The Concept and Practice of De-radicalisation in the PREVENT Strand of the UK Counter-terrorism Strategy: What is De-radicalisation?

Submitted by Mohammed Elshimi to the University of Exeter as a Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Ethno-Political Studies

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature:

Mohammed Samir Elshimi
Abstract

De-radicalisation has become increasingly prevalent in the UK’s counter-terrorism policy as a strategy for tackling the threat of religiously inspired violence/extremism. Recently, British citizens fighting in Middle Eastern conflicts have rekindled the preoccupation of policymakers with the radicalisation of British Muslims. In fact the work of PREVENT post 2011 has primarily been recalibrated towards a greater focus on de-radicalisation interventions, which is delivered by the police through the Channel programme. Channel is perceived by policy-makers to be a more streamlined and effective way of dealing with radicalised/extremist individuals than the wide remit of PREVENT initiatives between 2006 and 2010. Indeed since becoming placed on a statutory footing in 2015, PREVENT requires public institutions, like schools and universities, to identify ‘vulnerable’ individuals’ at risk of radicalisation. And yet despite the greater attention on de-radicalisation, very little continues to be known about what makes violent individuals leave terrorism behind. De-radicalisation in PREVENT is characterised by the absence of credible research, little or no empirical evidence for policy development, confusion surrounding its conceptual framework, and conflicting policy logics.

The following thesis is based on a case-study examination of de-radicalisation with 27 PREVENT practitioners. Through qualitative semi-structured interviews, my investigation seeks to address the problems that arise from the concept and practice of de-radicalisation in PREVENT by ascertaining (a) an ontological understanding of de-radicalisation and (b) the practice of de-radicalisation. The findings of the fieldwork data revealed the existence of multiple conceptions of de-radicalisation and a number of conceptual features unique to the UK context. Despite yielding a more
fruitful conceptual and empirical understanding of de-radicalisation, the data in itself nevertheless could not fully explicate the relationship between several critical themes comprehensively within an analytically generative framework.

With the inductive method falling short, I draw on Michel Foucault’s concept of the ‘technologies of the self’. Comprising of discursive, disciplinary, and confessional technologies, it is argued that the technologies of the self allows us to reframe the concept beyond the narrow confines of counter-terrorism policy and place it within wider governmental relations. Situated within neo-liberal governmentality, the technologies of the self encourage individuals to work on themselves and regulate their behaviour through a wide range of discursive, practical, and technical interventions. Seen in this way, de-radicalisation is therefore less about the mitigation of violence and more about the making of a particular political and ethical subjectivity.

Ultimately, the technology of the self eschews the conceptual problems inherent in the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation, the limitations evident in the literature, whilst amplifying the salient findings of my fieldwork data. It provides a more robust concept and theory that successfully captures and explains de-radicalisation in the UK context. This thesis thus makes an original contribution to knowledge by (1) being the first study to gather primary data on de-radicalisation in the UK; (2) offering an alternative concept of de-radicalisation; and (3) contributing to theories on the governmentality of radicalisation policies, focusing on the micro-politics of identity in neoliberal governance.
Acknowledgment

Doing a PhD can be a lonely and challenging task; I often found myself trying to stagger forth, tentatively and fumblingly, into what always seemed like a vast ocean of uncertainly. I would not have the strength, patience, and persistence to ride the vicissitudes of PhD research and finish my thesis without my loving and supportive family; and not without inspirational friends and interlocutors.

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I embarked on this intellectual journey in order to understand the changes that have occurred in my life and the world around me over the last fifteen years. The following PhD thesis is my humble attempt at doing so.
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Introduction

What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine. And like any extreme doctrine, it is subversive. At its furthest end it seeks to destroy nation-states to invent its own barbaric realm. And it often backs violence to achieve this aim – mostly violence against fellow Muslims – who don’t subscribe to its sick worldview. But you don’t have to support violence to subscribe to certain intolerant ideas which create a climate in which extremists can flourish. Ideas which are hostile to basic liberal values such as democracy, freedom and sexual equality…

(Prime Minister David Cameron ‘Extremism’ Speech, July 2015)

We need to now be less precious about the private space. This is not about us invading private thoughts, but acknowledging that it is in these private spaces where this [extremism] first germinates. The purpose of private-space intervention is to engage, explore, explain, educate or eradicate. Hate and extremism is not acceptable in our society, and if people cannot be educated, then hate and harmful extremism must be eradicated through all lawful means.

(Scotland Yard Commander, Mak Chishty May 2015)
Le Problematique: what is De-radicalisation?

Following the terrorist attacks on London in 2005, a key question has occupied British policymakers and public discourse: why do some young British Muslims legitimise, and in some cases, adopt violence against the state? How do young British Muslim become radicalised? Governments and policymakers in Europe invested a lot of financial, political, and emotional capital into the discursive production of radicalisation in order to answer the question, as well into a policy designed to ‘prevent’ radicalisation. The UK government responded to the challenges of violent radicalisation through its counter-terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) (HO 2006; 2009; 2011). In its efforts to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of British Muslims in the struggle against violent radicalisation, the strategy focused on preventing the long-term causes of radicalisation through the PREVENT strand of CONTEST. CONTEST was launched in 2003 and became public in late 2006 (HC 2010, 7). CONTEST comprises of four ‘P’s’ (HO 2011): (1) ‘Prevent’: preventing people from being drawn into extremism; (2) ‘Pursue’: pursuing those who become involved in planning; (3) ‘Protect’: protecting critical national infrastructure to reduce vulnerabilities and populations; (4) ‘Prepare’: preparing to manage the consequences of attack.

However, since 2011 PREVENT has readjusted the focus of counter-terrorism initiatives towards something called ‘de-radicalisation’ (HO 2011, 56). Indeed ‘de-radicalisation’ has become somewhat of a buzzword amongst policymakers. In September 2014, UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced that British jihadists returning from Iraq and Syria would be forced to attend de-radicalisation programmes to ‘reverse their warped brainwashing’ (Whitehead 2014). In the
aftermath of the Paris attacks in January 2015, Cameron also championed the
development of de-radicalisation in his discussion with Barak Obama at the White
House. They discussed moving towards tackling hard-line ideologies, with American
and British officials devising plans that ‘will focus on ways of working with Muslim
communities to challenge extremist thought and designing deradicalisation
programmes’ (Morris 2015). Elite policy-makers have thus conceived de-
radicalisation as a vital instrument of counterterrorism in the fight against violent
radicalisation.

Meanwhile, since receiving Royal Assent in February 2015, the Counter-Terrorism
and Security Bill has enshrined de-radicalisation in statutory law, thereby ensuring it
now plays a pivotal role in the management of public spaces and the regulation of
public conduct. The Act made Channel— the UK’s voluntary de-radicalisation
programme for people ‘at risk’ of radicalisation – a legal requirement for public
bodies so that it is delivered consistently across the country (CTSA 2015). Schools,
universities, NHS trusts, nurseries and local councils are compelled to identity
‘vulnerable’ and ‘at-risk’ individuals and report them to Channel. In time this
inevitably will lead to greater investment of resources, whether financial capital or
man power. Making de-radicalisation a legal requirement has not only expanded its
operation and reach nationally, but has also further ensconced it institutionally into
structures of governance in the UK.

As an instrument of counter-terrorism, de-radicalisation is supposed to provide the
police and policymakers with a more selective, targeted, and structured approach to
tackling the threat of terrorism. It is also supposed to do away with the blanket and
problematic approach characterising PREVENT initiatives between 2006 and 2010
(See chapter 6, section 1). However, in contrast to counter-part programmes in the
Middle East (M.E.) and Southeast Asia (S.E.A)\(^1\), de-radicalisation in the UK is distinguished by several key features: (1) it is aimed at ‘vulnerable’ youths who have not committed a crime but are deemed ‘extremist’; (2) interventions primarily take place outside of prisons; (3) interventions require the involvement of civil society and public institutions in identifying radicalisation; (4) it targets youngsters; and (5) it focuses on the primacy of ‘Weltanschauung’ or worldview in behaviour explanations of radicalisation, consequently valorising counter-ideological approaches in interventions.

And yet despite the growing prevalence of de-radicalisation in UK counter-terrorism policy, little continue to be known about these programmes and about what de-radicalisation as a concept actually means. Questions about de-radicalisation have also remained underexplored: is it possible to reverse years of cultural, religious, educational, and political conditioning? Can somebody’s ‘worldview change’ change through debate and discussion? Is it possible to dissuade people from supporting or adopting violence? Does changing a person’s behaviour depend on changing their views? How do we prevent people from committing terrorism? Is de-radicalisation really a norm free tool of governance, a means to ‘protect the vulnerable’, secure a healthy identity for individuals, and a way to ensure that youngster are diverted from radicalisation? As an area of academic study therefore, de-radicalisation remains unchartered terrain.

Notwithstanding the absence of knowledge on de-radicalisation and its novelty as a counter-terrorism initiative in the UK, the PREVENT strategy presents a number of challenging problems. First, there appears to be confusion regarding the underlying

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\(^1\) Those programmes are primarily (1) based in prisons; (2) target convicted criminals, militants, and terrorists; and (3) aimed at collective groups (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009; ICSR 2010).
purpose of de-radicalisation. On the one hand de-radicalisation generally posits as a rehabilitative model targeted at individuals who have already crossed the line and pose a threat. It is thus underscored by the notion that ‘we are going to make you good and/or better’. On the other hand de-radicalisation sits within PREVENT, whose underlying logic is ‘prevention is better than cure’ and suggests that ‘we are here to stop you from becoming bad’. The logic of ‘cure’, to use the medical vocabulary of this policy domain, has been intertwined with that of ‘prevention’; one is an act of reversal, the other pre-emptive.

A second problem is the wide ambit of concern governing de-radicalisation interventions. For example, the PREVENT strategy exhibits a preoccupation with a future orientated temporality; something could happen in the future, which in conjunction with the immanency of the threat justifies corrective interventions in the present. This logic operates outside of juridical spaces: since those deemed ‘extremist’ and ‘radical’ have not committed a crime, have not even breached the law, the future oriented logic underpinning de-radicalisation shifts attention way to from the juridical realm and towards another sphere altogether; and it is in this space of the non-juridical, one geared towards shepherding the ‘Weltanschauung’ of British Muslim youngsters, that the terrain of PREVENT strategy and de-radicalisation intervention takes place. In other words, it targets individuals who have not even committed a crime but who merely harbour certain ideas deemed as ‘extremist’.

As a result, the third problem relates to the disjuncture between what policymakers say de-radicalisation is about on the one hand, e.g. ‘preventing radicalisation’, and what it seems to be doing on the other, e.g. policing thought crimes. It effectively moves the objective of policy-makers towards other concerns beyond only reducing the potentiality of violence: particular ideas, behaviours, and practices in the
temporality of the present become problematic. Religious, political, and dissenting ideas and behaviour of religious and racial others therefore acquire greater significance, becoming objects of apprehension and existential concern, some of which has been reflected in public debates on multiculturalism, identity, and immigration, amongst other issues, in a way that transcends the narrow scope of counterterrorism.

Finally, the most surprisingly problem presented by de-radicalisation in the UK is the fact that there is not a single conceptual, theoretical, and empirical study on de-radicalisation in the UK (corroborated in chapter 2). The scant literature on de-radicalisation brings to light the fact that de-radicalisation as a policy rests not only on insubstantial evidence but underscores how little we continue to know about the precise details of the process of de-radicalisation, the profile of individuals undergoing interventions, and the success rate of de-radicalisation interventions. Even though de-radicalisation has become a centralised programme sanctioned by statutory law, there remains a marked absence of robust conceptual framework underpinning de-radicalisation interventions, not to mention an evidence-based approach to policy development.

The Challenges of Investigating De-radicalisation

When it comes to de-radicalisation we have seen the deep disjuncture that exists between the popular uses of the term, the way the concept is formulated, the actual programme on the ground, the process of de-radicalisation itself, and then what we know of it in the literature. Linked to this is the striking absence of an attempt to analyse and codify the rules, operations, concepts, and theories of de-radicalisation.
In other words, the emergence of de-radicalisation occurred without an invested concern for ontology. As a concept tied to policy objectives, de-radicalisation was conceived as a policy strategy (fight terrorism, reverse radicalism, and reduce the risk of re-offending), before it was conceived as a concept. As a researcher endeavouring to study the phenomenon of de-radicalisation amidst such a fragmented and immature picture, where does one begin? How do we study it? And what are policies of de-radicalisation supposed to look like? It transpired very early on in the research process that if I was going to do any justice to my inquiry into de-radicalisation, some heavy-lifting would be required.

This thorny state of affairs was further exacerbated by the contested, ideological, and politicised discourse on radicalisation—a new and recent knowledge domain with its own considerable research and conceptual issues. And yet it became quickly evident that no study of de-radicalisation could be undertaken without comprehending and dissecting the discursive formation of radicalisation that preceded it. For de-radicalisation shares, prima facie, similar conceptual features with radicalisation; etymologically, the ‘de’ that prefixes the term ‘radicalisation’ connotes the relationship between both concepts. More importantly, the conceptual features associated with de-radicalisation—the importance of ideology, the causal relationship between thought and action, the significance of identity, and the fact it is conceived as a linear process affecting individuals—bear the ontological fingerprints of radicalisation. It is therefore ‘radicalisation’ that is dominant in ‘de-radicalisation’ because it constitutes the reference point upon which it acquires it signification, since de-radicalisation cannot exist outside an understanding of radicalisation. The suturing role played by radicalisation conceptually in counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation then begged a whole range of other questions: Why radicalisation and
not terrorism? What is radicalisation? Why did it not exist before? Why is radicalisation a new security challenge? What is the relationship between radicalisation and de-radicalisation?

Another challenge confronting the researcher of de-radicalisation is that it sits within the PREVENT strategy, which is regarded as a controversial government policy. Amongst a whole panoply of other issues associated with PREVENT, it was officially acknowledged by parliamentarians, practitioners, academics and civil society organisations to have been a muddled policy that focused its activities on intelligence gathering and counter-subversion rather than countering violent radicalisation; wastefully expended public money on irrelevant community projects, and fostered divisions within Muslim communities, promoted envy between Muslim communities and other communities, and severing the trust between government and Muslim communities. This emotionally laden policy area presses itself upon any attempt to conduct a robust, independent, and interest-free investigation. Not to mention the difficulty of securing fieldwork interviews with practitioners and stakeholders in a low-trust policy domain that is characterised by as much mistrust and suspicion that exists in Prevent.

That de-radicalisation is a PREVENT initiative also makes research challenging given that it is a dynamic and constantly evolving strategy. In a space of six years, for example, we have seen three iterations of PREVENT, all of which have been accompanied by substantial changes in its approach, where the flow of resources go, changing terminology, and the altering profile of practitioners who are ‘in’- vis-à-vis those who are ‘out’. We often forget that PREVENT belongs to an important and
bustling policy area that has to be responsive to political events and the influx of the latest research, both of which have demonstrably been integrated into the PREVENT documents more than once during its lifespan since 2006. This rapidly shifting policy domain, accompanied by a lexicographic field resembling the game of musical-chairs, and supported by a hyper research area moulded by contributions from various disciplines on a one time basis, presented an external form of pressure to perpetually remain on top of developments in relation to de-radicalisation.

The last problem PREVENT threw at me was that de-radicalisation is administered by the Police. Although Channel is public facing, it is nonetheless a highly confidential programme that precludes access to interventions, the name of mentors, and the profile of individuals undergoing de-radicalisation. Conducting ethno-graphic fieldwork to observe de-radicalisation in real-time, interview radicalised subject to ascertain the phenomenological experience of being ‘de-radicalised’, or interviewing mentors to acquire the ‘ins and outs’ of de-radicalisation was consequently not a feasible option for me.

So, provoked as I was by the questions highlighted in the previous section and motivated to resolve the barriers mentioned above, my research examines the ontological framework of de-radicalisation using the case study method. It does this by conducting qualitative interviews with experts and practitioners of de-radicalisation and PREVENT. The rationale behind this approach was that primary data would ground my investigation and therefore enable me to deal with substance over mere conjecture, and new data over canned material. Speaking to experts with years of experience and intimate knowledge of the field behind them would also
enhance the credibility of my findings. Furthermore, speaking to a wide range of experts hailing from a plethora of diverse organisations, positions, interests, political affiliations, at different levels of the policy-making process would allow me to tease out multiple interpretations in a way that goes against the conventional grain in this area, dominated as it is by binary perspectives (e.g. ‘moderates’ vs ‘extremists’). This would augment the usefulness, validity, and purchase of my research data. My focus on ontology therefore is an attempt to say something substantial about de-radicalisation, in a way that is neglected in the literature and marginalised by policymakers.

I also decided to investigate de-radicalisation with an open mind to embracing various perspectives. What had started off as a data driven and conceptual study of de-radicalisation with a focus on policy and with a firm grounding in methodology within the disciplines of politics and international relations broadly, also quickly morphed into a theoretical thesis that drew inspiration from the disciplines of philosophy, history, sociology, anthropology, and Islamic Studies. Although being immersed in the literature of several disciplines proved to be an immensely enriching experience, it was in reality borne out of sheer necessity. It was the only way that I could overcome many of the intellectual cul-de-sacs characterising the field of counter-terrorism and the study of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. The conceptual tools of traditional international relations and political theory in some instances were not particularly helpful. For example, both disciples have little ability to examine ‘religion’, besides being seen as a form of ideology, like false consciousness, or dated value system within modernisation theory. Hence I dipped into sociology, anthropology, Islamic studies, and philosophy in order to understand
the role of religion within the wider discussion surrounding radicalisation. As a result, the following book is replete with multi-disciplinary references and is driven by a heterodox spirit.

At this juncture is it vital to say something about my use of this strange term ‘ontology’. In the case of de-radicalisation, I use the word in two ways. In the first instance, I use it in the sense of getting to the bottom of what gives something its thingness. What is this thing that we are talking about? What, also, makes the thing we are talking about, namely de-radicalisation, de-radicalisation? What has to be present for de-radicalisation to be de-radicalisation? What does it comprise of? What is it that I am studying? Ontology is the most fundamental question because it starts with the basics. Before we can talk about solutions to tackling radicalisation (why) and the process we go about doing this (how), we need to know what it is that we are proposing as the solution. My concern for ontology means I am interested in the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation.

The second use of ‘ontology’ aligns with the use of post-structuralist ontology inspired by the likes of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler. We can make sense of post-structuralist ontologies in contradistinction to both Realist and Constructivist conception of ontology. Material ontology states what counts for something is its material existence. Interests are pre-given and fixed. According to this concept, de-radicalisation exists in the real world with fixed properties that are universally true from which we can generate universal laws about its nature, which accurately coincide with the term and concept we designate for it. In contrast, the Constructivist position, which takes its cue from idealist thinking, posits that reality is
constructed primarily by ideas. It is this immaterial conception of reality that led International Relations Constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt (1999) to claim that the world is made up of ideas ‘all the way down’. This position is primarily an ideational and linguistic one that would claim that the reality of de-radicalisation is constructed through language, culture, and identity.

For post-structuralism however, the material is not eviscerated. The material world does exist but only acquires intelligibility and meaning through discourse. Discourse here is not just language but a framework of significations that shapes and constrains the way that people think and behave. The meaning of something only occurs in relation to a whole range of references, say the way that a hammer only makes sense in relation to nails, wood, carpenter, houses, and other things too otherwise it would be rendered an incomprehensible and useless metal object. Also, the way the hammer is discursively framed determines whether I see it as equipment used in carpentry or a weapon deployed to hit an aggressor with. With respect to de-radicalisation post-structuralist ontology would agree that de-radicalisation exists in the real world but that the way it is framed, understood, and disseminated is mediated through discourse and representation. Hence I attempt to ascertain a better picture of de-radicalisation in the UK context by finding out how it has been discursively framed and whether a coherent portrait of it emerges that would allow us to describe how it operates in the real world.

This discursive framing however does not occur in a vacuum but is shaped by history and politics, coalescing in a certain form for a particular purpose. Specifically, it is in this sense that Foucauldian ontology is considered radical because it contends that
reality as we know it is the result of social practices and struggles over truth and objectivity- what he calls ‘truth-games’- effectively exposing the constitutive role of power in shaping reality. This forms the philosophical background underpinning my argument in this book. Chapter 4 elaborates in greater detail Foucault's ontology and how it informs the theoretical structures of chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis to analyse my fieldwork data. As a result of employing a post-structuralist ontology, a crucial output of this book will therefore be a more contextualised understanding of de-radicalisation.

Indeed one of the glaring failures of the literature on de-radicalisation is the ahistorical approach to understanding programmes, as well an overall neglect of the social-political context that allows such a phenomenon to emerge. Much of the discussion does not move beyond the domain of counter-terrorism. And yet the multifaceted challenges surrounding de-radicalisation contradict this narrow debate. The study of terrorism must involve analysing the discourses that give the term meaning in conjunction with the social and political institutions that produce and disseminate them, as well as the wider context that make such discourse possible, not least endow them with traction. Inspired by post-structuralist ontology, I argue that what de-radicalisation is and what it means cannot be separated from the historical and political context in which de-radicalisation is being discussed. In fact the idea and practice of de-radicalisation impinges on multiple policy areas and issues, attested, as you will see, in chapter 1.

Notably however my ontological investigation primarily focuses on the concept and understanding of de-radicalisation. The data elucidates how practitioners, who are involved with, work in, or are familiar with the way de-radicalisation operates in
Prevent, view and understand de-radicalisation. Recapitulating my argument in previous paragraphs, de-radicalisation does exist in the real world. It just exists meaningfully in the world in different ways, shaped by how it is framed discursively, and how it relates to the historical and political context in which it is discussed.

However, my investigation will attempt to provide a concept and theory for making sense of the practices of de-radicalisation. The coordinated activities directed towards tackling the risk (distinct from threat) of radicalisation and extremism in the UK, pushed by government, and affecting all society is an evolving and constantly transforming practice. The alternative concept I propose to conceptualise de-radicalisation in chapter 4 can be applied to describe the practice of de-radicalisation in the UK. This is because the concept and theory I outline employs a Foucauldian Interpretive Analytics, which presents an analytically strong framework for studying the human world; it encompasses the interconnected relationship between discourse (knowledge/power), disciplinary institutions (bodies), and subjectification (the identity of subjects). That these also sit within a theory of government makes such an analytical framework relevant and applicable to the concrete reality of our present day context. This investigation will therefore offer a more accurate and deeper way of describing the concept and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK.

Accordingly, this book is based upon PhD fieldwork conducted for eighteen months between December 2011 and May 2013, in which 27 Prevent and de-radicalisation practitioners were interviewed. The following also tries to answer a number of questions that arise from the above problematique of de-radicalisation:

- What is de-radicalisation?
- What is the purpose of de-radicalisation interventions?
• Why are policymakers concerned with what young Muslims are thinking?
• What does the hitherto non-juridical location of intervention says about the policy?
• How can de-radicalisation interventions be justified in the absence of empirical evidence about the process of de-radicalisation?
• Why has no substantial academic work on the subject been undertaken?

Notwithstanding such objectives, it must also be explicitly mentioned that it is not the purpose of this research to investigate how de-radicalisation occurs in a positivist way and neither does it attempt to offer an explanation of the best way to de-radicalise radicalised subjects. This investigation is not, in other words, concerned with the question of process or with any normative proposal for how interventions should be done or improved. Those questions fall outside the scope of the thesis.

**Why De-radicalisation is Important**

By gathering primary data and thinking rigorously through de-radicalisation conceptually, this thesis attempts to arrive at a more meaningful analytical framework that moves beyond the sensational headlines, the politicised discourse, and the contentious claims made by commentators on the topic. Invoking the post-structuralist normative spirit, this thesis seeks to disrupt the dominant binaries characterising the discourse and implementation of de-radicalisation, e.g. Islamism vs. British values, vulnerable vs. radical, integrated vs. violent, moderate vs. extremism, cognitive vs. behaviour, etc. The dominant securitisation topos and with its positivist episteme that determines the way we think about de-radicalisation has
marginalised other crucial ways of examining it. It has relegated and closed off a world of nuance, layers, and multiplicity. The following book is interested in opening up alternative spaces of thought and analysis, one that will prove significant to policymakers, academics, everyday citizens, not least citizens of the Muslim religion.

Consequently, given the priority invested in tackling radicalisation and terrorism in the UK, the findings of this investigation will be of great relevance to policymakers.\(^2\) Now that the Channel programme is expanding, de-radicalisation is likely to play a greater role in counter-terrorism and in the management of public spaces against extremism. This has not hitherto been helped by the existing limitations of the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation, which is currently mired in confusion. Moreover, the question of de-radicalisation touches upon some of the biggest, if not most pressing concerns of our age: security, identity, and religion. Yet without such an understanding on de-radicalisation, we are left with inadequate analysis that creates the condition for ill-informed policy decisions.

This research is also pertinent academically. De-radicalisation offers an account of human behaviour.\(^3\) For example, as a concept, de-radicalisation is premised on the notion that behavioural transformation can occur through thought reform and that agency resides in ‘cognitive change’. De-radicalisation claims to be able to make

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2 One of the most influential think-tanks working in this field- the Quilliam Foundation- has acknowledged in a recent paper ‘In and Out of Extremism’ the conceptual challenges raised in one of my article’s on de-radicalisation (Quilliam 2015, 25), which proves the relevance of de-radicalisation to policymakers. Elsewhere the paper also states: ‘Analysing behaviour around deradicalisation is also extremely relevant for policy makers. It can indicate why people choose to adopt a particular ideology, or why they participate in high-risk activism. It also shows why people choose to deradicalise and break away from a particular ideology or organisation’ (14).

3 This point is illustrated in Quilliam’s recent paper: ‘By analysing extremists’ journeys in and out of extremism we are able to examine the emotional and cognitive behaviour which often underlines their commitment to a group or cause. All of this knowledge can be built into persuasive and realistic counter-extremism strategies which can prevent radicalisation and offer strategic support to those who have deradicalised’ (Quilliam 2015, 14).
radicalised subject renounce violence, as well as have individuals re-integrated back into the ‘mainstream’. Intellectually, it connotes the relationship between theory and action in terms of human behaviour, as well as the relationship between the individual and society. But as will become evident later, research on de-radicalisation has been ideologically driven, lacks methodological integrity, credible data, and depends on an over reliance on anecdotal evidence, and limited research design. The need for robust, independent, and fine-grained analysis has never been so pressing.

This research also provides very much needed insight for Muslims to understand a programme primarily targeting them. The production of discourses on radicalisation post 2004, the implementation of PREVENT since 2006, and the growing prominence of de-radicalisation has the Muslim population in sight. Amidst the flurry of media headlines, public debate, and implementation of policy initiatives, the agency and voice of Muslim subjects has been suppressed. More significantly, the Muslim population in the UK occupies a position in the social imaginary of the majority that can be described as the ‘infidel within’ (Ansari, 2004). The Muslim population of Britain are perceived, through the prism of an undifferentiated and conflated category of radicalisation, by policymakers, political elites, and the popular media to represent a political, social, and cultural problem to the nation-state. Put in other terms, elite policymakers are thus responding to the issues provoked by ‘the Muslim Question’.

In light of this top-down political pressure and wider cultural scrutiny on Muslims in Britain, de-radicalisation thus poses significant questions about identity, religion,
citizenship, and power-all of which profoundly impacts the lives of Muslims and every British citizen today, as well as in the future. It is crucial therefore that counterterrorism policy is expounded and that sound research is produced, disseminated, and shared for the purposes of public awareness. The future of the Muslim minority in European societies is poised between assimilation on the one hand and marginalisation on the other. This thesis should thus be seen as a humble yet necessary intervention in the debate about that future.

A Journey through the Thesis

The first chapter analyses the way Muslim identity was constructed as a problem over three decades in the UK. In particular, it discusses three critical themes that came together into a common localisation in the concept of ‘radicalisation’: security, identity, and religion. Indeed the intersectionality of these themes together constitutes, what has been called, the ‘new security challenge’. The aforementioned themes are then subsequently situated within the culturalisation of politics, in order to say something about the wider politics of de-radicalisation. Although chapter 1 reads like a literature review, it tries instead to identify the chief discursive and historical developments that allowed the idea and practice of de-radicalisation to emerge in UK counterterrorism at a particular period in history.

Chapter 2 examines the literature on de-radicalisation. This chapter is particularly interested in finding out what the term and concept means, what the process itself entails, and the evidence of de-radicalisation programmes. The aim is to find out the
lacuna in the literature, as well as to situate my investigation. This provides the background for the rest of the thesis, as well as enables me to place my research within the wider field. It will allow me to amplify the originality of my contribution to the research on de-radicalisation.

Chapter 3 attempts to answer the question of my investigation using fieldwork data. My aim is to find out what 27 practitioners working in the field of PREVENT and de-radicalisation think and believe de-radicalisation is. It tries to take the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation as a point of departure, and examine de-radicalisation ontologically in a more meaningful way than articulated in the literature and by policymakers. This chapter sets out my methodology, presents the data, and then analyses it. The new conceptual features that emerge from the data are examined and its implication for conceptual and policy development is assessed. I also evaluate the significance of my data as well as reflect on the research process itself. This chapter makes the case for the importance of my data in deepening our understanding of de-radicalisation and the fact that it represents the first case-study of de-radicalisation in the UK. It also empirically grounds the move towards an alternative framework of de-radicalisation.

Chapter 4 presents an alternative conception and theory of de-radicalisation. Drawing on the works of Foucault, I propose that de-radicalisation be understood through the concept of the ‘technologies of the self’, which is defined as that:

....which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and the
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.

(Foucault 1988a, 18)

Here the technologies of the self is explained and how it was modified in light of the empirical data gathered from my fieldwork. Other key concepts are addressed, like the ‘fourfold’ (the four step guide to ethical self formation), the self, and what is meant by ‘technologies’, as well as agency. The three technologies that constitute the technology of the self are: discursive (chapter 5), disciplinary (chapter 6), and confessional (chapter 7). The technology of the self is then situated within the theory of governmentality. The last section deals with the way that government shapes the subjectivity of citizens: deploying concepts like the ‘paradigm’, ‘central sphere’, ‘the political’, neo-‘liberalism’ and ‘normalisation’, I try to explain how the regulatory norm operates conceptually. Overall, this chapter lays the conceptual and theoretical background for understanding de-radicalisation as the technologies of the self.

Chapter 5 examines the role of discursive technology. Discursive technology is about the codification of knowledge through the claims of science and the formation of ‘regimes of truth’ that guide the way we think, talk, and understand something. This chapter highlights how ‘radicalisation’ as a discourse and concept constructed the problematisation of the Muslim population. It examines the use of narratives, the legitimisation of discourse by ‘experts’, the search for ‘root-causes’, and the politicised nature characterising the will to knowledge on ‘radicalisation’. More importantly, ‘radicalisation’ etches the discursive parameters that define the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation in the UK. It is through discursive technology
that the problematisation of Muslim identity was achieved for the purposes of corrective intervention.

Chapter 6 focuses on the Prevent strategy and the Channel programme through disciplinary technology. Disciplinary technology describes the way that knowledge systems, like radicalisation, are actualised and implemented in material domains, through social institutions, programmes of intervention, and by managerial experts. Disciplinary technologies seek behaviour modification and conformity amongst the population through the process of discipline and normalisation rather than through punishment. This chapter examines the PREVENT strategy and the Channel programme. It analyses what interviewees thought of the implementation of PREVENT, its effectiveness in tackling radicalisation, and the impact it had on PREVENT practitioners and Muslim communities. In terms of de-radicalisation, this chapter also shows how individuals who are deemed ‘vulnerable’ and ‘at risk’ of radicalisation are identified, the criterion used to judge individuals bound for interventions, and the normative framework guiding de-radicalisation. Through PREVENT, individuals, problematic populations, and the wider population are disciplined according to a norm.

Chapter 7 assesses the role of confessional technology. This chapter is significant because it explores the pastoral logic governing de-radicalisation interventions and the process of subjectification. Confessional technology is rooted in the idea that concern with the welfare and wellbeing of individuals in our culture represents a secularised version of the Christian penance. The confessional today, re-enacted through intervention programmes and embodied in the role of the expert, is about ‘salvation in this life’. This chapter argues that the pastoral logic was evident in two ways: firstly through the extraction of knowledge from community organisations and
think-tanks working on counter-radicalisation; and secondly by the transformation of individual Muslim subjectivity through programmes of intervention. The last two sections highlight the confessional dimensions of interventions: mentoring, the techniques of psychotherapy, the role of dialectic dialogue, and the notion of ‘redemption’, all of which culminate with the erasure of surfeit Muslim-ness and a transformed identity for the radicalised subject.

In the conclusion I summarise the salient issues and arguments made in this thesis. I contextualise the significance of conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technologies of the self, explicitly demonstrating the contribution my research has made to the study of de-radicalisation in the field of counter-terrorism, radicalisation studies, and political theory. I argue that this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in three ways: empirically, conceptually, and theoretically.
CHAPTER 1

Setting the Scene: Radicalisation as the ‘New Security Challenge’

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economical. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of Civilization will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

(Huntington 1993, 22)

A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seed to repeat it to us inexorably.

(Wittgenstein 1958, 45, Para 115)

This passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it is written that ‘animals are divided into (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) Sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies’. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.

(Foucault 2002, xvi)
Why has one of the proposed solutions by policymakers to some of the biggest security challenges of our age—the problem of transnational violence, the integration of problematic minority into the nation, and the ubiquitous yet ambiguous spectre of ‘extremism’—been conceived in terms of ‘support’ interventions aimed at youngsters who have not committed a crime, but who express ‘extremist’ views? If Islamist inspired terrorism represents a security threat, even an existentialist threat to Britain, why has analysis of radicalisation primarily focused on identity issues and theological interpretation and not about politics, foreign policy, social-economics matters, and notions of justice? Why has the radicalisation of Muslims in Britain been conceived in terms of a problem of culture and individuals? Such questions occasion a more detailed discussion of the areas that have not only shaped the idea and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK but which also represent the main issues and challenges confronting the nation-state, international and domestic politics, and society in the last three decades.

In the quote above, Foucault invites us to consider the wider discursive structures—what he calls ‘episteme’—that shape what is being said and done in a particular epoch rather than merely attributing it to the zeitgeist produced by authors or thinkers, or individuals in general. Taking my cue from Foucault’s ‘episteme’, the premise of the following chapter rests on the idea that the way things are ordered and made intelligible is structured by a paradigm that governs mainstream thinking and practices. Following this logic, I claim that our understanding of de-radicalisation, in the UK context at least, emanates from the discourses on radicalisation. In other words, it is our conception of radicalisation which will allow us to arrive at a clearer understanding of how de-radicalisation came to acquire certain characteristics.
Consequently, this chapter aims to (1) provide a discursive account of the major ideas and debates that lead to our current understanding of radicalisation; and (b) situate de-radicalisation genealogically within the historical and political context in which it emerges.

The next section highlights the new security paradigm that has impacted security thinking since 7/7. Section 1.2 discusses the integration agenda and the problematisation of identity. Section 1.3 attempts to situate the debate on religion and its role in the public sphere sociologically and historically within the secularisation thesis. The last section discusses the politics of de-radicalisation, positioning de-radicalisation within the framework of the culturalisation of politics. This chapter is about the construction of problematic Muslim identity and accompanying discursive developments that allowed the idea and practice of de-radicalisation to emerge.

1.1 The New Security Paradigm: Pre-emptive Risk and Radicalisation

The first major theme that is crucial to understanding the ‘new security challenge’ confronting Britain since 2005 is the concept and practice of ‘security’. How did the domestic radicalisation of British Muslims, alongside the ubiquitous spectre of ‘extremism’, come to occupy such a menacing presence in security thinking and in the national imaginary? What, in simple terms, constitutes a severe security threat?
The concept of security is ‘paradoxical and complex’ (Jarvis and Holland 2015, 2). It denotes a desirable goal that actors such as states, communities and individuals want to achieve. At the same time ‘security’ makes us less safe and is capable of terrible acts- destruction, violence, incursions into civil liberties, and huge opportunity costs (2-3). For Jarvis and Holland the complexity of security is borne out by the fact that it is not immediately obvious to whom or what we are referring when we think about, discuss, or seek to achieve security’ (3). Conventionally, the concept of security is concerned with how states interact with one another. By the 1990’s the logic of deterrence and ‘mutually assured destruction’ that governed security thinking during the Cold War period gave way to ‘new wars’, ‘Responsibility to Protect’, and humanitarian intervention. The referent object of security therefore expanded to include non-state actors, like individuals and communities, and wider issues besides national security, like the environment, food, and poverty (Booth 1991).

An important starting point for identifying the establishment of a new security paradigm was the 9-11 attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001. The American administration responded with the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWT). Analogous to its counterpart nomenclature that preceded it (i.e. the ‘Cold War’), which structured the mainstream security dynamics of inter-state politics for decades, the GWT has become the international policy narrative describing and legitimising the security practices of nation-states post 2001. The GWT narrative essentially conceives the world as its stage and postulates the existence of a ubiquitous, evil and omnipotent enemy. In the words of Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, the GWT ‘sets out states as protecting individuals from non-state actors known as terrorists in a battle for security’ (2014, 76).
Under the pretext of conducting the GWT, the US and Britain have gone to war in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), and have consistently intervened in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan through the use of drone attacks; it has also legitimised the expansion of greater surveillance techniques, the securitisation of boarder control, the rolling out of new technologies for the regulation of the population, extraordinary rendition flights, expansive and penetrating domestic counter-terrorism policies, the suspension of habeas corpus, and has been associated with the controversial images of the Guantanamo Bay concentration camp, as well as torture centres like Abu Graib in Iraq. Besides legitimising the globalisation of violence and the expansion of the machinery of War globally (Reid 2006), the GWT effectively rendered all domains (education, health, charity, etc.)- even the banal and the mundane, such as carrying toiletries with you whilst passing through an airport- has become subjugated to the politics and logic of securitisation.

Key to understanding the political reality of unrestricted conflict, the flouting of domestic law, the expanding power of nation state sovereignty, and the extensive infrastructure accompanying the ‘War on Terror’, is the idiom of the ‘state of exception’. The works on the ‘state of exception’ (Schmitt 1985; Agamben 2005; Butler 2006; Husymans 2008) asks questions about the limits of law, when exceptional practices are justified, and the general problem of limits (Huysmans 2008, 167). Limited by space to address this debate, we refer here only to the progenitor of the idiom of the exception- Carl Schmitt. In Political Theology, Schmitt defined the sovereign as ‘he who decides on the exception,’ (Schmitt 1985, 5). For Schmitt the state of the exception determines the authority and place of sovereignty, compelling the ‘decision’ to appear in its absolute purity. Politics for Schmitt is
predicated on the decision of the sovereign against the norm or rule. Given that unpredictability of the emergency scenario, it is futile for legal positivism, or the norm to establish what can be done beforehand. Schmitt also believed that the exception was more important than the norm, for the exception defines the norms (15). Notably, Schmitt emphasised that the exception is by definition exceptional and cannot be transferred into a permanent state. For Benoist (2013), Reid (2006), and Agamben (2005) however, the ‘War on Terror’ made the exception a permanent state of affairs.

The politics of ‘state of the exception’ is justified on the grounds of averting a crisis, catastrophe, and an exceptional circumstance. Such a logic was encapsulated in Donald Rumsfeld’s famous ‘unknown unknowns’ speech (Rumsfeld 2002), as well as Tony Blair’s proclamation in the aftermath of the London bombings that the ‘rules of the game had changed’ (Blair 2005). Importantly, the ‘state of the exception’ helped established the condition for a particular form of governance centred on pre-emptive policies. For Massumi (2007), ‘preemption is not prevention’: ‘Prevention operates in an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function of a lack of information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect’ (ibid). He continues: ‘Prevention has no proper object, no operational sphere of its own, and no proprietary logic. It is derivative. It is a means toward a given end.’ In other words, prevention presumes the objective existence of something before intervention and only makes sense within the domains of different policy domains (economics, health, etc.).
Pre-emption however operates according to a different logic. Whilst prevention and pre-emption strategies are both concerned with risk, it is the ‘uncertainty’ of the future which distinguishes them apart. ‘Risk’ is used to indicate the possibility of danger or harm and is constituted by three major properties: probability, uncertainty and futurity (Mythen and Walklate 2006, 381). Massumi (2005) argues that the uncertainty of the future shifts the rationale for decision-making from what is known, quantified and understood to the realm of the imagination, catastrophe, and the worst case scenarios. This risk-governed rationale differs therefore from the logic of other political decision-making such as prevention or rational calculation in the way it acts on the basis of uncertainty and probability. It does not matter whether the spectre of the catastrophe actually occurs, but it is instead sufficient for the potentiality to exist in order to justify pre-emptive action. This is how ‘uncertainty’ becomes tied up with ‘futurity’. According to Massumi therefore, the emerging aim of security governance is to police the future by anticipation so as to bring about a ‘future perfect’ liberated from the ominous spectre of always-imminent catastrophe (2005, 6). The conceptual lens through which the idea of security is understood has thus been temporalized, with an imagined fear of the future providing justification for sovereign action under the pretext of security, thereby rendering the present as the site of intervention.

It is this pre-emptive logic that has provided the intellectual and ‘scientific’ justification for policies of community intervention and counter-terrorism. The discourse on ‘new terrorism’ is a case in point. ‘New Terrorism’ is associated with academics like Walter Laqueur (1999), Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005), and Peter
Neumann (2009). The concept of ‘new terrorism’ argued that Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism witnessed in the attacks of 9-11, Madrid, and the London bombings were qualitatively different to previous patterns of violence in four main ways (ESRC 2007; Jackson et al. 2011, 165). First, unlike old terrorism like the IRA or ETA which focused its operations within territorial boundaries, new terrorism was transnational and operated across borders. Second, organisationally new terrorism was horizontal in structure and based on loose networks, whereas old terrorism was hierarchical. Third, in terms of personnel new terrorism comprised of amateurs, whilst old terrorist were more professional. Lastly, new terrorism was driven by ideology based on religious fanaticism divorced from political goals, whereas again old terrorism, epitomised by groups like the Red Brigade and Baader Meinhoff, is presented as being motivated by clear political objective.

The discourse on ‘new terrorism’ was influential in shifting the conceptual boundaries of what constituted an existential threat, as well as being linked to the legitimisation of counter-terrorism policy. Basia Spalek (2011) traced the impact of the ‘new terrorism’ discourse on many fronts: Muslims distrusting the government, increased counter-terrorism powers, creation of suspect communities, human rights abuse, Muslims being viewed as fifth column, and the problematisation of Muslim identities (194-195). Similarly, Heath-Kelly (2013) also attributes the emphasis in the PREVENT strategy’s focus on religious ideas and vulnerability to the ‘new terrorism’ literature (399). Meanwhile, the London attacks in 2005 were explained in terms of the ‘new security challenge’ posed by ‘new terrorism’, now embodied by home-grown

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4 A number of scholars (Jackson, Jarvis; Gunning, Smyth 2011; Spalek 2011, Lambert 2011) are critical of the categorisations of ‘old’ and ‘new terrorism’. They argue that there are similarities between what was called old terrorism and new terrorism and believe that the validity of New Terrorism is hampered by its link to counter-terrorism policy.
terrorism (ESRC 2007). This led to the preoccupation in Britain with ‘preventing root-causes’ of terrorism, which was crouched in the concept ‘radicalisation’. It was due to the success of discourses like ‘new terrorism’, governed by the political imperative to manage the risk of existential threat emanating from it, that lay the groundwork for the emergence of radicalisation and preventive approaches to countering terrorism.

A melange of discourses aspiring to investigate and codify the ‘truth’ of radicalisation emerged post 2005, bringing a vast tapestry of knowledge domains, experts, institutions, and organisations into common localisation. Indeed one of the distinguishing features of the way that knowledge developed during this period, in conjunction with multiple other discourses, was the dominance of the natural sciences over the social science in the theories, language, tools, and methods deployed to construct a predictive and explanatory model of radicalisation. There was, for example, a preoccupation with ‘root-causes’, ‘process’, and the use of various ‘models’ said to explain and predict radicalisation (Moskalenko & McCauley 2008; 2010, Sageman 2008, Wiktorowicz 2005, Haqq Baker 2011). Despite their differences in emphasis and degree, all models nevertheless posited a causal relationship between thought and action within a linear process, which Muslims undergo on route to violent radicalisation. The production of discourse on radicalisation reached its zenith in 2010 (Richards 2011; Sedgwick 2010; Kundnani 2012), culminating in a body of knowledge with its own theories, models, experts, and concepts.

The by-product of the discourses on radicalisation was the creation of the ‘radicalisation’ process. The notion of radical had a plethora of meanings and contexts before 2005, such as progressive, left-wing, and outside the box thinking
(IRR 2012, 1) but became associated after this period with the religion of Islam, Islamist ideology, the ‘identity-crisis’ of second and third generation Muslim diasporas (Roy 2002; Sageman 2008, Wiktorowicz 2005), and the causal relationship between these factors and violence (Githens-Mazer 2010a, 10). In fact ‘radical’, ‘radicalism’, and ‘radicalisation’, went from being a state of mind and/or activity to becoming a state of being and a problem of the soul, or something internal to the radical.

Another effect of radicalisation discourses was that the ‘radical’ existed in a type of transcendental and eternal way, prefiguring their historical, social, and political context. The production of the radical rendered him a threat and danger irrespective of the existence of an actual threat/danger. The existence of the radical, through discursive production, enabled the possibility and potentiality of radicalisation and the perpetual perception of an immediate and imminent threat, divorced from the reality of attacks occurring by radicals (Heath-Kelly 2013, 407-408). Indeed radicalisation had been conceived within a particular framework and process- one which took at its starting point the paradigmatic law abiding citizen, and placed at the polar end of the spectrum the paradigmatic violent Muslim radical. The potentiality for violence by implication therefore resided within every British Citizen of Muslim faith.

Similarly to Wittgenstein’s quote at the beginning of this chapter about the ‘picture’ captivating Western thinking, the accounts of radicalisation have been built upon the threat of ‘ideology’. The dominant conceptions of radicalisation, which is embedded in PREVENT, posits that ideology leads to violence and that it is thus ideology that constitutes the main security threat. It is a formulation that holds that ideas and beliefs not only explain behaviour but can also predict it. And it is based on a
foundationalism that dichotomises the mind and body and reduces identity and religion to a list of propositions and statements. More importantly, it is a result of downloading the Islamist ideology, to use a software metaphor, that the perceived Muslim potentiality for violence is activated. This is why, like Wittgenstein’s picture, security thinking became captivated by ideology.

A corollary of the conceptualisation of radicalisation were a number of salient features that were deployed in the PREVENT strategy and which later constituted the assumptions of the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation. These were:

- **Radicalisation is a ‘process’ experienced by Individuals**: despite the acknowledged academic complexity, policy-makers conceived radicalisation as a ‘process’ and a type of ‘conveyor belt’ which constructed individuals as starting off as ‘integrated’ and non-radical, and due to mainly ideological influences, in response to an identity crisis, end up on a trajectory that results in violence. Despite the affirmed role of groups and movements in influencing radicalisation, it is nevertheless a ‘process’ that affects and ends with the individual.

- **Radicalisation is synonymous with violence**: radicalisation almost always means or implies violence. The line of radicalisation is placed between political activism and violence, rather than between apathy and political mobilisation. This consequently means that political mobilisation is viewed within a security lens and therefore potentially criminalises democratic
legitimate activism. It also implies violence being committed by its own citizens.

- **Radicalisation is associated with Islam and Muslims**: a particular conceptualisation of radicalisation took ascendency in popular use, one in which associated Islam and religion as a causal variable in the radicalisation process. Githens-Mazer critiques the dominant pejorative use of radicalisation in academia, the media, and amongst policy-makers that radicalisation is about the ‘implicit correlation between the “dangers of radical Islam” and violence’ (2010, 10).

- **Radicalisation is about the direct causal relationship between ideas and violence**: the concept and process of radicalisation presumed a direct relationship between ideas- particularly religious, theological, and political- and action (political mobilisation and especially committing acts violence). Consequently, given the influence afforded to ideas as a prime mover in the radicalisation process (since ideas lead directly to action), PREVENT prized count-ideology as a strategy and has led to an inordinate focus on what individuals are thinking rather than doing.

- **Radicalisation minimises the role of politics**: the concept of radicalisation excludes ascribing causative role or any significance to political actions taken by governments/State either domestically or internationally. Structural reasons like foreign policy, repression, war, etc. are acknowledged in some accounts (discussed as grievances real or ‘perceived’) but are mostly marginalised in
favour of psychological and theological explanations claimed to be the ‘root-causes’ of the radicalisation process. Analysis is primarily focused on the ‘identity crisis’ and ‘vulnerability’ of individuals and not wider structures.

However, ‘radicalisation’ was beset by a number of problems: epistemologically, methodologically, conceptually, and empirically. The concept suffered from a diversity of understandings (Sedgwick 2010, Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin 2012; Githens-Mazer 2010; 2012), espoused a linear narrative that explains radicalisation but not terrorism (Richards 2011, Kundnani 2012), stigmatises and criminalises Muslims (Githens-Mazer 2010; 2012, Lambert 2011, Kundnani 2009; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis 2015), and has proven practically inoperable (Heath-Kelly 2013; Githens-Mazer 2012). The instability of the radicalisation concept has led some to question its utility and purpose. For example, Richards (2011, 144) posed the poignant question: ‘If it is terrorism that we are concerned with, then where is the additional benefit of investigating radicalization as a process, over and above becoming a terrorist as a process?’ For Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin (2012, 3), radicalisation was the ‘symptom and cause of the state of hypersecurity’, in which it emerged as a ‘tangible and intangible threat’ feeding into the construction of discourses surrounding terrorism. Githens-Mazer also asks whether radicalisation is a made up ‘securitising’ label designed to ‘other’ Muslims and maintain a non-Muslim hegemonic status quo (2012, 10). And Heath-Kelly suggested that caution should be exercised with respects to the accuracy of the radicalisation concept to explain the actual process of radicalisation in the real world (2013, 397). Ultimately, the concept of radicalisation remains unstable and provokes the following question: why did policymakers invest so much in the concept?
A credible explanation is found in the social construction of risk. Ulrich Beck (2008) argues that risk is a feature of modernity, a ‘side effect’ of the advances made in modernity. These risks, defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities, which can be transformed into catastrophe, are seen as an objective reality of modernity, an externality impacting global societies. In response to the global risk thesis espoused by Beck, Awan, Hoskins, O'Loughlin rightly alert us to the pertinence of asking ‘how and why some processes or threats become understood as risk and some do not’ (Awan, Hoskins, and O'Loughlin 2012, 9). In the case of radicalisation, Gutkowski (2011) asks us to differentiate between the risk posed and threat posed by radical Islamism. Thus what is under consideration in the discourse production of radicalisation is not the threat of an imminent attack but several stages removed: the risk of radicalisation spreading among a population (347). It is explicitly risk and not threat that has preoccupied policy-makers.

Hence we turn here to Mary Douglass (1992). Douglass argues that risk is a modern approach to the way in which traditional communities and societies addressed threats to their cohesion and values. According to Douglass, risk is seen as a socially constructed phenomenon that reflects the norms and cultural values of a particular tribe, group, or society. Risk, in other words, is a cultural artefact. The role of socially constructed risk in the discourses of radicalisation is also noted by other scholars in the field. For example, Githens-Mazer (2012) emphasises the substantial gap between the reality of the security threat and perception of that threat. He reminds us that the actual threat of violence from Muslim communities in Europe is statistically negligible. There is ‘probabilistically higher dangers involved in driving too fast, drinking too much, not looking both ways when crossing the street, or falling
asleep with a cigarette in our hand’ (10). For Heath-Kelly (2013) radicalisation is viewed more in terms of ‘performativity’, in that it produces the effects it names’ (2013, 395). She argues that knowledge on radicalisation produces a possible counterfactual to terrorism by inventing a narrative about transitions to militancy, one that allows security mechanisms to perform interventions into the supposed production of terrorism (397). In other words, radicalisation is produced as a discourse in order to justify governmental interventions.

Summarising: the way security has been understood and practiced evolved in the years leading to and after 9-11. I argued that the ‘GWT’ and events like 7/7 created the conditions for the emergence of new security paradigm called ‘radicalisation’. Central to the development of radicalisation has been the entrenchment of pre-emptive logic in structures of governance and the implementation of policies. Such a logic has been aided by the rationale of the ‘state of the exception’, the severity of which is reinforced by the social construction of risk. The risk of Islamist radicalism has, at its heart, the narrative that Islamist ideology, coupled with the precariousness of Muslim identity (more below), can trigger the path toward violence. Security thinking has, in other words, been captivated by the risk posed by Islamist ideology. It is this contextual background that not merely impinges on other domains (e.g. identity and religion) but which creates the conditions of possibility for de-radicalisation to become a practice and idea of counter-terrorism
1.2 The Integration Agenda and the Politics of Belonging: the ‘death of multiculturalism’ and problematic Muslim identity

The second cluster of issues this thesis is concerned with is political, social, and categorical identity. Here political multiculturalism must be distinguished from social, as well as normative multiculturalism. The social multiculturalism denotes the fact that Britain today is a multicultural society (which is not the matter being discussed in public debate), whereas normative multiculturalism signifies the ideal of celebrating and promoting diversity and plurality. By contrast, Political multiculturalism refers to government strategies to manage difference (Modood 2005; Parekh 2006). Beginning with political identity: political multiculturalism in Britain developed in an ad hoc way. The arrival of migrants to the UK was a consequence of labour migration, the arrival of families to join migrant workers, as well as the arrival of political asylums. The initial model of integration, formulated by the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966, was based on the gradual socialisation of racial and ethnic groups from the Commonwealth countries into wider society. Integration was defined by Jenkins as ‘not a process of flattening out uniformity but of cultural diversity, couple with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Rex 1996, 236-7). Initially the integration of immigrants into Britain merely focused on providing immigrants with the language and employment skills in order to bolster their economic opportunities. The move towards political multiculturalism was developed through local government, particularly in the 1980’s by promoting the celebration of diversity in
schools and festivals, what Ali Alibihai-Brown called ‘sari, somosa, and steelband’ (2000,17), whilst nationally it was responsive to political and social events in the country.

However, a number of critical events over three decades have led many to question the viability of multiculturalism: the Brixton Riots (1981), the Rushdie Affair (1988), the Northern Riots (2001), Danish cartoons (2006), and the Charlie Hebdo attacks (2015). In particular, the Rushdie Affair revealed the beginning of the disorientation with multiculturalism and produced new fault lines. It led to the surprising lamentation by Roy Jenkins that ‘we might have been more cautious about allowing the creation in the 1950’s of a substantial Muslim community here’ (Parekh 2000, 301). This episode created a polarisation between the liberal elites and many British Muslims, in which the ‘cultural difference’ of Muslims became the subject of questions (Rai 2006; McRoy 2006; Brighton 2007, 7).

The Northern Riots were also particularly important because it brought to light the failure of multiculturalism as a model for managing multi-ethnic/religious communities in Britain. It also introduced, in the publication of the Cantle Report, the concept of ‘community cohesion’ and the notion that communities were living ‘parallel lives’ into the political lexicon (Cantle 2001, 9; Thomas 2007). The Cantle report identified the Asian communities for not being adequately integrated, recommending that a ‘greater sense of citizenship’, ‘common elements of nationhood’, and the use of the ‘English language’ would need to be forged by the ‘non-white community’ (10-13). These events culminated in arguments calling for the ‘death of multiculturalism’ articulated by political and media elites (Alibhai-Brown 2000).
Whilst the viability of political multiculturalism was questioned during these events, it was not until the attacks on London in 2005 that political multiculturalism became securitised. Multiculturalism was identified as one of the causes of radicalisation amongst British Muslims. It was blamed for creating segregated communities, undermining a cohesive national identity, and promoting a type of relativism with respect to values (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, and Ja’far 2007). The integration agenda, which confusingly encompasses concerns about immigration, the emergence of neo-nationalism, and the management of diversity (Sedgwick 2010; Coolsaet 2010), became integrated into the security agenda (the threat of Islamist ideology and home-grown terrorism) in the media, the discourse on radicalisation, and the PREVENT policy. Indeed David Cameron’s speech at Munich 2011 marked the success of this logic, further entrenching multiculturalism and political identity as a source of the security challenge (Cameron 2011).

In the democratic age, multiculturalism poses obstacles to coexistence because it concerns the divisive issue of the political identity of the state. Charles Taylor (2011) brings to light the paradox of liberal democracy: that despite being considered as the philosophy of inclusion (rule of the people, by the people, for the people), it also excludes certain citizens, minorities, and identities in its pursuit of a high degree of cohesion. Taylor shows how in the modern period the new collective agency of ‘the people’ was created and how popular sovereignty needs to have a personality (124-125). In order to remain viable, states seek to create a feeling of common belonging. The modern state has a political identity, defined as the generally accepted answer to the ‘what/whom for?’ question (128): ‘To form a state, in the democratic era, a
society is forced to undertake the difficult and never to be completed task of defining its collective identity’ (131). Political identity is crucial for the cohesiveness and integrity of the nation state.

There is thus a sort of dialectic between state and nation. It is not just that nations strive to become states; it is also that modern states, in order to survive, strive to create a national community. Indeed accounts by historians like Anderson (1982), Hobsbawm (1983), and Ernst Geller (1983) reveal the constructed nature of the nation, the development of the nation-state in line with the growth of capitalism, homogenisation of language, and the printing press. In the twentieth century, nationalism, an extension and feature of the nation state, has proved to be the most popular ideology, and most successful heir to religion (in terms of a unifying grand narrative) (Eagleton 2014). This is why, explains Taylor, that democratic states need a healthy degree of patriotism, a strong identification with the polity, and a willingness to give oneself for its sake. This explains why nation-states have focused on cultivating citizenship over a host of other poles of identity, like the family, class, gender, and religion. This may be promoted either through a direct assimilationist model like French republicanism, or fostered in more indirect ways, like British multiculturalism, which renders other modes, such as religion, outside the operation of public life (Taylor 2011, 90). It is in this way, that the task of defining political identity, a necessary feature of the nation-state, creates exclusions in democratic societies.

If we are to make sense of the cacophony of voices denouncing multiculturalism as a source of social and political tensions, then we must consider the ideas of political
liberalism. John Gray (2000) identifies two faces of liberalism—‘universalist’ and ‘modus vivendi’. This is also referred to by Bhiku Parekh as ‘proceduralist’ and ‘civic assimilationist’ (2006, 199). For Gray, ‘universalist’ liberalism is inhospitable to difference, insists on the uniform application of the rules defining rights and is suspicious of collective goals; whereas the second mode of liberalism is a project that seeks peaceful coexistence between different regimes and ways of life. British multiculturalism primarily belongs to the second liberal regime. However, the Muslims presence in the UK, as a result of ‘modus vivendi’ liberalism, is seen as hindering national and community unity. It is thus the task of ‘universalist’ liberalism to curb Muslim difference in order to ensure a common political identity is possible.

Indeed political elites in the UK have gestured a preference for ‘universalist’ liberalism, encapsulated by David Cameron’s ‘muscular liberalism’ and underlined by the promotion of ‘British values’ in public institutions and counter-terrorism policy. Part of the problem according to Charles Taylor is that ‘universalist’ liberalism cannot accommodate ‘what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is survival’ (Taylor 1994, 61). However, in the case of ‘liberal multiculturalism, tension arises when particular demands are met at the expense of a unified nation and when separate communities develop little attachment to the nation. A second source of tension arises when a disconnection occurs between the identity of nation (based on common ethnicity, language, and history) and the legal and political dimensions of citizenship.

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5 In his speech Prime Minister Cameron introduced the phrase of ‘muscular liberalism’: ‘Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism….’ (Cameron 2011)
It is with the second tension that the narrative about the failure of Muslims to integrate in the UK takes place. In contrast to the ‘death of multiculturalism’, this narrative confusingly conflates questions about immigration on the one hand with concerns about religion, ethnicity, and culture (all reductively merged), on the other hand. A stereotype developed post 9-11 in Europe that equated the ‘immigrant’ with Muslim, further entrenching the image of that Muslim as different and foreign outsider (Roy 2002). The second sub-narrative moved the focus beyond the limitations of citizenship and towards a different boundary of difference: culture. According to this argument, despite being citizens, Muslims are perceived as being culturally different and therefore cannot be accepted as part of the nation until their beliefs and practices are reformed.

This logic is reflected in the language of public discourse and PREVENT policy, exemplified by the array of perpetually shifting signifiers attributed to Muslims—between the binary ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ and ‘vulnerable’ and at-risk’, to ‘fundamentalist’, ‘violent radical’, and violent ‘extremist’, all of which are synonyms for surfeit Muslim difference. Such signifiers are also connected to the association of British Muslim communities with a wide range of social ills perceived by many to be disrupting community and national cohesion: the repression of women, the practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)\(^7\), homophobia, sex trafficking (Roberts and Hurst, the Mirror 2015)\(^8\), extremism in faith schools\(^9\), proliferating birth rates, and a

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\(^7\) PM David Cameron explicitly mentions the practice of FGM in relation to young British Muslim girls in his Extremism Speech in Birmingham 2015 (Cameron, 2015).

\(^8\) The Rochdale sex trafficking gang was a group of men who preyed on under-age teenage girls in Rochdale between 2005 and 2013. Twelve men were originally charged. Of the nine men convicted, eight were of British Pakistani origin and one was an Afghan asylum-seeker.

\(^9\) There were allegations concerning Birmingham schools arising from the ‘Trojan Horse’ letter sent to Birmingham City Council in November 2013. Operation ‘Trojan Horse’ refers to an organised attempt
drain on welfare resources, etc. The meaning produced is that Muslims are disrupting the cohesiveness of the British nation.

As mentioned above, the narrative about the failure of Muslims to ‘integrate’ had its origins in the Rushdie Affair. This episode in the history of British multiculturalism was a catalyst for the move away from the category of ‘Black’ to the category of ‘Muslim’ (Rai 2006; McRoy 2006; Brighton 2007). In fact throughout most of the post-war era, Muslims in Europe were defined primarily defined by race and ethnicity. The ascendancy and predominance of the ‘Muslim’ category in describing diverse immigrant and diaspora populations in Europe can be attributed to (1) European Integration in the 1990’s, which had to define itself against Islam in the making of a common European identity (Casanova 2012); (2) domestic efforts by the Labour government to promote and encourage the creation of a single body of Muslim representation in the 1990’s (Ansari 2004; Rai 2006; McRoy 2006) (3) the political and media response to 9-11 compressed Muslims into a monolithic category of the ‘Muslim community’, despite the vast ethnic and racial diversity, class disparity, and socio-cultural differences amongst Muslims; and (4) globalisation played a pivotal part in creating new spaces, lifestyles, and transnational networks for a global community of Muslims (‘Ummah’).

Although a complex topic to be addressed properly here, a couple of points on globalisation must nevertheless be made. The significance of globalisation stems from the challenges it poses to the nation-state in areas relating to the control of information, people, capital, goods, and the distribution of power. In terms of shaping by a number of associated individuals to introduce an Islamist or Salafist ethos into several schools in Birmingham (Clarke 2014).
Muslim categorical identity, globalisation allows ethnic diaspora’s in Europe to maintain strong social, cultural, and political relations with their countries of origin (Roy 2002; Rai 2006; McRoy 2006). It is also crucially able to make and unmake social and political realities, so that what happens in Palestine impacts London and where the political dynamics of Bangladesh influences the power struggles unfolding in Tower Hamlets (DEMOS 2006, 55). The narrative here argues that minorities have managed to hold on to older identities, as well as creating other newer identity synthesis, without developing affiliation and allegiance to the British mainstream political identity. Over the last thirty years a dominant perception emerged that minorities were increasingly identifying with a global Muslim identity. Paradoxically, however, many diasporic communities have adopted the ‘Muslim’ category, despite the top-down construction of the category and attempt to racialize Muslims by political and media elites. The result, according to Sayyid and Tyrer is that Muslim identity is problematised:

In turn, Muslims are frequently represented as an awkward presence, interrupting the closure of the nation because of an assumed lack of shared symbolic grounds between Muslims and the ‘host’ nation. The solution offered with increasing regularity takes the form of attempts to tame or erase the difference that is seen as tearing the nation apart.

(2012, 354)
Nevertheless, the dominant narrative about Muslim populations being problematic due to problems of identity made its way into accounts of radicalisation. For example, Olivier Roy (2002) treats Islamism as a cultural, social, and political phenomenon in which individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity in a hostile and confusing world. The adoption of a globalised transnational Islam by second and third generation Muslims is accompanied by the abandonment of the traditional culture of their parents. Oliver Roy explains this phenomenon in terms of ‘de-culturalisation’ (117-147). The cultural displacement experienced by the Muslim diaspora in Europe has thus been construed in terms of ‘identity crisis’; in other words, many young Muslims do not feel like they belong to Europe or their countries of origin. This leads them to appropriating ‘purer’ forms of religiosity which does away with cultural and national markers. This process is exacerbated by the ‘de-territorialisation’ of Islam (18), which became reconfigured through globalisation, and resulted in the formation of alternative identities, with loyalties beyond the state.

Furthermore, social movement theories also emphasise the importance of identity, meaning, and belonging in accounts of radicalisation, particularly articulated by Marc Sageman and Quinton Wiktorowicz. Their works have been influential, inspiring the radicalisation model used by the Intelligence Division at the New York Police Department and the FBI, as well as being directly linked to extensive surveillance of Muslim populations in America by the NYPD with the assistance of the CIA (Kundnani 2012). Wiktorowicz, who sits on the US Nation Security Council, was also largely responsible for drafting the counter-terrorism strategy for Obama’s administrations in 2011 to prevent violent extremism, which was inspired by the
experience of PREVENT in the UK.\textsuperscript{10} Both Sageman and Wiktorowicz formulated a model that combines psychological, theological, and factors in the analysis of radicalisation, known as the ‘bunch of guys’ theory. The theory is predicated on the notion that radicalisation is a phenomenon that happens amongst networks of friends.

Specifically, Sageman identifies four stages to this process: (1) moral outrage (2) enabling Interpretation (3) personal Experience and (4) mobilising Network. The first stage of moral outrage is in response to a perceived injustice; the second relates to the framing of political events within a narrative, e.g. there is a war against Islam (2008, 75-81); the third relates to personal experiences of discrimination, which is understood as a manifestation of the grievances afflicting Muslims globally (83); and finally the existence of a group of people who share their experience and grievance and who ‘can help them cross the line from venting their anger to becoming terrorists’ (84). According to this model, radicalisation begins with the individual who tries to understand the world through a particular narrative that pits them in identity camps, which is then internalised and reinforced by a social group. Crucial to stages (1) and (2) is identification with Islam and the Muslim ‘Ummah’ and the feeling of despair and outrage with regards to Muslim suffering in a plethora of conflicts globally, whilst (3) problematises the identity further, which is then recalibrated at stage (4). In order for stages (1) and (2) to occur there must be what Benedict Anderson (1983) calls ‘imagined communities’, or the emotional, imaginative, and intellectual investment of individuals into a collectively that is constructed. In other

\textsuperscript{10} In August 2011, the White House revealed its strategy for countering radicalisation, entitled ‘Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism’. Wiktorowicz has been described as the ‘chief architect’ of this strategy (Vidino and Hughes 2015, 18).
words, it is the affiliation of British Muslims with other Muslims globally problematizes Muslim identity for UK political and social elites.

Meanwhile, the narrative of problematic Muslim identity became embedded in PREVENT. This was poignantly demonstrated by the fact that the delivery of the PREVENT strategy until 2011 was delegated to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). It was unreservedly clear, and what later proved problematic, that British counter-terrorism was being executed through a Department of government responsible for delivering the Community Cohesion agenda. This, if anything, was testament to the fact that the logic of security and identity had intermeshed in the eyes of policymakers. But, as I have argued here, the intertwining of the integration and security agendas had its roots in the problematisation of identity in Britain as far back as the 1980’s.

Such arguments are made by security scholars like Shane Brighton and Heath-Kelly. Shane Brighton (2007) situates PREVENT within the historical development of domestic multiculturalism. Amidst the backdrop of the loss of a cohesive British identity, precipitated by the decline of empire, religious affiliation, and the shifting socio-cultural changes of the past decades, events like the Rushdie Affair and Northern riots were framed as ‘crisis’ by political elites (12-13). Brighton thus argues convincingly that PREVENT signified the reworking of political multiculturalism in the UK. Heath-Kelly (2013) also makes the connection between British Muslim communities being produced as the problematic ‘Other’ during events like the Rushdie Affair and the Northern Riots in 2001 and narratives linking Muslim communities to violent disorder, and its persistence as a discourse in PREVENT (Heath-Kelly 2013, 409). The fact that PREVENT anchors the problem of
radicalisation in the identity crisis of British Muslim and promotes ‘British values’ as a panacea further reinforces the argument that the problematisation of Muslims was shaped by discourse surrounding multiculturalism and integration.

I have argued in this section that the problem of the integration agenda has been articulated in terms of a failure of multiculturalism on the one hand and the inability of Muslim to ‘integrate’ on the other. It has also implicitly explained the move towards the category of ‘Muslim’ as an attempt by government to racialise and problematise Muslim identity in order to manage and curtail perceived excess, which is represented as threatening liberal democratic values, as well as disrupting the unity of the nation. This constructed narrative of problematic Muslim identity made its way in the conceptualisation of radicalisation and the implementation of PREVENT. Hence it is the attempt by government to reverse Muslim surfeit difference that paves the way for the emergence of de-radicalisation.

1.3 The Religious Other as Radical Alterity and the De-Privatisation of Religion: the ‘Muslim Question’ within the context of the Secular in Europe

The final set of issues impacting our understanding of what became problematic to policymakers relates to the role of religion in modern public life. The dominant theory that explains modernity and religion in the West has been the secularisation

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11 The category ‘religion’ is complex, for it either emphasises or excludes certain aspects of religion. Two broad approaches see religion as (1) functional and (2) Substantive. The functionalist perspective examines religion in terms of society’s needs, whereas the substantive perspective is concerned with the content of religion. There are also various interpretations on the role of religion (Marxists and Feminist) in human life, as well as existence of studies trying to determine the relationship between religion and society (religion as a conservative force, revolutionary, or progressive), the existence of a plethora of religious organisations and its relationship to the state and society, and the changing nature of religion in modernity (the emphasis on ‘faith’ and the individual), the impact of globalisation and religion as catalyst of globalisation (transnational groups and diaspora’s), and the emergence of ‘new age’ religions. (Haralambos & Holborn 2008, 394-457)
thesis. This scholarship is complex and cannot be rehearsed here.\textsuperscript{12} However, noteworthy is the fact that the secularisation thesis is both descriptive and normative (Asad 2003, 181). Descriptively, it states that as societies industrialise and modernise, religious belief declines. In terms of normativity it states that in order for ‘society to be modern it has to be secular and for it to be secular it has to relegate religion to non-political spaces’ (182). To avoid confusion, I draw on Casanova’s (1994) tripartite distinction of this thesis: (1) increasing structural differentiation of social spaces resulting in the separation of religion from politics, economy, science and so forth; (2) the privatisation of religion within its own sphere; and (3) the declining social significance of religious beliefs, commitments and institutions.

Casanova holds that (1) and (3) hold true whereas the same cannot be said of (2). We are witnessing what Casanova calls the ‘de-privatisation’ of religion the re-emergence of religion in the public space. Whilst Casanova considers the ‘de-privatisation’ of religion a global phenomenon, visible with the rise of Pentecostalism in South American, Evangelical Christianity in America, and Christianity in China, many commentators view the presence of Islam and Muslims in Europe as disrupting the narrative about secularisation and the decline of religion.

The role of the secular in European consciousness and history must be stressed. According to Casanova, the ‘secular’ nature of the modern European state and the ‘secular’ character of European democracy serve as one of the foundational myths of

\textsuperscript{12} The debate on the secularisation theory is complicated by different uses of definitions, concepts, empirical evidence, type (‘weak secularism’ like the UK vs. ‘strong’ secular states like France) and contexts (the theory does not apply in the same way to the Unites States, for example, which was established as a secular state, unlike European states, but which predominantly remains socially religious, in contrast to Europe where religious belief has declined). For more see Bruce (2002; 2011) Taylor (2007; 2011); Casanova (1994; 2006; 2008); and Talal Asad (2003).
contemporary European identity (Casanova 2008, 109). For Charles Taylor, the Modern West’s normative order was established from the seventeenth century onwards as it moved away from ‘cosmic-religious’ order to a new ‘bottom up view of society’, which stresses (1) the rights and liberties of its members, (2) the equality among them, and (3) the principle that rule is based on consent (Taylor 2011, 318). What Taylor therefore describes as the ‘modern moral order’ (intermeshed with Enlightenment ideals, particularly liberal ideas and values), political identity, democracy, and the modern nation state is associated with European history of secularisation.

To reiterate, modernity, at one point synonymous with the West, was associated with the decline of religion and being modern entailed moving beyond religion. Indeed for Asad secularism is not merely about the confinement of religious belief and practice to a private space where its threat to political stability and the ‘liberties of free-thinking citizens’ is mitigated, but rather builds a particular conception of the world and the problems generated by that world’ (2003, 191-192). In a sense, Asad teases out the analogy between secularism, the nation-state, and nationalism and the way religion operates, indirectly and paradoxically showing the ‘religious’ nature of the secular in Europe (191-195).

The presence of Muslims in European societies amidst wider security challenges since 9-11, continual immigration, and rampant globalisation has been interpreted by European societies as not only a social challenge but as a threat to its secular shibboleths, not least paradoxically its Christian heritage. This is provoked by the
growing visibility of religious symbols like the veil, the growing presence of Muslims in urban cities, and the political mobilisation of Muslims over issues regarding free speech and foreign policy. This tension between secular critique on the one hand and the protection of the sacred on the other has acquired an almost ritualised re-occurrence in public discourse in response to crisis events like Rushdie (1988), the Danish Cartoons (2006), and Charlie Hebdo (2015). Also, this perception has been exacerbated by Muslim mobilisation in response, inter alia, to the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War, Gaza protests (2009), the Palestinian issue, amongst others. The overall perception and feeling is of an expansive and encroaching Muslim presence. In terms of a sociological and political reality rather than as faith, Muslim identity poses problems for Secular, Christian, and Liberal Europe. Parekh argues that there is now a widespread perception that:

…. Muslims are collectivist intolerant, authoritarian, illiberal and theocratic and that they use their faith as a self-conscious public statement, not quietly held personal faith but a matter of identity which they must jealously guard and loudly proclaim, not only to remind them of who they are but also to announce to others what they stand for.

(2006, 180-81)

In addition, Islam represents the Other of Western secular modernity (Casanova 2008, 108; 2012). For Roy (2009), the hostility to Islam in France is rooted in the belief that Islam cannot be integrated into secular and liberal society. This notion has its basis that religion is rooted in a particular culture and must therefore be curbed and contained. There is a message being produced in discourses, the media, and
the social imaginaries of Europe that Islam is anti-modern, fundamentalist, backward, and barbaric. This discourse on Islam has been built upon three elements (Casanova 2008 109; 2012; Oliver Roy 2009, 42):

(1) A theological-political distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbaric’ religions, that is, between religions that are compatible with enlightenment principles and liberal democratic politics and religions that are grounded in traditions that resist the progressive claims of the Enlightenment philosophy of history, liberalism, and secularism;

(2) A nativist, anti-immigrant posture that postulated the unassailability of foreign immigrants because of their illiberal and uncivilised social customs and habits, supposedly grounded in their traditional religion; and

(3) Transnational attachments and loyalties to either a foreign religious authority (i.e. the papacy) or to a transnational religious community (i.e. the umma) that appears incompatible with republican citizen principles and the exclusive claims of modern nationalism.

The responses to the challenge of Islam in the public sphere have differed depending on the place and context. Examples include banning the veil in schools in France, banning minarets in Switzerland, the growth of right wing parties in many European countries, the rise of Gilt Wilders in the Netherlands, the emergence of
PEGIDA in Germany\textsuperscript{13}, the rise and fall of the English Defence League (EDL) in the UK, the rising popularity of UKIP, and the promotion of ‘British values’ in public institutions, amongst many others. In addition, the problematisation of Muslims has been instrumentalised politically. This is exemplified by the way that politicians stoke the flames of anti-Muslim prejudice in order to win votes and appeal to a growing constituency of anxious voters\textsuperscript{14}; the way that the liberal elite invoke the fundamentalist threat in order to stop the transmission of illiberal, fundamentalist, and patriarchal customs to younger generations (Casanova 2012); the manner in which the media regularly conflate issues and spins stories in order to sell papers; the way that anti-Muslim prejudice has galvanised various groups of the far right, evidenced by the activities of the EDL, the works of right-wing think-tanks\textsuperscript{15}, the Oslo attacks by Andres Breivik in 2011, and the political success seen with UKIP in Britain.\textsuperscript{16} More importantly, the anxiety directed towards Muslims has been primarily driven by the mainstream and not just by the fringe, encapsulated by Barons Warsi’s speech on Islamophobia, in which Islamophobia had passed the ‘dinner-table test’ (Batty 2011). In sort the spectre of Islam within Europe has provoked various reactions and is being employed as a pretext for the fulfilment of heterogeneous political, social, and cultural objectives.

\textsuperscript{13} PEGIDA stands for ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident’ is a German anti-Islam political organisation founded in Dresden in October 2014 (BBC 2015).
\textsuperscript{14} In the build up to the 2015 General Election in the UK, Nigel Farage, Leader of UKIP, in an interview with Trevor Philips, equated the fear of immigration with some British Muslims who were described as a ‘fifth column’ (Mason, the Guardian 2015). In addition, Afzal Amin, a Conservative candidate in North Dudley, was suspended after being caught by the Mail on Sunday trying to arrange with the EDL a fake demonstration outside the mosque UKIP, which would then be called off after his intervention (Watt and Mathew, The Guardian 2015).
\textsuperscript{15} Spin Watch Reports examines the work and funding of two right-wing think tanks in the UK- the Centre for Social Cohesion (now Henry Jackson Society) and the Policy Exchange. The report reveals their links to global transnational counter-jihadi movements and shows that the arguments advanced by these think-tanks are a reversion to counter-subversion strategies of the Cold-War era (Mills, Griffin, Miller 2011).
\textsuperscript{16} UKIP received almost 4 Million votes and 12.6% of the share of the vote in the elections of 2015 (BBC Election 2015)
What makes intolerant liberalism justifiable is the notion of teleological liberal secularist assumptions built into notion of modernity that one set of norms is enlightened and progressive and the other is dark and backwards. A European narrative of progress is uncomfortable with looking in the mirror and seeing its past return. In one sense the vocal and visible Muslim presence is perceived as a throwback to the Middle Ages in Europe:

At a more diffuse level, the Islamic revival signals a cultural anxiety in the West. The West sees in Islam the distorted mirror of its own past. It marks the rebirth of the God they had killed so that Man (sic) could live. The Islamic resurgence mark the revenge of God; it signals the return of faith, the return of all that puts into question the idea of the progressive liberation of humanity.

(Sayyid 2015, 4)

Part of the anxiety in Europe comes from the implicit fact that being modern is no longer associated with being Western. There is a global trend towards what Taylor (2011) and Casanova (2008) refer to as ‘multiple modernity’s’, that is, that every society, cultural, and tradition seeks to negotiate a modernity in its own image and in a way compatible with its way of life, instead of the previously held assumption that all societies have to follow the trajectory of the West on route to modernisation. Even a champion of the Enlightenment and secular modernity like Jürgen Habermas now speaks of a ‘post-secular age’ in which secular reason must learn to become ‘aware of what is missing’ in secularity and which the reason of faith, oxymoronically, provides space for. For Habermas, secularisation now ‘functions less as a filter separating out the contents of traditions than as a transformer which redirects the
flow of tradition’ (Habermas et al 2010, 18). In other words, the de-privatisation of religion in Europe is seen to have derailed its conception of modernity. This argument draws on current global trends in which Western modernity is challenged by globalisation, the rise of new powers in Asia, and the diversity of European society. The notion of multiple modernities effectively decentres the West as the bastion of universal values and severs the link between the West and modernity.

With this in mind, it is important to turn to the connection between the role of the secular, the perceived threat of Islam, and counter-terrorism in Britain. Using PREVENT as a case study, Stacy Gutkowski (2011) shows how political and cultural secularity has contributed to perceptions of risk. Secular ideas consequently helped make the following problematic suppositions seem plausible (358):

• Religious identity (rather than evidence of extremism) was a useful and unproblematic way to identify a diverse Muslim population, bringing it under surveillance;

• Religious narratives, doctrine and law are static entities that can be instrumentalised for security purposes; and

• There is a ‘slippery slope’ between mainstream Islamic ideas and radical extremism, particularly for young men.

Gutkowski also crucially highlights the position of religion in relation to secularism and liberalism, supported by assumptions like the natural separation of politics and
religion, and that religion is a kind of personal ‘idiosyncrasy’ with an ‘irrational’ hold over people (349). Concomitantly important in defining religion as risky is the perception of religion by the political liberal tradition, the historical experience of British colonialism with non-violent and violent religions, and the increasing non-religiosity among the white mainstream from the 1960s onwards (Ibid). She therefore argues that a by-product of this secular orientation, is something she calls the ‘ambivalence of the secular’, which has ‘exaggerated the extent to which radical ideas have taken hold among Muslims’ and that ‘moderate Islam could be co-opted into managing the spread of radical ideas’ (35). It is thus the secular liberal context of Europe that has determined what is seen as ‘risk’ and which has shaped the representation of the radicalisation threat in security discourses and counter-terrorism policy in the UK.

The construction of problematic Muslim communities and the threat posed by the spectre of Islam has shaped the production of discourses on radicalisation. Specifically, it has resulted in the privileging of theology and identity as causal factors in accounts of radicalisation; the focus of PREVENT on Islamist ideology and ‘extremism’ and the religious rehabilitative models deployed in de-radicalisation interventions (PSJ 2012; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009; Ashour 2009). Such examples point to the primacy of beliefs and ideas in the conceptualisation and understanding of human behaviour. The by-product of this thinking is that individuals are defined in solely religious terms, the conflation of religion and personal identity into a categorical identity, and that 3 million Muslims constitute a single subjectivity.

17 The notion of beliefs as a doctrine or set of rational precepts was also a feature of Enlightenment conception. Thinkers of the Enlightenment attacked religious doctrine, covertly assuming that religious behaviour is a result of religious beliefs, and will cease when the belief is refuted. Roger Scruton shows instead the various ways religions exist for people: as a social fact, as myth, as cult, religion as an aid to survival, and religion as sublimated violence (Scruton 2006, 121-128).
Consequently, this discursive development inscribes causal power onto Islam and Muslim subjectivity and links it with propensity to violence, as well as identifying it as the source of problematic identities, not to mention troublesome practices incompatible with life in modern Britain. As a result, the solution to ‘radicalisation’ and ‘integration’ become an issue that needs to be addressed in theological and psychological terms. Indeed the preoccupation with theological reflections in Muslim political activity is itself an integral component of de-radicalisation intervention. Since the security and integration threat is understand and analysed in terms of identity and religion, then the logical solution for government and civil society is to intervene in the religious life of Muslims. Hence we see the call, in some quarters, for a ‘reform of Islam’ as well as the promotion of ‘moderate Muslims’ in PREVENT, evidenced below in a recent speech by Prime Minister David Cameron in July 2015.

Now the third plank of our strategy is to embolden different voices within the Muslim community. Just as we do not engage with extremist groups and individuals, we’re now going to actively encourage the reforming and moderate Muslim voices. This is a significant shift in government approach – and an important one.

(Cameron 2015)

The history and experience of Christianity in the British context provides a normative blueprint for the type of Islam that would be accepted in the UK. Both Casanova (Casanova 2006, 23) and Taylor (2007; 2011) show how Protestant Christianity is implicated in the development of secular modernity. For Taylor, Western Enlightenment produced a type of religious sensibility compatible with secular
modernity, characterised by the disenchanted of the world, a self-immanent order, and a staunchly buffered identity (2011, 285-286). Similarly, for policymakers the remoulding of Islam to suit British political, social, and cultural spaces would ideally take the shape of Anglican Christianity—private, non-political, and institutionalised. Such a strategy is also tied up with concepts of citizenship. And it would also entail, clear from the emphasis on ‘shared values’ in PREVENT, compatibility with liberal values of equality, human rights, and democracy. The British experience of the secular and religion not only prescribes a normative template for the indigenising of Islam in Britain, but also becomes adopted as a strategy in British counter-terrorism policy.

In summation, in this section I have argued that constructions of Islam as a foreign entity, transnational in scope, politically ambitious, and possessing a fanatical hold on its adherents have been shaped by the European experience of religion, the secular, and modernity. The de-privatisation of religion as a result of immigration and globalisation in recent times has challenged European societies with respect to the place of religion in public and social life. These both explain the fashion in which the threat of Islam has been imagined, as well as the attempt by elites to remake and domesticate Islam in an image palatable to European realities. Doing so enables us to make sense of the role of religion in theories of radicalisation, its place in the PREVENT strategy, and its association with de-radicalisation.
1.4 The Culturalisation of Politics and the Self-Other Nexus

One approach to contextualising the backdrop to the themes mentioned above of security, identity, and religion in the formulation of ‘radicalisation’ as the ‘new security challenge’, is the ‘culturalisation of politics’ (Brown 2006, 17). Events of the past three decades have put culture as the primary lens through which politics is analysed (Huntington 1993). The ‘culturalisation of politics’ consigns politics, history, political economy, class, gender, international relations, colonialism, the state, and many more to mere footnotes in the analysis of phenomenon, placing in its stead ‘culture’ as the primary explanation for motivations, actions, and events. Whilst liberal democracies ascribes culture to the fundamentalist Other, it excludes itself from culturalisation. Only Western liberal democracies have politics and history, whereas the Other is dispossessed of them.

According to Brown (2006), this non reciprocity is based on three elements: first, Liberalism’s claims to universality through secularism, the rule of law, equality, moral autonomy, and individual liberty. Second, Liberalism unit of analysis (the individual and its primary objective of maximising individual freedom) is the antithesis of the coherence and continuity claimed by groups and so naturally positions the individual in tension with culture. Third, Liberalism privatises and individuates culture, as it does with religion, exemplified in the basic premise of liberal secularism that ‘neither culture nor religion are permitted to govern publicly; both are tolerated on the condition that they are privately and individually enjoyed’ (21). Culture must be contained by liberalism so as to make no political claim (22).

The offshoot of culturalisation is de-politicisation. Brown identifies two different dimensions assumed by de-politicisation in Western Liberal democracies: De-
politicisation involves ‘construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal and individual’ (15). Second, de-politicisation presents such domains as problems that are natural, religious or cultural (Ibid). In short, significant issues that demand political solutions are replaced with therapeutic or behavioural solutions, as well as making religious, ethnic, and cultural difference an inherent site of conflict (Ibid). Brown highlights several causes for de-politicisation: long-standing tendencies in liberalism itself, individualism, and the diffusion of market rationality across the political and social spheres precipitated by the ascendency of neo-liberalism (17). In this light, de-radicalisation is a by-product of the ‘culturalisation of politics’.

After all, de-radicalisation is seen as a solution framed at the individual level explained in terms of ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ variables, implemented to eradicate ‘radicalisation’ itself said to be caused by ‘culture’. In addition, the narrative of radicalisation depicts Muslims as a security threat because of the problems with their identity, the misinterpretation of religious doctrine, which are also the reasons that they pose a social threat. It also attributes blame to political multiculturalism for rendering Britain conducive for the incubation of radicalisation. Indeed Kundnani (2012) writes that the radicalisation discourse deliberately removed politics, foreign policy, and notions of injustice out of purview; whilst scholars like Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2012), Lee Jarvis, Baker-Beall, and Heath Kelly (2015), have critically noted that the discourse on radicalisation ignores decades of scholarship linking the importance of political, social, economic, meso, and macro issues to political violence. It is little wonder that political analysis evades radicalisation discourses, not to mention the glaring absence of politics in discussions surrounding de-radicalisation.
Through culture, essentialism takes up residence in our understandings and explanations of the Muslim Other. Everything becomes a matter of religious and theological causation: crime, social ills, political violence, terrorism, and much more, occur as a result of religion. Muslims are presented as exceptional and Islam as backward and distant from the progress of modernity embodied in Enlightenment values such as tolerance, democracy, free speech, equality, and individualism (Said 2003, Casanova 2008; 2010; Asad et al. 2009). Moreover, the foreign, religious, radical, and cultural Other is denied the capacity to be authors of their own narrative, are disposed of any agency, and exist statically and menacingly in the shadows of the imaginations of the Western nation state.

The same phenomenon of culturalisation was at play in European representations of the Middle East at the height of colonialism, what Edward Said famously called ‘Orientalism’ (2003 [1978]). One of Said’s claims was the notion that Western Orientalism constructed a particular understanding of the Orient for the purposes of political control and hegemony (3-6). The remarkable feature of contemporary Orientalist representations of Muslims in Europe is the ease with which it is made, in large part made possible by 9-11. Whilst my argument in chapter 5 on discursive technology echoes Said’s argument about the political objectives governing the will to knowledge, it is the second feature of Said’s claims that also opens avenues for further insights on the ‘culturalisation of politics’; namely, the claim that such constructions were done for the purposes of Self construction. That is to say the West (as a cultural and ideological construction and not as a geographical place) came into existence through the representation of the foreign Other.¹⁸

¹⁸ Sayyid (2015, 32-35) identifies two versions of orientalism- ‘weak’ and ‘strong’. Weak orientalism sees the orientalist enterprise was subverted by its complicity with western imperialism. It remains
In the case of Europe, European identity was built in opposition to Islam and through the exclusion of Muslims. For example, Talal Asad (2003) shows how European identity was formed through the deliberate exclusion of Muslims in its cultural and historical narratives (166). This is exemplified by the absence of Bosnia from the idea of Europe, the beginning of European civilisation as a homogenous space and time dated to the Battle of Vienna against the Ottomans, and severing the link between the World of Islam and its inheritance of Hellenistic culture (166-169).

Today, the West (primarily Euro-America) is defining itself once again against Islam.\textsuperscript{19}

There are many benefits conferred to Western Liberal democracies, like the UK, by the construction of the backwards fundamentalist Other of Islam: politically, governmentally, socially, and culturally. Politically, it has an internal and external function. Internally, it galvanises the population and permits the construction of a political identity, the ‘we’ that is integral to the nation state.\textsuperscript{20} Externally, it enables it to execute hegemonic projects (a la War on Terror) in the Middle East with greater legitimacy. Domestically it enables the government to fix the content of the label ‘Muslim’, which in Britain was placed into crisis by the emergence of Muslim subjectivity in the wake of Rushdie, thereby disrupting the racial categories governing bio-political management of the population (Tyler and Sayyid 2012, 357).

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\textsuperscript{19} Said (2003, 300-301) argued that Orientalism produces accounts about Islam and the Orient organised around four themes: (1) There is an absolute and systemic difference between the West and the Orient (2) the representation of the Orient are based on textual exegesis rather than modern Oriental realities (3) the Orient is unchanging, uniform, and incapable of describing itself and (4) The Orient is to be feared or mastered.

\textsuperscript{20} See analysis on Carl Schmitt’s concept of the Political in Chapter 4, Section 4.3
In other words, the presence of unracialised Muslims augments the domestic disciplining capacity of government (see chapter 4).

Thirdly, the presence of Muslims allows European society to transfer its tensions and social ills on to the Muslim Other. British society becomes understood as a place which stands against a whole range of social ills embodied in the Muslim Other. Notably, this rationale of deflecting social tension to a scapegoat is found in the works of French anthropologist Rene Girard (2013). In ‘Sacred Violence’, he formulates the notion of ‘mimetic rivalry’ amongst the same group of people, who become rivals in the struggle for status, power, and resources. Only the sacrifice of an internal or external other can ensure the dissipation of conflict and tension and thus the scapegoat acts as a mechanism to deflect inherent violence in every society. In this way, the Muslim Other serves as a scapegoat mechanism for the purification of the West. This partly explains why the Other is often spoken in terms of the language of purification, moral disease, and medicalisation. This phenomenon was also corroborated in the works of British anthropologist Mary Douglass (2002). She found that the understanding of danger and threats to a community was couched in the language of purification, dirt and hygiene, and disease.

Culturally, it allows Europe to realign itself with universal values. For Brown (2006) the culturalisation of politics occurs in response to a ‘legitimacy deficit’ and the ‘diminished capacity to embody universal representation’ (83/84). For Sayyid (2015), the ‘War on Terror’ in Europe is a desperate attempt by the West to re-establish Eurocentrism (Europe as the bearer of universalism). Meanwhile Julien Reid (2006, 62) argues that the ‘War on Terror’ is underwritten by a liberal conception of humanity in a way that not only exceeds and challenges state sovereignty, but one
which ‘re redraws the boundary between a biopolitical account of human being and it’s enemy’. Hence the reason that anti-Muslim prejudice has become a prominent feature in European societies and why its manifestations will persist unabated as long as it continues to serve the above functions effectively.

Equally significant is the changing practice of citizenship. The idea of neutral and norm free citizenship has been challenged by feminist thinking (Mouffe 1993, 78-82). Feminists critiqued both the liberal and republican models shared assumptions of separation between public and private spheres, articulated in the platitude- ‘the personal is the political’ (Heywood 2007, 234). Such dichotomies were contested on the grounds that they were socially constructed and that discarding the abstraction characterising notions of citizenship reveals the reality of citizenship situated in the real world in which life is organised according to differences of class, gender, race, culture, and religion.

However, more significant than the circumspect notion of neutral citizenship today is the issue of changing citizenship. I wrote earlier that the reconfiguration of citizenship was propelled by the integration of the pre-emptive risk logic into structures of governance in the UK, concomitant with the challenges posed by minority difference to the nation in conditions of plurality and globalisation. For example, the new ethics of citizenship has witnessed the revoking of citizenship for British nationals believed to be involved in terrorism (Provision 1, CTSA 2015), as well as the move away from rights to duties and obligations. This is amplified in chapter 6, which elucidates the powerful way non-juridical categories such as ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’ were remaking communities, not least inculcating a type of citizenry geared towards a proactive monitoring of risk in society, the de-legitimisation of ‘radical’, ‘extremist’,
and dissenting ideas from public spaces, and the purging of difference, which is associated with Muslim idea and practices. Practices of citizenship are developing in ways previously conceived in terms of services to be provided by government (Rose 1999, 166). In the drive for inclusive citizenship, the new face of citizenship today in the UK paradoxically creates new exclusions.

Moreover, nation-states are not merely civil political entities that demand the civil allegiance to institutions of the state but are also ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983) that call for a cultural identification with the nation. The fact that the PREVENT policy is driving ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’ in public institutions nationally has the effect of excluding Muslims from the political and cultural identity of the nation. This is corroborated by the fact they have been viewed as ‘suspect communities’ (Hillyard 1993; Hickman et.al 2011), are seen through the prism of security and are perceived to be an alien and disloyal fifth column.

Importantly, Asad (2003, 173) asks the pertinent question: what is the possibility of representing Muslim minorities in secular European states? By exploring the paradox of enjoying equal rights as citizens but being excluded as ‘minorities’ Asad shows that it is difficult if not impossible to represent Muslims in liberal democracies. The concept of ‘minority’ is not merely a quantitative concept but one which has roots in a Christian post reformation context in which it was the state’s business to secure religious uniformity, if not exclude dissent (Ibid). Asad therefore remains sceptical in the end that the exclusion of Muslim from the political, social, and cultural representation of Europe can be reversed without the introduction of a new model of representation, something akin to a pre-modern multiplicity of overlapping bonds and identities (174). This idea regarding the exclusion of Muslims is reiterated by Stuart Croft (2012) who argues that Muslims have come to be seen as the ‘Other’ outside
the contemporary conceptions of Britishness. Hence Muslims cannot be incorporated into the ‘imagined community’.

In terms of future prospects then (of which de-radicalisation is seen as but one solution) the position of British Muslims has to be re-thought outside the scope of juridical concepts of law, sovereignty, and citizenship. There is, to be precise, no single subjectivity or homogenous group called ‘Muslim’, sociologically, economically, and theologically, and so there can never be one ‘solution’. Also redundant is the move towards ‘reforming Islam’ in order to prevent violence undertaken in the name of Islam or even the ever elusive ‘extremism’; such calls presume that Muslims constitute a single subjectivity, mistakenly reduce religion to propositional beliefs\(^\text{21}\), and assume that reform has not already been a feature of Islamic history.\(^\text{22}\)

In fact the emergence of Al-Qaeda inspired violence, as John Gray (2007) and Faisal Devji (2008) have rightly shown, owes more to European secular modernity and to groups like the Jacobins then traditional Islam. Given the failure to represent the Muslim in the nation-state, the prevalent illiteracy of history and religion characterising mainstream discourse, not to mention the function of citizenship as a carrier of harsh exclusion, it is pertinent instead to re-frame the problem of Muslims in terms of the power characteristics of majority-minority relations within the nation-state. It is also crucially important to find new analytical tools to understand the

\(^\text{21}\) Understanding Islam in terms of the Western and Christian notion of ‘belief’ distances us from the subtleties that drive it. Asad shows that in Islam it is faith rather than belief that is a more accurate concept but one which the Quran itself has stated is an unknowable entity and unidentifiable amongst people. In contrast, the ‘Christian tradition allows that thoughts can commit the sin of blasphemy and should therefore be subject to discipline: thoughts are subject to confession’ (Asad et al. 2006, 40).

\(^\text{22}\) ‘…the Islamic tradition in the very recent past has undergone an unprecedented process of pluralization and fragmentation of religious authority, comparable to that initiated by the Protestant Reformation and operative ever since within Protestant Christianity’ (Casanova 2006, 29).
challenges of security, identity, and religion than currently deployed by theories of radicalisation, liberal discourse, and utterances made by policymakers about ‘de-radicalisation’.

This section examined the wider politics of de-radicalisation. In particular, it singled out the dominant recourse to ‘culture’ by policymakers and public discourse. The ‘culturalisation of politics’ reduces major problems and issues confronting our politics to either a problem of ‘culture’ on the one hand and/or an individuation of the problem on the other. In the context of the ‘new security challenge’, it has the effect of ‘naturalising’ radicalisation as a problem of identity and religion, instead of macro (politics and Society) and meso factors (organisation, social groups). The tropes of culturalisation reside in the tendencies of liberalism, as well as being the discourse of choice for dominant powers. Whilst one manifestation of culturalisation is the objectification of culture for the purposes of domination, we also alluded to the other more critical dimension of this discursive strategy and technique: the formation of the self through the construction of an ‘Other’. In light of the fact, therefore, that Islam serves as the antithesis and antagonistic quilting point for the formation of the self, a call was made to re-examine our conceptual vocabulary in order to make sense of the new realities shaping the Muslim experience in Britain.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined the discursive conditions that allowed de-radicalisation to emerge. It also showed the ontological components of the problems said to be confronting Britain (security, identity, and religion), commonly understood in terms of ‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’, and the ‘Muslim Question’. The first section traces the
changing security paradigm. This was articulated in terms of the ‘politics of exception’, the social construction of risk, and the adoption of pre-emptive anticipatory logic in policy-making. These produce the radicalisation discourse and legitimise PREVENT. In particular, ‘radicalisation’ becomes associated as a process affecting individual Muslims and their trajectory towards violence through an ideology comprising of theological-political elements. Section 1.2 addresses the two-fold dimension of the identity debate: the failure of political multiculturalism on one hand and the failure of Muslims to ‘integrate’ on the other. The overall message is that a more robust political identity is required to assimilate problematic Muslim communities, whilst Muslim identity must be tinkered with in order to ensure compatibility between the nation and Muslims. Section 1.3 tries to make sense of the role of religion in the discourses on problematic Muslim communities and its re-emergence in the public sphere. Here religion is situated sociologically within the experience of secularisation and modernity in Europe. Doing so fruitfully contextualises current debates and policy strategies that seek to ‘reform’ Islam, counter ‘extremism’, counter ideology, and promote ‘moderate’ Muslims- all of which is associated with de-radicalisation. The last section attempts to analyse the problematisation of security, identity, and religion through the main paradigm shaping the way we think, understand, and analyse contemporary challenges: Culturalisation. The concept and practice of de-radicalisation is presented as the by-product of the culturalisation of politics par excellence because it targets the individual by addressing the ideas and beliefs they hold through therapeutic and behavioural remedies. Absent from this ‘solution’ are wider discussions and strategies to address politics, society, and power. The argument was made that the process of problematisation by policymaking elites in Britain was intertwined with
identity construction. Analysing the stranglehold of top-down identity models for Muslims through concepts of nationhood, citizenship, identity politics, and liberalism’s favoured default category of ‘culture’, fails to encapsulate the reality of power relations characterising discourses relating to Muslims in Britain.

Another way of viewing all the above is to see Muslim difference as being framed in terms of surfeit difference (too religious, too political, and too foreign). It is in this way that the discourse on ‘Radicalisation’ entails both the Radicalised Other (individual Muslims) and the Orientalised Other (referred to singularly as the ‘British Muslim Community’). De-radicalisation in PREVENT is thus tasked with the responsibility of mitigating Muslim excess through the transformation of Muslim subjectivity in conformity to norms which the national majority consider desirable. Herein lays the politics of de-radicalisation. It also constitutes the backdrop to the following investigation into the concept and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK. The next chapter examines the literature on de-radicalisation so that we can ascertain both the ontological framework of de-radicalisation- championed by policymakers as a solution to the problem of ‘radicalisation’ engulfing British Muslim communities- and the position of my thesis within the wider field.
De-radicalisation is situated under the second objective- ‘supporting vulnerable people’- of the PREVENT strand in CONTEST:

This area of Prevent is based on the premise that people being drawn into radicalisation and recruitment can be identified and then provided with support. The purpose of that support is to dissuade them from engaging in and supporting terrorist-related activity. This support is sometimes described as ‘de-radicalisation’, a term which is sometimes used to refer to cognitive or behavioural change: in the context of our own programmes we use it to refer to both. We seek to remove people from the influence of and from contact with terrorist groups and sympathisers, and to challenge any support they have for them.

(HO 2011, 56, section 9.4)

The above definition is taken from an updated PREVENT document at the time of writing (June 2015), whereas the initial document of 2011 also compared de-radicalisation to crime prevention work. Notably, the analogy of de-radicalisation to ‘crime prevention’ is included in the summary section on page 55 in the updated version. The important point here is the opacity of this definition of de-radicalisation. To reiterate, de-radicalisation is defined as a ‘support’ programme aiming to ‘dissuade’ radicals from supporting or adopting violence and involves ‘cognitive or
behavioural change’. The definition offered by the Home Office does very little to explain the ontological framework of de-radicalisation. This confusing definition provokes consternation given that fact that governments in Europe are interested in knowing what factors get violent individuals to abandon violent radicalisation. The following chapter endeavours to find out the state of research on de-radicalisation in order to begin answering the question about ontology: what is de-radicalisation? Overall, the purpose of this review is twofold; it aims to highlight what is known about de-radicalisation in the literature and to situate my investigation within the wider field.

The first section provides an inventory on the state of the field of studies on de-radicalisation. The section after surveys the various de-radicalisation programmes operating in different parts of the world. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 examine the definition, concept, and process of de-radicalisation respectively. The last section sums up the chapter and the key findings of this review.

2.1 A ‘State of the Nation’ Overview

De-radicalisation is a new area of study and little research has been done on it. The nascent state of this research area is summarised below.

The literature on (de-) radicalisation is young. In the attached bibliography the majority of the 175 titles are from the last decade, especially from the last six years. Only eleven titles are from the 1990s, four from the 1980s, none is from the 1970s
and only one from the 1960s. Most of the literature focuses on Islamist radicalization. The majority of studies describe radicalisation processes with studies of de-radicalisation being fewer and of more recent origin. The literature selected here is, however, more illustrative than representative for the dynamic and fast growing field of (de-) radicalisation studies. Part of the literature is “grey”, that is, it consists of reports that are not distributed in the form of academic monographs or published in social science journals, though many of them are available online.

(Schmid & Price 2011, 338)

An important aspect mentioned above is the fact that most of the literature is ‘grey’. The majority of the literature on de-radicalisation can be classified as reports available online but which are not published in journals or academic monographs. In fact much of the reports online are produced by think-tanks (Demant et al. 2008; Rabasa et al. 2010; Disley et al. 2011; the ISD 2010; and the ICSR 2010). The UK literature on de-radicalisation has mainly been confined to think-tank reports (ICSR 2010; ISD 2010; ISD 2011), which provide a best-practice description of prison programmes. Other think-tank reports that provide comprehensive reviews are non-UK based, e.g. the RAND Corporation (Rabasa et al. 2010) which is an American think-tank and the Centre for International Migration and Ethnic Studies (Demant et al. 2008) based in the Netherlands. The only real attempts academically at conceptualising de-radicalisation have been made by John Horgan (Horgan 2008; 2009; 2009a; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009) and Omar Ashour (Ashour 2009). Notably, Ashour’s (2009) ‘The De-Radicalization of Jihadists’ is the only detailed and focused
case study of de-radicalisation in the field, whilst ‘Leaving Terrorism Behind’ (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009), is the first attempt in the field to provide a comparative study on the processes and programmes of disengagement and de-radicalisation.

It is important to state here the absence of a detailed study of de-radicalisation in the UK context. For example, Ashour’s and Horgan’s studies of de-radicalisation and disengagement are either primarily concerned with (a) prisons and (b) terrorists and/or convicted militants. The significance of this observation can be understood in relation to the fact that in the UK de-radicalisation intervention is primarily (a) outside prisons and instead target at civil society and (b) ‘extremist’, especially it seems non-violent terrorist, and not necessarily terrorist or convicted criminals; and (c) youngsters. Moreover, there is no independent and rigorous assessment of ‘Channel’, the flagship police-run de-radicalisation programme in the UK in the literature. Instead there is only rudimentary information on Channel (Kundnani 2012; ACPO report 2010, HO 2011; HMG 2015) and no reliable data, let alone evaluation of any form on it. The only case study of de-radicalisation interventions that could be

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23 In the UK, Prison de-radicalisation is managed by the National Offender Management (NOMS). Since 2007 NOMS has been trying to develop interventions targeting the drives of radicalisation (HO 2011, 88; Spalek, Al-Awa, and Lambert 2008, 45-46). According to the Prison Service Journal, there are two intervention programmes- Healthy Identity and Al Furqan (PSJ 2012, 31). The Healthy Identity Interventions delivers one-to-one (or two facilitators to one offender) over a number of sessions and are responsive to the individual’s needs, risks, type and level of engagement and are suitable for all types of extremist offenders (regardless of cause) (NOMS 2013). Al Furqan (meaning to distinguish between truth and falsehood) is specifically suitable for Islamist offenders where ideology has become wedded with extremist interpretations of the Islamic faith. It is intended to challenge misinterpretations of Islamic texts (PSJ 2012, 32). However, the Journal concluded that the ‘development and delivery of a co-ordinated, multi-faceted approach to preventing terrorist offending is still in its relative infancy’ (PS J 2012, 36). Furthermore, PREVENT 2011 stated that ‘progress has been slower’ due to the lack of ‘proven methodology’ and the lack of template to develop interventions from (HO 2011, 89), although national implementation was planned for 2012. One of the future goals of PREVENT 2011 was ‘significantly scaling up’ de-radicalisation interventions in prisons. According to the NOMS summary on Healthy Identity interventions in 2013, interventions ‘available to all convicted extremist offenders in both custody and community who are assessed as suitable’, with interventions being monitored and re-evaluated (NOMS 2013, 2). However, an article in January 2014 reported that “Three quarters of all prisoners convicted of terror offences reject rehabilitation and not a single senior terror convict has engaged with the de-radicalisation programme ”(Gover 2014). In short, given the lack of documentation and access to data it is difficult to assess how interventions in prison are faring.
found in the literature in the UK context is either on the Strategy to Reach, Empower, 
and Educate (STREET) (Lambert 2011; ISD 2012; Baker 2011) or Active Change 
Foundation (ACF) (Rabasa et al. 2012, 133-136), which represent the two flagship 
organisations delivering interventions. Perhaps the most relevant reading of de-
radicalisation to the UK context is advanced by Lasse Lindekilde (2015). His analysis 
of de-radicalisation focuses on individual interventions in Denmark after their revised 
counter-radicalisation policy of 2011, which was influenced by the separation of 
community cohesion projects from counter-radicalisation efforts in the UK (229). 
Despite the similarities prima facie of the PREVENT strategy in both countries, the 
fact remains: there is not a single conceptual, theoretical, and empirical study on de-
radicalisation in the UK.

It is worthwhile referring to the findings of a comprehensive review on the literature 
on de-radicalisation commissioned by the OSCT, titled, ‘Individual disengagement 
from Al-Qaeda influenced terrorist groups’ (Disley et al. 2011). The report was 
produced to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism. The report begins by 
stating that:

Very little academic research has been completed into the factors leading individuals 
to desist and disengage from Al-Qaeda-influenced terrorist groups, or indeed into 
intervention designed to draw individuals away from such terrorism.

(2011, 1)

However, the review identifies seven main flaws in the literature (78-80):
• Limited amount of robust research focusing on Al-Qaeda influenced terrorism; their review found only five empirical studies, with three only using primary data (Demant et al. 2008; Garfinkel 2007; Horgan 2009b) in each study interviews included Al-Qaeda extremist, as well as others.

• Limited amount of research interest in leaving groups; report states that desistance and disengagement is a new area and that most of the research has focused on radicalisation. Concerns about safety and access acts as barriers to further research in the field.

• Limited empirical basis; the report states that three studies mentioned above are well designed in that they sought to gather information about the experience and motivation of leavers but that caution must be exercised with respect to transferability of findings from these studies given that so few leavers have spoken to researchers.

• Causality cannot be inferred; that the limited studies only provide information on those who have left and thus the problem with the ‘control’ selection of the limited research conducted on leavers of terrorism means that it is therefore difficult to infer causality.

• Reliance on personal accounts; personal accounts of why someone has left the group can be unreliable- the individual might not be telling the truth, may not be able to articulate clearly the reasons he’s left the group, or may not know the reasons with much certainty-coupled with the limited numbers of
those actually being involved let alone leaving, that personal accounts cannot be self-validated with confidence.

- **Lack of robust evaluation of interventions, including no counter-factual;** No evaluations of interventions to facilitate exit from terrorist groups were identified. Instead the reports can be considered programmes reviews with unverified information about intervention. Another important weakness to note is the absence of the counter-factual in these ‘reviews’: what would happen if those individuals did not participate in the intervention? Moreover the report stated that there was no evidence of any reported longitudinal studies that looks at the long-term effects of interventions.

- **Lack of peer reviewed literature:** although some of the reviews, reports, and studies found in the literature are written by credible academics or policy officials, this literature, unlike that produced in Journals, is not peer-reviewed, which in conjunction with the absence of empirical data, means that findings should be treated carefully.

Given the weaknesses in the quality of the literature on de-radicalisation and disengagement the report finds little or no evidence for policy development:

The available evidence provides a limited basis for policy development. There are too few studies that look at leaving terrorist groups and a very limited number that
look at leaving Al Qa’ida-influenced groups. The studies that have interviewed individuals who have left terrorist groups are useful starting points, but they provide an insufficient basis for isolating the factors that caused, or were strongly associated with, an individual’s decision to leave.

(Disley et al. 2011, VI)

Indeed the lack of empirical data emerging from reports on programmes is acknowledged in PREVENT 2011:

‘There is little empirical evidence underpinning intervention work in this area here in the UK and internationally.’

(HO 2011, 61)

In summation, this section provided a schematic overview of the state of the literature on de-radicalisation. The first major point is that as an area of study, de-radicalisation is very new, with the bulk of the literature being produced after 2006. Secondly, the vast majority of the literature is ‘grey’. This means that very little of the available literature has been subjected to academic scrutiny or even peer review. The vast majority of the literature is available online are in fact primarily think-tank reports and reviews of de-radicalisation programmes. Another issue is that there is a marked absence of primary and empirical data. Besides the rudimentary mention in a few policy documents, we have no body of work on de-radicalisation programmes
in the UK. As a result of the fragmented state of the knowledge on de-radicalisation and the absence of primary data, no causal inferences can be inferred with regards to the process of de-radicalisation and no basis for policy development can be established.

2.2 De-radicalisation Programmes

De-radicalisation programmes emerged in many countries in the Middle East (M.E.) and Southeast Asia (S.E.A), and Europe in the late 1990’s with the overarching objective of getting individuals and groups to move away from terrorism (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009, Ashour 2009). Many countries began responding to terrorism in innovative ways out of recognition that traditional coercive methods of counter-terrorism do not work on its own. Other factors included the counter-productiveness of repressive measures, the need for a more systematic way of managing risk, and the need to reduce recruitment (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009, 1). In fact de-radicalisation programmes were implemented before 9-11 in places like Egypt and Algeria (Ashour 2009; 2012, 124).\(^{24}\) However, such programmes were more associated with attempts at reconciliation and doctrinal revision of prison inmates convicted of terrorism than de-radicalisation. It was only after the growing number of terrorist attacks globally after 9-11 that the development and concern for de-radicalisation in the M.E. and S.E.A. began to take shape.

Table 1 in the Appendix illustrates a variety of de-radicalisation programmes and the reports conducted on them. These programmes or interventions have been targeted at all types of violent groups; from the left-wing guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces

\(^{24}\) In Egypt al- Gama’a al-Islamiyya, AKA Islamic Group (IG) declared a unilateral ceasefire in July 1997 that resulted in comprehensive de-radicalisation of the organisation by 2002. In Algeria a unilateral ceasefire declared by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in October 1997.
of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, to right-wing extremists in Europe, and to Takfiri-Jihadi militants in the M.E. and S.E.A. These programmes have been guided by different strategies and vary in type—from individual to collective de-radicalisation, and state or/and NGO run programmes. The delivery of these programmes has been implemented and expressed through a number of diverse activities that include counselling, dialogue, counter-ideology, state repressions, family involvement, and aftercare (Barret & Bokhari 2009, 173-4). Interventions are also predominantly prison based programmes, whereas European programmes mainly target individuals outside of prison environments.

Most the de-radicalisation programmes in the M.E. and S.E.A. employed theological discussions as well as counter-ideological dialogue with militant inmates as an essential component of ‘rehabilitation’. Notably, these theological dialogues are predicated on the idea that militant extremist follow an incorrect understanding of Islam and a crucial dimension therefore of de-radicalisation intervention has been religious doctrinal revision. De-radicalisation in Egypt was the first and arguably the most successful programme in the 1990’s, which was distinguished by the pioneering work on theological doctrinal revision. This involved dynamic interaction between inmates, charismatic leaders, and discussions with Al-Azhar imams. The comprehensive de-radicalisation of the IG in 2007 was accompanied by the publication of twenty five volumes of doctrinal revisions. Similarly, the de-radicalisation of al-Jihad in 2007-8 resulted in the publication of two books by former Al-Qaeda ideologue and Emir (leader) of al-Jihad Dr. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Ashour 2012, 124).25

Another example of this approach was seen in Yemen through the ‘Committee for Dialogue’. It was one of the first de-radicalisation programmes to be based on religious dialogue with militants in 2002 in order to get detainees to accept legitimacy of the regime and to prevent attacks within Yemen (Boucek, Beg, Horgan 2009, 189). This approach was seen as a success (Yemen claims 98% of graduates have remained non-violent) and has influenced programmes in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia (Abuza 2009, 191-211). In Singapore, for example, the Yemeni model was loosely replicated with the creation of Religious Rehabilitation Group, which undertook over 800 individual counselling sessions between 2003 and 2007 (198).

Equally significant, the material based components are also a major if not substantive part of de-radicalisation programmes. This approach indicates that ideological and theological dialogues are not sufficient factors in influencing militant detainees to renounce the use of violence. These programmes offer economic and social support to families of detainees, providing job training to detainees released from programmes, as well as involving the support of families and friends in rehabilitation efforts. For example, the programme in Saudi Arabia has received acclaim for taking a comprehensive approach and using family members in the intervention process, providing job training, as well as finding apartments for detainees (Boucek, Beg, Horgan 2009, 212-223).

In contrast to counterpart programmes in the M.E. and S.E.A, European programmes are broadly voluntary-based and target non-violent extremist. Examples include programmes such as ‘Exit’ in Sweden and Norway (these programmes emphasise non-ideological factors in explanations of pathways towards far-right extremism), which targets far-right extremism, not to mention the ‘Violence
Prevention Network’ in Germany, which expanded its previous remit to include religiously radicalised individuals (ISD 2012, 12). In Amsterdam a programme called ‘Information House’ targeted radicalised Muslims but due to concerns about privacy had to be closed in December 2009 (Rabasa, et al. 2010). In the UK interventions include STREET, which was run by a community and grass roots group based in Brixton, South London\textsuperscript{26} and the ACF, which is a grass-root organisation based in East London. Overall, de-radicalisation in the European context primarily targets individuals in civil society rather than in prisons, albeit some prison programmes exists (ICSR 2010).

Importantly, since de-radicalisation programmes include both material and counter-ideological components, it is difficult to evaluate what factors are the most important in enabling the de-radicalisation of individuals to occur. In addition given the limited data available it is also difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these programmes. At the moment, current evaluation methods focus on something called ‘recidivism rates’, i.e. the number of “ex” Jihadist who re-engage (Chowdhury & Hearne 2008, 16), but due to the lack of information and the unreliability of this measure, there have been calls, by the likes of Horgan, to find more effective ways of evaluating the success of programmes (Horgan 209b; Horgan & Bruddock 2010). Despite the highly publicized claims for success associated with some interventions

\textsuperscript{26} STREET stopped receiving money with the suspension of PREVENT by the Coalition government in 2010. They are no longer provide counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions for government.
programmes, John Horgan and Kurt Braddock (2010, 285-6) concluded that there are major barriers to even the most tentative of evaluations:

- There are no explicit criteria for success associated with any initiative;

- There is little data associated with any of these initiatives that can be reliably corroborated independently;

- There has been no systematic effort to study any aspect of these programs, even individually, let alone collectively.

In summation, it is clear that de-radicalisation programmes differ significantly in aim, implementation, and targets of intervention. The most salient distinction between de-radicalisation in Europe and elsewhere is the fact that policymakers target non-violent youngsters with little or no connections with wider networks but who are believed to harbour ‘extremist’ views. In contrast, de-radicalisation in the M.E. and S.E.A targeted convicted militants in prison. The absence of empirical data and in-depth study of de-radicalisation means that academics and policymakers cannot draw causal inferences regarding successes of interventions. More significant, there is no robust way of evaluating the success of de-radicalisation interventions, even if some have tried to employ the notion of ‘recidivism’ from crime prevention. Instead, some of the reports identify ‘best practice’. Overall de-radicalisation programmes are diverse, what we know of them is limited, and evaluation of interventions is non-existent.
2.3 The definition of De-radicalisation

There are eight different definitions of de-radicalisation that can be discerned from the literature (shown as table 1 in the Appendix), which could be categorised into the following: official (policy driven); academic; and definitions formulated by think-tanks. Moreover, the confusion surrounding the meaning of de-radicalisation is compounded in the literature with the use of other terms which are used in the same context as de-radicalisation and yet contain subtle differences in meaning and subsequently pose different policy ramifications. For example terms like ‘rehabilitation’, ‘desists’, ‘de-legitimisation’, ‘socialisation’, ‘de-programming’, and ‘dialogue’ are used to refer to de-radicalisation programmes. It is also employed interchangeably in the discourse with other terms like “disengagement” and “counter-radicalisation” (Horgan 2008).

There are two official definitions of de-radicalisation. The first official definition that was formulated at a policy level was in 2008 at the United Nations by the UN Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism leading to Terrorism, which defined de-radicalisation as:

Programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or dissuading them from violence.

(UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force 2008, 5)

A second definition to consider and one which is relevant to discussions about the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation is the one used by the UK Home Office,
which was quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The reference to ‘support’ in this definition relates to supporting ‘vulnerable’ individuals. These two policy orientated definitions are different; the UN definition refers to de-radicalisation as programmes, whereas the PREVENT strategy conceives it as ‘support’. Another obvious difference is that the PREVENT strategy deploys the terms ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural change’, which is terminology adopted from debates about de-radicalisation in the literature, particularly associated with the works of John Horgan (2008; 2009), whereas the UN definition states the intended objectives of de-radicalisation programmes, i.e. reintegrate back into mainstream society and/or dissuading militants from the use of violence. These explicit objectives are missing in the UK’s Home Office’s definition. Although both definitions are ambiguous, in many respects the UK Home Office’s conception of de-radicalisation indicates greater confusion, evidenced not only by the ambiguity of ‘cognitive and behavioural change’ but also the confusing analogies it draws with ‘crime prevention’.

Meanwhile, there are three definitions of de-radicalisation made by academics, John Horgan (2008; 2009), Omar Ashour (2009), and Demant et al. (2008). John Horgan is the most vociferous critic of the term and concept. He defines de-radicalisation as:

[T]he social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues.

(Horgan 2009, 153)
In contrast to Horgan, Omar Ashour situates de-radicalisation as a process within Islamist movements (defined in relation moderation and radicalisation of Islamic movements) instead of emphasising the individual and things like ‘risk’:

A process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimises the use of violence to achieve political goals.

(Ashour 2009, 5-6)

This definition represents the clearest attempt by a scholar to define de-radicalisation with some detail. Unlike the previous definitions, Ashour locates de-radicalisation within the particular context of Islamist movements and political Islam with wider political and social environments. Another difference between this definition and the two policy orientated definitions above is that it conceives of de-radicalisation as (a) Collective phenomenon and (b) specifically involves ideological revision.

Another academic contribution is made by Demant et al. (2008). They define de-radicalisation as ‘the opposite of radicalisation’ and as the process of ‘becoming less radical’, where ‘becoming less radical’ applies to behaviour and beliefs (2008, 13). Moreover they define what ‘belief change’ involves:

…..increase in the confidence in the system, a desire to be a part of society, and the rejection of non-democratic means.

(13)
Their distinction between behaviour and belief echoes the definition used by the UK Home Office. However their elaboration on what ‘belief’ change would entail is unique from the definitions above, which avoid defining what belief or “cognitive change” entails besides renouncing violence. It is notable that the no mention of changing attitudes toward violence features in their definition.

Finally, examples of definitions employed by think-tanks are offered mainly by Rabasa et al. (2010) for RAND, the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007), and the Quilliam Foundation (2009). The ICG report defined de-radicalisation as a prison based effort to “persuade terrorists and their supporters to abandon the use of violence” (2007, 5). Also, according to the report the term covers anything from ‘inmate counselling to development aid for Islamic schools’ (Ibid). This definition is similar to others above with the difference that it specifies de-radicalisation as being ‘prison-based’ programmes as well as highlighting the different associations the terms connotes. In contrast, Rabasa et al. (2010) define de-radicalisation as

A process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to effect social change. As part of the process there is recognition that social, political, and economic transformation will occur slowly and in a pluralistic environment.

(1-2)

This definition sets out what ‘worldview’ change entails. In contrast to previous definitions, this definition uses words like ‘extremist worldview’ without defining what extremism is, as well as being the most demanding of all the definitions seen above.
With this definition, necessary and sufficient conditions for de-radicalisation would require individuals to abandon extremist worldview on social, political, and economic issues. In other words, Rabasa et al. view of de-radicalisation entail substantial belief change.

The third example of a think-tank definition is provided by the Quilliam Foundation (QF). This definition was taken from an interview between a researcher and a member of the QF. The QF defines de-radicalisation as a process through which the ideology behind extremism is ‘questioned and refuted and replaced in favour of a more traditional, pluralistic understanding of Islam’ (Johnson 2009, appendix). This is a completely different understanding of de-radicalisation. No mention is made of violence, behavioural change, or prisons, and solely focuses on (a) ideology and (b) adopting plural interpretations of Islam.

Notably, there is some reluctance regarding the use of the term ‘de-radicalisation’ by policymakers. In the UK de-radicalisation interventions existed at a local and ad hoc way in the 1990’s, not to mention on the ground work during the first two iterations of PREVENT in 2006 and 2009. However, it was not until 2011 that the term de-radicalisation was expanded in PREVENT. This raises the question: why was the term de-radicalisation not used before to describe on the ground interventions? Why wait until 2011?

Whilst no definitive answer exists, there is certainly an indication that there was some reluctance with regards to the definition of the term de-radicalisation, which is evident with the confusing definition of de-radicalisation in PREVENT. It is also significant that the OSCT at the Home Office commissioned a review in 2011 on ‘disengagement’ and not de-radicalisation. Another reason, which will become more
transparent in chapter 5, is the fact that unlike discourses on radicalisation, there was no institutional investment in the study of de-radicalisation. In any case the term de-radicalisation is certainly contested. In a literature review conducted for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Alex Schmid highlighted the fact that governments prefer to use terms like ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘reintegration’.

The term ‘de-radicalisation’ is generally avoided by governments when it comes to winning back the ‘hearts and minds’ of those who became violent radicals or terrorists. The Global Counterterrorism Forum (a new multilateral forum consisting of 30 member states spearheaded by the US and Turkey) used, in its recent Rome Memorandum, the terminology of ‘Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders’ as did the Roundtable Expert Meeting and Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, co-organised by ICCT – The Hague and UNICRI, in their paper Core Principles & Good Practices.

(Schmid 2013, 49)

Finally, the eight definitions reviewed above illustrate the lack of agreement in the literature with regards to the meaning of de-radicalisation. The various definitions of de-radicalisation convey that the term ‘meant different things to different people’ (ICG 2007, 3). Another salient feature is that de-radicalisation as a term is being conflated with numerous other terms in the literature. Of the eight definitions, the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation is the most confusing, whilst the definition of de-radicalisation offered by Western think-tanks emphasise an expansive view of
de-radicalisation in which radical individuals have to embrace Western values as a necessary prerequisite for successful de-radicalisation. This was contrasted with Ashour’s definition which places de-radicalisation within the history and politics of Islamist movements at the collective level, whereas all the other definitions seem to place de-radicalisation as an intervention designed for individuals. Horgan defines it in two ways revolving around the desire to ‘reduce risk’. In addition, Quilliam’s definition of de-radicalisation was not an official definition but one found in a written interview between a researcher and a Quilliam analyst. It was used because it showed another understanding of de-radicalisation relating to the hermeneutics of the Islamic tradition, which is a theologically focused definition. It is interesting that at the global and UN level member state governments show a reluctance to use the term ‘de-radicalisation’ and prefer the term ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘re-integration’. In short, the term is ill-defined and confusing.

2.4 The Concept of De-radicalisation

2.4.1 Older Conceptions of De-radicalisation

There are four journal articles on de-radicalisation written before the 1990’s. The earliest is dated to the 1960’s, two written in the 70’s, and the fourth in the 1980’s. The most influential piece of work belongs to Robert Tucker on ‘The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements,’ (1967). The second and third articles, in terms of chronology, are ‘Deradicalisation of the Japanese Communist Party’ and ‘Deradicalisation and the French communist Party’, by Hong Kim (1976) and Sue Charlton (1979) respectively. The last article is ‘A Theory of Political Socialisation: Institutional Support and Deradicalisation’ by Donald Searing (1986).
Robert Tucker defined de-radicalisation as:

Deradicalization signifies a subtle change in the movement's relation to the social milieu. Essentially, it settles down and adjusts itself to existence within the very order that it officially desires to overthrow and transform. This is not to say that the movement turns into a conservative social force opposed to social change. Rather, it becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the established system and its institutionalized procedures as the framework for further efforts in the direction of social change.

(Tucker 1967, 348)

Based on Tucker's definition of de-radicalisation, the phrase 'coming to terms with the existing order' best indicates what de-radicalisation means. In other words, de-radicalisation means acceptance of the 'established system and its institutionalised procedures' and by default abandoning the notion of 'change' and 'transformation'. The underlying notion expressed in Tucker's conception of de-radicalisation is analogous to political socialisation, which translates into an acceptance of the world as it is, rather than how it ought to be. More significantly however is that de-radicalisation refers to a 'change' that happens to 'movements”. In fact Tucker espouses a comparative framework for analysing the de-radicalisation of Marxist movements. This framework was derived from his study of the similarities in the evolution of German social democracy and Soviet communism, and was premised on the principle that involvement of communist parties in democratic electoral politics makes them more pragmatic, non-heretical, and non-ideological (349).
Meanwhile, Hong Kim (1976), Sue Charlton (1979) deploy Tucker’s framework in their articles. Hong Kim, for example, argued that the success of communist Party (JCP) in Japanese elections in 1974, organisationally and electorally, could be attributed to the de-radicalisation of the Japanese communist movement which has taken place under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto after 1961 (274). The term de-radicalisation for Kim means making an ‘accommodation to the world as it stands’ instead of seeking the ‘ideal order’ through violent means (Ibid). More specifically it means the transformation of a revolutionary party into an electoral party that seeks power largely through the parliamentary process. Similarly, Sue Charlton uses Tucker’s framework to examine developments with French Communist in the 1970’s (1979, 42). The most interesting dimension however of Charlton’s study is the following hypothesis:

On the basis of the French experience, one can hypothesis that as deradicalisation proceeds, it will inevitably affect the ideology of a Marxist movement as well as its practice and tactical doctrine: the tension generated by maintaining an obvious contradiction between ideology and practice would end by discrediting the party even more than by altering basic revolutionary tenets, this recalls the point made earlier, that the process of deradicalisation creates further pressure for deradicalisation. Deradicalisation is thus a conflictual, dialectical process.

(Carlton 1979, 58)

The underlying notion here regarding ideological change of Marxist Movements is that it follows changes in practice, and does not precede it. In other words, it is only after achieving worldly or political success or confronting a structural reality, that
ideological revision ensues in order to reconcile ideology and practice. This is an important point to consider given the emphasis the role ideology has in the PREVENT’s strategy’s conception of de-radicalisation.

Meanwhile, Donald Searing’s (1986) study presents a theory of political socialisation by examining institutional support and the de-radicalisation of political parties, their activists, and parliamentarians. Notably, he does not define de-radicalisation but uses the term loosely to mean a type of moderate orientation or beliefs towards economic and social policy (345). In this respect, Searing’s conception of de-radicalisation was vague and adds little to our understanding conceptually.

However, Searing’s study is nevertheless useful because he conceives de-radicalisation as a crucial dimension, in conjunction with theories on institutional support, in theories on political socialisation. For example, institutional support claims that a ‘consensus behind political rules of the game, behind constitutional and procedural conventions, is essential for democracy’s survival’ (348). More significant for our understanding of de-radicalisation, Searing explains the link between institutional support and de-radicalisation and socialisation: ‘...there is no reason to expect people to support the rules of the game unless they learn to believe in them’ (Ibid). In Searing’s view, being increasingly involved with political institutions and system increases the likelihood of de-radicalisation, which means adhering to status quo views on political, economic, and social policy. Thus de-radicalisation in his conception, e.g. learning the rules of the game and believing in them, becomes a possibility the more individuals, organisations, and movements become increasingly involved with the political system. This claim, that institutions are buttressed by
encouraging defenders of the system as well as absorbing insurgents, is aptly underscored by a quote from a Labour MP: ‘I think instead of me turning this place inside out, they turned me inside out a little’ (372).

2.4.2 Contemporary Conceptions of De-radicalisation: Disengagement, Collective De-radicalisation, and the Adoption of Values

There has been scant consideration of the conceptual ontology of de-radicalisation in the literature, and what little discussion that has taken place has focused on making distinctions between cognitive and behavioural variables. Whilst there are other characteristics to de-radicalisation conceptually, namely the distinction between voluntary/involuntary, state/non-state programmes and between programmes/initiative (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009, 3), the salient issue ontologically remains analysing the influence of cognitive and behavioural factors, something which is again reflected in the PREVENT’s strand’s formulation of de-radicalisation.

John Horgan, for example, critiques current understandings of de-radicalisation for failing to distinguish between cognitive and behavioural dimensions of de-radicalisation. De-radicalisation is predicated on the reorientation of ‘worldview’ and cognitive shift of detainees taking part in such programmes (Bjorgo and Horgan 2009, 5). However, one aim of de-radicalisation is to get armed Islamist groups to renounce violence, which is in fact a behaviour change—also known as ‘disengagement’. Unlike de-radicalisation, disengagement does not require a change of ideals or views but only the renunciation of violence. Therefore the most significant problem with current assumptions about de-radicalisation is the failure to divorce conceptually between behavioural and cognitive dimensions. In other words
it is based on the misleading assumption that ‘radical views predict radical behaviour’ (Ibid). Instead, Horgan argues that the relationship between behaviour and cognition and how they interact is more complex than previously understood. Contrary to misconceptions, research demonstrates that more often than not extremist views are acquired after an individual joins a group, and not before (Ibid).

Based on the principle that behavioural changes can and does occur before changes to the view of militant individuals, Horgan emphasises the need to focus more on disengagement. As a result Horgan prefers to use the term ‘risk reduction initiatives’ than de-radicalisation because the deeper scrutiny of such programmes actually reveal that de-radicalisation is about ‘reducing the risk for ‘engagement (and/or re-engagement) in terrorism and illicit activity’ (Horgan 2009). Ultimately, Horgan argues the case for disengagement as the preferred strategy for counter-terrorism policy-makers whilst critiquing the conceptual viability of de-radicalisation.

In contrast, Omar Ashour’s conceptual understanding of de-radicalisation uses a different methodological approach that situates de-radicalisation as a process of relative change which occurs at the collective level within Islamists movements (Ashour 2009, 5). It does not thus address the strict conceptual separation between behaviour and cognitive variables as a process at an individual level. Instead Ashour distinguishes three different levels of de-radicalisation (Ibid: 6):

1. Behavioural: refers to groups abandoning the use of violence
2. Ideological: relates to the de-legitimisation of violence.
3. Organisational: refers to the demobilisation of members and can only occur after the former two levels are achieved.

In contrast to Horgan, Ashour is more open about the potential of cognitive change in inducing a more ‘substantive’ level of de-radicalisation through the delegitimising of violence in counter-ideological provisions. In addition, Ashour’s conceptualisation encompasses three dimensions (Ibid):

1. Pragmatic: refers to behavioural de-radicalisation without ideological change
2. Substantive: this encompasses both behavioural and ideological changes
3. Comprehensive: this occurs when de-radicalisation happens at all three levels

Indeed the categorisation of different types and levels is useful as a framework to understand de-radicalisation since it does way with problematic dichotomy in the cognitive-behavioural formulation. In other words, Ashour offers a conception that does not presume a causal relationship between cognitive and behavioural variables at an individual level. However the challenge with Ashour’s conceptual understanding of de-radicalisation is that it is context specific. De-radicalisation in Europe for example appears to be concerned with processes at the individual level and does not occur amidst the same influences inherent to Egypt and Algeria, e.g. repression by the state in processes of de-radicalisation, and thus questions arise regarding the transferability of his framework.

Meanwhile, there is an important caveat to consider about discussions on ‘cognitive change’ in the literature. Indeed de-radicalisation is predicated on the idea of a quick fix - the undoing of years of social and behavioural conditioning that has led an
individual person to harbour certain views or engage in terrorist activities. Putting aside the practical question about the feasibility of this actually occurring, it is not always clear what is meant by ‘cognitive change’; on the one hand there is unequivocal agreement that at a policy level it entails changing attitudes towards violence. On the other hand there is also recognition that conceptually de-radicalisation is about the softening of views and attitudes with respect to issues like democracy and women’s rights, which is important to ‘reintegrate into mainstream society’.

For example, whilst Rabasa et al. (2010) and Demant et al. (2008) do not advance a conceptual framework for de-radicalisation, both reports nevertheless stress the significance of a particular type of ‘cognitive change’, one entailing belief change on issues like democracy and women’s rights. The ambiguity that such a conception of ‘cognitive change’ entails is also reflect in Demant et al.’s conclusion that even if an individual’s radical beliefs has not changed then de-radicalisation would still have ‘taken place’ (2008, 13). Rabasa et al. and Demant et al. therefore present an expansive view of de-radicalisation, one in which substantial ‘cognitive change’ occurs when participants in these programmes not only abandon violence but also embrace the views and norms of the host society.

In contrast, both Ashour and Horgan conceptualise de-radicalisation as being about getting violent takfirri jihadist to abandon violence. Ashour explicitly states that de-radicalisation in Egypt is not about changing attitudes towards democracy and other norms, claiming that many de-radicalised groups still uphold ‘misogynist, homophobic, xenophobic, and anti-democratic views’ (Ashour 2009, 6). Cognitive change therefore does not entail the adoption of liberal values and norms that has become associated with de-radicalisation in the European context (Demant et al.
2008, 13; Rabasa, et al. 2010, 2). Consequently, Horgan’s and Ashour’s studies on de-radicalisation, as well as the wider field analysis seem to suggest a disjuncture between de-radicalisation as a notion and actual de-radicalisation as practice.

Within these debates, Horgan and Ashour provide the ontological foundations of a new research area. Horgan crucially questions the conceptual coherence of de-radicalisation and suggests an alternative policy in the form of disengagement whilst Ashour offers the most detailed conceptual categorisations of collective de-radicalisation of armed Islamist movements in the literature. Despite laying down some foundations to the ontological makeup of de-radicalisation, Horgan’s and Ashour’s conceptions, not least Demant et al. and Rabasa et al. contributions, remain divorced from the context specific reality of de-radicalisation in the UK.

2.4.3 Foucauldian Interpretations of De-radicalisation

Neil Aggarwal (2013) tries to establish convergence between Foucault’s model of disciplinary power in ‘Discipline and Punish’ and prison de-radicalisation programmes in the M.E and S.E.A. He begins by tracing the influence of psychiatry on the knowledge production of what constitutes de-radicalisation (2013, 264-265). Interestingly, Aggarwal claims that by adopting the language and concepts of psychiatry, Ashour and Horgan have laid the foundation for corrective interventions (265). For Aggwarwal, the production of de-radicalisation knowledge can be divided into ‘secular psychological’ and ‘religious reformist’. Aggarwal believes that de-radicalisation programmes have high recidivism rates, which means that high percentage of inmates recanting from violence end up reoffending, and he makes
the argument that there is a correlation between the ‘religious reform model’ and high recidivism rates. Hence de-radicalisation are said to target the symbolic form rather than actual cause of violence (274). His account affirms the comparisons between Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish’ and de-radicalisation with reservations regarding the effectiveness of religious rehabilitative models divorced from political and economic context. As well as identifying the emphasis on ‘religious reform model’ in de-radicalisation interventions as the cause behind high rates of recidivism (274), he concludes that de-radicalisation programmes indicates an attempt of the state to create docile subjects:

This technical transformation of individuals is an attempt to instil discipline and self-governance to render subjects obedient to the state.

(2013, 272)

Aggarwal’s contribution to the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation lies in making a link between the discursive production of knowledge on de-radicalisation and programmes of interventions, as well as critically questioning the religious-ideological focus of de-radicalisation programmes. Aggarwal’s analysis however, similarly to the bulk of the literature on de-radicalisation, largely depends on the works of Horgan and Ashour and his analysis remains restricted to prison environments, albeit interpreted through a Foucauldian filter. In other words, Aggwarwal’s analysis is divorced from the realities of de-radicalisation in the UK context.

Perhaps the most relevant reading of de-radicalisation to the UK context is advanced by Lasse Lindekilde (2015). His analysis of de-radicalisation focuses on individual interventions in Denmark after their revised counter-radicalisation policy of 2011, which was influenced by the separation of community cohesion projects from
counter-radicalisation efforts in the UK (229). His study presents two crucial addendums to other accounts of de-radicalisation in the literature; the first relates to the pastoral dimension of mentoring in de-radicalisation and the second to the fact that de-radicalisation is situated within Foucauldian governmentality.

In the first instance, the pastoral dimensions of mentoring of de-radicalisation in the UK context brings to the fore the fact that de-radicalisation interventions are built upon existing crime-prevention infrastructures (225). By examining the mentoring aspects of de-radicalisation, Lindekilde elucidates the flexible and pragmatic nature involved in de-radicalisation interventions. For example, he notes the diversity of opinions on what it means to achieve de-radicalisation as the end goal of mentoring interventions and that often the goal of interventions fell short of comprehensive de-radicalisation, which is the formal policy goal of de-radicalisation in counter-radicalisation policies (233-4). With regards to the second point, it is through the multifunctional role of the mentor, e.g. mentors as role models, supervisor, coach, and ‘significant other’ (232), that he situates the pastoral logic within the workings of neo-liberal governmentality. He also challenges the ‘post-political nature’ of targeted de-radicalisation interventions, which distinguishes it from ordinary crime prevention because it essentially entails protecting individuals against political and religious views (236).

Lindekilde’s argument echoes a number of key features present in UK de-radicalisation interventions. This includes the fact that de-radicalisation was built on pre-existing crime prevention infrastructure, the multifaceted use of mentors in interventions programmes, the political nature inherent to such programmes, and
situating de-radicalisation within neo-liberal governmentality. However, whilst Lindekilde does situate de-radicalisation within policy objectives to re-calibrate counter-radicalisation efforts to a narrow the focus of PREVENT’s activities, it does not directly trace the relationship between discourses on radicalisation and de-radicalisation intervention, nor does it allude to the interplay between discursive domains and their concretisation in institutions and programmes. Yet it has been the discursive production of ‘radicalisation’ that has distinctively characterised the British experience in relation to fighting terrorism and which much of the literature on de-radicalisation has evaded and overlooked.

2.5 The De-radicalisation Process

Understanding the process of de-radicalisation effectively deals with the factors that lead individuals to disengage and exit from militant groups. Given the absence of data and in depth studies on the process of de-radicalisation, some of the literature draws on the work on gangs, cults, and social groups and is applied to terrorist groups in order to understand processes of de-radicalisation (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009, 7-10; Disley et al. 2011; Edwards 2015). The literature on the de-radicalisation process could be categorised into: factors leading to individual disengagement; factors leading to collective de-radicalisation; rational choice theory; and social movement explanations.

Contributions on the disengagement process at the individual level are made by Horgan and Bjorgo (Bjorgo & Horgan 2009). Based on interviews with terrorists,
Horgan identifies two factors of disengagement- psychological and physical. Psychological factors include (21-22):

- Disillusionment arising from incongruence between the initial ideals and fantasies that shape a person’s initial involvement and their subsequent experiences with the reality of what is entailed by involvement- in other words, the mismatch between the fantasy and the reality;
- Disillusionment arising from disengagement over tactical issues;
- Disillusionment arising from strategic, political, or ideological differences
- Becoming burned out
- Changing personal priorities

Whereas physical factors include (25):

- Voluntary exit from the movement
- Involuntary exit from the movement
- Involuntary movement into another role
- Voluntary movement into another role
- Involuntary exit from the movement altogether
- Experiences stemming from psychological disengagement that acts as a catalyst for physical disengagement across 1 to 4 above.

Also, arrest, imprisonment, and death are identified by Horgan as the most dramatic examples of physical disengagement (Ibid). These psychological and physical factors can therefore either become linked, occur independently, or/and converge.
Moreover a salient point about this process is that the occurrence of these factors does not necessarily lead to complete and total disengagement; it may lead instead to ‘role change’ (26). In this instance the individual may renounce violence but remain active with the group’s activities in another way or role, and uses the example of a known IRA militant that moved away from militant role to a political role in Sinn Fein (Ibid).

Horgan does provide an explanation of processes that occurs at the level of the individual, which he admits does not supersede explanations focusing on collective dynamics, since terrorism does happen predominantly at the collective level (18), but instead contributes to a multi-level approach to understanding terrorism. Indeed the focus of de-radicalisation programmes in Europe is predominantly on the processes at an individual level, which makes Horgan’s approach transferrable. Another interesting point about Horgan’s disengagement process is the absence of ideology as a motivating factor in disengagement, which is a notable area of contention in the literature and de-radicalisation programmes.

Meanwhile, Tore Bjorgo draws on interview data (50 individuals) in order to shed further light on disengagement process but from the perspective of right-wing extremism. Bjorgo makes a distinction between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (Ibid: 36-40).

‘Push’ factors include:

- Negative social sanctions may cause some to reconsider their affiliation. These may range from parental scolding and social isolation to criminal persecution and harassment or violence by militants anti-racists. (36)
- Some lose faith in the ideology and politics of the group or movement;
- A feeling that ‘things are going too far’ (37);
- Disillusionment with the inner workings and activities of the group;
- Losing confidence, status and position in the group (38); and
- A feeling of exhaustion and that they can no longer take the pressure.

‘Pull’ factors in contrast refer to factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative. This includes:

- A longing for the freedoms of a normal life (39);
- Activist feeling they are getting too old for what they are doing,
- Activist caring about career prospects and personal futures; and
- Establishing a family with new responsibility for spouse and children (40).

Moreover Bjorgo believes that ‘how’ questions are more useful than the ‘why’ questions when trying to persuade an individual to leave an extremist or violent group (42). He identifies three main strategies to facilitate disengagement: individuals need to make a public break with the group and therefore renounce attitude and ideologies it represents (Ibid); breaking with the group without breaking the ideology (43); third, a quiet and gradual withdrawal. Interestingly, Bjorgo concludes the following:

Anti-racist campaigns with a focus on ideology and values- the favourite measure of politicians who ‘want to do something against racism and right-wing extremism’- are not likely to have much effect in terms of preventing youths from joining racist groups or of inducing anyone to quit such groups.

(48)
As a result of the stress on behavioural approaches to the understanding of disengagement, the role of counter-ideology as factor in disengagement is disregarded. The behaviour over cognitive approach has been translated in real life through the EXIT programmes in Scandinavian and other European countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland; Germany; and Netherland) that deal with right-wing extremism, a project Bjorgo has influenced and been involved with (47).

The only real attempt to understand the process of de-radicalisation directly has been made by Omar Ashour (2009). Ashour’s study is based on case study examination of collective de-radicalisation efforts in Egypt and Algeria and uses comparative qualitative research that combines content analysis and interviews (17). His analysis shows that the de-radicalisation process relies on the dynamic interplay between the following factors (102-109):

- **State repression**: this incorporates a range of actions by the state to bring about political quiescence- restrictions on free speech, violation of rights, such as torture and imprisonment, as well as state sponsored terror in the form of assignations, civilian slaughters and mass-murders. (14-15)

- **Selective inducements** (material incentives: refers to explicit or implicit socio-political/socio-economic incentives to Islamist movements, which include ceasing systematic torture or offering a power-sharing formula for participation in the government. (15)

- **Social interaction with significant others**: refers to internal and external interactions with individuals and groups within and outside their own group and with others and takes place mainly in prisons. (Ibid)
• Involvement of influential leaders in the process: only leaders/leadership are seen by the majority of followers as pious, theologically knowledgeable, and preferably with a history of ‘struggle’ could cast legitimacy on the de-radicalisation process. Leaders have a considerable influence over followers. (15-16)

Ashour states that a combination of all these factors played a role in the de-radicalisation of Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group in Egypt (102-109). Despite providing the most detailed case study of de-radicalisation in the field, Ashour’s work is context specific to Egypt. A factor like state repression, for example, is not transferrable into de-radicalisation programmes in the UK. In addition, whilst it is clear that counter-ideology played a role in the collective de-radicalisation efforts in Egypt, Ashour’s analysis actually demonstrates a more complex picture in which other influences, particularly structural political factors, played a greater role in the de-radicalisation process.

Furthermore, Rabasa et al. (2010) report’s for RAND provide a breakdown of individual disengagement process through their examination of the literature on gangs, cults, and group. Interestingly, the authors claim that de-radicalisation may not be radicalisation in ‘reverse’ and the pathways to each could be ‘different’ (iii). Their conception however outlines a general path of disengagement for violent/extremists but says little about the trajectory of de-radicalisation. Their process of individual disengagement is (11-26):
- **Trigger**: the beginning of the process occurs during a traumatic event, like arrest or death, which leads to a cognitive opening that allows the individual to begin weighing the pros and cons of disengagement.

- **Turning point**: Using rational choice theories. This stage refers to the individual's rational calculations between motives, strategies, and structures and makes a decision.

- **Disengagement**: this stage in the process is about leaving the group entirely.

- A new identity and integration into society; this is followed by the desire of the individual for a new life, a new identity, and to reintegrate into society.

- **Likelihood of recidivism**: the last stage deals with the condition which reduce the prospect of reengagement, also known as recidivism, which depends on the individual finding a job, new social network, and whether the person is de-radicalised.

Meanwhile, Demant et al. (2008) examine radical social movements in the Netherlands and identify three degrees of commitment to radical/extremist groups by individuals and therefore present a different set of factors to consider in the de-radicalisation process. These factors can be categorised into (115-116):

1. **Normative**: deals with meaning and ideology for the individual,

2. **Pragmatic**: deals with the cost benefit analysis of staying or leaving the group.
3. Affective; deals with the emotional attachments of individuals to these groups through friendship and identity.

Demant et al. conclude from their examination of the literature that Islamically inspired individuals and groups are more ideological than other extremist groups (129). Consequently, de-radicalisation programmes geared towards Muslim radicals in the Netherlands should include counter-ideological components. However, their emphasis on the role of counter-ideology in tackling Muslim radicalism contradicts their analyses on the decline of radical movements, like the radical Moluccans, the Squatters’ movement, and extreme right movement in the Netherlands, which revealed that disengagement and collective decline was predominantly due to non-ideological factors, such as organisational failure and changes in practical circumstance (122-126).

Another contribution to the debate of de-radicalisation process is made by Rohan Gunaratna (2009). Gunaratna identifies four modes of rehabilitation: religious, psychological, social and vocational. Of the four, he considered religious rehabilitation to be the most important because with it came the ‘unlocking of the terrorist mind’ and ‘it has the power to make a beneficiary of rehabilitation repent, become remorseful and re-enter the mainstream’ (150). Second, psychological rehabilitation involves psycho profiling, assessment and solution (ibid). Third, social rehabilitation is about providing assistance to the family of the captured terrorist. This takes the form of providing aftercare by way of jobs, monetary assistance, and a fresh outlook. Fourth, vocational rehabilitation is concerned with preparing inmates re-integrate into society with skills development and educational attainment (152). Gunaratna also pointed out several parameters within which rehabilitation could be optimally used. It should be used as a complementary strategic tool to fight
extremism and terrorism. Every rehabilitation programme should be accompanied by a community education programme. Ultimately, despite the marked absence of any empirical data, case studies, or reference to any other in depth examination of the ‘rehabilitation’ of inmates, Gunaratna provides a holistic take on the concept of ‘rehabilitation’ without explaining factors and process of disengagement and de-radicalisation.

Consequently, besides Ashour, all the others- Horgan, Bjorgo, Demant et al., Rabasa et al., and Gunaratna- provide accounts of disengagement and rehabilitation at the individual level and not de-radicalisation. The scant and limited examination of processes, factors, and pathways of de-radicalisation in the literature unanimously concludes:

1. **The inconclusiveness of the role of counter-ideology in the de-radicalisation process**: since de-radicalisation programmes include both material and counter-ideological components, it is difficult to evaluate what factors are the most important (Chowdhury and Hearne 2008, 16).

2. **Counter-ideology plays little or no role in the process of de-radicalisation**: in fact the literature shows ideological factors play little or no role in persuading individuals to enter or leave such groups and movements (Bjorgo 2009, 36-40). In fact Horgan, Bjorgo, Demant et al. conclude the same and prefer to emphasise disengagement, a behavioural focus, over de-radicalisation, which focuses more on cognitive change. Ashour does consider ideological revisionism and de-legitimisation an integral feature of the de-radicalisation process but based on the four chief processes he
identifies needed for successful de-radicalisation, it is clear counter-ideology plays a limited role in contrast to state repression, selective inducements, and the role of leaders (the role of social interaction encompasses ideological revision). This fact was poignantly corroborated by the findings of a study of 145 people across four European member states on behalf of the European Commission published by the Change Institute in 2008 (one of the very few empirical studies done in radicalisation studies). The report- ‘Beliefs, ideologies and narratives of violent radicalisation’- concluded that developing and promoting counter ideologies is unlikely to suffice in itself (140) and that:

…..there is little, if any, historical evidence that ideology, whether radical, violent or otherwise, can be defeated solely by the employment of a counter-ideology. More often ideology collapses or comes to be seen as redundant as its explanatory power comes into question in the face of accumulating evidence that it is unable to explain. (Change Institute 2008, 143)

3. Material provisions are more influential than ideology in the de-radicalisation process: Abuza’s review on de-radicalisation programmes in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore targeted at Jamaah Islamyia (JI) is instructive here. He conveys that many of those ‘de-radicalised’ remain committed goals of JI in establishing an Islamic state and the imposition of Sharia (Horgan and Bjorgo 2009, 194). Perhaps more interesting is the observation he makes those detainees completing de-radicalisation programmes still had a commitment to Sharia and maintained their ‘cognitive radicalism’ (211). Moreover, many segments of society hold and share and would ‘not think JI did anything wrong in the first place’ (194).
Abuza writes how providing support for detainee’s families had a dramatic impact on detainees involved in de-radicalisation programmes, leading the overseers of the programme to conclude that the ‘economic aid, however, is ultimately more important than religious arguments in changing prisoner’s attitudes’ (Ibid).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literature on de-radicalisation. The first section provided a brief snapshot of the state of the literature on de-radicalisation as a whole. There were a number of critical challenges posed by the study of de-radicalisation, which included: the newness of de-radicalisation as an area, which primarily begins after 2006, the absence of empirical data, the majority of the literature are considered reviews of programmes, little in depth study of de-radicalisation, little or no robust methodologies used, no evidence for policy development, and not a single examination of de-radicalisation in the UK context exists. The section after surveys the existence of de-radicalisation programmes. It shows that there is a diversity of de-radicalisation programmes, with different methods, objectives, and focus. Most the programmes are prison based and used a combination of ideological and material based provisions in interventions. In the UK however, the focus is on individuals outside of prison environments and civil society and on ‘extremist’ instead of militants convicted of crime. Another challenge was evaluating the success of programmes.

The third section outlined eight definitions of de-radicalisation. There were many different definitions of de-radicalisation, the term was synonymous with other terms, all of which underscored the notion that de-radicalisation was an ill-defined term that
‘meant different things to different people’. Section 2.4 analysed the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation. This section revealed the older conceptions of de-radicalisation were associated with Marxist movements and that the move away from radicalisation was precipitated by material changes first, not ideological ones. More importantly it analysed the two main conceptions of de-radicalisation: John Horgan argued against the use of the concept of de-radicalisation and for disengagement, whereas Omar Ashour offers a more multi-layered framework of collective de-radicalisation. The main tension in the ontological discussion of de-radicalisation is the relationships between ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ dimension and its viability as a policy. In addition, two other perspectives on de-radicalisation conceptually came from the use of Foucauldian analysis, which contributed to the conceptual armoury of de-radicalisation.

The section after examined the literature on the actual de-radicalisation process. This is important given the stated objectives of policymakers of wanting to move individuals away from violence, as well as preventing people from heading towards radicalisation. Of the five accounts, only Ashour identifies some credible factors leading to collective de-radicalisation. Others accounts emphasises factors relating to disengagement and rehabilitation. The significant finding here is that the literature emphasises the importance of material components of interventions or affective factors at individual level over ideological dimension in successful interventions. It illustrates the disjuncture between the valorisation of counter-ideology associated with the idea of de-radicalisation on the one hand, and the actual reality of de-radicalisation interventions on the other.

Consequently, my fieldwork investigation of de-radicalisation will attempt to understand and reconcile the lacuna evident in the literature and the disjuncture
between the idea and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK. My aim is to answer the question: What is de-radicalisation?
CHAPTER 3

The Concept of De-radicalisation: an Analysis of Fieldwork Data

It became clear in chapter 2 that no substantial academic work on the de-radicalisation has been conducted. This investigation takes the conception of de-radicalisation articulated in the PREVENT strategy as a point of departure. The apparent meaningless discourse on de-radicalisation therefore begs the following questions: What is de-radicalisation? What is de-radicalisation supposed to tackle if the targets of interventions are non-violent youths with no links or association to terrorist groups? Is it about tackling the threat of violence for policy-makers? Or is it about affirming and suppressing certain identities in the UK? What is the relationship between de-radicalisation and PREVENT? What is the relationship between de-radicalisation and counter-terrorism?

This chapter attempts to answer the first question using data from 27 interviews. The first section outlines the methodology used in my investigation of the ontological make-up of de-radicalisation. The section after presents the fieldwork data in tabulated and graphical form. The aim is to illustrate what interviewees thought de-radicalisation was. Section 3.3 analyses the definition of de-radicalisation and the terms used to describe it, whilst the section after analyses the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation in more detail. It conveys the existence of four understandings of de-radicalisation and a confusing conceptual framework. Section 3.5 assesses the implications of having multiple conceptions of de-radicalisation. The section after evaluates the data and situates its significance in relation to the literature and what it
entails with respect to understanding the ontological reality of de-radicalisation. The last section of the chapter evaluates the research process itself. The conclusion opens the discussion for an alternative way of conceptualising de-radicalisation.

3.1 Research Methodology

My research seeks to investigate the ontological conceptual framework of de-radicalisation. Policymakers are making causal claims about human behaviour based on the principle that cognitive change leads to behavioural change in both conceptions of de-radicalisation, without substantially addressing the question of ontology. Hence I am interested in the ‘what’ question: What is it? And what does it mean? Given the opacity and absence of conceptual clarity surrounding de-radicalisation I aim to use the data collated from my fieldwork to disentangle the confusion and assumptions that currently characterise the idea and policy of de-radicalisation and say something more substantively on it. I was particularly interested in finding out from the interviews the actual meaning of de-radicalisation conceptually and as a strategy of counter-terrorism in a way not captured in the literature and not reflected in policy. To do this, I needed to find out (1) what interviewees thought de-radicalisation was about conceptually and (2) understand the wider context of de-radicalisation, which included de-radicalisation interventions, the PREVENT policy, and the politics accompanying it. Notably, this chapter analyses the first set of data, whereas the second category of data will be examined throughout the rest of the thesis.
My research will therefore conduct the investigation using the case study method. The case study method is defined as:

An empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.

(Yin 2009, 18)

There are two important features of the case study method that is pertinent and useful to my research enquiry: the first relates to my objective of conducting a study of de-radicalisation in order to understand the ontological framework of de-radicalisation in more detail, whereas the second concerns my wanting to understand the wider context of de-radicalisation. Indeed these objectives are linked to some key assumptions implicitly underlining my research investigations. The first is my motive to try and directly address my research question, which is a descriptive as well as exploratory enterprise. Given the paucity, confusion, and lacuna in current conceptions of de-radicalisation, this exploratory aim is consequently concerned with gathering data, making sense of it, and offering an ontological account of de-radicalisation. This exercise is however tied up by the question: is there another way to frame the concept of de-radicalisation? This type of analysis begins with what I have discovered and potentially offers an alternative concept of the reality of de-radicalisation in the UK context. Hence the motivation to describe, explore, and offer
conceptions of de-radicalisation in the following investigation are inextricably tied to my research objectives stated above.

The case study method will enable me to accomplish both research objectives. A case study is an in depth study of a particular situation used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one easily researchable topic (Yin 2009). The ‘case’ being investigated in this research is the idea and practice of de-radicalisation in UK Counter-terrorism. A ‘case’ is generally a bounded entity (a person, organization, behavioural condition, event, or other social phenomenon), but the boundary between the case and its contextual conditions may be blurred. Case study research assumes that examining the context and other complex conditions related to the case(s) being studied are integral to understanding the case(s) (Yin 2009). The case study method will thus allow me to explore the wider context, in terms of themes and concepts from which the idea and practice of de-radicalisation emerged and developed in the real world.

However, the case study method does have drawbacks. The first major drawback is the notion that case study methods are a less rigorous inquiry (Ibid). This stems from the notion that case study research is the exploratory phase for using social science method and serves only a prelude to further and more substantial investigations. A second critique of the case-study method is that case study procedures lack credibility in that it does not sufficiently protect against researcher bias and its effect on research findings (Ibid). Lastly, the case study method is perceived to lack the ability to generalise the research findings to a wider level (Ibid).

The notion that the case study is exploratory is in the context of de-radicalisation, given the rudimentary state of research on it, an advantage. Also, bearing in mind
my objectives of investigating the wider context of de-radicalisation, the data can potentially provide interpretations beyond a restricted exploratory remit. This thesis will attempt to elaborate in chapters 4 to 7 that this was in fact the case. Regarding the second concern, I acknowledge this as a general reality of research in the social sciences as a whole. However as will be explained below, this critique is mitigated by this research’s presumption philosophically that objective and value free knowledge, as professed by positivist epistemology, does not apply to the human world. Finally, the problem of being able to generalise case study data is better understood by distinguishing between two types of generalizing: statistical generalizations and analytic generalizations (Ibid, 38–39). For case study research, the latter is the appropriate. In contrast to statistical generalisations, analytic generalizations depend on using a study’s theoretical framework to establish a logic that might be applicable to other situations. Ultimately, generalisation of data is not likely to achieve the status of ‘proof’ in geometry, but the claims must be presented soundly and be able to resist logical challenge. Despite some evident drawbacks, the case study method remains the most appropriate and potentially knowledge yielding for my research objectives.

Accompanying the case study method in my investigation is the qualitative approach to gathering data. Qualitative approaches were favoured over quantitative ones for philosophical reasons, as well as suiting my research objectives. I am cautious of the claims made by positive epistemology that it can arrive at hard objective and value-free ‘facts’ like in the natural sciences (Dela Porta and Keating 2007, 31). This is due to a philosophical position that I hold that humans are meaning seeking beings, which means that there are countless ways of seeing, experiencing, and interpreting any given phenomenon, event, and the world. Interpretative approaches are based
on the belief that social action can only be understood by interpreting meaning and motives in which it is based (Ibid, 26). Quantitative data, which functions under the assumption that a true representation of the real world can be represented in numerical data, will not give you this. The unit of investigation of the hard sciences is the inanimate world and even investigation of more complex phenomenon’s, like the animal world, is not characterised by the same level of generating capacities as humans. As a result, the main criticism of interpretative approaches to phenomenon of the human world is that qualitative interviewing is seen as more subjective than quantitative interviews. This because the evaluator/researcher decides which quotes or specific examples to reproduce and interpret in particular ways and that qualitative data may be more reactive to personalities, moods, and interpersonal dynamics between the interviewer and the interviewee than methods such as surveys found in quantitative data. Context is thus considered very important since research is dependent on an individual's situational self-interpretation (Ibid, 27).

Despite this, my investigation proceeded on the notion that every individual interviewee will bring their own biases, prejudices, and personal take on the reality of de-radicalisation. I also labour under the proposition that interpretive approach endows the investigation with a richer, more meaningful, and deeper exploration of phenomenon than what quantitative methods allows for. The other charge of course against interpretive approaches is that of relativism. I do not have space to address the epistemological challenges involved in research methodology. However, following an epistemological approach that shuns the crudeness of positivism does not mean that any interpretation of the data goes or is accepted; nor does it prevent better and more illuminating version and account of de-radicalisation from coming forth. I do accept that some level of solid knowledge acquisition in the social
sciences is possible, that some knowledge is more objective than others, or more accurate or even useful than others. Accordingly, I hope to make the case that my interpretation of the data is reliable, convincing, and best describes the conceptual ontology of de-radicalisation as far as the data allows, at least more substantially than contemporary conceptions of de-radicalisation.

Secondly, research questions are different in quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Qualitative research questions are used to seek understanding of phenomena that are not fully developed, where quantitative methods are used to test hypotheses (Dela Porta & Keating 2007, 29). In qualitative research, the research question leads the evaluator into the data where the issue can be explored and allows the participant to describe what is meaningful or important to them using in their own words rather than being restricted to predetermined categories. In light of the definitional, conceptual, epistemological, methodological and empirical challenges confronting de-radicalisation, my investigation was attempting to collate, explore, and develop knowledge on the phenomenon of de-radicalisation, which the qualitative approach facilitates more effectively than quantitative, which is more suited to hypothesis testing and narrowly focused enquiries. In contrast to quantitative approaches, qualitative interviews allow researchers to probe for more details and ensure that participants are interpreting questions the way they were intended. The qualitative approach would also provide me with the flexibility to use my knowledge, expertise, and interpersonal skills to explore interesting or

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27 Similar to a position called 'the search for commensurable knowledge', which is a middle ground between the extremes of positivism on the one hand and hyper subjectivist approach on the other (Dela Porta & Keating 2007, 33). This approach admits differences in paths to knowledge, shaped by choice, context, question, and problem. '......nobody in mainstream social science now denies the existence of the physical world or maintains that reality is entirely subjective and in our minds. This encourages a cross-fertilization in a large middle ground' (Ibid, 35).
unexpected ideas or themes raised by participants. In short, the qualitative approach is best suited to my research objectives.

Qualitative interviewing is typically semi-structured. The interviewer has a focus but is also afforded flexibility. In semi-structured interviews the interviewer generally has a list of questions and discussion prompts, but the order in which they are asked can vary in each interview. The interviewer may ask additional questions and probe beyond the questions on their lists. It is the balance between some consistency in questioning and some flexibility to probe further during interview that attracted me to semi-structured approach. Accordingly, this research is based upon 27 semi-structured interviews I conducted between December 2011 and May 2013. Participants were identified for their expertise and knowledge on PREVENT and de-radicalisation from across a cross section of bodies, and organisations. This included PREVENT Engagement Officers, Police Officers, a de-radicalisation intervention provider, think-tanks analysts, academics researchers, Muslim organisations that received PREVENT funding, community activist, Prevent practitioners, and a former counter-terrorism officer. This targeted sample was the most effective way of collating data on a phenomenon that is under studied, misunderstood, and lacking in rigorous methodology. Interviewing 27 individuals as I had planned was determined primarily by the time designated for fieldwork, access to interviews, and the quantity and quality of the data obtained. At 27 Interviews I was not sure how different 30 or 35 interviews would have been to the data trends. I stopped once I felt that I had interviewed sufficient diversity of participants and could identify a number of trends and patterns to begin answering my research question.
3.2 Presentation of Fieldwork Data

This section aims to present descriptively the results of my fieldwork data and explain the way that data was codified. It is important to emphasise out the outset that the data in this section and the chapter as whole relates to the first objective of my investigations, which seeks to answer the question: ‘What is de-radicalisation?’

The data regarding the context of de-radicalisation will be analysed in subsequent chapters. The data presented here is the by-product of 27 interviews conducted over a span of eighteen months, between December 2011 and May 2013, over thirty hours of recorded interviews and over three hundred pages of transcribed interviews. Overall, the data reveals twenty eight ways of defining de-radicalisation, nine main conceptual features, and four conceptual interpretations.

Part of the condition for acquiescing to be interviewed participants signed a statement of confidentiality stipulating that their names would not be mentioned. However, participants accepted to be referred to by their position/organisation/company, even if their attitudes and opinions expressed in the interviews was their own. In fact the data analysis throughout the thesis employs the name of the person’s occupation and not their names. I have included the interviewee’s place of occupations here because it adds greater weight to the credibility and usefulness of the data given that many of the interviewees were at the forefront of work on PREVENT and de-radicalisation. For example, as shown below in table 3, interviewee No. 14 was the former Secretary General (SG) of the MCB, and No.17 was one of the directors of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), and No. 23 was the Director of Siraat, an organisation that was providing prison de-radicalisation. These interviewees represent community approaches to PREVENT,
which I will elaborate more on in chapter 7. Similarly, interviewee’s No.21 and No.22 are PREVENT practitioners in Lancashire, whilst interviewee No. 25 works for Quilliam, an organisation that has enjoyed a lot of influence of policymakers. This group of interviewees constitute influential PREVENT practitioners. In short all the interviews were involved in PREVENT in some form, with the majority playing a lead role in the formulation and implementation in policy. The high profile status of my interviewees therefore enhances the results of the data, particularly with regards to the reliability, relevance, and usefulness of the data, which I will come to later in more detail.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DEMOS (Think-Tank) Analyst</td>
<td>08/12/11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Director of Arts Versa (countering extremism on campus)</td>
<td>14/12/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ex-President of the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS)</td>
<td>19/12/11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (Analyst)</td>
<td>20/12/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Director of Khayaal Theatre Company (received PREVENT funding)</td>
<td>21/01/12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Academic/Director of the ESCR's 'New Security Challenges Programme' (NSC)</td>
<td>03/02/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Academic and former PREVENT practitioner (Police and Community Engagement)</td>
<td>21/02/12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>PREVENT Practitioner in Birmingham (worked on counter terrorism at the West Midland’s Police)</td>
<td>21/02/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic Dialogue (Think-Tank) (Analyst)</td>
<td>27/02/12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Investigative Journalist (author of a number of security books)</td>
<td>01/03/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Academic (leading experts on Islamophobia)</td>
<td>20/03/12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Academic/ free-lance Consultant on PREVENT Community Engagement</td>
<td>20/03/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Former Vice Chair of the Muslim Safety Forum (MSF)</td>
<td>11/04/12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Former Secretary General of the MCB</td>
<td>17/05/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Academic (on new religious movements)</td>
<td>21/05/12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Former President of the National Association of Muslim Police [NAMP]</td>
<td>30/05/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Founder and Former Head of MCU</td>
<td>31/05/12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Founding Chair of the Muslim Safety Form (MSF)</td>
<td>12/06/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Academic / Activist (detained for six days by the Police whilst a student)</td>
<td>25/11/12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Academic (Islamophobia expert)</td>
<td>21/12/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>PREVENT Engagement Officer in Lancashire</td>
<td>05/02/13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Senior PREVENT Engagement Officer in Lancashire</td>
<td>05/02/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Director of Siraat (Prison Intervention provider and co-director of STREET)</td>
<td>07/02/13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Former Chief Inspector and PREVENT Delivery Board</td>
<td>18/02/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Quilliam Foundation (Think-Tank) Senior Researcher (former Jihadi)</td>
<td>25/03/13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Forward Thinking (Think-Tank) Analyst</td>
<td>26/03/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>President of the Cordoba Foundation (Think-Tank )</td>
<td>10/04/13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
During interviews I asked all of the 27 participants the question: what is de-radicalisation? The research data revealed that there were for over 28 ways of referring to de-radicalisation by interviewees, which included:


Meanwhile, I collated the definitions from the 27 interviewees and began to read them, underline key words, and group together all the key words and phrases into a table on an Excel sheet. I then recorded the repetition of the same descriptions, or similar references. For example, I would colour code the word ‘young’, ‘child’, or ‘youngsters’ every time a respondent mentioned the word in their explanation of de-radicalisation, and tally up the total number of times ‘young’ was used. This was done for all the sub-themes and central themes that emerged from participants responses. This method allowed me to group reoccurring and pivotal ideas into themes. There were roughly seventeen themes. Tables 4 below illustrates the seventeen themes, while the bar chat overleaf represents the nine conceptual features or categories with respect to the number of times the category is mentioned.
Table 4: The Conceptual Themes of De-radicalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontological Components</th>
<th>No. of references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive Change</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Change</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Ideology</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioural Change</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence/terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interventions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support/vulnerable/probation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transformation and Change</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expertise and Knowledge</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educating/ Debate</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Remit</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agenda</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Young</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radicalisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Don’t Know</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first category has been labelled ‘Cognitive Change’. This category encompasses the themes of cognitive change (mentioned 10 times), ‘extremism’ (9), and ‘counter-ideology’ (5). The three themes were expressing the same idea in different ways, which was that de-radicalisation related to the change of the individuals worldview. The second category ‘Behavioural Change’ includes all references to terrorism and violence (12), and ‘violent extremism’ (4). This category could be quite confusing given that all these terms are synonymous with ‘violence’. Some interviewees believed that there was a relationship between ‘Worldview’ and ‘Violence’ in conceptions of de-radicalisation whilst some others merely believed that it related the change of the worldview without the need to stop the violence. The third category encompasses all references to de-radicalisation in terms of ‘support’, ‘vulnerable’, and ‘probation’ (9) with those describing it as interventions (5). The fourth category, labelled ‘Transformation’ includes all references to de-radicalisation as a state of change (9) and/or process (5). The category after, ‘Expertise and Knowledge’, encompasses the 8 references to think-tanks, with 6 mentions of Quilliam and 2 mentions of Policy Exchange, in relation to de-radicalisation, as well as all references to de-radicalisation as ‘education’ and debate’ (5). This particular category was interesting because de-radicalisation was never understood as a by-product of experts and those with knowledge in the literature. The category on ‘Political Remit’ is extremely important despite only tallying up in sixth place in terms of mention by respondents in relation to de-radicalisation. This theme refers to the direct and indirect mention of governmental/political objectives (5) in relation to de-radicalisation; whilst the theme of ‘Islam’ refers to the fact that de-radicalisation is associated with the promotion of a particular form of Islam in the UK (5). The category ‘Other features’ includes three categories ‘Young’ (9), which means that de-
radicalisation targeted the young, ‘Radicalisation’ (7), which refers to the association of de-radicalisation with radicalisation for some interviewees, and the ‘Individual’ (5), which views de-radicalisation as interventions targeting individuals. They were not grouped in terms of separate boxes of categories for presentational reasons. Finally, the theme ‘Don’t know’ was kept despite not representing a conceptual feature because it was useful in assessing the problem of defining de-radicalisation. Again, referring to the table 4, these seventeen themes were grouped further into nine categories, illustrated below in chart 1. The nine categories all tell us something about the ontological makeup of de-radicalisation in the UK context.

A clearer illustration of the nine categories or conceptual features of de-radicalisation according to the data is shown in Charts 1 and 2. Chart 1 shows the seventeen themes of table 4, grouped into the nine categories, which represented the total number of times the word is mentioned out of 27 in relation to each other. Chart 2 is a pie chart representing the bar chart in relation to the total concept of de-radicalisation.
Chart 1: The Conceptual Features of De-radicalisation

Chart 2: The Conceptual Features of De-radicalisation
The data provides a more nuanced and complex picture of what de-radicalisation entails conceptually. De-radicalisation is thus comprised conceptually of the following:

1. Cognitive Change
2. Behavioural Change
3. A process/journey of change experienced by the individual
4. Programmes of interventions
5. Expertise and knowledge
6. Political Remit
7. Targeted at young people
8. Radicalisation
9. Individual level

As enumerated above, the data from my fieldwork validates the main argument of the debate in the literature about the relationship between cognitive and behavioural factors underpinning conceptions of de-radicalisation. However in contrast to the various conceptualisation of de-radicalisation discussed in the literature review, there were other factors that interviewees considered, referred to directly or indirectly, as well as understood, when discussing de-radicalisation. In particular, numbers 5 to 8 above are unique and distinctive to the UK understanding of de-radicalisation. An analysis of the definitional and conceptual features will be undertaken in subsequent sections.
3.3 Bewitched by Language: the Many Faces of De-radicalisation

This section attempts to address the problem of defining de-radicalisation. It transpired in chapter 2 that there were eight definitions of de-radicalisation, whereas fieldwork data revealed that there were over 28 ways of referring to de-radicalisation by interviewees. Also linked to the myriad ways of defining de-radicalisation is the fact that it is synonymous with other terms like ‘disengagement’, ‘disaffection’, ‘de-legitimisation’, ‘disaffection’, and ‘counter-radicalisation’, amongst others. Indeed during the interviews terms were used interchangeably. For many, the term ‘violence’ was used synonymously with the term ‘terrorism’, as well as other concepts like ‘extremism’, ‘non-violent extremism’, and ‘violent radical’. The sheer diversity of definitions relating to de-radicalisation and its association with other terms provokes a number of questions: how do we account for the plethora of terms associated with de-radicalisation? Why did some struggle to define it? And why did some ‘experts’ working in the field of counter-terrorism feel it was sufficient and permissible not to define it? Would practitioners in other fields tolerate the same laxness with respects to key terms and concepts in their knowledge domain? If not, why is there a discernible resignation to the use of vague and ambiguous terminology in this field?

This section argues that the inability to define de-radicalisation, coupled with the existence of various terms connoting the same phenomenon, can only be understood employing the semantic logic of ‘language games’. It shows that despite the terminological confusion and conceptually opacity, the underlying meaning of de-radicalisation is secured in the ‘language games’ played in the domain of PREVENT.

I want to examine the semantic logic that underpins the search for objective and precise meanings of words, known as the designative theory of language. The
designative semantic logic works by ascribing names to objects in the world. It makes the meaning of words clear and is concerned with tracing relations between sentences and their truth conditions (Taylor 1995, 220-221). It came into its own in the seventeenth century with Descartes, Bacon, and Hobbes, where a meaningful view of the universe was abandoned in favour of an objective view of the world (224). According to Taylor this theory of language is suited to the canons of modern science (220-221). However, since language is not just about ascribing terms to corresponding objects in the world, it is clear that the designative theory of language does not take us far and we have to look elsewhere for explanations. The fact that de-radicalisation is associated with so many other ideas for example confirms this. Similarly with the term de-radicalisation, the word itself does not seem to be important in designating the phenomenon of de-radicalisation in the world. Consequently, a different semantic logic is needed in order to understand the vague meaning of de-radicalisation, the inability to pin it down, and its diverse associations.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy offers a different route. In Philosophical Investigations (1958), Wittgenstein introduced the concepts of ‘language-game’ to designate forms of language simpler than the entirety of a language itself, ‘consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven’ (7), and connected by family resemblance or ‘Familienähnlichkeit’. The concept was intended ‘to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life’ (23) which gives language its meaning. Some examples are needed to illustrate the profound importance the concept ‘language-games’ has for understanding the conundrum of de-radicalisation in terms of meaning. Wittgenstein urged his interlocutors to consider examining what all the various ‘games’ that are played have in common:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic Games, and so on. What is common to them all?- Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’- but look and see whether there is anything common to all.- For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.

(Ibid, 66)

Thus the things we call ‘language games’ are indeed related to one another, but they do not all share a defining characteristic. If we examine all the things we call games, we will not find any one feature in common, but simply a number of relationships between kinds of games. Wittgenstein calls the similarity between different kinds of games a ‘family resemblance’ because a family is also distinguishable by certain similarities in features, but is not defined by any one or number of those features. The notion of family resemblance is fruitful in trying to make sense of the fact that de-radicalisation is associated with so many other terms, like radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism. Hence whilst it is clear on the one hand from the data that interviewees found the existence of many terms, as well as the lax application of those various terms in conjunction with de-radicalisation problematic, on the other hand the notion of ‘family resemblance’ does suggest, in contrast to the designative theory of language, that exact definitions are not required for meaning to be secured. Instead, as Wittgenstein shows, use comes before the individual meaning of the word. In other words, we know what a word means not because there is some fixed
meaning attached to it with which we are familiar, but because we know how to use that word in certain contexts. This is expressed by the following interviewee:

I’m going to take a hard line view. For me I think de-radicalisation is about empowerment... what you are trying to do I guess... well it’s a good question. I’m just going to say empowerment because you can get into difficult territory otherwise.

(Interview 7, Academic and PREVENT practitioner)

What seems at first glance to be pointing to the notion of de-radicalisation as a confusing and misleading term also suggests upon closer inspection that the meaning of de-radicalisation can be secured without having to define it. The word ‘empowerment’ is a concept and term that can take on countless other meanings and associations. To say therefore that de-radicalisation is ‘empowerment’ is to connote any number of meanings (e.g. subjects undergoing intervention gain more confidence, skills, resources, mental health, literacy, etc.). However, as a result of the language ‘games’ that interviewees played, the meaning of de-radicalisation in connection with ‘empowerment’, rather than merely signifying an attempt to evade the necessity of defining and explaining the term, actually makes sense in the context of youth development, probation services, and mentoring, an area of work this interviewee specialises in.

With the notion of ‘language games’ and ‘family resemblance’ in mind, we can situate the status of de-radicalisation with respect to meaning more clearly. De-radicalisation as term, word, and idea belongs to its own language game: it makes sense in the
context in which it is employed, which for interviewees means the policy domain of counter-terrorism. Every single word of the 28 words/phrases has a unique meaning and yet each shares similar connotations/meanings. In the context of radicalisation, particularly the radicalisation of young British Muslim men, it is clear or understood, without any precise definitions, what is broadly meant by de-radicalisation, as articulated below:

I mean there’s a problem with the terminology and even people in the Channel Project would say that they don’t like the word de-radicalise because they are not trying to de-radicalise people. People use the term in different ways so it’s important to realise that people that use the term are probably saying we are trying to move someone down from a violent extremist angle away from violence.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

In the context of de-radicalisation therefore the general meaning pertains to getting individuals away from violence using discursive debate and education and as the data highlights this phenomenon can be expressed in a multitude of ways. However, an important matter to consider besides the plethora of terms denoting de-radicalisation by practitioners in this policy domain is the fact that confusion enveloping the term remains a glaring problem for practitioners, evidenced by the fact that four of the interviewees openly stated that they did not know the meaning of de-radicalisation. This is shown by the following respondents, both of whom
attempted a definition but who first conceded the ambiguity of de-radicalisation as a term.

So de-radicalisation....I don't know what it means, I'd be surprised if anyone even knows what it means.

(Interview 18, Chairman of the MSF)

Yeah I know but I don’t know much about it. I don’t know why the government doesn’t take a more humanist approach to all this instead of seeing young Muslims as statistics.

(Interview 5, Director of Khayaal Company)

Whence does the confusion emanate? A clear problem with the use of the term de-radicalisation is the conflation with other concepts, discourses, and knowledge domains. The following statement highlights the confusion surrounding the concept of de-radicalisation.

So the problem is when you have that approach and you use the term de-radicalisation, you could easily say that what you are trying to do is make someone
not extreme. In order to deal with the threat of terrorism you have to tackle all radical and extremist thinking. That becomes problematic because how then do you define extremist and radical thinking (?)....We need to focus on the issue of terrorism rather than the issue of extremism per se because the language of extremism is muddying the waters.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

The respondent believes that the language of ‘extremism’ rather than ‘terrorism’ is ‘muddying the waters’. In the coming section this chapter elucidates some of the potential reasons why policymakers are employing certain terms and why a lot of confusion surrounds the term de-radicalisation. These reasons include policymakers lacking the knowledge to tackle radicalisation, the fact that policymakers have alternative political objectives to accomplish, and the fact that ambiguous definitions and terms can still function practically, as demonstrated through Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’. Also, I argued that the ‘family resemblance’ approach to conceptualisation was a better way of understanding de-radicalisation, because it was based on grouping common features under the same term rather than concentrating on the veracity of the word to its designative phenomenon in the world. The undetermined status of de-radicalisation in terms of definition and meaning should consequently be understood within the context of ‘language games’.
3.4 The Conceptual Framework of De-radicalisation

The data conveys that while the concept of de-radicalisation encompasses nine themes, there are four main understandings of the concept of de-radicalisation, which include: the renunciation of violence, counter-ideology/extremism, the re-integration of individuals into mainstream society, and youth empowerment. This section addresses these four conceptions of de-radicalisation and their implications for the ontological framework of de-radicalisation. It will be argued that the four conceptions of de-radicalisation point to both conceptual confusion and to an incoherent and muddled policy.

The first interpretation of de-radicalisation views it as a way of getting radicalised and militant individuals to abandon their use/support for violence. The data conveys that 16 interviewees, almost 60% of the sample, believed the de-radicalisation signified a move ‘away from violence’. This also represents PREVENT’s conceptions of de-radicalisation and essentially aims to reduce the risk of violence committed on British soil by intervening in the worldview of the militant before they cross the line. The following respondent explains the logic underpinning this predominant interpretation of de-radicalisation.

It’s just reversing radicalism and getting extremist ideas out of people’s heads and especially violent extremist. Many committed terrorists in the country, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have admitted their path was wrong and have publicly recanted.

(Interview 25, Quilliam Senior Researcher)
This view of de-radicalisation is posited as a solution to the security threat posed by transnational terrorism, which security thinking post 7/7 believes is primarily motivated by a perverse and dangerous ideology. The assumption underlying cognitive change in conceptions of de-radicalisation is that the justification for violence by militants is sanctioned by a particular ideology; de-radicalisation is therefore about dislodging the theoretical construct behind it. In other words, ideology and/or set of particular ideas are a causal factor in pathways towards terrorism. Hence whilst de-radicalisation purportedly aims to achieve behavioural change, i.e. to stop terrorism, behaviour change is considered secondary to cognitive change. It is in this sense that de-radicalisation is presented as a strategy that seeks to tackle the ideas that lead to violence:

De-radicalisation, to do it, you need to be able to deconstruct the ideas that formed in that persons mind and give him a better way of understanding the proof and evidences that led him to those thoughts. Plus we have to give him an alternative to taking that course of action.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

The second interpretation of de-radicalisation presents it as an attempt to counter the ideology of extremism in a broad sense and not just the way it is deployed by militants seeking to justify violence:

Having said that, it’s equally possible to see de-radicalisation has been part of the process that is not at all concerned about people’s behaviour or about moving
people away from violence, whether it’s gang violence or extreme violence, but it’s more about de-radicalising people from this ideology.

(Interview 17, former Director of the MCU)

In contrast to the first conception of de-radicalisation, an alternative view of this ideology, one that emphasises the political, social, and cultural threat of such ideas, was articulated by a number of interviewees. This alternative interpretation suggests that the theological-political framework underpinning ‘violent-extremist’ ideology, outlined above, is re-framed and represented as the framework underpinning the ideology of ‘non-violent extremists’.

The Salafis, some of the Brotherhood groups, Hizb-el-Tahrir, basically preached in this country for many years that a good Muslim cannot integrate and be a loyal citizen of this country; cannot serve in the military or the police because that’s allegiance to a Kufr system or man-made laws; so a lot of these Islamist ideas are holding back Muslims in this country and also it kind of builds up rage, with an over emphasis on foreign policy.

(Interview 25, Quilliam Senior Researcher)

This interpretation of ‘worldview’ is more expansive than the first because it is not only concerned with tackling the threat of violence. It is an interpretation that consequently bought many individuals and groups into the category of ‘extremism’.
The category ‘extremist’ encompassed ‘non-violent’ individuals, as well as violent individuals on the cusp of radicalisation towards terrorism. Indeed this new categorisation was introduced with the second revision of PREVENT in 2009. It was not merely violence therefore that was problematic but also issues like ‘integration’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘loyalty’ to Britain. Instead of terrorism therefore this expansive focus on ideology belongs to a strategy of counter-subversion. As a result, with this interpretation of ‘worldview’ in mind, it became feasible to conceive of a more substantial conception of de-radicalisation, one preoccupied with the purging of political and social spaces of these theological and political ideas in the UK. The former President of the Muslim Association of Police Officer draws analogy between de-radicalisation and the ‘detox’ of certain ideas.

I look at it in my head as it being like going to a detox clinic and getting cleansed and you come out and I’m not now on drugs or alcohol or anything. Look, this is not as simple as that.....To answer your question, a journey to radicalisation and backwards, where to a point you are considered by the government to be a saint and don’t pose a threat and you hold Islamic values that are compatible with the Prevent strategy.

(Interview 16, former President of the NAMP)

The third interpretation of de-radicalisation evident in the data sees it as a programme designed to re-integrate individuals to the political and social mainstream. Unlike the two previous conceptions, this view of de-radicalisation is
less about moving away from radicalisation and extremism and more about emphasising the move towards the mainstream. This view is encapsulated by a retired Police Officer who has served on the PREVENT Delivery Board:

I think the agenda is to stir disaffected young people into the mainstream viewpoint. Getting them to sign up to those elusive British values we were talking about, getting them to sign up to liberal secularism.

(Interview 24, former Police Chief Inspector and PREVENT Board)

This understanding of de-radicalisation focuses on changing an individual's 'worldview' and moves the concern of policy-makers beyond violence. It suggests that de-radicalisation in the UK shows a greater concern than programmes in the M.E and S.E.A with the adoption of values and norms by individuals undergoing intervention. A closer examination also indicates that this understanding of de-radicalisation is more about the socialisation of individuals, not only into mainstream society, but also towards a political mainstream view. It is therefore a conception that seeks a more substantial transformation in the individual and suggests that in the UK context, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to get violent individuals to renounce violence as part of the de-radicalisation process. In other words a necessary and sufficient condition for de-radicalisation to occur entails both abandoning violence, as well as adopting the values and norms of wider society. Two respondents expressed this holistic conception of de-radicalisation in the following ways:
It’s almost like mind control, thought control, it’s about your thought, your beliefs, your understanding is wrong and we will put you through something that will actually make you have the correct thoughts. It brings us back to the idea that, is what we are trying to achieve here is a version of Islam that is palatable to a British political mindset?

(Interview 11, Academic)

So you spoke about British values earlier on; if you feel someone isn’t well integrated and believes Britain is the enemy and that kind of narrative and that’s somebody you consider to be radical, then de-radicalisation is about pacifying this person to try and make him understand that actually, Britain and the West doesn’t have a problem with Muslims and British society and values are great.

(Interview 26, Forward Thinking Analyst)

The fourth understanding of de-radicalisation and perhaps unique to the UK understanding of de-radicalisation, is its preoccupation with youths and their empowerment, in addition to crime prevention strategies. In fact as seen in section 3.3, the data indicates that nine interviews mentioned youngsters in relation to de-radicalisation. This amounts to a third of interviewees and suggests that this feature
is unique to the UK context in comparison to de-radicalisation in the M.E. and S.E.A. For example, here is a senior PREVENT Officer discussing de-radicalisation in terms of crime rehabilitation:

As Police Officers....we’ve began a process of holding that persons hand, picking them up, and walking with them; to places where they can get voluntary experiences, be mentored, and meet people outside his universe of reference; he’s never met anybody outside his community other than his own and that, and if he was radicalised, well that’s de-radicalisation.

(Interview 22, Senior PREVENT Officer)

As indicated in the statement, this view of de-radicalisation has a tenuous link with tackling terrorism and violence at the level of ideas. Another example is also shown below by a community activist, who not only talks in terms of youth empowerment and crime prevention, but also interestingly evokes other phenomenon’s, like extremism and political violence, in her definition of de-radicalisation:

Ideally it’s about making disenfranchised young people make the right choices. Deradicalisation could be about any route. So in this instance it should be about becoming extremist Muslim and going to fight wars abroad and stopping that. But it should be about giving young people choice and money should be pumped out, you know, to help them staying out of gangs.

(Interview 13, former Vice-Chair of the MSF)
This conception of de-radicalisation indicates a greater preoccupation with crime prevention strategies than counter-terrorism strategies. In the PREVENT strategy for example, de-radicalisation falls under ‘supporting vulnerable’ individuals and the relationship between preventative approaches to crime and youth empowerment is evident in the police run Channel project. This view of de-radicalisation indicates a pastoral logic, one that extols the importance of caring for ‘vulnerable’ individuals and ‘extremists’, and providing them with support, education, and resources to overcome radicalisation.

In summation, the data shows that there are multiple understandings of de-radicalisation in the UK context: one concept of de-radicalisation relates to the renunciation, through thought-reform, of violence only; a second conception situates de-radicalisation as part of an attempt to domesticate Islam by suppressing extremism and promoting more liberal version of Islam in public spaces; the third conception, emphasises the need to have individuals adopt the political and social values of the country as a sufficient and necessary condition for a successful de-radicalisation to occur; and the fourth conception situates de-radicalisation within the preventative framework of youth empowerment, probation services, and crime prevention. Overall, the data corroborates the contested conceptual framework of de-radicalisation presented by PREVENT. The next section elaborates the implications of the data in more details.
3.5 The Implications of Multiple Conceptions of De-radicalisation

What are the implications of the articulation of four different conceptions of de-radicalisation in the data? And what does it mean in terms of understanding the ontological framework of de-radicalisation? It reveals four important elements to consider: (1) that de-radicalisation as a concept suffers from definitional and conceptual confusion; (2) that de-radicalisation interventions indicate a muddled policy logic at the heart of the UK counter-terrorism policy; (3) valorising ideology in counter-terrorism policy shifts the focus of policy on to other issues unrelated to terrorism; and (4) The data shows the limits of the inductive method to understanding de-radicalisation, suggesting both an academic and policy imperative to find an alternative conceptualisation of de-radicalisation.

Regarding conceptual confusion, the data corroborates findings in the literature that de-radicalisation as a term and concept ‘meant different things to different people’. It also reinforces the critiques made by the likes of John Horgan and Bjorgo regarding the conceptual weakness of de-radicalisation. Not to mention the fact that the data also proves that the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation is confusing. However two of the four conceptions of de-radicalisation expressed in the data were not seen in the literature, namely the second and fourth interpretations relating to de-radicalisation as counter-subversion and youth empowerment respectively. This points to the important role of disciplining the Muslim population in the case of the second interpretation of de-radicalisation (counter-subversion) and the role of pastoral power in the case of the fourth interpretation of de-radicalisation (youth empowerment).
The data reveals other important conceptual features of de-radicalisation in the UK context, like the significant role of knowledge and expertise as well as the relationship of de-radicalisation with radicalisation. Thus whilst the data sheds light in greater detail on de-radicalisation in the UK context then found in the literature, it does not provide a coherent conceptual framework of de-radicalisation. In any case, which of the four accurately embodies the idea and practice of de-radicalisation in the UK? Could all four interpretations be valid? It is in this way that de-radicalisation represents a conceptual confusion. The conceptual confusion surrounding de-radicalisation do not get us closer to a coherent and robust conceptual framework that enable academics to understand the phenomenon properly or even for policymakers to build an effective policy.

However, there are two suggestions in the data explaining the confusion of de-radicalisation: the role of experts in formulating de-radicalisation and the impact the concept of radicalisation had in the way that de-radicalisation developed. For example, 8 interviewees mentioned the role of think-tanks in formulating de-radicalisation. Of the 8, 6 identified Quilliam as a key player in shaping de-radicalisation, the other 2 respondents mentioned the Policy Exchange. This is interesting because de-radicalisation as a policy and idea was not the by-product of Quilliam’s work and yet for 6 of the interviewees de-radicalisation is explicitly associated with them. The association of de-radicalisation with the work of Quilliam nevertheless shows the success of Quilliam in being able to position itself as an ‘anti-extremism’ think-tank, as well the fact that de-radicalisation connotes counter-ideology; and Quilliam’s work has primarily focused on counter-ideology. More will be said on this in chapter 7. Interviewees below make the link between de-radicalisation and the influence of the Quilliam Foundation.
...you know, people like Quilliam think that you could re-programme these people in a different way, like denazification....

(Interview 24, former Police Chief Inspector and PREVENT Board)

De-radicalisation is the word often used by Majid Nawaz at Quilliam. It’s the journey backwards after you’ve gone on the path of being radicalised but then....

(Interview 16, former President of the NAMP)

I think it was clear that de-radicalisation from a government’s perspective was to intervene with people whose ideological heart lies in more retribution action against British policy interests. This was defined for instance by Quilliam, and they managed to shift the definition to be wider than it was originally.

(Interview 2, Director of Arts Versa)

Meanwhile, the second factor explaining the confusion of de-radicalisation is exemplified by the importation of the ideas, theories, and language of radicalisation, which had predated the emergence of de-radicalisation as a policy in 2011. Indeed as illustrated in section 3.3, 7 interviewees mentioned radicalisation in conjunction with de-radicalisation. This shows that for almost 25% of the interviewees, de-
Despite the discernible relationship between both concepts, both have their origins in different genealogies. As enumerated in chapter 2, most the literature on de-radicalisation is based on work undertaken in other places before 2006, as well according to completely different contexts. De-radicalisation in the M.E. and S.E.A was concerned with terrorism and not radicalisation. However, in contrast to the M.E. and S.E.A, the UK conceptualised the ‘new security threat’ posed by transnational terrorism in the register of radicalisation, with the UK government sponsoring the codification of radicalisation as a body of knowledge to accompany its move towards preventative approaches in counter-terrorism. By 2011 discourses on radicalisation had formed into a body of knowledge with its own theories, experts, and concepts. Radicalisation discourses encompassed a number of concurrent discursive formations, which included the security discourse; the integration and identity discourse, the fragmented knowledge domain of terrorism studies, foreign policy (different in its own right to discourses on security) discourse, and discourses on Islam and Muslims, amongst others.

The by-product of the discursive explosion on radicalisation was a particular thinking that shaped the formation of de-radicalisation interventions in the UK. This includes the primacy of tackling the worldview of radicalised subjects, the fact that it targets individuals, the existence of a process, and the importance of identity. Hence while the definition of de-radicalisation in PREVENT 2011 adopts the language found in the literature that conceives de-radicalisation in terms of ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’
change, in reality, de-radicalisation interventions through Channel indicate a greater affiliation with the thinking produced by radicalisation discourses. This explains some of the confusion surrounding de-radicalisation that is evident in the data. The influence of radicalisation theories on de-radicalisation is articulated by the former President of FOSIS.

De-radicalising people- what a stupid and horrible thing to do; if you are talking about radicalisation as someone becoming extremists then you need to know what makes an extremist in the first place and is going to go on and be a terrorist. As far as I understand it there’s no roadmap to say that A+B+C+D equals terrorist. Actually quite the opposite; I guess this deradicalisation process, which you have noted here, and perhaps Prevent is trying to do, relies on there being this conveyor belt to a person becoming a terrorist.

(Interview 3, former FOSIS President)

The second significant implication of the data is that the four interpretations of de-radicalisation highlights the fact that de-radicalisation is a muddled policy. As explained in the introduction of above, the conflation of several policy domains is manifested in PREVENT’s conception of de-radicalisation: a policy designed to ‘reverse radicalism’ is situated in a preventive strategy and then compared to crime prevention. Similarly, the four interpretations correspond to four different policy domains and agendas: the first interpretation of de-radicalisation, getting individuals to abandon violence, fits with the counter-terrorism agenda. This is motivated by the
need to secure the lives of citizens, manage the backlash against Western military involvement in Muslim-majority lands, and the implementation of risk-management strategies and institutional resilience building.

The second interpretation, where de-radicalisation is about counter-ideology in a broad sense, in which Salafi and Islamist ideas and practices are purged from public spaces, coupled with the promotion of ‘moderate Islam’, fits in with a strategy of counter-subversion. This interpretation views political and religious Muslims as subversive elements within the UK that need to be disciplined and controlled. Here analogies with counter-subversion of the communists and the Trade Union movement in Britain during the Cold War can be made.

The third interpretation of de-radicalisation, which conceives it as a policy designed to re-integrate individuals into mainstream society, relates to the community cohesion agenda. This interpretation is a complex one given that it brings together a number of issues and concerns regarding the integration of Muslim in Britain and the political and national identity of Britain. Hence problems related to immigration, anti-EU sentiments amongst the public and the rise of a neo-nationalism are conflated into the integration agenda. As part of the discourse of the integration agenda, the position of Muslim vis-a-vis the majority is debated, their loyalty questioned, and norms and values acquire greater significance in discourse and social and political practice. This interpretation consequently places emphasis on the adoption of British values and norms by Muslims.

The last interpretation of de-radicalisation stresses the development of the youth, which relates to work done in crime prevention. The onus in crime prevention is on the pastoral care of youngsters through mentoring, courses, and relationship
Since the majority of those deemed radical in the UK are youngsters, the aim of this policy logic is to prevent them from becoming radicals further up the line. These policies often involved the probation services, parents, and a number of other agencies.

Ultimately, the data shows that de-radicalisation as a policy exhibits a tangled logic in which it performs the functions of counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, and crime prevention altogether. Insofar as de-radicalisation encompasses all four logics, then it is clear to see that it represents an incoherent policy that moves the concern of policymakers far beyond terrorism.

The third significant dimension relates to the primacy placed on ideology, or as PREVENT states it, ‘cognitive change’. This observation was reflected in the data in section 3.3, which illustrates that almost 89% of interviewees believed that ‘cognitive change’, either in the form of counter-ideology or counter-extremism, was a central feature in the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation. Given that there is no criminal liability for possessing a particular state of mind, why is one of the strategies of the UK's counter-terrorism policy placing particular emphasis on certain ideas?

The answer can be gleamed from the logic underpinning all four interpretations of de-radicalisation: the belief that behaviour change (whatever the outcome) is dependent on cognitive change. In other words, the realm of ideas is conferred with agency and has become the locus for human behaviour in accounts of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. Another way to put it is that de-radicalisation is an account of human behaviour in which human action in the real world is determined by ideas, beliefs, and values. Without delving into the philosophical veracity of such a
proposition here, this section is more interested in what ideas actually constitute a threat to policymakers. According to interviewee's 23 and 25, these ideas are linked primarily to concepts and rulings found in Islamic Jurisprudence surrounding, in no particular order:

1. Jihad ('Struggle' but in this context violent struggle),
2. Kafir (Non-believer or 'infidel'),
3. Khalafa (Islamic political institution akin to a Sultanate),
4. Ummah (General Community of Muslims).
5. Sharia (Islamic Law)

Notably, the majority of interviewees did not go into this much detail. As articulated by almost 50% of interviewees this type of technical language and specialist knowledge highlights the important role that expertise and knowledge plays in constructions of de-radicalisation, and PREVENT strategy more generally, an area that will be addressed in chapter 5 and 7. Nevertheless according to the data the five point theological-political formulation above forms the constitutive block of the 'worldview'/ideology of violent militants.

The PREVENT strategy's conception of de-radicalisation, shared by some of the interviewees, is that this 'worldview' causes violence and must consequently be challenged. However, as confirmed by the data, many interviewees believed that the focus on ideology was not merely confined to the problem of violence but to also the perceived problem of the subversive threat posed by Muslim mobilisation, the threat to community cohesion as a result of illiberal values, and the inability of 'vulnerable' Muslim youth to effectively think through ideology and make the right choices. In
other words ideology is represented as a pervasive and penetrating force that guides all Muslim action. This type of agency is not merely conferred on to ideology but also to Islam more generally.

The important point to note here is the repercussion such a valorisation of ideas and beliefs has in counter-terrorism policy. This represents the most distinctive dimension in UK counter-terrorism. The impact is primarily three-fold: it enables policymakers to problematised particular forms of Muslim theological and political thinking; it justifies interventionist policies in the theological and political lives of Muslims, and it enables the expansion of governmental remit and intervention beyond terrorism and into other spheres of life. There is limited space to discuss each point here but they will be analysed throughout the rest of the thesis. However the problematisation opened up by placing ideology at the heart of counter-terrorism policy is aptly summarised by the academic below, as the statement implies that the focus of de-radicalisation has moved far from terrorism.

Is it your views on women? Or you views on democracy? Or you views on foreign policy? Or is it your views on domestic policy? Or is it your views on violence?...they're saying it's not just about terrorism and violence it's about all these other things that somehow makes you vulnerable to the violent part.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

The last significant implication of the data is that it reveals the limit of the inductive method. De-radicalisation suffers from poor definition, is conceptually confusing: is it
about tackling violence, ideology, identity, crime, or the management of risk? It indicates conflicting policy logics: is it governed by the objectives of counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, or crime prevention? And the primacy of ideology in de-radicalisation has made the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate thinking and behaviour murky. Taken altogether the data demonstrates the fact that de-radicalisation rests on a weak conceptual framework. Consequently it shows the disjuncture between the idea and practice of de-radicalisation and between the notion of preventive notions of counter-terrorism and the reality of counter-terrorism. When we consider the additional lacuna in the literature with regards to the absence of robust research on de-radicalisation, the non-existent empirical basis for de-radicalisation, and the unavailability of data on intervention programmes, then the picture of what we know and can confidently pronounce on de-radicalisation is grim. To that effect, the data reveals how little we continue to know about de-radicalisation. However this oblique state of affair with respect to understanding de-radicalisation compels us to search for an alternative way of conceptualising de-radicalisation. Some of the contours such a concept should take will be outlined in chapter 4.

3.6 The Evaluation and Significance of the Fieldwork Data

The first dimension to consider is the reliability of the data. Insofar as a number of key themes were reoccurring in most interviews, that the content of the data could be substantiated, and that the data was relevant and insightful, then it can be asserted that the data was largely reliable. However, this is not the reliability extolled in the natural sciences in which repeating the same methods would yield the same results
or that the findings can be checked. Although I am confident that similar results, instead of the same results, would be possible if the same questions were asked and the same attention was paid to the quality of interviewees. In the domain of de-radicalisation the quality of the interviewee is determined by their credibility, which is judged on their knowledge, expertise, and experience. I deliberately chose practitioners and experts with experience of PREVENT and knowledge of radicalisation given the scarce experts on de-radicalisation, save two or three interviewees. It is the focus on experts and practitioners that enhances the quality and reliability of the data accumulated. This is based on the rationale that experts have accumulated a certain experience that allows them intimate knowledge of a field (Yin 2009).

Moreover, the reliability of the data was reinforced during the fieldwork process when, to my surprise, similar themes, concepts, and critiques were consistently coming through the data. This consistency of themes in the data can be attributed to the nature of the policy domain and the methodological approach of semi-structured interviews. In the case of the first, PREVENT has been a highly politicised and publicised policy, whilst radicalisation has become the chief way of thinking about the Muslim problem in the UK since 2005. A number of the ideas, issues, and challenges associated with PREVENT and knowledge domain of radicalisation had been known to most if not all the interviewees. Therefore, despite the different personal, organisational, and philosophical positions of all 27 interviewees, there was nevertheless a pool of common ideas, concepts, and themes. Finally, the semi-structured interviews were characterised by questions that were the same, similar, and different. An example of the same question I put to interviewees were question such as ‘What is de-radicalisation?’ and ‘what is your verdict on PREVENT?’ Whilst
such questions elicit a diversity of responses, they nevertheless result in similar ideas being expressed, albeit worded different.

Secondly, the data was largely valid. Again, caution must be exercised with the use of ‘valid’ since I do not employ it in the same way as in the natural sciences. As explained in the section on methodology, my research inquiry rejects the positivist claim of objective and value-free knowledge. Thus at the outset my investigation was not committed to the proposition that a factual statement of the social world could be made. However, I explained elsewhere that the best explanation or even the most valid representation of the human world could be attempted. To that effect, the data was contextually valid, that is, it accurately depicts the picture of what de-radicalisation is like in the UK, but is less valid externally, which means it cannot be applied as well in other contexts outside the UK.

With respect to the construct validity of the data, this was substantiated by researcher reflexivity, the fact that my literature review, background reading, and frequent exposure to conferences, events, and news coverage allowed me to judge the reliability of the information coming from interviewees. This made up for the lack of data triangulation in my analysis. I did not read my data, for example, in conjunction with other data sources, such as observation data or even quantitative data, like surveys and questionnaires. This type of triangulation of data was not required given the type of inquiry I conducted, the background information I possessed, and sufficient enough exposure I had in the field. Consequently, I am confident that my data can make statements about de-radicalisation.

Regarding external validity, this was restricted due to the nature of the inductive nature of case-study approaches. The problem effectively relates to generalisability
and transferability of the data to the real world case. With respect to the UK, the data is moderately generalisable, but does not apply to other cases of de-radicalisation, e.g. right wing de-radicalisation, or other categories, such as collective de-radicalisation, or other places such as the M.E. and S.E.A, or even prison environments. The data speaks to the UK context, which is unique, as attested before, for all sorts of reasons.

Another dimension to consider is the usefulness of the data. The data was useful in three ways: it presented original data on de-radicalisation in the UK context, it brought additional conceptual features and other information to light, and it debunked some prevalent presuppositions on de-radicalisation. With respect to originality of data, my research data represent the only primary data available on de-radicalisation in the UK context. This is significant for the corpus of work on de-radicalisation given the limited availability or absence of data missing in the literature on de-radicalisation. It thus offers distinctive insights about de-radicalisation ontologically in a more nuanced and meaningful way than stated in policy and think-tanks documents. In particular, the research data illustrates that features comprising the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation, like expertise and knowledge, political remit, young people as targets, and relationship with radicalisation discourse, are explicitly unique to the UK context in comparison to conceptualisation of de-radicalisation in the literature.

Secondly, the data brings our attention to new perspectives untouched or hidden in the literature. For example, the data suggests that de-radicalisation in its current iteration in the UK represents the conflation of four agendas; it reflects concerns with the security agenda and with mitigating violence; it reflects the concerns with counter-subversion and the domestication of Islam; it shows a preoccupation with
social and political integration agenda, as well as broader agendas of crime-prevention and youth empowerment. The data was also useful in revealing the full extent to which de-radicalisation was in a conceptual morass. Hence it is in this way that key aspects of de-radicalisation were more clearly ascertained.

Lastly, the data was useful in debunking some of the ‘conventional wisdom’ on de-radicalisation. For many, the term was a signifier that meant ‘moving away from violence’. Indeed policymakers are selling de-radicalisation as an instrument of counter-terrorism designed to reduce the risk of violence. The data however suggests that another way perhaps of understanding de-radicalisation, besides conventional concerns with terrorism, is to view it as being concerned with wider political and governmental objectives relating to reconstructions of the state, identity, and citizenship. Overall therefore the data was useful in understanding de-radicalisation conceptually.

The final strength of the data is the possibility it offers to integrate data into a different framework, one which opens up possibilities for our understanding of de-radicalisation. Qualitative case studies are methods that approach data inductively as opposed to deductively. Hence I did not have a hypothesis to begin with, even if I had some implicit inclination of where the data might take me. I was open and keen about letting the data direct me. So I did not start with a set theory or hypothesis and then went out into the field to confirm and substantiate any pre-conceived notions of what de-radicalisation is. I was fully aware from the literature review that my data would corroborate the contested nature of de-radicalisation ontologically, even if qualitative results are not generally used for confirmation of existing theories; neither was this my objective. Whilst an entirely original theory of de-radicalisation did not emerge from qualitative inquiry, the data nevertheless did directly towards an
existing theory- it is Foucault’s theory of the ‘technology of the self’ which I have decided to interpret the rest of the data in forthcoming chapters. Theoretical frameworks can provide explanations and deeper understanding when interpreting qualitative data. I hope to demonstrate in chapter 4 that the ‘technology of the self’ presents an alternative and novel way of conceptualising de-radicalisation.

It is important to note here some of the methodological limitations of my data set. The first is sample size. I interviewed 27 individuals, which although is a reliable set in order to identify patterns and be able to draw coherent interpretations, it is nevertheless a small and selective sample size, which makes resounding conclusions challenging to affirm. A mention must also be made with respect to demographic issues. I deliberately chose individuals who were working in the field of counter-terrorism and PREVENT, as well as individuals who have specialist knowledge of the field. One of the drawbacks of the sample was that I was unable to gain access to interviews with politicians that knew this area, who were high profile and difficult to reach. The other group of experts I wanted to interview were journalist and those in the media. Despite persisting with this group, I was able to only secure one interview. While it would have added to the data the usefulness and quality of the data was not comprised by their absence in the sample. This due to the fact that patterns had already emerged in the data and that many of themes were commonly referred to in interviews.

Furthermore, it could be argued that a more effective data set would have included interviewing individuals who were ex-militants and/or had been through a Channel intervention in order to capture some of the conceptual threads underpinning their transformation in the de-radicalisation process. However, it was not practically feasible to interview individuals who have been through Channel for the simple
reason that the identity and cases of those individuals are classified. With respect to interviewing ex-radicals, I interviewed at least two ex-radicals; however, these individuals spoke about de-radicalisation and PREVENT in their capacities as professionals working for organisations rather than as de-radicalised individuals. Perhaps even more sought after of course is data from actual real life militants and yet this is problematic for ethical and practical reasons and access to such high risk-high profile interviews seldom happens (Disley, et al. 2009, VI). My data does not shed new light on how somebody actually becomes deradicalised. In part of course this is due to the scope of my research, which is more concerned with understanding de-radicalisation ontologically. Finally, it must be stated that my research is, after all, a preliminary ontological investigation into a complex phenomenon. More empirical data is needed with a large sample of people over a long time period to fully contextualise some of my findings as well as accentuate its implications further.

3.7 Researcher Reflexivity

In this section I am concerned with the factors that influenced the type and quality of the data I collated. What, in other words, affected my data? Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) describe this exercise as the ‘interpretation of interpretation’ - another layer of analysis after data has been interpreted. Reflexivity involves making the research process itself a focus of inquiry, laying open pre-conceptions and becoming aware of situational dynamics in which the interviewer and respondent are jointly involved in knowledge production. Undertaking this exercise of reflexivity is important for other reasons; in subsequent chapters, namely chapters 5-7, the bulk of the data will be deployed to paint- what the data reveals to be- a more accurate picture of what de-
radicalisation is really about in the UK. In these chapters, I deliberately eschew taking a critical approach to analysing the data. This is not because I take what interviewees say at face value. On the contrary, I am fully aware of the multiple influences involved in knowledge production, which include: the wider political, social, economic, and historical context, organisational/institutional factors, personal motivations, where interviews take place, and the level of trust between the interview and interviewee. Knowledge production is thus unequivocally a deeply embedded, multifaceted, and complex process. Instead, I deploy the fieldwork data in order to paint, what I claim, is a coherent picture of de-radicalisation. In what follows therefore, reflexivity allows me to take a more acute and critical look at the fieldwork process.

It is important to begin with the wider historical and policy context of my PhD fieldwork. I began my interviews at the beginning of December 2011. The third iteration of Prevent had just been published in June 2011. At that time, Prevent had been running since 2006 and so had been operating for five years. Due to being a controversial policy, in conjunction with other political expediencies, the Coalition government suspended Prevent II and had it examined by the House of Commons Select Committee. As I write about in more detail in chapters 6 and 7, Prevent 2011 marked a new departure from ‘old’ prevent. The identity elements associated with the community cohesion agenda was removed; funding was terminated to the majority of counter-radicalisation projects, the focus increasingly shifted away from ‘community’ approaches to ‘value’ based approaches to counter-terrorism, and PREVENT recalibrated its resources towards de-radicalisation programmes like Channel.
Indeed, these changes affected the interviews I conducted. A large number of the interviewees had been recipients of PREVENT money. At the time of interviews, their money had been cut off. This, from an organisational perspective, is a huge loss that only adds pressure to resources and staff - the blood line of organisations working in this field. I can only infer, though with some confidence, that this made it easier for many of the interviewees to be critical of Prevent. Had I conducted the same interviews 4 or 5 years earlier, I would have had a different response on a whole range of issues. The person receiving money and generating work is not likely, except in rare circumstances, to acrimoniously knock down their funders. It must be granted, of course, that this did not prevent people from coming forward to critique PREVENT in the early years. In fact immediately at the outset, criticism had been made by leading figures in the Muslim communities, amongst a few others, regarding the predominant accounts of radicalisation and the ulterior objectives of Prevent. The first time, however, that public critique of Prevent was taken seriously was with the publication of Arun Kundnani’s report ‘Spooked’ in 2009. Despite the numerous examples of critical voices before 2010, these remained, on the whole, marginal. In the end, it became a lot easier and common to criticise PREVENT post 2010, something that was reflected in the data set.

The historical and temporal period I conducted my interviews - between 2011 and 2013 - also impinged on the kind of responses I elicited. Hypothetically speaking, suppose I conducted my investigation in the 1970’s? I would venture to say that de-radicalisation would be associated with left-wing/communist radicalism. In fact, this is corroborated in the literature review in chapter 2 where it was shown that older conceptions of ‘de-radicalisation’ were used in relation to communist parties and their engagement with democratic politics. By the same token, if I conducted my
investigation in the future then the meaning would change again. This is what is meant, in effect, by Jacques Derrida’s (1982) non-concept of ‘Differance’. Derrida’s notion of *différance* exploits the play of meaning in the French original, which means both ‘to differ’ and to defer’. He makes the point that since meaning is not entirely present in any signifier, language creates an endless deferral of meaning. As the signifier is relational and not fixed, it becomes constantly subject to change, often changing with context. Terms are therefore perpetually re-signified and re-defined, which allows it to mean different things in different places. It can never be fixed eternally or trans-historically.

Hence we can say of ‘radicalisation’ (for de-radicalisation acquires its meaning from radicalisation) that it is a concept that slides and floats- it is a floating signifier; it is never completed or achieves wholeness in its meaning. There is always space for an outsider or someone Other or exotic or different that can assume its meaning, dislodge it, and take its place. There is no escape from the fact that in the end meaning is always a process of interpreting what is represented. And Interpretation is dependent on historical and culture context. Thus in the historical period in which I conducted fieldwork interviews there was a palpable lack of knowledge and understanding, if not confusion regarding de-radicalisation. This is because despite being mentioned in PREVENT 2009 it was not until 2011 that the concept of de-radicalisation was elaborated, and in fact continued to be developed thereafter. In effect, I conducted my investigation of de-radicalisation at a point in history when its meaning was both sutured by the radicalisation discourse and paradoxically was still in formation. De-radicalisation has not, in other words, had sufficient time to articulate its meaning clearly. The instability of the term and concept is therefore reflected in the responses of interviewees. Another factor impacting the data was
the influence of the organisation/institution the interviewee’s work/worked in. One of
the glaring observations evident in the data was that all interviewees use terminology
used in their specialism or line of work. For example, the two PREVENT Officers I
interviewed work in what they call ‘soft’ counter-terrorism, which is actually more
connected to crime prevention work that focus on the development of the youth.
There is little wonder therefore that they spoke a lot about ‘vulnerability’, ‘risk’,
‘engagement, and ‘what if’ scenarios. Similarly, of all the interviewees, the only
interviewee with an overwhelmingly positive view of PREVENT was the senior
researcher at Quilliam. Again, there is little to be surprised about here. As I elaborate
further in chapter 7, Quilliam was heavily supported by the New Labour Government,
and till this day, despite the fact they no longer receive PREVENT money, enjoy a
high profile in the media. It makes sense, in this respect that this particular
interviewee does not step out of line with his organisations stance on many of the
prominent issues characterising the discourse in this policy domain. So it is perfectly
sensible that when giving interviews individuals do not deviate beyond the accepted
boundaries set by their employers.

This somewhat banal observation- that individual views and opinions closely align
and seldom diverge from those of their organisations- does not accurately reveal
where an interviewee’s personal and organisational views begin and end. I’m not
making the crude point that an individual’s knowledge, views, and opinions are
determined by their institutional affiliation. This, naturally, is not always the case. The
field and place one works in does however, whether one is consciousness of it or
not, provide the paradigm and conceptual lens with which one understands and
grapples with things in that world. As I alluded to in a previous section, this partly
explains how we can have so many different definitions of de-radicalisation. For an
interviewee working in crime prevention, for example, they understand de-radicalisation as ‘desistance’, whereas the interviewee with a religious studies background comes to de-radicalisation through ‘de-programming’. This is, then, the other and more indirect way organisational/institutions mould interviewees’ conceptions on many issues.

There are personal motives involved for interviewees which also impacts the data produced. Admittedly, this is a clumsy phrasing, for discussions about ‘personal motives’ are largely redundant. After all, a person’s motive is seldom transparent to others, not always even to the person themselves. Instead, what I mean here, which I explore in chapters 5-7, is the motive of the expert in a competitive market place. As I explicate further in chapter 4, the cultural norm of the UK is predominantly defined by neo-liberal governmentality. As a result, individuals are encouraged to be responsible and autonomous individuals who should inculcate entrepreneurial values. Subjects are expected to self-regulate according to commercial values, which includes being a consumer, being financially prudent, and managing one’s own brand. The latter point in particular has been exacerbated by the proliferation of social media. As a result, it is more fitting to view experts working in PREVENT as entrepreneurs who try to draw on a range of ‘capital’ (money, knowledge, experience, networks, access, position, etc.) to borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) concept, to maximise their position and status in a given field. PREVENT is, therefore, a policy terrain where people compete for prestige, status, money, and fame. It is possible, according to the entrepreneurial logic governing the actions of experts in this field, that some of the interviewees participated in my fieldwork or said certain things in order to keep their status as experts going.
However, I should not of course omit other motives, which may be considered more benign. Some of the individuals I interviewed wanted to make a difference and influence the direction of policy in a positive way. As I expound further in later chapters, there was a notable tension between what came to be referred to, employing the phrase of one my interviewees, ‘community’ and ‘elite’ approaches to counter-terrorism. It is undeniable, in the case of this particular interviewee, that he was motivated by wanting to implement the most effective solution to the problem of radicalisation whilst simultaneously avoid stigmatising and criminalising Muslims in Britain. That this came at significant personal cost to the individual was testament to the fact that some experts in this policy domain do genuinely have additional motives beyond utilitarian ones. For some, it is not just about, to paraphrase one interviewee, Prevent being ‘sexy’. It is also possible that many of the interviewees acquiesced to participate in my investigation in order to get, what they perceived to be, the right narrative ‘out there’. Others perhaps, contrary to my point above regarding organisational/institutional constraints, use opportunities like academic research, where they can guarantee at least a more robust treatment of the data then, say, the media, to ‘set the record straight’. In short, there are diverse factors and motivations influencing the data I collated.

Another factor shaping data output was the type and number of questions I asked during interviews. Being selective with the questions posed is important because it shapes the quality and type of data obtained and affects the way I would later answer the question I set myself. I considered the questions before, during, and after interviews with the aid of a notebook. Revisions were normally made to either some of the questions asked or to the themes I should exclude or emphasise. With regards to the pre-formulated questions, very early on in the process, even after the
first interview, I was compelled to re-examine some of the questions I had prepared, as well as the number of questions I could ask. I could not ask all the questions I wanted and some of the questions induced confused or quaint responses. I also had to make a judgment about what questions were fixed and those questions I would ask naturally as issues arose ad hoc during interviews.

In addition, I was compelled to examine other themes surrounding de-radicalisation that arose during interviews which either directly impinged on de-radicalisation, like the role of experts in its formulation, or influence how we think about it at the periphery, e.g. Islamophobia. Wider themes like ‘narrative’ and ‘language’ became salient in a way I could not foresee before beginning fieldwork. It has forced me to think about how I should include it in this thesis. Moreover, sometimes I could not follow up questions on important things that were said which could have opened other areas to explore. This was due to constantly having time constraints; some interviewers did not, because of their busy schedules, complete the designated hour. So I had to make judgments during the interview of what I should pursue, follow up, or ignore. In some cases I had to just press ahead with the questions I had formulated beforehand. This naturally shaped the data coming through, allowing even for some flexibility between each interview.

Furthermore, and more counter-intuitively perhaps, the place and settings where interviews take place impacted the data. Interviews were conducted in different parts of the country- Manchester, Liverpool, Preston, Birmingham, Coventry, and across London- and in different settings- Universities, local cafes, libraries, and meeting rooms. During interviews I realised the importance setting had on the mood of the interviewee and quality of the data. For example, conducting an interview in the private office of an academic at a University usually resulted in quantifiably more
data and more conceptual discussions, whereas some of the interviews held in a loud cafe were shorter in length and were generally less conceptual. This suggested that time and place were had an effect on the interview as well as the transcribing process. Ultimately, I became consciousness of that fact that meaning was a by-product not merely of the words in the text, but the actual settings and context of interview, not to mention that relationship I had with the interviewer.

Equally significant to the success of my fieldwork was that interviewees could ‘trust’ me. Trust is highly important in this policy domain because it determines whether you are granted access to the right people, as well as the quality and quantity of data obtained. In the hypothetical scenario of an absence of ‘trust’, a few people would acquiesce to be interviewed, and even if they did, I would not get very much from them.

However, in PREVENT and counter-terrorism generally the lack of trust was real. There was a palpable feeling of distrust and suspicion. I knew I would struggle to obtain quality data if others saw me as an industry ‘insider’ or become suspicious of my motives for undertaking research on these issues. I overcome this challenge by primarily arranging interviews through my networks and relationships. My supervisor, Jonathan Githens-Mazer, had fortunately put me in touch with a number of interviewees, who were in reality only granting me access as a result of my affiliation with Jonathan, who is a leading expert on radicalisation and someone who had cultivated relationships in the field over a number of years. A considerable number of other interviewees were secured through other contacts I had. Of the twenty seven interviews, I only managed to secure one without a contact in between and other individuals outside my networks and contacts were pursued without success. This
made me reflect on the significance of social networks and how it is tied up with knowledge and power in the formulation of policy.

A potential consequence of conducting research this way was obtaining data by groups of experts who think similarly on particular themes and issues, resulting in a narrow sample of interpretations. This would affect the usefulness, reliability, and validity of my data. However, this potential outcome was mitigated by the sheer diversity of participants selected, who hailed from different sides of the political fence and who worked in the field of PREVENT in different capacities. The diversity of participants was important given many of the interviewees understand de-radicalisation and events in this area through the prism of their work, discipline, and personal experiences. So PREVENT practitioners saw it more positively and in terms of caring for Muslims whilst some academic were more critical, which is normal given their profession.

Finally, I believe that my being a PhD student with no affiliation to any organisation, bodies, or paid position, made me more trustful in the eyes of interviewees. I had disclosed such information in my interview information sheet I sent to potential interviewees. Participants would did not have to worry about the data being published in a sensational fashion or being used by competitors against them. The trust between me and most interviewees was exemplified by the frank discussion during and after interviews, the way many of them were helpful with suggestions of the name of individuals I could interview after, and the quality of the data I obtained. In the end, in a policy area rife with suspicion, mistrust, and competition, I was able to secure the trust of participants in a way that yielded fruit for my investigation.
3.8 Conclusion

This chapter analysed and evaluated the result of data gathered from fieldwork conducted between November 2011 and May 2013. Section 3.1 outlined the methodology used to answer the question governing my research inquiry. The research was conducted employing the case study method, qualitative approaches to data gathering, the use of semi-structured questioning, and selecting targeted sample of 27 practitioners and experts. The section after presented the fieldwork data. The aim there was to explain how the themes and concepts were grouped and then represented into tables and graphs. Section 3.3 analyses the definition of de-radicalisation and tries to understand the countless definitions illustrated in the data through the concept of Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’. Section 3.4 attempts to identify and assess the most salient aspects of the data with respect to the conceptual understanding of de-radicalisation amongst interviewees. Four interpretations of de-radicalisation were identified, which correspond to four separate policy domains. Section 3.5 assess the impact of multiple de-radicalisation concepts, which include the fact that the PREVENT concept of de-radicalisation suffered from conceptual confusion, policy confusion, and throws the valorisation of ideology into scrutiny in terms of its effects on counter-terrorism policy. Section 3.6 deals with the evaluation of the data itself and argues for the reliability, validity, and usefulness of the data overall, not least its compatibility with theory. In the final section I undertake reflexivity in order to evaluate the research process and to identify some the factors involved in the production of knowledge. Ultimately, in terms of contribution to knowledge, this chapter makes the case that the data represents the first of its kind on de-radicalisation in the UK context, as well as offering important insights into both
the ontological reality of de-radicalisation and the possibility of an alternative conceptual frame of engagement.

Notwithstanding the greater inroads made into understanding the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation, the inductive method nevertheless does not entirely succeed in providing us with a coherent and cogent understanding of de-radicalisation. The existence of countless definitions and multiple conceptual understandings does not allow us to analyse and describe de-radicalisation in a meaningful way. Since this chapter has only focused on the conceptual framework of de-radicalisation, the remainder of the thesis will advanced an alternative framework of de-radicalisation using the rest of the data.

However, an alternative conception will need to eschew the conceptual problems inherent in the PREVENT strategy’s conception of de-radicalisation. It must also try to overcome the limitations associated with cognitive/behaviour factors in conceptualisation of de-radicalisation, not to mention the predominant association of de-radicalisation solely with the objectives of counter-terrorism. Additionally, it has to offer a way of understanding the explicit contradictions in the policy logic of de-radicalisation between pre-emptive and preventive orientations, the disjuncture between the ideas (ideology) and practice of de-radicalisation (renouncing violence), and the ostensible paradox of premeditated interventions targeting youngsters categorised as ‘vulnerable’. Consequently, I will present the rest of the data through the theoretical lens of the ‘technology of the self’. Reasons for this will become clear in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
An Alternative Concept and Theory: De-radicalisation as a ‘Technologies of the Self’

“There is nothing greater on earth than I, the regulating finger of God”- thus the monster bellows.

(Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra)

I don’t think that we should consider the “modern state” as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but, on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns.

(Foucault 1982, 783)

What is de-radicalisation? According to data analyses in chapter 3 there are 28 ways of defining de-radicalisation and there are four conceptions of de-radicalisation: de-radicalisation as renunciation of violence; as counter-ideology; as socialisation into the mainstream; and as youth empowerment. It is also associated with four different policy domains: counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, and crime prevention. The contested nature of de-radicalisation conceptually renders academic enquiry into the phenomenon extremely challenging. It also makes analysis of policy difficult-what are we analysing exactly? Not to mention the adverse effect on policy domains unrelated to terrorism. It results in the diminishing ability of
policymakers to counter terrorism effectively. Whilst the data has enriched our understanding on the salient features of de-radicalisation in the UK context, it nevertheless remains unable to bridge the gap between the idea and the practice of de-radicalisation, resolve a number of conceptual problems, and says very little about the wider context, beyond terrorism, surrounding the concept. As a result, it is imperative that a new conceptual framework is formulated in order to make better sense of de-radicalisation in the UK context. Given the important role de-radicalisation has for policymakers, the ongoing securitisation of Muslims identity, and the various challenges facing the UK, a coherent and operationally robust concept of de-radicalisation is vital and desired.

Drawing on the works of Michel Foucault, this thesis will attempt to make the case that de-radicalisation should be seen as a ‘technologies of the self’. The rest of the thesis will henceforth analyse the data gathered from my fieldwork through the theoretical lens of the technology of the self. This alternative framework not only incorporates the conceptual features emanating from the data, but accommodates the wider context of de-radicalisation, reconciles many of the conceptual fissures evident in the literature, and provides a more accurate and coherent concept than provided by policymakers. This chapter outlines the co-ordinates of an alternative concept and theory of de-radicalisation.

The first section is a detailed breakdown of the technology of the self. It tries to explain where it comes from, what it entails, and how it relates to de-radicalisation. The section after provides an additional context to the technology of the self by situating it within the theory of governmentality. The fourth section in the chapter examines a number of useful theories: the concept of the ‘central sphere’, the ‘paradigm’, ‘normalisation’, the ‘political’, and ‘neo-liberalism’. It provides deeper
theoretical tools to understand how power works outside conventional juridical notions and situates contemporary debates within a different field of analysis. This chapter claims that de-radicalisation should be analysed through the technology of the self.

4.1 The Technologies of the Self

This section presents the case for conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technology of the self. The concept of the technology of the self was formulated by Michael Foucault in a series of seminars at the University of Vermont in 1982. As a context for the summary of his own work on the subject, Foucault proposes four major types of technologies, ‘each a matrix of practical reason’, that ‘human beings use to understand themselves’: (1) technologies of production, (2) technologies of sign systems, (3) technologies of power and (4) technologies of the self (Foucault 1988a: 17). Reflecting on his work, Foucault admits that he concentrated perhaps too much on the technology of domination and power in his earlier work and that he was more and more turning toward the study of the technology of self, “the interaction between oneself and others … the history of how an individual acts upon himself…” (Foucault 1988a, 18). The ‘technologies of the self’ is defined as that:

....which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and the way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.

(Foucault 1988a, 18)
As a self-steering mechanism, the technologies of the self comprises of four critical dimensions (Foucault 1998, 26-28; 1997, 263-6; Dean 2010, 26-7):

(1) **Ontology**: what is the part of oneself that is the object of thought and work? Foucault’s answer to this question is the ‘ethical substance’. In other words is one working on their thoughts, body, desire, or identity, etc.? For example, in Christian ethics one works on the flesh, whereas in Sports it is the body.

(2) **Ascetics**: how does the self achieves the ethical goal? How is the ethical substance worked upon? This takes the form of exercises and techniques and other practices (confession, diary writing, group discussions, and the twelve steps programme of Alcoholics Anonymous).

(3) **Deontology**: this relates to the question of ‘who’ we are when we are governed in such a way (e.g. active jobseekers in social programmes). ‘Is it as a member of a kin group or nation or religious tradition that one should observe them, or as an occupant of a particular social status?’ (Laidlaw 2014, 103)

(4) **Teleology**: this is concerned with ‘why’ we are governed and the ends sought. What is the mode of being the subject aims to achieve? What codes of knowledge support these ideals, and to what ethical valorisation are they tied? (Salvation, money, beauty, etc.) (Rose 1996, 133)
These four dimensions notably constitute the ontological conditions and techniques involved in the formation of the self. The fourfold is deployed to interpret de-radicalisation as a technology of the self as part of UK governmentality (more in the next section). For example, the conventional view of de-radicalisation see it as an attempt to tackle the ideology (Islamism) and cognitive dimension of “radicals” (ontology), through the practise of interventions, programmes, and pastoral techniques (ascetics), targeting general Muslim subjects and radicalised Muslim subjects in particular (De-ontology), for the purposes of behaviour change, which means the abandonment of violence (Telos).

However, although the four step breakdown accurately describes what the technologies of the self entails, in the context of de-radicalisation, the real difference concerns teleology, because the real goal is less about abandoning violence, but more the reconfiguration of citizenship and the production of politically approved subjectivity. Furthermore, this thesis offers a modification of Foucault’s concept of the technology of the self. Although his conception situated self fashioning as a form of freedom undertaken by individuals, I will use it more explicitly to conceptualise the focus of governmentality with the conduct of individual citizens. As I will elaborate further on, while it is true that governmentality also explains the governing of collective populations, I will demonstrate in this thesis that the concept of the technology of the self is appropriate in capturing the focus of de-radicalisation in the UK with individuals and not groups and networks. I also want to deploy it in an expansive sense to include the way that all individuals and not just radicalised
individuals fall under the preview of de-radicalisation. There is a sense that all citizens and subjects should scrutinise and hold their ideas in check in relation to Islamist thinking and practices (synonymous with religion, politics, and foreign policy).

Borrowing therefore the ethical fourth-fold that constitute the process of self fashioning, I will present my fieldwork data through the domains of discursive technology (chapter 5), disciplinary technology (6), and confessional technology (7). Organising the chapters this way enables me to incorporate Foucault’s oeuvre over twenty-five years into my work: discursive technology, which corresponds to early Foucault, disciplinary technology with middle Foucault, and Confessional with middle-to-late Foucault. It also aligns the interconnected framework that shape governmental relations that characterise political rationality in the modern age with the ethical constitution of subjects. For example, this form of government power entails the relationship between truth, power, and identity or it’s ‘episteme, techne, and it ethos’ (Dean 2010, 27). This tripartite formulation corresponds to the ethical components outlined above: ontology (discourse), ascetics (discipline), and de-ontology (confessional). Chapters 5, 6, and 7 deal with the three technologies involved in producing a particular Muslim subject in the UK. To elaborate further, these are:

**Discursive Technology (Truth):** incorporates both the production of discourse and knowledge, which is about the objectification of objects, events, and people in order to manipulate and transform, as well as the construction of representation, which frames things through discourse. This technology codifies and produces the ‘problem’ and makes it intelligible within structures of governance. As will be argued in chapter 5, the production of radicalisation constitutes the ‘Truth’ of de-
radicalisation, which formulates the ontological dimension of self-government. Its findings are rendered malleable for concrete action in non-discursive domains (Foucault 1991; Miller, Peter and Rose 1990; Heath-Kelly 2013).

**Disciplinary Technology (Power):** refers to the way that institutions (Education, Health, Criminal & Justice, etc.) interventions (rehabilitative, preventative), programmes, and rationalities of government (Civil Society) work and operate together to create ‘docile subjects’. The discipline and control of populations is achieved through surveillance, judgement, and different forms of the ‘examination’. This is accomplished through the materialisation of systems of knowledge and normative frameworks known as ‘regimes of truth’, which subjects internalise. In the context of de-radicalisation, the Channel programme and the PREVENT strategy are used to inscribe ‘regimes of truth’ into the bodies of the population. This is analysed in chapter 6 and corresponds to the notion of ‘ascetics’ formulated above.

**Confessional Technology (Identity):** refers to pastoralist practices in the governance of the population, which focuses on the body and soul of the individual, traced to Christian confessional practices, based on the relationship between experts and citizen, in order to acquire knowledge that feeds into discourses, as well as transform the subjectivity of individuals. Although the confessional can also be seen as a form of ‘ascetics’, this thesis conceives of the confessional as the deontological dimension of self formation because of the need to highlight the fact that the Muslim radicalised subjects has to see themselves as deviant/problematic, that an imposed identity has been constructed through the production of radicalisation, which has to
be rejected in favour of a more sanitised identity. Notions of ‘sin’, ‘speaking truth to power’, and ‘redemption’ characteristic of the confession do well to capture the fact that radicalised subject are compelled to view themselves as bad citizens, deviants with pathologies who are need of reform. This will be examined in chapter 7.

An important addendum to the aforementioned theoretical lens that will be used to analyse the data in chapters 5-7 must be made. The first concerns how I intend to use the fieldwork data. Chapter 3 discussed some critical reflections regarding fieldwork data, much of which was critical of the data. In proceeding chapters, I am not using the data in a critical way. That is to say, I will not be examining the data or scrutinising the claims and assertions made by interviews. Instead I will be using the data in order to make an argument and prove that the comments of PREVENT practitioners are better understood in light of the chapter’s theoretical lens. The data was chosen in this way in order to maintain the thrust of the argument.

Secondly, the way the data has been organised into sections and chapters follows a particular logic, no matter how arbitrary it may seem upon first glance. Admittedly, some of the data could be organised differently. Some sections in chapters 5 and 6 can easily sit coherently in alternate chapters. For example, the section on ‘supporting vulnerable people’ (a second pillar of PREVENT) in chapter 6 could also have been placed in chapter 7, which examines de-radicalisation interventions more directly. However, I opted to have that section under Disciplinary Technology because it reinforces the way that anomalies, i.e. ‘radicals’/’extremists’ are examined and detected before being placed on a programme of ‘re-education’. It therefore dovetails the other dimension of de-radicalisation, beside concerns with the rooting out of individuals, who are ‘vulnerable’, namely the analysis of the management of society in modern state structures and how the identity of the mainstream and its
socialisation into a norm (more on this later) is achieved. A similar rigorous thought process has been applied to the arrangement of the rest of the data in chapters 5-7.

I want to return to the point regarding the interconnectivity of these technologies and how they shape modern subjects. This is because these technologies above form the anonymous structures, networks of knowledge, social and cultural institutions that embody, as well as produce, structural environment of the subject. All those structures shape people’s life and set the rules or procedures to be followed; they ‘determine conduct of individuals’ (Foucault 1988a, 17). It is also important at this juncture to clarify what is meant by ‘technology’ in the mechanistic formulation of the ‘technology of the self’. Nikolas Rose provides a comprehensive definition of Foucauldian understanding of technology as:

....any assembly structure by a practical rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal. Human technologies are hybrid assemblages of knowledge, instruments, persons, systems of judgment, building and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by certain presuppositions about, and objectives for, human beings.

(Rose 1996, 131/132)

In other words, ‘technologies’ encompasses all those things that go into shaping the self in our contemporary society. Technologies are always local and multiple and enable the implementation for corrective interventions in order to accomplish particular ends:
….our very experience of ourselves as certain persons- creatures of freedom, of liberty, of personal power, of self-realisation- is the outcome of a range of human technologies, technologies that takes modes of being human as their object.

(Rose 1996, 131/132)

The technology of the self is compatible with the post-modern take on identity that conceives the self as emerging as a result of discourse and regular self-fashioning practices. Indeed, the post-modern concept of the self posits the self as emerging in response to linguistic practices and culturally available narrative forms (Hall and Du Gay 1996). It is a conception critical of the Enlightenment conception of an autonomous, rational, and disengaged self. This is why despite Foucault's constant interest in the theme of the subject he did not develop a theory of the subject. He refused to set up a theory of the subject for the reason that

…beginning from the theory of the subject, you come to pose the question of knowing, for example, how such and such a form of knowledge was possible.

(Foucault 1987, 121)

According to Foucault, setting an a priori theory of the subject implies an idea of a universal and timeless subject which attaches people to specific identities, a position he rejected. There is no autonomous transcendent subject which exists outside its context, but rather the subject should been seen as embedded within historical and social context. Stressing the point that the subject is not a substance but a form, Foucault noted that this form is not always identical to itself (Foucault 1987, 121).
The subject and the notion of identity is therefore not fixed, but is instead constantly modified.

Notwithstanding the fluidity of identity or the fact that it is negotiable and no longer a given today, paradoxically one of the major drawbacks of the post-modern concept of the subject is the notion of a floating subject that can easily be made and re-made. After all, these accounts present the self as unfixed and ‘decentred’ (Hall 1996). However, the lack of permanence inherent in conceptions of the ‘decentred’ subject does not explain adequately the investment individuals make in taking up more secure identity positions. The attempt to soften the term, to acquit it of the charge of ‘essentialism’ by stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple-leaves us without a rationale for talking about ‘identities’ at all and ill equipped to examine the essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics. This is why theorists like Stuart Hall moved away from the notion of identity and preferred to speak about ‘identification’ (Hall 1996, 16) or Judith Butler in terms of ‘performativity’ (2006). As Hall asserts, for Foucault the ‘decentring of the subject is not the destruction of the subject’ (Hall 1996, 27). Foucault’s account of the practices of subject self constitution in later seminars, ‘The uses of Pleasure’ (1998), and the ‘Care of the Self’ (1990) (more below) provides a more measured and nuanced place to talk about the ‘subject’.

The question of agency is important to consider here. The biggest criticism levelled at Foucault is that he denies the notion of interiority for the human subject and more importantly denies the role of human agency (Laidlaw 2014, 93; McNay 1994; Connolly 1985). In particular his account in Discipline and Punishment depicts the political subjugation of ‘docile bodies’ in the grip of disciplinary powers and the way the self is produced by processes of objectification, classification and normalisation.
in the human sciences (Foucault 1991; Connolly 1985). The passive subject is the outcome of power effects, where ‘power produces the subject that becomes not a mere fiction of theory and law, but a real artefact’ (Connolly 1985, 371). Paradoxically the very analytical theory that situates the subject at the heart of its concerns is also the theory that does away with subjectivity. After all, one reading of Foucault’s work is that there is no subjectivity outside of discourse practices (McNay, 1994, 104).

Foucault himself regarded his ‘ethical turn’ as a continuation of his earlier work on the subject but approached from a different angle (Foucault 1998, 5-6). However the ‘ethical turn’ entailed rethinking the concept of how power worked as well as how the subject was constituted. In his 1982 essay the ‘power and the subject’ Foucault affirms that power is only power when it addresses individuals who are free. Power is defined as: ‘action on others’ actions’: that is it presupposes rather than annuls their capacity as agents’ (Foucault 1982, 790). ‘Power’, he said, ‘exists only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free’ (Dreyfus and Rainbow 1983, 221). He also proposed two meanings of the word ‘subject’:

....subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.

(Foucault 1982, 781)

Foucault also makes the distinction between the subject and the individual. The individual is transformed into the subject and the transformations take place as a result of outside events and actions undertaken by the individual. Indeed Foucault’s work on the technologies of the self includes analyses on the techniques of self-
formation, ‘specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves’ (Foucault 1988a, 18). By this point Foucault saw individuals ‘as self-determining agents capable of challenging and resisting the structures of domination in modern society’ (McNay 1992, 4). I thus read Foucault’s later works as an attempt to revise some of the overtly limiting space for the subject within the broad continuity of his oeuvre and not as an abrogation of his previous positions on power and the subject. Notwithstanding the possibility for agency, Foucault does not however set the subject free to do just anything. Foucault explained the change in his thinking on subjectivity:

I would say that if now I am interested, in fact, in the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of self, these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his social group.

(Foucault 1997, 291)

Subjects therefore take on different characteristics according to the range of cultural constraints that exist in a particular socio-historical context. Hence while Foucault does endow the subject with the possibility to actively constitute themselves or ‘act upon themselves’ (Foucault 1988a, 18), they are constrained by the resources available to them and not entirely free to act as they wish. Rose suggests that we understand the material concept of the self through Deleuze’s concept of the ‘fold’ (Rose 1996). The fold is a critique of typical accounts of subjectivity - those that presume a simple interiority and exteriority (appearance and essence, or surface and depth) - for the fold announces that the inside is nothing more than a fold of the
outside. Another way of framing the position of the subject and the process of self-
formation is through the concepts of structure and agency. It is this small room for
choice within wider relations of power that permits Foucault to employ ‘technology
self’ rather than ‘technology of the subject’.

In summation, the technologies of the self is thus a third-person material conception
of self formation and not a first-person perspective centring on how the ‘I’ is shaped
psychologically or through interiority. Instead, it examines subject formation through
the three technologies outlined above- discursive (truth), disciplinary (power), and
confessional (identity). It also situates self formation within institutions of
government, intervention programmes, and governmental policy. In this way it
incorporates the way that schools, universities, prisons, and governmental agencies
play a role in the socialisation of individuals, as well as the relationship between
discursive domains and state structures. Another benefit of the technology of the self
is the recognition that knowledge and expertise play a critical role in guiding the lives
of individuals, the important place of pastoral power in everyday life. Finally, the
technology of the self accommodates the agency of the self within structures of
power and thus offers a sensible take on the relationship between structure and
agency. Ultimately, these relations are constructed and historical and are to be
addressed from the perspective of government relations, which is addressed in the
next section.
4.2 Governmentality and Bio-Politics

As a technology of the self, de-radicalisation concerns itself with operating on the bodies, souls, thoughts, and conduct of individuals in order for those diagnosed as ‘radical’/ ‘extremist’ to transform themselves. Importantly, the technology of the self is deployed in this thesis as a form of individuating power belonging to governmentality.

A short definition of the term governmentality is captured by the phrase the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 2; Dean 2010, 17). Conduct refers the attempt by government to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behavior according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991: 2; Dean 2010, 18). A more expansive definition of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is:

Government is any more or less calculates and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seek to shape conduct by working through desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.

(Dean 2010, 18)

Governmentality therefore refers to political rationalities, or mentalities of rule, where rule becomes a matter of the calculated management of the affairs of each and of all in order to achieve certain desirable objectives (Rose 1996, 134). In his historical examination of governmental practice- the Greek City state power, Christian pastoral power, early modern European police and classical liberal state, and finally neo-liberalism post world war two- Foucault found that all concerns of governmental
power was linked by a single theme- ‘Omnes et singulatim’ (all and each). In other words, Foucault saw in Western societies the tendency towards a form of political sovereignty which would be the government of all and each and whose concern would be at once to ‘totalise’ and to ‘individualise’ (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 3). Foucault found that the practice of government was characterised by the way it took freedom itself and the ‘soul of its citizens’ as a correlative objective of its own capacity (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 5) and ‘to develop those elements constitutive of individuals’ lives in such a way that their development also fosters that of the strength of the state’ (McNay 1994, 121).

Significantly, this understanding of governmental power shows the relationship between government and ethics. For example, government takes an interest in promoting lifestyles, knowledge’s, and mentalities that encourage the promotion of health and longevity for its citizens, such as stressing the importance of regulating diet and exercise. In similar fashion, in the context of de-radicalisation, individuals are expected to regulate and refashion their views and behaviours which are deemed ‘radical’ and ‘extremism’. It is important when discussing the relationship between practices of government and ethics to distinguish between the practices of the self from the practices of others by government. Whilst governmentality encompasses the notion of the government of self and others, the concept of the technologies of the self refers to the practice of the self. As explained in the previous section, this practice of the self within the sphere of governmental relations presupposes a freedom, which is critical to single out given that it provides a means for the resistance of norms of domination. Overall governmentality allows us to place the concern expressed by policymakers through the discursive production of radicalisation and the formulation of de-radicalisation as belonging to the sphere of
governmental activities, which is concerned with regulating the behaviour of individuals, and not merely as a policy designed to counter terrorism.

Furthermore, the concept of ‘Bio-power’ provides an additional dimension to consider in making the case for de-radicalisation to be viewed as a technology of the self. Bio-power elucidates the backdrop to how governmental practices became concerned with the life of individuals within its territory. Bio-politics signified the way that political rationality became concerned with the ‘power over life’ above the ‘right over death’. In the pre-modern world power was more appropriately characterised as ‘deduction’ and ‘subtraction’, or in terms of seizure: ‘in things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself’ (Foucault 1998, 136). Foucault demonstrates that with time, the rise of industrialization, capitalism, and the growth of the ‘police’, this type of deductive power was superceded by a mechanism of power working to ‘incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize forced under it’ (136). Moreover, Foucault traces the development of two poles of power in the beginning of the seventeenth century, both of which come together by the nineteenth century: one of the poles centred on the body, the other the species body. The first relates to the power of the body as machine:

…its disciplining, the optimization of its capacities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterised the disciplines: an anatimo-politics of the human body.

(139)
The second pole, concerned with the population, is

......imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological process: propagation, births and morality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity....

(139)

Both these poles were no longer characterised by the right to kill but by the power to ‘invest life through and through’ (139). In short, bio-power was thus concerned with the welfare of individuals as well as collective populations. It is in this sense that government rationality was characterized by the power of individuating, as well as its tendency for totalizing rationality.

This transformation has considerable consequences: whereas before the classical period political rationality and power was exercised in defence of a sovereign over a territory, was couched in the language of juridical law, and belonged to the higher order of the heavens or the ethical/political community, bio-power

....brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human life . . . . Modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence in question.

(143)
In essence, bio-power encapsulated the modern form of power and how it was directed towards humans as living beings. Moreover, following Foucault, Julien Reid (2006) illustrates powerfully how the process of bio-power is intertwined with the emergence of disciplinary societies, which became concerned with the transformation of human bodies. Reid calls this process ‘logistical life’ which he defined as:

……live lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one’s purposes transparently in relation to others, to be positioned where one is required, to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told, and to be able to extol these capacities as the values for which one would willingly, if called up, kill and die for.

(20)

We see how ‘logistical life’ operates through the example of sexuality, in which ‘individuals are supposed to discern their own fundamental nature as sexual beings and, on the basis of this self-knowledge, transform their lives’ (Gutting 2005, 96). In this example, sexuality operates as a tool for the infusion of bio-power into the social body.

Through the deployment of sexuality bio power spread its net down to the smallest twitches of the body and the most minute stirrings of the soul . . . the body, knowledge, discourse and power – were brought into a common localization.

(Dreyfus and Rainbow 1983, 169)
The way that sex was used to intervene and shape the conduct of the population is analogous to the way that radicalisation in the UK context was deployed. With respect to the de-radicalisation in the UK therefore, bio-power situates radicalisation within the two ordering poles of disciplinary bodies (the individual) and the population (the collective), and explains how power works to shapes the subjectivity of individuals and wider population, through the technique of de-radicalisation. Ultimately, bio-power is a useful concept because it reconceptualises power as a positive and not merely a negative force, whilst also emphasising the way that government activity takes the life of humans as its main purpose, on the principle that enhancing human life strengthens the state.

However there are critical differences between bio-power and governmentality. One such difference is the re-conceptualisation of power from objectivising power—a process that involves the transformation of individuals into objects or docile bodies—to viewing power as a subjectivising force (McNay 1994, 122). It is governmentality that affords space for the critical process of subjectification. Governmentality is the indirect manipulation of the mind and soul of individuals:

…this form of power cannot be exercise without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets; it implies knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.

(Dreyfus and Rainbow 1983, 214)
Viewing de-radicalisation as a technique of governmentality concerned with shaping the conduct of individuals, allows us to understand why policymakers and PREVENT in the UK are preoccupied with what Muslims are thinking. Secondly, despite the negative conception of power as subjection, this power should not be understood as domination, as articulated in Discipline and Punish (1991) and History of Sexuality (1998). This is the second difference: ‘the process of subjectification through which individuals are regulated also provides the basis from which resistance to such government can be articulated’ (McNay 1994: 123). Overall it is governmentality rather than bio-power, despite the analytical uses conferred by bi-power, which provides the subject some autonomy to resist. This is important for our conception of the technology of the self in both the broad sense, encompassing individuals in everyday life and how they act upon themselves and occupy certain subject positions, and also simultaneously in the narrow sense, which strictly pertains to individuals undergoing different forms of interventions, particularly de-radicalisation.

Governmentality accommodates the variety of techniques, strategies, and development of certain practices characterising the evolution of governmental power. It also enables power to be conceptualised as positive and not merely negative, and bottom up and multi-directional, instead of top-down and linear. It also embedded the relationship between knowledge, power, institutions and interventions, and the conduct of subjects in its conceptualisation of power. This is important because it moves us beyond analysing de-radicalisation merely as a response to terrorism, or to view discourses on radicalisation as an isolated knowledge domain disconnected from policy, or even that change in conduct is merely brought about by elites. By conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technology of the self within governmental
relations we understand the role that the multi-faceted dimensions of power played in executing de-radicalisation.

4.3 Regulatory Norms: the Political and Neo-Liberalism as Paradigmatic Ideals

This section attempts to explain in greater detail the significance of the ‘background’ or normative ideals that regulate the behaviour of citizens and individuals in the UK. If governmentality is about the ‘conduct of conduct’ and the technology of the self is concerned with normalising individuals into a prescribed norm, it begs the question: what are these norms that citizens and subjects are encouraged to adopt? And how does this work? In order to explain this normative ideal, or what I later refer to as the ‘central sphere’, I will draw on a number of concepts, which include Foucault’s notion of ‘normalisation’ and ‘neo-liberalism’, Thomas Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’, and Schmitt’s concepts of the ‘central sphere’ and ‘the political’.

In order to explain the ‘background’ and begin situating the technology of the self as an individuating power of governmentality, it is useful to begin with the metaphor of the ‘paradigm’. In ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1970), Kuhn shows that scientific research operates by setting up a total interpretation of some region of reality. The ideal of ‘normal’ science is to show how the anomalies that emerge can be fitted into this total account. Kuhn calls such total interpretations and agreed upon science, ‘paradigms’ (43-63). Kuhn notes how ‘results gained in normal research are significant because they add to the scope and precision with which the paradigm can be applied’ (35-36). The paradigm therefore works in a way to reinforce its own structure by perpetuating ‘normal science’ whilst simultaneously bringing anomalies
within its scope. In short, all the research conducted is codified, ordered, shaped, and transformed in order to fit the paradigm, for the good of both the anomaly and the paradigm itself. It is the paradigm which demarcates and defines what is considered ‘normal’ and what differentiates what constitutes ‘anomaly’.

This metaphor of the ‘paradigm’ is also explained in terms of the ‘central spheres’ by Carl Schmitt (1929) in his paper ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’. Schmitt identifies four stages over four centuries in which the ‘European mind has moved’ and the ‘intellectual spheres’ which formed the centre of human existence—from the theological to the metaphysical sphere, and from there to the humanitarian-moral and finally to the economic sphere (131). According to Schmitt, Europeans sought a ‘neutral sphere’ at each of the four stages in which there would be no more conflict and where disputes can be settled (137). Notably, a sphere becomes central when

...the problems of other spheres are solved in terms of the central sphere—they are considered secondary problems, whose solution follows as a matter of course only if the problem of the central sphere are solved.

(135)

Schmitt illustrates how the ‘central sphere’ functions in his example of European technical progress during the nineteenth century and how ‘technicity’ (the religious belief in technology) was the central sphere that affected all ‘moral, political, social, and economic situation’ in the twentieth century (134). All these aspects were defined in relation to technical progress. Thus all concepts including:
God, freedom, progress, anthropological conceptions of human nature, the public
domain, rationality and rationalization, and finally the concept of nature and culture
itself derive their concrete historical content from the situation of the central sphere
and can only be grasped therefrom.

(136)

Similarly, in the age of theology when religion was the central domain in Europe, the
driving force of thinking and behavior was moral education and the ethical life and
thus all domains were defined in relation to the paradigmatic morality. Progress in
that context would be measured in reference to the Christian theological and moral
ideal. The central sphere should thus be seen providing the distinctive locus of
purposive action and thought for subjects in a given place and time. What then, is
the ‘central sphere’ defining the activities of government and society today? There
are of course a number of different perspectives on what actually constitutes the
‘central sphere’ of our day. The social science literature for example have identified
capitalism’, and the ‘nation-state’, amongst other, as central domains. In reality there
are many ways of defining and understanding the structure or paradigm shaping the
locus of our thoughts and actions today.

In this thesis I will argue that the ‘central sphere’ that constitutes the regulatory ideal
today is the nation-state. However, it is a take on the nation-state that comes with
two caveats. The last section conveys that I have opted to use the concept of
governmentality instead of the nation-state, albeit I sometime employ each
interchangeably. The concept of governmentality offers a distinct analysis of power
from the various theories of the nation-state. In fact Foucault deliberately defined his
concepts of governmentality in opposition to prevalent notions of the state by both Liberal and Marxist thinking. For Foucault, he avoided the state ‘in the sense that one abstains from an indigestible meal’ (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 4).

Liberals viewed the state as a problematic repository of power, in which the freedom and autonomy of the individual was embodied in civil society and pitted against it (McNay 1994, 118). This theory presented the state as unitary and as a result modern activities in government are deduced from essential properties of being a state. Foucault was more concerned with practice and transformation of state practice rather than structures of institutions (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 4).

Meanwhile, the Marxists viewed the state as playing a functional role in the service of capitalism and that power relations were located in certain sections of the populations. Such constructions of the state led for calls to denounce power as repressive and espouse notions about occupying the state in order to ameliorate excess. Instead of Liberal and Marxist notions, Foucault spoke of the ‘governmentalisation of the state’ (McNay 1994, 18).

Analytically therefore I employ the category of governmentality, however, the term ‘nation-state’ will continue to be used in a more loose sense, perhaps tentatively and with reservations, to denote the constructed historical entity in which the state is the highest order in a territory able to make claims on a population. As explained in chapter 1, every ‘state’ needs to have ‘nation’ and it is useful to maintain the concept of the ‘nation’ because it not only underscores the fluidity, historical, and constructed nature of ‘nations’, but analytically continues to help us make sense of the issues at hand. The three themes I have identified in chapter 1- the changing logic of security practice towards pre-emptive risk, questions of identity and belonging, and the relationship between the secular and religion in the European context- can only be
understood within the category of the ‘nation-state’. In other words governmentality has more explanatory power, whereas the category ‘nation-state’ has greater purchase on the imagination.

Secondly, the nation-state is one of those social science terms that has become reified and taken for granted in terms of its complexity and historicity. There is also a tendency to view the state as single unified entity that is ahistorical and fixed. Instead of delineating further what I mean by the nation-state I want to elaborate further on two particular features of several constitutive dimensions of the nation-state (see the last footnote) – (1) Sovereignty but focusing on the ontological conditions that make sovereignty possible, which I identify as the Schmittian ‘Political’; and (2) the cultural-social feature of the nation-state ambit, which is being managed by neo-liberalism of governmental practice (not to be confused with neo-liberalism as theory). The focus on the two different features of the ontological state is not contradictory because both dimensions should be seen as complementary and two sides of the same coin. The difference between these two distinct theories should be seen mostly in terms of the function of perspective. I have chosen to focus

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28 Wael Hallaq (2013 23-36) identifies five form-properties possessed by the modern state: (1) Its constitution as a historical experience that is fairly specific; (2) Its sovereignty and the metaphysics which it has given rise;(3) its legislative monopoly and the related feature of monopoly over so-called legitimate violence; (4) its bureaucratic machinery; and (5) its cultural-hegemonic engagement in the social order including the production of the national subject. Another take on the state is offered by Francis Fukuyama (2012, 469), who presents successful state development under contemporary conditions to comprises of (1) State Building (2) Rule of Law (3) Democracy (4) Economic Growth (5) Social Mobilisation and (6) Ideas/Legitimacy. Together, these dimensions represents everything needed to be a modern successful state, which is different from the prerequisite features required to form a functioning state, not to mention the fact, that very few States today are able to achieve a healthy balance between all dimensions.

29 Foucault (1997, 73-79) saw Liberalism less as a coherent doctrine or a politics pursing clear goals, but of a critique of governmental practice. Liberalism breaks with ‘reason of state’ in Nineteenth Century England, which had sought to strengthen the state, and framed the problem of government in terms of ‘too much’. Whilst there is no doubt that market reality and political economy as a theory played a role in Liberal critique, in reality the market sphere proved to be ‘testing ground’ where the excess of government could be established. In reality it was the question for regulation of government, through law rather than through the ‘wisdom or moderation of the governors’, that ushered in the birth of liberalism and not theory and doctrine.
on these two features because of the different features of the nation-state they help explain the background context shaping the discourse on radicalisation, PREVENT policy, and de-radicalisation initiatives.

My understanding of ‘the Political’ derives from the work of Carl Schmitt (2007). Schmitt argued that whilst key domains can be defined by the relations of antithesis, such that in the realm of ‘morality the distinction is between good and evil, in aesthetics between beautiful and ugly, in economic profitable and unprofitable’, the Political was consequently defined as the friend-enemy distinction (26). The enemy is a stranger, the other, something different and alien (27). However, this self-other distinction did not apply to individuals or the private sphere but to collectivities and the public sphere. And the enmity that comes as a result of the friend-enemy distinction did not have to be real- it just had to be perceived as real. Driven by the bio-power logic of administrating life, the political is about political identity, what constitutes the ‘nation’, and what is considered the focal point for activities within the state and externally with other states. The intense antagonism defining the political is what makes the political meaningful, whereby men could ‘be required to sacrifice life, authorised to shed blood, and kill other human beings’ (35). It is only though the construction of an Other therefore that the self is formed and the ‘political’ exercised.

In this sense, the political precedes politics because it creates the conditions for politics. Mouffe distinguishes between the political and politics as that between the ontological, which is concerned with the way society is instituted and the ontic, which has to do with manifold practise of conventional politics (Mouffe 2005, 8-9). As a result the political cannot be restricted to certain type of institutions or confused with or reduced to the state but must be ‘conceived as a dimension that is inherent to every human society and that determines our very ontological condition’ (3). Seen in
this light, there can be no juridical concepts of law, citizenship, or even the notion of the ‘social contract’ without the foundational grouping to which an entity belongs. The political community, held together by political identity, must therefore exclude in order to exist, must base its politics on the spirit of antagonism and not the elimination of conflict and strife through rational debate. The ‘political’ reaffirms the role of antagonism, conflict, and war as features of how societies are managed and how government operates.\(^{30}\)

The political creates the condition for the nation-state. The nation state exists for its own end following the development of what Foucault called the ‘reason of state’- a political rationality that emerged in the sixteenth century and is embodied in the ‘Polizeiwissenschaft’, which is the rational concern for populations, the efficient management of resources, and the promotion and safeguarding the power of the state (Foucault 1997, 74). However, for Schmitt, ‘reason of state’ was analogous with metaphysics, the modern secular state constituting a temporalised God. Schmitt argued that as sovereign being, the states’ ‘decision has the quality of being something like a religious miracle: it has no reference except the fact that it is’ (Schmitt 1985, xiv). This was because ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised theological concepts’, whereby ‘the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver’ (Schmitt 1985, 36). The state for Schmitt was the new God that made claims on its citizens. The citizen is an extension of the sovereign will and the ultimate manifestation of citizenship is sacrificing one’s life for the state (Hallaq 2013, 28). Since the ‘decision’ was analogous to an act of miracle, it is the ‘decision’, outside the constraints of rational deliberation, parliamentary

\(^{30}\) Foucault inverts Clausewitz’s assertion that ‘war is the extension of politics by other means’ so that ‘politics is the extension of war’ by other means. By this Foucault meant that the logic of war is inscribed in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and every one of us’ (Foucault 1988b, 90 and 2004, 15-16).
systems, and juridical law, that actualises sovereignty. The real Sovereign of a state is he who rules by ‘exception’, who is able to make the decision that matter.

Consequently, it is in the non-juridical space of the ‘exception’ that politics post 9-11 must be situated. As mentioned in chapter 1, 9-11 effectively ushered in a securitised pre-emptive order; one which is future orientated, geared towards tackling potential risks, dangers, and threats, and which is characterised by mitigations in the present, through the execution of wars abroad, risk-management strategies domestically, ‘resilience’ in infrastructure, extensive architecture of surveillance, and use of new technologies. The political provides the pretext that legitimises the securitisation of many domains unrelated to security, like education and health. It is also in the name of the ‘omnipotent Law giver’ that the ‘exception’ has been normalised and extended. Not to mention, it is under the ordering principle of the political that redrawing of the political frontier between friend and enemy in the UK and the West developed. In the aftermath of the cold-war, the political situates Islam broadly as the enemy of the West and Muslims, as embodied subjects of the enemy, as problematic citizen. The political also expedites the formation of collective identity around liberal values, which is posited as the antithesis of Islam, the source of values for the enemy. In this sense, the political creates the conditions conducive for the production and adoption of neo-liberal values (more below). Given that citizenship is contingent on the Omnipotent Lawgiver, Muslim subjectivity (but not all, for then the political would cease to exist) has to be refashioned in the image of the new God- the nation-state.
Meanwhile, neo-liberalism must be analysed and understood in terms of an art of government and less as a political and philosophical idea (Foucault 1997, 74). The idea of liberalism begins with society as its end point, and not the state (75). Foucault stated that it was the existence of society that allowed the principle of ‘too much’ to be posited in relation to the rational justification for government. Thus in his readings of liberalism, Foucault found that ‘liberalism forms an auto-critique of governmental reason: a governmentality which develops and corrects itself through its own critique’ (Donzelot and Gordon 2008: 57). It is the modern Anglo-Saxon variant of liberalism, belonging to the Chicago school of the 1970’s that Foucault finds that the principle of market rationality being extended to non-economic domains like the family and penal policy (Foucault 1997, 79).

Neoliberalism was striking because it not only blurred the lines between private and public, market and society, but it also deployed market rationality as a criteria to judge and shape other spheres of life. David Harvey (2005, 2) posits that neoliberalism is a theory drawn from political economy that proposes the idea that human well-being is best advanced through ‘private property rights, free markets… and free trade’. In this respect neo-liberalism refers to governmental practice associated with late-Capitalism, which prizes capital accumulation, efficient markets, and state interventions to ensure that markets are ‘free’; not least to privatise and reconfigure social relations and subjectivities along market lines; and a set of political doctrines championing the autonomy and freedom of individuals with the principles of equality and Human Rights.
Furthermore, neo-liberal governance is identified with ‘a political rationality which seeks to develop a congruence between the economic subject – the rational, utility maximising individual – and the responsible, self-sufficient, moral individual’ (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose 1999, 230-232). In essence liberal democratic societies seek the cultivate a citizenship able regulate itself thereby enabling political government to relinquish its responsibilities for providing security, health care, education and so on for its citizens. Hence the fact that the neo-liberalism framework drives the individual/citizen towards imbibing values like autonomy, freedom, and self-realisation (Rose 1996, 145). Neo-liberalism as a practice of government that is concerned with imposing limits on itself consequently ‘acts at a distance’ upon the choices and values presented to citizens and tries to forge symmetry between the political values (consumption, profitability, efficiency etc.) and citizens’ lives. Contemporary government according to Rose thus operates through the ‘delicate and minute infiltration of the ambitions of regulation into the very interior of our existence and experience as subjects’ (Rose 1999, 10/11).

Furthermore, for Dean neo-liberalism has a certain affinity to technologies of risk (Dean 2010, 194). We see today the re-emergence of a prudentialism that emphasises the monitoring of risk by ‘active citizens’, which include ‘physical and mental ill health, of sexually acquired disease, of dependency (on drugs, alcohol, nicotine, welfare or in personal relationships), of being a victim of crime, of a lack of adequate resources in retirement, of their own and their children’s education, of low self-esteem and so on’ (194-195). Ultimately neo-liberalism seeks to create self-regulating, autonomous, and responsible citizens, who are governed by market and consumerist logic, who are de-politicised, and whose identity is alterable.
Equally important to consider is the fact that neo-liberalism and the political do not have a monopoly on values, regulatory ideals, and normative models that exist in society or which operate within a state. Whilst these form the background to which strategies, programmes, and techniques work against, other domains like the family, religion, philosophies, alternative lifestyles, social movements, political ideologies, different cultural practices, education, etc. also play a part in forming and constituting the subject. Indeed, it is crucial to stress the heterogeneity of the ideals or models of personhood deployed in different practices. There are so many understandings, lifestyle choices, and different teleology’s of how the existence of human beings should be defined, promoted, and worked towards:

.....manliness, femininity, honour, modesty, propriety, civility, discipline, distinction, efficiency. Harmony, fulfilment, virtue, pleasure- the list is as diverse and heterogeneous as it is interminable...

(Rose 1996, 130)

The regulatory ideals differ too across places and time. And it is also important to reiterate that whilst the political and neo-liberalism may form the central domain that defines other domains and presents the regulative ideal that citizens are expected to adopt and internalise and then embody, the paradigm nevertheless generates counter ideas and practices, accommodates inconsistencies and contradictions. And many still fail to realise Neo-liberal and mainstream ideals.
To reiterate, it is the job of the technologies of the self in our society to bring the diverse assemblages of knowledge, techniques, persons, experts, and practices to bear on individuals in order to reconcile the subjectivities of individuals with the paradigmatic value of the state and society. Another way to understand this process is through the power of ‘normalisation’. Notably, normalisation was Foucault’s way of explaining how power works outside the conventional ‘monarchical’ view of power in which there is the unified symbol of power in the form of the King, institutions like the army, and the effects of juridical power. Instead of top-down and singular, power in modern societies for Foucault was circular, multiple, and operated through new invisible and continuous practices of control. Normalisation is a technique of power which imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another.

(Foucault 1991, 184)

This concept refers to the standardisation of the human population, followed by differentiation. Human bodies are ranked and ordered in relation to each other and specialities fixed to each body. Based on this grid, individuals are not judged by the right and wrong of their actions (e.g. the law) but by where their actions place them on a ranked scale that compares them to everyone else. It does this by making a totalising grid of ‘normality’, in which clinical assessment of all anomalies are made by the social institutions of the state; individuals are then either normalised or pathologised with respect to all aspects of their behaviour according to this grid of
normality. Corrective technologies are applied to those who deviate from the norm. Normalisation techniques, such as the technologies of discipline and confession are supposed to be an impartial way for ‘dealing with dangerous deviations’, but that ultimately, according to Paul Rainbow, the ‘end of government is the correct disposition of things- even when these things have to be invented so as to be well governed’ (Rainbow 1984, 21). What matters in the end in modern forms of government, is the ontological reality of power: the totalising all-encompassing ordering of things. It is in this sense that normalisation can be distinguished from concepts of socialisation, which Hubert Dreyfus explains eloquently:

Normalization is, of course, more than socialization into norms. Socialization into norms is the universal way the understanding of being or power governs the actions of the members of any society. In the new arrangement which has emerged more and more clearly since the Classical Age, however, norms are progressively brought to bear on "all aspects of life" What makes normalization different (and dangerous) is that it seeks to cover all practices.

(Dreyfus1996)

In this way de-radicalisation must be seen as a corrective technique of normalization operating to bring deviant individuals that fall outside the values and ideals of the central sphere into line and closer to these ideals. Notably, the underlying principle of de-radicalisation applies not only to individuals on intervention programmes but also to individuals in everyday life, in civil society, at home, within the family. Seen in this
light, de-radicalisation as a technology of self targets all citizens, and consequently blurs the lines between the ‘public-private’ dichotomies. The private is subject to the control of the public; all spheres of activity in essence belong to the public; that governmental practice is in the business of ‘governing the soul’ (Rose 1999). It is fruitful in fact to see the technologies of the self, and therefore de-radicalisation, as an inclusive mechanism as opposed to viewing it as a mechanism of exclusion and marginalization. It is nevertheless true that the before this drive too inclusivity can begin, power has to exclude and divide subject from others and within themselves. After the anomaly or deviant has been identified, objectified, represented as divergent and different, then the process of inclusion begins.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter endeavoured to outline an alternative framework for conceptualising de-radicalisation. It has argued that de-radicalisation be viewed through the conceptual lens of the technology of the self. The first section laid down the coordinates of the technology of the self. This entailed a breakdown of the four dimensions of what the government of the self comprises of at an individual level (ontology, ascetics, deontology, and teleology) and the three broader technologies in terms of governmental relations of discursive, disciplinary, and confessional technology. The aforementioned technologies correspond to the tripartite formula: ‘Truth’, ‘Power’, and ‘Identity’. In addition, the first section defined the term ‘technology’ and what Foucault meant by the ‘self’ and the role of agency for the subject in conceptions of de-radicalisation. The section after situates the technology of the self within the theory of governmentality. This is important because it places subject formation at the heart of governmental activities. Through the concept of bi-power an attempt was
made to show how modern forms of power in practices of government focus both on the individual and the collective population simultaneously. It also significantly presents power as life giving force and not merely as a negative force of deduction and constraint on human freedom. It thus elucidates the preoccupation of government with the welfare of its citizens and the interest shown in government of the soul.

The section after tries to situate the technology of the self within wider normative frameworks; if governmental practices constitute ‘the conduct of conduct’, then this ‘conduct’ proceeds according to regulatory norms. Employing the concept of the ‘paradigm’ and the ‘central sphere’, the argument was made that all human activities are defined by a norm or criterion and that deviations from the norms activate the techniques of ‘normalisation’. The ‘central spheres’ identified as defining the locus of activity in the UK was the nation-state, with a focus on two particular features of the nation state- the political, which triggers sovereignty and forms the self-other nexus that is a prerequisite for the formation of political community; and secondly neo-liberalism as a practice of government, which represents the socio-cultural dimension of the nation-state, insofar as it manages society and seeks to forge symmetry between political objectives, economic exchange, and the norms and values citizens aspire to, as well as adopt. Hence the technologies of the self operate to bring individuals in life with these regulatory norms. Through the processes of governmentality, ‘difference’ is expedited by the process of normalisation, which is effectively a pervasive socialisation process of inclusion.

The subsequent chapters will attempt to demonstrate that the technology of the self is the most fitting concept that describes and explains de-radicalisation in the UK context. As a concept, it sidesteps many of issues associated with the concept of de-
radicalisation in the wider literature (chapter 2) and fieldwork data (chapter 3). The technology of the self enables us to sidestep the definitional morass and overcome the positivist cognitive/behavioural distinction. It also allows us to connect the concept and ideas of radicalisation with the policy of de-radicalisation, thus bridging the gap between the idea and the practice of de-radicalisation. More importantly, it situates de-radicalisation theoretically within governmental relations and not merely as an isolated policy measure.

In this way, de-radicalisation is re-framed theoretically- it is no longer merely about the mitigation of terrorism but actually the shaping of subjectivity and the production of particular conducts amongst Muslims. This explains why policymakers are preoccupied with the ideas and practice of young Muslims, which makes more sense than claiming that the views of a twelve year old can be used to gauge the future likelihood of becoming a terrorist. Viewing it as a technique of government also answers the various challenges posed about its pastoral dimensions, like the fact it targets the young, not to mention the non-juridical approach of de-radicalisation, e.g. its pre-emptive logic, which is a feature of how governmental practices seek to govern risk.

Moreover, the concern with the ideas and practices of young Muslims echoes the themes expressed in chapter 1 regarding the problematisation of Muslim identity and the need to govern the future by intervening in the present, to redirect the ‘hearts and minds’ of young Muslims. Finally, analysing de-radicalisation as the technologies of the self enables us to account for the interplay between discursive domains, its actualisation through interventions and places of public institutions, and the internalisation of such norms and conducts through pastoral relationships and techniques. Ultimately, the concept of the technology of the self is the most apt and
robust framework for both capturing the reality of de-radicalisation in the UK, as well as re-framing it, by opening up spaces of discussion on pertinent issues to do with politics, power, and identity.

Forthcoming chapters are concerned with substantiating de-radicalisation as a technology of the self. Specifically these chapters elaborate the way government guides self formation of its citizens through discursive technology, which corresponds to ontology, disciplinary technology, which relates to ascetics, and confessional technology, which tallies with deontology. As a result, the prospective chapters will analyse the remainder of fieldwork data through the conceptual lens of the three technologies that are constitutive of the technology of the self. As previously explained, I will not be using the data in a critical fashion, but will instead deploy it to augment my argument, not least to help me paint my canvass. As you will see, de-radicalisation in the UK would not exist without a discourse on radicalisation, the disciplinary regimes of Prevent and Channel, and the pastoral practices of ‘experts’ and the confessional techniques for subjects. The task of the next three chapters is to make the case, supported by the data, that de-radicalisation is best conceptualised as a technology of the self.
CHAPTER 5

Discursive Technology (Truth): the Production of Radicalisation

Truth is not outside of power or itself lacking in power . . . . Truth is of this world; it is the product of multiple constraints . . . . Each society has its own regime of truth, its general politics of the truth . . . .

(Foucault in Rainbow 1984, 73)

Time was that ‘radical’ was a term of approval. A radical was on the side of progress, a radical ‘exhausted the limits of the possible’. And radicalisation meant being open to the world as a changing thing and engaging with others to leave the imprint of difference, of change. Above all, radical was associated with being on the Left, on the side of progress, a history that took humanity to a higher plane.

(IRR 2012, 1)

Crucially, chapter 2 highlighted that one of the chief omissions from the main corpus of the literature on de-radicalisation was the disconnection between the research on de-radicalisation and the discursive development of radicalisation since 2004. This in large part explains the divergent conceptions of de-radicalisation between Europe and the M.E and S.E.A found in the literature. In the UK, radicalisation was an object of study by government, academia, experts, the media, and the wider public. It is the concept of radicalisation therefore that undergoes a discursive explosion and not de-radicalisation. It is the conceptual framework of radicalisation, which is deployed in PREVENT that shapes the underlying assumptions framing the conception of de-radicalisation in UK. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the relationship between both
concepts was identified by 7 interviewees, about 26% of participants, in their definition of de-radicalisation.

This chapter analyses fieldwork data through the theoretical lens of discursive technology. As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, I will not be critically examining the data but rather allowing the data to speak through the conceptual lens of ‘Discursive Technology’. Discursive technology is the first dimension of three constituting the technology of the self. Discursive technology is about the incitement to discourse in order to codify a phenomenon for the purposes of understanding it and rendering that knowledge amenable for action in governmental institutions and structures of governance. At the heart of discursive production is the coupling of knowledge/power. Power deploys knowledge with the help of the human sciences and a plethora of experts to represent objects through the claims of scientific methods and language. The role of discursive technology in the technology of the self is to construct ‘regimes of truth’ (Rainbow 1984, 74), which subjects are disciplined in reference to, and then subjected according to.

The first section provides a contextual overview of the institutional and political factors shaping the advent of radicalisation post 2004. Section 5.2 addresses the notion of ‘problematisation’, which refers to the way Muslim populations became framed as problematic; whilst the section after analyses the role of expertise and knowledge in the production of radicalisation. The fourth section examines the ontological makeup of the process conception of radicalisation articulated in PREVENT, whilst the last section assess radicalisation as a body of knowledge. Overall, it will be shown that rather than reflect the reality of the phenomenon on the real world accurately, ‘radicalisation’ is instead produced for the purposes of intervention and mitigation in structures of governance.
5.1 The Birth of Radicalisation

Radicalisation did not exist before 2004. In fact the term radicalisation was seldom referred to in the press before 2001 and that the greatest increase in the usage of the term in the media was between 2005 and 2007 (Sedgwick 2010, 480). Indeed ‘as late as the early 2000’s, hardly any reference to radicalization could be found in the academic literature on terrorism and political violence’ (Neumann 2008, 3). The word ‘radical’ has a number of meanings, one of which is the noun: ‘person who advocates thorough or complete political or social reform; a member of a political party or part of a party pursuing such aims’ (Oxford Dictionary). Or the adjective: ‘characterised by departure from tradition; innovative or progressive’ (ibid). In modern times radicalism was primarily associated politically with the Left, the Civil Right Movements in the United States, Student ‘Social Revolutions’ of 1968, and the Feminist movement (Githens-Mazer 2010). Radicalism was also not merely the preserve of the Left, since it was also associated with former conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980’s. Being a ‘radical’ and ‘radicalism’ generally meant ‘change’ and ‘innovation’ in the political sphere and was on the whole regarded as a positive attribute, if not a celebrated feature of democratic societies. However, today the current understanding of ‘radical’ has become synonymous with fundamentalism, extremism, terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Islamism, and loosely applied in conjunction with Islam (Githens-Mazer 2010; Tahir Abbas 2005). How did the meaning of the term ‘radical’ change and how did the concept radicalisation come to signify the journey by Muslims towards terrorism? This section traces the birth of radicalisation and its relationship to counter-terrorism policy.
The changing security environment post 9-11, coupled with the severity of the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) brought a new urgency to understand terrorism. This shift in the understanding of terrorism is explained by Peter Neumann.

Following the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, however, it suddenly became very difficult to talk about the ‘roots if terrorism’, which some commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent civilians. Even so, it seemed obvious (then) that some discussion about underlying factors that had given rise to this seemingly new phenomenon was urgent and necessary, and so experts and officials started referring to the idea of ‘radicalisation’ whenever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’. In the highly charged atmosphere following the September 11 attacks, it was though the notion of radicalisation that a discussion about the political, economic, social and psychological forces that underpin terrorism and political violence became possible gain.

(Neumann 2008, 4)

The advent of radicalisation as a term and concept enabled policymakers, researchers, and the public to investigate the question of the ‘root-causes’ of terrorism. This was a welcomed development given the long neglected search for the causes of terrorism (Jackson et al. 2011). The Madrid attacks prompted the EU and its member states to break new ground in their approach to counterterrorism,
compelling them to delve into the mechanisms underpinning the recruitment of individuals into terrorism (Coolsaet 2010, 858). A number of policy documents expounding this new thinking in counter-terrorism were developed in 2004. For example, the ‘EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism’ was adopted in June 2004 and by November 2004 the European Council adopted the ‘Communication on prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks’ and the ‘Hague Programme’. These documents refer to the need of identifying factors that cause people to take a path of violence and terror (Change Institute 2008, 8).

Following the 2004 Action Plan, the European Commission Communication published ‘terrorist recruitment; addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation’ in 2005, which presented the initial development of a long-term EU strategy for addressing the complex factors that contribute to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist activities (Ibid). Following this Communication, the European Commission adopted the ‘EU strategy and Action Plan on Radicalisation and Recruitment’ in December 2005 (Ibid). In this document, the concept and term of radicalisation was first defined as: the ‘phenomenon of the people embracing opinions, views, and ideas which could lead to terrorism’ (CEC 2005, 2). Despite Europe’s long history with various forms of terrorisms for over a century (NSC 2007, 1; Jackson et al. 2011), the EU document merely referred to terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda.

It was thus at the European level that preventive approaches to counter-terrorism were formulated. More significantly, this new focus on the ‘root cause’ of terrorism situated the problem of terrorism at a stage preceding it, what came to be known as ‘radicalisation’. The term ‘radicalisation’, as well as a strategy geared towards preventing terrorism, was further buttressed into the architecture of EU counter-
terrorism framework following the London attacks. The fact that the UK held the rotating presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005 enabled it to play a key role in shaping counter-terrorism at the EU level. It brought ....order to the chaos and elaborated—mirroring the structure of its own recently adopted counterterrorism strategy—an overall European Union Counterterrorism Strategy, effectively streamlining the ad hoc measures into a single framework.

(Coolsaet 2010, 860)

Meanwhile, the London bombings not only provided the political impetus to firmly anchor the concept of radicalisation in the EU counter-terrorism framework, not to mention at member state level for the UK, Netherlands, and Denmark in particular, but it also embedded ‘radicalisation’ with the ‘home-grown bomber’ theory (Ibid: 869). This theory moved the focus away from the threat of international terrorism to domestic terrorism, emphasising the threat of violence posed by citizens of the Islamic faith. The narrative of the ‘enemy within’ represented a significant shift from the narrative accompanying the September 11 attacks, which stressed the international and foreign nature of the terrorist threat. The ‘home-grown bomber’ narrative had the effect of legitimising the move towards ‘softer’ approaches in counter-terrorism policy. In the UK, for example, the New Labour government made public the Home Office Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) in 2006, which was accompanied by a new preventive approach to countering radicalisation, known as PREVENT. It is clear that the growing currency of the term and concept in this period was primarily linked to developments in the policy world.

Following the London attacks in 2005, the then New Labour government set up working groups, called ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Together’ (2005), to
investigate the causes of radicalisation. In December 2006 the EC funded three related studies in order to further understand the subject of ‘violent radicalisation’: motivation and desisting factors for violent radicalisation; the beliefs, ideologies, and narratives of violent radicalisation, and the socio-economic factors contributing to violent radicalisation (Change Institute 2008, 8). In the UK, in early 2007, a research project titled ‘The New Security Challenge’: Radicalisation and Violence- A critical Reassessment’ and funded by Foreign Office, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and the Economic and Social Research Council, was set up, with a pot of £2.5 Million to examine and assess the causes of radicalisation (ESRC 2007, 4).

The project incidentally was nearly aborted due to the fact that a number of researchers had expressed their concerns about the potential risks the project, particularly its connection to agencies interested in intelligence gathering on British Muslim communities (ESRC 2007, 8). According to an evaluation of the project, the legacy of the ‘false start’ and further issues led to the eventual disengagement of the FCO (Tilley, Bouhana, Braithwaite 2011, 1). Notably, by 2011, the project had produced 3 books, 2 journal special issues, and more than 40 peer-reviewed journal articles (Ibid). The UK government and the EC were thus directly sponsoring and funding research on radicalisation. It was government and policy-makers in effect that stimulated the proliferation of radicalisation as a discourse, as well contributing to the legitimisation of it as an academic concept, which dovetailed strategies of counter-terrorism.

Conceptually, radicalisation had undergone some revisions in the three PREVENT iterations between 2006 and 2011. In 2006, radicalisation was defined in the
PREVENT strategy as a ‘process whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence’ (HO 2006, 9). In 2009 PREVENT II defined radicalisation as: ‘the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism, and in some cases, then to join terrorist groups’ (HO 2009, 82). The term ‘violent extremism’ was added in the 2009 version in order to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the 2006 definition, where ‘the question of why and how the government should take an interest in thwarting radicalisation was left open’ (Edwards 2015, 55). The term ‘violent extremism’ was perceived as the link between the radicalisation process and the turn to violence, albeit it conflated the distinct problems of support for terrorism, ideology, and terrorism itself. However, the term ‘violent extremism’ was subsequently abandoned in the revised PREVENT strategy in 2011. Radicalisation became defined as ‘the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’ (HO 2011, 108).

Meanwhile, the term ‘extremism’ was defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and belief’ (HO 2011, 107-8). Whilst this most recent formulation of radicalisation is more nuanced than it its previous articulation in 2009, it nevertheless leaves unresolved the question of how non-violent radicalism, e.g. ‘extremism’, leads to terrorism. Linked to this question is the question whether something that does not lead to violence, such as ‘extremism’, could be considered a threat (Sedgwick 2010, 484). Despite the growth of knowledge on radicalisation there still remains a legacy of confusion as to what
radicalisation actually is and what forms of radicalisation should be the focus of a counter-terrorism strategy (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010).

Regardless however of the frequent revisions of the radicalisation as a concept, the various definitions articulated amongst policymakers, academics, and others, the explosion of discourse, the emergence of the counter-radicalisation industry, and three iterations of PREVENT, radicalisation still emerged as a term and concept with a distinct framework. Table 2 in the Appendix illustrates some examples of definitions of radicalisation (this is not exhaustive). Despite in some instances of differing conceptions of radicalisation, characterised primarily as disagreements concerning the relationship between radicalism and violence and between thought and action, some of the official definitions of radicalisation reveal some agreement: not all radicals are terrorist, the interchangeable use of radical and extremism, and that radicalism is a function of threat.

Consequently, between 2006 and 2011 the framing of radicalisation acquired salient features. Radicalisation became a loosely defined conceptual framework constructed by government officials and the media, with the help of academics to understand the processes and causal factors which lead individuals to support extremist ideas or even to support or commit violence- or ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’ (Neumann 2008, 4). The framework implied the existence of a spectrum of the archetypal ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Muslim at opposite ends, or integrated on one end, and ‘religious extremist/ violent extremist’ on the other. Along this spectrum a process occurs which leads such individuals to support or in rare cases, commit acts of violence. It is a process which the Home Office and the Foreign Office described as the ‘terrorist career path’ (HO/FO 2004, 15). Radicalisation was shorthand for the
process in which ‘extremist’ ideas prevalent amongst Muslim communities might lead some individuals to undertake acts of violence.

However, conceptually radicalisation remains a source of confusion. Despite the popularity of radicalisation as a term and concept, there is marked absence of a consensus with respect to its meaning. Sedgwick (2010) has shown that radicalisation is used a variety of contexts and in reference to different policy agendas: security, integration, foreign policy, and private Islamic agendas. Consequently, the line can be drawn in unusual places. In Moskelenko and McCauley definition, outlined in table 4 in the appendix, the line is placed between political activism and violence, whereas Githens-Mazer situates the line between apathy and political activism. Moskelenko and McCauley’s definition therefore situates political activity within the process towards terrorism, whereas radicalisation for Githens-Mazer is the transition towards action and not violence.

Another poignant example of where the line can be placed in unusual places is gleamed from Denmark, where a Dutch newspaper remarked that since Danish culture is not religious, that ‘reducing Muslim’s religiosity is therefore a triumph for integration’ (2010, 490). Sedgwick notes that on this basis that the normal practice of Islam may be classified as ‘radical’. This expansive understanding of radicalisation is the by-product of the fact that radicalisation conceptually was intertwined with issues of integration, social policy, multiculturalism and the representation of minority groups (Coolsaet 2010, 870).

By 2010, despite the political, financial, and emotional capital invested in the construction of radicalisation and the question about root-causes, there was no evidence supporting the transition of ‘radicalised’ groups and individuals to violence.
(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). However the outcome of the multiple discourses on radicalisation, in a plethora of spaces-politics, the media, academia, various public institutions, society, etc. was the concept and body of knowledge on radicalisation.

This section traced the explosion of discourse on radicalisation, as well as the spaces in which they were expressed. It has argued that in response to the changing security and political environment, EU and UK policymakers were the prime catalyst behind the development of radicalisation as a concept. Radicalisation was the vehicle by which policymakers and the media acquiesced made sense of the ‘problems’ represented by its Muslim population. Its trajectory as an analytical category has been mired by contention. Rather than a scholarly and academic attempt at understanding the phenomenon of terrorism, the radicalisation discourse became circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorism policy.

5.2 The Construction of Threat Narratives

The data indicates the existence of several narratives about problematic Muslim identities, which can be simplified into two main narratives: the security threat posed by individuals in the British Muslim communities on the hand and the inability of British Muslims to ‘integrate’ on the other. Both narratives were accompanied by sub-narratives: there were at least three narratives in the security context (Al-Qaeda, new terrorism and home grown bomber) and two with respect to the integration agenda (Muslims inability to integrate because of their religion and political multiculturalism

\footnote{Croft and Cerwyn (2010) identify four threat narratives in the aftermath of 9/11: (1) Al-Qaeda as a central organisation conducting hostile operations; (2) Decentralised networks working strategically in common but uniquely tactically in disparate areas; (3) ‘Home-grown bombers’, where radicalised young people in Britain are drawn to terrorism by ideology or the internet; (4) apocalyptic threat, with a focus on the perceived determination of the ‘new terrorism’ to inflict extraordinary damage through the use of weapons of mass destruction (823).}
as the problem). These narratives framed the Muslim population as problematic and constituted the bedrock of the development of radicalisation as a concept.

According to Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’ Loughlin (2014) narratives ‘explain the world and set constraints on the imaginable and actionable, and shape perceived interests’…. Narratives can be a power resource setting out what characterizes any state in the world, or how the world works’ (76). They also identify three levels in order to understand how narratives operates as a ‘soft power’ (Ibid): (1) International system Narratives, which describes how the world is structured, who the players are, and how it works; (2) National Narratives, that set out the story of the nation state and what values and goals it has; and (3) Issue Narratives, which set out why a policy is needed and desirable, and how it will be successfully implemented or accomplished. All three levels are at play in the radicalisation discourse. The narratives in this section set the context for the PREVENT policy.

The ‘War on Terror’ problematised the threat of violence and terrorism posed by Al-Qaeda inspired groups, stressing the religious dimensions and ‘exceptional’ nature of religiously inspired terrorism. One interviewee frames it in the following way:

...9/11 makes us feel incredibly threatened, nuclear weapons, and all the rest of it—we are going to be destroyed. And then the next level comes, which is of course the ‘home grown’ threat; because for a period of time post 9/11 it’s about foreigners coming to do something to do things to us. In the period up to and not just from the London bombings there’s the increasing concern about the ‘home-grown’..... So what does it mean to say there’s a home grown threat if you want to use this kind of language? It means people must go from being us to them. The foreigners were
never us but they’re gone. You’ve got to describe this road from being mainstream to radical and that is the label given to radicalisation.

(Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)

The ‘home-grown bomber’ narrative emerged after the attacks on 7/7 and moved the focus away from international terrorism to the threat of violence posed by domestic militancy (ESRC 2007; Croft and Cerwyn 2010, Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010b). The former Secretary General of the MCB explains:

Well 9-11 was done, although there are no absolute proofs, by Muslims; 7/7 was done by Muslims and there were the Madrid bombings in 2004, which was done by Muslims. That meant that here is a community that is producing terrorists, then what is it doing that it is producing these sorts of people? Then there must a problem in this community. Then if there’s a problem with the community there must be a problem with Islam, although none of this was evidence based.

(Interview 14, former SG of MCB)

Both statements below, the first by former chairman of the Muslim Safety Forum and second by Director of the Cordoba foundation mention the impact of the new-terrorism thinking in practical terms.

We’ve always said to the police and the government we want to stop the crime. The police said the problem with this kind of terrorism is with the Irish it was okay to stop them at the last act but with this kind of terrorism-the police call it international
terrorism- with international terrorism it’s not the same thing, we have to stop them a few stages before the last act and the reason is because they would do suicide bombing whereas the Irish never did suicide bombing.

(Interview 18, former chairman of MSF)

The term terrorism in its modern mode I argued in my thesis was maybe first cemented by Netanyahu in 1996 in which he first brought to light the danger of Islamic based terrorism as a new threat to Western way of life. That was adopted after 9/11 as a result of the attacks and it became a part of the language.

(Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation)

The second major threat narrative pertains to the problem of integration and identity posed by the Muslim population in the UK. Interviewee data suggests that this major narrative about integration and identity is characterised by two sub-narratives: the first places the problems of integration on Islamic beliefs and practices, whilst the second locates the problem with political multiculturalism. The overall narrative encompassing these two sub-narratives however frames the UK Muslim population as an obstacle to the wider political project of a cohesive single British identity. The following respondent summarises the underlying message of this narrative.

This notion that we are of a particular identity and this identity is how we succeed and solve our problems and that any other element is alien to our main structure, is a cost, a burden, and possibly a threat- that is what is emerging from the narrative and
is being perpetuated by policy. The remit is to find this harmonious society that looks at one.

(Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation)

This focus on identity became not only a feature of the conceptual framework of radicalisation, but the overall ‘integration’ agenda, suturing such narratives, was also the locus of the Home Office’s response to the London bombings (Blair 2005). This interviewee situates the problem of Muslim communities within the integration narrative.

It’s related to extremism and integration because what was clear was that there was a lack of integration by certain Muslim groups in Britain. The Salafis, some of the Brotherhood groups, Hizb-el-Tahrir, basically preached in this country for many years that a good Muslim cannot integrate and be a loyal citizen of this country; cannot serve in the military or the police because that’s allegiance to a Kufr system or man-made laws. So a lot of these Islamist ideas are holding back Muslims in this country and also it kinds of builds up rage with an over emphasis on foreign policy.

(Interview 25, Quilliam senior researcher)

This interviewee highlights the first sub-narratives- the inability of Muslims to integrate and adopt British values. According to this sub-narrative, the problem
resides in the incompatibility of the ideas and practices of the Muslim population with mainstream political, cultural, and social spaces. Similarly to the security threat narratives in which there is a marked absence of a consensus on the nature of the threat, there are several narratives depicting Muslims as the foreign and problematic ‘Other’. Another academic describes the absence of socio-economic factors in discussions about the challenges facing Muslims. Instead the discourse on Muslims is characterised by reductionist accounts that employ an essentialised reading of Islam. This tendency to speak about Islam in a monolithic way is highlighted by interviewees below.

If you look at deprivation it’s about socio-economic status and not about your religion, identity, or ethnicity. We use all of this to problemitise the Muslim communities and in all those spaces we use Islam as the explanation for that. Muslim communities that are isolated, well, it’s because they are Muslims and their Islam tells them that......It’s this constant problematisation of Muslims and Islam that has been accepted in all the different arenas of the British spaces that reinforces this problem.....

(Interview 11, Academic)

If a Muslim does a bad thing it becomes racialised or Islamised- if I’m allowed to use this word. But if a similar kind of crime is done by other communities, then it remains an issue of individuals. The Eurabia and Londonistan theories are becoming more mainstream in European countries.
However, the second sub-narrative is defined by the ‘death of multiculturalism’ debate. This narrative situates discussions about radicalisation, extremism, and problems posed by Muslims within wider attempts of policymakers to renegotiate Britain’s political policy of managing diversity and immigration. An academic specialising on community approaches to counter-terrorism elucidates below.

I think it’s about structural issues with how minorities are viewed in the UK and again it goes back to the colonial mentality of there are problematic subjects and you have to treat them in silos as problematic communities and you deal with them like that and it’s always about integrating minorities into a majority or people who are abnormal into an normative thing- that’s a broad framework for operating..... That was the immediate go to problem, it’s all about integration and immigration, which is a constant theme since post-war migration and that lazy thinking, has made it into CT arena.

(Interview 12, Academic/practitioner)

The growing call by media commentators, the think-tanks, and official statements by politicians, to move away from political multiculturalism were exacerbated with the

So what you saw for a year or two years after 7/7 the discourse of radicalisation emerged and with it went hand in hand the death of multiculturalism. Because the politicians have allowed the community, and this is the mindset- ‘allowed’- to be themselves, to develop, grow, and have their own identities, because multiculturalism requires us to respect difference without making a difference the argument went that because we allowed them to do that, we’ve also created this problem where within those communities they can “hate us” and want to destroy us. .........The argument was multiculturalism needs to die; it needs to come to an end so it gets to a stage when everybody can buy into Britishness, British values, and so on.

(Interview 11, Academic)

More importantly, a return to a singular mainstream identity highlights the way the logic of counter-terrorism became intertwined with the notion of identity. This was reflected in David Cameron’s Speech in 2011 at a security conference in Munich in which he made a link between integration, multiculturalism, and security.

You saw that with David Cameron’s speech in Munich, where he started talking about that if you got a lack of integrated young men then you’ve got a terrorism problem. They’re conflating two separate things and drawing the wrong conclusions; you can look at Aunty down the road who doesn’t speak a word of English, she’s not
blowing things up. Well I mean, my sister, a Muslim convert with generations of forefathers in Scotland- you couldn’t really describe her as not integrated?

(Interview 12, Academic/practitioner)

Despite the powerful effect of these various narratives about the Muslim threat, these narratives are not objective but are constructed. In other words these narratives are not based on “objective facts”. Academic and Director of the New Security Challenge Research explains:

So basically what I’ve argued is that it’s a set of constructed narratives; there isn’t an objective way of rooting these sorts of things and because they are a set of narratives, it’s always emotional, it’s always moving, and there are a set of political projects that are trying to shape it in particular ways.

(Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)

Connected to the construction of the threat, some interviewees believed that the threat of Islam and Muslims were over-exaggerated. The interviewee below highlights a critical point. He points to the disproportionate ‘funding, attention, and discourse’ invested in radicalisation by policymakers for political expediency in a way that does not reflect the reality of the threat. The very small likelihood of attacks against the UK indicates the huge disjuncture between the reality of the threat and the social perceptions of this threat. This was reflected in the comments of the following academic:
The point I want to make is that the proportions dedicated to extremism and radicalisation is much higher than the reality is. I have spoken to hundreds of Muslims all over the UK and I can tell you they are more bothered about football, relationships, and Ex-Factor, like other citizens are, and what we need to accept that if a Muslim is against foreign policy, which many Muslims are, it doesn’t make them an extremist or likely to commit terrorism. Those people that are likely to commit a terrorist act are a small number of people but the amount of funding, attention, and discourse, is much higher than it needs to be and I think it’s a fundamental political tactic, which anyone who studies politics knows, that if you want to generate support from the mainstream population the best way to do that is to create the problem and to show that you are tackling it effectively.

(Interview 20, Academic)

This section has shown the significant role that threat narratives played in the construction of the Muslim problem for interviewees. Overall, there were two major narratives produced- the security threat and the problem of integration- with a number of other concurrent sub-narratives also peddled. These narratives produced the problematisation of the Muslim presence in UK, which becomes embedded in policy documents, and become a feature in the construction of radicalisation, which will become evident in this chapter.
5.3 The Contested Boundaries of Expertise and Knowledge

Chapter 3 highlighted the fact that 13 interviewees, roughly 48% of the sample, referred to the importance of experts in the formulation of de-radicalisation. Similarly, the data indicates that the formulation of radicalisation as a body of knowledge was not the result of organic academic enquiry but was instead constructed and developed by a diversity of ‘experts’ - academics, media ‘experts’, and think-tanks. Moreover, the data shows that the expertise in the policy domain of counter-terrorism is contentious, with many interviewees critical of the notion of the ‘expert’. It also indicates the importance conferred on particular modes of knowledge and the competition amongst experts. This section attempts to elucidate the significance of expertise and knowledge in the explosion of discursive production.

The data points to the existence of a multitude of ‘experts’ involved in the production of radicalisation, drawn from diverse and seemingly disassociated fields: probation officers, managers, public servants, academics, and social worker, mentors, therapists, and PREVENT Police officers, amongst others. However, many respondents were critical of the notion of the ‘expert’ in counter-terrorism.

I think the expert circuit is very much a politicised circuit because experts that talk to government are selected because they say to government what they would like them to hear or think they like what they are going to say. Experts who go on the media again have....if you look at simple qualitative assessment of the terrorism literature,
which has been done now, basically demonstrates that the literature overwhelmingly excludes the role of the state in directly or indirectly cultivating terrorist practices.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

According to the interview above the expert circuit is ‘politicised’; it is characterised by the selection of certain experts, a media presence, and the absence of critique of state power. In other words, experts in this policy domain are seen as individuals who legitimise the government’s narrative and policy. This presents a pejorative view of experts, which questions the objectivity and the knowledge produced by some experts. Indeed some of the data thus suggests that ‘expertise’ in the field of terrorism studies and policy domain is constructed in the interstitial spaces between the state, media, and academia. The interviewee below brings to light the business demands of the media for ‘explanations’ and how this compels them to find ‘experts’. Also intrinsic in his response is the notion that discourse emanate from ‘elites’ and how it flows down to institutions in order to convert into action, one of the institutions being the media.

When ‘that’ elite had a shared discourse that there was this big new radical threat to the United Kingdom, it created the consequences that flowed through each of those institutions. When it flowed through the media it created the demand; the demand for expertise-who are the people who can come and create some explanations and understanding? Actually it’s normally some commentary to fill a bit of a newspaper or
fill a few seconds on radio. And you know, it’s a capitalist society, when you create demands you get supply.

(Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)

This respondent raises important points regarding the fact that a shared discourse come from elites and the business needs to fill media headlines, couched in terms of the language of economics- ‘supply and demand’. This view of the relationship between experts and the media is supported by the interview below.

But I would say on the whole terror experts are on the right and the press are naturally attracted to them for that reason. They usually say a lot of crap and the press rely on that crap in order to run their own stories and that their papers have stories on terrorism on them so that they can sell papers, creates hysteria, gets people clicking onto websites and a bit of panic doesn’t harm either.

(Interview 19, Academic/Activist)

The implication of such a close relationship between experts, government, and the media undermines the notion of genuine knowledge on terrorism and radicalisation.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{32}\) For Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin ‘radicalisation’ has been ‘incubated in the cracks’ of the new media ecology (2012, 6). The new media ecology is characterised by a set of somewhat paradoxical conditions of ‘effects without causes’ and profound connectivity through which places, events, people and their actions and inactions, seem increasingly connected (5).
A community worker from an organisation known as Muslim Safety Forum explains how PREVENT work created a space for ‘expertise’ and created work for people who did not necessarily have the knowledge and expertise.

I don’t know what I’m talking about but I still want money. I’ve seen quite a few so-called experts who don’t know a thing about a thing…. Okay, you can be called an expert only because you’ve been in the area longer than anybody else and there’s a niche, there’s nobody here, there’s a gap for the Muslim community, certainly. If you then put so called experts and people around Prevent, Prevent officers and all that, it’s only because there’s nobody else. Put them next to an expert in another field, they will fall down quite drastically.

(Interview 13, former vice-chair of MSF)

This respondent highlights the poor knowledge base of some experts and the real motive for many experts: money. Other interviewees mentioned the low level entry requirement for experts in this policy domain and the financial imperatives underpinning the work of many experts. Indeed there are clear instances of academics, organisations, and individuals with no prior experience in this field moving into the policy domain in order to contribute to it. The ability of some experts to capitalise on the opportunities generated from funding and work in this area was discussed below.
Anthony Glees is a great example of someone whose entire career was completely in a different area of expertise and was able to move into this field. People are pulled in because they are the talking heads. So I think it’s about the setting of a discursive frame amongst ‘that’ London elite and the consequences of that flowing down those various institutional channels and when it is the media the editors want to have coverage on these topics and as I said demand creates supply. And some people made a lot of money out of it.

(Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)

This respondent frames some experts as ‘talking heads’ and explains the role of supply and demand. As a result, the data shows that the boundary of legitimate expertise and illegitimate expertise is fluid. This has hitherto been attributed to the fact that the state anoints experts, the role of the media, and the competition for money, jobs, and prestige in a capitalist system. However, a few interviewees have expressed the view that research on radicalisation and the PREVENT strategy as a policy has morphed into an industry.

You know there are many people out there looking for money and a job. I know think-tanks who have sought money from government sources and what is interesting is how they’ve tailored their approach and outputs to suit what government will like….. There’s a lot of insincerity in the expert industry; they are not talking based on research, evidence, and passionate belief but instead for money and status. If you go on the news or are mentioned in a policy paper then that’s
something to be proud off and it’s also an opportunity for you to get funding for your organisation to conduct research and keep yourself alive.

(Interview 20, Academic)

This interviewee not only highlights the influence of money and the role of government in selecting experts. There are thus structural, organisational, and personal reasons for the emergence of the expert industry. The notion that the experts in the policy domain of counter-terrorism has become an ‘industry’ was acknowledged by an analyst at DEMOS.

Yes, I would call it a cottage industry that’s popped up out of nowhere and has probably been detrimental, and I include myself in all of that; there is suddenly a million of Prevent experts and terrorism experts who knew nothing about the subject three years ago and are now parading themselves as the world’s leading experts on the subject but they’re all bringing a lot of baggage with them. I’m just as guilty and I’m open about that.

(Interview 1, Demos Analyst)

However despite the overall critical response by many to the role of experts in radicalisation discourse, the data does reveal a more nuanced categorisation of expertise. For example, the data shows the different types and levels of expertise and knowledge. This includes experts belonging to different epistemic domains such
as the intelligence services, government, academia, communities, think-tanks, the religious sphere, and politics. An analyst at IPPR explained to me that despite the diversity of actors conceiving, implementing, executing and adapting the principles of counter-terrorism, the overall hard-hitters were ‘white guys in suits’.

David Omond is important; he was head of GCHQ and was the government’s intelligence and security coordinator; he was on our IPPR security commission; he was a primary architect of CONTEST....But who’s making the decisions? I think on this stuff the answer has to be senior civil servants and a handful of tomatoes; the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Treasury, no. 10, and they are probably doing it within a framework laid down by senior ministers that say muscular liberalism or go here and don’t go there; they lay out the parameters and civil servants fill in the details. The spooks would be pretty influential so MI5 and MI6 people; but I think it’s one of those areas that isn’t about public debates and think-tanks, it’s about a few experts- white guys in suits- deciding, because when it comes to national security there’s a sense of leave it to the experts, which I think is misguided.

(Interview 4 IPPR Analyst)

Notably, the categorisation of expertise in this field does not necessarily correspond directly to a vertical hierarchy. In fact all forms of capital- personal relationships, flows of knowledge, competition for space, dissemination of knowledge, competition for influence- leveraged by experts are actually in constant interaction. Knowledge became extremely significant in the production of radicalisation discourses. Knowledge was important not only to codify the reality of radicalisation but from the
perspective of many experts was crucial in enhancing their status. This explains the democratisation of the enterprise of collating knowledge on radicalisation, as well as the horizontal structure of expertise given that premium was placed on particular forms of knowledge. In terms of radicalisation, knowledge was required on a very niche area- Islam (encompassing many areas of specialisation) and political Islam and other related knowledge domains. This was attributed to the fact that the source of the problem was placed on Islamist ideology. The comment below illustrates the highly specialised nature of expertise.

Also, through our research we found out that there were generally five topics that Muslims who were classed as radicals or extremist, had misunderstandings in. Those five were: Takfir- Calling Muslim’s non-Muslims and the understanding of that. Another one would be Jihad and their understanding of that- what is Jihad and what is allowed and not allowed in Jihad? Another understanding would be what would you class as a place of war? Another would be there what are the responsibilities of Muslims in places with no Islamic rule? ...What was the last one? And the last one is where did they take the knowledge from? And what is something that you can say that you took knowledge in the correct manner?

(Interview 23/ Directors of Siraat)

This passage shows the type of knowledge valorised by policy-makers in this field; especially the technical nature of this knowledge, and the way in which experts employed this knowledge to stamp their authority and augment their claims to
expertise. Based on the data above, critical to the attributes of authority were proficient knowledge of Islam, theology, politics, history, and Arabic. Indeed an understanding of this niche knowledge legitimised the credibility of many experts, many of whom capitalised on this discourse to great effect, not least because it was lucrative in career terms.

In fact the classical tradition, which holds a special status within Islam, was referred to in various ways by diverse range of experts for different ends and strategies. For example, whilst the interviewee above refers to the tradition, he nevertheless does so from a particular school of thought within the tradition (one that stresses the right of the individual to interpret the tradition without the aid of scholars); whereas the interviewee below, an analyst at Quilliam, provides an example of how the classical tradition can be understood, accessed, and then deployed from the perspective of another school of thought within Islam, that is even more liberal with respect to interpretation of texts.\textsuperscript{33}

As someone with a background in Islamic Studies I could only talk about from an Islamic point of view, which is losing the balance of life. So religion is supposed to be balanced, this was the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH).... From the teachings of the prophet and the classical tradition of Islam it’s always been understood that if you get too extreme in your Islam or your thinking then you’re basically wrong....

\textsuperscript{33} Ramadan (2004, 24-28) identifies six trends: (1) Scholastic Traditionalism (2) Salafi Literalism (3) Salafi Reformers (4) Political Literalist Salafism (5) “Liberal” or “Rationalist” Reformsim (6) Sufism. Although I do not know precisely the hermeneutical grouping the aforementioned interviewees subscribe to, based on their organisation affiliation and interviews, it can be said that the Quilliam Analyst interprets the classical tradition from the position of liberal reformism, whereas the Director of Siraat argues from the standpoint of Salafi literalism.
The analyst at Quilliam, like the Director of Siraat, invokes the ‘classical tradition’ and reminds me of his credentials as someone with a ‘background in Islamic Studies’. Despite working for different organisations, their divergent approaches to tackling radicalisation, and their different understanding of the Islamic faith, these experts nevertheless both refer to Islamic Jurisprudence and the classical tradition. They are effectively making a claim to possess knowledge and expertise. A crucial dimension to consider here is the existence of a vast diversity of schools, interpretations, etc. making competing claims of what the ‘real’ and ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam as a religion and discursive tradition actually is.

However, it is clear from that data that knowledge and expertise on Islam and the classical tradition are not the only prerequisite criterion that gives a person a license to be an ‘expert’ on radicalisation. Other knowledge domains unrelated to religion are a feature of expertise in the PREVENT strategy. These include knowledge on the diverse subjects such as youth empowerment, mentoring, psychology, Middle Eastern politics and history, the local community, to name but a few. For example, the importance of ‘local’ knowledge being based in communities is further explained below.

I think when it works when people actually give a damn and that can only work locally. So someone from London coming down to tell me how to do de-radicalisation is never going to work because you cannot explain why, what we talked about earlier, why something always feels right. Because you look at multiple factors in what is actually happening and know why that person came to that mosque and stuff
like that. Local knowledge is with local people. They are able to know what’s happening and know what’s best for their community.

(Interview 8, PREVENT Practitioner)

Interestingly however a senior PREVENT officer does stress the importance of expertise in tackling radicalisation but distinguishes instead between the kinds of expertise in her department that specialises in ‘preventative’ approaches vis-a-vis the kind of expertise in traditional counter-terrorism.

It’s a skills and expertise thing. The traditional skills of CT were in investigative skills rather than understanding communities and what vulnerabilities look like. ...The CT world is not going to do that and so it’s really important if you’re looking at a preventive strategy that you haven’t got an investigative arm leading that preventative strategy because they’re not going to know where to start; they will not theoretically understand it and in practical terms they have no idea.

(Interview 23, Senior PREVENT Officer)

This section has tried to present the production and development of radicalisation as a discourse that was formulated by policymakers, popularised by the media, and legitimised by a plethora of experts. It also highlighted the sheer diversity of ‘experts’
involved in the production of discourses on radicalisation and the various ways that experts make claims to expertise. In fact one of the distinguishing characteristics of expertise in the production of radicalisation is the competitive dynamic between distinct epistemic knowledge domains. It suggested that through competing analysis and solutions advanced by experts, those who are given credibility and are allowed to speak are those legitimising governmental policies, evidenced with the dominance of the idea-action formulation underpinning the conceptualisation of radicalisation. The ontological makeup of radicalisation that became legitimised and substantiated by expertise will be explored in the next section.

5.4 The ‘Conventional Wisdom’: The question of Root-Causes and Process

With the emergence of radicalisation as a concept and discourse, the enterprise of developing and codifying the science of radicalisation focused on the ‘root-causes’ and ‘process’ of radicalisation. Indeed the preoccupation of identifying ‘root-causes’ and ‘process’ in explanations of radicalisation mirrors the methodology of the hard sciences, where the methods of building knowledge depend on establishing universal fixed ‘laws’ for all places and time. However, ‘root-causes’ and ‘process’ are distinct ways of conceptualising radicalisation. Understanding radicalisation in terms of ‘root causes’ tries to ask questions about the objective of radicalisation, e.g. restoring a caliphate or reversing Western foreign policy, whereas the ‘process’ definitions of radicalisation views the phenomenon as a linear narrative and does not ask questions of ‘why’ but is more concerned with questions of ‘how’ (Githens-
Mazer 2012, 5). The PREVENT conception of radicalisation represents the process view of radicalisation. This section analyses the ontological framework of radicalisation governing PREVENT.

The majority of respondents did not dismiss the findings articulated in the literature on the process of radicalisation. Many believed that factors like ideology and social group’s dynamics were important to the radicalisation process. The objections by some however to the focus on ideology in conceptions of radicalisation and PREVENT is two-fold: (1) the degree of influence accorded to ideology in radicalisation and how it actually functions and (2) the policy ramifications of valorising ideology in explanations of radicalisation. The notion underpinning the process conception of radicalisation is that ideology directly leads to violence. The two statements below by director of Siraat and researcher at Quilliam explain this logic.

So what tafkir does, takfir is legitimate in Islam, but the wrong understanding means I can label a Muslim a non-Muslim and then allows me to put them in a category which makes it easier for me to justify killing them.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

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34Based on his study of the sources relevant to the study of radicalisation by 2011, Githens-Mazer identifies 107 sources, of which 56 do not offer any definition of radicalisation (2012, 4). Of the remaining 51 sources, the way ‘radicalisation’ was defined can be grouped into three categories: process, causation, and those who define it negatively (4-5).
When we are looking at Islamist extremism it’s very clear that notions of Jihad and the misuse of the notions of Jihad which drives people towards violence. They convince themselves, or delude themselves, that they are carrying a sacred duty and that they will be martyrs or Shahid.

(Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam)

The role of ideology presents radicalisation in terms of the direct causal relationship between ideas and actions. For example, the interviewees believe that a misunderstanding of the ideas about ‘Takfir’ and ‘Jihad’ leads to terrorism. A few others, express the belief that ideology plays a role at the end of a long process. In his view, ideology does not necessarily lead directly to violence but is actually one factor amongst many which allows the radicalised subject to interpret the world in a certain way.

Ideology is the kind of final factor, it’s not the driving force that radicalises someone. It’s the final factor where someone has gone through this whole process and they’ve looked for something to do and the ideology comes and the ideology plays off the fact that you’re probably isolated, you probably don’t connect with you family, you don’t have a safe space at home, you don’t have a safe space externally, so this network provides you with that space, that belonging, provides you with a sense of worth and purpose.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)
However, for many respondents having ideology as the primary cause of radicalisation and enshrining it as the first objective of PREVENT in counter-terrorism policy had a number of consequences. Given the influence afforded to ideas as a prime mover in the radicalisation process (since ideas lead directly to action), the PREVENT strategy valorised count-ideology as a strategy and has led to an inordinate focus on what individuals are *thinking* rather than *doing*. This was poignantly articulated by the director of the research programme on the ‘New Security Challenge’.

However the principles, the idea for example, that there is a conveyor belt from ‘X’ through radical to terrorist which can or can’t be interdicted at various points is commonly shared. And that phrase ‘radicalisation’ is like a black box in the middle of someone’s mainstream life on one end and someone’s terrorist life on the other. So anybody’s views we don’t like, ‘we’ the mainstream don’t like, can be black boxed in that way and by definition imagined to be on the road towards terrorists acts.

(Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)

The interviewee below, who has been arrested for trying to download material online, also explains how the focus on ideology leads to a criminalisation of ideas.

So what they are saying is that violence comes after the ideology and this is what the centre right were saying, like Quilliam. And then what you do is counter the ideas
and by default people won’t want to commit the violence. What you’ll find is that if you start countering ideas and don’t allow them to engage with ideas that challenge their own understandings and views then how they will ever develop an understanding about how to take action; that leads to frustration when you start to criminalise people for trying to understand things.

(Interview 19, Academic/Activist)

A second implication of having ideology as the prime catalyst of the radicalisation process is that radicalisation becomes synonymous with violence. In the PREVENT conception of radicalisation, it almost always means or implies violence.

There are three priority areas and ideology is the first and most important priority in the new Prevent strategy. So they say that actually ideology matters; there are certain ideologies that are compatible with the potential drift toward violence and we won’t work with anybody with that ideology because it’s a slippery slope towards who knows what.

(Interview 9, ISD Analyst)

This lead to models of radicalisation in which the distinction made is between political activism and violence, rather than between apathy and political mobilisation (Moskalenko and McCauley 2008; 2010; Baker 2011). The salient features in these models is (a) the causal link between ideas and action, between ideology and
violence and (b) placing political participation by Muslims along the same spectrum as violent radicals. The conceptualisation of radicalisation in these models thus has the effect of making ideas the central concern and preoccupation of policy-makers, as well situating the political participation of Muslim individuals and organisation in the UK, not as a positive form of democratic practice, but rather as representing the beginning of a radicalisation process that might tautologically lead to violence. This consequently means that political mobilisation is viewed within a security lens and therefore potentially criminalises democratic legitimate activism. This model stressed in short the causal relationship Islamism as the first step towards terrorism.

I think it’s the idea you don’t end up being a terrorist without being an Islamist first and therefore Islamism is the first step towards terrorism; Islamism is your marijuana to your terrorism is your cocaine. That’s the basic idea. I think there are Islamists who never thought a violent thought and there are terrorists who were never Islamists and certainly weren’t members of HT.

(Interview 4, IPPR Analyst)

Doing this has effectively justified criminalising certain ideas, because it is believed to be leading to violence. The focus on ideas also justifies intervention in the theological lives of Muslims, legitimising the surveillance approach of PREVENT which seeks to monitor public spaces in the name of purging it of early signs of radicalisation. Second, as explicated above, it is deployed to delegitimise the
involvement of certain individuals and organisations in PREVENT, despite their effectiveness in countering radicalisation (more in chapter 6).

Meanwhile, the second major factor identified in models of radicalisation is the role of identity. The problematisation of Muslim identity is constructed in various discourses. This is reflected in the data in different ways. One interviewee situated the identity problem abstractly within wider questions about modernity.

So identity choices are just a way of life now and some of them are great, some of them empower people. People get empowered to things they couldn’t imagine they could do and it’s great, whether it be in the commercial world, in religious life, whatever, it’s fantastic. But there is that radicalised edge as well that people might shop in. They might go into that radical shop; they might stay there and buy lots; they might go in and come out. I don’t know you can play with this metaphor in all sorts of ways.

(Interview 6, Academic/Director of NSC)

This interviewee employs the metaphor of the ‘shop’ to frame the issue of identity as a reflexive process intrinsic to modern life. This is linked to the narrative expounding the crisis of identity experienced by young British Muslims, articulated in chapter 1. We saw there how the wider literature explains the move towards radicalisation in terms of British Muslims embracing the transnational ‘ummah’, made possible by globalisation, in which they adopt the more rigorous practices of Salafism.
analyst at Forward Thinking challenges the narrative that a lack of integration leads to radicalisation.

Yes the teacher from Leeds. If you look at whether he was integrated or not, some would argue that he was really integrated. He broke the norm within his family by marrying someone outside his kinship, which was a big issue in his family. If you talk about integration would you say that he wasn’t well integrated as British values were concerned? We all have our own understanding of British values are and from Prevent's perspective it was about the narrative that a lack of integration led certain people to become radicalised.

(Interview 26, former analyst at FT)

Hence the narrative propelled, seen in previous sections, is that a lack of integration leads to radicalisation. Whilst some interviewees were sceptical about the validity of this narrative, others saw the issue of identity as crucial in the radicalisation process.

What I’m arguing and others are too is that we need to look at this as a structure where the individual goes through the process, because of the perception of being an outsider and due to foreign policy grievance as well as the sense that many Muslims, not all but many, feel like they are not being treated the same as mainstream society, then that creates the feeling of an outsider’s identity.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)
The notion expressed in the comments above—the importance of identity, the link between identity and radicalisation, and the experience of Muslims with being an ‘outsider’—all point to the problematisation of Muslim identity. The respondent below, a consultant for Muslim Safety Forum, eloquently describes the way in which categorical Muslim identity was pushed on to her by others.

I think it’s a good question, what is British? If you asked me a few years ago what I was, I don’t think I chose to define myself as a Muslim British person—I thought I was just a normal person. About five or ten years ago or whatever I suddenly noticed and identified as a Muslim. So what am I, a Muslim what?

(Interview 13, MSF/consultant)

Another way that the problem of identity is articulated is through the concept of ‘vulnerability’. Although this concept will be addressed properly in chapter 6 because it is an essential feature of PREVENT and de-radicalisation, it is nevertheless important to note that the question of identity, radicalisation, and ‘vulnerability’ are connected. The way in which the problem of identity and the concept of ‘vulnerability’ are linked is through the idea that a lack of identity is one of the ‘vulnerability’ factors that make some individuals susceptible to ideology and therefore radicalisation. This is explained by a PREVENT Officer.
Radicalisation is where the people who have extreme views find somebody who is vulnerable in order to make them believe they could change things. So if somebody is a vulnerable position, whether it is being in prison, criminality, drugs, or not having an identity or not understanding religion, it could be anything that gets that vulnerability.

(Interview 21, PREVENT Officer)

However, the problem of identity is not only seen as a symptom of vulnerability. It is also viewed as an indication of ‘risk’. So an identity problem makes you vulnerable and puts you at risk of radicalisation. The dominant narrative posits that vulnerable individuals adopt alternative points of identification, which when activated amongst religious groups or online environments, ignites the radicalisation fuse. It in this way that ‘identity’ is understood in policy terms as playing a causal role in the radicalisation process.

What was equally instructive, besides those factors that were deemed within the legitimate scope of the narrative on radicalisation, was what was excluded or marginalised within the formation of the discourse: the role of foreign policy in accounts on the ‘root-causes’ of radicalisation. The following research analyst at ISD explains how the official narrative did not acknowledge the role of foreign policy in the radicalisation of Muslims.
I’ve always got the sense when I’ve done interviews in communities, back at that time particularly, people were angry at foreign policy, but so was everybody frankly, but one of the things most people were angry about was they were not even allowed to talk about it. There was a complete lack of willingness to go there and that was while at the same time behind the scenes memos were being prepared for the Home Office and other departments that were saying that we know the war in Iraq and foreign policy is directly causing recruitment. When you have a situation when a government doesn’t have legitimacy because it’s refusing to acknowledge obvious truth because it doesn’t suit its immediate ends, that can’t be a good thing, right?

(Interview 9, ISD Analyst)

This ‘official’ line on the causes of radicalisation was contrasted with the statement and actions of prominent Muslim public figures. At the PET workgroups in 2005 Muslim representatives requested that the working groups look into the effects of UK foreign policy on Muslims and called for a Public Inquiry to help place ‘facts as opposed to speculation-informed or otherwise- into the public domain about the process by which some British Muslims are being radicalised’ (Brighton 2007). While this request was rejected, others like Shahid Malik, (ex-Labour MP) and Salma Yacqoob (former RESPECT Party member) as well as bodies like the MCB, amongst many others, stressed the role British foreign plays in radicalising British Muslims. In addition, this ‘official’ position had been contradicted by the video statement of the ring-leader Mohammed Sidique Khan, who had invoked the Iraq War as a motivation to take ‘revenge’ for his ‘brothers and sisters’ (Brighton 2007; Rai 2006; Devji 2008). It was also discredited by numerous leaks from government documents linking foreign policy to the radicalisation of British Muslims (HO/FO 2004).
Moreover the concern with the influence of foreign policy by some Muslim was reported by the security services to the British government a few weeks before the 7/7 bombing in 2005, acknowledging that events in Iraq were continuing to act as ‘motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist related activities in the UK’ (Rai 2006,19). In fact, Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of MI5 between 2002 and 2007 told a parliamentary enquiry in 2010:

Our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word, a whole generation of young people – not a whole generation, a few among a generation – who saw our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as being an attack on Islam.

(Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin 2012, 1)

Notably, it became easier to discuss the impact of foreign policy as a source of a radicalisation only once former Prime Minister Tony Blair left office in 2007, given that he had been associated with the War on Iraq (Briggs 2010). However, a legacy of this period was that the PREVENT policy formulated, with the assistance of the radicalisation concept, a narrative that focused on micro factors affecting the individual, primarily ideology and identity, with macro factors, like Western foreign policy, being marginalised (Kundnani 2012; Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly, and Jarvis 2015, 1). The following interviewee aptly speaks of the ‘psychologicalisation’ of radicalisation accounts and the identifying instead what he considers being the real cause of radicalisation-Western foreign policy.
I actually don’t think human beings are as complicated as psychologists make them out to be. So there’s a lot of psychologicalisation, if such as word exists, of the terrorist- what motivates them? Why? Was he traumatised? Was the father absent? No actually it’s actually quite simple way people chose to commit political violence. It’s because they feel disempowered at the might of the Western military superstructure that does do unjust things in the Middle East.

(Interview 20, Academic)

This section attempted to understand what interviewees thought on the ‘conventional wisdom’ of radicalisation and the factors believed to lead some individual British Muslims to terrorism. Respondents did not dismiss the role that ideology and identity crisis played in radicalisation and some believed that they were indeed significant factors. However the majority of interviewees were critical of the emphasis placed on these particular factors at the expense of others and frequently commented on the consequences of privileging ideology in accounts of radicalisation. The main issue is that the central role afforded to ideology enabled the activation of a type of counter-terrorism policy that becomes more preoccupied with policing thought crimes in public institutions than actually fighting terrorism. Other interviewees identified foreign policy as a critical source of radicalisation but one which was deliberately marginalised in accounts of radicalisation. Focusing on micro factors like ideology and identity shifts the focus away from more macro and politically contentious issues like foreign policy and politics. Prospective chapters will address the impact the conceptualisation of radicalisation had on PREVENT, the Channel programme, and de-radicalisation.
5.5 Radicalisation as a Body of Knowledge: Spurious Social Science

The explosive incitement to discourse on radicalisation made ostensible claims to the language and methods of the natural sciences. As addressed in the last section this could be seen in the language used in this discourse- ‘root-causes’, ‘processes’, and ‘models’. This positivist framework employed by ‘experts’ is used with the goal of providing solutions to the problem of radicalisation. However, many interviewees were very critical of radicalisation as a research area. The major point raised by interviewees is the flimsy research foundations underpinning the codification of radicalisation enterprise. This section addresses radicalisation as a field of knowledge.

Despite claims to scientific rigour and the appropriation of scientific methods, many interviewees were explicitly clear that the concept and idea of radicalisation was not rooted in the sciences or backed up by ‘empirical evidence’. This contradiction between the aspirations of many theories on radicalisation to acquire the legitimisation of being scientific and the actual reality of these theories and causal explanations is raised by a think-tank analyst whose reports were influential in the early days when the PREVENT strategy was being formed.

I think that on the whole, particularly in the preventative area, it hasn’t been evidence based as much as it should be. In many ways it’s because the evidence is really hard to get. As I was saying, there’s great theories on all this stuff... let’s imagine we were talking about, rather than violent extremism, talking about a particular health issue, what would we do? We would find a big enough sample size, we would create
that sample and compare it to a control group, we would have longitudinal data, we
would have large data sets, we would test, triangulate, we would apply all sorts of
scientific rigour to the analysis of whatever data it was we were going to use. We
simply haven’t done that in this area. There are some areas where there’s scientific
rigour. You know, a lot of it is qualitative, a lot of it is based on views of frontline
workers, a lot of it end up being dominated by individuals who’ve got polemical
views, are able to communicate them effectively and then they’ve got hold and then
they become the dominant norms in terms of thinking.

(Interview 9, ISD Analyst)

This respondent makes an important critique of PREVENT- that in contradistinction
to other policy areas, research on radicalisation was not evidence based and
scientific enough. In terms of methodology for example, she notes the absence of
substantial data, the lack of data analysis, the predominance of qualitative data, and
the tendency towards polemical approaches in counter-terrorism. The absence of
robust methodologies characterising research on radicalisation, as well as the scant
evidence base for policy development is also highlighted by the following think-tank
analyst at Demos.

First how difficult it would be to identify the root causes and everyone has their
personal philosophical view and there isn’t any evidence to support any of it. So
some people say it’s the ideology because they hate the ideology. Some people say
the ideology is a symptom of broader structural problems and inequality in society
and discrimination against Muslims in Britain. Some people say what the spark here is, is the war in Iraq, so if we wanted to prevent anything we should stop the war in Iraq. But we are not going to do that so we what can we deal with? I don’t think there’s anyone to blame for all of that. It just happened very quickly without being able to answer the root cause.

(Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst)

An important point is raised by this interviewee was the notion that discussions regarding ‘root-causes’ of radicalisation reflect ‘personal philosophical views’. It reinforces the shaky empirical and methodological foundations of research on radicalisation. Equally important is the idea that the question of ‘root causes’ was not in the end answered because ‘it happened very quickly’. Both previous observations suggest that the production of discourse on radicalisation was ultimately characterised by the absence of methodological rigour, empirical data, and was in the end undermined by policy imperatives. The same two interviewees questioned the overall objective of radicalisation as a body of knowledge.

Now I don’t think we are ever going to answer root cause because it’s different for each person. But even if were able to perfectly identify root causes, which is a fool’s errand for social scientists anyway, it wouldn’t necessarily tell us anyway what our response would be.

(Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst)
So I went through this really exhaustive process of all these dominant theories of radicalisation, whether they were grievances, segregation, divisions, criminal networks, ideologies, and so on. It all sounds great in theory. Then when you start to define, what are the things you would do to prevent each of those causal factors and how would you measure each of those to know your moving in the right direction. It’s actually like the emperor’s new clothes, when you actually look at it, it actually looks really ridiculous because you think even if all more indicators were moving in the right direction does that mean there would be less radicalisation?

(Interview 9, ISD Analyst)

According to these interviewees the government does not have the resources to tackle radicalisation. There are too many factors involved in radicalisation for the government to be able to address it. There is thus a disjuncture between the discourse of radicalisation and the actual political capacity to resolve the problem of Muslim radicalisation. This observation is coupled with the fact that the development of radicalisation was not the result of organic academic enquiry but was formulated by policymakers and popularised by the media before it found its way into academia.

Consequently, the radicalisation discourse brings into question the relationship between the codification of knowledge by the social sciences and wider governmental objectives. In other words, was the discursive production of radicalisation actually supposed to accurately codify the radicalisation process in the
real world or what is merely supposed to provide a retrospective blanket narrative for already agreed political objectives for policymakers? The implication there is that given the relationship between government funding and the research community, the independence and objectivity of the research, knowledge, and overall discourse produced is compromised.

The terrorism field is a big field and huge money has been poured at it. How much of it is real solid? It’s not solid in the same way that other disciplines in social sciences are which have been around for over a hundred years and have evolved, you know, and terrorism is a very new field in that sense; it’s very modern, it’s very driven by government agendas. This is the other thing: who’s funding terrorism research? Overwhelmingly its government’s and even academic governing grant making bodies that are giving funding are doing under the parameters established by states.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

The issue at hand relates to the politicised nature characterising the production of knowledge on terrorism and political violence. The funding provided by governments to academia is one of the chief ways research grants and money is provided in research. In particular, topics like political violence and radicalisation requires funding because the study of radicalisation and terrorism are not considered disciplines in their own right and primarily belong as sub-branches in International Relations. Research contributions to the field have been made from numerous other
disciplines- like psychology, medicine, criminology, sociology, economics, etc. Thus research has been overwhelmingly fragmented and multi-disciplinary and undertaken in the crevices and sub-disciplines of academia. For example, the interviewee below explains the popularity of psychology amongst politicians and media in explaining radicalisation over sociology.

I think it’s the easy option; it’s the easy way out for politicians. The politicians and the media actually love psychologists and don’t actually come to sociologists for solutions. Psychologist offer quick-fix solutions and formulas; follow these description and it’s very black and white, it’s like statistics. The politicians and the media love statistics because it’s a quick fix. Psychological models suit the agenda and the speed at which politics needs to work at. So if someone talks about a deradicalisation programme- it sounds nice, it’s easy to sell, easy to fund and implement. But if a sociologist comes and talks about social policies and different structures, this isn’t easy to manipulate and implement. There is also a myth around psychology that it is scientific, which seems to give them more credibility that they are dealing with the problem. But they don’t want to address root causes about British foreign policy.

(Interview 20, Academic)

In other words the respondent believes that the time and scholarship required to produce quality research are not amenable to both the imperatives and objectives of the world of policy and 24-hour media, centres of power that demands simple, accessible, and quick information and the spectacle of an event. Psychologists, ‘experts’, and many commentators that deploy information are therefore more suited
to the logic of the media and policy machine. Again this reinforces the inbuilt politicised and sensationalised approach to knowledge building. Another academic underscores the policy driven nature of knowledge development in PREVENT.

These people do not have any background in social science and academic research. They haven’t done any research they’ve just claimed first-hand experience and some politicians just buy it like this. They don’t realise that actually the expertise of these people are pretty much secondary. I’m not saying we can’t learn from them, of course we can, but only as once source amongst other sources, and distinguishing between what they actually experienced and their accounts of these experience, which are obviously already processed and catered for certain people, politicians, so Prevent programme, whatever. Look at the Quilliam papers; they’re always policy driven.

(Interview 15, Academic)

His gripe is with the so-called ‘experts’ making knowledge claims that are not rooted in the social sciences. According to this academic the problem is thus not the social sciences. Instead the problem is that the discourse is being led by the experiences of certain individuals. Again the suggestion here is that personal experiences are not scientific enough. Given that the social sciences, as well as a diversity of actors outside the social sciences, played a significant role in the production of multiple discourses, knowledges, and theories, it is striking that the conceptual framework of radicalisation, as posited by policy-makers, and supported by academic discourse
and research, can be reduced to a few salient features. Despite such shortcomings, a whole raft of counter-radicalisation measures and the implementation of the PREVENT strategy was delivered on the basis of this knowledge on radicalisation. This raises an important question: does the same laxness towards the veracity, integrity, and credibility of research exist in other policy domains? In other words, would other policy areas like Education or Health build their strategies and polices on the basis of such weak research foundations?

This critique of the knowledge foundations of radicalisation was also corroborated in two reports commissioned by the Home Office in order to examining radicalisation. The first report, ‘Understanding vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the influence of Al Qaida violent extremism’ (HO 2011b), was prepared for the OSCT. Having reviewed the main thirty-nine studies that looked at Al-Qaeda influenced violent extremism, the report identified the key challenges characterising research in this areas from an empirical perspective; the difficulty of interviewing or accessing actual terrorists and as a result much of the current literature provides only anecdotal evidence (1). Another challenge is that when factors leading to terrorism are evaluated and analysed it is done without referencing the fact that the vast majority of people who share the same background as terrorists do not become involved in terrorism (Ibid). Moreover, there is limited evidence that can provide suggestions on what causes individuals to become involved in violent extremism. With respect to methodology the report concluded that:

The majority of studies are based on a small number of case interviews or secondary analysis of documents, such as trial transcripts, radical websites or other publications promoting violent extremism, where terrorists document their thoughts.
Qualitative research involving interviews with participants is often limited to those who are more peripherally involved in terrorism than suicide bombers, such as bombers’ family or friends, or other group members who have not taken that final step towards violence. There is also a large body of ‘think-pieces’, based largely on anecdotal evidence.

(2)

Meanwhile, the second report, ‘Al-Qaeda influenced Radicalisation: a rapid evidence Assessment guided by Situation Action Theory’ (2011), provides a useful summary on the problems of conducting research on radicalisation.

The study of the causes of radicalisation in particular, and of course on terrorism in general, is in its infancy. A number of factors contribute to the scientific immaturity of the field, among them: the low volume of incidents and the relatively small number of individuals implicated, notably in the West; the security issues involved in accessing non-open data; the lack of integration between disciplines; and the imprecise boundaries of the problem area.

(Bouhana and Wikstrom 2011, 2)

In summation, the research foundations of radicalisation and its integrity as a research area were questioned by many interviewees. The rocky foundations of radicalisation as a body of knowledge was also corroborated by government commissioned reports. There was a salient contradiction between the claims made by the social sciences to the methods of the natural sciences and the reality of the
research output. Despite, the weak state of the field, the knowledge on radicalisation was incorporated into the PREVENT Policy, as well as counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts.

5.6 Conclusions

This chapter analysed the discursive formation of radicalisation between 2004 and 2011. The first section provided an overview of the conditions of emergence for radicalisation as a term and concept. It traced the emergence of radicalisation and the production of discourse to elite policymakers in the UK and the EU. ‘Radicalisation’ thus acquired its current association as a result of legitimisation by key institutions and by political elites. The section after elucidates the numerous narratives depicting the threat posed by the UK Muslim population. Indeed the data conveyed that it is hard to grasp the precise nature of the threat. It also indicated that there was a substantial gap between the reality of the security threat in real life and the perception of that threat. Section 5.3 analyses the role of experts and knowledge in the production of radicalisation. The data revealed the blurred boundaries of legitimate claims to knowledge, the contested nature of expertise, and competition amongst various experts in discourses of radicalisation. Interviewees believed that ‘legitimate’ expertise was intrinsically linked to governmental objectives and that the construction of radicalisation had created an ‘industry’. Section 5.4 examined the ‘conventional wisdom’ of radicalisation, which describes the transition of ‘good’ Muslim to ‘bad’ Muslim primarily in terms of problems of identity and ideology. This conceptualisation resulted in the marginalisation of Meso and Macro factors in the
PREVENT conception of PREVENT, even though both were identified in the wider literature (including government sources) and wider public debate as pivotal in arriving at a more comprehensive account of radicalisation. In particular, there was an attempt by many prominent British Muslims post 7/7 to emphasise the role of foreign policy in the debate on radicalisation. The last section assesses radicalisation as a body of knowledge. The majority of interviewees expressed the verdict that radicalisation as a field is in its infancy and that it has been comprised by the absence of epistemological and methodological rigour, not to mention limited availability of primary data, and the inbuilt politicisation to knowledge growth.

The arguments made in this chapter echoes the themes outlined in chapter 1. There I explained how the problematisation of Muslim identity was shaped by the changing security environment, the challenges posed to the nation state by changing citizenship and identity, and the experience of religion within secular modernity in Europe. The by-product was the securitisation of Muslim identity in a way that pathologies Muslims. Identity and ideology become causal variables in both the path towards violence and the source of social tension. Given that the problematisation of Muslims in the UK has been conceptualised in terms of radicalisation, it is unsurprising that the prescribed solution (de-radicalisation) becomes understood according to the norms of radicalisation. Hence the focus of this chapter has been on the production of radicalisation as a discourse because it is ‘radicalisation’ that produces de-radicalisation. In fact the PREVENT conceptualisation of de-radicalisation inherits the legacy of the thinking on radicalisation undertaken between 2004 and 2011. This is reflected by the inbuilt conceptual implications of de-radicalisation, such as the importance of tackling ideology, the focus on individuals
rather than groups, theological revision, and the need to promote safe identities. It is in this way that discursive production constituted the knowledge base for administrative rectification (PREVENT) and programmes of threat-mitigation (Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation).

Consequently, it is important to situate discursive formations on radicalisation within the theoretical lens of discursive technology. The technology of the self is about the transformation of the self according to a particular social and political norm and thus depends on the existence of normative discursive paradigm with its own concepts, language, and experts, that perform the function of what Foucault called ‘regimes of truth’. In the context of de-radicalisation, it is the discourse of radicalisation that enables de-radicalisation interventions. Since radicalisation was intended to be applied in policy terms, the next chapter will analyse how the knowledge of radicalisation was implemented in structures of government through disciplinary technology.
CHAPTER 6

Disciplinary Technology (Power): Surveillance, Detection, Discipline

It reinforced the idea of bad and good Muslims; it reinforced the idea of those who want to be a part of us and those who don’t, and as the independent review of the Prevent programme stated, “Prevent was a means for government to impose a British version of Islam on Muslim communities”, and this was from an independent Prevent review; the perception was that this was a way of gendering a form of Islam that was palatable and suitable to British social and political spaces.

(Interview 11, Academic)

The UK’s de-radicalisation programme known as Channel had emerged under PREVENT II in 2009, and yet the concept of de-radicalisation itself was not articulated until PREVENT III in 2011. De-radicalisation was only mentioned in passing in PREVENT II, without an attempt to define it (HO 2009, 90). By 2011, de-radicalisation was considered by policymakers to be a more streamlined and effective approach to countering radicalisation than PREVENT I and II’s wide remit. However, a number of questions became pertinent. If PREVENT shows a long term concern for terrorism (future oriented), and de-radicalisation seeks to reverse radicalism (crossed the line), which points to conflicting policy logics, why does de-radicalisation sit within PREVENT? Why is Channel preoccupied with ‘vulnerability’ and ‘extremism’ and not terrorism? What is the significance of employing the language of ‘vulnerability’ in a counterterrorism strategy? Why is Channel preoccupied with religious and political makers in its identification process?
This chapter will argue that PREVENT and the Channel programme should be viewed through the lens of disciplinary technology. Underlying disciplinary technology is the working of a more subtle and pervasive form of power. According to Foucault the purpose of the punishment of crime evolved from retribution in the pre-modern world to reform and rehabilitation of the criminal in the modern world (Foucault 1991). This rehabilitative model is premised on the logic that transforming the soul leads to changes in behaviour (Foucault 1991, 104-134). The focus is therefore on discipline and control of subjects rather than physical retribution and punishment. Crucial to the execution of disciplinary technology is the apparatus encompassing the institutions, buildings, as well as strategies of government, through broader domains like civil society, with the assistance of networks of authority (Doctors, psychologist, teachers, youth workers, managers). This is done through surveillance, in which subjects are aware of being observed and thus internalise norms through self-regulation/self-policing, in conjunction with ‘normalising judgment’ and the ‘examination’; both of which is concerned with judging and placing subjects in relation to grids of ‘normality’ in order to control their behaviour (Foucault 1991, 170-194).

The first section analyses interviewees view’s on PREVENT, whilst the second brings to light the construction of classification systems in PREVENT and the impact it had in the execution of policy. These two section focus on the way that PREVENT was deployed to reconfigure new communities amongst the Muslim communities and alternative conceptions of Muslim conduct. The last two sections focus on the second and third objectives of PREVENT, supporting vulnerable people and
supporting institutions and sectors where there is risk of radicalisation. Both objectives involve the Channel programme. This chapter discusses the impact of such objectives and situates Channel within wider disciplinary techniques.

6. An Overview of PREVENT in CONTEST

The aim of the PREVENT strategy is to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (HO 2011, 61). The rationale underpinning PREVENT was that government would work in partnership with Muslim communities to counter the long-term conditions that lead to violent radicalisation. This ‘soft’ turn in counter-terrorism was largely the by-product of the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) workforce and the Wilton Park Conference in 2006, which had predated the PREVENT strategy and had brought Muslims leaders and the government together in order to address the issue of violent extremism.
The PET workforce published their recommendations in November 2005, some of which was incorporated in the PREVENT strategy of 2006 (HO 2006, 82). PREVENT II also built and led to other initiatives, like the publication by the Department Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in April 2007 of ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds’, which set out a community-led approach to tackling violent extremism; the sponsoring of the ‘Radical Middle Way’ by the FCO and DCLG to challenge terrorist ideology; and a programme of work to improve the capacity of NOMS and other agencies to manage the risks posed by violent extremist offenders, amongst other initiatives (HO 2009, 82-83) A consensus emerged between 2005 and 2006 that the most effective and legitimate strategy for tackling violent extremism was through the support and mobilisation of the Muslim communities (Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsborough 2006; Briggs 2010; Lambert 2011).
The delivery of PREVENT fell on the DCLG with funding available to organisations and charities in local municipalities seeking to counter radicalisation. PREVENT allocated £6M in 2007, which increased to £140M by 2008-2009 (HO 2009, 16; Briggs 2010, 971). PREVENT funding was distributed according to the population size of Muslim communities in a particular locality (HO 2006; 2009; HC 2010, 50). In 2008, the PREVENT strategy was rolled out nationally, along with National Indicator 35 (NI35)—building resilience to violent extremism—which incorporated a measure of a local authority’s ‘engagement with and understanding of Muslim communities’ (Briggs 2010, 975). All local areas were therefore required to report to government whether they had engaged with the Muslim communities as part of their performance measures (Briggs 2010, 975). Police PREVENT coordinators were also created in 2008, as well as the trialling of the Channel project (Ibid). Since its inception in 2006 PREVENT has undergone two revisions and is currently in its third iteration (2006, 2009 and 2011).

The first and second PREVENT strategies were designed to address the causes, or drivers, of radicalisation at a variety of stages. The strategic objectives were designed to (HO 2009, 80; HC 2010; Briggs 2010):

1. Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism through targeted communications and work with credible religious authorities both in the UK and overseas to counter the extremist narrative;

2. Disrupt the activities of those who seek to recruit vulnerable people;
3. Provide interventions to support vulnerable people, largely concentrated in high priority, high risk geographical areas as well as within specific sectors, such as prisons and higher education;

4. Build community resilience primarily through work at a local level but also including initiatives to build community capacity, such as the support of national bodies and the establishing of best practice guidance for mosques;

5. Address wider grievances including work in the UK and overseas.

However, the introduction of a second version of PREVENT (2009) was characterised by two important features. Firstly, PREVENT II shifted the focus further away from violence and towards new category called ‘non-violent extremism’ (HO 2009, 81). The most immediate challenge was its meaning (Briggs 2010, 976). This new categorisation proved problematic given that some of leading partners of government in the delivery of counter-radicalisation initiatives, such as the MCB and STREET, in addition to several other organisations, were considered ‘non-violent extremists’ (more in chapter 7). The second critical dimension of PREVENT II was the move towards a greater focus on ‘Our Shared values’ (HO 2009, 87), defined loosely as a commitment to rights, support for institutions and democracy, and respect for the rule of law and equality (HO 2009, 87). This categorisation was used by the former Labour government not only to restrict and marginalise ‘non-violent extremists’, which by then included the MCB, who had previously been championed by New Labour as representatives of Muslim communities, but also to delineate a set of national and cultural values.
Meanwhile, the publication of Arun Kundnani's 'SPOOKED!' in 2009 was a significant intervention in the discourse on PREVENT because it presented the first empirical critique of PREVENT in the public domain. The overall conclusion of the report was that PREVENT had little to do with preventing radicalisation and more to with counter-subversion, particularly intelligence gathering by the secret services and the government (Kundnani 2009). His report also stated that PREVENT was perceived by British Muslims as a way to police 'thought-crimes', restrict legitimate dissent, and construct models of the 'good Muslim' (39-41). With the arrival of the Coalition government in 2010 PREVENT was subjected to review by the House of Commons Select Committee. The Select Committee investigation highlighted a number of critical issues. These include but do not exhaust the following (HC 2010):

- PREVENT is situated within a counter-terrorism strategy and the Muslim community is therefore guilty by association (8, para 11).

- The focus on Muslims alienates them and legitimises the views of the Far Right and Islamophobes (8, para 13).

- Problems with terminology: the language of Prevent 'lends itself to the idea that there lies a dormant terrorist within Muslims' (9, para 14).

- Being labelled 'at risk from violent extremism' criminalises Muslims (9, para 17 and 18).
PREVENT was accused as being a vehicle for spying, surveillance and intelligence gathering (11-14). For example, in late 2007 the West Midlands Police created project ‘champion’. 218 CCTV Cameras in Muslim areas, particular Alum Rock and Sparkhill, were installed in Birmingham by the police. The installation of the cameras began in January 2010 and by April questions by the community began to be asked (Thornton QPM 2010, 8). By July 2010 the West Midlands Police agreed to halt the project.

PREVENT was using the Channel programme to delegitimise dissent, spy and pursue ‘suspects’ (14-17 and 52-55).

It promoted envy amongst other faith groups who wanted did not have access to the same amount of money and attention for community projects (18, para 41-43).

South Asian Organisations were accessing PREVENT through emphasising the ‘Muslims aspect of their identity’. It had thus led to anti-cohesion projects. (19, para 43)

It did not target other forms of extremism in other communities and ideologies (20, para 45).

It did not appreciate the diversity of Muslims communities and the Muslim identity has been reduced to the faith persona. It has reified the Muslim identity and divided the Muslim communities even further (22, para 51).
- It tried to social engineer Muslim communities by promoting ‘Good Islam’ against ‘bad Islam’ (34, para 85-87).

- It was accused for funding extremist individuals and groups (37-8, para 94-95).

- It conflated community cohesion work with the narrower objective of preventing violent extremism/radicalisation, which convoluted the ability of policy-makers to effectively tackle the problem of violent radicalisation (37, para 92 and pp. 56-961).

- It was criticised for sitting within the DCLG Government. This meant that Local government had to deliver security work it was not familiar with (40, para 101 & 108)

- It could not be measured. Policymakers cannot gauge success (52, para 136-138)
Consequently, a revised version of PREVENT was released in June 2011. PREVENT III was different to previous strategies in that it widened the scope of its objectives to cover all forms of terrorism and extremism, like those of the Far-Right, and not just Al-Qaeda inspired types, whilst narrowing the focus of the strategy, e.g. not funding integration projects (HO 2011, 60). Furthermore, the objectives of PREVENT, although similar in many respects focused on ideas, people, and institutions (HO 2011, 63):

1. Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;

2. Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and

3. Work with a wide range of sectors where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

According to the revised strategy, the biggest change was disentangling the integration strategy from the PREVENT strategy (HO 2011, 62). With this streamlined strategy, PREVENT officially introduced ‘de-radicalisation’ interventions under the second objective, ‘supporting vulnerable people’ (65) and delivered through the Channel Programme (59-71). Channel is a police run programme that is anchored institutionally in pre-existing crime prevention infrastructure and is administered through a multi-agency approach. It has 28 coordinators and a handful
of support posts and covers about 75 local authorities and 12 police forces (57). The total funding for Channel for the period April 2007 to March 2011 was approximately £4.7 million (60). Notably, this second objective of PREVENT is linked to the third-supporting sectors and institutions where there are risk of radicalisation (66). This includes Schools and Children, Higher and Further Education, Health, the Criminal Justice System, Prison and Probation, Youth Offenders and Youth Justice, PREVENT Policing Officers, and the Charitable Sector (66-72). As part of the strategy, government will work with these sectors in order to raise an ‘awareness of the risks of radicalisation and of how radicalisers work and to develop an effective response’ (Ibid, 66). Where PREVENT II previously encompassed various community projects, the current strategy, focuses on Channel and de-radicalisation interventions.

6.2. PREVENT: counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, or crime prevention?

This section highlights the assessment of PREVENT by interviewees. Of the 27 interviews, the senior researcher at Quilliam was the only interviewee who spoke positively about PREVENT. A couple of others, like the directors of Siraat and the MCU distinguished between ‘old’ and ‘new’ PREVENT and believed that ‘old’ PREVENT was a more effective strategy. The notion of ‘old’ PREVENT refers to PREVENT I in 2006 in which organisations like Siraat and STREET were funded to counter-radicalisation. ‘New’ PREVENT designates PREVENT III, which terminated such projects out of the principle of not funding ‘non-violent extremist’.
This government now for example have fallen into the trap and got rid of all the work and just left it to people who profess what they profess. You don’t find Prevent anymore; you don’t find any successful prevent. That was even mentioned by Mr (inaudible) who came from the FBI in New York who came and sat with the Home Affairs Select Committee. What was his statement? Old Prevent is better than New Prevent.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

However, interviewees were overwhelmingly critical of PREVENT. An example of a critical verdict of PREVENT is articulated by a former Chief Inspector and someone who sat on the PREVENT Delivery Board, as well as being responsible for assessing the community impact of counter-terrorism.

It was an ill thought out strategic approach in my view and that’s been acknowledged by government now. The whole issue was poorly researched, not properly understood, and as a consequence of that we ended up with an ill-judged policy approach.

(Interview 24, former Chief Inspector /PREVENT Board)
This interviewee provides an overview of PREVENT from someone who was involved in it at a strategic level. A more detailed breakdown of PREVENT from another prominent interviewee is explained by former SG of the MCB. The interviewee highlights a number of problems with PREVENT, ranging from the way that the strategy was framed at the outset, to its delivery through local Councils who were reluctant to implement security work, to the negative impact on Muslim communities in terms of ‘spying’ and dividing Muslims. Again his comment is significant given his former position as one of the main representatives of Muslim communities.

From day one it was seen from the community in a very negative light in the sense that government was giving lots of money to councils and many of them weren’t interested to do this sort of work because local Councils had done work in the Muslim communities - youth groups, mosques, and other bodies - but the way it was framed as if the problem was with the Muslim community and we have to deradicalise them. Many local Councils rejected it, and some Muslim organisations got some money and then realised it was Prevent money, which was seen as more or less spying on the community and then it divided the community.

(Interview 14, former SG of the MCB)
However, contra PREVENT, the data reveals a disconnect with the delivery of PREVENT between different stages of the policymaking framework, starting with policymakers at the top, such as the OSCT and the Home Office, to Local Authorities and the Police below them, all the way down to community organisations. In other words the data shows that PREVENT meant different things to different people. So while it was officially about the prevention of terrorism, beneath the surface it meant a plethora of things: to be publicly seen tackling a problem for politicians, career progression for civil servants, funding for organisations unable to get funds elsewhere, an administrative tick-box initiatives for local government, and the building of relationships with communities for the police, amongst many other things.

Examples illustrating the myriad understandings of PREVENT from the perspectives of the different individuals and organisations can be seen below. The first interviewee, explains his own career motives and those of civil servants for getting involved in PREVENT.

The problem with OSCT, despite having a good guy at the top, was basically a bunch of young ambitious civil servants who thought they were spooks ....they put their mobile phones in the lockers as they go in because what they do is an important secret. But actually a lot of them worked there for six months, got the t-shirt and left. None of them stuck at it, it was a flash place to be in government. Part of the problem with this whole agenda for ten years was that it was sexy. If I’m honest it was partly why I got into it, front page stuff every day. It was sexy.

(Interview 4, IPPR Analyst)
This comment suggests that PREVENT was an attractive prospect from the perspective of career progression, in the interviewee’s words: ‘it was sexy’. There are other examples in the data set that reinforce the notion that PREVENT had in fact become an industry with money and jobs. The interviewee below, the director of Khayaal Theatre, an organisation that received PREVENT money for counter-radicalisation projects, explains his organisations experience with PREVENT.

It’s really interesting for us that the only significant resources we were able to access was through Prevent, the only significant press coverage we were able to get was press coverage that’s going to inform Prevent about Prevent. The press were never interested in any of the stories around the work we did about us being the first professional Muslim theatre company in the UK, around being a theatre company that brought together artists of different faiths, around our delivering work in places like Shakespeare’s Globe, the press was never interested. But the moment we started doing Prevent work all of a sudden there was all sorts of interest.

(Interview 5, Director, Khayaal Theatre)

His account shows that PREVENT money provided both crucial financial support and publicity for his company’s work. He told me that he had struggled to obtain funding from the art bodies before the advent of PREVENT. It is an insight into the reasons behind the involvement of many organisations with PREVENT. In other words, in many instances it was less about countering radicalisation and more about access to
funds in order to ensure organisational survival. Again, the key ideas here is that PREVENT was understood and implemented differently at all levels according to the individual and organisational remit. This exemplified below by PREVENT officer, who viewed PREVENT in terms of building relationships between the police and the community.

So with Prevent the idea was it’s about taking some secret stuff and having a forward facing side in order to engage with the community. If something happened the public have a face to talk to and be able to build a relationship. So if I’m at Preston I know we have a link worker working with the Mosques and Imam’s and police officers now visit Mosques once a week or a month just as a normal routine to see if there’s any problems with crime or anti-social behaviour so that you build a relationship with your community and understand what their problems are.

(Interview 21, PREVENT Officer)

Ultimately, PREVENT was understood and implemented differently by diverse actors for all sorts of reasons and motivations. It is unsurprising then that the majority of interviewees were critical of the notion that PREVENT was supposed to tackle radicalisation or that it was in the end effective in directly preventing terrorism. There was a clear disjuncture between the objectives of PREVENT and the projects it funded.
There were lots of other somosa and pancake projects.....It was basically asking Muslim women to tackle violent extremism without any research, prior experience, or any practical tools or trialling. I think it was, again, doomed to failure because having people, or social workers, or at best do good-doers who felt they were proud to be British, and getting them to deal with something as heavy as this was ridiculous. They neither had the qualifications, nor the understanding of the problems, nor the time to bring on board academics or any other kind of strategy, so simply having a rolling out a range of projects...

(Interview 2, Director of Arts Versa)

The comment above by the director of Arts Versa a company involved in counter-radicalisation work situates the failure of PREVENT in the securitisation of community cohesion projects or what he calls ‘somosa and pancakes’ projects. He raises the important issue that local authority and public sector workers had neither the expertise nor experience to perform counter-terrorism related tasks. In addition, the notion of the push towards community cohesion projects in a counter-terrorism strategy is seriously questioned by the former Chairman of the Muslim Safety Forum, the main police-community relation body.

But in real counter-terrorism terms it hasn’t done an iota of good and that’s something we and the police agree that Prevent has not done anything tangible in the fight against terrorism. I remember in 2006 and 2007 the DCLG did this conference at the Queen Elizabeth Centre to showcase what Prevent has achieved, you know, what the funding has achieved; they had six or seven projects and one of
these projects was we took these young girls to a camping trip, we took some boys to the cinema, we went to the seaside, fantastic...

(Interview 18, former chairman of the MSF)

These comments highlight the disjointed nature of the implementation of PREVENT, particularly between the stated threat (terrorism), the proposed solution (Preventing radicalisation), the delivery of the strategy (Local government, police), and the means (community projects). In short, interviewees frequently pointed at the irrelevance of the bulk of PREVENT activities in relation to its objective, which is reflected above in the observation that PREVENT has not done anything ‘tangible in the fight against terrorism’. In addition, a number of interviewees raised a significant weakness of the strategy- the absence of a criterion to measure the successes and failures of PREVENT. The inability to calculate the output of the strategy in relation to whether it has stopped or prevented terrorism is a remarkable drawback for such as high profile policy area. The following interviewee discusses the difficulty of measuring preventive work in this area.

Well it’s really difficult isn’t it? It’s really hard to prove the negative of something. It’s difficult to prove something hasn’t happened because it might not have happened anyway. How do we prove that it not happening was because of something we did? I mean you are always in security area or most areas of preventative policy making that’s the challenge. And particularly when you have really, really, small numbers. So
for instance in Health policy there’s all sort of preventative policy you can prove. You can prove you know introducing more hand sanitation units in hospital you bring down MRSA or whatever it’s called.

(Interview 9, ISD Analyst)

She raises two crucial questions: how do you prove the negative of something? And conceding her point that proving preventive work in other policy domains is possible, why then is there a high tolerance by policymakers for the absence of measuring tools and techniques in PREVENT? Why invest political and financial capital on a policy you do not know is working? While this section does not attempt to answer directly these questions, such questions nevertheless challenge the assumptions that state that the strategy is supposed to tackle terrorism or even prevent radicalisation. The fact that PREVENT was not linked to terrorism and that policymakers were not preoccupied with establishing a direct connection between measuring PREVENT work and terrorism, provokes a significant question: what was the purpose of PREVENT?

Overall, PREVENT was seen by interviewees to be a muddled policy exhibiting different policy logics. Instead of an effort to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Muslim communities, the data reveals that the majority of interviewees believed that PREVENT was about two main objectives: (1) the intelligence gathering on Muslims and (2) the social re-engineering of communities. With this in mind, PREVENT was viewed more as a counter-subversion strategy than as a counter-terrorism strategy.

With regards to intelligence gathering, interviewees have pointed to a number of features: the fact that PREVENT was delivered in local areas with Muslim
populations; community projects had to be documented; signs of potential radicalism reported to the authorities; project Champion in Birmingham, in which cameras were placed to spy on the community (see footnote 39); the fact that PREVENT was coordinated by the police, amongst others. The long quote below is by someone who was arrested for downloading material as a university student. His comments aptly encapsulates the notion of intelligence gathering in PREVENT.

….this is why they rolled out the programme to areas with more than 2,000 Muslims, was because they were trying to understand all Muslims and where the problem were, and then eventually they found that Universities were a problem, schools and colleges were a problem, community centres and Mosques were a problem and so the new Prevent strategy decided to focus on these institutions...... The Prevent programme was rolled out in order to gather information on the community which then became intelligence and then was used to form new policy and new actions by the police towards the community......

(Interview 19, Activist/Academic)

Crucially, he highlights the role of institutions marked out by policymakers as sites of potential radicalisation as well as focal points of surveillance networks in structures of governance, something this chapter address in subsequent sections. Meanwhile, the second dimension raised by many interviewees was the push by the government towards remaking Muslim communities. This view is expressed by the former head of the MCU and counter-terrorism specialist.
But then CLG started up, first with Ruth Kelly and then with Hazel Blears, they made very clear they were looking to engage with a different set of communities rather than communities that are or happen to be. But to construct new ones either with the help with created bodies like Quilliam and the Sufi Council of Britain and I remember witnessing that first hand and yes you could describe elements of that as post-colonial. You need to ask the question of whether Labour government ministers could ever dream of taking the same approach with other communities.

(Interview 17, Director of the MCU)

The interviewee calls the approach of government to Muslim communities ‘post-colonial’ in reference to the fact that it was trying to recreate community leadership by promoting certain organisations and other religious denominations over existing ones. This view is also echoed in the comments below. Similarly to the interviewee above, this interviewee identifies the Quilliam Foundation and the Sufi Muslim Council as key players in the efforts of government to construct new partners.

They tried to create the Sufi Muslim Council- that failed. They tried to create the British Muslim Forum-that failed. They have somehow coerced an organisation called MINAB, which has for all intents and purposes fallen flat on its face; they heavily funded the Quilliam Foundation, they took the money, they creamed it, I know Mr Majjid Nawaz very well- they’ve got nice houses and property out of it but what have they done? They’ve not changed anything and wherever they go they get
kicked and shouted at. So all this money they spent on all this, all it's done is help to identify who the sell outs are in the eyes of the community and who aren't.

(Interview 18, former chairman of the MSF)

The point in this section is to shed light on how PREVEENT was seen by many as a subterfuge for other governmental objectives. PREVENT was sold as an attempt to counter radicalisation and yet the data reveals a disconnection at every level of the policy chain, from policymakers at the top, all the way down to the layperson at the receiving end of PREVENT. The availability of funding, delegating the delivery of the policy to DCLG, investing in community cohesion projects - all revealed the confusing logic at the heart of PREVENT and how far removed the work of PREVENT was from its stated objectives. However, a closer inspection of the data indicated that instead of tackling radicalisation, PREVENT was about the intelligence gathering, surveillance, and the reconstruction of Muslim communities. The next section examines the normative aim governing PREVENT in relation to Muslims.
6.3 ‘British Values’ and ‘Extremism’ in PREVENT: ‘Four Legs Good, Two Legs Bad’

Fieldwork data conveys how PREVENT created a dichotomy between the category ‘British values’ on the one hand, and ‘extremism’ on the other hand. Whereas ‘British values’ encompasses notions such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights and is associated with the mainstream and therefore the ‘Good’, ‘extremism’ connotes categories like Islamism, Salafism, Sharia, and violence, embodies the abnormal and deviant, thus representing the ‘Bad’. Whilst interviewees predominantly expressed a constructivist take on categories like ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’, they nevertheless argued that the aforementioned binaries had created a classification system which acts as a regulatory mechanism in policy terms so that activities, people, and objectives are ordered according to ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’. Classification systems apply ‘a principle of difference to a population in such a way as to be able to divide them and all their characteristics into at least two opposing groups- us/them’ (Woodward 1997, 29).

The concept ‘shared values’ became prominent in the second iteration of the PREVENT strategy in 2009. It is important to recognise that the notion of ‘British values’ (Albeit PREVENT does not refer to it as British values, but as shared values) is not enshrined in law and that it sits merely within a policy document. It does not have any juridical effect. Many interviewees believed that ‘British values’ were
constructed values. Below, for example, an academic expresses his understanding of British values.

When you start to talk with people about what British values are, they will mention democracy, equality, and fairness, etc. and is that any different to the Swedish, or the Italians, or the Spanish, or the Canadians, or the Japanese? No..... At the cultural level you can go down the route of, you know, it’s the monarchy; but if you look back, they are German and Greek, not exactly British so then you look at the food we eat; the favourite dish is the chicken tikka masala, well, tikka masala might have been invented in Glasgow but it was invented by Pakistani and Bangladeshi’s for the British palate, you know, making a curry that reflected British sensibilities.... Where do we go?

(Interview 11, Academic)

The underlying argument above is that British values and the search for a singular and ‘mainstream’ national identity is depicted as an elusive exercise. It is instead arbitrary defined, which is shaped historically by various immigrant communities settling in Britain. Another example of the tenuousness of British values is expressed by the former Chair of the MSF who raises the contested nature of British values:

So the idea of British values is a red herring. It fell flat on their face.... What did they come up with? Everything they came up with was airy fairy and universal. They were human rights things. I still can’t figure a single British thing.
Alongside discourses on British values in PREVENT is the notion of the ‘good’ Muslim or ‘moderate’ Muslim. Notably, some interviewees were not clear what the category ‘moderate’ Muslim meant. An academic below aptly describes the way that different groups and organisations not only compete to occupy the ‘moderate’ category but the way in which such groups and organisations compete for the ‘moderate’ category in relation to each other. The ‘moderate’ category in short does not exist as an empirical fact and only makes sense in relation to other groups.

So the carrots being dangled and what you have is one organisation saying ‘we are moderate Muslims’. Then you have another organisation saying ‘they are moderate, but we are moderate mainstream Muslims’ and then you have another group say ‘they are moderate Muslims but we are middle of the road mainstream Muslims’ and then you end with a group that says ‘well, we are not even Muslim but we’ll deal with the problem.

The term is even rendered meaningless, encapsulated by the parody- ‘we are middle of the road mainstream Muslims’. In this case, terms like ‘moderate’ come attached with the ‘carrot’ of funding, as does the term ‘extremism’. In many respects the use of these terms can be understood in relation to the strategic manoeuvring of actors for various ends, thus reinforcing the hollow nature of such categories.
conception of moderate relates to foreign policy. The criterion for being ‘moderate’ Muslims below is not then religious but is instead political, especially with regards to acquiescence with Western foreign policy.

I think it was Tariq Ramadan who said that a real test of who is a moderate and extremist Muslim is who supports American foreign policy. So you can have people with extremist Islamic beliefs in Saudi Arabia but because they bump along okay with the US government, they are okay. But if you are Syrian or Iranian and you don’t like the US government and even though your concept of Islam might be a lot more moderate, you are an extremist.

(Interview 24, former Chief Inspector/ PREVENT Board)

Again people have different conceptions of these terms. According to the director of the Cordoba Foundation, the distinction between the dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is the distinction between apolitical and political. The notion of ‘good’ Muslims corresponds to the idea of someone who is spiritual and prays but is non-political, and ‘bad’ Muslim is someone who is political. However this binary is challenged by the interviewee. If he has political views, then it is the result of being a ‘citizen’. Being a good citizen means he has the freedom to engage with society and politics. Again, this understanding of ‘bad’ Muslim inverts the prevalent understanding of ‘bad’ Muslims.
Good and bad Muslims today in the government’s eyes and mainstream establishments eyes unfortunately is about if you are somebody who prays and is into spirituality and the such and you embody that and that alone and whether you have a political dimension. My argument is this: I have a political view because I am a citizen of this country and have a freedom to do so not because I’m obliged to have this view by my religion.

(Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation)

So the binary presents the ‘moderate’ Muslim according to interviewees as spiritual, non-political, and someone who agrees with Western foreign Policy. The ‘moderates’ are of course those who subscribe to British values. What then about the ‘other’? The ‘other’ in discourses of radicalisation is represented by ‘Islamism’, or ‘political Islam’. The director at the Cordoba Foundation explains the association the discourse has of Political Islam.

Unfortunately Political Islam when we talk about it today say through the mainstream prism or talks to people in positions of governance and the like, the understanding is that the term pertains to the term Sharia, which pertains to subjugating women, amputating people and the penal code, which people take as whipping and stoning. So Political Islam is seen as something as enforced, which in my dictionary goes against the value system of Islam, which creates a schism in terms of rights for men and women, which again I see as contradictory to the value system of Islam. And
that it seeks to eliminate the ‘Other’; cannot exist within the realm of any other idea or faith and hence in order to exist has to eliminate everything else.

(Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation)

So Political Islam, referred to often in the discourse as ‘Islamism’, is associated with: the sharia, the subjugation of women, amputating people, stoning, and eliminates the ‘other’. Political Islam also became associated with ‘non-violent extremism’ in 2009. The advent of ‘non-violent extremism’ in PREVENT 2009 was not only a symbolic distinction but also a policy re-calibration of resources and effort towards tackling ‘extremism’. The underlying principle of this approach was that Government would not support groups and individuals who did not subscribe to British values despite the acknowledged experience and knowledge such groups and individuals have in tackling the threat of violent radicalisation. The category ‘non-violent extremism’ was superseded by the term ‘extremism’ in the PREVENT strategy of 2011 and was defined as:

...the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

(HO 2011, 62, footnote 52; HM 2015, 3)
Hence ‘extremism’ is defined as the opposite of British values. Despite the definition offered in PREVENT most interviewees believed that ‘non-violent extremism’ was synonymous with ‘extremism’ and that there were various understandings of what ‘extremism’ actually means. The interviewee below discusses the difficulty in defining ‘non-violent extremist groups’.

There’s difficulty in defining who non-violent extremist groups are. Because it is a relative term everyone has their own definitions.....Hypothetically let’s imagine we had a good definition: it’s a belief in this or that view makes you extremist. How do you then determine whether a group is an extremist group or not? Will it have to be written in their governing articles? Will it be based on the fact they once invited a speaker who once shared that view? What if you have a chairman, who used to be an extremist, but is now renounced, but used to sit on another board? And this is the problem; it’s not just about how you define but what is your criterion for making that decision?

(Interview 1, Demos Analyst)

However, as articulated above, the term is ill-defined and vague, a problem it shares with the word ‘extremism’. One view of ‘extremism’, explained below by a prison de-radicalisation agency provider is that it leads to violence. His notion of ‘radical’ does not equate with that of radicalisation, which makes more of an explicit link between extremism and violence.
We made a distinction between radical and extremist. An extremist is somebody who would allow the killing of innocent people based on those five areas. A radical is somebody who misunderstands those five areas but wouldn’t go so far as to call for other people to cause harm.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

Thus according to the director of Siraat an extremist is someone who legitimises violence whereas ‘radical’ merely has radical ideas but does not act upon those ideas. His understanding of ‘extremism’ emphasises the diversity of interpretations the word entails. Another view of ‘extremists’ is not necessarily linked to violence but that it is associated with Salafi Muslims, as explained by a PREVENT practitioner.

If you ask people what extremism is and what de-radicalisation means, you have too many different things to explain; so you hide behind words that you don’t understand yourself. So ‘Salafi’ has become a buzzword of saying what is wrong rather than saying what is right.

(Interview 8, Birmingham PREVENT practitioner)

According to the comment above, Salafi Muslims are associated with ‘extremism’ and with ‘what is wrong rather than saying what is right’. Another perspective of ‘extremism’ is shared below by an academic posing the question through the hypothetical eyes of the EDL.
You scratch the surface and you ask the EDL what does an extremist Muslim look like?.....So actually when you start looking at that, well, actually an extremist is a Muslim, who prays and goes to mosque and eats halal meat- they are all extremists. Actually you’ll find they are huge swathes of Muslim communities. So are we talking about extremist or are we talking about Muslim in culture terms only? Like cultural or secular Jews.

(Interview 11, Academic)

This comment suggests that according to the EDL ‘extreme’ Muslim equates to practicing Muslim, ‘someone who eats Halal meat, who prays, who wants a mosque to go to’. This conception of ‘extremism’ moves the lines of demarcation beyond the narrow fringe of individuals and small groups and situates the entire Muslim community within the purview of ‘extremism’. The problem therefore resides with Muslim communities and the religion of Islam and not extremism of thought and action. The suggestion above is that when Muslims abandon religion and become ‘cultural Muslims’, then Muslims cease being seen as ‘extremists’. Overall therefore, ‘extremism’ means different things to different people and yet it still occupies the position of ‘Bad’, violent, alien, and thus the opposite of British values.

In light of the above, how do we make sense of the role of contested categories like ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’, which remain undefined legally in PREVENT? What in other words is the significance of British values in counter-terrorism? The first is the creation of a criterion for distinguishing in policy terms between the legitimate
(good) from the illegitimate (bad), whilst the second pertains to the discipline and control of individuals, organisations, and structures in line with this criterion. Hence the classification system produced by PREVENT created a regulatory norm. The first dimension is explained by an academic.

We need them to see what is proper and improper and what is legitimate and illegitimate and so on. Policy-makers need a kind of criteria to know what is legitimate and what is not so they came up with the ideas of British values. And also it’s a good idea because it resonates with all sorts of public policy aspects and resonates with the general public.

(Interview 15, Academic)

This comment elucidates that classification systems are about drawing boundaries in public life for policymakers and thus delimiting the spaces and ideas of what constitutes acceptability. Moreover, it generates shared vocabulary- one that is moral, intellectual, scientific, and institutionally and organisationally workable. It also allows for the formation of the vast and loose associations to come together in administrating governance: between various governmental departments internally, and externally with other sectors and partners; think-tanks, pressure groups, civil society organisations, the media and their apparatus, the security establishment, the various public institutions, the market, experts, managers, and parents.

Secondly, the by-product of this new classification was that organisations that were previously considered ‘moderate’ and partners in the delivery of counter-terrorism,
were branded as ‘extremists’ and eventually marginalised. This approach was explained by the former SG of the MCB in the following way.

The problem with the current Prevent is that there are categorisations of Muslims, probably from QF’s paper, categorising Muslim organisation into violent and nonviolent extremist and advising government not formally talk with non-violent extremism. So these are the very laughable position the government has taken. Even organisations like the MCB and mainstream Muslim organisations like FOSIS, which has been around since 1963, organisations like these are seen, because they were defined by Quilliam Foundation and Neo-Cons as non-violent extremist- we are somehow extremists- and so now government won’t formally talk to them. So they will formally not talk to us but will talk informally.

(Interview 14, former SG of the MCB)

The former president of the MCB highlights how the categorisation of ‘non-violent extremism’ effectively precluded and proscribed them from gaining access to government. Such classification systems should also be viewed as an instrument of producing certain behaviours and conducts. The following interviewee explains the intended meaning behind ‘non-violent extremism’, which ultimately aims at creating ‘moderate’ Muslims.
The Tories are double-speaking…..comes and says we are not interested in violent extremism but we’re interested in non-violent extremism. ...they have certain problems with Muslim theology and aspects of Sharia and Muslim life. They want Muslims whole heartedly to accept homosexuality and ideally they want Muslim women to stop wearing niqab, they would like Muslims women to freely marry non-Muslims. We can’t get away from the fact certain elements within Western societies have a problem with elements and practices within Islam.

(Interview 5, Director of Khayaal Theatre)

In summation, PREVENT produced a classification system dichotomised between ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’. Data analysis conveyed that for the majority of interviewees these terms and ideas were contested and yet the intended meaning- ‘we are good, they are bad’- was still secured through a classification system. A notable feature in the data was that Muslim identity, particular associated with politics, foreign policy, and religious commitment was synonymous with ‘extremism’. The promotion of ‘British values’ outside juridical channels is consequently seen as the antidote to ‘extremism’, or Muslim surfeit. The classification system was deployed to discipline certain players, promote others, whilst also producing a particular conduct labelled ‘moderate’ Muslims.
6.4 The Channel Programme: Supporting ‘Vulnerable’ People

When you are talking about de-radicalisation, you are talking about Channel, which is about diverging people away from becoming extremist or terrorist. They would say that Channel is the only long-term solution to preventing this problem.

(Interview 21, PREVENT Officer)

As articulated above, de-radicalisation in the UK context is associated with the Channel programme and seeks to support ‘vulnerable people’ (Home Office 2011, 64). The word ‘vulnerable’ has developed in conjunction with the discourses on radicalisation and is a central feature in both the Channel identification process and the PREVENT strategy. A number of interviewees critically questioned the term and concept ‘vulnerable’. The most immediate question consequently relates to the link between the concept of ‘vulnerability’, normally associated the young, disabled, the old on one hand, and violent radicalisation on the other. The academic below questions the relationship between vulnerable youths and violence.

First of all the link between vulnerable youths and violence is highly questionable. In particular, when it's also linked to radical ideas; whatever research we have on radicalisation we see that the most active people are by no means vulnerable. Many of them come from the most successful sections, like Ed Hussain, of the Muslim community. What they have, and nobody tries to make sense of it, someone like Ed
Hussain is bloody ambitious and he was very clear about this in the Islamist, he wanted to be the leader and now he’s using it in a different way but for the same purposes. So who is vulnerable? In what sense they are vulnerable?

(Interview 15, Academic)

This interviewee does not believe that radicals are ‘vulnerable’ but are instead ‘ambitious’ and hail from ‘successful backgrounds’. Knowledge on the profile typical of those deemed radicals suggest that they are far from being ‘vulnerable’. In other words, in order for someone to be susceptible to radical ideas they need to educated and ambitious. He thus debunks the notion that vulnerable individuals are typically those most likely to go on to commit terrorism. Another interviewee critical of the notion of ‘vulnerability’, also asks the pertinent question regarding what constituted ‘vulnerability’.

It’s these words like ‘support’, ‘intervention’, and ‘vulnerable’, all of these words are okay if you knew what it actually meant but I don’t actually know what it means... Someone who says Osama Bin Laden is cool, is he vulnerable? Just because someone said it, what makes them vulnerable?

(Interview 18, former Chairman of the MSF)
There are however a number of interviewees who view the term ‘vulnerability’ as a legitimate concept in the radicalisation process. The rationale underpinning the notion of ‘vulnerability’ is that vulnerable people are more ‘at risk’, at danger, and more susceptible to embracing radical ideology or be attracted to extremist groups. Interviewees who were particularly positive with regards to the notion linking vulnerability with radicalisation included two PREVENT Officers, two academics based in Birmingham working on community engagement, alongside a local government employee working on PREVENT, and some of the think-tanks analysts, such as Quilliam and DEMOS. Most these interviewees were practitioners and perhaps as a result more appreciative of its role in the radicalisation process. More important is whether interviewees believed that the relationship between vulnerability and a future propensity to undertake violence could be established and was therefore a legitimate way of pre-empting potential problems in advance. An example of this logic can be seen in the way that a Senior PREVENT Officer understands the causes that lead someone down the route of radicalisation.

What are the vulnerability factors in Keith’s life? He’s never had a father figure, whatever it is, he’s been to Somalia or Yemen, he has post-traumatic stress disorder, I’ve left the army and I’ve been made redundant and the right-wing are trying to recruit me and we are getting more and more right wing cases; as you see because of the economy we are getting more and more cases of mental health and people aren’t in work. Meanwhile the governments got its head on Al-Qaeda they’re not seeing some of those other risks.
In this comment we see an expansive view of ‘vulnerability’. Vulnerability is associated with a variety of factors; a person’s biography, where a person’s been, ‘traumatic stress disorder’, being made redundant, mental health issues, being bullied at school, etc. The word ‘vulnerable’ according to this Senior PREVENT Officer has thus become shorthand for anything that happened in the past that may have played a part in that person’s trajectory towards radicalisation. The interesting feature nevertheless in her use of the word ‘vulnerable’ is the removal of agency from individuals who have been identified as ‘vulnerable’. This understanding of ‘vulnerability’, which reflects the PREVENT’s conception of ‘vulnerability’, removes agency from young people attempting to contextualise political, religious, social, cultural, and philosophical realities, and instead situates the burden on the evils of ideology and psychological problems. The problem, in other words, is a defect in character or the unfortunate circumstances engulfing the individual. The word ‘vulnerable’ not only dilutes the seriousness of a crime but also evokes a concern for the vulnerable individual. This logic is explained by DEMOS analyst.

It’s hard to say; because vulnerability is like a nice sort of forgiving left-wing term for it’s not their fault, they are being sucked in by radical preachers and we need to help them become more resilience to being manipulated and I think there’s some truth in that for some people. But other people aren’t vulnerable at all, they are actively empowered and going out and seeking these opportunities. Vulnerable, I think, has become a short hand, a pleasant non-discriminatory way of talking about it by using
a language of vulnerability you are not stigmatising them, you are trying to understand why they are getting involved in this.

(Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst)

Whilst he acknowledged that some are not vulnerable and go out ‘seeking opportunities’, he nevertheless aptly encapsulates the instrumentalising effects of the term, e.g. removing the stigmatisation associated with radical ideas and acts, as well as the fact that it is a ‘nice forgiving left-wing term’. The implication with the term vulnerability is that the individual was not to blame, should not be castigated, and instead requires support, care and education. This logic is also buttressed further by the fact that some of the individuals deemed vulnerable are young adolescents (more in the next section). It is more natural and fitting to view young adults (in some cases children) in terms of ‘vulnerability’ than seeing them as being empowered by the adoption of radical ideas and practices.

Implicitly excluded in the use of ‘vulnerability’ therefore is the agency of those deemed vulnerable, particularly their ability to freely and rationally negotiate and contextualise their wider political, social, and religious terrain. By stating that someone is vulnerable in relation to extremism is to not only attribute the blame elsewhere, but it is also to suggest that the individual was brain-washed, duped, and deceived into extremism. In short the word ‘vulnerable’ affirms a particular framing of the problem whilst denying others. The overall implication is that ‘vulnerability’ indicates a pastoral logic embedded in PREVENT, and by default de-radicalisation.
Indeed the language of pastoral care is deeply intertwined with the concept of vulnerability. This can be ascertained from the language of the following respondent.

The impression I get from Channel is that it’s nurturing, these kids aren’t criminals, just as the schools do and society has an obligation towards young people and for adults to help nurture them as much as with parenting or teaching.

(Interview 25, Senior Researcher Quilliam)

This interviewee employs words like ‘nurturing’, ‘obligation’, ‘parenting, and ‘teaching’ to describe Channel. Again the language used evokes a type of pastoral logic. Also important in this thinking is the idea that the ‘kids aren’t criminals’. This in fact is one of the striking features of Channel in PREVENT - it does not targets criminals or even individuals necessarily involved in extremist groups or activities. It is mainly concerned with individuals showing the potentiality in the future for radicalism. Before discussing how some interviewees believed that future radicalism can be detected, it is important to note therefore that ‘vulnerability’ denotes a category that describes the vague space between non-criminality, to ‘at risk’ of criminality, and risky or threat, which in this instance refers to radicalisation.

However given the murky continuum between being vulnerable and hence ‘at risk’ and being considered a threat, it is a notable feature of Channel that non-threat vulnerabilities, such as mental health and social issues, become mixed up with threat-vulnerabilities (that is, extreme views indicating propensity for radicalism). The
fact that some individuals who are vulnerable in the non-radical sense get picked up by Channel is explained by an academic who has done PREVENT community work.

...something say like the Channel Project I know there are community members who may assess and they’ll get a report from Channel saying this person looks like they are vulnerable and a person will see that and say: ‘no this person isn’t vulnerable they might have a mental health issue’ developing, lots of other things, they don’t need de-radicalisation’. So potentially you have many people going through the system who have no issues anyway.

(Interview 7, Academic/PREVENT Practitioner)

The conflation of different forms of ‘vulnerability’ in the case of Channel, between a general form of vulnerability and ‘at risk’ from being drawn into terrorism type of ‘vulnerable’, is also acknowledged in PREVENT 2011.

During the consultation to the Prevent review we found that the attraction of community cohesion work appears to have sometimes steered people towards Channel who may have been perceived as potentially vulnerable in some broader sense, rather than specifically at risk of being drawn into terrorism.

(HO 2011, 65)
What then are the risk triggers that convey the right type of vulnerability that potentially puts someone on a de-radicalisation intervention? In April 2015, as part of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the ‘Channel Duty Guidance’ was issued. It was the first time a ‘vulnerability assessment framework’ was provided (HMG 2015, 11). It is built around three criteria: (1) engagement with a group or cause or ideology; (2) Intent to cause harm; (3) Capability to cause harm. The three criteria are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, six that relate to intent and three for capability). For more on the Examples of the 22 factors, see page 12 and Annex C on page 28. Despite this however PREVENT concedes, ‘at present OSCT-funded intervention providers do not have a ‘standardised’ risk assessment tool; each project has developed and deployed its own risk assessment’ (HO 2011, 61).

However, there were two types of broad responses by interviewees. One view states that ‘vulnerability’ according to Channel corresponds to religious and political ideas and practices, whereas the second view, not antithetical to the first but merely places the emphasis on other factors, situates ‘vulnerability’ in terms of psychology, the individual, social background, and grievances. Again, these two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive and yet where the line is placed naturally lead to different policy approaches. The second view certainly tries to play down the political and religious context given the sensitivity with regards to the suggestion that government was intervening in the religious and political lives of Muslims. The first view is articulated below.
What we found is that the way they identified people who are vulnerable were very Islamophobic, to find a better word. So those who visited the mosque regularly, or whose parents were religious, Muslims who belong to a certain school of thought within Islam, whether it was Salafi or Ikhwan; those who were from South East Asia or North African would be identified. There was a phase when Somalis were identified as vulnerable, so now young Somalis are targeted because, you know, especially if they are talking about Somalia or are against African Union intervention there then those individuals would be identified.

(IInterview 18, former Chairman MSF)

According to this view Channel risk indicators correspond to the articulation of particular views and beliefs associated with religion and politics, in addition to changes in outward behaviour/ appearance. In other words professing a belief in ‘sharia’ or the ‘caliphate’, the sudden adoption of certain clothing, the articulation of political views, and the networks individuals associate with flag up that particular individual as a potential terrorist (Gutkowski 2011, 352-3; HMG 2012, 12; Kundnani 2014, 176-181; HMG 2015, 12). This is implicitly acknowledged by ACPO, the body overseeing Channel, but is couched in the language of countering ideology. The second view on what constitutes ‘vulnerability’ is articulated by both PREVENT Officers.

You are talking about a fine line here. It’s about that particular person, how they are, and what they do. It’s not about a change of dress, or change of different things. So
say some ones’ got a drug problem; if you look at someone like Isa Ibrahim in Bristol; he had a drug problem, he was isolated from his family, and then starts to learn about Islam over the internet and because of that makes a homemade explosives and then makes a suicide vest.

(Interview 21, PREVENT Officer)

This is what government doesn’t understand; their measurement would seem like I find someone who is radicalised and put them on a de-radicalisation course; I'll get a provider, largely with theological and jurisprudence knowledge, I put them through a mentoring course, and Keith will magically transform and come the other side; meanwhile we haven’t dealt with his drug addiction, his dad doesn’t sit with him at the dinner table, and he’s got a grievance against Kashmir. We are not thought police in that sense.

(Interview 22, Senior PREVENT Officer)

This Senior PREVENT Officer emphasise general factors like identity, drug addiction, and personal experience. She is not dismissive of the other dimension but seems to suggest that a focus on theology and mentoring is futile without tackling the underlying personal and social vulnerabilities. Both conceptions of vulnerability not only frame the problem in a certain light, which actually guides the work of practitioners and intervention providers on the ground with respect to identifying it, but it also serves to legitimise interventions in the lives of individuals, which would
not otherwise be normatively and legally possible within liberal structures of governance, which theoretically prizes the sovereignty of the individual in these matters. It is the vocabulary of ‘vulnerability’ that legitimises the corrective techniques of de-radicalisation.

6.5 Hotspots of Radicalisation: Sectors and Institutions

This section examines the third objective of PREVENT, which is about supporting sectors and institutions where there are risk of radicalisation (Home Office 2011, 66). Identifying ‘vulnerable’ individuals requires institutions and sectors to have the knowledge and capacity to identify individuals ‘at risk’ from radicalisation and report them to Channel. Channel then examines the individual, makes a risk assessment and if the individual satisfies the risk triggers is assigned to an intervention provider. It is the job of sectors and institutions to identify and report potential radicals for de-radicalisation interventions and for Channel to act as the hub which receives these reports as well as place individuals to agency’s providing de-radicalisation interventions. The director of Siraat explains the actual role of Channel in relation to wider work on sectors and institutions.

Channel was basically...the Met Police, what they did, was try to set up in certain boroughs across community support where they can find individuals to sit on a board and tell the Met Police that we are concerned XYZ people. And then the Channel board would invite known deradicalisers to come and work with those individuals. So Channel was just a conduit to get information on people they thought were radical and try signpost a community de-radicalisation programme.
Channel thus acts as a ‘conduit’ between the community and intervention providers. According to the data set there are seven or eight interventions providers, whilst others have also mentioned the existence of local community mentors who work on a contractual basis but who do not belong to an agency or organisation as such. The PREVENT strategy does not list the agency providers and this information is generally difficult to access online. The most commonly cited examples of de-radicalisation intervention providers in most if not all papers and reports are STREET and the ACF. One respondent working on PREVENT discusses the different intervention providers.

There are I think seven or eight intervention providers nationally, funded by the Home Office or operate different- this is about accreditation and a pool of mentors, that’s what’s unique about this bit and they’ve all undertaken a six day training course. I think in London you got ACF, Active Change Foundation, don’t know if you’ve met them; you used to have STREET and SIRAT for example but they’ve now be curtailed because they are too Salafi for the government- so they used to be intervention providers; you got Inner City Guidance in Birmingham. There’s an organisation in London called FAST, which do kind of family sort of therapy but they all concentrated on the hard range interventions.
This was the closest I could get to a general overview of intervention providers operating in PREVENT. More will be said on de-radicalisation intervention providers in the next chapter. To recapitulate, the radicalisation ‘hotspots’ incorporate Primary and Secondary schools, Universities, Hospitals, Local Government, Probation services and other institutions and bodies. One of the main aims is the building of networks and relationship between the various parts of society and government with the community. This is embodied in the role of Channel, which works with a board where various community and public representatives assess potential radicals. Channel relies on the active assessment of many stakeholders in the risk identification process and as a result there are two important features: first, a criterion of risk or what constitutes ‘at risk’ (albeit until recently this was not specified). These ‘risks’ refer to indicators which correspond to certain behavioural types and patterns, as well as the articulation of particular views and beliefs by individuals.

A second feature of the identification process is the ability and capacity for employees, managers, and experts in civil society and public institutions to understand radicalisation and associated risk triggers. This idea is based on giving ordinary citizens in society the knowledge and education to identify and report ‘risks’ and threats in the community. Hence the investment by PREVENT in the teaching and training of individuals in professional positions across the various sectors and institutions on radicalisation and risk indicators. For example, training is available to frontline staffs that are critical to the identification process. This includes the Home Office
developed Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training. WRAP is an hour long DVD-led interactive workshop. PREVENT III claims that 15,000 frontline staff have received WRAP training (HO 2011, 58). Also, the National Counter-Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ), in conjunction with the College of Policing, have developed an e-learning package for Channel. There is training also available in local authorities arranged by local Police Prevent Co-ordinator (HMG 2015, 19-20).

Regarding a criterion of risk in order to identify ‘vulnerable’ and radical individuals, interviewees overwhelmingly believed that the criteria were based on the religious and political views and behaviour of Muslims. The respondent below, an analyst at DEMOS, explains the way that young adults were referred to Channel based on political views expressed in class.

In the beginning they didn’t know on what basis to refer someone. So they were hearing about some kid in class mouthing off about Palestinian bombings being justified by religion, which isn’t controversial amongst many Muslims, and if you end up referring every Muslim that said that, you end up having hundreds of thousands. It’s a difficult case, especially young kids they are going to say that of course they are being segregated and got no other ways to express their freedoms, what do you want them to do? So initially they were referring people that were expressing that type of view and realised quite quickly it was stupid, not the right people to go through the programme.

(Interview 1, DEMOS Analyst)
This comment implies that identifying people according to views was something that Channel has revised and improved on with time. There is the implicit suggestion that it is either not done anymore or that Channel has got better at identifying ‘at risk’ youngsters. Whilst some others have similarly acknowledged the learning process involved in identifying real risk from non-threat risk by Channel, the majority still believe that the identification process is linked with indicators pertaining to political and religious views. However interviewees were roughly divided into a group that questioned the existence of a coherent identification criterion and another group that spoke in terms of the criterion being nuanced, complex, multifaceted, and that assessment were undertaken according to each individual. Despite this, none of the interviewees however dismissed the notion that the risk triggers corresponded to religious and political views. Examples of both views on the criterion of risk held by interviews can be read below by a police and a PREVENT officer.

I don’t think it works. First of all what are the indicators of being radicalised? I haven’t seen any written indicators. If you go by the line of questioning at Heathrow airport by counter-terrorism officers: Do you pray five times a day? Do you read the Quran? What are you view on the Iraq war? If you say yes to the first two and I don’t agree with the third, does that mean you are at risk of being radicalised? So I think there are questions to do with indicators and a question of awareness and understanding about people who refer people to Channel.

(Interview 16, President of NAMP)
....when you’re talking about where’s the line for intervention, the line is so variable sometimes. On top of that, what’s your level of intervention? ....Not everyone we get notified about gets referred to Channel, you know, all it is, is a way of doing things, and only if there’s evidence they are going down a certain road. It’s like a young lad starts ordering chemicals from the internet to do experiments with in his shed. Do you think we should do something about that? And it’s about intervening before something happens.

(Interview 21, Lancashire PREVENT Officer)

The first interviewee states that he has not seen any written indicators but only infers from the questioning at airports that such indicators related to religious and political views. The second point he raises relates to the relationship between ‘at risk’ and radicalisation. This is an important issue that was addressed in the last section between ‘vulnerability’ and radicalisation and the same applies with the notion ‘at risk’. Channel, for example, emphasises the importance of ‘risk’: ‘Risk is a theme that runs through the entire Channel process, i.e risk to the individual; risk to the public; and risk to partners or organisations providing support to the individual, including any intervention providers. The panel is responsible for managing the risk in relation to the vulnerable individual’ (HMG 2015, 16, paragraph 74). What is the link between being ‘at risk’ and radicalisation?

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36 Channel emphasises the importance of ‘risk’: ‘Risk is a theme that runs through the entire Channel process, i.e risk to the individual; risk to the public; and risk to partners or organisations providing support to the individual, including any intervention providers. The panel is responsible for managing the risk in relation to the vulnerable individual’ (HMG 2015, 16, paragraph 74).
Meanwhile, the second respondent talks of ‘variables’, ‘levels’, ‘evidence’, and non-ideological factors, like ‘ordering chemicals’. Being a practitioner, this respondent articulated a complex view of the risk identification criterion. Both views thus highlight the centrality of religious and political indicators as highlighting whether an individual is ‘at risk’, whilst simultaneously remaining officially elusive.

What’s that left us with is this wishy-washy thing without a clear criteria of how to actually identify how someone might be at risk. I think that’s why you have had this wide net approach because if you don’t know what the pathways are, and you know, anybody can become an extremist whether you are religious or not, then it’s kind of an open playing field, how do we identify people? We don’t know. Your criterion becomes diluted and as a consequence it vindicates this surveillance approach, well in that case we need to have endeavours like the Channel project.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

This comment alludes to the consequences of an ambiguous criterion. The respondent believes that it justifies the surveillance approach. It is important to examine however what interviewees said about the role of institutions in reporting radicals to Channel. An insight is given by the former president of FOSIS.
student unions have reported back to the NUS how they have been approached for data on Muslim students. This all kicked off with Christmas bomber Umar Farouk so UCL union were pressured into providing the contact details of Muslim students to the police without a warrant and they weren’t just details of Muslim students at the time of Umar but also of Muslim students who weren’t around at the time of Umar. Those contact details were handed over... We know this is happening it’s coming from Prevent.

(Interview 3, former President of FOSIS)

This passage describes the experience of Muslim students at the University College of London (UCL) following the revelation that the Christmas day bomber, Umar Farouk, had been ex-President of the Islamic Society at UCL. UCL were compelled to investigate and despite the fact that the investigation revealed that Umar had not been radicalised at University[^37], there was a lot of attention on ISOC’s at Universities by think-tanks like the Centre for Social Cohesion and Quilliam.[^38] The above interviewee highlights how this incident was used by the police to obtain the names

[^37]: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up transatlantic flight on Christmas Day 2009. In January 2010 the Council, the governing body of UCL, set up an independent inquiry to investigate the case of Umar Farouk and whether he had become radicalised on campus. The panel concluded that ‘there is no evidence to suggest either that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was radicalised while a student at UCL or that conditions at UCL during that time or subsequently are conducive to the radicalisation of students’ (Caldicott 2010, 3).

[^38]: The Centre for Social Cohesion produced a report ‘Radical Islam on UK Campuses’ in 2010 which made the case that ‘British university campuses are breeding grounds of Islamic extremism’ (2010, V). The Quilliam Foundation also published ‘The Threat of Radicalisation on British University Campuses’ using the Islamic Society at City University as a case study, the paper argued that Islamic Societies at Universities potentially represents a vehicle for radicalisation.
of Muslims students held by the NUS. It reveals the extent to which the university became subject to scrutiny.

Notably the focus on institutions or sites of potential radicalisation in PREVENT has evolved over the three iterations. Initially the concern was with Mosques in PREVENT I, and then with Universities in PREVENT II and more recently with PREVENT III the focus has turned towards the internet (HO 2011; Neumann and Rogers 2007). This shift on hotspots of radicalisation represents the incorporation of knowledge into the strategy over time. The rationale underpinning supporting institutions is the notion that radicalisation and particularly ideology becomes incubated in certain places and so the strategy attempts to buffer institutions from such a threat. Another example of the pressures on institutions to report ‘radicals’ is shared by one respondent, who was arrested and for downloading material online at campus whilst a student at University.

In a way I don’t blame the management for picking up the phone and calling the police; ten years of constant Islamophobic news reporting and pejorative words used to describe Muslims and negative headlines, create a moral panic about Islamic terrorist so when they did find me in possession of a book you could buy from WH Smith they reported that and that’s what they’re told to do.

(Interview 19, Academic/Activist)
He explains lucidly the impact the wider securitised environment had on the University management committee in making their decision to report him to the police. In addition, he situates this decision taken by the University which substantially affected his life in many ways to the fact that ‘that’s what they’re told to do’. Other interviewees have made remarks regarding the culture of suspicion accompanying the PREVENTs message of reporting signs of radicalism. The academic below alludes to the exhortation by a government Minister for Muslim to report other Muslims when they see the ‘tell-tale’ signs of radicalism.

I remember John Reid and that amazing speech he did in East London to Muslim parents where he told them to look out for the ‘tell-tall’ signs in the children. So what are the ‘tell-tale’ signs? John Reid never told us. But I was like we don’t know, by ‘we’ I mean the white British majority, we don’t know what the ‘tell-tale’ signs are but you know what, as Muslims, what the ‘tell-tale’ signs are. It’s again about putting the problem elsewhere.

(Interview 11, Academic)

There is the hint in this comment that the onus was put on the Muslim community to self-regulate radicalism in their communities. However it points to something more substantial than the instruction for parents to spy on their children. Instead it brings to the fore the notion of building institutional resilience as protection against radicalism. It suggests that the Channel programme and PREVENT more widely should be seen through the lens of risk management strategies. Indeed some of the
interviewees have spoken about the impact this risk management logic underpinning PREVENT has had both at an individual level and at a collective level. For example the Senior PREVENT Officer uses the language and logic of risk management to explain the work of Channel.

What we are trying to build Lancashire into safeguarded hubs. So our referrals when they come in, there would be a risk assessment of whether it's violence, sexual, extremism, or whatever, and then the case is referred to a panel of expertise exist to help that person. So we are trying.... some people may get referred to us thinking they're being radicalised when actually what people are seeing is child exploitation going on. Partner agencies don't have the skill to recognise what's actually going on. That's the approach we have here in Lancashire.

(Interview 22, Lancashire Senior PREVENT Officer)

The following respondent also analyses the work of Channel through the lens of risk management and the securitisation of spheres previously unrelated to security, like education.

Otherwise they would be flagged up by teachers who are becoming increasingly concerned that little Johnny said something in class and later become a terrorist- are they going to be held responsible for not flagging this up? Again it's about risk management and people getting a little bit scared because this mainstreaming of the
security consciousness has gone into all sorts of different areas, into housing, into education.

(Interview 12, Academic / PREVENT Practitioner)

The risk management logic therefore explains the relationship between being ‘at risk’ and radicalisation. It was believed, according to one respondent, that the 7/7 bombers had written things about Osama Bin Laden in their exercise books at school and so the link between youngsters, certain behavioural indicators and radicalisation was established.

I get the idea, the idea is you want to make sure that people like Mohammed Sadique Khan and some of the 7/7 bombers....there were identifiers, they were writing things about Osama Bin Laden from a young age at school. This came out apparently with one of the bombers. So there is this idea if we pick up on these things early we can actually talk to the kids.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

Despite being designed to address all forms of terrorism, research data, as well as limited data available on Channel, suggest that the identification process is preoccupied with individuals from a Muslim background. For example, of the 1,120
individual identified by Channel between 2007 and 2010, 290 were under 16, and 55 were under 12 (HO 2011, 59). When the Security and Counter-Terrorism Act came into law in July 2015, it was reported that there were 349 referrals that month (Tran 2015). Of the 796 individuals referred to Channel between June and August 2015, 312 were under 18 (Ibid). According to these figures a high proportion therefore of individuals identified by Channel was under the age of sixteen, with some being under 12. The interviewee below believed that anyone under the age of 18 was too young to be put on an intervention programmes.

With the work we did we tried not to work with anybody below eighteen years of age because their ideas were not formed. We were asked to work with some fifteen to sixteen years old but we find that their ideas were not formed and more importantly the last issue- who they were hanging around with. They are just taking ideas of people they’re hanging around with.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

Notably, on this matter, Channel states that:

Participation in Channel remains voluntary and consent by the individual must be given by the individual or by parent/guardian in the case of a child (a child being defined as anyone under the age of 18). If consent is refused by a parent but sufficient evidence that the child is at risk of particular harm, then social services become involved in the decision making process (HM 2015, 16).
So Channel has established that de-radicalisation for those under 18 require consent. It is interesting nevertheless to see the negative reaction elicited by the notion of re-educating youngsters without consent. Even the biggest advocates of countering extremism and counter-ideology found the prospect of primary school children being subjected to an intervention to be ethically questionable:

Nine is too young, primary school kids, yes it’s a concern. I’m not convinced they should be in Channel; they could just grow up to be racist but not violent. They could become an offender or grow out of it, depends on friends and company. They could be normal with no issues.

(Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam)

The young targets of intervention and the ‘vulnerability’ label employed by Channel seem to suggest that the programme is administered according to the conventional mechanisms associated with the youth and probation services in its implementation of de-radicalisation. This, after all, is no surprise given that PREVENT 2011 stated that de-radicalisation programmes are akin to crime prevention programmes. Questions arise regarding the purpose of observing and looking out for ‘early sings’ in children in a counter-terrorism strategy. PREVENT is supposed to mitigate the likelihood of support and engagement with terrorism. The fact the Channel appears to be preoccupied with youngsters who have not committed a crime but exhibit signs
of ‘extremism’ suggest that the pre-emptive framing of Channel effectively makes particular subjects problematic (Muslim, political, religious, etc.) through future potential, thus permitting mediation in the present. Consequently, this section has argued that many interviewees understood the third objective of PREVENT through the lens of risk management. It aims to build institutional resilience and mitigate future risks of radicalisation through the surveillance of public space and the identification of bodies deemed radical for the purposes of rectification.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter argued that the PREVENT strategy and Channel programme should be viewed through the lens of disciplinary technology. The first section analysed how interviewees understood PREVENT, while the second highlighted the classification system between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Muslim embedded in PREVENT. Overall, the data indicated that the majority of respondents believed that PREVENT was not only a conflated strategy combining different policy logics, but more importantly, was seen by many as an attempt by government to gather intelligence on the one hand and remake Muslim communities on the other. Although the majority of interviewees in section 6.3 again believed that categories like ‘British values’ and ‘extremism’ were socially constructed categories, it transpired that it had concrete effect in reconfiguring the community by rendering certain individuals and organisation beyond the pale, while promoting others in this policy domain. However this section
particularly elucidated the way that the aforementioned categories corresponded to constructions of ‘good’ and bad’ Muslim, a bifurcation which has normative reverberations beyond counter-terrorism. This has produced a dichotomised regulatory framework for Muslims in which no other way of being Muslim is afforded space.

Meanwhile, sections 6.4 and 6.5 examine Channel. Both sections bring to light the way that surveillance is generated at a collective level, the way that individuals are identified for intervention, and the way that concepts like ‘vulnerability’ justify interventions of youngsters in a fashion compatible with liberal doctrine. Section 6.4 explores the notion of ‘vulnerability’ and its connection to Channel since PREVENT makes the claim that de-radicalisation is about ‘supporting vulnerabilities’. This section demonstrated that couching the phenomenon of individuals flirting with terrorism as ‘vulnerable’ includes and excludes particular framings of the problem. It also demonstrated the pastoral logic underlying Channel, something the next chapter will address in more detail.

The last section highlighted the attempt of PREVENT through Channel to build resilience into publics sectors and institutions. The data revealed that respondents viewed it as an attempt to build an infrastructure of surveillance between the community, public spaces, and the police, not to mention the actualisation of discourses of radicalisation institutionally. Crucially however a significant notion that was inferred from the data was that PREVENT and Channel should be seen as risk management strategies that operated through the problematisation of Muslim identity. This explains the preoccupation of Channel with political and religious
markers, as well as with youngsters who have not committed a crime but who are thought to hold ‘radical’ views.

The data analysis in this chapter also corroborates the themes outlined in chapter 1. Section 6.3 shows how PREVENT inherited the presumptions espoused in public discourse over three decades regarding Muslim identity by trying to change the leadership of Muslim communities in Britain. The section after conveyed how Muslim identity was synonymous with ‘extremism’ and in light of the integration agenda, formulates ‘British values’ as a palliative to the ‘extremism’ embodied by Islamist, Salafies, and many Muslims more widely. The focus on Channel in Section 6.5 and 6.6 raises many points that echo the assertions regarding the changing nature of security. PREVENT as a strategy is governed by the pre-emptive risk logic that has characterised politics and society since 9-11. Under the pretext of potential and anticipated threats in the future, government is thus legitimised to intervene in the theological, sociological, and political lives of Muslims in the temporal reality of the present.

Ultimately, the Channel programme, which makes de-radicalisation interventions possible, strongly exemplifies the working of disciplinary technology as a component of the technology of the self. The type of de-radicalisation envisaged and practiced by PREVENT cannot occur independent of disciplinary technology. This is due to the fact that such programmes are concerned with deradicalising individuals in public spaces and civil society rather than a group of known terrorist in a controlled environment. Disciplinary technologies encompasses the strategy (PREVENT), places (various Institutions and Sectors), partners (various experts, civil society)
interventions (counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation) that go into discipline of society and individuals. It amplifies the argument made about the link between the ontological framework of radicalisation (ideology, identity crisis, and vulnerabilities) and the counter-radicalisation policies such as PREVENT (a policy which focuses on counter-ideology, counter-subversion, and British values). As a process Channel allowed institutions to perform such discourses and convert them into reality, as well as identify the individuals categorised as deviant and problematic in need of cognitive and behavioural rectification. The structure of surveillance induces a form of self-policing, whilst society and Channel Panels perform an ‘examination’ of Muslim subjects. It is in this way that PREVENT and Channel should be seen as technologies of discipline.
CHAPTER 7

Confession Technologies (Identity): ‘Salvation in this Life’

This form of power applies itself too everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him.

(Foucault 1982, 781)

This chapter is about the third component in the technology of the self-confessional technology. It will try to argue that de-radicalisation embodies a modern and secularised version of confessional technology, which aims at the salvation of the individual and the enhancement of governmental power. It does this in two main ways: incitement to discourse in order to improve the knowledge and codification of a phenomenon and secondly through the transformation of individual subjectivity. The Confession elucidates the logic of pastoral power governing not only de-radicalisation interventions but also the PREVENT strategy more widely. It also situates the preoccupation of policymakers with the welfare of the individual within wider governmental practices, as well as the role expertise plays in the management of our society.

The first section provides a brief genealogical backdrop of how the confessional evolved and was incorporated into governmental practice. The section after examines community approaches to counter-terrorism, whilst the third addresses elite forms of expertise, focusing on Quilliam. These sections read the conflicting approaches between community and elite modes of expertise through the first
dimension of the confessional - the incitement to produce discourse. The fifth and sixth sections endeavour to provide an explanation of how subjectification in confessional technology occurs. The fifth highlights techniques of mentoring and psychotherapy in de-radicalisation, whilst the last section demonstrates that de-radicalisation interventions aim to transform the subjectivity of young Muslims in order to reconcile Muslim subjectivity with wider society.

7.1 A Genealogy of Confessional Technology

Pastoral power has its origins in the Christian practice of Confession. According to Foucault, the Church had in fact adopted many of the techniques of self-examination derived from pre-Christian practices, from the Stoics and even the Pythagoreans of fifth and fourth century BC (Foucault 1987; 1988a). These techniques included: ‘mortification of the flesh, contemplation to rid oneself of earthly desires, absolute obedience to one’s spiritual director, and the examination of conscience as a prelude to public confession at the end of the period of penance, knowledge of the self...’ (Foucault 1988a, 133). Since the Lateran Council in 1212, in which the sacrament of penance was codified, the confessional became a central feature in religious and civil power (Foucault 1998a, 58). The confessional was centred on the relationship between the Church and its flock, the priests and the congregants, between a party that speaks and confesses and an authority ‘who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile’ (Foucault 1998a, 62).
Notably, pastoral power encloses several important themes. The first dimension is that pastorship hinges on the notion that the leader is a shepherd in charge of a flock. What matters in pastoral power is the relationship between the shepherd and the flock, his ability to unite the flock, without him which the individuals would be dispersed. Also, the shepherd’s role is to ensure the salvation of his flock through ‘constant, individualised and final kindness’ (McNay 1994, 120), not to mention watch over his flock with scrupulousness. Hence pastoral power is a form of power that looks after both the community and the individual, which cannot be exercised without knowing the ‘inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets’ (Foucault 1982, 783). This type of power therefore, unlike royal or legal power, is salvation orientated and individuating (Ibid, 783).

Whilst the influence of the Church has waned, the pastoral function has nevertheless evolved and moved beyond its previous localisation, even multiplying in the modern world, impacting a number of other domains. In a long passage Foucault describes the extent to which ‘Western man has become a confessing animal’:

‘It plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with the great precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses in public and in private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctors, to those one loves; one admits to oneself, in pleasure and pain, things it would be impossible to tell to anybody else, the things people write books about.'
One confesses- or is forced to confess........Western man has become a confessing animal’.

(Foucault 1998a, 59)

The Christian Confessional is governed by a religious logic that seeks salvation in the next life, whereas the confessional logic of contemporary society is concerned with ‘salvation in this life’ (Foucault 1982, 784). ‘Salvation in this life’ assumes different forms, such as the promotion and safeguarding of individual and collective well-being, health and longevity, security, etc. (Foucault 1982, 783). Thus pastoral power has been employed in a whole series of relationships: ‘children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts’ Foucault 1998a, 63). Where the language used by pastoral power was once religious and then legal, in the modern world it became medical and psychological.

Moreover, the techniques employed in confessional practices have been adopted in pedagogy, medicine, psychiatry, literature, and popular culture. It has taken on various forms, such ‘interrogations, consultations, autobiographical narratives, letters; they have been recorded, transcribed, assembled into dossiers, published, and commented on’ (Ibid). With these new techniques of self-inspection, self-examination, self-evaluation, and self-regulation, citizens are persuaded and encouraged to be ‘free’, ‘true to one self’, and to ‘realise oneself’ (Rose 1999, 114).

Similarly to the role of priests in the Christian confessional, today’s ‘experts’- therapists, psychologists, doctors, counsellors, mentors, academics, managers, etc.- are the new priesthood of our secularised societies. They perform the old pastoral
functions in terms of guiding and directing the individual in this life, selling their expertise and their knowledge, techniques, language, and models of self formation to everyone. Governing at ‘a distance’, expertise achieves its effects ‘not through the threat of violence or constraint, but by way of the persuasion inherent in its truths, the anxieties stimulated by its norms, and the attraction exercised by the images of life and self it offers to us’ (Rose 1999, 10). More significantly however for Rose is the fact that experts (psychologist, psychiatrist, and psychotherapists) are considered ‘engineers of the soul’ that operate in conjunction with neo-liberal government in the subjectification of citizens.

However, implicit in the notion of ‘salvation in this life’, is the ‘repressive hypotheses’ (Foucault 1998a, 17-35). This hypothesis, which has become a valorised maxim in the West, states that power represses individuals and that the truth can be unleashed by opposing power. It posits that power and truth are diametrically opposed and also independent of each other. The belief in ‘salvation’ of the subject in popular discourse has therefore been deliberately depicted as hinging on the act of ‘speaking truth to power’. Foucault criticised the notion that somehow the suppression of sexuality was caused by power and questioned popular conceptions that ‘speaking truth’ to power and ‘coming out’ was a method of liberating individuals from repression (34). Instead, it is this underlying pressure to speak, to confess all, to lay bare, that must be seen as an instrument of power. In the confession the agency of domination does not reside in the person that speaks, but in the one who questions and listens. Confessing does not set you free, but makes you a subject of power. ‘Truth’ therefore according to Foucault exists through power, is shaped by it, and not outside of it (Rainbow 1984, 72-47).
Consequently, the confession has two primary functions: one relates to producing discourse on ‘truth’, which encourages the production of discourse. Knowledge gained from the confession is then recodified into discourses of medicine, psychiatry, etc. which establishes a normalising field- a regime of truth- in which individuals are categorised as deviant or normal (McNay 1994, 122). The second function of the confession is to direct and shape the subjectivity of the individual. Indeed, confessing and telling the truth, having one’s guilt absolved, repenting, and performing religious rituals has the effect of reconstituting the thoughts, soul, and behaviour of the individual repenting. Foucault aptly explicates the ritualising effect of the confessional on subjectivity:

The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement....a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modification in the person who articulates it: it exonerates redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberate him, and promises him salvation.

(Foucault 1998a, 62)

It is thus the act of verbalisation, alongside the act of proclamation that turns the individual into a subject. In other words it is the performative function of language that turns the individual into a subject (Besley 2005, 85). This occurs because the confession is both a communicative and an expressive act, ‘a narrative in which we (re)create ourselves by creating our own narrative, reworking the past, in public, or at least in dialogue with another’ (Rose 1999, 222). The critical role language plays in
the modification of subjectivity consequently reinforces the significant effect that the pastoral techniques in the de-radicalisation process (counselling, dialogue, debate) have on the radicalised subject. Concomitant with the guidance offered by experts, who are responsible for re-interpreting and re-constructing the knowledge professed by the radicalised individual, the act of recantation results in the individual acquiring self-knowledge, which paves the way for a recalibration of the self to occur.

This chapter deploys the conceptual framework of the confessional to understand the pastoral dimensions inherent in de-radicalisation interventions in the UK. As an ordering power of government, pastoral power not only preoccupies itself with the welfare of individuals within its territory, but more importantly, their subjectivity. De-radicalisation must be viewed through the lens of the confessional: the existence of countless experts involved in the identification process, as well as the implementation of intervention; the shepherd/flock relationship assumed by the imam/mentor/experts on one side and the radical/vulnerable/extremist individual on the other; the stated objectives by experts to have the radical/vulnerable/extremist individual transformed; and to ultimately have the individual re-integrated back with the whole flock, or mainstream society.

7.2 Community Approaches to Countering Radicalisation: MCU, Islamists, & Salafis

The use of communities and civil society actors to counter terrorism predated the PREVENT strategy. Special Branch at the Metropolitan Police had set up the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in 2003 to support the Muslim communities counter terrorism (Lambert 2011). According to the former Director of the MCU, their work was successful in tackling the influence of Al-Qaeda at the Finsbury Park Mosque, the
Brixton Mosque, and other places before the advent of PREVENT. In the two passages below he explains what community approaches to countering terrorism entailed.

....yes 2006, there was still that MCU approach which as far as possible was trying to adopt the post-Laurence approach of engaging with communities as they are; the idea really that the police should not be concerned with engineering change; that you work with communities as they are…

(Interview 17, director of the MCU)

So I think that the Muslim Contact Unit just went to places where particular problems existed and so particular solutions. I don’t think there was any attempt to import some kind of solution that wasn’t local.

(Interview 17, director of the MCU)

Community approaches to countering terrorism were primarily characterised by (1) engaging with the Muslim communities as they existed on the ground rather than having to engineer a change of social and community representation; (2) that the solutions to the problem of radicalisation had to emanate from already existing communities, which required a type of expertise that was local rather than national. Moreover, the interviewee argues that the MCU’s community led strategy was based on deploying the Islamist at Finsbury Park and the Salafis in Brixton and was justified
on the basis of legitimacy and effectiveness. Legitimacy was derived from the fact that the likes of STREET and MAB had both the religious and political profile, as well as local experience working with their communities. Their effectiveness was based from the fact that they were legitimate to begin with and that they possessed the right skills and expertise. Their skills and expertise was based on both their religious and ideological similarity and therefore familiarity with religiously inspired Jihadi discourse, coupled with actual experience countering radicalisation. This notion of expertise was certainly the case with the Salafis in Brixton, who had the experience countering radicalisation in the 1990’s, as explained below.

I think the best examples of successful elements are engagements with groups that had a long track record that sort of pre-dates Prevent. The one example I mention in the book is the Salafi community around the Brixton Mosque. I mean this community had the advantage of being well established and later becomes known as STREET, so I will use that name. When the individuals in STREET meet the top-down approach of the Home Office they have the skills and the experience to negotiate; if they think the police got something wrong, I mean I know this from experience, they were never frightened to say to the Muslim Contact Unit, “we want to do it this way”. So a number of factors I think would demonstrate that established groups that were well connected in their communities, and on the specific point of tackling violent extremism, they certainly benefited from Prevent and Prevent benefited from them.

(Interview 17, director of the MCU)
Meanwhile, when PREVENT first began in 2006, it embraced the notion of community approaches in counter-terrorism, empowering organisations and individuals drawn from local communities amongst the Muslim population. Concomitant with preventative strategies post 7/7, a number of initiatives developed the notion of community’s working in partnership with government to counter radicalisation (see chapter 6). Positing the role of the Muslim community as a ‘partner’ with the then New Labour government was cemented at the Wilton Park Conference in 2006, which hosted a number of think-tanks, community organisations and representatives, the Home Office and Foreign Office, amongst others (Briggs, Fieschi, and Lownsbrough 2006). Hence the theme ‘community approaches’ characterised the approach of PREVENT in the early years. A former research analyst at DEMOS at the time brings to light the overarching theme of community approaches to countering terrorism under the narrative ‘Bringing it Home’ (Ibid).

So the ‘Bringing it Home’ report, it wasn’t the only thing written on that theme, but at that point of time a few of us were working very carefully on, you know, trying to reshape the counter-terrorism policy to broaden it out and put more emphasis on the preventative side of things. To a certain extent we succeeded. Obviously with the change of governments there are certain think-tanks that are more in favour at the moment.

(Interview 9, ISD Analyst)
Community expertise was legitimised in the early days of PREVENT and it was this model that was championed by the Home Office. It was the pioneering work of organisations such as STREET, Siraat, and ACF, alongside community and political engagement by the likes of the MCB and Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), and others, in conjunction with academia, which lay the groundwork in terms of knowledge building on radicalisation, not to mention the delivery of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions. This is explained below.

I don’t want to trumpet us as the best thing since slice bread but most of that was because of the work we did- us, STREET, ACF- we were forerunners of Prevent and de-radicalisation from 2005, at least us definitely, between 2005 and 2011. It’s only when the new government came in that they decided to change the discourse.... the idea of how to do it and the best people to do it were generally looked at through our prisms because the police had done their research and they come and asked us and then the Home Office moved towards the way we were doing it.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

Whilst a few Islamist and Salafi groups had been identified as possessing the skill and knowledge to provide more bespoke interventions, it is worth mentioning that the number of individuals and groups involved in community approaches to tackling terrorism was in fact limited. The usual suspects mentioned are primarily three organisations- STREET, Siraat, and ACF- all of whom operate with the same model.
This limited number of best-practice example of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions could be attributed to the fact that work in this area demanded a type of specialised expertise that was scarce and in short supply, as well as the fact that it was a new strategy for the Home Office. The interviewee below made this point directly.

There’s kind a handful of celebrated people like Abdul Haqq Baker; actually the list is too short which means the same people use the same examples all the time, which is a problem. Everything you read....talks about Finsbury Park Mosque or Brixton Mosque, which is a limited set of examples to draw upon five years later.

(Interview 10, IPPR Analyst)

However, the role of community approaches to countering radicalisation was challenged by think tanks like the Policy Exchange and the Quilliam Foundation. Instead of preventing ‘violent extremism’, these think-tanks stressed the importance of tackling ‘non-violent extremism’. Their criticism was twofold: attacking community organisations for being unrepresentative of Muslim communities and establishing the ideological similarity between Islamists and Salafies with violent extremists.

Regarding the first critique, the MCB was criticised for representing a small constituency of the British Muslim communities who were Islamist in orientation (Bright 2006, 26). This argument were made by Policy Exchange at a time when the MCB, which enjoyed a degree of influence with the New Labour government in the
late 1990’s, was sidelined and ostracised by government for failing to support the government’s position on the Iraq War (Abbas 2005a; Brighton 2007). The director of the Cordoba Foundation explains the issue of representation and its link as an argument with other political factors.

You know, when I write an article people come back to me and say “who do you represent?” I’ve always said I represent myself and whoever agrees with me, I don’t represent anyone. The common attack on the Muslim Council of Britain or the Muslim Association of Britain is that you don’t represent anyone. Well okay it doesn’t negate my views. The whole argument about the Muslim community itself needs to be revised. .. The MCB was once in the favour of the Labour government until they spoke against the War in Iraq and after that they marginalised them and government then went on the crazy track of trying to find a replacement of the MCB....

(Interview 27, Director, Cordoba Foundation)

The second critique made against the community expertise by Quilliam and Policy Exchange, was that PREVENT should not start with ‘violent extremism’ but with ‘non-violent extremism’. This argument was based on the rationale that Islamist and Salafi groups shared a religious and ideological affiliation with ‘violent extremist’ and therefore these organisations were similar to ‘violent extremist’ in belief, their difference being merely one of tactic. This was encapsulated in Quilliam’s

39 It was an argument that was made forcibly by Policy Exchange in a pamphlet titled ‘Choosing our Friends Wisely’: ‘PVE is thus underwriting the very Islamist ideology which spawns an illiberal, intolerant and anti-western world view. Political and theological extremists, acting with the authority
catchphrase that ‘not every extremist is a terrorist but every terrorist is an extremist’. In effect, this argument situated STREET and the MCB on the trajectory towards violent extremism. Ascribing STREET and MCB to the category ‘non-violent extremist’ effectively rendered them part of the problem of radicalisation. In fact Quilliam considered many mainstream organisation and groups in the Muslim communities as ‘extremists’. Quilliam compiled a list of extremist sympathisers in a document entitled ‘Preventing terrorism; where next for Britain?’ and was sent to the Director General of the OSCT, Charles Farr in June 2010. The document was leaked to the press. Quilliam accused several organisations and institutions operating in the UK as the MCB, MAB, MSF, FOSIS, the Cordoba Foundation, Islam Channel, the MCU, the East London Mosque, and many others, who are sympathetic to Islamism (Nawaz and Hussain 2010, 59-62). ‘The ideology of non-violent Islamists is broadly the same as that of violent Islamists; they disagree only on tactics’ (Nawaz and Hussain 2010, 7). The Director of the MCU explains how community experts became problematic ‘gate-keepers’.

......and yet a group like the MCB has been put into this category of problematic Islamists, all of a sudden they are spoken as “gate-keepers” in the pejorative sense, and government says we are no longer going to do anything because you are somehow preventing us from engaging with real communities. I think somehow this is disingenuous because government doesn’t say that to other faith communities. I think this is one of the outcomes of all anti-Islamism hysteria, all this good and bad Muslim category and therefore you could also ask what the negative impact for Prevent when groups, whether it’s a national body like MCB or a local project like

\[\text{conferred by official recognition, are indoctrinating young people with an ideology of hostility to western values (Maher and Frampton 2009, 5).}\]

\[\text{40 Quoted by Maajid Nawaz in the Express Tribune 26th June 2010.}\\]
STREET, when either these groups are being excluded I don’t think the funding is the key issue.

(Interview 17, former director of the MCU)

This two-pronged strategy by Quilliam and Policy Exchange to discredit the likes of STREET and the MCB as ‘extremists’ was integrated into the second iteration of PREVENT in 2009, which was testament to the success and influence of the elite expert approaches. The category of ‘shared values’ and ‘non-violent extremism’ concretely impacted the role of community approaches to countering terrorism. It manifested in the way that government sidelined a number of previously key organisations, promoting other organisations like the Sufi Council of Britain, the severing of funding for PREVENT projects (albeit this was an outcome of a combination of factors following the 2010 review on PREVENT), and the centralisation of PREVENT. Hence Quilliam and Policy Exchange were successful in changing the narratives surrounding the PREVENT strategy, thereby affecting the way the rules of the games was executed. Indeed the data largely supports the idea that think-tanks played a significant role in the PREVENT Strategy.

...The MCU approach, instead of that being adopted, the policy Exchange/Quilliam approach was adopted. This was an approach that could be described as top-down, you know it was an approach that the ideology was going to be tackled.

(Interview 17, director of the MCU)
Why was it easy to marginalise the likes of STREET and other Islamist organisations despite their early success in laying the groundwork for tackling radicalisation and developing de-radicalisation intervention programmes? One factor discerned from the data is the existence of a tension between the discursive domains of politics vis-à-vis the distinct domain of professional experts. This distinction between public and professional domain explains the political move by policymakers to support elite approaches over community expertise in delivering the PREVENT strategy by 2010.

The disjuncture evident with the quality of expertise between community organisation and think-tanks like the Policy Exchange and Henry Jackson Society (Quilliam is a little different) suggests that behind closed doors professional expertise operates according to a logic that is governed by a greater commitment to knowledge and expertise, whereas the same expertise is not as useful in the public sphere of policy, public opinion, and political imperatives. The discursive dynamic in this domain has a different objective and strategy, which makes different use of the same expertise and knowledge. Indeed knowledge and expertise is subjugated to the demands of politics and has to therefore go through the political production line for sanitation and repackaging. The additional political dynamic makes the policy domain of counter-terrorism more politicised and sensitive than other policy domains. This process is explained in the following way:

But the discourse at the time was being led by organisations like Quilliam and the government looked like they were supporting that. Therefore they couldn’t come out openly and say they’re supporting us and the way we do things. They could however publicly support Quilliam and so the discourse became Quilliam-esque. And that
ended up being was written in the last Prevent document. What is written in the
document isn’t exactly what people tried to do. Because if you ask anybody from the
MET police, if you ask anybody from the Home Office prior to 2012, they will tell you
who were the successful people and who weren’t. The will tell you why they had the
outward facing discourse and then the ones actually doing the work.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

Seen through the lens of the first dimension of confessional technology, another
factor explaining the marginalisation of community expertise was the fact that their
knowledge was integrated into a more centralised approach once a substantial
amount of the knowledge has been extracted and codified. Despite the work, capital,
and resources invested by community expertise in delivering PREVENT, they were
not only branded as a part of the problem, but their approach to countering
radicalisation was abandoned in favour of Quilliam and the Policy Exchange’s
counter-ideological approach. It is important to note that their marginalisation began
in 2006 but it was not until the advent of the Coalition government in 2010 that they
became excluded from the PREVENT. 2010 is significant because the PREVENT
strategy was suspended for re-evaluation under the new government. Debunking the
position of community approaches in PREVENT therefore coincided with the apogee
of the codification of knowledge on radicalisation and the initial experimental years of
an innovative instrument in counter-terrorism policies. A substantial amount of
learning and experience had occurred in this period off of the back of community
expertise, in addition to the information gathering on Muslim populations, for
preventative strategies to become increasingly centralised. In short, community expertise had ‘confessed’ and passed over information and knowledge pertaining to Muslim populations in the UK into the structures of power. This made community expertise more disposable once government was able to lay down the foundations of a preventive infrastructure in counter-terrorism.

7.3 Elite Approaches to Countering Radicalisation: the Quilliam Foundation

Many interviewees emphasised the significant role that think-tanks such as Quilliam and the Policy Exchange had in shaping the PREVENT strategy. As analysed in chapter 3, many respondents associated de-radicalisation with Quilliam. In fact there is no evidence linking the emergence of de-radicalisation in the UK as interventions on the ground and its incorporation into the wider national strategy with Quilliam. Instead it was community experts such as STREET and ACF that developed local de-radicalisation interventions before it became centralised by Channel. The link between de-radicalisation and Quilliam in the minds of a number of respondents underscores the influence think-tanks had in this policy domain. Whilst several think-tanks played a role in contributing to the discursive production surrounding the PREVENT policy, such as the and DEMOS, and I even interviewed analyst from others, like the IPPR, Forward Thinking, and ISD, this section primarily focuses on Quilliam because they are perceived by interviewees to be the most influential players in PREVENT.
Quilliam was set up in November 2007 by Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain as Britain’s first ‘counter-extremism’ think-tank. Both were former members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Liberation Party- HT), an organisation which was founded in 1953 in Jerusalem. Ideologically, it had its roots in the anti-colonial ideas of Palestinian Taqiuddin al-Nabhani. Islam is viewed as anti-nationalist, transnational, and pan-Islamic. HT is ideologically committed to establishing a political Islamic polity, with Sharia law and the Caliphate as its core aims. The Hizb has an estimated membership of 8,500 and is particularly popular amongst University students and professionals. In the 1990’s both Ed and Maajid had become active members, with Maajid occupying a senior role within the organisation, a position which saw him travel abroad trying to establish organisations roots in other countries. Whilst Ed naturally transitioned away from the Hizb (Hussain 2007), Maajid was imprisoned in Egypt in December 2001 and released in 2006. He left the Hizb in 2007 (Nawaz 2013).

Both Ed’s and Maajid’s transition from Islamism became publicly documented case studies in bestselling books, titled the ‘Islamist’ (2007) and ‘Radical’ (2013) respectively. Quilliam’s strategy as a think-tank was based on two broad objectives: (1) countering extremism, with a focus on addressing Islamist ideology and (2) Promoting a ‘Liberal’ Islam in Britain. As a trend within Islam, ‘Liberal’ Islam was born out the influence of liberal thought during colonialism in Muslim majority countries and seeks the application of social and political system that resulted from secularisation in Europe. Liberal Islam emphasises private and individual forms of practice and elevates reason above Quran and Sunna as reference points when it comes to norms and behaviour (Ramadan 2004, 27-28). Both Ed and Maajid have articulated and prescribed an interpretation of Islam that confirms to this ‘liberal’ trend in Islam in their published works (Hussain 2007; Nawaz 2013) and a number of conceptual pieces published for Quilliam. A subsidiary objective for
Quilliam was support for liberal and democratic values in order to counter (1) and promote (2).

With respect to countering Islamist ideology, Quilliam distinguished between Islam as a faith on the one hand and Islam as an ideology on the other. Echoing the analysis in PREVENT, Quilliam argued that the ideological formulation of Islam was considered problematic because it was based on political considerations, which although did not lead to violence, nevertheless created the condition for violent extremism to flourish. The causal link between Islamist ideology and the transition to violence was stressed (See Chapter 5). This is explained by the interviewee below.

People like Ed Hussain.... when he bought out the Islamist and Majid Nawaz when Quilliam started there was this whole debate that....it’s the conveyor belt theory, you know, people that were involved in ideas and the radicalisation process; that it eventually leads them to becoming terrorists and involved in violent extremism.

(Interview 19, Activist/Academic)

The crux of this rationale was the belief that Islamist groups and ideas belonged to the same camp as ‘violent extremist’. Hence Quilliam forcefully pronounced the importance of tackling ‘non-violent extremism’ as a crucial dimension of PREVENT (Nawaz and Hussain 2010). In the early years their targets were mainly Hizb-ut-Tahrir, but this changed later to include the majority of mainstream Islamist organisations. Indeed many respondents mentioned the counter-ideological focus of Quilliam. The Director of the MCU explains the attractiveness of adopting a counter-
ideological approach, which enables the government to extend its reach nationally, as opposed to more local solutions, which is context specific.

........that Islamist ideology was going to be targeted and therefore the violence would be dealt with as well because, you know, the ideology understood to be feeding that violence was going to be tackled. I suppose on paper it had the merit, the potential to be adopted nationally anywhere. The great attraction from a policy point of view, of being clear and in theory being able to deployed anywhere. It had the notion that Hizb Ut-Tahrir in particular and those sorts of groups needed to be tackled as part of the strategy.

(Interview 17, Director of the MCU)

Meanwhile, the quest to construct a Liberal Islam was concretised through a strategy of counter-subversion; Muslims organisations and individuals in Britain were categorised into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims. These tactics were exposed to the public when a document Quilliam had written to the director of the OSCT at the Home Office, Charles Farr, was leaked into public domain (Nawaz and Hussain 2010). In the document Quilliam listed a number of organisations they advised that the government should stop working with (see footnote 50). Although many respondents claimed that Quilliam’s role within the Muslim communities was discredited at the outset because of their affiliation to government, as well as their aggressive approach, according to one interviewee Quilliam’s approach weakened its relationship with government because they became seen as heavy handed in the delivery of the counter-extremism agenda.
I think they didn’t do themselves any favours in terms of how they presented themselves. Also they had a tendency to go in for kind of personal attacks on individuals. They were sending out these... I remember I was getting their updates like three times a day at one point, you know, they’d be sending ‘we condemn this individual for this that and the other’. Their tactics weren’t well received and then they kind of made it difficult for themselves to be seen as partners of government, they might have seen as liability for government.

(Interview 9, ISD Analyst)

However, the data shows that Quilliam was very influential in a very short period of time, with a number of reasons cited: being funded by government, instant access to the media, links to influential right wing organisations, the compatibility of its message with PREVENT, and the expertise they possessed. Their influence is underscored by the fact that they were consulted in detail on Cameron’s 2011 Munich Speech on Extremism and Birmingham Speech in July 2015. This was corroborated by Paul Goodman, editor of Conservative Home in a Guardian article (Shariatmadari 2015) and by investigative journalist Nafeez Ahmed (2015b). With respect to receiving PREVENT money—this was not controversial since many organisations received PREVENT money, including the community organisations like STREET and the MCB. However, it was the level of funding that was particularly distinctive. Reports show that up till 2011, Quilliam received 2.7 Million through PREVENT (Ahmed 2015b). The two excerpts below corroborate the fact Quilliam were funded by government to implement PREVENT objectives.
And they were really influential and he was almost like a celebrity within the police, he was invited to all the conferences. Quilliam were heavily funded and nobody knew for a long time where the money was coming from. We did establish later on that they were being paid by government departments like FCO, Home Office, and CLG.

(Interview 16, Chair of the NAMP)

They got the most money from CLG and from the Home Office and Foreign Office to present the public face of Islam so they gave them that money to change the discourse and because they gave them the money it gave the platform that allowed them to go be invited to speak to government Ministers.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

Another factor that explains Quilliam’s popularity was the space afforded to them in the popular media, like tabloids such as the ‘SUN’, which has a readership of several millions. The MCU Director explains that this access to media was matched by very accessible and relatable narratives that were effective in getting the Quilliam ‘extremism’ message across.

When there was a terrorist incident the popular press would call upon Maajid Nawaz to explain what the problem was. It was done very effective, you know, by Dean
Goodson, who was writing in the Times, and in The Sun it was presented in accessible format by Maajid that before the joined Hizb-Ut-Tahrir they were regular guys, they enjoyed playing badminton and supported Liverpool football team, that was his football team I think. But they had these wonderful accounts tailor made for The Sun that kind of left out the important bits and thus made it clear that all these terrorist incidences were directly related to problems of the Mosque across the road.

(Interview 17, Director of the MCU)

Thirdly, many respondents believed that Quilliam were influential because they were ‘Muslim Neo-Conservatives’ to quote the former leader of the MCB.

Now why does the Quilliam Foundation do this? They are Muslim Neo-Cons in my opinion.

(Interview 14, former SG of the MCB)

Quilliam has indeed explicitly identified itself with Neo-Conservatism, particularly their values-based approach to politics and foreign policy. However Nawaz stated that his organisation preferred to push liberal and democratic values through a bottom up approach in contradistinction to the American neo-Conservative’s top-down approach (Nawaz 2011). In this respect Quilliam differed only in their approach rather than the principles of Neo-Conservatism. However, a few interviewees highlighted the relationship between the neo-conservatives and Quilliam and as a
result its ability to influence government. As the former FOSIS President put it, there is a ‘neo-conservative element within government’, which further underscores the influence of neo-conservatives.

......that some of these think-tanks perhaps through neo-conservative think-tanks have too much say over the shaping of our policy today. I think that’s something to be concerned about. There seems to be a neo-conservative element within the government which is peddling certain narratives, Michael Gove for example being one. That’s something for us to be worried about.

(Interview 3, former ISOC President)

This argument is buttressed by the fact that Michael Gove had in fact contributed to the discourse on radicalisation post 2005 with a book (Gove 2006) and was a leading player in the evolution of Policy Exchange, and sat on the Advisory Board for Quilliam.41 The Policy Exchange is not only Neo-conservative but they also play a public role advocating its ideological agenda for the Tory Party. Also, Douglass Murray of the Henry Jackson Society published a book advancing the merits of neo-conservatism. The book is titled: ‘Neo-conservatism: Why We Need It’. Interestingly, Douglas Murray was one of the people Gove thanked for helping him write ‘Celsius 7/7’ (Mills, Griffin, and Miller 2011, 40) In addition, the former Director of the MCU during his experience believes the scrutiny and negative smear campaigns against Islamists, reflects the working of a ‘sophisticated’ and ‘elite’ campaign, which is transnational, connected to American and ‘pro-Israeli’ networks. The influence of right-wing organisations in the shaping of PREVENT suggests that Quilliam benefited as a

41 Quilliam Advisory Board (http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/quilliam-announces-new-head-of-advisory-board/). Michael Gove became early trustee of Policy Exchange in 2002 and was its first Chairman. Its first director was Gove’s former flatmate Nicholas Boles, a Conservative member of Westminster City Council. See (Mills, Griffin, and Miller 2011, 36).
result of their link to these organisations, as well as the fact their stated agenda seemed to be compatible with the counter-subversion approaches of Neo-conservative organisations.

You know I suppose to a certain extent it is the organisation and the sophistication of the operations. When Daniel Pipes came over it became clear to me what I was witnessing was this very sophisticated movement; it’s like an elite campaign; of course it’s very pro-Israel in a particular sense and I suppose if you consider the media aspect and that Tony Blair was forging close relations with Robert Murdoch.

(Interview 17, Director of the MCU)

In contrast to other think-tanks working on counter-terrorism, such as Policy Exchange, the CSC, IPPR, ISD, Centri, Forward thinking, and DEMOS, Quilliam had in the form of Maajid, ED, and Usama Hasan, Muslims with actual years of experience with political Islam, who could speak Arabic, and were familiar with Islamist theological arguments. Of all the think-tanks vying for influence and power therefore, only Quilliam could claim genuine credible expertise.

Also they are articulate and eloquent, Ed in particular but both of them. What Whitehall had was as couple of guys that had been there done that and spoke a good game and suited them.

(Interview 4, IPPR analyst)
More importantly however to note is the impact Quilliam from the beginning of its inception. Quilliam were positioned as the official experts on radicalisation amongst the civil service, politicians, and the media. Quilliam’s status as the experts on radicalisation was augmented by the popular and widely read book the ‘Islamist’. The former Director of the MCU also identifies this book as being very influential in playing a role in getting Quilliam’s view of radicalisation rolled out at as part of a wider national strategy at the expense of local approaches represented by community experts.

I think Quilliam managed to do more training than anyone else. So you are talking about an elite approach; Quilliam, as an agent of that approach is able to train junior police officers and civil servants; I soon became aware that our very small efforts here was being over-ridden by this national strategy, with Majid Nawaz and Ed Hussain’s view of the problem was being rolled out, and it was being backed up with a very readable book, the “Islamist”, and other surrounding literature.

(Interview 17, Director of the MCU)

At the time, the lack of knowledge and understanding on radicalisation and Islamism made Hussain’s book mandatory reading for civil servants and officials in Whitehall.

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42 Investigative Journalist Nafeez Ahmed claims learning from a senior researcher at the Home Office that the Islamist was ‘effectively ghostwritten in Whitehall’: ‘he official told me that in 2006, he was informed by a government colleague “with close ties” to Jack Straw and Gordon Brown that “the draft was written by Ed but then ‘peppered’ by government input”. The civil servant told him “he had seen ‘at least five drafts of the book, and the last one was dramatically different from the first” (Ahmed 2015a).
For example, the police officer below mentions the importance of the ‘Islamist’ as a reference point for senior police officers.

He wrote his book. A lot of senior officers read it. I even wrote an article in the Police Review, because everywhere I went I saw people reading his book.

(Interview 16, Chair of the NAMP)

Seen through the lens of confessional technology, the ‘Islamist’ should be seen as a biographical and confessional account of Ed’s transformation from ‘radical’ to a liberal reformed person. Ed and Maajid’s experience encapsulates the repressive hypothesis embodied in the phenomenon of the ‘ex-radical/ex-Muslim’ syndrome, which epitomises the logic of ‘speaking truth to power’. In their public statements, publications, and in their discourse more generally, Ed and Maajid could be seen as concretised examples of individuals who had ‘confessed’ their sins and their bad ways. They had publicly recanted and laid bare their inner secrets, despite the fact that Ed and Maajid had not been violent in their ‘extremist’ phase. This suggests that the narrative of their experiences was more important than actual facts of what happened. Below are four statements by respondents, two academics and two from

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43 This is exemplified in a recently published Quilliam report, ‘In and Out of Extremism: ‘The personal stories of Quilliam staff, including Maajid Nawaz and Dr Usama Hasan, have been fundamental to Quilliam’s success at deradicalising violent extremists….Each testimony highlighted the importance of these personal stories when delivering counter-narratives. Upon hearing these personal stories it prompted the then-extremists to rethink their own commitment to the cause’ (Manning and La Bau 2015, 27).
the think-tank world, discussing the notion of ‘reformed’ or ‘ex’ Islamist/Muslim and its prominence in PREVENT.

I think one of the reasons we had an emphasis on de-radicalisation, because many people didn’t come forward to help with Prevent, but those that did were the likes of Shiraz Maher, Shahid Butt, Majid Nawaz, Ed Hussain; these were people who claimed that they were ex-radicals and that they had an antidote to radicalisation and it was called de-radicalisation.

(Interview 26, Forward Thinking)

I mean there’s even an industry in that context for ex-Muslims who will stand up and say ‘yes, I used to be one of them’. It’s not just the ex-extremist but it’s also the ex-Muslims who are cashing in on money and politics. That’s what’s happening.

(Interview 12, PREVENT practitioner and academic)

And what we’ve seen after 7/7 is the rise of the group saying ‘well we are extremists, we are reformed extremists so we know even more than they do; we’ve actually been there, we understand it a lot more’.

(Interview 11, academic)
Because they said to the establishment, look here we are, we used to be what you fear we’re not anymore and we got insight into things that nobody else has.

(Interview 4, IPPR analyst)

Ultimately, the data reveals that a significant reason that Quilliam was afforded this influence on policy by government so early on is the fact that their narrative, conduct, and articulated vision embodied a normative model of Muslim identity the government was actively promoting. This is explained by Director of Siraat, who discussed the fact that the government could not publicly support their organisation; it found it easier instead politically to support Quilliam because they were the ‘acceptable face of Islam’, who fitted in with ‘secularism’, not to mention the fact that Quilliam was run by someone who called himself ‘Ed’ instead of Mohammed.

Because they presented what the government thought was an acceptable face of Islam. The government is interested in who looks like us, talks like us, really into secularism, because we’re not really into religion in any shape or form, so who looks like that and better chimes with the public. Those who look like the Muslims blowing people up, we’re not accepting those people, like I’m dressing, whatever, we’re not accepting those, they’re not going to be the public face.....Doesn’t even make sense, but he dresses like us; looks like us, he can be an acceptable face of Islam. Same with Majid Nawaz and Ed Hussain- he doesn’t even call himself Mohammed, he calls himself Ed instead-become an acceptable face.
Like the majority of organisations and interventional providers, the funding stream was cut by government with PREVENT 2011. Other factors for their diminished position post 2010 included the departure of Ed Hussain from Quilliam; the fact that they had become a liability for government as a result of leaked memo and aggressive approach, and the emergence of a more streamlined PREVENT policy post 2011, which had less need for their input. Regardless however of their diminished influence post 2010, the data indicates that as the representative of the elite approaches to countering radicalisation, Quilliam succeeded in discrediting and undermining the community approaches embodied by STREET, Siraat, as well as Islamists like the MCB and MAB, whilst simultaneously ensuring that their expertise was incorporated into a more centralised and national strategy post 2009. In many respects Quilliam encapsulated the confessional: it was run by individuals who were ‘ex-radicals’ and who publically confessed their past activities, offered a breakdown of the ideology they previously professed, and were involved in the dissemination of such knowledge publicly.

7.4 De-radicalisation Interventions: Mentoring and Psychotherapy

Whilst the majority of respondents associated de-radicalisation with Channel, only a couple of interviewees were able to make more detailed comments about the nature of interventions. However, it is clear from the limited data that de-radicalisation is

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44 21st September 2010 ED declared he was leaving Quilliam for a position at the Council for Foreign Affairs (http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/ed-husain-to-join-us-council-on-foreign-relations/)
delivered through the pastoral care of mentorship. The importance of mentoring in de-radicalisation is also supported in the literature (HMG 2012, 21; HMG 2015, 17; Lindekilde 2015; Spalek and Davies 2012). Consequently this section examines the notion of mentoring as a vehicle for de-radicalisation and how it encapsulates confessional technology.

In chapter 6 it was stated that Channel makes risk assessments of individuals and places ‘extremists’ on de-radicalisation interventions. Once Channel assigns individuals to an intervention programme, the premise is that the worldview of the ‘extremist’ has to be tackled. How is this done? The data shows that de-radicalisation is undertaken through the mentor-mentee relationship. The following respondent, a mentor and PREVENT practitioner, identified the link between the Channel programme and mentoring and described it as the link between the police and the community.

The individuals, even now at this moment, who go through mentoring, are people from Channel, who are referred through Channel processes. That’s where the relationship between the police and the community is. The people who sat on the Project Board for the mentoring came from CTU, came from Birmingham and Coventry City Council, they were the funding bodies but we also got Probation and one or two of us from prisons who were involved in it. So they were the kind of stakeholders and in terms of how it then worked out- so now the projects gone live- you have say the police here in terms of Channel and CTU; we have commission and organisation called the Centre for Conflict Transformation, CFCT, which is based in Birmingham; they are a third sector community organisation who kind of, l
suppose, act as a neutral body through which to receive referrals and they do all the systems and processes so that when you get a referral from the police it goes through the Centre for Conflict; they kind of loosely use the eleven mentors we got on the books to kind of use them as consultants.

(Interview 8, PREVENT practitioner)

In her description de-radicalisation is conceived as a ‘community’ initiative that involves several bodies and agencies that employ mentors. According to the interviewee (at the time of fieldwork) there were 11 mentors on the books at the CFCT in Birmingham. Meanwhile, another respondent, a senior researcher at Quilliam, highlights the pastoral components of de-radicalisation when asked about de-radicalisation: ‘one to one’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘didn’t have any friends’, ‘issues’, and ‘journey’. These words once again show that radicalisation has been crouched in the language of ‘vulnerability’ but also stresses the pastoral features of the mentoring relationships. After all, pastoralist care essentially revolves around the welfare of the individual and their salvation. The language used by the interviewee to describe the signs that mentors examine in the radicalised subject does reflect the pastoral objectives of de-radicalisation interventions.

It's basically a process of mentoring on a personal one to one basis. Again because of the vulnerability factors a lot of these people become potential terrorist because they didn’t have any friends, didn’t have a steady job, or had been imprisoned or in trouble with the police before. There are all sorts of reasons why they are angry at
society— they don’t feel they fit in or feel any sense of brotherhood or sisterhood with people in a different environment. There are many issues to address and these interventions do and lead them away from their previous ideas to better ideas, helping them along their journey.

(Interview 25, Senior Research at Quilliam)

The relationship between mentor and mentee is analogous to the relationship between the priest and layperson in the Christian penance, which is characterised by the dynamic of the listener vis-a-vis the confessor. In other words, the mentor-mentee relationship should be seen as the secularised version of pastoral power. At the beginning of this chapter, we argued that the ‘repressive hypothesis’ was a deep-seated practice of ‘speaking truth to power’ in Western societies. Indeed in the context of de-radicalisation, the ‘repressive hypothesis’ is manifested in the mentoring of the radicalised subject. The imperative to confess and reveal one’s innermost thoughts and secrets is a central technique in de-radicalisation interventions. Hence this first dimension of the confessional logic exists in de-radicalisation interventions, as young ‘extremist’ are assigned to mentors and are encouraged to speak, argue, and confess. In fact my data identifies techniques such as dialectic discussions, rational debate, and argumentation as critical components of the process itself. The interviewee below explicitly mentions the discursive dimensions involved in de-radicalisation.
De-radicalisation, to do it, you need to be able to deconstruct the ideas that formed in that person's mind and give him a better way of understanding the proof and evidences that led him to those thoughts. Plus we have to give him an alternative to taking that course of action. For example, lots of people said they were angry about the Iraq War. Okay well, you as an individual could you change the war in Iraq? Could you go at the time and get to Tony Blair to stop? The answer is no. But by blowing up somebody are you going to change the war in Iraq. The answer is no. On top of that you have to give him alternative outlets for his anger.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

The interviewee describes de-radicalisation in terms of ‘deconstruct’, ‘proof,’ and ‘evidence’. These words connote the discursive dialectical technique involved in de-radicalisation interventions. The rationale underlying discursive argumentation is that rational enquiry, debate, and the presumed superior knowledge of the mentor will result in the dislodgement and displacement of the thinking believed to support Islamist ideology. It adheres to liberal assumptions that cognitive change can come about through rational enquiry. More importantly the discursive interaction between the interlocutor and the radicalised subject takes place within the structured and formalised procedure and relationship of mentoring. The academic below views de-radicalisation as ‘counter brain washing’ which occurs through persuasion, debate, and discussion.
I suppose it’s like brainwashing really; its counter-brain washing. They want to convince people that are convinced of something that they shouldn’t be that and should be convinced of something else. In a way I am in favour of that. I’m in favour of debate and discussion. If I see a Muslim who has an extreme interpretation, whether extreme in a peaceful way or in a violent way, I would try and de-radicalise them in a way using discussion and debate.

(Interview 20, academic)

The de-radicalisation process stresses that cognitive change depends on the discursive interactions characterised by dialogue, debate, and language between listener and confessor. As mentioned earlier, speaking ‘truth’ to power by the radicalised subjects in de-radicalisation interventions is expected to play an important part in reconfiguring the identity of subjects. This is why discursive categories of ‘moderate’, ‘extreme’, ‘British values’, etc. are discursive devices that the subject is expected to embrace in order to become subjected. It is discourse that guides the subject, ‘go here; don’t go there’. It is thus the act of verbalisation, alongside the act of proclamation that turns the individual into a subject. It is the performative function of language that turns the individual into a subject.
Furthermore, given the connotation of de-radicalisation with ‘brain-washing’, something which was evident in a few of the responses by interviewees, a notable feature of the mentoring process that is relevant to understanding de-radicalisation is the idea of ‘contract’ or ‘consent’ (HO 2011, 59; HMG 2015, 16). The notion of contract, according to the director of Siraat, relates to the fact that intervention programmes only take part with the consent of the radicalised subject. The idea of ‘consent’ is central to counter claims and accusations that point to similarities between the concept of brainwashing and de-radicalisation. In this way, the mentoring relationship is contingent on the radicalised subject accepting the authority of the mentor and hence the ‘contract’.

Behavioural change business means that if I want to change your behaviour then first and foremost we need to have a contract to say that you are going to accept something I say to you or at least give it credence and dialogue; in the same way that when you are at school you have a contract with your teacher that what your teacher says you’re going to take it on board.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

The suggestion is that de-radicalisation is neither compulsory nor legally mandated but is a by-product of the subject’s acceptance. If this were true, then the subject has implicitly conceded that they have a problem or exhibits the symptoms of radicalisation that need to be treated. Insofar as the subject agrees to take part in the
mentoring process they consequently affirm their identity as radicalised subjects. Similarly therefore to the sinner or faithful confessing to the priest, the radicalised subject consents to confessing since their liberation is perceived to be hanging on the expertise of the mentor. Again the fact that de-radicalisation interventions are based on the 'consent' and voluntary acquiescence of individuals is explained below by the researcher at Quilliam. Interestingly he explicitly mentions that pastoral objectives of such intervention, the fact that the radicalised subjects have not been arrested or changed.

The point with the prison service, same with mentoring, is to try and help turn their life around because generally this country will try to look after the welfare of its people. Remember they are not criminalised; Channel is voluntary and has to be done with the agreement of the parents. They haven't been arrested or charged and the criminal justice system works differently.

(Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam)

Another critical point to consider in the mentoring process that structures interventions is the notion of 'counselling'. Indeed it is this dimension relating to counselling, psychology, and therapy that connects and brings together the aforementioned features inherent to de-radicalisation, such as talking, consenting to
take part, and mentoring together. A mentor and PREVENT practitioner employs the analogy of counselling to explain the objectives of mentoring.

It means when you have a referral sitting in with a client, that you’re not sitting there indefinitely to talk about life in general - this is something that has an outcome at the end and not to make the process ongoing you need to have an end point. It’s more around the basics of what counselling is about. So with counselling, for example, the idea of consent......

(Interview 8, PREVENT practitioner)

This respondent’s answer sheds light on the structured logic of de-radicalisation, e.g. it has a beginning and an ‘end point’ and is compared to counselling. Another interviewee, also employs the language of psychology to tackle radicalisation and speaks of the process in terms of ‘stages’, with the aim of putting ‘doubt’ in the subjects conceptions.

.....we also need to tackle the psychology of that individual as well because we don’t know about the traumas in their life that might lead them to be the bomber instead of the bomb maker. At least if we can put enough doubt we can stop him becoming the bomber; put some more doubt and stop him becoming the bomb-maker; then put some more doubt and stop him becoming a supporter; and then that takes him back. It goes through a stage process.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)
Continuing the logic of a structured intervention based on consent, with an end in sight, deploying the discursive technique of psychotherapy, the words expressed by the radicalised subject undergoing intervention is recorded and monitored. Seen through the lens of confessional technology, one of the objectives of power in the incitement of discourse is to collate knowledge in order to feed it back into discourse that evokes the methods and language of science, which produces the ‘truth’. The PREVENT’s practitioner’s comments below highlights how this process works through mentoring. She describes de-radicalisation intervention as a formal programme in which ‘reports’ are written, ‘debrief’ sessions occur, and that information ‘passes upwards’.

So there two mentors that go in for example. When you’ve had an intervention you write up a report and then you have a debrief session with the operations managers from the Centre for Conflict and the idea is that you aware of everything that happens in the process and you know exactly what will pass upward.

(Interview 8, PREVENT practitioner)

The similarities between the techniques of mentoring and psychotherapy and their associations with de-radicalisation intervention are evident (HMG 2015, 17). As argued thus far, this is due to the fact that the rationale, techniques and language employed by all these programmes have a common origin in the Christian confessional. And they are all based on the individual or subject having to discuss,
talk, and confess. An overview of psychotherapy elucidates this further. Psychotherapy is based on the notion that it provides for a medical, scientific, and objective way of diagnosing the problem experienced by a patient with ‘x’ symptoms and ‘y’ problems. Psychoanalysis depends on the expertise of the doctor/therapists/counsellor and their ability to interpret the language used by the patient, in which the patient provides a detailed account and analysis of their past, memories, feelings, hope, and expectations—in short, confessing their internal world to the expert (Rose 1999). The objective is that the doctor is able to interpret and diagnose the problem and then offer prescription that fixes the problem. The patient is offered a chance in this process of understanding and reconciling their issues and in the end being rehabilitated back to ‘normality’. Likewise, de-radicalisation interventions are based on programmes with several interlocutors, who shepherd and educate the individual, encouraging them to speak and confess, and have their positions re-examined and minds changed.

7.5 Redemption: ‘integration into the Mainstream’

De-radicalisation is predicated on the notion that intervention agencies and mentors are able to undo years of social, cultural, and political conditioning. Is this possible? The simple answer is: we do not know. Channel does not provide access to data with regards to the profile of individuals undergoing interventions, the success rates, or whether those young individuals have been re-orientated in conformity to the objectives of PREVENT. This means the public and researchers are unable to know
whether de-radicalisation interventions work overall. There a few other questions that arise: do interventions actually work according to the logic articulated in PREVENT, e.g. cognitive change results in behaviour change? What does a successful de-radicalisation look like? And how do we know they were going to commit acts of violent anyways? The dataset is silent on these questions, as is the wider literature. During fieldwork data I was unable to interview ‘reformed’ extremist who had undergone de-radicalisation or even talk directly to mentors implementing an intervention, so I could not ascertain the phenomenological experience of being ‘de-radicalised’. This is a notable weakness in the dataset. Despite the absence of data relating to the de-facto process of de-radicalisation itself, the data does however affirm that de-radicalisation ultimately seeks a transformed self, whose behaviour changes as a result of an internal change of the soul.

The first major challenge for researchers wanting to understand de-radicalisation interventions as a process and not merely as an idea and policy is access to data and an ostensible lack of transparency when it comes to the activities of Channel. This is expressed by the majority of interviewees. This means that we are unable to know if Channel is working and has been successful in implementing de-radicalisation. One respondent noted that despite the absence of evidence to prove the success of Channel, policymakers are ‘proud’ of it. It’s almost like when Prevent first started, everybody is very proud of Channel. I have not seen a single document which is independent, which shows me the tangible results produced by Channel.

45 ‘Evaluation of Channel has been primarily process based. We judge that mapping of outputs has again been hampered by a lack of quality-assured data (HO 2011, 59).
As a result of the absence of any meaningful and transparent data, some interviewees suggested that Channel is being financed and supported by policymakers off of the back of conjecture. And it is risk aversion that bears the fingerprints of political imperatives and pressures and not the mark of seriously evidence based research expected of governmental policy. The academic below poignantly articulates the contradiction between policy imperative that usually evoke the need for evidence to substantiate a policy and the absence of the same logic in PREVENT.

If it was explained to me more, you know, the science, or the rational, or the evidence for it; now a days they talk about evidence base policing. Where’s the evidence for Channel? Where’s the evidence base for de-radicalisation? Where’s the evidence base for Prevent? These are not evidence base or led policies and if you compare it then with in stark contrast with Islamophobia, the argument against doing anything against Islamophobia is there’s no evidence to substantiate action or change. So we look at that and in one breath we can do a lot of things with no evidence whatsoever and in another breath we can’t do anything.

Another challenge for policymakers and researchers alike is measuring de-
radicalisation. In the words of PREVENT: ‘It is essential in this area, more even than in other areas of Prevent, that data collection is improved against a standard set of criteria.’ (HO 2011, 61). In other words how do we know when somebody has been successfully de-radicalised? The literature presented the notion of recidivism rates common to crime prevention, which is about measuring re-offending rates of ex-convicts. There is still nevertheless something more intuitive about the notion of long term prevention. Measuring cognitive change however is fraught with greater challenges. One respondent explains this inherent ambiguity in the exercise of establishing successful de-radicalisation.

There will always be ambiguity and I don’t know the answer to that; because remember the people that go through Channel, how do we decide they’re “clean”? What are you going to peer in their heads and see if they’ve changed their minds?

(Interview 1, DEMOAS analyst)

Whereas this comment represents the sceptical view on how to measure de-radicalisation, the respondent below for the use of recidivism rates in measuring de-radicalisation, which also encompasses an assessment of ‘vulnerabilities’.

All we can look at is what the vulnerabilities were beforehand and what they look like after. So when they started, they had a drug addiction, a mental health problem, and some family problems and when they come out they still got two of four of those
indicators and say there's been some progress. That's all you can do is benchmark with an individual before and after and that's what you'd do with any programme. So if you were looking at repeated criminal offenders you'd say: twelve months on how many have re-offended? Six years on how many have reoffended? Ten years on how many have re-offended? And at the moment we have seven convicted terrorist and none of them have reoffended. Now we don't know what reoffending rates in the country are. Again a part from the two in prisons, the others are in work or education.

(Interview 22, Senior PREVENT Officer)

Furthermore, another difficulty in analysing Channel is the clandestine nature surrounding the profile of individuals who have undertaken a de-radicalisation intervention. The interviewee advised me that interviewing individuals who had been on intervention programmes would benefit my investigation of de-radicalisation but that he also mentioned that I would not have access to them.

But the people you really want to talk to are punter A, B, and C who went through the programme: how do they feel and what happened? I don't know their names and you're not going to get it in Google. A lot of them wouldn't have known they were channelled and those that did probably don't talk about it much. But if you ask to the government they will tell you there are hundreds of those.

(Interview 4, IPPR analyst)
As a result, not only do we not know whether de-radicalisation interventions have been successful but we also do not know the actual reality of the process itself. What, for example, is the phenomenological experience of de-radicalisation? Does it operate the way formulated in the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation in terms of cognitive change first? Again the absence of data surrounding the actual process in the UK means we can only speculate. This provokes the following questions: Why persist with de-radicalisation if we cannot establish whether it has worked? And caring for vulnerable individuals may be important, but why does it have to be done under the auspices of a counter-terrorism policy? What is the overall goal of de-radicalisation?

There are two broad perspectives on the issue of the overall objective of de-radicalisation; the first perspective is articulated in PREVENT and by policymakers that de-radicalisation seeks to get individuals to abandon violence and to do that requires a change in the worldview of the radicalised individual. The second perspective articulated by some interviewees is that the change of subjectivity and behaviour is less to with violence and more to do with the adoption of the ‘mainstream’ worldview. The first perspective is encapsulated in the view expressed below.

It’s quite simple, they have to renounce violence. We know from their own testimony’s that they are convinced that violence including terrorism is an illegitimate means of achieving the end. So they might say that we could attack British tax payers as they are legitimate targets because of the Iraq War and that they are Kufar
and we have to wage Jihad against the Kufar. A lot of individuals say things like that and after a successful intervention when they realised form religious experience, general experience, and practical arguments, they renounce those ideas and say it’s never right to kill innocent people.

(Interview 25, senior researcher at Quilliam)

The idea expressed here is that ‘arguments’ will lead the militant individual to renounce violence. This idea of deconstructing the thoughts that lead to violence is also explained by the Director of Siraat.

What I or we class as radicalisation is somebody has the wrong understanding of those five things, not necessary all five, but enough of those five to justify unjustly killing people or unjustly harming people.

(Interview 23, Director of Siraat)

The five categorises mentioned above have been discussed in chapter 3 but in essence they relate to concepts like ‘Jihad’, Sharia’, ‘Caliphate’, ‘Kufr’, and ‘ummah’. With de-radicalisation interventions therefore policymakers and experts aim to
rearticulate and reshape the individual’s understanding of these terms. Thus both interviewees explain the fact that there problem with radicals was their understanding of central terms and ideas.

I had a few objections to the definition of Islamist though. It said the Islamists believed in Sharia, Caliphate, and Jihad. Well I disagree with that. I believe in those terms but I have a modern understanding of them whereas I agree that extremist exploit those terms and have a medieval understanding of those three points.

(Interview 25, Senior Researcher at Quilliam)

According to this perspective de-radicalisation is concerned with changing the worldview of the radicalised subject with respects to their understanding and interpretation of certain classical notions in the Islamic tradition. Whilst this approach seeks to suppress a particular Muslim identity, e.g. politicised Muslim identities, it does not necessarily require, in theory, the adoption of ‘British values’ or liberal values. The dividing line in this instance is violence.

However, the second broad perspective views the objective of de-radicalisation as integration into mainstream society (See chapter 3). One of the definitions evidenced in the data is reflected in official definitions of de-radicalisation in the literature: ‘dissuade somebody from the use of violence or/and reintegrate into mainstream society’ (UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force 2008, 5). The two
interviewees below make an explicitly associate de-radicalisation with a 'return to the mainstream'.

So when you are talking about de-radicalisation as a dictionary definition, what your saying is we are talking about moving people towards what mainstream society believes.

(Interview 10, Investigative Journalist)

I understand Islam to be de-radicalisation, again with all the reservations about using the word, but bringing people back from the margins if you wish from the extremities of practice- whether it be religious, political, social, ideological- bringing them back to mainstream fold.

(Interview 27, Director of Cordoba Foundation)

The key question here is what is meant by the 'mainstream.' While some interviewees could not define what the 'mainstream' meant in practice, the following three interviewees associated the ‘mainstream’ with either ‘Liberal secularism’, ‘British values’, or ‘values compatible with the Prevent strategy’.

... if you feel someone isn’t well integrated and believes Britain is the enemy and that kind of narrative and that's somebody you consider to be radical, then de-radicalisation is about pacifying this person to try and make him understand that
actually, Britain and the West doesn’t have a problem with Muslims and British society and values are great.

(Interview 26, Forward Thinking Analyst)

To answer your question, a journey to radicalisation and backwards, where to a point you are considered by the government to be a saint and don’t pose a threat and you hold Islamic values that are compatible with the Prevent strategy.

(Interview 16, former President of the NAMP)

I think the agenda is to stir disaffected young people into the mainstream viewpoint. Getting them to sign up to those elusive British values we were talking about, getting them to sign up to liberal secularism.

(Interview 24, former Chief Inspector/ PREVENT Board)

These comments suggest what that the purpose of de-radicalisation for policymakers is getting Muslim youngsters to adopt particular modes of subjectivity through pastoral care. In these examples the ‘mainstream view’ is represented by discursive categories like ‘British values’ and ‘secular liberalism’. As articulated by the respondents above, policymakers want to affirm through de-radicalisation intervention, a particular Muslim identity in conformity with society, and according to
one respondent the PREVENT strategy. Indeed overall this view of de-radicalisation-the second perspective on the objective of de-radicalisation- is more convincing. The first view is contradicted by the fact the majority of the individuals deemed ‘extremist’, from the little we know, are predominantly young, non-violent, with little connection to actual militant groups. In addition, it has become clear through the analysis of data in this chapter, that de-radicalisation does not attempt to tackle terrorism but works to produce alternative Muslim subjectivity. This fact is explained by a PREVENT Officer.

The difference is whether you consider that person crossing the line into criminality. People have this idea sometimes that Prevent wants to lock people up and stop committing terrorist acts; it’s not the case, we want to get to them before they get that far and realign their thinking, in many ways, and give them a balance in life.

(Interview 21, PREVENT Officer)

The important points raised in the comment above are ‘get them before they get that far’, ‘realign their thinking’, and give them a ‘balance in life’. These notions support the idea argued in this chapter that de-radicalisation interventions are a form of pastoral power. This pastoral logic exhibits the logic of risk management (‘get them before they get that far’), care (‘realign their thinking’), and redemption (‘balance of life’). To do this, PREVENT has employed the discourse on radicalisation, which
problematises Muslim identity in terms of explaining terrorism and integration as a problem of religious and political practices (chapter 5), and through Channel identify the individuals that exhibit such problematic ideas and behaviour (Chapter 6), in order to apply corrective solutions to individuals categorised as ‘extremist’ through pastoral care (chapter 7), with a particular focus on theological and political revision.

The outcome is a sanitised politically sanctioned Muslim identity. It is in this way that the radicalised subject is expected to adopt ‘British values’ (good), ‘secular liberalism’ (even better), and abandon extremism (e.g. Islamism, which is synonymous with bad). This is what a de-radicalisation point/position would ideally resemble. Hence from the point of view of normalcy, ‘normal’ adolescence is constituted by privatised religious practice, de-politicisation, and self-regulated citizenry.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter examined the role of the confessional in the technologies of the self. An overview of the historical context of the Christian confessional and its integration into governmental practices was provided at the beginning in order to situate the data. It introduced important prerequisite notions for reading the data, which included: the important role experts play in government and the management of society; the logic of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ governing Western conceptions of liberation; the instrumentalised deployment of discourse, and the fact that political rationality invests in the care of individuals. Section 7.2 traced the role of community expertise in PREVENT and tried to frame the marginalisation of their approaches within the
first dimension of confessional technology—namely the incitement to discourse. This section should be read in conjunction with section 7.3, which focused on the Quilliam Foundation as an embodiment of ‘elite’ approaches in PREVENT. Fieldwork data showed that Quilliam was very successful in undermining the community experts and despite the fact it was not itself directly providing de-radicalisation interventions, it nevertheless enjoyed the support of government. The Quilliam Foundation was favoured because they were ‘confessional’ Muslims. Once knowledge on radicalisation and measures designed to counter it had been collated and documented, de-radicalisation become the government’s way of centralising counter-terrorism initiatives.

The final two sections focused on de-radicalisation interventions. Section 7.4 discusses the role of mentoring as a form of modern pastoral power in de-radicalisation interventions. Crucial to the mentor-mentee relationships were the techniques of counselling and psychotherapy. It suggested that subjectification occurs through the verbalisation of thoughts and the dialectic argumentation between the mentor and mentee. Section 7.5 went through some of the difficulties researchers face trying to understand de-radicalisation in the UK. This stems from the absence of data with respect to the success of the Channel programme, how the success of de-radicalisation could ever be established, and inability to access the profile of individuals who have undergone interventions. Despite the aforementioned challenges, fieldwork data nevertheless showed that the process of de-radicalisation was preoccupied with the transformation of subjectivity of the radicalised subject. In particular this change of subjectivity had little to do with the abandonment of violence, but rather the adoption of politically approved Muslim identities in
accordance with wider social and governmental norms. This supports the view that
the process of de-radicalisation is mediated through pastoral care.

Confessional technology enables us to explain the conundrum regarding
PREVENT’s emphasis on a number of distinctive features in de-radicalisation: the
focus on the individual rather ‘extremist’ groups, the conflation of prevention and
rehabilitation in terms of policy, and the proposition that behavioural change happens
through the revision of a person’s worldview. These factors are manifested in
Channel’s concern for ‘vulnerable’ individuals who have not committed a crime but
who harbour ‘extremist’ views. This pastoral logic evident in Channel presents a
removes the attention of policymakers several stages away from terrorism. De-
radicalisation in this light becomes less about terrorism and more about the
affirmation and suppression of certain identities. This is exemplified by the existence
of Channel risk indicators, which correspond to the political and religious view and
behaviours of Muslims, as well as the promotion of British values in public
institutions.

The underlying objective of Channel is designed to tackle problematic Muslim
identity, which is linked with the themes highlighted in chapter 1 of this thesis;
namely that Muslim identity in Britain is believed to be impregnated with theological
and political excess, which potentially risks being converted into violence in the
future. Policymakers have chosen to cull Muslim surfeit by shaping the subjectivity of
Muslim youngsters through the vehicle of pastoral power, embodied in de-
radicalisation and enabled by Channel. It is thus through confessional technology
that we can make sense of the fact that Muslim identities- not terrorism- has been
problematised and actualised in the UK counter-terrorism policy.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion

We do not destroy the heretic because he resists us: so long as he resists us we never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind; we reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring him over to our side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and soul. We make him one of ourselves before we kill him. It is intolerable to us that an erroneous thought should exist anywhere in the world, however secret and powerless it may be.

(Orwell 1987 [1949], 267)

....But a long process of pulverising, dissolving and rooting awaits any physical things that have been recognised as dirt. In the end, all identity is gone. The origin of the various bits and pieces is lost and they have entered into the mass of common rubbish. It is unpleasant to poke about in the refuse to try to recover anything, for this revives identity. So long as identity is absent, rubbish is not dangerous.....where there is no differentiation there is no defilement.

(Douglas 1992, 197-198)
8.1 A Summary of the Thesis

Chapter 1 set the scene for the study of de-radicalisation and summarised schematically the three themes considered to be integral for understanding the 'problem' occupying policymakers in Britain: the re-calibration of security post 7/7 towards a pre-emptive risk regime; the death of political multiculturalism and the problematisation of Muslim identity; and the re-positioning of Islam within the paradigm of European secularisation and modernisation. A by-product of such discursive and non-discursive developments was the problematisation of Muslim identity and religion, which was conceptualised in the register of 'radicalisation'. By securitising identity and religion, Muslim subjectivity became seen as being in need of reform. Hence the fact that de-radicalisation became touted as one of the solutions to the 'Muslim Question'.

Moreover, the prevailing recourse of policymakers and public discourse to explaining complex political, social, and economic phenomenon in terms of 'culture' was addressed. The culturalisation of politics revealed the co-constitutive role of identity and security, in which both domains are dependent on the other, and which the construction of the British Self is achieved through the culturalisation of Islam. The move towards de-radicalisation is therefore a by-product and extension of the politicisation of culture. These themes not only encapsulated the major issues that constituted the theoretical and discursive background of de-radicalisation, but more importantly outlines the historical context which paved the conditions that allowed de-radicalisation to emerge as an idea and practice in the UK.

Despite the growing importance of de-radicalisation in counter-terrorism, there was surprisingly very little on it in the literature. Chapter 2 revealed that the definition and
conception of de-radicalisation is ambiguous. Ontologically the literature was inconclusive on whether it described the move away from violence, integration of prison inmates into the mainstream, the adoption of liberal values, preventing crime, or the adoption of progressive interpretation of Islam by militants. Also, no agreement exists on the factors that lead individuals away from violence and that there exist various programmes with different approaches and strategies. There appears to be little or no evidence from the literature regarding how you get someone to deradicalise, let alone what de-radicalisation itself is. There was no empirical basis for the policy development of de-radicalisation programmes. We continue to know very little about the specifics of de-radicalisation in the UK.

Chapter 3 analysed and evaluated qualitative fieldwork data collated from 27 practitioners working in the field of PREVENT. The data showed the need to abandon attempts to establish a fixed definition of de-radicalisation given that there were 28 ways to describe de-radicalisation. When it came to defining de-radicalisation, the majority of interviewees associated it with ‘cognitive change’ as well as getting people away from violence. In this respect, it reflected the preponderance of thinking in conceptions of de-radicalisation. One explanation we investigated for the high laxity towards terminological ambiguity was the notion of ‘language games’ and ‘family resemblance’. The concept of ‘language games’ allowed us to situate the plethora understandings of de-radicalisation within the context of games that people play in language; that it was not the word which was important per se, but the context in which the word was used.

In addition, the data also revealed that de-radicalisation for interviewees encompassed four different interpretations, corresponding to four different policy agendas: conceptually, this meant getting people away from violence, counter-
ideology, integration, and youth empowerment. In policy terms this related to counter-terrorism, counter-subversion, community cohesion, and crime prevention respectively. In contrast to its conception in the literature, the fieldwork data also indicated that interviewees associated de-radicalisation with other themes: like expertise and knowledge in formulating de-radicalisation, its focus on the youth, its connection to the idea of radicalisation, and the fact that it was linked with wider political objectives. Although the fieldwork data provided us with a more nuanced and complex understanding of de-radicalisation, it did not resolve the problems presented by PREVENT and the wider literature.

Consequently, in chapter 4 it was proposed that the solution to understanding de-radicalisation in the UK context lay in conceptualising it as a ‘technology of the self’. To recapitulate, the technology of the self is defined as that:

....which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and the way of being, so as to transform themselves...

(Foucault 1988a, 18)

The technology of the self comprises of four areas: ontology, ascetics, deontology, and telos. Using this fourfold breakdown, de-radicalisation is about working on the worldview of Muslims, conceived as ‘ideology’ (ontology), through disciplinary and confessional technology (normalisation, surveillance, being examined and judged, and intervention programmes), which corresponds to ascetics, in which Muslims understand themselves to be radicalised and extreme citizens (de-ontology), in order
to redeem themselves and become good citizens and adopt a new identity (telos). It was argued that the same process within governmental relations can be delineated into three broad areas: discursive (ontology), disciplinary (ascetics), and confessional (deontology) technology. The formation of the self is accomplished through the interplay of these three technologies. Foucault’s concept of the technology of the self is therefore modified for my purposes of enumerating de-radicalisation in the UK. Whilst such technologies describe governmentality in its initial conception more accurately than the technology of the self, this chapter nevertheless argued that it effectively captures the way that governmentality guides every citizen at the individual level. The theory of governmentality includes a positive conception of power (besides a negative one), as well as a totalising one, in which government operates through myriad strategies, techniques, relations, and spheres to order and guide the welfare and discipline of the collective population and individuals simultaneously.

The regulatory ideal that underlies the logic of governmentality in terms of the ‘paradigm’, ‘central spheres’, and ‘normalisation’ was also addressed. The regulatory ideal shapes what is normally referred to as ‘structure’: networks and systems of power, knowledge, culture, institutions, experts, and governmental activities that control human behaviour in terms of norms rather than through the law. The regulatory ideal in the UK is defined by both ‘the political’ and neo-liberal practice of government, two features of the nation-state commonly associated with sovereignty and cultural/social domain respectively. Self transformation according to a norm is a process that also affects the non-radicalised subject, like the everyday citizen, who is also guided to work on themselves.
Moreover, it was argued that the Schmittian ‘political’ must be seen as the precondition of the nation-state. In order for the political and national community to exist, politics has to be exclusionary and antagonistic. Schmitt shows that every act of consensus is based on exclusion, since the nation presupposes the collective agency of the ‘we’; it reinforces the fact that identities are constructed through difference and hence the irreconcilable exclusion of Muslims from the British nation. It is the ‘political’ that allows practices like citizenship and identity to acquire significance and therefore provides the normative blueprint for everyone bounded by the sovereignty, law, and power of the nation-state.

The second ideal was neo-liberalism as a practice of government. In the UK, government operates according to the logic of neo-liberal values, in which there is an alignment between the functions of government, the management of society, the normative values promoted to citizens, and a market based logic. Specifically, neo-liberalism seeks a de-politicised subject and market-consumer based values, as well as self-regulating and responsible citizenship. It is in this sense that ‘radicalisation’ represents an aberration of the neo-liberal ideal or what constitutes normality. If, in other words, radicalisation is about too much religion, politicisation, and a problem of identity, normality is defined as de-politicisation, liberal values, and particular forms of conduct. This is why British identity and values are valorised as an antidote to the radicalisation malaise. The technology of self depends on the criterion of normal and deviant, of good and bad, and hence the significance of discursive production in the technology of the self.
Chapter 5 examined the emergence of radicalisation as a discourse post 2004. This was achieved through the problematisation of Muslims in Britain and the conceptualisation of radicalisation as a ‘process’, invoking the use of ‘models’ and the question of causation associated with the methods of the natural sciences. The construction of radicalisation, with the help of ‘experts’ and the social science, built a narrative about radicalisation that has a number of inbuilt assumptions: that it affects individuals with identity problems who download the ‘Salafi script’, then who go from being normal citizens to being terrorists. Thus identity and religion were the cornerstones of what was considered a new security threat. The diagnosis in the discourse on radicalisation situated the problem of radicalisation with ‘ideology’, which comprises of theological and political doctrines, the adherence to which causally drives Muslims to violence. Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation initiatives are therefore supposed to tackle the ‘ideology’, something notably expected of all Muslims and not just radicalised subjects singled out for intervention programmes.

As highlighted in chapter 1, critiques of radicalisation have suggested that rather than reflect the process in the real world, radicalisation should be viewed within the social construction of risk. Doing so puts the future orientated logic of radicalisation, one which is concerned with the potentiality and possibility of threats, into relief. In this respect radicalisation is more about risk management than about fighting terrorism. This explained the tolerance by policymakers of the substantial gap between research and policy, between perception and reality, and between counter-terrorism policies that focus on countering radicalisation versus those that counter terrorism. In summation, we can identify three governmental reasons for the incitement to discourse post 2004: (1) it created systems of knowledge for
deployment in governing structures; (2) it created regulatory frameworks for the ‘normal’ mainstream and by default deviance from normality; and (3) it justified social engineering and individual-level corrective interventions.

In the sixth chapter, the UK’s PREVENT strategy was analysed through the lens of disciplinary technology. The problematisation of Muslim identity was embedded in PREVENT. For example, the first two sections showed what PREVENT did in terms of remaking Muslim communities. As Salafis and Islamists were categorised as ‘extremists’, they became marginalised from counter-radicalisation efforts and the conventional leadership were generally demoted from their position as ‘gatekeepers’. Data showed that alternative communities were promoted instead, especially those deemed ‘moderate’. Viewed in this way, PREVENT must therefore be seen as a normative project. It seeks to produce new forms of subjectivity and suppress others.

Meanwhile, the pre-emptive logic of risk is exemplified in the second and third objectives of PREVENT, which seek to protect ‘vulnerable individuals’ from radicalisation and to help social and public institutions identity ‘extremism’. Notably, ‘extremism’ enjoys no legal definition but acts as the benchmark by which individuals are assessed and placed on a de-radicalisation programme. No crimes were perpetrated by radicalised subjects but instead through their expressions and outward behaviour displayed the potentiality and possibility for becoming violent. The data analysis also indicated that ‘vulnerability’ and ‘extremism’ were associated with Muslim difference and excess (defined as too much religion and politics), which are to be found and ‘channelled’ into processes of normalisation to curtail Muslim surfeit. Hence Muslim subjectivity is being managed by government and remade along more congenial lines.
Thereafter, chapter 7 addressed ‘subjectification’ or how individuals become subjects of a particular ‘regime of truth’. The first two sections conveyed the way that community and elite experts, many of whom were Muslims, confessed or disseminated their knowledge, which was subsequently used by government and experts to improve their knowledge on radicalisation and in order to hone the PREVENT strategy. This was evident with the emergence of the category ‘non-violent extremism’ in PREVENT II, which effectively discredited community expertise. Elite experts, like Quilliam, were favoured in the end over community experts because, to paraphrase an interviewee, ‘they looked like us’ and are ‘into secularism’. In other words, they embodied a government sanctioned Islam.

The second dimension of the confession was about the transformation of individual subjectivity. The young age of radicalised subjects, their disconnection from wider terrorist networks, the focus of interventions on individuals rather than groups, and the way individuals are viewed as ‘vulnerable’, together reinforced the pastoral logic of de-radicalisation. It is a pastoral logic contingent on the pre-emptive logic of risk, instead of the logic of rehabilitation commonly associated with de-radicalisation in prisons. The confessional is embodied in de-radicalisation interventions through the mentoring of radicalised subjects, the use of technique associated with psychotherapy, such as counselling, and religious theological dialogue in order to de-legitimise the ideological underpinning of radicalised subjectivities. The ultimate goal of de-radicalisation in the UK is not necessarily violence, for many of the subjects were never violent to begin with, but a type of ideological and religious revisionism, which contextualises world politics, foreign policy, and theology in a way that is endorsed by political authority. By this we mean that Muslim identity is transformed to something more amenable to British social and political spaces. This
was encapsulated in the notion prominent in the data of ‘returning to the mainstream’, also articulated in terms of ‘redemption’.

Finally, de-radicalisation is the logical endpoint of the problematisation of identity. In terms of intervention programmes and the wider sense in which it impacts everyone in society, de-radicalisation seeks to inscribe a form of Muslim subjectivity compatible with the nation state and neo-liberalism: modern, secular, liberal, consumerist, self-regulating, individualistic, and apolitical. Only once Muslims have been de-radicalised can they be included into the national majority. Situated within neo-liberal governmentality, de-radicalisation is therefore less about the mitigation of violence and more about the making of a particular subjectivity and conduct. An important by-product of de-radicalisation is the formation of the identity of the collective British nation. De-radicalisation is therefore not only about the remaking of subjectivity of the problematic radical ‘Other’, but perhaps more importantly, about the remaking of the British Self in relation to the uncertainly about British political identity amidst the wider pressures posed by globalisation and fragmentation of the nation.

8.2 Contribution to Knowledge

This thesis has contributed to original knowledge in the field by (a) gathering data on de-radicalisation- the first of its kind in the UK context (b) offering an alternative ontological framework to understand de-radicalisation in the UK; and (c) a theoretical contribution to the governmentality of radicalisation policies, in which the self-other functionality is explored (usually considered and studied at the global and
international level) through the micro-politics of identity and the ‘micro-physics’ of power in the neo-liberal era. This three-fold claim will be expanded further and defended in this section.

The first contribution to the knowledge on de-radicalisation is empirical. At the start of this investigation, there was not a single study of de-radicalisation in the UK in the literature (see chapter 2). As result, my research tried to address the lacuna in the literature by collecting data on de-radicalisation in the UK context. As argued in the last section, the fieldwork data revealed a number of important aspects with respect to the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation. It therefore represents the first attempt in the UK to gather primary data on de-radicalisation and analyse it in a novel and original way.

The second contribution to knowledge is conceptual. My thesis reconciles the conceptual confusion characterising de-radicalisation. These problems include: a contested definition, the limitations associated with cognitive/behaviour factors in the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation, the predominant association of de-radicalisation solely with the objectives of counter-terrorism; contradictions in the policy logic between pre-emptive and preventive orientations, disjuncture between the idea and practice of de-radicalisation, and the ostensible paradox of premeditated interventions targeting youngsters categorised as ‘vulnerable’.

Specifically, conceptual discussions in the literature were primarily around the relationship between cognitive and behavioural variables. These conceptions provide insight into de-radicalisation ontologically, but they do not advance a clear conceptual framework, which is exemplified by the problematic implications of the cognitive-behavioural dichotomy in conceptions of de-radicalisation and notions
regarding the adoption of values. To elaborate further, reductionist discussions about ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ variables can be attributed to the positivist epistemology dominating the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation in the literature. Epistemologically, both Ashour and Horgan are committed to a positive framework. This is also evident in the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation. This positivism means that de-radicalisation conceptually looks for causation in human behaviour using scientific premises, which subordinates other factors conducive to analysis, shapes the way that policy is implemented, and ultimately obscures the reality of political violence.

Indeed the notion of causation has been at the heart of discursive production on radicalisation. After all such research programmes have in large part motivated by the questions ‘why’ and ‘how’ British nationals undertake violence against their country and ‘why’ and ‘how’ they could abandon violence. The modern scientific language discusses human action in terms of ‘root causes’. It seeks to determine causes that trigger behaviours, instead of investigating the goods that agent’s pursue through their choices and actions. The positivist framework which sees de-radicalisation in terms of cognitive and behavioural variables presupposes a level of determinism.

For example, the interchangeable use of ‘worldview’, ideology, and cognitive change, denotes, despite their different meanings, the notion of a particular paradigm that individuals subscribe to that provides both an explanation of the world and a prescription of what to do and how to act. The presumption is that the unitary worldview of the individual can be dislodged through a dialectic dialogue with radicalised individuals. The implicit suggestion is that (1) the worldview could be abandoned abruptly; (2) that a new worldview is adopted; and (3) a new behaviour
and lifestyle results from (1) and (2). It is these points that are encompassed by the term 'cognitive change'. The causal linear logic dominating analysis of radicalisation, and by implication de-radicalisation, goes something like: 'if the ideas and precepts are right, then it follows that the behaviour will be right'. The preoccupation of policymakers with the threat of ideology consequently gave the impression that the solution to radicalisation resided with alterations with the worldview of the radicalised subject, in which tweaking an individual's belief on certain issues would result in behavioural change.

However, the de-radicalisation process does not happen in such a simplistic manner. It also meant that de-radicalisation efforts in the UK have focused on 'thought-crimes' and the expressed opinions and views of youngster as a barometer to gauge potentially for radicalism. How does putting a young Muslim, say of fifteen years, identified by his school and vetted through Channel, on a de-radicalisation programme protect Britain from terrorism? This conception of de-radicalisation however restricts our analytical lens solely to the domain of epistemology, when in fact the actual concern of policymakers is with a type of political ethics; namely the conduct of citizens and the formation of politically sanctioned subjectivities.

Another inherent problem with the positivist framework dominating the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation is that the study of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, takes place in an objective and neutral way. It presumes that policymakers can arrive at universal laws for all times and place. Given that de-radicalisation is conceived as a policy and solution to radicalisation, any positivist study of de-radicalisation is done with the efforts of satisfying policy objectives. Thus the study of radicalisation has not been neutral or objective. I have argued that the function of radicalisation is not supposed to describe the phenomenon of the real
word exactly but is instead supposed to be performative in order to justify interventions. In other words, the positivistic framework surrounding de-radicalisation is intertwined with a ‘blowing out the fire’ logic, which has undeniably stymied attempts to conduct robust research in this area. Popular conceptions of de-radicalisation however try to produce a concept that is applicable to every place and time. It presumes a static temporality that precludes the possibility of changes to the idea and practice of de-radicalisation and ignores the wider political, social, historical context of de-radicalisation. Even the literature, which is dominated by think-tanks reports, conceded the importance of context and the absence of any applicable laws for de-radicalisation.

Conceptually therefore, the technology of the self manages to capture the main dynamics of de-radicalisation without the terminological labyrinth. It allows us to sidestep the problems associated with causation and recalibrate our focus on the ethical and political dimensions inherent in de-radicalisation. Another benefit is that it describes de-radicalisation solely in the UK context and as a by-product of the political, historical, and sociological changes in Britain over the past three decades. The technology of the self thus grounds de-radicalisation in a conceptual framework that is particular, relevant, and compatible with the context of the UK. It enables us to make sense of the conflicting policy logics found in PREVENT and the fact that it operates according to a much wider remit than afforded by counter-terrorism. Finally, it explains why and how liberal governmentality intervenes in people’s lives through the contradictory functionality of the anticipatory logics of detention and pastoral logics of care. Ultimately, the technology of the self is the most analytically fruitful concept to understand de-radicalisation in the UK context.
The third contribution to the knowledge of de-radicalisation is theoretical. In some respects, my account of de-radicalisation echoes the critical constructivist and post-structuralist works of David Campbell (1998), Iver Neumann (1998), and Stuart Croft (2012) which emphasise the fact that identity and security are co-constitutive. However, unlike the authors above, the focus of my thesis has been on the micro-politics of identity rather than macro and externalised version of identity formation between states. In fact the wider conclusion of conceptualising de-radicalisation as technology of the self is that it is about ‘who we are’ as much as about disciplining the conduct of subjects. The attempt to fix a national political identity and socialise subjects in conformity to it is not merely the objective of security. Rather, the existence of security is contingent on identity constructions. It is in this sense identity and security cannot be ontologically separated, which is controversial given that the role that identity plays in security is contested. Notwithstanding the challenging questions open to exploration in this field, the technology of the self integrates the idea and practice of de-radicalisation into the more elaborate schema of Foucauldian governmentality. It is a more comprehensive, coherent, and analytically fecund theory than the current PREVENT framework of de-radicalisation.

Remarkably, the literature was devoid of theories on de-radicalisation. The closest to a theory on de-radicalisation were Foucauldian interpretations of de-radicalisation by Neil Aggarwal and Lindekilde and yet both accounts are not relevant to the UK context. The overall lack of theoretical development is surprising given that the de-radicalisation thesis claims explanatory and prescriptive powers. For example, it claims it can explain human behaviour (causal relationship between thought and action) and transform behaviour (the experience of change), which manifests in both
the renunciation of violence and the socialisation of militants back into mainstream society. But the technology of the self provides a theory that not only accommodates the claims of de-radicalisation but also offers more with respect to salient debates in security studies on issues relating to complexity/parsimony, continuity/change, ideas/material, and agency/structure (Jarvis and Holland 2015, 20). The way the technology of the self responds to the aforementioned issues is elaborated below.

Despite the immense complexity of deradicalising someone, government and academic accounts are parsimonious: it situates de-radicalisation merely as an instrument of counter-terrorism and has primarily focused on the need to tackle Islamist ideology. In contrast, the technology of the self introduces more complexity to de-radicalisation. It allows us to debunk the prevalent notion that de-radicalisation is concerned with merely mitigating the possibility of violence on British soil. Although this is undeniably one objective amongst others and indeed a necessary and desirable goal for policymakers, employing the concept of the technology of the self however situates de-radicalisation as a technique deployed by government in order to ensure that the Muslim populations within the nation-state are disciplined, that citizens acquire the appropriate conduct, and that individuals adopt and invest in modes of subjectivities that are deemed sanitised and certified by political authorities. From the standpoint of neo-liberal governmentality acceptable subjectivity begins with the notion of the ideal liberal citizen, who is not only democratic, non-violent, and tolerant but also active, responsible, and self-regulating.

The preoccupation of policymakers with the ideas and practices of citizens beyond issues relating to violence is reflected in the way that certain forms of identities are being suppressed and affirmed. This risk management logic at the heart de-radicalisation and PREVENT strategies has to be contextualised within wider
narratives, in which Islam is being constructed as an essentially fundamentalist religion and Muslims as a threat to the security and identity of the nation state. The technology of the self is an individuating power that represents one pole of governmentality, whereas the other pole is concerned with the collective population. Hence the reason governmentality is conceptualised as the government of ‘all and each’. Conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technology of the self therefore enables us to view it as an instrument of government that seeks to deal with the multifarious challenges embodied in ‘the Muslim Question’ and construction of the majority identity, and not merely as a strategy to fight terrorism.

An additional layer of theoretical complexity conferred by using the technology of the self is the role of civil society in shaping conduct on behalf of government. After all, the PREVENT strategy delegated the responsibility of tackling radicalisation to Muslim civil society not to mention the fact that de-radicalisation interventions in the UK primarily target non-violent youths in civil society and not in the enclosed environment of prisons. The prevailing view in social science literature sees civil society as a sphere located between state and market-a buffer zone strong enough to keep both state and market in check, thereby preventing each from becoming too powerful.

However, the technology of the self also supports a view of civil society that posits it is a sphere which is not just independent and external to the state and government but as being an internal, as well as an extension, to the state and political institutions. In other words, civil society is something which forms part of modern governmental rationalities. To say that civil society belongs to political rationalities does not deny its external reality but instead presents another perspective. It is only by viewing civil society in this way that we can begin to reconcile the paradox in
which the strategy of de-radicalisation has sections of civil society as its target whilst simultaneously accomplishing its objective with the help of the very thing it targets. Put in another way civil society is tasked with the job of controlling, disciplining, and modifying the bad apples at the bottom of its own barrel. It is this self-regulating and self-correcting mechanism that connects de-radicalisation, civil society, and disciplinary technology.

Another theoretical benefit gained in employing the technology of the self is the distinction between whether de-radicalisation represents continuity or change in governmental policy. It sheds lights on the workings of governmentality with respect to interventions and programmes that operate in society outside a juridical spaces and frameworks. Indeed the non-juridical dimension of de-radicalisation interventions remains one of the striking features of UK de-radicalisation. This thesis has hitherto demonstrated the way governments seek the modification of behaviour in its citizenry outside the juridical realm through wide ranging measures, e.g. discourses, strategies, policies, programmes, interventions, and pastoral power. Therefore, understanding de-radicalisation through the lens of the technology of the self contextualises de-radicalisation in relation to similar interventions in other policy domains.

In this respect de-radicalisation interventions share a similarity with programmes that help individuals improve their well-being by overcoming threats to their health, like obesity and smoking found in the policy area of Health, or ‘back to work’ initiatives found in Welfare and Employment. Whilst undeniably constituting a change in certain respects, it represents more continuity, the critical difference is that the nation, and by extension the European project, is invested in the cultural universalism through the objectification of its antithesis, Islam, and so a lot more is at stake here than back
to work schemes for job seekers. The change of de-radicalisation is therefore historical and related to the incorporation of theology and religion in counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts.

Furthermore, the technology of the self presents a symbiotic relationship between the role of ideas and material in the de-radicalisation process. The whole enterprise of fighting radicalisation and extremism is built on the premise that ideas have agency and that ideology is the root cause of our new security challenge. By implication therefore counter-ideology gets militants away from violence. However, the literature on de-radicalisation argues against the primacy of counter-ideology in interventions. In fact the literature shows ideological factors play little or no role in persuading individuals to enter or leave such groups and movements. This highlights the disjuncture between the largely ideological focus of current de-radicalisation programs and the factors found to motivate individuals’ entry into and exit from terrorist organisations.

Although I have not been concerned with the actual process of de-radicalisation in my investigation, the literature on the process of de-radicalisation nevertheless forces us to question the influence of ideology as a primary influence in explaining the journey towards and away from radicalisation. However, similarly to contemporary security thinking regarding the importance of ideas, the technology of the self also valorises the role of ideas and discourse in the formation of the self and the implementation of policy. However, unlike current thinking on de-radicalisation, the technology of the self offers a more holistic account that reconciles discursive dimensions with material domains, describing the interplay between radicalisation and its concretisation in institutions and programmes. In doing so, the technology of the self encompasses the discursive production of ‘radicalisation’ that has
distinctively characterised the British experience in relation to fighting terrorism and which much of the literature on de-radicalisation has evaded and overlooked.

However, the importance of discursive technology does not mean that radicalisation does not exist in the real world or that there is no such thing as de-radicalisation. Nor does it mean that the only thing that exists is meaning, language, and discourse. A distinction must be made between the idea that ‘nothing meaningful exists outside the discourse’ on the one hand, and that ‘nothing exists outside of discourse’ on the other. The second statement is a claim that no material world exists out there and that is patently not the case. But to say nothing ‘meaningful’ is different; it is to say that you could make sense of the world only within the framework of discourse and interpretation. Without the constitutive and instrumental role of discursive production therefore in the PREVENT strategy, the meaning of radicalisation as body of knowledge could not be exchanged and secured. It is through discourse that the interplay between representations of difference, what should be regarded as a threat and what is legitimate, the dissemination of that knowledge, in conjunction with power, occurs.

The role of agency is really important. This is another area where the concept of the technology of the self moves the debate along, even if only slightly. The positivist framework, addressed above, does not afford space for subjects to have any agency. It forces the conceptualisation of de-radicalisation to take a deterministic view of human behaviour and relegates the influence of structure on subjects, reducing the radicalisation process to questions of psychology, identity, and ideology. This is obvious in definitions of de-radicalisation as ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ and in other definitions that posit de-radicalisation as a process of integrating ‘militants into mainstream society’. The suggestion in popular conceptions
of de-radicalisation is that ‘mainstream society’ and radicalised subjects are at polar ends of the spectrum, completely divorced from one another. It is reflected in the discourse of PREVENT itself, the concept of ‘vulnerability’ being a case in point.

Therefore, the technology of the self presents a more sophisticated account of the debate surrounding agency. It allows the subject to act and make decisions, albeit the space for action is limited. The Foucauldian subject was presented in chapter 4 as internal and not external to structures and as a by-product of society and history and not as a disengaged subject floating abstractly in a transcendent way. Foucault’s account of the subject as presented in his later works had to be included in order secure the agency of the subject, in our context, the Muslim subject, who although is subject to scrutiny, objectification, and regimes of domination, has the capacity to act in different ways: to reject subjectification and resist in a multitude of ways- as many do and many others are trying to negotiate- equally as much as many end up accepting and silently embracing regimes of normalisation.

Whilst this thesis has not included examples of Muslim agency, and perhaps my account of de-radicalisation ostensibly appears too silent on Muslim agency, an attempt was made nevertheless to maintain the capacity for agency theoretically out of the belief that although regimes of domination and processes of normalisation are impossible to escape, governmentality can only guide and shape conduct- it cannot generally determine it. In any case, my concern has been with the task of ontological description rather than normative statements. As a result, the technology of the self provides a better account of the relationship between structure and agency.

In summation, my research has made an original contribution to knowledge by gathering empirical data that allowed a more holistic and richer understanding of de-
radicalisation to emerge; by offering a more accurate conceptual framework to understand de-radicalisation in the UK and which resolves both the opacity of the PREVENT conception of de-radicalisation and the fissures found in the literature; and by contributing to theoretical discussions on the governmentality of radicalisation policies, emphasising the micro-physics of power and the micro-politics of identity formation in our modern era. This thesis has answered the question posed at the beginning of my investigation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source(s) of information</th>
<th>Country and name of programme</th>
<th>Programme dates</th>
<th>Programme leaders</th>
<th>Programme targets</th>
<th>Activities and techniques</th>
<th>Measures of success</th>
<th>Success</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alonso (2009)</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Late 1980's</td>
<td>Irish Government</td>
<td>IRA and Sinn Fein leadership</td>
<td>Security activities, Negotiation to cease violence, Recasting terrorist leaders as ‘men of peace’ in media and political circles</td>
<td>Cessation of violence, Signing of peace agreements</td>
<td>Peace process successful but still some violence – for example, the attack on British soldiers in 2009 by the Real IRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barrett and Bokhari (2009)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2007–present</td>
<td>Mainstream religious groups working closely with senior policy officials</td>
<td>Terrorist members</td>
<td>Poverty alleviation through employment, Stopping propaganda by terrorist members</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abuza (2009)</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Saudi Counselling Programme</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Saudi Government Clerics, Former militants on advisory committee</td>
<td>Terrorists and sympathisers in prisons</td>
<td>Engaging in intensive religious debates, Psychological counselling, Economic aid to family if a breadwinner is incarcerated, Continued economic and employment support upon release</td>
<td>Rate of release following renunciation of beliefs, Recidivism rate</td>
<td>Mixed results: Some detained prisoners and sympathisers have refused to participate, Of those who have participated, roughly 1,500 out of 3,000 participants have renounced their former beliefs and been released, 1–2% recidivism rate as of November 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Bouoek (2009)</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
<td>President Saleh al-Hitam, former Supreme Court Justice</td>
<td>Islamist terrorist prisoners</td>
<td>Religious dialogue with Yemeni ulamas</td>
<td>Rate of release after concession of Yemeni state legitimacy and renouncing violence</td>
<td>364 detainees released through programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnsen and Bouoek (2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yemeni ulamas (Muslim scholars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>President al-Hitam states that 40% of jihadists were reformed through the programme (note that younger generation were more resistant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>della Porta (2009)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Late 1970s</td>
<td>Italian Government</td>
<td>Terrorists at all organisational levels</td>
<td>Reducing sentences to those who renounced violence, collaborated with authority or confessed guilt</td>
<td>Rate of politically violent groups that have dissolved</td>
<td>Leftist political groups dissolved by mid-1980s as a result of intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunaratna and Ali (2009)</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1997–present</td>
<td>Leaders of terrorist organisations supported by the Government</td>
<td>Extremist leaders</td>
<td>Leaders – dialogue and debate with own group</td>
<td>Number of jihadi incidents</td>
<td>Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya leaders persuaded to renounce violence through interaction with al-Azhar and broader political events</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic University of al-Azhar</td>
<td>Young people</td>
<td>Young people – education focused on moderation</td>
<td>Terrorist groups having renounced violence</td>
<td>For Al-Jihad Al-Islami, some success in converting members</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General public</td>
<td>al Azhar – correcting misperceptions of Islam, dialogue with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan and Pereire (2006)</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Formation of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in 2003</td>
<td>RRG – Muslim scholars (Pergas) and volunteers from various Islamic bodies supported by the Government</td>
<td>Extremist detainees</td>
<td>Producing ideological counter-material</td>
<td>Rate of release from RRG religious counselling</td>
<td>RRG religious counselling – mixed results:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dates for other Singaporean initiatives unknown</td>
<td>Internal Security Department</td>
<td>General public</td>
<td>Promoting racial harmony</td>
<td>Unknown for the other initiatives</td>
<td>3 participants released while 3 had their restriction extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source(s) of information</td>
<td>Country and name of programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Crisis Group (2007)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2004–2007 (possibly still ongoing)</td>
<td>Police Muslim scholars Former Jemaah Islamiyah members</td>
<td>Prisoners involved in terrorism Schools (Muslim scholars' publications)</td>
<td>Persuading terrorists that the Government is not anti-Islamic through addressing terrorists' socio-economic concerns Co-opting leaders to influence movement and obtain intelligence Publications on correct interpretation of jihad (minor)</td>
<td>Ability to co-opt Jemaah Islamiyah members into de-radicalisation effort through prison programme Level of influence of co-opted insiders on the movement Other initiatives – unknown</td>
<td>Co-optation of high-profile Jemaah Islamiyah members Ali Imron and Nasir Abas, who now work with authorities on de-radicalisation Ali Imron's arguments about why Bali was wrong convinced some key Jemaah Islamiyah members (this illustrates the importance of co-opting insiders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribetti (2009)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Colombian Government</td>
<td>Members of insurgent groups Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (recruited either individually, voluntarily or collectively) disbanding the group as a result of negotiation</td>
<td>Social services and economic support (now changing from benefit-oriented to more flexible, individualised approach)</td>
<td>School attendance Enrolment in vocational training Enrolment in health care Homicide rates</td>
<td>Lowest murder rate in 20 years, from 28,837 in 2002 to 17,209 in 2006 (last available statistic) Homicide rate dropped by 13% in demobilised areas (Note that logistical difficulties hindered uptake of services – in July 2007, only 32% of beneficiaries enrolled in school, 32% in vocational training and 41 in health care)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Definitions of De-radicalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| UN                      | Programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or dissuading them from violence. | • Programmes  
• Individuals  
• Reintegration into Society  
• Dissuade from use of violence |
| UK Home Office          | This support is sometimes described as "deradicalisation", a term which is used to refer to cognitive or behavioural change and sometimes to both. There are analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention | • Support for the ‘vulnerable’  
• Individual process  
• Cognitive Change  
• Behavioural Change  
• Analogies with Crime Prevention |
| Horgan                  | Reducing the risk for engagement (and/or re-engagement) in terrorism and illicit activity | • Reducing risk  
• Terrorism  
• Illicit activity |
| Ashour                  | A process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimises the use of violence to achieve political goals | • Islamist Movements  
• Collective Process  
• Ideology  
• Delegitimizing violence |
| Demant et al.           | The opposite of radicalisation and becoming less radical with respect to behaviour and beliefs. Belief change entails increase in the confidence in the system, a desire to be a part of society, and the rejection of non-democratic means | • Opposite of Radicalisation  
• Becoming less Radical  
• Behaviour  
• Beliefs  
• Belief change= support system, society and politics |
| Rabasa at al. (Rand)    | A process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding not acceptable to use violence to effect social change. Recognition that social, political, and economic transformation will occur slowly and in a pluralistic environment | • Abandoning Extremist Worldview  
• Rejection of violence  
• Accepting of political, social, and economic structure  
• Accepts pluralistic environment |
| International Crisis Group (ICG) | Prison based effort to persuade terrorists and their supporters to abandon the use of violence | • Prison programmes  
• Persuade terrorist  
• Abandon violence |
| Quilliam Foundation (QF) | Ideology behind extremism is questioned and refuted and replaced in favour of a more traditional, pluralistic understanding of Islam | • Ideology  
• Extremism  
• Refutation  
• Acceptance of Liberal Islam |
Table 5: Definitions of Radicalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Commission (2005)</strong></td>
<td>‘Phenomenon of the people embracing opinions, views, and ideas which could lead to terrorism’</td>
<td>• Terrorism, • Extremist beliefs, • Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTEST, UK (2009)</strong></td>
<td>‘Process by which people come to support, and in some cases to participate in terrorism’</td>
<td>• Directed Process, • Terrorism, • Individual, • Support for terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NYPD, Silber &amp; Bhatt (2007)</strong></td>
<td>‘Local residents or citizens gradually adopt an extremist religious/political ideology hostile to the West, which legitimises terrorism as a tool to affect societal change. This ideology is fed and nurtured with a variety of extremist influences. Internalizing this extreme belief system as one’s own is radicalisation’</td>
<td>• Directed process, • Hostility to the West, • Terrorism, • Extremist beliefs, • Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Danish Government</strong></td>
<td>‘The process by which a person gradually accept extremist ideas and methods possibly supports organised groups’</td>
<td>• Directed Process, • Acceptance/Support, • Extremist beliefs, • Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moskelenko and McCauley (2008)</strong></td>
<td>‘Dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviours in support of intergroup conflict and violence’</td>
<td>• Directed Process, • Extreme belief, feelings, and behaviour, • Violence and Conflict, • Political Mobilisation, • Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jonathan Githens-Mazer (2010)</strong></td>
<td>‘Collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action’</td>
<td>• Moral Obligation, • Collective and Individual, • Direct Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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