

Xenophon *Poroi* 5: Securing a ‘More Just’ Athenian Hegemony

Abstract: The present study examines section five of *Poroi* and Xenophon’s proposal to restore the reputation of Athens. After outlining his plan for ‘justly’ supplying the *dēmos* with sufficient sustenance in *Poroi* 1-4, section 5 addresses the desire to regain hegemony after Athens had lost the Social War. Xenophon does not adopt an anti-imperialist stance; instead he seeks to re-align imperial aspirations with Athenian ideals and earlier paradigms for securing hegemony. Xenophon’s ideas in *Poroi* are contextualized with consideration for his ‘Socratic’ distinction between tyranny and kingship, as well as his wider advice for ruling well. It is shown that his proposals for securing the consent of the allies reiterates ideas that Xenophon outlines across his corpus, especially *Hiero* and *Cyropaedia*. In *Poroi* Xenophon therefore applies his political thought in an attempt to re-direct Athenian ambitions away from policies that prompted charges of being a ‘tyrant polis’ and towards ‘legitimate rule’.

Keywords: Xenophon; *Poroi*; imperialism/hegemony; Social War

In 2009 Dustin Gish and Wayne Ambler co-edited a volume of *Polis* devoted to Xenophon. In their concluding remarks the pair observed that the level of ‘disagreements in interpretation suggest that the full depths of Xenophon’s political thought have yet to be fathomed and that such an enterprise remains a vital one’.¹ The present work draws on a wider study of *Poroi* and the Xenophontic corpus in order to offer one such contribution towards achieving this end. Xenophon most clearly attempts to apply his thought directly for practical, political application in *Poroi* and yet its contribution to ancient political theory remains largely overlooked. From the work’s outset Xenophon expresses a two-fold aim: to ensure that all Athenians have sufficient sustenance, and to restore the standing and reputation that Athens once enjoyed throughout Hellas.² To facilitate the realization of both ends Xenophon presents a series of economic proposals for capital investments and internal improvement projects that dominate the first four sections of *Poroi*. To date the overwhelming majority of scholarship on *Poroi* has focused on these economic aspects and

¹ D. Gish, D. & W. Ambler ‘Political Thought of Xenophon’, *Polis* 26.2 (2009), pp. 181-4, p. 183.

² *Poroi* 1.1; all references to Xenophon’s works are to E. C. Marchant, *Xenophontis Opera Omnia*, Vols. 1-5, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1920). All translations are my own.

their plausibility, as well as the precise meaning of Xenophon's concern 'that sufficient *trophē* be produced for all Athenian citizens at public expense'.³ Yet this proves not only to be an end in and of itself, but also to be the means of securing Xenophon's second stated aim – to help Athens justly re-secure hegemony across Hellas and the Aegean more broadly. What follows therefore evaluates Xenophon's plan to transform Athenian hegemony from a suspected 'tyranny' into a legitimate rule over willing allies. By contextualizing the ideas of

³ *Poroi* 4.33; On the economic aspects of *Poroi* see, for example: T. Figueira, 'Economic Thought and Economic Fact in the Works of Xenophon' in F. Hobden and C. Tuplin (eds.), *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 665 – 687; D. Lewis 'Xenophon's *Poroi* and the Foundations of Political Economy', *Polis* 36 (2009), pp. 370 – 388; J. Jansen, 'After Empire: Xenophon's *Poroi* and the Reorientation of Athens' Political Economy', (Diss. The University of Texas at Austin, 2007); H.R. Breitenbach, 'Xenophon', in A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll (eds.), *Real-Encyclopädie in der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Band IX.A,2 Vulcanius-Zenius (1967), 1567-1928, especially col. 1760; A.M. Andreades, *A History of Greek Public Finance*, Vol. I, trans. Carroll N. Brown, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), pp. 381 ff.; W. Schwahn 'Die xenophontischen *Ποροι* und die athenische Industrie im vierten Jahrhundert', *Rheinisches museum für philology* 80 (1931), pp. 253-278; the debate between Gauthier and Schütrumpf concerning *trophē/misthoi* is similarly concerned with the financial aspects of Xenophon's proposals, albeit for a somewhat different end. P. Gauthier, *Un commentaire historique des Poroi de Xénophon*. (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1976); P. Gauthier, 'Le Programme de Xénophon dans les *Poroi*,' in V.J. Gray (ed.), *Xenophon*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 113-136, originally published in French as, 'Le programme de Xénophon dans les *Poroi*', *Revue de Philologie*, 58 (1984), 181-199; E. Schütrumpf, *Xenophon: Vorschläge zur Beschaffung von Geldmitteln oder Über die Staatseinkünfte*, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1982).

Poroi 5 alongside the rest of the Xenophontic corpus, though especially *Hiero* and *Cyropaedia*, it is demonstrated that Xenophon attempts to re-align the imperial aspirations of the Athenian *dēmos* with his – and allegedly its – own professed ideals. For the purposes of the present study these are understood to be the terms that the Athenian *dēmos* swore to uphold in the prospectus of the Second Athenian Confederacy.

Section one situates *Poroi* and the present study in their wider contexts. Xenophon's stance on fourth-century Athenian imperialism is re-examined with consideration for his wider treatment of the concepts of *hēsychia* (quiet, peace) and *apragmosynē* (love of a quiet life), as well as the life of the *archōn* (ruler) and the life of the *idiōtēs* (private person). Section two then explores how Xenophon invokes the dichotomy of 'tyranny' and 'legitimate rule' in *Poroi* in order to re-direct Athenian action away from the use of coercive force; in order to persuade his audience to do so Xenophon draws on earlier, idealized presentations of successful Athenian leadership secured through benefaction. Part three develops the significance of this new reading of *Poroi* with reference to the work's parallels to Xenophon's *Hiero*. The result suggests that in *Poroi* Xenophon can be understood to offer the Athenian *dēmos* a 'princely mirror' that promised to remind Athens how to retain the allies it still had after the Social War and to suggest how Athens might undertake a third period of imperial ascendancy and once more be recognized as 'King of Hellas', rather than face rejection as a 'tyrant polis'.⁴

Context for *Poroi* and the Current Study

We may safely situate *Poroi* amid the imminent concerns of 355/4 BC on the basis of textual references to the unrest surrounding Delphi and the so-called 'Social' War.⁵ Beginning

⁴ See, for example, Aristophanes *Knights* 1330,1333; Thucydides 1.122.3; 1.124.3; 1.18.

⁵ *Poroi*, 4.40; 5.9, 5.12.

c. 357 BC,⁶ the conflict witnessed the defeat of Athens at the hands of its former allies: Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, as well as the island of Cos. The war compounded the losses of Amphipolis with its gold and silver resources, as well as the *poleis* of Pydna and Potidaea to the rising power of Macedon and Philip II.⁷ Taken together, this string of defeats had serious political and economic consequences for Athens. The participation of Byzantium and Rhodes underscore the significance of the opposition facing Athens. Historically Byzantium and the *poleis* on Rhodes had held pivotal roles in ensuring the security of Athens' external grain supply; therefore their mutual hostility to Athens in the Social War effectively re-created the successful strategy that Sparta had deployed against Athens during the final decade of the Peloponnesian War. At that time Athens was cut off from its northern and southern trade routes; the precise nature of this external supply continues to be debated, though if they remained essential for feeding the population of Attica, the threat that

⁶ The chronology for the outset and duration of the Social War remains problematic thanks in part to distinct reckonings of Olympiads and archons in our extant sources. Dionysius of Halicarnassus places the outset of the war in the archonship of Agathocles (*De Antiquis Oratoribus: Lysia Iudicium*, 12), while Diodorus Siculus 14.6.1 identifies the archonship of Cephisodotus, i.e. the third year of the 105th Olympiad and the reign of Philip II; see S. Peake, 'A Note on the Dating of the Social War', *Greece & Rome*, 44.2 (1997), pp. 161-4.

⁷ J. Pečírka, 'The Crisis of the Athenian *polis* in the Fourth Century B.C.', *Eirene*, 14 (1976), pp. 5-29, p. 16 documents Athenian attempts to re-gain control over Amphipolis from 404 and the increasing frequency during the 360s. The ambition strained Athenian resources and the cohesiveness of the Second Athenian confederacy; see also G. Cawkwell, 'Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy', *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 101, (1981), 40-55.

Byzantium and the *poleis* of Rhodes in the early 350s is magnified.⁸ When Xenophon composed *Poroi* the Athenian *dēmos* faced vital policy decisions that would have a profound impact not only on the future of Athens, but also on the political landscape of Hellas as a whole.

While one may quibble over the feasibility of all or part(s) of Xenophon's plan outlined in the first four sections of *Poroi*, Xenophon claims that such proposals were intended to ensure that *all* Athenians should enjoy adequate maintenance acquired *justly*. He therefore expresses his aspiration to see Athens enact each measure 'in succession' (*kata meros*), so as to ensure the means of maintaining *all* Athenians with provisions at the public expense (*pasin Athēnaios trophēn apo koinou genesthai*).⁹ The form and method in which Xenophon presents such advice unmistakably realize the expectations placed on the good citizen and the aspiring leader in Xenophonic thought.¹⁰ The same was true of the means of attaining the hegemony that Athens continued to strive for, even after its defeat in the Social

⁸ Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.1.2, 1.1.35; 1.5.1; 2.2.1-21 outlines Spartan naval activity in both regions during the Peloponnesian war. *Hellenica* 4.8.20 again stresses the important role that Rhodes played in Athenian ambitions after the war, as well as Spartan attempts to block Athenian control. For the ongoing debate concerning the fourth-century grain supply and additional scholarship, see: A. Moreno, *Feeding the Democracy: the Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); more recently B. Rustishauser, *Athens and the Cyclades: Economic Strategies 540-314 BC*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), especially pp. 104-5 with n. 157, and p. 212, raises the late fourth-century evidence for increasing emphasis on supplies from North Africa, though evidence for the North African supply lines are secure only from the late 330s.

⁹ *Poroi* 4.32-4.

¹⁰ See, for example, *Memorabilia* 3.6 and 4.6.14, as well as the required knowledge that Aristotle outlines for any would-be orator *Rhetoric* 1359^b8.

War. As shall be shown, Xenophon understood such stability to be the first step in the process of securing hegemony.

Gauthier astutely observed a useful parallel between the language that Xenophon deploys in *Poroi* and the account of the fifth-century imperial vision that pseudo-Aristotle later attributed to Aristides the Just.¹¹ According to pseudo-Aristotle ‘food/sustenance’ was promised ‘for all’, just as Xenophon does in *Poroi*.¹² Following Aristides and ‘having seized the empire (*archē*),’ pseudo-Aristotle opines that the *dēmos* then ‘managed their allies despotically (*despotikōterōs*)’, but secured ‘an abundant food supply for the many’ and also sustained thousands of offices ‘from the common fund’ (*apo tōn koinōn*).¹³ While the language of the *Athēnaiōn Politeia* does echo ideas in *Poroi*, the precedent is already set in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*. Xenophon’s fictional Cyrus there outlined that sustaining an empire began with providing payment and sustenance for all whilst paying scrupulous attention to the ‘public revenues’ (*prosodōi*); the latter reflects the alternate title of *Poroi*, which is *peri Prosodōn*.¹⁴

In his study of Athenian imperialism in *Poroi* Dillery attempted to equate Xenophon’s sole invocation of the term *hēsychia* in *Poroi* with the concept of *apragmosynē*.¹⁵ The term *apragmosynē* is linked with ideas of ‘isolationism’ in foreign policy as well as individual

¹¹ Pseudo-Aristotle *Athēnaiōn Politeia*, 24-25.1; Gauthier, *Un commentaire historique*, p. 25.

¹² *Poroi* 4.33.

¹³ Pseudo-Aristotle *Athēnaiōn Politeia* 24.1-3.

¹⁴ *Cyropaedia* 2.3.8; 8.1.13, 8.5.23.

¹⁵ J. Dillery, ‘Xenophon’s ‘Poroi’ and Athenian Imperialism’, *Historia*, 42.1, (1993), pp. 1-11, p. 2; for similar arguments that *Hellenica* and *Cyropaedia* are anti-imperialist, see: C. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire*, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993); R. Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p.151; C. Nadon, *Xenophon’s Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 163.

withdrawal from political life.¹⁶ While Isocrates invites readers to make such a connection between *hēsychia* and *apragmosynē* because he explicitly opposes *hēsychia* to *polypragmosynē* in *On the Peace*,¹⁷ Xenophon never uses the term *apragmosynē* in a positive way. Moreover, claiming that Xenophon espoused a view of quietism in *Poroi* fails to explain why the policies that Xenophon outlines ultimately are intended to make Athens a *polis* ‘better in war’ (*eupolemōteran*).¹⁸

Across his corpus Xenophon distinguishes between at least three forms of *hēsychia*. The most common is neutral and denotes a quietness or stillness, for example of horses or soldiers at rest.¹⁹ The second is used as a pejorative and denotes passivity where action is required or expected. It is this form that Dillery invokes in his reading of *Poroi*, though Xenophon actually rejects this sense in all cases.²⁰ Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great counsels his younger son to strive against this sort of *hēsychia* after the youth learns that he will not become king.²¹ The sense in *Poroi* actually belongs to a third category of Xenophontic usage that is positive and denotes a state of peace in opposition to war that enables prosperity, specifically one that allows its possessor to build material wealth.²² Xenophon similarly features Callias speak of this type of *hēsychia* in his capacity as an Athenian ambassador addressing the embassy sent to Sparta. Callias there observes, in very neutral terms, that the ambassadors were drawn from the same group of men that Athens elected to be generals

¹⁶ Thucydides 1.32; 2.63.2; 6.18.6-7.

¹⁷ Isocrates 8.26.

¹⁸ *Poroi* 4.50.

¹⁹ *Cyropaedia* 1.4.18, 7.5.39; *Hipparchikos* 5.15; *Hellenica* 1.5.10; 4.2.15; 4.8.22.

²⁰ *Anabasis* 3.2.4; *Hellenica* 6.2.28; *Hiero* 6.2; *Cyropaedia* 8.7.12.

²¹ *Cyropaedia* 8.7.12.

²² *Poroi* 5.3; *Cyropaedia* 7.2.22; *Anabasis* 2.3.8. *Hellenica* 6.3.4.

when the *polis* desired war and peacemakers when they desired *hēsychia*.²³ This positive sense of peace also re-appears in the speech that Xenophon’s Croesus offers on the state of happiness that he and the Lydian empire had enjoyed *before* losing the war and, with it, their empire, to Cyrus.²⁴

In *Poroi* Xenophon deploys the word *hēsychia* only once, and he does so in order to invoke this third sense of the term that denotes ‘tranquility/peace’ defined by its opposition to the *polis* being at war. Xenophon’s use of the term *hēsychia* here explicitly invokes the stated purpose of the Second Athenian Confederacy in which Athens and its allies swore to resist the hegemony of Sparta so as to ensure that all members were ‘free and autonomous and *to bring peace (hēsychia)*’.²⁵ This previously overlooked parallel to the official language of the decree initiating the Second Athenian Confederacy ought to put any debate to rest; by invoking *hēsychia* in *Poroi* Xenophon does not call on Athenians to abandon its hegemonic ambitions, rather he demonstrates concern for realigning Athenian actions with the oath that they had sworn two decades earlier when creating the second Athenian Confederacy. Compare, for example, the *hēsychian agein* of the prospectus of the Second Athenian League to Xenophon’s use of *hēsychian agousēs* in *Poroi* 5.3. To Xenophon the implications of such impiety invited the wrath of the divine and therefore helped to explain the loss of the Social War;²⁶ Xenophon offers additional advice on how the Athenian *dēmos* could secure divine

²³ *Hellenica* 6.3.4.

²⁴ *Cyropaedia* 7.2.22.

²⁵ P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*, (Oxford: Oxford Classical Press, 2003), no. 22 ll. 9-11: [...] *eleuthe[r]jos [kai] autonomos hēsychian agein*.

²⁶ For a detailed analysis of oaths in inter-state relations, see A. H. Sommerstein and A. J. Bayliss *Oath and State in Ancient Greece* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013), especially 167 ff. Similarly Xenophon explicitly links the impious act of seizing the Theban Cadmeia to the loss of Spartan hegemony in *Hellenica* 5.4.1.

consent in *Poroi* 6.

Xenophon's stance on withdrawal from public life is most explicit in *Memorabilia* as part of the condemnation of the hedonistic Aristippus and his desire to withdraw from society completely. Xenophon features Socrates attacking Aristippus and his proposed withdrawal as being not merely impractical but completely antithetical to realizing the sort of 'happiness' and 'pleasure' that Aristippus desires.²⁷ Xenophon and his Socrates routinely reject idleness/withdrawal, whereas all work, save for 'playing dice and other base pursuits bringing loss', are identified as good.²⁸ Xenophon's Socrates even mocks the popular perception that he was an *apragmōn* and proclaims that he enjoyed 'no leisure', because he was perpetually occupied with both 'private' (*idios*) and 'public' (*dēmosia*) business.²⁹ The rebuke of Aristippus also clarifies the connection between the 'prosperity' or 'happiness' (*eudaimonia*) and the 'kingly' rule to which Athens had long aspired and Xenophon promises to help secure in *Poroi*. As the discussion progresses, Socrates asks Aristippus: 'do you wish us to examine this [question], whether the ones ruling or the ones being ruled are more pleasantly bound?'³⁰ Xenophon here reveals that Socrates equated this 'royal art' (*tēn basilikēn technēn*) with *eudaimonia*. Each comes at a cost repugnant to Aristippus, who speaks of this so-called 'kingly' art as little more than being 'willing or accustomed to endure painful things' (*talypēra*). Yet Xenophon's Socrates notes that the key lies in the willing embrace of such suffering for, by enduring, man gains controls over physical appetite and base desires as well as acclimatizing himself to toil so as to enjoy the ends of his pursuit.³¹ By the discussion's close, Xenophon's Socrates concludes that rulers, that is, those who possess self-mastery and

²⁷ *Memorabilia* 2.1.33.

²⁸ *Memorabilia* 1.2.56-7.

²⁹ *Memorabilia* 3.11.16.

³⁰ *Memorabilia* 2.1.10.

³¹ *Memorabilia* 2.1.17-18.

put the common interest before their own, ‘toil gladly in these things and boil over with gladness, being content with themselves, and being *applauded* and *emulated* by all of the others’.³²

This connection between toil and rule proves a foundational tenet of Xenophonic thought that recalls the advice of Thucydides’ Pericles. Both Xenophon’s Socrates and his Cyrus the Great claim that human beings train themselves to be self-controlled and toil in order that they may enjoy greater rewards, of which the greatest is to rule.³³ For example, once Xenophon’s Persians complete their conquest of Asia, Cyrus reiterates this message and advises them that they must continue ‘to toil’ (*ponein*) and to maintain the virtues instilled in them as children, particularly their ‘moderation’ (*sophrosyne*) and ‘self-control’ (*enkrateia*) or else they will lose ‘all of the good things’ that they have won.³⁴ This also was the vision of Thucydides’ Pericles, who commends preceding generations of Athenians for building their empire through toil and sacrifice and exhorts contemporary Athenians to devote themselves to maintaining their empire in the same manner in his final speech.³⁵ Amusingly this is also the message of Aristophanes’ ‘Just’ education in *Clouds*, which attacked Socrates. Indeed ‘Just’ aspires to teach Pheidippides ‘justice and *sophrosyne*’, which he identifies as the virtues

³² *Memorabilia* 2.1.19.

³³ *Cyropaedia* 1.5.9, 7.5.78, 82; *Memorabilia* 2.1, especially 18-20; Xenophon *Symposium* 4.34ff.

³⁴ *Cyropaedia* 7.5.70 ff.

³⁵ For the final speech of Pericles, see Thucydides 2.59-65, though especially 2.62; previously Thucydides’ Pericles twice invoked the role of ‘toil’ in the Funeral Oration 2.38-39; see also 1.70 where Thucydides depicts the Corinthian embassy as characterizing Athenian life in terms of their desire to embrace a life of ‘toil’ (*ponos*) and dangers rather than to succumb to *hēsychia* and *apragmosynē*.

instilled in the Athenians who fought at Marathon and later built the fifth-century empire.³⁶

This preference for the life of a ‘ruler’ (*archōn*), which in ‘interpoleis relations’ means choosing ‘empire’/hegemony, is a theme evident across the Xenophontic corpus. For Xenophon rule is always preferred to the life of the private person. Xenophon instructs Seuthes in *Anabasis* that it is more painful to appear a ‘private person’ (*idiōtēs*) after having been a king than not to have been a king in the first place’.³⁷ Nor does Xenophon restrict this to individuals. Just as he observes that an entire *polis* can attain *kalokagathia* in *Memorabilia*, Xenophon also reflects his understanding that an entire *polis* can behave, or perhaps live, ‘privately’ in *Cyropaedia*. Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great proclaims from his deathbed that he had found Persia ‘occupying a private station (*idiōteuousan*) in Asia’ but ‘left it honored above others’ as a ruling power.³⁸ Instead of debating whether Xenophon advocates the pursuit of hegemony part two therefore considers Xenophon’s second stated aim in *Poroi*, that is, how he planned to help end the suspicion with which Athens was held across Hellas in 355/4 BC and then regain hegemony. The choice Xenophon places before Athenians is identical to the one that his Simonides places before Hiero - *rule* of the willing or a *tyranny* over unwilling subjects.

‘Tyrannical’ or ‘Kingly’ Rule.

If choosing to rule was Xenophon’s answer to the question of whether one should withdraw or lead, then Xenophon’s follow-up question is whether that rule should manifest itself as ‘tyrannical’ or ‘kingly’. Xenophon’s stance from the outset of *Poroi* invites reflection on the theme of tyranny, which was associated with wealth won in a ‘disgraceful’ or ‘unjust’

³⁶ *Clouds* 950, 986-7.

³⁷ *Anabasis* 7.7.20-8.

³⁸ *Cyropaedia* 8.7.7.

manner. For example, in the opening chapters of book one of his *History* Thucydides links the increase of tyrannies throughout Hellas to an increased desire to acquire wealth and the corresponding rise of naval power.³⁹ In *Poroi* Xenophon opposes ‘unjust’ avenues for obtaining material gain and power. He notes that previous attempts to solve the financial woes facing Athens by force had cast suspicion over Athenian intentions and sabotaged Athenian hegemonies. As Xenophon presents things in *Poroi*, the reputation of Athens in 355/4 justified the fears voiced by external critics of Athens. Recall that Thucydides previously had claimed that such behavior prompted the Corinthians to condemn Athens before the Peloponnesian War as a ‘tyrant’ and a ‘tyrant polis’ (*polin tyrannon*).⁴⁰ Nor were external rivals the only ones to apply the label of tyranny to Athenian imperialism. The Athenian ambassadors of Thucydides justify their actions to the Spartans before the war noting that although their ‘rule’ (*archē*) should not prompt envy,⁴¹ it ‘had become hated’ by many, a reality which necessitated the suppression of revolts.⁴² In Thucydides all three *poleis* fulfill the stock roles already evident in the *Histories* of Herodotus,⁴³ though the rebellion of the

³⁹ Thucydides 1.13. See also: Aristotle *Politics*, 1311^a; Euripides *Suppliants* 450-51; Xenophon *Symposium* 4.36, *Hiero* 7.12; Plato *Gorgias* 466b; Aristotle *Politics* 1311a4; Diodorus Siculus 10.16.4. For a modern discussion of the issue, see R. Seaford, ‘Tragic Tyranny’, in K. Morgan (ed.), *Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), pp. 95-115, p. 110, also n. 56 ‘disgraceful gain is frequently attributed to tyrants’.

⁴⁰ Thucydides 1.122.3; 1.124.3; 1.18; 6.50 presents a tradition in which Sparta serves as a traditional opponent of tyranny in any form.

⁴¹ Thucydides 1.75.1.

⁴² Thucydides 1.75.4.

⁴³ Herodotus 5.91.1 posits that with Athens now freed from tyranny and growing in power Sparta grew fearful and plotted to reverse Athenian freedom; 5.92a-b the Corinthians urge the

allies of Athens in the Social War reiterates what this earlier literary tradition implies - a rejection of Athenian hegemony. More explicitly, the hegemonic ambitions of Athens were equated with tyranny in Attic comedy,⁴⁴ oratory,⁴⁵ and the speeches that Thucydides has Pericles and Cleon deliver.⁴⁶

Raaflaub has proposed that such invocations of tyranny were deployed in Athenian discourse because it was ‘good to think with’ and because “tyranny’ encompassed everything [...] hostile to democracy.’⁴⁷ *Poroi* 5 reflects this dichotomy as Xenophon balances his advice between two arguments historically used to distinguish ‘kingly’ from ‘tyrannical’ rule, a metaphor that had been applied to label Athenian imperial power since the fifth century.⁴⁸ These concern the distinction between ‘unjust’ or ‘just’ gain on the one hand and the distinction between ruling by means of consent, i.e. the rule of law, or rule by means of force. In *Memorabilia* Xenophon uses this distinction in order to demonstrate Socrates’ definitions of ‘kingship’ (*basileia*) and ‘tyranny’ (*tyrannis*). According to Xenophon’s Socrates both ‘kingship’ and ‘tyranny’ were forms of ‘rule’ (*archē*); yet the difference between them

Spartans not to impose a tyranny on Athens and invoke the alleged horrors that Corinth had endured under the Cypselids and explicitly state that tyranny is ‘more unjust’ (*adikōteron*).

⁴⁴ Aristophanes *Knights* 1114.

⁴⁵ Isocrates 15.64; 8.142-145.

⁴⁶ Thucydides 2.63.2; 3.37.

⁴⁷ K. Raaflaub, ‘Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy’, in K. Morgan (ed.), *Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), pp. 59-93, p. 83.

⁴⁸ Contrary to J. Davidson, ‘Isocrates against Imperialism: An Analysis of the *De Pace*’, *Historia*, 39.1 (1990), pp. 20-36, p. 32, Isocrates’ *On the Peace* is not unique in this regard; his own citation of *Memorabilia* (p. 31) demonstrates Xenophon’s awareness of the same ideas.

concerned the consent of the ruled and ruling in accordance with the ‘law’ (*nomos*) rather than at the whim of the ruler.⁴⁹ The authority of Xenophon’s ‘kingly’ rule looks to the laws rather than coercive force.

In inter-*poleis* relations ruling in accordance with established law requires obeying one’s oaths. In the case of the Second Athenian Confederacy this denoted following the terms outlined in the decree of Aristoteles. The old debate manifest in the works of Bradeen and de Ste. Croix and finished definitively by Low concerning how the allies viewed Athenian rule over the Hellenes in the fifth-century as either benevolent or tyrannical proves to be of little concern here.⁵⁰ While the precise causes of the Social War remain uncertain, the literary record makes it clear that Athens struggled to abide by the oaths that the *polis* had sworn in the decree of Aristoteles in 378/7 BC and that the allies could, and did, use perceptions of Athenian aggression to justify leaving the confederacy.⁵¹ The decree of Aristoteles had promised all those who became allies of Athens a permanent, *defensive* alliance that ensured the ‘freedom and autonomy and peace’ of all members. The Athenian *dēmos* similarly swore to: surrender territory it held in the lands of its allies, to not collect tribute, or to establish

⁴⁹ *Memorabilia* 4.6.12.

⁵⁰ D.W. Bradeen, ‘The Popularity of the Athenian Empire’, *Historia*, 9 (1960), pp. 257-69; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, ‘The Character of the Athenian Empire’, *Historia*, 3 (1954/5), pp. 1-41; a debate finished off once and for all through Low’s treatment of the nature of power, as well as authorship and agency expressed in extant epigraphic evidence in P. Low, ‘Looking for the Language of Athenian Imperialism’, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 125, pp. 93-111.

⁵¹ For an alternate view, see J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

cleruchies, garrisons or appoint governors in allied lands.⁵² The Athenians likewise agreed that severe penalties should be exacted from any member who violated, let alone proposed to pursue any of the prohibitions outlined in the oath. These included the loss of citizen rights, property, and either execution or exile from, and eventually the denial of burial in, Athens or the territories of its allies.⁵³ The first to join the League were Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium.⁵⁴ These three ultimately led the rebellion against Athens in the Social Wars and Athenian evidence suggests that they were justified in doing so. As Harding observes, it is clear that the Athenians were then installing garrisons in allied *poleis* in 357/6 in violation of the oaths of the Second Athenian Confederacy.⁵⁵ Even in the presumably more favorable accounts of Demosthenes and Isocrates, which were directed towards Athenian audiences,⁵⁶ it becomes clear that the allies rebelled in their own right *because* Athens had violated their oaths. Xenophon, and later Demosthenes, outlined such ‘perjury’ as grounds for condemning Artaxerxes II, Artaxerxes III, as well as Philip of Macedon in their respective invectives

⁵² Rhodes and Osborne *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 22; a ‘defensive’, rather than an ‘offensive’, alliance, see *ll.* 46-50; for the policy on cleruchies, see *ll.* 25-31; 31-45; on governors or garrisons see *ll.* 15-25.

⁵³ Rhodes and Osborne *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 22 *ll.* 51-62.

⁵⁴ Rhodes and Osborne *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 22 *ll.* 79-83.

⁵⁵ P. Harding, ‘Atthis and Politeia’, *Historia*, 26.2 (1977), pp. 148-160, p. 194; cf. M.N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2 Vols, (Chicago: Ares, 1946-8), no. 152 = Rhodes and Osborne *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 51.

⁵⁶ Cawkwell, ‘Notes on the Failure’, p. 52 observes that we possess the testimony of Demosthenes that the Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians went to war ‘accusing us [i.e. the Athenians] of plotting against them’, cf. Demosthenes 15.3. In addition, Isocrates 8.41 *ff.* proves more explicit.

against their contemporary rivals, even where perjury or breaking oaths could not be proven.⁵⁷ In overreaching itself Athens lost part of its hegemony for a second time, along with nearly half of the original members of the confederacy listed on the stele of Aristoteles. In *Hellenica* Xenophon illustrates the significance of this in a speech that he presents Autocles delivering to the Spartans that explains the rejection of Sparta's fourth-century hegemony. By ruling the Greek *poleis* without regard to law but by means of 'force' (*bia*) the Spartans are said to prefer to rule 'just as tyrants' do.⁵⁸ In *Poroi* Xenophon builds on this understanding to suggest that if Athens was to stop further losses from the Second Athenian Confederacy, re-gain its former allies, and even forge new ties, it must modify its approach and seek to regain the trust of the Hellenes.

For Xenophon the simplest proof of the need to change was defeat. In losing the Social War, Athens is reminded of its imperial capacity and power, that is, of the limits of its *dynamis*. In *Poroi* Xenophon therefore calls Athens to 'know itself'; it is a task tailor-made for a Socratic disciple adopting the mantle of an Attic orator. In *Hellenica* Xenophon records that once Thrasybulus brokered a new peace with Sparta the restored democratic faction convened an assembly to address the defeated 'men of the city.' Amongst other themes, Xenophon reports that Thrasybulus advises the defeated oligarchs that they ought to come to 'know themselves.' Beyond its Delphic and Socratic overtones, Xenophon declares that the oligarchic regime had justified its authority on faulty premises. Xenophon's Thrasybulus observes that the defeat of the oligarchs was the simplest proof of this.⁵⁹ In *Memorabilia* Xenophon's Socrates outlines that knowing oneself also meant knowing one's *dynamis* (capacity).⁶⁰ As such, Xenophon implies that the Thirty sought to surpass their *dynamis* and

⁵⁷ Demosthenes 9.16; Demosthenes 14.39; *Cyropaedia* 8.8.

⁵⁸ *Hellenica* 6.3.7-12, cf. *Memorabilia* 4.6.12.

⁵⁹ *Hellenica* 2.4.40-41.

⁶⁰ *Memorabilia* 4.2.25-6.

therefore were guilty of *hybris*;⁶¹ the same can be said of Athenian overreaches within the Second Athenian Confederacy in the fourth century.

Xenophon anticipates criticism of his stance. He observes that ‘No one, I dare say, contests this [i.e. that peace will increase Athenian revenues]; but there are some who wish Athens to recover her ascendancy and *they may think* that it is much *more likely to be won* by war than by peace’.⁶² In *Memorabilia* Xenophon depicts the young Glaucon, brother of Plato, as one such individual.⁶³ Yet Xenophon never denies the potential financial benefits of war. Rather he, and ultimately his fictional Cyrus the Great, speak of financial gain through conquest as a ‘just’ and entirely expected behavior in the right circumstances; Xenophon’s caveat concerns the source of such gain. For Xenophon just gain must result from actions taken against enemies rather than friends.⁶⁴ Thus at *Poroi* 5.5 Xenophon does not imply that Athens had not financially benefitted from, or could not again, benefit itself through war. Rather he argues that it was naive to simply presume that war would bring success or prove the most effective means of doing so. It is far likelier, Xenophon argues, that war with other Hellenes – and the allies in particular – would diminish additional, otherwise safer methods

⁶¹ C. Dewald, ‘Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus,’ in K. Morgan (ed.), *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), pp. 25-58, p. 35. *Hellenica* records two occurrences of the *dēmos* awarding a sole Athenian autocratic authority; 1.4.20; 1.5.16; 2.1.25 reflect that in 407 Alcibiades was elected general with autocratic authority, which ended with Alcibiades withdrawing to his fortress. *Hellenica* 2.2.17 observes that Theramenes was sole ambassador to Sparta with autocratic power, which culminated in surrender, the rise of the Thirty and his own death.

⁶² *Poroi* 5.5 ff.

⁶³ *Memorabilia* 3.6.7.

⁶⁴ *Anabasis* 3.2.26, 39; *Cyropaedia*, 6.1.22; *Memorabilia*, 4.2.16.

for raising revenues. To persuade his audience Xenophon offers a paradigm for securing the willing obedience of the allies; it is a variant of a theme at the heart of the Xenophontic corpus and one most recently analyzed in other contexts by Gray,⁶⁵ though here it is deployed in the arena of *inter-poleis* relations.

Case Study 1: The Delian League and the Perversion(?) of Benefaction?

Against this idealized recollection of a bountiful financial harvest reaped from a successful imperial past, Xenophon recalls four instances drawn from Athenian history. He asks his listeners first whether it was by ‘coercing’ (*biazomenoi*) or ‘acting as a benefactor’ (*eurgetountes*) that the Athenians had won for themselves the ‘leadership’ (*hēgemonias*) of the fleet and control of the treasury of the Delian League?⁶⁶ Gauthier thought the view of Xenophon a fallacy and a misuse of the notion of benefaction.⁶⁷ Strictly speaking this is true, but the judgment ignores that Xenophon consistently advocates this paradigm throughout the entirety of his corpus. Thus, regardless of how we evaluate the perspective as a whole, it reflects Xenophon’s philosophy of rule through benefaction. Xenophon’s Socrates offers this same advice in *Memorabilia*,⁶⁸ while Athens receives it directly in *Poroi* and indirectly in

⁶⁵ See, for example the discussion of V. J. Gray, *Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), which does not touch on the theme as it appears in *Poroi*, though offers a broader overview of the concept and its relevance for Xenophon’s leadership theory, especially pp. 15-18, and then examines with case studies from other works, 180-2.

⁶⁶ *Poroi* 5.5.

⁶⁷ Gauthier, *Un commentaire historique*, p. 212; V. Azoulay, *Xénophon et Les Grâces du Pouvoir*, (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004), pp. 156-7.

⁶⁸ *Memorabilia* 4.4.17-18.

Hellenica.⁶⁹ Xenophon also held that Agesilaus had adopted this approach. He explains that Agesilaus exchanged his favors, rather than giving them away, for otherwise ‘no one would have thought that he owed Agesilaus anything; but the one having suffered a gift, always gladly became a servant to his benefactor’.⁷⁰ Xenophon’s Simonides suggests the same paradigm to Hiero,⁷¹ and his Cyrus the Great similarly stakes Persian claims to empire on the basis of their benefactions.⁷² Individually Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great likewise is said to have secured the title of ‘father’ from those he ruled by ‘acting as a benefactor’ (*euergetountos*) rather than by ‘taking away’ what they had.⁷³ In turn Xenophon’s Ischomachus, who speaks of Athenians emulating the ‘King’ of Persia,⁷⁴ advocates the same methods for ruling an individual household.⁷⁵ More specifically, Ischomachus expresses how benefaction can secure the loyalty of slaves and servants who easily can be understood as subject peoples when the practice is applied to interpoleis relations.⁷⁶ In its own right linking the rule of the household with ruling a *polis* or even an empire proves suggestive of Xenophon’s wider political thought, though the theme merits development in its own right elsewhere.⁷⁷

⁶⁹ *Hellenica* 6.5.40.

⁷⁰ *Agesilaus* 4.4

⁷¹ *Hiero* 11.11-15.

⁷² *Cyropaedia* 4.2.11, 5.1.19-29, *et al.*

⁷³ *Cyropaedia* 8.2.9.

⁷⁴ *Oeconomicus* 4.4; 14.4-7.

⁷⁵ *Oeconomicus* 12.5-7; 13.4-14.10; 15.5-21; 20.29.

⁷⁶ *Oeconomicus* 5.1; 7.37; 12.6; 21.12.

⁷⁷ *Memorabilia* 3.6.14-16 reflect that the basic principles differed only with respect to scale. Xenophon was not alone in viewing the skills as interchangeable. See, for example,

Although equating the absence of harm with benefaction may seem perverse to modern audiences, Xenophon's Socrates again implies as much in *Memorabilia*. In turn Xenophon suggests that Socrates understood an unwillingness to act unjustly to reflect justice.⁷⁸ Like Gauthier in *Poroi*, Sancisi-Weerdenburg objected to the same system in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which she deemed an apparent perversion of traditional reciprocity. She argued that in *Cyropaedia* receiving favours from Cyrus 'meant recognition of the overlordship of the Persian king'.⁷⁹ As an expression of their gratitude Cyrus' subjects willingly bestow every imaginable gift on the King, which he then redistributes and so perpetually allows him to maintain his status as a benefactor to all.⁸⁰ On his deathbed Xenophon's Cyrus advises Cambyses, his eldest son and heir, that the power of a ruler lay with his friends and their just treatment.⁸¹ By this point in the narrative Xenophon's Cyrus has demonstrated this method to his audience by dispelling the skepticism that Croesus vocalized about such a policy. Croesus had objected that excessive benefactions would leave Cyrus penniless; yet Xenophon says Cyrus refuted this through his experiment of asking each friend for an immense sum of money for an unknown venture, which they provided quickly out of

Herodotus 5.29; *Lysistrata* 493-5; *Memorabilia* 3.6.14; Plato *Statesman* 258e- 259c; Xenophon's stance puts him at odds with the thought of Aristotle *Politics* 1252a9ff.

⁷⁸ *Memorabilia* 4.4.12.

⁷⁹ H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, 'Gifts in the Persian Empire', in P. Briant and C. Herrenschmidt (eds.), *Le Tribut dans L'Empire Perse: actes de la table ronde de Paris, 12-13 décembre 1986*, (Paris: Peeters, 1989), pp. 129-145, p. 135; P. Carlier, 'The Idea of Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*', in V.J. Gray (ed.), *Xenophon*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 327-366, originally published in French as 'L'idée de monarchie impériale dans la *Cyropédie de Xénophon*', *Ktéma*, 3 (1978), pp. 133-63, pp. 349, 353.

⁸⁰ *Cyropaedia* 8.6.23.

⁸¹ *Cyropaedia* 8.7.13.

gratitude to Cyrus and his gifts.⁸² Once again Xenophon suggests that it is Cyrus' ability to moderate his desires, i.e. to live modestly and to toil, as well as his 'Socratic' recognition that true wealth exists in having friends/allies who are grateful for just treatment and benefactions that enables rule over the household, the *polis*, and an empire. Xenophon offers the same paradigm to Athens in *Poroi*. The genius of this sort of inversion of 'reciprocity' and its application to the relationships between *poleis* lies, as Mitchell has demonstrated, with the appropriation of paradigms previously evident in personal relationships for inter-poleis ones, or what we might now call 'international relations'.⁸³ For Xenophon the careful cultivation and manipulation of 'friendships'/alliances offers the capacity of an individual or an entire *polis* to secure willing rule and mitigates against the perception of enslavement.

However 'naïve' we may find this 'Xenophonic' vision to be, he merely reiterated the history of the Athenian empire as the Athenians themselves knew it. In book one of his *History*, for example, Thucydides records that the Athenian ambassadors believed that Athens had won its empire 'not by means of force' (*ou biasamenoī*), just as Xenophon outlines in *Poroi*, but because the Spartans were unwilling to continue the war against the Persians.⁸⁴ Elaboration soon follows, as Thucydides adds that the Athenians said that they had 'received their hegemony' because the allies had grown to hate the treatment endured under the Spartan command of Pausanias and looked at Athens favorably.⁸⁵ The idealized claim that Xenophon makes in this first case study of Athenian history echoes another view of the imperial power that Thucydides presents. More specifically it was the act of conferring, rather than of

⁸² *Cyropaedia* 8.2.13-23.

⁸³ L. Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World, 435-323 BC*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 40, 51.

⁸⁴ Thucydides 1.75.2; and so Athens simply 'accepted the empire being given' to them 1.76.2.

⁸⁵ Thucydides 1.96.1; reiterated later in pseudo-Aristotle *Athēnaiōn Politeia*, 23.4-5 and Plutarch *Aristides* 23 and *Cimon* 6.

receiving *charis*, his Pericles claimed, that had enabled Athens to win for itself the stronger position (*bebaioteros*)⁸⁶ and had sown the seeds of friendship and debts that ultimately must be repaid to Athens.⁸⁷ Thucydides again presents Pericles offering the same advice to Athens in his final appearance to offset the charge that Athens behaves as a ‘tyrant polis’. Returning to the theme of Xenophon’s *Poroi* once more, however, we are instructed that friends, i.e. allies, are won not ‘by means of force’ (*bia*) but ‘by means kindness’ (*euergesia*).⁸⁸ As Papazarkadas highlights in his discussion of the late fifth-century empire, the form that Athenian imperialism took was flexible, oscillating at times between cruel force and reciprocal benevolence with no clear trajectory.⁸⁹ It is therefore significant that Xenophon’s reflection in *Poroi* appear to be in line with one end of this spectrum and Thucydides’ presentation of fifth-century Athenian imperialism at its most idealized, if not the very peak of Athenian power. It also reflects lessons learned following shifts in Athenian imperial

⁸⁶ J.T. Hooker, ‘Χάρις and ἀρετή in Thucydides’, *Hermes*, 102 (1974), pp. 164-169 highlights that the language of Thucydides’ Pericles extends Homeric guest-friendship to fifth-century foreign relations; L. Pearson, ‘Popular Ethics in the World of Thucydides’, *Classical Philology*, 52 (1957), pp. 228-244 similarly understands that Thucydides 2.40.4 embraced a recurring theme in Herodotus that ‘friendships between states’ was ‘the greatest force for good or evil in international affairs’. Foreign policy here dictates that the democracy bestows honors and therefore social status in terms of benefaction and friendship.

⁸⁷ Thucydides 2.40.4.

⁸⁸ Thucydides 2.65.7; 2.40.

⁸⁹ N. Papazarkadas, ‘Le Programme de Xénophon dans les *Poroi*,’ in A. P. Matthaïou and R. K. Pitt (eds.), *ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΙΟΣ: Studies in Honour of Harold B. Mattingly*, (Athens: ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΓΡΑΦΙΚΗ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ, 2014), pp. 215-240, especially pp. 233-4, 238. On coercive force and reciprocity, see also P. Low *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

policy down to the capture of Athens in 405, an event seemingly seared into Xenophon's consciousness and infamously recorded in *Hellenica*.⁹⁰

Case Studies 2-4: The Second Athenian Confederacy and Fourth-Century Alliances with Thebes and Sparta

The second case study that Xenophon offers invokes the failure of the first Athenian hegemony, itself ensured by the disastrous dénouement of the Peloponnesian War. Yet even this proved a short-lived rebuke. Xenophon observes that although 'deprived' of its 'empire' (*archē*) because Athens 'seemed to lead too savagely', he reminds his listeners that 'after we abstained (*apeschometha*) from doing wrong/committing injustices, we again became the leader of a fleet of willing islanders'.⁹¹ This distinguishes *Poroi* from Isocrates' *On the Peace*. Whereas Isocrates rejects all manifestations of Athenian hegemony after Pericles,⁹² Xenophon complements the Athenian achievements of the early fourth-century and reiterates that the foundation of the fourth-century hegemony offered a positive paradigm for leadership. Xenophon here refers to the Second Athenian Confederacy. The omission of the confederacy in *Hellenica* has prompted long-standing criticism of Xenophon as a historian, yet its appearance in *Poroi* is never discussed.⁹³

⁹⁰ *Hellenica* 2.2.

⁹¹ *Poroi* 5.6.

⁹² Isocrates 8.37-8; 64-5; 126-7.

⁹³ F. Pownall, *Lessons from the Past* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 16-18, 65; G. Cawkwell, 'The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy', *Classical Quarterly*, 23 (1973), pp. 47-60, p. 57; see also: H. Beck, 'The Laws of the Fathers' versus 'the Laws of the League': Xenophon on Federalism', *Classical Philology*, 96 (2001), pp. 355-75; E. Badian, 'Xenophon the Athenian,' in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and His*

Continuing, Xenophon details his third case study, i.e. the fourth-century alliances struck between Thebes and Athens. He observes ‘did not the Thebans receiving *benefactions* give themselves to the leadership of the Athenians?’ Overall Xenophon’s example remains largely undefined. It may combine the alliances between Thebes and Athens before the start of the Corinthian War in 396/5 BC⁹⁴ and again in 378/7 when Thebes joined the Second Athenian Confederacy, or may simply refer to 396/5 or 378/7 individually.⁹⁵ The fourth and final example that Xenophon provides invokes the alliance between Athens and Sparta forged after 371,⁹⁶ noting ‘and indeed the Lacedaemonians as well, not *being forced* by us but being treated well turned over the leadership to the Athenians to set it up in whatever way they wanted’.⁹⁷

With each case study Xenophon repeatedly contrasts the willing obedience offered to Athens and the resistance to, or outright rejection of, Athenian leadership from those Athens suppressed by force. The rejection of force in *Poroi* neither implies Xenophon’s opposition to hegemony nor requires ideological justification. He merely argues to Athenians that their own

World: Papers from a Conference Held in Liverpool in July 1999, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), pp. 33-54, and M. Jehne, ‘Überlegungen zu den Auslassungen in Xenophons *Hellenika* am Beispiel der Gründung des Zweiten Athenischen Seebunds,’ in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and His World: Papers from a Conference Held in Liverpool in July 1999*, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), pp. 463-480.

⁹⁴ See, for example, *Hellenica* 3.5.7-16; Andocides 3.25; Lysias 16.13; Aristophanes *Ecclesiazusae* 193-6; *IG II²* 14; see also the discussion of P. Harding, *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), no. 14; Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 6.

⁹⁵ *Hellenica* 5.4.34-6.3; *IG II²* 40 see also the discussion of Harding, *From the End*, no. 33.

⁹⁶ Xenophon *Hellenica* 6.3.14,18; 7.1.1-14.

⁹⁷ *Poroi* 5.7.

history offered documented failures of force in contrast to idealized successes that were associated in collective memory with leadership secured through acts of benefaction. The theme is also central to his stated purpose in writing *Cyropaedia*, which he outlines in the preface to that work that Cyrus was worthy of emulation not least because he secured the willing obedience of subject peoples; as noted previously Xenophon used these criteria in order to differentiate between ‘kingship’ and ‘tyranny’ in *Memorabilia*. Xenophon’s paradigm in *Poroi* therefore calls on Athenians to assume their ‘kingly’ role as an imperial power and forsake the path of tyranny. In this way Xenophon’s observation combines the expedient and the just. He also suggests that Athenian history demonstrates through the first-hand experiences of his audience and their ancestors that extracting power and financial revenues by force was simply unsustainable.

Transforming ‘Tyranny’ to ‘Rule’ in *Poroi* and *Hiero*

The rhetorical argument that Xenophon advances in *Poroi* echoes the attempt of Xenophon’s Simonides to persuade or to ‘convert’ Hiero so that he will reject ‘tyranny’ and embrace legitimate ‘rule’.⁹⁸ Xenophon’s Hiero rejects tyranny in his own words, highlighting a tenuous position that rendered all supposed pleasures inconsequential in light of the constant concern for security.⁹⁹ For, according to Xenophon, it is fear for safety above all else that prevents a tyrant from surrendering rule and so enslaves the one person presumed to be the

⁹⁸ G. Glenn, ‘Strauss’ *Hiero* and Machiavelli’s *Cyrus*’, in L.G. Rubin (ed.), *Politikos II: Educating the Ambitious*, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1992), pp. 184-206, p. 185 claims that Xenophon obscures ‘the distinction between king and tyrant’ though ignores that what Xenophon actually distinguishes is rule over the willing and rule by force. Hiero is taught how he can win over subjects and thus attain legitimate ‘rule’ (*archē*).

⁹⁹ *Hiero* 7.13.

‘freest’. Xenophon’s emphasis again echoes Thucydides, who outlines security as the principal motivation that Athenian leaders offered when seeking to justify sustaining the fifth-century empire.¹⁰⁰ Thucydides also highlighted the role that calls for security played in justifying some of the most aggressive decisions of fifth-century Athenian foreign policy. Two of the most notable instances where leaders invoke security in order to justify excessive force are the speech of Cleon urging swift execution in the Mytilenian debate and the call of Alcibiades for the Sicilian expedition.¹⁰¹ Both prompt action by inducing fear and desire in their audience. With respect to Cleon, what may appear unjust is understood as necessary and explicitly equated with the lot of the tyrant.¹⁰² In *Cyropaedia*, however, Xenophon depicts Cyrus in a strikingly similar situation. Although Cyrus is also initially inclined to pursue similarly draconian measures he is taught that mercy can win a more devoted ally and greater benefits in the future. Fittingly Cyrus learns this at the hands of Tigranes, whose own perspective on the matter is attributed to the education that he had received at the hands of the unnamed ‘Armenian sophist’ who is often equated with Socrates.¹⁰³ In *Poroi* Xenophon assumes the role of Tigranes and offers the same ‘Socratic’ advice to Athens.

Xenophon poetically captures the consequences of ruling over others in *Cyropaedia*, *Hiero* and *Poroi*. Both Xenophon’s *Hiero* and fifth- and fourth-century Athenians have the rare experience of enjoying the pleasures and pains of both ‘private’ life and life as rulers over unwilling subjects, itself the prompt for Xenophon’s Simonides to engage *Hiero* in conversation in the dialogue.¹⁰⁴ Both *Hiero* and mid-fourth-century Athenians lament their uncertain fates, possess inadequate resources and few allies; in turn both fear that they cannot

¹⁰⁰ Thucydides 1.75.3-4.

¹⁰¹ Thucydides 3.37 *ff.*, 6.18.

¹⁰² Thucydides 3.37.2.

¹⁰³ *Cyropaedia* 3.1.7-37.

¹⁰⁴ *Hiero* 1.1-3.

undo their unjust acts of *hybris*. The most dramatic instance arises by comparing Xenophon's description of Hiero¹⁰⁵ with his vivid depiction of the Athenians mourning their anticipated fate in the closing days of the Peloponnesian War.¹⁰⁶ There he reports that the Athenians actively began to mourn and anticipate retribution for their imperial atrocities during the Peloponnesian War as Lysander and the Spartan fleet closed in on a *polis* with no meaningful defense. Faced with a similar crisis of self-discovery Xenophon's Hiero proposes that, constantly beset by enemies and devoid of all the pleasures of life, the tyrant alone benefits from suicide.¹⁰⁷ Yet Xenophon has Simonides offer the tyrant an escape that was as applicable to Athens in the wake of the Social War as it was to his fictional Hiero. Salvation, Xenophon argues, lies with legitimate 'rule'. That is, safety relies on transforming a 'tyranny' into a beloved rule through securing the willing obedience and loyalty of the ruled, just as Xenophon claims Cyrus had done in Asia and still could be done in Europe in the preface to *Cyropaedia*.¹⁰⁸

The impetus in *Hiero* concerns the deep-seated pessimism of the tyrant. Simonides finally addresses the concerns of Hiero in the closing chapters of the dialogue and his proposals closely parallel the advice that Xenophon offers to Athenians in *Poroi*. Simonides attempts to reform, or perhaps re-direct, the nature and future of the power that Hiero wields and explains how Hiero ought to build new relationships with those he presently commands and may yet come to rule. Xenophon's Simonides suggests that he can equip Hiero to lay down his tyranny and realise the true benefits of 'rule' (*archē*), which Xenophon holds to be more advantageous than the life of a 'private individual' (*idiōtēs*). Xenophon's Simonides proposes solutions directed towards helping Hiero achieve this end; these are strikingly

¹⁰⁵ *Hiero* 1.12.

¹⁰⁶ *Hellenica* 2.2.10.

¹⁰⁷ *Hiero* 7.13.

¹⁰⁸ *Cyropaedia* 1.1.3.

similar to the call for beneficial and philanthropic treatment that Xenophon advocates throughout the first four sections of *Poroi*; there Xenophon suggest that the Athenians adopt philanthropic (*philanthrōpa*) steps that will secure the loyalty and service of non-Athenians and will make the *polis* a more attractive destination.¹⁰⁹ Thus Xenophon signals that his advice is not limited to any one particular type of constitution. Rather, it represents a flexible strain of Xenophon's political thought consistently applied throughout his corpus. Indeed he outlines the same principles in *Memorabilia* and *Hipparchikos*.¹¹⁰ Yet another implication of this conclusion is to acknowledge that Xenophon's proposals in *Poroi* do *not* reflect a 'remarkable conversion' in his thought as Cawkwell once objected, prompting Gauthier to soften his stance on Xenophon's political outlook in *Poroi*.¹¹¹

In his seminal study of *Hiero* Strauss suggests that the dialogue is divided into two 'unequal' parts. He proposes that chapters 1-7 permitted Xenophon's Hiero to show the reader that the life of the tyrant is not worth living, while part two, consisting of chapters 8-11, enabled Xenophon's Simonides to demonstrate that 'the tyrant can be the happiest of men.'¹¹² Higgins subsequently elaborated on this reading, especially in his discussion of *Hiero* 10.1 and observed that this shift is matched by the change in Xenophon's vocabulary where references to 'tyranny' become less and less common.¹¹³ As the work's final sections unfold

¹⁰⁹ Compare *Poroi* 3.6 and 6.1 with *Hiero* 9.9 and 11.11 *ff.*

¹¹⁰ *Hipparchikos* 4.7; *Memorabilia* 2.6.31; 4.4.17-18.

¹¹¹ G. Cawkwell, 'Review: *Un commentaire historique des Poroi de Xénophon* by Philippe Gauthier', *Classical Review*, 29.1 (1979), pp. 17-19, pp. 18, 19; See Gauthier, *Un commentaire*, p. 244; P. Gauthier, 'Le Programme' p. 135 with n. 25.

¹¹² L. Strauss, *On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1948), pp. 8, 48.

¹¹³ W. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis*, (Albany: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1977), p. 64; against this view, see (ed.) V.J. Gray, *Xenophon*

Simonides increasingly stresses ‘rule’ (*archē*). Also speaking of this transition from ‘tyranny’ to ‘rule’ Rasmussen objected that Xenophon’s conversion of Hiero is not, as Aristotle later suggested ‘reforming tyranny by assimilating it to kingship, in essence, mitigating the tyrant’s vicious nature by turning him into a king’. Rather, Rasmussen claimed, Xenophon’s emphasis rests upon securing ‘happiness and success *as tyrant*.’¹¹⁴ Yet this distinction proves erroneous in the full context of Xenophon’s thought. The steps that Xenophon takes to ensure the happiness and success of the tyrant also result in the increased success and happiness of the *polis*/subjects ruled. For Xenophon this increases the likelihood that the ruled will be led/obey willingly rather than through coercion and thus demonstrates a path for directing rule away from tyranny and towards kingship according to his Socratic definitions of tyranny and kingship in *Memorabilia*. As an imperial power trying to maintain and expand its influence, Athens faced the same challenges and desired the same ends as Xenophon’s Hiero; in particular both sought *eudaimonia*, which Rasmussen translates as ‘happiness’, but also denotes material prosperity.

In *Poroi* Xenophon offers Athens the same hegemonic alternatives that his Simonides offers Hiero. That the Greek term *archē* can denote both the rule of an individual monarch/magistrate as well as the rule of one *polis* over others, i.e. what we understand to denote ‘empire’, makes the parallel between Xenophon’s *Hiero* and the choice he places before the Athenian *dēmos* in *Poroi* all the more compelling. Nowhere in *Poroi* does Xenophon outline his expectation that Athens will simply withdraw and watch as events unfold around them. Rather, Xenophon explicitly outlines how he envisions Athens will once

on Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), who cautions that references to tyranny do not disappear entirely.

¹¹⁴ P. Rasmussen, *Excellence Unleashed: Machiavelli’s Critique of Xenophon and the Moral Foundation of Politics*, (New York: Lexington Books, 2009), p. 34; see also Aristotle *Politics* 1313^a8-1315^b10.

again assume an active role in shaping the next phase of Hellenic history most notably by resolving the Sacred War.¹¹⁵

Xenophon hints at this new Athenian role in Hellenic affairs when he chides those who think Athenian ascendancy was ‘*more likely* to be won by war than by peace’.¹¹⁶ The implication of *Poroi* is that preeminence may be attained through both avenues but that initiating war merely *seemed* to be the more straightforward of the two. Xenophon makes this view clear as he continues: ‘and now, at any rate, it seems to me that on account of the political confusion that has befallen Greece, the *polis* can regain the Hellenes without toil, without danger, and without expense’.¹¹⁷ He here employs the verb *anaktasthai*, which fittingly denotes the recovery of rule as well as the winning of both friendship and favors.¹¹⁸ Both senses of the word suit the proposals that Xenophon outlines in *Poroi* and *Cyropaedia*. Superficially this result appears to align closely with Isocrates’ *On the Peace*. Though, in contrast to Isocrates who argued that Athens should imitate Sparta so as to reclaim hegemony,¹¹⁹ Xenophon reiterates Athenian paradigms for doing so. More significantly, Xenophon offers practical advice in *Poroi* for how Athens might proceed whereas *On the Peace* lacks comparable constructive advice.

According to Xenophon the first step that Athens should take on the path to attaining its *third* phase of imperial ascendancy is ‘to attempt to reconcile the *poleis* warring with each other’ and then to ensure through diplomacy that the shrine of Delphi remains autonomous,

¹¹⁵ *Poroi* 5.9-10.

¹¹⁶ *Poroi* 5.5 *ff.*

¹¹⁷ *Poroi* 5.8-9.

¹¹⁸ *Cyropaedia* 2.2.10; cf. Herodotus speaking of the tyranny of Hippias 1.61.3; and of Persian kingship 3.73.2.

¹¹⁹ Isocrates 8.143-4.

i.e. an allusion to the Third Sacred War (356-46 BC).¹²⁰ He argues that by ‘appearing to be cultivating peace in every land and sea, in truth I believe that all would pray for Athens to be safe after their own homeland’.¹²¹ Both Higgins and Delebecque have suggested that the closing lines of Xenophon’s *Hellenica* signal the same opportunity.¹²² In *Poroi* Xenophon emphasizes his belief that by shifting away from the failed paradigm of exploiting the allies and towards internal improvements and just treatment of friends and allies, the Athenians will realize the ‘security’ (*asphaleia*) and ‘prosperity’ (*eudaimonia*) that they craved justly, and therefore with divine support, itself the focus of the final chapter of *Poroi*.¹²³

Conclusions

In *Poroi* 5 Xenophon offered Athens advice for transforming the remnant of the Second Athenian Confederacy and converting its perceived ‘tyrannical’ hegemony into a ‘just’ rule that aligned with the oath of the Second Athenian Confederacy. His ideas reiterated a paradigm for winning hegemony through benefaction that was familiar to Athenian audiences from their own historical traditions and is consistent with Xenophon’s wider views on leadership and empire. Throughout the Xenophontic corpus Xenophon argues that rule/hegemony was preferable to the quietist-withdrawal embodied in the so-called ‘private’ life.

¹²⁰ *Poroi* 5.8.

¹²¹ *Poroi* 5.10.

¹²² É. Delebecque, *Essai Sur La Vie De Xénophon*, (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1957), p. 472; Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian*, p. 138.

¹²³ *Poroi* 6.1.

For the better part of two millennia readers presumed that Xenophon was a devotee of monarchy,¹²⁴ not least because of his alleged influence on Alexander the Great. It is therefore ironic that it was the actions of Philip the Great, whom Xenophon never mentions, that offered the strongest endorsement for the effectiveness of *Poroi's* strategy for securing hegemony in the second half of the fourth century. For it was Philip's intervention in the 'Third' Sacred War that helped to restore 'autonomy' to the shrine at Delphi, and it was Philip

¹²⁴ For the view that Xenophon prefers/advocates 'monarchy', see Carlier, 'The Idea of', p. 333; Balot, *Greek Political Thought*, p. 184; Azoulay, *Xénophon et Les Grâces* pp. 16-7; R. Brock, 'Xenophon's Political Imagery', in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and His World: Papers from a Conference Held in Liverpool in July 1999*, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), pp. 247-58, p. 257; J. Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 325 with n. 66; D. Gera, *Xenophon's Cyropaedia*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 12; J. Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction: On the Education of Cyrus*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 6; W.R. Newell, 'Machiavelli and Xenophon on Princely Rule: a Double-Edged Encounter,' *The Journal of Politics*, 50 (1988), 108-130, p. 112; E.M. Wood and N. Wood, *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 4; E.N. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*, Vol. II, (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1974), p. 34; J. Luccioni, *Les idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon*, (Paris: Ophrys, 1947), pp. 51, 201, 211, 304; E. Scharr, *Xenophons Staats- und Gesellschaftsideal und seine Zeit*, (Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1919), pp. 18-20, 168-70; L. Ravani, *La Politica di Senofonte: Studio Critico*, (Roma: Senato di Forzani, 1877), pp. 12-13, 16-17; W. Engel, *Xenophons politische Stellung und Wirksamkeit. Zu der öffentlichen Prüfung der Böglinge des Königlichen Gymnasiums zu Stargard 17 März 1853*, (Stargard: Carl Ferdinand Hendess, 1853), pp. 7, 14, 18; J. Bodin, *Les Six Livres de La Republique*, (Paris: Jacques du Puis Libraire, 1583), pp. 215, 257, 969.

who managed to capitalize on this ‘goodwill’ to then conquer the Hellenes by striving to bring the feuding *poleis* to peace. Philip achieved what Xenophon exhorted Athens to do in *Poroi* and what Demosthenes later chastised Athenians for failing to do in his *Fourth Philippic*.¹²⁵ In the fourth century the *dēmos* continued to conceive of its domestic and imperial rule in ‘monarchic’ terms, a metaphor enhanced through visual representations in which the personified *Dēmos* appears crowned.¹²⁶ Yet none has ever considered that Xenophon’s concern for what he happened to call the ‘kingly art’ (*tēn basilikēn technēn*), might be directed towards enhancing the rule of the Athenian *dēmos*. Nevertheless this is what Xenophon offers his audience in *Poroi*, the choice between Xenophon’s Socratic conception of ‘kingship’ or the allegedly unjust, and therefore ‘tyrannical’, approach that the *dēmos* had stood accused of adopting since the fifth century.

¹²⁵ Compare *Poroi* 5.8-10 with Demosthenes 19.59 and Pausanias 10.3.1 on the role that Philip of Macedon subsequently took in resolving the conflict. For the perception that this cemented the hegemony of Macedon, see: the exhortation of Isocrates 5.74 and Demosthenes 10.47, which states Athens should have done what Philip did. See also the discussions of Aeschines 3.132; Pausanias 4.28.1-2, 8.27.10; and Justin *Epitome* 8.1; 145-6.

¹²⁶ See, for example, the law against Tyranny re-inscribed in 337/6 BC that depicts the personified *dēmos* crowned IG II³ 320 (= SEG 12.87); B. Meritt, ‘Greek Inscriptions’, *Hesperia*, 21.4 (1952), pp. 340-380, p. 355, with plates 89,90; Lawton, C. L., *Attic Document Reliefs: Art and Politics in Ancient Athens*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), no. 38. See also: Blanshard, A. J. L., ‘Depicting Democracy: an Exploration of Art and Text in the Law of Eukrates’, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 124 (2004), 1-15; K. Glowacki, ‘A Personification of Demos on a New Attic Document Relief’, *Hesperia*, 72.4 (2003), 447-466, pp. 453-4, with figure 7. One similarly finds the image of Theseus ‘crowning’ the *dēmos* in Euripides *Supplikes* 351-3 and Isocrates 12.129-30.

Perhaps one reason for the relative lack of interest that political theorists have expressed towards Xenophon throughout the twentieth century can be explained by the reality that Xenophon's approach to the problem of governing appears to be less theoretical than Plato's but, like the works of the Attic orators, was more concerned with addressing pragmatic issues facing the everyday workings of the Athenian government. In cases where Xenophon's works have been understood as examples of political theory, e.g. *Hiero*, we therefore stand to gain greater appreciation of his purpose and a new awareness of their potentially broader beneficiaries by contextualizing their ideas within the entire Xenophonic corpus as well as the contemporary political concerns facing fourth-century *poleis*. *Hiero* may superficially address itself to a long-dead Sicilian tyrant, albeit one who provocatively shared a name with a member of the Thirty,¹²⁷ but its advice transcends constitution type. Thus *Poroi* may be understood as a sort of 'princely mirror' for the Athenian *dēmos* in which *Poroi* 5 offers an alternate path for regaining preeminence across Hellas justly, something that Isocrates either failed or, more aptly, decided not to do in *On the Peace*.¹²⁸ In place of an Athenian 'tyranny' Xenophon proposes that the financial lifeblood and security of the Athenian *dēmos* could be realized in ever-greater amounts *without* exploiting the allies. The proposals outlined in *Poroi* 1-4 aspired to establish a financially stable and politically ascendant Athens that would be capable of leading willing allies and enable the *dēmos* to be acclaimed once more as the 'king of Hellas' just as it had in fifth century.

¹²⁷ *Hellenica* 2.3.2.

¹²⁸ Gauthier, *Un commentaire historique*, p. 42.