Between Philosophy and ʿIrān: Interpreting Mullā Ṣadrā from the Qajars to Post-Revolutionary Iran

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Abstract

This thesis examines the interpretive tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā in the context of the schools of Tehran and Qum. Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy (al-ḥikmah al-muta‘āliyah or ḥikmat) avails itself to a number of readings; however, this thesis focuses on the philosophical and mystical (ʿirfānī) readings in terms of their development, transmission and their impact on how ḥikmat is understood in the modern Iranian seminary (ḥawza). The way in which a text is read in the ḥawza has great implications for the development of ideas, as the ḥawza uses a text based system to train students in a particular field. While both readings were studied by the majority of transcendental philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) in the school of Tehran, the school of Qum saw a greater separation between the readings and I show that for a number of reasons, including the introduction of seminal texts written by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, a preference developed for a more philosophical reading of transcendental philosophy. I examine evidence for the different preferences of the ḥukamāʾ for either a more philosophical or ʿirfānī reading of ḥikmat through an examination of their writings on the subjects of existence (wujūd), guardianship (walāyah) and resurrection (maʿād) which act as case studies. The theoretical implications of both approaches are examined in each chapter as well as their interdependence. The schools of Tehran and Qum built on Mullā Ṣadrā’s framework and provided new interpretations of important issues. Apart from the intricate discussions on the core aspects of ḥikmat, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī’s masterful examination of the Seal of the Saints and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s philosophy of bodily resurrection are examples of a thriving interpretive tradition in Iran and constitute significant developments of important philosophical and ʿirfānī concepts from the ideas of their predecessors.
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Note on Transliteration

I follow the IJMES transliteration system for Arabic and Persian words with following exceptions: I have avoided transliterating the names of major cities in the Middle East, except when they appear as part of a person’s name (thus: Qum and Qummī, Tehran and Tihrānī). Transliterated words are italicized throughout. The Arabic definite article “al-” has been dropped from surnames in overwhelming majority of cases as per Persian usage. In Persian transliterations, the tāʾ marbūṭa is rendered a, not ih, for the sake of consistency with the Arabic. Persian ʾizāfa is indicated as –i (–yi for words ending in vowels), except for in personal names (e.g., Fayḍ Kāshānī instead of Fayḍ-i Kāshānī).
Introduction

Comprehending the metaphysical, understanding the nature of the human, living a life of true happiness and success and reaching true understanding in the experience of the Divine are all goals of Islamic spirituality. The Qurʾān and *aḥādīth* refer to these concepts and in the context of the modern Shiʿi *ḥawza ʿilmīya* (the traditional Shiʿi seminary, lit. territory of

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1 The works that elucidate the views of the scriptural sources on these goals are too many to cite and generally include the commentary genre both of the Qurʾān and the *aḥādīth*. For the period of concern a good number of these works within the philosophical and ʿirfānī frameworks are cited throughout the thesis and I return to explain the relationship between the scriptural sources and ḥikmat later. Among many other primary references, for the Qurʾān see: 2:255, 36:1-83, 59:17-24 114:1-4. The most comprehensive of these references is the sūrat al-fāṭiḥah 1:1-7: In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. The Beneficent, the Merciful. Master of the Day of Judgment. Thee do we serve and Thee do we beseech for help. Keep us on the right path. The path of those upon whom Thou hast bestowed favors. Not (the path) of those upon whom Thy wrath is brought down, nor of those who go astray. For the *aḥādīth* see Muhammad b. ‘Ali Ibn Bābawayh Qummī, *al-Tawḥīd*, ed. Sayyid Hashim Ḥusayni Tihrani (Beirut: Dār al-maʿrifa li-ṭibāʿa wa al-nashr, no date) and Muhammad b. Yaʿqūb b. Ishāq Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, eds. Nīʿmat Allāh al-Jalīlī et al. 15 vols (Qum: Dār al-ḥadīth, 2008) (1), (2) and (3) which comprises the sections on intellection and ignorance, knowledge, tawḥīd (unity of God), ḥujjat (the proof of God) and belief and unbelief all of which contain *aḥādīth* about these issues.
knowledge) they are most fully explored in the sciences of philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān. There is an intricate interdependence between the later two subjects and this relationship is the focus of the present study with reference to the ḥukamāʾ (Sadrian philosopher-ʿārifs) of the Sadrian tradition in the school of Tehran and the school of Qum. While some ḥukamāʾ had deep ʿirfānī inclinations, others relied more upon the foundations of transcendental philosophy, while others used the corpus of Islamic scriptural sources to solve problems in the

2 Hawza (pl. ḥawzāt) is the term used for a traditional seminary within the Shiʿī world often adjoined by the geographical locality in which it exists (like the ḥawza of Najaf). Within that locality a number of madressas may also be referred to as a ḥawza with an adjoining word of choice such as the ḥawza of Ahl al-Bayt for example. The ḥawza has traditionally been an informal setting for the transmission of knowledge, even though the ḥawza of Qum has seen more formalization in recent years. See R. W. Hefner and M. Q. Zaman (eds.) Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010) 250-252. Islamic law has been the centre of ḥawza education and so patronage was not usually received from political parties to maintain the ḥawza’s independence, see R. Brunner and W. Ende (eds.) The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political History (Leiden and Boston: BRILL, 2001) 59. Both the ḥawzāt of Iran and Iraq have tried to improve educational methods in the last century, see R. L. Euben and M. Q. Zaman (eds.) Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009) 181. For some problems associated with the informal ḥawza setting such as the control of religious authority and the regulation of who can and cannot wear a turban see L. S. Walbridge (ed.) The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institution of the Marjaʿ Taqlid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 142. For a history of the ḥawzāt in Qum, Ray, Baghdad, Najaf, Hilla, Jabal Amil, Isfahan, Tehran, and Mashhad see G. H. Adel, M. J. Elmi, and H. Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya: Shīʿī Teaching Institution: An Entry from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam (London: EWI Press, 2012).

3 The term ʿirfān is commonly translated as Gnosticism and an ʿārif as a Gnostic. This is perhaps due to the lack of an exact translation of the terms as ʿirfān has very little in common with Gnosticism except for the attainment of knowledge of transcendence by way of the inner aspect of the human. For this reason, I have avoided translating the term altogether in the thesis. The term only appears in quotations from other authors who have chosen to use the term. For a more in depth critique of the use of the term Gnosticism in various contexts see M. A. Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism": An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). The meaning of ʿirfān is explained in detail in the section concerning definitions later in this introduction.
light of Sadrian philosophy. Most ḥukamāʾ intricately combined all of these aspects whilst showing a preference for one trend overall.

The variation of perspectives resulted in a rich tradition of commentary on the most important matters of Islamic belief. While theologians had incorporated philosophical concepts in their discussions, it is the ḥukamāʾ from the Sadrian tradition that stand firmest on the intellectual battleground of comprehending the intricacies of belief. Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. circa 1045/1636) contribution in providing a new framework from which to further explore these intricacies, drawing from the previous philosophical and ‘irfānī discussions, cannot be underestimated. The tradition that followed him discussed his ideas and while the key principles of his philosophy are accepted by all who would consider themselves part of his tradition, there are some issues that did not sit well with many. That agreement amongst Sadrian ḥukamāʾ is reflected in the chapter of this thesis concerning existence (wujūd), while the most contentious issue is that of resurrection (maʿād), which is explored in the final chapter of the thesis.

The research question that this thesis seeks to answer is how did philosophical and ‘irfānī reasoning develop in the seminary as receptions of Mullā Ṣadrā from the Qajar period to the Islamic Republic? The importance of the role of variant readings when trying to understand the development of ideas in the traditional Shiʿi seminary is acute, as a ḥawza education is
centred upon the reading of specific texts. A student’s training in ḥikmat thereafter affects the way in which they explain and develop traditional questions of belief and how they deal with contemporary challenges. Understanding the development of ideas and belief systems enables dialogue and development.

This study falls into a number of interlinked circles of academic study and therefore has a wide base of readers who would be interested in its findings. Starting with the more general areas, this thesis contributes to the study of the Islamic intellectual tradition by examining an intellectual response to key matters of belief and law. It is in a Shi‘i context and so overlaps the area of Shi‘i studies. It is from both a philosophical and ʿirfānī perspective which causes

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4 Ḥikmat (lit. wisdom) is a word used in the Qurʾān and the aḥādīth as a valuable moral trait, see for example in the Qurʾān: He grants wisdom to whom He pleases, and whoever is granted wisdom, he indeed is given a great good and none but men of understanding mind (2:269) and Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner; surely your Lord best knows those who go astray from His path, and He knows best those who follow the right way (16:125). However, in this thesis it is a term that connotates the system of belief and understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā, best expounded in his magnum opus the Asfār.

5 The Islamic intellectual tradition comprises a large part of Islamic studies and literature in the field is usually narrowed down to a specific thinker, area or concept. For some studies of the tradition see F. Daftary (ed.), Intellectual Traditions in Islam (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000); A. Saeed, Islamic Thought: An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); A. Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); for the modern period see I. M. Abu Rabi’, “Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective”, Islamic Studies, (44/4) 503-526; and M. Q. Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Thought and Internal Criticism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

it to cross over into the fields of philosophy in the Islamic world\textsuperscript{7} and specifically in Iran\textsuperscript{8} as well as the field of Sufism and mysticism in Islam.\textsuperscript{9} Since Mullā Ṣadrā was influenced by Ibn ‘Arabī and his school, scholars of those fields will find interest in seeing how the *ḥukamā’* of Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretive tradition interaction with the school of Ibn ‘Arabī and their works, as well as the developments they made to those ideas. Aside from the inherent importance of the *ḥukamā’* of the research period to scholars in the fields of *ḥikmat* and ‘*irfān*, the research question is also of specific interest to researchers dealing with Mullā Ṣadrā, as it investigates the reception of his ideas and their interpretation from within the tradition that he hailed from.

Mullā Ṣadrā himself had his own reading of the philosophy of his predecessors. An intrinsic quality of his works is that they can be understood from a variety of perspectives. His *al-Ḥikma*...
al-muta‘āliya fī al-asfār al-‘aqliya al-arba’a (the Asfār), for example, is not a book of pure philosophy, nor of ‘irfān, nor of theology and it is not exclusively a work that commentates on the Islamic scriptural sources. Rather it is a work that encompasses all of these facets and therefore is susceptible to a variety of readings. The study of these readings within the context of the schools of Tehran and Qum has not been attempted previously, and so this thesis goes beyond the limited discussion of the legacy of Mullā Ṣadrā. This thesis will use a wide range of sources distinctly understudied in Western language scholarship and will examine some important aspects of philosophical and ‘irfānī thought in recent Shi‘ī Iranian discourse.

There are two main readings that this thesis will focus on, both in terms of their historical development over the last two centuries as well as a demonstration of how these readings affect each other and how they result in a rich tradition which has been able to address the detailed questions of Islamic belief. The first reading is a philosophical one which rests on the historical development of philosophy in the Islamic world. These are Peripatetic or Illuminationist approaches. Mullā Ṣadrā introduces new concepts to these traditions in such a way that he creates a new philosophy based on ‘irfānī teachings, but the reading of that philosophy is understood from within the existing philosophical tradition. The second reading is an ‘irfānī one where Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy seeks to create a philosophical framework through which ‘irfān can be better explained. His texts are full of hints and guidance towards comprehending higher ‘irfānī truths. From these two ways of reading Mullā Ṣadrā two styles

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It is important to note that it is unlikely that Mullā Ṣadrā wrote all or even most of the Asfār himself. Rather his students seemed to have contributed with their notes from his lectures. See S. H. Rizvi, Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) 39. This study primarily uses the Asfār to present Mullā Ṣadrā’s opinions as it is his most comprehensive work.
of teachers evolved. One type of ḥakīm inclined more to the philosophical reading and specialised more in elaborating Mullā Ṣadrā using a Peripatetic or Illuminationist approach, where as the other type of ḥakīm elaborated Mullā Ṣadrā’s views from a more ʿirfānī perspective.

This difference is found in the types of critique of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy as well as the other classes the ḥukamā’ taught and the works they wrote. Ḥukamā’ with a greater ʿirfānī inclination became teachers of ʿirfānī texts and transmitted the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā to future generations. While ḥukamā’ with more philosophical reading were teachers of Peripatetic texts like the Shifā’ and the Ishārāt of Ibn Sīnā and were not as well known for having expertise in ʿirfān. The difference between these two types of ḥakīm was clear enough to be noted in biographical works and historians of the period make note of which ḥakīm sided with which tendency. But these tendencies have rarely been related back to the different types of reading of transcendental philosophy due to the lack of studies on the ḥukamā’ of this period.

Specifying two key readings is a simplification as there are other readings which are attested by the different types of criticism levelled upon transcendental philosophy. It is only the two specified readings that will be investigated in this thesis and they are arguably the most important. A key finding of this research is that alongside the philosophical reading, the ʿirfānī

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"This difference in reading Mullā Ṣadrā is reflected in modern literature as well, see I. Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on Existence, Intellect and Intuition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 198-201."
reading of Mulla Sadra became very popular in the school of Tehran due to the presence of exceptional teachers who were proficient in expounding this reading and complementing the ‘irfani reading of Mulla Sadra with expertise in reading ‘irfani works. However, after the transition of the main activity of Sadrian philosophy to Qum, that reading has become more philosophical due to a variety of factors which will be explained further in the thesis.

This thesis therefore seeks to construct a web of beliefs concerning two principle readings of Mulla Sadra and shows that his ideas have a vibrant interpretative tradition. It argues that the philosophical reading of Mulla Sadra, due to certain factors is currently the predominant reading. Though both readings are required to fully grasp hikmat, the hukamah of the schools of Tehran and Qum can be placed within a spectrum of the two readings. Although passing mention may be made of the wider historical and political contexts in the thesis, I will not investigate them further as they are not of primary concern to the research question. An in-depth examination of these factors would also distract the focus of the thesis from the examination of an intricate interplay between the readings of Mulla Sadra.

This introduction is split into three main parts. The first part contextualises the discussion of hikmat and ‘irfan in the schools of Tehran and Qum by placing it within the larger academic discussions surrounding the history of Islamic philosophy and Sufism. It provides an introductory glance at some of the subtle trends that will be brought out further through the course of the thesis such as the interaction between the sciences of philosophy and ‘irfan and the consequent tendencies to read Mulla Sadra according to the context in which his
philosophy is analysed. The study of both ḥikmat and ʿirfān in the ḥawza is through a text based system that draws on all of these phases in the history of both sciences. A tentative link between the scriptural sources and the sciences is also established through the interaction between the Shiʿī Imams and important Sufis in their times.

12 In the modern ḥawza a training in transcendental philosophy usually comprises of a reading of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī's Bidayat al-ḥikma followed by Nihayat al-ḥikma and perhaps Hādī Sabzavārī's Manẓūma and Mullā Ṣadrā's al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya before the Asfār. For theoretical ʿirfān the sequence is Ibn Turkā's Tamhīd al-qawāʾid followed by Dāwūd Qayṣarī's Sharḥ fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam and then Hamza Fanārī's Miṣbāḥ al-uns with only a few formally reading selections of Ibn ʿArabī's Futūḥāt or other advanced texts like Ibn ʿArabī's Mawāqīʿ al-nujām or the Taʾyah of Ibn Fāriḍ. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Hādī Sabzavārī and Mullā Ṣadrā will be discussed in some detail throughout this thesis. Sāʾīn al-Dīn Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī (d. 835/1432) was a Timurid philosopher and mystic who also had important occult themes in his works see Melvin-Koushki, M. S. The Quest for Universal Science: The Occult Philosophy of Sāʾīn al-Dīn Turka Iṣfahānī (1369-1432) and Intellectual Millenarianism in Early Timurid Iran, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 2012. For more on him see S. H. Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, (Albany: SUNY, 2006) 209–213, and Sāʾīn al-Dīn Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīdī sharḥ qawāʾid al-tawḥīd, translated and commented upon by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nāʾjī, 2 vols (Qum: Maṭbūʿāt-i dīnī, 1383 Sh/2004) (1) 3–21. Sharaf al-Dīn Dawūd Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350) was a student of ʿAbd al-Razzāq Qāsānī (d. 730/1330) and his importance within the school of Ibn ʿArabī in a Shīʿī setting stems primarily from his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam of Ibn ʿArabī which is studied as a core text within the ḥawza system. Chittick has schown his indebtedness to Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 673/1274) who was Ibn ʿArabī's son in law and student, see W. C. Chittick, “The Five Divine Presences: From al-Qunawi to al-Qayseri” in Moslem World, 1982, (72) 107-128. For more on Qayṣarī see S. Murata The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992) 99-101; M. Ali, Qayṣarī’s Muqaddima to His Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam: A Translation of the First Five Chapters Together with a Commentary on Some of Their Themes, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 2007 and T. Izutso Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983). Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Hamza Fanārī (d. 833/1429) was also substantially indebted to Qūnawī but chose to express Ibn ʿArabī's ideas differently from Ibn Turkā and Qayṣarī by not using Peripatetic terminology in the expression of ʿirfānī concepts. His commentary on Qūnawī’s Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb is an important work that deserves further research. Fanārī's thought is the most under researched of these three important figures with only passing mention of him in most academic studies. For Qūnawī's influence on Fanārī see see R. Todd, The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawi's Metaphysical Anthropology (Leiden: Brill, 2014) 174-175.
The second part analyzes the definition of both sciences as well as some epistemological concerns. While both philosophy and ʿirfān discuss nondelimited wujūd (i.e. existence without limitations or conditions) there is a difference in what is meant by wujūd and by nondelimitation in each science. This difference is discussed and illustrated. There is potential for confusion for the reader of transcendental philosophy. This confusion is explained by differentiating between three aspects, the subject, the mode of explanation, and the approach of the reader. It is from this differentiation that the issue of different readings of Mullā Ṣadrā is evaluated and the readings that are investigated in this thesis explained.

The first epistemological discussion concerns the intellect. ʿIrān accepts the intellect in its own sphere but rejects its supremacy over the heart. Rather it is less a question of supremacy and more an issue of how different faculties have different uses and how the heart has the ability to witness realities first hand. The discussion then moves onto the primary method of ʿirfānī knowledge which is kashf (unveiling). The discussion of epistemology throws light on the method of philosophy encouraged by Mullā Ṣadrā and the way that he himself took by not accepting to base his arguments on unveiling alone, but to provide intellectual proof. But he also makes clear that intellectualising without unveiling is certainly deficient.

The third part deals with the methodological considerations and my assumptions in the writing of this thesis. While my approach is anti-foundational, I aim to create a web of beliefs about the interpretive tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā in the schools of Tehran and Qum and a central hermeneutic I use in the analysis of the works produced in this time is the distinction between
manyness and oneness. Whilst using manyness as the basis of explanation is philosophical, maintaining oneness as the overarching principle is ʿirfānī.

I then move on to discuss my assumptions by formulating a number principles concerning what I believe about the way the texts are produced. I use some of the reflections of Mark Bevir in his book, *The Logic of the History of Ideas*. The books, treatises, glosses, super-glosses and text books produced by the ḥukamā’ of the schools of Tehran and Qum are intentional, sincere, rational (meaning inner consistency) and conscious. That is that the texts accurately reflect the true beliefs of their authors and their works are rational at least for them and can therefore be reflected rationally. The web of beliefs I create seeks to avoid inconsistencies which result in dilemmas and in this way I try to offer the most consistent web to answer my research question. However, since I am constructing a web which is based on the portrayed webs of beliefs of the ḥukamā’ of this period through their works, it does not matter which strand I start with and I present the strands that are important to the web. I then move on to briefly discuss some historiographical concerns of the period as a whole, such as political agendas and some reasons for why there is a lack of research on the schools of Tehran and Qum.
1. The Context of the Schools of Tehran and Qum

Philosophy as an independent subject developed in three main stages in the Islamic world. The first phase was the introduction of Greek philosophy through the translation movement, which resulted in a philosophical tradition in the Islamic lands which produced important works like the *Shifāʾ* of Ibn Sinā (d. 428/1037). These early philosophers were known as Peripatetic philosophers and while owing a great deal to Greek philosophy also contributed to its development. It was the works of these philosophers, primarily Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), which would be translated into Latin and reintroduced to the West contributing to the thought of figures such as Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). It was therefore not surprising that early academic efforts to understand Islamic philosophy were also focused on understanding the

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impact of Islamic philosophy on such important western thinkers.16 There was also an effort
to reinterpret Aristotle in the light of Arab thinkers. Ibn Sinā was a figure who rather than
reinterpreting Aristotle's metaphysics moved towards its abandonment by providing a
concrete replacement for Aristotle's works.17 An effort was also made to revise the traditional
Orientalist view of Peripatetic philosophy and show the importance of philosophy as a way of
life.18 The premature conclusion of the stagnation of Islamic philosophy after a scathing attack
by Ghazali in his Tahāfut al-falāsifa was an acceptable academic view until efforts were made
to understand Islamic philosophy as a living tradition in the Islamic lands and especially in
Iran.19

17 See A. Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Šifāʾ: A Milestone in Western
Philosophical Thought (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006) viii.
18 See M. Azadpur, Reason Unbound; On Spiritual Practice in Islamic Perepatetic Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press,
2011).
19 Rather Ghazālī's critique was part of a larger dialoge between philoshers and theologians on the validity of
philosophy. But by the time of Ghazālī wrote his Tahāfut al-falāsifa, Avicennian principles had infiltrated as far
as juristic theory and so any kind of sudden death of intellectual pursuit would be inconceivable. See S. H. Rizvi,
Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, 17-18. The discussion was particulary important for Ghazali
who attempted to set intellectual boundries for what could be considered an Islamic science, see F. Griffel, “al-
ghazali/#PlaFallstl [Accessed 7th May 2016] Interestingly new evidence has been presented showing that although
al-Ghazālī ostensibly rejected Ibn Sinā's philosophy his mystical and eschatological views were rooted in
philosophy, see A. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Mystical Cognition and
It was the pioneering writings of Henry Corbin, Seyyed Hosein Nasr and others including Fazlur Rahman and Max Horten, which threw light upon the inherent value and richness of Islamic philosophy and ʿirfān after the death of Ibn Rushd. The views first expressed in the writings of Corbin and Nasr became the paradigm for later academic studies on the history of Islamic philosophy. The nature of these more recent philosophical and ʿirfānī investigations in Iran contributed to a philosophy connected to the Islamic scriptural sources, very different to the early Arab Peripatetics such as Kindī (d. 252/866), Farābī (d. 339/950), Ibn Sinā and Ibn Rushd and the Greek philosophy from which they drew inspiration.

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21 This impact was intentional and desired, as both Nasr and Corbin felt that it was only a certain aspect of Islamic philosophy termed falsafa that was receiving academic attention. Falsafa left out other aspects such as Sufism science and art, see Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy*, 107–108

22 Hādī Sabzavārī, *The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī*, trs. M. Muḥaqiq and T. Izutsu (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1991) 3. It was Naṣr al-Dīn al-Ţūsī’s defense of Avicenna that has influenced the acceptance of his works in Shiʿi circles and consequently the ḥikmat tradition, see Sabzavārī, *Metaphysics*, 4. For more information on Ţūsī’s important role in Imami theology and philosophy, see H. Landolt “Khāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ţūsī (597/1201-
The second stage of the development of philosophy started with a major challenge to the
Peripatetic school by Shihâb al-Dîn Suhrâwârdî (d. 587/1191) who founded the Illuminationist
school of philosophy with his work Ḥikmat al-îshrāq. He had a profound effect on
philosophical discourse in the Islamic lands with the introduction of key concepts—— such
as knowledge by presence, the existence of an imaginal world and the principality of light —
that were incorporated or modified in later philosophies. While Suhrâwârdî accepted the
rational basis of philosophy, he also stipulated that the philosopher had to purify himself in
order to comprehend the metaphysical realm. For this reason, his Ḥikmat al-îshrāq starts by
stressing the importance of self-purification and its place in the attainment of true knowledge
to ensure true happiness.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{23}\) The Illuminationist tradition began after Suhrâwârdî’s death and by the end of the 13\(^{\text{th}}\) century his books were
read in the major centers of Islamic learning in Syria, Iraq and Iran. His ideas finally spread to the Turkish
Ottoman and Persian Indian traditions. Ziai points out that modern thinkers such as Kâzîm ʿAṣṣār were also
influenced by Illuminationist thought. See H. Ziai, “The Illuminationist Tradition”, in S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman

\(^{24}\) Shams al-Dîn Muḥammad Shahrâzûrî, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-îshrāq*, ed. Ḥusayn Ziyâʾi Turbatî (Tehran:
With a more explicit inclusion of ʿirfānī experience, philosophers had a precedent to interact with the science of ʿirfān and at about the same time the most monumental figure in Sufism, Muhyi al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 636/1240) and the students of his school formulated a language for ʿirfān that was similar to the language of the philosophers. Suhrwardi’s philosophy was based on the principality of light (i.e. that light was reality), but not only philosophers responded to his ideas.25 ‘Urafāʾ also took it upon themselves to stress the principality of wujūd based on Ibn ʿArabi’s theory of the oneness of Existence (waḥdat al-Wujūd).26

While all three trends accepted an underlying reality to the extramental in opposition to sophistry, they differed in their understandings and explanations of what was the factor that gave things their external existence. Peripatetic philosophers stipulated that existence was a condition to bring about the realisation of something and was therefore specific to each thing, whereas both Suhrwardi and the school of Ibn ʿArabī claimed that there was another factor that flowed throughout the whole of existence that was the principle. For Suhrwardi that factor was light and for the school of Ibn ʿArabī it was the Truth, which was also expressed as Existence. Later the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā would take a middle ground between the latter two opinions in specifying wujūd (or existence with a small e) — which is a mode that repels nonexistence — as the factor at the heart of reality.

25 His discussion on quiddity was as a critique to Ibn Sinā’s existence-essence distinction rather than a proposition of the principality of essence as Rizvi points out, see S. Rizvi “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction Suhrwardi’s Visionary Heirarcrhy of Lights”, in Asian Philosophy, 1999, (9/3), 219-227.

26 This is clearly expressed in Dāwūd Qaṣṣārī’s exposition in his introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam of Ibn ‘Arabī, see Dāwūd Qaṣṣārī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, edited by Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 2 vols (Qum: Bustān-i Kitāb, 1382sh/2003) (1) 21-61.
As the philosopher needed purification in order to comprehend the higher truths, the science of wayfaring or practical ‘irfān (al-‘irfān al-‘āmalī) became pertinent in order to clarify the process of self purification and attaining the higher stations of the soul’s perfection. Theoretical ‘irfān (al-‘irfān al-naẓarī) and especially the school of Ibn ‘Arabī also became relevant as it sought to expound many of the same issues and indeed in some cases ‘urafā’ were writing with the philosophical audience in mind.27 Expounding ‘irfān in a philosophical way gave rise to a philosophical reading and understanding of ‘irfān. That is that while the science of ‘irfān seeks to explain Reality as it is, a cognitive philosophical understanding of ‘irfān can also be created from the texts written by the ‘urafā’. This was perhaps to some extent the intent of writers of theoretical ‘irfān, but was usually accompanied by a caution to the readers that the realities explained can only be fully grasped by directly tasting and witnessing the truths that were being explained. With so much common ground it was natural for these

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27 A good example of this is Ibn Turka’s Tamhid al-qawā’id, which takes time to recount the proofs of those who reject unveiling as a method of comprehending the realities and to produce counter arguments against such proofs. See Sā’in al-Dīn Ibn Türka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhid fi sharh qawā’id al-tawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurasānī (Beirut: Mu’assasat Umm al-qurā li-l-taḥqīq wa-l-nashr, 2023) 136–149. Tamhid is the first text studied in theoretical ‘irfān and a traditional sequence was to study this text after a full training in Peripatetic philosophy and before studying transcendental philosophy. However with the change in the system of teaching with the introduction of Bidāyat and Nihāyat al-ḥikma a student would study Tamhid after completing their training in transcendental philosophy. The reason for the selection of this text seems quite obvious when placed within the first method of study. Tamhid has a Peripatetic voice and speaks to a Peripatetic audience. At the same time, it introduces the main principles of theoretical ‘irfān while assuming that the reader is new to the subject unlike the books that are studied later such as Qāyṣārī’s commentary on the Fuṣūṣ and Miṣbāḥ al-uns of Fanārī. The traditional pathway of studying philosophy also provides a more holistic outlook where both readings of Mullā Ṣadrā are introduced before training in transcendental philosophy.
two sciences to interact, with different scholars taking different positions on the spectrum of intellection and ʿirfān.

The philosophical understanding of ʿirfān was elucidated in a new way in the third major turn in philosophy in the Muslim lands with the transcendental philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā. Mullā Ṣadrā was educated in Shiraz and later in Isfahan under the auspices of teachers such as Bahā al-Dīn Āmulī (d. 1031/1621) and Mir Dāmād (d. 1041/1631). He brought together the contributions of his predecessors and critiqued them in his Asfār. This later tradition — which forms the mainstream philosophical tradition of the ʿawza today — combined the rich philosophical, ʿirfānī and theological discussions and came to be known as hikmat (lit. wisdom). The school of Shiraz, where Mullā Ṣadrā had his early education, was a centre of the intellectual sciences and ʿirfān.

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29 It is only recently that the Asfār has become widely available in critical editions. Before these receny efforts this valuable work was only available in lithographed format. See S. H. Nasr, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī and his Transcendent Theosophy: Background, Life and Works (Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1997) 13. For a survey of Mullā Ṣadrā’s main principles see R. Akbarian, The Fundamental Principles of Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy (London: Xlibris, 2009).

One of the main families of scholars was the Dashtaki family. The first important scholar from the Dashtaki family was Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtaki (d. 933/1497) whose positions regarding cognitive existence (wujūd al-dhihnī) are discussed in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Asfār. He was the real founder of the school of Shiraz and had a chain of teachers which led back to Ibn Sinā. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maṇṣūr Shirāzī (d. 949/1542), the son of Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtaki, was a prolific scholar and the Madrasa-yi Maṇṣūriya was founded for him by Shāh Tahmasp. There is a historical relationship between the Iranian court and philosophers. The court would sponsor schools and give generous gifts to talented philosophers and conversely would seek answers to philosophical questions. This relationship is a key factor in understanding the various bursts of philosophical activity that make up a school and the reason for a school to relocate.

Although Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtaki and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shirāzī did not write seminal texts, they commented on the existent ones. These commentaries were not simple expositions but were places where they would discuss their own ideas. Shāh Ṭāhir b. Rāzī al-Dīn Ismāʿīlī Husaynī (d. 952/1545-1546 or 956/1549), the student of one Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s top students, Shams al-Dīn Muhammad Khafri (d. 935/1528-1529 or 957/1553), settled in India, where he was active in

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31 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 336.
34 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 336 and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 196.
35 For more on him see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 202–203.
propagating Shi‘i thought. Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s son, Amir Ṣadr al-Dīn II (d. circa 961/1553-1554) also established himself as a scholar and wrote a book on mineralogy.

Other key figures include ‘Aḍud al-Dīn Īji (d. 756/1355), Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) and Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrizī (d. after 933/1526). Another strand of philosophy was argued by Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 908/1501) whose debates with the Dashtakīs had an impact on philosophical discussion for decades afterwards. The school dispersed after the death of Ghiyāth al-Dīn and spread to other areas of the Islamic world including Isfahan. The discussions in the fields of philosophy, ‘irfān and theology of the school of Shiraz, prepared the ground for the intellectual boom that occurred in Isfahan.

Contemporary to the school of Shiraz were two figures from the school of Ibn ‘Arabī; Ibn Abī Jumhūr Āḥsā‘ī (d. 936/1521) and Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī (d. 835/1432). After Ibn ‘Arabī’s death his

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36 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 337. For more details on Shirāzī scholars who contributed to the intellectual milieu in India see A. Thubūt, Faylasūf-i Shirāz dar hind (Tehran: Markaz-i bayn al-milalī-yi guftagū-yi tamuddunhā, 1380 Sh/2001). See also Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 204–7 for the role of Mīr Fatḥ-Allāh Shirāzī and Shah Ṭāhir, the foremost student of Khafrī, in India.

37 Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 336.

38 R. Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran; Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrizī and his Writings (Leiden: Brill, 2011)

39 For more on him see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 197–199.

40 R. Pourjavady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran, ix.

mantle was taken up by a number of important characters of Persian origin. In fact his key
disciple and stepson Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 673/1274) the son of Majd al-Dīn Ishāq b. Yūsuf
Rūmī was Persian, had links with Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 672/1273); and exchanged
correspondence with Naṣīr al-Dīn Ĥūsî (d. 673/1274). Qūnawī was an erudite scholar of
philosophy, ahādīth and ‘irfān and drew ideas with important philosophical ramifications
from Ibn ‘Arabî’s works. Chittick points out that Qūnawī’s reading is only one way in which
the works of Ibn ‘Arabî can be read and his reading at times seems to miss the Shaykh’s main
purpose in exposing the imaginal realm. At the same time, it was Qūnawī’s stance on
philosophy that was to bring together the philosophical and ‘irfānī traditions in Iran, which
contributed to and culminated in the hikmat tradition.

One of Qūnawī’s students, Sa‘îd al-Dīn Farghānī (d. 700/1300) wrote a commentary on the
Tā‘īyah of Ibn Fāriḍ in which he clearly uses the term wahdat al-wujūd in a technical sense

Dedicated to Renate Jacobi, (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2006) 119-145 and S. Schmidtke, “New sources for the life and
Schubert (Shtutgart: Shtaynar, 1995).
Schubert (Shtutgart: Shtaynar, 1995).
45 Qūnawī’s discourse dominates the school of Ibn ‘Arabî, but research on him and his ideas has not reflected his
importance to the school. In the traditional seminary it is through Qūnawī that the majority of the students of
‘irfān will gain an authoritative grasp of the subject. Michel Valsan was perhaps the first to write on him, see M.
Traditionelles, (67) 241-268. More recently see W. C. Chittick, “Qūnawī on the One Wujūd”, in Journal of the
Muhîyîddîn Ibn ‘Arabî Society, 2011, (49) 117-128, which is a translation of the first section of his Miftâh al-ghayb; A.
perhaps for the first time.\(^\text{46}\) Another of Qūnawi’s other probable students, Naṣîr or Naṣîr al-Dīn Khū’ī wrote a work in Persian called \(\text{Tabṣirat-i mubtadi}\) that helped to disseminate the teaching of Ibn ‘Arabī to the general populous,\(^\text{47}\) and Mullā Aḥmad Ilāhī translated Qūnawi’s \(\text{Miftāḥ al-ghayb}\) into Persian at the request of Meḥemmed II Fāṭiḥ in 880/1475-6, further aiding the dissemination of the teachings of the school.\(^\text{48}\) While the school of Shiraz was developing Islamic philosophy the school of Ibn ‘Arabī was in full swing producing works of theoretical ‘\(\text{irfān}\) and poetry in a variety of locations.

In a more formal Sufi setting Ni‘mat-Allāh Wali Kirmānī (d. 834/1431) wrote over one hundred works and trained many disciples making him an important figure in the history of Shi‘i Sufism in this period. It is this Persian tradition of interpreting the ideas and works of the \(\text{Shaykh al-akbar}\) to answer philosophical questions that is continued through the school of Tehran and in the school of Qum until the present day.\(^\text{49}\)

The modern ‘\(\text{irfān}\) tradition has extensive discussion of intellectual interests in Najaf. The practical side of ‘\(\text{irfān}\) in Najaf is an area that requires further investigation, as possibly one of the most influential ‘\(\text{urafā’}\) in recent times — Sayyid ‘Alī Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabā’ī — was based in


\(^{47}\) Chittick, “Tasawwuf”, 320.

\(^{48}\) Chittick, “Tasawwuf”, 322.

\(^{49}\) For the influence of these Persian thinkers on Ottoman scholars see K. Rouayheb, \(\text{Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb}\) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 312-344.
Najaf after moving from Tabriz. The view that there was little interest in philosophy is also brought into question by figures like Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Rafi‘ī who both studied philosophy in Najaf. Aside from the well known Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabā‘ī the biographical literature betrays many more unknown personalities of importance such as Kāẓim Dawlatābā‘ī Baghdādī, Muḥammad Bahār Hamadhānī who was the successor of Ḫusayn-Quli Hamadānī (the teacher of Sayyid Aḥmad Karbalā‘ī who was the teacher of Sayyid ‘Ali Qāḍī); Murtaẓā Mudarris Gīlānī who became an important teacher and wrote a large number of works on his return from Najaf after being a student of Sayyid ‘Ali Qāḍī; Sayyid Murtaẓā Kashmīrī Najaḥī and others. The connection between these scholars based in Najaf and the philosophical tradition in Iran will be investigated later in this thesis.

It was common for Iranian scholars to spend time in Najaf completing their studies in jurisprudence and its principles. These advanced students and teachers probably affected the outlook towards ʿirfān and philosophy in Najaf. Suhā has included chapters on Mullā Ḫusayn-Quli Hamadānī and Mullā Fath-ʿAlī Sulṭānābādī, who were ʿurafāʾ based in Najaf, and within

50 For more on Sayyid ‘Ali Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabā‘ī see Mahdī Qāḍī, Āyat al-ḥaqq (Tehran: Intishārat-i ġīrmat bā hamkārī intishārāt-i baṣīrat, 1386 Sh/2007).
54 Tihrānī, Kernel, 345–346.
55 He was buried in Sayyid Ṣadr al-Dīn cemetery. See Āghā Buzurg Tihrānī, ʿTabaqāt aʿlām al-shī‘a, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā‘ī Bihbahānī, 10-13.
these chapters he also discusses the history of some other personalities in Najaf at that time.\textsuperscript{56} Meir Litvak has generally surveyed the activities of the 'ulamā' (scholars) in Najaf and Karbala but does not include information regarding informal philosophical or 'irfānī circles, choosing to focus on the leadership, socio-political and jurisprudential aspects of the Shi‘i scholars based in these shrine cities. Many of his observations relating to the 'ulamā' in Iraq equally apply to those in Iran and he frequently mentions links and contrasts between the two sets of scholars.\textsuperscript{57}

Spiritual practice has long been a feature of Shi‘ism as the Shi‘a tried to emulate the spiritual characteristics of the Prophet and his family, such as staying awake in the nights in prayer, plentiful supplication, recitation and reflection upon the verses of the Qur‘ān, fasting on specific days, continuous remembrance of God, watchfulness over their actions, devotion to the Prophet and showing kindness towards the needy and deprived. Their spiritual states of love, fear, hope, reliance, satisfaction, their disregard for what is worthless of the world and their hope in God’s promise are recorded in narrations about them and in their own words.

Since the Imams are considered the true inheritors of Prophetic knowledge their words are considered to contain deep secrets only understood by the friends of God and are the sustenance of the philosophers and 'urafā’. Shaybi discusses the role of the Imams in inspiring Sufi asceticism focusing on the worship and states of the fourth Imam known with the epithet


Zayn al-ʿābidīn (the adornment of the worshipers).⁵⁸ A collection of supplications narrated from him constitutes one of the most important contributions to Shiʿi spiritual heritage.⁵⁹

Within this work there are countless examples of intense spiritual states which inspire those who read them until today.

The notion of a relationship between the spirituality of Shiʿism and ʿirfān is one that is hotly debated and at times the difference between popular Sufism and ʿirfān is not clearly defined.⁶⁰

The issue is complex due to the varied nature of Iranian Sufism and its link to the political landscape. Mirza Mahdī Iṣfahānī was the founder of the Maktab al-tafkīk based in Mashhad which stressed the independence of scriptural sources from both philosophy and ʿirfān.⁶¹ Such views are still widespread in the hawza especially amongst students who do not specialise in philosophy or ʿirfān. Others propose a direct relationship between Sufism and Shiʿism.⁶²

According to Shaybī, the first link between Shiʿism and Sufism (in its undistinguished sense) seems to have been forged by the extremists (ghulāt) who turned to esoteric doctrines to

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justify their claims. Another potential link between the Shi‘ism and Sufism can also be found in some of the companions of the Shi‘i Imams who were also well known Sufis. It is perhaps through these figures that the teachings of the Imams reached Sufi circles. Most of the Imams themselves were able to integrate into the wider Muslim society and had the opportunity to teach the spirituality of the household of the Prophet. This opportunity was especially present during the Immate of Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir and Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq.

An example of the interaction between the companions of the Imams and Sufi circles may be found in the book the Lantern of the Divine Law (Miṣbāḥ al-shari‘a) which although attributed to Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq, seems to more accurately be the work of one of his companions. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭihrānī attributes the work to Fuḍayl b. ‘Ayād who had links with Sufism. If this assertion is assumed to be correct, Lantern of the Path is an intelligently written book that quotes Imam al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) on various spiritual issues and at the same time weaves in the quotes from famous Sufis, showing the similarities in the views as well as highlighting what the Imam has to offer to the Sufis in terms of spiritual advice. In this sense it can be seen as an attempt by Fuḍayl to share the ʿirfānī views of Imam al-Ṣādiq with

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63 Shaybī, al-Šī‘a, 21-27
64 There are numerous examples including the story of Bishr al-Ḥāfī, see Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn al-Ḥillī, Minhāj al-karāma, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Mubārak (Qum: al-Hādī, 1379 Sh/2000) 59.
66 Imam Ja‘far b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq was a decedant of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah and is the 6th Imam of the twelver Shi‘is. It is the dispute over his succession that lead to the split between twelver Shi‘is (also known as the Ja‘fari school) and Isma‘īlis. For more on Imam al-Ṣādiq and the Ja‘fari school see H. Halm, Shi‘ism, tr. J. Watson and M. Hill, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001) 28-154.
the Sufis of his time. It is interesting therefore that Imam al-Ṣādiq is considered by Sufis as a Sufi *par excellence* and is quoted in Sufi works.

The Ismaʿili tradition also focused on esoteric doctrine emphasizing on the allegorical (*taʾwil*).

On the other hand, due to the practice of dissemination (*taqiyyah*) and the persecution of the ‘Abbasid authorities some Shiʿa found safety in calling themselves Sufi due to the close link between Sufism and Sunnism. It is the overwhelming character of ʿAli b. Abi Ṭālib as a source of spiritual inspiration and emulation, and the notion of *walāyah* (guardianship) which provides an important link between Sufi writings and Shiʿi theoretical *ʿirfān*.

With the rise of the Safavids and the adoption of Imamism, Twelver Shiʿi Sufism gained temporal authority combining the roles of traditional *ʿulamāʾ*, devoted Sufis and political statesmen into a complex intellectual environment with a host of motives and implications. The vicious repression of Sufis by the Safavids in an attempt to consolidate their power has affected attitudes towards Sufism until today and it is sensitive to refer to the spiritual trend

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68 *Walāyah* is a multifaceted term linked to the scriptural sources, see M. M. Dakake, *The Charismatic Community: Shiʿite Identity in Early Islam* (Albany: SUNY, 2012). Here it corresponds greatly to Amir-Moezzi’s analysis where it relates to the ontological reality of the Imam, see M. A. Amir-Moezzi, “Notes à Propos de la Walāya Imamite (Aspects de l’Imamologie Duodécimaine)” in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 2002, (122) 722-741. This is what draws me to prefer the terms guardianship or sainthood rather than friendship and the concept will be elucidated in great detail in the chapter on *walāyah*.

as Sufi. This stigma has lead to the adoption of the word ‘īrfān to delineate the same trend of spiritual attainment without the social connotations of Sufi orders. Muṭahharī stresses that ‘urafāʾ in this sense are real ‘urafāʾ, rather than those who have evolved cultural practices outside of the mainstream. In the second part of Shaybī’s work he traces the connection between Shi’ism and Sufism until the Safavid period and so this study — which starts in the Qajar period — will contribute to the study of Shi’ism and ‘īrfān, although not in a strictly Sufi sense.

During the Safavid period philosophical thought reached a turning point that would emphatically establish Shi’i philosophy. A new philosophy called transcendental philosophy was founded, which took positions on all the major discussions between the Peripatetics and the Illuminationists. This period saw philosophers such as Mir Dāmād (d. 1040/1631), Mir Ṣafawi-Bihbahānī, Ḥakīm-i Astarābād, Mir Damad (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1998); ‘A. Awjabi, Mir Dāmād: Bunyānguzār-i hikmat-i yamānī (Tehran: Şāhāt, 2004); M. Khāminihī, Mir Dāmād (Tehran: Bunyād-i hikmat-i islāmī-ī Šadrā, 1384 Sh/2005) and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 212-16. For his works see Muḥammad Bāqir Mir Dāmād, Kītab al-qabasāt, eds. Mahdi Muḥaqiq et al. (Tehran: Intishārāt-i dānishgāh-i Teherān, 1374 Sh/1995); Muḥammad Bāqir Mir Dāmād, al-Sīrāt al-Mustaqīm, ed. ‘Ali Awjabi (Tehran: Mirāg-i maktūb, 2002); Muḥammad Bāqir Mir Dāmād, Muṣannafāt-i Mir Dāmād, ed. ‘Abd Allāh Nūrānī, 2 vols (Tehran: Anjumān-i āsār va mafākhir-i farhang, 1385 Sh/2006) and Muḥammad Bāqir Mir Dāmād, Taqwīm  al-īmān, edited by ‘Ali Awjabi (Tehran: Mirāg-i maktūb, 2006).

70 See for example, R. J. Abisaab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004) 137. There is an important polemic that occurs in the Safavid period that shifts the authority of the Sufis to the traditional ‘ulama’ and that shift is epitomised by a shift in terminology from Sufism to ‘īrfān. See A. Anzali, Safavid Shi’ism, the Eclipse of Sufism and the Rise of ‘īrfān, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Rice University, 2012.


Abū-l-Qāsim Findiriskī (d. 1050/1640), Șadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shirāzī, Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1091/1680), Mullā ʿAbd al-Razzāq Lāhījī (d. 1072/1661) and Qaḍī Saʿīd Qummī (d. after 1107/1696) who were all very different thinkers.

Philosophers such as Mullā Rajab-ʿAlī Tabrīzī (d. 1080/1669) and ʿAlī-Quḥ b. Qarchaqākhān disagreed with many positions taken in al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah such as the primacy of being (aṣālat al-wujūd), the identity thesis (ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl) and motion in the category of substance (al-ḥarakah al-jawḥāriyah). With such diversity of thought it is hard to view the philosophical activity in Isfahan as a unified school. Philosophical activity significantly slowed down with the fall of Safavid rule and some philosophers were persecuted or expelled due to a temporary change in attitudes towards ḥikmat. Yet philosophical activity did not stop completely as evidenced by intact chains of transmission of philosophical thought and in the

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75 He was a student of both Mullā Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī and Fayḍ Kashānī, who both had views that were poles apart; see Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy*, 219. His works mainly consist of commentaries on aḥadīth such as his exposition of forty ḥadīth and his magnum opus; *Sharḥ tawhid al-Ṣudūq*. For more information on him see S. Rizvi, “Qāẓī Saʿīd Qomi”, in *Encyclopaedia Iranica* [online], 2005, [http://www.irancaonline.org/articles/qazi-said-Qomi](http://www.irancaonline.org/articles/qazi-said-Qomi) [Accessed 24/5/2016].


77 As illustrated later by the case of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ardistānī (d. 1134/1721) who was banished from Isfahan by Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn. Isfahan was the capital of the Safavid dynasty and had been a hub of philosophy and ʿirfān.
cases of some specific thinkers. It was at this stage that philosophical activity moved to Tehran — the new capital chosen by the Qajar rulers — and a new phase in the history of Islamic philosophy in Iran commenced.

Of key concern in this thesis is the question of how the subjects of Sadrian ḥikmat and theoretical ʿirfān have interacted in the traditional Shiʿi seminary in Iran. Both their interaction in terms of the essential nature of the subjects and how this interaction has been perceived differently by various ḥukamāʾ of the Sadrian school. During the course of the discussion I argue since Mullā Ṣadrā drew upon theoretical ʿirfān, philosophy, Qurʾānic hermeneutics and aḥādīth, his philosophy can be read with different readings. The two most evident readings are a philosophical reading and an ʿirfānī reading. Due to a number of historical factors, both within the traditional seminary and external to it, the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā has become predominant. External factors such as the interaction between ḥikmat and Western philosophy and modernization, and internal factors such as the interaction between ʿirfān and the principles of jurisprudence; and the role played by the seminary in the decline of Sufism and the rise of ʿirfān. While this thesis cannot hope to examine each of these factors in detail, it concentrates on the role of the preferences of the ḥukamāʾ with the variant readings played in this separation. Although a discussion of how theoretical ʿirfān developed in the Shiʿi context is important to understand why and how it


was incorporated into Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought, the majority of the thesis will focus on the development of *ḥikmat* after Mullā Ṣadrā and specifically focus on the schools of Tehran and Qum, which until now have not received much academic attention.

2. **Epistemology and Definitions**

According to Aristotelian logic, sciences can be differentiated according to the subject they address. Subjects should therefore be articulated in a formulated statement that includes all of the issues addressed in the subject and at the same time prevents the inclusion of those issues that are irrelevant to the subject. This kind of definition is based on the subject having a quiddity\(^{80}\) so that its definition can be formulated in terms of genus and differentia. What is immediately clear from the nature of both *ḥikmat* and theoretical *ʿirfān* is that their subject is not a quiddity. In *ḥikmat* the subject is *wujūd* and in *ʿirfān* it is God and both of these concepts cannot be defined in the sense above. Even though some *ḥukamāʾ* consider the concept of *wujūd* as the subject of *ḥikmat*, that concept is based on direct experience. Both subjects therefore rely on the self evident nature of their subject matter and the fact that that self evidency is more indicative of what is being discussed than defining the subject matter using quiddity.

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\(^{80}\) The quiddity of something is its whatness and it is intellectually differentiated from a thing’s existence. So for example the quiddity of a human is that he is a rational animal and this is differentiated from his existence in the extramental.
Efforts have been made to define each subject, not in its strict logical sense, but in order to differentiate the subjects. This can be achieved by describing the most specific proprium (*akhaṣṣ al-lawāzim*) or by a specified genus and species (*al-jins wa al-faṣl al-ṣinā‘i*). Ḥamza Fanārī wrote one of the most influential commentaries on Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī’s *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* which is a text studied closely as part of the *ḥawza* curriculum in theoretical ‘irfān. It is after studying this text that the student of ‘irfān will attain the qualification to study the field of ‘irfān by himself, although some choose to embark on a reading of Ibn ‘Arabi’s *al-Futḥāt al-Makkīya* as well. Fanārī’s commentary, as well as the other commentaries and works studied in the *ḥawza*, are a key part of how concepts are explained in this thesis as familiarity with these texts is important to an understanding of the development of ideas in the context of the *ḥawza*. Fanārī says the following about the esoteric sciences:

The esoteric sciences are realised after solidifying the outward laws...if it is related to building the inside with heart centric acts, the removal of that which causes destruction and the attainment of that which leads to salvation, then that is the science of Sufism (*taṣawwuf*) and wayfaring (*sulūk*). If it is related to the connection between the Truth and the creation and [from] the perspective the dispersion of manyness from true oneness with their difference, that with its connections and levels; then [it is] the science of realities, unveiling, witnessing and the Shaykh calls it: the knowledge of God (*al-ʿilm bi Allah*), in the same way that he names what is before it: the stations of the afterlife.81

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The esoteric sciences can therefore be split into two: one aspect deals with the practical side of wayfaring and experiencing and the other aspect relates to the knowledge of how God interacts with His creation. Since knowledge of the pure Essence of God is incomprehensible it is outside the realm of human understanding as for the human conscious to comprehend something it must be through differentiation. The first aspect in the context of the modern ḥawza is referred to as practical ḫıfān and the second aspect is classified as theoretical ḥıfān.

The words ḥıfān, ṣārif and maʿrifā come from the Arabic root ‘-r-f’ which means to know or to recognize.82 In the modern Iranian ḥawza the word ḥıfān is used for the more spiritual nature of Islam as opposed to the term Sufism.83 Outside of the ḥawza ḥıfān has been used in Iran in a variety of other ways as a substitute for general spirituality.84 There are two broad senses in which ḥıfān can be discussed. The first is a natural inclination in the human towards

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82 For some other definitions see for example, Miṣbāḥ al-munīr where ḥıfān is to know something through the senses Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Fayyūmī, Al-Miṣbāḥ al-munīr fi gharīb al-sharḥ al-kabīr li-l-rafiʿī, (Beirut: Maktabat Lūbnān, 2001) 153; Rāghīb Iṣfahānī says it is to comprehend something by thinking and contemplating on its effect, it is more specific than knowledge and its opposite is refusal (al-inkār); Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Rāghīb Iṣfahānī, Muʿjim mufradāt alfāẓ al-Qurʿān, ed. Șafwān ‘Adnān Dāwūdī (Beirut: Dār al-qalam, 1412/1992) 560-562.

83 See Anzali, Safavid Shi’ism, the Eclipse of Sufism and the Rise of ḥıfān, 277-279 where he explains the usage of the term ḥıfān as mysticism as opposed to Sufism and shows that this is a modern development by tracing the definitions of both terms in Persian dictionaries. In these dictionaries it is the term Sufism that holds the monopoly on the spiritual dimension of Islam. However, it was the emergence of modern media and the social transformations in Iranian society that caused a move away from Sufism towards ḥıfān.

84 Anzali, Safavid Shi’ism, the Eclipse of Sufism and the Rise of ḥıfān, 7. The Sufis in Iran and Sufism were fiercely combated after the revolution see M. V. Bruinessen, Sufism and the ′Modern′ Islam (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007) 67. While both terms are used to denote the path to knowledge of God, ḥıfān indicates the heart of knowing God without the sociological connotations of Sufi orders.
returning to his origin within the higher realms and a desire for abstraction from the material body in order to experience those realms further. It is a natural pull towards wanting to witness God and a natural tendency to want to increase that relationship due to its innate pleasure and the graded nature of that pleasure. This inclination is found across most religions and time periods and the Qurʾān refers to it as the natural disposition (fiṭra) of the human. It is the starting point of religion and the basis for comparative ʿirfān. It is an aspect of the human that in of itself is related to existence and so therefore in the same way as existence cannot be defined neither can the human’s natural disposition.85

On the other hand, the word ʿirfān can be understood in terminological sense within a specific science in reference to the spiritual station of knowing. It is commonly understood to refer to a specific path or way, but this is inaccurate. It is the paths that lead to ʿirfān rather than the paths themselves being ʿirfān. The term was used as such within Sufi circles from about the third century hijri to distinguish simple abstention (zuhd) from the real goal of Sufism as knowing God (maʿrifa).86 This is characterized as the Sufi path of knowledge as opposed to the Sufi path of love. The distinction between the two Sufi paths is an intellectual one as true ʿurafāʾ strive for both knowledge and love, which cannot really be separated in the realm of experience.

ʿIrfān in this sense is also specific to Islam as it is to reach the realities upon which Islam is based and many ʿurafāʾ have stressed a deep link between the outward religion and the inward

realities that they experience. It is not the case for these ‘ʿurafāʾ’ that the outward aspect of religion is just a construct that fades when reality is experienced. Rather it is the experience of reality that helps one to understand the depth of the outward religion and enable them to comment upon it and explain it. This is perhaps understood further when considering the role of the Muḥammadan reality (al-ḥaqqah al-Muḥammadiyah) in both theoretical and practical ‘irfān which will be explored later in the section on walāyah. Ibn ‘Arabi classified the ‘ārifūn (plural of ‘ārif which can also be rendered as ‘urafāʾ) as the greatest friends of God. The ‘urafāʾ are the elite Sufis. Qaṣṣarī further clarifies theoretical ‘irfān in his treatise on Unity, Prophecy and Guardianship where he has a section concerning the subject, questions and principles of the science:

There is no doubt that this group [of ‘urafāʾ] researches and clarifies about the Essence of God, His Names and His Attributes from the perspective that they lead all of their manifestations and hidden aspects to the Divine Essence. Therefore, the subject of this science is the Unified Essence and its eternal and everlasting Attributes. Its issues [for discussion] are how manyness came about from It and how it returns to It; the explanation of the manifestation of the Divine Names and the Lordly Attributes; and the explanation of how the people of God return to Him; how their wayfaring, efforts and asceticism is...  

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87 Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge, 148.
The subject of theoretical ʿirfān in this passage is defined as the nondelimited Essence and its modes which are the Names, rather than a defined subject to which those issues are essential accidents (ʿawārid dhātiya). Qayṣarī carries on in his Rasāʾil to compare the sciences of ʿirfān, philosophy and theology placing his preference with the science of ʿirfān. But the philosophy he is criticizing is not what he calls al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah as he later praises the science in his exposition.

This science [of ʿirfān] is the most honourable and greatest science from among the sciences due to the honour of its subject and the greatness of its issues. [As for] the sciences of philosophy and theology, even though their subject is the same as the subject of this science [of ʿirfān], they do not investigate how the servant reaches his Lord...what is comprehended in their sciences is an understanding with their imaginations and thoughts, [which] is nothing except for their intellectual view and not the Essence of the Everlasting Truth.

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89 The secondary literature usually doesn’t seek to radically redefine the subject area, rather they try to explain the expressions of earlier sources like the one quote above. See for example K. Ḥaydarī, Al-ʿIrfān al-shīʿī (Beirut: Dār al-hādī, 2008) 10 where he quotes Qūnawī and Y. Yazdānpanāh, Mabānī va uṣūl-i ʿirfān-i naẓar (Qum: Intishārāt-i muʾassasa-yi āmūzish va pazhūhish-yi Imām Khumaynī, 1389 Sh/2011) 76-78 who refers to Qūnawī and Qaysari.

90 Qaysari, Rasāʾil-i Qaysari, 16. The term al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah was first introduced by Ibn Sīnā in his al-Ishārāt wa al-tanbīḥāt and is explained by Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī as philosophy which can only be completely understood through discussion and unveiling together. See S. H. Rizvi, Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, 23.

91 Qaysari, Rasāʾil-i Qaysari, 6.
Qayṣari gives the science of ʿirfān superiority because of its practical aspect of guiding a servant to God by explaining the method of wayfaring and because of the truth of what he experiences. In this passage he does not differentiate between the subjects of all three sciences in general sense, while in his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam he is careful to differentiate what Existence connotes in ʿirfān from what it means in philosophy. It is the lack of differentiation that leads to confused readings of philosophical and ʿirfānī works. To analyse this further it is useful to make a simple differentiation between three interrelated aspects of interpretation; the actual subject of the science, the mode of explanation and the approach of the reader.

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Fig 1.1: Factors in the interpretation process.

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Qayṣari, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, (1) 21-60.
The Peripatetics discuss the concept of *wujūd* and also explain the subject within a conceptual explanation. There is little confusion as there is unity between the subject, the mode of explanation and the approach of the reader. Illuminationist philosophy on the other hand discusses light which exists in the extramental as the essential subject of their understanding of reality. However, the mode of explanation is Peripatetic and here is where there is a possibility of misunderstanding. The mode of expression is not conducive to the underlying concept of light in the extramental as while Illuminationists are trying to explain a phenomenon in the extramental, the tools for explanation are designed to explain the concept of something in the mind.

Fig 1.2: The potential for misinterpretation in the reading of Illuminationist Philosophy.

Transcendental philosophy has two philosophical readings for a single subject. The subject of transcendental philosophy is *wujūd* as it is in the extramental. One reading of transcendental philosophy returns the subject to the conception of *wujūd* like the Peripatetics. Here there is confusion between the explanation of *wujūd* as an outside reality and the subject of *wujūd* as
a conception. This is the Peripatetic reading of Sadrian philosophy, which is the reading presented by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1401/1981) in Bidāyat and Nihāyat al-hikma as will be investigated later. The second reading is where the subject of transcendental philosophy is wujūd in the extramental, but the nature of philosophical enquiry is conceptual and so therefore the reading is conceptual. Here again there is confusion but to a smaller extent as since the explanation matches the reading there is some unity. Still the fault is on the side of the reader who cannot find his way out of conception. This is why the study of ʿirfān is complementary to a reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as it releases the philosopher from the world of pure conception leading to a third reading.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Wujūd (in the extramental)} & \\
\text{Wujūd (in the mind/reading 1)} & \text{Philosophical (reading 1,2&3)} \text{ ʿIrfānī (readings 1&2)}
\end{align*}
\]

Fig 1.3: Philosophical readings of ḥikmat.

The subject of ʿirfān discusses the Truth and it also has a variety of readings while its explanation is philosophical. Although at first glance there seems to be confusion between the subject and the explanation, the ʿurafāʾ seemed to have realised this issue and therefore cautioned the reader not to take their expressions at face value. They have also differentiated
between the terminology as used in philosophy and its use in ʿirfan. Here although there is a potential misunderstanding from the explanation due to the use of philosophical terms, the ‘urafāʿ tried to avoid that by reviewing and changing some philosophical terms and at times by using their own terms. But there were still many problems with using terminology from Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy. In ʿirfān the subject is in the extramental and the explanation is also of the extramental and not the concept. The approach of the reader remains the third facet. The redefinition of terms and the caution not to take the expressions at face value was a kind of warning not to understand ʿirfan with a Peripatetic mindset as the Wujūd that is discussed is the self-disclosed Truth, not the understanding of the Truth or wujūd as the Peripatetics saw it.

The first reading of ʿirfān is like the second reading of ḥikmat, where although what is being discussed is the Truth in the extramental, the concept of the Truth is what is read. This concept can be understood with a Peripatetic approach, an Illuminationist approach, an approach that reads transcendental philosophy with its first reading or an approach that reads transcendental philosophy with its second reading. From here many issues of understanding arise and as such some criticisms can be answered by showing the differences in the reading of the subject. The second reading of ʿirfān is the reading of an ʿārif who himself experiences the realities explained in the text. Here there is no confusion between the explanation and the subject as the reader is able to see past the restraints of philosophical terminology.

93 See for example, Dāwūd Qaṣṣārī, Sharḥ Fustūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (1) 21-60 and Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʿid al-tawḥid, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurasānī, 90-130.
In this thesis the first two readings of Sadrian philosophy will be investigated as a single “philosophical reading” and the third reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as well as the two readings of Ḥiżb al-Fatāṭ will be investigated as an “Ḥiżbī reading” of Mullā Ṣadrā. From the third reading of Mullā Ṣadrā, Sadrian philosophers are able to link the Ḥiżbī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā to the first reading of Ḥiżb. It is from this reading of Mullā Ṣadrā that his philosophy offers a more suitable framework for the philosophical discussion of Ḥiżb than Peripatetic and Illuminationist approaches and terminology. This reading of transcendental philosophy is a great contribution to theoretical Ḥiżb, but since it was born in a Shi‘i setting how far it has impacted the Sufi sphere is yet to be investigated. Understanding these three aspects is a powerful tool in understanding the works of Islamic philosophers and ṭurafā’.

\[
\text{Wujūd (in the extramental)}
\]

\[
\text{Philosophical but adjusted} \quad \text{Philosophical (reading 1,2&3) Ḥiżbī (readings 1&2)}
\]

Fig 1.4: Readings of theoretical Ḥiżb.
Philosophers considered their subject as the highest and greatest of all sciences. The proof they offered for this was that the subject was the most general from among the sciences dealing with reality. Since the subject of philosophy was more general the science was a prerequisite for the sciences which had more limited subjects. In the classical categorisation of the sciences the sciences were first split into sciences dealing with reality and sciences that were formulated. The sciences dealing with reality were then split into the sciences that were sought for themselves and sciences that were sought for the sake of other sciences. Then finally the sciences desired for themselves were split into mathematics, physics and philosophy. Philosophy was the supreme science because its subject was the most general compared to mathematics or physics as both of those sciences dealt with \textit{wujūd} but with the condition of something as opposed to philosophy which dealt with nondelimited \textit{wujūd}. It was therefore required before the other subjects as the subject of philosophy affected all other subjects.

In the same way that the adherents of philosophy championed their science by its subject, the \textit{ʿurafāʾ} also sought to place their science above all other sciences including philosophy by using the same argument as the philosophers. The difference between the subject of \textit{ʿirfān} and the subject of philosophy can be explained using terminology that came about after Mullā Ṣadrā.\footnote{Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār, \textit{Majmūʿa-yi āsār-i ʿAṣṣār}, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshṭiyānī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr kabīr, 1376 Sh/1997) 25-26.} While this is not the terminology directly used in the writings of the \textit{ʿurafāʾ} (as they were limited to Peripatetic and Illuminationist terminology as explained previously) the terminology helps to clarify what was being discussed. Although the philosophers and \textit{ʿurafāʾ} both discussed nondelimited \textit{wujūd}, philosophers took nondelimitation as a condition for
What was being discussed was nondelimited *wujūd* as opposed to delimited *wujūd* as category of *wujūd*.

Furthermore for the Peripatetics that nondelimitation was in the mind as realities in the extramental were completely separate. However, the ‘ʿurafāʾ discussed nondelimited *wujūd* but without nondelimitation as a condition as they spoke directly about God, which meant that both nondelimited *wujūd* with nondelimitation as a condition and delimited *wujūd* with delimitation as a condition both fell under the subject of ‘ʿirfān. This level of nondelimitation even precedes transcendental philosophy whose subject is the single reality of *wujūd* which
flows throughout creation. It was therefore Ḹīrfān that had the most general subject and was consequently the greatest and most honorable subject.

The second factor that made Ḹīrfān more honorable was that it dealt with the reality of wujūd and not the understanding of wujūd as was the case with philosophy. The terms for these different categories are that Ḹīrfān investigates wujūd without condition as the source of division (lā bi sharṭ al-maqsamī) whereas philosophy investigates wujūd without condition but as a division (lā bi sharṭ al-qismī). Mathematics and physics investigate wujūd with a condition (bi sharṭ shay'). Javād Āmulī expands on this point in the introduction to his commentary on Tamhid al-qawā'id:

Theoretical Ḹīrfān is a science above philosophy as it concerns nondelimited existence. That is, it researches wujūd unbounded even by the bound on nondelimitation (without condition as the source of division). The issues raised [are therefore] concerning the specifications of that nondelimitation and not nondelimitation itself. Philosophy studies wujūd with the condition of not something else (bi sharṭ lā), that is without natural, mathematical, ethical or logical specification. Since unconditional wujūd (lā bi sharṭ) — which is the subject of Ḹīrfān — is above wujūd with the condition of not something else (bi sharṭ lā) — which is the subject of philosophy — theoretical Ḹīrfān is above philosophy.95

On the other hand, some Sadrian philosophers like Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva (d. 1314/1896)\textsuperscript{96} stressed the similarity of both subject matters due to the third reading of ḥikmat. In his gloss on the Asfār when discussing what is meant by the flow of wujūd in all of the existents he says:

\begin{quote}
...The existence of the Necessary in terms of noticing those Names and archetypes is split into three categories; taking It [the Necessary] with the Names and archetypes which would be the degree of Dualistic Unity; taking It in terms of the nonexistence of those Names and archetypes which would be the degree of Non-dualistic Unity; and taking It without condition. That is without the condition (lā bi sharṭ) of them [the Names and the archetypes] and without the condition of their nonexistence which would be the degree
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{96} He was one of the four founding ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran and is discussed later in the next chapter.
of the flow [of wujūd] in all of the existents, meaning the Names and archetypes and this is the degree of the Necessary according to the ‘uraftā’. As for the ḥukamā‘: the Necessary with the condition of no (bi šart lā) and what they mean by with the condition of no is the Essence without any imperfections which is the same as the level of without condition according to the ‘uraftā’, so do not be heedless!97

According to this reading although there may be a technical difference in the different expressions of the conditions or lack of conditions with which wujūd is taken, Jilva in this paragraph explains that what the philosophers meant by taking wujūd with a condition was the same as what the ‘uraftā’ meant when taking wujūd without a condition. That is that according to Jilva they both discuss the flow of existence which he equates to the Essence, which is either expressed as nondelimited wujūd without the condition of nondelimitation, or wujūd with the condition of no imperfection. If this is the case then there is no difference between the subject of ḥikmat and the subject of theoretical ʿirfān. Jilva’s analysis is inaccurate as he has confused the flow of existence to be the Essence according to the ‘uraftā’ while they are vastly different as will be shown in the chapter on wujūd. In the above passage Jilva illustrates the confusion between the subject, the reading and the method of explanation. This confusion begins for Jilva in the definition and differentiation of the subjects.

It is no coincidence that the ‘ʿurafāʾ discussed the supremacy of their subject in the intellectual sphere. In much the same way that philosophy had been criticised by Islamic scholars from other fields, the validity of ‘ирфāн as an authentic Islamic science was disputed and still is until today in traditional ḥawza environments. Therefore in the same way that the philosophers had to address these criticisms through their writings in order to find acceptance and following for their subject, so too did the ‘ʿurafāʾ. Major criticism to ‘ирфāн came from philosophy as the main epistemological tool in philosophy is the intellect, while some sayings of the ‘ʿurafāʾ concerning the intellect seem to be derogatory to it at first glance. So it is not surprising that the definition of ‘ирфāн and in fact most of the issues in theoretical ‘ирфāн are discussed in a philosophical voice.

Qayṣarī explains that the reason for the birth of the science of theoretical ‘ирфāн was the criticism the ‘ʿurafāʾ received from other parts of the intelligentsia.⁹⁸ According to Sayyid Kamāl Ḥaydari it was the need to validate knowledge from kashf that caused some writers like Ibn Turka in his Tamhīd al-qawāʾid and ultimately Mullā Šadrā to provide a scientific basis and framework to the knowledge attained by kashf and this is ḥikmat.⁹⁹ Theoretical ‘ирфāн as a science developed later then philosophy in the Islamic world as philosophy was introduced with the translation movement during the Abbasid reign. The ‘ʿurafāʾ therefore had the benefit of formulating the basis of their science with philosophy in sight. They were therefore able to

⁹⁸ Cited in Ibn Turka İsfahānî, al-Tamhīd fi sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Hasan Ramažâni Khurasâni, 6-7.

show the supremacy of their science by placing it above philosophy, which had already fought
a battle for supremacy.

I. The Intellect (ʿAql)

The Arabic word for intellect carries different meanings according to different sciences; but
two meanings are the most important when discussing the intellect in philosophy and ʿirfān.
The first are the ontological intellects, which are transcendental beings and the second
meaning of the intellect is a faculty of the human, or in Sadrian terms a level of the human
soul. It is the aspect of the human that can comprehend the universals as opposed to the
imagination which can only comprehend particulars. The second meaning is of
epistemological concern and the centre of discussion in this section. While quoting some of
the sayings of the ʿurafāʾ may indicate a negative position on the value of the intellect in ʿirfān,
much of the criticism of the ʿurafāʾ on the intellect is when the intellect is considered
competent to comprehend that which is above its level. The intellect is a valuable tool for the
ʿārif in explaining what he has witnessed; deciphering between true and false experiences;

100 It is worth mentioning that the Islamic scriptural sources have yet another definition of the intellect. It
confirms the ontological intellect and comprises a wider definition of the intellect within the human. For an
example of some of the aḥādīth on the ʿaql see Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (i) 23-71. Amir-Moezzi finds the most suitable
translation for the ʿaql of the aḥadīth to be hiero-intellegence and differentiates it from the use of the term ʿaql
used in theological texts. See M. A. Amir-Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi‘ism: The Sources of Escotericism in
understanding the instructions and teachings of his Shaykh and for learning about the path he is to follow from the writings of the previous ‘urafā’. However, the intellect cannot comprehend reality first hand as that is the job of the heart. The intellect that is accepted by the ‘urafā’ is the intellect which is in harmony with the heart, not that intellect which refuses to accept the hearts place as the main source of illumination and reception. In this regard Ibn Turka says:

We do not accept that the intellect does not comprehend the unveilings and understandings of that high way which are beyond the intellect in their entirety. It is true that there are some hidden matters that the intellect itself cannot reach, rather it reaches and comprehends them with the help of another faculty which is more honourable than it...after attaining [that knowledge] the intellect comprehends it in the same way as the other comprehensibles. Like the particulars [for which] it requires another faculty to comprehend them...

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101 A Shaykh, Murshid or Pīr is a spiritual mentor or guide. A spiritual mentor is often likened to a travelling guide who guides the traveller through unfamiliar territory. In the same way, the wayfarer requires a spiritual guide in order to navigate the spiritual plane and purify his soul.

Mullā Ṣadrā confirms this analysis of the intellect and stresses the importance of experience and unveiling as well as intellectualising and proving. In his Asfār when explaining why he has discussed many of the opinions on the limitation of effusion he says:

“The purpose of mentioning all that we have mentioned is so that the researcher in these issues can fully comprehend all that has been said [concerning them]...so that he may know the value of what we have understood...and that he does not put what we have said down to unveiling and taste alone, or [simply] following the divine law, without providing proofs and arguments...as unveiling alone, without proof is not sufficient in wayfaring in the same way that only researching without unveiling is a great deficiency...”

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, in line with theoretical ʿirfān, God’s effusion is never ending due to the superabundance of the Essence. In faṣl 3&4 of mawqif Mullā Ṣadrā takes great pains to recount as many of of the proofs of those who deny this opinion as he can and refutes them see Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shirāzī, al-Hikma al-mutaʿālīya fi-l-asfār al-ʿaqliyah al-arbaʿah, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., 9 vols (Qum: Ṭalʿah al-nur, 2009) (7) 265-288. At the beginning of faṣl 5 he explains why he takes such pains to do so which is quoted above. This is different to texts in theoretical ʿirfān which will usually simply state this opinion as definitive or as a nesseasary aspect of their view of existence and then explain its implications.

Shirāzī, al-Hikma al-mutaʿālīya fi-l-asfār al-ʿaqliyah al-arbaʿah, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (7) 288.
II. **Unveiling (Kashf)**

Unveiling and thereby witnessing or tasting is the basis of ʿirfānī knowledge.\(^{105}\) ʿAbd al-Razzāq Qāsānī shows the place of witnessing in his definition of the ʿārif when he says the ʿārif is: "[the one] who God has made to witness his Essence, Attributes, Names and Actions, and therefore knowing occurs from what he has witnessed."\(^{106}\) Kashf is a direct connection between the knower and the known where the knower witnesses or tastes the known. This connection is something common to all types of witnessing including sensory and intellectual knowing, but the heart is capable of this connection on a higher level and so it is the knowing of the heart that is intended in ʿirfān. In Sadrian terms, witnessing is graded and at each level of witnessing the soul uses the appropriate tool, be that sense, the intellect or the heart or indeed yet deeper levels of the inner explained by the ʿurafāʾ such as the spirit (rūḥ), the secret (sirr), the hidden (kafī) and the more hidden (akhfā). As the tool of knowing increases in its depth of comprehension, the knower also becomes less prone to making mistakes. Rather the ʿurafāʾ claim that on some levels of knowing there is no possibility of being mistaken. This is due to the increase in the clarity of the unity between the knower and the known. Qayṣari defines taste as:


What the knower finds in terms of self evidence and unveiling, not by proof or learning, nor by taking by faith or blind following, as all of these while being worthy in terms of their own level do not reach the level of the unveiling sciences as news [of something] is not the same as seeing it.\textsuperscript{107}

Tasting is experiencing first hand rather than learning about something second hand. Here there is a link between *kashf* and the concept of knowledge by presence as both directly experience the known. *Kashf* is more general than knowledge by presence as what can be known through unveiling may be both by presence and through attaining. This difference is seen in the categorisation of two types of *kashf*: *kashf ṣūrī* (image unveiling) and *kashf maʿnawi* (meaning unveiling).\textsuperscript{108} Mullā Ṣadrā also draws on the above classification by Qayṣārī in his *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*\textsuperscript{109}. While an image unveiling comprises the witnessing of the unseen with the senses, a meaning unveiling is direct experience of the realities. While these can occur separately most of the time they are experienced together.\textsuperscript{110} The knowledge from an image unveiling is knowledge by attainment. It is akin to knowledge through the senses in the sensory world, except the senses used in an unveiling are the senses of the heart. The direct

\textsuperscript{108} Qayṣārī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, (1) 127-140.
\textsuperscript{110} Qayṣārī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, (1) 130.
experience of knowledge in a meaning unveiling is knowledge by presence, while the explanation of that knowledge would fall into the category of knowledge by attainment.

Due to the epistemological centrality of witnessing to the science of ʿirfān it was important for ʿurafāʾ to explain the difference between kashf and baseless hallucinations (awhām). Hallucination is a creation of the soul with no relation to reality. However, kashf by its definition is an unveiling of reality and so there is no kashf without reality to be unveiled. It is in connecting and discovering reality by unveiling that the science of ʿirfān finds a foundation from which to base itself on. That basis is in no way constructed by the intellect, but is a direct experience of the reality which is the object of discovery. It is therefore impossible for any intellectual science to be the benchmark by which the correctness of the science of ʿirfān is judged. The difficulty with kashf for those outside of the science of ʿirfān is the personal nature of such experiences. Unveilings can only be understood by those who experience them and that makes ʿirfān somewhat exclusive. At the same time, how is one to decipher one who claims to have understood something by kashf and someone who has dressed their own thoughts in the apparel of kashf?

The answer to these questions is that ʿirfān is a personal path to God and what is witnessed along that path is a gift from Him. While it is true that the experiences are exclusive, the ʿirfānī path of certainly is not and those that sincerely pursue such a path may experience similar

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Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavari, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummi, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 7.
things due to the oneness of reality. Secondly, *Kashf* is the basis of *ʿirfānī* knowledge but is not the tool used to explain reality as individual experiences are not a proof upon anyone other than the person who experiences them. Rather the outward proofs are used to explain the realities, while *kashf* guides the *ʿārif* to what outward opinions are correct according to his experience. As Qayṣari clarifies:

This science, even though it is of an unveiling tasting type [of science]...the people of the exoteric sciences think that this science does not have a basis upon which it is built...rather it is poetic imaginations...without any proof...and the simple claim of unveiling does not necessitate guidance by it...What is mentioned in terms of proof and argument is brought because of their [the people of the exoteric sciences] sticking to their way [of rational argument]...as the unveiling of the people of witnessing is not a proof upon them, and the outward of the [Qurʿānic] verses and [ḥadīth] reports are based upon what the people of *kashf* say and its basis is with them [the people of *kashf*], so it became necessary for us to speak with them in their language...\(^{112}\)

So while *kashf* is a direct experience of reality through unveiling there are other methods of reaching that reality which are more laborious. Rather each faculty attains the knowledge that is suitable to its level. The outward ear cannot create intellectual proofs, but it can listen to an authentic tradition. The intellect cannot directly experience reality as the faculty for experiencing reality is the heart. But it can comprehend those realities intellectually according

\(^{112}\) Qayṣari, *Rasāʾīl-i Qayṣari*, 7.
to its own level. The inner aspect of what is mentioned in the Islamic scriptural sources is
witnessed by the people of *kashf*, while its outward aspect is accepted by the people of the
exoteric sciences. Therefore the platform of discussion between these two groups is that of the
outward sciences. The ‘ārif enters such a discussion with the benefit of his unveiling, whilst
the people of the exoteric sciences have no such advantage. The place of *kashf* therefore
remains in its personal sphere and is not used as a proof upon others, but the ‘ārif uses his
experience to guide his choices in carving an understanding from the complex scriptural
sources.

The validity of *kashf* is further attested in the scriptural sources which deny the possibility of
knowing God through intellectual speculation or through the senses. God is above the
corporeal senses as the corporeal senses only comprehend matter limited by time and space.
Similarly God is above the mental forms created by the mind, as those forms are limited firstly
to man’s comprehension and secondly are themselves based on sensory experience. At the
same time as denying the possibility of knowing God through these means, the scriptural
sources validate the possibility of knowing God through the heart.\textsuperscript{113} Although that
comprehension is not in terms of a complete understanding, it is a greater level of
understanding then what can be derived from applying intellectual laws. Comprehension of
God occurs through the heart, making knowing God a personal journey where God
continually increases the understanding of His servant, unveiling to him what is hidden to

\textsuperscript{113} For a Qur’anic reference see the story of Khidr in Qur’ān, 18:65. The *ahadīth* also make reference to this type of
knowledge such as: “Knowledge is not by learning, it is a light that ignites in the heart of the one that God wishes”
see Imam Ja’far al-Ṣādiq (attr.) *Miṣbāḥ al-sharīʿa* (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-a’lamī lī-l- maṭbūʿāt, 1979) 16.
others. When this journey is discussed on a scientific level it is the science of 'īrfān, and kashf is its epistemic basis as the other ways of knowing cannot comprehend what the heart can.

Kashf is of many types and it takes an expert to differentiate between the different types.\footnote{See the chapters on kashf, mushāhada and muʿāyana in ‘Abd-l-Razzāq Qāsānī, Sharḥ manāzil al-sāʾirīn, ed. Muḥsin Bīdārfar (Qum: Intishārāt-i Bīdār, 1385 Sh/2006) 701-719 for an initial breakdown.}
The 'ārif with his determination can even create reality itself.\footnote{Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliya fī al-asfār al-ʿaqlīyah al-ʿarbaʿah with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 6 vols (Tehran: Vizarat-i farhang va irshād-i islāmī, 1386 Sh/2008) (1) 436.}

There are also many possible pitfalls and mistakes that are known to those who excel in this science.\footnote{Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī, al-Nafaḥāt al-ilāhīya, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1382 Sh/2004) 113-114.} Qayṣarī explains further in his introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ:

If a person sees something in his imaginal realm, sometimes it is correct and at other times it is mistaken. That is because what he is witnessing is either something real or not. If it is real, then he has achieved vision of it and if not then it is something he has created from his false imaginations, in the same way that the confused intellect creates with fantasy [impossible issues like] for an existence, existence and for that existence another existence [i.e. that there is infinite regress in existence, which is impossible] or that there is a partner to the Creator, and other such concepts that have no reality in actuality.\footnote{Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-hikam, (1) 99.}
The imaginative faculty is therefore a tool which can be used to witness reality or to witness something completely detached from reality. Like all tools it can either be used for its purpose or misused. Therefore, the ʿārif needs to learn how to use the tool of his imagination and understand when he has misused it and can thereby differentiate between experiences of reality and those detached from reality. Qayṣari explains the conditions for an effective imaginative faculty:

...Reaching the reality has causes, some of them concern the soul, others concern the body and some concern both. As for the causes that concern the soul [they are issues such as] full attention to the Truth, being habitually truthful, the leaning of the soul towards the intellectual spiritual realm, its purity from deficiencies, turning away from bodily occupations and characterising itself with striving to attain good qualities, as these meanings necessitate the enlightenment and strengthening of the soul and according to the amount it is illuminated and strengthened it is able to tear through the sensory world and lift the darkness that is preventing him from seeing. Also his compatibility with the abstract souls increases as he is characterised by their character traits, so they emanate the meanings upon the soul...As for the causes related to the body [they are things such as] its health, balanced constitution and blood. As for those causes that concern both of them, it is performing the obediencies and bodily worships...The causes of mistakes is what is opposite to that [which has been mentioned]...\(^{118}\)

\(^{118}\) Qayṣari, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, (1) 100-101.
The conditions are therefore both bodily and spiritual. Through wayfaring the ʿārif gains these conditions and is able to witness reality, but fully fulfilling the conditions to always witness reality is something limited to a few. Rather most wayfarers will witness reality some of the time and this is the reason for a guide who can help the wayfarer differentiate between experiences:

When the soul moves from the outward to the inward in sleep, these [false] meanings [from his mistaken actions] become formed for the soul and so distract it from its real world and he has confused dreams (aḍghāth aḥlām)...so these things that are seen are all a result of the outward states. A vision may sometimes [be seen] while awake and other times may be seen while asleep. In the same way that what is seen in sleep may be confused dreams or otherwise, so too what is seen whilst awake is either true issues occurring in actual fact or what is imagined with no relation to reality, satanic, which Satan may with something of the truth to lead the person who is seeing astray. That is why a sālik needs a guide who guide him and save him from those things that will cause his destruction...for the distinction between true issues and purely imagined [i.e. fantasised] issues there are scales that are known by the lords of tasting and witnessing according to their unveilings in the same way that for the philosophers there is a scale...which is logic. A general scale is the Qurʾān and the aḥādīth which are based on the full Muḥammadan (saw) unveiling...

Reference to a person who knows the difference between these types of vision is essential for the beginner and one of the principle roles of a spiritual mentor. Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurasānī (one of the students of Ḥasanzāda Āmulī and a contemporary teacher of hikmat and ʿirfān) writes in his gloss on Tamhīd al-qawāʾid of Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī:

Know that the author, after clarifying the truth of the paths of purification and examining the principles of the realizers of the people of unveiling and the people of proof, intended to indicate that in the same way that in the path of theorization, it is necessary for the theorizer to have rules that would prevent him from making mistakes in thought — which is the science of logic — so too, in the path of purification it is necessary for the sālik (wayfarer) to have a scale by which he can distinguish between true unveilings and false imaginations. In short what he [Ibn Turka] means here is that if the sālik has a perfect Shaykh, who perfects others, then his scale is his Shaykh and his Murshid, as he presents him with his states and visions so his Shaykh guides him in every station according to what he sees in him and according to his capacity, and saves him from the destructions and darkness of his fantasies.” However, if the sālik does not have a Shaykh then before taking the path of purification he must first inculcate the intellectual sciences so that he can attain the trait of comprehension...so he is able to distinguish between truth and falsehood and between true visions and things that are false imaginations.120

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120 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurasānī, 588-589 nt 469.
Ramažānī offers a solution for not having a Shaykh based on the interplay between studying the outward sciences and attaining an ability to decipher between true and false visions. It is through increasing ones intellectual abilities that comprehension is attained which in turn aids the wayfarer in understanding what he has seen. This is because as Qayṣari pointed out above, the Muḥammadan *kashf* was the complete and most perfect *kashf* by which all other experiences of reality can be compared. This again points to the interplay between the intellect, the Islamic scriptural sources and ʿirfānī knowledge. However, the intellectual sciences also are important as what is discovered by *kashf* may be above the intellect but will not be at odds with the intellect. The intellect therefore plays a key role in both theoretical and practical ʿirfān.

III. The role of *Kashf* in Transcendental Philosophy

There are similarities when comparing what has been mentioned above, concerning the subject of ʿirfān and the importance of *kashf* in attaining true knowledge, with Mulla Ṣadrā’s ideas on the subject of ḥikmat and the importance of *kashf* within ḥikmat.121 For Mullā Ṣadrā *kashf* was originally an essential part of ḥikmat but it was a certain group of philosophers that removed *kashf* from philosophy.122 Although this issue repeats itself in different ways in many of Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings it echoes the position he expounds in the beginning of the *Asfār*,

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122 See for example, Shirāzī, *al-Asfār*, with the glosses of Šabātabāʾī et al., (2) 191 where he explicitly states this.
where he explains the subject of ḥikmat and his own personal journey to enlightenment. In his introduction to the Asfār, while explaining that there is no other subject that deals with purely intellectual sciences without any relation to matter or any other science that deals with the development of the substance of the human except for al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah, Mullā Ṣadrā enters into a definition of what that science involves:

It is the knowledge of God (al-ʿilm bi Allah), His Attributes, His angels, His books and His messengers; and how things emanated from Him in the most perfect way; and the best order; and how His Graciousness and Knowledge is by it and His running of it, without mistake or shortcoming...and the science of the soul and its path to the afterlife and its connection to the highest presence (al-malaʿ al-ʿālā).\(^{123}\)

The overlap between this definition and the definition of ʿirfān given by Qayṣarī above is immediately apparent with the same key phrase at the beginning of the definition; the knowledge of God (al-ʿilm bi Allah). What differentiates this definition from the definitions of the ʿurafāʿ above in terms of the mention of angels, divine books, messengers, the perfect system of creation and the path of the soul to the afterlife, is less relevant to philosophy than the Islamic scriptural sources. Rather this definition seems to have been inspired directly from

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verses of the Qurʾān.\textsuperscript{124} Later in the same introduction Mullā Șadrā explains how he had found many precious points in the words of the Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophers and wanted to write in order to bring these points to the fore. But a major point in Mullā Șadrā’s intellectual life was his period of seclusion where:

My soul, due to the length of struggling, was enlightened with an illuminated enlightenment and my heart, due to the great amount of ascetic practices, with great strength caught fire. So the celestial lights emanated upon it...and the lights of [the degree of] Non-dualistic Unity met it...so I became aware of secrets that I had not been aware of until now, and signs became unveiled for me that were not unveiled with this kind of unveiling by proof. Rather I saw everything that I had known by proof and more, by witnessing and seeing, in terms of the divine secrets...so His Mercy determined that these unveiled meanings from the Emanator of the world of secrets would not be hidden in the inner and [behind] veils...so I authored a divine book for the wayfarers busy with the attainment of perfection, and I made manifest the lordly wisdom for the seekers of the secrets of the presence of the Possessor of Beauty and Majesty...and surely God made me

\textsuperscript{124} For example, see Qurʾān 2:177: “It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards the East and the West, but righteousness is this that one should believe in Allah and the last day and the angels and the Book and the prophets...”, Qurʾān 2:164: “Most surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day, and the ships that run in the sea with that which profits men, and the water that Allah sends down from the cloud, then gives life with it to the earth after its death and spreads in it all (kinds of) animals, and the changing of the winds and the clouds made subservient between the heaven and the earth, there are signs for a people who understand” and Qurʾān 67:3-4: “Who created the seven heavens one above another; you see no incongruity in the creation of the Beneficent Allah; then look again, can you see any disorder? Then turn back the eye again and again; your look shall come back to you confused while it is fatigued”.

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aware of the meanings with bright lights in the knowledges of His Essence and Attributes, while the intellects of the intellectuals wander around it and return grieved...\(^{25}\)

In this passage there are some important points regarding the nature of what Mullā Ṣadrā experienced which would be his impetus to write the *Asfār*. It was after a period of practical wayfaring; in terms of ascetic practices and seclusion that Mullā Ṣadrā’s heart became enlightened and became the locus of divine secrets that were shown to him. It is the heart that is the receptacle of these secrets which were not only what Mullā Ṣadrā had known through proof, but more. Mullā Ṣadrā takes this point further by saying he was made aware of the knowledges of the Essence and Attributes of God, while those knowledges are incomprehensible to the intellects. The Essence and the Attributes are the subject and the issues (*masāʿil*) of theoretical *ʿirfān*.\(^{26}\) Here Mullā Ṣadrā gives a place to the intellect, as much of what he had known was by proof, but also recognises that there are some things that the intellect cannot comprehend first hand. Rather it is the clean heart which is the receptacle of divine secrets.

The terminology he uses such as unveiling and witnessing are *ʿirfānī* in nature and a scholar like Mullā Ṣadrā would be aware of the purport of using this kind of terminology. From this passage, and the introduction as a whole it is clear that it is what Mullā Ṣadrā experienced and comprehended with the heart that inspired his ideas and gave him the certainty to write the

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\(^{25}\) Shirāzī, *al-Asfār*, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʿī et al., (1) 34-36

\(^{26}\) Fanārī, *Miṣbāḥ al-uns*, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavari, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummi, Muḥammad Rīzā Qumshīhī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 6-7.
Asfār. That is, it was what Mullā Ṣadrā had attained by ‘irfān that is the underlying knowledge of what he sets about to prove by proofs in the Asfār. This is very similar to the relationship between practical and theoretical ‘irfān, as what the ‘ārif experiences informs what he explains. Until the exposition of Mullā Ṣadrā the ‘urafā’ used the principles laid down by the Peripatetic philosophers to explain their insights. Mullā Ṣadrā on the other hand was a capable enough philosopher to initiate his own principles, while at the same time show that some of what he had understood through experience was what some earlier philosophers had tried to explain.

The usefulness of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles in explaining the conclusions of theoretical ‘irfān will be seen in the upcoming chapters. Ḥikmat therefore has a lot of common ground with ‘irfān and some may even place Mullā Ṣadrā in the school of Ibn ʿArabī due to his great contribution to the field of theoretical ‘irfān. Mullā Ṣadrā’s style of explanation is primarily philosophical and in the Asfār it is clear that he sets about to create his own framework and explanation of the major tenets of Islam. So while ‘irfān is at the heart of that framework his work is not only a work of theoretical ‘irfān, but a synergised contribution to our understanding of Islam. Mullā Ṣadrā also had a clear picture of those he wrote the Asfār for and saw himself as part of a wider tradition of those who seek to know the deepest of realities:

I wrote it for my brothers in religion and my friends on the path of unveiling and certainty, as it will not be useful except to the one who had understood most of the discussions of
the intellectuals, and who has understood the purport of the writings of the wise ones
(ḥukamā’)...

To understand the Asfār fully the reader has to at once be well read in the writings of the philosophers and ‘urafā’, as well as be a man of unveiling and certainty as these people are the intended audience of the Asfār. However, these conditions are not easily fulfilled and so what may happen is that those who are not fully qualified to understand the full meaning of all that is contained in the Asfār may understand and benefit only from some aspects of it. At the same time, those that are qualified may not agree with all of it. A part of the argument in this thesis is this that is precisely what has happened in the Iranian hawza. While some experts in hikmat have stressed the synergistic nature of the writings of Mullā Ṣadrā and the importance of ‘irfān within that synergy to fully comprehend what Mullā Ṣadrā intended to convey, others have presented a Peripatetic reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. This trend has increased over time with the more general acceptance of Sadrian philosophy and the wider teaching of the subject matter across the entire board of hawza students, regardless of whether they intend to

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127 Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʼī et al., (1) 36.

128 The levels of certainty that are gained differ according to the completeness of the journey the seeker undertakes. Sabzawārī points this out in his gloss concerning why Mullā Ṣadrā organised the Asfār based on the journeys of the ‘urafā’: “...The intellectual journeys are an indication towards the journeys previously mentioned that the book explains in correspondence with the journeys of the wayfarers and friends [of God], as the intellectual and practical faculties are both important in the [comprehension] of the lights and effects. With the first [journey] certain knowledge (‘ilm al-yaqīn) is attained and with the second [journey], the eye of certainty (‘ayn al-yaqīn) [i.e. witnessing] and the reality of certainty (haqq al-yaqīn)…” Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʼī et al., (1) 41. The first part of this explanation which is referred to in the paragraph above is an effort to tie together the issues discussed in the Asfār with the four journeys of the wayfarers. The chain of the explanation goes from Sabzwārī to Muḥammad Qumshihī to Muḥammad Ḥasan Nūrī to Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī. Shīrāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʼī et al., (1) 41-42.
specialise in philosophy and 'irfān or not. This separation is therefore a natural phenomenon which occurs with a more generalised teaching of ḥikmat, while there are stringent conditions for one to truly be a ḥakīm.

Mullā Ṣadrā, based on a prophetic tradition, warns against giving this wisdom to those who do not deserve it as that will only increase them in misguidance. Rather wisdom should only be given to those who deserve it, those who have “alive souls” and Mullā Ṣadrā even advises his readers to purify themselves before they embark on a reading the Asfār. While defining philosophy he places the development of ḥikmat in the soul with practical improvement and shows that this method is encouraged in the Islamic scriptural sources. In many ways this synergy is a summary of his approach to ḥikmat.

IV. Ḥikmat, 'Irfān and the Source Literature

Since the case studies of wujūd, walāyah and maʿād examined in this thesis are considered within the traditional seminary in Iran, it is necessary that the conclusions arrived at correspond to the Islamic scriptural sources; the Qurʾān and the aḥādīth, as these texts also express intricate views on these issues. That necessity is born out of a strong tradition of

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130 Shirāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 36-37.

131 Shirāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 38.

132 Shirāzī, al-Asfār, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 47-49.
criticism within the ḥawza against that which is “unislamic” and indeed a propensity for pronouncements of unbelief. The interpretations of the ḥukamāʾ may conflict with literal interpretations of the scripture and this is a source of tension between ḥukamāʾ and more literalist scholars. But the onus to show the relevance of their pursuit to the scripture is certainly on the ḥukamāʾ and the ‘urafāʾ. Although the process of reconciliation may not be central to the subjects themselves, the audience of scholars within the seminary considers this aspect as one of the most important benefits of these sciences.

The best proof to such a claim is the plethora of literature which expounds the verses of the Qurʾān and provides more complex insights into the aḥādīth. Two of the main contributors to this literature were Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn ‘Arabī themselves. While Mullā Ṣadrā wrote commentaries devoted to specific chapters of the Qurʾān and a separate work dealing with some of the main themes in the Qurʾān in his Asrār al-ayāt, his Asfār is replete with Qurʾānic references. He has a dedicated section to the reality of the Qurʾān in the Asfār while other parts specifically expound particular aḥādīth. He wrote a partial commentary on al-Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī and one would be hard pushed to find a single work of his that did not refer to a scriptural source in any way.

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The same can be said for Ibn ‘Arabī, who built his framework on the Qurʾān and hadith rather than relying on other sciences. It is less a process of reconciliation, but rather a process of interaction, where what is understood by experience and the intellect is confirmed by the scriptural sources, and what is found in the scriptural sources provides inspiration for reflection, study and precision. In other cases conclusions may be directly taken from the scriptural sources and this is the case for many particularities in the topic of resurrection. Reference to the Qurʾān and aḥādīth provide another point of intersection where the sciences of hikmat and ‘irfān meet. The use of the scriptural sources is an important part of Islamic rhetoric as the scriptural sources are the axis of Islamic studies. The interaction of philosophy, ‘irfān, theology and the Islamic scriptural sources in dealing with the question of wujūd is a quintessential characteristic of the hikmat tradition which seeks to optimize the synergies in all of these sciences. After discussing the concerns of the hukamāʾ in reading hikmat, I now turn to discuss some of my own assumptions and discuss how this study will be conducted in the next section.

3. Methodology

This section will discuss some of the overarching principles that will inform the way in which the present study will be carried out. Approaching conceptual or intellectual history has been the subject of much discussion in recent years. In a broad sense, the study of intellectual

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135 See Chitick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, xv-xvi.
history is born from the fact that humans generate ideas and try to communicate those ideas to others, who then also add to the corpus of ideas by generating ideas of their own. Critically assessing the way in which philosophical and ʿirfāni texts have been understood — texts that are specifically produced to convey meaning — will assist in formulating the appropriate way this study should be conducted, as it aims to understand concepts expressed in the writings of specific authors.

The texts produced can be thought of as historical artifacts and in the same way history is selective according to human interest, popular texts and ideas are a selective representation of vaster underlying activity. Historians construct historical narratives based on the artifacts they have inherited and this is a limitation when trying to grasp the reality of a historical situation. Thinking about these issues will also bring to light the underlying assumptions and presuppositions when assessing the thoughts of the ḥukamāʾ in this study. Despite the plurality of thoughts in this area I choose to approach these texts within a framework inspired by the analytic philosophy tradition. I specifically use some of Mark Bevir's reflections in his book *The Logic of the History of Ideas* which focuses on how to justify the understandings we reach from interacting with texts rather than the process of interaction itself. Bevir's approach is reconcilable with a hermeneutical method and indeed it is hermeneutic meanings (i.e. meanings that an individual seeks to express or understand as being expressed) that Bevir is

the philosophy of history overlaps many philosophical concerns and consequently has been the subject of debate from various angles. An annotated bibliography of many except the more recent works, maintained by Andrew Reynolds (Cape Breton University) can also be found at [http://faculty.uccb.ns.ca/areynold/paul/alphabib.htm](http://faculty.uccb.ns.ca/areynold/paul/alphabib.htm)
concerned with. I will then highlight some general concerns raised by historians of the Qajar, Pahlavi and contemporary periods.

I. Hermeneutic Meanings

Hermeneutics focuses on the way an interpreter grasps the meaning of a text and makes it part of his own system of understanding. It is the theory of interpretation which finds its roots in Greek philosophy and was later used to interpret religious texts before taking a philosophical turn with thinkers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Paul Ricoeur and Wilhelm Dilthey. At this time, a key question that needed to be answered was how to justify the humanities on the foundations of reason? Dilthey argued that the humanities complement and complete the scientific explanation of how the world works by understanding their human and historical aspect. In his essay, The Rise of Hermeneutics, he argues that historical knowledge can only be valid if it can be raised to the level of universality. Ricoeur, on the other hand, finds validity of an interpretation in comparing it with other interpretations of the same material.

139 Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”.
These two views express what was later to be understood as foundationalist and post-foundationalist approaches to interpretation, where post-foundationalists, in contrast to foundationalists, reject the idea of an objective reality or reject the proposal that man can ever fully know an existing objective reality. Raising knowledge to the level of universality implies an objective reality and this is how texts in the ḥawza are often taught. But considering the tripartite analysis of the possible readings of ḥikmat in the previous section, Ricoeur’s stance is more suitable to this analysis as it allows the question of the reality of an interpretation to be suspended and replaced by the best known human explanation, a concept which will be developed further in this section shortly.

A powerful tool for understanding the process of interpretation is the hermeneutical circle. Understanding is a dynamic and cyclical process, as is the process of interaction. If it is a text that is the object that one wants to understand, then the understanding of that text evolves as interaction with it increases. Each new partial understanding contributes to revising a previous understanding of the text as a whole, which itself it made up of past partial interactions. Interpretation and understanding are graded processes and occur by degrees which start with some kind of prejudgment of the text.\footnote{See Hans-Georg Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method} (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) 279–282.} The hermeneutical circle can be left when one gains a coherent, clear and indubitable understanding of the text.\footnote{Ramberg and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”.} History can also be understood as a hermeneutical circle, where each additional investigation results in a better picture of the whole.\footnote{Ramberg and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”.} The approach assumes an underlying order in history, such that the smaller investigations find their roots in larger themes and is coherent with Hegel’s view.
that rationality is intrinsic to reality. On the other hand the hermeneutical circle may be self fulfilling in that the larger picture is simply the evolved cumulative understanding of the previous parts.

An important hermeneutic I use is the differentiation between oneness and manyness to distinguish the readings of the *ḥukamā* as either ʿirfānī or philosophical. Understanding the whole system of *ḥikmat* hinges on this issue and permeates throughout the analysis of the theological discussions presented in the later chapters. For example, the principle of gradation, which is a primary hermeneutic in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works, is dependent on this distinction. Gradation can be viewed from its manyness or from its oneness. That depends on the perspective of the reader in deciphering what the purpose of gradation is within Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Is gradation a system of manyness with graded reality accorded to each level? Or is it a system which brings manyness back to oneness in a way that is acceptable to a philosophical approach? While the perspective of manyness is from a more philosophical perspective, using oneness as the overriding principle is ʿirfānī.

This is expressed again in the discussion of cause and effect, where philosophy accredits real existence to effects, whereas ʿirfān uses the concept of self-disclosure to avoid that attribution of real existence to an effect in order to maintain the oneness of Existence. These are all concepts that will be explored in much detail throughout the course of the thesis. By using this hermeneutic as a starting point for the hermeneutical circle the writings of *ḥukamā* can be categorized as fundamentally philosophical in outlook or ʿirfānī.

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146 Little, “Philosophy of History”.

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Ricoeur highlights that meaningful actions themselves are a form of text in that they are a replacement for actual words.\textsuperscript{148} Hence hermeneutics can be used as an epistemological theory and the hermeneutical circle is between us and our understanding of the world. At this stage hermeneutics leaves the area of historical enquiry and becomes concerned with existence. Gadamer brought this ontological turn back to history, viewing man as already affected by the cumulative culture produced by the texts he wishes to objectively examine.\textsuperscript{149} Hence there is no way to access the meaning the text had for its contemporaries as a complex web of interpretation effects the way the text is now perceived. In fact, the meaning of the text can never be grasped in its entirety.\textsuperscript{150} But this is not necessarily a problem as studying a text still provides a better understanding of it and a better understanding of ourselves in what Gadamer calls a fusion of horizons.\textsuperscript{151}

A key criticism of Gadamer’s understanding of interpretation is the potential relativism that could result, as the hermeneutical circle can be radically different when different people are trying to understand the same text. Hermeneutics, like phenomenology, runs into a problem, in that the results of applying methods based on these methodologies may not yield repeatable results. But the proponents of such approaches may not see this as a problem as endeavors from different perspectives will result in richer understandings. That said the number of interpretations is limited by the fact that the author of the text intended a specific

\textsuperscript{148} Ricoeur, \textit{From Text to Action}, 146-67.

\textsuperscript{149} Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”.

\textsuperscript{150} Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”.

\textsuperscript{151} Ramberg, and Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics”.
meaning and it is that meaning that is being investigated. Additionally, although phenomenology tries to access fixed real meaning in the life-world through bracketing, Gadamer’s hermeneutics accepts the impossibility of ever really knowing the real meaning and instead advocates a more dynamic role for the meaning of a text. This view of meaning allows for a level of relativism and from here many meanings for a text are possible and the reader is not limited to finding the intended meaning of the text. Mark Bevir’s approach seeks to avoid relativism, by proposing that all webs of belief are rational for their proponents and can be represented faithfully. This presents a scale against which the value studies can be judged; that is how faithfully they represent the webs of belief under investigation. It is his ideas to which we will turn to now.

II. Constructing a Web of Beliefs about the Readings of Mullā Sadrā

At the point of intersection between analytic philosophy and history, issues which are at the heart of the truth of historical knowledge are examined such as objectivity, causation, verifiability and generalizability. Some of the philosophers that have concerned themselves with these discussions include Dray, Danto and Gardiner. A contemporary thinker that has discussed intellectual history in depth based on analytic philosophy is Mark Bevir. In one of his writings, *The Logic of the History of Ideas* — where he also discusses the ideas of other contemporary academics such as Leo Strauss, Quentin Skinner and John Pocock — he bases

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154 Little, “Philosophy of History”.
his approach on the writings of thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson.\textsuperscript{155} He aims to present a grammar of historical investigation.\textsuperscript{156}

Bevir explains that the study of the history of ideas revolves around meaning and therefore involves interpretation.\textsuperscript{157} He rejects the idea of given truths or self-evident truths making him an anti-foundationalist.\textsuperscript{158} However, anti-foundationalism in this sense does not reject that some principles can be agreed upon and used as a foundation, as that would mean that nobody would agree on anything. But all truths that contribute to an individual’s web of ideas can be questioned and so principles do not entail ontological commitments.\textsuperscript{159} This implies that all starting points must be justified before they can be relied upon.\textsuperscript{160} Here Bevir suggests that the foundations for a particular field are the “...concepts operating in a discipline, and this suggests that these concepts provide the foundation of the logic they construct.”\textsuperscript{161} So if one accepts the understanding of the world propounded in a given discipline as valid, they must accept the foundations of that discipline as valid.\textsuperscript{162} It does not matter whether the foundations in the disciple are actually true as the truth of these foundations can never be known with certainty.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{155} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, x.
\textsuperscript{156} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 16.
\textsuperscript{157} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{158} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 6.
\textsuperscript{159} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 8.
\textsuperscript{160} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 17.
\textsuperscript{161} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 17.
\textsuperscript{162} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 17.
\textsuperscript{163} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 21.
While both the subjects of ḥikmat and ʿirfān appeal to a foundationalist understanding through the self evidency of their subject matter and the idea that some of the concepts explained are realities, the study of the development of the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā is open to an anti-foundationalist approach. This approach admits human limitation in constructing the “real” narrative of the development of these readings but rather the practitioners of this discipline can “…make rational decisions between rival webs of theories, and thereby pronounce their theories to be the best currently available to us.” \(^{164}\) There are four foundations that are the bases to my approach.

The first justifiable foundation of this anti-fundationalist approach is establishing the intentionalism or “individual viewpoint” of the authors of the texts that I interact with. When discussing the hermeneutical activity of the historian of ideas, Bevir distinguishes between strong and weak intentionalism (Skinner on the other hand is a strong intentionalist). \(^{165}\) Intentionalism occurs because the meaning of our communication is an expression our intentions, that is when we convey a meaning we intended to convey that meaning. While strong intentionalism stipulates that the writer of a text consciously and preemptively intends the meaning he portrays, weak intentionalism allows for changes in the writers intend during the process of writing. \(^{166}\) “Weak intentions are individual viewpoints”. \(^{167}\) But authors may not know their own intentions at the time of writing or at the very least may not realize the

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\(^{164}\) Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas*, 80.

\(^{165}\) Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas*, 27.

\(^{166}\) Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas*, 27; 67-70.

\(^{167}\) Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas*, 27.
intention they portray in their utterance. This was an important aspect of the tripartite distinction between the reader, the subject and the mode of explanation explained previously.

Due to the limitations of explaining a new philosophical framework within the terminology of and older one, the intentions of the author may be misunderstood. The same issue arises for an interpreter of the interpreters of those texts as the ḥukamā‘ fell into the same trap of explaining themselves in the same way as the previous generations. Since the word intention implies prior purpose, Bevir changes the term to “individual viewpoint”, which he later equates to expressed belief, regardless of actual belief. Objects do not have meaning in themselves; rather meaning is assigned to them by humans. What is expressed by the ḥukamā‘ is therefore taken to be their beliefs making it possible to classify their interpretations on a spectrum from the purely philosophical to the solely ʿirfānī.

The second foundation is that expressed beliefs are “…sincere, conscious, and rational beliefs.” Bevir establishes sincerity as a starting point, as without this assumption there would be no possibility of deception and because it is the conceptual starting point in human interaction. This is not to rule out the acts of deception if there are other factors, such as the danger in frankly expressing controversial beliefs in an orthodox environment; but the writings are initially conceived of as sincere before contradictory factors challenge that

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168 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 71.
169 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 76.
170 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 130-3.
171 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 61.
172 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 142.
173 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 145.
assumption.\footnote{Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 146.} Since the writings discussed in this thesis were at a time where philosophical pursuit was encouraged by the ruling parties and due to the nature of philosophical discussion this foundation is acceptable.

On the other hand, ‘\textit{irfān} presents a more challenging situation. For example, although ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī studied ‘\textit{irfān} with some of the most important ‘urafā’ of his time, he only taught ‘\textit{irfān} privately and his works notably lack ‘\textit{irfānī} analysis. Is this solely due to his belief? Or were there other factors at play that prevented ‘Allāmah from expressing himself in an ‘\textit{irfānī} manner? According to the assumptions presented here the only aspects of his belief that can be evidenced are those that he expressed. His writings are presumably sincere as although it is plausible that there were factors preventing ‘\textit{irfānī} expression that does not undermine an analysis of his approach in his written works.

Consciousness is prior to unconsciousness as when a reason cannot be attributed to an action it is referred to as unconscious.\footnote{Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 151-2.} In this capacity it is unlikely that philosophical and ‘\textit{irfānī} texts are produced unconsciously but rather they are written in a self-conscious, deliberate manner and are influenced by pre-conscious beliefs. Rationality — meaning inner consistency — is correlated to consciousness, but Bevir separates them due to the possibility of rational unconscious or irrational conscious beliefs.\footnote{Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 159.} This approach avoids the possible ethnocentricity and intellectualism of equating rationality to a self critical outlook.\footnote{Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 167-8.}
Rationality does not become relative as webs of ideas can be compared to assess which best explains the facts.\(^{178}\)

The third foundation, based on semantic holism, is that a historical interpretation derived from a set of facts cannot be claimed as conclusive, as all theories are subject to improvement.\(^{179}\) There is no need to claim an infallible interpretation of the facts as this level of certainty is impossible even in the sciences, making the flexibility for improvement a more realistic position than pure objectivism.\(^{180}\) Hence arriving at the best current theory is less about the facts as comparing the merits of rival theories, where theories are an explanation of significant relationships found in the facts.\(^{181}\) It is intellectual honesty in taking criticism seriously; relying on “established standards of evidence and reason”\(^{182}\) in order to accept evidence that contradicts preferred theories; and preferring theories open new possibilities — rather than negative theories that are designed to block criticism — that allows a stronger theory to replace a weaker one.\(^{183}\)

But these general rules are not set in stone and if they seem to prevent a correct understanding of reality, they may be sidestepped.\(^{184}\) The better web of theories therefore, is that which explains the greatest amount of facts while positing coherent relationships between them.


\(^{179}\) Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas*, 96.

\(^{180}\) Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas*, 96.


Inconsistencies in a theory do not necessarily invalidate it, as a better theory is one that has fewer inconsistencies than other theories.\textsuperscript{185} Consequently a theory, even though it may not be accurate, is accepted to explain a group of facts until a better theory is proposed.\textsuperscript{186} An unrealistic theory would quickly result in problematic consequences, and so the reliability of theories shows that our perceptions can result in reliable theories.\textsuperscript{187} Hence; “We can ground objective knowledge on facts, facts on perceptions, and perceptions on our ability to interact successfully with our environment.”\textsuperscript{188}

Finally, since individual beliefs make sense by their relation to other beliefs in the web, it does not matter which belief the historian starts with as long as they can explain its location in the web.\textsuperscript{189} To this end people’s beliefs are situated in the background of the traditions of their time, which themselves have been formed by the web of beliefs of those in the past.\textsuperscript{190} These traditions change over time as individuals accept or reject aspects of the past web in their own web, which in turn becomes part of tradition for the next generation.\textsuperscript{191} Hence there is a role for explaining inherited tradition in terms of the way a web of belief started, rather than determining its final amalgamation.\textsuperscript{192} So a belief cannot be accounted for solely by reference to traditions, but should be explained by its position in the web of beliefs of the individual.\textsuperscript{193}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{185} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 132.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 133.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 108.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 108.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 191-2.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 195.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 196; 202.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 203; 213.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Bevir, \textit{The Logic of the History of Ideas}, 214.
\end{itemize}
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Hence webs of belief aid the historian in explaining the meaning of a text without being the meaning itself. A historian prioritizes the web of beliefs of an individual and what is important to that web (in this case the readings), as opposed to contextualists who immediately seek to explain beliefs by their context, or the sum of a previous tradition.

III. Historiography and Iranian Studies

Turning our attention to concerns specific to Iranian history, historians of the Qajar (1786-1925) the Pahlavi (1925-1979) and the Islamic Republic (1979-present) periods, have discussed some historiographical concerns particular to them. There are two key strands in Iranian historical writing, which were both uncritical in their approach; nationalistic histories where the need to create a national heritage is expressed and Islamic writings which caused many historiographical issues due to sectarian and ideological bias. Philosophical and ‘irfānī writings fall into both of these categories in their own way as on the one hand the philosophers and ‘urafā’ are usually from the ‘ulamā’ class and are therefore linked to Islamic ideals, and on the other philosophy and ‘irfan occupy an elevated place in Iranian culture.

This complexity also manifests itself in the relations between the Sadrian philosophers and the state, reflecting the narratives of Arjomand and Amanat more than the confrontational

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explanations of Algar and Keddie. The Qajar period was a time when traditional methods of history were replaced with more popular efforts and innovation in style. There were also many problems mainly due to the lack of an academic environment and organized resources despite the copious amount of documents, which allowed for abuses in history for political motives. This perhaps explains the lack of research on the schools of Tehran and Qum in the Persian language.

Although the focus of historians had primarily been the writing of history, Iranian historians have shown an increased interest in incorporating historiographical concerns. The reason for this relatively late interest may be because the scholars writing Iranian history seldom tend to be specialized historians, but are scholars from other fields. But for the historian of ideas this has its benefits as they are less likely to misrepresent or misunderstand those ideas. Unfortunately, most of the historical literature produced does not concern the construction of a narrative of the intellectual trends examined in this study. An exception to this is the Sufi and Shi'i biographical literature which stands independent of other historical literature

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99 Amanat, “Historiography viii. Qajar Period”.

200 Adamiyat, “Problems in Iranian Historiography”, 132.

201 Adamiyat, “Problems in Iranian Historiography”, 142.
produced as they are usually underrepresented in state produced histories.\textsuperscript{202} Exaggeration of the merits of a scholar and inaccuracy of attribution are always possibilities in these writings as writing to form an ideal or to flatter a particular figure are features of such literature. Hagiography is a concern in this genre.

The revolution of 1979 changed the intellectual landscape and affected the historical image created by writings at the time of the Shah and those that supported his regime in the West.\textsuperscript{203} As is generally the case, the revolution led to the production of literature by and about the revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{204} The traditional seminary relies on the practical success of certain individuals to maintain its spiritual authority and therefore it is not a large step to over exaggerate the merits of a certain scholars, thereby idealizing them and encouraging others to emulate them. On the other hand, the revolution freed the writing of Iranian history from the political agenda of the Pahlavis,\textsuperscript{205} while bringing its own political agendas as explained above. Cronin notes that the role of the ‘ulamā’ was specifically sensitive to the Pahlavi regime and therefore Western academia shied away from examining it.\textsuperscript{206} Newman, on the other hand, argues that academics believed that with secularization and modernization in Iran religion would become more and more insignificant, mitigating the need to study the ‘ulamā’.\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{202}Adamiyat, “Problems in Iranian Historiography”, 142.
\textsuperscript{204}Cronin, “Writing the History of Modern Iran”, 180.
\textsuperscript{206}Cronin, “Writing the History of Modern Iran”, 180-182.
\textsuperscript{207}A. J. Newman, Twelver Shiūm, 4.
the revolution works were produced which focused on the political and jurisprudential role of the scholars, which was conceivably more pertinent. It is part of this gap created by political pressure that this study aims to contribute towards.

The introduction has covered a number of important issues and so it will be useful to sum some of them up before moving on to the first chapter concerning the context of the schools of Tehran and Qum. The beginning of the introduction sought to place the research question within the Islamic philosophical and 'irfān traditions and thereby show how these traditions share a common audience. That audience received Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy and comprises a number of different approaches to reading his works. These readings were explained in detail and two principle readings were chosen as the focus of this thesis within the context of Mullā Ṣadrā’s more recent interpretive tradition in the schools of Tehran and Qum. I argue that the ḥukamā’ of the schools of Tehran and Qum interpret ḥikmat on a spectrum. On one end is a purely philosophical reading and the other end is a purely 'irfānī reading. From the school of Tehran to the school of Qum there is a visible shift in attitudes to reading Mullā Ṣadrā with a preference for a philosophical reading. I show the complexity of these readings taking the concepts of existence, guardianship and resurrection as case studies to prove my argument. Understanding how Mullā Ṣadrā is interpreted can reveal a lot about the development of ideas within the traditional ḥawzā where ḥikmat is the dominant philosophy.

Central to the 'irfānī approach is the issue of unveiling and taste. It is with the heart that realities are grasped in their clearest form and subsequently the role of the intellect is to
explain those understandings and unveilings. This method of enquiry is also a key aspect of *ḥikmat* and something the Mullā Ṣadrā himself makes plentiful reference to. While theoretical *ʿirfān* focuses on oneness, philosophy relies on manyness to distinguish between realities. These are themes that will be explained in greater detail in the coming chapters. But in the next chapter the *ḥukamāʾ* of the schools of Tehran and Qum will be introduced in order to contextualize the readings investigated in the later chapters.
Chapter 1: The School of Tehran and the School of Qum

1. Introduction

The context in which the various readings of Mullā Ṣadrā are examined in this thesis is that of the school of Tehran and the school of Qum. It is therefore necessary to trace the historical development of these readings through these two schools and investigate which ḥukamāʾ sided towards which tendency. It is also important to introduce the figures whose writings will be used to further investigate the relationship between the two readings in the upcoming chapters, in terms of their teachers, students and writings in order to situate them within the larger activity that can be called a school.

Historicising will also add to the limited research on the schools of Tehran and Qum and take another step in contributing to our understanding of the period. One of the key aspects of this contribution is a deeper look into the chains of transmission of ḥikmat and ʿirfān, which will also provide an insight into the transmission of these sciences in Najaf. The relationship between the centre of seminary studies in Najaf and that of Tehran and Qum was one of interdependence and most successful scholars of the period studied jurisprudence and its principles in Najaf. The transmission of ḥikmat and ʿirfān from Isfahan to the predominantly Iranian scholars residing in Najaf resulted in a burst of activity in exclusive circles.

An interpretive tradition is the hallmark of seminary activity due to the method of teaching in the ḥawza. Teaching usually is concentrated on a single text rather than focusing on a subject
in general. Therefore there is a rich tradition of glosses, super-glosses and commentaries on specific texts, while the use of separate treatises or correspondences fulfilled the need to write on specific subjects. As a text moves down the chain of scholars, criticism and discussion of it ensures a strong framework until an exceptional scholar changes that framework by writing another text which is then studied over generations. This is the process by which a text becomes seminal. As such the ḥawza system is conducive to producing a school of thought centered on an important figure who produced an important work. A school from this perspective may last for centuries and in various locations. A good example is the use of the term “the school of Ibn ʿArabī” which refers to the commentators and interpreters of the thought of Ibn ʿArabī no matter what location or time period.

The complication that exists in the activity that is discussed in this thesis is the intertwining of more than one trend within one set of scholars. The term “school” was first coined by Corbin and Nasr to describe a philosophical movement within a specific location, but one should not assume that philosophical activity at a certain time was confined to these areas. Rather the term denotes a burst of activity that primarily occurred in a certain place. Other scholars who were not present in those areas may have contributed to the thought at that time and influence the next burst of activity. An example of such a scholar relevant to this study is Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī who almost created a school of activity in Sabzavar due to his prowess as a teacher of numerous students and his being an author of a seminal text. He therefore influenced the school of Tehran both in terms of some his students, who later became part of

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the school of Tehran — such as Ḥusayn Sabzavārī — and the teaching of his text in ḥikmat, the Manẓūma.

The scholarly use of the term school also shows a limitation in a complete understanding of history as the conception of “bursts of activity” is based on the available scholarship which always leaves the possibly of the exclusion of important figures unmentioned or under investigated. At the same time, it seems as though there was great fluidity in the transmission of ideas in the Islamic world, perhaps due to the culture of traveling to seek knowledge. The success of this designation to the activity in Isfahan has resulted in its use to explain localized philosophical activity in other times and areas.

There are certain conditions that contribute to the success of activity in one area to make it a school. Teachers who have a deep affinity with the core texts and explain them at a high level are essential in the formation of a school. Their importance is increased due to the patronage structure the distribution of which is based on an informal student teacher relationship. Conversely genuinely interested and intelligent students are key to an intellectual milieu as learning is a two way process. Both students and teachers must produce works, which may culminate in creating textbooks and works of originality. It is these works that testify to the richness of activity and which allow the ideas of the school to be transported to other places, thereby attracting more students and teachers. Students that leave the school to take up

\[\text{See Dāmād, } \text{Muṣannaft-i Mir Dāmād, (i), 6.}\]

teaching posts in other areas, while disseminating the center of learning act as ambassadors for the school, attracting those students who want to pursue their studies further to go to the school itself. Those students that stay in the school must continue the activities of their teachers and improve on them so that students are attracted and continue to benefit.

Thereafter factors not directly related to studies are important, such as security, accommodation, patronage, facilities for foreign students, and other support functions. If these support functions are present in more than one area at more than one time, then it is the prowess of the students and teachers that result in the formation of a school as the method of study in traditional environments was — and to a large extent still is — to attach oneself to a teacher.

This chapter will begin by linking the school of Isfahan to the school of Tehran by investigating some of the key figures and lines of transmission that directly affect the scholars of the school of Tehran. Thereafter it chronologically moves through the generations of teachers and students, showing the different tendencies that resulted in different readings of Mullā Ṣadrā. A key aspect of this chapter is an investigation into the role of Muḥammad Bīdabādī as a teacher to whom both the school of Tehran and the school of Najaf can trace their ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā back to. An investigation of his students also shows the interchange between the ḥukamāʾ that travelled to Najaf and those who remained in Tehran.
2. From Isfahan

After the “full flowering of Islamic Philosophy” with Mullā Ṣadrā and the school of Isfahan, philosophers who had trained in Isfahan faced more difficult times at the end of the Safavid period with the loss of patronage which was further enhanced by the onset of the Afghan revolt. The pursuit of philosophy requires a stable, peaceful and wealthy situation, especially when the government is a major player in the patronage network. The outbreak of war and general instability is enough to turn royal attention back to what is really important for them, which is the continuation of their rule. While hostility towards philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān has always existed amongst traditional scholars, there also seems to have been a change in attitudes towards ḥikmat within the ruling class as illustrated in the case of

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Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ardistānī (d. 1134/1721), who is considered by Nasr as perhaps the most important hakām and ʿārif of his time.²³³ Ardistānī was expelled from Isfahan by Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn and due to the harsh weather conditions he and his family died in the expulsion.²³⁴ He wrote a treatise on Jaʿl concerning how possible existences are supported by the First Truth in the same style as Mullā Ṣadrā. Additionally, a transcription of his lessons on the soul was formed into a treatise called Ḥikmat-i ṣādiqīya by Mullā Ḥamza Gilānī.²³⁵

Despite the unfavourable situation, the teachers and students of Sadrian philosophy continued to spread his teachings to the next generation of Islamic philosophers. An important facet of the robustness of transmission of the teachings of ḥikmat and ʿirfān in the face of hard times is that spiritual practice calls the hakīm to a frugal lifestyle and helping the

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²³⁵ Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya fi manāhij al-sulākīya, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshityānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1388 Sh/2010) 96-97 and Lāhījī, Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 79-82. For the treatise Ḥikmat-i ṣādiqīya itself see Jalāl al-Dīn Āshityānī, (ed.) Muntakhabātī az āsār-i ḥukamā-yi ilāhī-yi Īrān az ‘aṣr-i Mīr Dāmād va Mīr Findirskī tā zamān-i ḥāżir, 4 vols (Qum: Dantar-i tablīghāt-i ʿilmīya-yi ʿālami, 1378 Sh/2008) (4) 60-220. A student of his — Ṣāliḥ al-Mūsawī al-Ḥakīm became a teacher at the madrasa Dust ‘Ali Khān. He wrote a commentary on a work attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī’s called al-Aʿimmah al-ithnā ʿasharī and a commentary on the Qaṣīdah ʿikmīya of Mir Findirski, see Muṭṭāḏa Muṭṭāḏī Gilānī, Muntakhab muʿjam al-ḥukamā‘, chosen and commented upon by Muṭṭāḏa Muṭṭāḏī Gilānī (Tehran: Muʿassasah-yi pāzūhīshī-yi ḥikmat va falsafa-i Īrān, 1384 Sh/2005) 106. Perhaps Ardestānī’s most important student was Mullā ʿIsā il Khwājū’ī who was one of the teachers of Muḥammad Mahdī Naraʿqī and Muḥammad Bīdābādī, see Āshityānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār-i ḥukamā, (4) 244.
poor in difficult times while not letting such factor affect their faith or their teaching. Weekly
classes in ethics attended by many students at all levels of the hawza reinforce such ideas.\textsuperscript{266}

The most important ħukamā’ of this interim period according to the biographical dictionaries
included the likes of Mullā Ismā‘īl Khwājū’ī (d. 1173/1759),\textsuperscript{267} Mirzā Muḥammad Taqī Almāsī
(d. 1159/1746)\textsuperscript{268} and Sayyid Qutb al-Dīn Muḥammad Nayrizī Shīrāzī (d. 1173/1759)\textsuperscript{269} who were
the teachers of the likes of Muḥammad Badībādī (d. 1198/1783)\textsuperscript{270} and Muḥammad Mahdi

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{266} Adel, Elmi, and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ‘Ilmiyya, 12.
\item \textsuperscript{267} Among his important students aside from Badībādī and Narāqī was Abū-l-Qāsim Isfahanī (d. 1203/1789) who
studied in Isfahan and taught in the madresa Chahār Bāg Shāhī until he died. His writings include a commentary of Nahj al-Balāgha; a commentary on the Qur’ān and on each of the four books of Shi‘ī aḥādīth and a gloss on Tafsīr al-Kāshī, see Muḥammad Muḥsin Āghā Buzurg Tīhrānī, Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shī‘a, 2 vols (Najaf: al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿilmīya fī al-Najaf, 1954-1958) (1) 50. Khwājū’ī wrote over one hundred and fifty works, glosses and commentaries; see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 336-337. For his treatise on some issues to do with resurrection called Thamarah al-fuʾād, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 227-364. While Khwājū’ī is mentioned as a teacher of some of the great ħukamā’ of the next generation his role as a teacher of ħikmat is questionable and it seems as though his main expertise was in jurisprudence and its principles, theology, hadīth and Qur’ānic exposition see I. Ḥ. Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafā’, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 2008) (1) 483; Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 335. For this reason he is not included in the chains of transmission of ħikmat and ʿirfān in this thesis.
\item \textsuperscript{268} His full name was Muḥammad Kāẓim b. ʿAzīz Allāh b. Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī. There is scant information
about him in biographical works, but the most important fact mentioned concerning him was that he was the
teacher of Badībādī.
\item \textsuperscript{269} His spiritual training was at the hands of Shaykh ‘Ali Naqī Iṣṭahbānātī (d. 1203/1789) and became his successor
in the Dḥahabī chain. Shaykh ʿAlī Naqī Iṣṭahbānātī (d. 1241/1826) learnt under Naṣīrī when the latter stopped in Aḥsā.
Nayrizī’s works include Faṣl al-khitāb which has been published along with the commentary of Abū-l-Qāsim Amin al-Sharī‘ah Khū’ī (d. 1347/1928) in three volumes, see Qutb al-Dīn Nayrizī, Mizān al-ṣawāb dar sharḥ faṣl al-khitāb, edited by Muḥammad Khājājī, 3 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1383 Sh/2004). He also wrote various
treatises, see Shīrāzī, Ṭarāʾīq al-baqqāʾīq (3) 216-219.
\item \textsuperscript{270} Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Rafīʿ al-Jīlānī known as Badībādī, as he lived and taught in an area called Badībād
in Isfahan, was a key figure who spiritually and intellectually trained many important students. He was the
teacher of Mullā Muḥammad Mahdī Narāqī, the father of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, both of whom wrote important
works in ethics and of Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī. Other students of his were Sayyid Mirzā Abū-l-Qāsim Isfahanī (d. 1203
A.H.); Akhound Mullā Naṣīr ‘Ali Gīlānī who wrote a work on epistemology called Tulufah, see No author. Tafsīr
sūrat fātiḥat al-Kitāb, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1386 Sh/2007) 11; and Sayyid Ṣadr al-Dīn Dizfūlī who wrote many works including Irshād al-muridīn and Sharḥ Naḥi al-balāgha; Dalīl al-mutahayyīrīn on the etiquettes of wayfaring and the adhkār written by his brother Sayyid Muḥammad ʿAli; Shirāt al-Ḥaqq on wayfaring; Misbāḥ al-dhākīrīn on literature; Mīrāt al-dhākīrīn on supplications, protections and specific points on verses of the Qurʿān and the Names of God; Qāṣim al-jabbārīn; Rawḍah al-sālikīn; Kalimāt al-maknūna; al-Fawāʾid al-Nūrīya; a divān of poetry called Kullūyāt; and Miʿrāj al-muʾminīn a commentary on one of the verses of Ḥāfīz and a commentary of the famous ḥadīth “man ‘arafa nafsahu faqad ‘arafa rabbahu” (“whoever knows his self, knows his Lord”); see Āghā Buzurg Tihrānī, Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-sh ʿa, (2) 667; and Shirāzī, Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq (3) 214-5. It was through Dizfūlī that the ‘īrfānī tradition was transmitted to the scholars of Najaf, see see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 489 but there were also other key figures of that tradition who studied with Bidābādī. Important figures like Sayyid Mahdī Bahr al-ʿUlūm who wrote a famous treatise on wayfaring, Sayyid Murtaẓā Kashmīrī, Mīrzā Muḥammad Javābd Tabrīzī and Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī were all students of Bīdābādī, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 367; Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 339. Ashtiyānī comments on the similarity in the ethical writings of Bidābādī and Mullā Ḥusayn-Quli Hamadānī and uses this to strengthen his assertion that Hamadānī was a direct student of Bidābādī, Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āgār, (4) 367-368. However Bidābādī died in 1198/1783 whereas Hamadānī was born in 1239/1824 making it impossible for Hamadānī to have studied directly under Bidābādī. This is also the case for Mīrzā Muḥammad Javābd Tabrīzī and Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī who were students of Hamadānī. Another key student was Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAli b. Muẓaffar Isfahanī who was another intermediary in the transmission of ‘īrfānī teachings to the likes of Majdhūb ʿAlī Shāh, Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī and Muhammad Rīzā Qumshīhī, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 488. Although Bidābādī’s teacher in the intellectual sciences was Ismāʿil Khwājūʾī, he learnt ḥikmat with Mullā ʿAbd Allah al-Ḥakīm, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 483; His spiritual mentors were Sayyid Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī who was the spiritual head of the Dhahabīya order and Muhammad Taqī Almāsī see Shīrāzī, Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq, (3) 214. Significantly both of the ‘īrfānī trends in Iran and Iraq have roots leading back to this key teacher and some of his students also benefited directly from Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī who spent some time teaching Ibn ʿArabī’s Futuḥāt in Najaf see Shīrāzī, Āṯār al-ḥaqāʾiq, (3) 217. Surūr disputes Bidābādī’s learning under Nayrīzī due to not finding anything in Bidābādī’s works that indicate a relationship with Nayrīzī, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 484. For his treatise on al-Mabdaʿ wa al-maʿād see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āgār, (4) 373-417. Bidābādī’s works include a commentary on the Qurʿān until the chapter of The Cave; Risāla-i ḥusun va dil; a treatise in wayfaring written in answer to Sayyid Ḥusayn Qazvīnī; a treatise on wayfaring in answer to Mīrzā Qumī; and a treatise on relinquishment (takhlīya), embellishment (taḥlīya) and the etiquettes of wayfaring as well as glosses on many books, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ, (1) 490. His ‘īrfānī letters have been compiled in Muḥammad Bidābādī, Ṭadhkirat al-sālikīn, ed. ‘Alī Ṣadrāʾ Khūʾī (Qum: Intishārāt-i Khūʾī, 1389 Sh/2010).
Narāqī (d. 1209/1794). After the dust settled from a period of turbulence, new scholars rose to spread the teachings of ḥikmat. Chief among them was Mullā ‘Alī b. Jamshīd Nūrī (d. 1246/1830) who taught many important students and wrote important works and glosses. He studied under Sayyid Quṭb al-Din Muḥammad Nayrizī Shirāzī and Muḥammad Bidābādī. It was primarily Bidābādī’s students who were the major scholars of the ensuing period and who formed the basis of the school of Tehran; which thereafter outshone philosophical activity in Isfahan. Some of his most important students were Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī (d. 1270/1853), Mullā ‘Abd Allah Zunūzī (d. 1257/1841), Muḥammad Jaʿfar Langrūdī, Hasan Nūrī and Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī.

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221 He was one of the greatest Shiʿi scholars and wrote many works on various subjects. Surūr lists thirty seven works, see see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafū’i, (1) 342-343. Perhaps his most famous work is his work on ethics Jāmʿ al-saʿādāt. His treatise on existence called Qurrāh al-ʿuyūn has been published, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 427-607. See also R. Pourjavady, “Mullā Mahdī Narāqī”, in R. Pourjavady and S. Schmidtke (eds.) Philosophical Traditions in Qajar Iran, (Brill: Leiden, forthcoming). One of his students Majdhūb ‘Alī Shāh was the successor to Nūrʿ Alī Shāh as the head of the Niʿmatullahi order, see Āghā Buzurg Tihrānī, Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shaʿa, (1) 258.

222 Aside from his glosses and answers to questions and criticisms about Islam during his time, he wrote a treatise on waḥdat al-wujūd which has been published, see Āshtiyānī, Muntakhabātī az āsār, (4) 616-666; and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 236. Suhā includes the names of Nūrī's teachers such as Mīrzā Abū-l-Qāsim Mudarris, Mīrzā Taqī Almāsī and Muḥammad Ismāʿīl Khwājū’ī, see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 86. Suhā also traces many lines of transmission from Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī back to Mullā Ṣadrā, see especially the diagrams on pages 95-118 and devotes an entire chapter to this pivotal figure, mentioning his teachers, works and students see pages 143-155. See also ‘Abd Allāh Niʿma, Falāsafat al-shīʿa (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-lubnānī, 1987) 353 and S. H. Rizvi "Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī: inheritor and reviver of ḥikmat in Qajar Iran", in R. Pourjavady and S. Schmidtke, (eds.) Philosophical Traditions in Qajar Iran (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

223 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 236.

224 He was the son of Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī yet very little is known about him. His birth and death dates are unknown and none of his works have been discovered or passed down. According to Kūhsārī his importance is only ascertained through oral transmission, see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 353. He was a teacher of ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī and perhaps this is where his importance is ascertained, see ‘A. Ťarmī, "Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān", part 2, in Kharadnāmah-i Ṣadrā, 1998, (4/14) 83.

225 These figures will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
The Qajars established their new capital in Tehran which was significant in many ways, but primarily in terms of the movement of government patronage in order to promote the new capital. The Qajars patronised the writing of philosophical works; provided stipends; endowed specific madrasas which taught ḥikmat; and had an associated printing press from which they printed important philosophical texts.\textsuperscript{226} As well as attempting to legitimise their rule, the Qajars also sought to respond to the challenge of secular schooling in Europe.\textsuperscript{227} The concentration on the new capital was likely to bring greater material benefits that have always been a basic requirement for flourishing education. Additionally the Qajars were keen to maintain a relationship with the intellelgencia ensuring political benefits and influence for the ḥukamāʾ.

Philosophical activity is part of a flourishing court and culture and as such the Qajars had an interest in supporting philosophy. Nūrī was invited to Tehran by the Qajar ruler Fath-ʿAli Shāh, to teach in the newly built Madrasa-yi Khān Marvī (also known as Madrasa-yi Fakhrīya) but due to his old age and the large amount of students that were dependent on him in Isfahan (over four hundred students were at the required level and attend his classes), he sent one of

\textsuperscript{226} S. Rizvi “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya): two poles of intellectual and mystical enquiry in Qajar Iran”, in R. Gleave, (ed.) Religion and Society in Qajar Iran (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) 115.

\textsuperscript{227} S. Rizvi “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 115. For the interactions between the court and three ḥukamāʾ, ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī, Muḥammad Rīzā Qumshihī and Hādī Sabzavārī see pages 116-117. The legitimacy of Qajar rule was discussed among Shīʿī scholars, see A. Hairi, “The Legitimacy of the Early Qajar Rule as Viewed by Shīʿī Religious Leaders”, in Middle Eastern Studies, 1988, (24/3), 271-286.
his foremost students Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī, the father of ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī who was one of the major four key figures who established the school of Tehran.²²８

Many other scholars moved to Tehran for a variety of reasons including; Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī’s son Mirzā Ḥasan, who was invited by ʾIʿtimād al-Salṭana; Āqā Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī who was invited by Mirzā ‘Ali Riżā Gurgānī; and the teacher of ʾirfān, Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshīhī (d. 1306/1888),²²⁹ who was requested to teach at the Madrasa Ṣadr-i Aʿẓam.²³⁰ It is important to note that all of these key scholars had connections to the Qajar court. The purpose of these invitations was to ensure the ḥukamāʾ a teaching position and consequently patronage. Other scholars, such as Sayyid ‘Ali Tanakābunī — another student of Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī — already resided in Tehran.²³¹ These ḥukamāʾ and many others formed a scholastic environment of individuals concerned with interpreting and expanding on the works of their predecessors. With the migration of these teachers a new capital for the teaching of ḥikmat was established in Tehran, and although this period saw an explosion in intellectual output — with many scholars and writings — this aspect of this period remains under researched.²³²

²²⁸ Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 238-242.
²³⁰ See S. Rizvi, “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 116.
²³¹ Sayyid Tanakābunī taught in the Marwī school, see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 153.
²³² The lack of scholarship in the area is evident from the silence on this period in writings which generally explore the history of Islamic philosophy. These writings commonly stop after Mullā Ṣadrā and sometimes include a brief mention of Mullā Ḥādi Sabzivārī. See for example, M. Aminrazavi, “Mysticism in Arabic and Islamic Thought”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-mysticism/ [Accessed 12/3/2012] and Nasr, The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Persia.
There are two pivotal figures in this period for the transmission of *ḥikmat* and theoretical *ʿirfān*. Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī can be considered the grandfather of *ḥikmat* in the school of Tehran and his teacher Muḥammad Bidābādī is the figure through which *ʿirfānī* teachings spread to both the school of Tehran and to Najaf. It is useful therefore to devote some space to studying their lines of transmission to Mullā Ṣadrā and their students, through whom those teachings reached the school of Tehran. Nūrī was a student of Bidābādī and so they both share lines of transmission back to Mullā Ṣadrā, but the students of Nūrī generally are more inclined to *ḥikmat* whereas some of those that trace their lines back to Bidābādī directly, without going through Nūrī, incline more to *ʿirfān*. This is an indication of their respective teaching styles. One of the chains the Suhā traces is as follows:

![Fig. 2.1: Mullā Ṣadrā’s chain to Mullā Ṣadrā.](image)

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The Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī in this chart is not the commentator on Ibn ʿArabī who lived in the eighth century hijri, but rather one of the direct students of Fayḍ Kāshānī. In another chart instead of tracing transmission through Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī, Suhā traces Bidābādī’s line through Mullā Ismāʿīl Khwājū’ī to Ḥakīm Muṣṭafā Qumshīhi to Qaḍī Saʿīd Qummī back to Fayḍ Kāshānī. It seems that Khwājū’ī was not as much of a master in ḥikmat as he was in other Islamic sciences and so chains that feature him as the teacher of Bidābādī may be called into question. Another chain features Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī as the teacher of Bidābādī leading back to Shāh Muḥammad Dārābī back to Mullā Ṣadrā. None of Suhā’s chains feature Mullā ‘Abd Allāh Ḥakīm, who was Bidābādī’s teacher in ḥikmat according to Surūr.

These chains of teachers show the transmission of teachings back to Mullā Ṣadrā, but it is hard to analyse what the readings were transmitted in these lines. Although they seem to establish the transmission of ḥikmat, what about the transmission of ʿirfān? Bidābādī was certainly a teacher that had a stronger ʿirfānī stance but from which line did he learn the transmitted teachings? Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī seems like a logical starting point and due to his being the head of the Dhaḥabīya order, Bidābādī could find his line of transmission back through the Shuyukh of that order. However, another possibility is suggested by Āshtiyānī in his commentary on

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234 Suhā, ʻTārīkh-i ḥukamāʼ, 116-117.
235 Surūr, Madrasat al-ʻurafāʼ, (1) 483; and Kühsārī, ʻTārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 335.
236 Suhā, ʻTārīkh-i ḥukamāʼ, 117-121. For more on Shāh Muhammad Dārābī Anzali, Safavid Shiʿism, 222-247
237 Surūr, Madrasat al-ʻurafāʼ, (1) 483
238 For the origins of the Shiʻi identity and indeed the naming of the Dhaḥabīya order see A. Anzali, “The Emergence of the Zahabiyya in Safavid Iran”, in Journal of Sufi Studies, 2013, (2) 148-175. For an indepth analysis of the Niʿmatullāhī order in Iran from the Qajar period to the Islamic Republic see M. Van Den Bos, Mystic
the introduction of Qayṣarī’s commentary on the *Fuṣūṣ*. He suggests that Mullā Ṣadrā cannot be included in a Sufi chain but at the same time should be included in the annals of the ‘urafā’. It is certain, according to his own statements cited at the beginning of this thesis, that he experienced knowledge by unveiling and through purifying his heart through the dictates of religion. Mullā Ṣadrā’s style was to include ‘irfān within philosophical theory and religious practice. He therefore in some sense had his own type of ‘irfān which is intrinsically intertwined into his whole corpus of thought and this is what is reflected in these lines of transmission. Some interpreters took a greater interest in expounding the ‘irfānī aspect of Mullā Ṣadrā’s teachings and specialised in the works of the ‘urafā’ while spiritually training the students of ḥikmat, while others focused on the philosophical framework that Mullā Ṣadrā proposed and taught students the intricacies, implications and depth of those ideas.

The following chart shows the extent of Bidābādī’s prowess as a teacher of the ḥukamā’ of the following generation. It is a general chart which does not differentiate between ḥikmat and ‘irfān but will be separated into a series of charts for further analysis. These charts are based on the biographical literature and not a rigorous examination of permissions (*ijāzāt*). They should also be viewed with the knowledge that Bidābādī was certainly not the only teacher of these students. Rather it was common for students to study under a number of teachers some of whom would be of different persuasions. The charts are therefore presented in order to

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*Regimes: Sufism and the State in Iran, from the late Qajar Era to the Islamic Republic* (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2002).

illustrate the position of Bidābādī within the biographical literature as an extremely important figure in the transmission of *ḥikmat* to the schools of Tehran and Qum:

![Fig. 2.2: Chains of transmission back to Bidābādī of the hukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum.](image)

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The first sub chart that can be drawn from this general chart is one that reveals Bīdābādī’s influence on the ʿirfānī circles of Najaf and the consequent return of this line of scholars to Iran in the school of Qum. All of the direct students of Bīdābādī in this diagram were known for their ʿirfānī inclination. While ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī was known for his interest in practical ʿirfān he chose to interpret and explain Mullā Šadrā in a philosophical manner as will be shown during the course of the thesis. A stint in Najaf to perfect the sciences of jurisprudence and its principles was normal for many scholars who were seriously pursuing the transmitted sciences. It was through the students of Bīdābādī that an ʿirfānī movement began in Najaf, while another strand of his students remained in Iran and were the foundation for the school of Tehran. Although some of the scholars in the following diagram remained in Najaf such as Sayyid ʿAlī Qādīm, figures like Muḥammad Javād Malikī Tabrizī, Imam Khumaynī and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī travelled to Qum after their years in Najaf and the latter two scholars were to have a profound effect on the school of Qum.
Fig. 2.3: Chains of transmission leading back to Bīdābādī of the ‘irfānī ḥukamā’ of Najaf.

The next sub chart shows the transmission of ḥikmat. This is a chart which is relative to the chart that will follow it concerning the transmission of theoretical ‘irfān. At this stage in the
development of the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā there is much more of an interaction between the readings which have not entirely distinguished themselves from each other. But there are some ḥukamā’ that have a very distinct ʿirfānī approach and so the following chart does not include them.

Fig. 2.4: Ḥukamā’ with a philosophical reading whose chains lead back to Bidābādī.

The final sub chart shows a chain of transmission of ʿirfān to the school of Tehran:
Fig. 2.5: A chain of transmission of 'īrāfūn to the school of Tehran from Bīdābādī.

There are other chains of transmission but the ones presented here illustrate Bīdābādī’s influence both on the chains of transmission of a philosophical reading of Mullā Şadrā (Fig. 2.4) and a more 'īrāfūn reading of Mullā Şadrā (Figs. 2.3 and 2.5). The rest of this chapter explores the key figures in the schools of Tehran and Qum. It starts by analysing the main writings to date on the schools and their figures and then moves onto a discussion of those figures in order to contextualise the following chapters. In the chapter an attempt has been made to classify ḥukāmā' in terms of their intellectual leanings in order to understand the basis behind different readings. This classification follows easily from the biographical literature which made a point to specifying which scholars specialised more in which field. The chapter is split into generations of ḥukāmā' starting with the establishment of the school.
of Tehran and explores the links between various teachers and students are explored in order to determine the transmission of the two key readings which are focused on in this thesis.

3. The School of Tehran

According to Ṭārimī the school of Tehran was established in approximately the year 1816, with the establishment of the Marwī school and continued as the main centre of ḥikmat until about 1998 before transferring to Qum; lasting about a hundred and eighty two years. While the establishment of the Marwī school is an important event in the formation of the school of Tehran, the reason behind the formation of schools was the creation of Tehran as the capital of the Qajars and their search for legitimacy as rulers. Ṭārmī gives no indication of why he considers the transfer to Qum to occur in about 1998. Perhaps the first whisperings of a philosophical school in Qum were the lessons of Mirzā ‘Ali Akbar Hakimi Yazdi who had been a student of the four hakims and had later settled in Qum as well as the classes of Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafī’ī Qazwīnī (d. 1392/1973) and Mirzā Muḥammad ‘Ali Shāhābādī (d. 1398/1979). The school at Qum continued to teach various philosophical texts after the Marwī school closed its doors.

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241 His classes were attended by Imam Khumaynī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafī’ī Qazwīnī, see Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 112; Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 454, 485; and Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafā-i islāmi, 399.
242 For his biographical details and a summary of some of his key ideas see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafā-i islāmi, 427-436. For more detailed accounts see the introductions of his collected treatises and his collected glosses; Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafī’ī Qazwīnī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥawāshī va taʿlīqāt bar kitāb-i kalāmī, falsafī va ḥikmat, ed. Ghulām-Ḥusayn Riżā Nazhād (Tehran: Muʾassasa-yi pajūhish ḥikmat va falsafa-i ʿirān, 1386 Sh/2008) and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafī’ī Qazwīnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʿīl va maqālāt-i falsafī, ed. Ghulām-Ḥusayn Riżā Nazhād. (Tehran: Mu’assasa-yi pajūhish ḥikmat va falsafa-i ʿirān, 1385 Sh/2008). In Qum he taught the Manẓūmah and theASFūr; see Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 113. He was also a teacher of Khumaynī; see Lāhījī, Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 99.
who remained in Qum for about seven years. These activities were followed by classes in Sabzavārī’s Manzūma and Ṣadrā’s Asfār initiated by Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī in 1956. From that time the school of Qum was established by a series of migrations of significant teachers of ḥikmat and ‘irfān. Some important scholars remained in Tehran and were still teaching ḥikmat at the University level.

In Qum he taught the Asfār, the Manẓūmah, the Fuṣūṣ and Miṣbāḥ al-‘uns; see Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 112. Marʿashī Najafī was also one of his students see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 409, 410. Shāhābād is a key figure who deserves further study. He was born in Isfahan and migrated to Tehran where he studied under Ḥasan Āshtiyānī, Hāshim Gīlānī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, see Surūr, Madrasat al-ʿurafāʾ (2) 595; Suhā also mentions him as one of the students of Jilva, Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 482. After travelling to Najaf he returned to Iran and stayed for some time in Shāhābād and then he travelled to Qum. After teaching there for some time he travelled to Ray where he is buried. There is scant information concerning him, but his importance is accertained from the accounts and the high level of respect given to him in the writings of his student Rūḥ-Allāh Kumaynī. From his writings it seems that there was a Shaykh/murīd relationship between them despite the fact that they met later in Khumaynī’s intellectual life. Recently a number of works in Persian have been published concerning him including a translation of his Rashaḥāt al-biḥār, see Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābād, Rashaḥāt al-biḥār, ed./tr. Zāhid Waysī (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va and shā-i islām, 1387 Sh/2008) and a commentary on the same work, see N. Shāhābād, Sharḥ rashaḥāt al-biḥār, (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va and shā-i islām, 1387 Sh/2008); Muḥammad ʿAli Shāhābād, Rashaḥāt al-maʿārif, compiled by Ḥaydar Tahrānī commented upon by Fāzīl Gulpāygānī, (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va and shā-i islām, 1387 Sh/2008); Muḥammad ʿAli Shāhābād, Shadharāt al-maʿārif, commented upon by Nūr Allāh Shāhābād (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va and shā-i islām, 1386 Sh/2007). Studies on his views include ʿA. Murtaḍawī, Faylasūf-i fitrat (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va and shā-i islām, 1387 Sh/2008); H. Vakīlī, ʿA. Khusrūpanāh and B. ʿAlīzādah (eds.) Hadīg-i ʿishq va fitrat: darbāra-yi ārāʾ-yi ḥikmāyā Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī (Tehran: Sāzmān-i intishārāt-i pazhūhishgāh-i farhang va and shā-i islām, 1386 Sh/2006). His son’s glosses on the Asfār have also been published; see Muḥammad Shāhābādī, Rashaḥāt al-ḥikma: taʿlīqa ʿalā al-asfār (Qum: Nashr-i mahdīyār, 1424/2003).

For example, Dr. Ghulām-Ḥusayn Ibrāhīm Dinānī who was a student of Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfiʾī Qazwīnī.
After a period of alliance with the ʿulamāʾ Riżā Shāh’s relationship with the traditional seminary deteriorated with his move towards westernisation and he made an effort to remove clerics from legislative positions.\(^{246}\) These movements decreased the prowess of the hawza in Tehran and some scholars from Isfahan moved to Qum in protest of the order for conscription.\(^{247}\) One of the most important factors for the establishment of Qum was the political shift in power from the Iranian aristocracy to the revolutionary ʿulamāʾ. Since this was a process the assignment of a specific date to the end of the school of Tehran rather forced as the transfer in focus was certainly more gradual and important teachers travelled between Qum and Tehran regularly.

Nasr was one of the first to contribute to an understanding of this period in the English language with chapters in two of his publications concerning the history of Islamic philosophy, but draws attention to the lack of scholarship on the figures in this period and identifies areas for further research.\(^{248}\) His introductions to the school of Tehran are full of information on key figures and texts, but as chapters in a larger work concerning the entire history of Islamic philosophy, they cannot hope to present the detail that would be possible in more focused works on the later periods alone. Furthermore, these chapters cannot analyze the thoughts of any particular ḥakīm in the school of Tehran or any important themes as these would require separate studies. Although he indicates that different ḥukamāʾ were known for

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\(^{247}\) Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) *Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya*, 8; 42.

\(^{248}\) See Nasr, ʿṢadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 99 and Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy*, 18; 255; 334 nt 34; and 335 nt 39. The sentiment is echoed in S. Rizvi, “Being (*wjūd*) and sanctity (*wilāya*)”, 7; and 16-17 nt. 17.
different intellectual preferences he does not explore the issue further and does not show how these preferences affected Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretive tradition.

The only figure of this period studied in any depth is Mullā Ḥādi Sabzavārī,249 who arguably is not part of the school of Tehran as he was not based in Tehran and did not study under any of its teachers, despite being a student of Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī for about two years.250 Due to his scholarly erudition he affected the school of Tehran and the subsequent tradition in Qum and his poetical rendition of ḥikmat the Sharḥ al-manẓūma is still taught in traditional seminaries to this day. An indication of the importance of this text can be seen in the number of commentaries and glosses written on it. Suhā lists over sixty (one written by himself) with some of them belonging to key figures in the school of Tehran such as Mirzā Abū-l-Ḥasan Jīlva,251 Mirzā Ḩāmid Ḩāshi-yī (d. 1340/1921), Muḥammad Riżā Qumshī (d. 1396/1888),


251 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 173-177.
Sayyid Kāẓim ‘Aṣṣār (d. 1396/1975) and Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafi‘i Qazwini. The work was also analyzed and commented upon by members of the school of Qum such as Ḥasanā’da Āmuli and Murtaţā Muţahhari (d. 1399/1979) who were students of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’i.253

Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad’s presentation of translated articles from the *Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam* on the Shi‘i ḥawza provides key sections on the schools of Tehran and Qum as well as the other main geographical locations that saw important seminary activity.255 But since this work is a survey of so many locations it is unable to delve into detail into each one and as such does not investigate the hikmat and theoretical ʿirfān trends sufficiently. At the same time, it is a good source for more general information on the ḥawza and its main activity in Tehran and Qum as well as the other major cities of traditional learning.

Works in Persian that deal which focus on the school of Tehran include a four part series by ʿAbbās Ṭārmī published in the *Khiradnāmeh*254 — a quarterly journal published by the Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute (SIPRIn) — and Suhā’s *Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ va ʿurafā-yi mutaʿākhkhirīn*, which mainly deals with philosophers from Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī to the early philosophers in the school of Tehran. Ṭārmī’s articles serve as a good starting point, presenting

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253 Translations of works from this period are extremely rare, although Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafi‘i Qazwini’s treatise on the four journeys (al-asfār al-arba‘a) has been translated into English and annotated by Sajjad Rizvi, see A. Qazwini, “On the Four Journeys”, tr. S. Rizvi, in S. G. Safavi (ed.) *Sufism (ʿIrfan)* (London: London Academy of Iranian Studies Press, 2008) 117-123.

the reader with information about the four founding ḥakīms of the school, but lack any in depth analysis. Furthermore they do not include other key members of the school, who were not necessarily founders but contributors to the intellectual movement.

Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī has significantly contributed to the historical understanding of the period with important sections in the introductions of critical editions of various philosophical works. These introductions usually exceed a hundred pages and information on various figures from the school of Tehran is spread throughout.555 His Muntakhibātī az āsār-i ḡukamā-yi ilāhī-yi Īrān is a collection of works from key figures of the period after Mullā Ṣadrā. Information regarding particular figures can also be found in the introductions to their collected works. At times these introductions discuss the ideas of the figures whose works are presented, but none of these introductions fully discuss the readings of Mullā Ṣadrā presented in this thesis. Furthermore, they usually focus on one figure in the ĥikmat tradition rather than analysing the tradition as a whole. Āshtiyānī’s contributions are barely critical and often not evidenced. Nevertheless, his contributions show how the ĥukamā’ of the school of Tehran are regarded by those within the tradition and so his works are still an important source from that perspective.

On the other hand, Suhā’s work is well researched, detailed and scholarly. He traces lines of transmission from Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī back to Mullā Ṣadrā, mostly through Nūrī’s teacher

555 A comprehensive listing of these works can be found in the section concerning him in the part of this chapter which discusses the school of Qum.
Muḥammad Bīdabādī, and therefore establishes the connection between the school of Isfahan and the school of Tehran as it was Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī’s student — Mullā ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī — who connects the two schools by his migration to Tehran to teach at the Marwī school.\footnote{Therefore, any attempt to trace a chain of transmission between the two schools has only to take the numerous chains constructed by Suhā and add Mullā ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī's name to the end, see Suhā, \textit{Tārīkh-i ḥukamā}, 91-123.} While Suhā deals with other key figures in the same rigorous fashion, he can only hope to explore a few of the main figures which connected the school of Isfahan to the school of Tehran and so many later figures from the school of Tehran are not included, and no key figure in the school of Qum receives detailed attention. Additionally, since it is a book that deals with the history of philosophers after Mullā Ṣadrā, it lacks analysis into the ideas of the scholars it explores. He does, however, include a very important chapter on Ḥusayn-Quli Hamadānī (d. 256)
Books that cover the history of Iranian philosophy in a more general sense sometimes include relevant entries on some members of the school of Tehran, although they do not deal with the school itself. Rare works examine the thoughts of specific scholars, such as Dinānī’s Maʿād:

Refer to Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 237-258. Much has been narrated concerning his knowledge and asceticism as well as his karāmāt, see Āghā Buzurg Tihrānī, Tabaqāt a’lām al-shīʿa, edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Bihbahānī, 11-13. He studied in Najaf under Shaykh Murtażā Anṣārī and migrated to Samurra when Āyatullāh Ḥasan Shīrāzī migrated there. He was the teacher of Mihrān Nūrī the author of Mustadrak al-wasāʾīl and Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī Yazdī, see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 245-246.

Refer to Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 209-231, see especially note 15. Ḥusayn-Qul Hamadānī’s letters to his students have been collected by Shaykh Ismāʿīl Tāʾib Tabrızī in a book called Tadhkirah al-mutaqīn.

See Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī; ‘A. Ḥalabī, Tārikh-i falsafa-i īrānī: az āghāz-i islām tā imrūz (Tehran: Intishārāt-i zavvār, 2002); and Ḥ. Maʿmal et. al. Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī (Qum: Markaz-i jahān-i ʿulūm-i islām, 2006).

az didgāh-i ḥakīm-i mudarris Zunūzī where his explanation of the concept of resurrection in ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s thought explores a key area in Sadrian philosophy. As possibly the only full size book analyzing ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s thought in a single key area, Dinānī’s work is a major contribution to the analysis of the school of Tehran and ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s thought in particular. Dinānī highlights the innovative nature of ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s responses regarding the nature of Resurrection in his Badāyi’ al-ḥikam, his glosses on the part regarding spiritual psychology in the Asfār, and an independent treatise Sabīl al-rashād fī ithbāt al-ma‘ād. ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s views are based on Sadrian principles but depart from them enough to constitute as ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s own as will be discussed later in the section on ma‘ād. However, most of the information about this school is to be found in the prefaces of works produced by the ḡukamā’ of the school of Tehran. To this end it seems as


263 Dinānī’s introduction not only includes Sadrian points but includes the thoughts of Western scholars in the introduction, especially those of Kant. This comparative approach was a feature of the school of Tehran. Discussion of some of Kant’s ideas is presented in Mudarris’s Badāyi’ al-ḥikam, which is a key text in this area; see Dinānī, Ma‘ād, 16 and Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 243-1. During the eighth issue Kant is actually mentioned by name, see Dinānī, Ma‘ād, 16. Comparative philosophy is now a prominent feature in the discussion of Sadrian ideas, evidenced by the plethora of books and papers written, especially in Persian, on such issues.


though there is still much room for writing the history of this period even in the Persian language itself. Although interest in the period seems to be increasing, perhaps due to the increasing awareness of the important works that were written during the period.\footnote{269}

An earlier attempt to analyze the thoughts of ʿAli Mudarris Zunūzī was Muḥsin Kadīvar’s paper, presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra in Tehran in May 1999.\footnote{270} He highlights the importance of ʿAli Mudarris Zunūzī as a key figure in the interpretive tradition following Mullā Ṣadrā\footnote{271} as ʿAli Mudarris Zunūzī not only elucidated Mullā Ṣadrā’s views but added his own arguments and ideas to those of Mullā Ṣadrā.\footnote{272} Kadīvar proceeds to analyze ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s ideas on the principality of existence, where ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī examines the intricacies of the concept including different types of principality.\footnote{273} The majority of the paper deals with two new arguments presented by ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī for the principality of existence.\footnote{274} Kadīvar compares these views to the opinions of Mullā Ṣadrā and Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī, interpreting ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s contributions as a “logical continuation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s thoughts.”\footnote{275} He highlights an important historiographical issue in attributing new

\footnote{269 See especially the translation of two of important treatises of Muḥammad Riḍā Qumšīhī, W. C. Chittick, “Āqā Muhammad Riḍā Qumšāhī”, in S. H. Nasr and M. Aminrazavi (eds.) An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia: From the School of Shiraz to the Twentieth Century (London: I. B. Taurus, 2015).}


\footnote{271 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 389.}

\footnote{272 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 389. This point is also stressed in Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 241.}

\footnote{273 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 396.}

\footnote{274 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 401-412.}

\footnote{275 Kadīvar, “A Critical Analysis of the Ontological Innovations of Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris”, 391.}

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ideas to later philosophers, as many of the works of scholars between Mullā Ṣadrā and the ḥakīms that later followed in his tradition have not been published. The English translation of the article has room for improvement, the most debilitating issue being the sparse use of transliteration for key terms, making it difficult to trace the exact meaning of key translated terms in an article focusing on technical issues.

Biographical dictionaries usually comprise one the most basic sources of information on the lives of scholars and possible links of transmission. The names of students, teachers and works are recorded in some cases. For the later periods which are less concerned with narrators of Iṣḥādīth than scholars in various fields, some of the most important biographical dictionaries are Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shīʿa by Āqā Buzurg Tihrānī; Ṣarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq by Muḥammad Maʿṣūm Shīrāzī; Mudarris Gilānī’s Muʿjam al-ḥukamā’; Mudarris Gilānī’s Muʿjam al-ḥukamā’; Madrasat al-ʿurafā’ by Ibrahīm Ḥusayn Surūr; Tadhkirat-i riyāḍ al-ʿārifin by Riḍā Qulī Khān Hidāyat and Aʿyān al-shīʿa by Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amin. Biographical information can also be obtained from encyclopaedic entries on various figures, but due to the limited study of this period, many key figures do not have designated entries. Biographies and indeed autobiographies of varying length have been written on many

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277 This work has been summarized; see Gilānī, Muntakhab muʿjim al-ḥukamā’.
figures including Mullā Hādi Sabzavārī, Sayyid Kaẓim Aṣūr, Sayyid Jalāl al-Din Āshtiyānī, Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmuli.

Ṭārmī notes some trends that distinguish the school of Tehran from the proceeding school of Isfahan. The philosophers of the school produced of works in ḥikmat which depart from traditional Sadrian ideas and the publication of critical editions of important texts. They also defended Sadrian philosophy from newly introduced Western ideas. One of the earliest works to do this was ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s Badāyiʿ al-ḥikam which was a response to the questions of his student and Qajar prince, ‘Imād al-Dawla. This mantle was to be taken up by the school of Qum and an important work worthy of note was ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Uṣūl-i falsafa va ravish riʿālism which was commented upon by Murtaţā Muṭahharī. Comparative philosophy is currently taught in the modern ḥawza; however, a full discussion of this aspect of the ḥikmat tradition is outside the scope of this thesis.

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282 M. Borzgar, Najm al-dīn (Qum: Būktiāb, 2008) and M. Borzgar, Jamʿ-ī parākanda (Qum: Būktiāb, 2008).
Another feature is the movement of discourse from purely Arabic to Arabo-Persian, where many of the words and terminology in a philosophical work are in Arabic, while the overall text is in Persian. Another offshoot of the Persianisation of philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān was an effort to translate important works into Farsi. These moves were to widen the hikmat audience while maintaining the continuity of the tradition. The Arabo-Persian style has filtered through to the school of Qum, where it has become the predominant language for both writing and teaching philosophy and ʿirfān.

I. The Beginnings of the School of Tehran

The establishment of the Marwī school and the invitation of Fatḥ-ʿAlī Shāh at the behest of Muḥammad Ḥusayn Khān Marwī to Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī to teach there was an indication of the royal intention to move the capital of philosophical activity from Isfahan to Tehran. Many factors were required to create the conditions for a flourishing school such as madrasas, stipends and networks of scholars who would attract students and distribute those stipends. With the building of schools and invitations from the court to important ḥukamāʾ the corium of high quality teachers began to grow. There were a number of important schools in Tehran such as the Sepahsālār school, the Ṣadr school — which hosted many of the teachers with a more ʿirfānī preference — the Dār al-Shifāʾ, the ʿAbd Allāh Khān school and the Marwī school. There were also a few schools of less importance such as the Dānki school which was founded

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28 Rizvi, “Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)”, 117.
The importance of the first four schools is easily understood by the fact that each of them hosted one of the four founding ḥukamāʾ and thereafter their students. Abu-l-Ḥasan Jilva taught at the Dār al-Shifāʾ; Ḫusayn Sabzavārī taught at ‘Abd Allāh Khān; Qumshihī taught at Ṣadr and ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī taught at the Sepahsālār.

Mullā ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī, the son of Bābākhān Zunūzī, was the first teacher of Sadrian philosophy in the Marwī school. His life is described by his son in an account found by Jalāl al-Dīn Āshityānī which contains most of what is known about him. After studying the introductory sciences in Zunūz where he became an expert in Arabic grammar to the extent that people called him ‘Abd Allāh the grammarian, he went to Karbala and studied the principles of jurisprudence under Sayyid ‘Ali Ṭabāṭabā’ī. He then went to Qum and continued pursuing his studies in the principles of jurisprudence under Abū-l-Qāsim Qummī. It was after completing these studies that he went to Isfahan and studied ḥikmat under Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī while continuing to pursue his studies in jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence as well as mathematics.

287 For his biography written by his son ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī see Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (3) 145-147. The account of ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī does not give dates for the movements of his father to Karbala, Qum and Isfahan but just uses the term he went (رفت...).this is probably because ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī was born in Isfahan and may not have known the exact dates for these movements himself. Other sources follow ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī’s account and therefore also do not mention a specific date see for example ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī, Anvār-i jalīya, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshityānī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr kabīr, 1371 Sh/1992) 37-39.
His writings include *Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya* which discusses the existence of God and His Attributes in a detailed fashion; *Anvār-i jāliya* which includes a commentary on the hadith of Kumayl where he asks Imam ‘Ali about reality; *Risāla-i maʿārif* which is a Farsi treatise that remains unpublished in the archives of the Millī library in Iran;³⁸⁰ *Muntakhab al-khāqānī fi kashf ḥaqāʾiq-i ʿirfān* which is a shorter discussion of the existence of God and His Attributes than in *Lamaʿāt* while not simply being a summary of it as the *Muntakhab* includes proofs not to be found in *Lamaʿāt*;³⁸⁹ and his *Risāla-i ʿillīya* discussing God’s Anger. Jalāl al-Dīn Āshīyānī discovered his commentaries on the *Asfār, al-Mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād, al-Shawāhid al-rubūḥiya* and *Shawāriq al-ilhām*.³⁹¹

‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī’s efforts were complemented by the deep spirituality of Sayyid Raẓī Lārijānī (d. 1280sh/1901),³⁹² who was known as being “the possessor of spiritual state of the king of the inner” and “knower of the occult sciences to perfection”.³⁹³ Lārijānī had studied ʿirfān under Sayyid ʿAbd al-Jawād Shīrāzī Kirmānī and Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfarābādī who were both students of Muḥammad Bidābādī.³⁹⁴ After his father passed away he travelled to Isfahan with his mother and brother and entered the seminary of Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī where he studied Peripatetic, Illuminationist and Transcendental philosophy. He was one of the best students of Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī and a teacher in the school of Isfahan.³⁹⁵

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³⁹⁰ For more information on him see Āghā Buzurg Tīhrānī, *Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-shās*, (2), 765.
³⁹⁴ Ţārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfānī Tīhrān”, part 1, 68.
His abilities in the sphere of ‘īrān were unrivalled at his time. However, he was under a lot of pressure with some — such as Ḥājj Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Kalbāsī — even pronouncing him an unbeliever. Jalāl al-Dīn Āshṭiyānī points out that this type of pronouncement did not meet the conditions of the revealed law as he had not done anything to deserve such a verdict. Furthermore he says that the reason there were many scholars that opposed Sayyid Rażī was that there are always fewer people that understand the intellectual sciences and could therefore understand Sayyid Rażī’s excellence. Larijānī is one example of many such pronouncements within the traditional ḥawza.

Even though Sayyid Rażī is considered as one of the masters of the school of Isfahan, he went on to teach in the school of Tehran when he responded to an invitation from Āqā Ismā‘īl Gurgānī before 1888. Qumshihi reportedly relates that the students of Sayyid Rażī were required to attend classes in tawḥīd (unity) with minor ablution (wuḍū’) as it is impossible to understand the science of tawḥīd without sincere worship as well as intellectualization. These kinds of practical instructions betray the more hidden practical aspect of ‘īrān where the teacher privately instructs the student to observe a number of practices that will enhance his spirituality. As the relationship between teacher and student develops so does the nature

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296 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 68.
297 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 90.
298 For more information on this kind of phenomenon and the reaction of different kinds of scholars. see Anzali, Safavid Shi‘ism; and C. Adang, H. Ansari, M. Fierro and S. Schmidtke, (eds.) Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on Takfir (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
299 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 67-68.
300 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 90.
of that instruction until the student becomes qualified to be a teacher in the practical aspects of ʿirfān. Minor ablution is a relatively simple and basic instruction compared to the type of instruction that would be privately received by a qualified student. Sayyid Rażī was forced to pretend he was mad in order to preserve his life and therefore did not suffer the same fate as other accused ʿurafāʾ before him.301 He taught the books of Ibn ʿArabī and Qūnawi to students such as Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Mirzā Naṣīr Gilānī.302

II. The Four Founding Hukamāʾ

Nasr, Suhā and other scholars of the period speak of four teachers that established the school of Tehran both due to the strength of their own scholarship and the copious students they trained.303 They were ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī (d. circa 1309/1891), Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, Mirzā Ḥusayn Sabzavārī and Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī.

i. ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī

Āqā ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī also known as Ḥākim-i Ṭūs was the son of Mullā ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī and accompanied his father when he migrated from Isfahan to Tehran at the age of three. He was one of his father's closest students and taught philosophy and ʿirfān for about forty years in Tehran and was finally at the Madrasa Sephasālār where he taught for about twenty years.304

301 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafiʿ/ʿirfāni Ṭihrān”, part 1, 68.
302 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafiʿ/ʿirfāni Ṭihrān”, part 1, 68.
303 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 239-46; and Suhā, Ṭārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 63.
He began his studies under his father and progressed to study advanced texts such as Shawāriq al-ilhām, Tūṣī’s commentary on the Ishārāt of Ibn Sinā and al-Mabda’ wa al-ma’ād of Mullā Ṣadrā. After his father died he pursued studies in jurisprudence and its principles in Tehran and then in Isfahan where he studied under Mirzā Ḥasan Nūrī for 3 years and became busy in studying the intellectual sciences. Hence he has intellectual lines of transmission to Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī both through his own father and Mirzā Ḥasan. During his time in Isfahan he also studied with important figures such as Sayyid Rīzā and Mullā Muḥammad Ja’far Langarūdī (d. 1255/1839). So while the majority of his training and consequently his writing style are more geared towards a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā, he also benefited from more ‘irfānī inclined ḥukamā’ even if he did not embrace theoretical ‘irfān as fully as some of his contemporaries.

‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s movements from Tehran back to Isfahan to study with some of his father’s contemporaries and his subsequent return to Tehran illustrates the gradual geographical transmission of ḥikmat. ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī taught the important texts in ḥikmat including the Shīfā’ of Ibn Sinā, Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq of Quṭb al-Dīn Shirāzī and the Asfār of Mullā Ṣadrā. His treatises include a treatise on tawḥīd (the unity of God’s Essence), a treatise proving resurrection, a treatise on wujūd al-rābīṭ (existence-in-something-else), a treatise on ḥaml (predication); a treatise on the rules of wujūd (existence) and māhiyyah (quiddity); a treatise on the al-haqiqah al-Muḥammadiyyah (the Muḥammadan reality) and a

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305 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 240.
307 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 240.
308 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 240.
treatise on the history of the philosophers. He also wrote glosses on the Asfār; on al-Shawāhid al-rubābiya; on Sharḥ al-hidāya; on the glosses of Mullā Ṣadrā on the ilāhīyat section of Ibn Sinā’s Shifā; on Mullā Ṣadrā’s gloss on the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī on Suhrwardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq; on Shawāriq al-ilhām; on Lāhiji’s gloss of the Ishārāt and glosses on some of his father’s writings including Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya.

One of his most important works is Badāyiʿ al-ḥikam which was written at the behest of ‘Imād al-Dawla who himself was well versed in ḥikmat and had written glosses on the Mashāʿir of Ṣadrā, al-Durrah al-fākhirah of Jāmī and a summary of Suhrwardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq called Ḥikmat ‘imādiya.309 Dinānī points out that the nature of the questions asked by ‘Imād al-Dawla shows that he was aware of Kant’s ideas, even if only on a general level.310 He sent these questions to two hakīms ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī and Mirzā ‘Alī Akbar Mudarris Yazdi Ḥakīmī,311 who himself was a student of ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva and was one of the teachers of Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī. Below is a chart summarizing ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī’s training leading back to Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī (and consequently his chain back to Mullā Ṣadrā) and some of his students who taught figures in the school of Qum:

309 Dinānī, Maʿād 16.
310 Dinānī, Maʿād, 17.
311 Dinānī, Maʿād, 17; He moved to Qum in the later part of his life where he taught students such as Aḥmad Khwansārī, Muḥammad Taqī Khwansārī and Rūḥ-Allāh Kumaynī, see Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 399.
Fig. 2.6: ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s teachers and students.
ii. Abū-l-Hasan Jilva

The second ḥākim, Abū-l Ḥasan b. Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā‘ī was known as Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva (d. 1314/1896). He was born in 1238/1822 in Ahmadabad, Gujarat and travelled to Isfahan with his father at the age of seven. After his father passed away he spent his early years playing until one day a miller reminded him of his lineage which was full of scholars and admonished him for not taking the same line. This event had a deep effect on him and he started his studies in the course of which he learnt under teachers such as Mirzā Ḥasan Nūrī, Mirzā Ḥasan Chini (d. circa 1264/1843); Mullā ʿAbd al-Javād Tūnī, who was a well known scholar in the fields of jurisprudence, the principles of jurisprudence, medicine, mathematics and language as well as ḥikmat; and Mullā Muḥammad Ja'far Langrūdī, all of whom had been students of Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī in Isfahan and had later migrated to Tehran. Isfahan became unsuitable for him for a variety of reasons and so he moved to Tehran.

He taught ḥikmat for forty one years and spent his life researching and studying, becoming one of the four ḥukamā‘ who established the school of Tehran. He was esteemed and gained

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312 As he would sign his poetry with the pen name Jilva, see Ṭabāṭabā‘ī, Majmū‘a-yi āsār-i ḥakīm Jilva, 19.
313 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamā‘, 468.
314 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamā‘, 469.
315 He had been a student of Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī and taught ḥikmat in Isfahan, see Ţārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfāni Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70, nt. 4.
316 Ţārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfāni Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70, nt. 4.
317 Ţārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfāni Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70, nt. 5.
318 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamā‘, 468.
319 Ţārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfāni Ṭihrān”, part 1, 69.
a good reputation such that Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh came to visit him in the Dār al-Shifā. He was well known as a Peripatetic philosopher but also taught other texts such as al-Shawāhid al-rububiya and Ḥikmat al-ishrāq and according to Āshtiyānī, was possibly the best teacher of the safar-i nafs (the journey of the soul) section of the Asfār during his time.

He was involved in producing critical editions of texts and would correct a text before teaching it. Furthermore he edited and wrote glosses on the three main theoretical ʿirfān texts taught in the traditional seminary, although Āshtiyānī stresses that since he was not an expert in ʿirfān it was not his job to correct these texts. Āshtiyānī criticizes Jilva based on the issues Jilva raises on some of Mullā Ṣadrā’s views saying that these criticisms showed that Jilva did not fully grasp Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas. He quotes Mirzā Ḥasan Kirmānshāhī stating that until the time of his death Jilva did not fully grasp Ṣadrā’s notion of motion in the category of substance (al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyah). Because of his work editing important texts Jilva never wrote a large separate work expressing his ideas but wrote many glosses, including a gloss on the Shifā’ among twenty six other known works.

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320 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70.
321 Isfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī, 19.
322 Ṭārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 70.
324 Shīrāzī, Sih rasāʾil-i falsaf, 24.
325 Suhā, Ṭārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 468-9. He edited Tamhid al-qawāʾid of Ibn Ṭurka Iṣfahānī; the Shifā’ of Ibn Sinā; the Mathnawi of Rūmī and Miṣbāḥ al-uns of Ḥamzah Fanārī. He wrote glosses on the Asfār explaining some of its foundations; Tamhid al-qawāʾid; the Shifā’, the Mathnawi of Rūmī; Miṣbāḥ al-uns; al-Durra al-fākhirah by Jāmī; Sharḥ al-mukhlasa of Chagmī; Sharḥ al-manṣūma of Sabzavārī; Sharḥ al-hidāya, Mabdaʾ wa al-maʾād and mashāʾir of Ṣadrā and the introduction of Qayṣari’s commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. He also wrote the following treatises: Risālah fī bayān kāyffīya istijāba al-duʾāʾa; Risālah fī anna al-qadīya al-muhmala hiya al-qadīya al-ṭabiʿiyah; Risālah fī tarkīb wa al-kāmala; Risālah fī al-jism al-taʿīmī; Risālah fī al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyah; Risālah
His students include Ḥusayn Bādkūbahī (d. 1385/1968) also popularly known as “Mullā Ṣadrā Bādkūbahī” who had a philosophical study circle in Najaf; Sayyid Shihāb al-Dīn Nayrīzī who was part of the school of Tehran, taught at the Ṣadr school and was the author of a commentary and glossary on the *Asfār*; Mirzā Tāhir Tanakābunī a teacher in philosophy and ʿirfān from the school of Tehran; Ḥāj Fāzīl Rāzī Ṭihrānī who was one of the students of Mullā Ḥusayn Sabzavārī and a member of the school of Tehran; ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Rashtī also one of the students of  Ḥusayn Sabzavārī as well as many other important scholars; ‘Abd al-Majīd Mirzā bin ‘Ali Naqī Mirzā, a descendent of Fath-ʿAlī Shāh; ‘Abd al-Nabī Nūrī Tihranī one of the teachers in the school of Tehran; Mullā Muḥammad Hīdjī Zanjānī a teacher in the school of Tehran; Muḥammad Bāqir Iṣṭahbānātī Shīrāzī part of the school of Najaf and Tehran; Muḥammad Maʿsūm-ʿAlī Shāh the author of *Tarāʾq al-ḥaqāʾiq* and the son of Rahmat-ʿAlī Shāh who had been the head of the Niʿmatullāhī order when its leadership was unified; and Sayyid Mūsā Zarābādī Qazvīnī who owned a school for ḥikmat and ʿirfān in Qazvin and who later became the founder of the *Maktab-i tafkīk*.  

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327 Tārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḡawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 5.  
328 Tārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḡawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 6 and Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy*, 246  
329 Tārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḡawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 7.  
331 Tārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḡawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 8.  
332 Tārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḡawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 10.  
333 Tārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḡawza-yi falsafi/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 12.  
Jilva taught Asad Allāh Yazdī and Mahdī Āshtiyānī who were both teachers of Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī; Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāžīl Tūnī who taught the books of ‘irfān to Ḥasanzāda Āmulī; ‘Alī Akbar Ḥakīmī Yazdī a teacher in both the schools of Tehran and Qum who was one of the teachers of Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī; and Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāhābādī who was Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī’s spiritual master. This places Jilva as a key influence on the direction of philosophy and ‘irfān until the present age. Most of the students mentioned here were students of the other ḥukamā’ and so benefitted from the different readings and teaching styles of these experts. While Jilva’s reading is considered more Peripatetic there are many instances in his works where he discusses ‘irfānī principles and points. However, he was by no means the authority on the ‘irfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as will be explained further when discussing the fourth ḥakīm.

iii. Mirzā Ḥusayn Sabzavārī

Little is known about the third ḥakīm, Ḥusayn Sabzavārī (d. 1352/1934) except that he was a student of Mullā Ḥādī Sabzavārī and was an expert in mathematics. He taught ḥikmat in the

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336 His treatises have been published in a collection, see Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāžīl Tūnī, Majmū‘a-yi rasā’il-i ‘irfānī va falsafī, ed. Majīd Dastyārī (Qum: Kitābsarā-yi ishrāq, 1386 Sh/2007) and separately by Intishārāt-i Mawlā, see for example, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāžīl Tūnī, Ilāhīyāt, ed. Mahnāz Ra’isādā (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mawlā, 1386 Sh/2007).

337 Ṣārmī, “Āshnā-yi bā ḥawza-yi falsafī/ʿirfānī Ṭihrān”, part 1, 71, nt. 11.

338 For a list of Jilva’s most important students see Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamā’, 475-82
Madrasa ‘Abd Allāh Khān with Sayyid Muḥammad ‘Aṣṣār who was Sayyid Kāẓim ‘Aṣṣār’s father and first teacher. The limited information on Ḥusayn Sabzavārī makes it hard to ascertain why he is considered a founding hākim by some historians of the period. In fact, Kūhsārī does not include him with the other founding hukamā’ but rather as an important student of Sabzavārī. Rather, Kūhsārī mentions his mastery over philosophical issues and how he was known as Mirzā Ḥusayn Kabīr in Tehran.

iv. Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī

The previous three hukamā’ were better known for their philosophical grasp of hikmat. Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva had a Peripatetic approach whereas ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī’s approach was more of a Sadrian blend. Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī on the other hand was a master of the ‘irfānī reading. According to Mahdawi, Muḥammad Riżā b. Abī-l-Qāsim al-Qumshihī and was born in 1241/1825 and died in 1306/1888. This would make him sixty five years old when he died, but Suhā maintains that he was eighty making his birth date 1226/1811. Qumshihī studied the Fuṣūs, Sharḥ al-mashāʿir and Sharḥ al-tajrid with Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Langarūdī who was one of the well known students of Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī and who was also a teacher of ‘Alī Mudarris

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339 He was the son of Sayyid Maḥmūd ‘Aṣṣār and his works include Nāsikh al-Tafāsūr; Mawāhib al-Raḍawī a commentary on Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma; as well as a correction of some of the poetry in Manẓūma in a work called Ishrāqāt al-Raḍawī; and an answer to some questions in Pāsukh Nāmah.

341 ‘Aṣṣār, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 1 nt. 1.

342 Kūhsārī, Tārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 400-401.


345 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamā’, 261.
Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva in Isfahan.\textsuperscript{344} Langarūdī himself studied philosophy with Mirzā Abū-l-Qāsim Mudarris Khāṭūnābādī (d. 1202/1787) and Mullā Mīhrāb Gīlānī (d. 1217/1802).\textsuperscript{345} Although it seems Langarūdī did not write many works he did write a commentary on Ṣadrā’s \textit{al-Mashāʿir} answering the issues raised by Aḥmad Ahsāʾī.\textsuperscript{346} He wrote a glossary on the glossary of Khafī on the commentary on Qūshchī on \textit{Tajrid} and another glossary on the \textit{ilāhiyāt} section of Qūshchī’s commentary on \textit{Tajrid} are attributed to him in some biographical dictionaries but remain unconfirmed.\textsuperscript{347} Qumshihī also studied under Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī’s son Mirzā Ḥasan who taught ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva as well.\textsuperscript{348} His teacher in \textit{ʿirfān} in Isfahan was Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī with whom he studied the \textit{Fuṣūṣ} again in a more profound way as he says Langarūdī was a philosopher whereas Sayyid Rażī was a dervish; and teaching the \textit{Fuṣūṣ} is the work of a dervish.\textsuperscript{349} This statement shows how there are also variant readings of \textit{ʿirfānī} texts.

Qumshihī was an important figure in the transmission and the development of the \textit{ʿirfānī} reading of \textit{ḥikmat}. His presence, expertise and efforts contributed to creating an environment of enthusiasm for \textit{ʿirfān} as he trained important students whose students were influential in the school of Qum. He taught \textit{Tamhīd al-qawāʾid}; Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī’s commentary on the

\textsuperscript{344} Lāḥijī, \textit{Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir}, 7; and Āghā Buzurg Tīhrānī, \textit{Tabaqāt aʿlām al-shīʿa}, (1), 239.

\textsuperscript{345} Lāḥijī, \textit{Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir}, 18.

\textsuperscript{346} Lāḥijī, \textit{Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir}, 61.

\textsuperscript{347} Lāḥijī, \textit{Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir}, 61.

\textsuperscript{348} Suhā, \textit{Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ}, 261.

\textsuperscript{349} Lāḥijī, \textit{Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir}, 61, nt. 2.
Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam; al-Fanārī’s commentary of Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī’s Mafāṭīḥ al-ghayb; Miṣbāḥ al-uns; and Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futuḥāt al-makīyā. He is sometimes credited with the introduction of Tamhīd al-Qawāʾid into the ḥawzā’s theoretical ʿirfān curriculum, although Qumshihī studied the text with his own teacher Sayyid Riżā Lārijānī. Āṣhtiyānī includes Qumshihī among the important expositors of the thought of Ibn ʿArabī, such as Qūnawī, Qayṣarī and Kāshānī. After Qumshihī passed away Mirzā Hāshim Rashtī (d. 1332/1913) carried on his classes.

Qumshihī’s other students included Shihāb al-Dīn Nayrizī Shīrāzī (d. 1320/1902) (who was also a student of Abū al-Ḥasan Jilva) who taught the Fuṣūṣ, the Asfār and Qurʾānic hermeneutics; Ghulām-ʿAlī Shīrāzī who wrote interesting glosses on Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ and the Asfār; and Ḫusayn Najmābādī. The classes taught by the students of Qumshihī were more popular that the classes of other masters at that time who were not only based in Tehran but other areas such as Isfahan and Sabzavar. Below is a chart of the chains of transmission leading back to

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359 This is the chosen commentary taught in the traditional Shīʿī ḥawza, despite the existence of many other commentaries on the Fuṣūṣ and it is primarily Qayṣarī’s introduction that distinguishes his commentary over others. For a translation in English of the first five chapters of this introduction (out of twelve) with commentary on the some of the themes see Ali, Qayṣarī’s Muqaddima to His Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam.

360 Shīrāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya, 131.


348 Suhā, Ṭārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 477; Kūhsārī, Ṭārīkh-i falsafa-i islāmī, 388.

355 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 8.

356 Isfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī, 18.
Qumshihi through Hāshim Rashti. The significance of this chart will be understood further as this chapter expands on the significance of each of these students.\footnote{Qumshihi, Majmū‘a-yi āgār, 90-91.}

Fig. 2.7: Chains of transmission back to Qumshihi through Hāshim Rashti.

III. Contemporaries of the Four Hakims
Although the four ḥakīms are well known for their impact on the teaching of philosophy and ʿirfān, there were others who contributed to the teaching of hikmat in different localities at the same time as the four ḥakīms. Isfahan was still an important center of learning and the movement of the center of hikmat to Tehran was a gradual process. There were therefore important teachers who remained in Isfahan. One of these figures was Mullā Ḥasan Iṣfahānī (d. 1281/1865) who had been one of the top students of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī and as Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī’s health deteriorated his students started to attend classes with Mullā Ḥasan who would teach them after teaching his own students. Among these students of Nūrī was Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī. Mullā Ḥasan wrote a gloss on Shawāriq al-ilhām and a precise treatise responding to the intellectual challenge of Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾi on which Mullā Hādī wrote a gloss.

Another important center for traditional ḥawza studies is Mashhad which also became a hot spot in the debate between Sadrian philosophers and the Maktab-i tafkik. Āqā Buzurg Shahidi (Ḥākim) (d. 1355/1936) was a descendant of Mirzā Mahdī Shahid and studied philosophy in Tehran before teaching it in Tehran and later in the seminary in Mashhad. Some of the students of Muḥammad ʿĀṯar Qumshīḥī were his students including Mirzā Mahdī Ilāhī Qumshīḥī. Ḥājī Fāżīl Khurāsānī (d. 1342/1924) also taught for some time in Mashhad where both he and Āqā Buzurg Ḥākim combated anti-philosophical sentiment. Ḥājī Fāżīl was a student of Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī and seems to also have studied under Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥākim.

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358 Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 95.
359 Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 95.
360 Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 95.
362 Ṣuhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 294.
Sarūqadi (with whom he studied the *Asfār* for a while) and Mullā Ghulām-Ḥusayn Shaykh al-Islām who were both themselves students of Mullā Ḥādi and had been active in Mashhad before Ḥājī Fāzīl and Āqā Buzurg Ḥakīm. Mullā Ghulām-Ḥusayn was the leader of the Friday prayer in Mashhad and had been a student of Mullā Ḥādi for six years after which he travelled to Najaf to study under Shaykh Anṣārī before going to Mashhad.\(^{364}\)

Much has been written concerning Mullā Ḥādi Ibn Mahdī Sabzavārī (1212/1797/8-1295/1878), who was based in Sabzavar and was an enigmatic character. His popularity was such that during his lifetime he sparked a center of learning around his own personality. Although he was not part of the school of Tehran his activities influenced the school and his student Mirzā Ḥusayn Sabzavārī was an important teacher in Tehran. Mullā Ḥādi Sabzavārī is considered by some as the greatest philosopher of the nineteenth Century,\(^{365}\) a sentiment echoed by Mullā ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī himself in his *Risālah fi wujūd al-rābiṭ*.

\(^{366}\) He wrote *Sharḥ ghurar al-farāʾid* more popularly known as *Sharḥ al-manẓūma* which has been studied and taught by many ḥukamāʾ including the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Qum until the present day. His other popular work was a book called *Asrār al-ḥikam*, which he wrote in Persian for Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh Qajar.\(^{367}\)

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\(^{366}\) "He [Sabzavārī] is unequaled in our time and matchless in our era." See Zunūzī, *Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt*, (2) 175.

Sabzavārī also wrote a very important gloss on the Asfār, but he notably did not write any commentaries on the important works of ʿirfān. This is an important fact, as Sabzavārī was a prolific writer and while his ʿirfānī tendencies cannot be missed in many of his works he is a figure — like ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzi — who sits in the middle of either extreme. He wrote an autobiography due to the requests of some people who wanted to know more about his education, which is one of the main sources for information on his life. His son in law Mirzā Sayyid Ḥasan also wrote a biography on him.

IV. Students of the School of Tehran

In the previous sections the ḥukamāʾ that connected the school of Isfahan to the school of Tehran were examined and in this section the ḥukamāʾ that connected the school of Tehran to the school of Qum will be discussed. Some of these figures have been introduced in the diagrams of ḥukamāʾ in the preceding sections. There were two generations of students that formed a connection between the school of Tehran and the school of Qum. The earlier generation were the important students of the four ḥakīms, who transmitted Sadrian philosophy and Ibn Arabian metaphysics to the next generation of ḥukamāʾ who were to become the teachers of the school of Qum.

368 Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshṭiyānī points out that Mullā Ḥādī was not an complete expert in theoretical ʿirfān and so seems to have faltered when explaining some mystical points such as confusing the understanding of wahdat al-wujūd and its manifestation in the outside world, see Shirāzī, al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya, 115.

369 Browne, A Year amongst the Persians: Impressions as to the Life, Character, and Thought of the People of Persia Received during Twelve Months' Residence in that Country in the Year 1887-1888 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1391 Sh/2012), 144-147.
One of the key figures of the earlier generation was Mirzā Maḥmūd Qummi (d. 1346/1927) who was born in Qum and had travelled to Tehran to complete his studies where he became one of the well known students of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshīhī because of his sharp intellect. He was famous for his expertise in ʿirfān. Like many other scholars of this period, he was afflicted with poverty. He also benefited from the lessons of ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abu-l-Ḥasan Jalva. He wrote glosses on *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*, the Asfār and on Dawūd al-Qayṣarī’s commentary on the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* as well as a treatise on *vilāyat-i kullī* (complete Guardianship) and composed ʿirfānī poetry, some of which is still extant. His students included Abū-l-Ḥasan Shaʿrānī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī who were both teachers of Ḫasanzāda Āmulī among others. Another of Qumshīhī’s students was Shaykh Ghulām-ʿAlī Shirāżī. He also wrote a glossary on Qayṣarī’s *Sharḥ al-fuṣūṣ*, which contains the thoughts of his teacher as well as other interesting points and glosses on the *Asfār* and *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya*.

The most important students of ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī and Qumshīhī to effect the next generation of scholars were Mirzā Ḥasan Kirmanshāhī who was an expert in peripatetic philosophy, medicine and mathematics, and Mirzā Hāshim Rashtī who was an expert in ʿirfān and Illuminationist philosophy. The next generation of the school of Tehran such as

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374 Shirāżī, *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya*, 104.

375 Shirāżī, *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya*, 104.
Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī, Mirzā Mahdī Āshtiyānī, Mirzā Aḥmad Āshtiyānī, Mirzā Maḥmūd Āshtiyānī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfīʿī Qazwīnī were all students of these two masters.\(^\text{376}\) Although Mirzā ʿAlī Muḥammad Iṣfahānī had been one of the most important students of ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī and Qumshīḥī, he did not have the same effect on the next generation his contemporaries partly due to health problems which prevented him from active teaching.\(^\text{377}\)

Ḥakīm Ṣafā was a ʿārif who taught the commentary of the \textit{Fuṣūṣ} and the \textit{Ishārāt} in Tehran before migrating to Mashhad where he gave up teaching to focus on spiritual exercise.\(^\text{378}\) He seems to have started this training before migrating and was never reported to have left the bounds of the law or belief although some have reported he was afflicted by madness at the end of his life.\(^\text{379}\) He has a \textit{divān} of ṣūfī poetry which contains important theoretical points and from which his spiritual states can be understood.\(^\text{380}\)

The next generation of the school of Tehran includes many key figures who contributed with important writings and teaching. Among them was Mirzā Mahdī Āshtiyānī (d. 1372/1952) who translated Şadrā’s \textit{Asfār} into Persian; wrote a commentary of \textit{Tuhfah al-ḥakīm} of Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Iṣfahānī as well as an incomplete commentary of the \textit{Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikām} of Fārābī, which he stopped when he found out that one of his contemporaries, Mahdī İlahī Qumshīḥī, was also writing a commentary on the same text. He also wrote glosses on the \textit{Asfār}

\textsuperscript{376} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya}, 105.

\textsuperscript{377} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya}, 105, nt. 1.

\textsuperscript{378} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya}, 105, nt. 1.

\textsuperscript{379} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya}, 105, nt. 1.

\textsuperscript{380} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya}, 105, nt. 1.
and on *Bahār al-fawāʾid*.

One of his students, Muḥammad Riżā Rabbānī relates that he entered upon his teacher near the time of his death and found him in a calm state, facing the *qiblah* and remembering God until he recited “Oh the most Merciful of the merciful” (*yā arḥam al-rāḥimīn*) three times, dying during the third repetition.

Mīrzā Mahdī Ilāhī Qumshīhī (1318-1393sh) had travelled to Tehran and taught at the Madrasa-yi Sephasālār. He had been one of the students of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshīhī and was one of the teachers of Muḥammad Riżā Rabbānī and Javād Āmulī. His printed works include a gloss on the *Tafsīr Abī al-Futūḥ*, *Naghmih-i ʿussāq*, *Naghmih-i Ḥusaynī*, *Tawḥīd-i huwshmandān*, a translation of Fārābī’s *Fuṣūṣ* and his unpublished works include *Maqāmāt al-ʿārif*, *Risālat al-ʿushshāq*, *Risālat marāṭib al-ʿidrāk*, *Risālat manṭiq*, a gloss on al-*Maʿbdaʾ wa al-qiṣāb* of Mullā Ṣadrā, and commentary on the famous *Khوṭbat-i Ḥammām* in *Nahj al-balāgha* called *Naghmih-i ilāhī*. His other works include *Falsafah-i kuli*, *Marāṭib al-ʾishq*, a translation of the Qurʾān, a translation of *al-Sahifah al-Sajjādīya* which is a compilation of supplications attributed to the fourth Shiʿī Imām ‘Ali b. Ḥusayn who had the epithet of Sajjād and a translation of *Mafāṭīḥ al-jinān*, the famous supplication compendium written by Abbās Qummī. The common aspect of these three works is their wide practical appeal and use amongst Shiʿīs; layman and scholar alike. His other unpublished works include a work of poetry, *Risālah fī al-umūr al-ʿāmmah* on metaphysics and *Risālah fī sayr wa sulūk* on practical *ʿirfān*.

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Sayyid Kāẓim ‘Aṣṣār, traveled to France and other Western countries to learn new sciences not taught in the East before traveling to Najaf to complete his training in jurisprudence and its principles. He was an open minded scholar and a key link in the transmission and flow of ḥikmat to the West. In Tehran he had studied at the Marwī and Ṣadr schools and later taught at the Sepahsālār. His teachers in the intellectual sciences were Mīrzā Hāshim Rashti, Mīrzā Ḩasan Kirmanshāhī and Mīr Shihāb al-Dīn Nayrizī Shirāzī.\footnote{His primary teacher in ‘irfān was Mīrzā Hāshim Gīlānī.\footnote{His other students included Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāhābādī and Mahdī Āshtiyānī, see Gīlānī, Muntakhab muʿjīm al-ḥukamā’, 183, 188.}} His primary teacher in ‘irfān was Mīrzā Hāshim Gīlānī.\footnote{Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 351-2.} In Najaf he studied under Sayyid Ḩusayn Bādkūbahī who was also a teacher of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī in theoretical ‘irfān.\footnote{See S. Guppy, The Blindfold Horse: Memories of a Persian Childhood (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006) 23.}

His works include a treatise on waḥdat al-wujūd; a treatise on change in decree (badā’); a treatise on the answering of prayers in relation to the question of change in decree; a treatise on the science of hadīth; a treatise on explaining the Qur’ān; a book containing some lessons in philosophy and logic; a treatise answering some selected metaphysical problems; a work on freewill and predestination; and glosses on the Asfār, Sharḥ al-ʿarshīya, the Manẓūma and on part of Uṣūl al-kāfī. He was also behind the Civil Code produced at the time of Reza Shah.\footnote{See S. Guppy, The Blindfold Horse: Memories of a Persian Childhood (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006) 23.}

Some of his most important students became instrumental in the development of ḥikmat and the writing of its history in both the East and West including Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī who has produced numerous critical editions and is introductions where he includes the history of the school of Tehran in many cases for the first time; Āyatullāh Mar’āshī Najafi whose library

\footnote{‘Aṣṣār, Majmū’a-yi āsār, 3.}
is testament to the work he did to preserve Shi‘i works of all genres; Muḥammad Riżā Rabbānī who was an important teacher; Manūchahar Sadūqī Suhā, Dr. Mahdi Muḥaqqiq and Dr. Hossein Nasr who are all well known for their academic contribution.386 Below is an illustration of his teachers and students:

Fig. 2.8: Kāẓim ‘Aṣṣār’s teachers and students.

Āqā Aḥmad Āshtiyānī was born in 1879/1300 in Tehran and was the youngest son of Mirzā Ḥasan Āshtiyānī. He studied the classical texts in theoretical ‘irfān and the ilāhīyat of the Asfār with Mirzā Hāshim Rashti. He studied the ṭabi‘īyat and ilāhīyat sections of Ibn Sinā’s al-Shīfā’,

the commentary on the *al-Ishārat wa al-tanbihāt* of Ibn Sinā, the journey of the soul in the *Asfār* and other general issues in the *Asfār* under Mirzā Ḥasan Kirmanshāhī and was taught a large part of the *Asfār* by Shihāb al-Dīn Nayrizī. He also studied medicine with famous teachers during his time. Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī has based his edition of *Tamhīd al-qawā'id* on Āqā Aḥmad Āshtiyānī’s critical edition of the text and a version written by Mirzā Ḥāmjūd Qummī who wrote glosses on it, some of which seem to have been copied from his teacher Muḥammad Rīzā Qumshīhī.387

Mīrzā Abū-l-Ḥasan Sha’rānī (d. 1435/2014) is an example of a ḥakīm who tried to apply his training in ḥikmat to elucidate the Islamic scriptural sources. He had studied in the Madrasa-yi Marwī and wrote super commentary on Ţūsī’s *Tajrīd*; an introduction and gloss on Sabzavārī’s *Asrār al-ḥikam*; and a book on philosophical terminology. As to the scriptural sources he produced translations and commentaries on *Du’ā’ al-ʿarafa* of Imam Ḥusayn and *Ṣaḥīfah Sajjādiyah*; a gloss on the commentary on the Qur’ān called *Manhaj al-ṣādiqīn*; a gloss on *Majma’ al-bayān*; a gloss on the hermeneutical work of Abū-l-Futūḥ al-Rāzī; an incomplete encyclopedia of Qur’ānic terminology; a gloss on Mullā Ṣāliḥ’s commentary on *Uṣūl al-kāfī*; glosses on *Wasāʿil al-shī’a* and *Irshād al-qulūb*. He also produced some astronomical works and taught astronomy at the Sepahsālār. Ḥasanzāda Āmulī was one of his special students. Sha’rānī’s teachers in the intellectual sciences had included Mirzā Ḥāmjūd Qummi. He distinguished between *taṣawwuf* that does not benefit the *murīd* with practices outside of the divine law and spiritual development within the bounds of the law.388


The last major figure of this generation to be mentioned in this section is Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfi‘ī Qazvinī who came from an esteemed family of Shi‘i scholars. He began his studies in his hometown of Qazvin before traveling to Tehran to pursue them at a higher level and began studying under Shaykh ‘Abd al-Nābi Nūrī in 1915. He also studied under Mīrzā Ḥasan Kirmānshāhī, Ḥājī Fāzīl Tihrānī and Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī among others. He also studied mathematics with Mīrzā Ibrāhīm Zanjānī and Shaykh ʿAlī Rustī before traveling to Qazvin for two years in 1920. On his return to Tehran he taught a variety of books including the Manẓūma and Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt, and then went to Qum in 1922 where he attended Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karīm Ḥā’rī Yazdī’s classes in jurisprudence and its principles while teaching the books of jurisprudence and its principles as well as holding classes on the Asfār and the Manẓūma. He then moved back to Qazvin for between 1930-1960 before returning to Tehran where he passed away. He studied ṯrāfān with Mīrzā Hāshim Ashkivar for some time.

Qazvinī’s many students included Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, Ḥasanzāda Āmuli, Dr Ibrāhīm Dinānī and Dr Sayyid Hossein Nasr. Qazvinī wrote glosses

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389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 19.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 19.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 19.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 19.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 20.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 20.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 21.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 25.
389 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 30-31.
on many works including all the taught texts in the ḥikmat tradition. He wrote separate treatises on many subjects including waḥdat al-wujūd, motion in the category of substance, the reality of the intellect, ḥudūth al-dahrī, the reality of the night of decree, the Prophet’s night ascension and a commentary on the supplication recited in the mornings in the month of Ramadan.

By discussing some of the most important figures in each generation of the scholars of the ḥikmat tradition, this section has shown how the tradition has been passed through close teacher-student relationships which has been the hallmark of classical Islamic education. While the teachings of Mullā Şadrā and Ibn ‘Arabī had been faithfully transmitted by clarifying the meanings of obscure phrases in their works and explaining their thoughts and ramifications, the tradition also developed its own interpretations and a plethora of works were written. Some of these works returned to the original scriptural sources with the strength of philosophical thought and ‘irfānī illumination, whereas other works added dimensions to understanding the original texts through glossing and commentating on them. Important treatises on key topics such as wujūd, walāyah, resurrection, changes in decree, logic, spiritual wayfaring and other topics important to the understanding and application of ḥikmat or related to its practical realization were authored. Critical editions of important texts and well as translations of the Asfār and other important Shi’i works were produced. This method of learning continued in the school of Qum, to which we will shortly focus our attention.

What is noticeable about the last generation of ḥukamā’ that graduated from the school of Tehran is a balance between the more philosophical reading and the ‘irfānī reading of Mullā Şadrā. Although there were those who inclined more to a specific reading, most of these
ḥukamāʾ sought to benefit from variant readings by attending the classes of different experts. At this stage in the development of hikmat and its teaching in Iran there was a level of cohesion. That cohesion was propounded by some of their students who became teachers in the school of Qum. However, in the present age there is a wider separation between the two readings amongst the students of hikmat and the reasons for that will be explained further in the following sections.

4. The School of Qum

Qum has been a centre of traditional Shīʿi learning for centuries; however, the mainstream ḥawza was usually associated traditionalism as Qum has been an important centre of ḥadīth scholarship. Yet it hosted some of the best ḥukamāʾ of the Safavid period in its geographical periphery such as Mullā Ṣadrā who spent his years of seclusion in Kahak, and Fayd Kāshānī who retired to Kashan where he was a prolific writer and teacher. While Isfahan and Tehran flourished as the centres of philosophy, there was no notable figure like Sabzavārī to start a centre of hikmat in Qum. There were others who spoke out against Sufism such as Muḥammad Tāhir Qummī who had been a student of Muḥammad Taqī Majlisī and was later based in Qum where he wrote a treatise with anti-Sufi sentiment. This situation has changed in recent times due to various factors, the most important of which are the migration of philosophers — including those trained by the school of Tehran — after the rejuvenation of the ḥawza in

397 See M. al-Ṭabsī, Qum: ʿĀṣimat al-ḥaḍāra al-shīʿīya (Beirut: Dār Jawād al-aʾimma, 2006) and Newman, The Formative Period of Twelver Shiʿism both of which give some insight into the intellectual milieu in Qum.

Qum under the leadership of ‘Abd al-Karim Ḥā’iri Yazdī (d. 1355/1930) and the success of the Islamic revolution.\(^{399}\)

Sadrian philosophy found its popularity and became more significant after the revolution due to the new role of traditionally trained scholars in national politics\(^{400}\) and the role philosophy played in defending the Islamic outlook from competing ideologies such as Marxism and Westernisation. The foundations for traditional scholarship in Qum had been set by ‘Abd al-Karim Ḥā’iri Yazdī\(^{401}\) — who within the space of a few years revitalized Qum as a centre of learning — and Āyātullah Burūjurdī, who introduced important financial reforms.\(^{402}\) The two visits to Qum by Aḥmad Shah Qajar during Ḥā’iri’s term also contributed to the thriving of Qum.\(^{403}\) His first visit was in 1342/1923 to present his congratulations for its establishment and the second visit was on the arrival of some of the most eminent scholars of Najaf to Qum. These scholars included the likes of Abū-l-Ḥasan Isfahanī and Mirzā Husayn Nā’īnī. Ḥā’iri welcomed these scholars and immediately vested them with teaching positions which helped


\(^{403}\) Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 42.
to bolster Qum’s intellectual activity. The resultant “university town” home to the school of Qum has not been investigated in depth in modern scholarship.

Some publications have investigated the views of specific figures, such as Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī but the largest contributions have been by way of translations of their works, originally written in Persian and Arabic. Such translations are usually targeted at the lay Shiʿi lay population in English speaking countries and are, at times, poor renditions of the originals. Information about the scholars in this school and their works can also be found in the forwards of these translations. The lack of material in English may lead some to believe that Qum has remained disinterested in ḥikmat tradition or has some limited involvement with it, however, a review of the works published in Persian and Arabic and of scholars of importance over the last few years paints an entirely different picture.

Adel, Elmi and Taromi-Rad (eds.) Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya, 42.

M. Litvak, Shiʿi Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq, 2, where he uses the term in reference to Najaf which has similar characteristics as a center of learning, commerce and pilgrimage.

One exception to this is the publication of Mehdi Hāʾiri Yazdī’s PhD dissertation which was originally written in English. See M. Haʾiri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence (Albany, SUNY Press, 1992).


See for example, M. Mutahhari, M. H. Tabatabai, and R. Khumayni, Light Within Me (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2001) and M. H. Ṭihrānī, Kernel of the Kernel showing the difference in the quality of publishing.

For example, on ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī see the references above as well as M. H. Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics, (Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah), tr. Sayyid ʿAlī Qūlī Qarāʾī (London: ICAS Press, 2003).
Two important interrelated developments in the history of Islamic philosophy occur with the school of Qum. The first is the expansion of the discipline from a few interested individuals to the larger population of Shi‘i scholars. One of the key reasons that enabled this expansion of the ḥikmat audience was the introduction of Bidāyat al-ḥikma which is an introductory text written by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā‘ī to be studied by all students of the hawza regardless of their specialisation. Bidāyat is written in accordance with a Peripatetic reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and in many places Ṭabāṭabā‘ī holds positions on philosophical issues which are Peripatetic rather than Sadrian. The book also completely removes the ‘irfānī discussions or explanations of ḥikmat which are found in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works.

The consequence of this method of explaining ḥikmat is that the most widespread understanding of ḥikmat among hawza students based on a Peripatetic reading without the inclusion of theoretical ‘irfān. Ṭabāṭabā‘ī also wrote a text for advanced students of ḥikmat called Nihāyat al-ḥikma. The same issues explained above concerning Bidāyat are to be found in Nihāyat and have had a profound effect on the study of ḥikmat as the ‘irfānī reading of ḥikmat may only be studied after completing Nihāyat, but is usually embarked upon after reading the Asfār as well. Other factors which have increased the ḥikmat audience include recorded lectures on most of the studied books of ḥikmat which has facilitated self learning and the continuation of learning after leaving Qum; the publication of a critical edition of the Asfār; the availability of philosophical books; and the monetary concentration on Qum and its development as the primary centre of learning in the Shi‘i world.

Philosophy plays a key role in disciplines such as the principles of jurisprudence which incorporate a level of philosophical discussion at the level of bahth al-khārij (advanced
research). This means that a student of jurisprudence — which continues to be the mainstay of the ḥawza — requires a good understanding of philosophy to full participate in contemporary discussions on the principles of jurisprudence. In some sense this is a natural development as the principles of jurisprudence is a meta-science considering the methodological issues in deriving jurisprudential rulings and is therefore philosophical by nature. Philosophy is therefore taught to increase the prowess of a scholar and ensure sound intellectual abilities.

The second development is the visible separation in the teaching of philosophy and ‘irfān among contemporary teachers of the school of Qum such as Mişbāḥ Yazdī and Ghulām-Riţā Fayyāţī. As mentioned above, this phenomenon finds its roots in the institutionalization of the ḥikmat tradition in the traditional seminary and a precedent in Bidāyat al-ḥikma. Furthermore, solely teaching a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā at an introductory level to a wider corpus of students means many of these students who do not specialise in ḥikmat do not experience or understand the close relationship between philosophy and ‘irfān still advocated by other members of the school of Qum such as Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Sayyid Kamāl Ḥaydāri and Muḥammad Taqī Ja‘fārī.\(^\text{411}\)

\(^{411}\) Muḥammad Taqī Ja‘fārī studied at the madrasa Marwī and studied the Manẓūma and the Asfār with Mīrzā Mahdī Āshṭiyānī. He travelled to Najaf where alongside his studies in jurisprudence and its principles, he studied philosophy with Shaykh Ṣadrā Qaḍīrī and Shaykh Muṭṭāţā Ĥālīqānī. He returned to Tehran and began a career teaching and writing, producing voluminous commentaries on Nahj al-Balāgha and the Mathnawī of Rumī among about one hundred and fifty works. He also studied Western philosophy and the contemporary issues they raised, see M. F. Ashkivārī, “Falsafah-i islāmī dar Irān-i mu‘āṣir”, in Faṣalnāma-i īsrā, 1388 Sh/2010, (2) 128-130.
The school of Qum also develops characteristics found in earlier schools, the most important of which is its interaction with Western philosophy and its elucidation of ideas fermented in its traditional milieu. It was Islamic metaphysics that asserted an Islamic worldview and protected the position of the hawza in the face of an onslaught of new ideas from the West.

Works in this regard were written by ‘Allâmah Ṭabâṭabâ’î, Murtażâ Muṭahhari and Mahdi Ḥâ’iri Yazdi. The most important of these works was Uṣūl-i falsafa va ravish-i ri’alism written by Ṭabâṭabâ’î and commented upon by Muṭahhari which was a timely written book dealing with western thought and Marxism. Muṭahhari also has works on social issues such as hijâb (Islamic modest dress), education in Islam and sexual ethics. The school of Qum uses hikmat and theoretical ‘irfân as a tool to increase the depth of unrelated topics such as political philosophy in the scheme of walâyat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurist), Qur’anic hermeneutics, ethics and the environment. This has its precedent in the wide inclusion of topics in the writings of Mullâ Ṣadrâ and its contemporary manifestation in the prolific writings of Javâd Āmulî, Ḥasanzâda Āmulî, Mişbâḥ Yazdi and Ja‘far Subḥâni. The state of completeness (jam’) between knowledge of the intellectual and transmitted sciences as well as ‘irfâni realization on a practical level, as the quintessential prototype of the perfect scholar is the driving force behind such efforts. Knowing reality is attained by utilizing all of man’s abilities and revelation, expressed as an infusion of Qur’ân, philosophical burhân (proof) and ‘irfân.


413 Ḥasanzâda champions this view and has written a separate treatise on it see: Hasan Ḥasanzâda Āmulî, Qur’ân va ‘irfân va burhân ham judâyi nadârand (Qum: Intishârât-i Qâ’im, 1374 Sh/1995)
I. Key figures in the School of Qum

There are several key figures that have been instrumental in shaping the philosophical and ʿirfānī landscape in the contemporary ḥawza. In this section some of those figures will be examined further. Perhaps the most influential philosopher in establishing the school of Qum was ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who as well as writing the twin seminal texts, Bidāyat al-ḥikma and Nihāyat al-ḥikma, which replaced Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī’s Sharḥ al-manẓūma as the taught text in the ḥawza, wrote some valuable treatises; a major work of Qurʾānic hermeneutics al-Mīzān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān; and trained important students who currently hold the mantle of philosophy and ʿirfān in the contemporary ḥawza. ʿIrfaṇ was the hallmark of Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and his stance on the subject contributed to its acceptance in the mainstream ḥawza.

At the same time, other important teachers from the school of Tehran like Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāzil Tūnī, Mīrzā Mahdi Āshtiyānī, Mīrzā Mahdi Ilāhi Qumshīhī, Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār, Āḥmad Āshtiyānī, Mīrzā Abū-l-Ḥasan Shaʿrānī and Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfiʿī Qazwīnī contributed to the education of important students like ‘Abd Allāh Javād Mul, Ḥasan Hāsanzāda Āmulī, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, Dr Ghulām-Ḥusayn Ibrāhīm Dinānī414

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414 A professor at the University of Tehran who has a number of important works including Gh. I. Dinānī, Qawāʿid-i kull-i falsafī dar falsafa-i Islāmī, 2 vols (Tehran: Pazhūhishgāh-i ‘ulūm-i insān va muṭālī’āt-i farhangī, 1388 Sh/2009); Gh. I. Dinānī, Shuʿāʿ-yi andisha va shuhud dar falsafa-i Suhrawardī; and Gh. I. Dinānī Wujūd-i rābiṭ va mustaqīl dar falsafa-i Islāmī (Tehran: Mu’assasa-yi pazhūhishī-yi ḥikmat va falsafa-i Irān, 1383 Sh/2004).
Muḥammad Rizā Rabbānī⁴⁵ and Sayyid Hossein Nasr. These students of the school of Qum are teachers in various intellectual environments including Iranian and Western academia and are current experts in their fields. In the contemporary era their students enjoy increased popularity and will eventually take their place in shaping the landscape of philosophy and 'irfān in the Iranian hawza. Some of those students include Dāwūd Ṣamad Āmulī,⁴⁶ Ghulām-

⁴⁵ He was a student of Mirzā Mahdī Ḥashtiyānī for about fourteen years, studying the Fuṣḥās of Ibn 'Arabī, Miṣbaḥ al-uns, Ṣadrā’s al-Shawāhid al-rubūbīya and parts of the Fuṣūs of Farābī with him during that time. He had immense respect for his teacher and always had pen in hand during class. After Ḥashtiyānī’s death he attended the classes of Abū-I-Ḥasan Ṭāfī’i Qazwīnī for twenty years and would have private classes in ‘irfān with him during the holidays. He also attended the classes of Mahdī Qumshīhī and Sayyid Ḥājīm ‘Aṣār. See M. Rabbānī, Ḥamd-i Rabbānī (Qum: Maṭbuat-i dānā, 1386 Sh/2007); Muḥammad Rizā Rabbānī, Āʿīnā-yi īzādnumā (Tehran: Nashr-i jānān, 1376 Sh/1997); M. Rabbānī, Miʿrāj-i Rabbānī (Tehran: Nashr-i dānā, 1382 Sh/2003) 4-7. He has written commentaries on the Qurʾānic chapters of al-Fāṭihah (chapter 1) and al-Kawthar (chapter 108); a book on Lady Fāṭīmah’s poetry; D. Ṣamadī Āmulī, Fūḥṣūl 'ulāʾī al-uns, Muḥammad Rizā Rabbānī, Ḥamād-i Ḥamād-i Rabbānī (no place: Muʾassasa-yi kūhān, 1376 Sh/1997). His own works include a book on consciousness from a practical perspective, see D. Ṣamadī Āmulī, Hużūr va murāqabāt (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim, 1387 Sh/2008); and a commentary on Ṣadrā’s Nihāyat al-ḥikma, see Dāwūd Ṣamad Āmulī, Sharḥ nihāyat al-ḥikma, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim, 1386 Sh/2007).

⁴⁶ He has made important contributions as a commentator on Āyatullāh Ḥasanāzādā Āmulī’s works including D. Ṣamad Āmulī, Sharḥ daftar-i dīl (Qum: Intishārāt-i ibn ‘Arabī, 1386 Sh/2007) which is an exposition of some of Ḥasanāzādā Āmulī’s poetry; D. Ṣamad Āmulī, Sharḥ marāṭib-i tahārat az risāla-yi vaḥdat az didgāh-i ārīf va ḥakīm ‘allāma-yi Ḥasanāzādā Āmulī (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim Āl Muḥammad, 1388 Sh/2009); and D. Ṣamad Āmulī, Ādāb-i sālik ilā Allāh (Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mīm, 1386 Sh/2007); and D. Ṣamad Āmulī, Sharḥ risāla rābiṭa-i ‘ilm va dīn (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim Āl Muḥammad, 1387 Sh/2008). He has also translated some of Ḥasanāzādā Āmulī’s works into Farsi including Ḥasan Ḥasanāzādā Āmulī, Tarjuma-yi risāla-i wujūd-i rābīṭ va rābīṭa, tr. D. Ṣamad Āmulī (Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mīm, 1387 Sh/2008); Ḥasan Ḥasanāzādā Āmulī, Tarjuma-yi risāla-i ja’l, tr. D. Ṣamad Āmulī (Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mīm, 1387 Sh/2008); Ḥasan Ḥasanāzādā Āmulī, Addākār-i sālik ilā Allāh, tr. D. Ṣamad Āmulī (Qum: Nashr-i alif lām mīm, 1387 Sh/2008). His own works include a book on consciousness from a practical ‘irfān perspective, see D. Ṣamad Āmulī, Ḥuzūr va murāqabāt (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim Āl Muḥammad, 1387 Sh/2008); and a commentary on Ṣadrā’s Nihāyat al-ḥikma, see Dāwūd Ṣamad Āmulī, Sharḥ nihāyat al-ḥikma, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Qāʾim Āl Muḥammad, 1386 Sh/2007).
Rižā Fayyāţī, Ḥasan Ramaţānī Khurasānī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nā‘ījī, Ḥamīd Parsānī and Sayyid Yad-Allāh Yazdānpanāh.

Aside for these key students many others were trained by the second generation of teachers in the school of Qum and the students of Javād Āmuli and Ḥasanzāda Āmuli are especially plentiful in the current hawza system. With the introduction of recording devices during the careers of the Āmulis the lessons of these masters have been preserved for future generations who may not have had direct access to their classes. Recorded lessons of the Āmulis and some of their most important students include all the major works and seminal texts in philosophy and ‘irfān and are easily available at low prices. These recorded sessions are often transcribed further facilitating the possibility of self study, which adds a new dimension to traditional Islamic learning, allowing students to benefit from a variety of classes on the same text whether they are present in Qum or anywhere else in the world. This development especially facilitates learning for women, who are usually unable to attend segregated classes. The critical editions of important works produced by both the school of Tehran and the school of

417 A famous teacher of ḥikmat, who is more well known for his departures from Sadrian philosophy some of which are explained in his four volume gloss of Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Niḥāyat al-ḥikma.

418 Who has trained many students as well as produced an important Arabic gloss on Ibn Turkah’s Tamhid al-qawā’id and a treatise on asceticism in ‘irfān in a series of forty lessons using Khwājah Ḥab Allāh Anṣārī’s Manāzil al-sā’īrin as a basis, see Ḥ. Ramażānī Khurasānī, Riyādat dar ‘urf-i ‘irfān (Qum: Ayat-ī ishrāq, 1388 Sh/2009).

419 He has produced a sizable Farsi commentary on Tamhid al-qawā’id in two volumes and possibly the first complete Shi’i commentary on Mişbāḥ al-uns of Ḥamzah Fanārī in Farsi in five thick volumes.


421 His introductory lessons on ‘irfān have been transcribed and published, see Yazdānpanāh, Mabānī; he has also written a two volume work on Illuminationist philosophy see Y. Yazdānpanāh, Ḥikmat-i ishrāq, ed. M. ‘Alīpūr, 2 vols (Qum: Pazhūhishgāh-yi hawza va dānashgāh and Tehran: Sāzmān-i mutţāla’a va tadvin-i kutub ‘ulūm-i insānī dānashgāh-hā, 1391 Sh/2012).
Qum became widely distributed with the modernization of the printing press. More recently software which contain libraries of books and search facilities are provided at discounted prices to seminary students, further facilitating the study and spread of ḥikmat within or outside the city of Qum.

i. **Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī**

Although Khumaynī taught philosophy he was clearly more influenced by and took a larger interest in the ‘irfānī aspects of the ḥikmat tradition and this is evident in his writing where he more often expresses his ideas in ‘irfānī terms. This aspect of his personality was also evident from his disinterest in Peripatetic philosophy as opposed to Illuminationist and transcendental philosophy, which are both closer to ‘irfān than the purely rational approach of the Peripatetics. He felt that Sadrian philosophy was so different to the Greek philosophy that greatly influenced the Peripatetics that Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy could not be said to have originated in Greek philosophy. This outlook clearly influenced both his reading and teaching of Mullā Ṣadrā. He studied ‘irfān under Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī and frequently acknowledges his teacher’s excellence in his writings. He also studied ‘irfān with Mîrzā Javād Maliki Tabrizī for a short period until his death. Tabrizī had migrated to Qum

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424 He has mentioned him by name about fifty times in his collected works and also refers to him with terms such as Shayykhunā and the perfect ‘ārif (‘ārif-i kâmil).
from Najaf after spending some time in Tabriz and Tehran. Maliki Tabrizi wrote on the secrets of prayer in Asrār al-salāt; on meeting God in Risālat liqā Allāh; and the spiritual states and manners of each month of the Islamic calendar in al-Murāqabāt.

Khumaynī's teachers in ḥikmat included Abū-l-Hāṣan Rāfī‘ Qazwīnī and ‘Alī Akbar Yazdī, who was a student of Alī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Hasan Jilva. Khumaynī contributed to the field by writing glosses on Qayṣarī's commentary on the Fuṣūṣ and Miṣbāḥ al-uns; a commentary on sūrat al-Fāṭiha (the first chapter of the Qur'ān); two books on prayer, Asrār al-ṣalāt and Ādāb al-ṣalāt; a commentary on the supplication recited in the early hours of the morning in the month of Ramaḍān known as Du‘ā’ al-saḥr; a commentary on forty aḥādīth which serves as a text from which classes on ethics are given in the contemporary ḥawza; a commentary on one hadīth from al-Kāfī called Junūd-i aql va jahl; and an important work on walāyah called Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya ilā al-kilāfa wa al-walāya. He also wrote glosses on the Asfār which have been lost. Khumaynī believed that a book on ethics should not explain ethical issues in an academic and detached way, but that the book itself should improve the readers and solve their ethical deficiencies. That is that since knowledge should not be pursued

425 Bāḍī‘ī, Dar asnān-i mu‘rifat, 111.
426 Ashkīwārī, “Falsafah-i islāmī dar Irān-i mu‘āšir”, 113
427 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamāʾ, 454: 480.
428 A commentary on his gloss has been published, see ‘A. Maẓāhirī, Sharḥ ta‘līqa-yi Āyatallāh al-ʿuẓmā Imām Kumaynī bar Fuṣūṣ al-hikam-i Ibn ‘Arabī (Tehran: Nashr-i ‘ilm, 1387 Sh/2008).
431 He expressed this view in his ethical writings, see for example, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Junūd al-‘aqīl wa al-jahl, tr. A. Fahrī (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-a’lami li-l-maṭbū‘āt, 2009) 10-11.
simply for its own sake, but for self improvement and seeking the Truth, writings dealing with those subjects should reflect those aims and stay away from scientific points of limited use.

Khumaynī was an accomplished jurist and spent many years studying and teaching jurisprudence and its principles at the highest levels offered by the Islamic seminary and was the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran. His most prominent teacher of jurisprudence and its principles was the founder of the seminary in Qum, ‘Abd al-Karīm Ḥā’irī Yazdī. The collective nature of his personality as jurist, ārif, philosopher and revolutionary has served as an inspiration to many, especially those within the hawza and his ideas are taught until today in the modern hawza. He taught Sharḥ al-manẓūma and the Asfār in Qum between 1944 and 1949 although many of his classes were private due to the negative attitude towards philosophy in Qum at that time when some philosophers were pronounced infidels.432 It was Khumaynī’s attitude in creating an environment for philosophy that paved the way for the success of other philosophers like ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī.433 His students include Murtażā Muṭahharī, Mahdī Ḥā’irī Yazdī, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtīyānī and Sayyid ‘Abd al-Ghanī Ardabīlī.434

ii. ‘Allāmah Muhammad Husayn Tabāṭabā’ī

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī was the key figure who transmitted the philosophical teachings of the school of Tehran to the school of Qum and the time he spent in Qum marks a key turning

point in the ḥawza. While most biographical accounts about him are posthumous and hagiographical, he no doubt had a deep affect on the ḥawza. Soon after Ṭabāṭabāʾī arrived important students like Javād Ṭāmul (in 1955) and Ḥasanzāda Ṭāmul (in 1963) moved to Qum from Tehran. His teacher in Tamhīd al-qawāʾid, Sayyid Ḥusayn Bādkūbah was a student of Mirzā Hāshim Ashkivārī who was a student of Muḥammad Rizā Qumshī, Alī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Jalīva. ‘Allāmah in turn taught Tamhīd al-qawāʾid among other subjects and texts in private circles in Qum but has an Avicennian approach in his philosophical writing. His teacher in practical ʿirfān was Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī, who had been the student of Sayyid Aḥmad Karbalāʾī who was a student of Mullā Ḥusayn-Qulī Hamadānī.

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436 Ashkivārī, “Falsafah-i islāmī dar Īrān-i muʿāṣir”, 133.


438 See Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, al-Tamhīd fī sharḥ qawāʾid al-ṭawḥīd, edited and glossed by Ḥasan Ramażānī Khurāsānī, 11; and Badiʿī, Dar asmān-i maʿrifat, 20-21. Mirzā Hāshim Ashkivārī taught in the madrasah Sephasālār until he became the head teacher in transcendental philosophy. He has writings in ḥikmat and his gloss on Miṣbāḥ al-uns has been published.

439 Mullā Ḥusayn-Qulī Hamadānī was a student of Sayyid ʿAlī Shushtārī who was a student of Mullā Qulī Jūlān. His chain of teachers ends here and Jūlān’s teacher and to a large extent Jūlān himself was unknown even to Shushtārī. Shushtārī was a scholar in Shushtar and when he met Jūlān he was confused about a conflict concerning land that was disputed as waqf as both sides seemed to have valid arguments. At that time Jūlān came to Shushtārī’s house and told Shushtārī to go to Najaf and told him where to find the agreement proving that the land was indeed waqf. Shushtārī went to Najaf and after some time met Mullā Ḥusayn-Qulī Hamadānī looking for guidance. After a while Mullā Ḥusayn-Qulī Hamadānī took on the role of spiritually training students including Sayyid Aḥmad Karbalāʾī, Shaykh Muḥammad Taqī Ṭāmul and Mirzā Malīkī Tabrīzī who was one of the
ʿAllāmah takes a philosophical approach to interpreting and explaining Mullā Ṣadrā in all of his important works but it is the accounts of his students that betray his more ʿirfānī side. While he was clearly involved in practical ʿirfān he preferred not to discuss philosophical issues from an ʿirfānī perspective in his works but rather spoke about ʿirfān in private. The meetings in Tehran between ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Henry Corbin over a period of twenty years displayed a new method of interaction between the Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, where the Islamic tradition was respected as a rich tradition in its own right. Such a meeting of minds had not been recorded before. Due to this approach Corbin was one of the first Orientalists to write about Shiʿi ʿirfān in a depth and therefore one of the pioneers of academic interest in the field today. Others included Toshihiko Izutsu, who contributed provided a rigorous analysis of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as well as a critical edition and translation of Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma. Henry Corbin was introduced to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī by another important academic; Sayyed Hossein Nasr, who at that time was the director at the Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy.

Ṭabāṭabāʾī wrote a number of important works in philosophy. Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāžī relates the story of the genesis of Bidāyat and Nihāyat, in his lectures on Nihāyat al-ḥikma. These books were the result of courses he taught to a select number of philosophy students.

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teachers of Imām Khumaynī, see Bādīʾī, Dar asmān-i maʿrifat, 39-41. See Ţihrānī, Kernel of the Kernel, xvii for a diagrammatic representation of his chain until Mullā Ḥusayn-Qulī Hamadānī.

44 For example see Ţihrani, Shining Sun, 8-9.

44 For more information on his life and an annotated bibliography of his works on Islamic topics see D. Shayegan, “Corbin, Henry”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica [online], 1993, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/corbin-henry-b
Although Mullā Ḥādī Sabzavārī’s work *Sharḥ gurar al-farāʾid*, better known as *Sharḥ al-manẓūma* had been used as the introductory text to the study of philosophy until that time, `ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī was approached to write an introductory book which would be suitable for students of all disciplines as well as exclude some of the more `īr蕨į content in *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*. The *Sharḥ al-manẓūma* is a poetical rendition of transcendental philosophy, based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s magnum opus known as the *Asfār*. Therefore `ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī set about writing a work based on *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*. Once he had finished the book was taught for the first time by Āyatullāh Javād Āmulī, after which he suggested some improvements that were subsequently incorporated into the text. This book was called *Bidāyat al-ḥikma*. After a while `ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī was approached a second time and was asked to write another book which would be suitable for more advanced students of philosophy. This time Ṭabāṭabā’ī wrote a book directly based on the *Asfār*, which was subsequently taught by Āyatullāh Javād Āmulī and became known as *Nihāyat al-ḥikma*. These two books enabled a large variety of students to have a good understanding of philosophical concepts, without having to specialize in the study of philosophy.\(^{442}\)

Although the *Manẓūma* and *Nihāyat* both draw directly on the *Asfār*, *Bidāyat* acts as an introduction to both of these texts. Its comparatively simple phraseology and summarized entries make it a good introductory book to the study of metaphysics as a whole. The lack of distinction between the various philosophies included in *Bidāyat* under the general assumption of it being an introductory text in transcendental philosophy leaves room to

\(^{442}\) Fayyāžī, “Dars 1”, in *Tasjīlāt-i durūs-i Nihāyat-i ḥikmat* (Qum: Mu’assasa-yi amūzish-i narmafzā’i-yi Quds, no date) 00:38-06:27.
confuse the beginner. ‘Allamah’s selection of ideas that he incorporated into *Bidāyat* and *Nihāyat* offer an insight into some of his views on philosophy. Firstly he was careful to separate philosophical, ‘irfāni and scriptural discussions. So in both books there is no mention of ‘irfāni concepts, nor are there quotes from Qurʾān and *ahādīth*. ‘Allamah believed that these discussions all had their own principles and so mixing them would result in inaccurate conclusions.

Secondly, he departs from Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles in some concepts and prefers the ideas of the Peripatetic philosophers due to the strength of their demonstrative proofs. ‘Allamah Ṭihrānī summarizes Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s views on philosophy as follows:

Our teacher truly revered Ibn Sina and regarded him as stronger in philosophical arguments and demonstration than Mulla Sadra. Meanwhile, he was a proponent of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical approach in transforming Greek philosophy, and his new and original views in discussing subjects like principality, unity and gradation (*tashkik*) of being…’Allamah Tabataba’i regarded Mulla Sadra’s philosophy as superior to others, and the closest to reality… Moreover, ‘Allamah maintained that most of the objections made against Mulla Sadra and his philosophy were due to failing to understand what he really meant in his discussions…’Allamah considered him [Mulla Sadra] the reviver of Islamic philosophy…

*Uṣūl-i falsafa va ravish-i ri’ālīm* is a work of comparative philosophy which resulted from meetings initiated by Ṭabāṭabā’i held on Wednesday and Thursday nights. In this book

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443 Tihrani, *Shining Sun*, 27.


Ṭabāṭabā’ī critically analyzes western philosophy and Marxism which at that time was widely influencing the worldview of seminary students. At the same time, Ṭabāṭabā’ī presented Islamic philosophy in a new way. He wrote an important treatise on guardianship called *Risālat al-walāya* which has been rendered in English several times. His other treatises include a treatise on *tawḥīd*; a treatise on the Names of God; a treatise on proof; a treatise on error (*mughālaṭa*); a treatise on dreams; and a treatise on potential and action.

*Tafsīr al-mīzān* is a work of Qur’ānic hermeneutics which presents a medium between the purely intellectual hermeneutical works on the Islamic scriptural sources, presented by a host of philosophers, *ḥukamā* and ‘*urafā*’ and the traditional approach to Qur’ānic commentary. The work, in parts, successfully uses a self contained hermeneutical method, where the Qur’ān is used to explain itself. Since Muslims consider the Qur’ān as the only completely infallible source, this method ensures interpretations endorsed by the Qur’ān itself and therefore stays away from baseless personal opinion (*ra’y*). It is perhaps this breath of appeal that made the work so popular and effective. While those not versed in the intricacies of philosophy are able to access deeper meanings, those acquainted with the intellectual sciences can appreciate the finer ideas ‘Allāmah presents. Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s step towards spreading philosophy to a wider circle of scholars was carried through by one of his most important students; Murtażā Muṭahharī. Ṭabāṭabā’ī traced the inspiration for his method of hermeneutics to his spiritual teacher Sayyid ‘Ali Qāḍi, who had written his own partial commentary using this method, saying:

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It was the late Qadi who taught us this style of interpreting the verses of the Qur’an by one another. We follow his method and style in Qur’anic hermeneutics. Moreover, he was very bright and open-minded on the traditions reported from the Infallible Imams. We learnt method of comprehension of traditions, called fiqh al-hadith, from him.448

iii. Murtażā Mutahhari

Mutahhari arrived in Qum in 1944 after completing his introductory studies in Mashhad.449 He attended Khumayni’s classes in the Asfār and Sharḥ al-manẓūma as well as his classes in jurisprudence and its principles before attending the classes of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī.450 He became Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s most significant student and wrote an important commentary on Uṣūl-i falsafa explaining Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s more complicated insights in an accessible way. Mutahhari’s clear style — which betrays a sound understanding — is seen in all of his numerous works which were all originally composed in Farsi. He wrote commentaries on Ibn Sinā’s Najāt; parts four, eight and nine of Ibn Sinā’s Ishārāt; on the ilāhīyāt section of the Shifā’; on the Asfār; and on Sharḥ al-manẓūma.

448 Tihrani, Shining Sun, 18.
450 He also attended the classes of Mirzā Mahdī Aṣhtiyāni for some time see Ashkivarī, “Falsafah-i islāmī dar Irān-i mu’āṣir”, 119.
Muṭahhari did not limit himself to the traditional books of philosophy. Aside from his commentary on *Uṣūl-i falsafa* he wrote other works on philosophy in a wider sense such as a four volume work on the philosophy of history; a criticism of Marxism; on practical philosophy where he includes the views of Kant; and the philosophy of ethics. He wrote books in 'irfān on the perfect man; on spiritual freedom; and on the 'irfānī points in Ḥāfiz’s poetry. He was also possibly the first traditional philosopher to pay serious attention to the history of philosophy in his book *Khadamat-i mutaqābil-i Islām wa Īrān*. The works he wrote in other subjects such as prophethood, justice and the purpose of the human derive from his philosophical outlook which was heavily influenced by Mullā Ṣadrā and his understanding of the Islamic scriptural sources. His clear style and numerous writings and speeches on various subjects greatly contributed to the dissemination of *ḥikmat* amongst other scholars and lay Muslims. He thereafter moved to Tehran in 1952 where he was intellectually and politically active until he was assassinated.

iv.  *Mahdī Hā‘īrī Yazdī*

Mahdi (d. 1420/1999) was the son of Ḥāfīz Hā‘īrī Yazdī, who had established the *ḥawza* in Qum. Mahdi studied philosophy with Mīrzā Mahdī Āshtiyānī, Sayyid Aḥmad Khunsārī,

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459 Muṭahhari disusses Marxism in a variety of contexts but for his critique of materialism in general where he also discusses Marxism see M. Muṭahhari, *Majmū‘a-yi āsār-i ustād shahīd Muṭahharī*, 27 vols (Tehran: Intishārāt-i ṣadrā, 1378 Sh/ 1999) (3) 23-54.


453 Ashkivārī, “Falsafah-i islāmī dar Īrān-i mu‘āšir”, 119. He taught at the Marwī school while Javādī Āmulī was there and that is how they became colleges. Muṭahhari would seek Javādī Āmulī’s help in finding sources in the library as he was new to the school, see Javādī Āmulī, *Mahr-i ustād*, 92.
Sayf-Allāh Isī and Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī with who he studied the Manẓūma and the Asfār for more than ten years. He maintained scholarly connection with Khumaynī via written correspondence and would ask him about problems he was having understanding ʿirfānī texts. After completing his traditional studies and obtaining a doctorate from the University of Tehran he traveled to America and wrote a book on the epistemological notion of knowledge by presence. He spent about ten years studying and teaching at western universities, including Harvard and Oxford, before returning to teach at the University of Tehran. He is one of the earliest hukamāʾ to experience Western thought first hand, perhaps preceded only by Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār. He has written works on universal science, pure reason (ʿaql-i naẓar), practical reason (ʿaql-i ʿamal) comparative notions of existence in his work Haram-i hastī (The Pyramid of Existence), and a Arabic commentary on the Shifāʾ.

Some of his courses have been transcribed including his classes on analytic philosophy, the fourth journey of the Asfār in a book called Safar-i nafs (The Journey of the Soul), and philosophical investigations.

v. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī

455 Hāʾirī Yazdī, Justārhā-yi falsafī, 482
456 See Hāʾirī Yazdī, Knowledge by Presence.
457 Hāʾirī Yazdī, Knowledge by Presence, x.
458 Hāʾirī Yazdī, Knowledge by Presence, x-xi.
459 Hāʾirī Yazdī, Knowledge by Presence, xi.
460 Ashkivar, “Falsafah-i islāmī dar Īrān-i muʾāṣir”, 123.
Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn traveled to Qum from Ashtiyan in 1944, where he received his preliminary education. Whilst studying the other traditional subjects, he studied philosophy with Shaykh Mahdi Māzdārānī.\textsuperscript{461} He travelled to Najaffor two years in 1956 to strengthen his jurisprudence and then returned once more to Qum where he joined the philosophical and hermeneutical classes of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī.\textsuperscript{462} He was also a student of Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfī Ṭabāṭabā’ī Qazwīnī for some time,\textsuperscript{463} and studied parts of the Āṣfār with Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtiyānī.\textsuperscript{464} He finally settled down in Mashhad where he taught philosophy and ‘irfān for eleven years.

Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn is one of the figures better known in the West due to his collaboration with Henry Corbin,\textsuperscript{465} and he has significantly contributed to writing the history of this period in the Persian language through the writing of introductions to major works and the publication of critical editions of key texts.\textsuperscript{466} These texts include many of the most important classical

\textsuperscript{461} Ashkivar, “Falsafāh-i islāmī dar Iran-i mu’āṣir”, 124-5.

\textsuperscript{462} Ashkivar, “Falsafāh-i islāmī dar Iran-i mu’āṣir”, 125.

\textsuperscript{463} Qazvīnī, Majmūʿa-yi ḥavāshī, 31.

\textsuperscript{464} Lāhjūjī, Sharḥ risāla al-Mashāʿir, 73, nt. 1.


texts in philosophy and *ʿirfān* such as *Sharḥ fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* of Qaysārī and of Muʿayyid al-Dīn Jandi; *Tamhid al-qawāʿid* with the glosses of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Maḥmūd Qummi, Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Shawāhid al-rubūbiya; al-Mazāhir al-ilāḥiya*; and *al-Mabdaʿ wa al-maʿād*; as well as selected texts from the time of Mullā Ṣadrā to Mullā Ṭāhir ʿAlī Nūrī including texts by Muḥammad Mahdi Narāqī, Muḥammad Bīdābādī, Mullā Ismāʿīl Khwājū, Qāḍī Saʿīd Qummi and Fayd Kāshāni in *Muntakhābātī az āsār-i ḥukamā-yi Īrān* comprising of four volumes. He also published and introduced works produced by the school of Tehran such as ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī’s *Anvār-i jalīya dar kashf-i āsrār-i ḥaq-i ʿAlawīya* and his *Lamaʿāt al-ilāḥiya*; a collection of Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī’s treatises; Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAṣār’s collected works; and Mahdi ʿAshtīyānī’s *Asās al-tawḥīd*.

The breadth of his publications means that the history of ḥikmat and especially its history after Mullā Ṣadrā can barely be studied without reference to ʿAshtīyānī’s valuable contribution. He was a prolific writer and produced important works in ḥikmat and ʿirfān such as *Naqd bar Tahāfat al-falāsifa-i Ghazālī* (Criticisms on the Incoherence of Ghazālī), *Sharḥ-i ḥāl va ārā-yi falsa费率-i Mullā Ṣadrā* (A Commentary on the State and Opinions of Mullā Ṣadrā), *Sharḥ Zād al-musāfīr-i Mullā Ṣadrā* (A Commentary on the Provision of the Traveller of Mullā Ṣadrā), *Sharḥ muqadima-i Qaysārī* (A Commentary on Qaysārī’s Introduction [to the Fuṣūṣ]) and *Hastī az naẓar-i ʿirfān va falsafa* (Being According to ʿirfān and Philosophy). He was more inclined towards ʿirfān than pure philosophy.467

Javādī Āmulī was born into a family of scholars and after completing his studies in Amul and Mashhad to a reasonable level at the hands of capable scholars, he travelled to Tehran in 1950 and studied at the Marwī school under teachers such as Abū-l-Ḥasan Shaʿrānī with whom he studied part of Manẓūma, part of the Ishārāt of Ibn Sinā and part of the Asfār; Muḥyyī al-Dīn Ilāhī Qumshīhī with whom he studied the 'īrfānī points in the Ishārāt; Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fażīl Tūnī with whom he studied the Fuṣūṣ of Ibn ʿArabī with Qayṣarī's commentary; and Muhammad Taqī Āmulī who had been one of the students of Sayyid ʿAlī Qādī. He then travelled to Qum in 1955 and studied in the Madrasa-yi Ḵuǧjatiya attending the classes of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī in philosophy, 'īrfān and Qurʾānic hermeneutics while furthering his studies in jurisprudence and its principles.

Javādī Āmulī preferred 'Allāmah's private classes, where 'Allāmah gave his opinions on various important topics. 'Allāmah also gave lessons on resurrection, commented on the poetry of

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468 In his autobiography, Mahr-i ustād, Javādī Āmulī includes some points about the teaching style of his teachers in Amul, which encapsulate the style of teaching in the traditional hawza. Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 39-48. For his experience in Mashhad see Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 51-53.
469 Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 60; 63-65.
470 Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 60; 65-71. He was a spiritual character and never went to Mashhad unless he was invited by Imām Riḍā. When Javādī Āmulī asked him what this meant, he said that sometimes he sees himself in the haram or its courtyard in a dream and then he goes to Mashhad see Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 69.
471 Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 60; 78-87. Tūnī studied the Fuṣūṣ under Ākhund Kāshī in Isfahan for two years.
472 Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 73-78
473 Ashkivarī, "Falsafah-i islāmi dar Irān-i muʿāṣir", 133
474 Even though he did not attend these particular sessions see Javādī Āmulī, Mahr-i ustād, 117.
Hāfiẓ and taught some of the classical texts at a high level in these gatherings such as Tamhid al-qawā'id. During the course of his studies Javādī Amuli realized the ‘Allāmah was no ordinary teacher but a true hakīm. Javādī Amuli continues his teaching activities until today with classes in Qur’ānic hermeneutics, which are transcribed and published in a voluminous work entitled Tasnīm; classes in ethics and insights into Nahj al-balāgha; and bāḥth al-khārij in jurisprudence and its principles. During his long teaching career he has taught the important texts in philosophy and ‘irfān including Bīdāyat, Nihāyat, the Shifā’, the Asfār, Tamhid al-qawā’id and the Fuṣūṣ all of which have available recordings.

vii. Hasan Hasanzāda Amuli

Originally from Amul, Hasanzāda Amuli traveled to Tehran in 1950 to further his studies at the Ḥājj Abū-l-Fatḥ school and then proceeded to the Marwī school and studied with many of the same teachers as Āyatullāh Javādī Amuli. Ḥasanzāda Amuli’s career is distinguished by the numerous teachers whom he studied and maintained close connections with. While in Tehran he was a notable student of Abū-l-Ḥasan Rāfī’ī Qazwīnī and a student of Aḥmad Āshṭiyānī. Then he proceeded to Qum in 1963 where he studied Qur’ānic hermeneutics, philosophy, ‘irfān and the occult sciences under masters such as ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ilāhī and Sayyid Mahdī Qāḍī.

475 Javādī Amuli, Mahr-i ustaḏ, 117-120.
476 Javādī Amuli, Mahr-i ustaḏ, 127.
Hasanzâda Âmuli has scholarly works in almost every field of ḥikmat including mathematics, astronomy and medicine and is a prolific writer (with about two hundred works primarily in ḥikmat and ‘urfân) in both Arabic and Farsi and is a teacher in all of those fields. As he displays incredible depth and grasp of the subjects he comments on and is also a poet. Most of his works are tainted with ‘urfânî language and concepts. As opposed to some of the other ḥukamâ‘ of the school of Qum, Hasanzâda has not written any work dealing with Western philosophy. In his view the West has advanced in the sciences, but is not on a level playing field in the inner sciences dealt with in the ḥikmat and ‘urfân tradition. Hasanzâda Âmuli believes that the Qur’an, philosophy and ‘urfân are in perfect harmony and cannot be separated from each other.

viii. Muhammad Taqi Mišbah Yazdî

Mišbah Yazdî was a student of ‘Allamah Tâbâţabâ‘î in both philosophy and Qur’ânic hermeneutics, and gained a reputation for his insightfulness, precision, critical analysis and new ideas. He taught the important philosophical texts including Nihâyat, sections of the Shifā‘ and sections of the Asfâr. Among his works are two new texts in philosophy (Âmûzish-i falsafa) and theology (Âmûzish-i aqâ‘id) taught at the introductory level in the ḥawza.

480 Ashkivari, “Falsafah-i islami dar Irân-i mu‘âşir”, 131. For a list of his works, most of which have been published, see http://www.heatmapislami.com/showdata.aspx?dataid=5126&siteid=1
Āmūzish-i falsafa (Philosophical Instructions) is studied before Bidâyat and includes important sections on the history of Western philosophy, which was an innovative introduction to traditional education which usually focuses on the Islamic view alone. It indicates Mišbâḥ Yazdî’s view on the importance of being aware of Western philosophy.

Apart from his hermeneutical works including Mafāhîm al-Qurʿân (Qur’anic Concepts), Akhlâq dar Qurʿân (Ethics in the Qurʿân), Qurʿân dar āyina-i Nahj al-balâgha (The Qurʿân in the Mirror of Nahj al-Balâgha), Khudâshanâs dar Qurʿân (Knowledge of God in the Qurʿân) and Jang va jihâd dar Qurʿân (War and Struggle in the Qurʿân). Mišbâḥ Yazdî has written works on the philosophy of ethics, ethics, ‘îrфан, politics, theology and beliefs and the history of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Like Muṭahharî his works apply philosophical skills to new areas of research, thereby increase their depth and persuasiveness.

Conclusion

In this chapter the discussion on the readings of Mullâ Ṣadrâ has been contextualized by examining the historical development of the schools of Tehran and Qum. The chapter has also introduced the most important ḥukamâ’ who contributed to the development of Sadrian philosophy over the last two centuries. An attempt has also been made to analyze lines of transmission in the teaching of both a more philosophical reading of Mullâ Ṣadrâ and an ‘îrфанî one. The pivotal role of Muḥammad Bidâbâdi in the transmission of ‘îrфанî teachings to both the schools of Tehran and Najaf was discussed as his students dispersed and became teachers in both centers. While Bidâbâdi’s expertise in ‘îrфан and the ‘îrфанî reading of Mullâ Ṣadrâ may
have originated in his interaction with the Dhahabīya order through Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrizī, Āshtiyānī suggests that these expertise were transmitted through Sadrian lines as Mullā Ṣadrā was an ʿārif in his own right.

An important finding of this chapter was the interactive relationship between the schools of Najaf and Qum in the transmission of ḥikmat in recent times. Ḥukamāʾ moved freely between these two centers and student teacher relationships were established during the time Iranian ḥukamāʾ spent perfecting their jurisprudential skills in Najaf. On the other hand, a more philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā was transmitted and developed through hukamāʾ such as Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī, ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī and ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī.

The chapter has contributed to current research on the schools of Tehran and Qum by introducing many hukamāʾ in terms of their biographical details, works and the links between various hukamāʾ within the context of a larger trend of philosophical and ʿirfānī activity. By introducing these relationships, it opens a further area for study as only the most relevant relationships between hukamāʾ for this study were explained. The chapter also presented numerous important works, commentaries and glosses many of which are worth of further research and analysis.

While ḥukamāʾ may have preferred one reading of Mullā Ṣadrā over another, both of the readings discussed were mastered by various hukamāʾ throughout the generations of hukamāʾ who studied and taught in the schools of Tehran and Qum. An attempt was made to classify
the ḥukamāʾ according to which reading they preferred based on the biographical literature concerning them and the works they wrote. Both readings continue to be taught, studied and discussed in the modern hawza. At the same time, due to an increase in the amount of students who will study ḥikmat but not necessarily specialize in it; there are a larger number of students who do not experience the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā due to the factors discussed in the chapter. Those factors include the expansion of the teaching of ḥikmat to a much larger sphere of students both within Qum and through distance learning; the introduction of Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s twin seminal texts Bidāyat and Nihāyat; the use of philosophy in the principles of jurisprudence and the nature of the critique of westernization and Marxism which is more of a philosophical critique than an ʿirfānī one. It was the practical use of philosophy in these last two areas that made it essential for the modern scholar to have a good understanding of Islamic philosophy, but not necessarily any type of ʿirfānī understanding. This has widened the split in the teaching of the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and the ʿirfānī one.

In the following chapters the thesis will examine the impact of these two readings on the most important areas of theological discussion addressed in ḥikmat. The first is wujūd (existence) which from a philosophical perspective discusses the nature of the world around us in order to create a framework from which the existence of the Necessary Existent can be established. The second discussion is that of walāyah (guardianship) which seeks to understand the reality of prophethood and sainthood. It is a discussion that has particular significance to Shi’ism as it contributes to the esoteric understanding of the Infallibles including the twelve Shi’i Imams. The third investigation is maʿād (resurrection) according to ḥikmat and ʿirfān to which Mullā
Ṣadrā devoted much effort to elucidate in the background of Ghazali’s critique on philosophy as being contradictory with the Islamic scriptural sources. Sadrian philosophers made various attempts to reconcile this contradiction based on the principles of ḥikmat, even if they did not fully accept Mullā Ṣadrā’s view as expressed in the Asfār. It is in this chapter that the vibrancy of the school of Mullā Ṣadrā is perhaps seen the most as well as the ḥukamā’ use of ḥikmat to explain the scriptural sources.
Chapter 2: *Wujūd* (Existence)

How do we understand the reality that we find ourselves in? What is its and our relation to the Creator and how do we understand His Unity (*tawḥīd*)? These questions are implicitly at the heart of philosophical and ʿirfānī discussions concerning *wujūd* and from the answers to these questions many theoretical and practical implications result. While philosophy seeks to understand reality and its implications on human behavior partly in order to form more perfect societies, ʿinfān seeks to understand reality and the relation between God and the wayfarer. Both sciences therefore seek to understand reality.

It is therefore somewhat natural that these sciences should intermingle and that is what links Sadrian philosophy to ʿirfān and in turn results in different readings of Mullā Ṣadrā as he made use of the overlap. The same link was established by Suhrawardī in his Illuminationist philosophy, but his explanation which indicated towards primacy of quiddity did not sit well with the ʿurafāʾ of the school of Ibn ‘Arabī and Ibn Turka’s *Tamhīd al-qawāʿid* is a refutation of Illuminationist philosophy. There are some fundamental differences in the way *wujūd* is

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484 One of the primary building blocks for both Islamic philosophy and theoretical ʿirfān is that there is a reality (*wāqiʿiyah*) which needs to be understood. This is not an issue that can be proven but something that has to be agreed upon before pursuing those sciences. A relative philosophy that did not start on the premise of an underlying reality would not be considered Islamic. It is then the nature of reality that is discussed and this is where the sciences differ both in method and in conclusion.


486 See Sabzavārī, *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (2) 67, nt. 10. Even if Suhrawardī was misrepresented by his critics, see Rizvi, “An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distiction? Suhrawardi’s visionary hierarchy of lights”.

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conceived and explained in ḥikmat and theoretical ʿirfān. While ḥikmat juxtaposes wujūd to quiddity following the distinction made by Farābī and Ibn Sinā building upon Neoplatonic thinkers;487 ʿirfān sees wujūd as a single reality and does not discuss quiddity, following Ibn ʿArabi’s concept of the oneness of Existence. While admittedly transcendental philosophers agree that in the extramental there is indeed only one reality which is wujūd, much of the discussion of wujūd includes the discussion of quiddiy’s place within it to deal with another issue. That is the concern of how oneness turns to manyness, as all contingent existents must come from God who is the Necessary Existent and is One.

The meeting point of ḥikmat and ʿirfān is the concept of a flow of existence that contains multiplicity within it. That multiplicity is explained in ḥikmat by gradation (tashkīk) and in ʿirfān by self-disclosure (tajallī) and both of these concepts find their origination in the conception of wujūd. Why do these positions matter? The simple answer is that wujūd is reality in transcendental philosophy and ʿirfān and so a ḥakīm’s understanding of wujūd is his understanding of reality. Since wujūd is the cornerstone of these sciences, most if not all positions taken on the other discussions within them directly depend on the position of the ḥakīm on wujūd. Understanding these discussions is therefore fundamental to a serious understanding of more complex Shiʿi beliefs as they try to approach a better understanding of God and His interaction with His creation.

What influences a ḥakīm to adopt a philosophical or an ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā? No doubt the ḥakīm's personal journey and training is an important factor. Intellectual arrival is more universal than ʿirfānī experience as a person only requires a philosophical approach and obedience to the rules of philosophy and logic to attain an understanding of existence based on those foundations. But to properly grasp what is being explained from experience the reader must also have a level of experience. Experiencing existence requires a different kind of effort, whereby they seeker undertakes a path of wayfaring and self-purification. A successful philosophical ḥakīm moves from the concept (mafhūm) of wujūd to the referent (miṣdāq) of wujūd by moving from intellectual comprehension to experience; whereas the ʿārif moves from the referent of wujūd to its concept, by experiencing and then intellectualizing. But there may be ḥukamāʾ that are not able to move beyond the realm of concept, or see a benefit in confining their reading of Mullā Ṣadrā to concept.

Since both types of thinker actually seek to understand the referent of wujūd or in other words, Being qua Being (wujūd bi-mā huwa huwa), the sciences share a common goal and a basis for dialogue. At the same time, philosophers are agreed that the essence of existence cannot be completely grasped especially by intellectual means. As Sabzavārī says regarding the self-evident nature of existence in his Sharḥ al-manẓūma: “Its notion is one of the best-known things, but its deepest reality is the extremity of hiddenness.” Therefore all can recognize wujūd as it is “one of the best known things”, but ʿirfān becomes necessary for the complete ḥakīm and for

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a full grasp of ḥikmat as witnessing the reality of wujūd with the heart is as important, as the hidden nature of its deep reality requires a type of enquiry suitable for that kind of knowledge.

This chapter is split into two key parts; one discussing wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān and the other discussing wujūd in al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah from a philosophical perspective. Understanding these two approaches to comprehending wujūd will help us understand the two readings of Mullā Ṣadrā discussed in this thesis as a ḥakīm could read Mullā Ṣadrā from either one of these perspectives or indeed both of them. Deciding which of these traditions to explain and analyze first was an interesting dilemma as that decision influences from which tradition the other tradition is understood. Whichever reading is presented first can play a role in the approach of the reader while analyzing the other reading.

Although philosophy explains wujūd in a step by step manner, guiding the reader through a set of separate concepts until they have an overall picture of wujūd, ʿirfān explains wujūd by linking various overall concepts and assumes a level of experience on the part of the reader. From whichever concept you want to explain in ʿirfān, you can extract a plethora of other concepts. For example, the discussion of wujūd and walāyah in theoretical ʿirfān are not entirely separate discussions and during the course of explaining one concept, the other is repeatedly referred to. Rather one has to understand the levels of wujūd and the issue of self-disclosure (tajallī) to understand walāyah. However, walāyah needs to be comprehended properly for an understanding of wujūd as the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil) is the secret of the effusion of wujūd and the key to understanding God’s Unity to the extent it can be comprehended by man; as God can never be known completely and is above all efforts and descriptions.
In the modern ḥawza, philosophy is considered an introductory science to a proper understanding of theoretical ʿirfān and should therefore be taught first, however, at the same time, the origins of some of the most important philosophical concepts in ḥikmat are to be found in theoretical ʿirfān. The approach in itself shows a preference for a philosophical mindset. This kind of graded approach of the ḥawza is also found in the Neo-Platonic tradition where the student studies the works of Aristotle — especially logic — before moving on to reading Plotinus’s works.

Using transcendental philosophy as a tool to understand ʿirfān is an approach seldom found in modern studies of transcendental philosophy, and so using this method may significantly add to current research into the thought of Ibn ʿArabī and other ʿurafāʾ in his school. Explaining the concepts in theoretical ʿirfān is somewhat facilitated by comparing them with the philosophical ideas in ḥikmat and this is where analysis can produce many fruitful results. However, this goal can be achieved without ordering the chapter as such, as long as both readings are compared throughout. I therefore decided to start with theoretical ʿirfān in order to chronologically order the flow of ideas through the school of Tehran and Qum and to illustrate the impact of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s twin seminal texts in shaping a more philosophical reading in the modern school of Qum.

The first part of this chapter discusses wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān and is split into several sections. The first section explains how the term wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān only concerns God, while the term for the rest of creation is kawn. The ʿurafāʾ are more careful in maintaining the principle of unity and so find other ways to describe other than God’s Essence with terms such
as manifestation (ẓuhūr) and self-disclosure. It is also because that is the way that the ārif perceives reality as his attention is focused on God alone, while it is also a more accurate expression according to the ārif on the intellectual plane.

Wujūd is completely separate to quiddity and so God has no quiddity. It is the Breath of the All-Merciful (al-nafas al-Raḥmānī) which brings creation out of the hidden knowledge of God, and it is through this concept that levels of manifestation are specified. From the degree of Non-dualistic Unity (al-martabah al-aḥadīya) to the degree of Dualistic Unity (al-martabah al-wāḥidīya) to the permanent archetypes (al-aʿyān al-thābitah) to the external archetypes (al-aʿyān al-khārijīyah), which are the realms of the intellect, the Imaginal world or the isthmus (ʿālam al-mithāl) and the material world. If something ceases to exist in the outward (ẓāhir) plane it returns to the inward (bāṭin), and all that has ever existed or will exist is in the knowledge of God.

The discussion then turns to how the ḥukamā’ analyzed the oneness of Existence, wujūd by something else and then on to the permanent archetypes. The permanent archetypes are the side of the Names that face existence, and as such represent everything that exists in the knowledge of God. But not the knowledge that exists in an undefined manner in the Essence in the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, nor the Attribute of Knowledge itself in the degree of Dualistic Unity, rather the determination (taʿayyun) of that knowledge for every created thing. It is their link to God’s everlasting knowledge that makes them permanent, while they do not enter the plane of creation. Gradation in īrāfān starts with God who is the true existent and also incorporates gradation of the Names. Gradation is to do with the differing levels of
capacity among created beings, and not \textit{wujūd} in itself as \textit{wujūd} only applies to God who is not graded.

The second part of the chapter analyzes \textit{wujūd} in transcendental philosophy.\footnote{See M. Abdul Haq, “Mullā Ṣadr ā’s Concept of Being”, in \textit{Islamic Studies}, 1967, (6/3) 267-276 for a brief rundown of the main concepts in Mullā Ṣadr ā’s philosophy of being.} The order of the discussion follows the order of many books produced in the schools of Tehran and Qum and indeed those books were based on the order of issues discussed in the \textit{Asfūr}. I have used ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s \textit{Nihāyat al-ḥikma} and Sabzavārī’s \textit{Manẓūma} to aid the shape the flow of the discussion and the order of the topics, with offshoot discussions into the more interesting points brought up in various works, commentaries and glosses produced by the \textit{hukamā’} of the schools of Tehran and Qum. Ṭabāṭabā’ī was an important teacher in the establishment of the school of Qum and Sabzavārī was a contemporary of the school of Tehran. These discussions at times overlap \textit{‘irfānī} concepts from the \textit{hukamā’} that consider these concepts as contributing to a better reading of Mullā Ṣadr ā and at other times reference the scriptural sources using \textit{ḥikmat} to comment upon it. Using Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s \textit{Nihāyat} will provide a good insight into the philosophical reading of \textit{ḥikmat} when placed within the background of the other discussions concerning the same issues.

The reason for laying out this part of the chapter using this method is that it is precisely what a student of \textit{ḥikmat} in the \textit{ḥawza} would do as well. After attending classes on an advanced text like \textit{Nihāyat}, the \textit{Manẓūma} or the \textit{Asfūr}, they would return and read the other opinions of the previous and current philosophers, spend time thinking and formulating their own ideas, and then have a discussion with a classmate(s) on the issue, which is called \textit{mubāḥatha}. The final
step is to teach the text and to write articles and books dealing with specialized topics. Using this method the student is expected to grow with the text, rather than just memorize its contents without thinking, researching and discussing. Taking this approach in this chapter provides the reader with a glimpse of the first two actions taken by the student, whereas thinking, discussing and teaching cannot be comprised within written prose. The step by step approach taken in explaining hikmat is one of the tools that aid its study and comprehension. The study of wujūd is the most important cornerstone of transcendental philosophy and while the depth of the discussion is vast the key conclusions, such as the principality of wujūd and gradation, are agreed upon by most of the ḥukamāʾ of the Sadrian school.

After differentiating wujūd from quiddity (māhiyah), as well as distinguishing between mental comprehension of wujūd and wujūd as it is in the extramental (al-khārij) and the types of predication suitable for each plane; the discussion starts by explaining the self evident nature of wujūd and that there is no need to define it, as any definition of it is more complicated than its initial conception. To further grasp the issue another distinction is made between knowledge by presence (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) and knowledge by acquisition (ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) and that distinction is brought back to the aḥādīth which discuss how God is known. Then the discussion moves to the meaning of words discussing homonymy (ishtirāk lafẓ) and univocity (ishtirāk maʿnawi).

Both of these discussions are introductory to the more important ideas in transcendental philosophy, and the next idea to be discussed is the principality of wujūd and the mentally posited nature of quiddity. That is that although both exist together in the extramental, it is wujūd that really exists, and quiddity exists by wujūd, not vice versa. Thereafter a few
implications of the principality of existence are discussed before the chapter moves on to the issue of gradation in existence. Whilst all existents exist within the realm of *wujūd*, there are differences between these existents in terms of limitation. While the material world (‘ālam al-māda) is limited by time and space, the world of intellects (al-‘ālam al-‘uqūl) is not, and so existence is graded. From gradation another form of predication called the predication of reality on its shadow (ḥaml al-ḥaqiqā ‘alā al-raqiqa) is derived. This is when a cause and its effect are predicted to each other. Linked to the predication of reality on its shadow is the concept of something that exists by the existence-in-something-else and this issue is the next major turn in the discussion of *wujūd* in transcendental philosophy.

Mullā Šadrā considered motion a property of *wujūd* and not of quiddity. He elucidates that notion in his theory of motion in the category of substance (al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah). This motion is involuntary and has implications that are especially important for development of the human soul and Mullā Šadrā’s theory of resurrection. Therefore, transubstantial motion is introduced at this point in its appropriate section as a factor of *wujūd* as a building block for later discussions. Finally, mental existence (*wujūd al-dhihnī*) is with its implications; such as the fact that quiddity in the mind is different to the quiddity in the extramental and that mental existence imitates external existence and so anything that exists mentally has its basis in the extramental. That is that we cannot imagine something that is completely divorced from anything we have sensed.

Throughout this chapter and those that follow the English words for philosophical and ‘īrfānī terminology will be used primarily although some key words such as *wujūd* will remain in their original Arabic transliteration. Both the Arabic and English terms are provided when they first
appear and a glossary of terms has also been appended to the thesis for ease of reference. Translations of Qur’ānic verses use the rendition of M. H. Shakir.496

I.  Part 1: Wujūd in Theoretical ʿIrifān

It was theoretical ʿirfān that arguably first gave wujūd such importance in response to the Illuminationist school of philosophy while Mullā Ṣadrā distilled those ideas into a coherent philosophical system. Therefore, the way wujūd is explained in both subjects somewhat varies. While ʿḥikmat uses a step by step approach to lead to an overall concept of wujūd, proving and discussing each issue along the way, and extracting other issues and answering other philosophical problems at each stage and then perhaps offering an insight based on ʿirfānī principles; theoretical ʿirfān opts for a more direct approach as understood by the experience of the ʿārif.

As highlighted in the previous chapters, the key texts in the ʿhawza used to teach theoretical ʿirfān are Tamhīd al-qawāʿid of Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Dāwūd al-Qayṣārī’s commentary on Ibn ʿArabi’s Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam and Ḥamza Fanārī’s Miṣbāh al-ʿuns, which a commentary on Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī’s Mafātīḥ al-ghayb. These texts are specifically chosen in order to present the student with the key concepts of theoretical ʿirfān, after which the student should be well equipped to delve deeper into the subject.

496 Muhammad Habib Shakir (tr.), The Qur’an (New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 1982)
It is interesting to note that the Shi‘i ḥawza has not produced its own texts in theoretical īrfān in the same manner as it has for transcendental philosophy and still relies upon medieval texts. Rather the focus has been on expanding and explaining older texts. Perhaps an exception to this general trend was Khumaynī’s Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya, which has many facets of a taught text. This phenomenon is perplexing, especially since there are some issues in Shi‘i īrfān that are not expounded in the medieval texts, such as the station of the Shi‘i Imams. It may be due to the secretive nature that īrfān has developed within the ḥawza system, as for many years the study of īrfān was frowned upon and in the modern ḥawza it is still viewed with some skepticism by a number of clerics.492

I. Revisiting the Subject of Īrfān

The difference between the subjects of ḥikmat and īrfān was discussed in the epistemology and definitions section of the introduction. There an important distinction was made between two types of nondelimited wujūd. Philosophy discussed wujūd in its nondelimited sense when compared to other sciences, like medicine, where wujūd was discussed with the condition of something. In the case of medicine it is wujūd with the condition of the human body. Nondelimitation was a condition for the wujūd studied in philosophy. However, the subject of īrfān was nondelimited wujūd without the condition of nondelimitation. While these distinctions may seem rather abstract, they are actually at the core of the difference in the approach to understanding the nuances of how Mullā Ṣadrā’s view on wujūd can be read.

492 Euben and Zaman (eds.) Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, 156 nt 1
It is the difference in these two types of nondelimited \textit{wujūd} that will be unfolded in this chapter. The subject of a science is that which links all of the issues within that science and so this classification of the types of nondelimited \textit{wujūd} affects all of the issues within \textit{ḥikmat} and \textit{ʿirfān}.

Muhammad Riżā Qumshihī of the school of Tehran further explains the intricate positions on \textit{wujūd} in \textit{ʿirfān} in his commentary of the \textit{Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}:

The possessors of the heart from among the leaders of the \textit{ʿurafā́} have differed — after agreeing on the oneness of existence, rather [the oneness of the] existent...— concerning the reality of the Necessary. Is it \textit{wujūd} without the condition of things or their nonexistence [i.e. without any condition]? Meaning the actual nature of \textit{wujūd} as it is, expressed by them as the ipseity flowing through the Necessary, the contingent, the unknown unseen (\textit{al-ghayb al-majhūl})...or whether it [\textit{wujūd}] is taken with the condition of the nonexistence of things known as the degree of Non-dualistic Unity (\textit{al-aḥadiya}), the first unseen (\textit{al-ghayb al-awwal}), the first determination (\textit{al-taʿayyun al-awwal}) or \textit{wujūd} with the condition of no......\textit{wujūd} without any condition is the Essential Necessary Truth. [He is not \textit{wujūd}] taken with the condition of no...also the general \textit{wujūd} which connects with all things is the shadow of \textit{wujūd} without condition...as the condition of no prevents connection with things.\footnote{Qumshihī, \textit{Majmūʿa-yi āṣār}, 33-34.}

\footnote{Qumshihī, \textit{Majmūʿa-yi āṣār}, 33-34.}

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In Qumshihi’s analysis *wujūd* without condition is the nondelimited *wujūd* of the ‘*urafā’*; but this time that nondelimited *wujūd* is not in comparison with *wujūd* with the condition of something. Rather it is compared to another analysis of existence which is existence with the condition of the nonexistence of anything else. Both of these analysis are within the science of *ʿirfān* as they concern God and Qumshihi later clarifies that the view that *wujūd* with the condition of the nonexistence of things is an interpretation of a *ḥadīth*.\(^{494}\) However, for Qumshihi the problem with this analysis of *wujūd* is that its shadow cannot be consolidated with manyness or things. Ruḥ Allāh Khumaynī of the school of Qum explains that this is the level that is sometimes referred to in the scriptural sources and that should not confuse someone into rejecting the theory of manifestation as that theory deals with a different aspect.\(^{495}\) Qumshihi wants to avoid the idea that the Essence of God does not contain the perfections of the Names.\(^{496}\) While there certainly is a level of existence where there is no thing, oneness and manyness needs to be consolidated. It is therefore the flowing ipseity that is existence.

Later Qumshihi also clarifies what he means by the flow of the ipseity. He means manifestation (ֿ*ẓuhūr*).\(^{497}\) This is what makes his analysis of *wujūd ʿirfānī* as it is not *wujūd* as a graded reality that pervades all of existence.\(^{498}\) For something to be graded it must be

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\(^{494}\) Qumshihi, *Majmūʿa-yi āsār*, 37. The *ḥadīth* being “God was and there was nothing with Him.”


\(^{497}\) Qumshihi, *Majmūʿa-yi āsār*, 37.

\(^{498}\) Qumshihi, *Majmūʿa-yi āsār*, 40.
universal. However, the nondelimited wujūd is neither universal nor particular. Rather wujūd has different manifestations and this will be elucidated further when analyzing the Breath of the All-Merciful (nafas al-Raḥmānī). Wujūd manifests itself to itself and this is within the Necessary; it manifests in the clothes of the Names on the plane of God’s knowledge and it manifests in existents, which is its manifestation in contingent beings.

In his twelve-part introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-Qayṣāri deals with some of the most important concepts in theoretical ʿirfān. The first part of his introduction specifically deals with wujūd. As Qayṣāri points out, ʿurafāʾ are careful to restrict the term Wujūd to God as He is the only true existent, and use the word kawn (creation) to describe anything other than God’s Essence. Hence he calls the chapter: “About Being; and that It is the Real.” Here Wujūd refers to God alone who is One, making every individual thing in the blanket of multiplicity (kathrah), a task (shaʾn) from the tasks (shuʿūn) of God, rather than separate existences described as existent. Wujūd is therefore not in dichotomy with essence. For ʿurafāʾ understanding Wujūd means understanding tawḥīd; a concept which cannot be fully grasped by the intellect.

So Wujūd (meaning God) is the subject of theoretical ʿirfān in the same way as wujūd (meaning existence) is the subject of ḥikmat. ʿIrān starts from the Necessary Being and then discusses contingent beings, whereas ḥikmat starts with contingent beings and finds its way back to the

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499 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 40.
500 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 37.
501 Qayṣāri, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 33.
Necessary Being, who is the ultimate cause. To explain this using the idea of gradation, 'īrān starts at the top, with the most intense level of being and ḥikmat starts at the bottom, discussing beings in the corporeal realm, which is the lowest world of existence.

'Īrān starts with nondelimited existence (wujūd al-muṭlaq) and adds the conditions or limitations of manifestation and self-disclosure to create an intellectual separation between the unknowable Essence of God and His creation, whereas ḥikmat starts with accidental necessity and removes real limitations until it reaches nondelimited existence. Nothing except God has any existence in 'īrān as everything that is other than God’s Essence is His manifestation, whereas ḥikmat finds the existence that is common to all contingent beings, meaning that existence is to be found in that being itself. 'Īrān starts with the Absolute, who cannot be known in any way as any attempt to define Him immediately necessitates otherness by which to define, and ḥikmat starts with wujūd whose existence is known by self-evidence but whose reality can never be fully grasped.

II. The Univocity (ishtirāk ma’nawi) of Wujūd

Wujūd is univocal for the ‘urafā’ but not in the same way as it is for Sadrian philosophers. The philosophical reading analyzes the concept of the wujūd to be a common concept (i.e. univocal on the level of its concept), however, when the ‘urafā’ discuss wujūd they are referring to Wujūd as it is in the extramental (i.e. the referent). While the direct experience of the oneness of Wujūd is at the heart of fully realizing the core principle of tawḥīd in Islam, its expression remained elusive until the school of Ibn ‘Arabī and particularly in Sa’īd al-Dīn Farghānī’s commentary on the Taʾyah of Ibn Fārīd al-Miṣrī. As Ibn Turka clarifies:
Do not say it is clear from his [Abū-l-Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī] other books that the univocity of *wujūd* is as in the terminology of the Peripatetics, as his words are according to their way and therefore there is no need for the explanation of the sharing of existence by meaning that we are currently elucidating. For the difference in meaning becomes clear according to the different terminologies as we say: What the author [Abū-l-Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī] has chosen for the meaning of *wujūd* is the real (*ḥaqiqi*) that the realizers (*muḥaqiqūn*) have chosen, not the conceptional (*iʿtibārī*) as is the view of some of the later scholars.593

The difference highlighted in this passage is one that springs from the different ways of knowing. Understanding happens on the plane of the mind, but experience is more directly associated with the soul or the heart. While the mind finds terminology to describe concepts accurately, the terminology used in *ʿirfān* indicates incomprehensible realities. The modification of terminology is a theme found in a number of *ʿirfānī* writings and is an important aspect of the debate in this thesis. Such concern in clarifying the use of terminology is less often found in writings on *ḥikmat*, perhaps in order to make use of the different hermeneutics that can be extracted by the mindful reader. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī of the school of Tehran discusses the difference between knowing by the heart and the mind in the beginning of his Persian treatise on the oneness of Existence and then summarizes the view of theoretical *ʿirfān* in the following way:

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To explain the saying of the Sufis is that they have said that *wujūd* rather the existent (*mawjūd*) is one, and that this multiplicity that we see is all Him. This multiplicity is our imagination and in reality there is no multiplicity.\(^{504}\)

It will become clearer during the course of this chapter that this is only one possible explanation of the oneness of Existence and perhaps not the most accurate one. Here ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī brings the theoretical understanding of unconditional *wujūd* to what the ’ārif actually experiences on a practical level. That is that the ’ārif does not see multiplicity as he is completely absorbed in the One without specifications. At the end of the treatise he summarizes the view of the ‘urafā’ a second time:

In summary they say that the existent and existence is one thing which is God Himself, the Most High. Then the clothes of the creation became manifest and its specifications by quiddities of accidents and archetypes in many ways. The self-disclosures of every one of those clothes are fresh states and conceptions imposed on them. They have mentioned clarifications of that with many examples such as the waves and the ocean, or the sun, light and shadow, or [the number] one and numbers...\(^{505}\)

‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī’s explanation shows a philosophical approach at work trying to decipher the terminology of the ‘urafā’. The oneness of *Wujūd* as explained by Qumshīhi above is neither *wujūd* in the extramental nor mental existence, as unconditional *wujūd* is not even

\(^{504}\) See Zunūzī, *Majmu‘a-yi muṣannafāt*, (3) 501.

\(^{505}\) See Zunūzī, *Majmu‘a-yi muṣannafāt*, (3) 503.
limited by nondelimitation. It is therefore wujūd which is non-conditional as the source of division. Rather when these descriptive aspects are applied to God they are by necessity, as His position and level do not allow access to the mind except by creating approximate ways of understanding. The one who theorizes at this level must be aware of his limitations. In the same way as wujūd is completely separated from quiddity and its rules in philosophy, so God does not have any quiddity and therefore none of the rules of quiddity can apply to Him.

III. The Breath of the All-Merciful (nafās al-Rahmānī)

According to the ‘irfānī worldview there is nothing that is detached from God and so the ‘urafā‘ reconcile the manyness experienced in the corporeal world with the oneness of God by viewing the Essence in different ways. This is expressed as conditions, manifestations, self-disclosures or tasks which are manifest through the Breath of the All-Merciful. Yet the starting point is to understand that these conditions are only in terms of analysis. There is never any departure from the pure Essence as the source of manyness which is the Names are at once the Essence.

Wujūd without any mode (ḥaythīyah) is at the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, where all opposites are brought together as all the Names are brought together in the simple Essence. It

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is a stage where nothing is known about God as referred to in the Prophetic ḥadīth when a person asked the Prophet where God was before creating the creation, to which he replied:

“He was in a Cloud (ʿāmā), there was nothing above Him nor under Him.”\(^{507}\) Then with the effusion of existence, which is also called the Breath of the All-Merciful, multiplicity occurs and with multiplicity, opposites. Hence opposites find their roots in different aspects of the Essence, not in any extra actor. So for an ʿārif the coming together of two contradictories is not impossible even though it is intellectually impossible in the extramental on the material plane. Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī elucidates this point in his gloss on Tamhid al-qawāʿid on the third question regarding that Necessary Reality is nondelimited with real comprehensive nondelimitation (al-īṭlāq al-ḥaqiqi al-iḥāṭi) saying:

Know that nondelimitation is like oneness regarding the Necessary, the Most High. So in the same way as His singularity is essential oneness, which comes together with multiplicity without effecting His oneness, His nondelimitation, which is the same as His Essence, which is expressed as His comprehension (iḥāṭa) of everything and His comprehensiveness by His oneness, due to the reality of bringing together [all] things, and its essence, its outward and its celestial. So He, on the level of His Essence is neither necessary or possible, rather what is necessary is the essential manifestation which is achieved by His self-disclosure to His Essence by His Essence. The possible is from His self-disclosure by a perfection from among His perfections. So glory be to

\(^{507}\) Aṣṣār, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 26.
Him who is not a thing from among things, and at the same time as not being a thing from among things, is everything.598

Maḥmūd Qummi of the school of Tehran elucidates the fact that on the level of God’s Essence, or more accurately, at the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, God is above every condition, even the conditions of oneness and nondelimitation. In fact, he goes one step further to say God is above the condition of Necessity. That does not mean that He is no longer Necessary, but that the condition of Necessity cannot be applied to Him as what exists on at the degree of Non-dualistic Unity is a Necessity which is greater than the condition of Necessity can comprehend. At this stage the mind and words are incapable of rational understanding and intellectual description. It is the level of the unseen of the unseen (ghayb al-ghuyūb).

Qummi uses different terminology from Qumshihi to explain nondelimitation. Nondelimitation for Qummi means comprehension (iḥāta) of all things as all things are brought together in His Essence and emanated from His Essence by the Breath of the All-Merciful. He also clarifies what he means further by specification regarding the Essence and essential manifestation later in his gloss. The Attributes are the same as each other and the same as the Essence. The first manifestation of the Essence is an essential manifestation to itself as so He is even above Necessity. Qumshihi continues:

In summary, these meanings are that the Divine Perfections and the Essential Names such as Knowledge, Will, Power and Life are all on the way of the Essence. So in the

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598 Ibn Turka Isfahani, Tambid al-qawā’id bā ḫavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Rizā Qumshihi va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummi, 214, nt. 3.
same way that the Essence, by the regulation that His specification is the same as His
Essence, and He, in terms of His specification in the second meaning, He does not have
anything opposite to Him and He is not opposite to anything [in terms of direction].
In the same way, the perfections mentioned. So His Knowledge is not opposite to His
Will, and His Will in not opposite to His Life. Rather every one of them is the other and
comprehensive for Him. So if He is Knowledgeable He is Powerful, and Alive and so
on for all the Names and Unknown Qualities in Him, the Most High. This regulation is
by the regulation of “Say: Every one acts according to him manner...” (17:84) pervading
all of the manifestations of the Names. Those manifestations are all one. So Knowledge
is the same as Oneness...\(^{599}\)

The final line of the Qummî’s gloss on the third question he says: “So glory be to Him who is not
a thing from among things, and at the same time as not being a thing from among things is
everything” refers to the idea that God is distinguished from things by comprehensive
specification (\(al-ta’ayyun al-iḥāṭ\)) rather than differential specification (\(al-ta’ayyun al-
taqābul\)). That is that with comprehensive specification there is no distinction between God
and His creation, because distinction is either by that which is opposite or by the specification
of two things that are the same but can be viewed differently. Qummî is not pantheistic, but
is elucidating the oneness of Existence which needs to be experienced to be fully
comprehended. As Muḥammad ʿḤusayn Nāʾījī explains:

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\(^{599}\) Ibn Turka ʿIṣfahānī, *Tamhid al-qawāʾid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Rīžā Qumshīhī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummī*, 241, nt. 4.
...That is because comprehensive specification is in the language of non-specification.

Similarly, singularity and nondelimited existence are problematic issues. Hence a few people who have taste (*dhawq*) are needed, until the human can extract himself from his normal limited intellect...for an intellect overcome by desires and fantasies this cannot be imagined or confirmed...understanding of these issues is for those who have delicate secrets (*sirr*). What is meant by secret is the connection of man with whom he worships. To express it another way the secret is the connection between each person and nondelimited existence according to the terminology of this group.510

After the level of the undifferentiated Essence and the level of the differentiation of the Names the creative act moves through God’s knowledge which is expressed as the permanent archetypes. These permanent archetypes are then reflected in the external archetypes and this process is known as the Breath of the All-Merciful. It is what Qumshihi meant by the flowing ipseity, but there is no physical flow. Rather it is through the process of manifestation or self-disclosure. Below is a diagrammatic representation of the Breath of the all-Merciful which is an expression of how the existents came into existence. The most holy effusion (*al-fayḍ al-aqdas*) is the self-disclosure of God within His own Essence from being completely unknown to the level of the individual Names in the degree of Dualistic Unity and thereafter in the permanent archetypes. Then the holy effusion is from the permanent archetypes to the

510 Here secret (*sirr*) refers to a level of the soul, not a matter that they cannot disclose. In some traditional classifications the sequence is the outward (i.e. the body), then the inward, the heart (*qalb*), the spirit (*rūḥ*), the secret (*sirr*), the hidden (*khafi*) and the more secret (*akhfā*).

external archetypes. Although the perfect human is an external archetype he is represented separately as he is the reason for the whole action of effusion. The representation of the perfect human also shows the difference between effusion and emanation. The levels in the Breath of the All-Merciful are not emanated levels of graded \( \text{wujūd} \). They are expressions of \( \text{wujūd} \) with different conditions.

![Fig. 3.1: The Breath of the All-Merciful.](image-url)
The ‘ʿurafāʾ have somewhat complicated the terminology in the first stages of the Breath of the All-Merciful. In essence there are three stages. The first is that when God is completely unknown and unknowable, that is the stage of the Absolute. The second is where God’s Names are manifest in one Name, Allah. The Name Allah contains all the other Names and is known as the comprehensive Name (ṣām al-jāmiʿ). The third stage is the dispersion of all the other Names from the comprehensive Name into different Names such as the Hearing, the Seeing, the Giver of Life, and so on. In the explanation above stage one is the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and stages two and three are together in the degree of Dualistic Unity.

According to another classification stage one is termed the unseen of the unseen (al-ghayb al-ghuyūb), the second stage as the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and the third stage as the degree of Dualistic Unity. Therefore, the reader of these texts and commentaries must take care to observe the context of the terminology in order to understand which set is being used or indeed if the writer switches from using one set of terminology to using another. This complication is typical of texts taught in the hawza and highlights the importance of learning under a qualified teacher who can save the student from misconceiving the ideas expressed in more complicated writings.
IV. The Oneness of Existence (waḥdat al-Wujūd)

The discussion of the nature of tawḥīd and the oneness of Existence is a multifaceted one and much has been written about Ibn ‘Arabī’s ontology. Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī of the school of Tehran in his gloss on the Manẓūma provides an interesting breakdown of the different ideas and attributes them to the various hukamā’. He states that there are four levels of tawḥīd.

There are those that see multiplicity in both wujūd and existent beings and from this multiplicity one is the Necessary Being. This he states is the tawḥīd of most of the common people. Then there are those that see oneness in both wujūd and existents (i.e. that they are one thing). This idea he attributes to the Sufis and is further split into two conceptions. The first is what is attributed to ignorant Sufis who say that wujūd has only one real referent which does not have an abstract reality behind it and the multiplicity witnessed is conceptual and so has no affect on oneness. This was the explanation of the oneness of Existence given by ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī a few paragraphs ago.

The second concept he attributes to the Sufis who say that wujūd has an abstract reality behind the self-disclosures, but that both the abstract Wujūd and the self-manifestations are the

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Necessary Being. That is that it is not only the abstract that is Necessary, but rather both aspects of abstract *Wujūd* and its manifestations, while at the same time the manifestations are fully in need of the abstract. The poverty of the manifestations does not affect its necessity as it is poverty to the same reality that it is. It is this idea that Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī finds this to be the apparent belief of Mullā Ṣadrā especially in his *Asfār*.

The third idea is that of the oneness of Existence and the multiplicity of existents and this is the idea of many philosophers including figures such as Dawānī, Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā for part of his intellectual life. It means that *Wujūd* is one without any multiplicity at all not even in terms of gradation, whereas the existents are many which is due to their quiddity. The fourth idea is that of the oneness of *Wujūd* and the existents while at the same time maintaining their manyness, which again is the idea of the ‘ʿurafāʾ’ and Mullā Ṣadrā himself. This idea finds its basis in the poverty of existents which do not own any *wujūd* for themselves and are only mirrors for the manifestation of God.

Abu-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī of the school of Tehran also breaks down the oneness of Existence into four possible meanings in a treatise on the oneness of Existence as this is a term oft quoted in the works of ḥukamāʾ and ‘urafāʾ alike. The first meaning is that what is meant by oneness is the oneness of God himself as an existent in *wujūd* and there is no other existent like Him. In fact everything else perceived in existence is an imagination and all that exists is God. Like the waves in the sea. The waves are nothing but the water and it would be incorrect to assign

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them a separate existence to the water. This explanation corresponds to ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s as well as to the first part of the second explanation given above and according to both Muḥammad Taqi Āmulī and for Qazvinī this explanation is also very much mistaken. Qazvinī refutes this idea by saying that the explanation denies the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and the rules of ḥikmat such as causality.

The second explanation given by Qazvinī is that there is unity between all the levels of wujūd from the perspective that they are all wujūd. However, there is a difference in the level of wujūd and its modes. He says that this explanation is neither entirely correct nor entirely incorrect. Rather it is an essential foundation of causality. It is also the philosophical explanation of gradation which is one of the cornerstones of ḥikmat. The third explanation is that while wujūd is one, manyness also exists in reality. An example of this is the relationship between the human soul and its faculties. While the soul is one, manyness is observed in its faculties. Qazvinī assigns this explanation as the choice of Mullā Ṣadrā. The fourth explanation is that the witness sees oneness by only seeing God behind the various manifestations and self-disclosures. This explanation is the one that he chooses as the most correct as it is the most devoid of criticism.

From the explanations of both Qazvinī and Āmulī the use of ḥikmat to explain and analyze an ʿirfānī concept is observed. While Āmulī gives a clearer picture of the different views and then

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595 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʿīl, 51.
596 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʿīl, 51.
597 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʿīl, 52.
598 Qazvinī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʿīl, 53-54.
opts to use ‘irfānī principles to explain the meaning of wujūd-in-something-else, Qazvini is more active in using the philosophical reading of ḥikmat to judge between the various ideas and chooses the most coherent according to that analysis. Qazvini’s examination is from a philosophical perspective which gives a reality to manyness and he is very concerned with maintaining the laws of ḥikmat such as causality and gradation. At the same time, his analysis did not examine the meaning of the oneness of Existence according to the ‘urafā’ but rather discussed the different possible meanings of the term and judged between them according to the one that had the least philosophical criticism. This method of analyzing terminology leads to a more philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā, as opposed to Āmulī, whose description of the view of the ‘urafā’ and whose explanation of the reality of existence by something else is perhaps more faithful to the principles in theoretical ‘irfān.

In his treatise on waḥdat al-wujūd, Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār of the school of Tehran indicates that much confusion, incorrect attribution of heresy, and ultimately the rejection of the concept of the oneness of Existence occurred due to the unclear nature of the terms used to express this complex issue. He then proceeds to give a commentary on some poetry attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī which is deemed heretical. ʿAṣṣār solves the apparent problem by firstly pointing out that there is an obvious and outward meaning to the words used, and another poetical meaning, and those who attack the idea of the oneness of Existence have only understood the concept according to the literal meaning of the words. He then proceeds to draw a distinction between two different types of relation (iẓāfa) and by that distinction shows that the words of Ibn ‘Arabī are from a completely different perspective to that what has been understood by his critiques:
In some of the poetry of Muḥyī al-Dīn he said: “So He praises me and I praise Him, and He worships me and I worship Him.” The outward of these words indicates to the oneness of the creation and the Creator, the worshiper and the Worshiped and the praiser and the Praised. This meaning is clear in [the concept of] the oneness of Existence, the unity of the worshiper and the Worshiped and the praiser and the Praised and a rejection of everything except the apparent world. It is from this that many have rejected [this poetry] in the language of curses, taunts...[however,] it is that the difference in the pronoun of the speaker and the one who is not present in poetry is above the indication of multiple existences of the worshiper and the Worshiped and the praiser and the Praised...to express it another way, the relation between praise and worship to the servant is opposing relation (iẓāfah-i qābulī) but with the Truth, the Most High, it is agent relation (iẓāfah-i faʻīlī). It is obvious that the relation of a thing to its agent is more complete than the relation with its opposite. With this meaning and the rule of “there is no affecter in existence except God”, the Truth, the Most High, brings worship into existence in the servants. Hence He in reality is the Worshiped, the Worshiper and the One who brings into existence worship. [He is also] the Praiser, the Praised and the Creator of praise...

Any type of relation which involves separation is the relation between two opposites such as the servant and the Lord. Agent relation expresses who the real actor is. That is that the reality of any action cannot be attributed to the servant, as he stands in the position of complete poverty. It is not the case that God worships Ibn ʿArabi but that there is no separation between

\[\text{509}\, 'Aṣṣār, Majmūʿa-yi āṣār, 15-16.\]
God and servant, as that would make the servant a God too (i.e. an independent existent). Rather God is manifested in Ibn ‘Arabī and in everything else that is created, and therefore to worship God is to worship yourself. Not with the meaning of opposing relation, as this is the essence of polytheism. Rather with the understanding that there is nothing in existence and no affecter except God. The ‘ārif realizes this idea within himself, not through thought, but by presence which is attained by cleansing the soul and the grace of God. ‘Aṣṣār continues to explain other possible meanings for Ibn ‘Arabī’s utterance and summarizes the discussion as the unification of each level of existence. That is that each lower level of existence is the servant of the higher level of existence, but at the same time they are unified as what separates them is self-disclosure, not separation in the ordinary sense:

The summary of this clarification is that the worshiper and the Worshipped, the witness and the Witnessed, the praiser and the Praised are all one picture, self-disclosure and manifestation of each other in levels. Hence the picture that is below the presence of the Worshipped and the descending self-disclosure from the Praised and the Witnessed are all the existence of the worshipper, the praiser and the witness. Because the higher picture and the ascension of the worshipper and the praiser are one with the existence of the Worshipped...

The idea of the oneness of Existence did not sit as well with Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, another ḥakīm of the school of Tehran, who discussed the issue in some of his classes recorded in the form of notes by his student Sayyid ʿAbbās Shahrūdī. Jilva discusses some outcomes of the theory of

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520 ‘Aṣṣār, Ḍaftār-i Ḍagār, 16.
521 Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Ḍaftār-i Ḍagār-i Ḥakīm Jilva, 632-638.
the oneness of Existence that he considers rationally inconsistent. He starts by discussing the impossibility of every specification of *wujūd*, when considered individually, and nondelimited *wujūd* being the same thing. If they were it should mean that all specifications could be extracted from any individual specification. That is from the existence of a man, the quiddity of a horse could be extracted and all other quiddities that were not that of a man. He rejects the idea that some of these quiddities are manifest and the others hidden as they should all exist by one existence and so need a cause for one manifestation to be preferred over another.

Furthermore, he argues that the understanding of a limited existent, such as a man, comes from the limit of existence, and something that is limited cannot be Necessary. The quiddities cannot all be one either, rather they are disparate. Additionally, if the *wujūd* that is Necessary is not abstract, that necessitates neediness, and that the Essence of the Necessary can be described by the attributes of lack, beginning and possibility. In fact, the Necessary would have an infinite number of quiddities. Rather there are two levels of existence, that of the Necessary and that of the possible beings. If the oneness of Existence was accurate, then what is the difference between the most holy effusion from the degree of Non-dualistic Unity to the permanent archetypes and the holy effusion from the permanent archetypes to the external archetypes?

The essence of these concerns is that the oneness of Existence stands opposed to the concept of gradation as various existents cannot be graded and have the same level of intensity at every grade. This is because each grade necessitates further limitations as they descend, all of which

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cannot be attributed to the Necessary Being who is unlimited. This problem finds its roots in a difference of perspective, as although the maintenance of the same intensity of *wujūd* for each graded level may be impossible intellectually, the outcome of this concern raises another problem which is also unacceptable. That is that if the intensity of *wujūd* varies on each level, it follows that the Necessary Being is not present with the same intensity throughout His creation. Rather while Jilva is right to point out the disparity between the different levels described by the ‘*ʿurafāʾ*’ in the Breath of the All-Merciful and the same level of intensity of *wujūd* at every level, the concept of the oneness of Existence is more refined.

It can be explained using the similitude of a jigsaw puzzle. A piece of the puzzle may be examined and one may ask: “How can there be one picture throughout the puzzle, while this piece is not the final picture?” However, when the puzzle is completed, the individual pieces are forgotten, as it is the picture that is the most manifest. In the same way the ‘*ārif*, after removing the veils through self purification, sees God in existence and different grades become one, while maintaining specification. This is indicated in a famous tradition attributed to Imam ‘Ali: “I have not seen anything except that I saw God before it, with it and after it.”

In *Miṣbāḥ al-uns* Fanārī points out that the experience of this comprehensive vision is at the peak of ‘*ʿirfān*’ and that very few ‘*ʿurafāʾ*’ have actually reached this level with perfect balance. Most ‘*ʿurafāʾ*’ see one aspect more than the other; either they see more unity then multiplicity;

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53 Sadr al-Din Muḥammad Shirāzī, *Sharḥ usūl al-kāfī*, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī, 4 vols (Tehran: Mu’assasa-yi muṭālaʿa va taḥqīqāt-i farhangī, 1383 Sh/2005) (3) 432. The tradition is not found in the canonical works of Shi‘i *ahādīth*. 

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or more multiplicity than unity.\textsuperscript{544} It is only the perfect man that has the balanced constitution to see both with perfect balance as he is the isthmus between unity and multiplicity as will be explained further in the chapter on \textit{walāyah}. It was perhaps this type of criticism that gave Jilva the reputation of a more philosophical ḥakīm.

V.  \textit{Wujūd}-by-Something-Else

The reality of this existence-by-something-else is explained by Muḥammad Taqi Āmulī in another part of his gloss on the Manẓūma where he explains the concept according to three levels of manifestation. The first level is the manifestation of the Essence upon itself which is the degree of Non-dualistic Unity. The second manifestation is the manifestation of the Names and Attributes and what they necessitate in terms of the permanent archetypes. Since these archetypes are a necessary part of the manifestation of the Names they cannot be said to have their own independent existence. Rather they are existent by the existence of God not by His creation. This level is the degree of Dualistic Unity. The third manifestation is that of the permanent archetypes and all of the levels of creation.\textsuperscript{545} From this explanation it is clear that all of the levels of manifestation have no independence in terms of their \textit{wujūd} from God, rather they are completely poor and exist by God’s existence.

\textsuperscript{544} Fanārī, \textit{Miśbāḥ al-uns}, with the glosses of Hashim Ashkavari, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummi, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 663-665.

\textsuperscript{545} Şabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma ma’a ḥawāshī mukhtār min al-ʿallama al-muḥaqiq al-shaykh Muḥammad al-Taqi al-Āmulī}, 88-89. These terms are explained further in the section on the permanent archetypes.
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fāżil Tūnī of the school of Tehran explains in his gloss on Qayṣarī’s commentary on the Fuṣūṣ that Wujūd has no opposite and is unlike anything as this would require another existent being besides Wujūd that could be its opposite or that could be compared to it.⁵²⁶ So wujūd is on every level of existence as God manifests on every level and at the same time nothing exists independently of Him. This is incongruent with the concept of wujūd which will be explained in transcendental philosophy, as in ḥikmat contingent existents have a level of wujūd in themselves. Their wujūd is by the Necessary (i.e. wujūd-by-something-else) but they are then existent in a real sense. In ‘irfān only the Necessary is existent in any real sense. There is nothing like Him according to the verse of the Qurʾān: “...nothing like a likeness of Him...”⁵²⁷ Wujūd is such that no second wujūd can be imagined with it.⁵²⁸ Nor can it be split due to its simplicity (baṣāṭah) except when mentally distinguishing the Names.⁵²⁹

Qayṣarī explains that Wujūd has no beginning, as that would make God needy of a cause for His existence making Him contingent and not Necessary.⁵³⁰ Wujūd has no end as it would be juxtaposed to nonexistence and so the end of Wujūd would be described by its opposite.⁵³¹ It would also violate the law of identity,⁵³² as Wujūd has no other, but placing a limit on Wujūd necessitates another (even if that other is nonexistence). There are two interpretations of the

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⁵²⁶ Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (2) 26.
⁵²⁷ Qurʾān 42:11.
⁵²⁸ Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 51 and Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 26.
⁵²⁹ Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 53 and Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 28.
⁵³⁰ Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 30.
⁵³¹ Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 30.
⁵³² Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 30.
idea that God has no beginning and no end. One is related to time, meaning God has no beginning or end in time. There was no time period where He did not exist and no time period will come where He will not exist. But there is no meaning to time when speaking about abstract beings. Time is a variable of the material world.

The other interpretation is that when it is said that God has no beginning what is referred to is the depth of His Essence. That is that His Essence has no beginning or end. When it is said He has no End, what is referred to be His manifestations, which will never cease as due to the depth of His Essence, He will never run out of manifestations. Due to His depth His Reality is only known to Himself.533 “Vision comprehends Him not, and He comprehends all vision...”534 He is therefore the Manifest in terms of the outward world,535 which either refers to the material and imaginal world, or to all the levels of existence except the Degree of Non-dualistic Unity, and the Inward which refers to all the other levels of existence except the material and the imaginal, or never ending Essence depending on which of the two interpretations is taken.

If a contingent being becomes nonexistent in ḥikmat, it is wiped off the face of wujūd. However, in ʿirfān a thing becoming nonexistent does not mean that it ceases to exist. Rather it reenters the hidden realms, in the same way it manifested from them in the first instance.536 That is something that becomes nonexistent, does not become completely nonexistent, but becomes hidden from the corporeal world, as the reality of anything except God is

533 Qayṣari, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 33.
534 Qurʿān, 6:103.
535 Qayṣari, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 30.
536 Qayṣari, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 42.
nonexistence. The misinterpretation of the philosophers according to the ‘ʿurafāʾ’ comes from their attributing existence to each individual thing as those existences are different to Existence. Like the existence of individuals from a common species (naw’). In ‘irfān individual existences are exist by an illuminated relation (iṣāfah ishrāqīyah), like the relationship of the rays of the sun to the sun. That is that existents are in no way separate from Wujūd, as relation is conceptual.

VI. The Permanent Archetypes (al-aʿyān al-thābitah) and Quiddity

Quiddity for Sadrian philosophers is similar to the permanent archetypes in the terminology of the ‘ʿurafāʾ’ as it is a things permanent archetype that gives it its characteristics. The permanent archetypes are the Names but with a face towards creation, therefore they never enter the world of creation themselves. The following rough example can be used to understand this idea and the permanent archetypes themselves. If a person was to ask another person a philosophical question, before the event of the question, the person who is being asked has the attribute of being a philosopher, but that attribute is mixed with all the other attributes the person has, such as being a linguist, a jurist, a ʿārif and so on. Then when he is asked the question, the attribute of being a philosopher presents itself in his essence. With that attribute he creates an answer in his mind. Then after the creation of the answer in his mind, he expresses the answer in the extramental with words and the question is answered.

537 Qaṣṣārī, Sharḥ Fūṣūs al-ḥikam, (1) 42.
In this example the stage of nondelimited attributes of the person who is asked, is likened to the level of God’s Essence which has no specification even in terms of His Names. This level in the Breath of the All-Merciful is the degree of Non-dualistic Unity. Then when the Names become specified it is another level of God’s Essence which is the degree of Dualistic Unity. In our example this is when the attribute of philosopher becomes specified in the essence of the person answering the question. Then in the Presence of God’s Knowledge [before existence] (al-ḥadarah al-ʿilmīyah) — the Attributes manifest as the permanent archetypes, which is like the formulation of the answer in the mind of the philosopher. The mind of the philosopher, although an internal faculty, is differentiated from his essence. In the same way although the permanent archetypes exist in the unseen realm they are different from the pure Essence and are therefore classified as quiddity instead of wujūd.

The permanent archetypes, like the essences of the quiddities in ḥikmat, are neither existent in themselves nor non-existent, as their existence depends on the manifestation of the Essence. Then when those permanent archetypes manifest in the extramental they become the external archetypes. The external archetypes therefore find their truth in the permanent archetypes and this is the meaning of actuality (nafs al-amr) in ʿirfān. Hence all things in outward existence including quiddity find their reality in inner existence and are all simply manifestations of the Pure Essence.

Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī disagrees with the similitude drawn between the permanent archetypes and quiddity in his gloss on Qayṣari’s introduction to his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ. He argues that the permanent archetypes are not even in the system of wujūd for them to be
like quiddity. Rather the permanent archetypes are in the knowledge of God before coming into existence:

They mean by the reality of the human the permanent archetype of the perfect human in the knowledge of God. For every archetype of the external archetypes there is a permanent archetype in the knowledge of God which is the origin (aṣl) of what it is in the external. What is in the external world is a shadow of this origin. By this the imagination that the permanent archetypes of things in the knowledge of God is the quiddity of things and that they are opposed to a things wujūd. This is because the world of knowledge is before the world of existents...

The clear response to this argument of Qumshihī is that the external archetypes are in the system of wujūd as the shadow of the permanent archetypes. What is meant by saying that the permanent archetypes are similar to quiddity is that quiddity can either be existent or not and so it can be understood outside of the system of wujūd and therefore compared with the permanent archetypes rather than the external archetypes. Yet this whole discussion is from a philosophical perspective as Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī points out when criticizing a later comparison Qumshihī makes in the same gloss between the permanent archetypes and the Names, with wujūd and quiddity:

So comparing wujūd and quiddity, even though it is with a difference, is not correct for that which they are being compared with [the permanent archetypes and the Names] in

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538 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 78.
terms of what he [Qumshihi] said — may God sanctify his secret — according to the lords of insight and the people of taste and wayfaring. For attributing effects to quiddity is either from the perspective [of] oneness in manyness and that wujūd while being detached from specification is manifest in it and is everything; or from the perspective of the people of philosophy as they see the world...[actually] existing. Not the ‘irfānī perspective as for the free [i.e. the ‘urafā’] it is imagination within imagination.539

Here Khumayni criticizes Qumshihi’s analysis as being a philosophical reading of the concept of the permanent archetypes as opposed to maintaining his stance from an ‘irfānī perspective. Quiddity should be not be taken as anything other than a conceptual distinction and to attribute any real affect to quiddity would be — as Khumayni points out — from the perspective of real manyness. The permanent archetypes on the other hand have nothing to do with quiddity as they are part of God’s knowledge. As such the permanent archetypes are always part of Wujūd, not outside of it.

VII. **Gradation (Tashkik)**

Gradation in *wujūd* is a major concept in transcendental philosophy as will be discussed. Philosophers seek to explain gradation by starting with what they have in front of them and gradually removing delimitation, until they reach the level of the Necessary Being. For example, *wujūd* in an element has a certain level of existence, which is lower than the *wujūd* in a plant. The *wujūd* in that plant is at a lower level then the *wujūd* in an animal, which in

turn is at a lower level then wujūd in an intelligent being and so on until the wujūd of the Necessary Being, whose wujūd is at such a level that it is necessary. Therefore, gradation and the attribution of wujūd to the Necessary Being are arrived at through examining contingent beings. In ṣīra gradation must be understood in the light of the oneness of Existence. That is that gradation is not real in the sense that it is real in hikmat. Gradation occurs not only for wujūd but also for modes related to wujūd such as knowledge, life and desire. These are present in all the levels of wujūd, but at the intensity or weakness of that level. So the knowledge, life and desire in a plant are at a lower level then in an intelligent being for example.

The ṣārif starts with God who is the only true existent. Then since His manifestations are nothing except Himself, He is manifest on all levels of creation. He also gave each level of creation and each created being on each level, their own capacity. So each thing reflects Him, through His Attributes, according to their own capacity. For example, the sun manifests God's attribute of the Light, however, only to the extent of its capacity, which God through His Wisdom created at a certain level. Here it is the issue of capacity that explains gradation, rather than the intellectual exercise of removing delimitation. At the same time, Wujūd meaning God has no gradation as it is not God who is at different levels according to the level of existence. What is graded is His manifestation according to the capacities of His created Beings. Otherwise a God whose own existence can be described by intensity and weakness is a God that can be described by place, as He would exist with more intensity in the angelic world for example, then in the corporeal world. This is a problem that the transcendental philosopher falls into with his explanation of wujūd as a chain with the Necessary Being is at the end of that chain, in order to prevent infinite regress (tasalsul). Ṣārār explains this point
when discussing two different ways multiplicity can be viewed, one from the perspective of quiddities and their capacities, and the other being the different levels of *wujūd*:

[The second type of multiplicity is] multiplicity in terms of perfection and imperfection, intensity and weakness, precedence and delay, needlessness and poverty and necessity and possibility, are in the essence of the reality of *wujūd*. His essential states (*shuʿūn*) and that which follow from what is necessary from the perfections of *wujūd* should not become separate from His Essence. The reality of *wujūd* and the pure reality from the perspective of nondelimited perfection (*iṭlāq-i kamāli*) and flowing emanating perfection (*kamāl ʿirsāl sarayānī*), possesses perfections that not in terms of the essence of *wujūd*, nor from the perspective of mentally posited intellectual specificity (*nawī iʿtibār ʿaqlī*), is there any separation from those perfections. To summarize, this type of multiplicity is called gradation...⁵⁴⁰

*Irfān* is a subject concerned with how multiplicity comes from the One, how that multiplicity will return back to the One and what the purpose of the creative action is. Does the One become many? Or is the multiplicity all in the One? The answer lies in between these two extremes and is expressed in a phrase narrated from Imam ‘Alī and also in other instances⁵⁴¹

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⁵⁴¹ See for example Imam ‘Ali: *Imagination does not comprehend Him, rather He self-disclosed to them by them and by them became forbidden to them*, see Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn Sharif al-Raḍī (compl.) *Nahj al-balāgha*, ed. Ṣubḥī Ṣāliḥ (Qum: Intishārāt-I hijrat, 1414/1993) 269; and narrated from the Prophet: *Tawḥīd is that His Manifest is in His Hidden and His Hidden is in His Manifest, His Manifest is described but not seen and His Hidden is existent not hidden, He is sought for in every place but no place is empty of Him for even the blink of an eye, He is Present unlimited and Hidden never lost*, see Muḥammad b. ‘Ali Ibns Bābawayh, *Maʿānī al-akhbār*, ed. ‘Ali Akbar Ghaffārī (Qum: Mu’assasat al-nashr al-islāmī al-tābiʿa I-jāmiʿa al-mudarrisin bi qum, 1403/1983) 10.
from the other Shi'i Imams: “He is not close to things by connection and not distant from them by separation.” There is a difference between oneness and connection. The idea of the effusion of existence by manifestation and self-disclosure bridges the gap between God and His creation, as nothing emanates from the Truth except the Truth. But His manifestations and self-disclosures make Him knowable in some way, while simultaneously acting as veils of light and darkness that block true knowledge of Him. It is easy to see how such a refined discussion is easily misinterpreted by those without significant background in philosophy and 'irfan. Consequently the 'urafā’ have often been accused of polytheism and pantheism (neither of which are intended by 'urafā’ as the above discussion shows) by more traditionally trained scholars. Conversely the ‘urafā’ were careful to keep their teachings secret, only disclosing them to who they considered worthy.

To summarize the previous sections in this part, Wujūd in theoretical ‘irfan is a term used for God as He is existence, while everything else is a manifestation of Him. This focus on God’s Oneness is the view of the oneness of Existence where there is no real wujūd except God. Other terms for this concept include nondelimited wujūd and wujūd which is non-conditional as the source of division. This view of Wujūd explains the seemingly heretical utterances of the ‘urafā’. The univocal nature of Wujūd is the Wujūd which is understood in the experiences of the ‘urafā’. Wujūd manifests with its modes and has no opposite. The permanent archetypes are similar to quiddities according to some, while others disagree with drawing comparisons in this way. The source of gradation is the capacities of created beings to manifest God. The next part will discuss wujūd in ḥikmat.

542 See al-Raḍī (compl.) Nahj al-balāgha, 40.
II.  **Part 2: Wujūd in Transcendental Philosophy**

According to a distinction made by Farābī and Ibn Sinā when a person considers the extramental they are able to mentally divide each existent thing into two distinct metaphysical concepts; its wujūd and its quiddity or what-ness. The conception of each of these principles is completely separate, which means wujūd cannot be described with any of the categories of quiddity. Division between the two concepts is possible as the mind is able to view quiddity independently of wujūd; even though in the extramental the two cannot be separated. Quiddity is the limit of wujūd by which we comprehend different existents and does not have a separate existence, as will be explained further later. This gives rise to two distinct planes when understanding wujūd; the mind and the extramental. If the concept of wujūd in the mind has no relation to wujūd in the extramental, all efforts to understand wujūd would be pointless. But if there is a relationship between the concept of wujūd and wujūd in the extramental, then philosophy has meaning. This is a key question dealt with in the section on mental existence, and is a point of intersection with Western philosophy.

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544 Quiddity has two meanings: 1) in a specific sense (*bi ma'anā al-akhaṣṣ*) which is the response to the question: What is it? And 2) in a general sense (*bi ma'anā al-a'am*) which is also known as the individual quiddity (*māhiyyah innīyah*) or the thing as it actually is. For this reason philosophers say that God has an individual quiddity even if it cannot be grasped, but as pure Existence, does not have quiddity in the first sense. For a further explanation of *māhiyyah innīyah* see Ibn Sinā, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, ed./tr. M. E. Marmura (Provo Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005) 383, nt. 1.
The different planes give rise to different types of predication when formulating sentences, which are valid or invalid, depending on the plane the sentence is tested against. In propositional logic, primary essential predication (\(\text{al-ḥaml al-awwālī al-dhātī}\)) occurs when there is unity in the concept of the subject and the predicate. For example, the proposition “man is a rational animal” is a valid primary essential predication as the concept of man is the same as the concept of a rational animal. Since the rule to distinguish this type of predication is unity of concept it concerns the plane of the mind. On the other hand, common technical predication (\(\text{al-ḥaml al-shā'ī al-ṣinā'ī}\)) occurs when there is unity of the subject and predicate in the extramental. So for example, in the proposition “man laughs”, although the concept of man and laughter are two distinct concepts they are brought together in the laughing man in the extramental, making predication by common technical predication in the proposition “man laughs” valid. But in this case predication by primary essential predication is invalid as man and laughter are two separate concepts. The distinction becomes important when solving the problem of some tricky propositions which will be tackled in the section on mental existence.

Although the separation between wujūd and quiddity can be traced back to Neoplatonic forerunners, Islamic philosophers discussed the issue in more depth and gave it much more importance when formulating their philosophical frameworks. Ibn Sinā deals with the issue in his most important works and Suhrawardi proposed a rival framework based on the

\[543\] Common technical predication is also known as oft-used predication (\(\text{al-ḥaml al-muta'ārif}\), as it is used so often) and accidental predication (\(\text{al-ḥaml al-ʿarḍī}\)) (as opposed to essential predication (\(\text{al-ḥaml al-dhātī}\)) see Hasan Hasanzāda Āmulī, \(\text{al-Nūr al-mutajallī fī al-zuhūr al-ṣillī}\) (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008) 35–37.
primacy of quiddity before Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy which gave primacy to wujūd.546

I. The Self-Evident Nature of Wujūd

In both Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Bidāyat and Niḥāyat and Sabzavārī’s Manẓūma the foundations for an understanding of wujūd begin at the obviousness of wujūd and the consequent uselessness in defining it with a definition, as any definition of the term wujūd results in a more complex and incomplete definition then an intuitive understanding of the concept.547 A person intuitively knows the difference between something that exists and something that does not, as when they want to fulfill their needs they seek existent things that have the effect they are searching for. For example, a thirsty person seeks water, but not just any water, he seeks water which is existent, not imaginary water, and this fact is obvious to every person once they have been informed of it and their attention has been turned to it. Conversely a child who is scared of a monster under their bed is comforted by explaining that this creature has no real existence outside of imagination. Intuitive knowledge can also be termed as knowledge by presence and it is contrasted with knowledge by acquisition.548

546 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, 87.

547 The obviousness of wujūd is found at least as far back as Ibn Sinā see Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing, 22-24. Therefore all definitions of wujūd are in fact admonitions (tanbihāt) that point the seeker back to what he already knows through his own experience.

548 For an in depth analysis of the concept of ‘ilm al-ḥuḍūr in Islamic philosophy and ‘irfān see Ḥā’irī Yazdi, Knowledge by Presence. The other view is that intuitive knowledge is by acquisition when a person interacts with their environment over a period of time.
Hasanzāda Āmuli of the school of Qum in his gloss on the Manẓūma brings this discussion back to a report from the Prophet when he was asked: “How did you know your Lord?” The Prophet replied: “By God I knew things.” Hasanzāda comments saying it is due to the manifestness of God and the hiddenness of things.⁵⁴⁹ That is that God can be known by presence. Yet when one knows the Source of things, he knows all things, which is a more 'īrfānī approach to this issue as explained previously. From a philosophical perspective this tradition may also be an indication to an ontological proof for the existence of God (burḥān al-ṣiddīqīn), where the knower of existence knows existence by existence and not through intellectual arguments. In any case the type of knowledge referred to is not one of acquisition, but is a clear vision of what is known by presence, albeit at different levels depending on the purity of the knower. A similar tradition is quoted concerning Imam ʿAlī, when someone asks him if he has seen his Lord. He responds by saying that he would not worship a lord he had not seen. The questioner then asks how he has seen God and he answers by saying that the type of sight is not with the eye, rather it is with the sight of the heart.⁵⁵⁰

After establishing wujūd Ṭabāṭabāʿī continues to argue that all that we know of wujūd is by moving from one necessary aspect of wujūd to another rather than either an argument from an effect to uncover its cause (burḥān al-innī) or an argument from the cause to establish the effect (burḥān al-limmī). He classifies this third type of proof as another type of burḥān al-innī.

⁵⁴⁹ See Ḥādī Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, ed. Masʿūd Ṭālibī with the glosses of Ḥasan Hasanzāda Āmuli, 5 vols (Tehran: Nashr-i nāb 1380 Sh/2001) (2) 60. This hadīth also has an ‘īrfānī interpretation which reflects the Prophet’s station of witnessing.

⁵⁵⁰ Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1) 242.
argument even if it is not one in its strict sense. This type of reasoning is possible because differentiating aspects of *wujūd* is purely a mental exercise. *Wujūd* and all of its modes are unified in the extramental. While Muḥammad Shāhābādī, another ḥakīm of the school of Qum who is the son of Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī agrees that the proofs concerning *wujūd* are strictly of neither category he disagrees with Ṭabāṭabāʾī's classification of it being an extension of the first category of proofs as he argues that there is no effect when discussing pure *wujūd*. What can be understood of *wujūd* are the necessary aspects of *wujūd* itself and so he argues that these proofs are better classified as an extension of *limmī* arguments. At the same time, what is established from moving from the cause is not an effect, but a necessary attribute of the cause itself. Shāhābādī says in his gloss on the *Asfār*:

> I say: The ontological proof for the existence of God (*burhān al-ṣiddiqīn*) is neither a *limmī* proof or an *innī* proof according to the terminology, except if we say that the *limmī* proof is wider then what has been mentioned in logic in terms of establishing the effect by means of the cause. Rather it includes the establishment of the cause from itself to establish something else, not itself so that it would necessitate a circular argument. As Mawlawī said: “The sun rising is the proof of the sun [existing].”

He further clarifies his point when commenting on Ṭabāṭabāʾī's gloss on the *Asfār* when Ṭabāṭabāʾī argues that arguing from the perspective of gradation to establish the Necessary Being is an argument from the effect to the cause by saying:

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559 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, *Nihāyat al-ḥikma*, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāżī, 4 vols (Qum: Mu’assasa-i āmuzish wa pazhūhish-yi Imām Khumaynī, 1378 Sh/1999), (1) 30-32.

I say: Firstly gradation is not a necessary aspect of *wujūd*. It [gradation] is *wujūd* itself as it [*wujūd*] is simple in all of its levels...so it is not an *innī* argument from this aspect in the same way that necessity is not a necessary aspect of *wujūd*, rather it is also the reality of *wujūd* itself...553

While Ṭabāṭabā’ī argues from the perspective that gradation is a real effect of the Necessary Being, Shāhābādī argues that gradation is part of the Necessary Being as it is the Essence that indicates towards the Essence. The split in views is very much an illustration of the different readings of Mullā Șadrā. While Ṭabāṭabā’ī has adopted a more philosophical approach in preferring the separation of the cause and the effect, Shāhābādī has taken a more ‘irfānī approach even though his interpretation of gradation being essential to *wujūd* is consistent with a philosophical reading.

It follows from the distinction between *wujūd* and quiddity that *wujūd* cannot have a definition based on a complete genus and differentia, but why *wujūd* not be defined in an incomplete fashion using a description (*rasm*) like the categories (*maqūlāt*) which also cannot be given a complete definition? Sabzavārī commenting on the *Asfūr* answers:

> The intended meaning [of *rasm*] is logical description, that is, definition by accidental properties that pertain to the quiddity. It is clear that *wujūd* does not have a definition in this sense. Additionally, the reality is not attained by the mind except under a term

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553 Shāhābādī, *Rashaḥāt al-ḥikma*, 4-5.
and this necessitates tautology. The understanding of a thing is equal to it in knowledge and ignorance and the thing being defined is better known [then by its definition].

That is that since both necessary and accidental properties are from a things quiddity, they cannot be attributed to wujūd. Therefore, wujūd has no definition as it does not fall under any of the categories of quiddity and any attempt to define it necessitates an attempt to conceptualize it. However, that conceptualization is not as clear as the initial experience of wujūd before theorization. In other words, wujūd is self-evident and there is no need to define it. Existence is therefore the starting point of all discussions as it is proved in of itself and from this base other concepts can be proved. With the intuitive character of existence established the nature of that existence can be discussed further in terms of its primacy and gradation. In some way the discussion on the self evident nature of wujūd shapes the flow of the more ‘irfānī discussions incorporated in the study of hikmat. To accept something as self evident one has to accept that some things are left better unexplained and experienced with a clear vision of the self. It means that the philosopher does not rely only on his intellectual prowess, but has to return to himself at times as well to understand what his intellect cannot define.

II. Ishtirāk lafẓī and ishtirāk ma’nawi

When we say “man exists” or “this tree exists” or “God exists” or other phrases similar to this, is existence univocal (ishtirāk ma’nawi) in all of these sentences? Or is the word existence a

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554 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-muta‘āliya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabā’ī et al., (1) 53, nt. 1.
homonymy (ishtirāk lafẓ)? Or does the word existence share the same meaning for some existents and a different meaning (tafṣīl) for God? Transcendental philosophy bases its understanding of wujūd on the idea that wujūd is only one reality and so carries one meaning on whatever it is predicated to (i.e. it is univocal). That is existence in all three of the above sentences has the same meaning. For philosophers, sentences are not considered simply for their linguistic value in a particular language, so that one could say that the philosophers argue that wujūd has only one linguistic meaning. Rather the abstract concept of wujūd, independent of which ever language it is expressed in, is univocal. The meaning of wujūd in each sentence must be the same as that is the point of the sentences. That is the sentences seek to express whether something has existence or not, where existence in each case means the same thing.

Another argument for the oneness of meaning of wujūd is that when we doubt about the quiddity of something but are sure that it exists, the meaning of that existence does not change as we change our idea of what that existent could be. For example, if something is seen from a distance, the object may be thought to be a tree, but as one draws closer they find that the object was actually a man. Although what was known of the quiddity of the existent has changed, the knowledge of the existence of an object has remained.

As for the third possibility, which is a shared meaning among existents and a different meaning concerning God, Sabzavārī says it is true in the extramental but not true of our concept of existence,555 as everything related to God cannot be grasped by the intellect.

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555 Sabzivārī, The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī, 42.
However, the intellect can verify that God's existence with the self-evident meaning of existence explained above and also verify that God's existence is more intense than other existences and it is that intensity that cannot be understood. There must be some relationship between the existence of God and the existence in contingent beings which is different to the relationship of *wujūd* and nonexistence (*'adam*). Although God's existence cannot be comprehended and is certainly different form the existence of what He has caused to exist, He still exists in the univocal sense of the word applied to His creation, as it cannot be said that He does not exist.

The distinction between God's existence and that of other existents is distinguished by various terms. For example, God's existence is necessary whereas all other existence is contingent. Or God's existence is essential and real, whereas the existence of others is accidental and subtle. This point finds its roots in the *aḥādīth* which from one perspective completely deny any possibility of comparing God with His creation, but at the same time affirming His existence and the human's intuitive grasp of His existence. The existence of the contingent is not outside of God's existence and so a paradox remains. This paradox is further elucidated in the oneness of Existence in theoretical *ʿirfān*.

ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī of the school of Tehran dedicates a chapter of his book *Lamaʿāt al-ilāhiya* to the very issue of Gods Essence being known to only Himself. After an epistemological categorization of the different types of knowledge, he shows that knowing God as He is does

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556 Sabzavārī, *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Ṣamuli, (2) 78, nt. 1.

not fall into any of these categories while Gods knowledge of Himself is knowledge by presence.\textsuperscript{558} It is impossible to know God through knowledge by attainment as God does not have a form that can be imagined.\textsuperscript{559} But for one to know God through knowledge by presence, he must fully comprehend Gods Essence, which is impossible for an imperfect existent.\textsuperscript{560} Zunūzī explains what can be known of God in the concluding section of his argument entitled “A Fine ʿirfānī Point.” Here he explains that what can be known of God is in proportion to the effusion (fayḍ).\textsuperscript{561} Therefore the Essence is not knowable in itself, but God is known by what He manifests, which is an incomplete knowledge of Him. Zunūzī’s method of discussing the issue of knowing God from a purely philosophical perspective and thereafter moving on to conclude using an ʿirfānī framework is commonly seen in the works of Sadrian philosophers in the school of Tehran as many ʾhukamāʾ were well versed in both readings of Mullā Ṣadrā.

In his gloss on the Asfār, Ḥasanzāda Āmulī traces Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion on the univocality of wujūd back to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s comments in al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqīyah, including Mullā Ṣadrā’s observation that the univocality of wujūd is close to being self-evident.\textsuperscript{564} He comments that the reason that the univocality of wujūd is not self-evident is that some have disagreed with it. “And surely he [Mullā Ṣadrā] said close to self-evident as if it was self-evident from every perspective, the Ashʿarīs, al- Баṣrī and those who followed them, would not have disagreed.”\textsuperscript{565} In his discussion Mullā Ṣadrā’s points out that those who reject the univocality

\textsuperscript{558} Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 82.
\textsuperscript{559} Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 92.
\textsuperscript{560} Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 93.
\textsuperscript{561} Zunūzī, Lamaʿāt al-ilāhīya, 95.
\textsuperscript{562} Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya with the glosses of Ḥasanzada Āmulī, (1) 58.
\textsuperscript{563} Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya with the glosses of Ḥasanzada Āmulī, (1) 58.
of \textit{wujūd} have actually accept it without realizing; as if \textit{wujūd} was different for each thing, there would not be one concept that could be discussed. Rather this discussion would involve a never ending number of concepts of \textit{wujūd} that would have to be enumerated to understand whether or not they shared a meaning or were just named the same thing. Since nobody claims separate meanings for the \textit{wujūd} of each existent, and since they discuss \textit{wujūd} as though it is one reality, they subscribe to the univocality of \textit{wujūd} without realizing.\footnote{Shīrāzī, \textit{al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya} with the glosses of Ḥasanzada Āmulī, (1) 59-63.}

III. \textbf{The Principality of \textit{Wujūd}}

It is from this point the transcendental philosopher asks: Of these two metaphysical ideas, that is \textit{wujūd} and quiddity, on which is the object in the extramental really dependent.\footnote{On the question of principality see M. Moris, \textit{Mullā Ṣarā's Doctrine of the Primacy of Existence} (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2003).} Although they are one reality in the extramental, they are certainly completely separate concepts, as \textit{wujūd} is shared among all existents and quiddity is different for each existent. Similarly, quiddity can exist or not exist and this would be impossible if quiddity was the same as \textit{wujūd}, as the \textit{wujūd} would be essential to quiddity and therefore it would be impossible for it to not exist. So which one of these metaphysical modes (\textit{ḥaythīyāt}) is real and which one is simply our expression, as one reality in the extramental cannot emanate from two separate realities?\footnote{If both \textit{wujūd} and quiddity were fundamentally real, it would result in each thing being two things. Shaykh Aḥamd Aḥsāʾī believed in the fundamental reality of both, where \textit{wujūd} was the origin of all good and quiddity the origin of all bad. Ḥasanzāda Āmulī points out that this shows that he did not fully comprehend the rules of philosophy as evil is a lack of perfection and has no separate existence within itself. The lack of perfection is due}
The question of principality is important because it is at the heart of understanding reality, as another way of expressing principality is to ask which of these concepts is real. The philosophers have differed on whether it is *wujūd* or quiddity although to say it is both goes against the grain of the question, which specifies one of the two. The traditional explanation is that the transcendental philosopher opts for *wujūd* and this is what is meant by their belief in the principality of *wujūd* (*aṣālat al-wujūd*), whereas Illuminationist philosophers believe in the principality of quiddity (*aṣālat al-māhīya*). Although this explanation may not be incorrect, it is a simplified one as it seems Illuminationist philosophers were using a different basis to discuss *wujūd* and in fact believed in the principality of light which is a mode of *wujūd*.567 *Wujūd* is considered primary as when we ask if something exists we mean is it predicated with the quality of existence. Hence it is that quality that existence stems from, that is *wujūd*. Additionally, oneness between two things (such as man and writing) would never be achieved in the extramental if quiddity was the principle as all quiddities (*māhīyāt*) are differentiated without any relationship between the different quiddities.

According to Mullā Ṣadrā’s summarization of Suhrawardi’s opinion,568 one of Suhrawardi’s attempts to invalidate the primacy of *wujūd* was by claiming that it leads to infinite regress.

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568 Shirāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-muta‘āliya*, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 65. I have referenced the problems of the interpreters of Suhrawardi previously, see note 481. The basic contention with what Ṣadrā and Nūrī have done here is that they did not criticise Suhrawardi according to his own philosophical principles and as a critique
This is because if *wujūd* is in the extramental then *wujūd* itself exists. Everything that exists has *wujūd* so the *wujūd* that brings something to existence needs another *wujūd* to give that *wujūd* existence and so on until infinite regress. Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī one of the most important teachers of the founders of the school of Tehran, in his gloss on the *Asfār*, rejects this contention as it assumes that *wujūd* can be separated from itself and then predicated to itself, as the extramental is existence and not the plane where existence comes to exist:

What is meant here [by this contention] is that the extramental is a container (*żarf*) for the existence of *wujūd*. Not that the extramental itself is the sphere for *wujūd*. Because this last aspect is not the issue being discussed at present, so understand! We prove that the extramental, in itself, is the sphere for *wujūd* by its being a sphere for its own *wujūd*. As if *wujūd* itself is existence for other than *wujūd*, in relation to attaining it [*wujūd*] for it [existence of *wujūd*], then attaining it [*wujūd*] for itself is preferred and more correct in its attaining something for something, due to the impossibility of separating a thing from itself.569

Hence *wujūd* exists in itself and there is no meaning to separating *wujūd* from itself and then claiming that existence needs existence to exist, while at the same time existence is existence itself. Suhrawardi’s argument uses the framework of the principle of quiddity, as in principle of quiddity, *wujūd* is predicated to quiddity. The predication of *wujūd* is also possible in the view of the Peripatetics, so Suhrawardi’s point was not completely off the mark and presents

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569 Shirāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya*, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabā’ī et al., (1) 65, nt. 1.
a strong criticism of the Peripatetic view. Rather, logical predication is not the issue at hand for the Sadrian philosopher as they are discussing \textit{wujūd} in the extramental. That is that Mullā Ṣadrā rebuts Suhrawardī's criticism on his own principles, not on Suhrawardī's or from the perspective of the Peripatetic philosophy Suhrawardī was criticizing.

IV. The Mentally posited Nature of Quiddity

For the proponents of primacy of \textit{wujūd}, existence is what is really experienced in the extramental and the quiddity of a thing is a limit of \textit{wujūd} from which we extract intellectual definitions of disparate things. From this limit the mind creates an image which corresponds with the extramental and we can distinguish what we consider separate realities from the blanket of \textit{wujūd}. Hence quiddity does not really exist but is a mental construct derived from the limits of existence which in itself is not existent (\textit{mawjūd}) or nonexistent (\textit{ma’dūm}). If it exists in the extramental, that is not due to its own essence but the attribution of \textit{wujūd} to it making it necessary as long as \textit{wujūd} is attributed to it (\textit{wujūb bi al-ghayr}). Quiddity is completely dependent on \textit{wujūd}.

It follows that anything necessary (\textit{lāzīm}) to a certain quiddity in the mind such as being-a-species (\textit{naw’iyah}) in relation to man are also established by \textit{wujūd} but that \textit{wujūd} itself is not described by any of the rules of quiddity. This is because all of these rules are developed for quiddity after the initial separation of quiddity and \textit{wujūd}. Hence \textit{wujūd} has no definition as definitions are dependent on a genus (\textit{jins}) and a differentia (\textit{faṣl}) which are both attributes.
of quiddity, taken from the limits of wujūd. This was discussed previously in the section of the self-evident nature of wujūd and it relates to the referent of wujūd (i.e. wujūd in the extramental); however, the concept of wujūd can follow the rules of quiddity as a mental construct and not wujūd qua wujūd. This point will be further clarified further when mental existence is discussed.

Although many would struggle to separate an attestation to the concept of the principality of wujūd and the mentally posited nature of quiddity from a transcendental philosopher, even this cornerstone of Sadrian philosophy is critically discussed by some contemporary ḥakīms. Ghulām-Riţā Fayyāżī of the school of Qum proposes the concept of the principality of wujūd and quiddity (aṣālat al-wujūd wa ‘ayniyat al-māhiya), but in a different manner then those who have been refuted in the ḥikmat tradition when establishing the principality of wujūd. In his gloss on Nihāyat he states:

The truth is that in this question [of the principality of wujūd] both wujūd and quiddity are existent, meaning that both are reality in itself. Not meaning that each has a reality that is specific to them — as some that have been attributed [with the opinion] of the principality of both of them have said — rather meaning that the outside reality, which is one real referent for the concept of wujūd, in the same way that it is one true referent for the concept of quiddity. The first [referent] narrates what is shared with others and the second [referent] narrates that which distinguishes from others, while what is shared is the same as what distinguishes in the extramental. Quiddity is
mentally posited in the meaning that if it is considered by itself it is not existent and it only becomes existent by *wujūd*, not by itself.⁵⁷³

Here Fayyāžī returns to the point where the concepts of *wujūd* and quiddity are extracted from one single referent in the extramental. That existent never loses its oneness, and so therefore principality should not be attributed to one concept in exclusion of the other. But here is where the discussion stops short, as the concept of principality has to be attributed to one concept as two complete concepts cannot be the principle for one referent as established by the proponents of the principality of *wujūd*. Fayyāḍī is criticizing Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s exposition of the concept of *wujūd* by reanalyzing the referent in the extramental.

V. **Consequences of the Principality of Wujūd**

There are many implications that result from accepting the principality of *wujūd*. The first is that the terms *wujūd*, being-a-thing and being-a-individual are synonymous (*musāwiq*) because they share a referent and their semantic content overlaps. This means that although *wujūd*, being-a-thing and being-a-individual are separate concepts they have the same referent and the same mode of reference (*ḥaythīyat al-ṣidq*) from which the referent becomes a concept. No being-a-thing does not exist in the extramental as being-a-thing is necessarily related to existence.

This idea is clarified when considering other possible relationships that \textit{wujūd} and being-a-thing can have. The relationship could be exclusive (\textit{tabāyun}), synonymous (\textit{tarāduf}) or equivalent (\textit{tasāwi}). In an exclusive relationship the two aspects do not share the same concept, referent or mode of reference, like man and stone. In a synonymous relationship the two aspects share the same concept, referent and mode of reference, like two different words for the same thing. In an equivalent relationship although the referent is one, the concept and the modes of reference are different, like a man and his knowledge. In this last case the man is one reality in the extramental with his knowledge and so the referent is one. But the concept of “man” and the concept of “knowledge” are two separate concepts that do not share in any aspect; hence the concept is different.

At the same time, the way in which each of these concepts is related to the referent is different and so the mode of reference is different. One concept relates to the essence of the referent and the other is a mode of that referent. However, the mode of reference when referring to \textit{wujūd}, being-a-thing and being-a-individual is the same. This is true of all the necessary implications (\textit{mulāzamāt}) of \textit{wujūd} such as the relationship between \textit{wujūd} and oneness or \textit{wujūd} and actuality; and the relationship between each of the necessary implications, such as the relationship between oneness and actuality.\footnote{Sayyid Kamāl Ḥaydarī, \textit{Sharḥ Bidāyat al-ḥikma}, 2 vols (Beirut: Dār al-Hādī, 2007) (1) 107-109.}

Another implication is that there is nothing similar to \textit{wujūd} as for something to be similar to something else; the two must share their quiddity in some way. Yet \textit{wujūd} has no quiddity as it has no definition as established previously. In a similar vein \textit{wujūd} has no opposite as
opposites are existent and therefore part of *wujūd*. Nonexistence is not opposite to existence as nonexistence has no being-a-thing whatsoever and so cannot be the opposite of anything in the extramental. Rather when something is described with existence it means that existence is necessary (*ḍarūr*) for that thing. When something is nonexistent it means that nonexistence is necessary for that thing. The opposite of necessity is possibility which is the negation of both the necessity of existence or nonexistence. Therefore, anything with subsistence (*thubūt*) attains that subsistence by *wujūd* as nonexistence has no subsistence or being-a-thing.

But there is also some level of subsistence for propositions that have no direct reference to ascertain their truthfulness in the mind or in the extramental (*qaḍāyā nafs al-amrīya*) such as the phrase “the nonexistence of a cause is the cause of the nonexistence of an effect.” Since nonexistence has no subsistence in the extramental or the mind, this phrase has no direct reference against which to test its truthfulness. However, because the mind accepts that “the existence of a cause is the cause for the existence of an effect” it is forced to accept its opposite even though there is no referent to prove the opposite. This forced acceptance is its subsistence.

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574 The secondary intelligibles (*al-maʿqūlāt al-thānīyah*) i.e. the concepts not extracted directly from the outside world, but are understood through thinking about necessary relationships, such as opposites, pairs, ownership, causality, oneness etc, are all *nafs al-amrīya* issues, see Ṭabāṭabāʾī, *Nihāyat al-ḥikma*, with the glosses of Ghulāmrizā Fāyvāḏi, (1) 75, nt. 97. *Nafs al-Amr* can be translated as actuality meaning that which corresponds with reality. In theoretical ʿirfān, the *nafs al-amr* is explained as that which corresponds to the permanent archetypes, which is another way of saying what is truly real as it is what exists in God’s knowledge. In logical terms the *nafs al-amr* is that which corresponds to the nature (*ṭabīʿa*) of a thing, whether that thing exists in the extramental or is conceptualized in the mind or is in neither of these spheres. Ṭabāṭabāʾī deals with the *nafs al-amr* in more detail in his *Bidāyat* see Haydari, *Sharḥ Bidāyat al-ḥikma*, (1) 96-106.
\textit{Wujūd} does not have parts so that it can be split into other than itself. It is simple (\textit{baṣīṭ}). Hence the adjectives used to describe \textit{wujūd} are modes and not separate parts that make up \textit{wujūd}. The only reality in the extramental is \textit{wujūd} and the quiddities are the limits of \textit{wujūd}, which do not have an existence independent of \textit{wujūd} except by mental construction. Like a blanket of existence with creases of quiddity. In this example the only thing that really exists is the blanket, but we may conceptually construct realities for its creases. The limits in \textit{wujūd}, or the creases in the blanket, are those realities that we can separate from each other. For example, a man sitting on a chair in the extramental has sensory limits and from those limits we are able to mentally construct a separate quiddity for the man and another quiddity for the chair. So the limit of an existent helps us to separate different kinds of limit so that we know that a chair or a tree is not a man.

\textit{Wujūd} does not have a cause, but exists by the fact that it is pure existence that in itself deflects nonexistence and it is this property that gives it principality. Hence \textit{wujūd} deflects nonexistence from itself and from anything that is described with the property of existence. Like the sun, which deflects darkness from itself and from other things that come under its rays, or knowledge which deflects ignorance itself and deflects ignorance from the person who possesses it.\textsuperscript{573} Though \textit{wujūd} in itself deflects nonexistence, it is possible for some levels of existence to depend on others for their existence. For example, a contingent existent (\textit{mumkin al-wujūd}) depends on the Necessary Existent (\textit{wājib al-wujūd}) for its existence.

\textsuperscript{573} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (2) 67, nt. 12.
A contingent existent neither necessitates existence or nonexistence in its essence, and therefore it only can be existent when existence it attributed to it. But when existence is attributed to it, existence is necessary to it as long as it is still described as existent. This type of necessity is accidental necessity (wujūb bi-l-ghayr). However, pure existence in itself has no cause. Although there is no specific argument put forward regarding this, it is part of a foundationalist approach to wujūd as well as a derivation from theological arguments concerning God’s Needlessness. According to His Needlessness, God does not have a cause, is the principle of all creation and is not decreased in any way when He creates.

The Necessary Existent is superabundant and so the giving of existence does not decrease the Necessary Existent in any way as it is not the case that the Necessary Existent gives a part of its existence to a contingent existent. Here the example of the sun no longer applies, as the sun loses its light as it is distributed and has to create more light within itself to maintain its level of light. In contrast to the sun, knowledge increases when taught, so also cannot be directly compared to wujūd. Furthermore effusion does not imply loss or gain of perfection, but rather like the casting of a shade it has no effect on the one who casts. As Sabzavārī in his gloss on the Asfār warns:

Be cautious of understanding the apparent meaning of transfer from [the word] descent, for surely effusion from a thing is not an expression of evacuation from its position or its withdrawal from its level. Rather its meaning is casting of a shade or a picture. In summary it is something that is originated from something [else] in such a manner that it does not decrease from the perfection of that [first] thing at all. If we
hypothesize its return to it [the original thing] it would not increase its perfection at all.574

VI. **Wujūd is a Single Graded Reality**

According to the Sadrian school, the Peripatetics claimed that although *wujūd* is the principle, the existents are separated completely by their essences, like the separation of the highest genera (*al-ajnās al-ʿāliyah*) from each other.575 Yet this idea is clearly invalid due to the impossibility of deriving a general meaning of *wujūd*, applicable to all existents, whilst also claiming that the existents share in no aspect at all.576 Rather it would mean that every instant of existence linked to an essence should have a different meaning for *wujūd*. Mullā Șadrā solved the issue of distinctiveness in existence by referring differentiation in existence to differences in the level of *wujūd* in terms of intensity (*shidda*) and weakness (*daʿf*) or perfection (*kamāl*) verses imperfection (*naqṣ*). This was his principle of gradation.

When we look at the world around us we find that realities are different to each other in many aspects. Two objects may have different quiddities; or one object may be in the state of potential whereas the other may be in action; or one may be necessary and the other possible and so on. However, all of these differences are within the sphere of *wujūd* as *wujūd* does not

574 Shirāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya*, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 86, nt. 1
have any parts and anything outside of \textit{wujūd} does not have existence. So \textit{wujūd} comprises differences within its own sphere whilst being one simple reality. How can this be explained? The concept of gradation answers this question stipulating that \textit{wujūd} is a single reality with different levels. All the differences in each level and between each existent return to what is similar to them; which is \textit{wujūd}.

The example of movement helps to understand the concept of gradation. If an object is moving fast, another at a medium pace and the third at a slow pace, we notice that all the objects have different speeds but all share in the fact that they are moving. The movement is at different levels but at the same time they are all essentially doing one thing; moving. Another example is the different shades of a certain color. If an apple starts off as light red, then changes to a medium shade of red and then changes to a deep shade of red; then the colour has remained the same whereas what has changed has been the intensity of the colour.

The levels of \textit{wujūd} are separated by nondelimitation (\textit{īṭlāq}) and delimitation (\textit{taqyīd}) such that the Necessary Being is pure existence without any limitation and other existents move away from the Necessary Being through increasing amounts of delimitation. So the first effusion (\textit{al-ṣādir al-awwal}) is not the same as the Necessary Being as it adds a level of delimitation from the level of the Necessary being whilst being relatively nondelimited with regard to the second effusion (\textit{al-ṣādir al-thānî}). In the same way the angels are closer to pure existence then material beings as material beings are limited by corporeality in a way that angels are not and so on for all the levels of \textit{wujūd}. This spectrum between nondelimitation and delimitation is also expressed as a spectrum between intensity and weakness in \textit{wujūd} or perfection verses imperfection, as every delimitation is an imperfection and the more a thing
is nondelimited the closer it is to perfection. Ṭabāṭabā’ī when commenting on Mullā Ṣadrā’s division of wujūd as either the pure reality of wujūd or a level of that pure reality in the Asfār says:

What is intended here by the actual reality is the reality taken with the condition of being negated (bi sharṭ lá) [i.e. in of itself] which is the highest level of gradation, as wujūd for him [Mullā Ṣadrā] is graded with levels. It is known that the reality taken without any condition (lā bi sharṭ) includes all of the levels. To explain this further, if the levels you hypothesis rising from weakness to intense and from intense to more intense, then every lower level is limited in relation to what is above it, due to their lack of what is in the higher level in terms of perfection and not the opposite [i.e. that the lower level is more perfect]. So the higher level is nondelimited in relation to it [the lower level], containing all that is in it in terms of perfection. The lower level is limited in relation to the higher levels, and in this way upwards it ends with the level that is nondelimited without any limitations at all. If you like you could say: “It has no limit except that it has no limit.” It is the actual pure reality except that it is taken with the condition of being negated (bi sharṭ lá). It is one of the levels if it is taken without any condition (lā bi sharṭ) it includes all the other levels and there is no opposite level to it among all the other levels.577

As well as explaining gradation, Ṭabāṭabā’ī differentiates between the various ways the philosopher can look at wujūd, which were explained in the introduction when explaining the

577 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-muta‘ālya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabā’ī et al., (1) 69-70, nt. 2.
difference between the subject of philosophy and the subject of theoretical ʿirfān. The essential difference between the two subjects was that while ʿirfān discussed nondelimited wujūd without condition as the source of division (lā bi sharṭ al-maqsamī), philosophy discussed nondelimited wujūd without condition as a division (lā bi sharṭ al-qismī). Sayyid Kāẓim ʿAṣār traces the use of these terms back through one of his teachers to scholars in the school of Tehran such as Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshīhī and Hāshim Rashtī. 578

But to say that each level of existence not on the level of the Necessary Being is composed of wujūd and increasing levels of nonexistence as things move further away from the Necessary Being is inaccurate as existence cannot be compounded with nonexistence. The difference between the levels of existence has to be explained within existence itself. This is because wujūd is simple and so no level of wujūd can be composite (murakkab) of existence and nonexistence. Therefore, all differentiation in wujūd in the extramental must return back to wujūd itself and not to anything outside of wujūd, such as nonexistence.

Gradation gives rise to a fourth type of predication not discussed in the classical books of logic but propounded by the Sadrian school called the predication of the reality up its shadow (ḥaml al-ḥaqīqa ʿalā al-raqiqa). For something to be predicated to something else it must have an aspect of similarity and an aspect of difference, so that the subject and predicate are related but the predicate also says something new about the subject. Therefore, due to gradation in

**wujūd** it is possible to predicate the cause to its effect and vice versa. When the cause is predicated to the effect, this is the predication of the reality on its shadow.

However, with this type of predication what must be recognized is that the shadow is predicated to the reality as a manifestation of that reality, and the reality can be predicated to its shadow, because the reality contains everything that its shadow contains. The reality and its shadow are not the same thing. So if someone says “man is existence” or “existence is man” they are not claiming that man and existence are the same thing. Rather in the first sentence the real is predicated to its shadow meaning that man is a manifestation of existence, and in the second sentence existence contains everything man does in a more perfect and complete sense.

The whole issue of gradation raises the question of how **wujūd** can be stronger on one plain and weaker on another. Is it really **wujūd** that is stronger and weaker? Or is it the capacities of the quiddities and essences of what exists on each plain in terms of nondelimitation and delimitation? While it is possible to theorize the levels of existence as graded to further grasp the increase in perfection through the rising levels of existence, theoretical *ʿirfān* takes the difference in the levels back to the quiddities, while **wujūd** remains one throughout all of existence. Graded existence explains our concept of existence in terms of the arch of ascent, whereas the different capacities of the essences explain gradation in terms of the arch of decent.
VII. Nonexistence

This view of existence has implications for the concept of nonexistence as well. It has already been discussed above that nonexistence has no being-a-thing. Opposed to \textit{wujūd} there are no levels of nonexistence such that something would be closer or further from “pure nonexistence.” This is because a relative relationship is between two things and nonexistence has no being-a-thing nor does it have any essence (\textit{dhāt}). The only way nonexistence can have levels is if it is mentally attributed to \textit{wujūd}.\textsuperscript{579} So we can say the nonexistence of an angel is different from the nonexistence of a material being. It is clear in this example that the differentiation is in \textit{wujūd} and not in nonexistence. Or we can limit nonexistence with a condition to mentally differentiate kinds of nonexistence such as essential nonexistence (\textit{'adam dhātī}) or temporal nonexistence (\textit{'adam zamānī}).

Essential nonexistence refers to a possible existent which does not exist by common technical predication (i.e. in the extramental). Temporal nonexistence which refers to nonexistence in time such as the nonexistence of the world before it came into existence. Hence both terms express the reality of nonexistence which is the same in the extramental, even though adding mental conditions to nonexistence helps us to differentiate different types of nonexistence in the extramental.

Distinguishing the concept of nonexistence in the plane of the extramental from nonexistence in the plane of the mind therefore helps in understanding clearly the various issues related to

\textsuperscript{579} For further detail see Ţabātabā’i, \textit{Nihāyat al-hikma}, with the glosses of Ghulāmrizā Fayyāḍī, (1) 102.
nonexistence. For example, there is a contradiction in the proposition “nothing can be said about nonexistence” as the proposition in itself says something about nonexistence. But if we distinguish the extramental and the mind this paradox is solved. That is the proposition is invalid in the extramental (i.e. by common technical predication) as for something to be expressed it has to exist first. Hence the part of the proposition stating “nothing can be said about” has no subsistence in the extramental. Yet in the mind (i.e. by primary essential predication) this proposition is acceptable as nonexistence is given a hypothetical level of subsistence so that the proposition is valid.

One of the contributions of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī to the discussion of wujūd was his specification that there is no repetition (tikrār) in wujūd. It is an important point as wujūd is a single simple reality, not a disparate reality that can be broken into sections of existence and nonexistence and this affects various discussions in philosophy such as the issue of time and movement. The discussion is related to the idea that there is no repetition in nonexistence but talking about wujūd is more suitable to transcendental philosophy, as its subject is wujūd and nonexistence is discussed as a result of wujūd. Repetition means that the same existent thing cannot be existent again a second time, with the same existence as the first existent so that they are both in fact the same existent. In other words one existent thing cannot be two existents things at the same time as being one existent thing. Hence if there are two separate things they must be different in some aspect no matter how insignificant. So when a thing is designated it cannot be repeated.

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386 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāżī, (1) 109-117.
387 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāżī, (1) 109, nt. 1.
Some might question this rule by hypothesizing a gap of nonexistence in the existence of a certain thing. In such a situation one thing repeats its existence as it exists before the gap of nonexistence and then exists again after the gap; which is repetition, while at the same there is only one thing. ‘Allāmah answers this question by saying that the nature of nonexistence is not such that a thing can be described by it and then when nonexistence is lifted the thing becomes existent. This possibility is only in the mind where nonexistence can actually be attributed to something (as discussed above).\(^{582}\) Hence if something exists and then ceases to exist and another thing comes into existence with the same quiddity as the first existent, they are two separate existents and not the same existent thing. Furthermore, if something could be nonexistent by nonexistence it would imply principality for nonexistence while the principality of existence has been established, which necessitates the coming together of two contradictories (\(ijtima‘ al-naqīdāyn\)).\(^{583}\) From here ‘Allāmah moves onto the impossibility of the repetition of nonexistent things (\(i‘ādah al-ma‘dūm\)) which is a principle considered to be obvious bearing in mind the above discussion.

VIII. **Existence-in-Something-Else (\(wujūd al-rābi‘\))**

Existence-in-something-else directly affects the human and his view of his place in the system of \(wujūd\).\(^{584}\) He is an existent who is completely connected to the Necessary Existent in order for him to exist and continue to exist. How this relationship is conceptualized and explained can either take a philosophical form or an ‘irfānī one. Whilst the philosophical reading gives a

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\(^{582}\) Ţabāṭabā‘ī, *Nihāyat al-hikma*, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāzī, (1) 112.

\(^{583}\) Ţabāṭabā‘ī, *Nihāyat al-hikma*, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāzī, (1) 112.

\(^{584}\) See Gh. I. Dinānī, *Wujūd-i rābi‘ va mustaqil dar falsafa-yi islāmī*.
real level of existence to existents other than the Necessary Being, *ʿirfān* takes a more subtle approach in order to preserve the principles of *tawḥīd* as was explained above. According to the philosophical approach *wujūd* can be categorized as that which exists-in-itself (*wujūd* al-*mustaqqil* also named *wujūd* al-*nafsī* and *wujūd* al-*maḥmūlī*) and existence-in-something-else.

ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʿī arrives at this distinction by analyzing the relationship of truthful sentences about the extramental to the extramental itself. Since the subject and predicate are existent in the extramental, that which links the subject and predicate (i.e. the relation or *nisba*) must also exist in the extramental. The relation does not independently exist in the subject or the predicate but exists because of the existence of both of them. If either the subject or the predicate was to cease to exist so would the relation, showing that it has no independent existence. The relation therefore exists wherever, and as long as, the subject and predicate exist, be they in the mind or the extramental. This means that the subject and predicate are unified due to the relation as the relation is one thing that is shared by the subject and the predicate.

Sentences with primary essential predication (such as “man is man”) or *al-hillīyāt al-baṣīṭah* (sentences with “exists” as the predicate such as “man exists”) or those sentences concerning nonexistence (except when nonexistence is given some sort of existence in the mind) do not have any relation between their subjects and their predicates as it is meaningless to talk about the relation between a thing and itself or between a thing and nonexistence. The relation

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does not have a quiddity as something needs to have an independent concept to have a
quiddity.\textsuperscript{588} Hence from this relation a second type of \textit{wujūd} can be said to exist in the
extramental, which is existence-in-something-else.\textsuperscript{589}

This proof for the existence of existence-in-something-else is not without criticism. Fayyāzī
points out that the truthfulness of a statement is the unity of the subject and the predicate in
both primary essential predication and common technical predication. The former it is unity
in concept and the latter unity in the extramental. Separation of the subject and predicate
occur only in the mind, which is where the creation of a relation occurs, and therefore the
truthfulness of a statement in the extramental has nothing to do with the relation.\textsuperscript{590} Miṣbāh
Yazdi of the school of Qum somewhat removes the confusion by separating between two
terminological meanings of existence-in-something-else according to Mullā Ṣadrā:

\begin{quote}
Shaḍr al-Muta’allihīn mentioned that existence-in-something-else has two
terminological meanings among the philosophers: One of them is the connection
between predicates, which would be a type of incomplete meaning (lit. lettered
meanings \textit{al-ma‘āni al-ḥarfīya})...the second of them is of the meaning of existence-by-
something-else (\textit{wujūd bi al-ghayr}), that is \textit{wujūd} that is realized in something, like
blackness in a body, or for something like the existence of an effect due to its cause, or
in the presence of something like the existence of the mental forms (\textit{al-ṣuwar al-

\textsuperscript{588}Ṭabāṭabā’ī, \textit{Nihāyat al-hikma}, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāzī, (1) 129.
\textsuperscript{589}Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāh Yazdi, \textit{Ta‘līqah ‘alā Nihāyat al-hikma}, (Qum: Salmān-i Fārsī, 1984) 57.
\textsuperscript{590}Ṭabāṭabā’ī, \textit{Nihāyat al-hikma}, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāzī, (1) 121-122, nt 2.
ʿilmīya) in the soul...and what is opposite [to this type of existence] is independent existence.590

Mullā Ṣadrā distinguishes between existence-in-something-else in the sense explained by Ṭabāṭabāʾī and the term existence-in-something-else which is another term for existence-by-something-else. Mullā Ṣadrā continues to explain that there is no independence for the cause from its effect ontologically. This conclusion is philosophical, based on the establishment of one side (i.e. the cause), whereas the first classification is a logical one based on the formulation of sentences (i.e. the subject and the predicate),591 and this is the essence of the confusion on the need for relation in the extramental for truthful sentences.

To clarify existence-in-something-else in its philosophical sense further (i.e. in the second sense), the case of a continual cause and its effect can be examined. The effect continues to exist due to the continual existence of its cause, like a speaker and speech. In this example if we look at the effect in and of itself — the speech — we can assign an independent existence for it in the mind. However, in reality it is continually dependent on its cause. There is only one truly independent existent in reality and that is the Necessary Being. All other existents are completely dependent on Him for their existence.592 The word wujūd therefore, is not applied to the term existence-in-something-else in the same way as has been discussed until now. That is there is homonymy between the use of the word wujūd in the general concept of wujūd in contrast to quiddity and the use of the word wujūd in the term existence-in-

590 Miṣbāḥ Yazdi, Taʿliqah ʿalā Nihāyat al-ḥikma, 57-58.

591 Miṣbāḥ Yazdi, Taʿliqah ʿalā Nihāyat al-ḥikma, 57-58.

592 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāžī, (1) 134.
something-else as Muḥammad b. Maʿṣūm ‘Alī al-Hidji al-Zanjānī of the school of Tehran clarifies in his gloss on the *Asfār*:

For surely existence-in-something-else due to its being connection cannot be, by this expression, *wujūd* or a thing from among things. As if *wujūd* is applied to it in this state, then it is homonymy only and this is the truth. Then if the intellect directs its attention to it [existence-in-something-else] and wants to judge it or judge by it, it becomes predicated existence (*wujūd maḥmūl*) which is the state of non-substantive notions (*al-maʿānī al-ḥarfī*), in their state as a connection or tool rather than a thing among things which is complete.\(^{595}\)

*Wujūd* which exists-in-itself can be further categorized as that which exists-in-itself-for-itself (*wujūd li-nafsihī*) and that which exists-in-itself-for-something-else (*wujūd li-ghayrihī*).

Examples of *wujūd* which exists-in-itself-for-itself are any complete species such as “man” or “cat”.\(^{596}\) *Wujūd* which exists-in-itself-for-something-else expels nonexistence from itself and from something else without taking on the quiddity of that other thing.\(^ {597}\)

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\(^{594}\) Muḥammad b. Maʿṣūm ‘Alī Hidji Zanjānī taught the intellectual sciences at Madrasah al-Munirīya in Tehran for 25 years after completing his initial training in Zanjān. He wrote a gloss on *Manzūma* where he included a biography of his friend Bahman Shidānī at the end of the work. He learnt classical theology and mathematics with Mirzā Ḥusayn Sabzavārī and learnt philosophy from Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva. He also has a collection of works on various subjects in various languages and also wrote a simple table of contents on a copy of the *Asfār*. See Āghā Buzurg Tibrānī, Ṭabaqāt aʿlām al-šāʿa, ed. Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Bihbahānī, 285-286; and Suhā, *Ṭurīkh-i hukamāʿ*, 495-499.

\(^{595}\) Shirāzī, *al-Hikma al-mutaʿāliya*, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 99, nt. 4.

\(^{596}\) Ṭabāṭabāʾī, *Nihāyat al-ḥikma*, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāż, (1) 137.

\(^{597}\) Ṭabāṭabāʾī, *Nihāyat al-ḥikma*, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāẓ, (1) 136, nt. 3.
An example of *wujūd* which exists-in-itself-for-something-else is knowledge, which when it comes into existence, exists within itself and also expels ignorance (which is like nonexistence) from its subject.⁵⁹⁸ In fact all accidental properties are *wujūd* which exists-in-itself-for-something-else as when they come into existence they expel nonexistence from their own quiddity as well another nonexistence from the substance they attach to.⁵⁹⁹ Hence the addition of accidental properties signify an increase in the level of *wujūd* as they displace imperfections.⁶⁰⁰ By the same token the specific forms (*al-ṣuwar al-nawʿiyah*) when they attach to matter give both the matter and the form their existence.⁶⁰¹

IX. **Motion in the Category of Substance (**al-*harakah al-jawhariyyah*)**

The dichotomy of the conceptual and the real; quiddity and *wujūd*; the outward and the inward; the divine law (*shari‘ah*) and the reality (*haqiqa*) and the world (*dunya*) and the hereafter (*ākhirah*), is a dichotomy present in man himself, who possesses an outward body and an inward soul. All of these dichotomies are intellectual divisions of single realities. That is that although we may intellectualize an outward and an inward aspect to the human, he is in fact one reality. Mullā Šadrā’s theory of motion in the category of substance further explains how the human’s whole reality develops, not just his external form. The theory is based on the primacy of *wujūd* and gradation. For Mullā Šadrā everything is in a continual state of

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movement and transformation in the space-time continuum, and the human evolves in this continuum from being a material existent to an abstract one.

In other words, as the human develops he moves up the grades of existence, from the corporeal to the realm of the intellects. By virtue of the human’s existence he moves back through the ark of ascent to the Necessary Being. Any form that makes such a movement moves towards perfection and so each development includes all the perfections of the previous stage. The development is not just in the accidental properties of man. Rather since all accidental properties find their origin in the essence, it is the human’s essence that moves. In this process philosophy, contingent beings are in continual movement and with this theory Mullā Ṣadrā answers important philosophical problems like the creation of the world and resurrection.

The movement of the human’s whole essence may be better understood by questioning the definition of the human in traditional philosophy as a “rational animal.” Mahdī Ḥā’iri Yazdī of the school of Qum disputes the differentia in this definition (i.e. rational) and claims that it is the soul itself that particularizes the human from other animals:

Rational here is not the real differentia, rather it is a differentia that indicates to the real differentia...If rational has the meaning of comprehending, then that is also a

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602 This is a philosophical rule: Kullu mā bi al-ʿaraḍ lā budda wa an yantahī illā mā bi al-dhāt. For more explanation of the rule see Dinānī, Qawād-i kulli-falsafī, (1) 293-295.
psychic quality (*al-kayf al-nafsānī*), and a psychic quality is also an accidental property...therefore the soul is the real differentia of the human.\(^6\)

If the soul is the essence of the human, then it makes sense that as the soul develops it increases its level of existence by which it can have comprehension of the higher realms of existence outside of itself. Here it is not the faculties of the soul that develop but the existence of whole soul, which is one reality.

In the *Asfār* motion in the category of substance is discussed in detail in the seventh stage (*al-marḥalah al-sābī‘*), where Mullā Ṣadrā, explains the classical Peripatetic stance on this issue, which specifies that a body has to be existent before it can be in motion, and that motion is an accidental property.\(^6\) He then moves on to assert his own ideas by saying that the cause of motion must itself be in motion, and therefore the body is intrinsically in motion in the same way as the agent of motion. That is motion is only conceptually separable from the moving body. Moving bodies occur in the corporeal world and so the corporeal world must also be in motion, meaning that there is no need for an external cause for motion.\(^6\) This avoids the infinite regress that occurs when a cause is needed to explain motion. The corporeal world has continual renewal, and by this meaning it is stable and dependent on the Necessary Being for that renewal; thus making the corporeal world a contingent existent.\(^6\) Change

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\(^6\)  Shīrāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya*, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (3) 49-51.


\(^6\)  Shīrāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya*, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (3) 53-56.
therefore, does not occur due to any accidental properties, but rather occurs essentially, or in other words, in the category of substance.\textsuperscript{607}

Any speculation on different points in the motion of an object is purely conceptual. For us to say the beginning, middle or end of the motion of an object is only an expression of what we perceive of the extramental through our limited senses. In fact, any analysis of motion in terms of quiddity necessarily places limitations on the concept of motion as to categorize is to lose motion. Rather motion must be understood in terms of \textit{wujūd}, beyond the categories.\textsuperscript{608} The role of quiddity is to keep the object individual, in a general way, through the differentia. This allows for the object to change in all of its other aspects without becoming a different object altogether. For example, a human grows in all his different faculties, physical, mental and spiritual, in such a way that if he is viewed in the beginning of his life, he seems almost a completely different creation by the end of his life. Nevertheless, what keeps him as a single object, that is a human, is his differentia, which remains with him throughout the whole process of change. Hence those categories that have motion, such as quantity, quality, place and position, do so in relation to \textit{wujūd} and not to quiddity.

Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tihrānī of the school of Qum quotes a conversation with ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī where he asks Ṭabāṭabā’ī verses in the Qur’ān about motion in the category of substance. Ṭabāṭabā’ī responds by quoting a verse from the chapter of The Believers and explains his choice saying:

\textsuperscript{607} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Ḥikma al-muta‘ālīya}, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabā’ī et al., (3) 56-57.

\textsuperscript{608} Ṭabāṭabā’ī, \textit{Nihāyat al-ḥikma}, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāżī, (3) 803.
Verily We created man of an extract of mud. Then We set him [as] a drop in a secure receptacle. Then We created of the drop a clot; then We created of the clot a tissue; then We created of the tissue bones; then We garmented the bones with flesh; thereafter we produced him as another creation. So Bounteous is Allah, the Best of the creators (23:12-14)

Here Allah says that ‘We created man from an extract of mud,’ and obviously that mud is a body (jism). Thus, the origination (huduth) of man is from mud, which is a body.

‘Then, after creating it from mud, We turned it [the creation of mud] into sperm.’ Here again it is observed that it turns into a body, for the sperm is a body. Therefore based on transubstantial motion (al-harakah al-jawhariyah), mud is turned into sperm. It means that one body turns into another.

‘After that, We created the of the sperm ‘alaqah,’ which means blood clot, coagulum. Here again one body is turned into another.

‘And then We created of the ‘alaqah mudghah,’ which means some crushed muscle tissue. Once again, a body is turned into another.

‘And then We created of the mudghah bones.’ Here also one body is turned into another.

And once Allah covered the bones with muscle, the verse says, ‘At this stage, We gave man another creation.’ It means ‘We turned the bodily man spiritual.’ The reality and spirit of these bodies turn into man’s rational soul (al-nafs al-natiqah, i.e. intellect).

So ‘Thereafter We produced him as another creation’ indicates that matter us set aside, and the body turns into an immaterial and transcendent soul...
The ancient sages maintained that man is composed of spirit and body. However, the verse does not suggest composition (tarkib); rather, it explicitly talks about transformation (tabdil). It says that man is [made] from the extract of mud that becomes these things. So God's creation carries on step by step and bit by bit in the material course, until it reaches a point where it jumps out of matter. 'Thereafter We produced him as another creation' is about the same matter, saying that it becomes another creation. Based on transubstantial motion, matter turns into a transcendent being; the body becomes the rational soul.\textsuperscript{609}

\textbf{X. Mental Existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī)}

The issue of mental existence is an important one for philosophers as the mind is the main epistemological tool in philosophy.\textsuperscript{610} Mental existence has implications on issues such as what constitutes knowledge; the validity of philosophizing about the extramental; the identity thesis, which is the oneness of the intellector and the intellected (ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa al-maʿqūl); and even plays a role in the issue of resurrection. This section cannot comprise the whole discussion of mental existence but will just summarize some of the main issues according to the philosophical analysis given by Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Ḥasanzāda's analysis which is more holistic and includes the 'irfānī concept of shadows. For Ṭabāṭabāʾī \textit{wujūd} in itself cannot enter the

\textsuperscript{609} Tihrani, \textit{Shining Sun}, 184-185.

\textsuperscript{610} Mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī) is different to the existence of the mind (wujūd al-dhihn) as the first relates to cognitive existence and the second refers to existence of the mind itself as something in the outside world.
mind as it is the actual reality in the extramental. Yet the mind is capable of constructing concepts that are compliant with the extramental without the extramental wujūd entering the mind. One indication of this is because existent things have certain effects and those effects are not realized in the mind. So if an existent had transferred from the extramental to the mind, its effects should have also transferred, otherwise it would be a violation of the law of identity (inqilāb).

For example, fire in the extramental burns and releases smoke. But when we imagine fire we do not feel hot and smoke does not come out of our ears. Hence fire qua fire does not enter our mind. But when we imagine fire there are other effects that result from our imagination different from the effects of fire in the extramental. One of the key differences that help to differentiate the planes is the difference in effects. While metal existence does not have an effect except on the soul, extramental existence affects other things in the extramental. It follows that the categorization of wujūd as either in the extramental or in the mind is conceptual, as wujūd has no separate existence in the mind. Fire does not exist in the mind, but an image (ṣūra) of it exists in the mind. That image has the effects of an image in the extramental, not the effects of fire in the extramental. So using the expression wujūd regarding the mind means that our knowledge of the quiddities is diverted from nonexistence and this is what is meant by cognitive existence. The mind is not a separate plane of existence but an action of the soul. Existence is only in the extramental and is synonymous with the extramental; of which the human’s soul is a part.

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60 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Rižā Fayyāžī, (1) 151.
Ṭabāṭabāʿī offers a proof for mental existence saying that we imagine various things such as “man” and when we imagine them we know that they have some level of subsistence and are therefore existent in some way, even though that existence is not the same as the existence in the extramental. Hence since we know that they exist but not in the extramental, we must accept that they exist on another plane, which is the mind. At the same time, we are able to imagine nonexistent things (such as pure nonexistence) and other impossible things (such as the coming together of contradictions) even though they are not present in the extramental in any way. So they also have some level of subsistence. Since that subsistence is not in the extramental it must be in another plane which is called the mind. Here, there is no contradiction between the mind being a cognitive plane, separate to the extramental, and the fact that everything in the mind actually exists in the extramental. This is because what actually exists in the extramental are the mental images and not the contents of those images. The cognitive plane is not a separate plane of existence, but exists within the world of existence.

Ṭabāṭabāʿī then extracts the implications of this concept of mental existence in a fashion that is distinctive of his style when explaining philosophical issues in Nihāyat. Although Mullā Ṣadrā also extracts the implications Ṭabāṭabāʿī is more rigorous in doing so and makes each implication clear in a number of separate points. The first implication is that the quiddity in the mind is different to the quiddity in the extramental and so the quiddity in the mind can only be categorized in categories (maqūlāt) in the mind without any affect on the extramental. So there are two sets of categories. The first is related to the extramental, and

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612 Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāżū, (1) 147-151.

613 Ṭabāṭabāʿī, Nihāyat al-ḥikma, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāżū, (1) 152.
if anything is categorized under a certain category, it has the effects associated with that category. The second are categories in the mind, which do not have any effect on the extramental. The distinction between the two planes solves many philosophical issues related to mental existence using the distinction between primary essential predication and common technical predication explained previously.

For example, someone may say that a substance (jawhar) in the mind is an essential property, but at the same time, its conception is an accidental property of the soul, making a substance both essential and accidental and it is impossible for one thing to be both essential and accidental at the same time. The question is answered by saying that the substance is essential by primary essential predication in the mind and accidental by common technical predication as an action of the soul in the extramental. Similarly, someone may say that when a substance is intellected it has its own category in the mind, but since its intellection is knowledge it falls under the category of a quality of the soul (al-kayf al-nafisānī) which is another separate category to that of substance; and it is impossible for the same thing to be categorized under two separate categories as the categories are essentially and completely separated. The problem is answered by saying that the substance in the mind falls under the categories of the mind, whereas the action of the soul is related to the extramental and so related to the categories in the extramental.\footnote{Ṭabāṭabā’ī, \textit{Nihāyat al-ḥikma}, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāžī, (1) 152-157.}

The second implication of mental existence is mimesis (hikāyah) meaning that nothing can exist in mental existence without having its basis in external existence. It is impossible to
imagine something that is completely unlike anything we have sensed in the extramental. Mental existence has its own affect on the soul, while cognitive forms that affect the soul are abstract (mujarrad) and unrelated to matter.\(^{615}\) Thirdly, since the quiddities in the extramental come to the mind without the effects they have on the extramental, it is impossible that those quiddities are themselves attained in the mind. Similarly, it is impossible for any nonexistent quiddity to enter the mind.\(^{616}\) That is that these realities in the extramental do not enter the mind, but that the soul creates concepts for these quiddities.

In his treatise on mental existence called \textit{al-Nūr al-mutajallī fī al-ẓuhūr al-ẓillī}, Hasanzāda Āmulī explains that knowledge is light and the manifestations of that light are in the cognitive forms which are manifested in the locus of mental existence. Hence the cognitive forms are the shadows of the knowledge which is light as true knowledge is a property of the \textit{wujūd} in the extramental and at its highest level knowledge is an Attribute or Mode of the Necessary Being. By the same token mental existence is a shadow of \textit{wujūd} in the extramental. Knowledge in the mind is therefore attained knowledge as opposed to knowledge by presence even though in truth attained knowledge finds its origins in knowledge by presence.\(^{617}\) The separation of a shadow from that which casts a shadow, clearly indicates the difference between mental existence and what is meant by \textit{wujūd} in the extramental which is the principle; even though things — such as fire for example — can be in both planes. Rather it

\(^{615}\) Ṭabāṭabāʾī, \textit{Nihāyat al-ḥikma}, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāž, (1) 159.

\(^{616}\) Ṭabāṭabāʾī, \textit{Nihāyat al-ḥikma}, with the glosses of Ghulām-Riżā Fayyāž, (1) 163-164.

\(^{617}\) Hasanzāda Āmulī, \textit{Al-Nūr al-mutajallī}, 8.
is the quiddity of that thing that is the same in both planes. This is what makes knowledge possible, as the quiddity connects the two planes.\textsuperscript{618}

On the other hand, the higher intellects above the mind experience realities without the use of the mind but by knowledge by presence and so the discussion of mental existence does not concern those intellects.\textsuperscript{619} Knowledge in mental existence is of a weaker level than higher levels of reality, as knowledge in the mind is a creation of an aspect (i.e. the limit) of what really exists in the extramental. The mind itself is a level of the soul and so in reality it is the soul which creates the cognitive forms not another separate entity. The mind is the power of the soul to attain knowledge that is not present within itself.\textsuperscript{620} Similarly the cognitive forms themselves are not separate entities but are illuminative relations (\textit{idāfāt ishrāqiyya}), like the relation of the sun to its rays.

To summarize the previous sections, \textit{wujūd} is a simple single graded reality from which all things are able to exist. It is the principle as opposed to a thing’s quiddity, which is a mental construct derived from the limits of \textit{wujūd}. At the same time, both \textit{wujūd} and quiddity exist without differentiation in the extramental. While the initial comprehension of \textit{wujūd} is self-evident, reaching the reality of \textit{wujūd} is a difficult task. Although existence in the extramental cannot be completely fathomed by the mind, the mind is able to understand existence through creating corresponding images. By the same token existence in the extramental is not the same as God’s existence, but it is not opposed to His existence as He exists. Differentiating

\textsuperscript{618} Hasanzāda Āmuli, \textit{Al-Nūr al-mutajallī}, 12.

\textsuperscript{619} Hasanzāda Āmuli, \textit{Al-Nūr al-mutajallī}, 12.

\textsuperscript{620} See S. Daghim, \textit{Mawsū‘at muṣṭalḥāt Šadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī} (Qum: Dhawi-l-qurbā, 2007) (1) 436.
the mental sphere from the extramental solves many philosophical problems to do with the different types of predication.

Gradation and of existence-by-something-else create a fourth type of predication, which is the predication of the reality on its shadow. Pure ṭawāfūq deflects nonexistence from itself and the sphere of ṭawāfūq is infinite, leaving nonexistence without subsistence. Mental existence is the shadow of existence in the extramental, just as the cognitive forms are shadows of God's knowledge. This brings to close our discussion of ṭawāfūq in transcendental philosophy. After summarizing the main conclusions from both parts the thesis will move onto the subject of ṭalā‘īyah.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the key questions and issues on the topic of ṭawāfūq from both the philosophical reading of ḥikmat tradition and by using concepts in theoretical ʿirfān to understand an ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. The ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran and Qum took different positions on the spectrum of these two readings and at times disagreed with each other’s interpretations and elucidations of concepts in ḥikmat based on their reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. There were ḥukamāʾ that had a more philosophical reading such as ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī, Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafiʿi Qazvinī, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Ghulam-Riżā Fayyāżī; and there were ḥukamāʾ with a more ʿirfānī approach such as Muḥammad Rizā Qumshihī, Kāẓim ‘Aṣṣār, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Shāhābādī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī.
At times those with an ʿirfānī reading would criticize others who also had an ʿirfānī reading but who might have discussed ʿirfānī issues from a philosophical perspective like Khumaynī’s criticism of Qumshihi. There were also times where a ḥakīm would use ḥikmat to decipher the meaning of an ʿirfānī concept as in the case of Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvinī’s analysis of the oneness of Existence. Many a time an ʿirfānī concept was introduced at the end of a philosophical analysis like in ʿAbd Allāh Zunūzī’s analysis of what can be known of God. A disagreement on the reality of gradation between the Peripatetic and ḥikmat philosophical readings caused Muḥammad Shāhābādī to disagree with Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s classification of proofs. Overall one notices an intricate picture of different readings, explanations and analysis by different ḥukamā’ due to the mixing of these two traditions which was also characteristic of Mullā Ṣadrā’s effort to introduce a holistic framework of thought in his Asfār and other works.

There are no text books which teach the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and there are also no text books in the ḥawza curriculum which teach Shiʿi ʿirfān, so the discussion of the main principles for Wujūd in theoretical ʿirfān was constructed using the works produced by ḥukamā’ in the schools of Tehran and Qum. From these works a wider discussion of issues such as the oneness of Existence, the Breath of the All-Merciful and the permanent archetypes was produced based on the glosses and treatises written by the ḥukamā’ of the schools of Qum and Tehran. This exercise not only brought to light the two readings discussed in this thesis and the manner by which they would be attained by a student of ḥikmat in the modern ḥawza, but it also brought forth the intricacy of the ḥukamā’ discussions on such crucial and evasive topics.
The works that shaped the flow of the discussion in the ḥikmat section were the works used to teach these readings in the modern ḥawza and so another aspect of this chapter was an insight into this type of study offered to modern students of ḥikmat. Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Bidāyat and Nihāyat are perhaps the most important text books for ḥikmat in the modern ḥawza as they are studied by the largest number of students. But both of these books, and indeed Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s gloss on the Asfār in the majority of cases, offer a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. This point was illustrated by comparing Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s approach to more ʿirfānī or scripturally sourced based glosses by other ḥukamāʾ in the schools of Tehran and Qum. At times there was direct criticism by those ḥukamāʾ on Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s philosophical approach to commenting on ḥikmat.

A whole host of philosophical and ʿirfānī terms were introduced and discussed in this chapter, many of which will be referred to in the upcoming chapters as both the topics of walāyah and resurrection build upon the positions taken on the issue of wujūd. Indeed the preferred reading of the ḥakīm of wujūd very much affects the way they analyse the next two topics and the conclusions that they prefer to adopt. The term wujūd is used differently in ḥikmat and ʿirfān. While in ḥikmat it is used to explain the existence of something, in ʿirfān it is a specific term for God as He is the only true existent. These differences find their origin in the various conditions that can be applied to wujūd and form the subject of both sciences.

This distinction affects almost every aspect of the discussion of wujūd and was indicated by Sabzavārī in the section on univocal nature of wujūd, when he stipulates that wujūd has a different meaning for creation and a different meaning for God. Although the reason for that separation was that God cannot be fathomed, that is not what is meant by the ʿurafāʾ when
designating *wujūd* for God alone. Rather the ‘*urafā‘* do not consider the existence of existents as real Existence and claim the oneness of Existence and the oneness of the Existent. The concepts of self-disclosure and manifestation which also find their roots in the applications of conditions stand opposed to the concept of emanation in philosophy, even though the same Arabic term is used in the Breath of the all-Merciful. The self-evident nature of *wujūd in ḥikmat* is that the existence of a contingent is obvious, whereas in ‘*irfān* it is that the existence of God is self-evident.

The univocal nature of *wujūd in ḥikmat* is that the word *wujūd* when predicated to a quiddity always means the same thing, whereas in ‘*irfān* it is that all ‘*urafā‘* experience the same *wujūd* and so speak of the same thing. Existence is the principle from which is the basis of the effects of a contingent in ḥikmat, whereas in ‘*irfān* God is the principle of all things. Quiddity is mentally posited in ḥikmat, while the philosophers agree that in the extramental there is no difference between the existence of *wujūd* and quiddity. However, in theoretical ‘*irfān* the permanent archetypes, which are the *nafs al-amr*, dictate the capacities of the external archetypes and while they themselves never come into existence, what exists is all a manifestation of God. Gradation in ḥikmat is a quality of *wujūd*, but in ‘*irfān* it is a quality of the capacities of things.

Nonexistence in both subjects is not the opposite of *wujūd*, and does not have any subsistence. In ‘*irfān* something that becomes nonexistent in one plane, returns to the planes above and ultimately exists in the knowledge of God. The term *wujūd*-in-something-else holds a different meaning for existence than the term *wujūd* as differentiated from quiddity in ḥikmat. It is an expression of the complete need of the effect for its cause. Through the process of motion in
the category of substance all of creation involuntarily moves towards its perfection as movement is a quality of \textit{wujūd}.

Mental existence and differentiating the mental plane from the extramental is a key differentiation in \textit{ḥikmat} when discussing \textit{wujūd}, whereas in \textit{ʿirfān} the discussion is about God and so there is no need to differentiate mental existence from external existence. The problem of separating the mental sphere from the extramental when understanding \textit{wujūd} is avoided in theoretical \textit{ʿirfān} which places more emphasis on experiencing with the heart, while it is an acute issue in philosophy as the mind is the main source of knowledge. The issue of gradation is also keenly discussed by the \textit{ḥukamāʾ} as there is an issue of reconciliation between different levels in existence and the oneness of Existence. Actuality can be understood ontologically in theoretical \textit{ʿirfān} as the permanent archetypes, which do not actually enter the extramental.

The implications of all of these concepts on the human will be the subject of the next chapter. It is a topic of great importance to Shi‘i theology due to the idea of the perfect human (\textit{al-insān al-kāmil}) which was also introduced in this chapter as the purpose of divine effusion in the Breath of the All-Merciful. He is the reason for the effusion of \textit{wujūd}, the movement from unity to multiplicity and the creation of every grade of existence.
After establishing and discussing *wujūd*, and discerning the human's position as a contingent existent, in total need of God for his existence, both to exist and to continue existing, the question that may be asked is why did God create the creation whilst being completely needless of it? Or in philosophical terms, why did the Necessary existent emanate its *wujūd* to contingent beings? What is the purpose of creation? Why does multiplicity come from unity? And what causes the Unseen to become seen? It is in the topic of *walāyah* that these questions are given various answers according to the principles of thought that built the worldviews of different ḥukamāʾ.⁶²¹ The answer given by the ‘urafāʾ is that God created the creation as He loved to be known, according to the ḥadīth qudsī:⁶²² “I was a hidden treasure, so I loved to be known, so I created the creation.”

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⁶²² Ḥadīth qudsī is a term given to traditions that are narrated from God but not part of formal revelation.

⁶²³ This tradition has been narrated with variations, but is not found in any canonical works of Sunni or Shiʿī *aḥadīth*. Nevertheless, it has emerged as one of the most important *aḥadīth* referred to by ‘urafāʾ due to its meaning rather than its chain of narration. It has been used to support the idea of effusion from the Unseen of the unseen (*ghayb al-ghuyūb*) due to Divine Love for the purpose of knowing Him. The references to this ḥadīth are too many to be cited but an example of some of the earlier sources around the sixth and seventh century hijri are given below. It seems that although the tradition appeared in some Sufi works before Ibn ‘Arabī, it became canonized with his school perhaps due to his use of it in the *Fuṣūṣ* and also due to its appearance in the *Mathnawī* of Rūmī where he explains some facets of this ḥadīth. Rūmī quotes the ḥadīth in some of other works as well, see: ‘ʿAbd al-Karīm Qushayrī, *Sharḥ asmāʾ Allah al-ḥusnā*, eds. ‘Abd al-Raʿūf Saʿīd and Saʿd Hasan Muḥammad ‘Alī
Since God is known by other than Himself, He created the creation for those among the
creation that would know Him. God did not need to be known, but out of His Generosity and
Mercy He created a creation that could know something of Him. That creation is the human
and therefore the human’s perfection is in his knowledge of God. In the terminology of ‘urfān,
this knower is the perfect human (al-īnān al-kāmil). The perfect human reflects God’s
perfection as he is the locus of the manifestation of God’s Names. He is the perfect servant
who owns nothing within himself but his heart is a mirror for the self-disclosures of God. In
philosophical terms he is someone who has reached the perfection of the soul with one of its
key levels being the state of abstraction as “whoever knows his soul, surely knows his Lord.”

(Cairo: Dār al-ḥarām li-turāth, 1422/2002) 31; ‘Abd Allāh Anṣārī, Ṭabaqāt al-ṣūfiya (no place: no publisher, no
date) 131, 133 and 134; ‘Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī, Shakwā al-gharīb ‘an al-aḥtān lā ‘ulamā’ al-buldān (Paris: Dār
biblion, 1962) 19; Rūzbihān Baqli, Tafsūr ‘arā’īs al-bayān, ed. Aḥmad Farid al-Mazūdī, 3 vols (Beirut: Dār al-kutub
al-‘ilmīya, 2003) (1) 297, 345, 367; (2) 65; (3) 391, 532, the ḥadīth also occurs in some of his other books; Muḥyī al-
Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Abū al-ʿAlā al-Afīfī (Cairo: Dār iḥyāʾ al-kutub al-ʿarabīya, 1946) (2) 6, 61, 66,
303, 326; the ḥadīth is explained in a section by Rumī in his mathnawi see Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Balkhī,
Mathnawi-yi ma’nawi, ed. Taufiq Ṣubhānī (Tehran: Sāzmān-i chāp va intishārat-i vizārat-i irshād-i islāmī, 1373
Negah, 1386 Sh/2007) 96, 199, 201, 253; Mu’ayyad al-Dīn Jandī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, ed. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn
Āshṭiyānī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 2002) 45, 442, 457; ‘Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (Qum:
Intishārat-I Bidār, 1370 Sh/1992) 161, 214; Qaysāri, Rasā’il-i Qaysāri, 112.

624 The use of the concept of the perfect human is observed in a variety of contexts including social structure in
Sufism. In Moroccan Sufism see V. Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1998).

625 This tradition is the inverse of the Qurānī verse 59:19: “And do not be like those who forget God, so He makes
them forget their own souls...” Hence those who know themselves know God, and those who forget God, forget
themselves. For the tradition see for example, Imam Ja’far al-Ṣādiq (attr.), Miṣbāḥ al-sharī’ā, 13: Muḥammad b.
‘Alī Karājaki, Kanz al-fawāʾid, ed. ‘Abd Allāh Ni’ma, 2 vols (Qum: Dār al-dhakāir, 1989) (2) 34; Muḥammad Bāqir
‘Abd-l-Wāḥid b. Muḥammad Tamīmī Āmīdī, Taṣnīf ghurar al-ḥikam, ed. Muṣṭafā Darāyī (Qum: Maktab al-
The concept of the perfect human was introduced in the previous chapter and his state of servitude was discussed by Kāẓim Aṣṣār while explaining Ibn ʿArabī’s poetry. It was mentioned in the discussion of the Breath of the All-Merciful that while the corporeal manifestation of the perfect human is in the corporeal world, the perfect human is mentioned as a separate stage in the Breath of the All-Merciful as he is the reason for effusion. He is also the only creation that is able to contain every level of the Breath of the All-Merciful. In this chapter the perfect human will be discussed in much detail both in terms of his ontological position in the world of existence which is termed as his existential guardianship (walāyah takwīnīyah) — which is linked to the perfect man’s ability to affect the universe in any way he chooses (walāyat al-taṣarruf) — and in terms of the person of the perfect human on the corporeal plane. Without the perfect man there is no reason for the effusion of wujūd and so walāyah is inextricably connected to the ‘irfānī conception of wujūd. The search for a cause of effusion links the question of walāyah to philosophy, as there is no meaning to purposeful action without a reason which is the final cause (al-ʿilla al-ghāʾīya).

*iḥām al-islāmī, 1427/1987* 232; in these last two sources a host of variations to the ḥadīth with the beginning “Whoever knows himself…” (man ʿarafa nafsahu…) is offered. The ḥadīth with a slight variation occurs in many Sufi sources as early as the third Century hijri. See for example, Yahyā b. Maʿadh Rāzī, *Jawāhir al-taṣawwuf*, ed. Saʿīd Hārūn ʿAshūr (Cairo: Maktabat al-ādāb, 1423/2003) 17 where the ḥadīth appears with the additional “surely” (qad) before “…knows his Lord” and in the same book on page 19 where the ḥadīth is quoted without the “surely.” See also al-Hakīm al-Tirmidhī, *Kayfīyat al-sulūk ilā rabb al-ʿālamīn*, ed. ʿĀṣim Ibrāhīm al-Kayālī al-Ḥusaynī al-Shādhili al-Darqāwī (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya, 1428/2007) 55; Abū Ṭālib Makkī, *ʿIlm al-qulūb*, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir Aḥmad ʿAtā (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʾilmīya, 1424/2003) 58. It therefore seems that this tradition with its variations was in circulation amongst Sufis and traditional scholars of Shiʿa aḥadīth well before Ibn ʿArabī and his school. I did not find this ḥadīth in either variation in any of the main sources of Sunni aḥadīth.
Mullā Ṣadrā subscribed to the view of the perfect human and the system of *walāyah* and indeed the search for the perfect human is a central theme in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works. He believed that the perfect man is the microcosm and the greatest sign of God. Another important concept introduced in the previous chapter is that of gradation. The idea of the perfect human necessitates the existence of the less than perfect human over whom the perfect human has guardianship. According to the philosophical reading of the perfect human the perfect human would have a greater level of *wujūd* than the less than perfect human. But for the ‘ārif the oneness of *Wujūd* would prevail and so the difference between the perfect human and the less than perfect human would be the extent of his manifestation of the Names in their correct balance. Not a difference in the intensity of *wujūd*. The discussion of *walāyah* in ‘irfān offers different stations that the wali may hold which does not necessitate a direct comparison as to which wali is better in the sense of gradation.

Returning to the discussion on the different ways of knowing in philosophy and ‘irfān concerning the topic of *walāyah*, while a philosopher discusses the perfect human and gradation in *walāyah* from an intellectual and theoretical perspective, an ‘ārif first hand experiences the system of *walāyah takwīnīyah* as he occupies a position within it. There is no need to prove the existence of *walāyah* as it is indeed as self-evident to the ḥakīm as *wujūd* itself. The ḥakīm is the referent of the concept of *walāyah* even if he must theorize about the nature of the perfect human. This puts a great onus on the ḥukamā’ that lack ‘irfānī experience.

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627 M. Abdul Haq, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Concept of Man”, 281.
as it is much harder for them to get to the core of the issue. Other concepts of importance for this chapter which were introduced in the previous chapter include motion in the category of substance, existence-by-something-else, manifestation, self disclosure and the permanent archetypes.

The position given to the perfect human of guardianship over the rest of creation is a key discussion point in theoretical ḍirfān. The Prophet Muḥammad is that creation who brings the unseen into the witnessed, by being the perfect manifestation of God. He is the keys of the unseen (mafāṭīḥ al-ghayb). The ontological position of the Prophet as the beginning of God’s creation whether termed as the first effusion or the beginning of the Muḥammadan light (al-nūr al-Muḥammadī) as well as his position as the Seal of the Prophets (khātim al-anbīyā’ī) is undisputed. However, the issue of the person who holds the position of the Seal of the Saints (khātim al-awliyā’) is one of debate. That is due to the seeming incoherence in Ibn ‘Arabī’s writing which the ḥukamā’ tried to clarify as the chapter will show when discussing Muḥammad Riżā Qumshīhi and Mahdi Āshtīyānī’s treatises on the issue. Although the discussion of walāyah is primarily an ḍirfānī one, Mullā Ṣadrā repeatedly refers to the perfect human in the Asfār and in his other works such as his Rasā’il. It consequently became a concept that Sadrian ḥukamā’ had to be aware of and understand.

Mullā Ṣadrā was not the first thinker to incorporate the ideas of Ibn ‘Arabī on the perfect human into a Shi‘i framework of thought. Before him Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. after 787/1385) also recognized the powerful implications of the theory for Shi‘i theology and

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628 On Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī see A. Khālidī, Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī: guzārish-i zindagī va ḍirfān (Tehran: Ma‘ārif, 1381 Sh/ 2002); I. Mansūrī Lārijānī, Musāfīr-i gharīb : sharḥ-i aḥvāl va ās̲ār-i ‘allāma Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī va barras-ī
much of his intellectual contribution was an attempt to introduce those ideas to a Shi'i audience. With the Sadrian school there is a flurry of activity in terms of acceptance and development of the implications of the concept of the perfect human in understanding Shi'i aḥādīth. Fayḍ Kāshānī’s al-Kalimāt al-maknūna is an important work that seeks to develop the concept of the perfect human to understand the more esoteric aspect of the Imams. Works by other Safavid thinkers such as Qāḍī Saʿīd al-Dīn Qummī (d. 1108/1696) in his treatise called al-Talāʾiʿ wa al-bawāriq; Mīrzā Rafīʿā Nāʾīnī (d. 1083/1672) in his works Shajara-i ʿilāhīya and Thamara-i shajara-i ʿilāhīya; ’Abd al-Razzāq Lāhījī in Gawhar-i murād; Mīrzā Ḥasan Lāhījī (d. 1121/1709) in his Ṭawāhir al-ḥikam; all delve into the concept of walāyah and the Shi'i Imams within the context of ḥikmat. Thereafter many separate treatises were written on the concept by the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum which will be examined in this chapter.


\(\text{Ḥukamā'\textquotesingle\ of the school of Qum also wrote works providing an intellectual framework from which to analyze the scriptural sources. Some of these treatises and works include Ṭabāṭabā'ī's Risālat al-walāya; Javādī Āmulī's Ḥayāt-i 'īrfānī-i Imam 'Āli; Ḥamāyat va 'īrfān; Walāyat dar Qur'ān; and Wahdat-i jawām' dar Nahj-i Balagha amongst others; Ḥasanzāda Ūmulī's Insān-i kāmil az didga-yi Nahj-i Balagha; Murtažā Muṭahhari's Insān-i kāmil and Jāziba va dāfī'ayi 'Āli; Sa'ādat Parwar's Jilva-i nūr and Furūgh-i shahadat and Muḥammad Ḫusayn Tihrānī's ten volume work Ma'rifat al-Imāma. Most of these works are outside the remit of this thesis as they are more concerned with interpreting the scriptural sources however, some reference will be made to them when appropriate.}

For Shi'i scholars the discussion of walāyah is an issue close to heart as it distinguishes them as a sect. Although their belief in the walāyah of twelve Imams after the death of the Prophet (saw) is based on scriptural sources, such as the interpretation of various Qur'ānic verses, ahādīth and historical events, the discussions concerning walāyah in theoretical 'īrfān and transcendental philosophy add a deeper intellectual framework to what was already accepted from the Islamic scriptural sources. Therefore, the issues of wujūd and walāyah are two of the most important interrelated concepts in Shi'i intellectual discourse.\(^\text{632}\)

This chapter discusses the issue of walāyah using the 'īrfānī texts of the hawza as a basis from which to delve into the important glosses and treatises written by the Ḥukamā' of the school of Tehran and Qum. In a similar fashion to the previous chapter the method follows the journey of the modern hawza student as walāyah is not dealt with in Bīdāyat, Nihāyat or the

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\(^{630}\) 'Ali Sa'ādat Parwar Pahlawānī Tihrānī was an important student of 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī.

\(^{632}\) See S. Rizvi "Being (wujūd) and sanctity (wilāya)", 113-127.
Manẓūma. Rather the modern student of ḥikmat would only encounter this issue if he continued his studies and moved onto texts such as al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiya and the Asfār or indeed began his training in theoretical ʿirfān. However, as indicated above the issue of walāyah is a key issue in ḥikmat, so one may ask why it is introduced at such a late stage in a modern ḥakīm’s training? Part of the answer certainly returns to the issue at the core of this thesis which is the preference of some ḥukamāʾ for a certain reading of ḥikmat over another.

The issue of walāyah is quintessentially ʿirfānī and very much linked to the ʿirfānī conception of wujūd and therefore is not part of a solely philosophical reading of Mullā Šadrā. It is therefore not included in a teaching text that presents a philosophical reading, interpretation and explanation of transcendental philosophy. A natural result of this method of teaching is a wider separation between the two readings as most students of ḥikmat would approach the Asfār with a philosophical approach alone. However, a philosophical approach still needs to interact with these concepts and this interaction produces a philosophical reading of the perfect human and a philosophical explanation of walāyah takwīnīyah. The chapter will also discuss human perfection in philosophy which is the abstraction of the soul. Abstraction is linked to walāyah and wujūd but falls short of the much deeper discussions of walāyah in ʿirfān. Indeed, it is the ʿirfānī reading of this topic where the soul reflects the unity of God termed as a Shadow of True Unity (al-wahdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓilliyah) and the unity of the soul mirrors the oneness of Existence that reconnects the two subjects as will be shown.

The chapter therefore discusses two issues: the first is an investigation into the ʿirfānī and philosophical readings and explanations of the perfect human and the concept of walāyah; and the second is a philosophical approach to the perfection of the soul. A key aspect of the
discussion in this chapter is the investigation of treatises written by ḥukamāʾ where they attempt to use hikmat to add depth to Imamology. The chapter begins by differentiating between the philosophical readings and explanations of the perfect human by discussing a gloss of Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī on the section concerning the perfect human in Tamhid al-qawāʾd where he identifies the different readings in the works of the ḥukamāʾ. The chapter then moves on to discussing the relationship between the Name of God, Allah, and the perfect human which is a deeper discussion into the ʿirfānī reading presented in the previous chapter.

Such a seemingly outrageous examination is possible in the light of Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār’s discussion on the “heretical” poetry of Ibn ʿArabī discussed in the previous chapter as all that exists in any of the worlds including the corporeal is a manifestation of God. In this discussion since the Name Allah is the most comprehensive Name, capturing the realities of all the other Names, it produces the most comprehensive permanent archetype when the Name faces creation and that archetype is that of the perfect human. Perfection here is linked to comprehensiveness or the ability of the perfect men to manifest all of the Names in their correct fashion. A philosophical reading of comprehensiveness would take the issue back to the intensity of wujūd. The reality which comprises all things is the Muḥammadan reality which necessitates the existence of a living perfect friend of God (walī) in every time period so that the Breath of the All-Merciful has a place of descent. Since the Name Allah manifests on three planes; the perfect human; the cosmos as a whole; and the Qurʾān, the chapter continues to explain the concept of the three books and shows how these concepts were used by the ḥukamāʾ to strengthen the arguments for the Imamate of ʿAli by tying these issues to the scriptural sources.
The chapter moves onto one of the most important issues discussed by the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran which was that of the different Seals of the Saints. In his influential book Seal of the Saints, Chodkeiwicz, while showing that the Seal of the Saints may not be exclusive to Ibn ‘Arabī also disagrees with Corbin’s interpretations that would make Ibn ‘Arabī a Shi‘ī.633 Chittick claims that at least three types of Seal can be distinguished from Ibn ‘Arabī’s writings.634 The ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran offered a different interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabī’s works to this commonly held understanding of the Seals of the Saints. That interpretation was not only more palatable for traditional Shi‘ī scholars but also brought into question the theory of walāyah propounded by Ibn ‘Arabī as being quintessentially Shi‘ī.635 This section is therefore of great interest for researches studying the ideas of the Shaykh al-akbar. The interpretation carries great importance as the same charges leveled at Ibn ‘Arabī by traditional scholars were also leveled at Mullā Šadrā and Sadrian philosophers as Mullā Šadrā acknowledges his intellectual debt to Ibn ‘Arabī. There was therefore a vested interest for ḥukamāʾ to present Ibn ‘Arabī in a Shi‘ī light. The work of the school of Tehran in this aspect was so thorough that similar works are not found in the school of Qum. Rather the school of Qum concentrates more on the implications of the theory of walāyah in applying an intellectual framework to interpret aḥādīth on the reality of the Imams.

634 Chittick, “Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumsha‘ī”.
635 The debate of Ibn ‘Arabī’s Shi‘ism or Sunnism is perhaps not the most important as he probably does not neatly fit into either denomination in its strict sense. While Ibn ‘Arabī did not consider himself a Shi‘ī, the system of walāyah has little doctrinal compatibility with traditional Sunnism. It is the placing of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib at the top of that system by his being the closest person to the Prophet that turns Ibn ‘Arabī’s system of walāyah evermore towards Shi‘ism as shown by the Qumshihi and the school of Tehran. Ibn ‘Arabī was perhaps more of a product of his varied context, see M. Ebstein, Mysticism and Philosophy in al-Andalus: Ibn Masarra, Ibn al-‘Arabī and the Ismā‘īlī Tradition (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014).
After establishing the position of the Seal of the Saints the discussion moves back to the knowledge of God in light of the concept of *walāyah* and that all that can be known of God is through the Seal. The chapter then discusses the relationship between the perfect human and the Truth. The Breath of the All-Merciful is also called The Real Through Whom Creation Takes Place (*al-Ḥaq q al-makhāluq bihi*) which is another expression of the oneness of Existence using the Name of God, the Truth. Javādī Āmulī uses this key *ʻirfānī* terminology and expands the discussion to include Shiʿi scriptural sources. His discussion is therefore outside of what would usually be found in the glosses and treatises on the classical texts. Rather what he does in his treatise *Ḥayāt-i ʻirfānī-i Imam ʿAlī* is use an intellectual framework based on *ʻirfānī* principles from which to understand the Shiʿi scriptural sources.

After discussing Javādī Āmulī’s *ʻirfānī* approach to the issue of the perfect human the chapter moves on to discuss a more philosophical approach adopted by ʻAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī in his *Risālat al-walāya* in a section concerning the interplay between the outward and the inward. The final part of the analysis of *walāyah* discusses the role of the perfect woman. While the concept of *walāyah* does not leave out women nor does it imply their exclusion from existential *walāyah* or the journey to perfection, recent works produced by the school of Qum begin to discuss the station of Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet who is considered one of the fourteen infallibles. This discussion is still in its early stages in the school of Qum but it is an area where Shiʿi *ḥukamāʾ* can certainly add to the topic of *walāyah* within the wider *ʻirfānī* tradition.
The second issue discussed in the chapter is the perfection of the soul for philosophers. Perfection is the abstraction of the soul from its corporeal body and this is what links the theory of the soul to resurrection and the discussion on bodily resurrection (al-maʿād al-jismānī) which will be discussed in the next chapter. The negative view of the body in philosophy is not entirely reflected in ʿirfān which sees the body as a natural part of the completeness of the perfect man to reflect every world including the corporeal. But all that is known to man is known through his soul and so the topic of the soul is very intriguing as the soul mirrors wujūd itself. Therefore to know the soul is to know wujūd and knowing wujūd is a key aspect of ḥikmat. Indeed the soul reflects the unity of God (al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓilliyah) and this is what connects this discussion to the perfect man who reflects the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and therefore all of the Names. Using the concepts of motion in the category of substance and al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓilliyah we return to a discussion linked to the philosophical reading of the perfect man and discuss the possibility of the soul unifying with an Intellect. The concept of abstraction is then explored as another introductory issue to the topic of resurrection before discussing some concluding observations.

1. The Philosophical and ʿIrāfī Readings of the Perfect Human

Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī in his gloss on Tamhīd al-qawā’id provides a useful summary on the views concerning the reality of the human which will aid the discussion in this chapter. While one view finds its context in a philosophical reading and understanding of wujūd, the perspective that Āshiyānī chooses as the more correct is that which corresponds to an ʿirfānī reading. He says:
Concerning the reality of the human in terms of his comprehensiveness...and the relation between the human and the world of existence there are three views...: [For] the philosophers as the last stage in the perfection of the human is the station of the first intellect they say: The human in terms of his existential comprehensiveness contains the corporeal, imaginal and intellectual worlds. That is that the human has a compound disposition in a general sense. He contains the levels of the elements, plants and animals...the end of his journey is the first intellect as in the hadith “The first thing that God created was my light.” They understand created here as brought into existence, not decreed.636

This is a clearly philosophical reading and explanation of the perfection of the human. Here there is separation between the first intellect and the person of the perfect human. The human is striving to reach the level of the first intellect and so is secondary to it. There is no concept of manifestation or self-disclosure which is a prominent facet of the ‘irfānī reading. While the view referred to in the quote above is that created in the hadith above refers to existence, the second view is that it means decreed, which is also a philosophical view. Āshtiyānī at a later point in his gloss shows that the implication of both of these philosophical views is that the first intellect must be more perfect than the perfect human.637 Though it is a third view that Āshtiyānī finds the most compelling:

636 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawā’id bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummi, 356, nt. 1.
637 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawā’id bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummi, 358, nt. 1.
The locus of inspiration (mashrab) of the perfect ones among the Muḥammadan friends [of God] is that...the station of the Muḥammadan reality is the degree of Non-dualistic Unity in wujūd...it means that [it is] the final stage of the wayfaring of the perfect Muḥammadan human after annihilation in the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and accepting the self-disclosures of the Outward Names...[and after he] reaches the level of manifesting the Inward Names. After wayfaring in the Inward Names one after the other he accepts to manifest a mixture of Names from the Inward and the Outward in the Names comprehensive of the Outward and Inward...[until] he reaches the level of balance in comprehensiveness...638

The implication of the ʿirfānī view is that the perfect human is the reason for existence and the existence of all else in creation is introductory to his appearance in the corporeal realm.639 He manifests the Names of God and so the issue here is different to that in a philosophical reading where the perfection of man is seen in his increase in wujūd or unifying with the first intellect. Therefore the first intellect exists for the perfect human whose reality is in the knowledge of God before the act of creation. Āshtiyāni also explains that the station of the perfect human is unknown to anyone except the perfect human himself and his inheritors as this position is an explanation of the level of the unveiling of tawḥīd that he has reached.640

638 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʿid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummi, 356, nt. 1.
639 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʿid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummi, 358, nt. 1.
640 Ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Tamhīd al-qawāʿid bā ḥavāshī-yi Āqā Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī va Āqā Mīrzā Maḥmūd Qummi, 358, nt. 1.
This is a concept that will be discussed further in the chapter. With the categorization of the views of the ḥukamā’ identified by Āshtiyānī it is possible to classify the approaches of various ḥukamā’ in the schools of Tehran and Qum as either philosophical or ‘irfānī.

2. The Name Allah and Its Manifestation

In the previous chapter the Name Allah was discussed as the Name that encompassed all of the other Names represented by either the degree of Non-dualistic Unity or at the apex of the degree of Non-dualistic Unity depending on which set of terms was used. That is that the degree after the level of the unseen of the unseen where nothing is known of God, the manifestation of all of God’s Names occurs with comprehensiveness in the Name Allah. Therefore the Name Allah contains all the other Names and manifests before the other Names. The external archetype which manifests the Name Allah therefore also takes priority over the other archetypes which manifest other Names. Qayṣarī discusses how the Name Allah is related to the other Names, and splits the types of relationship into two. The first is the relationship between the manifestation of the essence of a Name and all of the Names. Here the comprehensiveness of the Name Allah is like a single reality which comprises individuals in the same way as wujūd and quiddity are a single reality in the extramental, only separated on the level on the intellect. That is that the other Names of God are like modes of a single reality, so although Qayṣarī chooses to use wujūd and quiddity as an example, a better example

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641  Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 140.
642  Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 141.
according to the Sadrian school would have been \textit{wujūd} itself. It is important to note here that Qayṣarī did not have Sadrian language with which to explain his concepts.

The second type of relationship is its comprehensiveness over all the other Names in the same way that a universal (\textit{kull}) is related to a particular (\textit{juz‘}), where the particular is the same as the universal in terms of manifestation as a universal cannot manifest except in a particular.\footnote{Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 141.} Here the dependence of the universal on the particular is not what Qayṣarī intends. Rather it is that a Name which is at the height of nondelimitation needs delimitation in order to manifest on a delimited plane. Therefore the Names that are more delimited manifest the Name that is more nondelimited. That means that everything that exists in the world is the manifestation of the Name Allah, as this Name comprehends all the other Names. Here Qayṣarī is using a philosophical explanation for an \textit{ʿirfānī} concept and so there is room for error when reading these issues in his commentary on the \textit{Fuṣūṣ}.

The perfect human is the archetype that is the manifestation of the Name Allah as he is the manifestation of that which comprehends all the Names, which is the same nondelimitation that is found in the Name Allah. This is the ontological position of the perfect human as the level of Non-dualistic Unity in the Breath of the All-Merciful. The reality of the perfect human is the Name Allah as he comprises anything that is not the pure, nondelimited, undifferentiated Essence. As Qayṣarī says:
And for this reason it is said that the perfect human must flow in all of the existent beings, like the flow of the Truth in them, which is the third journey, which is from the Truth to the creation by the Truth. In this journey his perfection is completed, and by it he attains the truth of certainty (ḥaqq al-yaqīn). From here it becomes clear that the last is the same as the first, and from that the secret [of the verse] becomes apparent: “He is the First and the Last and the Ascendant (over all) and the Knower of hidden things, and He is Cognizant of all things”\(^{644,645}\).

According to this passage the reality of the perfect human, which is also known as the Muḥammadan reality or the creation by the Truth, pervades all of existence and it is through him that God is known, as God is known through His manifestations. But his reality does not comprise God, while God comprises the reality of the perfect human. Deciding the boundaries between the reality of the perfect human is a tricky and dangerous area, while safety is found in understanding that God and the perfect human are not the same and that the perfect human is a creation of God and dependant on Him. The reality of the perfect human is only completely known to himself and God, as Āshtiyānī pointed out above. Those who move closer to his reality may understand more, but this discussion is far beyond the realm of intellectualization. It is beyond the realm of pure philosophizing and only the realm of unveiling and experiencing can open the door of discussion and certainty. In this paragraph Qayṣārī refers to the third journey of the wayfarer in the same way as the third journey according to Mullā Ṣadrā. Although the immediate influence on Mullā Ṣadrā concerning the four journeys was the Dashtakī family there is a point of intersection between the height of

\(^{644}\) Qurʾān 57:3

\(^{645}\) Qayṣārī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, (1) 143.
the spiritual journey as expressed in theoretical 'ırfān and ḥikmat. This is because Şadrā basis his four intellectual journeys is the journeys of the 'ūrafā’ and writes his Asfār “…according to their way of their movement.”

Fāżil Tūnī explores the relationship between the prophets and the Names in more detail in his gloss on Qayṣari’s commentary on the Fuṣūṣ. The friend of God that manifests the Name Allah is only the perfect human or someone who holds the position of his successor. Tūnī explains that even at this position there is gradation and proves his point by linking it back to a saying of Imam ‘Alī when he says that he is a servant from among the servants of Muḥammad (anā ‘abd min ‘abīd Muḥammad). So while the successors of Muḥammad are greater than the other prophets, they are below the level of the Prophet himself. Regarding the Names Tūnī says:

“The holder of general walāyah is a manifestation of the comprehensive Name, the Beneficent (al-Raḥmān) and the rest of the prophets are manifestations of the particular Names such as the Compassionate (al-Raʾūf) and other [such Names]. The holder of nondelimited walāyah is the manifestation of the Name Allah as he is the manifestation of the [degree of] Non-dualistic Unity. Therefore the Seal of the Prophets emanates from the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and is called the first specification (taʿayun-i awwal)...in the same way that the Name Allah comprises all of the other Names, the permanent

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646 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (1) 44.
647 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 113.
648 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 113. For the ḥadīth see Kulaynī, Al-Kāfī, (1) 90.
649 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 113.
archetype of Muḥammad comprises all of the permanent archetypes and therefore all of the realities are particularities of the Muḥammadan reality.\textsuperscript{650}

According to the Breath of the All-Merciful there are stages of manifestation before the Names manifest in this material world. The external archetypes in this world have an original form in the permanent archetypes, and since the Muḥammadan reality is the form of the all-comprehensive Name it is also the form of all of the external and permanent archetypes. This kind of lordship is not comprehensible without justice, which is commonly defined in the ḥawza as giving everything its due according to its capability. This concept will be explained further in the section concerning the perfect man and the Truth. In the corporeal world the external archetypes compete with each other due to being veiled from the other’s reality therefore requiring a manifestation of justice to judge between them.\textsuperscript{651} This judgment is also an aspect of the Muhammadan reality in the hidden realms,\textsuperscript{652} as it was a function of the person of Muḥammad in the corporeal world. In another part of his gloss Tūnī explains this concept by explaining that the perfect human contains all the worlds within himself in the perfect balance so that one internal world does not overcome another. He says:

So the perfect human contains all of the levels of existence in such a way that the manifestation of one level is not prevented or veiled by the manifestation of another level. For example, the manifestation of [the] animalistic [level] does not prevent the

\textsuperscript{650} Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾīl, 113

\textsuperscript{651} Qayṣārī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 166.

\textsuperscript{652} Qayṣārī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 165.
manifestation of [the] intellectual and spiritual [levels]. [He] is qualified to [posses the level of] divine vicegerency.\textsuperscript{653}

In the same way that the Names are not truly differentiated at the degree of Non-dualistic Unity they are not differentiated in the reality of the perfect human:

Each [Name] is not other than the other Names, while some are greater than others. In the same way the perfect human who is a manifestation of the Name Allah has different manifestations...which are one with the perfect human...each manifestation is one with the other manifestations and there is no difference between them.\textsuperscript{654}

The perfect man may have deficiencies related to the corporeal world and related to his human nature such as tiredness or being limited by sense perception. But if those deficiencies are part of his comprehensiveness and correspondence with the corporeal world then they are not really deficiencies. Rather they are perfections that allow him to contain the outward and the inward aspects of every level of existence and capture the whole effusion of the Breath of the All-Merciful.\textsuperscript{655} This vicegerency is necessary in every time as the perfect man is the connection between God and his creation. Each vicegerent is the manifestation of the Muhammadan reality, as there must always be a perfect human on earth to capture the full Breath. The perfect man manifests with the particularities of his own time, and so the

\textsuperscript{653} Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾīl, 108.

\textsuperscript{654} Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾīl-i ʿirfānī va falsafī, 109.

\textsuperscript{655} Qayṣārī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-hikam, (1) 147.
vicegerents vary significantly when analyzing their outward aspect alone.\textsuperscript{656} However, if they are analyzed by the oneness that prevails the higher levels of the Breath of the All-Merciful it becomes clear that they are all that same reality.\textsuperscript{657}

The vicegerents before Muḥammad were messengers (rasūl) or prophets (nabī) and after his death prophethood (nubuwwah) was sealed and vicegerency became walāyah. Rather walāyah is the inner aspect of prophethood and so it is more comprehensive as it concerns every friend of God, which is inclusive of the prophets. Hence God has the Name al-Walī (the Friend) rather than a Name related specifically to prophethood.\textsuperscript{658} Muḥammad Rızā Qumshihī discusses the Name al-Walī in his important treatise on walāyah saying:

\textit{Walāyah is from al-Walī meaning closeness and it is either general which covers all of the believers...or specific which is only for the people of the heart and the people of God who are annihilated in His Essence...this walāyah also has levels: The first level [is] the annihilation of the servant in His Essence with the divine self-disclosure and his subsistence by Him by taking off the clothes of possible existence and wearing true wujūd at the end of the first journey and the beginning of the second journey of the four journeys...So the specific walāyah which is the Muḥammadan walāyah...may be delimited by a Name from among the Names and a limit from among the limits, or it could be nondelimited...}\textsuperscript{659}

\textsuperscript{656} Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 148.
\textsuperscript{657} Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 148.
\textsuperscript{658} Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 169.
\textsuperscript{659} Qumshihī, \textit{Majmū`a-yi āsār}, 111-112.
The difference in manifesting the Names is not due to the self-disclosure as Qumshihī explains. Rather the obstruction is from the locus of manifestation and not the self-disclosure. The friends of God do not attain these high positions through their own actions rather they are bestowed by God on His chosen servants, due to their permanent archetypes. Those who are bestowed with such high stations of walāyah are deserving of them, due to Gods knowledge of them. Qumshiihī continues to say that the Name al-Wali is the inner of the Name Allāh:

The two Names are vertically related and the Name al-Wali is the inner of the Names Allāh as walāyah is more hidden than divinity...divinity is the inner aspect of the Muḥammadan reality...so walāyah is the inner aspect of the Muḥammadan reality [as well] and that reality is the outward of both of them...the outer is the inner and the inner is the outer so the difference is in mental separation while they are one in the necessary existence.

Divinity is the inner aspect of the Muḥammadan reality because the Muḥammadan reality is a full manifestation of the Name Allāh. Qumshiihī returns to explain the difference between the outward and inward aspects of the Muḥammadan reality in the same way that Qayṣarī first explained it to be mentally posited. However, since Qumshiihī was able to use Sadrian terminology he relates the difference to wujūd alone and not to wujūd and quiddity as Qayṣarī

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660 Qumshhihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 115.
66a Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 169.
66b Qumshhihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 118.
did. The Name Allah therefore manifests within the Muḥammadan reality which is the whole of creation as well as in the person of the perfect human. Still there is a third aspect to this relationship which is the Qurʾān.

3. **The Three Books**

Since the Name Allah manifests in the creation as a whole and in the perfect man specifically, there is a relationship between the world and the perfect human. The perfect human is the microcosm and the world is the macrocosm, and it is the comprehensiveness of the perfect human that allows him to be the vicegerent of God over the rest of creation, as he contains everything that is contained by anything else. Therefore in the same way that there are manifestations of the Names in the worlds in a differentiated manner, there are manifestations of the Names in the human in a general sense.\(^{663}\) Here the relationship between knowing the self and knowing God becomes apparent yet again. If one knows the manifestations of the Names of God within themselves then they understand the manifestations in the extramental as well. The perfect human witnesses all of the Names within then he witnesses the whole of creation, as all that is manifested in the extramental is manifested within his own soul; *“Do you think you are a small seed, while within you is folded the greatest world?”*\(^{664}\)

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\(^{663}\) Qaṣṣarī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, (1) 144.

\(^{664}\) This poetry is attributed to Imam ‘Ali although some scholars have concluded it belongs to another person with the same name.
The relationship between microcosm and macrocosm is also expressed in terms of different books, so that a third entity can be incorporated. The microcosm is the book of the soul (kitāb al-anfusī), the macrocosm is the book of the horizon (kitāb al-āfāqī) and the Qurʾān is the recorded book (kitāb tadwīnī). Javādī Âmuli explains the relationship between the cosmos and the Qurʾān when elucidating the kind of knowledge possessed by Imam ʿAlī:

The Qurʾān is God’s verbal book, the cosmos being His existential book. These two books are entirely consistent, such that should the Qurʾān become manifest in an existential form, it would take the shape of the cosmos, and should the cosmos transform into verbal expression, it would appear in the form of the Qurʾān. Thus the one who comprehends the Qurʾān immediately in its diverse aspects is ipso facto aware of the secrets and mysteries of the cosmos.

The relationship between the Qurʾān and the perfect human is expressed by Imam ʿAlī in his own words as he is reported to have said phrases such as “I am the speaking Qurʾān” and “I am the Word of God that speaks.” Javādī Âmuli goes on to explain such phrases:

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666 The two books relating to the microcosm (kitāb al-anfusī) and the microcosm (kitāb al-āfāqī) are termed as such due to the Qurʾānic verse: “We will soon show them Our signs in the Universe [āfāq] and in their own souls [anfusīhā], until it will become quite clear to them that it is the truth. Is it not sufficient as regards your Lord that He is a witness over all things?” [Qurʾān, 41:53]

666 ‘A. Javādī Amuli, *Life of Gnosis: A Mystical Study of Imām ʿAlī’s Life*, tr. D. D. Sodagar (Qum: Īsrāʾ Center of Publication, 2011) 31. For the original Farsi see ‘A. Javādī Amuli, Ḥayāt-i ʿırfān-i Imām ʿAlī (Qum: Intishārāt-i Īsrāʾ, 1380 Sh/2002). I have quoted the passages from the English translation which are faithful to the original Farsi text.

The summit of the Qurʾān is “with Us in the Mother Book, sublime and wise.” This apex of the Qurʾān subsumes by way of hierarchical consummation all the lower levels of its manifestation. As such, one who is the “speaking Qurʾān,” the incarnate divine revelation, comprehends immediately the secrets of the cosmos. As God possesses immediate knowledge of the hierarchical levels of the Qurʾān essentially and independently, so too does His viceroy and righteous slave as His manifestation and exemplification of His knowledge possess it but in a dependent mode that owes to His grace.

While elucidating the intimate connection between the Qurʾān, God’s knowledge and the perfect human, Javādī Amuli is careful to point out the difference between God and the perfect human, which is the essential servitude in the perfect human and the transcendence and independence of God as the Creator of the perfect human and his Benefactor. Yet the extent of the knowledge of the perfect human is astonishing at first, but since the ʿirfānī view sees the true perfect human as the vicegerent of God not only for the material world but for all the created worlds, one may grasp the general comprehensiveness that such a position requires. The value of the human therefore in the Islamic world view becomes apparent from this discussion, as the perfection of the human is attainable in various degrees by all people and indeed that is the philosophy of revealed religion. God reveals to mankind the path he needs to pursue in order to reach his perfection. Perfection in its ultimate sense may be attainable only by a very small elite, but as that perfection becomes less perfect, more people would be

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668 Qurʾān, 43:4
669 Javādī Amuli, Life of Gnosis, 35.
able to attain the subsequent lower levels of perfection. So perfection in this sense is relative and graded rather than ultimate for the friends of God in a more general sense.

There are many statements and situations narrated in the scriptural sources concerning Imam ‘Ali and the other Imams elucidating the extent of their knowledge and this is why knowledge of the Imam became an important tenant of Shi‘i theology.\textsuperscript{670} It was especially significant for the establishment of the Imamate of the ninth Imam, Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Jawād, who became an Imam at the age of nine upon the death of his father Alī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā. Shi‘i scholars who wanted to assess which of the claimants to the office of Imamate were authentic, both for leadership and in order to give them the khums, would ask the claimant a series of questions to assess the claimant’s knowledge. Since knowledge of the Imam is such an important factor, it is easy to see the importance of the ‘irfānī discussions on the perfect human are for Shi‘i scholars. It is not that the ideas of the perfect human were imposed on the Imams like some would argue, rather there seems to have been an innate consistency between what emerged as the vision of the Imam based on scriptural sources and the investigations of the ‘urafā‘. A good example of this is seen in another tradition from Imam ‘Alī where he says:

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\item The scriptural sources contain many traditions of this nature and so any quick glance in the kitāb al-ḥujja in the important sources of Shi‘i ahādīth will be sufficient for the reader to get a general picture of the importance of the knowledge of the Imām in the Shi‘i scriptural sources. Some examples include: Narrated from Imam al-Bāqir: By Allah! We are the treasurers of Allah in His heaven and earth, not over gold nor over silver, but over His Knowledge, see Kulaynī al-Kāfī, (1) 474; In part of a long hadith narrated from Imam al-Riḍā he says: ...The Imam is single in his time, nobody can approach him \textit{[in excellence]}, no scholar is equal to him, nobody can replace him and nobody is like him or is his peer... , see Kulaynī al-Kāfī, (1) 495; and narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq in reference to Qur‘ān 3:8: We are the firmly rooted in knowledge, and we know its \textit{[the Qur‘ān’s]} original meaning (ta‘wil), see Kulaynī al-Kāfī, (1) 529.
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\end{footnotesize}
I have been granted seven privileges in which no one exceeds me. I have been taught the Names, governance of creatures, interpretation of the Book, and distribution of booty among the children of Adam according as their due. There is no knowledge but that God has taught me. And I have been granted a word that discloses a thousand words. And my wife has been granted a codex, in which there is knowledge such as no one else has attained to and which is from God and his Prophet as her exclusive right.

It is interesting that the first privilege is exactly the characteristic most important in the perfect human, which is his knowledge of the Names, as his reality is the comprehensive Name, Allah. The second privilege and some of the other privileges are the job of the vicegerent, which involves governing the creatures and giving them their rights. Here it is clear that Imam ʿAli is not referring to the outward political role of the Caliphate, as that would not be a privilege that was reserved for him alone. Rather this governance is more general, being not only over the Muslims, but over all creatures. Such general governance is unlikely to be in the political sense but rather of a spiritual nature. There is also reference to knowing the interpretation of the book, being the Qurʾān. All of the characteristics are to do with knowledge, either in its theoretical or practical sense.

4. The Muhammadian Reality (al-haqiqah al-Muhammadiyah)

671 Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet is the female prototype of the al-insān al-kāmil and this will be discussed further in the chapter.
673 Here the word used is al-ʿibād which literally means servants. Since all created beings are servants of God the translator has used creatures.
The Muḥammadan reality is the manifestation of the Name Allah, and from this reality all realities in the rest of the world are produced. The part of the reality that is outward produces the outward world and the part that is inward produces the inward worlds, as the Prophet — in his reality — is the possessor of the greatest Name (al-Ism al-aʿẓam) which had lordship over all of the other Names. This lordship necessitates that everything in creation is given its correct proportion according to its capacity and potential. So the lordship of the Muḥammadan reality cannot be imagined without justice. Here justice does not mean equality, but rather means giving everything what it deserves. In philosophical terms it means that the amount of existence and perfection given to a stone in the material world should not be the same as the level of existence and perfection given to an angel in the world of the intellects.

To implement justice, the power to implement is necessary and this is the basis of walāyah takwīnīyah and walāyat al-taṣarruf. At the same time, since everything in existence has different needs, that which gives everything its right must also possess everything and this is why the Muḥammadan reality must contain all of the Names. Therefore, the Muḥammadan reality has two aspects; servitude and lordship. That is that the ability that is required to administer justice is not essentially possessed by the Muḥammadan reality, but rather it is

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674 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 145.
675 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 146.
676 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 146.
677 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 145.
present within the Muḥammadan reality by the virtue of it being the manifestation of the all
comprehensive Name, which is the reality of vicegerency.

A vicegerent in the corporeal world is required in all ages since he is responsible for sustaining
the creation, and this necessitates the existence of a various number of vicegerents through
the course of time. This is because the material nature of the world necessitates birth and
death, creation and destruction and the deterioration of things with passing of time. Since the
perfect human is in the body of a human, that body must deteriorate and eventually die.
Therefore, the perfect human must also pass away from this world and another perfect human
must take his place. The Muḥammadan reality manifests in different ages according the Name
that governs the age in the form of the prophets who lived in each individual age. Indeed it
was not possible for the Muḥammadan reality to manifest completely at one time, so it
manifested gradually. It also manifested in the different prophets in different ways according
to their own capacities. All of the realities of the prophets originate from the degree of Non-
dualistic Unity and this is what unifies them.

Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī in a book expounding the vicegerency of the Prophet and the walāyah
of ‘Alī called Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya ilā al-khīlāfa wa-l-walāya expounds the manner in which their
realities permeate the whole of existence. After explaining the degree of Non-dualistic Unity
and establishing the existence of a veil between the degree of Non-dualistic Unity and the

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678 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Faṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 147:148-149.
679 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Faṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 148.
680 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Faṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 148.
manifestation of the Names in the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, he continues to describe the need for the divine vicegerent in lamp nine of the first niche as follows:

When it is unveiled to you that this unseen reality is too majestic to be attained by the hands of the waders, nor does anyone procure from the precinct of holiness, nor is any of the names or attributes, including their entifications, the intimate of its secret, nor has any of the forgoing been given the permission to enter its arena, there must be, for the sake of the manifestation of the names and their prominence as well as the unveiling of the mysteries of their treasures, an unseen divine vicegerent to succeed it in manifestation in the names and reflect Its light in the mirrors, so that the gates of blessings may open up, the fountainheads of boons may gush forth, the morning of beginninglessness may break, and the last may link with the first.681

The vicegerent is the intermediary which is also known as the most holy effusion with one face towards the level of Non-dualistic Unity and the Unseen and another face towards the multiplicity of the Names, which is not like the multiplicity that is understood in the corporeal world, as every Name is all-comprehensive while some of them are outwardly specific.682 The first manifestation of the most holy effusion is the Name, Allah, after which the other Names are manifested and therefore vicegerency is manifested in all the Names.683 It is through the

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681 See Rūḥ-Allāh Khomeinī, The Lamp of Guidance into Vicegerency and Sanctity, tr. Salam Judy (Tehran: Uruj Publishing Center, 2010) 10-11. For the original Arabic see Khumaynī, Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya. I have used the translation by Salam Judy for these quotes as the translation is faithful to the original Arabic.


multiplicity of the Names that there multiplicity in the creation. Khumayni continues in lamp twenty seven of the same niche:

This vicegerency is the spirit, lord[ly] origin and source of the Muḥammadan vicegerency. There from grew the root of the vicegerency in all the worlds, or rather, the root of vicegernecy, the vicegerent and the one whom it represents. And this became manifest, to the greatest degree of manifestation, in the Presence of the Greatest Name ‘God’, the Lord of the absolute Muḥammadan reality, the origin of the divine universal realities. Based on this it is the origin of vicegerency, and vicegerency is its manifestation. Or rather, it is the outwardly manifest in this presence, because of the unification of that which is manifest and the locus of manifestation, as He has alluded to with a fine allusion in the Divine revelation, with His words,

إنا أنزلنا في ليلة القدر

Indeed, We revealed it on the Might of Measuring out.


685 The night of measuring out (also translated as the night of power, the night of fate, the night of decree and the grand night) is referred to in chapter 97 the Qurʾān: In the Name of Allah the Beneficent the Merciful. Surely We revealed it on the grand night. And what will make you comprehend what the grand night is? The grand night is better than a thousand months. The angels and Gibreel descend in it by the permission of their Lord for every affair. Peace! it is till the break of the morning. It is historically the night on which the Qurʾān was revealed to the Prophet in its complete sense before being revealed over the course of 23 years, verse by verse. However, the the night of measuring out has more than this historical significance. Ṭabāṭabāʾī comments that the apparent meaning of the term qādr in this instance is taqdir and so it is a night of measuring out which occurs every year when the life, death, sustenance, success and failure and other affairs are decreed, see Muhammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, *Tafsīr al-Mizān*, 20 vols (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-a’lamī li-l-maṭbūʿāt, 2006) (20) 592.
Our Shaykh and teacher in divine knowledge and teachings, the perfect gnostic, Mīrzā Muḥammad ‘Ali Shāhābādī Isfahanī, may God make the days of his blessings last, in reply to my question about the manner if divine revelation, in the first meeting I was honoured with his presence, said, among other things, thus, The (it) in His words...is an allusion to the unseen reality sent down in the Muḥammadan structure, which is the reality of ‘the Night of Measuring out’.  

Another aspect of the effusion is the effusion of knowledge, which is represented by the asking of questions to the Prophet in the well known ḥadīth of Miʿrāj (the night ascension). While explaining a long ḥadīth where Imam ‘Alī asks the Prophet whether he or the angle Gabriel is better, Khumaynī says that it was not that Imam ‘Alī did not know the answer to this question as he was the inheritor of the inner knowledge of the Prophet which made him party to knowledge before its formation in words. Rather the purpose of his question is to unveil the realities for others. This is an outward manifestation of an existential flow of knowledge from the heaven of Aḥmad’s mystery (samāʾ sir al-Aḥmādī) through the ‘Alawī Cloud (al-ʿamā ʿAlawīyah) which is also the reality of the famous ḥadīth: “I am the city of knowledge and ‘Alī is its gate”.  

While the Muḥammadan reality in ʿirfān is explained by the manifestation of the Name Allah, ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī uses a philosophical approach in his treatise on the Muḥammadan reality. He begins by classifying the different types of existent until he comes to the Platonic

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687 Khomeini, The Lamp of Guidance, 97.
Forms. Some of these forms have nondelimited lordship and receive from the nondelimited Truth and are annihilated and subsist by It.\textsuperscript{688} It is from here that the \textit{walāyah} of every prophet comes from and there is no \textit{walāyah} without annihilation and subsistence.\textsuperscript{689} From a philosophical perspective Forms are separate entities unlike the Names which are all modes of the same reality. He thereafter links the issue of \textit{walāyah} though the stations of annihilation and subsistence to the four journeys in the \textit{Asfār}.\textsuperscript{690} Those existents that are lacking perfection in the origin of their existence must move to find those perfections either by accidental movement or by motion in the category of substance.\textsuperscript{691}

‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzi explains the position of different existents through the concept of gradation in terms of their closeness or distance from God and their level of delimitation.\textsuperscript{692} Then in his description of the most perfect existent he returns to the ‘ırfānī issue of the perfect man manifesting all of the Names and the Muhammadian reality as the creation by the Truth before beginning a philosophical explanation of the corners of the Throne (\textit{al-ʿarsh}) and a commentary on a \textit{ḥadīth} concerning the intellect.\textsuperscript{693} He then finishes his treatise with a usual ‘ırfānī commentary of the \textit{ḥadīth} “I was a hidden treasure...”\textsuperscript{694}

\textsuperscript{688} Zunūzi, \textit{Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt}, (3) 114.
\textsuperscript{689} Zunūzi, \textit{Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt}, (3) 114-115.
\textsuperscript{690} Zunūzi, \textit{Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt}, (3) 115.
\textsuperscript{691} Zunūzi, \textit{Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt}, (3) 116.
\textsuperscript{692} Zunūzi, \textit{Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt}, (3) 117.
\textsuperscript{693} Zunūzi, \textit{Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt}, (3) 118-122.
\textsuperscript{694} Zunūzi, \textit{Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt}, (3) 123.
One of the most important modes of God is His Unity and the unitarian (muwahhid) is the perfect manifestation of God’s Unity. At the apex all possible spiritual levels is the station of the Seal of the Saints who is the perfect human. The ontological position of the Prophet as being the beginning of God’s creation, whether termed philosophically as the first effusion (al-ṣādir al-awwal) or in ārifāni terminology as the beginning of the Muḥammadan reality, as well as his position as the Seal of the Prophets is undisputed. However, there is debate about the person who holds the position of the Seal of the Saints after him. A vicegerent or Quṭb is required in each age on the material plane and that position before the Prophet was occupied by various prophets. After the death of the Prophet, according the Shi‘i theology that position was given to Imam ‘Alī and the other Imams after him and is currently held by the Mahdi who is in the greater occultation. Yet according to some statements of Ibn ‘Arabi, the Seal of the Saints in an absolute sense will be Jesus, and he claimed the Seal of the Muhammadan saints himself. Shi‘i ārifā took much effort to reinterpret these views commonly attributed to Ibn ‘Arabi by writing treatises on the issue of the Seal of the Saints, and in turn formulated an alternative interpretation of the words of the Shaykh al-akbar. It is this interpretation that will now be discussed.

5. The Types of Wāli

The discussion of the different types of wāli and specifically the different types of Seal (khātim) occurs in the background of Ibn ‘Arabi’s claim to be the Seal of the Saints. Deciphering what

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695 Elmore, Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time, 594-596.
696 Elmore, Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time, 7.
he meant by that assertion was an important issue for Shi‘i ‘urafā’ to explain as it seems to go directly against the Shi‘i belief in the Imams as the spiritual successors of the Prophet. The distinction is found in the difference between the Seal of nondelimited walāyah and the Seal of delimited walāyah in the community of Muḥammad. Since Muḥammad was the Seal of nondelimited waláyah, after his death only another Seal of nondelimited waláyah can take his place in the corporeal plane and that is his successor. This was not the Seal that Ibn ‘Arabī claimed to be according to the interpretation elucidated in the school of Tehran. Rather he was a Seal of delimited walāyah which is a position available to all of the friends of God in the community of Muḥammad. The confusion concerning Jesus’s position as the Seal of Saints as asserted by Qayṣarī was also an issue that needed to be addressed.697

In his Risālat al-walāyah, after explaining the manifestation of the Attribute of walāyah in existence, Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtiyānī explains a classification of different kinds of walāyah. Walāyah can be split into nondelimited (muṭlaq) walāyah and delimited (muqayyad) walāyah. Nondelimited walāyah is the walāyah that is related to God, who has no limitations, whereas delimited walāyah is the walāyah of the friends of God. “Delimited walāyah exists by nondelimited walāyah, and nondelimited walāyah is manifested by delimited walāyah.”698 The walāyah of the friends of God is then split into general and specific. General delimited walāyah belongs to all believers according to their different levels of faith. Specific delimited walāyah belongs to the wayfarers when they reach the levels of annihilation (fanāʾ) and subsistence (baqā’), and this is his definition of a friend of God.699

697 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-hikam, (1) 351.
698 Aḥmad Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, ed. Riżā Ustādī (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1388 Sh/2009) 337.
699 Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, 337.
Later in the same treatise Mīrzā Aḥmad explains nondelimited and delimited prophethood. Nondelimited prophethood belongs to the Prophet Muḥammad who has always been a prophet before the creation of Adam. The inner aspect of nondelimited prophethood is nondelimited walāyah, which in this case is an expression of the attainment of these perfections in terms of the bātin for eternity, as expressed in a tradition: “I and ʿAlī are from one light.” Delimited prophethood belongs to all of the various messengers who were sent to explain the realities, the way and the divine law to the human; and delimited walāyah is the inner aspect of this function. Therefore when walāyah is analyzed as an Attribute of God it is delimited when regarding the prophets and saints, but when it is considered solely referring to the prophets and saints it carries another meaning, where nondelimitation is used to describe the walāyah of the Prophet and his successors as explained above. Qumshīhi, in a treatise on walāyah penned by his student ʿAlī Akbar Ṭabāṭabāʾī as a gloss to the Ringstone of Seth, provides a simpler breakdown of the friends of God from among the community of Muḥammad saying:

Muḥammadan walāyah...is [either] nondelimited or delimited. For each of them there are levels; for the delimited it is in terms of numbers and for nondelimited it is in terms of intensity. For each of them there is a Seal (khātim). So it is possible for a scholar from...

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700 Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh, al-Amālī (Tehran: Kitābchī, 1376 Sh/1997) 236; Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Ibn Shahrāshūb Māzandarānī, Manāqib āl Abī Ṭālib, 4 vols (Qum: Intishārāt-i ʿAllāma, 1379 Sh/2000) (1) 27; (3) 269; Majlisi, Bihār al-anwār, (33) 483; (35) 34; (37) 150.
701 Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, 342.
amongst the scholars of his community for be the Seal of delimited walāyah and for a successor from among his successors to be the Seal of nondelimited walāyah.\textsuperscript{702}

In this passage Qumshihī immediately differentiates between two types of wali. One is a scholar from amongst the community of the Prophet and the other is a successor, by which he means an Imam as only the Imams are spiritual successors of the Prophet in a nondelimited sense. Mīrzā Aḥmad continues to discuss the issue of the Seal of the Saints in his treatise and begins by specifying that Seal in this title does not mean that there can be no other saint at this level after a Seal of the Saints in a specific time. Rather what is meant here is that the position of the Seal of the Saints is the highest position of the friends of God.\textsuperscript{703} According to Mirzā Aḥmad, this position can either be possessed as a state (ḥāl) or as a station (maqām). Possession of the station of the Seal of the Saints belongs only to Muḥammad and his successors who inherit this position because of him. If other prophets possessed this station it was possessed as a temporary state and not a permanent station.\textsuperscript{704}

Specific walāyah (al-walāyah al-khāṣṣah), which is the Muḥammadan walāyah, may be delimited by a Name of God, or may encompass all the names of God. Therefore Muḥammadan walāyah can be split into nondelimited and universal (kullī) in terms of the universality of the spirit of Muḥammad, which is known as the First Intellect (al-ʿaql al-awwal); and delimited and particular (juzʾī) in terms of his particular spirit that administered his body. Within both of these categories are levels with nondelimitation indicating

\textsuperscript{702} Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 113.
\textsuperscript{703} Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, 342.
\textsuperscript{704} Āshtiyānī, Bīst risāla, 342.
intensity, in a similar fashion to the discussion of \textit{tashkik} in \textit{wjūd}. After explaining the different categories Mīrzā Aḥmad arrives at the explanation of who these categories may refer to:

...It is possible for a knowledgeable one (\textit{ʿālim}) from among the knowledgeable ones of the community of Muḥammad to be a Seal of Muḥammad's delimited \textit{walāyah}, and for a successor of Muḥammad's successors to be a Seal of Muḥammad's nondelimited \textit{walāyah}...by what we have mentioned the confusion in their words is solved, and their expressions are no longer contradictory. So we say — branching from and confirming what we have mentioned — that the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Ali b. Abī Ṭālib, is the Seal of the Saints with nondelimited Muḥammadan \textit{walāyah}, with the first type of nondelimitation, which encompasses the manifestation of all of the Names and Attributes found in the aspects of self-disclosures, and the Seal of delimited Muḥammadan \textit{[walāyah]} with the second meaning, which is specific \textit{walāyah}. Jesus the son of Mary is the Seal of the Saints in the nondelimited sense according to its second meaning, which is general \textit{[walāyah]}. The Awaited Riser al-Mahdī (may God, the Most High, hasten his reappearance) is the Seal of nondelimited \textit{walāyah} with the first meaning, and the Seal of \textit{walāyah} in the second meaning. The difference between him and his grandfather, Amīr al-Mu’minin will be explained later. I say: From this explanation the intended meaning of the writer of the \textit{Futūḥāt}, Muḥyī al-Dīn al-ʿArabī is known...\footnote{Āshtiyānī, \textit{Bist risāla}, 343.} \footnote{Āshtiyānī, \textit{Bist risāla}, 343}
The Mahdi and Imam ‘Ali share in nondelimited walāyah as they are one light that manifests differently in different times. "The first of us is Muḥammad, the last of us is Muḥammad, the middle one of us is Muḥammad and all of us are Muḥammad!" Mīrzā ʿAḥmad then goes on to further prove his point using some of the aḥadīth that confirm that the Imams and the Prophet are all from one light including this hadīth from Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī:

From what has been narrated in the chapter concerning the Imams being the light of God, from Abū Khālid al-Kālibī who said: I asked Abā Jaʿfar about the words of God: “Therefore believe in Allah and His Messenger and the Light which We have revealed...” He said: O Abū Khālid, the light, by God, is the light of the Imams from the progeny of Muḥammad until the day of resurrection. And they, by God, are the light of God that descended. And they, by God, are the light of God in the heavens and the earth. By God O Abū Khālid, the light of the Imam in the hearts of the believers is more illuminated then the shining sun in the day. They, by God illuminate the hearts of the believers, and God, the Most High, veils their light from whoever He wishes, so their hearts become dark. By God, O Abū Khālid, no servant loves us or befriends us until God purifies his heart. And God does not purify the heart of a servant until he submits to us and is submissive to us. And if he is submissive to us God makes him safe from the intense accounting and makes him safe from the fear of the great day of resurrection.

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707 Majlisi, Bihār al-anwâr, (26) 6 and 16.
708 Qurʾān, 64:6
709 Kulaynī, Al-Kāfī, (1) 478.
But how does Mīrzā Aḥmad’s categorization render the words of Ibn ‘Arabi clear, when he referred to himself as the Seal of the Saints? Shaykh Fāżil Tūnī in his gloss on the Fuṣūṣ provides a clear, concise and simple explanation. Specific walāyah in a nondelimited sense is only for the Prophet and the Imams, whereas general walāyah is for the other prophets. General walāyah is achieved at the end of the first journey when the wayfarer reaches the station of annihilation. The Seal of specific walāyah in terms of station is ‘Ali b. Abī Ṭālib and in this time it is the Mahdi; the start of general walāyah is Adam and its Seal is Jesus who is a manifestation of the first intellect and all of the prophets emanate from him. Specific walāyah occurs after the first journey and emanates from the degree of non-dualistic Unity. From this walāyah all of the friends of God including the prophets receive a share of walāyah. In a delimited sense specific walāyah belongs to the community of the Prophet, so the claim of Ibn ‘Arabi is not a claim to be of a station higher than the Imams as the peak of Ibn ‘Arabi’s walāyah is that of the community of the Prophet excluding the Imams, who are the inheritors of nondelimited specific walāyah.

Qumshihī also considers the tradition of “The first of us is Muḥammad, the last of us is Muḥammad, the middle one of us is Muḥammad and all of us are Muḥammad”, by using a philosophical example first to guide a reader with a philosophical approach to understand an ‘irfānī conclusion. The example he gives is that if a person intellectualises the concept of

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710 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 112.
711 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 112.
712 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 112.
713 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 112.
714 Tūnī, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 112.
715 Majlisī, Bihār al-anwār, (26) 6 and 16.
amount with his abstract intellect and then imagines that same meaning with his imagination, the abstract understanding becomes a form. Nothing of the concept has changed but its manifestation in the realms of the intellect and the imagination differs according to its plane. He then counters his own philosophical objection in that the manifestation in both levels is not the same by asking the philosopher to take the meaning of the example rather than the specifics to understand that one archetype can have many archetypes without a change in its essence or its accidents. He concludes by saying that the permanent archetype of Muḥammad is the archetype of his successors:

So the permanent archetype of Muḥammad is the permanent archetype of his successors...so if the walāyah is one and there is no difference in the manifestation of the hidden essential attributes then he was truthful when he said: “The first of us is Muḥammad, the last of us is Muḥammad, the middle one of us is Muḥammad and all of us are Muḥammad”...and from here there is no difference or contradiction in our saying at times the Seal of the Muḥammadan walāyah is Amīr al-mu’minin ‘Ali b. Abī Ṭālib, and at other times saying it is the Mahdi...as both of them rather all of them [the twelve Imams] are one light and one reality in essence and in attributes but the difference is in tasks (shu’ūn) and manifestations...\(^{716}\)

Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī further explains the different types of walāyah by rejecting two categorizations, one made by the ‘urafā’ and another made by the philosophers in his treatise

\(^{716}\) Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 119-120.
Risālah fī al-khilāfah al-kubrā. He then proceeds to answer the question of how this wali should be known and appointed by using the concept of hidden or unmanifested Names, saying:

_Khilāfah_ cannot be split into outward vicegerency and inward vicegerency as some of the ‘urafā‘ have said, nor can there be many vicegerents according to the most knowledgeable or the most intellectual, as some of the philosophers have said; as the _khalifah_ is the _quṭb_ and there cannot be many [in the position of the] _quṭb_. If this is accepted and you have known that then we say: Specifying that vicegerent is either done by the community (_ummah_), or by the Prophet, or by God, the Most High. The first is invalid as they [the community] do not have knowledge of his station, from the table he is taking from, or his capability, let alone their lack of knowledge of the Exclusively possessed Names (_al-asmā‘_ _al-musta‘tharah_) with God. The second possibility is also invalid due to the existence of the Exclusively possessed Names with Him, the Most High, and the Prophet's lack of knowledge of them and their rules. So the third possibility becomes specified [as the answer] which is that the specification of the _khalifah_ is from Him, the Most High. Therefore it is compulsory that God specifies him, and not every person is spoken to by God, except by revelation or from behind a veil, and that person is the Prophet. So it is necessary for God to reveal the affair of the _khilāfah_ and its specification to his Prophet and it is necessary for the Prophet to convey that message...but there has been nobody specified for the _khalāfah_ of the Muslims among the companions — as agreed by all of the Muslims — except ‘Ali...

...Then know that in the same way that it is not up to the Prophet to judge with a rule except with the permission of Him, the Most High, as he is unaware of the Exclusively
possessed Names and their rules, in the same way it is not upon the khalīfah to judge with any rule except by following the Prophet, as although he takes his knowledge from the divine realm, he does not know the Exclusively possessed Names and these are not revealed to him unless he is a prophet. So he must judge following the Prophet and he cannot forbid what the Prophet allowed, nor can he allow what the Prophet forbade. Then, as you have known the khalīfah is the qutb of his time, and the qutb is better than all of the people in his time. So there is nobody in his time that is better than him. Hence the forbidding of al-Fārūq al-aʿẓam [i.e. ʿUmar al-Khaṭṭāb] of the two types of mutʿah, and the admittance of al-Ṣiddīq al-akbar [i.e. Abū Bakr] that he was not the best of the community whilst ʿAlī was among them, are proofs for the invalidity of their khilāfah after what you have known that the specification of the khalīfah is not upon the community.

This quintessential Shiʿi proof for the necessary existence of a specific appointment for the vicegerent of the Prophet — who would be the vicegerent not only in political and social spheres, but more importantly the inheritor of prophetic knowledge and the interpreter of the Qurʾān — is expressed in a new way by Qumshihī using concept of the Exclusively possessed Names which invokes all of the ʿirfānī principles developed in theoretical ʿirfān in support. The explanation of the position of the Prophet and the requirements of his vicegerent are nowhere better explained then in ʿirfān as the science is concerned with expounding the highest positions of the Saints. When those theoretical positions are reflected back in history and compared with the Islamic scriptural sources Shiʿi scholars find a strong proponent in the personality of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and do not find the same characteristics mentioned for those

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77 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 96.
who claimed the outward Caliphate. One of the most important parts of Qumshihī’s argument is the existence of exclusively possessed Names. The Exclusively possessed Names are Names of God that are only known to Him and which concern His Essence. Their existence is derived from expressions that stress that God cannot fully be known. Some of these Names can be known by the wayfarer, but there is always something that he does not know.

Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī clarifies what is meant by these Names in his gloss on Miṣbāḥ al-uns. He narrates his teacher’s (presumably Shāhābādī) explanation saying that the manifestation of the worlds springs from the specified Essence and not the nondelimited Essence. That is from the degree of Unity not the unseen of the unseen. Hence when the term Name is used to describe the nondelimited Essence is not altogether accurate. Rather it is with the understanding that there is no specification in this level of Essence and so there are no Names. Khumaynī proceeds to criticises Fanārī’s interpretation of Qūnawī’s text in the same gloss where Fanārī says that the exclusively possessed Names are not manifested as opposed to the other Names, because their tasks are never ending and anything that is manifested has to have contact with that which is finite. Rather Khumaynī explains that what Qūnawī means is that the exclusively possessed Names do not manifest because they are unable to manifest as they are part of the unknown. So even if their tasks were finite they would still not manifest as the reason for their not manifesting is that they are part of the unknown. But Khumaynī had his own opinion on the issue as well. He believed that the exclusively possessed Names

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718 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummi, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 47, nt. 1.

719 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummi, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 47, nt. 2.
are manifested in the world, but their manifestation is also unknown to any except God and that the side of the essence which is unknown has a manifestation which is also unknown.\textsuperscript{223}

Qumshihī was not satisfied with only showing how the ʿirfānī framework supports the concept of walāyah in Shiʿi theology. He also tried to show that the same belief was held by Ibn ʿArabī thereby not only strengthening the basis of his interpretation of Ibn ʿArabī’s works but also tackling sectarian bias against theoretical ʿirfān among traditional scholars. He quotes a passage from the Futuḥāt:

After mentioning our Prophet...“...and he [the Prophet] is the first manifest in existence and the closest of people to him is ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib — may peace be upon him — the Imam of the world and the secret of all of the Prophets.”\textsuperscript{224}...I say: His words here indicate that the Seal of nondelimited divine walāyah according to him — as it is according to us — is ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and not Jesus for three reasons. Firstly he has made a clear statement that he [ʿAli] is the closest of people to him [the Prophet]...and by its [the statement’s] nondelimitation it covers closeness in terms of [outward] form and spiritual — that is hidden (ghaybī) and manifest (shahādī)...so whoever is closest to him [the Prophet] — that is that there is none other closer to him — [then] he is the Seal of that walāyah and the Seal is only one...secondly he [Ibn ʿArabī] clearly stated that he is the Imam of the world and Jesus — may peace be upon him — is part of the world. So he [ʿAli] is the Imam

\textsuperscript{223} Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Ḥashim Ashkavārī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, Muḥammad Rizā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 47, nt. 1.

of Jesus...thirdly he clearly stated that he [ʿAlī] — may peace be upon him — is the secret of all of the prophets and Jesus is a prophet so he [ʿAlī] is his secret and the secret of the prophets is their walāyah. So he [ʿAlī] with his walāyah flowed in him [Jesus] and in the other prophets. So his [ʿAlī’s] walāyah is the nondelimited walāyah flowing in all of the delimitations and the delimitations are affairs, manifestations and takings (maʾkhūdhāt) from him. So he [ʿAlī] is the Seal and everyone takes from him...if you say the Shaykh [Ibn ʿArabī] has clearly stated in other places that Jesus is the Seal of the friends of God, I say: He meant by that the Seal of general walāyah...⁷²²

In this passage Qumshihī shows how his grasp of the works and ideas of Ibn ʿArabi lead him to his own conclusion on what Ibn ʿArabi really means for each level of the Seal of the Saints. The coherency of his arguments provides an alternative explanation to a critical issue in the thought of the Shaykh al-akbar, even though Chittick finds his interpretation streatched.⁷²³

Some ḥukamāʾ attempted to claim that Ibn ʿArabī was indeed Shiʿi as the whole issue of walāyah takwīniyah is at odds with the outward system of the khalifat.⁷²⁴

6. What is known of God is Known is Through the Seal of the Saints

The previous chapter discussed the extent of the knowledge of God that was possible for man according to ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī in his Lamaʾāt al-ilāhīya. He concluded that while God cannot

⁷²² Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 126-127.
⁷²³ Chittick, “Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshaʾī”.
⁷²⁴ See especially M. H. Tihrānī, al-Rūh al-mujarrad (Mashhad: Muʾassasa-yi tarjuma va nasl-i dawra-yi ʿulūm va maʿārif al-Islām, 1426/2005) 317-379 where he also narrates Sayyid ʿAlī Qāḍī’s opinion that Ibn ʿArabi was Shiʿi.
be known in Himself by either knowledge by acquisition or by presence, what can be known of God is in proportion to His effusion. Qumshihī brings this discussion back to the issue of *walāyah* and shows that all that is known of God is what is known through the nondelimited Seal:

When he [Qayṣarī] mentioned that this knowledge [of God] is for none other except both of them [Muḥammad and ʿAlī] and he mentioned that the servant sees the Truth in the mirror of himself, rather he sees his form in the mirror of the Truth, he wanted to mention that this vision is from their niche. Rather from the niche of the Seal of the Saints. That is from what you have understood that everyone that sees the Truth sees Him in the form of his archetype. So the prophets see Him in the form of their permanent archetypes and their permanent archetypes are from the affairs of the Muḥammadan permanent archetype...so they see the Truth from the niche of his [Muhammad's] prophethood and messengership...and in the same way every friend of God...sees Him through the niche of the Seal of the Saints. Then the messengers do not see the Truth from the perspective that they are messengers, rather they see Him from the perspective of being friends of God. So they see Him from the niche of the Seal of the Saints.  

All that can be known is the Muḥammadan reality as that comprises the whole effusion. Therefore anything that is known of God is known through the Seal of the Saints who is a full manifestation of that reality. Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī explains the same issue from the perspective of the Names in his gloss on the *Fuṣūṣ*.

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725 Qumshihī, Majmūʿa-yi āsār, 130
The difference between the friends of God in this station and in the other stations is according to the difference in the Names that self-manifest upon them. So the nondelimited wali is the one who manifested from the Essential presence according to the all-comprising station and the Greatest All-Encompassing Name which is the Lord of the Names and archetypes...the rest of the friends of God are manifestations of his walayah and the locus of his self-disclosures...so in the same way that there is no self-disclosure...except the self-disclosure by the Greatest Name...there is no prophethood, walayah or Imamate except by his prophethood, walayah and Imamate.246

Since the Seal of the Saints experiences the self-disclosures of the Greatest All-Encompassing Name it is through him that the rest of the friends of God experience their self-disclosures. That is that the self-disclosures of the friends of God other than the Seal of the Saints are not direct. They experience self-disclosures through him in the same way that their very existence is by God acting through his reality.

7. The Perfect Human and the Truth

Javādi Āmulī examines the relationship between Imam ʿAlī and the Truth. Expressing God through His Name, the Truth, is common practice in ʿirfānī literature, and this is the first meaning that Javādi Āmulī assigns to Truth out of the various other meanings that the word
can have. That is Truth which is “the absolutely undifferentiated essence of existence.”\textsuperscript{727} The second interpretation of Truth is that which comes from God; the effusion of existence; or in other words the Muḥammadan Reality:

The truth in this second sense is either the First Effusion or its consequent qualities and properties. Now this First Effusion is God’s viceroy, the perfect human being, the “noble microcosm.” the “universal being;” as he is the embodiment of God’s Name and its Logos...Within the matrix of human society such a knowing and willing subject functions as a paragon and standard-bearer...so as to distinguish the extent of truth or the level of falsehood of his [the one who is comparing himself to the perfect human] personal beliefs, conduct and deeds.\textsuperscript{728}

Although the Truth has a metaphysical and ontological reality in the perfect human, it also has a practical role in developing and perfecting society. Those who seek perfection use the perfect human as their benchmark and accordingly adjust their view and practices to become more like the perfect human. “Certainly you have in the Messenger of Allah an excellent exemplar for him who hopes in Allah and the latter day and remembers Allah much.”\textsuperscript{729} The perfect human is therefore the Truth by which falsehood is tested and eradicated. Javādī Āmulī continues to remark that the Truth is inseparable from the perfect human as it is part of his existential reality and indeed this is the concept of the creation by the Truth:

\textsuperscript{727} Javādī Amuli, \textit{Life of Gnosis}, 87.

\textsuperscript{728} Javādī Amuli, \textit{Life of Gnosis}, 87-89.

\textsuperscript{729} Qur’ān, 33:21
This means that the Truth in the second sense, which constitutes the realm of plurality, revolves around the perfect, infallible human being. He is neither prior or subsequent to the truth; he, rather, concurs with it...In this light we may assert that the concurrence between the truth and the perfect human being is due exclusively to the latter’s existential identity, not to any third entity...It is in this way that we may interpret the already quoted phrase from the Prophet: “ʿAlî is with the truth, and the truth is with ʿAlî.” Truth (in the second sense) centers round ʿAlî: In the realm of divine actions and manifestations, he embodies truth, functioning as a locus wherein true knowledge and virtue are displayed...[in another tradition the Prophet prays for ʿAlî saying] “O God, center the truth on him in whatever position he may take.” The Prophet in effect is asking to place ʿAlî as the fulcrum of truth, to make his opinions and conduct expressions of the truth, thus interminable connecting the two. This indicates ʿAlî is the criterion, not some other reality that would require him to abide by it. 730

The usefulness of theoretical ʿirfān and the concept of walāyah to elucidate the position of Imam ʿAlî are clear from the discussion above. From a theological perspective Shiʿi scholars might prove the rightfulness of ʿAlî as the successor of the Prophet on a textual or historical basis. But the rational and experiential underpinnings of philosophy and ʿirfān significantly strengthen those earlier theological efforts and provide a deeper insight into some of the traditions which were perhaps left unexplained previously. Rather not only do implications of the traditions affect the theoretical basis of ʿirfān, they also affect the method of wayfaring,

730 Javād Amulī, Life of Gnosis, 89-90.
and here is where Shi‘i ʿirfān practically takes a more defined place in the background of Sufism as a whole. It is then through attaining certitude found in experiencing the levels of *tawḥīd* and *walāyah* that ʿirfān becomes the axis of religion by taking the wayfarer through the levels of certain knowledge (*ʿilm al-yaqīn*) certain witnessing (*ʿayn al-yaqīn*) and experiencing the reality with certainty (*ḥaqq al-yaqīn*).

At the same time, the philosophical approach to understanding *walāyah* is an important part of the *ḥikmat* tradition. Ṭabāṭabāʾī in his treatise concerning divine philosophy and the personality of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭalib, recognizes the first Shi‘i Imam as the best example of the practical realization of the highest goals that philosophy seeks to achieve:

Surely our aim in pointing to some of his [Imam ‘Alī’s] traits, and some of the matters of his life is to draw the attention of the researcher to carry out a psychological and ethical research into all of his character traits. Then compare on [trait] to another and compare them to find out whether he was given true perfection in the bodily and spiritual faculties. As he also accorded valuable perfection to comprehend the realities and attain the knowledges, for himself...This in reality the goal that philosophy is conditioned with, especially divine philosophy (*al-falsafah al-ilāhīyah*).\(^{79}\)

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The Outward and the Inward

`Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī in his *Risālat al-walāya* applies primarily a philosophical approach to explaining the journey of the human to annihilation in God. He starts by discussing the conceptual (*iʿtibār*) in relation to reality, and how in the same way that the conceptual has rules and ways, so does reality. In this work what `Allāmah means by conceptual are concepts that are extracted from reality, such as ownership and marriage, which are called the secondary intelligibles (*al-maʿqūlāt al-thānawīyah*). Although these constructs have no reality in themselves, they have effects which are real. This is similar to *wujūd* and quiddity where *wujūd* is the only real phenomenon and quiddity is conceptual.

Ṭabāṭabā’ī then relates the conceptual and the reality to the outward (*ẓāhir*) and the inward (*bāṭin*). While the divine law elucidates the way the human should live his conceptual life, the stipulations it makes are based on the reality. That is that the outward and the inward are harmoniously related. This is in accordance with *ʿirfānī* literature which traces the path towards the inner realms, starting with the divine law then moving on the path (*tariqah*) until

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733 All of the concepts that we have about the world are *al-maʿqūlāt al-thānawīyah* as by definition they are concepts about the world and not the world itself. These constructs allow us to analyze the world and live an ordered life. There are two types of *al-maʿqūlāt al-thānawīyah*; those related to philosophy and those related to logic.

one reaches the reality.\textsuperscript{735} It is also part of the concept of gradation. The divine law can never be bypassed, as it is by virtue of it that one finds its reality. But the conceptual is only required for the material realm, as the worlds to come are worlds closer to reality, where the conceptual has no role to play. The friends of God practice the divine law due to the fact that it is the truth that is the full manifestation of the Muḥammadan unveiling and out of thankfulness. As Ṭabāṭabā’ī clarifies this issue one of his speeches, where he discusses the importance of the performance of the divine law even when one has reached the experience of the reality:

It has been heard from some people who say that after the wayfarer reaches advanced stations and enjoys Lordly effusions and blessings, he is free from all obligations [to observe the divine law]. This is a prevarication and a false assertion. For even the Prophet, who was the most perfect and noblest of all creation observed all sacred precepts [of the divine law] until the last moments of his life. Therefore, exemption from religious obligations in this sense is false and an inaccurate assertion. But one can interpret this statement in a different manner, which those who make such an assertion do not understand. That is, performing rites and rituals of worship is a means for the human soul to grow to perfection. The human’s faculties and capabilities are transformed from potentiality to actuality through his commitment to prayers and observation of rites of worship. Therefore, for those who have not yet actualized all their potentials in every respect, rites and prayers are necessary in their quest for perfection. But for those who have already achieved complete actualization of all their potentials, performance of rites for the sake of perfection and proximity [to God] is no

\textsuperscript{735} See for example, Ḥaydar Āmulī, \textit{Asrār al-shari‘a wa aṭwār al-ṭarīqa wa anwār al-ḥaqīqa}.
longer relevant. Rather, for this group of people, observing the Sharī’ah and performing the rites are required precisely because of the very station they have attained. Hence, when Ā‘ishah asked the Blessed Messenger [Peace be upon him] why he bothered to pray so much when God had declared to him:

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that God may forgive thee of thy sins that which is past and that which is to come.

the Prophet (Peace be upon him) replied, “Do you want me not to be a grateful servant for God?” This statement makes it abundantly clear that performance of the rites of worship for some human souls is not for attaining spiritual perfection, but is purely for the sake of expressing gratitude and appreciation to Almighty God.736

The people that witness reality are those that have full intellection and understanding of the divine law as the divine law is a manifestation of that reality. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī quotes various traditions from the Imams that show that the reality of religion is not only deep, but difficult or even impossible for most to bear.737 As for other than the Infallibles, ‘Allāmah believes that those that struggle can reach the highest levels of proximity to God and witness the some of the deep secrets of existence.738 That is for ‘Allāmah it is possible for people to enter in to the system of walāyah that exists in the extramental (i.e. existential walāyah), as they purify and improve themselves.

736 Ṭihrānī, Kernel of the Kernel, 37-38.
737 Ṭabāṭabā’ī The Return to Being, 8-13. For example, see a tradition narrated from the Prophet: We the prophets speak to people according to the level of their intellects, see Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1) 51; and narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq: Surely our discourse is difficult and is considered difficult, it is not borne except by a close angel or a prophet who has been sent or a believing servant whose heart Allah has tested for faith, see Kulāynī al-Kāfī, (2) 333.
738 Ṭabāṭabā’ī The Return to Being, 29-32.
Reaching the position of the Prophet or the Imams is a different issue, and considered impossible by Shi‘i scholars. Therefore, there are different levels of perfection and what ‘Allāmah is alluding to is the possibility for all those who strive to reach a level of perfection. These stations are impossible to fully apprehend,\textsuperscript{739} and even those that are recorded by some who have defined certain stations in the stations (manāzīl) literature in ‘irfān, do not claim to have charted every station. Rather what they have recorded are some common stations, or indeed the stations that that particular ‘ārif passed through. Annihilation and subsistence are sometimes regarded as the final or highest stages, but a ‘ārif lives a life after subsistence and continues his never ending journey, and there is no end to God’s Grace or indeed His self-disclosures.

It is the poverty of the contingent existent and the Absolute needlessness of the only true Existent that is the door through which religion enters into metaphysics. With the idea of existential poverty (al-faqr al-wujūd), the human is no longer the independent existent which detaches him from a relationship with God. Rather he is in complete need of God’s existence and guidance and only through His servitude can he attain salvation from his lower self. As although God created every human with the potential to reach a level of perfection, that potential remains dormant unless it is acted upon and activated. This is the place for divine legislation, making clear to the servant how to move on the path of his own perfection. For this reason, following the divine law is an essential part of ‘irfān, as without it one is not treading the path God has ordained and so cannot reach the desired goal.

\textsuperscript{739} Ṭabāṭabā‘ī \textit{The Return to Being}, 84-85.
In fact, what is more accurate is that following the divine law in its spirit and with attention to its purpose rather than dogmatically is an essential part of ʿirfān. Since not every human is able to reach these understandings by themselves, it is God's Mercy that He sends those that have reached perfection, charged with guiding others and that He gives them proof of the authenticity of their claim of being sent by Him. The cornerstone of al-faqr al-wujūd found in both ḥikmat and ʿirfān has key implications for theology and the philosophy of religion. Without al-faqr al-wujūd Existence or Being remains detached from human existence where Being exists and the human exists too, both in their own unrelated spheres.

9. The Perfect Woman

Much of the discussion concerning walāyah is concerned with deciphering the reality of the prophets and the Imams who were all male. Ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ deals with different prophets and the treatises on walāyah mostly build from the conclusions in theoretical ʿirfān that implicitly discuss the role of the male friends of God. But while it is clear that there were many outstanding female personalities in the history of Islam that occupied stations in the system of walāyah, the question is that it possible for a woman to reach the station of the perfect human? Is a woman able to be the Seal of the nondelimited Saints? Ibn ʿArabī did not write a section in his Fuṣūṣ on any woman despite the example of Mary and the wife of Pharaoh in the Qurʾān. Shiʿi theology offers an answer to the question of the perfect woman while the

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741 Qurʾān 66:11-12.
same scriptural basis is somewhat lacking in other sects, as within the fourteen infallibles, which includes the Prophet and the twelve Imams, one infallible is a woman. If the Prophet and the twelve Imams are all Seals of nondelimited Sainthood then what is the position of Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet?

Haṣanzāda Āmulī attempts to address the issue in a treaties upon which he himself wrote a commentary called *Sharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ʿiṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya*, which is intended to be an appendix to the *Fuṣūṣ*. However, his explanation of the topic is philosophical and while he offers an *ʿirfānī* commentary on some *aḥādīth* and stresses the importance of knowing her station by unveiling, the ringstone leaves many questions unanswered and especially that of the Seal of nondelimited Sainthood. At the same time, he discusses her stations with reference to her being one of the five people of the cloak and in the wider context of the infallibles and so implies her inclusion in their stations of the Seals. Whilst acknowledging Ibn ʿArabī's blamelessness for not adding a section in a book that he was given in a dream, Haṣanzāda

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742 One of the most important verses used to prove the infallibility of Fāṭimah is Qurʾān 33:33: “...Allah only desires to keep away the uncleanness from you, O people of the House! and to purify you a (thorough) purifying.” Here thorough purification is interpreted as infallibility and there are traditions from narraters accepted by both Sunnī and Shiʿī scholars of ḥadīth that state that the intended people of this verse are Muḥammad, ʿAlī, Fāṭimah, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, see Ṭabāṭabāʿī, *Tafsīr al-Mīzān*, (16) 516-517. For a discussion on whether the wives of the Prophet are also included in this infallibility see Ṭabāṭabāʿī, *Tafsīr al-Mīzān*, (16) 517-518.

743 Muḥammad, ʿAlī, Fāṭimah, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn are referred to as the people of the cloak (*Ahl al-Kisāʾ*) due to a number of traditions where the Prophet would wrap them and himself in one cloak and state that these were the people of his house (*Ahl al-Bayt*). This is taken by Shiʿī scholars as an indication of the exclusivity of that term. For an example of a tradition like this see Furāt b. Ibrāhīm Kuṭṭī, *Tafsīr Furāt al-Kuṭṭī*, edited by Muḥammad Kāzīm K [], (Tehran: Muʾassasa al-ṭabʿ wa al-nashr fi wizārat al-irshād al-islāmī, 1410/1990) 336: ...He [the Prophet] took the cloak from under us and spread it [over the people of the cloak] then gathered it in his hand and said: “O my God these are the people of my house, remove from them all impurity and purify them with a thorough purification!..”
argues that there was a gap that needed to be addressed. Women are not given the responsibility of the station of prophethood.

The traditional explanation for this is that although man and women are created equal in the eyes of God, they are also created with different natures and consequently different roles. This is a natural part of the system of creation where everything is created in pairs and with the coming together of those pairs, new creation is born. Both sides of that pair have their own specifications and that is beautiful in creation. The woman is the natural pair of the man and she is like the pure and good tree which bears the fruit of creation. That is that the perfect human, who fulfils the purpose of knowing God, is created within the woman.

Ḥasanzāda explains that if a man is the perfect human then he is a manifestation of the universal intellect (al-ʿaql al-kullī) and if she is a woman she is a manifestation of the universal soul (al-nafs al-kullī). Ontologically the universal intellect is precedent over the universal soul, and the same station is given to man in the scriptural sources. Both of these stations are never-ending oceans and the prioritisation of one over the other does not concern most of creation, as nobody can fully manifest either of these two realities with the full manifestation that were ‘Alī and Fāṭimah; ‘Alī as the same soul as the Prophet and Fāṭimah as the only woman in the event of mubāhalah, indicating her superiority over all of the women in the

community of the Prophet. So as every man moves towards the universal intellect, every woman moves towards manifesting the universal soul, each to the extent of their capacity as dictated by their permanent archetype. However, all must respect the womb (raḥim) of the woman, as it is derived from the Name the Beneficent (al-Raḥmān), and due to its role in the story of creation as explained above. Regarding the more specific issue of the derivation of Fāṭimah’s name, in a tradition it is reported:

This is Fāṭimah and I am the Maker (Fāṭir) of the heavens and the earth, and the Detacher (Fāṭim) of My enemies from My Mercy on My Judgement Day. I am the detacher of My saints from that which disgraces and shames them. Therefore I derived for her one of My Names.” The Messenger of Allah (s.a.w.) said: “O Fāṭimah! Allah has derived a name for you from one of his own. He is the Maker (Fāṭir) and you are Fāṭimah.

Fāṭimah was a name that existed among the Arabs before the event of Islam. Therefore this tradition is specific for Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet who represented the reality of this Name. The relation of God’s Name the Maker with Fāṭimah is explained by the relationship between the body and the extramental, or in other words, the relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm. In the same way as the women’s body produces

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748 See Qur’ān 3:61.
749 Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Ṣharḥ faṣṣ ḥikmat ‘iṣmīya fī kalimat Fāṭimīya, 131.
750 Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, The Bezel of the Wisdom of Infallibility in the Word of Fātimah, tr. Z. Al-Salami, (Qum: Salman Azadeh Publications, 2007) 29. I could not find this exact version of the hadīth with the saying of the Prophet at the end, but the first part of the hadīth has many instances such as: ‘Ali Astarabādī, Taʾwil al-āyāt al-ẓāhira fī faḍā’il al-ʿitra al-ṭāhira, ed. Ḥusayn Ustādvalī (Qum: Muʾassasat al-nashr al-islāmī, 1409/1988) 38; Sayyid Hāshim b. Sulaymān Baḥrānī, al-Burḥān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān, 5 vols (Qum: Mu’assasa-yi bi’tha, 1995) (1) 196.
the fruit of a child, so too do the universal intellect and the universal soul produce the world. The marriage of ‘Alī and Fāṭimah is one of the perfect man to the perfect woman, and were it not for ‘Alī there would have been no suitable match for Fāṭimah as the sixth Imam al-Ṣādiq is reported to have said: “Had not Allah created the Commander of the Faithful for Fāṭimah, there would not have been an equal for her on the face of the earth.”

Ḥasanzāda’s student ‘Ādil ‘Alawī is more direct in proving Faṭimah’s position as a Seal of nondelimited Sainthood and the reality of wujūd. In one of his transcribed lectures he shows that Fāṭimah is the reason for existence in the same way that the Prophet and ‘Alī are the reasons for existence.

That is that the Fāṭimah is also a perfect knower of God. He proves his point by referring to a number of aḥadīth including “…and was it not for Fāṭimah I would not have created either of you [Muḥammad andʿAlī]” and “We are the proofs of God upon His creation and Fāṭimah is a proof upon us.” Rather he goes further using this ḥadīth to say that if the Seal of nondelimited walāyah is the secret of existence and the Quṭb then Fāṭimah is the secret of the secret of existence as her station is unknown.

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751 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1), 486.
The knowledge of the soul is the fruit of philosophical discussions due to its connection with the practical wayfaring of the human to his ultimate goal; knowing God through knowing himself. This is because the soul has an outward and inner aspect, related to the indescribable and similar aspects of the knowledge of God. It is this dichotomy found in the soul and in what man can know about God that makes the soul man’s best tool in knowing God. The metaphysical perfection of the soul reminds the philosopher that the corporeal world is not the only world and the perfect happiness that the human should strive for is not to be found in it. Rather the human should strive for the perfection of his soul in order to achieve ultimate pleasure, while the body will at some point deteriorate and disappear. The soul lasts forever, and here there is a link between the topic of the soul and resurrection, which will be discussed further in the next chapter. Ḥāsanzāda summarizes the importance of knowledge of the soul and its link with the next world in the following way:

It is not unknown to one who does not forget or neglect his soul, that the best knowledge is mans knowledge of his own self. Its knowledge is one of the ways — rather all of the ways — of establishing the Necessary Being by His Essence. It is the door to the unseen that opens for us the knowledge of the rational soul (al-nafs al-

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See Sabzavārī, Shark al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥāsanzāda Āmulī (5), 13, nt. 1. There are many traditions concerning the knowledge of God lying between the two extremes of complete detachment and complete connection. On the same page Ḥāsanzāda provides one for Imām al-Ṣādiq which says: “Connection without detachment is disbelief and detachment without connection is the inability to grasp; the way between them is tawḥīd.”
nāṭiqā), and the establishment of the resurrection that leads to the attainment of the
eternal happiness that is linked to its establishment. And [the door to establishing]
that it [i.e. the soul] is neither a body, a substance, nor a constitution (mizāj), rather it
is an independent genus, away from the senses, imaginations and unmixed with
material. It is spiritual in fabric and conduct, [completely] withdrawn from bodies. It
is separate in essence in subsistence and intellect, and does not degenerate with the
degeneration of the mineral body. In fact it does not die, but lasts forever. And [the
door to establishing] that the knowledge and action of man are two independent
genuses, which are existentially unified — which is that man is nothing more than his
knowledge and action — and that his knowledge forms his spirit (rūḥ), while his
action forms his otherworldly body (badan ukhrawī). His recompense [in the other
world] is according to his knowledge and action, rather his knowledge and action are
the recompense itself. And [the door to establishing] that knowing (maʿrifah) is the
door to witnessing (mushāhadah)...757

The link between ḥikmat and Islamic beliefs is clear from this paragraph.758 The knowledge of
the soul establishes the Necessary Being and from that branches His qualities of simplicity and
perfection that in turn establish His Unity. Discussing the perfections of the soul, in terms of
knowledge and action, coupled with the knowledge that there must be practical examples of
the attainment of such traits leads to the establishment of the prophethood. The everlasting
nature of the soul, leads to the conclusion that it must abide after the disintegration of the

757 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 114, nt 1.
758 Ḥasanzāda champions this view, see Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, Qurʾān va ‘urfān va burhân ham judāyī nadārand
body and that the actions it commits in this world must have an effect on it, in the same way that actions that are related to the body, affect the body, leading to the establishment of resurrection. The independent nature of the soul also sheds light on the possibilities for human perfection in this world, and a door into the world of ʿirfān. So the discussion of the soul is of key importance to Islamic philosophers as it provides an independent rational basis that can be used as a framework to discuss the realities of Islam. It is for this reason that the topic of the soul is the fruit of philosophy leading to the knowledge of God Himself.\(^759\)

The existence of the soul is proved by knowledge by presence where an essence is known by its own essence (ʿilm al-dhāt bi al-dhāt) and where the knowledge is the same as the known.\(^760\) That is that our knowledge of our soul is our soul. Such knowledge does not require proof as any intellectual exercise would change the type of knowledge of the self to one where the knower and the known are different. This is because theorizing and proving the existence of the soul involves creating mental pictures and content of these pictures are different to the pure experience of the soul.\(^761\) Rather all that is required is an indication (tanbīh) so that one can return to his own reality and witness the truth of the claim himself. This is similar to the self evident nature of wujūd. The human contains the capabilities of those creations below him, and this is expressed as him containing the souls of those things. Therefore man is said to contain the mineral soul (al-nafs al-jamādīya), the plant soul (al-nafs al-nabātiya) and the animal soul (al-nafs al-haywāniya) but is specialized in having a rational soul.

\(^{759}\) Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda Āmuli, (5), 114, nt. 1.

\(^{760}\) Naṣrī, Safar-i nafs, 19.

\(^{761}\) Naṣrī, Safar-i nafs, 20.
The human soul can be explained as the soul that contains a rational soul as well as containing the mineral, plant and animal souls, and it is by the rational soul that man knows God. Or the human soul can be expressed as the rational soul without attention to other levels of the soul as in reality man only has one soul, and its animal, plant or mineral aspects are modes within that higher soul. This second expression of the levels of the soul is like a fire, which increases in its heat and light. As it rises in degrees, each new level contains all the light and heat of the previous levels while at the same time adding new heat and light. In the same way the beginning of the fire of the soul is the mineral soul. Then the plant soul contains all of the perfections of the mineral soul, and adds further abilities. All of what the plant soul contains is present in the animal soul, which also adds further abilities from those present in the plant soul, and the same is the case for the rational soul and for its own levels through which human is able to rise.

Therefore, there is one soul which is every faculty of man from the senses to the intellect, and that is why man refers to any action that comes from him or thought that is within him to one entity, not multiple entities. The nature of this unity of the soul has been disputed. While some classify the soul with numerical oneness, there are similarities between the above theory and gradation. Sabzavāri says that the soul has a simple unity which is the shade of the unity of the Necessary Being (al-wahdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓilliyah). This idea offers a correspondence with the explanation of the ‘urafā‘ where the perfect human is the complete manifestation of every Attribute of God. Al-Wahdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓilliyah is the reason as to why man can understand tawḥīd by knowing his own soul. Yet the unity that is envisaged in this concept is reliant on

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\(^{76a}\) Sabzavāri, *Sharḥ al-manżūma*, with the glosses of Ḩasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 118.

\(^{76b}\) Sabzavāri, *Sharḥ al-manżūma*, with the glosses of Ḩasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 121.
the reading of ʻwujūd. ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī explains this waḥdah further in his gloss on the 

Asfār:

This is an indication to the unity of the soul that is the same as its existence, which is another type of unity. It [that unity] is the complete collection of all of the planes of existence in terms of multiplicity in unity on the one hand, and unity in multiplicity on the other hand. As it [the soul] has a comprehensive unity in terms of the original essence...and a differentiated existence in terms of the branches of its origin and those aspects which follows its essence; which are the same as it [the soul] in terms of its flow (sarayān) and decent (nuzūl)...so it is low in its highness, and high in its lowness; holy in its abasement, abased in its holiness; abstract with its attachments, attached with its abstraction; internal with its branches, which are the levels of its actions and the watering places of its light. Not like the entering of a thing into a thing. External from them, not like the separation of a thing from a thing, whoever knows himself knows his lord!64

The discussion concerning the soul is a discussion that concerns the reality of man. According to the concept of motion in the category of substance the soul is corporeal in its beginning (jīmāniyāh al-ḥudūth) and spiritual in its subsistence (rūḥāniyāh al-baqā‘), even though its origin (mansha‘) is outside of time (qadīm). Therefore, the corporeal beginning discussed here is not the origin of the soul, but its beginning in this world, which is signified by its attachment to a body. That is that the soul had a spiritual existence before this world. But upon entering

64 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-muta‘āliya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabā‘ī et al., (1) 5-6 nt. 2.
the world it became one with its body, which is the material extension of the soul. Like a catalyst which interacts with a gas under certain conditions and solidifies, then with other conditions the solid becomes a completely different type of gas due to its interaction with the catalyst. For Sadrian philosophers the soul and body are not two things attached to each other; rather the body is a level of the soul. Therefore it is not the case that the soul is perfect and simply hindered from manifesting that perfection though and inconvenient connection with the body as a Peripatetic may argue. Rather the body is the vessel by which the raw soul can perfect and refine itself, through following the realities of religion, until it becomes separated from the body again to continue its journey.

The human is also capable of developing a rotten soul if his actions while connected to the body chase the material and he becomes forgetful of the Real. The human’s comprehension cannot remain on the level of the corporeal, rather he has to work up the ladder of his own soul, whilst living in a suitable world that will enable him to act and be tested. He therefore must live in a world blind from the direct witnessing of realities, which is the material world. Then as he improves he moves in his cognizance of the other worlds which are perceived by the faculties of the soul. His ability to deal with the affairs of the corporeal world justly and effectively is another aspect of his perfection as this is not possible for any other of God’s creations.

This idea seems to go against the ideas of previous Islamic philosophers who viewed the soul as spiritual both in its beginning and in its end, with the body as a cage that holds it to the
world for a short period of time. If the soul is spiritual in its beginning it would be accidental to the body, as it would be fully formed before the existence of the body and then attached to it. This conception intuitively goes against the oneness that is perceived in the human. The soul is perceived as individual from the body, but according to the philosophers of transcendental philosophy, this abstraction is the abstraction of the intellect, which is only one of the faculties of the soul and should not be mistaken for the soul in its entirety. It is also the intellect that is eternal (qadîm), as opposed to the soul in its entirety which is material in its beginning. With this distinction the two opposing views on the relation of the soul to the body come together as the soul is in fact eternal and abstract in its reality — on the level of the intellect — whereas when it is considered with the body in this world it has a material beginning.

By applying the concepts of *al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓilliyah* and motion in the category of substance, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī solves the contention of some previous philosophers, including Ibn Sinā, who claim that it is impossible for the soul to become one (*muttaḥid*) with the active intellect. The reason given by those philosophers for this impossibility is due to the simplicity of the active intellect and the composition of the soul. Therefore if they became one then either the active intellect would become composite, or the soul would become simple.

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76 Sabzavārī, *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda Āmuli, (5) 117, nt. 5.

76 Sabzavārī, *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda Āmuli, (5) 120.

76 Sabzavārī, *Sharḥ al-manẓūma*, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda Āmuli, (5) 187.
and both of those conclusions are unacceptable to those philosophers. For Sadrian philosophers this problem can be solved as the soul can be simple. ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī explains that in reality motion in the category of substance is a movement of love towards perfection as each effect moves towards its cause.\footnote{Zunūzī, \textit{Anvār-i jalīya}, 220-222.} The Essence of God is the final goal for motion in the category of substance\footnote{Zunūzī, \textit{Anvār-i jalīya}, 222.} and each existent no matter which level it is on moves up the ladder of existence to finally reach the never ending Essence. Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī takes another approach to solving Ibn Sinā’s conundrum:

The contention of the Shaykh [Ibn Sinā] (may God have Mercy on him) is not valid for a variety of reasons [including] his heedlessness of the secret of nondelimited unity (\textit{vahdat-i ṣafāt}), and confusing this kind of unity with numerical unity; as well as his rejection of essential transformation (\textit{taḥvīl-i dhātī})...as we explained before the soul in its primary manifestation is the same as material and body. After transformations he reaches the spiritual position and his body is revolutionized due to the intellectual forms and pure meanings. Any form that comes to the soul enters its existence and the external existence and the soul become one. The soul by attaining abstraction is able to act in the worlds of isthmus and the intellect. Due to these factors, the soul while in the station of intellection of meanings and forms becomes the same as them.\footnote{See Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, \textit{Sharḥ-i ḥāl va ārā-yi falsafī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā} (Qum: Bustān-i kitāb, 1387 Sh/2008).}

\footnote{Zunūzī, \textit{Anvār-i jalīya}, 220-222.}
Perhaps the most important aspect of the rational soul is its abstraction (tajarrud) and Sadrian philosophers have focused their attention on proving it. Linked to this issue are the issues of the abstraction of the imaginative faculty and the abstraction of the intellect. Ḥasanzāda has devoted a work to proving these three issues called *al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha ‘alā tajarrud al-nafs al-nāṭqa* and within it he seeks to prove that the abstraction of the rational soul is a higher level than the abstraction of the intellect. But the soul is unified as explained above by *al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah*, meaning that the rational soul, intellect and imagination are all levels of the same reality.\(^{778}\) Abstraction in this discussion means being separate and unmixed with matter or bodies, which means that it does not deteriorate with the deterioration of the body. Rather the soul continues to live beyond the physical death of the human.

The issue of abstraction is therefore key to the issue of resurrection, which is a fundamental tenet of Islam. There seems to be a contradiction between the vision of the soul as a unified reality, and the claim that the soul is abstract from the body. But the soul can be viewed in different ways. Sometimes it can be examined with its relation to the body, and at other times it can be examined in itself without relation to the body. The body is the lowest level of the soul, however, the soul is much more intricate than this level and contains levels that are not comprehensible. Therefore when examining the abstraction of the soul, the discussion concerns the essence of the soul and the levels above the physical body, such as the imagination, the intellect and the rational soul.

But as Ḥasanṣāda explains, the intellectual soul has levels above abstraction, and the more one delves into the soul, deeper are the pearls that one finds.\textsuperscript{773} Since the soul has no defined boundaries or limitations, its rules are also undefined and limitless. The soul is the shade of the unity of the Truth in \textit{al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah}, and since the Truth has not limit, neither does its shade have any perceivable limit. The human is always the servant of the Truth, but is also His vicegerent. A \textit{ḥadīth} of the Prophet indicates towards this expansiveness where he is reported to have said: \textit{“The heart of the believer is Gods greatest throne.”}\textsuperscript{774} Ḥasanṣāda explains this further in a gloss on some statements in the \textit{Asfār}, where Mullā Şadrā explains the limitless nature of the soul:

> It means that it does not have a level in existence that it stops at, and this meaning is expressed by saying that the soul has a level above abstraction. The theosopher Sabzavārī has said:

> Surly it is a pure part of the existence of the shadow of the Truth

> With me and the possessor of [the level] above abstraction, unrestrained

\textsuperscript{773} Ḥasanṣāda Āmulī, \textit{al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha}, 269.

\textsuperscript{774} Ḥasanṣāda Āmulī, \textit{al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha}, 271. I could not find this specific \textit{ḥadīth} in any work of \textit{ahādīth} although there are other variations such as \textit{“The heart of the believer is the throne of the Beneficent.”} See Majlīsī, \textit{Bīhār al-amwār}, (55) 39.
So reflect on His words: “Say: If the sea were ink...”775 and “And were every tree that is in the earth (made into) pens...”776 The Qurʾān is the banquet of God, and whatever is on that divine banquet, which is never ending, is your food “Then let man look to his food.”777 Your essence is a container which can encompass that banquet, as the leader of the people of unity, our master, the Commander of the Faithful has said: “Every container becomes confined with what is placed within it, except the container of knowledge, for surely it expands.” All of this indicates that the soul has no known level in its ipseity (huwīyah). The Commander [of the Faithful] has said in his will to his son Muḥammad: “Know that the levels of paradise are the amount of the verses of the Qurʾān. So when it is the day of Resurrection it is said to the reciter of the Qurʾān: “Read and Rise!”” So understand!778

Conclusion

Walāyah is the reason and the vehicle through which creation occurs and returns back to God. Understanding walāyah is therefore very much connected to the understanding of wujūd albeit from a different perspective as it concerns everything in creation other than God’s unknowable Essence. The variant readings of the ḥukamā’ of the schools of Tehran and Qum were clear in their writings from how they chose to explain the topics of walāyah and the soul. In some cases the lack of writing on the issue of walāyah also betrayed a preference for a

775 Qurʾān 18:109.
776 Qurʾān 31:27.
777 Qurʾān 80:24.
778 Ḥasanzāda Amuli, al-Ḥujaj al-bāligha, 271.
certain reading. At the same time, there were ḥukamāʾ such as Fāżil Tūnī, from the school of Tehran and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī from the school of Qum who made use of both readings in their explanations. This method is perhaps the most faithful to the Sadrian effort of cohesion between the sciences. Ḥukamāʾ such as Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, Aḥmad Āshtiyānī, both from the school of Tehran and Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī of the school of Qum took a much more ʿirfānī approach and contributed greatly to the school of Ibn ʿArabī from a Shiʿi perspective. Others such as ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī, ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī and Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī all from the school of Tehran took a more philosophical angle and while they accepted the concept of the perfect human they did not seek to delve into its full implications.

While the philosophical explanation of walāyah relies on concepts such as gradation and the First Intellect, an ʿirfānī approach is more concerned with the Names based on concepts such as waḥadat al-wujūd and self-disclosure. The discussion of the various types of Seal is also of key concern. Both approaches are directly informed by the ḥukamāʾ’s conception of wujūd. It is therefore not altogether surprising that those ḥukamāʾ with a more philosophical reading of wujūd tended to take a more philosophical approach to walāyah and vice versa.

Qumshihī’s treatises were a key aspect of this chapter and an important part of the hikmat tradition of the school of Tehran, His treatises show a firm grasp of the works of Ibn ʿArabī which allowed him to deal with the more thorny issues and criticisms leveled against the ʿirfān tradition within the traditional seminary. His exposition of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought also validated its use by Mullā Ṣadrā and the Sadrian tradition as a whole within traditional hawza circles. His reading of Ibn ʿArabī and the issue of the Seal of the Saints provides food for thought for those interested in the ideas of the Shaykh al-akbar. The thoroughness with which the topic
of the Seal of the Saints is dealt with by Qumshihi and others such as Aḥmad Āshtiyānī meant that the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Qum did not feel the need to revisit the same questions and instead embarked on a different route, attempting instead to explain the scriptural sources using ḥikmat in the field of Imamology.

Perhaps the most outstanding ḥākim of the school of Qum to discuss Qumshihi’s ideas was Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī. His valuable treatise Miṣbāḥ al-hidāya is deeply rooted in ʿirfānī principles and is worthy of becoming a seminal text in Shiʿi ʿirfān. From his criticisms and ideas the strength of Khumaynī’s understanding of the difference between a philosophical reading and an ʿirfānī reading was clear as illustrated in his criticism of Qumshihi in comparing the permanent archetypes with quiddity and wujūd in the previous chapter and his criticism of Qumshihi regarding the al-asmāʾ al-mustaʾtharah in this chapter.

The school of Qum dedicated works to applying the conclusions of ḥikmat to the scriptural sources specifically in the field of Imamology. Whilst works of this nature existed before the school of Qum and whilst many treatises written by previous ḥukamāʾ tied in ḥikmat to explain ḥādīth and Qurʾānic verses, the school of Qum develops this tendency into a trend of the writing of multiple full works. Another more recent effort is the writing of separate works discussing the station of Fāṭimah the daughter of the Prophet. This is a field which is still developing and expanding the discussion further to individually investigate all of the twelve Imams — especially the later Imams — may also be a powerful exercise in the establishment of ḥikmat as the principle intellectual framework in traditional Shiʿi scholarship.
Knowing God is the reason for existence and the perfect human is the perfect knower through whom all know God. His permanent archetype comprises all of the Names and therefore all of the other permanent and external archetypes. Every sign of God is through him as God can only be known through his manifestations and the perfect human contains all of those manifestations which are the Muhammadian reality. He is the creation by the Truth (al-Ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihi) and is never separated from reality and Truth. The perfect human is the perfect servant of God who owns nothing within himself but rather mirrors God’s self-disclosures. Therefore what God does not manifest to His creation is not known by his creation including the perfect man and these are the exclusively possessed Names. The corporeal world cannot continue to exist without a living Seal of the Saints or the Quṭb, who in its nondelimited meaning is either the Prophet or one of his successors. This is because he is the one who receives the full manifestation of the Breath of the All-Merciful. With his movement into the hidden he drags the whole of creation back up the arch of ascent through the event of resurrection and the life after this world. The soul is an everlasting entity which continues to exist after its abstraction from the body. The unity of the soul mirrors the unity of existence (al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓilliyah) and so “whoever knows his soul, knows his lord.” It is the theory of that next life that we now turn to in the final chapter of this thesis.
Chapter 4: Maʿād (Resurrection)

With the death of the final nondelimited Seal of the Saints the corporeal world is no longer able to sustain itself and this leads to the beginning of its return through the arc of ascent.\(^{779}\) In the terminology of the Islamic scriptural sources this is the process of resurrection.\(^{780}\) It is the movement of \textit{walāyah} back into the realm of the hidden that pulls the corporeal world up through the grades of existence. Although the intellect cannot establish all of the particularities of resurrection, as the intellect cannot grasp particularities that it has never witnessed, it can discuss the human’s intellectual perfections; the paths of happiness and despair; and establish some universal concepts concerning resurrection.\(^{781}\) While revelation provides more details on the happenings on the Day of Resurrection and the afterlife, the final

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\(^{781}\) See Ṭabāṭabāʾi, \textit{Tafsīr al-Mīzān}, (1) 147.
resting place of each individual creation is known only to God. Revelation is the expression of the full Muḥammadan unveiling and therefore is the benchmark for the witnessing of the ‘urafū’. What is characteristic of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of resurrection is his use of a variety of intellectual principles he establishes in other discussions and his implicit and at times explicit attention to the scriptural sources on the issue of resurrection through which he formulates a radically different view of resurrection from his predecessors.

While early Islamic thinkers took the Islamic scriptural sources at face value, discussions on resurrection developed in the light of philosophical discussions on the soul. The philosophers discussed two types of resurrection; bodily resurrection (al-ma‘ād al-jismānī) and spiritual resurrection (al-ma‘ād al-ruḥānī). Bodily resurrection is the resurrection of the same body that the human lived with during his time in the corporeal world through which he will experience the pleasures of the next world. Spiritual resurrection is the continual development of the soul and its return to its creator. While from a philosophical perspective the second type of resurrection is easy to comprehend, the first type of resurrection has been the cause of some discussion, as it seems to contradict some basic philosophical laws like the impossibility of the soul returning to a lower plane of existence after passing from it. Building on his ideas on the principality of existence and its individualization; the philosophy of the soul; motion in the category of substance and the gradation of existence as well as other

782 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavarī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummī, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Ḫasanzāda Ḵāmūli, 650.
783 Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology: Evolution of Being, 7-12.
aspects of his philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā creates a philosophy of resurrection from the necessary implications of all of these key concepts.\textsuperscript{784}

As the issue of resurrection rests on these principles, for a ḥakīm to completely reject Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of resurrection they have to provide different views on the concepts that form the foundation of his analysis. While Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the notion of bodily resurrection as defined above, he offered a different version of bodily resurrection based on the unity of the soul and body. His stipulation that the human body when resurrected will be a subtle body created by the human soul, not a corporeal body to which the soul attaches itself has been the source of some disagreement. This contention is at the heart of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of bodily resurrection, while it is an idea that departs from philosophical discussion before it.

I will show that Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the subtle body has roots in witnessing rather than intellectual stipulation and for that reason is more palatable with the ‘īrfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā. It’s not that Mullā Ṣadrā simply copied the idea from the ‘urafāʾ or from philosophers who relied on witnessing, but rather it was this concept that corresponded to his own witnessing and it was from here that he was able to develop the notion and answer the question of bodily resurrection, which is primarily a philosophical issue.\textsuperscript{785} That is that Mullā Ṣadrā

\textsuperscript{784} See Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 161-171, where he sets out twelve principles from which he bases his discussion. Much of the content in this section is discussed is other parts of the Asfār.

\textsuperscript{785} Al-Kutubi provides a study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of eschatology from a philosophical perspective and he brings to light Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical prowess in arguing his view of resurrection. While this view is undisputed this thesis also seeks to show that this is only one of the primary ways in which Mullā Ṣadrā can be read and indeed some of the foundations upon which Mullā Ṣadrā basis his arguments are more suitable to an ‘īrfānī line of enquiry. See Kutubi, Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology.
Ṣadrā used the epistemology of the heart rather than the epistemology of the intellect as the basis of his thought on bodily resurrection. By his own testament, the way to gain knowledge of resurrection is blocked (masdūd) for one who does not follow his method of combining unveiling and intellectual proof.\(^\text{786}\) In that sense Mullā Šadrā’s importance to the school of Ibn ‘Arabi is once again highlighted. Mullā Šadrā’s view on bodily resurrection is an issue that clearly distinguishes the two readings discussed in this thesis as while some ḥukamā’ accepted the idea others completely rejected it. In the ḥawza system, resurrection is not discussed from the Sadrian perspective until a student studies the last volume of the Asfār. While Sabzavārī includes a small section on resurrection in the Manzūma, Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s decision to leave out the study of resurrection from Bidāyat and Nihāyat is quite telling, as from a Peripatetic stance bodily resurrection is impossible to prove.

The silence on the issue of resurrection from a Sadrian perspective in the teaching curriculum shows the preference for the philosophical reading of Mullā Šadrā as it is only when Mullā Šadrā is read holistically, using both the philosophical and ʿirfānī readings, that Mullā Šadrā’s view on bodily resurrection can make sense. The discussion of this issue by the ḥukamā’ of the schools of Tehran and Qum shows the independent thinking of some of the ḥukamā’ as some of them did not fully agree with Mullā Šadrā’s view and provided different ideas while remaining faithful to his broader principles. An alternative interpretation was offered by ‘Ali Mudarris Zunuzi which corresponds better with a philosophical reading while not completely rejecting the rest of Mullā Šadrā’s philosophy of resurrection. ‘Ali Mudarris Zunuzi’s work on bodily resurrection is therefore of great importance, making it one of the three main views on

\(^{786}\) Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabā’ī et al., (9) 211.
the issue alongside Mullā Ṣadrā’s view and Ibn Sinā’s testimony that it is beyond the grasp of Peripatetic philosophy.\textsuperscript{787}

Resurrection in whatever manner it occurs is a natural consequence of the worldview established in the \textit{wujūd} and \textit{walāyah} sections. The intricacy of such a system seems too complex to end with the short life of the corporeal world and if that was the case such a complex system of worlds and levels of perfection would lack any meaningful purpose. Indeed the perfect man, who is the whole purpose of existence and the guardian of each level of existence, cannot be limited to the world of corporeality as this would negate his ability to contain all of creation. These are in themselves sufficient proofs of another life after death and indeed a higher purpose for the levels of existence. The philosophy of the soul is central to understanding the necessity of resurrection. The soul is suitable to a higher plane of existence and it is eternal, so the obvious question is what happens to it after it has left the corporeal body behind? Additionally the impossibility of something going into non-existence after being existent further calls towards an investigation of what death actually is and what happens to the reality of that existent that seems to have perished.

Therefore, this chapter begins with an elucidation of the philosophy of resurrection as a continuation of the discussions on \textit{wujūd} and \textit{walāyah}. From the distinctions made in the previous chapters between the philosophical and ‘\textit{īrfānī} readings of Mullā Ṣadrā the distinction between the philosophical aspects and ‘\textit{īrfānī} aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s outlook will be easy to identify. Mullā Ṣadrā weaves these concepts into a comprehensive theory

significantly adding to the major philosophies that preceded him. The elucidation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s outlook is necessary to contextualize the ideas of the ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum. The role of the Muḥammadan reality and the Shīʿi Imams is explained and linked back to the discussions in the walāyah section, while at the same time their role in resurrection completes the picture of their role on the physical and ontological planes. The philosophical roots of resurrection are then briefly discussed and specifically the importance of Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of individualisation in existence to the concept of bodily resurrection.

The next section discusses reincarnation which is a concept traditionally rejected in all of its commonly understood interpretations. There is a type of reincarnation that is accepted by the Sadrian school which is not reincarnation in the sense of the soul occupying another body, rather it is the soul that manifests a body that is suitable to itself. This is the concept of celestial reincarnation (al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī). The link between this concept and the concept of reincarnation is that some people will have acted more like animals in this world then as true human beings and so the form that their soul projects will be that of an animal. It is not strictly a type of reincarnation, as it does not involve the movement of the soul from one body to another.

Thereafter the concept of the Return (rajʿa) is discussed which is a concept discussed in Shiʿi belief where after the rise of the Mahdi people who have either been exceptionally good or exceptionally evil will be raised and the good will emphatically overcome the evil on the corporeal plane. The event is found in a collection of Shiʿi aḥādīth and whether or not one
chooses to accept those *aḥādīth* as authentic, they do raise a range questions related to reincarnation and resurrection. An understanding of Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of the body and soul relationship is fundamental to understanding his ideas on bodily resurrection and so the next section discusses the subtle body and the isthmus. The concept of the subtle body finds its roots in witnessing and therefore is more palatable to an ‘ʿirfānī type of investigation. Indeed Ḥasanzāda Āmulī provides an insight into the ‘ʿirfānī reading of the subtle body by linking it to the concept of the *Abdāl*. After these introductory discussions the chapter quickly discusses spiritual resurrection before moving on to a more detailed consolidation of spiritual and bodily resurrection. The view of ‘ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī that the subtle body at resurrection is an evolved corporeal body is elucidated before discussing some other ideas of the *ḥukamāʿ* of the schools of Tehran and Qum on the tricky issue of bodily resurrection.

1. Existence, Guardianship and Resurrection

There are three worlds that are most relevant to the human; the corporeal world, the isthmus (*barzakh*) and the intellectual world. The human is born in the corporeal world with pure potential to move in any direction he chooses. Once he has fulfilled his potential in the corporeal world and no longer needs the corporeal body to move from potential to action, he can move to a world that is less limited as he is also no longer as limited as when he started. This second world is the isthmus. The isthmus has some characteristics of the corporeal world such as shape and distance, but it is a world that is at a higher level of existence than the corporeal world and so the soul experiences everything in the isthmus on a higher level. It is the human’s inner senses that are at work in the isthmus. This is perhaps the place of the
“physical” heaven and hell as there is no pain in the intellectual world — due to the lack of shape, distance and time — and so hell cannot exist on the intellectual plane.

There is also the possibility of development after this world in the isthmus known as al-takāmul al-barzakhī.\textsuperscript{788} That development occurs due to the remaining good acts that a person has left behind in the corporeal world; or that his loved ones perform on his behalf; or due to the natural course of motion in the category of substance. The intellectual world on the other hand is a world of only light and goodness. The establishment of a metaphysical realm and the abstraction of the soul, give rise to an understanding of the outward and inward nature of the world we witness around us. The metaphysical worlds are vaster and more perfect than the corporeal world in the same way that the soul is vaster and more perfect than the body.

The human’s experience of the material world is fleeting and will pass, whereas his experience of the metaphysical worlds is everlasting. Attachment to the fleeting world at the expense of everlasting happiness is the plight of those deprived of wisdom. Rather spiritual ascension to the metaphysical realm before physical death is the quest of true happiness in both worlds, as happiness has various levels. The shortness of the humans life in the corporeal world is contextualised when taking into account his beginning in the arch of decent (al-qaws al-nuzūlī) and his return to the everlasting world in the arch of ascent (al-qaws al-ṣuʿūdī). Resurrection is a movement from the exterior to the interior, which occurs both in terms of the world the human lives in and within the human himself. That is that from living in the

\textsuperscript{788} See Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, ṬUyūn masāʾil al-nafs, 820-837.
exterior world, the human moves to live in the interior, metaphysical world and from only seeing the outward nature of himself he moves to witness his inner self manifested outwardly. It is not that the isthmus and the Day of Judgment occur after the material world in terms of time, as these planes already exist. Rather when it is said for example that the human moves from the material world to the isthmus after death it is in terms of his comprehension of the isthmus not that the isthmus did not exist while he was occupied with the material world. It is somewhat inaccurate to say that the worlds above the isthmus exist at the same time as the corporeal world as those worlds are outside of time. But due to their timelessness there is not a time when they did not exist in relation to the corporeal world and the isthmus.

Death is therefore in no way the end of life. Rather it is the start of a completely new life, where happiness and despair are contingent on the way man lived in the comparatively fleeting corporeal world. The Qurʾān summarizes the direct relationship between the two worlds in the following verse regarding one who is spiritually blind: And whoever is blind in this, he shall [also] be blind in the hereafter; and more erring from the way. But the human’s vision of this reality only becomes truly sharp and undeniable when he directly experiences the metaphysical world and it is too late to return. The scriptural sources promise great forgiveness and mercy in the next world for those who attempted to take the path of truth.

The word maʿād comes from the root m — ‘ — d which means to return. In a general sense, it is the return of any effect to its cause and in the Islamic worldview it can have one of two

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Qurʾān, 17:72
connected meanings. The first is that all created beings, but especially the human, will be raised after their physical death and brought to account for what they have done in this world. This is the Day of Judgment or Resurrection, and the Qurʾān and ḥādīth are replete with descriptions of what will occur on that day and how every person will be in need of the intercession of the Prophet in order to enter heaven. According to Shiʿi ḥādīth the Imams and Lady Fāṭimah, the daughter of the Prophet, also play an important role on that day in interceding for their followers.\footnote{See the chapter on intercession in Biḥār al-anwār which has traditions that support the intercession of the believers for eachother as well, Majlisi, Biḥār al-anwār, (8) 29-64. For an example of the intercession of the Imams it is narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq: “...And give good news to those who believe that theirs is a footing of firmness with their Lord.” [Qurʾān, 10:2] [Means] the guardianship of Amīr al-Muʾminīn [ʿAlī]. “...That theirs is a footing of firmness...” [is] the intercession of the Prophet. “...And he who brings the truth...” [Qurʾān 39:33] [is the] intercession of ʿAlī. “...these it is that are the truthful...” [Qurʾān, 57:39] [is the] intercession of the Imams, see Majlisi, Biḥār al-anwār, (8) 43.} The second meaning of return is the human’s return to his Creator, which is known as the meeting with God (liqāʾ Allah). That is that the human returns to his Cause as expressed in the Qurʾān: “O soul that art at rest! Return to your Lord, well-pleased (with him), well-pleasing (Him), So enter among My servants, And enter into My garden.”\footnote{Qurʾān, 89:27-30}

Not all humans return by the same path and therefore they do not reach the same end or arrive in the same way. In the ‘irfānī worldview, the paths to God are based on the Names that the human is a manifestation of, as every human is an expression of the realization of a combination of Names. Most of creation follows their own particular natural path to the Name from which they originated, however, the human has been bestowed with free will and so chooses his path. While the path of the Prophets corresponds to the Name Allah and the other Beautiful Names, other paths lead to other Names such as the Punisher if that is the choice
that the human takes.\textsuperscript{790} The perfect human plays a key role in this return just as he played a key role in the original creation. In the same way that the Prophet was the isthmus which brought the Unseen of the Unseen out of being completely unknown and is the closest veil between God and His creation, tempering the strength of the effusion so that it was possible for creation to exist, all creation must pass back through him in order to achieve essential communion with God. This is the true meaning of his intercession\textsuperscript{793} and in the life before natural death he is the guide to the station of annihilation. It is not necessarily the case that all people will choose his way, but those that follow his way will end up at his destination, which is God. Rather whilst most people will be saved from eternally abiding in hell, fewer people will have taken the path of the prophets.

The prophets before Muḥammad are all manifestations of his reality and the exemplary followers of his way. The same is the case for the Imams who are complete manifestations of the Muḥammadan reality, while the prophets are incomplete manifestations. Although Mullā Ṣadrā includes many of the concepts mentioned above in his \textit{Asfār}, the discussion of the Names and the role of the perfect human in resurrection are \textit{ʿirfāni} in nature.

In the \textit{Asfār} Mullā Ṣadrā describes the importance of the human in the eventual return of all beings to their Creator and the importance of the perfect human in the return of all of mankind to God.\textsuperscript{794} Matter must become plant so that it is consumed by the human and plants

\textsuperscript{790} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya}, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 25.


\textsuperscript{794} Shirāzī, \textit{al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya}, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (7) 21-23.
that cannot be consumed by the human must become other types of animal to be consumed by the human so that they can reach their perfection as part of the human body, which is the lowest level of his soul as the human moves towards his perfection. In turn, the human must take the path of the perfect human in order to reach his own perfection. That is that the human must annihilate himself in the Muḥammadan reality, which is itself annihilated in God.  

The human must take a specific path, the path of walāyah, in order to reach his perfection. He must walk through the gate to reach the city and this carries a further significance for the Shi’a who believe, according to aḥādīth, that gate to the limitless city of Muḥammadan perfection is ‘Ali b. Abī Ṭālib. It is by following ‘Ali that one is truly following Muḥammad. The outward sense of religion, where the Imam is the political and legislative leader after the demise of the Prophet is perfectly reflected on the ontological plane, but perhaps more importantly the correspondence between outward and inward leadership is the best recipe for wayfaring and reaching the Muḥammadan reality. It is the method of return both in terms of wayfaring in this world and returning in the next, as the role of the Imams and Lady Fāṭimah in the origin of creation is also reflected in the return. Their ontological role is reflected in practical ʿirfān and their role in wayfaring is reflected in the outward aspects of the religion of Islam. All are levels of one reality as it is the world of causes that dictates the world of effects, the metaphysical that dictates the world of the physical, and the world of pure existence that dictates the ways of the world of possibilities. A key characteristic of Shi’i ʿirfān that the inward is completely reflected in the outward, which is in correspondence with the Islamic scriptural

795 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (7) 21-23.
796 For more information on their role in the beginning of creation see Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār, (25) 1-36.
That is that the ḥāfīzī view of tawḥīd, imamate and resurrection and the role of the Imam in each of these areas are testified in the Shi‘ī āḥādīth.

The death of the last Imam is the final cause for resurrection as the world cannot maintain itself without an Imam. As the God’s vicegerent on earth there are existential functions that the Imam performs and his existence is a balancing factor that prevents the destruction of all that exists. If there is no Imam in the physical plane the physical plane cannot maintain any order and falls into chaos. This view is emphasized in the Shi‘ī āḥādīth literature and is also expressed in ḥāfīzī cosmology. When all of the saints are sealed through the passing of the various Seals the Day of Resurrection must necessarily occur as the earth cannot continue without a khalīfah. The material world can only survive as long as there is a vicegerent that contains all of the Names of God living in the world. Resurrection becomes necessary as the time moves from being ruled by the Name, the Manifest to being ruled by the Name the Hidden. At this stage all that was hidden becomes manifest and what was hidden in the souls becomes manifest. So the death of the last Imam is the cause of the movement of the universe to its next stage which is the resurrection and accounting of all that was done in the world of free will.

Resurrection does not actualize in the corporeal world until an appointed time, and that is due to the way the Names are manifested. Every era has a Name governing it, and it is the

797 This is the core thesis in Ḥaydar Āmulī, Asrār al-sharī‘a wa aṭwār al-ṭarīqa wa anwār al-ḥaqīqa.
798 Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (1) 433-439, especially ḥadīth 10 onwards.
799 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 149.
800 Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 149-150.
governance of that Name that dictates the happenings in the world. For the ʿurafā all that is in the world is not separate from God, rather it is His self-disclosure. Therefore there is no possibility of something that existed to become non-existent as it is a manifestation of the Truth. Rather what changes is the Name that governs it causing it to move from the plane of the manifest to the plane of the hidden. The resurrection occurs under the governance of the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, dictating the destruction of multiplicity.\footnote{Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 161.}

Everything will annihilate in God, not in terms of the destruction of their archetypes, but the annihilation of the servant in the Lord, like the annihilation of a drop of water returning to an ocean.\footnote{Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 162.} This annihilation may be one of overwhelming, where the servant still exists but God completely overwhelms his existence.\footnote{Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 162.} Or it could be that the human attributes of the servant are transformed into lordly attributes.\footnote{Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 162.} Therefore whereas the corporal world is currently governed by multiplicity, on the Day of Resurrection it will be governed by unity due to essential self-disclosures.\footnote{Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 161.} Some of the other Names governing that period will be the Dominator (al-Qahhār), the One (al-Wāhid), the Unique (al-Āḥad) and the Needless (al-Ghani).\footnote{Qayṣarī, \textit{Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam}, (1) 161.}

From a more philosophical perspective Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas on resurrection are based on some key philosophical foundations that he establishes earlier in the \textit{Asfār}. The first principle which requires...
overrides his whole philosophy is the principality of *wujūd* and its gradation. Mullā Ṣadrā stipulated that the corporeal world was intimately connected to all of the worlds above it by a single all-pervading reality which was *wujūd*. The difference between these realms was therefore not in their existence but in the intensity of their existence. While the corporeal world was limited, the other worlds were less limited, but all the worlds were levels of *wujūd*. This view had key implications on individualization. Whilst previous philosophers had considered individualization to be a consequence of the specification and the attachment of the soul to a corporeal body, Mullā Ṣadrā viewed individualization as an issue of *wujūd*.

For Mullā Ṣadrā the body and the soul are one reality which has a presence on all of the levels of existence and so it is the individualization of this whole reality that is important rather than the body alone. For Mullā Ṣadrā the body is a level of the soul and not something that the soul attaches to. This outlook simplified the problem of bodily resurrection for Mullā Ṣadrā greatly, as it is not a specific body which must be resurrected for an individual to maintain their individuality. Rather whatever body that the soul creates is sufficient for individualization as the body is not what individualizes the soul. That is why a person at the time of childhood is the same person at old age, even though most of their bodily matter may have changed. Bodily resurrection is therefore something very natural, as the soul must manifest in a way suitable to the plane of existence. So while confirming bodily resurrection based on his own interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the previous conception of bodily resurrection as the resurrection of the corporeal body.

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808 Kutubi, *Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology*, 47.
Rather for Mullā Ṣadrā the annihilation of the corporeal body is a necessary step for the human to take on his imaginal body as his main body and live on a higher plane.\textsuperscript{809} The corporeal body is not the human’s real body; rather it is the body that is alive by the life of the soul.\textsuperscript{810} Mullā Ṣadrā was able to explain the body of Islamic scriptural sources on resurrection as his contention was simply concerning the type of body that would be resurrected.\textsuperscript{811} According to Mullā Ṣadrā the confusion of the other philosophers arose from giving accidents the role of individualization.\textsuperscript{812} His argument gains further validity when considering abstract beings, as while those beings are individual they are not connected to the body. Therefore the individualization of a being must be from something other than the body.\textsuperscript{813} The oneness of the body and the soul also avoids the issue of reincarnation as the soul does not attach and detach, but rather manifests from one individualized reality. The issue of the unity of the soul informed Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the soul in terms of its faculties as the soul in its unity is all of the faculties (\textit{al-nafs fī waḥdatihā kull al-qiwā}).

2. \textbf{Reincarnation}

It was important for Mullā Ṣadrā to discuss reincarnation. Aside from the valuable analysis and arguments he provides using his own framework and his contribution to the discussions of his predecessors, Mullā Ṣadrā did not want to be accused of reincarnation in its regular sense. He

\textsuperscript{809} Kutubi, \textit{Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology}, 117.  
\textsuperscript{810} Kutubi, \textit{Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology}, 114.  
\textsuperscript{811} Javādī Āmulī, \textit{Manbaʿ al-fikr}, 166.  
\textsuperscript{812} Kutubi, \textit{Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology}, 45.  
\textsuperscript{813} Kutubi, \textit{Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology}, 46.
had his own concept of celestial reincarnation (*al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī*) and that too was a part of his overall concept of how bodily resurrection would occur. Reincarnation for Mullā Ṣadrā is of two types; reincarnation in material world, known as corporeal reincarnation (*al-tanāsukh al-mulkī*) and reincarnation on a higher plane of existence called celestial reincarnation (*al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī*). While corporeal reincarnation is completely rejected by Sadrian ḥukamā’, celestial reincarnation is acceptable. Celestial reincarnation is where the human will be resurrected in a shape according to the character traits he possessed in this world by a phenomenon called the embodiment of actions (*tajassum al-aʿmāl*). It is not only actions that will be embodied, but also character traits, beliefs and anything else that affects the soul. Few are resurrected as true human beings as most tended towards the base desires, anger and imagination, whilst the intellect remained dormant. He who was dominated by the animalistic desire will be resurrected in the form of a beast; he whose anger dominated him will be resurrected with the form of a predatory animal; and those whose imagination took control will be raised in the forms of devils. These forms will be revolting in the same way as the blameworthy traits that they reflect are ugly.

There will also be those who were dominated by more than one of these principle blameworthy traits who will be raised in a combined form. On the other hand those whose intellect dominated them and who found balance between the faculties to attain praiseworthy traits will be raised as lights. Although such an explanation is commonly found in the books

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814 See Hasanzāda Āmulī, ʿUyūn masāʾil al-nafs, 941-949 where he shows that concept is indicated by the scriptural sources the most important of which being the following verses: ʿAnd that man shall have nothing but what he strives for. And that his striving shall soon be seen.” (Qurʾān 53:39-40) Here the human seeing his striving is interpreted as *tanāsukh malakūtī* or *tajassum al-aʿmāl*. He goes on to show that *tajassum al-aʿmāl* was accepted by Bahāʾ al-Din Āmulī, Shaykh Mufīd (d. 413/1022), Fayḍ al-Kāshānī and Hādī Sabzavārī.
of philosophy, there is a clear crossover with ʿırfān. A necessary and introductory step in that journey is the purification of the soul; but its conclusion is knowing God, not on the level of the mind alone, but with the complete existence of the wayfarer so that he witnesses his subsistence by God. Along the journey the wayfarer experiences many things, and one of those that is commonly related is his witnessing of the embodiment of actions with those he interacts with.

The various forms in which the human can be raised indicate a change in the definition of human as a rational animal, as with the embodiment of actions humans do not share the same form. It is not the case that those people with animalistic or devilish forms have become animals or devils. Rather their movement in this world has added another particular to their essence, where they have become a rational animal beast or devil. This situation is worse than beasts or devils as they did not possess the particular of rationality, whereas a human whose actions are like a beast to the extent that being bestial becomes an established trait in his soul while at the same time possessing rationality is much more blameworthy. Exploring the definition of rational, as the potential to understand universals (quwwa idrāk al-kulliyāt) further clarifies the issue, as while the human raised as an animal had the potential to understand the universals, he chose not to and so this potential never reached actuality. Rather he actualized the potential of another animal and so he became a human animal and has the lost potential to be a true human.  

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815 Shirāzī, al-Hikma al-mutaʿāliya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 20.
816 Shirāzī, al-Hikma al-mutaʿāliya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 20.
Sabzavārī adds another category to the types of reincarnation which is that of the corporeal connected reincarnation (*tanāsukh mulkī muttaṣīl*) as opposed to corporeal disconnected reincarnation (*tanāsukh mulkī munfaṣīl*) — which is what is usually discussed in the general term of corporeal reincarnation. Corporeal connected reincarnation occurs in the movement of some matter to plant; some plants to animals; and some animals to humans. Corporeal connected reincarnation also occurs in a reverse sense when an intellect manifests in the imaginal or corporeal worlds with a form suitable to the world it manifests in. This is known as imaginalization (*tamaththul*) and an example of this type of occurrence in the scriptural sources is that of the archangel Gabriel who manifests as a man on the corporeal plane when he appears to the prophets. It also occurs for the wayfarer when he is absent from himself, in the forms that correspond with his wayfaring. Sabzavārī rejects the possibility proposed by some ‘*urafat*’ of an ‘ārif spiritually manifesting in the bodies of those who are alive.\(^{817}\)

Intellectually proving the invalidity of disconnected corporeal reincarnation is therefore an introductory step in establishing bodily resurrection, as if the soul does not continually move from corporeal body to corporeal body the answer to the question of what happens to an eternal soul after death is still unanswered. Another result of proving its invalidity is proving the invalidity of bodily resurrection as understood by some theologians who believe that the soul returns to a body after being separated from it. This leads the philosopher to seek for a more refined understanding of how exactly bodily resurrection will occur.

\(^{817}\) Sabzvārī, *Rasā’il*, 449-450.
While Sadrian philosophers confirm bodily resurrection, it is not with the same meaning that is confirmed by theologians as returning to the material world in a corporeal form after completely detaching from the corporeal body is intellectually impossible. If the soul returns to the body it must return to the same body before complete abstraction (\textit{al-tajarrud al-tāmm}) otherwise it is corporeal reincarnation. Therefore, the detachment of the soul experienced on death cannot be complete abstraction, but rather a type of incomplete abstraction — like that experienced when sleeping — if resurrection is to occur in the corporeal world with the same corporeal body. This is the view that Ṭabāṭabā’ī arrives at when explaining the reality of death and the possibility of the Return which will be discussed in the next section.

A series of questions then arise on as to what happens to the corporeal body after death as it is required for resurrection. While ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī pursued this line of inquiry as will be shown later, Mullā Ṣadrā preferred the interpretation the resurrection of the imaginal body which is a natural reflection of the soul and this is what made his concept of resurrection controversial. There are many other discussions in the Islamic sciences where the intellectual understanding of the issue at hand refines a simplified understanding attained through a preliminary reading of the scriptural sources. Issues such as the interpretation of hands, or a face for God as being allegorical due to its impossibility confirmed both in the scriptural sources and by the intellect.\footnote{The verse “...nothing like a likeness of Him...” (Qur‘ān 42:11) negates any kind of direct comparison between God and His creation. Therefore, expressions that liken God to His creation must be interpreted allegorically. For a more in depth discussion see Ṭabāṭabā’ī, \textit{Tafsīr al-Mīzān}, (14) 380-385 where he discusses some of the relevant \textit{ahādīth}.} Or another example is the issue of temporal origination (\textit{ḥudūth zamānī}) which the theologians interpreted as existence after nonexistence but which
philosophers interpreted as the origination of contingency as opposed to necessity. This allowed for beings other than God to be eternal while at the same time being creations of God.

Another factor that influences the philosophy of resurrection from the scriptural sources is the use of parables and examples for realities that are above common understanding. This is especially applicable to resurrection as it is a key component of Islamic belief and so has to be comprehensible to all the various intellectual levels of the Muslims. So explaining the heights of pleasure in paradise as the height of physical pleasure in this world, or explaining the torment of hell as the pain experienced by burning and other types of pain is suitable for an audience that can only comprehend these types of pleasure and pain. But that does not necessarily mean that this is exclusively what is experienced in the next world. Rather there are indications of higher pleasures and pains, such as the pleasure of God being greater than the physical pleasures, and the pain of embarrassment when the bad deeds of a person are exposed to all.

Furthermore the acceptance of relating ḥādīth by meaning rather than by their specific words adds to the argument for preferring an intellectual stance over a literal one for issues such as bodily resurrection, as those relating the ḥādīth on the subject of resurrection may have interpreted them and related them by meaning according to their understanding. An overriding issue with resurrection is the possibility of the occurrence of something which is intellectually impossible as the rules of the next world may significantly differ to the rules of this world and this is what makes it one of the debatable issues in Islamic belief.
3. The Return (*Rajʿa*)

According to the principles established in the concept of motion in the category of substance the body and the soul are unified together and move towards their perfection. The movement is essential not accidental. It is impossible for something to move back to the same potential after that potential has been actualized. The new state of actuality has a corresponding potential. So it is impossible for an old man to become a youth as he has passed that potential which was present when he was a child. That is because in order for an old man to become a youth he has to move in an opposite direction to his essential movement, which is impossible as then the movement would not be essential, it would be forced and forced motion is neither natural nor sustainable. Therefore it can be argued that while it is possible for the soul on death to be connected with a different type of body suitable for another realm, it is not possible for it to return to a physical body as it has passed the stage of requiring a physical body on its journey to perfection. Therefore corporeal reincarnation is impossible.

While this proof may be useful in arguing against physical reincarnation it gives rise to another problem except that of interpreting traditions on bodily resurrection, which is the issue of how to understand the belief of some Shiʿa in the Return (*al-rajʿa*). The event of the Return occurs before the resurrection where those that were particularly good or particularly evil will raised again in this world and good will triumph over evil in the corporeal world, before the full enactment of God's Justice on the Day of Resurrection. According to the proof mentioned above it would mean that those raised in the Return would return from a higher state of action to a previous state of capacity that they have essentially passed which, according to the laws of motion, is impossible.
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī counters this problem in his discussion on the Return in Tafsīr al-mīzān by saying that death for these people is not the fulfillment of their potential and therefore they can return to a physical body in order to fulfill that remaining potential. That is that the natural course of motion in the category of substance is that a person should reach old age before dying. A person who does not do that still has potential that can be brought into action in this world. It is clear that the soul can return to the same body after a while of separation as it does in sleep. Since the soul returns to the same body and is not completely separated from it, Ṭabāṭabāʾī avoids the problem of reincarnation. He says:

Now, we come to his argument that (1) All people die when they reach the perfection of the life, and when their potentialities are converted into achievements; (2) What has attained achievement cannot be turned back to potentiality; (3) Therefore, a dead man cannot be returned to this life.

In this argument, the second premise is correct; the first is not. It is not “all” people, but only “some”, who die after attaining perfection and converting their potentialities into achievements. A man, who completes his natural span of life and dies from old age, may be said to have reached the last stage of his perfection. But what about another man who prematurely dies of an epidemic or fatal sickness, or is killed? Can it be claimed that he had already reached the last stage of his potential perfection? The answer is ‘No’. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is impossible for such persons to be returned to the life of this world. Now it is obvious that his argument is neither comprehensive nor correct.
We can think of many cases where it might be possible for a dead person (even if he had died after attaining his perfection) to be sent back to this world; for example, a man in his first life had a potential for a perfection which was not available at that time; he died; then by the progress of society, that perfectness became possible. What is there to prevent his return to this world to achieve that perfection for which he had a potential in the first life? Because it will not be a step back-ward - from perfection to potentiality; it will be progress from potential to perfection.\(^8\)

Although this may seem like an argument against the Sadrian outlook and indeed contradicts Mullā Šadrā’s explanation of natural death,\(^8\) it is in fact in line with Sadrian principles as the soul only discards the body and cannot return to it by complete abstraction when it has reached its full potential and there is no need for the body as there is no capacity left in the body for the soul's perfection. It is once the soul has completely left the corporeal world and exists in the isthmus that it cannot return. Here Ṭabāṭabā’i is saying that for some people death is not the end of their potential and they still need the body in order to fulfill their remaining potential. Death is like a period of sleep where the soul returns to the body. The scriptural sources validate considering death as a period of sleep and resurrection as waking up from that sleep. However, questions are left unanswered such as an explanation of how the soul exists without attaching itself to a body? Another question of how the soul can return to a disintegrated body is discussed in a philosophical problem called the question of the eater and the eaten (\textit{shubhah al-ākil wa al-ma’kūl}), which is discussed later in the chapter.

\(^{8\text{a}}\) Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’i, \textit{Al-Mīzān: An exegesis of the Qur’ān}, tr. S. S. A. Rizvi, 12 vols (Tehran: World organisation of Islamic services, 1982) (3) 141-142.

\(^{8\text{b}}\) Shirāzī, \textit{al-Ḥikma al-muta‘āliya}, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabā’i et al., (9) 47.
Sayyid Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī takes a different approach in his attempt to provide an intellectual justification for the Return. He starts by establishing the strong connection between the body and the soul and that this relation is present between the corporeal world and the universal that governs it. The relationship between the body and soul comes under this greater relationship of the whole corporeal world and its universal, as the universal — which he says is the greatest soul (al-rūḥ al-aʿẓam) — is able to create the forms necessary for matter itself whereas the soul provides the forms of the body’s actions and not its matter. Another difference is that the greatest soul does not need matter to reach its perfection whereas the soul uses the body in order to develop itself as explained by motion in the category of substance. With the development of the soul, as it becomes more and more like the greatest soul, there comes a stage where it can provide the form necessary for matter.\textsuperscript{821}

It is therefore untrue to stipulate that the relationship between the body and the soul ceases at death, as in that case it would not be able to create its own matter and manifest in its own body. It is the soul that governs the body and this relationship does not become completely invalid on death. Rather the soul does not interact with the body in the sense that it did before death, where the body manifested the acts of the soul. It is therefore not an intellectual impossibility for the soul to manifest itself in the corporeal world after death as the body itself is simply the manifestation of the soul on the material plain rather than something separate from it.\textsuperscript{822} This manifestation of the soul is the same type of manifestation that the intellects are able to perform when they appear to man in the act of imaginalization. It is not

\textsuperscript{821} Qazvīnī, \textit{Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾīl}, 4.

\textsuperscript{822} Qazvīnī, \textit{Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾīl}, 4.
reincarnation, which is the movement of the soul from one corporeal body to another corporeal body, but rather the soul creates its own form suitable for the corporeal world.\(^{823}\) Qazvini’s explanation is based on the Sadrian explanation of bodily resurrection and returns to the concept of individualization and the manifestation of the body as a lower level of the soul.

In another attempt to explain the Return, Sabzavārī in his answer to a question from Mullā Ismā’īl Bujnūrdī on how the Return will be, explains that the Return has an outward and an inward. As for the inward aspect Sabzavārī explains how the reality of man is his intellect and this is what is really intended by the definition of man as a rational animal (al-ḥaywān al-nāṭiq). While man begins with the intellect in potential he develops until he reaches the universal intellect where the universal intellect is the intermediary in the effusion of existence. The universal intellect is manifested ontologically in the person of the prophet Muḥammad and the universal soul is manifested in the person of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Their lights illuminated the world but the world tried to put out their lights and while they returned to the higher planes where their light is undisputed, it is necessary for them to return and overcome the corporeal world. As for the outward aspect of the Return, Sabzavārī refutes the notion that it occurs on the imaginal plane as some philosophers have proposed; rather he believes that it will occur on the corporeal plane.\(^{824}\)

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\(^{823}\) Qazvini, Majmūʿa-yi rasāʾil, 18.

\(^{824}\) Sabzvārī, Rasāʾil, 476-478.
4. The Isthmus, Witnessing and the Subtle Body

The basis of the Sadrian philosophy of resurrection rests on the establishment of the imaginal world. It was perhaps the denial of an isthmus between the corporeal world and the intellectual world that caused some of Peripatetic philosophers to deny the possibility of bodily resurrection. Even though Ibn Sinā accepted the role of imaginalization as a human faculty and discussed the issue of dreams, he did not assign an ontological role for it.\textsuperscript{825} It was Suhrawardī who first discussed the imaginal world an intermediary world between the corporeal and intellectual worlds as he did not find Ibn Sinā's explanation of dreams adequate.\textsuperscript{826} On the other hand, the ‘\textit{urafā́}’ and especially Ibn ‘Arabī strongly emphasized the role of the imaginal world and it is in the imaginal world that witnessing and unveilings occur. He differentiated between attached and detached imagination (\textit{al-khayāl al-muttaṣīl} and \textit{al-khayal al-munfaṣīl}); where attached imagination is specific to the individual and detached imagination is the imaginal world.\textsuperscript{827}

Rabbānī lists fourteen arguments for the existence of the imaginal world; five according to the principles of the philosophers and nine according to the principles of the ‘\textit{urafā́}’.\textsuperscript{828} By the proof of the possibility of the nobler (\textit{al-inkān al-ashraf}), since the isthmus is a superior world to the material world and we know that the material world exists, the isthmus must exist as well. Rather due to the effusion of existence the isthmus exists before the material world.

\textsuperscript{825} Kutubi, \textit{Mullā Šadrā and Eschatology}, 87.
\textsuperscript{826} Kutubi, \textit{Mullā Šadrā and Eschatology}, 93-94.
\textsuperscript{827} Kutubi, \textit{Mullā Šadrā and Eschatology}, 97.
\textsuperscript{828} Rabbānī, \textit{Maʿād}, 65-66.
Another argument is the impossibility of a gap in effusion (buṭlān al-ṭafira). Since all of the worlds mirror each other and the corporeal world does not mirror the intellectual world, there must be a world in between that has some characteristics of the material world and other characteristics of the intellectual world and that is the meaning of the isthmus.\textsuperscript{829}

In simple terms the gap between the completely spiritual and the entirely material is too large for a natural movement from one to the other and so a world, which is both spiritual and material, is required for a natural transition. The body that is resurrected is of the imaginal form for the ḥukamāʾ following Mullā Ṣadrā’s approach to resurrection, even if there is a difference of opinion on whether that imaginal form is an evolved corporeal body or not and what the exact make up of that imaginal body is. Without the imaginal world the only possibility for the body would be to remain absolutely corporeal and this would be much harder to prove using intellectual means.

The isthmus mirrors the imaginative faculty of the human and so cognitive existence as a world in between the humans physical and spiritual existence goes some way to prove the existence of an imaginal realm between the outside world and the world of the intellects. The correspondence between the human and the extramental is a principle fully explained in theoretical ʿirfān as was elucidated in the previous chapter on walāyah. The imaginal realm is not a physical plane or an abstract one but rests in the middle of these two planes. One of the proofs of the existence of the soul is the use of different senses for different planes of

\textsuperscript{829} Rabbānī, Maʿād, 70-71.
existence. The senses are different as they must be suitable to interact with the plane they are experiencing, but at the same time they return to a unifying sense.

For example, seeing in the material world is through the eye, seeing in the imaginal world is with the sense of seeing and seeing in the intellectual world is a type of comprehension as there are no forms to see. Hence the images seen in dreams are not in an entirely separate world but are linked to the soul through its perception of the imaginal world. The imaginal world is either a person’s own imaginal world disconnected from the outside imaginal world, or it is their perception of the outside imaginal world using their imaginal senses translated into imaginal forms which they can understand.

Mullā Ṣadrā’s concept of sight is different from the traditional views on sight, as he believes that sight is not a function of the eye itself. Sight is not caused by rays of light from an object reaching the eye; rather this process is introductory to sight itself. Sight is a function of the soul as it is an abstract faculty. The soul is an active principle and all the human faculties pertain to the soul. What the eye sees is a preparatory cause for the effusion of a form in the

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831 As opposed to Suhrawardī’s opinion that the imaginal world is a separate world in which one sees independent images that are not linked to the person when the factors that prevent this sight are removed. Ḥasanzāda Āmulī disagrees with this as it means that the bad or confusing things a person sees in dreams should actually be in that realm. He considers it more accurate to attribute these happenings to the soul itself, Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, *al-Nūr al-Mutajalī* 66-68.

mind, due to the presence of two abstract realities. That is that the form is not mixed with matter in any way as some philosophers had argued. Rather it is a level of existence.

While the soul is connected to the corporeal body, sight is separate to the imaginative faculty, as sight in the corporeal world needs the eye whereas the imaginative faculty does not. But when the soul leaves the body these two faculties unite and the soul sees with the imaginative faculty. There is no intellectual proof for this view, however, it is a view that can be verified by experience and this is why this view is more suitable to an ʿirfānī type of enquiry. Mullā Șadră’s witnessing of a subtle body in the state of abstraction from matter is central to his notion that the resurrected body will be a subtle one rather than a corporeal one as a subtle body is more suitable to a higher plane of existence.

Hasanzāda Āmulī devotes a chapter in his Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn fi sharḥ al-ʿuyūn to the imaginal body where he quotes the views of various ʿurafāʾ from the school of Ibn ʿArabī on the subject in their discussion of a category of ʿurafāʾ called the Abdāl. He moves on to show Ḥaydar Āmulī’s proof for the Abdāl in his Asrār al-sharīʿa and Fayḍ Kāshānī’s agreement on the existence of Abdāl in his ʿAyn al-yaqīn. After exploring the issue further in the writings of

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833 See Kutubi, Mullā Șadră and Eschatology, 137-138 for more explanation.
834 Kutubi, Mullā Șadră and Eschatology, 112.
835 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 166-167.
836 Shirāzī, al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 167.
837 Hasanzāda Āmulī, Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn, 761-776.
838 Hasanzāda Āmulī, Sarḥ al-ʿuyūn, 765-766.
Qayṣarī he references Shiʿi aḥadīth before explaining Sabzavārī’s view in the Manẓūma on bodily resurrection and passages from the Asfār.

Ḥasanzāda’s approach to the reading of this issue is an ʿirfānī one par excellence as he uses theoretical ʿirfān as the basis from which he examines the philosophical text of the Manẓūma and Mullā Ṣadrā’s statements in the Asfār. The Abdāl have the ability to multiply their imaginal bodies and are therefore able to be in more than one place at the same time and are at once aware of all of their imaginal bodies. These imaginal bodies are present in the corporeal world not on the imaginal plane alone. That manifestation of the imaginal to the corporeal is not reincarnation, but rather it is imaginalization (tamaththul) like the manifestation of Gabriel to Mary in the form of a man. This ability stems from their nondelimitation and abstraction from the limits of both the corporeal and imaginal worlds. It is the universal part of them that is constant whereas their manifestation in many situations does not affect the oneness of their universal aspect in any way. This view of the reality of the human and the way in which the soul is able to create its body or indeed various bodies is of great significance to Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of bodily resurrection.

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839 Such as It is narrated from Iṣḥāq b. ‘Ammār that he asked Imam al-Kāẓim whether a person who has died visits their family? He said: “Yes” I said: “When do they visit?” He said: “Every Friday and [then at various times] in the month and year according to their station.” Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (5) 579.
840 Qaṣṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 586-587.
841 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Ḥāshim Ashkavārī, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummi, Muḥammad Rizā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 113.
842 Qaṣṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 189.
843 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 337-340.
The reality of resurrection is the witnessing of God, which is spiritual resurrection. This kind of resurrection can occur before resurrection in the extramental in the same way that the wayfarer can experience voluntary death before compulsory death. When the wayfarer attains the station of *walāyah* and experiences annihilation and subsistence by God he has returned to Him. According to the Sadrian world view, perfection in existence is linked to nondelimitation. The higher a thing is in graded existence, the fewer limitations it has. Therefore a more perfect soul is a soul that has less limitations and annihilation is an expression of when the soul loses its limitations to such an extent that it is no longer a separate entity from the Necessary Existent. In other words the wayfarer realizes his own reality and the reality of *tawḥīd* on an experiential level. His soul loses its corporeal limitations before the forced separation from the body at death and becomes annihilated in God. This does not mean that the wayfarer becomes non-existent. Rather he becomes so absorbed in God that he forgets his own existence, and does not see his own existence as anything except God's existence. His poverty — which is the basis of this vision — distinguishes him from lordship.

Love drives the wayfarer in his pursuit to truly recognize the Beauty of His Lord and to experience true happiness and the pleasure of wayfaring. His whole motivation, purpose and existence is by God, for God and to God. At the station of one who has reached (*wāṣil*) the wayfarer can truly be called the *ʿārif* and it is an essential station to qualify the *ʿārif* to guide others if that is the purpose chosen for him. The same reason is the reason for all of creation.
to return to its origin in the journey of love between the needy and the Perfect according to ʿAbd Allah Zunūzī. But it is the eternal love of God which creates the creation to return to Him through the route of discovery and that is where the place of the perfect man is understood. As the greatest knower of God, he is the purpose of creation. This is the secret of motion in the category of substance, which is the essential movement of love.\textsuperscript{844}

Mīrzā Mahdī Āshtiyānī in his treatise concerning \textit{tawḥīd} and resurrection draws a parallel between the speech of the human and the creation of God. Speaking is something that does not essentially increase the human, even though it gives existence on the linguistic plane to the words spoken. In the same way if it was imagined that those words somehow returned to the speaker, that also would not increase him in any way. The same principle stands with God and His creation. Neither does the initial creation of existents decrease or increase anything from God, nor does their return to Him increase Him in anything.\textsuperscript{845} The idea of creation as words is also found in the writings of the ‘\textit{urafā’} and is a key principle in Sufi \textit{tafsīr}, as a parallel is drawn between the book of the souls (\textit{kitāb al-anfūsī}), the book of the horizon (\textit{kitāb al-āfāqī}) and the Qurān which is also known as the recorded book (\textit{kitāb al-tadhwīnī}). The other example Āshtiyānī gives is of a ray of light emanating from its source while at the same time not affecting the source,\textsuperscript{846} although this is an example more suited to a common understanding of the effusion of light from a source such as the sun rather than a scientific one.

\textsuperscript{844} Zunūzī, \textit{Anvār-i jaliya}, 220-221.

\textsuperscript{845} Āshtiyānī, \textit{Bīst risāla}, 182.

\textsuperscript{846} Āshtiyānī, \textit{Bīst risāla}, 182.
The wayfarer traverses the external worlds within his own soul, and has a type of voluntary death known as the minor resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-ṣughrā). Die before you die,\(^{847}\) according to a famous hadīth attributed to the Prophet. The major resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-kubrā) is annihilation in God, which is only understood by those who possess the station. Ḥasanzāda lists the five types of resurrection as explained by Qayṣarī as follows: “[Resurrection] that occurs in every hour and moment; [resurrection] by natural death; [resurrection] by voluntary death; [resurrection] that is promised and waited for [i.e. the Day of Judgment]; [resurrection] that is the annihilation of the mystics.”\(^{848}\) Sayyid Yazdānpanāh further explains these different resurrections during the course of his lectures.\(^{849}\) The first type of resurrection occurs moment by moment, based on the interpretation of verses such as: “...every moment He is in a state (of glory)”\(^{850}\) and the general definition of resurrection being the return of something that was manifest to the hidden. Since the world is in a continual state of creation and decay, that which decays returns to the hidden and therefore resurrection occurs every moment. Natural death is also a type of resurrection as the actions of the person become manifest to him in imaginal forms in the isthmus.\(^{851}\)

Voluntary death is within the soul of the wayfarer while his body is still present in the corporeal world. The tradition from which this type of death and resurrection draws its inspiration from is the well known saying of the Prophet: “Die before you die.” At this stage the

\(^{847}\) Majlisi, Bihār al-anwār, (69) 59.

\(^{848}\) Qayṣarī, Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (1) 152, nt 9.

\(^{849}\) This is an increasingly popular method employed by traditional scholars who have a greater focus on teaching leaving them with less time for writing. Good examples are of Javādī Āmulī and Sayyid Kamāl Ḥaydari.

\(^{850}\) Qur’ān, 55:29.

\(^{851}\) This is known as the minor horizontal resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-ṣughrā al-āfāqī).
wayfarer witnesses the realities of actions and other existential realities like a person who has died a natural death and has passed into the word of the isthmus. He is no longer veiled by the corporeal world. This is known as the minor resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-sughrā) in the terminology of the ‘urafā’. The resurrection explained in the Islamic scriptural sources are primarily the resurrection of all creation after its death for the important event of judgment. It is the manifestation of the rule of the degree of Non-dualistic Unity as explained above. The final resurrection is for the person who has actualized tawḥīd to the extent of annihilation and subsistence in the Truth. This occurs for the wayfarer before it occurs for the whole of creation and is known as the major resurrection in the terminology of the ‘urafā’. Yazdānpanāh links these resurrections to the Muḥammadan reality and the First Emanation as all manifestation is through this reality, as any witnessing of reality occurs before the level of the Unseen of the Unseen.

The return of man to God through the various worlds of delimitation and from manyness to oneness are expressed in verses of the Qurʾān such as “…as He brought you forth in the beginning, so shall you also return” and “On the day when We will roll up heaven like the rolling up of the scroll for writings, as We originated the first creation, (so) We shall reproduce it; a promise (binding on Us); surely We will bring it about.” However, if man returns to exactly the

852 Also more specifically known as the minor resurrection in the soul (al-qiyāmah al-sughrā al-anfusī).
853 This is known as the major horizonal resurrection (al-qiyāmah al-kubrā al-āfāqī).
854 Also more specifically known as the major resurrection in the soul (al-qiyāmah al-kubrā al-anfusī).
855 Yazdānpanāh, Mabāni, 406.
857 Qurʾān, 7:29.
858 Qurʾān 21:104.
same place he started after completing the circle of decent and ascent, or returning to his permanent archetype, then what was the point of creation? Is it that man returns in exactly the same way that he began, or is there something more to the issue?

Fanārī explains in his commentary on Qūnawi’s *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* in regard to the eighth question regarding the specific qualities on the perfect human, that man does return to the same level that he began, but not in the same way. That is that man returns to the level of the Cloud (‘amā’) and all returns to God through the arch of ascent from where it began, but perfected and a real reflection of his actions in this world. This is not only a natural consequence of the effusion of *wujūd*, but also because of the changes in which Names dominate the different stages of man’s decent and ascent. This is not to say that the permanent archetype changes either, as then it would no longer be permanent. Rather all that man experiences are deeper levels of his own permanent archetype, facilitated by the creation of the different planes of existence. That is that man is created so that he can *witness* the manifestations of God, while at the same time being the locus of those manifestations.

The Qurʾān stresses the fact that the resurrection is corporeal as well as spiritual and therefore an interpretation that stops at only spiritual resurrection is incomplete and unacceptable in the eyes of Shiʿi scholars. The *ḥukamāʾ* also believed that a person who only established bodily

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resurrection without any aspect of spiritual resurrection had fallen short of the mark.\textsuperscript{862} Rather the aim is to find an interpretation that establishes both types of resurrection while at the same time does not limit itself to either type of resurrection at the expense of the other. Peripatetic philosophers, due to their belief of the attachment of the body to the soul during its stay in the material world but their essential separation, believed that the body becomes non-existent after death when the soul leaves it behind. Since something that becomes non-existent cannot become existent again, the resurrection of the same body is impossible.\textsuperscript{863} The abstract soul only comprehends universals, so it cannot perceive the particulars described in the Qurʾān such as palaces, pleasures and delicious foods. Rather a body is required to comprehend these realities and since there is no body the resurrection must be spiritual, which renders the expressions of material pleasures in the scriptural sources as metaphorical.\textsuperscript{864}

6. **Bodily and Spiritual Resurrection (al-maʿād al-jismānī wa al-rūḥānī)**

How are these two seemingly contradictory types of resurrection consolidated into one coherent philosophy of resurrection? Spiritual resurrection is easily understood philosophically and revelation confirms bodily resurrection, while neither completely necessitates the possibility of the others occurrence.\textsuperscript{865} One obvious way is to admit the limitations of the intellect, and while confirming that which the intellect has comprehended

\textsuperscript{862} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 306.

\textsuperscript{863} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 306.


\textsuperscript{865} Šadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī, \textit{Sharḥ al-hidāya al-athīrīya} (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-tārīkh al-ʿarabī, 1422/2002) 439-.
— in terms of a spiritual plane of existence — one can also accept that this resurrection will have some kind of impact on the material. But not knowing has never satisfied philosophical pursuit.

Another way to consolidate the resurrections is to revisit the idea of the arch of descent. The arch of descent views the material realm as the lowest realm whereby existence emanates from the realm of God to the realm of matter and then begins its rise once more with the arch of ascent. But if descent to the realm of matter is not considered a deficiency, but rather a stage of perfection as explained in the ʿirfānī interpretation of the comprehensiveness of the perfect human, then there is only an arch of ascent and the term descent is metaphorical and regards our intellection of the planes. For the ʿurafāʾ manifestation (ẓuhūr) is a type of perfection and not a deficiency, and God's existence is unified on all planes. Therefore the issue is one of manifestation and not of return. From this perspective there is nothing to prevent manifestation on the physical plane after the material death as we know it.

ʿAllāmah Ṭihrānī offers a similar solution in his ten volume work dealing with the subject of resurrection. Although the classical ʿirfānī view is that the body will not manifest in a corporeal sense but rather will manifest in a body suitable for the plain that it exists in, Ṭihrānī sets out to prove the resurrection of the same corporeal body that man leaves behind, but rather than focusing on the resurrection of that body within a certain time span, he focuses

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866 Fanārī, Miṣbāḥ al-uns, with the glosses of Hāshim Ashkavārī, Rūh-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad Qummi, Muḥammad Rīţā Qumshihī and Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, 631.

on the migration of the soul outside of time. That is that while the soul is limited by time it can only comprehend its corporeal and imaginal bodies which are both manifestations of the soul according to the world suitable for it. Once man passes the isthmus he enters the world of resurrection where time ceases to have any meaning. It is the plane of gathering as things are only scattered due to limitation.

It is at this stage that man fully comprehends both the inner and outer aspects of his actions and therefore does not need any external force to bring him to account, rather the account of his actions is directly perceived by him. He perceives the corporeal body that he had, as he perceives past present and future, all of which have no meaning in a timeless existence. That is he perceives all that is below his level of existence, including the material body and the material plane. The spiritual resurrection is his returning to God and perceiving the intellectual world and the worlds of the Names and Essence and his bodily resurrection is his renewed perception of his corporeal body and of all that he has experienced but in terms of its reality. While most of the philosophical arguments focus on the issue of abstraction and resurrection within time after that abstraction, Ṭihrānī focuses on what is perceived after the stage of abstraction. He summarizes his view saying:

The human reaches the stage of subsistence after the stage of annihilation and the lowest level of this is to attain complete knowledge and existential comprehension of his manyness. That is that he attains control over the knowledge of time and place and will witness his soul from the time of his birth until the time of his death which is his corporeal body along with all of the actions he performed...that is he will existentially comprehend his corporeal body, not for one moment only [as the human currently does] but every
moment of his life as well as all of the affects, peculiarities and necessities...the human will manifest with his actions in that world with a celestial form and the realities of things will be unveiled for him. The heaven and hell, reward and punishment are — on the other hand — the realities of the actions, their realities and the corporealization of their spirit...so the human will comprehend his entire corporeal body...and this comprehension is not only [on the level of] knowledge or form, rather it is existential comprehension...

While Ḥasanzāda also comes to the same conclusion, he shows that Mullā Ṣadrā indicated towards the remaining of the soul in matter as the soul imprints a form on the matter during its connection with it. Mullā Ṣadrā did not elaborate further. Šabzavārī also scratches the surface of the issue, but Ḥasanzāda makes clear that the comprehension of the body is to do with an eternal (dahrī) view.

The Qurʾān alludes to the fact that the body that is raised on resurrection day is exactly the same body that was connected to the soul in the corporeal world. Consequently proofs from the Sadrian school that do not establish this are of limited use in convincing literalists especially when removed from their overall philosophical framework, such as the proof based on being-a-thing (shayʿiyah). According to this proof since the being-a-thing of a thing is in its form rather than its matter, that is by its wujūd not its quiddity, then if we supposed that the


870 See for example, Qurʾān 75:3-4.
form of the world is detached from prime matter (hayūlā) then all of the forms would exist in
the collective form of the world. That is a table is a table not due to the matter it is made of,
but by its form. So if its specific form was attached to another matter it would still be the same

table. Since the next world is the world of realities, all that does not exist are the necessary
aspects (lawāzim) of prime matter such as decay or anything to do with potential or
nonexistence. Therefore the body in the next life is a reflection of the soul, which is the form
of man, according to his actions. So a person is recognized by his body in the next world in
the same way that he is recognized in this world, such that someone who knew him in this
world would also know him in the next world as the soul is the same. As Ḥasanzāda clarifies:

The secret in that is that the matter is the thing in potential, as the potential of something
is not that thing. However, the form is the thing in action, and the activeness of something
is that thing, so understand!

An argument along similar lines is an argument based on individualization. The wujūd of
something is its individualization. The individualization of a person is by his soul and not his
material body. The material body has no real importance in the specification (taʿayyun) of
wujūd and is not an essential factor in determining the existence of the soul. Rather whatever
matter the soul connects to is the same body, as individualization is determined by form
rather than matter.

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871 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Amuli, (5) 332-333.
872 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Amuli, (5) 333.
873 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Amuli, (5) 332, nt.2
874 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Amuli, (5) 332, nt. 4.
875 Shīrāzī, al-Ḥikmah al-mutaʾāliya, with the glosses of Ṭabāṭabāʾī et al., (9) 174.
Another argument is from the principle of gradation in \textit{wujūd}, which allows for intensification in \textit{wujūd}, whilst maintaining its oneness throughout each grade. Gradation also allows for essential change (\textit{tabaddul al-dhātī}) by motion in the category of substance, which is a change in the substance of something whilst maintaining the principle \textit{wujūd}. Therefore something can be connected to matter in one instance and disconnected in another instance whilst maintaining its \textit{wujūd} and genus. Hence things can exist in reality in the higher planes which do not have time or space, whilst also existing on a material plane, as its material existence is a shadow of its reality. Therefore a second body has the same reality as the first body and with this principle the concepts of decent and ascent and the pre-existence of the souls in the world of the souls or in the world of particles (\textit{ālim al-dharr}) is explained. While these arguments may explain how both a type of corporeal and spiritual resurrection can occur, they does not show how the body that is raised will be the composed of the same matter as at death as the explanations rely on deemphasizing the importance of what matter the form attaches to.

There are many questions that arise at this point such as what if the matter that made one human, to which he must necessarily return, becomes recycled due to natural processes and is eaten by another human? Which human does this matter belong to and how can both humans be raised while that matter cannot repeatedly exist? Following on from this question,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{876} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 333.
\item \textsuperscript{877} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 334-335.
\item \textsuperscript{878} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 334-335.
\item \textsuperscript{879} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 335, nt 17.
\item \textsuperscript{880} Sabzavārī, \textit{Sharḥ al-manẓūma}, with the glosses of Hasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 336.
\end{itemize}
what if one human was a believer and the other an unbeliever, if the believers will be taken to heaven and the unbelievers to hell, how can they both share the same matter? This question is known as the question of the eater and the eaten (shubhah al-ākil wa al-maʾkūl). Mahdī Ilāhī Qumshihī answers by saying that God will protect the matter of the believer so that it does not mix with the disbeliever. This answer is based on a ḥadīth as will be shown further on.

Sabzavārī also answers these questions in his Manẓūma. He proposes that the perceived change in matter is in fact a change of form. But this change in form is not a change in the real form of a thing. For example, if water changes into steam, it is not the case that the real form of water has changed. Rather it is that the form of the water wore the clothes of matter in one way as a liquid, and then in another way as a gas. Although a different form is required for both the liquid and the gas, these are not the real form of water. If the form occupies a certain matter, it is impossible for that matter to be occupied by another matter. Therefore each person will be raised with the very matter they died with. The form of a believer can never be the form of a disbeliever. It is not eating the matter which occupies the matter; rather it is the form that occupies it.

Another way to answer this problem is to consider a single nondelimited (muṭlaq) form which occupies the all of the prime matter. In this case all of the changes that occur to matter are accidental rather than essential. Each form changes as time progresses within eternity.

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883 Sabzavārī, Sharḥ al-manẓūma, with the glosses of Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (5) 344-345.
881 Ilāhī Qumshihī, Ḥikmat-i ilāhī, 317.
882 Sabzavārī, Manẓūma, (5) 354-346.
884 Sabzavārī, Manẓūma, (5) 346, nt. 9.
Therefore what changes with the changing of time and space, is everlasting with the Everlasting. Therefore what changes with the changing of time and space, is everlasting with the Everlasting. ʿAli Mudarris Zunūzī formulates the impossibility of matter taking two forms while interpreting a tradition from Imam al-Ṣādiq. The tradition explains that the dust of the good people is like gold amongst the other dust and is protected (i.e. from change). That is that this problem does not occur as either the matter is not eaten or if it is eaten it never becomes the constituent matter of another. Using this explanation and the impossibility of reincarnation Zunūzī finds evidence for his view that the body makes its own journey towards perfection before being rejoined with the soul, and at the same time solves the problem of the eater and the eaten. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī formulates the impossibility of matter taking two forms while interpreting a tradition from Imam al-Ṣādiq. The tradition explains that the dust of the good people is like gold amongst the other dust and is protected (i.e. from change). That is that this problem does not occur as either the matter is not eaten or if it is eaten it never becomes the constituent matter of another. Using this explanation and the impossibility of reincarnation Zunūzī finds evidence for his view that the body makes its own journey towards perfection before being rejoined with the soul, and at the same time solves the problem of the eater and the eaten.

7. ʿAli Mudarris Zunūzī’s Solution to the Problem of Bodily Resurrection

Perhaps the most complete discussion of bodily resurrection produced by the school of Tehran was that of ʿAli Mudarris Zunūzī whose view somewhat correlated with Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī. Although Mullā Ṣadrā does discuss Dashtakī’s ideas in his al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya, Zunūzī debates the issue in more clearly in his treatise called Sabīl al-rashād fī ithbāt al-maʿād. The treatise starts with a discussion of the difference between real and conceptual composites (al-murakkab al-ḥaqīqī and al-murakkab al-iʿtbārī) in order to explain that the relation between soul and body is that of a real composite. That is that the soul and the body are one reality in the same way that the soul and its various levels are one reality. So

885 Sabzavarī, Manzūma, (5) 347.
886 Sabzavarī, Manzūma, (5) 347.
887 Zunūzī, Majmuʿa-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 94-99.
888 Dīnānī, Maʿād, 64.
889 Dīnānī, Maʿād, 64-65.
when the soul and the body or the soul and its levels are discussed as separate entities it is only for the sake of analysis rather than an absolute reflection of the way they are. The soul is however, at a higher level of existence and it affects the body as it is what administrates it. Each body is therefore an intricate and specific reflection of the soul as the characteristics of each soul affect the body that it administrates in the most intimate way.

When the soul leaves the body on death the soul returns to the universal soul and the body continues its development with a general motion towards perfection that encompasses the whole corporeal world. It is a collective movement towards the afterlife based on the motion in the category of substance of each individual part of the universe. When the body completes its movement towards oneness it unites with the soul that is specific to it with oneness which is more perfect than the oneness in this world. This is the meaning of everything returning to its origin as the soul is the origin of the body. The movement is of the body to the soul, not the soul returning to the body. The body will not be exactly the same as it was in this world, as due to its perfection it will reflect the reality of the soul, but at the same time those that knew that individual in this world will know them in the next world by some kind of similarity. This is similar to the changes that a person undergoes in this world, from a child to a youth to an adult to an old man. Although the body has various forms when pictures of the different stages of the person's life are aligned, the same individual is recognized. The body becoming

\[\text{Zunūzī, Majmu’a-yi muṣannafūt, (2) 88-92.}\]

\[\text{Zunūzī, Majmu’a-yi muṣannafūt, (2) 105.}\]

\[\text{Zunūzī, Majmu’a-yi muṣannafūt, (2) 106.}\]
otherworldly also challenges the opinion that the resurrection occurs on the same corporeal plane as the life of the world occurred.\textsuperscript{893}

When the body rejoins the soul it is not the imaginal body that is a reflection created by the soul, but the corporeal body which gains characteristics that are suitable for the imaginal world.\textsuperscript{894} It gains new characteristics like the ability to speak and testify to the acts that a person carried out. Zunūzī likens the connection to the connection between the corporeal body and the imaginal faculty while sleeping. The sight of a person becomes wider and the person can see the imaginal realm but at the same time the corporeal body does not become the imaginal body.\textsuperscript{895} Zunūzī’s key proof for these individual movements is that all movement is towards its own goal that is suitable for it, whether that be the movement of the body, the soul or anything else.\textsuperscript{896} Therefore matter moves towards a goal which is suitable for itself and that will necessarily not be the same as something that starts out as abstract.

Zunūzī quickly spots the obvious contention to this argument which is that all of existence is moving towards one goal which is the Necessary Being from which everything came from. He answers by saying that his explanation is from the perspective of manyness. He attests to the view that when one looks with the eye of oneness all is from Him and all will return to Him regardless of intermediary causes.\textsuperscript{897} But from the perspective of manyness that return does not have to be in exactly the same way. This is especially true of the Judgment Day, which is

\textsuperscript{893} Zunūzī, 
Majmu’a-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 92-94.

\textsuperscript{894} Zunūzī, 
Majmu’a-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 108.

\textsuperscript{895} Zunūzī, 
Majmu’a-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 108.

\textsuperscript{896} Zunūzī, 
Majmu’a-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 111.

\textsuperscript{897} Zunūzī, 
Majmu’a-yi muṣannafāt, (2) 111.
only a level amongst the ever increasing levels of oneness and as manyness is attested by the various occurrences that take place on resurrection.

Abū al-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī concurs with Zunūzī’s view in his treatise on *maʿād* while criticizing Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of a resurrected imaginal body alone as it does not correspond with the Islamic scriptural sources. Sabzvārī concurs with Mullā Ṣadrā in that the body will be imaginal, but the imaginal body is the corporeal body itself after it has lost its corporeal characteristics. He therefore explains what the perfection of the corporeal body is. Sabzvārī continues to defend his position by saying that the opinion that an imaginal form is not a body is mistaken. The distinguishing factor for a body is its existence in three dimensions and this is true of the imaginal body. Proposing an imaginal body is not denying the bodily resurrection as those that have proposed a spiritual resurrection alone do not believe in any role for a corporeal or imaginal body, while also claiming that the physical pleasures and pains of paradise and hell are metaphorical. Rather resurrection of an imaginal body is a complete confirmation of bodily resurrection.

In fact the denial of a bodily resurrection is due to the denial of an imaginal plane, whereas the confirmation of the imaginal plane allows for a more refined interpretation of bodily resurrection. This interpretation means that no corporeal body is required for resurrection in the corporeal world as the body at the time of resurrection is imaginal and not corporeal.

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898 Qazvīnī, *Majmuʿa-yi rasāʾīl*, 18
900 Sabzvārī, *Rasāʾīl*, 481.
901 Sabzvārī, *Rasāʾīl*, 481.
even though its origin was the same corporeal body that was lived in before death. That is exactly what the likes of Zunūzī and Rafīʿī Qazvinī disagree with; rather for them the perfection of the corporeal body will be corporeal.

Conclusion

Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles of the principality of existence, gradation and individualization refined his conception of the relationship between body and soul which he considered to be one graded reality. This view departed from the traditional view of the body and soul being two separate realities forcefully connected to each other during the soul’s stay in the corporeal world. Mullā Ṣadrā also considered the imaginal to be a level of an individualized soul and showed the relationship between the imaginal and corporeal bodies. It is on the imaginal plane that comprehension occurs even if the necessary prerequisites were corporeal, such as the prerequisites of sense perception. When the soul leaves the corporeal plane the same comprehension that occurred in the corporeal world occurs in the imaginal world but at a higher level as sense and the imaginal unite. His contribution in this sense is very significant both to philosophy and theoretical ‘īrfān where the idea of an imaginal body had been discussed in relation to the Abdāl. Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī of the school of Qum provides a classical ‘īrfānī reading of the issue of the imaginal body by tracing the topic through the works of the ‘urafā’ to Mullā Ṣadrā’s Asfār.

Based on his philosophy of the soul Mullā Ṣadrā was able to solve the most challenging problems in Islamic philosophy concerning resurrection. The conclusions he reached on those
problems flowed smoothly out of the principles he had established. Reincarnation was impossible as each soul was individualized. There was no reason to separate between bodily and spiritual resurrection as they were both the resurrection of one soul manifesting in different planes. There was no need to insist on the same corporeal body as the corporeal body changes as a natural factor of the corporeal world is creation and decay. Rather it was individualization that was important in the resurrection of the same soul and that soul would manifest an imaginal body. This reflection of the soul is created by it and so is in no need for matter in the same way as the imaginalization of the angels. The reality of the soul is manifested, which is known as celestial reincarnation.

This conclusion did not sit well with traditional scholars who insisted that the resurrected body must be corporeal and must be the same body that the individual left on death. It was also a difficult idea to comprehend without the aid of witnessing. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī of the school of Qum, decided to leave out the discussion of resurrection in his seminal texts, showing a preference for the teaching of what can be comprehended intellectually over what needed witnessing at its start. This naturally leads to a preference for the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā as Mullā Ṣadrā’s standpoint on the issue of resurrection follows intuitively from his principles, but is more powerful with an ʿirfānī insight. Indeed, both witnessing and philosophical speculation are required to fully appreciate Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas on resurrection as he himself testifies.
ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī, of the school of Tehran, developed Mullā Ṣadrā's ideas but focused on the concept of motion in the category of substance to solve the critique of traditional scholars concerning the corporeal body. Basing his analysis on a hadīth from Imam al-Ṣādiq, ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī showed that the same individual corporeal body of the deceased will become the imaginal body suitable for the imaginal plane with the natural movement of the universe. The body moves towards the perfection of the soul rather than an abstract soul returning to an undeveloped corporeal body. This is the resurrected body which is at once the same corporeal body and the imaginal body that Mullā Ṣadrā stipulated.

The interplay between the Islamic scriptural sources and the topic of resurrection is significant in Sadrian works and ultimately returns to the method in which the scriptural sources should be interpreted. Is it a literal interpretation which is most accurate? Or does the intellect refine the interpretation of the issue even if that interpretation seems to contradict what is immediately understood from the text? ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī's view became the last principle view of the subject with Mullā Ṣadrā's and Ibn Sīnā's views. His view skillfully addresses the concerns of those with a more literal tendency as the body resurrected is the corporeal body, but its evolved state fits into the Sadrian analysis of resurrection. ʿAllāmah Tihrānī offers an explanation based on ʿirfānī principles, which negates the need for the continual manifestation of a body on any plane. Rather the soul comprehends the body limited by time by being out of time. That is that when the soul becomes timeless it comprehends once again the body that it had previously as it comprehends past present and future all of which have no meaning for the soul anymore.
While criticism of an idea can be shown through the works of authors who expressed opinions on it, silence in debating an idea also tells us about its reception. While there were more ḥukamā’ of the school of Tehran who saw Mullā Šadrā’s philosophy of resurrection as an important aspect of his overall philosophy and therefore engaged with it, some of the ḥukamā’ of the school of Qum separated Mullā Šadrā’s philosophy of *wujūd* from his ideas on resurrection. As I have shown, this is partially because of the different readings of Šadrā as his concept of an imaginal body is more palatable to an ḍīfānī reading. With the shift in preference towards a more philosophical reading of Mullā Šadrā in the school of Qum engagement with Mullā Šadrā’s eschatology visibly declined and is absent from Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s seminal texts on transcendental philosophy.

The perfect human plays a key role in resurrection as the intermediary between God and the rest of His creation. In the same way that through his reality the world was able to come into existence, so too is it able to return to God. The roles of the Imams and Lady Fāṭimah are a branch of the role of the perfect human as they are the Seals of nondelimited sainthood. The rule of the Names over a particular time is also significant as the dictates of the Names manifest in the outward planes. A change in Names causes resurrection. It is the death of the final Seal of the nondelimited Saints that causes the rule of some Names, such as the Manifest, to end and the rule of others, such as the Hidden, to begin. Resurrection occurs under the governance of the degree of Non-dualistic Unity, and so all will annihilate in God. Manifestation is a key ḍīfānī concept which is used heavily by Mullā Šadrā.
Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this study was to investigate the development of the two specified readings and explanations of Mullā Ṣadrā in the schools of Tehran and Qum and study their interaction within the modern Iranian hawza. The thesis aimed to address two areas that were under researched and has contributed to modern research in both areas. The first was a detailed investigation of the interaction of philosophy and ʿirfān within a Sadrian context through examining the various readings of ʾḥikmat and the second was the lack of research about the intellectual activity of the schools of Qum and Tehran. The thesis therefore has contributed to our understanding of the development of ʾḥikmat in the last two centuries as part of a wider history of Islamic philosophy as it is an era which still lacks in significant research especially with regard to the school of Qum.

The introductory chapter contextualised the thesis within larger academic fields such the Islamic intellectual tradition and Shiʿi studies, narrowing down to Sufism and philosophy in Iran. This discussion showed the wide variety of interest groups that this thesis aimed to engage as well as the gap in modern research in the historical study of the schools of Tehran and Qum. It identified the lack of research on the interplay between various readings of Mullā Ṣadrā and what implications those readings might have. It also discussed the framework of the thesis by defining the readings as well as discussing the interplay between the intellect and unveiling as epistemological tools and their role in ʾḥikmat. The methodology explained my assumptions and limitations in forming a web of beliefs on the interaction between philosophical and ʿirfānī reasoning during the period concerned. It also identified the key
hermeneutic of the interplay between oneness and manyness in the differentiation between philosophical and ʿirfānī readings.

Chapter one then proceeded to detail the schools of Tehran and Qum by first discussing the idea of a school and its limitations before moving on to investigate key figures, texts and links between students and teachers. It shed light on the link between various ḥukamāʾ in Iran and in Najaf. This exercise contributed to a significant lack of detail in figures related to this period. During the course of the chapter different philosophical and ʿirfānī inclinations between the schools of Tehran and Qum already began to appear and these differences were investigated further in the following chapters.

The first of these chapters focused on wujūd which is the area most ḥukamāʾ commented on. In this chapter the hermeneutic of oneness and manyness was examined in relation to the explanations of wujūd of the ḥukamāʾ from the schools of Tehran and Qum. A key aspect of the analysis was their views on gradation and its use in explaining the reality of wujūd. Was wujūd really graded? Or was gradation a stepping stone to understand the sheer oneness of existence? The discussions on the various aspects of wujūd betrayed a rich tradition of interpreting Mullā Ṣadrā which was hitherto understudied but presented in detail in this thesis. A spectrum of readings began to emerge as while the interpretive exercise could be broadly classified as either philosophical or ʿirfānī, the ideas of the ḥukamāʾ of the period were complex. Indeed, the ḥukamāʾ of the school of Tehran were apt in their used of both systems of thought, whereas a more philosophical approach became more evident with the school of
Qum. This phenomena, I argued, was largely to do with the introduction of seminal texts in the school of Qum that preferred a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā and indeed omitted many ʿirfānī concepts weaved into ḥikmat. The exclusion of ʿirfānī ideas to further philosophise ḥikmat was shown in the next two chapters.

Chapter three examined walāyah is the purpose of creation and distinguished between a philosophical reading of human perfection and an ʿirfānī one. It then moved on to examine the thoughts of various ḥukamāʾ of the schools of Tehran and Qum showing how these different readings present themselves in their works. A ḥakīm’s explanation of walāyah and the soul was linked to his understanding of wujūd, as wujūd was the subject of both philosophy and ʿirfān whereas walāyah is one of the issues examined under each subject. At the same time, the choice not to write on walāyah was an indication of a philosophical preference as walāyah was heavily discussed as a primarily ʿirfānī topic. The spectrum of readings continued to surface as while philosophical readings relied on concepts such as gradation, ʿirfānī readings relied on the Names of God and the oneness of Existence. Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī’s treatise on walāyah was a key aspect of the chapter as an outstanding example of the intellectual contribution of ḥukamāʾ of the period. The subsequent discussion of his treatise by Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī showed that these contributions continue to be discussed and developed betraying an active intellectual tradition.

The final case study was on maʿād which comprises the third foundational tenant of Islam. Mullā Ṣadrā formulated important ideas on resurrection and specifically concerning the
resurrection of a subtle body rather than a corporeal one. He did this as a natural follow through of his ideas on the gradation and individualisation of \textit{wujūd}. However, the pull of his philosophical framework did not entirely convince some \textit{ḥukamāʾ} of the correctness of his ideas on resurrection and this was shown by a lack of willingness of later \textit{ḥukamāʾ} to engage with them. I argued that one of the reasons for this phenomena was that the concept of a subtle body relied on ‘\textit{ṭa‘lā ‘irfānī} experience rather than philosophical reasoning alone. Mullā Șadrā’s philosophy of resurrection was completely omitted in Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s twin seminal texts. Another important aspect of this chapter was the contribution of ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī, who wrote an important treatise which tried to find the middle ground between the criticism of more traditional scholars and Mullā Șadrā’s ideas. The treatise is another example of the understudied but extremely valuable works of the period. From this study many useful results have emerged as well as areas for future research.

The first and perhaps most fundamental is the gathering of evidence for the existence of these readings which were often alluded to in historical accounts of the period. While the assertion of the different preferences of the \textit{ḥukamāʾ} in the interpretation of Mullā Șadrā are stipulated in the biographical literature, it was not the remit of this type of literature to provide detailed proof of these generally accepted assertions. However, this thesis has traced the interaction of the sciences of philosophy and theoretical ‘\textit{ṭa‘lā ‘irfān} from a historical and epistemological perspective and has shown the implications of both readings on the way Mullā Șadrā is interpreted. Philosophy and ‘\textit{ṭa‘lā ‘irfān} were interrelated subjects long before the emergence of the Sadrian school. ‘Urafā’ would write texts in the language of philosophers (like \textit{Tamhid al-Qawā‘id} and Qayṣārī’s introduction to his commentary on the \textit{Fuṣūs}, for example) and
philosophers would incorporate practical self purification in their quest for reality. Illuminationist philosophy clearly stipulated the need for wayfaring and practical programmes and introduced the issue of light. Yet Qayṣārī validates *al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah* whilst criticising other forms of philosophy. Mullā Ṣadrā included principles from theoretical *ʿirfān* to a much greater extent and proposed a new philosophy based on those principles. Mullā Ṣadrā's works therefore contained the potential to be interpreted from a philosophical or *ʿirfānī* perspective and this is what was witnessed in the writings of his interpretive tradition.

Building on these findings the thesis then moved on to show exactly how the different readings affected the *ḥakīm*’s approach to *ḥikmat* by working through the topics of the greatest theological interest in the chapters of *wuṣūd*, *walāyah* and *maʿād* and was able to identify factors which have caused a wider gap between the philosophical and *ʿirfānī* readings as the school of Qum developed. While the *ḥukamāʾ* of the school of Tehran benefited from a greater synergy from both readings of Mullā Ṣadrā, a greater separation between the philosophical and *ʿirfānī* readings occurred with the generalisation of the teaching of *ḥikmat* to the majority of *ḥawza* students in Qum. That separation was greatly influenced by the introduction of twin teachings texts, *Bidāyat* and *Niḥāyat*, which were both written by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī and the generalization of the study of *ḥikmat* to all *ḥawza* students.

While modern methods such as recorded and transcribed lectures have changed the landscape for the teaching of *ḥikmat*, the centrality of the taught introductory texts in
formulating a student’s perspective on ḥikmat cannot be emphasised enough. Ṭabāṭabāʾī presents a Peripatetic reading of ḥikmat and does not include the issue of resurrection at all despite it being one of Mullā Šadrā’s major contributions to philosophy. Consequently the teachers within the current ḥawza system such as Gulam-Riżā Faryāžī and Miṣbāḥ Yazdi are much more pronounced in their philosophical approach then the ḥukamā’ that preceded them; whereas other ḥukamā’ such as Ḥasan Ramaţānī and Yad-Allāh Yazdānpanāh push for a more holistic approach. Walāyah and maʿād are understudied in the philosophical reading as while walāyah is rooted in ʿirfānī principles, Mullā Šadrā’s view on bodily resurrection was very different to the Peripatetic conclusion reached by Ibn Sīnā. However, to grasp Mullā Šadrā’s view properly the ḥakīm must use both his intellect and unveiling.

By investigating the works of the ḥukamā’ of this period, some significant contributions that were made to ḥikmat and ʿirfān during this time were elucidated, such as Qumshīhi’s discussion of Ibn ʿArabī’s interpretation the Seal of the Saints in the Futuḥāt and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s reinterpretation of bodily resurrection. Many ḥukamā’ and their works were introduced in chapter one most of whom are worthy of separate studies both in terms of their ideas and their impact on the Sadrian interpretive tradition. Some key figures include Muḥammad Riżā Qumshīhi, Kāẓīm ʿAṣṣār, Muḥammad ʿAli Shāhabādī, Mahdī Ilāhī Qumshīhi, and in the contemporary era figures such as Ḥasan Ḥasanzāda Āmulī and ‘Abd Allāh Jawādī Āmulī. There is a lack of studies on the ideas of most of these figures in the Persian language as well as in English.
The hikmat and ʿirfān traditions of Qum and Najaf were linked by Iranian ḥukamāʾ who travelled to Najaf in order to complete their further studies in jurisprudence and its principles. At the same time, a parallel tradition developed from Tehran to Qum with ḥukamāʾ that did not travel to Najaf. This thesis traced this relationship through the students of Muḥammad Bīdābādī, many of whom were experts in ʿirfān. It is through Bīdābādī’s students that the ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā became available to other traditional scholars studying in Najaf. This is an issue that requires further study as although the link between these two centres of learning was relevant to the discussion of hikmat in Iran — as many of Bīdābādī’s students returned to Iran to become teachers in the school of Qum — much of the discussion concerning the development of hikmat and ʿirfān in Najaf was outside the scope of this thesis.

Important students of Bīdābādī such as Ṣadr al-Dīn Dizfūlī were precursors to ḥukamāʾ such as Sayyid ‘Ali Qāḍī and Muḥammad Jawād Tabrizī taught key teachers in the school of Qum such as Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī. Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī also studied under Bīdābādī and was the teacher of the at least three of the four ḥukamāʾ who established the school of Tehran as well as Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī. The ʿirfānī reading of Mullā Ṣadrā can be traced back to Bīdabādī from the second generation of the students of Hāshim Rashtī through Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī and Sayyid Rażī Lārijānī to Muḥammad ‘Alī b. Muẓaffar Iṣfahānī who was the student of Bīdābādī. Diagrammatic representations of some of these chains were presented in chapter one. Therefore two parallel chains of students of Bīdābādī continue the interpretive tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā; one in Iran in the schools of Tehran and Qum and the other in Najaf later returning to Iran and the school of Qum.
Iranian ḥukamā’ went to Najaf in order to study jurisprudence and its principles at the highest level and this process took a good number of years. In those important intellectual years relationships were formed between ḥukamā’ who studied the core hawza sciences but at the same time had an interest in studying and teaching hikmat. But with the decline of the hawza in Najaf the migration of scholars has all but ceased. Whilst the centres of Qum and Najaf and the relationship between them has received some academic attention, the hikmat aspect of this relationship is still under researched. This thesis has established some of the links in terms of teacher student relationships and readings of Mullā Ṣadrā. Studying the charismatic authority of these ḥukamā’ in the post-revolutionary Iranian conscious within the hawza and outside of it, as well as the affect of that vision on Iranian culture is also an area of further research.

The ḥukamā’ studied in this thesis fall along a spectrum between a purely philosophical reading of hikmat and a purely ʿirfānī reading. While many found a middle ground between these two readings most displayed a preference for one kind of reading over another. The writings of ḥukamā’ such as ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī, ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī, Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva, Abū-l-Ḥasan Raḥī Qazvinī, Hādī Sabzavārī, Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī showed a philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā where philosophical principles were primarily used to explain and analyse the topics of wujūd, walāyah and maʿād. They expounded a number of topics in a philosophical way and rarely delved beyond the surface of a more ʿirfānī approach. Their works were also skewed in this direction and some such as Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva have been critiqued by later ḥukamā’ for the work they did on ʿirfānī texts whilst not being fully qualified to do so. While the writings of Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī had a
greater leaning towards Peripatetic philosophy, the other ḥukamāʾ in this category were more faithful to Mullā Ṣadrā’s synergistic philosophical framework and critiqued the Peripatetics and Illuminationists. While their explanation of the key topics in Islamic belief was more philosophical, they often included ʿirfānī interpretations as part of those explanations, usually after more philosophical points.

Philosophy therefore was important in preparing the mind of the reader for a more delicate ʿirfānī point which was often also presented as the truth of the matter at hand. This was illustrated in ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī’s treatment of how God’s creation knows him. After philosophising the issue he ends with and ʿirfānī point where he explains that God is only known in proportion to His effusion. This medium way perhaps reflects Mullā Ṣadrā’s approach most faithfully. What differentiates these ḥukamāʾ from the more ʿirfānī ḥukamāʾ is that philosophy was the basis from which ʿirfān was to be understood and not vice versa. Philosophy was the primary tool used for discussion and ʿirfān was secondary. This point was particularly apparent in the discussion in chapter two concerning the different interpretations of the oneness of Existence according to ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī, Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī and Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī. All three ḥukamāʾ discussed wujūd as opposed to Wujūd and approached the question of what the oneness of Existence really meant from a philosophical perspective rather than an ʿirfānī one.

A spectrum also exists within this category of ḥukamāʾ as Abū-l-Ḥasan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī took a more philosophical approach to understanding and evaluating the different possible
interpretations of the oneness of Existence then Muḥammad Taqī Āmulī. Ṭabāṭabāʾī's approach on the other hand was to discuss the issue of wujūd solely from a philosophical perspective without reference to the oneness of Existence discussed by the ʿūrafāʾ. Indeed in Bidāyat and Nihāyat he discusses wujūd in a Peripatetic manner by focusing on the concept of wujūd rather than wujūd in the extramental. The difference between the study of wujūd as a concept and wujūd in the extramental was discussed in the beginning of the thesis when the different readings were analysed. This method has the potential to cause confusion for the reader as while the subject of ḥikmat is wujūd in the extramental, the explanation of wujūd as a concept can be misinterpreted if the reader is unclear on the subject or indeed approaches the study of ḥikmat with a Peripatetic approach. Abū-l-Ḥasan Jilva’s critique of the oneness of Existence reflected this confusion in readings as he found it difficult to reconcile extramental oneness and conceptual manyness. On the other hand ʿAṣṣār defends the seemingly heretical poetry of Ibn ʿArabi in the light of his view of the oneness of Existence by explaining different types of relation. His was an approach that used philosophy to explain ʿirfānī concepts rather than using philosophy as the main tool of understanding.

This difference was also seen in the discussion of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view on gradation by Muḥammad Shāhābādī, the son of Muḥammad ʿAli Shāhābādī who was the spiritual mentor of Khumaynī. While Ṭabāṭabāʾī argued that gradation was a real effect of the Necessary Being and therefore using gradation to prove the existence of the Necessary Being was a type of innī (from the effect to the cause) argument, Muḥammad Shāhābādī argued that the meaning of gradation was that the Essence indicated the Essence and so gradation was existence and not a necessary aspect of it. Ṭabāṭabāʾī also opted for a philosophical explanation of the journey
of the human to annihilation in his *Risālat al-walāya* even though many issues discussed in
the text are of an `irfānī` nature. His method in such texts was use philosophical explanations
and to link those explanations to the scriptural sources. ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī's treaties on the
Muḥammadan reality opted for a philosophical analysis and left out the issue of the Names.
Conversely and `irfānī` reading of the same concept would be inconceivable without some
reference to the Names and their relationship to the Muḥammadan reality. Rather ʿAlī
Mudarris Zunūzī substituted the Names for the Platonic Forms which are separate entities
unlike the Names. He returns to the issue of the Names only when expounding the reality of
the perfect human.

Other ḥukamāʾ such as Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī, Kāẓīm ʿAṣṣār, Fāzil Tūnī, Aḥmad
Āshṭiyānī, Rūḥ-Allāh Khumaynī, Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāhābādī, Jalāl al-Dīn Āshṭiyānī and
Ḥasanzāda Āmulī championed an `irfānī` reading of Mullā Ṣadrā where `irfānī` principles were
preferred to interpret Mullā Ṣadrā. While these ḥukamāʾ also used philosophical
interpretations at times there was a clear preference for using theoretical `irfān` to get to the
depths of ḥikmat. For these ḥukamāʾ the truth of what Mullā Ṣadrā wanted to explain was
`irfānī` and therefore in order to get to grasp Mullā Ṣadrā, to expand his ideas further and to
elucidate and develop what Mullā Ṣadrā did not mention in his books the study of `irfān` was
key. Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical framework was extremely useful in getting to grasp with
`irfānī` concepts. While the first group of ḥukamāʾ used philosophy as the bases for
understanding, this group of ḥukamāʾ found their basis in `irfān` and understood Mullā Ṣadrā
from that vantage point.
Kāẓim ʿAṣṣār demonstrated the usefulness of philosophy in explaining some of Ibn ʿArabī's seemingly heretical poetry. He differentiated the different types of relation and then proceeded to explain the oneness of Existence from the perspective of gradation but differentiated between gradation in its philosophical sense and its ʿirfānī sense. He also skilfully differentiated the different types of relation in order to show how ʿirfānī relation, which he called agent relation, is different to philosophical relation, which he called opposing relation. Using the concept of the oneness of Existence he was able to defend the utterance of Ibn ʿArabī and reach a better understanding. His approach was as to use philosophy to aid his discussion of theoretical ʿirfān. Ḥasanzāda on the other hand reversed this approach and used classical works in theoretical ʿirfān concerning the issue of the Abdāl to explain Mullā Ṣadrā's ideas on the imaginal body.

A spectrum of views was displayed in this group of ḥukamāʾ as well when Khumaynī criticised Muḥammad RiżāQumshihī's view on the comparison between the permanent archetypes and quiddity as inaccurate due to its philosophically inclined view of the permanent archetypes. While Qumshihī argues that the permanent archetypes cannot be considered quiddity as they do not even enter the system of wujūd, Khumaynī argues that the distinction between wujūd and quiddity is from the perspective of manyness and so therefore cannot be directly compared in the system of the oneness of Existence. It is these detailed discussions that throw light on the meaning of existence and its necessary implications in ḥikmat and ʿirfān and indeed highlight the similarities and differences between them. The view that the ḥakīm opts for has profound effects on his reading of ʿirfānī and ḥikmat texts.
In the process of answering the main research questions of this thesis a number of other interesting issues arose. The first was an insight into the method of study of a student of hikmat in the modern Iranian ḥawza. By using the taught texts of the seminary as a basis and then expanding the discussion of key concepts through the works of the ḥukamā’ of the schools of Tehran and Qum the reader of this thesis followed the process of development of the thought of a seminary student. The stage by stage process through which the student goes through shows the method of gradual teaching based on texts and further research which is the method of traditional studies in the ḥawza. Through this method the student is expected to grow with the text; unlocking its meanings; thinking over its delicacies and problems; and eventually outgrowing the text and moving onto a deeper text and more intricate discussions until they are able to have their own opinions and contribute to the interpretive tradition or indeed invent a new framework.

After studying a number of texts the student is able to read other texts within the field while having a benchmark from which to analyse those texts. Students are also taught how to read and write texts by carefully analysing the texts of others. Through discussing the glosses and treatises of the ḥukamā’ of the schools of Tehran and Qum the latter aspects of this process was also shown as these are the mediums through which new ideas are presented in the seminary. Modern students of hikmat begin with a Peripatetic reading of hikmat where the issues of walāyah and maʿād are not even discussed. It is only at a more advanced stage where they would encounter the latter two and at this stage they would have already developed a Peripatetic approach. It is only through studying theoretical ʿirfān with a view towards a different reading of hikmat that a more holistic reading of Mullā Ṣadrā can be formulated. But
this requires time and the students who do not intend to specialise in philosophy and ʿirfān understand Mullā Ṣadrā primarily through a Peripatetic reading of ḥikmat.

The second issue was a presentation of the major principles of ḥikmat and ʿirfān as well as a comparison between them. While Sadrian ḥikmat shares much in common with theoretical ʿirfān, the subjects are not the same. The epistemological discussion on the interplay between the intellect and kashf showed that both had their place in ḥikmat and ʿirfān. While kashf was the primary way to experience and grasp reality, the intellect played a key role in deciphering, explaining and developing insights received by unveiling. Wujūd is the most widely discussed issue amongst ḥukamāʾ as from it the most important principles are derived. It is first discussed as part of the general issues (al-umūr al-ʿāmmā) before being analysed further in relation to the Necessary Being in the specific issues (al-umūr al-khāṣṣa).

While not all ḥukamāʾ will necessarily comment on the issues of walāyah and maʿād one would be hard pressed to find a ḥakīm with nothing to say about wujūd. For these reasons the chapter on wujūd was lengthier than the chapters on walāyah and maʿād and this is reflective on the literature produced in the period. In the chapter on wujūd the philosophical reading of Mullā Ṣadrā presents a wujūd which is self-evident, principle and graded. While these concepts are shared amongst this reading and the other readings of Mullā Ṣadrā what distinguishes it as philosophical is its focus on the existence of existents. This focus made it hard for the ḥukamāʾ with the philosophical reading of wujūd to come to terms with the theory of the
Oneness of Existence proposed by the ‘ʿurafāʾ and consequently affected their ability to delve into the issues of walāyah and maʿād.

On the other hand, the ‘irfānī reading presented Existence as essentially one and so interpreted univocality, quiddity and gradation differently. Other issues such as self evidency, actuality (nafs al-amr) and relation also carried different meanings based on the system of ‘irfān. The primary hermeneutic in ‘irfān was that of oneness which starkly contradicts the idea of separate existents propounded in philosophy. Manyness is explained through other concepts such as self-disclosure, manifestation and the analysis of Wujūd through conditions that do not give real existence to anything except Wujūd. Walāyah and wujūd are interconnected topics as walāyah answers the question of why wujūd emanates from the Necessary Existent. Therefore different explanations of walāyah were given according to the preferred reading of wujūd of the various ḥukamā’. While the ‘irfānī explanation of walāyah concentrated on the Names and the permanent archetypes, the philosophical explanation relied on concepts such as gradation and the First Intellect. The ‘irfānī exposition of walāyah is extensive, but the main concern of the thesis was to show how the concept was read differently by the different ḥukamā’. At the same time, Sadrian philosophers introduced oneness in the theory of the soul where the soul is the shadow of True Unity.

Resurrection also builds on both wujūd and walāyah. While the most important issue in the chapter on resurrection was bodily resurrection which is primarily philosophical, the theory of resurrection as a whole can be understood in an ‘irfānī light as well. The perfect human who
is the nondelimited Seal of the Saints plays an essential role in the return of all beings to their
Creator due to his ontological position in the arch of decent and ascent and this was expressed
by Mullā Ṣadrā in his *Asfūr*.

The third result was a glimpse into the correspondence between the scriptural sources, *ḥikmat*
and ‘*īrfān*. While there is still scope for further research into this area by the school of Qum
itself, there is a clear correspondence between the fields. The relationship was illustrated in
the discussion of the self evident nature of *wujūd* and its relation to the ontological arguments
in reference to a *ḥadīth* from the Prophet when he was asked how he knew his Lord. Instead
of knowing God from tracing the existence of existents back to the Necessary Being, the
Prophet responds by saying that it is by God that he knew things. This is a quintessentially
‘*īrfānī* response as it indicates towards the direct witnessing of God and oneness but is also
linked to *ḥikmat* through ontological arguments which substitute existence for God. It is the
knowledge of the soul — an important aspect of *ḥikmat* — which leads to knowledge of God
according to a *ḥadīth*.

Sabzavārī's argument that in the extramental the meaning of *wujūd* is neither strictly univocal
nor a homonymy, but is different for God and for other existents also found roots in the
scriptural sources, which are adamant that God cannot be compared in any sense with His
creation but at the same time the intuitive grasp of His existence is hard wired into the very
nature of man. This issue was further philosophised by ‘Abd Allāh Zunūzī who showed that
God could not be known by His creation by categorising the different types of knowledge. His
point about the extent of knowledge being to the extent of effusion was completed by Qumshihi and Khumayni who both showed that the vision of all knowers is through the niche of the Seal of the Saints.

Another example was Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s answer to Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tihrānī about the correspondence between Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory of motion in the category of substance and the verses of Qur’ān. Ṭabāṭabā’ī quoted a verse from the chapter of the Believers to show that man starts as a bodily creation and is then bestowed with a soul, but not in the sense of composition. Rather the whole creation of man becomes spiritual and is different to a pure material existence. The scriptural sources were an important part of the exposition of wujūd and walāyah in ʿirfān and in many cases clarity on an issue was given by quoting a Qur’ānic verse or a ḥadīth. This relationship became more manifest in the section on walāyah, and a plethora of literature was written especially by the ḥukamā’ of the school of Qum who used the idea of the perfect human extensively to explain the position of the Imams and the superiority of Imam ʿAlī over his contemporaries. Qumshihi used an ʿirfānī framework and the concept of the Exclusively Possessed Names to present a well known argument for the superiority of Imam ʿAlī in a new light. He thereafter went to show that this could have been the apparent belief of Ibn ʿArabi himself based on a statement in the Futūḥāt.

This effort of Qumshihi is significant in the fight for the acceptance of ḥikmat and ʿirfān among critics in the traditional ḥawza. The frameworks offered by ḥikmat and ʿirfān provide stronger readings of the scriptural sources due to their epistemic basis and strengthen textual and
historical conclusions. At times they explain intricacies in the scriptural sources which were hard to explain or provide deeper insights into their meaning. Conversely the scriptural sources also inspired ḥukamāʾ in their discussions such as that of the perfect woman. The scriptural sources are the benchmark for witnessing as they are an expression of the full Muḥammadan unveiling which cannot be surpassed.

The scriptural sources perhaps played the largest role in the topic if resurrection. Aside from explaining the particularities of the afterlife it shaped philosophical discussion on the nature of bodily resurrection. Perhaps some of this focus was in the light of criticism from the theologians who condemned philosophy as contradictory to the outward statements of the scriptural sources. In that light, philosophers had to prove that their concept of resurrection was in line with the scriptural sources even if their interpretation was not a literal one and conversely prove the invalidity of a purely literal interpretation of the scriptural sources concerning resurrection.

The final issue was the usefulness of ḥikmat in explaining and providing a stronger framework for theoretical ʿirfān. The idea of modes was a better way to explain the relationship between the various Names than the relationship between wujūd and quiddity that Qayṣarī used. Different types of relation easily explain the oneness of Existence while different existents are conceptualised. The flow of wujūd aids in the explanation of the flow of the Breath of the All-Merciful and the The Real Through Whom Creation Takes Place. Qumshihi uses a philosophical example to lead to an ʿirfānī conclusion in his explanation of the hadīth: ʿThe
first of us is Muḥammad...” The subject of the imaginal body also received great attention from Sadrian philosophers, who offered competing theories as to how the corporeal body would become imaginal.

The study was limited to the works that were accessible as well as to the some of the more famous ḥukamā’. There is a lot of room for researching the ideas and contributions of a whole host of figures and works from the schools of Tehran and Qum. Many works were listed in chapter one while discussing the biographical details of the ḥukamā’ that were peripheral to the main thrust of the investigation in this thesis. These personalities and works deserve further attention especially since some of these ḥukamā’ are instrumental in the transfer of ḥikmat such as Ḥusayn Bādkūbahī, Mahdī Āshtyāni, ʿAlī Akbar Yazdi Ḥakīmī, Muḥammad Jaʿfar Langarūdī and Hāshim Rashtī. There is also room to further explore the ideas of the ḥukamā’ that were discussed to some extent in this thesis. The rich works of Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī especially offer tantalising prospects in the field of theoretical ʿirfān.

Another important area that requires further research is the affect of ḥikmat on Sufi discourse in Iran. While this thesis focused on the more traditional sphere of the hawza, there were some important Sufi’s that attended classes in ḥikmat such as Maʾsūm Ali Shāh who studied under ‘Ali Mudarris Zunūzī.973 How did these Sufi’s use ḥikmat in their own field and how did they conversely contribute to the development of ʿirfānī readings and theoretical ʿirfān within a more traditional setting? An indication of their importance was seen in the relationship

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973 Suhā, Tārīkh-i ḥukamā’, 460.
between Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrizī and Muḥammad Bīdabādī. But what more can we learn about these relationships and what was the extent of cross fertilization? Other trends such as the interaction between the ḥukamāʾ and Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī; the impact of western philosophy and the development of the teaching and critique of western philosophy in the ḥawza; the maktab al-tafkīk and its modern manifestations and an examination of the scriptural reading of Mullā Ṣadrā are all important trends that deserve further investigation.

Ḥikmat revolutionised Islamic philosophy and at the same time works in theoretical ʿirfān used a philosophical voice to explain their views. While those works used the philosophy of their time, hikmat provides a new set of concepts and terms which greatly aids the explanation of theoretical ʿirfān. Mullā Ṣadrā embarked on an interesting project of ridding philosophy of manyness using two key principles. For existents in the extramental he used the concept of gradation, where the reality of gradation was oneness and for issues that could not be incorporated into gradation — such as quiddity — he categorised as conceptual in reality and gave its reality to wujūd. This unification of the philosophy of wujūd brought hikmat close to the oneness of Existence in theoretical ʿirfān.
Glossary

ʿadam dhātī: Essential nonexistence

ʿadam zamānī: Temporal nonexistence

ʿadam: Nonexistence

adghāth aḥlām: Confused dreams

adhkār: Formulations of invocation

ahādīth: Actions or words reported to have been spoken by the Prophet or the Imāms.

al-ajnās al-ʿālīyah: The highest genera [summum genera]

ajzā’: Parts

akhaṣṣ al-lawāzīm: The most specific proprium

ākhirah: The hereafter

akhfū: The more hidden

ʿaks al-ḥaml: Reverse predication

ʿālam al-dharr: The world of particles

ʿālam al-mādda: The corporeal world

ʿālam al-mīthāl: The isthmus/ The Imaginal world

ʿālam al-ʿuqūl: The world of the Intellects

ʿāmā: The Cloud

ʿaql: The intellect

al-ʿaql al-kullī: The Universal Intellect

aʿrāḍ: Accidental properties

aṣālat al-māhīyah: The primacy of quiddity

aṣālat al-wujūd wa-ʿayniyat al-māhīyah: The principality of wujūd and quiddity

aṣālat al-wujūd: The primacy of existence

al-asmāʾ al-mustaʾtharah: Exclusively possessed Names

ʿawāriḍ dhātīyah: Essential accidents
awliyāʾ: Saints/friends

al-aʿyān al-khārijīyah: The external archetypes

al-aʿyān al-thābitah: The permanent archetypes

ʿayn al-yaqīn: Certain witnessing

badāʾ: Change in decree.

badan ukhrawī: Otherworldly body

baḥth al-khārij: Advanced research

barzakh: The isthmus

biṣāṭah: Simplicity

baṣīt: Simple

bāṭin: The inward

bi-sharṭ lā: With the condition of being negated

bi-sharṭ shayʾ: With a condition.

burhān al-innī: A posteriori argument

burhān al-limmī: A priori argument

burhān al-ṣiddiqīn: An ontological proof for the existence of God

burhān: Proof

buṭlān al-ṭafira: The impossibility of a gap in effusion.

ḍaʿf: Weakness

dahrī: Atemporal

ḍarūrī: Necessary

dhāt: Essence

dhawq: Taste

dunyā: The world

al-falsafah al-ilāhīyah: Divine philosophy

fanāʾ: Annihilation
*al-faqr al-wujūd*: Existential poverty

*faṣl*: Differentia

*fayd*: Effusion

*al-fayd al-aqdas*: The most sacred effusion

*al-fayd al-muqaddas*: The sacred effusion

*fikr*: Thinking

*fiʿl*: Action

*fiʿliyah*: Actuality

*fīṭra*: natural disposition

*ghayb al-ghuyūb*: Unseen of the unseen

ḥadīth*: Single of aḥādīth.

*al-ḥadarah al-ʿilmīyah*: The Knowledge Presence/ The Presence of God’s Knowledge before existence

ḥajj*: Major pilgrimage

ḥakīm*: Sadrian philosopher

ḥaml*: Predication

*al-ḥaml al-awwal al-dhāt*: Primary essential predication/ intensional prediction

ḥaml al-ḥaqīqa ‘alā al-raqiqa*: The predication of reality on its shadow

*al-ḥaml al-shāʾiʿ al-ṣināʿ*: Common technical predication/ extensional prediction

ḥaqīqah*: The reality

*al-ḥaqīqah al-Muḥammadīyah*: The Muḥammadan reality

ḥaqīqi*: real

*al-Ḥaq al-makhlūq bihi*: The Real Through Whom Creation Takes Place

ḥaq al-yaqīn*: Truth of certainty/experiencing the reality with certainty

*al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyah*: Motion in the category of substance

ḥawza*: Traditional Islamic seminary.

*al-ḥayawān al-nāṭiq*: A speaking/rational animal
‘aythiyah: Mode
‘aythiyat al-ṣidq: Mode of reference
‘aythiyāt: Modes
hayūlā: Prime matter
al-ḥikmah al-muta‘āliyah: Transcendental philosophy
hikāyah: Mimesis
ḥikmat al-ishrāq: Illuminationist philosophy
ḥikmat: Short for transcendental philosophy
al-hiliyah al-basītah: Simple proposition/ a proposition in which the existence of something is confirmed.
ḥudūth zamānī: Temporal origination
ḥudūth: Origination
ḥukamā’: Plural of ḥakīm (Lit.) The wise ones
huwīyah: Ipseity
i‘ādah al-ma‘dūm: The return to existence of nonexistent things
iżāfah ishrāqiyyah: An illuminative relation
iḥāṭa: Comprehension
iṭtimā‘ al-naqiḍayn: The coming together of two contradictories.
‘ilm al-dhāt bi-l-dhāt: Where an essence is known by its own essence
‘ilm al-Ḥuḍūrī: Knowledge by presence
‘ilm al-ḥuşūlī: Knowledge by acquisition
‘ilm al-yaqīn: Certain knowledge
imkān: Possibility
al-imkān al-ashraf: The possibility of the nobler
imtinā‘: Impossibility
inqilāb: A violation of the law of identity
al-insān al-kāmil: The perfect human
al-ʿirfān al-ʿamālī: Practical ʿirfān
al-ʿirfān al-naẓārī: Theoretical ʿirfān
ishtirāk lafżī: Homonymy
ishtirāk maʿnawī: Univocity
al-ism al-jāmiʿ: The Comprehensive Name
iʿtibār: Conceptual construct
iṭlāq: Nondelimitation
al-iṭlāq al-ḥaqiqī al-iḥāṭī: Nondelimited with real comprehensive nondelimitation
iṭlāq-i kamālī: Nondelimited perfection
ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa-l-maʿqūl: The identity thesis
ittiḥād: Union
iẓāfa: Relation
iẓāfah-i fāʿīlī: Agent relation
iẓāfah-i qābulī: Opposing relation
jadhba: Attraction
jamʿ: Completeness
jawhara: Substance
jīns: Genus
al-jīns wa al-faṣl al-ṣināʾī: A specified genus and species
jīsm: Body
al-jīsm al-latīf: Subtle body
jīsmāniyat al-hudūth: Corporeal in its origin.
juzʿ: Particular
kamāl ʾirsālī sarayānī: Flowing emanating perfection
kamāl: Perfection
al-khārij: The extramental
kashf maʿnawi: Meaning unveiling

kashf ṣūrī: Image unveiling

kashf: Unveiling

kathrah: Multiplicity

kawn: Creation

al-kayf al-nafsānī: Psychic quality/A quality of the soul

khātim al-anbiyāʾ: The seal of the prophets

khātim al-awliyāʾ: The seal of the saints

khayāl: The faculty of imagination

al-khayāl al-munfaṣil: Discontiguous imagination

al-khayāl al-muttaṣil: Contiguous imagination

khilāfah: Vicegerency

kitāb al-āfāq: The book of the horizon

kitāb al-anfus: The book of the soul

kitāb tadwini: The recorded book

kull: Universal

lā bi-sharṭ al-muqsimi: Without condition as the source of division.

lā bi-sharṭ al-qismi: Without condition as a division.

lāzim: Necessary

liqāʾ Allah: Meeting with God

maʿād: Resurrection

al-maʿād al-jismanī: Bodily resurrection

al-maʿād al-ruhani: Spiritual resurrection

al-maʿānī al-ḥarfīyah: Incomplete meanings/non-substantive notions

māddah: Matter

maʿdūm: Nonexistent
mafātīḥ al-ghayb: The keys of the unseen
mafḥūm: Concept
māḥīyah: Quiddity
al-mala’ al-a’lā: The highest presence
mānāzīl: Stations
mansha’: Origin
maqūlāt: The categories
al-ma’qūlāt al-thānīyah: The secondary intelligibles
ma’rifā: Knowing
masā’il: Issues
masdūd: Blocked
al-martabah al-ahādiyyah: The degree of Non-dualistic Unity
al-martabah al-wāḥidiyyah: The degree of Dualistic Unity
mawḍū‘: Subject
mawjūd: Existent
al-mawādd al-thalātha: The three modalities
al-mawt al-ikhtiyārī: Voluntary death
miṣdāq: Referent
mizāj: Constitution
mubham: unspecific
mughālaṭa: Error/ sophistry
muḥaqqiqūn: The realizers
mujarrad: Abstract
mulāzamāt: Necessary implications
mumkin al-wujūd: A contingent existent
murakkab: Composite
al-murakkab al-ḥaqīqī: Real composite

al-murakkab al-iʿtbārī: Conceptual composite

musāwiq: Synonymous

mushāhadah: Witnessing

mutaʿayyin: Determined

nabi: Prophet

al-nafas al-Raḥmānī: The Breath of the All-Merciful.

nafs al-amr: Actuality, which is neither in the mental nor the extramental

al-nafs al-hayawānīyah: The animal soul

al-nafs al-jamādiyah: The mineral soul

al-nafs al-kulliyah: The universal soul

al-nafs al-nabāṭīyah: The plant soul

al-nafs al-nāṭiqah: Rational soul

naqs: Imperfection

nawʿi itibārʿaqli: Conceptual intellectual specificity

nawʿiyah: Being-a-species

nisba: Relation

nubuwwaḥ: Prophethood

al-nūr al-Muḥammadī: The Muḥammadan light

nuzūl: Descent

qaḍāyā nafs al-amriyah: Propositions that have no direct reference to ascertain their truthfulness in the mind or in the extramental

qadīm: Outside of time/eternal

al-qaws al-nuzūlī: The arch of decent

al-qaws al-ṣuʿūdī: The arch of ascent

al-qiyāmah al-kubrā: Major resurrection

al-qiyāmah al-sughrā al-āfāqī: Minor horizontal resurrection
al-qiyāmah al-ṣughrā: Minor resurrection

quwwa idrāk al-kulliyāt: The potential to comprehend universals.

quwwah: Potential

ra‘y: Personal opinion

raḥim: The womb

raj‘ah: the Return

rasm: A description

rasūl: Messenger

rūḥ: Spirit

al-rūḥ al-aʿẓam: The greatest soul

rūḥāniyat al-baqāʾ: Spiritual in its subsistence

al-ṣādir al-awwal: The first emanation

al-ṣādir al-thānī: The second emanation

safar-i nafs: The journey of the soul

sālik: Wayfarer

sarayān: Flow

sha‘n: A task

shakhṣiyah: Being-a-individual

sharī‘ah: The divine law

shay‘iyah: Being-a-thing

shiddu: Intensity

shu‘ūn: Tasks

shubhah al-ākil wa al-ma‘kūl: The contention of the eater and the eaten.

sirr: The secret

sulūk: Wayfaring

ṣūra: An image
al-ṣuwar al-‘ilmīyah: Intelligible forms
al-ṣuwar al-naw‘īyah: Specific forms
ta‘ayyun: Determination
al-ta‘ayyun al-iḥāṭi: Comprehensive determination
al-ta‘ayyun al-taqābuli: Oppositional determination
tabāyun: Exclusive
tabaddul al-dhātī: Essential change
tabdīl: Transformation
tahvīl-i dhātī: Essential transformation
tajallī: Self-disclosure
al-tajarrud al-tāmm: Complete abstraction
tajassum al-a‘māl: The embodiment of actions
takāmul al-barzakhī: Development in the Isthmus.
tamaththul: Imaginalization
tanāsukh: Reincarnation
al-tanāsukh al-malakūtī: Celestial reincarnation
al-tanāsukh al-mulkī: Corporeal reincarnation
al-tanāsukh al-mulkī al-munfaṣil: Corporeal disconnected reincarnation
al-tanāsukh al-mulkī al-muttaṣil: Corporeal connected reincarnation
tanbīh: Indication
taqyīd: Delimitation
tarāduf: Synonymy
ṭariqah: The path
tarkīb: Composition
tasalsul: Infinite regress
tasāwī: Equivalent
taṣawwuf: Ṣufism

tashkik: Gradation

tawhīd: The unity of God

thubūt: Subsistence

tikrār: Repetition

‘ulamā’: Scholars

vaḥdat-i iṭlāqī: Nondelimited unity

valāyat-i kullī: Complete guardianship

valāyat-i taṣarruf: The perfect man's ability to affect the universe in any way he chooses

vilāyat-i faqīh: Guardianship of the jurist

Waḥdah: Oneness

al-waḥdah al-ḥaqqah al-ẓillīyah: A Shadow of True Unity

waḥdat al-wujūd: Oneness of Existence

wājīb al-wujūd: The Necessary Existent

walāyah: Guardianship

al-walāyah al-takwīniya: Existential guardianship

al-Walī: The Friend (A Name of God)

wali: Saint/friend of God

wāṣil: One who has reached

wujūb: Necessity

wujūb bi-l-dhāt: Essential necessity

wujūd: Existence

al-wujūd al-ʿaynī: Extramental existence

wujūd al-dhihnī: Cognitive/Mental existence

al-wujūd al-ʿilmī: Mental existence

wujūd al-khārijī: Extramental existence
wujūd al-muṭlaq: Nondelimited existence

wujūd al-rābiṭ: Existence-in-something-else

wujūd bi-l-ghayr: Existence-by-something-else/accidental necessity

wujūd bi-mā huwa huwa: Being qua Being

wujūd li-ghayrihī: Existence-in-itself-for-something-else

wujūd li-nafsihī: Existence-in-itself-for-itself

wujūd maḥmūlī: Predicated existence

ẓāhir: The outward

zuḥd: Abstention

zuḥūr: Manifestation
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