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Editorial note:
To further discussion, the editors invite brief communications on articles which have appeared in Wepwawet. We regret that at present we cannot extend an open invitation for articles. Applications, however, may be made by letter to the editors. Wepwawet primarily is intended as a forum for the work of researchers to post-doctoral level.

The editors would like to express their gratitude to the Egypt Exploration Society for the use of their computing and laser printing facilities.
Studies in new kingdom Nubia. 1.
Politics, economics and ideology: Egyptian imperialism in Nubia.
Robert G. Morkot

The past ten years have seen the publication of a number of important studies which re-evaluate the traditional view of the Egyptian presence in Nubia as purely exploitative. B.J. Kemp discusses 'imperialism' as applying to Egypt, and in terms of its practical cultural and economic manifestations. Kemp proposes the view that the temple-towns served as the centres of a local redistributive economy within Nubia, and that the Egyptian presence was far from being purely exploitative. In the collected papers of the symposium 'Power and propaganda', P.J. Frandsen argued a very similar case to Kemp, whilst in keeping with the subject of the symposium he addressed himself to some more theoretical issues. The theoretical-modular approach taken by some of the other contributors to this collection is particularly stimulating and valuable in establishing a range of possibilities in considering this subject. D. O’Connor considers the nature and functioning of the viceroyal administration, the Egyptianised elite and role of Nubia as a gold producer, but perhaps most importantly, also offers some new interpretations of the geographical material which, if accepted, indicate wider ranging Egyptian campaigning in the central Sudan than had previously been thought likely.

This paper is an attempt to consider some aspects of the three key issues discussed by Kemp and Frandsen, but particularly the context of the time-scale of the Egyptian presence in Nubia.

I. New kingdom Nubia: the response to domination.

Whilst the importance of time-scale relative to the changing attitude of Egypt to Kush is implicit in all of the writing on new kingdom Nubia, it is rarely explicitly discussed in detail. The Egyptian presence in Nubia, from the beginning of the re-conquest under Kamose to the campaigns of Herihor against the viceroy Panehesy, covers some five hundred years. Even this ignores the old kingdom and middle kingdom presence, which must (at least in the case of the middle kingdom) have considerably affected the attitude of the Egyptians towards the south. Clearly there were many changes and developments during the period of new kingdom domination, and the resulting smaller phases each had their own characteristics defined by the interaction of Egyptians and Kushites, their policies and motives. The important factor to consider is attitude: the response of the Kushites to the Egyptian expansion and that of the viceroyal administration to Nubia. The information available to us is far too limited to reconstruct actual policy, although certain phenomena can be distinguished which may, or may not, be the result of the policies which must have been formed. It is, however, all that we have. The following outline of phases of the Egyptian presence in Nubia is therefore tentative, and its divisions somewhat arbitrary. Its function is to establish a temporal framework for the consideration of the changing relationship between Egypt and Nubia during the new kingdom.

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1 Nubia and nubian are here used throughout in a purely geographic sense to avoid political, ethnic or linguistic connotations; i.e. that the indigenous population were either ethnically nubian or nubian-language speakers during the new kingdom. They were probably not. Kushite is the deliberately vague term here applied to the indigenous populations of Nubia and the central Sudan.
2 Kemp 1978. Säve-Söderbergh (1941, p.224f.) had already argued that many of the b3tw remained in Nubia.
3 Kemp 1972a and 1972b.
5 Frandsen 1979.
6 Particularly interesting are the studies by: S.E. Eisenstadt 'Observations and queries about sociological aspects of imperialism in the ancient world', p.21-33; O. Lattimore 'Geography and the ancient empires', p.35-40; K. Eckholm and J. Friedman 'Capital imperialism and exploitation in ancient world systems', p.41-58; R. McC. Adams 'Common concerns but different standpoints: a commentary', p.393-404.
7 O’Connor 1982 and O’Connor 1983: see also Postscript, below.
8 Many of the ideas in this paper were discussed or expressed in seminars I gave at University College London between 1984 and 1986. My thanks to those who have commented on them. My ideas have considerably benefitted from discussions with Professor Dr. St. Wenig during my period of study in Berlin/DDR, although we retain differing positions on a number of issues. To him my especial thanks.
9 Kemp 1978 does, to some extent. The standard work on new kingdom Nubia and its relationship with Egypt remains, of course, Säve-Söderbergh 1941.
The theban princes Kamose and Ahmose were victorious against both the Hyksos rulers of lower Egypt and the Kushite princes. H.S. Smith and A. Smith have discussed the campaigns of Kamose against Nubia, and conclude that the main function of these was to establish a rear protection before directing a major campaign against Avaris. This is doubtless correct. The effect was the re-occupation and restoration of Buhen, which marked the southern limit of Kamose’s expansion, creating a large buffer between the Kushite kingdom, probably ruled from Kerma, and upper Egypt. This expansion was almost certainly before Kamose’s year 31, and consequently must be considered as his first military campaign. Whilst it is likely that Kamose would have regarded the defence of his southern frontier essential as a prologue to any attack on the Hyksos, the opportunity arose with a change of ruler within Kush itself, as is revealed by the text of the letter from Awessere Apety to the new ruler (hk3) intercepted by the Thebans.

Since lower Nubia had a fairly substantial population the imposition of some sort of civil administration at an early date was clearly imperative, and there is a strong likelihood that a viceroy, Tety, was appointed by Kamose. However, we do not know anything of the local socio-political composition, although it seems probable that the three prince-doms known later already existed, perhaps as vassals of the Kerma chiefs. The fortress of Buhen, and possibly others, had an Egyptian overseer working for the Kushites, and there was an Egyptian or Egypto-Kushite population in these centres.

The Egyptians regarded lower Nubia as part of Egypt as is revealed by the Kamose texts and other documentary material. This is significant when considering the attitude displayed towards Nubia. Kamose and Ahmose may have had no intention beyond the reclamation of the territories ruled by the middle kingdom pharaohs. Indeed, there seems to be no indication that greater expansion was considered before the reigns of Thutmose II or III. Even the establishment of the fortresses of Sai and Tumbos may have been related to the defence of the frontier against Kerma, or the suppression of Kerma, rather than the beginning of a positive expansion programme.

Ahmose - Amenhotep I.
Ahmose 25 years.
Amenhotep I 21 years.

The length of Kamose’s reign is not yet known, although five or six years are usually accredited to him. As Cl. Vandersleyen has argued Ahmose was probably still a minor at his brother’s death and own

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10 Smith and Smith 1976, particularly section 6, p.66-69.
11 Smith and Smith 1976, 67; see also the stela from Buhen Smith 1976, p.8-9 (no.488) and p.82, 206.
12 Habachi 1972; Sæve-Søderbergh 1956.
13 Simpson 1963, p.32ff.
14 Sæve-Søderbergh 1956; the continued existence of a ‘chiefdom’ as a territorial unit does not, of course, mean that the chiefs or dynasties were not replaced by others more amenable to the Egyptian administration for an example see Lorton 1974, p.147-8 (AP no.2).
15 Smith 1976, p.80-85, for the history of Buhen in the second intermediate period: for the officials Smith 1976, p.73-76; for the nubian kingdom of the second intermediate period see Sæve-Søderbergh 1949 and 1956; Vandersleyen 1971, p.51-2: for the issue of acculturation or egyptianization in the second intermediate period see Sæve-Søderbergh (ms) cited in Frandsen 1979 n.13 (p.183).
16 Vandersleyen 1971, p.56-61.
17 see Vandersleyen 1971, p.53-6.
18 Sai itself had been an important centre of the Kerma culture.
19 The suppression of Kerma does not necessarily signify incorporation of its territory and may have been to establish vassalage in the region. The collapse of the Kerma chiefdom and the apparent cessation of large burials in the south cemetery (dated by Bonnet to ca 1450 BC see Bonnet 1987, p.90-1, p.109) may have seen the rise of a new chiefdom in upper Nubia, or a struggle for power amongst kushite chiefs who had formerly been vassals of Kerma.
accession. This accounts for the lack of follow up to Kamose's campaigns until year 11, or perhaps better, a lack of major campaigns led by the king in person.

Ahmose's military activities in Nubia, discussed by Vandersleyen\(^\text{21}\) established an Egyptian presence beyond the second cataract in the northern part of the Abri-Delgo reach. The quantity of material with the names of Ahmose and Amenhotep I from Sai would seem to suggest the establishment of a fort there during this period\(^\text{22}\). The Ahmose-Abana text states that the campaign against Hnt-hn-nfr came after that against the Mntyw of Asia, suggesting that Kamose's second cataract frontier had been maintained without serious problems, and that the new viceregal administration was strongly in control of lower Nubia, allowing Ahmose to direct his attention towards the north. Vandersleyen suggests that the Ahmose campaign against Kush took place around his 15th year.

After the Nubian campaign Ahmose was confronted with the 'rebellion' of 332\(^\text{23}\), possibly a Nubian chief active somewhere in lower Nubia or upper Egypt. Later came the campaign against Tete-an. Whether these 'rebellions' indicate serious internal difficulties and opposition to the new regime towards the end of Ahmose's reign is presently impossible to determine. If Ahmose and Amenhotep I had to consolidate their rule in Egypt this may have led to a cessation in foreign campaigns thereby establishing the necessity for Thutmose I to make a major display of strength in Nubia and in Asia.

Thutmose I-II.
Thutmose I, 12 years.
Thutmose II, 4 years.

Thutmose I campaigned in Nubia in the 2nd year of his reign\(^\text{24}\), and prior to his Asiatic campaign. Indeed, this seems to be the regular pattern, demonstrated previously with Kamose's campaigns, and later with those of Thutmose III: a display of authority in the south, serving also to protect the rear. During Thutmose I's expedition a Kushite chief, possibly the ruler of Kerra, was captured and his body hung upside down from the prow of the king's warship for his triumphant return to Thebes\(^\text{25}\). However, Thutmose I established his frontier at Tumbos, to the north of Kerra\(^\text{26}\).

Although the rock inscription of Thutmose I at Hagar el-Merwa (Kurgus)\(^\text{27}\), and the report of a fortress near the same place suggests the presence of the Egyptian army in this region, it seems more likely that this was associated with the Korosko road and gold mines than with the control of riverine upper Nubia (i.e. the 2nd-4th cataracts)\(^\text{28}\). If, as seems possible, the latter years of Ahmose and part of that of Amenhotep I had been occupied with internal politics a major show of strength would have been necessary at this time. The at least symbolic, boundary stele of Thutmose I at Hagar el-Merwa and on the Euphrates mark a sphere of Egyptian influence not extended by any later rulers.

The evidence suggests that from this time Sai was the major fortress in upper Nubia, although there is no indication of the establishment of a wider colonisation programme.

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\(^{21}\) Vandersleyen 1971, p.49-74.


\(^{23}\) Vandersleyen 1971, 75-81; Säve-Söderbergh 1941, p.143; Smith and Smith 1976, 74.

\(^{24}\) see Säve-Söderbergh 1941, p.146-151; the campaign is recorded in an inscription at Tumbos dated year 2, 1st season, day 15; the return to Aswan is recorded in three texts of year 3, 3rd season, 1st month, day 22. Further texts of the campaign were carved at Tanger and Sai; see Vercouter 1972, p.28. The campaign went into the new regnal year which began on day 21, 3rd month of the 2nd season.

\(^{25}\) Säve-Söderbergh 1941, p.147; see the text of Ahmose-Abana, Urk IV, 9.

\(^{26}\) For the fortress at Tumbos see Urk IV, 138,16-139.1; Säve-Söderbergh 1941, p.149-150. Breasted noted a 'brick stronghold' at the south end of the island; see Breasted 1908, p.45. This is not mentioned in PM VII, 175.

\(^{27}\) Arkell 1950, p.36-9; Vercouter 1956, p.67-70.

\(^{28}\) Whilst Egyptian presence in the Kurgus region should probably be connected with the control of the desert routes, it did establish Egypt's claimed area of interest relative to the Berber-Shendi reach. The official boundary of Egypt along the Nile in the populated regions of upper and lower Nubia, was, from the time of Thutmose III set at Napata and the fourth cataract. The Kurgus boundary would seem to be serving the same function relative to the desert routes and gold-mining regions over which the Egyptians maintained a claim. Both boundaries delimited Egypt's claimed area of domination in Kush, and were oriented towards the princecons of the Berber-Shendi reach and central Sudan.
Thutmose II’s accession saw an offensive launched by the ‘sons’ of the kushite (Kerma?) ruler against the Egyptian presence in the third cataract region\textsuperscript{29}. The attack may have been inspired by the news of Thutmose I’s death, as the record of the campaign combines the bringing of the news of the ‘rebellion’\textsuperscript{30} with the announcement of the coronation\textsuperscript{31}. Thutmose II took one of the captured kushite princes to Egypt, which is the earliest direct evidence of the policy of creating vassals in the region. Indeed, this could be the actual turning point in Egyptian policy. Until now, the Egyptians appear to have observed a boundary at Tumbos, on the Nile (the Wadi Allaqi/ Gagaba routes being unconnected with the policy towards the Dongola reach). However, the repeated revival of a kushite offensive may have led to the concerted attempt to suppress Kerma (or its successor) once and for all.

Hatshepsut-Thutmose III co-regency, 22 years. years 67-89.

The Egyptian attack initiated by Thutmose II against Kush continued during the co-regency of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III, resulting in the defeat of the kushite princes. One certain nubian campaign in the reign of Hatshepsut has been known ever since Labib Habachi published the graffito of the imy-r sd\textsuperscript{32}wry, Tiy at Sehel\textsuperscript{32}. Habachi also drew attention to texts in the tomb of Senmut\textsuperscript{33} and on the stele of Djeuty\textsuperscript{34}, which allude to nubian campaigns. The issue was discussed in detail by D.B.Refdorf\textsuperscript{35} who cites a badly preserved text at Deir el-Bahari\textsuperscript{36} which directly connects Hatshepsut’s campaign with that of Thutmose I. The texts of Tiy and Djeuty are quite explicit that the expedition was led by Hatshepsut in person\textsuperscript{37}. Unfortunately neither these, nor the Deir el-Bahari texts are year-dated. Redford, in conclusion, suggests two certain campaigns during the co-regency; the first, early, being led by the king herself, and the second dated by the Tumbos inscription\textsuperscript{38} of Thutmose III to his year 20. Redford suggests the possibility of two further expeditions; if the Deir el-Bahari text is taken as referring to a different campaign to that in the Tiy graffito, and the Armant pylon texts\textsuperscript{39} and stela\textsuperscript{40} relate to an expedition different from that recorded in the Tumbos inscription\textsuperscript{41}. Indeed the Armant stela, as Redford argues\textsuperscript{42}, states that a nubian campaign took place not long before the first asiatic campaign of year 23.

The nubian wars of Hatshepsut are also considered by W.-F.Reineke\textsuperscript{43} in the light of his republication of the graffito at Tangur dated to year 12 of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III\textsuperscript{44}. The military activity in Nubia during the co-regency thus consisted of three or four campaigns. The first led by Hatshepsut in person and soon after her seizing of the kingship. This, probably the campaign referred to in the Deir el-Bahari inscription, would be a direct reaction to the kushite response to the expeditions of Thutmose I and II. The second campaign, of unknown extent, in year 12 recorded by the Tangur graffito was perhaps led by Thutmose III. The third campaign in year 20, possibly followed by a campaign in year 21 or 22 (shortly before the death of Hatshepsut), which if the suggestion of Kemp that Miu is to be located as far south as the

\textsuperscript{29} S\textdegree ve-S\textdegree derbergh 1941, p.151; Urk IV, 138f.
\textsuperscript{30} ‘rebellion’, being, of course, the subjective, Egyptian, interpretation of events.
\textsuperscript{31} cp below n.57.
\textsuperscript{32} Habachi 1957, p.99-104.
\textsuperscript{33} Urk IV, 399: 2, 6: Theban tomb 71, PM I.1\textsuperscript{2}, p.140 (2).
\textsuperscript{34} Habachi, 1957, p.104.
\textsuperscript{35} Redford 1967, p.57-63.
\textsuperscript{36} Redford 1967, p.58-9; E.Neville The Temple of Deir el Bahari VI (London 1908), pl.165.
\textsuperscript{37} Redford 1967, p.60.
\textsuperscript{38} S\textdegree ve-S\textdegree derbergh 1941, p.207 ff. with handcopy and translation p.208 and Abb.16 (after Breasted 1908).
\textsuperscript{39} Urk IV 1248-49.
\textsuperscript{40} R.Mond and O.Myers The Temples of Armant, London 1940, 8 ff., pl.88; Urk IV, 1243-1247.
\textsuperscript{41} S\textdegree ve-S\textdegree derbergh 1946, p.6, n.1 associates the Tumbos inscription with the year 47 Gebel Barkal stela, see Redford 1967, p.61, n.30.
\textsuperscript{42} Redford 1967, p.61-2.
\textsuperscript{43} Reineke 1977, this text was overlooked by Redford.
\textsuperscript{44} The older reading, cited in PM VII, p.157 derived from Breasted 1908, was year 15.
Berber-Shendi reach, was a major and far-ranging expedition. This military activity at the end of the co-regency surely marks the final crushing of resistance by the Kushite princes.

Egyptianisation of the Kushite elite in Wawat was rapid from the reign of Thutmose I onwards. Its results are particularly clear during the co-regency of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III, the princes of Debeira being a good example, adopting Egyptian names, working within the viceregal administration and being buried in Egyptian style tombs (one at Aswan). Other Nubians working within the viceregal administration are known from burials, again in Egyptian style and with Egyptian statuary and grave goods, from Aniba.

Thutmose III sole reign, years 22-54.

The years 22/3-31 and 33-42 were dominated by Thutmose III's Asiatic expeditions. Upper Nubian resistance may have been completely suppressed by the campaigns of years 20-22, although O'Connor suggests that year 31 may be the significant date for the secure establishment of Egyptian dominance, since this is the first year that the b3kw of Wawat and Kush are recorded. Any military activity in Nubia during these years of Thutmose III's northward consolidation was doubtless in the hands of the viceroy Nehi. The boundary inscription of Thutmose I at Hagar el-Merwa was duplicated, probably in year 35, although the royal presence is not a corollary of Egyptian activity in the region. The last recorded campaign led by the king in person in Nubia occurred in year 4751, when the fortress sm3 h3sw was founded near Gebel Barkal. This suggests an expedition covering the 3rd cataract to Dongola reach and 4th cataract, although whether it was militarily active, or a display of strength is unclear.

Four sons of the prince of Irem were sent to Egypt along with the b3kw of year 34, indicating that the Egyptianisation of the upper Nubian elites was strongly desired.

The sole reign of Thutmose III witnesses much building work throughout lower and upper Nubia. The fortresses received new or restored temples, indicative of their continued importance. The beginning of temple building outside the fortresses in lower Nubia (eg Amada) and the cutting of rock chapels, denotes a change in attitude. The cults of Amun-Re and Re-Horakhty are pre-eminent in these new temples, indicating a change in the religious policy within Nubia. The fortress temples had been largely dedicated to the Horus deities, or gods of the cataracts and their associates. The introduction of the Egyptian state-gods in the new temples, allied with their contemporaneous promotion in Egypt, shows that lower Nubia was considered as an extension of Egypt itself.

Amenhoptep II - Thutmose IV.

Amenhotep II 26 years (+ ?)
Thutmose IV 10 years (+ ?)

An inscription of an overseer of works, Minhotep, at Tura, dated to year 4 of Amenhotep II mentions the setting up of stelae in Naharin and in Karoy. The former doubtless associated with the king's Asiatic campaign, and the latter with the hanging of one of the slain Asiatic princes from the walls of Napata, both of which events are dated to year 3. Egypt's limits were thus defined as they had been.

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25 Kemp 1978, n.68 (p.290) see also Postscript.
26 For the princes of Debeira see Säve-Söderbergh 1960 and 1963, and Hodjache-Berlev 1977; the princes of Mi'äm (Aniba) are discussed by Simpson 1963; for general discussion of the princes of Debeira and Aniba see Kemp 1978, p.35-7; O'Connor 1983, p.265-67 and fig.3.23; Smith 1976, p.208-9.
27 The grave goods and statuary of Rulu, now in Leipzig, and of Pahul; see Steinordoff 1937, 187-9 (S 66) and p.221 (SA 17).
28 O'Connor 1983, p.257; see also Postscript.
29 Nehi is attested in office from year 23 (is the beginning of the sole reign) until year 52.
30 See Arkell 1950, and the text of year 35 of Thutmose III in Vercovertter 1956, p.68 ff (no.4). If this indicates a campaign in year 35, it surely could not have been led by Thutmose III in person.
31 For the Gebel Barkal stele, now Boston MFA 23.733; see G.A. Reimer and M.B. Reisner ZÄS 69 (1933), p.24-39; Urk IV, 1227-1243.
32 See BAR II 799; Säve-Söderbergh 1946, p.6 n.1, connects this inscription with the campaign of year 47 of Thutmose III.
33 The Amada and Elephantine stele Urk IV 1297-98; Säve-Söderbergh 1941, p.155-6.
established by Thutmose I, consolidated by Thutmose III and were later expressed, in a less dramatic fashion, by Thutmose IV \(^{54}\) and Amenhotep III \(^{55}\).

A campaign is indicated by the Konosso inscription of Thutmose IV \(^{56}\), in the king’s 8th year. This, however, seems to have been directed against bedouin in Wawat, and was not led by the king in person.

The administration reached its fully developed form by the reign of Amenhotep II or Thutmose IV, when the idaw were defined as ‘of Kush’ and ‘of Wawat’, and a dual system was established for the two parts of Nubia.

Amenhotep III, 38 years. 

The only known campaign of Amenhotep III was in year \(^ {57}\), and this was directed primarily against the territory of Ibhet \(^ {58}\), but the new toponym Ikayta also now occurs in the topographical lists \(^ {59}\) and is also to be located in the gold mining regions of the eastern desert. O’Connor views this year 5 campaign as part of a ‘comprehensive plan to expand and improve the exploitation of the gold mining areas as a whole’ \(^ {60}\). This plan included the extension of viceroyal authority as far north as Nekhen, in order to embrace the gold mining regions of southern Egypt \(^ {61}\).

The reign of Amenhotep III saw the beginning \(^ {62}\) of a new policy in upper Nubia. The king established a new temple and town which became the major administrative centre for the region until the early 19th dynasty. This was at Soleb, and called after the king’s Horus name H^r-m-M3’t \(^ {63}\). The date of the town’s foundation is so far unknown, but a jar label from Sesebi records wine of the ‘House of Nb-M3’t-R’ in H^r-m-M3’t dated to year 7 of Amenhotep III \(^ {64}\). The temple of Soleb was one of the major works of the reign of Amenhotep III, and in many ways resembles his two major theban monuments, the temple of Luxor and the mortuary temple (Kom el-Heitan) \(^ {65}\). Indeed, it belongs to a scheme of building work in which the king emphasised particular aspects of his divine nature. Religious policy in Nubia during this reign placed greater emphasis upon the royal cult associated with Amun-Re, and the queen associated with Hathor, paralleling developments in Egypt \(^ {66}\).

\(^ {54}\) A scarab, JEA 17 (1931) p.23; also see Edwards 1939, p.8-9, pl.9, a stela of a 1st prophet of Anhur, who followed the king ‘from Naharin to Karoy’.

\(^ {55}\) On the well-known ‘marriage scarab’.

\(^ {56}\) Ust IV 1545.14-1546.3; Säve-Söderbergh 1941, p.156f.

\(^ {57}\) A text at Konosso records the return, and the Semna stela (BM 657), Edwards 1939, p.21-22, pl.20, the campaign. The ‘rebellion’ was announced year 5, 1st season, 3rd month, 2nd day, the day of the coronation. Is it possible that some symbolism was attached to an announcement of a royal campaign on the day or the feast of the coronation? cp the similar announcement under Thutmose II n.31 above, connected with the accession. An inscription from Sai, Vercoutter 1956, p.81 (no.28) may also refer to this campaign.

\(^ {58}\) Zibelius 1972, p.74-75.


\(^ {60}\) O’Connor 1983, p.259.

\(^ {61}\) The investiture of the viceroy Hu;y before Tutankhamun (Davies-Gardiner 1926, pl.VI) indicates his control from Nun to Karoy’ and from Nun to Nefert-tawy; these are usually taken as expressing the same limits (see n. 103, below). It might, however, be interesting to consider whether Nun to Nefert-tawy (Gebel Barkal) indicates riverine Nubia, and Nekhen to Karoy the deserts and wadis to Kurugs. The nature of the viceroy’s control of the Nile valley north of Aswan, and its towns, is a matter for some conjecture. One might reasonably suppose that the towns remained within the sphere of the upper egyptian vizier, only the deserts, and certain essential valley resources and transport depots being under the control of the viceroy.

\(^ {62}\) At least, the evidence suggests this reign, although there are some grounds for believing there was occupation at Sesebi and Soleb earlier, also possible at Tabo.

\(^ {63}\) see Schiff Giorghini 1965 (p.155-56 gives complete bibliography of the expedition to that date, subsequent reports appearing in volumes of *Kush*).

\(^ {64}\) This label will be published with the other material from Sesebi in the final excavation report (in progress, see n. 76 below). My thanks to the committee of the Egypt Exploration Society for permission to cite this document here.

\(^ {65}\) Probably also the temple at Memphis, see Morkot 1.

\(^ {66}\) see Morkot 1986, passim.
Soleb temple was dedicated to Amun-Re of Karnak and to Amenhotep III himself, in his form as 'the living image of Nbf-M3'is-R' and as 'lord of Nubia'. The king was worshipped as a lunar manifestation. A second town built by Amenhotep III in the Abri-Delgo reach, at Sedeinga, had as its centre a temple dedicated to queen Tiye associated with the goddesses Hathor, Tefnut, Isis and Weret-Hekau. She was called the 'mistriss of foreign lands', thereby forming a counterpart to the king's role as 'lord of Nubia'. Unfortunately our knowledge of the Sedeinga temple is presently even less than that of Soleb, although the cultic relationship between the two was clearly very close.

This expansion within the Abri-Delgo reach was perhaps motivated by a number of practical factors: this part of upper Nubia was now no longer considered hostile, was reasonably fertile, and was within the gold mining region. An ideological motive for the building of the new towns is, however, also apparent. The main administrative centre of Sai was associated with the cult of Horus 'the bull, lord of Nubia'. Amenhotep III developed and personalised this cult, the whole temple and town functioning as one of the 'houses of millions of years' built at various towns throughout Egypt, and which played an increasingly important role from the late 18th dynasty to 20th.

The fortress of Sai, which was still occupied in the 19th dynasty, was superceded as the upper nubian administrative centre by Soleb and later Amara west. However, Sai doubtless retained, as many lower nubian towns and fortresses did, an important role as a staging post and population centre.

The establishment of vineyards at Soleb indicates that the programme initiated included intensive and long-term agricultural planning. It is from this time also that manufactured goods appear in the hoti swt; indicating that towns were also functioning as production centres, largely for objects made from the 'luxury' materials, or specifically Kushite products such as leather.

Akhenaten, 17 years years 195-212.

A campaign has been known since the publication of the Buhen stele fragment in 1911, and a fragment of a parallel text from Amada by M. Sandman, but, as H.S. Smith has noted, this received relatively little attention. Smith's republication of the Buhen fragments with the beginning of the text discovered during the EES excavations, allows a date of between years 10 and 12 to be given to the campaign. Smith suggests year 12 as best fitting the traces. The expedition was directed against 3k3y3, which is to be located in the Wadi Allaqi region and seems to have been caused by attacks on the mining settlements.

Sesebi, the upper nubian foundation of Amenhotep IV, Akhenaten, was a large walled town, over half the area of which was taken up by the temple precinct. Sesebi was founded early in the reign and was connected by a road with Soleb where Akhenaten had the decoration of his father's temple completed. Unfortunately we know little of the original dedication of the Sesebi temple, which was altered during the

87 The cult is briefly discussed in Morkot 2, in which for the lunar aspect and iconography see sections 4 and 5.
89 see Morkot 1986, p.3, 5.
90 My thanks to M.Prof.J. Leclant for his information on the current state of work at Soleb and Sedeinga and their publication, see also p.6 above.
91 Perhaps also, having made a decision to absorb this area the Egyptians needed settlements which would establish an integrated local economy, something a fortress does not do. Also with the expansion of the lower nubian system land may have been needed to settle, if not Egyptians, nubians or egypto-nubians.
92 see Morkot 2, section 1.
94 Smith 1976, p.129; the exception is Sve-Söderberg 1941, p.162f.
95 Smith 1976, p.124-129 (no.1595) and pls.xxix, xxx.
96 The final report on the excavations carried out by the Egypt Exploration Society 1936-38 is currently in progress (R. Morkot, Sesebi-Sudia); the preliminary reports were published in JEA 23 (1937), p.145f, and JEA 24 (1938), p.151f. see also Bengt Peterson in Orientalia Suecana 16 (1967) p.3f. and Morkot p.4.
reign of Akhenaten, and later re-decorated, with re-dedication to the theban triad, by Sety I. What is clear from the fragmentary evidence, is that the deified Amenhotep III was included in the cult.

Tutankhamun, 10 years.

With the accession of Tutankhamun the focus of attention, at least in terms of major monumental work, seems to have moved to lower Nubia, with the building of a new temple and administrative centre for Wawat at Faras (called after his Golden Horus name Shp-ntrw)\(^{78}\). However, this does not mean that there was a decrease in activity in upper Nubia. Soleb remained the administrative centre\(^{79}\) and some minor work continued in the temple\(^{80}\). Unfortunately our knowledge of Kawa, certainly founded before or during this reign, is incomplete. Faras was the first new town in Wawat to have a large temple dedicated to the royal cult at its centre. Is it possible that Tutankhamun was building Faras as a lower Nubian parallel to Soleb?

It is significant that Soleb was retained as the major upper Nubian centre. This could be an example of the 'devotion' displayed by Tutankhamun to Amenhotep III allied with the desire to build his own monument promoting the royal cult within lower Nubia, and with the practical advantages of maintaining Soleb, conveniently situated and splendidly endowed as the upper Nubian centre.

Faras was a large temple\(^{81}\), whereas the only known building of Tutankhamun in upper Nubia is the relatively small temple 'A' at Kawa\(^{82}\). The royal cult in lower Nubia had previously been promoted through those of Horus and Senusret I and II; the cult of Tutankhamun at Faras established the more direct personalised royal cult of the later 18th dynasty using the king's throne name Nb-Hprw-R'. A practical advantage of the site was its position at the centre of its block of productive land, whereas Buhem was at the southern end\(^{83}\). The central region of lower Nubia already had Aniba at its centre: it would have been impractical to have replaced a large town and fortress, administrative capital and cult centre which was centrally positioned both for its agricultural block and for the whole of lower Nubia.

Although the details of the cult are unclear, Tutankhamun was worshipped in a lunar aspect at Faras\(^{84}\), as Amenhotep III was at Soleb. J.Karkowski\(^{85}\) has proposed that the king's temple was paired with the chapel of Hathor of Ibshek already existing at Faras, thus paralleling the temples of Soleb and Sedeinga, and the later temples of Ramesses II and Nefertari at Abu Simbel.

Ay-Horemheb.

Ay 4 years.

Horemheb 28 (?) years.

\(^{78}\) For Faras before Tutankhamun see Karkowski 1981, p.66-70; the settlement was not a large temple-town until the reign of Tutankhamun: cpn.83 below.

\(^{79}\) So the evidence from the tomb of Huy (whose idnw Amenemopet was buried there) indicates. Huy, on his arrival in Nubia is shown greeted by the two idnw and the officials of Shp-ntrw and the mayor of Soleb (Davies-Gardiner 1926, pL XIV-XV).

\(^{80}\) The second of the 'Prudoc' lions, see Edwards 1939, p.14; Morkot 2, sections 4 and 6.

\(^{81}\) The excavated remains of the temple proper were 56 x 25 m., before which there would have been a pylon and possibly a courtyard, and/or dromos. The temenos of the Buhem temple was 31.5 x 24 m approx., and the temple itself 15 x 10 m approx. Soleb was 102m from the back wall to the second pylon, and a further 72 m to the first pylon and 30-33m wide.

\(^{82}\) Macadam 1955; see also the important study of L.Bell 'Aspects of the cult of the deified Tutankhamun' in Mélanges Mokhtar I (Cairo 1985) p.31-59.

\(^{83}\) Frandsen 1979, p.173, observes of the fortified settlements of lower Nubia that their distribution 'is clearly correlated with the location of the gold mines and the need to control the river traffic'. Faras falls outside this definition, and the reason is obviously that time had reduced the necessity for major defensive sites in lower Nubia, and a greater emphasis on agricultural potential. Trigger 1965, 14, p.151-4 on the position of Faras.

\(^{84}\) A statue group from Faras (Karkowski 1981, p.124-29, no. 73) shows the king with Amun and Mut and describes him as 'he who is born entire every month' see also Morkot 2, section 5.

\(^{85}\) Karkowski 1981, p.70 and n.314.
The late 18th dynasty is not well attested in Nubia; the only temples are the small chapels of el-Shems and Abahuda. Ay did a little work at Soleb. One interesting feature is the appearance of a new Horus-god in lower Nubia, 'Horus the lord of Mh3', the region of Abu Simbel. This may reflect a renewed emphasis on the Horus-king as opposed to the type of cult celebrated for Amenhotep III, Akhenaten and Tutankhamun. The nature of these rulers' accessions may have dictated a more conventional, and less personal cult form.

The evidence from Buhen indicates that it was not a major centre during the Tutankhamun-Horemheb period, although it doubtless remained important in the communication and transportation network. Faras retained its importance until the reign of Sety I.

The frequent occurrence of the name of Tutankhamun on temple blocks from Faras suggests that the decoration of at least the innermost rooms, and consequently that much of the building work, was complete at Tutankhamun's death. The erasure of Tutankhamun's name and its replacement with that of Horemheb on a relief depicting the bark shrine, is unusual (Tutankhamun's name in most instances being left) and particularly interesting. The result is that Horemheb is described as 'beloved of Nb-ḥprw-R'.

Whilst little evidence from the reign of Horemheb has yet been recovered from upper Nubia, it is perhaps possible that he founded Amara west and the earliest part of B500 at Gebel Barkal.

Ramesses I, Sety I, years 254-270.
Ramesses II 2 years.
Sety I 14 years.

Sety I founded new temple towns at Amara west in upper Nubia and at Aksha in lower Nubia. It is significant that these are close to Soleb and Faras respectively, indicating that the areas were controlled in much the same way, and also that the foundation of these new towns was an ideologically rather than politically or economically motivated change.

Amenhotep III had built at Soleb and at es-Sebua, but these do not in any way seem to have been equal foundations. Nor is there any evidence, although a possibility, that Faras and Kawa constituted a pair. However, with the reign of Sety I it is clearly Aksha and Amara west which serve as parallel administrative centres for lower and upper Nubia, each with a temple for the royal cult. It is interesting that the two foundations are roughly similar in size, and both considerably smaller than Sesebi or Soleb.

The Nauri decree of year 4 of Sety I presents a number of problems of interpretation. Whether it records land and property owned by an Egyptian or Nubian foundation of the king is briefly considered below. What is clear, however, is that the varied and probably intensive agricultural system initiated by Amenhotep III in Abri-Delgo reach continued during the early 19th dynasty. Indeed, if Soleb ceased to be used as a major centre, the estates may have been transferred to the new foundations and restorations of Sety I at Amara west and Sesebi.

Ramesses II, 67 years, years 270-335.

This is one of the reigns best attested in Nubia through monumental building works. Aksha, founded by Sety I, was completed and replaced Faras as the new administrative and royal cult centre in lower Nubia. The cult of the 'living image' of Ramesses II at Aksha indicates a policy in relation to the royal cults deriving from that of Amenhotep III. Abu Simbel, completed in the 20's, marks the beginning of a new policy, directly analogous to the cults of the king in Egypt.

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86 A text was carved on one of the 'Prudhoe' lions recording its setting up in the temple see Morlot 2, sections 6-7.
87 Smith 1976, 211.
88 Karkowski 1981, p.116 (no.58). The continuance of the cult of Tutankhamun at Faras under Horemheb is significant, and lends weight to any ideas that Horemheb was not 'anti-Amarna'. The 'usurpation' of Tutankhamun's name elsewhere, e.g. at Luxor, is most probably because the work was completed and dedicated by Horemheb.
89 i.e. land holdings of the Faras institutions were probably transferred largely, if not entirely, to the successors in Aksha.
90 i.e. es-Sebua does not appear to have possessed a large town.
91 As stated above, I believe Faras and Soleb were serving the same function for lower and upper Nubia during Tutankhamun's reign. Kawa probably held a very different role.
The later temples of the reign, Wadi el-Sebus, Gerf Hussein and el-Derr, were attached to the pr-domains of Amun, Ptah and Re, although whether these domains are to be identified with the major egyptian centres of Thebes, Memphis and Heliopolis, is far from clear. Many questions are raised by a close examination of these temples, however, by this stage in the occupation of Nubia it would seem that the cultural integration of Nubia (at least as far as the Abri-Delgo reach) and Egypt was complete. The mode of celebration of the royal cults, and in private monuments the greater emphasis upon family relationships and hereditary office all parallel contemporary developments in Egypt. The viceregal bureaucracy was almost certainly controlled very largely by nubian families, whether of indigenous, egyptian, or mixed origin, with only the very highest officials being appointed from Egypt. It is however, noteworthy, that, the office of chief of bowmen of Kush was held by one family for at least three generations during the reign of Ramesses II, and that there are strong indications that one or more of the viceroys came from Nubia.

The later 19th-20th dynasties. years 335-490.

Little or no major building activities, although many smaller and mainly private works. However, the question should be asked: does the evidence from Nubia during this period reveal a situation which is totally contrary to what is happening in Egypt? There is perhaps no reason to view the later 19th and the 20th dynasties in Nubia as anything other than prosperous.

Egyptian control still extended as far as Kawa, and the evidence from Amara indicates that it remained an important town. Indeed there is much viceregal work at Amara, and it is possible that attention was being directed towards the rising power of the Kurru kingdom.

The withdrawal of the viceregal administration.

The end of the viceregal administration in Nubia\(^2\) has been treated only very superficially by most writers who have considered it. The historical details are far from clear, but if we are to assume that the major centres were 'evacuated', fundamental questions about how this was achieved must be considered. Whilst many have supported the view that in the later new kingdom there was a decrease in the agricultural productivity and consequent decline in population, the evidence for this is far from conclusive\(^3\). A wholesale withdrawal of the administration and elites to Egypt is usually advocated, without asking the many questions which derive from such an idea, much less whether this is even likely. O'Connor\(^4\) prefers a political cause for depopulation and it should be recognised that ecological conditions must be extreme in their severity and prolonged before wholesale migration of populations occurs. Also, that the removal of the upper strata of society (i.e. here the egyptian administration and rulers) does not necessarily indicate that the peasant population also moved. A peasant farmer eking out a subsistence living is perhaps not particularly worse off without the visible paraphernalia of government.

Indeed, even if we are to believe that most of the population drifted away into the wilderness of upper Nubia over a longer period, there must have been a point when the administration was officially closed down. The disestablishment of the machinery of a bureaucracy in existence for nearly five hundred years is no overnight matter. The records of land tenure, and endowments, taxation assessments, viceregal correspondence, orders for building must have been disposed of or transferred somewhere. Were the temples closed down? If they were, what happened to their administrative records, their furnishings and fittings, their cult images, and religious libraries? Also, what happened to the emigrating population? How was it, indeed, how could it, have been easily absorbed into Egypt itself?

Should we not rather envisage, as perhaps the evidence suggests, that an attempt was made at secession by the viceroy Panehesy\(^5\), and that the local chieftains and elite tried to carve out principalities for themselves?

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\(^2\) I discuss this phase and the following 3rd Intermediate period and rise of the 25th dynasty and scholastic interpretations of them, in detail in Morkot 3.

\(^3\) For discussion see Trigger 1965, p.112-14.

\(^4\) O'Connor 1983, 268 suggests a 'voluntary and wholesale evacuation of Nubia... which may initially have been caused by the intensity of Piankhi's campaigning'.

\(^5\) A secession by P anchesy is fairly widely advocated, see Kitchen 1973, p.248 (§209); Černý 1975, p.632-34; O'Connor 1983, p.268; although note that Kitchen seems to assume an actual control of some parts of lower Nubia by Herihor and Piankhi.
Panehesy was dealing with grain supplies and nubian products, apparently at Thebes itself, in years 12 and 17 of Ramesses XI\textsuperscript{96}. He was also involved in the 'suppression' of the high priest of Amun, Amenhotep, campaigning as far north as Hardat\textsuperscript{97}. Although he was apparently still in Thebes, or controlling Thebes in year 17 of Ramesses XI, by year 19 a new situation is apparent in the southern city. Year 19 was also the year 1 of the 'repeating of births'\textsuperscript{98}, and marks the appearance of Herihor in Thebes with the titles high priest of Amun, generalissimo and viceroy of Kush\textsuperscript{99}. In the tomb robbery papyri Panehesy is referred to with the determinative signifying 'something deadly, hostile or detrimental'\textsuperscript{100}. There is no evidence that Herihor and his son Piankh, who succeeded him in year 7/26\textsuperscript{101}, were anything other than titular viceroys of Kush.

An alternative interpretation of events is that, Panehesy was invited, or of his own accord, took some control of upper Egypt around year 12 of Ramesses XI. Herihor was sent against him and installed as ruler of upper Egypt with the office of high priest of Amun added to his military rank of generalissimo. Panehesy was, at least technically, deprived of the office of viceroy, which was then given to Herihor, but Panehesy himself remained de facto ruler of lower Nubia. Indeed, he was buried at Aniba, and possibly succeeded by another independent ruler.

How far Panehesy controlled the whole of the viceroyal domain is uncertain. His authority may eventually have been confined to lower Nubia, whilst upper Nubia was divided amongst local princes. The most important of these were later the chiefs buried at el-Kuru. It is significant that 20th dynasty material has been identified amongst the earliest burials at el-Kuru\textsuperscript{102}, indicating that our interpretation of the sites chronology needs reconsidering. Viceregal control of the Abri-Delgo reach lasted until the reign of Ramesses XI, and the fragmentation of Nubia may have been rapid and the direct result of the activities of Panehesy.

II. Limits of influence and control.
A. Geographical.

The military expeditions recorded in Nubia after the reign of Thutmose III were most frequently against the nomadic tribes of the eastern desert which presented a constant threat to the gold mining stations and perhaps also the riverine settlements. The frequent depictions of the slaughter of the kushites is certainly more symbolic than historical.

Egypt defined its southern frontiers by use of natural features, originally the first cataract, and later, with the middle kingdom occupation, the natural boundary of the 2nd cataract. The 18th dynasty expansion south of the 2nd cataract limited itself first at Tumbos, and ultimately in the region called Karoy. This is to be identified with the 4th cataract region\textsuperscript{103} or Abu Hamed reach\textsuperscript{104}.

The southermost Egyptian fortress was established at the 4th cataract by Thutmose III who was apparently the first Egyptian ruler to reach Gebel Barkal, as recorded in a stela of year 47 from there. The fortress (called sm3 δ'σιδω) contained a chapel dedicated to Amun, although neither of these have yet been

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\textsuperscript{96} Kitchen 1973, p.247-8 (§208) and refs; p.16 (§14) and refs in n.70.
\textsuperscript{97} Kitchen 1975, 247 (§208); Çerif 1975, p.630-31.
\textsuperscript{98} Kitchen 1973.
\textsuperscript{99} Kitchen 1973, p.16-23 (§§14-19); p.248 (§209).
\textsuperscript{100} Çerif 1975, p.634.
\textsuperscript{101} For Piankh see Kitchen 1973, p.16f. (§§14-17).
\textsuperscript{102} T. Kendall, Kush: Lost kingdom of the Nile (Brockton, Mass., 1982), p.21 (for general discussion of el-Kuru cemetery); p.22, for faience bowl, Kendall raises the possibility that this object was actually an heirloom. Manufacture in Egypt is not, of course, necessarily to be assumed; it could equally have been the product of lower Nubia or Amara west.
\textsuperscript{103} Sève-Soderbergh 1941, p.156; Vandersleyen 1971, p.55 n.6; Zibelli 1972, p.162-3; Kemp 1978, p.29; Saumeron and Yooyotte in BIFAO 50 (1952) p.183-7 associate the name with the root KUR/KAR and with the modern Kareima and Kuru. Many of these writers use the analogy of the text in the tomb of Huy (Davies-Gardiner 1926, pl.VII), but see my comment in n.61 above.
\textsuperscript{104} Vercoutter in Kush 7 (1959), p.135 suggests that Karoy covered a large area and most probably included the Fourth Cataract region with the gold mines east of Abu Hamed.
located. Amenhotep II had an asianic prince hung from the walls of the fortress\textsuperscript{105}, but there is relatively little known building work of the 18th dynasty, and no town or fortress has ever been discovered.

Our knowledge of this southernmost area of Egyptian control is limited. The way in which different empires have controlled their frontier zones is far too complex to discuss in detail here, although it should be considered in relation to Egypt's 4th cataract frontier. The usual assumption is that the frontier was established at the cataract, north of which, in riverine terms, all was in control of the viceregal administration.

Owen Lattimore\textsuperscript{106}, discussing chinese imperial expansion and establishing a model for other old world expansions indicates three radii:\textsuperscript{107} unification by military action; centralization under uniform civil administration, and economic integration.\textsuperscript{107} To qualify these, then, simplistically apply them to Nubia. Military action itself comprised inner and outer radii, over territories that could be added to the state and those which could be invaded with 'profit' in plunder or tribute, or to prevent the growth of powerful military strength. The outer radius comprised territories which could not be permanently annexed. In Nubia these radii are clear, being defined by the Bayuda desert and 4th/5th cataract region. Beyond this the Berber-Shendi reach could have been invaded (as O'Connor has proposed) but not annexed. Similar administrative structures all derived from the central type were introduced into each newly acquired region. Within Nubia this is abundantly documented, the bureaucracy being modelled directly on that of Egypt. Economic integration, with the shortest range, was, in Lattimore's model, dictated by the transport of bulk goods (especially food) at a profit. This for Egypt and Nubia is a more complex issue, and discussed below.

Whilst the Egyptians may have patrolled the cataract region as far as Kurgus, and even campaigned farther south, the sphere of control, although not necessarily influence (which may have ranged farther) certainly ended at Napata. The natural frontiers are too formidable for integration, military or administrative, of the region beyond.

The lack of evidence for Egyptian activity between Kawa and the fourth cataract suggests the possibility that this area may have been in the control of local princes who owed an allegiance to the pharaoh. Such local chieftains would doubtless have found many advantages in an alliance with a powerful Egyptian state, although they probably tried to establish their own hegemonies when that authority ultimately weakened. Such a situation would also account for the extensive building works of the Egyptians in the region immediately to the north, the Abri-Delgo reach, which is less fertile than the Dongola reach.\textsuperscript{108} B.J.Kemp has already plausibly argued that the fertile Kerma-Leiti basin region might have been given over to cattle grazing.\textsuperscript{109} Although this is the most fertile region south of Silsila, it is known that for high agricultural (i.e., crop) production, irrigation of the basins is necessary. There is however, some supporting evidence for the large scale pasturing of cattle in upper Nubia.

The role of the frontier fortress of Napata is very unclear. Although it has been regarded by some that Napata functioned as a viceregal seat and the major administrative centre for upper Nubia, there is no direct evidence to support this. Indeed the evidence we possess and theoretical considerations seem rather to indicate the opposite. Napata in the 18th dynasty may have been not a major city but a relatively small frontier fortress marking Egypt's official boundary\textsuperscript{110}. Such religious significance that it had was due to the association of Gebel Barkal with the 'throne of the two lands' and consequently a dwelling place of Amun\textsuperscript{111}. Whilst we know very little of Napata in the 18th dynasty, Piye's transferrence of the Soleb sculptures to adorn

\textsuperscript{105} see n.53 above.
\textsuperscript{106} Lattimore 1962, p.450; see also Mason 1984, p.99.
\textsuperscript{107} These radii will of course be governed and modified by a number of factors: the nature of the country; its population; political structure and economic resources; its proximity to militarily powerful states and other spheres of influence.
\textsuperscript{108} The political interpretation of the Abri-Delgo settlement proposed here deliberately ignores the ecological alternative of Kemp 1972b, p.667: 'The apparently non-ecologically based distribution of temple towns into the impoverished area between the Batin el-Hagar and the Third Cataract looks suspiciously like the result of an over-assessment of agricultural potential based on a false understanding of the processes of nature.' cp. Frandsen 1979, p.173 and see further below.
\textsuperscript{109} Kemp 1978, p.21,32.
\textsuperscript{110} Säve-Söderbergh 1941, p.155 'Napata spielte wahrscheinlich nicht nur als Grenzfestung, sondern auch als Handelsplatz eine grössere Rolle, wo die Produkte des südlichen Sudans das ägyptische Imperium erreichten...'; a view also held by Kemp (1978, p.28); cp. however, my alternative suggestion for the method of trade below.
\textsuperscript{111} A sacred site in a remote place does not, however, predilect either a large temple and town, or a major cult and pilgrimage centre, cp. perhaps the Hathor shrine at Sinai. The popularity (and hence wealth and importance) of centres such as the Amun oracle at Siwa seem to belong to a later phase of religious development.
his enlarged Amun temple (B500) surely indicates that there had been no monumental building there for him to re-use. A small temple (B600) is thought to date from the reign of Thutmose IV,  and the first larger temple, the eventual core of B500, was begun by Horemheb or Sety I and completed by Ramesses II. However, it has been argued for lower Nubia, ramesside temples, whatever their size, do not necessarily predicate large town sites or population centres. Ramesses II's temple at Gebel Barkal is similar in size to the temple of Gerf Hussein.

The major new kingdom building work was in lower Nubia and the Abri-Delgo reach. It is, in any case, hardly likely that the Egyptians would have built their major administrative centre at the frontier.

The evidence indicates that Soleb and Amara were successively the seats of the ignBW in the late 18th-20th dynasties, and in consequence should be regarded as the most important towns. Access to Napata may have been most frequently via the Meheila road from Kawa, thereby avoiding the Dongola reach.

No archaeological evidence for a town or fortress has yet been discovered at Gebel Barkal. The site of Sanam, a little way to the west of Barkal, on the south side of the river, has been suggested to have been the town site of Napata during the 25th dynasty. However, during the new kingdom such a situation for Napata is clearly impossible. While Sanam controlled the Bayuda road to Meroe and thus during the napata-meriotic period would have been an important position, as an Egyptian garrison it would have been extremely vulnerable.

It is possible that the frontier fortress founded by Thutmose III was located on one of the large islands in the river, near Gebel Barkal. Lepsius found some new kingdom fragments on 'Om Oscher, although these could have been taken there at a later date. The Egyptians would doubtless have chosen the position of their frontier fortress a site which was both easily defensible and had some controlling position. Island or west bank fortresses had been favoured at the second cataract, because the major military threat came from the eastern desert. The early-mid-18th dynasty fortress in upper Nubia was on the island of Sai, and there was possibly a fortress founded by Thutmose I on the island of Tumbo. At Napata the situation was complicated by the direction of the river, which here runs in a great double bend. Military threat from the Berber-Shendi reach would thus have come directly from the south along the desert routes which strike the Nile again at Sanam. Attack from desert dwellers would have been possible along the whole north bank of the river. An island fortress is a logical possibility. As an historical reality it can be verified only by exploration of the islands in the Gebel Barkal region.

The boundary inscriptions at Kurgus are, as noted above, more likely to be connected with Egyptian control of the Wadi's Allaqi and Gabbala, and the Korosko road, than with control of the Nile and delimiting Egyptian interest relative to the Berber-Shendi reach.

It falls beyond the scope of this survey to discuss O'Connor's suggestion that Irene is, in the new kingdom, to be located in the Berber-Shendi reach. This new interpretation conflicts with the view that Irene is the same as the old kingdom Yam and meriotic Arme/Armi, both equated with Kerma. Acceptance of O'Connor's theory would require a complete re-evaluation of Egyptian military activity in the 3rd to 6th cataract region. B.J. Kemp has independently located Miu, another important Kushite chieftain in the new kingdom, in the Shendi reach. Whether or not these theories of identification are correct, it is certain that there were important political units within the central Sudan at this date. This does not, of course, mean that they came into military conflict with the Egyptian presence further north, although they must have been the main suppliers of the 'luxury' products which formed a considerable part of the ignBW and mmkw of Kush.

112 PM VII, p.215 for materials.
113 Evidence, that is, which has survived, been excavated and published. However, it is significant that such documentary sources as the tomb of Huy refer to Napata only as the limit of viceregal power, and to the officials of Soleb and Faras as the leading towns of the regions. Also no specifically Napatan officials appear to be recorded in any surviving new kingdom source.
Political.

In the tomb scenes depicting the presentation of foreign products, or the rewarding of officials, it is noteworthy that there are representatives of both the Asiatic and African states. The interpretation of such scenes, and the extent to which they can be read literally as records of events is, of course, problematic. Some might argue that this is another example of the symbolic duality found so frequently, and that it does not necessarily mean that there were Kushite or African ambassadors. What good reason can we have for maintaining such an idea? The Kamose texts quite clearly record letter exchange between the Hyksos and the Kushite princes. There is quite simply no need to accept that the states were incapable of sending ambassadors and communicating with Egypt. Admittedly the Kushite and African states were very differently organized to the highly structured city-states of the Levant and Mesopotamia, and in consequence the nature of their relationship with Egypt must have been different. However, it was mutually advantageous for the Egyptian and Kushite elites to establish and maintain contacts, and it should be emphasized, diplomatic exchange is between the representatives of ruling elites/princes/chiefs, and thus within discussion of Kush is not necessarily indicative of political cohesion, but of the existence of important individual rulers. There is certainly a considerable amount of evidence from periods other than the new kingdom indicating 19 or suggesting 20 such diplomatic contact and gift-exchange.

As suggested elsewhere, the region south of the third cataract may have been largely controlled by indigenous Kushite princes. There is some evidence in support of this, and it is likely that the Egyptians would have established a buffer zone between their political frontier at Napata and their colonized region of the Abri-Delgo reach.

The existence of such indigenous princes is not accepted by all scholars, who believe them to have been village headmen of little importance. However, there is ample evidence for Kushite chiefs in the early 18th dynasty leading resistance to the Egyptians. Any total disappearance of them, not paralleled in other imperialist expansions, needs to be accounted for. Also it is worth considering the role of chiefs as found in models of frontier expansion where one 'weaker' people retreats before a stronger culture. 121 Here it can be seen that retreat (physical) or resistance emphasizes the power of local chiefs, indeed, in societies which are loosely structured during peaceful times (e.g. due to the agricultural capabilities of the land) a former village-headman may increase his power and become a chief because of a tightening in the society's structure. If they are recognized as representatives of the communities by the invading power in order to impose the institutions of that power, or to establish a framework for the co-existence of the two communities, the power of chieftains over their own people is increased even further. The hereditary principle is also strengthened, and a family of chiefs may have a vested interest in perpetuating the subordination of the people as a whole. This situation is quite compatible with tribal insurrections against the dominant people.

It is a commonplace of Egyptological discussions of Nubia and the viceregal administration to regard Egypt's attitude to the southern country as totally different to its attitude to Asia. But does this interpretation derive solely from our own pre- (or mis-) conceptions? Inherent is the attitude that the Egyptians thought like 'us' in relation to the south. 122

One example of the result of this attitude is the confusion as to whether there were Kushite women married to the pharaoh. We have evidence for kings marrying Mianian or hitite princesses, but this is due largely to the survival of unusual source materials in the form of the 'Amarna letters,' and the marriage stela of Ramesses II. The tomb of Huy shows the arrival of the nsw wsw from Kush, which includes two

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119 e.g. the embassies to Alexander III at Babylon; the meroitic graffiti recording embassies to Rome (in Egypt); the treaties leading to the establishment of a tyrannos in the dodekaschoinos, and with Augustus at Samos; the ambassadors mentioned in Strabo.
120 As suggestive (i.e not accurately recorded; or preserved in source materials which require particularly careful treatment) of embassies (or payment of tribute) from Kush to other powers in the near east; Herodotos; the tradition of Kushite ivory used in the building of the palace at Susa; the Apadana reliefs at Persepolis and other figures of Kush as one of the throne-supporters of the Persian kings; the letter exchange between 'Kandake' and Alexander III; the meroitic treasurer recorded in Acts of the apostles 8.27.
121 Lattimore 1962, p.476; since the writer discusses China I paraphrase to a greater or lesser degree.
122 We should, of course, be equally wary of imposing upon Egyptian-Nubian relations the diplomatic machinery of the near-eastern states, but at the same time recognize that some sort of contracts must have been mutually agreed. Whilst it is accepted for the pharaoh and the near eastern rulers, the idea seems to be prevalent that in Nubia the king could set up an inscription (NB in Egyptian) effectively saying 'keep out', and he was obeyed. The Nubian boundary inscriptions are analogous with those in Naharin and at the Bahr el-Kalb: there is no good reason to believe that they lacked the contractual background of the Asiatic inscriptions.
princesses. We accept without demur that the male children of foreign princes were brought up at the Egyptian court as *ḥrdw n k3p*, yet, seem reticent to believe that the pharaoh married Kushite women. However, our knowledge of the royal wives is so limited that we are hardly able to argue such a position. Whilst the king may, for political reasons, have avoided choosing a foreign princess as the *hnw rsw nwt*, it is hardly likely that the union of such marriages were always childless. The greater number of 18th dynasty kings were children of 'minor' wives, and the accession was possibly sometimes disputed. Can we really be certain that there was no foreign blood, asiotic or Kushite, in the royal line?

III. The economy of Nubia.

In lower Nubia there were three major agricultural regions to which the three indigenous principedoms seem to have conformed. Probably the most productive of these, as in Christian times, was the central Derr-Toshka region, which had Aniba at its heart.

Lower Nubia was re-organised along the Egyptian pattern of land distribution, although when and how this was achieved is not known; i.e. whether it was a gradual development over a longer period or a single decisive action. The few extant documents relating to land holdings in lower Nubia are of 19th and 20th dynasty date, but reveal a situation closely corresponding to that of Egypt. Of course, within Nubia the agriculturally productive land was far more limited than in Egypt and possibly was of only one or two fields' width between the river and desert. Consequently we must envision a series of narrow fields, rather than the broader field patterns of Egypt. This is at least the impression conveyed by the Pennut donation text.

Kemp, discussing the postulated decline in population in the 18th dynasty, suggests the possibility of demographic revision in which the population was attracted to the urban centres. This may reflect a policy by the Egyptian administration of moving the people in order to re-organize the land.

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123 Davies-Gardiner 1926, p.xxvii and xxviii.
124 Frandsen 1979, p.179 citing Davies-Gardiner 1926, p.xxvii, regards the princesses as hostages and that 'this does not prove that they were subsequently admitted to the royal harim'. Equally it does not prove that they were not. Ironically, if Mutemwiya is actually a relative of Heka-ro-neheh and Heka-resheh, as may be indicated by the evidence, Frandsen's theory (1979, p.169-70 and n.14 on p.183) that *kh3*-names indicate nubians would provide us with a nubian *mrw nsw*. A nubian origin is often proposed for Mutemwiya; the issue is however, too complex and theoretical to discuss here. A nubian origin was advocated for Ahmose-Nefertari by earlier scholars (for refs. see Redford 1967, p.68, n.56), and, on the basis of the (unnamed) Berlinwest 'ebony' (actually boxwood) head, and her temple at Sedeinga, for Tiye.
125 On the 18th dynasty queens, see G. Robins 'The Role of the royal family in the 18th dynasty up to the reign of Amenhotpe III: 1. Queens.' Wepwawet 2, 1986, p.10-14, particularly p.13.
126 Redford 1967, p.66-69 proposes (on perhaps rather contentious grounds) a nubian origin for the 17th dynasty royal family.
127 The only work by an egyptologist (other than editions of economic texts, many of which have illuminating commentaries) which makes the attempt to survey the new kingdom egyptian economy is the immensely valuable study of Janssen 1975. A masterful work on the historiography of the ancient economy is to be found as chap.1 of Finlay 1985. Max Weber's 'Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum' in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 1909 (trans. R.I. Frank as The Agrarian sociology of ancient civilisations, London 1976) whilst a fundamental work is, for Egypt, out of date. The same applies to F.W. Heichelheim's weighty *An Ancient economic history*, transl. J. Stevens (3 vols. Leiden, 1958-70).
128 O'Connor 1983, p.265, fig.3.22.
130 see comments of Kemp 1979, p.40 on el-Sebua. Trigger 1965, p.154 'the geography of Nubia is hostile to the spontaneous emergence of urban centres which give the society an organic unit in the Durkheimian sense. The natural tendency is for the farming population to disperse itself along the river in order to exploit what land is available'.
131 see most recently, and with abundant references, W. Helck 'Die Stiftung des *Pn-nwt* von Aniba' *BZS*.1, 1986, p.24-37.
132 Kemp 1978, p.39f.
The system of temple town economies proposed by Trigger and Kemp, whilst establishing a model which provides for the greatest productivity and a locally self-sufficient and re-distributive machine, remains largely unsubstantiated. In upper Nubia the land redistribution possibly developed alongside increasing Egyptian interest in the region. Whilst Kemp's idea of demographic revision may account for the apparent population decline, there must have been small settlements throughout the cultivable area due to the intense linear distribution of agriculturally productive land.

It is possible that some Egyptian temple foundations held land in Nubia, although the evidence for this is difficult to interpret. Within the agricultural sphere it is difficult to know how such land-holding would have operated, unless it was to provide food for the use of those employed elsewhere in, for example, the gold mines. However, land-holding immediately creates an elaborate system which cannot be wholly exploitative, since it is necessary to feed, even at subsistence level, the local workers, and also to provide administrative staffs. Any involvement of the Egyptian temples within Nubia may therefore have been ideologically motivated. The king was the founder of temples, and donor of land. If the Nubian temples were attached to their respective pr-domains in Egypt this may have been to embrace Nubia more closely within Egypt.

The Nauri decree, one of the most informative, but difficult, donation texts from Nubia records a temple of Sety I 'Heart's ease in Abydos', but whether this temple was actually the famous Abydos temple of the king is far from certain. It may perhaps be possible that the temple was either the re-dedicated temple at Sesebi, or the king's new foundation at Amara west, which was attached to the Abydos temple, and perhaps contributed some revenue (mineral wealth) to the more august facade of the temple.

The Nauri decree enumerates the other agricultural possessions and products of the Sety I temple, indicating a wide-ranging exploitation of resources and agricultural potential. The temple owned bird trapping and fishing rights, fish pools, cattle, asses, dogs and goats. The agricultural employees mentioned include beekeepers, gardeners and vintners, whilst other employees were involved with gold-washing and with foreign trade, some of the products of which would have been transported by the temples own fleet. The inw brought to the temple is characteristically Nubian, including gold, ivory, ebony, leopard skins and animal tails. The tenor and location of the inscription suggest that these activities were carried out largely in upper Nubia.

Wine production is attested from the reigns of Amenhotep III and Sety I, presumably indicating continuity. Although the precise locations of vineyards are unknown, the estates were attached to the temple foundation of Amenhotep III at Soileb, and to the estates donated by Sety I in the Nauri decree, thereby suggesting an upper Nubian provenance. Wine was also imported from Egypt, probably as part of the food allocations to the higher ranking officials.

There is evidence for imports from Egypt, and exports to Egypt, in agricultural and foodstuffs terms. However, the movement of products between Nubia and Egypt may perhaps reflect the similar movements within Egypt, most areas being largely self-sufficient in basic agricultural terms, and perhaps manufactures, but with some types of food and other goods being transported and exchanged. Frandsen argues the case for the integration of the Egyptian and Nubian economies during the new-kingdom against the view of simple

133 Trigger 1965, p.109; Kemp 1972a; 1972b, p.661, 667; 1978, p.33f; see also discussion of Frandsen 1979.


136 Although it is usually accepted, see Kemp 1978, p.30.

137 An idea briefly discussed in Morkot 4.

138 Smith 1976, chap.10-11 (p.162-179) and importantly chap.12 (p.180-189), discusses all of the jar sealings and vintages from Buten, which include nubian products from the Soleb estates as well as imports. Frandsen 1979, n.29 (p.184) gives further references to wine in Nubia, apparently from delta vineyards. The Amara west excavations discussed many examples, which are as yet unpublished. Indeed the Amara west material should eventually shed light on the late new kingdom economy of upper Nubia.

139 E.g. cattle, indicated by the Huy scenes (Davies-Gardiner 1926, pls. xxx, xxxii, xxxiii; cattle are also frequently depicted in inwibabkw scenes. The issue is, however, complex, and it is unknown whether long-range trade within Egypt was exceptional or common, and whether it concerned luxury goods or also commodities for daily use; also to what extent the population was dependent upon local production and to what extent upon commodities from other regions, see Janssen 1975, p.161f.

140 Frandsen 1979, p.171-72.
exploitation. It is important to remember that the situation is one of ancient, pre-capitalist economics and that consequently notions of 'profit' applied within more recent imperialist expansions are not necessarily relevant.

Kemp suggests two ways in which the Egyptians may have derived advantage in terms of economic return from their expansion into Nubia, particularly upper Nubia. The first is that trade products were encountered closer to their sources and therefore were diminished less by customs dues levied upon them by a succession of native rulers. This may be valid, although it does raise the extremely difficult and complex issues of whether customs dues were actually levied, and whether profit is really a consideration within the terms of the pre-capitalist economies. In any case it should be considered whether, if the Egyptians maintained an actual limit of occupation in the Abri-Delgo-Kawa region, they actually controlled the trade with the central Sudan. Whilst it is a common assumption that they did, and that to an extent this was a motivation for their activity in the region, can we really be certain that 'control' of trade was desired by the Egyptians? They may in fact have found it more convenient to leave it in the hands of the local princes of the Dongola reach, and receive it direct from them. There seems to be little direct evidence that the Egyptians were involved in trade expeditions in Nubia at this time (unlike the expeditions of the 6th dynasty).

Foreign trade was probably less for 'profit' than for the acquisition of luxury or desirable commodities which could not be produced in Egypt. The agricultural production of Egypt was used largely within Egypt, as were many of the manufactures. Lattimore raises the important issue that in China the justification for commodities passing over the frontier was political rather than economic. For this reason the economic categories 'trade', int and b3kw may be difficult to distinguish, trade being an exchange of commodities of equal value at one time, whereas the gift exchange was part of an extended cycle of events. In terms of products exchanged, there may have been no distinction. The evidence for nubian goods certainly seems to attest the same commodities being exchanged under the three different categories. The distinction derives from the social relationship implicit in gift exchange: trade probably did not involve such complex social obligations.

Kemp secondly considers direct exploitation of the available resources, both mineral and directly of the land. The mineral, particularly gold, exploitation of Nubia has for long been regarded as the prime factor in the Egyptian expansion, although J.Janssen has raised some doubts about this. Kemp also points out that economic exploitation as a prime motive in imperialism has been doubted in the history of more recent colonial empires. The agricultural production of Nubia is unlikely ever to have been so great as to have made it particularly 'profitable' for the Egyptians in a strictly economic sense. The investment in terms of people, army and ultimately temple building, as Kemp points out, must have been a 'loss'. The benefit is the extension of the very state itself.

Slaves were acquired directly from territories adjacent to those occupied by the Egyptians in Nubia, primarily the eastern deserts. These were most usually captured during military campaigns, and were thus initially prisoners. Whether the Egyptians conducted slave-raids, is the purposeful acquisition of slaves by use of military force, is little unclear. It is possible that the campaigns described in texts really had the function of a slave-raid, even if the excuse given is 'rebellion' or attack on gold mining settlements. Slaves were also acquired as part of the int and b3kw of the kushite states of the south of Nubia and the central Sudan. Within Egyptian society and economic structure, however, slaves constituted a relatively small group. Egypt did not possess the necessary conditions for large-scale slavery, and there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between these two systems.

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141 Kemp 1978, p.19f.
142 Trade with Punt is a different issue. I did once suggest that the Hatshepsu Punt expedition may have been an attempt either to avoid upper nubian and central sudanese levies, or have been due to political and military difficulties in upper Nubia.
143 A stimulating work on this subject is K. Polanyi, M. Arensberg and H.W. Pearson eds., Trade and market in the early empires. Economics in history and theory (Glencoe, Ill., 1957) although it has little detailed discussion of Egypt.
144 Lattimore 1962, p.483.
145 although it can be argued that almost all trade was conducted by the means of gift exchange, see discussion of Mauss in Mason 1984, p.118 f.
146 Janssen 1975, 153-56; Frandsen 1979, p.172 pursues this with some crucial, if unanswerable questions; cp. however, O'Connor cited under Amenhotep III above (text to n.60).
147 Kemp 1979, p.33.
148 Janssen 1975, p.171-73, considers slaves 'economically irrelevant' within the Egyptian system.
between egyptian and greco-roman or industrial/capitalist slavery\textsuperscript{149}. Slaves in Egypt were employed in households, temples, or in the production of luxury goods, but not as the largest group of agricultural labourers.

Of the forms of Egypt's economic exploitation of Nubia, the most frequently cited, and apparently most clear example is 'tribute'. The terms \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} are well recognized as difficult of interpretation. It is possible, following W.Helck\textsuperscript{150}, that \textit{b3kw} indicates produce of a non-agricultural nature. This was perhaps paid as annual tax to the central government. D.Lorton regards it as indicating trade goods\textsuperscript{151}. A recent discussion of \textit{inw} by E.Bleiberg\textsuperscript{152} proposes that it is to be regarded as the products exchanged between foreign princes and pharoah in gift-giving, and as such indicates a social relationship rather than the taxation or levies of an imperialist or political hegemony. The produce or commodities represented by \textit{inw} became part of the king's privy purse\textsuperscript{153}.

It is simplistic to view \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} entirely as commodities disappearing from Nubia, to lump them together and represent the situation as purely exploitative. We need to assess the roles of \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} within the Egyptian economy, and they are clearly different. Whilst the commodities represented in \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} are frequently the same, or at least there is a large overlap, they are two different economic categories, deriving from different relationships.

The 'luxury' products acquired as \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} possessed a particularly important role within the society. The use of some products, such as gold, incense, ivory and ebony can be relatively easily accounted for. Their value in the redistributive economy as gifts to officials, and within the diplomatic sphere of gift-exchange, was not purely economic, it also cemented social relationships, and emphasised the position of the king, both within the Egyptian hierarchy and in the wider geo-political context.

To recognize \textit{inw} as indicative of a social relationship introduces the issue of reciprocal obligation with its corollary that a reciprocal and social relationship cannot be wholly exploitative. Since \textit{inw} was presented by the kushite rulers to the pharaoh we must acknowledge that the pharaoh gave gifts to the kushite rulers in return. Past studies have usually seen the pharaoh as depleted Nubia of its gold resources and luxury goods, either directly, or as 'tax' or 'tribute' which then entered a reciprocal gift exchange cycle with the other near eastern potentates. However, reconsidering the nature of \textit{inw} we must radically alter our perception of the kushite-egyptian relationship. The pharaoh thus becomes involved in mutual gift exchange with both kushite and near eastern rulers (and libyan and puntite chiefs, and probably chiefs of the eastern desert tribes). It should be stressed that transference of goods by gift is not principally, or essentially, with the idea of receiving a profit or an economic advantage\textsuperscript{154}.

It is not possible to discuss here the constituent elements of \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} in detail. The role played by the nubian products not depicted as forming part of the \textit{inw/b3kw} should also be considered, and the question posed: did they not belong to them, falling instead into some other economic category or were they not depicted because they were not 'exotic' or 'luxury' commodities?

Some categories of product are, however, economically inexplicable. For example, what function was a giraffe in the egyptian economy? Wider issues must be considered, and although \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} have an

\textsuperscript{149} see the 'Slave mode of production' chap.1 of Anderson 1978; and the inspiring studies of Sir Moses Finley, Finlay 1963 and 1985 (chap.3).

\textsuperscript{150} see Jansen 1975, p.173 and discussion p.174f.

\textsuperscript{151} Lorton 1974, p.99-104, with many useful references.

\textsuperscript{152} Bleiberg 1984; see also Lorton 1974, p.104 who thinks that the word has a more general application.

\textsuperscript{153} This is a different issue and we can accept Bleiberg's interpretation of the origin of \textit{inw} without here discussing its ultimate use as 'privy purse'. The significant feature is that gift can be re-used only in certain ways eg. as gift to a temple, an official, or a foreign potentate. This, however, all falls beyond the immediate capability of this survey, if not its ultimate scope. My gratitude to Prof.J. Jansen for providing me with an english version of his study of gift by the king in Egypt. My own study of the \textit{inw} and \textit{b3kw} of Kuh is not yet complete. The fundamental analysis of gift is, of course, M. Mauss, \textit{The Gift}, New York 1954 (trans. of 1925).

\textsuperscript{154} Lattimore 1962. p.483, discussing cross-frontier silk trading, raises the interesting phenomenon of 'barbarians' submitting petitions and sometimes demands 'that they be allowed to submit tribute' to China more often [his italics] since the return gifts of the emperor were customarily of greater value than those presented to him. Here one might postulate a net profit to the 'barbarians', although its nature and use may qualify this. China was a different economic case than the ancient near east, but this does rather cast the gift/tribute relationship in a different light. Although the material has not yet been treated rigorously enough for analogous situations to be noted in the ancient near east, it does at least pose the question, was gift exchange economically 'profitable' to the politically superior power?
important economic role, that is only one aspect. A giraffe is without obvious religious or ritual connotations. As a function therefore, it must be considered within the 'prestige' sphere. Whether Egyptian kings kept zoos is rather unclear, but such exotics would have played a significant role at some of the great royal displays of power, such as the so-called 'presentation of foreign tribute' depicted in two tombs at 'Amarna. At these occasions the might of the Egyptian ruler was manifested to his own courtiers and people, and also to the foreign princes, dignitaries and their representatives. On these occasions people from upper Nubia and Mitanni, the Aegean, Libya and the levantine states, Mesopotamia and perhaps Punt were all assembled. The display of animals from Africa or from the remoter regions of Asia would have impressed upon all those present the extent of pharaoh's authority throughout the world. The ultimate value of such 'products' thus falls within the sphere of prestige and power: the display of pharaoh's universal rule. All people and their products are gathered together in his presence. A close analogy can here be made with the 'tribute' scenes in the Apadana at Persepolis, and those on the black obelisk of Shalmaneser III.

IV. Ideology.

In new kingdom Nubia only the dominant ideology, that of the ruling elite, is visible, and that is itself represented through the Egyptian kingship ideology.

An examination of the kingship ideology as expressed in the nubian temples and comparison with the more abundant evidence from Egypt, does however, allow us to see something of the way in which the Egyptians regarded Nubia.

The function of the kingship as expressed in the nubian temples is fundamentally the same as it is in the Egyptian temples. The function of the Egyptian kingship in Nubia, must therefore have been essentially the same as it was in Egypt. Had its function been strikingly different, its expression would reflect this. The king is still the sole performer of the rituals - and the same rituals; the preserver of m'set and establishe of offerings. The king is the subder of foreign lands, and ruler of all that the sun encircles. He is the son and successor of the gods.

The chief gods of the nubian temples, from the mid-18th dynasty onwards are Re-Harakhty and Amun-Re, with the addition of Pah in the late-18th dynasty. In this respect Egypt is no different. The state triad of Re-Harakhty, Amun-Re and Pah was promoted after the 'Amarna period, in association with the king. Local deities are also found, admitted usually forms of Horus, Hathor and Isis, but with a specifically nubian, and local sphere. The indigenous nubian religion plays no part in the state cults, but the distinction may be much as that between personal and state religion within Egypt. There are indications that at least some of the rock-cut temples were at places which were already ancient religious sites. Nubian religion itself seems to have been so fundamentally different from the Egyptian that it was impossible to assimilate deities in the same way as happened with the asiotic gods. It is perhaps also incorrect simply to assume that the Egyptians despised local religious forms, it may rather be that an abstract religious conception and possibly lack of state-organized, temple-oriented cults did not allow for assimilation with Egyptian kingship ideology, which was, after all, the foundation of Egyptian state religion. Asiotic deities such as Resheph, Baal and Asurra were more easily accommodated within the Egyptian state religion and kingship ideology.

The promotion of the divine kingship in Nubia has local manifestations, but is not otherwise different from the Egyptian. The 'aussenspolitische Propaganda' seen by Wildung certainly exists, but no more than in any egyptian temple. Frandsen believes that the nubian temples reveal 'a process of deification manifesting itself in iconography, epigraphy, epithets and divine typology' which 'had a distribution confined, by and large, to Nubia'. A rigorous examination of every temple in Nubia does not suggest this. Royal iconography and epithets are very much as found in Egypt. Of course, the ramesside temples are different from those of Amenhotep III or Thutmose III, but this is a result of the period of time involved. The attitudes of Egyptians and nubians had changed considerably. As Kemp noted, 'it is not enough to say that these rock temples were built to overawe the local inhabitants; this had happened generations before'.

A thorough analysis of the nubian temples as outlined above in the brief chronological survey reveals a development in kingship ideology which closely parallels developments within Egypt itself.

155 The worship of Horus and Hathor as patrons of foreign lands was not confined to Nubia; cp. Hathor at Byblos, Sinai and Timna.

156 In Egypt, of course, there was a greater overlap between the deities worshipped in personal and state religion, and in some cases it is not different gods, but different aspects of them which were particularly important within personal religious practice eg Hathor and her associated deities, Bes, Taweret etc.

157 And were also identified with Egyptian gods, notably Seth.
The earlier 18th dynasty emphasized the Horus-king, but from the reign of Thutmose III there was an increased emphasis upon the "hdb-ixd which led ultimately to the personalisation of the royal cult as expressed by Amenhotep III, and most extremely, by Akhenaten. Tutankhamun reverted to the kingship ideology of Amenhotep III, although new developments are also apparent during this reign. Ay and Horemheb may have stressed the Horus-aspect of the kingship, perhaps for personal political reasons. The early 19th dynasty is a continuation of the royal cult-forms established by Amenhotep III, with new cults of the 'living image'. However, the later years of the reign of Ramesses II saw the complete ascendancy of the royal cult in many different forms. Indeed, it is tempting to interpret the policy pursued Ramesses II as derived from that of Akhenaten, but expressed in more politic fashion. Instead of replacing the divine images with royal ones, the royal images proliferate and combine with the divine in many different ways.

Kemp pertinently observed that the texts relating to Egyptian new kingdom imperialism are about divine kingship, not about national greatness. Indeed, within the conventions of Egyptian kingship ideology, Egypt and its people were treated in much the same way as the foreign lands. The appearance of a new king involved the seizure of the two lands and the bringing of the people to order. The emphasis is always upon the person and divine power of an individual, the king. Egyptian imperialism thus lacked many of the nationalistic and racialist aspects of later, particularly modern capitalist, empires.

Because the theology and ideology of Egyptian imperialism focus upon the person of the king, de facto 'imperialism' becomes a different issue, the nature of which has been extensively discussed by Kemp and Frandsen. The constituent elements of the Egyptian expansion into, and domination of, Nubia, outlined here, require more detailed and rigorous analysis, including further field work in upper Nubia. Only then will it be possible to give any assessment of the full significance of the new kingdom control, both to Egypt and to the later history of Nubia.

Postscript.

In the final stages of editing David O'Connor's detailed argumentation of the location of Irem (presented initially in O'Connor 1982) was received: D.O'Connor 'The Location of Irem' JEA 73, 1987, 99-136. O'Connor's new study will doubtless prove challenging to the now widely accepted view that Irem is to be identified with old kingdom Yam and merotic Aten (argued by K.-H.Priese, see n.117 above). In his historical conclusions (part V, p.135) O'Connor discusses the contrasting implications of siting Irem in the 3rd-4th cataract region or in the Berber-Shendi reach, and also gives support to the idea that Muu should be located in this same region. O'Connor's interpretation seems to accord with the present writer's views as expressed in sections II A and II B, at least to the extent that he regards Egyptian policy in Nubia as paralleling that in Syria/Palestine. This new study is of major importance, and will help us to reevaluate our interpretations of Egyptian policy in the central Sudan.

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158 Kemp 1978, p.15.


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