ‘manage, control, administer, order, or govern’, and suggests activities after the first acts of creation. These acts would thus be related to providence, not creation.

Irenaeus, in writing about ‘fashioning’ in On the Apostolic Preaching as quoted above, appears to refer to Gen. 2. 7-8 (LXX) and perhaps to Hermas. These

---

198 See section 1.3.3. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1, 22.1, p. 87
199 See section 1.3.4. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, 20.1-2, p. 150.
204 Lust, Eynikel, and Hauspie, Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint, p. 612.
205 This word is in Wis. 7. 22 in this translation. Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, p. 704.
206 Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, p. 704.
verses, as I noted earlier, use plassō to say God ‘formed’ or ‘molded’ the first human being.\textsuperscript{208} Thus Irenaeus, in expressing his ‘first principles’ of faith, was drawing on ideas that stem from multiple sources or which were ‘in the air’. This illustrates that one cannot assume that early tenets of faith about the ‘one God’ who is the Creator represent solely scriptural or theological beliefs. They also reflect a mix of Christian, Jewish, Platonist, and other terminology, if not also ideas.

1.3.3 Pre-trinitarian views of creation ‘out of nothing’

Gerhard May argues that the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ was founded as an orthodox / catholic Christian doctrine in the second century by Theophilus of Antioch and Irenaeus.\textsuperscript{209} As May summarises it:

The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo proclaims in the most pointed manner the absolutely unconditioned nature of the creation and specifies God’s omnipotence as its sole ground. Together with the corresponding idea of the unconditioned freedom and contingency of God’s creative work, it possesses constructive meaning for the Christian understanding of creation.\textsuperscript{210}

As May states this doctrine, it is about God’s power and that God was not compelled to create, and the freedom of both God and creation. Other tenets sometimes included in the doctrine are belief in the ‘dependence of “all that is” … on God’, and belief in God’s ‘free choice’ to ‘sustain’ the world God created.\textsuperscript{211} These are tenets of monotheistic faith, and some tenets of the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ came to be shared by Jews, Muslims, and Christians in later centuries.\textsuperscript{212} These tenets are not christological or trinitarian, but some authors I will discuss, especially Irenaeus, add these perspectives based on John 1. 1-3.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{208} See my analysis of creation terminology in section 1.1.3. Irenaeus, \textit{On the Apostolic Preaching}, Part One, 1, 8-11, pp. 44-47; Rahlfis-Hanhart, \textit{Septuaginta}, I, p. 3; Lust, Eynikel, and Hauspie, \textit{Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint}, p. 495.

\textsuperscript{209} The Christian Basilides held to creation ‘out of nothing’ earlier in the century, but was deemed a ‘heretic’ for other reasons. G. May, \textit{Creatio Ex Nihilo}, pp. 76-77, 177-178; see also Stead, \textit{Philosophy in Christian Antiquity}, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{210} G. May, \textit{Creatio Ex Nihilo}, p. xi.

\textsuperscript{211} These tenets of the doctrine are from Soskice, ‘Creatio ex nihilo’, p. 24.


\textsuperscript{213} May does little with the Gospel of John. He believe ‘the goal of the New Testament statements about Christ as the agent of creation is much more to show that the whole
May argues that the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ emerged in the second century in response to ideas held by Marcion, gnostics, and followers of Basilides and Valentinus, many of whom identified themselves as Christians and some of whom suggested there might be more than one God. May also says that the doctrine emerged in response to ideas in Greek cosmology about there being at least two first principles, God and matter.\(^{214}\) Here I will briefly discuss Marcionite views, because they will be relevant again to my later analysis of Augustine’s responses to Manichaean ideas. I then will analyse the responses offered to such views by early orthodox / catholic authors.

The second-century Marcion thought the God of the Old Testament was not the same as the God whom Jesus called ‘Father’. Marcion posited the existence of two gods, one a harsh god (among other attributes) who was the creator, the other a god who was ‘simply good and excellent’ and the Father of Jesus Christ.\(^{215}\) Marcion’s belief that there are two gods is related to theodicy, and can be seen as a defense of God in the context of acknowledging the reality of evil. However, Marcion’s response of positing the existence of two gods had obvious ramifications for thinking about the oneness of God.

Clearly orthodox / catholic Christians could not accept the premise that there were two gods. They also did not accept that the Father of Jesus Christ was not the same God written about in the Jewish scriptures. The belief that the creator God is \textit{good} is not explicitly stated in Gen. 1. 1 – 2. 4, but might be inferred from the statements about God proclaiming God’s creation to be good. So Marcion and others who challenged the \textit{goodness} of the creator God were challenging a fundamental scriptural and theological belief that there is only one God. They also rejected the belief that the one God is good, which could be an inference from the scriptures or influenced, as argued above, by some Platonist ideas. Moreover, Marcion also rejected the authority of the Old Testament scriptures and most New creation is dependent on Christ and subordinate to him, who himself stands wholly at God’s side’. This is a statement about the power of God and Christ. G. May, \textit{Creatio Ex Nihilo}, pp. 28-29.

\(^{214}\) G. May, \textit{Creatio Ex Nihilo}, pp. xi-xiv; 1-5; 39-117 (on Marcion, see pp. 40-41, 53-61).
Testament scriptures. Thus there multiple ways in which Marcion and his followers deviated from orthodox / catholic thinking because of their dualistic beliefs about creation and God, as well as about Jesus Christ and the scriptures.

Thus, some orthodox / catholic Christians who were responding to the dualistic ideas of Marcion and others had to demonstrate both that there is only one God, who created everything, including good and evil, and that this God was the God of the Old and New Testaments and the Father of Jesus Christ. Some of these Christians also included ideas about the Persons of the Trinity in their writings, although not always in systematic ways, as will be shown. However, not all early orthodox / catholic Christians held the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, which emerged in the latter half of the second century. A few examples will illustrate some of the positions taken on these matters.

Justin, the earliest author examined here, did not hold that creation took place ‘out of nothing’. He explains that Christians have been ‘taught [from our tradition] that in the beginning [God] in his goodness formed all things that are for the sake of men out of unformed matter’, and he refers to God as ‘the Father and Fashioner of all things’, which is not the same as Father and Maker or Creator. These ideas are similar to the concepts of fashioning and forming I discussed earlier, which I showed did not have to entail creation ‘out of nothing’. It is possible, moreover, that Justin may have been aware of the statement in Wis. 11. 17 (LXX) that God had created out of formless matter. Justin also mixes Plato’s idea that God had made the universe ‘by changing formless matter’ with ideas from Gen. 1. 1-3 when Justin says: ‘by God’s word the whole universe was made out this substratum, as expounded by Moses, and Plato and those who agree with him’.

Irenaeus shows that the ‘heretical’ Valentinians used vocabulary from the prologue to John (e.g., Beginning, Son, monogenēs, and Logos). One expression he claims that they used is ‘kai Huion Monogenē kai Theon’, which has

---

217 Bray, *We Believe in One God*, p. 34.
219 See section 1.1.3.
been translated as ‘“Son” and “Only-Begotten God”’.\(^{222}\) Translated thus, this phrase may reflect the textual tradition of John 1. 18 that speaks of the \textit{monogenés theos}, but one could challenge the translation and say that \textit{Monogené} should go with ‘Son’ not ‘God’. Moreover, as I argued above, the translation of \textit{monogené} is not necessarily ‘Only-Begotten’. It has been suggested, in fact, that Irenaeus, as a result of his rebuttals against the Valentinians, may have been responsible for the introduction of ‘\textit{unicus}’ (only) or ‘\textit{monogenés}’ into a version of the Old Roman Creed, so that it came to read ‘His only Son’\(^{223}\). Irenaeus does say, drawing on John 1. 1 and John 1. 3, that John’s gospel ‘tells of [Christ Jesus’] primal, powerful, and glorious generation from the Father’, while saying that ‘[e]verything was made through [the Word], and without him was made nothing’.\(^{224}\) So Irenaeus was thinking of the concept of generation, but it is not clear that he was doing so in conjunction with the word \textit{monogenés}.\(^{225}\)

However, as these arguments show, Irenaeus brings together ideas about the Word and its role in creating \textit{everything} with ideas about the generation of Christ Jesus from the Father. This means that all things were created \textit{by} God / the Father \textit{through} the Word / Jesus Christ, which is a pre-trinitarian view of creation ‘out of nothing’. Irenaeus discusses these ideas after having laid out the principle of faith that there is \textit{one God}, who is the creator \textit{and} the Father of Jesus Christ, and the God of the Old and New Testaments.\(^{226}\) These are significant moves for associating the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ with pre-trinitarian ideas.

Gunton, who cites Irenaeus as a model for thinking about creation (and the Trinity), argues that ‘the New Testament confessions of creation in, through, by and for Jesus Christ’ provide ‘an essential basis for Irenaeus in particular to develop the characteristically Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing’.\(^{227}\) But Gunton does not give Irenaeus enough credit. It would be more appropriate to say

\(^{222}\) Irenaeus, \textit{Against Heresies}, I, 8.5, pp. 68-69; Thesaurus Lingua Graeca, I, 18 (line 6).
\(^{223}\) This is from Kelly. J. Kelly, \textit{Early Christian Creeds}, pp. 141-143.
\(^{224}\) Irenaeus, \textit{Against Heresies}, III 11.8, pp. 131-132.
\(^{225}\) Thesaurus Lingua Graeca, Irenaeus, \textit{Adversus haereses}, III, 11 (line 27).
\(^{226}\) On God being the God of the Old and New Testaments and the Father of Jesus Christ, see the example I cited above and Irenaeus, \textit{Against Heresies}, I, 22.1, pp. 87-88.
that the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, as May and others present it, is not
classically Christian, but monotheistic. What Irenaeus does, by drawing on
the prologue to John and principles of the apostolic faith, and by making the moves
he does in his polemical arguments, is to offer perspectives on creation ‘out of
nothing’ that can be considered Christian. Specifically, this is because Irenaeus
includes the role of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in creation. For this reason,
Irenaeus’s position also can be described as a pre-trinitarian theology of creation.

Irenaeus draws on Hermas’s first commandment again, this time in conjunction
with ideas about the Word (from Ps. 32. 2 and John 1. 3) and mention of the Spirit.
He thus offers a christological understanding, and perhaps an early trinitarian view,
of the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’. Irenaeus says:

But we hold fast the rule of truth, that there is one almighty God who founded
everything through his Word and arranged it and made everything out of the
non-existent (Hermas Mandate 1), as scriptures says: “By the Word of the Lord
the heavens were made firm and by the Spirit of his mouth all their power” (Ps.
32:2), and further, “All things were made through him and without him nothing
was made” (John 1:3). Nothing is excepted from this “all things.”

As I discussed, ‘maker of this universe’ is suggestive of Platonist terminology.
Irenaeus does end Book III by saying that Plato appeared to be ‘more religious’
than Marcion and the Valentinians, because Plato ‘acknowledged the one God who
is both just and good’ and ‘shows that the Maker and Creator of this universe is
good’, ideas conveyed in Tim. and in Philo’s works, as I argued above. Hence
Irenaeus was aware that some Platonists and Christians held similar tenets of faith
about the one God, including God’s goodness. Thus Irenaeus may be another
example, after Philo, of someone, in Runia’s words, who associates the goodness
of Plato’s demiurge with Jewish or Christian concepts of God the creator.

Tertullian, in his Against Hermogenes, draws on Genesis, the prologue to
John, and Prov. 8:22-31 in his defense of the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’.
According to May, Hermogenes, a contemporary of Tertullian’s, was a Platonist
who believed in the unity of God, but he thought that matter was ‘unoriginate’ or

228 Italics added. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1, 22.1, p. 87.
229 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, III 25.3-25.7, pp. 142-143.
‘uncreated’ and the ‘ground of evil’. Hermogenes also believed that the idea of ‘beginning’ in Gen. 1. 1 was related to matter, which was eternal, and that God had made ‘heaven and earth’ in this matter in some way.

Tertullian argues, in response, that ‘principium’ means ‘beginning’ as it relates to the ‘very moment of [something’s] beginning to exist’, and if God had not made heaven and earth ‘before all things’, in the ‘literal sense’ of ‘beginning’, Gen. 1. 1 would have said: ‘At the end God made heaven and earth’. He also argues, drawing on Prov. 8. 22-31, that ‘if it is through the agency of the Wisdom of God that all things were made, then it follows that when God made both the heaven and earth in the beginning – that is, at the commencement – He made them in Wisdom.’

He cites John 1. 1-3 to argue that ‘there the Intermediary [the Word] is revealed through whose agency [God] made all things’, and it is clear who the ‘maker’ was [God], and ‘that which was made, namely all things’. With these statements Tertullian, like Irenaeus, establishes that God had made ‘all things’ through the Word. This is a partially pre-trinitarian statement about creation ‘out of nothing’, but Tertullian does not include the Spirit’s role. Tertullian goes on to ask whether, with these other aspects of creation mentioned, Genesis would not also have mentioned it if God had made things ‘out of something’?

Tertullian makes a similar argument, based on Gen. 1. 1-2. 4, when he asks whether the Spirit [working through Scripture] would not have ‘informed us about the heaven and the earth’ and what source they had been made from, given that Genesis shows God commanding things that God made to produce other things (e.g., telling the earth to ‘bring forth grass yielding seed after its kind and after its likeness’). He concludes that the heaven and earth were made ‘out of nothing’.

---

230 G. May, Creatio Ex Nihilo, p. 140; see also Waszink, pp. 3-9.
232 Italics added. Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, ch. 19, pp. 51-52.
233 Italics added. Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, ch. 20, p. 52.
234 Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, ch. 20, p. 54.
235 Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, ch. 22, pp. 56-57.
In these arguments in defense of creation ‘out of nothing’, Tertullian defends belief in one first principle (not God and matter), and he reads Gen. 1 with John 1. 1.–3. However, his ideas are about creation and God and the Word / Wisdom, and he does not include the Spirit except for its role in speaking through scripture.

Origen, in the third century, evidently assumes the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’. He includes, in the preface to Book I of On First Principles, a section on the ‘kind of doctrines which are believed in plain terms through the apostolic teaching’. These begin with: ‘First, that God is one, who created and set in order all things, and who, when nothing existed, caused the universe to be’, which is another adaptation of the first commandment in The Shepherd of Hermas. Also included in Origen’s apostolic doctrines are statements that God is ‘the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ’ and God of both ‘the Old and New Testaments’.

So the somewhat unorthodox Origen begins with apostolic and orthodox / catholic principles about creation, and about the ‘one God’ who is both the Creator and the Father of Jesus Christ.

1.3.4 Creation and God, the Word / Son / Wisdom, and Wisdom / the Spirit

Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen offer, in varying ways, perspectives on the roles of God, the Logos or Word, the Son, Jesus Christ, Wisdom, and / or the Holy Spirit in acts of creation. Here my analysis will be limited to Irenaeus’s and Origen’s ideas about the roles in creative acts of God through the other Persons and their ideas about the role of Wisdom. Justin’s ideas do not offer substantive insights for later developments in theologies of both creation and the Trinity. Some of Tertullian’s trinitarian ideas, including about substance and person, are not

---

236 G. May, Creatio Ex Nihilo, p. 178.
239 As I noted earlier, the term ‘Persons’ did not come into some usage until Tertullian’s Latin writings. Tertullian wrote of God as one substance or nature and three persons partly in response to ‘heretical’ ideas that went under the names of monarchianism, modalism, Sabellianism, and patripassianism. These trinitarian ideas would be of interest but they are
related to Tertullian’s theologies of both creation and the Trinity. He also does not have much to offer about the Spirit’s role in creation. However, even though I will focus here on Irenaeus’s and Origen’s ideas about acts of ‘initial creation’, I also will demonstrate ambiguities in their theology.

Irenaeus is known for asserting that the Word / Son and Wisdom / the Spirit are the two ‘hands’ through whom God works in acts of creation. His ideas need to be examined, however, to see that they reveal some ambiguities in, or not fully developed aspects of, his trinitarian thinking about creation. First, in writing of the two hands, he asserts that creation is the work of the ‘one’ God. He states that ‘it is [God] who by himself created and adorned and contained everything’, including ‘us and our world’. He again cites Hermas’s first commandment (‘there is one God, who created and completed all things and made everything exist out of the non-existent …’), even as he says that God ‘made all things by his Word and adorned them by his Wisdom’. Secondly, Irenaeus identifies Wisdom and the Spirit here, not Wisdom and the Son.

In his passage about the hands, Irenaeus draws on Gen. 2. 7 and Gen. 1. 26 to argue against the idea that God had needed intermediaries, such as angels or ‘any power far distant from the Father of all things’, to assist with creation. He then follows with the frequently-quoted words:

God needed none of these [entities] to make whatever he had foreordained to make, as if he did not have hands of his own. For always with him are his

not associated Tertullian’s creation theology. Moreover, Ayres cautions that Tertullian’s terminology of one ‘natura’ and three ‘persona’ was not necessarily important to later Latin writers in the fourth century, and not consistently used by Tertullian himself. See Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, pp. 73 FN 30, 183-184; Ludlow, The Early Church, pp. 92-93; Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, I, pp. 176-182; Marmion and Van Nieuwenhove, An Introduction to the Trinity, pp. 55, 61; S. Hall, Doctrine and Practice in the Early Church, p. 72; Michel René Barnes, ‘Latin trinitarian theology’, in The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, ed. by Peter C. Phan (New York: CUP, 2011), pp. 70-84 (p. 70).

M. Barnes says Tertullian did not see the Spirit as a ‘co-creator’, a ‘very important omission’, and Tertullian ‘gives a diminished account’ of the Holy Spirit’s activities as compared to Irenaeus and others. M. Barnes, ‘Latin trinitarian theology’, pp. 75-76.

I use ‘initial creation’ in this thesis to represent scriptural or theological ideas about the first acts of God or the Trinity in creation, based on Gen. 1 or John 1. 1-3.

Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, 20.1, p. 150.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, 20.1, p. 150.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, 20.2, p. 150.
Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, through whom and in whom he made everything freely and independently…

Irenaeus is saying that the hands, the Word / Son and Wisdom / the Spirit, are not intermediaries. So he clearly believes there is a relationship between God and these hands: they are not entities other than or external to God. But he is not discussing the immanent Trinity, nor does he say how God and the two ‘hands’ work together in economic trinitarian acts of creation. Thus, his statement that God works through these ‘hands’ is an assertion that he bases on some biblical texts but without offering further explanation. Even so, Irenaeus’s position on God not needing other entities or intermediaries shows that he held that there was only one first principle of creation, and this is another pre-trinitarian view of creation.

Irenaeus draws in part on Prov. 8. 22-31 and Prov. 3. 19-20 to support his identification of Wisdom with the Spirit:

We have provided many proofs to show that the Word, that is the Son, was always with the Father. But that Wisdom, which is the Spirit, was with him before all creation, it says through Solomon...

He also says: ‘Therefore there is one God who by Word and Wisdom made and harmonized everything. He is the Creator…

According to Anthony Briggman, Irenaeus’s identification of Wisdom and the Spirit is restricted to the context of the Spirit’s role in creation and to his arguments against Gnostic and Valentinian ideas about Sophia’s role in creation. If this is correct, the ambiguity of the identification Wisdom and the Spirit needs to be highlighted here in discussing Irenaeus’s ideas about creation and the Trinity.

One could argue that by equating Wisdom and the Spirit, Irenaeus either personifies Wisdom, who is personified in the Prov. 8. 22-31 and Wis. 7. 22 – 8. 1, or, conversely, detracts from the ‘personal’ aspects of the Spirit. The latter possibility exists if Irenaeus is suggesting that the Spirit, as Wisdom, is a concept or principle through which God harmonised what God made through God’s Word.

---

245 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, 20.1, p. 150.
246 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, 20.3, p. 151.
247 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV, 20.3-20.4, pp. 151-152.
Briggman discusses the ‘creative activity that Irenaeus connects to the concept of wisdom’, including preparing, adapting, harmonizing, ordering, and arranging.\textsuperscript{249} These ideas about Wisdom and its roles are similar to concepts about the Logos that combine personal and conceptual aspects such as those I discussed in my analysis of Philo’s ideas.\textsuperscript{250} Some of these concepts also are similar to those attributed to the Logos by early Christians that I noted above.\textsuperscript{251} I also showed that the acts of ordering, arranging, or fashioning are attributed to the figure of Wisdom in Wis. 7. 22 and Wis. 8. 1, and appear in early Christian writings.\textsuperscript{252} Moreover, some of these roles are similar to roles Augustine will attribute to the Spirit in his late fourth century ideas about ‘ordered-abiding’ and trinitarian acts of creation.\textsuperscript{253}

My critique of Irenaeus, therefore, is not that his ideas about Wisdom, or about creative acts such as ordering, arranging, or fashioning, are not represented in early theology or in the scriptures, but that Irenaeus makes the move of identifying Wisdom with the Spirit. Thus, I do not fully agree with Gunton that Irenaeus’s ideas are a role model for thinking about creation and the Trinity,\textsuperscript{254} and I believe that Gunton masks the ambiguities in Irenaeus’s thinking by not pointing out that Irenaeus identifies Wisdom with the Spirit. On the other hand, given Irenaeus’s inclusion of the Word / Son and Wisdom / the Spirit in creative acts with God, based on his readings of John 1. 1-3 with Genesis and Proverbs, and possibly Wisdom, Irenaeus offers christological and at least pre-trinitarian views of acts of initial creation. Irenaeus also is clear, in his two-hands model of creation and his defense of creation ‘out of nothing’, that there is one Creator and first principle.

My interest in Origen’s ideas about creative acts is limited to his varying views on what ‘the beginning’ means, his ideas about Wisdom, and his readings of John 1. 1-3, Gen. 1, and Prov. 8. 22-31. In later chapters, I will argue that some of Basil of Caesarea’s and Augustine’s ideas have resonances with Origen’s ideas.

Origen offers many meanings for ‘the beginning’ in his \textit{Commentary on John}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{249} Briggman, \textit{Irenaeus of Lyons}, pp. 136-137.
\item \textsuperscript{250} See sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.5.
\item \textsuperscript{251} See section 1.3.1.
\item \textsuperscript{252} See section 1.3.2.
\item \textsuperscript{253} I will discuss these in section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 and elsewhere. See also Appendix B.
\item \textsuperscript{254} See, e.g., Gunton, \textit{The Triune Creator}, pp. 9, 53-54.
\end{itemize}
and his homilies on Genesis.\textsuperscript{255} In the former, he emphasises the Father’s role:

But it is not absurd to say that the God of the Universe is evidently a beginning [or principle] on the grounds that because the Father is the beginning of the Son, the artisan of the things fashioned, God is also, in an absolute sense, the beginning of existing things. This is proved by ‘in the beginning was the Word,’ understanding the Word as the Son, so that as a result of his being in the Father, he is said to be ‘in the beginning’.\textsuperscript{256}

This argument about the Father’s role builds from the Son’s role in creation, as ‘artisan of the things fashioned’, which may allude to Wisdom’s role as ‘technitis’ of all things in Wis. 7. 21. This offers a contrast with Irenaeus’s identification of Wisdom with the Spirit. Origen also may be alluding to Plato’s \textit{Tim.}, because the word translated as artisan is ‘demiourgos’.\textsuperscript{257} Here Origen is reading John 1. 1-3 with Wisdom and Gen. 1. 1, as he reflects on what ‘the beginning’ means, and he identifies the Word with the Son as is done in the prologue to John.

In another argument,\textsuperscript{258} Origen says ‘In the beginning was the Word’ does not refer to ‘coming into existence’, so one sees how his interpretations of ‘beginning’ can have non-temporal meanings. He draws on Gen. 1. 3, 6 and Prov. 8 in arguing that, ‘As “beginning,” Christ is an artisan, in as much as he is Wisdom; because he is Wisdom, he is called “beginning”’. Origen here associates Wisdom with supplying the ‘patterns’ or ‘rational formulas of future things’, while the Word ‘is understood as the communication to rational beings of things theoretically considered’. This is a combination of ideas that other early Christians associated with the Logos, but here Origen associates them with both Wisdom and the Logos. For Origen, in this example, the Son of God, the Word, is ‘principle only in so far as he is Wisdom, not in so far as he is Word, since the Word was “in the beginning”’.


\textsuperscript{256} Origen, \textit{Commentary on John}, Book 1, 102.

\textsuperscript{257} Trigg says Origen may have thought that Prov. 8 ‘provides essentially the same picture of Creation’ as Plato’s \textit{Tim.}, and ‘[t]he Son as Word, acting in the capacity of Plato’s Artisan (demiourgos), creates the universe after an unchangeable pattern contained in the Son as Wisdom’. Trigg, \textit{Origen}, ECF, p. 262 FN 38, also 121-122, 261 FN 34.

\textsuperscript{258} Citations in this paragraph are from \textit{Commentary on John}, 1, 109-118.
[and, according to Prov. 8. 22-31, Wisdom was the beginning]. Thus, Origen has suggested that the beginning refers to the Son only as Wisdom.

A third example of how Origen understands ‘the beginning’ comes from his ‘Homily 1’ on Genesis. The opening paragraph shows his thinking on ‘in the beginning’ from Gen. 1. 1 and John 1. 1. It includes the idea that all things were made through the Word (John 1. 3), and offers an example of ‘beginning’ not having a temporal meaning. This time Origen says the beginning is Jesus Christ / the Word, which is reminiscent of Philo’s having called the Logos ‘the beginning’.

Thus, Origen attributes the beginning to the God / the Father, to Wisdom, and to Jesus Christ / the Word, and his ideas about the ‘beginning’ are not systematic. He also gives somewhat equal treatment to Gen. 1. 1, John 1. 1-3, and Prov. 8. 22-31, and this is one affinity with Tertullian’s reflections.

1.3.5 Problems left ‘on the table’ for thinking about creation and the Trinity

As I discussed above, using Irenaeus as my primary example, some early orthodox / catholic Christians developed ideas about creation ‘out of nothing’ in the context of responding to the dualistic views of the Marcionites and others who believed that two ‘gods’ existed, rather than one Creator God, because of the existence of good and evil and the world. Some Christians also developed their ideas about creation ‘out of nothing’ in responding to dualistic views about the co-existence of God and matter in the beginning that were held by some Platonists. This included Hermogenes, who was a Christian Platonist (if deemed a ‘heretic’), and I illustrated Tertullian’s defense of creation ‘out of nothing’, based on his interpretations of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, and Prov. 8, in rebuttal to Hermogenes’s views. In these instances, orthodox / catholic Christians were arguing against belief in either two ‘gods’ or two first principles. Some also defended, against Marcionite views, that the God who created everything was the Father of Jesus Christ: this is another away of defending belief in one Creator God.

I also showed, using Justin as an example, that some early orthodox / catholic Christians accepted the existence of both God and matter in the beginning. If

259 The citations and ideas in this paragraph are from Origen, ‘Homily 1’, p. 47.
May’s analysis is correct, the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ did not emerge until the second half of the second century. However, one can conjecture that varying views were held on this doctrine during that time and later.

I argued that Irenaeus’s views on creation ‘out of nothing’ were pre-trinitarian, and that he added specifically Christian ‘content’ to a doctrine that otherwise is primarily monotheistic, at least as May defines it. Moreover, both Irenaeus and Tertullian draw on John 1. 1-3 in their arguments about God and the Word / Jesus Christ having created ‘all things’. Irenaeus also posits roles in creation for the Holy Spirit in his ‘two hands’ model, and even though I critiqued some of these views, this too makes his ideas more trinitarian than the other views I analysed above.

Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen posited roles for Wisdom in creation with God, sometimes, as Irenaeus does, identifying Wisdom with the Holy Spirit, and at other times with the Word / Son / Jesus Christ, the more typical view. Prov. 8. 22-31 was one of the bases for the identifications of Wisdom with either the Spirit or with the Word / Son. Origen also used Prov. 8. 22-31 in some of his reflections on what the ‘beginning’ meant, according also to Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, as did Tertullian. This might suggest, if unintentionally, that Wisdom is another entity or principle involved with creation, or that conflation took place between Wisdom and the Spirit, or Wisdom and the Word / Son. However, one also has to accept that these views arose because Christians were reading multiple scriptural texts together in their pre-trinitarian reflections on creation and the Trinity.

On the other hand, whether Wisdom was identified with the Spirit or the Word / Son, the creative acts of ordering, arranging, fashioning, or forming creation do appear in texts where the authors also defend creation ‘out of nothing’. Hence, and as I argued in the sections on Philo and on Greek and Alexandrian ‘creation terminology’, multiple ways existed of viewing creative acts in the early centuries.

1.4 Conclusions

My analysis in this chapter showed that other entities (e.g., the Logos or the ‘ideas’), Persons (e.g., the Word / Son / Jesus Christ), or figures (e.g., Wisdom) besides God / the Father were held to be involved in creation in Jewish and early Jewish Christian or Christian writings. However, systematic treatment was not
given by the early theologians whose works I examined to how these entities worked together the way it later would be in views on the ‘unity of operations’ or ‘inseparable operation’ of the Trinity. The question also was not addressed in these early writings of how one could hold to the Jewish and Christian tenet of faith that there is only one God who is the sole Creator, while acknowledging roles in creation for other entities or Persons. This was even true for Irenaeus’s ‘two hands’ model, because Irenaeus, like others, makes assertions about roles or acts of creation but does not posit how they took place. However, as will be seen, the ‘ideas’, angels, and other entities will appear in Augustine’s mature fifth century commentaries on Gen. 1, and some of these also appear in Basil’s fourth century homilies.260

The foundation I laid in this chapter of looking at how Gen. 1 was interpreted in Philo’s writings and early Christian writings will be of use in my analysis of sources for fourth and fifth century ideas on creation and the Trinity. There it will be seen that ideas from the hexaemeral traditions were influential in developments in trinitarian thinking, and should be given more attention to add to the typical focus on Nicene-related theologies. I also will continue to demonstrate that John 1.1-3 was highly influential in Christian thinking on creation and the Trinity.

Another question that arises out of my analysis, and which will be of concern in the fourth century, is how scriptural passages about the figure of Wisdom should be interpreted. This applies especially to Prov. 8.22-23, and what it might suggest about Wisdom, the Word or Son, the Holy Spirit, or the ‘beginning’. On the other hand, as I discussed here and will continue to argue in the chapters on Augustine, the biblical book of Wisdom should be given more attention as a source of ideas about creation, God, and the Trinity.

One of the possibilities for fruitful application today arises in response to the principle that God’s omnipotence is the sole ground of creation out of nothing, as expressed by May. One might ask whether acts of creation that are undertaken not by ‘one’ God who works alone, but rather by a God who works through ‘hands’, or by a God working through or with the Word and Spirit, are not acts of omnipotent

260 See section 4.2 in Chapter 4.
power, but acts of trinitarian or shared power. Theologies based on creation 'out of nothing' still have room for other ways of viewing creation, as I argued in my analysis of varying 'creation terminology'. They also have room to be trinitarian in ways that do not emphasis monotheism or omnipotence.
Chapter 2: Creation, Modes of Origin, Trinitarian Acts, and the Trinity in the Fourth Century before Augustine

Introduction

In this second of the two chapters in Part I, my focus is primarily on the second half of the fourth century, the period in which trinitarian theologies compatible with Nicene principles came into fuller development. The writings I will analyse are from the 350s to early 380s, and I also will discuss the creeds from the 325 Council of Nicaea and 381 Council of Constantinople. My approach is to critically analyse trinitarian principles in light of ideas about creation or about modes of origin held in this period. Through the use of this lens, I will offer interpretations of developments in trinitarian theology that may be overlooked by scholars who focus on pro-Nicene trinitarian theologies.¹

This chapter has three main objectives. The first is to argue that ideas about creation, including the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and perspectives on modes of origin, influenced the principles that were posited about consubstantiality, unity, and distinctions within the Trinity. The second objective is to continue my analysis of ideas about creation and the Trinity that are grounded in interpretations

of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, and / or Wisdom. These include ideas in *hexaemeral* commentaries, but I also will show that John 1. 3, by itself, was influential in theological debates and drawn on by orthodox / catholic and ‘heretical’ Christians. The third objective is to analyse ideas about the roles of and unity and distinctions among the Persons of the Trinity in creative acts.²

My analysis of trinitarian ideas formulated in *hexaemeral* works is one of the original dimensions of this chapter. These works offer other views on economic acts and the Trinity besides those found in theological or polemical works that were undertaken because of the debates over Nicene theologies and Arian or Eunomian principles. Moreover, *hexaemeral* works are part of a line of transmission that began earlier than, ran in parallel with, and extended beyond the period when these debates were active, and they draw on sources beyond Nicene sources.

As my analysis will show, connections between creation and the Trinity exist in *hexaemeral* works and in theological or polemical arguments that draw on the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’. However, it may be less apparent how ideas about modes of origin (i.e., ways in which something or someone comes into being) are related to creation and the Trinity. As I discussed in Chapter 1, ‘coming into being’ terminology, based on the word ‘egeneto’, is one type of ‘creation terminology’ that appears in the LXX or other Greek scriptures, including Gen. 1 and John 1. 3, 10.³ This word also appears in the Greek texts of the 325 and 381 creeds (evidently based on John 1. 3, 10).⁴ Moreover, ‘coming into being’ as a mode of origin can apply to creatures or creation as well as to the Son or the Spirit, although obviously in different ways. As I will argue and demonstrate below, the differences lie in which additional ideas about either creation or the Trinity are combined with ideas about modes of origin.

The orthodox / catholic theologians, who also were bishops, whose ideas and writings to which I will give the greatest attention are Athanasius of Alexandria and two of the Cappadocian ‘Fathers’, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nazianzus. I

---

² The terminology of ‘Persons’ or ‘Persons of the Trinity’ is used here for convenience.
³ See sections 1.1.3, 1.2, and 1.2.2 in Chapter 1.
also will examine the ideas of the ‘heretical’ Eunomius of Cyzicus, who was from Cappadocia, because trinitarian principles were presented by Basil and Gregory in their anti-Eunomian arguments. I will supplement my analysis with some limited commentary on Gregory of Nyssa (the third Cappadocian ‘Father’), Ambrose of Milan, and Jerome, and I will discuss common sources drawn upon and similar ideas held by Greek, Alexandrian, and Latin authors.

The writings I will analyse are limited to those about creation and the Trinity in some way. Besides passages from hexaemeral commentaries and other works in which creation is discussed, I will examine passages about whether or not the Son or Holy Spirit were created or came into being, or what their mode of origin was. These include sections of writings or orations by Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus ‘against’ the Eunomian beliefs that God is Unbegotten (*agennêtos*), and that the Son, who was begotten (*gennêthenta*) and *monogenês* (definitions vary) is different in substance (*heteroousios*) from God.\(^5\) I also will analyse these words or other terminology in the 325 and 381 creeds.

Given that my focus is on creation and the Trinity and a fuller treatment of trinitarian theology will not be offered, I consulted several secondary sources as background on fourth century developments in trinitarian theologies.\(^6\) Lewis Ayres

---


and Michel Barnes are the patristic scholars with whom I primarily engage in this chapter and the chapters on Augustine. I will engage with other scholars who specialise in the theologians or the ideas to be discussed below in each section.

This chapter comprises four major sections.

In Section 2.1, I will offer a brief survey of the known and likely sources of ideas that the theologians whose works I will examine drew upon as they formulated their ideas about creation and the Trinity. Among the purposes of this section is to identify common sources or influences on fourth century thinkers. I also will continue my analysis of the transmission of ideas from earlier centuries, and will discuss transmission of ideas in the late fourth century.

In Section 2.2, I will critically analyse ways in which ideas and terminology about creation and modes of origin influenced ideas about consubstantiality, unity, and distinctions within the Trinity. Most of these topics are about the immanent Trinity. However, I will include a discussion of principles of unity and distinction posited in the late 370s or early 380s about the immanent Trinity and trinitarian acts of creation. I begin with the analysis in section 2.2 because the ideas to be discussed are those which are typically the primary interest of scholars who study pro-Nicene theologies. This allows for establishing common ground with some scholars, while I also will critique or nuance their views. It also establishes one of the bases for me to draw upon in my analysis of Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies.

In section 2.3, I will offer a critical analysis of Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies.

---

7 This is not to be confused with economic ideas up through the early fourth century, which McGuckin explains were ‘based within the standpoint of pre-Nicene’ Monarchianism, and held that ‘God is ultimately one, and only became “threelfold” for the purposes of creation and redemption’. McGuckin, *The Westminster Handbook*, pp. 111-112.

will analyse the ways in which he depicts God, the Son / monogenés, and the Holy Spirit as involved in acts of ‘initial creation’, and I will assess his inconsistent application of the principle of ‘unity of operations’ in his works. I also will argue that he draws on Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 to assert that one can see something about the Trinity from the beauty and other aspects of creation. I will show that while some of Basil’s ideas may not be found in pro-Nicene writings or reflect Nicene sources, they represent theological and scriptural ideas about creation and the Trinity held in the fourth century. Later I will argue that ideas similar to Basil’s appear in Augustine’s fourth century hexaemeral commentaries, although one cannot establish that he knew Basil’s hexaemeral homilies that early, and in Augustine’s fifth century *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* (*Gn. litt.*).

In Section 2.4, I will offer a summative analysis of the ideas and sources I evaluated in this chapter. I also will identify areas that will be significant to my analysis in Part II of Augustine’s works, and to the fruitful applications of early theological ideas about creation and the Trinity to be explored in Part III.

### 2.1 Sources of fourth century ideas about creation and the Trinity

This section offers a survey of the known and potential sources drawn upon by the authors whose works I will examine below, and calls for more research into the potential influences of Philo of Alexandria’s ideas on fourth century Christians.

#### 2.1.1 Orthodox / catholic, ‘heretical’, and philosophical sources

The primary authors I will discuss were involved in church life in many ways:

---

9 I use ‘initial creation’ in this thesis to represent scriptural or theological ideas about the first acts of God or the Trinity in creation, based on Gen. 1 or John 1. 1-3.


as bishops, through preaching and pastoral activities, and through participation in councils or synods. They also argued against Christian 'opponents' or 'heretics', as did Christians in earlier centuries, and Athanasius himself was sent into exile a few times. Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus lived an ascetic or 'philosophic' life for a while, Basil for longer than Gregory, before being ordained in the early 360s. In light of the various roles and experiences of these theologians and bishops, their Christian sources (with their own mix of influences) for their theological reflections included the scriptures; doctrines (e.g., of creation 'out of nothing'); creeds; liturgical formulae; the ideas of orthodox / catholic Christians and 'heretics'; and sometimes, as with Basil, their ascetic or moral ideals. Authors in this period often did not identify their sources, and it is not always known whether they had direct or mediated access to works, including those of their contemporaries. For example, differing perspectives exist on whether the Cappadocians were influenced by Athanasius, although they probably knew of some of his ideas mediated through the Homoiousian Basil of Ancyra. With

___________

16 M. Barnes asserts that it is not known if the Cappadocians had read anything of Athanasius’s. Hanson and DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz think the Cappadocians knew Athanasius’s ideas through Basil of Ancyra. Beeley suggests Gregory of Nazianzus shared aspects of an ‘agenda’ with Athanasius, although Beeley says Gregory had never met him, and does not seem to have known his work ‘firsthand’. On the other hand, Lienhard says Basil wrote letters to Athanasius asking, unsuccessfully, for his help in persuading ‘Westerners’ to adopt Basil’s position on matters related to Marcellus of Ancyra. M.
respect to the practice of not citing sources by name, Basil was more typical while Ambrose offers an egregious example. Basil, for example, was influenced by Origen, although he rejected Origen’s allegorical methods of interpreting Genesis, but he rarely cites Origen by name. On the other hand, Ambrose was criticised by Jerome in the fourth century for what we would call plagiarism, including for borrowing, in his *The Holy Spirit*, from Basil and Didymus the Blind of Alexandria. Moreover, according to Philo scholar David Runia, Ambrose draws on Philo about 600 times, but mentions Philo’s name only once.

Origen was known to the authors who wrote in Greek, and to Ambrose, who drew on Origen in his *hexaemeral* sermons. Didymus may have influenced both

---


Basil of Caesarea and Ambrose through Didymus’s *On the Holy Spirit*. Moreover, Didymus and Athanasius are each credited with being the first to offer full treatments of the Spirit, while Ambrose is said to be the first do so in Latin. Jerome contributed to exchanges of ideas by translating texts and the Hebrew scriptures into Latin, and his translations of and comments on Gen. 1 and John are of note below and in the chapters on Augustine. Jerome also heard Gregory of Nyssa read from his *Against Eunomius* at the 381 Council of Constantinople, and had contact with Gregory of Nazianzus. Exchanges of ideas also took place during exiles, and Alexandria and Rome are thought to share some trinitarian traditions, because of Athanasius’s time in exile in Rome.

Another common thread between several of these theologians is their participation in traditions of doing *hexaemeral* commentaries, for which Philo of Alexandria in the first century and Origen in the third were predecessors. Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome gave *hexaemeral* sermons or wrote some form of *hexaemeral* commentary. Basil may have preached his

24 R. Hanson, *The Search*, p. 748; Anatolios, *Athanasius*, ECF, p. 82.
26 On Jerome’s translations and commentaries, see section 2.3 below and section 3.1.2 in Chapter 3. See also Mark Vessey, ‘Jerome and Rufinus’, in *CHECL*, pp. 318-327 (p. 319).
30 On Philo, see section 1.1 in Chapter 1, and section 2.1.4 below.
31 On Origen, see section 1.3 in Chapter 1.
*hexaemeral* homilies in 377 or 378, although the dating may have been earlier.\textsuperscript{33} If the later dating is correct, only a decade would have separated Basil’s delivery of these homilies and Augustine’s undertaking of his first commentary on Gen. 1.\textsuperscript{34} I selected Basil’s homilies to be analysed here because of their influences on others, including Augustine,\textsuperscript{35} Gregory of Nyssa,\textsuperscript{36} Ambrose,\textsuperscript{37} and possibly Jerome.\textsuperscript{38}

Other common sources for orthodox / catholic Christians were the ideas or writings of opponents. Eunomius and his followers, who are called Heterousians because they believed the Son was *heteroousios* (different in substance\textsuperscript{39}) from the Father,\textsuperscript{40} are countered by Basil and Gregory of Nyssa in their treatises *Against...*
Eunomius\textsuperscript{41} and Gregory of Nazianzus in some orations.\textsuperscript{42} ‘Heretical’ groups also existed that believed that the Holy Spirit was created, such as the ‘Tropikoi’ or ‘Tropici’, against whom Athanasius writes in ‘Letters to Serapion’,\textsuperscript{43} and the ‘Pneumatomachians’ or ‘Macedonians’, whom Basil and Ambrose address in their respective works On the Holy Spirit and Gregory of Nazianzus in his orations.\textsuperscript{44}

Orthodox / catholic authors can be the main extant witnesses to the ideas or texts of their opponents. Eunomius’s works were condemned at the end of the fourth century, and only two works are extant, according to Richard Vaggione, because they were bound with copies of Basil’s and Gregory’s treatises.\textsuperscript{45} These are his Liber Apologeticus (\textit{The Apology of Eunomius} or ‘First Apology’), to which Basil responds in \textit{Against Eunomius}, and Expositio Fidei (\textit{The Confession of Faith}), to which Gregory of Nyssa responds in his own \textit{against Eunomius}.\textsuperscript{46} Eunomius’s \textit{Apologia Apologiae} (\textit{An Apology for the Apology} or his ‘Second Apology’) is not extant, and Vaggione says it is only preserved in Gregory of Nyssa’s citations in his \textit{Against Eunomius}.\textsuperscript{47} Vaggione does not mention Gregory of Nazianzus, but his

\textsuperscript{41} Basil of Caesarea, \textit{Against Eunomius}, trans. and with an introduction by Mark DelCoglino and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, FotC, 122 (Washington, DC: CUAP, 2011); Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{Against Eunomius}, trans. by William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson, in \textit{Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, Etc.}, NPNF, 2\textsuperscript{nd} series, 5 (1893; Oak Harbor: Logos Research Systems, 1997 [on CD-ROM]).


\textsuperscript{45} Vaggione, \textit{Eunomius}, pp. xv-xvii, 79-81, 89-94.

\textsuperscript{46} Vaggione, \textit{Eunomius}, pp. xv-xvii, 79-81, 89-94.

\textsuperscript{47} Vaggione, \textit{Eunomius}, pp. xvii, also 79-81, 89-94.
orations also are a source of references to Eunomian ideas, if not to his works.48

Orthodox / catholic authors also can be the main extant witnesses to ideas that are deemed orthodox / catholic, including texts of credal statements. For example, Athanasius’s ‘On the Council of Nicaea’,49 where he writes about the 325 creed, is, as David Gwynn says, one of the few extant writings about the 325 council.50

Thus, one has to consider, as will be done below, whether the accounts of the primary authors discussed here are likely to be faithful representations of texts, ideas, or events, whether orthodox / catholic or otherwise. If they are not deemed to be fully faithful witnesses, one has to decide whether their accounts still have theological value as well as value for tracing the history of theological ideas.

I will offer general comments here on the philosophical backgrounds of the primary authors to be discussed, and will discuss specific influences of Platonism and other philosophical ideas in my analysis of their works.

Athanasius, who may have had little formal education, was at least familiar with Platonist and Stoic ideas.51 Basil, who studied in Athens, knew of Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Aristotle, and Stoicism.52 Gregory of Nazianzus, who likewise studied at Athens, knew the Greek classics, philosophy, and rhetoric, and he refers to Plato and Aristotle in his works.53 Gregory also draws on Plotinian ideas in discussing differences between philosophical ideas about ‘emanation’ and Christian ideas about begetting and procession within the ‘Godhead’.54 Gregory of Nyssa, who

54 Gregory’s references to the ideas about emanation of the ‘non-Christian philosopher’ are similar to those expressed by Plotinus in Enneads V.2. Gregory of Nazianzus, ‘The Third Theological Oration: Oration 29’, in On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius, trans. and with an introduction and notes by Lionel Wickham,
studied under Basil, drew on Platonist and Stoic ideas, but is said rarely to refer
directly to philosophical sources.\(^{55}\) Ambrose was well educated and read Greek as
well as Latin texts, and he may have had philosophical training.\(^{56}\) All of these
theologians also could have taken in philosophical ideas through Origen’s writings.

### 2.1.2 Potential influences of Philo of Alexandria and Prov. 8. 22

The known and possible influences of the first century Philo are of ongoing
interest throughout this thesis. His writings, including his *hexaemeral* commentary,
represent a blend of scriptural, theological, and philosophical ideas as I established
in Chapter 1.\(^{57}\) Here I will discuss and propose some possible influences of Philo
on fourth century ideas about creation or the Trinity. My objectives are to identify
potential sources of ideas and lines of transmissions, and to call for more research
on Philo’s influences on the Cappadocians and others by scholars who are
interested primarily in pro-Nicadocian or Nicene-related controversies.

Philo’s ‘On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses’ (*Opif.*),\(^{58}\) which
includes his *hexaemeral* commentary and was analysed in Chapter 1, may have
been one of Basil’s sources for his *hexaemeral* homilies, but this has not (yet) been
proven.\(^{59}\) If it could be established, it would be helpful for identifying the breadth of
influences on Basil’s interpretations of Gen. 1, which would include Philo’s Jewish
and Platonist ideas (e.g., from Middle Platonism or Plato’s *Timaeus* [*Tim.*]).\(^{60}\)

---

\(^{55}\) Meredith, ‘Gregory of Nyssa’, in *CHPLA*, I, pp. 471-473; Anthony Meredith, *Gregory of


\(^{57}\) On Philo, see sections 1.1 and 1.3.1 in Chapter 1.

\(^{58}\) Philo’s account of the six days of creation is in *Opif.*, ch. 3, 13 – ch. 15, 128. Philo, *On
the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses*, trans. and with an introduction and
commentary by David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, 1 (Atlanta, GA:
SBL, 2001), pp. 47-93 (abbrev. *Opif.*).

\(^{59}\) Runia explains that the possibility that *Opif.* was one of four sources for Basil for his
*hexaemeral* homilies was put forth by Armand de Mendieta, who died before he was able
to publish the work to support his assertions. Runia, *PECL*, pp. 236-237, also 251-252.

\(^{60}\) See section 1.1 in Chapter 1 for my analysis of Philo’s ideas. Plato, *Timaeus*, in *Plato:
Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles*, trans. by R. G. Bury, LCL, Plato 9
also would be helpful for tracing the mediated influences of Philo given that Basil's homilies were drawn upon by others, including Augustine. Evidence does exist that Gregory of Nyssa may have borrowed from Philo in Gregory's *hexaemeral* writings and in his *De virginitate* and *De vita Moysis*, enough that Runia concludes that Gregory had works of Philo in his library. Moreover, Gregory claims, in *Against Eunomius*, that Eunomius had borrowed Philo's words. Thus the search for evidence that Basil drew on Philo can draw support from the fact that Basil's brother Gregory knew of Philo's works.

Origen's commentary on Genesis may have been a common source, if mediated, of Philo's ideas to Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and others who seldom, if ever, mention Philo by name. Moreover, and as I discussed in Chapter 1, Origin and others preserved, translated, or passed on Philo's works. This is relevant here in exploring the possible influence of Philo on terminology that was significant in fourth century controversies over matters about creation and the Trinity, although this is not related to Philo's *hexaemeral* commentary.

The possibility I will develop here is that Philo may have had some influence on fourth century translations or interpretations of Prov. 8. 22. This verse, which was significant in controversies over Nicene and Arian views, is the opening verse of Prov. 8. 22-31, a passage I introduced in Chapter 1 because it was drawn upon by earlier Christians. My arguments and conjectures presented here are original,


61 I will offer examples of where Augustine's ideas are similar to Basil's in section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3 and section 4.2 in Chapter 4. Examples of where Augustine's ideas are similar to Philo's will be offered in Part II, but see especially section 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3.


63 Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, Book VII, 1; Runia, *PECL*, pp. 261, 244-249.


but they build on Runia’s research on the transmission of Philo’s ideas through Origen, and Mark DelCologlano’s research on Prov. 8. 22 and Basil.  

In Prov. 8. 22-23, according to some LXX and English translations, the figure of Wisdom says:

‘The Lord ‘ektisen me’ ['created me'] as the beginning [archén] of his ways, for the sake of his works. Before the present age he founded me [ethemeliōsen me], in the beginning [en arché].’

Philo, Basil, and Gregory of Nyssa were aware of the same Greek alternative, ‘ektésato me’, to the key phrase ‘ektisen me’ that appears in LXX translations of the Hebrew word in Prov. 8. 22 and is often translated ‘created me’ as it is above. Philo uses ‘ektésato me’ (‘obtained me’) in one instance, and this wording for Prov. 8. 22 is mentioned by Basil in Against Eunomius. Philo’s source for this phrase may have been a Greek translation of Prov. 8. 22 that was not one of the LXX translations. Likewise, Basil, as DelCologlano says, attributes Basil’s own knowledge of ‘obtained me’ to ‘other translators, who have hit upon the meaning of the Hebrew in a more appropriate way’. Gregory of Nyssa also knew that the Hebrew word in Prov. 8. 22 that was often translated as ‘ektisen me’ (created me)


could also mean ‘obtained’, ‘possessed’, and ‘constituted’, so ‘created’ is not a wrong translation of the original Hebrew word, just not the only one. This Hebrew word is ‘ambiguous’ according to Jennifer Dines, and she includes ‘begot’ with ‘created’ or ‘acquired’ as possible meanings while saying that the LXX translators chose to use ‘created’.

That Prov. 8. 22 might suggest that the Word or Son was begotten is inferred by Basil from the use of ‘acquired’ in Gen. 4. 1, an interpretation DelCogliano argues that he adapts from Eusebius of Caesarea’s understanding of ‘acquiring’. DelCogliano, in arguing that Basil was dependent on Eusebius for translations of Prov. 8. 22, says that Eusebius was the first to use the translation ‘ektésato me’ in debates about this verse, which DelCogliano attributes to Eusebius’s use of the Greek translations of the scriptures of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion.

However, an intriguing possibility, which can only be conjectured but warrants more research, is that Eusebius may also have been influenced by Philo. As I noted in Chapter 1, Eusebius assisted Pamphilus in cataloguing and preserving Philo’s works in Origen’s library in Palestinian Caesarea, in the late third and early fourth centuries. Eusebius, in his Ecclesiastical History, includes Philo’s ‘On Drunkenness’, the text in which ‘ektésato me’ appears, in a group of Philo’s works ‘that have come into my hands dealing with Genesis’. According to Frances Young and Andrew Teal, Pamphilus ‘was not just a collector of books, but one who

76 According to DelCogliano, Eusebius cites these three Greek translators in his Ecclesiastica theologia. Young and Teal consider Eusebius’s ‘frequent discussion of Greek versions other than the LXX’ to be one of the ‘striking’ features of his Old Testament exegesis. DelCogliano, ‘Basil of Caesarea on Proverbs 8:22’, pp. 183-184, 187-188; Young and Teal, From Nicaea to Chalcedon, p. 22; see also DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Against Eunomius, p. 160 FN 105.
77 See section 1.3.1 in Chapter 1. See also Runia, PECL, pp. 16-24, 212-234.
engaged in collation, correcting and copying … and engaged his disciples in this oral and collaborative process’. 79 In light of this, it is worth asking whether Eusebius may have been aware of Philo’s use of ‘ektésato me’ from having seen or discussed it while assisting Pamphilus with Philo’s works. This possibility suggests the need for more research into Philo and Eusebius, to add to DelCogliano’s research on Basil and Eusebius. This could result in discoveries about Philo’s mediated influence on Basil’s use of this alternative to ‘ektisen me’.

It also might lead to new perspectives on why some fourth century Christians, such as Arius or his followers, chose to accept that Prov. 8. 22 indicates that Jesus Christ was created, if they were aware of other options. It is possible, as Dines suggests, that fourth century Christians made a ‘lexical choice’ when they took Prov. 8. 22 to read ‘created me’, if they were aware of alternatives, and that this influenced the trinitarian controversies. 80 This too would require more research. However, the possibility that words took on different meanings in the fourth century because of debates over ideas related to creation and the Trinity will also arise in my study of the word monogenés below.

2.2 Creation, modes of origin, consubstantiality, and unity and distinctions within the Trinity

Attention is often given in studies of the fourth century trinitarian controversies to the word ‘homoousios’ (of the same substance, 81 of one substance, 82 or consubstantial), which is used in the 325 creed to speak of the Son with respect to the Father. Historians have traced who adopted this word or homoiousios (of like substance 83), or neither – those, like Eunomius, who thought that the Son was heteroousios (of a different substance 84) from the Father. Moreover, one of the contentious issues among some scholars is whether differences exist between the emphasis placed on substance within the Trinity by the Cappadocian ‘Fathers’ and

79 Young and Teal, From Nicaea to Chalcedon, p. 21.
81 Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 958.
83 Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 955.
84 Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 553.
Augustine, because Augustine is often presumed to prioritise unity of substance over distinctions within the Trinity.\(^{85}\) Thus one objective of this section is to examine ideas and terminology related to nature or substance in writings from the 350s and later and in the 325 and 381 creeds, where these ideas relate to creation or to modes of origin.

The orthodox / catholic authors whose works I will examine here did not use *homoousios* often. Athanasius does not offer support for the word until the early to middle 350s, in his ‘On the Council of Nicaea’.\(^{86}\) Basil did not offer much support for it until after he wrote *Against Eunomius* in the mid-360s,\(^{87}\) and it is seldom used by Gregory of Nyssa in his *Against Eunomius*, written from 381 to 383.\(^{88}\) Gregory of Nazianzus, in his theological orations in 380,\(^{89}\) is unusual in saying that both the Son\(^{90}\) and the Spirit\(^{91}\) are ‘consubstantial’ with the Father, but he seldom uses this term.\(^{92}\) However, I will demonstrate that these Alexandrian and Greek authors supported the *concept* of the Son, and sometimes the Spirit, being of the same nature as the Father, even if they did not use the terminology of *homoousios*.\(^{93}\)

---

\(^{85}\) On these assumptions or debates, see the introduction to this thesis.


\(^{89}\) The dating is from Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, p. 39.

\(^{90}\) Gregory of Nazianzus, ‘The Third Theological Oration: Oration 29’, 16, also 10.


\(^{92}\) According to Beeley, Gregory seldom uses *homoousios*, and when he does it is often in responding to the arguments of others. Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, p. 213.

\(^{93}\) Kelly, in defending Athanasius for not using *homoousios* earlier, cites examples of how he wrote of similar *concepts* (e.g., ‘“intimately united with the Father’s substance”’). Kelly says these expressions are ‘really synonyms of the Nicene teaching’. Similar examples will be offered here, from arguments about creation. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, p. 260.
One of the goals for my analysis in this section is to demonstrate that some of these ideas about substance are related to ideas about how the Son and Spirit were ‘from’ the Father (i.e., about their modes of origin). I also will show that ideas about substance that were debated during the Eunomian controversies were related to the question of what names, especially those indicating modes of origin, indicate about the nature of that which they designate. I will argue that some of these ideas were related to the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, because orthodox / catholic thinkers had to demonstrate that the Son and the Spirit did not come from ‘nothing’ as creation did. They also had to demonstrate that the nature of the Son and Spirit could not be the same as that of creatures; this includes showing that the Son, who was begotten, could not be of the same substance as human offspring, who also are begotten. I also will argue, building on my analysis of its use in John 1. 14, 18, that ‘monogenés, which appears in the 325 and 381 creeds and fourth century writings, may not have been intended to convey something about how the Son came into being or to support the word homoousios, which would represent a connection between mode of origin and nature, but to speak of the Son’s uniqueness in other ways.

I will then conclude this section with a summary of some principles of unity and distinction within the Trinity and in external acts that were held by the early 380s.

2.2.1 Athanasius on the Son and Spirit being ‘from’ the Father, creation ‘out of nothing’, and divine simplicity

The works I will examine in my analysis of Athanasius’s ideas include his ‘On the Council of Nicaea’, from the middle 350s, and ‘Letters to Serapion’, which are dated to 359-361, and a later letter, ‘To the Bishops of Africa’, which he may have co-authored. I will argue that Athanasius thinks that the differences between how the Son comes ‘from’ the Father and how creation came ‘from’ God are not just

94 See section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1.
95 DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, Works on the Spirit, p. 29.
96 This letter was written by Athanasius and other bishops, according to its heading. Hanson dates it to 369 and raises the question of its authenticity. Athanasius, ‘To the Bishops of Africa’, trans. by Archibald Robertson and Cardinal Newman, in St. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, NPNF, 2nd series, 4 (1892; Oak Harbor: Logos Research Systems, 1997 [on CD-ROM]), 1; R. Hanson, The Search, p. 420.
differences between being begotten and made, or between the substance of what is begotten versus the nature of what is made, but also about coming from God’s essence as opposed to from ‘nothing’. I also will show that Athanasius relied on the principle of divine simplicity to argue that the Spirit was of the same substance as the Son and the Father, and that they all engage together in creative acts.

I use ‘On the Council of Nicaea’ with caution, given that Athanasius is said to misrepresent his opponents in some writings.97 These misrepresentations include, according to Gwynn, his grouping and labeling opponents as ‘Eusebians’, after the fourth century Eusebius of Nicomedia,98 and, as Khaled Anatolios says, ‘conflating all anti-Nicene factions as “Arians”’.99 Gwynn also cautions that what Athanasius deems to be ‘orthodox’ or Nicene theology should not be taken to represent ‘the traditional and universal faith of the Church that [Athanasius] wished to claim’.100 My method is to examine Athanasius’s writings about the 325 creed and council to see what they reveal about his theological perspectives in the 350s. This is compatible with the approach taken by Anatolios, who looks at Athanasius as a ‘theologian in his own right’,101 and by Ayres, in his analysis of ‘On the Council of Nicaea’.102 However, Athanasius did attend the 325 council,103 and one should hold open the possibility that his accounts could in fact be historical.

2.2.1.1 Athanasius on the Son’s nature, kind, and mode of origin versus creation’s

Athanasius, in ‘On the Council of Nicaea’, purports to explain why the council included ‘‘from the essence” (ek tés ousias) and “one in essence” (homoousios)’ in its creed.104 He claims that the council, to respond to the ‘Arians’, had wanted to

---

98 Gwynn, The Eusebians, p. 6 and throughout; see also Anatolios, Athanasius, ECF, pp. 176-178.
99 Anatolios, Athanasius, ECF, pp. 176-178.
100 Gwynn, The Eusebians, p. 170, also pp. 6, 239-244.
101 Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea, pp. 12-13; see also Young and Teal, From Nicaea to Chalcedon, pp. 51-52.
102 Ayres, ‘Athanasius’ Initial Defense of the Term homoousios’.
103 Anatolios, Athanasius, ECF, pp. 11; Gwynn, The Eusebians, p. 4.
104 English and Greek citations are from Anatolios’ translation. Athanasius, ‘On the Council of Nicaea’, 3, p. 180; see also 1, p. 178.
use scriptural words to convey ‘that the Son is not from non-being but from God … neither creature nor something made, but from the Father as his own (idion) offspring’. He says that ‘Arians’ or ‘the party of Eusebius’ had thought that being ‘from God’, according to the scriptures, referred not only to how the Son came into being, but also to how human beings come into being. In other words, the words ‘from God’ would not, by themselves, indicate something unique about the Son’s mode of origin. Thus, according to Athanasius, the council was compelled to say that ‘the Son is from the essence of the Father’ (ek tés ousias tou theou).

The distinctions Athanasius makes here, whether they represent the thinking of the 325 council or his ideas, reflect the need to establish that the Son did not come ‘from nothing’ as creation had. This suggests that a connection existed between the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and reflections on the substance of the Son himself, which in turn influenced developments in the principle of consubstantiality within the Trinity. Whether this is an obvious point or a subtle one, it shows that fourth century discussions about how the Son came into being are not just about modes of origin (e.g., being begotten not made) but about the need to establish that the Son had an original substance (God’s) that differed from that of creation (‘nothing’). I will develop these and other points in the examples to follow.

Ayres shows that Athanasius’s arguments that the Son is ‘from the essence of the Father’ and ‘proper’ to the Father’s substance’ appear in Athanasius’s earlier Orations against the Arians, which Anatolios dates to 339-343. Similar ideas are also expressed in the later ‘To the Bishops of Africa’, where another purported explanation is given of why the 325 council had said the Son is ‘coessential’ with the Father. This letter supports my argument that the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ influenced ideas about the substance of the Son, and then about the substance of the Son and Father. The letter says that the council, to counter both

105 Italics added. English and Greek citations here and for the rest of this paragraph are from Anatolios’s translation. Athanasius, ‘On the Council of Nicaea’, 19, pp. 196-197.
109 Athanasius, ‘To the Bishops of Africa’, 5; R. Hanson, The Search, p. 420.
the idea that the Son was a creature 'made of nothing' and that there was a time 'when He was not', had sought to establish that 'the Son alone might be deemed proper to the Essence of the Father', because 'this is peculiar [idion] to the one who is Only-begotten [monogenous] and true Word in relation to a Father'. 110 This movement is from (1) establishing that the Son had not come 'from nothing'; to (2) arguing that the Son comes from the Father’s essence; to (3) positing that the Son was monogenēs (which, in the translation above, is rendered 'only-begotten').

My argument that Athanasius’s ideas, and perhaps those of the 325 council, were grounded in the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ is not intended to suggest that other principles were not involved in these developments in trinitarian thinking. For example, Ayres argues that when Athanasius distinguishes between how the Son and creatures are ‘from God’, Athanasius draws on the relationship ‘by nature’ of a Father to his ‘offspring’ or Son. 111 One can accept Ayres’s argument that Athanasius is drawing on the principle that offspring must be of the same nature as their father. This argument too is about creation, but it moves from the nature of the Creator / Father to the nature of created things versus that of the Son. Here I am arguing that Athanasius was also arguing from the principle of creation ‘out of nothing’ to ideas about the nature of the Son.

Athanasius’s arguments in ‘On the Council of Nicaea’ are of interest in other ways for assessing relationships between ideas about creation and developments in trinitarian principles. Athanasius writes:

... if the Word is not from God as a genuine son who is from his father by nature, but is said to be from the Father in the same way that all creatures are said to be so, because of their having been created [by the Father], then indeed he is not from the being of the Father, nor is he a son according to essence [kat’ ousian], but because of virtue, as we are who are called sons by grace. But if he is alone from God as genuine Son, as indeed is the case, then it is well said that the son is from the being of God. 112

The word translated ‘genuine’ in the passage above is ‘gnésios’, and ‘genuine sonship’ is an implication of the first definition of this word, ‘belonging to the race, i.e., lawfully begotten, legitimate.’ In the second instance in which this word is used above, the word ‘monos’ appears: ‘ei de ek tou theou esti monos ēs huios gnésios’. One might see a connection here between monos and gnésios, and monogenēs. As I discussed in Chapter 1, monogenēs can mean ‘single of its kind, only’, ‘the only member of a kin or kind’, or ‘uniqueness of being’, meanings which stem from ‘of a single [monos] kind [genos]’, but do not indicate how a son comes into being. For Athanasius, however, in this passage, the ‘genuine Son’, who is from the Father’s being ‘by nature’, is of the divine ‘race’ or ‘kind’. This includes Father and Son, so the Son is not the only one of this kind. The Son, moreover, is of this kind because he did not come ‘from the Father in the same way that all creatures are said to be’, although Athanasius does not say (here) how the Son came into being. Thus these meanings of ‘genuine sonship’ are similar to, but not the same as, the meanings of monogenēs to be discussed below.

In his ‘Letters to Serapion’, Athanasius asserts that distinctions exist between ‘makers’ and ‘begetters’, and that fathers, whether human parents or God, are ‘begetters’, and sons, including the Son, are sons ‘by nature’ and are of the same

---

113 Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, ‘De decretis Nicaenae synodi’, Ch. 22, 5, lines 1-2, 5-6.
115 Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, ‘De decretis Nicaenae synodi,’ Ch. 22, 5, lines 5-6.
118 See section 2.2.2.
substance as their fathers. He does not explain how the Father’s begetting of the Son took place, but here he associates the state of being begotten (which is a mode of origin) with that of being of the same essence as the begetter (which is about substance). According to Athanasius, these concepts apply to living creatures that are begotten as well as to the Son and the Father, but not to created things that are ‘made’. Things that are made, such as a ‘house’ or ‘ship’, cannot be of the same ‘substance’ as those who made them, but ‘it is appropriate for someone to say that every son is the same as his own father in substance’. 

Thus Athanasius’s ideas about the Son’s mode of origin and substance are related to three principles and represent a movement from tenets of faith and ideas related to creation to trinitarian principles: first, the Son cannot have come ‘from nothing’; secondly, the Son must have been begotten; and thirdly, the Son must have come ‘from’ the Father’s essence. These three principles stem from the contrast between how some created things come into being through having been made versus how living creatures come into being through having been begotten by their parents, and what these modes of origin mean for their substances. Athanasius, in the passages examined here, does not clearly say that the Son had to have a unique way of ‘being begotten’ to distinguish his substance (which is the Father’s) from the substance of creatures, including human beings, who also come into being through ‘being begotten’.

2.2.1.2 Athanasius, the 325 creed, creation ‘out of nothing’, and John 1. 1, 3

Whether or not Athanasius’s account of the proceedings of the 325 council is historical, the text of the 325 creed itself appears to be grounded in the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, which I have argued was accepted by some Christians in the late second and third centuries. The creed, in saying that Jesus Christ, the Son, was ‘begotten not made’ (gennéthenta ou poiéthenta), distinguishes his mode of generation from that of some creatures, and the creed says further that all things

122 See section 1.3.3 in Chapter 1.
came into being through him (‘di’ hou ta panta egeneto’, from John 1. 3, 10). The creed also condemns, in the anathema section, those who say, ‘There was when He was not, and, before being born (gennéthénai) He was not’, or that ‘He came into existence out of nothing’. The first condemnation applied to people, like Arius, who had said there was a time when the Son ‘was not’ (ouk én). This should be seen as a rejection of the scriptural attestation of John 1. 1 that the Word ‘was’ (én) in the beginning. The second condemnation applied to those who thought the Son came from the same origin as creation: out of nothing.

That the creed condemns these views provides support for the claims in one of the letters cited above that the council had sought to counter both the idea that the Son was a creature ‘made of nothing’ and that there was a time ‘when He was not’. Athanasius makes related arguments when he says that the council ‘made it manifestly clear that “from the essence” and “of one essence” are abrogations of the trite slogans of the impious: such as that he is a “creature” and “made” and something which has come into being (genéton) and changeable and that he was not before he was generated.’

2.2.1.3 Athanasius, the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, and divine simplicity

Athanasius also addresses questions about the non-created status and the substance of the Holy Spirit, and, to a lesser extent, of how the Spirit is ‘from’ God, in his ‘Letters to Serapion’, where he argues against the ‘Tropikoi’ or ‘Tropici’, who believed that the Spirit had been created and was not divine. Athanasius bases some of these arguments, as well as some of his statements about the Trinity, on his understanding of the principle of divine simplicity. So he is not drawing on the
same principles in these arguments about the Spirit and the Trinity as he was in the arguments examined above about the Son.

Athanasius uses ‘homoousios’ in saying that the Spirit is ‘proper to the one Word and proper to and the same as the one God in substance’. His ideas here, however, are based more on the relationship the Spirit has with the Son, than with the Father. This is clear when he asserts that the Spirit is of the substance of the Word: ‘Thus the Spirit is not a creature but is said to be proper to the substance of the Word and proper to God and in God’. He also emphasises the relationship between the Spirit and Son when he says that if the Spirit has ‘the same unity with the Son as the Son has with the Father’, the Spirit cannot be a creature.

In defending his arguments that the Spirit must have an uncreated nature, in which he implies that the Spirit is of the same essence as the Father, Athanasius draws on a version of divine simplicity similar to Philo’s version. Athanasius argues that ‘two distinct natures’ cannot be mixed in the Godhead, which would be the outcome if the Spirit was a creature, while the Son, like the Father, was not. That there would be two natures, one shared by the Father and Son, the other the created nature of the Spirit, is implicit in Athanasius’s statement that the Tropikoi accepted the ‘unity’ of Son and Father, without ‘dividing them’. Athanasius then argues that the Trinity cannot have anything ‘foreign’ mixed with it, because God cannot be a ‘compound’ and ‘the whole Trinity is one God’, which suggests the Spirit shares the essence of the Father and Son. These views are similar to Philo’s position that God is not comprised of parts nor mixed with anything.

Athanasius’s argument that if the Spirit were a creature, the mixture that would

---

133 On Philo’s views of divine simplicity, see section 1.1.5 in Chapter 1 and below here.
134 Athanasius, ‘Letters to Serapion’, 1.2.1-1.2.4, pp. 54-55; see also 1.17.1, p. 79.
136 Athanasius, ‘Letters to Serapion’, 1.2.3-1.2.4, pp. 55; see also 1.17.1, p. 79.
occur in the ‘divinity in the Trinity’ would ‘rupture’ its unity and ‘reduce it to the level of creatures’, also has affinities with Philo’s view that God would be ‘lessened’ if something inferior were to be ‘assimilated’ to God.

Athanasius offers similar arguments about the Trinity when he says:

So, the Trinity is holy and perfect, confessed in Father and Son and Holy Spirit. It has nothing foreign or external mixed with it, not is it composed of Creator and creature, but is entirely given to creating and making. It is self-consistent and indivisible in nature, and it has one activity.

Athanasius is speaking of oneness of substance within the Trinity and oneness of economic acts of creation, and he indicates that all three Persons are engaged in these acts: all three are Creator. Thus he is speaking of God as Creator and Trinity, and he grounds his arguments here in his understanding of divine simplicity and his conviction that the Son and Spirit were not created. In another place Athanasius also says that ‘the Son is Creator like the Father’, and the Spirit ‘is not a creature but is involved in the act of creating’. He grounds these arguments partly on his belief that ‘our knowledge of the Spirit is derived from the Son’ and on the attestation of John 1, 3 that ‘all things came to be through’ the Son.

Athanasius is vague, however, about what it means for the Spirit to be ‘from’ God. He also argues for the Spirit’s being ‘from God’ based on 1 Cor. 2. 11-12, which is not about creation or proceeding, but about the Spirit knowing ‘the things that belong to God’. He draws on the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ when he says that the Spirit cannot have ‘kinship’ with creatures partly because the Spirit is ‘from God’ and thus ‘cannot be from nothing’, which indicates a connection between the Spirit’s mode of generation and its substance. It is not obvious, though, how the Spirit’s being ‘from God’ differs from other ways that being ‘from

---

138 Athanasius, ‘Letters to Serapion’, 1.2.3-1.2.4, p. 55.
God’ is presented in scripture, which Athanasius says prevented the 325 Council from using simply ‘from God’ language for the Son.

2.2.1.4 Closing comments on Athanasius

My analysis has shown that a close connection exists between the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and Athanasius’s trinitarian ideas, and that he attributed some of these connections to the 325 Council of Nicaea in their formulation of their creed. The text of the creed and its anathema section do appear to be grounded in this doctrine, and the creed cites John 1. 3, 10. Those, like Arius, who had said that there had been a time when the Son ‘was not’, and who thus were condemned in the creed’s anathema section, apparently were rejecting John 1. 1.

Given my lens of beginning with Athanasius’s creation theology, I concluded that three principles (not just that the Son was a ‘son by nature’ from the Father) were at work for Athanasius with respect to the Son. First, the Son’s original substance cannot have been ‘nothing’ (based on the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’); secondly, the Son was begotten (a mode of origin he shares with living creatures); and thirdly, he must have come from the Father’s essence not simply ‘from God’ (a son by nature from God’s essence).

In my analysis of Athanasius’s ideas about creation, the Holy Spirit, and the Trinity, I showed that he drew on a version of the principle of divine simplicity to extend his arguments to the Holy Spirit. Once he had established that the Son was of the same nature as the Father, he then argued that there could not be a mixture of two natures within the Trinity, where the other would be the Spirit’s nature if it were a creature (and hence had come from ‘nothing’). He further extended the principle of divine simplicity, drawing on John 1. 3, to say that the Father, Son, and Spirit engage in one activity of creation, just as they are indivisible in nature. As I will discuss in Part II, these ideas about simplicity differ from Augustine’s mature ideas, but the concept that simplicity entails both unity of action among the Trinity and unity of substance within the Trinity also was known to Augustine.145

145 See section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4.
2.2.2 Case study: the word monogenés and the Son’s mode of origin and substance versus other unique attributes of the Son

Before I move to discussing modes of origin and nature in some Cappadocian writings and Eunomius’s works, I will offer a case study of the potential meanings of and translation options for monogenés. This analysis builds on my discussion in Chapter 1 of monogenés as it appears in John 1. 14, 18. 146 In Chapter 3, I will study ‘unigenitus’, the Latin word that was typically used to translate monogenés and which is typically translated into English as ‘only-begotten’. 147 One of my objectives for that study is to assess Augustine’s use of ‘unigenitus’ and ‘unicus’ (‘only’) and his sources for knowing the former word, which appears in Latin writings and translations of the 325 creed (‘unicus’ appears in old Latin creeds). 148 Thus my analysis here and later involves looking at terminology that appears in creeds and in theological writings. This is significant because the creeds not only reflect, but also become, sources for theological terminology.

In the fourth century, monogenés appears in the articles about Jesus Christ, the Son of God, in the 325149 and 381150 creeds; in Cappadocian writings against Eunomius; Eunomius’s own writings; and other works. One argument I will make is that if monogenés, in the fourth century, came to convey meanings about how the Son came into being (that he was ‘begotten’ or the only one begotten in a certain way), it may have been because of how monogenés was used in Cappadocian-Eunomian debates over substance and origins within the Trinity. This raises the question of whether English translations of fourth century creeds and theological writings should use the other translation options for monogenés, besides only-begotten, that scholars have applied to the Gospel of John. 151

---

146 See my analysis of the prologue to John in section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1.
147 See section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3.
148 See section 3.3.4 in Chapter 3.
151 Giles applies some alternative translations of monogenés to the 325 creed and fourth century writings, and he argues that these alternatives were accepted at the time. I do not think he offers enough supporting evidence and we disagree at points, but he shares my interest in relooking at monogenés. Giles, The Eternal Generation of the Son, pp. 27-28, 64-66, 69, 81, and elsewhere.
My analysis also will challenge J. N. D. Kelly's position on *monogenés* in the 325 creed. In a discussion of the ‘special clauses’ in this creed that were intended to ‘rebut Arianism’ Kelly asserts that ‘[w]e may pass over ONLY-BEGOTTEN [sic] (*monogenés*), although much ink has been expended in the discussion of it, because it was accepted by all parties in the Arian quarrel and no special dogmatic significance was read into it’. He cites an 1876 work on variant textual traditions of *monogenés* as it appears in John 1. 18, and on its use in the 381 creed and other Greek and Latin creeds, including creeds known to Augustine. Kelly’s research and this older work are helpful, but the research I will build on here is more recent. I will argue, contra Kelly, that *monogenés* did have theological significance, both earlier and later in the fourth century.

The intended meaning of *monogenés* in the 325 creed is not clear. As Oskar Skarsaune says, it has ‘rather unelegant positioning’ or seems ‘misplaced’. It could clarify *gennéthenta* in saying that Jesus Christ, the Son, is ‘*gennéthenta ek tou patros monogené, toutestin ek tés ousias tou patros*’. This can be translated as ‘begotten from the Father, only-begotten, that is, from the substance of the Father’. Skarsaune’s position that *monogenés* is a ‘precision to’ *gennéthenta* is similar to my arguments being made here, but he takes this to yield ‘“begotten as only-begotten”’ while other possibilities will be presented here.

Skarsaune cites a creed he attributes to Arius, which uses ‘*gennésanta huion monogené*’ but with God as the subject (not Jesus Christ, the Son, as in the 325 creed). This can be seen in Skarsaune’s translation: ‘We know one God … who brought forth the only-begotten Son…’ Skarsaune argues that Arius thought that *monogenés* ‘has no other meaning than that God’s Son was brought forth

---

155 Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, pp. 34-35.
158 Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, p. 36.
159 The Greek and English text is from Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, pp. 40-41.
directly by the Father without any mediator – unlike the rest of God’s creation, in which the Son was the Mediator’. Skarsaune also says that ‘the standard Arian exegesis’ of *monogenés* later came to be that ‘the *monos* applies primarily to the *Father as sole begetter-creator of the Son*, and that the ‘Son alone was brought forth *from the Father alone*, without any mediator’. This interpretation, with its emphasis on God, and its perspective that God ‘begot-created’ the Son rather than begot the Son, will be relevant in my discussions of Eunomius’s ideas.

Skarsaune shows that the early fourth century Alexander of Alexandria used a creed that places *gennéthenta* directly after *monogenés*. Although Skarsaune is aware of other meanings of *monogenés*, including ‘only one of its kind’ (which he believes was the original ‘Johannine meaning’), he takes *monogenés* in this creed to be a ‘precision’ on *gennéthenta*, with the latter word followed and further clarified by ‘*ek tés ousias tou patros*’. According to Skarsaune, Alexander thought ‘genes’ could mean ‘begotten’ and thus connected *monogenés* with *gennao*, and Origen had made a similar move. Skarsaune asserts that Alexander thought that using *monogenés* to mean begotten and alluding to Origen’s ‘concept of eternal begetting’ would be a ‘strong weapon’ against Arian views of the Son’s status. So these concepts are about the Son’s mode of origin (being begotten) and about substance (coming ‘from’ the essence or substance of the Father).

Skarsaune’s analysis may offer one explanation of why *monogenés* came to refer to a mode of origin (being begotten) in some cases in the fourth century. In building on this, one can suggest that *monogenés* was viewed as being related to ‘*genesia*’ or generation, rather than taken as ‘of a single [*monos*] kind [*genos*],

---

160 Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, p. 41.
161 Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, p. 52 FN 22; also p. 45.
162 Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, pp. 42-44.
163 Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, p. 44.
164 According to Butterworth’s translation, Origen says the Father must have begotten His ‘*unigeniti filii*’ in some exceptional way which cannot be understood, and that this is an ‘eternal and everlasting begetting’, and that the Son is ‘Son by nature’. Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, p. 44; Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. and ed. by G. W. Butterworth, in *Origen: On First Principles*, by G. W. Butterworth (1936; New York: Harper Torchbooks, The Cathedral Library, 1966), pp. 1-328 (Book I, 2, 4).
165 Skarsaune, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’, p. 44.
166 This point is original. On ‘*genesia*’, see Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 310.
which does not indicate mode of origin. The view of ‘genes’ as referring to *mode of origin* also might be contrasted to the ‘origin, source, or beginning’ (*genesis*) of something (e.g., creation), where ‘genesis’ does not indicate how it came about.  

Another proposal about how *monogenēs* may have been understood at the time of Arius comes from Tarmo Toom. Toom says that Arius probably could have agreed with the words in the 325 creed that come before ‘from the essence of the Father’, including *monogenēs*, which Toom says Arius likely understood to mean ‘unique’, but when *monogenēs* was read with the ‘clarifying clause’ of ‘from the essence’ of the Father, it meant the Son was consubstantial with the Father. In other words, Arius, as Skarsaune also indicates, could have accepted that the Son was ‘from’ the Father in a unique way (in some mode of origin). But Arius could not have accepted the association of mode of origin with substance.  

However, as I discussed in Chapter 1 and above here, other possibilities exist for understanding *monogenēs*. Besides ‘only-begotten’, other options include ‘single of its kind, only’, ‘the only member of a kin or kind’, ‘uniqueness of being’, or ‘only child’. The word *monogenēs* may also be synonymous with *agapētos* (typically translated as ‘beloved’), and the former word can suggest a ‘beloved child’, as it does in a work by an unknown author that is attributed to Athanasius, or, conversely, the latter word can mean ‘only child’.

Any of these meanings, if they had been held by the 325 council when the creed was being crafted, might not have reinforced that the Son was begotten (a  

---

167 The definition of ‘genesis’ as origin, source, or beginning is from Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 310.
168 Toom, *Classical Trinitarian Theology*, p. 93, see also 81.
169 See the analysis of *monogenēs* in section 1.2.3 of Chapter 1 and section 2.2.1.1 above.
170 Citations for these were given in sections 1.2.3 and 2.2.1.1.
172 See section 1.2.3. C. H. Turner, ‘HTOC’, *Journal of Theological Studies*, os-27, no. 106 (1926), 113-129 (pp. 120-129).
mode of origin), and possibly would not have conveyed something about the Son’s substance. One cannot conjecture what the council thought about *monogenés*, other than referring to Skarsaune’s and Toom’s insights derived from the creeds used by Arius and Alexander, but it might be fair to assume that people on the council held more than one view of *monogenés*. One scholar offers evidence that Eusebius of Caesarea used *monogenés* and *agapétos* together in writing of the Father and Son, to emphasise ‘the nature of the Son in His relation to the Father’ and ‘the uniqueness of the Sonship’.173 It is possible, therefore, that the council could have understood the Son as unique in some ways, besides necessarily in the way in which he came into being. While the ambiguity of how *monogenés* is placed in the creed does not permit conclusions, this possibility should be given consideration.

Athanasius may have known some of these meanings. He used *monogenés* in the writings discussed above and in his earlier *Orations against the Arians*.174 In the orations, Athanasius discusses the difference between the Word or Son being the ‘“firstborn of creation”’ and being ‘only-begotten’.175 He says that the former expression applies to someone born first who has siblings and is related to the created order, but someone is called *monogenés* ‘because there are no other brothers’.176 That someone has no siblings does not say how he or she came into being, so this is not necessarily about the Son’s mode of origin.

Athanasius also asserts that *monogenés*, Son, Word, and Wisdom are ‘terms that refer back to the Father and indicate the fact that the Son belongs to the Father’, and he cites biblical passages that use these terms, including John 1.14 and Mt. 3.17 (‘“This is my beloved Son”’).177 He argues that ‘*monogenés*’ is more appropriate than ‘firstborn’ for the Word, because there is no other Word or Wisdom (thus, he is one of a kind), and ‘he alone is the true Son of the Father’.

174 This can be seen by searching the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
175 The expression ‘firstborn of creation’ is from Col. 1.15. The citations from Athanasius in this paragraph are from Athanasius, *Orations against the Arians* (selections), trans. and ed. by Khaled Anatolios, in *Athanasius*, by Anatolios, ECF, pp. 87-175 (2.62, pp. 155-156).
which is an earlier instance of his discussing the ‘true Son’ than in the works I cited above.\textsuperscript{178} Athanasius’s mention of the ‘beloved Son’ and only-begotten Son ‘in the bosom of the Father’ (John 1. 18) also may hint that he understood \textit{monogenés} and \textit{agapétos} to be related. Athanasius does also say that \textit{monogenés} is used in ‘in reference to the generation from the Father’.\textsuperscript{179} However, his overall arguments here suggest that \textit{monogenés} and the Son’s \textit{belonging to} the father have other meanings about how the Son is special and unique, and loved by the Father.

Athanasius’s writings, in which he shows that he held various perspectives on \textit{monogenés}, were a few decades earlier than Cappadocian writings and orations against Eunomian ideas. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa use \textit{monogenés} frequently in their respective treatises \textit{Against Eunomius},\textsuperscript{180} and while they sometimes use it in quoting Eunomius, there are instances where they show that they understand it to refer to the uniqueness of the Son’s mode of origin (i.e., that he is the only one begotten in the unique way in which he is begotten). In one instance where Basil is responding to (what he considered to be) Eunomius’s misuse of \textit{monogenés}, he says that ‘in common usage [\textit{monogenés}] does not designate the one who comes from only one person [as Eunomius thought], but the one who is the \textit{only one begotten}.’\textsuperscript{181} Eunomius’s position (as reported by Basil) apparently represents what Skarsaune calls the later ‘standard Arian exegesis’, where ‘\textit{monos}’ applied primarily to the \textit{Father} as sole begetter-creator of the Son.\textsuperscript{182} However, Basil, in his response, says \textit{monogenés} refers to the \textit{only one begotten}. Basil also accuses

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \cite{Orations:2.62:155-156} Athanasius, \textit{Orations}, 2.62, pp. 155-156.
\item \cite{Orations:Orations:pp.118} Widdicombe cites this section of his \textit{Orations}, saying ‘it is clear’ Athanasius thinks ‘the prefix (\textit{monos}) (“only,” “unique”)’ gives the interpretative key’ for \textit{monogenés}. Widdicombe also says Athanasius seems to think \textit{monogenés} ‘was determinative of the sense in which “generated” is to be taken’, which suggests Athanasius had multiple meanings of \textit{monogenés} in mind. Giles cites this section, and thinks \textit{monogenés} conveys something about the eternal begetting of the Son, a unique way of coming into being. Giles is ambiguous, given that he also says the correct meaning of \textit{monogenés} is unique or only. Widdicombe, ‘The Fathers on the Father’, p. 118; Giles, \textit{The Eternal Generation of the Son}, pp. 81-82.
\item \cite{WhatHasAthens:pp.102} Examples are numerous. See the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae; Pelikan, \textit{What Has Athens...?}, p. 102; Lampe, \textit{A Patristic Greek Lexicon}, pp. 880-882.
\item \cite{AgainstEunomius:pp.132} Italics added. This passage is cited by Giles, who supplies the Greek for \textit{monogenés}. Basil of Caesarea, \textit{Against Eunomius}, 2.20, p. 159; Giles, \textit{The Eternal Generation of the Son}, p. 132.
\item \cite{AgainstEunomius:pp.159} This was cited above.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Eunomius of linking *monogenés* with the concept of being begotten in the same way that creatures are begotten, which thus meant that the Son is similar to other sons that are begotten according to some scriptures.  

Similarly, Gregory of Nyssa argues that ‘Only-begotten’ refers to ‘something unique and exceptional’ about the *generation* of the Son, which is ‘not in common with all begetting, and is peculiar to Him’.  

Gregory’s argument is related to the *nature* of what comes into being, because he says that if there were no distinctions in the begetting, there would be ‘mixture and community’ between the Son and ‘the rest of generated things’.  

His reasoning is similar to Athanasius’s ideas about begetters and those begotten being of the same nature. For Gregory, however, the Son’s mode of origin – of being the only one begotten in the way that is unique to the Son – results in the Son’s being of the same nature as the Father. Gregory thus posits two types of ‘being begotten’. Athanasius had combined the principle that the Son had to have come from the Father’s essence (which was unique to the Son) with the belief that the Son was begotten (which is not a unique mode of origin). Gregory appears to think that both concepts are entailed in *monogenés*.

Gregory also says that ‘non-existence before generation is proper to all things that exist by generation’, but ‘this is foreign to the special character of the Only-begotten, to which the name “Only-begotten” bears witness that there attaches nothing belonging to the mode of that form of common generation which Eunomius misapprehends’. This connects the mode of origin of the Son to the Son’s original substance, which cannot be ‘nothing’ (non-existence), as well as to the Nicene and Johannine principle that there was not a time when the Son ‘was’ not.

Gregory of Nazianzus does not use *monogenés* often in his theological orations. However, in two cases where he may understand it as only-begotten, which is inconclusive in the texts, he lists it as one of many attributes for the Son or Jesus Christ, without saying it is significant, and it is the English translations that

---

187 This is shown in searching Gregory’s orations using the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
say that his meaning was 'only-begotten'.

Eunomius uses monogenés, sometimes ambiguously. One instance is in a ‘profession of faith’ in his ‘First Apology’, where he says ‘kai eis hena monogené huion theou, theon logon … di’ hou ta panta …’. Here monogené clarifies the Son of God and ‘begotten’ does not appear, nor does, of course, a statement that the Son is from the substance of the Father. Vaggione uses ‘only-begotten’ in translating the above statement, as do DelCiglano and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz in translating Basil’s restatement of Eunomius’s profession. However, unless Eunomius understood monogenés by itself (without being placed with ‘begotten’ or with a phrase about the Son coming from the Father’s substance) to mean ‘only-begotten’, these translations may not be appropriate. The earlier Alexander of Alexandria may have considered ‘monogenés’ to mean ‘only-begotten’ because he thought it drew on the word ‘genes’, but in his creed monogenés was followed by gennéthenta.

On the other hand, given that Eunomius’s statement includes ‘di’ hou ta panta’, which is an apparent reference to John 1. 3, 10, his use of monogenés may be related to its use in John 1. 18 (where, in some textual traditions, this verse refers to the monogenés theos). In that case it could be a title for the Son. In other places where Eunomius uses monogenés, he does appear to use it as a title, probably in place of ‘Son’, given that Eunomius did not like ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ terminology, as will be evident below. If Eunomius was using monogenés as a title, and likely referring to John, then, again, the translation ‘only-begotten’ may not be the most appropriate.

---

189 Vaggione provides an index entry for monogenés. Vaggione, Eunomius, p. 204.
191 Vaggione, Eunomius, p. 39.
192 Vaggione, Eunomius, p. 39; Basil, Against Eunomius, 1.4, pp. 88-89.
193 See section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1.
194 See the discussion below and Ayres and Radde-Gallwitz, ‘Basil of Caesarea’, p. 466.
One of Vaggione’s cautions about using Basil’s Against Eunomius as a witness to Eunomius’s ‘First Apology’ is that Vaggione suspects that ‘mutual influences’ exist between these works. Based on my analysis above, which would require further research in order to support any firm conclusions, it is possible that Jerome was not the only theologian in the second half of the fourth century to change the translation or meaning of monogenés out of theological motives. Monogenés may have taken on the meaning that the Son was the only one who was begotten in a certain way because of the ways it was used in Basil’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s rebuttals to Eunomius. If so, the meaning of this word would have either changed, or one meaning, among others, was emphasised in some Cappadocian-Eunomian debates. If this is true, this change would have been a result of arguments over the Son’s mode of origin, and the implications it had for the Son’s having come from the substance of the Father and not from ‘nothing’. Conversely, monogenés may have meant other things at the time, and it is the translations of fourth century works that use ‘only-begotten’ when other meanings would be more appropriate.

The creed adopted by the 381 Council of Constantinople refers to Jesus Christ as ‘ton huion tou theou ton monogené, ton ek tou patros gennéthenta’. Kelly points out that ton monogené stands in apposition to ‘the Son of God’ and has an article, which he considers among the ‘minor’ differences between the 325 and 381 creeds. However, the clause that contains monogenés is identical to the clause in Alexander’s creed, cited by Skarsaune, although in the 381 creed, gennéthenta is at the end of the clause that follows (which does not mention the Father’s substance), not the beginning of the clause. This further separates monogenés from the idea that the Son is begotten, and the creed does not mention that the Son is homoousios with the Father until later in the lengthy clause on the Son.

These could be significant differences. The 381 creed, with this placement of monogenés, may not have been intended to refer to the Son’s mode of origin or his substance. The creed’s authors may have held other meanings of monogenés

197 J. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, pp. 303-305.
about the Son’s being unique, one of a kind, or even beloved. If so, monogenēs may not support the principle of the unity of substance of the Father and Son, or ideas about the Son’s mode of generation being related to the Son’s substance. It may have intended to indicate an attribute that distinguishes the Son in other ways.

2.2.3 Cappadocian-Eunomian debates: modes of origin, substance, and unity and distinctions within the Trinity

In this section, I first will analyse some of Eunomius’s ideas, and then ideas that Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus present in their anti-Eunomian arguments. These include Eunomius’s position that the Son was begotten by the Father’s ‘will’ (not from God’s essence), which changes the relationship between ‘being begotten’ as a mode of origin and being a son ‘by nature’. I also will discuss Basil’s concept of ‘distinguishing marks’, and Gregory’s reflections on relations, attributes, and substance within the Trinity. Their ideas may be well known, but my argument is that Basil and Gregory present these ideas in the context of reflecting on relationships between modes of origins and substance, and in rebutting Eunomius’s position on what names or terms designate for substance. I thus ‘begin’ with modes of origin, rather than with substance. My objective is to nuance the views of scholars who study the Cappadocian-Eunomian controversies.

I will analyse passages from Basil’s Against Eunomius, from the mid-360s, and Gregory’s orations, from about fifteen years later. I also will cite Eunomius’s ‘First Apology’, from 360-361, both in discussing his ideas and as support for Basil’s or Gregory’s statements of his positions. According to Vaggione, Eunomius began his ‘Second Apology’, which he wrote in intervals, in 378. So Gregory was responding to Eunomian ideas while Eunomius was responding to Basil.

2.2.3.1 Eunomius on names, simplicity, modes of origin, and generation by ‘will’

As I introduced above, Eunomius’s preferred titles for God and the Son were Unbegotten (agennētos) for God, and Begotten (gennēthenta) or Monogenēs (this
will be left untranslated) for the Son. Eunomius held that the Son was different in substance (*heteroousios*) from God, and his ideas had some precedent in Arius’s earlier ideas. However, Eunomius’s ideas also reflect other principles that are significant for examining Basil’s and Gregory’s ideas and which will be relevant in my later analysis of Augustine’s trinitarian thinking.

Eunomius’s ideas about substance were partly grounded in the ‘naturalist position’ he held in ‘names theory’; this position entailed that the substances of the Father and Son were *designated by* their names or titles. For Eunomius, ‘Unbegotten’ was not one characteristic of God’s substance, among others. It was a *name* or title for God that indicated that *being unoriginate* was God’s substance. Likewise, the substance of the Son or *Monogenés* was different from the Father’s because the Son is called ‘Begotten’. According to Eunomius, the Son’s essence ‘was begotten – not having been in existence prior to its own coming to be’, and it was ‘begotten before all things by the will of its God and Father’. I will discuss the implications of being begotten by God’s ‘will’ below. But Eunomius’s beliefs entailed that the Son’s substance was *not being unoriginate* and hence could not be the same as God’s substance. For Eunomius, moreover, and as Barnes says, only one ‘Unoriginate’ could exist, and this also entailed that the Son’s and Father’s substances could not be the same.

Eunomius’s ideas about substance are characterised by Radde-Gallwitz as

---


205 According to DelCogliano and Toom, a ‘naturalist position’ in ‘names theory’ held that names reveal the *nature* of objects designated. A ‘conventionalist’ position held that names are not necessarily related to nature. Eunomius does not use this terminology but explains why the name ‘Unbegotten’ designates God’s ‘unbegotten essence.’ Eunomius, ‘First Apology’, 7-8, pp. 40-43; Mark DelCogliano, *Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names: Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 103 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 25-27, 32; Tarmo Toom, ‘Hilary of Poitiers’ *De Trinitate* and the Name(s) of God’, *Vigiliae Christianae*, 64 (2010), 456-479 (pp. 456-457, 460-461, 471, 479 FN 86); see also Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy*, p. 149; S. Holmes, *The Quest for the Trinity*, pp. 99-100.


representing the 'identity thesis' with regard to understandings of divine simplicity.\textsuperscript{209} This thesis held, according to Radde-Gallwitz, that 'every term one attributes to God names God’s essence or substance'.\textsuperscript{210} This thus applies to other terms used to speak of God besides Unbegotten, all of which, Eunomius says, would 'be equivalent in force of meaning' to Unbegotten and would 'signify the essence of the Father'.\textsuperscript{211} Eunomius bases his views that all of these terms are equivalent, and that they name God's essence, on the principle of divine simplicity that 'the Father is without parts and uncomposed'.\textsuperscript{212} This view of simplicity is similar to that known to Athanasius and Philo, but Eunomius's application of it is different.\textsuperscript{213} However, we will see later that some similarities exist between Eunomius's reliance on the 'identity thesis' within divine simplicity and Augustine's fifth century ideas about simplicity, attributes, and substance within the Trinity.\textsuperscript{214}

Eunomius believed, according to Ayres, that something 'generated from the essence shares the essence of that from which it is generated'.\textsuperscript{215} This would make Eunomius's position on this similar to that of Athanasius and others who thought that a begetter and something begotten, or parents and offspring, were of the same nature. However, in keeping with Eunomius's position on names and what they designate, Eunomius could not accept that something generated or begotten could share God's ingenerate or unbegotten nature.\textsuperscript{216} Eunomius thus distinguished between 'generation from essence and generation by will'.\textsuperscript{217} He says that the Son is begotten, which is consistent with terminology used by others

\textsuperscript{210} Italics added. Holmes makes similar points about Eunomius's identification of multiple names or terms used for God with each Person and with God's substance. Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, \textit{Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity}, pp. 5-6; see also S. Holmes, \textit{The Quest for the Trinity}, pp. 99-100.
\textsuperscript{211} Holmes cites this passage from Eunomius's works. Eunomius, 'First Apology', 19, pp. 56-59; S. Holmes, \textit{The Quest for the Trinity}, pp. 99-100.
\textsuperscript{212} Eunomius, 'First Apology', 19, pp. 56-59.
\textsuperscript{213} See sections 1.1.5 in Chapter 1 and 2.2.1.3 above.
\textsuperscript{214} See section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{215} Ayres, \textit{Nicaea and Its Legacy}, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{216} This is based on my arguments here. See also Ayres, \textit{Nicaea and its Legacy}, p. 147.
and in the 325 and 381 creeds. But ‘being begotten’ by God’s will was not the same mode of origin as the ‘being begotten’ that takes place from the begetter and the begetter’s substance, as with human parents and offspring, because in the latter case it would have been connected with substance. \(^{218}\)

Eunomius equivocates on the Son’s substance by saying that although the Son is not begotten of the Father’s essence, neither was he ‘brought into existence out of nothing, for “no-thing” is not an essence’, but that the Son was ‘begotten when as yet he was not’. \(^{219}\) He also is inconsistent in drawing on the prologue to John. He refers to John 1. 3 and to ‘the blessed John’ in saying that ‘“all things were made through”’ the Son. \(^{220}\) However, his statement that there was a time when the Son was not contradicts John 1. 1, at least when this verse, which is about the Word, is read with the other verses in John 1. 1-18, which associate the Word with the Son and Jesus Christ. \(^{221}\) So Eunomius may have used John 1. 14, 18 as his source for the title ‘Monogenés’ and John 1. 3 for his position on the Son’s role in creating all things, but he did not accept John 1. 1 and the full prologue to John.

2.2.3.2 Basil on ‘distinguishing marks’ in substance and early views on the Spirit

Basil, in Against Eunomius, criticises another Eunomian principle that held, according to Basil, that ‘“the unbegotten has no comparison with the begotten”’. \(^{222}\) As I noted above, Eunomius and other Heterousians did not necessarily believe that God and the Son were unlike in every way, although this claim was sometimes made by their opponents. Whether Basil was overstating his claim or not, Basil says that as a result of this principle Eunomius established opposition between ‘the very substance’ of the Father and Son. \(^{223}\) Basil counters that ‘whatever one may assign to the Father as the formula of his being, the very same also applies to the Son’ (or ‘Monogenés’) and ‘this is how divinity is one’. \(^{224}\)

---

\(^{218}\) See Eunomius, ‘First Apology’, 16, pp. 52-55.
\(^{221}\) On this identification of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ, see section 1.2 in Chapter 1.
\(^{222}\) Italics added. Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 1.18, pp. 118-119.
\(^{223}\) Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 1.18, pp. 118-119.
\(^{224}\) Italics added. As noted above, DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz translate ‘monogenés’ as ‘Only-Begotten’. Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 1.19, pp. 119-120.
Basil is arguing on behalf of the Father and Son being of the same substance, and he offers multiple justifications. He gives an example of the Father and Son sharing ‘light’ as their substance, which could come from the 325 creed or John 1. 4-5. He also argues that God and the image of God (the Son) are eternal and the ‘image’ is ‘of the same substance’ with God. He bases this on Heb. 1. 3, as can be seen when he says the Son is called ‘the radiance’ and ‘the character of his subsistence’ so that ‘we may learn that he is of the same substance’ as God. According to DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, this is the only instance in Against Eunomius when Basil uses ‘homoousios’ for the Son. However, Heb. 1. 3 uses ‘hupostaseōs’ and may have been one of Basil’s sources.

Basil quotes Eunomius as indicating that the scriptures refer to the Son as ‘something begotten and something made’ (‘gennéma kai poiéma’); however, the translation of ‘gennéma’ as ‘something begotten’ could have been rendered as ‘offspring’ instead, according to the translators of Basil’s and Eunomius’s works. Basil argues, in rebuttal to Eunomius, that it does not make sense ‘to designate the Maker of the universe [the Son] as “something made” ’, or to think that different names necessarily suggest differences in substance. Basil then offers his own principles in response: the names Father and Son ‘do not communicate substance but instead are revelatory of the distinguishing marks’ (tōn idiōmatōn) in the

225 The 325 creed says that the Son is ‘light from light’. Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 1.19, p. 120; see also J. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, p. 215.
226 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 1.20, p. 120.
227 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 1.20, p. 120.
228 DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Against Eunomius, p. 120 FN 112.
230 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 2.1-2.2, pp. 131-132; see also Eunomius, ‘First Apology’, 12, pp. 46-49.
231 The Greek from Basil’s work is given by DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz. They say that ‘gennéma kai poiéma’ could have been translated ‘ “offspring”’ and ‘ “product / work”’. Vaggione uses ‘offspring’ for gennéma in his translation of the passage from Eunomius’s work that Basil is citing. Vaggione says that Eunomius, in his ‘Second Apology’, had indicated that in this passage here he had been drawing on Prov. 8. 22 and 1 Cor. 1. 24. DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Against Eunomius, p. 132 FN 3; Vaggione, Eunomius, p. 49 FN 6; see also Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 311-312.
232 ‘Maker of the universe’ (‘ton poiétén tōn holōn’) refers to the Son. Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 2.3-2.4, p. 134; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, 2040.019, line 27.
substance,233 and that ‘begotten and unbegotten’ are ‘distinctive features that enable identification and are observed in the substance’.234 Basil asserts that these names or terms differentiate what is common [the substance], without ‘sunder[ing] the substance’s sameness in nature’.235

Basil’s ideas about distinguishing marks are somewhat analogous to saying that ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ are attributes of the substance, not the substance itself, although Basil does not use this terminology. The concepts of substance and attributes are influenced by Aristotelian principles of substance and ‘accidents’, which Augustine would adapt and apply (to an extent) in his own ideas on divine simplicity, substance, and attributes.236 Ayres and Radde-Gallwitz also attribute Basil’s ideas on what a ‘particular characteristic’ is to Aristotelian ideas about the definition of a ‘proprium’, which is ‘a characteristic that necessarily inheres in a natural kind, is unique to the kind, but does not strictly define it’.237 Basil’s ideas about distinguishing marks are not fully trinitarian, given that he is speaking of the Father and Son. However, they illustrate one of the ways in which Basil posited unity and distinctions within the substance of the Trinity.

Basil discusses the Holy Spirit at the end of Against Eunomius in rebutting Eunomius’s ideas about the Spirit or ‘Counselor’.238 My brief look at Basil’s ideas (from the mid-360s) will show that his views are less trinitarian, by what would become orthodox / catholic standards by the early 380s, than are Athanasius’s views on creation and the Spirit in ‘Letters to Serapion’ (from 359-360). My views draw support from DelCogliano’s and Radde-Gallwitz’s perspective that Basil, in the passages I examine, indicates that the Spirit’s nature is divine ‘in some sense’, but its ‘dignity and rank remain less than’ the Father’s and the Son’s, and that while Basil discusses some of the Spirit’s acts, the Spirit’s role in creative acts ‘remains

233 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 2.3-2.5, pp. 134-136; DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Against Eunomius, p. 136, FN 33.
234 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 2.28, p. 174.
235 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 2.28, p. 174, also 2.29, pp. 175-176.
236 In section 4.4 in Chapter 4, I will analyse Augustine’s ideas on simplicity, substance, and attributes, including that attributes cannot be lost, added, or changed within the Trinity.
238 The analysis below is based on Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 3, pp. 185-196; Eunomius, ‘First Apology’, 25-27, pp. 66-73.
unclear’. Athanasius, by contrast, worked from his understanding of divine simplicity to argue that the Spirit was not a creature and was of the same nature as the Son and the Father, and also was engaged with them in creative acts.

Eunomius had asserted that the Spirit was ‘third both in nature and in order’ to the Father and Son. He describes the Spirit as the ‘first and greatest work’ and a unique ‘thing made’ by the Son / Monogenés ‘at the command of the Father’, but he asserts that the Spirit lacked ‘godhead’ and the ‘power of creation’. His inclusion of the Spirit in the things made through the Son relies on John 1.3 and perhaps 1 Cor. 8.6. This concept may represent the influence of Origen, who had drawn on John 1.3 to argue that the Spirit had been created. Moreover, this use of John 1.3 to argue that the Spirit was created through the Son was a concern for orthodox/catholic theologians in the second half of the fourth century. It is alluded to by Gregory of Nazianzus in a 380 oration, and by Ambrose, in his 381 The Holy Spirit, where he is writing against ‘Macedonians’.

Basil agrees with Eunomius that the Spirit is ‘below the Son in both rank and dignity’, but he takes issue with the Spirit’s being ‘of a foreign nature’. Rather than grounding his arguments in divine simplicity, as Athanasius had done, Basil bases his statement that the Spirit is not foreign in nature to the Father and Son on his belief that angels share ‘a single designation’ (i.e., name) and thus ‘a nature that is absolutely the same’, even though they hold differing ranks. He also bases his arguments, including in response to whether the Spirit was created, on the names ‘Holy’ and ‘Spirit’, which he says the Spirit shares with Father and Son;

---

239 DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz, Against Eunomius, pp. 53-55.
240 See section 2.2.1.3 above.
247 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 3.1, p. 186.
248 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 3.1, p. 186.
he claims that ‘the communion of names does not communicate the Spirit’s estrangement of nature, but rather his affinity with the Father and the Son’. His arguments thus appear to be related to connections between names and nature.

Finally, that Basil’s trinitarian thinking is not fully worked out here, including on how the unity and distinctions of the Persons can be defended, can be seen when he says: ‘Indeed, the account of singleness will be preserved in the Trinity in this way, by confessing one Father and one Son and one Holy Spirit’.

2.2.3.3 Gregory of Nazianzus on modes of origin, the Father-Son relationship, and the consubstantiality of the Trinity

My brief analysis here will continue my focus on modes of origin and nature, and I will discuss other trinitarian ideas that Gregory of Nazianzus presents in his anti-Eunomian arguments. Then in the next section I will discuss his principles of unity and distinction within the Trinity from the early 380s.

In Oration 29, Gregory argues against the Eunomian belief that when one calls God or the Father ‘unbegotten’ or ‘unoriginate’, one says something about ‘God’s substance or activity’ and implies something about the Son. One of Gregory’s rebuttals is that ‘Father’ designates ‘neither the substance nor the activity, but the relationship between Father and Son, although Gregory also says that the names Father and Son indicate ‘kindred and affinity’ and ‘sameness of stock, or parent and offspring’, as with human beings. Gregory had earlier said, in the same oration, that the ‘begetter and begotten’ must be the same (in nature) because ‘it is in the nature of an offspring to have a nature identical with its parent’s.’

Gregory is making multiple moves. His arguments that ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ indicate sameness between parent and offspring, as do ‘begetter’ and ‘begotten’, where these names or terms imply or explicitly entail sameness of substance, hold echoes of Athanasius’s ideas. Gregory also is countering the Eunomian view

250 Basil of Caesarea, Against Eunomius, 3.6, p. 194.
251 See section 2.2.3.4.
255 See section 2.2.1.1 above.
that names and terms, whether Father and Son or Unbegotten and Begotten, designate the substance of the Father and Son. However, Gregory introduces into the debate the concept of ‘relationship’ between the Father and Son, which is signified by their names or titles. Gregory thus disagrees with Eunomius’s view that the names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ necessarily say something about their substance, while, at the same time, he still holds to the idea that the begetter and the one begotten are of the same substance.

Gregory speaks of the Spirit as ‘consubstantial’ [‘homoousion’] with God in his Oration 31, and he asserts that there is ‘one supreme nature’, even though there is a ‘Trinity’ of Father, Son, and Spirit. Gregory argues that the ‘facts’ of not being begotten, being begotten, and proceeding ‘safeguard the distinctiveness of the three hypostases within the single nature and quality of the Godhead’. Thus he views the Spirit as consubstantial and coequal with the Father and Son. He also recognises distinctions among them, if only based on whether they came into being or not and their mode of origin, while at the same time stating that they are a single nature in the Godhead. However, while being begotten and proceeding are modes of origin, he admits in another oration that what these terms mean is a mystery.

Gregory, in Oration 42, written after his resignation as president of the 381 Council of Constantinople, can be seen as still addressing Eunomian ideas and speaking about nature, while offering statements that reflect his own trinitarian theology. He writes:

That which is without beginning, and the beginning, and that which is with the beginning – these are one God. Neither lack of beginning, nor lack of generation, constitutes the nature of that which has no beginning: for an entity’s nature is never constituted by what it is not, but by what it is; it is defined by positing what it is, not by removing what it is not. The beginning is not separated, by virtue of its being a beginning, from that which has no beginning: for beginning is not the nature of the former, nor is lack of beginning the nature of the latter. These are attributes of the nature, not the nature itself.

---

256 See section 2.2.3.1 above.
260 McGuckin, St Gregory of Nazianzus, pp. 361-366; Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus, pp. 54-58.
... [T]he unoriginate has the name of Father; the originate has the name of Son; that which is with the originate is called the Holy Spirit. But these three have the same nature, namely, Godhead. The Father is the principle of unity; for from him the other two derive their being, and in him they are drawn together: not so as to be fused together, but so as to cohere. ... [U]nity properly belongs to those who have a single nature and whose essential being is the same.  

As with his rebuttal of Eunomian ideas about names, here Gregory argues that the Son is not of a different nature from the Father, even though the Son is called ‘Beginning’ and the Father ‘without beginning’. Gregory’s point, though, is that the Father’s being unbegotten does not say something about the Father’s nature, but is an attribute of his nature, because it speaks of what He is not, not what he is. Gregory is arguing about the unity of the nature of all three Persons, while arguing, by contrast to Eunomian ideas, that the Father’s nature cannot be defined by something lacking, in this case a lack of beginning or generation. The nature the Persons share is something that is, which, for Gregory, is ‘Godhead, and it is the Father’s nature, ‘for from him the other two derive their being’.

That Gregory argues all of the above points offers evidence against Barnes’s argument that pro-Nicene theologies, arising in the 360s or 370s, did not posit that the Father-Son relationship signified unity of substance based on the assumption that an offspring and a parent must have the same nature, but rather understood this relationship as representing their distinctions, based on causal relations. 

Barnes’s arguments are based on his analysis of Gregory of Nyssa’s trinitarian

---


262 This is based on Barnes’s distinction, which I noted earlier, between ‘Neo-Nicene’ theology, which he asserts began in the 350s, and ‘Pro-Nicene’ theology, which he says started later in the fourth century. Ayres views pro-Nicene theologies as beginning in the 360s. Ayres, in responding to Barnes’s position on changes in what Father-Son designate, asserts that pro-Nicene theologians ‘often incorporate earlier arguments alongside more fully pro-Nicene arguments’. Michel René Barnes, ‘Divine Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology in its Psychological Context’, Modern Theology, 18, no. 4 (2002), 475-496 (pp. 383-384); M. Barnes, ‘De Trinitate VI and VII’, p. 196 FN 19; Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, pp. 236 FN 51, 239-240.
principles, and it is not possible to evaluate here whether Barnes is correct about Gregory of Nyssa or not.\textsuperscript{263} However, Gregory of Nazianzus’s multiple arguments suggest that Barnes’s assessment may not apply more broadly. John McGuckin says that his arguments in Oration 42 are not typical for Gregory, and he ‘usually argues that ingeneracy describes only relationship, not nature’, thus not saying anything about the Son’s nature but about his person or hypostasis.\textsuperscript{264} However, my analysis shows that Gregory did set forth arguments about modes of origin, nature, the names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’, and relationships. He took this further by also arguing on behalf of the consubstantiality of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

2.2.3.4 Concluding comments on the Cappadocian-Eunomian debates

In my analysis in this section, I used the lens of ‘beginning’ with modes of origin, because they are related to ideas about creation, rather than looking directly at the Father-Son relationship and ideas about substance. I suggested that Eunomius broke the connection that had been posited by some Christians between the Son’s mode of origin as ‘being begotten’ and the Son’s nature. This was a result of his assertion that the Son had been begotten \textit{by the Father’s will}, and not from the Father’s essence. Eunomius’s perspective contrasts with Athanasius’s views that the Son and Father were of the same nature \textit{both} because the Son was begotten by the Father, \textit{and} because he was begotten \textit{from the Father’s essence}. I also discussed that some of Eunomius’s related arguments were grounded in his position that the terms ‘unbegotten’ and ‘begotten’ and the names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ necessarily designate different substances.

I showed that in their responses to Eunomian views, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus posited ideas about what ‘unbegotten’ and ‘begotten’ (unoriginate or originate for Gregory) and ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ indicate about substance. Basil asserts that both pairs of terms represent ‘distinguishing marks’ within the one substance. Gregory argues that the first pair designates attributes of the substance, and that Father and Son designate \textit{both relations and} that the Son was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{263} See M. Barnes, ‘Divine Unity and the Divided Self’, pp. 383-384; see also M. Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity’, pp. 155-156.
\item \textsuperscript{264} McGuckin, \textit{We Believe in One Lord Jesus Christ}, p. 35 FN 57.
\end{itemize}
of the same nature as the Father. Thus, Basil and Gregory, in their different ways, argue that being unbegotten or begotten, or Father and Son, does not entail being of different substances but rather indicates distinctions that exist within the one divine substance. Gregory went further in saying that the Spirit was of the same substance with and equal to the Father and Son. These ideas, as well as Eunomius’s, will be of interest again in my analysis of Augustine’s ideas about substance and attributes in Chapter 4.  

Ironically, Basil and Gregory did not develop these trinitarian ideas in the context of reflecting on ideas about creation itself or on the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’, although that doctrine underlay some of Eunomius’s ideas. Basil and Gregory also do not appear to have drawn much on John 1.1-3 in the ideas that I analysed, but Eunomius had drawn on John 1.3 to argue that the Spirit was one of the things made through the Son. I suggested that Eunomius drew on most of the prologue to John, including John 1.14, 18’s use of monogenés, but he rejected John 1.1’s attestation that the Word ‘was’ with God in the beginning. So my analysis also shows that the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and John 1.1-3 could be used as a basis for ideas that came to be deemed ‘heretical’.

2.2.4 Trinitarian principles of unity and distinction in the early 380s

Gregory of Nazianzus was delivering his orations around the time Eunomius and Heterousians were losing the battles over Eunomius’s position that the Son and Spirit could not be of the same substance as God, the Unbegotten.

The creed attributed to the 381 Council of Constantinople does not use ‘homoousios’ for the Spirit, although the Spirit is called ‘the Lord and life-giver’. In 382, however, a letter written in Constantinople and sent to Pope Damasus and western bishops says that the Spirit is of the same substance as the Father and Son. The letter says that, according to the faith of Nicaea, ‘there is one

---

265 See my analysis in section 4.4 in Chapter 4.
266 Greek and English words are from J. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, pp. 297-298.
267 The English and Greek citations of this letter in this paragraph are from Ayres. Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy*, p. 258; see also Theodoret, *The Ecclesiastical History of Theodoret*, trans. by Blomfield Jackson, in *Theodoret, Jerome, Gennadius, Rufinus: Historical Writings, Etc.*, NPNF, 2nd series, 3 (1892; Oak Harbor: Logos Research
Godhead (theotés), Power (dunamis), and Substance (ousia) of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; the dignity being equal, and the majesty being equal in three perfect hypostases, i.e. three perfect persons (prosōpa)." 268 The letter also condemns "the blasphemy of the Eunomians, of the Arians, and of the Pneumatomachi", which "divides the substance (ousia), the nature (phusis), and the godhead (theotés), and superimposes onto the uncreated consubstantial and coeternal Trinity a separate nature, created, and of a different substance." 269

It has been observed that this letter does not use the expression "one ousia, three hypostaseis" that is attributed to the Cappadocians, even though it rarely appears in their writings. 270 It also has been said that being of one substance is only one of the ways the letter says the Father, Son, and Spirit are 'one': they also are one Godhead and one power. 271 One can see, though, that the letter does address the principle of consubstantiality, stating it in different ways: there is one ousia; neither the ousia nor the nature is divided; and the Trinity is the 'uncreated consubstantial and coeternal Trinity'. The letter also implies that that Son and Spirit could not have been created, because the substance would be divided, which is likely based on views of divine simplicity within the Trinity.

Gregory of Nazianzus also offers a summary of trinitarian principles in Oration Systems, 1997 [on CD-ROM]), Book V, ch. IX.

268 Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, p. 258.
269 Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, p. 258.
271 This is from Lienhard. Barnes argues that belief that the Persons are of one power (and one substance), as evidenced in the unity of works, is characteristic of Latin thinking, beginning with Tertullian. Lienhard, ‘Ousia and Hypostasis’, p. 100; M. Barnes, ‘Latin trinitarian theology’.
20, delivered likely in 379 or 380. Gregory, in explaining how ‘both to maintain the oneness of God and to confess three individual entities, or Persons, each with his distinctive property’, offers principles that apply both to the immanent Trinity and to economic trinitarian acts. Gregory asserts:

The oneness of God would ... be maintained if both Son and Spirit are causally related to him alone without being merged or fused into him and if they all share one and the same divine movement and purpose [kinéma te kai bouléma] ... and are identical in essence [tés ousias tauto tēta].

Here unity is maintained within the Trinity both because of the causal relations that exist between God / the Father and the Son and Spirit, and because all three are the same in essence, but these principles do not speak of how the causation occurred. Gregory maintains distinctions by considering the ‘individual properties’ (idiotētes) of the ‘three individually existing entities’ (treis hupostaseis), while avoiding thinking of them as ‘fusing or dissolving or mingling’.

Unity also is maintained by positing that God, the Son, and the Spirit are one in ‘divine movement and purpose’. This is a way of looking at unity of operations, if movement is expressed in economic acts. I will analyse unity of operations in Basil’s works below. Here I will cite Gregory of Nyssa’s view and compare it to Gregory of Nazianzus’s principles. Gregory of Nyssa writes:

---


276 I use ‘unity of operations’ because it is compatible with Basil’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s terminology, and does not necessarily entail the other principles Ayres associates with ‘inseparable operation’. For Ayres, ‘inseparable operation’ is one of three principles of ‘pro-Nicene’ theologies. It requires ‘clear’ statements that the Persons ‘work inseparably’, even if acts are attributed to a Person by ‘appropriation’, and it is related to divine simplicity. Clear statements also must be made about ‘the person and nature distinction’, and of ‘the eternal generation of the Son’ occurring ‘within the unitary and incomprehensible divine being’. Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, pp. 236, 278-282, 286-288, 296-300.

277 See section 2.3.4.
But in the case of the Divine nature we do not similarly learn that the Father does anything by Himself in which the Son does not work conjointly, or again that the Son has any special operation apart from the Holy Spirit; but every operation which extends from God to the Creation ... has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit.278

Gregory of Nazianzus maintains that the Father is ‘both source and without source’ (kai anachou, kai archés), and that the Son, who is not without source, is ‘the source of all things’ (archés de tôn holôn).279 Thus, Gregory distinguishes between the Father’s being the causal source of the Son and Spirit within the Trinity, and the Son’s having a role with the Father as the source of all creation. However, Gregory does not use the ‘through whom’ terminology that appears in Gregory of Nyssa’s description of unity of operations, or in John 1. 1-3 and the 325 and 381 creeds, which indicates that creation takes place ‘through’ the Son. The noun ‘source’ does not express action or indicate either how the Persons were caused or creation came about. Even so, Gregory of Nazianzus’s ideas about the Father being both source and without source, and the Son being not without source but being the source of all things that exist, are similar to some of Augustine’s ideas from the late fourth century.280

2.3 Basil’s hexaemeral homilies: acts of initial creation and the Trinity

In this section my focus moves from having been primarily about modes of origin and trinitarian principles related to the immanent Trinity, to analysing ideas about the ‘initial creation’, economic trinitarian acts, and the Trinity represented in Basil’s hexaemeral homilies. One of my objectives is to examine Basil’s readings of Gen. 1, sometimes with John 1. 1.-3, that allow him to assert that the Son or Spirit had roles in creation, and I will argue that he does so in more ways than are identified by some scholars.281 Basil’s sources also are of interest because some

280 See my analysis in section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3 of Augustine’s Gn. litt. imp.
281 Ayres and Radde-Gallwitz cite only two places where Basil speaks of the roles of the Son (Homily 9.2) or Spirit (Homily 2.6) in creation. Gunton says Basil ‘seems to overlook the role of the Son in creation’, and that Basil refers to the Spirit’s role twice, including in
of them come from traditions other than Nicene-related theologies. Moreover, I will discuss here and in Part II that his ideas about seeing the Creator from the beauty of created things, which he appears to base on Wis. 13. 1-5 (read with Rom. 1. 20), are similar to ideas that appear in Augustine’s commentaries on Gen. 1.

The dating of Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies is unknown, but many scholars think he delivered them in 377 or 378, after he wrote *On the Holy Spirit,* and not long before his death. If this dating is correct, the ideas Basil presents should represent his mature thinking, and he would have delivered these homilies shortly before Gregory of Nazianzus delivered his orations and just a few years before the 381 Council of Constantinople. However, Basil may have delivered these homilies earlier, and I will suggest clues that might suggest earlier datings below.

Differences may exist between how Basil expressed his ideas in homilies and in theological or polemical works (e.g., *Against Eunomius* or *On the Holy Spirit*). According to Gregory of Nyssa, Basil delivered his homilies to people from a variety of educational levels and employment. Agnes Way, who acknowledges the varied backgrounds of Basil’s congregants, says that he used examples from nature that would have been ‘familiar’ to his listeners to support his arguments, some of which were moral and some scientific. These examples from the created world will be of interest here where Basil uses them in presenting ideas about creation and the Trinity. As will be seen, his homilies contain theological, scriptural, and philosophical ideas, and this supports the views of scholars who suggest that his audience may have been more sophisticated than supposed.

---


282 These scholars were noted above.


285 One of Gregory’s defenses against criticisms of Basil’s homilies was that he addressed church people from mixed backgrounds and many would not have understood complicated arguments. Basil of Caesarea, *On the Hexaemeron,* Homily 3, 1; Gregory of Nyssa, *Traité sur les six jours,* 65A-65B; see also Way, *Saint Basil: Exegetic Homilies,* pp. x-xi.


287 Sandwell argues that ‘moral and pastoral matters’ were not Basil’s primary interests in these homilies. She emphasises his theological and philosophical interests, and desire to
2.3.1 The roles of the Son, Word, or Monogenés with God in creation

My analysis begins with Basil’s ideas about the roles of the Son, Word, or monogenés in creation. Way’s English translation of Basil’s homilies renders ‘monogenés’ as ‘only-begotten’. However, I will leave ‘monogenés’ untranslated because Basil appears to use it as a title (as did Eunomius). Basil’s frequent use of ‘monogenés’ may support an earlier dating for these homilies, perhaps in the 360s when he was writing Against Eunomius.

Basil speaks of the Son in Homily 9, where he argues, based on the plural in ‘“And God said, ‘Let us make mankind’”’ and ‘“In our image”’, from Gen 1. 26, that in the scriptural text ‘the Second Person was being indicated mystically, but not yet clearly revealed’. Basil says here (as in Against Eunomius) that the Son is ‘the image of [the Father’s] substance’. That Basil indicates that the Son is both the image of God and God is seen when Basil suggests that the word ‘God’, in ‘“And God created Man”’, refers to the Father and Son. However, Basil says the ‘singular form’ was used to avoid ‘the risk of polytheism’, which, although he does not say this, would have arisen if the Father and Son were referred to as ‘two Gods’. Basil also suggests that the Father and Son worked together in creation, as ‘one’ God and ‘substance’, although he does not mention unity of operations.

Basil reads Gen. 1 as indicating the role of the second Person in creation in a way similar to Origen, as I discuss here, and I will show later that Augustine offers similar ideas in an early commentary on Gen. 1. In Homily 9, Basil cites the expression ‘For, He Himself spoke, it is said, and He Himself made’, which appears in varying words in Gen. 1. He does not explain here why this represents the involvement of the Father and Son in creation, but he had already explained this in two earlier homilies. In Homily 3, he says that Gen. 1 says that after God gave a ‘command’ (e.g., ‘“Let there be a firmament …”’), God made something (e.g.,
‘God made the firmament’) because the Spirit calls through the scripture about the involvement of the monogenês in creation. In Homily 6 he then asked: ‘Who spoke and who made? Do you not notice in these words the double Person?’.

Basil may have adapted these ideas from Origen, who gives similar examples in his Commentary on John in discussing the meanings of ‘In the beginning was the Word’ from John 1. 1. Basil goes further, though, in saying that scripture, in showing God ‘commanding and speaking’, indicates ‘silently Him to whom He gives the command and to whom He speaks’, and thus ‘leads us on to the idea of the [monogenês] in a certain orderly way’. Basil also says that scripture shows God speaking and giving commands to suggest that ‘the divine will joined with the first impulse of His intelligence is the Word [Logos] of God’. Basil, moreover, calls the Logos or monogenês God’s ‘Co-worker’ [sunergounti] in creation. By contrast, Origen uses the titles Word, Christ, and Son of God, but not monogenês, in discussing creation in light of John 1. 1-4.

Basil does not defend himself in Homily 3, as he would do in Homily 9, against a possible charge of speaking of ‘two Gods’ working together, which is especially a concern because of his use of ‘Co-worker’. Basil also does not address the implication of subordination of the one who is responding to the commands to the one giving them, although this concern might be mitigated by how he shows the two Persons sharing ‘their plans’ through thought.

Basil also does not address how the Word or monogenês, who is ‘joined with’ God’s intelligence or will, and shares God’s thoughts, is distinct from God or not a

---

292 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 3, 4; also 3, 2; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
293 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 6, 2.
295 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 3, 2; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
296 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 3, 2; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
297 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 3, 2; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
298 Origen does use ‘monogenês’ in other places. Origen, Commentary on John, Book 1, 109-112; see also Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
299 Gregory of Nazianzus says that his own opponents (likely Eunomians) used Creator, Co-Worker, and Minister to reflect differences in rank and ‘the qualities of the realities’ of the Persons. Gregory of Nazianzus, ‘The Fifth Theological Oration: Oration 31’, 5.
part of God. I raised a similar concern in Chapter 1 in discussing Philo’s ideas about the Logos and God.\textsuperscript{300} This also should have been a concern for pro-Nicene trinitarian theologies, which needed to establish the unity and the distinction of the Persons in their economic acts. Basil’s objective, however, seems to have been to demonstrate that scripture does reveal the role of the Word or monogenēs in creation,\textsuperscript{301} rather than to discuss trinitarian principles. This raises the question of how consistently trinitarian or pro-Nicene principles were applied across varying types of works, including theological or polemical treatises and hexaemeral works.

In Homily 2, Basil argues against Platonist ideas, which may stem from the Timaeus, that suggest that God was a ‘Craftsman’ (ho technités) who took over ‘matter’ and then ‘formed it by His own intelligence, reduced it to order, and thus through it gave visible things existence’.\textsuperscript{302} Basil is clear that there are not two first principles, God and matter: otherwise matter would be ‘considered worthy of the same superior ranking as the wise and all powerful and all-good Craftsman and Creator (dēmiourgō kai ktsité) of all things’, terminology reminiscent of Philo’s.\textsuperscript{303} Basil asserts that God, ‘having cast about in His mind and resolved to bring into being things that did not exist, at one and the same time devised what sort of a world it should be and created the appropriate matter together with form’.\textsuperscript{304} Basil’s objective seems to have been to be clear that ‘matter and substance’ had not co-existed with God in the beginning and that God had not simply provided the ‘plan and form’ for what was created, which would have suggested ‘the great God is not the author of the formation of all beings’.\textsuperscript{305} However, that Basil speaks only of God, and not here of the Logos or Son, distinguishes his ideas from Philo’s thinking on the roles of God, the Logos, and the ‘ideas’ in acts of creation.\textsuperscript{306}

\textsuperscript{300} See section 1.1.4 in Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{301} See Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 3, 2.
\textsuperscript{302} Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 2, 2; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae; Way, Saint Basil: Exegetic Homilies, p. 23 FN 2.
\textsuperscript{303} On Philo’s terminology, see section 1.1.2 in Chapter 1. Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 2, 2; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
\textsuperscript{304} Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 2, 2.
\textsuperscript{305} Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 2, 2.
\textsuperscript{306} See section 1.1.4 in Chapter 1.
2.3.2 The roles of the Holy Spirit in initial creation

Basil describes one role for the Holy Spirit in acts of initial creation in his Homily 2, where he gives an interpretation of Gen. 1. 2 borrowed from a ‘Syrian’. Basil explains that the use of the Syrian language, which was closer to the Hebrew, had allowed the ‘Syrian’ to translate ‘“was stirring above”’ (which translates epephereto) as ‘“warmed with fostering care”’, like ‘a bird brooding on eggs’, an activity the Spirit undertook to prepare ‘the nature of the water for the generation of living beings’. This interpretation appears in Greek, perhaps Syrian, and Latin texts, as will be seen, and goes beyond Nicene theologies. As I will discuss below, this example also was known to others, including Augustine.

The identity of the ‘Syrian’ is not known, but it is now said not to be Ephrem, an older contemporary of Basil’s to whom a commentary on Genesis is attributed. Basil could have been drawing on Diodore of Tarsus, who used Eusebius of Emesa’s writings on Gen. 1. 2, although some scholars say Diodore could not have been his source. The ‘Syrian’ ideas Basil cites may stem from Eusebius’s writings on Gen. 1. 2, although it is not known how Basil learned of his ideas, and

---

Eusebius’s writings are said not to be trinitarian.312 The ideas Basil cites appear in a commentary on Genesis wrongly attributed to Ephrem the Syrian,313 and the ideas in that commentary and those held by Eusebius are similar.314 There may have been a connection between Basil and Syrian theology, because Eusebius came from a Syrian region and knew Syriac, although he wrote in Greek.315

Basil draws on the ‘Syrian’ interpretation to offer ‘sufficient proof’ that the Spirit

312 See Haar Romeny’s citation of texts, including Basil’s, that relate to Eusebius’s interpretation of Gen. 1. 2, and his discussion of lines of transmission. Hanson, however, says that Eusebius did not believe in the divinity of the Spirit, and regarded the Spirit as inferior to the Son, who was inferior to the Father. Haar Romeny, A Syrian in Greek Dress, pp. 174-183, 27-28; R. Hanson, The Search, pp. 395-398.

313 Elowsky and Louth quote passages with words similar to the words Basil cites, attributing them to a commentary by Ephrem on Genesis, and citing as the source a 1737 edition of Ephrem’s works by J. A. Assemani. The passage, as quoted by Elowsky, is: ‘The Holy Spirit warmed the waters with a kind of vital warmth, even bringing them to a boil through intense heat in order to make them fertile. The action of a hen is similar. She sits on her eggs, making them fertile through the warmth of incubation.’ Mathews, Jr. asserts that the 1737 edition is ‘unreliable’; it is an edited version of a ninth century Catena on Genesis by Severus, purported to contain passages from Ephrem and Jacob of Edessa. It is clear from comparing the passages quoted by Elowsky and Louth to passages from the commentary on Genesis attributed to Ephrem published by Dembski, Downs, and Frederick (from FotC, vol. 91), that two different commentaries are cited. The latter, which is understood to be by Ephrem or his followers, is explicit that Gen. 1. 2 is not referring to the Holy Spirit, but to ‘the wind’ (an element) of God, and that the Holy Spirit could not have a role in creation. Joel C. Elowsky, ed., We Believe in the Holy Spirit, Ancient Christian Doctrine, 4 (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), p. 39; Louth, Genesis 1-11, pp. 6, xxxvii; William A. Dembski, Wayne J. Downs, and Justin B. A. Frederick, eds., The Patristic Understanding of Creation: An Anthology of Writings from the Church Fathers on Creation and Design (Riesel, TX: Erasmus Press, 2008), p. 228, also p. 225 and the ‘Permissions Acknowledgements’ page in the front matter; Mathews, Jr., The Armenian Commentary on Genesis, pp. xxxvi, 5-7; Brock, The Luminous Eye, p. 145, including FN 2, and pp. 179-180, FN 2; Haar Romeny, A Syrian in Greek Dress, pp. 181-182.

314 As to ideas that seem to be established as Ephrem’s, more work is needed. Ayres’s idea that Ephrem may have been writing in support of Nicene theology may be true, based on Ephrem’s other works, which Ayres cites, but Ephrem’s ideas about the Spirit not having a role in creation, according to Gen. 1. 2, do not suggest Nicene influences. Ayres does say that work needs to be done on studying Ephrem’s trinitarian theology. Young and Teal say his theology ’in some respects bears comparison with that of the Cappadocians’, although he expressed his theology in poetry. Brock says it is because Ephrem wrote in Syrian and did his ‘most important work’ in poetry, including expressing his ‘theological vision through the medium of poetry’, that Ephrem is both neglected and important today. Ayres, Nicæa and its Legacy, pp. 229-235; Young and Teal, From Nicaea to Chalcedon, p. 175; Brock, The Luminous Eye, p. 13, also 23; see also Ludlow, The Early Church, pp. 140-143.

315 Haar Romeny, A Syrian in Greek Dress, pp. 180-181, 5, 9; R. Hanson, The Search, p. 387.
did have a role in creation, and Basil is clear that the spirit in Gen. 1. 2 is ‘the Holy Spirit which forms an essential part of the divine and blessed Trinity.’ Given that this is the primary example of the Spirit’s role in creation in Basil’s hexaemeral homilies, it would be interesting to know whether this trinitarian interpretation of creation, and not just the turn of phrase about ‘warming with fostering care’, was adapted from the ‘Syrian’ source, or whether Basil already held similar ideas.

Similar interpretations of the role of the Holy Spirit in Gen. 1. 2 were known in Latin writings. Ambrose, who drew on Basil’s homilies in his hexaemeral homilies, cites similar phrases to Basil’s from a ‘Syrian text’, to support the belief that ‘the Holy Spirit, too, is called Creator’. As a result of this interpretation, Ambrose argues that Gen. 1. 2 offers evidence that ‘the operation of the Holy Trinity clearly shines forth in the constitution of the world’. Ambrose’s wording suggests that he held an understanding of the principle of the unity of operations and applied it here, even though Basil had not done so.

Jerome, in Hebrew Questions on Genesis (QHG), published in the early 390s, also cites Hebrew translations of Gen. 1. 2, which, instead of using ‘moved’ in ‘the Spirit of God moved over the waters’, rendered the idea as ‘‘was brooding over’ or ‘was keeping warm’, in the likeness of a bird giving life to its eggs with warmth’. Jerome is trinitarian in his thinking, and he understands Gen. 1. 2 to apply to the Spirit, the ‘Life-giver of all things’, which may reflect the influence of the 381 creed and John 1. 3. He goes beyond the creed in arguing for the divinity of the Spirit based on the Spirit’s role in creation: ‘If, then, He is the Life-giver, He is therefore also the Author [of life]; and if the Author, then He is also God…’. Jerome knew

---

320 Jerome, QHG, 1: 2, p. 30.
of Ambrose’s work, so Basil’s ideas could have been known to Jerome, if without attribution to Basil, from Ambrose. Jerome also may have used one of the sources discussed for Basil or Origen’s works, although he studied Hebrew himself.322

In Chapter 4, I will examine Augustine’s discussion of the ‘Syrian’ interpretation in his fifth century commentary on Genesis. I will take the position there, based on my analysis supported by the positions taken by some scholars, that Basil was Augustine’s most likely source.323

2.3.3 Basil’s inconsistency on unity of operations for creative acts

In his hexaemeral homilies, Basil does not explicitly show all three Persons of the Trinity working together, nor discuss the principle of the ‘unity of operations’. This is by contrast to Basil’s ideas about this principle in his On the Holy Spirit. In that work, which is one of his theological and polemical treatises, Basil states belief in ‘the unity and indivisibility in every work of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son’, although many of Basil’s examples are not about acts of creation.324

Basil does, however, discuss the Spirit’s role in acts of initial creation in one section of On the Holy Spirit in which he discusses the creation of angels and ‘heavenly powers’.325 He says that one can ‘learn the communion of the Spirit with the Father and the Son also from what was created in the beginning’, because the ‘heavenly powers’ that were created acquired the ‘gift of holiness’ from the Holy Spirit.326 He further says, about these powers: ‘In their creation, consider for me the initial cause of their existence (the Father), the Maker [démiourgixén] (the Son), the Perfecter (the Spirit).’327 Basil defends himself by saying he is not speaking of three ‘sources’ but of one source by which the Father ‘makes through the Son’ and ‘perfects in the Spirit’.328 Basil attributes the Spirit’s role in perfecting things to the Son’s having willed that ‘perfection should come about through the Spirit’, even

322 See Hayward, Saint Jerome’s Hebrew Questions on Genesis, pp. 103-104.
323 See section 4.2.2 in section 4. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 18, 36
324 St Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, 16, 37, p. 70; see also 16, 39, p. 73.
326 St Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, 16, 38, p. 70.
327 St Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, 16, 38, pp. 70-71; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, 2040.003, line 14.
though Basil says that the Son did not need a ‘co-worker’ [sunergias].

Basil’s explanation is that the Son brings in the Spirit, and Basil also says that the Father ‘creates by his will alone’ but ‘wills through the Son’. Basil relies, moreover, on Ps. 32. 6 (LXX) and John 15. 26, in addition to John 1. 1, in his arguments about the existence with and roles of the Word and the Spirit with God ‘in the beginning’. Basil’s view of the Father’s working with the Son, and the Son’s bringing in the Spirit (where these words are not intended to convey that these actions are not simultaneous), may be similar to Gregory of Nyssa’s view of the unity of operations. Gregory asserts that the Father works conjointly with the Son, and that the Son does not have any special operation apart from the Spirit, but ‘every operation which extends from God to the Creation ... has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit’. In Basil’s and Gregory’s views, the Son appears to have a special role with the Spirit.

Basil’s views in On the Holy Spirit show that he did subscribe to one view of the unity of operations in writing about the Spirit, in which he posits both unity and distinctions among the Father, Son, and Spirit in their acts. Again, however, he does not discuss the unity of operations in his hexaemeral homilies. Whether this is a sign that these homilies were earlier than On the Only Spirit, or an indication that he was adhering to the text of Gen. 1, or based on another reason, it does show that pro-Nicene principles are not consistently applied in Basil’s writings.

### 2.3.4 Seeing God and the Son from creation: Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20

Few explicit examples exist in Basil’s hexaemeral homilies of relations between creation or creatures and God as Creator and Trinity. However, Basil does exhort his listeners to respond to their Creator because of what they see in the created world or nature around them. Basil’s arguments in this case are not trinitarian, although he appears to allude to the Son in addition to the Father.

In Homily 5, in commenting on Gen. 1. 11, Basil asks his listeners to ‘recognize

---

329 St Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, 16, 38, p. 71; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, 2040.003, line 27.
331 St Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, 16, 38, p. 71.
332 See section 2.2.4 above. Gregory of Nyssa, ‘On “Not Three Gods”’. 
grandeur in the tiniest things’, such as the variety of plant life, flowers, and trees, and to ‘continue always in your admiration, and increase, I pray you, your love for the Creator’. This is not a movement from creation to the Trinity, but it shows that Basil took interest in things that exist in nature. Thus his ideas and sources in his hexaemeral homilies went beyond the scriptures and theological sources to looking at the created world itself.

In his Homily 6, Basil tells his listeners that they can conceive ‘an idea of the Creator of the universe’ and infer ‘the invisible Creator’ from the beauty or wonders of creation, including of the stars, the sun, and ‘the day’, and from the beauty of ‘visible things’. With this combination of ideas about seeing the Creator or the invisible Creator from the beauty of creation or of visible things, Basil was likely alluding to both Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20. Basil argues that by observing these things, ‘we shall learn to know ourselves, we shall know God, we shall Worship the Creator, we shall serve the Lord, we shall extol the Father, … we shall not cease adoring the Author of our present and future life…’ This is an example of how making inferences from creation leads people to love the Creator (the Father) and adore the Son, ‘the Author’ of our present and future life. According to Way, Basil is apparently alluding to the Son when he says that ‘the beauty of the Sun of justice’ will be far greater than the beauty of the sun. Here again, however, Basil also may have had Wis. 13. 2-3 in mind. These verses say, in referring to people who assumed that the 'luminaries of heaven' were gods because of their beauty: ‘let them know how much better than these is their Sovereign Lord, for the first author of beauty [genesiarchēs] created them.’

Basil also may be alluding to Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 together in two other

333 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 5, 9; see also Homily 6, 11.
334 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 6, 1.
335 On Wis. 13. 1-5, see Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, p. 708; Rahlf/Hanhart, Septuaginta, II, p. 364. On Rom. 1. 20, see Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum Graece.
336 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 6, 1.
337 On the ‘Author’ being the Son, see Way, Saint Basil: Exegetic Homilies, p. 84 FN 1.
339 On Wis. 13. 2-3, see Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, p. 708; Rahlf/Hanhart, Septuaginta, II, p. 364.
homilies. In these instances, as in Homily 6, Basil is arguing that people can see something about the Creator, including the Creator’s beauty and power, from creation. In Homily 1, Basil exhorts his listeners by saying, ‘from the beauty of visible things let us form an idea of Him who is more than beautiful; and from the greatness of these perceptible and circumscribed bodies [evidently those in the ‘heavens’] let us conceive of Him who is infinite and immense and who surpasses all understanding in the plenitude of His power’. In his Homily 3, Basil asks God, who created ‘mighty things’, to grant that Basil’s listeners would be able to ‘conceive the proper idea concerning our Creator’ from ‘the greatness and beauty of creatures’, and to see God’s ‘invisible attributes’ from ‘visible objects’.

Basil is not explicitly trinitarian in these examples of his apparent use of Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20. However, Augustine will use both passages, sometimes together, in his commentaries on Gen. 1 and other works, in his arguments that one can know something about the Trinity from creation, including its beauty. Moreover, Philo, in one of his exegetical works, discusses people who had ‘advanced from down to up’ because they were able to see something about the Creator from the beauty and order of creation. Wis. 13. 1-5 was probably

---

340 Schaeffer offers a fuller citation of this passage from Basil’s Homily 1, but she does not mention the clear parallels between Basil’s ideas and terminology and Wis. 13. 1-5, even though she is writing about beauty. In the passage from Homily 1 that I cited above, the allusion to Rom. 1. 20 is represented by Basil’s mention of ‘visible things’. One can hear more echoes between Basil’s ideas and Wis. 13. 2-5 in his arguments about seeing God from the beauty and power of created things, especially heavenly bodies (stars or ‘luminaries’). Wis. 13. 4-5 says: ‘And if they were amazed at their power and working, let them perceive from them how much more powerful is the one who formed them. For from the greatness and beauty of created things is their Creator correspondingly discerned.’


342 Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 3, 10.

343 See sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, and 3.4 in Chapter 3, and sections 4.1.1, 4.4, and 4.4.2 in Chapter 4. See also Appendix A.

344 I will discuss this example from Philo in section 3.2.1.1 in my analysis of this and other affinities between Philo’s ideas and Augustine’s ideas in his early Gn. adv. Man., which is from the late 380s. The citations here are from David Winston’s translation of an excerpt from Philo’s Praem. Winston includes this excerpt in the category of ways in which God can be known, according to Philo’s writings. David Winston, translation and introduction, Philo of Alexandria: The Contemplative Life, The Giants, and Selections, Classics of
written roughly contemporaneously with Philo’s works in the early to middle first century, and Rom. 1. 20 would have been written not long afterwards. Thus the concept that one can – and should – look from creation to God may have been a first century Jewish and early Christian idea. Given its foundation in Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20, Basil was not working from natural theology to God, but rather working from scriptural and theological statements about creation and God.

2.3.5 Concluding comments on Basil’s hexaemeral homilies

In summarising my analysis of Basil’s hexaemeral homilies, I can conclude that Basil reads Gen. 1 as indicating that the Son and Spirit had roles in initial acts of creation, but he does not explicitly convey that God, the Son, and the Spirit work together through unity of operations. Basil does more with unity of operations in On the Holy Spirit including discussing acts of creation. By contrast, even though Ambrose borrowed from Basil’s homilies in his own hexaemeral sermons, Ambrose offered a trinitarian view of Gen. 1. 2 that included unity of operations. Basil may have thought that establishing trinitarian principles was more important in his theological or polemical treatises. He also may have been limiting his commentary on Gen. 1 to things he could derive from the scriptural text.

Basil does, however, argue that the Son and the Father work together in acts of initial creation in ways that also illustrate relations between Father and Son within the Trinity. This can be seen in his discussions of the statements in Gen. 1 about God speaking and God making, which Basil takes to refer to the Father and Son (or monogenés). These actions must have taken place within the Trinity even as they resulted in created things coming into being externally. If his arguments about the ‘Double Person’ in creation stem from Origen’s ideas in his Commentary on John, this would represent the mediated influence of John 1. 1-3 on Basil. With that said, Basil does not overtly indicate that he was reading Gen. 1 with John 1. 1-3 in the ways that Augustine would do.

Basil does not explicitly discuss unity and distinctions among the Persons of
the Trinity in acts of initial creation. However, he did pass on an understanding of the Spirit’s role in brooding over the initial creation that was known in multiple traditions in the fourth century and to Augustine in the fifth century. Basil describes this role as that of preparing ‘the nature of the water for the generation of living beings’[^344]. This may represent a ‘perfecting’ role given that Basil attributes the act of perfecting to the Spirit in Basil’s *On the Holy Spirit*. But Basil does not draw together the roles of Father, Son, and Spirit in his homilies in ways that explicitly depict unity of operations with distinctions.

2.4 Conclusions

I had three objectives for my analysis in this chapter, in which I continued to develop my main argument in this thesis: that ideas, principles, and terminology associated with creation influenced developments in trinitarian theologies. The first objective was to argue that ideas about creation, including the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and perspectives on modes of origin, influenced principles that were posited about consubstantiality, unity, and distinctions within the Trinity. The second objective was to continue my analysis of ideas about creation and the Trinity that are grounded in interpretations of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, and / or Wisdom, including those found in *hexaemeral* commentaries. A related objective was to analyse ideas about the roles of and unity and distinctions among the Persons of the Trinity in economic acts of creation.

As I argued and demonstrated in this chapter, ‘coming into being’ as a mode of origin applies to creatures or creation as well as to the Son or the Spirit. I stated in the beginning that the differences lie in which additional ideas about either creation or the Trinity are combined with ideas about modes of origin. Thus, one of my areas of analysis was of the Son’s mode of origin as ‘being begotten’ and what this entailed for the substance of the Trinity, according to varying fourth century views. I argued that ideas about modes of origin were significant in the formulation of trinitarian ideas and in polemical debates, especially the Cappadocian-Eunomian debates. Thus *both* the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ *and* ideas about modes

of origin were significant in the second half of the fourth century.

I demonstrated that Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory of Nazianzus argued, in their own ways, on behalf of the Father and Son being of the same nature, even if they did not use the word ‘homoousios’. Athanasius and Gregory also argued, in differing ways, that the Spirit was of the same substance as the Father and Son.

For Athanasius, the Son could not have come ‘from’ nothing, as creatures do, but had to come ‘from’ the Father in a way that resulted in the Son and Father being of the same nature. Athanasius posited differences between coming ‘from’ the Father ‘by nature’ as a ‘genuine’ Son, which meant that Father and Son were of the same ‘kind’ or ‘race’, and coming ‘from’ God as creatures do, who are not of the same substance as God. Even so, the Son was begotten in ways that were analogous to human beings or other living creatures being begotten from their parents. The mode of origin of ‘being begotten’ implied something about nature, whether divine nature or human or other created nature, but this mode of origin was not, by itself, unique to the Son.

Athanasius also argued, based on his understanding of divine simplicity, that the Spirit is not a creature, and that the Spirit is of the same essence as the Son and Father. Otherwise, God would be comprised of parts. His arguments, though, were based primarily on the relationship the Spirit has with the Son. He further drew on divine simplicity to say that the Trinity could not be ‘composed of Creator and creature’, and is ‘entirely given to creating and making’. Here he makes a clear statement about God understood as Creator and Trinity, and he is speaking of the Persons being of the same substance within the Trinity, and of the Persons taking part in acts in and with creation. These arguments emphasised unity of substance and of creative action although Athanasius names the Father, Son, and Spirit as being engaged together in their acts.

I argued above that during the controversies over Eunomian ideas, the mode of origin of ‘being begotten’ took on more nuanced views. Eunomius, who believed that names or titles designated substances, did not believe that the Unbegotten or Unoriginate Father and the Begotten Son could be of the same substance; yet Eunomius still accepted that ‘being begotten’ was the Son’s mode of origin. He
thus posited that the Son was begotten by the Father’s ‘will’ rather than from the Father’s substance. This established distinctions within the mode of origin of ‘being begotten’, and it broke the connection that necessarily existed between ‘being begotten’ and being of the same race, kind, or substance. Gregory of Nyssa, whose ideas I discussed briefly in the context of evaluating appropriate translations of *monogenés*, also had said that distinctions were required within the concept of ‘begetting’, in order to preserve differences between the substances of the Son and of human beings or creatures who come into being by ‘being begotten’. I also argued and conjectured above that if the word *monogenés*, when applied to the Son, did take on definitions of being begotten in a unique way in the second half of the fourth century, it may have been as a result of arguments that Gregory of Nyssa and Basil set forth against Eunomian ideas about the Son’s ‘being begotten’ that did not entail the Son’s being of the Father’s substance.

However, I also argued above that *monogenés* has other meanings, and that when it is used for the Son, as it is in John 1. 14, 18 or in the 325 and 381 creeds, the authors of those texts may not have intended to convey something about the way in which the Son came into being. It is possible that it was intended to convey that he is unique in other ways besides his mode of origin (e.g., one of a kind, an only Son, or beloved). If so, this would represent a distinction within the Trinity, and it would not convey something about either the Son’s mode of origin or about unity of substance within the Trinity.

For Basil, in his *Against Eunomius*, unbegotten and begotten, and Father and Son, said something about the ‘distinguishing marks’ in the divine substance, but the Father and Son are of the same nature. Basil’s arguments about whether or not the Spirit also was of the same nature as the Father and Son were based on what appears to be an application Basil was making of what names designate about substance. Basil, moreover, did not believe, in the 360s when he wrote *Against Eunomius*, that the Spirit was of equal rank with the Father and Son.

Gregory of Nazianzus, in his orations, argued that the Father, Son, and Spirit are consubstantial. He posited distinctions based on whether they were without or with a beginning or source, and whether they were unoriginate or originate, or
unbegotten, begotten, or proceeding. This is a combination of asking whether or not God (the Father), the Son and the Spirit came into existence, and, if so, how they did, which is about modes of origin. So Gregory’s trinitarian arguments are related to these questions about creation, even if he did not (explicitly) base his arguments on creation ‘out of nothing’.

One can connect Gregory’s views on the Persons being either without or with source, within the Trinity, to his position that the Father is ‘both source and without source’ (kai anarchou, kai archés), and that the Son, who is not without source, is ‘the source of all things’ (archés de tón holón). Gregory thus establishes that the Father and Son are together the source of creation, while the Father is ultimately the only source without source within the Trinity and for creation.

Gregory, in his anti-Eunomian arguments, held that the Father and Son must be of the same substance, stock, or kind, which is similar to arguing based on the ‘son by nature’ principle. Gregory also argued, against Eunomian views about names and substances, that the names Father and Son designated relations between them, although he did not discuss these relations in detail. Gregory further asserts that being unoriginate or without beginning (as the Father is), or being the beginning (as the Son is), or being with the beginning (as the Spirit is) are attributes of nature that do not affect unity of substance.

Much of my analysis in this chapter was about ideas about modes of origin and substance within the Trinity. However, I discussed some trinitarian principles from the late 370s or early 380s, including the principle of the unity of operations of the Trinity in external acts. This principle, or the principle of the inseparable operation of the Trinity, is deemed to be a key pro-Nicene principle by Ayres and Barnes. I demonstrated above, however, that Basil did not explicitly articulate or defend this principle in his hexaemeral homilies, although he does so in his On the Holy Spirit. Basil, in his homilies, shows that the Father and Son (or monogenés) and the Spirit had roles in creation, but he did not defend their unity or distinctions in their acts. This is evidence that this key Nicene principle either was not adopted or at least was not expressed in all works in the second half of the fourth century.

However, some of Basil’s ideas about the involvement of the Father and Son (or the ‘Double Person’) in acts of initial creation are similar to ideas that were later known to Augustine. Further, the ‘Syrian’ understanding Basil cites of the Spirit’s role in creation, according to Gen. 1. 2, where the Spirit was brooding over, and likely perfecting, the waters in order to prepare for the generation of life, was known to Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. As we will see in Part II, Basil’s ideas about seeing God or the Creator from creation, including from its beauty and in the smallest of things, also have some similarities with Augustine’s ideas.

Finally, given my ongoing interest in this thesis of interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, among my discoveries was that John 1. 1-3 was cited by orthodox / catholic and ‘heretical’ Christians for different purposes in the fourth century. For example, Eunomius and others cited John 1. 3 as support for arguing that the Spirit had been one of the things brought into being by the Son. Moreover, both Arius early in the century, and Eunomius later, apparently rejected John 1. 1’s attestation that the Word (who is the Son / Jesus Christ according to John 1. 1-18), ‘was’ in the beginning with God. I also showed that John 1. 14, 18 were influential verses because they include the word ‘monogenés’ or, in some textual traditions of 1. 18, the expression ‘monogenés theos’.346 Thus the prologue to John was influential in polemical debates over matters related in varying ways to creation and the Trinity.

With that said, Basil does not often explicitly cite John 1. 1-3 in his readings of Gen. 1 in the parts of his hexaemeral homilies that I analysed. This will represent a distinction between his readings of Gen. 1 and Augustine’s. However, Origen’s interpretations of John 1. 1-3 in his Commentary on John may have influenced Basil’s views of the roles of the Father and Son in creation which are represented by the places in Gen. 1 that say that God spoke and then God made. In Part II, I will show that these views were known to Augustine, and I will raise the possibility that Augustine may have known Basil’s homilies earlier than is thought.347

---

346 See my analysis of John 1. 1-18 in section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1.
347 See section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3.
Part II
Chapter 3: Augustine on Initial Creation, Triadic Aspects of Creation, and Trinitarian Acts of Creation (388-400)

Introduction

This chapter is the first of the two chapters in Part II on Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity. It begins chronologically in 388, the year after his baptism under Ambrose of Milan, and geographically after his return to Africa from Milan and Rome, and ends around the turn of the fifth century, a few years after his appointment as a bishop. During this period, Augustine commented on Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wisdom, and other scriptures, and on the creeds, and some of his ideas are similar to those represented in Greek, Alexandrian, and Latin thinking, including in hexaemeral commentaries. Augustine’s more independent thinking is demonstrated in his responses to Manichaean criticisms about creation, God, and the scriptures, and in his postulation of triadic aspects of creation and associations with trinitarian acts. Augustine’s early ideas about creation and the Trinity were more exploratory than systematic. However, I will put forward two hypotheses in these two chapters: first, that he makes inferences about economic trinitarian acts of creation or about the Trinity from his reflections on all of creation (viewed from theological, scriptural, ontological, and philosophical perspectives); and, secondly, that he values the existence of, and ascribes goodness and beauty to, all created things. Therefore, by looking at Augustine’s trinitarian theology in light of his ideas about creation in a more systematic way than has been attempted before, these chapters will yield new insights on his theology of both creation and the Trinity.

This chapter comprises five major sections, in which I will critically analyse passages of primary importance from Augustine’s fourth century works. These will be supplemented by citations from his sermons, letters, and Revisions (retr.).

In my analysis, I will evaluate how well Augustine balances unity and distinctions in his views on economic trinitarian acts of creation, so that I can respond to claims that he had over- emphasised unity.\(^4\) Two appendices support my analysis in the two chapters in Part II and show similarities and changes between Augustine’s early and later ideas. Appendix A shows the key groupings of scriptures that I will demonstrate that Augustine interpreted in light of each other in his reflections on creation and the Trinity. Appendix B analyses his ideas about triadic aspects of creation and the Trinity using terminology original to this thesis.

In Section 3.1, I will analyse the influences on Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity of his prior affiliation with Manichaeism, and of the scriptures and translations he used.

In Section 3.2, I will examine passages from Augustine’s *On Genesis, against the Manichees (Gn. adv. Man.),*\(^5\) *True Religion (vera rel.)*,\(^6\) and Letter 11 (ep. 11),\(^7\)

---


which are from the period he lived in Thagaste from 388 to his ordination in 391, and from Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions (div. qu.). Augustine also wrote On Music (mus.) in this period, but he later emended mus., Book VI, the book of interest here, and this will be cited in later sections. I will focus on Augustine’s ideas about the ‘initial creation’ and interpretations of Gen. 1 with John 1. 1-3, Wisdom, and other scriptures; his ideas about triadic aspects of creation and trinitarian acts of creation; and his attribution of goodness and beauty to creation. I also will critically assess affinities between Augustine’s and Philo of Alexandria’s ideas and those in Wis. 11. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5, some of which also appear in Basil of Caesarea’s hexaemeral homilies.

Section 3.3 covers the period from 391, after Augustine’s ordination and move to Hippo, to 395, the year he was named a bishop. I will analyse the ideas about
creation and the Trinity, and his interpretations of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, and other scriptures and of the creeds, that Augustine presents in ‘Sermon 214’ (s. 214), On Faith and the Creed (f. et symb.), and On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, an Unfinished Book (Gn. litt. imp.) Here too I will argue that some of his ideas are similar to those in Basil's hexaemeral homilies. Following from my studies in Part I of monogenès and unigenitus, I also will evaluate Augustine’s possible sources for his use and interpretations of ‘unigenitus’ and ‘unicus’, and will argue that ‘unigenitus’ should not necessarily be translated ‘only-begotten’ for his works.

In Section 3.4, I will look briefly at Confessions (conf.), which Augustine began in 397 and likely finished after the turn of the century. In an original
analysis, I will propose that Augustine used Ambrose’s hymn ‘Deus, creator omnium’ (‘O God, creator of all things’), which speaks of God as Creator and Trinity,\(^\text{19}\) as a ‘device’ for creating theological unity in \textit{conf.} I also will ask whether Augustine had come to view created things, including their beauty, differently,\(^\text{20}\) and whether he now discouraged study of the natural world,\(^\text{21}\) which, in either instance, might appear to preclude him from viewing creation itself as a source of ideas in his reflections on creation and the Trinity. One of my further questions is whether he came to emphasise the human soul at the expense of all creation, as alleged by some of his modern critics.\(^\text{22}\) If sustained changes had occurred in his thinking, as demonstrated in \textit{conf.}, it would call into question my hypotheses in this chapter and the next that Augustine develops his trinitarian theology in light of his ontological and qualitative ideas about creation, and that he values all creation. Thus the section on \textit{conf.} will be used to ‘test’ aspects of these hypotheses, before moving to the analysis of Augustine’s major fifth century works in Chapter 4.

Section 3.5 will serve as the chapter conclusion. The analysis will include identifying problems that Augustine ‘leaves on the table’ because of ambiguities or

---


\(^\text{20}\) This question is related to my original arguments here in Parts II and III.

\(^\text{21}\) This claim is made by Freeman in a ‘popular’ scholarly work, cited by others, although I will argue that it is unfounded. He bases it in part on a quote he extracts from \textit{conf.}, Book X, xxxv (54-55) for which he names Augustine as the author without citing \textit{conf.} as the source. Charles Freeman, \textit{The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason} (2002; New York: Vintage Books, 2005), pp. 5, 277-278, 280-283, 286-288, 290-291. The quote is on the page before the Table of Contents.

\(^\text{22}\) This criticism is discussed in section 0.1 in the thesis introduction. Chadwick also says that Augustine, in the fourth century, \textit{learned} to speak about God and the Trinity in more Christian ways, with fewer Neoplatonic themes, but he \textit{moved} from ‘seeking evidence of the Trinity in the act of creating’ [or in economic trinitarian acts] to suggesting, by the end of \textit{conf.}, that ‘the right place to look is the soul of man’. Chadwick, \textit{Augustine of Hippo}, pp. 117-118; see also Henri Marrou, \textit{Saint Augustine and His Influence through the Ages}, trans. by Patrick Hepburne-Scott, Men of Wisdom Books (London: Longmans, Greene, and Co., 1957), pp. 72-73; Scott MacDonald, ‘The Divine Nature’, in \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Augustine}, ed. by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (New York: CUP, 2001; 7th printing, 2009), pp. 71-90 (pp. 72-73).
underdeveloped aspects of his trinitarian thinking, as well as opportunities he ‘places on the table’ for further development: both will be of interest in Chapters 4 and 5. The conclusion also will highlight areas in which Augustine’s ideas are similar to those of others or in which he exhibits independent thinking.

It is important to acknowledge that as a result of my employing the lens of looking at Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity together, I will not be offering a full treatment of his trinitarian theology. However, I do engage with scholars who have analysed the question of how he balances unity and distinctions in his trinitarian theology. In this thesis, I engage in-depth with the work of Lewis Ayres and Michel Barnes on Augustine, but Chad Gerber’s work on Augustine’s early pneumatology, from 386 to 391, also is especially useful here. Ayres, Barnes, and Gerber share an interest in Augustine’s pro-Nicene Latin sources,

---


but Gerber's ideas diverge from those of Ayres and Barnes in ways I support and build on in my analysis. Colin Gunton is the doctrinal theologian whose criticisms of Augustine I primarily respond to in this thesis, but he draws more heavily on Augustine’s fifth century works and will primarily be engaged with in Chapter 4. A common tendency among these scholars is that they do not give enough attention to Augustine’s use of the scriptures or Latin creeds as sources of theological ideas, whether because they focus on his Latin pro-Nicene sources, or, like Gunton, take the position that his ideas are too philosophical and not scriptural enough.\(^{26}\)

In this chapter I will move beyond previous research by, amongst other things, identifying where Augustine’s ideas are similar to or differ from those represented in earlier *hexaemeral* or other commentaries on Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wisdom, or related scriptures, especially those of Basil of Caesarea and Philo of Alexandria. Contrary to some previous assumptions, I argue that Augustine does not appear to have drawn upon Ambrose’s *hexaemeral* homilies,\(^{27}\) which I base on differences that exist when specific ideas about creation and the Trinity are compared.\(^{28}\) However, I will show that Ambrose’s catechetical training and hymns are likely to have been early sources of ideas on creation and the Trinity for Augustine.\(^{29}\)

My analysis in section 3.2 of Augustine’s views on triadic aspects of creation and the Trinity draws on Eugene TeSelle’s\(^ {30}\) and Gerber’s\(^ {31}\) work, and on Carol

---

\(^{26}\) Gunton’s criticisms are often tied to his view that Augustine was too influenced by Platonist ideas. See section 0.1 in the thesis introduction.


\(^{29}\) Examples that support my assessment will be presented below. See also Ellingwood, ‘Ambrose’s Hymn “Deus, creator omnium” and Augustine’s Early Theological Ideas’.

\(^{30}\) TeSelle’s analysis includes *vera rel.*, 7, 13; *ep.* 11; and other passages not examined.
Harrison’s insights on his association of form, beauty, goodness, and existence, and I will critique Ayres’s and Barnes’s views. Also of note is the earlier work of E. Hendrikx, M. Mellet, and Th. Camelot on Augustine’s ideas about triads viewed in light of his trinitarian ideas, and Du Roy’s study of Augustine’s triads and of Wis. 11. 21, but my analysis does not support du Roy’s emphasis on potential Neoplatonist influences on these triads. What is original here and in Chapter 4 is my focus on Augustine’s own ideas about triadic aspects of creation (given through trinitarian acts of creation), especially aspects that give creatures some agency in seeking to maintain their existence, an area not typically addressed by others.

3.1 Augustine’s early sources and influences on his theology

One of the objectives of this section is to assess the influences of Augustine’s affiliation with Manicheism, prior to his return to Christianity in 386, on his early acquaintance with Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 and on his exegetical methods. I also will show that the scriptures, including translations, that he draws upon represent a mix of Latin, Greek, Jewish, and Alexandrian influences. My goal here and in this thesis is to argue and demonstrate that scholars should give more attention to the

broad mix of Augustine’s sources for his ideas about both creation and the Trinity.

3.1.1 Manichaean influences on Augustine’s theology and exegesis

One differentiating aspect of Augustine’s background is that Manichaeism was deemed a ‘heretical’ religion,\(^{37}\) and thus the influences on his ideas included more than orthodox/catholic and philosophical ideas.\(^{38}\) Augustine positions some of his fourth century ideas about creation, God, and the scriptures, especially but not only in his first commentary on Genesis, in response to Manichaean ideas,\(^{39}\) and he continued to respond to Manichaean ideas in the fifth century.\(^{40}\) Thus it will be helpful to discuss Manichaean beliefs that are relevant to the examinations of his ideas and sources, but it should be noted that Augustine’s writings are sometimes the only extant witnesses to the Manichaean ideas against which he was writing.\(^{41}\)

Manichaeism was founded by Mani in the third century and was wide-spread in Augustine’s day,\(^{42}\) but it was deemed heretical by Christians on varying sides of the fourth century controversies.\(^{43}\) Arius had considered the idea that the Son was

---

\(^{37}\) Coyle says that Augustine viewed Manicheism as ‘a distortion of Christianity’, but Manichaeans considered themselves Christians. Augustine, *util. cred.*, 1, 1-2; Augustine, *conf.*, Book VI, 1, 1; J. Kevin Coyle, ‘Mani, Manicheism’, in *AttA*, pp. 520-525 (p. 521).

\(^{38}\) La Bonnardière points out the significance of Augustine’s having learned exegesis from a ‘heretical’ tradition, and this will be addressed below. Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, ‘Augustine’s Biblical Initiation’, in *AatB*, pp. 5-25 (p. 10).


\(^{40}\) This will be noted again in section 4.1.1 and illustrated in Chapter 4.


\(^{43}\) Lyman says ‘the passionate theological commitments which Arius and Athanasius share
a ‘consubstantial part of the Father’ to be Manichaean, and this was one reason for his rejection of the terminology of consubstantiality in the creed from the 325 Council of Nicaea. Manichaean ideas about God, creation, or evil also were criticised by Athanasius, Basil, and Ambrose, who viewed Manichaens with other ‘heretics’: Arians for Athanasius, and Marcionites and Valentinians for Basil and Ambrose. Moreover, Manichaens, Eunomians, and others were excluded from an edict of ‘toleration’ of Christians, issued by Emperor Gratian in 378. Even so, Manichaeism was popular in Roman Africa, where Augustine lived most of his life, and had adherents in Rome, where he lived in 383-384 and 388.

The Manichaean theodicy, which was dualistic, posited the existence of two first principles, and was similar, in ways, to Marcionite and Valentinian views,


See, e.g., Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 2, 4; Homily 8, 1.


such as those against which Irenaeus and Tertullian had written.\textsuperscript{51} Manichaean could not accept that there is one God who is both good and also the creator of all things, including evil, and hence they posited the existence of a good god and an evil power, with the latter being the source of darkness and evil.\textsuperscript{52} They believed that the good god, or 'Father of light', ruled over the 'kingdom of the good', the other power over the 'kingdom of evil',\textsuperscript{53} and these kingdoms were composed of their substances, establishing a dualism between lightness and darkness.\textsuperscript{54}

Manichaean thus did not believe in one God who was the sole Creator and first principle and also omnipotent. Their belief that humans were composed, in part, of lightness, the good god's substance, means that they did not maintain ontological distinctions between God and creation, which runs counter to the doctrine of creation 'out of nothing'.\textsuperscript{55} Further, their belief that the Son was 'detached' from God's substance\textsuperscript{56} differs from the Nicene belief that the Son is \textit{homoousios} with, and in eternal unity with, the Father.

Augustine's affiliation with Manichaeism is relevant to my arguments about his ideas about creation and the Trinity and his sources for four reasons.

First, some scholars think it is likely that through Manichaeism Augustine had been exposed to scriptures Manichaees either accepted or criticised.\textsuperscript{57} Given their criticisms of the Genesis creation accounts, he thus was probably aware of Gen. 1 before his return to Christianity in 386.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{51} On some of these Marcionite and Valentinian views, see section 1.3 in Chapter 1.


\textsuperscript{53} J. O'Meara, \textit{The Young Augustine}, pp. 56-57.


\textsuperscript{55} On the early Christian doctrine of creation 'out of nothing', see section 1.3 in Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{56} On this belief, see Augustine, \textit{conf.}, Book V, 10, 20.

\textsuperscript{57} See La Bonnardière, 'Augustine's Biblical Initiation', pp. 12-13; La Bonnardière, 'The Bible and Polemics', p. 186; Roland J. Teske, 'Genesis Accounts of Creation', in \textit{AttA}, pp. 379-381 (p. 380); Roland J. Teske, 'Augustine, the Manichees and the Bible', in \textit{AatB}, pp. 208-221 (pp. 210-212); J. O'Meara, \textit{The Young Augustine}, pp. 52-54.

\textsuperscript{58} See Fiedrowicz, 'Introduction', \textit{On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees}, p. 26; Teske,
Second, Manichaeans also criticised passages in the Old and New Testaments they believed conflicted. These included, according to Augustine, John 1. 1-3 and Gen. 1, because they believed that the former said that ‘the world was made by our Lord Jesus Christ’ (see John 1. 3, 10), and that Gen 1. 1-5 said that ‘God made heaven, earth, and light by himself’. Thus Augustine is likely also to have known John 1. 1-3 as a result of these Manichaean claims, and he cites from John 1. 1-18 and the Gospel of John in his earliest works.

Thirdly, one reason Augustine sought to correlate passages in his exegesis of scripture, and especially to reconcile those which may appear to conflict with each other, was that he was influenced by Manichaean criticisms and rejections of the passages that were fundamental to his ideas about both creation and the Trinity. I will later demonstrate his exegetical methods for interpreting Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 in light of each other and other passages in my analysis of his early Gn. adv.

‘Augustine, the Manichees and the Bible’, pp. 214, 209.
59 Roland Teske, translation, introduction, and notes, Answer to Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani, by Augustine, in The Manichean Debate, ed. by Boniface Ramsey, WSA, vol I / 19 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2006), pp. 163-223 (p. 165); Augustine, util. cred., 2, 4 - 3, 7.
60 Italics added. These quotes are from c. Adim., which Augustine began writing around 393, but he makes similar statements in his mor., which he started after his 387 baptism. Augustine, Answer to Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani, in the Manichean Debate, trans. and with introductions and notes by Roland Teske and ed. by Boniface Ramsey, WSA, vol I / 19 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2006), pp. 176-223 (1) (abbrev. c. Adim.); see also Augustine, retr., Book I, 22 (21); Augustine, The Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of Life, in The Manichean Debate, trans. and with introductions and notes by Roland Teske and ed. by Boniface Ramsey, WSA, vol I / 19 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2006), pp. 31-103 (Book I, 10, 16) (abbrev. mor.); Teske’s ‘Introduction’ to mor. in the same volume, p. 17.
61 Augustine wrote b. vita and sol. in the period between his conversion in 386 and baptism in 387. See, e.g., Augustine, b. vita, 4, 34; Augustine, Soliloquies, trans. and with notes by Kim Paffrenroth, with an introduction by Boniface Ramsey, and ed. by John E. Rotelle, Augustine Series, vol 2 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2000) (Book I, 3-4) (abbrev. sol.);
62 My emphasis in Chapters 3 and 4 on Augustine’s exegetical method of correlating or reconciling scriptural passages and its connection to his Trinitarian theology goes beyond previous scholarship. However, MacCormack says that ‘the complementarity [Augustine] perceived between the Old and New Testament was central to his anti-Manichaean stance’. She also mentions his looking at Gen. 1 and John 1 together for interpreting ‘in the beginning’, and for understanding the role of ‘Christ the Word’ in creation. Sabine MacCormack, ‘Augustine Reads Genesis’, Saint Augustine Lecture 2007, Augustinian Studies, 39, no. 1 (2008), 5-47 (p. 42).
Man., and more so of his fifth century *The Literal Meaning of Genesis*.\(^{63}\) Finally, if Augustine knew John 1. 1-3 during his affiliation with Manicheism, this would pre-date the time when he had been reading 'Platonist' books before his 386 conversion.\(^{64}\) He recounts this event in *conf.*, where he says that he had discovered that some ideas in these books were compatible with ideas about the Word or Son, including the Word's role in creation, ideas which stem from John 1. 1-3.\(^{65}\) If Augustine had learned of these verses prior to studying these Platonist books, the early influences on his thinking about these verses, which are highly influential in his reflections on creation and the Trinity, would therefore represent a mix of 'heretical' Christian, Christian, and non-Christian Platonist influences.

### 3.1.2 Augustine's preferred scriptures

I will give Augustine's use of the scriptures in his reflections on creation and the Trinity a great deal of attention in this chapter and Chapter 4, and one of my objectives is to encourage scholars to give more attention to the scriptures as primary sources for Augustine. In particular, recognition needs to be given to his preference for Old Latin (OL) translations of scriptures and to his use of scriptures not deemed fully canonical by some Christians, including by his contemporary Jerome, who was working on his own translations of the scriptures into Latin.\(^{66}\)

Based on his extensive research on Augustine's use of the Gospel of John, H. Houghton concludes that he began citing Jerome’s translation after 403 while continuing to cite OL translations.\(^{67}\) If this is correct, Augustine's citations of the

---


\(^{64}\) See Augustine, *conf.*, Book VII, 9, 13-14; Book VIII, 2, 3 (Boulding).

\(^{65}\) Augustine, *conf.*, Book VII, 9, 13-14 (Boulding).


John 1. 1-18 in his fourth century writings are from OL texts. In the analysis below, examples will be offered of where his use of John (OL) influenced his ideas about creation and the Trinity. This includes his ongoing reliance on John 8. 25 (OL), which said that Christ himself had said he was the ‘beginning’. As will be seen, Augustine reads this verse with Gen. 1. 1 and John 1. 1-3 in discussing what ‘the beginning’ means and ‘who’ was involved in acts of creation.

Augustine himself informed Jerome of his preference for Latin translations of Septuagint (LXX) Greek translations, over direct Latin translations, of Hebrew scriptures, because he deemed the former authoritative as a result of their use by the apostles even though discrepancies existed among the LXX translations. He also continued to prefer the OL translations in the fifth century despite the textual issues, and to view them as valid scriptural texts for his mature works.

---


72 In civ. Dei, Book XVIII, written around the end of the second decade of the fifth century, Augustine discusses the authority and inspired nature of the LXX translations of scripture, while also discussing Jerome’s translations. Greene-McCreight, who draws on Augustine’s earlier doc. Chr., Book II, says that he considered the LXX translations ‘to be uniquely inspired and authoritative for the church’. Augustine, The City of God (De Civitate Dei), 2 vols, trans. and with an introduction by William Babcock and ed. by and with notes by Boniface Ramsey, WSA, vol I / 6-7 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2012-2013), I, Book XVIII, 42-44 (abbrev. civ. Dei); see also Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s ‘City of God’: A Reader’s Guide (New York: OUP, 1999; repr. 2009), pp. 34-35; K. E. Greene-McCreight, Ad Litteram: How
Jerome did not translate scriptures he did not consider canonical, including Wisdom (Wis.), Sirach (Sir.), and 1 and 2 Maccabees (Macc.). Augustine considered the first two books ‘authoritative’ and 1 and 2 Macc. canonical, and I will argue and demonstrate that his uses of Wis. 11 and Wis. 13, and Sir. 18, were significant influences on his ideas about creation and the Trinity. That Augustine gave such weight to these books sets him apart not only from Jerome but also from their contemporary Rufinus, who, according to J. Kelly, deemed them appropriate for use in church but not ‘authoritative for doctrine’. Augustine’s use of Wisdom gave him access to a scriptural book that represents Alexandrian, Hellenised (including Middle Platonist), and Jewish ideas, some of which are represented in Philo’s works. As I showed in Chapter 2, Basil also evidently draws on Wisdom in his hexaemeral homilies, and I will explore affinities among ideas represented in Augustine’s, Basil’s, and Philo’s works and Wis. 11 and Wis. 13 below.

### 3.1.3 Broader views of Augustine’s sources

In this analysis, I have discussed some of the significant sources Augustine draws upon for his early ideas about creation and the Trinity. This is not to say that he was not influenced by other ideas, including Neoplatonist ideas, an area given considerable attention by scholars who look at his early sources. While not...
denying the importance of these philosophical sources, my contribution to the debates is to take a broader view of Augustine’s sources. I am seeking to go beyond the more typical focus on the Latin pro-Nicene sources analysed by Ayres, Barnes, and Gerber, and the Neoplatonist sources Gunton claims were primary influences on Augustine. I am also advocating for scholars to recognise the OL translations of the scriptures, and the Latin creeds, which I will discuss below, as Latin sources for Augustine’s theological ideas about creation and the Trinity.

3.2 Initial creation, triadic aspects of creation, and trinitarian acts (388-391)

In this section, I will examine passages from Augustine’s writings from 388 and 391 in assessing two major areas of his early thinking on creation and the Trinity from the period after his baptism and before his ordination. These are Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1 in light of John 1. 1-3, Wisdom, and other sources, and his ideas about triadic aspects of creation and trinitarian acts of creation.

3.2.1 Augustine’s exegesis of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wisdom (Gn. adv. Man.)

Gn. adv. Man. is the first of Augustine’s commentaries on Genesis. I will examine sections of Book I for what he says about the ‘initial creation’, God, and the Persons of the Trinity. I also will analyse Augustine’s potential sources and his exegetical method of correlating scriptural passages that are about creation.


See sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.4.
Among the questions about Gen. 1. 1 that Augustine attributes to Manicheans is: ‘ “In what beginning” (“In quo principio”) did God create heaven and earth?’ Although he says that the Manicheans were interested in time and eternity, his response is not about a temporal beginning, but about how the first two Persons of the Trinity were involved in creation. Augustine writes:

not in the beginning of time but in Christ, since he was “the Word with the Father, through which and in which all things were made” [*Verbum esset apud Patrem, per quod facta et in quo facto sunt omnia]*.81

Given the interest in Augustine’s early sources, it is significant that he uses orthodox / catholic and scriptural terms. This is said to be the first place he uses the title ‘Verbum’ or ‘Word’.82 He speaks of the Father, in saying the Word was with the Father (not with God, as in John 1. 1), and of Christ, who is the Word and, by implication the Son, another title he uses in Book I.83 He could be drawing on the full prologue of John in associating these titles together,84 given that he also says that all things were made through Christ,85 or through the Son,86 and John 1. 1-3 says they were made through the Word. However, the expression ‘in which’ all things were made may come from Col. 1. 16.87 The view that Christ is the ‘beginning’ in which God made heaven and earth may reflect Origen’s idea that the ‘beginning’ is Jesus Christ or the Word, which Origen based on Gen. 1. 1 and John 1. 1,88 in light of Roland Teske’s view that Augustine may have known Origen’s

84 The full prologue, John 1. 1-18, associates these titles together, as discussed in the analysis of the prologue in section 1.2 in Chapter 1.
commentary on Genesis when Augustine wrote *Gn. adv. Man.* Augustinian, however, attributes his ideas about the 'beginning' to John 8. 25 (OL), which in his translations says that Christ had said that he was ‘the beginning’. 

Augustine does not systematically identify his sources, but this example demonstrates his early knowledge of John 1. 1-3 and the broader Gospel of John, as well as Gen. 1. Moreover, if he was aware of Origen’s commentaries on Genesis he would have had access to ideas from early *hexaemeral* commentaries. Even where one cannot establish his sources, Augustine’s reading of Gen. 1 with John 1. 1-3 is compatible with prior traditions of interpreting these passages. On the other hand, the scriptures themselves can be the common sources, without requiring mediation. For example, Augustine and Ambrose both cite John 8. 25 (OL), but there is no evidence here that Augustine was drawing on Ambrose’s *hexaemeral* homilies, and OL translations of John are likely their common source.

Augustine also discusses creation ‘out of nothing’ in *Gn. adv. Man.* a principle he had known by 386-387. He emphasises distinctions between the natures of the Creator and created things, and mentions differences between begetting and making. He starts by citing other distinctions between God and creation, including that while all things God makes are ‘very good’ (as Gen. 1 says), they cannot be good in the way God is good, because God made them. Thus even when he

---

90 On this verse, see section 3.1.2 above. Augustine, *Gn. adv. Man.*, Book I, 2, 3 (Hill).
91 See especially section 1.3 in Chapter 1, and sections 2.1.1 and 2.3 in Chapter 2.
93 As noted above, *sol.* is from 386-387. In his prayer in *sol.*, Augustine addresses God as ‘founder of the universe’, and says: ‘You are God, through whom all things [‘*Deus per quem omnia*’], which by themselves would not exist, strive to exist; ... God, who from nothing has made this world [‘*Deus qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti*’] ...’ That God ‘from nothing has made this world’ and ‘all things’ would ‘not exist’ by themselves may stem from 2 Macc. 7. 28. This verse, in the LXX, says ‘*ouk ex ontón epoíesen auta ho theos*’, rendered ‘*ex nihilo fecit illa Deus*’ in today’s Vulgate. Augustine, *sol.*, Book I, 1, 2 (PL 32, <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/soliloqui/index2.htm>); see also 2 Macc. 7. 28 in Rahlfs-Hanhart, trans., *Septuaginta*, editio altera (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006), I, p. 1117; Angela M. Kinney, ed., *The Vulgate Bible, Vol V, The Minor Prophetical Books and Maccabees*, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 2012), pp. 490-491.
94 On God proclaiming creation good, see Gen. 1. 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31.
95 Augustine also says later, in commenting on Gen. 1. 31 and discussing God’s creation of all things, and of the universe as a whole, that all things were proclaimed by God to be
ascribes attributes to creation and the Creator, which he does for goodness and beauty, as will be seen, there are distinctions between these attributes as they apply to God or to creation. He then says that God did not ‘beget’ (genuit) the things God had made ‘from himself, to be what he is himself, but made [fecit] them out of nothing [de nihilo], so that they would not be equal either to him by whom they were made [a quo facta sunt] or to his Son through whom they were made [per quem facta sunt]. The implications that something begotten is of the same substance as its begetter, and that the Son is ‘from’ God are reminiscent of Athanasius's ideas discussed earlier. Here for Augustine, these concepts reinforce distinctions between created nature and God's nature.

In interpreting what Gen. 1. 1-2 suggests about the initial creation, Augustine cites creation ‘out of nothing’ in defending God's omnipotence. He argues that the Almighty God (‘omnipotentem Deum’) did not need ‘the help of any kind of thing at all which he himself had not made, in order to carry out what he wished’. He then posits a two-step creation process in which there is one first principle: God created ‘basic material, unsorted and unformed’, from ‘absolutely nothing’, and made ‘everything that has form’ from this material. This proposed two-step creation process is Augustine’s way of reconciling Wis. 11. 18 (which says that God created out of ‘unformed’ or ‘unseen’ material) with Gen. 1. 1-2 and also with his own views on God's omnipotence and creation ‘out of nothing’. He also uses this method in formulating his response to the Manichaean claim that Gen. 1. 2 says something (water) existed with God at the time of creation. Therefore, Augustine knew...
passages from Wisdom, in addition to Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, at this early point, and these passages will continue to influence his theological ideas.¹⁰²

Some of Augustine’s arguments discussed above, including his defense of God’s power, his arguments against belief in God and matter as two first principles, and his ideas about matter and form, are similar to Basil’s ideas,¹⁰³ and Augustine is defending the ‘Catholic’ faith when he says it would be ‘sacilege’ to think God might have needed assistance from something God had not made.¹⁰⁴ This does not mean he had read Basil’s homilies at this point. However, it is significant because his claim to represent the faith can be defended by showing that his ideas are consistent with ideas in earlier orthodox / catholic works, especially hexaemeral commentaries. This represents a different line of transmission than the pro-Nicene sources that are given more attention by Ayres, Barnes, and Gerber.

On the other hand, Augustine does not speak of the Holy Spirit in discussing the ‘Spirit of God’ (‘spiritus Dei’) being ‘borne over the water’ in Gen. 1. 2.¹⁰⁵ In this, he is less trinitarian than Basil and Ambrose in their hexaemeral sermons, and unlike Ambrose, he does not cite unity of operations in discussing this verse,¹⁰⁶ which may be a clue that he was not drawing on Ambrose’s hexaemeral sermons.

Teske suggests that Augustine could have learned the concept of the Spirit’s working over the water (which Teske says is implied by Augustine’s concept of the

---

¹⁰² Du Roy attributes Augustine’s use of Wis. 11. 18 here to his own reading of Wis., not to Basil’s or Ambrose’s hexaemeral sermons or other sources. Du Roy, L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, pp. 273-274.

¹⁰³ See section 2.3 of Chapter 2 and Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 2, 2.

¹⁰⁴ Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 6, 10 (Hill) (BA 50, p. 180).


‘will of a craftsman’ being ‘borne over the things he intends to make’) from Ambrose’s catechetical teachings about the Spirit’s working over the water in baptism and in creation.107 Ambrose typically taught that the Trinity is present in the baptismal water because of the ‘operation’ of the water, and that the ‘mystery’ of baptism is ‘pre-figured in the origin of the world itself’, because the Spirit was ‘moving’ or ‘working’ over the waters at the time of creation. Ambrose bases this latter statement on Gen. 1. 2 and Ps. 32 (33).6 It is likely that Augustine received this instruction from Ambrose,109 but even so his ideas here about the Spirit are still less trinitarian than Ambrose’s so it is not clear that he is drawing directly on Ambrose.

There are trinitarian suggestions in Augustine’s other ideas about creation in Gn. adv. Man., when he draws on Wisdom as one of his sources. Augustine refers to God as ‘maker and craftsman’ (‘conditori et artifici’) and omnipotent craftsman (‘omnipotentis artificis’), which may come from Wis. 13. 1, in a section where he also draws on Wis. 11. 21, which says that God arranged or ordered all things in measure, number, and weight.111 Augustine writes, in referring to all creatures:

107 Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 5, 8 (Teske); Teske, Two Books on Genesis, p. 56 FN 32.
109 According to Augustine, he gave his name in for baptism in Milan around the beginning of Lent in 387. Ambrose’s typical instruction lasted throughout Lent and continued for another week after the catechumens were baptised on Easter. See Augustine, conf., Book IX, 6, 14; see also Boulding, Confessions, p. 219, FNs 63, 66, and 67.
111 Augustine draws on this verse more than once in these sections. Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 16, 25-26 (Hill) (BA 50, pp. 214-217); see also Edgar and Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol III, pp. 796-797.
In all of them, though, when you observe their *measures* and *numbers* and *order*, look for the craftsman [*artificem quaere*]; and you won’t find any other but the one with whom the supreme measure and supreme number and supreme order is to be found, and that is God, about whom it says … that he has arranged all things [*omnia*] in measure and number and weight.112

Here Augustine mixes the triad of measure, number, and weight from Wis. 11. 21 with his own version, measure, number, and order.113 He will postulate other triadic aspects of created things in works contemporaneous with *Gn. adv. Man.*, as well as in his later works.114 Augustine’s terminology here is not trinitarian in an orthodox / catholic way. But he may be implying something about the Trinity in saying that this craftsman, God, is ‘with’ the supreme measure, supreme number, and supreme order, although he is ambiguous about whether these concepts are ‘with’ God / the Trinity or whether he is referring to the Trinity.115

Augustine’s statement that one should ‘look for the craftsman’ (*artificem*) when one sees the triad of measure, number, and order / weight in creation may also represent an allusion to Wis. 13. 1-5. This passage criticises people who did not know God, the ‘artifex’, from the ‘good things’ that can be seen or by ‘attending to [God’s] works’ [*operibus adtendentes*], or who did not acknowledge the Creator from the beauty, power, and greatness of creation.116 It also refers to God as the ‘begetter of beauty’ or ‘first author of beauty’.117 Wis. 13. 1-5 will be significant for

---

114 See section 3.2.2 below, and sections 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4. See also Appendix B.
115 The possibility that these three concepts are ‘with’ God / the Trinity arises in his fifth century *Gn. litt*, where Augustine himself points out that this raises questions about the relationship between this triad and God. These concerns will be addressed in section 4.2.4.2 in Chapter 4. See Augustine, *Gn. litt*, Book IV, 3, 7 – 6, 12).
117 This is from Wis. 13. 3. Hill’s translation of Augustine’s full quote of Wis. 13. 1-5 in *Trin.*, XV offers ‘beggetter of beauty’. The English translations of the Vulgate and LXX versions of Wis. 13. 3 give the ‘first author of beauty’. These titles for God translate ‘speciei generator’ in the Vulgate and ‘*ho genesiarchés*’ in the LXX. According to Stelten, ‘*generator*’ can mean ‘first author, producer, generator’. *Cassell’s Latin Dictionary* offers only ‘beggetter,
Augustine’s later works, and it is conceivable that he knew it at this point too, given his knowledge of verses from Wis. 11.118

Given that Augustine cites Wis. 11. 18, which says that God created out of ‘unformed’ or ‘unseen' material, and Wis. 11. 21, which speaks of triadic aspects of creation, he is likely to have known Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2, the broader passage in which these verses about creation are situated.119 In the section of Gn. adv. Man. that contains the passage cited in the block quote above, he is responding to Manichaean questions about why God had made creatures that are not beneficial to human beings.120 His response is that all creatures are ‘beautiful in their own specific kind’, although they may be harmful to people because of our ‘sin’.121

These ideas are somewhat reminiscent of what Wis. 11. 16 - 12. 2 says about harmful creatures and God’s justice and mercy in light of sin, and this passage also says that God loves all people and all creatures, and that if this were not true God would not have made them.122 Thus several statements about creation and God reside within Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2, with Wis. 11. 21 (the verse about the triad), offering the possibility of making inferences from creation to the Trinity.123 I will discuss this again below in my examination of ideas in Augustine’s, Philo’s, and Basil’s works that have affinities with those in Wis. 11 and Wis. 13.124

I also will demonstrate below and in Chapter 4 that Augustine offers several

118 Augustine’s later citations or allusions to Wis. 13. 1-5, often with Rom. 1. 20, will be discussed in sections 3.2.1.1 and 3.4 below and in Chapter 4.
120 According to Augustine, Manichaens raised these questions in arguing about Gen. 1. 24-25. Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 16, 25-26 (Hill).
122 Gerber says that Wis. 11 is about the ‘judiciousness of [God’s] dealings with the wicked’ without mentioning these other matters about creation. See Wis. 11. 24 – 12. 1 in Edgar and Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol III, pp. 796-799; see also Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Pneumatology, p. 159 FN 39.
123 Again the verses about creation are Wis. 11. 18; Wis. 11. 21; and Wis. 11. 24 – 12. 1.
124 See section 3.2.1.1.
other early ideas about triadic aspects of created things.\textsuperscript{125} There, based on my critical analysis of Augustine’s ideas, I will label these triadic aspects ‘existence’, ‘differentiation’, and ‘ordered abiding’.\textsuperscript{126} His statement, cited above, that all creatures are \textit{beautiful} in their own specific kind is related to the second aspect, differentiation, which is about a creature’s form or species. According to Harrison, his association of form with beauty and goodness, and also with existence, is characteristic of his early anti-Manichaean works, including \textit{Gn. adv. Man.}.\textsuperscript{127} She also cites Plotinus’s ideas on beauty, goodness, and form,\textsuperscript{128} and she points out that both ‘\textit{formosus}’ and ‘\textit{speciosus}’ mean ‘beautiful’ in Latin.\textsuperscript{129} As I just discussed, the beauty of both creation and the creator are spoken of in Wis. 13. 1-5, which Augustine may have known by this time. Therefore, Augustine may have been influenced by scriptural, Platonist, and Latin ideas in his thinking on beauty as an aspect of form, which is related to both differentiation and existence.

Moreover, if Augustine did know Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2, he would have known Wis. 11. 25-26, which says that things would not be able to ‘endure’ or ‘abide’ (‘\textit{permanere}’) unless God willed it.\textsuperscript{130} This terminology is similar to wording Augustine will use in describing the third aspect of created things, and this gave rise to my use of the label ‘ordered abiding’. In \textit{Gn. adv. Man.}, Augustine had begun to explore triadic aspects of creation, drawing on Wis. 11. 21, but he was

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{125} See section 3.2.2 below here, and sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 in Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{126} See section 3.2.2 and Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{127} Harrison cites du Roy’s similar observations about the relationship between form, beauty, and existence in Augustine’s works. C. Harrison, \textit{Beauty and Revelation}, pp. 36-42 (for her citation of du Roy, see p. 38 FN 188); du Roy, \textit{L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin}, p. 281 FN 4, also pp. 421-424.
\end{footnotesize}
not yet making explicit associations with any Person of the Trinity, nor using orthodox / catholic terminology, given his use of supreme measure, supreme number, and supreme order. This will change, I will argue, in his other works written in the same period.\(^\text{131}\)

3.2.1.1 Augustine, Philo, Basil, and Wis. 11 and Wis. 13

Augustine’s use of the concepts of measure, number, and weight (or order), which come from Wis. 11. 21, has some precedent in Philo’s first century works. Affinities also exist between Augustine’s and Philo’s ideas and those found in Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2, which was cited above in examining Gn. adv. Man.\(^\text{132}\) Moreover, there are affinities between Augustine’s ideas about looking to the craftsman from created things, and ideas represented in Wis. 13. 1-5 and in one of Philo’s works. These similarities will be assessed briefly here. One cannot assume that Philo had read Wisdom, which was probably written contemporaneously with his works in the first half of the first century.\(^\text{133}\) However, some similar ideas appear in Philo’s works and Wisdom, and Philo and the author of Wisdom can be seen as sharing some Alexandrian, Hellenised (including Middle Platonist), and Jewish ideas.\(^\text{134}\)

Moreover, Augustine’s use of Wis. 13. 1-5 with Rom. 1. 20, which appears especially in his later works, has precedent in Basil’s hexaemeral homilies if my analysis of Basil’s work is correct.\(^\text{135}\) Here I also will demonstrate that the concepts of measure, number, and weight appear in Basil’s hexaemeral homilies (and Ambrose’s), even if Augustine may be original in his applications of this triad. These are examples of affinities that exist, but more research would be required before one could suggest Augustine was aware of Basil’s homilies this early.

\(^{131}\) See section 3.2.2.

\(^{132}\) See the end of section 3.2.1 and Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 16, 25-26 (Hill).


\(^{134}\) The existence of an Alexandrian Hellenised Jewish tradition in Philo’s day that is also represented in Wisdom is posited by Pelikan. I discuss this in section 1.1.1 in Chapter 1. See Pelikan, What Has Athens … ?, pp. 67-69, 111-132; see also Runia, On the Creation, p. 30; Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, Anchor Bible, pp. 3-4; Kolarcik, ‘The Book of Wisdom’, pp. 438-440.

\(^{135}\) See section 2.3.4 in Chapter 2.
Even so, some of my arguments challenge a current scholarly consensus. TeSelle asserts that the terms measure, number, and weight do not appear in a ‘Trinitarian context’ before Augustine, and TeSelle suggests, drawing on du Roy, that Augustine seems to have ‘come upon’ this triad in Wis. 11. 21 ‘by himself’. Ayres asserts that while one or two of these three terms can appear ‘in close proximity’ in other works and may represent allusions to Wis. 11. 21, Augustine’s use of Wis. 11. 21 ‘does not fit within an established exegetical tradition’ nor are there any ‘substantive earlier parallels for his usage’. Gerber makes a similar claim, citing Ayres, TeSelle, and W. J. Roche.

However, Philo speaks of God’s acts of measuring, weighing, and establishing limits by numbers in ‘On Dreams’ (Somn.), an exegetical but not hexaemeral commentary. Philo says that Moses had taught that God ‘is the measure and weighing scale and numbering of all things’. He moves from that application of these three concepts to applying these concepts to created nature. He writes:

And the true and just measure is to hold that God Who alone is just measures and weighs all things and marks out the confines of universal nature with numbers and limits and boundaries, while the false and unjust measure is to think that these things come to pass as the human mind directs.

Philo does not name measure, number, and weight in the same sequence as

---

136 As noted in section 3.2.1, du Roy thought Augustine’s awareness of Wis. 11. 18 was based on his own reading of Wisdom. TeSelle, Augustine, pp. 118-119; see also du Roy, L'Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, pp. 273-274.


138 Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Pneumatology, p. 159.


140 Philo, Somn., II.193.

141 The emphasis is added. Winston comments that Plato speaks of the human mind (not God) ‘measuring, counting, and weighing’ objects to assess their true, not ‘apparent’, dimensions or value. Winston cites Plato’s Rep. 602D among other citations from Plato. Kolarcik also cites Rep. 602D and other passages from Plato’s works. However, the point being made above here is that Philo makes the connection between these three concepts and creation. Philo, Somn., II.194; see also Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, Anchor Bible, pp. 234-235; Kolarcik, ‘The Book of Wisdom’, p. 541 FN 100; Plato, Republic, trans. and with an introduction and notes by Robin Waterfield, Oxford World’s Classics (New York: OUP, 2008), 602D, p. 355 (abbrev. Rep.).
does Wis. 11. 21, but he uses his equivalent of these terms to discuss justice and he refers to Moses. Similarly, Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2, the broader passage in which Wis. 11. 21 is situated, is also about God’s judgment and mercy, as discussed above, including with reference to Moses and the Israelites.\footnote{See section 3.2.1. Wis. 10. 15 – 12. 2 is about Moses and the Israelis, and Kolarrck says that Wis. 11. 2 – 19. 22 is a ‘midrash’ on the Exodus events and desert journeys. Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, Anchor Bible, pp. 230-236; Kolarck, ‘The Book of Wisdom’, pp. 441, 525-544; Edgar and Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol III, pp. 796-797.} So there are some similarities between these passages from Philo and Wisdom.

What is significant is that Philo makes the connection between the activities of measuring, weighing, and limiting by number as they are associated with God’s judgment, and as they are involved in God’s acts of establishing the nature of all things. The latter move thus represents an ontological application of these three concepts to created nature. This move might have been justified by Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2, had Philo known this passage, given that Wis. 11. 18 and 11. 21, two of the verses Augustine frequently draws upon in his reflections on creation and the Trinity, are about creation.\footnote{As noted above, Wis. 11. 18; Wis. 11. 21; and Wis. 11. 24 – 12. 1 are about creation.} This move also could have been justified by drawing on Is. 40. 12-28, where the concepts of God measuring, weighing, and numbering appear in discussing God as creator and creation as well as God’s justice.\footnote{See Angela M. Kinney, ed., The Vulgate Bible, Vol IV, The Major Prophetic Books, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 2012), pp. 164-167.} But Philo was commenting on the Pentateuch.\footnote{Philo’s exegetical work was primarily on the Pentateuch as noted in section 1.1 in Chapter 1, and he was commenting on Moses in the passage cited here.} Thus, somewhat similar applications of the concepts of measure, number, and weight to created nature and to God’s acts of creation appear in Philo’s and Augustine’s works and in Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2, and these concepts are situated, in all the instances cited here, within the context of discussing ideas about God’s judgment.

Philo, moreover, in his On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses (Opif.), speaks of ‘anterior forms and measures’ that ‘pre-existed’, and ‘by means of which the things that came into being are given form and measured’.\footnote{In this part of his commentary, Philo is interpreting Gen. 2. Philo, On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses, trans. and with an introduction and commentary by David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, 1 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical}
ideas, while they are not triadic, also have affinities with Augustine’s ideas about triadic aspects of created things, for which the second aspect is about form (or differentiation). Philo, like Augustine, applies these ideas both to acts of creation (because they are the means by which thing are created) and to the nature of created things (which are given form and limits).

These observations illustrate that some partial precedent existed in exegetical traditions, as represented in Philo’s work, for Augustine’s use of measure, number, and weight, and also form, in his reflections on triadic aspects of created nature and trinitarian acts of creation, which are analogous to Philo’s ideas about God’s acts in establishing universal nature. Philo was not writing in a trinitarian context nor explicitly speaking of triadic aspects of creation, although one might infer that God’s acts of measuring, weighing, and marking limits by numbers would result in triadic dimensions of nature. Thus, one can say that some of these concepts were expressed in nascent form in Philo’s exegetical works.

It may be true that Augustine’s application of measure, number, and weight, concepts he attributes to Wis. 11. 21, to his interpretations of Gen. 1 or to his explorations of triadic aspects of created nature and God or the Trinity, are original, and these applications will be explored further below and in Chapter 4. However, these three concepts also appear, in different ways, in Basil’s and Ambrose’s hexaemeral homilies, where Basil and Ambrose both cite Job.

Basil, in citing Job 36. 27 (LXX), speaks of the one ‘who disposes all things by weight and by measure’ and by number. Given Basil’s citation of Job for the concept of number, Basil may or may not also be alluding to Wis. 11. 21. But even though he does not name measure, number, and weight in the same order as in Wis. 11. 21, Basil does group these three concepts together.

Ambrose, in citing Job 38. 4-11, which is from the creation chapters in Job,
says that this passage shows that God established all things through God’s majesty, and ‘not by number, weight, and measures’. Ambrose’s naming of number, weight, and measures follows neither the order in Wis. 11. 21 nor Basil’s order. Ambrose’s view also runs counter to Augustine’s ongoing position, based on Wis. 11. 21, that God does create or arrange things in measure, number, and weight / order. These differences may indicate that Augustine had not heard Ambrose’s hexaemeral sermons, or that Augustine had heard Ambrose’s position but disagreed with it based on Augustine’s own readings of Wisdom.

Thus, the idea that God arranges things in measure, number, and weight was known to Basil and Ambrose and discussed in their hexaemeral works, although Augustine takes these concepts further in his reflections on Gen. 1, creation, and the Trinity. This offers evidence that these ideas existed in exegetical traditions, contrary to Ayres’s position, but Ayres and TeSelle may be correct that Augustine’s use of them in his trinitarian thinking was original.

Finally, I observed above that Augustine’s idea that when one sees the triad of measure, number, and order (or weight) in all creatures, one should look for the craftsman (artifex) or for the supreme measure, number, and order, has affinities with the position in Wis. 13. 1-5 that people should have known God, the artifex and creator, from the goodness and beauty, and the greatness and power, of creation. Philo, in another work, describes people who have ‘advanced from down to up’ because they are able to ‘form an image of the Creator and Ruler of all’ by observing the world around them, with its creatures and many aspects of creation, and with the changes of the seasons and the arrangement of the stars

---

149 Italics added. Ambrose’s citation of this passage from Job will be discussed in section 4.2.4.1 in Chapter 4. As will be noted again, Job 38 is part of a four-chapter sequence in Job (chapters 38-41) which offers the longest discussions about creation outside of Genesis 2-3, and there are parallels between Job and Ps. 103 (104), one of the major creation psalms. Ambrose, ‘The Six Days of Creation’, Book I, 6, 22.

150 Augustine’s citations of Wis. 11. 21 or of measure, number, and weight / order were introduced in section 3.2.1 and in the analysis on Augustine, Philo, and Wisdom in section 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3. Other examples were given in Chapter 3 and will be given below.

151 As noted above, Du Roy attributes Augustine’s use of Wis. 11. 18 to Augustine’s own reading of Wis., not to Basil’s or Ambrose’s hexaemeral sermons or other sources. As discussed here, Augustine clearly knew parts of Wisdom very early. Du Roy, L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, pp. 273-274.

152 See section 3.2.1.
and the heavens. These people, Philo says, arrived at the ‘conception’ that ‘all these beauties and such surpassing order’ came into being through ‘some world-building creator’. Philo’s ideas about beauty and order resonate with the call in Wis. 13. 1-5 to look from the beauty of creation, and from some of the same aspects of creation Philo mentions (with order perhaps implicit), to the Creator.

Augustine also argues from the beauty and other aspects of creation to the Creator, sometimes alluding to or citing Wis. 13. 1-5 and typically also Rom. 1. 20, and he will do so in increasingly trinitarian ways. He may be original in his trinitarian arguments. However, Philo’s ideas discussed here offer an earlier precedent. I also have shown that Basil, in his hexaemeral homilies, argues that one can move from seeing the beauty and greatness of creation to seeing the beauty, greatness, and other attributes of God, and Basil is evidently drawing on Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20. Thus the concept of moving from the beauty and other aspects of creation to God appears in Augustine’s, Philo’s, and Basil’s works, and in Wis. 13. 1-5 itself. Philo’s works, Wisdom, and Romans were probably written within a few decades of each other in the first century, so the idea that one can see God from the beauty of creation, or from ‘visible things’, as Rom. 1. 20 says, evidently was a Jewish and early Christian idea at that time.

In sum, while I have not shown any direct dependencies between Augustine,
Philo, Wisdom, and Basil, I have identified resonances between some of their ideas about creation and God, if not the Trinity. I will discuss these areas again in this chapter and the next, and they warrant further research by Augustine scholars.

### 3.2.2 Triadic aspects of creation, ‘ordered abiding’, and trinitarian acts

Augustine discusses creation and the Trinity in parts of *vera rel.* and *ep.* 11, written in Thagaste a year or two after *Gn. adv. Man.*, and in *div. qu.*, 18, which may be contemporaneous with them. This analysis will continue my focus on his ideas about triadic aspects of creation and the Persons of the Trinity in acts of creation. Augustine’s early ideas are not systematic, and to some extent I am offering a more systematic overview of his ideas. But my analysis, which I have summarised in Appendix B, is grounded in Augustine’s works and finds support in Gerber’s and TeSelle’s analysis.

In *vera rel.*, 7, 13, Augustine states, after speaking of the one God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit and a Trinity [*Trinitate*], that:

> ... every creature … gets its being, to the extent that it *is*, from the same creator Trinity [*Trinitate creatrice*] and derives from that source its own specific nature and is governed by it in the most beautiful order conceivable.

> Not that the Father should be understood to have made one part of the whole creation and the Son another and the Holy Spirit yet another, but that each and every nature has been made simultaneously [*simul*] by the Father through [*per*] the Son in [*in*] the Gift of the Holy Spirit. Every particular thing, you see, or substance or essence or nature … has simultaneously about it these three aspects: that it *is* one something [*unum aliquid sit*], and that it *is* distinguished by its own proper look or species [*specie propria*] from other things, and that it *does not overstep the order of things* [*rerum ordinem*].

> These three aspects of created things, and how they might relate to the Trinity, can be compared to what Augustine says in *ep.* 11. There he is explaining why the Catholic faith can teach, and ‘a few holy and blessed men also understand this', that the Trinity is ‘inseparable’ in its acts and ‘whatever [the] Trinity does must be thought to be done at the same time [*'simul']* by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Augustine is probably referring to Ambrose as one of the men who understood this.

---


principle, given that Ambrose typically illustrated the unity of operation of the Trinity in his teachings on the Latin creed\textsuperscript{160} and on baptism\textsuperscript{161} in his catechetical training. Ayres deems ‘inseparable operation’ of the Trinity, with its corollary that acts can be appropriated to one of the Persons, to be one of the three key principles of pro-Nicene theologies.\textsuperscript{162} Ambrose may well have relied on this pro-Nicene principle in his catechetical teachings, but in one instance where Ambrose discusses the unity of trinitarian operations, he attributes it to 1 Cor. 12. 4-6.\textsuperscript{163} In my assessment, by contrast, Augustine’s reliance on the concept of simultaneity in both \textit{vera rel.} and \textit{ep.} 11 appears to stem from Sir. 18. 1, in addition to, and as much as, it is based on the principle of inseparable operation. This can be seen through Augustine’s use of ‘\textit{simul}', given that Sir. 18. 1 says that God ‘created all things together’ (‘\textit{creavit omnia simul}') or simultaneously.\textsuperscript{164}

In \textit{ep.} 11, Augustine goes on to say that each ‘nature’ or ‘substance’ has three elements: ‘it exists’, which reveals the ‘very cause of the nature from which all things come’; ‘it is this or that’, which reveals the ‘form by which all things are fashioned and somehow or other formed’ (‘\textit{speciem per quam fabricantur, et}

\textsuperscript{160} This comes from \textit{Explanatio Symboli}, a work from around 385 thought by Connolly and others to represent Ambrose’s instruction on the Latin creed, which he delivered to his catechumens on the Sunday prior to their Easter baptisms. Ambrose says: ‘In this Symbol [the creed] the Godhead of the eternal Trinity is most manifestly comprised: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, with one and the same operation, that is the venerable Trinity; and that our faith is so that we are to believe equally and alike in the Father and the Son and the Holy.’ It will be significant in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 below that this Latin creed did not, itself, say anything about the Trinity and creation. Connolly provides a reconstructed text and translation of \textit{Explanatio Symboli} on pp. 6-27. R. H. Connolly, \textit{The Explanatio Symboli ad Initiantos: A Work of Saint Ambrose} (Cambridge: CUP, 1952, pp. 13, 26; \textit{Explanatio Symboli}, in Connolly, pp. 6-27 (pp. 7, 20; also 10, 23); see also Gary Wills, \textit{Font of Life: Ambrose, Augustine, and the Mystery of Baptism} (New York: OUP, 2012), pp. 105-108; Harmless, \textit{Augustine and the Catechumenate}, pp. 96-98.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{The Sacraments}, as noted above, is one of the works thought to record Ambrose’s teachings to his catechumens during the week following their Easter baptisms. According to this work, Ambrose explained to them: ‘Because you have been baptized in the name of the Trinity, in all that we have done the mystery of the Trinity has been preserved. Everywhere the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, one operation, one sanctification, although they seem to be, as it were certain special things.’ Ambrose, \textit{The Sacraments}, VI, 5; also VI, 6-9; see also Wills, \textit{Font of Life}, pp. 116-117.


\textsuperscript{163} Ambrose, \textit{The Sacraments}, VI, 6-9.

\textsuperscript{164} On Sir. 18. 1, see above and Edgar and Kinney, \textit{The Vulgate Bible, Vol III}, pp. 914-915.
quodammodo formantur omnia’); and ‘it remains as it was’ as it can, which reveals a ‘certain permanence’ (‘manentiam quamdam’) in which things exist.\(^\text{165}\)

Augustine says much the same thing in vera rel. and ep. 11 about the first two aspects of created things: that they exist,\(^\text{166}\) and that they exist in specific and differentiated ways, based on their forms or species. Support for this view also comes from div. qu., 18, where Augustine says ‘everything that exists is one thing in regard to its existence, another in regard to differentiation … ’, although there, as I will discuss below, the third aspect of a created thing differs from Augustine’s definitions in the other two works.\(^\text{167}\) Thus, for clarity in my ongoing analysis of his triadic ideas, I will label the first aspect of created things ‘existence’ and the second ‘differentiation’. It is significant for my analysis of his later works that the second aspect includes beauty, as he associated it with form and species in Gn. adv. Man., and, as Harrison shows, also with existence and goodness\(^\text{168}\)

Moreover, despite Augustine’s claim in vera rel., 7, 13 that he is not separating the parts of creation among the Persons, his words there and in ep. 11 imply that God (the Father) gives or is the cause of existence, and the Word of differentiation. Support for this comes from div. qu., 18, where he claims that all creation must have ‘a threefold cause’, which is God, and must ‘be a trinity’ (‘esse trinitatem’), although there he only implies he is speaking of Father, Son, and Spirit.\(^\text{169}\) Support for this argument also appears in ep. 11, where he refers to ‘[t]hat form that is properly ascribed to the Son’,\(^\text{170}\) and vera rel., where he speaks of the ‘Truth’ (the Son), as ‘the form and shape of all things that have been made by the One’, saying

---

\(^{165}\) Augustine, ep. 11, 3 (PL 33, <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/lettere/index2.htm>).
\(^{166}\) That ‘existence’ can be used for the first aspect of created things across Augustine’s works examined here deviates from du Roy’s view that one cannot find common ground on this aspect. Du Roy’s view is based on his translating ‘unum aliquid sit’, in vera rel., 7, 13, as ‘une certaine unité’, not as a creature being ‘one something’. His translation may fit with his interest in Augustine’s ideas about unity, but Hill’s translation is more accurate with respect to the text and Augustine’s overall arguments here. See du Roy, L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, pp. 382-383.
\(^{167}\) Augustine, div. qu., 18 (CCSL 44 A); see also Ramsey, Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions, p. 37 FN 18.
\(^{168}\) I discussed this in section 3.2.1 above.
\(^{169}\) Augustine, div. qu., 18 (CCSL 44 A); Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Pneumatology, pp. 173-174.
\(^{170}\) Augustine, ep. 11, 4.
that 'all things were made through this shape and form'.

Some support for saying that Augustine sees existence and differentiation as associated with the *first and second* Persons also comes from Augustine scholars. Barnes offers partial support for this view, in his analysis of Augustine’s *ep.* 11 and *ep.* 14. Ayres also does to an extent, but his analysis emphasises Augustine’s ideas on inseparable operation. Gerber goes further, in arguing against Barnes and Ayres, by saying that in *ep.* 11, Augustine sees *all three* aspects of created things as associated with the Father, Son, and Spirit, which slightly overstates the case given that Augustine is not systematic. Hendrikx’s view is more consistent with my position taken here because Hendrikx acknowledges that while Augustine makes analogies between the three aspects of creation and the Persons of the Trinity, Augustine does not offer clear ideas with respect to the Holy Spirit.

Augustine, in *vera rel.*, *ep.* 11, and *div qu.*, 18, says variously that the third aspect of a created thing is that it does not overstep the order of things; it remains as it was ‘as it can’, which reveals a ‘certain permanence’ in which it exists; and ‘its parts conform to each other’. Thus, a full definition of the third aspect must remain open-ended. However, I will label it ‘ordered abiding’, terminology that comprises Augustine’s ideas from *Gn. adv. Man.* and the three works examined here. As I will discuss, ‘ordered abiding’ includes the ordering that comes from without the creature, implicitly from the Spirit, and also capabilities creatures are given which allow them some agency in continuing their existence.

My label ‘ordered abiding’ owes some debt to Gerber’s work on Augustine’s early ‘order-pneumatology’, but that concept goes beyond creation or ontological

---

171 Augustine, *vera rel.*, 55, 113; also 12, 24; 43, 81; C. Harrison, *Rethinking*, pp. 111-112.
173 Ayres’s analysis includes the three passages examined here, and a mention of *Gn. adv. Man.*, Book I, 16, 26, and Ayres draws on Gerber’s ideas, including Gerber’s ‘order-pneumatology’. Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, pp. 67-68 and all of pp. 59-71.
176 Augustine, *vera rel.*, 7, 13.
177 Augustine, *ep.* 11, 3.
matters.\textsuperscript{179} In Gerber’s view of Augustine’s early pneumatology, the Spirit ‘perpetually orders all that the Father has created (i.e. formed) by means of the Son.’\textsuperscript{180} The Spirit also is the agent of ‘preservation’ or ‘maintenance’,\textsuperscript{181} and has roles in redemptive and ‘reformative’ work.\textsuperscript{182} These imply more passive roles for the creature. By contrast, ‘ordered abiding’, as I define it based on Augustine’s early ideas about creation and the Trinity, characterises Augustine’s ideas about creatures that are not given as much attention. As I will show, the concept of ‘ordered abiding’ leaves room for the creature’s own role in seeking to maintain its existence, which is an extension of its having been brought into being, because of the ontological and functional aspects of its triadic nature given to it in trinitarian acts, primarily attributed to the Spirit.

Augustine’s suggestions that creatures are given some agency offers support for the position I am developing here: that Augustine, in his early writings, is correlating the operations of the Trinity with both the ontological nature and the operations of created things. In other words, he correlates economic or external acts of the Trinity with immanent ontological and functional aspects of creatures.

My position is close to TeSelle’s assessment that Augustine, in his early works, views the triadic aspects of created things as comprising ontological and structural attributes, and that the third aspect is a ‘coordinated or uncoordinated functioning’ of a being ‘in its actual operation’, and is the being’s ‘crucial unifying factor’.\textsuperscript{183} According to TeSelle, Augustine viewed the ‘compositeness’ of finite beings’ as having static and dynamic aspects, because a created thing is ‘finally synthesized by its own functioning’.\textsuperscript{184} TeSelle captures Augustine’s early ideas about created things having their order preserved by something outside themselves, whether by the Spirit or the operation of the Trinity. This supports my use of the label ‘ordered abiding’ for the third aspect of created nature, which suggests passivity on the part

\textsuperscript{179} The term ‘order-pneumatology’ is original to Gerber. Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Pneumatology, pp. 155-156, 172-182.
\textsuperscript{180} Italics added. Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Pneumatology, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{181} Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Pneumatology, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{182} Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine’s Early Pneumatology, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{183} Italics added. TeSelle, Augustine, p. 120 and all of pp. 116-123.
\textsuperscript{184} Italics added. TeSelle, Augustine, p. 120.
of the creature. However, TeSelle also says that a creature, in Augustine’s view, has the capability of coordinating its own functions, and TeSelle’s use of ‘dynamic’ suggests movement and change on the creature’s part. This will be relevant to my analysis of Augustine’s fifth century works, where I will use ‘dynamic abiding’ to characterise his mature ideas about creatures having some agency of their own to seek to continue their existence.  

These ideas are about ontological aspects of a creature’s nature, and about creation and existence, not other matters or doctrines that go beyond creation and the Trinity (e.g., the providential care of creation).

On the other hand, TeSelle’s ideas also differ somewhat from my position that Augustine, in his early works, is correlating economic or external operations of the Trinity with immanent ontological and functional aspects of created things, and not correlating aspects of creation with the immanent Trinity. There is ambiguity in TeSelle’s views when he says that Augustine, in the early works examined here, was working out a ‘Trinitarian ontology’ based on the ‘triadic structure of being’, given that TeSelle says that Augustine did not have a doctrine of the immanent Trinity at this early point. The evidence I present in this chapter suggests a clearer picture: Augustine is not speaking of the immanent Trinity in these early writings, but rather about triadic and ontological aspects of creation and economic acts of the Trinity, specifically acts of creation.

My position also differs from Barnes’s view that Augustine, in ep. 11, is arguing that the Persons share in common operations, based on the premise that ‘common operations indicate (and are caused by) their common nature’. I have suggested that Augustine is arguing in the opposite direction, from the common nature and operations or functioning of created things, to the Trinity (in this case to economic trinitarian acts of creation). Augustine is not arguing about economic trinitarian acts and the nature of the Trinity.

In sum, the triadic aspects of created things Augustine posits in his early works are that a creature exists, it is differentiated from other creatures, and it has the

---

185 The label ‘dynamic abiding’ is my terminology, but it owes debts to Professor Morwenna Ludlow and to TeSelle’s thinking here. See sections 4.2.3 and 4.3 in Chapter 4.
186 TeSelle, *Augustine*, pp. 116-117, also p. 121.
187 M. Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine’s Theology’, p. 158.
capability of ‘ordered abiding’, and he suggests that these aspects are given to creatures by God / the Father, the Word / Son, and the Spirit in acts of creation. These ideas are rudimentary in these early works, but he will reprise them in his fifth century works, where he offers further views of triadic aspects of creation or existence and can be seen to develop the concept of ‘dynamic abiding’. The significance of these ideas is that Augustine explores ontological and functional matters about creation itself in his theological ideas about creation and the Trinity.

Augustine has been criticised in recent scholarship for over-emphasising the unity of trinitarian acts. But these ideas about triadic aspects of creation appear in contexts where he explicitly speaks of the inseparable or simultaneous operation of the Trinity while he attributes differentiated roles to the Persons. In vera rel., he asserts that the Persons operate simultaneously, with creation accomplished by the Father through the Son and in the Spirit and the result being that the nature of the created thing has three aspects that must hold simultaneously. In ep. 11, he asserts that everything has been made simultaneously by the Father, Son, and Spirit, and if all three aspects of created things do not hold simultaneously, it would be possible that, within the Trinity, a ‘person does something apart from the others’ (although he does not explain this well). These statements might suggest that Augustine emphasised the unity of the Persons over their distinct roles within their simultaneous or inseparable operation. However, I have shown that Augustine indicates that the giving of existence, differentiation, and ‘ordered abiding’ to a creature is associated with the Father, Son / Word, and Spirit, respectively.

Augustine’s emphasis on the triadic aspects of the nature of an individual creature holding simultaneously may be related to his ideas in Gn. adv. Man. about a two-step creation process that happened simultaneously. If so, the concept of

---

188 See my analysis in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4.
189 See section 0.1 in the thesis introduction.
190 This was cited above. Augustine, vera rel., 7, 13.
191 This was cited above. Barnes says that Augustine’s arguments are ‘peculiarly cast’ and ‘not very convincing’, and Ayres says Augustine’s arguments are ‘somewhat’ rhetorical. Augustine, ep. 11, 3; M. Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine’s Theology’, p. 158; Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 60.
192 See section 3.2.1 above and Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 5, 9 - 6, 10 (Hill).
simultaneity, which again likely comes from Sir. 18. 1,\textsuperscript{193} would be a contributing factor to his ideas about the initial creation as well as to his ideas about unity and distinctions among the Persons in economic acts. This would represent a dual reliance on scripture and on the pro-Nicene principle of inseparable operation.

Thus Augustine, in this early period, offers rudimentary views of unity and distinctions in trinitarian acts of creation associated with triadic aspects of creation. He is not doing natural theology here. He does not argue that the Trinity is a triad because of the triads he posits in creation. He makes inferences about external acts of the Trinity based on scripture, a pro-Nicene principle, and his own ideas about the triadic nature and attributes (e.g., goodness and beauty) of creation.

3.3 The creeds, Gen. 1, John 1. 1-18, creation, and the Trinity (391-395)

This section represents the period from 391, when Augustine was ordained and moved to Hippo, to 395, around the time he was named a bishop. I will examine sections of his s. 214, in which he teaches on a Latin creed, and f. et symb., where he comments on a Latin creed while drawing on a Latin translation of the creed from the 325 Council of Nicaea.\textsuperscript{194} I will briefly analyse his unfinished commentary on Gen. 1,\textsuperscript{195} and I will offer a case study on his understanding of 'unigenitus' and 'unicus', which appear in the creeds and OL translations of John. My analysis will focus on Augustine's interpretations of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, and other scriptures; his belief that God created 'all things' through the Word / Son 'from nothing'; his awareness of Nicene ideas; and his comments on human words and the words and Word of God. I also will identify instances where his thinking is similar to that of others and where it represents independent thinking.

3.3.1 Augustine's s. 214 on the Latin creed, creation, and trinitarian acts

In s. 214, Augustine states that he is new to 'assisting as a minister at the altar',\textsuperscript{196} and Edmund Hill dates s. 214 to 391.\textsuperscript{197} Ayres, however, prefers the

\textsuperscript{193} As noted above, Sir. 18. 1 says that God 'created all things together' ("creavit omnia simul") or simultaneously. Edgar and Kinney, *The Vulgate Bible, Vol III*, pp. 914-915.

\textsuperscript{194} The creeds he was commenting on in f. et symb. will be discussed in section 3.3.2.

\textsuperscript{195} Augustine, *Gn. litt. imp*.

\textsuperscript{196} Augustine, s. 214, 1.
minority position on dating it to later in Augustine’s career. The earlier dating is assumed here, because of Augustine’s words about the timing, and because his ideas are similar to ideas from his early works, especially his anti-Manichaean arguments and emphasis on God’s omnipotence; furthermore, his ideas about analogies between human words and the Word differ from his fifth century ideas.

The creed about which Augustine teaches in s. 214 is thought to be the Latin creed he had learned from Ambrose before his baptism in 387, and Kelly used s. 214 and other sermons by Augustine, and the Explanatio Symboli, which is attributed to Ambrose, in reconstructing the creed’s likely text. It is of note here, and will be significant in looking at Augustine’s f. et symb., that Ayres and Kelly say that Augustine used the creed he had learned from Ambrose for the rest of his life, including with his catechumens. This is relevant because this creed represents a different type of Latin theological source than the pro-Nicene sources identified by Ayres and Barnes. Also significant is that the Latin creeds of Ambrose’s and Augustine’s day did not attribute any roles in creation to the Persons of the Trinity nor mention creation, including in the first article which evidently stated belief in ‘deum patrem omnipotentem’ but did not refer to God as creator or maker.

---

197 Hill says one scholar, Verbraken, dates s. 214 to over twenty years later. Hill tries to reconcile Verbraken’s views with Augustine’s statement that he was new in his role by saying Augustine could have revised the sermon and preached it again after 412, although Hill says Augustine rarely did this. E. Hill, ‘Sermon 214’, WSA, vol III / 6, pp. 151-152 FN 1.

198 Ayres sides with Verbraken’s arguments for the later dating, because Augustine uses a ‘formula’ Ayres dates to late in Augustine’s career. Ayres says it is a ‘fly in the ointment’ that Augustine ‘begins the sermon with what appears to be a reference to the recent nature of his ordination’. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 97, FN 4.

199 This will be noted below here and discussed in detail in section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4.

200 Kelly offers one possible exception. He says that in Augustine’s late s. 215, from 425, Augustine may be referring to a ‘local African form’ of the creed that may have, by that time, attested belief in God as creator of heaven and earth. Kelly makes this surmise because Augustine uses ‘universorum creatorem’ (creator of all things) in s. 215. However, it is not clear in examining s. 215 that these words are part of the creed, rather than his teaching on the creed, and these words represent his typical teachings. Moreover, as will be seen in 3.3.3, Augustine uses the expression ‘universam creaturam’ in Gn. litt. imp. in
The difference between the old Latin or Roman creeds and Greek or Nicene creeds is not often noted by scholars who are examining Augustine’s ideas about creation or the Trinity, even though Kelly says that this is one of the ‘most characteristic features’ distinguishing these older creeds. The Latin creed also did not use the word ‘one’ (‘unum’) in the first and second articles, about God or the Son, by contrast to the 325 and 381 Nicene creeds. Augustine, as Ambrose had done, taught or preached about creation and the Trinity when he was explaining the creed, and, as will be seen here, Augustine also includes some of his own ideas.

Augustine begins s. 214 by establishing God’s omnipotence and its relevance saying that ‘God the almighty Father [Deum, omnipotentem Patrem] made and established the whole of creation [universam creaturam] through his only-begotten [unigenitum] Son ...,’ and this work is from the 393-395 period being examined here. J. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, pp. 172-176, 368-374; Augustine, s. 214, 1; Augustine, s. 215, 2, WSA, vol III / 6; Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 1, 2 (BA 50, pp. 396, 398).

Gunton, in writing about early and historical developments in the doctrine of creation, as well as the doctrine understood in systematic theology, says that the key features of the doctrine of creation were that creation was an article of ‘the creed’, it was accomplished ex nihilo, and it was the work of the Trinity. However, Gunton does not indicate what he means by ‘the creed’ nor does he state that the early Latin creeds differed from the early Greek statements of faith and the 325 and 381 creeds in not attributing roles in creation to the Persons of the trinity. Gunton also cites Irenaeus as a role model and asserts that Augustine combined Platonist ideas with credal elements of the faith, without mentioning that Irenaeus and Augustine knew different rules of faith, or, as argued here in Chapter 1, that there are Platonist elements to the view of God as ‘Father and Maker’ in Greek creedal belief. See sections 1.1.2, 1.3.2, and ‘Conclusions’ in Chapter 1. Colin E. Gunton, ‘The Doctrine of Creation’, in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, ed. by Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: CUP, 1997; 12th printing, 2010), pp. 141-157 (pp. 141, 149-150).


207 Examples of Ambrose’s catechetical teachings on the creed, creation, and the roles or unity of operation of the Trinity were cited in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. Another example is that even though ‘one’ is not in the creed’s articles, he taught that the article on the Son meant that ‘Unus Deus est, unus et dominus’ (‘There is but one God and but one Lord’). Ambrose may have been influenced by the Nicene or Greek creeds. He also may have been influenced by 1 Cor. 8. 6, a verse about creation, which says: ‘there is but one God...’ (‘unus est Deus’) ‘of whom are all things’, and ‘one Lord, Jesus Christ’ (‘unus Dominus, Iesus Christus’), ‘by whom are all things’. See Explanatio Symboli, in Connolly, pp. 8-9, 22; see also 1 Cor. 8. 6 in Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol VI, pp. 892-893.
to all creation. Speaking pastorally, Augustine tells his congregants that the creed ‘builds up in you what you must both believe and confess, so that you may be saved’, and speaking polemically, he says they will need to defend their beliefs against ‘people who think differently’ (probably Manichaeans). Augustine then gives his first teaching on the creed: ‘God is so almighty [omnipotentem] that there is absolutely no nature which he did not create’. He depicts ‘all’ [‘cuncta’] the animals and other creatures the Almighty has made, including living and inanimate creatures, and ‘whatever elements of the world’s mass can be perceived or even touched’, saying that ‘all these things [‘omnia’] the Almighty has made, joining the highest and the lowest by the ones in the middle’. 

Augustine says further, in articulating his ideas about both creation ‘out of nothing’ and the simultaneous creation of matter and form, that the Almighty set up ‘from absolutely nothing’ both the ‘formless matter of things’, which was ‘receptive of form and subject to the action of the creator, and what he made out of this matter. Thus, the Almighty ‘made all things in the beginning out of nothing [ex nihilo primitus cuncta fecit], and with them simultaneously made what they are made of’, which means that ‘the material of heaven and earth’, referred to in Gen. 1. 1, also was created. Augustine’s teachings are thus similar to those in Gen. adv. Man., where he had reconciled what Gen. 1. 1-2 and Wis. 11. 18 suggest about the creation of matter and form, but here he also correlates these passages with Sir. 18. 1. This is another example of his reconciling passages that appear to conflict, a practice he undertook in responding to Manichaean criticisms of such passages, and he is evidently responding to Manichaean ideas here.

---

208 Augustine, s. 214, 1-5.
209 Augustine, s. 214, 1-2.
210 Augustine, s. 214, 1-2 (PL, 38 <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>).
211 Augustine, s. 214, 2 (PL, 38 <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>).
212 Augustine, s. 214, 2.
213 Augustine, s. 214, 2 (PL, 38 <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>).
214 As noted above, Sir. 18. 1 says that God ‘created all things together’ or simultaneously. See section 3.2.1 above on Augustine’s reconciling Gen. 1. 1-2 and Wis. 11. 18 in Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 5, 9 - 6, 10; see also Augustine, f. et symb., 2, 2 (Campbell).
215 See section 3.1.1 above on Manichaean criticisms of apparent conflict between what Old and New Testament scriptures say about creation and who was involved (God or the Word / Son). As discussed there and will be demonstrated throughout Chapters 3 and 4,
As shown above, Augustine uses ‘cuncta’ and ‘omnia’ in s. 214 to refer to ‘all things’ or ‘all’ creation. There may have been little semantic difference to him, but these words may represent a mix of sources for this theological idea. ‘Omnia’ appears in John 1. 3 (OL), Wis. 11. 21, and Ambrose’s hymn ‘Deus, creator omnium’, a hymn Augustine had known in 386-387 after Ambrose introduced hymn singing to Ambrose’s congregations in Milan. Augustine uses ‘omnia’ but not ‘cuncta’ in Gn. adv. Man., and he uses both, although the former more often, in vera rel. He also uses both in mus., VI, where his use of ‘cuncta’ may stem from Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura, and where he also cites Ambrose’s hymn and argues that God created all things, and did so ‘out of nothing’. Whether he was

Augustine seeks to correlate or reconcile scriptures that appear to conflict about matters related to creation and the Trinity.


217 Augustine quotes John 1. 3 in speaking of the ‘Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia’. John 1. 3 (Vulgate) says, in speaking of the Verbum, ‘Omnia per ipsum facta sunt’. Augustine, s. 214, 5; see also Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol VI, pp. 472-473.

218 As discussed above, Wis. 11. 21 says that God has arranged or disposed ‘all things’ (‘omnia’) in measure, number, and weight, and Augustine draws on this verse in his early and mature works. See Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 16, 26 (Hill) (BA 50, p. 218); see also Edgar and Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol III, pp. 796-797.

219 ‘Omnia’ appears in the hymn’s first line (which is its title) and the final stanza, which is about the Trinity. According to Augustine (conf.), Ambrose introduced hymn singing in his congregations in Milan in early 386, and Augustine and Augustine’s mother were among his congregants at that time. Augustine cites the hymn’s final stanza in b. vita, which is from 386-387. See Augustine, conf., Book IX, 6, 14 - 7, 15; Augustine, b. vita, 4, 35; Boulding, Confessions, p. 220, FN 68; McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, pp. 195, 200-201, 225-226; Walsh and Husch, pp. 12-13; Ellingwood, ‘Ambrose’s Hymn “Deus, creator omnium” and Augustine’s Early Theological Ideas’.

220 This was verified by searching Gn. adv. Man. using the PL text available from <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/genesi_dcm/index2.htm>.

221 Augustine uses ‘omnia’ many times in vera rel. He uses ‘cuncta’ six times, including in 8, 14, directly after 7, 13, one of the passages examined above. See vera rel., 8, 14; 16, 32; 29, 52; 44, 82; 45, 84; 49, 94 (PL, 34, <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/vera_religione/index.htm>).

222 As noted above, mus., VI is from Augustine’s Thagaste period although he emended it later. Augustine’s use of ‘cuncta’ in mus., VI may stem from his knowledge of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura, a first century BCE work. This conjecture is offered here because of Jacobson’s view that Augustine was engaging with Lucretius’s ideas, including countering the belief that God could not have created ex nihilo. Augustine uses ‘cuncta’ in saying that God created ‘all things’ and ‘omnia’ in saying that ‘all things ... have been made and created from one origin through a form, equal and similar to this origin by the riches of its
intentionally blending his sources in using ‘omnia’ and ‘cuncta’ in s. 214 or not, Augustine’s depiction of so many living things and aspects of creation in describing the ‘all’ that God has made, and in his arguments in defense of creation ‘out of nothing’, clearly shows that he applied his theological reflections on God or the Trinity to all creatures. That he emphasises all creation and all created nature can be seen as one his anti-Manichaean positions, likely taken in response to their dualistic view that there was not a sole Creator or first principle of all things.

Augustine’s teachings on creation and the Word / Son / Jesus Christ begin at s. 214, 5, where he draws on Gen. 1.1 and John 1.1-3, and offers hints that he knew Nicene ideas and terminology. In a statement similar to one in Gn. adv. Man., Augustine says that Almighty God ‘begot the one and only Word through which all things were made [genuit unicum Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia] [John 1.3], but this not out of nothing, but from himself; that’s why he didn’t make him, but begot him’. Augustine combines Gen. 1.1 and John 1.1 by saying that while God made heaven and earth in the beginning, God did not make the Word, because the Word was with God and was God. He then says:

This [the Word] is God from God [Deus de Deo], while the Father is God, but not from God. This is the only [unicus] Son of God, because no other son is of the Father’s substance [de substantia Patris], co-eternal, equal to the Father. God the Word [Verbum Deus], not like a word [verbum] whose sound can be thought of in the mind and uttered by the lips, but as it says, … the Word was God [Deus erat Verbum].


225 Houghton says Augustine often cites John 1.3 using ‘per quod facta sunt omnia’. Augustine, s. 214, 5 (PL 38, <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>); Houghton, Augustine’s Text of John, p. 188.

226 Augustine has a full quotation of John 1.1 here. Augustine, s. 214, 5.

325 creed, but not in the Latin creed, and Augustine may have been aware of the 325 creed at this point. One cannot say whether he was citing the 325 creed here, but he attributes to John 1. 1 the idea that the Son is the only (unicus) Son of God because he is ‘of’ the Father’s substance. In saying that the Father is not ‘from’ God, Augustine also distinguishes between the Father and Son / Word based on whether they are ‘from’ another, a principle that appears in Athanasius’s works. However, one difference between Augustine’s terminology and that of the 325 creed is that he does not use ‘unigenitus’ (the Latin of ‘monogenēs’) to speak of the Son, and while he does so once in s. 214, 7, he uses ‘unicus’ several times. I will assess the significance of this in a case study below. It also is of note for my later examination of Augustine’s early fifth century ideas, where he explores analogies between human words and the words and Word of God, that Augustine says here that the Word was not like a human word that can be thought of and uttered. That he takes this position here, which differs from his fifth century ideas, may support an early date for s. 214.

Again, the Latin creed about which Augustine was teaching does not speak of the roles of the Persons in creation. This is by contrast to the 325 creed and the creed from the 381 Council of Constantinople, which confess belief in God as ‘maker’ of ‘all things’, and Jesus Christ / the Son as the one ‘through whom all things’ came into being or existence, with the latter creed also saying that the Holy Spirit is the ‘life-giver’. Augustine’s teachings in s. 214 reflect his interests in defending the omnipotent God as the only Creator and first principle of all creation, and Augustine associates acts of creation with God and the Word / Son, although he is not fully trinitarian. Augustine’s teachings reflect ideas or interests unique to Augustine. However, like the instruction he received from Ambrose on the creed,

---

228 As will be discussed in section 3.3.2, Augustine did know a Latin translation of the 325 by 393. The 325 creed has both ‘God from God’ and ‘true God from true God’, unlike the 381 creed, which has only the latter. J. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, pp. 215, 297.

229 See my analysis of Athanasius’s ideas in section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2 above.

230 See Augustine, s. 214, 7 (PL 38, <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>).

231 See section 3.3.4 for my case study on ‘unigenitus’ and ‘unicus’.

232 Augustine’s analogies about human words, a word which ‘abides within’, and God’s words and the Word of God in creation will be discussed in section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4.

they also represents a blending of Latin and Nicene credal and doctrinal ideas, with
the influence of the Latin creed being clearer than scholars may have supposed.234

3.3.2 Augustine’s f. et symb., the Latin creed, and Nicene terminology

Augustine offers further commentary on creation and the Trinity in f. et symb.,
a work about credal beliefs and the ‘Catholic’ faith based on a presentation he
gave in 393 to bishops at a synod in Hippo.235 According to Michael Fiedrowicz,
the 325 creed was recited at the synod’s opening, but Augustine’s commentary
was on a Latin creed, and Fiedrowicz cites E. P. Meijering’s attempts to reconstruct
the likely text of this creed.236 Meijering argues that Augustine was probably using
the Old Roman creed, but Meijering acknowledges that few differences existed
between that creed and the creed Augustine had learned from Ambrose.237 Taking
these arguments into account, it seems very likely that the creed about which
Augustine was commenting was the creed he had learned from Ambrose and had
discussed in s. 214. He is said to have used this creed throughout his career
including with his own catechumens,238 and he says at the end of f. et symb. that
the faith he had been speaking about is expressed in the ‘creedal form’ given to
‘those newly converted to the Christian faith’.239

Augustine says that he was aware of the works of ‘[l]earned and spiritual men’

234 I noted some of Ambrose’s teachings on the Latin creed above.
235 Augustine, f. et symb., 1, 1; Fiedrowicz, introduction to Faith and the Creed, p. 151; see
also Augustine, retri., Book I, 17 (16).
236 See section 3.3.3 on the Latin text of the 325 creed being recorded in the Breviarium
Hipponense, which contains materials from the 393 synod. Fiedrowicz, introduction to
Faith and the Creed, p. 152; see also E. P. Meijering, Augustine: De Fide et Symbolo:
237 Meijering uses Kelly’s reconstructions of the Old Roman creed and the creed Augustine
learned from Ambrose. Williams does not accept Meijering’s assessment that there are not
many difference between the Old Roman creed and the creed Augustine used in f. et
symb., but Williams does not cite the differences. Meijering, Augustine, pp. 8-12; J. Kelly,
Early Christian Creeds, pp. 102, 172-173; Daniel H. Williams, ‘Constantine, Nicaea, and
the “Fall” of the Church’, in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community, ed. by
Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1998; transferred to digital
238 This was noted above. See J. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, pp. 172-173, 175, 372-374;
Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 97.
239 Augustine, f. et symb., 10, 25 (Campbell); see also Fiedrowicz, introduction to Faith and
the Creed, pp. 152-154.
on the Father and Son, and of ‘learned and eminent exponents of sacred scripture’. However, perspectives vary on his sources. Fiedrowicz’s concludes that he was clearly aware of the fourth century Arian controversies. Meijering examined the works of other Christians (mainly Greek), and of ‘pagan’ authors, as his potential sources. Ayres asserts that he did ‘significant’ reading in Latin pro-Nicene sources to prepare for speaking to the bishops, and while Ayres acknowledges the usefulness of Meijering’s commentary, he criticises Meijering for not examining Augustine’s Latin sources. This reflects Ayres’s interest in pro-Nicene sources, but as we will show, Augustine also was drawing on other Latin sources while he also clearly knows Nicene terminology or ideas.

Augustine speaks of God as ‘God the Father’ (‘Deum Patrem’). This is a clearer blending of trinitarian and credal terminology than in s. 214, where he did not refer to God as Father until his teaching on the Word / Son / Jesus Christ, even though the creed uses ‘deum patrem omnipotentem’. He apparently is speaking against Manichaean ideas when he says that the omnipotent God created, from nothing, all natures, including formless matter, which God enables ‘to receive the forms of different things’. That he has Manichaeism in mind also can be seen from his saying that he offers his comments ‘lest anyone think that the teachings of the divine scriptures contradict one another, for they state both that God made everything from nothing and that the world was made from matter’ (he is again reconciling Gen. 1. 1-2 and Wis. 11. 18). Unlike in Gen. adv. Man., however, he does not posit a two-step creation process, although he speaks of God creating

---

240 Augustine, f. et symb., 5, 18-19 (Campbell); Fiedrowicz, Faith and the Creed, p. 167 FN 46; p. 168 FNs 50-52.
241 Meijering, Augustine, p. 12.
242 Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, pp. 72-73; see also Meijering, Augustine, p. 12.
243 Augustine, f. et symb., 2, 2 (Meijering, p. 25).
244 Augustine, s. 214, 7.
245 He says he is refuting the ideas of ‘heretics’. Meijering and Fiedrowicz believe he was writing partly in an anti-Manichaean context, which Fiedrowicz points out about his ideas about omnipotence. Meijering, Augustine, pp. 23-37; Fiedrowicz, introduction to Faith and the Creed, p. 153; Augustine, f. et symb., 1, 1 – 2, 2 (Campbell); see also s. 214, 1-5.
246 See sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.1 for earlier examples of his reconciling these verses. See also Appendix A. Augustine, f. et symb., 2, 2 (Campbell); see also Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 5, 9 - 6, 10 (Hill); Augustine, s. 214, 2; Meijering, Augustine, pp. 36-37; Fiedrowicz, Faith and the Creed, p. 156 FN 6.
things that have form and those capable of having form. This is similar to his saying in *vera rel.* that God created all things out of nothing, including those with 'minimal' form that had the 'potentiality of being formed'.

These ideas about creation, God, and the scriptures are still Augustine’s own, and he presented these ideas to the bishops in addition to demonstrating his awareness of other orthodox, catholic, or Nicene principles. This suggests that Augustine did not view his ideas about matter and form as contradicting the faith, nor think that it was inappropriate to interpret Gen. 1. 1-2 in light of Wisdom, which was not deemed canonical by some others.

Augustine also associates God’s omnipotence with God’s generation of the Word / Son, by saying that all created things owe their *existence* to ‘God the Father almighty’, who ‘alone was able to generate that Word, through whom all things were made …’; and that this Word is Jesus Christ and the Son of God. He identifies differences between God’s begetting of the Word, and the way human words come into being, by saying that people do not beget words but ‘manufacture’ them, but ‘when God begets the Word, he begets what he himself is’, which is neither nothing, nor ‘previously created matter’. So he is drawing on belief in creation ‘out of nothing’ to argue both that the Son was not created, and hence did not come from nothing, and that the Son was begotten from God’s being. He also continues to reflect on human words and the Word or words of God.

Augustine acknowledges the ‘Son of God’ as being the one ‘through whom’ God / the Father made ‘all things’ (‘omnia’), and he quotes from John 1. 3. He also refers to human beings as those ‘who have been created and formed by the Father, through the Son, by the gift of the Holy Spirit’, saying that the Trinity is ‘explicitly referred to’ in Rom. 11. 36; but this is not a well developed thought about creation and trinitarian acts, and the role of the Spirit is again ambiguous.

However, there is a development in *f. et symb.* Earlier Augustine had explored

248 See section 3.2.2 above. Augustine, *vera rel.*, 18, 35-36.
249 Augustine, *f. et symb.*, 3 (Campbell).
250 Augustine, *f. et symb.*, 3, 3-4 (Campbell).
252 Augustine, *f. et symb.*, 9, 16 (Campbell); see also Meijering, *Augustine*, pp. 104-105.
triadic aspects of creation and inseparable or simultaneous operation of the Trinity. Now he offers examples from nature about the immanent Trinity in order to suggest how one can speak of ‘God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, as a Trinity not of three gods but of one and the same substance’.\textsuperscript{253} His examples of how three things can be said to be a unity include water in different forms, and the wood in different parts of a tree, but these still reveal distinctions (i.e., the water and wood are divided into parts), and thus are rudimentary illustrations.\textsuperscript{254} Even so, and despite his claim that he is not offering these examples ‘because of their similarity to the divine nature’,\textsuperscript{255} Augustine is making tentative arguments about the unity and distinctions of the immanent Trinity based on analogies between the nature of created things and the substance of the Trinity.

### 3.3.3 Augustine’s struggles with Gen. 1 in Gn. litt. imp.

Augustine began working on his second commentary on Genesis, \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, in 393, the year he presented on the creed at the Hippo synod, and he set it aside without finishing it in 395.\textsuperscript{256} This brief analysis will discuss developments in his thinking on creation and the Trinity, which indicate that he was not as certain about some things; the exegetical methods he employs in this ‘literal’ commentary; and instances where his ideas are similar to those of others, especially Basil.

Augustine starts by speaking of the ‘obscure mysteries of the natural order’, which suggests he is not as clear on the created order as he may have thought he was earlier.\textsuperscript{257} These mysteries require his new approach of posing questions, to avoid the ‘sacrilege’ of ‘heretics’ who do not interpret scripture in keeping with the ‘Catholic’ faith (probably Manichaeans),\textsuperscript{258} and his opening statement of faith includes Catholic and Nicene principles about creation and the Trinity. He writes:

… God the almighty Father [\textit{Deum, omnipotentem Patrem}] made and established the whole of creation [\textit{uniuersam creaturam}] through his only-begotten [\textit{unigenitum}] Son, that is through his wisdom and power

\textsuperscript{253} Augustine, \textit{f. et symb.}, 9, 17 (Campbell).
\textsuperscript{254} Augustine, \textit{f. et symb.}, 9, 17.
\textsuperscript{255} Augustine, \textit{f. et symb.}, 9, 17.
\textsuperscript{256} Fiedrowicz, ‘Introduction’ to \textit{Unfinished Literal Commentary}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{257} Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, 1, 1.
\textsuperscript{258} Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, 1, 1.
consubstantial [\textit{consubstantialem}] and co-eternal with himself, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, who is also consubstantial [\textit{consubstantialis}] and co-eternal. So Catholic teaching bids us believe that this Trinity [\textit{Trinitatem}] is called one God [\textit{unum Deum}], and that he made and created all things that are [\textit{omnia quae sunt}] … to the effect that all creatures … are not born of God, but made by God \textit{out of nothing [de nihilo]} ...\textsuperscript{259}

These statements sound formulaic, and Augustine begins with ideas more about the consubstantiality and co-eternity of the Persons within the Trinity than about trinitarian acts.\textsuperscript{260} However, he also begins with exegetical matters, given his acknowledgment that he is addressing others, probably Manichaeans, who do not interpret Gen. 1 and other scriptures correctly. In this respect, his opening statements have affinities with the opening of \textit{Gn. adv. Man.}\textsuperscript{261} and the ending of \textit{mus.}, VI.\textsuperscript{262} In all three places he defends creation 'out of nothing' while apparently countering Manichaean criticisms of scripture.\textsuperscript{263}

In Augustine's opening statement to \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, he does not indicate what the roles of the Son or Holy Spirit were in the initial creation, even though he says they were involved with God / the Father. Augustine's approach of offering multiple answers to his questions also does not allow for gleaning definitive insights into his thinking. This can be seen in his discussions of the potential meanings of 'the Spirit of God' in Gen. 1. 2, where he says it could be the Holy Spirit but he is not conclusive.\textsuperscript{264} As in \textit{Gn. adv. Man.} where he also did not say that the Spirit was the Holy Spirit, he thus does not depict \textit{trinitarian} acts of creation.\textsuperscript{265}

Affinities between Augustine's terminology and that of others appear when he

\textsuperscript{259} Italics added. Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, 1, 2 (BA 50, pp. 396, 398).
\textsuperscript{260} Augustine also writes about the consubstantiality and co-eternity of the Persons in \textit{f. et symb.}, 9, 16 (Meijering); see also Meijering, \textit{Augustine}, pp. 102-104.
\textsuperscript{261} See Augustine, \textit{Gn. adv. Man.}, Book I, 1, 1-2; 2, 4.
\textsuperscript{262} The final section of \textit{mus.}, VI may be an epilogue Augustine added after the Thagaste period, as Jacobsson discusses. It was noted earlier that if he did emend \textit{mus.}, VI after 391, similarities existed between the closing sections and his works from 393-395. Two similarities between \textit{mus.}, VI and \textit{Gn. litt. imp.} are that they use ‘\textit{consubstantialis}’ (as does \textit{f. et symb.}), and he comments on ‘heretics’, evidently Manichaeans, who do not interpret the scriptures correctly. Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, 1, 1-2 (BA 50); Augustine, \textit{mus.}, Book VI, XVII.59; see also Augustine, \textit{f. et symb.}, 9, 16 (Meijering); Jacobsson, pp. xii-xxviii.
\textsuperscript{263} Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, 1, 1-2 (BA 50); Augustine, \textit{Gn. adv. Man.}, Book I, 2, 4; Augustine, \textit{mus.}, Book VI, XVII.56; XVII.57; XVII.59 (Jacobsson, pp. 109-113, 116-117).
\textsuperscript{264} Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt. imp.}, 4, 16-18 (Hill).
\textsuperscript{265} See section 3.2.1 above.
is discussing if 'in the beginning', in Gen. 1. 1, refers to time or to the beginning in 'the very Wisdom of God', the Son, based on John 8. 25 (OL). In one answer, he uses 'principium sine principio' to refer to the Father and 'principium cum alio principio' ('a beginning with another beginning') for the Son. This is by contrast to his use of 'principium sine principio' in an early work where he had applied it to the Trinity as the Creator and only principle of 'all things'. In Gn. litt. imp., his terminology is similar to that in f. et. symb., where he says that the Father and Son cannot be two 'principles without a beginning' [principia sine principio] for the Spirit, but there he is speaking of relations of origin within the Trinity, not about creation and the Trinity. In Gn. litt. imp., the Father and Son are one origin with respect to the external creation, but the Son is 'the beginning in such a way that he is from the Father', which is about relations of origin within the Trinity.

Augustine's wording of 'a beginning with another beginning' is like Victorinus's terminology in his trinitarian hymn, although Victorinus is not explicitly speaking of creation and the Trinity. Augustine's terminology of the Father being the

---

266 Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 3, 6 (Hill) (BA 50).
267 Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 3, 6 (Hill) (BA 50).
268 Fitzgerald dates ord. to late 386 or early 387. Ayres and Gerber discuss Augustine's use, in ord., of 'principium sine principio', and I cite Ayres's translation of this passage here. They suggest his use there of this phrase might be attributed to Marius Victorinus's works, and they cite Cipriani's research on the influences of Victorinus on Augustine. In Ayres's translation, Augustine speaks of the 'principium sine principio' of 'all things' and asserts that the 'mysteries' of the faith teach that this 'Principle' is 'one omnipotent God, and that he is the tripotent [tripotentem] Father and Son and Holy Spirit'. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, pp. 26-27, also pp. 20 FN 23 and all of 24-30; Augustine, On Order, trans. and with an introduction by Silvano Borruso (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2007), Book II, 5, 15-16 (abbrev. ord.); Gerber, The Spirit of Augustine's Early Pneumatology, pp. 23, 28-34, 38-40; Allan D. Fitzgerald, AttA, p. xlvii; Nello Cipriani, 'Marius Victorinus', in AttA, pp. 533-535; C. Harrison, Rethinking, pp. 45, 69-71.
269 Augustine, f. et symb., 9, 19 (Meijering, p. 120).
270 Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 3, 6 (Hill) (BA 50).
271 This stanza reads: 'One principle / And one with the other / And always one with the other / O Blessed Trinity.' Marius Victorinus, 'Third Hymn', in Marius Victorinus: Theological Treatises on the Trinity, trans. and with an introduction by Mary T. Clark, FotC, 69 (Washington, DC: CUAP, 1981; repr. 2001), pp. 324-335 (p. 324).
272 Victorinus uses 'principium sine principio' elsewhere in commenting on the Logos's role in creation and on John. 1. 1-3. His ideas are complex but tend to suggest that the Logos was a principle with another principle, and also the principle of all created things. Marius Victorinus, 'Letter of Marius Victorinus, Rhetor of the City of Rome, to Candidus the Arian', in Marius Victorinus: Theological Treatises on the Trinity, trans. and with an introduction by
beginning without beginning and the Son the beginning in such a way that the Son is from the Father, with both being the beginning for creation, is closer to Gregory of Nazianzus’s, who says the Father is ‘both source and without source’ (kai anarchou, kai archés), and the Son, who is not without source, is ‘the source of all things’ (archés de tōn holōn).

Augustine may not have been aware of Gregory’s orations at this point, although he may have known of Victorinus’s works, but his terminology clearly has precedent in eastern and western thinking, and it may stem from a ‘play on words’ from John 1.

There is an intriguing similarity between Augustine’s and Basil’s hexaemeral commentaries. Augustine asks, in reading Gen. 1. 3 (where God says ‘Let light be made’) in light of John 1. 1-3, whether what was said by God:

was said to the only-begotten Son [Filio unigenito], or whether what was said here is the only-begotten Son [Filius unigenitus est], and on being spoken is called the Word of God through which all things were made …

Augustine’s position is that the Word ‘is co-eternal with the Father’ (John 1. 1), and thus God must have been speaking to the Son, rather than God’s words being the Son, because words that are spoken have a beginning and an ending and are not eternal. Augustine says further that ‘the Word of God, the only-begotten [unigenitus] Son’, is not like ‘a sound uttered in the way that happens with us’.


Lienhard’s analysis of when Augustine may have known Gregory’s works shows it was not likely until the fifth century, but does not cover works on creation. See Joseph T. Lienhard, ‘Augustine of Hippo, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory Nazianzen’, in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. by Aristotle Papanikolaou and George E. Demacopoulos (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), pp. 81-99.

As noted above, Ayres and Gerber suggest that Augustine did know of Victorinus’s works. See also Cipriani, ‘Marius Victorinus’, pp. 533-535.


Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 5, 19 (Hill).

Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 5, 19 (Hill).
This is another instance of his drawing *distinctions* between human words and the words and Word of God in his interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, and it is of interest because he will later experiment with analogies between them.\(^{279}\)

Augustine’s saying that God (the Father) was speaking to the Word or only-begotten Son, according to Gen. 1, also appears in Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies.\(^{280}\) As I discussed in Chapter 2, Basil had said that the reason Gen. 1 says that after *God* gave a ‘command’ (e.g., ‘Let there be a firmament …’), *God* made something (e.g., ‘God made the firmament’), is that ‘the Spirit’ is calling through the scripture about the involvement of the ‘Only-begotten’ (*monogenés*) in creation, an allusion to what John 1. 1-18 says about creation and the Word.\(^{281}\) Origen had offered similar examples in discussing ‘“In the beginning was the Word”’ in commenting on John 1. 1-4, but he did not use ‘Only-begotten’.\(^{282}\) Ambrose also comments on Gen. 1 saying that ‘“God spoke” and “God created”’, but he takes this to refer to the Father and Son, who are ‘honored with the same name of majesty [God]’, and he does not use ‘only-begotten’ for the Son.\(^{283}\) That Augustine uses *unigenitus* in *Gn. litt. imp.* and Basil uses *monogenés* could be a clue that Augustine knew Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies this early.\(^{284}\) Ambrose is unlikely to have been his source because Ambrose, unlike Augustine, Basil, and Origen, was not interpreting Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 or 1-18 together.

This brief analysis of *Gn. litt. imp.* shows that by 395, Augustine held ideas similar to those of other eastern and western Christians. I will demonstrate in

\(^{279}\) See section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4 on his mature reflections on words and the Word.

\(^{280}\) See section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 and below here. See, e.g., Basil of Caesarea, *On the Hexaemeron*, Homily 3, 2; Homily 3, 4; Homily 6, 2; Homily 9, 6.

\(^{281}\) See section 2.3.1. Basil of Caesarea, *On the Hexaemeron*, Homily 3, 4; see also Homily 3, 2; Homily 6, 2; Homily 9, 6; Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.


\(^{284}\) Way says that Eustathius Afer translated Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies around 440. Lienhard’s analysis of when Augustine may have known works by Basil shows it was not likely until the fifth century, but his analysis does not cover works on creation. Agnes Clare Way, translation and introduction, *Saint Basil: Exegetic Homilies*, by Basil of Caesarea, FotC, 46 (Washington DC: CUAP, 1963), p. viii; Lienhard, ‘Augustine of Hippo, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory Nazianzen’, pp. 81-99.
Chapter 4 that even stronger evidence exists in *Gn. litt* that Augustine was aware of Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies and perhaps other works.\(^{285}\) While it may be unlikely that he knew of Basil’s *hexaemeral* homilies earlier, only a few years lie between 395, when he stopped working on *Gn. litt. imp.*, and the early fifth century, when he began *Gn. litt.*\(^ {286}\) Also, the similarities I identified in this section between Augustine’s and Basil’s ideas in their *hexaemeral* works are not the first affinities between their ideas I have shown. I suggested above that Augustine may have been drawing on Wis. 13. 1-5 in *Gn. adv. Man.*, and I established in Chapter 2 that Basil is evidently drawing on both Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 in his *hexaemeral* homilies.\(^ {287}\) So affinities between their ideas exist and warrant further research.

On the other hand, Augustine was not able to conclusively see the Holy Spirit in Gen. 1. 2, which speaks of the ‘Spirit of God’, and thus he was not fully trinitarian in *Gn. litt. imp.* in his views on creation and the acts of the Persons. This does mark a distinction between his early views of Gen. 1. 1-2 and those expressed by both Basil and Ambrose in their *hexaemeral* homilies, as I observed above.\(^ {288}\)

Finally, Augustine’s hesitancy in answering his own questions suggests the complexities of interpreting the opening verses of Gen. 1, including in light of John 1. 1-3 and John 8. 25. However, he did again try to reconcile these passages, and I will give his method of correlating the meanings of multiple scriptures significant attention in my analysis of his *Gn. litt* in Chapter 4.

### 3.3.4 Case study: Augustine’s uses and sources of ‘unigenitus’ and ‘unicus’

In this section, I will examine Augustine’s uses and explanations of ‘*unigenitus*’, typically translated as ‘only begotten’, in his early works. This case study builds on my analysis in Part I of potential meanings and translations of ‘*monogenēs*’, the Greek word typically translated into Latin as ‘*unigenitus*’.\(^ {289}\) *Unigenitus* appears in

---

\(^{285}\) See major section 4.2 in Chapter 4, especially sections 4.2.2, 4.2.4.1, and 4.2.5  
\(^{286}\) Fiedrowicz offers 401 for the starting of *Gn. litt*, Teske that it was after 399. Fiedrowicz, ‘General Introduction’ to *Saint Augustine: On Genesis*, pp. 13-14; Roland J. Teske, ‘*Genesi ad litteram liber, De*’, in *AttA*, pp. 376-377 (p. 376).  
\(^{287}\) See section 2.3.4 in Chapter 2, and sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1 above here.  
\(^{288}\) This observation was made in section 3.2.1 in examining Augustine’s *Gn. adv. Man*.  
\(^{289}\) See section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1, and the case study in section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.
Augustine’s s. 214,290 f. et symb.,291 and Gn. litt. imp.,292 from the 391-395 period examined above. Unigenitus also appears in John (OL), Latin Christian writings, and a Latin translation of the 325 creed, and ‘unigena’ appears in Latin translations of classical Greek works. As I will show, Augustine says that ‘unigenitus’ means ‘unicus’. Moreover, translation options besides ‘only-begotten’ exist for both these words, as for monogenés. These other meanings do not refer to how someone came into being (i.e., through being begotten) but are about being unique.

In f. et symb., Augustine offers insights into his understanding of unigenitus and unicus when he explains what the creed says about Jesus Christ.293 He says:

we also believe in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Father’s only-begotten one, i.e. only one, our Lord
[Patris unigenitum, id est unicum, Dominum nostrum].294

As I discussed above, Augustine was commenting on a Latin creed in f. et symb., but he also used Nicene terminology and commented on Nicene ideas, and in this example he may be doing both. The Latin creeds Augustine is said to have known used ‘unicus’, typically translated ‘only’, in speaking of Jesus Christ / the Son; according to Kelly, this is true of nearly all the creeds of his day, including the creed he learned from Ambrose and those known to Rufinus.295

Meijering, in considering Augustine’s use of unigenitus and unicus in the statement cited above, says Augustine may have used unigenitus to refer to the Latin translation of the 325 creed.296 Augustine likely knew that this translation used ‘unigenitus’, given that Ayres suggests he learned other Nicene terminology that appears in f. et symb. from the translation of the 325 creed that was used at the 393 synod and published in the Breviarium Hipponense.297 That translation

__________

290 See section 3.3.1. See, e.g., Augustine, s. 214, 7.
291 I will give citations from f. et symb. in this case study.
292 See section 3.3.3. See, e.g., Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 1, 2; 5, 19 (BA 50, pp. 396, 426).
293 Meijering points this out. Augustine, f. et symb., 3, 3 (Meijering, p. 40); Meijering, Augustine, p. 40.
294 This is Meijering’s translation and text. Augustine, f. et symb., 3, 3 (Meijering, p. 40).
296 Meijering, Augustine, p. 40.
297 Ayres does not address the word ‘unigenitus’. Ayres cites CCSL, 149. Ayres, Augustine
includes ‘natum de Patre unigenitum’ and ‘Deum de Deo’, similar to an earlier translation of the 325 creed given by Hilary of Poitiers. So Augustine may have been drawing both on the Latin translation of the 325 creed and also on a Latin creed in explaining that unigenitum meant unicum or ‘only one’.

However, Meijering translates ‘unigenitum’ as ‘only-begotten’, rather than using one of the other possibilities for unigenitus (or monogenés), and despite the fact that Augustine says it meant ‘unicus’, which itself has multiple meanings. These include ‘singular, unparalleled, unique, alone in its kind’, and ‘uncommon’ or ‘special’, which are also translation options for monogenés. So perhaps the appropriate way of translating Augustine’s commentary is to leave ‘unigenitus’ untouched, as some words are that are difficult to translate, and allow Augustine to explain it. This would result in:

we also believe in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Father’s [unigenitum], i.e. only one, our Lord [Patris unigenitum, id est unicum, Dominum nostrum].

There are other potential sources, besides the Latin translation of the 325 creed, for Augustine’s knowledge of unigenitus and unicus. Houghton has established that both unigenitus and unicus (for monogenés) appear in John 1. 14, 18; 3. 16 (OL), and that Augustine typically used ‘unigenitus’ in citing the verses from the prologue and ‘unicus’ for John 3. 16. (This differs from Jerome’s using

---

298 That the Latin translation of the 325 creed in CCSL, 149 does include the words cited here was verified through a Google Books search of C. Munier, ed, Concilia Africae a. 345-525 (date of search 18 May 2014, verified again on 23 June 2015).


300 For other translation options, see sections 1.2.3 in Chapter 1, and 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.


302 Stelten, Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin, p. 278.

303 See also below. See sections 1.2.3 in Chapter 1 and section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.

304 Adapted from Augustine, f. et symb., 3, 3 (Meijering); Meijering, Augustine, p. 40.

305 As discussed in section 3.1.2, Augustine used OL translations of John in the fourth century. Houghton, Augustine’s Text of John, pp. 93, 98-99, 144-145, 192-193, 194-195,
‘unigenitus’ for all these verses. Augustine also may have known that ‘unicus’ is an attribute of ‘Wisdom’ in Wis. 7. 22 (Vulgate), and can be translated as ‘one’ (a translation of Wis. 7. 22 [LXX] likewise gives ‘unique’ for monogenês). Ambrose could have been a source for Augustine’s use of unigenitus in f. et symb., because despite Meijering’s view that they understood ‘unigenitus’ and ‘primogenitus’ differently, the differences do not seem pronounced. Ambrose says that the latter term, when used for the ‘first-born’ Son (in Col. 1. 15), means ‘there is none before him’, while the former, ‘only-begotten’ (in John 1. 14), means ‘there is none after Him’. Augustine says that unigenitus means that the Son ‘has no brothers, but according to his status as the firstborn [primogenitus], he graciously called everyone his brothers’. Taking unigenitus and primogenitus together thus means that the Son is an only Son for Ambrose and Augustine. This can be compared to Athanasius’s view that the difference between the Word / Son being the ‘firstborn of creation’ (Col. 1. 15) and ‘monogenês’ was that the former applies to someone born first who has siblings, and is related to the created order, but someone is called monogenês when ‘there are no other brothers’. This is the difference between Jesus Christ as incarnate and as eternal Son.

Given these possible definitions and in light of my earlier arguments that monogenês should be translated as ‘one of a kind’ or unique, or can be applied to an only child or even mean ‘beloved’, it is significant that Augustine knew to explain that ‘unigenitus’ can refer to the Father’s ‘only one’, as shown above in the
quote from *f. et symb.* Unigenitus and unicus, for Augustine, do not necessarily say something about *how* the Son came into being (i.e., that it was through being begotten), but rather about other ways he is unique.

‘*Unigenitus*’ also appears in earlier Latin Christian writings. Victorinus uses it in citing John 1. 18 and 3. 16, and in his trinitarian hymn. Hilary had used it, in addition to citing it from the Latin translation of the 325 creed, and Tertullian used ‘*unigenito et primogenito*’ in drawing on John 1 and Col. 1. 15. These earlier uses of unigenitus may be clues that the practice of translating monogenēs as unigenitus did not begin with Jerome, but is nonetheless a Latin practice, and that it is not about how the Son came into being.

Given my discussion in Chapter 1 of ‘*monogenēs*’ appearing in the ending of Plato’s *Timaeus*, it is of note that Cicero used ‘*unigena*’ in his translation of *Tim.*, in ‘*singularis hic mundus atque unigena*’. This word can be translated as either ‘only-begotten’ or ‘unique’, and ‘*monogenēs*’ as ‘sole of its kind’.

---

313 See the adapted quote on the previous page. Augustine, *f. et symb.*, 3, 3 (Meijering).


321 See section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1. This is Bury’s translation. Waterfield’s is: ‘single, the only one of its kind’. Plato, *Timaeus*, in *Plato: Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus*,
also was used by the first century B.C.E. Catullus, who translated Greek poetry into Latin, but he used it to speak of brothers, with the meaning of ‘born at one birth, of the same race’, or ‘born of the same parents’ or ‘the brother’.

Augustine may have known Cicero’s translation of Tim. when he addressed the bishops in 393, because Hill says a word he uses in Gn. litt. imp. may have been borrowed from Cicero’s Tim. He also is thought, however, not to have used Tim. until the fifth century, and he may have read it in Cicero’s translation or had access to it through other sources. Intriguingly, Houghton notes that Augustine, in his ‘Homily 2’ on John, ‘claims that the concept of the unigenitus filius is found in ancient philosophers’. This is an early fifth century sermon, but Augustine could have been aware of this usage earlier, although this would be conjecture.


These two alternatives are from E. T. Merrill, Catullus.

Hill says Augustine’s use of ‘exorior’ for things which have been ‘originated’ seems to come from Tim., 29c in Cicero’s translation, and Augustine quotes this passage in The Trinity, IV, 24-25. Hill, Unfinished Literal Commentary, p. 123 FN 22; Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 4., 17 (Hill).


Van Fleteren and Pelikan think Augustine read Tim. in Cicero’s translation. Harrison says it may have been in Cicero’s or Calcidius’s translation. TeSelle does not think Augustine read Tim. but knew passages from it from other works, perhaps Porphyry’s. Augustine does cite Tim. in his civ. Dei, in the second decade of the fifth century, as will be noted in Chapter 4. Frederick Van Fleteren, ‘Plato, Platonism’, in AttA, pp. 651-654 (p. 651); Pelikan, What Has Athens …, pp. 111-112; C. Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, p. 98; TeSelle, Augustine, pp. 253-255; O’Daly, Augustine’s ‘City of God’, pp. 142, 255-257.

Augustine says that one can find in some books of the philosophers ‘the fact that God has an only-begotten [unigenitum] Son through whom are all things’ (he is referring to John 1. 1-3). Houghton, Augustine’s Text of John, p. 193; see also Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 2, 4 (CCSL 36, II, 4, 21-22).

Augustine, by the mid 390s, may have studied the ideas of Victorinus, Hilary, or Athanasius, which may have been sources of his thinking on \textit{unigenitus}. These works are from the middle of the fourth century. If my conjectures in my case study on \textit{monogenés} have any merit, it is possible that the interpretation that \textit{monogenés} meant ‘only-begotten’, understood as the only one who came into being through \textit{being begotten}, had something to do with Cappadocian-Eunomian debates over the significance of the titles ‘unbegotten’ and ‘begotten’, modes of origin, and substance.\footnote{See section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2, especially its conclusions.} Augustine seems unlikely have known of these controversies at this point, and this could provide a clue to where he stood with his studies. Moreover, even if Augustine’s use of \textit{unigenitus} in \textit{Gn. litt. imp.} could be proven to be based on Basil’s usage of \textit{monogenés} that I discussed above, it would have been Basil’s \textit{hexaemeral} commentaries Augustine was citing,\footnote{See section 3.3.3 above.} not his anti-Eunomian writings, and Augustine and Basil were interpreting Gen. 1 in light of the prologue to John.

Translators of at least Augustine’s early works should not assume that ‘only-begotten’ is the appropriate translation of ‘\textit{unigenitus}’, nor that his main source of awareness of ‘\textit{unigenitus}’ was a Latin translation of the 325 creed, which would be a Nicene source. As shown here, other sources of Augustine’s awareness of \textit{unigenitum} and \textit{unicus} are John (OL) and the Latin creeds, the former of which alternates between these words, the latter of which uses \textit{unicus}.

Augustine himself says that \textit{unigenitus} means \textit{unicus}, although he also offers other meanings. Given that both words have multiple and similar meanings and can be used to indicate something unique about the Son, my recommendation here is for translators to listen to Augustine’s understandings of \textit{unigenitus} as well as of \textit{unicus}. At least for Augustine’s early works, the meanings of \textit{unigenitus} and \textit{unicus} appear not to have had something to do with how the Son came into being as opposed to how created things do, but rather with other aspects of the Son’s uniqueness that are not about either creation or the Trinity. In other words, for Augustine these words were not about modes of origin, nor did they indicate

\footnote{Wright Doyle, ‘Augustine’s Sermonic Method’, \textit{Westminster Theological Journal}, 39, no. 2 (1977), 213-238 (pp. 220-221).}
something about the substance of the Father and Son, as was true in the Eunomian-Cappadocian controversies.

3.4 *Deus, creator omnium*: creation, beauty, Augustine himself, and the Trinity in Augustine’s *conf.*

Augustine began working on *conf.* in 397, about two years after having been named a bishop, and probably finished just after the turn of the century. So he ended *conf.* as he was beginning *The Trinity (Trin.)* and *Gn. litt.*, which I will examine in Chapter 4, and there is not a firm time division between some of his ideas in these works. However, there are significant differences in genre and the ways in which he expresses himself. While the final three books of *conf.* (XI-XIII) are among Augustine’s commentaries on Gen. 1, the topics they cover are not of primary interest in looking at creation and the Trinity, but where they are I will cite them either here or in Chapter 4.

As I introduced above, my analysis of *conf.* will focus on questions and ideas related to potential challenges to my dual hypotheses in Part II that Augustine makes inferences about economic trinitarian acts or the Trinity from his reflections on the nature of *all of creation*, and that he values the existence of, and attributes goodness and beauty to, all created things. Two questions I will address are whether Augustine changes his views on creation itself, especially its value or beauty, and whether he discourages study of the natural world. If changes had occurred, this would challenge my hypothesis that Augustine viewed creation, including its ontological and qualitative aspects, as a source of ideas about creation and the Trinity. Moreover, some scholars claim that Augustine’s ideas in

---

332 As noted above, he may have finished as late as 403.
334 As noted above, he began *Gn. litt.* perhaps around 401, just after beginning *Trin.*
335 As noted above, this question is related to my original arguments in Parts II and III.
336 As introduced above, this question is related to my original arguments in Parts II and III.

---

As C. Freeman, *The Closing of the Western Mind*, pp. 5, 277-278, 280-283, 286-288, 290-291. This quote is on the page before the Table of Contents and is attributed to Augustine but not to *conf.*
conf. show that he took an ‘inward’ turn toward the human soul at the expense of valuing all of creation, which Henry Chadwick says led Augustine, by the end of conf., to seek evidence of the Trinity in the soul, not in trinitarian acts of creation.

I cannot definitively demonstrate until Chapter 4 that Augustine continued to value the existence, goodness, and beauty of all creation, and to draw inferences about economic trinitarian acts of creation from all creation. What I will show in this analysis is that he still values the existence and beauty of created things in his reflections on creation and God or the Trinity, but his own feelings, temptations, and desires related to created things also are of concern to him. In other words, he introduces another element, Augustine himself, into his reflections on creation, both its beauty and its negative aspects, and God or the Trinity. This represents an ‘inward’ focus in addition to his continued outward focus on created things, and his responses to created things do not alter his views on their existence or value.

My discussion draws on some of Augustine’s many uses in conf. of Ambrose’s hymn ‘Deus, creator omnium’, which speaks of God as Creator of all things and as Trinity. Augustine cites or alludes to this hymn in conf., I-IX, in recounting his life until just after his baptism in 387, and we know that he knew of this hymn in the 386-387 period after his conversion and prior to his baptism. He also cites or uses words from the hymn in conf., X and conf., XI. Others have noted some

---

337 I discussed these criticisms in section 0.1 in the thesis introduction, and I noted them in the chapter introductory above. See Chadwick, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 117-118; Marrou, Saint Augustine, pp. 72-73; Scott MacDonald, ‘The Divine Nature’, pp. 72-73.

338 See Chadwick, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 117-118.

339 I will discuss these matters in major sections 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4.

340 As I noted above, the hymn’s final stanza is: ‘Christ and the Father we implore, / the Spirit of Christ and the Father, / unum potens per omnia, / as we pray, aid us, Trinity.’ As also discussed above, the translation of ‘unum potens per omnia’ preferred here is ‘one power in all things’. Walsh and Husch, pp. 10-13.

341 Augustine, conf., Books IV, X, 15; VI, 4, 5; IX, 6, 14; IX, 12, 32. See also Book V, 5, 9 (‘Domine creator omnium’) (CCSL 27, V 5 (9)), which could allude to Ambrose’s hymn or to 2 Macc. 1. 24 or both. As I noted above, a prayer is offered in 2 Macc. 1. 24 to ‘Domine Deus, omnium creator’ (‘O Lord God, creator of all things’). See 2 Macc. 1. 24 in Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol V, pp. 444-445.

342 As noted above in section 3.3.1, Augustine cites Ambrose’s hymn in late 386 or early 387 in his b. vita. Moreover, conf. is one of the witnesses to Ambrose’s introduction of hymns to his congregations in Milan in 386. See Augustine, b. vita, 4, 35; Augustine, conf., Book IX, 7, 15; see also McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, pp. 195, 200-201, 225-226.

343 See Book X, 34, 52. He also may allude to the hymn slightly later in X, 35, 57. There he
of these citations of the hymn in *conf.*, 345 and debate exists over why he introduces new themes in *conf.*, X-XIII, and whether *conf.* can be viewed as a whole. 346 However, scholars do not appear to have considered the idea that he uses the hymn as a theological ‘device’ to convey, implicitly, his belief that God, as Creator and Trinity, is the creator of all things, and to create theological unity among the threads of his narratives. 347 He also cites the hymn in sections that connect his ideas about creation and the Trinity that are of interest here and in Chapter 4.

In *conf.*, X, Augustine cites Ambrose’s hymn in talking about both music and the created world. He had been aware much earlier, before his baptism in 387, that psalms were sung in churches, 348 as were Ambrose’s hymns. Now, after having become a bishop, he leans in favor of singing psalms and hymns in church but he vacillates, and he wishes to be sure that he is not moved more by the music than by ‘the subject of the song’. 349 Despite his concerns, however, Harrison says that he clearly ‘loved’ music, 350 and it will be seen that this also applies to creation.

Augustine reveals some of his thinking about, and, as is relevant to *conf.*, his feelings about, created things, in discussing his concerns about the ‘pleasures of 

---

344 As I will note again, Augustine’s use in Book XI of the three words ‘Deus, creator omnium’, with their eight syllables, is similar to his use of these three words from the first ‘verse’ of Ambrose’s hymn in Augustine’s *mus.*, VI. Augustine, *conf.*, Book XI, xxvii, 35-38 (Chadwick); see also Augustine, *mus.*, Book VI, II.2; IX.23.

345 For example, some but not all of the citations or allusions of Ambrose’s hymn that are identified above are noted by Boulding and Chadwick in their annotations of *conf.*


347 Ambrose died on Easter Sunday in 397, the year Augustine began *conf.*, perhaps giving Augustine additional reasons for using Ambrose’s hymn in *conf.* On the date of Ambrose’s death, see McLynn, *Ambrose of Milan*, pp. 366-367.


the ear" and of ‘the eyes of my flesh’. He is worried that he likes things he can see, including ‘beautiful and varied forms’ [*pulchras formas et uarias*], which is significant in light of his earlier association of beauty with ‘form’ or differentiation in his ideas about triadic aspects of creation. He also likes ‘glowing and pleasant colours’, which he attributes to the sun, the ‘very queen of colours, which bathes with light all that we see’. He says that this ‘physical light’ works ‘by a seductive and dangerous sweetness to season the life of those who blindly love the world’. What one sees here, based on his descriptions, is that now the sun and the light are not simply beautiful or good things created by God / the Trinity (although he does acknowledge the goodness of the things *that he can see by the light* because they were ‘made’ by God and ‘are very good’). Now Augustine ascribes *other meanings* to the light, and by implication to the sun, that are not about their own existence or value, but about how he reacts to them. Augustine then alludes to Ambrose’s hymn and evidently to Ambrose himself when he says:

> But those who know how to praise you for it [the light], “God creator of all things” [*Deus, creator omnium*], include it in their hymn of praise to you, and are not led astray by it in a sleepy state.

Augustine does not explicitly say this, but the Creator / Trinity who *made all things* is the ‘subject’ of this hymn. Moreover, the hymn’s first stanza speaks of God as the creator who ‘dress[es] the day with its enhancing light’. So one can say that Augustine does not devalue the light or the sun, as created things, even

---

351 Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxiii, 49 (Chadwick).
352 Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxiv, 51 (Chadwick).
353 Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxiv, 51 (Chadwick) (CCSL 27, X, 33 (51)).
354 Augustine’s earlier ideas about beauty and ‘form’ or differentiation were related to the second of the triadic aspects of creation he postulated. The first aspect was ‘existence’ and the third ‘ordered abiding’. See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. See also Augustine, *Gn. adv. Man*, Book I, 16, 25-26; C. Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation*, pp. 38-40.
355 Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxiv, 51 (Chadwick) (CCSL 27, X, 33 (51)).
356 Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxiv, 52 (Chadwick).
357 Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxiv, 51 (Chadwick).
358 As Chadwick says, this hymn of Ambrose’s is also called his evening hymn, and the hymn ‘praises God for light by day and spiritual illumination by night’. See the translation of the hymn’s first stanza two notes below. Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxiv, 52 (Chadwick) (CCSL 27, X 33 (52)); Chadwick’s FN 36 (p. 210); see also Walsh and Husch, pp. 10-11.
359 The first three lines are: ‘O, God, creator of all things, / the heavens’ ruler, you who dress / the day with its enhancing light, / … ’ Walsh and Husch, pp. 10-11.
though he experiences temptations. But he is concerned that a person, notably himself, might not see God / the Trinity from creation, including from the beauty that was so important to him, if one gets distracted by the beauty itself.

These worries are reminiscent of what Augustine says in his retrospective views in *conf.*, IV, about the time before he abandoned Manichaeism.\(^{360}\) He writes:

For wherever the human soul turns itself, other than to you, it is fixed in sorrows, even if it is fixed upon beautiful things [*pulchris*] external to you and external to itself, which would nevertheless be nothing if they did not have their being from you [*nulla essent, nisi essent abs te*].\(^{361}\)

Augustine struggles with the fact that things come into existence, grow, die, and move toward ‘non-being’, but he acknowledges that God has ‘given’ creatures the ‘laws limiting their being’.\(^{362}\) He also observes that creatures ‘do not all have their being at the same moment’ but rather they have their being by ‘passing away’ and existing ‘by successiveness’, by which ‘they all form the whole of which they are parts’.\(^{363}\) In another example of his drawing on his ideas about human words in his thinking on creation and the Trinity, Augustine compares this to the way that human speech ‘would not be complete if one word did not cease to exist when it has sounded its constituent parts, so that it can be succeeded by another’.\(^{364}\)

Augustine then speaks of creation, God, and the word / Words of God, again separating out the existence (and transience) of created things themselves from

---

\(^{360}\) He abandoned Manichaeism two or three years before his return to Christianity in 386.

\(^{361}\) Augustine, *conf.*, Book IV, x, 15 (Chadwick) (CCSL 27, IV, 10, 15, 3-4).

\(^{362}\) Augustine, *conf.*, Book IV, x, 15 (Chadwick).

\(^{363}\) Augustine, *conf.*, Book IV, x, 15 (Chadwick).

\(^{364}\) Augustine later, in *conf.*, XI, experiments with the successiveness of the syllables of which human words are comprised in order to prove his points about how his mind can measure, through the capabilities of his memory, the length of syllables that have ‘ceased to sound’ and ‘gone into the past’. He uses the three words ‘*Deus, creator omnium*’, from the first line of Ambrose’s hymn, and he says these words have eight alternating ‘short and long’ syllables in Latin, which he can measure. This is similar to Augustine’s use of these three words from the first ‘verse’ of this hymn in *mus.*, VI, where he examines their rhythm and poetic form as they are sung. These examples are relevant to Augustine’s ideas about the successiveness of creaturesly existence as well as of words, and his ideas about both creation and music, and he uses Ambrose’s hymn as a device in both examples, as he does in the example above here from *conf.*, IV. These examples also are of note because of his ongoing explorations of human words and the word and Words of God, which will be discussed again in Chapter 4. See Augustine, *conf.*, Book IV, x, 15 (Chadwick); see also Book XI, xxvii, 35-38 (Chadwick); Augustine, *mus.*, Book VI, II.2; IX.23.
his feelings about them, and again citing Ambrose’s hymn. He writes:

Let these transient things be the ground on which my soul praises you [*Laudet te ex illis anima mea*] (Ps. 145: 2), ‘God creator of all’ [*deus, creator omnium*]. But let it not become stuck in them with love through the physical senses. For these things pass along the path of things that move towards non-existence. They rend the soul with pestilential desires ... it is not adequate to get a grip on things that are transient from the moment of their intended beginning to their intended end ... In your word [*In uerbo enim tuo*], through which they are created, they hear, ‘From here as far as there’ (Job 38. 11).365

Augustine is clear that he is moving from created things (*ex illis*) to God, and while he is not speaking explicitly of the Trinity he acknowledges the role of God’s ‘word’ in creation. This is not simply God’s speech but also the Word of God, given Augustine’s tacit reference to John 1. 1-3 in saying that transient things are created ‘through’ this word / Word. Here he is reading John 1: 1-3 with Job 38. 11, which is from a lengthy discourse on creation in Job.366 One might infer from his saying that transient things are made by God through the Word that these things are good, and he is clear in the quotes from *conf.*, IV that the transience and boundaries God set on created things are ‘given’ by God.

Augustine’s anxieties again are not about the existence, value, or goodness of created things, even their transience, which is part of God’s plan, but about temptations or desires he experiences. That his concerns about the transience and succession of creatures do not represent ongoing negative feelings toward creation on Augustine’s part can also be seen when he reprises these ideas in *Gn. litt*, in a section that might have been written just a few years after *conf*. There he says that this is how ‘the beautiful tapestry of the ages is woven’.367

The first of the above two quotes from *conf.*, IV might suggest that Augustine’s earlier ideas about creation had been focused on the soul. However, when one

---

365 Job 38. 11 (Vulgate) is a quotation of God speaking to Job about God’s creation of the sea and setting boundaries on it: ‘and I said, “Hitherto thou shalt come and shalt go no further, and here thou shalt break thy swelling waves.” ’. Augustine, *conf.*, Book IV, x, 15 (Chadwick) (CCSL 27, IV, 10, 15, 14-15; Chadwick’s FN 20 (p. 62); see also Edgar and Kinney, *The Vulgate Bible, Vol III*, pp. 130-131.

366 I cited Job 38 in my analysis in section 3.2.1.1 because Ambrose cites verses from this chapter in *hexaemeral* sermon. Job 38-41 is the longest passage about creation in the Bible outside of Gen. 1-3. See also Ambrose, ‘The Six Days of Creation’, Book I, 6, 22.

compares his statements in *conf.*, IV with what he says in *conf.*, X, also cited above, about how he was still attracted, after becoming a bishop, to the pleasures of the ear and eye, one sees that he is not turning to the soul at the expense of the created world, but is concerned with his ongoing struggles with the temptations of things in the world. Augustine, because of his own feelings, ascribes *additional layers of meaning* to created things, including music, beyond the facts of their existence or transience, both of which are ‘given’ to them by God through the Word. He thus adds *himself* into his reflections on creation and God / the Trinity.

The other question to be explored is whether Augustine discourages people from investigating nature, a criticism, as noted above, that stems largely from statements in *conf.*, X. He makes these statements in two sections that lie between the section just examined in which he cites ‘*Deus, creator omnium*’, and a slightly later section in which he makes a possible allusion to this hymn. He does speak against ‘a vain inquisitiveness dignified with the title of knowledge and science’ that occurs when people ‘study the operations of nature that lie beyond our grasp’ and ‘simply desire knowledge for its own sake’. When these statements are abstracted from the primary topics upon which he is reflecting, it would appear that he discouraged investigations of the natural world.

However, a close reading of the sections in question in their context shows that Augustine was discussing the opposite or obverse side of beauty, what he calls the ‘contraries’ of the ‘delights’ or ‘pleasures’ associated with seeing or pursuing beautiful things. He speaks of ‘curiosities’ and ‘another form of temptation’, to add to those temptations discussed above involved with the love of music or of

---

368 As noted earlier, the criticisms come from Freeman, who extracted some of Augustine’s statements from *conf.*, Book X, xxxv (54-55) to create a large quote that Freeman uses on the page before his Table of Contents. C. Freeman, *The Closing of the Western Mind*.
369 See Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxv (54-55) (Chadwick).
370 See Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxv (52).
371 As I noted earlier, Augustine may be alluding to Ambrose’s ‘*Deus, creator omnium*’ when he refers to God as ‘the marvellous [sic] Creator and orderer of all things [*creatorem mirificum atque ordinatorem rerum omnium*]’. The ideas are clearly similar. Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxv, 57 (Chadwick) (CCSL 27, X 35 (57)).
374 Augustine, *conf.*, Book X, xxxv (54).
beautiful colors, and he speaks of many types of temptations. Yet Augustine’s examples are not just about things themselves but about morbid or lurid curiosities (e.g., looking at a ‘mangled corpse’). This can be seen in his discussion of his own fascination when creatures are predators of others (e.g., lizards and spiders each in their own way capturing flies), or animals are being pursued in a ‘hunt’, which are examples of creatures harming each other or of the negative aspects of nature. Augustine says that when he becomes distracted by these things, he moves in his reflections from these things to thinking about ‘the marvellous [sic] Creator and orderer of all things’. While that move supports the premise here that he moves from creation to Trinity in his thinking, the problems are that this ‘was not how [his] attention first began’, and that the negative sides of creaturely existence fascinated or attracted him for the wrong reasons. Again Augustine has inserted himself into his thinking about creation and God / the Trinity.

If this were not true, and Augustine was now against investigating the created world, this too would have affected the premise that among his sources for his reflections on creation and the Trinity were created things themselves. This includes the triadic and ontological aspects of nature he postulates, and from which he makes inferences about trinitarian acts. It also includes the earlier interest he had shown about the order, successions, and cycles of the seasons, celestial bodies, and time in the world and universe. This is reflected in his retrospective views, in conf., V, about turning away from the incorrect scientific ideas held by

---

375 See Augustine, conf., Book X, xxxv (54) – xxxvii (61).
376 Augustine, conf., Book X, xxxv (55-57).
377 In section 4.3 in Chapter 4, it will be seen that he takes different views on these facts of life about creatures harming each other. Here see Augustine, conf., Book X, xxxv (57).
378 This is his probable allusion to ‘Deus, creator omnium’ cited above, but using different terminology. Augustine, conf., Book X, xxxv (57).
379 Augustine, conf., Book X, xxxv (57).
380 See sections 3.2. and 3.3 above and sections 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4.
381 Augustine expresses these interests in sol., dated to late 386. Possible sources for his early ideas about these matters in sol. include another of Ambrose’s hymns, ‘Aeterne rerum conditor’. The hymn’s opening lines are: ‘Eternal founder of the world [Aeterne rerum conditor], / who rule the night and day, and give / the seasons their established times …’. (These lines may be based on Ps. 135. 7-9.) Augustine, sol., Book I, 1, 4; Walsh and Husch, pp. 2-3; see also Edgar and Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol III, pp. 780-781.
382 Augustine, conf., Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (Chadwick).
Manichaean ideas, where he acknowledges that many philosophers were able to ‘verify’ such matters through their observations.383

It is fair to acknowledge that Augustine does not value scientific pursuits in their own right. In conf., V, he also criticises philosophers who knew ‘many things that are true’ about the created world but who did not seek, find, or know ‘the artificer of creation [creaturae artificem]’,384 or who neglected the God who has ‘disposed everything “by measure and number and weight”’, a reference to Wis. 11. 21.385 Here he alludes to Rom. 1. 21-25, which criticises those who study nature without knowing or honoring God,386 and likely also to Wis. 13. 1-5, which conveys similar ideas.387 I argued above that he may have been alluding to Wis. 13. 1-5 in his earlier Gn. adv. Man.388 In my analysis of his fifth century works, I will show that he will use the more positive Rom. 1. 20 (as compared to Rom. 1. 21-25), sometimes with Wis. 13. 1-5, to argue that one can see something about God or the Trinity from creation.389 If I am right about his allusions to Wis. 13. 1-5

383 Augustine also mentions ‘heretics’ who ‘deceive by false promises of reason and science’, who are most likely Manichaeans, in the final section of mus., VI (this section may be an epilogue added after he initial wrote mus.). Augustine, conf., Book V, iii (3-4) (Chadwick); see also Augustine, mus., Book VI, XVII.59.
384 Augustine, conf., Book V, iii (5) (CCSL 27, V 3 (5)) (Chadwick). See also all of Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (Chadwick).
385 Augustine, conf., Book V, iv (7) (Chadwick).
386 Chadwick identifies Augustine’s allusions to Rom. 1. 21-25. See Augustine, conf., Book V, iii (5) and all of Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (Chadwick). On Rom. 1. 20-25, see Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol VI, pp. 792-795.
387 Augustine’s use of ‘the artificer of creation [creaturae artificem]’ is a clue that he may have had Wis. 13. 1-5 in mind, which is similar to Rom. 1. 20-25. I proposed in section 3.2.1 that he may have been alluding to Wis. 13. 1-5 in Gn. adv. Man., and my analysis in section 3.2.1.1 shows that affinities exist between Augustine’s and Philo’s ideas and Wis. 13. 1-5. In section 2.4.3 in Chapter 2, I showed that Basil also evidently draws on Wis. 13. 1-5. This passage criticises those who did not know or see the ‘artifex’ from the ‘good things’ that can be seen or by ‘attending to [God’s] works’ [operibus adtendentes’], or who did not acknowledge the beauty of the creator from the beauty of creation. Augustine refers to Wis. 11. 21 in the passage from conf. cited here and in the passage from Gn. adv. Man. where he alludes to Wis. 13. 1-5. See Augustine, conf., Book V, iii (5) and all of Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (Chadwick); Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 16, 25-26 (Hill) (BA 50, pp. 214-217). On Wis. 13. 1-5, see Edgar and Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol III, pp. 804-805; Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, pp. 708-709.
388 See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1 above.
389 As just noted above, that Augustine often relies on Rom. 1. 20 and the similar Wis. 13. 1-5 in his mature works will be one of my major lines of argument in Chapter 4. See my discussion of these two passages in section 4.1.1.
in his earlier work, this represents another scriptural passage that he draws upon throughout his career that influenced his theology of creation and the Trinity.

Augustine’s perspectives on not acquiring knowledge of the natural world for its own sake do support my hypothesis that he moves from creation to the Trinity in his reflections, and was still doing so in conf., X. He conveys this in his reflections examined above in which he reinforces his ideas by his use of Ambrose’s ‘Deus, creator omnium’. In fact, the appropriate movement is from seeing and knowing things about creation to seeing and trying to understand things about God / the Trinity, and other pursuits of knowledge about creation seem to hold little value for him. He is theological here, and he desires to focus on the ‘subject’ of creation rather than enjoying or investigating creation in its own right. However, he does not devalue creation even as he acknowledges the desires or temptations he himself experiences in examining both its beauty and the obverse side of beauty.

These assessments of criticisms that have been raised about Augustine’s ideas in conf. were necessary both to ‘test’ whether my hypotheses in this chapter hold, and as preparation for my analysis of his fifth century ideas about creation and the Trinity to be undertaken in Chapter 4. I will argue there that Augustine continues to reflect on the created world and to make inferences about the Trinity from creation itself, including triadic aspects he postulates in, and the goodness and beauty he ascribes to, created things. He also will deal in very different, and more positive, ways with the questions of why animals harm each other than he did in his reflections in conf. on the negative aspects of creation.\(^{390}\)

It is important to examine Augustine’s conf. because it is an accessible work often cited by historical scholars and doctrinal theologians. However, contrary to some claims, his ideas in conf. are not a reversal of his earlier theology, but represent an ‘interlude’ between his earlier ideas and his fifth century ideas. He does indeed develop new ideas and he adds himself to his reflections on creation and God / the Trinity, but these developments do not take the place of his ongoing reflections on creation, trinitarian acts of creation, and the Trinity.

---

\(^{390}\) See section 4.3 in Chapter 4.
3.5 Conclusions

As I stated earlier, my hypotheses for Chapters 3 and 4 are twofold: first, that Augustine makes inferences about trinitarian acts of creation and the Trinity from his reflections on all of creation (specifically, on theological, scriptural, ontological, and philosophical matters related to creation); and, secondly, that he valued the existence of, and ascribes goodness and beauty to, all created things. Without falsely over-systematising his early thought, I sought to give his ideas more structure: for example, I characterised the triadic aspects of creation he posits as ‘existence’, ‘differentiation’, and ‘ordered abiding’, using terminology original to this thesis.\textsuperscript{391} In this concluding section, I will provide additional structure by analysing the above material as being theological, scriptural, ontological, or philosophical (although overlaps exist between these categories). I also will identify problems Augustine leaves on the table and opportunities he places on the table, whether for his own later works or for ‘fruitful’ appropriations to be proposed in Chapter 5.

3.5.1 Theology

In this chapter, I showed that Augustine drew upon the principle of creation ‘out of nothing’. However, Augustine’s ideas differ from those of the other Christians whose works I examined in Part I, because in his anti-Manichaean arguments he draws on this principle in conjunction with the principle that God is omnipotent, a tenet of the Latin creeds. This leads Augustine to argue, in multiple places, that clear distinctions exist between created nature and the nature of God, although he often discusses these ideas in contexts where he is not explicitly trinitarian. He also draws on creation ‘out of nothing’ and God’s omnipotence in arguing that God created ‘all’ natures and ‘all’ things, and he expresses this in a combination of scriptural, Christian, and classical Latin terminology by using both ‘omnia’ and ‘cuncta’ to refer to ‘all’ things or ‘all’ in general.\textsuperscript{392}

Augustine’s ideas here may have been a reaction to the Manichaean belief that

\textsuperscript{391} See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 and Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{392} See my discussion of ‘omnia’ and ‘cuncta’ in section 3.3.1 in the analysis of Augustine’s s. 214. As cited there, ‘omnia’ is found in John 1. 3 and Wis. 11. 21, and in Ambrose’s hymn ‘Deus, creator omnium’. The word ‘cuncta’ appears in Augustine’s works and in Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura.
human beings shared in the lightness or substance of the 'good god', although this is only conjecture. He does indicate that there was only one first principle and creator of all things, which would be an anti-Manichaean position taken against their dualistic views of goodness and evil. He also was likely defending belief in creation 'out of nothing' against the belief held by some philosophers that 'creation' was the forming of pre-existing matter. However, as I showed above, one of his primary concerns was to reconcile Wis. 11. 18, which says that God created out of unformed material, with Gen. 1. 1-2, which can be read to indicate otherwise.

Augustine, in one of his early works, indicates that he knew the principle of the inseparable operation of the Trinity, which Ayres deems to be one of the three key principles of pro-Nicene theologies, and which I argue he likely learned about it from Ambrose’s catechetical teaching. My analysis has shown, however, that Augustine tends to rely more on the idea that God or the Trinity created everything simultaneously, which Augustine apparently bases in Sir. 18. 1. The concept of simultaneous creation underlies his early interpretations of Gen. 1. 1-2, and some of his reflections on triadic aspects of creation and the unity or simultaneous nature of economic trinitarian acts.

Another of the theological principles that Augustine 'should' have understood, whether according to Ayres and Barnes or Augustine’s modern critics, is that a balance needs to exist between unity and distinction in trinitarian acts. Augustine is not explicit about this, but his assertion that triadic aspects of created things must hold simultaneously, and the inferences he explicitly or implicitly makes from these aspects to the simultaneous acts of the Persons of the Trinity in creation, suggest that Augustine was already balancing unity and distinctions at this stage, possibly to a degree previously unacknowledged by his commentators.

In this chapter I have also shown that Augustine knew, in his first commentary on Gen. 1, that the Son could not have been made, nor could the Son have come ‘from nothing’, and this represents a blend of Nicene ideas about the differences

---

393 This Manichaean belief, and their other relevant ideas, were discussed in section 3.1.1.
394 On his ideas on there being only one first principle, see sections 3.2.1, 3.3.1, and 3.3.2.
395 See Augustine, ep. 11, 2 and section 3.2.2 above.
396 See sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, and 3.3.2. See also Appendix B.
between things that are begotten and those which are created. These ideas, as I discussed, also are reflected in the mid-fourth century writings of Athanasius, although no evidence was offered above that Augustine was aware of Athanasius’s ideas. Moreover, Augustine later added his own ideas about the difference between human words that are manufactured and the begetting of the Son.

I also clarified the breadth of Augustine’s understanding of what ‘unigenitus’ and ‘unicus’ meant; that is that ‘unigenitus’, which he says means ‘unicus’, may not necessarily have referred to the way in which the Son came into being or his mode of origin. If ‘unigenitus’ had only indicated something about the Son’s being begotten, this would have represented a connection between principles about creation and those about the Trinity such as those involved in the Eunomian-Cappadocian controversies over differences in nature between the ‘unbegotten’ one and the one who is ‘begotten’. However, Augustine’s own understanding of unigenitus and unicus shows that he knew of other ways in which the Son was unique, and some of these ideas are represented in Athanasius’s works as well as Latin Christian writings from the mid-fourth century and earlier.

Another major conclusion of this chapter is that even though Augustine offered many ideas about the roles of the Holy Spirit in acts of creation, he was not decisive on these roles at this stage of his career. He did, however, write about these roles. Of greatest significance, both for my examinations of his historical theological ideas and my proposals for fruitful readings of his ideas today, are the various ways in which he depicts the Spirit’s roles in acts of creation that resulted in creatures having the capability of ‘ordered abiding’ (a characteristic which will become ‘dynamic abiding’ in his fifth century works). In Chapter 4, I also will show that, despite his uncertainties in his fourth century commentaries on Genesis,

398 See section 3.3.2 and Augustine, *f. et symb.*, 3, 3-4 (Campbell).
399 See the case study in section 3.3.4. See also section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.
400 See the case study in section 3.3.4.
401 I observed this in my analysis of *Gn. adv. Man.*, of Augustine’s varying ideas about the roles of the Spirit in acts of creation that resulted in triadic aspects of creation, of his commentaries on the creeds, and of his multiple answers to his questions in *Gn. litt. imp.* See sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.
402 See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 and also Appendix B.
he very much understood the Spirit to be involved in acts of initial creation, which resulted in triadic aspects of existence, in his mature readings of Gen. 1.403

However, among the theological problems that Augustine leaves on the table at this stage is that he had not yet worked through his ideas about creation and the Holy Spirit, and hence also his ideas about creation and the Trinity. Augustine does offer formulaic statements about the Holy Spirit being involved in creation.404 But his varying ideas on the role of the Spirit in bringing about triadic aspects of creation, and his uncertainty over whether Gen. 1. 1-2 includes the work of the Holy Spirit (even though the text mentions the Spirit of God), show that he was not able to back up this principle with his own theological ideas. Even in the final book of conf. he says he takes it on faith, because he believes God is a Trinity, that the Holy Spirit was involved in creation when he reads Gen. 1. 1-2.405 Moreover, his fourth century ideas about creation and the Trinity were more about economic trinitarian acts of creation than the immanent Trinity. This is not necessarily a limitation in his theological reflections, but it does suggest that scholars should give more attention to his views on trinitarian acts of creation in this period.

3.5.2 Scripture

One of my primary arguments in these chapters on Augustine is that his use of the scriptures as sources for his theological ideas about creation and the Trinity should be given more attention by scholars. In this chapter I demonstrated that when he embarked on his earliest writings on creation and the Trinity he was aware of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wis. 11, and possibly Wis. 13. 1-5. Augustine is not unique in reading Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 together, as my analysis in prior chapters shows, but his reliance on Wisdom distinguishes him to an extent from others.

On the other hand, I demonstrated that some of Augustine’s ideas may have had precedent in Philo’s works, which were contemporaneous with the book of Wisdom, and in Basil’s hexaemeral homilies.406 I showed that Philo and Basil (and Ambrose) were aware of the concepts of God’s measuring, numbering, and

403 See major section 4.2 in Chapter 4.
404 See Augustine, vera rel., 7, 13; Gn. litt. imp., 1, 2; conf., Book XIII, v (6) (Chadwick).
405 Augustine, conf., Book XIII, v (6) (Chadwick).
406 See my analysis in section 3.2.1.1.
weighing things, which, for Augustine, come from Augustine's reading of Wis. 11. 21. I also showed that Philo, Basil, and Augustine argued that people can move from seeing both the beauty of creation and some of its other attributes (e.g., its order for Philo; its greatness for Basil; and its triadic aspects for Augustine) to seeing something about God, the Creator. The concept that one can move from reflecting on the beauty, power, and greatness of creation to seeing the beauty and other attributes of God, the Creator, is expressed in Wis. 13. 1-5. I had shown earlier that Basil was most likely alluding to both Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 in his hexaemeral homilies.\textsuperscript{407} I suggested above that Augustine may have been alluding to Wis. 13. 1-5 in \textit{Gn. adv. Man.}, and he also may have been alluding to this passage in \textit{conf.} where he draws on Rom. 1. 21-25.\textsuperscript{408} In Chapter 4, I will show that his use of both Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 his fifth century works influenced his theological ideas about creation and the Trinity.\textsuperscript{409} Here it is significant that Augustine’s use of the triad of measure, number, and weight from Wis. 11. 20, and his likely allusions to Wis. 13. 1-5, may be somewhat original to Augustine, because he uses these verses in developing his ideas about creation and the Trinity. But both Philo and Basil were aware of these concepts expressed in Wis. 11. 20/21 and Wis. 13. 1-5.

In illustrating Augustine’s exegetical methods as well as his early knowledge of the scriptures, I demonstrated that he read Wis. 11. 18 (which says that God created out of unformed or unseen material) with Gen. 1. 1-2, and he also, at times, read these two passages with Sir. 18. 1 (which says that God created all things together or simultaneously).\textsuperscript{410} His correlation of the meaning of these verses resulted in his positing ideas about God’s simultaneous creation of matter and form, and also about simultaneous trinitarian acts of creation. His method of reconciling scriptural passages about creation in his early works is a precursor to the robust method he will employ of correlating passages about creation in the fifth century. I proposed above that Augustine adopted this method in responding to

\textsuperscript{407} See section 2.3.4 in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{408} See section 3.4 and Augustine, \textit{conf.}, Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (Chadwick).
\textsuperscript{409} I will argue and demonstrate this throughout Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{410} I offered examples above. See also Appendix A.
Manichaean criticisms of scriptures that appeared to conflict in what they say about creation and acts of the Persons of the Trinity in creation.\textsuperscript{411}

\subsection*{3.5.3 Ontology}

In this chapter, I demonstrated that Augustine bases his belief that creation itself and all creatures are both good and beautiful in part on the scriptures. But these also are attributes associated with their being – and hence with ontological matters. Among the grounds for Augustine’s ideas about goodness and beauty that I identified were his anti-Manichaean stances; his readings of Gen. 1; his likely allusions to Wis. 13. 1-5; and other influences, including Platonist ideas.\textsuperscript{412} I also argued, in my analysis of \textit{conf.}, that Augustine had not changed his position on these matters, despite the arguments of some scholars to the contrary.\textsuperscript{413}

Augustine’s ontological ideas about triadic aspects of creation, some based on the concepts of measure, number, and weight from Wis. 11. 21 and others which he developed in reflecting on existence, differentiation, and ‘ordered abiding’, are among his most ‘fruitful’ fourth century ideas for exploration in Chapter 5. He is not systematic, but he suggests that creatures were given some agency and capability for existing on their own, in addition to other ‘gifts’ they were ‘given’ through trinitarian acts of creation. The evidence of this chapter suggests that these ideas are very much Augustine’s own, although there were some precedents in Philo’s ideas.\textsuperscript{414} Augustine was not doing natural theology. He was not arguing, by analogy, from triadic aspects of creation to triadic aspects of the Trinity. The inferences he makes about trinitarian acts in his reflections on triadic aspects of creation are among the richest ways he writes about the Trinity in the fourth century, and they are grounded in ontological ideas, some scriptures, and Augustine’s own independent thinking.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[411] See section 3.1.1.
\item[412] See my analysis in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.1.1. Some of the Platonist influences on beauty were identified by Carol Harrison in her analysis of Augustine’s ideas about the association of beauty with form as well as existence.
\item[413] See section 3.4.
\item[414] See sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, and 3.2.2. See also Appendix B.
\end{footnotes}
3.5.4 Taking broader views of Augustine’s sources

Finally, although Augustine’s early sources are of great interest in scholarly debates, particularly his Platonist sources, it is difficult to establish some of his sources. Thus I exercised caution in identifying areas of affinity between his ideas and those of others, while I also suggested areas that warrant further research.

As I demonstrated, Augustine draws on the scriptures as primary sources for his theological ideas about creation and God or the Trinity, and some of his ideas hold similarities to those of Philo and Basil in their hexaemeral or other works. He evidently also was influenced by the catechetical instruction he received from Ambrose and Ambrose’s hymn ‘Deus, creator omnium’. Moreover, he used Latin creeds and OL translations of the scriptures.

My analysis emphasised these sources because they are often overlooked by scholars who are more interested in Augustine’s pro-Nicene Latin sources or his philosophical sources for his trinitarian theology. I also acknowledged above that Augustine’s ideas were influenced by Platonist ideas, but my contribution was to show that other sources were more significant for his ideas about creation and the Trinity, and hence important sources for studying his trinitarian theology.

---

415 On affinities between Augustine’s and Basil’s ideas, see section 3.3.3. On Basil’s ideas, see also section 2.3 in Chapter 2. See Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 5, 19 (Hill) (BA 50, p. 426); Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 3, 2; Homily 3, 4; Homily 6, 2; Homily 9, 6
416 This was noted at various points above.
417 See especially the analysis of conf. in section 3.4, but also the citations of mus., VI.
Chapter 4: Augustine in the Fifth Century: From Triadic Aspects and Attributes of Creation to Trinitarian Acts and the Trinity

Introduction

In this second of the two chapters in Part II, my analysis moves to Augustine’s fifth century ideas and mature works. As in Chapter 3, my hypotheses are that Augustine draws inferences about economic trinitarian acts of creation or the Trinity from his reflections on *all of creation*, and that he values the existence of, and ascribes goodness and beauty to, all created things. My analysis also will continue to focus on his theological, scriptural, ontological, and philosophical sources for his ideas about creation and the Trinity. I will argue that by employing the lens of looking at his theology of creation, and beginning with his ideas about economic trinitarian acts, it is possible to offer insights into his mature trinitarian theology that are not uncovered by scholars who focus mainly on his ideas about the immanent Trinity. Thus, I will ‘begin’ with his *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* (*Gn. litt*),¹ as opposed to the common habit of ‘beginning’ with *The Trinity* (*Trin.*).²

I will support my hypotheses by analysing the inferences Augustine makes about trinitarian acts of initial creation and triadic aspects of creation from scriptural texts about creation, and I will give particular attention to the influences of his exegetical methods on his theology. I also will demonstrate the effects of

triadic aspects of creatures, which include the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’, on the ability of creatures to seek to maintain their ongoing existence, according to Augustine’s commentaries on Genesis. I will give some attention to Augustine’s ideas about triadic functions in the human mind and analogies he makes to the immanent Trinity. However, my main analysis of his thinking on the immanent Trinity will focus on his views on divine simplicity, substance, attributes, and acts. I will argue that even though he draws distinctions between created nature and the nature of the Trinity because of his views on simplicity, he also offers possibilities for further research on the attributes of the Trinity. This is especially true for the attributes of goodness and beauty that he ascribes to both creation and the Trinity.

This chapter also serves as a ‘bridge’ chapter to Part III. In my analysis, I will compare Augustine’s mature thinking to his own earlier thought and to the earlier ideas of others, drawing on prior chapters from Parts I and II. I also will identify areas of his theology that will be relevant to my proposals in Part III for how his ideas can be read in ‘fruitful’ ways by theologians and other scholars today.3

My analysis in this chapter will focus on passages from Augustine’s Gn. litt, his homilies on the Gospel of John (Jo. ev. tr.),4 The City of God (civ. Dei),5 and Trin., and I will supplement these passages with ideas from his sermons on two creation psalms (Ps. 103 [104] and Ps. 148),6 other sermons,7 and some letters.8 As I

3 The concept of ‘fruitful’ readings of patristic works will be discussed in Chapter 5.
6 Citations of sermons in en. Ps. use Cameron’s method. The numbering of Ps. 9-147 was one lower than today. So ‘en. Ps., 103.4.1’ refers to the first section of his fourth sermon on his Ps. 103 (our 104). Michael Cameron, ‘Enarrationes in Psalmos’, in AttA, pp. 290-296 (290); Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, trans. and notes by Maria Boulding and ed. by John E. Rotelle, with a general introduction by Michael Fiedrowicz, WSA, vol III / 15 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2000-2002); Expositions of the Psalms, trans. and notes by Maria Boulding and ed. by John E. Rotelle, WSA, vol III / 16-18 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2000-2002); Expositions of the Psalms, trans. and notes by Maria Boulding and ed. by Boniface
noted earlier, Augustine evidently began working on some of these texts as he was finishing his *Confessions (conf.),*\(^9\) which he may not have finished until 403.\(^{10}\) This means that there is not a firm division between his late fourth century and early fifth century ideas. Moreover, he wrote some of these treatises, sermons,\(^{11}\) and letters in parallel with each other, and they would have been mutually-informing sources of ideas for him, as they are for those studying his works. Augustine worked on *Trin.* from about 400 to 420,\(^{12}\) and started working on *Gn. litt* shortly after beginning

---


Trin., ending by 415 or 416.\(^{13}\) His first three homilies on John, which cover the prologue, were delivered in 406 and 407,\(^{14}\) and he was preparing all these homilies for publication in 419.\(^{15}\) He may have started civ. Dei in 412, and he finished in the early 420s.\(^{16}\) While the dating of most of his sermons in en. Ps. is unknown,\(^{17}\) he delivered some of them in an alternating series with his early homilies on John in late 406 and 407,\(^{18}\) and he had completed them all by 418 to 422.\(^{19}\)

This chapter comprises five major sections. I will draw on Augustine’s works identified above in multiple places in my analysis, but the general movement in each section and in the chapter overall will be from Gn. litt to Trin.

In Section 4.1, I will briefly discuss the historical, geographical, and polemical contexts for Augustine’s fifth century reflections on creation and the Trinity. Here I will propose that Augustine’s increased use of Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5 in his

---


\(^{15}\) In a letter discovered by Divjak and written in 419, Augustine says he was spending Saturday and Sunday evenings dictating his tractates on John to send to Carthage for publication. Augustine, ep. 23A*, 3, in WSA, vol II / 4; Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, new edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 467-468; see also Fitzgerald, ‘Introduction’ to Homilies on the Gospel of John, pp. 31-33.


\(^{17}\) Augustine’s sermons in en. Ps. on the psalms through his Ps. 32 (Ps. 33 today) are dated to shortly after his 391 ordination, although Fiedrowicz says he later ‘revisited’ these psalms. See Michael Cameron, ‘Enarrationes in Psalms’, in AttA, pp. 290-296 (pp. 290-291); Fiedrowicz, ‘General Introduction’, Expositions of the Psalms, pp. 14-15; Andrew Louth, ‘“Heart in Pilgrimage”: St Augustine as Interpreter of the Psalms’, in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. by Aristotle Papanikolaou and George E. Demacopoulos (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), pp. 291-304 (p. 294).


\(^{19}\) Cameron offers 418 as the end date, and Fiedrowicz 421-422. Louth says Augustine gave a third of these sermons in 412. Michael Cameron, ‘Enarrationes in Psalms’, pp. 290-291; Fiedrowicz, ‘General Introduction’, Expositions of the Psalms, pp. 15-16; Louth, ‘“Heart in Pilgrimage”’, p. 294.
mature works, particularly after the fall of Rome, may represent an attempt to offer a ‘bridge’ between philosophical and theological ideas about creation and the Trinity. I also will discuss Augustine’s key scriptures and his exegetical method of correlating scriptures, which, as I will subsequently demonstrate, significantly influenced his mature ideas about creation and the Trinity.

My analysis in Section 4.2 will focus on four areas of Augustine’s theological ideas about creation and the Trinity that are grounded in his readings of Gen. 1 with John 1. 1-3 and other scriptures. Firstly, I will discuss Augustine’s concept of the word that ‘abides within’ and the analogies he draws between human words and the Word or words of God, and I will argue that his explorations of these analogies began with his interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3. Secondly, I will show that Augustine attributes differentiated roles in acts of initial creation to God / the Father, the Word / Son, and the Holy Spirit that result in triadic aspects of existence, while he also depicts unity of operation among the Trinity. I define these triadic aspects as ‘formless existence’, ‘differentiated existence’, and ‘perfected existence’. Thirdly, I will demonstrate the importance of the ontological aspects Augustine posits in creation, especially the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’, which he associates with the Holy Spirit, and the attributes of goodness and beauty he ascribes to creation and the Trinity in economic acts. Fourthly, I will show how Augustine’s exegetical method of correlating scriptures enables him to posit roles in creation for the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in ways that have been overlooked by some scholars. However, Augustine’s method also results in his suggesting roles in creation for angels and other entities that complicate his trinitarian theology even if they have some precedent in the earlier works of others.

In Section 4.3, I will analyse areas of Augustine’s reflections on triadic aspects of creation that do not receive much scholarly attention: the effects that triadic and ontological aspects of creation have on creaturely existence. I will demonstrate that the capability that I call ‘dynamic abiding’, using an original label to describe

\(^{20}\) I summarise Augustine’s views on these triadic aspects of creation and the acts of the Trinity in Appendix B.

\(^{21}\) I introduced the label ‘dynamic abiding’, which is original to this thesis, in section 3.2.1 and discussed it briefly in section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3.
ideas that Augustine discusses in *Gn. litt* and *civ. Dei*, gives all creatures some agency in desiring and seeking to continue their own existence. This capability, I will argue, is an ontological gift ‘given’ by or ‘left’ with creatures as a result of trinitarian acts of creation.\(^{22}\) Moreover, it is related to God’s work of providence, using Augustine’s terminology, by which God ‘set up natures in order for them to be [‘ut sint’].\(^{23}\) Thus it is a gift specifically about creation and ongoing existence, by contrast to other gifts given through economic trinitarian acts that are related to other types of providence or to salvation or other doctrinal matters.

In section 4.4, my analysis moves to the immanent Trinity and will be based on the final book of Augustine’s *Trin.*, supplemented by ideas from other parts of *Trin.*, *civ. Dei*, and his sermons. I will ask whether Augustine thinks that something can be inferred about the Trinity from triadic functions of the human mind. However, I will address this question as he himself addresses it in *Trin.*, XV: in the context of examining his ideas about simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations within the Trinity. In light of the lens I am using of looking at Augustine’s ideas about the Trinity in light of his creation theology, I will give significant attention to the attributes of the Trinity, especially goodness and beauty. I will be able to demonstrate, at this point, based on my analysis in this chapter, that Augustine associates these attributes with creation, with the Persons in acts of creation, and with the Persons and the Trinity as a whole within the immanent Trinity.

Section 4.5 will serve as the chapter conclusion. As part of my summative analysis, I will identify opportunities that Augustine places ‘on the table’ for fruitful application or further research.

My lens of beginning with Augustine’s ideas about creation and trinitarian acts of creation, and moving to his ideas about the immanent Trinity, represents a distinction in my approach to analysing his mature trinitarian theology. Lewis Ayres examines some of the passages from Augustine’s works that I will analyse, but he

---

\(^{22}\) As I will show in section 4.3, Augustine uses the terminology of creatures having been given or ‘left with’ some ontological agency or capabilities.

\(^{23}\) Italics added. As I will discuss in section 4.3, he distinguishes this work of providence from ‘that other [work of providence] by which he administers as he may wish the natures he established as he wished’. Augustine, *Gn. litt*, Book IX, 18, 33 (BA 49, p. 140).
moves in the more typical direction of looking at Augustine’s ideas about creation in light of his trinitarian ideas or his Trin. Scott Dunham’s work, which Ayes cites, also moves in that direction, and Dunham focusses more on Augustine’s ideas about the immanent Trinity than trinitarian acts. However, Dunham’s analysis of Gn. litt supports my arguments, and he also acknowledges the significance of the scriptures and the ‘Catholic’ faith as sources for Augustine’s ideas. My analysis also draws on the works of other patristic scholars and doctrinal scholars, and I will address some of Colin Gunton’s specific criticisms of Augustine’s theologies of creation and of the Trinity.

One of Gunton’s general criticisms is that Augustine was too philosophical and not scriptural enough. In this chapter I will argue that neither Gunton, nor Ayres and Michel Barnes, gives enough emphasis to the scriptures as key sources of Augustine’s theological ideas. I will argue, as I did for his earlier works, that Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity, especially about trinitarian acts of creation, are deeply indebted to his knowledge of and exegesis of the scriptures. I also will show that his ideas have affinities with those of Basil of Caesarea and Philo of Alexandria in their hexaemeral and other works, and that evidence exists that Augustine was drawing on Basil at times in his fifth century works.

My analysis also contributes to Augustine scholarship by demonstrating some of the roles Augustine posits for the Holy Spirit in trinitarian acts of creation, and by showing that one has to look beyond his pro-Nicene arguments to his hexaemeral or other commentaries on scripture to see these roles. Barnes, for example, states that although Augustine discusses the Spirit’s role as ‘Creator’ in his early works, Augustine does not seem to have understood the significance of this role for pro-Nicene or anti-Homoian pneumatology until late in his career. However, as I argue in Chapters 3 and 4, Augustine posits various roles for the Spirit throughout

---

27 See section 0.1 in the thesis introduction for Gunton’s criticisms of Augustine.
his earlier and later works. Some of these roles also appear in *hexaemeral* or other works by Basil, Ambrose, and Jerome, which is another way, besides being pro-Nicene, that Augustine is aligned with orthodox / catholic ideas. In this chapter I will demonstrate that his fifth century ideas about the Spirit’s roles in creation are much more developed than those even in his late fourth century works – but this does not mean that he had no theology of the Spirit in creation before this. With their focus on Augustine’s pro-Nicene ideas or arguments, some commentators are missing the other ways in which Augustine writes about the Spirit which support his theologies of both creation and the Trinity.

Given my own focus on Augustine’s scriptural and ontological sources for his theological ideas about creation and the Trinity, it might be argued, in turn, that I am not paying enough attention to his other theological sources (e.g., pro-Nicene ideas or texts) or his philosophical sources (e.g., Neoplatonist ideas). However, I am not discounting the importance of these sources or influences on his trinitarian theology. Rather, I have identified a gap in current scholarship on Augustine’s mature theology that I am trying to fill with a focus on the scriptural, and especially *hexaemeral*, influences on his thinking about trinitarian acts and the Trinity. As I have shown, *hexaemeral* works themselves draw on scriptural, theological, and philosophical ideas, so they are not free from philosophical influence. Moreover, some aspects of Christian theology by Augustine’s time represented the blended influences between Christian and Neoplatonist ideas, as Ayres and Barnes argue, or between Christian views and some views in Plato’s *Timaeus* (*Tim*.).

---


30 Philo’s blending of ideas from *Tim* and scriptural ideas was discussed in section 1.1.2 in Chapter 1. Some of the influences of *Tim* on Augustine are identified by Pelikan, in his study of how *Tim* and Gen. 1 were read together, which was influential above in analysing Philo’s works. Harrison also discusses influences of *Tim* on Augustine, in her analysis of his ideas about creation, its goodness and beauty, and God. Jaroslav Pelikan, *What Has Athens to Do with Jerusalem?: ‘Timaeus’ and ‘Genesis’ in Counterpoint, Jerome Lectures*, 21 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 111-132; Carol Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine*, Oxford Theological Monographs
One of my desired outcomes for this thesis is that my analysis will encourage scholars to take broader views of Augustine’s sources for his theologies of creation and the Trinity, especially key scriptures (e.g., Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wis. 11, and Wis. 13) and *hexaemeral* commentaries. I thus offer, in addition to my analysis, a summary in Appendix A of the key scriptures Augustine ‘reads together’, using his method of correlating scriptures, in his reflections on creation and the Trinity.

My analysis of Augustine’s ideas about triadic aspects of initial existence and ‘dynamic abiding’ builds on my analysis in Chapter 3 of his early ideas about triadic aspects of created things.\(^{31}\) In this chapter, I engage with the scholarship of Carol Harrison,\(^ {32}\) Eugene TeSelle,\(^ {33}\) Paul Blowers, Dunham, and Olivier Du Roy.\(^ {34}\) In particular, I draw on Harrison’s and Blowers’s insights on ‘seminal principles’,\(^ {35}\) and Blowers’s and Dunham’s views on divine ‘administration’\(^ {36}\) and ‘providential governance’,\(^ {37}\) in Augustine, in order to develop the notion of ‘dynamic abiding’. As I discussed above, my original contribution in this area is based on Augustine’s own ideas in *Gn. litt* and *civ. Dei* that are not typically given attention.

Finally, I also goes beyond current research in my method of looking at Augustine’s ideas about simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations within the Trinity *together*, and looking at them after examining his ideas about creation and economic trinitarian acts. Ayres,\(^ {38}\) Barnes,\(^ {39}\) TeSelle,\(^ {40}\) Edmund Hill,\(^ {41}\) and

---

\(^{31}\) For my analysis of Augustine’s earlier ideas about triadic aspects of creation and the associations he makes with the Trinity, see section 3.2 in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.

\(^{32}\) See C. Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation*, pp. 36-42, 97-139.

\(^{33}\) See Eugene TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (Herder and Herder, 1970; Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), pp. 116-123 (especially p. 120).


\(^{37}\) See Dunham, *The Trinity and Creation in Augustine*, pp. 81-83.

Maarten Wisse\textsuperscript{42} examine some of Augustine’s ideas on these principles, mainly in the context of looking at his trinitarian theology. Andrew Radde-Gallwitz comments briefly on how Augustine’s ideas on simplicity and attributes compare to late fourth century ideas.\textsuperscript{43} Doctrinal theologians Gunton\textsuperscript{44} and Robert Jenson\textsuperscript{45} criticise Augustine for emphasising unity within the Trinity and claim that he departed from Cappadocian ideas, while Stephen Holmes sees similarities between Augustine’s ideas and those of Gregory of Nazianzus and others.\textsuperscript{46} My analysis will cite or critique these perspectives, but will be unique in giving primary attention to the attributes and acts of the Trinity, especially the attributes of goodness and beauty.

\textsuperscript{40} See TeSelle, Augustine, pp. 294-303, also p. 120 FN 32.
\textsuperscript{41} See Hill, ‘Introduction’ to The Trinity, Intro., Sections 18, 94-99; Hill, ‘Foreword to Books V, VI, and VII’, in The Trinity; Hill’s introductory comments to Trin., Book XV, 4, 6 – 7, 13; and Hill’s translator’s note 24 to Trin., Book XV, 7, 12. See also Hill’s translator’s note 19 to Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 23, 9, where Hill cites Augustine’s ideas on divine simplicity in Trin., VI, 6, 8-7, 9; VII, I, 2; and VIII, 2, 3.
\textsuperscript{42} Wisse briefly assesses Ayres’s and Barnes’s reading of Trin., V—VII and he also comments on their emphasis on Nicene theologies (pp. 19, 76-81). Maarten Wisse, Trinitarian Theology beyond Participation: Augustine’s De Trinitate and Contemporary Theology, T&T Clark Studies in Systematic Theology, 11 (London: Bloomsbury, 2011; first paperback edn, 2013), pp. 50-83.
\textsuperscript{43} This will be discussed below. Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity, Oxford Early Christian Studies (New York: OUP, 2009), pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{44} Gunton’s criticisms will be addressed in the analysis below. See, e.g., Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn (London: T&T Clark, 1997, 2003; repr. 2006), pp. 40-42; Colin E. Gunton, ‘Relation and Relativity: The Trinity and the Created World’, in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. by Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), pp. 92-112 (pp. 106-107).
\textsuperscript{46} Holmes’s views on these ideas in The Quest for the Trinity draw on Ayres’s and Barnes’s views. Stephen R. Holmes, ‘Classical Trinity: Evangelical Perspective’, in Two Views on The Doctrine of the Trinity, ed. by Jason S. Sexton, Counterpoints Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2014), pp. 25-48 (pp. 29-30, 36-43); see also Stephen R. Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity: The Doctrine of God in Scripture, History and Modernity (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), pp. 134-139.
4.1 Augustine’s fifth century contexts, sources, and methods

Given my analysis in Chapter 3 of Augustine’s fourth century sources and influences, I will treat only a few areas here to enable the transition to the fifth century. I will briefly discuss Augustine’s fifth century contexts, controversies, and challenges; his preferred scriptures and translations; and his methods for interpreting scriptures that influenced his theologies of creation and the Trinity.

4.1.1 Polemical contexts and Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5

Augustine, who had moved to Hippo after his ordination in 391, continued to live there until his death in 430, although he traveled to Carthage to preach and attend councils. As is well known, he was involved in two controversies in North Africa, the Donatist controversy, which formally ended in 411, and the disputes with Pelagius and Pelagians, which officially began and ended with synods held in Carthage in 411 and 418 but continued to engage Augustine after that. The theological and other concerns involved in those disputes are not of direct interest here, although Augustine’s writings during the Pelagian controversy about how the human soul comes into being would be relevant to theological anthropology.

More relevant here is that some of Augustine’s arguments about being able to know God or the Trinity from creation appear in his responses to pagan ideas after

---


50 The debate about whether the human soul came into being through ‘creationism’ or ‘Traducianism’ is not relevant here. According to Lancel, who is citing Augustine’s *ep.* 166, *ep.* 190, and other sources, creationism meant that God creates each soul for each person born, and Traducianism, which Lancel says had been a traditional African belief since Tertullian, meant that the soul was transmitted through generation, beginning with Adam. Lancel, *Saint Augustine*, pp. 333, 342, 353-355; see also Augustine, *ep.* 166, 4, 10 and *ep.* 190, 1, 2 – 2, 5, in WSA, vol II / 3; V. Grossi, ‘Traducianism’, in *EAC (ET)*, III, pp. 825-826.
the sack of Rome in 410,\textsuperscript{51} which had resulted in pagans coming to North Africa.\textsuperscript{52} In these arguments, he draws on Rom. 1. 20,\textsuperscript{53} sometimes with Wis. 13. 1-5,\textsuperscript{54} in saying or implying that he is arguing from the created world,\textsuperscript{55} or from the human mind,\textsuperscript{56} to the Trinity. Augustine also begins the final book of Trin. with full quotes of both Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5.\textsuperscript{57} As I introduced earlier, Rom. 1. 20 says that all people should have been able to gain knowledge about God, the Creator, \textit{from creation}, by seeing the ‘invisible things’ of God from ‘things that are made’.\textsuperscript{58} Wis. 13. 1-5 is of greater direct relevance to my analysis of Augustine’s ideas because it says that people should have seen God, the Creator, from the goodness, beauty, power, and greatness of created things.\textsuperscript{59} In Chapter 3, I argued that Augustine is likely to have been alluding to Wis. 13. 1-5 in his early Gn. \textit{adv. Man.},\textsuperscript{60} and in
conf., where he also draws on Rom. 1. 20-25.\textsuperscript{61} With his mature uses of Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5, whether together or on their own, Augustine himself offers support for employing the lens of analysing his views on creation itself, to see what he infers about trinitarian acts of creation or the Trinity. This does not mean that Augustine was doing natural theology.\textsuperscript{62} He bases his argument that one can, or should, see God or the Trinity from creation on scriptures that take this position. This is a subtle distinction given that these scriptures themselves offer some evidence of doing natural theology.

Moreover, with respect to his defense of some philosophical ideas after the sack of Rome, Augustine quotes Rom. 1. 20 in \textit{civ. Dei} in defending ideas held by Plato or Platonists who believed that God was the ‘author of created things’.\textsuperscript{63} Augustine also draws on Rom. 1. 20 and, implicitly, Wis. 13. 1-5, in s. 241,\textsuperscript{64} in speaking somewhat favorably of the ‘most outstanding’ of the philosophers who had ‘investigated nature’, and ‘from the works had come to know the craftsman’ [‘\textit{de operibus artificem cognovisse}’].\textsuperscript{65} As I noted in Chapter 3, these are positive statements about being able to see God or the Trinity from creation. This is by contrast to the negative statements Augustine makes in \textit{conf.}, when he draws on Rom. 1. 21-25, and evidently on Wis. 13. 1-5, to criticise those people, including philosophers, who did not see the Creator or God from the natural world.\textsuperscript{66}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} See my discussion of Rom. 1. 20-25 and Wis. 13. 1-5 in section 3.4 in Chapter 3. See Augustine, \textit{conf.}, Book V, iii (5) and all of Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (Chadwick).
  \item \textsuperscript{62} On this, see my conclusions to section 3.2.3 and section 3.5.3 in Chapter 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Augustine quotes Rom. 1. 20 more than once in these chapters. Augustine, \textit{civ. Dei}, I, Book VIII, 9-12 (the quote is from VIII, 9).
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Hill dates s. 241 to 411 because he thinks it reflects Augustine’s thinking from after the sack of Rome. Augustine, s. 241, 1-3, WSA, vol III / 7; see also Hill’s notes to Augustine’s s. 240 and s. 241, WSA, vol III / 7, pp. 68 FN 1 and 75 FN 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} This is likely adapted from Wis. 13. 1, which criticises those who did not know or see the ‘artifex’ from the ‘good things’ that can be seen or by ‘attending to [God’s] works’ [‘\textit{operibus ad tendentes}’]. He also implicitly cites Wis. 13. 5 (LXX) (‘For from the greatness and beauty of created things is their Creator correspondingly discerned.’) Augustine, s. 241, 1-2 (PL 38, <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>); see also Wis. 13. 1-5 in Edgar and Kinney, \textit{The Vulgate Bible, Vol III}, pp. 804-805; Pietersma and Wright, \textit{A New English Translation of the Septuagint}, pp. 708-709.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} See my discussion of Rom. 1. 21-25 and Wis. 13. 1-5 in section 3.4 in Chapter 3. Rom. 1. 21-25 contains negative statements or criticisms of people who do not see the Creator or God from creation. Rom. 1. 20 makes the positive statement that this can be done. See Augustine, \textit{conf.}, Book V, iii (5) and all of Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (Chadwick).
\end{itemize}
can only be conjectured, but after the sack of Rome Augustine may have chosen to frame his mature arguments about what can be known about the Trinity in light of what is understood about the natural world, drawing on the scriptures and Platonist ideas, in order to create a ‘bridge’ to the Trinity for his readers and auditors, who included both Christians and pagans.67

Another polemical matter of note with respect to Augustine’s ideas about the immanent Trinity is that his arguments about substance and relations within the Trinity were, according to Barnes, influenced by his responses to Latin Homoian ideas.68 Here Augustine’s geographical and historical location is again relevant, given that Ayres says that Homoian ideas were brought to North Africa by refugees after the sack of Rome and by Homoian troops stationed in North Africa.69

Finally, Augustine continued to respond to Manichaean criticisms about God and the created world.70 Hence my discussion of Manichaeism in Chapter 3, and my analysis of Augustine’s early works in which he reacted to Manichaean ideas and their criticisms of the scriptures, will be of use for my discussions of his mature ideas and exegetical methods in his reflections on creation and the Trinity.71

4.1.2 Augustine’s preferred scriptures and exegetical methods

In Chapter 3, I discussed Augustine’s early use of the scriptures and certain translations.72 In the fifth century, he continued to offer many interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, and to draw on Wis. 11 and Wis. 13, but he had a broad knowledge of scriptural passages about creation, as I will demonstrate. He also

68 This will be discussed in section 4.4. M. Barnes, ‘The Arians of Book V’; see also Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, pp. 171-173.
69 See Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, pp. 171-173.
70 See, e.g., Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 1, 13-16; civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 22.
71 See section 3.1.1 in Chapter 3 for a brief survey of Manichaean ideas and criticisms of God, creation, and the scriptures, and how this influenced his early exegetical methods.
72 On his early use of scriptures and translations, see section 3.1.2 in Chapter 3.
continued to prefer Old Latin (OL) translations of Septuagint (LXX) translations of Old Testament books, although he began to use Jerome’s Latin translation of the Gospel of John, in addition to OL translations, early in the century. As I argued in Chapter 3, the combination of scriptures and translations Augustine used means that he was drawing upon Latin, Greek, Hellenised, and Alexandrian texts, another justification for taking broader views of his ideas than seeing them as primarily representing western or Latin (including Latin pro-Nicene) theology.

In Chapter 3, I demonstrated Augustine’s exegetical method of reconciling scriptures in my analysis of his Gn. adv. Man. and other works, and I proposed that he employed this method in response to Manichaean criticisms of passages that they claimed conflicted with each other (e.g. Gen. 1. 1 and John 1. 1-3). Some of the methods Augustine employs in his fifth century (and earlier) commentaries on Gen. 1 are discussed by Dunham and K. Greene-McCreight, amongst others, with attention typically given to his literal and allegorical methods. Here I will introduce two of his mature methods of interpreting scriptures about creation that are not given much scholarly attention, but which I will argue, here and in section

---

73 See section 3.1.2 in Chapter 3. See also Augustine’s discussion, in a late book in civ. Dei, about the LXX translations and Jerome’s translations from the Hebrew. Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XVIII, 42-44; see also O’Daly, Augustine’s ‘City of God’, pp. 34-35.
75 I introduced Augustine’s early exegetical methods in section 3.1 in Chapter 3, and I discussed his exegesis of Gn. adv. Man. in section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3.
4.2, significantly influenced Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity. He employs these methods in his ‘literal’ commentary on Genesis (Gn. litt), in addition to civ. Dei and elsewhere, and they should be viewed as sub-methods under the umbrella of his literal approach to interpreting Genesis.

The first method is Augustine’s approach of applying questions to the text of Gen. 1. At the start of Gn. litt., Augustine asks whether Gen. 1 is to be considered as offering a ‘faithful account of what actually happened’ at the initial creation, or is to be taken figuratively, or both.\textsuperscript{78} In civ. Dei, XI, one of his last commentaries on Gen. 1,\textsuperscript{79} he says ‘there are three points that we especially ought to know about anything created … who made it, the means by which [or how] he made it, and why he made it’.\textsuperscript{80} Without being overly simplistic, it will be useful below to think of ‘what’ happened as related to creation or trinitarian acts of creation, and of ‘who’ undertook the acts as being about the Trinity. This statement exemplifies the flow I have identified in Augustine’s thought from creation to the Trinity.

Augustine’s more complex method is a robust version of his earlier approach of reconciling passages that seemed to conflict. In Gn. litt and civ. Dei, he correlates the meanings of multiple passages about creation in his exegesis of Gen. 1, and he grants them virtually equal weight. As I will argue in section 5.2, his use of this method results in his presenting some original insights as well as interpretations similar to those that appear in the works of others, including Basil.

My analysis also will demonstrate that Augustine’s method of correlating passages goes beyond ‘prooftexting’, which is how Greene-McCreight describes his use of multiple scriptures to support his arguments. She contends that he read trinitarian ideas \textit{into} the scriptures as a result of his ‘ruled readings’.\textsuperscript{81} Augustine’s

\textsuperscript{78} Emphasis added. He contrasts these options to allegorical interpretation. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 1, 1-2 (Hill); see also Augustine, Revisions (Retractationes), trans. and with note and an introduction by Boniface Ramsey and ed. by Roland Teske, WSA, vol I / 2 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2010), Book II, 24 (51), 1 (abbrev. retr.).


\textsuperscript{80} Italics added. Augustine, civ. Dei, II, XI, 21; see also XI, 23-24 (Babcock).

\textsuperscript{81} Greene-McCreight defines this ‘prooftexting’ as ‘the use of canonical passages to shed light on others’, but she does not adequately portray what this means for Augustine’s
own words, from one of his sermons on Ps. 103, offer a reason why he correlates passages, and here he is drawing on John 1. 1. He writes:

There is but one single utterance of God [*unus sermo Dei*] amplified throughout all the scriptures ... Through the mouths of many holy persons a single Word [*unum Verbum*] makes itself heard, that Word who, being God-with-God in the beginning [*in principio Deum apud Deum*], has no syllables, because he is not confined by time.\(^82\)

That Augustine viewed scriptures as conveying a single Word influenced his method of correlating what the scriptures say about creation and the Trinity, and I will show that this was a significant influence on his development of his ideas.

Moreover, Augustine did not look solely to the scriptures or the faith for reliable information about the 'natural' world. He acknowledges, as he had earlier, that philosophers possessed knowledge of the earth, constellations, seasonal cycles, and animals that some Christians did not have,\(^83\) and he argues that Christians should not insist on points they believe scripture makes that contradict established information.\(^84\) Augustine’s position on this challenges the claims made by some scholars, which I countered earlier, that he discouraged investigations of the natural world.\(^85\) His willingness to accept 'scientific' knowledge about creation is noted by scholars who hold a variety of interests in his interpretations of the creation accounts in Genesis.\(^86\) This will be relevant here and in Chapter 5, where resulting interpretations of the scriptures, which go beyond rules of faith. Greene-McCreight, *Ad Litteram*, pp. 57-60.

\(^82\) This is Ps. 104 today. Cameron also cites this passage. Augustine, *en. Ps.*, 103.4.1 (CCSL 40); see also Michael Cameron, ‘*Enarrationes in Psalmos*’, p. 291.

\(^83\) See section 3.4 in Chapter 3 about his earlier acknowledgements that philosophers knew about these matters and his willingness to draw on these ideas.

\(^84\) See Augustine, *Gn. litt.*, Books I, 18, 37; 19, 39; 21, 41; II, 1, 4.

\(^85\) I addressed these claims in section 3.4 in Chapter 3 in discussing Augustine’s conf. The claim comes from a ‘popular’ scholarly work that misrepresents his position, as shown in Chapter 3, but the claim is cited by others. Charles Freeman, *The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason* (2002; New York: Vintage Books, 2005), pp. 5, 277-278, 280-283, 286-288, 290-291. The quote Freeman offers from Augustine’s *conf.*, Book X, xxxv (54-55) is on the page before the Table of Contents although Freeman only attributes it to Augustine without citing the specific location in Augustine’s works.

I will discuss fruitful readings of his theological ideas about creation and the Trinity.

Finally, Augustine acknowledged that Gen. 1 is difficult to understand, and he permitted varying readings of the text, provided they did not violate the ‘Catholic’ faith or ‘rule of faith’. This supports Dunham’s and Greene-McCreight’s position on Augustine’s reliance on a rule of faith, although they do not acknowledge his willingness to draw on other sources. In accordance with his own exegetical principles, Augustine was permitted to ‘fill in the gaps’ when it was not clear, from the scriptural text, what or how something happened during creation. This practice is of concern to my analysis only when it affects Augustine’s answers to ‘who’ was involved with economic trinitarian acts of creation, as it sometimes does.

4.2 ‘Fiat lux’: the initial creation and trinitarian acts of creation

In this section, I will critically analyse Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1.1-3, which I will demonstrate that he read together and also with other scriptures about creation, for insights into his ideas about what happened at the initial creation and who was involved. I will demonstrate that Augustine draws inferences about the particular roles and attributes of the Persons of the Trinity in acts of initial creation from his interpretations of the scriptures, and I will argue that his exegetical method significantly influenced these theological ideas. I also will assess how well Augustine balances unity and distinctions among the Trinity in economic acts of creation. Moreover, I will show where his ideas are similar to those of others, especially Basil of Caesarea and Philo of Alexandria in their hexaemeral and other works, and where he exhibits independent thinking.

I will employ a ‘device’ to structure my analysis and to present Augustine’s ideas thematically. My discussions will mainly follow the flow of his commentary in Gn. litt on Gen. 1.1-5. These verses begin with the creation of ‘heaven and earth’

---


Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 18, 37 – 21, 41; Augustine, civ. Dei, II, XI, 32 (Babcock).
and go through the creation of light, when God said ‘fiat lux’, and of ‘day one’, and thus are about acts of initial creation. I will integrate into my analysis some of Augustine’s ideas from his ‘Homily 1’ on John, other sermons, civ. Dei, and Trin.

4.2.1 God’s speech, the Word of God, and the word that ‘abides within’

Early in Gn. litt, Augustine asks in what way ['quomodo'] or how God said ‘Let light be made’ ['fiat lux'] (Gen. 1. 3). One of Augustine’s related questions is whether ‘the voice of God’ should be understood as ‘being the intelligible meaning of the audible utterance’, rather than the utterance itself.

Augustine’s interest in God’s speech reflects his perspective that the primary differentiated role in trinitarian acts of initial creation that is attributable to God (the Father) is that God creates by speaking, according Gen. 1 and other scriptures. I will develop and argue this position later in section 4.2 in discussing his views on triadic and other aspects of creation and the Trinity.

As I will argue here, Augustine also is broaching the concept of separating the meaning of a word from the word as it is spoken or heard. As I will show, this concept is related to his ongoing interest in human words, and his evolving views on whether analogies can be drawn between human words and the words and Word of God, a possibility he had rejected earlier.

My position, based on the lens

---

88 Augustine’s first citation of this verse in Gn. litt is in Book I, 2, 4. See also Gen. 1. 3 in Swift Edgar, ed., The Vulgate Bible, Vol I, The Pentateuch (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 2010), pp. 2-3.
89 In the OL translations Augustine used, Gen. 1. 5 says ‘day one’ or ‘one day’ (‘dies unus’), not the ‘first day’, and this translates the LXX’s ‘émera mia’. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 9, 16; 10, 18; 17, 33; see also Gn. 1. 5 in Edgar, The Vulgate Bible, Vol I, pp. 2-3; Rahlfs-Hanhart, Septuaginta, I, p. 1; Pietersma and Wright, A New English Translation of the Septuagint, p. 6.
90 Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 2, 4 (BA 48, p. 86).
91 Italics added. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 2, 6.
92 In addition to in Gen. 1. 3; 1. 6; 1, 9; 1, 11; 1, 14; 1, 20; 1, 24; and 1. 26, God’s creating by speaking is attested to by other scriptures. One of the verses Augustine cites, as I will show, is Ps. 148.5: ‘He spoke and they were made; he gave the command, and they were created’. (This is his citation.) Michael McCarthy identifies Ps. 148. 5, Ps. 32. 6, 9 (Vulgate, LXX), and Ps. 147. 15 as verses Augustine draws on from the psalms because these verses speak of the Word or words of God in acts of creation. Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 1, 5; Michael C. McCarthy, ‘Creation through the Psalms in Augustine’s Enarrationes in Psalmos’, Augustinian Studies, 37, no. 2 (2006), 191-218 (p. 201).
93 In Chapter 3, I identified some of Augustine’s earlier ideas about human words that were
I am using of looking at his ideas about creation and trinitarian acts of creation first, is that Augustine developed these ideas in his interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, even though his mature ideas may not appear until late in *Trin*.

First, Gn. litt is one of the earliest of his fifth century works in which Augustine suggests the concept of separating a word's meaning from the word that is spoken. He also explores this and related ideas in two sermons, one which may be earlier than the early books of Gn. litt and one contemporaneous with them, and in his first homily on John, from just a few years later. In s. 120, which is on John 1. 1-3, Augustine discusses analogies between human words (the words of a creature), and the Word of God (which Augustine associates with the creator), and he uses the illustration that the words he has spoken in his sermon have ‘gone out’ to his listeners but have not ‘departed’ or ‘been separated’ from him. In s. 225, where Augustine is speaking of John 1. 1-3 and Gn. 1. 1, 5, he says that the word that was in his mind, which he had spoken to his congregants and which had ‘assumed sound’, was now in their minds, but he had not ‘lost it’ nor had it ‘departed’ from him. So he asserts that human words can, in some way, remain within a person while and after they have been expressed by that person and heard by others, and he suggests, by analogy, that this is the case for the Word of God or God’s words.

In his ‘Homily 1’ on John, Augustine says that the words of the text of John 1. 1 can be spoken but then cease, but the Word of God through whom ‘all things were made’ (John 1. 3), is a ‘kind of Word’ which ‘is both spoken and does not come to an end’. Augustine says further that there is ‘a word within a human person that abides there [‘*quod manet intus*’], for only the sound comes out of the mouth’, and

---

94 Hill dates s. 120 to after 396, and Augustine refers to himself as a bishop. Augustine, s. 120, 3, WSA, vol III / 4, pp. 231-233; see also Hill's translator's note, p. 233 FN 1.
95 According to Hill, s. 225 was given on Easter, between 400-405. Augustine, s. 225, 3, WSA, vol III / 6; see also Hill's translator's note, p. 238 FN 1.
96 As noted above, this is from late 406 or early 407. Augustine, *Jo. ev. tr.*, Homily 1, 8.
this word that abides within is ‘spoken in the spirit’ but is ‘not itself the sound’.\(^97\) This again separates the meaning of a word from the spoken, audible word (or its sound), and I will refer to this concept here and below as the word which ‘abides within’. Here again he is making analogies from human words to the Word of God.

Ayres, who offers a brief analysis of Augustine’s first three homilies on John, but in the context of analysing *Trin.*, says that ‘Homily 1’ is the first place Augustine ‘likens the Word of God to the “inner” word of human beings’.\(^98\) Moreover, Ayres and others say that Augustine did not develop his mature ideas about the inner word until the final books in *Trin.*\(^99\) My analysis, by contrast, shows that Augustine had begun to explore these analogies earlier than ‘Homily 1’, in his commentaries on Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3. However, Augustine’s suggestions in the early fifth century works I just cited that human words have an analogous relationship to the Word and words of God do represent a development in his ongoing explorations about words. This can be seen by comparing these ideas to those in his early s. 214, where he had said that ‘God the Word [*Verbum Deus*]’ was ‘not like a word [*verbum*] whose sound can be thought of in the mind and uttered by the lips’.\(^100\)

Later, in *Trin.*, XV\(^101\) Augustine will develop the human-divine Word analogy. He says that with human beings it is possible to understand that there is a word that exists before it is spoken, and that in reflecting on this word one can see some ‘likeness’ of the Word spoken of in John 1. 1.\(^102\) Augustine describes this as a

\(^{97}\) Augustine, *Jo. ev. tr.*, Homily 1, 8 (CCSL 36, pp. 4-5).

\(^{98}\) Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, pp. 193-196 (the quote is on p. 194).


\(^{100}\) Emphasis added. As I discussed in section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3, most scholars, citing Augustine’s own words, date s. 214 to after his ordination in 391, but Ayres takes the minority position on a fifth century date. That Augustine says, in s. 214, that human words and the Word are not alike offers support for the earlier dating. Augustine, s. 214, 5, WSA, vol III / 6 (PL 38, <http://www.augustinus.it/latino/discorsi/index2.htm>).


\(^{102}\) Augustine, *Trin.*, Book XV, 10, 19.
word that ‘precedes all the signs that signify it and is begotten of the knowledge abiding in the human consciousness, when this knowledge is uttered inwardly just exactly as it is’.\(^{103}\) In a sermon from around the same time he was finishing *Trin.*, in which he was commenting on John 1. 1-5, he refers to the Word of God as ‘a Word that abides’ with the Father, even if it is expressed or ‘brought out’, a Word that also is able to express itself, because the Word was begotten of the Father.\(^{104}\)

Thus, one can discern a trajectory in Augustine’s fifth century ideas about a human word that ‘abides within’ as it is expressed, and the Word of God which abides with the Father but can be expressed or expresses itself in external acts. This trajectory began with Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 and his reflections on the implications of God’s speaking in acts of initial creation.

Second, Augustine, in *Gn. litt*, says that the light that was made (Gen. 1. 3), was made through God’s Word, because ‘All things were made through him’ (John 1. 3), and thus ‘God’s saying Let light be made is something eternal, because the Word of God, God with God, the only Son of God [*uerbum Dei, Deus apud Deum, filius unicus Dei*], is co-eternal with the Father, although when God said this in the eternal Word, a time-bound creature [light] was made’.\(^{105}\) The expressions ‘God with God’ (John 1. 1) and ‘the only Son of God’ appear in John and / or the Latin creed. As I discussed in Chapter 3, both ‘unicus’ and ‘unigenitus’ appear in John 1. 14, 18 (OL), and ‘unicus’ is used for the Son in the Latin creeds.\(^{106}\) Augustine’s terminology here in *Gn. litt* contrasts with Nicene credal language, which speaks of ‘God from [de] God’ (not ‘with’), and uses ‘unigenitus’ for the Son.\(^{107}\)

---


\(^{104}\) Augustine, s. 341, 5 (Dolbeau 22), WSA, vol III / 11.

\(^{105}\) Augustine, *Gn. litt*, Book I, 2, 6 (BA 48, pp. 88, 90); also Book I, 10, 20; 18, 36.


\(^{107}\) As I discussed in Chapter 3 in section 3.3.2, and noted in section 3.3.1, Augustine knew a Latin translation of the 325 creed at least by 393 and possibly by 391 (when gave his s. 214). The Latin translation of this creed used ‘unigenitum’ for the Son, according to the version published in the *Breviarium Hipponense* after the 393 synod in Hippo. This
use of this terminology, Augustine makes connections between economic acts of initial creation that are accomplished by God’s speaking, and the relationship within the Trinity between God / the Father and the Word / Son. John 1. 3 simply asserts that all things were made through the Word (which John 1. 1-18 associates with the Son). It is Augustine’s correlation of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 that results in Augustine’s saying that the Word is the one through whom God spoke. He thus posits roles for the God / the Father and the Word / Son in initial creation.

Third, Augustine says that when God called ‘the light day and the darkness night’ (Gen. 1. 5), God spoke ‘by a word co-eternal with himself’, and this means ‘with the inner and eternal ideas [rationibus] of unchanging Wisdom’. His emphasis on the co-eternity of God and the Word / Son comes from John 1. 1-3, but his comments raise questions about the relationship of the inner and eternal ideas to the Word, and similar questions will be addressed below.

4.2.2 Triadic aspects of existence, ‘dynamic abiding’, and goodness

Augustine, early in Gn. litt, offers ideas about triadic aspects of initial existence and trinitarian acts of initial creation that I will interpret partly in light of his fourth century views about triadic aspects of all created things, but which are more complex. I will argue here that Augustine offers three views of the roles of the Trinity in bringing about what I label ‘formless existence’, ‘differentiated existence’, and ‘perfected existence’, and that he associates the capability of being able to continue in existence, which is the key aspect of ‘dynamic abiding’, with his ideas in his second view. As I will show, Augustine’s ideas about triadic aspects of existence are interwoven with his thinking on the roles of God’s speech and the Word in initial creation. My analysis also will demonstrate that Augustine attributes roles in trinitarian acts of creation primarily to certain Persons, but he also depicts

---

translation also used ‘Deum de Deo’ or ‘God from God’ for the Son. These translations were verified through a Google Books search of C. Munier, ed., Concilia Africae a. 345-525, CCSL, 149 (date of search 18 May 2014, verified again on 23 June 2015); see also Augustine, s. 214, 5; J. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, p. 215.

108 Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 10, 20 (BA 48, p. 106); see also Book I, 9, 15 - 10, 19; 18, 36; Book II, 6, 12; 8, 14.

109 See section 4.2.4 below.

110 On his fourth century ideas, see sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.
shared roles. I thus will assess how clearly he balances unity and distinctions in his depictions of these acts. Moreover, I will show that Augustine attributes goodness to both creation and the Trinity, based on his interpretations of Gen. 1.

In his first view, Augustine apparently offers varying ideas about the roles of the Persons in initial creation because he was accommodating the text of Gen. 1. 1-2 and Gen. 1. 3. God does not speak until Gen. 1. 3, so God does not create solely by speaking, which otherwise is God’s primary act according to Augustine’s reading of Gen. 1. Augustine also had to reconcile Gen. 1. 2’s statement that the earth was ‘shapeless’ (or ‘formless’) in the beginning\(^{111}\) with his belief that the giving of differentiation or form is primarily attributed to the Word, with whom Augustine could not associate the creation of formless material.

Thus in his first view of formless, differentiated, and perfected existence, Augustine asserts that God created ‘unformed basic material’ first, and he offers two understandings of the roles of the Word / Son.\(^{112}\) As in other works, he says that ‘In the beginning’ (Gen. 1. 1) refers to the Son (John 8. 25 [OL]).\(^{113}\) He also states that the Son, with the Father, is ‘the source of creation still in its formless imperfection’, given that unformed material, which is imperfect and incomplete, cannot ‘imitate the form of [the] Word’.\(^{114}\) Here he distinguishes between the Son and the Word, but he will resolve this immediately, as will be seen. He also does not say how God and the Son were the source of formless existence, but neither does Gen. 1. 1-2 say how God created heaven and earth in the beginning.

Augustine then identifies the Son with the Word, based on Gen. 1. 3’s saying that God said ‘Let it be made’, because, according to Augustine, God said these words by ‘the Word’.\(^{115}\) This is similar to his arguments that I examined above about the relationship between God’s speech and the Word, only now he identifies

---


\(^{112}\) Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 4, 9 - 5, 11; see also Book I, 14, 28 - 15, 30.

\(^{113}\) For other examples of his citations of John 8. 25, see, e.g., Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 2, 3 (Hill) and my Appendix A. Here see Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 5, 10.

\(^{114}\) Italics added. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 4, 9 – 5, 10; see also Book I, 6, 12.

\(^{115}\) Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 4, 9.
the Word with the Son. *God’s speech*, according to Augustine, represents an ‘incorporeal utterance of God in the substance of his co-eternal Word, *calling back* to himself [God / the Father and the Son / Word?] the imperfection of the creation’, so that the unformed creation should be formed, ‘each element on the particular lines which follow in due order’.\(^{116}\) Augustine also writes:

\[\text{the Son’s} \text{ being the Word implies his conferring *perfection* on creation by *calling it back* to himself [the Son / Word], so that it may be *given form* by adhering to the creator [God / the Father], and by imitating in its own measure the form [the Word] which adheres eternally and unchangeingly to the Father, and which instantly gets from him [the Father] to be the same thing as he *is*.}\(^{117}\)

Augustine is saying that creation moves from the *imperfect formless state* by being given form (differentiation) when it turns back when *called by God / the Father and the Son / Word*.\(^{118}\) The idea of turning has hints of Plotinian ideas from one of Augustine’s early works, where he had applied it to *the Son’s turning*.\(^{119}\) He also speaks in *conf.* about formless things being ‘dependent’ on the Word, by which ‘they are recalled to [God’s] oneness and receive form’.\(^{120}\) Here in *Gn. litt*, he says that creation, by turning to the creator (God / the Father) and the Son / Word, ‘imitates, every element in its own way, *God the Word*, that is the Son of God who always adheres to the Father in complete likeness and equality of being, by which he and the Father are one …’\(^{121}\) So this process applies to creation as a

\(^{116}\) Augustine’s Latin is ambiguous. He could be referring to God / the Father, the Word / Son, or both. The translation here is Hill’s, and Hill uses the ambiguous ‘calling back to himself’. Taylor’s translation, which assumes that the Word is the subject, is ambiguous in saying the Word ‘recalls His imperfect creation to Himself’. Given Augustine’s statements in Book I, 5, 11, cited below, it is suggested here, in brackets, that he implies both God / the Father and the Son / Word. Augustine, *Gn. litt*, Book I, 4, 9 (Hill, Taylor) (BA 48, p. 92).


\(^{118}\) Hill translates ‘*conuersione*’ as ‘turning back’. Taylor uses ‘conversion’. Augustine, *Gn. litt*, Book I, 4, 9 (Hill, see also Taylor) (BA 48, p. 92); see also Book I, 3, 7.


\(^{120}\) Augustine, *conf.*, Book XIII, i (2), also iv (5) – v (6) (Chadwick).

whole and to individual things. Augustine also asserts, as shown above, that the Word / Son gives perfected existence to creation as a result of the Word / Son giving form to formless existence.

Thus, in Augustine’s first view, he depicts shared roles between God and the Word / Son in calling formless existence, and he suggests that both Persons have roles in giving form. However, Augustine also attributes primary roles to God and the Word / Son, although not explicitly. He attributes the first act of creating, in the beginning, primarily to God. God created in the Son, who was the beginning, and both God and the Son were the source. The noun ‘source,’ unlike the verb ‘speaking’, does not indicate how creation took place, but Augustine’s ideas are reminiscent of his view in Gn. litt. imp. that the Son was ‘a beginning with another beginning’. Augustine attributes the giving of form or differentiation primarily to the Word / Son, and he says that the Word is form. He also attributes the giving of perfected existence primarily to the Word / Son. Therefore, he depicts unity of operation between God and the Word / Son, with some distinction, in this first view.

Augustine’s perspectives in this first view differ from his fourth century ideas on triadic aspects of created things. He had attributed the giving of existence to God / the Father, the giving of differentiation (into forms or species) to the Word / Son, and the giving of the capability of ‘ordered abiding’ to the Spirit. Augustine does not reject these earlier ideas, given that he reprises them in civ. Dei and Trin., as I will discuss. However, as my analysis proceeds of his three views in Gn. litt, we will see that he is speaking of a triad of formless, differentiated, and perfected existence based on his interpretations of Gen. 1 and the initial creation. He also attributes varying roles to the Trinity in his views, without making the more concise attributions that appear in his earlier ideas about triadic aspects of creation.

In his second view of initial existence, Augustine infers the goodness of the

---

123 For my analysis of these ideas, see section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.
124 I will discuss this again below. Augustine, civ. Dei, I, Book V, 11.
125 I will examine this passage below. Augustine, Trin., Book VI, 10, 12.
Trinity from the goodness of creation and from trinitarian acts of creation, even though Gen. 1 only says that creation was good.\footnote{On God's proclaiming creation good, see Gen. 1. 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31.} He asserts that Gen. 1. 2, ‘And the Spirit of God was being borne over the water’, comes before Gen. 1. 3, where \textit{God speaks} and light is created, because the formless material represented by the water, which God ‘initiated, ready to be \textit{formed and perfected}', had to first be subject to ‘the good will of the creator’.\footnote{Italics added. Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt}, Book I, 5, 11 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 96).} This good will is expressed primarily through the Spirit’s action over the water, which Augustine associates with ‘a kind of love’ stemming from ‘generosity’ in God’s acts in creation.\footnote{In \textit{civ. Dei}, he similarly says that God did not create out of necessity, but out of the goodness of what was made (of creation) and the goodness ‘on account of which it was made’ (the Spirit). Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt}, Book I, 5, 11 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 92); see also Book I, 6, 12 – 8, 14; see also Augustine, \textit{civ. Dei}, II, Book XI, 24.} Here he refers to God’s \textit{good will} and implicitly indicates that the Spirit is good, but we will see that Augustine soon refers to the Spirit as the ‘Divine Goodness’.\footnote{Dunham also demonstrates that Augustine is referring to the Spirit here for some of the same reasons I offer. Dunham also offers as evidence that Augustine mentions Divine Goodness third in ‘his enumeration of the creative work of the Trinity in the conversion and perfection of creatures’. See Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt}, Book I, 6, 12; 7, 13; 18, 36; see also Dunham, \textit{The Trinity and Creation in Augustine}, p. 74, also pp. 75-79.} Thus the Spirit’s action of moving over the water results in the perfecting of formless existence (which is a second view of how this comes about) and is grounded in the goodness of God and the Spirit. The passive voice of the Spirit’s ‘being borne over’ the waters shows that the agency also is God's.

Augustine then asserts that when \textit{God speaks} ‘in his Word’ to create light (Gen. 1. 3), ‘what was made would abide [\textit{manaret}] in [God’s] good will’ or ‘meet with [God’s] approval according to the measure of its kind’, which is an allusion to species or form, and hence differentiation.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt}, Book I, 5, 11 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 96); see also \textit{Gn. litt}, Book I, 8, 14; \textit{civ Dei}, II, Book XI, 23-24.} This approval is indicated when \textit{God saw} that the light ‘was good’ [\textit{bona est}] (Gen. 1. 4).\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt}, Book I, 5, 11 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 96).} Augustine’s association of God’s good will with \textit{God’s seeing} that the light was good connects the goodness of creation to God and the Word (through whom God spoke).\footnote{See Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt}, Book I, 6, 12 – 8, 14 (Taylor).} Thus Augustine,
in his reading of Gen. 1. 2-4, ascribes goodness to the Spirit’s action of moving over the waters and to God’s good will, and also to God’s speech and the Word.

Augustine further asserts that there were ‘two purposes in God’s love of His creation’, that it may exist and abide, and here he associates the Spirit’s role in working over the water with existence, while the ability to continue in existence is given through God’s seeing that the water was good. The ability of creatures to seek to continue their own existence – to abide – is the primary aspect of ‘dynamic abiding’, as I will develop further in section 4.3. Here, Augustine attributes the giving of this capability to God, although it also is a result of the Spirit’s action over the water. This is atypical for Augustine based on my analysis of his earlier ideas about ‘ordered abiding’ and my analysis to be offered below of his ideas about ‘dynamic abiding’. He typically attributes, if implicitly, the giving of the capability of continuing in existence or of ‘dynamic abiding’ to the Holy Spirit. The difference here is that Augustine is still associating the giving of perfection with the giving of form or differentiation. He is not primarily thinking of ongoing existence.

In Augustine’s third view of acts of bringing about formless, differentiated, and perfected existence, he offers another perspective on the Spirit’s role in enabling creation to abide. Here he shows that he knew the translation options for Gen. 1. 2 that were attributed to a ‘Syrian’ in Basil’s and Ambrose’s hexaemeral sermons, and were known to Jerome. He refers to the Spirit’s creative action as ‘a kind of brooding [‘fotu’] … of [God’s] equally co-eternal Holy Spirit’. He then says:

For what is said here … according to the Syriac … a language closely related to the Hebrew (this is how a learned Christian Syrian is said to have explained the word) is reported to mean not was being borne over [‘superferebatur’] but was brooding over [‘fouebat’] the water in the way birds brood over [‘foventur’] their eggs, where that warmth of the mother’s body in some way also supports the forming of the chicks through a kind of influence of her own kind of love.

---

133 See Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 8, 14 (Taylor).
134 See my analysis in section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3 and in section 4.3 below.
135 See my analysis of Basil’s hexaemeral homilies in section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
136 Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 18, 36 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 132).
137 Hill translates ‘fotus’ and ‘fouebat’ as ‘brooding’, but ‘fotus’ can also refer to a poultice or compress on a sore or wound, and Taylor also offers ‘to nurse’ a wound for ‘fovere’. O’Connell translates fotu as ‘a kind of incubating action’. According to Simpson, ‘fovere’ was known to Cicero and could mean ‘to warm’ or ‘to keep warm’ for a bird, and ‘to foster, cherish, support’. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 18, 36 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 132); Hill, The Literal
This way of speaking of the Spirit’s love in acts of creation does not represent Nicene theology or Greek or Latin credal language, but, again, it has precedent in hexaemeral commentaries from East and West. Here Basil is likely Augustine’s source. However, Augustine’s interpretation that the action of brooding plays a role in the forming of offspring supports his own argument that the Spirit, in working over the formless material represented by the water, had a role in its formation and perfection, and hence in the second and third aspects of initial existence.

Augustine himself summarises the ideas I have examined thus far in section 4.2.2, and he explicitly discusses the Trinity and the text of Gen. 1. He writes:

Hence, in the very beginning of creation in its inchoate state, which has been called heaven and earth because of what was to be produced from it, it is the Blessed Trinity that is represented as creating. For, when Scripture says, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, by the name of ‘God’ we understand the Father, and by the name of ‘Beginning,’ the Son, who is the Beginning, not for the Father, but first and foremost or the spiritual beings He has created and then also for all creatures; and when Scripture says, And the Spirit of God was stirring above the water, we recognize a complete enumeration of the Trinity. So in the conversion and in the perfecting of creatures by which their species are separated in due order, the Blessed Trinity is likewise represented: the Word and the Father of the Word, as indicated in the statement, God said [Gen. 1. 3] and then the Divine Goodness [the Holy Spirit], by which God finds pleasure in all the limited perfections of His creatures, which please Him, as indicated by the words, God saw that it was good.

138 This point was made in section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
139 See section 2.3 in Chapter 2. Basil’s and Augustine’s ideas here are more similar than Augustine’s and Ambrose’s. Jerome, unlike Basil or Ambrose, does not mention the ‘Syrian’. Taylor says that a ‘careful comparison’ of Augustine’s ideas here with Eustathius’s translations of Basil’s commentaries and with Ambrose ‘makes it highly probable’ that the former was Augustine’s source. Hill says Basil is Augustine’s probable source in Gn. litt, Book II, 4, 7, which, if true, shows Augustine knew of Basil’s homilies when he was writing the early books of Gn. litt. See John Hammond Taylor, translation and notes, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, by Augustine, 2 vols, ACW, 41 and 42 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), I, pp. 229-230 FN 61; Edmund Hill, translation and notes, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, in On Genesis, by Augustine, with a general introduction and other introductions by Michael Fiedrowicz and trans. by Matthew O’Connell, and ed. by John E. Rotelle, WSA, vol I / 13 (Hyde Park, NY: NCP, 2002), pp. 168-506 (p. 194 FN 6).
140 The Latin text and English and French translations of this passage are difficult, but Taylor’s translation is helpful. Dunham also quotes and does an analysis of this passage. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 6, 12 (Taylor) (BA 48, pp. 96, 98); see also Dunham, The Trinity
One could say that Augustine was doing a trinitarian reading of Gen. 1 here in keeping with a ‘rule of faith’, as Greene-McCreight describes his reading,\(^{141}\) while, as Dunham says, he also sought to honor ‘the authority and truth of scripture’.\(^{142}\) However, my analysis of Augustine’s ideas that led him to the point of offering his own summary suggests otherwise. Augustine reads the text of Gen. 1. 1-4 as being itself trinitarian, an idea hinted at but not developed by Dunham\(^{143}\) and Greene-McCreight.\(^{144}\) For Augustine, the very words of scripture indicate both the Persons and their roles in initial creation. As seen above, the words ‘God said’ (Gen. 1. 3) indicate the first two Persons and their acts of giving differentiated and perfected existence. The words ‘God saw that it was good’ (Gen. 1. 4) indicate the first and third Person and their roles in enabling the initially formless creation to abide or continue in existence, represented by the concept of ‘dynamic abiding’.

Later in civ. Dei, Augustine offers a similar interpretation of these verses in which he associates the goodness of creation with that of the Trinity.\(^{145}\) As in Gn. litt, he speaks of the goodness of creation and the Spirit in acts of creation, but he attributes goodness to the Son by saying ‘the supremely good’ had begotten ‘the equally good’, which is about attributes and relations within the Trinity.\(^{146}\) He was still responding to Manichaeans who could not accept ‘that the reason for creation was that the good God might create good things’.\(^{147}\) He also refers to Plato, by name, in attributing to Plato that ‘no reason why is better than that something good

---


\(^{143}\) Dunham does say that Augustine begins the passage I quoted above ‘by noting that the trinitarian shape of creation is “represented” in the text of Genesis itself’, but then Dunham argues that Augustine read Gen. in light of his Catholic faith. Dunham, *The Trinity and Creation in Augustine*, p. 65.

\(^{144}\) Greene-McCreight also points out Augustine’s ‘close’ reading of scripture, where she mentions the potential for his reading to be considered ‘theologico-eisogesis’. But then she returns to her primary argument: ‘Clearly, however, the catholic understanding of the subject matter of the text guides his interpretation.’ Greene-McCreight, *Ad Litteram*, p. 54.

\(^{145}\) This section of civ. Dei was cited above in discussing Augustine’s second view of triadic aspects of initial creation. On God saying that creation was good, see Gen. 1. 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31. See Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 21-24 (Babcock).

\(^{146}\) On relations and attributes within the Trinity, see the discussions in section 4.4.

Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 24 (Babcock).

\(^{147}\) Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 22 (Babcock).
should be created by a good God’, a reference to Tim., a reason that has echoes in Philo’s work, where Philo also was drawing on Tim. That Augustine cites Plato in civ. Dei supports my observation above that he acknowledges Platonist influences on his ideas about creation in the Trinity in his works written after the sack of Rome. However, this does not shed light on Augustine’s sources for his earlier ideas in Gn. litt. about the goodness of creation and of the Trinity because of their acts of creation, which seem to be his own.

Augustine’s readings of Gen. 1. 1-5 evidently represent the influences of multiple sources, which he most often does not cite, but his independent thinking deserves more attention. Among his other ideas that appear to be his own is the atypical Trinity of God (the Father), the Word / Son, and the Divine Goodness that he names when he points out the trinitarian nature of Gen. 1. 1-5. He identifies the ‘Divine Goodness and Love’ with the ‘Spirit of God’ in other places too, and this is an atypical way of characterising the Holy Spirit. Further, he introduces the capability of 'dynamic abiding’ or of continuing in existence in his discussions of the goodness of creation and the Trinity. I will explore this capability and the concept that it is a gift, given through trinitarian acts of creation, in section 4.3.

Augustine, in Gn. litt., makes inferences about the goodness of the Trinity in his reflections on creation and acts of creation. In this respect, he should be added to Philo and Irenaeus as being among the Jewish and Christian thinkers who associated the goodness of God as Creator with the goodness of creation. He

148 Pelikan attributes Augustine’s ideas here to Tim., 28a, 29d-e, while O’Daly attributes them Tim., 29e. These and related sections from Tim. are noted in the next footnote below. Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 21, see also XI, 22-24 (Babcock); Pelikan, What Has Athens … ?, pp. 120-121; O’Daly, Augustine’s ‘City of God’, p. 142.

149 Philo, in drawing on Tim., answered the ‘why’ question about creation by saying it was because ’the Father and Maker’ was good. See section 1.1.2 in Chapter 1. Philo, On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses, trans. and with an introduction and commentary by David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, 1 (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2001), pp. 47-93 (4, 21) (abbrev. Opif.); see also Plato, Tim., 28c, 29a, e.

150 See the block quote above, which is from Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 6, 12 (Taylor).

151 Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 7, 13 (Taylor); see also Book I, 18, 36.

152 I discussed this in Chapter 1. In section 1.1.2, I quoted David Runia (as cited by Pelikan) as saying that ‘it is ‘an event of enormous significance in the history of ideas’’ that Philo became ‘‘the first thinker to associate the goodness of Plato’s demiurge with the Judaic-Christian conception of God the creator”’. In section 1.3.3, I said that Irenaeus
should be credited further, however, for his efforts in associating the goodness of creation with trinitarian acts of creation and with each of the Persons of the Trinity, based on his readings of the text of Gen. 1 itself.

That Augustine attempts to do this early in the fifth century, in Gn. litt, offers further evidence that his earlier frustrations in reading Gen. 1 or his indecisiveness about the Holy Spirit did not hinder him from continuing to read Gen. 1. In conf., XIII, which he may have written in the early fifth century, he says that ‘formless things’ received their form from the Word and they ‘have being and are all ‘very good’ because this comes to them from ‘the One, the supreme Good’. This, however, is not trinitarian because goodness is ascribed to God, and Augustine’s terminology of ‘the One, the supreme Good’ is more philosophical than scriptural. In Gn. litt, by contrast, he does the serious exegetical and theological work of moving from the attestation in Gen. 1 that creation is good to his interpretations of what Gen. 1 suggests about the goodness of the Trinity in acts of creation. He is thus moving from the triadic aspects and other attributes of creation to the Trinity, but this does not represent doing natural theology. Augustine’s ideas in Gn. litt are grounded in his interpretations of what scripture says about creation and God or the Trinity (as well as in other ideas), and his primary focus is on trinitarian acts.

Augustine’s ideas about formless, differentiated, and perfected existence and trinitarian acts of creation are his own. However, small similarities exist between his complex discussions of these aspects of creation, and a statement Basil makes about the creation of angels and ‘heavenly powers’ (a subject of interest below).  

153 As observed in the analysis of Augustine’s Gn. litt. imp. in section 3.3.3, he was not certain what Gen. 1 indicated about the role of the Holy Spirit, and he experienced other frustrations in interpreting the text. See Augustine, Gn. litt. imp., 1, 1-2; 4, 16-18 (Hill).
154 That created things are all ‘very good’ is an apparent reference to Gen. 1. 31, as Chadwick points out. Augustine, conf., Book XIII, i (2), also iv (5) (Chadwick).
155 See section 4.2.4.1 below. St Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, trans. and introduction by Stephen Hildebrand, Popular Patristics Series, 42 (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s
According to Basil, these entities were brought into being by their ‘initial cause’ (the Father), the ‘Maker’ (the Son), and the ‘Perfecter’ (the Spirit), although Basil is clear that the Persons work together in their operations.\footnote{156}

As my analysis shows, Augustine also offers perspectives on the unity of operations of the Trinity in acts of creation. However, Augustine, in \textit{Gn. litt}, like Basil in his \textit{hexaemeral} homilies,\footnote{157} does not explicitly use the terminology of unity of operation nor of the attribution of roles to certain Persons. As I demonstrated, he attributes primary roles to God (the Father), the Word / Son, and the Holy Spirit in initial creation, while he shows that acts of creation were undertaken by God with the Word / Son or with the Holy Spirit.\footnote{158} God’s role was primary in giving formless existence, the Son’s role was primary in giving form (and giving perfection because of the giving of form), and the Spirit’s role was primary in perfecting existence.

Augustine’s depictions of God having agency, even in roles \textit{primarily} attributed to the Word / Son or the Spirit, are not inconsistent with the earlier views of others. Irenaeus, for example, had asserted that God worked through his two ‘hands’, the Word / Son and Wisdom / the Spirit, so God had agency.\footnote{159} Gregory of Nyssa had asserted that ‘every operation which extends from God to the Creation ... has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is \textit{perfected} in the Holy Spirit.\footnote{160} Augustine’s views are consistent with Gregory’s general principle that the Father is the origin of trinitarian acts, but Augustine, in his reflections I analysed, does not depict a sequence in those acts that brings in both the Word / Son and

\footnote{156} Seminary Press, 2011), ch. 16, 38 (pp. 70-73).
\footnote{157} I cited this example from Basil in section 2.3 in Chapter 2. ‘Maker’ (for the Son) translates \textit{demiourgixén}. Basil also talks about the creation of angels in his ‘Homily 15’, which is on Ps. 32 (33), where he reads Ps. 32. 6 in light of John 1. 1-3. Basil, \textit{On the Holy Spirit}, ch. 16, 38 (pp. 70-71); Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, 2040.003, line 14; see also Basil of Caesarea, \textit{Exegetic Homilies}, trans. and with an introduction by Agnes Clare Way, FotC, 46 (Washington DC: CUAP, 1963) (Homily 15, 4).
\footnote{158} I have summarised these roles in Appendix B.
the Spirit. Augustine grounded his ideas about unity of operations in *Gn. litt* in Gen. 1. 1; 1.2; and 1.3. He thus posited roles, respectively, for God and the Son / Word in the beginning, for God and the Spirit in working over the water, and for God and the Word / Son in creating through God’s speech. Augustine’s approach thus may resonate more with Irenaeus’s two-hands model than Gregory’s flow model, but this is a result of Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1. Augustine, moreover, demonstrates how unity of operations might work, even though he does not assert this principle in *Gn. litt*.

### 4.2.3 Initial creation and the Word / Son / Wisdom / Christ

The roles that Augustine ascribes to the Son / Word in giving differentiation or form to initial creation, as seen in my analysis above, can be subject to criticism. Gunton, for example, criticises Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1 as not being christological because he emphasised the role of the Platonist ‘forms’, not Christ, in creation.¹⁶¹ This view may have some merit, and I will address related concerns in section 4.2.4. Now, however, my analysis will turn to the many ways Augustine writes about the ‘second Person’ and creation, which identify a balance in his views that is not acknowledged by Gunton.

As I have shown, Augustine does ascribe roles to the Son / Word in giving form to or differentiating creation.¹⁶² He draws on scripture in his depictions of the roles of the Word and God’s speech in creation (e.g., Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3), in addition to his own ideas (e.g., about human words that ‘abide within’).¹⁶³ I also suggested that he was drawing on Plotinian ideas in his argument that the Word / Son or God called creation, which turned and received form.

However, this is not the only way Augustine views the Word / Son. He also understands the Son to be ‘the beginning’ in which all things were created, based

---


¹⁶² See section 4.2.2 above and major section 3.2 in Chapter 3.

¹⁶³ See section 4.2.1 above.
on John 8. 25 (OL) and Gen. 1. 1. Here I will discuss some of the other titles Augustine uses for the ‘second Person’ in discussing acts of creation, in the first of my two examples which illustrate the effects of his exegetical methods on his ideas about ‘who’ was involved in the initial creation.

In *civ. Dei*, Augustine defends his interpretations of Gen. 1. 1-3, which had resulted in him seeing the Trinity in varying ways in the text of Genesis. He says, though, that he would accept another interpretation of *what* was created and *who* did the creating when Gen. 1. 1 says ‘In the beginning God made heaven and earth’, if it were that ‘God created all things in his *Wisdom*, which is his Word, whom Scripture calls the Beginning [John 8. 25 (OL)]’. Augustine says further that Gen. 1 may be understood to say this, and to indicate that heaven and earth were created *in* the Son, because this is ‘attested’ by Ps. 103. 24, which says ‘O Lord, how magnificent are your works! *In wisdom you have made them all.*’

Thus here Augustine is correlating verses from Gen. 1 and from one of the creation psalms, Ps. 103, in addressing the ‘who’ question about acts of creation. He had done something similar in his earlier ‘Homily 1’ on John, where he used Ps. 103. 24 with John 1. 3-4 to argue that the Word, Wisdom, and Christ (who is the Wisdom of God according to 1 Cor. 1. 24), are the same, and that ‘all things’ were made ‘through’ (John 1. 3) and ‘in’ (Ps. 103. 24) him. Moreover, Augustine includes the Son in one of his sermons on Ps. 103, in saying that Ps. 103. 24 refers to Christ, ‘the power of God and the wisdom of God’ (1 Cor. 1. 24), and that God had created ‘all things’ in Christ, the Son. Thus, one result of Augustine’s method of correlating scriptures which say something about creation is that he can assert that all things were made through or in the Word / Son / Wisdom / Christ, who is ‘the beginning’. This allows Augustine to emphasise the Son / Christ, as well as the Word, in his interpretations of Gen. 1 and other scriptures.

---

164 This is from his reading of John 8. 25 (OL). See section 4.2.2 above and Appendix A.
167 This is Augustine’s quote from this verse. Augustine, *civ. Dei*, II, Book XI, 32 (Babcock).
168 Ayres also cites this example in his analysis of ‘Homily 1’, and Ayres uses words from Ps. 103. 24 in his title for his short section on Augustine’s first three homilies on John. Augustine, *Jo. ev. tr.*, Homily 1, 16; see also Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, pp. 193-194.
Augustine’s method of correlating scriptures enables him to listen to the ‘one single utterance of God’ that speaks across the scriptures, which is ‘a single Word’ and the Word of God itself. This is one of his exegetical principles, and it comes from one of his sermons on Ps. 103. His application of this principle shows that he placed emphasis on what multiple scriptures say about creation and the Word of God or God’s speech.

Moreover, with his ideas about the Word / Son giving form or differentiation to creation, Augustine offers suggestions about how the pre-existent Word / Son / Jesus Christ could have been involved with trinitarian acts of initial creation before the incarnation. This question is not addressed by Gunton when he criticises Augustine for not being christological in his views on creation and the Trinity, nor is it addressed in John 1. 1-3; Col. 1. 15-20; and other New Testament scriptures that attest to the role of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in creation.

Augustine’s exegetical principles permitted interpretations of Gen. 1 that addressed matters not discussed in the scriptures, provided they did not violate the ‘Catholic’ faith. His ideas about the Word / Son giving form to creation do not violate the scriptures, and he can be seen as ‘filling in the gaps’, drawing in part, evidently, on philosophical ideas accepted in his days that may not have run counter to the ‘Catholic’ faith. This is suggested by the fact that Augustine had felt comfortable in presenting his earlier ideas about God having created, from nothing, all natures, including formless matter, which God enables ‘to receive the forms of different things’, when Augustine had presented to the bishops at the 393 synod in Hippo. He was not then speaking explicitly of the role of the Word / Son in giving form to creation, but these ideas had appeared in his works by then. He apparently viewed them as compatible with the faith then as he does now.

---

170 This was discussed above in section 4.1.3. Augustine, en. Ps., 103.4.1 (CCSL 40).
171 Besides John 1. 1-3 and Col. 1. 15-20, see 1 Cor. 8. 6; Heb. 1. 1-2; and Rev. 3. 14.
172 See section 4.1.3 above.
173 See section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3.
174 See section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3 on Augustine’s ideas on triadic aspects of creation, where he attributes the giving of form or differentiation to the Word / Son.
4.2.4 Augustine’s questionable interpretations of Gen. 1

Even though Augustine’s ideas about acts of initial creation and the Trinity are grounded in his interpretations of Gen. 1. 1-5, John 1. 1-3, and other scriptures, he introduces questionable ideas about who or what was involved in creation. In the examples below, the criticisms that can be leveled against Augustine are that his method of correlating scriptures may be too ‘literal’ or he has tried too hard to hear ‘a single word’ in scripture. On the other hand, given that some of his ideas appear in the hexaemeral and other works of Basil and Philo, as I will illustrate, it can be asked again whether Augustine’s questionable ideas do violate the faith.

4.2.4.1 The creation of angels and their role in creation

My first example of Augustine’s questionable interpretations of ‘who’ was involved in creation draws on Gn. Litt, his ‘Homily 1’ on John,175 and civ. Dei,176 and is about the creation of angels and their role in acts of creation.177

In Gn. litt, Augustine says that the creation of light on the first day (Gen. 1. 3) represents the establishment of the spiritual, intelligent, or rational creation, which includes the angels, and that this light ‘was not made but begotten’ [non facta, sed genita].178 Augustine argues that all things created after this spiritual creation, and thus after the angels were created, were first created ‘in the Word of God in terms of begotten Wisdom’, and then in the knowledge of the angels, who first saw the ‘rationes’, ‘forms’, or ‘ideas’ of things to be made in the Word, before those things were made in their differentiated ‘specific kind’.179 The problems here are that the angels, as well as the forms or ideas, have intermediate roles in acts of creation and a relationship with the Word that are not mentioned in Gen. 1.180

Augustine’s ideas in Gn. litt about the role of angels in creation can be seen in

175 Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 1, 9.
176 Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 9, 29, 32.
177 My arguments here and above are original. However, some of Augustine’s ideas about angels and the scriptures he draws upon are discussed by O’Daly and Blowers, who offer helpful insights. O’Daly, Augustine’s ‘City of God’, pp. 139-140; Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, pp. 121-123.
178 Augustine, Gn. litt, II, 8, 16 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 170).
179 Hill translates ‘rationes’ as forms or ideas. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book II, 8, 16 – 8, 17; also 8, 18 – 19; see also Book I, 10, 20; Book IV, 32, 39 (Hill) (BA 48, p. 170).
180 Augustine discusses these ideas again in Gn. litt, Book IV, 24, 41; 31, 48 – 32, 50.
light of what he concludes about the creation of the angels in his ‘Homily 1’ on John and civ. Dei.\textsuperscript{181} There he correlates verses from the scriptures, including Ps. 148, another creation psalm, to establish that the angels had been created, even though their creation is not mentioned in Gen. 1. In ‘Homily 1’, he cites Ps. 148. 5, ‘He spoke and they were made; he gave the command, and they were created’, in discussing John 1. 1-3.\textsuperscript{182} He says that angels, and five other ‘spiritual creatures’, had been made ‘through the Word’ (John 1. 3), because these spiritual things are listed in Ps. 148 before the psalm says God spoke and they were made.\textsuperscript{183} In civ. Dei, he uses Ps. 148. 5 similarly to argue that God had created the angels, when God spoke and created the other aspects of the ‘heavens’ named in Ps. 148. 1-5, many of which also appear in Gen. 1, although the angels do not.\textsuperscript{184}

The spiritual creatures that were created through the Word, according to Augustine’s ‘Homily 1’ and his reading of John 1. 1-3 and Ps. 148. 1-5, are angels, archangels, and ‘thrones, dominions, powers, princeps’.\textsuperscript{185} Of these six entities, only the angels are explicitly named in Ps. 148, and none is in Gen. 1. However, all six are in a list of ‘invisible’ things in the ‘invisible world’ given by Basil in a hexaemeral homily, and Basil and Augustine add angels and archangels to what otherwise is a list of invisible things in heaven created by the Son / Christ Jesus, according to Col. 1. 16.\textsuperscript{186} Basil also mentions some of these entities in his On the Holy Spirit, where he cites Col. 1. 16 in discussing the creation, ‘in the beginning’,

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{181} The example here is from Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 9 (Babcock).
\textsuperscript{182} As I noted earlier, McCarthy identifies Ps. 148. 5, Ps. 32. 6, 9 (Vulgata, LXX), and Ps. 147. 15 as verses Augustine draws on from the psalms because these verses speak of the Word or words of God in acts of creation. Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 1, 5; M. McCarthy, ‘Creation through the Psalms’, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{183} Ps. 148. 1-5, which Augustine quotes in full in civ. Dei, is a call for the ‘heavens’ to praise the Lord, and the call includes the sun and moon and ‘all stars and light’, and waters above the heavens, which are all mentioned in Gen. 1. 1-19, up through the fourth day of creation, as well as the heights, angels, hosts, and ‘the highest heavens’ [‘caeli caelorum’], which are not named in Gen. 1. Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 1, 5; see also civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 9 (Babcock) (BA 35, p. 58); en. Ps., 148, 6.
\textsuperscript{184} Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 9 (Babcock) (BA 35, p. 58); see also en. Ps., 148, 6.
\textsuperscript{185} Augustine, Jo. ev. tr., Homily 1, 5; see also Homily 1, 9.
\textsuperscript{186} Basil’s list is ‘Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities or Powers’, which are from Col. 1. 16, and ‘Forces’, ‘hosts of Angels’, and ‘sovereign Archangels’. Basil of Caesarea, On the Hexaemeron, in Saint Basil: Exegetic Homilies, trans. and with an introduction by Agnes Clare Way, FotC, 46 (Washington DC: CUAP, 1963), 3-150 (Homily 1, 5).
of the ‘heavenly powers’ and ‘ministering spirits’, which include angels and archangels. By contrast, Ambrose mentions some, but not all six, of the entities in his own *The Holy Spirit*. Ambrose also speaks of angels, ‘Dominations’, and ‘Powers’ in his first *hexaemeral* homily, where he says angels were brought into being through the Son before the world were created, itself an interpretation of Gen. 1, and Ambrose, like Basil and Augustine, cites Col. 1. 16.

That Augustine and Basil include angels with the other entities in Col. 1. 16 may suggest that Basil was a source for Augustine. Basil also cites Ps. 103. 4, which he reads to be about angels, and Ps. 148. 2, which *is* about angels praising God, verses from the same creation psalms Augustine often cites, so Augustine and Basil draw in common on other scriptures about creation. Given that Col. 1. 16 says that ‘all things’ were created ‘through’ [*per*] and ‘in’ the Son / Jesus Christ, and John 1. 1-18 that ‘all things’ are created through the Word, who is the Son, the exegetical move of adding angels to the other entities in Col. 1. 16 to support the position that angels were created is not inappropriate. Basil, moreover, in a sermon, draws on Ps. 32. 6 (LXX), which attests to the roles of the word and spirit of God in creation and which Basil reads in light of John 1. 1-3, in saying that the angels had been brought into existence by the Word. So both Augustine

---

190 Basil, *On the Holy Spirit*, ch. 16, 38 (pp. 70-73)
191 The phrase ‘*per ipsum*’ is in Col. 1. 16 and John 1. 3, but, in one translation, the former is translated ‘by him’ and the latter ‘through him’, even though the Greek is ‘*di’ autou*’ for both. Here ‘through him’ is used for both. See John 1. 3 and Col. 1. 16 in Kinney, ed., *The Vulgate Bible, Vol VI*, pp. 472-473, 1060-1061; see also John 1. 3 in Nestle-Aland, *Novum Testamentum Graece*, edn 27 (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006).
192 Basil’s ‘Homily 15’ was noted above. He draws on John 1. 1 and implicitly on John 1. 3 in reading Ps. 32. 6 (LXX), which speaks of the roles of the word and spirit of God creation. Basil, *Exegetical Homilies*, Homily 15, 4; see also Rahlfs-Hanhart, *Septuaginta*, II, p. 31.
and Basil attribute the creation of the angels to the Word. On the other hand, the interpretative move that Augustine makes of giving angels a role in acts of creation adds more than one might infer from the passages upon which he draws.

In civ. Dei, Augustine’s arguments about angels also draw on Job 38. 7, which is situated within a lengthy text in Job about the created world and God. Augustine draws on the arguments cited above and Job 38. 7 to say that angels must have been created with the light on the first day (Gen. 1. 3), because Job 38. 7 says that angels praised God when ‘the stars were made’, and according to Gen. 1. 16-19, the stars were created on the fourth day, and thus angels must have been made before all the things in the ‘heavens’ named before then in Gen. 1.

Augustine’s exegetical methods and resulting interpretations are his own, but Basil and Ambrose also cite verses from Job 38 in their hexaemeral homilies, and Augustine had cited Job 38. 11 in conf. where he read it with John 1. 1-3. Ironically, Ambrose cites verses from Job 38. 4-11 but he omits 38. 7, the verse about the angels, and he used this passage to say that God had established all things through God’s majesty, ‘not by number, weight, and measures’. This represents two notable disagreements with Augustine’s views, on angels and on Augustine’s use of the triad of measure, number, and weight (from Wis. 11. 21), which may be signs that Augustine either was not drawing on or disagreed with Ambrose’s hexaemeral commentary.

The examples above illustrate that Augustine looked at Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 with other passages about creation, resulting in his adding two things not in Gen. 1 or other scriptures: the creation of angels with the light or spiritual creation on day one, and their role with the Word (and the forms) in creation. Augustine also says

---

193 As noted in Chapter 3, Job 38-41 contains the longest passages about creation in the Bible outside Gen. 1-3. Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 9 (Babcock).
194 This is an OL translation of the LXX verse. Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 9 (Babcock).
195 Basil cites Job 38. 6 for other purposes. Basil, On the Hexaemeron, Homily 1, 9.
197 See section 3.4 in Chapter 3 and Augustine, conf., Book IV, x, 15 (Chadwick).
198 Emphasis added. Ambrose use of this passage to say that God had not established things by number, weight, and measures was discussed in section 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3, Ambrose, ‘The Six Days of Creation’, Book I, 6, 22.
199 This was discussed in section 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3.
the angels were ’participants in the eternal light’, the ’immutable wisdom of God, by which all things were made’, the Word of God, and the ’only-begotten’ Son of God [’unigenitum Dei filium’]. Augustine says, too, that angels knew the Holy Spirit of the Word and the Father, ‘through the very presence’ of the Word. These statements suggest the angels had a relationship of ’participation’ in the Word / Son, beyond simply being in the presence of the Trinity.

One can say, as suggested earlier, that Augustine was too literal, and worked too hard to create a single voice, in his method of correlating scriptures. On the other hand, some of his ideas about angels and their creation are similar to Basil’s, and he and Basil draw on similar scriptures, so there is some precedent for his ideas. Even so, Augustine introduces his own interpretations by saying that the angels first saw the forms or ideas of things to be made in the Word, before things were created and differentiated. This gives angels a role in differentiating creation, which he otherwise attributes to all three Persons, but especially to the Word / Son, and it affects his answers to ’who’ was involved in acts of initial creation.

4.2.4.2 Measure, number, weight / order, and the Trinity

Similar concerns arise about the entities of measure, number, and weight / order that Augustine frequently discusses based on his adaptations of Wis. 11. 21. Here it will be asked whether Augustine is clear that these entities were neither co-existent with, nor ’in’, the Trinity. This question is analogous to the one I raised in Chapter 1 about Philo’s argument that the ’intelligible cosmos’ or the ’incorporeal ideas’ were ’in’ the Logos and thus ’in’ the mind of God.

Augustine himself, in reviewing the six days of creation as a whole in Gn. litt, poses questions about how measure, number, and weight relate to God, including whether they existed before God began to create, and ’where’ they were. He equivocates about whether God would have perceived these entities outside or within himself, but he establishes that they must have been created, and be ’in’

---

202 See the discussions about Philo in sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.5. See Philo, *Opif.*, 15-25.
203 Augustine, *Gn. litt.*, Book IV, 3, 7 – 6, 12 (Hill).
204 Augustine, *Gn. litt.*, Book IV, 3, 7 – 6, 12 (Hill).
God, because scripture says that all things that have been created are ‘in him’. So these entities are at least not eternally co-existent with the Trinity. However, while Augustine says that these entities were created, they ‘were not among the things that were arranged’ by God. He thus distinguishes between their having come into existence and whether they needed to be formed or ordered, which is an interesting distinction, given that Wis. 11. 21 says that God arranged or ordered all things in these three entities.

Augustine’s ideas about formless, differentiated, and perfected existence are again useful as a basis for evaluating his thinking. One could ask whether he was making an exception for the concepts of measure, number, and weight, by saying that they came into existence without needing to be differentiated, and that God (or the Trinity) used them in differentiating formless material. If this were true, it would mean that not all created things have to go through the process of coming into existence, being differentiated or formed, and being perfected.

Of greater concern with respect to ‘who’ was involved in acts of initial creation is that measure, number, and weight, like the angels, would have a role, with the Word / Son (and other Persons) in bringing about differentiated existence. These entities, moreover, would be ‘in’ the Trinity in some way. The latter concern is, again, similar to the concern with Philo’s hexaemeral commentary that the ‘ideas’ were in the Logos and the mind of God. Thus while the existence and roles in creation of these entities may be ‘questionable’ from a theological or scriptural perspective, Augustine is not unique, within hexaemeral traditions, in attributing roles in creation to entities other than God or the Trinity.

4.2.5 Closing analysis on the initial creation and trinitarian acts

Augustine’s exegetical methods for looking at scriptures about creation are appropriate theologically and scripturally, in his view, because they accord with his

---

205 Hill, Taylor, and Harrison say that his argument that these three are ‘in’ God could come from Rom. 11. 36. Hill also offers Col. 1. 16 as a possibility. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book IV, 3, 7 (Hill); Hill, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, p. 246 FN 12; J. Taylor, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, I, p. 248 FN 7; C. Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, pp. 101-102.
206 Augustine, Gn. litt, Book IV, 4, 10 (Hill).
207 See Wis. 11. 21 in Edgar and Kinney, The Vulgate Bible, Vol III, pp. 796-797.
criteria for interpreting Gen. 1, which included that multiple interpretations were allowed if they did not violate the Catholic faith. One could also ‘fill in the gaps’ about matters not addressed in the scriptures or draw on philosophical or scientific ideas, provided one did not violate the faith or the scriptures.

Augustine does not contradict the scriptures in his ideas about creation and economic acts of the Trinity. This is true even though he interprets Gen. 1. 1-5 as indicating the goodness of the Persons of the Trinity, when only the goodness of creation is attested by the text. It also is true despite his positing roles for angels in creation with the Word (and the forms), or his deciding when angels were created (with the light), matters not addressed in Gen. 1. 1-5. As I demonstrated above, Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1. 1-5 result from his exegetical method of correlating the texts of passages from scripture that are about creation. Contrary to the claims of scholars, like Gunton, that Augustine was too philosophical and not scriptural enough, Augustine, in his interpretations of Gen. 1. 1-5 and / or John 1. 1-3 that I analysed here, tried to reconcile what these passages say about creation and who was involved, with what is said in Job 38. 7; Ps. 103. 24 (104. 24); Ps. 148. 1-5; Wis. 11. 21; John 8. 25 (OL); 1 Cor. 1. 24; and Col. 1. 16.

The depth and breadth of Augustine’s knowledge of scriptures can be seen in his selection of these passages, which may also give clues to his other sources. First, Augustine stands within long traditions, illustrated in prior chapters here, of offering hexaemeral commentaries, and of interpreting the first verses of Genesis in light of John 1. 1-3 (and John 1. 1-3 is, itself, an interpretation of the beginning of Genesis). Moreover, he draws on John 1. 1-3 and Col. 1. 15-20, the two major New Testament passages that attest to the role of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in creation. Ps. 103 (104) and Ps. 148 are significant creation psalms, and Ps. 103 (104) and Job 38-41, within which Job 38. 7 is situated, are the longest passages about creation in the scriptures outside Gen. 1-3. Augustine’s use of these psalms has precedent in Basil’s work, and Basil and Ambrose cite Job 38. Augustine’s many uses of the triadic concepts of measure, number, and weight / order come

---

208 See the in-depth analysis of John 1. 1-18 in section 1.2 in Chapter 1.
209 Also of note are 1 Cor. 8. 6; Heb. 1. 1-2; and Rev. 3. 14.
from Wis. 11. 21, and Wisdom was virtually canonical for him. As I discussed in Chapter 3, these three concepts were known to Basil and Ambrose, whether from Wis. 11. 21 or other sources, and they also appear in Philo’s early works, although Augustine’s use of them in his ideas about creation and the Trinity is unique. Further, the scriptures he draws on (e.g., Gen. 1; John 1. 1-3; and Ps. 148. 5) attest to the involvement of the words or Word of God in acts of creation.

So Augustine’s ideas can be fairly said to be grounded in the scriptures, even when he adds ideas about the Word / Son giving differentiation or form to creation. One might ask whether Augustine was appropriate in granting equal weight to all these scriptures, but he was seeking to hear a single Word ['unum Verbum'], the exegetical principle he derived from Ps. 103 (104), itself a creation psalm. Given Augustine’s criteria that interpretations of Gen. 1 could not violate the ‘Catholic’ faith, one should assess whether the ideas about creation and the Trinity he derives in his interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 are consistent with earlier orthodox / catholic ideas. One crucial question relevant here is whether he defends both the unity and the distinctions among the Persons in their acts of creation. This is particularly important given the claims made by Gunton and others that Augustine over-emphasised both the unity of the Persons in economic acts and within the Trinity. Another question, which is a corollary to the first, is whether Augustine demonstrates that the Persons work ‘inseparably’, which Ayres deems a pro-Nicene principle, or through unity of operations. I treat these

210 See section 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3.
211 The examples I noted above of psalms Augustine draws on because they speak of God’s words in acts of creation are Ps. 148. 5, Ps. 32. 6, 9 (Vulgate, LXX), and Ps. 147. 15. See section 4.2.4.1 above and M. McCarthy, ‘Creation through the Psalms’, p. 201.
212 This was quoted earlier. Augustine, en. Ps., 103.4.1 (CCSL 40).
213 On Basil of Caesarea’s and Gregory of Nazianzus’s treatments of the unity and distinctions among the Persons, see sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 in Chapter 2.
215 As noted earlier, Ayres deems the principle of ‘inseparable operations’ to be one of
principles as being roughly equivalent, and Augustine himself attributes these concepts to the ‘Catholic’ faith.\textsuperscript{217}

Based on the evidence I offered above, one could criticise Augustine for not demonstrating sufficient differentiation between the roles of God and the Word / Son, or God and the Spirit. However, I have already presented my arguments in response to this potential criticism. I argued that Augustine, as with Irenaeus, Basil, and Gregory of Nyssa, shows that God has agency in acts of initial creation, even where roles are primarily attributed to the Word / Son or the Spirit. I also identified the roles Augustine posits as being both differentiated and shared in the bringing about of formless, differentiated, and perfected existence.\textsuperscript{218}

Finally, among the problems Augustine leaves on the table is that some of his ideas about the roles of the Word / Son in differentiating and giving form to creation may not have stood the test of time theologically, and they are not ‘personal’ roles such as one might attribute to Jesus Christ. The latter concern is raised because Gunton, based on the other doctrinal views Gunton draws on in looking at creation and the Trinity together, criticises Augustine for not being sufficiently christological. However, Augustine offers ideas about ‘what’ happened that cannot be attributed to Jesus Christ without some understanding of how Christ, as the pre-existent Word or Son, could have been involved in the initial creation.

One opportunity Augustine lays on the table, to be taken up below and in Chapter 5, is for the triadic aspects of initial existence and the associated capability of ‘dynamic abiding’ to be viewed as \textit{gifts} given to all creatures through economic trinitarian acts of \textit{creation}. This means that \textit{gifts} of creation can be valued in their own right, within the economy, because of the existence and creaturely agency

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216} See section 2.3 in Chapter 2 for examples of Basil’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s use of the principle of the unity of operations.
\item \textsuperscript{217} See section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 for an early example, in \textit{ep.} 11, 2, WSA, vol II / 1, of Augustine’s knowing the principle of inseparable operations, which he likely learned from Ambrose’s catechetical instruction. For a fifth century example, see \textit{Trin.}, Book I, 4, 7 – 5, 8. In both examples, Augustine attributes this principle to the ‘Catholic’ faith.
\item \textsuperscript{218} See section 4.2.2 and Appendix B.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
they bring into being and help to maintain, without requiring that other doctrines be
introduced into discussions of creation and the Trinity. Another opportunity is to
apply Augustine’s ideas about the goodness and beauty of creation and of the
Persons of the Trinity to his reflections on the attributes of the immanent Trinity.

4.3 Ongoing existence: ‘dynamic abiding’, creaturely desire and agency,
and ‘gifts’ of the economic Trinity

In this section, my focus moves from Augustine’s reflections on initial creation
and trinitarian acts to illustrations of how he applies his ideas about ‘dynamic
abiding’ to ongoing creaturely existence. As I have shown, Augustine associated
the capability of continuing to exist with the act of perfecting initial existence, which
he attributed to God and the Holy Spirit, and which he implied was related to the
goodness of creation and the Trinity. In this section I will argue that Augustine,
in his mature reflections, offers evidence that ‘dynamic abiding’ is an ontological
and functional aspect of triadic nature ‘given’ to all creatures that gives them some
desire and agency for maintaining their own existence.

The concept of ‘dynamic abiding’, as I interpret it here, represents a minor and
undeveloped aspect of Augustine’s thinking, although it appears in his works. This
aspect of his thinking is not given much attention by scholars, but it can be seen by
looking at his trinitarian ideas through the lens of looking at his ontological ideas
about creation. This doctrinal distinction is important, and it results from restricting
the lens used here to Augustine’s ideas that are about creation or existence and
the Trinity. Notably, ‘dynamic abiding’, a capability within a creature that gives it
agency, differs from his ideas about the divine ‘administration’ of or ‘providential
governance’ of creation, where the ongoing agency is more on the part of the
Trinity and can come from outside the creature. As Blowers describes Augustine’s
views on administration, and Dunham on providential governance, his ideas

---

219 See my analysis in section 4.2.2 of Augustine’s second view of triadic existence.
220 This line of argument was begun in section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3. See also section 4.2.
221 This is Blowers’s terminology, which I will explain here. Blowers, Drama of the Divine
Economy, pp. 106-107, 155.
222 This is Dunham’s terminology, which I also will explain. Dunham, The Trinity and
Creation in Augustine, pp. 81-83.
223 As Blowers describes Augustine’s views on the two stages of creation, they are based
about these matters arise in his interpretations of what happened in a ‘second’ stage of creation, after the six days of creation, and go beyond theological ideas that are primarily about creation, existence, and the Trinity.

Two areas of Augustine’s thinking may be related, in ways, to his ideas about ‘dynamic abiding’, although I will demonstrate the distinctions among them. I will discuss these briefly here and will return to them in my concluding analysis at the end of this section. First, like ‘dynamic abiding’, Augustine’s ‘seminal principles’ (or ‘seminal reasons’) are ontological aspects of creatures that he implies are given through trinitarian acts of creation. However, the seminal principles are the cause of the development or growth of a creature and the propagation of creatures and species. These aspects of creaturely life are not the same as a creature’s desire and ability to maintain its own existence, which is what the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’ gives to a creature. If a connection exists between the seminal principles and ‘dynamic abiding’, it may be because Augustine cites Wis. 11. 21 (the verse about measure, number, and weight) when he discusses these ideas. I will examine this in my primary example below, and Blowers and Harrison

---

on the division he makes in Gn. litt between the first six days of creation and the seventh day when God rested. These two stages of creation, according to Blowers, are: 1) ‘pre-temporal divine causality’ or ‘conditio’ [initial creation here]; and 2) the ‘actual product [of creation] and continuing administration’ or ‘administratio’, which began after God rested. Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, pp. 106-107, 155; see also Augustine, Gn litt, Book V, 11, 27; V, 20, 40.

Dunham refers to Augustine’s second stage of creation as the period of trinitarian ‘providential governance’ of creation, according to Augustine’s interpretations of the two creation accounts in Genesis (Gen. 1. 1 – 2.3 and Gen. 2. 4 –3. 24). Dunham, The Trinity and Creation in Augustine, pp. 81-83.

This is Blowers’s terminology for Augustine’s ‘rationes seminales’. As Blowers explains these principles, they are about the ‘propagation’ and ‘historical unfolding’ of creatures in ‘actual creation’ (not initial creation). Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, pp. 156-159.

This is Harrison’s terminology for the ‘rationes seminales’. Harrison, who draws on Agaësse and Solignac, describes ‘seminal reasons’ as being responsible for the growth of all creatures (after the initial creation). C. Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, pp. 101-103; see also P. Agaësse and A. Solignac, translation, introduction, and notes, La Genèse au Sens Littéral en Douze Livres, by Augustine, 2 vols, Bibliothèque Augustinienne, BA 48 and BA 49 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000-2001), pp. 657-667.

See, e.g., Augustine, Gn. litt, Book IV, 33, 51-52; Book VI, 10, 17 – 11, 18; Book IX, 17, 31 – 18, 35; Augustine, Trin., Book III, 9, 16.

According to Blowers, Augustine’s discussions of the seminal principles and the capability ‘to emerge and develop’ are ‘closely associated’ with Augustine’s references to
have established the significance of this verse to Augustine’s ideas about the seminal principles. Second, ‘dynamic abiding’ also may be related to Augustine’s concepts of ‘natural’ or ‘voluntary’ providence. My analysis, however, will show that ‘dynamic abiding’, according to Augustine himself, represents a different type of God’s providence that is specifically about continued existence.

The primary passage I will analyse here is from Augustine’s *civ. Dei*, V. I partly agree with Boniface Ramsey that the main purpose of the ‘natural trinities’ or ‘triads’ Augustine draws upon here, which Ramsey says ‘hint at the divine Trinity’, is to demonstrate ‘the underlying orderly structure of creation on all its levels’. However, Augustine is not simply speaking of order; he also names triads that reflect ontological aspects of creatures that give them agency or movement. This point also applies to Du Roy’s analysis of this passage. Du Roy cites this passage as evidence that Augustine, in his mature works, was still reflecting on the ‘création trinitaraire’ (trinitarian creation), and doing so by drawing on Wis. 11. 21. He identifies that Augustine’s triadic views of creation include elements of order or structure as well as other ontological elements that are of interest to me.

Wis. 11. 21 and the measure, number, and weight given to creatures by the Creator.
Blowers, *Drama of the Divine Economy*, p. 156.

Harrison sees associations between Augustine’s use of the triad of measure, number and weight / order, stemming from Wis. 11. 21, and his ideas about form and being, and also with his ideas about the seminal principles. She cites an example from *Trin* where he alludes to the seminal principles and draws on Wis. 11. 21. C. Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation*, pp. 101-103; see also Augustine, *Trin.*, Book III, 9, 16.

This passage is quoted in part by van Bavel and in full by Du Roy. Du Roy’s inclusion of this passage in Augustine’s citations of Wis. 11. 21 is also noted by Harrison. Augustine, *civ. Dei*, I, Book V, 11 (Babcock) (CCSL 47); see also Tarsicius Van Bavel, ‘The Creator and the Integrity of Creation in the Fathers of the Church especially in Saint Augustine’, *Augustinian Studies*, 21 (1990), 1-33 (pp. 8, 25 FN 32); Du Roy, *L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin*, pp. 423-424, including p. 424 FN 1; C. Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation*, p. 109 FN 71.


See Du Roy, *L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin*, pp. 421-422.
focus will be on those ontological aspects of nature that permit movement and enable creatures to try to maintain their existence. As I will argue, these aspects are typically associated with the third elements Augustine names in his triads, and he implies that these third elements come from or are given by the Holy Spirit.235

In this passage, Augustine begins by speaking of the Trinity, but then speaks primarily about creation. He states that the ‘supreme and true God, ... with his Word and his [Holy] Spirit [‘cum Verbo suo et Spiritu sancto’], which three are one, is the one almighty God [‘Deus unus omnipotens], the creator and maker of every soul and every body’.236 Through the triads Augustine goes on to name, he tacitly invites inferences to be drawn about the Trinity from creation. He writes:

From him [‘a quo’] comes all mode [‘modus’], all form [‘species’], and all order [‘ordo’], from him comes measure, number, and weight [Wis. 11. 21]; from him comes all that exists in nature [‘est quidquid naturaliter est’], whatever its kind [‘generis’] and whatever its rank in value. From him come the seeds of forms, the forms of seeds, and the motion of both seeds and forms.237 He gave [‘dedit’] also to flesh its origin [‘originem’], its beauty [‘pulchritudinem’], its health, its fruitfulness in propagation, the disposition of its limbs, and their apt and harmonious arrangement. He also gave [‘dedit’] memory, sensation, and appetite [‘adpetitum’] to the irrational soul; and to the rational soul, in addition, he gave mind, intelligence, and will [‘uoluntatem’]. Neither heaven nor earth, neither angel nor human being, not even the inner organs of the smallest and lowliest animal, not even a bird’s feather or a tiny flower in the grass or a leaf on a tree, has he left [‘dereliquit’] without a harmony and, as it were, a kind of peace in the disposition of its parts.238

Augustine’s use of ‘a quo’ refers to the Creator / Trinity he identifies in his opening statement, and his ideas are related to trinitarian acts of creation by his naming of the triadic aspects and attributes that come ‘from’ or are ‘given’ to all creatures by the Creator / Trinity. He also makes the intriguing statement that creatures have not been ‘left’, or more aptly stated abandoned or forsaken,239

235 My arguments that the third elements in the triad are implicitly related to the Spirit in Augustine’s work come in part from my reading of Du Roy, but also from my own analysis.
237 This statement, and his speaking of the gift of the fruitfulness in propagation in this passage, are likely allusions to Augustine’s ideas about the seminal principles.
239 Babcock, as seen in the quote, translates ‘dereliquit’ as ‘left’, but the other meanings given by Stelten of abandoned, forsaken, or deserted, in addition to ‘left’, seem more appropriate here. Bettenson uses both ‘abandoned’ and ‘left’ in his translation. See
without having been given some capacity for the disposition of their parts, which implies creaturely agency as well as economic trinitarian action. Augustine suggests creatures have some capacity for ‘motion’ because of the seeds and forms ‘given’ to them. He also is explicit about creatures having agency, although he does not say for what, when he says that irrational beings have been given ‘appetite’ [adpetitum] and rational beings ‘will’. I will propose other meanings of ‘adpetitum’ below, in discussing this aspect of ontological nature, which Augustine implicitly associates with the Holy Spirit by mentioning it third in a triad.

Augustine’s assertion that creatures are given their origin, form, and order, and their beauty, by the Creator / Trinity, are similar to his fourth century ideas about existence, differentiation, and ‘ordered abiding’ being given to created things.²⁴⁰ His interest in order and harmony within creatures also is reminiscent of ‘ordered abiding’, which, as I argued in Chapter 3, mainly entailed acts of the Spirit, but included the dynamic element that a creature could try to remain ‘as it was’.²⁴¹ This, I argued earlier, was an immanent ontological and functional aspect of a creature, given through acts of creation, which gave the creature some agency to maintain existence.²⁴² Now Augustine also can be seen to say that creatures are ‘given’ a capability of ‘dynamic abiding’, using my terminology for his ideas. I will develop my position on ‘dynamic abiding’ by looking again at his statement that the Creator / Trinity ‘gave’ memory, sensation, and appetite [‘adpetitum’] to the irrational soul, and mind, intelligence, and will [‘uoluntatem’] to the rational soul.

As I suggested above, more fitting translations of ‘adpetitum’ than ‘appetite’²⁴³ may exist that better convey Augustine’s ideas about creatures having the desire

---


²⁴⁰ See section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 and Appendix B. As I discussed in section 3.2.1, Harrison establishes connections between beauty, form, existence, and goodness in Augustine’s early works, and she also cites du Roy. See C. Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, pp. 36-42, also p. 109 FN 71; du Roy, L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, pp. 281 FN 4, also 421-424.

²⁴¹ This was argued in section 3.2.2 and was supported by TeSelle’s analysis of Augustine’s early ideas. See also TeSelle, Augustine, pp. 116-123, especially p. 120.

²⁴² Both Babcock (whose translation I quoted above) and Bettenson translate ‘adpetitum’ as ‘appetite’. Augustine, civ. Dei, I, Book V, 11 (Babcock, Bettenson).
for and some capability to seek their continued existence. These options are based on how Augustine uses *adpetitus* and similar works in his writings.

When Augustine uses ‘*adpetitus*’ or ‘*adpetere*’ in an early work, the former is translated ‘desire’ and the latter to ‘desire’ or ‘try, strive for, look for’, but he used these words with respect to human beings or the human soul.\(^ {244} \) According to Du Roy, one of Augustine’s early triads (measure, beauty, and order) evolved to being two triads in his mature views, one that applied to animals and the other to rational souls.\(^ {245} \) The former was the triad of life (or existence), sensation, and *desire*, and the latter was the triad of existence, knowledge, and love.\(^ {246} \) Thus, for the mature Augustine, non-human creatures were able to experience desires analogous to human desires, something I will illustrate from his works below.

Moreover, ‘*petitus*’ means having an inclining towards,\(^ {247} \) or a desire or request,\(^ {248} \) meanings associated with ‘*adpetitus*’. Augustine uses ‘*petit*’ in *Trin.*, in saying that a created thing is ‘some one thing’, is ‘fashioned in some form’, and ‘seeks or maintains [*petit aut tenet*] some order, like the weights or proper places of bodies, and the loves or pleasures of souls’.\(^ {249} \) I cited this passage earlier because it reprises Augustine’s early ideas about ‘ordered abiding’. Here it shows that Augustine moves beyond the concept of ‘ordered abiding’, which implies that most of the agency for action comes from without a creature. He suggests that creatures have some desire for and ability to seek to maintain their existence.\(^ {250} \) Similarly, he uses ‘*adpetitus*’ in *civ. Dei* in saying that all creatures ‘seek or hold

---


\(^ {245} \) Du Roy, *L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin*, pp. 422-423.

\(^ {246} \) Du Roy says the triad for (non-human) animals is ‘vie, sensation, et désir’, and for rational souls, ‘existence, connaissance et amour’. Du Roy, *L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin*, pp. 422-423.

\(^ {247} \) See D. P. Simpson, *Cassell’s Latin Dictionary*, p. 446.


\(^ {249} \) Augustine, *Trin.*, Book VI, 10, 12 (CCSL, 50, VI, 10, 12, 42).

\(^ {250} \) Du Roy cites this passage in discussing differences between the triads Augustine uses for non-human animals and rational souls in his mature works. Harrison cites this passage in her analysis of Augustine’s ideas about beauty and his triadic ideas. Augustine, *Trin.*, Book VI, 10, 12; see also Du Roy, *L’Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin*, p. 423 FN 1; C. Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation*, p. 10.
Thus, in light of his early and late usages of ‘adpetitus’ and related forms, one can see that the mature Augustine attributes desiring or seeking to all creatures.

Augustine offers several illustrations ‘of dynamic abiding’ and a creature’s agency in desiring or seeking to continue its existence. In these examples, he refers to triadic aspects of creation through his uses of Wis. 11. 21, or by naming the triadic aspects of creation I defined in my analysis above or in Chapter 3.

In Gn. litt, and a similar passage in civ. Dei, Augustine addresses questions about why animals harm each other, and his realism is evident when he says some animals ‘are the proper diet of others’. What also is evident is that Augustine’s earlier feelings, which he had expressed in conf., X, about the ‘curiosity’, ‘distractions’, or ‘temptations’ he experienced in watching predators catch their prey no longer appear to concern him. Now Augustine says that all things, ‘as long as they continue to be [‘quamdiu sunt’], have their own proper measures, numbers, and order [‘ordines’]. He implies that these matters of life and death are ‘given’ by God or through economic trinitarian acts, because of his reference to the triad in Wis. 11. 21. He explains that all creatures do ‘whatever they are capable of … to safeguard their bodily, time-bound health and welfare’, and those that are preyed upon ‘look after themselves’ by ‘their ability’ to engage in

251 He uses this word a few times here with respect to non-human and inanimate creatures and human beings. Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 28 (Babcock) (CCSL 48).
252 See section 4.2.2 for my analysis of formless, differentiated, and perfected existence. In Chapter 3, I analysed Augustine’s use of measure, number, and weight / order, from Wis. 11. 21, in addition to analysing his reflections on the triad of existence, differentiation, and ‘ordered abiding’. See sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, and 3.2.2. See also Appendix B.
253 Augustine, Gn. litt, Book III, 16, 25.
254 Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XII, 4-5.
255 In civ. Dei, he likewise says that ‘the weaker succumb to the stronger’. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book III, 16, 25 (Hill); see also Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XII, 4.
256 As discussed in section 3.4 in Chapter 3, he had been fascinated, in ways he deemed inappropriate because they did not cause him to move in his reflections from creation to God or the Trinity in the right way, with watching lizards and spiders, each in their own way, capturing flies, or animals pursued in a ‘hunt’. Augustine, conf., Book X, xxxv (57).
257 This is Taylor’s translation. Hill translates ‘ordines’ as ‘destinies’, because he follows one of Augustine’s practice of associating ‘ordino’ with ‘weight’ and extending weight ‘to cover the natural tendency of everything towards its proper place’. Augustine, Gn. litt, Book III, 16, 25 (Taylor) (BA 48, p. 252); see also Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XII, 5; Hill, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, p. 231 FN 24.
their various responses (e.g., fighting back, taking flight, hiding).\textsuperscript{258}

In \textit{civ. Dei}, he offers another example of ‘dynamic abiding’ and agency, with connections to triadic aspects of creation, when he says that ‘all natures, \textit{because they exist} [‘sunt’] and therefore have a mode [‘modum’] of their own, a form [‘speciem’] of their own, and a certain peace with themselves, are certainly good’, and they ‘preserve [‘custodiunt’] their own being to the degree that they have \textit{received it},’ which again indicates that this is a gift.\textsuperscript{259} These desires and agency apply even to creatures one might expect not to possess them. This can be seen when Augustine says, elsewhere in \textit{civ. Dei}, that all creatures ‘show that they want to exist [‘esse uelle’], and he speaks of the movements of ‘irrational’ animals to avoid death, and actions taken by trees and shrubs, ‘in their fashion’, to ‘preserve their existence [‘esse conseruent’].\textsuperscript{260}

The section in \textit{civ. Dei} from which this last example was taken will be used in a final ‘bridge’ example to aid in making the transition to section 4.4. Augustine goes on to say that ‘all corporeal things have causes that lie hidden in nature’, and all things ‘present their forms [‘formas’], which give beauty [‘formosa’] to the visible structure of this world, to be perceived by the senses’.\textsuperscript{261} Here again one can see that the concerns Augustine had expressed in \textit{conf.} about being attracted to things he could see in the world, including ‘beautiful and varied forms [\textit{pulchras formas et uarias}] in creation,’\textsuperscript{262} did not represent permanent concerns that detracted from his interests in the beauty and existence of creatures. With that said, Augustine does acknowledge a special place for human beings in creation because they are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt.}, Book III, 16, 25 (Hill).
\item \textsuperscript{259} Italics added. Augustine, \textit{civ. Dei}, II, Book XII, 5 (CCSL 48).
\item \textsuperscript{260} Augustine makes similar statements in a sermon on Ps. 148, one of the creation psalms cited above. He says that even ‘tiny’ creatures have their ‘bodily parts’ arranged [‘ordinem’] so that they ‘enjoy coordination, life, and movement’; love life and seek pleasures; and seek to avoid death and ‘painful conditions’; and flourish ‘in the mode [‘motu’] proper to’ themselves. He is implicitly referring to the triad in Wis. 11. 21 but is not as trinitarian as in the examples cited above here. However, this sermon is one of Augustine’s works in which he may be alluding to both Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5, and he speaks of the beauty of creation. Augustine, \textit{civ. Dei}, II, Book XI, 27 (Babcock) (CCSL 48); see also Augustine, \textit{en. Ps.}, 148, 10, also 2-3, 13-15 (CCSL 40).
\item \textsuperscript{261} Augustine, \textit{civ. Dei}, II, Book XI, 27 (Babcock) (CCSL 48).
\item \textsuperscript{262} Augustine, \textit{conf.}, Book X, xxxiv, 51 (Chadwick) (CCSL 27, X, 33 (51).
\end{itemize}
created in the image of their creator, ‘the eternal, true, and beloved Trinity’. He then implicitly refers to the Trinity when he writes:

And the things below us [human beings] would not exist at all, nor would they be shaped by any form [‘specie’], nor would they seek or hold [‘uel adpeterent uel tenerent’] to any order [‘ordinem’], if they had not been made by him who supremely is, who is supremely wise, and who is supremely good. As we run through all the things that he made in such marvelous stability, then, let us gather up the traces [‘vestigia’] of himself that he left more deeply impressed [‘inpressa’] in some places, less deeply in others.

This is a ‘bridge’ example to section 4.4 because the relationship Augustine describes is between created things and the Trinity, understood in economic and immanent terms. He implies that created things receive their existence, form and beauty, and order from the Trinity, and he says that the Trinity has ‘left’ traces impressed in their nature. However, this is not natural theology because these are not traces of the immanent Trinity but rather the evidence that exists – in triadic aspects of creation – of trinitarian acts. In speaking of the one who supremely is and is supremely wise and good, Augustine alludes to God / the Father as the giver of existence, the Word / Son / Wisdom of form, and the Spirit of the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’ or of seeking [‘adpeterent’] or maintaining order.

In drawing my analysis to a close in this section, I will address the question I raised earlier about whether similarities exist between ‘dynamic abiding’ and either ‘natural’ or ‘voluntary’ providence, and I will revisit the ‘seminal principles’.

In *Gn. litt*, Augustine, in commenting on Gen. 2, describes ‘natural’ activity as God’s ‘hidden management’ within a creature, by which God ‘also gives growth to trees and herbs’, while ‘voluntary’ activity is attributed to people (and angels) and includes aiding in the cultivation or growth of things from outside those things. Augustine offers a similar discussion in *Trin.* of angels and people aiding in the growth of created things from outside through ‘secondary causes’ (e.g., farming or

---

265 This example will be revisited in section 4.4.1 in discussing how Augustine' treats the attributes of the Trinity in his ideas about simplicity.
266 Augustine, *Gn. litt*, Book VIII, 9, 17; see also Dunham, *The Trinity and Creation in Augustine*, pp. 82-83; C. Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation*, pp. 127-129.
agricultural activities). He says that God has given creatures the ability to be cultivated, and this enables the ‘unfolding’ of the ‘measures and numbers and weights’ within them which were ‘secretly assigned [‘acceperunt’] to them by him who has arranged all things in measure and number and weight’ [Wis. 11. 21].

This ‘unfolding’, like the activities stemming from the ‘semenal principles’, is related to creaturely development, cultivation, or propagation, and while the potential for measures, numbers, and weights to be unfolded is part of a creature’s nature, the agency for the unfolding comes from without. By contrast, ‘dynamic abiding’, as I have defined and illustrated it, is an ontological and functional capability within a creature that gives it some agency in desiring and seeking to continue its own existence. This is not the same goal as growth, development, or propagation.

‘Dynamic abiding’, the seminal principles, natural providence, and voluntary providence may all be related to providence, but they are distinct, and support for this comes from Augustine. He distinguishes between the work of providence by which God ‘set up natures in order for them to be [‘ut sint’], and ‘that other [work of providence] by which he administers as he may wish the natures he established as he wished’.

Both the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’ and the seminal principles are ‘given’ to creatures in order for them ‘to be’, and both reside within a creature. But the former gives them agency in desiring and seeking to preserve their own existence. So the gifts of existence and of continued existence go together and are about the life of an individual creature itself.

In sum, Augustine’s ideas about ‘dynamic abiding’ and creatures having desire and agency for continuing their existence are theological, ontological, and ‘realistic’ ideas that can be seen by looking at his ideas about creation itself and trinitarian.

267 Augustine, Trin., Book III, 8, 13 – 9, 18.
268 This is Hill’s translation. Hill’s translation of ‘acceperunt’ as ‘assigned’ differs from the translation ‘received’, which is the translation offered by Stephen McKenna and Harrison and a more typical dictionary definition. However, whether ‘assigned’ or ‘received’ is the better meaning, either indicates that creatures were given these attributes by God, and Augustine’s uses of Wis. 11. 21 elsewhere would suggest that the Trinity may be implied. Augustine, Trin., Book III, 9, 16 (Hill) (CCSL 50, p. 143); see also Augustine, Trin., Book III, 9, 16 (McKenna); C. Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, pp. 102-103; Stelten, Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin, p. 4; D. P. Simpson, Cassell’s Latin Dictionary, p. 6.
acts of creation. These ontological and functional aspects of a creature’s nature are ‘given’ to creatures by the Creator / Trinity, implicitly by the Spirit because Augustine typically names these capabilities third in the triads he mentions. His implicit and explicit suggestions that existence itself, and continued existence, are gifts, as are the other things given by the Trinity through economic trinitarian acts, will be among the ‘fruitful’ ideas to be discussed in Chapter 5.

4.4 Triadic aspects of the human mind and the ‘simplicity’ of the Trinity

In this section, my focus moves from triadic aspects of initial existence and creaturely existence and agency, to the human mind and the immanent Trinity. My analysis will follow the sequence and content of Augustine’s commentary in the last book in Trin. (Trin., XV), supplemented by his ideas from other parts of Trin., civ. Dei, and some sermons and letters. I will continue to use the method of looking at Augustine’s trinitarian theology in light of his ideas about creation. Thus the overall direction of this chapter has moved from Gn. litt to Trin., and from trinitarian acts of creation to the immanent Trinity.

At the outset of Trin., XV, Augustine quotes Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5 (in full). As I have argued, these passages are among the foundations of Augustine’s belief that one can draw inferences about the Trinity from creation. Augustine cites these passages in telling his readers that he had not been ‘wasting time … in first searching creation for signs of that supreme Trinity we are looking for when we are looking for God’, but now his focus is on the ‘rational or intellectual soul’ or mind in human beings, which is the ‘image’ of the creator and of the ‘triad’. He will see whether he can demonstrate, according to the scriptures and reason, that the nature of God, the creator, is a ‘triad’ (‘trinitas’), but he is cautious about being able to do so. He thus begins Trin., XV with triadic aspects of the human mind,

---

270 Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 2, 3.
271 Augustine uses ‘mind’ (‘mens’) and ‘consciousness’ (‘animus’) to refer to the human soul, by contrast to ‘anima’, the soul shared by people and ‘beasts’, and he says that ‘animus’ is the aspect in which a human being ‘excels other animals’. See Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 1, 1; see also 2, 3 (CCSL 50 A, pp. 460, 462).
272 Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 1, 1.
273 Augustine, Trin., Book XIV, 19, 25; see also Book I, 7, 14; 8, 18.
274 Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 1, 1 (CCSL 50 A, p. 460); see also 4, 6.
and he summarises his prior explorations of such triads. The triads themselves are not of primary interest to my arguments, but I will cite memory, understanding, and love and memory, understanding, and will in my analysis.

My critical analysis will focus on an area of Augustine’s thinking that is key to understanding his answers to his own question of whether something can be inferred about the Trinity from the triadic aspects he posits in the human mind. This is the relationship between his ideas about divine simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations within the Trinity. I will approach this by beginning with his arguments or assertions in Trin., XV. I will argue that his ideas about attributes and acts warrant more attention among Augustine scholars, because they add dimensions to his trinitarian reflections that are more ‘qualitative’ and which can be viewed in light of his ideas about creation and the Trinity.

4.4.1 Simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations within the Trinity

As Augustine explains in Trin. and civ. Dei, the principle of divine simplicity requires that what one can say about God must fit ‘the whole trinity which the one God is and each of the persons in this Trinity’, which means that either the Trinity, or each of the Father, Son, and Spirit, must be said to do the same things (e.g., to ‘live’ or ‘understand’), and to both possess and be the same attributes. In civ. Dei, he also explains that a ‘being’ is ‘simple’ if ‘it is what it has’, and cannot ‘lose’ anything it has, which means an attribute cannot be lost, which is not true for created nature. Another way of saying this is that the substance of the Trinity is

---

275 Augustine explores triadic aspects of the human mind or soul in Trin., VIII – XIV, and he summarises his ideas in Trin., XV, 3, 4-5.
276 This triad will be cited below. See Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 7, 12.
277 This triad will be cited below. Augustine introduces memory, understanding, and will in Trin., X, and also speaks of this triad in ep. 169. See Augustine, Trin., Books X, 11, 17 – 12, 19; XV, 3, 5; XV, 7, 12; XV, 20, 39; Augustine, ep. 169, 2, 6, WSA, II / 3.
278 What ‘qualitative’ means here will be explained in section 4.4.2.
279 In the final book of his earlier conf., Augustine had offered a simpler statement about divine simplicity. There he had said, in addressing God: ‘You alone are in absolute simplicity. To you it is not one thing to live, another to live in blessed happiness, because you are your own blessedness.’ Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 5, 7-8; 6, 9; see also civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 10; conf., Book XIII, iii (4) (Chadwick).
280 Emphasis added. Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 10 (Babcock); see also Augustine, Trin., Book V, 4, 5 – 5, 6.
the same as the attributes or ‘qualities’ ascribed to God or the Persons. Moreover, no Person is a quality for another, and among the examples Augustine gives are that the Son is not the wisdom for the Father, but all three Persons are wisdom,281 and the Spirit is not (alone) the love for the Father and the Son.282 Augustine’s ideas about the simplicity of the substance of the Trinity are thus related to the attributes or qualities of the Persons; to their acts or what they ‘do’; and, as will be seen, also to their relations.

I will begin my analysis by comparing Augustine’s positions on simplicity with those held by others whose works I analysed in Part I. I will support and clarify my arguments by applying Augustine’s definitions, which I just articulated, to his ideas about creation and the Trinity that I have analysed thus far in Part II. This method will allow me to demonstrate how his ideas about creation and trinitarian acts of creation relate to his ideas about simplicity, attributes, and acts within the Trinity.

In Radde-Gallwitz’s assessment, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa would have been unlikely to have accepted Augustine’s view that the substance and the attributes ascribed to the Trinity are the same, which Radde-Gallwitz describes as a ‘vastly more sophisticated version’ of the ‘identity thesis’ held by Eunomius (this stated that ‘every term one attributes to God names God’s essence or substance’).283 Based on my analysis in Chapter 2, one can view Eunomius’s ‘identity thesis’ as related to Eunomius’s belief that names used for God say something about God’s substance.284 For Augustine, however, based on his own ideas about simplicity, the ‘identity thesis’ would apply to all attributes ascribed to the Persons, not just

---

281 Augustine, *Trin.*, Book XV, 4, 6 – 6, 9; see also *Trin.*, Book VII, 1, 1 – 1, 3; *civ. Dei*, II, Book XI, 10.
those of being ‘unbegotten’ or ‘begotten’ that were pivotal for Eunomius.  

For Augustine, for example, if the name or title ‘Wisdom’ is used for the Word / Son / Jesus Christ, or ‘Divine Goodness’ for the Spirit, or one ascribes goodness to a Person or beauty to God, one is saying something about the substance of the Trinity and ‘each’ Person, because the Trinity ‘as a whole’ and the Persons have to ‘be’ and ‘possess’ the same attributes. This is a common understanding of his ideas about simplicity, but it raises visibility to the goodness and beauty Augustine ascribes to creation and the Trinity, as I have shown in my analysis of his ideas about trinitarian acts, and which I will pursue further below.

Moreover, when Augustine speaks of the one ‘who supremely is, who is supremely wise, and who is supremely good,’ as in the ‘bridge’ example in the previous section, he should be seen, by applying his own principles about simplicity, to be attributing supreme existence, wisdom, and goodness to the Father, Son, and Spirit, respectively. However, he is not saying that the other Persons are not also supremely these attributes. Augustine’s practice of implicitly referring to each Person with respect to attributes, while referring to God as the subject of his discussion, is analogous to his practice of suggesting that the triadic aspects of formless, differentiated, and perfected existence are given by God / the Father, the Son / Word, and the Spirit, even though Augustine depicts all three as involved in ‘giving’ these gifts through economic acts of creation.

Augustine’s ideas about simplicity and attributes also can be compared to the Platonist versions of simplicity held by Philo and Athanasius. For Philo, simplicity required that God not be a ‘composite’ of parts or ‘mixed’ with anything, because anything mixed with God would either ‘lessen’ God or be equal or superior to God, which is not possible. I showed that Athanasius drew on a similar view of simplicity in his arguments that the Spirit could not be a creature and must be the

---

285 On Eunomius’s views, see below here and section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2.
286 See the discussions in section 4.2 and Augustine, *Gn. litt.*, Book I, 6, 12 (Taylor).
288 See section 4.2 above and Appendix B on triadic aspects of creation and the Persons.
same nature as the Father and Son. Augustine’s view that attributes have to be ascribed to all the Persons and to the Trinity as a whole might be based on the need to say that the divine substance is not a composite or mix of attributes. However, Augustine’s ideas about substance and attributes are generally considered to be influenced by his adaptation of the Aristotelian principle that God’s substance can have no ‘accidents’, because ‘accidents’, which can be added or lost, can cause a substance to change.

Athanasius also had applied the principle of simplicity to the economic Trinity in saying that all three Persons were ‘entirely given to creating and making’ and had only one ‘activity’. The examples I cited of living or understanding in Augustine’s definition of simplicity are not about economic acts, but rather attributes or acts of the Trinity (living) or aspects of the human mind (understanding). However, his position is that all Persons do the same things – that is, he did hold to the principle of the inseparable operation of the Trinity in all its works, which he attributes to the

291 This suggestion is based on Holmes’s discussion of simplicity, including Eunomius’s views. TeSelle and Ayres note that for Augustine, there is no compositeness in God. See S. Holmes, ‘Classical Trinity: Evangelical Perspective’, pp. 40-41; TeSelle, Augustine, p. 302; Ayres, ‘Augustine on the Trinity’, in The Oxford Handbook of The Trinity, p. 126.
294 On ‘living’ being one of attributes, see Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 5, 7 – 6, 9.
'Catholic' faith and Ayres deems a pro-Nicene principle related to simplicity. Ayres also points out that Augustine viewed Aristotle’s ‘category’ of ‘action’ as the one category that could be applied to God ‘without qualification’. However, from the evidence I am presenting, one can see that Augustine’s views on simplicity, acts, and attributes are influenced by more than his adaptations of Aristotelian principles about substance and ‘accidents’. Augustine himself, in illustrating his applications of the ‘categories’ to God, gives an example of how ‘action’ relates to God and creation when he says that God can be understood ‘to be … without any change in himself making changeable things’. Augustine’s premises that attributes must be possessed by and acts done by all the Persons would not, in themselves, allow for inferring distinctions within the Trinity. However, Augustine allows distinctions to be posited if they are about what is said about a Person in relation to another Person; these distinctions neither say something about the substance of the Trinity nor are ‘accidents’. In his various examples, names or words that designate relation include Father and Son; the Word ‘of God’ for the Son; ‘begetter’ and ‘begotten’; and the ‘proceeding’ of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. Many of these designate ‘modes of origin’, to use terminology I established in Chapter 2 in analysing Athanasius’s, Basil’s, and Gregory of Nazianzus’s ideas. These terms also reflect Augustine’s own theological and scriptural ideas about the Persons, including his emphasis on the Word of God which is characteristic of his writings on creation and the Trinity.

295 Augustine, Trin., Book I, 4, 7 – 5, 8.
296 Ayres’s perspectives on inseparable operation and simplicity were noted earlier. See Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, pp. 236, 278-282, 286-288, 296-300.
297 Ayres does not cite this, but Augustine, in conf., summarises and illustrates Aristotle’s categories, which include ‘whether [a man] is doing anything’, and Augustine also offers a summary in Trin. of how the categories might apply to God. Action is one of the categories, as Ayres and Hill indicate. Ayres, ‘Augustine on the Trinity’, in The Oxford Handbook of The Trinity, p. 127; see also Augustine, conf., Book IV, 16, 28-29; Augustine, Trin., Book V, 1, 2; Hill’s translator’s note 2 on Trin., V, 1, 2.
298 Augustine, Trin., Book V, 1, 2; see also Hill’s translator’s note 2 on Trin., V, 1, 2.
299 Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 3, 5; 5, 8 – 6, 9; 17, 28-29; see also Book V, 4, 5 – 5, 6; 8, 9 – 15, 16; civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 10; see also TeSelle, Augustine, pp. 294-297.
300 Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 3, 5; 7, 12; 17, 29; 17, 31; Book V, 11, 12 – 15, 16; Book VII, 2, 3; civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 10; Book XI, 24; ep. 170, 6-7, WSA, II / 3.
301 See major section 2.2 in Chapter 2, and especially sub-section 2.2.3.
Augustine’s ideas about relations and substance have some affinities with those in Gregory of Nazianzus’s ‘Third Theological Oration’, which I discussed in Chapter 2, although scholars differ as to whether Augustine knew this oration. Gregory had been responding to Eunomius’s position that the names ‘unbegotten’ and ‘begotten’ said something about the substance(s) of the Father and the Son, which thus had to be different. Gregory argued that the distinctions indicated by these designations are about relations and do not affect the substance of the Trinity. Similarly, Augustine’s own position that relations do not say something about substance was set forth in response to those who could not believe that the Father and Son ‘can have the same substance’ and thus held that ‘begetting and being begotten’ were ‘contrary substances’. However, Barnes has argued that Augustine, in these arguments, was responding to Latin Homoian, not Eunomian, ideas. Moreover, differences also exist between Augustine’s and Gregory’s ideas. For example, Gregory says in another oration that designations about origins within the Trinity are ‘attributes of the nature, not the nature itself’, while Augustine does not view relations as ‘accidents’ or attributes.

Nonetheless, without making any claims of influence, it is useful for heuristic purposes to mention Gregory’s arguments. Despite the similarities between their

---


303 TeSelle discusses differing scholarly positions on whether Augustine had known this oration, but he says it had not been translated into Latin by Rufinus. Ayres also comments on the different positions and supports the view that Augustine was not dependent on Gregory. TeSelle, Augustine, pp. 294-297; Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, pp. 212-213.

304 See section 2.2.3 above. Gregory of Nazianzus, ‘The Third Theological Oration’, 16.

305 See section 2.2.3 above. Gregory of Nazianzus, ‘The Third Theological Oration’, 16.

306 Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 3, 5; see also 7, 12.

307 This was noted in section 4.1.1 above. M. Barnes, ‘The Arians of Book V’; see also M. Barnes, ‘De Trinitate VI and VII’, pp. 192-193.

308 See section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2 above on Gregory’s Oration 42. This is cited from Henry Bettenson, ed. and trans., The Later Christian Fathers: A Selection from the Writings of the Fathers from St. Cyril of Jerusalem to St. Leo the Great (Oxford: OUP, 1970; paperback edn, 1972), pp. 119-120.
ideas, another place in which Gregory and Augustine differ is particularly relevant to my arguments. Augustine’s perspectives on the attributes of the Persons and the Trinity as a whole, particularly goodness and beauty, give him other aspects to reflect upon besides those of substance and modes of origin that were significant in Cappadocian responses to Eunomian positions.\footnote{On Eunomius, Basil, and Gregory of Nazianzus, see section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2.}

One of the typical claims made about Augustine’s trinitarian theology is that he prioritises unity, especially of substance but also of the being of the Persons, over distinctions within the Trinity. He himself poses the question of whether he does this in his ideas about simplicity when he asks ‘how will trinity be disclosed’, if the attributes have to be said about God, the Trinity, and the Persons?\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 5, 7; see also 6, 9.} One of Augustine’s answers draws his ideas about simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations, together with his triad of memory, understanding, and love.\footnote{This also applies to memory, understanding, and will. Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 7, 12.} He says that these three things (the acts or attributes named by this triad) ‘are the Father alone’, but the Son also \textit{is} all three of these things for himself, and the Son’s ‘being’ these things comes to him ‘from the Father of whom he is born’, and the Spirit ‘has’ and ‘is’ these three things because they come to the Spirit ‘from where he proceeds from’ (the Father and Son).\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 7, 12; see also 17, 28-29; Book I, 12, 26.} So the Son and Spirit possess, \textit{are}, and \textit{do} the attributes and acts that the Father possesses, \textit{is}, and \textit{does}, because the Son \textit{is born of} the Father, and the Spirit \textit{proceeds from} the Father and the Son. These last terms (is born of, proceeds from) represent modes of origin or how the Son and Spirit come into being, and explain how all three Persons possess all of the attributes.

Based on this analysis, it would be fair to say that Augustine does focus on unity, but not of substance alone. The unity is among the attributes or acts ascribed to or done by all three Persons or the Trinity as a whole, where the relations represent distinctions between Father, Son, and Spirit. My emphasis on unity of attributes and acts challenges some readings of Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity. For example, Gunton says that Augustine’s use of relation ‘as a logical
rather than an ontological predicate’ in his ideas about simplicity (based on the Aristotelian principle that ‘accidents’ cannot exist in God’s substance) does not allow Augustine to make claims about the being of the particular persons… who tend to disappear into the all-embracing oneness of God.³¹³ Thus, in Gunton’s view, Augustine ‘deprived the concept [of relation] of theological power by treating relation as ontologically intermediate between substance and accident’, rendering ‘person’ subordinate to ‘being’ in the ‘reality of God’.³¹⁴ Gunton’s claim is that Augustine departed from ‘the Cappadocian conceptual advance’ that the persons ‘are mutually constituted, made what they are, by virtue of their relations’.³¹⁵

Gunton’s retrieval of Cappadocian theology cannot be evaluated here,³¹⁶ but my argument above suggests that one can counter Gunton’s assessment of Augustine by saying that Augustine’s ideas about simplicity represent a complex intersection of substance (essence), attributes, acts, and relations. ‘Person’ is not subordinated to ‘being’ but integrally related to being, and all the Persons possess, are, and do the same attributes and acts and thus are equal. The Persons and the Trinity are mutually constituted by all these aspects, including relation. So one can acknowledge Gunton’s criticism that Augustine emphasises ‘oneness’, but not his attribution of this to Augustine’s ideas about relations. As I have shown, the ‘oneness’ is about the attributes and acts, while the relations are about distinctions.

4.4.2 Goodness and beauty: attributes of creation and the Trinity

The attributes of goodness and beauty are of particular interest here because Augustine, as I have shown, ascribed goodness and beauty to creation, to the Persons in economic acts of creation, and to the immanent Trinity.

In Chapter 3, I showed that in his earliest commentary on Gen. 1, Augustine had associated goodness with creation, and implicitly with the form and beauty given to creatures in trinitarian acts of creation.³¹⁷ Then in my analysis in this

³¹³ Italics added. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, pp. 40-42.
³¹⁶ Critiques of retrievals of Cappadocian ideas will be noted in section 6.3 in Chapter 5.
³¹⁷ See section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3 and Appendix B. As I discussed in sections 3.2.1 and
chapter of his mature commentaries on Gen. 1, I demonstrated that Augustine ascribes goodness to all creation and all creatures, and also to God, God’s will, the Spirit (whom Augustine calls the Divine Goodness), and God’s speech and the Word in acts of creation.\(^{318}\) I also argued that he associated goodness with the triadic aspects of initial existence and especially the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’, which gives creatures some agency in continuing their existence.\(^{319}\)

My analysis of his early works also showed that Augustine had associated beauty with triadic aspects of creation and trinitarian acts, particularly with the giving of differentiation or form.\(^{320}\) Much later, writing in civ. Dei in the second decade of the fifth century, Augustine still spoke of beauty as one of the ‘gifts’ given to creatures, with the triadic aspects of their origin, form, and capabilities of ordered and dynamic abiding.\(^{321}\) Other instances exist in Augustine’s mature works where he speaks of the beauty of creation and of God, but not necessarily in trinitarian ways. This theme appears in his s. 241, where he draws on both Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5,\(^{322}\) as he does in Trin., XV. He also speaks about seeing the creator from the beauty and goodness of creation in a sermon on Ps. 148 (a creation psalm), where he seems to allude to Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5.\(^{323}\)

Moreover, Wis. 13. 1-5 itself eloquently speaks of people being able to see the ‘begetter of beauty’ from ‘the greatness of the beauty and of the creature’ and from the ‘good things’ and the power of created things that can be seen in the world.\(^{324}\)

\(^{318}\) See my analysis and illustrations throughout section 4.2.2 above.

\(^{319}\) See my analysis and examples in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 above.

\(^{320}\) See sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, and 3.2.2 in Chapter 3, where I discuss both goodness and beauty. My discussions of beauty draw on Harrison’s work as well as Du Roy’s, as cited in those sections. But my work throughout this thesis on Wis. 13. 1-5 and the beauty of both creation and of the creator (the begetter of beauty or the first author of beauty) is original. See also Augustine, Gn. adv. Man., Book I, 16, 25-26.

\(^{321}\) See the analysis in section 4.3 above and Augustine, civ. Dei, I, Book V, 11 (Babcock).

\(^{322}\) This sermon was cited above. Augustine, s. 241, 1-2.

\(^{323}\) This sermon was cited above. Augustine, en. Ps., 148, 2-3, 10, 13-15.

\(^{324}\) This is Augustine’s wording, in Hill’s translation, from Augustine’s quotation of Wis. 13. 3, 5 in Trin., XV. The English translations of the Vulgate and LXX versions of Wis. 13. 3 offer the ‘first author of beauty’ instead of the ‘begetter of beauty’. These titles for God, the Creator, translate ‘speciei generator’ in the Vulgate and ‘ho genesiarchés’ in the LXX.
I demonstrated in this chapter that Augustine cites Wis. 13. 1-5 in his mature works, typically with Rom. 1. 20, but I also built a case in Chapter 3 that he likely knew and drew upon Wis. 13. 1-5 in his early Gn. adv. Man. in the late 380s. If that could be proven, it would show that the belief that one can move from seeing the beauty of creation to seeing the beauty of the Trinity would have influenced his ideas for most of his career.

Augustine’s ideas about the attributes of the Trinity in Trin., XV, read in light of Wis. 13. 1-5, and in light of his interpretations of Gen. 1 and ideas about triadic aspects of creation, support my argument that one should move beyond a focus merely on the philosophical aspects of Augustine’s ideas about the simplicity of the Trinity. That he ascribes goodness and beauty both to creation and to the Trinity, whether through his inferences about trinitarian acts of creation or about how the Persons of the Trinity and the Trinity as a whole both are and possess these attributes, is one of the ‘fruitful’ aspects of his thinking on creation and the Trinity for further consideration in Chapter 5. The attributes of goodness and beauty also warrant more focus by historical scholars, to add to the more typical focus on the attributes of wisdom and power that Augustine also ascribes to the Trinity.

### 4.4.3 Analogies and distinctions: the human mind and the immanent Trinity

With the above analysis of Augustine’s ideas about simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations in mind, it is now possible to return to Augustine’s

---

325 See section 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3.
326 Ayres cites Beauty and Goodness (and Wisdom and Justice) as examples of attributes Augustine names in Augustine’s ideas about simplicity, but Ayres does not make the connection to his ascribing these attributes to creation or to the Persons in acts of creation. Ayres, ‘Augustine on the Trinity’, in The Oxford Handbook of The Trinity, pp. 126-127.
327 As noted above, wisdom and power are among the twelve attributes Augustine names in Trin., XV, and according to 1 Cor. 1. 24, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. The belief that the Trinity was one power also was one of the tenets of trinitarian faith stated in the letter sent in 382 from Constantinople to Pope Damasus and bishops in the west, as discussed in section 2.2.4 in Chapter 2. The 382 letter is translated and cited by Ayres. See Augustine, Trin., Book XV, 5, 7 – 6, 9; Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, p. 258.
question of whether one can infer something about the Trinity, including that it is a triad, from the human mind. One of Augustine’s bases for answering this question is that his understanding of simplicity does not apply to human nature. Augustine says that one cannot simply move from triads within the human mind to the Trinity, because even when a similar triad might be ‘found’ in a person and in the Trinity, in human beings the three things are ‘in’ the person without ‘being’ the person.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 6, 10 – 7, 11; 23, 43; see also \textit{ep.} 169, 2, 6, WSA, vol II / 3.} Thus Augustine’s principles about simplicity would not permit him to establish firm analogies between created and divine nature.

Even so, Augustine, late in \textit{Trin.}, XV and after citing Rom. 1. 20, offers some support for seeing \textit{something} about the Trinity from triadic aspects of the human mind. He writes:

As far as we could, we have also used the creation … to remind those who ask for reasons … that as far as they can they should descry his invisible things by understanding them through the things that are made, and especially through the rational or intellectual creature which is made to the image of God; so that through this, as a kind of mirror, as far as they can and if they can, they might perceive in our memory, understanding, and will that God is a trinity. Anyone who has a lively intuition of these three (as divinely established in the nature of his mind) and of how great a thing it is that his mind has that by which even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recalled, beheld, and desired – it is recalled by memory, beheld by intelligence, embraced by love – has thereby found the image of that supreme trinity. …\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 20, 39.}

On the one hand, this is a very positive statement from Augustine about the possibility that a person might, by reflecting on the memory, understanding, and will that Augustine believes exist within the human mind, be able to ‘see’ something about the Trinity. His reference to a mirror here, which is one of his allusions to 1 Cor. 13. 12, does not mean that one cannot see or make inferences about the Trinity. As he states earlier in \textit{Trin.}, XV, his text of 1 Cor. 13. 12 said, ‘\textit{We see now through a mirror in an enigma}\’.\footnote{The Latin is ‘\textit{Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate’}. Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 9, 16 (CCSL 50 A, p. 482).} He takes the mirror to be the triad in the human mind, which is an ‘image’ (mirror) of the Trinity.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 9, 16.} He takes ‘enigma’ to signify that
even though this image can be 'a likeness', it can be 'an obscure one and difficult to penetrate'.\textsuperscript{332} He still says, nonetheless, that no likeness is more 'suitable' for 'understanding God' than that image that is in the human mind,\textsuperscript{333} which, in his statement I quoted above, is our memory, understanding, and will. On the other hand, as he goes on to say, this image in the human mind, which was 'made by the trinity and altered for the worse by its own fault', cannot be compared to the 'supreme trinity' in such a way that the image is considered 'similar' to it 'in every respect', and the 'dissimilarity' is great no matter the 'similarity' that exists.\textsuperscript{334} So Augustine is both positive and very cautious about seeing the Trinity from the human mind.

Augustine further says that there may be some 'likeness' between memory in the human mind and the Father, between understanding in the human mind and the Son, and between the love in the human mind and the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{335} However, his ideas about simplicity also apply here. He asserts that these three aspects of the mind belong to one person, which is not true for the 'supreme trinity', because within the Trinity these three things 'are one God and they are three persons, not one'.\textsuperscript{336} In other words, the Trinity is triadic in such a way that it is both one and three, including in its attributes and acts, and is so unchangeably and eternally.\textsuperscript{337} So, near the end of his final book in \textit{Trin.}, he relies on his ideas about simplicity, attributes, and acts in deciding whether there are any likenesses between, and in establishing the distinct differences between, triads in the mind and the Trinity.

Augustine’s assessment, based on his ideas about memory, understanding, and love within the human mind, is not much different from his ideas from an

\textsuperscript{332} Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 9, 16.
\textsuperscript{333} Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 9, 16.
\textsuperscript{334} In the final book of \textit{conf.}, Augustine had briefly reflected on whether the triad of ‘being, knowing, willing’ within a human self was analogous to the Trinity. He says the distinction is great, because even though a person has ‘one life, one mind, and one essence’ there is distinction within the inseparability of these aspects. He also had not defined his ideas about simplicity with respect to the question of whether being, knowing, and willing within the Trinity ‘constitutes the Trinity’ or whether these ‘three components are present in each Person.’ Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 20, 39; see also \textit{conf.}, Book XIII, xi (12) (Chadwick).
\textsuperscript{335} Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 23, 43.
\textsuperscript{336} Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 23, 43.
\textsuperscript{337} Augustine, \textit{Trin.}, Book XV, 5, 7 – 6, 9.
earlier passage in *Trin.* that I cited above. There he had been thinking of triadic aspects of all creatures, not just of the human mind, and he had quoted Rom. 1. 20 in saying that one should look from these triadic aspects to the creator. He refers to the 'supreme triad' as 'the source of all things, and the most perfect beauty, and wholly blissful delight.' He then makes comments based on ideas similar to his later ideas about the simplicity of the Trinity. He writes:

... in bodily things down here one is not as much as three are together, and two things are something more than one thing; while in the supreme triad one is as much as three are together, and two are not more than one, and in themselves they are all infinite. So they are each in each and all in each, and each in all and all in all, and all are one. ... For God is one, and yet he is three.

Here Augustine had also established that only the Trinity is triadic in such a way that it is both one and three, and, in different words, that they all are and have what each other is and has. In both places, moreover, here and at the end of *Trin.*, Augustine says that one can look from triadic aspects of creation or triadic acts or attributes of the human mind to the Trinity in some ways. This is true provided that one maintains the ultimate distinctions between created nature or the human mind and the substance, attributes, acts, and relations that are and are within the Trinity.

**4.5 Conclusions and bridge to Part III**

In Part II I have argued, first, that Augustine makes inferences about trinitarian acts or the Trinity from his reflections on all of creation, and, secondly, that he values the existence of, and ascribes goodness and beauty to, all created things. I also have demonstrated that Augustine drew on theological, scriptural, ontological, and philosophical ideas in his reflections on creation and the Trinity. However, given that the lens I employed was to begin with his ideas about creation or his interpretations of scriptures about creation, one of my particular contributions was

---

338 Augustine’s ideas from this passage were examined above in section 4.3 and noted in section 4.2.2. As discussed there, Augustine had reprised his earlier fourth century ideas about the triadic aspects of existence, differentiation, and ‘ordered abiding’ while also speaking of agency of creatures in seeking to maintain their order in ways that reflect the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’. Augustine, *Trin.*, Book VI, 10, 12.


to focus on the scriptures and exegetical methods that significantly influenced his theologies of creation and the Trinity. Another unique contribution was to examine his ontological ideas about triadic aspects of creation and ‘dynamic abiding’. This included analysing the inferences he made about trinitarian acts of creation, and illustrating the effects of these ontological aspects on ongoing creaturely existence. Given my interest in creation and the Trinity, my contributions about Augustine’s trinitarian theology lie mainly in the area of the economic Trinity. I nonetheless was able to demonstrate some of his ideas about the immanent Trinity, primarily about simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations. I concluded that Augustine’s ideas about the attributes and acts should be given more attention, particularly the goodness and beauty that he ascribes to creation and the Trinity.

I closed each of the major sections in this chapter with a concluding analysis, and I analysed Augustine’s known and likely sources. Thus the conclusions I will draw here will move more broadly across the sections, perhaps systematising his ideas more than he himself did, but usefully demonstrating key aspects of his thinking on creation and the Trinity. I also will identify opportunities he places on the table for ‘fruitful’ readings of his ideas today, which I will discuss in Chapter 5.

In Section 4.2, I demonstrated that Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity were grounded in the scriptures, and that he had an expansive awareness of those scriptures from the Old and New Testaments that were about creation in some way. Augustine, in the works I examined, was looking at creation and the Trinity together, without necessarily drawing on other doctrines or other passages in the scriptures that may have indicated the Trinity, but were not about creation. This is a systematic feature of his own method. He read Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 together throughout his career, along with other key passages I identify above and in Appendix A.341 I showed that his robust method of correlating scriptures was one of the most significant influences on his theological ideas about creation and the Trinity. I also pinpointed places where this method resulted in him offering questionable ideas about the involvement of angels or other entities in creation.342

341 See the conclusion to major section 4.2 offered in section 4.2.5. See also Appendix A.
342 His questionable ideas were addressed in section 4.2.4 above.
Augustine is particularly keen on drawing on scriptures that indicate that God created through God’s speech or through the Word of God, which he correlates with other passages. This enables him to attribute roles in creation to the Son / Word / Wisdom / Jesus Christ. Augustine had exhibited interest in human words in his fourth century works, but there had rejected analogies between human words and the Word or God’s words. He had, however, indicated that the Word was responsible for giving differentiation or form, and also beauty, to created things. In his fifth century works, Augustine attributes the giving of form or differentiated existence to the Word, and also perfected existence where it is specifically related to giving form to formless existence.

Augustine also explored tentative ideas about human words that ‘abide within’ as or after they are expressed, which also are grounded in his interpretations of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3. By the end of Trin. he was able to suggest that there are analogies between such words that ‘abide within’ and the Word of God, which is expressed and also expresses itself. These are not major ideas for Augustine, but through these analogies he connects his ideas about trinitarian acts of creation with his ideas about the Son’s relationship with God / the Father within the Trinity.

Augustine was clearer in his fifth century ideas than in the fourth century about the roles of the Holy Spirit in creation. This was demonstrated in my analysis of his interpretations of Gen. 1. 1-5. I showed that Augustine primarily attributes the act of perfecting existence to the Spirit even though God’s agency was significant. He offered two views of the Spirit’s roles in perfecting existence based on two readings of Gen. 1. 2. The Spirit, by being borne over the water (Gen. 1. 2), had a role with God in giving creation the capability to continue to exist, which I call ‘dynamic abiding’. This role was associated with the goodness of the Spirit and God, and Augustine refers to the Spirit as ‘Divine Goodness’. The Spirit’s other role, based on an alternative reading of Gen. 1. 2, was to give both form and perfection to existence by brooding over the water. These roles for the Spirit were about the Spirit’s involvement in acts of initial creation.

343 See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 and Appendix B.
344 See section 4.2 and Appendix B.
345 See sections 4.2 and Appendix B.
One of my striking findings was that Augustine implies, in his interpretations of Gen. 1 that I just discussed, and by referencing the third term in many different triads, that the Spirit is responsible for ‘giving’ the gift of ‘dynamic abiding’. This gift, as I have argued based on Augustine’s ideas in Gn. litt and civ. Dei that do not receive much scholarly attention, gives a creature the desire for and some agency in continuing its own existence. This is a gift related to creation and ongoing existence, and I will propose fruitful readings of these ideas in Chapter 5.

I also highlighted other aspects of Augustine’s ideas about the Holy Spirit and the attributes of creation and the Trinity that can be drawn upon in fruitful readings of Augustine’s ideas. This discovery was another result of looking at Augustine’s arguments through the lens of his theology of creation. I demonstrated that there was a three-fold movement in his reflections: firstly, he moves from the goodness of creation (which is attested to in Gen. 1) to the goodness of the Holy Spirit, whom he calls the Divine Goodness; secondly, and in parallel with the first movement, he associates goodness with the unified acts of God, the Word / Son, and the Spirit in creation; and thirdly, and later in his Trin., he ascribes goodness to the Persons and the Trinity in his arguments about simplicity, substance, and attributes within the Trinity. This does result in Augustine using the atypical terminology of referring to the Trinity as the Father, Word / Son, and Divine Goodness in Gn. litt. He grounded these ideas, however, in his readings of Gen. 1, perhaps also influenced by Platonist and other ideas about the goodness of the creator. An opportunity exists, for a future project, to connect Augustine’s other ideas about goodness and the Trinity (which appear in contexts where he is not writing about creation) to the ideas I have presented here.

---

346 See especially section 4.3 but also section 4.2.2.
347 These arguments are presented in sections 4.2.2 and 4.4.
348 See section 4.2.2 and Augustine, Gn. litt, Book I, 6, 12.
349 See Augustine, civ. Dei, II, Book XI, 21-24 (Babcock); see also Plato, Tim., 28c, 29a, e; Philo, Opif., 4, 21.
350 Dunham has already done work to connect Augustine’s ideas about the goodness of the Spirit, as Augustine establishes it with respect to one of the Spirit’s roles in perfecting creation, with ideas in Augustine’s other works. This is very helpful, but Dunham discusses doctrines beyond creation and the Trinity. Room still exists to look at goodness, the Trinity, and creation further. Dunham, The Trinity and Creation in Augustine, pp. 74-79.
As I have shown, Augustine also connects the beauty of creation with that of God or the Trinity, although not as often or as systematically as he does with goodness. Augustine identified beauty with form in his early works, and he drew on Wis. 13. 1-5 in his mature works, where he cites it explicitly, and perhaps earlier. This scriptural passage says that people should have been able to see the beauty of the creator or the ‘begetter of beauty’ from the beauty of creation. As I argued above, he used this passage, typically with Rom. 1. 20, to support his arguments that one can, in fact, see something about the Trinity from creation. Moreover, he ascribes goodness and beauty to all three Persons and the Trinity as a whole in his arguments about simplicity, substance, and attributes within the Trinity. Thus, another opportunity Augustine places on the table, to be taken up in Chapter 5, is to see whether one can make constructive theological use of his association of beauty and goodness with both creation and the Trinity.

Augustine is often criticised for emphasising unity over distinctions in his trinitarian theology, whether unity of substance or of acts. Based on my analysis of Augustine’s mature works, one can say that he does depict unity of operations in his ideas about trinitarian acts of initial creation. However, as I suggested above, Augustine’s model for his ideas in Gn. litt has conceptual affinities with Irenaeus’s ‘two hands’ of God model. I offered this observation because Augustine attributes primary (and other) roles in the acts of giving formless, differentiated, and perfected existence to God and the Word / Son, or to God and the Spirit. Thus he attributes roles to all three, including primary roles, but he appears to do this in pairs, rather than showing all three together in unity of operations. This is the result, however, of Augustine’s interpretations of the first four verses of Gen. 1.

Nonetheless, I argued above that Augustine’s ideas, which represent a real attempt to explain how unity of operations might work, are not inconsistent with the ideas about unity of operations held by either Basil or Gregory of Nyssa. All three

---

351 See section 4.2.1 in Chapter 4 and Appendix B.
352 See sections 4.1.1 and 4.4 above. See also Appendix A.
353 See sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, and 3.4 in Chapter 3. See also Appendix A.
354 See section 4.4.2.
355 See section 4.2.2 and Appendix B.
would agree that God (the Father) has some agency in all acts, even though some acts are accomplished primarily ‘through’ or by the Word / Son or the Spirit.

With respect to Augustine’s ideas about simplicity within the immanent Trinity, I concluded that where he emphasises unity is in the unity of attributes or acts.\(^{356}\) Augustine, however, through his focus on attributes and his ideas about relations that go beyond modes of origin, adds more complexity and richness to his ideas about the unity and distinctions among the Persons and the Trinity as a whole than when modes or relations of origin are deemed to be the only distinctions.\(^{357}\) The ways in which Augustine ascribes acts or attributes to one Person, while also ascribing them to the other Persons and the Trinity as a whole, offers a connection between his ideas about economic trinitarian acts and his ideas about the immanent Trinity.

Augustine appears, in his mature works, to be following his own paths in many ways, even though he was nearly always drawing on the scriptures, and often writing in ways compatible with other *hexaemeral* commentaries. As in Chapter 3, I identified places in his mature works where his ideas have affinities to Basil’s and Philo’s ideas. That Augustine was writing in ways compatible with other works means, as I suggested above, that he was indeed writing in keeping with the ‘faith’, even if he was not directly expressing pro-Nicene principles. My recommendation continues to be that scholars need to look more broadly at Augustine’s sources about creation and the Trinity. Specifically, more research is needed on the potential influences of both Basil and Philo on Augustine. Moreover, if one wishes to know more about Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity, one needs to study his *Gn. litt.* (and *civ. Dei*) and not mainly his *Trin.* (nor *conf.*), and go beyond his pro-Nicene and philosophical ideas.

One of the problems that Augustine leaves on the table is that he, like Philo, introduces entities into the creation process beyond God or the Trinity. In Philo’s case, the ‘ideas’ were in the mind of God.\(^{358}\) In Augustine’s mature works, the angels had a role in creation, as did the ‘forms’ or ‘ideas' and the triadic concepts

\(^{356}\) See section 4.4 above.
\(^{357}\) See section 4.4. above.
\(^{358}\) See section 1.1.4 in Chapter 1 and 4.2.4.2 above.
of measure, number, and weight, and it was not clear what relationship these entities had with the Word or the Trinity.\textsuperscript{359} These ideas cannot be said to have stood ‘the test of time’. However, I argued that Augustine’s introduction of these ideas was a result both of his exegetical method of correlating scriptures about creation, and his exegetical principle that he was allowed to ‘fill in the gaps’ where matters are not addressed in the scriptures.\textsuperscript{360}

Based on my analysis, one can conclude that Augustine, in his mature works, makes many scripturally-based inferences about trinitarian acts of creation from his readings of Gen. 1 and John 1.1-3 with other scriptures, and from his ideas about triadic aspects and other attributes of creation. This use of scripture in his theology should be given more attention by patristic and doctrinal scholars alike. Moreover, his ideas about trinitarian acts of creation suggest fruitful ways of understanding economic ‘gifts’ of creation and continued existence.

Finally, even though I gave less attention to Augustine’s ideas about triadic functions in the human mind and his analogies to the Trinity, he did say, at the end of \textit{Trin.}, that some analogies are possible, although ultimately great distinctions exist between created nature and the nature of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{361} Augustine thus leaves opportunities on the table for looking at other ways in which created nature and trinitarian nature may be looked at analogically because of his focus on existence, goodness, and beauty.

\textsuperscript{359} See sections 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4.2 above.
\textsuperscript{360} See sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.4 above.
\textsuperscript{361} See section 4.4 above.
Part III
Chapter 5: Responsible Scholarship on and Fruitful Readings of Augustine's Theologies of Creation and the Trinity

Introduction

With this chapter and Part III, this thesis moves from the critical analysis in Parts I and II of historical theological ideas about creation, God as Creator and Trinity, and economic trinitarian acts of creation, to the twenty-first century. In this chapter, I will offer my constructive proposals for responsible scholarship on and fruitful readings of Augustine's theologies of creation and the Trinity. My proposals are based on my analysis and arguments presented earlier in this thesis, and on the analysis I will offer below. Methodologically, my proposals are grounded in recent definitions of 'responsible' readings of patristic texts, and of 'fruitful' readings of patristic texts read with the ideas of present-day scholars. My proposals also engage critically with ideas presented by patristic scholars Michel Barnes and Lewis Ayres and doctrinal theologian Colin Gunton.

This chapter, which serves as the thesis conclusion, comprises three sections followed by closing words for this thesis.

In Section 5.1, I will restate the concerns in modern theology and patristic scholarship that were the stimuli for undertaking the research for this thesis. I then will present a summative analysis of my key conclusions for Parts I and II. I will identify my discoveries and contributions to scholarship about creation and the Trinity, and suggest areas for more research. I will include my broader conclusions from my analysis of Augustine’s ideas and sources, but I will not restate many of the significant points I established in my robust conclusions to Chapters 3 and 4.¹ I also will offer some analysis of Augustine’s ideas in section 5.3 as support for my constructive proposals.

In Section 5.2, I will present and illustrate the concepts of responsible readings

¹ See section 3.5 in Chapter 3 and section 4.5 in Chapter 4.
of and scholarship on patristic texts. I will then offer my constructive proposals for ways in which patristic and doctrinal scholars might augment or strengthen their collaboration, through dialogue, interdisciplinary events, or other approaches, or through the works they produce. My objective is to encourage new thinking on ways to enable the presentation of ‘trustworthy insight’ on Augustine and the Cappadocians in works on doctrinal theology.²

In section 5.3, I will offer proposals for how Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity can be read fruitfully with ideas held by Gunton, other theologians, and some scientists. My objective is to contribute to ongoing interpretations of both patristic and modern theology.

Finally, I will conclude with a few ‘closing words’ for this thesis.

5.1 Where we stand: summative analysis of Parts I and II

As I discussed in the Introduction, I originally undertook the research for this thesis in response to criticisms of Augustine’s trinitarian theology and preferences for ideas attributed to the Cappadocians that have appeared in theological works in recent decades.³ I observed that the trend of seeing profound differences between these theologies has begun to change now that we are in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Barnes and Ayres have made considerable contributions to Augustine scholarship and have challenged the views of doctrinal scholars on Augustine.⁴ Other patristic and doctrinal scholars also have criticised some of the ‘historical retrievals’ or appropriations of the trinitarian theologies of Augustine or the Cappadocians.⁵ This represents a partial ‘swing of the pendulum’, or what

² The concept of ‘trustworthy insight’ comes from Michel Barnes, as I will discuss.
³ See section 0.1 in the thesis introduction for an overview of major ideas published as a result of the revivals of interest in trinitarian theology, especially Cappadocian theology.
⁴ In section 0.1 in the introduction, I discussed Barnes’s and Ayres’s criticisms of retrievals of Augustine’s trinitarian theology and of claims made about differences between his ideas and those of the Cappadocians. I also engaged with their works throughout this thesis.
⁵ See, e.g., Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Where Do We Stand in Trinitarian Theology? Resources, Revisions, and Reappraisals’, in Recent Developments in Trinitarian Theology: An International Symposium, ed. by Christophe Chalamet and Marc Vial (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), pp. 9-71 (pp. 36-37); Karen Kilby, ‘Trinity, Tradition, and Politics’, in Recent Developments in Trinitarian Theology: An International Symposium, ed. by Christophe Chalamet and Marc Vial (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), pp. 73-86 (pp. 74-76); Gijsbert Van Den Brink, ‘Social Trinitarianism: A Discussion of Some Recent
Sarah Coakley classifies as the third ‘wave’ (of three to-date), in the revivals of interest in trinitarian theologies. Room still existed, however, to offer other critical analysis of Augustine’s trinitarian ideas and sources, and of both patristic and doctrinal scholarship on Augustine. Room also existed for doing constructive theology with Augustine’s ideas, as is done with Cappadocian theology.

I described some of the ideas that often appear in recent trinitarian theologies that led to my seeking to look at historical trinitarian theology through a new lens. As I discussed, many theologians give preference to the ‘threeness’, rather than ‘oneness’, of the Trinity. Some theologians posit mutual relations, communion, or perichoresis as characteristics of the Persons and the Trinity itself, sometimes without also positing any (other) substance in the Trinity, and these views are sometimes attributed to the Cappadocians. By contrast, the typical charge leveled against Augustine is that he over-emphasised unity within the immanent Trinity, especially unity of substance. Similarly, Gunton, Robert Jenson, and Karl Rahner also criticise Augustine for what they claim is his focus on unity, without clear distinctions, among the Persons of the Trinity in their economic acts.

Many doctrinal theologians also place greater emphasis on the economic Trinity than the immanent Trinity. As a corollary, some, including Gunton, assume that economic acts of creation, and the doctrines of both the Trinity and

---

[7] See section 0.1 in the thesis introduction.
[8] As I discussed in section 0.1 in the thesis introduction, these ideas are characteristic of John Zizioulas’s trinitarian theology, and Zizioulas influenced Gunton to an extent.
[9] I cite and discuss these assumptions or criticisms about Augustine’s trinitarian thinking in section 0.1 in the thesis introduction.
[10] I suggested in section 0.1 in the thesis introduction that this was influenced by Rahner’s axiom about the mutual identity of the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity.
creation, must be related to salvation, redemption, or eschatology. Gunton and some others do hold that the Trinity and creation are rightly paired in doctrinal theology. However, it is less common to find treatments of creation and the Trinity together, where creation as a doctrine, and the created world and creatures themselves, are viewed in their own right, and without other doctrines included in the analysis. Further, the typical theological movement, including for Gunton, is from the Trinity to creation.

Gunton, moreover, criticises Augustine’s ideas about creation as well as his trinitarian thinking, often giving preference to Irenaeus’s ideas or criticising Augustine for being too heavily influenced by Platonist or Neoplatonist ideas.

Thus room existed, from many perspectives, for examining developments in historical trinitarian theology, especially Augustine’s ideas, by moving from creation theologies to trinitarian theologies in the analysis.

Room also existed for offering further critical analysis of affinities between Augustine’s trinitarian theology and Greek or Alexandrian theology, and of his sources. Barnes and Ayres primarily focus on his pro-Nicene, especially Latin, ideas and sources. Scholars who use different lenses can make contributions to scholarship on Augustine’s trinitarian ideas, even if they accept many of Barnes’s or Ayres’s assessments. For example, Chad Gerber shares their interest in pro-Nicene theology, but with his focus on Augustine’s early pneumatology, he offered contributions about Augustine’s ideas about triadic aspects of creation that I was able to draw upon in my analysis, even when I disagreed with him at times.

In light of these concerns about portrayals of patristic trinitarian theology, my primary hypothesis for this thesis was that historical developments in trinitarian doctrine were significantly influenced by theological, scriptural, and other ideas held about creation. In other words, I employed the lens of looking at trinitarian

---

12 See section 0.1 in the thesis introduction.
theology in light of creation theology, thus moving from creation to the Trinity.

I analysed ideas about the ‘initial creation’, first principles, creation ‘out of nothing’, relationships between modes of origin and substance, triadic aspects of creation, and the beauty and goodness of creation. I also demonstrated that the created world and creatures were sources of ideas about creation and the Trinity, although early or patristic Christians were not doing natural theology. I argued that early trinitarian ideas and more robust trinitarian ideas in the fourth and early fifth centuries were significantly influenced by readings of Gen. 1 and / or John 1. 1-3, and, for Augustine, also of Wis. 11 and Wis. 13. I argued further that hexaemeral and other commentaries on Gen. 1 and / or John 1. 1-3 are important, and often untapped, sources for studying creation and the Trinity. I presented evidence that calls for more research on the potential influences on the Cappadocians and Augustine of Philo of Alexandria’s ideas on creation, God, and entities that may have been involved in creation,14 and more research on the potential influences of Basil on Augustine.15

To establish a foundation for moving from creation to the Trinity in my analysis of fourth and fifth century developments in trinitarian theology, I critically analysed historical theological ideas about creation from the first through the third centuries. This included the emergence of the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ in the latter part of the second century. One of my contributions was to argue that Irenaeus made specifically Christian and early trinitarian contributions to this doctrine that contrast with the monotheistic views of the doctrine presented by Gerhard May.16 I showed that Irenaeus, in drawing on John 1. 1-3 and principles of the apostolic faith, included the role of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in the creation of all things from ‘nothing’.17 By highlighting his specific moves, I went beyond Gunton’s own positive assertions of Irenaeus’s contribution to creation ‘out of nothing’.18

14 See, e.g., sections 2.1.2 in Chapter 2 and 4.2.1.1 in Chapter 3.
15 I will discuss this again here.
17 See section 1.3.3 in Chapter 1.
18 See Colin E. Gunton, ‘Between Allegory and Myth: The Legacy of the Spiritualising of
I also began an ongoing analysis about relationships between the attribute of *goodness* that is ascribed to God as *Creator* and arguments on behalf of the *oneness* of God. I argued that Philo and Irenaeus were influenced (Irenaeus to a minor extent) by Platonist ideas about the goodness of the Maker or demiurge. I also demonstrated that Irenaeus and others in the second century defended *both* the goodness and the oneness of God in rebutting dualistic views of creation and of the existence of two gods posited by Marcionites and others. I later argued that the need to defend the belief that God is omnipotent and the Creator of all *things*, which God brought into being 'out of nothing' through the Word / Son, was significant to Augustine in his rebuttals of Manichaean dualistic views of creation and God, and that he too was influenced by Platonist ideas about *goodness*.

Finally, my primary conclusion about the first through the third centuries was that many entities or Persons were *asserted* to have been involved with God in acts of creation. For Philo, these included the Logos and the ‘ideas’, which Philo says were in the mind of God. For Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen, the Persons or figures included, in varying ways, the Word / Son / Wisdom and Wisdom / the Spirit, as they do in Irenaeus’s view that God works through God’s two ‘hands’ in acts of creation. However, these early Jewish and Christian thinkers did not suggest *how* these entities or Persons can be understood to be involved with God in creation while maintaining belief in one God who is the sole creator. This was one of the challenges for fourth and early fifth century Christian thinking on creation and trinitarian acts of creation. Moreover, even Basil and Augustine, in their reflections on creation and trinitarian acts of creation in their *hexaemeral* works, would include entities besides the Father, Son, and Spirit.

My analysis in Chapter 2 was multi-faceted, even though I continued to employ the lens of looking at developments in trinitarian theology in light of ideas held...
about creation. I had to make a shift between the analysis of Athanasius’s ideas from the 350s and early 360s, and the analysis of ideas held by the Cappadocians and Eunomius in the mid 360s to early 380s, because of the different polemical matters that were being debated.

I argued that three principles were at work in Athanasius’s thinking about the Son’s mode of origin and substance. First, the Son’s original substance cannot have been ‘nothing’ (based on the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’); secondly, he was begotten (a mode of origin he shares with living creatures); and thirdly, he must have come from the Father’s essence not simply ‘from God’ (he is a son by nature from God’s essence).

Athanasius then relied on his understanding of divine simplicity to argue that the Holy Spirit could not be a creature (could not have come from ‘nothing’), because there would have been a mix of substances between the Spirit on the one hand, and the Father and Son on the other. Athanasius also argued that the Father, Son, and Spirit all engage in acts of creation as one activity, again based on divine simplicity. His views on simplicity were different than Augustine’s, but they were nonetheless of interest in my analysis of Augustine’s ideas on the relationship between simplicity, substance, attributes, and acts within the Trinity.

In my analysis of the Cappadocian-Eunomian controversies, I argued that ideas changed about what the mode of origin of ‘being begotten’ entails for the substance of the begotten: it was not necessarily that of the begetter. Eunomius distinguished between the Son’s ‘being begotten’ from God’s essence and by God’s ‘will’, with the latter not entailing that the Son was of the same substance as the Father. Eunomius also held that the Son and Father could not be of the same substance because one was called Begotten, the other Unbegotten or

---

25 See section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2.
26 See section 2.2.1.3.
27 See section 2.2.1.3.
28 See section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4.
29 See section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2.
30 See section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2.
31 See section 2.2.3.1 in Chapter 2.
Unoriginate, which is based on Eunomius’s views on names and substances.\textsuperscript{32}

I also argued that the preferred meaning of ‘monogenés’ may have become ‘only-Begotten’, rather than something else about the Son’s uniqueness (e.g., he is ‘one of a kind’), in Basil’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s anti-Eunomian writings, if not in Eunomius’s writings.\textsuperscript{33} Gregory asserted that ‘monogenés’ refers to ‘something unique and exceptional’ about the Son’s generation that is ‘not in common with all begetting’.\textsuperscript{34} He evidently held that ‘monogenés’, by itself, entailed both a unique mode of origin for the Son and that he was of the same substance as the Father.

Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus, in their rebuttals to Eunomian views, argued that neither ‘unbegotten’ and ‘begotten’ (‘unoriginate’ and ‘originate’ for Gregory) nor ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ designate different substances. For Basil, these terms or names refer to ‘distinguishing marks’ within the divine substance.\textsuperscript{35} For Gregory, the first pair designates attributes of the substance; the second designates both relations between Father and Son and that the Son is of the same nature as the Father.\textsuperscript{36} Thus Basil and Gregory argued that being unbegotten or begotten, or Father and Son, indicate 	extit{distinctions within the one divine substance}. This is a more nuanced view than saying that the Son (someone begotten) must be of the same substance as the Father (the begetter). In my later analysis of Augustine’s ideas about simplicity, substance, and attributes, I suggested that some of his thinking had affinities with Gregory’s ideas on relations and substance, and with Eunomius’s ‘identity thesis’ about attributes and substance.\textsuperscript{37}

For my conclusions about Augustine, I will focus here on significant points that connect my analysis in Parts I and II. I will save other aspects of my analysis for my constructive proposals in section 5.3.

\textsuperscript{32} See section 2.2.3.1 in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{33} See section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{34} See section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2. Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{Against Eunomius}, trans. by William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson, in Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, Etc., NPNF, 2\textsuperscript{nd} series, 5 (1893; Oak Harbor: Logos Research Systems, 1997 [on CD-ROM]) (Book VIII, 5).
\textsuperscript{35} See section 2.2.3.2 in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{36} See section 2.2.3.3 in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{37} See sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.5 in Chapter 2 and 4.2 in Chapter 4. On this identity thesis, see Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, \textit{Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity}, Oxford Early Christian Studies (New York: OUP, 2009), pp. 5-6.
One of my arguments in this thesis was that hexaemeral commentaries are significant sources of ideas about creation and the Trinity (or God) that often are overlooked by scholars who study historical trinitarian theologies. As my analysis demonstrates, Basil’s and Augustine’s hexaemeral commentaries are sources for understanding their theologies and their own sources. Moreover, they represent sources that are part of an ongoing line of transmission of ideas that began earlier than, and continued beyond, the fourth century debates over trinitarian ideas.

I identified one example of where Augustine’s late fourth century interpretations of Gen. 1 are similar to Basil’s. Basil argues that the statements in Gen. 1 that God spoke and then God made something indicate that the Father and the Son were involved in acts of creation.38 This idea appears in Augustine’s unfinished commentary on Genesis,39 and it had appeared earlier, in less developed ways, in Origen’s Commentary on John.40 I also argued that in Augustine’s fifth century The Literal Meaning of Genesis (Gn. litt), he was citing Basil’s interpretation of Gen. 1. 2 about the role of the Spirit in creation that was based on the interpretation of a ‘Syrian’.41 As I suggested, only a few years may have separated Augustine’s discussions of these ideas that also appear in Basil’s hexaemeral homilies, but more evidence would be needed to establish that he knew of Basil’s homilies in the fourth century. Even if direct dependencies on Basil cannot be established, Augustine’s early and mature works thus resonate with certain ideas about creation and trinitarian acts, based on readings of Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, that appear in other hexaemeral works.

Another of my original observations is that Basil and Augustine also evidently draw on both Rom. 1. 20 and Wis. 13. 1-5 in their writings about seeing God or the

38 See section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2.
40 See section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
Trinity from the beauty and other visible aspects of creation. Augustine’s pairing of these passages is important for his fifth century works but also appears in his early works, if my arguments are correct. If one could show that there was a connection between Augustine’s and Basil’s use of these passages together it might aid in determining how early Augustine knew of Basil’s hexaemeral homilies.

I also argued that Philo’s ideas about seeing the Creator from the beauty of creation were similar to those in Wis. 13. 1-5 and to Augustine’s and Basil’s ideas. It is possible that the concept of seeing God from the beauty or other visible aspects of creation was part of Jewish or early Christian traditions in the first century, as represented in Philo’s works, Wis. 13. 1-5, and Rom. 1. 20. Yet this concept notably appears in hexaemeral or exegetical commentaries. Thus the concept of seeing God or the Trinity from creation is not about natural theology as such, because these arguments are grounded in exegesis of the scriptures.

In my analysis, I also evaluated how Basil and Augustine draw on the principle of the unity of operations or the inseparable operation of the Trinity. Ayres and Barnes deem inseparable operation to be one of the key principles of pro-Nicene theologies. However, my analysis shows that neither Basil in his homilies nor Augustine in Gn. litt explicitly mentions this principle in these hexaemeral works, although they do in other works. This thus warrants more attention here.

For example, I showed that Basil states the principle of unity of operations, and applies it to creation in one case, in On the Holy Spirit, although without explaining how it works. In his hexaemeral homilies, by contrast, Basil illustrates unity and distinctions between the Father and Son in acts of initial creation (although not also the Spirit), but without mentioning the unity of operations.

---

42 See sections 2.3.4 in Chapter 2; 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, and 3.4 in Chapter 3; and Chapter 4.
43 See sections 2.3.4 in Chapter 2 and 3.2.1.1 in Chapter 3.
45 See section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2 on Basil, and section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4 on Augustine.
46 See section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2.
47 See section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2.
I argued that Augustine, in *Gn. litt*, offers three views on the roles of the Trinity in acts of initial existence, and I gave structure to these views in my analysis. I described the roles and acts as indicating, in general, that God / the Father gives existence by speaking; the Word / Son gives differentiated existence (or form) and perfection through differentiation; and the Spirit perfects existence and gives creatures the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’. Augustine typically attributes primary roles to Persons but he also depicts roles as shared between God and the Word / Son, or God and the Spirit, as a result of his readings of Gen. 1. 1; 1.2; and 1.3. Thus while Augustine *depicts* unity of trinitarian acts of creation, I suggested that his ideas resonate, conceptually, with Irenaeus’s ‘two hands’ model.

My analysis also shows that Augustine had earlier associated triadic aspects of created things with inseparable operation and simultaneous operation in his fourth century works, but not in his *hexaemeral* commentaries. I characterised his early ideas as indicating that God / the Father gave existence; the Word / Son gave differentiation and form (and beauty); and the Spirit gave the capability of ‘ordered abiding’, with hints of ‘dynamic abiding’. I also proposed that Augustine’s early ideas on these matters were influenced by his reliance on Sir. 18. 1 (which says that God created all things together or simultaneously), as much so as by his awareness of the principle of inseparable operation of the Trinity, which he mentions once and may have learned from Ambrose.

Based on this analysis of Basil’s and Augustine’s *hexaemeral* and other works, one could ask whether the principle of inseparable operation was like a credal statement where one might assent to it or assert it, but not always apply it. One also could ask whether this was a generally accepted pro-Nicene principle.

Regardless of the answers, Augustine states his belief in inseparable operation

---

48 See my detailed analysis in section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4. See also Appendix B.
49 See the analysis in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 and summary in Appendix B.
50 See sections 3.2.2 and 3.5.1 (and also 3.2.1, 3.3.1, and 3.3.2) in Chapter 3.
at the beginning of his fifth century *The Trinity (Trin.*)*. He also, as I showed, offers robust views of unity and distinctions of trinitarian acts of initial existence in *Gn. litt*, even though he there does not mention inseparable operation or unity of operations. That he depicts unity and distinctions in these acts contradicts the claims of those doctrinal scholars who say that he prioritised unity in economic acts, or did not differentiate among the roles he attributed to the three Persons.

Augustine’s views on triadic aspects of initial existence may not stand the test of time in some respects. However, his ideas about these aspects of creation and the associations he makes with the Trinity, especially the roles he posits for the Holy Spirit, are the most fruitful ideas I will draw upon in my proposals for reading his ideas constructively with those of modern theologians. I did acknowledge that Augustine gave varying roles to the Spirit in triadic aspects of creation in his fourth century ideas, and also in his *Gn. litt*, and he was not always consistent. He is unique, however, in granting such roles to the Spirit. The capability of ‘dynamic abiding’ and some of the characteristics of ‘ordered abiding’ give creatures their own agency in seeking to continue or preserve their existence. This is a gift that is about continued life for an individual creature, not about creaturely development or the development of species. These too will be among the fruitful ideas I will explore below, and despite Augustine’s inconsistencies, he does have a theology of creation and the Trinity that emphasises the roles of the Spirit. This is one of the most significant discoveries in my research and analysis.

One area of Augustine’s mature thinking I criticised in part were his ideas about divine simplicity, substance, attributes, acts, and relations within the Trinity. He offers a complex view of the immanent Trinity based on the intersection of these attributes or characteristics. However, he blurs the attributes because he ascribes any and all attributes that are ascribed to God or to one Person to them all.

---

53 See section 5.3.
54 See section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 and sections 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4.
55 See section 4.3 in Chapter 4.
56 See section 4.4 in Chapter 4.
and to the Trinity as a whole.\(^{57}\) In my assessment, this is the area in which he over-emphasises the unity of the Persons, but I do not agree with those scholars who claim that he emphasises unity of substance. I did not find evidence to support that claim in my analysis of his ideas that were related in some way in his ideas about both creation and the Trinity. I also believe, as I will argue in section 5.3, that the fact that Augustine ascribes the attributes of beauty and goodness to creation and to the Trinity is one of his fruitful ideas for further readings, and that these ideas have not been given sufficient attention by others.\(^{58}\)

Another significant discovery in my critical analysis of Augustine’s ideas and sources was that he had a broad knowledge of scriptures about creation. I have already illustrated his robust exegetical method of correlating the meanings of multiple passages, as he developed his ideas about creation and the Trinity.\(^{59}\) My analysis identified the roles he posits for the Word / Son / Wisdom / Jesus Christ in creation, some of which were based on what the scriptures, including but not only Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3, say about the role of God’s word or the Word in acts of creation.\(^{60}\) I offered that analysis in response to Gunton’s claims that Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity were not sufficiently christological. I also critiqued Augustine’s exegesis that resulted in him positing roles for angels and other entities, including the concepts of measure, number, and weight (from Wis. 11. 21), in creation and with the Trinity.\(^{61}\) However, other entities do appear in commentaries on creation, including Philo’s commentaries\(^{62}\) and Basil’s works, although Basil does not give angels roles in creation.\(^{63}\)

My most important recommendation for Augustine scholarship is for patristic and doctrinal scholars alike to give more attention to the scriptures as primary and significant sources for Augustine’s theological ideas about both creation and the Trinity. Hence I created Appendix A to summarise the key pairings or groupings of

---

\(^{57}\) See sections 4.4. and 4.5 in Chapter 4.
\(^{58}\) See sections 4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter 4 and section 5.3 below.
\(^{59}\) See section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3, and sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, and 4.2.5 in Chapter 4.
\(^{60}\) See section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4.
\(^{61}\) See section 4.2.4 in Chapter 4.
\(^{62}\) On Philo’s ideas, see above in this section and also section 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 in Chapter 1.
\(^{63}\) See section 4.2.4.1 in Chapter 4.
scripture Augustine read together in his reflections on creation and the Trinity. These include Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3 read together and with other passages. They also include Augustine’s known and likely uses of Wis. 13. 1-5 with Rom. 1. 20, and his readings of Wis. 11. 18 with Gen. 1. 1-2 and Sir. 18. 1. As my analysis has shown, all these passages were significant, in varying ways, to Augustine’s theological reflections on creation and the Trinity.

5.2 Responsible scholarship and collaboration on behalf of better historical retrievals of patristic theology

In this section, I will address the question of why it is important for patristic and doctrinal scholars to find ways of undertaking, within their disciplines and ideally through collaboration with each other, responsible production of portrayals of Augustine’s theologies of the Trinity and creation and his sources. Thus I will assert and defend my own case for why it is important to ‘get historical theology right’. My objective is to offer theological and theoretical reasons and practical suggestions that might be taken further on behalf of modern theology.

As I discussed above, a swing of the pendulum has taken place in scholarship on the trinitarian theologies of Augustine and the Cappadocians. Patristic and doctrinal theologians alike are calling for more accurate historical retrievals of these theologies. However, more work could be done on responsible readings of Augustine’s trinitarian theology, and for sharing research and ideas. And this is true for both patristic and doctrinal theologians. My recommendations will call for collaboration among scholars, particularly collaboration that occurs prior to the publication of works on historical theology so that it can inform those works.

My responses to the question of why getting historical theology ‘right’ draw in part on Barnes’s notion of ‘trustworthy insight’. Barnes writes:

Obviously it is true that historical theology, especially scholarship on the development of trinitarian doctrine during the patristic period, has not been as productive or responsible as one would think it should have been. On the other hand, this lack of productivity (resulting in a lack of trustworthy insight or ‘facts’) has not stopped anyone in the field of Systematics from saying whatever they wanted to say about Augustine’s trinitarian theology.

---

64 See my discussion of this and the scholars I cited at the beginning of section 5.1.
65 Italics added. M. Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity’, p. 152.
My primary position is that the most compelling reason for patristic and doctrinal scholars to find ways to create better historical narratives that offer trustworthy insight into Augustine’s trinitarian theology is because doing theology involves making ‘truth claims’ to the extent that this is possible. One cannot fully understand or make verifiable ‘truth claims’ about the Trinity, which ultimately is ineffable and a mystery. But one can seek to provide trustworthy insight about the theological reflections that were undertaken by a theologian or author from the patristic period. In other words, one can offer trustworthy insight about what Augustine did or did not say, or about Augustine’s theological and other sources, or about how his ideas compare to those of the Cappadocians and others, even if one cannot verify the ultimate ‘truth claims’ that are made about the Trinity.

Developing trustworthy insight is a matter of interpretation and of how Augustine is read, and the insights achieved depend on the lens that is used to analyse his trinitarian ideas. In this thesis, I analysed Augustinian trinitarian ideas by interpreting them in light of his ideas about both creation and the Trinity. This analysis was undergirded by an analysis of his possible sources. By contrast, Barnes and Ayres examine Augustine’s trinitarian theology and sources through the lens of their understandings of principles of pro-Nicene trinitarian theologies, especially but not only Latin pro-Nicene thinking in the second half of the fourth century. Gunton evaluated Augustine’s trinitarian theology in light of Gunton’s perspectives on Augustine’s Neoplatonist or other Platonist sources and ideas.

Augustine’s corpus is so large, and many of his treatises, especially on the Trinity or Genesis, so lengthy, that the use of lenses may be inevitable. The results may be challenged, however, on the grounds that some lenses are better than others. Hence in many cases I challenged Gunton’s criticisms of Augustine’s ideas about the Trinity or creation or of his sources. The results also can be challenged if the lens employed restricts the ideas or works that are examined to the extent that some of Augustine’s ideas or sources are overlooked. Hence I also offered critiques of Barnes’s and Ayres’s views on Augustine on these grounds.

Moreover, I criticised Gunton, Barnes, and Ayres for not reading Augustine’s hexaemeral commentaries or for not appreciating that Augustine’s ideas about
both creation and the Trinity were similar at times to those that appear in the hexaemeral commentaries of others. I also criticised them for not acknowledging the breadth of Augustine’s knowledge and use of scriptures that are about creation, which he drew upon as primary sources for his ideas about creation and the Trinity.

The lens I employed in this thesis also represents one particular perspective on Augustine’s trinitarian ideas and sources, which entailed giving more attention to his commentaries on Genesis or his ideas about creation. My use of this lens thus yielded partial insight into his trinitarian theology, but it enabled the discovery of ideas and sources that can be missed in Augustine scholarship.

Even if one declares one’s lens, what does it mean to do responsible readings of Augustine and to engage in responsible production of trustworthy insight on his theology and sources, in doctrinal or patristic works? Barnes, in his statements I cited, does not explain his ideas on productivity or responsibility. Ayres also poses questions about the responsibilities of patristic and doctrinal theologians in a review of one of Gunton’s books. Ayres asks, ‘[e]ven if I am right about Gunton’s misreading of Augustine one still needs to ask "does it matter?" ', and ‘[will it] positively help the modern theological task if we expose some of the problems of Gunton’s reading?’ Ayres then offers these reflections:

However, to those students of the period [patristic students] who think of themselves as theologians I want to suggest that Gunton’s book actually raises a number of issues which demand serious thought. How can dialogue between scholars of Patristics and modern theologians best be encouraged; can modern Patristic study still find a place among its many current styles for a theological examination of Patristic material; can scholars of Augustine find ways to demonstrate positively how Augustine’s own thought may contribute to modern theological debates while still remaining faithful to historically responsible methods of investigation? These are deep questions, but I think Gunton’s book reveals that they are ones which must be faced - a [sic] least by part of the Augustinian community.

Ayres’s and Barnes’s questions raise the related questions of to whom patristic scholars – and I will add doctrinal scholars – view themselves as accountable for

---


their readings of Augustine’s works, and who their communities are (using Ayres’s terminology of an Augustinian community). Scot Douglass and Morwenna Ludlow raise similar methodological and theoretical questions in their analysis of what constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘responsible’ reading of a patristic text, and ‘to whom’ or ‘to what’ such readings are ‘responsible’.68 They argue that readers are ‘readers-in-communities’, whether scholarly communities or faith communities, and that communities identify themselves with ‘a particular kind of authority against which reading practices are judged’.69 Ludlow also suggests that doctrinal theologians, in their historical judgments and interpretive work, have responsibilities toward the church and believers today, as well as to historical doctrine or tradition.70

Not all patristic or doctrinal scholars may believe they are accountable to each other, across their two disciplines. They also may not believe they are accountable to others outside their two disciplines who read their works. My contention here, however, is that ideally patristic scholars and those doctrinal theologians who do historical theological work would acknowledge some accountability to each other, and I will offer some suggested actions below. This is true, in my view, especially for those scholars who are willing to criticise the historical retrievals of others who do not get things ‘right’ about Augustine or the Cappadocians. I am drawing on Barnes and Ayres to support my arguments here because they do show interest in having their works read by doctrinal theologians and others, and they do raise questions about responsibility, accountability, and readership.

I also will take the concept of communities of readers to whom scholars may agree to be accountable further, beyond patristic and doctrinal scholarship, by offering three examples of cross-disciplinary pursuits at the intersection of creation,

the Trinity, and science.

First, as I noted in my analysis of *Gn. litt*, Augustine’s willingness to accept ‘scientific’ knowledge about creation is cited by scholars who hold a variety of interests in his interpretations of the Genesis creation accounts. Secondly, doctrinal theologians Gunton and Stephen Holmes have published essays that explore ideas about creation, the Trinity, and science that I will cite in my proposals for ‘fruitful’ readings of Augustine’s theology. These two examples illustrate that patristic and doctrinal scholars, and those in other disciplines, can share interests in ancient texts and theological ideas. Thus I contend that patristic and doctrinal scholars may accept accountability for producing ‘trustworthy insight’ on these texts or ideas, while also, where this is their objective, positioning them within other contexts today.

Thirdly, the trinitarian theologies of Augustine and the Cappadocians are discussed in essays written by patristic scholars (including Ayres), theologians, and scientists who are interested in creation, the Trinity, and science in an anthology edited by John Polkinghorne. This is of concern here because the essays by the

---


74 Polkinghorne, *Science and the Trinity*. The essays in this volume by patristic or doctrinal scholars include Lewis Ayres, '(Mis)Adventures in Trinitarian Ontology', pp. 130-145;
patristic and doctrinal scholars offer contradictory perspectives on the trinitarian 
theologies of Augustine and the Cappadocians, as Coakley also discusses.\textsuperscript{75} Thus 
some (still) unresolved disputes over the reliability of historical retrievals of these 
theologies are being 'aired' outside the communities of patristic and doctrinal 
scholars.\textsuperscript{76} If the joint work between these scholars and scientists is based on 
isights about trinitarian theologies that may not be trustworthy, does this mean 
that the 'truth claims' made by the scientists also are jeopardised?

I contend, based on these examples, that patristic and doctrinal scholars have 
extended communities of readers outside their respective disciplines for whom they 
can acknowledge responsibility when they are presenting the results of their 
patristic scholarship on, or historical retrievals of, the theologies of the Trinity or of 
creation held by Augustine or the Cappadocians. One cannot assume that all 
scholars would accept responsibility for extended communities, but those who 
publish on cross-disciplinary matters tacitly acknowledge this readership.

Based on my observations and contentions about responsible readings and 
communities, what would it mean for patristic scholars to include doctrinal scholars 
(who work in the area of historical theology) in their extended communities, and to 
view themselves as responsible to these doctrinal scholars in some ways? Barnes 
and Ayres critique the presentations of Augustine’s trinitarian theology that appear 
in doctrinal works. So they tacitly acknowledge that doing this, which typically 
takes place in some kind of publication, is part of their scope of responsibility. How 
could this responsibility be ‘pushed up’ in the production process so that dialogue 
or collaboration between patristic and doctrinal scholars occurs before doctrinal 
works with historical content are published? How can collaboration, rather than 
criticism, take place, on behalf of the production of ‘trustworthy insight’ on 
Augustine’s ideas which are in turn read by multiple readers and communities?

\textsuperscript{76} Coakley’s analysis of what she defines as three waves (so far) in the recent revivals of 
trinitarian theologies is very helpful. Coakley, ‘Afterword: “Relational Ontology,” Trinity, and 
Establishing venues for dialogue, whether through conferences, extended community events, the publishing of works that include structured dialogues, or in other ways, would be beneficial for enabling the exchange of ideas, questions, and research, and for being constructive rather than critical. Several initiatives or publications have been undertaken recently, many in the second decade of the twenty-first century. I am not suggesting that these are not working, but it may be too soon to assess the impacts of these efforts on patristic or doctrinal works that discuss the theologies of Augustine or the Cappadocians.

One example is an international symposium that resulted in the publication of an anthology on recent developments in trinitarian theologies that also includes critiques of historical retrievals. This anthology is constructive where it offers more recent perspectives on the revivals of interest in the Trinity that have now spanned several decades; however, some of the essays are critical of historical retrievals and thus represent ‘after the fact’ criticism. Another example, which looks forward theologically as well as back, is an ecumenical anthology that discusses historical and doctrinal perspectives on trinitarian theologies, but goes further in offering new readings. The third example is of the structured dialogues about the Trinity between Evangelical scholars, including Holmes, and Catholic scholars that are published in a volume that uses a three-pronged approach: an essay is presented by one scholar, followed by three responses from others and a rejoinder by the essay’s author. This format permits dialogues to occur prior to the publication of the volume, thus allowing for agreements and disagreements to

---

78 See Schwöbel’s lengthy and helpful analysis in ‘Where Do We Stand in Trinitarian Theology? Resources, Revisions, and Reappraisals’.
be known among the scholars before their work is published.

However, even if possibilities for dialogue between patristic scholars and doctrinal theologians prior to the publication of their respective works do not exist, there are options that would permit scholars to publish insights for extended communities of readers, if scholars agreed that this was part of their ‘responsibility’.

For example, patristic scholars who wish to be responsible to and publish ‘trustworthy insight(s)’ for a wider theological community could publish two types of narrative in one work, one for patristic scholars and a shorter one for theologians. The latter narrative could suggest the significance of the patristic research for historical theology, ideally for the period both before and after the focus of the patristic research. Ayres asks, in the quote above, if patristic scholars can do a theological examination of what they are studying. Barnes offers seven criteria for judging ‘a historical reading (or interpretation) of a text, criteria which include the text’s contexts within the broader text itself and outside the text, as well as the influences of traditions or of a ‘larger “external” narrative’ on the text. Based on Ayres’s and Barnes’s statements, one could suggest that a patristic scholar could not only work historically by analysing texts, contexts, and theological traditions, but might agree to provide the additional narrative to situate the texts within later traditions or narratives. Doctrinal theologians would still be free to situate these texts within their traditions or their constructive theology.

Another option for patristic scholars is to follow Ayres’s practice of publishing chapters, written in accessible styles, in anthologies where the primary focus is not patristics. I cited some of these anthologies earlier, including one on creation, the Trinity, and science. That Ayres is willing to write these chapters allows him to offer relevant, accurate information about Augustine’s theology (although he tends to emphasise Latin pro-Nicene ideas) and to challenge assumptions about

---

82 M. Barnes, ‘Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity’, pp. 150-151.
differences between Augustine’s theology and that of the Cappadocians or others.

Another excellent example of a historical scholar making historical theological or doctrinal ideas, and potential sources for those ideas, accessible to patristic or doctrinal scholars is Paul Blowers’s book on creation theologies. Blowers does not do as much with creation and the Trinity as with creation and other doctrines, but his analysis of Basil’s and Augustine’s *hexaemeral* commentaries was useful for my work. Blowers, like I do, also includes Hellenised Jewish ideas, from Philo and Wisdom, in his historical theological work on creation theologies. Thus patristic and doctrinal scholars who focus on other sources (e.g., pro-Nicene or Neoplatonist ideas) would benefit from drawing on Blowers’s historical and theological analysis of both the doctrine of creation and *influences on* this doctrine.

For their part, doctrinal theologians also can accept responsibility for publishing trustworthy insight about or faithful representations of historical theology. This might meaning drawing on the recent works of patristic scholars, including Ayres and Barnes, who are trying to shape or correct such presentations. It also could mean taking advantage of the other options and resources I described above.

In particular, doctrinal scholars who work with both historical theology and constructive or modern theology can be intentional about *not* drawing on established assumptions or paradigms about trinitarian theologies without re-examining them in light of recent developments or publications. For example, one can be cautious about drawing on ideas attributed to Cappadocian trinitarian theology without examining whether these are new theological ideas, as is the case with some of John Zizioulas’s ideas upon which Gunton draws. On the

---

84 Blowers, *Drama of the Divine Economy*.
85 Blowers’s analysis shows that in the early centuries, the doctrine of creation was related to the doctrines of salvation or redemption, christology, teleology, and eschatology. See Blowers, *Drama of the Divine Economy*, pp. 1-17, and throughout.
88 A good example is Stephen Holmes’s use of Ayres’s and Barnes’s research on Augustine in his *The Quest for the Trinity*.
other hand, and as Ludlow suggests, doctrinal theologians can make use of historical theological ideas as sources for their own theology (even to the extent of adapting or using them selectively), if they identify that these ideas are being used for constructive work and in this way. I am not advocating theology that is merely a return to patristic theology, which is why I will be presenting proposals for ‘fruitful’ readings of Augustine in the next section. I am arguing that it is important for theologians to state at the outset what Augustine or the Cappadocians actually said, so that readers can be clear when theologians move in their own directions.

Finally, one of the criticisms Ayres and Barnes level against doctrinal scholars who criticise Augustine’s trinitarian ideas is that they do not give evidence of having read, read carefully, or read enough of Augustine’s works. Such criticisms have been made of Gunton, both by Ayres and by scholars who critique but also seek to build upon Gunton’s ideas about creation or the Trinity. As I asserted earlier, it is not possible to read all of Augustine’s works, and the use of lenses, such as looking at his trinitarian theology in light of his creation theology can be very helpful. However, even when a lens is used, one should do a careful reading of Augustine’s works in selecting the passages to be analysed and those to omit, and one should be responsible for one’s ‘truth claims’ and assertions.

---


90 Ludlow credits Robert Jenson for acknowledging that he was drawing selectively on Cappadocian theology, by emphasising some strands and not others, in his constructive theology, even though she also identifies ways in which Jenson misrepresents Gregory of Nyssa’s doctrine. Ludlow, Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 44-47.


5.3 Fruitful theological readings of Augustine with modern ideas

With this section, my focus shifts to how Augustine’s ideas about creation and the Trinity can be fruitfully read and drawn upon in theology. I selected Gunton as the primary Augustine critic to engage with in this thesis not only because of his often unfounded criticisms of Augustine, but also because Gunton’s own ideas about creation and the Trinity are of theological interest and value. So I will read some of Augustine’s theological ideas with Gunton’s ideas, and also with the ideas of other modern theologians. My methodological basis for my proposals comes from definitions of fruitful readings offered by Douglass and Ludlow.

First, fruitful readings of Augustine’s theology with modern ideas may generate ‘textual spillage’ or ‘surplus or excess meaning’ from a text.94 This is represented, at times, by someone understanding something Augustine said better than he himself may have done.95 I make no claim to have understood him to that extent, but I structured my analysis of his ideas about triadic aspects of creation or initial existence in such a way that the structure might generate additional meanings to be drawn upon constructively. One such structuring concept was my definition of ‘dynamic abiding’ based on his ideas, although he does not use this terminology.96

Secondly, ancient texts also possess ‘future’ meanings because of the theological practice of undertaking ongoing interpretations in changing contexts and theological traditions.97 Fruitful readings are not ahistorical or non-contextual readings, but a scholar can ‘listen’ to ancient texts and be responsive to them in reading them with present-day ideas.98 Thus I will seek to move theology forward, reading Augustine’s ideas with those of Gunton, Holmes, and others, as well as my own, but going beyond them all as part of the process of continuous interpretation.

As I summarised Gunton’s trinitarian theology, he connects his trinitarian

---

96 See sections 3.2.3 in Chapter 3 and 4.2 in Chapter 4, and Appendix B.
98 These ideas are from Tamsin Jones, from a structured discussion with Douglass and Ludlow. Douglass and Ludlow, ‘Afterword: Conversations about Reading’, pp. 157-161.
thinking about communion, relations, and love within the Godhead with his beliefs that the trinitarian God gives creation its goodness and its freedom and ability to be other than God, while being in relationship to God.\textsuperscript{99} Gunton thus worked with theologies of both the Trinity and creation, but he moved from the former to the latter, the reverse of my direction.

Even working from the Trinity to creation, Gunton could have done more to connect his ideas. For example, he says that there are three themes to be ‘bound together’ for the doctrine of creation: it is an article of the creed, it depends on the principle of creation ‘out of nothing’, and it is the work of the whole Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{100} But this summary about the doctrine of creation does not represent Gunton’s own theological ideas about communion and relations within the Trinity, and between the Trinity and creation, nor Gunton’s defense of the goodness of creation and its ability to be other than God.\textsuperscript{101} Gunton also, as I have said, associated creation and the Trinity with other doctrines (e.g., redemption), and gaps exist in his ideas that are about creation itself, particularly ideas about economic trinitarian acts of creation. So opportunity exists to move theology forward beyond Augustine’s and Gunton’s ideas.\textsuperscript{102}

**5.3.1 ‘Dynamic abiding’: creaturely existence, agency, and independence**

A significant aspect of Gunton’s theology is that he believed that the trinitarian God gives creation its freedom and ability to be other than God (while in relation to God). Here the fruitful readings I will explore build on these ideas; on Augustine’s


\textsuperscript{100} Gunton does not say which creed(s) he is referring to. As I have discussed, the early Latin and Roman creeds did not say anything about creation. Colin E. Gunton, ‘The Doctrine of Creation’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine*, ed. by Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: CUP, 1997; 12\textsuperscript{th} printing, 2010), pp. 141-157 (pp. 141-142).

\textsuperscript{101} Gunton defines doctrine as ‘what is taught by the church, as the officially agreed teaching of the institution’. He describes theology as ‘more open-ended activity’ which may include ideas rejected by the church. Colin E. Gunton, ‘Historical and Systematic Theology’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine*, ed. by Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: CUP, 1997; 12\textsuperscript{th} printing, 2010), pp. 3-20 (p. 4).

\textsuperscript{102} Whitney offers insightful criticisms of Gunton’s criticisms of Augustine. He emphasises Gunton’s intentions for Gunton’s doctrine of creation, and Gunton’s desire for this doctrine not to ‘fall prey to’ the errors he perceived in Augustine. So Whitney offers a sympathetic treatment of Gunton, as I will do here. See W. Whitney, p. 30 and throughout.
The concept of ‘dynamic abiding’, as I have interpreted it; and on the ideas of others.

In Augustine, the concept of ‘dynamic abiding’ entails that a creature is given, through trinitarian acts of creation and primarily by the Spirit, some desire, agency, or freedom of movement in seeking to preserve or continue its existence. For Augustine, ‘dynamic abiding’ does not entail the Spirit’s being immanent in a creature. Likewise, Gunton preferred to preserve the Spirit’s transcendence and to not suggest it was immanent in creation. Gunton acknowledged that the Spirit is ‘active’ in the world, but it does not ‘become identical with any part of the world’, which, according to Gunton, is the ‘function of the Son, who becomes flesh’. This resonates with the gift and the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’, which, I argued, is an ontological and functional aspect of a creature given by, but not subsequently controlled by, the Spirit.

By adapting Augustine’s ‘dynamic abiding’ and Gunton’s ideas about creaturely independence, a trinitarian theology that emphasised the Spirit’s role in trinitarian acts of creation would have an element to it that pertained to enabling ongoing creaturely existence and agency. This would allow for a category within creation theologies that is about creatures themselves and their ontological and functional aspects that give them freedom apart from God. It also allows for viewing creation and ongoing existence together – and connecting them with economic trinitarian acts and gifts – without requiring associations with other doctrines (e.g., divine providence or governance or eschatology).

My proposal draws support from Elizabeth Johnson’s views of the Spirit’s role in ‘creatio continuo’: these involve the Spirit’s indwelling of creation, but they also include creatures having ‘their own innate agency’ and ‘autonomous creaturely action’, as a result of ‘God’s act of giving creatures their very nature’. Johnson’s

103 See especially my analysis in section 4.3 but also section 4.2 in Chapter 4.
105 Italics added. Gunton, Theology through the Theologians, p. 108, also p. 113.
107 Italics added. Elizabeth A. Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love
ideas are based more on Aquinas’s than Augustine’s. However, her ideas which do not involve the Spirit’s indwelling in creation resonate with ‘dynamic abiding’. Moreover, her fruitful adaptation of historical theology enables her to bridge between creation, the Trinity (especially the Spirit), and Darwin’s ideas about evolution or natural selection. As I argue throughout this chapter, I too believe that future constructive work can be done with creation, trinitarian acts of creation, and science, and, in this case, with the concept of ‘dynamic abiding’.

Ideas about ‘dynamic abiding’ and creaturely agency also can be read fruitfully with Holmes’s ideas about the ‘relative independence’ of creatures from God, and Howard van Till’s concept of the ‘functional integrity’ of creation. Adapting these ideas would require further constructive work, besides the brief proposals I will make here. However, these too offer theological possibilities for connecting the independence and agency of creation, the Trinity, and science.

Holmes develops a position that a triune doctrine of creation entails creation being given ‘relative independence’ from God so that creation has its own life and freedom, and ‘room’ to be itself, while still in relationship with God. Holmes mentions Augustine’s ‘triads’ in the human mind from Trin., but not the triadic aspects of creation I analysed and put structure around in Part II; Holmes also is anxious to point out that Augustine was not engaging in natural theology in looking for triadic images of God in human beings. This is similar to my position that Augustine did not argue from triadic aspects of creation to triadic aspects of the Trinity, but from scriptural statements and other ideas about creation to trinitarian acts of creation which resulted in triadic nature. Thus opportunities exist to read Holmes’s ideas about creation having independence from God with Augustine’s triadic aspects of creation, especially ‘dynamic abiding’. Augustine’s ideas on these matters apply to all creatures, even those we might not think have much

---

108 E. Johnson, Ask the Beasts, pp. 164-165.
110 Van Till, ‘Basil, Augustine ...’.
111 Holmes’s essay is in an anthology dedicated to Gunton’s memory. S. Holmes, ‘Triune Creativity’, pp. 73-74, 79.
agency. Moving forward from Holmes’s and Augustine’s ideas, one could offer an explanation of how all creatures are given some ‘room’ to be independent and also to continue ‘to be’, which Augustine says is one of the gifts of providence.\textsuperscript{113}

Van Till argues that there is support in Basil’s and Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1 for viewing creation as having been given ‘functional integrity’ apart from God, without creatures or species requiring special intervention from God for their developmental and functional capabilities.\textsuperscript{114} Van Till presents his arguments in defense of scientific views of evolutionary developments within species or for the emergence of new species.\textsuperscript{115} He thus draws on Augustine’s ideas about the ‘seminal principles’ to argue that Augustine asserts that God gave creatures and species, from the beginning, capabilities to bring about new structures and life forms in time.\textsuperscript{116} Van Till is not overtly trinitarian but he is looking at the ‘character’ of God’s ‘creative action’ and ‘its consequences for the created world’, in which God ‘acts’ and with which God ‘interacts’.\textsuperscript{117} By bringing his ideas together with Augustine’s ‘dynamic abiding’, which I have argued is a separate capability \textit{in addition to} the seminal principles, and one that is given through trinitarian acts of creation, one would give trinitarian content to Van Till’s perspectives on acts of creation that result in creatures having functional integrity to continue to exist or ‘to be’ in their own right, as creatures and species also change or develop.

Thus, by adapting ‘dynamic abiding’ from Augustine and ideas from Gunton’s, Johnson’s, Holmes’s, and Van Till’s theological work, one could offer additional fruitful – and trinitarian ways – of supporting the theological beliefs that God gives creatures independence, room to be themselves, functional integrity, and some agency and freedom simply to continue ‘to be’. ‘Dynamic abiding’ is a gift given

\textsuperscript{113} As I discussed in section 4.3 in Chapter 4, Augustine distinguishes between two works of providence that result in capabilities given to creatures in the beginning. One was related to the ‘seminal principles’. The other, as I argued, is related to the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’. In this second work of providence, God ‘set up natures in order for them to be [\textit{ut sint}]. Augustine, \textit{Gn. litt}, Book IX, 18, 33 (BA 49, p. 140).
\textsuperscript{114} Van Till, ‘Basil, Augustine ...’, pp. 25-34.
\textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., Van Till, ‘Basil, Augustine ...’, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{116} On Augustine’s seminal principles, see section 4.3 in Chapter 4. Van Till, ‘Basil, Augustine ...’, pp. 30-32.
\textsuperscript{117} Van Till, ‘Basil, Augustine ...’, p. 26 including FN 6.
through trinitarian acts, primarily by the Spirit, that is about creation and ongoing existence. A robust trinitarian theology of creation that allows for creaturely independence requires a focus on ongoing existence and creatures themselves, and an explanation of how creatures received the gift of having agency in continuing their existence. Augustine’s ideas on trinitarian aspects of creation and ‘dynamic abiding’ offer one answer to the ‘how’ question that might be adapted in ways that have some theological and scientific integrity today.

5.3.2 The perfecting role of the Holy Spirit and the roles of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in creation: creating a vision of economic trinitarian acts

Fruitful ideas also can be generated from reading Gunton’s ideas about the Holy Spirit with Augustine’s views of the ‘perfecting’ role of the Spirit in acts of initial creation.\(^\text{118}\) I set forth this proposal in light of Gunton’s interests in the ‘perfecting role’ of the Spirit, which he associates mainly with eschatological or teleological matters,\(^\text{119}\) and his views on economic trinitarian acts, which do not sufficiently include initial creation. I also will propose ways of viewing the role of the Word / Son / Jesus Christ in giving differentiation and uniqueness to the initial creation that build on Augustine’s ideas, while finding ways to accommodate Gunton’s criticisms of Augustine’s emphasis on the giving of form. This fruitful reading would add substance to Gunton’s position, cited above, that one of the themes of the doctrine of creation is that creation is the work of the whole Trinity.

Gunton acknowledges that Gen. 1. 2 speaks of the Spirit hovering over the waters at creation, but he does not cite Augustine’s views, based on this verse, of the Spirit’s role in perfecting creation.\(^\text{120}\) Instead, Gunton cites Basil’s concept of the Spirit’s perfecting role, and Basil’s understanding of the unity of operations of the Trinity.\(^\text{121}\) Basil, however, as I have said, does not address unity of operations

---

\(^{118}\) See section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4 and Appendix B; see also section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3.


\(^{120}\) Gunton, *The Triune Creator*, pp. 83-86.

\(^{121}\) Gunton, *The Triune Creator*, pp. 85-86.
in his *hexaemeral* commentary on Gen. 1, although he does elsewhere.\textsuperscript{122}

Gunton’s views on the Spirit’s perfecting activities, or on unity of operations with distinctions within the Trinity, also do not explicitly include the perfecting of ‘initial creation’, an area in which Augustine did robust work. Gunton writes:

God’s action is triune in the sense that it is the action of Father, Son and Spirit, whose *opera ad extra* are inseparable from one another, though they are distributed, so to speak, between the three persons: the Father being the originating source of action, which he performs through the Son’s involvement in the created world and the Spirit’s perfecting of created things in anticipation of and on the Last Day.\textsuperscript{123}

Gunton does indicate elsewhere that he includes creative acts in *economic* trinitarian acts,\textsuperscript{124} which means that these acts (and the resulting gifts) also are associated with redemption and eschatology, but he does not do much with acts specifically of creation.

Thus I propose that, when understood in line with my proposal about ‘dynamic abiding’, economic acts of the Trinity in initial creation should be understood as bringing about (1) formless existence; (2) differentiated existence, which brings with it form and uniqueness; and (3) both the perfecting of creation and the giving of the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’.\textsuperscript{125} While these acts and resulting gifts would be understood as undertaken by the Trinity through unity of operations, they would be attributed, respectively, to God / the Father, the Word / Son / Jesus Christ, and the Spirit. These too represent ways that creation is given its own integrity and freedom and ability ‘to be’, as well as uniqueness for each creature and species.

The problem with this proposal is that Gunton is unlikely to have accepted the role of giving differentiation or form that Augustine attributes to the Word / Son / Jesus Christ. As I discussed, Gunton criticised Augustine’s interpretations of Gen. 1 as not being christological because, Gunton claimed, Augustine emphasised the

\textsuperscript{122} See section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2. The example he gives in On the Holy Spirit that is related to creation is about the creation of angels and other heavenly powers. St Basil the Great, *On the Holy Spirit*, trans. and introduction by Stephen Hildebrand, Popular Patristics, 42 (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 16, 38, pp. 70-73.

\textsuperscript{123} Vial quotes this passage. Gunton, *Act and Being*, pp. 112-113; Vial, ‘Colin Gunton on the Trinity and the Divine Attributes’, pp. 135, also 133-134.

\textsuperscript{124} See, e.g., Gunton, *Act and Being*, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{125} See section 4.2.2 and Appendix B.
role of the Platonist ‘forms’, not Christ, in creation.126 Perhaps, however, if this role were not viewed in terms of giving form but in other ways associated with creatures being given the gifts of uniqueness within their species, it might have been palatable to Gunton. One might add these ideas to Gunton’s constructively, in support of Gunton’s visions of community in which creatures were of value in their own right and free to be other than God.

Some of these ideas about the roles of the Spirit and the Word are similar to those offered by Jeffrey Schloss, a scientist who discusses acts of creation.127 His views on the differentiation and perfecting of creation could be fruitfully read with Augustine’s and Gunton’s theologies to add further substance to ideas about trinitarian acts of initial creation. Schloss views the Spirit (not the Word) as ‘the distinguishing principle of life’, and he connects this to the Spirit’s action of moving over the waters (according to Gen. 1. 2).128 Schloss, still referring to the opening verses of Gen. 1, views the Word or words of God as ‘successively’ ordering ‘the formless’ and ‘blessing what emerges’.129 Thus Schloss’s ideas are similar to Augustine’s ideas about the giving of formless, differentiated, and perfected existence, but Schloss attributes the roles differently to the Spirit and the Word. Moreover, Schloss, like Augustine, bases his interpretations on Gen. 1, John 1. 3, and other scriptures about creation.130

Schloss’s ideas lend further support to my proposal that Gunton’s theology can be read fruitfully with Augustine’s depictions of the trinitarian acts of initial creation of 1) giving (formless) existence to; 2) giving uniqueness to; and 3) perfecting creation and giving creatures the ability to be independent while in relation with the Trinity. Schloss’s ideas, which he develops by working with scriptural, theological,

---

128 Schloss, p. 27.
130 Schloss, pp. 27-28.
and scientific sources, also support my argument that more can be done in the intersection of creation, the Trinity, and science.

This proposal offers a solution to the problems that, first, Gunton does not provide persuasive arguments as to how one is to see Jesus Christ’s role in acts of creation, without also bringing in the Word / Son of God; and, secondly, Gunton criticises Augustine for emphasising the Word’s role in giving form.\(^\text{131}\) Gunton also overlooks Augustine’s ideas about the roles of the Spirit, as I observed above. However, one learns from Augustine that one cannot look at creation and the Trinity together without drawing on scriptural or theological ideas about the Word / Son of God who was \textit{with God} in the beginning and co-eternal with God. There must be something said about the pre-existent, eternal Word / Son with respect to both trinitarian acts of creation and the immanent Trinity. Augustine took seriously the need to correlate Gen. 1 with John 1. 1-3 and other scriptures, and hence to offer his interpretations of the roles of the Word of God in creation. He also posited many roles for the Holy Spirit, including the roles of perfecting creation and giving creatures the gift of ‘dynamic abiding’.

\subsection*{5.3.3 The goodness and beauty of creation and the Trinity}

Ironically, another area in which Augustine’s ideas can be read fruitfully with Gunton’s is in building on Gunton’s vision of communion existing within the Trinity, and between the Trinity and creation, based on the attributes of goodness and beauty. This is ironic for two reasons to be noted briefly. First, one of the things Gunton gets wrong about Augustine is that he claims that Augustine did not think that all created things were good.\(^\text{132}\) Second, in discussing his own ideas about ‘transcendentals’, Gunton claims that Augustine, because of Platonist influences, did not view beauty as a necessary or transcendental ‘mark of being’.\(^\text{133}\)

One corrective to these misunderstandings of Augustine would be to pay close

\begin{footnotes}
\item[131] I also discussed this in section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4.
\item[133] Gunton makes this claim primarily about Aquinas, but he also discusses Augustine as well as Augustinian tradition. Gunton, \textit{The One, The Three and The Many}, pp. 139-140.
\end{footnotes}
attention to his interpretations of Gen. 1 in *Gn. litt*, a work Gunton does not typically cite, and to understand how he attributes goodness to each Person in acts of creation, which I demonstrated in Chapter 4.\(^{134}\) Moreover, as I argued in many places in Part II, Augustine also writes about the goodness and beauty of creation and God in his arguments against Manichaean ideas,\(^{135}\) in drawing on Wisdom,\(^{136}\) and in drawing on ideas from Plato’s *Timaeus* that were blended with Christian ideas in Augustine’s day.\(^{137}\) Augustine was influenced by multiple sources, but the scriptures, particularly Gen. 1 and Wisdom, were very influential in his thinking about the goodness and beauty of creation.

As I demonstrated in my analysis of *Gn. litt*, Augustine’s ideas about goodness and beauty, whether that of creatures or of God or the Trinity, are associated with trinitarian acts of creation in his writings. In his *Trin.*, in his discussions of divine simplicity, he includes goodness and beauty among the attributes shared by the Persons and the Trinity as a whole.\(^{138}\) These two attributes are thus associated with his ideas about economic acts of creation, the immanent Trinity, and created things themselves.\(^{139}\) Gunton, who criticised Augustine’s ideas about divine simplicity, does not acknowledge that goodness and beauty are among the attributes that Augustine ascribes to each Person and the Trinity as a whole.\(^{140}\)

Gunton asserted that if transcendentals exist, ‘they have their being in the fact that God has created the world in such a way that it bears the marks of its maker’.\(^{141}\) In my analysis of Augustine’s ideas, I have argued that creation and the Trinity share the attributes of goodness and beauty, although these attributes are not the same in created things as in the Creator. I thus believe that someone who was seeking to take Gunton’s theology further in ways faithful to Gunton but which also correct some of his misunderstandings of Augustine could establish new ground – which goes beyond Gunton and Augustine – in looking at goodness and beauty in the created world.

\(^{134}\) I discussed and illustrated this in-depth in section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4.

\(^{135}\) See, e.g., section 3.2.1 in Chapter 3.

\(^{136}\) See Appendix A for a summary of Augustine’s citations of or allusions to Wis. 13. 1-5.

\(^{137}\) See section 4.2.2 in Chapter 4.

\(^{138}\) I argued this in sections 4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter 4.

\(^{139}\) Again see my arguments in sections 4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter 4.

\(^{140}\) See section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4.

beauty in new ways. If these are not ‘marks’ of the Trinity in creation, they may at least be attributes of creatures given through economic trinitarian acts of creation, and they certainly were attributes of the Trinity itself, and of each Person of the Trinity, for Augustine. New perspectives, based on fruitful readings of Gunton’s and Augustine’s ideas, might involve ontological and qualitative views of creation that do not entail doing natural theology, but which are based on the scriptures and theological reflections about creation and the economic and immanent Trinity.

Gunton and Augustine both acknowledge the existence of sin or evil in their theological ideas. Augustine, though, in his anti-Manichaean writings, allows for creation to retain its goodness even when he acknowledges the existence of harmful or evil things. In his mature works, he also speaks of creatures having been given agency or power to try to avoid harm, as characterised by the concept of ‘dynamic abiding’. These ideas are about the ontological nature of creatures, given to them by the Trinity in acts of creation, and these aspects of creaturely nature can persist despite the existence of sin or evil.

Gunton’s vision of communion and relations within the Trinity, and between the Trinity and creation, could thus be enhanced by adding ideas about the ‘shared’ attributes of goodness and beauty. These attributes would be shared, by analogy, between creation and the Trinity, without implying that creation is good in the same way the Trinity is, and distinctions between creatures and the Creator would be maintained. Adding these shared attributes to Gunton’s vision would be faithful to his work while allowing Augustine to have a ‘voice’. Where their ideas would not be compatible is that there is little in Augustine’s writings that I examined in Part II that offers support for a vision of personal communion or a communion based on love between the Trinity and creation.

5.3.4 Concluding comments on fruitful readings

All of my proposals for fruitful readings of Augustine and Gunton together, and with the works of others, need further development. Moreover, distance and differences would still exist between Gunton’s and Augustine’s theological ideas.

142 See section 4.3 in Chapter 4.
As just stated, there is little in Augustine’s ideas, as explored in this thesis, that would support Gunton’s concepts of the existence of personal communion or relations, whether within the Trinity, or between the Trinity and people or creation. When Augustine occasionally speaks of love and acts of creation, his concept of love is not personal, and even with a communion based on the shared attributes of goodness and beauty, one does not have a personal communion.

With the above caveats, some of Augustine’s ideas may be of value in building upon Gunton’s vision of communion, relations, and love existing within the Trinity and between the Trinity and creation, and also building on Gunton’s corollary principles that God gives creation its goodness and its freedom and ability to be other than God. What Augustine offers is a way of doing this by looking primarily at economic acts of creation, although also at the attributes of goodness and beauty that are shared by the Persons of the Trinity and creation. My emphasis on economic trinitarian acts of creation in my proposals is fitting for Gunton’s own interest in economic acts. The ideas I have proposed give more substance to acts of creation and more attention to ongoing creaturely existence.

Closing words

The proposals I offered in this chapter bring this thesis nearly to a close. My intention is to draw on the proposals I have offered in sections 5.2 and 5.3 in future research and projects of my own, and to find ways to discuss them further with others. Two of the primary conclusions of my thesis are that Augustine’s ideas about the Trinity and creation have more to offer both to theology and to science, and to richer theological views on ongoing creaturely existence and gifts given to creation through economic trinitarian acts of creation, especially acts Augustine attributes to the Holy Spirit. Thus my work has implications for pneumatology as well as trinitarian theology, viewed in light of creation theology.

In my closing words of this thesis, I will make one final appeal, to patristic and doctrinal scholars alike, and to scientists and others. This appeal brings together Augustine’s own words with the words of John 1. 1-3, and words he included in a sermon on Ps. 103 (104), one of the ‘creation psalms’.

Take the time to appreciate Augustine’s breadth of knowledge about the
scriptures, especially as evidenced in his fifth century works, and to understand how his method of correlating passages to discern a single voice influenced his theological ideas. Augustine believed that throughout the scriptures there was ‘but one single utterance of God’, and that ‘a single Word [‘unum Verbum’] makes itself heard, that Word who, being God-with-God in the beginning [‘in principio Deum apud Deum’], has no syllables, because he is not confined by time.\(^{143}\)

Much of Augustine’s thinking on creation and the Trinity was based on the Word and words of God, and we owe it to Augustine to listen to Augustine’s own words, through which we also hear the Word and words of God.

\(^{143}\) Augustine, \textit{en. Ps.}, 103.4.1 (CCSL 40).
**Appendix A: Key Scriptures for Augustine’s Theological Ideas on Creation and the Trinity**

This appendix shows key groupings of scriptures that Augustine often read together using his exegetical method of correlating the meanings of multiple passages that were about creation in some way. The leftmost column lists the primary scriptures that drove his readings, and the next column lists scriptures he often read with those scriptures. The data is taken from my analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 and thus full references are not given here. Two columns to the right show where similar ideas appear in the *hexaemeral* or other works of Basil of Caesarea and Philo of Alexandria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Scripture(s)</th>
<th>Other Scriptures</th>
<th>Augustine (Fourth Century)</th>
<th>Augustine (Fifth Century)</th>
<th>Basil (Fourth Century)</th>
<th>Philo (First Century)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-3</td>
<td>John 8. 25 (OL) (Jesus Christ says he is the beginning.) (See also the row directly below.)</td>
<td>Gn. <em>adv. Man.</em>, I, 2, 3-4</td>
<td>Gn. <em>litt.</em>, Book I, 5, 10</td>
<td>Jo. <em>ev. tr.</em>, Homily 38, 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verses about the ‘beginning’.</td>
<td><em>f. et symb.</em>, 9, 18</td>
<td><em>Gn. litt. imp.</em>, 3, 6</td>
<td><em>Jo. ev. tr.</em>, Homily 73, 6</td>
<td><em>trin.</em>, Book I, 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-4</td>
<td>John 8. 25 (OL) (Jesus Christ says he is the beginning. See row above.)</td>
<td>Ps. 103 (104), 24 (God created in wisdom.)</td>
<td>Augustine reads and correlates the verses to the left in varying ways in <em>civ. Dei</em>, II, Book XI, 32; Jo. <em>ev. tr.</em>, Homily 1, 16; <em>en. Ps.</em>, 103.3.25-26. (Section 4.2.3.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verses about the roles of the Word / Son / Christ / Wisdom in creation.</td>
<td>1 Cor. 1. 24 (Christ is the power and wisdom of God.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 1 and John 1. 1-4</td>
<td>Ps. 148. 5 (The Lord spoke and they were made, commanded and they were created.)</td>
<td>He correlates verses to left with Job 38. 7.</td>
<td>Jo. <em>ev. tr.</em>, Homily 1, 5 (Section 4.2.4.1.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine reads verses to right to be about creation of angels</td>
<td>Ps. 148. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>乔. <em>ev. tr.</em>, Homily 1, 5 (Section 4.2.4.1.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Scripture(s)</td>
<td>Other Scriptures</td>
<td>Augustine (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Augustine (Fifth Century)</td>
<td>Basil (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Philo (First Century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John 1. 1-3</td>
<td>Gen. 1. 1</td>
<td>s. 214, 5</td>
<td>On the Hexaemeron,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(God the Word [Verbum Deus],</td>
<td>Homily 3, 2; see also Book</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Basil’s ideas are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not like a word [verbum]</td>
<td>I, 10, 20; 18, 36.</td>
<td></td>
<td>similar to Augustine’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>whose sound can be thought</td>
<td>s. 120, 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gn. litt imp.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of in the mind and uttered</td>
<td>s. 225, 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by the lips.)</td>
<td>Jo. ev. tr.,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>f. et symb., 3, 3-4</td>
<td>Homily 1, 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(He says that human words</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>are manufactured.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Word is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>begotten from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>what God is,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>which is not ‘nothing’ or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>created matter.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Gn. litt. imp.,</strong> 5, 19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(The Word of God … is not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>like ‘a sound uttered in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the way that</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>happens with us’. )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>conf., Book IV,</strong> x, 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>; Book XI, xxvii, 35-38</td>
<td>(also mus., Book VI, II.2;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(He discusses</td>
<td>IX.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>succession of human</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>words or syllables and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>makes analogies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>related to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>creation or the Trinity.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Scripture(s)</td>
<td>Other Scriptures</td>
<td>Augustine (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Augustine (Fifth Century)</td>
<td>Basil (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Philo (First Century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John 1. 1-3</td>
<td>Ps. 103 (104). 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ps. 148. 1-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other verses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>about the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word or God’s words</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in creation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 1. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gn. litt. imp., 4,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16-18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Holy Spirit in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Augustine is not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>conclusive on whether</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen. 1. 2 refers to the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Holy Spirit.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 1. 1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gn. litt, Book I, 18, 26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine reads these</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>On the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verses with his</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hexaemeron, Homily 2, 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>own ideas about God’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>omnipotence and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creation ‘out of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nothing’.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis. 11. 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gn. adv. Man., I, 5, 9 –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vulgate); 11. 17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6, 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LXX)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Does not cite Sir. 18. 1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(God created</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offers two-step</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>creation process for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unformed or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>matter and form.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unseen material)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>s. 214, 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir. 18. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Uses all verses to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(God created</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>argue that God</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all things</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>created ‘all things’ from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>together or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>nothing through</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simultaneously</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>simultaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[omnia simul]).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>creation of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>matter and form.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. et symb., 2, 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Does not cite Sir. 18. 1.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Scripture(s)</td>
<td>Other Scriptures</td>
<td>Augustine (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Augustine (Fifth Century)</td>
<td>Basil (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Philo (First Century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 1. 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31</td>
<td>These verses are among the grounds for Augustine’s ideas on the goodness of the Trinity.</td>
<td><em>Gn. adv. Man.</em>, Book I, 2, 4; Book I, 21, 32</td>
<td><em>Gn. litt</em>, Book I, 5, 11; 6, 12; 7, 13; 8, 14; 18, 36 <em>civ. Dei</em>, II, Book XI, 21-24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis. 11. 18 (Vulgata); Wis. 11. 17 (LXX)</td>
<td>This verse is covered in the row above on Gen. 1. 1-2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis. 11. 21 (Vulgata); Wis. 11. 20 (LXX)</td>
<td>Wis. 13. 1-5 may be alluded to in <em>Gn. adv. Man.</em>, I, 16, 25-26. Wis. 11. 16 – 12. 2 also may be part in the background of <em>Gn. adv. Man.</em>, I, 16, 25-26. Similar ideas appear in Philo’s <em>Somn.</em></td>
<td><em>Gn. adv. Man.</em>, I, 16, 25-26</td>
<td><em>Gn. litt</em>, Book III, 9, 16; 16, 25; Book IV, 3, 7 – 6, 12 <em>civ. Dei</em>, I, Book V, 11 <em>Trin.</em>, Book III, 9, 16</td>
<td>On the <em>Hexaemeron</em>, Homily 3, 5 (Basil speaks of the one ‘who disposes all things by weight and by measure’ and by number. He cites Job 36. 27 [LXX] for the concept of number.)</td>
<td>Somn., II.193-194 (Philo says that God measures, weighs, and numbers all things and universal nature.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir. 18. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>vera rel., 7, 13 ep. 11, 2 (Possible allusions in his discussions of simultaneous operations of the Trinity.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Opif., ch. 16, 130 (Philo speaks of anterior forms and measures by which things are formed and measured.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Scripture(s)</td>
<td>Other Scriptures</td>
<td>Augustine (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Augustine (Fifth Century)</td>
<td>Basil (Fourth Century)</td>
<td>Philo (First Century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rom. 1. 20</td>
<td>The citations here are of Rom. 1. 20 referenced on its own. See also the row for Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 below.</td>
<td>vera rel., 29, 52, 101; doc. Chr., Book I, IV-V; retr., I, 11 (10), 1 (referring to mus., Book VI)</td>
<td>Gn. litt., Books II, 8, 17; IV, 32, 49</td>
<td>Jo. ev. tr., Homily 2, 4 ep. 120, 2, 12 civ. Dei, I, Book VIII, 9-12; II, Book XI, 22 Trin., Books II, 15, 25; IV, 16, 21; VI, 10, 12; XIII, 24; XV, 6, 10; XV, 20, 39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis. 13. 1-5</td>
<td>Rom. 1. 20 (explicitly or implicitly referenced)</td>
<td>Gn. adv. Man., I, 16, 25-26 (Augustine may be alluding to Wis. 13. 1-5 here.) conf., Book V, iii (3-6) – iv (7) (He refers to Rom. 1. 21-25 here in making negative statements, rather than making the positive statement of Rom. 1. 20.)</td>
<td>s. 241, 1-3 en. Ps., 103.1.1 Trin., Book XV, 1-3 (Wis. 13. 1-5 and Rom. 1. 20 are quoted in full here.) en. Ps., 148, 13-15, also 2-3, 10 (possible allusions)</td>
<td>On the Hexaemeron, Homily 1, 11; Homily 3, 10; Homily 6, 1. (This are implicit but very likely references to Wis. 13. 1-5.)</td>
<td>Praem., 41-43 (People conceive that there is a Creator from the beauties and order of things in the world. Philo calls this moving from 'down to up'.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis. 13. 1-5</td>
<td>Wis. 11. 21</td>
<td>See the row on Wis. 11. 21 above.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Augustine’s Triadic Aspects of Initial Existence or of Creation and Trinitarian Acts of Creation

Table 1: Augustine’s Triadic Aspects of Initial Creation and Trinitarian Acts (Fifth Century)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Work</th>
<th>First aspect / Person(s)</th>
<th>Second aspect / Person(s)</th>
<th>Third aspect / Person(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Existence</td>
<td>Ongoing Existence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth century (Hippo)</td>
<td>Formless existence</td>
<td>Differentiated existence (form)</td>
<td>Perfected existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>View 1</strong> Gn. litt, Book I, 4, 9 – 5, 10; also Book I, 6, 12</td>
<td>Formless existence brought into being BEFORE God speaks.</td>
<td>Form is given when unformed material is called by and turns to God / the Father and the Son / Word.</td>
<td>Perfection is given when creation is called by and turns and is given form, leaving imperfect formless state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary: God’s role of creating (not defined).</td>
<td>Primary: Word / Son gives form to unformed existence.</td>
<td>Primary: Word / Son perfects creation by giving form to its formlessness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>God created in ‘the beginning’, which is the Son.</td>
<td>God’s speech is involved because God and the Word call together.</td>
<td>God’s speech has a role in calling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>God and Son are source.</td>
<td>Creation’s role is turning.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>View 2</strong> Gn. litt, Book I, 5, 11 – 8, 14</td>
<td>Perfecting formless existence / giving capability of ‘continuing to exist or ‘dynamic abiding’ / goodness associated with creation and acts of Trinity /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary: Holy Spirit’s activity of moving over the water.</td>
<td>The Spirit is the ‘Divine Goodness’ and God’s agency and good will are involved in the Spirit’s activity. God’s speech and the Word involved in God’s proclaiming creation good.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>View 3</strong> Gn. litt, Book I, 18, 36</td>
<td>Both form and perfection given to formless material /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary: Holy Spirit’s activity of brooding over the water (Gen. 1.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roles of God and Word / Son not named.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Augustine’s Triadic Aspects of Initial Creation and Trinitarian Acts (Fifth Century)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Work</th>
<th>First aspect / Person(s)</th>
<th>Second aspect / Person(s)</th>
<th>Third aspect / Person(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fifth century (Hippo) *Trin., VI, 10, 12*</td>
<td>Existence (it is ‘one thing’) in supreme triad, ‘the source of all things’</td>
<td>Differentiation (It is ‘fashioned in some form’) in supreme triad, ‘the most perfect beauty’</td>
<td>‘Dynamic abiding’ / ‘Ordered abiding’ (It both ‘seeks’ and ‘maintains’ order) in supreme triad, ‘wholly blissful delight’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Initial Existence**

**Ongoing Existence**

*Note:* Augustine’s fourth century ideas on triadic aspects of creation and economic trinitarian acts are summarised in Table 2 on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (Location)</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>First aspect / Person(s)</th>
<th>Second aspect / Person(s)</th>
<th>Third aspect / Person(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>388-391 (Thagaste)</td>
<td><em>Gn. adv.</em> Man., Book I, 16, 25-26</td>
<td>Measure / Supreme measure</td>
<td>Number / Supreme number</td>
<td>Order / weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supreme order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vera rel., 7, 13</td>
<td>'it is one something' / 'creator Trinity' / Father implied</td>
<td>'it is distinguished by its own proper look or species from other things' / 'creator Trinity' / Word or Son implied (see also vera rel., 55, 113)</td>
<td>'it does not overstep the order of things, and the creature is governed by 'the most beautiful order'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ep. 11, 3-4</td>
<td>'it exists' / its 'cause'</td>
<td>'it is this or that' / the form by which it is fashioned, also the Son</td>
<td>'it remains as it was' as it can, which reveals a 'certain permanence' in which things exist' / no explicit comment on where this aspect comes from</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                  | div. qu., 18 | it 'is one thing in regard to its existence' / 'threefold cause', a 'trinity' | it is 'another [thing] in regard to differentiation' / 'threefold cause', a 'trinity' | 'its parts conform to each other' / 'threefold cause', a 'trinity'

**Table 2: Augustine’s Triadic Aspects of Creation and Trinitarian Acts (Fourth Century)**
Bibliography

Augustine of Hippo

Latin abbreviations for Augustine’s works are from Allan D. Fitzgerald, ed., *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999; paperback edn, 2009), pp. xxxv-xlii. The Latin editions cited in this thesis are listed separately after the list of English translations cited.

*English translation series*


*English translations cited (with Latin abbreviations)*


——, *De Fide et Symbolo*, trans. and with and introduction and commentary by E. P. Meijering (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1987) (abbrev. *f. et symb.*)


——, *On Order*, trans. and with an introduction by Silvano Borruso (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2007) (abbrev. *ord.*)


### Latin editions cited

**BA** *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* (Turnhout: Brepols or Desclée De Brouwer)

**CCSL** *Corpus Christianorum*, Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols)

Augustine, *civ. Dei*, CCSL 47 and 48; BA 35
Augustine, *conf.*, CCSL 27
Augustine, *div. qu.*, 18, CCSL 44 A
Augustine, *en. Ps.*, CCSL 40
Augustine, *Gn. adv. Man.*, BA 50
Augustine, *Gn. litt.*, BA 48 and 49
Augustine, *Gn. litt. imp.*, BA 50
Augustine, *Jo. ev. tr.*, CCSL 36
Augustine, *Trin.*, CCSL 50 and 50 A; BA 15 and 16
Other ancient authors

**English translation and other series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>The Early Church Fathers (London and New York: Routledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPNF</td>
<td>A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ambrose of Milan**


**Arius**

Athanasius


———, *Orations against the Arians* (selections), trans. and ed. by Khaled Anatolios, in *Athanasius*, by Khaled Anatolios, ECF (London and New York: Routledge, 2004; transferred to digital printing, 2010), pp. 87-175

Athanasius – works attributed to him


Basil of Caesarea


Ephrem the Syrian – work attributed to him


Eunomius of Cyzicus


Eusebius of Caesarea


Gregory of Nazianzus


Gregory of Nyssa


Hermas

Hilary of Poitiers


Jerome


Justin Martyr


Irenaeus

Irenaeus, Against Heresies, trans. and ed. by Robert M. Grant, in Irenaeus of Lyons, by Robert M. Grant, ECF (London and New York: Routledge, 1997; transferred to digital printing, 2005), pp. 55-186


Marius Victorinus


Origen


**Philo of Alexandria**


**Plato**


Plotinus


Rufinus


Tertullian


Theodoret


Secondary sources

*English translation and other series*


ECF The Early Church Fathers (London and New York: Routledge)


*Works cited*


Ayres, Lewis, ‘Athanasius’ Initial Defense of the Term *homoousios*: Rereading the *De Decretis*, *Journal of Early Christian Studies*, 12, no. 3 (2004), 337-359

———, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)


———, ‘Measure, Number, and Weight’, in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. by Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999; paperback edn, 2009), pp. 550-552


——, ‘Augustine’s Last Pneumatology’, *Augustinian Studies*, 39, no. 2 (2008), 223-234


——, ‘Exegesis and Polemic in Augustine’s De Trinitate I’, *Augustinian Studies*, 30, no. 1 (1999), 43-59


—— , Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)


Behr, John, translation and introduction, On the Apostolic Preaching, by Irenaeus, Popular Patristics, 17 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997)


Borruso, Silvano, translation and introduction, On Order, by Augustine (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007)


Bray, Gerald L., ed., We Believe in One God, Ancient Christian Doctrine, 1 (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009)

Bright, Pamela, ed. and trans., *Augustine and the Bible*, The Bible through the Ages, 2 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999)


Cameron, Michael, ‘*Enarrationes in Psalmos*’, in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. by Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999; paperback edn, 2009), pp. 290-296


——, ‘New Sermons of St Augustine’, *Journal of Theological Studies*, 47, no. 1 (1996), 69-91


——, Basil of Caesarea’s Anti-Eunomian Theory of Names: Christian Theology and Late-Antique Philosophy in the Fourth Century Trinitarian Controversy, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 103 (Leiden: Brill, 2010)


Dembski, William A., Wayne J. Downs, and Justin B. A. Frederick, eds., The Patristic Understanding of Creation: An Anthology of Writings from the Church Fathers on Creation and Design (Riesel, TX: Erasmus Press, 2008)


———, eds., *Reading the Church Fathers* (London: T&T Clark, 2011)


Ellingwood, Jane, ‘Ambrose’s Hymn “Deus, creator omnium” and Augustine’s Early Theological Ideas’ (unpublished paper presented on 24 May 2014 at the annual meeting of the North American Patristics Society)


Giles, Kevin, The Eternal Generation of the Son: Maintaining Orthodoxy in Trinitarian Theology, with a foreword by Robert Letham (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012)

Grant, Robert M., Irenaeus of Lyons, ECF (London and New York: Routledge, 1997; transferred to digital printing, 2005)


Greene-McCreight, K. E., Ad Litteram: How Augustine, Calvin, and Barth Read the “Plain Sense” of Genesis 1-3, Issues in Systematic Theology, 5 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999)


——, *Father, Son and Holy Spirit: Essays Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2003)


——, *Theology through the Theologians* (London: T&T Clark, 1996; repr. 2003)


——, *The Quest for the Trinity: The Doctrine of God in Scripture, History and Modernity* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012)

——, ‘Rejoinder Comments and Clarification’, in *Two Views on The Doctrine of the Trinity*, ed. by Jason S. Sexton, Counterpoints Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2014), pp. 67-68


Horrell, David G., Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, eds., *Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical, and Theological Perspectives* (London: T&T Clark, 2010)


—— , Early Christian Doctrines, 5th edn (London: Continuum, 2007)


—— , ‘Basil of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra, and “Sabellius”’, Church History, 58, no. 2 (1989), 157-167


——, 'Eusebius and the Birth of Church History', in The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature, ed. by Frances Young, Lewis Ayres, and Andrew Louth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; first paperback edn, 2007), pp. 266-274


——, 'Heart in Pilgrimage': St Augustine as Interpreter of the Psalms', in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. by Aristotle Papanikolaou and George E. Demacopoulos (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), pp. 291-304


——, 'Power and Dominion: Patristic Interpretations of Genesis I', in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical, and Theological Perspectives, ed. by David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou (London: T&T Clark, 2010), pp. 140-153


Lust, Johan, Erik Eynikel, and Katrin Hauspie, Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint, rev. edn (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2003)

Lyman, Rebecca, 'Arians and Manichees on Christ', Journal of Theological Studies, 40, no. 2 (1989), 493-503


Marmion, Declan, and Rik Van Nieuwenhove, An Introduction to the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)


McCarthy, Michael C., 'Creation through the Psalms in Augustine’s *Enarrationes in Psalmos*', *Augustinian Studies*, 37, no. 2 (2006), 191-218


——, ed., *We Believe in One Lord Jesus Christ*, Ancient Christian Doctrine, 2 (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009)


Merrill, E. T., ed., *Commentary on Catullus (English)*, Perseus Digital Library (Medford, MA: Harvard University Press, 1893 [on CD-ROM])


Murphy, Roland E., *The Tree of Life: An Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature*, 3rd edn (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002)

Nausner, Bernhard, ‘The failure of a laudable project: Gunton, the Trinity and human self-understanding’, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 62, no. 4 (2009), 403-420


———, The Young Augustine: The Growth of St. Augustine’s Mind Up to His Conversion, 2nd rev. edn (Staten Island, NY: Alba House, 2001)


Papanikolaou, Aristotle, and George E. Demacopoulos, eds., Orthodox Readings of Augustine (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008)

Parvis, Paul, 'Justin Martyr', in Early Christian Thinkers: The Lives and Legacies of Twelve Key Figures, ed. by Paul Foster (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010), pp. 1-14


———, The Mystery of Continuity: Time and History, Memory and Eternity in the Thought of Saint Augustine (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1986; first paperback edn, 1987)


Polkinghorne, John, 'Introduction', in The Trinity and an Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. by John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), pp. vii-xi

——, ed., The Trinity and an Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010)


Rahlf-Hanhart, trans., Septuaginta, editio altera (Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006)


Ramsey, Boniface, Ambrose, ECF (London: Routledge, 1997)


Remes, Pauliina, Neoplatonism, Ancient Philosophies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008)


Schwöbel, Christoph, ed., Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995)


Sexton, Jason S., ed., Two Views on The Doctrine of the Trinity, Counterpoints Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2014)


Skarsaune, Oskar, ‘A Neglected Detail in the Creed of Nicaea (325)’}, Vigiliae Christianae, 41, no. 1 (1987), 34-54


——, To Know God and the Soul: Essays on the Thought of Saint Augustine (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008)


Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, A Digital Library of Greek Literature, University of California, Irvine

Thomas, Nicholas L., Defending Christ: The Latin Apologists before Augustine, Studia Traditionis Theologieae, Explorations in Early and Medieval Theology (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011)

Thompson, Marianne Meye, The God of the Gospel of John (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001)


Toom, Tarmo, Classical Trinitarian Theology: A Textbook (New York: T&T Clark, 2007)

——, ‘Hilary of Poitiers’ De Trinitate and the Name(s) of God’, Vigiliae Christianae, 64 (2010), 456-479

——, ‘Marcellus of Ancyra and Priscillian of Avila: Their Theologies and Creeds’, Vigiliae Christianae, 68 (2014), 60-81

Torchia, N. Joseph, Creatio ex nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond, American University Studies, Series VII, Theology and Religion, 205 (New York: Peter Lang, 1999)

Trigg, Joseph W., Origen, ECF (London and New York: Routledge, 1998; transferred to digital printing, 2005)

Trigg, Joseph Wilson, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-century Church (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1983)


Vanderjagt, Arlo, and Detlev Pätzold, eds., The Neoplatonic Tradition: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Themes, Dialectica minora, 3 (Köl: Dinter, 1991)

Van Bavel, Tarsicius, 'The Creator and the Integrity of Creation in the Fathers of the Church especially in Saint Augustine', Augustinian Studies, 21 (1990), 1-33


——, 'Plato, Platonism', in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. by Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999; paperback edn, 2009), pp. 651-654

——, 'Porphyry', in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. by Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999; paperback edn, 2009), pp. 661-663


