

**The Merits and Perils of Intra-Party Democracy**  
Assessing the Effects of Party Reform in Germany, France and the  
United Kingdom

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## Abstract

Over the past decades, European democracies have experienced diminishing trust in their political representative institutions leading to a decline in party membership as well as both reduced electoral turnout and overall political participation (Van Biezen et al., 2012). In response, many European parties began reforming themselves allowing for the direct participation of party members or even non-members in various intra-party arenas, such as leadership selections through primaries. Parties claim that such reforms increase intra-party democracy (IPD) by making internal organisation more inclusive and by providing all party members or even non-members with decision-making power perilously reserved to the party elites (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). However, the positive effect of increased IPD on membership is highly contested and surprisingly few relevant empirical and comparative studies exist.

The central research question of this thesis is what are *the (different) consequences of adopting different types of primary rules for party members?* Hence, my aim is to examine whether the introduction of primaries is in fact as negative for party members as outlined by Katz and Mair (1994), Lefebvre (2011) or Hopkin (2001) or, alternatively, whether it represents a chance to revitalize parties as membership organizations (Macpherson, 1977; Ware, 1979; Bille, 2001). Primaries are defined as selection process for party leaders and candidates in which the final vote rests with either party members in closed primaries, or loosely defined group of party supporters or the wider electorate, open primaries. Thus, introducing a primary leads to a change in the level of intra-party democracy, as it shifts power from a more exclusive selectorate to either of the two selectorates outlined above. While this project focuses on primaries that select top-executive candidates, the theory and conceptual framework developed can be applied to primaries more broadly. The general argument put forward is that to capture the differentiated effects of party primaries we have to *study the interplay between the rules determining who can vote (selectorate) and who can run (candidacy requirements)* in primaries.

This thesis answers its central research question by developing a conceptual framework that combines these two dimensions for party primaries that select the party leader in public office. First, it outlines the underlying logic of the conceptual framework that links the two dimensions and then provides a theoretical discussion of its consequences for party members looking specifically at the interaction between the two. To assess the consequences of different primary reforms, the thesis focuses on four dimensions of party membership: the party membership level, the turnout in primaries, the quality of membership and the attitude towards the leadership. This perspective highlights that different combinations of selection rules and candidacy requirements in primaries result in four distinct types of intra-party democracy from the perception of party members. In turn, these types lead party members to respond in a distinct fashion. Using a mixed-method case study approach, the second part of the thesis tests the theoretical framework for various Western European parties. The analysis will mainly use primary and secondary document analysis as well as new and existing survey data complemented by qualitative in-depth membership surveys. The main conclusion is that only some combinations of primary rules can lead to a positive effect for members while others do not. For example, closed primaries with open candidacy requirements will lead to more active participation of members, while open primaries with open candidacy requirements will reduce membership participation considerably.

## Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>8</b>
1.1	The Study of Primaries: Main Concepts and Typologies .....	12
1.2	A Review of the Literature and Thesis Contribution .....	21
1.3	Organization of the Study .....	44
1.4	Conclusion .....	47
<b>2</b>	<b>Conceptual and Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>51</b>
2.1	Introduction .....	51
2.2	Defining and Differentiating the Two Dimensions of the Framework .....	51
2.3	Differentiating Consequences of Increased IPD on Party Membership .....	56
2.4	The Four Types of Primary Selection and their Impact on Party Membership .....	71
2.5	Conclusion .....	86
<b>3</b>	<b>Case Selection, Methods and Data .....</b>	<b>90</b>
3.1	Introduction .....	90
3.2	Case Selection.....	91
3.3	Method and Data .....	93
3.4	Operationalization of the Indicators .....	103
3.5	Conclusion .....	123
<b>4</b>	<b>The Case of the UK Conservative Party .....</b>	<b>126</b>
4.1	Introduction .....	126
4.2	The UK Conservatives in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects .....	129
4.3	Conclusion .....	149
<b>5</b>	<b>The Case of the German Greens .....</b>	<b>151</b>
5.1	Introduction .....	151
5.2	The German Greens in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects.....	155
5.3	Conclusion .....	176
<b>6</b>	<b>The Case of the French Parti Socialiste (PS) .....</b>	<b>179</b>
6.1	Introduction .....	179
6.2	The PS 1995 and 2006 in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects .....	183

6.3	The PS 2011 Primary in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects ..	206
6.4	Conclusion .....	221
<b>7Conclusion.....</b>		<b>224</b>
7.1	Introduction .....	224
7.2	Empirical Findings .....	226
7.3	Normative and Practical Implications .....	240
7.4	Limitations of the Study .....	248
7.5	Avenues for Future Research.....	252
7.6	Conclusion .....	253
<b>Appendices .....</b>		<b>256</b>
I	Overview of Interviews .....	256
II	General Fact Sheet .....	257
III	General Interview Guide .....	258
IV	Interview Consent Form.....	261
V	Green Survey Questionnaire .....	263
VI	Certificate of Ethical Approval.....	278
VII	Selectorate and Candidacy Requirement Types in Framework .....	279
<b>Bibliography .....</b>		<b>280</b>

## Table List

Table 1.1. The Four Dependant Variables .....	17
Table 2.1 The Four Dependant Variables .....	57
Table 3.1 Date of Party Membership Surveys and Leadership Reform.....	96
Table 3.2 <i>General-Incentive Model</i> —Outcome Incentives .....	109
Table 3.3 General-Incentive Model—Process Incentives .....	110
Table 3.4 General-Incentive Model—Ideological Incentives .....	110
Table 3.5 General-Incentive Model—Collective Political Incentives .....	111
Table 3.6 General-Incentive Model—Normative Incentives.....	112
Table 3.7 General-Incentive Model—Altruistic Incentives .....	113
Table 3.8 General-Incentive Model—Expressive Attachment Incentives .....	113
Table 3.9 Perceived Level of Activity: .....	114
Table 3.10 High Intensity Intra-Party Activities .....	115
Table 3.11 Regime-based External Efficacy .....	117
Table 3.12 Incumbent-Based External Efficacy .....	118
Table 4.1 The Expected Effects for the UK Conservative Party .....	129
Table 4.2 Turnout in Conservative Primaries 2001 and 2005.....	134
Table 4.3 Motivation to Join the Conservative Party 1992 and 2009.....	137
Table 4.4 Level of Perceived Activity in Conservative Party 1992 and 2009.....	139
Table 4.5 Level of Perceived Activity in Conservative Party 2009 Five Years Before .....	140
Table 4.6 Hours Spent Working for the Party 1992 and 2009 .....	141
Table 4.7 Participation in High Intensity Activities 1992 and 2009 .....	143
Table 4.8 Influence in Leadership Selection 2009 .....	146
Table 5.1 The Expected Effects for the German Green Party .....	155
Table 5.2 Turnout in German Green Primary 2012.....	160
Table 5.3 Motivation to Join the German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, Existing and New).....	165
Table 5.4 Time Devoted Working for German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, Existing and New).....	167
Table 5.5 Membership Activities in the German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, Existing and New) .....	169
Table 5.6 External Political Efficacy of Green Party Members (2009 and 2015) .....	172
Table 6.1 The Expected Effects for the Closed Primary in 1995 and 2005 in the French PS ..	183
Table 6.2 Turnout in PS Primary 1995 and 2006.....	187
Table 6.3 Motivation to Join the French PS 1986 and 1998 (All, Existing and New).....	193
Table 6.4 The Expected Effects for the Open Primary 2011 in the French PS .....	207
Table 6.5 Motivation to Join the French PS 1998 and 2011 (All, Existing and New).....	213
Table 7.1 Four Types of IPD with Indicators and Expected Effects.....	229
Table 7.2 Four Types of Primaries with Variety of International Cases' .....	232
Table 7.3 Green Party Survey and Overall Membership 2015 by Age Groups .....	250

*Figure List*

Figure 1.1 Four Types of IPD .....	22
Figure 2.1 Inclusiveness of Selectorate .....	52
Figure 2.2 Inclusiveness of Candidacy Requirements .....	54
Figure 2.3 Four Types of IPD .....	72
Figure 2.4 Restrictive Candidate Nomination Arrow Diagram .....	82
Figure 2.5 Permissive Candidate Nomination Arrow Diagram .....	83
Figure 2.6 Four Types of IPD with Indicators and Expected Effects.....	84
Figure 3.1 Four Types of IPD with Case Studies .....	92
Figure 4.1 Timeline: The Conservatives .....	128
Figure 4.2 UK Conservative Membership Development 1995-2011.....	131
Figure 5.1 Timeline German Greens.....	154
Figure 5.2 Membership Development of the German Green Party (1980-2014).....	159
Figure 6.1 Timeline: French PS.....	182
Figure 6.2 Membership Development in the PS 1944-2014 .....	186
Figure 6.3 Membership Development PS 1995-2014.....	209

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## 1 Introduction

Over the past decades, European democracies have experienced diminishing trust in their political representative institutions leading to a decline in party membership as well as both reduced electoral turnout and overall political participation (Van Biezen et al., 2012). In response, many European parties began reforming themselves allowing for the direct participation of party members or even non-members in various intra-party areas, such as candidate selection (Hazan, 2002; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Rahat and Hazan, 2001), leadership selection (Kenig, 2009a; Kenig et al.; 2015b) and policy formulation (Gauja, 2013). For example, more inclusive leadership selection procedures for both party leaders and chief executive candidates are by now very common in Europe with over 24 parties either using closed or open primaries (Sandri et al., 2015: 10). While parties can use primaries to decide about their personnel, this study mainly focuses on one specific type of primary, namely primaries for the selection of a party's candidate for the national chief executive position.

Parties often claim that by adopting such reforms they increased intra-party democracy (IPD) by redistributing power to ordinary rank and file members, giving them a more significant, if not decisive voice in various aspects of intra-party decision-making (Scarrow et al., 2002, Bille, 2001, Hazan, 2002). The literature points to potential positive effects of such reforms in transforming party organizations to be more inclusive, participatory, transparent and open (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). However, the positive effect of more inclusive leadership selection procedures on membership is highly contested (see, for instance, Lefebvre, 2011; Young, 2013; Colomer, 2011) and



surprisingly few studies exist that address this question in an empirical, systematic and comparative manner.

While over the past years there has been an increase in studies on various aspects of leadership selections and the use of primaries in these processes (Cross and Pilet, 2015; Pilet and Cross 2014; Cross and Blais, 2012a; Kenig, 2009a; Sandri et al., 2015), they largely focus on developing tools for measuring, classifying and explaining the adoption of different selection processes or study their impact on various aspects, such as electoral performance, leadership profile, competition (i.e., the number of candidates and incumbency advantages), approval rating and cohesion. However, their implications for party membership and especially the perception of the party membership itself remain very little studied (Sandri, 2012, Scarrow and Gezgor, 2010), although many scholars stress the need to do so (van Holsteyn and Koole, 2009; Bille, 2001). This lacuna in research is surprising as it seems that party membership—and its provision with more or less power—is central to the recent debates about the introduction of primaries.

A second and highly related aspect that remains hardly researched is the question of how such reforms *affect different membership sub-groups or types of members* (Sandri, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 1972). Following Hirschman's argument (1970) that measures to recruit new members are often not the same as or even in contradiction to measures to keep existing members, the thesis separately studies the impact of primaries on members who joined before and after the introduction of primaries.<sup>1</sup> Thus to fully understand how changes in selection rules affect membership, we need to strengthen the party

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<sup>1</sup> For a detailed discussion of why a classification between existing and new member is suitable, see page 18.

membership's perspective in the IPD debate by comparing changes in membership characteristics both over time as well as between existing and new members.

The central research question is: What are the consequences of the adoption of different type of leadership selection rules for the individual level conception of party membership? This thesis is a first attempt to fill the current gap in the literature. In doing so, it theorizes and empirically assesses the consequences of more inclusive leadership selections (open or closed primaries)<sup>2</sup> on party members. The overall aim is to test whether the introduction of inclusive leadership selection procedures is really as negative for party membership, as argued, for example, by Katz and Mair (1994), Lefebvre (2011) or Hopkin (2001). They suggest that these procedures reduce membership power and diminish the role of active members within party organizations in favour of passive or even non-members. Or in contrast, is it a chance to revitalize the party as a membership organization by providing new participatory opportunities to members and by creating a more direct link to the party leadership, thus enhancing accountability, legitimacy and empowering member (Macpherson, 1977, Ware, 1979, Bille, 2001). The argument put forward in this thesis is that to reconcile these two opposing views, we have to theorize and then study the interplay between the *rules determining who can vote (selectorate)* and *who can run (candidacy requirements)*. The need to go beyond the study of the role of the selectorate in leadership selection and to

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<sup>2</sup> In some cases, the party leader is the same as the top executive candidate (see, for example, the United Kingdom or Japan), while in other cases they can be separate positions (see France). In the first case, the position of party leader acts as a gatekeeper to the highest national office. Thus the top executive candidate is defined as the person who would be president, prime minister or chancellor in case of a party's election victory.

study other factors that might have influenced or even predetermined the outcome of the selection process was pointed out by Aylott and Bolin (2016).

In contrast to previous studies, this thesis is less concerned with comparing the effect of no-IPD and IPD on party membership but rather with how different ways of and procedures for implanting direct and inclusive leadership selections affect membership differently. To do so, the study looks at four indicators: *membership level, turnout, quality of membership and members' attitude towards the leadership*. These dimensions are crucial, because they allow assessing both the popularity and acceptance of primaries among members as well as changes of behaviour and attitude at the individual level. Thus, these indicators provide us with a more differentiated and nuanced understanding of effects on members and goes beyond the simple argument that primaries are either good or bad for members. Importantly, exploring Hirschman's observation (1970) of the differentiated effects of these rules on existing and new members offers an even more sophisticated insight.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, it presents the main concepts and typologies used throughout the thesis. The chapter then provides a first brief outline of its contribution to the field, before critically assessing the current state of the arts when it comes to research into the impact of increased IPD and more inclusive leadership selection methods on political parties and the individual level conception of party membership. It also outlines in more detail the growing importance of studying party leadership selections, especially in the form of primaries. The chapter ends by outlining the overall structure of the thesis and by providing an overview of the remaining chapters. Here, the

chapter also provides a first brief outline of case selection, chosen method and data used.

## **1.1 The Study of Primaries: Main Concepts and Typologies**

Before reviewing the current literature on primaries, intra-party democracy and its impact on party membership, it is necessary to define the key concepts and terms used in the thesis. This is necessary since many key terms, their definition and scope, such as IPD (for a more detailed discussion, see Cross and Katz 2013: chapter 1) or even primary (for a more detailed discussion, see Sandri et al. 2015: p. 11-13), are highly contested and debated in the literature. The key terms defined in the following are intra-party democracy (IPD), primary elections, party membership and the two sub-groups of existing and new members. The operationalization of the terms defined below are discussed in more detail in the chapters two and three.

### ***IPD-Intra Party Democracy***

The first concept to be defined is IPD and what an increase or strengthening of IPD implies. As Cross and Katz (2013: 2) highlight “like democracy itself, the definition of IPD is essentially contestable”. Nevertheless, a definition of the term needs to be based on, first, its understanding “as a participatory and inclusive decision-making processes” and, second, as the democratic outcome such process achieves in terms of participation, inclusiveness, centralization and accountability. Thus, a primary would provide a vehicle to change the level of IPD, and its use would result in a certain level of participation, inclusiveness, centralization and accountability within the party. Consequently, an increase or strengthening is understood as a positive impact on the democratic outcome

after the party adopted a new, more participatory and inclusive decision-making process, for example, a shift from a delegate meeting choosing the candidate to an open or closed primary. Therefore, the degree of IPD in a party influences “to what extent, how, and in which aspects of party life the members are able to control what their party does” (Cross and Katz, 2013: 10). Thus, the project follows a definition of IPD “as the power relations between party leaders and members and in particular as instruments for giving members a greater say” suggested by Scarrow (2005) and used by Sandri (2011). Here the main focus is on whether members perceive a difference in the level of IPD and act accordingly when less inclusive decision-making processes are replaced by a procedure with a higher degree of inclusiveness.

### ***Party Primary Elections***

Primaries are one instrument in the party’s tool box to increase IPD, but there are different forms of primaries that can be used to make different personnel choices. Based on Hazan and Rahat (2010) and Pliet and Cross (2013), the project uses the definition suggested by Sandri et al. (2015: 11) of party primaries as “the internal elections for selecting political leaders or candidates for office (either parliamentary elections or for chief executive mandates at all levels) that entail full membership vote (closed primary, full membership votes) or votes by members, sympathisers and registered voters (open primary)”. The empirical focus of the project is on leadership selection process for chief executive mandates, however the framework developed here is also applicable to other forms of candidate selection. In order to avoid confusion about or misuse of the concept of *primary*, it is necessary to distinguish its use in and

outside of the US. While in the US primaries are used to choose candidates for subsequent elections (Ware, 2002), outside of the US (Europe and Asia) they are more generally defined as party-internal direct elections. Further, as Sandri et al. (2015, p. 12) and others (Kenig 2009; Cross and Pilet 2015) point out, in the European contest “although the select party leader is not automatically a candidate for general or presidential elections at the time of the selection procedures, in most parties the leader is designed as candidate for Prime Minister (or equivalent) in subsequent elections” (Kenig et al., 2015b: p. 12). After the selectorate (open/ close), the second dimension of the definition of primaries is who is eligible to run. Broadly speaking candidate requirements can be placed on a scale from permissive to strict. While strict is, for example, the appointment of candidates by a party committee or based on special status in the party such as MP, permissive requirements allow, for example, all members to run or require a low threshold of supporting signatures.

Apart from who can vote or run in them, primaries can also be defined based on the election mechanism they use (Kenig et al., 2015a). Most straight forward is a ‘one member, one vote’ (OMOV) system or a mechanism in which the vote is shared between two groups, such as supporters and members, and all votes enjoy equal weight. In both cases, the decisive vote lies within an inclusive selectorate. However, parties can also use more complex systems with a first round of voting by a non-inclusive body, such as the parliamentary group of a party, as, for example, the Conservative Party leadership selection in the UK, or a college system, used in the UK Labour Party leadership selection until 2010. In order to draw a clear line between selections that are primaries and those that are not, the project follows the suggestion by Kenig et al. (2015a)

that “for purposes of the inclusiveness criteria, primaries are those selection methods in which the cumulative weight of influence of party members, supporters and/ or voters is equal to or greater than all other more exclusive selectorate(s) combined”. If this condition is met, the selection falls into the “primary zone”. Thus, the leadership selection of UK Conservatives falls into the primary zone, while the Labour Party selection until 2010 does not.<sup>3</sup>

### ***Party Membership***

Scarrow (2015: 30-32) suggests six types of party memberships or “affiliation modes” based on the cost to join and the rights of individuals under the specific affiliation mode. Throughout the thesis, the term membership mainly refers to the most costly mode of “traditional individual membership” (Scarrow 2015: 30). Compared to other mode of affiliation, it also confers the most political rights within the party, and also carries the heaviest obligations. In all cases here, that involves paying a membership fees, signed declaration to support party principles and prohibits membership in other political parties. In contrast, primary voters both spontaneous and pre-registered, the second mode of affiliation frequently referred to in this thesis is not very costly and involves little if any obligations but only comes with one right: to vote in the primary. Some parties’ also introduced light/support membership with reduced fees and limited rights. This mode of “second class membership “(Scarrow: 30) often exists instead of primary voters mode in close primaries, for example in the French PS 2006 primary. Having provided a first classification of the different mode of party affiliation and which one is most relevant here the next step is to outline what it

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<sup>3</sup> After the reform of the Labour leadership selection process in 2015, it now falls within the primary zone.

means to be a party member. Further Gauja (2015, p. 244) suggests, party membership is “a contested and constructed concept that is shaped by party, state and individual motivation”. All three factors need to be considered to fully understand what membership is and, why and how it changes. State conceptions of party membership usually provide a clear legal distinction between members and non-members and “those who belong are afforded recognition, legal protection and [...] legitimacy” (Gauja 2015: 236) but also responsibility. However, this thesis focuses primarily on the individual conception of party membership and its tension with the party organisational conception of membership. While from an individual perspective party membership is perceived as “diverse incentives that draws citizens to a party and the activities they subsequently engage in”, for the party as organization, members are a “strategic or functional resource”. More importantly by adopting certain new internal party rules to achieve strategic or functional aims, such as increased legitimacy, electoral success or reversing party decline, the party can, intended or not, affect the concept of party membership on an individual level in terms of partisan engagement (Faucher, 2015). As outlined above, here we focus on the adoption of leadership selection processes that can either increase selective incentives to join and be active in the party (closed primary) or further blur the line between formal membership and non-members (open primary) by granting the latter voting rights. Either way the question emerges of how these organizational reforms affect the conception of party membership on an individual level and vis-à-vis the party organization, and the relation between members and non-members (i.e., primary voters) in the case of open primaries. To study this, the thesis uses the following four indicators:



Table 1.1. The Four Dependant Variables

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Short Description</b>
<i>Quantitative</i>	
Membership level	increase/ decline of membership
Turnout in primary	rate and share of member participation in primary
<i>Qualitative</i>	
Quality of membership	increase/ decrease in intra-party participation
Membership attitude	membership view and relation to the party leadership

A change in level of membership after the introduction of primaries is a useful way to see whether it contributed to the revitalization of the organization or to its decline (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Lefebvre, 2011), while turnout in the primary is a way to capture the mobilization effect of primaries (Norris, 2000; Wauters, 2009). The third variable is the impact on the *quality* of party membership composed of changes in the motivations to join the party (Whiteley et al., 1994b) and changes in the behaviour of party membership. The last indicator is the individual member's *attitude towards the party leadership* capturing how the relationship between members and the elite changed due to the new selection mechanism. Taken together, these variables strengthen our understanding of how members perceive party organizational reforms and how the latter affects the individual level conception of party membership. Gauja (2015) stresses further that the engagement of individuals with parties is diverse and can be very fluid. She (Gauja 2015) and others (Scarrow, 2014; Sandri and von Nostitz, 2015) primarily stress the difference between full formal party membership and new alternative forms, such as supporters or primary voters with a less formal and/ or permanent link to the party, which might have an after all different conception of party membership. While we only focus on change in

the conception of membership in terms of full formal party membership, the project nevertheless looks at two sub-groups that potentially have a very different conception of membership with regard to their motivation to join and respective activities: existing and new party members. While the former are members that joined prior to the adoption of primaries, the latter are defined as members that joined during the year or after the primary was formally adopted.

Depending on the rules underlying the primary, the conception of membership between these two groups can be largely similar or reveal stark differences. For existing members, the change in the rules implies also changes in the incentives to be a member. This can either lead them to be loyal and remain in the party, voice their discontent or even exit it (Hirschman 1970). In contrast, new members join with the new incentives or even because of them.

Before turning to the literature review, the next section outlines the broad normative perspective that underpins this thesis. As with democracy at the state level, one central question is what shape IPD should take. Here the three main competing conception of democracy at the state level, deliberative, direct and representative, are a useful starting point. Given that the aim of parties is, as often claimed by them, to use primaries to revive party membership participation and encourage party membership growth the guiding principle to evaluate which conception of intra-party democracy (IPD) is preferred needs to start with the question which one is best from the perspective of the party membership. In light of this, the next section first outlines the three conception of democracy in the intra-party context and analyses them in terms of the process they require and outcome they produce. Hazan and Rahat (2010) suggest four democratic outcomes that vary with the process: participation,

representation, competition and responsiveness. They argue that it is not possible to maximise all four at the same time and thus the main aim is to find a balance between them. Here we suggest the balance parties should strike is the one that benefits party membership the most.

The classical and most common way to select the party leader is to use the party delegate model. This would correspond to representative democracy. Returning to the idea that IPD should take the form that benefits members the most with the least cost a party delegate model clearly limits the possibility of members to participate in the selection. Further, becoming a delegate can require substantial investment in both time and money. Here a direct OMOV system would allow for overall more and less costly participation of all members. In terms of representation, a delegate meeting usually fares relatively well due to rules ensuring all intra-party groups are represented in the voting process. Nevertheless, using an OMOV system would allow strengthening the voting power of certain groups within the party even further rather than reducing their power to one or few token seats. The degree of competition depends much more on the candidacy requirements than the selectorate. Thus regardless of the type of overall IPD democracy chosen, the competition can only be high and meaningful with permissive candidacy requirements. The last aspect raises the issue to whom is the leader responsive to: the delegates, all members or the supporters of the party more broadly. Most likely, to the delegates as the leader requires their approval to be re-elected in future. Thus it seems from the perspective that IPD should benefit all members, representative democracy at least for leadership selection seems not to be ideal as it somehow limits participation, representation and responsiveness to party delegates and does not include the whole party membership.

The second type of democracy to consider is deliberative democracy. The thesis agrees with the strong advocates of a deliberate model of IPD such as Teorell (1999) or Wolkenstein (2016) that it would be very beneficial for party members in terms of the four above outlined aspects. It would allow for discussion and debate among party members to nominate and then vote for their leader. Thus, it should produce high level of participation, representation and responsiveness as it allows for preference-formation at the partisan base. Therefore, as Wolkenstein (2016:297) argues the provision of such deliberative fora “makes internal democracy meaningful”. However, the main problem of deliberative democracy, at least in the case of leadership selection, is to collect and aggregate the decisions of the different deliberative fora. Here the model relies on either a delegate model or direct OMOV system. Thus, deliberative fora might be a good addition to the either form of democracy but cannot fully replace it.

The last type of democracy to consider is direct democracy using direct voting by individuals to make decisions. In the intra-party context, this means a vote by all members (OMOV) to produce an outcome, here to select the leader. Some parties went further and allowed supporters and voters to participate. Such open primaries might lead to high participation but from a membership perspective are otherwise mainly negative as their voice is crowded out by the larger external electorate. However limiting voting rights to members should overall be very beneficial for party members. This should lead to high level of participation at a low cost. Further, the selected candidate will represent the majority of party members and needs to be responsive to them in order to be re-elected. In addition, such closed primary would provide insight into the relative strength of factions within the party and would allow the leader to work together

with the leaders of these fractions producing an overall more stable and responsive intra-party environment. Returning to the guiding principle that IPD should produce the higher benefit for party members, it seems that direct democracy using a closed primary is the most suited form for democracy in the intra-party setting. It not only allows all members to participate with relatively low cost involved but also makes the leader highly responsive to the party members and representative of the majority in the party. Further, given that such a close primary is combined with permissive candidate requirements, competition should also be high.

In short having theoretically discussed how different model of democracy in the intra-party setting affect participation, representation, competition and responsiveness, it becomes clear that from the membership's perspective, direct democracy is the most beneficial and therefore perceived as more democratic. Direct democracy allows for highly inclusive tool that enables party members to have the maximum direct influence over the leadership selection with minimal effort and cost. Therefore, the closer a party get to this, the more democratic it is. This provides the guiding normative underpinning of this thesis. It returns to the question of what form of IPD is normatively most desirable from the membership's perspective in the overall conclusion of this thesis.

## **1.2 A Review of the Literature and Thesis Contribution**

Based on the above discussion of the main concepts and typologies used throughout the thesis, it is now possible to provide a first overview of its contribution to the field of political science. It introduces a new analytical framework to study the effect of different primary selection rules on party

membership's perceived level of IPD. Thus different primary rules affect the individual level conception of party membership either positively or negatively, becoming manifest in changes in membership size, primary turnout, membership quality and attitude towards the leadership. Overall, the thesis demonstrates that it is possible to distinguish between four distinct types of IPD (see figure below). As the next section demonstrates, it is possible to formulate theoretical expectations for new and existing members along the four indicators outlined above to capture how members perceive and react to the four types of IPD:<sup>4</sup>

Figure 1.1 Four Types of IPD

Open	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Atomized Democratization</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Example: United States Democrats and Republicans</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Disempowering Democratization</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Examples: <b>French Parti Socialist (2011)</b>, Italian Centre-Left Coalition (mainly DP)</i></p>	
<b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Protected Democratization</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Examples: <b>German Greens</b>, Several Portuguese Parties, Belgium N-VA</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Controlled Democratization</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Examples: <b>UK Conservative and Labour Party, French Parti Socialist (1995, 2006)</b></i></p>	
Closed	Permissive	<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	Strict

It is important to stress that the categories used refer to the members' perception of democratization achieved, and how this in turn affects party membership. The next section very briefly outlines the four types of IPD.

<sup>4</sup> The case studies chosen and analysed in this thesis are indicated in bold in figure 1.1 above

In the first case of **Atomized Democratization** (permissive candidacy / open primary), the party membership loses any control over the outcome of leadership contests, as both selectorate and candidacy are completely opened up. In this case, organizational boundaries are highly blurred or even non-existent, and the party ceases to be a clearly defined organizational entity of members and becomes a loose assembly of atomized individuals. Thus, the classical conception of party membership is replaced leading Berdahl (1942: 16) to argue that in such cases “party membership is generally not distinguished from mere voting affiliation”. Consequently, a negative effect along all indicators can be expected.

In the next case of **Disempowering Democratization** (strict candidacy/ open primary), members feel truly disempowered, atomized and their voice is crowded out by a large external selectorate and the process is tightly controlled by the elite (Katz and Mair, 1994). However, the party continues to exist as a defined organizational entity of members but with a reduced role. Thus, the general conception of party membership is adversely affected resulting in negative reactions along all four indicators.

The third category is **Protected Democratization** (permissive candidacy/ closed primary). From a member’s perspective they are empowered as they now hold the deciding vote on who will lead the party and their voice is not crowded out by a large external selectorate. Further, they can run in leadership selection contest if they wish to do so. Thus, members feel their interests and organizational role is protected. Thus, an improved impact on conception of party membership is expected with a positive increase in all four indicators.

Under the last combination of **Controlled Democratization** (strict candidacy/ closed primary) members also perceive that they hold the deciding vote on who will lead the party and that their voice is not crowded out by a large external selectorate, however, candidacy access is more limited and controlled by the party leadership. Thus, in contrast to the above, they feel that their interests and organizational role is not only protected but also controlled by the elite to prevent members from interfering with its aims. Nevertheless, an improved impact on the conception of party membership is expected but slightly more moderate across all four indicators.

In short, the main claim of the thesis that primaries are not good or bad for members but positively or negatively affect the individual level conception of party membership depends on the combined effect of candidacy and selectorate rules, and how this interplay affects the membership's perception of intra-party democracy. Thus, the thesis developed the conceptual framework above to empirically test different hypotheses that rest in different constellations of primary rules.

In addition to its theoretical and conceptual contribution to the field, the project collected new individual level party membership survey data and conducted qualitative in-depth membership interviews. Further, it combines existing pre- and post-reform membership surveys data. This newly collected and generated data set can contribute to and inform future research in the area of IPD and the development of party membership more broadly.

More generally speaking, with an increased understanding of the effect of different rules on party membership, we also gain new and valuable insight into the functioning and effect of such reforms on democracy at the national level.



Following the normative assumption that democracy does not only rely on the institutions of the state but also on parties that operate within these institutions and thereby represent the people. If the reforms are successful in fostering more involvement in parties, they could help in counteracting the generally negative view of and low trust in parties. The effective use of primaries can thus improve the societal linkage function of parties, make candidates more representative of the general electorate and increase legitimacy and accountability.

The next section reviews the current debate about IPD, primaries and its impact on party membership. It illustrates how and why the thesis arrived at identifying the above outlined gap in the current literature. Furthermore, this highlights the foundation on which the above framework is based. It also elaborates where the assertions about the consequences for party membership stem from.

### *1.2.1 The Importance of Leadership Selection and its Repercussions for Party Membership*

Before discussing the importance of how the party leadership is selected, the first step is to define what it means to be a party leader. Pilet and Cross (2014) highlight that who is the party leader and the role of the leader can vary from party to party. However, two types of party leader can be clearly identified: the leader of the party in public office and the leader of the party in central office. Of course, they are cases in which both these positions are one and the same, held by the same person or even one is a prerequisite for the other. This overlap of leadership is very common in Westminster countries but not for example in Belgium, Norway or Austria. In these cases, there might be rules in

place prohibiting holding multiple leadership positions at the same time. Here it is required to identify the dominant leader of the party. Giving the recent trends in personalisation, presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2005), changes in media cover, party finance regulations and the ascendance of the party in public office over the party in central office more and more the party leader in public office is or is portrayed and perceived as the dominate leader. Therefore, the thesis will focus on the selection of this position. In other words the thesis focuses on the selection of the leader of the party that in case of an election victory would either assume the top executive position or top cabinet post in case of being the junior collection partner.

The recent increase in studies focusing on various aspects of leadership selection in political parties is both proof of its growing importance and the fact that it has been overlooked in the past (Cross and Pilet, 2015; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross and Blais, 2012a; Kenig, 2009a; Sandri et al., 2015). One factor contributing to the growth in this area of research is that selecting a party leader or the chief executive candidate of a country (the focus here) is arguably one of the most important functions of parties. This choice determines who might run the country either as head of government, cabinet minister or as leader of the opposition. A second aspect that reignited the interest in methods of leadership selection is the ongoing empirical trend of opening up contests allowing members and even non-members to vote. This is often linked to the ongoing controversial debates around presidentialization of party politics, whereby parties arguably shift intra-party power to benefit the leader and increase his/her autonomy from other intra-party political key players (Poguntke and Webb, 2005).

The importance of studying the effect more inclusive leadership selection methods have on party membership is further highlighted by the increasing and more frequent use of primaries by many parties outside the US. In the US, primaries have a long history and started to spread in the late 19th century. By now, virtually all candidates for elected office are chosen in primaries (Ware, 2015). In some cases, the primary even becomes the actual election (for example, non-partisan primaries in Louisiana since 1978). In addition, primaries in the US are regulated by individual states rather than parties and thus follow more clear, enforceable and stable rules. Outside the US, the uptake of primaries accelerated about two decades ago. A recent study by Sandri et al. (2015) found that outside the US over 35 parties in 19 countries used primary to select their party leader and over 31 parties in 16 countries used either open or closed primaries to determine their candidate for the chief executive position. Furthermore, in 12 countries more than 18 parties also employed primaries to determine their national legislative candidates. In addition, primaries also become popular to select candidates for other offices, such as mayoral candidates in France (Fekl, 2015). Importantly and in contrast to the US, primaries in France, UK or other Western European democracies are adopted and regulated by the party itself rather than being state imposed. Thus, each party can adopt a different set of rules and change these rules quite easily compared to the US. The fast and vast spread of primaries into different institutional and political settings therefore underlines the importance of grasping how different rules of primaries affect the individual level conception of party membership.

The growing use and importance of primaries was and is accompanied by an increasing academic interest. So far, previous work on the effect of IPD on political parties focused mainly on its impact on electoral competitiveness (Schattschneider, 1942; Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Panebianco, 1988), its use as an elite tool (Michels, 1911; Katz and Mair, 1994; Young, 2013) and how it can create more opportunities for political activism (van Haute, 2009b; Kosiara-Pedersen et al., 2014; Gauja and van Haute, 2014). Other studies point out how the choice of selection mechanism can affect a party's electoral success and cohesion.<sup>5</sup> For example, Kenig and Barnea (2009) show that being selected in a primary increase the chances of being selected to the cabinet, while Scarrow and Gezog (2010) came to the conclusion that at country level an increase in the power of the party membership seem to have led to smaller but more representative membership regarding all aspects but age. Existing research has also focused on developing tools to measure, classify and explain the adoption of different leadership selection processes (Pilet and Cross, 2014; Kenig, 2009; Cross and Blais, 2012). Nevertheless, the study of how different leadership selection methods affect party membership remains underdeveloped, despite many scholars acknowledging the need to do so (van Holsteyn and Koole, 2009; Bille, 2001). The study by Sandri (2011) is one of the first to empirically and systematically explore the extent to which the introduction of primaries affects the role of grass-roots members, and how this change was perceived by the members themselves. But rather than tracing change in party membership over time, her study provides a snap shot of party

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<sup>5</sup> See, for example, the fight in the UMP (now Les Républicains) on whether to adopt an open or closed presidential primary. With both leading candidates arguing that one gave the opponent an unfair advantage, the party was forced to hold a referendum about the selection method (Boucek, 2012).

membership by conducting post-reform membership surveys. While most of the listed studies are not directly concerned with how the development of perceived levels of IPD in form of primaries impact on party membership, they nevertheless touch or remark on it and thus offer a good starting point. Based on this, the next section will present the current debate on the effect of changing IPD levels on party membership. The second part of the review goes beyond the party organizational literature and discusses how previous studies, mainly from political sociology and psychology, can be used to capture changes in the individual level conception of party membership. Based on this discussion, it is possible to identify a clear gap in the existing literature that the above introduced framework addresses, and how it in turn builds on the existing literature.

### *1.2.2 The Controversy about the Effect of IPD*

The very nature of research into IPD and the democratization of party leadership selection methods cuts across a wide variety of literatures. It encompasses literature on party organization, political participation and democracy. The discussion below provides an overview of the diverse mainly theoretical perspectives of the concept, its development and the impact of IPD in terms of primaries affecting party membership. What will become clear is that there are three distinct views in the party organizational literature regarding the effect of IPD on the party and its membership. The first group sees IPD as unachievable, the second group as negative or even dangerous and the final group as desirable.

The two main scholars who saw IPD as unachievable are Ostrogorski and Michels. Ostrogorski (1902) states that the strategic manipulation of party structures by their elites is the main factor that actually limits the development of democracy within parties. Furthermore, the party organization stops being an instrument for achieving policy and societal linkage goals but rather becomes a goal in itself for the leadership (Avril, 1993: 19). Michels (1911) advanced these ideas by formulating his famous 'iron law of oligarchy'. For him there seems to be a trade-off between party organizational inclusiveness and centralization of powers. According to his argument, elites use their power to advance the latter. Thus, elites strengthen their powers further, make themselves indispensable and foster a shift away from a policy-focused to vote- and office-seeking organization. To achieve this, the power of the membership is reduced making IPD unachievable. Later studies by Epstein (Epstein, 1967: 220 and 225) and Obler (Obler, 1974: 184-185) empirically confirm this trend, further supporting the claim that IPD is not possible. For Michels (1911) this implied party members losing power, but his main conclusion was that when the internal functioning of parties cannot be democratic, then democracy as a whole becomes untenable at regime level. IPD is therefore seen as positive, even necessary yet unattainable. The mentioned studies, however, do not address whether primaries could be used to create a certain type of IPD, which balances organizational and systemic imperatives with the power of the party base, reducing the oligarchic tendency.

The second group of scholars does not see IPD as unachievable but as negative or even dangerous for the power of party membership and the party organization. The best examples of the latter are probably found in work by Schattschneider claiming that "democracy is not to be found in the parties but

between the parties” (1942: 60) or Giovanni Sartori’s (1968: 124) conclusion that “democracy on a large scale is not the sum of many little democracies”. These arguments’ underlying logic is that parties create the link and space for deliberation and interest aggregation within the political system. Thus, party leaders provide linkage structures between the state and ordinary citizens. To do so effectively, parties need to be united and cohesive. In their view however, IPD weakens this pre-conditions by providing internal minorities and factions with a tool to challenge the party leadership (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Panebianco, 1988). Similar to Michels (1911), Duverger (1954) states that the practical imperative of efficiency pushes party organizational structures in the exact opposite direction of real and meaningful IPD (Duverger, 1954: 204), but rather than being a choice by the leaders, it is triggered by the external factor of electoral competition. McKenzie (McKenzie, 1982: 195) agrees with the negative assessment of IPD formulated by the above authors. He stresses that “intra-party democracy [...] is incompatible with democratic government”. For him increased IPD implies that the party in central office supersedes the legitimately elected party in public office (McKenzie, 1982). The emphasis on the impact of IPD on inter-party competitiveness and the link of interest aggregation and accountability between voters and government leads this group of scholars to a negative outlook. Teorell (1999) summaries the above by highlighting that the quality of democracy at polity level seems here to be considered inversely proportional to the degree of democracy within parties. What these studies do not show is how the presence or absence of IPD affect party members and, even less, how different forms of IPD could be used to strike a balance between membership power and electoral imperatives or even

help to provide the linkage structures between the state and ordinary citizens they rate so highly.

In their cartel party thesis Katz and Mair (1994) also warn about the negative effects of increased IPD. However, they are less concerned with its impact on a party's electoral competitiveness but IPD's use by the elite as a tool to manipulate members and to strengthen their own power. As Mair (1997: 149) puts it by referring to membership votes, it is, "[...] not the party congress, or the middle-level elite, or the activists, who are being empowered, but rather the ordinary members, who are at once more docile and more likely to endorse the policies proposed by the party leadership". The adoption of direct membership elections and the subsequent enfranchisement of individual ordinary party members decreases the possibility for activists to hold the leadership accountable. This point draws from May's law of 'curvilinear disparity' (1973), which states that party activists are supposed to be more radical than ordinary party members and the electorate. This strategic empowerment of individual members and simultaneous marginalization of party activists lead some scholars to describe it as a form of 'new plebiscitarianism', since it bypasses the intermediary representative strata and empowers elites both by simply enlarging ordinary members' privileges and marginalizing middle-rank members (Seyd, 1999, Scarrow, 2002: 131). In contrast to previous explanations, increased IPD is not an obstacle to elite control or a danger to the party as office-seeking and vote-maximising actor. On the contrary, it is an instrument to achieve these very aims (Hopkin, 2001). Thus increasing IPD can lead to ever-greater autonomy of the leadership and immunization from any possible real and significant influence of the 'party on the ground'. Later Katz (2001: 277) also highlights the interplay of selectorate and candidate requirements, stating that leaders "democratize



candidate selection in form, while centralizing control in practice”. Even though he points to the negative impact increased IPD can have on members in general, he does not explore empirically and comparatively how the constellation of different rules can have diverse effects on party membership or might even be able to mediate some of these negative effects.

The third group to consider are studies that support IPD and see it as having a positive impact on party membership by empowering it. Normatively speaking, they represent a participatory and deliberative conception of democracy rather than a competitive one. Some of these early supporters were Miliband (1958), Macpherson (1977) and Ware (1979). For example, Ware (1979: 71) states that only when parties provide their members with the possibility to influence policy and leaders, they can be viewed as instruments of democracy, since the accountability of party leaders towards their members indirectly also strengthen the responsibility of the latter towards the electorate. More recently, Bille (2001: 2) outlined that “it is hard to understand how a regime can be classified as democratic if the political parties have an organizational structure that leaves no room for citizens to participate and have influence. The decision-making process within the parties, that is, the degree of internal party democracy becomes an interesting and even crucial issue for analysis”. The above listed scholars recognize the general importance and potentially beneficial effect of increased IPD for party members, as it is empowering and creates a new direct link between members and the leadership, which in turn enhances accountability. But they do not consider the specific effects different rules to organize IPD might have on members, and whether there is a peak level of IPD that can be achieved through primaries before having adverse effects.

Reflecting these different positions on IPD, studies have produced conflicting empirical results with regard to the effect of primaries on party membership. For example, Hopkin (2001) is much more negative about the effect of the leadership selection on party membership in the UK Labour Party than, for example, Sandri (2011). However, these differences could be partly explained by the fact that both look at different indicators. While Hopkin (2001) focuses mainly on membership figures and responsiveness based on the characteristics of candidates, Sandri relies much more on membership surveys. Further, a recent comparative study by Sandri et al. (2015) about the political consequences of party primaries did not come to a decisive conclusion. While primaries have a positive effect on public opinion and therefore on citizen's perceptions of parties, this seems not to translate into a positive impact on the electoral or organizational level (Sandri et al. 2015: 192). Thus, primaries do not have the negative electoral effect on parties as claimed by some of its opponents, but they neither lead to sustained membership growth as its supporters suggest. Further, Sandri et al. clearly outline the limitations of the indicators they used as "the impact of primaries on membership size could not fully understood by solely focusing on quantitative data...on the contrary they may actually be misleading if the increases are due to manipulations by the party elites" (Sandri et al. 2015: 192). Overall, this again confirms the need for the common research design and framework developed in this thesis. A framework that allows to study the effect of primaries on party membership in a more nuanced and detailed way and that combines qualitative and quantitative indicators for the development of party membership to draw a more comprehensive picture.

### *Classifying Leadership Selection Methods*

After having established the current debate about whether IPD is good or bad for party membership and the party as a whole—a debate that inevitably produced conflicting results—the next step is to discuss current literature that classifies leadership selection methods. This is important, because only if we merge the different organizational dimensions of primaries under a single framework, it becomes possible to evaluate whether the effect of a specific set of rule is negative or positive for party membership. The current literature suggests four main characteristics of selection processes: candidacy, selectorate, decentralization and appointment or voting system. While these dimensions are relevant for both candidate and leadership selections, here they are only considered in relation to primaries.

The first dimension of candidacy outlines the rules of who can run in a contest, while the second characteristic, the selectorate, defines who can vote. The third characteristic of the degree of centralization is less relevant for primaries as the process to select the chief executive candidate is by definition a centralized process and thus rarely decentralized. However, an example of some decentralization can be found in Canada where several parties use a 'point system' to calculate votes; here each constituency is given the same weight, regardless of how many members actually cast a vote. Also in some cases, there might be multiple elections before a candidate is selected, but the final vote rests with one national selectorate. Thus, Kenig, Rahat and Hazan (2015b) see this dimension as irrelevant for leadership selections. The final dimension of appointment/ voting system is more important, as it provides

insight into the election system used as well as its competitiveness. With regard to the former, a leadership appointment usually only consists of one candidate that is confirmed rather than elected. In such circumstances, it is not possible to talk about a leadership contest but a coronation, regardless of the size of the electorate. Such elections are excluded from this study. With regard to the selection system, the project only considers cases in which the final and decisive vote rests with either party members or a wider electorate and falls within the primary zone (see p. 14-15 for definition).<sup>6</sup>

While all these dimensions are prominent in the literature, they are rarely combined to study their joint impact on parties more generally and on party membership more specifically. While highlighting the importance of the interaction between the different characteristics, the large majority of studies focuses only on a single one and mainly the electorate dimensions of primaries. Clearly, these dimensions do not operate in isolation but affect each other and act together, and hence need to be studied together to capture the full effect of primary rules. An initial attempt to consider the interaction between multiple characteristics can be found in Rahat and Hazan (2001), and Carty and Blake (1999). The paper by Carty and Blake (1999: 214) provides in their words a “simple four-fold typology for considering party members’ participation in the decision-making process of political parties”. They distinguish between the openness of the process, as either restricted or unrestricted participation, and mediated or unmediated voting systems in leadership selection processes. In addition, they do study the impact of different combinations on membership growth and turnout in the Canadian case, but they do not present generally

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<sup>6</sup> The project includes selection processes that use voting systems with a multi-stage method, where members/ voters have the final vote, but not weighted method.

testable and transferable hypotheses. The authors themselves talk of “map(ing) variations within each of the distinctive types in order to discover what leads particular parties to adopt particular systems and with what consequence”. However, since then little work has been done in this specific regard (Sandri et al., 2015), and little attention has been paid to other ways in which primaries affect party membership. Rahat and Hazan’s (2001) study focuses on candidate selection rather than the primaries themselves. It is only concerned with the impact of the interaction for overall democratization and does not present any specific effects that distinct combinations of rules have for the party organization or members. Again, while this 2010 study outlines various political consequences different types of candidate selection methods have, it focuses much more on broader implications for democracy and again mainly highlights the impact of the selectorate.

As pointed out above, the recent study by Aylott and Bolin (2016) stressed that the selectorate is not the only important factor in deciding who will be the leader. Instead, they argue that “leader selection is seldom an unguided decision” and that “formal rules and informal practices pertaining to stages prior to the involvement of the selectorate should be examined systematically in order to assess where real power over leader selection resides” (Aylott and Bolin, 2016: 2). They go on to say that “if the greater inclusiveness has been offset by the management of an ostensibly democratic process, questions can legitimately be asked as to how much parties have really ‘democratized’” (Aylott and Bolin, 2016: 1). They identify the significance of a steering agent in the leadership selection process, and how formal candidacy requirements can either strengthen or restrain its power. While their framework allows classifying selection processes according to the steering agent’s role and power, it does

not consider its interaction with other dimensions of the leadership selection. Thus to fully answer the questions of how much parties have really 'democratized', it is necessary to combine the power of the steering agent—here in form of candidacy requirements—with the selectorate dimension of the leadership selection process. This would allow studying, on the one hand, the party's real commitment to IPD and, on the other hand, its effect on party membership.

The above shows that overall more studies began to develop classifications for primaries and leaderships selections (Kenig 2009) and discuss their political and organizational consequences (Sandri et al., 2015), but so far no unified framework emerged that would combine the different dimension of the selection process and link them to specific consequences for democracy and party members. Only then, it becomes possible to see if the ostensive increase in IPD is actually positive, negative or makes no difference at all to party membership.

So far the review of the existing literature outlined the diversity of views in the party organizational literature with regard to how increases in IPD, mainly due to the use of OMOV systems, affect the role and power of members within the party organization. Secondly, the above discussed different ways of classifying different types of primary according to the rules applied. However, existing studies do not capture this by studying behavioural changes and the attitude of members but mainly by looking at turnout and membership levels. It also shows that so far little attention is given to the effect of primaries on the individual members' perception of IPD and whether this varies when different

primary rules are used. To do so a framework combining primary rules with individual level indicators is required. Here contemporary political sociology and psychology provide a useful starting point to explore individual level changes of party membership across time.

### *1.2.3 IPD and its' Effect on Membership: Political Sociology and Psychology Literature*

One main persisting and frequent puzzle in the current literature on the effect of party membership and IPD is how reforms intended to increase IPD actually affect the size of party membership, intra-party participation, member attitudes and encourage new groups to participate in a party organization and politics generally (Cross and Katz, 2013). So far no clear picture emerges, because most studies focus only on two individual level aspects, mainly turnout and membership size, and do not consider all four in combination. Further, they mainly focus on one type of primary but do not compare the effect of different primary rules on party membership. Thus some studies point, for example, to a short-term positive effect on party membership (Cross and Young, 2004, see also UK Labour in 2015) or high levels of turnout (Sandri, 2015; Wauters, 2015). Other studies indicate decreasing levels of satisfaction among party members (van Haute, 2009b) and a feeling of disempowerment (Lefebvre, 2011). Thus so far a very mixed picture of the effect of primaries on party membership emerges, partly due to the focus on certain types of primaries and partly due to the study of individual level aspects.

Studies by van Haute (2009b), Kosiara-Pedersen, Scarrow and van Haute (2014) or Gauja and van Haute (2014) show that the adoption of open

and inclusive membership participation encourages new types of interaction with the party. Further work by De Luca (2013) on the French PS primary showed that it attracted mainly young, highly educated people and non-members. To analyse what motivates new members to join, Seyd and Whiteley's (1992) general incentive theory proves highly effective. It has been used to study the motivation to join several UK and other European parties<sup>7</sup> but rarely to compare to what extent motivations differ between members who joined since the introduction of primaries or before, and how different primary rules affect motivation. Sandri (2011) explores how direct internal elections contribute to the internal mobilization of already enrolled party members. More importantly Sandri's study (2011) is one of the first to empirically and systematically explore the extent to which reforms in leadership selection procedures affect the role of grass-roots members, and how these changes are perceived by members themselves. But rather than tracing change in party membership, her study provides a snap shot of party membership using post-reform membership surveys. Hazan and Rahat (2010) outline how IPD can affect the representation of members within the party. The question emerges whether new internal mechanisms increase party members' influence over the leadership and internal decisions. To capture this on an individual level, the *efficacy-and-trust model* developed by Craig et al. (1990) can be used. It analyses how "party members perceive their own political organization and whether they are satisfied with its functioning" (Sandri, 2011: 196). The study follows Sandri (2011) based on Eldersveld's (1964) claim that parties can be considered as a system of their own and applies the model, originally developed

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<sup>7</sup> For example, the UK Conservative Party (1994), PS (1998, 2011) and German Parties (1998, 2009).



for electoral research, to party members. Previous research from across the world<sup>8</sup> shows that members stay and continue to be active within their party despite high levels of dissatisfaction about their limited role within the party, marginal involvement and limited influence of key decisions. Increasing IPD could be seen as response to these criticisms but for now no study compares the development of members' external efficacy and attitude towards the leadership pre- and post-primary; and how different selection regulations affected both. Studies on IPD and the effect on membership rarely look at membership changes over time or the effects the interplay of different primary rules have on party membership.

Further the existing literature often takes a perspective of parties as unitary actor and studies the aggregate effect on party membership. However, the literature regularly points out that the very measures to recruit new members are often not the same or even contradict measures meant to keep existing members (Hirschman, 1970). Thus, it is only logical that organizational changes in leadership selection methods affect existing and new members differently (Sandri, 2010). New members are defined as members who joined after, while existing members are defined as members who joined before the shift to a more inclusive selection method. When discussing existing members, the project mainly refers to active party members, as they will be affected most, be aware of the consequences and respond to the reforms (Katz and Mair, 1995). Kenig, Rahat and Hazan (2015b) recently pointed out that the introduction of more inclusive leadership selection methods "might create disincentives for loyal long-term membership". Passive members are most likely

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<sup>8</sup> See, for example, Canada (Cross and Young, 2006), Germany (von Allemann and Klein, 2009) or Belgium (van Haute, 2009b).

to remain passive and will not spend much time considering the direct implications of reforms for them (Sandri, 2010). To test whether the two sub-groups are really affected differently by the introduction of primaries and whether different rules have different effects on the two sub-groups, this thesis studies the impact of different leadership selection rules for existing and new members separately.

The above clearly highlights the need for further research into the effect of increased IPD on political parties. It also highlights that most scholars focus on the shift from no IPD to IPD rather than to look at how different constellations of rules governing IPD affect parties. This project aims to fill this very gap in the literature by systematically and comparatively studying how different sets of rules affect party membership in terms of size, participation and attitude pre and post adoption of primaries. Further, in contrast to studies discussed above, it does not treat members as a homogenous group but analyses how reform differently affects existing and new members. More broadly speaking, the project hopes to contribute to the long-standing but still unresolved debate on the desirability, necessity or even danger of IPD by introducing the membership's perspective to the debate. Further, what becomes clear from the above is that to fully understand how these changes affect members we need to compare membership behaviour under different leadership selection rules. To do so, we need to go beyond the often used indicators of turnout and membership size and use individual level indicators derived from party membership surveys. This emphasizes the party membership's perspective in the IPD debate and allows one to identify the optimal combination of rules that facilitate more direct leadership selection, on the one hand, and true

membership empowerment, on the other hand. Further, only then can we fully understand how primaries affect not only IPD but democracy as a whole in terms of participation, representation, competition and responsiveness.

In summary, the literature review identified three aspects in the current academic debate that needs to be combined to shed more light on the question of how primaries and the consequential changes in the level of IPD affect the individual level conception of party membership. The first section of the more general party politics literature outlined the possible negative and positive effects of increased IPD by stressing the effects on the position, role and power of members within the party; but they do not empirically test these claims at the individual level. The second group of party organizational literature offers various classifications of primaries derived from the procedural features of primaries. While they acknowledge that the interaction of these features is important, they rarely study them at the same time and even less often link them to changes at the individual level. The third and final group of political sociology and psychology literature provides the means to study the changes in membership characteristics and behaviour triggered by primaries. However, existing studies mainly focus on the shift from no primary to primary and rather investigate the effect of different types of primaries on party membership once adopted. Existing studies also largely analyse only one way of how primaries affect membership and not, as suggested here, their effect on multiple aspects. As outlined above, this thesis suggests the merging of these elements into one unified framework (see p. 22) to gain a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the effect primaries have on the perceived level of IPD, and of how this is reflected in changes at the individual level conception of party membership.

### 1.3 Organization of the Study

So far, the study outlined why it is important to study the consequences of primaries for the individual level conception of party membership. It unpacked the central research question that aims to address a gap in current literature and provided an overview of the thesis' original contribution to the field. Building on this, the rest of the thesis unfolds in the following way.

**Chapter two** introduces in detail the conceptual framework used to study the consequences of primaries for the individual level conception of party membership. As presented above, the framework consists of two dimensions to address the two main identifying regulatory features of primaries: *primary selectorate (open/ close)* and *candidacy requirements (permissive/ strict)*. The chapter then presents and discusses the theoretical justifications for the four indicators used in the thesis to capture the complex and extensive impact of different primary rules on party membership (*membership level, turnout, quality and attitude of membership*). The last section of chapter two brings together the four indicators and two regulatory dimensions of primaries. It explores in detailed the theoretically expected consequences of the interplay between the independent variables—*electorate and candidate requirements*—along the four discussed indicators (DV) for the individual level conception of party membership in each type of primary.

The **third chapter** of the thesis presents the case selection, method, data used and operationalization of the dimensions in the conceptual framework for the three chosen cases studies. To capture the effect of different types of selection procedures on membership, the thesis uses mainly new and existing pre- and post-reform membership survey data complemented by in-depth

qualitative membership interviews. Overall, 24 interviews were conducted with both party members and elites. With regard to the survey, the study collected data from six pre- and post-reform membership surveys (Whiteley et al., 1994a, Dargent and Rey, 2014, Rey and Subileau, 1991, Subileau et al., 1999, Spier et al., 2011, YouGov, 2009) and conducted one post-reform survey. To assess *procedural changes, turnout and membership figures*, the project uses a large variety of primary documents, such as party statutes, internal regulations, reports, party self-reported information and secondary documents, such as newspaper articles, independent expert reports and the MAPP project database. The survey data is mainly analysed using descriptive statistics, such as frequency distributions and cross tabulations.

Regarding case selection, the project follows Seawright and Gerring (2008: 297) by using a typical case study design. The German Greens, UK Conservative Party and French PS are taken as cases, since they stand representative for a wider group of cases that can be placed in the quadrants combining candidate requirements and selectorate. As such they allow to confirm or disconfirm the theoretical expectations about a specific relationship between primary rules and effects on party membership for each of the three types of IPD. The study only includes European mainstream parties, here defined as parties that either are or were in government or have government potential (Sartori, 1976). Chapter three further introduces the operationalization of the four indicators.

**Chapters four to six** form the **empirical** part of the thesis. All three chapters follow the same structure. They first discuss the background of the case and why and how leadership selection methods were reformed. It then

provides a discussion of the theoretically expected consequences for the individual level conception of party membership along the four indicators of turnout, membership level, quality and attitude of membership. **Chapter four** analyses the case of the UK Conservative Party as an example of *controlled democratization*, followed by a discussion of the case of the German Greens in the category of *protected democratization* in **chapter five**. The next **chapter (six)** studies the case of the French Parti Socialiste (PS), which was an example for *controlled democratization* in 1995 and 2006 and underwent a second reform in 2011; nowadays it falls into the category of *disempowering democratization*.

**Chapter seven** first compares and contrasts the findings of the three case studies. It then provides a brief discussion of the validity of the framework when applied to other cases. The chapter also highlights how the project can facilitate future research by studying further cases over time, and how it can inspire new avenues of research. The chapter ends with the overall conclusion discussing the three main contributions the thesis makes. First, conceptually, it provides a new framework combining selectorate and candidacy regulation aspects to study the impact of primaries in a more nuanced fashion; by doing so it strengthens the membership perspective in the debate. Empirically, the thesis uses new data and brings together existing data to demonstrate that the framework is useful in identifying the combined effect of primary rules on party membership and its relevance for other cases. Thirdly, it challenges the normative assumption that the interests of party membership and elites are often at odds but instead argues that carefully designed rules can lead to positive outcomes for both. The thesis ends with a discussion of the link between IPD and democracy at the state level.

## 1.4 Conclusion

The chapter started by stating the motivation for this study. It highlighted the increasing academic interest in party leadership selections for central and public office and the election of leaders. It also pointed to the increased use of primaries outside of the US and especially in Europe to selected not only party leaders but also candidates for public offices at all levels (regional, national and European). This development is often framed as an attempt by parties to increase IPD to counteract the current trend of declining membership and trust. In short, parties and some scholars see IPD as a remedy to fight the crisis of the 'party on the ground'. This triggered a renewed academic interest into the subject of primaries and their consequences in the field of party organizational literature. This trend began with Scarrow in 1999 and became more prominent in more recent works by Hazan and Rahat (2010), Cross and Katz (2013) or Pilet and Cross (2014), Sandri et al. (2015). However, despite this increase in studies on the consequences of primaries, their effects on membership are hardly studied at all, and if so studies mainly adopt a theoretical and normative perspective and look only at a few cases. There is a clear lacuna in empirical and comparative studies that focus on the effect of changes in the level of IPD on party membership caused by primaries. Such studies would provide insight into whether or not parties ought to increase IPD in general, whether primaries are an effective tool to increase IPD, and how the new level of IPD, brought about by the adoption of the primary, affects party membership. This is the point from which this thesis departs. The chapter then outlined the current controversies in the debate about the effect of IPD on parties in general and membership in particular. It identified three main arguments presented in the literature:

Scholars see IPD as (1) unachievable, (2) as negative or even dangerous for party membership or (3) are supportive of IPD. The chapter then briefly discussed previous classifications of leadership selection methods, and how they have been used to study the effect of IPD on party membership. The section stressed the fact that previous studies do identify multiple aspects of primaries that can be regulated differently; however, they rarely combine them into one framework or study their interaction. Further, most studies that look at the impact of primaries on party membership only consider the selectorate-*who can vote*-dimension. The last section of the literature review turned from the organizational literature towards the political sociology and psychology literature. This provided the theories and approaches to study individual level membership changes and demonstrated how little the link between organizational reform and individual level membership changes is studied in a comparative and comprehensive manner. It showed how increased IPD, which offers new participatory opportunities for members and even non-members in various intra-party areas, can affect internal mobilization, motivations to join, the profile and type of party members. Further, it was argued that these new participatory possibilities influence the perceived influence, representation and responsiveness of members vis-a-vis the party elite, either positively or negatively. The literature also argues that different sub-groups within party memberships—new vs. existing, active vs. passive—should perceive organizational reforms differently and thus are differently affected by them. However, to date there are few studies that would test these theoretical claims empirically.



Based on the literature review, the study identifies a clear gap in the current research on IPD, primaries and party membership: a new unified conceptual framework to study the combined effect of different leadership selection rules—selectorate and candidacy regulation—on the individual level conception of party membership affected by the perceived level of IPD. It not only allows for studying the impact on overall membership but also on the two different sub-groups of new and existing members simultaneously. Thus, it strengthens members' perspectives in the debate about the effect of changing levels of IPD. The chapter ended by outlining the overall structure of the thesis and provided a first overview of each chapter.

While the empirical section of the thesis focuses on primaries that select the top-executive candidates of parties, its findings can be applied more broadly to other types of intra-party personnel decisions, such as the selection of parliamentary or mayoral candidates and party general secretary. In all these instances, members' roles and power within the party organization are affected. This can therefore result in either a negative or positive evaluation of the new level of IPD from their view as well as a change in their conception of membership. More generally, the framework introduced here can be a tool both for parties to evaluate intended changes in their organizational design and for members to gain better insight into the potential impact of such reforms on them. More broadly speaking, the thesis further contributes to the question of whether a particular intra-party selection method can serve IPD and democracy at state-level (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 166). To answer this question the thesis

returns to the following three guiding questions listed by Hazan and Rahat (2010: 166) in their conclusion:<sup>9</sup>

- “1. Does the [leadership] selection method enable the expression of democratic norms (participation and competition), and does it produce democratic outputs (representation and responsiveness)?
2. Does the [leadership] selection method serve the liberal norm of power diffusion?
3. Does the [leadership] selection method enhance the general health of the party as a crucial organization for the functioning of democracy?”

While the first two questions are based on contemporary held views on the norms, procedures and output of democracy, the third links the organizational level of democracy, hence IPD, to state-level democracy. Thus, if parties are vital institutions of democracy and their wellbeing is vital for the health of democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 168), then parties have to be careful of how a leadership selection method effects one of the vital corner stones of party organization, membership; otherwise they might face unintended consequences for both the party as an organization and democracy in general. The next chapter develops the already mentioned new conceptual framework and discusses its theoretical expectations for the nature of party membership. Chapter three introduces the case selection, method, data and operationalization, before it empirically tests the framework in the subsequent chapters four to six.

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<sup>9</sup> These questions were originally used to study the link between candidate selection and democracy. However, executive top candidate selection is a specific type of candidate selection and, hence, the very same questions are relevant as well as applicable.

## **2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter starts by outlining and defining the two dimensions which can be used to distinguish between different types of primaries: (1) who can vote in the primary, how the selectorate is specified; and (2) who is allowed to run in the primary, the candidacy requirements. The chapter first outlines how both these dimensions are constructed. In a second step, it combines them under a single analytical framework. The chapter then continues to outline how the interaction of the two dimensions leads to four distinct perceptions of intra-party democracy (IPD) among party members that in turn affect the individual level conception of party membership. It then discusses the four ideal cases of IPD and their effect on the four indicators: party membership level, turnout in primaries, quality of membership and membership's attitude towards the leadership. This provides the foundations for the detailed comparative case study analysis that engages with the three chosen cases, the UK Conservative Party, the German Green Party and French Socialist Party (PS).


### **2.2 Defining and Differentiating the Two Dimensions of the Framework**

#### *Selectorate*

The selectorate, constituting the first dimension, is considered the most important characteristic of any selection process. It is defined as the group of people that is allowed to vote in intra-party leadership selections. The criteria that determine who and how many can participate in the primary directly affects the intra-party balance of power. Hazan and Rahat (2010) and others (Kenig

2009a) suggest five different types of electorate with different degrees of inclusiveness, reaching from fully inclusive with all voters allowed to participate to fully exclusive, where a single leader nominates his/ her successor. This can be depicted with the help of the following continuous scale:

Figure 2.1 Inclusiveness of Selectorate  
(Kenig, 2009a, Hazan and Rahat, 2010)



As the project is only interested in the more inclusive forms of selections, it divided the scale into two parts. On the left of the vertical line are the cases considered as democratized as their electorate extends beyond the parliamentary group and a small group of party delegates, and falls within the primary zone (Kenig et al. 2015). In the given context, all selections are considered to be a primary where the final and decisive vote lies in the hand of a selectorate in the primary zone. However, it is necessary to distinguish between two distinct selectorates in the primary zone: (1) voters (open primary) and (2) party members/ registered supporters (closed primary).<sup>10</sup> The central difference between the two selectorates is whether voting is restricted to voters with a formal and financial link to the party and requires pre-registration, or whether it is open to everyone who even wants to participate spontaneously. So

<sup>10</sup> A more detailed outline of what kind of selectorate are considered closed and open can be found in Appendix VII


if light members can register on the day and vote, the primary would be considered open but if pre-registration of light members with a fixed deadline is required, it is a close primary. The constitution of the selectorate has various political consequences. It affects participation by defining who can vote as well as responsiveness, since “leaders who are selected by a more inclusive electorate may claim direct mandate given to them by voter or members” (Kenig et al., 2016: 38). This further contributes to the ostensive presidentialization of party politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005) by empowering the party leader and making him/ her less responsive to certain actors and committed to other actors in or even outside the party. Thus, the type of selectorate should have an impact on party membership. Hence, the selectorate as the first dimension of the conceptual framework is vital for studying the effect of different types of primaries on party members. The next section outlines the less discussed—especial its interaction with the *selectorate*—second dimension of *candidacy requirements*.

### *Candidacy requirements*

The second dimension of *candidacy requirements* allows a comparison of the different rules that determine who can run in intra-party primary selections. Again, similar to the selectorate, candidacy requirements can be placed on a continuous scale reaching from fully inclusive to fully exclusive. On the most inclusive end, all citizens can run if they wish to do so; while on the most exclusive end, the part leadership imposes a wide range of additional requirements that need to be met to be eligible as candidate in the selection process.

Figure 2.2 Inclusiveness of Candidacy Requirements

(adopted from Hazan and Rahat, 2010, Kenig, 2009a)



It is important to highlight that the right side of the scale is open-ended as party elites usually can freely increase the level of requirements, giving the elite effectively total control over candidacy and more importantly the entire selection process. Therefore, in the most extreme cases the elite can decide who can run and nominate only their desired candidate. This highlights the analytical problem when one only looks at either selectorate or candidate requirements, since parties might have a very inclusive selectorate but very strict or even closed candidacy requirements. The vertical line in the figure signifies the distinction between permissive and strict candidate requirements. While permissive requirements would, for example, encompass all citizens, party members or all list candidates, strict requirements would limit candidacies to MPs or be bound to the pre-approval by various party bodies.<sup>11</sup> A further key difference between permissive and strict candidate selection rules is the presence or absence of a veto power from another intra party organ(s) or actor(s). Thus even if requirements are otherwise low, the presence of veto power from another intra party organ(s) or actor(s) that can stop candidates to

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<sup>11</sup> A more detailed outline of what kind of candidacy requirements are considered permissive and strict can be found in Appendix VII

run makes it strict candidate requirements. Of course, the overall size of the effect of this dimension depends on how strict the rules are and can vary within both broad categories of permissive and strict candidacy requirements. This characteristic of primaries has a strong impact on competition (Kenig, 2009a) and allows the party elite to manage and control it via the candidacy rules. They do not only determine who and how many candidates can actually run for the position of party leader, but whether there is a credible challenger to the incumbent leader. If there is only one candidate, it is meaningless to talk about a primary contest we are rather confronted with a coronation, regardless of the size of the selectorate. Thus, it seems that this second dimension mainly decides whether a reform of a chief executive selection method is only democratising in form, due to its formal rules, or both in form and substance, leading to an increased influence and power of party members (Katz, 2001). Consequently, this constitutes the second dimension of the conceptual framework intend to study the effect of different types of primaries on party members.

Overall, candidacy requirements and selectorate provide the two dimensions of the conceptual framework to study the impact of the different primary rules on party members. This framework unpacks the consequences of different types of primaries on party membership. The importance of the interplay of the two dimensions is also highlighted by Musil (2011: 15) who argues that “no matter how inclusive the candidacy requirements are, the limited selectorate will have the full control over the final results”. Of course, the reverse can also be argued: No matter how inclusive the selectorate, the limited and restrictive candidate requirements will provide a small group, the party elite, with full control over the final results. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of a

substantial degree of democratization, if not both selectorate and candidacy become more inclusive. Subsequently, any consequences on membership will depend on the combination between candidate requirements and the inclusiveness of the selectorate. Combining the two dimensions and different aspects of primary rules into one single unified framework is an effective way of studying the effect of different types of primaries on party membership. After having outlined the two relevant dimensions of the framework, the next step is to outline the four dimensions that form individual level membership conceptions and then to unite candidacy requirements and selectorate in a single analytical framework to capture the effect of different primary rules on party membership.

### **2.3 Differentiating Consequences of Increased IPD on Party Membership**

The party organizational, sociological and physiological literature suggests various dimensions that can be used to study the development and changes within political parties and their membership over time. However, not all of them have been directly and simultaneously applied to party membership development in general and to changes in leadership selection rules in particular. Further, these dimensions need to be slightly amended for their use in the specific context of primaries. For example, turnout is not a typical dimension of the conception of party membership, but since we are here concerned with party internal selections, turnout is an intrinsic feature and can shed light on the participation rate and share of members (in open primaries). It provides thus indications for the acceptance of primaries as a new participatory tool or not. The project uses the following four analytical dimensions—dependent variables—to capture the



complex and extensive impact of different primary rules—*independent variable*—on the individual level concept of party membership (*outcome*):

Table 2.1 The Four Dependant Variables

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Short Description</b>
<i>Quantitative</i>	
Membership level	increase/ decline of membership
Turnout in primary	rate and share of participation of members in primary
<i>Qualitative</i>	
Quality of Membership	increase/ decrease in intra-party participation
Membership attitude	membership view and relation with the party leadership

The section first discusses the theoretical rationale and justifications underlying the selection of the four dimensions to study the change in membership conception triggered by the use of primaries. Having done so, the next section outlines the theoretical expectations for the general, existing and new membership separately due to different primary rules along the introduced four dimensions.

### The Quantity and Quality of Party Membership

#### *Membership Size*

The development in *membership levels* is an admittedly crude, yet effective dimension to capture the impact of reforms in general (Mair and van Biezen, 2001, Van Biezen et al., 2012) and of increased IPD in particular (Rahat and Hazan, 2001). It outlines whether or not, and, if, how the quantitative level of membership differs before and after the reform. Thus, it sheds light on whether the concept of party membership at an individual level is now seen

more positive or negative, by attracting new members or causing membership decline. By dividing the membership into existing and new members, we can observe whether there is a different quantitative impact at the level of membership in both groups. It is important to bear in mind that existing membership cannot increase but only decline. However, in some cases former disillusioned members might return to the party, which could be labelled as an increase in 'existing members'. With regard to ensuring the inflow of new members, reforms in intra-party democracy are often linked to active recruitment drives or the introduction of new membership categories (often with limited rights and reduced fees).<sup>12</sup> Thus, when studying the impact of IPD changes on membership size, it is important to be aware of the potential short-term inflow of 'instant' members (Rahat and Hazan, 2007) that can cause and produce temporary, artificially high membership levels. To avoid this issue, the project looks at membership levels just before primaries, during and approximately one year later, when new members are asked to renew their commitment. This dimension of the concept of party membership reveals that individuals are more likely to see membership as a long-term engagement, short-term political support or more and more irrelevant depending on the applicable primary rules.

### *Turnout*

The second dimension to consider is turnout. This again is a more quantitative indicator, but it also provides insight into who participates in the new party activity. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between overall turnout and the

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<sup>12</sup> See, for example, the 2015 UK Labour leadership selection (£3 support membership).

share of the two groups of party members (new and existing) participating in leadership selections (Sandri 2011). The former measures the overall acceptance of the new participatory tool by voters, and whether they see it as an effective way to influence internal decision-making (Norris, 2000, Wauters, 2009). A more detailed analysis of the different shares of turnout between existing, new members and non-members, in case of an open primary, provides an insight into the relative strength of the different groups and their influence in the decision-making process. Thus, it offers the possibility to see the extent to which the vote by existing members and activist is diluted, and whether the groups vote differently (Seddone and Venturino, 2013). It helps to understand whether intra-party democratization is actually disempowering active and organized membership in favour of a more ad hoc, individualized and more docile intra-party selectorate (Hopkin, 2001; Katz and Mair; 1994). From an individual member's perspective, it also reveals whether they are empowered as they can make up the majority or entry primary selectorate, or if they are effectively disempowered by being crowded out by a large inflow of new members or even an external selectorate. This should either positively or negatively contribute to the individual level conception of party membership.

### *Quality of membership*

The limitation of a mere focus on the dimension of membership levels or turnout is that it does not capture members that stay in the party and/ or vote in primaries but might have altered their behaviour in another way in response to the new perceived level of IPD. The dimension of the quality of membership allows distinguishing between the effect of primaries on active and passive

members in the party; it also helps to establish how membership participation might vary with changing levels of IPD as well as differ between new and existing members (Scarrow, 2005; Seddone and Venturino, 2013). It is difficult to define membership quality, but following Whiteley et al. (1994b), the dimension of membership quality can be further broken down into (a) the reason for why members join the party, and (b) what they do once in the party. The project looks at whether the reform led to an increase or decline in certain motivations to join the party and studies changes in behaviour of party members in terms of the type and intensity of their activities. Further, as argued by Seyd et al. (1994) as well as Seyd and Whiteley (1996, 1994a), the two aspects are linked as the motivation to join a party is a good predictor of how active (both in terms of time and type) members will become. However, it has to be noted that the quality of membership is a purely quantitative measure and looks at the increase or decrease in quality due to changes in how members behave; this does in no way imply any normative judgments about the positive or negative nature of such an increase or decrease for the party. Nevertheless, these changes reflect how the new primary rules affected the perceived level of IPD among members and their conception of party membership. Different conceptions of party membership at the individual level lead to different people joining the party with specific motivations which in turn can lead to a more active or passive role of members in the party organization.

To study the effect of primaries on the motivation to join a party, the thesis applies a widely used *general-incentive-model* originally developed by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). The model itself distinguishes between seven different categories of incentives for people to join parties, reflecting different basic individual level conceptions of party membership and their role and power

within the party organization. The following section discusses these seven motivations and highlights those that can be expected to become more prominent due to the use of different primary rules.

The first three categories of *individual selective-outcome* incentives, *individual selective-process incentives* and *ideological incentives* emphasize a direct personal benefit to the new party member. They not only play a vital role in explaining why individuals join a party but most importantly provide an insight into the factors that motivate members to become active within the party.

1. *Outcome incentives* are personal aims, such as working towards an intra-party or elected office. Further, by joining the party, new members expect advantages in their professional life. Thus, benefits are mainly personal and not collective. Following a rational choice logic, the fact that under the new selection regimen every member can vote and more importantly that it is easier to be a candidate should increase selective-outcome incentives (Olson, 1965). This development should be more pronounced among new members, but usually applies only to a very small career-oriented group; and we do not expect this group to increase extensively. One reason for this is that we look at the selection of the top position in the party, and, further, in many parties the selection of local officers and candidates is already mostly decentralized for a longer period of time, providing many opportunities for career-oriented members. Nevertheless, an increase in this incentive can be expected.

2. *Individual selective-process incentives* refer to benefits stemming from participation in the party. This category mainly encompasses members who joined the party, because they enjoy political work, want to be better informed about politics and want to socialize. Such motives can often be found among a large group of members, which it can be expected to grow over time, as it does not require a high level of activity to gain the benefits people joined for. For many members of this category, party membership is also part of their self-expression. From an elite perspective, these are the ideal members as they are interested in the party's social aspects but show only very limited interest in partaking in policy-making and influencing the overall direction of the party (Maor, 1997). However, they create an image of a party rooted in society, ultimately providing legitimacy and a secure electorate (Katz and Mair, 1994).

3. The category of *ideological incentives* is based on the idea that party members are more radical than both the party leadership and voters, which in turn motivates them to be active in the party. It is hard to capture this last incentive. Thus, following Whiteley et al. (1994), the thesis also assumes that higher scores in the two above incentives reflect higher scores in this, third, one. More radical members should gain more benefit from the process, as he/she is more likely to be among like-minded people and also be more willing to run for office to change the direction of the party. They often support a specific ideological principle or current within the party and want to influence the course of the party. In a more recent revised version of the model by Klein (2006), survey items are included to capture *ideological incentives* and are used where available in this study.

4. *Collective group based incentives*. Members in this category join to push for specific policies and political actions. They are active to advance the goals of the party and to strengthen its influence. Further, they want to campaign for specific party ideological objectives (for example, social justice, liberal economy or ecological policies). Thus, they represent the classical party activist. *Collective group incentives* can be both positive and negative. In the former case, people join to support the ideas and policies of the party, while in the latter case they join to express their opposition to another group's ideas and policies. Thus, they either work for a collective good or work to oppose objectives pursued by other (internal or external) groups and parties and see their party as an effect avenue to do so (Whiteley et al., 1994: 86-87).

5. *Normative incentives* can be found among people who join a party to fulfil certain normative expectations in their social environment. They join due to pressure or influence from family and friends. This category is already relatively small, and it can be expected to shrink further with the continued increase in individualism and party *de-alignment* (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). On the positive side, a decline in this incentive means that members do not only join because of tradition, but because they want to and see it as important and thus should be more active in the party. However, on the negative side, the party cannot rely on a save supply of members fed by individual socialization processes, who are then trained by the party while making party careers and present the party's future elite (Van Liefferinge and Wauters, 2014). Overall, this renders the party membership more divers and volatile.

6. *Altruistic incentives* are important to members whose motivation for joining the party is to contribute to the functioning of democracy, i.e. people join to fulfil their duty as citizen. This is usually a large group and the use of primaries—both open and closed—should further increase its size, as members might feel that it is easier to do one’s democratic duty by just voting in the primary.

7. *Expressive attachment incentives* make members join to express their support for a specific intra-party fraction or an impressive person within the party and to communicate their perceived emotional attachment to a party. In general, the use of primaries should increase the size of this group, especially members who state that their main motivation for joining was to support a specific party leader. However, it can be argued that if a primary truly empowers members and increase their power, this incentive might actually decrease as people join as activist rather than as followers of a leader.

The short discussion above shows that it can be expected that specific organizational rules can mobilize different types of members, due to the altered individual conception of party membership resulting from the level of IPD. Thus changes in party rules, here the leadership selection method, might—intentionally or not—lead to a shift in the incentives for members to join the party. This consequently affects the quality of party membership, as different incentives lead to different levels of activity within the party. Thus the next section discusses the second aspect of the membership quality dimension, namely, how the adoption of different primary rules theoretically changes the



type and intensity of active members' engagement in the party caused by the changed conception of party membership and its role.

The second aspect captures the kind and intensity of activities members participate in to support the party organization and its electoral campaigns. In short, higher levels of participation in general and of resource-intensive activities (time and money) in particular point to a positive evolution of an individual's concept of party membership. The spectrum of membership activity reaches from inactivity or passive member to the highly active member (van Haute, 2009a). On the lower end of the scale, members might take part in activities that require a low investment of time and money. Voting in internal or primary election is surely one of the low investment activities, as it usually requires relatively little cost and time. Here, the question emerges of whether new members who join after the introduction of such measure have lower quality, as they only join to vote rather than to take an active role in the party (Rahat and Hazan, 2003). Thus, do they conceive themselves as party members or rather supporters in the shape of primary voters? In addition, existing members might feel discouraged in maintaining their high investment activity, if their influence is diluted and diminished by a large passive membership holding equal voting rights (Scarow, 2002). It can be argued that, if on the one side, the introduction of primaries is perceived as empowering by members, this should lead to an overall increase in activism and higher engagement in time- and money-intensive activities. On the other side, the introduction of primaries could lead to a decrease in time-intensive work for the party and an increase in low time and money-intensive activities, if the primaries are seen as disempowering. In short, primaries can lead to a revitalization or further weakening of party activism depending on what conception of party

membership they foster. Thus, this dimension is vital in understanding of how reforms affect active party members, especially under what conditions they remain active. It is important to look at how the pattern and intensity of participation differ before and after the reform, and between existing and new members (Sandri, 2011). This allows for analysis of how different types of primaries affect party members differently and to assess the positive and negative implications of the changed level of IPD.

Overall studying changes in members' motives for joining, measuring the variations in how much time and what type of activities members engage in under different rules and before and after the reform provides insight into how the reform affects membership quality, and whether the new rules advance a new individual level conception of party membership or reinforce the existing one.

#### *Membership Attitude towards Party Leadership*

The next section outlines the theoretical rationale underlying the dimension of *attitude towards party leadership* and how it is expected that different leadership selection rules affect them. This dimension is included here, as the literature on party politics frequently refers to the changing and conflictual relationship between the party on the ground and the party in central and public office (Katz and Mair, 1995). The majority of the reforms discussed here were triggered by the party leadership and designed to bring back, if not empower, rank and file members (Cross and Blais, 2012b; Kittilson and Scarrow, 2003). Therefore, such reforms also aim to improve the relationship and strengthen the

ties between the three faces of party organization.<sup>13</sup> The question that emerges is whether different groups of members and activists perceive the changes in the same way as the leadership, and, thus, how their attitude towards the leadership is affected by the reforms. The project uses parts of *the efficacy-and-trust model developed by Craig et al. (1990)* to capture changes in attitude at the individual member level.

In general, the *efficacy-and-trust model* analyses how “party members perceive their own political organization and whether they are satisfied with its functioning” (Sandri, 2011: 196). In addition to the more widely studied areas of intra-party conflict (Bolleyer et al., 2016, Boucek, 2009) and internal discontent (van Haute, 2009b), this is an additional vital area to better understand the dynamics and perceived role of party members within the party. The model marks a turn away from the rational choice tradition that dominated party membership research towards a socio-psychological approach; after all, in a traditional rational choice approach unsatisfied members would not stay within their party but simply leave. However, as multiple membership surveys from across the world<sup>14</sup> show members do stay and are even active within their party organization despite high levels of criticism and dissatisfaction. Their main criticisms are their limited role within the party as well as marginal involvement and influence in key decision-making areas. Thus, the move to a higher level of IPD could be seen as responding to such criticism and result in an improved individual conception of party membership. However, as mentioned more critical scholars see increases IPD as a pretext to further disempower the membership

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<sup>13</sup> Katz and Mair (1994) distinguish between three faces of party organisation: the party on the ground, the party in central office and the party in public office.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Canada (Cross and Young, 2004), Germany (von Allemann and Klein, 2009) or Belgium (van Haute, 2009).

and reduce its role in the party organization (Lefebvre, 2011) in favour of a new conception of individual party members as supporters and primary voters. Thus, the question remains whether members' attitude towards its party organization and leadership improve due to increased IPD brought about in the form of primaries, and whether this has a positive impact on the individual level conception of party membership.

The *efficacy-and-trust model* underwent many developments since it was first used in the 1950s. This project will use the latest version developed by Craig et al. in 1990. It was originally developed to study voting behaviour but is applied here to party members, based on Eldersveld's (1964) claim that parties are a closed system of their own. The main underlying idea is that both trust and efficacy affect individual behaviour within organizations. Broadly speaking, efficacy is defined as the way in which individuals perceive their role within party organizations, and how effectively they use the opportunity structure provided by party organizations. Thus, political efficacy provides an indication of individually perceived powerlessness (Campbell, 1954). In the following, we only focus on efficacy and leave trust aside; overall, capturing perceived efficacy gives an insight into the level of satisfaction and the attitude of party members towards the party organization and its leaders. Thus, the level of satisfaction and attitude of party members offers a better understanding of the individual level conception and perceived role of party membership.

Overall, the model by Craig et al. (1990) consists of four components: (1) external political efficacy, (2) internal political efficacy, (3) incumbent-based trust and (4) regime-based trust. This project only focuses on the first aspect, as it is interested in party members' perspective on their role within the party, and how

the introduction of different types of primaries affect the power of members within the party.<sup>15</sup> The next paragraph outlines the concept of *external political efficacy*.

*External political efficacy* is defined as an individual's political influence over the organization she or he is part of. Thus, rephrasing Craig et al. (1990) to fit to party members, the category captures the members' believe about the responsiveness of the party leaderships and bodies to their demands as well as the extent to which they feel that their participation matters. The category can be divided into two aspects of political efficacy.

The first aspect of *regime-based external efficacy* measures how members perceive the opportunities, established via formal rules and procedures (here primaries), to influence political process or its outcome provided by the political organization (Craig et al., 1990: 291). Here we focus on how much influence members feel they have over the party in general, its candidate and leadership selection processes. This perceived power distribution and influence in key decision-making areas affects the overall satisfaction with party membership and the membership conception at the individual level.

Second, *incumbent-based external efficacy* captures the responsiveness of the party leaders themselves rather than the ability of the individual to

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<sup>15</sup> Incumbent-based trust: This is defined as the expression of (dis-)satisfaction with party organisational performances (Craig et al., 1990) and measures beliefs about whether or not the party is "functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual expectations" (Craig et al. 1990: 291).

Regime-based trust: The last component measures more general and broad feelings of attachment or loyalty to the political system and constitutional order (Craig et al. 1990: 291).

Internal political efficacy refers to the individual self-perception that members "are capable of understanding politics and competent enough to participate in political acts" and in the political process (Miller et al, 1980, 253). The project is not interested in how such reforms change their perceived ability to understand politics. Consequently, all these categories are not covered here.

influence the party as a whole. Thus, it focuses on how members see the ability and motivation of the party leaders to respond to members' demands (Shingles, 1988, Craig et al., 1990: 291), or whether it is necessary to be a party official or public office holder to achieve anything. Further, it is concerned with what members would like to reform in order to increase their influence.

Overall, an increase in external efficacy is clearly a positive effect for party members and is most likely in cases where they have influence on both aspects of the primary. While in cases where members' influence is reduced due to very strict candidacy requirements and open primaries, external efficacy is likely to decline and this affects membership negatively. Thus, external efficacy is an effective dimension to capture the effect of different primary rules on the individual conception of party membership, and how its role is affected by the reform. Looking at the two sub-groups of new and existing members separately, on the one hand, existing members' and activists' attitudes could improve when they perceive changes to bring them more influence, hence this would improve the members' attitude towards the party leadership (Young and Cross, 2002). On the other hand, they could also see it as an attempt by the leadership to atomize decision-making and disempower activists to strengthen their own power (Katz and Mair, 1994). It is probably right to assume that new members who join after the reform generally have a positive image of the leadership, as they join to either run or vote in the intra-party election. Individuals would not join a political party in the first place, if they had negative attitudes towards its leadership or potential candidates for the leadership position (Whiteley et al., 1994). Although it is possible that new members might join to challenge the existing party leadership (Barnea and Rahat, 2007), such events are probably rare and would require large resources, mainly financial, on

the side of the challenger to recruit enough voters and/ or members to topple the leadership. The attitude towards the party leadership is in itself an important factor to study the effect of the individual level conception of party membership brought about by different primary selection rules and the new level of IPD but also in relation to other aspects, as it affects the level and types of intra-party activity, voting behaviour and party loyalty.

In summary, the above discussion of the four dimensions that together form the individual level party membership outlined the theoretical justification of why these dimensions matter. It also showed how different primary rules are expected to affect these dimensions and lead to a new perceived level of IPD among party members and thus affects the conception and role of their membership within the party organization.

## **2.4 The Four Types of Primary Selection and their Impact on Party Membership**

Based on the above discussion, the next section outlines the theoretically expected effects of the interplay between the two dimensions—electorate and candidate requirements—along the four discussed dimensions on party membership (figure 2.3). It is necessary to study the impact of the rules on all four dimensions simultaneously to capture the full impact of the four different types of party primaries on party membership. Further, following the literature (Kenig et al., 2015b; Hirschman, 1970), the project not only investigates the overall effect on party members but on existing and new members separately. This leads to a rather complex theoretical framework consisting of four distinct types of IPD with overall and separate theoretical expectations for new and

existing members introducing members' perceptions for all four dimensions (see p. 57, figure 2.1). It has to be stressed that the descriptions below are the ideal-type conceptions of the effect of primaries on the new individual level conception of party membership brought about by the IPD, which in turn is achieved by the primary selection rules.

Figure 2.3 Four Types of IPD

Open  <i>Selectorate – Primary Zone</i>	<b>Atomized Democratization</b>	<b>Disempowering Democratization</b>
	<b>Protected Democratization</b>	<b>Controlled Democratization</b>
Closed	Permissive	Strict

*Candidate Requirements*

As previously mentioned the categories of IPD refer to the perceived democratization through primaries seen from party members' point of view, and how this in turn affect the individual level conception of party membership expressed in changes along the four dimensions. The next section outlines the theoretically expected changes in the individual level conception of party membership brought about by the new level of IPD, in the perception of members, along the four dimensions.

In the first case of **Atomized Democratization** (permissive candidacy/open primary), the party membership loses any control over the outcome of leadership contests, as the selectorate and candidacy are completely opened up. In this case, organizational boundaries are highly blurred or even vanish, and the party ceases to be a clearly defined organizational entity of members and becomes a loose collection of atomized individuals. Thus, the classical conception of party membership is replaced, leading Berdahl (1942: 16) to



argued that in such cases “party membership is generally not distinguished from mere voting affiliation”. It is unsurprising that this leads to a decline in existing membership; incentives to actively participate in the party are reduced and overall membership quality declines (Berdahl, 1942). The open candidate requirements transform the organization into a vehicle for ambitious individuals to run for office and to fulfil personal as well as professional goals rather than to serve the party and its ideology. Thus, traditional mass or catch-all party organizational models are demolished in favour of professional campaign organizations (see Panebianco, 1988).

This constellation of primary rules probably leads to a decline in *existing membership* as their power to influence leadership selection is substantially diminished (Cohen et al., 2008). Further, the open candidate requirements reduce the incentive to invest time and effort into the party so that conditions to run are met more easily (Berdahl, 1942). Consequently, the quality of the membership will decline. There are fewer incentives to become an activist but rather more incentives to attract professional opportunists (Panebianco, 1988). Thus, overall loyalty also decreases. The existing members’ attitude towards the leadership declines, as they feel disempowered. Their share of the turnout should be low as many feel their voice is crowded out by external voters.

There will only be few *new members*, as there is no need to join the party to vote. The quality of the new members is relatively low as they probably join to become a candidate and pursue their personal and professional ambitions rather than to be a party activist (Snyder and Ting, 2002). Therefore, their loyalty to the party is low; they leave it, if they fail to meet their professional goals, and they only become active members, if this furthers their aim of

becoming a candidate or winning the contests. Their attitude towards leadership should increase, as they provide the resources and support needed to run an effective campaign (Panebianco, 1988). As mentioned, only few new members are expected to join, however, they should be highly active during the leadership contest, thus increasing the level of overall turnout among members and accounting for a high share of the turnout. After all, their main motivation to join in the first place was the open selection regulations. Schattschneider (1942: 59) argued that in this view, parties are alliances of leaders, between which voters choose and not organizations of the citizens themselves. Thus, apart from professional staff, candidates and electoral campaign helpers, membership becomes mainly redundant. Observations about US parties would confirm the consequences for party members outlined above.

In the next case of **Disempowering Democratization** (strict candidacy/open primary), members feel truly disempowered, atomized and their voice is crowded out by a large external selectorate, while the process itself is tidily controlled by the elite (Katz and Mair, 1994). However, the party continues to exist as defined organizational entity of member but with a reduced role. Overall, members lose the exclusive right to participate in leadership selections but do not gain the right to run as candidates. Thus, they are further disempowered, atomized and their voice is crowded out by a *large party external primary selectorate*. Further, due to this disempowerment of members and a lack of incentives to join to participate in leadership elections, few new members join. Overall, this combination provides the elite with a high level of control over the primary and substantially reduces membership power and influence (Michels 1911; Katz and Mair 1994).

This constellation of rules is most likely to lead to a decline in *existing membership*, as members' power to influence the outcome of membership selection is substantially reduced (Katz and Mair 1994). In addition, the very strict candidacy requirements reduce the members' possibility to run in the contest, overall leaving them with a feeling of disempowerment. Consequently, the incentive to invest time or other resources into the party declines, leading to a drop in the quality of party membership (Rahat and Hazan, 2007). Thus, fewer members will be willing to participate in any high-intensity party activities. Further, the loyalty towards the leadership decreases as existing members feel they are not truly represented. Hence, negative attitudes towards the leadership increase. Overall, existing party members' participation rate is low and amounts only to a small share of the turnout, as they feel that they have no real choice and that their voice is crowded out by a larger external selectorate (Lefebvre, 2011).

In general, the inflow of *new members* should be small, as there is no need to join the party to vote (Knapp, 2002). The closed candidate requirements reduce the possibility to be a candidate in future and reduce the incentive for the membership further. However, often reforms that widen the leadership selection methods are combined with large-scale member recruitment drives (Haegel, 2012, Haegel, 2009). The most common method is to create new membership category with lower fees and limited rights vis-a-vis full party membership (Kosiara-Pedersen et al., 2014, Sandri and von Nostitz, 2015). This low cost support or friendship membership often only provides the right to vote in primaries and to attend party meetings but without voting rights. Often, these memberships are not renewed in years without leadership contest or restricted to one year only (Bachelot, 2008). Thus, they can artificially increase

membership levels for a short period of time. The quality of the new members is also lower, since they join mainly as 'voters' and not as party activists. The turnout in the first contest is probably high due to its novelty factor, but it should drop and remain relatively low in consecutive contests (Gans, 2010). However, newly acquired party members provide a high share of the turnout, if the recruitment drive was successful but remains still lower than the share of non-party members.

The third category is **Protected Democratization** (permissive candidacy/closed primary). From a members' perspective, members are empowered as they now hold the deciding vote on who leads the party, and their voice is not crowded out by a large external selectorate. Further, they can run in leadership selection contests, if they wish to do so. Thus, members feel that their interests and organizational role is protected. There should be no decline in membership levels, as the powers of members increase giving them the right to vote and, more importantly, to become candidates in the leadership race. Additionally, members' empowerment should also lead to more intra-party participation and an improved attitude towards the leadership (Scarrow, 2005). The party elite loses its control over the candidacy requirements, and, thus, new candidates gain the opportunity to enter the contest. In the long run, this will contribute to party survival, renewal and facilitate generational turnover (Scarrow, 2005). Overall, the power of members is protected from external voters and elite control, and, hence, the overall turnout should be high. The impact on the quality of membership should be positive with new members having a positive attitude towards the leadership. This seems to be the optimal form of intra-party democracy, as it sustains the organizational structure and strengthens the power and role of the membership without providing excessive control and

power to the party elite. Thus, it protects both party members and the party organization (Young and Cross, 2002).

There should be no decline in the membership level of *existing members*. Some former disillusioned members might even return, as the new regulations provide more power and a new incentive to join. The power of members is enlarged, and they are free to become candidates in the leadership race, if they want to do so. The quality of membership is likely to increase. Activists are motivated to participate, as they feel they have more influence over the party leadership (Spier et al., 2011). Further, the empowerment for members should also lead to higher party loyalty. Consequently, the attitude towards the leadership should improve. Overall turnout should be high, and existing members should provide a high share of it (Wauters, 2015). However, some activists might abstain due to a feeling of disempowerment, as they lost the exclusive right to vote for the leadership in delegate conferences.

Given this regulatory constellation, an increase in *new members* joining the party should be observable. It does not only give them the right to vote in leadership contests but also to run without the need to overcome high hurdles. Thus, the incentives to join increase. Again, the impact on the quality of membership depends on whether the leadership introduces new membership categories or not (Kosiara-Pedersen et al, 2014). If there is a new 'primary voter/ supporter' category the new members' quality is most likely to be lower, as they just join as primary voters rather than with the aim to become party activists; they invest little in the party and soon leave again. Of course, some join to become candidates, and their level of activism can be expected to be very high. If no new membership category is introduced, the membership quality

is likely to improve. New members who pay a higher membership fee—than supporter, which for them is often free or very cheap (Sandri and von Nostitz, 2015)—will invest more time and resources to get a return on their initial investment (Scarrow, 1995). This is practically true for new members who want to run as candidates in the leadership contest. Overall, new members should have a positive attitude towards the leadership. Their participation rate and share of the overall turnout should be high, as one of the main reasons to join the party was to vote in the leadership selection contest (Young and Cross, 2002).

In the last combination of **Controlled Democratization** (strict candidacy/closed primary), members also perceive that they hold the deciding vote on who will lead the party, and their voice is not crowded out by a large external selectorate; however, candidacy is more limited and controlled by the party leadership. Thus, in contrast to the above, they feel their interests and organizational role is not only protected but also controlled by the elite so that they do not interfere with the latter's aims. The elite can still limit the list of candidates and in this way contain unwanted outcomes. This combination leads to a clearly defined and distinct selectorate and provides the elite with extensive control over the process. Hence, even though this is a more democratic method in comparison to others, such as delegate meetings, it overall remains highly controlled by the elite (Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2013).

In this combination, the power of *existing party members* to determine the leadership increases, but their ability to run is still very limited. Often increasing the size of the selectorate is combined with the introduction of more exclusive candidate requirements further reducing the possibilities of members

to run (Katz, 2001). Thus, this should lead to a moderate decline in membership as activists lose their exclusive voting rights to ordinary members. Further, the quality of membership should also decrease, as many middle-level activists invest less resources into the party because the former reward for attending the delegate meeting to select the next party leaders is removed (Sandri, 2011; Amjahad, 2013). The overall level of mobilization in terms of turnout should decrease but be still relatively high, as existing members' voices are still protected. Further, the attitude towards the leadership will worsen as activists feel they have less influence over it. However, these effects should be less profound than in the case of a move to an open primary. The overall share and level of turnout should be high (Wauters, 2015).

*New Members* are likely to join to gain the right to vote in the leadership selection contest. As previously outlined, such reforms are often linked with membership recruitment drives (Haegel, 2009). This should further increase the number of new members joining the party. The incentive to gain voting rights should lead to a higher inflow than under open primaries. The quality of the new members depends on whether or not the party introduces new membership categories with lower fees (Kosiara-Pedersen, et al. 2014). In the case of a new 'primary voter/ supporter' category, the quality should decline as new members join only to vote rather than to become party activists. In this case, loyalty should be low, and a large amount of members only becomes active during leadership contests (Young and Cross, 2002). If no new categories are introduced, the quality is most likely to improve as new members are prepared to pay high membership fees and should invest time into the party to benefit from their investment (Scarrow, 1995). This should lead to a more loyal and active membership. But overall, in both cases a more positive impact on the

quality of membership can be expected, as some of the new members will become activists. The attitude towards the leadership should be positive, as members join to vote for it. New members provide a large share of the overall high turnout, as their main motivation to join is to vote in the leadership selection.

After discussing the theoretical expectations for all, existing as well as new members along the four dimensions under four different primary regimes, the next section offers a summary and turns them into individual, testable hypotheses.

## **6. From Concept and Dimensions to Hypotheses**

The next section turns the above outlined expectations in the discussion of ideal cases into testable hypotheses. The following outline is based on the assumption that party members and primary voters are aware of who can run and what set of rules apply in the elections. As a reminder, candidate requirements, who can run, are seen as either permissive or strict. Further, *open primaries* are those in which non-members may vote in the selection, while *closed primaries* are those in which only party members can vote. As previously discussed, the effect of the four types of primaries along the four indicators is discussed separately for existing and new members.

The following two pages outline the above-discussed relationships in a graphical manner. The first figure outlines the consequence for both new and existing members under conditions of strict candidacy requirement and open/closed primaries. The second figure outlines the impact under permissive candidacy requirements and open/ closed primaries. The general direction of



membership development in each dimension and in all combinations is indicated by plus and minus signs or an o in case of no change.

Figure 2.4 Restrictive Candidate Nomination Arrow Diagram




Figure 2.5 Permissive Candidate Nomination Arrow Diagram




Figure 2.4 below presents in a table the above outlined effects on new and existing members in each of the four combinations of leadership rules as individual, testable hypotheses.

Figure 2.6 Four Types of IPD with Indicators and Expected Effects

Open	<p><b>Atomized Democratization</b>  Overall effect: --  Membership level  Existing: - New: +  Quality of membership  Existing: -New: -  Attitude towards leadership  Existing: - New: +  Turnout in primary  Existing: low New: high</p>	<p><b>Disempowering Democratization</b>  Overall effect: -  Membership level  Existing: - New: +  Quality of membership  Existing: - New: -  Attitude towards leadership  Existing: - New: +  Turnout in primary  Existing: low New: high</p>	
	<p><b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b></p> <p><b>Protected Democratization</b>  Overall effect: ++  Membership level  Existing: o New: +  Quality of membership  Existing: + New: +  Attitude towards leadership  Existing: + New: +  Turnout in primary  Existing: high New: high</p>	<p><b>Controlled Democratization</b>  Overall effect: +  Membership level  Existing: - New: +  Quality of membership  Existing: -New: +  Attitude towards leadership  Existing: - New: +  Turnout in primary  Existing: high New: high</p>	
Closed	Permissive	<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	Strict
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase			

Due to different consequences of the types of primaries for both existing and new memberships, each of the above outlined types of IPD can be divided into testable hypotheses for both sub-groups along the four dimensions. To illustrate this, the following section does so for the case of *turnout* in primary selections.

The four types of IPD differently affect the relative participation of existing, new and non-members in the primary.

### **Disempowering Democratization:**

H(a) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate but closed candidacy requirements lead to a low turnout of existing members.

H(b) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate but closed candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and non-members.

### **Atomized Democratization**

H(a) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate and open candidacy requirements lead to a low turnout of existing members.

H(b) Leadership selection methods with permissive selectorate and open candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and non-members.

### **Controlled Democratization**

H(a) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate and closed candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of existing members and high share of it.

H(b) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate and closed candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and high share of it.

## Protected Democratization

H(a) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate but open candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of existing members and high share of it.

H(b) Leadership selection methods with strict selectorate but open candidacy requirements lead to a high turnout of new members and high share of it

The analysis of the different types of primaries using the four indicators of (1) party membership level, (2) turnout, (3) membership quality and attitude towards the membership will prove the overall effect of each type of primary on party members.

## 2.5 Conclusion

The chapter first developed the conceptual framework and in a second step provided a discussion of the indicators used to study the impact of different primary rules on the individual conception of party membership. It ended by combining all relevant aspects in a unified framework and discussed the effect of the four distinct types of IPD from the members' perspective.

The first dimension of the framework is *the selectorate* of the primary, i.e. who can vote. Hazan and Rahat (2010) and others suggest five different types, reaching from fully inclusive (voters) to fully restricted (single leader), in which case the leader is appointed rather than voted. The project is only interested in the inclusive end of the scale and, thus, selection that lies within the *primary zone*, which is defined as cases where the decisive and final vote either rests with party members or voters. Conceptually, the former is defined as a closed

while the latter is defined as an open primary. This constitutes the first dimension of open vs. closed selectorate.

The second dimension is *candidacy requirements*, which defines who can run in a primary. Again, they can be either fully inclusive with no rules to highly restrictive with candidates having to meet a long list of requirements. The entire continuous scale is divided into two conceptual categories: permissive and restrictive candidacy requirements. While, for example, requirements of being a sitting MP or high numbers of signatures from different party bodies and regions are considered as strict, party membership or a small percentage of signatures from party members are categorized as permissive. This constitutes the second dimension of permissive vs. strict candidacy requirements.

To fully understand and analyse the effect of different primary rules on the nature of party membership, we need to study the interaction between the two dimensions outlined above. The chapter discusses the theoretical justifications for the four indicators suggested by the project to do so. The first indicator is changes in membership levels. The increase or decline of membership provides an insight into whether reforms are able to attract new members and retain existing ones. Second, turnout in primary selection provides insights into the mobilization of party membership or the electorate at large. It further allows seeing whether all sub-groupings within the party or among members and voters participate equally and have proportional influence over the outcome, or whether one group dominates the process. The third indicator is the quality of party membership. It provides insight into whether the new selection system affects the motivation and thus type of members that join the party. The main question is whether different combinations of primary rules

attract different types of members and lead to a more active or passive membership. The last indicator is the membership attitude towards the party leadership. Here, the question is whether members feel they have more or less influence and voice in the party (external efficacy) under different primary rules. As highlighted throughout the chapter, the effect of different rules along the four indicators are not only discussed for the membership as a whole but also separately for the two sub-groups of new and existing members.

The next section of the chapter merges the two dimensions and four indicators into one unified framework and discusses the four conceptual categories. The framework distinguishes between four ideal types of IPD based on the members' perception of different primary rules. Open primaries with strict candidacy requirements are seen as **Disempowering Democratization**, since members lose their exclusive voting right to the larger external electorate. Closed Primaries with strict candidacy requirements are classified as **Controlled Democratization** as both the party elite and party members retain control over both aspects of the selection process. The third category is **Atomized Democratization** with permissive candidacy requirements in an open primary as both members and elite lose any control over the selection process. The final category of **Protected Democratization** with permissive candidacy requirements in a closed primary is so called like this, as it protects the power of members by giving them not only the exclusive right to vote but also to run and challenge the party leadership, if they wish to do so.

The chapter ends by presenting as individual, testable hypotheses in a table and graph the discussion of the effects of the interplay between the primary rules on the four indicators. As an example, the section also outlines a



full list of hypotheses—for all, new and existing members—for turnout as one of the indicators. It is now possible to test the effect of different types of primaries on party membership in a comparative and systematic way, based on the four indicators of *membership level*, *membership quality*, *membership attitude toward the leadership* and *turnout*.

Before exploring the merit of the hypotheses in form of an in-depth and detailed case study analysis, the next chapter justifies the project's case selection, introduces the method chosen here, provides an overview of the data used and presents an operationalization of all variables, before applying the above developed conceptual framework to the cases of the UK Conservative Party, the German Greens and French PS.

### 3 Case Selection, Methods and Data

#### 3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is threefold. It first discusses the cases selection; second it outlines the method and data used. It shows that the project uses a mixed-method case study approach based on a combination of new and existing primary and secondary document and data analysis. This enables the project to study the effects of the four types of primaries on party members along the four indicators of (1) membership level, (2) turnout in primary, (3) membership quality and (4) membership attitude towards the party leadership. Overall, this allows the project examining the theoretical claim that different types of primaries can be perceived by party members as either disempowering, atomizing, controlling or protective. The third section provides an overview of survey questions in existing membership surveys that are used to operationalize and measure both theoretical concepts of membership quality and attitude. In the case of party quality, the project uses a mix of survey items used in previous surveys to capture intra-party participation (Haegel, 2012; Dargent and Rey, 2014; Rey and Subileau, 1991; Subileau et al., 1999; Spier et al., 2011; Whiteley et al., 1994) as well as items developed as part of the *general-incentive model* by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). Together they can demonstrate how the quality of membership varies due to the different types of primaries in operation. To measure differences in membership attitudes towards the party leadership due to the four types of primaries, the study will use survey items developed as part of the *political-efficacy model* by Niemi et al. (1991). Further, the section also uses items measuring satisfaction with membership.

To triangulate the findings, the project also uses party member and elite interviews. The final part of the chapter discusses the research method of using interviews, the structure of the interviews and its utility for verifying survey data and also provides further background information. In summary, the chapter justifies the case selection, the methodology used, operationalizes the theories and concepts to enable the subsequent chapters to empirically examine the effect of different types of primaries on party membership.

### **3.2 Case Selection**

Following Seawright and Gerring (2008: 297), the project uses a *typical case* study method. The case of the German Greens, the UK Conservative Party and the French PS are chosen, as they are a representative example for a wider population of cases that can be placed in the quadrats combining candidate requirements and selectorate. As such, they allow confirming or disconfirming the theoretical expectations of the specified relationship between primary rules and effect on party membership for each of the three types of intra-party democracy (IPD). In all cases chosen, the adoption of primaries constitutes a structural change towards a higher level of IPD in the shape of a shift from a delegate meeting system to an open or closed primary selection. All cases also meet the competitiveness requirement; selection takes place with more than one candidate—reaching from two to 15 candidates—and can thus be considered a contest rather than a coronation. The following *typical cases* are selected here:

Figure 3.1 Four Types of IPD with Case Studies

Open	<b>Atomized Democratization</b>	<b>Disempowering Democratization</b> <i>French Parti Socialist (2011)</i>
<b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b>	<b>Protected Democratization</b> <i>German Greens</i>	<b>Controlled Democratization</b> <i>UK Conservative Party, French Parti Socialist (1995,2006)</i>
Closed	Permissive	Strict
	<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	

Based on the two dimensions, the case selection consists of a total of three parties but four cases. The French PS constitutes two cases, as it considerably changed its leadership selection method twice over the past decades (in 1995 and 2009). This allows tracing the changes in the party membership's attitude and behaviour within the same organization but under two different selection methods. The effect on party members is the same regardless of the party adopting an open primary directly or first a closed and moves then to an open primary.

Further, for unit homogeneity to hold, the project only looks at advanced long-lived democracies and the use of different types of primaries to select the party leader at the national level. The study only includes mainstream parties, here defined as parties, which either are or were in government or have government potential (Sartori, 1976). Another constrain on the case selection is that parties voluntarily adopted primaries rather than they being state imposed. This leads to the exclusion of the US as a potential case. After all many scholars point out that the concept of party membership in the US is substantial different from the one in the European context (Stone et al., 2004, Heidar,

2006). This further restricts the case selection to European parties, leading the top right box of the above figure to be empty. The absence of such a case in Europe is logical, as most reforms were adopted by the party elite and no party elite would voluntarily adopt a selection system that would lead to total loss of their power and control. As the project focuses on intra-organizational changes and intra-party elections, external and systemic factors, such as the electoral system or party system, should have no significant impact on the effect of different types of primaries on party members.

### **3.3 Method and Data**

The project follows a mixed-method approach applied to three case studies. The project mainly uses quantitative membership survey data complemented by in-depth qualitative membership interviews. It further uses a combination of primary and secondary sources that will be analysed in a qualitatively (party statutes) and quantitatively manner (membership figures and turnout). Survey data is mainly analysed using descriptive statistics, such as frequency distributions and cross tabulations.

As the project aims to compare the development of the four above-mentioned indicators (membership level, turnout in primary, quality of membership and membership attitude towards the leadership) before and after the introduction of more inclusive leadership selection methods, each indicator will be measured twice, before and after the reform.

The main benefit of the mixed-method approach is that it profits from the advantages of both methods and offsets their weaknesses. Following Morgan's (1998) two criteria for mixed-method research, here the quantitative method in

form of membership surveys constitutes the principal tool of data-gathering (priority decision), and it precedes the qualitative method in form of semi-structured interviews (sequence decision). Based on Creswell and Plano Clark's (2011) classification of different mixed-methods designs, the project opted for an *explanatory sequel design*. The findings of the quantitative survey data collection inform the design of the subsequent qualitative semi-structured interview guide. The interviews allow for elaboration and detailed explanation of the survey findings. Further, the interviews provide insight into contexts in which the survey data was gathered and thus contributes substantially to a more comprehensive account of the effect of different primary rules on party membership. In addition, the interviews allow for triangulation of the survey findings to produce greater validity of the findings.

Generally, there are two main criticisms in the literature with regard to the use of a mixed-method research approach. The first states that quantitative and qualitative research carries distinct and fixed epistemological and ontological commitments, and, thus, to mix them is impossible and undesirable (Hughes, 1990: 11, Smith, 1983: 12 f). The second criticism is that quantitative and qualitative research is a separate paradigms (Bryman, 2016: 636). While this discussion is beyond the scope of this project, in defence of the methodological choice made, it has to be stressed that the project adopts a technical version of the nature of qualitative and quantitative research rather than an epistemological one. This implies a "greater prominence to the strengths of the data-collection and data-analysis techniques with which each quantitative and qualitative research are each associated and sees these as capable of being fused" (Bryman, 2016: 637). This version acknowledges that both types of research have distinct epistemological and ontological assumptions, however, it

does not see them as fixed and inevitable. Thus, the research methods are seen as autonomous. The next section outlines the data collection and data analysis for both methods.

### *Data*

To assess the *procedural changes* political parties enact, the project uses a large variety of primary documents, such as party statutes, internal regulations, reports and party self-reported information. In addition, especially for the two *quantitative indicators turnout and membership figures*, it uses secondary documents, such as newspaper articles, independent expert reports and the MAPP project data base. This allows for the triangulation of the membership and turnout figures stated by the parties, as self-reported membership figures and turnout rates are often artificially inflated. In the cases under study, the primary and secondary documents listed above are widely and generally available and accessible.

For the two indicators aiming to capture changes in *membership quality and attitude towards the party leadership*, the project will use party membership surveys. To measure the impact of the primaries on party membership, the project collects membership survey data from before and after the shift from delegate meeting to either open or closed primary. The table (2) below outlines the availability of party membership surveys for the cases under study. A detailed discussion of the data used in each case can be found in the next section.

Table 3.1 Date of Party Membership Surveys and Leadership Reform

Party	Membership Surveys and Reform Dates		
	<i>Pre-Reform</i>	<i>Reform</i>	<i>Post-Reform</i>
<i>Conservatives (UK)</i>	1992	1998	2009 <sup>16</sup>
<i>PS I (France)</i>	1985	1995	1998
<i>PS II (France)<sup>17</sup></i>	1998	2009	2011
<i>Greens (GER)</i>	2009	2012	<b>2015</b>

One general disadvantage is that individual level data relies on self-reported information, which is not objective, and might lead to an overstatement of the level of activity or underreport party internal undesirable events. However, the careful survey design and large sample size cancels out some of these effects (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Further, the interviews provide for more contextual information and triangulation of the survey findings.

The analysis of the existing pre- and post-reform surveys is a form of secondary survey analysis, as it re-analyses the existing survey responses with the aim of examining research questions that differ from those of the original research (Nathan, 2004). In most cases, the existing surveys are either publicly available through national data services or access has been provided by contacting the organizer of the original survey. This is a very cost- and time-saving method of data collection. The original survey might have been designed with a different analytical purpose in mind, but the scope of the questions in the membership survey is also somewhat limited, which reduces the potential variety of concepts and questions. However, as will be seen later in this chapter,

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<sup>16</sup> There is a further small survey by Bale and Webb from 2013.

<sup>17</sup> The table shows the cases of the PS twice as the party first moved from a delegate model to a closed selectorate and later to an open selectorate. However, in both cases it maintained very strict and closed candidacy requirements.



operationalizations and measurements can vary, but as Kiecolt and Nathan (1985) point out, secondary survey analysis always requires some creative analytical techniques, when it comes to applying pre-collected data to new research questions. Common methods are harmonization (Office of National Statistics, 1996) or establishing equivalence (van de Vijver and Leung, 1997: 144). However, the general problem with the same concepts being operationalized and measured differently remains. In many cases, it is the only source of information we have available, if we want to study the changes caused by a certain phenomenon. Thus, overall, the advantages of a secondary survey analysis clearly outweigh its disadvantages, as it is better to have debatable research than no research at all (van Deth, 2003).

The Green post-reforms survey (bolt in table 3.1 above) is conducted specifically for this project. In order to save money and time, the project opted for an online survey. In order to gain access to the population, the project contacted the party headquarters (gatekeepers) with the hope to use their internal mailing list to distribute the survey among party members. The Germany Green party survey was completed in autumn 2015.

The survey design is partly based on pre-existing question batteries constructed for the *general-incentive model* developed by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and the *political-efficacy model* developed by Niemi et al. (1991). The survey also used behavioural and attitudinal indicators outlined and extensively tested in previous membership surveys (Rey et al. 1991; Whiteley et al. 1994; Rey et al. 2001; Spier et al. 2011; Haegel 2012, Dargent and Rey 2014). Here the project relied heavily on *the Members and Activists of Political Parties*

(MAPP) *working group*<sup>18</sup> database. Further, the survey uses standard control variables, such as age, gender and occupation status. The survey is designed to provide anonymity to all respondents. The large majority of questions in the survey are closed questions; they are formulated in a precise and simple manner, and the survey is kept short. Further, it was tested among a small group of party members who provided feedback on its clarity and the time it took to complete. All this should have increased the response rate.

Overall, the survey design stresses within-case comparison rather the cross-case comparison. It thus prioritises the same way of operationalizing and measuring constructs within cases over using them across cases. This is done, as the main aim is to capture change in membership due to primaries within the same party organization over time. The collected data are mainly analysed using descriptive statistics, such as frequency distributions and cross tabulations.

#### *Data for the Three Case Studies*

After this general discussion of the method and survey design's suitability, the next section outlines the details of survey data collection and of interview structures for each of the three case studies.

In the case of the *UK Conservative Party*, the study relies on two pre-existing surveys. The pre-reform survey was conducted by Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson (1994) in 1992 and was accessible via the UK data service

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<sup>18</sup> (van Haute, ongoing-<http://www.projectmapp.eu/>).

website<sup>19</sup>; the post-reform survey was conducted by YouGov in 2009 and accessed via the MAPP project website<sup>20</sup>. A further small survey conducted by YouGov for Bale and Webb in 2013 is also used<sup>21</sup>. The 1992 postal survey ran for four months and was sent to 3,919 Conservative party members. The participants were sampled from unpublished membership lists of a sample of parliamentary constituencies in Great Britain (multi-stage stratified random sample). The survey obtained 2,467 responses resulting in a response rate of 63 per cent. The study applied interlocked weights to adjust for under representation of respondents with weak partisanship and being male. The majority of questions were closed-ended (for further details, see Appendix I in Whiteley et al. 1994). The 2009 survey was conducted online and used an internet panel of party members. The survey was sent to a sample of 1,690 respondents and all targeted members responded. There were no weights applied. The survey included several questions asked in 1992 and most questions were closed-ended. In 2013, the survey was again sent to an internet panel of party members consisting of 852 participants. The overall survey was much shorter but included questions already used in 1992 and 2009. Thus, it allowed to trace trends in certain membership developments over a longer period of time. The sample is again unweighted.

In the case of the *German Greens*, the study uses both *existing and new survey data* (see **table 3.1** above). In the case of existing survey data, the thesis uses the data produced by the 2009 Party Membership Survey under the direction of

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<sup>19</sup> <https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=3286&type=Data%20catalogue> Whiteley, P.F., Seyd, P., Richardson, J. (1995). *Survey of Conservative Party Members, 1992*. [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 3286, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3286-1>.

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.projectmapp.eu/databases/>.

<sup>21</sup> <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/07/08/conservative-member-survey-paints-rather-gloomy-pi/>

Professor von Alemann (Spier et al., 2011). The postal survey was sent to a representative sample of 3,000 members out of the 45,405 Green party members, overall producing 1,835 valid responses and a response rate of 61.2 per cent. The 2009 survey also provided the template for the survey design and operationalization of the qualitative indicators in the 2015 survey. This ensures comparability across the two surveys. In 2015, further questions were added to evaluate the impact of the new leadership selection method on party members. Further, the 2015 survey added items to capture external political efficacy, to measure the self-perceived influence of members on intra-party decision-making and the party leadership. Standard control variables, such as age, gender and occupation status were also included, and the survey was totally anonymous. As in 2009, the large majority of questions in the survey are closed questions and were formulated precise and simple, and the survey was kept short. Before the distribution to ca. 41,000<sup>22</sup> party members via the electronic newsletter of the party<sup>23</sup>, it was tested among a small group of party members for some feedback. The survey ran from June to September 2015 attracting 391 responses.<sup>24</sup>

To study the membership development for the French *PS*, the study uses three independently conducted membership surveys from 1985, 1998 and 2011. In addition, it also uses a small survey conducted by the party itself in 2006 meant to study the profile of the members that joined as part of the recruitment drive conducted in the primary and pre-election year. The 1985 survey was

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<sup>22</sup> The exact number varies slightly with each reminder as the size mailing list changed over time.

<sup>23</sup> In order to save money and time, the project opted for an online survey

<sup>24</sup> At 95 per cent confident level the survey has a 5 per cent margin of error

conducted by Rey and Subileau (1991). The survey was distributed during regional party meetings and in the regional party newspapers to 43,190 members in 30 representative regions. Together this encompassed 40 per cent of all party members. In total 4,319 responded, leading to a 10 per cent response rate. The survey data was not weighted (for further details, see Appendix 1 in Rey and Subileau (1991)). The second survey conducted in 1998 was directed by Subileau, Ysmal and Rey (1999). The survey was distributed via the national party newspaper (*l'Hebdomadaire des socialistes*) to all 148,795 members. Overall 12,291 members replied resulting in a response rate of 8.3 per cent. This figure is based on the author's own calculation based on the 1998 membership figures, as the original report does not contain this information. The 1998 survey contains all relevant question of the 1985/6 survey to study the development of party membership and the impact of the closed primary in 1995. Unfortunately, there is no electronic data set of this survey, and due to the large response rate, it was not possible to re-code all responses. Thus, the author drew a random sample, using R random number generator, of 2,000 questionnaires from all available survey questionnaires.<sup>25</sup> The party internal 2006 survey was sent to a sample of 18,000 out of the 40,000 new members that joined under the 20-Euro-for-One-Year-Membership recruitment drive to the date the survey was sent out (45 per cent of all new members). It attracted 8,000 responses, hence, a response rate of 44.4 per cent. The survey was distributed online. While it was much shorter than the two previous surveys, it still contained the key questions of why members joined the party under the new membership category and socio-demographic questions. The final survey

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<sup>25</sup> Here I would like to thank Emilie van Haute and the MAPP project for providing the financial means to re-code the surveys. I also would like to thank Giulia Sandri and the staff of the PS archive for all their help, advice and support during this process.

used in this project by Dargent and Rey (2014) dates to 2011. The survey was distributed online to all party members using the newly created central party membership register (*Rosam*) and a small sample was done by telephone. In total 11,000 members responded resulting in a response rate of 6.3 per cent. Again, this is the author's own calculation based on the 2011 membership figures, as the original report does not include this information.

The survey data is complemented by qualitative in-depth *semi-structured interviews* with party elites (high public and party office holders), middle-level elites, activists and ordinary members in all three parties. In total, the project conducted 24 interviews between September 2015 and July 2016 with each interview lasting between 20 and 60 minutes. The author conducted eight interviews with members of the French PS, nine with members of the German Greens and six with members of the UK Conservative Party. For all three parties, participants were initially recruited by contacting the local party branch and constituency representatives at the local, national and European level. Further the author visited a local party branch and spend one day there asking visitor if they were willing to be interviewed. Following each interview, the snowballing method was applied to recruit further participants. This approach was highly effective.

Before turning to the operationalization of the indicators, the next section discusses some of the limitation of the data. This is mainly relevant for the data used to capture the dependant variable, particularly for membership and turnout figures. Both measures are at the aggregate level and thus are not a perfect fit

to test how individual level of party membership changed. Nevertheless it is a good proxy to capture how different types of primaries affected the motivation of individual members to participate in the primary (turnout) and if it motivated individuals to join or leave the party. Another limitation of the membership data is that it hides turnover effects. Thus, a stable number of members might hide a loss of existing members that have been replaced by the identical amount of new members. This would be interpreted as no change and no gain of new and no loss of existing members. Thus by equating net membership gain of members to measure new members, the share of new member may be systematically underestimated This in turn might have impact on the results and also the calculation of how turnout might differ between new and existing members. These limitations are vital to bear in mind and some caution in interpreting findings is always advised. However, in order to partly compensate for some of these limitations, the study complements this aggregated data with both survey questions and interview items to capture the effects of the type of primary on turnout and motivation to join, leave or re-join the party.

### **3.4 Operationalization of the Indicators**

#### *Membership Figures and Turnout*

The measurements of *membership size* and its trajectory due to the new selection rules is relatively straight forward. Rather than reporting the share of party members of the electorate or population, the project uses absolute membership figures. This allows for a better detection of small changes in membership size. To trace membership development in individual parties, the project first presents the overall membership trend over a longer period of time

and then focuses on how the size changed between the year before the adoption of the new section rules, during and after the year of the selection. This approach enables the project to detect whether the development during the selection years follows the party's general trend in membership development or not. In addition to reporting the absolute values in party membership size, the project also reports percentage changes.

The second indicator to look at is *turnout*. The project looks at overall turnout and the relative turnout of the two sub-groups, existing members and new members. The latter provides information about the influence each sub-group has on the outcome of the selection process. In order to determine the relative size and thus strength of the two sub-groups, the project uses the differences between the membership in the year of selection and then in the year before the new selection method was adopted. A member who joined in the year of the adoption and from then onwards is considered a new member, while members who were already in the party prior to the reform are considered existing members. Based on the outcomes, the project calculates the percentage share of each sub-group. This operationalization allows seeing to what extent the vote of new members had the potential to determine the outcome of the selection process, or whether existing members still held a decisive share of the vote. The main drawback of this approach is that it cannot be applied in cases of overall declining party membership. In such cases, the project assumes that the sub-group of new member does simply not exist. For the case of open primaries, the project also compares the membership turnout rate with the share of non-members to measure how much the voice of party members is crowded out by a large external selectorate. To evaluate whether the turnout is good or not, the overall turnout rate is compared to the turnout in



other selection processes with similar rules, mainly based on a study by Kenig et al. (2015b) that compares how different selectorates affect turnout rates.

### *The Challenge of Measuring the Change in Party Membership Quality and Attitude*

As discussed above (chapter 1), various studies on IPD point to the potential negative effects of increased IPD on the attitude and behaviour of party members. The argument often states that members' attitude towards the leadership will drop; they will become more passive and overall assume more the role of followers of a leader than of active party members (Katz and Mair, 1994, Kirchheimer, 1966) The only way to observe whether these changes really do occur and membership is changing in the outlined way is to analyse individual level data in the form of membership surveys before and after a substantial increase in IPD brought about by adopting primaries. Unfortunately, we do not have perfectly comparable pre- and post-reform membership surveys. However, as discussed in the data section of this chapter, we do have a variety of individual membership surveys for only a limited number of cases. These allow us to study the development of party membership over time measuring membership attitude, intra-party activism and political external efficacy.

Based on the limited availability of survey data, the project mainly focuses on *within-case* comparisons. Hence, it will trace the developments and changes triggered by the use of different types of primaries *within* each party. In most cases, the project uses equivalent rather than identical survey items (Harkness et al., 2003). They capture the same concept and construct but are

operationalized and measured in a slight different manner (see, for examples, Kosiara-Pedersen et al., 2014). In some cases, this implies combining data from individual items to create an aggregated measure. For example, in some surveys participants are asked if they held a party office in the past, while in others they are provided with a list of possible party offices. The latter will be combined to provide one single measurement. Overall, the project thus provides first and foremost separate case study analyses each representing a conceptual category of the different types of primaries developed in the previous chapter. This shows how the interplay of selectorate, who can vote, and candidacy rules, who can run, differently affects membership. To a more limited extend, the project discusses similarities and differences to establish some more general conclusions.

Despite some limitations, the above listed surveys are best suited to study both the change in quality and attitude of party members under increased IPD due to different types of primaries. The use of pre- and post-surveys allows to capture how changes in party organization and power distribution, i.e. the use of primaries, changed party membership over time. One disadvantage of this method is that it cannot completely isolate the effect of primaries on membership. Still, due to the usually intense discussion about their adoption, the often increased media attention, intensified intra-party conflict and the instability that often follows the adoption and use of primaries (see the conflict in the French PS or the UK Conservatives with the only exception being the Greens), it can be assumed that primaries have a substantial effect on party membership, both its quality and attitude.

The section below illustrates how the theoretical concepts of membership quality and attitude are translated into measurable concepts based on the availability of concrete survey items in different existing surveys. Further, it shows how survey items used to operationalize the two theoretical concepts are partly based on survey items developed as part of the *general-incentive model* by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and *efficacy-and-trust model* developed by Craig et al. (1990). The former provides survey items to capture changes in membership quality, while the latter provides survey items to measure the changes in membership attitude. The survey items and measurement for the *quality of membership* are based on a variety of items, such as levels of activity (self-perceived levels and time spent) and type of activities (running for party and elected offices). It is mainly based on behavioural indicators. In contrast, the *membership attitude towards the leadership* is mainly based on items asking how members perceive their role within the party, if they feel they have influence, and whether the leadership is responsive. The next section provides an overview of the individual survey items used in the party membership surveys in order to capture the two theoretical concepts of membership quality and attitude.

As discussed in the previous conceptual chapter, the project will study the impact of the three types of primaries for both sub-groups of members, those that joined before the reform and those that joined since the reform, separately. The operationalization of how to isolate the two sub-groups is discussed at the end of this section.

## *Quality of Membership*

### *Why Members Join the Party?*

As outlined in chapter two, the thesis uses the *general-incentive model* by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and revised by Klein (2006) to look at the reason for why members joined in the first place. The model itself distinguishes between seven different incentive categories for why people join parties, which can be captured in surveys by using a specific question battery. The following section unpacks the questions used in each individual membership survey to capture the different incentives and shows how they are operationalized. The table below only list the items available in both the pre- and post-reform surveys. While in some surveys participants were provided with an open question asking why they joined, and the replies were afterwards grouped according to the incentives outlined below, in other cases participants were supplied with a list of reasons to join representing the different incentives, and they had then to indicate the importance of each in their decision to join.<sup>26</sup> Despite this difference, the surveys are based on the same theoretical concepts and are therefore comparable.

### *Selective Incentives*

As discussed in chapter two, we can distinguish three different types of individual selective incentives: *process, outcome and ideological incentives*.

1. *Outcome incentives* are personal aims, such as working towards an intra-party or elected office. Further, by joining the party, new members expect advantages for their professional life. Thus, benefits are mainly personal and

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<sup>26</sup> Using a four point Likert scale.

not collective. The following responses capture individuals motivated by outcome incentives:

Table 3.2 *General-Incentive Model—Outcome Incentives*

<p>Selective— outcome incentives</p>	<p><i>UK Conservative Party:</i> - In order to advance my career</p> <p><i>German Green Party:</i> - To gain a career advantage - In order to gain a public mandate - In order to gain a party office</p> <p><i>PS 1985/ 1998</i> - In order to gain a public mandate - In order to gain a party office - In order to gain a public or party office</p> <p><i>PS 1998/ 2011</i> - In order to gain a public mandate - In order to gain a party office</p>
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2. *Process incentives* refer to benefits derived from participating within the party. This category mainly applies of members who joined the party due to the enjoyment of political work, to be better informed about politics and to socialize. Items measuring process incentives are:

Table 3.3 General-Incentive Model—Process Incentives

<p>Selective— process incentives</p>	<p><i>UK Conservative Party:</i> - For social reasons</p> <p><i>German Green Party:</i> - Because I enjoy the political work - To be better informed about politics - To meet nice people</p> <p><i>PS 1985/ 1998</i> - To meet nice people - To meet like-minded people</p> <p><i>PS 1998/ 2011</i> - To meet nice people - To be informed about politics</p>
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3. *Ideological incentives* address the idea that party members are more radical than both party leadership and voters, which in return motivates them to be active in the party. It is hard to capture this last incentive, and Whiteley et al. (1994) argue that this incentive most likely applies to people who join to meet like-minded ideologically oriented people or to support a specific ideological principle or current within the party. Based on this, the recent revision of the model by Klein (2006) suggests the following survey items to capture *ideological incentives*:

Table 3.4 General-Incentive Model—Ideological Incentives

<p>Ideological incentives</p>	<p><i>German Green Party:</i> - To strengthen a specific wing within the party - To influence the political course of the party</p>
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	<p><i>PS 1985/ 1998</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To influence the political course of the party</li> </ul> <p><i>PS 1998/ 2011</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To strengthen a specific wing within the party</li> <li>- In order to influence the political course of the party</li> </ul>
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4. *Collective political incentives.* Members in this category join to push for specific ideological objectives, policies, goals and political actions. *Collective group incentives* can be both positive and negative; members join to support the party or to oppose another group's ideas and policies (Whiteley et al., 1994: 86-87). Items to measure the two are:<sup>27</sup>

Table 3.5 General-Incentive Model—Collective Political Incentives

<i>Collective political incentives</i>	<p><i>UK Conservative Party:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Because joining the party provides me with greater influence</li> </ul> <p><i>German Green Party:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To promote the aims of the party</li> <li>- To increase the influence of the party</li> <li>- To promote ecologically motivated politics</li> </ul> <p><i>PS 1985/ 1998</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To promote the aims of the party</li> </ul> <p>(to participated in the</p>
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<sup>27</sup> There are items directly measuring positive incentives for all cases but not negative incentives. Therefore, it is not always possible to trace changes in negative incentives for all cases.

	transformation of society)  - To increase the influence of the party (to win elections  <i>PS 1998/ 2011</i> - To promote the aims of the party (to participated in the transformation of society)
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5. *Normative incentives* can be found when people who join a party to fulfil certain expectations in their social environment. They join due to pressure or influence from family and friends. Items to capture this are:

Table 3.6 General-Incentive Model—Normative Incentives

<i>Normative incentives</i>	<i>German Green Party:</i> - Through the influence of family and friends  <i>PS 1985/ 1998</i> - Through the influence of family and friends  <i>PS 1998/ 2011</i> - Through the influence of family and friends
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6. *Altruistic incentives*. People join to contribute to the functioning of democracy or to fulfil their duty as citizen. The following survey items are used to capture this:



Table 3.7 General-Incentive Model—Altruistic Incentives

<i>Altruistic motives</i>	<p><i>UK Conservative Party:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To promote freedom and democracy</li> <li>- Good for helping Britain</li> </ul> <p><i>German Green Party:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To fulfil my responsibility as citizen</li> </ul> <p><i>PS 1985/ 1998</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To fulfil my responsibility as citizen</li> </ul> <p><i>PS 1998/ 2011</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To change political practices</li> </ul>
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7. *Expressive attachment incentives* allow members to express their support for a specific party or an impressive person within the party; consequently, the following items are used:

Table 3.8 General-Incentive Model—Expressive Attachment Incentives

<i>Expressive incentives</i>	<p><i>German Green Party:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Due to the impressive personalities at the top of the party</li> <li>- To demonstrate my sympathies for the party</li> </ul>
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Based on the survey item above, it is possible to trace how the motivations to join changed over time and differed between existing and new members due to the four types of primaries. The next section provides the operationalization of the type and intensity of membership activity.

### *What Members Do Within the Party: Intensity and Type of Activities*

The second aspect to look at, after why people join a party, is what they actually do, once they joined the party. In other words, how active are they, and what kind of activity do they engage in. To capture this, it is possible to look at two different indicators: (1) measuring the amount of time party members invest into the party (intensity): and (2) what type of activity party members engage in.

With regards to item (1) above, all surveys include questions on how many hours members are active in the party in an average month. The measurements vary very little across cases but are always consistent within cases. In most cases, the question asked for the amount of time spent per month. In cases where the question asked for an estimate about weekly time spent, the response was multiplied by four to provide the average amount per month. In addition, participants are asked to rate their overall level of activity. These survey items typically use a four point Likert scale. Further, to capture short-term change in levels of activity, some of the surveys include a question on whether members would describe themselves as more active or less active than five years ago. The project uses the following survey items:

Table 3.9 Perceived Level of Activity:

<b>How active do you consider yourself to be in the Party?</b>
Do you consider yourself as: (1) No response (2) Simple party member (3) Episodic activist (4) Party activist
Are you more active, less active within the party than you were five years ago, or about the same?

<b>Hours:</b>
How much time do you devote to party activities in the average month?
(1) Up to 5 hours
(2) 6-10 hours
(3) 11-20 hours
(4) 21-30 hours
(5) 31-40 hours

A second group of questions captures the type of activity members engage in. These activities can range from activists with very low time and financial investment (e.g., display a poster, wear a button, etc.) to activities with very high time and financial investment (e.g., run for office, co-ordinate campaign, etc.). In order to ensure within-case and limited across-case comparability, the project mainly focuses on members' activities of either running or holding a party public office and working for the party organization. Thus, it mainly looks at high intensity participation. These indicators are also chosen, as it is often argued that more direct selection methods attract more professionally minded members; thus, we expect to see an increase in these activities. Most survey items measuring the type of membership activity asked how frequently the participants had engaged in a specific activity over the past years. The following survey items are used:

Table 3.10 High Intensity Intra-Party Activities

Do you currently hold any office within the party? (list of positions and offices) <sup>28</sup>
Do you currently hold any publicly elected office? (list of positions and offices)
We would like to ask you about political activities you may have taken part in during the last five years:
(1) Stood for office within the party organization?
(2) Stood for elected office in a local or national election? <sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> The amount of items in the lists varies but normally distinguishes between offices/ positions at different levels (regional, national, European. etc.).

Please tick, if you have ever held any of the following positions or got elected for the following offices: (list of positions and offices)

Overall, these survey items allow the project to see whether there is a change in the amount of participation and the type of participation due to increased IPD; and whether certain members with specific incentives, mainly with individual selective outcome incentives, become more or less active within the party. Further, the study of the two sub-groups of new vs. existing members enables the project to see whether these groups have similar activity profiles, and whether primaries differently affected their level and pattern of participation.

### *Members' Attitude Towards the Party and its Leadership*

#### *The Efficacy-and-Trust Model*

The subsequent section shows how survey items developed as part of the *efficacy-and-trust model* (Craig et al., 1990) are used to operationalize and measure the impact of different types of primaries on membership attitudes towards the leadership. As outlined in chapter two, this project only focuses on external *political efficacy* as we are interested in member's perceived influence within the party. External political efficacy captures the members' believe about how responsive the party leadership and party bodies are to their demands, and the extent to which they feel their participation matters. Political efficacy can be divided into two sub-aspects.

First, *regime-based external efficacy* measures how members perceive the opportunities to influence political process offered by formal rules and

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<sup>29</sup> This question asked for the frequency of engagement in these activities.

procedures or their outcome provided by the political organization (Craig et al., 1990: 291). This is measured by a variety of survey items asking for how much influence members feel they have over the party in general and its candidate and leadership selection process in particular. All the survey items chosen here asked about the perceived distribution of power within the party, and whether members feel that specific groups do have too much power over certain areas. The perceived power distribution and influence in key decision-making areas affects the overall satisfaction with party membership. Admittedly, asking for overall satisfaction with membership does not directly capture the perceived opportunities of members but acts as a useful proxy and item to triangulate responses to other more direct items. Listed below are the items used to operationalize this construct:

Table 3.11 Regime-based External Efficacy

- Conservative Central Office should have a more influential role in the selection of parliamentary candidates
- Do you think that the leadership has too much, not enough or about the right amount of influence in the candidate selection process?
- Do you think the influence of the following groups over the selection process is generally too little, too great or about right? 1) National Party Leadership 2) Local Party Members
- In the Greens, every member has the possibility to actively influence the politics of the party
- If you know personally a publicly elected representatives do you feel you can influence them?
- How do you think elected office holders see party activists: (1) As simple supporter of their electoral campaign (2) Are part of the defining process of their campaign
- How satisfied are you with your party membership today?

Second, *incumbent-based external efficacy* captures the responsiveness of the leaders themselves rather than the ability of the individual to influence the

party as a whole. Thus, it focuses on how members see the ability and motivation of the leader to respond to members' demands (Shingles, 1988, Craig et al., 1990: 291). Surveys deploy a variety of questions to measure this concept including items of how well members perceive their party official to listen to them, whether it is necessary to be a party official to achieve anything, and what they would like to reform to increase their influence. The following items are used in the various surveys to capture this concept:

Table 3.12 Incumbent-Based External Efficacy

The party leadership doesn't pay a lot of attention to the views of ordinary party members.
In the Greens, the party reacts to criticism of the members.
The opinions of ordinary party members do not find an open ear within the Greens.
- Do you think that in order to gain influence in your party, one must hold a local elected office (local councillor, major, departmental councillor)?
The leaders of the party are not very attentive to what the members think.
To what extent do you agree with the following statements: (1) The leaders of the party are not very attentive to what the members think. (2) In general, the PS MPs try to resent the views of the party members. (3) In general, the party is more interested in representing the views of the electorate of the party members.
<b>Reforms:</b>
The Conservative party leader should be elected by a system of 'one member, one vote'.
How sensible/ useful do you find the following measures to reactivate party membership participation: (1) Selection of the national party executive by all party members (2) Selection of the front running candidate by an all membership congress (3) Decision over central policy issues via intra-party votes

Of course, we do not have all the above items in all surveys and across all parties. However, there are sufficient items within cases to capture the development of political efficacy due to the adoption of primaries. In some

instance, we can also compare across parties, for example, between the two French cases, and thus come to some more general, albeit limited, conclusions. An increase in external efficacy is clearly a positive effect for party members and is most likely in cases where they have influence on both aspects of the primary. While in cases where members influence is constrained because of very strict candidacy requirements and open primaries, external efficacy is likely to decrease affecting membership negatively.

As stated above, the project aims to distinguish the two sub-groups of existing and new members. Throughout the analysis, the different survey items will not only be studied on an aggregate level, but the sample will be split into two groups: (1) members who joined before the reform and (2) members who joined after the reform. The split of the dataset will be based on the year the party introduced the primary and not on the year it used it first, as it can be assumed that members motivated by participating in the primary started joining from this point onwards and not only in the year of the selection itself. Further, usually the time span between formally adopting a primary and running it is very small. This allows us to see whether there is a difference in the effects the reform had on the two groups. The survey item to allocate two membership cohorts is the following:

- When did you first join the party: \_\_\_\_\_ Year<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> This is the question in all surveys, apart from the PS in 1985, which provided different periods of joining.

In some cases, the survey also asked, whether participants were constant members since they first joined, or whether they ever exited the party, and if so when they re-joined. In other cases, respondents are asked whether there was a specific event that motivated them to join. In cases where such data is available, it can provide further insight into what role primaries and increased IPD in general played in joining or re-joining the party. However, the project's findings mainly rely on the first indicator (year first joined).

Overall the above section outlined the operationalization for the four indicators used throughout the project to analyse changes in party membership. To measure changes in the quality of party membership, the project uses items developed as part of the *general-incentive model* by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). This allows capturing if and to what extent members' motivation to join the party changed due to increased IPD. To further account for changes in membership quality, the project uses survey items capturing the amount of time members devote to the party and types of activities they engage in. The last set of survey items to measure external political efficacy are taken from the *efficacy-and-trust model* developed by Craig et al. (1990).

### *Interviews*

In addition to the party membership surveys and to triangulate the findings, the project also uses party member and elite interviews. This part discusses the interview methods used and their utility in verifying survey data, and how interviews can provide further background information. From the perspective of the mixed-method approach chosen, qualitative interviews provide an



opportunity to collect more detailed information and to gain a better understanding of party members and how different types of leadership selections affect them on an individual level (Warren and Karner, 2005; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). One of the main criticisms of using only party membership surveys is that it is hard to control for the fact that observed changes in membership might be due to other factors and/ or might have happened without a primary. While some surveys include direct questions asking about the impact of the reforms on party membership, others do not. Thus, the interviews are a possibility to ask members how the new selection method affected them, whether they observe changes in their surrounding and to capture alternative factors that might have had an effect on membership in the past years. In short, the interviews are an effective way to as much as possible isolate the effect of the new leadership selection method and to determine its weight and role in changes in membership since its introduction. Overall, the project conducted 24 in-depth semi-structured interviews with both party members and elites lasting between 20 and 60 minutes each from autumn 2015 to spring 2016 (for a detailed list of participants, see Appendix I).

The interviews were organized in the following way. First, participants were asked to sign a consent form with the option to remain anonymous and a 'face sheet'. The face sheet provides important background information about the participant, such as gender, age and when they joined the party (new vs. existing members) but also contained questions about whether or not they currently hold or in past held any party or public office(s), and if they voted in the past leadership selection(s) (for face sheet, see Appendix II). This not only permits to place the consecutive answers of the interviewee to their specific personal and professional context but also was useful as an ice breaker to start

the interview. All interviews were recorded and later transcribed by the interviewer. To conduct a structured and clear interview, the interviewer used an interview guide based on the four dimensions of party membership discussed in chapter two. These were further divided into nine themes consisting of questions used in the membership survey (for the interview guide, see Appendix III). This design allowed to adopt the questions asked for each theme according to who was interviewed and to react to responses in previous themes and/ or sub-questions.

The **first** theme includes questions to capture the motivation to join the party in line with the *general-incentive model* of Whiteley et al. (1994) and asked about the personal experience and development of the interviewee. The **second** theme on 'intra-party democracy and your party' requested them to define the term and provide examples from within their party. It further includes questions to gauge the perceived level of external efficacy of members (Craig et al., 1990; Niemi et al., 1991). The **third** theme asked about the general long-term impact of the primary along the four dimensions of the individual level conception of party membership size, turnout, quality and attitude. This section is practically relevant for the case of the French PS and UK Conservative Party where, in contrast to the Greens, the post-reform surveys did not include question directly asking about the effect of and experience with the primary. The **fourth** theme examined the context of the reform (Cross and Blais, 2012), and the role members played in it. The **fifth** section inquired about their personal experience and satisfaction with the primary and their knowledge about its underlying rules, and if they would like to change them. Based on their response in this section, the interview moves either to one of the following

themes: participation (**sixth**), attitude (**seventh**) or political efficacy (**eighth**). For each theme, interviewees were asked how the primary affected these aspects of party membership in general and for them in particular. Further, they were asked about other factors that might have affected membership along these dimensions and led to the observed changes since the introduction of the primary. The **ninth and final** theme asked directly about their view on the representativeness, reliability and possible explanations for the results of party membership surveys. The interview ends with providing the participants with an opportunity to add any further comments or add points they think are important but were not covered in the interview. Further, they were asked if they can think of anyone else who would be interested to be interviewed (*snowballing approach*).

### **3.5 Conclusion**

This chapter outlined the case selection, method, data and operationalization of all indicators. As outlined above, the case selection is based on Seawright and Gerring (2008: 297). The project uses a *typical case study* method. The cases of the German Greens, UK Conservative Party and French PS are chosen as they are representative of a wider population of cases that can be placed in the same quadrats combining candidate requirements and selectorate. As such they allow confirming or disconfirming the theoretical expectations of the specified relationship between primary rules and effect on party membership for each of the three types of IPD. In total, the study looks at three parties but four cases, as the PS reformed its leadership selection method twice.

The project opted for a mixed-method design consisting of quantitative individual level survey data and qualitative in-depth semi-structured party member and elite interviews. Thus, while the surveys allowed to collect data from a large population and provide insight into its characteristics and how it changed over time, the interviews provide the opportunity to elaborate and to offer detailed explanation of these changes and the context of them. The chapter then proceeds by outlining the data it will use to capture the leadership selection rules (selectorate and candidacy requirements) and the four indicators to measure the impact on the individual level concept of party membership. Primary rules, turnout and membership figures are based on primary sources, such as party statutes, party-self information and secondary sources, like the MAPP project database. The other two indicators of membership quality and attitude towards the leadership are based on various survey items and question batteries, such as the external efficacy questions developed by Niemi et al. (1990) or the *general-incentive model* by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). Further, it uses various attitudinal and behavioural indicators developed by existing surveys. The above also forms the foundation of the survey design for the new membership survey conducted among German Green Party member in 2015. In total, the project uses five existing and one new survey, three pre- and three post-reform surveys.

Finally, the chapter presents the operationalization of the survey items and the structure of the interview guide. The survey design and outcomes informed the interview guide highlighting specific survey items to be asked about, stressing how interviewees explain certain membership developments and offering further details and context. It also included questions already used

in the survey to triangulate survey findings. The operationalization of the four indicators now allows studying how the quality of party membership changed with the introduction of different types of primaries; it further contributes to a general assessment of increased IPD for the nature of party membership.

Base on the above chapter, it is now possible to test the conceptual framework developed in chapter two with the help of the three cases studies chosen using both survey and interview data. However, before doing so, it is necessary to recall some of the caveats of this study. The main aim of the study is to examine the validity of the conceptual framework for investigating the consequences of different types of primaries on party members. Thus the main analysis compares and traces within-case development due to the reforms. The availability and comparability of the data, especially secondary survey data, and the different survey designs allow only for very limited across-case comparison and any such conclusion is very general and provisional. The next chapter analyses the case of the UK Conservatives followed by the case of the German Greens and finally the French PS.

## 4 The Case of the UK Conservative Party

### 4.1 Introduction

The Conservative Party adopted closed primaries for selecting its party leader in 1998 and used it for the first time in 2001. The party opted for a two-round selection process, where in the first round MPs reduced candidates to two finalists who then faced a full party membership vote to establish the next leader. Following the adoption of the new leadership selection method, the party underwent a turbulent period marked by intra-party fighting (Bale, 2011). During this time, the party held three leadership selections of which two were closed primaries (2001, 2005) and one MPs vote only in 2003, as only one candidate was nominated.<sup>31</sup> With the selection of Cameron in 2005, the party returned to more stable times. This section studies how the members of the Conservative Party were affected and reacted to the reform in 1998, and, thus, how their individual level conception of party membership changed due to the introduction of the closed primary. In order to do so, it will use two membership surveys (Whiteley et al., 1994, YouGov, 2009) complemented by six in-depth qualitative interviews with both ordinary party members and party elites. The interviews were conducted in 2016. Further, the chapter to a very limited extent uses a further small survey conducted by Webb and Bale in 2013 to either highlight long-term developments for certain items or compensate for the lack of an item in the 2009 survey. The case of the UK Conservatives is a good case for exploring the expectations of this quadrant: it represents a mainstream UK party, and, until recently, its membership vote was more direct than Labour's

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<sup>31</sup> In 2016 the Conservative Party also had a leadership selection by MPs vote only as only one candidate remained.

electoral college system (until 2015)<sup>32</sup>. It is also an interesting case, as it allows for analysis of the influence of a two-step selection model on the individual level conception of party membership, and whether it differs from the effect of primaries with the same rules—in terms of candidacy strictness and openness of selectorate but only a direct membership vote in the same quadrant—or not (see chapter six on the PS primary in 1995 and 2006).

The chapter starts by outlining the external factors that related to the adoption of the primary in 1998, using the hypotheses suggested by Cross and Blais (2012). It then places the case of the UK Conservative Party in the analytical framework and briefly discusses the theoretical expectations associated to the four dimensions, before it offers a detailed empirical analysis. In conclusion, the chapter finds that the empirical case of the Tory party supports the theoretical expectations for the case of ***controlled democratization*** suggested in the framework.

### *Background of the Reforms*

In 2012, Cross and Blais suggested four factors to explain reforms in party leadership selection methods. These are mainly based on external party system factors. They argue that parties are more likely to reform its leadership selection method after an electoral setback, when in opposition, and if other parties within the system have already democratized their selection process (contagion


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<sup>32</sup> Until the adoption of a direct membership vote in 2015, the Labour leadership selection method consisted of three electorates or sections that carried over the years either equally or different weights towards the total vote. The three electorates were (1) Labour members of the House of Commons and the European Parliament, (2) Labour constituencies/ individual members of the party and (3) individual members of affiliated organisations, such as trade unions and socialist societies (for more details, see Cross and Blais, 2012).

effect). They argue further that new parties are more likely to adopt a more inclusive selection method.

The UK Conservative Party experienced a substantive electoral defeat before the reforms in 1997, when they lost power after 18 years in government (1979-1997). Consequently, they were in opposition when they reformed in 1998. Thus, the case reflects Cross and Blais (2012) approach, and the reform should be viewed as an attempt of party organizational renewal after the dramatic electoral defeat in 1997.

Figure 4.1 Timeline: The Conservatives



The third factor of the contagion effect also holds in the case of the Conservatives. It was the last major party in the UK to reform its leadership selection method, after the Social Democrats and Labour did so in 1981, and later, after the merger, the Liberal Democrats reformed in 1988. The final factor mentioned by Cross and Blais (2012) is not supported as the Tory party is certainly not a new party; after all, it was founded in 1834. Overall, the case of the Conservatives reflects all of Cross and Blais (2012) factors but party newness. Thus, external factors played clearly a major role in triggering the party leadership reform in 1998. The next section of the chapter outlines the theoretical expectations for the effect of the reform on members in the case of the UK Conservative Party, followed by a detailed empirical analysis.



## 4.2 The UK Conservatives in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects

The UK Conservative party has a closed selectorate limited to party members and strict candidacy requirements that only allows Members of Parliament backed by two other MPs to stand as candidates. This makes it an example of **controlled democratization** and the conceptual framework developed in chapter two suggests the following impact for the individual level conception of party membership under this type of intra-party democracy (IPD):

Table 4.1 The Expected Effects for the UK Conservative Party

Open		
<b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b>		<p><b>Controlled Democratization</b>  Overall effect: +  Membership level  Existing: - New: +  Quality of Membership  Existing: - New: +  Attitude towards Leadership  Existing: - New: +  Turnout in Primary  Existing: high New: high</p>
Closed	Permissive	Strict
	<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	
	Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase	


Overall, the new selection method should be associated with a positive effect on party membership. The use of the primary should attract new members, improve the quality of membership and its attitude towards the leadership. Further, turnout should be high. However, as the table suggests, we should see a partly different effect on new and existing members with the latter being more sceptical about the reforms. Some party activists might be disappointed as they feel bypassed with voting rights granted to all members. Thus, they might moderately reduce their activity contributing to a decrease in the quality of membership, and their attitude towards the leadership worsens, as activists feel they have lost influence. As a reminder, the framework outlines the consequences associated with the different perceived levels of IPD from a member's point of view, and how their conception of membership is altered. The next section, first, discusses the findings for membership levels and turnout before turning towards quality of membership and attitude towards leadership.

### *Membership Level*

Overall, similar to most UK parties, the Tories experienced a substantial membership decline over a long period of time (McGuinness, 2012). In order to gain a better picture of how this long-term negative trend was affected by the adoption of the new leadership selection, the table below just presents the membership development in the years of the reform and since then. Following the electoral defeat in 1997, the party lost 50,000 members, dropping from 400,000 to 350,000 (Mair and van Biezen, 2001). With the announcement by William Hague to reform the leadership selection method and at the end of 1998, membership started to grow again reaching 401,000 by 2000 (McGuinness, 2012). Thus, the initial reform and prospect of more influence in

the leadership selection method seems to be related to a positive impact on membership figures in the short run. However, in the year of the first primary, membership actually seem to have dropped to 311,000 members and continued to decline in the first half of the 2000s. This is partly explained by the fact that the Tory party underwent a difficult time in the first half of the 2000s. As result the party had four different leaders between 1997 and 2005, in contrast to only two for 22 years between 1975-1997 (Snowdon, 2010). This related to a level of uncertainty among party members and a high level of membership fluctuation over the period reaching its lowest point in 2004 with 215,000 members. This lends support to the suggested development of existing members leaving the party in reaction to the leadership selection method and its outcomes. In 2005, the year of Cameron’s election as party leader, membership improved to 258,000 and even reached 290,000 in 2006 (McGuinness, 2012), the year after the general election. However, since 2005, the party held no leadership contests and since then membership has declined again to 130,000 by 2011.

Figure 4.2 UK Conservative Membership Development 1995-2011



Sources: (Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 2012; Webb et al., 2002; McGuinness, 2012)

Overall, it can be seen that the introduction of a closed primary with closed candidate requirements for the leadership selection is associated with a positive impact on party membership levels in the short run, attracting new members by providing new participatory tools as incentives. However, we can also see that existing members seem to have left the party in reaction to the outcome of the primary in 2001 and after. Thus, broadly speaking, this is in line with the suggestions in the conceptual framework. Further, it shows that if primaries are not used for a while, its effect wears off and membership levels seem to start dropping again. This points towards the constant need to involve members in intra-party decision-making to avoid members exit from the party. Thus, it seems that although the use of the primary might not have halted or even reversed the decline in membership in the long run, it is connected with a substantial slowdown in the short run.

The interviewees describe a similar short-term positive effect of the reform, and how for many it seems to have been an additional incentive to join the party. One interview partner stated that “one of the reasons to be a member of the Conservative Party is to have your voice in the leadership selection, as it is the intro to choosing the prime minister and people like that” (elite-member since 1991). Another one clearly highlights the recruitment potential of the primary by outlining that “if you want people to join you, you have to give them some form of say” (activist-member since 1995). The same interviewee also described how the reform of the leadership selection in 1997 initially contributed to the “renewal process” of the party after the “traumatic electoral defeat” but quickly led to chaos in the party, and thus membership declined due to uncertainty and only really worked for the selection of Cameron. However, the positive impact of Cameron’s selection did not last long as many interviewees

describe him as a “bad party manager”, and one even said that “when David Cameron was the leader, some left because they didn’t like him” (mid-level elite-member since 1991). With regard to the anticipation of a potential leadership selection in 2016, one member of the party elite reported an increase in party membership in the months before the EU referendum, and another mid-level elite person confirmed this by stressing that “just after the resignation (of Cameron) there were reports of twelve hundred applications in 48 hours!” (mid-level elite-members since 1999). However, it seems there is very little optimism about these new members, as the same interviewee goes on to say “they could become activist with any luck. On the other hand, they could join but not remain”. Overall the interviews support the trend outlined in the framework of an effective recruitment tool, inflow of new members but also exit of existing members in response to the primary.

### *Turnout in the Primary*

The second indicator to look at is turnout. In the case of the UK Tory Party, the turnout in the two leadership contests that used a membership vote was nearly the same with 79.1 per cent in 2001 and 78.0 per cent in 2005<sup>33</sup> (Kelly and Lester, 2005). The study by Kenig et al. (2015) outlined that on average turnout for party membership votes range from 31.3 per cent to 79 per cent. Thus, the UK Tory Party has a very high turnout, which points to large acceptance of the tool among members. The next step is to look at the share of new and existing members during the leadership contest. From 2004 to 2005, the party gained 43,000 new members, if all of them voted, this would constitute a 21.6 per cent

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<sup>33</sup> However, looking at the actual numbers of participants, there is a decline from 256,797 in 2001 to 198,844 in 2005.

share of the turnout. Hence, existing members still have a larger share in the turnout, but the share of new members is moderately high and potentially has a large influential. In 2005, members that joined in the year of the primary made up 16.94 per cent of the total membership compared to 83.06 per cent of existing members. The new members' share of the turnout is slightly higher than their overall proportion of the total membership. For 2001, it is not possible to provide similar findings, as the party actually lost 90,000 members from 2000 to the end of 2001. This points to the limitation of the data outlined above and so there might have been new members but the data does not allow to identify them. However, the overall number of members who participated is with 256,797 much higher than in 2005. This points to a high acceptance of the new selection methods among the remaining existing members. Overall, the case of the Conservatives seems to endorse the expected findings outlined in the conceptual discussion of high turnout and a high share of both existing and new members in 2005. While in 2001, it just confirms the expectation of high turnout among all members.

Table 4.2 Turnout in Conservative Primaries 2001 and 2005

Year	Number of candidates	Turnout
2001	2	Overall turnout: 79.1 per cent Share of turnout existing members: 79.1 per cent Share of turnout new members: - (membership decline)
2005	2	Overall turnout: 78.0 per cent Share of turnout existing members: 78.4 per cent Share of turnout new members: 21.6 per cent

The interviews support the fact that members accepted and appreciate the new participatory possibility and that this is reflected in the high turnout. One elite member stated that “the opportunity to vote for the leader was extremely positive” (elite-member since 1970). This is confirmed by interviews with both ordinary members and mid-level elite with one of the latter saying “I think people did appreciate that they could vote, and they had a voice” (mid-level elite-members since 1999). Many also stated their frustration of not being allowed to vote in the leadership election in 2016, but some make the point that an all membership vote is a luxury a party only has when in opposition (ordinary member- since mid-1980s).

So far, it can be seen that the case of the Tories mainly in line with the theoretical expectations of **controlled democratization**. The party experienced a short growth in membership and a generally high turnout with the share of existing and new members roughly proportionate to their share of the overall membership. The next step is to outline how the reforms relate to membership quality and attitude, and if these two differ between existing and new members.

### *Quality of Membership*

The next section moves from the two quantitative indicators to the two more qualitative indicators of membership quality and attitude. To explore developments in these two, mainly the pre- and post-reform membership surveys are used. Under **controlled democratization**, an overall positive effect in both dimensions is expected. The next section first outlines changes in motivations to join the party followed by analysing variations in intra-party

activity and lastly how members' attitude towards the party leadership was affected.

### *Motivation to Join the Party*

As outlined in chapter two, the study uses the *general-incentive model* by Seyd and Whiteley (1992) to investigate why members join the party. In both surveys, participants were asked to provide their most important incentive for joining the Conservative Party. Overall, Seyd and Whiteley (1992) developed seven incentives to join but due to the difference in survey design, it was only possible to study developments across four of them. The first is *selective-outcome incentives*. This category identifies members who joined mainly for reasons of personal benefit. Overall, there is a slight decrease in this incentive, however, when looking at existing and new member separately, the amount of new members that joined to advance their career is much higher. Thus, the new leadership selection method seems more likely to attracted more career-oriented members but also reduced the number of existing members who see the party as an effective arena to advance their career. The second category is *selective-process incentive*. Here members join to be part of the political process itself and find it enjoyable. Overall, we see an increase in this incentive, which might predict a more active membership motivated by this incentive. It is also interesting to see that existing members are more motivated to join based on the selective-process incentive than new members. In terms of party activity, this would envisage that existing members are should be more active compared to new members. The third group is *altruistic motives*, which are important for people who join the party to express their support for abstract and idealistic



goals. There is an increase in people sharing this motive to join the party between the two surveys. Further, for both existing and new members, it is of nearly equal importance when it comes to joining the party. This increase is a sign that people are more likely to have increased trust in the party and see it again as an organization that can make a real difference for the country and democracy as a whole. The last category encompasses collective positive incentives. Here, members are motivated by promoting party policies and the vision of the party acting for the collective good, mainly by winning elections. Once more, there is an overall increase in this motivation to join the party. It is interesting to observe that it is slightly stronger among new than existing members. Overall, this increase indicates that members see the party as an effective mean to address issues and to change them.

Table 4.3 Motivation to Join the Conservative Party 1992 and 2009

Incentive	Measurement	1992	2009		
		N	ALL	EXISTING	NEW
		2467	1690	1050	509
Selective-outcome incentives	- In order to advance my career	1.4	1.0	0.6	1.8
Selective – process incentives	- For social reasons	11.4	13.2	15.2	10.0
Altruistic motives	- Promote freedom and democracy	2.5	12.2	12.9	10.7
	- Good for helping Britain	3.3	58.8	57.1	60.9
Collective positive incentives	- Because joining the party provide me with greater influence	4.4 <sup>34</sup>	7.0	6.3	8.4

1) all values in per cent 2) For 1991 “very important” or “important” motivation to join the party, for 2009 “most important” (open ended question).

<sup>34</sup> Composed of Answers stating the main motivation to join is to increase general influence and joined to influence specific local or national policy concerns. In all cases they joined to increase their influence.

When asked during the interview about the development and changes in motivation to join the party, many confirmed that there are “a lot more of careerists in the party” (elite-member since 1991) and especially new members want to use the “party as springboard” (mid-level elite-member since 1999). Further, an activist (member since 1995) confirms that “they are less people nowadays who join for non-political reasons, I mean the social aspect is dead”. In addition, many of the long-term members confirmed that their involvement in politics was not intentional but just happened (mid-level elite-member since 1999), and that they initially joined after they helped during election campaigns, due to their partners’ involvement or to keep Labour out. One ordinary member (since mid-1980s) sums up the new mentality in the following way: “People will run for office; they want to wear the crown but not do the work which is really frustrating”. This already indicates that there might be a divide in intra-party activity between new and existing members that will be explored in more detail in the next section.

So far, it seems that the introduction of primaries is related to attracting a new group of highly motivated members and, thus, members who might be more active, as they join for incentives that require more membership participation to be realized. The next section discusses, whether this is also reflected in a change of the level and type of intra-party activity.

### *Intra-party Participation*

Intra-party participation can be measured in two different ways: How active members are, and in what type of activities they participate in. With regard to the former, the table below illustrates that overall party membership became

more active since the introduction of primaries in 1998. In 2009, 31.8 per cent stated that they were “active” compared to only 20 per cent in 1992. Further the “not at all active” category dropped by nearly 16 per cent in the period between the two surveys. When looking at existing and new members separately, it can be seen that new members are more active with 37.1 per cent compared to 30.7 per cent of existing members. Further, the level of totally passive party members in both groups was nearly equally high. Thus, an increase in activity seems to be mainly driven by a small group of highly motivated party activists.

Table 4.4 Level of Perceived Activity in Conservative Party 1992 and 2009

How active do you consider yourself to be in the Conservative Party?	1992	2009		
	ALL	ALL	EXISTING	NEW
N	2467	1690	1050	509
Very active	6	10.1	9.8	12.5
Fairly active	14	21.7	20.9	25.6
Not very active	36	39.9	41.5	36.3
Not at all active	45	28.2	27.7	25.6

1) all values in per cent

To determine whether this is a long-term trend or due to more recent events prior to the survey, the next survey item looks at how membership activity changed over the past five years. Taking the 2009 survey, it asked how active members were compare to five years ago (i.e., in 2004—before the election of Cameron as party leader). The table shows that most members have about the same level of activity, and only a small number increased its activity in the past five years. When looking at new and existing members separately, it can be seen that a large share of new members is more active now than in

2004, and in contrast existing members' activity seems more constant or even declining. This is supported by the finding that 20.6 per cent of all and 26.1 per cent of existing but only 9.1 per cent of new members state that they are much less active than they used to be. This points to the outlined potential negative effect of primaries on existing party members. Further, there is a large group of new members that joined in the past five years, which points again to the mobilizing effect related to primaries and its potential to attract new motivated members. However, this most likely comes at the cost of decreasing activity among existing members.

Table 4.5 Level of Perceived Activity in Conservative Party 2009 Five Years Before

Are you more active or less active within the party than you were five years ago, or about the same?	2009		
	ALL	EXISTING	NEW
N	1690	1050	509
Much more active	9.1	6.3	15.8
A little more active	9.6	8.5	12.3
About the same	36.8	41.3	27.4
A little less active	12.3	15.6	7.2
Much less active	20.6	26.2	9.1
N/A - I was not a member five years ago	11.7	2.2	28.2

1) all values in per cent 2) overall more active: 18.7 per cent, less active: 32.9 per cent

The next question is whether this general increase in the stated level of activity is also reflected in the amount of time people invest into the party. When the members were asked in the 1992 survey how much time they invested into the party, the large majority stated none. In 2009, the majority still stated to spent no time for the party in an average month, however, the number declined from 76.0 per cent to just 55.6 per cent. Thus, it seems that many members shifted to a more active engagement since the introduction of the primary. A large group

now states to spend up to five hours a month. It is also interesting to notice that the increase in activity is not only visible in the lower categories but in 2009 2.7 per cent claimed to spend between 20 and 30 hours a month in contrast to only 0.8 per cent in 1992. When looking at the two sub-groups of new and existing members separately, it can be seen that there seems to be little difference among them in the top categories of spending ten or more hours working for the party. There are, however, slight differences in the lower categories. Existing party members provide a larger share of members spending no time at all working for the party. There is also a larger share of new members in the middle categories of spending up to five and between five and ten hours compared to existing members. This again points to the envisaged positive effect the primary has on intra-party activity by reducing the number of totally passive members and increasing the number of active new members.

Table 4.6 Hours Spent Working for the Party 1992 and 2009

How much time do you devote to party activities in the average month?	1992	2009		
		ALL	EXISTING	NEW
N	2467	1690	1050	509
None	76	55.6	57.0	47.4
Up to 5 hours	15	27.1	25.6	32.9
From 5 to 10 hours	5	6.8	6.3	8.7
From 10 to 20 hours	2	5.0	5.2	5.7
From 20 to 30 hours	0.8	2.7	2.9	2.6
From 30 to 40 hours	0.4	0.9	1.0	0.6
More than 40 hours	0.7	1.9	2.0	2.0

1) all values in per cent

The next step is to study whether the introduction of primaries is associated with a change in the kind of activities members engaged in. Due to limited availability of compatible items in the two surveys, the analysis focuses on three high

intensity activities (1) working for the party, (2) running for elections and (3) holding a publicly elected office. These survey items are available in both surveys. Between the two surveys, there is a general upwards trend, when it comes to participating in more time-intensive party activities. For the two indicators of (1) running for elections and (2) holding a publicly elected office, the development is mainly driven by an increase in stated participation at the local level in the 2009 survey. Thus, for example, 15 per cent stated to have stood for local party office and 11.4 per cent ran for local mandates. Unfortunately, the last item is not directly comparable as the 1992 survey only asked whether respondents currently hold an elected mandate but did not ask about the past. Nevertheless, following the trend in the other two items, it is likely that there is also an increase in members that held public office, however, it is not as drastic as the table might indicate. Looking again at new and existing members separately, it can be seen that new members are generally participating less in high intensity activities. This gap is the widest when it comes to standing for intra-party offices. The gap for running for elections and especially holding a publicly elected office are much narrower. This points to a group of new, ambitious and career-oriented members within the party. Thus, the overall development seems to point to a more active but also more professionalized party membership with the clear aim to forge a career in politics mainly by gaining a public office.

The last item in this section looks at how many party members stated to never have taken part in any high intensity party activities. Comparing the two levels of non-participation between 1992 and 2009, there is a clear decrease, and, thus, more members started to take part in high intensity party activities. However, when looking at the two sub-groups of new and existing members in

the 2009 survey, it seems that new members are less likely to participate in high intensity party activities. It seems that only a small share of new members take part in such activity. Further, it seems to mobilize existing members to become more active, at least for high intensity activities.

Table 4.7 Participation in High Intensity Activities 1992 and 2009

We would like to ask you about political activities you may have taken part in during the last five years Did you in the past five to 10 years....	1992	2009		
	ALL	ALL	EXISTING	NEW
N	2467	1690	1050	509
- stand for office within the party organization	11.0	24.1	21.4	14.0
- stand for elected office in a local government or national parliamentary election	6.0	11.6	13.3	9.8
-hold an publicly elected office on local or national level	2.0**	7.5	8.5	6.5
NEVER	93.2	69.8	66.8	72.9

1) all values in per cent

\* The Yes score for 1992 is the sum of the categories: rarely, occasionally and frequently in question 19.

\*\* The question only asked, are you currently a local councillor, and did not include the past.

The interviews support the recent development in party membership activity; one outlined that there are certainly “two types of members, those who want to register their support on the base that if there is a vote, they get to exercise it but do not do anything else, and then there is people like me who are politically motivated or motivated by politics” (activist-member since 1995). Thus, there is

a small group of highly ambitious new members, who invest a large amount of time and are highly active in the party. But most interviewees observed that more and more there are “members who will come for events or discuss politics but don’t want to deliver leaflets” (elite-member since 1970). This is supported by others who state that “you cannot get anyone to do anything. People seem to like to sign up to things to show support but do not do anything. So there is a difference between membership and active membership, people might just want a say in it but don’t want to do the hard work to deliver leaflets and bang on doors” (activist-member since 1995). The interviewee empathized that he particularly faced this challenge as an officer of Conservative Future (first half of 2000s) belonging to the sub-group of new party members. Further, most interviews confirmed that existing members are more active in general, i.e. also in high intensity activism, and that there is no replacement of their work by younger members.

In total, members report to be more active both in terms of the self-reported level and hours spent working for the party. But a considerable, large group of existing members say they are less active than five years ago, generally more passive and seem to spend less hours working for the party than new members in 2009. Further, at the same time members are more likely taking up high intensity activities, especially in running or holding a public office. Overall the case of the Tories seems to support the theoretical expectations for **controlled democratization** outlined by the conceptual framework for highly motivated new members and some decline in activity among existing members. However, overall the introduction of primaries seems to be associated with a positive effect on the quality of party membership positively, as more members



are ready to take up high intensity activities, work more hours and see themselves as more active. The next step is to see, if a similar positive development can be observed with regard to membership attitude towards the party leadership.

### *Membership Attitude and External Efficacy*

After outlining how the primaries relate to the motivation of members to join the party, their level and type of activities, the next section looks at how it relates to members' attitudes towards the party leadership and members' perceived influence on it. The project uses survey items developed as part of the *external-efficacy model* by Craig et al. (1990). Generally, the level of external efficacy in 1992 was relatively low with 43 per cent of members agreeing with the statement that the party leadership does not pay a lot of attention to ordinary party members. A similar question in the small membership survey conducted by (Bale and Webb, 2013) in 2013 (N=852) showed that 53 per cent think the party leadership does not respect ordinary party members very much. Thus, it seems that in general external efficacy decreased over the past twenty years. The next step is to move from general efficacy to the specific case of perceived influence on the leadership and candidate selection process. While in 1992, 41 per cent disagreed with the statement that Conservative Central Office should have a more influential role in the selection of parliamentary candidates, in 2009 68.9 per cent agreed that the leadership's influence in the candidate selection process is "about right". Nevertheless, there is still 26.4 per cent who think it is too high. Nearly identical views emerge when one looks at existing and new members separately. The next item asks, if members think that either the national party leadership or local party members' influence over selection

processes is generally too small, too big or about right. Overall, members think with 45.5 per cent that the influence of the party leadership is about right, but there is a large share of 38.0 per cent that think it is too big. This view is equally shared among new and existing members. However, when asked about the influence of local party members, 39.7 per cent think it is too small. This view is more dominant among existing members with 47.2 per cent compared to 36.9 per cent among new members.

Table 4.8 Influence in Leadership Selection 2009

Do you think the influence of the following groups over the selection process is generally too small, too big or about right?	2009		
	ALL	EXISTING	NEW
N	1690	1050	509
<b>National party leadership:</b>			
Far too little	1.7	2.1	2.1
Too Little	5.4	7.3	5.2
About right	45.7	53.6	55.7
Too great	22.3	26.4	26.9
Far too great	8.5	10.7	10.0
Don't know	16.3		
<b>Local party members</b>			
Far too little	8.1	9.2	10.9
Too Little	31.6	38.0	26.0
About right	38.3	44.2	45.5
Too great	5.7	6.7	6.3
Far too great	5.7	2.0	1.4
Don't know	14.9		

1) all values in per cent

So far, the overall membership seems mainly satisfied with their influence over the leadership selection. However, there is a substantial group of members—especially existing members—who think that the national party has too much and the local party members too little influence over the leadership selection

process. This seems to indicate that the theoretical expectation of the framework is sustained by pointing towards overall increased political efficacy with some existing members feeling left out. In addition, in 1992, 50 per cent of the survey respondents also agreed with the idea that the party leader should be selected by a 'one member, one vote' system thereby expressing a wish for more influence and increased external efficacy. Nevertheless 35 per cent were critical about the proposal in 1992. When asked in 2009 to what extent they agreed that the new leadership selection method is democratic and fair, 76.3 per cent of all members agreed with the former and 69.2 per cent with the latter.<sup>35</sup> When looking at the two sub-groups separately, both nearly equally agree that the process is democratic with 81.2 per cent of existing and 82.7 per cent of new members and fair with 73.1 and 78.1 per cent respectively. Thus, some previous scepticism among existing members regarding the direct selection of party leaders seems to have decreased after actually using the method. All this seems associated with a high level of perceived influence over the leadership selection among members and thus a high level of perceived external efficacy. In addition, when asked the same questions about the general parliamentary candidate selection process, the same picture emerges with 53.6 per cent of all members agreeing that it is a democratic and 46.9 per cent a fair process. This holds when looking at existing and new members separately, with the latter being somewhat more critical of the process.

The interviews support the argument that there is a positive effect of the primary on perceived levels of influence and an increased role of party members. One mid-level elite-member in the party (member since 1999)

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<sup>35</sup> They were further asked, if the leadership selection method is efficient (68.3 per cent agreed), complicated (24.7 per cent agreed) and transparent (61.3 per cent agreed). This further supports the overall positive evaluation of the new leadership selection method.

described the primary as “a genuine attempt and it has been a genuine democratizing [attempt]” and an activist (members since 1995) confirmed that he found “it empowering that I was actually able to pick the one I thought was better”. Further, members seem to have newly gained confidence, as an interviewee stated that in “the past loyalty to the party leader was always very strong, even if someone had doubts, they would be expressed very privately [...] now people feel embolden to criticize the party leadership very openly” (elite-member since 1991). Nevertheless, most interviews also stressed the limits of the influence members have. Thus, one interviewee stated that due to the primary, members “are empowered but got the feelings that as ordinary member my only right in the party is the right to vote” (mid-level elite-member since 1991). Even one member of the party elite reported, “to do anything through the party structure would be impossible (in my constituency); so for me, if I want to achieve any kind of impact, it would be much better done through the local government” (elite-member since 1991). Further, one activist claimed that “Cameron has been a bad party manager in failing to creating a direct link between leader and members” and goes on to say “there isn’t a link to the leadership” (activist-member since 1995). Thus, one interview points out that if “you really wanted to democratize the party [...] you have to take away this corpus of power that lies with MPs” (elite-member since 1991). In short, as a one long-term party elite-member (member since 1997) summaries “on the voluntary side of the party, we would always like a little bit more influence”.

Overall, it seems that external efficacy seem positive related to the introduction of primaries. Party members both new and existing are more likely to feel that they have improved influence on the leadership and candidate

selection. Members feel that the leadership cares more about them, partly due to the fact that they met their demand of introducing primaries. Further, members are more likely to continue to feel that their power and influence in the key intra-party decision-making areas of leadership and candidate selection are largely distributed fairly between the national leadership and party members. With regard to the last point, there is a substantial group of existing members who feel that they still have too little power. In addition to the overall higher level of members who think leadership does not respect ordinary party members, this very much seems to indicate a decrease in the political efficacy of existing members, despite the fact that the leadership listened to the existing members who demanded the introduction of the primary. Thus, overall, the case of the UK Conservatives seem to support the theoretical expectations about the effect of controlled democratization on membership attitude towards the leadership.

### 4.3 Conclusion

Overall, it can be seen that the introduction of the closed primary in the UK Conservative Party support the theoretical expectations of **controlled democratization** type of IPD. The perceived high level of control over the leadership selection process by members (but also the elite) seem to be associated with a positive effect on the individual level conception of party membership. It is interesting to see that the effects on membership in selection processes using a two-round design also seem to also confirm the theoretical expectations of the analytical framework, as much as in the case of the French PS discussed later (see chapter six), which uses a direct membership vote and no mediation by MPs. Overall, the primary seem to be linked to an inflow of new

members after the reform and the year of the selection in 2005, but total member levels continued to drop. The overall turnout rate in the two primaries was very high and both sub-groups participated equally with their shares being proportional to their sizes in the overall membership. Further, the primary seem to have had the expected positive effect on the quality of overall party membership and the two sub-groups. New members perceived themselves as more active than existing members and spent more hours working for the party but participated slightly less in high intensity activities. Further, it is more likely to have a negative effect on existing members, as they contributed fewer hours and perceived themselves as less active but continued to engage more in high intensity activities than new members. Finally, the expectations for attitude towards the leadership are also in line with a high level of perceived influence over the leadership selection process by all members. However, this is slightly lower among existing members and here more feel that members have not enough influence over the process. These developments were supported in the in-depth qualitative party member interviews. Thus, one party activist (member since 1995) sums up the reform of the leadership selection as “superficial democratization of the party, while in fact it is very centrally controlled as I, as a member, I can only select out of an approved pool of candidates”.

In conclusion, this chapter is a first step in demonstrating how useful and reliable the conceptual framework developed in this project is for studying the associated impact of different leadership selection rules (in the form of selectorate and candidacy requirements) on the individual level conception of party membership.

## 5 The Case of the German Greens

### 5.1 Introduction

The chapter investigates the case of the German Greens to assess the theoretical expectations for the lower right quadrant with *permissive candidate requirements* and a *closed selectorate*, making it an example of *protected democratization* from a members' perspective (see Table 5.1 below). Empirically, the case of the German Greens is an interesting case, as it is the first German party to formally adopt a 'one member, one vote' selection system to determine its two top executive candidates,<sup>36</sup> the leaders of the parliamentary group or, in case of government participation, the top ministerial posts.<sup>37</sup> Previously, for the 2002 and 2005 election, the top executive candidate was chosen by the party's council consisting of 16 members (Rosar and Ohr, 2005)<sup>38</sup>. In 2009, the top duo was selected by the national party delegate meeting. Thus, the use of the all membership selection method is a natural continuation of the trend towards more inclusive selection methods in the Green Party over the past decade. Further, the party has decided to continue using primaries for the selection of the top candidate for the 2017 national election, which so far attracted four candidates<sup>39</sup>. In addition, primaries are now also used to determine the top candidate for regional elections (see, for example, in Bavaria). Therefore, the adoption and continued use of primaries constitutes a structural change towards a higher level of intra-party democracy (IPD) in form

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<sup>36</sup> The party rules require always two leaders, one female and one male.

<sup>37</sup> The SPD used a membership vote in 1993 to select its party leader but not its top executive candidate. Further, the final choice needed to be confirmed by the party delegate meeting.

<sup>38</sup> Before the 2002 election the Green Party did not select a top executive candidate. One long-term member stated during the interview that until then the argument was that a top candidate would distract too much from the policy issues.

<sup>39</sup> Candidates can register until the 17 October 2016.

of a shift from a narrower selectorate to a selection process involving all members. Further, the Green Party was already considered the most internally democratic party in Germany in terms of participatory possibilities and grass-root involvement and, nevertheless, opted for further democratization (Alemann, 2003).

The Greens are also a good case from a methodological perspective, namely to test the two membership subcategory outlined in the framework as the party allowed to run a survey among its members, including survey questions specifically tailored to capture the changes in party membership due to the use of the primary. Furthermore, as the party already had a long history of a high level of IPD, the effects on party members due to the more inclusive leadership selection method should be more visible and easier to identify than in parties where there were multiple reforms towards higher levels of IPD simultaneously or very close to each other. The relatively short time span between the primary and the survey should further ensure that the observed changes are mainly explained by the adoption of the primary. As a reminder, the empirical data used to study the German Greens are two membership surveys (2009 and 2015) with the latter being conducted especially for this project; the survey data is triangulated by in-depth qualitative party elite and membership interviews (for a detailed discussion, see chapter 3).

The chapter unfolds in the following way. It first outlines why the Green Party adopted primaries using the hypothesis developed by Cross and Blais (2012). The chapter continues by placing the case of the German Greens within the developed framework and discusses the theoretical expectations for the case of *protected democratization* for party membership. It then presents the



empirical findings for the case using both survey data and interviews. The chapter shows that, overall, the case of the German Green Party supports the theoretical expectation for the *protected democratization* category with a positive development along all four aspects of party membership: increase in membership size, high level of turnout, improved membership quality and positive attitude towards the leadership.


### *Background of the Reforms*

Before analysing the impact of the primary on party members, the next section explores why the German Green Party reformed its leadership selection mechanism in the first place and adopted closed primaries. In order to do so, the project uses the approach developed by Cross and Blais (2012). It links the negative impact of external factors in a party's comparative position to the reform leadership selection method. According to Cross and Blais (2012), a party is more likely to reform its leadership selection method after an electoral setback, when in opposition, if it is new, and when other parties within the system have already democratized their selection processes (contagion effect).

The general rules for all membership votes and primaries were adopted by the Länderrat in Lübeck in April 2012, while the details for the primary to select the two top executive candidates and the 2013 procedure was adopted in Berlin on 2 September 2012, about a year before the next general elections (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN-Länderrat, 2012a; BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN-Länderrat, 2012b). With regard to an electoral setback, the Greens consistently increased their vote share, apart from 1990, since they first entered parliament in 1980 becoming government coalition partner from 1998 to 2005. Despite their continued electoral gains, reaching 10.7 per cent in 2009, the party failed to re-

enter national government and reformed in 2012. Thus, the Greens continued to improve their electoral performance of winning votes but failing to re-enter government. This was a clearly disappointing electoral performance that contributed to reforming the leadership selection mechanism, supporting the first suggestion. Further, the party was in opposition, when they adopted the primary also reflecting the second aspect of Cross and Blais (2012) approach.

Figure 5.1 Timeline German Greens



During time in opposition, reforms can be motivated by the party leadership either to promote party renewal or as a strategic electoral tool. As pointed out above, in the case of the Greens the decision to reform the leadership selection method was made shortly before the election. Thus, this is more in line with the explanation of reform as an electoral tool. With regards to the third factor, the German Green Party is by most definitions a new party (Hug, 2001, Bolleyer, 2013). Despite this, it did not opt for an inclusive electorate from the start, nor did it reform during the party's formative period. While the party enshrined the possibility of a primary in its statutes since the early 1990s, it did no reform until 2012. So the third factor outlined by Cross and Blais (2012) is only partly confirmed, as certainly the Green party can be and is often defined as a new party but was not young, when it adopted the closed primary. The final factor of Cross and Blais (2012) approach is that parties are more likely to reform, when other parties within the system have already

democratized their selection process (contagion effect). This is not confirmed in the case of the German Greens, as it is the first German party to permanently adopt a closed primary. One might argue that the one-time use of a membership vote to select the SPD's party general secretary in 1993 might support the contagion effect theory, but it is highly unlikely that this played a significant role nearly 20 years later. The above clearly outlined the external factors that are related to the adoption of the closed primary by the German Greens in 2012. The next step and main purpose of the project is to look at how the reform actually might have affected the party and, more specifically, its party membership.

## **5.2 The German Greens in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects**

The German Green Party fits the category of *Protected Democratization* (permissive candidacy/ closed primary). It carries this label, as from a members' perspective the reform empowered them, since they now hold the deciding vote on who will lead the party, and their voice is not crowded out by a large external selectorate associated with an open primary. Further, they can run in leadership selection contests, if they wish to do so. Thus, members feel that their interests and organizational role is protected, and their role is strengthened. Thus, they have influence and control over both aspects of leadership selections: *candidacy and selection*. In the closed primary, the only restriction to candidacy was party membership, leading to 15 members running in 2012. According to the theoretical discussion above, the following consequences can be expected:

Table 5.1 The Expected Effects for the German Green Party

Open		
<b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b>	<b>Protected Democratization</b> <b>German Greens</b> Overall effect: ++ Membership level Existing: o New: + Quality of membership Existing: + New: + Attitude towards leadership Existing: + New: + Turnout in primary Existing: high New: high	
Closed	Permissive	Strict

**Candidate Requirements**  
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase

Before discussing the theoretical expectations, it is important to stress once more that the categories of IPD refer to the member's perception of democratization brought about by the primary, and how this in turn might affect the individual level conception of party membership expressed in changes along the four dimensions. Overall, the predicted impact on party membership should be very positive. Thus, in terms of party *membership size*, there should be an inflow of members due to the new incentive created by the primary vote. Further, there should also be an increase in intra-party participation, an improved quality of membership and a more positive attitude towards the leadership. The latter is further supported by the fact that due to the candidacy rules, new candidates can enter the contest and challenge the leadership. The positive assessment of the primary should be reflected in an overall high


turnout. Returning to the impact of the closed primary on the two sub-groups of existing and new members, no decline in membership level of existing members can be expected, and some former disillusioned members might even return due to the new incentive. This should also attract new members to join the party. The overall turnout among existing members should be high, and they should provide a high share of it. However, some activists might abstain due to the feeling of disempowerment, as they lost the exclusive right to vote for the leadership in the delegate conference. New members' participation rate and share of the overall turnout should be high, as one of the main reasons to join the party was to vote in the primary. For both sub-groups the share of turnout should be proportional to its share of the overall membership. The quality of the membership among existing members is likely to increase, as activists are re-motivated and some formerly passive members start to actively participate. As the party did not create a new membership category or launch a recruitment drive, the new membership quality is likely to be high. Thus, they will invest time and resources into the party to get a return on their initial investment to join the party, beyond voting in the primary (Scarrow, 1995). The attitude of the existing membership towards the party leadership should improve, as they now feel that they have more influence over the party leadership. New members should also have a positive attitude towards the leadership, as they joined to vote for it. It seems to be the optimal form of intra-party democracy from both the membership and organizational perspective, as it strengthens the power and role of the membership and at the same time creates loyal and engaged members working for the benefit of the organization. Having established theoretical expectations, the chapter now moves on to the empirical part testing whether these assumptions hold in the case of the Germany Green Party.

### *Membership Level*

In terms of membership, the party only gained 579 new members in 2012, which is a 1 per cent growth from 2011 (Hampel, 2013). A possible explanation for this low growth rate is that in a party with already many possibilities for ordinary members to get involved, the new selection method might provide little incentive for new members to join. This is also reflected in the survey with only 8.5 per cent claiming the leadership selection method played an important role in joining the party. Another argument presented above is that former disillusioned members might re-join the party, after it introduced a primary. The fact that for only very few members the overall membership selection method played a role to join in 2012 seems to not support this point. Further, while in 2009, 56.1 per cent stated that there were reasons to be unsatisfied with their membership in the Green Party in recent years, only 4.3 per cent of those threatened to leave the party as a reaction, while the majority used different ways to voice or demonstrate their dissatisfaction but remained loyal. So probably, there were not many existing members in the first place that left the party and could return due to the primary. The low exit rate can be associated to the already higher level of IPD before the primary providing ample opportunities to voice discontent. However, in parties with lower levels of IPD before the reform, the return of former disillusioned members should be more visible. In addition, the party experienced a prolong period of growth in previous years gaining alone 6,000 new members in 2011 (Hampel, 2013). This is with 11 per cent the biggest growth in membership since 1990 (Niedermayer, 2015). Further, since the leadership selection process the party continues to grow reaching over 60,000 members in early 2013 and 60,329 by the end of the 2014 (Reif, 2014).

Thus, the party grew more moderately than expected, but it is likely that in parties with less IPD before the reform in leadership selection method, the increase in membership would be more pronounced. Further, it is the only German party that did not lose members and grew by 46 per cent since 1990 (Niedermayer, 2015). Thus, returning to the theoretical framework, it can be seen that the case of the Greens the introduction of the primary is associated with the expected pattern of no membership decline among the existing membership and a moderate inflow of new members.

Figure 5.2 Membership Development of the German Green Party (1980-2014)



Source: Niedermayer, Oskar: Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2015. Arbeitshefte a. d. Otto-Stammer-Zentrum, Nr. 25, FU Berlin 2015

### *Turnout in Primary*

The turnout of the closed primary was 61.73 per cent (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 31.10.2012). As mentioned above in chapter two, the turnout for primaries using an all party membership vote ranges from 31.3 per cent to 79 per cent (Kenig et al., 2015b). With a turnout of 61.73 per cent, the Greens are located towards the top end of this range. If we assume that all members voted who joined in 2012, they would provide a share of only 1.6 per cent; and if all

new members who joined between 2011 and 2012 voted, they provided 18 per cent of the turnout. Comparing the new party membership share of turnout to the overall share of membership, it can be seen that it was proportionate with new members providing 1 per cent of all membership in 2012 and 12.4 per cent of all members in 2011 and 2012 together. This is a proportionate share of new members' turnout and supports the argument that the existing members remain in control, as they hold the decisive majority, and their interests are protected. A similar picture of the level of turnout emerges, when one looks at the survey with 67 per cent of the respondents stating to have participated in the primary. Further, the large majority of survey participants who joined either in 2011 or 2012 also claimed to have participated in the selection process. Here again, the framework seems to hold with existing members forming a high share of the turnout and an overall high membership turnout.

Table 5.2 Turnout in German Green Primary 2012

Year	Number of candidates	Turnout
2012	15	Overall turnout: 61.73% per cent Share of turnout existing members: 98.2% per cent Share of turnout new members: 1.6% per cent
In 2012		Existing members' share of total membership: 99% per cent New members' share of total membership: 1% per cent

### *Quality of Membership*

So far, the two quantitative indicators seem to point to a positive impact of the primary on party membership as it seems related to a continued inflow of new members in the year of the primary and after, and an overall high turnout pointing to general acceptance of the new participatory tool and mobilization



effect of the primary. All this supports the theoretical expectations of the framework. The next section studies the expected effects of primaries related to membership quality and attitude. Thus, the question is whether primaries are complementary to other intra-party activities or even have a positive effect on them, as they motivate members; or are primaries seen as substituting such traditional activities leading to their decline. In order to do so, the thesis analyses data from the 2009 German Party Membership Survey (Spier et al., 2011) and the author's own survey conducted in 2015. Changes in quality are captured by looking at changes in the motivation to join the party and patterns of participation, while changes in the attitude of party members is captured by survey question measuring external efficacy (Craig et al., 1990, Niemi et al., 1991).

### *Motivation to Join the Party*

The first indicator to measure changes in the quality of party membership is to ask why members do join the Greens in the first place. The thesis uses the *general-incentives model* consisting of seven incentive categories used previously for German party members (Klein, 2006; Laux, 2011) and based on the original model developed by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). These are based on the argument that specific organizational rules can encourage different types of members. Thus changes in party rules, here the leadership selection method, might—intentionally or not—lead to a shift in the incentives for why members join the party.

The first category of incentives to consider is *selective-outcome incentives*. They address direct personal benefits for the individual member

mainly in terms of a career in the party. Following a rational choice logic, the fact that under the new selection regime every member can vote and more importantly be a candidate, *selective-outcome incentives* should become more powerful (Olson, 1965). This development should be more pronounced among new members. The table below (Table 5.3) indeed shows an increase in respondents who stated that *selective-outcome incentives* played an important role in their motivation to join the party. We can clearly see an increase in all three items measuring *selective-outcome incentives* between 2009 and 2015, and they seem to be slightly more important for new members. This supports previous findings by Laux (2011) who finds that *selective-outcome incentives* among members and, especially, new members were already on the rise between 1999 and 2009. Or as one interviewee put it: “The *Urwahl* provides the possibility for everyone to participate but also to promote yourself; this makes it attractive” (party elite-members since 2004). Thus, the new, more individualistic and open selection method seems to have reinforced and accelerated the trajectory towards a more career-oriented party membership. The next category of *selective-process incentives* encompass incentives individuals achieve through participating in party life, such as meeting nice people, being informed about politics but also because they enjoy political work. For all three indicators, an increase between 2009 and 2015 can be observed. Further, these incentives are more important for new members than existing members. Thus, they are not only motivated by the outcome of the political process or personal gains but also the process and interaction within the party. This should have a positive impact on intra-party participation. The third category captures *collective incentives*, and members join in the hope to benefit from public goods provided by the party through influence and policy realization. Again, we can observe a

positive development in this incentive, but it is slightly more important to existing members than new ones. However, this is clearly still the most important incentive in comparison to the two aforementioned ones. Thus members continue to be mainly motivated to contribute to the improvement of society rather than purely personal gains. This again should have a positive impact on intra-party participation. In this regard, it is interesting to observe that the increase in incentives to join relates to more active participation, such as joining to influence the political direction of the party or to advance its influence and policies. The next category of *normative incentives* motivates members to join due to social norms. Here, a clear decrease from 10.2 per cent in 2009 to 7.2 per cent in 2015 can be observed, and it plays a nearly equally low role for both membership sub-groups. The fourth category of *altruistic incentives* consists of the motivation to join to fulfil one's perceived civic duty; it also increased between the two surveys and plays a slightly more important role for existing than new members. This incentive is often linked to more passive intra-party participation. Thus, an increase points to the symbolic act of joining the party, rather than the intention to become a party activist. The next category of *ideological incentives* expresses the wish to increase the parties influence or to support a specify fraction. Here the developments are also positive with increase among all members and new members, especially, who stated they were motivated to join to influence the political course of the party. Further, the share of members that joined to support a specific fraction did not increase and was slightly smaller among new members. Thus, primaries seem not to have necessarily the negative impact on cohesion and party unity as often suggested (for an overview, see Cordero and Coller, 2015). The last category is *expressive incentives*. Here individuals join to communicate their perceived psychological

attachment to a party. In 2015, considerably fewer new members with 7.5 per cent compared to 19.2 per cent of existing members seemed to be motivated to join due to impressive personalities at the top of the party. This is an overall decrease from 20.4 per cent in 2009 to 16.6 per cent in 2015. The level of members that joined to demonstrate their sympathies for the party remains high and important in both sub-groups. Hence, members seem to see the party as an effective way to express their support, but their positive evaluation of the party is not solely based on who leads the party but the overall party organization.

In the interviews, a similar picture emerged. All members stated they joined out of sympathy for the party but clearly emphasized that they joined to take an active role in the party and to influence the party. For example two members stated: “I didn’t just wanted to be a nominal member [...] and I didn’t just join out of sympathy or admiration for anyone [...] but I believe in my party willingness and the wish to actively participate is very pronounced” (mid-level elite member since 2000) and “I just wanted to join to be active and support it [the party]” (former mid-level elite now party activist member since 2004) Overall, this seems to point to an increase in the quality of membership as specified by the conceptual framework. Members are increasingly motivated by *selective-outcome* and *process incentives* in addition to *collective political incentives*. All of them require a higher level of participation to be realized within the party and the overall political process. The growing but still small number of professionally motivated members is a positive development for the party providing it with a bigger personnel reservoir for internal recruitment but without being (yet) dominated by career politicians. Also contrary to often expressed theoretical expectations, members and especially new members seem to be *less not more*

motivated by *expressive incentives* to just support the leadership. As discussed in chapter two, parties often use recruitment drives to increase the number of people voting in primaries resulting in large membership spikes of passive members, who only join for the primary. Despite the fact that the Greens did not opt for a recruitment drive, they experienced membership growth, and this suggests that new members have a higher level of motivation and want to be active in the party beyond just being a primary voter. This should result in more active and long-term members. So far, there seems to be no sign of the docile and passive membership produced by higher levels of IPD predicted by Mair (1997), but rather members see the party as effective in representing their values and as an arena to actively participate and shape party goals. In order to consolidate these first findings, the next section looks at whether the positive association between the adoption of the primary and the development towards more participatory motivations to join actually translates into more party activism beyond voting in the primary selection.

Table 5.3 Motivation to Join the German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, Existing and New)

Types of incentive To join the party	Measurements	2009	2015	2015	
		<i>All</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Existing</i>	<i>New</i>
<b>N</b>		<b>1835</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>120</b>
<i>Selective-outcome incentives</i>	- To gain a career advantage	2.2	3.6	2.5	5.8
	- To gain a public mandate	11.1	15.6	14.4	18.3
	- To gain a party office	8.9	13	11.5	16.7
<i>Selective - process incentives</i>	- Because I enjoy the political work	45.8	52.1	47.6	62.5
	- To be better informed about politics	34	40.2	36.9	47.5
	- To meet nice people	21.9	28.1	25.4	34.2
<i>Collective political</i>	- To promote the aims of the party	80.9	87.5	89.3	83.3

<i>incentives</i>	- To increase the influence of the party	76.4	80	84.1	70.8
	- To promote ecologically motivated politics	91.7	90.8	91.9	88.3
<i>Normative incentives</i>	- Through the influence of family and friends	10.8	7.2	7.1	7.5
<i>Altruistic motives</i>	- In order to fulfil my responsibility as citizen	57.7	63.9	64.6	62.5
<i>Ideological incentives</i>	- To strengthen a specific wing within the party	20.7	20.7	21	20
	- To influence the political course of the party	37.5	47.5	45.4	52.5
<i>Expressive incentives</i>	- Due to the impressive personalities at the top of the party	20.4	15.6	19.2	7.5
	- To demonstrate my sympathies for the party	64	63.9	64.6	62.5

1) all values in per cent; 2) “very important” or “important” motivation to join the party

### *Intra-party Participation*

After having outlined how change in leadership selection are related to the motivation to join the party and thus the membership type that the Green Party attracted as a result, the next section outlines how membership activity was affected. In particular, the next section outlines whether the positive increase in motivations to join that related to a more active party membership is reflected in higher levels of intra-party participation. Broadly speaking, in 2009 only 30 per cent of members considered themselves active compared to 49 per cent in 2015. Interestingly, also in 2015 existing members claimed to be more active than new members with 50.8 per cent and 44.4 per cent, respectively. Further, in 2015 members invest more hours per month into the party than previously. Most remarkably is the drop from 30 per cent to 11 per cent of responses of members who stated to spend no time for the party and the strong increase in members that claim to spend working between five to ten or ten to 20 hours per

month for the party. There are slightly fewer existing members who are completely inactive, and there are more members represented in the two top categories of over 30 hours per month. In addition, 25.3 per cent of the total and 30.3 per cent of existing members claimed to be more active than five years ago. This points to an overall positive development in intra-party participation.

Table 5.4 Time Devoted Working for German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, Existing and New)

How much time do you devote to party activities in an average month?				
	2009	2015 all	2015 existing	2015 New
N	1835	391	271	120
None	31.1	11.1	10.1	13.3
Up to 5 hours	29.7	28.8	28.3	30.1
From 5 to 10 hours	15.7	22.6	20.5	27.4
From 10 to 20 hours	11.5	21.0	22.1	18.6
From 20 to 30 hours	5.9	7.8	8.5	6.2
From 30 to 40 hours	1.9	3.8	3.9	3.5
More than 40 hours	3.5	4.9	6.6	0.9

1) all values in per cent

This trend also emerges from the interview with one members saying: “I believe that it [the *Urwahl*] was very important for the members, and it also motivated them“(mid-level elite member since 2000), and another one stated: “I think through it [die *Urwahl*] the grass-roots were motivated and became more active. I believe the more one has the feeling to be able to influence something, the more one gets involved” (former mid-level elite now party activist member since 2004). More precisely 25.7 per cent of all members and 23.5 per cent of existing members agree with the statement that the use of a more inclusive leadership selection method motivated them to take part in more party activities.

For 31 per cent of the new members, the selection methods motivated them to be more active.

After discussing the positive link between the new selection method and the intensity of membership activity, the next step is to look at what type of activities members engage in with a special focus on high intensity activities. The table below clearly outlines that overall intra-party participation increased across a large variety of party activities. For example, in 2015 more members stated to have attended a party meeting, to have worked at a public information stall of the party or distributed flyers and displayed posters than in 2009. Also attendance at social occasions and participation in charity events increased. Unsurprisingly, existing members took part more frequently in all the above listed activities. However, the differences for most activities are not very large. Thus, new and existing members both frequently participate in a large variety of intra-party activities. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe some interesting differences between new and existing members when looking at high intensity activities, such as running or holding a public or party office. The share of members that held a party office or ran for public office increased between 2009 and 2015. While existing members are more likely to have engaged in one of the activities with 39.5 per cent and 38.8 per cent respectively, the share of new members is not as low as one might expect after only four or less years of membership. Hence, 19.5 per cent of new members held a party office and 18.9 per cent stood for public office. A similar picture emerges when one looks at members who ran for a party office or actually held a public office. Unfortunately, the 2009 survey does not include the survey items for members who ran for a party office or actually held a public office to capture the overall level of members that engaged in these activities but asked for individual party



and public offices. However, it seems that a similar picture emerges when one looks at members who ran for a party office or actually held a public office.

Table 5.5 Membership Activities in the German Green Party 2009 and 2015 (All, Existing and New)

We would like to ask you about political activities you may have taken part in during the last years?				
	2009 all	2015 all	2015 existing	2015 new
N	1835	391	271	120
Displayed posters, distributed flyers and other information material of the party	29.3	48.4	51.7	40.7
Participated in party social events	24.2	41.7	42.6	39.8
Attended a party meeting	42.1	65.1	67.5	59.8
Helped at a party charity event (e.g., collected existing cloth)	6.4	9.0	9.0	9.1
Helped to recruit new members in form of personal discussion	9.8	12.9	15.2	8.0
Worked at public information stalls of the party	29.5	47.2	51.9	36.3
Donated additional money to the party	15.6	21.0	26.3	9.0
Contributed to the formulation of the political program of the party in committees and other working groups	26.2	41.8	45.5	33.7
Stood for office within the party organization	-	32.2	37.9	19.5
Held an office within the party organization	25.9	33.5	39.5	19.5
Stood for a public office	28.6	32.8	38.9	18.9
Held a public office	-	24.9	29.6	14.1
Helped organising the work of the party business	26.8	41.8	46.9	30.1

1) all values in per cent

\*Percentage for *often* and *very often* participated in the political activity

Overall, the above shows that we do not only see an increase in hours and stated activity, but members participate also more in high intensity activities, such as run for public mandates, work at info stalls or hold a party office. Thus, the empirical analysis shows a positive association between the primary and the level of party membership quality in terms of motivation to join and intra-party participation confirms the theoretical discussion outlined above.

Further, the empirical findings for new and existing members support the suggestions made by the conceptual framework for the use of a closed primary with permissive candidacy requirements. In short, all this points towards a positive development of the individual conception of party membership due to the new perceived level of IPD achieved under *protected democratization*. The next step is to see whether the primary is also related to a positive impact on the attitude of members towards the party leadership as suggested by the above findings, or whether members are active despite negative attitudes and the feeling of discontent.

#### *Membership Attitude and External Efficacy*

After discussing the impact of the primary on membership size, turnout and membership quality, the next section turns its attention to the final dimension: the primaries' effect on membership attitude towards the leadership. To do so, the section looks at overall levels of membership satisfaction, perceived levels of IPD, and how much influence members feel they have in the party.

Overall satisfaction with membership increased between 2009 and 2015 from 66.8 per cent to 72 per cent. Looking at the two subgroups separately, new members are slightly less satisfied with 70 per cent compared to 88.2 per cent of existing members. Further, the number of very unsatisfied members stayed the same between 2009 and 2015 with 1.3 per cent. However, when looking at the two sub-groups, 1.5 per cent of existing members stated they are totally dissatisfied compared to 0.8 per cent of new members. This might point to a very small group of long-term activists that are now dissatisfied due to the use

of the primary. Nevertheless, overall the primary seems to be associated with a positive effect on membership satisfaction. In terms of membership perception of IPD, a similar positive image emerges. First, 77.5 per cent of all members agreed in 2015 with the statement that the internal party organization is highly democratic. This few is equally high when looking at the two sub-groups separately. Also new and existing members stated both with 74.6 per cent that the new leadership selection method made the party more democratic. Unfortunately, there are no similar questions in the 2009 survey but 52.6 per cent back then confirmed that it would be very sensible to determine the national leaders of the party using a primary, and only 3.3 per cent disagreed completely with the idea.

Another way to measure the change in attitude of membership is to ask how satisfied they are, and how much influence they feel they have in the party. To do so the project uses the survey items develop as part of the *external-political-efficacy model* (Craig et al., 1990; Niemi et al., 1991). The lower the satisfaction and the perceived level of political efficacy, the worse the membership's attitude towards the leadership, and this probably has negative effects on party activity and quality. As the table below shows regarding the three items available in both surveys, members continue to agree that they have the possibility to actively contribute to the party, are listen to and the party reacts to criticism of its members. The scores are overall high among both sub-groups, however, existing members are more critical towards the leadership and see their influence as being more constrained. Thus, while only 8.0 per cent of new members agree with the statement that the decision-makers within the Green Party do not listen to the views of ordinary party members, this doubles to 16.3 per cent among existing members. Further 72.5 per cent of existing

compared to 80.5 per cent agreed that all members have the possibility to influence policy and 60.1 per cent compared to 66.4 per cent respectively agreed that the Green Party is responsive to criticism from its members. The interviews confirmed the overall positive relationship, and even ordinary members claimed to have enough influence over the decision-making process within the party; an activist statement confirms the good relationship between members and the leadership saying, he only knows “very few who constantly complain about the national leadership”. Another member supports this view affirming that: “Every, from the leadership perspective, unimportant member has the chance to speak out and is listened to. In so far our party found a way at the organizational level to indeed provide members with possibilities that other parties do not grant so readily”. (mid-level elite member since 2000).

The additional items measuring external efficacy further and linking it to the primary in the 2015 survey confirm its overall high level. Both existing and new members have a very similar core for each item. Most importantly, 42.9 per cent agreed that thanks to the new leadership selection method, they have the feeling of more influence within the party, with 42.4 per cent agreeing among existing and 44.0 per cent among new members. Thus, overall, members express a high and improved level of satisfaction with their party membership and the perceived level of political efficacy. Further, the survey responses endorse the positive effect of the primary on both membership satisfaction and efficacy; this again is in line with the theoretical suggestions of the conceptual framework.

Table 5.6 External Political Efficacy of Green Party Members (2009 and 2015)

External Efficacy—Survey Item	2009	2015		
		All	<i>Existing</i>	<i>New</i>
N	1835	370	271	120
The decision-makers within the Green party do not listen to the views of ordinary party members.*	13.6%	13.8%	16.3	8.0
The Green party is responsive to criticism from its members.*	56.7%	62%	60.1	66.4
In the Green party every member has the possibility to actively influence the policies of the party.*	74.8%	75%	72.5	80.5
Are you satisfied with the personal influence you have within the party? **	-	63.3%	64.6	60.0
There are many official possibilities for members to influence the actions of the party leadership.*	-	57.1%	59.2	52.0
Members like me have no influence over what the party leadership is doing.*	-	23.3%	22.6	25.9
Thanks to the use of the new leadership selection method, I have the feeling of more influence with the party.*	-	42.9%	42.4	44.0

1) all values in per cent

\*Responses for “strongly agree” and “agree” with statement.

\*\*Responses for “very satisfied” and “satisfied”.

One aspect presented in the discussion of the analytical framework is that party activists might become disappointed due to the feeling that they lost their former exclusive power to nominate the party leader during the party conference. Thus, there might be a small group of unhappy party activists whose attitude towards the leadership is negative. Indeed, there are 10.8 per cent of members who disagree that the use of the new leadership selection method increased the feeling of more influence within the party. This feeling is stronger among existing members with 13.2 per cent compared to only 5.0 per cent among new members. However, if you asked members to what extent they agree with the statement that the involvement of all members reduced the meaning and rights of active party members, 65.6 per cent of all members and,

more importantly, 66.7 per cent of existing members disagree. Only 13.8 per cent of existing members agree with this statement and, somewhat ironically, with 18.0 per cent more new members approve this statement. The theoretical argument of the unhappy or disappointed activist is further weakened in the case of the German Greens by the fact that 73.7 per cent of existing members also agree with the statement that all members, regardless of being passive or active, should have the same rights within the party; and the majority disagrees with the statement that active members should play a more important role in decision-making processes than passive members. In addition, the large majority of members, irrespective of being existing or new, agree that all members regardless of the length of their membership should be able to put themselves forward as a candidate in the leadership selection. Clearly, the above seem to contradict some theoretical claims (Mair, 1997; Lefebvre, 2011). Existing members and activists seem not to feel disempowered by the introduction of an all membership vote but see it as very positive. However, the 2015 survey also shows clearly that members with 77.6 per cent do not wish to extend the right to vote in to non-members. This view is nearly equally strong among new members with 75 per cent and existing members with 78.6 per cent. Members are clearly in favour to empower all members of the organization but against a blurring of the line between members and non-members in the case of leadership selection.

In summary, party members, new and existing alike, are seem to be very satisfied with their membership, perceive a high level of political efficacy, view the new leadership selection method as positive, while the often claimed negative effect on party activists is very limited. The last point is not to surprising given that in 2009, 52.5 per cent of all members supported the idea of

electing the national leader via an all membership vote. Overall, the survey results support the expectations of the analytical framework regarding the membership attitude towards the party leadership, namely that a closed selection method with permissive candidacy requirements are associated with a positive effect on both existing and new members' attitude towards the leadership.

### *New Rules—New Attitude?*

In October 2015, the party changed the candidacy rules for primaries. While until then all members could be candidates, the new rules require them to be nominated or on the nomination ballot for the parties national electoral list. While this is undoubtedly a move towards more closed and strict rules, it allows a large pool of over 600 potential candidates to compete in the leadership contest. Further candidates for the lists are first selected by local membership votes. Thus, the process is still highly democratic and inclusive, but moderately restricts candidacy to individuals who have some experience or are seen as qualified to present the party as a Member of Parliament. Given that the primary selects the party leader in public office, it makes sense to limit candidacy to individuals on the electoral list. Returning to the candidacy dimension of the framework, this move would shift the Green party slightly from the extreme end of the permissive-restrictive scale towards the centre, but leave it firmly in the permissive half. During the interviews, most participants were very supportive of this change, as it guarantees more qualified candidates with a good track record. They also saw it as an effective way to reduce the risk of fringe candidates that could damage the party's image or avoid unnecessarily high

costs of an internal contest that would use up energy and resources needed to compete in the inter-party arena. This point is supported by the fact that the party effectively funds the entire primary process; the previous primary attracted 15 candidates among them only a few had a realistic chance to be elected. This unnecessarily increased the cost of the process. Until now, the 2016 primary attracted four candidates.

### 5.3 Conclusion

Overall the empirical analysis of the case of the German Greens supports the theoretical expectations the conceptual framework made for the category of **protected democratization**. The fact that the German Greens already had a high level of IPD before the shift to primaries and the permission to run a membership survey with specify items to capture the effect of the primary on party membership made it an ideal case to study. To do so the chapter used not only quantitative party membership surveys but also qualitative in-depth membership interviews.

The chapter started by mainly outlining the external factors that led to the adoption of the primary in 2012. The case of the Greens reflects Cross and Blais (2012) approach that electoral defeat and being in opposition are external factors that contribute to the adoption of primaries, while the additional factors of party newness and contagion effect are only in part or not confirmed by the case of the German Greens. The chapter then presented a short theoretical discussion of the expected effect of the closed primary with permissive candidacy requirements on the individual level conception of party membership brought about by the changed level of perceived IPD. The empirical discussion



supports the overall assumption of the framework, namely a positive association between the closed primary in the protected democratization category and the effect on party membership. Members seem to have high political efficacy and a positive view of the elite. Further, they are overall more active and engage in more high intensity activities. Also, overall turnout is high, and new and existing members participate proportionally. The theoretical expectation of membership growth is only partly met. While the party experienced substantial growth in the years before the reform and after, the membership increase in the year of the selection can be described as moderate at best. The empirical findings for the German Greens also support the theoretical expectations for the sub-groups of existing and new members. There is an inflow of new members and no decline of existing members; the quality of both in terms of motivations to join and intra-party activity is improved as well as high, and they both have a positive attitude towards leadership. Also, existing and new members provide a high and proportional share of the turnout in the primary. The interviews with party members mainly confirmed the positive impact on party membership and the positive role the primary played in the party's development since its introduction.

In conclusion, the new selection method *protects* the power and interest of the party members from a large external selectorate and empowers it by providing members with a new intra-party participatory tool. Moreover, the elite's power over the selection outcome is restricted; together, this seems to be associated with a positive impact on all aspects of the individual level conception of party membership. Moreover, the chapter further highlights that the conceptual framework developed in this project is useful and seem to be reliable when it comes to studying the impact of different leadership selection

rules (in from of selectorate and candidacy requirements) on the individual level  
conception of party membership brought about by changing perceptions of IPD.

## 6 The Case of the French Parti Socialiste (PS)

### 6.1 Introduction

The following chapter analyses the effect of primaries on the nature of party membership in the Parti Socialist (PS) in France. It is a particularly interesting case, as the party first adopted a closed primary in 1995, used it again in 2006 and later adopted an open primary in 2009 for the presidential candidate selection in 2011. Thus, the case allows tracing the impact on membership the shift had from a selection by a party congress to both closed and open primary within the same party. Despite the reform towards a more and more inclusive electorate, candidate requirements remained strict. While in 1995 candidacy had to be authorized by the National Council (306 members), in 2006 it required endorsement of 30 National Council members. In 2011, candidates had more options and could be endorsed by either 5 per cent of MPs, or 5 per cent of National council members, or 5 per cent of regional councillors or 5 per cent of mayors. Nevertheless, all contests attracted more than one candidate with two in 1995, three in 2006 and six for the open primary in 2011. Thus, competitiveness increased over the years.

Returning to the framework developed in chapter two, the case of the PS can be classified as an example of **Controlled Democratization** for the period of 1995 to 2006 and an example of **Disempowering Democratization** since the adoption of the open primary in 2009. As a reminder, the cases chosen here are *typical cases* (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) and are representative examples of a wider population of cases that can be placed in the same quadrants. They allow to explore the theoretical expectations of the specified

relationship between primary rules and effect on party membership for each of the different types of intra-party democracy (IPD).

As outlined in chapter three, the empirical chapters follow a mixed-method approach. Thus, the project uses here a combination of three independent and one party-conducted membership surveys (1986, 1998, 2006, 2011) complemented by nine in-depth semi-structured interviews with both ordinary rank and file members and the party elite, conducted in autumn 2015.

The chapter will first analyse the impact on the nature of party membership for those primaries in 1995 and 2006 that match the **Controlled Democratization** type. The second part of the chapter will study the 2011 primary classified as a **Disempowering Democratization** type. The chapter finds that most of the framework's theoretical expectations associated with the two types of democratization are supported when one looks at the effect of different primary rules on the nature of party membership in the case of the PS.

While the impact of the 1995 and 2006 primaries on party membership seem to have been largely positive in terms of size, turnout, intra-party activism and attitude towards the leadership, the consequences of the 2011 open primary were from the party membership's perspective seem more negative overall. Following the 2011 primary, membership declined, became more passive, and members only provided a very small share of the turnout. Further, the membership perceived political efficacy as decreased, and its attitude towards the leadership was more negative. Overall, the empirical findings in the case study below supports the theoretical expectations derived from the conceptual framework for the categories of controlled and disempowering democratization.


### *Background of the Reforms in 1995 and 2009*

Before analysing the consequences of primaries for PS party members, a first step is to establish why the party adopted a closed primary in 1995, later on reformed a second time and opted for an even more inclusive open primary in 2009. Here, the approach developed by Cross and Blais (2012) is used. They link party factors and changes in a party's comparative position within the party system to the reform of leadership selection methods. With regard to the later, they stipulate that an electoral setback for the party, being in opposition and following other parties within the system that have already democratized makes reform of its leadership selection method more likely. Further, they argue that new parties are more likely to have more inclusive selection methods.

When the PS reformed in 1995, the party still held the presidential post but experienced a dramatic electoral setback during the 1993 parliamentary election, resulting in the most right-leaning parliament for 100 years (Rene Remond in Mitrache, 2011: 75) and the loss of the prime ministerial position to the political right. Further, in the polls for the presidential elections the right was leading from early 1994 on. Thus, with regard to the first aspect, the party did experience an electoral setback but on the legislative and not executive branch and, consequently, was in opposition in the legislature. Therefore, aspects one and two are met in part. It is further likely that the party hoped, although in vain, that adopting the primary in 1995 would avoid electoral defeat in the 1995 presidential election. However, in case of the second reform in 2009, aspects one and two clearly apply. The further opening of intra-party elections only took place after a long series of dramatic electoral defeats and setbacks. Further, the

party was in opposition in both the legislature (since 2002) and the executive (since 1995).

Figure 6.1 Timeline: French PS



With regard to the third aspect, the PS was not a new party when it opted for closed primaries in 1995. It was the result of a merger of multiple left parties in 1969. In 1995 the PS was also the first party in France to reform its selection method, so aspect four 'external contagion effect' does not hold in this case. However, the second reform in 2011 can be partly explained by external contagion, as by then other parties in France also reformed, and the PS wanted to maintain its competitive advantage. Further, there also seems to be a case of internal contagion. Though contrary to the argument by Cross and Blais (2012), this was not triggered by positive experience but rather despite negative experiences.

While for the initial reforms in 1995 a more mixed picture emerges, the second reform in 2009 fully reflects the approach by Cross and Blais (2012) except for the aspect of party newness. While in 1995 party newness and the contagion effect do clearly not apply, electoral setbacks and being in opposition are partly confirmed and most likely played a significant factor in the strategic consideration to reform. One point not captured by Cross and Blais (2012) but often marshalled to explain the reform in 1995 is the fact that the PS lacked a clear presidential candidate. The primary was a transparent and fair way to find

one (De Luca and Venturino, 2016). Thus, while in 2009 external factors clearly provide an explanation for the reform, it seems that in 1995 it was more a mix of internal and external factors.

## 6.2 The PS 1995 and 2006 in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects

Returning to the conceptual framework, the following impact on the nature of party membership is expected under **Controlled Democratization**:

Table 6.1 The Expected Effects for the Closed Primary in 1995 and 2005 in the French PS

Open		
<b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b>		
		<p><b>Controlled Democratization</b>  Overall effect: +  Membership level  Existing: - New: +  Quality of membership  Existing: -New: +  Attitude towards leadership  Existing: - New: +  Turnout in primary  Existing: high New: high</p>
Closed	Permissive	Strict
	<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	
	Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase	

The overall effect should be positive. The use of the primary should attract new members, improve the quality of membership and its attitude towards the leadership. Further, turnout should be high. However, as the table suggests, we

should see partly different effects on new and existing members with the latter being more sceptical about the reforms. The next section discusses, first, the findings for the membership level and turnout, before it turns towards the quality of membership and attitude towards the leadership. Finally, the section discusses the unique profile of the new members that joined during the 2006 recruitment drive, and whether they differ from the existing membership.

### *Membership Level*

Looking at the overall trend of party membership, it can be seen that while party membership is lower than in the past, it fluctuates significantly. In order to better understand these fluctuations, the section discusses the overall membership trend, inflow of new members and outflow of existing members separately.<sup>40</sup> While new members are defined as members that joined in the year the use of the primary was announced, while existing members are those who were in the party before. By the end of 1994, the year before the first primary, the PS had 102,991 members (figure 6.2). However, by the time the party voted on 5 February 1995, 112,681 members were entitled to vote. Thus, the party managed to attract 9,690 new members in the few months between the announcement of the primary and the vote itself. The increase in party membership in the PS continued until 1999, before it started to decline again, reaching 133,831 in the year just before the next primary and the '20-Euro-one-year-membership' recruitment drive. Returning to 1995, it can be observed that,

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<sup>40</sup> A decline of existing members is given, if the numbers of members at the end of year or the year following it, is lower than the base membership level in the year before, as this means not only that new members left after the primary but also that members who were in the party before. Some of these members might have died, rather than voluntarily left the party. But, for example, in 1995, this would imply the death of nearly 10,000 members. Taking the German CSU, which has a similar size as the PS of 1995, it reports that on average 1.2 per cent of members leave because of death. That would be about 1,352 of PS members in 1995. The remaining about 8,650 members can be assumed to be existing members that left.




while at the beginning of the year, the party managed to recruit new members, by the end of the year party membership actually declined relatively to the year before by 19,078, before increasing again by 17,933 in 1996. It seems that some existing members decided to leave the party after the adoption of the primary and its outcome. This already points to a more negative reception of the reform by existing members and might be reflective of a large-scale change in the nature of the PS party membership. If so, this should become visible in the survey responses discussed below. The use of an all membership vote to determine the new party leader for the first time in 1995 probably also partly contributed to the increase in membership during the second half of the 1990s. The survey also asked, in the case members re-joined the party, when they did so. It can be seen that re-entry rate between 1994 and 1996 is very high compared to other years, and even years with a presidential election. Thus, while it is normal that membership increases and members re-join in years with presidential elections, the rate was much higher than usual. So there probably was a further incentive, most likely the primary, that made former disillusioned members re-join the party.

As mentioned above, by 2005, the year before the next closed presidential primary, membership dropped to 133,831. In comparison to the previous primary, the party had more experience and time to prepare. Thus, it opted to adopt the '20-Euro-one-year-membership' recruitment drive to increase the electorate of the primary and the legitimacy of the new presidential candidate, as he/ she would be voted by a larger and more diverse section of the population. The drive was highly successful, and on the day of the primary on the 16 November 220,269 PS members were eligible to vote. However, by the

end of the year the party's membership was again slightly lower with 218,771. Thus, while the party managed to recruit new members, some of the existing members also left the party. In the following year 2007, the year of presidential election, the party again managed to attract new members reaching 239,520. This was the highest membership count since 1947.

Overall, it can be seen that there is an association between the new incentive provided by the party to determine the presidential candidate by an all its membership vote (closed primaries) and the recruitment of new members for the party. It can also be seen that some existing members left the party in the year of the primary. Thus, so far, the case of the PS seems to confirm the expectations of the conceptual framework.

Figure 6.2 Membership Development in the PS 1944-2014



Source: Delwit, P. (2015), 'Party Membership Figures. France 1944-2014'. MAPP Project Data Archive [[www.projectmapp.eu](http://www.projectmapp.eu)], Sandri et al. (2015), Le Monde (2015)

### *Turnout in Primary*

The second indicator to look at is turnout. The section looks at the overall turnout and the share of turnout among existing and new members. The primary is often considered to be a new incentive for people to join the party, and in many cases, it is combined with a recruitment drive. Thus, it can be assumed that most if not all members who joined in the year of the primary will vote in it, as this probably was their main motivation to join. The split of the turnout into the two sub-groups also reveals who dominated the process, and whether the voice of existing members is crowded out or not. In 1995, turnout was high with 73.4 per cent (De Luca and Venturino, 2016). Assuming that all members that joined since the end of 1994 also voted, they provide 11.72 per cent of the turnout and 8.5 per cent of the total party membership. Thus, existing membership with 88.28 per cent of the turnout clearly dominated and had the decisive power in the primary. Existing members made up 91.4 per cent of the total party membership. In 2006, overall turnout is even higher with 81.97 per cent. As mentioned above, the party managed to attract 86,438 new members, this is 39.24 per cent of the overall membership. Assuming that all new members voted, they would provide a share of 47.87 per cent of the overall turnout. In contrast, existing party membership in 2006 made up 60.76 per cent of the total party membership and 74.12 per cent of the turnout.

Table 6.2 Turnout in PS Primary 1995 and 2006

Year	Number of candidates	Turnout
1995	2	Overall turnout: 73.4 per cent Share of turnout existing members: 88.28 per cent Share of turnout new members: 11.72 per cent
2006	3	Overall turnout: 81.97 per cent Share of turnout existing members: 60.76 per cent Share of turnout new members: 47.87 per cent

The turnout rates in the PS primaries from 1995 and 2006 are in line with the theoretical expectations of the framework. In both, overall turnout is very high and both sub-groups participate proportionally to their overall membership share. However, in 2006 the power of existing membership is more reduced compared 1995, and new members have a more substantial influence on the outcome of the primary. This shows the potential negative effect of recruitment drives on the shares of the turnout. While the existing membership still represents the larger and decisive part of the electorate, its power is reduced in favour of new often more docile and short-term party members (Cross and Young, 2004). Whether this translates into a lower quality of membership and more negative attitude towards the leadership will be discussed in the next section.

### *Quality of Membership*

Following the analysis of the two quantitative indicators of membership size and turnout, the next section investigates the quality of membership. First, it looks if there is an association between the change in the motivation to join the party and the introduction of the primary, and, second, how this relates to the type and intensity of participation among members. The surveys of the PS members included items comparing membership activity within the party and within other voluntary associations. The following section also includes these items to see whether party membership activity is slowly replaced by activities in other voluntary associations, as it might not be seen as effective any more.

According to the analytical framework, the quality of membership should decrease as many mid-level activists invest less resources into the

party, as the previous reward to select the next party leaders in a delegate meeting is removed (Sandri, 2011). This might also encourage some more passive, existing members to become more active, as it could re-motivate them. Further, new members that joined and paid the full membership fee should invest time into the party to gain a return on their investment (Scarrow, 1995). However, due to lower fees for new members in 2006, they need to invest less time to regain their cost of membership resulting in more passive new members. Nevertheless, overall the move to a closed primary should have a positive impact on the quality of membership. The next section, first, looks at how this is reflected in the motivation to join the party, and, second, in the type and intensity of intra-party participation. The next section is mainly based on two membership surveys conducted in 1986 (pre-primary) and 1998 (post-primary) (Rey and Subileau, 1991, Subileau et al., 1999).

#### *Motivation to Join the Party 1986 and 1998*

As outlined before, to study the different motivations to join a party, the project uses the *general-incentive model* developed by Seyd and Whiteley (1992). The model suggests seven distinct incentives that can be captured with different survey items. While both surveys include items to capture most incentives, they do not necessarily use the same questions to capture these incentives. Nevertheless, the questions used are mostly comparable across surveys, as they represent only different measures for the same incentive. Thus, changes in the overall increase or decrease of the incentive—rather than the individual items—can be traced and allows capturing broader developments in the motivation to join the party before and after the introduction of the closed primary.

The first incentives to look at are selective-outcome incentives. This category identifies members who joined mainly for personal gain. It can be seen that while in 1986, 41.8 per cent joined with the ambition to take up a party and/or public office, in 1998 the figure rose to 57.5 per cent. Nearly equal shares of new and existing members state this as an important reason to join the party. This points to a continuous professionalization of the party and its membership. The next incentives are selective-process incentives. Here members join to be part of the political process itself finding it enjoyable. Thus, the party is seen as a place to socialize. In 1985, 69.1 per cent joined the party to meet like-minded people, and, in 1998, 89.2 per cent agreed with the statement that the party is a good place to meet interesting people. Support for this statement is slightly stronger among new members. It seems that, compared to 1998, the party is increasingly more perceived as a social space than before. It seems there are two parallel developments pointing into opposite directions among members, on the one side, there are more professional members and, on the other side, there are more social members, leaving less and less room in between, a room traditionally occupied by the classical party activist. The third incentives are collective political incentives. Here, members are motivated by promoting party policies and a vision of the party acting for the collective good mainly by winning elections. Thus, while in 1986, 78.8 per cent claimed they joined the party to support it to win the election; this figure further increases in 1998 to 82.7 per cent. Also, both new and existing members are equally motivated by this incentive. Further, the members that joined to promote the party's aims and thus contribute to transforming society rose from 90.5 per cent in 1986 to 93.65 in 1998. Again, both new and existing members share this incentive as a main motivation to join the party. To achieve this aim, members need to be active,

which should be positive for the party. Thus, whether the rise in these incentives, requiring active participation to fulfil, is also reflected in actually higher levels of participation is discussed below. Another incentive to look at is normative incentives. They capture whether members join on the grounds of external societal pressure and norms rather than their will to do so. In 1998, 24.4 per cent stated that they joined the party to continue family tradition, this number decreased to 19.9 per cent a bit more than ten years later. While in 1998 still 20.5 per cent of the existing members list this as an important reason to join, only 16.3 per cent of new members do so. This should contribute to a decline in passive members, who just joined due to family pressure and thus have a positive effect on party membership. Altruistic motives are important for people who join the party to express their support for abstract and idealistic goals. Thus, rather than to join for specific policy goals, they join based on more moral grounds. Unfortunately, there is no relevant directly comparable item in the two surveys. However, in 1986, 43 per cent stated that an important reason to join is to be a better citizen, while in 1998 82.2 per cent joined, because they “care for other people”. This was equally strong between new and existing members. Thus, while it is difficult to say, whether altruistic incentives increase or not, it is clear that they still play an important role in the decision to join the party. The last incentives are ideological incentives. Here, members join to give expression of their deeply held beliefs and, thus, to influence the course of the party accordingly. The surveys show that this was and remains a very important motivation to join the party among all members. Following Whiteley et al. (1994b), in the case of the PS the high level of ideological incentives is further reflected in high levels of process incentives.

When asked during the interviews what their main incentive to join was, a very similar picture emerged to the one drawn by the surveys. Many long-term members stated that they joined because of a “desire to change society” (activist-member since mid-1970s) or to “advance my convictions” (elite member since 1992), and only one member stated that a main motivation to join was to run as candidate in the local elections (activist and former elite-member since 1981). In contrast, members who joined later clearly stated their motivation to join was influenced by the option of being a candidate; one even stated that “I decided to run for an elected office [...] so I said to myself that in order to be elected it would be useful to become actually a member of the party” (elite-member since 2006). Overall, there is little change in the motivation to join the party. Further, there is only a small difference between new and existing members. Nevertheless, the party attracted more new, more career-oriented members than before without this becoming the dominant incentive to join the party. Also, process and collective incentives increased, while normative incentives decreased. All this should contribute to an increase in intra-party participation. Whether this really transformed the case or just produced more social but passive members is discussed in the next section by looking at changes in the type and intensity of membership participation.



Table 6.3 Motivation to Join the French PS 1986 and 1998 (All, Existing and New)

Types of incentive to join the party	Measurements	1985	1998	1998	
		All	All	Existing	New
	N	4319	2000 (12,000)	1409	473
<i>Selective-outcome incentives</i>	- To gain a public mandate		29.8	29.6	29.6
	- To gain a party office		27.7	28.3	26.5
	- To gain a public or party office	41.8			
<i>Selective-process incentives</i>	- To meet nice people (agree-disagree five point Likert scale)	69.1	89.2	88.2	91.5
	- To meet like-minded people				
<i>Collective political incentives</i>	- To promote the aims of the party (to participated in the transformation of society)	90.5	93.6	93.7	92.4
	- To increase the influence of the party (to win elections)	78.8	82.7	83.2	82.1
<i>Normative incentives</i>	- Through the influence of family and friends	24.4	19.9	20.5	16.3
<i>Altruistic motives</i>	- To fulfil my responsibility as citizen	43	82.3	82.3	81.2
<i>Ideological incentives</i>	- To influence the political course of the party	87.5	88.0	88.0	88.8

1) all values in per cent, 2) "very important" or "important" motivation to join the party

#### *Intra-party Participation*

The above showed that more people join for career reasons, and because they enjoy political work. Both motivations are usually associated with higher membership participation especially in high intensity activities, such as

running or holding a party of public office. A good starting point to analyse the level of participation is to ask members whether they consider themselves to be an active member or not. In 1985, 17.5 per cent described themselves as passive, 27.4 per cent as occasional and 51.9 per cent as active party members. In 1998, the passive and occasional membership slightly decreased to 16.6 per cent and 23.7 per cent respectively, and active membership increased to 57.1 per cent. When looking at new and existing members separately, existing members see themselves as considerably more active with 60 per cent and only 14 per cent as passive members, in comparison to 49.3 per cent of active new members and 22.4 per cent of passive new members. Thus, so far, it seems the primary re-activated existing members, and new members are more passive. To verify this trend further, the next step is to look at how many hours member states they spend working for the party.

While in 1985, the survey asked how many hours they spent working per week, in 1998 the survey asked for an monthly estimate. In order to be comparable, the responses from 1986 are multiplied by four to account for the amount worked for the party in a month. Nevertheless, direct comparisons are very difficult between the two surveys. Comparing 1986 and 1998, it seems that members spend much less time working for the party than before. The fact that the survey question was changed from a weekly to a monthly estimate is probably further evidence for this. However, it is possible to compare the hours spent working for the party by existing and new members for 1998. Interestingly, there are nearly no differences between the two groups. Thus, over time existing members became more passive, and former activists were not replaced by new ones. If we compare this to the amount of time members

spent working for the party to other voluntary associations, we can see that 36 per cent in 1986 and 48.7 per cent in 1998 stated they spent most time working for the party compared to trade unions or other associations. Looking at existing and new members separately, while in the former group 40.8 per cent claimed to spend more time working for the party compared to other associations, this drops to 34.7 per cent among new members. Further, in 1998 37 per cent stated they spent more time working for other type of associations in contrast to only 23 per cent in 1986.

In addition to looking at how much time party members work for the party, the next section looks at what type of activities members engage in. The section first looks at low intensity activities, such as attending a party meeting or knocking on doors, and then high intensity activities, such as running or holding party or public offices. The only survey item that measure low intensity activities in both surveys refers to the attendance of local party meetings. There is little difference between 1986 and 1998 with about 70 per cent of all members (both existing and new) attending party meetings on a regular basis. The 1998 survey has some more items measuring low intensity activities that can provide an insight into whether existing and new members participate in different activities. When asked, whether they had signed a petition of the party or a petition that the party supported in the past five years, 80.3 per cent of all members said they did. Existing members are more likely to sign a petition with 83.1 per cent in comparison to 73.6 per cent among new members. When asked, whether they had donated extra money to the part in the past five years, 54.3 per cent had donated extra money to the party in the past five. The readiness to give more is higher among existing members with 59.5 per cent in comparison to

38.3 per cent among new members. Further 79 per cent stated that they have distributed party fliers during the last election campaign with 81.4 per cent of existing members and 74.0 of the new members. Thus, it seems that overall party membership is less active in 1998 than in 1986, but members still regularly attended party meetings. Further, there seems to be little difference in the hours new and existing members spent working for the party in 1998, but new members are less involved in low intensity activities than existing members. Whether or not new party members rather spent more time in high intensity activities and are more career-oriented is discussed next.

As mentioned above, high intensity activities are defined as holding or running for a public or/ and party office. In 1986, 20 per cent claimed that they currently hold a position within the party, while in 1998 the number rose to 23.3 per cent with 27.9 per cent of the old members and 10.6 per cent of the new members. When looking at whether members have or had a public office, 27.6 per cent answered with yes in 1986. In contrast, in 1998, 40.5 per cent reported to either have or had a public office. Looking at new and existing members separately, it can be seen that 48.5 per cent of all existing members and 26.6 per cent of new members either have or had a public office. The latter is very high considering that they only joined the party over the past four years. This supports the finding that new members are generally more career-oriented. This is further supported by the fact that 18.8 per cent of all new members were a candidate in an election for a party office and 20.1 per cent for a public office in the past five year, compared to 34.7 per cent and 37.5 per cent of existing members. Thus it seems that party members and especially new party

members seem to be more active in high intensity activities rather than low intensity ones, pointing towards a professionalization of the party.

Returning to the framework, the expectations for membership quality are only partly met, while indeed the primaries seem to have positively associated with the quality of new members, as they attracted highly active members. However, the negative consequences on existing members manifest in less participation cannot be observed.

This positive relation between the move to primaries is also confirmed by the members during the interviews. One of them, a member since 1992, who took part in the 1995 primary, reported that “with the opening of the primary in 1995 legitimacy increased, it created a dynamic among party member; they kept their claim over the power and influence in the life of the party to choose this person”. Another long-term activist stated “indeed, it [the primary in 1995] gave more power to the activist and this is good” (former elite and activist since 1981). Despite continuous involvement, it might be that existing members are less satisfied with their membership and influence than in the past. Consequently, the next section looks at the attitude of party membership towards the leadership.

### *Membership Attitude and External Efficacy*

After having discussed how the shift towards closed primaries relates to changes in the quality of membership in terms of motivation to join the party and members’ patterns of activity, the next section discusses the influence on the attitude of the party membership towards the party leadership. The surveys of PS members also included items comparing membership satisfaction and

perceived influence in the party and within other voluntary associations. The following section also includes these items to see how party membership satisfaction and perceived influence in parties compares and changes relative to other voluntary associations. Overall, a positive attitude can be expected as now members are allowed to directly vote for the leader and, thus, should feel empowered. However, when looking at new and existing members separately, the latter sub-group is more likely to be negatively affected, as activists lose their exclusive right to determine the leader during the party congress, and their voice is reduced by the vote of the entire membership. As discussed in chapter two, the project uses the *external-efficacy model* suggested by Craig et al. (1990) It is mainly based on survey items asking about the perceived influence of party membership, and whether their needs are listen to or not.

A first useful indicator to look at is the overall level of satisfaction among party members. In 1986, 70.9 per cent were satisfied with their party membership, while in 1998 this increased to 79.9 per cent. When looking at the two sub-group separately, the satisfaction among existing members seems to be higher than among new members with 81.9 per cent and 75.3 per cent respectively. In comparison to other voluntary associations, in 1986 25 per cent said that working for the party was the most satisfying. In 1998 the number increased to 29.7 per cent with 30.2 per cent of existing and 28.5 per cent of new members. Thus, so far, it seems that the primaries had a positive effect on the overall attitude of party membership. The next questions look closer at the relationship between ordinary members and the party elite.

The first question in this regard is to ask who usually takes the decisions in the local party section. In 1986, 47 per cent stated it is either local party elite

or elected officials. A similar picture emerges at the regional level with 41.1 per cent. In addition, in 1986, only 28.3 per cent felt they had influence on elected officials, and 31.9 per cent claimed to have any influence in the party, one had to be an elected official, and a further 54.1 per cent said it is not necessary but very helpful. A similar question asked in 1998 showed that only 35.7 per cent felt they could influence elected officials. While 38.5 per cent of the existing members felt they had influence, only 26 per cent of the new members felt they did. In 1998, still 37.6 per cent of all members thought that one had to be an elected official, and 49.9 per cent agreed that it was very helpful to have influence in the party. Looking at the two sub-groups, 32.1 per cent of new members and 39.7 per cent of existing members thought one had to be an elected official to have influence in the party, 51.6 per cent of new and 49.5 per cent of existing members thought it was not necessary but very helpful. This is further supported by the fact that in 1998, 73.6 per cent agreed with the statement that the party leadership did not care much about the views of the members, and a further 77 per cent agreed with the statement that the leadership cared more about voters than party members. New members were less negative about the leadership with 68.1 per cent agreeing with the statement that the party leadership did not care much about the views of the members and 72.1 per cent agreeing with the statement that the leadership cared more about voters than party members compared to 75.8 per cent and 78.5 per cent of the existing members respectively. In addition, in 1998, only 38.5 per cent were satisfied with the listening skills of the party leaders. In line with the above, new members were more satisfied with 43.8 per cent compared to existing members with 35.9 per cent with the leadership's capacity to listen to members. This is further supported by the fact that in 1986 46.0 per cent of

respondents felt that elected officials saw party members only as “electoral tool” and only just above 50 per cent were satisfied with the relation between members and the party’s elected officials. In 1998, the share of members that felt elected official saw party members only as “electoral tool” rose to 54.9 per cent with this view slightly more pronounced among existing members. Nevertheless, in 1986 compared to other voluntary associations, they saw party membership as the most important activity and invested substantially more time in volunteering for the party compared to other associations. Overall, in 1998, party members still spent most time working for the party, but when looking at the two sub-groups separately, this is only the case for existing members and new members spent slightly less time working for the party compared to working for other associations.

It is also interesting to note that in 1986, the satisfaction with the internal democratic functioning of the party was low, with 66 per cent of responses stating that internal problems of the PS were a frequent topic during party meetings; 70.1 per cent felt that activities of the party membership were not recognized enough and 79.1 per cent felt their main function in the party was to support the government in comparison to only 34.7 per cent who feel their main function was to contribute to the political debate. This only improved slightly in 1998, as members were only reasonably satisfied with the democratic functioning of the party with 59.6 per cent. New members were more satisfied with 62.3 per cent compared to 58.4 per cent of existing members. On the other end of the scale, 37.7 per cent of all members were not satisfied with 39 per cent of existing members and 34.9 per cent of new members not being satisfied with the democratic functioning of the party.



As already outlined above, the interview partners clearly expressed that the primary had a positive impact on membership activity and that this translated into a positive impact on the attitude towards the party leadership. Thus, one long-term activists stated that “before the 2000s we had the impression [...] to be heard and to participate in decisions, to contribute to a development that was influenced a bit by the grass-roots” (activist-member since mid-1970s). Moreover, another member claimed that in 1995 “party activists were rather happy and [...] expressed themselves, because Jospin had a good campaign and [...] had been the leader of the PS for a long time, so he had legitimacy” (elite-member since 1992). In addition, he went on to explain that even though his favourite candidate did not win, he felt empowered and motivated to support the winning candidate, as he was selected in an inclusive and democratic manner.

Overall as suggested by the analytical framework, there seems to be a positive link between the attitude of the party membership towards the leadership and the new leadership selection method. They were overall more satisfied with their membership and their perceived influence on elected officials improved. However, members’ perception that one had to be an elected official to be heard in the party increased and was especially high among existing members. Further, as the framework suggests, the attitude of existing members towards the leadership was more likely to be negative, and their level of dissatisfaction with the internal democratic functioning of the party was higher. Nonetheless, the primary seems to have contributed to the improvement of the overall perceived political efficacy of members.

### *The Nature of New Members in 2006*

In 2006, the party decided to use a primary to select its presidential candidate for a second time. However, in difference to the 1995 selection, the party decided to link it to a recruitment drive by offering a reduced membership fee for the first membership year. Returning to the theoretical framework, we expect slightly different consequences of controlled democratization with a recruitment drive than without such an initiative. In case of a new low-cost membership category, membership quality should decline, as new members join only to vote rather than to become party activists. In this case, loyalty should be low, and large amounts of members should only become active during the leadership contests (Young and Cross, 2002). The party conducted a new membership survey, which forms the base for the following discussion on the nature of the new members attracted in 2006.

As outlined above, the primary in 2006 attracted a large amount of new voters, and the overall turnout was high. Further, if we assume all new members voted, they provided 47.87 per cent of the total turnout. Of the new member that joined in 2006, 91.3 per cent were never a member of any political party. Of the 10 per cent that were, 30.4 per cent were previously a member of the PS. Thus, the recruitment drive did not only attract new members but motivated former disillusioned members to re-join. The first aspect to look at is what the motivations to join the party were. The dominant motivation was to support the upcoming presidential election with 76.3 per cent, to determine the next president candidate with 64.6 per cent and to defend the values of the left with 60.2 per cent. While only 10.5 per cent stated that the personalities at the top of the party were an important reason to join, and only 26.7 per cent joined

to fight the right. Thus, it seems that collective political incentives and ideological incentives were more important than expressive incentives. Further, 47.5 per cent joined also, because they had friends in the PS pointing toward selective-process incentives. Unfortunately, there is no direct question measuring selective-outcome incentives, but as a proxy 11.5 per cent of the new members said they were already on an electoral ballot paper at previous elections. Thus, they might see joining the party as the next step in their political career. As these were all new members, the survey did not ask about past membership activities, but about which activities they were most willing to engage in the next months. 51.5 per cent would attend a meeting to help with specific projects of the party, but only 48 per cent would attend a local party meeting and even less, 29.5 per cent, an election event. Only 11 per cent would be willing to help with distributing leaflets, and a tiny share of 1.2 per cent were willing to knock on doors. In contrast, 82.7 per cent were willing to vote for the next presidential candidate of the party. Thus, overall, this new party membership seemed to be rather passive and did not engage in many party activities. However, 24.1 per cent were willing to be on the ballot paper at a local election. Thus, not only were new members more passive, they were clearly more career-orientated. All this points towards a decline in membership quality among new members. With regard to the attitude of the new members towards the party leadership, the fact that 82.7 per cent were willing to vote for the next presidential candidate indicates a positive attitude. Unfortunately, there are no direct measures for perceived external efficacy in the survey. Nevertheless, 76.1 per cent thought the party was transparent and democratic. Further 67.3 per cent believed the party was close to the people's concerns. This clearly supports the analytical framework's expected positive attitude of

new members towards the party leadership, as they not only joined to vote for it, but also think that the party is close to the people's needs. In comparison to the new members that joined in 1995, they seem to be more passive, more career-oriented and have a very positive attitude towards the leadership. Thus, overall the recruitment drive seems to lead to a lower level of membership quality among new members but a positive attitude towards the leadership compared to the selection that was not preceded by a recruitment drive.

When asked about the 2006 primary, all interview partners had a comparatively more negative view than after the 1995 primary. While many of them believe that the form of the closed primary was great, they are highly critical of the parallel large-scale recruitment drive and its impact on the nature of party membership. The following statement probably summarises best the feeling among existing members: "The primary of 2006 with its membership for 20 Euros produced the feeling that internal democracy had been confiscated and therefore led to a result that wasn't completely legitimate". He further outlines how disappointed most activists were afterwards: "There was a great debate afterwards, because, we said yes ok, but it's too easy, why they pay 20 Euros and we pay more, [...], it [the selection process] did not go well" (elite-member since 1992). With regard to long-term membership, one interviewee said that "we gained five or six members in addition, and I would say that three or two stayed. [...] people have been interested in that moment so they just wanted to join to vote, after they did not renew their membership" (member since 1981). This is confirmed by other members who stated, for example, that in 2006 "there were a lot of people who participated in the selections and after did not renew their membership" (activist-member since 2004). And one said

that the debate surrounding the 2006 primaries was very negative with the main arguments against it being the “Americanization of French politics, elitist personalization that would push ideas into the background [...] and the dispossession of the power of part activists” (activist-member since 2002). Thus, it seems, while the idea of a closed primary is welcomed by existing and new members alike, the combination of it with a large recruitment drive, creating two types of membership with equal rights at different cost, is seen more negative by members. Not only did this not contribute to any long-term membership growth, it considerably undermined the power of existing members during the primary.

#### *Summary of the Consequences of the Closed Primary*

The above discussion of the effect of the closed primary on the PS party membership highlighted the overall positive consequences of primaries under *Controlled Democratization* (strict candidacy/ closed primary). Both leadership contests in 1995 and 2006 are associated with higher levels of party membership size and produced high turnouts. It also seems to confirm the expectation for the two sub-groups of existing and new members. While new members flowed in, some existing one left, and the share of the turnout was proportional to the share of overall party membership among the two groups. Further, the empirical discussion of the PS also supported the expectations of an improved attitude of the party membership towards the leadership, while existing members' attitude toward the leadership were more negative and showed a higher level of dissatisfaction with the internal democratic functioning of the party. The expectations for membership quality are only partly met. While indeed, the primary seems to have be positively related to the quality of new

members, as it attracted highly active members, the negative consequences on existing members in form of less participation cannot be observed in the 1995 survey.

The 2006 survey conducted among new members gave further support to the theoretical expectations of the framework with regard to new members. In addition, as can be seen by the interviews, many existing members were deeply dissatisfied with the 2006 primary and especially with the recruitment drive. Thus, the recruitment drive seems to have had negative effect on the attitude of existing members towards the party leadership.

Overall, the effect seems positive, as the membership, especially the existing members, continue to hold the deciding vote on who will lead the party, and their voice is not crowded out by a large external selectorate. However, the elite can still limit the list of candidates and thus contain unwanted outcomes. This combination leads to a clearly defined and distinct selectorate and provides the elite with extensive control over the process. Hence, even though, this is a more democratic method in comparison to others, such as delegate meetings, it overall remains highly controlled by both sides (Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2013).

### **6.3 The PS 2011 Primary in the Conceptual Framework and its Expected Effects**

After the two closed primaries in 1995 and 2006, the party decided to go a step further, and adopted an open primary to determine its next presidential candidate in an all membership vote with 67.91 per cent of all members in 2009 (Libération.fr, 2009). The first time the party used it was in 2011. The next

section discusses the impact this shift had on party members in from a closed to an open primary. Returning to the conceptual framework outlined above, the following consequences for members are expected, when using an open primary:

Table 6.4 The Expected Effects for the Open Primary 2011 in the French PS

<b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b>	Open	<p><b>Disempowering Democratization</b>  Overall effect: -  Membership level  Existing: - New: +  Quality of membership  Existing: - New: -  Attitude towards leadership  Existing: - New: +  Turnout in primary  Existing: low New: high</p>	
	Closed		
		<b>Permissive</b>	<b>Strict</b>
		<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase			

The overall effect is expected to be negative with a lower level of membership, a lower quality of membership, a low turnout with a low share of party membership and even lower share of existing members and finally mostly negative attitude towards the party leadership. The data used here are the PS

membership surveys conducted by Dargent and Rey (2014)<sup>41</sup> and Subileau et al. (1999). The next section starts by discussing the potential impact of the open primary on the membership level and turnout, before turning to membership quality and the attitude towards leadership.

### *Membership Level*


In 2008, after the closed primary, party membership peaked at 232,511. The highest membership level since the late 1940s. However, the membership size soon dropped again to 145,361 in 2010, the year before the open primary. Despite no real new incentive to join the party, as one could vote without being a member, membership size increased to 174,022 (Parti Socialist, 2012) by the end of 2011. Thus, in the year of the primary, 28,661 new members joined. This already points to the importance of other incentives to join among these new members, in addition to or instead of voting in the primary. However, growth was short lived and membership figures declined again in the following year and declined since. It is interesting to see that even in the year of the presidential election 2012, in which parties normally experience membership growth, party membership already started to decline again. This might be explained by the fact that many members were disappointed by the outcome and felt their voice was crowded out by the large external electorate. Thus, in protest some members, probably mainly long-term activists, left the party.

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<sup>41</sup> The authors did not supply me with a full data set but only the frequencies of responses per survey item. Therefore, it was not possible to study the effect separately for new and existing members in this section.



Figure 6.3 Membership Development PS 1995-2014



Source: Delwit, P. (2015), 'Party Membership Figures. France 1944-2014'. MAPP Project Data Archive [[www.projectmapp.eu](http://www.projectmapp.eu)]. Sandri et al. 2015, (Laurent, 2015)

The case of the PS seems to support the suggestion of the analytical framework that the use of an open primary should reduce party membership in the long run. Further, it seems also to support the expectations for the two-subgroup with an inflow, albeit limited, of new members during the year of the primary and a further decline of existing membership. This trend is also outlined in the interviews with some reporting that new members joined motivated by the primary and existing members leaving because of it. One interviewee claimed that in the running up to the primary in 2011 there “were people who really didn’t want this development and left the party and people who simply did not renew their contributions” (former elite and activist-member since 1981). The next indicator to look at is turnout.

### *Turnout in Primary*

In terms of participation, the primary was a big success for the party, as it managed to attract over 2.6 and 2.8 million voters<sup>42</sup> in the first and second round respectively (Evans and Ivaldi, 2013), together representing about 6 per cent of the overall electorate (Boissieu, 2013). This did not only increase the legitimacy of the outcome, but the party even made a financial profit from the primary. Assuming that all members voted, their share of the turnout would have been 6.54 per cent and 6.08 per cent in the second round. The non-member share of the turnout is 93.5 per cent in the first and 93.92 per cent in the second round. The next step is to look at the two sub-groups of new and existing members separately. Again assuming that existing membership is the level of membership in the year before the primary, their share of the first round is 5.5 per cent and 5.08 per cent of the second. In comparison, the share of the new members that joined during the year of the primary is 1.07 per cent in the first and 1.00 per cent in the second round. Thus, it can be clearly seen that the voice of the party membership is literally crowded out, and they are disempowered. While during the closed primaries, existing members' share declined over time from 88.38 per cent to 60.76 per cent in 2006, it still controlled the decisive share of the vote, which was not the case under the open primary. Thus, it can be assumed that turnout among existing members would be lower than in the past, especially since they had to pay a one Euro voting fee regardless of membership. Further, despite the fact that the main incentive for new members to join was probably not only to vote in the primary, it nevertheless played an important role, and thus it is likely that most new

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<sup>42</sup> 2,661,231 in the first and 2,860,157 in the second round. EVANS, J. & IVALDI, G. 2013. *The 2012 French presidential elections : the inevitable alternation*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

members voted. So far, the theoretical expectations of the framework for disempowering democratization in terms of membership development and turnout seem to be supported by the case of the PS. The next step is to look if there is an association between the introduction of the open primary and changes in membership quality and attitude towards the leadership.

### *Membership Quality and Attitude towards the Leadership*

#### *Motivation to Join the Party*

As outlined in chapter two, the project uses the *general-incentive model* developed by the Seyd and Whiteley (1992) to capture the changes in the motivation to join the party before and after the introduction of the open primary. While the design of the two surveys follows the *general-incentive model*, the question batteries used, however, slightly differ in questions and scope. Thus, to be comparative here the chapter focuses on the seven items covering five of the seven incentives.

The table below shows that the majority of members in 2011 continued to be motivated by collective political incentives with over 80 per cent members still seeing the party as a good place to meet interesting people. However, this number slightly decreased in comparison to 1998. Also less and less people join the party to be informed about politics.

Overall selective-process incentives were declining. Further, selective-outcome incentives were also declining with considerably less members joining the party to either gain a party or public office. This might be related to the decline in altruistic motives to join the party with fewer members joining the

party in order to change political practice. Thus, they might feel disillusioned and do not see the party as an effective way to challenge the existing political structure. On a more positive note, members who mainly join to continue the family tradition further declined. Overall, it seems that the majority of members supported the abstract ideas of the party rather than its concrete policy goals, and they were less and less motivated to join in order to actively influence the party's direction. While overall career incentive seems to decrease, many of the interviewees said that it seems nevertheless to be a very dominant motivation among new members. Thus, one activist claims that the party is "struggling to recruit new party activists except for those who want to have a party post or be elected, but the party also needs grassroots activists!" (activist-member since 2004). A new member with elected office even openly admits that "the reason why I joined the party is because voters want to know what direction we belong to and in an average size city one needs a party machine, the logistics and the means to convey my ideas, which explains that I am committed and a member of the PS" (elite-member since 2008). In addition, a party activist criticized that "today there are people who are elected, who have used the system of the PS, its structure and who are not members and once elected, they can do what they want and this annoys me greatly" (active member since 2004). This all points to a professionalization of the party.

So far, it seems that there is a negative association between the open primary and the quality of party membership supporting claims by, for example, Lefebvre (2011) that open primaries cause an end to the party of party activists. As Whiteley et al. (1994) point out, the motivation to join affects the intensity and type of activity members are likely to engage in. To get a full picture of how

the open primary influences the quality of membership, the next section looks exactly at these two indicators.

Table 6.5 Motivation to Join the French PS 1998 and 2011 (All, Existing and New)

<b>Measurements</b>		<b>1998</b>	<b>2011</b>
		<i>All</i>	<i>All</i>
N		2000 (12,000)	11,000
<i>Selective-outcome incentives</i>	- To gain a public mandate	29.8	23.0
	- To gain a party office	27.7	19.1
<i>Selective-process incentives</i>	- To meet nice people (agree-disagree five point Likert scale)	89.2	86.8
	To be informed about politics	49.7	41.7
<i>Collective political incentives</i>	- To promote the aims of the party (to participated in the transformation of society)	93.6	92.7
<i>Normative incentives</i>	- Through the influence of family and friends	19.9	13.2
<i>Altruistic motives</i>	- To change the political practices	85.8	75.2
<i>Ideological incentives</i>	-To strengthen a specific wing within the party - To influence the political course of the party		

1) all values in per cent, 2) “very important” or “important” motivation to join the party.

#### *Intra-Party Participation*

This section starts by looking at overall participation, then at high intensity activities and finishes by comparing the level of activity between the PS and other voluntary associations.

Between 1998 and 2011, the number of party activists decreases slightly, and the share of sporadic and passive members increased. While, in 1998, 57.1 per cent classified themselves as active members, this decreased to 52.8 per cent in 2011, and the share of ordinary members increased from 16.5 per cent to 19.9 per cent.<sup>43</sup> This development is further supported by an overall decline in the number of members who claim to participate regularly in local party meetings, declining from 70.7 per cent to 66.4 per cent, and 9.6 per cent compared to 2.3 per cent in 1998 stating that they never attend a local meeting.

In contrast, it seems the hours individuals invest into the party increased moderately. In 1998, 54.2 per cent worked three hours or less, in 2011 this decreased to 44.9 per cent. Further, the number of members stating that they work more than ten hour per month for the party increased from 10.2 per cent to 12.2 per cent. Combing the type of party membership variable with the time spent working for the party, it can be seen that there is a clear difference between ordinary members, activists and members with an official party function. Thus, while 69 per cent of ordinary members work less than three hours per month, only 26 per cent of those are activists and 15 per cent have an official party function. This development might be explained by an increase in members engaging in high intensity activities, such as holding an official party or elected office.

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<sup>43</sup> Sporadic party activism remains nearly equal with 24.7 per cent and 25.7 per cent in 1998 and 2011 respectively.

### *High Intensity Activities*

At first sight the above outlined contradiction between an increase in hours spent, despite a reduced attendance of party meetings and a decrease in members classifying themselves as activists might be explained by an increase in high intensity activities, with fewer members working lots of hours for the party. This would also point to a professionalization of the party relying more on party officials and public office holders than activists and members. When asked whether they were candidates in an internal party election in the past five years, in 1998 30.2 per cent said yes, while only 25.1 per cent did in 2011. However, when asked whether they currently held a party office, there was a small increase from 23.3 per cent to 24.6 per cent of members who held a local, federal and/ or national party office. Further, when asked whether they currently hold or held a public office in the past, 40.5 per cent answered with yes in 1998 and 45.8 per cent in 2011. Further, in 2011, 25.2 per cent stated that they ran for public elected office in the past five years, while a further 16.8 per cent said they were asked by the party to be a candidate. There seems to be less and less active party members sharing public and party offices between them. Thus, it seems the party is shifting from a party of activists to a party of mainly elected officials. This further points to a negative development in the quality of party membership. In addition, when asked whether they had donated additional money to the party in the past five years, 54.3 per cent stated they did so in 1998, while only 33.3 per cent agreed in 2011. In contrast, the number of members who claimed they distributed leaflets during election campaign increased from 79 per cent to 82.4 per cent. This points further to the fact that

members are more sporadic activist during elections campaigns and that they rarely engage in diverse low intensity activities outside of elections.

In terms of membership quality, the last aspect to look at is to compare party participation with participation in other voluntary organizations. In 1998, 38.7 per cent stated they spent most time working for the party; this number reduced to 32.1 per cent in 2011. Further, in 2011, only 19.3 per cent reported to exercise most responsibilities within the party, while it was 24.5 per cent in 1998. Thus, party activism among members is more and more replaced by either activity in alternative associations or inactivity.

The decline in party activism is also a recurring theme in the interviews. One long-term member simply states that "there are more [...] passive members than activists at the moment" (activist-member since 1981) and even newer members report that "activists became demotivated and we arrive at the current situation of total abstention. It is interesting that we were forced to resort to the primary to choose people (candidates)" (elite-member since about 2008). Another long-term member describes the current majority of members as "more distant; they pay a fee in order to obtain information, to be invited, participate a little, to support by giving money; this is useful for their ideas but they do not want to be active members neither in their voting behaviour or commitment to the party" (elite-member since 1992). Others claim that membership activities only occur during election times (elite-member since 2006), and one activist states that due to the lack of party activism in her section, she doubts the usefulness of her membership every year before renewing it nevertheless (activist-member since 2004). Further, another activist that joined in 2002 claims that the party membership is becoming more and more depoliticized and



that the classical way of PS activism “is over or it exists less, especially in people of my generation, [...], it is replaced by something else such as the investment in the community of the party branch or municipality. The interviews confirm the more and more passive and sporadic nature of party activism in the party. Further, it can also be seen that newer members and elites, while acknowledging this decline, see it more as a new way of party membership *in-activism*.

Returning to the analytical framework, the tendency of open primaries with strict candidacy requirements having a negative association with the quality of party membership holds. Overall, members claim they are less active and not as much engaged in high intensity activities as they used to be. Further, many of them seem to become only active during election times. It can also be seen that fewer and fewer members share party and public offices between them. Overall then, the shift towards open primaries seems to have further contributed to a shift from a party of activists to a party of elected officials, negatively related to the quality of grass-root party membership.

#### *Membership Attitude and External Efficacy*

The last aspect to study is how the perceived level of external efficacy of party members changes with the introduction of the open primary. According to the theoretical framework, an increasingly negative attitude towards the leadership should be expected.

The first indicator to look at is how this affected satisfaction with party membership. In 1998, 79.9 per cent stated that they were very satisfied with their party membership; this dropped to 52.5 per cent in 2011. The drop is

mainly due to a large decline in very satisfied members from formally 24.4 per cent to 10.6 per cent in 2011. Further, the satisfaction of party membership also decreased in comparison with the level of satisfaction of the membership in comparison to other voluntary organisations. While, in 1998, 29.7 per cent reported the party was the most satisfying membership they hold, this decreased to 20.9 per cent in 2011.

The next indicators to look at measure the influence and relationship between ordinary members and elected party officials. In 1998, 35.7 per cent of members had the feeling they had influence over elected officials. This decreased to 30.1 per cent by 2011. Further, in 2011, fewer members had the impression that their views were considered by their local candidates in the planning of the electoral campaign, declining from 39.4 per cent in 1998 to 34.7 per cent. Further, an increasing number of members, up from 21.85 per cent in 1998 to 27.3 per cent in 2011, fully agreed with the statement that the party leadership did not listen to the party members. In addition, a similar share of 58.5 per cent in 2011 and 57.7 per cent in 1998 were unhappy with the listening ability of party officials. While, in 1998, 5 per cent were very satisfied with the listening ability of officials, this dropped to 2.7 per cent in 2011. Also, the majority of members continued to agree with the statement that the party is more interested in representing voters than its members. Despite all of the above, it is interesting to notice that the satisfaction with the quality of the functioning of internal democracy only decreased moderately. Thus, while in 1998, 59.6 per cent were satisfied with the level of IPD (includes 15.9 per cent that were very satisfied), in 2011 this is reduced to 56.7 per cent (includes 8.8 per cent that were very satisfied). A similar picture emerges on the other side of

the scale with 37.7 per cent unsatisfied in 1998 and 40.2 per cent in 2011. These first findings confirm the negative attitude suggested by the theoretical framework.

When asked about their satisfaction with party membership in the interviews, there seems to be a division between newer and long-term members. One long-term member states that in the past “four to five years membership influence has decreased, and we do not have the impression that our wishes, our desires, orientation would lead to anything in reality”. He goes on to say that the primary gives only “the impression of occasionally being useful, it is only temporary” (member since mid-1970s). Even office holders stated that they had the feeling that there were too few party meetings, and when they happened, “we have the impression to speak into emptiness and that is frustrating for party activists” (elite-member with public office since 2006), or they never hear back from Paris (member since 2006). One long-term party elite-member admits that “members can have an influence, if they come at the right time, in a good discussion with good arguments and they might be able to *convince* a party leader or elected official” (elite- member since 1992). This is supported by former activists who felt that to be heard and achieve anything in the party, she had to get an elected public office (elite-member since 2002), and thus another activist observed that some local party branches only consist of elected officials (activist-member since 2002). Another member outlined the loss of power to the large external primary electoral by exclaiming that if “I pay membership fee or not, I have no extra rank”. The member went on to clearly distinguish members and primary voters explaining that they “ have not the

same ideological background; this can tip the outcome [of the primary] which could contradict the will of the members” (activist-member since 2004).

Thus, the interviews support the trend found in the survey, namely that members and especially long-term members feel their external efficacy is declining, or they even just have an illusion of influence. Further, the interviews confirm the perspective that to achieve something in the party, one needs to be a public office holder. In addition, most interview partners felt the influence of members in the party was undermined by the large external electorate.

Overall, it can be seen that the open primary is indeed associated with a decrease in political efficacy, reducing the perceived influence of members over its elected officials and diminishing satisfaction with the internal democratic working of the party. This trend is supported by the survey results and confirmed during the interviews. Together, this seem to produces a more negative attitude towards the party leadership as suggested by the analytical framework.

#### *Summary of the Consequences of the Open Primary*

Overall, the case of the PS (from closed to open primary) seems to support the theoretical expectations of the category *Disempowering Democratization*. From a party membership’s perspective, the consequences are overall more negative. Membership declines, becomes more passive, and members only provide a very small share of the turnout. The interview with party members and elites confirmed this development in the nature of party membership since the introduction of the open primary. Further, the interviews shed some light on the relationship between new and existing members. These accounts broadly point to the development suggested by the framework for the

two sub-groups. Thus, the process might be more democratic in form but the high level of inclusiveness and strict candidate requirements effectively disempowers party members and reduces their ability to influence the selection process. Further, members were less satisfied with their membership; the level of intra-party democracy and their attitude towards the leadership was negative, all pointing to a low level of perceived political efficacy among the party membership.

#### **6.4 Conclusion**

Overall, the empirical analysis of the case of the French PS seems to confirm the theoretical expectations of the conceptual framework of the two categories of controlled and disempowering democratization. The case of the PS is very useful in studying the development in party membership associate to the two types of primaries, since the party held selections using both open and closed primaries. The chapter used both quantitative party membership surveys and qualitative membership interviews to study the impact of primaries on members.

The chapter started by providing the background for the reforms that led to the adoption of the closed primary in 1995 and the open primary in 2009. It showed that external factors stressed by Cross and Blais (2012) clearly dominated in 2009, while it seems the lack of a clear candidate played a larger role than external factors in 1995. The chapter then continued by analysing the impact of adopting a closed primary on the PS membership in 1995 and 2006. While both selections fall in the category of controlled democratization, the 2006 primary had the added feature of a large-scale recruitment drive. The 1998

survey results supported the overall positive development of the party membership for both new and existing members when using a closed primary. Thus, all but one theoretical expectation were supported, as the primary did not have the expected negative impact on existing party membership quality but rather a positive one. The 2006 survey of new members further confirmed the theoretical expectations for this sub-group. Here, it is interesting to note that most interview partners were highly critical of the recruitment drive, which points to a more negative attitude of the membership towards the leadership than in 1995 and highlights the need that such recruitment drives as part of primaries have to be carefully designed to avoid negative and unintended consequences.

The second part of the chapter then studied the shift to an open primary in 2009 and its use in 2011, pushing the party into the category of disempowering democratization. Again, the chapter found that the case study confirmed the theoretical expectations of the conceptual framework. The consequences from the party membership's perspective seem to be overall more negative. While the discrepancy between new and existing members should be lower in open primaries compared to closed primaries with a large recruitment drive such as in 2006, the tension between existing members and primary voters was high. The negative effect on existing members and membership overall came more from empowering individuals outside of the party rather than the new members that joined. However, the discrepancy between existing and new members still seems to be persisted. As the framework suggests, the empirical analysis showed that membership was declining, became more passive, and members only accounted for a very small share of the turnout. Thus, the process might be more democratic in form but the high level of inclusiveness and strict candidate requirements effectively disempowers party members and their ability to

influence the selection process. Further, members are less satisfied with their membership; the level of intra-party democracy and their attitude towards the leadership is negative resulting in a low level of perceived political efficacy among members. In the case of disempowering democratization, the interviews highlighted that there is a different conception of what party membership means for ordinary members and the elite, with the latter making little if any distinction between the views of members and voters, as they assume that the main goal for everyone is to win the election, and they think the more open the primary, the easier to achieve this aim. Thus, one activist summarized the current nature of party membership in the PS in the following way: “Being party activists was another form of party activism, as we did not have the same tools available; it is not the same thing and it's been very good for its time; party activism has evolved because the party has evolved over time; people who join are not the same, they have not the same issues in mind”.

In conclusion, the chapter further strengthens the usefulness and reliability of the conceptual framework developed in this project is for studying the impact of different leadership selection rules (in the form of selectorate and candidacy requirements) on the nature of party membership.

## 7 Conclusion

### 7.1 Introduction

The study set out to explore how party membership is affected by the use of primaries to select the party executive leader. More specifically, the central research question was to investigate the consequences of the adoption of different type of leadership selection rules for the individual level conception/perception of party membership. The study builds on the so far mainly theoretical literature on the effect of primaries for parties and specifically party membership. The main theoretical divide is between scholars who see the introduction of inclusive leadership selection procedures as negative and those who view it as beneficial for the party membership. For example, Katz and Mair (1994), Lefebvre (2011) or Hopkin (2001) argue that primaries reduce membership power and diminish the role of active members within party organization in favour of passive or even non-members. In contrast, others see it as a chance to revitalize the party as a membership organization by providing a new participatory possibility to members and creating a more direct link to the party leadership, which is hoped to increase accountability, legitimacy and to empower members (Macpherson, 1977; Ware, 1979; Bille, 2001).

The more detailed analysis presented in this thesis aims to resolve some aspects of the current debate in the literature. The central argument put forward here is that to reconcile the two opposing views, we have to theorize and then empirically study the interplay between the rules determining *who can vote (selectorate)* and *who can run (candidacy requirements)*. The study sought to



provide a more detailed and holistic picture of the impact of different types of leadership selection rules for party membership by studying its effect on party size, turnout in the primary, changes in membership quality and attitude towards the leadership. A simultaneous study of these four dimensions does not only provide a more differentiated and nuanced understanding of the effect on members but transcends the simple argument of primaries as either good or bad for members. Further, the study also examines the effects of these reforms on existing and new members separately and, thus, offers an even more sophisticated insight. This point is based on Hirschman's argument (1970) that organizational changes that aim to attract new members might have different or even reverse effects on the existing members of an organization. In short, the thesis aimed to challenge the basic assumption that primaries are either good or bad for members but rather claims that its positive or negative affect for the individual level conception of party membership (Gauja, 2015)—expressed through membership level, turnout in primary, membership quality and attitude towards the party leadership—depends on the combined effect of candidacy and selectorate rules. Thus, the thesis developed a conceptual framework to empirically test different hypotheses that reflect different constellation of primary rules. This is meant to empirically show that there is no uniform effect of IPD in from of primaries on party membership. Thus, for example, as the preceding chapters showed, closed primaries with permissive candidate requirements have a positive impact on the quality of party membership, while open primaries with strict candidate requirements have a negative effect.

The concluding chapter is structured as follows. It, first, synthesizes the empirical findings by comparing and contrasting the results of each individual

case study with each other. It then discusses the normative and practical implications of the findings before outlining their limitations. The chapter ends by suggesting various avenues for future research before bringing the thesis to a close.

## **7.2 Empirical Findings**

This section synthesizes the empirical findings to answer the study's central research question. To do so, it highlights the similarities and differences among the findings of the three cases along the four dimensions of membership level, turnout in the primary, quality of membership and attitude towards leadership. As a reminder, the central research question was to investigate the consequences of the adoption of different type of leadership selection rules for the individual level conception of party membership. For this purpose, the project developed a new conceptual framework outlining the effect on membership in terms of size, turnout, quality and attitude based on four distinct combinations of candidacy requirements and selectorate rules. These combinations produce four different types of intra-party democracy (IPD) from the members' perspective (Table 7.1 on p. 220 below).

Covering disempowering, protected and controlled democratization types of IPD, the detailed empirical analysis of the three case studies of German Greens, French PS and UK Conservative Party mostly confirmed the expected effect put forward by the conceptual framework. As chapter two outlined, the study is limited to parties operating in established Western European democracies and to parties, which voluntarily adopted primaries rather than

them being state imposed. A further practical constraint was the availability of pre- and post-reform membership surveys. Due to these limitations, the top left box of the category of atomized democratization remains empty. The absence of such a case in Europe is also logical, as most reforms were suggested, drafted and adopted by the party elite, and no party elite would voluntarily adopt a selection system that would lead to a total loss of power and control. Further, the cases of the two main US parties that would fit the type of atomized democratization are excluded here, as primaries are state imposed and regulated. They are also excluded as many scholars point out that the concept of party membership in the US is substantially different from the one in the European context (Stone et al., 2004; Heidar, 2006).

In general, the empirical analysis above demonstrated that from a membership's perspective closed primaries are more beneficial than open primary, as they have a positive effect on all dimensions of individual level membership conception. Further, candidacy requirements seem to reinforce either the negative or positive effect of open or closed primaries respectively. However, strict and permissive candidate requirements seem to have the reverse effect, if combined with selectorate rules. Thus, while permissive candidate requirements combined with a closed primary increase the positive effect on party members, combined with an open primary it increases the negative effects. Overall, from a party membership's perspective, protected democratization represents the most desirable combination of a closed primary with permissive candidacy requirements. It does not only include members into the decision-making process by providing them with the right to select but further empowers them by allowing them to run as candidate. Overall, this type has a positive effect on the individual level conception of party membership

manifest in an increase in membership size, high turnout, increased membership quality and positive attitude towards the leadership. Also, the effects for both new and existing members are mainly the same and positive, compared to other combinations of rules where they divert substantially. This is supported by the empirical findings for the German Greens. Thus, similar to democracy at the state level, IPD requires a clearly defined *demos* but relatively unrestricted access for all members of this *demos* to compete in the selection process, if they wish to do so. The second-best scenario for members would be controlled democratization. However, this is more in line with Bolleyer and Weeks' (unpublished manuscript: 22) argument that the expansion of membership rights in form of voting power can rather more strengthen and democratize the organizational structure members are embedded in than empower the individual members themselves. Nevertheless, the "reform re-integrated members into organizational decision-making by giving them a direct say about [...] leadership selections" (Bolleyer and Weeks, unpublished manuscript: 14). Further Bolleyer and Weeks (unpublished manuscript) claim that contrary to the theoretical argument outlined in the literature review, linking the use of primaries to strengthen *cartel-party model* primaries can be part of "a movement away from organisational characteristics that theoretical literature associates with cartel model of party organisation towards characteristic echoing more traditional mass party structures" (Bolleyer and Weeks, unpublished manuscript: 2). Thus, primaries can be an effective way to take power away from the party in public office and to strengthen the party in central office and thereby indirectly or directly the party on the ground.

Table 7.1 Four Types of IPD with Indicators and Expected Effects

Open	<p><b>Atomized Democratization</b>                  Overall effect: --                  Membership level                  Existing: - New: +                  Quality of membership                  Existing: -New: -                  Attitude towards leadership                  Existing: - New: +                  Turnout in primary                  Existing: low New: high</p>	<p><b>Disempowering Democratization</b>                  Overall effect: -                  Membership level                  Existing: - New: +                  Quality of membership                  Existing: - New: -                  Attitude towards leadership                  Existing: - New: +                  Turnout in primary                  Existing: low New: high</p>	
	<p><b>Protected Democratization</b>                  Overall effect: ++                  Membership level                  Existing: o New: +                  Quality of membership                  Existing: + New: +                  Attitude towards leadership                  Existing: + New: +                  Turnout in primary                  Existing: high New: high</p>	<p><b>Controlled Democratization</b>                  Overall effect: +                  Membership level                  Existing: - New: +                  Quality of membership                  Existing: -New: +                  Attitude towards leadership                  Existing: - New: +                  Turnout in primary                  Existing: high New: high</p>	
Closed	Permissive	<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	Strict
Explanation: (-): decrease ;(o): stays the same ;(+): increase			

The only theoretical expectation of the framework not supported here is the development of membership quality for existing members after the adoption of the closed primary by the PS in 1995. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, the primary had a positive effect on the membership quality for existing members. However, the case of the UK Conservative is also an example of controlled democratization supporting the negative expectations for existing party membership quality brought about by the primary. A possible explanation might be the two-round system of first MPs and then members voting employed by the Conservatives, while the PS only used a direct membership vote. Another slight discrepancy from the expected effect is that

the membership growth in the German Greens is lower than expected, but nevertheless the party increased in size. However, the party experienced substantial growth in the years before and since the introduction of the primary. Further, it is the only German mainstream party with membership growth.

The empirical analysis was conducted using a mixed-method case study approach combining quantitative pre- and post-reform party membership surveys complemented by in-depth qualitative interviews of party members, mid-level elites and elites. Such an approach was suitable to examine the implications of my framework, because it allowed to analyse how party membership changed with the introduction of the primary, and how the reform was perceived at the individual membership level. Further, the interviews provided contextual and case specific information to fully understand and assess the impact of the change in leadership selection rules and to separate its effect as much as possible from both other factors that might have similar consequences and alternative explanations for changes in party membership development. Further, the interviews were opportunities to see to the extent to which the survey results are supported by observations and experiences of party members. Thus, the use of a mixed-method case study approach provided an opportunity to collect a large amount of data combining individual level as well as detailed and case specific information. This allowed to examine my framework's suggested implications for party membership brought about by changes in leaderships selection rules.

### *Generalizability of the Findings*

One central question of research is the generalizability of the result of one's study. Could for example, the positive effects of protected democratisation on membership be specific to the case under study? Or could they be specific to green parties, small membership parties or highly educated grassroots parties? In order to explore the generalizability of the newly developed framework, the study expands the small sample used so far to include further cases in each category. It covers parties from different party families and continues with varying party and political systems. The below brief discussion of additional cases should shed light on the question if we find the same associations between type of primary and development in party membership in different settings and parties. If this is the case, then the newly developed framework and findings of this study will be relevant and useful to evaluate the impact of primaries on party members more generally in a variety of situations. We expect the findings of this study to be relevant for other parties in the same categories. The generalizability of the above findings would be further supported if we find similar trends in the analysed additional cases below. The likelihood that other cases support the theoretical expectations of the framework are higher, if they also operate in established democracies, involve mainstream parties (Sartori, 1976) and point to the voluntary adoption of the same leadership selection rules (not state regulated). As the brief discussion of other cases below will show, some of these strict criteria can be relaxed, and the framework still seems to be effective. Even if parties adopted multiple reforms towards more IPD in a short time, the effect of changes to the leadership selection method should have the most profound impact on members in an alleged age of presidentialization and personalization of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). Overall, this seems to support the generalizability of the findings and the possibility to transfer the

newly developed framework to other situations with similar leadership selection rules in place to explore their effect on party membership.

Thus, as mentioned above, this section briefly discusses very preliminary findings for further examples placed in the here developed framework. It does not offer a detailed analysis but rather aims at inspiring future research in the area, demonstrating the transferability of the conceptual framework and emphasizing its general validity<sup>44</sup>. The use of examples in the framework below indicates its wide reach in terms of political systems and countries and thus points to the vast number of potential cases to be explored.

Table 7.2 Four Types of Primaries with Variety of International Cases<sup>45,46</sup>

Open	<b>Atomized Democratization</b> <u>US</u> ; <u>DP 2007</u> (I)	<b>Disempowering Democratization</b> <u>PASOK</u> (G); <u>UCR</u> (A)
<b>Selectorate – Primary Zone</b>	<b>Protected Democratization</b> <u>Conservatives</u> (C); <u>Greens</u> (Ir) Bloc Quebecois (C); PS (P); FA (U); PSD (P); PN (U); New Dem (C)	<b>Controlled Democratization</b> <u>PS</u> (B); <u>Labour</u> (Ir); <u>LibDem</u> (UK); <u>PSOE</u> (S); <u>UMP/LR</u> (F); <u>PAN</u> (M); <u>PS</u> (B);
Closed	Permissive	Strict
	<b>Candidate Requirements</b>	

However, the possibility to analysis many of these cases is currently rather limited, mainly due to a restricted access to or complete lack of data. This could be addressed by the above suggested development of large-scale membership surveys. Consequently, the discussion below is restricted due to information available from secondary sources, and, thus, it was not always possible to

<sup>44</sup> These cases are not selected based on any specific rationale other than their leadership selection rules.

<sup>45</sup> Parties operating in Westminster, presidential, semi-presidential and consensus systems but also from a variety of countries: North America, Latin America and Europe.

<sup>46</sup> A= Argentina, C= Canada, B= Belgium, C= Canada, F= France, G= Greece, Ir = Ireland, I= Italy, M= Mexico, P= Portugal, S= Spain, U= Uruguay, UK= United Kingdom.



discuss all four indicators in each instance. Nevertheless, with the use of proxies, it was possible to provide information for at least three of the four indicators in most examples. The cases discussed here are in bold and underlined in the table 7.2 above.

Both the US Democrats and Italian Democratic Party (DP) are cases of **Atomized Democratization** with open primaries and permissive candidacy requirements.

The first time the DP used an open primary was in 2007 to select its new leader, who later became the prime ministerial candidate in the 2008 general election. The candidate requirements were very low and only required 2,000 signatures of party members. In terms of membership, it amounted to 615,414 in the year of the primary and rose to 831,042 the year after (Sandri, 2014). However, it quickly started to decline again. The turnout was 3,554,169 voters composed of party members and (on the day) registered primary voters. If we assume that all members of the party voted, they would only amount to 17.3 per cent of the turnout. Thus, their voice was crowded out. The quality of the membership seems to be relatively high. A survey conducted in 2010 (Sandri, 2010) showed that 73.9 per cent of members claim to be heavily involved in party activities. But a closer look at the types of activities they engage in reveals that they are largely very low cost activities (28.9 per cent) or representative activities (34.6 per cent). This seems to confirm the idea outlined in the conceptual framework that members are either professionals or rather inactive. Nevertheless, the survey also showed that 61.8 per cent perceive the chance to participate and influence party decision-making as effective. This combined with

a high level of 72.8 per cent satisfaction with IPD seems to point to a positive image of the party leadership. Thus, for the DP a rather mixed picture emerges with a membership in decline and a low turnout of members, a low membership quality but a positive membership attitude.

The US Democrats use primaries to select their presidential candidate, but in contrast to most European countries primaries in the US are state regulated. Further, they developed—especially since the Fraser-McGovern act in 1968—in different states gradually over time rather than being introduced for all parts of the country at once (Cohen et al., 2008). In the US, it is more common to speak about party-identification rather than party membership. A Gallup poll by the Pew Research Centre shows that the Democrat party self-identification dropped from above 40 per cent in the late 1960's to just above 30 per cent by 2010 (The Economist, 2010). A recent study by the American University's School of Public Affairs (Gans, 2010) shows that voter turnout in primaries dropped since the first primary after the Fraser-McGovern Commission Act. While in 1970, average turnout for the Democratic primaries was 19.3 per cent, it dropped to 8.3 per cent in 2010. Further, party membership quality also seems to have declined, as Americans participate less and less in election campaign activities, such as attending meetings, wear a button or donate money, since 1968 (Norris, 2002: 117). Norris (2002) also points out that the decline of activists within parties since the sixties reflects the erosion of grassroots party organizations. Further, looking at the overall external efficacy index soccer of the American Election Study, it can be seen that it mainly decreased since the Fraser-McGovern Act in 1968. While in 1968, the score was 57, in 2012 it was only 36 out of 100 (American National Election Studies, 2015). The case of the US Democrats seems to generally support the

theoretical suggestions of the conceptual framework for **atomized democratization**.

The case of the 2007 Greek PASOK is an example of **disempowering democratization**, which combines an open primary but highly restrictive candidacy requirements. In the year of the primary, party membership rose to 347,991, but in the years after it already drop again to 210,000 (Van Biezen et al., 2012) and further to 156,000 in 2009 (Sotiropoulos, 2013). The turnout with 78.4 per cent or 769,156 votes was high (Rori, 2010), and the total electorate was composed of 347,991 members and 626,675 people in the status of the “friend of the party”, resulting in a total electorate of 974,666 (PASOK, 2007). If all members voted, they would have amounted to 35.7 per cent of the electorate and 45.2 per cent of the turnout. It can be seen that the voice of the members is substantially reduced by the large inflow of ‘friends of the party’. Unfortunately, the project was unable to find a membership survey for the PASOK case to assess the effect on membership quality and attitude. However, for the latter, there were various proxies that can be used. Sotiropoulos (2013) describes the PASOK leadership style as very hierarchical and closed, and the decisions to adopted a primary was taken ad-hoc and by a small circle of trusted advisors. He argued that this led to a small circle of party cadres competing for influence and party members becoming disheartened (Sotiropoulos 2013). Further polls before the primary revealed that PASOK members preferred Venizelos (62.1 per cent) over Papandreou (25.7 per cent), but the latter won due to large external support (Mega News, 2007). Following the above, it can reasonably be assumed that the attitude of membership towards the leadership was very

negative. Based on these first impressions, the case of the PASOK seems to fit the expectations for **disempowering democratization**.

The Irish Greens and Canadian Conservatives are both cases of **protected democratization** using a closed primary with permissive candidacy requirements.

The Green Party has allowed its membership to vote the party leader since 2001. In 1990, the membership level was 1,200. It dropped to 700 in 1998 but since then recovered and reached 2,000 in 2008 (Mair and van Biezen, 2001, Van Biezen et al., 2012). Thus, it seems that the introduction of inclusive leadership selections had a positive impact. This is further supported by a membership survey from 2002, in which 49 per cent claimed to have joined the party in the current or past year (Rüdiger, forthcoming). The same survey revealed that 90 per cent claimed to be strong party supporters and only 18 per cent stated to not have attended a party meeting in the past 12 months (Rüdiger, forthcoming). In comparison to other European Green parties, this is a very high rate of participation and party support (Rüdiger, forthcoming). Membership loyalty is average with 30 per cent of the respondents maintaining to be a party member for 5 years or more. Beside the high quality of party membership, the attitude towards the party leadership seems also positive as 82 per cent stated to be in favour of a single party leader (Rüdiger, forthcoming); a position that did not exist in the Irish Green Party until 2001. Due to the small number of party members at the time, it can be assumed that most attended the vote and thus voter turnout was high.

The Canadian Conservative party moved to a full membership selection in 1995 and used it for the first time in 1998. Its membership figures are hard to determine, as they fluctuate extremely between years with and without leadership nomination contests (Cross and Young, 2004). Cross and Young note that membership levels routinely increase by 200 to 300 per cent in years with leadership selection but otherwise are very low (Cross, 2004b: p. 15). In the 2000 party membership survey, 45 per cent (Young and Cross, 2002) stated that to support the leadership candidate was a very important motivation to join. The turnout in 1998 was high in both rounds with 52 per cent of all party members voting in the selection (Cross, 2004a: 88). This is high given the substantive costs to gain voting rights, as voters have to join the party and pay a voting fee. In terms of membership quality, the survey showed that the Conservatives have a higher level of engagement in more intensive activities in comparison to other Canadian parties: 49 per cent served on riding association executives and 88 per cent attended them, 74 per cent helped with electoral campaigns and 84 per cent attended nomination meetings. The only party with a slightly better performance in some of these indicators is the Liberal Party, which used membership votes since 1990. However, when looking at other types of intra-party activities members' engagement seems largely low, both in time and/ or financial investment. Nevertheless, overall the quality of party membership seems to be high. Unfortunately, direct measures for attitude and external efficacy are not accessible, but as a proxy the ideological self-placement of the members and the party is apposite possibly indicating a positive attitude towards the party leadership. Based on this first discussion the two cases seem to fit the expectations for protected democratization.

The cases of both the Irish Labour Party and Belgium PS are examples of **controlled democratization** using a closed primary and candidacy is highly restricted.

In the Irish case, the party opened its leadership selection process to its members in 1989 while keeping strict candidate requirements. Overall, it had five leadership selections since then, but only three included a membership ballot as the others only had one candidate (Rafter, 2016). In the years after the reform, party membership increased from 6,720 to 10,000 by 1992 but quickly started to decline over the decade (Webb et al., 2002). Turnout is high with approximately 60 per cent or 3,474 (Fitzgerald et al., 2004)<sup>47</sup> member in 2002 and 48.5 per cent in 2014 (2,720 members out of 5,606) (Weeks, 2014) voting in the primary. Unfortunately, there are no membership surveys to look at the development in membership quality or attitude.

The Belgium PS has been using internal leadership selection since 1999. The 1999 leadership selection did not lead to a membership increase but continued decline from 107,581 to 103,713 (Van Haute, 2014). The same picture emerges for the 2003 and 2007 leadership selection. Wauters et al. (2015) argues that this might be related to the fact that the Belgium parties seem not to initiate large recruitment drives before leadership selections. Further, they point out (Wauters et al., 2015) that many party activists were reluctant to adopted primaries or were even against it, which might have led them to exit the party. In terms of turnout, in the first selection in 1999 it reached 38.7 per cent but since then declined to 35.0 per cent in 2003 and 24.9 per cent in 2007. This is relatively low but as Wauters et al. (2015) point out, turnout in Belgium leadership selections is generally low reaching from 14.5 per cent to

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<sup>47</sup> Based on closed membership figures available from 2000 with 5,719 members.

67.6 per cent. So the PS is somewhere in the middle. The party membership survey from 2010 reveals that party membership activity is relatively high with 35.4 per cent of all members participating in low cost activities, 23.4 per cent in campaign activities, 17.4 per cent in high cost activities and finally 23.8 per cent in representative activities (Sandri, 2011). The survey also shows that political external efficacy is very low among members with 70.5 per cent stating they have low or weak perceived efficacy. This combined with the observation by Wauters et al.' (2015) that many activists were sceptical if not against the adoption of the primary would suggest a rather negative attitude of party members towards the leadership. Thus, the case of the Belgium PS supports the framework in terms of existing membership decline, high turnout (for Belgium standards) and more negative attitude. But nevertheless, intra-party activism is relatively high and this is contrary to the framework's suggestion.

The above section explored the generalisability of the newly developed framework and findings of this study. It did so by presenting a first very preliminary application of the conceptual framework to seven other cases. The cases covered a variety of party families and countries. The above discussion further supports the association between leadership selection method and changes in party membership along the four indicators of membership size, turnout, activity and attitude. This provides a first indication of the framework's generalisability and transferability to study the impact of different types of primaries in a large variety of settings. More importantly, it served as an illustration that the classification scheme works, captures something relevant and is useful to capture the impact of different types of primaries on party membership. The next step is to return to the normative perspective underlying

this thesis presented in the introduction and outlines the practical implications of the study's overall empirical findings.

### **7.3 Normative and Practical Implications**

Starting with the normative implications, they are complex as they not only affect democracy within parties but also democracy at the state level. As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, this study aims to help answer the question of whether a particular intra-party selection method can serve democracy more broadly (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 166). In order to answer this question, the thesis returns to the following three guiding questions posed by Hazan and Rahat (2010: 166):<sup>48</sup>

- “1. Does the [leadership] selection method enable the expression of democratic norms (participation and competition), and does it produce democratic outputs (representation and responsiveness)?
2. Does the [leadership] selection method serve the liberal norm of power diffusion?
3. Does the [leadership] selection method enhance the general health of the party as a crucial organization for the functioning of democracy?”

Before answering question 1 regarding leadership selection and how this study contributed to answer it, we need to define core terms. For democracy at state level, this is rather straightforward. Democracies should operate a system that allows all voters to participate in choosing between candidates that claim to better represent them. Thus, candidates compete for the support of voters, and after being elected are expected to remain responsive to the demands and needs, i.e. the electorate. For IPD and the relation to state-wide democracy,

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<sup>48</sup> These questions were originally used to study the link between candidate selection and democracy. However, executive top candidate selection is a specific type of candidate selection, and, thus, the very same questions are relevant and can be used.



definitions are more difficult. One important aspect in this regard is Hazan and Rahat (2010) observation that the maximization of some of these norms and outputs in the intra-party arena can have negative effect on their maximization in state-wide democracy. Further 'voters' cannot be easily replaced with 'party members', as the parties can use both open and closed primaries. Nevertheless, the aim of IPD should be to maximize these norms and outcomes to the degree that they benefit party members the most. Thus, in terms of the norm of participation, the voting right in primaries should be restricted to party members. In terms of competition, it should use permissive candidacy requirements to allow for a meaningful challenge of the leadership and fair legitimacy contest. Thus, the party leader should be representative of the party members' interest and values and be responsive once elected. If this is given, it should have a positive impact for party membership, as it increases its value and power. Therefore, new members might join, participation in the primary is more meaningful and is more likely to encourage participation in other intra-party activities, thus the quality of membership increases, and last but not the least, this should also improve the perceived responsiveness of the leader to the member better representing the views and values of members. The empirical analysis of the three case studies has clearly supported the idea that to generally maximize these outputs and norms within political parties, the combination of primary rules clearly matters. The careful design of selectorate and candidacy rules can achieve higher levels of competition, of participation of party members in primaries and of general intra-party activities and can lead to an improved perceived responsiveness of the party leader. It also shows the attempt to maximize inclusion in the primary by transcending the party membership as the selectorate. But a mere focus on increased participation in

primaries can have negative effects on the other democratic norms and outcomes in the intra-party arena.

Similar to the above, before answering question 2, the term “*liberal norm of power diffusion*” needs to be defined. Democracy is not a system designed to produce certain norms and outcomes but rather a system to prevent the concentration of power and contain it. Thus from an IPD perspective, parties should adopt a structure, including leadership selections, that promotes power diffusion between the different actors in the party. The empirical analysis showed that the rules of the leaderships selection clearly matter in this regard, as they can act as a check and balance to the power of the party leadership. After all, the latter has to face membership votes and/ or the possibility that members challenge it by running in the selection process. It also shows that if the selectorate becomes too large, the perceived responsiveness of party leaders to party members declines, and, thus, members feel they lose the possibility to influence the leadership and hold it accountable. Thus, a careful combination of selectorate and candidacy rules can increase power diffusion and help to contain it within parties. In short, the careful combination of primary rules can enable the manifestation of democratic norms, produce democratic outputs and serve the liberal norm of power diffusion. Thus, primaries can be useful tools to contribute to the increase and generation of meaningful IPD. This thesis supports the suggestions made by some scholar that primaries can be an effective tool in addressing the current crisis of party decline, especially the crisis of the party on the ground.

The last and probably most important aspect here is the third question, as it links the organizational level of democracy, IPD, to state-wide democracy.

As outline above, if parties are vital institutions of democracy, and their wellbeing is vital for the health of democracy (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 168), then parties have to be careful of how leadership selection method affect one of the vital cornerstones of party organizations, membership; otherwise they might face unintended consequences for both the party as organization and democracy in general. Here, it is useful to return to the three key arguments about IPD identified in the literature: impossibility, danger and desirability of IPD.

The underlying argument for the impossibility of IPD is the iron law of oligarchy (Michels, 1911). It is certainly true that some combinations of primary rules are more likely to further centralize power in the hand of the elite, but as shown here and by others (Hazan and Rahat, 2010), the careful design of intra-party selection methods can be an effective way to diffuse power and to introduce new checks and balances to limit, if not avoid, the development of undemocratic pathologies. If this can be avoided within parties, it can contribute to avoid such developments at state-level. As putting more power into the hand of the membership and as a consequence of voters, it can be an effective way to do so. However, the warnings by Dahl (1970), Schattschneider (1942) and Sartori (1976) about the dangers of IPD for democracy are valid, if we expect IPD and state-wide democracy to adhere to the same democratic norms and produce the same democratic outputs. Rather than, for example, trying to also maximize inclusiveness, a key norm of state-wide democracy, IPD can help foster a culture of democratic participation, responsiveness and democratic linkage. Here, the effective use of primaries can support these efforts. Thus, IPD needs to be regulated differently to not just replicate democratic norms and output of the state-level but rather compensate for the shortcomings of certain

elements at the state-level. This finally leads to the desirability of IPD for party members and democracy at state-level. If correctly designed, IPD can contribute to many democratic norms and produce outputs required to ensure the functioning of democracy at state-level. Young (2013: 74) highlights that “declining party membership has roughly coincided with a decline in voter turnout, rising cynicism and distrust in politicians, and hollowed-out forms of participation”. Thus, as shown here, if primaries can lead to an increase in party membership, this could also translate in a positive development in these other areas. Increased IPD could contribute to a reversal of parties from “leader-dominated, electorally focused state-supported entities” back to “membership-based, participatory organizations” (Young 2013: 74). In addition to revitalising political and intra-party participation, increased IPD can also increase societal linkage. Increased societal linkage in turn would legitimize the parties’ selection of a leader and thus would require more responsiveness by the party between elections. In short, the thesis agrees with Young (2013) that intra-party decision-making, such as primaries, play a key role in creating this linkage not only between members and the party but between citizens and the state. Last but not the least, IPD can increase deliberation among members and voters, and lead to more informed choice both in primaries and general elections .

Overall then, it shows that the careful design of IPD in general and specifically in terms of leadership selection rules can make a positive contribution to the general health of democracy. Thus state-wide democracy and IPD together can maximize democratic norms and outputs, as long as they are not seen as having the same functions but rather aim to supplement each other. The next section highlights avenues for future research.

The practical implication of the new conceptual framework developed in this thesis is that its findings can be used by parties and members to assess the impact of proposed leadership selection reforms. Consequently, it can help both members and party leadership to assess, whether the proposed reform can actually achieve what the party wants to achieve with it. For example, a party might adopt a primary for party organizational renewal or as an electoral tool. Depending on the aim, a different combination of primary rules might be required. In the case of party renewal, the party might decide to opt for rules that are more likely to produce membership revitalisation and empowerment, while, if primaries are used as an electoral tool, the party might prefer to choose rules linking it directly to the voters rather than only its members.

Having discussed the implications of the new framework in both normative and practical terms, the next section briefly reflects more widely on the new typology of IPD developed here. More specifically what does it tell us about the link between leadership selection reform, party membership, party types and finally party change?

The reforms in leadership selection method are part of a wider change in the relationship between members and parties. Over the past decade, many parties responded to dropping membership figure by granting new rights to its members or even supporters often through the use of intra-party ballots. Scarrow (2015) outlines that such internal ballots have two main aims first “making parties more popular by burnishing their democratic (or sometimes populist) credentials, and giving supporters more incentives to get active within their preferred party.” However as we have seen above, parties decided to

adopt different rules to organise the leadership selection that do not only have different consequences for members but also reflects the type of party it is or aims to be. Here Scarrow (2015; 206) observes that the “pattern of organizational evolution ...has come almost full circle, with a more individualistic model of party activity replacing the group-based and subscriber-democracy templates first popularized by parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” At the same time Bolleyer and Weeks (unpublished manuscript: 2) argue that primaries can be part of “a movement away from organisational characteristics that theoretical literature associates with cartel model of party organisation towards characteristic echoing more traditional mass party structures.” Thus the effect of organisational reform through leadership selection method seems to be able to go both ways and this needs to be reflected in any typology exploring the effects of such reforms on party membership.

In addition, parties also went beyond formal membership and opened up to supports. Most of these reforms have not replaced traditional party membership but rather these new forms of affiliations, at least for the moment, existing on top of the traditional membership or traditional members even have to pay just like supporters or primary voters to enjoy certain rights, such as voting in the primary. Parties adopting this new types of affiliation seem to be more interested in electoral outcomes than in maintaining traditional structures (Scarrow 2014: 206) as parties aim to reach “supporters who may not be seeking long-term organizational commitments, but who are nevertheless interested in connecting with a party, and possibly in shaping its future” (Scarrow 2014: 206). How much this reform matters from a party organisational perspective depends on how much parties value and /or need their members as

a source for party policies, personnel and legitimacy. Parties adopting primaries limiting voting rights to its members only, seem to value their membership much more compared to parties with open primaries who might see members more as fans to support and spread leadership message but with no or little further link in terms of accountability or policy influence between these fans and the leadership. Following Scarrow's (2014) observation, it follows that by adopting open primaries parties move from cleavage parties and subscriber democracy parties towards the "ethos of political market parties, touting practices which keep them attentive to the wide swathes of voters who are their potential customers"(Scarrow 2014: 206). In short, subscriber-democracy parties' leaders are accountable to a small group of members rather than to the wider party electorate but in political market parties their primary loyalty is to the voters at large, rather than to their members or to a specific ideology or group. Hence parties who see themselves as the former and would like to remain subscriber-democracy parties would be better off to adopt close primaries with high membership influence. However, this might reduce the autonomy and room to manoeuvre of the party leadership. In contrast, political market parties would opt for open primaries with very restrictive candidacy rules.

Returning to the here developed typology subscriber-democracy parties' would adopt leadership selection reforms that make their members feel empowered or protect while more political market parties who care less about its members and in general prefers supporters to members would be more ready to adopt leadership selection reforms that create a feeling of disempowerment or atomization among its members. This is in line with the argument put forward by the advocates of the cartel party hypothesis that open primaries might actually empowers party leaders at the cost of mid-level elites

and activists within parties. Thus, for example Katz and Mair (2009: 759) argue that “the apparent democratization of the party through the introduction of such devices as postal ballots or mass membership meetings at which large numbers of marginally committed members or supporters...can be expected to drown out the activists”. However if reforms go too far, they might disempower both party leaders and activists and empower a fluid and unpredictable selectorate. Thus democratisation can be harmful for the party membership as outlined above but also the parties’ ability to act and undermine party values (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Blais 2012). Overall then the choice of leadership selection method is not only an instrument in the tool box for parties to potentially re-engage membership in nature and numbers but its use also has consequences for both party type and party change. Thus the choice of leadership selection method can be instrumental in reinforcing the cleavage parties or subscriber democracy party type with mainly traditional conception of party membership or be part of a wider organisational reform to push towards political market party types with a conception of party affiliation more as supports or fans. The here newly developed typology reflects this overall trend in party organisational types and the underlying dynamics of either change or safeguarding the organisational structure and the role of membership within the party organisation, by classifying democratisation as either empowered or protected and disempowerment or atomisation from the memberships point of view.

#### **7.4 Limitations of the Study**


The study has offered an evaluative perspective on the impact of the interaction of different leadership selection rules on party membership with a specific focus



on the individual level conception of party membership. As a direct consequence of the methodology required to do so, the study encountered a number of limitations, which need to be considered. One of the main limitations of the study was data collection. However, this was less relevant for membership figures thanks to national databases and the MAPP projects and turnout, which are widely reported in the media or secondary literature (Sandri et al., 2015). However, the collection and access to party membership survey data is rather complex and unsatisfying at times. During the data collection, the project faced limited availability of parties' membership surveys, both pre- and post reform. Further, in some cases where data did exist, it was not always made available or only available in part. For example, in the case of the 2011 PS party membership survey, the project was only supplied with result per item but not the actual data set. This also limited the possible scope of statistical analysis. The project therefore only used descriptive statistics. Another limitation the project faced was the limited comparability between the surveys, mainly across cases but occasionally also within cases. In order to overcome this problem, the project relied on proxies and items testing for the same concept but using different questions (see chapter three for details). In addition to reanalysing secondary survey data, the project also conducted its own membership survey. Here the limitation was the political danger of bias and non-response. The project aimed to avoid bias by sending the link to all members who provided an e-mail address, when they joined the party (about 67 per cent of all members; 41,000 out of 60,000 members). They all had an equal chance to participate, and thus using an online survey established a close to random sample. The second aspect is non-response. The survey sample was highly representative of the overall party membership with 38.6 per cent female

and 61.4 per cent of men in both the survey sample and overall membership in 2015 (Niedermayer, 2015). Also, the average age was nearly the same with 50 of the total membership (Niedermayer, 2015) and 53 in the survey. When looking at the overall age distribution, we can see that for all age groups, apart for the 26-30 category, the frequencies of the survey and total membership are very similar.

Table 7.3 Green Party Survey and Overall Membership 2015 by Age Groups



Further in order to maximize the response rate, the project sent out multiple reminders. The main cause of non-response here is probably refusal rather than no-contact or not able to answer. Overall, however, it is unfortunately rather difficult to deal with non-response. One general disadvantage with all individual level data collected through survey is the reliance on self-reported information, which are not objective and might lead to an overstatement of the level of activity or underreporting of party internal undesirable answers. However, the careful survey design and the large sample size will cancel out some of these effects (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The last limitation is the fact that it is hard to isolate effects, as changes are not solely

due to one organizational reform, and other factors also contributed to them. However, the reforms in leadership selection methods affected all aspects and facets of the party organization substantially, are therefore likely to play a large role and have a big impact on the development of membership. Further, some surveys include questions specifically asking for the effect of the reform in the leadership selection method on party membership.

To overcome some of these limitations the study opted to complement the survey results with in-depth qualitative party membership interviews. These provided detailed contextual information and triangulation of the survey findings. It allowed to ask members about the impact of the primary, and whether they felt the survey result reflected reality or not. Thus the mixed-method methodology chosen here, despite its limitations, still effectively permitted to investigate the development of party membership brought about by the use of primaries. Further, the avenues for research outlined below can be used to reduce these limitations in future. Here a large-scale cross-country membership survey and full access to all existing survey data would be particularly helpful in addressing still existing gaps.

Beside limitation of the data that limited somehow the broad and wide evaluation of the framework, the framework itself has some limitations. First, it has been developed to capture the effect of one very specific intra-party event, mainly party leadership selections. Therefore, it might be of more limited use to study the effect of similar intra-party events such as large scale candidate selection or votes on policy questions. However, both events are part of broader move towards IPD and its success can be captured along the same indicators and thus it would be possible to maintain the basic structure of the framework

developed here and adjust it to be applicable to other intra-party votes. The second limitation of the framework is that it does not capture the effect of changes in overall level of IPD on membership but only the effect of changes in leadership selection method, one aspect that can affect IPD on members. The thesis partly assumes that in order to have high levels of IDP one needs to have a certain kind of leadership selection rules. However, it is fully possible to achieve a high level of IPD and high quality party membership through other reform. Thirdly, the framework does not incorporate the design of selection method used in the primary. Thus, it could be that certain selection method amplify, reduce or even reverse positive and negative effect of the primary. Thus for example in a two round model, it could be that the candidates with the plurality in the first round lose in the second round leading to a large group of members unhappy with the primary. The last limitation of the framework is that it does not consider external factors that might have affected membership in the outline way. So for six types of party example, it could be that a recent electoral victory encourages new members to join and all members to become more active rather than the primary. Nevertheless the here newly developed framework remains a useful tool to study the link between change in leadership selection method and development in party membership.

## **7.5 Avenues for Future Research**

Based on the above discussion of the findings and their broader implications, various further avenues for future research can be identified. The most straightforward is to apply the above developed framework to additional cases further test its validity. The table above already placed a diverse group of

parties that all use primaries into the conceptual framework and briefly discussed very preliminary findings. In this regard, it would be ideal to develop large-scale and cross-country membership surveys with specific items asking about the experience with IPD and more precisely the leadership selection method. This would not only provide new insight into party membership and its development but reduce many of the limitations this study faced in terms of data collection and comparability. Another avenue of future research is to study primaries and their consequences at other levels, such as the EU-level with, for example, the recent use of primaries by the European Greens and Socialist or at the regional and local level, such as the mayoral primaries in France. In addition to studying the impact on party membership, future research should shed more light on the effect of primaries on other intra-party and electoral dynamics. In terms of electoral dynamics, it would be interesting to explore, for example, the effect of primaries on electoral campaigning, parliamentary cohesion and the profile of party leaders (beyond gender). While in terms of intra-party dynamics the consequences for internal power distribution, factionalism and party communication would be insightful themes to investigate. These suggestions for future research would not only allow a further testing of the conceptual framework developed in this thesis but increase our knowledge about IPD and primaries in general, but, more specially, our understanding of its effects on various aspects of politics and the party organization.

## **7.6 Conclusion**

The thesis started with affirming the well documented trend of party membership decline, and how many parties responded to it by adopting new

participatory possibilities, often in form of direct votes on policies and personnel questions. One of the most prominent aspects of this is the use of open or closed primaries to select the party executive leader, studied here. Parties claim that all these reforms increase IPD and should have a positive impact on party membership. However, the impact of increase IPD—especially in form of primaries—for parties in general and specifically for party membership is highly contested in the current literature. This thesis' aim was to shed light on one particular aspect of this debate by addressing the question of how different types of primaries, in terms of underlying rules, affect the individual level conception of party membership. In doing so, this thesis' main contribution to the field is to provide a more complete picture of the effect of increased IPD; to do so it strengthened the membership perspective in the literature and moved beyond the analysis of its impact on party organization or electoral competitiveness. Overall, the contributions of this thesis are threefold. First, conceptually, it combines the selectorate-candidacy regulations of primaries in a single and unified conceptual framework to study their joined impact on the individual level conception of party membership, in terms of changes in membership behaviour and attitude. Second, empirically, it collected new data and brought together existing data to demonstrate, in the form of three detailed cases studies, the validity of the conceptual framework to study the impact of different leadership selection rules on party members. The findings support the argument that the impact of primaries on party members is far from black and white, as frequently suggested in the existing literature. Rather different rules bring about distinct merits and perils for members. While the conceptual framework seems to capture something relevant, it needs to be further tested by applying it to more cases in different settings. Most importantly, it provides a

first step in increasing our knowledge in this area and offers a transferable tool for future research. Third, it challenges the normative assumption that the interests of party membership and elites are often at odds and instead argues that careful regulatory design can lead to positive outcomes for both. It can empower membership and, at the same time, increase the legitimacy of the party leader, bring new vital financial resources into the party and mobilize party members. Thus, the precise regulation of more inclusive leadership selections can reduce the perils of primaries to a large extent and maximize its merits for both party members and leadership.

## Appendices

### I Overview of Interviews

Elite, Mid-Level/ Activist, Ordinary Member

Party and No. of Interview	Type of Interviewee	Party Member Since	Length (in Min)
<i>UK Conservative Party</i>			
1	Elite	1991	27:03
2	Activist/ Former Young Conservative Officer	1995	49:20
3	Mid-Level	1999	Joint Interview: 42:54
4	Ordinary Member	Mid-1980's	
5	Mid-Level	1991	58:46
6	Elite	1970	47:20
<i>German Green Party</i>			
1	Elite	2004	49:33
2	Ordinary Member	2005	25:21
3	Ordinary Member	2006	29:59
4	Mid-Level	2003	35:42
5	Mid-Level	2000	34:38
6	Ordinary Member	1992	29:28
7	Activist/ former Mid-Level	2004	33:30
8	Mid-Level	2002	32:05
<i>French PS</i>			
1	Ordinary Member	2007	Joint Interview: 31:05
2	Ordinary Member	2007	
3	Mid-Level	2006	44:27
4	Mid-Level	1988	43:49
5	Ordinary Member	2004	42:16
6	Activist	1978	45:38
7	Elite	2008	51:37
8	Mid-Level	2002	45:09
9	Mid-Level	2002 and 2006	41:17
10	Elite	1992	56:19

Full interview transcripts are available on request in an anonymized format from the author.



**II General Fact Sheet**

**Fact Sheet for Interviewees (to be completed)**

Your gender: M\_\_\_\_ F \_\_\_\_

Your age: \_\_\_\_\_ (year of birth)

Party Member since: \_\_\_\_\_

Party office (internal or public mandate): Yes \_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

If **Yes** please specify (job title and level):

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Party office in the **past** (internal or public mandate): Yes \_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

If **Yes** please specify (job title and level):

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Did you vote in the past leadership selection?

UK Conservatives

German Greens

French PS:

2001:

2012:

1995:

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

2005:

2006:

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

2011

Yes\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_

### III General Interview Guide

#### Interview:

*Before Recording starts:*

Short briefing about aims and purpose of project and how interview contributes to it.

*Outline:* The aim of the project is to study the consequences of party organizational reforms for party members. It will focus on how different leadership selection methods (closed and open primaries) affect party members in terms of participation, attitude and relations to the party leadership.

*Interview's contribution:* The interview provides me with an opportunity to collect more detailed information and a better understanding of party members and how different types of leadership selections affect them on an individual level. Further it allows to triangulate my findings in the survey.

*Asked permission to record:*

"What I did during pervious interviews it to take notes and record the interview. Would it be fine with you if I did the same in this interview? Of course you have the right to stop the recording at any time during the interview, and I can provide you with a transcript of the interview afterwards".

Fill in: Fact Sheet (see appendix A)

Sign: Consent Form (see appendix B)

#### **Recording starts:**

Semi-structured interview by themes (**in bolt**) with *sub-question* for each theme (note: the order of themes can be changed and not all sub-questions have to be asked; they are more of a guide).

##### **1. Personal questions:**

- I can see from the fact sheet that you have been a member for a long/ short time. What was your initial motivation to join?
- Has your motivation change since then? Do you see a general change in why people join the party?
- Would you say this is the typical reason to join?
- Tell me about your general experience as party member? (level of satisfaction)
- If office holder: I can see you have/ had a party office, tell me more about it? Why did you decide to take up a party office or public mandate?

##### **2. Intra-party democracy with our party**

- *What is intra party democracy for you? In your party (rules in your party)?*
- In general, how would you describe the distribution of power within the party?
- Would you describe the party as overall democratic?
- Do you think that (you as) ordinary member(s) have influence/ is heard in the party?
- Could you provide an example of the typical way decisions are taken within the party and in your local branch? How do the two differ?

- Do you think that one group disproportionately dominates decision-making within the party
- Do you see the promotion of IPD as something positive, and what do you think are its limits?
- How could the party improve intra-party democracy or reduce it?

### **3. Continuous influence of leadership selection method (especially PS and Conservatives)**

- How did the change in leadership selection method affect the party (positive/ negative)? In what way (participation/ attitudes etc.)?
- Does it still affect the party? Is it highly debated among members? (since 2005, so 10 years later-Labour Party effect). And in 2009 during the survey (year before the election)
- Do the method and the debate surrounding it still affect the party today?
- Is there a link between today's members in the survey and the reform?
- LINK Reform, survey and findings (interview)

### **4. Context of adoption of leadership selection method**

- Where you part of the reform process?
- What do you know about it or the context it was adopted in?

### **5. Leadership selection with your Party (one aspect of IPD)**

- Did you take part in the last primary? Your party so far held XX primaries in how many did you vote?
- What do you think about the new/ different (close to open) way to select the leader?
- How would you like to change it in future (open to supporters, back to delegate meeting etc.)?
- What do know about the candidate requirements (too open or strict)?
- What do you think about the candidate requirements (too open or strict)?
- Recent changes to rules? What you think?
- In what way do you think the reform had an impact on the party as a whole and its members?
- And on you personally? (based on this response move to one of the next themes: 5, 6 or 7)

### **6. Participation in party activities**

- In general, how active would you consider yourself in the party? (for example in hours per month)
- Did your level of activity change over time and so why? Are there any specific changes or events (elections or reforms) that triggered these changes?
- If you think about your activities in the party, what type of activities you usefully undertake (leaflets, donate money, etc.)? Is this the usual mode of participation in the party?
- Did you ever consider running for a public or intra-party office? Why or why not?
- What are your personal motivations to be (not) active in the party? To what extend do you think this is a general motivation among members?
- Have you seen a change in patterns and intensity of participation since the direct leadership selection method was introduced?
- Are there ways how the party could improve the level of participation within the party? (Or why there is no need to do so)

**7. Attitude towards party leadership**

- How would you describe the general mood in the party and the relationship between the ordinary members and the national leadership?
- How about the relationship between activist/ middle-level elites of the party?
- Would you say the relationship between the different groups in the party has improved since the direct leadership selection or did new tensions develop?
- Have you seen a change in the attitude since the direct leadership selection method was introduced?
- How would you say the party could improve/ strengthen the relationship between members and elites?

**8. Your influence and role within the party (political efficacy)**

- How much influence do you feel you have in the party over
  - (a) policy,
  - (b) candidates,
  - (c) leadership selections? (3 questions)
  
- Do you feel there are many possibilities for party members to influence the party and its leadership? If so, which ones do you use?
- Do you think the leadership listens to the views and needs of ordinary members or more to the voters?
- Should the party strengthen the influence of member? How or why not, reduce it?
- Do you think active and passive members should have the same rights and power, for example, in voting for the party leader?
- What do you think about the recent development of providing party supporters (not full and formal members) with voting rights? Or should they have voting rights?
- Is there any other specify group within the party that should have more say/ influence?

**9. The result of the survey**

- Did you complete the party membership survey in (year(s))?
  - o If yes, how was your experience with it?
  - o If no, why didn't you complete it?
- To what extent do you think certain results (a, b, c) are representative of the party as a whole?
- Why do you think the party members have changed or not in the way the results for (a, b, c) suggest?
- What question do you think we should have asked or asked differently?

**End of interview:** *Any comments you would like to add?*

*Recording ends:*

**-Snowballing and debriefing (from interview back to present)**

## IV Interview Consent Form

### PROJECT INFIRMATION/ CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS

#### Title of Research Project

*The Merits and Perils of Intra-Party Democracy: Assessing the Effects of Party Reform in Western European Parties.*

#### Details of Project

The aim of the project is to study the consequences of party organizational reforms and their impact on parties as organisations. The project will focus on consequences of the use of more inclusive leadership selection methods (closed and open primaries) for party members, as well as their relationship to party leadership, and party leadership. The project is based on the central research question of how organizational reform alters the behaviour, relations, role and nature of individuals and sub-groups within political parties. And if so, what are these changes and their impact on the party as an organization?

The collected data for this research project therefore intends to explore the impact and changes intra-party reforms have on party members and party leadership by capturing their experience with the reforms of leadership selection methods and how they changed their behaviour. This PhD Project is funded by The University of Exeter Politics Department. The data will be used for the doctoral thesis, academic papers and other material related to the overall research project. There is also a small chance the PhD in its entirety could be published as an academic monograph.

#### Contact Details

For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact:  
Felix-Christopher von Nostitz, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK.  
E-mail: [fv206@ex.ac.uk](mailto:fv206@ex.ac.uk)

If you have concerns/ questions about the research you would like to discuss with someone else at the University, please contact:

Professor Nicole Bolleyer, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK  
Email: [N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk](mailto:N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk)

#### Confidentiality

Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of *your* interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below). Your data will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act until the project is submitted to the examination committee in 2016, and then it will be held for an indefinite period of time on an anonymous basis.

#### Anonymity

If not agreed otherwise, all data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, but we will refer to the group of which you are a member. For example, the party you belong to.

Please tick the anonymity option you prefer

- Complete anonymity
- Use of initials
- Use of full name

**Consent**

I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewers.

**TICK HERE:**

**DATE** .....

**Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data**

Name of interviewee: .....

Signature: .....

Email/ phone: .....

Signature of researcher: .....

2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each

**V Green Survey Questionnaire**

**Befragung der Mitglieder von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  
2015**

**Durchgeführt als Teil der Doktorarbeit von  
Felix-Christopher von Nostitz,  
University of Exeter**

In Fall von Rückfragen und Anmerkungen zu der Studie wenden Sie Sich bitte an:

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## **Projektinformation**

### **Titel des Forschungsprojektes**

*Die Vorzüge und Gefahren der innerparteilichen Demokratie: Diagnose der Auswirkungen von organisatorischen Reformen innerhalb westeuropäischer Parteien.*

### Details zum Projekt

Das Ziel des Projektes ist es, die Folgen von Reformen auf die Parteien als Organisationen zu durchleuchten. Das Projekt konzentriert sich hauptsächlich auf die Auswirkungen für Parteimitglieder, deren Beziehung zur Parteiführung und der Parteiführung selbst nach der Verwendung von mehr inklusiven Auswahlmethoden für die Bestimmung der Parteiführung (geschlossene und offene Urwahlen). Die zentrale Forschungsfrage des Projektes ist es, inwiefern Organisationsreformen Verhalten, Beziehungen, Rolle und Natur des einzelnen Mitglieds und der Untergruppen innerhalb der politischen Parteien verändern. Wenn das der Falls ist, welche Veränderungen finden statt und welche Auswirkungen haben diese auf die Partei als Organisation?

Die durch das Projekt erhobenen Daten beabsichtigen daher Einsicht in die Auswirkungen und Veränderungen von innerparteilichen Reformen auf Parteimitglieder und Parteiführung zu gewähren. Die gesammelten Daten erlauben die Erfassung von unterschiedlichen Eindrücken, Erfahrungen und Reaktionen aller beteiligten Gruppen während und nach der Urwahl (offen oder geschlossen).

Das Promotionsprojekt wird durch den Fachbereich Politik der *University of Exeter* finanziert. Die Daten werden für die Doktorarbeit, wissenschaftliche Arbeiten und andere Materialien im Zusammenhang mit dem Gesamtforschungsprojekt verwendet. Es besteht die Chance, dass die Promotionsarbeit in ihrer Vollständigkeit als wissenschaftliche Monographie veröffentlicht wird.

### **Kontaktdetails**

Für weitere Informationen über das Forschungsprojekt kontaktieren Sie bitte:

Felix-Christoph von Nostitz, Fachbereich für Politik, University of Exeter, Devon UK.

E-mail: fv206@ex.ac.uk

Wenn Sie Bedenken / Fragen über das Forschungsprojekt haben, die Sie gerne mit einem weiteren Ansprechpartner an der Universität diskutieren möchten, kontaktieren Sie bitte:

Professor Nicole Bolleyer, Fachbereich für Politik, University of Exeter, Devon UK

E-Mail: N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk



### Hinweise zum Ausfüllen des Online-Fragebogens

- Bitte lesen Sie sich die jeweilige Frage einschließlich der Antwortmöglichkeiten vor der Beantwortung vollständig durch.

- Die Mehrzahl der Fragen können Sie durch Ankreuzen beantworten. Setzen Sie Ihre Kreuze einfach in die dafür vorgesehenen Kästchen

Beispiel:         Ja  
                      Nein

-Nach vielen Fragen finden Sie in Klammern weitere Bearbeitungshinweise:

Beispiel        (Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)

- Für die Beantwortung einiger Fragen finden sich im Fragebogen sogenannte Skalen, Mit diesen können Sie Ihre Antworten zwischen zwei inhaltlichen Positionen abstufen, im Beispiel etwa zwischen „überhaupt nicht gern“ oder „sehr gerne“

Beispiel:

Überhaupt nicht gerne									Sehr gerne
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

- An einigen Stellen des Fragebogens bitten wir Sie, Ihre Antwort frei zu formulieren. Verwenden Sie in diesen Fällen die dafür vorgesehenen Linien.

Beispiel:        \_\_\_\_\_  
                     \_\_\_\_\_  
                     (Bitte notieren)

1. Seit wann sind Sie Mitglied bei Bündnis90/Die Grünen?  
(bitte notieren Sie)

Seit dem Jahr \_\_\_\_\_

2. Warum sind Sie Bündnis 90/Die Grünen beigetreten? Bitte geben Sie für jeden der folgenden Gründe an, wie wichtig dieser für Sie damals war.

	Sehr wichtig	wichtig	Teils- teils	Weniger wichtig	Über- haupt nicht wichtig
Wegen beeindruckender Persönlichkeiten an der Parteispitze					
Um mich für die Ziele der Partei einzusetzen					
Um den Einfluss der Partei zu stärken					
Aus Spaß an der politischen Arbeit					
Wegen des Einflusses von Familie und Freunden					
Um berufliche Vorteile zu erlangen					
Um meinen Ortsverband zu stärken					
Um mich besser über Politik zu informieren.					
Aus Interesse an einem Parteiamt					
Um nette Leute zu treffen					
Aus Interesse an einem öffentlichen Mandat					
Um einen bestimmten Flügel in der Partei zu stärken					
Um den politischen Kurs der Partei zu beeinflussen					
Weil ich mit den Grundwerten der Partei übereinstimme					
Um mich für eine ökologisch orientierte Politik einzusetzen					
Um meine Sympathie für die Partei zu zeigen					
Um meiner Verantwortung als Bürger(in) nachzukommen					
Weil sich die Partei für Leute wie mich einsetzt					

3. Wenn Sie sich an Ihren Beitritt zu Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zurückerinnern: Gab es damals einen besonderen Anlass, der Sie zu diesem Schritt bewogen hat?

(Bitte notieren)

\_\_\_\_\_

4. Sind Sie seit Ihrem Beitritt dauerhaft Mitglied bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen?

- Ja  
 Nein

Falls nein, wie viele Jahre waren sie insgesamt Mitglied bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen?

Für (ca.) \_\_\_\_\_ Jahre

5. Falls Sie der Partei im Jahr 2012 beigetreten oder wieder beigetreten sind, wie wichtig war dabei die Entscheidung der Partei, eine Urwahl durchzuführen.

Sehr wichtig	wichtig	Teils-teils	Weniger wichtig	Überhaupt nicht wichtig

**Oder**

Trifft nicht auf mich zu

6. Haben Sie an der Urwahl zur Bestimmung der beiden Spitzenkandidaten für die Bundestagswahl 2013 teilgenommen?

- ja  
 nein

**Falls JA →Frage 7**

**Falls Nein →Frage 8**

7. **Falls ja**, wen haben Sie gewählt? (Bitte geben Sie beide Kandidaten an, falls sie nur einen gewählt haben, kreuzen Sie den ersten Kandidaten und dann p) an.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Thomas Austermann      | <input type="checkbox"/> Friedrich Wilhelm Merck   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Katrin Göring-Eckhardt | <input type="checkbox"/> Claudia Roth              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Patrick Held           | <input type="checkbox"/> Hans-Jörg Schaller        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Nico Hybbeneth         | <input type="checkbox"/> Franz Spitzenberger       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Roger Kuchenreuther    | <input type="checkbox"/> Jürgen Trittin            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Renate Künast          | <input type="checkbox"/> Werner Winkler            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Alfred Mayer           | <input type="checkbox"/> Peter Zimmer              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Markus Meister         | <input type="checkbox"/> nur eine Stimme abgegeben |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Weiß Ich nicht mehr    |  |

8. Wie zufrieden sind Sie alles-in-allem-mit Ihrer Mitgliedschaft bei Bündnis90/Die Grünen?

Sehr zufrieden	Eher Zufrieden	Teils-teils	Eher Unzufrieden	Sehr Unzufrieden

9. Wie stark sind Sie an Politik interessiert?

Sehr interessiert	Eher interessiert	Teils-teils	Eher nicht interessiert	Überhaupt nicht interessiert

10. Es gibt verschiedene Formen der Mitarbeit in Parteien. Natürlich hat kaum jemand die Zeit und die Möglichkeit, dies alles zu tun. Wie oft haben Sie in den letzten Jahren die nachfolgenden Aktivitäten ausgeübt?

(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz. Bei keinerlei Aktivität bitte das Kästchen „selten/ nie“ nutzen)

	Sehr häufig	Eher häufig	manchmal	Eher selten	Selten/ nie
Plakate geklebt, Flugblätter und Informationsmaterial von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen verteilt					
Bei Festen und anderen geselligen Veranstaltungen der Partei mitgemacht					
Die Parteiversammlung besucht					
Bei sozialen Aktionen der Partei mitgemacht (z.B. Seniorenbetreuung, Kleidersammlung)					
In persönlichen Gespräch neue Mitglieder geworben					
An Informationsständen von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen mitgearbeitet.					
Bei Bedarf zusätzlich Geld gespendet					
In Arbeitskreisen oder anderen Gremien der Partei an der Formulierung politischer Aussagen mitgewirkt					
Für ein Amt in der Partei kandidiert					
Ein Amt in der Partei übernommen					
Für ein öffentliches Amt kandidiert					
Ein öffentliches Amt übernommen					
Bei der Organisation der Parteiarbeit mitgeholfen					

11. Wie viel Zeit verwenden Sie normalerweise pro Monat für die Mitarbeit bei Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen auf? (Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)

- keine
- bis unter 5 Stunden
- 5 bis unter 10 Stunden
- 10 bis unter 20 Stunden
- 20 bis unter 30 Stunden
- 30 bis unter 40 Stunden
- 40 Stunden mehr

12. Wie würden Sie Ihre gegenwärtige Aktivität in der Partei insgesamt einschätzen? Für wie aktiv halten Sie sich persönlich?

(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)

- sehr aktiv
- ziemlich aktiv
- weniger aktiv
- überhaupt nicht aktiv

13. Wenn Sie Ihre gegenwärtige Aktivität in der Partei betrachten, wie würden Sie einschätzen, hat sich diese in den letzten 5 Jahren verändert?

- Aktiver
- Weniger aktiv
- Ungefähr gleich
- Bin erst seit Kurzem Mitglied bei Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen

14. Wie oft nehmen Sie an Treffen Ihrer lokalen Partei teil. (Kreisverband, Ortsverband, etc)

Überhaupt nicht										Sehr oft	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

15. Wurden Sie als Mitglied von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen schon einmal in eines der folgenden Ämter gewählt oder haben Sie ein Mandat übernommen? Falls Sie eines der unten angeführten Ämter oder Mandate derzeit inne haben, kreuzen Sie bitte auch das ganz rechte Kästchen, „habe der es derzeit inne“, an. (Bitte machen Sie in jedem zutreffenden Kästchen ein Kreuz)

	Nein, noch nie	Ja, einmal	Ja, mehrfach	Habe es derzeit inne
<b>Vorstandsmitgliedschaft</b>				
Mitglied des Ortsvorstandes				
Mitglied des Kreis- oder Bezirksvorstandes				
Mitglied des Landes- oder Bundesvorstandes				
<b>Vorstandsvorsitz</b>				
Vorsitzende(r) des Ortsvorstandes				
Vorsitzende(r) des Kreis- oder Bezirksvorstandes				
Vorsitzende(r) des Landes- oder Bundesvorstandes				
<b>Delegierte(r) für den...</b>				
Kreis- oder Bezirksparteitag				
Landesparteitag				
Bundesparteitag				
<b>Mandatsträger</b>				
Mandat im (kreisangehörigen) Stadt- oder Gemeinderat				
Mandat im Kreistag oder dem Rat einer kreisfreien Stadt				
Mandat im Landesparlament				
Mandat im Bundesparlament				
Mandat im Europaparlament				

16. Wenn von Politik die Rede ist, hört man immer wieder von links und rechts. Bitte geben Sie an, wo auf der folgende Skala von links nach rechts Sie sich selbst einstufen würden.

Links								Rechts			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Wo Sie die Parteiführung einstufen würden:

Links								Rechts			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Und wo Sie die Partei insgesamt einstufen würden:

Links								Rechts			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

17. Es gibt verschiedene Gründe dafür, sich stärker oder schwächer in einer Partei zu engagieren.

Inwieweit stimmen Sie den folgenden Aussagen zu?

(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Wer sich in einer Partei engagiert, kann mit Achtung und Anerkennung rechnen					
Neben einem anstrengenden Alltag noch auf Partei-veranstaltungen zu gehen, kann sehr ermüdend sein.					
Für eine Partei zu arbeiten, kann sehr langweilig sein.					
Das Engagement in Parteien lässt häufig zu wenig Zeit für Freunde und Familie.					
Als aktives Parteimitglied kann man interessante Leute kennenlernen.					
Nur wenn man als Parteimitglied auch aktiv ist, kann man für politische Fragen Sachverstand entwickeln.					
Die aktive Mitarbeit in Parteien ist ein geeigneter Weg, um persönlich Einfluss auf die Politik auszuüben.					
Als Mitglied einer Partei wird man heutzutage schief angesehen.					

18. Was meinen Sie: Wie sehr treffen die nachfolgenden Aussagen auf Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zu? (Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen hat jedes Mitglied die Möglichkeit, die Politik der Partei aktiv mitzugestalten.					
Bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen wird auf Kritik von Seiten der Mitglieder eingegangen.					
Bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen wird es nicht gern gesehen, wenn man sich gegen die Meinung der Mehrheit stellt.					
Die Meinung der einfachen Parteimitglieder findet bei den Entscheidungsträgern von B'90/Die Grünen kein Gehör.					

19. Gibt es in Ihrem persönlichen Umfeld jemanden, der derzeit ebenfalls Mitglied von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen ist?

- nein
- ja, und zwar

(Bitte notieren Sie alle Personen, die Ihnen einfallen, z.B. Vater, Ehepartner, ein Freund)

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- ja in der Vergangenheit, und zwar

(Bitte notieren Sie alle Personen, die Ihnen einfallen, z.B. Vater, Ehepartner, ein Freund)

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20. Welche Vorstellung haben Sie darüber, wie B'90/Die Grünen als Partei sein oder wie Sie sich in der Politik verhalten sollte? Wie sehr stimmen Sie persönlich den nachfolgenden Aussagen zu?

(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Die innerparteiliche Diskussion bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen sollte niemals so intensiv geführt werden, dass die Geschlossenheit der Partei gefährdet wird.					
Es sollte für Bündnis 90/Die Grünen wichtiger sein, konkrete Probleme zu lösen, als an seinen Grundwerten festzuhalten.					
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen sollten fachlich qualifizierte Kandidaten für Parlamente und öffentliche Ämter aufstellen, auch solche die nicht Mitglied der Partei sind.					
Die Abgeordneten von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen sollten sich stärker an den Meinungen der Parteimitglieder orientieren, als den Meinungen der Wähler nachzulaufen.					
Interessierte Nicht-Parteimitglieder sollten bei Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen gleichberechtigt mitarbeiten können.					
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen sollten in ihrer Programmatik nicht dem Zeitgeist nachlaufen, auch wenn dies zum Verlust von Wählerstimmen führt.					

21. Nachfolgend stehen einige Aussagen zur Politik. Bitte geben Sie für jede Aussage an, inwieweit Sie ihr zustimmen. *(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)*

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Die ganze Politik ist so kompliziert, dass jemand wie ich nicht versteht, was vorgeht.					
Ich traue mir zu, in einer Gruppe, die sich mit politischen Fragen befasst, eine aktive Rolle zu übernehmen.					
Die Politiker kümmern sich nicht viel darum, was die Leute denken					
Die Politiker bemühen sich im Allgemeinen darum, die Interessen der Bevölkerung zu vertreten.					
Die Parteien wollen nur die Stimmen ihrer Wähler, ihre Ansichten interessieren sie nicht.					
Die Parteien sind alles in allem zuverlässig und verantwortungsbewusst.					
Die Parteien betrachten den Staat als Selbstbedienungsladen.					
Den Parteien geht es nur um die Macht.					

22. Bitte geben Sie für jede nachfolgende Aussage an, inwieweit Sie mit ihr zustimmen. *(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)*

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Insgesamt sind die internen Entscheidungsprozesse der Partei höchst demokratisch.					
Insgesamt kann man der Führung der Partei vertrauen.					
Die meisten Parteiabgeordneten versuchen im Interesse des Gemeinwohls zu handeln, selbst in Fällen, wo dieses nicht ihren eigenen Interessen entspricht.					
Aussagen von Mitgliedern der Parteiführung in den Medien sind normalerweise wahrheitsgetreu.					
Abgeordnete, die wir in öffentliche Ämter gewählt haben, halten normalerweise ihre Versprechen, die sie während des Wahlkampfes gemacht haben					
Die meisten Kandidaten, die durch die Partei aufgestellt werden, sind gut qualifiziert, um die Probleme, die diesem Land bevorstehen, zu bearbeiten.					



23. Mit der Einführung der Urwahl wurde die parteiliche Organisationsform mehr oder weniger demokratisch?

- Demokratischer
- Ungefähr gleich
- Weniger demokratisch

24. Nachfolgend stehen einige Aussagen zur innerparteilichen Demokratie und der Grünen. Bitte geben Sie für jede Aussage an, inwieweit Sie ihr zustimmen.

*(Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)*

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
In meiner lokalen Parteiorganisation sind die Entscheidungsprozesse höchst demokratisch.					
Mit der Einführung der Urwahl wurde die parteiliche Organisationsform demokratisiert.					
Die Urwahl motiviert mich, an mehr Parteiaktivitäten teilzunehmen.					
Die Urwahl half der Partei, Stimmen und Unterstützung im Wahljahr 2013 zu gewinnen.					
Die Spitzenkandidaten der Partei machen gute Arbeit.					
Die Partei hat ihre „grünen“ Ideale aus den Augen verloren.					

25. Als nächstes würden wir Ihnen gerne ein paar Fragen bezüglich Ihres persönlichen Einflusses in der Partei stellen.

	Sehr zufrieden	Eher zufrieden	Teils-teils	Eher unzufrieden	Sehr unzufrieden
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie innerhalb der Partei haben?					
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie auf die Wahl der Parteitage-delegierten haben?					
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie auf die Wahl der Bundespartei-führung haben?					
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie auf die Wahl der Parteivorsitzenden haben.					
Sind Sie zufrieden mit der persönlichen Einflussnahme, die Sie auf die Wahl der Bundestagsabgeordneten haben?					

26. In wie stimmen die nachfolgenden Aussagen über den Einfluss von Mitglieder in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zu? (Bitte machen Sie in jeder Zeile ein Kreuz)

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Es gibt viele offizielle Möglichkeiten für Mitglieder, das Handeln der Parteiführung zu beeinflussen.					
In unserer Parteiorganisation haben die Mitglieder das letzte Wort, wie die Partei arbeitet, egal wer im Amt der Parteiführung ist					
Mitglieder wie ich haben keinen Einfluss darauf, was die Parteiführung macht					
Dank der Verwendung der Urwahl habe ich das Gefühl von mehr Einfluss in der Partei					

27. Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie den jeweiligen Aussagen persönlich zustimmen.

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Ich betrachte mich als qualifiziert genug, um an der Politik teilzunehmen					
Ich habe ein relativ guten Überblick über die wichtigen politische Themen, die dieses Land betreffen.					
Ich denke, ich könnte eine genauso gute Arbeit in öffentlichen Ämtern leisten wie alle anderen.					

28. Als nächstes würden wir Ihnen gerne ein paar Fragen bezüglich Ihrer Einstellung gegenüber politischer Partizipation in Form einer Urwahl fragen:

	Stimme voll und ganz zu	Stimme eher zu	Teils-teils	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme überhaupt nicht zu
Das Einbeziehen aller Parteimitglieder verringert die Bedeutung und Rechte aktiver Parteimitglieder.					
Die Integration aller Parteimitglieder bei der Wahl der Kandidaten spiegelt den innerparteilichen demokratischen Charakter der Partei wieder.					
Aktive und passive Mitglieder haben die gleichen Rechte und Pflichten.					
Aktive Mitglieder sollen eine wichtigere Rolle in internen Entscheidungsprozessen als passive Mitglieder spielen.					
Alle Mitglieder, ungeachtet der Länge ihrer Mitgliedschaft, sollten das Recht haben, sich in der Urwahl als Kandidat aufzustellen.					

29. Kommen wir nun zu einem anderen Thema: In welchen Vereinigungen oder Arbeitskreisen von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen arbeiten Sie mit? In welchen sind Sie Mitglied? Und außerdem: In welchen haben Sie ein Amt inne?

(Bitte in jedem zutreffenden Kästchen ein Kreuz machen)

	Arbeite mit, ohne Mitglied zu sein	Bin passives Mitglied	Bin aktives Mitglied	Habe ein Amt
Campusgrüne. Bündnis grüne-alternative Hochschulgruppe				
Grüne Jugend				
Grüne Alte				
Gewerkschaftsgrüne				
Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und zwar: _____				
Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und zwar: _____				
Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und zwar: _____				
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und zwar: _____				
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und zwar: _____				
Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft, und zwar: _____				
Andere, und zwar: _____				

30. In welchen weiteren Organisationen außerhalb Ihrer Partei arbeiten Sie mit? In welchen sind Sie Mitglied? In welchen arbeiten Sie aktiv mit? Und außerdem: In welchen haben Sie ein Amt inne?

(Bitte in jedem zutreffenden Kästchen ein Kreuz machen)

	Arbeite mit, ohne Mitglied zu sein	Bin passives Mitglied	Bin aktives Mitglied	Habe ein Amt
Berufsverband				
Gewerkschaft				
Unternehmerverband				
Freizeitverein (z.B Musik-, Sport- oder Kleingartenverein)				
Freiwillige Feuerwehr				
Wohlfahrtsverband/ Kriegsoferversverband				
Traditions- und Heimatverein				
Umweltschutzverband				
Tierschutzverband				
Bürgerinitiative				
Frauengruppe bzw. -vereinigung				
Jugendorganisation, soweit nicht kirchlich				
Kirchliche/ religiöse Gruppe				
Andere Organisation, und zwar: _____				

**Und nun noch einige Angaben zu Ihrer Person**

31. Geschlecht:

- weiblich
- männlich

32. In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren? (Bitte notieren)

\_\_\_\_\_

33. In welchem Bundesland leben Sie?

---

34. Welches ist Ihr höchster allgemeinbildender Schulabschluss?

*(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)*

- Bin zur Zeit Schüler(in) → siehe Frage 30
- Schulausbildung beendet ohne Abschluss
- Volks-/ Hauptschule bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule, vor der 10. Klasse abgegangen
- Mittlere Reife, Realschule bzw. Polytechnische Oberschule 10. Klasse (Fachschulreife)
- Fachhochschulreife (Abschluss einer Fachoberschule), Ingenieurschule, Erweiterte Oberschule (EOS) ohne Abschluss
- Abitur, allgemeine Hochschulreife, Erweiterte Oberschule (EOS) mit Abschluss

35. Falls Sie noch Schüler(in) sind: Welchen Schulabschluss streben Sie an?

*(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)*

- Hauptschulabschluss
- Mittlere Reife, Realschulabschluss, Fachschulreife
- Fachhochschulreife, Abschluss einer Fachoberschule
- Abitur, allgemeine oder fachgebundene Hochschulreife

36. Welche der folgenden Beschreibungen trifft gegenwärtig auf Sie zu?

*(Mehrfachnennungen möglich)*

- Ganztags erwerbstätig, auch mithelfend (mit 35 Stunden/ Woche und mehr)
- Teilzeit erwerbstätig (mit 15 bis unter 35 Stunden/ Woche)
- Geringfügig erwerbstätig (mit unter 15 Stunden/ Woche)
- Gelegentlich oder unregelmäßig beschäftigt
- Zurzeit arbeitslos
- Umschulung
- In Berufsausbildung/ Lehre (einschließlich Fachschule)
- In Schulausbildung/ Hochschule (einschließlich Fachhochschule)
- Wehrdienst/ Zivildienst/ Soziales Jahr
- Mutterschafts-, Erziehungsurlaub, Elternzeit oder sonstige Beurlaubung
- Hausfrau/Hausmann, nicht (mehr) berufstätig
- Rentner/ Pensionär
- Im Vorruhestand

37. Welcher der folgenden Berufsgruppen gehören Sie an (oder gehörten Sie zuletzt an)?

*(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)*

- Arbeiter
- Angestellte in der Wirtschaft
- mithelfende Familienangehörige
- Beamte/ Angestellte im öffentlichen Dienst/ Berufssoldaten
- Selbständige im Handel, Gewerbe, Handwerk, Industrie, Dienstleistungen
- selbständige Landwirte
- Akademiker im freien Beruf (Ärzte, Rechtsanwälte, Steuerberater u.ä.)

38. Eine letzte Frage: Es wird heute viel über die verschiedenen Bevölkerungsschichten gesprochen.

Welcher Schicht rechnen Sie sich selbst eher zu?

*(Bitte nur ein Kästchen ankreuzen)*

- Unterschicht
- Untere Mittelschicht
- Mittlere Mittelschicht
- Obere Mittelschicht
- Oberschicht
- Keiner dieser Schichten

**Vielen Dank für Ihre Mithilfe!**

Haben Sie Vorschläge für Ergänzungen oder Anmerkungen zum Fragebogen? Wir sind für jede Anregung dankbar!

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## VI Certificate of Ethical Approval



**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
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### CERTIFICATE OF ETHICAL APPROVAL

**Academic Unit:** Politics

**Title of Project:** The merits and perils of intra-party democracy: assessing the effects of party reform in Western European parties

**Research Team Member(s):** Felix von Nostitz


**Project Contact Point:** fv206@exeter.ac.uk

**This project has been approved for the period**

From: 02.08.2014

To: 30.09.2016

**Ethics Committee approval reference:** 201314-051

Signature.....  
(Lise Storm, Chair, SSIS College Ethics Committee)

Date.....19 August 2014

## VII Selectorate and Candidacy Requirement Types in Framework

### a) Selectorate

#### Open

#### *Selectorate – Primary Zone*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Public/Voters</li> <li>-Registration on the day possible</li> <li>-Primary Voter Membership with no other rights attached to membership</li> <li>-No formal links to Party</li> <li>→spontaneous voting possible</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Full Party Members</li> <li>-Light Members and Supporters with additional rights than voting in primary</li> <li>-Pre-registration to vote required</li> </ul>	

#### Closed

### b) Candidacy Requirements

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Voters (no restrictions)</li> <li>-Party Membership and low additional rules (low candidacy fees, no time limits, supporting signature of membership only)</li> <li>-no additional approval required</li> <li>-No veto power of other intra party organ(s) or actor(s) after low requirement are met</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Party Membership with strict additional rules (time limits, signature of multiple groups)</li> <li>- Limited to MPs</li> <li>-Approval required by intra-party Election Commission or Electoral Commission</li> <li>- Multiple hurdles with veto power of other intra party organ(s) or actor(s)</li> </ul>

**Permissive**

***Candidate Requirements***

**Strict**

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