Europeanisation of the EU defence and security policy
after the end of the Cold-War

Submitted by Petros Violakis to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics
In March 2016

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature: ........................................................................................................
“Europeanisation of the EU defence and security policy after the end of the Cold-War”

Petros Violakis

University of Exeter
February 2016
Acknowledgments

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In loving memory of my father Ioannis Violakis (1934 – 2015) 
and my grandmother Maria Stergiotis (1919 – 2015)
ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to examine the extent to which the end of the Cold War led to Europeanisation in European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The analysis takes into consideration previous studies on Europeanisation and its impact on the transformation of national security and defence, and attempts to account for the development of Europeanisation and related mechanisms. These mechanisms, which were described by Radaelli as framing mechanisms and negative integration, incorporate all major relevant factors identified in the thesis (i.e., a common strategic culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, industrial base and defence spending decline) which contribute to the realisation of the CSDP. The relevance of these factors for CSDP Europeanisation is examined through historical and empirical analysis. Furthermore, the relationship between CSDP and NATO is also explored. This approach facilitates the analysis of the debate concerning the emergence of CSDP and throws light on the political shift that led EU leaders to support CSDP. Another aspect of this study is the empirical analysis of the dynamics and limitations of the European defence sector. The changes which took place in the European defence sector facilitated the emergence of CSDP. Hence, these changes are analysed in view of globalisation issues, economies of scale, economic crises, military autonomy, new security strategy and R&D impact.
## 1 List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEPA</td>
<td>Common European Priority Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoBPSC</td>
<td>Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoC</td>
<td>Code of Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CTDS</td>
<td>Military Credits</td>
</tr>
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<td>EAEC</td>
<td>European Atomic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBBoD</td>
<td>Electronic Bulletin Board on Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>European Single Currency</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDTIB</td>
<td>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Actions Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic Monetary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Co-operation</td>
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<td>ESRP</td>
<td>Several European Security Research Programs</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCLID</td>
<td>European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defence</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHEDN</td>
<td>Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHG</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEPG</td>
<td>Independent European Program Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Internal Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDDI</td>
<td>Less Developed Defence Industries</td>
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<td>LI</td>
<td>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>LoI</td>
<td>Letter of Intent</td>
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<td>LT</td>
<td>Lisbon Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTV</td>
<td>Long-Term Vision</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Maastricht Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milreps</td>
<td>EUMC military representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defence</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>Network Enabled Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFR</td>
<td>NATO Reaction Forces</td>
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<td>NPE</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCCAR</td>
<td>Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>R&amp;T</td>
<td>Research and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSI</td>
<td>Rationalization, Standardisation, and Interoperability</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>Research and Technology Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SEKPY</td>
<td>Association of Military Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small Medium Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAFTA</td>
<td>Transatlantic Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCE</td>
<td>Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTIP</td>
<td>Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEAG</td>
<td>Western European Armaments Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEAO</td>
<td>Western European Armaments Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEO</td>
<td>Western European Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WUDO</td>
<td>Western Union Defence Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

The official end of the Cold War in 1990, the Gulf War in 1991 and the Yugoslav crisis in 1990s have considerably influenced the debate within Europe on a common security and defence policy. A key policy development came in 1998 with the St. Malō declaration, which signalled Anglo-French policy convergence—which marked a major shift in the UK’s traditional position-towards European security and defence (Ferreira-Pereira and Groom, 2010). The US engagement in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan showed the demand for a coordinated European response and the attendant need for resources. This led to German involvement in Common European Security and Defence (CSDP) in the 2000s (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010).

Scholars writing on CSDP have recognised the importance of these events. Howorth underlined the importance of “powerful historical forces” which have had “a transformational effect” on European security policy (Howorth, 2001: 767). Mörth went a step forward by arguing that European security policy is a pivotal issue and should be analysed in relation to other areas where European integration is already taking place (Mörth and Britz, 2004: 959). Mörth considered the defence industry as an important element of the CSDP Europeanisation in terms of a “cooperation game” which involves multiple actors in the European integration process, namely; European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Western European Union (WEU) (Mörth, 2003: 164). Ojanen also argued that integration in security and defence has linked European integration to other factors (i.e. economic and sovereignty) and follows the principle that (overall) gains should exceed losses (Ojanen, 2006: 61,71). Beyers and Kerremans link European integration and Europeanisation to the action of rent-seeking groups (interest groups) including defence and defence industries (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007: 461,476). Richardson notes the key role of national interest groups which affected an important shift of focus on to the EU level and influenced the Europeanisation process according to their perceived needs (Richardson, 2012: 347-348). Smith also notes the utilisation of the institutional learning process—in a top-down approach—by policy elites in an attempt to safe-guard and expand their interests and
links Europeanisation to the elites’ ‘collective mind-set or value system’ in the CSDP (Smith, 2012: 257). Koutrakos identifies CSDP as an emerging policy, which incorporates different approaches that reflect the influence of diverse interests emanating from different Member States (Koutrakos, 2013: 92,247). For Koutrakos, European security is linked to a wide range of threats and “a growing understanding of the connections” between internal and external EU security (Koutrakos, 2013: 83). Thus, the conclusion in the literature is that CDSP is just evolving. In the same spirit, Gnesotto underlined that major differences in defence issues between EU Member States have prevented EU-level coordination (Gnesotto, 2000). Burgess argues that the value-ridden nature of security policy has led to a fragmented approach and resulted in multiple European security arrangements instead of a single European security (Burgess, 2009: 310). Howorth concluded that any signs of Europeanisation in terms of CSDP were “premature” as it is a “work in progress” (Howorth, 2001: 766; Howorth, 2014: 1).

Although Biscop identifies the European Security Strategy (ESS) as a milestone inasmuch as it defines objectives and tools of policy evaluation (Biscop, 2005: 129), much of the literature has criticised ESS for failing to outline a credible alternative mechanism to governmental decision making and failing to determine what security policy is about (Toje, 2005: 132-133). Dorman (2011) criticises the ESS for not providing a sufficient response to the most serious threats to Europe such as a resurgent Russia, terrorism, or economic crises. In addition he argues that the EU’s inability to decide on threats and priorities and therefore on the direction of CSDP generally confirms the existing literature in its view of EU member states as being unable to agree on which direction Europe is or should be heading (Dorman, 2011). Other authors have pointed to sovereignty issues (Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees, 2003), NATO historical relations with EU member states (Cornish, 1996; Cottey, 2013: 82,100-120) and lack of political will as hindering deeper integration and as being responsible for severe delays in the development of the EU technological and defence industrial base (Mölling and Brune, 2011: 52-53; Moustakis and Violakis, 2008: 429).

Hence the question: Is there Europeanisation in defence and security policy? This is the central research question of this thesis. The issue of Europeanisation of the European Security and Defence Policy is an area of further research (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1352). The fact that CSDP is a relatively new and evolving institution (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1360) presents a unique opportunity to identify and study the forces behind the integration and its impact. Indeed, the introduction of CSDP
altered the security and defence attitudes of the EU member states and created a
dynamic that points to the need for a debate on strategy (Biscop, 2005: 8).

Compared to studies in other areas of Europeanisation, research on CSDP
appears limited. That is mostly due to the fact that there has been little by way of EU-
level CSDP policy in the second half of 1990s. As Waever notes, European cooperation
on security has accelerated from this time on (Waever, 1996: 111). During the Cold
War, security provided cohesion within a divided Europe (Ham, 2002: 36; Cornish,
2004: 68). EU states were united in opposition to the communist Eastern Block.
However, when it came to EU level security and defence policy, despite enormous
achievements in other areas of cooperation, European Community (EC) states did not
operate under a single strategy. European-level policy did not get under way until after
the establishment of the second pillar of Maastricht (post-1992). Currently, defence is
organised under the European Security Strategy established in 2003 by the European
Council.

There is a vast literature on Europeanisation. Olsen in his analysis argues that
Europeanisation encompasses a variety of phenomena and processes, with emphasis on
the extension of political unification and combines both internal and external aspects of
European dynamics (Olsen, 2002: 921,943). Buller and Gamble decompose
Europeanisation into three stages: the development of institutions of governance at the
European level, the creation of distinct European forms of organisation and governance
and the achievement of the political unification of Europe (Buller and Gamble, 2002;
Radaelli, 2004: 2). There are many ways of defining Europeanisation, but for the
purposes of this thesis (which investigates the domestic consequences of European
integration on defence and security) “Europeanisation consists of processes of
construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures,
policy paradigms, styles […] incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse” (Radaelli,
2004: 3,4).

1.2 Main argument and scope of research

This thesis contributes to the Europeanisation literature in 3 ways: firstly it
examines CSDP through the analysis of the relevant processes. In this way, it goes
beyond existing institutional accounts of CSDP in terms of correlating several distinct
but interrelated areas of investigation. Secondly, it provides new insight into the
Europeanisation by arguing that substantial Europeanisation has taken place in terms of

Knill and Lehmkuhl distinguished between three categories of Europeanisation mechanisms: positive integration, negative integration and framing (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010: 200). In the same spirit, Bulmer and Radaelli identified the following key patterns of EU governance which interact with policies to produce different mechanisms of Europeanisation: governance by negotiation, governance by hierarchy and facilitated coordination (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013). These mechanisms, the patterns of governance and the patterns of adjustment will be further analysed in chapter two. The first of these is the Europeanisation-learning-pattern of adjustment (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 369-371). The learning-pattern-of-adjustment seems to have an important impact (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 368-369) on setting goals, guidelines and timetables of national and regional action plans. Conzelmann also notes the importance of policy learning processes, especially when it comes to cross-border policy and change (Conzelmann, 1998: 9-10), while Radaelli identifies learning as a unique force “that is supposed to bring about Europeanisation” (Radaelli, 2008: 240). Thus Europeanisation of the CSDP will be examined from the learning mechanism perspective. A second factor is reciprocity. Several academics argue that shared interests are a requirement for interaction (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013: 210). For example, the European Single Currency (ECU) is an area where member states do not seem to share strong motives for integration (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013: 212; Wang, 2007: 96). However, the introduction of the ECU (Medvedev and Ham, 2002: 4) and especially the economic
crisis of late 2008 (European Commission, 2009), increased integration (Dabrowski, 2010; European Commission, 2009: 85-86; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 358-359). This thesis will show that a similar process has occurred in the area of common security (Mölling and Brune, 2011: 47). An important, but not a stand-alone factor in this process was the financial pressure on EU member states defence budgets. Defence budgets in relation to the committee’s initiatives for the creation of a market framework and supporting mechanisms (EU Committee, 1999), have fostered further European integration and Europeanisation. This approach, within the confines of state, regional and urban planning, may be considered as a first attempt whereby CSDP triggers Europeanisation (EU Committee, 1999: 45). Bulmer and Radaelli identify Europeanisation as an on-going process which does not follow a single pattern and is based on reciprocity between member states; therefore it would be difficult to measure or model it (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 360-361). Nevertheless it cannot be overlooked that the Europeanisation process, which triggered the CSDP, has influenced defence industry integration (DeVore, 2014: 455; Blom, Castellacci and Fevolden, 2013; Cross, 2013; Ojanen, 2006). This integration has been reflected, over the previous two decades, in trans-European economic transactions, academic and corporate cooperation (including R&D) with the objective of developing new technologies and initiating new joint production lines. Yet, in view of asymmetric military capabilities and the technological gap between EU and NATO forces (Chappell, 2010; Howorth, 2001; Gompert, Kugler and Libicki, 1999: 28; Mattox, 2011: 118) much remains to be done in terms of joint development and production.

The methodological challenge in the present context is to identify factors affecting Europeanisation from a political science perspective. The fact that Europeanisation is not a simple ad hoc procedure, with impacts on CSDP only, makes the research more complicated and the debate more intense. Indeed, there has been a long debate, on the issue of Europeanisation, which started to take form during the mid-1990s (Ladrech, 2010: 12-13) and resulted in a more specific definition of Europeanisation (Quaglia et al., 2007: 406-407; Radaelli, 2004). The debate also revealed that Europeanisation is a multidimensional, interactive, on-going, but observable process (Bale, 2008: 4-5) where investigation, however, is subject to three methodological difficulties. Saurugger identifies these three methodological problems in her analysis of the relationship between Europeanisation and interest groups: complex interdependence, the distinction between European and domestic variables and measurement of change (Saurugger, 2005: 291-292). In addition, she indicates the need
for a long-term methodological approach to be applied prior to the time-period of interest (Saurugger, 2005: 296). In order to confront this challenge, our analysis takes as its point of departure the decade prior to the official introduction of ESDP/CSDP while in terms of groups of interest and neo-corporatism even earlier key historical events are considered.

1.3 Research methods and research design

In view of these methodological challenges attention is paid to preserving the fragile balance between the true Europeanisation impact and exaggerated estimates of it (Ladrech, 2010: 40). The Europeanisation of the member states’ national security and defence policy is a sensitive issue which is directly related to national sovereignty; therefore changes are small and are being realised over long time periods. Changes in national security and defence policy are mainly influenced by changes in international security and the international economic environment. Consequently, we investigate the Europeanisation implied by CSDP and propose the alternative following hypotheses: (a) Yes there has been substantive Europeanisation or (b) not (due to several constraints). We ask: what is the impact of domestic political decision-making, the creation of a common defence industrial base, single market creation, defence spending decline, the new security identity establishment, globalisation, the US and NATO influence, the common strategic culture, neo-corporatism and special interest groups and R&D on the CSDP? Does, for example, EU member states’ coordinated R&D lead to further European integration? The impact and the variation are being measured on a basic scale of: “substantive Europeanisation”, “absence of Europeanisation”, “inexplicit Europeanisation”.

Because Europeanisation is an on-going, interactive process which includes national actors, policies, ideas and structures (Saurugger, 2005: 292), separating the dependent1 from the independent variables can be difficult. In this thesis the dependent variable is the Europeanisation in the context of CSDP. The methodological approach is based on and corresponds to “learning” via a facilitated coordination mechanism (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010: 200-201), in conjunction with a “process tracing”2 research strategy (Ladrech, 2010: 40-41), both of which are employed throughout this

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1 A dependent variable (Europeanisation) is what is being identified/ measured and what is affected during the research. Hence, the dependent variable responds to the independent variable(s).
2 Process tracing is used as a means to identify change/Europeanisation when and where it occurs.
thesis. This combined approach is expected to generate vital information which will contribute to the identification of the key factors underlying Europeanisation in the context of CSDP. The key factors so identified will be compared with the empirical findings. The empirical findings are derived from primary and secondary data sources along with historical analysis in the areas of transatlantic relations and of the European defence industry (market forces). What is the justification for choosing domestic political decision-making, creation of a common defence industrial base, single market creation, defence spending decline, the new security identity establishment, globalisation, the US and NATO influence, the common strategic culture, neo-corporatism and special interest groups and R&D? Firstly, the implication of selecting a distinct yet embedded area of Europeanisation, is intended to reduce or even to avoid the false identification of “right kind” hypothesis-related explanations (Bennett, 2010: 208). In other words, the identification of the common key factors and of the driving forces behind the CSDP will enhance the validity of the findings while minimizing the potential use of Europeanisation as an all explaining factor. But how are these areas related?

The argument here is that the CSDP military objectives have been built upon capabilities, collaboration and burden-sharing of the EU member states, whose dynamics rely on a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe with strong research and development (Secretary General/High Representative, 2008). Consequently, there is a unique mutual interaction such that the EU defence industry affects the CSDP realisation and the CSDP, in its turn, influences the defence industry’s Europeanisation. In addition, the CSDP realisation and the EU defence industry integration may be considered as an overall-objective which incorporates the on-going processes of Europeanisation which are also related to national sovereignty. Indeed, the CSDP and the EU defence industry policies reflect two different but interrelated areas which have been undergoing intensive transformation after the end of the Cold War.

The course of the transformation is related to the intergovernmental and supranational/European policy debate and leads to a two-pronged path: The direction of the CSDP as a collective response mechanism, which is based on a strong EU coalition, or the common response mechanism, which is based on common EU mechanisms, military governance and operations’ ability. On the other hand the CSDP response mechanism seems to be significantly affected by member states’ participation in international coalitions (Dorman, 2011), that could impact the CSDP and the EU defence industry integration. This impact may be better comprehended in relation to a
historical analysis perspective of EU – NATO relations. The examination of these
different but interrelated issues, along with the contribution of historical events analysis,
offers a different perspective on the same issue (Creswell, 2007: 74). Hawkesworth
underlines the importance of historical analysis (Hawkesworth, 2006: 20-21), which
may be summarised in Santayana’s phrase: those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it (Santanaya, 1953: 172). On the other hand the lack of direct
observations and the historian’s perspective may compromise the credibility of the
analysis.

Another point, related to historical analysis, is time-shift relevance. Lee argues
that in order to confront this time-shift relevance the researcher should analyse the
historical events with full awareness of the time and place the events took place (Lee,
1983). In other words: what we consider today as reasonable may not provide an
adequate standard for the time period under study. Consequently our analysis will focus
on the events after the end of the cold war, in 1991, which shaped the CSDP as we
know it today.

The use of historical analysis as a methodological instrument is expected to
contribute to the comprehension of the historical facts that shaped our current world. In
addition, historical analysis is expected to enhance the comprehension of the causal
relations among historical events and the understanding of internal and external factors
that shaped the circumstances which, in turn, led to important decisions. The
comprehension of this causal chain is expected to throw light on the identification of the
underlying driving forces and of the major policies which have had an important impact
on the European integration but primarily on the advancement of Europeanisation.

1.4 Organization of the thesis

Chapter two focuses on the debate regarding the role of CSDP and its relation to
the Europeanisation process and mechanisms of adjustment. Hence the analysis initiates
with the examination of previous studies of Europeanisation and its impact on the
transformation of national security and defence. The analysis is assessed in terms of
identifying key factors related to the development of Europeanisation and associated
mechanisms. The resulting findings are processed via applying the process-tracing
method to the ESS (2003), ESS (2008) and ISS reports (2014) in order to identify
change and mechanisms that facilitate change in the formulation of defence and security
policy. Radaelli has identified such mechanisms as Framing (due to the absence of an EU model in CSDP) and (in the case of EU defence industry) as negative integration mechanisms. These reports represent the short and long-term goals of Member States (in the context of European Security and Internal Security) and may be viewed as Europeanisation in security and defence. Thus, the aforementioned mechanisms and policies incorporate all major relevant factors (common strategic culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, industrial base, spending etc) which contribute to the realisation of the CSDP.

Focusing on the historical record and through historical and empirical analysis, Chapter three examines the political climate and other factors that contributed to the process of Europeanisation (following Radaelli’s definition, i.e., that “Europeanisation consists of processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles […] incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse” (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4)). The first section of this chapter investigates historical events, contributing factors, actors, policy procedures and treaties which, through causation analysis, are identified as relevant to the Europeanisation process. The role of corporatist/interest groups in political decision-making and their impact on the Europeanisation process is investigated in the second section.

Chapter four investigates the evolution of the relationship between CSDP and NATO. The analysis starts with NATO’s history analysis in view of identifying the political influence of NATO on Member States. The investigation takes into consideration the active and strong relation between NATO and the US, which seem to further complicate the political climate through its potential influence on the decision making process of EU governments. The inclusion of these factors in the decision making process is important on account of their impact on other areas, such as the EU defence industry. However the decision of the EU leaders to establish the CSDP altered worlds’ security and defence equilibrium. This chapter focuses on this shift and analyses the debate behind it in relation to the Europeanisation process in view of a number of factors: opportunities and gaps in political and military policies that emerged during the last two decades, the transatlantic impact of CSDP, NATO and US interaction, and the CSDP Europeanisation dynamics.

Chapter five examines the European defence output and its limitations through empirical analysis. Hence, this chapter explores the driving forces behind the “defence industry change”, taking into account the following: globalisation issues, economies of scale, economic crises, military autonomy, new security strategy and the internal
strategy of EU regarding R&D which is investigated in a policy-making context. In this respect, Greece is being examined as a test case. Finally, R&D policies and their impact will be assessed from a different perspective. This perspective implies a new role for R&D as a distinct Europeanisation learning mechanism and a unique driving force for European integration.

**Chapter six** examines how Greece contributed to the realisation of the CSDP. Moreover, the analysis aims to shed light on how the EU “ways of doing things” has been incorporated into the logic of Greece’s domestic security and defence policy. Hence, these “ways of doing things” are identified and presented in terms of Radaelli’s definition (Radaelli, 2004: 3-4) with emphasis on the domestic (national and sub national) discourse. Therefore, this chapter aims to identify the impact of CSDP on Greece’s political structures which are related to the country’s defence and security policy. These changes are presented in terms of an explanatory schema for better understanding the dynamic impact of Europeanisation in the Greek case.

**The final chapter** brings together the findings of the previous chapters in an attempt to answer the question previously raised, namely, whether there is substantive Europeanisation in terms of CSDP. By doing so it provides an overall roadmap of the driving forces behind the Europeanisation process and a list of Europeanisation core issues in relation to the learning mechanism. This roadmap is not a simple listing of mechanisms and factors inasmuch as the order of implementation is important for the successful establishment of the Europeanisation process. Considering, the study’s main focus of the learning mechanism, the analysis provides the basis for future investigation and analysis of additional Europeanisation mechanisms which, in turn, could lead to the identification of other Europeanisation forces at work.
Chapter 2

2 Europeanisation

Chapter two begins with a review of previous studies of Europeanisation and its impact on the transformation of national security and defence. In addition, the chapter focuses on the debate concerning the role of CSDP and its relation to the Europeanisation process and mechanisms of adjustment. The relevance of these studies is assessed - in particular, their success in establishing key factors related to the development of Europeanisation and associated mechanisms. The analysis relates its findings, via the process-tracing method, to ESS (2003), ESS report (2008) and ISS report (2014) in order to identify change and mechanisms that facilitate change in the formulation of defence and security policy. Such mechanisms are described/identified by Radaelli as Framing mechanisms (due to the absence of an EU model in CSDP) and (in the case of EU defence industry) as negative integration mechanisms. Inasmuch as these reports incorporate the short and long-term goals of states in the context of European Security and Internal Security, they can be seen as Europeanisation in security and defence. Hence, the introduction of these mechanisms and policies incorporates all major relevant factors (common strategic culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, industrial base, spending etc) which contribute to the realisation of the CSDP.

2.1 Introduction

Common Security and Defence was introduced as a European security concept several decades ago, after the end of WWII, though without substantial progress, until the early 1990s. Since that time, the political leadership of the EU produced a unique dynamic which had a profound impact on the European security field, and resulted in the introduction and development of new institutions and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The emergent state may be summarised as follows: the deeper the integration the bigger the need for security, or in the words of the EU Council: “And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected
infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields” (European Council, 2003). In this regard, European security gradually became a popular research subject, especially with regard to the study of Europeanisation. In turn, such research produced deeper conceptualisation of European Security and better understanding of its dynamics in terms of an autonomous EU security and defence. This dynamic is unique as there is no obvious resemblance with other areas of Europeanisation. Nevertheless, there is a certain resemblance concerning institutional structure with a NATO. The fact that EU Member States have chosen NATO (since the late 1940s) as a means toward the institutionalisation of their defence and security complicates things. Thus the Europeanisation of European defence and security, in contrast to other areas of Europeanisation (i.e. education), had to deal with NATO’s institutional competition. This complementary - competitive relationship had direct impact on the development of CSDP inasmuch as EU Member States gave been unable to decide which approach to follow. The situation becomes more complex as different approaches and perspectives (European - Atlantic centric) contributed to debates as to whether Europeanisation has played an important role in the transformation of national security and defence of EU member states, and how this should be measured. These debates utilised multilevel analysis and process tracing techniques (Checkel, 2005: 814; Rieker, 2004: 371), in order to explain European integration dynamics, in terms of: supranational, intergovernmental and institutional framing (Rieker, 2004: 369). The identification of key conceptualisation elements and of related mechanisms of adaptation and/or adjustment, constitute an important starting point for the identification of key Europeanisation forces.

However, the identification becomes difficult when focusing on the relation between European security and member states’ national security and defence. The initial identification of security threats to EU Member States became easier with the introduction of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) by J. Solana (European Council, 2003). The emergence of this conceptualisation reflects the existence of strong Europeanisation forces that tend to generate a European strategic culture, built upon the lowest common dominator (Howorth, 2012: 448). In this regard, the initial ESS document provides a valuable tool, which in conjunction with to the subsequent ESS report and Internal Security Strategy (ISS) report (European Commission, 2010; European Commission, 2014), constitutes a unified progress-report. This unified progress-report incorporates both goals and results and therefore facilitates process tracing and element extraction for further investigation. In addition, the goals described
in these documents constitute a learning mechanism of adjustment which facilitates coordination and results in the production of specific output: mechanisms, legal framework and new institutions. Therefore it constitutes an Europeanised approach to Member States security and defence.

The aim of this chapter is to shed light in this process and identify contributing mechanisms and other relevant factors that lead to the Europeanisation of European Security and Defence. These elements constitute the basis for Europeanisation adaptation and adjustment mechanisms in that they incorporate time tables, objectives, and the evaluation of expected results. Thus, the identification of the forces underlying these objectives provides important information for the identification of other factors relevant to the Europeanisation process.

2.2 Debate on Europeanisation

As Puchala points out, the debate on Europeanisation is important because it helps to explain what is happening between EU states and their citizens. (Puchala, 1999: 318). Especially in the period following the Cold War, it was the signing of the Maastricht treaty that triggered a new debate over European integration while bringing up –once again- national sovereignty issues. Rieker argues that sovereignty issues emerged in relation to the reorganisation of Member States national defence forces and touched upon the establishment of a deeper political union (Rieker, 2004: 373). The political union described by the Maastricht Treaty was viewed by some media as a “paring back of essential attributes of sovereignty” (Ladrech, 1994: 75). Devine notices that the Maastricht Treaty was viewed as an effort toward deeper integration and a signal for the introduction of common defence (Devine, 2011: 347). However, it wasn’t only the EC that played an important role. European elites’ actions appeared to favour European integration (Eichenberga and Dalton, 1993: 507) while EU governments’ position on integration seemed to have undergone an important shift since the time of the Treaty of Rome (Franklina, Eijkb and Marshc, 1995: 103). Franklina, Eijkb and Marshc argued that “Europe” was treated as “an aspect of foreign policy” to be decided behind closed doors by political leaders, who favoured the formulation of joint policies (Franklina, Eijkb and Marshc, 1995: 103). Therefore, despite the sovereignty issues, there was substantive progress in terms of integration, due to the benefits to EU governments’ from international collaboration (Puchala, 1999: 323). Bulmer and Lequesne linked sovereignty to European integration in terms of three propositions: integration
strengthens the state; integration alters domestic politics by creating multilevel politics; the EU has an effect on governance transformation (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 10,11). Multilevel governance and governance transformation in terms of Europeanisation were analysed by Ladrech. Ladrech identified Europeanisation “as an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994: 69). Despite the lack of supporting empirical evidence, this new organisational logic triggered a series of studies on the impact of Europeanisation which suggested some sort of convergence among EU Member States (Börzel, 1999: 576,577). Going a step forward, Radaelli and Börzel, drawing on Ladrech’s argument, describe Europeanisation as a process of EU penetration into domestic policies (Radaelli, 2003: 29,30; Ladrech, 1994: 69; Börzel, 1999: 574). As Rieker noticed, the European integration progress, in security terms, had been accelerated and/or was a reaction to the end of the Cold War (Rieker, 2004: 371). However, the “Cold War-inspired understanding of security” (Rieker, 2004: 371) decelerated the speed of adjustment to the new security environment.

The beginning of 2000s could be considered as more promising. Indeed, the early 2000s literature on Europeanisation though at an early stage was nevertheless an evolving bone tide field (Buller, 2003: 528,534). A closer view on the number of academic articles on Europeanisation over the 1981-2014 period shows an increase during the late 1990s and a significant increase after 2008³ (Thomson Reuters Web of Science, 2013). The increase in the number of articles in the 2000s may reflect: the end of the “cold War-inspired understanding of security” and progress in understanding the Europeanisation mechanisms as well as Member States re-orientation toward a more Europeanised approach. This understanding was captured by Buller and Gamble, who describe Europeanisation as a “situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics” (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 17,18). In their later work with Lequesne, they make a clear distinction between European integration and Europeanisation. According to them, European integration is related to the political and policy development at the supranational level, while Europeanisation is related to the results of this process (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 12). In addition, Clark and Jones argue that “European integration and Europeanisation are very closely

³ Based on the total number of articles with 'Europeanization' or 'Europeanisation' as a subject term, in all languages, listed for each year in the Social Sciences Citation Index, as reported via the 'ISI Web of Science' database (26/2/2015)
enmeshed, with Europeanisation construed as modification of national structures resulting from European integration” (Clark and Jones, 2008: 307). The analytical dimension of Clark and Jones work is presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical dimensions</th>
<th>Europeanisation</th>
<th>European integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basis</td>
<td>Socialisation and learning processes; historically and geographically contingent</td>
<td>Post-war hegemonic geographical project designed to shape/direct Europeanisation processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus of analysis</td>
<td>Spaces comprising cross-cutting transcalar networks of relations</td>
<td>Recalibrating the nation state; ensemble of relations between national and supranational scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of analysis</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Political narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Persistent; though mutable</td>
<td>Temporary; dependent on elite consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Europeanisation and European integration (Clark and Jones, 2008: 310)**

This research, which aims to identify key Europeanisation forces, has taken into consideration Buller’s arguments on Europeanisation (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 14,15) and views Europeanisation as a process. In this regard, the reverse approach will be used in an attempt to identify the processes and the driving forces of European integration which in turn, trigger Europeanisation. Furthermore in order to avoid the squabbles concerning the various definitions of Europeanisation (e.g. Ladrech, Börzel, Olsen), the definition of Radaelli’s (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4) will be used throughout.

The reason for utilising Radaelli’s definition is that it incorporates elements that distinguish Europeanisation from European integration. According to Radaelli, Europeanisation is a process which is characterised by stages of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation “of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4). Such stages can be identified and measured. This approach can deal with the lack of Europeanisation theory. Bulmer and Lequesne noticed this namely, that there is no theory of Europeanisation, and argued that Europeanisation is used as a term to investigate the impact of the EU on Member States (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 11). Radaelli’s approach incorporates causal elements as it investigates the construction, diffusion and institutionalisation which took place prior to implementation. The approach also allows for correlation of actual outcomes with Radaelli’s stages of the Europeanisation process. Therefore it is possible to identify other factors and mechanisms which contribute to the Europeanisation process.
On the other hand, European integration is also relevant. The term European integration, historically, was used to describe both the process of change at the EU level and the establishment of a unified political community where the sovereign member states move toward a federal state (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 11,12). As Loughlin points out, this approach originates in the early years of European integration when federalism was ascendant and nationalism on the defensive (Loughlin, 1996: 143). Thus the initial concept of European integration incorporated elements of federalism and therefore Europeanisation. The initial federalist objectives of European leaders were not attained; this failure contributed to the development of European integration theories. Radaelli, drawing on Börzel’s work, argued that theories of European integration focus on its integration impact on the nation states in particular, on the transformation of multilevel governance dynamics (Radaelli, 2003: 33; Börzel, 1999: 576). Subsequently, Radaelli moved the Europeanisation debate onto another level by arguing that the balance of power remains “more important for theories of European integration than for Europeanisation” (Radaelli, 2004). For Radaelli, European integration was following a different path from that of Europeanisation. This point is very interesting as it indicates the existence of a new dynamic for European integration. In terms of this dynamic, European integration may follow a different path from the one which leads to Europeanisation. This path is being analysed in relation to NATO dynamics, in chapter four.

In an attempt to identify the origin of this deviation in dynamics, Chryssochoou, referred to a “battle of theories” which disagree on conditions, processes, variables, sovereignty issues and on integration application and eventually lead to a zero-sum notion of interstate bargain (Chryssochoou, 2009: 8). Bulmer and Lequesne identify the origin of this battle in the (going back to the 1950s) with neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists looking at European integration from different theoretical perspectives (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 5). Rieker by considering EU as an entity in between an international organisation and a federal state has tried to identify the impact of the supranationalists – federalists’ debate on the integration process.

### 2.3 Supranational/federal or intergovernmental debate

The relation of European integration and Europeanisation was investigated by Puchala. Puchala argued that the deeper the integration the more likely are policy making shifts from the intergovernmental to the supranational mode (Puchala, 1999:
Thus the supranational mode may lead to substantive Europeanisation. However, the fact that the intergovernmental approach goes back several decades and has influenced attitudes toward European integration cannot be overlooked. Moravcsik, who is viewed as the main representative of intergovernmentalism (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 5), was mainly influenced by De Gaulle’s opposition to the EC federal perspective, favouring French national interests within a Europe of intergovernmental cooperation and negotiation (Moravcsik, 2012: 53; Hoffmann, 1995: 240). Similarly, Hoffmann argued that European integration is the outcome of member-state governments’ negotiation and agreement on EC common policies and institutions consistent with the pursuit of national interests (Ginsberg, 2007: 70; Hoffmann, 1995: 289). This debate contributed to a better understanding of the integration process and the forces facilitating such integration. Bulmer and Lequesne reduced Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalism into four components: the EU is viewed as a cooperative project among states within a hierarchical structure; a set of common norms, institutions and policies constitute a more profound form of economic interdependence that facilitates the management of specific issues; the resulting joint sovereignty is viewed as an enhancement of the role of the state and is related to the international environment; the creation of one regime is not linked to the creation of others (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 6,7). Individually and jointly the above factors contribute to a better understanding of how integration works and promote a better conceptualisation of Europeanisation. More specifically, Hoffmann noted the importance of authority and hierarchy which constitute Radaelli’s vertical governance approach of Europeanisation. Hoffmann also spoke of common norms, institutions and policies which we find in Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation. Therefore better understanding of key trends in EU governance results in a better conceptualisation of Europeanisation factors and the Europeanisation process itself.

Moravcsik’s contribution is also important. He refined Hoffmann’s work, by introducing Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), in terms of which he emphasised the national governments’ representation of domestic (commercial and other) interests as “important drivers of integration” (Ginsberg, 2007: 71). These interests became the subject of further investigation in terms of their political influence. Indeed, Moravcsik’s LI aimed at uncovering the motivation of social actors, states and leaders in an attempt to produce behavioural predictions and/or dynamic effect that could help explain the evolution of regional integration (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 68). The motivation of social actors is being analysed in relation related institutional
arrangements in chapter thee. Drawing on the Moravcsik’s ideas of “social actors’ motivation” and influential power, Weiss made an important point regarding the establishment of the ESDP/CSDP, which seems to confirm Moravcsik’s approach. Weiss links social actors’ motivation with other factors which emerged after the end of the Cold War. These factors are: the decline of US commitment towards European security, which created a window of opportunity for the establishment and design of EU’s own security institution (Weiss, 2012: 657) and the interstate agreement between UK and France. These points are quite important, considering EU member states’ contemporaneous commitment to the then existing security providers, such as NATO and US. This commitment, in relation to other relevant mechanisms which resulted in the creation of the CSDP will be analysed below. In addition, these factors verify Moravcsik’s three key points related to European integration. These points are: the state is a fundamental actor in Europe; EU power results from interstate bargaining; national preferences formation may be better analysed under the Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory (Moravcsik, 2005: 353,358; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 6). In view of the interstate agreement between France and UK, these points (and especially the last two) seem to explain the need for an autonomous European security and defence. The US commitment towards European security was also a decisive factor, which in relation to the declining military budgets of the 1990s and NATO’s search for a new identity provided a window of opportunity.

On the other hand Moravcsik’s LI didn’t escape criticism. Wincott identified two weaknesses in Moravcsik’s LI: treaty negotiations and the European integration process serve nation-states whose existence is taken for granted, and that the crucial interaction of the EU Court and of related political institutions has been ignored (Wincott, 1995: 607). Wincott managed to incorporate the dynamics of Europeanisation in the context of Member States trying to move onto a supranational governance model. Also, Wincott identified the EU Court as an outcome of Europeanisation. The existence of the EU Court reflects the Member States shared objective for an Europeanised Justice.

Bulmer and Lequesne offered four distinct criticisms of Moravcsik’s LI work: member states are viewed only through the prism of governments (neglecting internal diversity); it is assumed that power is exercised mainly by large EU states; institutions are viewed as agencies capable of influencing national governments; it is assumed that national interests may be pursued only via national governments (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 7). Indeed the intergovernmental approach of LI views governments as the only
bargaining entity within EU, neglecting other influential actors such as special interest
groups and existing institutions.

However, this approach -even if incomplete- portrays a horizontal scheme of
Europeanisation whereas in the view which stresses domination by large EU states
horizontal and vertical governance schemes coexist within the EU institutional
environment. Regarding the argument of institutions as influential actors one must
remember that EU Member States adhere to such institutions conditional on their
perception of their national interest. This approach reflects Radaelli’s definition of
Europeanisation, which occurs only after successful bargaining among Member States.
Therefore Europeanisation may be identified with intergovernmentalism.

Chryssochoou, also views Europeanisation as an intergovernmental process, in contrast
with Massey who identified Europeanisation as a federalisation process (Massey, 2004:
25). This important differentiation in perspective is reflected in Risse, Cowles and
Caporaso’s, argument according to which the very meaning of Europeanisation may
vary from state to state (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 8). The diversification of
EU member states in national governance and politics, inevitably results in different
approaches toward Europeanisation due to the fact that policy-making are unevenly
developed across the EU (Buller, 2003: 533). Buller and Gamble previously have
discussed this subject and noted contrasting attitudes between countries as well as
within countries (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 13; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001:
8,18; Bendiek, 2012: 47). These diversifications reflect the misfit policies variations
from state to state, which result to Europeanisation realisation variation, accordingly.

This perspective was duly appreciated during the early 2000s, when “the
governance” became more important than “the approach”. Buller identified EU’s
complexity in terms of national-EU multilevel governance mixture (Buller, 2003: 529)
while he, in his later work with Gamble, conceives of Europeanisation not as a process,
but as “a situation where certain effects can be shown to have occurred” (Buller and
Gamble, 2002: 17). This approach is reflected in the ESS and ISS documents which
incorporate certain effects of Europeanisation: mechanisms, legal framework and
institutions regarding defence and security. Going a step further Massey builds on
Buller and Gamble’s argument and adds that Europeanisation “is contingent upon
social, political and economic interactions and implies change or transformation in
domestic politics and institutions” (Massey, 2004: 24). Therefore, Europeanisation is
affected by social, political and economic interactions; such factors underlying
Europeanisation will be identified and analysed in subsequent chapters.
Given the above approaches, it should be noted that the aim of this thesis is not to be involved in an ongoing ideological controversy but to utilise the Europeanisation framework in order to identify the driving forces behind developments and processes in EU CSDP. These forces or as Ladrech calls them “EU effects” create varying pressures on various “domestic policy areas, actors and/or institutions” and consist of directives, regulations and decision-making processes (Ladrech, 2010: 42). In view of Massey, Ladrech, Bulmer and other scholars’ work, and despite sharp differences in outlook, it should be stressed that all accept the importance of institutions and of the institutional character of Europeanisation and integration.

2.4 The institutionalist character of Europeanisation

The institutional character of the EU was largely (re)initiated by the events of the 1990s-2000s, which provided the impetus for new research regarding the development of the EU in an attempt to explain the process of institution-building at the European level (Buller, 2003: 529). Moravcsik considered the EC/EU to be a world-wide example of institutionalised international policy (Moravcsik, 1993: 473), and as reinforcing individual states (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 11; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). Moravcsik, Bulmer and Lequesne emphasise the intense institutional character of the EU which for them constitutes an important advantage; in fact an advantage important enough for the gain from participating in the EU to offset the side-effects of governance change. This perspective is common to Institutionalists, who insist that the explanation of why and how European integration is happening is related to the impact of institutions and the players who direct them (Puchala, 1999: 318).

Risse, Cowles and Caporaso highlighted the importance of institutions by defining Europeanisation in terms of the development institutions of governance at the European level (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 3; Buller and Gamble, 2002: 10). Therefore the existence of institutions could be viewed as a requirement for the changes associated with Europeanisation. Olsen further explained the importance of institutions in terms of creating, maintaining and representing social groups in the face of change (Olsen, 1996: 143). His approach indicates the importance of social groups for change, in contrast to Moravcsik’s perspective who considered governments as the only key players. Greenwood and Hinings argue that institutional theory focuses on “convergence around institutionally prescribed templates” which is related to change (convergence change and radical change) (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1025-1028).
In relation to Olsen’s approach theirs is different in that it identifies change as a prescribed template (process) which incorporates a (another) process of creation, maintenance and representation of social groups which are related to the original change. Therefore Europeanisation, which constitutes change, may be put in a template (policy), which will alter socioeconomic and political equilibrium.

Change and institutional dynamics were investigated by Puchala, who argued that institutions “once established take on a political life of their own” while the rule-making authority delegated to them by the states “binds and bounds governments” in collective behaviour patterns (Puchala, 1999: 318). This approach attributes substantive Europeanisation in the face of “rule-making authority” to the fact that it reflects a common decision which evolves into an actual institution that implements governance over Member States. Collective authority and governance was also the subject of Buller and Gamble, who directly related European governance to stable institutional patterns (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 19); Ladrech stressed another dimension by analysing the process of Europeanisation from a domestic political and institutional perspective (Ladrech, 1994: 69). Börzel investigated this issue and concluded that the impact of Europeanisation on domestic institutions is diverse and institution dependent (Börzel, 1999: 577). In her later work, Börzel (with Risse) went a step forward by introducing an institutionalist perspective and a bottom up approach (Börzel and Risse, 2000). The importance of this institutionalist approach is also reflected in Radaelli’s work, which draws upon Ladrech’s definition of Europeanisation and incorporates institutionalist perspectives in his approach (Radaelli, 2003: 30). These works indicate the importance domestic political decision-making has in the Europeanisation process. As regards CSDP this argument becomes more convincing in that it highlights the role of national sovereignty.

Despite the strong relation between Europeanisation and the institutional environment, the institutionalisation approach was considered to be less related to change (Buller, 2003: 531). It seems that occasionally institutions are overwhelmed in which case “large gaps between existing structures and underlying realities” (Olsen, 1996: 143) can be observed. On the other hand, Bache related change to institutional orientation and argued that institutional analysis better captures changes in domestic policy and governance, and can broadly explain political phenomena (Bache, 2008: 12; Buller, 2003: 529). The institutional approach (though slower) has deeper impact in society and domestic politics as it incorporates elements of learning.
However, Learning and institutional orientation, though necessary for Europeanisation, is hardly uniform across Member States. Changes in domestic policy and governance are not just random realisation of institutions or policies. Buller and Gamble argue that random replication of institutions and/or policies may result in failure (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 10,11). In this sight, a key question is: whether a common institutional model of European administration could exist? To this question Buller and Gamble provided a partial answer by suggesting that it could exist, and speculate about its form and content (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 15). This in turn, raises several questions in relation to the dynamics of normalisation policies with regard to the governmental structures of Member States and the on-going debate of the supranational and intergovernmental approaches. In terms of CSDP this perspective complicates things more, as it incorporates two interrelated areas: the coordination of national military forces and the coordination of national defence production. The first, pertains to factors such as domestic political decision-making and the potential of a common strategic culture. On the other hand, the coordination of EU defence production is related to factors such as domestic political decision-making, the dynamics of a common defence industrial base and a single market, the dynamics of a new security identity and a common strategic culture, and the dynamics resulting from defence technological superiority (related with R&D). All these factors are directly related, in addition to institutions and governments, to social players and other aspects of the social process. Therefore, despite the initial interstate bargain, the direct impact of aforementioned factors on the Europeanisation process of CSDP cannot be disregarded. In this respects, the examination of new-institutionalism in relation to Europeanisation takes the analysis one step further.

2.5 New institutionalism and Europeanisation

The role of new institutionalism in the Europeanisation process has been identified by several scholars. Lajh views new institutionalism as a helpful tool in explaining the outcomes of Europeanisation (Lajh, 2004: 52), while Ioakimidis links the Europeanisation process with “the rise of new institutional structures, bodies and channels of democratic expression” (Ioakimidis, 2001: 87). The claims of Ioakimidis may be considered as a response to the events of 1970s, which included: EC expansion, the introduction of new institutions and the first elections for the European parliament. These events certainly created new institutional and governance data waiting to be
analyzed. During the early 1980s, March and Olsen responded to this challenge by launching the new-institutionalism. New Institutionalism focuses on the autonomy of political institutions, their efficiency or lack thereof (March and Olsen, 1984: 734). Therefore this perspective is useful when trying to understand inefficiencies and political actions related to the emergence of CSDP, inasmuch as CSDP may exhibit significant autonomy. This autonomy is described by Thielemann who argues that the basic aspect of new institutionalist analysis is that it accepts institutions as actuators/mediators of political actions and outcomes (Thielemann, 1999: 401). Bulmer and Lequesne went a step forward and identified two assertions of new-institutionalism which are related to CSDP: institutions reflect the objectives of social groups and institutions’ role is not limited to a neutral political arena (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 8; March and Olsen, 1984: 734). Social groups’ contribution to the realisation of CSDP has a bottom-up impact on political decision making, acceptance of the new security identity of EU and adaptation to a common strategic culture.

On the other hand, Thelen and Steinmo define historical institutionalism as an attempt to throw light on the relation between political acts “mediated” by institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). This approach takes for granted the importance of the institutional environment in the context of a top-down approach in policy implementation. Peters also noted that most versions of empirical institutionalism take as given the political and social institutions of society while attempting to answer the following questions: do institutions matter and what is the impact on members of their societies? (Peters, 1999: 80,90). DiMaggio and Powell’s organisation theory linking societies and institutions (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991: 1,63-82) induced Fligstein to answer this question. Fligstein linked institutional analysis with social aspects and social learning (Fligstein, 1991: 309,310). Kohler-Koch underlined the importance of institutionalised learning, as a means which facilitates governments to adopt instruments and strategies to both internal and external environment (Kohler-Koch, 1996: 93). Therefore she identifies, in terms of CSDP, the importance of learning in an institutional environment such as EU. Institutional learning and especially social learning in view of the establishment of a common security and defence logic is linked with factors such as the new security identity emergence and the adoption of a common strategic culture. The importance of such institutionalist approach was noted by March and Olsen, who pointed out the relationship between sociological work on the subject and institutionalism (Peters, 1999: 110; March and Olsen, 1996: 247). Lane and Ersson drawing on Olsen’s approach, argued that under sociological neo-institutionalism,
institutions assume the role of actors and include the following areas of interest: physical structure, demographic structure, historical development, personal networks and temporal structures (Lane and Ersson, 2000: 30,31). Lane and Ersson also underlined that institutions may shape the wishes and desires of individuals and are therefore prior to interests (Lane and Ersson, 2000: 31). Thus the introduction of the CSDP reflects the common desire of EU Member States for an autonomous defence and security. This security and defence institutional environment is embedded-within EU’s institutional environment and represents learning within learning.

The emergence of CSDP (itself) is the result of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of “ways of doing things” within EU’s institutional environment and therefore reflects the existence of substantive Europeanisation. Without the initial institutional environment provided by the EU and the other key contributing factors, the emergence of CSDP would have never been realised. Such factors include the political willingness of interest groups to contribute to the shaping of EU’s institutions. Salisbury in his 1984 paper related interest groups to institutions (Lowery and Gray, 1998: 231) while Peters presented International institutionalism as a “theoretical place assigned to structure in explaining behaviour of states and individuals”, whose actions are guided by national interests rather than collective values (Peters, 1999: 20,126). Peters’ argument although it reflects an intergovernmental approach, highlights the necessity of an institutional environment for new structures, such as the CSDP, to develop. This approach is enhanced by Tsygankov’s argument. Tsygankov describes International institutionalism from Gorbachev’s perspective which includes common values of the participants, global problems, interdependence and international security (Tsygankov, 1997: 249).

The emergence of the CSDP against the background of declining interest of the US in European security matters during the 1990s reflects an initiative within the EU institutional environment that featured the aforementioned factors. Such an approach is reflected in several researchers’ interpretation of this initiative as a move to counter US domination.

Finally, as Peters argues for institutionalism -both old and new- “causation can go in both directions and institutions shape social and economic orders” (Peters, 1999: 15). Drawing on Radaelli, Peters’ argument reflects a bi-directional Europeanisation approach which incorporates both top-down and bottom-up process. The existence of both processes represents the dynamics of adaptation to any differences/misfits to the EU polices, bringing together the old with the modern into an environment of constant
learning. Epstein argued that what is considered as “modern”, among state institutions, is often a matter of opinion or even of ideology” and in order for states to modernise, they even have to rewrite their constitution (Epstein, 1980: 348). These final arguments expose the true dynamic of Europeanisation, which becomes more visible in the light of common security and defence considerations.

A similar situation was faced after the end of the Cold War as the discrepancy between old and modern transcended the available learning time-frame, causing the Cold War-inspired understanding of security to be retained for several years.

2.6 Europeanisation and EU Security

The Europeanisation of Member States’ national security and defence policies may be considered as a major breakthrough for the history of the Union as it incorporates a major shift/adaptation to a new security environment. The decision for the EU to become a security actor constitutes the first evidence of Europeanisation in the security and defence field (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011: 9). The importance of this breakthrough is related to the strong aversion created after the failure of the European Defence Community in the 1950s, which lasted for several decades (Manners, 2002: 237), and left plenty of space for NATO to occupy (Biscop, 2012: 1298). Until the 1970s, the only dimension of security for the EC (later EU) was the national security of its member states. Europeanisation was being realised in the economic sphere, but not in the field of common security, which was non-existent. However, as Europeanisation progressed in the economic field during the 1980s (Fligstein and Merand, 2002: 18), several arguments were raised in favour of self-sufficiency in EU defence (Bull, 1982: 152; Manners, 2002: 27; Bohnen, 1997: 62). Bull based his argument on three reasons: divergence of interest between Western European countries and USA, the development of a European military potential and a way to tackle the continuing threat of the Soviet Union (at that time) (Bull, 1982: 153-156).

The first reason, which Bull describes, reflects the existence of a window of institutional opportunity related to the US/NATO decline of interest in European security, after the end of the Cold War. Thus the declining role of NATO as a committed security provider for the European states facilitated the emergence of initiatives resulting in the Europeanisation of European national securities. The impact of member states’ linearization in security and defence is an important breakthrough in
terms of establishing self-sufficiency in EU defence. However, for such linearization to exist, (at least) a strong core of member states with important and measurable defence capabilities is a prerequisite. This prerequisite is also described (or better prescribed) by Bull, who argues that the contribution of West Germany (a major economic power) and France (a military power), and a British change of policy towards its European neighbours were prerequisite for a Europeanist strategic policy to be realised (Bull, 1982: 160). Bull’s approach indicated that progress in establishing CSDP would be inevitable without the support of a strong defence industry. By doing so, Bull anticipated the need for Europeanisation in the defence industry as a supporting factor for the realisation of the CSDP.

The decade that followed and the intense discussions among EU member states, concerning European security and defence, provided fertile ground for major developments. The birth of the CSDP, in turn, initiated a new series of academic discussions and articles. The number of academic articles referring to "CSDP" or "ESDP" during 1980-1999 was small, while after 1999 there was an increase of 80%-90% (Thomson Reuters Web of Science, 2013). It should be noted that despite the academic interest on the CSDP/ESDP, which is reflected in the increase of published articles, no perceptible increase has been noticed on the publication of articles on “Europeanisation and CSDP/ESDP” or “the Europeanisation and security and defence” (Thomson Reuters Web of Science, 2013). The introduction of EU’s autonomous security and defence project during 1998-1999 shifted researchers’ focus on the CSDP but it was too soon for Europeanisation to take hold as there were several issues pending with regard to the conceptualisation of the CSDP. The evidence indicates that academic articles referring to Europeanisation and CSDP/ESDP began to appear after 2005-2006. Key contributing factors include the conceptualisation of security and defence that provided by the ESS (2003) and convergence in the European defence industry (convergence) which was initiated during the 1990s. Risse, noticed convergence citations (regarding ESDP) in the press beginning in the late 1990s and moving on to a peak in 1999 (Risse, 2012: 87). This is a very interesting finding which gives ground for discussion of the actual relation between CSDP/ESDP and Europeanisation process. It is noteworthy that the CSDP and the Europeanisation articles appear close to the time of

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4 The listing illustrates the total number of articles with "CSDP" or "ESDP" as a subject term, in all languages, listed for each year in the Social Sciences Citation Index, as reported via the 'ISI Web of Science' database (26/2/2015)

5 This approach of numbering academic articles was firstly presented by Featherstone (Featherstone, 2003)
publication of “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy” (2003) and after EDA’s inception (2004). Indeed, the inception of the EDA was considered as an important tool of integration which aimed at interstate cooperation in defence matters. In terms of Europeanisation the contribution of EDA was in the fusion of “various contrasting institutional logics,” including “defence sovereignty versus pooled defence resources, Europeanist versus Euro-Atlanticist, Europeanisation of the defence market versus liberalisation of the defence market” (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011: 6). In addition, the introduction and quick completion of the European Security Strategy (eight months after the original idea was presented) reflect the impact of political willingness to move forward with the integration process (Chappell, 2012: 112). As a result, the ESS introduction induced a major change in the conception of threats and security (Kaldor, 2012: 81,82) which, in turn, constitutes another breakthrough as it reflects a major shift from the Cold War-inspired understanding of security. It also constitutes a shift from the traditional instutionalisation of national security and defence of the Member States and NATO’s primacy to a mixed model. Such shifts take time to emerge and more time to be accepted and realised. All these arguments (quick completion, change in concept and change in institutional model) reflect the three stage process of Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation: construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of “ways of doing things”. Europeanisation elements were there but it took time and the contribution of other relevant factors for Europeanisation to occur. The gradual impact of these interrelated elements, included some factors originating in the early 1990s (convergence of European defence industry, single market creation, defence budgets decline, globalisation) and some others which emerged after the ESS conceptualisation (new security identity, common strategic culture). Thus the time of realisation of CSDP Europeanisation is related also to the fact that EU didn’t have an institutionalised security in the past (Rieker, 2006: 513). Rieker links the time lag in the Europeanisation CSDP to the dual character of the EU, which is something between international organisation and a federal state (institutional hybrid), and to the fact that there is no security policy legacy (Rieker, 2006: 513). These elements, according to Rieker, are responsible for “other forms of governance” and for an “innovative security approach” (Rieker, 2006: 513), while integration deepening is related to the transformation of the states’ role and identity (Rieker, 2006: 511). However, Rieker’s arguments represent only a part of the emergent debates about the CSDP. In an attempt to summarise the debates, Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, indentified four categories: the debates related to power (individual, CSDP, normative,
hard, actual and potential power); the nature, role and impact of institutions; the institutional structure and agency of the CSDP; and material and ideational factors in terms of state’s interests as the shaping and driving force (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011: 10,11). Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon’s narrower categorisation includes CSDP’s power in relation to identity which is itself connected to the role of new institutions and to the change in state’s interests and structure. Therefore for Europeanisation to be achieved, it is important to understand the process of change/adaptation related to states’ role and identity in relation to the CSDP, which process constitutes a form of learning. Thus the identification of influencing factors (as described previously) and the mechanisms of change/adaptation related to this process become more important.

2.7 Europeanisation process and mechanisms

2.7.1 Mechanisms of change and adaption

Already, during the early 2000s, the literature on mechanisms of Europeanisation was still in its infancy (Radaelli, 2000). Europeanisation mechanisms were viewed as connecting things constituting “recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a specific outcome” (Mayntz, 2003). For Ladrech the importance of these mechanisms derived from the need to bridge the diversified characteristics of EU Member States under the Europeanisation process. As Ladrech argued, the differences of the member states all combine to reinforce the argument that the role of the intervening (or facilitating) factors is important in the realisation of Europeanisation process and change (Ladrech, 2010: 34). Thus, the importance of the “understanding of variations in response to the same pressures” for change is related to the features of organisations that “produce adoption and diffusion rather than resistance and inertia” (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1042). Therefore, as Knill argues, both adaptational pressure and facilitating factors are considered as a prerequisite for change (Knill, 2001: 13). For Knill facilitating factors act as “corresponding responses” to adaptational pressure, and are related to belief and preference change of domestic actors (Knill, 2001: 13). Therefore the identification of such factors is a part of the task of any researcher who studies with Europeanisation and change. As Börzel and Risse argue, most scholars view Europeanisation as the impact of the EU on member states such that, EU members (and candidate members) adopt and change domestic institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 6). Flockhart also notices that Europeanisation refers to the process of
change, in which “European ideas, values, policies, culture and organisational principles and practices” are transferred from the EU to member states (Flockhart, 2006: 86). He also identifies as a prerequisite for Europeanisation the development of a common consciousness related to a “European identity and a European idea set” (Flockhart, 2006: 89). Thus the development of a common consciousness related to the CSDP, is due to two factors: the new security identity establishment (which was partially implemented with the introduction of the ESS 2003) and the introduction of a common strategic culture.

All these arguments describe many causes, reasons and facilitating factors, but eventually they are all related to the “degree of misfit between the EU and domestic institutions and policies” (Ladrech, 2010: 35). Börzel describes this misfit as the “adaptational pressures needed in order to rebalance the domestic distribution of resources”, and identifies two types of misfit: the policy misfit between EU rules and regulations and the domestic policies misfit (Börzel, 1999: 574-5). For Börzel and Risse, this misfit reflects the inconvenience/incompatibility between EU-level processes and domestic-level processes caused by Europeanisation, whose existence, constitutes the first condition for change (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 56-57). The second condition, according to Börzel and Risse, is the contribution of various facilitating factors to change (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 56-57). These factors contribute in terms of facilitating or obstructing the Europeanisation process. Thus an anticipated positive impact/result is directly related to the identification of facilitating factors/mechanisms which contribute to a successful Europeanisation outcome. Knill and Lehmkuhl, by suggesting a threefold classification of the Europeanisation impact (positive integration, negative integration and framing) (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999), also come to the same conclusion regarding the importance of facilitating factors. Their classification contributes to the misfit analysis by incorporating the following: elements of institutional compatibility amongst EU-level and domestic arrangements, change of domestic structures, redistribution of power and resources amongst domestic actors and most importantly, change of beliefs and expectations of domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999: 11). These elements after being correlated with the findings of historical and causal analysis (which is done below) contribute to the clarification of key facilitating factors, responsible for the implementation of Europeanisation policies. Radaelli further investigated policy transfer issues and related those to mechanisms of coercion, mimetism, policy diffusion pressures and “induced cognitive convergence” (Radaelli, 2000: 16). In addition, Radaelli identified the power of “the Europeanisation of policy”
while describing its impact in terms of triggering “processes of transformation of the state” (Radaelli, 2000: 26). Radaelli’s argument is extremely important as it views “Europeanisation of policy making” as a unique Europeanisation force which goes beyond the classical intergovernmentalism-supranationalism debate. Risse, Cowles and Caparaso, who also adopt Radaelli’s perspective, notice that all member states adapt to the Europeanisation process regardless of traditional debates related to the strengthening or weakening of the state, and that this mechanism is labelled “goodness of fit” (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 2,6-8). They have, also, identified five mediating (institutional) factors that either assist or block structural change: multiple veto points, facilitating formal institutions, political and organisational cultures, differential empowerment of actors and learning. These factors may be divided to those which affect structure (the first three) and those that affect agency (the last two) (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 7,11). All these factors one way or another influenced the inception and sustainability of common security and defence. Specifically, the fact that CSDP decisions must be unanimous reflects in part the logic of multiple veto points as it makes it more difficult for institutional changes to be introduced, therefore fosters Europeanisation. From a different perspective, this approach may be viewed as a safeguard for a bottom-up Europeanisation approach, which guarantees better and permanent change. Therefore, even though the anticipated effort for change is bigger (due to political, organisational and cultural obstacles), Europeanisation would be more effective (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 14; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 6-9; Kerwer and Teutsch, 2001: 28,29), as it would incorporate substantial change related to learning and institutional learning. Thus the bigger the change, the more important the mechanisms of Europeanisation become.

Risse, Cowles and Caparaso elaborated further on the concept of Europeanisation by introducing a three-step Europeanisation approach, which includes the following: Europeanisation process (identify EU processes), goodness of fit (identify compatibility) and mediating factors (type of adaptational pressure identification) (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 2,11,14; Bache, 2008: 11). The outcome derived from the interaction between the successful Europeanisation and adaptational mechanisms in the presence of facilitating factors (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 12). Their model is presented in the figure below.
In a similar perspective, Jacobson further analysed the factors that affect the impact of EU (Ku et al., 2001: 20). Olsen summarised this as follows: more precise legal foundation; preference on hard law rather than soft law (actual binding responsibilities and rights than lack of direct binding/obligations); direct involvement of the affected parties in the development of the arrangement; independence of their secretariat; single headed secretariat; and greater financial autonomy of the institution or regime (Olsen, 2002: 933). Lodge, also, distinguished four sources or triggers of Europeanisation, which are: coercive (with three subcategories: EU legislation, EU court of justice and EU commission executive acts), mimetic (with two subcategories: civil servants interaction leading to best practice, national coordination networks), professionalization (with two subcategories: policy networks transnationalisation of societal actors spill over) and domestic politics (with three subcategories: strategic competitive adjustment of domestic institutions and regulations, shaping domestic policy through legitimising specific policy beliefs and option, lobbing of elite groups as a driving force for domestic adjustment) (Lodge, 2002: 46-47; Massey, 2004: 25). Both Jacobson and Lodge’s observations went exactly to the heart of Europeanisation and reflect an important element of this analysis. Jacobson’s factors constitute a prescription for the success of new institutions related to Europeanisation, while Lodge’s sources/triggers indicate the potential origins of Europeanisation. Regarding Jacobson’s approach, we may identify several of his factors in the ESS 2003 document and subsequent update. On the other hand, Lodge’s observations provide a compass for the identification of potential Europeanisation cores. Noteworthy is that Lodge’s observations may be used in causal analysis as well as in the identification and
establishment of new Europeanisation triggers/sources. The following figure depicts these triggers and their subcategories:

![Figure 2: Europeanisation Triggers (Lodge, 2002: 49)](image-url)

Börzel in her analysis also focuses on the governmental perspective of Europeanisation by identifying Europeanisation as a two way process (bottom up and top-down) and distinguishes between those governments that successfully uploaded policies (pace-setters), those that didn’t upload in an effort to delay or obstruct the process (foot-draggers), and those that do neither but instead build coalitions with the above governments (fence-sitters) (Börzel, 2002: 193,194). In the same prospect, Buller notices that the uneven impact of Europeanisation on EU member states is related to the way that the adaptational pressures are being implemented due to differing domestic circumstances, what is known as goodness of fit (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 13). In his later works, Buller underlines the need (noted also by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso) for systematic study of “why, how and under what condition” Europeanisation impacts on
domestic structures (Buller, 2003: 529). Following these leads, Marginson argued that regime competition may reverse top-down Europeanisation and result –paradoxically– in “encouraging processes of cross-border learning and collaboration” (Marginson, 2006: 102). Radaelli also linked deep Europeanisation with learning as a means to create growth and jobs (Radaelli, 2008: 240). Thus, CSDP Europeanisation progress, according to Marginson and Radaelli, is linked to the Europeanisation of Member States’ defence industry. Therefore it is significant for CSDP Europeanisation to identify learning mechanisms and patterns, especially the ones that promote cross-border collaboration in EU defence industry. This is illustrated, in the next chapters where systematic study of “why, how and under what condition” is applied in an attempt to reveal mechanisms, triggers and factors related to Europeanisation.

Radaelli has, also, done significant work on the mechanisms of Europeanisation by mapping those mechanisms. Radaelli’s mapping is depicted in the following figure.

![Figure 3: Mechanisms of Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003: 41)](image)

Radaelli’s mapping of Europeanisation mechanisms constitutes a safe-path for any researcher (including this one) and policy maker who wishes to identify or facilitate Europeanisation. Hence, picking up the most appropriate mechanism produces a more forceful Europeanisation impact. In this regard, Radaelli noted two types of Europeanisation mechanisms: vertical and horizontal (Radaelli, 2003: 41). He argued that vertical mechanisms are related to pressure for policies to adapt from national to EU-level, while horizontal mechanisms incorporate different framing forms and are applicable in cases where there is “no pressure to conform to EU policy models” (Radaelli, 2003: 41). Noteworthy is that the CSDP Europeanisation, which is linked with the Europeanisation of EU defence industry constitutes a case where horizontal and
vertical mechanisms coexist. That is due to the fact that CSDP was created in a pooling-and-sharing volunteer model, without any pressure to conform, and to that extend constitutes a horizontal model. Likewise, EU defence industry Europeanisation was initiated in a market context and on patterns of socialisation (cooperative funded projects) both of which constitute a horizontal mechanism. However, the creation of a legal framework and structures for CSDP to be operational could presage a change from a horizontal to a vertical model. In addition, the emergence of CSDP military missions, confirms the above. On the other hand, the creation of EDA and the Single Industrial Base reflects a shift away from the market and toward an EU model. This approach, though more complex, is much more appropriate than that of Risse, Green, Cowles and Caporaso’s. Saurugger underlines the limitations in Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso’s approach and identifies, based on the earlier work of Schmidt, Europeanisation as a circular (or two-way) process (Schmidt, 2002: 143-144; Saurugger, 2005: 291,301). Bache, also, identifies two limitations in the Risse, Cowles and Caparaso approach: that they model Europeanisation as a linear process (not as dynamic and circular) [as Saurugger does] and that they do not model the effects of domestic processes that proceed in relative isolation from the BU (Bache, 2008: 17-18). Bache has moved further and proposed an adjustment to the Saurugger schema in an attempt to incorporate both the potential for complex causality and noncomplex causality (Bache, 2008: 18-19). Complex causality, according to Braumoeller, refers to cases in which several different combinations of conditions result in an outcome (Braumoeller, 2004: 210). Hence, complex and noncomplex causality “offer alternative explanations for Europeanisation which may occur simultaneously and offer part of the explanation” (Bache, 2008: 18). The proposed adjustment is depicted in the following figure:
Ladrech has updated and expanded the Risse, Cowles and Caporaso’s model by embedding mediating institutions and actors’ practices into a more comprehensive setting (Ladrech, 2010: 41-42). The mediating variables include: cycle of reform, facilitating institutions, multiple veto points, political and organisational cultures, differential empowerment of actors, learning and political or partisan conflict (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 6; Bache, 2008: 17). These variables are significant for the Europeanisation process as they regulate the upload and download of policies in an attempt to facilitate change. In view of Ladrech’s argument that change constitutes a process of socialisation and learning (Ladrech, 2010: 35), we may conclude that other mediating factors can be linked to learning, e.g., the cycle of reform may be linked to the timeframe of learning (which takes roughly a decade); facilitating institutions gradual influence which is related to learning; political and organisational cultures as areas where socialization and learning may result in substantive change. Hence, the significance of learning: it is a key element of the facilitating factors for achieving Europeanisation and it is compatible with complex and noncomplex causality, which means that learning may affect factors that have not yet matured. In addition, it may be considered as more appropriate than goodness of fit as it does not incorporate pressure or narrow realisation timeframe, and thus does not raise opposition to change in contrast to other mechanisms. In any case learning may be viewed as a slow but effective force for change and a major contributor to Europeanisation.
2.8 Learning and related mechanisms

Learning and Europeanisation are interrelated issues which co-evolve. Learning despite its long-term impact, constitutes an important means of Europeanisation. Learning’s significance is related to its dynamic ability to penetrate as if by osmosis. Therefore the affected parties are willing to learn and have opted for change. This approach acquires added significance when it comes to CSDP Europeanisation in that it reflects the Member States’ sharing-and-pooling (volunteer) effort. Hence switching to a unified and operational security and defence approach would require political will on the part of Member States for change and sufficient time to adjust. Such an approach may derive by the learning associated with the Europeanisation mechanism.

The importance of learning as a means to Europeanisation was highlighted by several researchers. Saurugger, drawing on the work of Knill, Lehmkuhl and Caparaso and learning, identifies learning as “one of the main mechanisms of Europeanisation” (Saurugger, 2005: 297). Clark and Jones relate Europeanisation to territorially-oriented processes, which comprise a “myriad socialisation and learning processes that have been configured over centuries by distinctive patterns of European government and power” (Clark and Jones, 2008: 31). Bache views learning under an institutionalisation perspective, as a more complex process of social learning (Bache, 2008: 12). He also considers the learning process as a feature of change both in terms of readjustment of actor strategies that allows them to achieve stable objectives in a new context (thin learning) or as a process of modification of actors' values and thus a reshaping of their preferences and goals (thick learning) (Bache, 2008: 13-14). In the context of CSDP both approaches have been realised. Thin learning was achieved when the EU security and defence goal seemed to be jeopardised after the end of the cold war in view of US declining interest in European regional security. On the other hand, thick learning was on-the-go prior the end of the cold war, and contributed to the reshaping of EU regional security, with the late-1990s initiatives for autonomous security and defence.

However, the key question of why choose the learning mechanism admits of a very simple answer: because politicians and “policy makers focus on those aspects of an issue which they can understand” (conception) (Sabatier, 1978: 408). This becomes clearer if we consider the cold-war conception of security which has been an obstacle to change. In this light, learning is linked to understanding while understanding enables more learning to take place. The relation of understanding and learning, in political terms, was developed by Heclo. In 1974, Heclo defines “political learning” as an
activity undertaken by policy makers in response to changes in the external policy environment (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 276,277). Heclo considered political learning as a governmental response to social or other environmental stimuli (Birkland, 2006: 12). Etheredge linked learning to governments in his “governmental learning”, which he used to describe the process by which governments enhance the effectiveness of their actions by increasing their abilities (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 276,277). The increase in governments’ abilities was also described by Hall, who considered learning to be a deliberate attempt for readjustment of means, by using all the latest available information, in order to avoid past policy failures and “attain the ultimate object of governance” (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993: 14). Therefore governments’ learning in the 1990s became a stepping stone for the inception of CSDP and the continuation of governmental learning and may have contributed to the sustainability of CSDP. However, obstacles to governmental learning may result in problems with CSDP.

Trying to trace the reasons for the success or failure of policy-making processes, Hall associates the learning process with “third-order changes” originating with society (social learning) and in the political arena (ideas in politics) (Hall, 1993: 288,289). According to this argument, the identification of any emerging snags in governments’ learning and policy-making originates in society and the political sphere. Thus applying causal analysis in both areas would assist in the identification of new social learning objectives and ideas which could facilitate change. Such aims and ideas may be linked with the creation of new institutions which would include a new security identity and a common strategic culture.

March and Olsen highlighted the role of institutions and argued that “institutions accumulate historical experience through learning” and that institutional factors affect key features of the learning process. (March and Olsen, 1984: 745,746). Howlett and Ramesh argue that theories of policy learning are related to “instrument choice” while they offer an opportunity for furthering our understanding of this instrument (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993: 3,14). This instrument is directly related to decision-makers’ preferences (political decision making) and social acceptance. (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993: 13) Regarding the learning process, Howlett and Ramesh distinguished three dimensions which affect the choice of policy instruments: the inter-temporal, the inter-sectoral and the cross-national (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993: 17). Sabatier directly linked learning with implementing policies, techniques and processes while he considers the core values behind the policies to be less relevant for the learning process (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993: 14). Rose also introduces a learning relevant approach, the “lesson-
drawing” approach, under which processes and programmes are being transferred and diffused through the world (Rose, 1991: 3,6). In the same spirit, Sabatier and Smith relate policy-oriented learning to policy innovation and change, while they underline the fact that learning may be significantly enhanced by external events (Sabatier, 1988). This combination of learning and external events is directly related to the CSDP implementation. Indeed, as stated earlier, the decline in the US interest in European regional security after the end of the Cold War provided a window of opportunity for alternative approaches to security and defence, especially in the view of declining military budgets and NATO’s search for a new identity. The Persian Gulf War was the external event that triggered change.

On the other hand, Levy just like Sabatier and Smith, considers that learning itself does not provide a complete explanation for policy changes while it may be directly affected by external events, or in Levy’s words: “by individual policy preferences” (Levy, 1994: 312). Risse, Cowles and Caparaso relate learning to differential empowerment and redistribution of power resources which eventually result in structural change (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 11-12). According to their argument, learning mechanisms may “lead to fundamental changes in actor’s interests and identities” and result to Europeanisation (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 12; Levy, 1994: 290; Bache, 2008: 17).

However, learning’s impact on change is not always the same. Learning comes at different levels and frequencies. Regarding the levels of learning, Levy distinguished between simple and complex learning, where “in "simple learning new information leads to a change in means but not in ends, and in complex learning a recognition of conflicts among values leads to a modification of goals as well as means” (Levy, 1994: 286). In the CSDP context, both types can be encountered. The information related to the post-Cold War new security environment (US decline, defence budgets’ decline, imminent threats/Gulf War/NATO quest for a new Identity) leads to change in the means of defence and security throughout the development of an alternative to NATO. The new security environment and the emergence of CSDP reflect complex learning, which triggers conflict between security and defence providers (value) and leads to modification of means (NATO and CSDP as security providers).

In a different perspective, Bennett and Howlett, investigated the learning process, in terms of understanding the effect and impact of learning on policy change which resulted in a synthesis of perspectives (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 289). In total, Bennett and Howlett, drawing on Heclo, Etheredge, Sabatier, Weiss and Rose,
identified five conceptions of learning with important implications for policy formation: political learning, government learning, policy-oriented learning, lesson drawing and social learning - (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 276-277). In addition, they accepted that learning is a complex phenomenon which affects decision making organisations and processes, uses instruments and programs to realise policies and that each type of learning is different (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 289). The relation of policy change to learning is illustrated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEARNING TYPE</th>
<th>WHO LEARNS</th>
<th>LEARNS WHAT</th>
<th>TO WHAT EFFECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Learning</td>
<td>State Officials</td>
<td>Process-Related</td>
<td>Organizational Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson-Drawing</td>
<td>Policy Networks</td>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>Program Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Learning</td>
<td>Policy Communities</td>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>Paradigm Shift</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Three types of learning and policy change (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 289)

Drawing on the above aspects and on Bennett and Howlett’s work (that reconception of government learning, lesson drawing and social learning is needed) (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 289) one may conclude that change is related to processes, instruments and ideas. These three aspects of learning interact with and have two areas of application: governments and EU governance. Levy distinguishes the governmental learning, as “more problematic than the organisational learning” due to the aggregation aspect of learning, where multiple individuals and organisations create an unresolved dynamic mixture (Levy, 1994: 289). This broad range of application is linked to the broad range of Europeanisation concepts, which in turn may result in conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970: 1034).
2.9 Further clarification of Europeanisation methodological approach in relation to mechanisms

Causal conceptual stretching (all explaining factor), misinterpretations and exaggerations are common in research work. Thus conceptual stretching when investigating the interrelation between Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003: 27) and CSDP is no exception. On the other hand, misinterpretations may occur when confusing Europeanisation with the impact and results of globalisation. In this context, Haverland argues that economic globalisation may trigger changes similar to Europeanisation (Haverland, 2007: 69) and suggested a threefold research strategy in an attempt to confront these issues (Haverland, 2006: 134-146; Haverland, 2007: 59-87). Haverland’s strategy aimed at answering the question of whether and to what extent the EU itself matters in accounting for the causal effects of the following variables: process tracing, counterfactual reasoning and the inclusion of non-EU cases for quasi-experimental control (Ladrech, 2010: 40). This analysis uses process tracing and counterfactual reasoning as a means for identifying key Europeanisation factors related to CSDP. In doing so, the analysis turns on the identification of Europeanisation in EU defence industry on account of the special relationship between CSDP and defence industry. These factors are being identified along with Radaelli’s Europeanisation mechanisms of negative integration and framing.

Regarding globalisation misinterpretations, Risse, Cowles and Caparaso, provide a solution which incorporates careful process-tracing in relation to the time-frame of EU policies realisation (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 4). Hence, the process tracing research strategy is implemented according to Ladrech, by extraction of observable implications, at EU level, and their correlation with “what, how and when it will happen” (Ladrech, 2010: 40-41). However, the identification of the observable implications and theories (processes), as Risse, Cowles and Caparaso emphasise, depends on the questions the researcher poses (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 6). In the context of this analysis, the key questions are: is there substantive Europeanisation in CSDP and what are the factors that have affected its development?

In another analytic approach, related to process tracing, the utilisation of forward or backward mapping research implementation is used. As Elmore noted, forward mapping focuses on policymakers’ manipulation tools (“funding formulas; formal organisational structures; authority relationships among administrative units; regulations; and administrative controls”) and backward mapping, which focuses on
policymakers’ indirect manipulation tools (“knowledge and problem-solving ability of lower-level administrators; incentive structures that operate on the subjects of policy; bargaining relationships among political actors at various levels of the implementation process; and the strategic use of funds to affect discretionary choices”) (Elmore, 1979: 605). Of course, all these levels of analysis refer to the acquisition and processing of raw data, delivered from the researcher’s questions. In this respect there are two fundamental approaches to process data: Qualitative and quantitative.

Both qualitative and quantitative approaches try to answer the research questions using empirical data, but qualitative research is mostly based on descriptive data (Marvasti, 2004: 124). Saurugger argues that it is a methodological challenge to measure change in relation to the Europeanisation process (Saurugger, 2005) as quantitative measurement of Europeanisation may prove elusive (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 14,15). Marvasti notes that qualitative research analysis focuses on social practices while theory and methods are considered to be inseparable (Marvasti, 2004: 11-12). Hence, the qualitative approach may be considered as more appropriate for the current analysis of the impact of Europeanisation due to the fact that the CSDP represents a rather complex matter, with sensitive security policies and armaments’ programs which includes different, and in many cases intertwined actors, namely, political, bureaucratic, industrial, companies, markets and the community pillar of EU (Morth and Britz, 2004: 958). This thesis, following Elmore’s approach begins with a statement of the policy-makers’ objectives (Elmore, 1979: 602), which in this case are – as agreed by EU Member states- the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) official documents. In this regard, and in the interest of avoiding conceptual stress, the exclusion of spuriously similar factors, careful process tracing, observable theories and results, forward and backward mapping, Radaelli’s mechanisms and the learning mechanism dynamics, the utilisation of the conceptualisation documents of the CSDP and of the ISS are all implemented. Specifically: the document presented by J. Solana: “A secure Europe in a better World” (2003), the document “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World” (17104/08), the document “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action- Five steps towards a more secure Europe” (7120/10), the “Second report on the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy” (COM (2013) 179 final) and the document “The final implementation report of the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010-2014” (COM 2014/365 final). These documents reflect the common approach decided by EU member states on a common political basis (Chappell, 2012: 72); therefore they
represent the common conceptualisation of key of European security aspects. Security strategies constitute a starting point for an organisation’s aims, interests and tools concerning security and defence (Chappell, 2012: 109,110). In addition, the realisation of a conceptual framework for the CSDP may be said to reflect an Europeanisation approach through the identification of Europeanisation mechanisms and particular of learning mechanisms, where goals are set and results are anticipated. The expected results –as depicted in the reports- capture changed conditions brought about by Europeanisation mechanisms.

2.10 Identifying Europeanisation in the CSDP

The measurement of progress in Europeanisation, especially during the last two decades indicated significant progress due to the conceptualisation of the Europeanisation process and the identification of Europeanisation mechanisms. The reason for this progress may be attributed to the events of the early-1990s which contributed to the removal of invincible barriers linked to cold-war conceptualisation of security and defence, including NATO’s primacy as security and defence provider. Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, highlighted Øhrgaard’s argument, according to which “mainstream European integration theory has excluded by assumption cooperation in the security and defence fields” (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011: 8). Jacobs argues along the same lines, that relevant studies on ESDP/CSDP Europeanisation of the administration (administrative adaptation) have been rare (Jacobs, 2012: 468). These arguments account for the small number of articles on Europeanisation and the CSDP. Hence, the “Europeanisation infant” seems to be taking its first steps under the CSDP implementation and through a shared approach by the member states, implying that CSDP is politically and military active (Chappell, 2012: 73). In this respect, Jacobs argues that Europeanisation has occurred (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 536), “in the sense that ESDP/CSDP triggered the acknowledgment that coordination was needed”, though the results were limited by way of institutional outcomes (Jacobs, 2012: 482).

A much clearer view of progress made in the Europeanisation of CSDP may be inferred from the ESS and ISS documents. The ESS and ISS documents may be viewed as a process tracing tool for CSDP due to the fact that CSDP is thought of as a crisis management tool (Jegen and Mérand, 2014: 195). Regarding the ESS in particular, Liaropoulos argues that the ESS “emphasises the role of the European integration,” and
“may be perceived as an indication of what the EU is willing and can perform” (Liaropoulos, 2012: 5,6). Similarly, Biscop argues that the ESS derived from the “converging motivations of those in support of and those against the invasion” in Iraq (Biscop, 2012: 1302). In any case, both ESS and ISS documents delineates a map which incorporates information regarding Member States’ conceptualisation of what constitutes a threat, and specific (lowest common denominator) directions regarding the structures, mechanisms and administration of CSDP.

Drawing on the aforementioned methodological approaches and relative to the ESS and ISS documents, the anticipated analysis’ results, are expected to indicate variations of change/no change (Table 16: Internal Security Strategy objectives, actions and adaptation: 2010-2014). However, in those cases where ESS shows no influence or no change (inertia) or even opposition (retrenchment), and in the where ISS is viewed in isolation from the CDSP or as opposite to EU integration - EU reality asserts itself. The first case, may also reflect a misfit between EU and domestic institutions (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 222-223; Buller, 2003: 533). Ladrech (in continuance to Adrienne et al) agrees and argues that opposition to domestic changes is also evidence of Europeanisation and may be a result of the absence of mediating factors/mechanisms (Ladrech, 2010: 33,36). Massey, too, highlights the fact that even when new institutions result from Europeanisation, the existing institutional actors inevitably modify their behavior in light of EU imposed exigencies (Massey, 2004: 27). This phenomenon captures the uniqueness of EU.

Indeed, the EU has been and remains a unique political phenomenon in world’s history. Critical elements of the EU, such as pooling of sovereignty, EU parliament and other EU institutions represent “constitutive norms of a polity which is different to existing states and international relations” (Manners, 2002: 253). Drawing on Manners, Kaldor adds that the new hybrid polity constitutes a new form of regional governance which is designed to retain the “dangerous tendencies for both economic and military unilateralism” (Kaldor, 2012: 81). Similarly, Bache emphasises the connection between EU policies, practices and preferences “voluntarily used to shape domestic policies and practices as a result of actor preferences changing through engagement with the EU”, with deep Europeanisation (Bache, 2008: 19-20). On the other hand, Jegen and Mérand argue that “EU defence policy has not substantially shaped national defence policies,” despite the establishment of a “real social structure” to support this policy (Jegen and Mérand, 2014: 198).
However, formal EU documents indicate otherwise. A comparison of the initial ESS 2003 document with the ESS 2008 report illustrates the initial common conception and the progress that followed CSDP. These documents describe the critical areas for the ESS 2003 (European Council, 2003), the ESS 2008 (report) (European Council, 2008), the update period and the resulting policies. The ESS (2003) was considered as a broad approach to security, which reflected the widening and deepening of the international security agenda (Zwolski, 2012: 70; Kaňa and Mynarzová, 2012: 105), and the need to address new threats with both military and not-military instruments (Burgess, 2009: 322). However, as Biava, Drent and Herd note, the ESS 2003 reflects the priority of hard security capability (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1236). Their argument indicates something more than the Member States’ resolve for autonomous security and defence; it indicates a change in the conception and handling of security and defence opposed to NATO’s primacy and shaped by the new security environment.

A careful comparison of these documents indicates that the 2003 and 2008 conceptualisation and goals, have in turn resulted in further change. It is noteworthy that the ESS 2008 report, which was produced during the EU French Presidency, reflects a superior integration and operation that “clarifies the types of military and civilian capabilities the EU needed to acquire, and explains in greater detail the operational tasks” (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1236). Regarding the policies that remain in operation, Jacobs made an important observation: the reason for resistance to change may be found in a combination of internal institutional and political factors, without –of course- rejecting external factors (Jacobs, 2012: 485).

This approach reflects an on-going Europeanisation process, where common policies and strategies give birth to new policies and strategies and produce further Europeanisation. These processes incorporate both horizontal and vertical Europeanisation. Prior to the emergence of CSDP there was no EU security and defence model and therefore there was no pressure to conform to EU policies that didn’t –yet- exist. This horizontal Europeanisation approach was facilitated by market/environmental factors and socialisation factors/learning, and eventually resulted in the introduction of CSDP. Once CSDP was introduced, vertical Europeanisation mechanisms acquired primacy in terms of conceptualising and framing policies and mechanisms in support of CSDP. Hence, the ESS and ISS documents contain plans for the implementation of these policies and mechanisms and constitute proof of hard-Europeanisation. This is illustrated in the following table (Table 3: ESS/ISS 2003- 2010 Strategies and Policies: resulting goals, policies, instruments and tasks), which is also based on ESS 2003, 2008 (European
Council, 2003; European Council, 2008) and ISS 2010 (European Commission, 2010) documents is an attempt to codify the goals, new tools (specific instruments, tasks) and governance scheme behind the emergent mechanisms. Each of these documents (ESS, ISS) since its inception reflects a security governance scheme which varies from those which are EU oriented, EU-NATO oriented or EU oriented with external cooperation. The ESS 2003 document clearly distances itself from the Bush administration aims of unilateralism and preventive war (Risse, 2012: 91). Another significant point in the ESS 2003 is the establishment of a common conceptualisation of common security threats. Rieker notices that the ESS 2003 represents a more holistic approach to security, which favours conflict prevention and civil military crisis management over military power projection (Rieker, 2006: 510). Silva argues that ESS 2003 “reinforced the EU’s need to improve its ability to act” (Silva, 2015: 56), while Mitzen noted that ESS reflects EU Member States’ self-conscious pursuit of a “grand strategy” (Mitzen, 2015: 65). As a result, this initial conceptualisation further enhanced conceptualisations of new strategies, policies and communications. Chappell summarised the primary functions of the ESS: it outlines the EU’s approach to security and defence, it provides a point of reference for other initiatives to be developed, it enables member states to participate in CSDP missions, and it is a means of “encouragement” for member states to contribute further (Chappell, 2012: 115). Therefore ESS 2003, 2008 and ISS may be considered as an initial Europeanisation framing mechanism. Specifically, in the following table (Table 3: ESS/ISS 2003- 2010 Strategies and Policies: resulting goals, policies, instruments and tasks) the end column to the right indicates the security governance scheme behind the suggested instruments and means. Thus, it represents change. The diversification in the governance scheme traces the diversification of the dominant tendency as between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. It is noteworthy, that this fluctuation reflects the pace of European security integration. In either case, Europeanisation mechanisms in security and defence (since the introduction of ESS 2003) indicate important progress both in terms of further conceptualisation and in operations/ infrastructures implementation. This on-going integration effort in security and defence may be also observed in terms of the Internal Security Strategy.

Critics of the ESS argued that there were limitations and several areas, such as intervention areas, remained unclear. More specifically, Liaropoulos makes two important observations: that ESS does not refer to EU’s global security, and/or military means, showing preference for non-military approaches to security challenges (Liaropoulos, 2012: 5,6). In addition, Biscop emphasises that the ESS provides very
limited guidance regarding intervention areas while no specific ESDP/CSDP strategy was adopted and operational decision making remained ad-hoc (Biscop, 2012: 1304). Furthermore, Biscop considered the ESS 2008 report to be a failure due to lack of specific planning (Biscop, 2012: 1305) argued that both ESS documents (2003 and 2008) lacked a specific strategy (Zwolski, 2012: 78). Bendiek argues that the ESS limitations reflect the “inability of the member states to identify a European national interest” (Bendiek, 2012: 48). Hence, the reason for “the ESS remaining stuck in ambition” was the lone effort by Western European member states “for military and political self reliance” (Bendiek, 2012: 47).

These arguments get more complicated in the context of Zwolski’s approach, under which the ESS’s focus on human security reflects a position framing (new narrative) which fits the new normative reality of the EU (Zwolski, 2012: 71). In addition, Zwolski emphasises Biscop’s claim that security should have been “reserved for issues posing an effective threat of violence” (Zwolski, 2012: 73). One may, then claim that the new normative reality reflects both member states’ will to jointly confront security issues (in an updated fashion) and the will to further analyse these security issues and formulate an operations framework. A new normative aspect introduced by the ESS was the linkage between security and development policy, in terms of humanitarian crisis management. In this respect, Zwolski highlights the Commission’s policy which considers security and development aspects as a precondition for EU relations with third countries (Zwolski, 2012: 71). This new normative reality, in relation to the Commissions’ perspective, has been expressed through CSDP’s humanitarian crisis management operations. Styan, drawing on Sepos’ reasoning, underlines that these operations are “related directly to the EU’s credibility, legitimacy, identity and self-promoting image as a moral and ethical power, a force for good in the world” (Styan, 2012: 656). This argument is directly linked with the common strategic culture of the EU, which constitutes a means of learning and will be investigated in chapter five.
### Strategies and Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESS 2003</th>
<th>aims</th>
<th>instruments type</th>
<th>goals</th>
<th>specific instruments - tasks</th>
<th>governance scheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>introduction of Strategic objectives to be resolved under a common Strategic culture</td>
<td>crisis management, conflict prevention</td>
<td>political, diplomatic, military, civilian, trade, development</td>
<td>(a) develop operations involving both military and civilian capabilities, (b) support UN</td>
<td>(a) establishment of a defence agency, (b) transformation of national militaries, (c) systematic use of pooled and shared assets, (d) combined diplomatic capability, (e) common threat assessments, (f) sharing of intelligence among member states and partners, (g) wider spectrum of missions, (h) EU-NATO permanent arrangements, (i) strengthening CFSP, (j) bringing together different instruments and capabilities</td>
<td>EU oriented (supranational/Europe an)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESS 2008 report</th>
<th>aims</th>
<th>instruments type</th>
<th>goals</th>
<th>specific instruments - tasks</th>
<th>governance scheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We need to strengthen this strategic partnership (EU NATO) in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities (ESS report 2008)</td>
<td>no change noticed</td>
<td>(a) Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key, (b) combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation, (c) putting the appropriate financial mechanisms and systems in place (d) full interoperability between national contingents, (e) military missions: strengthen efforts on: capabilities, mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements, (f) key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO, (g) continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, (h) maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, (i) broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights, (j) mould IMF and other financial institutions, (k) the G8 should be transformed, (l) better communication with the citizens</td>
<td>(a) improve training, (b) building on the European Security and Defence College and (c) the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus, (d) for civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel, (e) These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development (EDA important role in this).</td>
<td>EU - NATO oriented (intergovernmental)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISS (22/11/2010)</th>
<th>aims</th>
<th>instruments type</th>
<th>goals</th>
<th>specific instruments - tasks</th>
<th>governance scheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The realisation of the Internal Security Strategy in Action is the shared responsibility of the EU institutions, Member States and EU agencies EU institutions, Member States and EU agencies. (a) Disrupt international crime networks (b) Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment (c) Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace (d) Strengthen security through border management (e) Increase Europe's resilience to crises and disasters</td>
<td>(a)common policies, legislation shared agenda for Member States, the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council and agencies and others, including civil society and local authorities and practical cooperation in the areas of police and judicial cooperation, border management (b) EU security industry in which manufacturers and service providers work closely together with end-users (c) soft power means with 3rd countries &amp; organisations</td>
<td>This requires an agreed process for implementing the strategy with clear roles and responsibilities (see the Appendix table with 40 objectives analysis)</td>
<td>40 Objectives and Actions (analysis follows in Appendix)</td>
<td>EU oriented (supranational/Europe an) &amp; with USA (for organised crime and terrorism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: ESS/ISS 2003-2010 Strategies and Policies: resulting goals, policies, instruments and tasks**
CSDP is based, on soft-framing horizontal Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2003: 43) due to its non-compulsory character of sharing and pooling of resources. The ESS (2003) reflects a fundamental shared Member States’ conceptualisation of security and defence; it therefore constitutes the first attempt to establish a permanent CSDP structure/model. This initial phase is described by Radaelli as the Framing or modelling process phase and is characterised by lack of a pre-existing model. However, the subsequent ESS (2008) and ISS (2010) reports include more specific objectives than the initial ESS (2003) and reflect the creation/birth of a specialised EU model of CSDP, far removed from the traditional European alliances of the past. Indeed, these documents indicate that the initial framing phase given way to a more coherent model of framing and adaptation than that which resulted from the first stage. These phases incorporate Radaelli’s Europeanisation mechanisms, namely, framing/modelling of new CSDP cooperation schemes and mechanisms, and further expansion and/or readjustment of the existing models (Framing, Coercion, Mimetism and Negative Integration). These interrelationships are presented in the tables below. It is noteworthy that the realisation of these phases occurs under the influence of several facilitating factors (which are also related to Defence Industry) which will be analysed in chapters three, four and five.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>GOALS</th>
<th>Radaelli's Europeanisation Mechanism</th>
<th>Specific instruments - Tasks</th>
<th>Radaelli's Europeanisation Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td>(a) develop operations involving both military and civilian capabilities</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>(a) establishment of a defence agency</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td>(b) support UN</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>(b) transformation of national militaries</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) systematic use of pooled and shared assets</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d) combined diplomatic capability</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e) common threat assessments</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(f) sharing of intelligence among member states and partners</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(g) wider spectrum of missions</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(h) EU - NATO permanent arrangements</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(i) strengthening CFSP</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(j) bringing together different instruments and capabilities</td>
<td>Framing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>GOALS</th>
<th>Radaelli's Europeanisation Mechanism</th>
<th>Specific instruments - Tasks</th>
<th>Radaelli's Europeanisation Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(a) Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>(a) improve training</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetis m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(b) combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>(b) building on the European Security and Defence College</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetis m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(c) putting the appropriate financial mechanisms and systems in place</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>(c) the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetis m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(d) full interoperability between national contingents</td>
<td>Framing/ negative integration</td>
<td>(d) for civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetis m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(e) military missions: strengthen efforts on: capabilities, mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>(e) These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development (EDA important role in this).</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetis m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(f) key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO, (g) continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(h) maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(i) broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(j) mould IMF and other financial institutions</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(k) the G8 should be transformed</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS (2008)</td>
<td>(l) better communication with the citizens</td>
<td>Framing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: ESS 2003-2008 and Europeanisation Mechanisms
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>GOALS</th>
<th>Radaelli's Europeisation Mechanism</th>
<th>Domestic Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>1. Proposal on the use of EU Passenger Name Records</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>2. Possible revision of EU anti-money laundering legislation to enable identification of owners of companies and trusts</td>
<td>Framing (pending)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>3. Strategy on collection, analysis and sharing of information on criminal financial transactions, including training</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>5. Proposal on monitoring and assisting Member States anti-corruption efforts</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>6. Establish a network of national contact points for governmental and regulatory bodies</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (completed)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>7. Actions for enforcement of intellectual property rights and to combat sale of counterfeit goods on internet</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (on-going)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>8. Proposal on third-party confiscation, extended confiscation and non-conviction-based confiscation orders</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>11. Create an EU radicalisation-awareness network with an online forum and EU-wide conferences. Support civil society to expose, translate and challenge violent extremist propaganda</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCUMENT</td>
<td>GOALS</td>
<td>Radaelli’s Europeisation Mechanism</td>
<td>Domestic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>disengagement and rehabilitation</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>14. Framework for freezing terrorist assets</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>15. Implement action plans for preventing access to explosives and chemical, biological radiological and nuclear substances</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (on-going)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>16. Policy for EU extraction and analysis of financial messaging data</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>18. Establishment of an EU cybercrime centre</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>19. Develop capacities for investigation and prosecution of cybercrime</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (on-going)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>20. Establishment of cybercrime incident reporting arrangements and provide guidance for citizens on cyber security and cybercrime</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (on-going)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>21. Guidelines on cooperation in handling illegal content online</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>23. Establishment of European information sharing and alert system (EISAS)</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (completed &amp; on-going)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>25. Pilot operational project at the southern or south-western border of the EU</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>27. Initiatives to improve capabilities for risk analysis and targeting</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>28. Development of national common risk analyses involving police, border guards and customs authorities to identify hot spots at the external borders</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (on-going)</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS( 2010)</td>
<td>29. Suggestions for improving the coordination of checks at the border carried out</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCUMENT</td>
<td>GOALS</td>
<td>Radaelli’s Europeisation Mechanism</td>
<td>Domestic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS(2010)</td>
<td>31. Proposal on the implementation of the solidarity clause</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS(2010)</td>
<td>32. Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (completed)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS(2010)</td>
<td>34. Cross-sectoral overview of possible future natural and man-made risks</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS(2010)</td>
<td>35. Proposal on health threats</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS(2010)</td>
<td>37. Establish a coherent risk management policy</td>
<td>Framing/Coercion/Mimetism/Negative Integration (on-going)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS(2010)</td>
<td>38. Reinforce links between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation functions</td>
<td>Framing (on-going)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS(2010)</td>
<td>40. Proposals for the development of a European Emergency Response Capacity</td>
<td>Framing (completed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: ESS/ISS 2003-2010 and Europeisation Mechanisms
2.11 ISS and CSDP interrelation

The importance of European security, and “the close link between internal and external security” was emphasised in J. Solana’s 2008 report on the implementation of the 2003 ESS (Monar, 2010: 26). The following (2010) ISS approval, was initially described “as an indispensable complement” to the existing 2003 European Security Strategy (Monar, 2010: 28). Along with the ESS introduction, ISS realisation reflects the perception of tackling/confronting “common threats that the union allegedly faces globally” (Guild and Carrera, 2011: 1). Koutrakos argues that the European approach to security reflects the linkage between internal and external security or in his words: “a growing understanding between the internal and external dimensions of security” (Schmidt, 2013: 1259).

In a different perspective, Biscop and Coelmont stress that CSDP focuses on the external security of the Union with a complementary role for internal security, which reflects a potential overlap of CSDP and ISS capabilities (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011: 2,20). Biscop and Coelmont also noted that the diversification between internal and external security may be viewed as a potential weakness of the security of the union and its citizens (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011: 8). Guild and Carrera criticized ISS by arguing that the ISS “lacks an accompanying solid rule of law and liberty strategy” while it serves “exclusively internal security purposes and interests” (Guild and Carrera, 2011: 1). In any case, for EU, the ISS remains “strictly linked to the broader ESS” (Commission, 2014). The focus and the objectives of the ESS and of the ISS were summarised by Mawdsley, and are being illustrated in the following table (Mawdsley, 2013):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Security</th>
<th>ESS Objectives</th>
<th>ISS objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extending the zone of security on Europe’s periphery</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disrupt organised crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting the emergence of a stable and equitable international order, particularly an effective multilateral system</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevent terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking effective countermeasures to new and old threats</td>
<td></td>
<td>Raise levels of security in cyberspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen external borders management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase the EU’s resilience to natural disasters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following the EU commission position, the ISS reports, which are linked to the broader ESS, should be analysed in terms of ESS. Based on Bache’s adaptation of Börzel’s and Risse’s categorisation of domestic responses to the EU, the ISS objectives and actions implementation (2010-2014) reports provide both a conceptualisation of internal security and a progress report. Hence, the importance of the ISS progress reports is linked to evidence of implementation and a time table. The importance of the 2013 (2nd) report is also twofold: it provides a schedule (progress report) of what is being implemented and, a mapping of the new communications, procedures, decisions and mechanisms which result from the initial objectives. Therefore, the ISS report constitutes the second stage of Europeanisation mechanisms, which reflects (post-framing) the application of the model of mixed Europeanisation mechanisms (vertical and horizontal). This mixed model incorporates –as Radaelli described- the horizontal mechanisms (in view of lack of model, therefore no pressure is applied) and the vertical mechanisms (in terms of (a form) adaptational pressure). The factor linking the two is learning and socialisation which emerges along with the ongoing implementation of objectives and actions. These facts reflect the attitude of EU Member States toward Europeanisation as an on-going process.

The ISS reports are presented in the appendix (Table 16: Internal Security Strategy objectives, actions and adaptation: 2010-2014). A closer look at the reports reveals that the cases, for which the European Commission (48, 8%) is responsible, are not ranked, because the adaptation process has already taken place. Also, the adaptation progress is within the EU Commission’s jurisdiction rather than that of the member states. On the other hand, the cases where there is a cooperative scheme (29, 3%) or a joint European Commission and Member states scheme (12, 2%), reflect member states’ will for joint handling of security threats, and therefore the Europeanisation of security. Finally, regarding cases where individual Member States have to assume full responsibility, and where a specific outcome, or communication or common announcement exists, Europeanisation is present due to joint confrontation of security threats. After grouping the findings, an important result uncovers. This additional-result is illustrated in the following smaller table and is related to goal-setting and to responsibility/governance for the resulting policies and strategies. According to this, the European commission accounts for nearly 50% of cases handled, while other cooperative schemes and European Commission-Member states schemes, represent (12, 2% + 29, 3% =) 41, 5%
at the total. Consequently, the fact that EU member states retain responsibility for only 9.8% total of the goals reflects a shift in governance, which is related to the EU integration and the Europeanisation process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Responsibility</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission with Member States</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members (only)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cooperative scheme</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Actions and objectives governance responsibility

Therefore, the ISS communication (as it was initially presented and realised) promotes further Europeanisation in security cooperation at the EU level (Guild and Carrera, 2011: 1). More specifically, the initial ESS and ISS strategies and communications provide a common conceptualisation of European Security, which in turn triggers new strategies, treaties, communications and further conceptualisation of security and defence related mechanisms. Biava, Drent and Herd underline the importance of these strategic documents and their contribution to the learning process, in terms of which the identification of shared norms, socialisation and learning by doing “contribute to spreading and institutionalizing these norms” (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011). In related research, on the ESS impact, Chappell identifies gradual change in the security and defence policies in two member states (Germany and Poland), while arguing that the new security environment had a positive influence on the CSDP realisation (Chappell, 2012: 170). These findings clearly support the presence of Europeanisation. It also constitutes a Learning process and a “Reverse Learning” process, under which the learning process initiates/ triggers new learning process and further Europeanisation. Consequently, the learning processes and the learning impact(s) are, in turn, becoming the driving force behind further learning and further integration.

2.12 Chapter conclusions

Europeanisation reflects a unique phenomenon of EU development which has been and remains important for researchers. However, the research becomes rather complex, when it comes to Europeanisation of European security and the CSDP which
constitutes a new institution and incorporates other (interrelated) areas such as the defence industry. Following questions as to why and how it was developed; how does it work and what is its impact (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011: 12) this research investigates whether there is substantive CSDP Europeanisation.

The objective of this chapter was to identify the existence of substantive Europeanisation in national security and defence of EU Member States. This was done through the utilisation of Radaelli’s definition and attendant criteria for detecting the presence of Europeanisation. Making use of Radaelli’s definition, can be seen throughout this chapter, has been chosen for a number of reasons: it clearly distinguishes between Europeanisation and European integration, it stresses causal elements which drive implementation, it highlights the dynamic relationship between sequential outcomes thus enabling the identification of other contributing factors and mechanisms, (and therefore abstracts from sovereignty issues) and is easy to update in view of all changes taking place both at EU and national levels.

Hence, Radaelli’s definition also incorporates key aspects of other definitions, such as Ladrech’s political and economic incorporation of national politics (Ladrech, 1994: 17), Börzel’s linkage of domestic policy with EU policy making (Börzel, 1999: 574), Risse et al.’s distinct structures of governance at the EU level (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001), Héritier’s dynamic influence running from EU level to Member States’ structures (Héritier, 2001: 3), Buller and Gamble’s distinct modes of EU governance transformation of domestic politics, Olsen’s and Gualini’s political integration, unification and co-evolution of domestic and EU level (Olsen, 2002; Gualini, 2003), and Salgado and Wool’s multidirectional reaction to “Europe” (Salgado Sanchez, 2004).

Therefore, Radaelli’s definition captures the evolution of Europeanisation, which occurred along with the evolution of EU structures and governance. This is reflected in the structure of this chapter, which introduces the debate on Europeanisation in terms of historical (construction) and causal (diffusion) analysis. As a result our analysis of Europeanisation is related to supranational/federal and intergovernmental debates affecting EU’s institutional character and dynamics (institutionalisation). In turn, EU’s institutional character and dynamics are analysed with a view to their impact on EU Security (further institutionalisation- formal, informal rules, procedures). Hence, the identification of mechanisms of change and adaptation and, specifically, of mechanisms related to learning, reveals the presence of Europeanisation in CSDP, in terms of informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ways of doing things as
described in the ESS and ISS documents. Thus, in this chapter, a number of mechanisms underlying Europeanisation, with a significant impact on the Europeanisation of CSDP and of the EU Defence industry, are identified.

These mechanisms, related to both CSDP and EU Defence industry, were described by Radaelli as Framing mechanisms and Negative integration mechanisms due to the fact that they are being realised prior to the existence of a European model. Thus, any Europeanisation mechanism prior to the introduction and conceptualisation of CSDP is related to these categories (Framing and Negative). The conceptualisation of the CSDP role and the creation of supporting, administrative and legal structures constitute the incipient form of EU’s autonomous security and defence model. This new form of institutionalisation is time consuming, or to put it differently, it takes time to learn. The fact that the learning time-frame is estimated to be about a decade and that there is another, pre-existing competing institutional structure for security and defence provision (NATO) complicates the situation.

However, there was substantive progress in the context of establishing the institutional character of CSDP which was reflected in the ESS and ISS goal-setting documents. In this progress an important factor was the shift in EU orientation in the area of security and defence. This shift resulted in a new institutional environment which impacted on intergovernmental cooperation, even that between former adversaries (Spain, Belgium, and Italy) (Börzel, 1999: 593). These aspects support the presence of integration – Europeanisation dynamics. It seems that the deeper the integration the better the conceptualisation, and the better the conceptualisation the higher the potential for further integration and Europeanisation. Therefore it becomes clear that the institutional approach has an important impact on the realisation and future dynamics of the CSDP. The measure of this impact derives from the fact that the institutional approach (as explained above): constitutes a common normative approach; it utilises both sub-approaches (supranational- intergovernmental); it may transcend supranational – intergovernmental logic; it may bridge supranational – intergovernmental lines of reasoning. In addition, it provides an operations framework. Furthermore, it enables conceptualisation and further understanding of EU institutional environment; acts as an enabler for small cores of Europeanisation to emerge and as an enabler for small cores of Europeanisation to operate. Thus it enables action due to circumstantial windows of opportunity (e.g. changes in the balance of power or security environment) but it doesn’t necessarily rule outs overlapping or coexisting of alternative institutions. Therefore the institutional approach may operate smoothly either under
strong political leadership or mere administrative service and may generate—according to its architecture and dynamics—initiatives or simply result in the implementation of politically assigned tasks.

The importance of the above characteristics, deriving from the institutional character of European security, there uses with the operation of other contributing factors. In this spirit, Jones related the EU security integration with the change in the international structure and emphasised that “European states have no reason to cooperate on defence because trust is non-existent in the international system” (Cross, 2013: 47). Bulmer and Radaelli also highlight the fact that Europeanisation is a policy-spreading procedure but it may occur as a result of market-driven causes (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005: 339). Howlett and Ramesh highlight the political factor in decision-making and argue that the political choices remain “bound by political institutions and made by political actors often responding to political pressures” (Howlett and Ramesh, 1993: 5). Biscop underlines the NATO influence in terms of compatibility between the CSDP and NATO, and argues that EU capabilities will remain “a complex puzzle of national and multinational capabilities” (Biscop, 2012: 1310). These claims reflect only a small sample of a growing list of explanatory variables. Drawing on Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, an initial identification of such (external or internal) variables includes: the leadership of some governments (political decision making); the need for rationalisation of the European defence industry (creation of a common defence industrial base); single market creation; increasing costs leading to the need for sharing the defence burden (defence spending decline); the new EU security identity establishment; a common strategic culture; the impact of R&D; the changing balance of power (globalisation); the emerging co-operation between Europeans in terms of NATO (the US influence) (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011: 8). These variables constitute factors that facilitate the development of the Europeanisation mechanisms. In particular the contribution of political decision making to the conceptualisation and framing of CSDP played a tremendous role given that the fragile balance (which included domestic factors, domestic players/groups of interest and external institutional pressure) (NATO/US) had to be retained. In this effort, the EU institutional environment facilitated socialisation and learning as alternatives to Europeanisation mechanisms or mechanisms with a long time-horizon of application. The creation of a single market and—later— the establishment of a common defence industrial base contributed to push things in the indicated direction. The contribution of these factors in conjunction with the Europeanisation mechanisms is related to Negative integration (the removal of
market barriers) and to facilitated coordination and coercion. A comprehensive factor was the defence spending decline which acted as a time-frame compressor in so far as learning goes. The reduced defence spending and the anticipated globalisation thrust defence industry to convergence as a means to avoid internal competition and duplication. Thus coercion and mimetism mechanisms became the tools for convergence and Europeanisation. R&D cooperation programs/projects by EU played an active role in the merging of European firms. These projects, under the funding provision, created several intra-European groups among academics, researchers, developers, governments and businessmen. These groups constituted an intra-EU institutional environment driven by R&D which later facilitated the creation of defence industry mergers and coalitions, by establishing a new EU cooperative culture. This cooperative culture represents a micro-learning environment, where professionals cluster and establish Europeanisation cores, which in turn create further Europeanisation. Such professional groups contributed to Europeanisation (some such as the new EU security identity establishment and the common strategic culture are being examined in the following chapters). Therefore for a better understanding of factors and mechanisms, it is necessary to begin with a brief historical sketch of causal factors and influences.
Chapter 3

3 European Defence Industry evolution in the post-WWII environment

Chapter three identifies, through historical and empirical analysis, the elements that shaped the political initiatives and the institutional environment underlying the emergent Europeanisation process. Focusing on the historical record, the chapter examines the political climate and other factors that contributed to the process of Europeanisation (where the latter is understood along the lines of Radaelli’s definition, i.e., that “Europeanisation consists of processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles [...] incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse” (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4)). The first section of this chapter explores historical events, contributing factors, actors, policy procedures and treaties which, through causation analysis, are identified as relevant to the Europeanisation process. The second section investigates the role of corporatist/interest groups in political decision-making and their impact on the Europeanisation process.

3.1 Introduction

The European Union’s creation was viewed as a response, on the part of European leaders, to recurrent conflict in Europe. The liberalisation after the end of WWII promoted integration among European states (Gillingham, 2003: 4). This integration was further enhanced by the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, in the 1950s, which triggered unification tendencies in the political and economic spheres (Dinan, 2005: 2). The market liberalisation process was considered to be a long-time trend, but not the sole tool of integration. Gillingham underlines Hayek’s argument, in which market liberalisation facilitates institutional, constitutional and legal mechanisms of adaptation and change to operate in the direction of integration (Gillingham, 2003: 311). In this regard, the Europeanisation mechanisms, (framing, learning, negative integration, coercion, mimetism) presented in the previous chapter, may have had a long-term impact on European security integration within the European
institutional environment. The objective of this chapter is to identify the key factors and mechanisms that contributed to the co-evolution of defence policy and defence industry. Thus, emphasis will be placed on the analysis of learning, framing and socialisation mechanisms and factors, as well as on the institutional environment in which they are being realised. Therefore, the identification of historical milestones on the way to European military integration and the post-WWII establishment of CSDP, offers important insights for the comprehension of the EU military industry and CSDP dynamics. An understanding of developments in the European defence industry in the context of European integration (Gillingham, 2003: 28,30), after the end of WWII, is expected to provide valuable information regarding the new EU political environment that emerged at that time. The importance of the role of the USA in post-WWII Europe is reflected in the rearment of European states and the rebuilding of European defence. Indeed, the intense and direct involvement of the USA in rebuilding Europe, set a precedent for a discreet, soft-power approach (Jospeh S. Nye, 2004: 48,129). This approach of the US was further strengthened during the years of the Cold War, and played a pivotal role in the later restructuring and consolidation of Europe’s military industries and the EU’s approach to defence. Following these leads, the analysis is expected to throw light especially on the historical issues that have influenced EU policy-making and external relations, and even EU foreign policy nowadays while contributing to the shaping of a security identity in modern Europe. Merino, Koch and MacRitchie underline the importance of historical analysis in enabling researchers to examine the relations and internal structure of events and improve their research design (Merino, Koch and MacRitchie, 1987: 760). Historical analysis is, also, important for the design of future strategies and avoidance of past mistakes (Santanaya, 1905: 289), while historical awareness is expected to provide politicians and researchers with a deeper understanding of their subject. Hence, as pointed out in chapter two, historical analysis constitutes an important element, especially in terms of institutionalism, institutional environment and learning mechanism (such as the EU and CSDP) (Lane and Ersson, 2000: 30,31; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2; March and Olsen, 1984: 475,476). Therefore, the analysis will establish the importance of domestic decision making and corporatist/groups of interest as well as their contribution to the Europeanisation of Member States’ security and defence.
3.2 Structural changes in the defence industry post WWII

WWII annihilated Europe’s defence and brought the need to rebuild both infrastructure and defence to centre stage. The states had to face the new post-war reality under which they had to balance competing claims with limited resources both domestically and internationally. These claims had an important impact on the ongoing reconstruction process. As a result, the different aspects of reconstruction were influenced both by interstate dynamics and the initiation of the Cold War. In an attempt to better understand these dynamics analysts utilised different period classifications. In her classification, Sköns identifies four main periods without, however, specifying exact dates. The periods are: the first years of rearmaments (US assistance); rebuilding of European defence industrial capabilities; increasing intra-European collaboration; post-cold war restructuring and consolidation of military industries (Sköns, 2011). On the other hand, Edwards’ classification includes three dated periods. The periods are: rebuilding capabilities with US assistance (1945-1960); enhancing EU collaboration and moving away from US relationship (1960-1990); reduction in spending and moving towards EU cost reduction frameworks (1990 – present) (Edwards, 2011: 4). Owen, on the other hand, identifies two phases, which include: an initial attempt to create “national champions in industries” in order to assist national economies (1960-1980); a period of horizontal policies in terms of improving environment and removing protectionist barriers at the national and European levels (1980- present); (Owen, 2012)

For the purposes of this analysis, and drawing on Sköns and Edwards research, five main periods in the post WW II period are considered: The first years of Western European rearmament with U.S. assistance (1945-1954) (Thies, 2009: 143); rebuilding of European defence with a focus on industrial capabilities (1945-1960); increasing intra-European industrial collaboration (1960-1990); post-Cold War restructuring and consolidation to adjust production to new economic conditions and to increase the competitiveness of European arms production (1990-2001); the post-9/11 period which initiated the reorganisation of the global scene, in political, economic and security terms (Edwards, 2011: 4-6). During these periods, Edwards identifies elements of integration in the European defence industry and highlights two determining factors: market liberalisation and political initiatives (Edwards, 2011: 2,14,15). Morth also notices that changes related to the liberalisation of military industry are politically sensitive (Morth, 2000: 179), while Kyriazis highlights the interrelation between the European defence industry and the sustainability of “combat ready” armed forces (Kyriazis, 2014).
Therefore, one could argue that the Europeanisation process with its impact on the overall European defence policy and defence dynamics are strongly influenced inter alia by two key factors: political initiatives and market forces. The joint operation of these factors contributed to the formation of a common security and defence policy, beginning with the St. Malo Treaty. Indeed, the St. Malo Treaty provided the basic conceptualisation of the EU security and defence policy, moving several steps beyond the initial Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) concept, which was proposed during the late 1940s-early 1950s. As Rimanelli explains, WUDO was the “military arm of the Brussels Pact, the defence alliance among Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxemburg, and Netherlands, created by the Brussels Treaty of 1948” (Rimanelli, 2009: 650). On the other hand, the CSDP establishment, marked a new era for the EU defence industry as well. This new era is characterised by the institutional environment which contributed to further integration and helped to overcome existing problems in defence industry and politics. This section aims at analysing the evolving political will, which resulted in the formation of the CSDP. The market dynamics will be analysed in a separate chapter.

3.2.1 The first years of rearmament (1945-1954)

The immediate post war period marked a period of rearmament. Judt estimated Great Britain’s war time expenditures to have been more than half of its Gross National Product (Judt, 2005: 14). During WWII Germany exploited mines, factories, farms, and railways in the occupied thus reducing resources unavailable to local residents. However, the greatest physical destruction took place during the final year of the war caused by Allied bombings (Judt, 2005: 16,17). Nonetheless, there are some cases of significant physical destruction which took occurred as a result of conquest and occupation by the Nazi forces. Such cases include Greece, Yugoslavia and Ukraine. The fiercer the opposition to the occupiers, the largest the physical damage was. It seems that the extensive physical destruction and exhausting of national resources played a major role in the decision to accept US assistance for the rebuilding and rearmament of Europe (Edwards, 2011: 4).

The rearmament of European states was initiated in cooperation with the United States under the Marshall Plan. At the national level, US production was coordinated

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6 The USA Marshall Plan (known as European Recovery Program(ERP) 1947–51 for the rebuilding of a stronger economic foundation for the countries of Europe.
under the 1940 Defence Plant Corporation (DPC)\(^7\). The U.S. supplied arms and other equipment to Europe directly (lend-lease) and then, over time, through licensed production of U.S. weapon systems (Milward, 1979: 72; Klare, 1983: 73; Edwards, 2011: 4). Licensed American technology, allowed for knowledge transfer for mass-production methods and US personnel-management practices (Eichengreen, 2008: 3). National military production within Europe was hence under US direction. This control over armaments and arms production was a key component of US foreign policy. The financial gain generated by armament sales was a key part of US trade policy (Klare, 1983: 74). It is noteworthy that “before the DPC's founding, government-financed capital spending accounted for only 5 per cent of the annual U.S. investment in industrial capital (while) in 1943 […] the government accounted for 67 per cent of U.S. capital investment, utterly transforming not only how much was produced but what was produced” (Hyma, 2012: 44). On the other side of the Atlantic, liberalisation of European economies was pushed via the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (WTO, 1947). Trade liberalisation needed to be accompanied by the establishment of common institutions in Europe for coordinating economic cooperation proposals. However, there was some opposition due to the fact that the introduction of common institutions was seen as a means towards the future integration of European economies (and political unification). This situation changed in 1948, with the European integration movement reaching its apogee (Dinan, 2004: 5). During the 1950s, the objective of economic integration gained momentum following Jean Monnet’s initiatives (Etzioni, 1963: 39; Birkenmeier, Carson and Carson, 2003). Following the ideas and under the guidance of Monnet, Robert Schuman proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which was agreed in 1951 (Europa, 1950) (Gillingham, 2003: 22).

The ECSC laid the foundation for, a second regional agreement, the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and UK establishing the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948. The Treaty, later known as the Brussels Treaty, formulated a plan for collaborative defence in Europe (Notes, 1948: 41). NATO was established the following year. Following this, France proposed the creation of a European Army in 1950 which would have been under the control of the Alliance. This proposal did not come to fruition. However, negotiations and discussion resulted in the

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\(^7\) The DPC was run by a committee of businessmen from all areas of commerce: William Knudsen, Ford's production line organizer and then president of General Motors Co.; Donald Nelson, a vice president at Sears, Roebuck & Co.; and Ralph Budd, president of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad.
signing of the 1952 European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. Following the collapse of EDC, in 1954, Sir Anthony Eden proposed the expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include Germany and Italy. His initiative resulted in the 1954 amendment of Brussels Treaty protocols and the birth of WEU as a new international organisation for promoting unity and encouraging further integration in Europe (Duke, 1996: 168). It is noteworthy that the driving force behind the ECSC and the EDC was Jean Monnet, who clearly deserves the credit for Europe’s first institutions for integration (Gillingham, 2003: 16). Both Monnet and Schuman aimed to produce a spillover effect: once a certain sector became integrated “the complexity of modern economies would force other sectors into similar structures and developments” (Urwin, 2014: 55). Howorth also notes that the story of European integration began with defence, and more specific with the Brussels and Dunkirk treaties (Howorth, 2000: 1). Nonetheless, the integration forces at that time were not strong enough to push beyond the bilateral programmes with the USA and to encourage collective European action (Edwards, 2011: 4).

3.2.2 The rebuilding of the European defence (1945-1960)

During 1945-1960, the creation of a native European defence industry was fuelled by growing nationalist feeling as well as the strengthening of the European economy (Eichengreen, 2008: 129). American equipment was being produced in European countries (Vestel, 1995) while European governments were reluctant to give up control over the defence industry. Acquisitions or the military industry were mostly tied to Research and Development (R&D) and procurement (Converse, 2012: 8). This climate had an important impact on technology transfer, which was further enhanced by extant European capacity which facilitated the assimilation of transferred knowledge. Eichengreen highlights this prospect and notices that Europe’s educational systems were more focused on the assimilation of existing techniques than the creation of new ones (Eichengreen, 2008: 25, 26). These new dynamics were gradually translated into growth. Delbeke and Van der Wee noticed a major shift, during 1950s and 1960s, towards “sectoral and macroeconomic growth and towards the institutional factors associated with this growth” (Delbeke and Van der Wee, 2006: 83). Aitken links progress in the 1950s with the liberalisation of intra-European trade (Aitken, 1973: 885). Despite the robust overall growth the cost of European defence expenditure remained high due to research and development (R&D) costs and duplication by different states (Sköns, 2011: 2). This meant continued dependence on cooperation with the U.S. during late 1970s
and early 1980s through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This on-going dependence helped European countries to realise the need for domestic military production and for autonomy relative to the US (Eichengreen, 2008: 3,4). In this direction, WEU played an important role as a forum for the promotion and development of defence cooperation in Western Europe. During the 60s and 70s, the first cooperative programmes took place between France and Germany, UK and France and between France and Italy (Steinberg, 1992: 5,34,70). These programmes, which reflected bilateral cooperation, survived on the strength of underlying political commitment (Steinberg, 1992: 49). The survival of these programs also indicates they constitute a distinct micro-institutional environment in which socialising forces and learning take place amongst Member States.

3.2.3 Increasing intra-European industrial collaboration (1960-1990)

The third period (from the 1960s to the 1990s) is characterised by the beginnings of collaborative programs in Europe and first steps towards a European-level policy (Sköns, 2011: 2). Especially during the 1960s and early 1970s, robust growth was reflected in an average growth rate of GDP for the 15 EU countries of 5.48% per annum (Nikolaidou, 2008: 274). The impact of this growth resulted in the industry’s gradual detachment from US technology transfers (Edwards, 2011: 4). In addition to this climate, the highly charged atmosphere of the Cold War contributed to the US paternalist attitude but also introduced free trade idealism (Zeiler, 1998: 354). The continuation of US paternalism had consequences. This shift, from a transatlantic to a European-oriented cooperation policy may also be regarded as a result of European opposition to US policies on technology transfer and the limited access to the US armaments market for European companies (Sköns, 2011: 2). The signing of the Rome Treaties, the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Community (EAEC) (Dinnage and Laffineur, 2012: 65,66) created a basis for independence on the US. However, national industrial and employment policies presented severe barriers to European integration in this field. Governments had not matured enough to move to a more competitive environment. Hence, the UK was a first mover in promoting market integration via the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (EFTA, 2011) rather than the EEC. EFTA, which may be considered as a forerunner of (military) market liberalisation (Ben-David, 1993: 671,672,673), was founded in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK and aimed at closer economic co-operation between the Western European
countries. During that time the process of European integration faced several problems (Laursen, 1990: 306). In the early 1970s, the establishment of research production units in an attempt to bridge the integration gap between research and production had very limited results (Eichengreen, 2008: 154,155). Nonetheless, market liberalisation under the EEC and EFTA did not prevent the reduction in co-production of armaments with the US. The reason was that EU defence industries were sufficiently recovered (by the 1960s) “to produce goods without the need for American technology transfers” (Edwards, 2011: 4), thereby weakening US influence over European production. It is noteworthy that “EEC and EFTA were based on different theories of co-operation and integration”: EFTA aimed to enhance cooperation by promoting free trade in industrial goods; the EEC focus was on economic and political union under institutions vested with real powers (Laursen, 1990: 305). The EFTA’s role in market liberalisation was very important: the EFTA countries had achieved free trade among themselves by December 1966, while the withdrawal of UK and Denmark in 1972 had no effect in the subsequent successful negotiation of free trade agreements with the EEC (Laursen, 1990: 311).

Another contributing step towards integration and collaboration was the Independent European Program Group (IEPG). The IEPG was established by NATO, the USA and 13 European NATO states in 1976 with the aim to enhance intra-European arms collaboration. The IEPG was the first step towards an open and competitive market as it enhanced procurement. Sainsbury notes that the IEPG was viewed as a means to remove protectionist barriers in the defence industry both by the US and within Europe (Sainsbury, 1989). However the IEPG didn’t have the expected impact, until Michael Heseltine became chairman of the 1983 Euro group and provided some important boost in terms of strengthening European industrial cooperation (Walker and Gummett, 1989: 429,430). The commissioning of the Vredeling Report, by the IEPG in 1985, was an important step towards industrial competitiveness. Many of the report’s recommendations, which aimed to improve the competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry, were adopted in the IEPG Action plan which was later approved by defence ministers in 1988 (Walker and Gummett, 1989: 430). Walker and Gummett reduced the Action plan into five key elements: opening markets to competition; juste retour (cross border contracts fair returns); technology transfer research and technology systematic cooperation; countries with Less Developed Defence Industries (LDDI) assistance and protection (Walker and Gummett, 1989: 430). On the other side of the Atlantic, it was believed that the Vredeling Report and the Action Plan constituted a response to the fear
of domination of US producers in the European market (U.S. Congress, 1990: 56). This climate was reflected in NATO’s 1991 Copenhagen meeting where the strengthening of NATO’s European pillar was decided (Coëme, 1991: 20). IEPG’s importance and impact derives from the fact that it was linked with the European industrial integration and the European industries tendency to engage in tougher competition (U.S. Congress, 1990: 56). Indeed, the IEPG, provided the EEC with a window of opportunity to move away from WEU cooperation and establish the European Political Co-operation (EPC).

The EPC’s aim was “to maximise the Twelve (member states) influence in international affairs through a single coherent European approach. It is the essential counterpart to progress towards European unity in the Community framework” (European Commission, 1998: 5). The efforts towards integration continued under the 1981 Genscher-Colombo initiative, which aimed at reinvigorating the process of integration and strengthen security cooperation (Peters, 2004: 385). Sutton argues that the Genscher-Colombo initiative aimed to extend the EPC’s sphere of influence beyond economic aspects of security issues (Sutton, 2007: 203). This climate raised concerns in the US regarding NATO’s viability (Peters, 2004: 382). Nevertheless, the West European states’ need for NATO security assurance prevailed (Smith, 2000: 14) and the Genscher-Colombo initiative was unsuccessful.

The transatlantic crisis of the 1980s provided another window of opportunity for West European Cooperation and defence to develop (Smith, 2000: 14). The WEU scheme was revived and resulted in the Rome Declaration (WEU, 1954). The Declaration aimed at strengthening peace and security and enhancing integration and cooperation among member states through WEU institutional reform. This established a foundation for future cooperation in the area of defence. Peters argued that the main reasons behind the Rome Declaration were: to revitalise the European integration process by incorporating foreign and security policy; to re-establish European involvement in foreign affairs; to provide a solid response –in terms of foreign and security European positions and actions- to the US security policy towards Europe (Peters, 2004: 385). European integration also marked important progress, under the Delor’s presidency in the European Commission, in areas such as the economic and monetary union with the objective of creating a single European currency and a single market (Peters, 2004: 387). Considering these, one may observe that European security policies and European institutional structures provide leverage for the Europeanisation processes, though the provision of favourable opportunities and political initiatives.
3.2.4 Post-Cold War restructuring and consolidation (1990-2001)

The fourth period (1990-2001) began after the end of the Cold War in 1991. In the late 1980s to early 1990s, there were new political initiatives. The fall of the Berlin wall signalled a new era characterised by major cuts in the defence industry. The new security environment triggered a series of changes in the European military industry as the traditional collaborative scheme of cooperation, among European military industries, was replaced by market concentration (Schmitt, 2000: 51). The focus of the military industry shifted to R&D European funding programs. This effort intended to suppress duplication and competition within European borders. Nevertheless, during the transformation period, the decrease of European players/competitors in the European defence market led to an increase in international competition, particularly from the US. In this climate, the IEPG (later transferred under the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) in 1992) (Mörth and Britz, 2004: 52)\(^8\) introduced the 1989 European Cooperation for the Long Term in Defence (EUCLID) programme. The 1998 draft Recommendation was seen as a response to deficiencies in European defence R&D spending, avoiding duplication, enhancing coordination and overcoming legal issues (Dumont, 1998). Another initiative with the aim to improve and extend research activities was the introduction of Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO), in 1995, which would operate within the WEU structures (WEAG, 1995). WEAO also undertook the responsibility for managing EUCLID (Mörth and Britz, 2004: 53). However, Vlachos-Dengler argues that WEAO’s core research program EUCLID had limited effectiveness due to limited financial and political support (Vlachos-Dengler, 2015: 87,88). Despite the important initiatives, the limited financing and political support were evident in the new security environment and the changes it triggered. The financial limitations were reflected in the significant decrease in the demand for military equipment. The demand for military equipment in Europe during the period 1989-95 declined by 31 per cent on average, according to SIPRI statistics (Sköns, 2011: 3). Military expenditures were also significantly reduced in Europe.

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\(^8\) WEAG was closed on 23 May 2005 in the view of newly operating European Defence Agency (EDA)
Figure 5: Military expenditure by region in constant US dollars 1988-2014 (SIPRI, 2015)

The following table shows the percent reduction in military expenditure in Europe over the period 1988-1995. Kindly note that the 1991 and 1992 values which are marked with the symbol ". ." indicate that data is unavailable, or that the world or regional estimate is considered too uncertain to be reliable.

| Military expenditure in Europe in constant US dollars (billions), 1988–2014 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 708 | 690 | 621 | . . | 387 | 370 | 361 | 333 |
| Decrease since 1988 | 2.54% | 12.27% | . . | . . | 47.74% | 48.98% | 52.96% |

Table 8: Military expenditure in Europe (SIPRI, 2015)

The reduction in demand led to the closure of several factories, such as the BAE Systems plants at Kingston and the Hatfield and Vickers tank factory (Neal and Taylor, 2001: 346). As Sköns observes, “the combined arms sales of the 50 largest arms-producing companies in Western Europe increased from $57 billion in 1990 to $65 billion in 1996, but this actually represents a fall of about one-fourth in real terms (Sköns, 2011: 3). Considering the fact that the “Top 50” Sköns’s study comprised the leading companies, the overall reduction in defence industry was even larger. Industry consolidation gradually led to an increase in the share of market for the top 50 firms. But this trend did not persist due to lack of confidence in the consolidation process on the part of political leaders. The European political elite lacked the experience and the regulatory tools to support and encourage cooperation. As the changing economic environment called for adaptation, governments reacted sluggishly while the industrial sector had no alternative but to adapt. Guay and Callum highlight the opposition of
domestic companies and governments to acquisitions by foreign firms under fear of sovereignty loss and other political consequences following job losses upon restructuring in the affected firms (Guay and Callum, 2002: 758). More specifically domestic companies were reluctant to follow an uncertain acquisition path abandon “cosy relationships” developed over the years with their “home” defence ministry (Guay and Callum, 2002: 758).

On the other side of the Atlantic, US companies rapidly adjusted (Guay and Callum, 2002: 757) as they were better prepared due to the prevailing competitive field in the domestic defence sector. Hoeffler argues that the US rapid consolidations during the early 1990s, may be considered as an important factor in renewing European integration, perhaps more important than the concurrent changes in the military environment after the Cold War or the development of a European defence policy and globalisation (Hoeffler, 2012: 437). Meijer also highlights the significant impact of the armaments market and the associated economic financial and technological challenges on the transformation of European defence industries (Meijer, 2010: 64). Edwards links the extensive consolidation in the US defence industry with political power initiatives (Edwards, 2011: 6). This argument explains the delay in and slow-pace of consolidation in European military industries, relative to the US (though there are other factors that she mentions) and highlights the role of political initiatives in the process. This can be better understood in view of the fact that political decisions resulted in the introduction of DPC (run by a committee of businessmen), which was responsible for the US defence industries consolidation, as early as the late 1940s. This provided a unique competitive advantage for US defence industries, several decades prior to the EU consolidations initiatives.

In order to understand the relative slow adaptation of EU industries to decreased demand, one must consider the political orientation of European states with their protectionist tradition (Edwards, 2011: 2,3). Moravcsik identified ubiquitous protectionist policies which aimed at keeping redundant industries (Moravcsik, 1990: 67) and underlined the danger of the potential increase in European protectionism along with deeper European integration (Moravcsik, 2005: 24). These facts reflect the opposition both by industries and politicians to the learning and adaptation policies of the EU which lasted until the end of 1990s when the situation became untenable (Guay and Callum, 2002: 758).

What further historical factors affected changes in European defence industry during the last half of the 1990s? The answer to this question may be found in the
preparation and introduction of the Single European Act (SEA)(1992), which led to
many elements of Europeanisation with a view to establishing a single European market
(Zwaan, 1986: 747). Budden argues that the SEA was not intergovernmental in
character but was mainly shaped under the influence of other actors (concerning
structure and ideas) (Budden, 2002: 94). Therefore the existing market players and
political forces needed time to adjust to the emerging new market environment and
economy, after the realisation of SEA. Streit and Mussler underline the strong
interdependence of the political and market system (Streit and Mussler, 1995: 9) and
argue that the market economy represents a self organising system which “requires a
high degree of autonomy and correspondingly allows rather limited control by the
political system” (Streit and Mussler, 1995: 8,9). Regarding the political system
Deighton added a new factor. She linked the SEA’s introduction to Hill and Smith’s
claim that change may have been going on unbeknown to the participants (Deighton,
2002: 722). She also argued that the SEA’s introduction signalled the new
Commission’s participatory role in European political cooperation (Deighton, 2002:
722). These arguments account for subsequent opposition by companies and
governments to the adjustment and consolidation required by the new political and
market environment. These facts also reflect the learning process framework as an
adjustment to Europeanisation mechanism which includes the steps of: introduction of
policy, adjust or opposition, realisation of policy/integration.

The integration process continued in 1992 when another major treaty, which
encapsulates the symbiotic nature of deepening and widening was signed (Dinan, 2004:
4). The Maastricht Treaty (The Maastricht Treaty , 1992) was drafted in 1991 and
signed in 1992. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the 12 member states committed
themselves to the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under
Article (B) which stated “the implementation of a common foreign and security policy
including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead
to a common defence” (The Maastricht Treaty , 1992). In 1995, the EU Council created
the Ad-Hoc Working Party on a European Armaments Policy (POLARM) intend to deal
with armaments policy, exports and security of supply (Mörth, 2003: 43,44). Mörth
highlights POLARM’s argument, under which there are “important market implications
of the issue of armaments” (Mörth, 2003: 126). Mörth and Britz also linked the
armaments issue with both market and defence components (Mörth and Britz, 2004:
964). However POLARM didn’t have the expected results. Britz argues that the limited
impact of POLARM, WEU and WEAG resulted in the introduction of the “Letter of
Intent (LoI), which was followed be a Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of European Defence Industry” (Britz, 2010: 178). The framework of agreement, which was developed by civil servants, provided an alternative safe-path to overcome the intergovernmental limitations of the previous institutions. Britz also highlights the fact that the integration process was driven by intergovernmentalism which reflected –at that time- the lack of regulating laws for EU defence industry or arms production collaboration (Britz, 2010: 178). In this regard, the EU parliament and the Commission intended to fill this gap by drafting additional EU market procurement laws (in arms) and regulations (Britz, 2010: 178). The introduction of EDA in 2003 provided an important safeguard by formalising defence industrial policy and encouraging cooperation (Petrov, 2012: 45). Further analysis on the EDA’s emergence and role will take place in Chapter four. Of course, without the Maastricht treaty’s new normative framework the emergence of EDA would have been unlikely.

Indeed, under the Maastricht Treaty, security and defence were put –for the first time- under a common framework, while a new instrument termed “military capacity” was introduced with a view to coordinate actions in cases of “crisis” management. This new policy was first tested in Kosovo and provided vital information for the future demand of coordinated military production. Despite the fact that there was no direct reference of the CSDP in the Maastricht Treaty, there was later a WEU Declaration on the occasion of the 46th EU Council, which referred to the development of the European security and defence identity (WEU, 1991). The Declaration states that the “WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.” (Treaty on European Union, 1992). Edwards notices that the frameworks and institutions which emerged after 1996 aimed at contributing to the main issue of cost reduction and encourage industrial integration in the EU (Edwards, 2011: 6). Of course, these frameworks and institutions could not have emerged without the fertile ground created by the Maastricht Treaty and market unification efforts.

In November 1996, the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) was created under the WEU to fund armaments research while it was mandated by WEAG (Mörth, 2003: 123). At that time, WEAG and WEAO were viewed as an appropriate arrangement to support a ministerial political forum open to all EU nations (Mörth, 2003: 123). Kenny argues that both WEAG and WEAO assisted in the better
conceptualisation of cooperation limits, in terms of major industrial, technological and financial investments by the participant countries (Kenny, 2006: 492). In the same month, some EU states initiated Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR)⁹ to enhance collaboration. The aim of Member States was not as broad as WEAG/WEAO, but instead focused on smaller multilateral initiatives (Kenny, 2006: 489). Initially, OCCAR had no policy role as its task was strictly to manage projects (Kenny, 2006: 492) and was viewed as “a limited central organisation charged with overseeing financial and administrative business” (Mawdsley, 2003: 98). This can be better understood from the fact that OCCAR’s emergence took place after the end of the Cold War. Mörth and Britz link the origins of OCCAR with the post-Cold War “new possibilities for organising co-operation on armaments” (Mörth and Britz, 2004: 965). They also note that OCCAR and LoI, in contrast to WEAG and WEAO, are not remnants of the Cold War and are based “on exclusive membership and commercial principles” (Mörth and Britz, 2004: 965). WEAG, WEAO, OCCAR and LoI may be considered as important integration forces which created the appropriate institutional and managerial environment. Kenny argues that WEAG, WEAO, OCCAR and LoI have played an important role in accelerating progress towards a common armaments policy (Kenny, 2006: 495). Concerning OCCAR, Mawdsley noted that it was “developed from existing national armaments agencies, which in turn have been ceded their powers by their respective ministries of defence” (Mawdsley, 2004: 97). This argument is consistent with Kenny’s claim, that OCCAR has “laid the foundations for the (later) introduction of the EDA” (Kenny, 2006: 495).

This initiative was followed by others establishing intra-European cooperation schemes. However, the presence of two programmes undermined the existence of a coherent policy and allowed influence by non-European countries, chiefly the US. This deadlock was overcome with the signing of the 1998 Joint Declaration on European Defence by the UK and France, known as St. Malo Declaration (British-French Summit, 1998). The Declaration, which was confirmed at a meeting of the 1999 European Council in Cologne, stated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis” (British-French Summit, 1998). Hence it was the entrepreneurship of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac which led to the launch of ESDP (Moga, 2010: 137). Tony Blair recognised the efficiency gains of

⁹ The Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement was established by an Administrative Arrangement on 12th November 1996 by the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK.
cooperation. In a 1999 press release, he stated that “we can cooperate better, complement each other’s capabilities, have a full range of defence options open to us” (BBC News, 1999). The St. Malo declaration provided a new window of opportunity which enabled several international joint ventures within the EU to be consolidated. The following table illustrates the consolidations which took place during that time (table 9):

- May 1996: BAe and Lagardere form a 50:50 missiles joint venture, Matra BAe Dynamics.
- January 1997: French confirm that Aerospatiale and Dassault will merge.
- December 1997: Raytheon acquires Hughes defence business for $9.5bn.
- April 1998: BAe pays pounds 269m for 35 per cent of Swedish aircraft maker Saab.
- July 1998: France reveals plan to merge Aerospatiale and Lagardere defence interests and float 20 per cent.
- December 1998: BAe indicates it is poised for $23bn merger with DaimlerChrysler Aerospace; GEC announces plans to demerge Marconi and intensifies talks with BAe.

| Table 9: Countdown to consolidation (Harrison, 1999) |

Among the most important company mergers were those between Lockheed and Martin Marietta. The talks between Lockheed Corporation (Grant, 2007: 283-284) and Martin Marietta were initiated during 1994 and the deal was finalised on March 15, 1995. The new partners managed to exploit two main advantages: (a) the complementarities of various business areas and (b) considerable savings from eliminating duplications (Lifshits, 2003: 215-216). During 1996, Lockheed Martin also acquired Lorar Corporation (Grant, 2007: 283-284), while in 2000; Lockheed Martin Control Systems were sold to BAE Systems. Clearly the long pre-existing experience of cooperation within an established institutional environment played its role in the consolidations. Schmitt highlights the importance of cooperation experience in the preparation of mergers between parent companies (Schmitt, 2000: 20). The role of cooperation experience under specific environmental and institutional features (e.g. funded EU R&D projects), is critical and will be further examined in Chapter five.

Thus, cross border market liberalisation cooperation, in conjunction with external market pressure and political initiatives resulted in the consolidation of several
companies. From the viewpoint of largest European players, consolidation was considered as insurance for maintaining a dominant market position. The consolidations continued during 1999, with the UK groups British Aerospace (BAe) and GEC/Marconi merging under BAE Systems. In parallel, French, German and Spanish groups (Aerospatiale Matra of France, DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (Dasa) of Germany, and Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. (CASA) of Spain) created the first European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) (Sköns, 2011: 4). As Bühl explains, this cooperation was more a result of national and EU policies than a market requirement (Bühl, 2004: 37). More specifically Bühl argues that the governments’ (clients) needs for budgetary solutions resulted in defence industries’ search for alternative solutions which would increase access to each other’s markets. Such solutions include mergers and coalitions, joint ventures, teaming arrangements, or acquisitions (Bühl, 2004: 36-37). The following graph illustrates the formation and major acquisitions of EADS during 1985-2005:

Figure 6: EADS major acquisitions 1985-2005 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI, 2011)

Jabko takes the analysis a step further and identifies the strong planning behind the single market creation. In his analysis, Jabko links the single market creation with the reinstitutionalisation of the European economy (Jabko, 2006: 1). More specifically he identifies the market both as a constraint on existing institutional forms and as a
norm of economic organisation, which gradually influence a large number of people until they become fully adapted to the “mechanical reality of the market” (Jabko, 2006: 6). This approach is also part of the European integration mechanism of adaptation, and learning (including social learning). Indeed, the long term motivations of the market building agenda (Jabko, 2006: 27) were a clear indication of the influence of the learning process. As Krizsan and Popa argue, social learning takes place via adaptation to EU norms, “facilitated by the EU with instruments such as persuasion, capacity building, and the promotion of transnational cooperation and exchanges of good practice” (Krizsan and Popa, 2010: 383). Hence, the EU market constitutes a distinctive learning environment where Europeanisation forces are active. However, Jabko distinguishes market forces from the market. More specifically he argues that market reforms were more successful when market forces were least potent; therefore market forces constitute an obstacle to the European market integration progress (Jabko, 2006: 36, 37).

From a different perspective, Barbarouz and Laperche (2013) claim that clientelism was at work as “the individual decision-makers who strongly sponsored the merger project were all coming from defence-oriented companies that formerly merged to create BAE Systems and EADS in the late 1990’s” (Barbarouz and Laperche, 2013: 16). This argument reflects a reality where both market reforms and market forces align themselves under the common goal of viability and expansion through consolidation. This situation also reflects Jabko’s perspective, under which the market players fully adapt to the mechanic reality of the market. Hoeffler identifies this situation as a combination of liberal and protectionist practices (Hoeffler, 2012: 439). Therefore, one may identify the dynamics of the newly introduced market framework, and the attendant pressure on the leading industries to change their strategy. This climate became more intense during the years 1997 to 1999 causing a series of economic, technological and political restructuring. Moreover and despite such intense restructuring, convergence procedures were questioned even when large mergers and acquisitions were taking place in many sectors of the economy. The joint statement by the German Chancellor, the Prime Minister of the UK and the French Prime minister and President on December 9th 1997, reflected the understanding of the need for change and stronger consolidation in Europe (Dickson and Arkley, 1997).

This change was also reflected in the Commission’s 1997 Communication ‘Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence-Related Industries’ (COM (97) 583 final, 1997). The Communication outlined a need for market liberalisation and
identified 14 areas of intervention: Simplification of intra-Community transfers; European Company Statue; Public procurement; Research and Technological Development; Standardisation; Customs duties; Innovation, transfer of technology and small and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs); Competition policy; Exports; Structural funds; taxation; principles for market access; benchmarking; and enlargement; (COM (97) 583 final, 1997). Borchert argues that the communication creates incentives for political cooperation and reveals the true potential of CFSP along with the community path (Borchert, 2001: 186). It is noteworthy is that the commission issued this Communication, without waiting for a new intergovernmental conference and called for restructuring in the defence industry given its dual nature: a major sector in the economy and essential to the CFSP (Morth, 2000: 183). This communication incorporates the key elements of Radaelli’s approach on Europeanisation process: policy making construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal rules and procedures (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4). Indeed, as Morth argues, the communication “reframed the defence equipment issue (so as) to cover both the market and the defence frame” and created a “broader range of issues, actors and inter-organisational activity” (Morth, 2000: 184). The coupling of defence and market issues represents the integration efforts on behalf of the Commission in an attempt to bypass the obstacle of supranational or intergovernmental conceptualisation (Morth, 2000: 184). Though in the first place it may look like an EU integration process, the initiative of the Commission incorporates two elements in relation to Europeanisation: the element of bypassing existing EU governance debates and the element of formulating a market adaption framework which constitutes an institutional framework. Accordingly, many scholars consider as indications of Europeanisation the role of the committee work on EU matters while measure Europeanisation in relation to institutional adaptation by legislatures (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 524). The continuation of initiatives, under the Europeanisation logic, was reflected in the fact that until late 1990s, two new agencies were created in the second pillar of foreign and security policy (Tallberg, 2006: 207). The institutional environment of the EU enabled further Europeanisation initiatives to take place.

Indeed, the security changes initiated from the 1990 to 1999 period resulted in the “Europeanisation of NATO” which enabled the EU defence structure to evolve according to the Union’s requirements (Haine, 2004: 134-136). This became evident with the St.Malo declaration and founding act of the ESDP, in 1998, which underlined the need for “a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology”
(Missiroli, 2004: 69). This step is outlined, in the 1999 Cologne Conclusions: “The Conclusions in Cologne, called for an enlargement of the General Affairs Council” to include defence ministers to set up a permanent committee dedicated to the ESDP/CSDP and an EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre, and to transfer the WEU's operational resources to the European Union (Cologne EU Council, 1999). The Cologne Conclusions and the St. Malo declaration outlined all major steps to be taken in the process of Europeanisation of security and defence: construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of security and defence procedures in an attempt to create crisis management tools. After the establishment of ESDP/CSDP, EU officials worked for two years “to create crisis management tools” (Dijkstra, 2012: 459) which would enable deployment. Apart from a crisis-management tool, EU defence was viewed as a means to restructure the defence industry (Mérand, 2008: 121). Consequently, in 1999, Javier Solana, former NATO secretary\textsuperscript{10}, was nominated Secretary-General of the EU Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy\textsuperscript{11}. His presence in this position marked a new era for CSDP\textsuperscript{12}. At the 1999 meeting of the European Council in Helsinki “The Helsinki Headline Goal 2003” (Council of the European Union, 2003) for military capabilities was established in an attempt by EU states to improve their military capabilities (Aalto et al., 2008). The overarching goal was the realisation by European ministers of defence, of the need for an independent, eligible European military force that should operational by 2003. This would be the first attempt to create a common task force for securing Europe’s interests and would constitute solid evidence of the Europeanisation process. The 1999 war in Kosovo enhanced the Europeanisation initiated by the St. Malo agreement (Haine, 2004: 43). The Kosovo war allowed a real-time operational and technological comparison between US and EU operational forces, as the latter struggled to fight alongside the former. It was clear that they lacked the sophisticated equipment of the US forces. As a result, the lessons from Kosovo (Mérand, 2008: 122), the new security environment, the uncertain US (security) leadership in Europe (Van Ham, 2000: 217,218), the new security needs and the overall economic climate became the actual driving force for reform both in terms of operations coordination and military production coordination (Maior, 2001: 122,123). This pattern of integration in the CSDP and in the military industry couldn’t have emerged were it not for the existing EU institutional framework and political initiatives. In addition, the weaknesses revealed in Kosovo became a driving force behind goals for further

\textsuperscript{10} NATO secretary 1995-1999
\textsuperscript{11} He held these posts from October 1999 until December 2009.
\textsuperscript{12} The official name-change of the policy from ESDP to CSDP was indicated in the Lisbon Treaty
adjustment to the actual field needs. The joint decision for the creation of crisis management tools, the test of Kosovo war and the common decision for adjustments constitute an Europeanisation learning framework. The events that followed verify this claim. The adjustments which were decided at the 1999 Helsinki Summit included reforms for the development of necessary equipment for the participation in multinational operations (Savković, 2010: 28). These adjustments reflect the three step learning approach which is: progress in the (re)conceptualisation of the security and defence needs, the new goals according to these needs and the reforms realisation process. The establishment of the Headline Goal 2003 was a commitment of the member states to reach specific deployment goals and constitutes substantive Europeanisation in the security and defence sector. Mérand argues that the Headline Goal “allowed the European to go beyond institutional debates and focus on something tangible” (Mérand, 2008: 123). The will to establish and realise a tangible result was reflected in the EU defence ministers’ Sintra decision to establish (within the period of a month) temporary structures which included the following: EU Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and military Staff (Van Ham, 2000: 219). Van Ham also notices that changes in the structure of the military industry were on the EU’s agenda in an attempt to provide the ESDP/CSDP with a “solid basis for autonomous action” (Van Ham, 2000: 119). These structures and actions reflect Radaelli’s Europeanisation approach in that they incorporate integration, diffusion and new institutions. Accordingly, the post-St.Malo consolidation resulted in the merger of large European companies which managed to overcome barriers of market integration (legal differences, production, state ownership, cartels, national sentimental) in an attempt to expand their interests. Consolidation included a series of actions by the Commission in order to ensure the success of the emergent cooperative schemes and programmes in the military industry (Guay and Callum, 2002: 766). The 1998 code of conduct on arms exports is a vivid example of these actions. Bauer argues that the code of conduct constitutes a key element of the EU Europeanisation process in the defence industry (Bauer, 2004: 129).

The defence industry, being hit by defence budget reductions, was entering a stage of restructuring. The reductions in defence budgets also affected research and development (R&D), leaving only France, Germany, Sweden and UK as the main suppliers of funds in the above area. On the other side of the ocean, the US maintained R&D funding in order to ensure its future technological superiority and to preserve its market share. However, in Europe, the downsizing of the armaments production
couldn’t be fully realised because of protectionism by national governments. Up until the 1990s European military industries, have sustained their revenues thanks to their respective governments’ orders, in contrast to the US military industries that have been major players in the international weapons market for decades. As Edwards notes, “a key difficulty the European Commission faces in upholding the directive is the culture of national defence-industrial protectionism” (Edwards, 2011: 2). The foundations for Europeanisation in the defence industry and in the common defence and security policy were set. Thus, the historical events that followed were about to challenge the dynamics of the CSDP.

3.2.5 A new world order post 9/11.

The fifth period was initiated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) which (Jayasuriya, 2011) along with the awaking of the Russian Bear (Moon, 2012) and the Chinese Dragon (Dellios, 2005) has produced a new global environment. These events were accompanied by worldwide deflation (Gross, 2006). Under pressure of these events, the EU “agencies and actors worked together to develop a coherent political approach to the crisis”, while terrorism entered the agenda (Howorth, 2003: 22). These facts have had an important impact on defence industry. Golde and Tishler argue that 9/11 and the spread of local disputes (Serbia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Haiti, etc.) during 2000-2003 brought about an increase in defence spending worldwide, which in 2002 amounted to approximately 89% of the 1987 figure (Golde and Tishler, 2004: 676). This climate and the opening of markets strengthened the tendency toward consolidation initiated during the mid 1990s. James argues that the European defence industry’s response to liberalisation and globalisation varies considerably across countries, sectors and firms (James, 2002: 123). He also points out that pan-European consolidation has a transatlantic dimension. (James, 2002: 123). James’ argument throws light on the other factors that influence industry restructuring. According to his argument, the choice of country and the transatlantic preference indicates that (a) economies of scale are decisive in the new corporate schemes and (b) the “process of consolidation is far from over” (Gergorin and Betermier, 2004: 212). Despite the overall atmosphere and cooperation attempts both from European politicians and from the military industry, there was still much uncertainty in the European defence market. This uncertainty was revealed by the unsuccessful attempt of EADS and Finmeccanica to create a joint venture in 2001. The joint venture would have produced a European military aircraft. One year later, in 2002, the British Government decided to join a US
programme for the production of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This decision was followed by other European NATO members to create national-level policies. These policies undermined potential efforts for CSDP. There were several reasons for this including economies of scale and US influence. The response of European governments varied: they were willing to see EU defence industry strengthened though they did not want to commit themselves to the institutionalisation of these goals within EU, OCCAR or NATO (Guay, 2005: 16). This was clearly a decision that depends upon the mix of political and economic factors (Guay, 2005: 16). In any case, consolidation continued. Sköns describes a series of important transnational acquisitions and joint ventures, in the field of defence electronics, beginning in the early 2000s, whose main player include: ThalesRaytheonSystems, Sonar System and ASTRIUM (Sköns, 2011: 4). In the meantime the introduction of European Security Strategy (ESS) and its 2008 update, gave the CSDP “a sense of purpose and direction” (Norheim-Martinsen, 2013: 1).

Meyer notices that the ESS implementation is related with military and civil capabilities, “shared norms, beliefs and ideas regarding the means and ends of defence policy” (Meyer, 2005: 524). According to these claims the role of the ESS is twofold: As an enhancer for the establishment of a common institutional environment in order to enable the CSDP realisation, and as a process and common goals clarification tool. Jolana stressed that the ESS aimed to strengthen the coherence “between development policy and security policy, between actions of the Commission, the Council and the member states” (Solana, 2004: 8). Indeed, both ESS documents (2003, 2008) called for more resources in defence linking capabilities with competitive and robust defence industry (Andersson, 2013: 106). Regarding the later, consolidation was proceeding until mid-2000s. During that time, consolidation met its first obstacle right at the outset. The German government tried to block a French company from buying German Atlas Elektronik (Competition Commission, 2010). Despite the efforts for market liberalisation, nationalism was ever-present. Economies-of-scale arguments were gaining ground: shorter innovation lead-time and engagement in larger combined projects (Cloodt, Hagedoorn and Kranenburg, 2006: 644). Hence the industry shifted its production model from vertical organisation to horizontal production: “In 2005 the EEC/EU set out for the first time an integrated approach to industrial policy with horizontal and vertical initiatives, to provide the right framework conditions for enterprise and innovation to succeed, and drive the economy forward. The Mid-term Review of Industrial Policy in 2007 concluded that this approach should be continued, with a focus on how best to respond to globalisation” (Dunne and Sköns, 2010). Indeed
according to the Commission the indicated policy, appeared to be successful and on that account was decided to continue with it (European Parliament, 2008). Edwards notices that in the early 2000s cross-border trade and investment barriers were reduced and state-controlled sectors partially liberalised (Owen, 2012: 3).

The agreement, the introduction and the success of these initiatives and the framework conditions constitute a three step learning framework-process which constitutes Europeanisation. The 2008 review of this process and attendant decision to continue along these lines, reflect the continuity and adaptability of the Europeanisation process. Dyson argues that change is related to strategy transformation which emphasises “the skills of policy entrepreneurs, whether in the state or in the private sector” in the process of negotiation and implementation of domestic reforms (Dyson, 2000: 661). This argument stresses the importance of initiatives in the transformation process, regardless of their origin (whether from private sector/market or the state).

When these initiatives originate at the local level they reflect upload Europeanisation (Marshall, 2005: 672). Marshall’s argument also confirms the impact of substantive Europeanisation. The upload character of Europeanisation demonstrates that the seeds were there, waiting for the proper institutional and economic environment to thrive in. The introduction of Euro and of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) was a major factor in the consolidation of EU. The decision to form a monetary union was taken during the 1991 Maastricht Council and later formalised in the Maastricht Treaty (The Maastricht Treaty, 1992). The introduction of the euro in 1999 can be considered as a major transformative act in the direction of further integration. Dyson argues that the EMU constitutes a top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation process, in which domestic elites have an active role (Dyson, 2000: 646). More specifically he links the EMU introduction to domestic learning dynamics which lead to power restructuring amongst and within domestic institutions (Dyson, 2000: 659,660). In this regard, one could conceive of the EMU and the single currency, as a unique institutional environment. In this environment policy is affected “via a process of decision making by committees, and in CSDP there is considerable emphasis on socialisation, deliberation and learning processes” (Richardson, 2012: 352).

Richardson considers the EU regulatory success as a one-way road in that it incorporates key elements of Europeanisation: learning, deliberation and policy change under the EU, policy-making setting and application (Richardson, 2012: 353). According to Richardson, once a public organisation develops a learning capacity it could generate additional policy input (Richardson, 2012: 352). Likewise the European
Defence Agency (EDA) was created by the European Council in 2004, in order “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future” (EDA, 2011). DeVore notices that EDA was “envisioned as the institution that would set the agenda for future armaments cooperation” (DeVore, 2012: 452). Guay argues that EDA aimed at helping member states to improve cooperation on R&D, develop defence capabilities, foster armaments cooperation and coordinate Europe-wide purchasing and contracting of weapons systems” (Guay, 2005: 13). The introduction of EDA was a major step, which indicated understanding of the need for a strong European military industry that could make advances in defence research and technology and create internationally competitive European defence equipment. Barrinha views EDA as a legitimate basis for the support of Europeanisation of both industry and states (Barrinha, 2015: 38,39). He also argues that the success of Europeanisation in the defence sector is linked with the industry. Therefore EDA plays an important role in the Europeanisation process. In the same spirit, the adoption of the new Headline Goal for 2010, under the “semi-public pressure” of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) focused on qualitative improvements in addressing multinational operational needs and promoting synergies (Diedrichs, 2011: 165). Savković argues that the Headline Goal for 2010 “was an endeavour to encourage the reform process” which will gradually turn the armed forces of the member states into efficient formations (Savković, 2010: 28). Mérand, Hofmann and Irondelle argue that the Headline Goals reflect the dynamics of Europeanisation in terms of both producing important benchmarks and developing Community law where it is absent (Mérand, Hofmann and Irondelle, 2011: 125). Their argument is consistent with Radaelli’s Europeanisation approach and learning adjustment, in that it incorporates: construction, diffusion, evaluation and re-adjustment (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4). All these arrangements and goals were subjected to the test of events: The 2004 Madrid (BBC News, 2004) and 2005 London (BBC News, 2011) terrorist attacks presented new challenges for the CSDP. Following the first attack, the 2004 Seville EU Council, indicated the need for further European anti-terrorist measures with emphasis on military means (Council, 2002: 272). Follow-up reports from the EU Council Secretariat described in detail measures that would be taken to combat terrorism globally under a Counter-Terrorism Strategy which covered four areas: Prevention, Protection, Pursuit and Response” (European Council, 2011). Dover notes that the 2001, 2004 and 2005 terrorist attacks have contributed to the “acceleration of the
Europeanisation of the arms trade” (Dover, 2007: 129). Indeed, the political climate, led to the Directive (2009/43/EC) which simplified the terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community and was followed by Directive (2009/81/EC), that outlined coordination procedures for the award of certain supply and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security (P.Camus, R. Hertrich and Turner, 2003).

The 2007 launch of European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) was also an important step towards Europeanisation. The EDTIB was considered as insurance for the “security of supply for EU countries through an Europeanisation of the landscape” (Chagnaud, Mölling and Schütz, 2015: 207). As an effort to strengthen the EDTIB, the contributions of the Commission and of the EDA were of high importance. The contribution of the Commission employs market regulation and competition while the EDA’s contribution is achieved through collaboration enhancement between member states (Fiott, 2015: 546). This approach reflects a complementary logic of horizontal and vertical Europeanisation mix where EDA, the Commission and EDTIB have active roles. However a crack in the EDA was later created that can be traced to the UK – US influence. More specifically, prior to 2010 UK’s elections, the UK Conservative party announced a possible withdrawal of the UK from the EDA (UK Parliament Publications and Records, 2011). The withdrawal announcement didn’t come as a surprise as the UK had already refused participation in many EDA projects, which it considered financially wasteful (O’Donnell, 2011: 422). This approach was later revised into a more conservative thesis according to which the UK was to remain in the EDA for a period of two years, and then re-evaluate its membership status (UK Parliament Publications and Records, 2011). This decision had its origin in a number of reasons which included lack of political will by the Conservative led coalition, the economic crisis in the UK, and outstanding unfunded liabilities in defence (O’Donnell, 2011: 3,4). It is noteworthy that the UK’s contribution to EDA’s budget was quite high at that time. In 2009 the indicated contribution was 4.254.341 Euros, and was among (and remains) the three highest contributions to the EDA’s budget (EDA, 2009). The following table illustrates the 2014 EDA contributions:

The continuation of EDA depends on both contributions and political incentives. Without political incentives, EDA would remain a secondary defence-coordination tool in the UK’s coproduction plans. The question remained whether the UK or any other member state could support modern security and defence on its own. In this climate the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, offered a number of improvements with the aim of enhancing coordination and facilitating the CFSP and CSDP realisation. The High Representative (HR) double-hatted function is one such arrangement which combines “security and military measures with softer crisis management measures” (Blockmans and Wessel, 2009: 299). Wright links CFSP with the Europeanisation “uploading” of national foreign policy objectives and argues that unanimity reflects member states’ acceptance or approval (Wright, 2011: 16). Drawing on this argument, the CSDP
incorporates the uploading of national security and defence goals, in its unanimity clause and thus establishes a formal Europeanisation setting. De Flers argues that among the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations the “mutual clause” and the “solidarity clause” eschew, at least in part, the logic of pooling and sharing resources, and constitute a de facto unified approach for dealing with security and defence issues (De Flers, 2012: 8-10). In addition the Lisbon Treaty supports the upgrading of EDA so as to include developing of defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market (De Flers, 2012: 8-10). In late 2010 the Commission released a Communication to the European Parliament and the Council under the title- The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe (COM (2010) 673 final) (European Commission, 2010). The Internal Security Strategy (ISS) incorporated in a “sole document” all the previously-adopted measures in an attempt to establish strategic guidelines and a plan to be in place by 2014 (Schroeder, 2012: 45). The ISS final report indicates the successful realisation of most of the designated objectives, which included common administrative structures and authorities. Consequently the ISS may be considered as part of Europeanisation process in that it incorporates Radaelli’s construction, diffusion and institutionalisation rules and procedures into a new set of common institutions and administrative structures (COM (2014) 365 Final) (European Commission, 2014).

In these regards, one could stress the importance of political initiatives in making use of EU institutions in order to facilitate the realisation of common goals. The cautious distinction of internal security from European Security Strategy is not an adverse development, but rather facilitates the prioritisation of member states’ unique internal security needs. Such national needs incorporate domestic and geographical peculiarities and form a cluster of security policies which constitutes the ISS. In this spirit, an examination of the key domestic factors which influence political-decision making, governance and military industry policy will follow. Given that Molina and Rhodes identify corporatism as a strong normative and ideological component which has at its core “the advocacy of an institutional relationship between systems of authoritative decision making and interest representation” (Molina and Rhodes, 2002: 306-307), an investigation of the impact of corporatism/neo-corporatism and special interest groups will be undertaken.
3.3 Implications of EU internal political forces: Special interest groups and neo-corporatism

Another important element in the Europeanisation and European integration process is the impact of special interest groups and neo-corporatist groups. These groups are directly or indirectly implicated in the political decision making and implementation of EU policies in terms of lobbying. The existence of such groups is not a new finding. References to interest groups and corporatism since the early 1970s are critical of the pluralism thesis and questioned its relevance in modern western democracies. Rather than pluralist competition, certain entrenched groups are able to exert undue influence while others remain excluded from the political process (Kioukias, 2006: 142). Corporatism remained a strictly national issue at that time, especially after the 1970s recession. Streeck and Schmitter, did not observe “the reality of corporatism” and concluded that the Brussels bureaucracy “failed to develop into a corporatist engine of supranationalism” (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 135,136,144). They attributed this absence to the economic crisis of the 1970s which resulted in a desperate effort to capture domestic political and institutional resources and promote national corporatism (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 143,144). However, the introduction of the SEA, which was related to the demise of national corporatism in the 1980s, changed the climate.

These facts may be explained with reference to the broader meaning of corporatism, which involves a coordination of interests through a network of associations, unions and other groups with a view to achieving national domination. In this regard, George Stigler developed his theory of regulatory capture (for which won the Nobel Prize in 1977), which claims that politicians protect monopolies because they become captives of the firms they are supposed to regulate and lose sight of the general welfare they are supposed to serve (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2008: 91)\(^\text{13}\). The SEA introduced a new institutional environment which was not fully regulated by national governments. Erin McGrath argued that “corporatism is a mode of interest intermediation that has been successful in negotiating social and economic policy reforms in some welfare states” and differs between “old” EU welfare states (with the exception of Germany) as it has been developed “incrementally through decades of decision-making in social-democratic political conflicts over issues of social welfare and the welfare states” (McGrath, 2006: 2). McGrath’s argument reflected the old

\(^{13}\)This situation is more prompt to state-owned monopolies and includes direct bribes or promises of jobs.
corporatism which had to adjust to the transnational, post-SEA market environment. In this environment, corporatism, according to Strange, influences states’ relations (Stopford, Strange and Henley, 1991: 178,179). Telò summarises Strange’s arguments as follows: “states’ authority depends on the material resources of transnational businesses that have gained a considerable role in their domestic politics as well as in the dynamics of international relations” (Telò, 2009: 61). This claim reflects only the economic interests of corporatist groups. On the other hand there are claims – especially in USA- that refer to corporatism as a countervailing force state power: “The American state is weak and unwilling to resist economic group interest in the United States” (Griggiths, 1999: 44). This interrelation, between state – interest groups – international negotiations, has been a subject of investigation by many scholars. Putnam, already in the late 1980s, had identified under a two-level-approach, the interaction and impact of domestic politics and industrial relations in the context of international negotiations (Putnam, 1988: 434,435; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 7).

Moravcsik, in the early 1990s, linked the EC/EU intergovernmental character with the behaviour of states which are constrained internally by social pressures and externally by strategic factors (Moravcsik, 1993: 474). More specifically he argued that national interests emerge through domestic political conflict by social groups competing for political power, national and transnational coalitions formation and new policies (Moravcsik, 1993: 481; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 7). This argument is quite important, especially when considering the EU member states’ status, which affects the extent to which they realise their national interests within the EU’s institutional environment, along with other member states. Within this relationship, which Peters identifies as a “structural relationship between government and interest organisation in the society” (Peters, 1999: 117), the role of these groups is decisive in the national governments’ decision making. Epstein notices that modernised or not, governments are always “salient for political parties and interest groups” (Epstein, 1980: 355) while Bentley directly relates and treats as equivalent the terms interests and groups. (Bentley, 1908: 211). Along such lines, one sees that special interests become the driving force behind groups attempting to impose their interests through the use of political power. This approach may seem vague and indeed, Schmitter's definition of corporatism is quite broad and incorporates characterisations which describe a stable, formalised pattern of interaction between state and social actors (Peters, 1999: 117). However in his work with Streeck, neocorporatism is defined as a state of affairs produced for
organised interests (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 135). This approach may point to a wider impact of interest influence.

Drawing on the US experience, Epstein argues that major economic interest groups are often “federations of state based components” which may be influential in state and national politics (Epstein, 1980: 359). This argument reflects the transitional status of European corporatism/neocorporatism from the national to the EU level. In this spirit, Massey notes that the study of Europeanisation should not be limited to the impact of intergovernmental and supranational institutions as it has national, regional, transnational, supranational and global dynamics (Massey, 2004: 19). Other theorists view corporatism as a form of policymaking, while yet some other economic versions of neo-corporatism “the main feature is the manipulation of groups within the system by the state and/or business interest” (Wilson, 1983: 106).

The linkage of corporatism/groups of interest with policy making is very important as it reflects its dynamics in the Europeanisation/European integration process. Buller and Gamble, note the relation between domestic issues and European integration, and claim that traditional theories do not pay sufficient attention to the domestic sphere (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 9). Their argument seems to locate a potential gap in the theory of Europeanisation/EU integration as it relates to neo-corporatist/interest groups’ transition from the national to the supranational level. Nye, under his liberal-realism perspective, also links states, economic relations and chaotic transnational relations in a three-dimensional chess board (Nye, 2008: 36,37). In Nye’s approach, corporatism or interest groups are not mentioned as he only identifies the three-stage play. In view of Nye’s claims, and considering the expanded role of the state, one may identify the existence of multilevel (transnational and international) competition among national and transnational corporatist groups. Each dominant national corporatist group creates its own coalitions with other national and international groups with the objective of surviving and expanding its sphere of influence and economic gains. As a result, the key player in international relations is no longer the state or the markets, but corporatist groups, which sometimes succeed in identifying themselves with national governments or other governing mechanisms in order to achieve their objectives.

In the case of EU, this situation gets more complicated due to the existence of the EU institutional environment. Hix and Goetz identify elements of corporatism in the EU process, which benefit from institutional structures at the EU level (Hix and Goetz, 2000: 8). These tendencies derive from the character of the EU institutions which
provide opportunities for domestic groups to alter the status quo to their advantage (Buller, 2003: 531; Hix and Goetz, 2001: 8). Summarising the arguments of Sandholtz, Zysman and Marks, Börzel, notices that European policy-making provides domestic actors with tools which enable them to bypass their national governments by accessing directly European-level political institutions. (Börzel, 1999: 576). Sandholtz argues that integration could trigger changes in domestic institutions and policies by creating new options for domestic actors both in terms of choices and fields of action (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 11). These arguments seem to complement each other nicely: the institutional environment of the EU offers opportunities from which domestic/corporatist groups may benefit through their participation in the integration process. This three-stage-process incorporates: environmental changes/policies, gains-targets and adaptation. These three stages constitute a pattern which resembles the Europeanisation learning process. Within this pattern, the important element is the process of transition from one stage to the other: from nation-wide corporatism to EU-level corporatism. In Europe, the transition period from national to intra-European corporatism, for most (western core) EU member states, started in the late 1970s – early 1980s: “An essential precondition for reform was the convergence of the economic policy prescriptions of ruling party coalitions in these countries following the election of the British Conservative party in 1979 and the reversal of French Socialist party policy in 1983” (Moravcsik, 1991: 21). This fact is directly related with the initial key aspects of EU creation, economic prosperity and peace. It also reflects the attempts by national interest groups to position themselves in the context of states, markets and political elites. This relation is illustrated in the following drawing.
These claims are also endorsed by “Wisse Dekker, officer of Philips, (who agrees that) European integration in the 1950s was initiated by political elites, while in its current industrial phase it is driven by business leaders” (Moravcsik, 1991: 22). Schmitter and Grote, in their 1997 working paper, sketched the corporatist groups and their operation in a similar way: “Its central claim was (and still is) that behaviour - economic, social or political - cannot be understood exclusively in terms of either the choices and preferences of private individuals or the habits and impositions of public agencies. Somewhere between markets and states existed a large number of “self-organised” and “semi-public” collectivities that individuals and firms relied upon more-or-less regularly to structure their expectations about each other’s behaviour and to provide ready-made solutions for their recurrent conflicts” (Schmitter and Grote, 1997: 4). The importance of these groups’ contribution, to the formulation and realisation of EU policies is identified by several scholars. Lampinen and Uusikylä identify neocorporatism as a cooperative relationship between government and certain interest groups: a constellation necessary for the implementation of EU policies (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998: 239). They claim that interest groups (such as labour unions) can easily block certain EU directives and therefore threaten the integration process (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998: 249). Siaroff links the level of integration with the unions’ reformist tendencies and their will to integrate into the political-economic system (Siaroff, 1999: 195). The existence of such tendencies proves that national interest groups remain key players, not only by defining interstate politics, but also by influencing member states’ relations with each other. This became evident during the years of the Delors presidency. Delors’ contribution was significant in that he didn’t attempt to impose his beliefs but rather to empower and enrich the prevailing political and economic tendencies among member states. During his presidency, Delors both respected national interest groups and managed to extract the “unique potential” of each group (e.g. intergovernmentalists and federalists), which later became the source of SEA, CSDP and other synergies (Delors, 1991: 106). In this regard he investigated and realised a common area of norms and institutions which reflected the aims and dynamics of both intergovernmentalists and federalists. As a result the state maintained its sovereignty and enabled national markets to become more liberal (Kipas, 2004: 165). Delors’ approach reflects the identification of corporatist groups’ important role in the realisation of EU integration. In addition, it should be emphasised that the EU not only incorporates, but also encourages “the development of a sort pan-European corporatist network by granting these groups privileged access to the policy process” (Moravcsik,
This encouragement seems to have had a transformative impact on corporatism and on the groups of interest. It is noteworthy that the corporatism of the 1970s is not the same as the corporatism of the 1990s and 2000s.

Schulten notices such a change since the late-1990s: EU trade unions “have started to develop a new approach which might demonstrate an alternative path towards an Europeanisation of collective bargaining” (Schulten, 2002: 5). His claim clearly reflects a bottom up Europeanisation approach under which groups of interest undertake initiatives in an attempt to safeguard their status quo or even to increase their gains. The changes in corporatism and groups of interest approach have taken place gradually in time and should be investigated accordingly. Schmitter and Grote argue that during the 1980s the assumption that corporatism is a pre-arranged process was erroneous (Schmitter and Grote, 1997: 5,6). Corporatism and groups of interest evolve and adapt according to their environmental and political conditions. The environment may vary from one member state to another, unless common institutional arrangements are established. Streeck notes that national governments utilise interest groups as a means of integrating their political systems while in many cases collective bargaining with such groups seems to be preferred over parliamentary majority legislation (Streeck, 1991: 5).

Different outcomes associated with interest groups’ presence seem to provide support for Schmitter and Grote’s argument. Such variations of corporatist evolution may be classified into three types: “national corporatism”, “transitional to the EU” and “EU level corporatism”. These three types co-exist while their form depends on member states social features: “Change occurs in both ways, interactively, as policy needs and the internal dynamics of the Community create new possibilities, each for the other” (Christopher Hill, 1993: 321). However, despite the fact that social changes and politics are intertwined, several politicians and officials seem to neglect that linkage and the distortions it can produce. Such distortions are reflected in the displacement of national employment-schemes from their traditional areas, either under the influence of coordinated EU-level plans or economies of scale. In either case these distortions result in a rise of neo-corporatist tendencies. Schmitter and Grote note that corporatism may disappear or reappear depending on market circumstances. More specifically they argue that capitalists utilise this aspect of corporatism in an attempt to control wages and restrain trade unions’ demands (Schmitter and Grote, 1997: 12). As this vicious circle of control and restraint continues, these groups will continue to appear and

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14 Economies of scale dictate the reallocation of industrial production in the EU.
vanish, affecting both national and EU growth. Alesina and Giavazzi investigated the social impact of growth fluctuations, both in terms of numbers and of growth dynamics and concluded that: National growth deceleration is linked with the emergence of social stagnation which gradually results in tax increases (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2008: 6-8). In this regard, and considering the fact that corporatism was viewed as a transition tool for European national governments, groups of interest have gained powers that eventually downgraded the role of states (assuming this wasn’t the initial aim). Considering these claims and the EU centralised decision-making process, “organised interests have no other choice, even if they were otherwise inclined, than to maintain a strong national base and to cultivate established national channels of influence” (Streeck, 1991: 11). In this spirit, it is rather obvious that national politics are reflected in policies that are influenced or shaped by dominant corporatist groups. These groups “build up” and maintain power, based on local and regional characteristics, such as geography, geomorphology, and historical circumstances. Regarding the Unions of States (EU), or other kind of coalitions, the dynamics of these formulations are being strongly influenced by the transformation of these groups: from national to transnational range (supranational corporatism). As a result, governments, states and organisations, become means for power acquisition and/or power maintenance for these groups. These means are linked with labour direction, either nationally, trans-nationally (EU etc.) or internationally.

The maintenance of the social structure in national and international relations is an implicit social contract and at the same time objective of those who participate in government decision making: “state structures matter for interest politics and interest representation, and they certainly do for corporatism […] The emerging shape of the European non-state […] does not bode well for a reconstitution of corporatism at supranational level” (Streeck, 1991: 18). However, when it comes to a union of states, the maintenance of the existing national social structure may become fragile. Major shifts and changes may occur as a result of major societal diversifications and failures, which emanate from false or poor political choices. Consequently internal political fluctuations (and failures) may be “exported” to international relations. As Waltz acknowledges that state behaviour depends apart from international structure on its internal characteristics and on the decisions of its leaders (Waltz, 1979: 122). This claim seems to balance a state’s internal structure, political initiatives, and corporatist impact.
3.3.1 National Corporatism transition to Liberal supra-corporatism

Given the aforementioned facts and in the view of the growing international (liberal) interdependence, corporatist groups’ importance and role will likely increase and is bound to influence major EU decision making mechanisms in various areas including trade and common security and defence: “Growing international interdependence is undoubtedly the key element to be taken into account in any discussion of foreign or security policy, as in any approach to major economic, monetary or trade-related issues” (Delors, 1991: 99).

Liberal supra-corporatism builds on earlier approaches of Moravcsik’s Intergovernmental Institutionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik’s theory of intergovernmental institutionalism and subsequently of liberal Intergovernmentalism, were the outcome of deep investigation and comprehension of different, yet contemporaneously evolving policies and beliefs in EU member states, which included: (a) heads of governments (council of ministers) in relation to domestic policies’ formulation, (b) minimum common ground in the bargaining among member states with different interests and beliefs, and (c) protection of member states’ sovereignty, in terms of mutual concessions in exchange for certain advantages. Elements of this approach can be recognised in the period of Delors’ presidency which resulted in the SEA adoption by EU member states. Through this approach, Delors managed to confront separately and handle corporatist groups across member states (with emphasis on former Western EU states), through the exploration of dynamics and the development of common ground for cooperation. To be sure, apart from his skilful approach, he had certain aces up his sleeve which facilitated his task. These aces were related to Brussels’ powers and quick reactions to important obstacles: “Europe tries to handle the competition problem by shifting responsibility for industrial policy away from national politicians to Brussels”, and this attempt has met with some success mainly due to (a) the European institutions’ executive powers and the prompt implementation of the Commission’s decisions, (b) EU’s enhanced transparency and accountability (c) EC’s Big Bang approach (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2008: 94). The same principle was also applied by European governments, in both the launching of common policies and the establishment of institutions. Delors’ vision of Europe included not just the creation of a community, but of an actual union: “The ideal which inspired Europe’s founding fathers was to bring nations and peoples together in a

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15Big Bang approach refers to the liberalization of markets all at once.
community which would be in a better position than each country on its own to give
practical expression to shared values, to defend those values where they were
threatened, and to promote them where they did not exist)” (Delors, 1991: 99).

Likewise, Liberal supra-corporatism looks beyond states’ and governments’
cooperation to the recognition in terms of a broad conception of the state of national
corporatist groups (groups of interest) as key players. Indeed, as corporatist groups have
a significant role to play in interstate bargains, cooperative schemes and policy creation,
it would be a mistake to overlook their importance in EU policy making. Moravcsik
agrees on the importance of such social groups while he identifies the liberal character
of interstate relations as a result of pressure by domestic social groups whose preferences
are aggregated through political institutions (Moravcsik, 1993: 481). In addition he
argues that national interests emerge through domestic political conflict and the struggle
for political domination as well as under national and transnational coalitions
(Moravcsik, 1993: 481). This liberal-corporatist approach reflects EU’s on-going
interstate discussions among domestic corporatist groups, with the aim of establishing a
common ground for institutional developments and gradual integration. An important
pre-condition for the success of the integration process is the study of interest groups
“of which the state is an expression” (Wendt, 1999: 294). Conclusively, the contribution
of corporatist/groups of interest to the EU integration and Europeanisation process may
turn to be invaluable, as it could constitute a unique driving force for integration and
Europeanisation which bypasses intergovernmentalism obstacles.

3.4 Conclusion

The Europeanisation of the European Defence and Security policy is a relatively
new concept but it has old roots. Though the periods under investigation begins with the
end of the Cold War, certain key elements related to the emergence of Europeanisation,
were already present in the immediate aftermath of WWII. Thus, our brief historical
treatment includes five periods, starting with the end of WWII, that relate to political
and other factors which underlay the Europeanisation of the security and defence policy
and of the European defence industry.

As indicated by Kyriazis, there is a strong interdependence between European
defence and “combat ready” armed forces. Indeed, the record reveals that there was
joint evolution/development in the context of rebuilding the devastated European
industry along with a common defence and security policy.
In relation to the Europeanisation process there were different attitudes, political background and initiatives, in each period, whose interaction resulted in what we know today as CSDP. In the first and second period (1945-60) there were several mechanisms and contributing factors that turned out to be important for the subsequent development of Europeanisation. The consequences of this interaction reflect the joint evolution of defence policy and defence industry. Furthermore the presence of a raison d’être becomes a driving force for reconstruction and change. Such driving force was the threat of the Soviet Union. The threat of the Soviet Union created the need for European states to rearm. Rearming led to the rebuild of the military industry and to the reorganisation of defence and security structures. US assistance was a major factor in the following period. The contribution of the US in the rebuilding of European defence industry was linked to the long-established ties that European firms and politicians had in the other side of the Atlantic. This relationship also include NATO.

NATO reflects the first institutional approach to security and defence and until this day represents the most advanced approach for this purpose. This alliance provided the first successful “test event” for an institutionalised common defence and security approach. Undoubtedly the NATO members’ co-operation provided important lessons and experience for the gradual Europeanisation of EU defence and security policy. Furthermore, the bonds created at that time, have played and continue to play an important role in the shaping and growth of European security and defence industries. Another contributing factor was trade liberalisation. Though time for adjustment may be necessary, ideas and policies appear to boost Europeanisation when supported by forceful political initiatives. This adjustment mainly takes place through the response to a common institutional environment. Adjustments and transformations of existing structures and domestic institutions are more successful and may be realised faster within a shared institutional environment. In this context political commitment and initiatives are important. Through the third period 1960-1990 there were elements, mechanisms and factors that contributed to the process of Europeanisation. The signing of Treaties, declarations and cooperation arrangements (EEC, EAEC, EFTA, EPC, Rome Declaration and IEPG) resulted in the creation of new institutional structures which promoted integration among members. The tendency and integration has played an important role in the subsequent emergence of Europeanisation. Indeed, the first collaborative programs among EEC member states reflect basic top-down Europeanisation as they incorporated rules and policies within a new institutional environment. These collaborative programs became the “test event” for future programs.
in terms of identifying co-operative and administrative issues. The identification of these issues contributed to the subsequent adjustments and corrections of future policies. This approach indicates the existence of a basic learning mechanism which resembles Europeanisation. Political initiatives played a pivotal role in development of policies for the defence industry and market regulation (e.g. protectionism-liberalisation). On the other hand the lack of an institutionalised environment and/or delays in institutionalisation may result in integration along transatlantic lines. Though duplication of institutions is inefficient both types of integration may occur as long as a complementary –rather than a competitive- approach is followed. In this approach historical windows of opportunity could be exploited if proper institutional arrangements exist. Through the fourth period 1990-2001 there were mechanisms, and factors of which related in Europeanisation processes and substantive Europeanisation. The existing institutional arrangements and the emergence of new institutions as well as global security changes (window of opportunity) triggered a series of changes both in defence industry and in European security and defence. The introduction and realisation of Maastricht Treaty, IEPG, WEAG, WEAO, EUCLID, SEA, OCCAR and POLARM reflected the existence of strong integration initiatives and member states’ growing adjustment experience to new institutional environments. The political will towards adaptation to the new institutional reality was, however, limited due to domestic reasons. The opposition to adaptation reflects the existence of Europeanisation elements (Ladrech argues that opposition to change is also evidence of Europeanisation) (Ladrech, 2010: 33,36) which could gradually result in substantive Europeanisation. Adaptation to the new policies of the post-Maastricht era, was part of the general drive toward Europeanisation. This occurred for two reasons: the emergence of a unipolar system and NATO’s pursuit of a new strategic role. Market liberalisation and security and defence were being realised within an institutional framework strongly influenced by the Europeanisation concept. The Committee’s role was a major factor in the overall process. The Europeanisation approach became more evident with the introduction of the CFSP and of the ESDP/CSDP. The consolidation of the European defence industry also reflects this reality: the adaptation framework (related to Europeanisation) becomes more important than adaptation itself. By the same token lack of an adaptation framework or the presence of a weak one may result in no or little adaptation. This argument may be applied in both cases namely: that of security and defence and that of defence industry. In addition a successful institutional environment is “responsible” for further institutionalisation and Europeanisation. This became clearer in the light of
events of late the 1990s, which included institutional decision making and the introduction of new institutions and organisations. These new organisations and institutions generated, in turn, short and long range goals (e.g. Headline goals) which constituted an Europeanisation learning mechanism. In addition, the emergence of external events (such as the Kosovo War) could be thought of as a contributing factor to the Europeanisation process, for it provided a number of feedback mechanisms: real time (mid-term) evaluation of the estimated headline goals, a basis for field operations and administrative needs and a time-constrained framework for overcoming deficiencies. These elements provide a boost to the overall Europeanisation drive in the context of defence and security policy and defence industry. Through the fifth period 2001-2014 there continued to be mechanisms and factors contributing to substantive Europeanisation. Indeed, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 2004 and 2005 resulted in an important extension of joint security and defence policies. This became evident in the military industry in terms of intense consolidation (begun in the late 1990s), while in the context of defence and security policy it was reflected in comprehensive re-arrangements. The conceptualisation of European security and defence under the ESS documents marked important progress for Europeanisation as it incorporated both objectives and policy making arrangements. These processes and the later ISS documents constitute a multilevel and multi-sector learning approach which incorporates construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures and styles under the aim of establishing and strengthening common security and defence and “a robust military industry”. Clearly this approach reflects the intense Europeanisation impact in the field of European security and defence. Important contributing factors included the launching of EMU and the introduction of the single currency. The EMU and the single currency are distinct institutions which also embody elements of Europeanisation. One may argue that the existence of such important Europeanisation factors may also have a horizontal Europeanisation effect. In any case, the latter factor has contributed to the increase of economic interdependence among member states. The increase of member states’ interdependence produced more Europeanisation and new European institutions were created. The emergence of the EDA and EDTIP may be viewed as strengthening existing institutions and/or as linkages to the CSDP and to European military industries. Likewise the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the institutional role of the EDA consistent with the pursuit of a more Europeanised defence and security policy and military industry. The presence of political initiatives for the realisation of Europeanised decision-making was vital.
Special interest groups constitute an active factor in the political decision making process, penetrating to the Europeanisation of CSDP and military industry consolidation. Their transformation and joint evolution along with the CSDP conceptualisation development and the military industry liberalisation reflects the existence of a strong interdependence. Their orientation was shifted from the national to the supranational/European level and played an important role in overcoming opposition to Europeanisation. Their influence, which incorporates many social and domestic institutional elements, can be detected in policy decisions regarding security and defence and in industrial policies. Therefore their transition from domestic to EU level may trigger substantive Europeanisation as long as it is linked to “gains”. Due to their penetrating incisive modus, operandi such groups’ influence can overcome the restrictions of national borders. This claim stresses dynamic change whether pro-Europeanisation or otherwise. The de facto incorporation of corporatist objectives in the Europeanisation learning process may be viewed as contributing to an Europeanised outlook. Corporatist/groups of interest constitute an important factor which is part of the EU landscape. External factors which have contributed positively or negatively to the Europeanisation of the EU defence and security policy (NATO, EU-US relations) are considered next.
Chapter 4

4 CSDP vs. NATO

Chapter four takes the empirical analysis one step further and investigates the evolution of the relationship between CSDP and NATO. Starting with NATO’s history, the chapter seeks to identify the political influence of NATO on Member States. In addition, the active and strong relation between NATO and the US, seem to further complicate the political climate through its potential influence on the decision making process of EU governments. The inclusion of these factors in the decision making process is important on account of their impact on other areas, such as the EU defence industry. On the other hand, the decision of the EU leaders to establish the CSDP altered the equilibrium, both within the Atlantic Alliance and between the EU and the rest of the world. This chapter analyses this shift and the debate behind it in relation to the Europeanisation process by taking into account a number of factors: opportunities and gaps in political and military policies that emerged during the last two decades, the transatlantic impact of CSDP, NATO and US interaction, and the CSDP Europeanisation dynamics.

4.1 Introduction

The role and impact of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the USA (McCauley, 2008: 27) on the rearmament of European states, and subsequently on the creation of EU military capabilities and identity, are indisputable. NATO creation, on April 4, 1949 may be considered as a milestone for global politics and security, while it is also related to the official beginning of the Cold War (McCauley, 2008: 15). Hampton argues that the initial driving force behind NATO’s creation was “an alternative to balance of power” by advocating more interdependence and institutionalisation among states (Hampton, 1995: 614). This process would contribute to the development of shared values which could lead to the creation of common security interests and a collective security community (Hampton, 1995: 614). Hampton’s argument that the Allied relationship was conceived as a means to
“institutionalise Western interstate security relations through the application of norms, principles, rules, and procedures” (Hampton, 1995: 653) presents a strong resemblance to Radaelli’s definition on Europeanisation. Thus it would be safe to talk about Westernisation of security or better, “NATOnisation” of security of its member states. Given that the establishment of the CSDP was initially based on the NATO framework of operation and administration after the end of the Cold War (Smith, 2000: 24) and that the US position towards the EU defence project has fluctuated (Howorth, 2014: 109), NATO and US impact on the CSDP establishment and operation is also indisputable.

This chapter aims to identify through empirical analysis the impact of NATO and the US on the Europeanisation process of the CSDP. In order to do so the influence of NATO and the US towards the establishment and operation of the CSDP will be examined. The examination takes place in terms of Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation and the Europeanisation mechanisms of adjustment with emphasis on the Learning mechanism. The time-frame of the analysis is about two decades. Radaelli argues that there are problems when estimating the Learning time-frame, for it could be too narrow or too long (Radaelli, 2009: 1147,1148). Drawing on Sabatier, Radaelli concludes that the time frame should be at least a decade (or so), in order to obtain clear results (Radaelli, 2009: 1147,1148). Therefore, the time frame which starts with the end of the cold war which includes the new era for NATO and the initialisation of the CSDP is the most suitable period for this analysis.

Indeed, during its 60 years of life NATO evolved from a defence alliance to a key security provider, whose key aim was peace preserving in Europe. However, this ended with the beginning of the Kosovo crisis and the terrorist events of 9/11 which altered NATO’s defence and security doctrine. The change of NATO’s scope begins with the end of the Cold War, when the alliance’s existence, upon the collapse of the USSR, was questioned. The Cold War climate induced western solidarity, in terms of “the common, external and unifying threaded posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation” (Cornish, 2004: 68). However, as Cornish argues, the threats of the 2000s, such as international terrorism, weapons proliferation, organised crime “have not so far had the consolidating effect seen during the Cold War” (Cornish, 2004: 68). This situation changed with the emergence of an imminent threat on European soil, i.e. the Kosovo war.

The Kosovo war provided a new raison d’être for NATO while it had serious consequences among the allies as there was severe ambiguity (Cornish, 2004) regarding the decision on interfering in Kosovo. This division among members weakened US
leadership over the alliance and provided the ground for EU to develop its own independent European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) with separate Reaction Force and military support (Duignan, 2000: 9). However the Kosovo crisis was not the only division within the alliance (Howorth, 2014: 109-110) as the ambiguity regarding its identity and scope were only partially resolved until the terrorist events of 9/11. The 9/11 events became a milestone as they resulted in the update of article 5 of the Alliance Treaty (NATO, 2015) which identified terrorism “as one of the risks affecting NATO’s security” (NATO, 2015). However, several issues remained unresolved. Cornish noticed a lack of consensus amongst NATO members on what constitutes a threat and what should be done about it (Cornish, 2004). The 2003 political and military campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime exposed to public view the deep and seemingly unbridgeable divisions between the US and some European allies. The UN and the EU were both severely mauled in the process, while NATO came close to collapse (Cornish, 2004). The Iraq invasion apart from NATO internal disagreements also revealed a split among EU member states (Risse, 2012: 88). However, this lack of consensus amongst NATO members has also provided a window of opportunity for the first EU peacekeeping mission, which took place during that time (Risse, 2012: 91). The new security agenda included both threats and challenges: the peace keeping operations in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Iraq war and on-going operations in Libya were only some of them. These challenges and the emergent security environment also raised questions about the prospects of Russia’s cooperation with the Alliance. These aspects should be thoroughly examined, especially with the emergence of new threats, on the global level, such as cyber-attacks, energy supply interruption and the return of piracy, which increase the demand for common action. In addition, given the global economic crisis, these threats and challenges may be confronted much more efficiently, under new and stronger cooperation schemes amongst NATO, the EU, the UN and other international actors (Scheffer, 2009).

Considering NATO’s history, and associated shifts in strategy, NATO has proven its adaptation capabilities to the changing political and security environment. During the last decades, the Alliance has enlarged several times, in partnerships involving strategic co-operation with other organisations and institutions (Iklódy, 2010: 18-19). This dynamic indicates the presence of a significant political impact of NATO on member states and candidate members, which is historically justified. NATO’s political roots, originating in the late 1940s involve complex political and military relations, which affect decision-making processes of EU governments (USA
Department of Defense Affairs, 1995). This climate was disrupted with the emergence of CSDP. The CSDP introduction altered the balance, not only within the Atlantic Alliance but also between EU and the world. This shift, in EU policy, from traditional relations with NATO, to a new level of collaboration is analysed in this chapter in terms of identifying the political impact of the CSDP on Europeanisation.

4.2 NATO and EU: framing industry policy

The 1989 fall of the Berlin wall and the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty set the stage for a change in NATO’s role. A concrete reform was initiated during the Clinton administration and was officially presented during the 1994 Brussels Summit (Reforming and enlarging NATO, 1996: 110). The reform included two sets of policies: expansion and integration of new Eastern and Central European members, and internal reform with a stronger EU orientation (Reforming and enlarging NATO, 1996: 110). Already in mid-1996 NATO and EU have agreed on a preliminary formula which allowed EU initiatives within NATO, with limited success (Moens, 2001: 262). NATO’s organisational changes continued with the 1998 Research and Technology Organisation (RTO) changes encompassing the merging of the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) and the Defence Research Group (DRG). RTO tasks featured the organisation of science and technology for defence purposes, including: co-operative research, information exchange and Research and Technology (R&T) strategy (NATO, 2015). Noteworthy is the role of the RTO, in terms of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation, which entails the basis for an institutionalised learning environment where information is uploaded and policies are downloaded. Such information includes analysis, sensors and electronics technology and modelling from technical teams and panels (six panels in total for a number of scientific research activities, one modelling group) (NATO, 2015). Thus, the RTO processes fuse the Alliance Members’ security and technological needs (upload) through studies, workshops and symposia in order to coordinate (download) a common technological framework and shape (download) common policies. This approach employing political and market shaping means resembles the Europeanisation mechanisms with their positive and negative integration through market shaping measures and framing integration. Quaglia et al. notice that integration through market-shaping measures occurs when specific institutional models or policies are being
prescribed (Quaglia et al., 2007: 408-409). Thus market shaping in terms of competitive measures seems to have taken the place of the arms race of previous decades.

A predictable response on EU’s part came along with the 1991 Maastricht Treaty (MA). The MA introduced important European initiatives for the enhancement of co-operation in the field of armaments, with the later aim to create a European Armaments Agency (EDA) (James and Teichler, 2014: 133). The Western European Armament Group (WEAG) (WEAG, 2005) establishment derived from the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) and acted as an armaments procurement forum stimulating defence Research and Technology (R&T) programs (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 117). WEAG’s objectives included efficient resource use, requirements harmonisation, national defence markets opening up, EU defence technological and industrial base strengthening, and Research and Development (R&D) cooperation (WEAG, 2005). During that time, the Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO), established in 1996, was already operational. WEAO’s objectives included support services in defence R&T (WEAO, 2006) and R&D contracts tenders (James and Teichler, 2014: 133-150).

Both RTO and WEAG focused on avoidance of technology duplication and the enhancement of dual-use technology in the military field. Furthermore the need for the creation of a solid armaments base eventually resulted in an integrated military industry. Prime Minister Jospin, during the 1998 Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (IHEDN) 51st session, identified as a pre-condition for an EU defence industry, the need for a strong industrial and technological base in the defence (Jospin, 1998). Similarly, NATO’s aims, under fiscal pressure, highlighted the need for more cost effective defence procurement, improved efficiency in equipment use and development and production enhancement (Mörth, 2003: 54, 55). The end of the Cold War altered the security environment and signalled the beginning of a new period of defence budgets cutting. Thus the existence of different institutional structures with the same aims reflected the need for a solution to fiscal austerity.

Given the fragmented defence industry scene, duplication was unavoidable as was intra-European competition. Furthermore, the existence of these institutional structures may be considered as an attempt by the US not to fall behind in R&D and analysis of military needs in Europe, thus to maintain a competitive advantage in standardisation. This competition also impacted US-EU political relations in that the US didn’t favour EU initiatives for a common defence. Hoffmann noted that Washington’s view of a unified Europe along with a common European security system
“unsubordinated to NATO,” could be considered as a threat: “Washington would like its partners to speak in a single voice, as long as they repeat what the United States tells them (Hoffmann, 1995: 293,295). This approach may be viewed from two angles: US favoured EU’s initiatives in the area of defence industry integration. Therefore the US was in favour of European integration, though not in favour of Common EU Defence policy which could jeopardise NATO coherence. Thus EU integration could be viewed as a common aim (ground) of NATOisation and Europeanisation competence, whatever the result.

![Diagram showing overlap of NATO, European Integration, and Europeanisation](image)

**Figure 8: NATO – European Integration - Europeanisation**

In this regard there seems to be overlap and competition (Sperling, 1999: 6) in Europe’s attempts towards a separate R&D cell. Also, the fact that NATO and WEAO (later absorbed by EDA) consisted of members who participated in both organisations inevitably created duplication and conflicts of interest. These initiatives had mixed results and created a complex institutional landscape (Georgopoulos, 2015: 120). As Reichard points out this situation was well known to European leaders who tried to maintain a balance of power between both sides of the Atlantic. This was done via bridging EU and NATO with the WEU and joint EU-WEU and NATO-WEU activities in the 1990s (Reichard, 2006: 7). Reichard argues that traditional EU–NATO relations have been replaced by a direct relationship (Reichard, 2006: 7). This new political environment indicated the need for closer cooperation between NATO and EU. Such initiatives were undertaken in 2001 (NATO, 2015). The reason for cooperation rather than segregation was mainly due to CSDP’s origins and political beliefs. McNamara argued that CSDP derived from Blair’s vision, rather than from Chirac’s, which viewed CSDP in complementary to NATO (McNamara, 2007). Blagden sheds more light on this. He noticed that the Atlanticists are opposed to European institutional initiatives regarding autonomous security given that they consider these initiatives as threats to
NATO’s dominance (Blagden, 2008: 91). He also points out that this attitude could change if these initiatives complement NATO’s functions and reduce burden (Blagden, 2008: 91). On the other hand, Perruche argued that the complementary aims of NATO and the EU may prove unrealistic due to the large number of members of both organisations (Perruche, 2014: 440). However, he emphasised that “complementary strategy depends first and foremost on the complementary nature of the interest pursued” (Perruche, 2014: 436). Therefore if the aims and benefits of US and NATO are not jeopardised, CSDP has a chance of success. This argument accounts for the steps which have been taken to strengthen EU- NATO relations. The direct influence of the US on EU governments also played an important role concerning the lack of political will by European leaders and that of supporting mechanisms, which would have led to a coherent defence policy. They are the key reasons why defence policy depends on NATO (Parisis, 2010: 103).

The change in the US attitude towards the EU’s security autonomy, beginning with the Clinton administration, was also an important contributing factor to the strengthening of cooperation. The post-Iraq US, displayed further understanding and support for new cooperative schemes in which EU had an enhanced role in the security and defence of the European region (Reichard, 2006: 43). Parisis argues that mutual accommodation becomes evident in the transatlantic relationship regarding security on the European continent (Parisis, 2010: 43). He also notices that a shift towards the EU and a more even-handed transatlantic relationship would favour both sides (Parisis, 2010: 43). This change of shift in security autonomy didn’t occurred overnight.

The concept of a Europe that relies only on NATO for its defence changed mainly due to distance and economic factors (major retrenchment in military funding initiated in the 90s). The Iraq conflict facilitated this understanding and raised the EU-NATO relationship to a new level. The fact that Iraq the war absorbed much of NATO’s operational efficiency exposed a potential weakness in tackling multiple threats in different regions. Therefore the fact that EU’s regional security could be compromised had to be confronted immediately. This could be also considered as a lesson learned in terms of the Europeanisation process, while the relevant timeframe is almost a decade. As mentioned previously, a decade (or so), according to Radaelli, is the minimum time frame to produce results concerning actual Europeanisation progress. Reichard notices this change of shift where by the US acknowledges the autonomy of EU defence policy. As Reichard states there is a need to tackle “international terrorism with non-military means to deal with a unitary and cohesive EU capable of delivering on commitments
and to do so in one go, with one voice and also one hand” (Missiroli, 2003: 86). Closer cooperation came with the 2003 agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangement, whereby the EU is granted access to NATO equipment and planning assets, in exchange for a commitment to provide a settlement of the debate concerning Europe’s security institutions (Cornish, 2004). Cornish argues that the Berlin Plus agreement may provide a safe-path for European security and defence integration under NATO, and therefore a safe-path for NATO’s continuation (Cornish, 2004).

However, it should be noted that the involvement of NATO in CSDP may be considered as inevitable and “pre-arranged”. The conception of the EDA and CSDP role during the early 2000s was embedded in organisations that were administering armaments programs. Any deviation from NATO lines was inconceivable: As Countryman pointed out “we can’t talk about US-EU relationship without talk about NATO”16. This close relation between NATO and Europe’s CSDP was reflected in military operations under the BERLIN PLUS (NATO, 2006) agreement. In short, the initial result of the 1996 Berlin Summit contributed to a decision by EU members, that CSDP should be formed within the NATO framework. As stated in Berlin “NATO foreign ministers agree for the first time to build up an ESDI (European Security Defence Identity) within NATO, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative was to improve European capabilities” (NATO, 2009). This initiative may be considered in the context of the overall cooperative climate between US and NATO which European nations endorsed after the end of WWII.

On the other hand Hofmann argues that despite the Berlin Plus initiative, the emergence of the EU autonomous security has eventually weakened NATO’s role as the principal security organisation and the US influence in terming NATO (Hofmann, 2009: 49). Hofmann also notices the existence of an oxymoron in the relationship between NATO and CSDP, which exhibits both cooperation and competition on various operational levels as well as duplication of institutions (Hofmann, 2009: 49). This environment reflects Buller and Gamble’s argument which states that the EU is a new form of political association with a complex and multi-level organisation that entails contingent and uncertain outcomes (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 9). Therefore, Hofmann’s claim that there is no Learning and institutional memory on the part of these institutions (Hofmann, 2009: 49), addresses four key issues: First, there is no common

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16Interview with T.M. Countryman, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of USA, SEKPY international conference in ASTERAS BOULIAGMENIS HOTEL, 2 October 2006
voice and agreement between NATO and the EU on security and defence issues; Secondly, the learning time-frame is at its lowest point (a decade or so – but the more complex a situation the more time is needed); Thirdly Hoffmann set a hypothetical learning framework in terms of the joint action of NATO-CSDP; Fourthly Hoffmann neglects the importance and impact of other factors in the NATO-CSDP learning framework. Conclusively there are two overlapping learning mechanisms, one due to NATO the other due to CSDP, which complement and compete with each other due to the fact that NATO and EU members cannot agree on the path to follow. Nonetheless, on the EU part, there are “smaller” learning mechanisms which follow specific time frame and have specific goals (such as ESS and ISS) and manage to produce results that do not compromise NATO’s primacy. The success of these learning mechanisms is based on the narrow and specific aims of these goal-setting-agendas which reflect Perruche’s argument of complementary strategy (Perruche, 2014: 436,440) in relation to the interest pursued.

On the other hand, when comparing the NATO – CSDP defence and security approach we may see that Europeanisation process mechanisms may also apply in both cases. The fact that both institutions share common members also enhances this approach. Radaelli and Exadaktylos notice that if adjustment pressure requires fundamental change eventually there will be no change (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010: 198). Thus the ESS and ISS successful outcomes were based to specific goals and timeframe setting, while the NATO – CSDP overall cooperation showed small progress due to the need for substantive change. In terms of Europeanisation, Kaeding and Mastenbroek notice that when it comes to substantive change, learning provides the last chance for change. More specifically they argue that in the EU context, policies conflict with existing beliefs and thus adaptation will depend on “a process of learning” (Kaeding and Mastenbroek, 2006: 346). In any case, for substantive change to occur prerequisite conditions must be met.

Börzel notices that institutional adaptation prerequisites include: new norms, rules, procedures, meaning and structures (Börzel, 2005: 60). When it comes to defence and security, in either NATO or CSDP, confronting threats in the post-Cold War security environment cannot be achieved without adequate technological support. Thus the framing of defence industry environment (defence industrial base, single market) and of defence equipment standards is vital for the sustainability of security and defence.
4.3 Shaping of industrial relations

During recent decades, NATO’s new role and policy was built upon the evaluation of new threats faced in the post-Cold War political environment, especially in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001. The emergent security environment was marked by terrorism, failed states, corruption, arms of mass destruction and arms’ proliferation. As Benz argues, NATO must be capable of tackling these problems quickly before they arise (Benz, 2004: 56). New operational needs are being registered and applied so that reaction lags are shorter and peace operations remain in effect over longer periods (Benz, 2004: 56). This approach was echoed by Ambassador Rizzo during “Industry day” (Imakenews, 2004) in Berlin.

These new operational needs demand highly sophisticated equipment and constant evolution of military technology which may be achieved in close cooperation with NATO and the military industry. As Kujat observed “for the industry, it is important to know where the Alliance is going, where their contributions are within the strategy of the Alliance’s nations” (Kujat, 2010). In this regard, close cooperation with NATO is linked to the adoption of NATO-oriented standards and procedures by the national military industry and armies. Deni highlights the importance of critical capabilities dependence in fulfilling the missions (Deni, 2007: 21). Drawing on Europeanisation we may observe that this approach reflects a misfit (Börzel, 1999: 574) and a “goodness of fit” process, where Alliance Members are called to adjust to NATO standards. Considering the fact that NATOisation precedes Europeanisation, one may identify the potential bottleneck that Radaelli describes as “not enough room” (Radaelli, 2004: 7). However, in NATO’s case, in contrast to Radaelli’s approach (Radaelli, 2004: 9) institutionalisation of security and defence was confined to the goodness of fit as it didn’t expose its members to the same magnitude of change as Europeanisation does. Europeanisation incorporates structural change and process of change in terms of domestic actors (Radaelli, 2004: 9).

However, in the case of NATO, technological adaptation was a prerequisite from its early years. The initial 1951 Military Standardisation Agency was later merged with the 1995 Office of NATO Standardisation, creating the 2001 NATO Standardisation Agency (NATO, 2015). NATO’s Standardisation Office creation indicates the importance that standardisation plays in the overall operation of NATO. More specifically in terms of technology, the creation of new military systems and potential upgrading of existing systems should be mutually compatible. This became a priority after the end of the Cold War, and interoperability became an important –if not
compelling argument for cooperation among industries. According to Schmitt the new security environment in the 1990s triggered cuts in funding for military equipment, the exploitation of economies of scale and the rise of globalisation that pushed industries towards transnational consolidation and closer transatlantic ties, whereas governments had difficulties matching industry-led initiatives (Schmitt, 2001). This strategy surfaced again in 1999 during the Washington alliance summit, when NATO announced the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in order “to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges” (NATO, 2001). The importance of rationalisation, standardisation, and interoperability (RSI) is depicted in the Under-Secretary of State Lucy Wilson Benson’s argument, in 1979, who noted that progress was imminent in RSI negotiations (Taylor, 1982: 95-112). Apart from the reduced defence budgets there were also other factors that made interoperability important.

During that time industries, particularly in Europe, were facing a new era of a globalised economy and international competition. Hartley notices that the economic model of “economies of scale” was viewed as the best solution against the existing fragmented small national markets (Hartley, 2003: 110; Kirkpatrick, 1995: 272). This approach was adopted by defence industries, which shifted their production model from vertical production to horizontal production, creating strong coalitions and joint ventures. During the late 2000s, and after (almost) two decades of consolidations, new cooperation schemes and joint ventures, another wave of consolidation emerged (Grace, 2009). This new wave of consolidation was probably not as extreme as the one of the 1990s-2000s due to the fact that the defence industry had already shrunk significantly and any future consolidation would refer mainly to small and medium companies. In this connection, NATO’s interoperability framework becomes more important while NATO remains the key security provider, and thus the primary equipment “consumer”. According to Grace NATO’s interoperability framework can be viewed as a key element for future cooperation schemes between industries in Europe and USA (Grace, 2009). Taylor also notices that “NATO RSI is a process of political and economic integration among its member-states” (Taylor, 1982: 95). Given that all NATO decisions require consensus (NATO, 2014), this process may also be considered as learning via facilitated coordination (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2010: 200) where the coordinator is NATO RSI. Bulmer and Radaelli link facilitated coordination to areas where no common law (EU Law) is applied while they identify potential applications in security policy (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 365). This argument is in accordance with
NATO’s RSI aims where its members are called –initially- to cooperate in standardisation setting which would be later adopted by them. NATO’s standardisation approach, even during the Cold War, didn’t come without problems or criticism. Feldman noticed the amendment to the US Defence Appropriation Authorisation (Sec. 302, PL 93-365) which aimed at mitigating the cost of failing to standardise equipment within NATO (Feldman, 1984: 285). Cohen argued that standardisation could also be a means to modify foreign tactics as well (Cohen, 1978: 78). On the other hand, he stressed the need for standardisation for some European nations who lacked adequate technology and industry (Cohen, 1978: 78).

Standardisation during the 1990s supplied -once again- the linkage between current and new technological products (Taylor, 1982: 97-98), mainly in terms of upgrading the existing ones. Standardisation has been used as a policy approach, in the past, mainly by the US, to enhance competition against emerging industrial threats such “as Japan and a unified European economic bloc” (Russell, 2006: 9). Considering this and in view of standardisation benefits (often those provide timely, widely adopted, and effective solutions to technical problems) (Updegrove, 1995), the whole standardisation procedure could have a decisive influence on the key market players presently as well as in years to come. Fountain noticed that the US Department of Defence (DoD) has been supporting basic science and military technologies throughout the Cold War period (Fountain, 2004). Specifically Fountain argued that US DoD considered this support to be a long term investment in military technology which would lead to superiority in national military strategy (Fountain, 2004). Feldman also argued that standardisation of weapons systems may lead to a single source provision (the US) (Feldman, 1984: 285). These approaches seem to support the argument that competition for standards among industries, nations and alliances, ultimately enables the strong, NATO friendly, industries to impose standards while the rest struggle to preserve a market share by adjusting to these standards. These (NATO friendly) companies may be viewed as instruments in the agenda setting within NATO while retaining a key role in “change facilitating” and policy “downloading” processes.

From a different perspective and in terms of “marketing”, NATO represents a common platform where several military industries cooperate and produce military equipment according to NATO specifications. Being in the platform provides a competitive advantage which ensures that the produced equipment will be absorbed by the Alliance members. This approach has also another perspective which is related to burden sharing. NATO’s member states are sharing in the responsibilities and burdens
of defence. Burden-sharing may be defined as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal” (Hillison, 2009). However, the new NATO members, on average, have higher levels of military expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) than older states due to the fact that new members need to modernise their armed forces while developing NATO-compatible capabilities. Their need to show “good will” in the Alliance is another factor for higher expenditures (Hillison, 2014: 7). The members of the Alliance –in marketing terms- may be viewed as the first target group that will “consume” “security” and armaments which they produce. Any enlargement of the Alliance may be also viewed as entry into new markets whereas new members share a greater relative proportion of burdens than older ones (Hillison, 2014: 26). Having dedicated “consumers” who have pre-acquired rather expensive military equipment is a part of a successful marketing plan, where the setting of standards is a key issue for success. It is up to the political leaders of NATO, to balance the Alliance, in terms of providing equal opportunities for military production and technology. Taylor linked NATO’s weapons standardisation to the degree “of ideological advocacy for the collaborative security imperative and the influence of economic competition in arms production and sales among the members of the alliance” (Taylor, 1982: 95-112). In other words, Taylor identifies the alternative use of NATO’s standardisation, apart from its operability role, as an alternative means for influencing its members. This process is being achieved through a number of methods, such as annual conferences, workshops and meetings.

4.4 Industrial policy agenda setting

Among the means for the implementation of NATOs’ policy conferences, workshops and meetings are particularly significant. In this effort partners’ “willingness is considered as the key to their success (NATO, 2015). These take place regularly among Member States. Their aim is to keep up with the needs of the member states while responding to new and emerging security needs. This is an issue of high importance as NATO is a dynamic organisation. During these meetings, long term strategy and short term goals are discussed and applied while, at the same time, background talks take place regarding foreign affairs, the economy, military, technological and other issues. NATO discusses cooperation with the EU over industrial policy at these conferences (Benz, 2004: 57). Examples of this include: Industry Day, Concept Development and Experimentation (CE&D) conferences, The Global
Commons, NATO Resource Conference, Chiefs of Transformation, Senior Leadership Workshop, Training Synchronisation, NATO Configuration Mgmt Symposium, Network Enabled Capability (NEC) Conference, Strategic Military Partners, Multiple Futures Project and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) 17.

The ACT programme among others, enhances capabilities development, innovation, evaluates the efficiency of current capabilities and gives emphasis to interoperability in current and future programs, in the context of reduced defence budgets (Stephane Abrial, 2010: 3). As Abrial states, the ACT programme aims at improving security by achieving concrete results in terms of innovation in relation to real-world constraints and by promoting think tanks and discussion tables between the alliance and military industry (Stephane Abrial, 2010: 3). It later served as a venue for NATO standard setting. During Industry day in 2004, Admiral Giambastiani presented, under ACT, a Green Paper that was designed to provide a foundation for industrial relations entitled “NATO – Industry cooperation within transformation” (Benz, 2004: 56). This document sets out what ACT expected from industry, which included: identification and development of special technologies, tackling capability gaps, counseling for the development of operationally useable technologies, support for new concepts, aiding joint research and enhancing interoperability and common standards. In return ACT would assist industry in developing products for NATO’s needs while enhance industrial participation and keep industry informed of NATO’s intentions regarding research and technology. In this way, ACT provided a unique competitive advantage for US forces and NATO allies who have associated themselves with industrial advances, and can anticipate technological trends through the interoperability framework. Therefore forces compatible with US and NATO’s industrial platforms and systems have access to state-of-the-art military technology and eventually distance themselves from the Europeanisation effort. Drawing on Radaelli’s argument, NATO aims at presenting a better deal for its Members (especially the old ones) while the new members seem to undergo some-kind of “goodness of fit” transformation so as to adjust to the Alliance’s framework (Radaelli, 2004: 16). Though it may be seen as a matter of simply direct gains by the Members of NATO or EU, other factors influence that outcome, such as the post-Cold War security environment.

17 Information for all NATO meetings and conferences may be found in official NATO web site (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events.htm). The importance of all these meetings is reflected in the large number of them.
4.5 NATO’s areas of intervention

The end of the Cold War altered NATO’s activity in two ways: NATO undertook an active “out-of-area” military role in the conflicts in the Balkans, adopted an “open door policy” of enlargement and developed a wide ranging partnership and dialogue programme (Flockhart, 2010: 1). Out-of-area NATO missions, in the post-Cold War world is an issue which has been discussed and criticised, among member states, for several years. Areas of intervention are being regarded as appropriate security and defence concerns, setting geographical limitations to NATO’s interference. Especially the limitations reflect a vital issue for the future role of both NATO and CSDP. Regarding the CSDP, this issue remains unclear. If the CSDP had a clear, unanimous mandate concerning areas and reasons for intervention it would have been easier to produce an operations framework and provide adequate forces for the task at hand. For NATO the end of the Cold War triggered a search for a new identity which complicated things. This climate was reflected in NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s words: “Importantly, however, this shift lies, not in the nature of NATO’s post–Cold War mission, but, rather, in its scope. What NATO sceptics have failed to recognise is the extent to which NATO laid the foundation for its post–September 11 initiatives in 1990 when the Allies declared that NATO’s mission was no longer to defend an existing order but, rather, to construct a new one”18. During that same year’s Summit in London, the Declaration of London (NATO, 2000) stated that changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would enable NATO to “help build the structure of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual and the peaceful resolution of disputes” (Levine, 2003; NATO, 2000). The Declaration brought many changes. Despite the fact that Member States were still committed to a collective defence under NATO, new initiatives depicted a new understanding of security since the end of cold war. The perception that NATO’s involvement in Bosnia effectively brought the war to an end triggered NATO’s involvement in conflicts beyond the Alliance’s traditional areas of concern. NATO’s lack of doctrine which would support out-of-area operations caused several problems. The identity crisis of NATO and internal transformation lagged behind external security needs. The strategy shift of the alliance was not followed by its organisational structure. According to Deni, this adaptation lag triggered significant

doubts about the ability of NATO to handle the new tasks it had assigned to itself in the post-Cold War period (Deni, 2007: 65).

Despite problems, NATO managed to avoid institutional decline (Smith, 2000: 24). Flockhart noticed that the 1999 NATO operations in Kosovo, could be considered as a success not only because of the positive result of the operations but also because of NATO’s moving forward on an important decision: to take part in a substantial “out-of-area” campaign to stop ethnic cleansing (Flockhart and Kristensen, 2008: 9). During the 1999 NATO Summit in Prague, members of the Alliance shared a mutual decision on emerging security threats. NATO’s official 50 year old defensive status was updated. The non-interventionist status, outside Alliance territory, was altered as the Alliance members agreed on the principle of out-of-territory operations. The territory that NATO could operate in was redefined as the Euro-Atlantic region allowing several operations that were previously out-of-the area, to be included (NATO, 1999). Despite this change and the fact that terrorism was identified as a security risk (NATO, 2010), the terrorist acts of 9/11 revealed that NATO was not prepared. Since this incident, the meaning of attack, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, came to include terrorist attacks such as 9/11 while NATO, which was engaged actively in the fight against terrorism, launched its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic region and began a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities” (NATO, 2010). During the same period (1999-2000) major European initiatives for an autonomous security were taken. NATO’s search for a new identity was simultaneously taking place with the definition of CSDP.

Following the terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the NATO Council decided to extend the intervention area, which was covering maritime operations in the Mediterranean, known as “Operation Active Endeavour” (Moore, 2007: 111). The extension included the entire Mediterranean region. Cassarino identified four reasons that contributed to the Mediterranean coverage inclusion: “invisibility, flexibility, limited cost of defection, adaptability to security concerns” (Cassarino, 2007: 190). All these reasons reflect the burden-sharing logic of NATO which had to cope with diminishing defence budgets. This became clearer during NATO’s 2006 Summit in Riga, in which members of the Alliance set a new goal regarding its operation so as to confront new security threats. The goal referred to a 40% contribution of each Member State to “deployable land forces” and a 8% contribution to “land forces” that would be available at any given moment for out-of-area operations (Deni, 2007: 31). New threats on the agenda include: terrorism, cyber-attacks, threats to energy supply and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, NATO’s reorganisation and
expansion, in order to face these new challenges, in view of burden sharing amongst the Allies may be viewed as a breakthrough in a period of major cuts in military equipment. Common actions, by the Allies, against current and emerging threats are aimed at achieving a greater level of security than they would have achieved on their own.

However, the fact that NATO’s role is enabling its Member States to achieve essential national security objectives (NATO, 2013) raises scepticism regarding the Alliance’s aims. The existence of a large scale military force under NATO is not intended to impoverish the national defence of member states. In this spirit, during the 2010 NATO’s Summit in Lisbon, Members were encouraged to pay regular premiums to maintain a collective insurance policy. This claim may have been justified if it had not been for the funding cuts in armaments at the NATO level. As a result, Alliance members must decide how to allocate scarce military funds; between NATO and national armament programs. This approach may be viewed as an additional “goodness of fit” mechanism which aimed at pushing member states to a new reality while maintaining the primacy NATOisation. Having a European security alternative (even non-operational) made Members of the Alliance skeptical. This change of approach in defence at the Lisbon Summit raised questions concerning the security NATO provides to its Members. Burden sharing for the Alliance refers also to security threats which NATO members’ face not just to cost sharing. Nevertheless, the new approach was not clear and could be interpreted in many ways. As a NATO official highlighted, these challenges affect the Allies in different ways: thus a terrorist attack on one member may “generate collective concern, yet it may not automatically be regarded as an attack against the Alliance as a whole” (Iklódy, 2010: 18-19). The ambiguity of this new strategy is reflected in several Alliance Member States’ hesitation to assume a stronger role in the areas of energy security and nuclear proliferation while serious questions exist regarding the potential for manipulation of smaller NATO counties by bigger member states. As stated earlier in the text, the bigger the change the harder the adaptation or lack thereof.

Another issue that needs special attention is the new wave of armaments and military equipment expenditure in the context of NATO related to new threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, out-of-the-area operations may also trigger a series of new expenditures necessary to tackle new operational needs. All these issues have put more pressure on member states’ decisions concerning the allocation of investment in security: (NATO vs. national). As argued earlier, Cornish suggested a solution which may overcome this dilemma and serve both objectives: the
establishment and strengthening of the CSDP in Europe may provide NATO with an operational substitute military force for the region. The scope of the new NATO strategy as presented during the 61st Alliance Summit (19 November 2010), clarified medium and long term goals in view of Afghanistan operations and the New NATO administration structure while evaluating cooperation prospects with Russia as a NATO partner (NATO, 2010). The new strategy redefined the NATO mission as moving from a Defence Alliance to a Global Security Organisation. This aim was to be achieved through the cooperation between NATO UN, Russia, EU and Eastern Countries and other (Borgomano-Loup, Masala and Faber, 2005). NATO’s primary goals regarding the Alliance states’ defence was not altered. However, Article 5 of NATO was updated to include collective defence “in the context of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine” (NATO, 2015). Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow in view of Russia’s aggression suggested closer cooperation between EU and NATO but distinguished NATO’s role as the primary defence player whereas EU’s role was downsized to contribution to political and economic reforms (Vershbow, 2015). Vershbow’s view results that the ongoing competition over defence and security in Europe is still alive. Vershbow’s speech reflects, the soft power approach that NATO uses to foster its values, policies and activities (NATO, 2015). NATO’s public relations policy may be viewed as a long-term public learning policy with a bottom up approach.

4.6 NATO’s public relations policy

Public opinion support for NATO’s strategy has always been a basic requisite of the alliance. As a result, the information flows between NATO and the public affects both decision making with the Alliance and its policies. The US president’s foreign policy shapes the image of NATO in the eyes of the public, as US leadership and NATO, are perceived to be interrelated (or at least US driven) (Rahkonen, 2007: 88). Goldsmitha and Horiuchia in their 2012 analysis conclude that “public opinion about US foreign policy (including issues related to NATO) indeed appears to matter when countries make decisions on issues of importance to the US” (Goldsmitha and Horiuchia, 2012: 581-582). In this respect, public opinion may be regarded as highly significant. Indeed, regular polls take place to record and anticipate the public’s reactions. Back in 2005, one of these polls, the German Marshall Fund on transatlantic trends, found that “significant popular support exists on both sides of the Atlantic for the United States and Europe to work together to face global problems” (Moore, 2007: 149). These findings reflected the general climate and the common need for security
after the events of 9/11 and 2004 Madrid bombings. They also indicate that the new security identity of NATO and EU’s CSDP were being accepted as coexisting and not as competing. Still there were some vestiges of the past which emphasised confrontation, such as the US president’s involvement with NATO.

The involvement of US president in high level NATO decision-making during recent decades, is seen by many as a direct application of US foreign policy via NATO. The climate was not better during the Cold War. During his administration (1963-1969) President Lyndon Johnson was considered by nearly one-third of the French population as the “most dangerous threat to peace” and the French president, Charles de Gaulle, labeled Johnson “the greatest danger in the world today to peace”. (Andrews, 2005: 81). However Obama’s popularity is quite high relative to his predecessor George W. Bush. During the first years of Obama's presidency there seem to be an increase in the desire for U.S. global leadership, according to German Marshall Fund (GMF) survey (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010: 7). The Transatlantic Trends survey of GMF also indicates “that after the first full year of Obama’s presidency, the public is now in a better position to evaluate whether its high expectations were met” (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010: 7).

Means of influencing public opinion influence include: various organisations, culture, music, TV, radio, internet, literature, magazines, movies (Hollywood), news, exhibitions and conferences. As technology advances, new means of communication and social networking have surfaced and are being used to inform citizens about NATO goals. Examples are: people to people diplomacy, direct relations and (social) networks. NATO does not differ much from a commercial brand name and attendant promotion. As Babst notices the Cold War top-down communication patterns are being replaced by peer-to-peer communications which require better planning (Babst, 2010: 6-7). In this context large organisations like NATO seem rather complex for the average citizen’s understanding. The results of the surveys provide a clear and detailed picture of NATO’s actions and policies. These surveys have been and may be made by anyone. Such surveys are: NATO internal surveys (NATO, 1952), Pew Research Center (Global Attitudes) (PewResearchCenter, 2015), Washington Post Survey (on demand) (Washington Post, 2015), IPSOS Agency research (Surveys have shown: 41.6 - 47 percent of citizens support NATO , 2015), GMF institute Transatlantic Trends survey (Transatlantic Trends, 2013) and other.

In the 2010 GMF “Transatlantic Trends” survey, there were several important findings. The survey indicated that 59% in 11 EU countries and 60% in US believe that
NATO is essential for security, with the exception of Turkey where the percentage is 30%. Thus, Turkey’s survey may be affected by the fragile balance of power within the country between the government and the military. The survey shows high levels of public comprehension of NATO’s role. These findings come 20 years after the end of the Cold War and ten years after the events of 9/11. In a more recent view, Brooking institute’s 2015 survey in relation to Pew Research Center study, on European citizens’ perception of NATO indicate that “Key NATO countries are reluctant to use force to defend Allies” (Shapiro and Newby, 2015)

These findings indicate clearly that NATO needs to engage in more public promotion concerning its role as security provider. Fortunately these findings come ahead of any potential incident that could jeopardise the Alliance’s coherence. Also, these findings indicate that with the Cold War (which strengthened the Alliance’s coherence) is gone and no comparable threat in sight NATO should follow a different policy if it hopes to prevent a major incident. In addition NATO should mobilise journalists, think tanks, decision makers, NGOs, marketers and other available resources in order to communicate its aims to the world. The Learning timeframe in this case initiates with NATO’s latest defence agenda, which means it will take at least a decade to have solid evidence of (re)NATOisation of the Alliance. This provides the EU with a unique window of opportunity in view of the conception of CSDP as an alternative institution for security provision. However, in case of cooperation between NATO and CSDP things could be different.

4.7 CSDP: Euro - Atlantic join cooperation.

Since its birth, CSDP was based upon NATO. However, the hesitation of many EU Member States to establish a fully autonomous security and defence policy mainly derives from lack of political will and the mechanisms which would support such actions. Bull, already from the early 1980s, poses the question of the burden of defending EU (Western Europe at that time), along with the decision-making authority within the alliance moving from American into EU hands (Bull, 1982: 157). Dorman noticed that there is a fundamental real disagreement amongst the European nations about what Europe’s future should be, what its priorities should be, who its allies are and who its potential foes are (Dorman, 2011). This situation is not new. As explained in previous chapters, European states created WEU, European Defence Community and several other cooperative schemes prior to NATO. However, the establishment of NATO in 1949 weakened an attempt that would have led to a European alliance.
The situation remained unchanged until the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the Soviet Regime. The CSPD was initiated in the early 1990s, during the first Iraq war operations. This political atmosphere was reflected in the words of George Bush senior, during the 1991 NATO summit in Rome: “if your ultimate aim to provide for your own defence, then the time to tell us is today [...] how there can be a substitute for the Alliance as the provider of our [U.S.] defence and Europe’s security” (Kelleher, 1995: 58). The first Iraqi war also raised a series of questions regarding the US and NATO’s availability in view of a potential threat against the EU Allies. The first Iraqi war required ample military and political recourses from key contributors USA and UK, leaving the Allies “uncovered” in the event of a potential threat. The US – EU different approach in the use of military power was only one piece of the puzzle, while the political approach was another. Kaňa and Mynarzová noticed several political issues which affect the institutional dimension of relation between the two organisations (Kaňa and Mynarzová, 2012: 112,113). Cornish notices that the Bush administration was regarded by Europeans as “preoccupied with the idea of eliminating vulnerability” while favoured prevention as a means to confront threats before they materialise (Cornish, 2004: 69). He also notices that Europeans believed that any countermeasures should primarily respect “the essence of life in a western liberal democracy” (Cornish, 2004: 69). Weiss also notices that the US reaction to the introduction of the ESDP/CSDP “has been hesitant and, during the George W. Bush years, even hostile” (Weiss, 2012: 656). However, during the years that followed, there was a major shift in the US approach in favour of the ESDP as “the Bush administration moved to declare its unequivocal backing for ESDP” (Jacobs, 2012: 737). An important contributing factor was the subsequent crisis in the Balkan region, which clearly verified that EU was not ready for any kind of military operation but also indicated that there were controversies regarding the availability of NATO’s military resources. The fragile political agreement was being tested. As Kelleher argued “European governments supported, or at least refrained from actively opposing, American policy activism around the world, while the United States supported, or at least refrained from actively undermining, a series of regional and global arrangements that underwrote Europe’s regional prosperity and international influence” (Andrews, 2005: 1).

With the Alliance’s strategic purpose unclear and insufficient resources, EU Member States could only rely on their own national military forces for defence. Hence the Rome 1991 Summit defined four NATO’s core functions “(a) to act as one (but only one) foundation for stability in Europe, (b) to be the forum for transatlantic political
consultation, (c) to constitute the primary mechanism to deter and defend against attacks on its members, and (d) to preserve the strategic balance in Europe” (Kelleher, 1995: 65). Thus considered NATO’s confrontation mechanisms should be sufficient. However, in cases of multiple and large-scale terrorist attacks they were insufficient. This gap in the Alliance structure provided the ground for some EU members to deepen cooperation with the CSDP. Since the introduction of the CSDP, several steps were taken to create an “autonomous” military capability. This “autonomy” raised much ambiguity amongst EU Member States as it allowed decision making with no intervention from the United States (Howorth and Keeler, 2003: 6). Weiss noticed that the ESDP/CSDP military assets’ redeployment on account of NATO represented the link that led to the establishment of ESDP/CSDP in 1998-9 (Weiss, 2012: 670). The 2003 Brussels “mini” Summit, between French, German and Belgian governments with the objective of increasing cooperation was also a sign of deeper cooperation (Bono, 2009). However, different trends within the EU resulted in lack of military coherence among Member States. With the Balkan crisis knocking on the EU door two potential solutions were presented. The first suggested the increase of WEU power. Hence there were concerns about the negative effect on the CSDP and/or NATO. The second solution favoured further borrowing under the “Berlin Plus agreement framework” (NATO, 2006). The first solution was discarded, while the second solution was taken on board even though it was deemed problematic (European Union, 2007). During the Berlin Plus talks in the late 1990s, the Bush Administration aimed at transforming NATO into a multi-task Alliance which could provide a variety of services, including ad-hoc coalitions against terrorism. On the other side of the ocean there seemed to be division amongst EU members regarding the CSDP approach. The French government preferred to maintain a high level of national military coordination and/or establish multilateral EU arrangements instead of transferring power to a central European organisation. Germany and Belgium supported other means of cooperation, such as economic, financial and humanitarian aid. This lack of unity among EU States was reflected in the 2003 EU Council’s decision which encouraged Member States to participate in “structured cooperation” schemes in order to carry out tasks as envisaged under ESDP (European Union, 2003). NATO’s policy presented as an alternative comprehensive approach which seemed to undermine the creation of a single EU military entity. Albright’s 1998 statement reflected the concern over CSDP’s conflict with NATO under the “3 Ds”: no Duplication, no De-coupling and no Discrimination (Chappell, 2012: 71).
In this climate, the scope of the Berlin Plus agreement, which was established during the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington, set a narrow framework for NATO and CSDP operations while preventing any further deviation from NATO. According to the Berlin Plus agreement, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was to be structured within a NATO operational framework while increasing cooperation and efficiency amongst the European Alliance Members. As the 1999 Communication stated “Building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance” (NATO, 1999). However, EU Member States conducted multiple discussions under the ESDI which led to the St. Malo Declarations concerning autonomous military operations by and credible military forces of the EU. As Howorth argues, “gradually, it became clear that, if the EU was ever to emerge as a serious security actor, it would need to develop autonomous capacity” (Howorth, 2003). Prior to St.Malo Declarations several political initiatives were in favour of CSDP. However, it was the British Ministry of Defence that played a major role with the establishment of Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). Shepherd argued that capabilities for expeditionary crisis management were the main motivation behind CSDP launch (Shepherd, 2010: 49) while Coffey noticed that there was a belief that US would not support a deeper EU defence integration (Coffey, 2013: 7).

The St Malo initiative included several documents which later became the basis for CSDP organisational and operational framework. These reports were drafted by UK officials under the initiative of British Prime Minister Tony Blair (Rutten, 2001). In the 1999 Helsinki meeting, the European Council established the institutions of the ESDP and the first military “Headline Goal” involving the creation of a European armed force capable of significant humanitarian, crisis-management and even peace enforcement operations (Howorth and Keeler, 2003: 11). During the same year, European Union governments decided to further strengthen the CSDP. As a result, Javier Solana became the first High Representative for the foreign and security policy in the EU and also named as new WEU Secretary General aiming at the highest level of cooperation between the two organisations (Bell, 2002: 748). The transfer of WEU’s crisis management function to the EU was finalised by mid-2001 while subsidiaries of the WEU were transferred later, in January 2002.

At that time, Europe considered the creation of a Rapid Reaction Military force under a European lead, as a response to international crises and cases where NATO
would not have military jurisdiction. The 1999 Declaration that stated “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO” (European Parliament, 1999). In addition Javier Solana’s strategic concept provided a common basis for EU and NATO to deliberate in broadly compatible terms about security threats, the use of armed force and ground for a potential agreement on a joint strategic vision (Cornish, 2004). Solana’s approach overcame the two obstacles, which concerned the role of NATO and the US and the utilisation of force, while acting as a catalyst for the creation of a European Security Strategy (Chappell, 2012: 73).

At the 2000 Feira EU Summit, a second HG was announced, called Headline Lite, which established a police-international-missions-capacity aiming at conflict prevention. The 1999 Helsinki, the Feira and later the 2001 Laeken meetings were considered to be a reference point for the future operational framework of CSDP, even though the outcome did not meet all the requirements of the Member States. The final EU council meeting at Laeken in 2001 captured this climate pushing through the ESDP operational status despite lack of preparedness (Howorth and Keeler, 2003: 30). The meeting’s conclusions that followed provided a clear view of the participants’ aims, both in terms of CSDP and NATO-EU relations: “Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities […] the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations. The Union is determined to finalise swiftly arrangements with NATO” (European Union, 2001). The Feira Summit comprised of four ad-hoc working groups aiming at preparing the ground for effecting permanent adjustments and agreements between EU and NATO. The ad hoc groups’ areas of interest were: security, capabilities goals, access of EU to NATO structures and Permanent adjustments arrangement. A new level of cooperation was set up between the two organisations while a letter exchange between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency in January 2001 defined the framework of cooperation. This high level of cooperation among the two organisations and the mature political environment resulted in the signing of the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP and the subsequent cooperation framework between the two organisations. This cooperation framework underlined EU-NATO dependencies but also outlined the importance of the decision making autonomy of EU. However, the narrow framework of cooperation had several legal blanks. The legal framework retained priority of NATO over the EU. This can be seen in the NATO-EU declaration which allowed the EU “access to NATO’s planning
capabilities for its own military operations and reiterated the political principles of the strategic partnership” (NATO, 2010). Hofmann noticed that the US would like to make use of European capabilities, while downplaying CSDP institutional autonomy (Hofmann, 2011: 112). This approach was evident during the first years of the CSDP when there was a clear preference for NATO over “the ambiguous project promoted by the EU” (Jegen and Mérand, 2014: 198-199). Chappell also highlights Biscop’s argument, under which EU’s policy priorities –in terms of objectives and instruments- were under the influence of the American framework of thought (Chappell, 2012: 111). Howorth and Menon also argue that US aimed at benefiting from CSDP and enjoy the gains of deploying troops elsewhere (Howorth and Menon, 2009: 736). However this did not occur.

The 2008 European Security Strategy (ESS) update incorporated the study “Providing Security in a Changing World” which added areas of security such as energy security, cyber security, newly emerged piracy and climate change to the agreement. Strengthening civil and military crisis management capabilities was also an ongoing goal of the EU. The study also highlighted the need for finalisation of administrative arrangements between the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) including the military Erasmus program.

In 2009 the European Union published the Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and security procurement (20 August 2009) and Directive 2009/43/EC (6 May 2009) which aimed to enhance cooperation between European military industries by simplifying terms and conditions for transfers of defence-related products. This legal framework reflected political maturity and willingness and a move away from protectionism by national governments. Hence, the EU has taken several steps, during the last decades both in terms of structure and legal foundation which led to a more coherent defence strategy. In this respect, EU has created a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1999), an EU Institute for Security Studies (2001), an EU Political and Security Committee (1999-2000), an EDA (2004), and EU Military Committee (2000), an EU military Staff (2001), a Policy Unit (2000), and a Situation Centre (2002). Biscop highlights the early 2010s climate where an important US supportive shift towards EU military cooperation was observed (Biscop, 2012: 1312). He argued that, in this context, the CSDP could “function militarily as the European pillar of NATO, under the political guidance of the EU” (Biscop, 2012: 1298). Such a partnership and a transformation of NATO were also described during the 1980s by
Kissinger (Kissinger, 1982). Such initiatives for further autonomy in defence and security were to be incorporated in the Constitutional Treaty.

4.8 Lisbon Treaty and amendments

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was initially viewed as a major breakthrough for enhanced cooperation in terms of the CSDP. However, after its rejection by France and Holland, the treaty was delayed for several years till its renegotiation at the 2007 European Council meeting in Lisbon. The resulting Constitutional Treaty evolved into the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (LT). Later on in the same year, the amending of LT, gave CSDP a new perspective. What was formerly known as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) would be referred to as provisions for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under Article 42 of the LT. For the first time, there was a direct linkage of CSDP to Common Foreign and Security Policy. The updated security and defence policy included a series of amendments which included provisions for a structured cooperation on a permanent basis. This progress may be considered as an important breakthrough for EU integration. Article 42 (2012/C 326/01) underlines the need for a permanent operational capacity, based on civilian and military assets which will operate under the UN charter and perform out-of-the-Union missions for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and for strengthening international security. Thus CSDP would not prejudice member states’ rights, under the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty. It is up to each state to decide whether to rely on NATO or the CSDP for its defence. Given the experience of WEU the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also the Vice-President of the European Commission under the Articles 17 and 18 of LT. In addition the introduction of a new instrument which would assist the EU High Representative was outlined in Article 27 of LT. The European External Actions Service (EEAS) was to contribute to cooperation amongst diplomatic services of the Member States in order to coordinate the future decision making processes. It is clear that EU actions and treaties reflected European governments’ objective to avoid any duplication of or conflict between CSDP and NATO goals. The transatlantic cooperation schemes also reflected progress amongst EU and US leaders. The key factors underlying overall progress were economic conditions, and the new security environment, which resulted in the reduction of military budgets and burden-sharing among member states of the alliance and the Union. This issue is not new, as the US-European alliance has been confronting burden-sharing issues since the foundation of NATO. Hence the arrangement which enabled the
use of NATO assets “was much in line with US interests” as it “increased burden sharing and at the same time undermined the need for autonomous EU military action” (Dijkstra, 2012: 460) (Weiss, 2012: 678). However, the reality is not that simple. As Biscop notices, there are several countries which fail to meet their financial responsibilities to NATO (Biscop, 2012: 1297). Cornish notices that several disagreements over defence spending threaten to occupy the vacuum at the heart of the alliance left by the collapse of NATO’s historical adversary (Cornish, 2004). The lack of imminent threat and the alternative security provision solutions (EU – NATO) further complicate this climate. An important contribution to a solution was expected to be made by the introduction of the European Defence Agency.

4.9 The establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA)

The idea of the European Defence Agency (EDA) originates from the mid-1990s talks and initiatives19, while an important step was made with the EU declaration of St. Malo: According to the Declaration the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (European Council, 1999). The 2002 decision by the European parliament to invite the Commission to present a Communication (Commission of the European Communities, 2003) on the EDA was another important step. The 2003 Communication (COM(2003) 113 final) made clear that EDA should take action in the fields of: standardisations, monitoring of defence and related industries, intra-community transfers, competition rules, procurement rules, export control of dual use goods and research. Later in the same year, the legal basis of EDA was discussed during 2003 EU Council at Thessaloniki which resulted in the 2004 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP. The backstage discussions for the EDA accommodated tension between UK and France over the CSDP. France’s persistence in developing an autonomous EU operational capacity stumbled onto UK objections. The UK did not want duplication of NATO’s capacity. Despite this dispute the 2003 Summit authorised an EU autonomous operational military force based on a Belgian army site in view of the Iraq crisis (Grant, 2003). The Iraq crisis and the divergence among EU member states, concerning the use of force, also created a critical situation for the future

19In 1996 and 1997 the Commission produced two Communications to encourage industrial restructuring and greater efficiency in the European Defence Equipment Market. Some of these ideas came to fruition.
of the CSDP. Whatsoever the states –eventually- reacted positively and CSDP made its first steps (Chappell, 2012: 72). Cornish notices that the deep disagreements over Iraq paradoxically represented an opportunity to strengthen NATO, the EU and the US-European relationship, by finally confronting and rectifying deep-seated strategic differences which had been festering since the end of the Cold War (Cornish, 2004).

This autonomous initiative provoked outrage in Washington and London and seemed destined to derail the entire CSDP if it wasn’t for the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who bridged the differences and provided a solution (Howorth, 2005: 44). The solution indicated three operational frameworks for the EU force. The first framework referred to operations led by the EU, under the Berlin Plus Agreement and included a dedicated EU unit under NATO. The second framework included EU based operations and national headquarters amongst the Member States. The third framework referred to specific EU based operations which included civil and military implementation to be handled under a CSDP autonomous EU Civilian – Military Cell. Blair’s initiative resulted in a shift in EU autonomy in military operations given that the Iraq crisis had absorbed too many NATO (including UK) sources to a distant region. For Blair, EU military autonomy was an alternative to large scale defence. As Andrews explains: “the Iraq War had diverted substantial resources from the war on terror” (Andrews, 2005: 55).

After this settlement, SFOR was handed over to the EU at the end of 2004. As Reichard explains, it was clear then that “the hand-over was in the obvious interest of the United States and NATO in order to free up military resources needed in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Reichard, 2006: 39). The 2004 terrorist events in Spain and the ones on UK (2005) provided evidence backing Tony Blair’s argument concerning European regional security and NATO’s inefficiency in the face of multiple terrorist attacks.

Thus the introduction of EDA was considered a rather important step in the further development of European military resources. EDA’s main aim was to enhance coherence among EU Member States in military production and operation under a common framework of defence and security. In this regards, the EDA contribution would be focused: on the development of defence capabilities, on the promotion and enhancement of European armaments cooperation, on the strengthening of the European defence, industrial and technological base, on the creation of a competitive European defence equipment market, and on research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities (European Union, 2004).
The understanding of EDA’s importance is reflected in the 2005 agreement on transferring WEAG/WEAO activities to EDA. Dirk Ellinger, chairman of the EDA steering board and Research and Technology (R&T) director of the German Defence Ministry emphasised from the outset the need for R&T and better collaboration among EU military industries (EDA, 2005). The transfer of activities from WEAG and WEAO to EDA was accompanied by the EDA’s Steering Board press release which highlighted the need for better collaboration in R&T and for more cost-effective approach which will be better linked to CSDP’s capabilities needs (European Defence Agency, 2005). The transfer of WEAG/WEAO activities took place during 2005 and 2006. Considering these and the role of EDA, Georgopoulos argues that the creation of EDA reflects Lessons Learned from the previous initiatives of institutions’ creation for the “coordination in the area of defence procurement in Europe” (Georgopoulos, 2015: 119-120). The learning continued.

The 2006 EDA “Long-Term Vision” (LTV) report provided a “compass” for current and future defence planners regarding CSDP dynamics. The report completed over a period of 11 months and set the foundations for EDA’s medium and long term goals. As Solana emphasised the importance of this report lay in its offering a shared analysis of the major trends and an encapsulation of the state of the world in which CSDP was to be realised (Solana, 2006). However, the LTV suffered from deficiencies in leadership and political willingness. As a result, the LTV was never updated and the Lisbon Treaty encountered serious obstacles.

Another contribution of the 2007 LT was the new EDA foundations (under Article 42, paragraph 3) and the new roles which included: the identification of operational requirements, the promotion of measures to satisfy those requirements, the contribution and implementation of necessary measures to strengthen the industrial and technological base, the participation in European capabilities and armaments policy definition, and assistance by the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities (The Lisbon Treaty, 2007). Article 42 also describes the organisation’s updated operation framework and role as an administration and coordination instrument of the EU, in the fields of defence capabilities, development, research, acquisitions and armaments. The EDA is therefore expected to act as an ongoing catalyst for future developments in the CSDP. As Linnenkamp and Molling explain the “Council should not be a one - off, but a re-launch of the CSDP infra - structure: capabilities, industry, and the EDA as the key catalyst of progress in both areas” (Linnenkamp and Mölling, 2013). Grevi explains the role of the EU institutions in the development of the CSDP
and in delivering top-level strategic analysis and assessments to Member States in a timely fashion (Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 2009: 406). This argument reflects the potential for a bottom-up mechanism of adjustment where specifications are being uploaded and policies downloaded. The emergence of EDA itself represents substantive Europeanisation which aims to create further Europeanisation as a regulator in defence and security policies. Such an operational organisation would provide an important support for CSDP autonomy.

4.10 CSDP’s first military mission

The launch of Operation Concordia under CSDP in 2003 marked the beginning of a new era for the EU. The operation was a testing ground for the new initiative while challenging the bond of communication between EU and NATO. The operation was the result of 13 EU Member States and 14 non-EU states’ contribution personnel. The 350 members of the force would support the Ohrid peace agreement and more generally support the emergence of a stable and secure environment (Lindley, 2007: 317). The mission was established by Security Council Resolution 1371 (United Nations, 2001) upon grounds of a host-state request and took over NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony (NATO, 2002). The operation, which constituted the EU’s first use of NATO assets and capabilities, marked the beginning of a new transatlantic strategic partnership. This would not have been possible without the 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit agreement and the operational agreement of Berlin Plus. Operation Concordia was viewed as a test event for future European military engagements due to the fact that it was consisted of only 350 military personnel. This first mission however confined any potential role to a narrow operational framework. The evaluation of operation Concordia revealed the complexity of international and regional dynamics while the political assessment of the operation deemed the Berlin Plus agreement to have been a success. As Monaco pointed out “...Italian Defence Minister Antonio Martino, and the Head of EU Military Staff, General Rainer Schuwirth, spoke before the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee (on 25 and 26 November 2003 respectively) and hailed Concordia a 'success' in terms of NATO-EU co-operation” (Monaco, 2007). She argued that EU needed to coordinate while maintain NATO presence in the area. Monaco also noted that EU forces seemed to be “better equipped than NATO for complex civil-military crisis management operations” (Monaco, 2007). On the other hand, NATO would have provided a safer result for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) had
the Concordia operation failed. Hence because Concordia was small, the risk was also small. This first application of EU military force may be considered as a reference point for future operations in Europe in terms of providing information regarding military personnel availability, technology and equipment needs and strategy assessment. The expert evaluation of political support and flexibility of coordination by European Forces has provided measurable information on performance, skills, flexibility and effectiveness of the operation body. As a result the operation may be viewed as a good example of European operations and thus a (first) Lesson Learned in Europeanisation of EU military operations.

In the future, NATO and EU officials may agree to provide a joint solution while avoiding duplication. One possibility may be the detachment of regional European powers from NATO and the establishment of a European Regional NATO command under a joint EU & NATO members’ authority (Gardner, 1999). The establishment of a European NATO as a single entity reflects Europe’s regional interests in defence and security and may be viewed as another Lesson Learned process.

4.11 Chapter conclusion

NATO and the US have played an important role in the rearmament and restructuring of the European armed forces in the post WWII Europe. This political/military interrelation between US, NATO and EU was build over decades of different methods of adjustment to the Alliance’s standards, based on members’ misfit characteristics. This process of adjustment incorporates Europeanisation characteristics and mechanisms, the difference being that the adjustment is to NATO rather than the EU. Therefore instead of Europeanisation, at that time, the adjustment should be termed NATOisation. This relation grew stronger over the years, strong enough for EU members to institutionalise an important degree of their national Defence and Security.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR altered this relationship. With NATO trying to re-establish its post-cold war identity and having resources dedicated to the Iraq war, the EU was provided with a window of opportunity to initiate the CSDP under the close watch of NATO. This development made European security and defence contestable for both parties in terms of NATOisation and

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20 Interview with Dr Andreas Kastanis, Former military officer and Professor at Hellenic Army Academy at Hellenic Army Academy, Vari, 14 October 2014
Europeanisation, respectively. The fact that there was also another common security provider other than NATO reduced NATO’s primacy.

However, in this contest there are also other factors involved, apart from the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. These factors, which sometimes favoured NATO and sometimes EU, include: the new security environment created by the USSR collapse, the declining military budgets created by the new security environment, the fragmented defence industry, political initiatives which assisted CSDP to take off, standardisation which acted as a means of influence and the introduction of a new EU institution (EDA) with the aim to regulate defence market issues. In terms of Europeanisation, facilitating factors are the EDA creation, the declining military budgets in relation to EU market frameworks/rules and standardisation as a means of NATOisation. However, in terms of NATOisation, EU could have a similar approach in term of Europeanisation. That approach includes establishing EU standards (interoperable with NATO or simply the same) instead of NATO standards. Considering these and in terms of Europeanisation, political initiatives which led to new EU institutions and Europeanisation may be viewed as mediating factors. However, the lack of threat posed by the USSR pushed EU politicians to reduce defence budgets. Cornish noticed the European unwillingness to provide adequate resource for defence and security (Cornish, 2004). Political willingness has always been the driving force not only for the creation of a steady, common security and defence policy, but for the project of European integration and was provided by politicians with long-term vision and anticipation of future threats: “Architects of the European Community doubtless had many gods in mind. Visions of peace, economic progress, and social harmony were prominent in their minds and writings of those who argued on behalf of a United Europe” (Caporaso, 2000: 21). The creation of EU right from the outlet aimed at leaving behind the memories of WWI and WWII while promoting peace among neighbours (European Union, 2010). However, political and economic conditions may tax politicians’ abilities, especially politicians with slow reflexes or low leadership potential. In any case, it is history which will provide the ultimate test. In this respect, Professor Moravcsik (1958- ) argues that “governmental elites choose specific policies […] because they (or their justifications) are consistent with more general, deeper, collectively held ideas or discourses” (Moravcsik, 1999: 670). In other words, (historical) circumstances may provide a window of opportunity but it is up to politicians to make use of it and take initiatives.
Chapter 5

Defence Production and Dynamics

Chapter five focuses on the empirical analysis of the dynamics of the European defence sector. In this chapter, the European defence output and its limitations are examined. In particular, this chapter explores the driving forces behind the “defence industry change”, taking into account the following: globalisation issues, economies of scale, economic crises, military autonomy and new security strategy. Furthermore, the internal strategy of EU regarding R&D is investigated in a policy-making context. In this regard, Greece will be examined as a test case. Finally, R&D policies and their impact will be assessed from a different perspective which implies a new role for R&D as a distinct Europeanisation learning mechanism and a unique driving force for European integration.

5.1 Introduction

The dynamics of European armaments production is an important factor in the emergence of CSDP. Barrinha views defence industry as a guarantee to the state’s survival (Barrinha, 2010: 470). It follows that for a credible CSDP, a European integrated defence industry is required (Barrinha, 2010: 484). Mörth highlighted the importance of integration but also identified potential drawbacks from policy controversies emanating from conflicting conceptual frames and different ideas about the integration process (Mörth, 2000: 173,183). These frames, as Mörth argued, constitute “referents for action,” which give direction to the integration process in that they can lead to better conceptualisation of the issues (Mörth, 2000: 173,174). This chapter examines such objectives, (e.g. market framework, market liberalisation and single market creation) and related factors (viewed as facilitating factors to the CSDP Europeanisation). These factors, which have contributed to the European “defence industry change” and the emergence of CSDP, include: economies of scale and economic crises in relation to defence spending reduction; the creation of a common defence culture and the establishment of a new security identity as means for
developing EU “ways of doing things”; globalisation as an extraneous factor for change. Neal and Taylor point out that globalisation was viewed as a means to survival by most EU and US defence companies (Neal and Taylor, 2001: 358). Their argument stresses the impact of globalisation in terms of industry downsizing (Neal and Taylor, 2001: 340). This became more evident after the end of the Cold-War. However, it is not clear if the Member States’ response, which included defence industry convergence (during the 1990s-mid2000s), was the result of Europeanisation or Globalisation. Wallace argues that “the impacts of globalisation in Europe have to be read through Europeanisation” (Wallace, 2000: 381), in that Europeanisation “is sufficiently deeply embedded to act as a filter for globalisation (Wallace, 2000: 381). Thus the importance and impact of globalisation and its relationship to Europeanisation are examined in this chapter as are other operative forces. One such is the internal strategy of EU regarding R&D, which is analysed in a policy-making context. The analysis of EU’s R&D policies utilised a new perspective which shows R&D policy as a distinctive Europeanisation earning mechanism as well as a unique driving force for European integration. Therefore R&D policies may be thought of as encompassing important factors for CSDP Europeanisation, such as the creation of intra-EU coalitions and cooperation, facilitation for state-of-the-art defence equipment production and direct and indirect economic gains for Member States’ national economies.

5.2 Defence-related economic policies

The determination of defence-related economic policies on the national-level has important implications for national security which, in turn provides an environment conducive to economic growth and hence to citizens’ welfare. Therefore, Moshovis’ argument that national defence and security have historically been considered a public-social merit good (Moshovis, 2000: 11) reflects a more general attitude which is relevant to the realisation of CSDP. Hence, CSDP may be considered as EU Member States’ shared means for promoting joint economic interests.

The importance of the establishment and maintenance of defence and security mechanisms for citizens’ welfare was highlighted by Adam Smith. In his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, defence is identified as one of the three sectors that require the “expenses of the sovereign or Commonwealth” (Smith, 1977: 922) along with “Justice and Public work & institutions” (Smith, 1977: 301). As Coulomb and Paul observe this logic survives to to-day inasmuch as “liberal orthodoxy dominates most studies devoted to defence economics” (Coulomb and Dunne, 2008:
147). Smith believed that the threat of war justified the maintenance of a “standing army”21 as opposed to ad hoc “militias” (Coulomb, 1998: 299-316). This argument can be used to justify CSDP though it implies that the “pooling-and-sharing” character of CSDP is inadequate. For Smith the maintenance of a military/defence power contributes to wealth accumulation. Specifically, he linked a country’s desire to increase wealth to its military power, and though that the latter was directly related to the value of annual produce (Smith, 1977: 161). Drawing on Smith and on Collier and Hoefflert’s argument to the effect that defence-related activities by the state affect the economy (Collier and Hoefflert, 1998), one may conclude that power and wealth are inextricably linked.

Nevertheless, in a Realist conception, certain states consider the strengthening of their economic and military position as a means for altering the international balance of power in their favour. Smith criticised this attitude inasmuch as from his liberal perspective it would jeopardise a state’s public finances. Indeed there is no doubt that the Cold War and the attendant arms race contributed to worldwide economic instability. Both USSR and NATO states spend enormous sums, mortgaging national wealth at the cost of future generations. Hence the end of the Cold-War was followed by massive defence spending cuts. This reduction had a greater impact on states whose economies were dependent on defence, such as Germany and the USA. Both countries followed Keynes’ economic prescription to escape from the 1930s depression. According to militant Keynesianism, governments should stimulate aggregate demand in every possible way, including military expenditure (Gold, 2005: 3). This policy was espoused by the US in the post-WWII period as attested by document NSC-68 (National Security Council, 1950) which defined the policy of containment towards the Soviet Union drafted by Nitze and Keyserling (Gold, 2005: 3). In the 1960s Baran and Sweezy provided an expanded interpretation of the indicated policy and claimed that political elites have come to accept military spending as a normal form of government economic stimulus (Baran and Sweezy, 1966: 178-217). This type of policy, which may be viewed in terms of Radaelli’s “facilitated coordination” (Radaelli, 2003: 40-41), reflects a top-down approach aiming at enhancing cooperation among sub-contractors and setting the stage for further integration. Such policy is visible even today, also in non-military sectors where certain projects are funded for special purposes. This state aid is meant to stimulate local industry while creating the pre-conditions for a successful product line. A typical example of a modern application of this state aid is the One Laptop per Child Association, Inc. (OLPC-A), a U.S. non-profit organisation that initiated the “100$
laptop” project, later called XO-1. The primary scope of this project was to create cheap laptops for developing countries and it was labelled as a research and development project. Many participating companies (leading US hardware and software companies) profited greatly. Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) registered a return of 20% profit in 2006. This is an example of indirect state aid. Another case is the catering of the US army by McDonalds and Pizza Hut (among others) which can also be seen as indirect state aid. Both cases incorporate the same features: the establishment of a micro-institutional environment (R&D or R&T project setting and funding with specific output/results) and the facilitation of the emergence of new cooperative schemes. Chomsky argues that “The Pentagon system was considered ideal for these purposes. It imposes on the public a large burden of the costs (research and development, R&D) and provides a guaranteed market for excess production, a useful cushion for management decisions” (Chomsky, 1993). Hence, Chomsky stresses such a micro-institutional environment as driven by R&D/R&T incentives and attendant profits for participating industries. These profits are directly related to the consumption of large quantities of products by the US government (e.g. army), which constitutes another economic stimulant to the participating industries (apart from the direct R&D/R&T funding).

The competitive advantage/gains for the industries originate in the low production cost of products (food in the case of McDonalds and Pizza Hut); such large-scale production (primarily absorbed by the US government) also enables US firms to set competitive prices in the international market. These facts indicate a strong relation between industry and defence; therefore investigating one sector while ignoring the other would lead to the suppression of important explanatory variables. Gold investigated this interrelation and found that, since the mid-1950s, “military and space R&D accounted for 54% of measured economy-wide R&D spending and by some measures, the military sector absorbed about half of the economy’s scientists and engineers” (Gold, 2005: 4-5). This investment has important spillovers for adjacent areas such as space, military and civilian technology and products, aircraft design, propulsion systems, radar, electronics and computers (Flamm, 1988: 116, 119-120, 147). In addition the dual use of military products has offset the decline in government military spending in the US (Gold, 2005: 7). Thus the dual use of military products prevented economic contraction and signalled the beginning of a period where market becomes a contributing factor to change. Based on the above, Say argued that armies and fleets comprise an example of non-productive labor (Say, 2001: 231,249). However, Ricardo argued that states prefer borrowing to taxation (borrowing and
taxation are the state’s main funding sources) in order to shift payment for defence expenditures onto future taxpayers (Churchman, 2001: 37). Thus, according to Say and Ricardo, the repayment of principal and interest is pushed forward in time. This can be seen today in several economies where military expenditure is not included in national budgets. Furthermore, Ricardo stresses that this shifting of the financial burden of defence, increases the probability of war. This argument is important in view of short-sighted taxpayers/voters who find it difficult to estimate the true cost of war when one is about to occur. Hence, a decision to make a war becomes easier.

By the early 1900s, the industrialisation of the world’s leading economies was complete. Until that time, defence was the exclusive purview of a country’s military forces. The impact of industrialisation and subsequent technological developments on the defence sector and armaments production was pervasive. World War I saw utilisation of technology in the battlefield: machine guns, new pistols, the air force, electrical technology (including searchlights), radio communications etc (Hochheiser, 2011). WWI made it clear that military superiority was not only a tactical issue, but also one of technology, innovation and science. Pigou in The Economy and Finance of the War (Pigou, 1916) and in the political Economy of War (1921), claims that WWI “assigned to the economist the duty to study the economy in wartime, which is completely different from the economy in peacetime” (Coulomb, 2004: 174). Hence, the significance of defence economics seemed to grow on account of the contribution made by technology, innovation and science to the art of warfare. Hirst in The Political Economy of War (1915) underlined the peculiar relations between defence industry and the armed forces. The raison d’être of such firms derives from the demand for military materiel and, by implication, from armed conflict during which demand is at its peak (Hirst, 1915: 94). Hirst’s argument clearly sheds light on the role of defence firms in the area of defence and security. This relation was also studied by Keynes, who published several articles in the London Times and other newspapers under the general title “How to pay for the War”. Keynes contribution was two fold; he contributed the term “universality” to modern war and argued that universal wars extend beyond the battle field (Moshovis, 2000: 15). Keynes’ approach also emphasised the interaction between military expenditure and economics, which became even more pervasive. Hence, military conflicts take place in economic arenas and are closely linked with national production. As Mokyr argues, “military spending and war mobilisation can increase capacity utilisation, reduce unemployment (through conscription), and generally induce patriotic citizens to work harder for less compensation” (Mokyr, 2003: 216). Mokyr’s
argument stresses the connection between national wealth and patriotic feelings. Mokyr’s approach is different from more traditional analyses in that he views war mobilisation as a conducive to increased growth.

The above notwithstanding the overall effect on the economy is not straightforward. Chan and Mintz argue that the connection between defence expenditure and aggregate output has been emphasised not only by Keynesians but also by New Classical writers such as Barro (Chan and Mintz, 2003: 101-102). Baran and Sweezy, on the other hand, argued that US governments have used variations in military expenditure to manage aggregate demand (Chan and Mintz, 2003: 101-102). All these arguments reflect the rising economic impact of defence production and expenditure on national economies. On the other hand, Melman’s 1970 research found a negative economic effect of US military expenditure. In his research Melman linked reduced competitiveness to the growth of bureaucracy and a decline in investment. In his subsequent study, The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline (1974), Melman pointed to the waste of military expenditure which put the economy in a state of “permanent war” (Coulomb, 2004: 186). Melman’s arguments heralded the impending shift in defence production policies. This shift became evident in the late 1980s with the move towards public investment in non-military industries and the dual use of civil-military technology. The linkage between defence industry and employment was also investigated by Melman. He argued that non-military spending would contribute to jobs creation and overall benefits (Melman, 1988: 30-31). He also indicated that investment in civil industries rather than military ones would benefit new technology development and lead to higher living standards in the USA.

The idea of a shift in government expenditure from the military to the non-military sector gained ground in the period following the end of the Cold War as attested by the steady reduction in military spending both in Europe and the USA. Hence, the post-Cold War environment triggered changes in the industrial maps of both US and Europe. These changes reflected the need for viable and competitive industries, which could succeed in a globalised environment. The US response to globalisation came much easier due to the fact that substantive convergence in the US defence industries had been gradually achieved in the decades following the end of the Cold-War. However, on the other side of the Atlantic, in Europe, the defence industrial map (of the 1990s) was about to change. Several views were put forth in order to account for the change, but it remains unclear if globalisation or Europeanisation is to “blame” or it is a multi-causal schema is in order.
5.3 Whose impact: Globalisation or Europeanisation’s?

Globalisation and Europeanisation have both been used in order to account for the origins of change in EU defence industry and the emergence of CSDP (Burgess, 2009: 312; Kaldor, 2012: 85; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 4; Giegerich, 2010: 144). Quaglia highlights the danger of viewing both as all-explaining factors for almost everything that cannot otherwise be explained at the domestic level (Quaglia et al., 2007: 410). Bache argues that there are “complex and noncomplex processes which may offer alternative explanations for Europeanisation, but they may also occur simultaneously and each offer part of the explanation” (Bache, 2008: 18). Burgess views Europeanisation as a “certain kind of globalisation” (Burgess, 2009: 311). Smeby and Trondal also argue that European initiatives and globalisation processes are not contradictory but closely interrelated (Smeby and Trondal, 2005: 463). Sandholtz, Zysman and Sweet viewed globalisation as an exogenous factor favouring European integration in terms of transnational alliances which resulted in the development of EU’s supranational institutions (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 8). Hence, Europeanisation and European integration should be considered of primary importance in that they constitute an EU “way of doing things”. Massey tracks the origins of Europeanisation as part of a global process, in the Cold War and argues that its present character is built on the foundation of economic liberalism (Massey, 2004: 19). Smeby and Trondal noticed that there is an intimate link between politics and market dynamics (Smeby and Trondal, 2005: 462,463). Indeed, as Hix and Goetz argue, policies on the European level are “responsible for almost 80per cent of all rules governing the production, distribution and exchange of goods, services, capital and labour in the European market” (Hix and Goetz, 2000: 4). Hence, Europeanisation might respond to globalisation processes by reinforcing their trends or by shielding EU member states against their undesired effects (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 4). These arguments may be summarised into three key points: the dual-use of products has made markets be a distinct/autonomous factor for change; EU level policies are crucial for change; Europeanisation is a means to confront globalisation. The interrelation of the above is also very important for understanding dynamics of the situation. Thus, in terms of EU-level policies, Hay and Rosamond argue that politicians may utilise “the need to comply with EU rules’ in an effort to withstand global pressures (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 15). This argument indicates that globalisation is a means for enforcing change. This constitutes what Radaelli describes as vertical, hierarchical Europeanisation. Risse,
Cowles and Caporaso make a similar argument. They argue that Europeanisation is linked with marker integration, the removal of trade and investment barriers (this, according to Radaelli constitutes negative integration which constitutes Europeanisation mechanism) (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001: 16). Hence, as Clark and Jones argue, “Europeanisation is a distinctively European oriented learning process initiated by global rather than European socioeconomic change” (Clark and Jones, 2008: 307). Therefore, in the absence of ongoing EU learning process and EU level policies, of the shift toward economic liberalism and of the external stimuli provided by globalisation it is reasonable to suppose that change could not have taken place.

However, when it comes to CSDP things get a little tricky. As Zwolski notice “EU’s role in international security surpasses any single policy framework” (Zwolski, 2012: 68). Therefore, the emergence of CSDP may be considered to transcend the traditional framework and usher into something new, namely Europeanisation. As Burgess noticed globalisation had a direct impact on CSDP through altering the present threat landscape in ways that no single state could manage to confront “both inside and outside Europe” (Burgess, 2009: 312). Jones also argued that “since the 1990s, the EU has also begun to develop a global political and security role” (Jones, 2007: 79) while Kaldor noticed that CSDP’s capabilities have been designed in terms of tackling global security challenges (Kaldor, 2012: 85). The design of these capabilities and the emergence of CSDP would not have been achieved without adequate support from EU defence industry.

5.4 European development

The end of the Cold War triggered market consolidations in national defence industry due to the new security environment which derived from military expenditure decline. The subsequent world economic crisis in the late 2000s further depressed military expenditure. As a result, European leaders re-introduced the concept of a Single European Industrial Market as a response to the economic crisis. The principle was applied to the European defence industry but was hampered by protectionism at the national level. Given the large number of inter-related factors, the speed of change exceeded the defence sector's capacity for adjustment. Consequently, the pace of change slowed down on account of dependent national economies, sluggish social

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22 The idea of a Single European Market was first introduced in 1992 for the Food Manufacturing Sector. Later on, the idea was expanded to include other sectors.
adjustment, and retrenchment in defence spending and domestic policies. On the other hand, the creation of the common market and a new security identity, the common strategic culture and policies on innovation tended to speed up change.

5.5 Transformation and competitiveness of defence industries

The dependence of National economies on defence industry derives from the contribution of defence production to GDP of Member States and assorted linkages. It is noteworthy that in 2006, the European defence industry turnover was about €70 billion, with employment of about 770,000, a number which represents roughly half of the US defence industry, both in turnover and employment (European Union, 2006). In terms of military expenditure, during the last decade and despite of the economic crisis, a small decrease in the overall EU’s military expenditures was initially observed, which gradually was turned to a small increase (for overall Europe).

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Table 11: Military expenditure by region in constant US dollars, 2000–2014
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015)
(Figures are in US$ b)
The inelastic military expenditure\textsuperscript{23} in Europe and in the world along with the fundamental claim that Security and Defence should be provided to citizens along with other public/merit goods, allows little room for manoeuvre.

*Figures are in US$ b., at constant 2011 prices and exchange rates, except for the last figure which is in US$ b. at 2014 prices and exchange rates.*

**Figure 9: Military Expenditure by Region, 2000–2014 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015)**

Hence, the primary goals of the EU are the viability of European industries (both military and civilian) and the provision of security and defence to citizens. The achievement of these goals is linked to the emergence of EU defence industry as a world-class competitive. In addition, the successful implementation of these goals is derived from a regional development model which respects local and social stability (social aspects) while developing the productive potential of national industries. The importance of social aspects according to some Europeanisation researchers is related to questions adjustment and/or resistance to change. Therefore, social aspects directly impact on the successful Europeanisation of CSDP and defence industry.

\textsuperscript{23}The elasticity of demand measures the relative response of a change in price. If demand remains the same, even if the price is raised, then the demand may be defined as unit-elastic.
5.6 Social aspects of defence industry reform

The impact of the civil and defence industry on the lives of a nation’s citizens is bound to governmental decision-making. With hundreds of thousands of people employed in the defence sector any abrupt shift in policies may result in serious job losses. During the 1990s, this fragile state became more so, due to the collapse of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. These events signalled the collapse of the bipolar system, which resulted in severe deductions in military expenditure all over Europe. As Bergstrom et al. explains, during the first half of the 1990s there was a dramatic reduction in procurement orders as “world military expenditure decreased from a total of over 1 trillion US $ at the end of the Cold War to less than 800 billion US $ in the mid-1990s” (Bergstrom et al., 2008). This emerging crisis of the defence sector was transferred to the armaments industry and necessitated prompt solutions. The danger was imminent, as the potential for massive job layoffs in the face of budgetary cuts could be expected to affect jobs in related sectors: subcontractors and raw material producers. As Rocha et al argue, “considering both direct and indirect employment, the number of people concerned by developments in the defence industry is more than 1,640,000 [...]” (Waelbroeck-Rocha et al., 2008). Therefore, any sudden change could create a domino effect with severe consequences for European societies and economies. The impact of this global political shift on the European defence industry could have involved potential closures and/or massive layoffs in adjustment to the new conditions did not take place. In view of declining defence budgets immediate solution were required. The introduction of dual use of military products and European defence industry restructuring were seen as a way out. As Bekkers argue “re-structuring reflecting mergers and acquisitions resulted in new names emerging in the top European arms firms, namely, BAE Systems, EADS and Thales. Most European mergers were at the national level although there were a few notable cross-border mergers and acquisitions, namely, EADS and Thales” (Bekkers et al., 2009). Bekkers’ argument captures the intergovernmental (national political decision making) forces behind mergers and acquisitions, while he notices a small amount of cross-border mergers and acquisitions which reflects the influence of market forces. According to Radaelli’s Europeanisation Mechanisms, this stage is characterised by lack of policy formulation (Radaelli, 2003: 41), thus resulting in the use of socialisation a driving force for Europeanisation. The justification of Europeanisation at this stage derives from changes in EU defence industries’ organisational models and the shift from vertical to horizontal
production line\textsuperscript{24}. This shift, which through imitation has penetrated into all Member States, reflects the cooperation of several players/subcontractors for the creation of cost-effective products/equipment. During that time EU recognised the need, and provided the first tools, for the creation of stronger coalitions among industries in Europe.

However, the slow adjustment of defence industry and the reluctance of EU political leaders to implement a common strategy that would result in a common European market were critical. According to Sempere et al., the delay, in decision making, has had a severe impact on society with job losses due to downsizing and reallocation of production units, reduced quality of life of workers due to lower pay upon relocation, early retirement or unemployment (Sempere et al., 2009). Sempere et al., stress the social impact defence industry (and therefore of CSDP) has had on account of domestic political decision-making. Thus, domestic political decision-making constitutes another important factor influencing change both in the field of defence industry and in CSDP. An EU document subsequently released (ENTR/06/054), indicates the linkage between industry, social welfare and security. In this document the European Commission identified the very existence of the industry to have had a direct impact on the establishment of “an environment in which individuals and companies are able and motivated to engage in economic activities and, hence, (on) growth and social welfare. In this sense, security is a basic public good which generates positive social externalities and, equally, inadequate provision is associated with negative externalities” (European Union, 2009). According to this argument security is a pre-condition for industrial growth and social welfare, therefore the establishment of CSDP for EU Member States becomes a pre-requisite for common development and social welfare. This approach represents Radaelli’s framing Europeanisation mechanism, according to which non-compulsory directives (due to the sharing and pooling of CSDP character) prepare the ground for major policy change (Radaelli, 2003: 43).

The major impact of defence industry is reflected in the fact that most defence firms in Europe remained state-owned in contrast to the largest global market players (US players) which were privately owned. According to the former argument, government ownership of defence industries reflects the need to control market forces as a means to retain their national sovereignty, which is not the case with US. Despite the fact that this amounts to opposition to change, such has been recorded and supported via EU initiatives. Such an initiative (bottom-up Europeanisation) is the 2008 new

\textsuperscript{24} Horizontal Industry Production refers to the type of products created with the contribution of several subcontractors and co operations. Vertical Industry Production refers to a single industry production, of all parts and sub-parts, of the final product.
partnership scheme with the unique aim of assisting defence workers. The duties of this new organisational arrangement (called the 2008 “European Partnership for the anticipation of change in the defence industry”) (European Union, 2008) include, among others, monitoring the developments in the industry, exchanging know-how on developing skills and managing restructuring in a socially responsible way (European Union, 2008). The EU also organised the 2008 Restructuring Forum which was to anticipate restructuring in the defence industry. The forum brought together European institutions, governments, social partners, academic experts, regional and local authorities and market development experts, with the aim of maintaining and strengthening the competitive position of EU defence industries, under the 2008 European Partnership for the Anticipation of Change in the Defence Industry (European Commission, 2008). As change in defence industry became a priority, the identification of other variables affecting this change acquires critical importance.

5.7 Variables affecting defence industry change in Europe

Some significant variables underlying EU industry change derive from the end of WWII. At that time, defence industry was considered to be a key pillar which would put back on (economic) track European states. The means to accomplish this objective was the Marshall Plan. Marshall Plan provided direct assistance to the European States which were put under the aegis of the USA (Schain, 2001: 4). The USSR responded to the Marshall Plan with the Molotov Plan (Wee, 1984: 354). These policies (and spheres of influence) were maintained during the Cold-War period and provided adequate socialisation and learning for NATO to become the institutionalised security bearer of (subsequent) EU Member States.

The end of the Cold War facilitated the first European consolidation schemes, which were formed during the second half of the 1990s and included the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)\textsuperscript{25}, Thales\textsuperscript{26} and British Aerospace

\textsuperscript{25}EADS was created by the merging of Matra Haute Technologie (France), Aerospatiale (France), Aerospatiale Matra (France), Siemens Defence Electronics (Germany), MBB/Germany, AEG/Germany, Dornier/Germany, MTU/Germany, DASA (Germany), CASA (Spain), EADS, Patria Industries, 27% (Finland), Astrium (UK), Siemens Unit (Germany), Racal Instruments (USA), Nokias professional mobile radio business (Finland). It should be noted that the merger was under the agreement between the French and German governments.

\textsuperscript{26}Thales was created by the merging of TDA Amemenis (Western Europe), Ariem (France), Racal (UK), Samsung Electronics defense unit, 50% (South Korea), Pillington Optronics, 10% (UK), Shorts Missiles Systems (Canada), ADI, 50% (Australia), African Defense Systems (South Africa), Sextant in-Flight Systems (USA), Avimo, 25% (UK), Embrera, 6% (Brazil), Pilkginton Optronica, 40% (UK), Dassault Electronique (France), Aerosperlic’s military electronics units (France), Sectant Avionique, 50%
The response on the other side of the Atlantic, under the coordinating role of US Department of Defence, was the encouragement of any attempt to merge, acquire or institute strong cooperation amongst military industries. A 2004 document of the US Department of Defence captured the encouragement towards defence suppliers to embrace change “by acquiring emerging defence suppliers or by expanding their product offerings” (US Department of Defence, 2004). This quote captures the evolving EU defence industry dynamics while being indicative of the importance of the US attitude toward market forces as a factor for change. Hence, despite the seeming encouragement for co-operation, there appears to be an unofficial red line, regarding some (military) technologies in which the US is dominant and competition is not welcome. Such is the case of Global Positioning System (GPS) and GALILEO (Ek, 2007; Sample, 2003). This inconsistent behaviour (encouraging competition while raising unofficial protectionist barriers) of the USA aims at weakening foreign investment while encouraging other countries (and Europe) to open their own markets. Thus, US aim to take advantage of EU integration process by encouraging a transatlantic co-operation path instead of an Europeanisation path.

However, this is a long-term one due to the fact that EU has to take more steps, not only to enhance its production-model and quality but also overcome a protectionist environment (Ek, 2007). On the other hand, the US defence industry operated in international markets for decades and may find it easier to create coalitions. In addition, the US GDP is heavily depending upon defence-related industrial output. The above are indicative of the US priority in maintaining a high global-market share in defence production. On the other side of the Atlantic, the bottleneck derives from large coalitions experiencing communication and coordination problems. This became evident in Kosovo, where Adams et al. observed that there were great inefficiencies resulting from a 19-country coalition running a war (Adams et al., 1999).

27 BAE focused on US market. BAE was created by acquisition or merging of Siemens Plessey Systems (Germany), Saab, 35% (Sweden), BAeSEMA (UK), STN Atlas Elekt., 49% (Germany), LFK, 15% (Germany), AWADI (Australia), British Aircraft Corp. (UK) Heckler & Koch (Germany, divested in 2002), Hawker Siddeley Av. (UK) Rovai Ordnance (UK), Hawker Siddeley Dy. (UK) Reflectone (UK), Scottisch Avierlion (UK) SD-Scicon (UK), British Aerospace BAE Systems, Marconi Electronic Systems (UK), Lockheed Martin Control Systems (USA), Lockheed Martin AES (USA), Watkins Johnson (USA), Ferntornierics (USA), Condor Pacifics (USA), Piper Group (UK), Advanced Power Tech. (USA), MEVATEC (USA), Alphatech (USA), Commercials electronics unit of Boeing (USA), Digital Nierl Holdings (USA), Practical Imagineering (USA), STI Government Systems (USA), Alvis (UK), Aerosystems International (UK), United Defense (USA).
The cause of these inefficiencies was formally identified in a subsequent EU 2007 Communication “Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry”. The strategy identified the European governments’ preference for their own national defence industries as a means to protect jobs and boost investment and “also to ensure security of supply and of information” (EU Commission, 2007). The strategy also highlighted the problems that producers face, which include the limited (at best) access to domestic defence markets resulting in duplication “which can be seen in the total of 89 different weapon programmes in the EU compared to only 27 in the US” (EU Commission, 2007). The straightforward approach of the Communication intended to create a new basis for military industrial production and CSDP which would exploit the European defence industry competitive advantage. As the Communication noted: “further industrial adaptation should aim at greater specialisation leading to a more integrated supply chain and competitive European DTIB” (EU Commission, 2007). However, specialisation in military production may be identified with national-oriented specialisation or defence industry specialisation. Hence, the degree of specialisation needs to be assessed before introducing or adapting some (possible incompatible) model which could result in the weakening of national security. Clearly, the maintenance of a standing, equipped army has been and continues to be an issue which should remain untouched as it is linked to the state’s power and self-defence. Therefore, privatisation and the risk of distorting the supply chain could threaten fighting capabilities and jeopardise national security. On the other hand, regional or national specialisation may jeopardise the supply of military hardware and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of developed system</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>USA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Main battle tank</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155-mm howitzer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighter-strike</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground-attack trainer</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack helicopter</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-ship missile</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air-air missile</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-submarine torpedo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diesel submarine</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear-powered submarine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>89</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
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Figure 10: Europe vs. USA (Waelbroeck-Rocha et al., 2008)
operational capabilities of military forces. Hence, the specialisation model may boost knowhow and operational speed but may also cause a decrease in the ability to withstand multiple attacks or asymmetric threats in the European region. Therefore, a mixed, balanced, threats-prioritised confrontation model is required along with the political will to develop CSDP Europeanisation.

5.8 The Impact of Politics

Political will has always been an outstanding force for change. Risse, Cowles and Caporaso argue that processes of change are highly correlated with measures of political commitment to change (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001). Moravcsik links the states’ priorities and policies to politicians’ constraints imposed by domestic and transnational civil society (Moravcsik, 1993: 483). He also notes that “the primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office” (Moravcsik, 1993: 483) and therefore the support of domestic coalitions, interest groups and bureaucracies is needed along with their contribution to the formation of national goals. As Jacobs emphasises, domestic decision-making represents “a new challenge for national administrations” (Jacobs, 2012: 467) due to national governments’ desire to “strengthen their control over domestic affairs” (Moravcsik, 1993: 507). This fragile political balance of EU-national interests is reflected on the institutional structure of EU.

Hence, Moravcsik and Jacobs’ arguments account for politicians’ blaming Europe whenever “they feel unable to mobilise political support for any new steps towards integration” (Kaldor, 2012: 79). This is reflected in the reluctance with which domestic parliaments have adopted EU policies (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 523) and explains opposition to Europeanisation-type change as well as their tendency for bargaining. In the context of CSDP, Menon argues that the EU’s poor performance as an international security provider has prompted member states to “blame EU institutional structures for their failings” (Menon, 2011: 77).

These arguments indicate that domestic political decision making remains an important factor in the Europeanisation process inasmuch as (despite the constrains that have been set by the Europeanisation process itself) there is still considerable room for autonomous domestic policy-making (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 359; Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 522). The link between European and domestic audiences according to Koivula and Sipilä, are parliaments viewed as linking institutions and Europeanisation process with limited impact (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 522). Koivula and Sipilä also
argue that Europeanisation may be seen as a process where member states, through the EU, export domestic policies, models, preferences and ideas: Thus their parliamentary debates may be indicative of the impact of Europeanisation (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 523-525). This argument is based on two facts, namely, that parliamentary speeches are primarily political and therefore have a wide audience, while they also have direct domestic ramifications (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 526). This approach represents a bottom-up Europeanisation mechanism and provides more space for intergovernmental bargaining in an attempt for each Member State to enforce/export its own domestic policies, models preferences and ideas. By doing so, governments hope to ensure minimum change and adaptation (therefore minimum domestic political impact) relative to other Member States’ policies, models, preferences and ideas. This is a pre-framing, pre-modelling Europeanisation stage and constitutes a form of socialisation as there is still no pressure to adjust to a EU specific model or policy. As Buller and Gamble argue, “Europeanisation has been defined as a smokescreen for domestic policy manoeuvres [...] whereby certain actors at the domestic level will encourage or at least acquiesce in European integration as a way of either implementing domestic changes, or legitimising the status quo at home.” (Buller and Gamble, 2002: 15,16)

The lack of political will for CSDP implementation was described by Balta and Stanca, who note that there is no political will to take appropriate measures and commit resources so that the effectiveness of the overall operation be increased (Balta and Stanca, 2013: 2563). Jacobs and Chappell also identify as the main reason for CSDP operability delay (referring to battle groups) the lack of political will (Jacobs, 2012: 467; Chappell, 2012: 76). Delays originating from lack of political will were also recorded by Giumelli, Cusumano and Kaldor. They identified the CSDP realisation delay as a political problem. More specifically they argue that the CSDP missions delay originates in the lack of personnel and resources, which results in systematic reliance on commercial providers and subcontractors (Giumelli and Cusumano, 2014: 49-50) and lack of institutional coherence (Kaldor, 2012: 84). Risse captures this aspect of things. As he states the EU is an economic giant but a political dwarf (Risse, 2012: 87). The lack of political will is also reflected in the EU’s inability to develop a coherent strategic culture (Liaropoulos, 2012: 6), a failure which favours the continued dominance of national strategic cultures. In this respect, Koivula and Sipilä’s observation becomes more significant. They argue that several European politicians and national parliaments seem to have a false or biased understanding of CSDP (Koivula and Sipilä, 2011: 535) and Europeanisation. This insightful observation can help explain
both the deficient decision-making process and the lack of a coherent strategic culture. Therefore obstacles to Europeanisation are directly related to lack of political willingness and/or misunderstanding of CSDP and Europeanisation dynamics.

This argument may be better understood in view of the CSDP background. Risse credits Prime Minister Blaire for understanding that the Anglo-American relationship was not endangered by closer EU defence cooperation and the CSDP emergence (Risse, 2012: 90). Solana also indicated the importance of political willingness in the future success of CSDP missions (Edwards, 2013: 285). As Chappell argues, Solana’s suggestion was based on the existing divergence of opinion over security issues (Chappell, 2012: 114). Solana clearly wanted to move forward from bargaining over Europeanisation to developing a common security framework. The overall positive atmosphere was captured by Weiss. Weiss related “continuity in CSDP politics over the 2000s to two reasons”: the more active US diplomacy in regions other than the European one and the further development of international institutions (Weiss, 2012: 680). Weiss argument directly links the US influence to political decision making and to the Europeanisation process. However, as Howorth and Menon emphasise US could benefit from the realisation of CSDP as the “major objective of ESDP (CSDP) is precisely to relieve the U.S. army of regional-crisis-management responsibilities in Europe” (Howorth and Menon, 2009: 735,736). Therefore, according to Howorth and Menon this constitutes a window of opportunity for the realisation of CSDP, provided national governments act in a timely fashion. As Menon argues, “the success or failure of these policies depends crucially on national governments displaying the political will to turn ambitious rhetoric concerning the Union’s military aspirations into reality.” (Menon, 2011: 76). A part of this reality is reflected in the development of an EU industrial base in support of CSDP.

5.9 Maintaining and developing an EU Industrial base

The idea of developing and maintaining an EU industrial base emerged during the 1990s as a response to the shift from bipolar to unipolar international structure. This shift facilitated the transnational collaboration and merging of defence industries (Cross Davis, 2013: 47). As Walker and Willett argue, reduced defence budgets and internationalisation of production induced EU governments to seek an alternative that would prevent “a steep rise in equipment cost” (Walkera and Willettb, 1993: 159). Pollack linked this change with the emergence of supranational institutions. Pollack described the emergence of supranational institutions as “agents”, created by principals
(EU Member States) in an attempt to reduce transaction costs (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 8). He also argued that the autonomy of supranational institutions is directly related to the control mechanisms established by member states, a situation which reflects both constrained and autonomous action (Pollack, 1997: 101,129). Howorth added another dimension. Drawing on Trybus, he argues that the defence procurement is viewed as a policy area where EU cooperation is essential in terms of avoiding subcontracting to the US industries (Howorth, 2012: 440). Given the above and Walker and Willett’s argument that “an industry driven restructuring of the EU Defence Industrial Base recognises no borders nor needs balanced integration”, one may conclude that EU governments had to choose between the International/Globalised way of doing things and the EU way of doing things (Europeanisation). Batora’s argument provided an answer to this dilemma. As Batora noticed, in the context of “liberalisation versus European preference, the EDA has denounced the maintenance of national tendering for national contracts [...] as no longer economically sustainable and operationally unacceptable” (Howorth, 2012: 440). Therefore, the establishment of EDA provides evidence for a preference toward the EU way of doing things and, hence toward Europeanisation. This statement receives support by the work of Howorth. Howorth notes Batora’s evidence which indicate the EDA’s efforts to “transcend the logic of defence sovereignty by introducing a raft of procedures and rules into the code of conduct on defence procurement” so as to facilitate cooperation and integration (Howorth, 2012: 439). A significant factor for facilitating cooperation and integration in defence production is the creation of a Single Market for defence.

5.10 Single Market Creation

The importance of creating a Single Market for defence equipment is emphasised by Hartley, who claims that this move would provide “opportunities for gains from trade and economies of scale and learning” (Hartley, 2006: 476). Hartley’s argument indicates the existence of learning as a universal (and ongoing) Europeanisation force, which transcends the intergovernmentalism-federalism distinction. Garrett also argues that the establishment of a single market represents the direct link between European integration and maximisation of gains for each member state (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 6). However, this outcome could also be attributed to the Europeanisation bargaining mechanism, which promotes innovative policy-making. Hoeffler’s argument supports this claim. Hoeffler notices that “All these
elements indicate that despite partial denationalisation and marketisation, co-operating through European programmes represents a form of protectionist economic patriotism at the European level, since governments have created organisations and rules that enable industrial strategies.” (Hoeffler, 2012: 442). Hoeffler perceived the presence of fear on the other side of the Atlantic related to imminent EU competition which could result in the displacement of the US from European markets (Hoffmann, 1995: 295). Hence he viewed single market creation as a part of the EU federalisation process, resulting in sectoral integration and interstate bargains (Hoffmann, 1995: 289). This perspective was criticised by Moravcsik who argued (Single European Act) that the driving force behind such breakthroughs could be found in the “transnational business pressure and economic policy failure” (Moravcsik, 1995: 617).

Hence, the business pressure and decline in defence spending decline constitutes a crossroads for the defence industries: on one hand there was a substantive need for change in order to handle potential cost increases (equipment) and ensure viability, and on the other hand there was much ambiguity regarding the new outcome. This became evident with the introduction of the Commission’s Green Paper on Defence procurement (COM/2004/0608) (European Commission, 2004) in 2004, which met opposition both from member states and the business sector. Specifically business was apprehensive of the volatility and dynamics of the fledging free market (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1133). Blauberger and Weiss highlighted the Commission’s significant role in this two-pronged effort aimed at (a) producing competitive public defence procurement and (b) consolidating a European defence market (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1133). Blauberger and Weiss’ observation is very important in that they identified the presence of Europeanisation implicit in the Commission’s pressures and policies.

Another important factor related to opposition towards change was the European protection environment. Castellacci, et al., note that European SMEs which operate in highly protected environments are sceptical about liberalisation while SMEs that originate in more competitive markets are not expected to oppose -at least not in the short run- the EU liberalisation directives (Castellacci, Fevolden and Lundmark, 2014: 1233). Their argument stresses the existence of fragmented national markets and indicates that enhanced coordination (via either negative or positive integration mechanisms) can help overcome uncertainty.

Blauberger and Weiss noted that the various initiatives, during the 1990s, for the creation of a single market in the defence sector repeatedly failed (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1121). Though the Commission did not possess the strategic means for
inducing member states toward agreement, the presence of strong functional motives for European integration in the procurement of weapons systems led to real integration albeit one of limited range (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1126-1127). Hence, the CSDP introduction raised new expectations for the integration of European arms procurement, which, however, were not fulfilled in the following years (2001-2003) (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1128). Consequently when the Commission presented its Green Paper on Defence Procurement (2004), as part of supranational legislation, both private players and governments strongly opposed it (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1121). This opposition was later ended under the Directive 2009/81/EC on defence procurement (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010: 1121). The reason for this shift of opinion is to be found in the Commission’s legal pressure. The Commission under the threat of suing for unlawful defence procurement (Court-driven integration) “transformed a blocking majority into a toughly bargain and ultimately to a consensual legislative body” (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1128-1131). As a result, member states anticipating future market constraints liberalised their industrial policies (Blauberger and Weiss, 2013: 1132). Considering the adaptation mechanisms, Court-driven integration represents an induced learning mechanism along with a tight timetable for implementation. However there is another factor that facilitated change, which is related to national benefits. Eventually, as Blom, Castellacci and Fevolden argue, the trade-off between innovation and defence industrial policy resulting from the market liberalisation, was expected to increase (Blom, Castellacci and Fevolden, 2013: 1588-1589). In light of the above, and the argument of Jabko, that “the invocation of the market as a rational means for reform and for overcoming political resistance and for achieving institutional change”(Jabko, 2006: 36), we may identify market dynamics also as a means to bypass political unwillingness and promote change and Europeanisation.

To achieve the goal of creating a single defence market, the EU introduced several Directives, Communications and Treaty amendments. Their existence constitutes proof of the on-going Europeanisation process (once it starts it creates dynamics of its own) while their evolution/progress (through amendments) is indicative of the advancement of Europeanisation. Therefore we may identify the following sequence in the transition toward Europeanisation: socialisation to bargain to the framing of policies to their adoption. The initial step was the Council Regulation (EC) No 3381/94 (1994) for setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods (Eur-Lex, 1994). This Communication was followed by a 1996 Communication (COM (96) 617) on the European Union and Space: Fostering

The sequence of these changes indicates the close relationship of defence industry and CSDP and hence highlights the connection between factors which facilitate the integration of defence industry and CSDP progress. Furthermore, we may link the emergence of stronger cooperation (and Europeanisation) to the development of security research and other regulatory aspects: A 2004 Commission Decision on the implementation of the Preparatory Action on the Enhancement of the European industrial potential in the field of security research (Cordis- Europa, 2004), Commission Directive 2004/72/EC as regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, a 2006 Code of Conduct (CoC) on defence procurement of the EU Member States participating in the European Defence Agency 28 (EDA, 2005), a 2006 Interpretative Communication (COM (2006) 779) on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurements.

28 The CoC works in complementarily with the EU Directive 2009/81 on defence and security procurement.

On the basis of these Directives, Communications and Treaty amendments one may come to two conclusions: (a) that there is a self-sustaining Europeanisation process and (b) that the advancement of Europeanisation (both in terms of defence industry and CSDP) facilitates and is facilitated by the formulation of a new security identity.

5.11 New Security Identity and its Impact

Rieker investigated the emergence of a new security identity in EU Member States and came to the conclusion that the definition of security by EU Member States is directly linked to the future dynamics of EU and for the EU potential for playing a significant security role (Rieker, 2006: 511,512). Hence, Kienzle’s argument on the importance of ideas, especially in intergovernmental policy formulation areas, can make a significant difference and have a “decisive impact on the EU’s ability to formulate a common response or not” (Kienzle, 2013: 425,427). The significance of ideas can be assessed in terms of actors and consequences, where given the fact that different actors (member states) face different consequences the outcome can be quite complicated
In terms of security and defence this approach can amount to different conceptions of and approaches to common issues, such as the defence of human rights and interventionist or non-interventionist operations of the CSDP. Thus, a common approach at the EU level in terms of strategy (converging interpretations of security and security threats) and the localisation of these policies according to each member-state’s unique features could accomplish important results. This process encompasses elements of Europeanisation, namely socialisation, learning and framing. But is this happening? The ESS initial conceptualisation, the 2008 ESS report and the ISS 2010-2014 communications and reports indicate that this approach is actually being realised and that there has been a transition from Europeanisation policies/modelling to the adoption of models/policies.

Regarding the operational impact of ideas, Kienzle’s research indicates that “crisis responses depend on cognitive and normative ideas that guide actions under conditions of high uncertainty” (security, international relations) (Kienzle, 2013: 438). This approach implies learning and socialisation. Rieker also argued that regarding security and defence, EU successfully managed to transform the ideas into concrete policy which in turn translated into CSDP formation (Rieker, 2006: 512) and that the “institutionalisation of certain ideas gradually reconstructs the interests of powerful actors” (Rieker, 2006: 514). These arguments describe clearly the Europeanisation process, as being realised in an institutionalised environment, under the influence of learning (ideas) and resulting in the establishment of common values. Hence, “defending Europe is identical to defending these values” (Burgess, 2009: 317). In addition, Burgess links the internal and external identity of EU with the emergence of new security challenges (Burgess, 2009: 316). Specifically, he relates the new security challenges to EU’s political, social, cultural and ethical values which constitute its unique identity in today’s world (Burgess, 2009: 316). Indeed, the new security environment of the 1990s and the re-establishment of NATO’s role and dynamics may be considered as a fundamental enhancement of the new security identity and orientation of EU. As Bull states, “it is the security afforded to each side by effective defences that provides the confidence required to work for change” (Bull, 1982: 156; Chappell, 2010: 69).

In a different perspective, Howorth linked change and the emergence of CSDP to concern for (eventually) US withdrawal from NATO (Howorth, 2000). Hence, UK initiative “was predicated on a desire to maintain it (US)” (Howorth and Menon, 2009: 734). Davis-Cross agrees with Hones’ argument that European security integration was
a result of EU reaction to the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world and a counterweight to US influence (Davis-Cross, 2013). Weiss in a similar vein added that the fading of major threats from the East, induced EU states to become less dependent on the US (Weiss, 2012: 660). Hence, despite the existence of fundamental differences, “the convergence between the policy-makers’ visions for CSDP have been growing” (Scheuremann, 2013: 986). The subsequent events of 9/11 prompted Cross-Davis to offer security action theory as a potential explanation of the EU security integration. According to this theory the “language of security threats” has acted as a conduit for new legislation, agencies, practices and the establishment of emergency powers (Cross Davis, 2013: 50). Bendiek also argued that the 9/11 events provided “fertile political ground for governmental efforts” to expand national security (Bendiek, 2012: 49). This argument justifies the emergence of the French strategic vision of EU as a post-modern security actor while reflects the impact of Europeanisation (Rieker, 2006: 524,525). This strategic vision indicates the existence of strong dynamics in the direction of a Common Strategic Culture which in turn, constitutes a facilitating factor for (further) Europeanisation.

5.12 Common Strategic Culture

The strategic culture term is not new. It was introduced in the 1970s by Snyder (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1227), as a means to interpret different organisational and political frameworks in relation to the development of the Soviet and American nuclear doctrines (Liaropoulos, 2012: 2). According to Chappell, Strategic Culture is “a set of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of military force” (Chappell, 2009: 419) (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1228). These arguments indicate that Strategic Culture has a direct relation to CSDP Europeanisation as it encompasses certain key aspects of Radaelli’s work on Europeanisation, namely, construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules (Radaelli, 2004: 3,4). These aspects describe the EU’s “way of doing things,” and thus constitute EU’s Strategic Culture.

On the other hand, critics of EU’s Strategic Culture argue that it is not possible to identify when a strategic culture emerges due to non-availability of metrics (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1229,1233). This argument might have had some validity if it had been formulated in the 1990s. However, there had been enough time since the end of the Cold-War (two and a half decades) to allow a better understanding of the Post-Cold War security environment. In addition, the creation of security related institutional
structures (e.g., WEU) with its socialisation and learning impact may have facilitated change even before the end of the Cold-War. Bull, already in the early 1980s, expressed the need for a “radical change in public attitudes to defence” and linked the own-defence of (Western) Europe to an increased European role in decision making within NATO (Bull, 1982: 158-159). The importance of this claim can be seen from the fact of NATO’s indirect influence on CSDP through the WEU (Hofmann, 2011: 112). On the other hand, WEU was considered a European organisation closely tied to NATO until its de facto subordination to the EU under the Amsterdam Treaty (Biscop, 2012: 1299; Devine, 2011: 350-351). However, the establishment of CSDP may be considered a consequence of both NATO and WEU with the former making room in the area of security and defence for the EU to occupy and the latter undergoing as transformation based on EU needs (Ojanen, 2006: 62). This claim receives support from the outcome of the St. Malo meeting, where the German government suggested WEU integration into the EU (Chappell, 2012: 70). This argument reflects the presence of two institutions (NATO – EU) which exert learning and socialising influence. In this regard, Levy’s argument is significant in that he views institutional learning as a bottom-up process. As Levy notices, “organisations do not literally learn in the same sense that individuals do” but learning takes place through the individuals who serve in these organisations (Levy, 1994: 287). Under these circumstances, the emergence of CSDP could be viewed as a bottom-up learning process related to strategic culture. Hence the learning impact could be better realised through the learning of the individuals (officers and citizens) who serve in the relevant organisations. As Bache argues, the identification of the type of learning that goes on could reveal whether Europeanisation is transformative or not (Bache, 2008: 18). Biava, Drent and Herd, identified two dominant clusters in European strategic culture, namely: smaller/ non-aligned states with limited ambitions and favouring the status quo, and large states with a colonial past and the capacity to undertake global military missions (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1232). Each of these groups would like to have their security priorities adopted within the Europeanisation framework: the effort of UK, Germany and Finland in the indicated direction is evident (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1232,1237). The above constitutes an Europeanisation process in terms of which there is uploading/downloading of policy between Member States as a result of the aforementioned dominant approach. Chappell notes that Solana’s introduction of ESS indicates clearly the need for a strategic culture to develop in terms of “fostering early, rapid and necessary intervention” (Chappell, 2012: 113; Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1236). Hence, the introduction of ESS may be viewed as
an important turning point in the debate concerning “whether EU can establish a common strategic culture” or not (Liaropoulos, 2012: 2) as well as whether it is possible to develop a consensus about the means and ends of security policy (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1231). Liaropoulos also argues that the introduction of ESS indicates that EU “acts with some notion of strategic culture” (Liaropoulos, 2012: 6,7). Biava, Drent and Herd, highlighted the importance of the ESS in relation to strategic culture as regards defending against threats, strengthening European security, and promoting a multilateral world order (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1235,1236). These objectives reflect the EU “way of doing things” and provide evidence of Europeanisation in process.

However, anticipation and realisation are different things. In this regard, Chappell underlines the difficulty of such an attempt and argues that the development of a European strategic culture “is likely to take many decades to develop” (Chappell, 2012: 115). Biava, Drent and Herd cannot identify any European models or common defence values which could result in the development of an EU strategic culture (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1230,1231). Their argument would have been correct were it not for the on-going CSDP missions which reflect common EU values in the realm of peace keeping. The existence of these missions and the underlying legal framework is indicative of Europeanisation-in-progress and the ongoing development of a common strategic culture. Similarly, Liaropoulos notes the absence of an EU military culture but traces the potential development of a European military culture which is “not unified” (Liaropoulos, 2012: 3). In addition, he argues that despite the fact that “the EU has no real, robust and coherent strategic culture,” the notion of strategic culture itself, “is a useful concept in understanding the CSDP” (Liaropoulos, 2012: 6). Biscop takes the analysis a step further and underlines the need to fill the gap in European strategic thinking (Biscop, 2012: 1311) in order to reach an agreement on “what counts as European security and defence policy” (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2011: 17). Biscop’s linking of strategic thinking (and culture) to the decision of what counts as CSDP reflects a post-socialisation stage, which includes the framing and modeling of common security and defence strategy into a EU model. Manners links the realisation of a common strategic culture with the shift from the normative path of Normative Power Europe (NPE) (Whitman, 2013: 181). In particular, Manners considered the development of EU’s autonomous military capabilities and development of a common strategic culture, to be a “sharp turning away from the normative path of sustainable peace” towards the path of interventionism (Manners, 2006: 189). This path was also
discussed by Howorth, who considered ESDP/CSDP to follow an integrated European interventionist course, whose outcome was the introduction of “a new normative paradigm into international relations” (Whitman, 2013: 181). Howorth’s new normative paradigm appears to be consistent with the new security environment, while being less so with Manners’ Westphalian approach (known as “Westphalian culturation”) (Whitman, 2013: 174). It is noteworthy is that Manners’ initial NPE perspective has drawn on Duchêne’s notion of civilian power Europe (Whitman, 2013: 172), which favoured economic and political over military means. This approach was criticised by Bull, who considered it to be inefficient due to the lack of EC/EU autonomous military capabilities (Bull, 1982: 164, 165). However, in his later work on NPE, Manners accepted that EU militarisation would “not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power” as long as it remained aloof from Great Power mentality (Manners, 2006: 186). Similarly, Weiss argues that CSDP reflects the policy adjustment and/or cooperation among member states in the security domain, in order to establish common political/defence structures within the Union’s (normative) framework (Weiss, 2012: 659). Therefore, as long as there is agreement on and participation in CSDP, the latter constitutes a learning mechanism and therefore promotes Europeanisation. This is not always feasible. The normative attractiveness of the EU remains inadequate, especially when it comes to dealing with security problems regarding which EU “member states cannot maintain a common position” (Liaropoulos, 2012: 4). Kaldor identifies the origins of such inadequacy in the difficulty to distinguish between norms and interests (Kaldor, 2012: 80). Similarly, Bendiek argues that the EU’s normative character imposes a binding constraint by ways of deficient military hardware (Bendiek, 2012: 41). If "all power" is normative and political will translates into power (Burgess, 2009: 314), self-restraint in the use of power clearly reveals lack of political will. Hence, self-restrain results in lack of hard power, which in turn results results in European governments’ security cooperation with Russia or US. (Bechev, 2011: 426).

On the other hand, there are other facilitating factors, related to Europeanisation and the EU (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2013: 359), which may help overcome the obstacle presented by lack of political will. In the context of CSDP realisation, this argument can be illustrated by the actions of the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The impact of the EUMC’s representatives derives from their shared expertise and prestigious status (Cross Davis, 2013: 52-62). It is the self-same expertise and status which allowed at least two CSDP operations (EUFOR Chad and Somalia operations) to take place overcoming hesitancy and division among member states (Cross Davis, 2013: 62). Their
attitude as epistemic community represents a smaller and richer “environment for socialisation and the development of a common culture”, which constitutes social learning (Cross Davis, 2013: 54). Biava, Drent and Herd identify institutionalised socialisation of military professionals at the EU level as a form of strategic culture, under which individuals familiarise themselves with CSDP priorities (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1238,1239). In a related approach, Howorth argues that decisions on security and defence policy are shaped by small groups of officials serving in key committees and acting “in a mode which is as close to supranational as it is to inter-governmental” (Howorth, 2012: 436).

Howorth’s argument, which was based on interviews with personnel serving in several EDA and CSDP committees and on the committees’ decisions, is quite important as it highlights a potent factor which exhibits both intergovernmental and supranational qualities (Howorth, 2012: 439-444). Howorth adopts Beyers argument according to which officials (state representatives), “adopt supranational role conceptions as norms of appropriate behaviour” (Howorth, 2012: 437). The argument advanced by Howorth resembles that Dijkstra concerning on Solana and his team of civil servants in the Council Secretariat. Dijkstra argues that Solana and his team were instrumental in putting several missions on the EU agenda and attribute this to reveal factors: availability of resources, joint presence with like-minded actors during agenda setting, access to top-level political resources on account of their political prestige and access to international networks (Dijkstra, 2012: 457,458,467). Based on the above one may think of Solana and his team as a small epistemic community of high status and expertise, with the will and wherewithal to advance CSDP, and establish the foundations of a European Strategic culture. This micro-socialisation environment of experts and like-minded actors was analysed by Chappell. Chappell linked progress in European strategic culture to “the institutionalisation and socialisation of EU security and defence elites at the EU level” (Chappell, 2012: 171). Some contributing/facilitating factors to the socialisation process have been identified by Biava, Drent and Herd. They distinguish between diversification absorbers and strategic culture enhancers: the European Security and Defence College, the European Police College, the European Defence Agency and the Institute of Strategic Studies (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1239). These absorbers and enhancers constitute a bottom-up approach to the formulation of a common strategic culture. However, things become more complicated when it comes to existing military forces and the conditions under which they operate. Chappell underlines the importance of the EU battle-group concept in relation to EU
strategic culture; in terms of conceptual coordination of member states in terms of agreement on the conditions under which the battle-groups should operate (Chappell, 2012: 144). Dijkstra also makes a similar remark regarding Solana’s approach that considered initial operations as “test cases” in which the “actual mission becomes less important” than the prospect of “getting the actors on board” (Dijkstra, 2012: 457). This approach constitutes a compulsory (Europeanisation) framework within which the coordination of Member States (and the narrowing of their differences) becomes more important than the actual planning of the mission. Biava, Drent and Herd note that despite narrowing differences, there were several analysts who argued that EU should have further developed its force-using approach prior to speaking of strategic culture (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1229). However, given the fact that some CSDP missions used military force to achieve their aims, one could claim that EU already has a strategic culture (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011: 1240), or at least that it is on its way to develop one. This argument implies that the existence of a common strategic culture actually facilitates and is being facilitated by CSDP. Strategic Culture has a unique dynamic in bringing individuals together in terms of a common aim or task as it incorporates elements of learning and socialising. Hence, the identification of additional factors, exhibiting similar dynamics could be of great importance in the advancement of CSDP’s Europeanisation.

5.13 EU Innovation Policy: the role of Research and Development in CSDP

EU innovation policy shares a number of features with Strategic Culture (such as an institutional environment, socialisation, learning and change). As Pavitt states, EU innovation policy aims at creating favourable conditions for the development of technological and organisational initiatives (Pavitt, 1998: 564). The means to this end are a “mix of R&D and indirect policies” (Pavitt, 1998: 564). In the same vein Nibbe linked the future of EU organisations and corporations to “the ability of Europe’s policymakers to create the environment for innovation to flourish” (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011). In this environment the impact of R&D is indisputable as it provides a competitive advantage for the defence industry (Sempere et al., 2009). This becomes evident in view of US R&D spending which in 2002 was “more than three times that of Europe’s” whereas, in 2006, it was five times as large (Neuman, 2010: 115-116).
The significance of R&D importance was initially recognised by a dyestuffs German firm in 1870s, which came to realise the profit potential of new products and new chemical processes. There are numerous examples of the impact of R&D prior to WWII, such as the development of Radar, of the atomic bomb and others which have had an impact on the outcome of WWII (Fontanel and Coulomb, 2008: 75). In the 1950s, military and space R&D accounted for 54% of measured economy while the military sector absorbed about half of the scientists and engineers (Gold, 2005: 4-5). Subsequently, the creation of EU initiated a new era for R&D, which featured inter alia the beginning of strong cooperation coordination and the creation of a single market. In 1976, European defence ministers established a forum for cooperation in the production of armaments, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which was later absorbed by WEU and WEAG (WEAG, 2005). In the 1980s, another EU successful initiative, under the name EUCLID, was introduced in order to enhance cooperation in research. As Sanbury argues this initiative “complements the open market in the creation of a European technology plan, which will foster co-operation in research among Independent European Programme Group nations” (Sanbury, 1989). The success of Euclid could be seen in the broad range of technologically-related issues which it dealt with and its unique contractual relations which led manufacturers from several countries to take part (Coëme, 1991: 15-20). These arguments reveal the existence of an institutional environment which facilitated socialisation and enhanced manufacturers’ cooperation with a view to mutual gains. In addition, these cooperative ad-hoc synergies, incorporate elements of learning which later resulted in more permanent cooperation schemes and mergers. Such an environment was encouraged by WEU members with the creation of a discussion forum on European armaments cooperation (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 118). This forum’s success was reflected in the subsequent establishment, by WEAG and WEO, of a forum for armaments R&D. Under their research cells, several European Security Research Programs (ESRP), Framework Programs\(^{29}\), and thirteen Common European Priority Areas (CEPAs) (Moustakis and Violakis, 2006: 3-4) were executed. These research objectives were preserved in the EDA planning project.

However, the Kosovo war provided a “serious wakeup call” concerning the technological lag relative to the US (Adams and Ben-Ari, 2006: 157). This feeling is captured in Jospin’s statement, to the effect that “we should make the necessary interoperability changes of our weapons with those of our allies” (Jospin, 2011). Hence,

\(^{29}\)Framework Programmes or Research Programmes are divided into thematic areas.
effecting interoperability, between European and US technologies became a priority. However, despite the prioritisation, the US lead widened post-2000 with the shrinking of defence budgets (Hamre, 2000: 28). In view of this, EU updated its priorities through the Lisbon Strategy30 and the prioritisation of industrial policy. Further initiatives included the 2005 Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme and the establishment of the EDA. Both were expected to enhance R&D and create new cooperation schemes. However, as Solana observed (2008) “less than 5% of Europe’s research and development budget (was) spend collaboratively” (Neuman, 2010: 107). Based on the above, one may conclude that the limited collaborative R&D budget indicates three things: (a) Europeanisation is slow (being based on learning needs a decade to show results), (b) the first collaborative steps have been taken (the framework and mechanisms are slowly used) and (c) there is a missing link in the production-absorption of technology process. This last argument may be better comprehended in view of the US strategy regarding R&D spill-over effects. Although the US invests massively on R&D, it also absorbs all technological and equipment products. On the other hand, the EU encourages and funds R&D procedures under the clause of intra-European cooperation but doesn’t absorb directly the resulting output. This “broken link” between innovation and production in Europe further hampers attempts at technological breakthroughs. The existence of this broken link may be seen in market fragmentation and the overuse of Article 29631 by EU Member States. According to Article 296 Member States could exclude defence equipment from the Common Market. This exclusion facilitates fragmentation, creates inefficiencies and has a negative impact on the overall EU competitiveness. As explained by Daguzan et al., the European Council has to think about strictly limiting the application of the Article 296 TEC (Heisbourg et al., 2003: 80) as it creates obstacles to the realisation of a single EU market.

The EU had made several attempts to remove the article, already in the 1970s and 1980s (Britz and Eriksson, 2005). The Article was (finally) amended in 2006, with

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30 The Lisbon Strategy was an action plan which aimed to boost EU economy between 2000 and 2010, in terms of competition, knowledge and sustainable economic growth.
31 Article 296: 1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules: (a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; (b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes. 2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply.(EUROPA)
the Communication on the application of Article 346 (formerly 296), which states: “Article 346 applies only to procurement of equipment specifically designed for military purposes and only if the exemption is required for the protection of essential security interests of the respective member state, with the burden of proof on the member state” (Hofbauer, 2010: 8). The article clarification was followed by two additional EU Directives aiming at enhancing business efficiency and rendering defence and security markets more open and transparent: Directive 2009/43/EC and Directive 2009/81/EC. Given the above as well as efforts to remove market barriers (originating in the 1970s) one may draw the following conclusions: (a) the persistence in establishing a single, open and transparent market that originated in the 1970s, indicates the impact of Europeanisation on learning, socialisation, bargaining, coordination and hierarchically-induced change; and (b) that R&D may contribute to Europeanisation as a distinctive and direct force for change.

5.14 The role of R&D policy making as an EU convergence pillar

The conception of R&D –apart from its initial purpose- as an enhancement tool/facilitating factor for closer cooperation among governments, universities, research institutes, and industries is not new. It has been used as such for a long time in federal state-entities –and beyond-, whose objective is to promote cooperation among the above-mentioned parties, with substantive results –especially in the military technology and equipment field (Schacht, 2012). Schacht argues that joint projects facilitate the sharing of costs, risks, facilities and expertise with a view to creating new industries and jobs (Schacht, 2012). He also notices that “since technological progress is not necessarily determined by economic conditions, it can have effects on trade independent of shifts in macroeconomic factors that may affect the marketplace” (Schacht, 2012). According to these arguments technological progress is not necessarily determined by economic factors but it may have a favourable effect on economic conditions. This positive impact is also important in the production of military equipment, as it also concerns states’ security strategy and identity. As Gilpin argues, “military or technological innovation may dramatically reduce the cost and increase the benefits of territorial conquest and thereby encourage military expansion” (Gilpin, 1981: 22-23). Gilpin’s argument links defence/technological innovation to the conceptualisation of security and defence and therefore to states’ strategy. This argument becomes more interesting in view of the fact that certain firms’ ‘plugging in’ to national innovation
systems. As Kluth argues this “plugging in” constitutes an important mediating institution in relation to crossborder consolidation (Kluth, 2009: 10), which brings us back to the role of interest groups and corporatism. Hence, R&D policies could act as a trasmition belt for these groups to shift from a national to an EU orientation and therefore to further Europeanisation. In this regard, the strengthening of EU convergence policies in Research, Development and Technology may be viewed as providing a unique opportunity for EU member states’ economies and their national and transnational companies.

Hence, EU’s accumulated knowledge and experience from 1970s onwards (mainly involving coordination of national entities and related performance through national funding) has prepared Member States for the next step. The period since 2000 may be characterised as one in which Europeanisation was considered as “fostering coordination of national entities involved in the orientation and programming functions” (Barre et al., 2013: 193-194). The main innovation of this period is that “the frontier of Europeanisation is no longer that of the size of the EU research budget. Rather, it is the political will of the member states” (Barre et al., 2013: 193-194). Barre et al.’s, argument reflects the consolidation of Europeanisation and its evolving dynamics which is, however, related to political will. This aspect is also reflected in the establishment of EDA as a coordinating organisation (Menon, 2011: 80; Biscop, 2012: 1302) in the areas of Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence, where the provision of new instruments of cooperation resulted in a new situation for EU member states. This became evident from the assessment of the 2007-2009 relevant data pertaining to R&D projects and programme commitments. The assessment reveals acceptance of cooperative schemes by EU member states and, in addition, a sizable increase in the amount spent rising from € 16 million in 2007 to € 41 million in 2009 (EDA, 2010: 39). In addition, EDA’s report for the same time-period indicates an increase in Collaborative R&T, rising from 9.6 % (2006) of total R&T spending to 16.5% (2008) (EDA, 2010: 50). These figures indicate that despite important progress in collaborative R&T projects, there is still much work to be done. The 2006-2014 time-period figures reflect the impact of the Great Recession (starting in 2008) and indicate that Member States show a slight preference for defence R&D investment (EDA, 2015: 31-33). As Eichengreen notes, “R&D spending, which is crucial for the development of these new technologies, continues to lag in Europe” (Eichengreen, 2008: 400). However, with the exception of the 2012-2013 periods, R&T shows a rise of more than 10% (EDA, 2015: 31-33).

32 EDA published in 2015 figures up to 2014 (estimate).
Figure 11: European collaborative R&T as % of total defence R&T

The above table and the relatively low R&T percentage confirm the claim that there is little absorption of defence R&T output, in contrast to the US approach. However, even the low percentage indicates that there is an Europeanised framework in support of future political initiatives which could then result in significant increases in of R&T spending and in restoring the “missing link”. Schmitt identifies the importance of joint structures and frameworks as a starting point for further consolidation (Schmitt, 2000: 20). Schmitt’s argument reflects the potential dynamic of established joint Europeanisation structures, which in turn create new structures, and further Europeanisation.
Ashton also highlighted the importance of defence industry, as a means “for jobs, growth and innovation” (Ashton, 2013: 1). This relation, between innovation and defence industry was investigated by Castellaci, et al. Their research indicates that there is a unique balance between innovation and industrial defence policies “in the sense that pursuing innovation would increase international competitiveness at the expense of military capabilities and vice versa” (Castellacci, Fevolden and Lundmark, 2014: 1588). This argument represents the current situation of EU Member States, which being apprehensive of military capabilities reduction underfund R&T and burden their national budgets. As Castellaci et al. argue, only “pure industrial defence policy” could produce good results while a mixed strategy might not (Castellacci, Fevolden and Lundmark, 2014: 1588). Hence, an Europeanised industrial defence policy could generate major results despite sovereignty issues. Given the above, one may conclude that innovation can drive defence capabilities provided that funding can be assured without adverse effects on defence budgets or national sovereignty. This argument becomes more important in view of the Great Recession and its aftermath and the emergence of new threats. However, as Epstein argues, despite the fact that outside control is disliked, in times of desperate need for funds, governments tend to jeopardise their autonomy (Epstein, 1980: 347). In these aspects, learning from the US experience could be beneficial for the defence industry and thus result in a robust CSDP.
5.15 The role of R&D in Security and Defence: US as a “test drive” example

The US experience on the use of R&D policies as a distinct cohesive force may prove rather useful in view of EU attempts to establish a “common way of doing things”. Starting in the 1960s, US federal policies were implemented on the national level with the permission of states governments in terms of so-called “permissive federalism” (Epstein, 1980: 367). This term, which originated in the 1930s US programs of cooperative federalism (Epstein, 1980: 367), may be applicable to the situation of EU presently. However, this resemblance does not imply that EU policies in research, development and technology should blindly imitate the indicated programs. On the contrary, EU R&D policies should be based on distinct and diversified structures built upon EU Member States’ comparative strengths and needs. This constitutes a bottom-up approach.

Closer scrutiny of the USA experience reveals that the research output is directly linked to the needs of defence industry, while there exists a remarkable mechanism (through NATO) that traces future military operational and equipment needs of the members of the alliance. Hence, all state-of-the-art technology and equipment are directly absorbed by security and defence mechanisms and the armed forces (including NATO member states). In this connection, Brooks and Wohlforth highlight the US commitment to military (and non-military) R&D as a means to maintain its overall competitive position (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008: 453).

This approach highlights valuable lessons for EU Member States, in terms of cooperative research and technology absorption so as to balance military expenditures with actual military capabilities. The need for a better approach is reflected in the 2002 European Parliament resolution (B5-0186/2002) which notes that “EU Member States spend the equivalent of about 60% of the US defence budget, but the return in military capabilities is only the equivalent of 10%” (Eur-Lex, 2002). As a result, “the European Commission launched the Preparatory Action in Security Research (2004), which will lead to the inclusion of security research in the 7th EU Framework Research Program starting in 2007” (Borchert, 2006: 19-20). The Commission’s action caused “the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in cooperation with other departments and agencies, to launch an ambitious homeland security research program and set up new initiatives to leverage the contribution of the industry and the scientific community” (Borchert, 2006: 19-20). These initiatives included the utilisation of civilian-technology products by
defence systems in response to need for “for cheaper off-the-shelf procurement further down the supply chain” (Mawdsley, 2004: 27). Mawdsley argued that this consensus was problematic due to the potential failure of governments to maintain control over key industrial assets and core technology (Mawdsley, 2004: 27). Such instances may jeopardise not only national security, but also social structures being based on regional production units. On the other hand, US government-by-network has proved –so far- to be a rather effective and cost efficient approach in situations concerning military production and national security. One government-by-network successful story is that of the renewal of the U.S. Coast Guard Deep-water supply chain network. According to the Deloitte Institute analysis, US Coast Guard altered completely its purchasing strategy from a simple bidding acquisition scheme, to consortium contracting for multi-year time frame inventory integration package (Eggers and Goldsmith, 2004: 11). The agreement included modernisation of deep-water fleet (90 ships and 200 aircrafts), and had an initial cost of US$10 billion (Eggers and Goldsmith, 2004: 11). The consortium that undertook the project obtained the capability needs directly from the Coast Guard, which were then relayed to producers so that the latter could design “the system of boats, ships, aircraft, satellites, information technology, and unmanned aerial vehicles that was needed. The ultimate goal: to revolutionise the way every man and woman in the Coast Guard does his or her job” (Eggers and Goldsmith, 2004: 11). This scheme is more-or-less being followed by NATO, while EU progress with large-consortium projects is in the same direction. However, there are instances where coordination schemes seem to fail, especially due to intrusive governmental interventions or other obstacles related to national corporatist groups. Such an example is provided by a Greek maritime telecommunications and electronics company (that also produces military equipment), named MARAC Electronics SA (MARAC SA). MARAC S.A. from the late 1990s to 2008 has developed an extensive list of technological proposals for upgrading existing infrastructures, while it also successfully executed EU-funded projects. Despite the company’s well established record for technological innovation (and just as with many other firms), Greek governments preferred to –mainly- acquire military “turnkey solutions” instead of custom-tailored products arising from coordinated consortium research and development. This approach runs contrary to Europeanisation and related change. The reason for this preference may be traced to side payments and kickbacks received by members of the decision-making bodies – e.g., defence ministers. The newspaper “To Vima” states with characteristic harshness the criteria for the selection of specific weapons systems which entailed political and
other benefits for the [then] Secretary of Defence […] among those mentioned in the text is the purchase of type 214 submarines concerning which there is an ongoing judicial investigation (Labropoulos, 2012). The importance of this case is based on the fact that Greece is among the biggest military spenders among EU member states and NATO but without significant domestic production output. In this regard, Dempsey noted that “in 2009, almost 28 per cent of its then ten billion euro budget was spent on military equipment—higher than in the United States or any other NATO country. Greece’s defence budget was 3.2 per cent of gross domestic product.” (Dempsey, 2012).

Military expenditures of Greece and EU are presented in the following table:


As indicated in the table, Greece “after the United States, […] is the second biggest defence spender among the 27 NATO countries in relation to its GDP (Dempsey, 2012). Dempsey views this situation as “astonishing for a country in a deep economic crisis” (Dempsey, 2012). Hence, despite the severe economic crisis and attendant austerity measures defence budgets seem to have their own dynamic. The reasons for this can be found in the pre-crisis military purchase “deals”, in the light of direct political “benefits or gains”. Also, Greece has been in a tough spot, given that the indicated acquisition deals were made with the countries which are actually among Greece’s key creditors. As Dempsey argues, “In the current situation, Athens does not want to anger Germany and France by leaving their bills unpaid. Therefore, it is really understandable that neither the EU nor NATO has eased the path for Greece to cut its defence budget in a way that would benefit both organisations” (Dempsey, 2012). This
situation results in an impasse concerning Europeanisation as national gains for Germany and France seem to have priority over CSDP. The cause of this bottleneck originates from previous Greek governments’ decisions concerning purchasing defence equipment rather than producing/co-producing it. This decision was made under the influence of two factors: domestic impact (votes and special interest groups and direct gains (bribes)) (Deutsche Welle, 2012) and the arms race with Turkey (Dritsakis, 2004: 262). Greece’s entanglement becomes even more difficult in view of its exposed borderline, the large number of islands and the fact that it constitutes an EU outpost. Because of the above and the fact that the EU defence and security mechanism is still based on the pooling of military power; there is little choice for Greece. Also, issues such as large-scale migratory flows, corruption and unfriendly neighbouring countries further complicate the situation. For all these reasons, Greece may be seen as a test-case in adversity. Hence, on-going issues of security and defence “meet” the need for monitoring exposed borders, including sea-borders and islands, while lack of cooperation between academics, research institutions, business and the government further complicates the problem.

In the following table a time series of, national military expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product is presented for the period 1988-2014. Apart from the US that has the “lead” in military spending it is Greece which has the biggest military expenditure followed by UK and France. According to these data (and remembering the US example), Greece should have been among the countries with the most developed and highly-sophisticated defence-related research and production. This is clearly not the case not only because of all the afore-mentioned factors, but also because of certain technical issues (which mainly relate to incompatible imported models and failed adaptation processes) but also to lack of both political will and a common vision. Hence, further analysis of the Greek case is required.
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Table 13: Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2014

Participation, Negotiation and Application of Common Security Defence Strategy: Greek Case

Greece’s special defence needs and large defence budgets make for an interesting case study. Consequently, the establishment and operation of EDA constitutes a rather important issue for Greece in terms of defence capabilities and defence industry viability. Hence, it accounts for Greece’s favourable position on the creation and operation of EDA, and its autonomous character. As Karambekios argues, “the large share of defence expenditures in the budget puts Greece at the top of the relevant list of EU Member States and highlights the need for convergence of EU states’ defence budgets and for the increase in defence spending along with the development of a common framework for the European defence industry” (Karambekios, 2012: 9). In these regard, Greece has adjusted its public administration services according to the EDA structure and placed the Ministry of National Defence (MND) in charge. Given that EDA pertains to the second EU Pillar, the final authority rests with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rather that with the Greek Minister of National Defence (MND) (in practice this means Sector A11  in cooperation with other MND organisational structures). This administrative structure indicates the unresolved political issues among member states inasmuch as the specific (A11) sector is subject to the General Sector of Political Issues of MFA, which handles bilateral issues of Greece as opposed to the 3rd General Sector of European Union Issues (Karambekios, 2012: 13). Therefore, EDA is treated as a bilateral issue, not as an EU one. The overlapping of national administration services and policies regarding CFSP and CSDP and the absence of real political and economic convergence allows dual exposure to international relations field (EU level and national exposure). This exposure allows “intervention windows” in the security area as well as in the defence industry structure, while it obstructs coordination between and allocation of EU and national forces. The reason for these issues remaining unresolved is (according to the Association of Military Industries (SEKPY)) the political unwillingness to tackle the outstanding problems.

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34 Greece has had a long history of cross-border tensions, and migratory problems due to its extensive borderline and geographic location.
36 Referring to Sector A11, which is the Sector of Common Foreign Policy of Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
37 SEKPY from Greek “ΣΕΚΠΥ” stands for Greek Association of Greek Military Industries
5.17 The Real Thing: Politics and the Defence Sector (Greek Case-SEKPY position)

Despite its extensive range of military equipment production Greek defence industry is characterised by several features that hinder its development and expansion. Briefly, production lines include: (a) weapons and weapons systems, (b) military and armoured vehicles, (c) civilian and combat vessels, (d) aviation materials, (e) electronic and electrical equipment, (f) telecommunications equipment, (g) optical and electro-optical equipment, (h) spare parts (about 40,000 different parts), (i) explosives and ammunition, (j) various items like inflatable sea vehicles, cords, protective masks, bulletproof vests, batteries etc (Moulias, 2005). However, despite the extensive range of products, the know-how and overall dynamism of the Greek defence industry, most military equipment used by the Greek armed forces, is purchased from EU and NATO allies. Consequently, far from significant transfers of skills taking place, there appears to be an enormous gap that derives from lack of political initiatives or from limited initiatives catering to individual interests. This gap was also confirmed by the president of SEKPY, in the 3rd International SEKPY Conference in 2002. He underlined the small participation of national defence industry, which accounted for 10% of the total during 1996-2000 and was expected to reach 20% in 2001-2005 (Moulias, 2002). According to him, the small share of defence equipment production accounted for by the Greek defence industry is due to political factors related to benefits (mostly benefits to individuals) that derive from defence equipment purchase. This claim undermines EDA’s foundations and Europeanisation efforts as it reveals EDA’s structural weaknesses.

In the same conference, the Greek Minister of Defence (MoD) Papantoniou presented EU’s central policy of establishing relations of interdependence among EU states in areas such as standardisation of weapons systems, military infrastructure and operational planning (Papantoniou, 2002). In addition, MoD Papantoniou noted that the “aim of our policy is to achieve economies of scale and to incorporate [...] technological innovations, which will contribute to the development of domestic value added” (Papantoniou, 2002).

There are, however, important differences of opinion between the two. MoD Papantoniou seems to ignore Moulias’ point concerning the need for an increase in domestic defence production and the closing of the aforementioned gap. Ramfos attributes this gap to the pathological flaws of the Greek political system. According to Ramfos “the political system is sick because, instead of driving society, it acts like a broker between the state and the citizens and receives broker-bonuses
and commissions. The role of the political system is to lead and not to bargain on the basis of political cost” (Pagratis, 2011). The “desperate” calls of SEKPY president were reflected in Moulias’ letter sent to the then main opposition leader, and later prime minister, K. Karamanlis in 2002. In his letter Moulias refers to the steps needed to support the defence industry and to lack of political will and initiative. According to Moulias, the key issues were: (a) the development of national policy for the defence industry, (b) the creation of defence industry committee, (c) the re-evaluation of the legal framework for procurement, (d) the institutionalisation of efforts for cooperation, (e) the securing of Greek participation in armaments programs, (f) the increase in the number of tenders for spare parts, (g) promoting competition - transparency, (h) R&D on new military equipment and (i) support of the Greek Defence Industry position in Europe (Moulias, 2002: 11). In the following year (2003), the suggestions were more or less the same, including requests for better and faster information for armament tenders, funding, domestic participation in armaments programs, rules for the administrative structure of big and small enterprises, creation of national military equipment producers registry, information dissemination on R&D programs, funding for defence industry representation in international organisations (NATO-WEAG-EDIG-EU) etc. (Moulias, 2002: 2-3). The new aspect added to Moulias’ claims was related to “direct projects entrusting” to specific companies. As Moulias noted, “on top of being excessively costly, direct placement of orders runs counter to genuine competition and results in adverse criticism and disillusionment. At some point this practice should be stopped” (Moulias, 2003: 21). The implementation of Moulias ideas depends on political support. As Alesina and Giavazzi argue, “the political support that could initiate change is simply not there” (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2008: 92). This situation changed as new government took office.

In the following years, some small steps took place, due to the new government; however there was still confusion as certain directives and guidelines from the Defence ministry were less than clear, causing complaints on SEKPY’s part (2007). SEKPY noted that “we cannot understand how to act because you (the ministry) do not refer to specific defence system procurement” (Moulias, 2007). Later on, in a meeting between president of SEKPY Moulias and General Secretary of Research and Technology of Ministry of Development Dr. Tsoukalas, Moulias highlighted several pending issues with emphasis on R&D and the difficulties in funding such projects (defence R&D). According to Moulias, defence R&D projects were excluded on the grounds that EU didn’t support the funding of such projects. In the same spirit, the General Secretary stated that despite the introduction of EDA, which funds R&D, there were no programs
for the development of defence equipment and that this would remain over the next five years (Moulias, 2007). In this prospect, Karambekios in his study, regarding Greek participation in EDA, noticed that: “The state cannot stay abreast of technological developments nor can it follow the technical aspects of domestic agencies due to the double purpose of the indicated technology which enables them to operate in multiple areas” (Karambekios, 2012: 26). Karambekios’ point brings to light important weaknesses related to national/governmental inability to provide EDA with necessary information. In conjunction with Moulias’ claims the above makes obvious that domestic defence industries were left to their own devices.

In the years that followed there were no important changes in the defence sector. As noted in the 2009 SEKPY report, the problems remain much the same, including R&D issues, producer’s registry, promotion of military equipment exports, timely dissemination of information for armaments programs, securing domestic participation in defence programs, creation of a legal framework for the cooperation of large and medium sized firms, increased purchases of domestically produced spare parts and more without, however, satisfactory responses on the government’s part (Moulias, 2009: 2-3). The single, most important point raised by SEKPY concerned the lack of cooperation and understanding between political staff, relevant government agencies and SEKPY. As Moulias argued, “there does not exist an adequate understanding and cooperation on the part of political personnel and relevant government agencies, which are absolutely necessary in order to perform effective work” (Moulias, 2009: 14). This final point, relates to the uniqueness of Greek environment, which features special interest groups, private defence firms, state owned defence entities, corrupt public servants and politicians, all of which undermine the implementation of EU policies.

5.18 The European side – Proposing and Applying Defence Industry changes

The above analysis does not rule out the characterisation of European defence industry as an important factor underlying CSDP realisation and Europeanisation. Hence, the re-drawing of the European defence industrial map was expected to trigger several changes. The European Commission has provided economic assistance for the indicated changes which included “the constitution of clusters and for the transfer of technology in these regions as well as initiatives that aim to help workers anticipate and adapt to economic change” (Robert Shuman Foundation, 2006). According to Moulias, several Greek defence firms were not included in this change due to (domestic) political factors. However, there were many cases in which the execution of defence
equipment orders and defence offsets\(^{38}\) along with subcontracting and technological fusion enabled national defence industries to survive. These claims become more significant in view of Greece’s enormous spending commitment linked to the purchase from and cooperation with other member states and European companies. However, as Karambekios noted, “during Greek negotiation strategy in the specific issue there was (during negotiations for Code of Conducts on Offsets (EDA, 2005)), and still is, a big number of unaccomplished offsets which result from conventional obligations among Greece and companies-suppliers from previous years” (Karambekios, 2012: 15). Karambekios’ argument acknowledges political interference in the defence equipment supply-acquisition process, resulting in financial loss as for the country. This constitutes (intra-European) corporatist behaviour inimical to national objectives, opposed to Europeanisation but in favour of intergovernmentalism.

In view of such problems (highlighted by the Greek case) besetting cooperation among member states and defence industries, EU introduced the “Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain (CoBPSC)” (EDA, 2008), a sub-part of the “Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement (CoBPSC)” (EDA, 2005) [launched on 1 July 2006], with the aim of enhancing CoC via competition and equal opportunities for defence equipment suppliers. A key tool for the application of CoBPSC is the “Electronic Bulletin Board on Defence (EBBoD)” (EDA, 2008), a digital platform which announces requests for defence equipment provision. This digital platform is divided into two parts: the first refers to Government-to-Industry provisions, and the second refers to Industry-to-Industry provisions. The latter component, which was supported in initial negotiations by the Greek side, was not favourable to Member States with a solid technological background, as its provisions were thought to weaken the opportunities for local sub-contracting (Karambekios, 2012: 17).

Despite criticism the first three years of the platform usage indicated Member States’ acceptance of the process. The following table displays the government-to-industry contracts as published on EBBoD (EDA, 2011) for the period 2006-2009 (transactions are in billions Euro). An initial reading reveals large sums which in turn indicate the importance and impact of defence equipment on European economies. It is noteworthy that former WEAG (older) members, with long-standing cooperation in armaments production, benefited the most from cross border contracts

\(^{38}\) Despite the fact that the seller country/company has the obligation –according to offsets agreements- to provide technological knowledge to the buyer country, there have been infringements in many cases at the expense of the buying country. EDA aimed to stop this infringement with the introduction of Directive EC 2009/81.
Despite the fact that both components of EBBoD were accepted and became operational, the initial negotiations and rejection, especially of the second component, revealed deep tension among Member States concerning the attempt by some to dominate European production and therefore “weaken” others’ defence industries. This fact may be considered the outcome of protracted contact within long-lasting coalitions, under WEAO and WEAG operation, prior to their absorption by EDA. The impact of such practice, despite finalised EDA operational agreements, is reflected on several attempts at coordinating large-scale, multinational coalitions, which resulted in delays or even failures. In this regard Karambekios noted that “The attempt to balance the (almost puritanical) rejection of this tool of industrial policy (for the purpose of combating corruption and inefficiency in domestic decision-making) with industrial reality in which the use offsets will continue to be standard practice [...] The survival and development of a domestic industrial defence base largely depends on access to production orders” (Karambekios, 2012: 23). To be sure, there are

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30Contract Opportunities (CN) refer to contract announcements which are published by sMS. sMS (Subscribing Member States) refer to EU countries participating in the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM): AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK and NO. Contracts awarded under competition (CAN) refer to contracts which were published on EBB and awarded. Contracts without competition (CANx) refer to contracts awarded without competition (under exceptions of EDA code of conducts).
many other factors “to blame” for delays and failures apart from industrial cooperation. Karambekios, (and Moulias, too) has documented political interference in the defence industry which has provided fertile ground for trading jobs for votes. As the Hellenic aerospace industry union noted, “(the) actions of professional unionists, who have set up a client-system of productive disorganisation have undermined productivity. We should, patiently, explain to these colleagues (professional unionists) the need to increase productivity in order to balance revenues and outlays as soon as possible so as to jointly contribute, not only to the preservation of our jobs, but also to further increases in employment” (Hellenic Aerospace Industry Union Blog, 2011).

All these flaws of EU Member States may be attributed to opposition to the transition toward a closer political and economic integration of EU member states. Given that the initial conception, of a single market was based upon respect for regional economic and development models, one can see that its application was not realised according to the original plan. As a result, production and reallocation decisions incompatible with regional development models have created several imbalances in EU Member States, with the exception those that managed to successfully exploit economies of scale. Such imbalances have, in turn, caused destabilisation of neighbouring member states’ economies and large-scale economic dislocation not unrelated to the economic crisis of 2008. However, in terms of learning, socialisation and drawing on the US experience, these imbalances may prove to be only temporary difficulties of a transitional nature and might give way to a longer-term development dynamic under substantive Europeanisation.

5.19 Conclusion

The Europeanisation impact of defence production also affects CSDP Europeanisation. This gives rise to a rather unique dynamic. The origin of this dynamic can be traced to the fact that defence industry Europeanisation constitutes a major supportive force for EU security and defence and therefore a key (facilitating) factor for CSDP realisation and operation. As a result the identification and behavioural analysis of other, interrelated factors contributing to these dynamics, supplies a list of factors-to-include for all researchers in this field. Such behavioural analysis, as presented in this chapter, includes information on the way these factors are activated/realised in time as well as information regarding the way these factors influence decision making. Hence, it provides windows of opportunity for the identification of future change.

Important elements in this behavioural analysis are the type of security environment, the conceptualisation of threats and the means to confront these challenges. The clarification of
elements, over the previous two decades, provided the basis for EU defence/economic policies to evolve. In this process the role of the state is significant due to the linkage between sovereignty and citizens’ security and welfare (which is related to employment). The above indicates that change and opposition to change cannot be understood without analysing their social aspects and impact. Social impact (and social tolerance) is a major factor related to learning and constitutes a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation. Hence, for Europeanisation to be successful, the social impact must be favourable inasmuch as social aspects are linked to the existence of an institutional environment, which can provide a starting point for change. Once social aspects become favourable (or at least not adverse), there exists fertile ground for change. On this ground other driving forces for Europeanisation have proven to be effective, or at least to have a long-term positive contribution. Such contribution leads to deeper Europeanisation penetration in that it sets the foundations for the creation of a common conception/conceptualisation of threats to EU and their joint confrontation.

The emergence of such forces is a process that cannot be moulded though it may be facilitated through the institutional environment. Therefore the existence of an institutional environment for security and defence constitutes a good starting point. Furthermore, the fact that the impact of change is expected over (at least) a ten-year period, many initiatives can be expected to occur. The US federal experience also indicates that change may last over several decades as it is affected by many (internal and external) factors. This effort becomes harder in view of the existence of competing security and defence institutions (NATO). However, the more complicated change is (due to the number of factors/variables) the more robust the result can be expected to be. This claim is based on the fact that hierarchical Europeanisation has a reinforcing impact, in terms of its use of legislative, judicial and administrative functions as means of integration (either negative or positive integration). As a result, hierarchical Europeanisation could create a two-tier change, in terms of a shorter time-frame supplementing the longer term learning one.

In a bottom-up approach, based on socialisation and learning, Europeanisation constitutes a safe-path for integration in response to globalisation. Thus, establishing an EU “way of doing things”, according to Radaelli’s definition, could take a longer time than that anticipated for important results to occur. The larger the number of players and factors in the process, the more the required time for change to occur. This also applies for the EU defence industry integration which cannot be viewed as a pre-scribed process as it encompasses a large amount of players and factors. Therefore, it is not only a process which incorporates physical change but non-physical change as well. As a result, integration cannot be realised without reference to non-physical integrating elements/factors,
such as the establishment of an EU strategic culture and a new security identity. EU strategic
culture and new security identity, in turn, constitute alternative conceptualisation-integration powers
which result in Europeanisation. Similar elements are found in the EU R&D policy-making. The
introduction of R&D policy-making goes back several decades; hence, there was ample time for
socialisation and learning through different and multilevel cooperative schemes.
Chapter 6

6 Europeanisation of National Defence and Security: The Greek Case

This chapter examines how Greece contributed to the realisation of the CSDP. Moreover, the analysis aims to shed light on how the EU “ways of doing things” has been incorporated into the logic of Greece’s domestic security and defence policy. Hence, these “ways of doing things” are identified and presented in terms of Radaelli’s definition (Radaelli, 2004: 3-4) with emphasis on the domestic (national and sub national) discourse. Therefore, this chapter aims to identify the impact of CSDP on Greece’s political structures which are related to the country’s defence and security policy. These changes are presented in terms of an explanatory schema for better understanding the dynamic impact of Europeanisation in the Greek case.

6.1 Introduction

The security dynamics after the end of the Cold War signalled the beginning of a new era for EU Member States’ security and defence. Especially for Greece this new era was seen as an opportunity for the upgrading of the country’s national defence and security. This became evident in the country’s efforts to maximise its benefits from the introduction of and (subsequent) participation in CSDP. These efforts and the importance of CSDP for Greece can be best understood in relation to Greece’s geopolitical issues and threats, which are set out at the opening of this chapter. The analysis then follows with a presentation of Greek governments’ views and initiatives which resulted in the development of a shared, national, conception of security and defence policy, which in turn led to the introduction and support of CSDP. Economides argues that this transformation, which was introduced during the second half of the 1990s, is evidence of the impact of the Europeanisation impact (Economides, 2005: 471). However, the evaluation of the Europeanisation impact cannot be complete without the identification of security and defence changes on the domestic front both in terms of structures and public policies. Hence, the gathering of related evidence and the identification of the underlying forces and motives supply proof of the
presence of Europeanisation and its overall development. Therefore, we begin with the analysis of the post-Cold War security balance in relation to Greece’s security at that time.

6.2 Post-Cold-War Greek security and defence in relation to the country’s geopolitical issues

The transformation of Greece’s national security and defence commenced with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War which resulted in a more complex global security environment (Tsakona, 2011). This transformation primarily related to the new conception of European security and defence present in Greek political thinking. At that time the only common security and defence arrangement for Greece was provided by NATO which Athens viewed as an important prop to national security and defence. Until this time other common security arrangements were not contemplated. This becomes evident in terms of then Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ argument that it was the 1990-91 Gulf War which indicated the weaknesses of the Community in the areas of common foreign policy and defence (Mitsotakis, 1991). In his analysis of post-Cold War Greek security policy, Mitsotakis suggest that “there was no substitute for a security relationship with the USA and NATO” (Moustakis and Sheehan, 2000: 101-102). Pagoulatos argues that in the 1980s and early 1990s, Greece failed to incorporate the EU factor into domestic political thinking (Pagoulatos, 2002: 3). However, this argument is contested by Mitsotakis who argues that EC/EU has provided additional security for Greece (Mitsotakis, 1991). Mitsotakis’ view is based on the fact that the mediating role of US, NATO and the UN in Greek-Turkish relations proved rather ineffective and hence pushed Greece to “place increased importance on the European card” (Dokos, 2003: 52). As Valinakis argues, Mitsotakis viewed Europe as a security provider (Valinakis, 1994: 208). This argument reflects the shift in policy making, which occurred in view of new information on security and defence. This is noted by Ladrech, who identified Europeanisation “as an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994: 69).

This approach is also incorporated in Radaelli’s definition (Radaelli, 2004: 3-4), especially the part which he terms construction. In this case construction refers to the “ways of doing things” in terms of shared beliefs. The construction of a shared-belief framework precedes or “opens the way” for the subsequent development of informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms and styles.
This constitutes a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation which is facilitated and enhanced by the pursuit of national objectives. The driving force in Greece’s case is to be found in Greek foreign policy. Economides links Europeanisation motives to Greek foreign policy, particularly in the area of Greece’s relations with Cyprus and Turkey (Economides, 2005: 472). The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and subsequent division of the island along with other problems in Greek-Turkish relations had already strained the relationship between the two countries since the mid-1970s (Coufoudakis, 1985: 206; Aydin, 2004: 35). Indeed, foreign and security policy issues were the key considerations underlying Greece’s decision to join EC (Economides, 2005: 473). Valinakis also notes that EC was seen as a guarantor of Greece’s external security (Valinakis, 1994: 200). As the Greek Prime Minister stated in a speech to the Greek Parliament in 1991: “Our strategic aim is to secure our borders within a broader defensive union through our participation in the economically, politically and military unified Europe, in which Greece’s borders are at the same time borders of Europe (Mitsotakis, 1991). According to Mitsotakis, Greek strategy involved the following four goals: support of international norms, preventing isolation and redressing shifts in the balance of power shift (in favour of Turkey), initiatives for restructuring the post Gulf-War environment and the promotion of problem-solving with regard to Cyprus and Palestine (Mitsotakis, 1991).

Therefore, participation in the EU was considered by the Greek government—among other things—as a security and defence booster. As Bulmer and Lequesne argue, such integration strengthens the state and alters domestic politics by creating multilevel politics which affect governance transformation (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005: 10,11). Due to the fact that this is a time consuming process, the occurrence of important results (related to the learning process noted in chapter two) will not appear before roughly a decade has passed. Hence, the period of reaming inactivity during the premiership of Kostas Simitis. In a speech in the Greek Parliament in 2001, Simitis noted that the Maastricht Treaty was not viewed as a turning point for Greek society (Simitis, 2001).

However, as early as 1999, 71% of Greek citizens favoured the support of a common security and defence policy (EU average 71%) (Eurobarometer 51, 1999: 54). The support Greek citizens expressed for CSDP, was related to Greek foreign-policy issues, and particularly to the 1996 Imia incident involving Turkey (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2002). In his speech to the Greek Parliament, the head of the opposition party (and later prime minister), Kostas Karamanlis referring to the Imia incident also emphasised the importance of EU common security and defence (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2002). This became evident during the period of Greece’s EU Presidency.

This change in favour of EU could not have taken place without the support of the major Greek political parties and of the Greek public opinion. Pagoulatos notes that the major Greek political parties (ND, PASOK, SYN) exhibited “significant convergence” over the direction of institutional reform in the EU (Pagoulatos, 2002: 32). The Greek public opinion also favoured institutional reforms linked with the EU. This was reflected in the Euro-barometer surveys of the early 2000s. According to Euro-barometer 57 (2002) 72% of the respondents were in favour of EU and the benefits from EU membership (EU average 61%) (Eurobarometer 57, 2002: 23,24), while 58% trusted EU (EU average 46%) (Eurobarometer 57, 2002: 46). In addition, Greeks had a 67% overall positive view of the EU (EU average 49%) (Eurobarometer 57, 2002: 51) while 72% were in favour of CSDP (EU average 71%) (Eurobarometer 57, 2002: B.60). This number increased in 2008 to 81% (EU average 75%) (Eurobarometer 70, 2008: 225-226) while in 2014 was 77% (EU average 76%) (Eurobarometer 82, 2014: 188-189). The ongoing public support for CSDP indicates the presence of a bottom-up Europeanisation process which has been incorporated in domestic political discourse (Radaelli, 2004). This approach, based on socialisation and learning (as noted in chapter two), has proved more successful than a top-down approach on account of the extensive penetration of the Europeanisation process.

Hence, domestic political influence in the form of “public opinion training” could also be considered as a learning tool which encourages Europeanisation. As a result, Kostas Simitis’ steady support for CSDP has had a decisive influence on Greek public opinion. In his 2008 speech at Cambridge University regarding Lisbon Treaty, Simitis noted that the Treaty creates a “framework for a common policy on foreign affairs, security and defence” while it shapes the “conditions for the
Union to emerge as a leading player in a multicentric international system” (Simitis, 2008). In his speech, Simitis expressed not only his own views, but those of Greek citizens in support of CSDP.

6.3 National defence and security changes

During Simitis administration, the initial key changes and adjustments to the new CSDP reality were discussed and agreed in the Greek parliament (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2002). The parliamentary discussions provided justification for the country’s compliance with the EU directives regarding the establishment of the following offices: Directorate-General for Defence Equipment and Investment, Directorate-General for Economic Planning and Support, and Directorate-General of Civil Defence and International Relations. The introduction of these Directorates was meant to deal with two key issues: better administration and combating of corruption related to public procurement (as noted in chapter 5).

As the Minister of Defence Papantoniou has argued, the introduction of these Directorates aims at developing an interdisciplinary approach to the administration of military operations which would replace the old fragmented administrative system (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2002). This interdisciplinary administration is expected to lead to an overall redeployment of the Armed Forces through their geographical and spatial rearrangement (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2002). Furthermore, regarding the Directorate-General of Economic planning and support, Papantoniou noted that its establishment would put an end to requests addressed to the Minister of defence by companies, embassies and others interested in public procurement (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2002). All these changes, as Papantoniou noted in his Parliamentary speech in 2002, derived from the experience from the participation of Greece in the international force, named “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan against Taliban in 2001 (Hellenic Ministry of Defence - Active Endeavour, 2001). The participation in this UN mission (resolution 1386)“ for many nations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), amounted to their first combat experience in decades”(NATO, 2011) As Biscop and Coelmont argue, although the Petersberg Tasks were defined in 1992 WEU ministerial summit, Member States remained politically divided over the use of force under the EU flag or NATO (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010: 22). As a result CSDP operations, at that time, remained low-intensity.

Although time-consuming, these legal and structural changes as well as the political will to change, reflect the impact of Europeanisation on national defence and security structures. The introduction of the interdisciplinary administration, Papantoniou noted, triggered more changes in the structure of the Greek army (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2002). Hence, the training of young officers which until 2003 took place in different war schools (one for each military body), was replaced by the Supreme Joint War College (Α.ΔΙ.Σ.ΠΟ/ADISPO). The decision for the establishment of the Supreme Joint War College by the Greek Minister of Defence was taken in July 2003 (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2003); the parliamentary discussion took place in September 2003 (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2003) and the college begun its operation under the 3186/Greek Law in September 2003 (Hellenic Parliament, 2003). The mission of the college is to provide senior Officers with multidisciplinary operational and strategic level education and training on key geopolitical issues; this was expected to raise the officers’ ability to design and direct interdisciplinary tasks and to participate in national and allied interdisciplinary headquarters in Greece and abroad (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2003).

Consequently, the introduction and operation of the Greek interdisciplinary college could be linked to a complex interaction pattern related to NATO and CSDP. The interdisciplinary aspect was introduced by NATO in 1994 in terms of the “Combined Joint Task Force” meant to facilitate WEU operations (Marjoukos, 2009). However, at that time, no changes took place in the Greek army structure. On the other hand, during the 1998-2002 formulation of European Security and Defence Policy (Marjoukos, 2009), key structural changes were introduced in the Greek army. Therefore, the EU influence and progress regarding the realisation of CSDP, at that time, may be considered to have had a stronger influence than NATO. This constitutes Europeanisation in terms of both top-down and bottom-up patterns of realisation.

Another change linked to the interdisciplinary administration was the creation, after a decade, of the Single Defence Research and Technology Body of the Ministry of Defence under the 2919/2001 Law (Hellenic Parliament Law, 2001) (it was later updated under the 4250/14 Law (Hellenic Parliament, 2014)). The creation of a single defence research and technology body signalled the merging of the different research and technology administrations in the Greek Armed forces (Hellenic Army General Staff, 2010). The objective of this fusion was to encourage, develop and exploit defence related research by facilitating participation in national and international
research, and the development of defence related projects (Hellenic Parliament Law, 2001). These legal and structural adjustments indicate the major impact EU has had on national defence and on the willingness of the Greek MoD administration to change. This impact constitutes clear evidence of Europeanisation. As noted earlier (chapter two) institutions “once established take on a political life of their own” (Puchala, 1999: 318). Hence, the impact of CSDP is long-lasting.

Consequently, further changes were introduced in 2006 via the 76th presidential decree (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2006) which gave legal basis and active roles to new MoD directorates: The Directorate-General for Defence Equipment and Investment, which was to be “responsible for the design and implementation of decisions on matters of Defence Programs and Contracts Procurement of major or other material Armament Programs, Contracts Offset (offsets), Quality Assurance and Investment Defence and Technological Research (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Defence, 2013); the Directorate-General for Economic Planning and Support, which was to be responsible for the development and submission of proposals; the implementation of decisions related to resources, environment and human resources; budget monitoring; coordination of the MOD; economic welfare; and military and technological support (Hellenic Republic–Ministry of Defence, 2013), and the Directorate-General of Civil Defence and International Relations, which would be responsible for elaboration and submission of recommendations; the monitoring of implementation of decisions related to the National Defence Policy and National Defence Planning in cooperation with the Chief of Staff and related strategic issues; the analysis of international relations; the analysis of defence cooperation agreements; the analysis of international law; and the analysis of international organisations under the Ministry of Defence (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Defence, 2013).

It is noteworthy, that under the Directorate-General for Economic Planning and Support (Hellenic Parliament/Law 3433, 2006) the Department of European & Development Management Programs (known as ΔΙΔΕΑΠ / DIDEAP) (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2006) is responsible for coordinating the preparation and submission of proposals for monitoring, control and overall management of all programs which utilise external funding. Such funding schemes use European funds under the rubric “Corporate Pact for Development Framework 2007-2013” (ESPA/ΞΠΑ 2007-2013). During that period the following nine projects were completed: The removal of asbestos from the buildings of the navy; Restoring the historical lighthouse Kokkinopoulou Psara (March-August 2014); Unit installation cogeneration - heat / cool to 251 general air force hospital; Fixing and restoring lighthouse Monemvasia (October 2015 – December 2015); Modernisation of
the lighthouse network in Greek territorial waters (December 2013-November 2014); Optimisation of recruitment services; Emergence exhibits through interactive electronic applications and services for the war museum (June 2015 – October 2015); Digitisation, documentation and promotion of the military-archives service (June 2012- January 2014); Digitisation, documentation and promotion of the archives of Greek navy (July 2014 – October 2015)(Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2016).

Furthermore, in terms of the new 2014-2020 EU funding scheme, the Greek navy under the supervision of DIDEAP has participated in the determination of the strategic targets of MoD according to the objectives set by the EU. Such strategic planning was the subject of the interdisciplinary committee established by directive (060.250/131/353788/S.417/10.21.13/MoD) under the title "Commission Training Development Programme"(Hellenic Navy, 2014).

The Ministry of Defence also participated in the EU-funded 7th Framework Package project for security, called Idira (Ref: 261726). The project is related to disaster management and includes a variety of procedures, tools and systems in order to confront large-scale emergency international situations (Cordis, 2015). The Ministry of Defence is to encourage such initiatives, regarding participation in projects, technology, structures and processes which would result from the introduction of the “Evolution Office” in 2006. The Evolution office’s objective is to encourage innovation and efficiency in the military (Hellenic Air Force, 2006). The key idea was to establish a permanent communication channel between the staff and the MoD administration and provide incentives and awards for innovative and useful information, ideas and proposals.

As the development of CSDP at the EU level continued, Member States moved on with further structural and legal domestic changes. For example, the Greek government introduced in Parliament, a draft law regarding “the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security”(European Commission, 2009) under the title, “Procurement Works, Services and Supplies in the fields of Defence and Security - Compliance with Directive 2009/81 / EC - Regulation of issues of the Ministry of National Defence”(Hellenic Government, 2011). Hence, both CSDP and CFSP were slowly incorporated in the domestic political agenda. In 2012, the Greek government initiated such a discussion in Parliament, (in accordance with Article 32 paragraph 6 of the Rules of the House), in terms of the Interparliamentary conference for the CFSP and CSDP (Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2012). Another parliamentary discussion of the same issue took place in the following year, regarding CFSP and CSDP and the forthcoming conference in Dublin on 24 and 25 March 2013(Hellenic Parliament Proceedings, 2013). The above as well as
the active participation of Greece in CSDP are indicative of domestic institutionalisation of the policy under study and therefore provide further evidence of the presence Europeanisation.

6.4 Greece’s participation in EU joint operations

Greece’s active participation in EU operations may be considered as means to an end, i.e., exercising influence in foreign affairs, participating in the decision and policy-making of the EU and creating new coalitions with the objective of promoting its national interests (Ioakeimides, 2002: 24). Drougos also notes that Greece took the lead in the formulation of CSDP; the Greek MoD has presented Greek views on CSDP and relevant matters while Greek military personnel participated in competent committees (Drougos, 2001: 65). Dokos confirms this. He stresses Greece’s active participation in peacekeeping efforts and operations, and opines that Greece has been “a strong supporter and willing contributor of European Rapid Reaction Force” (Dokos, 2003: 54). Hence, Ifestos’ argument that it is in the national interest of a minor state to participate in international institutions, to strengthen its ties to other Member States, to actively participate in policy decisions instead of being a passive observer of the European affairs (Ifestos, 2002: 71). This argument accounts for Greece’s strong pro-Europeanisation stance in security and defence.


Greece contributed 3 headquarter officers, 1 executive at the Belgian headquarter, one at the EU Napoli headquarter, 3 executive teams of 12 people and 6 vehicles, 1 ambulance with appropriate medical and nursing staff, 1 security platoon for FIROM headquarters with 18 men, Military hospital (424) services, one C-130 aircraft (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2013).


Greece’s ongoing participation in EU operations not only is in line with Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2004: 3-4) but encompasses the stages described in his definition: from construction to incorporation into domestic political structures and public policies. More significantly, the fact that EU military operations incorporate the various elements described in Radaelli’s definition, (construction of common security and defence reality, diffusion of the above, institutionalisation of CSDP and incorporation in Member States’ domestic political discourse of national security and defence issues) implies the presence of Europeanisation. This impact may
be better understood when investigating the changes in the military education and training in Greece, which is referred to in the ensuing section.

6.5 Broader security and defence changes adjustment

The diffusion of CSDP in the Greek defence and security thinking is also reflected in the changes made in the Military Education Training. These changes include the introduction of the European Security and Defence courses in the Greek Military Cadet School’s “Evelpidon” educational program (Greek Military Cadet School Evelpidon, 2014). As Evelpidon professor Ragies notes, the course “European Security: Military dimension” was incorporated into the curriculum during the 2010-11 academic year.

In addition, Evelpidon participates in the Erasmus program with the following objectives: support for states in the educational sector (when these states lack adequate infrastructure); to strengthen indigenous element in military training; and promote the European perspective in security and defence matters (Greek Military School Evelpidon, 2015: 1). As it is noted in the relevant policy statement, Evelpidon participation in international educational programs is considered an issue of high priority in that it integrates new educational practices while promoting international cooperation (inside and outside of the EU) (Greek Military School Evelpidon, 2015). Particularly with regard to EU educational programs, Evelpidon participation helps trainees to better understand the Union’s security and defence common policy through the gaining of experience and the broadening of their understanding of the EU system (Greek Military School Evelpidon, 2015). As a result, this process “contributes to the development of the European way of thinking” (Greek Military School Evelpidon, 2015), which is evidence of the presence of Europeanisation.

This is evident from reviewing the 2015 “Common Modules Organised by the Greek Military Academies” external evaluation reports regarding the Erasmus exchange education program (PaileCalvo, 2015: 7). The program was based on the 2008 political declaration of 27 Member States’ MoD for exchanges of young officers in the course of their initial training. As a result, 361 trainees from 10 Member States’ military institutions completed their education program and received two European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) (PaileCalvo, 2015: 7, 9). PaileCalvo in his 2015 report directly links the education and training of young officers in CSDP to the Europeanisation of security and defence (PaileCalvo, 2015: 10).

PaileCalvo argues that the module (offered by Hellenic naval academy) constitutes a “European learning environment for a European topic” (PaileCalvo, 2015: 10). PaileCalvo’s argument illustrates that Europeanisation is actually a learning process. Considering the fact that this learning program was offered by a Member State (in this case Greece), constitutes proof of Europeanisation according to Radaelli’s definition. In Radaelli’s definition, the process of CSDP ECTS incorporates construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of CSDP formal rules. The fact that this occurs in a Member State’s Military school/academy reflects the incorporation into the local/domestic thinking of a common EU “way of doing things”. This also reflects the fact that national interests of Member States (in this case Greece) are being served, and that the net gains from participation outweigh those from not doing so. Hence, the participation in other CSDP-related initiatives may be viewed as an important tool for the promotion of national interests.

However, the participation of Greece in the EDA is not simply a matter of “serving the national interest” amongst EU Member States, but also an issue of dealing with internal problems such as corruption and the viability of domestic defence industry (Epstein, 1980: 45). In addition, as noted in the 2014 Greek Defence White Paper, the participation of Greece in the EDA takes place “in the context of the development of military capabilities”, and R&D programmes that could “meet the shortfalls of the EU in military capabilities” (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2014: 55-56). This belief is actively reflected in the Greek participation in the EDA programmes, namely: Helicopters Training Programme, MARSUR - Network development, Multinational Modular Medical Units, Air-to-Air Refuelling, Development and Exploitation of Cyber Ranges and Remotely Piloted Air System (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2014: 56-57). In this context, MoD has introduced the Programme for the Development of Defence Research and Development over the next 15 years (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2014: 56-57). Hence, the number of programs Greece participates in and the ongoing support for EU initiatives, such as EDA, are linked to the country’s need to “maintain a domestic defensive and technological-industrial base in order to secure a safe procurement source for the Greek national forces in case of crisis or war” (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2014: 93-94).

Greek participation in the EDA is directly linked to the viability of the domestic defence industry. Related to the viability of the home defence sector is “EU’s significance as a potential deterrent against Turkish claims,” which are related to the armaments competition (amongst the two countries) and as a means for developing the capabilities required for CSDP support (Karampekios, 2015: 45,46). Dritsakis identifies regional geopolitical instability and the deterioration of the
security environment as the key reasons for armaments competition (Dritsakis, 2004: 263). As a result, Greece’s participation in EDA would facilitate the integration of national defence industry and national defence forces which has been viewed as an additional asset in Greece’s diplomatic arsenal. This integration would counterbalance “what it perceived as the most serious threat to its (Greece’s) security, namely the Turkish threat” (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003: 305). Tsakonas and Tournikiotis note that Greece has historically responded to the perceived Turkish threat by strengthening its armed forces and by participating in WEU, NATO and EU for security provision (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003: 305). Therefore, Greek participation in EU may be viewed as indispensable, in that it provides protection for Greek interests especially in view of Greece’s vulnerable geopolitical position. This sovereignty-linked approach constitutes a distinctive motive for a country (especially a small one) to Europeanise —but without losing its national character and autonomy— its national security and defence. As a result, further Europeanisation of national defence and security forces should be expected (as Radaelli notes in his definition), inasmuch as Member States’ liberal-interdependence continues to transform an ongoing relationship in the direction of political unification. In this process other Europeanisation forces may operate, in related areas. An example of a CSDP-related Europeanisation force at work is Frontex.

Frontex operations may be viewed as an important contribution to the national-border-surveillance mechanism of Greece. As a result, there is a direct relation between Greek national armed forces and CSDP due to the role of Frontex in “coordinating, implementing and evaluating joint operations conducted through the use of Member States’ staff and equipment at the external borders (Frontex, 2016). As Markantonatou notes, Frontex cooperates closely with Greek police, Greek Navy and air-force for the purpose of joint surveillance, control and arrest operations (Markantonatou, 2010: 57). The importance of Frontex’s contribution to Greek security and defence may be better understood in the light of Greece’s geopolitical disputes with Turkey and its intention to incorporate such disputes into the EU foreign policy agenda. Along this line, Greek President Pavlopoulos, noted that “Europe seems to forget that Greek borders are also European borders and Europe has responsibility for their safekeeping” (To Vima, 2015). The importance of this issue had previously induced Greece, to propose unsuccessfully in the 1996 Amsterdam summit, a “solidarity and guarantee of external borders” clause (Markantonatou, 2010: 53). Considering the above, and also the fact that Frontex is related to CSDP and EU Internal Security (Frontex, 2014), one may conclude that Greek support for Frontex has been and will continue to be strong.
The relation between Frontex and CSDP is analysed by Fiott. Fiott highlights Frontex importance and notes that “under CSDP no single agency such as Frontex is entrusted with operational planning or for taking autonomous decisions on the development of defence capabilities” (Fiott, 2013: 48). According to Fiott’s argument, Frontex has gone a step forward in the direction of autonomy and supranational decision making. Therefore, the exploration of the feasibility of the “Frontex formula” for CSDP could have important implications for the development of capabilities and supporting structures (Fiott, 2013: 62).

This connection indicates the impact of Europeanisation (Frontex) on national armed forces, which according to Carrera constitutes “a historical step toward the Europeanisation of the border security field” (Carrera, 2007: 1-2, 27). Pollak and Slominski also identify Frontex as a gradual force for Europeanisation originating in the EU “hand in hand” migration and border management policy at the late 1990s (Pollak and Slominski, 2009: 908). The gradual progress of Europeanisation may also be seen in the EUNAVFOR operation in which Greece participates. As Drent, Hendriks and Zandee notice “the new EUNAVFOR military operation in the Central Mediterranean is proof of the growing connection between EU external and internal security activities” linking “the CSDP military actors to the Frontex mission.” (Drent, Hendriks and Zandee, 2015: 7). As this connection gets stronger, so does the self-sustaining impact of ever-deeper Europeanisation. Drawing on Radaelli’s definition (Radaelli, 2004), the processes of construction, diffusion, institutionalisation and incorporation in the domestic discourse may be viewed as a complete sequence which repeats itself once started. Support for this interpretation can be derived from Leonard’s argument that the Europeanisation brought about by Frontex consists in the harmonisation of “basic training for national border guards across the EU through the development of a Common Core Curriculum (CCC) and a Mid-Level Course (MLC)” (Léonard, 2010: 241). Hence, the introduction and operation of Frontex evolved into an EU institution, which may be viewed as an important Europeanisation step. This step was followed by the decision for harmonisation of border guards’ basic training, which amounts to deeper Europeanisation and confirms the aforementioned argument of self-sustained Europeanisation.

6.6 Conclusions

The events that occurred in the first decade after the end of the Cold War indicated to “Greek security analysts and decision makers that neither NATO nor the EU could provide Greece with security guarantees” (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003: 302). This may be better understood in
relation to Greek security policy which is directly linked to foreign and defence policies due to the fact that it embraces “economic, societal, political, environmental and military considerations” (Moustakis and Sheehan, 2000: 112). This argument justifies the sustained willingness of Greek governments to constantly reinforce national defence dynamics both in terms of armaments and of strategic military coalitions. Such approach became evident during the Simitis administration (1996-2004), when Greece’s orientation shifted perceptibly toward the EU. As Moustakis and Sheehan argue, Simitis’ policy was dualistic in that it incorporated “nationalist and Western elements” (Moustakis and Sheehan, 2000: 102). Hence, considering the strong support given to CSDP by Greek public opinion, this policy can be viewed as a transformative policy in the direction of Europeanisation. Simitis’ dualistic policy remains in effect several decades later. This is also evident in Greece’s participation in EDA, R&D programs and in a series of military EU operations (personnel, equipment and facilities contribution). The strong support for CSDP is also reflected in the 2014 Greek Defence Ministry White Paper, where the importance of CSDP is highlighted: “the development of a Joint Defence and Security policy” is emphasised (Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2014: 42). This position is not confined to the political elite’s (who introduced this term during the 1990s) but is a shared belief amongst the Greek people.

The data presented in the Eurobarometer, regarding the European public support for CSDP, constitute evidence of awareness and shared perception amongst the populace of EU Member States that facilitates the incorporation of Common Security and Defence into national defence thinking. It is remarkable that the support for EU defence and security policy registered in the Eurobarometer “40 year issue surveys report” has been stronger than that for Common Foreign policy and EU monetary Union (European Commission Public Opinion, 2014). As Eurobarometer No 82 report indicates, 76% (average) of EU citizens continue to support a common defence and security policy (Eurobarometer 82, 2014: 188-189). When it comes to Greek citizens the percentage in favour is 77% (EU average 76%)(Eurobarometer 82, 2014: 188-189).

The impact of such beliefs can also be viewed in the Greek armed forces training programmes in which CSDP has been incorporated on account of Greece’s geopolitical disputes. As the Chief of General Staff of Hellenic National Defence (and later Chairman of the European Union Military Committee), General Kostarakos points out, the Greek case “is not perceived in the same way as in other EU countries; it is not identified with the risk assessment made at the level of NATO or of the EU CSDP, as it faces an additional regional problem”(Hellenic Ministry of Defence, 2014: 8). Therefore, as Kostarakos noted, Greece’s geopolitical issues constitute the key motivation for
deeper CSDP engagement and deeper engagement is achieved through common military education. This argument was presented by PaileCalvo (PaileCalvo, 2015), who noted that the incorporation of common security and defence thinking in Member States’ Military education modules, constitutes a distinctive leaning process, which contributes to Europeanisation. Such a (education) process was measured and presented in the 2015 “Common Modules Organised by the Greek Military Academies External Evaluation Report” (PaileCalvo, 2015). According to the report, the evaluation of the offered modules (self-assessment of the learning process), demonstrated that students indicated important progress in the CSDP-related abilities after the completion of the program (PaileCalvo, 2015: 34-36). The evaluation results (and the process itself) indicate two key findings: that the Europeanisation impact exists and that it is measurable.

In view of the above, one may conclude that the Europeanisation steps identified in the Greek case follow the path which is described in Radaelli’s definition (Radaelli, 2004). This path is linked to the learning process and incorporates stages of: introduction/ construction of CSD basic concept in the political speech; introduction/ construction of CSD basic concept in the domestic political speech; (re)shaping public opinion; construction of a legal concept/basis; construction/introduction of new cooperative schemes (operational units and incipient operations); strengthening of the legal basis, solving operational issues, strengthening cooperative schemes, new cooperative schemes. As a result, Radaelli’s definition may be considered as the most appropriate for Europeanisation analysis.

Other information supplied in terms of our explanatory schema in this chapter, indicates that motivation is very important for adapting and adjusting to a new EU reality. In view of lack of geopolitical threats there may be little appetite for further development of CSDP. Therefore different incentives may be required for other Member States to act. In this respect, EU has shown that communication is a very important issue, so much so as to prompt the establishment of the Eurobarometer service. Hence, if the CSDP impact can be measured (as shown above), then the impact of EU communication campaigns, in each Member State, should be measured and assessed. This process, taking into consideration Member States’ differential features, could facilitate and enhance intra-EU communications and campaigns, which in turn could result in deeper Europeanisation. In the Greek case the campaign for CSDP was initiated in the 1990s and was implemented by Greek politicians who presented CSDP as an important asset for the Greek Armed forces and hence for national sovereignty and national defence industry. Thus motivation may be considered as the key driving force behind Europeanisation.
Chapter 7

7 Conclusions and Further Considerations

The final chapter brings together the findings of the previous chapters in a comprehensive manner and attempts to answer the question previously raised, namely, whether there is substantive Europeanisation in terms of CSDP. In addition it provides an overall roadmap of the driving forces behind the Europeanisation process and a list of Europeanisation core issues in relation to the learning mechanism. It is a roadmap rather than a simple listing of mechanisms and factors inasmuch as the order of implementation is important for the successful establishment of the Europeanisation process. The significance of getting the sequence right can be seen in the analysis of the Greek case presented in the previous chapter. Hence, the emphasis on the learning mechanism can lead to the exploration of additional Europeanisation mechanisms which, in turn, could help to identify other Europeanisation forces at work.

7.1 Introduction/ overview

The objective of this thesis is to identify and analyse key aspects of the Europeanisation of CSDP in relation to domestic changes (Greek case) as well as changes in the European defence industry. Thus, the fundamental question concerns the extent of Europeanisation in defence and security policy both in terms of EU and domestic policy-making. In addition, this thesis considers other factors which might facilitate Europeanisation in CSDP and in European defence industry. The aim is to identify those factors’ influence and impact on CSDP Europeanisation. To accomplish this we have made use of historical and causal analysis as a means of isolating several key factors and their contribution to the Europeanisation of CSDP and EU defence industry. Hence, the empirical analysis of the primary and secondary findings, related to CSDP and defence industry, lowers the risk of faulty explanations and enhances the validity of the findings. This could not have been achieved were it not for the unique relation and interaction of EU defence industry and CSDP. As a result, the analysis, in chapters two through six, provides a comprehensive view of the interrelation and contribution of the indicated factors to EU defence industry and CSDP
Europeanisation. In addition these chapters include observations regarding the use, limitations and/or relevance of these factors.

The purpose of this chapter is to present conclusions emerging from our research and by connecting the threads of the argument into a coherent whole to provide direction for further research. It should be noted that CSDP is the outcome of the interaction of several factors, and that the emergence of the CSDP constitutes evidence that Europeanisation has affected Member States’ security and defence needs. Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2004: 3-4) was used as a means of identifying and analysing the impact of various mechanisms and forces for change, which follow “the EU way of doing things”. Hence, for our purposes, Radaelli’s definition seems most appropriate in that it: (a) distinguishes between Europeanisation and European integration, (b) stresses causal elements underlying implementation, (c) highlights the dynamic relationship between actual outcomes thus enabling the identification of other contributing factors and mechanisms, (d) bypasses debates related to European integration (and therefore abstracts from sovereignty issues) and is easy to update in view of all changes taking place both at EU and national level.

In view of the above, we focused on the identification of learning-related mechanisms and on factors which pertain to CSDP and EU defence industry Europeanisation. The challenge was to distinguish between key factors, related to CSDP and defence industry Europeanisation, and to avoid the pitfalls of interdependence (especially that between EU and domestic variables). These challenges were tackled by choosing as our point of departure the end of the Cold War (which coincides with the learning results time-frame from a decade earlier) and by focusing on EU-level official treaties, reports and communications (e.g. ESS 2003, 2008, ISS 2010). This approach prevents the use of Europeanisation as an all-explaining factor in the analysis.

To summarise the main steps: Chapter two presents an analysis of previous studies on Europeanisation in relation to national security and defence transformation. The analysis was conducted in relation to the Europeanisation process and mechanisms of adjustment and with a view to identifying key points related to Europeanisation advancement. As a result, the processing of ESS 2003, 2008 and ISS 2014 reports, under the process-tracing method, revealed evidence of joint confrontation of security and defence issues by Member States. The evidence refers to the introduction of new common mechanisms and structures (described in the reports’ time tables) which implement Europeanisation. These mechanisms, which can be related to both CSDP and EU Defence industry, were dubbed by Radaelli as Framing and Negative integration mechanisms.
Hence, preliminary identification of key Europeanisation variables was required. These include a common strategic culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, creation of a common defence industrial base, single market creation, defence spending decline, the impact of R&D, the changing balance of power and the emerging co-operation between EU and NATO. These variables (or facilitating factors) are identified and analysed in Chapters three to five. Chapter three begins with a historical and empirical analysis which leads to the identification of the elements that shaped political initiatives and the institutional environment underlying the emergent Europeanisation process. The analysis also reveals that special interest/corporatist groups constituted an operative factor in the political decision making process, leading to the Europeanisation of CSDP and consolidation of the military industry.

Chapters four and five provide an empirical analysis of the remaining factors identified in Chapter two. Chapter four investigates the evolution of CSDP in relation to NATO’s political influence on EU Member States. Hence, the introduction of the new CSDP-inclusive equilibrium within NATO as well as that between EU and the rest of the world. The importance of this action can be traced to the fact that intra-NATO’s relations developed along a pattern similar to that of Europeanisation which included mechanisms of adjustment to NATO standards and characteristics (NATOisation). This relation has expanded over the years to become strong enough for EU Member States to significantly institutionalise their national security and defence. After the collapse of USSR this situation changed. Our research indicates that during this time, a series of factors contributed to the realisation of CSDP. These factors include: the new security environment created by the collapse of the USSR, the declining military budgets of the new security environment, the fragmented defence industry, political initiatives which assisted CSDP to take off, and standardisation with the attendant introduction of a new EU institution (EDA) with the objective to regulate the defence market.

The analysis indicates that though these factors provided a window of opportunity for change, it was up to politicians to take the initiative and make use of them. Such initiatives were also observed in the Defence industry sector. Chapter five analyses the impact of Europeanisation and Defence sector on each other. The findings include the dynamics and limitations resulting from domestic political decision making along with the positive impact of a number of variables, namely the EU industrial base, the new security identity, the establishment of a common strategic culture and R&D policy.
Chapter six presents a case study in which the role of Greece in the emergence of CSDP and conversely the CSDP impact on Greek defence and security structures are being examined. The analysis in this chapter, following Radaelli’s definition, highlights factors whose operation resulted in the incorporation of EU “ways of doing things” into the logic of the Greece’s domestic security and defence policy. The identification of these factors and their dynamic impact reveals the significance of the appropriate sequencing of stages in Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation; Radaelli’s Europeanisation sequence can develop its own self-sustained dynamic and may become a driving force for Europeanisation and inasmuch willingness for change is vital for Europeanisation to be realised.

7.2 Contributions to the literature on Europeanisation

This thesis contributes to the Europeanisation literature in three ways: first, it examines CSDP in terms of the relevant processes at the EU and domestic level. Thus, it goes beyond existing institutional accounts of CSDP. Secondly, it provides new insights concerning Europeanisation by arguing that substantive Europeanisation has taken place by way of CSDP. To that effect the case of Greece has been examined. It is noteworthy that existing literature has not found substantive Europeanisation related to CSDP. Third, the thesis examines additional factors contributing to Europeanisation rather than simply record key historical events and political integration via formal institutional arrangements. These factors, include the factors that influence domestic political decision-making, the creation of a common defence industrial base, single market creation, decline in defence spending, the establishment of a new security identity, globalisation, US and NATO influence, the common strategic culture, neo-corporatism and special interest groups, and R&D.

These factors have a positive though lagged impact, especially when related to relatively new forms of institutionalisation such as CSDP. It takes time to learn and the learning process is estimated to be about one decade. In addition learning time may be extended due to the presence of other (competing) institutional structures for security and defence provision (in our context, NATO).

Another contributing factor derives from the relationship between integration and conceptualisation. In fact, the deeper the integration, the better the conceptualisation, and the better the conceptualisation, the larger the potential for further integration and Europeanisation. Therefore it is clear that the institutional approach has an important impact on the development and future evolution of CSDP. In this regard, it should be noted that a successful institutional environment is
“responsible” for further institutionalisation and Europeanisation; however, lack of institutionalised environment and/or delays in institutionalisation may result in integration along transatlantic lines.

Consequently, conceptualisation and institutional environment provide a common normative approach and operate along both supranational and inter-governmental lines; however, it could transcend supranational/intergovernmental logic and bridge supranational/intergovernmental lines of reasoning. Hence, it provides an operational framework as it facilitates conceptualisation and the further development of EU institutional environment and acts as catalyst for small cores of Europeanisation to emerge and operate. Thus, it promotes joint action given favourable conditions but doesn’t necessarily rule out overlapping alternative institutions. Therefore the institutional approach could operate smoothly either under strong/coherent political leadership or under routine administrative direction and may generate initiatives or simply result in the implementation of politically determined tasks. In this process the understanding of change and its impact is of the utmost importance.

Change (and opposition to change) cannot be understood without analysing their social aspects and impact. Hence, social impact, which is a major factor related to learning and constitutes a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation, cannot be overlooked. Therefore, for Europeanisation to be successful, its social impact must be favourable inasmuch as social aspects are linked to the existence of an institutional environment, which can provide a starting point for change. This has been discussed in chapter six, with reference to Eurobarometer public opinion findings. It appears that a receptive public (or at least a non-hostile one), is indispensable for further change to take effect. However, the more complex the change the more robust the outcome. This is due to the fact that hierarchical Europeanisation has a reinforcing impact, in terms of its use of legislative, judicial and administrative functions as means of integration. As a result, hierarchical Europeanisation could result in a two-tier change, along the lines of a shorter time-frame which supplements the long-term learning one. However, in a bottom-up approach, based on socialisation and learning, Europeanisation constitutes a safe-path to integration in response to globalisation. Thus, establishing an EU “way of doing things”, consistent to Radaelli’s definition, could take a longer time than expected for significant results to occur (The larger the number of players and factors in the process, the longer the time needed for change to occur).

However, Europeanisation and integration cannot be realised without the presence of non-tangible, integrating elements/factors, such as the establishment of an EU strategic culture and a new security identity. EU strategic culture and new security identity, in turn, constitute alternative
conceptualisation-integration forces which contribute to Europeanisation. Similar elements are found in the EU R&D policy-making. These elements/factors induce socialisation initiatives which, when launched in a learning environment, produce change and Europeanisation. These facilitating factors, elements and mechanisms provide a spring-board for new initiatives related to Europeanisation. Such initiatives, based on joint defence ventures, joint training/academic programs, common professional standards, cooperation enhancers and economic tools as means of Europeanisation, are presented below.

7.3 Extensions

7.3.1 Building Europeanisation on Economics

The analysis and comprehension of the social, political and economic foundations of EU, as presented in the aforementioned chapters, leads to a number of important factors which have affected EU’s past and can expected to have a significant impact on EU’s future evolution. These factors determine a relatively safe approach regarding decision-making and the application of “surgical solutions” which could set EU back on the initial development/progress path. This track was developed by taking into account regional and Member State differences as regards economic development and social structure. Hence, such “surgical solutions”, built on Europeanisation experience and mechanisms and include a set of structural proposals with a view to developing the dynamics of EU Member States in the most efficient way. The implementation of these solutions can be hard due to the fact that Europeanisation must confront, apart from old, new challenges which were brought to the fore by the 2008 economic crisis. These new challenges refer to economic issues such as defence spending decline, single market creation and globalisation with its adverse impact on Member States’ defence industries and national economies. In turn, these challenges raised/triggered hegemonic aspirations and rent-seeking behaviour amongst EU Member States.

Alesina and Giavazzi anticipated this situation and considered “the allocation of prerogatives between Brussels and the member states as trade-offs between economies of scale and heterogeneities of preferences. Government activities with relevant to economies of scale, which benefit from being large, could be allocated to Brussels” (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2008: 124). Their approach was controversial and was rejected by EU Member States. This left room for hegemonic behaviour and attendant economic games amongst EU Member States. As a result bigger EU Member States (with their economies of scale) benefited at the expense of the others. Such
behavioural patterns, which surfaced mainly during 2006-2012, indicated that liberal-interdependency is not sufficient for good relations amongst Member States, and that dominant, country-specific groups of interest could assert themselves. This is not an isolated claim, but is based on the earlier chapters’ analysis, which indicated that the EU used corporatism as a tool for industrial/economic viability in the 1970s, without considering the side effects. Corporatism has limitations (Panitch, 1980: 179,181; Riha, 1992: 182), and should be applied when necessary (Yep, 2000: 551) (just like antibiotics: You take them as needed them, but overuse leads to the destruction of the immune system). Likewise corporatism promotes development by bypassing governmental structures, but its overuse (in size and time) undermines efficiency.

However, when it comes to the realisation of CSDP, the situation becomes more complicated due to the fact that security and defence cannot be based on liberal-interdependency or on sharing and pooling of military forces. As Waltz argues, “the story is simple; the implications are tremendous. In cooperative action, even where all agree on the goal and have an equal interest in the project, one cannot rely on others” (Waltz, 1954,1959,2001: 168). According to Waltz, there are no guarantees in cooperative security and defence. Hence, the closer/tighter the Member States connectedness, the more efficient and realistic CSDP becomes. Therefore EU’s initiatives in favour of closer cooperation in the context of Europeanisation, enhance the likelihood of an effective CSDP. As a result, EU’s efforts to go beyond Maastricht Treaty and establish financial convergence should strengthen interstate cooperation. The introduction of new, solid bonds amongst EU Member States could lead to a new scheme for Europeanisation. This development has been greatly retarded due to the economic crisis (for example the case of Greece) which raised the risk factor/tolerance concerning foreign-direct investment.

Hence the introduction or re-activation of Europeanisation financial tools like the 2001 Societas Europaea may result in further Europeanisation in the defence and security sector. Such tools, as described in Chapter two, were (later) included in the 2008 ESS report concerning the introduction of the appropriate financial mechanisms and systems. Thus, Societas Europaea (European Enterprise) introduced by the European Council Regulation (EC/2127/2001) (European Council, 2001) opened a new path and may be viewed as an Europeanisation mechanism in that it constitutes a bottom-up approach which facilitates framing and negative integration (through the

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42 Interview with Theodor Krintas, Managing Director at Attica Wealth Management MFMC (former President & CEO at GlobalSoft S.A. CFO at Profile Systems & Software S.A. Asset Management Director at Investment Bank of Greece S.A. General Manager at Marfin Investment Services S.A., General Manager at Alpha Trust Investment Services S.A.), 25 January 2013
removal of market obstacles) with a view to creating inter-state legal entities. According to this EU Regulation, the creation of Societas Europaea may take place through the: (a) merging of two or more joint-stock companies, (b) the establishment of a portfolio parent company, known as Holding company, (c) the establishment of primary subsidiary Societas Europaea (including joint ventures), (d) the transformation of a communal joint-stock company, which has had a subsidiary for at least two years in another EU member state (Doufas, 2013). This Regulation was employed in 2015 by Airbus (AIRBUS, 2015) and Dassault Systèmes (Dassault Systèmes, 2015) which changed their legal status to that of a European Company. However, despite the fact that French and German companies have taken up European Company initiatives firms from other Member States have not. This reveals reluctance in certain key Member States (particularly the UK) to adopt this mechanism. This reluctance is also reflected in pending/remaining tax charges and similar issues which have not yet been addressed under the new rules by some Member States (WilmerHale, 2004).

Nevertheless, if this new entity (European Company) is properly employed, it is expected to boost industry production and to further expand the market from the national to the EU-level. As a result, the creation of a more liberal single market, based on a single/common financial environment, is expected to bridge transnational academic innovation and boost industrial production particularly in the area of R&D. Koukkoulli links the “improvement of transnational activation of enterprises” to the launching of the European Company, which constitutes a means to promote competition (Koukkoulli, 2009: 12).

In this respect, EU has showed important progress by creating legislation, legal acts, structures and mechanisms for the realisation of CSDP. In this effort, CSDP has played an important role in the transformation of a number of interrelated areas (namely, economy, state organisation, R&D, production (defence and civilian) and production models, education and defence &security). However, the most important factor has been and continues to be the citizens’ will for change. The influence of citizens will support a bottom-up mechanism for change and Europeanisation. A good example of this argument is the German citizens’ will to rebuild their destroyed country immediately after their defeat in WWII. Their determination for quick recovery reflected the understanding that cooperation is the most reliable tool for quicker and better results. This understanding was also the foundation for the EC creation in the post-WWII years.
7.3.2 Common Financial interests

However, despite the fact that several decades have passed since the EU’s inception, the key decision-making bodies and national financial interests remained more-or-less intergovernmental in this sector. As a result, major structural and national-governing differences amongst Member States remain intact while conditions remain unfavourable for further reforms to take place. This situation, which became evident in the post-2008 period, is reflected in the Member States’ current account. The following table illustrates the countries which mainly benefited (in terms of their export performance) from Eurocurrency (2002) and EU expansion (2004, 2007) in green colour. The benefit (for some Member States) is shown either by the increase in exports (e.g. Germany) or by the improvement in the trade balance. Also, the table illustrates the post-crisis (2008) performance of Member States in terms of imports-exports.
The balance of payments is a record of a country's international transactions with the rest of the world. It is composed of the current account and the capital and financial account. The current account is itself subdivided into goods, services, income and current transfers; it registers the value of exports (credits) and imports (debits). The difference between these two values is the "balance".

Table 14: Eurostat- Current Account Transactions. Exports, Imports and Balance (Eurostat, 2015)

According to the data, the Member States which benefited the most seem to be the ones which adopted economies of scale models, exposing EU vulnerabilities and policy errors (2012).
European economists linked the economic crisis and the lack of EU common industrial policy to the neo-mercantilist core formed around Germany (European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe, 2013). According to their argument, the (pending) intergovernmental character of EU allows for centrifugal tendencies which undermine the implementation of common policies (including CSDP). This situation represents a tough nut to crack especially in the absence of political institutions that could support binding decisions at the EU level. This argument highlights the need for stronger mechanisms of joint governance which would act as “balancers” between EU Member States’ governments and central EU mechanisms. Hence, the introduction and realisation of tighter EU institutional mechanisms/organisations which focus on common/joint Member States’ development and on common/joint Member States’ finance are expected to strengthen Europeanisation of Member States’ national policies, decrease hegemonic and rent-seeking tendencies and facilitate the (further) development of common defence and security policy realisation.

The need for these steps becomes more urgent in view of global economic challenges and of the current EU-US negotiations regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which commenced in 2013 (Chaudhry, 2014). As Foroohar observed, “The core idea was that globalisation, technological innovation and unfettered free trade would erase historical and geographic boundaries, making the world evermore economically interconnected and alike” (Foroohar, 2012: 38-39). The above argument implies that, there are benefits for the US industries and corporations which have undergone several consolidations since the end of WWII and therefore were prepared for global market competition. In this regard, any further market expansion in terms of TTIP, prior to political and financial consolidation of EU Member States could jeopardise Europeanisation by weakening EU structures and Member States’ economies. Kulish and Calmes argument stresses this point. According to their argument, TTIP is expected to “lift trans-Atlantic fortunes, not just economically but politically” (Kulish and Calmes, 2013).

However, as the application gains of TTIP (both for EU and US) were initially considered to be significant, EU Member States were in favour. According to the TAFTA/TIPP 2013 report, EU gains were estimated at 119 billion euro per year while for the US 95 billion Euro per year (Francois et al., 2013). As a result, TTIP was forwarded by UK, France in particular Germany,

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43 In any case, and with respect to Member States’ national sovereignty, the requested governing mechanisms should take into serious consideration that the Economic crisis of 2008 may be a renounced-product of massive (global) application of economies of scale model, as regional development was serious altered globally.
which was perceived to be among the top beneficiaries among EU Member States from the 2004 expansion. As Borchmeyer et al. notice “Germany supports trade liberalisation policies and advocates free and fair access to markets and free trade agreements” (Borchmeyer et al., 2012). However, during the following years, Germany turned against TTIP. The significance of the German position is due to the fact that (as for 2014) Germany accounts for 53% of the total trade deficit of the USA with the European Union (Roukanas and Mendrinou, 2016). According to the evidence, the realisation of TTIP is expected to induce several structural changes which will alter the production map of the European defence industry, with ambiguous results for and impact on CSDP. Some claim that the de-industrialisation of small Latin American economies (Bogliaccini, 2013) due to China’s flooding of international markets with cheap goods could be repeated between US-EU case.

Fierce competition in the defence industry may cause abrupt structural and social changes which are not part of the traditional style of EU states’ corporate management of defence industry, particularly in France and Germany. Adjustment to such change must allow for the time-consuming learning process and if it is not handled carefully it may result to significant opposition in some states. On the other hand, as Fiott argues, TTIP could have a positive impact on defence industries, both in EU and US, in terms of integration, interoperability, capability development and strategic relations (Fiott, 2013: 25). However, when it comes to CSDP, Fiott underlines that it “is not completely clear whether this will be to the benefit of NATO or CSDP, or both” (Fiott, 2013: 25). According to this argument (and given the competitive character of NATO), the realisation of TTIP would be more beneficial for NATO as it constitutes an all-inclusive security arrangement which serves both NATO and EU Member States. As Alcaro and Alessandri note, the proposal of TTIP and the conception of the Atlantic Ocean Trade Area as a laboratory where the most distinctive features of globalisation can be observed, may raise several questions as to which side might benefit the most (Alcaro and Alessandri, 2013: 13-14).

It is clear that TTIP constitutes a broader institutional arrangement, which stands between globalisation and the single European market. This arrangement constitutes an alternative to the expansion of the internal market cam transatlantic cooperation. As a result the realisation of TTIP may result in a different environment for EU Member States’ industries and corporations where transatlantic mergers and/or transatlantic coalitions may be preferred over Intra-European ones. As Fiott stresses, the 2013 Rompuy’s reference to the EU Council on Defence as European Defence (rather than EU defence) is indicative of “the coming defence policy and defence market order in
Europe” (Fiott, 2013: 25). Hence, in the long-run this could lead to weaker financial bonds amongst Member States and eventually in a weaker EU defence and a stronger NATO. NATO’s role would be significantly upgraded as a safe-keeper of EU-US joint interests.

On the other hand, other authors have argued that by way of an alternative solution, the establishment and operation of a permanent, institutional mechanism/organisation for the promotion of EU Member States’ common economic interests would constitute a significant progress for the EU institutional environment.

### 7.3.3 Building Europeanisation on Common/ Joint Defence regarding common interests

The introduction and realisation of a permanent EU institutional mechanism/organisation, complementary to the EDA, with a focus on common/joint Member States’ Defence could strengthen Europeanisation in the future. However, this still remains a faraway target. The emergence of new obstacles has slowed the expansion of CSDP. The economic crisis of 2008, and the hegemonic and rent-seeking behaviour of some EU states, not only have undermined the establishment of an EU common identity, but also undermined the foundations of EU Member States’ interrelations.

These obstacles initially identified in a 1999 report of the Centre for European Reform remain the same, as it was mentioned in chapter five. These are “political, philosophical, psychological and cultural differences (which) divide the European nations”(Adams et al., 1999: 22). Rodrik captures the EU reality. As he states, “first, political leaders may have had the talk, but they didn’t quite have the walk: their commitment to genuine reform was often skin-deep and there was a lack of follow-thought. Second and more fundamentally, even committed reformers stopped well short of undertaking the full gamut of institutional changes needed to create well-functioning market economies. Regulatory and supervisory institutions in product and financial markets proved too weak. Poor governance and corruption remained a problem”(Rodrik, 2006: 9). According to the report and Rodrik’s argument, it is difficult to effect change (or change is superficial) when a top-down approach is pursued. As will be shown, the establishment of such an institution/organisation could only be achieved via a long-run bottom-up, Europeanisation approach. Such an approach, in the area of common defence and security could be better realised via the establishment of an Europeanised conception as demonstrated in Chapter five.
7.3.4 Framing Europeanisation: Common Military Academic & Training program

The creation of a common European identity and culture is hardly a new subject. European identity and culture have been “largely constructed on historic grounds” (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 574). However, the success of constructing a European identity and culture based on EU integration has proven to be difficult. Mayer and Palmowski argued that “the closer the EU tried to link itself to a European identity, the less room there appeared to be for culture as distinguished by individuality and creativity” (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 581). Liaropoulos also argues that the heterogeneity and diversity of national strategic cultures in Europe has prevented the formation of a shared reaction to the changed international security environment. Arguing for a coherent and strong European strategic culture would be an exaggeration at this point” (Liaropoulos, 2010: 52). He also noticed that “the EU security culture can be defined as a set of core values, a common threat perception and a shared understanding on how to respond to these threats” (Liaropoulos, 2010: 51).

According to Liaropoulos, the best way to create an EU security culture is the formation of a common conception by Member States, starting from military personnel and officials (as long as pooling of forces exists). Such an approach, as noted in Chapter five, implies an agreement on threats which provides a common perception/framework and results in a common/joint response. This process includes several convergence steps such as the creation of common military education objectives and common educational/training experiences to the purpose of bringing together different EU nationalities. Such an approach incorporates Radaelli’s Europeanisation framing mechanisms in an effort to create a common EU military education model.

The need for a common/joint approach in military education and training is captured by Ecory’s 2009 report. According to the report, “in the area of security related education and training, the European market appears to be highly fragmented; for example current training initiatives for security functions and tasks are highly diversified, with a very large number of small public and private operational training centres (often) under direct control of local authorities or a specific public service. Accordingly, a first requirement is to establish the existing infrastructure in this field. A second step, drawing on an assessment of the existing infrastructure and market requirements could be to develop an EU initiative aimed at strengthening the provision of security related education and training” (ECORYS, 2009: 81). These claims, which highlight the need for a common Member States’ military education and training, are not new. The first indications regarding such a need came during the Kosovo operations and involved elementary communication and related problems, which seem to remain unresolved. As Howorth noticed, “already, there is
agreement that the European troops will have to undergo joint training. One of the more surprising conclusions drawn by the French government from the operations in Kosovo was that their officer corps was deficient in competent English language speakers. Interoperability is best conducted in a single language”(Howorth, 2000: 83). Hence, a more concrete and structured common training may provide more efficient and faster results, in addition to joint operational exercises and seminars. The incorporation of such objectives in the military academies of all EU Member States and the enhancement of current military Erasmus programs may also have a direct and positive contribution to the emergence of common security and defence consciousness in EU military staff and officers.

As Chapter three shows, the Kosovo affair became the actual test-event of common EU operations forces, it provided rather important information not only in terms of cooperation among military forces of Member States, but also in terms of military/technological deficiencies and incompatibilities. Our research findings demonstrate that the troubled EU Military Committee (and later the EDA) resulted in the introduction of a Capability Development Plan for the identification of needs and the means for satisfying those needs. The objective here is to link defence with “electronics, information and communications technologies, transport, biotechnology and nanotechnology industries” so as to facilitate “development and growth throughout the economy” (European Commission, 2007). Hence, the identification and resolution of these needs was expected to boost military and civilian industry production of EU member states as shown in Chapter three and four. However, it should be noted that the fulfilment of operational needs, both in terms of training (academic and military) and of equipment support, has been resolved, with relative success, by NATO many decades ago. Chapter four demonstrates that NATO had its own mechanisms of operational needs fulfilment, which –so far- have been proven to be quite efficient.

Furthermore, regarding military equipment and its acquisition, the US approach advocates the establishment of common academic and military training. As Eggers and Goldsmith noticed the US has “been revamped to include a much greater emphasis on networked government skills – managing contracts, being smart buyers, working in partnerships, and developing business management skills. In a similar vein, the Defence Acquisition University now offers week-long acquisition strategy executive training sessions for generals, admirals, and other military brass whose primary responsibilities don’t necessarily include direct oversight over procurement”(Eggers and Goldsmith, 2004: 22).

On the other hand, the EU has its own dynamics and resources, which could result in similar or better results with regard to the identification of needs. Hence, the introduction and utilisation of
a common framework in academic and military training of national military personnel can provide similar or better results than any existing committee or single specialists group. As a result, the “broken link” between innovation and production could be resolved by the contribution of “direct users”, i.e. military officers. As Navarro notice, already in 2000, “it is high time, now that the CSDP is taking shape, for Europeans to begin giving thought in operational terms to the future requirements of European armed forces and drawing up a document setting out a joint vision of the way forward” (Navarro, 2000: 12). According to Navarro, the implementation phase is to begin when requirements become known. This was anticipated in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (under Article 42, paragraph 3) which, as noted in Chapter four, identified operational requirements and implemented measures to satisfy those requirements. Hence the best way to fulfil these requirements is via Member States’ military users/personnel.

In this regard, Member States’ military personnel who have undergone joint educational and military training should be able to directly contribute to EU military cooperation, by providing vital information (from the field of operations) for joint operation of military forces and for research and development in the European defence sector. Hence, in the 2009 Ecorys’ “Study on the Competitiveness of the EU security industry” key EU policy responses to strengthen security industry and markets were presented (ECORYS, 2009: 29-33). These initiatives are summarised by the following: (1) initiatives to promote analysis and dialogue on security issues and to develop a European vision for security, (2) monitoring and updating a ‘roadmap’ for future security-related capability requirements and technologies, (3) development of an Industrial Policy for security, (4) enhancing standardisation and certification at EU and international level, (5) developing EU-level principles and systems for security equipment liability protection, (6) enhancing dialogue and understanding of societal issues and impacts, (7) assessment of the role of public and private training infrastructure in the security field, (8) development of international initiatives to improve education and training in the field of security, (9) better understanding of the endogenous conditions of the industry(ECORYS, 2009: 29-33). Even a cursory examination of these initiatives indicates the need for an interdisciplinary approach in the EU defence-industry area which, as noted in Chapter five, should be based on capabilities’ development, training and education.

Therefore, future research, will probably have to assess the role and impact of innovative ideas, such as military credits (CTDS) on the establishment of a common EU military identity and defence approach. This task constitutes a distinct research project awaiting completion.
Nevertheless, there are still other Europeanisation tools in the defence area, which haven’t been fully utilised, such as the establishment of a common framework of military professional standards.

7.3.5 Framing Europeanisation: Military professionalism as a distinctive Europeanisation force

Establishing a common EU framework for military professionals is one of the tools which has not yet been used due to Member States’ diversified defence and security needs. Starting from the fundamental professional elements one may acknowledge the importance of duty, effort, training, obedience and initiatives. Spagopoulos stresses this and argues that “professionalism should be our common aim, a term that is related to all of the afore-mentioned attributes” (Spagopoulos, 2009: 23-27). According to Spagopoulos, “professionalism is established through on-going effort, on-going training, eagerness and restive spirit for the improvement of military ideals. Professionalism means taking initiatives related to duties and directions from the senior officers” (Spagopoulos, 2009: 23-27). Hence, sustained efforts and military training constitute an on-going learning process. In terms of this process, Europeanisation could have a significant impact on the formulations of strong intra-European bonds. The importance of establishing a common professional framework is a rather important issue due to the fact that many of the Member States retain military forces based on civilian resources where aim is to defend their national sovereignty (mainly focusing on border defence).

This threats-concept was altered during late 1990s and protection of civilians became the ultimate goal for all EU military forces. The subsequent 9/11 terrorist attacks (and others on EU territory) reinforced this view, which was incorporated in EU norms and texts. In this regard, setting a common EU military professionalism framework may be viewed as a transitional step to the new citizen-protection concept and to the new threats which require a combined forces response. Hence, two key steps required for the introduction of common military professionalism framework, are the adoption of a common procedural framework as a means of ensuring meritocracy within European armed forces and creating a solid military power with common values and abilities; the introduction of common military education and training as a tool to streamline operability across EU Member States’ military forces. Moustakis and Violakis highlighted the benefits of common/joint training. According to them common/joint training is “beneficial for all the participants; increases cooperation and effectiveness of the troops while securing smooth operability in real events by enabling problems that emerge in the exercises to be identified and addressed” (Moustakis and
Joint training may also be viewed as a distinct Europeanisation form in that it enhances bilateral relations through military cooperation (Moustakis and Violakis, 2008).

In 2002, the European Commission established a new training program for military and political personnel as a response to the new security situation that was set after 9/11. During the same year EU defence ministers put security and defence policy making and application very high on the agenda, as well as common culture establishment through joint training in security issues. This was reflected in the defence ministers’ joint statement during the period of the Greek presidency. As they stated, we “will develop a joint training structure, in the Security and Defence sector, for military staff participating in crisis-management missions, in aiming to create for the European Union and for our personnel a common culture in security issues” 44. This statement was the first step towards joint training. Nevertheless, there are several steps that remain to be taken for the realisation of common European standards in military training, promotion procedures and joint trainings/classes. However, the initiation took place through the European Rapid Reaction Force (EURF), which resulted from the Headline Goal (HG2010) that was applied in Bosnia. At that time, EURF was called to replace the NATO Reaction Forces (NRF) and included the deployment of 7,000 men during the second half of 2005. It is noteworthy that this was the first EURF deployment which induced competition between NRF and EURF. Such competition entails comparisons of professionalism and skills among the indicated forces.

In view of these events and of the EU principal goals, the introduction of a common professional standards framework amongst Member States’ military forces, as was the case with Frontex (Chapter six), appears to be the next logical step which would ensure the smooth and efficient transition towards the establishment of permanent EU defence forces. Professionalism is thus the safe path for a successful CSDP policy, especially in view of the fact that most EU countries have civilian based armies (national armies) which in many cases may be considered unsuitable to confront potential threats. Hence, as shown in Chapter two, professionalism in the armed forces implies a high level of competence and mobility. This objective is supported by several academics and politicians who envisage a unified Europe with a European Army to protect its rights and territory. As Mahony noticed, the “German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle has said Berlin supports the long term goal of creating a European army, which will bolster the EU’s role as a global player” (Mahony, 2010).

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44 Defence Ministers Meeting in Crete (Rethymnon) on 4-5 October 2002.
On the other hand, there are those (academics and politicians), who believe that a European army is only the extension of a foreign policy project. According to Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith, EU is a “Foreign Policy Project” with an ambiguous international role (Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith, 2000: 186). In their view, CSDP was created to be complementary to CFSP which is the substance of what Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith named consider “Foreign Policy Project”. Hence in both cases, the establishment of a common military professionalism framework in European military forces would certainly contribute to the enhancement of common European foreign policy. Also, the establishment of a generally accepted framework would facilitate the measurement of Member States’ military professionalism so that a comparative evaluation – in terms of performance, preparation and strategy – could take place. Therefore, the adoption of universal (EU) military standards and professionalism in the CSDP is a rather important issue due to the fact that military professionalism will be assessed according to a universal conception of military power. As a result, every training course (military and academic) will be evaluated, ranked and credited to the trainee. Thus each trainee will be able to have an EU transcript (academic and military) based on commonly agreed EU standards.

The establishment of common standards in military training was brought to light in a 2002 report in the House of Lords. According to the report, “there is little evidence that sufficient attention has been paid to this and the EU must ensure that standards of training at all levels are laid down and monitored under the ESDP” (House of Lords, UK, 2002). However, the creation of a common professionalism framework for national military forces of EU Member States is not easily achieved, due to different security needs, different conceptions of security and different scales of national priorities. Furthermore, in most European national armies there are currently no specific standards which describe a “good soldier”, nor a common assessment method for promotion (Moustakis and Violakis, 2008: 427). Furthermore, NATO is already perceived by Member State as the existing security provider. On the other hand, the steps taken since the late 1990s, towards an autonomous CSDP cannot be neglected, nor the fact that actual field-operations have been installed. All these steps have been realised on the basis of good will and communication amongst EU Member States. This fact indicates that learning and socialising constitute an important force for change which is based on open communication channels and the safety of the EU institutional environment.
7.3.6 Framing Europeanisation: Establishing and enhancing cooperation between EU, governments, academic community and the private sector

Intrastate and interstate cooperation schemes amongst EU Member States’ governments, academic communities and private sector (industries, corporations etc.) constitute the backbone of EU. These cooperation schemes, which represent the core aims of Europeanisation, are based on three key factors: EU’s institutional environment, socialisation and learning mechanisms, and mutual gains for the participants. Hence the enhancement of these schemes results in the strengthening of Member States bonds and, therefore, deeper Europeanisation. For such enhancement to be realised two facilitating factors are required: socialisation and learning that occur in an institutional environment and mutual gains to the participants. In this regard, the US experience may be quite important in connection to the method (called Government-By-Network) used to bring the indicated entities together.

According to the US example, Government-By-Network reflects a multi-level, multi-partner incentive approach in terms of which participants obtain significant gains from their cooperation. Therefore, this approach may be viewed as an important cooperation enhancer for all participants (governments, institutes, private companies etc.). This is not to recommend the replication of this method (even though imitation is a Europeanisation mechanism), but to employ the core of this approach in the creation of a bottom-up economic and administrative model, based on EU regional needs. In this regard, it should be stressed that the backbone of this model is the direct and on-going communication among all contributing parties. With reference to defence industry Eggers and Goldsmith argue that: “in order for networked government to succeed agencies must be able to seamlessly, electronically connect at multiple levels with each other and with private and non-profit partners [in order] to advance relations between military industry representatives and military officials”(Eggers and Goldsmith, 2004: 14,22). Eggers and Goldsmith’s argument indicates that close communication amongst partners is a prerequisite for the success of the project. Therefore, this scheme’s implementation would constitute a successful instance of Europeanisation.

On the other hand EU, despite certain similarities with the US, is different, with distinct origins, structures and dynamics. Thus, communication channels are far more complex on account of Member States’ different priorities, cultures and perceptions. The situation becomes even more complicated when it comes to European defence industry and CSDP. Both face communication problems as their cooperation and communication schemes involve the simultaneous presence of
EU governments, academic communities and the private sector. Lack of communication among the aforementioned players has resulted in several problems which are enumerated in the 2009 final report of the Study on the Competitiveness of the EU security industry. According to the report most important among these are: (a) lack of mutual understanding between policy-makers and industry, (b) lack of comprehensive EU industrial policy for security, (c) lack of knowledge and understanding of the social aspects of security, (d) lack of training and skills of security equipment designers and users, (e) lack of quantitative and qualitative research carried out in the security field(ECORYS, 2009: 83-87). Further examination of these problems is expected to throw light on their origin and indicate potential solutions (starting from the lack of understanding).

Lack of knowledge and inadequate understanding of the social dimension of security, underlines the need for a wider and deeper approach concerning Member States’ security and defence needs. Such an approach should incorporate the social impact of national defence industries on local communities and national economies. This should be clear in view of the size of the EU defence industry which directly employs 400,000 people (while sustaining an additional 960,000 related jobs) in more than 1,350 small and medium-sized enterprises(European Commission, 2015). It is noteworthy that the EU has supported several research projects concerning the social impact and dynamics, of prospective changes ranging from the implementation of new EU mechanisms to the reallocation of the European production map (e.g. European Economy/Economic Papers 486)(Eurostat, 2014; Bartelsman, 2013). A similar though more focused approach is needed in the case of CSDP that would produce a clear analysis of perspective changes in terms of quality of life, wealth, health, education, research, justice, employment, demographics, trade, production etc.

The initiatives of the European Commission described in COM (2013) under the title “Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector”(EU Committee, 2013) highlight this necessity. The Communication emphasises EU “policies and instruments to implement structural change” and describes the initiatives which the Committee will take (EU Committee, 2013: 4). These initiatives include the preparation of “the ground for more and deeper European cooperation”, the monitoring of market openness, “supporting national authorities in their efforts to raise awareness of (defence transfer) with industry”, the promotion of hybrid(dual)-standards, establishing a European Strategic Cluster Partnership, the use of Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) to enhance SMEs networking, the promotion of skills through “Sector Skills Alliances’ and “Knowledge Alliances” trial programmes, the development of civil-military cooperation groups etc.(EU Committee, 2013: 5,7,8,9,10,12). In this regard, one could identify the
importance of the Committee as a “watch dog” and enhancer of cooperation amongst Member States’ defence industries and governments. These initiatives became possible through the enhanced trust and overall benefits provided to Member States by the EU. The following table depicts benefit perception by the citizens of different Member States and the corresponding EU average (Parlemeter, 2015: 72-75).

![Table 15: Percentage of EU citizens who consider that their country was benefited or not by participating in EU (Parlemeter, 2015: 23)](image)

However, it should be noted that these indicators pertain to Member States’ perceived economic benefits from EU, which were the original driving force underlying the EU creation. On the other hand, some EU politicians seem to neglect that in addition to its economic benefits, EU was created in an attempt to avoid future armed conflicts, such as WWI and WWII. The following table (QA8a.) demonstrates the diminished influence of this factor. As the Standard Eurobarometer report notices: “trust in the European Union has strengthened again (40%, +3 percentage points since autumn 2014), reaching its highest level since the Standard Eurobarometer survey of spring 2011 (EB75). Trust in the national political institutions has also improved slightly, though it is still at a lower level than trust in the European Union: 31% of Europeans tend to trust their national government (+2) and 31% their national parliament (+1). While the proportion of EU citizens that tend not to trust national parliaments (62%) has remained unchanged, the proportion tending not to trust the national government (63%, -2) and the European Union (46%, -4) has decreased.” (European Commission’s Directorate, 2015).
According to these data, trust in national and EU institutions has been significantly influenced by the 2008 economic crisis. A reason for this is the tendency for stronger countries to exploit weaker ones. Cruise claims Germany is a case in point. As he states, “of course Germany is taking profit from this ... They are paying less for their debt than ever. Because the euro is once again weak, this is very helpful for German exports abroad” (Cruise, 2012). Lack of solidarity and rent-seeking has enabled some technologically-advanced Member States to broaden their defence industry market share, within the union, at the expenses of other Member States.

Lack of solidarity is reinforced by inadequate understanding of other Member States’ security needs. One such example is provided by the UK whose security needs are more focused on asymmetric threats and less on illegal immigration. On the other hand, Italian security needs (just like those of Greece) are more focused on illegal immigration due to long border lines. This diversity in security needs also impacts on common defence spending through EDA in the sense that each Member State with less pressing defence needs have an incentive to contribute less than those facing bigger defence threats who would like to share their expensive defence bills with the others.

Alesina and Giavazzi convey this state of affairs in their book: “Europe could prevent its rapid military and political decline by pulling together resources (political and military) with a true foreign policy through the European Union. But recent experience suggests that European countries
are very far from reaching any resemblance of this, and in fact they are walking away from further political integration” (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2008: 13). According to Giavazzi and Alesina, EU integration is linked to the realisation of Member States’ common security and defence; consequently, stronger action should be taken in this direction so as to avoid political and military decline. Thus more initiatives that could enhance cooperative action in the areas of training and skill acquisition should be forthcoming along the lines suggested by the Committee’s communication COM (2013).

As regards inadequate training/skills of security equipment designers and users, EU has taken several initiatives (EDITB, EDA) in order to enhance cooperation amongst Member States and joint production of defence equipment. However, the realisation of these schemes remains the responsibility of national governments, which frequently appear reluctant to move in the indicated direction. In addition, EU mechanisms for the identification of defence needs and the development of mechanisms for the absorption of technology are not as successful as those of NATO. NATO’s mechanisms include periodical presentations and meetings for the purpose of identifying user requirements, technological needs and advances. As NATO’s declaration “Toward NATO Forces 2020” states, “(NATO) must find new ways to cooperate more closely to acquire and maintain key capabilities, prioritise on what we need most and consult on changes to our defence plans” (NATO, 2012).

Another factor contributing to the inadequacy of training/skills (relative to the US) is that most of the EU military industries were state owned. Hence, several state-owned subsidiary companies were seen as employment-creating agencies by politicians. As Kypraios argues, “Greek governments instead of long-term investing have become ignorant, turning military industries to “political side-stores” of their staff” (Kypraios, 2011). Such tendencies eventually resulted in the degradation of state-owned companies and the accumulation of debts. As a result, the preferred solution to this problem was the partial privatisation of state-owned companies. As Dimakos notices, the “Greek government is seeking partners in Europe and the US in order to acquire up to 49% of the state-owned defence industries, and to undertake the administration, in an attempt to rationalise this sector, which is an extremely arduous (task)” (Dimakos, 2010). According to Dimakos, state-ownership of defence industries was a key factor underlying the lack of comprehensive industrial policy. This state of affairs inevitably becomes more complex when it comes to EU industrial policy.
The EU has taken important steps in the direction of security-related industrial policy which include EDA and EDTIB. However, the slow progress in EU industrial policy is related to Member States’ social changes (and opposition) caused by post-Cold War defence industry restructuring. These changes also reflect the intergovernmental character of EU, which facilitates national governments to place more emphasis on their national defence industries’ performance and less on cooperative EU schemes. This tendency also indicates the lack of collaborative attitude by policymakers and industry toward the establishment of a comprehensive industrial policy.

Lack of mutual understanding between policy-makers and industry is attributable to several reasons, such as political and industrial fragmentation, the lack (on the part of policy makers) of Europeanisation consciousness, and/or opposition to Europeanisation. Hence, policy-makers who focus on defence industry production, have to overcome with governmental officials’ and civil servants’ resistance to change. Furthermore, the ultimate authority concerning the application of defence production policies rests with the nation state whose elected representatives frequently have limited time and comprehension. This veto-like factor has occasionally been abused in the form of overprotection or the stifling of competition. As a result defence industries, which are state-owned or politically-connected, may receive support while others are allowed to go under. This preference results in a protected environment and is also responsible for the lack of quantitative and qualitative research in the security field.

Lack of quantitative and qualitative research in the security field, is attributable to two factors, namely, political and market fragmentation and protectionism. This becomes evident if it is remembered that the identification of military equipment and technological needs was formally initiated with the introduction of EDA. The introduction of EDA also signalled the creation of several observation mechanisms and think tanks, with the objective of creating a common defence basis, which at the time was to be supplemented by private initiatives. This was captured by Tigkos arguments: “among the urgent problems affecting the development of the local defence basis is the absence of information regarding the industry itself. Long awaited plans for the creation of a comprehensive information database to include all major Greek contractors and subcontractors are still in embryonic stage. Attempts from non-profitable organisations (such as SEKPY) to initiate the development of such a database are currently the only source of reliable information”(Tigkos, 2004). According to Tigkos claims, EDA was seen as a significant advancement in terms of the collection and processing of defence production information. Despite the (the better than expected)
performance of EDA, the need for faster registration of requirements and analysis has significantly increased and remains pressing.

As a result, new EU mechanisms (or the upgrading of existing ones), are required that can deliver autonomous and, therefore faster decision-making. Such mechanisms, which constitute Europeanisation in action\textsuperscript{46}, will ensure the smooth and ongoing operation of CSDP, while avoid any political obstacles (drawbacks) which could jeopardise Member States’ security and defence coherence. This effort could be better realised in terms of bottom-up, trust-building collaborative approach. Such an approach bases its success on the effective collaboration of academics, research centres and industries.

There are several reasons for the communication gap between academics, research centres, industries and end users (military), both of an interstate and intrastate nature. This gap is responsible for the divergence between actual (field) needs and technology. However, this state of affairs is quite different from that in the US, which in turn indicates the existence of rather big differences in defence (though less so in civilian) technologies development. Hence, the EU gap between defence needs and defence industrial output is based on different security needs (than those of the US) and different defence priorities and, incorporates different national standards, while defence industrial production lines are organised in a different way than in the US. As a result, each EU Member State maintains its own production processes. A generic example, which illustrates the sequence of stages, is presented below.

\footnote{This could be viewed as an Europeanisation mechanism related to collaboration modelling/framing.}
According to the above figure, the commercialisation process involves several stages which are as follows: the product idea, solution design, prototyping, testing of products and commercialisation/end products. Hence, the introduction of initiatives at the EU level could facilitate and encourage the creation of consortiums for the realisation of joint projects and the coproduction of competitive state-of-the-art dual-use products. This approach encompasses new ideas and introduces incentives (EU funding) for the production of new technological ideas, EU consortium funding for the prototyping and testing phase and a CSDP contract for the absorption of new technological production (following the core idea of Government-by-Network). Such initiatives (already) take place at the EU level (e.g. 7th Framework programs) with the participation of national governments’ representatives and ministries (national contact points) for the production of state-of-the-art civilian products. Hence, the realisation of similar structures in the defence sector could revive national defence industries, boost cooperation schemes, and save money by producing technologies geared to the EU security and defence needs. A major factor for the realisation of these structures is political will and political unity.
7.3.7 Building EU political unity

Political unity has been and remains a fundamental requirement for the continued existence of EU institutions. The year 2012 marked the 60th anniversary of the union’s creation, which (despite the economic and political crisis) was celebrated with special conferences and meetings all around Europe. The atmosphere reflected the confused and contradictory feelings of EU citizens, as the new global order seemed to threaten the union’s benefits and the cast suspicion on the EU leadership. Ifestos captured this climate. As he noted, “if Edward H. Carr were alive, he might have written a new masterpiece under the title “The sixty years of crisis: The consequences of deficient strategic and political thinking for European interstate relations”” (Ifestos, 2012). In the same vein, Professor Platias argued that “the pillars on which EU was founded are insufficient in view of current European reality”47. As he stated, “the reaction of citizens against EU mechanisms and strategies derives from the fact that they reject changes imposed by bureaucratic elites”48.

These claims reflect the two-tier governance of the EU, where national politics conflict with EU policies, despite previous (intergovernmental) unanimous agreement. This fact derives from the dissimulation of European politicians (in national and European parliaments, respectively) who focus on personal political benefits rather than common/joint gains. There are also many cases in which the EU has provided a scapegoat for tailed national policies. This situation was described by Gilpin who argued that “the study of international political change must focus on the international system and especially on the efforts of political actors to change the international system in order to advance their own interests” (Gilpin, 1981: 10).

Moravcsik also anticipated this in his early 1990s work. As he noticed, it is “the primary interest of governments to maintain themselves in office” (Moravcsik, 1993: 483). Galbraith’s argument went a step further in its description of Member States’ behaviour in the midst of the economic crisis. As Galbraith noted, “One intense crisis, would force European governments, even today, to look after their own people, each one, even against their neighbours. And if things would have been even worse, political men would feel the temptation to bring up national matters in order

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47 Athanasius Platias, speech “Europe in Global Power Correlation” during the conference60 Years of European Integration, 30 Years Greece in European Union, University of Piraeus, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Eugene Foundation and National Parliament TV Channel (Vouli Channel) - conference held at Eugene Foundation, Greece, 29 March 2012.

48 Athanasius Platias, speech “Europe in Global Power Correlation” during the conference60 Years of European Integration, 30 Years Greece in European Union, University of Piraeus, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Eugene Foundation and National Parliament TV Channel (Vouli Channel) - conference held at Eugene Foundation, Greece, 29 March 2012.
to distract attention from economic problems” (Galbraith, 1972: 186). Galbraith’s argument was reflected in the comments of Helmut Kohl (former German Chancellor), regarding the actions of German Chancellor Merkel. Kohl stated that “Merkel is 'ruining' Europe” (The Local, 2011). Such behaviour can be easily linked with the rise in Euro scepticism (European Commission’s Directorate, 2015: 6). Thus, Former British Prime Minister Blair subsequently stated that “he is deeply worried that the UK may leave the EU in a referendum that could be triggered by a transfer of powers from London to Brussels as the union reconfigures in response to the Eurozone crisis. [...] we need a balance between European institutions and the nation states. If this is done wrongly, we could create a political crisis that could become just as a big as the euro crisis” (New Europe, 2012).

Blair’s arguments highlight two issues: the effects of the economic crisis and opposition to the unification process. According to his statement, UK is opposed to further unification resulting from power transfer to Brussels. Blair’s statement reflects US opposition to Europeanisation and downgrades the EU institutional setting to a mere plan for cooperation. As Ifestos argued “EU as a cooperation plan among states, cannot become the means to crash the less powerful states and the mastery of the most powerful, which lacks political legitimation [...] The survival of EU is inversely related to the pseudo-legislation, irrational economic policies and hegemonic behaviours” (Ifestos, 2012). According to Ifestos, Blair’s statement reflects a generic truth about EU, i.e., that the EU is a cooperation plan amongst sovereign states. Hence, one could claim that the fact that the EU Constitutional Treaty was not ratified reflects this truth. However, as Mayer and Palmowski argue, the accelerating integration (given the lack of public debate) gives the impression of being “the product of [actions by a] political elite” (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 574).

These arguments and rising Euroscepticism indicate that Europeanisation (in many states) originates from political leaders and elites’ initiatives. Hence this top-down approach justifies opposition to Europeanisation which was expressed by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. Therefore, if a bottom-up approach was followed, better results and less opposition (or no opposition) would have been encountered. In conclusion, EU political unity is a bottom-up, time-consuming, learning process which builds on socialising, learning and mutual gains.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS</th>
<th>RESPONSIBLE</th>
<th>TIMING</th>
<th>2013 2nd report</th>
<th>2014 final report</th>
<th>degree of Domestic Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible revision of EU anti-money laundering legislation to enable identification of owners of companies and trusts</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>proposed directive 2013</td>
<td>COM(2013) 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy on collection, analysis and sharing of information on criminal financial transactions, including training</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More use of Joint Investigation Teams set up at short notice</td>
<td>Member States, European Commission, Europol and Euro just</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>operational &amp; on-going</td>
<td>Modest-high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a network of national contact points for governmental and regulatory bodies</td>
<td>European Commission with Member States</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>completed 2012</td>
<td>completed 2012</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions for enforcement of intellectual property rights and to combat sale of counterfeit goods on internet</td>
<td>Member States and European Commission</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>OJ C 80, 19.3.2013, p. 1</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of effective Asset Recovery Offices and necessary arrangement for asset management</td>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>operational &amp; on-going</td>
<td>Modest-high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common indicators for evaluating performance of Asset Recovery Offices and guidance on preventing criminals reacquiring confiscated assets</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>operational &amp; on-going</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS</td>
<td>RESPONSIBLE</td>
<td>TIMING</td>
<td>2013 2nd report</td>
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<td>degree of Domestic Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Create an EU radicalisation-awareness network with an online forum and EU-wide conferences. Support civil society to expose, translate and challenge violent extremist propaganda</td>
<td>European Commission with Committee of Regions</td>
<td>2011 on-going</td>
<td></td>
<td>operational (9956/14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement action plans for preventing access to explosives and chemical, biological radiological and nuclear substances</td>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>on-going on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>Regulation (EU) No 98/2013, COM(2009) 273 final</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy for EU extraction and analysis of financial messaging data</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2011 completed</td>
<td>2013 final</td>
<td>SWD(2013) 488</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop capacities for investigation and prosecution of cybercrime</td>
<td>Member States with CEPOL, Europol and Euro just</td>
<td>2013 on-going</td>
<td></td>
<td>COM (2012) 141</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of cybercrime incident reporting arrangements and provide guidance for citizens on cyber security and cybercrime</td>
<td>Member States, European Commission, Europol, ENISA, and the private sector</td>
<td>on-going on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>COM(2013) 48</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines on cooperation in handling illegal content online</td>
<td>European Commission with Member States and the private sector</td>
<td>2011 competed</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>IP/13/335</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of a network of Computer Emergency Response Teams in every MS and one for EU institutions, and regular national contingency plans and</td>
<td>Member States and EU institutions with ENISA</td>
<td>2012 on-going</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS</td>
<td>RESPONSIBLE</td>
<td>TIMING</td>
<td>2013 2nd report</td>
<td>2014 final report</td>
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<td>response and recovery exercises.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of European information sharing and alert system (EISAS)</td>
<td>Member States with European Commission and ENISA</td>
<td>2013 completed 2012 &amp; on-going</td>
<td>COM(2012) 735.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilot operational project at the southern or south-western border of the EU</td>
<td>European Commission, Frontex, Europol, MAOC-N and CeCLAD-M</td>
<td>2011 completed 2011</td>
<td>completed 2011</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint reports on human trafficking, human smuggling and smuggling of illicit goods as basis for joint operations</td>
<td>European Commission with Frontex and Europol</td>
<td>2011 completed 2012 &amp; on-going</td>
<td>Directive 2011/36/EU</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Initiatives to improve capabilities for risk analysis and targeting</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2011 on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of national common risk analyses involving police, border guards and customs authorities to identify hot spots at the external borders</td>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>2011 on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestions for improving the coordination of checks at the border carried out by different authorities</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2012 on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of minimum standards and best practices for interagency cooperation</td>
<td>European Commission, Europol, Frontex, EASO</td>
<td>2014 on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management</td>
<td>European Commission with Member States</td>
<td>2010 completed 2011</td>
<td>17833/10</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS</td>
<td>RESPONSIBLE</td>
<td>TIMING</td>
<td>2013 2nd report</td>
<td>2014 final report</td>
<td>degree of Domestic Change</td>
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<td>made risks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposal on health threats</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>completed 2011</td>
<td>Decision 1082/2013/EU.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular overviews of current threats</td>
<td>European Commission with Member States</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a coherent risk management policy</td>
<td>European Commission with Member States</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>COM(2012) 793, 8761/3/13</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforce links between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation functions</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>on-going</td>
<td>Council Decision 2013/488/EU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Internal Security Strategy objectives, actions and adaptation: 2010-2014

9 APPENDIX B

Figure 16: Graphic overview of all the planned actions for 2011-2014 (Commission, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Proposal on the use of EU Passenger Name Records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Proposal on monitoring and assisting Member States and corruption efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Proposal for the Directive on freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Communication on the European Information Exchange Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>New PNR agreement with Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>EU strategy on trafficking in human beings, 2012-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Network of national contact points for governmental and regulatory bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Member States: Rely and implement existing instruments for judicial and law enforcement cooperation and information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Proposal for the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Adopt the Directive on the EU PNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Establish common indicators for evaluating performance of Asset Recovery Offices and guidance on preventing criminals reacquiring confiscated assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Proposal on the reform of Europol and CTIFCC, together with the European Training Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Proposal on the reform of Europol and CTIFCC in cooperation with the European public prosecutor’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Publish the First EU Anti-Corruption Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Establish effective Asset Recovery Offices and necessary arrangements for asset management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Present a proposal on the reform of Europol and CTIFCC in cooperation with the European public prosecutor’s office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBJECTIVE 1: Disrupt international crime networks
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Action 1: Empower communities to prevent radicalisation and recruitment</th>
<th>Action 2: Cut off terrorists' access to funding and materials and follow their transactions</th>
<th>Action 3: Protect critical infrastructure including transport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>EU radicalisation awareness network and EU-wide conferences. Help civil society to expose, translate and challenge violent extremist propaganda.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication on EU extracation and analysis of financial messaging data.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>implementing the EU CBRN Action Plan and a review of the EU explosives Action Plan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implement action plans for preventing access to explosives and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>High Level Symposium on Countering Violent Extremism.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider creating a framework for administrative measures such as freezing of funds of persons suspected of terrorist activities inside the EU.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review the Directive on the designation of European Critical Infrastructure Protection.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Revisit and update the EU approach on preventing radicalisation and recruitment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Colour coding:**
- Green: Action completed
- Yellow: Action ongoing
- Orange: Action ongoing
### OBJECTIVE 3: Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Action 1: Build capacity in law enforcement and the judiciary</th>
<th>Action 2: Work with industry to empower and protect citizens</th>
<th>Action 3: Improve capability for dealing with cyber attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>European Cybercrime Centre feasibility study</td>
<td>Guidelines on cooperation in handling illegal content online</td>
<td>Establish cybercrime incident reporting arrangements and provide guidance for citizens on cyber security and cybercrime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Communication on the establishment of a cybercrime centre</td>
<td>Member States: Ratify the Convention on Cybercrime</td>
<td>Establish National Governmental Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and create a well-functioning network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Build on the work done by the EU/US working group on cyber-security and cybercrime, and initiate cooperation with other international partners</td>
<td>Member States: Implement the actions in the EU Policy Cycle</td>
<td>Establish an EU cybercrime centre at Europol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Develop capacities for investigation and prosecution of cybercrime</td>
<td>Member States: Continue with efforts to develop national cybercrime awareness and training capabilities and set up centres of excellence</td>
<td>A European Cybersecurity Strategy Proposal for a Directive on network and information security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Colour coding:**
- Green: Action completed
- Yellow: Action ongoing
## OBJECTIVE 4: Strengthen security through border management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action 1: Exploit the full potential of Eurosur</th>
<th>Action 2: Enhancing the contribution of Frontex at the external borders</th>
<th>Action 3: Common risk management for movement of goods across external borders</th>
<th>Action 4: Improve interagency cooperation at national level</th>
<th>Cross cutting issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposal for the establishment of Eurosur</td>
<td>Amendement of Frontex regulation by the EP and the Council</td>
<td>Develop initiatives to improve capabilities for risk analysis and targeting</td>
<td>Develop national common risk analysis involving police, border guards and customs authorities to identify hot spots at the external borders</td>
<td>Member States implement the actions in the EU Policy Cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actively participate in migration, asylum and security dialogues with the new governments of North Africa and the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Member States and Frontex: Continue their efforts regards to the establishment of Eurosur</td>
<td></td>
<td>Make suggestions for improving the coordination of checks at the border carried out by different authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Eurosur fully established</td>
<td></td>
<td>Develop national common risk analysis involving police, border guards and customs authorities to identify hot spots at the external borders</td>
<td>Proposals on the Entry/Exit System and the Registered Traveller programme based on the two communications and consultation with all relevant stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SISII fully operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Color coding:**
- Green: Action completed
- Yellow: Action ongoing
### OBJECTIVE 5: Increase Europe's resilience to crises and disasters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action 1: Make full use of the solidarity clause</th>
<th>Action 2: An all-hazards approach to threat and risk assessment</th>
<th>Action 3: Link up the different situation awareness centres</th>
<th>Action 4: Develop a European Response Capacity for tackling disasters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster management</td>
<td>Proposal on health threats</td>
<td>Proposal for a coherent general framework for the protection of classified information</td>
<td>Proposals for the development of a European Emergency Response Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member States: National approaches to risk management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present a joint proposal on the implementation of the solidarity clause with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
<td>Carry out cross-sectional overview of possible future natural and man-made risks</td>
<td>Reinforce links between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation functions</td>
<td>Development of implementing rules for the setting up of the European Emergency Response Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carry out regular overviews of current threats based on national risk assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish a coherent risk management policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Colour coding:**
- Green: Action completed
- Yellow: Action ongoing

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