VULNERABILITY ON TRIAL: PROTECTION OF MIGRANT CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS

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ABSTRACT

Although vulnerability does not have an express legal basis in international human rights law, international human rights courts, particularly the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), have increasingly drawn on this concept in their jurisprudence. The ECtHR has developed an important line of cases concerning migrant children, whom it considers as particularly vulnerable to physical and mental harm during the migratory process. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”)...

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also anchored this notion in an influential advisory opinion on the rights of migrant children. This article critically examines this case-law against the existing scholarship on vulnerability and the legal framework on human rights protection. It argues that the concept of vulnerability, when complemented by considerations of best interests of the child, can operate as a magnifying glass for State obligations, exposing a greater duty of protection and care vis-à-vis migrant children. It suggests that human rights courts should deploy a more substantial approach to migrant children’s rights based on the concept of vulnerability and on the principle of best interests of the child. Above all, this approach would foster stronger protection of these children’s rights in the long term. In addition, if effectively applied, it would allow human rights courts to avoid stigmatizing the most exposed individuals in the ongoing global migration crisis.

I. INTRODUCTION

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), the number of displaced people worldwide is currently at one of the highest levels ever recorded.1 Alarmingly, it is reported that more than one in five migrants arriving in Europe in 2015 were children.2 They are commonly considered to be particularly exposed to the risk of physical and mental abuse during the migratory process.3


3 Uprooted: The Growing Crisis for Refugee and Migrant Children, supra note 2, at 3; see also, The Refugee Crisis in Europe, UNICEF (June 16, 2016), http://www.unicef.org.uk/Latest/Publications/The-refugee-crisis-in-Europe [https://perma.cc/SB2Q-CUQX]; Neither Safe Nor Sound: Unaccompanied Children on the Coastline of the English Channel and the North Sea, UNICEF (June 2016),
This is especially concerning in relation to unaccompanied or separated migrant children who lack adult supervision. Unaccompanied children are those individuals below the age of eighteen years “who have been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so.” Separated children are those who “have been separated from both parents, or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other relatives.”

However, even children migrating with their parents or caregivers are not automatically sheltered from the risk of abuse. For instance, they may be exposed to harm when placed with their families in reception and detention centers that are not adapted to receive families. Accordingly, migrant children, accompanied or not, can be vulnerable in relation to the context and external environment in which they are placed. Therefore, this article focuses on both accompanied and unaccompanied or separated migrant children, as they may be equally vulnerable.

Vulnerability is commonly understood as the state of being “[e]xposed to the possibility of being attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally.” For sociologist Bryan Turner, harm is a central element since “[v]ulnerability defines our humanity” as embodied creatures who are

http://www.unicef.org.uk/Latest/Publications/Neither-Safe-Nor-Sound/


6 Id. ¶ 8.

7 Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium, App. No. 41442/07 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96825 [https://perma.cc/ZT44-V6CX] (emphasizing the situation of extreme stress of the mother who was unable to protect her children while in detention); see also MARIE-BENEDITTE DEMBOUR, WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS 394 (2015) (providing a critical and insightful analysis of the ECHR’s decision in the case of Muskhadzhiyeva).

8 Vulnerable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2017).

9 BRYAN TURNER, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2006) (also presenting vulnerability as the common basis of human rights).
subjected to suffering.\textsuperscript{10} However, as deftly suggested by Professor Anna Grear, “vulnerability need not be conceived as a monolithic concept”\textsuperscript{11} and can allow for nuances and different degrees of complexity.\textsuperscript{12} Vulnerability is therefore universal and particular at the same time: it is universal insofar as it is based on the embodiment of human beings who by their very nature are capable of being harmed; it is also particular since it relates to the different contexts in which human beings can be protected from harm.\textsuperscript{13} As pointed out by Turner, vulnerability is our universally shared characteristic, which nevertheless “forces us into social dependency and social connectedness” as we seek protection from harm.\textsuperscript{14}

This protection is provided by different institutions, which include the State, the family, and the community.\textsuperscript{15} In this regard, Professor Martha Fineman’s definition of vulnerability as “the characteristic that positions us in relation to each other as human beings and also suggests a relationship of responsibility between state and individual”\textsuperscript{16} is markedly accurate. Precisely, this relationship between States and individuals is at the core of the development of human rights in international law.\textsuperscript{17} States are required to protect the vulnerable individual from harm in international human rights law.\textsuperscript{18} However, scholars have heavily criticized the use of the concept of vulnerability by suggesting that paternalistic and stigmatizing views of groups of individuals shift the focus from building resilience to State assistance.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{10} See id. at 27 (discussing both physical and psychological dimensions of vulnerability based on suffering).

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Anna Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity} 128 (2010).

\textsuperscript{12} See id. at 128.

\textsuperscript{13} Martha Albertson Fineman, \textit{The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State}, 60 Emory L. J. 251, 268-69 (2010-2011) [hereinafter Fineman, \textit{The Vulnerable Subject}].

\textsuperscript{14} Turner, supra note 9, at 10.

\textsuperscript{15} See id. at 28 (arguing that the creation of institutions such as family, religion, rituals, political institutions, serve the purpose of reducing vulnerability and providing security).

\textsuperscript{16} Fineman, supra note 13, at 255.

\textsuperscript{17} See Olivier De Schutter, \textit{International Human Rights Law} 13 (2d ed. 2014) (“[H]uman rights have a logic of their own . . . [as] they have originated in domestic constitutional documents . . . [and as] they regulate the relationships between the State and individuals under their jurisdiction, rather than simply relationships between States.”).


\textsuperscript{19} See Martha Albertson Fineman, \textit{Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth}, 23
The ECtHR has deployed its own conception of vulnerability insofar as migrant children are concerned. Across the Atlantic, the IACtHR anchored this notion in an influential 2014 advisory opinion on the rights of migrant children. Both courts recognize the vulnerability of migrant children in the wider context of migration, taking into account the multiple risks to which they are particularly exposed, and acknowledging the implications of the principle of best interests of the child.


Id. ¶ 90 (emphasizing the risks of sexual exploitation); Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 56 (condemning the “legal void” for the protection of minors held in detention centers).

Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 103 (proposing an evaluation of the best interest of the child after examination of migrant children’s
This article focuses primarily on the analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, using examples from the IACtHR’s jurisprudence as a comparative element supplementing the study. It argues that the concept of vulnerability, when complemented by considerations of best interests of the child, can operate as a magnifying glass for State obligations, exposing a greater duty of protection and care vis-à-vis migrant children. If both human rights courts apply this concept effectively in their future cases, it could achieve a substantive step-change in the protection of migrant children’s rights with long-term positive effects. In order to verify this argument, the article critically examines the use of vulnerability by the ECtHR and the IACtHR against the existing legal and theoretical frameworks of human rights protection and evaluates the implications for the effective protection of migrant children’s rights.

The analysis proceeds in four consecutive steps. Firstly, the article examines the nature of the concept of vulnerability against the background of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the protection of migrant children’s rights. Secondly, the article evaluates the relationship between vulnerability and the principle of best interests of the child, assessing its advantages and limits. Thirdly, the article evaluates the implications of the concept of vulnerability for State obligations, considering whether it necessitates modifications of the nature or degree of these obligations in this area. Finally, the article draws conclusions on the effectiveness of the use of the concept of vulnerability vis-à-vis the dangers inherent to the stigmatization of the most underprivileged individuals in the current context of the global migration crisis.

II. THE COMPOSITE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY

A. Group Dimension

The ECtHR tends to emphasize the group dimension of the concept of vulnerability): Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 109 (emphasizing the importance of the principle of best interest of the child).

24 The selected ECtHR decisions observed the following criteria: in the field of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR, all of the decisions involved migrant children (unaccompanied, separated or migrating with family members) and, at the same time, explicitly referred to the concept of vulnerability. In the field of Article 8 of the ECHR, all of the decisions related to migrant children but not always explicitly referred to the concept of vulnerability (which allowed for the argument to be put forward that the ECtHR still has to improve the use of vulnerability in this area). See infra Section III.A. Decisions of the ECtHR relating to children (nationals) in general were also used as a point of comparison. See infra Section IV.A.

25 The Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 is the main reference in this regard, as there are fewer IACtHR decisions relating to migrant children specifically. Decisions relating to children (including nationals) were used as a point of comparison insofar as they referred to the concept of vulnerability.
vulnerability, and not its individual and universal aspects. For instance, it has used this concept in a variety of situations relating to groups of people such as ethnic minorities, asylum-seekers, and the mentally ill. The ECtHR referred to vulnerability for the first time in the context of the protection of minority rights, namely when it designated the Roma minority as vulnerable in Chapman v. the United Kingdom.

Nonetheless, if the foundation of vulnerability can be situated in the embodied nature of all human beings, who by their physical constitution are subjected to the possibility of harm and depend upon one another, more than a few groups of people should be considered vulnerable. Vulnerability therefore has a universal reach, and the concept should be applied to all

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26 See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1056 (arguing that the ECtHR has deployed the concept of group vulnerability).

27 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 18, 20 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013) (“Human vulnerability arises in the first place from our embodiment, which carries with it the imminently or ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune.”); Turner, supra note 9, at 25-26 (arguing that every human being can be considered vulnerable).


31 Chapman v. United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, ¶ 96 (2001) (affirming that the recognition of their vulnerability led to the imposition upon the State of an obligation to take into account “special considerations” in relation to their specific needs and different lifestyle insofar as policy-making and decision-making processes relating to them are concerned).

32 See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 22; see Turner, supra note 9, at 25. See generally Grear, supra note 11.

33 See Turner, supra note 9, at 26 (“Human beings are ontologically vulnerable and insecure, and their natural environment, doubtful. In order to protect themselves from the uncertainties of the everyday world, they must build social institutions . . .”).

34 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 17 (2008) (“Vulnerability is universal and, as such, transcends historic categories of impermissible discrimination.”).
human beings. However, as affirmed by Fineman, “while human vulnerability is universal, constant, and complex, it is also particular. While all human beings stand in a position of constant vulnerability, we are individually positioned differently.”35 Some individuals may be better sheltered from harm as they may receive protection from their families, communities, and State, whereas other individuals may not receive the same degree of protection.36 The assertion that some groups of people can be more vulnerable than others can only be accepted as a starting point. The analysis of the context in which the individuals evolve, and their particularities vis-à-vis the groups to which they belong, should also be taken into account.

In the case of the protection of migrant children’s rights, vulnerability encompasses aspects linked to the fragile nature of all human beings and it equally relates to the children’s belonging to one or more social groups. The ECtHR has emphasized that migrant children are in an extremely vulnerable situation as they are not only minors, but also aliens in an irregular situation in a foreign country who are not always accompanied by an adult.37 This is certainly a positive step towards a more holistic approach to recognizing risks inherent in child migration.

Additionally, the ECtHR should also consider gender, as unaccompanied or separated girls are generally considered more vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuses when migrating on their own.38 Disability is another important concern that should be taken into account by the Court, as migrant children with disabilities are more frequently exposed to abuse, exploitation and neglect.39 Trauma, stress, and mental health issues are additional considerations that should be taken into account.40 These are all elements

35 Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 13, at 268-69.
36 See Turner, supra note 9, at 26 (discussing the dependency upon institutions and their precariousness).
40 The ECtHR takes into account the stress and anxiety that detention causes in migrant children which may be considered as inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 18, at art. 3; Tarakhel, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, ¶ 119; Mayeka, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223, ¶ 58; see also Mina Fazel et. al., Mental Health of Displaced and Refugee Children Resettled in High-Income Countries: Risk and Protective Factors, 379 Lancet 266, 279 (2012) (“Evidence lends support to the idea of spirals of loss.
that, when combined, lead to a situation of extreme vulnerability.

Accordingly, it is submitted that we can speak of a composite form of vulnerability whenever two or more of these elements are present at the same time. However, composite vulnerability should not be understood as cumulative in nature. It should not be misused and misunderstood as a simple tick-box exercise, with individuals who do not meet the requisite number of criteria excluded from protection. On the contrary, composite vulnerability should allow for a particularized view of migrant children’s concrete situations.

In comparison, although the IACtHR strongly relates to identifiable groups of individuals, it also takes into account their particular situation within the group and their relationship with individuals and institutions outside the group. In the case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the IACtHR recognized the vulnerability of certain indigenous communities, notably, when its members were not legally registered in the State’s official records. However, it is interesting to note that the IACtHR emphasized the existence of especially vulnerable groups within this indigenous community while assessing “the actual risk and vulnerability situation to which the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community are exposed, especially children, pregnant women and the elderly.” It follows that in Sawhoyamaxa certain categories of people were deemed to experience an additional aspect of drawing attention to the way many challenges affect refugees at all stages of their journeys.

41 The term compounded vulnerability has also been used by scholars in a broader context relating to other groups of people and not only migrant children. See Alexandra Timmer, *A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human Rights*, supra note 27, at 161; Ulrik Brandl & Philip Czech, *General and Specific Vulnerability of Protection-Seekers in the EU: Is there an Adequate Response to their Needs?*, supra note 27.

42 For the purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that the Human Rights Committee has also recognised the “special vulnerability of certain categories of person, including in particular children” which should be taken into account by States while ensuring that individuals have accessible and effective remedies. See Human Rights Comm., *General Comment No. 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant*, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004).

43 *See Aoife O’Higgins, Vulnerability and Agency: Beyond an Irreconcilable Dichotomy for Social Service Providers Working with Young Refugees in the UK, in Independent Child Migration – Insights into Agency, Vulnerability, and Structure 79, 85* (Aida Orgocka & Christina Clark-Kazak eds., 2012) (“Where young people did not conform to expectations of vulnerability deemed appropriate for a refugee child, they risked being denied the support they needed.”).


45 *Id.* ¶ 159.
vulnerability, as they not only belonged to the indigenous community and were therefore socially and economically excluded, but they were also children, pregnant women, or elderly.

Furthermore, in the case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, the IACtHR specifically considered that “the State must pay special attention to the needs and the rights of the alleged victims owing to their condition as girl children, who belong to a vulnerable group.” The composite nature of the victims’ vulnerability is apparent in this case, as they were not only children, but also girls, and were discriminated in relation to their origins (Dominicans of Haitian descent). In its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the IACtHR emphasized the “situation of additional vulnerability” in which migrant children often find themselves, entailing an “increased risk of violation of their rights.”

Therefore, any finding of group vulnerability must be complemented by a close contextual analysis of the situation of the individuals vis-à-vis their places in the different social groups. The next section examines how regional human rights courts have undertaken this type of analysis in their jurisprudence.

B. Contextual Analysis

Despite maintaining a group dimension for its understanding of the concept of vulnerability, the ECtHR also takes into account the particular aspects of the situation of individual migrant children. In doing so, it undertakes a contextual analysis of their individual cases. In this regard, Professors Peroni and Timmer have proposed a helpful general analytical framework. They suggest that the concept of vulnerability as exposed by the ECtHR is “relational, particular, and harm-based.” This framework can serve as a basis for verifying how vulnerability is applied to the specific context of the protection of migrant children’s rights in three main ways.

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47 Id. ¶¶ 109(9), 134.

48 Id. ¶¶ 109(9), 134.


49 Id.


51 See generally Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19.

52 Id. at 1064.
Firstly, Peroni and Timmer contend that vulnerability can be seen as relational insofar as it is “shaped by social, historical, and institutional forces.” The individual is therefore placed in a context, the one of relationships within his or her group. In the case of migrant children’s vulnerability, this aspect can be seen in the treatment of the vulnerability of the child as an axiom by the ECtHR. The Court considers that children are automatically vulnerable in their relationship with adults. The same type of approach has been taken by the IACtHR. This is also the perception of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (“the Committee”). Therefore, the ECtHR, the IACtHR, and the Committee all acknowledge that children are per se more vulnerable than adults to the abuse of their rights.
However, it is submitted that this position should be nuanced, as children do not constitute a homogeneous group. Research demonstrates that children’s cognitive development evolves with age and so does their capacity to adapt and to become more resilient to external factors. Moreover, if taken out of context, this aspect of the recognition of vulnerability can be highly problematic. It may indeed reinforce the assumption that all children are not fully capable beings and excessively emphasize their dependency on adults. In this regard, recognition of vulnerability should not exclude agency. In addition, migrant children’s vulnerability also relates to other aspects, such as their gender, disability, mental health, and condition as migrants. Accordingly, all of these elements should be taken into consideration where migrant children are concerned.

Secondly, the concept of vulnerability is arguably particular, insofar as the “vulnerability is shaped by specific group-based experiences.” The ECtHR takes into account the particular experiences that migrant children may have had within their vulnerable group. A case in point is Popov v. France, which concerned the detention of a couple from Kazakhstan who was facing deportation with their two children, aged five months and three years,

argining that taking into account the unique situation of vulnerability of unaccompanied minors, by not distinguishing unaccompanied minors from adults, the law gives no consideration to children’s unique difficulties in satisfying the same legal standards); John Tobin, Understanding Children’s Rights: A Vision beyond Vulnerability, 84 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 155, 166 (2015) (“[Children have] special vulnerabilities, which accord with the lived experiences of children, provide a basis for the special rights which children enjoy under the CRC.”).

agency is defined by O’Higgins as “young people’s ability to participate meaningfully in the construction of their daily lives, including their capacity to cope, their ability to adapt, and their resilience.” See O’Higgins, supra note 43, at 81.


Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1064. Material deprivation of unaccompanied children has also been considered by the ECtHR. Rahimi, App. No. 8687/09, ¶ 87.
respectively. The ECtHR affirmed that the migrant children concerned had been in a situation of particular vulnerability, heightened by the conditions of detention.

Likewise, in *Elmi v. Malta*, the ECtHR held that the applicants who were aged sixteen and seventeen years old “were particularly vulnerable because of everything they had been through during their migration and the traumatic experiences they were likely to have endured previously.” Furthermore, it admitted that they “were even more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker detained at the time because of their age.” By doing so, the ECtHR maintained its axiomatic view that children are *per se* more vulnerable than adults, but also took into consideration the risks related to the migratory context. Accordingly, this approach allows for a more *in concreto* analysis of the situation of the migrant children which can outweigh the negative effects of the use of the concept of vulnerability.

Thirdly, it is posited that the concept can be seen as harm-based. The ECtHR situates harm—including physical, mental and sexual abuse, social disadvantage, and material deprivation—at the center of its understanding of vulnerability. Harm is therefore assessed in light of the relevant context and potential external risk. For instance, in relation to the situation of migrant children, the external risk of harm appears to be at the heart of the development of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.

Accordingly, in *Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium*, the ECtHR concluded that the detention of four children, aged respectively seven months, three and a half years, five years, and seven years, in a closed detention center primarily designed for adults was unlawful, despite the fact that they were not separated from their mother. The conditions of their detention were deemed detrimental to their mental health. Likewise, in *V.M. v. Belgium*, the ECtHR took into account the possibility of harm due to the situation of vulnerability of the applicants, a family of Roma origin with five children (including a

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63 *Id.* ¶ 102.
65 *Id.*
66 Conversely, in *Jama v. Malta*, the ECtHR considered that the applicant who was found to be an adult following age determination proceedings “was not more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker detained at the time” even though she “was particularly vulnerable because of everything she had been through during her migration and the traumatic experiences she was likely to have endured previously.” *Jama v. Malta*, App. No. 10290/13, ¶ 100 (2015), [https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158877](https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158877) [https://perma.cc/FU2G-B5H9].
68 *Id.*
70 *Id.*
baby and a handicapped child). The ECtHR found a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") (prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) in relation to the deplorable conditions in which they were forced to live between their removal from the detention center and their expulsion to Serbia. Similarly, in Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the ECtHR emphasized the lack of sufficient assurances that, if returned to Italy, the applicant’s family, which included six minor children, would be taken care of in a manner adapted to the ages of the children.

The IACtHR has adopted a similar approach in its Advisory Opinion OC-21. It clearly emphasized the risks of harm to which migrant children are exposed while migrating and directly referred to General Comment No. 6 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. In particular, these risks relate to threats to their life, freedom, security, or personal integrity. The contextual analysis of their situation allows for a better understanding of their harm-based vulnerability.

Academic scholarship has drawn attention to the potential dangers posed by the concept of vulnerability. If not assessed adequately, it can give way to adverse outcomes. On the one hand, it can lead to the stigmatization of already vulnerable groups. On the other hand, it may lead to the overgeneralization of the concept, one that presumes all members of a group are equally vulnerable. However, in the specific context of the protection of migrant children’s rights, judicial recognition of their vulnerability can arguably lead to improved consideration of their specific needs. By identifying the particularities of these children’s situations, courts can avoid stigmatizing them as a vulnerable group. In addition, if their vulnerabilities relate to a particular situation and are not seen as inherent to their condition of children, harm can be more easily prevented. For instance, physical and psychological harm can be avoided if States agree that unaccompanied

72 Id. ¶¶ 162-63.
74 Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 90 (referring particularly to risks of harm incurred by unaccompanied or separated migrant children).
75 See id.; Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶ 23 (outlining the risks of harm that migrant children incur while on the move).
76 See Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 90.
77 See supra text accompanying note 19.
78 See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1070 (arguing that the ECtHR’s reasoning in relation to the concept of vulnerability risks reinforcing the vulnerability of certain groups by essentializing, stigmatizing, and paternalizing them).
79 See id. at 1073.
80 See id. at 1073-74.
minors and families with children should not be placed in detention facilities that are not adapted to receive them.

Accordingly, if regional human right courts are able to take into account the particularities of the situation of migrant children,\(^{81}\) it is possible to argue that the use of the concept of vulnerability can have a positive impact on the protection of their fundamental rights. The ECtHR takes into account the different elements relating to the migrant child’s personal history and state of physical and mental health, the environment in which they develop, and the risk of abuses they face while on the move and once in the country of destination.\(^ {82}\) By doing so, it imposes a multi-layered analysis of their vulnerability according to these different elements. However, these layers should not be understood as cumulative, since composite vulnerability should not be misused and transformed into an exclusionary tool.

Instead, composite vulnerability should be used as a tool to include a wider range of migrant children under protection and to inform better decision-making. By situating vulnerability into the specific context of migrant children’s experiences, the ECtHR is directing its jurisprudence towards a more inclusive framework of protection of migrant children’s rights. This is highly encouraging,\(^ {83}\) especially given that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can have persuasive authority and can lead to a form of judicial dialogue with domestic courts.\(^ {84}\) For instance, it is interesting to note the U.K. Upper

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\(^{81}\) See Wouter Vandenhole & Julie Ryngaert, Mainstreaming Children’s Rights in Migration Litigation: Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, in DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR 68, 72 (Eva Brems ed., 2013) (arguing that three factors determine vulnerability—personal, environmental, and risk—and that the degree of vulnerability and agency depends on the interaction between these different factors).


\(^{83}\) But see Marc Bossuyt, Is the European Court of Human Rights on a Slippery Slope?\?, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS: TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH 27, 30 (Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart & Julie Fraser eds., 2013) (expressing strong criticism about the ECtHR’s jurisprudence recognizing the vulnerability of asylum seekers).

\(^{84}\) See Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 515 (2000) (presenting a critical evaluation of the meaning and significance of the citation of judgments from other jurisdictions by domestic courts in the field of the protection of constitutional rights); Michal Bobek, COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME COURTS (2013) (analyzing cross-border judicial dialogue in Europe); Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Interpretation, in THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS: UNIFORMITY, DIVERSITY, CONVERGENCE 72, 72 (Helmut Philipp Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2016) (arguing that international law requires domestic jurisdictions to engage in a sort of judicial dialogue by considering decisions of other jurisdictions); Frédéric Sudre, À propos du ‘dialogue des juges’ et du contrôle de conventionnalité, in LES DYNAMIQUES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN EN DÉBUT DE SIÈCLE : ÉTUDES EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-
Tribunal’s recent decision ordering the family reunification of three Syrian
minors and one Syrian mentally disabled adult, who were living in an
improvised refugee camp (also known as “the jungle”) in Calais, France. The
resemblance with the general line of ECtHR’s jurisprudence related to
composite vulnerability of migrant children is remarkable. The U.K. Upper
Tribunal’s decision emphasized the applicants’ “special, indeed unique,
situation because of their ages, their vulnerability, their psychologically
traumatized condition, the acute and ever present dangers to which they are
exposed in ‘the jungle’, [and] the mental disability of [one of the
applicants].” Based on their vulnerability and considerations of the best
interests of the children, the judges decided that to refuse the admission of
the applicants to the U.K. would disproportionately interfere with their right
to respect for family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Upper Tribunal
thus took into account the specific situation of the applicants, while expressly
acknowledging their group vulnerability. Although this decision was later
overturned on appeal, the Court of Appeal similarly recognized the
importance of the vulnerability inherent in the situation of unaccompanied
migrant children.

Overall, the official acknowledgment of the composite vulnerability of
migrant children promotes awareness of the necessity to adequately protect
their rights. Specific consideration of the principle of best interests of the
child can further reinforce this necessity, as will be shown in the next section.

III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VULNERABILITY AND BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD

A. Complementarity

According to Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”), the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all
actions concerning children. This principle provides a normative

Claude Gautron 207, 210 (Joel Andriantsimbazovina et al., eds., 2004) (discussing the
existence of a judicial dialogue in relation to the application of the ECHR by domestic courts).
86 Id. ¶ 6.
87 Id. ¶ 58.
88 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. ZAT [2016] EWCA (Civ) 810 [8], [2016] WLR
(D) 452 (U.K.).
89 Id. ¶ 84 (per L.J. Beatson) (“The need for expedition in cases involving particularly
vulnerable persons such as unaccompanied children is recognised . . . Delay to family
reunification may in itself be an interference with rights under ECHR Article 8 . . . .”.
90 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, art. 3. The best interest principle
is also provided by Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. See Charter
of Fundamental Rights of European Union, art. 24, 2000 J.O. (C 364) 1. The Court of Justice
framework for the definition and interpretation of the rights of the child. The ECtHR tends to combine the concept of vulnerability with the principle of the best interests of the child when deciding on issues relating to the protection of migrant children’s rights. The principle of best interests of the child can indeed be a valuable complement to the concept of vulnerability.

It is commonly accepted that it is in a child’s best interests, for instance, to acquire a nationality and have her birth registered, to receive adequate education, to have her application for family reunification dealt with by States “in a positive, humane and expeditious manner,” to receive adequate protection against all forms of physical and mental violence or abuse, and not to be arbitrarily separated from her parents or caretakers. These considerations also apply to unaccompanied or separated migrant children, including in relation to conditions of reception, treatment, and access to basic rights in countries of transit and destination. The best interests of the child principle therefore creates an additional layer of protection, complementing the general protection offered by regional human rights treaties.


91 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14, supra note 56, ¶ 6 (recognizing that the child’s best interests is a threefold concept: a substantive right, an interpretative legal principle, and a rule of procedure).


93 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at art. 7. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is one of the most widely ratified treaties with 196 parties to the convention.

94 Id. art. 28.

95 Id. art. 10.

96 Id. arts. 19, 32, 34-36.

97 Id. art. 9.

98 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶¶ 7-8.


100 See JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 183 (2006) (affirming that the consideration of best interests of the child constitutes a complementary ground of protection vis-à-vis the Refugee Convention); Jason M. Pobjoy, The Best Interests of the Child Principle as an Independent Source of International Protection, 64 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 327, 344 (2015) (arguing that the best interests principle may give rise to an independent protection status in international law); see also, in the context of deportation of foreigners, Üner v. Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99, ¶ 58 (2006),
By way of an illustrative example, in Rahimi v. Greece, the ECtHR acknowledged the situation of extreme vulnerability of the applicant, an unaccompanied migrant boy from Afghanistan who was detained for two days upon arrival in Greece and subsequently abandoned to live on the streets.  

The Court found a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation to the deplorable conditions of his detention and the lack of care by public authorities, notably in light of his vulnerability. However, the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 5(1) was particularly based on the Greek authorities’ lack of consideration of the best interests of the child applicant. Taking into account the vulnerability of the applicant, the ECtHR indicated that the Greek authorities could not be deemed to have acted in good faith, as they did not consider the child’s best interests while deciding on his detention. In Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, a decision relating to the detention conditions of a mother and three children of Sri Lankan Tamil origins who had claimed asylum in Belgium, the ECtHR recognized the vulnerability of the children and also emphasized the importance of the best interests of the child principle. It is submitted that by referring and drawing upon both the concept of vulnerability and the principle of best interests of the child, the ECtHR advances the complementarity of the two notions.

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng/?i=001-77542  [https://perma.cc/G6FY-JKLB] (affirming that consideration should be given to the best interests and well-being of the children, especially the gravity of the difficulties which any children of the applicant may encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled).

102 Id. ¶ 95.
103 See ECHR, supra note 18, at art. 5(1)(f). (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: . . . f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”).
105 The ECtHR has established that detention of a foreigner is not arbitrary only insofar as it meets the four conditions established in Saadi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 74 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng/?i=001-84709 [https://perma.cc/D567-RWZM] (“To avoid being branded as arbitrary, therefore, such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that ‘the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country’; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.”) (internal citation omitted). The same conditions also apply for detention for the purpose of removal. Id. ¶ 73.
108 Id. ¶ 67.
This approach is certainly not without its flaws, and several of these deficiencies ought to be highlighted. Firstly, the ECtHR did not go as far as imposing a ban on detention of migrant children, whereas evidence demonstrates its negative effects on their long-term psychological health. Secondly, in Rahimi, the ECtHR imported the principle of best interests of the child from the realm of the CRC, but did not provide a comprehensive definition of its scope or the specific obligations required from States. Finally, although it expressly cited Article 3 of the CRC in the abovementioned decisions, the ECtHR failed to refer to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 6, which specifically relates to the treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin. In doing so, the ECtHR overlooked the definition of the determination of best interests adopted by the Committee, possibly in an attempt to avoid being bound by the Committee’s stronger child-centered views on detention of migrant children. This dissociation from the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s position on detention is confirmed by the ECtHR’s ruling in Elmi. In this decision, the ECtHR did finally explicitly refer to the General Comment No. 6, but it did not in fact use the principle of best interests in its assessment of the lawfulness and non-

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109 See DEMBOUR, supra note 7, at 394 (“[A] blanket condemnation of children’s detention when the said children are not ‘unaccompanied’ is conspicuous by its absence.”).


111 Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 33.


113 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶ 5.

114 Id. ¶ 20 (“[A] determination of what is in the best interests of the child requires a clear and comprehensive assessment of the child’s identity, including her or his nationality, upbringing, ethnic, cultural and linguistic background, particular vulnerabilities and protection needs. Consequently, allowing the child access to the territory is a prerequisite to this initial assessment process. The assessment process should be carried out in a friendly and safe atmosphere by qualified professionals who are trained in age and gender sensitive related interviewing techniques.”).

115 Id. ¶ 61 (“Detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied or separated, or on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof.”).


117 Id. ¶ 56.
arbitrariness of the detention of the applicants. By contrast, the IACtHR’s approach is closer to the one adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment No. 6 regarding detention and the best interests of the child. This can be seen in the fact that, in addition to citing the General Comment in its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the IACtHR has also directly drawn upon it.

In relation to Article 8 of the ECHR (right to respect for private and family life), the ECtHR’s recourse to the concept of vulnerability is comparatively less well developed than that of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR. In contrast, the references to the child’s best interests are quite significant.

For example, the ECtHR takes into account several factors, including age, rupture of family life, ties to the host country, immigration control, and considerations of public order, to determine whether it is in the child’s best interests not to be removed. Accordingly, achieving a fair balance between competing interests of States and individuals is at the center of its jurisprudence. On the one hand, States have the right to control the entry of non-nationals into their territories and family reunion is not automatically guaranteed under Article 8. On the other hand, the particular circumstances of the case and the child’s best interests have been taken into account by the Court. Still, these particular circumstances could and should also include the migrant children’s vulnerability. The ECtHR should expressly build this notion into its evaluation of the specific circumstances of

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118 Id. ¶¶ 140-48. The applicants were detained for eight months after having claimed asylum while their age was determined by the competent authorities. The ECtHR found that there was a violation of Article 5(1) of the ECHR after considering the four conditions established in Saadi, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 74. However, it did not explicitly consider the best interests of the child while assessing the authorities’ good faith and the length of detention imposed on the applicants.


120 See ECHR, supra note 18, at arts. 3, 5 & 8.


each case involving migrant children.

Comparatively, the IACtHR proposes a clearer double-layered test to determine the nature and scope of special measures for the protection of migrant children required from States. Firstly, it requires the domestic authorities to evaluate different factors that may result in the recognition of vulnerability. Secondly, it expects these authorities to analyze whether these measures were taken in the best interests of the children.126 Thus, the sole test of best interests would not suffice to determine the nature and the extent of the measures necessary for the protection of the migrant children. For instance, the IACtHR suggested that unaccompanied or separated migrant girls are particularly vulnerable due to higher risks of sexual exploitation and abuses.127 In this sense, domestic authorities should first take into account the children’s particular situation of vulnerability, and then consider what would be in their best interests in order to adopt the most appropriate measures.128

Drawing upon the abovementioned examples, it appears that the ECtHR tends to rely upon the concept of vulnerability to emphasize the need for special measures of protection of migrant children. This is particularly prominent in the context of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR.129 In addition, the principle of best interests of the child complements and reinforces the request for special measures, notably in the ambit of Article 3. By referring to the principle of best interests of the child, the ECtHR locates these special measures within a broader regulatory framework, making it easier to determine whether a substantive right has been violated or not by domestic authorities. In contrast, the IACtHR embraces a more comprehensive child rights-based approach that emphasizes considerations of the welfare of migrant children.130

It is submitted that the complementary use of the concept of vulnerability and the principle of best interests of the child should be welcomed, as it can pave the way towards a more robust and effective implementation of special measures of protection and assistance for migrant children.131 The assessment of the vulnerability of the situation of these children coupled with the consideration of their best interests as a guiding principle could require, for instance, that States provide more adequate assistance to unaccompanied

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126 Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 104.
127 Id. ¶ 102.
128 Id. ¶ 103.
129 See ECHR, supra note 18, at arts. 3, 5.
migrant children while in makeshift camps,\textsuperscript{132} or while placed in offshore detention facilities.\textsuperscript{133} However, this complementarity should not be undermined by the instrumentalization of the principle of best interests of the child, as will be exposed in the next section.

B. Instrumentalization

The analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence demonstrates that the principle of best interests of the child can be a powerful tool in finding breaches of protected rights. For instance, this approach was adopted by the ECtHR in \textit{Rahimi}.\textsuperscript{134} It was the procedural flaw in the appreciation of the best interests of the child by the Greek authorities that reinforced the finding of a violation of Article 5(1) of the ECHR in this decision, not the sole fact of detention of a vulnerable migrant child.\textsuperscript{135} Conversely, in \textit{Kanagaratnam}, the ECtHR found a breach of Article 5(1) insofar as the children were concerned.\textsuperscript{136} The vulnerability of the children was paramount for the Court in reaching its verdict.\textsuperscript{137} Without further developing its arguments, the ECtHR simply referred\textsuperscript{138} to a passage in its previous ruling in \textit{Mayeka v. Belgium}, where the situation of extreme vulnerability of unaccompanied migrant children was explicitly acknowledged.\textsuperscript{139} The ECtHR then applied the same findings to situations of detention of children, this time accompanied by their parents, referring to its decision in \textit{Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium}\textsuperscript{140} and finding a violation of Article 5(1).\textsuperscript{141}

Conceivably, the principle of best interests of the child was less prominent in \textit{Kanagaratnam} because the detention had lasted for approximately four months in a closed detention center, which had already been judged to be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations Regarding France, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/FRA/CO/5 (Jan. 29, 2016) (expressing concern about the uncertainty surrounding children and their families in refugee camps, such as in Calais and in Grande-Synthe, in the northern part of the state).
\item \textsuperscript{133} Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations Regarding Australia, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/AUS/CO/4 (May 29, 2012) (expressing concerns about the inadequate understanding and application of the principle of the best interests of the child in situations such as asylum-seeking, refugee and/or immigration detention).
\item \textsuperscript{134} \textit{Rahimi}, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 109.
\item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{Kanagaratnam}, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶¶ 86, 88.
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id}, ¶ 86.
\item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{Mayeka}, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 223, ¶ 103.
\item \textsuperscript{140} \textit{Muskhadzhiyeva}, App. No. 41442/07, ¶ 61.
\item \textsuperscript{141} See \textit{Kanagaratnam}, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶¶ 86-88; see also Vandenhole & Ryngaert, \textit{supra} note 81, at 68 (providing a comprehensive commentary of \textit{Muskhadzhiyeva}).
\end{itemize}
Taking into account their vulnerability, the Court considered that by placing the children (despite being accompanied by their mother) in such a closed center, the Belgian authorities had exposed them to feelings of anxiety and inferiority and had, in full knowledge of the facts, risked compromising their development. The ECtHR could therefore find a violation of Articles 3 and 5(1) of the ECHR without overly relying on the application of the principle of best interests of the child. The same approach was visible in Elmi, where the detention of the applicants for the purpose of determining their age lasted eight months. Despite explicitly referring to Article 3 of the CRC and to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 6, the ECtHR did not in fact make use of the principle of best interests of the child when finding violations of Articles 3 and 5(1) of the ECHR. By contrast, in Rahimi, the detention had lasted only two days and the ECtHR relied heavily on the best interests principle in order to legitimatize the overall finding of a violation of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.

Therefore, the ECtHR appears to instrumentalize the principle of best interests, only using it when convenient for finding violations of the ECHR. This approach, in addition to suffering from unnecessary pragmatism and inconsistency, is not without further risks. For instance, in a hypothetical situation similar to the one in Rahimi, if the State authorities proved that they had taken this principle into account in assessing the situation of a migrant child, the detention would not per se be contrary to the ECHR. In this case, the State would still need to satisfy the general test of detention as a measure of last resort, but the principle of best interests would be

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142 Kanagaratnam, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 26, ¶¶ 37-39; Muskhadziyeva, App. No. 41442/07 ¶¶ 59-63 (affirming that this same detention center was not an appropriate venue for detention of children).
144 Id. ¶¶ 68-69 (finding a violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR) and ¶¶ 86-88 (finding a violation of Art. 5(1) of the ECHR).
146 Id. ¶ 41.
147 Id. ¶ 56.
149 Rahimi, App. No. 8687/08, ¶¶ 107-08.
150 Id.
151 Popov, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, ¶ 119 (establishing that detention should be seen as a measure of last resort for which no alternative is available). In this sense, the ECtHR’s approach is similar to the one of the CJEU according to which immigration detention should be used as a last resort measure only. See Case C-61/11/PPU, El Dridi, 2011 E.C.R. 1-03015, ¶ 34; Case C-329/11, Achughbabian v. Prefet du Val-de-Marne, 2011 E.C.R. I-12695, ¶¶ 36-37; Case C-601/15/PPU, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, ¶ 63, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=c-601/15
satisfied. Despite these risks, the recognition of migrant children’s composite vulnerability, when combined with the assessment of their best interests, could pave the way towards the imposition of greater obligations of care and protection upon States, which is the subject of the following section.

IV. TOWARDS THE IMPOSITION OF ENHANCED STATE OBLIGATIONS?

A. ECtHR: Emphasis on Positive Obligations

The recognition of vulnerability of migrant children and the use of the principle of best interests can be accompanied by the identification of an important duty owed by States to provide care and protection to these children. It is important to understand whether by doing so, human rights courts are contributing to the creation of new categories of obligations to be imposed upon States. If this is not the case, it is crucial to investigate whether existing State obligations are being interpreted in an enhanced manner, and converted into a sort of super-obligations.

The ECtHR puts forward a distinction between negative and positive obligations, which overlaps to some degree with the tripartite distinction of obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights found in the academic literature. Negative obligations entail that States should refrain from interfering in the exercise of rights, whereas positive obligations mean that States should adopt all measures necessary to safeguard the effective


respect of rights.\textsuperscript{155}

Positive obligations applicable to situations involving migrant children are similar to those already in place regarding any individual falling within the jurisdiction of a State party to the ECHR.\textsuperscript{156} There are no new positive obligations created specifically in the context of the protection of migrant children’s rights. The same positive obligations are applicable to cases involving any other categories of individuals, and this is particularly apparent in relation to Articles 3,\textsuperscript{157} 5,\textsuperscript{158} and 8 of the ECHR.\textsuperscript{159}


\textsuperscript{157} For the positive obligation to take all measures necessary to protect children from ill-treatment, see \textit{A. v. United Kingdom}, App. Nos. 100/1997/884/1096, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2699, \S\ 24 (1998) (finding that U.K. domestic law failed to provide adequate protection to a child beaten by his stepfather when the beating constituted inhuman or degrading punishment and was known by the authorities); \textit{Z. v. United Kingdom}, App. No. 29392/95, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, \S\S\ 74-75 (2001) (finding a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR insofar as the State failed to take measures necessary to place vulnerable children into the Child Protection Register). For the procedural positive obligation to investigate cases of ill-treatment, see \textit{E. v. United Kingdom}, App. No. 33218/96, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 31, \S\ 100 (2002) (finding that local authorities failed to protect children from an abusive stepfather and emphasizing the lack of investigation, communication, and cooperation by the relevant authorities).

\textsuperscript{158} See Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276/94, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, \S\ 124, (1998). This case affirmed that States have the obligation to record details about the detention as “Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.” \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{159} See \textit{X. v. Netherlands}, App. No. 8978/80, 8 E.H.R.R. 235, \S\ 30 (1985) (finding a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR insofar as the Dutch legislation imposed a procedural obstacle for the prosecution of the perpetrator of sexual assault against a sixteen-year-old mentally ill girl, who was unable to represent herself and who could not be represented by anyone else, including her parent, according to the Dutch legislation); \textit{Maire v. Portugal}, App. No. 48206/99, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, \S\ 72 (2003) (“[T]he positive obligations that Article 8 of the Convention lays on the Contracting States in the matter of reuniting a parent with his or her children must be interpreted in the light of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction . . . and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.”); \textit{Hansen v. Turkey}, App. No. 36141/97, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, \S\ 97 (2003) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly held that Article 8 includes a right for parents to have measures taken that will permit them to be reunited with their children and an obligation on the national authorities to take such action . . . ”).
An area of key interest relates to the application of Article 3 of the ECHR to the situation of migrant children. For this provision to be applicable, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity in order to fall within the scope of Article 3.\(^{160}\) Interestingly, in decisions relating to migrant children, the ECtHR tends to use the vulnerability concept to analyze the requirement of minimum level of severity.\(^{161}\) This approach has been criticized on the basis that it purportedly leads to lowering the threshold for the application of Article 3, and does so in an inconsistent manner.\(^{162}\) On its face, the argument is appealing; however, it fails to convince for three main reasons.

Firstly, as affirmed by the well-established ECtHR’s jurisprudence, all circumstances should be taken into account by the Court when deciding whether the level of severity of a treatment or punishment is of such relevance as to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the ECHR.\(^{163}\) The mention of “all circumstances” explicitly includes the potential victim’s age,\(^{164}\) and should also naturally include her particular situation of vulnerability.

Secondly, it is clear that the assertion according to which all situations of vulnerability would automatically lead to the application of Article 3 of the ECHR is erroneous. Fortunately, this is not the ECtHR’s position. Indeed, the ECtHR’s methodology relates rather to \textit{in concreto} examination of all circumstances relating to the potential victim’s situation. It acknowledges the existence of composite vulnerability, recognizing that several factors leading to vulnerability can exist at the same time and that it is precisely the confluence of these elements that gives rise to a specific form of vulnerability.\(^{165}\)

Thirdly, the argument that the ECtHR incorrectly emphasizes the protection of social rights of specific categories of individuals\(^{166}\) cannot be

\(^{160}\) \textit{See} Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, ¶ 162 (1978). This case established that the assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative and “depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.” \textit{See id.; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 29 (1978); Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, ¶ 100 (1989).}

\(^{161}\) \textit{Rahimi}, App. No. 8687/08, ¶ 86.

\(^{162}\) \textit{See} Bossuyt, \textit{supra} note 83, at 29-31 (arguing that the ECtHR has lowered the threshold of application of Article 3 of the ECHR when the case relates to asylum seekers).


\(^{165}\) \textit{See supra} Part II.

\(^{166}\) \textit{See} Bossuyt, \textit{supra} note 83, at 31-32 (arguing that in its decisions in \textit{M.S.S.} and \textit{Rahimi}, the ECtHR transformed the prohibition of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment, which is a civil right that must be respected regardless of the available resources, into a social right requiring considerable expenditure).
accepted. Already in its seminal decision *Airey v. Ireland*, the ECtHR highlighted that whilst the ECHR “sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications of a social or economic nature.”\(^{167}\) It concluded with the famous holding that there is no “water-tight division” separating these two categories of rights.\(^{168}\) Since then, the ECtHR has confirmed this holistic approach on many occasions.\(^ {169}\) As the ECHR applies to everyone within the jurisdiction of a State party,\(^ {170}\) nothing would justify using a different approach in relation to foreign individuals. In addition, in *Rahimi*, the patent failure of the State to provide material support for the applicant was in clear breach of the domestic legislation, which explicitly required the State to provide care and appoint a legal guardian to all unaccompanied migrant children within its jurisdiction.\(^ {171}\)

Essentially, there is nothing intrinsically new in the ECtHR’s approach to the application of Article 3 of the ECHR to cases relating to migrant children. The Court is simply applying its well-established jurisprudence to a novel situation which, sadly, occurs with ever greater frequency in light of the ongoing migration crisis in Europe. Therefore, the ECtHR has not created new obligations for States in this case.

Similarly, in the domain of Article 8 of the ECHR, considerations of the children’s best interests have always been a central element in decisions relating to nationals as opposed to foreign individuals. This is the case in decisions relating to parental authority and placement of children in foster homes.


\(^{168}\) *Id.*


\(^{170}\) ECHR, supra note 18, at art. 1.

care,\textsuperscript{172} determination of paternity,\textsuperscript{173} and adoption.\textsuperscript{174}

Accordingly, the main impact of the recognition of the migrant children’s vulnerability and application of the principle of best interests is the degree of the obligations imposed upon States by the ECtHR. The recognition of vulnerability operates as a magnifying glass,\textsuperscript{175} exposing a greater duty to protect and care owed by States in relation to vulnerable individuals. In relation to the protection of migrant children’s rights, State authorities have a significant obligation to take the best interests of the child into account.\textsuperscript{176} However, this does not imply the creation of new obligations to be imposed upon States. In contrast, new obligations could be expected from States in the Inter-American system.

B. \textit{IACtHR: Potential for Innovation}

Comparatively, in the Inter-American context, the IACtHR is generally more prone to innovation and willing to impose a wider variety of obligations upon States, as explained below.\textsuperscript{177}

For instance, the Inter-American Court has imposed novel responsibilities upon States in relation to their obligation to identify non-national children who require international protection within their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{178} For instance, it held that States should provide training for professionals performing initial

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} See Mikulić v. Croatia, App. No. 53176/99, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 141, ¶ 65 (2002) (“[I]n determining an application to have paternity established, the courts are required to have regard to the basic principle of the child’s interests.”).
\item \textsuperscript{174} See Fretté v. France, App. No. 36515/97, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 303, ¶ 42 (2002) (considering that the right to adopt is limited by considerations of best interests of the child); Loudoudi v. Belgium, App. No. 52265/10, ¶ 97 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148672 [https://perma.cc/LX64-8ED2] (affirming that the best interests of the child is a component of the right to respect of family life and should be paramount to decisions of the domestic courts relating to adoption of children under the Islamic system of kafala).
\item \textsuperscript{175} See Peroni & Timmer, \textit{supra} note 19, at 1079.
\item \textsuperscript{176} \textit{See supra} Part III.
\item \textsuperscript{177} See \textit{Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen & Amaya Ubeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case Law and Commentary} 224 (Rosalind Greenstein trans., 2011) (arguing that the IACtHR’s approach to reparations is innovative and forward looking); Ana Beduschi, \textit{The Contribution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the Protection of Irregular Immigrants’ Rights: Opportunities and Challenges}, 34 \textit{Refugee Survey Q.} 45, 63-65 (2015) (arguing that the IACtHR is at the forefront of an innovative approach to reparations in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights).
\item \textsuperscript{178} Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, operative ¶ 3.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
assessments in age and gender sensitive related interviewing techniques. Similarly, the IACtHR has imposed an obligation to guarantee that the administrative or judicial proceedings concerning the rights of migrant children are adapted to their needs and are accessible to them. It based the justification for such an obligation on the necessity to ensure that the best interests of the child is a paramount consideration in all the decisions adopted. Importantly, this obligation may entail significant changes to domestic laws and policies. It implies, for example, that decisions on migratory matters involving migrant children should not be delegated to non-specialized officials, and that special attention should be paid to migrant children’s non-verbal forms of communication.

The IACtHR’s leeway in imposing such a variety of obligations upon States can be explained by the general mandate given to it by Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”). Indeed, the IACtHR interprets these provisions as the basis for a general obligation of States to adapt their domestic legislation to the ACHR.

The recognition of migrant children’s vulnerability is equally crucial for the determination of the nature and degree of State obligations in the Inter-American system. For instance, the IACtHR clearly established in its influential Advisory Opinion no. 21 that States must accord priority to a human rights-based approach, from a crosscut perspective that takes into consideration the rights of the child and, in particular, the protection and comprehensive development of the

179 Id. ¶ 85.
180 Id. operative ¶ 4.
181 Id.
182 Id. ¶ 121.
183 Id. ¶ 122.
184 American Convention on Human Rights art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”).
185 Id. art. 2 (“Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”).
187 Rights and Guarantees of Children, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, ¶ 71 (emphasizing the situation of additional vulnerability of migrant children).
child, which should have priority over any consideration of nationality or migratory status, in order to ensure the full exercise of their rights . . . . 188

Certainly, these obligations were introduced by the IACtHR in an advisory opinion, a non-binding interpretation of the law. 189 Nevertheless, the Advisory Opinion OC-21 is definitely noteworthy. It comprehensively illustrates the IACtHR’s general views on the topic and forms the basis for the development of its decisions in the future.

V. CONCLUSION

The ECtHR’s understanding of the concept of vulnerability in cases relating to migrant children, although not exempt from criticism, can contribute to the strengthening of the protection of their rights. By developing a contextual analysis of migrant children’s composite vulnerability, the ECtHR has avoided the risk of excessive stigmatization of this category of individuals. 190 We should welcome the Court’s emphasis on the complementarity between vulnerability and the principle of best interests of the child, given that it reinforces the need for special measures of protection. 191

Yet, the example of its Inter-American counterpart demonstrates that the European Court could indeed do more. 192 It took the ECtHR until 2016 193 to directly refer to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 6 194 while integrating the principle of best interests from Article 3 of the CRC. Nonetheless, even the 2016 reference was not dispositive, as the principle of best interests was not even applied in the case

188 Id. ¶ 18(2).
189 Hugh Thirlway, Advisory Opinions, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008) (“An advisory opinion is a judicial opinion, most frequently given by a standing international tribunal . . . on a legal question which is frequently, but need not be, related to a current international dispute. In the case of standing tribunals, their statutes provide for such opinions to be given at the request of a defined class of international bodies rather than of States. An essential characteristic of advisory opinions is, as the term implies, that they constitute advice, ie [sic] they do not legally bind either the requesting entity or any other body or State to take any specific action pursuant to the opinion. In general, there may be, at most, an obligation on the requesting entity to regulate its conduct or its affairs taking due account of the view of the legal situation expressed in the opinion.”).
190 See supra Part II.
191 See supra Section III.A.
192 Id.
194 See generally Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5.
Hence, the ECtHR is considerably instrumental in its use of this principle. If, on the contrary, the ECtHR allowed the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s child-centered views on the justifications of migrant children detention to robustly penetrate the realm of the ECHR, it would bring much-needed consistency to the understanding of the principle of best interests in the specific context of ECHR rights and liberties.

Despite its reserved approach in terms of detention, the ECtHR’s recognition of migrant children’s composite vulnerability and consideration of their best interests has contributed to the imposition of enhanced obligations upon States. The ECtHR’s approach is the most visible in relation to the existing positive obligations. Unlike the IACtHR, the ECtHR does not create new obligations in the field of the protection of migrant children’s rights. The ECtHR’s recognition of vulnerability only operates as a magnifying glass, exposing a greater duty to protect and care imposed upon States, which is further reinforced by the application of the principle of best interests of the child.

On balance, both the identification of their composite vulnerability, and recourse to the principle of best interests, embrace and foster the need for further protection of migrant children’s rights. In view of the current global migration crisis, and the growing number of unaccompanied or separated migrant children, a more substantial child-oriented approach to international migration is certainly needed. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence is slowly evolving in this direction. Notwithstanding, this process will still require a great dose of persistence and determination to achieve a more comprehensive level of protection.

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195 See supra Section III.B.
196 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, supra note 5, ¶¶ 61, 63.
197 See supra Section IV.A.
198 Id.
199 Id.