

## The Day After: What to Expect in post-Islamic State Mosul

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ABSTRACT GOES HERE

Since research was conducted on the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the fall of Mosul in late 2014/early 2015 that culminated in the writing of “The Enemy Within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul” much has changed in Iraq. With varying degrees of success, the Iraqi government has managed to retake several Iraqi cities, districts and towns, but with forces that have a distinctly sectarian hue. Direct support has been provided by Iran in the form of weapons, funding, training and military personnel to a range of Shi’i militia organizations. These organizations, expanded and empowered by Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s *fatwa* that led to the creation of the *Hashd al-Sha’abi* (or Popular Mobilisation Forces - PMF), have limited IS’s opportunities to advance, but in so doing have furthered the sectarian and ethnic divides that now run deep in Iraq’s society and political life. It is also crucial to understand the very significant impact Western airstrikes on IS positions continues to have. Without these airstrikes, neither the Shi’i militia nor the ISF have managed to make headway against IS in battles in Tikrit, Baiji, or Ramadi, and Bashir has not yet been attacked because of a lack of agreement on air support to the *Hashd al-Sha’abi*. A similar picture can be seen in the north – without support provided from the air by Western airforces, the Kurdish *peshmerga* forces would struggle to maintain their frontline against IS. Worryingly, none of these areas of engagement match Mosul in terms of scale, complexity of the urban environment, determination of IS to hold the city, and the length of time IS has had to prepare defences.

But an assault on Mosul seems to be looming. ISF brigades have moved to Makhmour, Kurdish leaders are now expressing their desire to be involved (arguably for their own political reasons), and there is a sensitive discussion taking place between exiled Sunni elites from Nineveh, Salahadin, and Diyala about the problems of seeing the *HaS* present in any retaking of territory held by IS. It also seems that the Obama administration may be viewing the retaking of Mosul as a final ‘success’ to round up the President’s final term, and the confidence of US government and military forces in particular suggests that the invasion of Mosul may be much sooner, rather than later, in the year. In light of this, what would have previously been viewed as a premature, even fanciful, line of thinking is now being voiced as legitimate questions. What can the international community expect in a “day after” scenario if IS is defeated and removed from power in Mosul? Is it even possible to do this – to surgically remove the IS organization from the city and governorate, when it has had some two years, if not longer, to deepen its roots into the socio-political fabric of Mosul and Nineveh? What do Iraqis in Mosul think about IS, and what are their thoughts on the recapture of their city by the central government in Baghdad? Would they view the recapture of Mosul as liberation, or just a transition from one repressive system and back into the fold of another? How could the Iraqi government assure *Maslawis*, as the people of Mosul are known, that the recapture of Mosul would benefit them? These questions are important. Every iteration of Arab Sunni opposition to have emerged since 2003 has been deeper, better organized, and more violent than that which came before. Lessons were also learned – from the previous organization’s experience, and the manner in which it was defeated – to make the next iteration even more capable. If ‘the day after’ in Mosul is not carefully managed to some pre-defined yet agile notion of ‘success’, then the result could well be another round of low-scale insurgency leading to a violent Sunni rebellion in subsequent years.

To answer these questions, this briefing paper has been divided into the following sections, each focused on a different actor or faction that has an impact on the future of Mosul. The first section,

and the one with the most emphasis, will assess the feelings of the people of Mosul towards IS, with particular reference to their method of rule, the economic situation, and other amenities such as health that are all part and parcel of living within a state, as IS claims they are. The second section will examine *Maslawi* attitudes towards the Iraqi government and the various Shia militias, in particular the Popular Mobilisation Forces, particularly in light of reports of various atrocities committed by these forces in their recapture of other cities like Tikrit and Ramadi. The third section will investigate how the people of Mosul feel towards members of the international community, with actors ranging from Turkey to the United States. The final section includes reflections from Arab sheikhs in exile in Kurdistan, as well as some issues concerning potential Kurdish involvement in the liberation of Mosul.

This briefing paper is not based on any extensive surveys conducted in Mosul. Due to resources available, the security situation in Iraq and other issues relating to the conflict, it has not been possible to conduct fieldwork in Iraqi government controlled territory, and certainly not in Mosul. As such, the attitudes surveyed within this paper come from a number of interviews already conducted for the more substantive research paper mentioned above, and from follow-up interviews conducted in late February 2016 with the same respondents as well as brief interactions with those who have been recently smuggled out of Mosul. The paper also benefits from extensive interviews undertaken in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq since the fall of Mosul in June 2014 until the spring of 2016. This data was also supplemented by conversations with sources who are in daily contact with people in Mosul. As such, it is important to note that the analysis contained herein provides us with a snapshot of what is happening in Mosul, and not an all-encompassing canvas that paints a detailed picture. Further research is thus required, and this paper should be viewed as a beginning into a much broader enquiry.

### **Attitudes towards IS:**

As a city known for its extraordinarily large number of Iraqi military and security service officers, Mosul has never been particularly fond of groups and organisations that work outside the confines of state institutions and civil discipline. Mosul has long been a city with disproportionate representation in the defence and security apparatus of the Iraqi state as compared to other cities, even Sunni Arab ones, since the establishment of modern Iraq in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Mosul was home to Ottoman military training colleges, and thus it became the home of the Iraqi military establishment in the nascent state. This reality did not change even during the rule of Saddam Hussein even though he was accused of favouring appointments from his clan or hometown of Tikrit. Although the reasons behind this are not directly pertinent to the current study, it demonstrates that Mosul has long been a city that has had loyalty to the notion of the Iraqi state, government and society. It is perhaps because of this history that Mosul and Nineveh remained the base for several 'former regime element' groupings after 2003.

Therefore, it was not a surprise when every respondent, without exception, displayed antagonistic attitudes towards not only IS, but also al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam (a Kurdish al-Qaeda affiliated organisation) and other groups they did not identify as being sufficiently "Iraqi" or genuinely "Islamic" in their objectives and methods.<sup>v</sup> Such attitudes harken back to a poignant quote contained within the original research where the only female participant stated, "...No one likes al-Qaeda, most of their fighters are not Iraqi anyway...".<sup>vi</sup> The same participant, who is still closely connected to her city and family living there, had the following to say about the current situation of women under IS rule:

"My family in Mosul tell me that life under *Da'esh* [IS] is unpredictable. When they leave their homes, women have to be accompanied by their male guardians, and

they now have to be fully veiled and covered. You know how some [Arab] Gulf ladies wear their *niqab*? You cannot even see their eyes, and they usually have to wear gloves. It wasn't like that in the early days of their rule, but new things are introduced every single day.”<sup>vii</sup>

Although this respondent was keen to stress that she did not oppose the full face and body veil, the *niqab* and its corresponding accoutrements, she rightly identified that such customs are alien to urban Iraqis, and even the majority of rural Iraqis of all ethnicities, including the Bedouin Arabs. The fact that she alluded to the strict enforcement of female dress codes in the Arab Gulf states, likely in reference to Saudi Arabian law, is demonstrative of a new kind of culture being imposed on the women of Mosul by men whom she had previously identified as not being Iraqi anyway.<sup>viii</sup>

One of the new respondents described the situation in Mosul as being “bleak” and that “the people were frightened, scared and constantly worried about the future”.<sup>ix</sup> When enquiries were made as to whether the source of this sense of anxiety amongst the population was because of IS, the following was said:

“Yes, but also it is a lot deeper than that. Imagine talking and dealing with those idiots [IS fighters] on a daily basis in order to acquire the most basic of services. Now imagine you hear that someone in your neighbourhood who was not particularly religious was caught by *Da'esh* fighters with alcohol in his home, and that person was not only executed, but had his properties and capital seized. Are you going to want to go into your district council to make any requests? Even if it's a comparatively rare occurrence, that fear is there.”<sup>x</sup>

On the subject of property seizure and economic punishments inflicted upon *Maslawis*, another respondent who claimed to have been a shop owner in Mosul said that IS regularly appropriated the properties of those whom they deemed as their enemies or as easier targets who could be extorted or pressured through threats to their families.

“You know that's partially how they make their money, right? [IS earn money] through forced seizure of the wealth of those they brand as ‘apostates’ or they have convicted of ‘corruption on Earth’, which can mean anything depending on which *Da'esh* operative is accusing you. Some of these charges we used to hear about in Iran, and we used to laugh at them. Now we're being charged with similar crimes by judges who are like the kind of idiots who used to come through the Sharia colleges at university,<sup>xi</sup> and they hand out sentences no one has ever heard of being used throughout Islamic history.”<sup>xii</sup>

According to this respondent and others, IS judges would order for defendants of smaller crimes, such as smoking, to pay fines and sometimes those fines would be extortionately high. If a defendant was not able to pay these fines, an IS judge would order the defendant's properties seized in order to pay off the outstanding balance.<sup>xiii</sup> Invariably, this would mean that someone could lose everything they possessed, and in a city that is under siege and cut off from the rest of the world and at the mercy of unpredictable extremists, such an individual would be likely to suffer immensely. Meanwhile, the seized property would either be granted to individuals within IS to foster loyalty, or would be put to other uses for the financial and economic gain of IS.<sup>xiv</sup>

In terms of how IS functions as a state that provides services, the main concern that was highlighted was that of health. Several of the respondents claimed that Mosul's medical facilities, including smaller clinics, had been bombed in airstrikes carried out either by the Iraqi government or its allied

Western partners. To make matters worse, medical supplies were extremely low or non-existent, as medicines and other supplies had been halted by Baghdad for several reasons, including security. This problem has likely been further exacerbated by the fact that IS had previously been known to transfer the already precariously stocked health supplies of Mosul to Syria.<sup>xv</sup> One respondent, whose relative worked in Mosul's main hospital, said:

“Health standards are unbearable. Medical infrastructure has been damaged by the bombs being dropped on Mosul, and there are no medicines. In order to acquire certain medicines, they have to be bought from the black market where medicines like simple painkillers and basic antibiotics like penicillin can cost several times their market value. The risk to getting medicine that way is not only financial, but if *Da'esh* catch you they might execute you as a smuggler. Basically, you or your family might die from a lack of medical treatment, or you might die for getting the medicines you need from a black market that is partially operated by *Da'esh* themselves. How do they expect us to live?”<sup>xvi</sup>

As is clear from the brief excerpts above, IS are not loved by the people of Mosul. The impact of IS's method of rule on *Maslawis* has varying effects, depending on gender, the kind of businesses people run, the properties they own, or even the state of their health that may compel them to seek medical supplies in black markets that may also buy them their own deaths. What appears to be common amongst all respondents is a fear of what might happen to them if they break any of IS's myriad rules and laws that are not stable and that are liable to change at any given moment with little to no warning. As such, a clear sense of palpable fear and anxiety combined with hatred and disdain for IS is clear from the respondents interviewed.

The situation, however, may be somewhat different in other, smaller, centres under IS control. With particular reference to Hawijah, Kurdish intelligence estimates place the proportion of IS members as being from their immediate community as perhaps being as high as 90 percent, with some 5-6 percent then coming from other parts of Iraq or Syria, and a much smaller percentage being 'foreign'. If these numbers are correct, and the pattern is replicated to some degree in Mosul, then there may well be the potential for a dangerous internecine situation to unfold – between and within Arab tribes and families as those associated with IS are removed from within, once it seems certain that an operation to retake the territory is underway.

#### **Attitudes towards the Iraqi government:**

Perhaps unsurprisingly to those who study contemporary Iraqi issues to any serious depth is the fact that few Sunni Arabs view the government and its allies in the Popular Mobilisation Forces and other sectarian Shia organisations as being any different from IS. The people of Mosul, it seems, do not deviate from this formula. The primary fear of *Maslawis* appears to be not continued IS rule, but a vengeful Shia army descending onto the city, branding the people as IS collaborators and sympathisers, and commencing a sectarian and genocidal campaign of imprisonment, torture and murder. Few Sunni Arabs, especially in Mosul, will forget that Iraqi Security Forces committed extrajudicial murder of Sunni detainees as they withdrew in the face of IS advances.<sup>xvii</sup> Similarly, few can forget the graphic scenes of Sunnis murdered by Shia terrorist organisations being hung from electricity poles in the city of Baquba,<sup>xviii</sup> or Popular Mobilisation fighters hanging Sunnis upside down over a fire and gloating as they sliced strips of flesh off of the victim with a sword.<sup>xix</sup>

The words frequently used to describe what the people of Mosul expect from “liberating” Iraqi government and allied Popular Mobilisation forces in Arabic were *mathbaha*, *ibada*, *majzara* and *damar*, which corresponds with the English slaughter, genocide, massacre and destruction respectively. “By Allah, there won’t be a Mosul left, nor anyone that can be called a *Maslawi* by the time those sectarian savages finish with this city”, said a former police officer in both the Ba’ath era and the period of the US occupation.<sup>xx</sup> “We remember al-Qaeda’s bombings, their racketeering and *Da’esh*’s murder of anyone who contradicted or resisted them, even non-violently. But what’s the difference between them and the government and its bloodthirsty gangs? Not a single one of us [Sunnis] hasn’t lost someone to their bullets, blades and drills”,<sup>xxi</sup> said the same respondent in reference to the heavily documented use of power drills by Shia militias to torture and kill Sunni detainees and hostages.

Such misgivings towards Baghdad and its allies were not limited to the expression of fear of lives being lost, but also with regard to women’s rights. Two respondents, both female, recounted stories of how widows in Sunni areas in Baghdad and other cities were forced into *muta’a* marriages, or temporary marriages permitted in Shia Islam, in order to be able to provide for their families after the main breadwinners were killed.<sup>xxii</sup> While IS has gained notoriety for its sexual exploitation and enslavement of women, Shia militias have also been known to be involved in the trafficking of Iraqi women and children in order to sell them into sexual bondage. Essentially these temporary marriages that are unregulated by Iraqi laws are used to provide a veneer of religious legitimacy to what is in effect forced prostitution:

“We know what happened to many of those poor widows in Baghdad. [The Shia militias] have even set up brothels that have dozens of these widows in each location, with *muta’a* marriages being officiated by in-house Shia imams who give their blessings to the exploitation of innocent women and girls. If the Shia militias come to Mosul, they’ll kill our men and sell us all into the sex trade. I’d rather die than be disgraced and humiliated for the rest of my life.”<sup>xxiv</sup>

This paints a bleak picture not only of what *Maslawi* women fear may come to pass, but of what has already been occurring extensively in Iraq since 2003. Although the Iraqi Shia religious establishment’s approval of *muta’a* has scarcely been reported in the media,<sup>xxv</sup> it cannot have passed the attention of the international community, who will be discussed presently, as many women’s rights NGOs have submitted reports to the United Nations, including one to the UN Human Rights Commission in February 2014.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Even the concept of “liberation” from IS received much derision:

“What liberation are these idiots from the West talking about? They first ‘liberated’ us from Saddam, then they ‘liberated’ us with their democracy, then they ‘liberated’ us by giving us Maliki, Abadi and the other Green Zone dogs who slaughtered and robbed us, and now they’re talking about liberating us from *Da’esh*? What exactly is this liberation if they’re only going to hand us over to psychopathic murderers who will commit genocide against us? They need to stop thinking of themselves as heroes that are there to slay monsters and banish nightmares that they created.”<sup>xxvii</sup>

Whilst this quote can also be applied to the following section on the international community, it demonstrates that many Sunni Arabs believe that a return to Baghdad’s control would be akin to handing over the fates of the population to a government that will either take part in or else turn a blind eye to a genocide of the Sunnis. None of the respondents demonstrated any kind of trust, goodwill or faith in the central government, nor did any of them praise the Popular Mobilisation. The

attitude displayed towards the scenario of the central government recapturing Mosul was simply one of jumping out of the frying pan of IS rule and back into the fire of the sectarian government.

### **Attitudes towards the international community:**

In direct relation to the final quote in the previous section, *Maslawis* expressed little trust or faith in the international community, particularly the US and the wider institutions of the UN. The US invasion in 2003 is viewed as the “original sin” that led to what the respondents feel is the wholesale destruction of Iraq as a state and society. Many of the respondents felt that the US had simply handed Iraq over to Iran “on a golden platter”,<sup>xxviii</sup> as one respondent worded it, and that under the Ba’athists they at least had livelihoods, their families and security, even if they lacked political freedom.

While blaming the West has already been heavily covered in numerous publications, what is of primary importance and utility to this enquiry is how *Maslawis* perceive the ability of the international community, especially regional powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to play a positive role in Iraq’s future. Although they saw the US, Britain, Turkey and Saudi Arabia as all problematic (not to mention their profound hatred of Iran, whom they view as a primary antagonist), they still viewed them as more reliable and trustworthy than their own government:

“If you’re telling me that they want to know what can be done to make us feel more at ease [about IS being removed from Mosul], then firstly they should stop bombing us and using the excuse of targeting *Da’esh*. Secondly, why don’t they show how committed they are and stop striking from the skies and start putting soldiers on the ground. The Turks are already nearby, they are part of NATO, so why can’t they act as peacekeepers under a UN mission like they do in Lebanon or in Africa? We need international observers and a clear message sent to the Green Zone that any sectarian killings will be treated as war crimes and that the [Iraqi] government will be prosecuted and held to account just like they did to Saddam. Otherwise, it’s more hypocrisy dressed up as care for us.”<sup>xxx</sup>

Granting the fact that a lot of mistrust can be read from this quotation, this can also be seen as an entrance into regaining the trust of Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs who feel that they have been marginalised at the expense of Shia Arabs and Kurds who obviously benefited the most from the 2003 invasion. These sentiments were echoed by many other respondents, and they believe that only other, external powers can effectively restrain the Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilisation from committing war crimes in the event that Mosul is recaptured.

### **The view from Kurdistan**

There are resident in the Kurdistan Region a notable collection of Arab tribal shaikhs who fled as IS forces advanced in 2014 – from Hawijah, Rabia/Shammar, and Sinjar in particular. These figures give a particular view of what is happening in Mosul and Hawijah, from their exiled perspective. Many of them present a view that IS is somehow alien to their people – which is detabable – but what is very telling is the way in which they talk about Sunni Arabs being dispossessed, whether by the US-led invasion, the government of Iraq, or IS, and how their areas have been destroyed, and will be even more so during and after any campaign to remove IS.

These figures also display a very great concern about the *Hashed al-Sha’abi*, and what they may do when they enter IS-controlled territory. What they tended to prefer to see was the creation of some form of Sunni Arab tribal militia, maybe as part of the ISF, which would be used to secure the city

following IS removal. Of course, however, the different Sunni Arab tribes are falling into different spheres of political influence, with some having moved into a group around KDP President Barzani, whereas others seem to be attempting to negotiate a closer arrangement with Iraqi PM Haidar al-Abadi. These fractured strategies may well end up either damaging the cohesion of any assault on IS, or complicating ‘the day after’ scenarios as they unfold.

A further development in Kurdistan focuses upon where President Barzani would intend to position his own *peshmerga* in any such conflict. Increasingly, it seems as if Barzani is keen to bring the *peshmerga* into the eastern side of Mosul, where there was a largely Kurdish population that would be, it seems, largely supportive of him. While it is difficult to imagine a Kurdish occupation of eastern Mosul, it seems that this discussion is occurring more often in the KDP leadership, and is reflected in the tactical movement of KDP *peshmerga* forces in recent weeks. Why should they do this? Any such annexation of eastern Mosul would be driven by internal Kurdish political dynamics. Currently, the areas into which the Kurds have expanded have been mainly to the south-east, in PUK territory, and if these territories, and especially Kirkuk, were to join the KRI in any future referendum, then the KDP would see its relative popularity weaken. But if Kirkuk were to be balanced by eastern Mosul, then the situation would be much more even. Some Kurdish maximalist maps show the boundary of the KRI should then follow the Tigris to the Jabal Hamrin, thus bringing in a very significant part of Nineveh into the KRI.

Why is this important for day after scenarios in Mosul. In short, any notion of a Kurdish territorial annexation of eastern Mosul and significant parts of Nineveh could well cause serious opposition among Sunni Arabs and Turkmens, as well as among Shi'i militias, thus complicating any attempts to bring stability to the post-conflict environment.

### **Conclusion:**

As the above survey shows, the people of Mosul are extremely fearful of a post-IS Mosul. The respondents firmly believe that the Iraqi government and its allied Shia militias, particularly the Popular Mobilisation Forces, will not have liberation in mind when they attempt to recapture Mosul, but vengeance. The Popular Mobilisation Forces have frequently perpetrated brutal excesses against the Sunni population, whether in Tikrit, Ramadi, Tal Afar, Jurf al-Sakhr, Muqdadia or many other places, and *Maslawis* are acutely aware of this. They believe, and not without good reason, that the sectarianism that is rampant and pervasive in both the Popular Mobilisation and the Iraqi Security Forces will lead these “liberating” forces to accuse the *Maslawis*, themselves victims of IS violence and oppression, of being IS sympathisers or collaborators. As many have seen in the Shia on Sunni violence in Diyala, it is usually enough to be Sunni to be accused of being an IS collaborator and killed for it.

However, it is also clear that they feel strong anti-IS sentiments and wish to see them gone and replaced, as long as it is not replacing IS tyranny with a return to the tyranny of Baghdad’s sectarian policies and the free rein granted to sectarian Shia militias and organisations that are directly supported and controlled by Iran. What is interesting is that, although they blame the international community and particularly the US and its allies for the situation of Iraq today, it seems that the people of Mosul would support an international force, including Arab and Turkish soldiers, in securing the city after IS is forced to withdraw. This is because they see this as the best solution to ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilisation Forces will be restrained from exacting bloody and misplaced reprisals against the population. According to the snapshot image produced by this paper, only with such international forces will the people of Mosul see the purge of

IS from the city as a liberation rather than simply Baghdad recapturing it and subjecting it to a different kind of oppression.

Whether the international community, principally the US, has the stomach for another intervention in Iraq, even if it is a peacekeeping operation, is highly debatable. However, without such a peacekeeping mission, the world risks very recent history repeating itself in Iraq. Just as al-Qaeda spawned IS, a mutated and even more extreme version of itself, no one can be certain about what IS may bring forth in the wake of its defeat, and indeed if such an organisation will be even more violent, even more capricious and even more brutal than IS itself. Such a scenario is one that does not bear thinking about, yet the international community must consider it deeply if they wish to restore order to the region and begin to curtail the rise and propagation of violent extremist organisations, Sunni, Shia or otherwise.

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<sup>v</sup> The respondents include all participants interviewed for “The Enemy Within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul”, with the exception of Participant G who was unreachable. It further includes all of the more recent, briefer interviews, conducted with a further four participants who left Mosul after being smuggled out in early 2016.

<sup>vi</sup> Participant B

<sup>vii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>viii</sup> Although al-Qaeda and IS are now different organisations, there is no doubt that in the Iraqi context one spawned the other, and that necessarily includes the shared pools of manpower they both relied and continue to rely upon.

<sup>ix</sup> Participant I

<sup>x</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xi</sup> This is in reference to the unfortunate fact that, throughout the Arab world, those with the weakest secondary education grades were admitted onto Sharia courses at university. As such, rather than the best and brightest students studying Islamic law, the lowest percentiles of students were admitted to study what is still a core part of life and culture in the Arab world. The lack of intellectual capital being invested into Sharia studies can arguably be linked to encouraging more extreme and aberrant interpretations of Islam.

<sup>xii</sup> Participant L

<sup>xiii</sup> Participants B, C, I, K and L all reported hearing about/witnessing such property seizures.

<sup>xiv</sup> Participant L

<sup>xv</sup> Omar al-Jaffal, ‘Iraqi hospitals under IS suffer lack of medicine, staff’, *Al-Monitor*, 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/iraq-anbar-mosul-hospitals-islamic-state.html>

<sup>xvi</sup> Participant J

<sup>xvii</sup> Amnesty International, ‘Iraq: Testimonies point to dozens of revenge killings of Sunni detainees’, 2014, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/06/iraq-testimonies-point-to-dozens-revenge-killings-sunni-detainees>

<sup>xviii</sup> Michael Georgy, ‘Shi’ite militias hangs up 15 executed Sunnis in Iraqi square’, *Reuters*, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-idUSKBN0FZ1VL20140730>

<sup>xix</sup> Mamoon Alabbasi, ‘VIDEO: Iraq Shia militiaman cuts burnt corpse “like shawarma”’, *Middle East Eye*, 2015, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/video-iraq-shia-militiaman-cuts-burnt-corpse-shawarma-814719537>

<sup>xx</sup> Participant H

<sup>xxi</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xxii</sup> Participants B and K

<sup>xxiv</sup> Participant K

<sup>xxv</sup> Tallha Abdulrazaq, ‘What form of “Islam” do these terrorists follow?’, *Middle East Eye*, 2015,

<sup>xxvi</sup> NGOs Coalition of CEDAW Shadow Report, ‘Iraqi Women in Armed Conflict and Post Conflict Situation: Shadow Report submitted to the CEDAW committee at the 57<sup>th</sup> Session’, *UNOHCHR*, 2014, [http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT\\_CEDAW\\_NGO\\_IRQ\\_16192\\_E.pdf](http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRQ_16192_E.pdf)

<sup>xxvii</sup> Participant J



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<sup>xxviii</sup> Participant E  
<sup>xxx</sup> Participant H