Landscape, Memory and Secrecy:

The Cold War Archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps

Volume 1 of 2

Submitted by Robert Clarke to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Archaeology in December 2016.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature…….

ABSTRACT

This project covers the development of a model framework intended to allow researchers of the archaeology of the Cold War to recognise a range of behaviours played out on military sites. The order and chaos model developed and utilised in this thesis introduces a heterotopian landscape populated by the Royal Observer Corps. Through a process of archaeological fieldwork a number of behavioural traits are recognised and discussed here for the first time. The group in question is fully researched, providing a historiography of the practice played out during the groups life-cycle. The landscape archaeology is discussed and contextualised by narration from the volunteers who once operated the posts. A range of case studies are introduced confirming the validity of the order and chaos model and potential for application elsewhere. Finally, the findings are discussed in detail and a proposal for the next step in the research are revealed.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervision team, Prof. Oliver Creighton, Prof. Stephen Rippon and Dr. Hajnalka Herold for their support, patient, insight and firm hand throughout the last six years.

I also extend my thanks to the staff of the many Historical Environment Records across the south-west, Historic England (formerly English Heritage) and the National Trust for supplying records and brokering access to sites across the study area. My family for their unstinting support over the last few years and all those who dedicated so much of their time to the pursuit of peace, no matter what form it took politically.

This work is dedicated to the Royal Observer Corps spare time members who have enlightened a, once dark, world and the late Prof. Mick Aston, who started me on this road back in 1997 with the comment “Well if you consider that to be archaeology, then so be it”.

Bob Clarke

December 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND GRAPHS

No. 1: Literature Review

No. 2: Methodology

No. 3: Populating a Heterotopian Landscape

No. 4: Order and Chaos

No. 5: Landscape Archaeology

No. 6: The Landscape of the Observer

No. 7: The Years of Chaos and a Return to Order

No. 8: Discussion

Graphs

ABBREVIATIONS

AAOR - Anti-Aircraft Operations Room

AMO - Air Ministry Order

ATS - Air Transport Service

BPI - Bomb Power Indicator

CBA - Council for British Archaeology

CDC - Civil Defence Corps

CND - Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

DS - Domestic Space

FOD - Foreign Object Damage

GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters

GDA - Gun Defended Area

GPO - General Post Office

GZI - Ground Zero Indicator

HC - House of Commons

HDN - Home Defence Network

HDR - Home Defence Region

HER - Heritage Environment Record

HMS - Her Majesty's Ship

HMSO - Her Majesty's Stationary Office

HODS - Highly Organised Domestic Space

HOOS - Highly Organised Operational Space

LiDAR - Laser Indication and Detection Down Range

MOS - Metropolitan Observation Service

NAAFI - Navy, Army, Airforce Families Institute

PRO - Public Record Office

RAF - Royal Air Force

ROC - Royal Observer Corps

ROCA - Royal Observer Corps Association

SAM - Scheduled Ancient Monument

UGMP - Underground Monitoring Post

UKWMO - United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation

VHF - Very High Frequency

WAAF - Women's Auxiliary Air Force

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Anti-Aircraft Operations Room

A central control where a number of automatic guns in an area known as a Gun Defended Area were operated. The structures are semi-sunken, two storey blockhouses. They were operated by Anti-Aircraft Command, a component of the Royal Artillery. The organisation was disbanded in March 1955.

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

A network of three powerful radar stations intended to detect missile launches from the east and compute their trajectory and intended target. The site in the United Kingdom, RAF Fylingdales, gave rise to the phrase ‘Four Minute Warning’.

Bomb Power Indicator

A visual indicator located in the control room of every underground monitoring post, operated by a baffle plate at the surface. Standard equipment the BPI measures the blast force of the pressure wave as it passes over the post.

Carrier Control Point

The United Kingdom had a network of 250 carrier control points - usually in police stations - each fed by information from the ROC and other government sources. From here it was possible to initiate over 7000 powered air-raid sirens and 9000 over warning devices nationally.

Civil Defence Corps

The Civil Defence Corps was a mainly voluntary organisation funded by Central Government between 1948-1968, although organised on a county level and the responsibility of that unitary authority. It comprised a number of specialist departments including warden; ambulance; rescue, control and welfare. By the early 1960s the organisation had over 300,000 members.

Defence of Britain Project

The Defence of Britain Project was a long running recording project managed by the Council for British Archaeology. The initial concept was to record all military remains in the United Kingdom. Eventually the task became so massive the project was downgraded to just those sites from World War II.

Fixed Survey Meter

An electronic instrument capable of recognising the ionisation of the atmosphere and subsequent radiation from a nuclear weapon once detonated. Standard equipment on underground monitoring posts.

Ground Zero Indicator

A drum-like device used to capture the direction and height of the nuclear flash. Operates like a pin-hole camera. Standard equipment on every underground monitoring post.

Gun Defended Areas

An air defence network operating heavy anti-aircraft, and later, missiles. The United Kingdom was divided into thirty-three Gun Defended Areas. The structure was disbanded in March 1955.

Home Defence Region

The United Kingdom was divided, during the Cold War, into eleven Home Defence Regions. This form of decentralised government reduced the country to a number of self-controlled regions managed from two control centres by an appointed junior minister. The key purpose was to maintain the machinery of government had central government become incapacitated.

Orlit Post

The Orlit post was an overground observation point for aircraft reporting. It was constructed using pre-cast concrete panels manufactured to a design by Messrs'. Orlit, Bedfordshire.

Rotor Project

The Rotor project was the regeneration of the radar network post- World War II. In several phases the construction phase of Rotor was the biggest capital works for a generation.

Underground Monitoring Post

The form of post used by the ROC during the nuclear reporting role. It comprised a control room, utility room and entrance stack with steel access ladder. The whole structure was buried at least 10ft (3.04m) below ground.

United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation

The government organisation responsible for warning the public and authorities of air and nuclear attack. The ROC fed information to it during phase two of its Cold War life-cycle.

INTRODUCTION

*'*The seductive interest of concrete should not hide wider significances; what it tells us about the Cold War cannot be assumed to be obvious or unarguable*'* (Fairclough 2007, 27).

The study of the remains of both warfare and the impact recent military activities have had on the landscape of the British Isles is a relatively new concept to archaeology. There is one overriding reason for this. It is only through redundancy that military remains and landscapes become available for investigation and research. Prior to that the military appears to be the preserve of historical commentary and often a very subjective one at that. The twentieth century is punctuated by anniversaries and commemorations, 11 November 1918, the Armistice of World War I and 6 June 1944, D-Day, the liberation of Europe, are two key dates that resonate through the British psyche as surely as the year 1066.

One such key date is 9 November 1989, the opening of the Berlin Wall to traffic and pedestrians without restrictions. This date is significant; this singular event initiated a radical change to the British military landscape, defence industries and, indeed, to a lesser degree the social structure of the 'left'; it also signalled the beginning of the eventual end of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991 (Judt 2005, 657) .The end of the Cold War and subsequent drawdown of forces in Europe, especially by the United States, brought about an academic and conservation discussion in 2001 with the publication of *Cold War Monuments: An assessment by the Monuments Protection Programme by English Heritage* (Cocroft 2001). This and subsequent works (discussed later in this thesis) were a reaction to the sudden and extensive reduction of land holdings by the British government for defence purposes.

The Complexity of Military Sites from the Twentieth Century

The release of so many military sites stemmed from how the Cold War estate had developed over the period (1948-1991). Many sites now available to the researcher are often a landscape of complexity, driven, on the whole, by advances in technology; developments that were often so rapid that structures became redundant before they were fully commissioned (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 3). Expand that premise to the whole period of the Cold War (41 years) and one can readily appreciate the challenges facing the archaeologist concerned with twentieth century military sites and their landscapes.

This Project

This challenge is exciting. Complexity, especially when investigating the recent past, should be embraced, it exposes the research community to other avenues of investigation and complements it by introducing other disciplines. The Cold War is especially attractive; moreover as unlike other military activities the Cold War suffers something of an identity crisis. I have spent most of my working life on military bases in Britain, Europe and the United States and have witnessed this first-hand. Indeed, the phrase 'Cold War' evokes some wild interpretations in the personal histories of those who lived through it, mostly they centre on one aspect, nuclear weapons and the threat of their use.

To allow this attitude to influence the current debate surrounding the value placed on monuments connected with the weapons of mass destruction, without an appropriate level of discord from those who are seen as the perpetrators, is unwise. Cold War monuments are not only a necessary component of the military landscape; they are often integrated into a far more social landscape than one is aware. The Royal Observer Corps is one such organisation whose monuments are dispersed across the British landscape, often hiding in plain sight. These monuments, or posts to give them their correct title, demonstrate how close to home components of the art of nuclear warfare really were. Moreover, the Royal Observer Corps was essentially a volunteer, or spare-time, organisation; many observers - some who served the whole period of the Cold War - are still alive, as is quite a large cross-section of the records produced by the organisation during its operational life-cycle. The opportunities for a multi-phase research agenda of the period is self-evident.

The historiography of the organisation is extant through the works of a handful of historians, Derek Wood especially in his work *Attack Warning Red* published in 1976 and updated in 1992. To date no known systematic review of the archaeological, cultural and social elements of the Royal Observer Corps has been undertaken; neither has an assessment of its activities both before and, more importantly, after the organisation was disbanded. This is where my interest, and this project, begins. Having been inducted into organisations whose primary purpose was to support the nuclear deterrent, maintain a nuclear centred 'flexible response' and, in case that extreme form of retaliation was needed, fly such weapons, I have held a privileged

position; one that provided a grandstand view of how organisations act when in pursuit of their objective. I have been able to exploit this in this project.

Archaeologically, I have been at the forefront of much of the recording of Cold War sites, although very little of my, or others research appear to have an overarching account of such monuments. What happens to Cold War sites once abandoned? What processes can we identify? Are they specific to the location of the monument? Connected with its original use or just 'natural' interactivity? Can we interpret certain social behaviours displayed by those who interact with monuments from this period? I am convinced we can; this thesis introduces the work aimed at demonstrating that certain military remains do have much to offer the archaeologist; it also shines light on a secret landscape and highlights the very real value of multi-discipline research, thus ensuring the results reach a much wider audience. The implications of the findings, especially when considering the process of abandonment of places, are important. The archaeological record is littered with areas of 'no activity'. Is this an accurate assessment of the interactions once enacted there - I believe it is not.

The Precis of the Following Work

To discuss any period archaeologically requires an assessment of the current debate concerned with the topic being researched, subsequently, this literature review follows a number of avenues, including the level of current work on the Cold War period. The form the research takes is necessarily multi-faceted; the methodology introduces both the research questions set and the route to maximising the information derived from a number of fieldwork and social expeditions. I then introduce the group under study, enlightening a surprisingly secret world with accounts from the Observers themselves, while laying out the historiography of the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold War period.

Beyond that, I layout the terms of the 'order and chaos' model; developed specifically to investigate the social structure and behaviours of organisations such as the military; especially their ability to influence both the landscape and the material culture connected with a given period. A number of routes increasing the detail of observations and interactions are presented and a case made for the utilisation of this model in research beyond this project. The landscape archaeology is presented, specifically concentrating on specify chronological markers in the Royal Observer Corps life-cycle, an important factor of abandonment processes. I then discuss the

life-cycle of the spare-time Observers, contextualising the archaeology and material culture located on ROC posts and elsewhere. Key aspects of the Observers' activities are discussed, demonstrating how fragile, or potentially invisible, many of the roles were during operation phases.

The field results are then offered and interpretations threaded through the new 'order and chaos' model. The results indicate a very complex series of activities are being enacted out on the ROC posts, ones that, even with the complexity of 'chaos' are still quantifiable. The extended discussion that follows offers a number of points that require further testing beyond this project. Moreover, I feel they currently support my thoughts on the process of abandonment, the form of the social group involved in the world of mass destruction and demonstrate the value of both historical archaeology and the study of Cold War monuments within a holistic framework.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

As noted in the in the introduction, the study of the Cold War, indeed the study of contemporary archaeology is necessarily multi-faceted (Harrison and Schofield 2010, 90); subsequently any review of the current academic position has to follow suit. What follows is an account of the work carried out in the areas identified as being relevant to the research objectives of this project. It calls on a wide range of forms of publication and methodologies demonstrating that the Cold War, especially when placed under archaeological scrutiny, still has much to offer.

Concentrating on the United Kingdom the research topic intends to examine a number of areas, including the conservation and contextualisation of structures connected with the defence of the civil population against nuclear war, located in the specific geographical location known as Home Defence Region 7 (fig.1-1) (discussed in chapter 5). At the forefront of this research is the remit to demonstrate ways in which such monuments can be assimilated into the current educational system, thus stimulating their use as a cultural resource rather than a chronological marker of a contested and contentious period. Reference to the Cold War's influence on social and popular culture over the last five decades of the twentieth century is the key to understanding this.



Fig.1-1. Home Defence Region 7. This map represents the core area under investigation in this project. This was the Geographical footprint of the Regional Seats of Government in the South West until the end of the Cold War. (Source: Civil Protection 1986)

THE DEVELOPING LANDSCAPE

To fully exploit the archaeological, educational and social value of Royal Observer Corps monuments, one first has to recognise and understand the multi-disciplinary debate that surrounds this relatively new area of investigation. The range of recognisable, defence orientated, sites originating in the twentieth century throughout the United Kingdom is staggering in both number and preservation. When peripheral sites, such as shadow factories intended to increase manufacturing output during World War II (Clarke 2009, 87); or civilian company test facilities like Smith's Industries missile site at Boscombe Down (Clarke 2005, 39) are considered the number is probably without international parallel (Osborne 2004, 7). Reasons for this are legion. Two major European wars dominated the first 50 years of the twentieth century; both preceded by major arms races. The first focused on the development of naval power leading indirectly to the outbreak of World War I (Massie 1991; Halpern 1994); although, by the cease of hostilities (November 1918) this focus had shifted to aerial warfare. The following two decades are dominated by development of both aircraft and the facilities to maintain and operate them. By the end of World War II the United Kingdom contained over 700 military airfields, 450 of them built between 1939 and 1945 (Clarke 2009, 100). Literally thousands of other defence related structures encompassing everything from small Observer Corps, Warden posts and pillboxes (Osborne 2008) through to Royal Ordnance Factories covering hundreds of hectares had also appeared on the landscape by 1945. Many of these defence related structures survive today or their effects are still visible in the landscape.

Post-World War II a major part of the wartime structure was retained as political relationships rapidly deteriorated with the Soviet Union; many of these sites have only recently started to be disposed of by the British Government. What drives defence related site survivability throughout the second half of the twentieth century has been the United Kingdom's unique geographical location in both World Wars and subsequent Cold War. The defence of Britain's coastline had been of concern since the mid-1850s with the French navy's construction of ironclad vessels (Osborne 2004, 11). By 1915 the Government had embarked on an ambitious plan to protect all sea lanes around the United Kingdom with airships (Mowthorpe 1995); during 1917 America entered into World War I on the side of Britain and France. Utilising the United Kingdom mainland as a marshalling area for additional troops

from the Commonwealth and the United States, London demonstrated how strategically placed it was when fighting in Europe (Clarke 2009, 23). This was famously illustrated again in 1940 when, after the Battle of Britain and Germany's failure to invade, Britain stood alone against the Fascist threat. In early 1944 the Isles were again a marshalling point for the invasion of Europe; estimates suggest that over one million troops were stationed on Salisbury Plain and in the surrounding landscape at this time (Rhatz *pers commm*). After the collapse of the Third Reich in May 1945, tensions increased between the three main Allies (Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States), primarily over control of the defeated Germany and her assets. This rapidly expanded to involve the whole of Central Europe, culminating in the first 'Battle' of the Cold War – the Berlin Blockade and Airlift through 1948-49 (Jackson 1988; Taylor 1999; Clarke 2007). It was at this point that nuclear weapons were brought to the United Kingdom for the first time by the United States; again capitalising on the United Kingdom's strategic position (Clarke 2007, 110). The point is many of the sites constructed during World War II continued to be utilised throughout the last five decades of the twentieth century, encapsulating earlier technological advancements and chronicling development of newer, often more potent, weapons.

The Shrinking Estate

Interestingly, the debate surrounding monuments connected with twentieth-Century militarism is both sporadic and subjective; Cold War sites are by their very nature prone to extremes of interpretation, brought on primarily by the secret nature of the period. There are a number of reasons for this. There is now recognition that twentieth-Century military structures and sites have much to offer the researcher. Indeed, in 1997 the call was already being made to consider military sites a part of the historic environment '-it is timely that the remains of both World Wars and of the Cold War are considered seriously as part of the nation's historical fabric' (Dobinson, Lake *et al* 1997, 289). Conflict archaeology has steadily moved to the forefront of mainstream archaeology since then. Initiatives at the national level such as the Defence of Britain Project (CBA 2002), have, in the last decade, been complemented by the rise of interest groups like the Fortress Study Group and, recently, the academic publication *The Journal of Conflict Archaeology*, hosted by the University of Glasgow's Centre for Battlefield Archaeology. That said, Cold War archaeological sites have a different level of social interaction to sites connected with both World

Wars. Indeed, Uzzell noted this difference in 1998, suggesting their importance and educational value lies in what they represent and might have been (1998, 18). Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union took many, including the British Government, by surprise. It also heralded the start of large scale reductions of the military and civil defence estates. In 1990, in the wake of the collapse of communism across Europe, the British Government embarked on a major reduction of defence spending (Clarke 2005b, 244). *Options for Change* reduced service manning by 18% along with defence commitments across Germany. Moreover, funding was removed from the UKWMO and ROC and the organisations were subsequently disbanded (Wood 1992, *i*). Further reductions in expenditure, namely *Front Line First* 1994 and the *Strategic Defence Review* 1998, have had a major impact on the defence estate, releasing large swathes of the Ministry of Defence's land holdings to private developers (Clarke 2009). This presented the academic community with a hitherto, largely unknown, landscape that was under serious threat of destruction almost immediately. Structures built to withstand the full effects of nuclear weapons are now no match for the concerted efforts of the developer; much has already been lost (fig.1-2).

Fig.1-2. The destruction of a Gaydon Hangar during the redevelopment of RAF Alconbury. The Gaydon Hangar was designed specifically to house V-bombers and as such is a Cold War monument. (Source: Bob Clarke 04/07/2016)

To review what has been discussed we must consider the evidence from a number of sources. This literature review first considers the output of statutory bodies such as English Heritage and other archeologically based work in the recording of both landscapes and structures. It then moves on to investigate the role of oral history when considering how to tackle the recording and conservation of sites linked to the Cold War. I have only included English based organisations in the discussion as the landscape under consideration (designated Home Defence Region 7) is located in the south-west of the country. That said, precious little is to be found in the literature beyond England. Disappointingly there is scant published discussion relating to work on Cold War sites; consequently, the following review of archaeological and conservation based is dominated by the work of English Heritage and a few academics and volunteers.

The Archaeologically Orientated Discussion

The involvement of the archaeological community in the debate surrounding monuments of war – especially those relating to the twentieth century – has been in evidence since the late 1980s, although, specific work on the interpretation of the Cold War archaeological record appears to have had to wait the turn of the twenty first century, then, English Heritage, utilising the Monument Protection Programme framework first proposed in 1987 (Darvill, Saunders *et al*, 396-399), led to the first nationally based assessment of Cold War monuments in England (Cocroft 2001). The work drew on a number of field surveys conducted under the auspices of the Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England (RCHME, later English Heritage) in the period 1996-99 (Cocroft and Thomas 1998) and a discussion paper that appeared in *Antiquity* (Dobinson, Lake *et al* 1997). This laid the foundations for many later initiatives, the most recognisable being the Defence of Britain Project administered by the Council for British Archaeology. The authors argue that military history has, throughout the conflicts of the twentieth century, been '- conditioned by the politico-military preoccupations of documentary historian' (Dobinson, Lake *et al* 1997, 288), an observation that charts more the development of history in general than one specifically aimed at military structures or indeed the archaeological community. They go on to acknowledge that the majority of information covering archaeological sites at the time of writing were '- held largely in the records and heads of amateur groups and individuals -'(1997, 288), a situation that, in my opinion, prevails to this day. The primary reason for this is that the task of

interpreting any defence orientated monument, even with a view to conservation or education, is a far more complex process than it first appears. To illustrate the point, it is worth considering the Defence of Britain Project.

The Defence of Britain Project

The Defence of Britain Project set out to enlist voluntary help to create a publically-accessible database of the twentieth century's sites and monuments of war, thereby heightening awareness of the subject (CBA 2002). The scope of the undertaking was arguably far too ambitious from the outset. At the project's inception in 1995 all twentieth-Century military structures would be recorded up to and including those from the Cold War; by 1998 this had been reduced to focus on one particular period containing the anti-invasion defences of the Second World War (*ibid* 2002). Even after the project was re-aligned it still took eight years to co-ordinate the efforts of over 600 voluntary investigators.

The final database extended to well over 20,000 sites across the United Kingdom and serves as a primary resource for the investigation of anti-invasion monuments from World War II. The wisdom of re-focussing the project in 1998 was borne out by the fidelity of the record produced. A hitherto unparalleled level of detail, encompassing a major aspect of military archaeology, has been made available to all heritage and interested parties. Moreover, the database makes use of the internet to the level where each feature can be viewed via Google Maps® and the Archaeological Data Service (online) (fig.1-3).

The final report included the question of Cold War monuments; however, citing English Heritage's recently released report *Cold War Monuments: an Assessment by the Monuments Protection Programme* (Cocroft 2001) the CBA removed post World War II structures from the projects remit (CBA 2002). Subsequently little work outside that undertaken by English Heritage (Historic England from 2015) has appeared. This underscores the problems raised by the sheer number of defence related sites that still survive in the British landscape. From this point on the monuments of the Cold War, especially those of a functional or unremarkable life-cycle, have featured little in the discussions surrounding the preservation or recording of military sites.



Fig.1-3. A screenshot of the Defence of Britain overlay to Google Earth. Site specific and additional reports are accessed via the ADS link on the information pop-out (white box). (Source: Google Earth®)

THE COLD WAR DEBATE

Cold War Monuments: an Assessment by the Monuments Protection Programme (Cocroft 2001) was the first major work intended to demonstrate the historical importance of defence-related structures constructed after 1945 (Cocroft 2001, 1). As such this work should be considered the primary initiator of the current study. The report was released at a seminar on the Cold War held at the Public Record Office, Kew, London in December 2001 and benefitted from a review in *Antiquity* in early the following year (James 2002), all intended to launch the subject with maximum coverage. The report divided England's surviving Cold War monuments into nine categories, offering a comprehensive list of sites considered to be of national importance and recommended for statutory protection through listing or scheduling (Cocroft 2001, 13). This paper is important, as not only was it the first time a conscious effort was made to differentiate between military and non-military monuments within the defence arena but It also introduced a completely new monument class to the archaeological record. English Heritage's aspirations were such that a representative suite of sites contained within each English county would, through consultation, receive statutory protection. Unfortunately, this aspiration has not been fully realised, indeed one might conclude the project failed. The reasons

surrounding this are legion; a number require further description if we are to fully demonstrate the validity of the current work and its value in the study of conflict archaeology.

As with any proposed management plan, a suite of assessment criteria was offered which broadly matched the current Monument Protection Programme. The usual dialogue covering condition, period, rarity and cultural and amenity featured, all sound conservation topics, have been articulated by English Heritage (Cocroft 2001, 11). Subsequently, these have been seen to be, in the main, adopted by the heritage community (Strange and Walley 2007, 159), although caution was noted as 'It is also recognised that the archaeological recording and analysis of twentieth-Century military sites is still in its infancy, and where the opportunity arises some sites may allow new methodologies to be developed' (Cocroft 2001, 13).

Later Cocroft reflected on the effort surrounding the primary assessment of the Cold War monumental landscape, citing the project as a predominantly field-based exercise (2007, 111). This approach had been especially effective in the assessment of those structures and sites utilised until the mid-1990s, whose paper record was still restricted and likely to remain so for 30 years (*ibid* 2007, 111). This had not been considered by Dobinson, Lake and Schofield when they published their discussion paper in *Antiquity* in 1997, a great deal of which promoted the use of documentation in the interpretation of England's defence heritage (*ibid* 1997, 288). Interestingly Fairclough warns against placing too much weight in the 'official' record as 'Public documents tend to be political and military' (2007, 24). This clearly had an effect on the structure of investigation and goes some way to explaining the paucity of sites actually fully investigated by English Heritage over the last decade. A distinction can be made here. Documentary and official accounts covering the monuments of World War II are copious; practically every facet of a particular building can be located, including the discussions surrounding the reason for location, financing and construction. The Cold War ushered in an unrivalled period of secrecy and 'need to know'. This now transmits through the sparse documentary evidence, very little of the day to day aspects survive or were indeed recorded in the first place. Those documents that are available are often subject to censorship (fig.1-4), rendering key aspects of the life-cycle of sites invisible, through documentation at least.


SECRET
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
June 1, 1976
In Reply, Please Refer to File No.
Official Irish Republic Army
(b1)
(S)
Sources whose identities are concealed herein have provided reliable information in the past except where otherwise noted.
SECRET
Classified By 6392
Exempt From GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Fig.1-4. Governmental censorship can often be at such a level that it renders the document useless. An extract from a request made for information regarding the movements of the IRA in the United States. (Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 61-7601, 19/02/2009)

Contained within English Heritage's assessment paper was a detailed recording regime, worryingly noting 'Many, although not put forward for designation, have been identified as being of national importance, with the presumption that local planning processes will endeavour to ensure appropriate levels of protection' (Cocroft 2001, 12). To date few initiatives have followed this call, one such scheme between the University of Bath and Wiltshire County Council produced a quantitative report on the amount of sites contained within Wiltshire (Clarke 2005a), however, lack of funding has ensured that no further work has been undertaken. Beyond the usual recording footprint was the acknowledgement that oral history had a part to play in the recording of Cold War monuments (Cocroft 2001, 12). The use of oral testimony has many advantages when constructing a competent, useable record of recently redundant military sites, especially those whose rarity dictates only a few people ever worked or operated them. The validity of subject based oral accounts in a military setting has been previously demonstrated through the Defence of Britain Project, in which 180 sites were identified through the follow up of testimonial accounts (CBA 2002). Further, it was recognised that some sites were so ephemeral

that they almost certainly only survived through memory, re-enforcing the potential of the oral account.

During 2003 English Heritage published what has to be considered the standard descriptive account of Cold War archaeology. *Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989*, covered all the main topic lines of the period; crucially discussing the formation of the landscape connected with both aircraft and nuclear reporting (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 174-196). The relevant chapter in this work attended to distribution, technology developments, structural typology and command and control. It did not contextualise the changes in structural types, nor populate the landscape with volunteer accounts. What was presented, therefore was a functional starting point, reliant on imagery and illustration to convey a populous narrative of the Royal Observer Corps operational footprint.

Academically, the situation is better. *Matériel Culture: The Archaeology Of Twentieth Century Conflict*, sought to open the debate on monuments of conflict by assembling a series of papers aimed at demonstrating the variety – and complexity – of what remains from the twentieth century (Schofield, Johnson and Beck 2002). Of the twenty-five chapters presented, only four discuss Cold War sites, two of those relate to exemplar sites (Nuclear Testing Sites (Beck 2002, 65) and The Berlin Wall (Dolff-Bonekämper 2002, 236)). A number of singular authored and multiple papers followed in quick succession after *Matériel Culture;* encouragingly the study of the Cold War landscape also gained ground within their pages.

In *Combat Archaeology: Material Culture and Modern Conflict* John Schofield published a detailed manifesto calling for military remains to be considered heritage (2005, 41). He proposed a wide range of study tactics utilising both traditional methods of archaeology and the inclusion of other disciplines to help contextualise the military landscape (*ibid* 2005, 32); moreover, he proposes a series of categories aimed at structuring the material culture of the subject matter (*ibid* 2005, 42-78). Encouragingly the Cold War features throughout the work, indeed, key defence sites across Britain are described, contextualised and preservation strategies proposed.

Two years later a series of papers aimed at providing the researcher with '- a critical assessment of the places, events, people and things that together constitute the contemporary archaeology of the Cold War era' appeared in a monograph of the *One World Archaeology* series. *A Fearsome Heritage: Diverse Legacies of the Cold*

War explored a wide range of off-shoot topics from the standard militarily based discussion of the Cold War centrepiece – specifically defence and offence sites. Landscapes of protest were presented along with domesticity on and around bases, recording of sites through the traditional survey and photographic work was complemented by more artistically based concepts (Schofield and Cocroft 2007). An important theme ran throughout the publication – the premise that we do not simply inherit the past, we engage and modify it and in so doing promote new ways to interpret activities (*ibid* 2007, 13). I suggest this can be mapped as part of the abandonment process, and mapped with a fair degree of chronological accuracy when considering contemporary sites.

The Public Cold War

In 2003, multiple specialist authors appeared in the *Conservation Bulletin* (2003) in an attempt to present the wider conservation community with a research agenda that comprised all Twentieth century conflict orientated structures and sites (Morris 2003, 3; Thomas 2003, 18; Holyoak 2003, 34). That said, a number of contributors indicated that conservation is often problematic especially when considering the limited funding available (Holborow 2003), a point usually lacking in academic debate (Cocroft *pers commm*). Again the subject of the oral record was raised, noting it as a main component in the work needed to construct an archaeology of the period (Schofield 2003, 4). The year 2003 also saw the publication of a discussion document aimed at maintaining the plight of military remains, again an English Heritage document. *Twentieth Century Military Sites* sought to categorise defence related structures, offering just six main streams (Lake 2003, 16) – not one contained or identified a Cold War site.

In 2007 Ian Strange and Ed Walley investigated the, by then, problematic issues surrounding the conservation of Cold War monuments in Yorkshire. They were well placed to do so: Yorkshire was, at the time, one of the few counties in England containing a Cold War site, the Royal Observer Corps headquarters bunker built in 1961 at York, that has benefitted from recording by English Heritage (Cocroft 2001, 10) and subsequent scheduling (Emerick 2003, 46). The authors recognise that the discourse, to be successful, has to address a number of period-specific issues including the symbolic popular culture of the era and the deep rooted opposition to

nuclear weapons that permeated the majority of the Western World (Strange and Walley 2007, 158).

Issues surrounding a site's social standing and value pale into insignificance however, when the practical aspects of conservation are considered. The twentieth century has, through the advance of technology, seen more defence related construction than any other period. Much of that estate is now being released back into the public domain, presenting an ever widening choice of defence related sites to record, understand and possibly preserve, overloading an already struggling heritage system (Strange and Walley 2007, 158). Unfortunately, the amount of documentation released into the public domain rarely keeps pace with the number of sites going through the disposal process, forcing field based investigation, often overloading survey teams in the process. Whilst this does not affect the validity of traditional archaeological methods, it does further remove the wealth of Cold War monuments from the twentieth century defence heritage footprint discussed in Dobinson, Lake and Schofield (1997).

Attitudes to Nuclear Conflict and the Conservation Argument

Beyond the professional debate surrounding the assessment of Cold War monuments, Strange and Walley tackle one of the more difficult aspects of the whole post World War II period – public perception (2007, 159). Public opinion, especially in the West, has been extensively captured through a number of media. This should, however, be treated with caution. The majority of texts are either driven by disarmament pressure groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or latched onto by the media and portrayed as no more than humorously optimistic episodes of civil defence planning. The Cold War, especially its landscape, is rarely, if ever, considered in an archaeological context. That said, this landscape is key to providing a balanced view that has an appropriate, objective, level of educational and social value. Strange and Walley consider 'the national experience of the Cold War - is a history that can be placed within other historical narratives of progress, grandeur, modernisation, adaptation and even national decline' (2007, 160).

The Cold War permeated much of the social fabric of the Western World, ensuring that the narrative can be articulated from a number of angles. The authors consider resource areas such as veterans and defence industry workers have much to offer here (*ibid* 2007, 160). It is true this would expand the understanding of sites and

allow for better contextualisation. That said, the Cold War should not be considered a perpetuation of the rest of the twentieth century's military experience. In his work *The Secret State* Peter Hennessy observed 'the Cold War neither socialised large numbers of people into its disciplines, rationales and complexities nor did it, in modern argot, give them any sense of ownership on outcome*'* (2003, 3). This should be noted when considering the comments of Cocroft (2001; 2007) and Strange and Walley (2007). It is likely the publically accepted view of the Cold War will continue to be at odds with the conservation community for many years to come. Clearly then, to include the public in a debate surrounding conservation places the Cold War landscape at risk and as such must lead to a level of enforced disenfranchisement. The question of the continued existence of monuments from this period, especially those concerned with the 'protection' of the public, is one that needs to be answered now. Attrition, currently being driven by the disposal of large areas of the defence and governmental estate, should drive the urgency in recording the current monument cohort. Indeed, there are some quarters that suggest that it might be too early to initiate a study of Cold War sites as many military sites are still in use (James 2002, 664). This view has been countered by Rachel Woodward who suggests that doing so risks sanitising the true intent of such sites to appease the clear ethical conflict associated with nuclear war (2004). This sentiment is echoed by Graham Fairclough who recently warned against accepting a history that is 'too clean' and devoid of conflicting memory and subsequent re-interpretation (2007, 31). That said, the archaeological community does not have the luxury of time, sites are being readily removed now; it would be far better to re-interpret a site once its future is secure than lament its removal due to public indifference or, worse, opposition (Clarke 2005a). The answer lies in how one presents the conservation issues surrounding such monuments as 'fighting' the Cold War, by its very nature, was an exclusive activity.

When considered within a twentieth century framework this point is even more salient. Both World War I and II called for the total mobilisation of the population. Everyone in the United Kingdom was inextricably linked with world events, from the agricultural fraternity, those in industry, Home Guard and Civil Defence orientated organisations through to the relatives of men and women fighting around the world – all had some 'ownership' of events both major and minor. Nowhere has this been demonstrated better than through the Defence of Britain Project; unfortunately, this

public ownership and participation does not extend to the Cold War period. During their research in Yorkshire Strange and Walley were exposed to the whole breath of emotion the spectre of nuclear war continues to instil in the public. 'Indeed, in our empirical research within the Yorkshire region we have encountered hostility, incomprehension and accusations of poor taste in response to our attempts to discuss the heritage value of Cold War sites' (2007, 159). However, the opposite is also true; during research on the Berlin Airlift many of those veterans interviewed for the project were surprised that interest was shown in a period where there was no combat (Clarke 2007). What is important here is that the Berlin Airlift, is considered the first 'battle' of the Cold War (Tusa and Tusa 1988). Little tangible archaeology survives after the event, often little more than a fading cognitive image. The recognition that memory - an integral part of any experience - assumes an added importance when placed within a late twentieth century context should dictate its inclusion in any project scoping from this point forward.

The Memory Record

Other events present similar problems. It would be impossible to recognise the Aldermaston Marches in anything other than the printed media or film, even though the concept of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) is one of the more internationally recognisable organisations of the entire Cold War. Fairclough notes that an archaeology of the Cold War is far more than just a study of military sites; through its global perspective it allows the investigator to explore the vast 'complexity of human social activity' (2007, 29), what better way to experience this than through an oral history tied to specific sites. For nearly five decades the Cold War shaped international relations, driven, in part, by extremes of ideology. The effects of the Cold War continue to reach deep into the current international landscape, this legacy should be informed by a monumental landscape not simply left to an officially driven narrative. One of the most iconic structures in Cold War Britain, save the 'Golf Balls' of RAF Fylingdales, has to be the Ground Launched Cruise Missile Alert and Maintenance Area (GAMA) site at Greenham Common. How to contextualise this monument was first discussed by the archaeological community in 2000 by John Schofield and Mike Anderton. They argue 'that to present the recent past at Greenham Common Airbase as it was, and not in some diluted, biased, or sanitised form, is desirable but difficult' (2000, 249); this is directly contradicted by Woodward's (2004) later thesis but has many compelling positives. The very

existence of structures intended to launch or preside over nuclear warfare force the researcher to confront complex social issues. The Cold War landscape should not be presented solely as one of protest and opposition; the two acts do not adequately describe the true nature of the archaeological record. To 'present' as Schofield and Anderton suggest is indeed difficult, however, it is required. The current project contains a landscape study of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) in Devon and Wiltshire. This multi-phase landscape charts both the development of airpower and nuclear weapons against a backdrop of mounting civil opposition to certainly the latter. Where these sites are placed is of importance and allow the researcher to experience the tension between groups involved in the act of protest and the passive defence of the population.

Recently the recommendations made by Schofield and Anderton (2000, 244) have been redefined (Fiorato 2007, 152). What was seen as an opportunity to present a balanced view of an internationally important site in 2000 now finds itself in danger. After a protracted discussion over the form the former airfield and its monuments would take it has been recognised that the fragile archaeology of the peace camps around the site are under threat (Fiorato 2007, 152). The discourse has once again turned to the part played by 'living memory' now being employed to complement archaeological techniques 'used in understanding the anticipated difference in material culture between the camps' (Fiorato 2007, 152). The call for a concerted effort in the compilation of oral testimony from the Cold War period, specifically relating to given sites and monuments, is compelling.

Recording Memory

In 2009, two Research Department Reports were published by English Heritage (Cocroft and Alexander 2009; Cocroft and Newsome 2009), concerned with the military landscapes at Orfordness and Foulness. They demonstrate the effort that goes into the recording of a complete military site, especially one that has been connected with the military since World War I. Both are survey reports in every sense of the word compiling the expected level of topographical, historical and architectural information to produce credible pieces of work. Neither make further recommendations for expanding the research nor do they fulfil the original research remit proposed by Cocroft (2001, 16). Moreover, their original remit proved far more complicated to fulfil than was first envisaged. The message to any official body

involved or responsible for heritage management is clear – Cold War sites will be a major drain on financial resources. The prospect of justifying any expenditure in this area, especially under intense scrutiny from the majority of the population, makes it all the more important that heritage agencies promote the correct level of social debate surrounding such landscapes. This has serious implications and probably drives the decisions by many local authorities to generally ignore the Cold War landscape within their respective county boundaries. Rather than approaching a large site, with all the financial restraints that brings, it would be far more cost effective to investigate a class of monuments that appear across the landscape. The aircraft reporting and later underground monitoring posts of the ROC are one such solution. Their purpose has been reported previously (Wood 1992; Cocroft and Thomas 2003; McCamley 2002; Clarke 2005b) however, how these copious, but no less fragile monuments, have survived long periods of abandonment has not been considered.

A condition survey of ROC posts within Devon allows for the investigation of a uniform structural type across three known periods. In 1968 slightly over 50% of Devon's posts were closed as a cost saving exercise (Wood 1992, 247), 21 years later the remainder closed. It is now 25 years since that event. The opportunity to demonstrate the survivability of a subterranean concrete structure, making reference to location and geology will have major implications for all subsequent conservation discussions on similar buried defence structures nationally. So far I have recognised no parallels to this project. It is hoped the results will encourage other local authorities to confront nuclear orientated structures within their own landscape. To influence the debate surrounding the appropriateness of the conservation of nuclear structures an oral history of Royal Observer posts is also to be constructed.

The Place of Oral History

The role of oral histories in the pursuit of contextualising events has been employed in a small number of archaeo-historical investigations, especially those concerned with the development of the agricultural landscape (David *et al* 2004, Harvey and Riley 2005). That said, oral history has been a primary source of historical information when considering major conflicts (Arthur 2005; Patch and van Emden 2007). Reasons for this are legion, however; anniversaries, the inclusion of conflict study in the National Curriculum and the recognition that the oral testament provides

an added human dimension to such events by media companies have all conspired to raise interest in the technique. Latterly, there has been recognition that veterans are always a finite, ever reducing, resource as demonstrated in recent times by the passing of the First World War from living memory.

Within the archaeological community the majority of research on singular sites, landscapes or, indeed, at a national level still favours the *linear narrative of the expert* (Harvey and Riley 2005, 2). There have been a number of papers recently indicating the value of the oral approach, most pertinent to this project is *Landscape Archaeology, Heritage and the Community in Devon; an Oral History Approach* (Harvey and Riley 2005). Here the authors describe the Community Landscape Project (CLP), a project intended to encourage '- greater participation and ensuring wider access to heritage within the UK' (Riley *et al* 2005, 40). They argue that rather than being considered mutually exclusive, oral testament and archaeological enquiry do complement one another, especially when applied to questions surrounding the use of landscape – for example agricultural practices (Riley *et al* 2005, 41). Particular value is recognised when considering late twentieth century industrial and agricultural practices, indeed; 'Even in just the last 50 years, technological and economic changes have been so considerable, that oral histories may provide an almost unique line of enquiry for the exploration of certain aspects of landscape experience and meaning*'* (Riley *et al* 2005, 47).

Technology as a Driver

This observation is extremely true of the defence driven landscape, especially that that developed as a consequence of the ideological struggle between East and West. Indeed, recently Graham Fairclough has pointed out that 'Despite being so thoroughly documented, it [the Cold War] is still a period that requires us to 'hear' the material culture*'* (2007, 23). The pace of technological breakthroughs in the development of nuclear weapons alone dictated radical changes in both offensive and defensive systems. The changes to doctrine and subsequent military posture often had an immediate effect on both sites and organisations throughout the Cold War (Clarke 2005b). Often, so quick was the rate of redundancy and implementation of a successor system that the previous or original role of a site was never fully implemented. This is true of a great many, purpose built, protected structures for the Royal Artillery throughout the 1950s (McCamley 2002, 114). The incessant drive for

faster aircraft removed the possibility of such vehicles being shot down by gunfire; the Gun Defended Areas were disbanded in the mid-1950s with the result that a great number of the rooms in many bunkers are of no known function (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 150). This supports Fairclough's point that the paper record can only ever be considered one facet of a site's physical record (2007,24), subsequently, however contradictory, the evidence from the oral transcripts are clearly to be considered necessary in the current work. A further advantage of an oral history approach complementing the archaeo-historical landscape is the socialisation of the site through the contextualisation of the monument, especially when linked to external events. As an example, RAF Duxford was an airfield built during World War I, it was still in operation in 1940 and is subsequently famous for the part it played in the Battle of Britain. Duxford then, is commemorated for acts in World War II but is actually a World War I airfield. Commemoration does not make distinctions between structures on site and subsequently, the station as a whole is preserved. This linking of a site to national and international events becomes a critical component in any discussion over preservation or educational status.

The Vocal Public

Recently a number of excavations at modern militaristically orientated sites in London have recorded oral accounts when they have been offered by members of the public. Work undertaken by the Museum of London Archaeological Service (MoLAS) in 2004/5/6 investigated the site of a crashed aircraft and bomb damaged housing, the latter as part of a community based project (MoLAS 2010); both recorded eye witness accounts of the events on, and surrounding the sites under investigation. During the aircraft excavation it was noted by the information officer that a significant number of those who came to look at the work had stories to offer about the event (Moshenska 2007, 93). A similar situation prevailed at Shoreditch Park during the excavation of the bombsite. Indeed, so valuable was the exercise MoLAS currently notes 'Although the excavations finished some time ago, even today work on the Shoreditch Park project continues as we explore ways to exploit the rich potential of an oral history provided by former residents*'* (*ibid* 2010). When considering this and the comments on the Defence of Britain project the call for an oral history of the Royal Observer Corps and other Home Defence Region 7 activities appears even more pressing.

There are distinct differences between the proposed recording of ROC and other Cold War activities and those encountered on the Defence of Britain Project and in London. The samples will be of a limited number and in the case of true Home Defence operation could be extremely difficult to locate. The sites in London were clearly in the public eye and media attention served to heighten the public's awareness of the research. Not only did this attract people to the excavation, but the subsequent records were complemented by the interviewee recognising parts of the site and even some artefacts as they were excavated (Moshenska 2007, 96). This has been confirmed by Riley *et al* noting that providing the individual with a topographical starting point stimulates memory and structures the following interview (2005, 409). Further, they support the use of the '*premeditated'* artefact (Riley *et al* 2005, 410) as a method of stimulus.

This approach presents a problem. Cold War sites are, by their very nature, remote. This makes the 'chance' visit almost non-existent and the possibility of organising visits to probably unsafe structures unwise; clearly another direction is required. The '*premeditated'* use of artefacts as suggested above will, with minor modification, provide an excellent surrogate for the Royal Observer Corps posts which are the focus of this research. Quite a range of material culture relevant to the ROC survive, much held by me, also it would be advantageous if the structures intended to be discussed had already been visited. Providing a high quality photographic record of the site, current appearance and environs has the potential to further stimulate discussion.

Gender in the Record

Earlier I made reference to the currently subjective view of women's roles in the non-military Cold War environment citing accounts from Greenham Common as the main reason for this. Academic papers and articles are numerous (Campbell 1982; Finch 1986; Carroll 2004; Laware 2004; Marshall *et al* 2009; Welch 2010; Titcombe 2013). This is to be expected; the peace camps around Greenham Common became a worldwide phenomenon, inspiring much emulation worldwide (Schofield and Cocroft 2007). The political stance throughout the 1980s ensured that the camps were never far from the spotlight of the media (Emberley and Landry 1989). The paradox here is that the capture of personal accounts from members of Royal Observer Corps, or indeed any Cold War activity in the United Kingdom, appear to be non-existent in the

current record (2011). Moreover, it has not been possible to ascertain the gender distribution of staff within the ROC.



Fig.1-5. ROC recruiting leaflet promoting the cross-gender activities the organisation intended to portray. (Source: *The ROC – The Service with a Difference* (1979))

A review of material held at the Public Record Office has so far drawn a blank, as has enquiries to the Royal Observer Corps Museum and the National Cold War Exhibition at RAF Cosford. Ominously the RAF Museum's archivist responded 'We are not aware of any records for individual members of the ROC, or operational records, having been preserved' (Elliott email Wed, 11 May 2011 16:06) Discussion with members of the Royal Observer Corps Association however, suggest the organisation, especially in No. 10 Group (Devon) would appear to be of mixed gender; this is supported by the recruiting and information literature from the period. A brief look at just one recruiting pamphlet (*The ROC – The Service with a Difference* published in 1979) promotes women's roles throughout the organisation. The pamphlet contains 25 photographs – 19 contain both genders. Clearly a recruitment drive would aim to appeal to the widest possible audience, but it does indicate that the publicised demographic depicted an overtly open organisation (fig.1-5). This reaffirms the point that an oral history of the ROC concentrating on the role

played by women will allow any recommendations as to monument conservation far more robust.

THE WAR FOR HEARTS AND MINDS

It is clear that Cold War studies, when applied within an archaeological framework, are in their infancy. As I have noted above, a concerted effort by English Heritage since 2001 has produced a small number of reports and papers, yet take-up outside the body has been extremely slow. A number of reasons appear to to account for this. Most important is the public's perception of what the Cold War actually means. Many see no worth in preserving sites that would have seen the perpetuation of Government at the exclusion of the public (Strange and Walley 2007). This view is presumably driven by the overwhelming bias in texts that punctuated the book shelves from the mid-1980s (*The Nuclear Survival Handbook*, Popkess 1980; *Protest and Survive*, Thompson and Smith 1980; *Nuclear War: What's in it for You?*, Ground Zero 1982), buoyed up by the work of CND (*Nuclear Disarmament for Britain,* England (undated); *Have you ever wished you were better informed: Facts Against the Bomb* CND 1981)) and a wide range of other pressure groups (*The Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons* Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons 1982; *The Christian and Nuclear Weapons* 1983). The Government certainly countered the demand for the abandonment of the nuclear deterrent. A series of information booklets were issued to the public including such titles as *Advising the Householder on Protection Against Nuclear Attack* (HMSO 1963); *The H-Bomb: What About the Millions of Survivors?* (HMSO 1959); *Civil Defence: Why We Need It* (HMSO 1983); *The Balanced View: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control* (HMSO 1983) and without doubt the most famous piece of government sponsored material culture, *Protect and Survive* (HMSO 1976 and 1980).

The question is, should we consider these publications within a literature review, or consign them to the material culture of organisations both with vested interests in the nuclear debate, while being poles apart in demand? I believe we should include them. True, both sides are reporting activities in either the best or worst light, although to ignore such a valuable resource covering such a contentious issue would be to render the character of the Cold War impotent. Public protest, civil

disobedience and, in the case of a number of underground monitoring posts operated by the Royal Observer Corps, acts of destruction and vandalism characterises this period like no other period of 'conflict' so far. The fact that political parties – especially the Labour movement – supported the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament demands that the material is at least used to demonstrate the very real fears of both public and state.

DISCUSSION

The pace of political change throughout the period immediately following the end of the Cold War in 1991 has a major part to play in the apparent lack of progress in recording Cold War sites. Devon Heritage Environment Record (HER) currently carries a fairly consistent record of military sites across the county, much of it from the records generated by Colin Dobinson or the *Defence of Britain Project* (CBA 2002). However, Wiltshire County Council comprises very little military material, and certainly no current Cold War sites were recognisable during catalogue searches of their archives for this project; the situation has now been partially resolved (McQueen, Wilts County Archaeology Staff *pers commm* 2014). Somerset HER contained the record of just one ROC underground monitoring post and the Headquarters of No.9 Group whilst South Gloucestershire HER returns primarily aviation orientated structures and war memorials.

How the Home Defence landscape is promoted will clearly be at the centre of the of the problem. Any discussion on the Cold War will naturally bring forward certain pre-conceived ideas of nuclear warfare and specifically its aftermath. The key to promoting the investigation of the Royal Observer Corps landscape is to demonstrate its humanitarian aspects, primarily fallout and air raid warning, no matter how sceptical the public. This area has the most relevant educational value and through a series of interviews could be contextualised in a number of ways. Aspects of the 'Home Front' during World War II are studied through a number of media at primary school level; it would be advantageous to project this concept into the current Cold War studies of the secondary education curriculum. By its very nature the Cold War carries the burden of secrecy and this has perpetuated the misrepresentation of the United Kingdom's role in the development of the modern world. Irrespective of the research frameworks previously offered, this project has validity across a number of areas. A number of lines of investigation are required,

these include the research and characterisation of a specific region and monument type, the capture of accounts of the operation and planning for the protection of the public through the spoken media and the use of historical documentation from a wide range of sources. We have an opportunity to present a more balanced view of this period through its archaeology, contextualising sites with a coherent, if contested, narrative, thus making the period more accessible and open to a more balanced debate. This balance will be more difficult to maintain as time goes on unless more structures representative of this period are retained across the landscape.

The archaeological community now recognises the importance of Cold War monuments when considered within a twentieth century framework. Official bodies have, however, found it difficult to stir more than a passing interest when the debate centres around specific sites. The amount of fieldwork and recording work undertaken over the past decade is small; site surveys have demonstrated that Cold War landscapes are extremely complex and require major investments of time and staffing to complete. Others recognise that the Cold War, especially when discussing physical remains, is interdisciplinary and for the barriers to current views to be breached this multi-faceted approach must make much of the tools available. A decade on from *Cold War Monuments: an Assessment by the Monuments Protection Programme* (Cocroft 2001) the picture is bleak. Only a handful of sites have received protection while many HERs still only hold basic information on the sites within their care. At the forefront of this apparent lack of effort is the difficulty the whole spectre of nuclear war presents the investigator, coupled with the unique, 'secret' nature of the structures currently available for research. There are also problems with using documents in the public record with the majority of archives holding just the Government and military view – further exacerbating, and possibly perpetuating the public's perceived view of secrecy.

What is clear is that the current investigation into the surviving archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps will provide a unique view of a specific part of the United Kingdom's planning for nuclear war. Moreover, work intended to build a fuller picture of the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation and Royal Observer Corps footprint in Devon is desperately needed. To date there has be no academic work undertaken on this, subsequently a major piece of the United Kingdom's Cold War legacy, one that was almost totally staffed by volunteers, has no real footprint in

the archaeological record. The intended work in Devon and, to a lesser degree the South-West, will benefit greatly from an oral history of the operations of the organisation through 1947-91, the target sample of interviewees aimed to include as many female members as possible. This will help challenge the currently subjective view of women's roles in the non-military Cold War environment primarily driven by accounts from Greenham Common. Moreover, if we are to confront our recent past we must understand the unpleasant and controversial aspects of nuclear warfare. Any such event would have immediately involved the entire population of Britain. We have a duty to manage at least a representative Cold War landscape so that this important, dominant social and economic aspect of the twentieth century is not misrepresented, or worse, lost.

CHAPTER 2: RECORDING THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The Cold War has a well-defined beginning and end (1948-1991) and moreover the period is only twenty years past. This raises problems for the archaeologist, not least the notion that archaeology has no place in the investigation of this recent historical period (Strange and Walley 2007) and is, instead, mere tautology, repeating the work of other disciplines (Andrén 1998, 179). Moreover, it is argued that the written record should suffice, especially when considering military sites sponsored by Central Government (Dobinson, Lake and Schofield 1997).

Increasingly, the debate surrounding the place of archaeology, especially when studying the material culture of periods provided for by a substantial official record, has come to the fore (Launius 2009; Myers, 2011). Nowhere has this been more evident than in the study of conflict archaeology (Cocroft 2007; Kean 2010; Harrison and Schofield 2010; Carman 2013). Events – especially those encapsulated in the twentieth century – have rapidly shifted modern warfare, once solely the domain of the historian, into a multi-disciplinary arena. The period now comprises many humanities-based research interests studying everything from structures of war (Osborne 2004; Schofield and Cocroft 2007) to attitudes on the Home Front (Campbell 1982; Grant 2010). So does archaeology, or more correctly historical archaeology, have a role to play in this multi-faceted approach to the recent past? In this chapter I introduce a number of research objectives that aim to prove that it does and has much to offer the researcher, especially in the interpretation of material culture, behaviour and ethnographical studies.

Current Aims

The aim of this study is to utilise a number of methods and models to discuss, interpret and explore a particular social group - the Royal Observer Corps - within the confines of the Cold War. To achieve this, the research comprises a number of key themes, namely processes linked to abandonment, the formation of archaeological sites witnessed through fieldwork (Schiffer 2010, 53), and the role of the volunteer in secret landscapes via a study of the life-cycle of a specific group. Furthermore, the development of a model designed to link the distribution of relevant

material culture to the organisational processes connected to rules and regulations is also required.

Objectives

1. Demonstrate the archaeological potential of the Royal Observer Corps through the monuments, memories and material culture of the organisation via an investigation into the current state of the Royal Observer Corps archaeological record.

2. Capture the narratives, attitudes and personal histories of individuals who were members of the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold War period. This will enable the activities enacted on all sites to be contextualised with individual experience.

3. Construct, and test, a new model intended to structure the interpretation of material culture, especially that encountered on sites recognised as highly ordered.

4. Identify the processes involved in the abandonment of structures constructed specifically for the monitoring of the effects of weapons of mass destruction.

5. Construct a more appropriate chronology of the Cold War, relying on the archaeological record currently extant in the United Kingdom.

What are presented in this chapter are the processes and lines of investigation developed that have provided the dataset utilised in the discharge of the current objectives. Each objective is presented separately below.

OBJECTIVE 1: DEMONSTRATE THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS THROUGH THE MONUMENTS, MEMORIES AND MATERIAL CULTURE OF THE ORGANISATION VIA AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD.

LINES OF INVESTIGATION – DATABASE

Introduction

Recently Harrison and Schofield (2010, 88) reminded us that ‘there is no one method for undertaking archaeological studies of the contemporary past’; that sentiment extends to this project. However, two main objectives of the present study required a traditional fieldwork element to ensure that those objectives were met. The following

section describes the processes employed leading up to, and refined during, the fieldwork element, ensuring the appropriate level of data was available for the final thesis.

It became clear from the outset that the current sample of surviving Royal Observer Corps posts across the County of Devon, and indeed across the South-West, was anything other than complete or representative. To accept the extant information would have quickly rendered any attempts monitor behavioural patterns pointless. To fulfil this requirement a number of sampling strategies were developed. The primary one was the creation of a database to utilise as an up-to-date reference tool which served as the basis for recording and interrogation.

Baseline Database Construction Jan-April 2011

The database comprises a hyperlinked Excel® spreadsheet containing all extant written information held by a number of organisations across the United Kingdom. This included the Royal Observer Corps Museum (since disbanded), Royal Air Force Hendon and Cosford Collections, The Public Record Office, QinetiQ Ltd and the Defence Science and Technical Laboratories Library. This was further complemented by the opportunity to use information from a number of personal archives. This wide range of organisations took fully two years to integrate into the database.

The initial database population was carried out early in 2011, with the intention of providing a quantitative view of the ROC landscape in Devon. Three main sources of information were identified during the development of the database structure (English Heritage, Devon County Historic Environment Record (HER) and the work undertaken by Derek Wood intended for publication). The interrogation of these initial groups official records proved most informative; it had been suspected that there may be some variation in the way sites had been recorded but not to the extent discovered. Perhaps unsurprisingly all were either incomplete or contradictory of each other. Sites that had been visited by one or all interested parties had a high degree of accuracy, whereas the level of accuracy for those that had been destroyed or were in difficult to access locations varied enormously.

To illustrate the point: a site noted on a county HER often relied on information collated by Colin Dobinson of English Heritage and subsequently published via that organisation (2003). This in turn drew specifically on information provided by Derek Wood (1992) in his work *Attack Warning Red*. This publication was the first, and only, complete history of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) and ambitiously listed all observation post locations across the United Kingdom. Wood's account is, at the time of writing, 24 years old and, while extremely useful at the time, now bears little resemblance to the extant landscape. Moreover, where no field visits were undertaken by Dobinson or the County Archaeologist, reliance of Wood's gazetteer has produced errors on the HER. Clearly an accurate and succinct database was needed to move forward any intended fieldwork. The creation of a geographically-focused database concentrating on ROC posts in Devon and Cornwall was the first step to providing a consistent and definitive view of the extant ROC landscape. By April 2011, the migration of information to the database was complete. The database contains 73 ROC posts (both Devon and Cornwall) and has 24 sections of information covering the location and history of each post, extant or not. This provided a baseline from which to begin the fieldwork.

Database Utilisation April 2011 to Present

Desktop Database

With all known, or suspected, sites noted on the baseline database, the task now required the verification of the location of surviving ROC posts. With a potential 52 sites across Devon it was imperative that those ROC posts removed after the creation of the HER were identified to reduce the fieldwork size, initially the entire landmass of Devon, as much as possible. This was partially achieved by utilising a number of online programmes and sites. The work was sub-divided into three key elements:

- Location
- Extant Physical Record and Environs
- History

Location

To minimise wasted effort, especially during the initial fieldwork, the baseline dataset required a level of refinement. Utilising the information outlined in the previous section, complemented by oral testimonies by a number of former observers, it was

possible to place the majority of ROC posts in the two counties within 500m² of their original construction point. All ROC posts in Devon and Cornwall are now represented in the database, irrespective of their current condition, along with the command and reporting structure of the organisation. This is important as a number of chronological markers, indicating changes in the archaeological record, (specifically 1953, 1968, 1973, 1991) dictate significant changes to the reporting structure of the ROC and its parent organisation, the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO). Finally, each ROC post was given a unique project number preceded by **D-** in the case of those in Devon and **C-** for Cornwall. Locational information is now recorded for each ROC post through a series of geographical, numerical and geological reference points which are consistently applied across all post locations in the county.

Extant physical record

The next step was to select a representative sample of sites to include in the fieldwork. The intention was to visit any suspected structural remains, an opportunity frustrated by almost total lack of cartographic recognition of Royal Observer Corps posts by the Ordnance Survey (OS). Interestingly the OS do, on occasion, acknowledge the existence of 'something' on the map. However, it is not obvious, nor is it often labelled, although if it does have a label it usually names the feature a 'covered reservoir' (fig.2-1). This could be considered a clear indication of a secret archaeology with links to a heterotopic landscape. For example, an extant site is often depicted by the OS as no more than a single rectangle denoting a fence around the ROC post. If such a shape appeared on the map it was recorded as a potential site – subsequently all shapes were identified as potential sites.



Fig.2-1. A screenshot of the 12th level of detail map with the ROC post compound D-41 described as a reservoir. (Source: © Crown copyright/database right 2010. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

The aerial photographic records at the National Monuments Record and the Devon HER were interrogated but proved to be of limited use. In both cases, the vertical image series did indicate an ROC post. The series were often created ten years apart (i.e. 1973; 1983; 1994) and by the mid-1990s had stopped being produced altogether for some counties, this seriously limited the resource's potential. Unexpectedly, the most effective tool, when undertaking the remote search for ROC posts, has been Google Maps®. This reliable and recently available data is already utilised by the Defence of Britain Project. This allowed me to gain a 'feel' for the surrounding landscape, especially when considering the possibility of other Cold War structures in the immediate area of suspected ROC posts. Moreover, it provided an indication of the current land use (certainly within the last three years) in the immediate locality of any site under investigation. Subsequently it has been possible, by blending information sources, to virtually investigate the landscape surrounding the ROC posts and significantly refine the sample of sites visited to those known, or suspected, to be extant.

Database Verification Case Study

D-19 - Holsworthy, Devon

What follows are a number of screen shots demonstrating the process whereby a site identified through the baseline database was further investigated using remote methods. Using the database generated NGR it was possible to characterise the immediate topography of an ROC post's location, noting whether a compound fence or other feature was recognisable (fig.2-2). This information was then used to open the same area in Google Maps®. The programme was then switched to the satellite view where the existence of the post was quickly verified (fig.2-3).



Fig.2-2. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A screenshot of the 12th level of detail from the current OS mapping in Digimap with the ROC post compound clearly indicated at the centre (Source: © Crown copyright/database right 2010. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service).



Fig.2-3. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A screenshot of the same area as Fig. 2.2 with Google Maps® set to satellite, the ROC post compound fence clearly indicated at the centre. Internal Features are also recognisable. Note imagery date is 2006 (Source: Google Maps® accessed and image created 14/05/2011).

As a final verification, each post was ‘visited’ via Google Street View® (Fig.2-4). This programme contained information just two years older (2009) than the construction of the database, subsequently providing information on 16 of the 23 sites identified as extant from the previous steps. The information does, however, have limits. All Google Street View® imagery is taken from metalled roadways, therefore any feature more than 200m away from the roadside is difficult to discern. That said, this proved a powerful tool when utilised within a desktop environment.



Fig.2-4. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A screenshot of the same area as Fig.2-3 with Google Street View® from the road to the north-west of the site. The ROC post compound fence (white), Orlit A (blue) and entrance to Underground Monitoring Post (red) are clearly visible on the skyline. Note imagery date is post 2009 (Source: Google Street View® accessed and image created 14/05/2011).

Fig.2-5. D-19, Holsworthy, Devon. A ground level view of post D-19 Holsworthy depicting the extant – above ground – archaeology as of 1 May 2011. Picture taken during the baseline survey. View looking south-west (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011).

History

A history of the location of each ROC post is also included in the database, noting the opening date, re-locations due to the 1953 aircraft reporting re-organisation, and subsequent repositioning of structures connected with nuclear warfare, the construction of underground monitoring posts and their eventual closure in 1991. This has two intentions. Objective 4 is an attempt to understand the processes involved in the abandonment of structures constructed specifically for the monitoring of weapons of mass destruction. For this to be effective, a chronological framework was required. Organisational changes were also included as the ROC comprised an organisational geography rather that one laid out on county landmasses, this had a bearing on which posts I selected for monitoring.

The final desktop database identified 72 sites across Devon and Cornwall of which 52 were within the current Devon County border. Using the processes mentioned

above, it was possible to reduce the number of posts in Devon requiring visits to 23, which included sites where limited evidence still survived in 2009.

LINES OF INVESTIGATION - FIELDWORK

Introduction

Any analysis of recent archaeology is necessarily multi-disciplinary in its approach. Indeed, Harrison and Schofield reminds us that '- an archaeology of the contemporary past is defined by, and is even reliant upon, working with and across a series of academic disciplines' (2010, 89). Furthermore, Schiffer notes that if we are to move beyond 'assumptions about formation processes especially post-initial-use life histories' then a multi-disciplinary approach is a pre-requisite in project design (2010, 31). This is especially true of the current project, attending as it does to behaviours acted out on abandoned sites, the discovery of attitudes towards such sites and the story of specific organisations through their life-cycle, memory and material culture. That said, this work is primarily a project investigating the archaeology of mass destruction. Subsequently, a large part of the research requires site visits and elements of traditional archaeological fieldwork.

Sub-objectives

The field recording of the sample monument type (Royal Observer Corps Underground Monitoring Posts) set itself number of key sub-objectives. These were designed to capture as much information about each surviving monument in its current physical condition as possible. A number of sub-objectives were included within each site visit that were intended to contextualise each field experience. Those sub-objectives were, but not restricted to, the following:

- To ascertain the current number and/or condition of extant sites across Devon.
- To audit threats to the extant archaeological record posed by current land use.
- To audit threats to the extant archaeological record posed by external agencies i.e. vandalism, development or neglect.
- To complement the current database with field results allowing the selection of a number of sites for the monitoring of abandonment and post-abandonment.

- Capture the attitudes of members of the public who were in the vicinity during the field recording of monuments.

Field Recording

Those sites identified as having archaeological potential were initially visited between late April and May 2011, with subsequent recording events taking place throughout 2012 -2013. To ensure a coherent, comprehensive and consistent record, a standard recording form was designed and completed separately for each ROC post (Appendix One for Devon, disc for all others). The form included criteria recommended by English Heritage (Cocroft 2000) although a more directed series of questions and fields was considered essential if the work was to capture the true nature of each site. The recording form comprises information covering the environment and geology of the site, condition survey of above ground, sub-terrainian features where accessible, environs and perceived or recognised threats to the welfare and survivability of the site. Recording activities enacted on the site between one visit to the next was a key function of the dataset. This was complemented by a comprehensive photographic survey of all known features, again following a predetermined series of directional shots to ensure consistency in the record.

Final Record

The final record maintains the unique serial number issued to each ROC post on inclusion of the site in the desktop database. This '**D**-' serial number is the nomenclature utilised in the creation of the completed record. Each post file comprises a digitally transcribed version of the field recording form. Located within the form are a number of hyperlinks to the photographic record created for each site; this is broken down into singular images allowing the enquirer to locate specific views instantly. The file also contains the remains of the images produced during the field exercise, accessible by opening each file (Fig.2-6). This information is to be passed to the Devon County HER in its entirety, including the transfer of copyright from the originator where appropriate, on completion of the project.



Fig.2-6. Screenshot of the file content and structure for each ROC post visited. File name with D- county code; main contents of specific file; ROC post image. (Source: Bob Clarke 18/05/2011).

Additional Landscape Investigation Post 2013

During a meeting of the supervisory staff in early 2013, the number of posts under investigation were discussed. Underground monitoring posts had been constructed in 52 locations across the county, of those 14 were extant. It was decided that it would be beneficial to include at least one more county and perhaps a token post from a number of others. Subsequently, I enlarged the fieldwork considerably. The survey now includes all extant sites in Devon and Wiltshire alongside a number of sites in Gloucestershire, Cornwall, Yorkshire and Berkshire; the sample has now been increased to 33.

OBJECTIVE 2: CAPTURE THE NARRATIVES, ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL HISTORIES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR PERIOD. THIS WILL ENABLE THE ACTIVITIES ENACTED ON ALL SITES TO BE CONTEXTUALISED WITH INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE.

Introduction

Two public engagement surveys, intended to provide information and contextualising any archaeological work, have been developed as part of this study. One was aimed at the general public, the other targeted just those who had been volunteer members of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC). The public survey proved to be a straight forward exercise, however, that aimed at the ROC proved far more problematic and is thus discussed below. The construction of an oral history to contextualise the archaeology and material culture of ROC is a key component of the present research. Objective 2 notes ‘capture the narratives, attitudes and personal histories of those who were members of the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold War era’; this involved capturing the memories and thoughts of the surviving observer cohort, which targeted, but not restrictively, those who served in Devon or the wider Home Defence Region 7 landscape. The identification of likely interviewees was initiated in late December 2010; by April 2011 it had become apparent that the methodology was flawed. Only three observers agreed to speak and then exclusively about one particular event, the 1991 stand-down. Interestingly this situation was not unique as others had also encountered similar problems with the same group (Oldcorn 2010, 51).

The capture of accounts drawing on the collective memory of an organisation disbanded 25 years ago naturally presents a number of challenges. In the small number of successful interviews, one event dominated the discussion – the 1991 stand-down - and, more importantly, the way in which this was carried out by the authorities. It is now clear what influenced the poor engagement and focussed responses was a high level of disenfranchisement. That is ‘a unique combination of culture with current and past political realities’ (Scham 2001, 190). The methodology surrounding the capture of the oral history of the ROC requires expansion at this point as the modification of collection methods has been the key to later successes.

Background to Failure

The Target Group

The capture of narratives is an extremely valuable part of this project. There are a number of recognisable periods of activity in the Royal Observer Corps archaeological record spanning 40 years; to contextualise these periods with human experience is essential. Only with an increased level of fidelity would it be possible to indicate any sort of taskscape (Ingold 1993) and changes in the material culture encountered on site indicating episodes of abandonment (Schiffer 2010, 31). Membership of the Royal Observer Corps was a voluntary undertaking and subsequently terms of service were not of fixed length, therefore, members' recollections expose different operational facets dependant on their lengths of service. To this end a number of key concepts were required to be placed within the design of the recording regime. Foremost was the empathetically based considerations when discussing past experiences with observers.

The Observer Demographic

Little, if any, investigative work has been undertaken academically into the social make-up of the Royal Observer Corps. The demographic of the ROC suggests a male orientated, ex-military service group primarily of retirement age, but this is not the case. Throughout the organisation's existence, the demographic changed dramatically; subsequently it is clear a number of changes are recognisable. From the restoration of the ROC network on 1 April 1947, two groups dominate membership: the returning observer who had performed the function during World War II; and, increasingly, the de-mobbed serviceman. By the 1970s, this had made way for a large number of non-service background applicants. It is possible that this 'demilitarisation' of members stems from an influx of applicants caused by the stand-down of the Civil Defence Corps in 1968 (Clarke 2005b, 164).

The role of women in the ROC is also a further neglected area of study. Women have been eligible to join the ROC since at least 1942 (Wood 1992, 181); initially employed in Group Headquarters but from the 1950s onwards this included positions out in the field. An accurate record of their role in Cold War activities is absent. Additionally, unlike other military services, rank in the ROC had no gender connotation, so an observer was an observer regardless of gender. Furthermore, it has proved impossible to locate the ROC service records; this was an unexpected

development, blamed by the RAF Museum Hendon on ‘a number of recent moves and funding cuts’ (Museum Curator 8 November 2014, *pers commm*). Taking this into consideration we are currently left with the information provided by a rapidly dwindling number of ROC Association memberships.

Disenfranchisement

When Peter Hennessey noted that ‘the Cold War neither socialised large numbers of people into its disciplines, rationales and complexities nor did it, in modern argot, give them any sense of ownership on outcome’ little did he know how accurate a point he was making (2003, 3). The ‘Cold War’ has built a self-imposed dichotomy into the historiography of the period. The initial research for this project discovered that observers were reluctant to engage with the research. Two reasons loomed large; the apparent lack of self-worth through connections with nuclear warfare and the level of disenfranchisement felt over the decision to summarily stand-down the organisation without any form of consultation period.

Regrouping

If we reflect on Peter Hennessey’s (2003, 3) comment, it is possible to recognised a paradigm shift in the mentality and attitudes of the public to warfare. In the United Kingdom, World War II was recognised as total war; almost all public activities were turned over to war production or support of the military. The nation assumed a ‘need to know’ stance as total war was just that – total. This is not the case regarding the Cold War, as it constructed many dichotomies and exposed many prejudices, especially in the relationship between the public and official agencies. This is further exacerbated by the overarching ideologically aspect of East vs. West, re-enforced at a national level with the personal ideology of the individual. Boundaries between those who supported nuclear weapons as a deterrent and those who were opposed to their retention, or stationing on British soil, were marked. This should come as no surprise. Strange and Walley noted while discussing the heritage value of Cold War sites that ‘ - in our empirical research within the Yorkshire Region we have encountered hostility, incomprehension and accusations of poor taste‘ (2007, 159). Unfortunately, there is no indication as to the demographic of the respondents however, the sentiment is clear: Cold War archaeology forces an identity crisis in those who were involved in its practice or engaged against it. The recognition that the Royal Observer Corps veterans were displaying a high level of

disenfranchisement due to their abrupt disposal now drove the research in a different direction.

The Secret Organisation

As I have already discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, the Royal Observer Corps was a secret organisation. Their monitoring posts are typically 'incognito', especially when appearing on Ordnance Survey maps, so it come as no surprise that this level of secrecy should be displayed by the Observers themselves. Membership or initiation into this or other organisations was via a personal agreement with the Government; the signing of the Official Secrets Act. The completion of this document initiates the signatory into a parallel world identifiable in Foucault's 'other space' or heterotopian landscape (1967); a world where the general public are excluded (Scham 2001, 187).

To what degree did the Official Secrets Act impact on my research? Moreover, why was it initially so difficult to engage any former members of the ROC in the project? To answer these questions, I first needed to understand the motivation behind joining a voluntary organisation. The reasons why members of the public decide to join a particular group – especially one as highly ordered as the ROC – are legion (Wardell and Lishman *et al* 2000; Yanay and Yanay 2008). It is clear that an understanding of such motives would be a key driver to success; this is where the breakthrough came. While re-evaluating some of the initial interviews/conversations one notion, mentioned almost in passing, stood out; the existence of a ROC Association. This had been in existence for many years and during the stand-down in 1991, all Observers had been encouraged to join, some did but others left in disgust. The ROC used a number of recruitment strategies across its life-cycle. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the ROC Association adheres to the same structural framework as the organisation proper. In this instance, it included a form of pseudo-Official Secrets Act. The key, therefore, to successful participation of groups or members of groups associated with highly ordered organisations is through a quasi-chain of command, irrespective of whether the organisation is still in existence or a member's association has replaced it. One has to obtain official approval before any contact is made with members and only then is it possible the access the organisation. A re-assessment of the original observer contacts from 2010-11 revealed one further salient point: that none appeared to have joined the

ROC Association. Being outside the current ROC social group, complete with its 'old boys' support network, appears to underpin the lack of perceived self-worth apparent in the initial data collection (Yanay and Yanay 2008, 74).

Initiation

Initial contact with the ROC Association was made in late 2011. Contacting the general membership requires a level of 'official sanction' before information is offered to the researcher. I underwent what can only be described as a vetting process, justifying my motives and background but luckily I too am a signatory of the Official Secrets Act, which I am sure smoothed over some initial apprehensions. Now the ROC website has an 'officially vetted' link to the current project survey, and a number of Observers have contacted me, via the ROC Association, expressing interest and help. The quality of the information supplied is such that it is now possible to narrate the life-cycle of the organisation from at least 1952 to stand-down and beyond.

The Role of Social Media in this Project

Social media is a fairly recent and complex phenomenon; it has also become an important research area for this project. A number of online areas have already been exploited for this thesis (discussed above) although, social networking (as defined in Cann, Dimitriou and Hooley 2011, 7) was not initially considered. Reasons for this are many.

Paramount to any research is the accuracy and authenticity of the date provided from those who are engaged for information, memory and life-cycles of organisation. It is already widely accepted that a level of phenomenology creeps into any personal account. This has been suggested by Cann *et al* to have an impact on the quality of the data obtained, noting 'This inevitably means that it is more difficult to identify which contributions are valuable or authoritative' (2011, 11). Apparently, supporting this Perry and Beale noted that 'all that seems clear about social web engagement in archaeology is that it *may* [authors emphasis] have the capacity to foster a series of very productive relationships and spaces for knowledge-making and knowledge-sharing' (2015, 155). My decision to pursue this direction of knowledge collection came primarily from the dramatic increase in Royal Observer Corps focussed interest groups on the social networking site Facebook®.

In the initial phases of this project the amount of information contained on social networks was so minimal it was of no value - occasional photographs requesting what sites were etc., by 2014 this had exploded to groups who represented the Royal Observer Corps Association; ROC post restorers; Cold War enthusiasts and, recently a group interested in the restoration of just Orlit posts. All are known as 'closed groups', essentially a member, usually the one who sets up the site, acts as a moderator, vetting applications to join. Currently I have been inducted into all four sites, providing access to over 2000 members with a vested interest in the ROC. Moreover, group members are from both the order (pre-Sept 1991) and chaos (post-Sept 1991) periods of the life-cycle of Cold War ROC field monuments. The information provided has greatly enhanced the research in a number of areas.

Maintaining a Record

The process where by a record of conversations undertake on social media, especially sites such as Facebook®, Twitter® and, to a lesser extent, Myspace® has been, and remains, problematic (Green 2014). Currently the Archaeological Data Service, based in York, is working to produce a set of guidelines that promote both best practice and appropriate levels of storage (*ibid* 2014, 1). That work has yet to achieve maturity. For the purpose of this project all names have been removed from all text and transcripts obtained from a third party through both social media and other electronic means. These records can be found in the appendices

The Use of Pre-set Questionnaires

The collection of data has taken a number of forms. With Observers being dispersed across the United Kingdom and, on occasion, in the Far East and beyond, it quickly became apparent that a form of online collection would be beneficial. A response form was developed and constructed on WWW.Wufoo.com – an online data collection programme. Links to the page were then lodged on the Royal Observer Corps Association website. The survey was open for 12 months (Jan – Dec) in 2012) and 31 responses were returned in that time. The survey reopened between January and June 2014, this time on social media sites that were aimed specifically at ROC members; this elicited a further 30 responses. All returns were anonymously recorded, although IP addresses were available, allowing an audit for multiple returns from a single correspondent.

The Royal Observer Corps form comprises ten questions:

Table 2-1. Royal Observer Corps Online Question Set

1) What made you want to join the Royal Observer Corps?	6) What were your feelings towards members of the peace movements such as CND?
2) To which group did you belong?	7) How long did you serve in the Corps? Please indicate your first and last year i.e. 1976-1987
3) Could you describe some of the duties you undertook during your time in the ROC?	8) Were you serving at the time of the stand down? If you were, what were your thoughts on the way it was conducted (be as frank as you like)?
4) What would you say was the greatest advance made in the equipment used during your time in the Corps?	9) Are you, or did you ever consider joining an ROC association? Please give reasons why you did or did not join.
5) If the 'balloon had gone up' how do you think you would have coped knowing everyone you held dear could be in grave danger?	10) Finally, do you think the role of the ROC should be taught in schools, and if so why?

Further information has been forthcoming from the ROC Association itself. The President was able to obtain an additional 13 returns of the form via a hard copy he posted out to members. To date 62 members of the Royal Observer Corps have offered information – a vast improvement on the three begrudgingly obtained previously.

The General Public Survey

Alongside the survey targeted at the Royal Observer Corps I conducted a survey, open to the general public, intended to provide some background evidence to the period. The survey has been in two parts; Form One was offered as a hard copy completed at a number of events (Poltimore House open heritage open day, Veryan ROC post open day (Fig.2-7), Wiltshire Industrial Archaeology symposium and so forth).

Fig.2-7. C-17, Veryan, Cornwall. Members of the public completing the General Public Survey using the vent stack of the ROC at Veryan, Cornwall 18 October 2011. (Source: Bob Clarke 18/18/2011).

Form One was used throughout 2011 and comprised the following questions:

Table 2-2. Hard Copy Public Question Set

1) When did the Cold War end? *Respondents were requested to select a date between 1987 and 1993*	6) What colour was associated with the Soviet Union? *Respondents were requested to select a colour from seven offered*
2) Who in the list were Soviet Leaders? *Respondents were requested to select as many names as they thought from seven offered*	7) Name a historical event you believe is connected or a result of the Cold War.
3) Name a location, site of base outside the UK that you think has connections with the Cold War.	8) Name a location, site of base inside the UK that you think has connections with the Cold War.
4) Name a location, site of base in (county survey is conducted in) that you think has connections with the Cold War.	9) Name an organisation, other than the Armed Forces, that was in existence during the Cold War.
5) Did you answer the last questions from memory or after listening to today's presentation or investigating the display? *a) yes* *b) no*	10) Should an abandoned Cold War bunker be considered – *a) A historic building* *b) An archaeological site* *c) An eyesore*

Additionally, to the ten key questions, I requested respondents indicate their gender and age. The survey achieved 138 completed returns. The data has been analysed, bringing a number of intriguing points to the fore, not least the role age plays in shaping memory (Schuman and Rodgers 2004, 218). Schuman and Rogers work has been used to calibrate my answer set when utilised in the order and chaos model.

Refining the Questions

Form Two was produced after it became clear some areas were worthy of deeper investigation. This was offered exclusively through Wufoo and posted on a number of historical and archaeological interest group websites. Between 19-01-2012 and 26-02-2016 the form received 1193 views, 178 were completed, a return of 14.92%.

The results were encouraging and have gone some way to helping contextualise the activities witnessed on redundant Cold War sites and the subsequent material culture during ROC post evaluations. The survey closed on 28-02-2016.

Form two comprised the following questions:

1) For over 40 years successive British Governments spent millions of pounds building 'nuclear bunkers' around the country. What do you think was the true purpose of these structures?	5) Is too soon to investigate the Cold War? Some think we should be protecting sites now as they force us to confront the period both personally and nationally. What do you think?
2) The development of an independent nuclear deterrent was promoted by successive Governments as essential to maintaining the British way of life. Was this a justified claim?	6) The Cold War is a relatively new subject to schools. Do you think we should a) teach it in a worldwide context; b) concentrate on the British story; c) not at all? Please give some context to your answer.
3) The Cold War dominated four decades of British life; in that time a vast defence orientated manufacturing industry developed. Many communities relied heavily on the defence industries for work. Do you think reliance on such industries, both here and abroad, perpetuated the Cold War?	7) Have you any other thoughts on the subject?
4) Did you or your family play any part in the Cold War? And if so could you describe what the activity was?	8) To enable me to filter your responses I need to know what age bracket you fall into please.

Table 2-3. Online Public Question Set

OBJECTIVE 3: CONSTRUCT, AND TEST, A NEW MODEL INTENDED TO STRUCTURE THE INTERPRETATION OF MATERIAL CULTURE, ESPECIALLY THAT ENCOUNTERED ON SITES RECOGNISED AS HIGHLY ORDERED.

Introduction

Material culture humanises the process of deposition. It also has the potential to differentiate between order and chaos; in the current study this concept is important. 'Order and chaos' is a descriptive model I have developed relating to the abandonment of sites or landscapes originated, inhabited or utilised by highly organised and ritualistic entities – in this case aspects of the British military of the twentieth century. 'Order and chaos' can be applied to sites of any size, making it the ideal vehicle to use in the investigation of the material culture of the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) and, more importantly, the Royal Observer Corps (ROC). The highly ordered environment required to effectively carrying out nuclear warning and fallout monitoring manifests itself through the almost clone-like order of the environs of the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP). This is in stark contrast to the chaos now encountered on UGMPs after 20 years of abandonment.

'Order and Chaos' as a Model

The concept and structure of the model is expanded in chapter 4, however, below is a brief, high-level introduction. Order and chaos, as a way of interpreting the material culture of recently abandoned or decommissioned military sites, appears an appropriate model to describe the pre- and post- use phases encountered. This model is specific to military, or agencies of the military, such as the Territorial Army; however, sub-sets may be appropriate for other, institutionally based, organisations such as the National Health Service, Prison Service or Central Government. Taking that into consideration the 'order and chaos' model is most effective when applied to military sites of any size. The model argues that it is possible to recognise differing levels of interaction initiated by the primary user on a site if the user is, itself, a highly structured organisation (Fig.2-8). Moreover, the model offers the chance to recognise pre- and post- organisational activity and offers an explanation for areas on a site that present little or no material culture.



Fig.2-8. Divisions in authority when applied to an RAF Station. Core/Peripheral Activities support a range of facets. For brevity here they are noted in numerical descending order of importance. (Source: © Crown copyright/database right 2010. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service; Overlay Bob Clarke)

The illustration above (fig 2-8) demonstrates divisions of order when applied to a functioning Royal Air Force station. Taking into consideration the operational aspects of the station, it is possible to recognise all facets of the proposed model. The Station is divided into ‘core’ (green line) and ‘peripheral’ Zones (blue Line). ‘Highly Organised Operational Space’ (red 1) includes all areas where activities required to ensure the air transport task of the squadrons are successfully carried out. ‘Highly Organised Domestic Space’ (orange 2) includes all administrative tasks required to support the primary tasking including the Officer’s and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer’s Mess. ‘Domestic Space’ (pale green 3) is less ordered than those previously mentioned but still with a high degree of military ethos. ‘Peripheral Activities’ (purple 4) are support functions that include Married Quarters and family orientated activities. It is here that the greatest level of interaction with the public is encountered.

Application

The Order and Chaos model was applied to each site visited over the period of this thesis with useful results. The concept of Core and Periphery – utilised to great effect

in Iron Age coinage studies – has been used to demonstrate the distribution of material culture, the taphonomy and systemic context (Schiffer 2010, 20) of sites connected with the Cold War.

OBJECTIVE 4: IDENTIFY THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN THE ABANDONMENT OF STRUCTURES CONSTRUCTED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE MONITORING OF THE EFFECTS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

INTRODUCTION

To complement the results generated by objective 3, a further level of detail was applied; this time investigating the processes at work on a site or landscape once it has been abandoned. Abandonment processes have long been discussed (Michael Schiffer 2010) however; the role of the organisation rather than the social groups appears to be ignored in the majority of cases. To ensure the interaction of as many actions and agencies as possible are captured a series of specific recordable criteria have been developed; these criteria are human; animal; meteorological and vegetation.

Application

Objective 4 was intended to answer one specific question 'Is abandonment and post-abandonment a consistent process across all extant ROC sites when considering their uniformity in both construction and use prior to September 1991?' Obviously the answer was no, the processes were, and continue to be, complex and multi-faceted. Applying the same criteria to each ROC post built a picture of the processes being acted out at each location. It soon became clear that activities were far more complex than the initial four criteria suggested (fig.2-10). Processes on site could be a combination of all four criteria or permeations including one, two or three in any order.

Considering the results from the initial baseline visits conducted in 2011, it became apparent that while the recording of human interaction with ROC posts did leave certain archaeological markers, that same interaction fell into broad streams of activity. Towards the end of the fieldwork cycle in 2014 enough data had been recovered to start streamlining the activities. Subsequent analysis identified four

main topics; Overtly Curated; Covertly Curated; Transitional, and ruined or removed posts. A greater level of detail covering these topics can be found in chapter 7.

Fig.2-10. D-7 Christow, Devon. The same ROC post's entrance stack over a two-year period, demonstrating the complexity of activities being enacted on a single site. (Source: Bob Clarke 2011; 2012;2013)

OBJECTIVE 5: CONSTRUCT A MORE APPROPRIATE CHRONOLOGY OF THE COLD WAR, RELYING ON THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD CURRENTLY EXTANT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Introduction

The historiography of the Cold War deals with a potentially global conflict, and subsequently, records it on a global scale. Politics feature largely in the narrative, as do events recognised as likely causes of potential war between the Superpowers. The Cuban Missile Crisis, Invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent effects on two Olympic Games (Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984) as well as tensions over the continued partition of Germany, Korea and Vietnam, strengthened by ideological rhetoric, are all recognised components of the period. Underpinning this was the constant drive to counter technological developments by both East and West, probably best demonstrated by the race to develop first nuclear, then thermonuclear weapons, as well as the means of delivering them which culminated in the Space Race and it is easy to see how the intricacies played out on a day-to-day basis are in danger of being lost.

Détente

In the United Kingdom, the period is dominated by Britain's desire to retain a position of global authority through the development of an independent nuclear deterrent and delivery method (Young 1993, 114), followed by an increasing reliance on the United States 'Umbrella' (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 52). Currently the period is divided into the First and Second Cold War, coinciding with times of heightened tension between the Superpowers (Cocroft 2001; Cocroft *et al* 2003, 10). This is not just the view of the archaeological community; it permeates many historical works (Young 1993; Judt 2005). The lull in hostilities is generally accepted to be the period immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) culminating in an extended period of détente throughout the 1970s. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops on 24 December 1979 is recognised as the *terminus anti quem* to this period of relative calm.

The Balanced View

Viewed from a historiographical standpoint, this can be mapped. This simplified chronology adequately describes the period between the traditional First and Second Cold War. When the first major piece of work to describe the Cold War

archaeological record was published in 2001 (Cocroft) the view was still that '- it is helpful to split the Cold War into a number of chronological periods.' The current research, coupled with observations on other sites located within Home Defence Region 7, has discovered that the archaeology does not readily demonstrate the inferred First and Second Cold War. Indeed, when considered against a backdrop of continued development in both passive and offensive technologies the period recognised as détente does not exist archaeologically in the United Kingdom.

Objective 5 intends to demonstrate that a chronology considering the archaeology of the Cold War structures of the United Kingdom, utilising but not exclusively relying on, the Royal Observer Corps offers a far more acceptable and rigorous method of interpreting activities within the Cold War.

Discussion

The multi-disciplinary approach of the present thesis levelled a number of challenges for me. Taking that into consideration the information, however hard won, has indicated that there is a measure of validity in the project. It is also clear that without inputs from social media there would be very few observer account available with which to contextualise the landscape of the organisation. Such accounts have ensured, as will become apparent in later chapters, that the role of the Royal Observer Corps in the monitoring of air, and later, nuclear attack have been more fully exposed to scrutiny. Subsequently, a contextualised landscape of both order and chaos has been identified and recorded. Through analysis, a wide range of activities have been recognised, not least that undertaken by the observers while on duty. The role of the internet and access to online information beyond social aspects should also not be underestimated. At least 50% of the fieldwork undertaken has been carried out remotely, certainly the reduction of posts requiring a visit has reduced the environmental impact of the project dramatically.

The following chapters investigate the roles undertaken by members of the Royal Observer Corps during the Cold War revival of the organisation (1947-1991). The next chapter introduces the reader to the Royal Observer Corps, describing the life-cycle of the organisation through its history, both institutional and social, and methods of recruitment intended to enlist volunteers into a heterotopian landscape.

CHAPTER 3 - POPULATING A HETEROTOPIAN LANDSCAPE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL, ETHNOGRAPHICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL LIFE-CYCLE OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS

INTRODUCTION

Successive British Governments, throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, relied on the general public for the greater part of their home defence policies. Indeed, the increasing level of voluntary organisations in the defence of the mainland can be matched with advances in aviation technology and its growing use in war; this was not to last. As the cost of weapon development increased along with destructive powers they could unleash on the population, organisations such as Civil Defence and Auxiliary Fire Service became increasingly impotent, so by 1968 many had been disbanded. However, one voluntary group, the Royal Observer Corps (ROC), was destined to play a full part in the continued defence of the British Isles until the end of the Cold War. The ROC offers the researcher the opportunity to investigate the archaeological, ethnographical and anthropological life-cycle of an organisation linked with weapons of mass destruction. The ROC has been categorised, through my research, as a highly ordered organisation which adheres, in an almost ritualistic fashion, to regulation. This chapter describes the life-cycle of the organisation through its history, both institutional and social, and methods of recruitment intended to enlist volunteers into a heterotopian landscape.

THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The origins of volunteers acting as aircraft reporters can be traced back to 1916 as a reaction to the increasing Zeppelin air-raids targeting the East Coast and London. Originally known as the Metropolitan Observation Service (MOS), the organisation identified aircraft and airship types from fixed ground-based locations and reported directional information to a central control (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 174). By 1916, the MOS had been drawn into a fledgling Home Defence Network (HDN). The HDN controlled a significant number of military assets concentrated along the east and south coasts; anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, balloon screens and fighter aircraft were all deployed in an attempt to deter enemy incursions (ROC Training Manual

1985, para 103). The organisation was disbanded at the end of World War I, but not before it had proved the concept of reliance on volunteers to support military units in the field (Wood 1992, 17). In 1925, with economic unrest spreading across Europe, an observation network was reinstated along the eastern approaches to London, at that time manned by volunteers who were enrolled as Special Constables (*ibid* 1992, 22). Control of the Observer Corps, as it was now known, passed to the Air Ministry in 1929 (ROC Training Manual 1985, para 107). It was to remain there until the development of the Hydrogen Bomb.

The rise of militarism in Europe throughout the 1930s, often in support of a fascist ideology (overtly obvious in Italy, Spain and Germany) relied heavily on a projection of influence through air power. The increasing political tensions coupled with the threat of aerial warfare so haunted the Continent that as early as 1932, Stanley Baldwin, British Prime Minister, was discussing the situation in Parliament:

> ' - the bomber will always get through, and it is very easy to understand that, if you realise the area of space. I said that any town within reach of an aerodrome could be bombed.'
>
> 'The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.'
>
> Stanley Baldwin INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HC Deb 10 November 1932 vol 270 cc525-641 para 632.

In an attempt to counter the threat, the British Government embarked on a series of substantial capital works designed to prepare the country for war (Clarke, 2009, 73). Known as the 'Expansion Schemes', these initiatives rapidly developed the structure of air defence, integrating the Observer Corps into a fully functioning reporting network. From the mid-1930s, a radar network had been in development and by the outbreak of war units were stationed around the coastline; crucially, it was of little use inland. Consequently, the Air Ministry deployed the Observer Corps across the United Kingdom's land mass to provide inland cover and complement the coastal radar network (ROC Training Manual 1985, para 109). The network was tested to the limit during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz (fig.3-1) although it did not find favour with the public, often been seen as the 'easy way out of service' (Wood 1992, 136). However, it proved so effective throughout the winter of 1940-41 that the Observer Corps was subsequently awarded the suffix 'Royal' on 9 April 1941 for its efforts (*ibid* 1992).

Fig.3-1 Traditional view of the ROC in World War II. This image, part of a comprehensive series of colour transparencies produced by the Ministry of Information in 1943, currently held by the Imperial War Museum, presents the now traditional view of the ROC 'guarding' the southern coast of the United Kingdom. (Image No. TR1443© Crown Copyright IWM)

Observation posts were geographically static throughout the conflict, a necessity of the function of aircraft tracking whereas personnel were not. Over a thousand observers accompanied the invasion forces into Northern France from 1944, some even making it to Germany. Towards the end of World War II, the ROC performed 'Granite' and 'Darkie' duties, warning aircraft of height related obstacles through a coloured flare system at night or in poor visibility, enemy incursions being rare by this time. Less than a week after the surrender of Germany (7 May 1945) the Royal Observer Corps was stood-down, all infrastructure was dismantled and the post network was abandoned (ROC Training Manual 1985, para 130; Clarke 2005b, 139). A letter to *Flight Magazine* captures the mood:

> It is impossible for us P.B.O.s [Poor Bloody Observers] to convince the public that we did have anything useful to do when Jerry ceased to come over in person. "What about Radar?" I believe that there are still uses in a future war – and perhaps in peacetime, too – for a similar organisation to the R.O.C., and I do not believe that Radar has in the recent war rendered us entirely obsolete.
>
> YET ANOTHER P.B.O, (Anon, 1945, 6 September, 268).

COLD WAR

However, stand-down was short lived. The Soviet Union's clear intention to continue occupying many Central European countries forced a re-think of Britain's air defence network, the reformation of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) was a direct

consequence of this (Clarke 2005b, 140). In the immediate post-War period the Government had placed much of the radar network in ‘care and maintenance’, a phrase now recognised as a euphemism for abandonment. With many of the radar sites derelict or their equipment obsolete – the Air Ministry looked once again to the ROC to plug the gap and the recruitment of former observers started in earnest in September 1946 (Anon 1946a, 5 September, 254). The operational landscape of the ROC essentially followed those developed throughout the Second World War. Observers were to spot enemy aircraft, identify the type, height, range and direction and pass on the information, in real-time, to a reporting centre.

The centre liaised with RAF Fighter Command whose aircraft would intercept the enemy. At this time the threat from nuclear weapons was considered slight and, if it was an atomic attack, damage was expected to be on a limited scale similar to that experienced at Hiroshima in 1945. This was fortuitous as an article in *Flight Magazine* in 1950 suggested the both the Corps and the RAF were ‘groping in dark over the future of air defence’ (Anon 1950, 20 April, 482).

Fig.3-2 ‘Searching the sky for planes – Javelins fly over the observation post, are logged and transmitted’. This image, taken on 12-06-58, actually chronicles the demise of the aircraft spotting role as it is one of a series reporting the opening of the first underground monitoring post at Farnham, Surrey. (Source: Central Press Photos Ltd.)

The infrastructure of the wartime ROC had also fallen quickly into dereliction. Of the 1,420 observation posts reactivated across the British landscape by 1949, nearly all were unusable (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 174). So in 1952, orders were placed by the Air Ministry with Messrs Orlit Ltd of Colnbrook, Buckinghamshire for a standard structure to replace the dilapidated posts. Two designs, known as the ‘Orlit A’ (see fig.3-2 for example) and ‘Orlit B’ were approved and supplied. Importantly the Orlit Post is one

of the first recognisable structures in the archaeological record linked exclusively to the Cold War.

The aircraft reporting network was also short lived. Technological advances including jet aircraft operating at extreme height and, later, rocket deliverable hydrogen bombs, quickly rendered the role of aircraft observer obsolete (Clarke 2005a, 2). In 1955, the poor level of preparedness of the British Government against the effects of nuclear weapons were finally explored by a government commission. The findings of the study, conducted by William Strath, into the effects of a hydrogen bomb attack exposed the entire country's vulnerability (Hennessy 2003, 131, Hughes 2003, 258). What is now known as the *Strath Report* is a pivotal document in the study of the British Cold War. Strath concluded that ten, megaton range, hydrogen weapons:

> – delivered on the western half of the UK or in the waters close in off the western seaboard, with the normal prevailing winds, would effectively disrupt the life of the country and make normal activity completely impossible (JIC 1955).

Of the many initiatives to come out of the report, the importance of the process whereby radioactive fallout should be monitored and tracked was by far the most revelatory. Prior to Strath, the residual effects of a nuclear blast had been based on the attacks on Japan; locally devastating, but with little physical effects beyond the target area. The true nature of H-Bomb warfare had become apparent through a series of tests in the early 1950s. Strath recommended a new monitoring force structured on similar lines to the current ROC aircraft reporting network (Hughes 2003, 267). Indeed, a 'central fall-out plotting organisation will be required to collate the reports of the monitoring organisation and interpret them in light of current meteorological information' (*ibid* 2003, 268). As the ROC's existing reporting role was now effectively redundant, the organisation moved from the Air Ministry to the new organisation alluded to by Strath – the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (Clarke 2005, 142). The move to the new monitoring role was swift, during 1955 '*Exercise Beware*', an annual air defence exercise, a report noted - 'The Royal Observer Corps would do valuable service by taking over the duty of measuring the strength of radioactive fallout' (Anon 1955, 30 September, 569). Meanwhile in Parliament:

> Radio-Activity (Warning Organisation)

> Mr. Ian Harvey asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is yet able to make a statement upon the Government's plans for setting up a national monitoring organisation to give warning and to measure radio-activity in the event of air attack on the United Kingdom.
>
> Major Lloyd-George Yes. I am glad to be able to inform the House that arrangements are being made for the Royal Observer Corps, in conjunction with the Air Raid Warning Organisation, to undertake this important new function in addition to their existing duties.
>
> HC Deb 15 June 1955 vol. 542 c18W 18W

By 1956 the move of the Royal Observer Corps from aircraft reporting to fall-out monitoring was clearly in development.

> III. The Warning System
>
> 11 The development of a fall-out warning system, supplementary to the system for giving warning of the attack itself, is proceeding. The Royal Observer Corps would monitor fall-out so as to provide the Air Raid Warning Organisation with the data on which to base public warnings of fall-out.
>
> Manual of Civil Defence Vol. 1, Pamphlet No.2, 1956, page 7.

The 'H' Bomb

The United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) encompassed a number of functions which, from 1956, became increasingly orientated towards the scientific monitoring of nuclear detonations and their after-effects (Anon 1956b, 27 July, 175). The most important aspects were fallout monitoring, warning and tracking. For this to be effective a comprehensive and evenly distributed network of monitoring stations was required – the ROC was the ideal solution (ROC Training Manual 1985, para 143). In an ambitious construction programme 1,563 Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP) were built over the period 1957-64, with a number re-sited due to water-logging over the next few years (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 180). Operated by three or four voluntary observers, the UGMP reported directly to one of 31 new control bunkers constructed through Home Office finance. The Group Headquarters, housing both UKWMO and ROC staff, were a mixture of semi- and fully protected structures intended to 'enable observers to live in it comfortably and healthily for a considerable time' (Anon 1961, 23 November, 798). All Headquarters were completed by 1962; No. 10 Group, designated Exeter and located at Poltimore Park, is extant (fig.3-3). The Underground Monitoring Posts (fig.3-4. is an example) and above and below ground Group headquarters s are the final recognisable structures to enter the archaeological record of the Cold War ROC.

Fig.3-3 No. 10 Group Protected Headquarters, Poltimore Park, Exeter. The site is now utilised by a recreational company. (Source: Bob Clarke 25/072012)

Fig.3-4 C-17 Veryan Post, Cornwall. A component of No.10 Group Exeter from 1973. This post is now run by a group of observer volunteers on behalf of the owner the National Trust. (Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2011)

The re-focussing of the Royal Observer Corps task, along with the major capital investment required to build the new monitoring network, was overshadowed by repeated demands for a reduction in arms expenditure in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Clarke 2005b, 150; Grant 2010, 175). The Labour Government, under Harold Wilson, set about initiating swinging cuts across a wide range of public services. This, coupled with reductions in Britain's defensive capability agreed throughout 1966-67, also focussed on the role of Civil Defence and with it, the Royal Observer Corps.

> In January 1968 the Wilson announced:
>
> Now I turn to Home Department Services, including Home Defence. We have decided to reduce Home Defence—Civil Defence —to a care and maintenance basis, with a saving of about £14 million in 1968–69, and £20 million in 1969–70 and in subsequent years. This will involve the disbandment of the Civil Defence Corps, the Auxiliary Fire Service and the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve Category III. The Government propose to restrain the growth of expenditure on other Home Department Services by £6 million in 1968–69 and £12 million in 1969–70.
>
> HC Deb 16 January 1968 vol. 756 cc1577-620

For a while it appeared the Royal Observer Corps had been spared any reduction – however:

> Mr. Merlyn Rees In consequence of the Government's decision to reduce expenditure on home defence the number of observation posts will be reduced from 1,559 [sic] to 873, the number of group headquarters from 29 to 27 and the complement from 25,000 to 12,500. I regret that upwards of 5,000 volunteers—to whose services I pay sincere tribute—will become surplus.
>
> HC Deb 20 March 1968 vol. 761 c399

The implications were clear, the public had now become the lowest priority tier of Home Defence; there would be no 'real time' rescue or provision from Central Government. Local Authorities would now be expected to make provision for nuclear warfare against a set of Government guidelines, intended to maintain the machinery of government but almost totally at the exclusion of the civilian population. The ROC too would become more militarily focused. Indeed, 'The Organisation also has an ability to provide more detailed information, particularly on fall-out, to services which can make use of it' (HC Deb 18 January 1968 vol. 756 cc2093-104).

UKWMO Operations

The Royal Observer Corps, as the field-force of the UKWMO, was regulated by a nationally imposed series of strict operating procedures. The UKWMO, in turn, provided an over-arching national command structure reporting directly to the Home Office. The organisation had four main objectives: originate air attack warnings; confirm nuclear strikes; provide an emergency meteorological service for fallout prediction, and provide Government agencies with a scientific appreciation of nuclear bursts (ROC 1989, 11). To facilitate this, the United Kingdom was divided into six UKWMO sectors (fig.3-5). Each sector was further divided into a number of groups, each comprising a protected operations room and a number of Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP) (*ibid* 1989, 7). The number of UGMPs in each group varied enormously (anywhere between 27 and 58) dependant on the geographical area of the group. Beyond the Field-Force (as the ROC component became known) a number of Nuclear Reporting Cells were established at major military command headquarters, primarily to interpret fall-out information passed from each Group headquarters (ROC Nuclear Reporting Cells 1989 part A - Function).

Southern Sector

The Southern Sector latterly (post-1975) comprised five groups (Shropshire, Swansea, Bristol, Yeovil and Exeter), with the Sector headquarters located at Lansdown, near Bath. Lansdown comprised the peacetime offices of the UKWMO in a purpose built structure and a converted Anti-Aircraft Operations Room (AAOR) as a protected facility (McCamley 2002, 118). An early casualty of the Strath report, the AAOR network was disbanded at the same time plans were being laid for the UGMP building programme. In 1962, the redundant structure was converted for use as No.12 Group, Bristol Head Quarters and the Southern UKWMO Sector headquarters.



Map of ROC sectors and groups

Fig.3-5 Royal Observer Corps national layout depicting sectors and groups in 1964. (Source Home Office Scientific Intelligence Officers' Operational Data Book 1964)

No.10 Group, Exeter

No. 10 Group (Exeter) initially utilised the World War II Sector Operations Room located at Poltimore Park as a headquarters from 1947 (Wood 1992, 271). In 1960-61 the construction of a purpose-built, above-ground, protected structure brought the group in line with the UKWMO Sector organisational framework. At that time the Group was bordered to the south-west by No.11 Group (Truro) and the north-east by No.9 Group (Yeovil). The 1968 reduction in voluntary services reduced Truro's capability to that of a communications centre parented by No.10 Exeter. By 1973 Truro had been disbanded and its UGMPs transferred to No.10 Group (fig.3-6 and 3-7).



Figs.3-6 and 3-7 Recent work on a protected structure in West Wiltshire discovered this ROC distribution chart from 1983. The extract on the right depicts the Southern Sector, marked EXE. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/06/2012)

The closure of Truro made No.10 Group geographically difficult to operate and subsequently the southern border of Yeovil was moved further south, absorbing ten Exeter posts in the process. The ROC then entered a period of relative stability; the geographical landscape remained stable for the rest of the service's life-cycle. There was, however, one event deemed so momentous it entered the ROCs training manual:

> 173. Other developments were foreseen by the purchase of Headquarters United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation of their first micro-computer for trials at Oxford to see whether programmes could be devised which would help in the operational tasks of the ROC and warning teams.
>
> Royal Observer Corps, Training Manual,1985, para 173.

Advances in technology, especially after 1980, had a visible impact on the way in which both the ROC monitoring posts and Group headquarters operated. Throughout 1981 the carrier warning network, a system linking all police, fire and council headquarters to a national warning centre at RAF Northwood in London, received a substantial upgrade, including the introduction of 'Handel', an air-raid warning circuit utilising the speaking clock system (Clarke 2005b, 143). As part of new 'Home Defence' legislation brought in by the Thatcher Government (returned in 1979) the UGMPs were refurbished. Twenty-one days' rations (from the original seven) were issued to all posts, improved lighting was provided via strip lighting, insulation for floors, wall and ceilings was installed and No.2 Group headquarters, Horsham was selected to trial a new form of ventilation system. By March 1989, all Group headquarters had been placed on the advanced automated switchboards of System X 2000, a national secure network, capable of withstanding the effects of the electromagnetic pulse issued by an exploding nuclear device. In November that same year the Berlin Wall was breached. Just over 18 months later Mr Kenneth Baker announced in the House of Commons:

> I have decided that the arrangements for monitoring details of nuclear bursts and radioactive fall-out in wartime must be restructured.
>
> I have therefore concluded with regret that the Home Office can no longer justify the continued use of the ROC and Home Department volunteers for the monitoring task. It has therefore been decided, following consultations between the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence, who share responsibilities for the ROC, that the Corps will be stood down in its operational role.
>
> HC Deb 10 July 1991 vol. 194 cc391-4W

On 25 July 1991, 2,000 members of the ROC undertook a Royal Review and Garden Party (fig.3-7a). On the penultimate day of the Corps' existence, over 300 members attended a service at the Royal Air Forces Central Church on the Strand in London. On 31 September the Royal Observer Corps was stood-down (Wood 1992, iv), and although a small number of observers continued to man Nuclear Reporting Cells, these too had gone by 1995 (Clarke 2005b, 152).



Fig.3-7a. The Royal Observer Corps Journal for September/October 1991. The cover depicts Her majesty the Queen reviewing the Corps on 25 July 1991. (Ministry of Defence)

End-Game

In the wake of the 1991 stand-down, a number of organisations have struggled to keep the story of the Royal Observer Corps alive. An official museum was intended to be run from the Winchester Group headquarters building (by 1998 designated a Grade II listed structure) (fig.3-8), unfortunately the structure was demolished and the site redeveloped less than a decade later (fig.3-9).



Fig.3-8 No.14 Winchester Group Headquarters depicted on the Ordnance Survey map of 1970. The red border depicts the ROC compound. Note – only the World War II centre is noted, the large grey block to the north is the actual Cold War structure. (Crown Copyright and database rights 2012, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)

Fig.3-9 Redevelopment of No.14 Winchester Group Headquarters site. (Crown Copyright and database rights 2012, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)

There has been more success at York where No. 20 Group headquarters was gifted to the Royal Commission for the Historical Monuments of England (later English Heritage). The structure was scheduled in 2000; English Heritage later noted the site was ‘considered one of the best surviving examples of either surface built or semi-sunken Royal Observer Group headquarters in the country’ (fig.3-10) (Emerick 2003).

Fig.3-10 No.20 Group headquarters, York. The steps up into structure are mirrored behind the door back down to the ground surface. On the right is an extendable aerial, intended to be used after a nuclear detonation. This site is now a Scheduled Ancient Monument. (Source: Bob Clarke 08/05/2004)

Moreover, a number of monitoring posts have now been recognised as nationally important throughout the United Kingdom, attracting statutory preservation through listing or scheduling. This is complemented by a small number maintained by ex-observers and enthusiasts for the purpose of education (discussed in detail in chapter 7). Former observers also have access to a ROC Association Network, which at the current time is something of an *ad-hoc* affair. Now, two decades since the events of 1991, brought this ‘delicate balance of terror’, as Winston Churchill noted, to an end, the Royal Observer Corps and its monuments have been consigned to a period of suspicion, often ridiculed or sensationalised in the press. Throughout the Corps history little investigative work was conducted into the material culture of the organisation or the motivations of those who volunteered as spare-time observers, some of whom served for three decades or more. The following section investigates that sense of ‘belonging’ utilising a number of theoretical concepts and the interim results from the current observer-centric survey conducted for this thesis.

Fig.3-11. Veryan Post on a public open day. The three-monthly event is supported by the National Trust and manned by ex-ROC members. (Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2011)

BELONGING

The period spanning the post–World War II reformation and operation of the ROC encompasses four decades of major social and political change, both in the United Kingdom and internationally. In that time, personal attitudes towards the state changed dramatically: the optimism of the 1950s was replaced by the pessimism and defiance to authority of the 1960s, industrial decay of the 1970s and doom-boom of the 1980s. Underpinning all this were the Superpower politics of East and West politics that solidified Central Europe in attitude and political geography for nearly forty-years. As Tony Judt noted, it took a political earthq uake to shatter the frozen topography of post-World War II Europe (2005, 1). That ‘earthquake’ demolished the Berlin Wall, and in so doing provided the British Government with an opportunity to dramatically reduce defence spending. The majority of Government funded voluntary services were disbanded over the next two years – amongst them the ROC and UKWMO. The entire Home Defence network was disposed of, often recovering just a fraction of the costs incurred during construction, all to a backdrop of a rapidly slowing economy initiated, in part, by political unrest spreading across Europe (Higgs 1994, 308).

The stand-down of the whole UKWMO network and closure of all ROC posts and group headquarters provide us with an opportunity. We are in the unique position of being able to recognise a complete series of structures encompassing the entire life-cycle of a heterotopian organisation. Moreover, the majority of the material culture is extant and we still have the opportunity to record the oral history of those for whom the ROC landscape formed a taskscape (Ingold 1993). Furthermore, the role of the voluntary services during the Cold War is an under investigated area. Indeed, the whole process of belonging to voluntary groups connected in some way to nuclear warfare presents the researcher with an opportunity to explore personal motivation, history and beliefs, occasionally in periods of international tension. Recognition of the motivation displayed by the act of membership or belonging to a specific group, in this case the ROC, also helps structure both the material culture and provide a map to the taskscape of the organisation.

A Heterotopic Taskscape

The physical infrastructure representing the Royal Observer Corps is, in many locations across Britain, extant. Here is not the place to discuss the archaeology in depth (see chapter 5 for a detailed discussion). However, a number of key concepts do apply if we are to contextualise the archaeological landscape with a social history. A study of the ROC is timely, not least due to the recent temporal timeframe through which the organisation enacted its life-cycle. The continued presence of a number of posts, both above and below ground, all attributed to the Cold War period, hints at a once complex, super-modernist landscape (Gonzáles-Ruibal 2008). This is not, however, a landscape tied solely to a chronological framework, neither is it driven directly by the ideological standpoint of the Superpowers. Furthermore, is not solely a physical account of technological developments in the detection of nuclear attack. Rather, it is a contested landscape displaying tension, disenfranchisement and, for the researcher, a wealth of other social and matériel related opportunities at both international and national level.

Furthermore, the landscape of the ROC presents us with a dichotomy. The way in which military sites are depicted by the Ordnance Survey varies enormously – when considering the Royal Observer Corps two distinct levels are evident. The group headquarters are always noted with their true intent and function (see fig.3-8 above), whilst the underground monitoring posts, if they appear at all, are identified as

something mundane, certainly not revealing the intended purpose of the post. This level of apparent subterfuge introduces a level of tension into the landscape – not least driven by the public's level of disenfranchisement when connected to nuclear warfare. However, tension is not a permanent feature; more activated in times of raised public awareness and protest such as the peace camps coverage in the early 1980s. For the most part ROC underground monitoring posts are functionally and spatially ambiguous to those who pass by. This is a classic example of a heterotopian landscape as defined by French philosopher Michel Foucault. In 1967 Foucault offered a number of principles in his discussion surrounding 'other spaces' or heterotopias – the British landscape of mass destruction adheres rigidly to all (Foucault 1967).

Matching the Heterotopian Model

Considering Foucault's principles we can develop a landscape that demonstrates all aspects of heterotopian taskscape. At its crudest level, a heterotopia suggests a location that is known, but not experienced; a place born out of crisis and deviance, a place at odds with its location. Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts can be recognised here. When in operation, the sites rarely appear on maps or landscape plans, yet they were, and in some cases still are, a visible, albeit slight, component of the landscape. Occasionally, the Government sought to hide underground monitoring posts in plain sight, noting a number on the Ordnance Survey as 'covered reservoirs' (fig.3-12). Encounters with such structures would be slight, and as such, open to extremes of interpretation. The only reason for the ROC post's construction was a need to monitor fallout from nuclear weapons; the whole concept of nuclear warfare being seen as deviant to the majority of the population. Located in rural settings, the ROC posts present a dichotomy as their stark concrete construction and surrounding fencing clearly indicated a functional, possibly official, presence in usually rural landscapes or Areas of Outstanding National Beauty.



Fig.3-12. Change Underground Monitoring Post Stockleigh Pomeroy, surveyed as post D-41 for this projects. Noted here as a 'reservoir (covered). A site hiding in plain sight. (Crown Copyright and database rights 2012, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)

Today, that landscape is one of variety, much of which is in a state of decay – indeed the continued existence of the Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP) appears deeply paradoxical. Structures comprising robust materials such as concrete, reinforced steel and tungsten, once capable of surviving the extreme environments caused by the detonation of a nuclear weapon, now display incredible levels of fragility. Places of secrecy and order have transformed into places of neglect, losing much of their stark uniform lines to vegetation encroachment, destructive visitors, agriculture, the weather, individually or through combinations of all. That a substantial number of UGMPs are extant, 20 years after stand-down, appears to be a product of rural positioning coupled with sheer weight of numbers. If we consider the Royal Observer Corps footprint in Devon it is clear the continued reduction of post numbers has reached a critical level. Indeed, the current reduced level of removals should not seduce us into considering this a hiatus. Ingold reminds us 'What appear to us as the fixed forms of landscape, passive and unchanged unless acted upon from outside, are themselves in motion' (1993, 164). This 'motion' provides one of the current research opportunities - the study of the processes of abandonment described later in this project. Moreover, the opportunity to understand this recent archaeology from the stand-point of those who worked in the organisation is still possible. Interestingly from the standpoint of the general public, Government-sponsored organisations were clearly beyond the control of the majority. The security fence, considered to be no more than a landscape feature by Ingold (1993, 156), actually marks out a clear division between ordinary and extraordinary in this case. The absurdity of Government signage declaring places *within the meaning Official Secrets Acts 1911-1989* reinforces that demarcation, creating a heterotopian world beyond (fig.3-13). Those who populated this heterotopian world is the focus of the

next section. It concentrates on the Royal Observers themselves who served throughout the Cold War.

Fig.3-13 'Official Secrets Acts' signs at GCHQ Oakley, Cheltenham. The blatant absurdity of such notices served, and continue, to create tension in the landscape. (Source: Bob Clarke 27/09/2004)

WORDS

The construction of an oral history to contextualise the archaeology and material culture of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) was identified early in this project as an integral part of the research framework; it also proved to be frustrating in the first instance. My experience was not unique. In 2010 Benjamin Oldcorn noted in his doctoral thesis discussing an unrelated site:

> The focus of my original research proposal was on the built and lived heritage of the Cold War, specifically the work and sites of the Royal Observer Corps. I began my exploratory research by contacting former Observers – but the results were not at all promising. There was a definite sentiment amongst the research subjects that the work of the Observer Corps didn't matter and that they were reticent to reply in any depth to my questions (Oldcorn 2010, 51).

Reflecting on the results of the ROC survey returns, it appears the subject group was, and to a certain extent still are displaying a high level of disenfranchisement. That is 'a unique combination of culture with current and past political realities' (Scham 2001, 190), in this case events surrounding the stand-down and disbandment of the organisations to which much time was invested.

EXCLUSION

The Cold War exposed and constructed many dichotomies, especially in the relationship between official agencies and the public. This is further complicated by the ideologically dominated stance of East and West, and is re-enforced at a national level with the personal ideology of the individual. At a government level it served the

authorities to exclude the general public from, or allow them, as Hennessey succinctly noted, ‘any sense of ownership on outcome’ (2003, 3). We can say this lack of ability to influence national policy, especially when created on their ‘behalf’ leads to a deep level of disenfranchisement; a situation manifest in a number of highly visible social aspects surrounding the Cold War. Any group experiencing perceived or actual disenfranchisement will, through necessity, court the media or react in a way likely to highlight the apparent wrong-doing (Scham 2001, 188).

During the Cold War a number of ‘peace’ orientated groups enacted just such policies. Most readily recognisable are the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) marches and rallies, Women’s Peace Camps at a number of defence orientated sites, the declaration of ‘Nuclear Free Cities’ by local authorities and the ‘Doom-Boom’ of the 1980s as portrayed through a number of films, books and television programmes (Finch 1986; Hilliard 1986; Phythian 2001; Chapman 2006). All are reactions to differing levels of exclusion. It is also clear that there are a number of ways disenfranchised groups displayed their perceived level of exclusion, not all take the direct civil disobedience route noted above. Within the latter half of the twentieth century, the general public takes either a *laissez-faire* attitude towards the organisation constructing the barrier to belonging, or the fatalist view, outwardly ridiculing the absurdity of nuclear warfare. What corrals these activities as acts of exclusion, in my view, is the apparent lack of influence the public exerted over the development, storage and use of nuclear weapons.

The intricacies of the nuclear deterrent were necessarily esoteric. For such a deterrent to be effective the United Kingdom needed to maintain a high level of secrecy with all activities connected to the policy. One major aspect of this is the way in which the Government creates a heterotopian landscape containing nuclear defensive and offensive capabilities. To access this heterotopia one has to have signed the Official Secrets Act; this initiation allowing access to a parallel world, or Foucault’s ‘other space’ (1967). It ensures deviation from the populous, forcing suspicion and disenfranchisement in equal numbers (Scham 2001, 187). In the initial stages of the Cold War, was overwhelmingly accepted by a population who had lived through the secrecy of World War II; however, Britain’s development of the hydrogen bomb quickly changes the social landscape. By the 1960s, and as a direct consequence of the terrible forces of the ‘H-Bomb’, civil disobedience had become a major feature of the British political landscape (Phythian 2001; Judt 2005, 255).

Scham warns against ‘categorising the archaeology of the disenfranchised merely as a component of resistance culture’ (2001, 186). However, ‘resistance culture’ is not evidence of formal subjugation, more a reaction to agency decisions (Clark, 2000); membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was a reaction to hydrogen weapons – so was continuing membership of the Royal Observer Corps after the Strath report in 1955.

The motivation to join CND is self-evident, a clear statement of self-preservation orchestrated through the mobilisation of mass protest. What drives someone to enlist or volunteer in a highly organised or regimented service is complex, to carry out such duties voluntarily is infinitely more so (Wardell and Lishman *et al* 2000, Yanay and Yanay 2008). Nevertheless, the motivation should be explored as it has implications for the continued survival of ROC monuments both in the current study and moving forwards. The Home Office, responsible for recruitment, exercised a range of strategies intended to attract a specific type of individual to the ranks throughout the life-cycle of the organisation. What those strategies looked like, the people they attracted and the material culture utilised is now now discussed.

‘Spare-Time Observer’

So what did attract members of the public to the Royal Observer Corps? To answer this, we need to explore the events surrounding the post-World War II stand-down, the new requirement for an observation element to complement Fighter Command and how that new requirement was staffed.

On 8 May 1945, Air Ministry Order A.M.O. N.517/1945 informed all Groups of the ROC of the impending stand-down of the organisation, just five days after the surrender of German Forces in Europe, on 12 May 1945, the order was actioned. At this time there were *c*.600 officers and *c*.35,000 men and women observers in uniform. A few months earlier, with the end of the war in sight, the Air Ministry had canvassed serving members as to who would be prepared to continue with service into peace-time; 78% indicated they would (Wood 1992, 182). These loose figures alone suggest that membership of the ROC was viewed by many as more than just a wartime necessity. On 15 November 1946, those who had expressed interest received letters inviting them back into training; the following day the BBC broadcast the invitation (McCamley 2002, 123; Clarke 2005b, 139). Some 9,000 returned to the service in the first three months of the regeneration drive, although, by mid-

February 1947, this had tailed off dramatically and subsequently the recruitment drive targeted new membership (Wood 1992, 191). The demographic of the early Cold War period volunteers is worth relaying here; 'Ex-servicemen with no reserve commitment, 16- and 17-year-old not immediately due for National Service, and a fair sprinkling of women, including ex-Wrens, ATS and WAAFs' (*ibid* 1992, 191). Clearly, in this immediate post-war period a leaning towards ex-service personnel, especially from the women's sectors, is to be expected. That considered, it does suggest a certain 'type' of volunteer was being sought. The methods of recruitment, in the main delivered through leaflets association with the Royal Air Force, are one of the primary items of material culture for the Royal Observer Corps, and much can inferred from their study.

Recruitment

"A Worthwhile Spare-Time Service"

A key part of any spare-time service is the continued ability to demonstrate a worthwhile, relevant use of volunteers' efforts. The post-World War II life-cycle of the Royal Observer Corps can be mapped through the varied methods of recruitment employed to attract new members. It also chronicles the changing face of warfare, downturn in Civil Defence and increasingly 'clandestine' approach to certain nuclear related tasks. The best place to start is often the recruitment literature. In the case of the ROC, this falls into three distinct areas – aircraft reporting, nuclear reporting and the post-1979 Home Defence Review.

The opportunity to review material from the formative, Air Ministry orientated, days of the post-World War II ROC (1950s-1960s) have so far proved elusive, it might well be that no such material was produced. Certainly neither Cocroft (*et al* 2003) nor Wood (1992) make mention of its existence. That said the initial years of the post-war build-up were chronicled through a number of articles in aviation orientated publications. One of the world's first aviation orientated magazines – *Flight International* – published a number of news items, articles and recruitment updates between 1946 and 1961. They record the drive towards full volunteer manning and the eventual move underground initiated by the Strath Report (Cocroft *et al* 2003,180, Hughes 2003, 267). What follows is a précis of the early years of the Cold War ROC, a period when aircraft reporting was the primary requirement of the tasking for volunteers.

Aircraft Reporting

In the last edition of 1946 *Flight International* announced that those who had expressed a wish to re-join the corps but had received a break in service during the war 'may now volunteer for the peace-time ROC' (Anon 1946b, 26 December, 29). Now, the catchment cohort would comprise those who were not serving at the point of stand-down; by early 1947 this had been extended to 'men and women without previous service' (Anon 1947a, 6 March, 202). Since November the previous year over 10,000 had returned to the organisation (Anon 1947a, 6 March, 202); widening the opportunity to join suggests recruitment was slowing by this time; an assumption borne out by figures published that September. In just ten months 11,162 men and 1,676 women had joined the service (Anon 1947b, 18 September, 242), although with over 10,000 already in uniform the reality was more like 2,500. By March the following year, the Air Ministry was pushing the benefits of service. Now 'Air experience flights were to be given to members of the Royal Observer Corps who make organised visits to R.A.F. stations' (Anon 1948, 25 March, 342). And even more telling – 'volunteers sign on for three years and receive small annual grants with some additions for travelling expenses and for passing proficiency tests' and 'There is a friendly club atmosphere in the Corps, and members are doing a valuable service' (*ibid* 1948, 342).

In less than three years it appears the ROC recruitment machine had almost ground to a halt. What is interesting here is the way in which this early change of direction responds to both the needs of the organisation and conforms to the proposed 'Intrinsic-Social-Service' model proposed by Wardell, Lishman *et al* (2000, 237) (discussed below). By the middle 1948, the number of uniformed personnel, still in war service, that were being demobilised was rapidly slowing, by the end of the year events in Central Europe had stopped the flow completely. From April 1948 transport disruptions into the Soviet held Eastern Zone of Germany, including access to Berlin, had become increasingly frequent headache for the western allies. By June 2.5 million people had been isolated in the city, their only hope of surviving a Central European winter was to be supplied from the air (Clay 1950; Tusa and Tusa 1988). Operation Plainfare (the Berlin Airlift) reduced de-mobilisation at a time when more voluntary recruits were being sought for organisations such as the Civil Defence Corps; Auxiliary Fire Service; National Hospital Volunteer Reserve; Women's Voluntary Service; and the Royal Observer Corps (Clarke 2007, Grant 2010, 35).

Indeed, from 1948 the Civil Defence Act had placed an additional burden on Local Authorities to raise a primarily voluntary Civil Defence Corps from a public increasingly turning their back on uniformed service or already members of other voluntary organisations. It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War (from 1950), and the occasion of the ROC's Silver Jubilee, that any further mention is made in the press of recruitment numbers. 'In three years recruitment has not been speedy, but it has been steady' stated the author of a two page article in *Flight International*; indeed 'they have achieved well over half their target of 28,000' (Anon 1950, 20 April, 483). Some eight years later a footnote declared 'R.O.C. GOES UNDERGROUND' 'The R.O.C. in now some 15,000 strong, but with its new responsibilities still more numbers are needed' (Anon 1958, 27 June, 904) – these rather telling figures all point to an organisation where the membership remained static for nearly a decade. With the move underground a new recruiting posture would be needed.

Four Observers surveyed for this project served during the early Air Ministry phase of aircraft reporting. At this early stage it is not possible to recognise any trends – suffice to say two, ROC#2 and ROC#5, had interests in aviation whilst ROC#6 followed a family member's example. ROC#10 noted 'I wanted to do my bit for the defence of our country'. Those with an aviation-motivated reason demonstrate 'Service' behaviour, that is a desire to further one's own experience through training and/or opportunity (Wardell, Lishman *et al* 2000, 237). The whole of the ROC's operation in the 1950s revolved around aircraft reporting, rank structure, and annual competitions – even the uniform was modelled and promoted as being linked to a Royal Air Force uniform. Indeed, irrespective of the decade they enlisted, 21% of all those surveyed cited an interest in aviation as their primary reason for joining the Royal Observer Corps. This is interesting as by 1960 the aircraft reporting role had all but gone from the ROC role. Taking that into consideration, the recognition aspect of the ROC and subsequently its aviation connection prevailed until stand-down in 1991. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the Home Office recognised that aviation was often a deciding factor in the recruitment of new observers. Retention of aviation subjects at a 'social' level ensured continuing recruitment – as the post -1950s observers who completed surveys testify.

Of course it would be unwise to suggest people volunteered purely to fulfil an interest. A number of respondents actually cited 'world events' as the primary

motivation to enlist. Probably the most prominent event in the Cold War's international history has to be the Cuban Missile Crisis. ROC#9, an observer who served with No.10 Group Exeter recalled his reason for joining:

> I joined in late 1962 with the Cold War at its height, the Cuban Crisis had only recently been resolved. I felt that I could contribute something without having to give up my job and join the services.

The final *Flight International* article relating specifically to the Royal Observer Corps appeared on 23 November 1961, covering the opening of the thirteenth Group Headquarters by the Mayor of Watford (Anon 1961, 23 November, 798) also (fig.3-14). As the ROC steadily relinquished its aircraft reporting role and proceeded underground, aviation publications appear to have ceased reporting the organisation's progress; even though it was not until late 1966 that the Air Ministry relinquished responsibility for the ROC to the Home Office, thereby closing off the aircraft reporting role.

Fig.3-14 'The Royal Observer Corps Thirteenth Underground Group Headquarters – The first to be built in the London area – was opened on Saturday by the Mayor of Watford.' A press photograph recording the event on 20/06/61 (Source Central Press Photos Ltd)

A highly ordered organisation such as the one under investigation would be expected to maintain a recruitment record. Unfortunately, the chance to search those of the ROC has, and currently is, frustrated (noted previously in chapter 2). Until we do locate this valuable record we can only make assumptions about recruitment figures, demographics and the like, neither can we be certain the ROC ever reached

its aspirational recruitment figures for a full complement of 25,000 volunteers. Interestingly, by 1968, this becomes a moot point as underground monitoring post numbers were cut by 686 and with them a personnel count reduced to just 12,500; all part of the Parliamentary announcement in January that Civil Defence was being scrapped (Grant 2010, 188). Derek Wood suggested in 1976 that 'since the strength was actually 17,500 – around 5,000 were made redundant' (1992, 246) again this has not been verified. However, the redundancies clearly did have an impact as ROC#19, who served with No.2 Group Horsham, from 1971 noted:

> One Saturday lunchtime, when I was 18, I saw a public information film on the television about the ROC. It seemed to have everything to attract me – links with the RAF, RAF blue uniform, important and secret role, also being a self contained organisation rather than a reserve of something else. The ROC was doing a vital job not done by anyone else and all performed by volunteers. I applied straight away, but because of lack of vacancies (probably a hang over from the 1968 cuts) I tried again the following year and was duly enrolled.

Nuclear Reporting

Substantially more recruiting material survives for the last two decades (1970s-1980s) of the ROC life-cycle, providing a useful, if official, insight into the motivational language used by the Home Office to attract new recruits. The effects of the Strath report, as I have already noted, provided the ROC with something of a lifeline. By the time of its delivery to Government (March 1955); the reporting of aircraft had become an almost pointless task – altitude and speed ensuring most went un-correctly or un-reported. Indeed, Strath noted a nationwide service dedicated to the monitoring of radioactive fallout would be needed 'on the lines of that already in existence for the Royal Observer Corps' (Hughes 2003, 267).



Fig.3-15 The cover of a recruitment leaflet. Published in 1979 the front image comprises all three demographic elements of the ROC – Women, Uniform, Civilian. (Extract from Pub. 417. Dec. 1979, Prepared for the Royal Air Force by the Central Office of Information, Dd.8034345 Pro. 10923)

In 1972 a 10-page A5 sized colour brochure bestowing the virtues of a role in the ROC appeared. Clearly by 1972, now four years after the disbandment of Civil Defence and reduction of ROC posts, the Corps was facing another staffing crisis, a combination of retirements and dwindling pool of those made redundant forced a new recruiting campaign. The brochure – titled simply 'ROC' – introduces some key language markers intended to attract a specific kind of individual. Throughout, there is emphasis on the following aspects: duty; service; rank; uniform; promotion, and proficiency through examination and training. There are also eight references to a close association with the Royal Air Force, further emphasizing the ROCs place in a militaristically orientated world – all are clear references to the highly ordered structure of the organisation, they also indicate the heterotopic nature of the group – post-initiation (fig.3-15). ROC#15, No.25 Group Ayr, noted: 'I wanted to do something to help the country plus I was interested in the armed forces', supporting this suggestion. However, world events also drove recruitment. ROC#16, serving with No.12 Group Bristol:

> I joined the ROC in 1976 when the Soviet Union was flexing its muscles and the future looked bleak. Because of my age (then 37) I doubted if I would be called-up for military service.

Interestingly, the biggest and final round of literature was produced between December 1979 and November 1985. This coincides with the return to office of a Conservative Government, a far reaching review of Home Defence, deployment of cruise missiles at British RAF stations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and deployment of the SS-20 medium range nuclear capability in Eastern Europe. The international perception of instability was further exacerbated by a succession of Soviet leaders (Brezhnev died in November 1982; his successor Andropov died in February 1984; and his successor Chernenko died just eleven months later) promoting a heightened level of political tension. It was also a period of increased civil disobedience – especially connected to the continued deployment of nuclear weapons. The language used in such literature echoes the uncertainty of the times – affectionately known as the 'Doom-Boom':

> The Corps exists today as a fully-working organisation, trained to take immediate action if any enemy were ever to launch a nuclear strike on the United Kingdom. At such a terrible moment, only readiness and training have any value. Knowing in advance what would have to be done, and training in advance to be ready to do it, are undoubtedly factors which could bring about the survival of, literally, millions of people at a time of devastation and chaos.
>
> These are indeed grim thoughts. But let us be quite sure that, in an uncertain world, it is the known readiness of Britain's defence services that contributes to the continued existence of peace.
>
> In the Royal Observer Corps <u>you</u> help safeguard Britain's future.
>
> PUB 417 (1985)

The Central Office of Information, the Government department who orchestrated recruitment drives on behalf of the Home Office were, by the early 1980s, mirroring the post-détente stance of the Conservative led administration. Attention was now focussed primarily on the intrinsic volunteer, that is an individual who is task focussed, often combined with a sense of duty or have an altruistic reason for volunteering (Wardell, Lishman *et al* 2000, 237). For some respondents of the current survey this meant a continuation of their armed service career. ROC#4, serving with No.10 Group Exeter:

> I had just left the Army Cadets as an adult Sergeaqnt [sic] Instructor and was looking around for another volunteer job. I thought the work the ROC did was

> important in the event of an attack as we would warn the population of dangers of nuke dust clouds as well as helping the Government forces.

For others this became an opportunity to be involved in something out of the ordinary. ROC#14, an observer who served with No.12 Bristol and No.8 Coventry from 1982, noted:

> By chance I saw an advert for the ROC in a local newspaper. I toured the headquarters. It looked like interesting work, it appeared somewhat clandestine as I would have to sign the Official Secrets Act, another pulling point was that it seemed vaguely connected to the RAF. Furthermore, I would meet lots of people, the commitment was one night a week and a few weekends.

ROC#14 also hints at the social component that appears in a number of observers accounts throughout the survey. Those who can be classed as the 'social' observer utilise membership to satisfy fears of isolation and to belong according to Wardell, Lishman *et al* (2000). For this current project, I suggest we attach those who enlisted via a family member to the 'Social' group or those whose social group were members. Probably most recognisable were the comments by ROC#8, an observer serving with No.10 Group Exeter and later Honorary Secretary of the Exeter branch of the ROCA: 'Joined because my husband was in the corp and wanted to do something differant [sic].' ROC#8 is one of the few female observers encountered so far by this project, six identified their gender as female, although more maybe present within the current survey results. This account underpins both the motivation for joining (family member serving) and the need to remain fully engaged with the service. Moreover, this simple account suggests a familiar structure to the ROC Association, one that must in many ways replicate that encountered prior to stand-down within the organisation. Family provided a major influence in a further number of accounts. ROC#6, serving with No.12 Group Bristol noted:

> My late father worked for Post Office Telephones at the start of WW2 and looked after phone communications for 24 Group, Gloucester. He joined the corps also. After he had completed war service in the Army he rejoined the corps. I joined in 1958 at age 15.

Demonstrating it was not all family orientated, ROC#13, No.12 Bristol, describes a different type of motivation to join:

> Me and my four grammar school friends were 14 years of age and the local ROC post held their meetings in the town's RAFA club. It was thus the only

> place where we could drink pints of beer at least once a week. (The minimum age limit was 16, but nobody asked for birth certificates and we lied – so sue me!)

Of course there were some who joined having seen the practicalities of working in a protected structure during a nuclear attack:

> - it was a no-brainer, especially when, following the recent Cuban missile crisis, I'd come to expect a nuclear war within my lifetime and worked out that I'd rather spend it "underground" in an ROC control room, than in a Scout hut.
>
> ROC#31, No. 20 York.

Gender and the Corps

From the outset of the redeployment of the Royal Observer Corps in 1947 it had been made clear that both male and female volunteers were welcome to enlist. Women had served in the wartime corps from July 1941, primarily to support a lack of volunteers due to National Service call-up, although, later, in their own right as full observers (Wood 1992, 123). With total mobilisation on the Home Front the reasons for enlisting are self-evident; the Cold War appears far more complex.

Cold War Service

Interestingly, the role of women in the Cold War is relegated to a footnote in all but one area; civil disobedience and protest are a classic area of feminist investigation. As the literature review demonstrated, the academic sphere is dominated by activities surrounding the deployment of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, specifically RAF Greenham Common. To find debate or discussion covering the activities of women who actively participated in the business of the Cold War is difficult. In 2009 Margaret Vining discussed the development of uniforms for women post-World War II, noting, on a number of occasions the overtly masculine signals of authority 'Central to the foundation of the military, uniforms are proof of an imposed discipline; they are also indisputably masculine' (2007, 93). The United States only abandoned specifically designed women's uniforms in the late 1970's, moving to a more universal male/female standard that prevails today (Morden 1990, 457). In the United Kingdom the Royal Observer Corps had three basic uniforms; the first was a two-piece battledress first issued to all members in 1942/3; this pattern was retained until the late 1970s (Wood 1992, 127) before being replaced by the 1972 pattern service dress of the Royal Air Force. There is no clear indication as to when this change took place, although, a memo *A Guide to Fitting: The Royal Observer Corps*

No. 2 Dress Uniform (1972) Pattern was issued from ROC headquarters in July 1977, suggests a reasonable point.

The survey results revealed five women had completed the forms (additional ex-members may also have answered and not indicated their gender), a very small sample, that while may be too small to infer much, does shine light on reasons for joining the organisation.

> Basically because I had always wanted to join the RAF, but in my day (the 1960s) girls "didn't do that sort of thing" and were steered towards nursing/teaching and the like. I saw a poster of people in RAF uniform and decided to give it a try. I thoroughly enjoyed the work and the challenge, as I had done nothing like that before, and it gave a very shy person a great deal of confidence to be treated as a valuable member of the Corps. When I was considering joining the Corps, I asked my father, who was ex-RAF and in favour of my joining the RAF, his opinion, and he encouraged me, saying that they had done a fine job during the war.
>
> ROC#27, Groups Oxford, Winchester and Bedford
>
> I wanted to join the Royal Air Force - my father wouldn't let me. He didn't think it was a "proper" job for a young lady. I wasn't fit physically but I wanted to serve. I don't think I would have made the grade at that time, but a friend mentioned that he had seen the ROC and thought of me! I was 18. It was the best decision I ever made - I became independent, self-reliant, confident and I made some of the best friends ever. I got to go to RAF Stations to train and I had the time of my life!
>
> ROC#30, No. 23 Group Durham
>
> I would have liked to join the WRAF but my father didn't approve so I went into engineering and I (think - 1964) I applied to an advert. I visited the Coventry Group headquarters, which was a fairly recently built sub-surface building and was shown round by Jack Matthews, my soon to be Crew Officer. Half-way round I decided it probably wasn't for me; too complicated and very little to do with the aircraft in which I was interested BUT for some reason I don't understand I found myself signing on the dotted line one of the best things I have done - 30+ good years and a husband.
>
> ROC#50, No. 8 Group Coventry and No.2 Group Horsham
>
> As an ex-WRAF it was a way to get back in uniform.
>
> ROC#44, No. 15 Group Lincoln

The key motivational drivers for the four correspondents above has been the Royal Observer Corps apparent connection, or similarity, to the Royal Air Force. Interestingly, some social pressure is also revealed, noting the services are not the place for women - especially in the 1960s. Such social constructs are discussed by Sara Lennox who, when exploring the role of women in the United States (US) after World War II, noted that the assumption women retreated into domesticity across most of Europe and the US, a domestication if you will, aimed at supporting the family unit, is wrong (2004, 67); '-rather, women after 1945, - took on a role of central importance to post-war economic expansion, -'(*ibid* 2004, 69). What the results from the survey suggest is that by the 1960s this attitude was being challenged and women were looking for ways to engage in similar defence activities as their male counterparts. This is simplistic at best, but it is an area worthy of further investigation.

Discussion

We can see from the brief examples noted above that the observer cohort is a diverse social group, demonstrating many facets of the recognised volunteer profile utilised within this chapter. They all, however, have one thing in common. They were prepared to populate a landscape – when called to duty – that was primarily concerned with the welfare of others. I propose the Royal Observer Corps volunteer or 'spare-time' observers display both an altruistic and personal-centred reason for enlisting. Beyond the individual, the organisation was structured in such a way to be easily assimilated into the highly organised world of the military – subsequently attracting those who had an interest in uniform, structure and even twenty years after the role was discontinued, aircraft recognition. The ROC initiated volunteers into a rigid structure through rank, promotion and secrecy of task, this has been continued through the ROC Associations where the uninitiated are excluded unless the top down structure is recognised and adhered to - presumably Oldcorn's undoing (2010). Membership was maintained by a sense of duty, a number of perks, including visits to RAF stations and the possibility of flying. It was also maintained through the opportunity to progress one's self in a form of pseudo promotional rank structure. The validity of a rank structure being that the organisation reacts rigidly to operational situations or emergencies. The value of this mode of self-aggrandisement is intrinsically linked to the existence of the parent organisation; graphically demonstrated when the entire organisation was stood-down. The loss of

earned position through competitions, assessments and length of service was keenly felt, leading to a sense of disenfranchisement and morning through the loss of the organisation itself.

An organisation as large as the ROC, with a national taskscape and heterotopic role naturally introduced tension into the landscape, especially with peace orientated organisations such as CND. The majority of the general public were disenfranchised, yet, appear to display a level of ambivalence to the general threat of nuclear warfare – indeed to many it was just 'background noise'. CND, with its policy of non-violent civil disobedience used a number of methods to raise awareness including peace camps, rallies and damage to ROC posts. In this particular case Scham nicely summarised the lot of the excluded 'In its political sense, the term includes those whose rights as citizens are diminished, in general, or arbitrarily curtailed' (2001, 187). It is unsurprising that when the ROC was arbitrarily stood-down, with no notice to the 12,500 members, it was to bring about a high level of hostility toward the Government – this time from the newly disenfranchised – the Royal Observer Corps membership itself. The following chapter discusses the order and chaos model, describing the structure of the concept, explaining the facets involved and the parameters and limits of its form before applying the model to the landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps.

CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS AN ABANDONMENT MODEL

INTRODUCTION

Material culture humanises the process of deposition; it also has the potential to differentiate between one activity and another. In the current study this concept is important. A model relating to the abandonment of sites or landscapes utilised or inhabited by highly organised and/or ritualistic entities – in this case the British military during the Cold War – has been developed by the author and applied to the current study of the Royal Observer Corps. In this chapter the concept of the 'order and chaos' model is introduced and develop, providing the reader with a detailed breakdown of the structure and application of the concepts intended to underpin the numerous facets that comprise the model. The order and chaos model can be applied to sites of any size, making it the ideal vehicle to use in the investigation of the material culture of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) and its later parent organisation the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO). The highly ordered environment required to effectively carrying out nuclear warning and fallout monitoring manifests itself through the, almost clone-like, order of the environs of the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP). This is in stark contrast to the chaos now encountered on UGMPs after 25 years of abandonment.

THE NEED FOR A FURTHER MODEL

The interpretation of landscapes, the level of interaction recognised between individuals, or groups, mutually exclusive or cohesive, separated by, or operating within the same chronological timeframe, are key to most archaeological investigations. Relationships between structural remains and the material culture encountered through excavation is pivotal to all interpretations offered through via the results of the post-excavation process. Moreover, interpretations at a local level are now routinely factored into regional frameworks and works of national synthesis. All are driven by the evidence drawn from aspects of material culture. I argue that by following this 'traditional' form of archaeology we may be missing the true extent of the site under investigation, especially when it comes to the interpretation of space that provides no physical evidence. I argue that space devoid of such evidence does not necessarily indicate a lack of human interaction, and in some cases we should actively consider actions, or control systems, that leave ephemeral or no physical evidence in our interpretations of the archaeological record.

Constructing a Methodology

To interpret the process of abandonment it has been necessary to deconstruct a series of events, agencies and natural processes that have been observed on a range of type sites across the South-West of England. Furthermore, it is necessary to decide what actually constitutes a phase of abandonment, for only then can the initiation of activities and processes be truly classified as components of abandonment. Subsequently, the activities of the originator of a given site, structure or location require identification, classification and intent/threat if the point of abandonment is to be accurately recognised through archaeological investigation.

The Components of Order

The British Government, as utiliser of the armed forces in the defence of the United Kingdom and the projection of foreign policy, states that the armed forces of the United Kingdom:

> - protect the security, independence and interests of our country at home and abroad. We work with our allies and partners whenever possible. Our aim is to ensure that the armed forces have the training, equipment and support necessary for their work, and that we keep within budget.
>
> (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence) (accessed 20/07/2015)

To achieve this apparently simple objective requires a system that functions increasingly autocratically the further down the chain of command one travels. This is often at odds with the society it serves, especially since the military system (currently under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence) in the United Kingdom is the instrument of a democratic governmental system. Considering this when investigating the landscape of the twentieth century – especially through the Cold War period – provides us with an opportunity to identify certain behaviours within such an organisation. It also allows us to interpret levels of activity, their boundaries when considering both the operation of the military landscape; and the interactions between those enacting government policy through military means, and the wider social system they are charged with protecting. That is not to say that there is total rigidity of activity across a military unit; a study provides the investigator with a range of activities, both coherent and unrelated, that allows the unit to function on a day-to-day basis.

If we consider military airfields in the United Kingdom we are presented with a well know series of sites that span little more than a single century of activity; indeed, the first true military flying establishment was not formed until 1910 at Larkhill on Salisbury Plain (Brown 2013, 31). Airfields fall into six broad periods of development, each with their own characteristic architecture and geography, all driven by both technology and threat mitigation (Clarke 2009, 217). This well documented process is chronologically limited, offering the researcher a succinct number of period-based activities from which to formulate models and hypotheses. This allowed the 'order and chaos' model to be constructed utilising British military airfield. The reasons were as follows.

- Airfields and their architecture are chronologically recognisable due to the technological development of aircraft.
- Airfields are geographically located in accordance with the perceived political and militaristic threat of the period.
- Military ethos is engrained in airfield layouts (rank dictates the position of living quarters and messes).
- British military airfields tend to be a palimpsest allowing comparisons to be drawn.
- Interaction between the military and local population is archaeologically recognisable through material culture.

Order and the Military Landscape

To ensure the effective operation of any military site requires a highly structured, rigid command structure, this naturally imposes itself on the landscape via structures or layout or, more often than not, a mixture of both. Researchers have, since the turn of the twentieth century, become increasingly interested in the archaeological possibilities presented by airfield study (Lake 2003; Schofield 2003; Clarke 2009; Schofield 2011; Carman 2013). This has become increasingly so since a large number of former stations have been declared surplus due to Government initiatives such as *Options for Change* and *Front Line First* (Clarke 2009).

In 2002 Michael Anderton sought to quantify the geographical structure recognised in the military landscape. He correctly recognised an inherent level of military control

over the occupants of a given site, suggesting this was connected to rank structure (2002, 192). Unfortunately, Anderton did not use a wide ranging sample when considering airfield layout, subsequently, this hypothesis is only appropriate when considering the layout of airfields constructed the expansion period (1935-39) (for a full discussion covering expansion period Royal Air Force stations, see Clarke 2009). From 1942 this model is redundant through reaction to bombing technology and the switch from permanent to temporary, dispersed, structures (*ibid* 2009).

Pre, or post-World War II, the rigid hierarchy inferred by Anderton is more difficult to find. Station facilities retained by the War Ministry, and later Ministry of Defence, after World War II are complemented with new, modern structures wherever possible, whilst accommodation is moved away from the immediate vicinity of the operational airfield. This is in evidence at Boscombe Down, Wiltshire; Greenham Common, Berkshire; Lyneham, Wiltshire and a host of other retained Cold War airfields. It follows then that the landscape of order is, by necessity, flexible at the point of implementation. It is driven by the geography of the site under investigation at a number of recognisable chronological markers; markers that, at the point of closure or abandonment, become static.

TOWARDS A USEABLE FRAMEWORK

The concept of order is, by its own volition, too wide a series of parameters to be applied without refinement or quantification. However, once underlying activities of the entity under investigation are exposed the concept achieves structured utility. Moreover, the influence of ordered entities in the development of the landscape requires identification, the extent of which is crucial to the interpretation of both the abandonment process and the creation of organisationally centred deposition of material culture.

The order model dictates that the entity under scrutiny must contain a visible hierarchy, that hierarchy should be structured in a top-down process and it should impose values on the landscape. Whilst this concept has been developed utilising the landscape of the military in the United Kingdom, sub-sets are likely to be appropriate in the investigation of other, institutionally based, organisations such as the National Health Service, Prison Service or Central Government.

Segregation

The concept of order influences two zones – core and periphery. A standard distribution model often used when considering tribal boundaries and economic exchange in the British Iron Age (Cunliffe 1981), the use of core and periphery appears appropriate in this context too. Moreover, I have developed a structure that deconstructs the activities enacted, through hierarchy, in the area demarcated as the core – Highly Organised Operational Space (HOOS), Highly Organised Domestic Space (HODS) and Domestic Space (DS). While the periphery includes activities in connection with the core function but are not highly organised. Between the core and periphery lies the security fence or wall.

Entities that rely on rigid structures of control to achieve their aims must, by definition, attempt to control the space to which they have jurisdiction. Within this thesis the most recognisable aspect of this has to be the security fence or wall. Such symbols of exclusion are instantly recognisable across the landscape, especially when punctuated by signs warning against entry or photography (fig.4-1). Here we must pause for a moment to consider the role of the fence and, moreover, the interpretation of the fence when considered as an instrument of control and landscape feature.

Fig.4-1. Ministry of Technology sign on the security fence at MoD Boscombe Down. (Source: Bob Clarke 03/05/2015)

The concept of the security fence is familiar to most of the population. Such structures appear to impose an authority on those ‘outside the wire’; the intent,

adorned by warning signs and topped with barbed or razor wire, becomes self-evident. As the twentieth century progressed this authority was underpinned with motion sensors, video, and later, digital surveillance. In its extremes the fence moved from a singular structure to one of multiple components with killing zones, the most notorious being the Berlin Wall (Baker 1993, 289) (fig.4-2).

Fig.4-2. A view from the East. The multi-layered Berlin 'Wall', more accurately a series of obstacles to deter escape to the West (Source unknown).

For the security fence to act as a watershed between components of the order and chaos model we need to understand the role of such constructions, their apparent meaning within social interactions, and the landscape implications for the archaeological record and deposition of material culture allied to both groups. A simplistic view is now offered utilising various military structures and activities before focus shifts specifically to the Royal Observer Corps

COMPONENTS OF ORDER

Once inside the security perimeter specific areas of activity can be recognised. Different strands of operational control are essential if the organisation who originated the structure is to operate effectively. To this end, a large military site often comprises a wide range of specialist and utilitarian structures which, in turn, contain an equally wide series of diverse activities, all with the common aim of supporting the activity or task. What is important here is that all activities in the core area influence the deposition of material culture across the site. This realisation helps determine the level of control in a specific area, and, more importantly, a distinction between that activity and one enacted elsewhere within the core area. What follows is a description of the three recognisable control mechanisms I have developed to aid the characterisation and nature of activities, specifically the

taphonomy related to the level and form of material culture encountered, during investigation.



Fig.4-3. The divisions of core and periphery when applied to a functioning flying station, MoD Boscombe Down, Wiltshire. (Source: Underlying Airfield Image MoD © Crown Copyright)

Taking into consideration the operational aspects of the station it is possible to recognise all facets of the proposed model (fig.4-3 above). The Station is divided into core (green line) and peripheral (yellow line). Beyond these two zones lies the incidental landscape, defined here as offering little direct support to the core activity, more a form of subordinate conjunction. Breaking this down further (fig.4-3a below) Highly Organised Operational Space (red) includes all areas where activities required to ensure the air transport task of the squadrons are successfully carried out. Highly Organised Domestic Space (blue) includes all administrative tasks required to support the primary tasking including the Officer's and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers Mess. Domestic Space (pale orange) less ordered than the previous, but still with a high degree of military ethos. Peripheral activities (yellow) are those support functions that include Married Quarters and family orientated

activities. It is here that the greatest level of interaction with the public is encountered.



Fig.4-3a. The attributes of core activities when applied to a functioning flying station, MoD Boscombe Down, Wiltshire. (Source: Underlying Airfield Image MoD © Crown Copyright)

Highly Organised Operational Space

Highly Organised Operational Space (HOOS) comprises buildings, specialist structures or specific areas associated with the primary task of the base, station or unit. This could be the battlefield command centre, aircraft hangar or bridge of a frigate although it could be just as easily a pillbox or, relevant to this project, a Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring post. All activities contained within these areas are rigidly directed by rules and regulations. The role of the individual is removed from the equation as all activities conform to a rigid set of procedures, reducing operatives to the level of automatons. Even in more technical environments, such as aircraft maintenance and operational spaces (runway; taxiway; hardstanding) there is a strict adherence to procedure and training, reinforcing the level of order placed on the surrounding environment. Activities within

this environment are managed and reinforced using a process of accountancy, responsibility and punishment.

HOOS in Action

Entities whose very existence relies on the total control of all activities enshrine in their belief systems rigid control over all aspects of their environment. As what this actually looks like can be complex, a brief case study is needed. To illustrate this the operational environment of a front-line fighter squadron, arguably one of the most 'ordered' environments of the military landscape today. The operation of aircraft, especially since the end of World War II, has become increasingly technology based. Today, aircraft years in the design and test stage, capable of high energy manoeuvres – in excess of eight times the force of gravity – managed by complex fly-by-wire systems and effective environmental control, routinely operate from a number of flying stations across the United Kingdom. The latest front-line aircraft on charge with the Royal Air Force, the Typhoon, currently cost in excess of £125million each and £3,875 per hour to operate (National Audit Office 2011, 26). Such is the complexity of the aircraft it requires highly trained pilots who are both mission management specialists and have the physical capability to survive the extreme environment of combat flying. Estimates note that the cost of training a new recruit to eventually fly the Typhoon is in excess of £4 million (in 2010) and takes 50 months to complete (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2015, 16).

The environment in which the Typhoon is stored, maintained and readied for deployment is one of complete control. This environment is classified by my model as a Highly Organised Operational Space (HOOS). All maintenance activities are rigidly structured to a series of procedures, divergence from them brings severe penalties including extra duties, expulsion from the service and even, in extreme circumstances, prison. Additionally, the service has a culture centring on 'Flight Safety'; this includes impartial reporting of problems and 'whistle blowing'. Effective flight safety saves the Ministry of Defence the additional expense of replacing major pieces of equipment such as aircraft engines or, indeed, a pilot and aircraft due to incorrect maintenance practices or negligent activities. An integral component of the flight safety culture, and one that explains the type of material culture entering the archaeological record on HOOS, is the 'FOD' or Foreign Object Damage regime (fig.4-4).





Fig.4-4. The control of material across an aircraft operating area is paramount to flight safety. Subsequently the amount of artefacts available to enter the archaeological record is practically non-existent. (Poster source MoD: Directorate of Flight Safety)

Across airfields there is an almost obsessive drive to control the amount of debris or 'loose articles' that are located within the HOOS. Indeed, it is convenient to demarcate HOOS from other areas and control mechanisms by utilising the FOD control area. FOD causes multi-millions of pounds' worth of damage every year. An aircraft jet engine is a complex piece of equipment and one small piece of gravel entering it at speed on take-off can cause a catastrophic failure of that engine. Indeed, on 25 July 2000 an Air France Concorde was totally destroyed in a crash caused solely by damage caused by FOD; 109 people were killed on the aircraft and a further four on the ground (BEA 2002) (fig.4-5).

Fig.4-5. Air France Concorde Flight 4590 seconds after take-off. A piece of debris on the runway was flicked up by one of the aircraft's wheels at nearly 300kmh. It pierced a wing fuel tank, causing a fire, loss of the aircraft and 113 lives. (Source: Buzz Pictures/Corbis Sygma)

To this end the aircraft operating areas are routinely swept every morning by a road sweeper vehicle. At least once a week a 'FOD plod' is initiated where the entire apron is physically walked by station personnel and any loose articles are collected, analysed for origin and flight safety notices issued. Furthermore, all personnel working on the apron are duty-bound to report any discoveries, no matter how small, to the flight safety team (Air Clues 2011, 4). In maintenance areas the FOD regime is even more controlled. All tools are accounted for at four chronological points throughout the day – each is individually tagged out by a numbered disc allotted to the tradesman carrying out the task – and double checked at the end of every day. Additionally, all consumables are accounted for (oil rags, emery paper, wire etc.). A task requiring nuts, bolt, rivets, splitpins, locking wire etc. has the specific amount required allotted to it. This ensures no spare items are left over, with the possibility of loss and subsequent FOD damage to the aircraft. The final job on any aircraft prior to release to service is to have a 'zonal FOD check' a role carried out by an independent staff member whose job is to ensure no loose articles are present prior to the aircraft being panelled up and declared ready for service. Essentially, the area is classed as surgically clean, again any infringement of the regulations brings severe penalties (fig.4-6).

Fig.4-6. Lightning Crews at RAF Binbrook, Lincolnshire scramble. The aircraft is off the ground in two minutes. The highly ordered operational space here is self-evident. A strict adherent to procedure and training makes this environment one of order. (Permission – Ministry of Defence© Crown Copyright 1988)

Material Culture and the HOOS

With the complete control of aircraft spare parts and FOD regimes enacted on a daily basis, artefacts that might indicate the use of a given space, be that a nut, bolt or washer, or discarded part of an aircraft, is systematically removed. Personnel conform to a rigid set of principles entrenched through a regime of training and discipline, this includes the uniforms and protective clothing they wear. Furthermore, the way engineering tasks are approached and managed and a high level of order ensures personnel do not introduce material into the aircraft environment from outside the HOOS. Subsequently, the type of material culture available to enter the archaeological record is specifically representative of the organisation. Unfortunately, the level of control, or order, enacted on the aircraft operating environment is such

that material from the activity is, in the main, non-existent. Essentially the operation of aircraft leaves no material culture behind.

Indeed, provision for this eventuality has been voiced, Michael Schiffer, when discussing systemic contexts, noted that an artefact can pass through a series of events before it is available for deposition in an archaeological context (2010, 20). While this model, especially when applied to modern mechanical technologies describes the process of aircraft operation and maintenance, it cannot take into account that deposition in a Highly Organised Operational Space. Aircraft, and their spare components, are encountered in areas other than airfields, primary locations include scrapyards or museums. From the deposition of material in the scrapyard it would be possible to recognise the process of recycling, the recovery of materials that re-enters the manufacturing process through a process of reduction, before refashioned into other objects. At this point the aircraft (a substantial piece of material culture in its ow right) have entered a state of chaos. A similar state is encountered in the museum. Here the aircraft are ‘overtly curated’; that is preserved in a publically accessible way although, they are neither functional nor flightworthy. So it is only when the aircraft, the sole reason for the flying station's existence, are placed in an environment of chaos that the potential for material culture from the entity who operates the station can be encountered. The opportunity to indicate the activities of the entity within a Highly Ordered Operational space – in this case the operation of aircraft - by material culture alone is extremely slight.

Highly Organised Domestic Space

Highly Organised Domestic Space (HODS) lies beyond the HOOS. The level of organisation is as structured as the HOOS although, the activities encompassed by it form a different aspect of military life-cycles. There are two types of activity recognised within the HODS, the technical site supporting the flying function, including what are known as bays and engineering manufacturing and messing arrangements. Bays are workshops that repair and overhaul both aircraft equipment and station facilities. An example is the electronic bays where aircraft communication equipment is often repaired, as is the mobile radio kits used by the security force.

Fig.4-7. Royal Scots Dragoon Guards Mess Dinner January 23 2009. Highly ordered domestic space contains a level of formalised social space. The rules and regulations of military life are enacted within this space. (Permission – Ministry of Defence© Crown Copyright)

The HODS also has a more domestic function including the Station Headquarters – the administrative centre of the unit – clothing stores, barrack stores, the gym, police section and other functional activities required to support the organisations primary function. While these functions are not as tightly controlled as the HOOS, they do require a high level of military ethos and ritual (fig.4-7). This includes respect for rank, correct dress and a high level of regulatory instruction.

The second areas of activity encountered in the HODS are those involving Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers and centre on messes. These areas display high levels of ritualisation through material culture. Past campaigns or battle honours, paintings of operations and past aircraft types in action adorn every wall, often these are arranged in chronological order. Specific activities drive behaviours: tea and toast is available from 15:00hrs; no coats should be worn; jacket and tie in the main bar, reading rooms; and a high level of domestic help in the form of waiters and secretaries ensure the experience is more akin to a gentleman's club in the centre of London than a fighter station in central Lincolnshire. The Senior Non-Commissioned Officers mess is similarly provisioned with the noticeable exception of the servile attributes. These areas have more potential for material to be introduced

into the archaeological record, again it is likely to be connected implicitly with the organisation.

Domestic Space

The final component of the ordered area is the Domestic Space. This component comprises the least organised area of a military site, often comprising the lower ranks' mess and other junior social centres such as clubs and accommodation. However, aspects of military ethos are still displayed, and this includes respect for rank, saluting, 'bull nights' and a level of discipline. Domestic Space as a landscape is located on the edge of the Highly Organised Domestic Space and as such can fall within the influence of its rules and regulations. Here barrack-rooms and single billets are personalised in a similar way to those encountered in civilian life, often recreating something of a system of remembrance for earlier lifestyles (fig.4-8). This has become ever more acute as it appears that aspects of the wider social system the military serves can no longer be excluded or relegated to beyond the security fence.

Fig.4-8. Hinaidi Block, RAF Lyneham, Wiltshire, mid-1984. Domestic Space comprises a low-level of formalised activities, expression is more singular here, reminding the participant of both a life earlier than the service while also mirroring wider society. (Source: Bob Clarke personal archive)

Interestingly, whilst the aspects controlling both previous ordered areas (HOOS and HODS) appear to have remained fairly static, especially throughout the Cold War, those aspects governing Domestic Space have changed dramatically. The influence has not come from the ordered aspects of the core area, indeed the aspects identified as order-centric have also remained fairly static. It is more the fact that interactions with the periphery are at their most detailed in the Domestic Space. Personnel routinely travel to local towns and villages during periods of stand down,

travel abroad on periods of leave and often own their own home rather than utilise the married quarters.

One easily recognisable change in Domestic Space is the increased ownership of motor vehicles and where to park them. Better pay and increased expectations have allowed service personnel, from the 1970s, to mirror a number of social trends that have increased in wider society, motor vehicle ownership is one of those trends. It is not uncommon to find that the parade square, once the centre of the Domestic Space, is now given over as a station carpark. Where once walking across the square attracted fatigues or extra duties, it is now necessary to access the space to park a vehicle (fig.4-9).

This change in the social strata experienced in the wider community clearly manifests itself inside the security fence too. Interestingly, the carpark on the former parade square is usually open to all ranks. So what was originally intended as a Highly Organised Domestic Space, constructed for the enactment of military rituals has, through contact with the wider social construct, become a place of chaos. In this particular case the periphery (outside the security fence) drives the deposition of material culture inside the fence line; interestingly, it brings with it chaos and the opportunity to miss-interpret a substantial part of the military landscape if the original use of the parade square was not known. This interaction between the periphery and domestic space ensures that material is likely to enter the archaeological record. It is, however, unlikely to be representative of the ordered entity that inhabits this space. It is more likely that the material culture available for deposition will mirror the social system to which the military ultimately reports.

Fig.4-9. Parade Square Royal Force Halton, Bucks. Once the scene of total order and control, parade squares are now a scene of chaos, brought about by the rise in car ownership. (Google Maps Image accessed 15/04/2016)

Peripheral Areas

Beyond the security fence lay the peripheral functions needed to ensure the military performs the tasks required. These can be the settlements that often congregate outside the military site comprising married quarters (fig.4-10), clubs and bars including the 'NAAFI', sports fields and pavilions, health or family centres. To these can be added general site maintenance both on and off station, that is grass cutting and other non-essential maintenance. Incidentally, general site maintenance should be considered the only activity that is constant throughout core and peripheral areas.

Fig.4-10 Married Quarters in the United Kingdom are usually located beyond the security fence, placing them in the Peripheral Zone. Activities in support of the Core areas are enacted here. (Permission – Ministry of Defence© Crown Copyright)

The material culture of society is prevalent here and conforms to the chronological development of consumerism and economic markers that can be encountered across the social system that defines the United Kingdom. Activities across the peripheral area dictate material, domestic or otherwise, will enter the archaeological record.

Order then, can be recognised through the activities enacted on any given site or landscape providing it has its origins within certain organisational parameters. Making the model flexible at the point of application allows for reassessment of a given building or space and perceived usage. The spatial distribution of specific activities can be inferred through the material culture encountered on such sites, although there are other cultural sources that will assist in that interpretation, including memory sources and the written record. Moreover, with the majority of landscapes dating from World War IIland acquisitions, no new airfields have been constructed in the United Kingdom since 1946 (Clarke 2009, 162), subsequently, the

taxonomy of the majority of structures is well known (Osborne 2004). The geography of airfields is also well known and has been described elsewhere (Lake 2002); what is important to the proposed model is that, armed with a very clear set of parameters, that model has the opportunity to be tested and patterns of abandonment and alternative use proposed. It has also been possible to suggest the probable types of material encountered on a site that has been abandoned (fig.4-11). This helps this project demonstrate the role of the Royal Observer Corps, the landscape in which the organisation operated and say something of the social interactions between a volunteer force, attitudes towards the archaeology of mass destruction and the deposition of modern material culture at specific sites in the landscape.



Fig.4-11. The closer one gets to a Highly Ordered Operational Space the more organisation-centric becomes the material culture encountered. The further away one gets from the core activity, the more one relies on narratives from those who inhabit a specific space it helps structure the material culture encountered there (Source: Bob Clarke).

Aspects of Chaos

Chaos is the point whereby order is removed via processes initiated by human, animal, vegetation or meteorologically related actions – singularly or by a combination of two, three or all agencies. The processes identified as chaos related begin at the point of abandonment, although the actual decent into chaos is not chronologically recognisable beyond the framework offered by the analysis of artefacts that enter the archaeological record. Additionally, sites that have been closed can be curated for a number of years, often protected by private security firms. I suggest this has little effect of the abandonment process as a site that has a closed aspect to its life-cycle (the fence continues to exclude interaction) will deter much of the build-up of material culture and so not bias an interpretation of a given space. What follows is a breakdown of the four primary agencies that contribute to the process of abandonment, their attributes and affiliations. The primary interest – Human Intervention - is fully described here, followed by a brief summary of the further three.

Human intervention – Material Culture

The deposition of material culture, especially when connected with entities of high control or order, is steadily reduced in quantity and form the closer one gets to Highly Ordered Operational Space (HOOS). Ultimately no material at all should enter the archaeological record, at least not while the HOOS remains effective. Interestingly, the more ordered the entity, the more attractive the material culture apparently becomes to the collector. At the point of abandonment or decommissioning the most mundane of objects become highly prised; especially by those whose personal history connects them in some way to the organisation or site. This phenomenon has been discussed previously in a military context (Saunders 2002; Baldwin and Sharpley 2009) and this thesis expands on the acquisition of material related specifically to the Royal Observer Corps in chapter 7. It is, however, important to acknowledge at this point that the curation of objects related to personal histories expands far beyond the influence of the uniformed services.

The fate of the Berlin Wall illustrates this perfectly. Constructed started on what was to become known internationally as The Berlin Wall at 2:45 a.m. on 13 August 1961, by the end of the day West Berlin was completely surrounded by a barrier comprising concrete posts and rolls of barbed wire (Baker 1993, 294). For the

following 28 years the barrier, strengthened and enhanced three times in that period, became a symbol of oppression, restriction and political soundbites. The construction of the Wall was partly a consequence of an overt period of political posturing culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Young 1993, 14). On the 9 November 1989 crossing points from East to West were opened, initially for 24 hours, however, the tide of movement was so great that the Wall ceased to be effective from that day forwards; just eleven months later East and West Germany were reunited.

Fig.4-12. My personal Berlin Wall. 'Pecked' parts of the original Berlin Wall I obtained from the site in January 1990, just two months after the wall was breached. (Source Bob Clarke)

A large section of the structure centred on the city itself fell victim to the attention of the 'peckers', a small army of entrepreneurs who removed the face of the wall that had, over a decade or so, become covered in graffiti (Dolff-Bonekämper 2002, 244) (fig.4-12). Demand eventually outstripped supply, leading to areas of the Wall, mostly that on the other side of the death strip, becoming covered in pseudo-street art before being pecked for consumption (*ibid*. 2002, 241). Other aspects of the Wall, especially those made of recyclable material, were removed by the authorities. In so doing the scarcity of such artefacts was increased, as was demand, subsequently artefacts were removed at an even quicker pace (Baker 1993, 306). Soon the intrinsic value of the Wall, especially what it represented, was outstripped by re-sale value driven by the tourist industry. Today the structure that drove superpower confrontations is all but destroyed, sections survive in museums across the world (fig.4-13) although it is now very difficult to locate in the City of Berlin itself.

(Fig.4-13) Sections of the Berlin Wall and a watch tower in the allied Museum in Berlin, Germany. This section was moved to the museum to ensure its survival. (Source: Bob Clarke 012/07/2012)

In 2011, Gregson, Crang and Watkins explored the material culture of war, its meaning to those who served and the process of end-of-life military material (2011,301). They discovered a complex series of meanings connected to a Royal Navy ship – HMS Intrepid – that was in the process of being scrapped. What is important here is that specific items, with little or no intrinsic value were 'procured' by a group of visitors to the ship in its final days. Interestingly, Buchli and Lucas noted that 'material culture shoulders the larger responsibility of our personal and collective memory – the decay or destruction of these objects brings forgetfulness' (2001, 80). Gregson *et al* conclude that the acquisition of such material culture demonstrates a commemoration of lives past, especially when considering close-knit communities such as those experienced in the military (2011, 319). They also demonstrate the problems attributed to leaving the armed forces and re-integrating back into civilian life-cycles – citing the collection and retention of items connected to personal service as a likely indicator of personal struggles (*ibid* 2011, 319).

When we consider the point of abandonment of the Royal Observer Corps post network a similar set of activities appear to have been enacted. At the point of stand-down all instrumentation was to be removed and returned to Group headquarters. From here the equipment fell into two broad categories – disposal/scrap or retention

by the Home Office – both reduced the opportunity for the majority of task specific equipment to enter the archaeological record. A demand is built through this normal action of disposal. Collectors of the material culture of the Royal Observer Corps were minimal throughout the last decade of the twentieth century; now demand is such, especially since the development of online auction sites and the ability to own underground monitoring posts, that the most basic of equipment attracts wildly inflated prices (see chapter 7 for a full discussion).

The progress of abandonment on a large site such an airfield can be easily mapped. Often first to be relinquished are the peripheral activities directly operated by the military site. All Highly Organised Domestic Space arrangements lose their previously ridged structure as a steady reduction of uniformed personnel drives efficiencies in messing arrangements and all three levels of rank are placed in one mess. Eventually the site is completely demilitarised and subsequently disposed of. Once this has occurred the recognisable aspects of chaos become clearly evident. This usually starts with the abandonment of grass cutting and other ground maintenance, clubs and shops close and, especially on rural sites, married quarters are abandoned. The security fence, a demarcation between the core and peripheral activities, is often damaged or breeched early after abandonment – usually by children.

Material from the primary use of the site often has a scrap value and is removed, building maintenance become sporadic, even if the site or structure is used for another function such as business units or workshops. On small sites such as the ROC underground monitoring posts, chaos, through abandonment, comes quickly as the Observer crews simply stop visiting the posts. On larger sites the process is more protracted although no less chaotic in the end. Buildings are used for other purposes than they were intended, altered, or abandoned (fig.4-14). Vandalism is often rife whilst demolition is increasingly the preferred option. All this introduces masses of material into the archaeological record compared to the previous ordered state imposed by the military.

Fig.4-14. Aircraft Hangar at Greenham Common, Berks in the process of dismantling, 2004. The value of structures, especially those in the HO Operational Spaces, is often in their scrap value. Chaos through human action is compounded by meteorological conditions. (Source: Bob Clarke 02/06/2004)

It is not just human agency that plays a hand in the alteration of sites, spaces and structures through abandonment. As building maintenance becomes increasingly sporadic, and eventually non-existent, three other agencies become increasingly destructive. If we consider the weather and vegetation, it is surprising how different aspects conspire to reduce the effectiveness of a building to protect itself against the elements. Recently during a watching brief at Boscombe Down the opportunity to record a series of abandoned buildings connected to aircraft gun testing was taken. The site comprised four structures, a Blister hangar, two-gun test buildings (fig.4-15) and a stop butt (rounds pit). The two-gun test buildings current state were described thus:

Building 309 and 310 on 6 May 2015

> Both structures appear to have been abandoned although racking and trestles found inside suggest they are being utilised in some stores capacity. Windows are showing signs of deep corrosion, once this reaches a certain point the pressure caused by the delamination of the frame structure breaks the glass panes, further accelerating the decay to the building fabric. All painted internal

surfaces are now in a poor condition and whilst water is not actually getting inside, the general damp conditions are corroding fittings and fixtures. Externally, the render and paint finish is generally poor, water and frost action will continue to remove rendering at an accelerated rate whilst surface decay in the double doors structure is likely to reach a critical point in the next few years if untreated. Vegetation has started to encroach on the building footprint; externally, overgrowth in the southeast corner of B309 is damaging the external surface of the structure, moreover this has started to undermine one of the window frames with briers now penetrating inside the building. (Clarke 2015, 23)

Fig.4-15 Building 310 Boscombe Down, Wiltshire. Note the poor state of the rendering around doors and windows. (IMG_0054 created 6 May 2015 ©QinetiQ Ltd - with permission)

Clearly then the action of two natural processes is already reducing the possibility of these structures to survive without substantial investment. In all likelihood these buildings will be removed in the near future. This is the eventual fate of many buildings constructed for organisations who are either recognised specialists in what process they undertake, or perform a unique service, this included the British military. What is also interesting here is that all the buildings surveyed were constructed for a highly specific and dangerous series of tests and as such are

classified in this model as an area of Highly Ordered Operational Space. The only evidence of their original purpose was through the memory and personal histories of a few technicians who remembered the facility in the late 1960s.

There is one final aspect of the life-cycle of military organisations that requires mention; the transition to war. Logistically, the movement of troops and equipment to theatres of conflict around the world demonstrates the value the military places on HOOS and the reliance on regulations. Once forces engage the enemy total order turns to total chaos in an instant; the outcome driven by the protagonists on the battlefield. While this aspect is currently outside the scope of this project it is still worth making the point that order, at its extreme promotes chaos.

'Order and *Chaos'* as a Model

The application of the 'order and chaos' model allows the researcher to apply an activity-based interpretation to the discussion of any structure, site or organised landscape's previous intended use. Utilising that contained within official reports covering the closure and subsequent disposal of military bases, complemented by local media and oral accounts, the point at which the site transitions from order to chaos can be recognised. The level of complexity of the record is dictated by the position of the feature or building within the core matrix (fig3-3a). Any discussion on abandonment requires a chronological point at which that process begins, this model goes someway to providing that point.

Order, Chaos and the ROC Abandonment

The Royal Observer Corps, up to the point of stand-down in September 1991, can be classed as a Highly Structured Organisation, staffed by a predominantly voluntary organisation modelled on the full-time military services. Training was compulsory, as was weekly attendance and participation in five exercises per year; a uniform was to be worn and the organisation had a militaristic rank structure. Processes aligned with the Royal Observer Corps are no longer enacted; a primary encounter with the organisation is now impossible. However, Highly Ordered Operational Space can be inferred and referenced against the official record. Aspects of organisation, technical development, maintenance and spatial distribution of artefacts throughout the structure appear in documentation that is now freely available (fig.4-16). Moreover, the day-to-day staffing and administrative functions can be explored through oral

transcription; a specific objective of this project. That said, this is likely to confirm the Highly Ordered environment in which the ROC Underground Monitoring Posts operated.

The fact that we are able to recognise the level of order placed within the UGMP provides the researcher with an opportunity to follow a micro-level detail of abandonment. The lack of Domestic Space, as recognised through the third tier of the proposed model, further accentuates this (fig.4-17). Naturally, the larger the site under investigation the more complex the issues surrounding the transition from 'order to chaos'. This is further compounded by the chronological distance from the point of abandonment through to the date any monitoring or study is initiated. That said; that complexity can now be predicted with some degree of accuracy.



Fig.4-16 The Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring post comprises both forms of highly ordered components of order. Encountering a structure still exhibiting such spatial organisation is now impossible. (Source: illustration created by Bob Clarke)

Fig.4-17. The size of the ROC underground monitoring post makes it simpler to recognise the point of abandonment on an ROC post. Personal recollections and imagery are also important. (Source: Malcolm Holland - Princes Risborough Post, Bucks closed in 1968)

The peripheral aspects of order are, like some larger sites, evident by ground maintenance, the observers themselves mowed the compounds (personal account. ROC #55, Horsham Group). Remember, with this model ground maintenance has been identified as a constant activity across all core and peripheral zones. As with all military or highly ordered sites, prior to September 1991, location and compound size were the only deviations from an otherwise clone-like series of structures distributed across the landscape. In 2011, those that have survived over 20 years of abandonment display interaction with all four facets of the chaos model (human, animal, vegetation or meteorologically related actions). Moreover, they present an opportunity to study the process of abandonment first-hand, human interaction with sites connected to controversial activities, conservation efforts and the local adoption of abandoned monuments for both display and other functions. It is to this final structure that I now turn, demonstrating that even in the depths of chaos certain types of behaviours can be recognised.

THE FOUR STATES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY

It quickly became apparent during the initial fieldwork undertaken in 2011, that while the Royal Observer Corps posts displayed, individually, unique evidence for human interaction, when considered together tentative patterns were recognisable. Further planned visits to baseline posts and an increase of the sample sites over the following three years increased the visibility of these patterns. Moreover, this was to such an extent that I can now offer a series of activity based situations; essentially providing a much more detailed framework with which to investigate the abandonment process. The implications are great. It is now possible to characterise the taskscape (Ingold 1993) of the Observer and the regime that held jurisdiction over both the volunteer members and the landscape they inhabited. Moreover, the activities enacted on the sites post-1991 (the Stand-down of the Royal Observer Corps) can now be characterised, allowing for the recording, narration and description of a class of contentious monuments. This next section introduces those recognisable states of abandonment deemed chronologically post the stand-down of the organisation.

The Basic Framework



Fig.4-18. A flow diagram demonstrating probable interactions with a structure originally constructed and operated by a Highly Organised Group - in this case the Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts - and their relationships. This context of this diagram in regards to the order and chaos model is discussed in the following text (Source: Bob Clarke).

Overview of Structure

The move of any structure or site from order to chaos is initiated by a transitional phase, this is central to all other activities noted (fig.4-18). The majority of Royal Observer Corps posts still extant are in this phase, although some have already transited to a ruined or destroyed status (1). Those posts recognised as being in covert curation are restored from a position of transition (2); as are those now overtly curated and promoted as living museums (3). Importantly a covertly curated site can regress to a state of transition. As more posts experience covert curation, a number are starting to offer open days. Clearly this declares the existence of a once secret site to the public (4) and as such cannot be considered covert from that point. That

said, some sites are known, or suspected to be in existence, but not confirmed through public promotion (5). A further interaction is that between the site and a statutory body. In this case no recognisable effect on the structure is noted, although the state of the structure often mirrors the surrounding landscape.

Overt Curation

Overt curation, as the title suggests, is the point in an ROC post's lifecycle where it is maintained to a high standard and the existence of the post is outwardly promoted to the wider society. The group who usually undertake such activities often retired observers or have a strong affinity with the organisation; this includes family or dependants of former ROC members and are often members of the Royal Observer Corps Association. The activities involved in curation include the imposition of some original regulatory aspects of a highly organised organisation, especially the originality of equipment and post layout. Furthermore, the role of the post is to educate the wider community about the work the ROC undertook on their behalf and as such are publicised as a form of living museum. Open days are publicised through a number of channels, (social media is increasingly important in this area) and the public are encouraged to experience first-hand the secret world of the observer during their nuclear reporting role (fig.4-19).

Fig.4-19. On Overtly Curated sites the onus is on education and experience. This is an annual open day at W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. The key activity being a decent into the secret world of the observer. (Source: Bob Clarke 04/08/2012)

Overtly curated posts are not solely directed at the public. Many of those who maintain such sites tend to be members the original post crew, or members from posts nearby. It is likely that this form of membership, especially when interacting

with familiar landscape monuments, displays a form of remembrance - one that replaces the group that was 'lost' in September 1991 - it also acts as a form of association, even if not in the official ROC Association. One such group operates in North Wiltshire, the discussed their activities during a military exhibition in 2013 at Lacock, Wiltshire August 17 2014.

> Interviewer (IV) – Are you fellas part of the ROC Association now?
>
> Observer (Obs.) - No, all got too 'political', besides it was at Winchester, never had chance of a pint after meetings!
>
> (IV) - Ah, yes I can see how that could get in the way a bit. So you guys are all local then?
>
> (Obs.) - Yes, two of us live down the road about 5 minutes' walk. He (points them out) lives at Chisledon and those two are from Swindon for their sins! Others dip in and out. Our section commander, he lives at Chissy [Chisledon] as well, usually gets to the pub once or twice a month.
>
> (IV) - So you use a pub for meetings?
>
> (Obs.) - yes, the Waggon and Horses at Beckhampton [Avebury]. Every Tuesday, we discuss the old days and usually moan about them over a few drinks. We had observers from four posts represented the other week. Ours is the only post maintained so we need help organising things like our annual barbeque and which [country] shows to attend. We don't have all the kit you see, and it's almost impossible to buy anything at a sensible price off eBay these days, these fellas lend their kit so we can present the post as originally as possible. They come and help out too.

Overt curation works on a number of levels. Outwardly facing is the will to accept the public into a once secret society. The public are allowed access to the site, see all the instrumentation and are instructed in the craft of nuclear reporting by the very people who did it for real. Considering the ROC post, the landscape is one clearly demonstrating curation. New or good order paint, repairs and a compound recently mowed are all likely indicators that the post is maintained. Below ground follows a similar trend. Again the furnishing and fittings are in good order, usually the bunks are positioned in the correct place and no material culture, other than that related

directly to the organisation, appears present. A search online often brings forwards information about events and photographs are available through subject specific websites and social media. Overt Curation is the closest category to that of an ‘ordered’ state, initially the appearance is one of a managed landscape, promoted as a historical site and high levels of originality. Overt Curation is, however, a state of chaos. Equipment is seldom laid out as it would have been during operational phases. There is far more information on posters on the walls of the underground monitoring post and, revealing many volunteers’ passion for aviation, posters of various aircraft. One of the key aspects of the public’s experience is through the physical encounter of the control room, at this point the actual layout of equipment becomes void; descending into the depths of the British countryside and experiencing the small control room lit using 12volt battery lights reinforces the unpleasantness of a prolonged period underground. It is this that the observers wish to relay to the public.

Covert Curation

Covert curation is a state whereby the Royal Observer Corps post is owned by an individual or group and is fully or partially maintained, although, those who are associated with the post are not necessarily former members of the organisation who built or operated the site. The motivation for covert curation is a more complex behaviour than overt curation. It appears that interactions with the post are more likely to be acts of remembrance than education, certainly levels of self-gratification are apparent. This form of curation is on the increase starting from a transitional point during the ROC post's life-cycle. A further consideration not connected to other forms of ROC post interaction is the issue of financial incentives; in chapter 7 this is discussed in detail, although, it is clearly a motivator and should be considered here too.

Covert curation can have similar visual cues to those posts overtly curated, especially the above ground components; tidy compounds repairs to concrete structure above ground and paint in good order all point to maintenance activities. Below ground the posts can be laid out in a number of ways, the main drive appears to be to replicate a close resemblance to the original post layout. This brings with it a specific series of problems. As with any organisation there is a specific material culture that defines the group, in this case the most obvious items are those that carry the monogram of the Corps (fig.4-19). Although to the covert curator other

items are far more important - the instrumentation and equipment that made the ROC post operational. This sort of material is in short supply and has become increasingly difficult to source, subsequently, in recent years such equipment has attracted premium prices; the same can be said of the value of the post structure too (see chapter 7 for a description of the implications for ROC posts). By far the most interesting behaviour until the rise of the social media presence of post restorers has been a total lack of communication with the groups. A range of communication methods (emails, landline, mobile, leaving a calling card on the posts themselves and letters) raised no responses what-so-ever. Subsequently, any ROC post clearly under some sort of maintenance regime but is, to all intense and purpose still within a secret regime, is classified as 'covertly curated'.

Fig.4-19 The Royal Observer Corps Badge. This particular monogram dates from the immediate post-World War II regeneration of the organisation. It depicts an Elizabethan period signaller below the Kings Crown. To the covert curator this symbol denotes authenticity and belonging. (Courtesy: ROC Museum)

Transitional

All Royal Observer Corps posts have, at one time or another experienced a transitional phase, indeed, no post recorded in this project appears to have entered any other state without first being 'abandoned' for a period of their life-cycle. Some (D-20 Hornscross, Devon; W-1 Alderbury, Wiltshire) may have, at one time, experienced a period of overt or covert curation; although, they are currently in a state chaos, due to the intervention of the key elements of the chaos model (animal, vegetation, meteorological and human). Structural components above ground tend to be in a poor state of repair; the compound is often slighted or totally removed although material such as concreate fence posts are still on site (fig.4-20). It is also possible that the compound is utilised for other purposes. At D-46, Torrington,

Devon, a piece of farm machinery was stood within the fence line, at D-37, Tiverton, Devon the structure of the underground post and surrounding compound has been converted to a radio ham station. The post structure is devoid of practically all furniture, ensuring D-37 is classified as ‘transitional’. In most cases the compound area is full of substantial regeneration, small saplings and briers making up the majority of species. The entrance and vent stacks are usually damaged by a mixture of weather, especially rain and frost, acting in areas already damaged by the destructive visitor. Grills for both the vent and entrance stack are increasingly missing, possibly the activity of those covertly restoring another post, and the hatch is often bent and twisted and loose on its mounts (fig.4-21).

Fig.4-20. D-27, Modbury underground monitoring post. Devon The debris created by removal of the ROC post compound has been dumped on the post itself (note fixed survey meter at centre-right of picture) (Source: Bob Clarke 02/04/13)

Fig.4-21. D-47 Whitestone, Devon, the entrance hatch has been forcibly opened, snapping one of the hinges. This form of interaction allows water to ingress the control room, transitioning the structure, in time, from transitional to ruined status. (Source: Bob Clarke 03/04/13)

Below ground the post can appear to be a micro-landscape of variety. The control room can be dry and devoid of material completely, contain some cultural objects from the ROC period through to being flooded or completely burnt out. It appears that the majority of those posts accessed for this project comprised a control room with at least some of the furniture utilised before 1991. In addition, material from the wider core area is present, this could be containers, wrappers and plastic drinks bottles, although it is usually a mix of all. This material often carries a date and batch number; drinks cans can be dated by the material used in their construction as can the type of opening system employed. Often this material is discovered at the bottom of the entrance shaft (fig.4-22). ROC posts overtly or covertly curated do not have material accumulating in this area as it blocks the water catchment sump up, any serious amount of water then penetrates into the rest of the structure.

Fig.4-22. W-2, Amesbury, Wiltshire. Debris in the sump area is a clear indicator that the post is neither covertly or overtly curated. In this instance material dropped in, and that from the post itself, can be seen to be mixed, W-2, Amesbury is considered to be a post in transition. (Source: Bob Clarke 20/07/2016)

In the control room there can be evidence from a number of sources. Interestingly material from the originating organisation is often limited to shelving, the main cupboard, chemical toilet and bunks (fig.4-23). We should not be surprised by this. Michael Schiffer, when discussing cultural formation processes, noted that items left behind are ‘usually bulky or of low replacement cost (2010, 37), I suspect size has something to do with this too. Furthermore, interaction is not restricted to removal, the addition of material can take a number of forms.

Figure. 4-23, D-20 Hornscross, Devon, Furniture and fittings, such as this cupboard, were standard issue to all underground monitoring posts. Examples of it were consistently located at nearly all posts. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011)

Candles have been recorded in six posts suggesting more than a fleeting visit; furniture is moved around and the walls can be the focus of graffiti. These posts are in the last stages of their life-cycles and if left will become completely ruined or removed from the landscape.

Ruined or Destroyed

Those Royal Observer Corps posts identified as ruined or destroyed represent the majority of ROC post sites across the project area (in Devon 38 posts out of 53 posts were destroyed, while in Wiltshire 8 out of a potential 20 had been removed by the baseline survey). This category exposes the dichotomy facing sites constructed to withstand the full force of the effects of nuclear weapon detonation but not prolonged, unmaintained, periods at the mercy of their environment. As will be apparent I have sub divided this category of condition, this is intentional. Structures that partially survive in the landscape, although only immovable or cast concrete remains have been classified as ‘ruined’ - that is they comprise no external furniture such as vent grills or master post fittings (fig.4-24). Hatches can be in place but might be welded shut, replaced by other forms of covering, or the entrance stack can be covered by a concrete cap or substantial obstacle. Below ground is chaos - often

with non-organisation specific material entering the space (fig.4-25). Whether the compound fully, or partially, survives at this point is immaterial.

Fig.4-24. W-7, Sutton Veny, Wiltshire is a classic example of a ruined ROC Post. The post has no vent stack, or other equipment fittings and the entrance stack is devoid of grills. (Source: Bob Clarke 07/07/2013)

Fig.4-25. W-7, Sutton Veny, Wiltshire. Below ground the only surviving features are components of the bunks, other material has been introduced at some time (corrugated sheet), general, non-structured interaction can be seen on the walls. (Source: Bob Clarke 07/07/2013)

Those ROC posts removed from the landscape completely, as I demonstrate in chapter 5, do still have a landscape presence. A small number of posts had ground zero indicators placed some distance from the underground monitoring post, often due to the immediate, topographical location (D-45, Torquay, Devon; D-7, Christow, Devon). Furthermore, a destroyed post, if a semi-sunken construction, can still have a partial landscape presence. Of 80 posts visited for this project only three (Y-1, Bridlington, Yorkshire; D-39, Sharpitor, Devon; W-7, Sutton Veny, Wiltshire) were of the semi-sunken type. Structure, D-39, Sharpitor, located on Dartmoor, Devon is the subject of a case study in chapter 7. Here the surface structure has been reduced to grass level although the earth mound covering the partially buried control room remains extant to over a metre high. It is, therefore, possible that a destroyed post can still have a visible aspect, although only if topography or geology are problematic at the time of construction.

The control room can survive at a destroyed ROC post, however, it should not be accessible. Presumably the majority of posts in this category do have extant sub-terrainian components as the effort to remove all vestiges of a structure up to three metres below ground would seem wasted effort. A description of all those sites devoid of any, above ground, features would be pointless, although, the location of former post positions using LiDAR (demonstrated in chapter 5) is a useful form of remote identification, especially when an ROC posts location is contested or inaccurate.

Discussion

The archaeology of abandonment, especially when considering contemporary archaeological sites, is controversial; that said, the amount of academic work currently being undertaken is increasing, as is the range of the subjects being researched, the ‘excavation’ of a Ford Transit van adequately demonstrates this (Myers 2011, 139). This should not force the researcher to shy away from such ventures. Controversy courts archaeological investigation of an ethically complex (Zimmerman 2003), or disagreeable nature (Kristeva 1982), it also forces comment from the press if the work is unusual or does not conform to the current public view of mainstream archaeology (Rathje and Murphy 2001; Bailey *et al* 2008; Myers 2011). Indeed, as we move inexorably to the conclusion that the modern world contains an ‘archaeology of us’; voices for and against such work are likely to become more polarised (Myers 2011, 139). As Newland recommended ‘the

increasing engagement with modern and contemporary archaeologies necessitates a renegotiation of disciplinary boundaries' (2004, 45). Unfortunately, these boundaries continue to undermine efforts to assimilate the archaeology of recent periods into the broader study of material culture (Bailey *et al* 2007; Strange and Walley 2007).

By demonstrating that the sites and landscape of the recent past, in this case the landscape and monuments of the Royal Observer Corps, have much to offer in archaeological analytical investigation, I hope they will become a more recognised aspect of the whole heritage debate. The opportunity to investigate the origins and the creation of an archaeological record through a monitoring programme involving the underground monitoring posts, and wider Cold War monument landscape, should not be missed. It could be argued that the role of analytic activities has already been demanded. In 2010 Schiffer noted a five-point requirement for the study of cultural formation processes (2010, 31), including the demand that '-new principles of formation processes could - and should - be obtained through experimental and ethnoarchaeological research' (*ibid* 2010, 31). Now with the realisation that a fixed point can be confidently recognised the process of abandonment can be monitored with a high degree of structure from the outset.

Conclusion

In the opening comments for this chapter it was suggested the study of material culture, in this case connected to activities in and around ROC posts, was key to understanding monuments constructed specifically for one purpose. It is important to recognise that redundant, or organised spaces, connected to the Cold War, were once centres of activity populated by groups (often volunteers) who were intent on carrying out roles under the most horrific of conditions. As the twentieth century recedes from living memory and personal histories to documented accounts and understanding utilising archaeological techniques, it is important that the correct interpretation is offered to those who encounter such sites as aspects of their past. It would be all too easy to note underground monitoring posts as simply observation sites to monitor the effects of nuclear warfare - this basic description pervades every Heritage Environment Record. With the current model it has been demonstrated that a humanised landscape, a landscape that clearly contains more than simple monuments to the folly of the Cold War. In this landscape a number of groups are

recognisable through their activities and interactions with underground monitoring posts; if we are to adequately discuss the landscape construct this level of detail is required as a minimum. Only then can the real Cold War landscape begin to be contextualised in anything like adequate detail. The next section attends to the landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps, placing the field monuments in a recognisable taskscape.

CHAPTER 5: THE LANDSCAPE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS

INTRODUCTION

In the following chapter the reader is introduce to the landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps. It concentrates specifically on the Cold War period and the structures developed during that time, including the three field monuments placed in the landscape during that period. Specific reference is made to the functional differences between types, their location, and how they appear to the local population; a number of issues relating to topography are also explored. This chapter is a precursor to the results of the fieldwork and exploration of the relationships between the public and the ROC. Furthermore, it introduces the concept of chronological longevity in the landscape and allows for the introduction of the order and chaos model intended to formalise the material culture encountered on ROC sites.

Britain's role in the Cold War has been promoted by successive Governments as one of passive defence, that is to say all military activities, including the possession of nuclear weapons, are purely defensive in nature. It is incorrect to suggest that a landscape orientated towards passiveness could dominate the military landscape across the United Kingdom. Paradoxically, to consider oneself a passive participant in conflict demands that a state present an offensive posture. The most recognisable aspect of this is the continued maintenance of a nuclear deterrence. Whilst the weapons systems are promoted as defensive, the fact that they were deployed on submarines on a state of readiness throughout the Cold War places them in an offensive role. Subsequently, it is often difficult to recognise the true nature of the components of the British defence landscape. In 1999, Gold and Revill published an account of the 'landscape of defence', suggesting a specific component of the material remains of the activity could be quantified. In this early work they provide us with a definition that holds true over fifteen years later.

> Landscapes of Defence' are regarded as landscapes shaped or otherwise materially affected by formal or informal defensive strategies to achieve recognizable social, political or cultural goals (Gold and Revill, 1999, 235).

One such 'defensive strategy' of the Cold War was the ability to record the effects of nuclear weapons during and after a nuclear strike on Britain. The landscape

archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) is a classic manifestation of a passive organisation displaying a taskscape concerned only with specific, non-aggressive, activities. The ROC also provides us with a dichotomy; the organisation conforms to a number of Michel Foucault's key definitions of a heterotopia (1967). For the organisation to have a landscape presence there must have been a catalyst. For the ROC this catalyst was the development of aerial warfare. Subsequently, the ROC was born out of crisis and deviance – a government's ability to wage war in the name of the population – even if not sanctioned by a popular mandate. The landscape displays an unfolding history driven by technological advances through weapons development. Furthermore the organisation operated within a closed, or secret, system, requiring initiation via the signing of the Official Secrets Act.

This chapter describes the archaeological landscape of the Royal Observer Corps within the confines of this project. The archaeology presented here concentrates on the organisation's Cold War activities only – specifically the structures synonymous with the ROC, the Orlit post, Underground Monitoring Post and Group Headquarters, placing them within a physical and chronological framework. In so doing, it demonstrates that, whilst a clandestine organisation, the ROC initiated many diverse groups, often not connected directly with its operation, into its ranks by proxy. Each architectural type is explained separately, followed by a discussion surrounding the complexity of multi-phase landscapes of Cold War defence and the implications this has for the study of remembrance and subsequent usage in a landscape setting.

SAMPLING

Interpreting the archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) and its attendant monuments requires a large geographical area to be placed under study. Taken as a whole the ROC covered the entire United Kingdom (including the Channel Islands) thus conforming to an organisational, not local governmental, geographical structure. The history of the organisation was revealed in chapter 3 (above) although it is useful at this juncture to remind ourselves of the key dates in the organisations life-cycle. This landscape has its origins in the pre-World War II Air Defence of Great Britain, an organisation that was formed as a direct consequence of the aerial attacks Britain experienced during the 1914-18 conflict (Wood 1992, 16). In 1925 the geographical structure was resurrected as a direct consequence of increasing European tension (Clarke 2009); by July 1936, a four command system was

introduced by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Observer Corps became, via the Air Ministry, part of the newly formed Fighter Command (Armitage 1995, 72). The ROC (the suffix 'Royal' was bestowed in 1941) stood down in May 1945, only to be called back to duty 18 months later. Tension in Central Europe led to restructuring, influenced by ever improving radar coverage, the increase in numbers of high performance fighter aircraft and, later, the hydrogen bomb (in 1955); all affected subsequent changes to the physical landscape of the organisation.

The fluidity of the organisational structure poses challenges as there is no county distribution of ROC sites in the traditional sense. Moreover, the sector and group layout, crossing authority boundaries in almost arbitrary fashion, forces the investigation of specific landscapes on a less than regional footprint invalid (fig.5-1).



Map of ROC sectors and groups

Fig.5-1. Map of ROC sectors and groups, note that current county boundaries are not recognisable. (Scientific Intelligence Officers' Operational Data Book, 1964, HMSO)

There is, however, another opportunity for investigating the landscape of the Royal Observer Corps that, importantly, allows for the retention of much of the organisation's reporting structure throughout the Cold War period. The sampling of sites for this thesis subsequently relies on another Cold War landscape, the Home Defence Region, specifically Home Defence Region 7 (HDR7). HDR7 comprises seven counties (Cornwall; Devon; Dorset; Wiltshire; Gloucestershire; Somerset; Avon) , the majority of which, crucially, have extensive coastlines. Coastlines provide a definitive boundary to the research area, simplifying the area of interest. Furthermore, the entire reporting structure of the organisation - everything from ROC post to Sector Headquarters - is available for scrutiny if this approach is adopted.

Home Defence Regions

The Home Defence Region (HDR) layout used in this thesis has its origins in post-World War I Britain during a time of increased political tension both in Britain and Europe (Cocroft *et al* 2003,197). By the mid-1930s, the rise of political extremism across the Continent had forced the British government to start an ambitious re-arming programme (Morgan 1992, 552). A key focus of this programme was the manufacture of aircraft and construction of aerodromes. With the threat of large scale devastation across British cities inflicted by fleets of enemy bombers, the government revisited the HDR. The premise was that London would be a likely target in any future conflict and a concerted effort by the enemy could reduce or remove central government control for extended periods. Accordingly, the geographical landmass of the United Kingdom was divided into 12 areas, designated as Home Defence Regions (HDR). Any disabling of central government, via ordnance damage or invasion, would be countered by devolving power to a Regional Commissioner who was located in a protected location within each HRD (McCamley 2002, 153). The network was stood down in 1945, however, as tensions grew over the blockade of Berlin (through 1948-9) by Soviet forces the British government renewed both its Civil Defence commitment and the Home Defence Region network (Fig.5-2) (Campbell 1982, 114). Throughout the remaining Cold War period, the HDRs changed little, save the inclusion of Dorset into HDR7.



Fig.5-2. Map of Civil Defence Regions (England and Wales) and Zones (Scotland). Note this map is prior to Dorset being moved to Home Defence Region 7. (Scientific Intelligence Officers' Operational Data Book, 1964, HMSO)

The Sample Utilised Within This Project

Demonstrating specific behaviours enacted on Royal Observer Corps posts requires a sample size that provides a degree of geographical separation between ROC posts; Home Defence Region 7 adequately provides for this. It comprises both the primary study area (Devon) where a total of 53 posts were constructed, and secondary study area (Wiltshire), comprising a potential 20 posts. Importantly, both counties are geographically separate reducing the potential for similar groups interacting with posts in each area. A number of ROC posts in the five remaining counties encompassed by HDR7 have also been recorded as they have been encountered (Fig.5-3). ROC post recording in these five counties has been driven by the activities suspected or known prior to the visit, for example C-17 Veryan Post,

Cornwall. Here there is a complex history of ownership and presentation, including tensions between a local group and the local authority.



Fig.5-3. The Home Defence Region layout for early 1980 overlaid with the ROC Group Footprint of the same period. (HDR map from Community Adviser Training Course, 1983, HMSO. Group overlay in pink after Wood 1992, 251)

Furthermore, Home Defence Region 7 contains the entire hierarchical organisation of the Royal Observer Corps and United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO), offering an opportunity to study command and control up to, and including, governance. This is important as only when the entire structure of the organisation is considered can a fully contextualised picture of activities be understood in any detail.

Examples from counties outside Home Defence Region 7 – primarily in Yorkshire – have been limited to those that display multi-period activity. This includes a monument sequence comprising at least an Orlit post and Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP) as well as those located within archaeologically sensitive areas such

as Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire. Here an Orlit and UGMP are built into the top of an Anarchy Period siege mound (Parishes: Pickering 1923) and have subsequently attracted statutory protection (National Monument No: 32662).

THE LANDSCAPE OF CONTROL

The control of the Royal Observer Corps was the responsibility of two radically different government organisations over the period of the Cold War. From 1947 to 1955, the Air Ministry utilised the ROC in a supplementary role, deploying the war-proven skills of the organisation to plug a radar gap. It would be a decade before the network of radar stations were well equipped enough to provide total coverage across the United Kingdom (Hansard: Henderson 1951, text block 247 – 248). In this period the Royal Observer Corps was controlled via an organisational structure reminiscent of that used during World War II. From 1947, Group Headquarters were often located in redundant operations buildings, recently vacated by the Royal Air Force (Group 10, Exeter was housed in the ex-RAF sector operations room at Poltimore Park), or original purpose built wartime structures such as that at Knavismire, York (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 174).

UKWMO

In 1955 the Home Office introduced a new organisational structure, the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO). It was to provide confirmation of a nuclear strike on the United Kingdom, warn of imminent radioactive fallout and advise national authorities accordingly. The UKWMO was a scientific body comprising staff from the Meteorological Office, a range of government and volunteer scientific officers and representatives from the armed services, the utilities and government. The Royal Observer Corps, with its distribution of posts across the United Kingdom, became the Field-Force of the UKWMO. In 1957, the entire network experienced a period of upgrades, including the relocation of posts and Group Headquarters (ROC 1989, 7). The first new Group Headquarters became operational at Maidstone, Kent in 1960; 31 locations were originally identified, although by 1960 this appears to have been reduced to 29 (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 187). There were a number of designs, and in some cases old structures were, again, reused. Within the thesis sample area three Group Headquarters were in operation: Group 10 Exeter (1961); Group 11 Truro (1963); and Group 12 Bristol (refurbished

Anti-Aircraft Operations Room 1959). The surface structure located in the town of Truro was demolished in 2003 (Lawrence Holmes *pers commm* 2010) (Fig.5-4).

Fig.5-4. Group 11 Truro in the process of demolition in 2003. (Image courtesy of Lawrence Holmes)

Extant Landscape

At this time the Southern Sector was administered from a redundant Anti- Aircraft Command bunker at Lansdown; 4 kilometres north-north-west of Bath, Avon. Anti-Aircraft Command was under the control of the Royal Artillery. By 1951 a mixture of 684 fixed and mobile anti-aircraft gun positions had been readied across the United Kingdom organised into 33 Gun Defended Areas (GDA) (McCamley 2002, 114; Cocroft *et al* 2003, 147). In all but a few cases, each GDA was provided with a new, semi-sunken Anti-Aircraft Operations Room (AAOR). The organisation was disbanded in March 1955 as the concept of shooting down invaders into British airspace with shells had become increasingly discredited, due to the increasing height and speed of military aircraft by this time. The AAOR at Lansdown thus stood empty until the Home Office restructuring of the ROC Southern Sector in 1958. Until then the Sector had been commanded from RAF Rudloe Manor, Wiltshire, part of the vast government complex at Corsham (McCamley 2002, Phimester and Tait 2014). The Lansdown site was remote, although in this case, owes more to the original location of the structure than it does pre-planning. Whilst there appears to be no reference to the site on Ordnance Survey maps prior to 1960, the headquarters is recorded a decade later as a 'Royal Observer Corps Operational Headquarters' (Fig.5-5). In the early 1980s a suite of offices for the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) was built – a requirement of the 1979 Home Defence Review – to house new computerised equipment.



Fig.5-5. Ordnance Survey map extract from 1972. The Royal Observer Corps facility is clearly noted. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

A site visit on 23 May 2012 for this project revealed that little survives of the original fixtures and fittings, save a display board utilising a number of map panels and a brief description of the structure's previous history. The air conditioning system ducting from the original 1950s AAOR is extant, as are later additions on the roof of the bunker, including a plinth for a Ground Zero Indicator. The site was substantially refurbished in 2005 by the Avon Fire Brigade (Fig.5-6); it now houses a suite of disaster training scenario classrooms and theatres. The adjacent structures once occupied by the UKWMO are now home to the offices of the Brigade. Hierarchically, Lansdown was the central point to which all information from Truro (Group 11) and Exeter (Group 10) would flow.

Fig.5-6. Lansdown, Avon. Southern Area UKWMO Headquarters and ROC 12 Group Headquarters looking north. The original AAOR is central to the image with the grey roof. The later UKWMO offices are to the left of the image. (Source: Bob Clarke 12/06/2006)

Exeter, Group 10 Headquarters

Exeter Group 10 Headquarters is situated in a well investigated rural landscape (Creighton, Cunningham and French 2013). It is located on a minor road from Pinhoe, Devon towards the hamlet of Poltimore. The site is multi-phase, comprising both World War II and Cold War structures, with further buildings in the immediate environs. The Royal Observer Corps Group 10 headquarters was, from 1947, housed in the redundant RAF Sector Operations Room, originally connected to RAF Exeter (Fig.5-7). When the Group was provided with a new protected surface structure in 1961, the wartime site was retained for training and office space. At the time of the site visit for this project (08 August 2012), both structures were in use as recreational facilities, owned by a paintball company.

Fig.5-7. The Ex-RAF Sector Operations Room at Poltimore Park. The building was used by the UKWMO and ROC as No. 10 Group headquarters until 1961. (Source: Bob Clarke 08/08/2012)

Structure

The Home Office-designed protective structure (completed by 1961) measured 32m by 13m in plan and was double storied at the centre to accommodate the control room. Entry to the structure (Fig.5-8) was via a decontamination room and then to a central corridor which runs the entire length of the building. To the left were the domestic rooms (dormitories, toilets, restrooms), whilst the operational aspects of the structure lay to the right (control room, communications, plant room). Group 10 headquarters retains some features contemporary with the operation of the ROC warning and monitoring function. These include tote boards (Fig.5-9) in the control room, and the diesel generator and filtration system is in situ in the plant room. Much of the structure has been damaged by fire or the effects of smoke, some walls have been punched through and paint from the current use is evident across the site.

Fig.5-8. Entrance to Group 10 Headquarters at Poltimore Park, Devon. Note the pseudo-military reuse of the site today. (Source: Bob Clarke 08/08/2012)



Fig.5-9. Tote boards survive at the Group 10 Headquarters. Each number signifies an UGMP. 50 denotes Modbury, one of the posts studied in this project. (Source: Bob Clarke 08/08/2012)

Visibility in the Landscape

The Sector headquarters at Bristol is difficult to see from any other vista than above (Fig.5-6), although it is clearly marked on the Ordnance Survey map once the site is signed over in 1958 to the Home Office (Wood 1992, 268). The Group headquarters at Poltimore Park, Exeter can be seen clearly from the M5 but is itself on a minor road. This suggests that when it was first designated the site would be fairly secluded. The Group headquarters site in Truro was close to the centre of town and could not possibly be hidden in any way. Exeter and Truro Group headquarters are correctly depicted on map sheets dating 1967 and 1968 respectively (Fig.5-10 and 5-11). A number of trees are noted at Poltimore Park (fig.5-11), which appear to surround the site, possibly shrouding it from view. However, a site visit on 29 January 2015 noted that the trees were too dispersed to be intended to obscure the structures inside the compound from view. Interestingly this topic was discussed by Cocroft *et al* who discovered the majority of trees were planted specifically for their aesthetic value (2003, 242) rather than obstructive qualities, as had been originally thought.



Fig.5-10. Truro Group 11 headquarters 1967. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

We are subsequently presented with a dichotomy. This project is investigating heterotopias in a Cold War landscape; surely then it cannot be expected that sites so overtly placed in the landscape – especially when located in the centre of town – a component of this project. In reality, this is an example of the Cold War suggesting a restricted space yet offering no hint as to the activities enacted within. Access was restricted to such sites, ensuring only those initiated into the activities required by the British Government in pursuit of its own political remit were allowed entrance.



Fig.5-11. Exeter Group 10 headquarters 1968. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

All components of the Royal Observer Corps facilities were surrounded by security fences. Out on the underground monitoring posts, a 122cm (48inch) high chain link fence enclosed the site. The fencing comprises two inch square, galvanised, wire supported by three strands of galvanised wire themselves supported by square concrete posts with a rounded top. An entrance gate allows entrance to the sounded space, these are often constructed using angle iron, although there are a number of locally manufactured examples. Those fences encountered through fieldwork are

very reminiscent of stock proof fencing, enclosing a space and deterring visitors from entering, although not totally excluding them visually.

The fencing around Group Headquarters was a far more substantial structure. This time it was 244cm (96inches) high, with the final 30cm projecting forward away from the compound, acting as a deterrent to climbing. The same galvanised chain link as on the UGMPs was used for the vertical aspect, although the projecting aspect comprises three strands of barbed, or later, razor wire. This type of fence is a clear physical barrier to those who wish to enter; the height of the structure and the final projection exerts an authority on those standing close to it; even the view of the facility beyond is partially obscured by the chain link and signs declaring this a quasi-military installation. Considering the taskscape element of this formalised landscape Tim Ingold reminds us:

> '- it is important to note that no feature of the landscape is, of itself, a boundary. It can only become a boundary, or the indicator of a boundary, in relation to the activities of the people (or animals) for whom it is recognized or experienced as such.' (Ingold 1993, 156)

When we consider the role of the security fence in an urban location, a number of tensions can be identified. Despite the height of the fence is it cannot remove the visual aspects of those structures and activities enacted within the confines of the barrier. Utilitarian structures around the compound have a view into such regulated spaces, as does anyone passing by the entrance or fence. Indeed, facilities located in such urban settings hint at 'overt subterfuge' – a classic representation of a heterotopic environment – that 'other space' as Michel Foucault notes (1967).

Naturally, this does not apply to all command aspects of the Royal Observer Corps and UKWMO structures, although it can be recognised as to why this is. Southern Sector headquarters at Lansdown, Bristol and Group 10 headquarters at Poltimore Park, Exeter are both remote sites and thus their level of public visibility is subsequently reduced. Exeter can be seen from the main arterial roadway from, and to, the south-west (the M5 motorway), yet is physically located on a minor road; therefore, only local traffic would have encountered the structure during pursuit of their own activities. Bristol is even more secluded, situated 700m down a single lane track and would require a concerted effort to view, encounters were even less likely here. One benefit of such seclusion has manifested itself in the preservation of the

group headquarters nationally. Those sites within urban areas have – in many cases –been demolished as the land they stand on has a very high commercial value; structures dispersed in the landscape tend to be utilised in other ways.

This overt landscape of command, displaying itself through Ordnance Survey maps, large monolithic concrete structures and substantial fences, is not restricted to the Royal Observer Corps; rather such structures came to symbolise the Cold War and Britain's intent (more accurately by 1960, the machinery of government) to survive a nuclear strike. The next section explores the landscape of the Orlit post, the first structural type to appear on the landscape that was specifically designed with aggression from the Soviet Union in mind.

THE LANDSCAPE OF THE ORLIT POST

The Orlit Visual Reporting Post, or Orlit post as the structure quickly became known, is one of the few monuments connected with the Cold War that provides the researcher with an opportunity to investigate a defined chronological period of the organisation's life cycle. The post design (there were two versions), purpose and operation was so specific that those surviving as landscape monuments today do so virtually without modification. Moreover, the Orlit post stands testament to the speed at which technologies and, to a lesser extent, organisations could, and were, rendered redundant by scientific breakthroughs during the Cold War arms race. Surprisingly, this was often at the point of their introduction or very soon afterwards. In the case of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) the operational usefulness of the aircraft monitoring role was less than a decade, and within that decade the Orlit post saw just five years' service.

Importantly, the Orlit post bridges the gap between the regeneration of the Royal Observer Corps in the immediate post-World War II era, defined as an 'age of innocence' where the atomic bomb was still upheld by many as a credible and acceptable component of the 'free world's' arsenal (Newhouse 1989, 52). And, as Albert Wohlstetter noted in his work in 1959, 'The Delicate Balance of Terror' became imposed on the world by the development of the immensely more powerful hydrogen bomb. However, the structure also presents a number of problems for the researcher. Their use as a platform for aircraft surveillance and reporting is not in question, despite the fact that some parts of the Orlit post's life-cycle remain unattended to through the current literature and published accounts of the ROC.

Were the structures manufactured in the same place or at a number of sites across the United Kingdom and, more importantly to this project, what was the criteria used to decide whether a Type ‘A’ or Type ‘B’ post appeared in a particular landscape? Moreover, how were the structures seen by the observers operating on later, underground monitoring posts on the same site, can we recognise remembrance in this instance?

The Structure

The Orlit post was a simple structure manufactured to a standard design. Precast concrete slabs were pinned or bolted together to produce a rectangular box 3.05m by 2.03m in plan (10ft by 6ft 8in). Access was via a wooden door leading into a small covered area 1.52m high by 1.06m wide (5ft by 3ft 6in). This area acted as a shelter from the elements, an equipment store and also housed the communications board, basically a telephone and place to hard-wire headsets used for real time plotting. To the immediate right of the entrance was a sliding door providing access to the observation platform. The platform was open to the elements, although it was covered by a corrugated, removable, tin roof when not in use. Central to the observation platform was a square plinth comprising four sections of angle iron bolted into the concrete floor, providing rigidity to a surrounding timber cladding. On top of this structure the post instrument was mounted and used to plot the bearing and altitude of suspicious aircraft. Two variations of the structure appear on the landscape: Type ‘A’, constructed directly onto a concrete base at ground level (Fig,5-12) and Type ‘B’, standing 1.82m (6ft) above ground on four precast concrete legs (Fig,5-13). In total, 413 Orlit posts were erected in almost equal numbers, 207 Type A; 206 Type ‘B’, across the United Kingdom (Cocroft *et al*. 2003, 175).

Fig.5-12. An Orlit Type ‘A’ at Farnham 2/N.1, Surrey. Observers visually tracking a pair of Gloster Javelins acting as intruders on an exercise in 1958. (Original picture taken by Press Associates 1958; Image now part of the author’s collection)



Fig.5-13. Diagram showing the internal arrangements of a Type ‘B’ Orlit Post. (© English Heritage Permission No: 2937 22 March 2013)

Messrs. Orlit Ltd, Manufacturer?

In early 1951, the Air Ministry requested tenders from industry to provide the ROC with a purpose-built structure. It had to be capable of sheltering crews from the wind, while also providing a stable, level platform from which to mount aircraft tracking equipment. Current literature has it that the contract was awarded to Messrs' Orlit Ltd, Colnbrook, Buckinghamshire (Wood 1992, 206; McCamley 2002, 125; Cocroft *et al*. 2003, 175). Moreover, the suggestion is that posts originated from one central point, being delivered in sections for ease of transportation to a wide range of locations (ibid 2003, 175). This is somewhat deceiving as a number of Orlit posts surveyed during research for this thesis display subtle differences. The problem requires expansion if we are to fully appreciate the Orlit post landscape and explain the archaeology that remains extant.

Messrs' Orlit Ltd, proficient in the construction of precast concrete structures, had manufactured air raid shelters and emergency housing during World War II (Kohan 1952, 428). In the immediate post-war period, the company under the *Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Act 1944, as amended by Section 5 of the Buildings Material Act 1945,* provided a large amount of replacement housing, utilising precast components. In total, the Act made provision for a number of construction contractors to build 158,748 houses (ibid 1952, 428). Designed by Czech architect Erwin Katone, the majority of Orlits were built in Scotland where – crucially - the company had a production plant (Grinrod 2013, 33). Housing construction was, at the time, high on the government's agenda with companies courted by eager politicians:

> With regard to the prefabricated houses I welcome the Orlit Company. I have been able to aid them in getting their factory at Edinburgh and in securing for them a licence for a factory near Glasgow. They are now in negotiation for a fairly large contract from my native city. I want to see them succeed in their work in Glasgow, because they are part of my efforts.
>
> HOUSING (FINANCIAL PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL Mr George Buchanan, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Labour.
> *HC Deb 19 March 1946 vol 420 cc1698-818*

By the time the Air Ministry had decided to provide a number of posts with new facilities in the early 1950s, Messrs. Orlit Ltd was a substantial government contractor. Assembly of the Orlit designed structure started in 1952 and was finally completed by mid- 1955 (Wood 1992, 207; Cocroft *et al*. 2003, 175). By 1955 over 1500 ROC posts were back in action, 413 of them with the new Orlit post structure. It is accurate to suggest that the posts were supplied as a 'flat pack', although logistically such heavy objects must have been manufactured in, and delivered from, more than one location. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the manufacture of Orlit posts must have been contracted out to a number of local construction firms. One such instance of contracted manufacture has come to light. The Melton Constable Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Works, Norfolk made a number of pre-cast concrete items for its own business (NRM 2007), including a number of Orlit post panels (Stephen Wright *pers comm* 29 September 2014). This assumption can be tested through the surviving archaeology. As described earlier the sample for this thesis is geographically wide-spread. Subsequently a number of small regional variations were noticeable during recording. While the majority of concrete panels utilised in the construction of the Orlit post bare no markings a small number do indicate a method of assembly.

Reminiscent of carpenters' marks often encountered on timber or stone structures (Brunskill 1999, 35), at least two examples display information for those who would later assemble the structure in the field. Those marks executed using a finger in the wet concrete cast provide a possible tracker for the identification of other Orlit panels manufactured at the same place. Unfortunately, they convey little other information (Fig.5-14). The stencilled identifications found at Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire allow us to deduce some of the circumstances surrounding the manufacture of posts by contracted civilian organisations (Fig.5-15). The majority of panels at Y-3 Pickering display a stencilled code, either: OPR; OPR2; OP1; OP2 or OP9, it is clear OP represents Observer or Orlit Post. If this is the case then those manufacturing the panels would have, generally, understood the role of the ROC. This represents a level of initiation into the organisation by those who were not actually members of the ROC. This can be interpreted as a further component of Foucault's heterotopia when considered alongside wider society (1967). When studying the lifecycle of the Orlit post there is clearly a connection between manufacturer and operator. However, the role is unlikely to be one of mutual understanding. More likely, the manufacturer

understands what the role the components they are making will play in the nation's defence. However, they could not fully describe the activities enacted within the space of which those component parts form once assembled.



Fig.5-14. D-44 Teignmouth, Devon. Orlit Type 'B'. Floor planks bearing two distinct marks. 'F' and 'B', both capitalised and executed using a finger in the, still wet, concrete cast. (Source: Bob Clarke 10/07/2014)

Fig.5-15. Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire. Orlit Type 'A'. Stencilled panel markings to aid assembly. (Source: Bob Clarke 07/06/2014).

The Question of Positioning

The Orlit post poses a further significant question in so much as there are two variants, the Type ‘A’ and Type ‘B’, recognisable within the current archaeological record, yet what was the decision process that influenced the positioning of one or other type at a certain landscape location?

Unfortunately, the extant landscape record is not complete enough to suggest trends between one or other post type. Almost two decades ago Colin Dobinson, through sponsorship by the Council for British Archaeology, produced a series of reports covering much of the known archaeological footprint of the Cold War (1998). Using documentation covering the distribution of Royal Observer Posts in support of the construction of a new radar network, Dobinson identified two locational arrangements: Elevated Post Required or Ground Level Post Required (1998, 174). No reason for the choice is noted, and the text contains a number of inaccuracies, for example the Type ‘B’ post at Teignmouth does not appear in the post record. Furthermore, there is no definition in official papers to suggest how many Orlit posts were actually constructed in the current project area, further exacerbating the situation. The Devon Historic Environment Record utilises Dobinson’s earlier work alongside that of Wood’s (1992) and so forth, cannot be considered complete due to the inaccuracies this project has recognised during the current research. A search of The National Archive and contact with the Royal Observer Corps museum has currently revealed nothing of consequence. Moreover, published work avoids the question with astonishing briskness (Wood 1992; Dobinson 1998; Cocroft *et al* 2003; Dalton 2011). This is not to be unexpected, especially as it appears that the relevant documentation has not survived. One notion is clear: when investigating the surviving archaeology, there appears to be no clear reasoning as to which post type is located where it is.

The extant landscape evidence, slight though it is (just ten posts in the project area), demonstrates the problem. At G-1 Rodmarton, Gloucestershire ROC post 3/B3 was identified as requiring an elevated Type ‘B’ post (AIR 20/10699). In 1954 a Type ‘B’ post was constructed at NGR SU 937 985 (Fig.5-16). Topographically, the post is located in an area that is, in the main, uniformly flat. To the north the ground rises 10m every 500m on average, whilst to the south it drops away at a rate of 20m every 400m (Fig.5-17). Elevating the observer platform does, in this instance, allow for

better 360° visibility. A post at ground level would have to contend with hedge rows, which if close to the post could hamper the possibility of locating and tracking low flying aircraft. The landscape context is, therefore, central to the decision to erect a Type ‘B’ post at his location.

Fig.5-16. G-1 Rodmarton, Gloucestershire 3/B3 Type ‘B’ Orlit post. (Source: Bob Clarke 31/12/2010)



Fig.5-17. Contour map of area surrounding G-1 Rodmarton 3/B3 (Red Cross in centre). The post has almost uninterrupted views around 360°. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

At D-19 Holsworthy, Devon ROC post 11/B1 was identified for relocation in 1952 (AIR 20/10699) including the provision of a ground level Type ‘A’ Orlit post; the new structure was built in 1953 at NGR SS 352 040 (Fig.5-18). Topographically, the post sits at 168m OD and has clear, uninterrupted views across 270° for at least 9km. The only high ground lies to the west of the post, although with the nearest coast 10km to the east it is probable that this direction was the most important focus for the observers manning the post (Fig.5-19). Clearly then a Type ‘A’ ground level post was adequate at this position.

Fig.5-18. Type ‘A’ Orlit post 11/B1 located at Holsworthy, Devon. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011)



Fig.5-19. Contour map of area surrounding Holsworthy 11/B1. The post has almost 270° views. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

The previous examples appear to work when the topographical aspects of the landscape, interact overtly with the visual aircraft reporting remit enacted by the Royal Observer Corps during the early Cold War. Where the topography is fairly flat an elevated post appears appropriate. Those posts situated on the highest sections of ground in the area do not need additional elevation and so are provided with a ground level post. Unfortunately, not all appear to conform to this thinking; although, when considering the geographical surroundings of an Orlit post reasons for type choice become clear. The most striking examples of counter-intuitive locations/types are D-44 Teignmouth, Devon and Y-2 Holme-on Spalding Moor, Yorkshire.

The Type 'B' situated at Teignmouth, Devon, designated ROC post 10/V4 was built in 1953 (AIR 20/10699) at location NGR SX 917 751. The post has commanding views around 360°, extending at least 7km in any direction; the reason for this is because the post is located on the highest point in the area – taking this into consideration why does the post require an extra 1.82m? The post looks out across Babbacombe Bay and the mouth of the River Teign which provides a straight inland route for just over 6km. This also provides low flying aircraft with an inland entry possibility, using the high ground on either side of the river as cover. When this is taken into account the reason for a Type 'B' Orlit post being chosen for this position becomes clear.

The topography for the first 100m in the direction of the river and coastline is such that a ground level post's view would be obscured by it. To ensure an unobstructed view of probably the most critical observational aspect the post, and more importantly the plotting equipment, was raised a further 1.82m from the ground.

This hypothesis can be further explored when considering the landscape position of the Orlit Type 'B' at Y-2 Holme-on-Spalding Moor, Yorkshire. Designated 18/R4, the Orlit post was erected on an existing wartime site known as Beacon Field sometime after November 1953, at NGR SE 822 387 (Wood 1992, 319). Views from the post appear unobstructed; only in the east does ground stand higher than the post although it is 7km distant. Over 270° there is an uninterrupted view of over 15km.



Fig.5-20. View from Teignmouth Orlit post Type 'B'. The River Teign can be clearly seen. Reducing the height of the post by 1.82m allows the topography in the foreground to obscure this. (Source: Bob Clarke 10/07/2014)



Fig.5-21. Holme-on-Spalding Moor visual obstructions if an Orlit Type 'A' had been erected. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Again the answer as to whether a Type ‘A’ or ‘B’ was selected lies in the immediate area the post is located within. Beacon Field, as the name suggests, has clearly been a point of reference for some time prior to the erection of the Royal Observer Corps posts. Topographically, Beacon Field is a flat geological feature formed by a remnant of the Mercia Mudstone Group. It extends 500m north-south and is 300m at its widest point, the post is located on the highest spot at 46m OD (Fig.5-21). If a ground level post had been built at Beacon Field substantial views to the north would have been obscured, therefore a Type ‘B’ Orlit post ensures clear views in the north-east to north-west sectors are uninterrupted. Also areas to the south are more visible including the River Humber, Goole and Hull which are all important industrial targets.

So it would appear that the immediate surroundings of a post, tied to topography and key landscape features, drives the type of choice for one post over another. It also demonstrates the tactics expected to be employed by enemy aircraft. A clear thought process can be demonstrated here, one that suggests each post site was visited and an assessment of the key, low flying entry points, topographical cover and industrial targets taken into consideration. Certainly, Wood notes that around 300 sites were moved during the 1952-55 upgrade period (1992, 208). If this is accurate, and there is no reason for dispute, then the topographical location and type of Orlit post chosen is a direct consequence of developments in aircraft tactical information and ability.

I propose that the selection of sites for Orlit posts was carefully considered, it also demonstrates a specific type of threat, the fear of low-level incursions from aircraft utilising, where possible, topographical aspects of the British mainland. Moreover, the Royal Air Force had requested a regeneration of the ROC, post-World War II, to carry out the aircraft reporting role, due mainly to the issues with radar development. Again, topography was the main issue as aspects of the radar development programme (*Operation Rotor*), in the 1950s, were still struggling with low-level detection (Gough 1993; McCamley 2002). Considering all this I can now say that the type of Orlit monument located in the field is a direct reaction to the air threat considered by the local topology, this explains the apparently counter-intuitive choice of Orlit post encountered during this project. It also strengthens my argument that monuments constructed during the Cold War do not readily conform to the notion of a first and second Cold War demarcated by the years of détente.

It is clear then that the Orlit post is a useful indicator of the technologies employed by both sides in the Cold War. The construction techniques of the Orlit post mirror the post- 1950s, a period which contained a drive for accommodation utilising, where possible, concrete (Grinrod 2013) This had two implications. Firstly, concrete provided a normalising effect on the structure's outward appearance, especially when encountered by the general public. And secondly, when considered within a chronological context, the Orlit post lies within a closed system (Foucault 1967). Here rites of admission are required – signing the Official Secrets Act – and the population in the 1950s still worked on a 'need to know' basis. Subsequently, the Orlit post site became a closed taskscape of the ROC; one in which a series of activities confined to those dictated by rules and regulations were enacted. Interestingly, whilst the activities were bound by official military legislation the primary activity was anything other than covert. As I have demonstrated, to gain the maximum visual coverage it proved necessary to exaggerate the height of a number of the reporting platforms on the landscape. An additional 1.82m elevation of a post hardly reduces the structures visibility, yet there appears to be no recorded examples of damage caused to posts in this period. Nor did any of the personal histories recorded for this project reveal anything. The manufacture of component parts also appears to have been a dispersed activity. Whilst the structure, especially while in those component parts, does not hint at a particular function, the fact that a number of posts have been noted with assembly marks stencilled on them suggests the function of the component parts was known.

GOING UNDERGROUND

Whilst the Orlit post network of the Royal Observer Corps presents an overt presence on the landscape, concerned primarily with aircraft reporting, what came next was in complete contrast. Certainly by the mid-1950s, it is known that the race to develop an air-deliverable hydrogen weapon had seen both East and West in possession of a potential to completely destroy each other (Newhouse 1989, 80). That success was to radically change public opinion and Government preparedness. The latter manifested itself on the landscape as acts of subterfuge, exemplified by the construction of structures underground for the preservation of the machinery of government (Campbell 1982, 263). This activity was increasingly viewed as deviant

by members of public - an activity born out of crisis, the Cold War and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, when Foucault suggested heterotopias (1967) – that 'other space' - he might well have had bunkers in mind. This next section investigates the archaeological evidence for the change driven by the development of the hydrogen bomb; essentially a move – for the Royal Observer Corps - from overt to covert activities that was technologically driven.

The Shock of the Strath Report

In 1954, the British government committed to developing a hydrogen weapon; if the country was to remain at the world 'top table', there was no alternative (Oulton 1987). Unfortunately, until this became a reality it was clear Britain would have a weapons gap, the question was what threat would such a gap represent? William Strath was commissioned to chair a committee exploring the threat posed to Britain by this alarming new development in mass destruction (Grant 2010, 90). When the 'Strath Report' was published in 1955, it portrayed a picture of a country devastated by a small number of the new weapons. The report identified a relatively newly recognised phenomenon responsible for this – radioactive fallout. Most troublingly there appeared to be nothing that the government could do to stop this most dangerous of effects (Hughes 2003). The most the country could hope for was adequate and timely warning in advance of the radioactive cloud. Accordingly, Strath proposed the formation of a monitoring service with a national distribution along the lines of the Royal Observer Corps, throwing the redundant organisation a life-line (*ibid* 2003, 167).

The proposal could not have come at a better time for the ROC as the plotting of aircraft across the refurbished network was becoming increasingly difficult to control. A series of exercises in 1954 and 1955, demonstrated that low flying aircraft were now operating at such speeds that the observers abandoned instrument plotting and use estimation only (Wood 1992, 216). Often an aircraft would appear, pass over the observation post and be behind the next visual obstruction before a true bearing or identification had been obtained. The problem was that the ROC had been brought back into existence to complement the current radar coverage. Unfortunately, breakthroughs in radar development were constant, often rendering reporting tactics redundant. In another example of technology influencing the archaeology, the radar network developed in the immediate post-World War II period, was all but redundant

by 1954 (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 87). Advances throughout the rest of the decade further removed aspects of the ROCs aircraft reporting roles by 1955, it was clear the role, and the organisation, was redundant.

> Mr. Ian Harvey
>
> Asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is yet able to make a statement upon the Government's plans for setting up a national monitoring organisation to give warning and to measure radio-activity in the event of air attack on the United Kingdom.
>
> Major Lloyd-George
>
> Yes. I am glad to be able to inform the House that arrangements are being made for the Royal Observer Corps, in conjunction with the Air Raid Warning Organisation, to undertake this important new function in addition to their existing duties.

> 15 June 1955, Written Answers (Commons), CIVIL DEFENCE
> Radio-Activity (Warning Organisation)
> *HC Deb 15 June 1955 vol 542 c18W 18W*

Discussion surrounding the requirements needed for the Royal Observer Corps to assume a nuclear reporting role had been initiated in April 1955 (Dobinson 1998, 137). The realisation that observers would need a new purpose built structure to remain safe and functional was self-evident, as the current post structures provided no protection from blast or radiation. By August 1955, architects at the Ministry of Works had designed the basic shape of an underground structure intended to house instrumentation and at least two observation crew for at least two hours in lockdown (*ibid* 1998, 138). By May 1956 the crew requirement had been increased to four. A prototype was constructed at Farnham, Surrey in May 1956; designated 2/C1 the post was used for all early equipment and lockdown trials (Wood 1992, 312) (fig.5-22). Unfortunately, this important Cold War monument was demolished sometime between 1998 and 2003.



General view of the new type shelter from above ground, showing (left to right) the air vent, the probe shaft and the entrance.

Protected Accommodation for R.O.C. Posts

THE SHELTER described here is only a prototype, but these accounts and illustrations are designed to keep members of the Corps abreast of current developments. The main aim of these shelters is to provide adequate protection to post observers on duty from the hazards of radioactive fall-out.



Close-up of the twin entrance doors. Notice the chains, which are to prevent the weights from pulling the doors fully open.



Inside the shelter, looking in from the doorway: there is adequate room for the pair of two-tier bunks, store cupboard and other furniture.



Looking towards the door from the other end of the shelter: beyond the centre of the doorway is the hand-pump which disposes of any water entering the shaft.

27 JANUARY 1957

Fig.5-22. An article from January 1957 that appeared in *Flight International*. The post depicted is the prototype built at Farnham in Surrey. Note that it has a radically different entrance hatch to all others surveyed for this project. (*Flight International* 1957)

The Underground Monitoring Post

Construction of the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP) structure had to be undertaken completely on site. Where the geology permitted, posts were completely buried, although semi-sunken examples are evident within the sample area (Y-1 Bridlington, North Yorkshire; D-39 Sharpitor, Devon; W-7 Sutton Veny, Wiltshire and W-12 Cricklade, Wiltshire). The construction method was simple; a hole was dug deep enough to ensure the post ceiling was covered with at least 1m of earth. This was often achieved using a mechanical digger, although, on occasion, explosives were used due to the underlying geology (Wood 1992, 223). A number of techniques were then used to create the main, monolithic, concrete box. Construction workers laid a concrete floor 5.8m by 2.6m (19ft by 8ft 6in). Reinforcing steel rods were then built up along the wall line before being shuttered with either wooden panels or a rough brick construction. Following that concrete was poured until a height of 2.3m (7ft 6in) had been reached. A roof was laid, again using shuttering, and the vent and entry point cast. Holes were cut in the roof for the Bomb Power Indicator, Fixed Survey Meter and telephone cable entry point before the whole structure was coated in a thick layer of pitch intended to keep out moisture. Finally, the structure was re-buried (fig.5-23).

Fig.5-23. The finished structure prior to applying the pitch coat to waterproof the structure and then reburial. Note the instrument pipes attached to the roof. Unknown post. (Courtesy of The Royal Observer Museum)

Imagery showing the construction process has been difficult to locate, as are details of who actually built the structures out in the field. However, a chance encounter with a family member has shed light on at least one UGMP site. The post being described here is Cayton, North Yorkshire 20/P3. The post was moved to this location in 1961 and then provided with a protected post in March 1964; the post was closed as part of the Civil Defence drawdown in 1968.

> "We were contracted, I think, by the Borough Council [Scarborough] to build a bunker over at Wheatcroft, sometime in the early 1960s. It was basically a box – about the size of a caravan – shuttered and poured in three days. It was then blathered with large amounts of road pitch to seal it up before we buried it. The whole job took about a month."
>
> Alec Bayes, 12 December 2012.

The construction effort was conducted on a massive scale. Over 1500 overground aircraft reporting posts were already in operation across the country; the problem was that not all were in the correct place for nuclear reporting. The new reporting role demanded 1,563 posts, which nearly all required a new Underground Monitoring Post. The average cost of each structure was put at £1,250, although on a number of sites the geological conditions required more than a pick and shovel to excavate, pushing the costs up considerably (Wood 1992, 223).

Field research for this study has identified 53 sites in Devon where Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP) were initially constructed. The first secure reference to an UGMP in Devon is D-35 Plympton 10/Q1 (NGR SX 560 510), constructed in April 1958 (Wood 1992, 285). Fieldwork for this project has noted Plympton has subsequently been demolished. The final UGMP was commissioned in July 1964 at D-36 Plymstock 10/J2 (NGR SX 498 518) (HER Mon. No. 72368). This post was located 200m east of Staddon Fort, a Victorian period structure operated latterly as a communications centre for the Royal Navy. It too had been demolished by the time of the project baseline survey (2011). There is one anomaly in the Devon record that is perpetuated through all currently located records. Wood, Dobinson and the Devon HER (Mon. No. 72347) all note D-39 Sharpitor 10/J1 as having an UGMP provided by April 1953. Although it has been demonstrated here that the first underground structure in the United Kingdom was built in May 1956, a 1953 date is not, therefore possible. It is more likely Sharpitor had an Orlit post constructed here in 1953 –

certainly there is archaeological evidence to support an Orlit Type ‘A’ being present on Peek Hill just a few metres south-east of the current, partially demolished, UGMP.

Landscapes of the posts

The new nuclear reporting role demanded a high level of restructuring, especially in the field. Conveniently, the distribution of underground monitoring posts required to establish an effective network broadly resembled that that had been devised in 1953 for aircraft reporting. Subsequently, the majority of posts were retained, Cocroft *et al* suggest this was as much to do with problems acquiring land as with distribution (2003, 180). Certainly, fieldwork for this project has identified a number of multi-phase sites, including a palimpsest at D-20 Brixham, Devon that demonstrates the last three monument changes in one landscape; displaying the lifecycle of the ROC from July 1940 to stand-down in 1991. Brixham is the focus of a case study below.

The Orlit post concerned itself with observation, a notably overt undertaking (in this case), the Underground Monitoring Post, while still interested in the observation of phenomena, promoted an air of subterfuge. The surface features are slight and unremarkable, displaying an air of functionality that can be easily misinterpreted. The fieldwork conducted here has not discovered any posts depicted on the Ordnance Survey in Devon under their actual use; indeed, where they do appear, it is either only the fence around the post that is illustrated or, more interestingly, or noted as a ‘Covered Reservoir’, adding to the feeling of deception considered by many to be a classic trait of the Government (fig.5-24 a and b).

The fact we see many structures annotated as reservoirs is clearly suggestive of a will to mislead or hide the true intention of posts out in the field. The question is – is this an intentional act? From the 1960s it became increasingly common to update Ordnance Survey maps via information obtained through aerial surveys. It is possible that the ROC post looks, to all intent and purpose, like a small reservoir and were interpreted as such by the Ordnance Survey team, although if this was the case then it does not adequately explain why some posts do not feature at all.

Fig.5-24 a. G-1 Kemble 3/J3 UGMP and 'reservoir' designation. (Source (Left): Bob Clarke 31/12/2010) (Source (Right): Map © Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)



Fig 24 b. D-41 Stockleigh Pomeroy 10/D2 UGMP described as a 'Covered Reservoir. The map actually depicts the compound fence. (Source (left) Bob Clarke 01/04/2013) (Source (right) Map © Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

More likely these omissions or mislabelling demonstrates a tension in the landscape between the public and the Government. A number of enquiries to the Ordnance Survey have revealed nothing, although it is clear that there must have been such a policy, a cursory glance at a wide range of military sites demonstrates this.

The large Group Headquarters, as it has been seen, appear on the map with plenty of detail. Their physical presence is undeniable, especially in an urban setting. To 'miss-interpret' these sites would simply confirm the public's suspicions. Out in the field, the opposite is true. ROC posts were locked whilst unattended, however the determined 'visitor' could easily break in. Once the hatch had been breached the

whole post was vulnerable, as they were full of the equipment required for service. Furthermore, in an attempt to insulate the posts against the cold, many had polystyrene tiles covering the walls and ceiling. A number of observers who provided information for this project noted vandalism on sites by members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). This resulted in the destruction of a number of posts by setting them on fire. Once the fire took hold – supplied with oxygen via the ventilation stack – everything inside was quickly destroyed. The majority of ROC posts were located in extremely rural settings and interference was probably a major concern (fig.5-25). Considering the geographical location of the underground posts, we should view the exclusion of the posts from the Ordnance Survey map an act of government sponsored subterfuge. This subterfuge is more likely intended to reduce acts of interference linked to CND or other peace orientated groups than because the site is llinked with mass destruction and defence.



Fig5-25. C-17 Veryan post 10/P2 Cornwall three miles from the nearest settlement. A fully rigged UGMP. Note there is no compound fence around this site. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/10/2011)

Reporting an Event

The underground monitoring post had a number of reporting functions. It recorded the direction and height of the nuclear flash via an instrument known as a ground zero indicator as well as recording the amount of radioactive fallout present through a fixed survey meter and the power of the blast via the bomb power indicator. Surprisingly, the majority of posts were serviced by overhead telegraph wires on traditional telegraph posts, the network only being 'hardened' (buried General Post Office (GPO) cables) on the mid-1970s. Subsequently a number of telegraph poles across the landscape often terminate at the site of a now demolished post, serving as markers to redundant technology that was, for a time, at the forefront of the nation's defence. Each post formed part of a cluster (fig.5-27), usually three or four other sites (map below), and within this group one had a VHF radio, in case the GPO network failed.

Information was passed directly to the Group Headquarters, where it was assessed, triangulated with information from other posts and the results plotted on large back lighted perspex screens. From here, the information was distributed to a number of other agencies (see fig.5-28 below for full diagram), including the Regional Seat of Government, local authorities, military departments and warning and broadcast systems run by the BBC and local police (fig.5-26).

Fig.5-26. Police Officer operating the public warning system. On the flick of a switch powered sirens in the local area would operate. The information required to initiate them came from the observations taken on the underground monitoring posts. (Source: HMSO Dd 085337 Pro 11/76)



Fig.5-27 Map depicting UGMP clusters locations as of 1982 across Devon and Cornwall. This layout prevailed until stand down in 1991. (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)



Fig.5-28. The communications network serviced by the ROC and UKWMO in 1976 (red rectangles indicate ROC activities) (HMSO Dd 085337 Pro 11/76)

Underground monitoring posts present us with yet another conflicting landscape. They are the most widespread and numerous of archaeological features on the British Cold War landscape, and large numbers survive. They also appear to be – outwardly – the most difficult to interpret. Surface features are non-descript, offering a utilitarian interpretation. This is hinted at by at least one official body, the Ordnance Survey (discussed above). The ROC posts' often secluded position in the landscape presents those who encountered, and continue to encounter them, with a tangible link to the horrors of nuclear warfare. They are also the most fragile of monuments. It is interesting to note that structures designed to withstand such destructive force are now being consumed by the weather, vegetation and individual acts of vandalism (fig.5-29).

Fig.5-29. W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire. Located within a World Heritage Site, Avebury post has, since stand-down in 1991, steadily succumbed to weather, vegetation and human destructive actions. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012)

Currently those visited for the fieldwork are in varying states of repair. A number are currently under private ownership, while others are in the last stages of collapse or are heavily vandalised. The details of the states of abandonment and their archaeological implications are the subject of chapter 7, while in chapter 6 the landscape of nuclear warning and monitoring will be integrated with the activities

enacted on them by the volunteer observers. What follows is an examination into the levels of archaeological inference that can be applied to underground monitoring posts that had been destroyed prior to this project. Working with the Ordnance Survey publications and a number of local and national websites and publications it is now possible to navigate this once secret taskscape (Ingold 1993). The fieldwork conducted here encountered a number of sites where all vestiges of the ROC had clearly been removed from the landscape.

Demolished Underground Monitoring Posts

The fieldwork conducted here has recorded a number of ROC posts in various states of preservation. The majority of these can be adequately explained through the 'Order and Chaos' model, presented in chapter 4. However, one - demolition or the deliberate act of removing a post - is the most obvious of activities recorded at many of the sites in Devon. In this county alone 39 ROC posts out of 53 constructed have been destroyed. While the focus of this project is on surviving monuments, and interactions enacted with them, it is clear that the majority of ROC Orlit posts and underground monitoring posts (UGMP) had, by the start of this project (2010), been removed from the landscape. Orlit posts survive in small numbers (four in this survey), often where a later UGMP was constructed at the same National Grid Reference. Additionally, when considering the UGMPs, the more remote a site, such as D-47 Whitestone 10/N.4 (D-47), the more likely the ROC post survives. As explained previously, the process of constructing an UGMP required a substantial amount of groundwork, an activity that might offer an opportunity to locate recently removed posts. The desk-top survey was unable to ascertain whether or not all posts were extant, subsequently visits were conducted to an additional twelve sites where posts were suspected. All but two sites (D-16 and D-45) were completely devoid of any surface indications. This section demonstrated that while surface features may be removed, utilising a number of other remote sensing techniques, it is still possible, in some cases to recognise the original positions of UGMPs. ROC posts D-13 and D-45, are used as case studies to demonstrate this.

D-13 Five Barrows, Exmoor, Devon

Five Barrows Hill is located on the eastern edge of Exmoor, in the parish of North Molton, Devon. The crest of the hill contains a grouped cemetery comprising nine

round barrows (8 bowl and 1 Bell), also a trig pillar is located in the top of the highest barrow, recording an elevation of 491m above sea level. The area is designated a scheduled ancient monument (1003183). Dobinson records an Orlit post being built on the hill in April 1954 but omits the type (1998, 202), while Wood notes an UGMP becoming operational by September 1959 (1992, 284). The post was closed as part of the civil defence reduction, initiated by the Labour government in 1968.



Fig.5-30 The post at Five Barrows in 1976, eight years after closure. Note both the Orlit Type A and UGMP are extant (Image No. CBO013 ©Cambridge University Collection of Aerial Photography)

Map regression provided no clue as to the actual location of the post, nor the presence of any other related features. A site visit, conducted on 1 May 2011, gave no indications as to a possible location. In this instance aerial photographic records provided far more interesting results. Images from the Cambridge University Aerial Collection (fig5-30), depict the post before demolition. It is clear from the image that an Orlit post Type ‘A’ was built at the site. Furthermore, it was retained when the UGMP was constructed. Interestingly the outline of a rectangular fence line is visible,

along with a soil discolouration from the excavation of the pit to construct the UGMP in. A search of the National Monuments Record (Swindon) aerial collection produced a false colour image taken on 7 March 1979, depicting both the Orlit and UGMP as shadows (fig.5.31). By 28 August 1989, the date of the next available aerial survey, these structures had been removed. The visual information was used to interrogate the current Environment Agency Geomatics database. A positive response contained within the LiDAR data depicts a feature at the same point as the location of the, now removed, post (fig.5-32).



Fig.5-31. False colour image taken on 07/03/1979 showing both the Orlit post and UGMP (Red box). (SS7336/5/89 – NMR SF1460)



Fig.5-32. The scar left by the removal of the UGMP at Five Barrows, via LiDAR imagery. (SS7336nw DSM 50cm, The Environment Agency)

D-45 Torquay, Devon

The ROC post at Torquay was situated close to a minor road, to the north-west of the A379. It was not possible to say with any degree of accuracy whether the post was extant at the time of the baseline survey; subsequently a site visit was conducted on 25 May 2011. The baseline visit discovered that there was no evidence for an Orlit post and that the UGMP had been a non-standard layout. The main structure of the ROC post, now removed, was constructed in the corner of a

steep sloping field, in which views to the north and east were unobstructed. However, those to the south and west were totally obscured as the UGMP had been constructed 7m below the crest of the hill (153m above Ordnance Datum) (fig.5-33). To counter this the visually dependant instrumentation, the ground zero indicator, was placed on a brick plinth 27m south-west of the UGMPs former location. The plinth is 1.5m high and still extant in the hedge line. Six concrete steps leading up to the plinth survive; the GZI holdfast also survives, however, there is no evidence for the UGMP or its former position on the ground. Map regression located one depiction of a compound fence line in 1993 (fig.5-34), just after the posts closure in 1991 (Wood 1992, *addendum xi*). Interestingly the LiDAR tile covering the site of 10/G.2 Torquay depicts the structure as extant (fig.5-35).

Fig.5-33 10/G.2 Torquay photographed in 1993. Note the position of the post in relation to the topography. Arrow indicates the ground zero indicator plinth in the higher hedge line. (Richard Sirley).



Fig.5-34 Post 10/G.2 Torquay (arrow) depicted on the 1:10000 1993 Landmark Information Group (© Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Fig.5-35 The UGMP 10/G.2 Torquay depicted via LiDAR imagery. (SS9211se DSM 50cm, The Environment Agency)

The Potential of the 'Lost Landscape'

The two case studies, albeit simplistic, demonstrate that by using a number of resources it is possible to recognise features that depict the location of a now removed ROC post. The position of the ROC post at Five Barrows has, until now, been reported incorrectly; original positions, due to findings at Torquay, can also be inferred by the use of earlier records. The obvious potential here is the possibility of populating landscapes with earlier – lost or invisible – features. Five Barrows Hill is well known for its prehistoric landscape; it clearly also played an important part in the defence of the United Kingdom throughout the Cold War. To fail to acknowledge that presents an incomplete picture, and therefore interpretation, of the land use of the hilltop, it also reduces the accuracy of any characterisation study.

COMPOSITE LANDSCAPES

One noticeable aspect of the sites included in this fieldwork has been the number of posts that have made use of earlier military sites. Ten sites were of at least two phase construction (Orlit and UGMP), but it is when exploration occurs regarding the environs beyond the chain link fence that a real possibility to discuss some behavioural aspects of the defence landscape presents itself. This last section introduces two very different landscapes with exactly the same activity in mind. It argues that, irrespective of technology, one activity always underpins the defence network in the United Kingdom - observation.

D-6 Berry Head, Devon

D-6 Berry Head, overlooking Brixham harbour is the site of numerous listed military structures (Fig.5-36). Additionally, there are two scheduled areas, Berry Head Fort and battery and Hardy's Head Battery, scheduled in 1950 (SAM 29694/01), and The Old Redoubts, scheduled on 14 March 2000 (SAM 29695). It is a popular local area with many visitors throughout the year. Berry Head Fort comprises structures from a long period of military activities; the fort was originally built in 1780, during the American War of Independence and later refurbished as response to continued threats from the French, under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte (Pye and Slater 1990).



Fig.5-36. The density of military remains can be seen on this LiDAR image. Inset Orlit post (prominent square in centre) and the underground monitoring post (a very low mound indicated by arrow). (SX9456 DSM 1m, The Environment Agency)

In World War II, the site had a coastal battery installed along with the establishment of the first of a number of observer related structures in July 1940 (Wood 1992, 284). The ROC post was stood down in May 1945 but was quickly regenerated in 1947 as the infrastructure at the site was built of brick and concrete. In 1953, the post was designated 21/J3 and provided with a Type ‘A’ Orlit post. What is interesting here is that the Orlit was constructed on top of the wartime post, the extension allowing for

visual clearance of the immediate topography. In 1960, the post was refurbished with an underground monitoring post, which subsequently closed in September 1991 (*ibid* 1992) (Fig.5-37). The entire landscape is scheduled, including now all aspects of the Royal Observer Corps facilities.

Fig.5-37. The three phases of Royal Observer Corps structures represented at Berry Head, Brixham. (13/06/2011 Bob Clarke)

Berry Head comprises over 250 years of military use. The landscape is one primarily of observation. The early forts were not there for a show of reactive force, nor were they constructed in an effort to conceal themselves in the landscape. The World War II facilities are similarly overt in their visibility, as is the lighthouse on site from 1908. The principle is similar when considering the Royal Observer Corps. Two posts concerned with observation of aircraft are replaced by a post dedicated to witnessing the effects of a nuclear detonation. While the UGMP may be a buried structure, an act of concealment and thus suspicion in the public's eyes, is not true. The posts and their attendance crews were buried for protection from the effect of nuclear weapons, the role is still one of observation.

Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire

Pickering Town, North Yorkshire surrounds a motte and bailey of at least Norman date (Steane 2003, 147). The castle is segregated from another, similar, feature by a

small river known as Pickering Beck. The feature, known locally as Beacon Hill, is a probable siege castle connected to the reign of King Stephen (1135-1154). The period was marked by civil war and it is thought that the mound is connected to an unrecorded siege of Pickering Castle during this period (Parishes: Pickering 1923) (Fig.5-38). The mound was scheduled on 22 March 1962 (SAM 60349).



Fig.5-38. Pickering Castle and Beacon Hill are plainly seen in this LiDAR image. Inset (top left) white arrows depict Orlit (bottom centre) and underground monitoring post (centre) Other medieval features including a wide market place and ridge and furrow are also noticeable. Inset Orlit post and UGMP. (SE7984 DSM 1m, The Environment Agency)

Beacon Hill was one of the earliest of the pre-world War II observer posts to be set up by the Air Ministry. The first structure was located on top of the motte mound in January 1937. The post was upgraded with an Orlit Type ‘A’ in 1953 and received an underground structure in November 1961. The post closed in September 1991 (Wood 1992, 320) (Fig.5-39). The mound is scheduled as are the Orlit post and Underground Monitoring Post.

Fig.5-39. Two phases of construction at Beacon Hill, Pickering, North Yorkshire. (07/06/2014 Bob Clarke)

Beacon Hill provides us with an interesting suite of monuments – all intended for a similar purpose. The role of a siege castle is, primarily, to observe the enemy’s movements. Clearly the site has been used as a visual reference point, hence the name ‘Beacon Hill’ and there has been a succession of ROC posts covering almost the entire lifecycle of the organisation. Again all activities have been connected with observation.

Both Berry Head and Beacon Hill provide us with examples of similar practices connected to potential political tension and subsequent warfare over extended periods of time. For both sites there are periods of relative calm before the next

threat arises. However, when it does authorities return back to the old landscapes. This connection with past organisations, especially those undertaking the same operation, must have an effect, through remembrance and physical connection, for subsequent observer's needs.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter demonstrates that the Royal Observer Corps has a complex landscape archaeology. It is clear that we cannot consider the organisational footprint as following a standard military layout. Diversity appears in the Group headquarters, Orlit posts and subsequent underground monitoring post. The organisation is one of paradox, with members being sworn to secrecy via an initiation into the group through the signing of the Official Secrets Act, whilst it inducted more and more members into the periphery of its activities. This heterotopia manifests itself through the manufacture of Orlit posts, and, one presumes, the construction effort that covered the underground monitoring post network and the Group headquarters, all, it has to be remembered, built by private companies. Tensions are created in the countryside, especially once the ROC moves to the reporting of nuclear detonations. Tensions are also created in towns where substantial Group headquarters structures are situated, although, in this instance to try and hide the group headquarters when they were in plain sight would only have increased tension with the public.

The landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps also hints at a defence landscape that has a deeper level of antiquity. The re-use of field monuments and previous, defence related, landscapes surely ties the observers into a historic landscape, one where remembrance is key. This remembrance after stand-down in 1991 has been evident in research for this project. What follows investigates the role played by the observer in the life-cycle of the organisation and the Cold War. It is also the first step in humanising a landscape that today is one of almost total diversity. From this point on the research will concentrate on the field monuments of the organisation (Orlit posts and underground monitoring posts) as the group headquarters footprint lacks enough numbers to be useful.

CHAPTER 6: THE LANDSCAPE OF THE OBSERVER

INTRODUCTION

The study of contemporary archaeology challenges us to co-habit the same intellectual space as historians, sociologists and other, human based, disciplines. This is especially important if we are studying a period located in recent memory. The previous chapter explored the physical remains of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC) relating to the Cold War. It identified a number of facets. While the organisation is recognised in the literature discussing the Cold War, especially when focussing on the United Kingdom, the life-cycle of those who operated the posts, the volunteer observers, is not. Subsequently, we have a dislocation between the monumental landscape, the organisation's material culture and the observers who enacted thousands of hours on duty at the many ROC posts distributed across the British Isles.

The landscape of the observer does not readily lend itself to scrutiny. While the previous chapter discussed the landscape of ROC posts and the reasons for positioning and choice of structures, what the evidence cannot easily do is place human activity into that landscape. At the time of stand-down (30 September 1991) at the end of the Cold War, 12,500 volunteer staff were working across nearly 800 ROC headquarters and posts, mostly spare-time volunteers (Clarke 2005, 152). The nature of the clandestine world they occupied means that beyond the extant monuments (Orlit posts, underground monitoring posts and group headquarters) the archaeological landscape of the observer is almost undistinguishable from the acts of the public around them. However, using aspects of Tim Ingold's taskscape (1993) and the 'order and chaos' model I have developed it is possible to reconstruct the observer's landscape, thus offering a framework to which a number of aspects of both voluntary service and membership of highly ordered organisations can be adhered.

Once that landscape has become 'visible' the process of recognising activities not bound by the regulations governing the ROC becomes clear. Only then is it possible to laminate the landscape of a highly ordered organisation, differentiating it from activities being enacted around it. Once that point is reached all activities outside that organisation should also be recognisable. This chapter intends to demonstrate that the members of the ROC are, in some instances, just as visible a feature of the twentieth century landscape as the monolithic structures often associated with

nuclear warfare. To achieve this aspects of the observer's operational life-cycle will be evaluated and categorised according to models by Ingold (1993) and Foucault (1967).

TOWARDS AN IDENTIFIABLE LANDSCAPE

To experience the landscape of the observer, one first has to understand the environment in which they operated, the political climate and, most importantly, the motives, both personal and nationalistic, under which volunteers elected to place themselves on the front line of the Cold War. The life-cycle of the organisation is explained elsewhere (chapter 3); However, activities that require direct interaction between observer and landscape are introduced here. Utilising the responses to the ROC targeted survey initiated for this project (full results can be found in the appendices) I have been able to map activities that are organisation centric and contained within certain specific, controlled, landscapes, juxtaposing them with more overt tasks that bring the ROC into clear contact with the general public.

To do this requires a reconstruction of a multi-faceted landscape, especially when considering the number of ROC posts investigated for this project. To adequately discuss the landscape of the observer requires a recognition that, while the organisation remains essentially the same across the total post-World War II life-cycle (1948-1991) - a voluntary uniformed force operating to a strict series of regulations - the activities and environment in which their tasks were enacted changed dramatically towards the end of the 1950s. To simplify the discussion surrounding the landscape of the ROC it is convenient to continue with the two phase approach utilised in the preceding chapter of this thesis. Phase One (pre-1960) deals with the overt, over-ground aircraft reporting role, while Phase Two (1960-1991) considers the underground, covert nuclear reporting role.

Following Earlier Footstep

The origins and remustering of the organisation after World War II is described in detail in chapter 3, When the wartime ROC was stood-down on May 7, 1945 many observers expressed an interest to re-join should the need arise (Wood 1992, 182; Clarke 2005, 139). It was not long before the intentions of the Soviet Union became clear, especially its plan to retain, through satellite states, a buffer between it and the West. Moreover, by 1948, these intentions had started to destabilise the reconstruction efforts of the West, especially in Germany (Clay 1950; Clarke 2007;

Judt 2005). In contrast the immediate post-war period in the United Kingdom was one of rapid reduction. Much of the infrastructure concerned with Civil Defence and other voluntary organisations – including the ROC – had been dismantled by 1946 as Britain moved into a period of austerity and increased rationing (it was not to end until 1954 (Morgan 1990, 124). So when the decision was made to reform the ROC in 1947 (Wood 1992, 193) and events in Central Europe drove the passing of the Civil Defence Act (1948) the call for volunteers was met with a certain amount of apathy. The Air Ministry had a vested interest in the reinstatement of the observer network as the radar network project, Rotor, was far behind schedule and constantly required updates to keep the pace with advances in radar development. Naturally this was not outwardly promoted; rather the growing threat to our shores by 'enemy' aircraft was the headline (Wood 1992, 199). Moreover, the connection with aircraft was emphasised, playing to the recently demobbed serviceman, original members of the corps and the young who, even though they had experienced the horror of war, were still excited by the prospect. Those who became members were inducted back into a world dominated by aircraft – stimulating the needs of many who joined at that time. Recognition training, visits to live RAF flying stations where air experience flights were arranged and exercises utilising low level flying were regularly part of the observer experience. The issue of uniforms cemented the volunteer's will to belong to a specific group while social activities interspersed with formal meeting evenings further immersed the observer in the required activities.

Phase One: The Landscape of the Orlit Post

The 'Cold War' Royal Observer Corps, by now under the control of the Air Ministry, required 1800 observation posts equally distributed across the whole of the United Kingdom. From these posts, a mix of locally built architectural types often dating to the early Second World War period, ROC crews visually scanned the skies from the horizon to vertically above the post; they also listened, as often the sound of the aircraft's engines was the first indicator that an intruder was in the area. In 1951, the Air Ministry requested tenders from industry to provide the ROC with a purpose-built structure capable of sheltering crews from the elements, while still providing a steady level platform for tracking instruments. Over the next five years (1952-1956) 413 Orlit Posts, as the structures became known, were constructed where existing World War II buildings were deemed unfit (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 174). The Orlit Post is the first

structure designed and constructed in the British landscape that has a purely Cold War origin.

Those Who Served

Interrogating the ROC survey results it is possible to suggest that the motives for around one-third of those joining the organisation was an interest in either aircraft or a connection – maintained or by association – with the armed services. Of phase one (pre-1960) respondents, around two-thirds cite these two reasons for joining. This may sound encouraging, unfortunately the number of respondents who served during phase one only made up 12% of the total completed survey forms. Moreover, those who indicated they were involved in the aircraft reporting role did not elucidate their activities, moving instead to a more detailed description of their responsibilities during phase two (1960-1991).

This reveals something of the complexities we encounter when interpreting contemporary archaeology. To ensure there is a level of accuracy in the interpretation of both monuments and landscapes – especially defence related – a number of avenues are available, usually site visits and operational records. Although this does not adequately explain the role of those who spent time on the post, for that we must make use of Tim Ingold's *Temporality of the Landscape*, specifically the taskscape element (1993).

Nationally, the Orlit Posts are poorly represented and, subsequently their physical remains are difficult to interpret without an understanding of the function. Over half a century since they were abandoned it was not surprising to discover that all seven Orlit Post visited as part of this project retained very few, and often no, original features; indeed, the situation is such that in some counties there are no extant examples. The remains of Orlit Posts across the sample area were no more than four walls enclosing a rectangular area 3.05m x 2.03m, and a small covered area with a few wooden battens screwed against the wall. The enclosed walls provide no hint as to the structures' intended function, nor the operational aspects of the tasks undertaken within the walls. It is to these earlier structures that I now turn. The following case study applies Ingold's thoughts on hills and valleys and people – specifically sight and sound – to the study of the Royal Observer Corps' role in aircraft identification and reporting (1993, 166).

Aircraft Reporting (1950s) - Sight

Of all the activities undertaken by the Royal Observer Corps throughout the Cold War one remained constant: observation. Up to the late 1950s visual and audio aircraft reporting was the primary task, post-H bomb the key function remained observation even though the corps members had moved underground. Both can be explored through Ingold's work. If we consider the taskscape of the observer in 1954, armed with a pair of binoculars, scanning the skies for invading aircraft, a range of parallels become clear. Each post was positioned in an elevated location, making use of the surrounding topography to increase the vantage point. Ingold (1993, 166) discusses the hills and valleys, in this particular case the limit of the observers' field of view, as a kinaesthetic experience where 'the contours of the landscape are not so much measured as felt'. The task of visual detection is not a static one; it requires motion by the participant. The ROC post is placed centrally to a section of landscape; it is then the observer's job to monitor the surrounding area. This requires movement through 360° at the horizontal and 180° vertically from horizon to horizon, effectively a dome of observation above the ROC post. The observer moves head, eyes, arms and body through any combination and direction in a search for aircraft and in so doing experiences the hills and valleys on the horizon. This concept, then, adequately describes the activities of the ROC when in the aircraft reporting role. Unfortunately, it does not provide for the piece of sky that the observer is scanning. For convenience I now introduce 'the skyscape'. The skyscape is that area of sky that is bound by the horizon and ends directly above one's head. To experience the skyscape one employs Ingold's kinaesthetic model (1993, 166) however, the experience of the hills and valleys is secondary to the utilisation of the space known as skyscape. Hills and valleys have no meaning for the observer beyond limiting the field of vision, the role of the observer is to monitor 'in' the sky. This concept is underpinned by the fact that aircraft, by their very nature, also inhabit this space when flying. Subsequently any hostile aircraft over the United Kingdom would have been operating within an ROC post's skyscape, with an observer at the centre of each ROC post. So the taskscape of the observer can be recognised if we apply the additional concept of the skyscape, a workplace above the landscape. This is appropriate as the ROC was not concerned with any terrestrial activities, although the terrain does limit the extent of the activities they are monitoring.

Aircraft Reporting (1950s) – Sound

Aircraft, by their very nature, are noisy; they are also recognisable by their engine note, a rather obvious example being the Rolls-Royce Merlin and its long association with the Spitfire. The mere sound of the Merlin stirs emotions well beyond the technological interpretation, visions of war, patriotism and bravery are associated with the note. It is also chronologically 'charged' as often the Second World War and, more specifically, Battle of Britain are instantly associated with the experience. This phenomenological aspect should not come as a surprise, indeed Kirby notes 'Our perception of things and events, experienced, interpreted, and then communicated to others, form our history, our culture, our world' (2008, 23). Events then, can be re-visited through a number of mediums, sound being one such aspect. The medium of sound was another aircraft detection method utilised by the ROC and in many ways this was more important than the visual aspects of the organisation.

Ingold (1993, 170) notes that 'the air is full of sounds of one kind or another'. This rather obvious statement masks the true nature of the audio taskscape. Sound, unlike sight, is an all-encompassing experience. For example, you cannot see the car approaching from behind, but you can hear it; you may optically focus on the footballer scoring the goal, but you hear the roar of the attendant crowd when the ball hits the back of the net. The point is we are immersed in sound, it is a constant backdrop to everything we do, we may create sound, like the drop of a hammer in a workshop, but it is accompanied by all the other sounds being generated in that same workshop.

The recognition and identification of an engine note was a critical part of the observers' role. Unless the aircraft was travelling at supersonic speeds, which would have been unlikely in the early 1950s, the engine note aided estimation of the height and direction of the approach. The observer would then search that quadrant of sky to visually detect the incoming aircraft. While the aircraft, if detected, becomes the visual focus of the observer, they are still immersed in 'localised' sound. Ingold (1993, 170) suggests that the entire cacophony, everything from village voices in the distance to those eating under a tree next to you, is a taskscape. While this might be correct as a generalised snapshot for someone traversing the countryside or walking through town, it does not allow us to recognise nor adequately explain the specific activities of a specific group. When considering the ROC observation tasks in the

audio sphere it is appropriate to refine his proposal. There are two specific regions of audibility: Low Level – immediate background sound, and High Level – task-focussed sound.

Low-Level

Low-level sound is the sound we are all immersed is as we undertake our daily activities, or if we are carrying out a specific task. The sound could be task specific, in the case of the observer this might be the other members of the team making a cup of tea, operational chatter between team members, from the group headquarters via a loud speaker, or the clanking setting up equipment. It might as easily be the passing car or the conversation between a member of the public and one of the observers. One post in Devon is located on a golf course; this too would introduce task–specific sounds for those playing, juxtaposing with the sounds from the post generated by the observers. The point is low-level background noise, conforming to Ingold's thoughts on the matter (1993, 170), does indeed offer a taskscape, it is however, a backdrop to the lives of those who hear it. To those engaged in the minutiae of the process, all those generating the small components that become the whole, all other sounds are also background noise, and so are filtered out subconsciously.

High-Level

High-level sound is that that can be directly attributed to the primary task of the organisation, group or team. In the case of the ROC this is the engine note of the aircraft, but might well be the call of another observer drawing the attention of others to a specific location in the skyscape. The engine note is being specifically hunted out by the observer; all other sounds in their immediate location are subconsciously filtered out. Once located the observer uses visual references to report the aircrafts' location, heading and height. The important point to make is that the observer team may not visually spot the aircraft; however, the engine note information will still be passed forwards as it too provides direction, type and rudimentary height readings.

It is appropriate to say that Phase One in the life cycle of the observer is a period of overt activities and that all tasks were undertaken in plain sight of the public. The post may have stood in a specific compound (Fig.6-1), but the activities enacted here would be well known, especially coming so soon after the end of World War II,

indeed on more than one occasion an encounter with a member of the public while recording an Orlit Post brought forward a World War II interpretation for the structure.

Fig.6-1. The Orlit Post Type B, G-1 Rodmarton, Gloucestershire. Post 3/B.3 opened in April 1954. This post stands within its own compound. The observational aspect of the structure is clear. This site produced a World War II interpretation from a passing member of the public. (Source: Bob Clarke 31/12/2012)

Fig.6-2. Observers at an unknown Orlit post tracking a target. Both are interacting with the 'skyscape' around them. The Observer on the left wears the RAF Aircrew Wings demonstrating a connection with the services, both wear medals presumably from World

War II service as this image originates from the mid-1950s. (Source: Rosemary Victoria Ward)

The environment in which hostile aircraft operated in was also fully integrated with public life and, as I have already proposed, should now be considered a theoretical landscape, or, perhaps more appropriately, skyscape. Activities within the skyscape are bound to sensory recognition; sight and sound, be that mutually exclusive or combined (fig.6-2). What is interesting is that this interaction between sight, sound and environment was the primary reason for members of the public volunteering between 1948 and 1955 (four respondents noted aircraft spotting as a pre-organisation interest). Ergo the required life-cycle of the volunteer is served by the structures and activities presented after initiation, through the signing the Official Secrets Act. Considering other points, the chronological interpretation of the Orlit Post when first observed is often incorrect, usually ascribed to World War II, while the purpose is not, recognising that the structure is connected to observation. Moving onto Phase Two of the Royal Observer Corps activities during the Cold War brings new challenges for both the researcher and the public. Interpretations are complicated by unfamiliar structures and subterfuge perpetrated by both the organisation itself and other government departments.

Phase Two: The Move Underground

Throughout 1955-1956, a secret committee (later known as the Strath Committee) comprising senior civil servants and members of the armed services assessed the potential danger of a new and more powerful weapon, the H bomb. The committee concluded that a small number of the weapons targeted on the western seaboard of the United Kingdom would devastate large parts of the country, primarily through radioactive fallout (PRO DEFE 13/45). As a direct consequence of the report the aircraft observation tasks of the Royal Observer Corps were abandoned in favour of fallout monitoring. This change of role required new protected facilities, eventually over 1500 Underground Monitoring Posts (UGMP), were constructed across the United Kingdom. The UGMP was, where the geology allowed, buried at least 4m underground to protect a small control room (5.8 x 2.6m by 2.3m high) from blast and radiation. A number of instruments were located on the surface to monitor bomb power, radiation and direction and height of detonation. The post crew, usually three observers, telephoned the information, from the relative safety of their sub-terrainian hideout, to a group headquarters, who in turn informed the military and Home Office

of the developing situation in a given geographical location (Wood 1992; Cocroft *et al* 2003; Clarke 2005).

Almost all activities in Phase Two were carried out underground; the only tasks that were not included the initial running up of a manual air raid siren, and/or the firing of maroons to warn of approaching fallout. Everything else was operated remotely from the bunker below. With observers disappearing down a hatch in the middle of a field it is not surprising, given the political climate and level of awareness connected with the H bomb, that the UGMP attracted suspicion and rumour from the public. The activities above ground were enacted within a specific compound and although this demarcation was only a small, stock-proof fence (Fig. 6-3), it helped exacerbate the misconception of restricted, or encoded space (a suggestion by John Schofield 2011, 166).

Fig. 6-3. The compound fence at Avebury Underground Monitoring Post, Wiltshire, Post14/B.1 opened in June 1961. The compound fence is intended to be stock proof. I suggest It was latterly interpreted as concealing ‘deviant’ activities. Range Pole 1m. (Photograph Bob Clarke 17/11/2013)

By the mid-1960s a number of posts, usually one out of three, were equipped with a radio to reduce reliance of vulnerable telegraph wires (Wood 1992). Above ground the post was provided with a pump-up aerial mast attached to the vent stack on the post. This was, where possible inside the limits of the fence, some posts

demonstrate an extension of the fence to accommodate this (one example is D-41 Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon fig.6-4), the erect aerial further visualising suspected ‘secret’ activities.

Fig 6-4. D-41 Stockleigh Pomeroy Devon, 10/D.2 opened in June 1959. The dome fitted on the left of the vent stack maintained support for a large aerial. Earthing straps are also visible in case of lightning strikes. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013)

Underground Tasking

Operationally the tasks carried out by the observer differs little from that of his above ground counterparts. Key to nuclear reporting was the direction of the detonation, including height and strength. The same environment, the skyscape, is involved, however this time rather than eyes and ears, a pinhole camera, or Ground Zero Indicator (GZI), with graduated photographic paper is used (Fig.6-5). After the blast wave has passed over the post, indicated on an instrument called the Bomb Power Indicator (BPI), an observer ascended the steel ladder and replaced the used photographic paper in the GZI (Fig.6-6).



Fig.6-5. C-17 Veryan, Cornwall Ground Zero Indicator, Graduated photographic paper in the instrument. The dark smudge on the lower sheet is the passage of the sun. (Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2011)

Fig.6-6. Observer changing ground zero indicator paper on an unknown post. (Photograph by permission of the Avon Fire Brigade)

ROC #55 (No.2 Group, Horsham) provides a succinct account of the activities enacted on an underground monitoring post in the last few years of the organisations life-cycle.

> Monitoring radiation levels 2. Monitoring the BPI (Blast Pressure Indicator) 3. Changing the GZI papers (Ground Zero Indicator) 4. Changing water in the post 5. Charging the batteries 6. Decorating the post so it looked spic and

span! 7. Undergoing lots of training and drills 8. Taking part in national and local exercises 9. Going on camp (Fabulous experience) 10. Visiting the Luftmeldakorpset in Denmark 11. Monitoring and reporting the weather 12. Aircraft recognition training 13. Reporting diplomatic number plates on cars.

Once back inside the protected control room the height and direction of the detonation, as indicated on the photographic paper, would report in to the Group headquarters with the relevant information. Initially this was via a telephone system, later three posts were connected to each other via a 'Tell-Talk' system – the master post then radioing in the information (Fig.6-7).



Fig.6-7. Tell-Talk system at W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. This simple device allowed communication between posts and the headquarters at Winchester. It has three buttons – two connected to posts, the other to the headquarters . (Source: Bob Clarke 26/05/2012)

This wide range of activities is typical of the majority of responses provided by observers and demonstrates that, where possible, post crews could perform all activities, presumably to cover shortfalls in crew members in times of crisis. It also provides an insight into the number of activities that were motives for those who volunteered. The majority of tasks were undertaken either below ground or within the bounds of the post compound, restricting a chance for those outside the group to interpret the activities. Moreover, the observers, signatories of the Official Secrets Act, probably would not have told anyone who did ask – such was their commitment to duty. Indeed, 37.5% of all correspondents cited 'doing their bit' or similar as an important factor in joining. Interestingly a number of other activities appear in ROC#55's duties including reporting diplomatic cars and, while more mundane, probably more important – changing water in the post. This essential activity is an ideal vehicle to explore part of the observers taskscape, primarily because it

demonstrates that once outside the post fence, topography and location suddenly come into play, in some cases reducing the effectiveness of highly organised entities to a level of chaos.

Organisation on the Edge

On 31 August 1978 Southern Area Command, through each group headquarters, issued an 'Operational Procedures – Posts' order number 163/Ops. Operational Procedures (OP) covered changes to the regulations and orders that governed every facet of the volunteer observer's life while on duty. No activity was undertaken independently of an OP or specific operating manual, ensuring the standard level of recording and reporting remained identical across the United Kingdom. Headquarters No 10 Group, Poltimore Park, Exeter, subsequently issued the OP as 10G/163/Ops. It is the content of 10G/163/Ops that allows us to glimpse something of the observer's peacetime activities while on duty.

Operational Procedures – Posts

1. In the southern Area we are already working on a system whereby water containers at Posts are kept full by replacing one container of water on each occasion on which the Post is visited.

2. headquarters ROC has now established and promulgated the following standard procedure which is to replace that is use in the Southern Area. It will be noticed that the standard operating procedure achieves the same objective but differs slightly in detail.

3. headquarters ROC states that where practicable all Posts should establish a water supply which is as near to the Post as possible. Water containers should be kept full and the routine established whereby there is a regular replacement of drinking water every time the Post Crew visits the Post. The routine is to be as follows:

a. One container of fresh drinking water to be taken to the Post and left there – sealed.

b. The contents of one container of the general purpose water emptied away and refilled with drinking water which is to be replenished.

c. The empty drinking water container taken from the Post for return full of fresh drinking water on the next visit.

d. On mobilisation – all the water containers should be replenished if time allows.

e. All containers will have to be numbered or marked in a way which ensures each container is replenished systematically.

> 4. It is recommended that within the Southern Area – containers are marked by means of a tie-on label on which is noted the date of the last change of water. Reinforced tie-on labels are issued herewith.
>
> 10G/163/Ops, Operational Procedures – Posts, 31 August 1978 (Original document gifted to this project by former member of the Royal Observer Corps)

What is not indicated is the size of containers used to store and transport water to and from the ROC posts. A specific ROC post held seven water flasks, each with a capacity of 20L, or weighing in at 22kg (including the hard plastic 'jerry can') when full. At the majority of ROC posts across the United Kingdom vehicular access was no problem, water was transported to the entrance of the facility. Subsequently carrying out OP 10G/163/Ops became part of the daily life-cycle of the site, raising no little difficulty for the observers. Subsequently, the changing of the fresh water supply does not feature in the majority of narratives, nor any written account, of the day-to-day operations. On posts that were difficult to access with a vehicle the order was to become a rather contentious issue.

Avebury Post

The underground monitoring post designated Avebury, Wiltshire 14/B.1, later post number 16 (W-3 for this project), after the alpha-numerical system of post designation was abolished in 1982 (YEO/635/COMMS). It appears the ROC post, located some distance from metalled roads, and built on the top of a substantial hill, offered little opportunity to take a vehicle right up to the post. For the observers stationed at Avebury 14/B.1 the continual circulatory movement of fresh water was a constant source of disgruntlement. A topographical assessment of the landscape surrounding the post demonstrates why.

W-3 Avebury 14/B.1 is located on the summit of Waden Hill, overlooking the Neolithic henge enclosure to the north, West Kennett Avenue running from north-east to south-east and Silbury Hill to the south-west. The village of Avebury itself is located in and to the west of the henge enclosure. Just a few metres south of the ROC post there is a mound concealing a reservoir, and just to the south of that is a trig point with a value of 191 metres above Ordnance Datum.

When carrying out order 'Operational Procedures – Posts 163/Ops' – which incidentally required at least one can of water to be changed every two days – the observers were faced with one very obvious obstacle, Waden Hill itself. To reach the

post required negotiating the steep rise from either east or west (Fig.6-8). The following extract is from a discussion with a crew member of Avebury post in 1980s. The discussion took place on 20 March 2015.



Fig.6-8. The environs of Avebury underground monitoring post Wiltshire, Post14/B.1 opened in June 1961, latterly Post 16. Post 16 is actually depicted as a 'covered reservoir' on the Ordnance Survey extract. With a kilometre on foot from the carpark and a 400m walk up a steep gradient, the crew of this post must have been noticed by members of the public. (Crown Copyright and database rights 2016, Ordnance Survey (Digimap Licence)).

Interviewer (IV) – Where did you park when you were on duty at the post?

Observer (Obs.) in the carpark opposite the bookshop.

(IV) And the last question, did you have to take water to the site? And if you did was it carried manually?

(Obs.) Yes, we did. Several gallons was stored up there in jerry cans and was replaced every couple of days. We used to take it in a minivan up the back side of Waden hill and then carry it the rest of the way when the laws of physics resulted in wheel spin and no progress! By some lucky chance I only ever got involved in carrying water on a couple of occasions over a ten-year period.

(IV) So I take it it was not a popular duty?

(Obs.) Got it in one.

(IV) So was the drive up from the avenue end?

(Obs.) No, we went up the west side of the hill via the field entrance opposite the EH carpark on the A361. However, on occasions it came up the other side from the Avenue side.

(IV) I suppose what I'm asking is - was the avenue ever used either on foot or in a vehicle?

(Obs.) In truth I can't remember fully. I think we used to carry it up by hand. I don't remember him bringing his van into the Avenue but, that's not to say he didn't. I did take my motor bike up the Avenue once and parked it at the bottom of the hill leading to the post.

The activities of the observer during phase two of the life-cycle of the ROC, while the majority of the time, invisible to the public in a protected bunker do, in the main, mirror that of the phase one, above ground crews. Both phases are concerned with the monitoring, recording and reporting of activities that happen within the proposed skyscape.



Fig.6-9. W-2 Amesbury, Wiltshire. This label, with added lines in pen, was discovered inside the control room of the underground monitoring post. Left column 'WATER and 5 JUNE'. Right column 'Change'. Presumably it was originally tied to a water filled jerry can. This label demonstrates the fragility of artefacts connected with nuclear warfare. (Source: Bob Clarke 27/07/2016)

The move underground comes at a time when the true horrors of the new hydrogen devices are just becoming apparent to the public through pressure groups such as the recently formed Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in London on 17 February 1958 (Judt 2005, 255). Even the word 'protected' elicits a view of demarcation, further driving both the activities and, probably more important to those outside the organisation, the life expectancy of the observer further into the heterotopic states discussed by Foucault (1967). The most prominent of those being in regard to crisis and deviance, or deviation.

Comparing both proposed phases of operation then there are a number of clear parallels enacted by the post crews; this is not immediately obvious as phase two dictates activities out of sight of the public. Tasks undertaken by the Royal Observer Corps during phase one of the organisations life-cycle are overt, they are almost

immediately recognisable to anyone with experience of the British defence landscape in World War II, although the archaeology is not easily interpreted. Phase two, while similar in activity, contains much more heterotopic elements. Drawing together the concepts of hills and valleys, sight and sound we can suggest that Ingold does provide a framework from which further investigation into the behaviours of certain groups can be explored. This is specifically so when looking at the taskscape of secret organisations, in this case phase one of the Royal Observer Corp's life-cycle. The role of the observer in the defence of the United Kingdom was, as far as possible, a clandestine undertaking, requiring the volunteer to be inducted into the organisation through the signing of the official secrets act and attendance of official courses. Now, over two decades later, the majority of members still hold true to that official code of silence. Utilising Ingold's initial concepts it has been possible to expose something of the taskscape of the early Cold War observers. It is also true that with structures overtly placed in the landscape – especially in locations of prominence – those not initiated into the activities of the group can still reasonably, if not accurately, interpret the generalised concept of a given structures' utilisation. This is especially so when the interpreter considers the topography of the location. The study of the landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps in the pre-hydrogen bomb era (pre-1954) has also demonstrated that rather than blindly accepting or discarding concepts, we should be receptive to the basic framework they offer. Furthermore, we should not be afraid to complement such theoretical frameworks with additional concepts and observations.

POSTS AS 'WORKSPACE'

All workspace is constructed or demarcated, although all activities enacted within a workspace have the potential to change. This change could be for a number of reasons, be that political, social, environmental or driven by technology. The challenge is to identify the initial activities enacted within a certain space, only then can a true interpretation of the building, construct, space or place in society, be offered. Within a highly ordered organisation (see chapter 4) this can prevail for many decades, often masking changes within the wider group construct. We need to understand what 'workspace' actually means before we decide whether it is an appropriate vehicle to discuss the monuments of the Royal Observer Corps. For clarity this section will concentrate on the workspace of the post-Second World War in the United Kingdom.

Workspaces, by their very nature, are places of production, be that physical or cognitive, and they are usually, but not exclusively, distant from the home environment. A workspace is often an environment that contains many tensions, imposition of company values and rules over the social need of the occupant are a recurring theme in late twentieth- early twenty-first century Europe. During a study of recently vacated offices in Saville Row, London, John Schofield noted abandoned pot plants, the victim of '- a memorandum that the owners of the new accommodation forbade their tenants to keep them' (Harrison and Schofield 2010, 204). The point is workspaces appear to attract personalisation. The 'clutter' of personal life encroaches on work life in a myriad of ways, the most noticeable being photographs of family and friends, be that in frames, simply stuck on walls or, as microprocessor technology has irreversibly altered the way we use information, as screen savers or wallpaper. Subsequently tensions over what is either appropriate or not have risen over the last three decades, especially when considering racial or gender issues.

Within a highly organised organisation such as the Royal Observer Corp the issues of 'personalised workspace' were less of an issue. Every underground monitoring post has a similar orientation and geography; subsequently, tensions do not feature as heavily as those connected to the majority of workspaces beyond the home environment. In this instance we are assisted by the restrictive nature of the organisation's self-imposed internal rigidity – the desire or necessity for order. The question is how recognisable are these primary geographical layouts in an Underground Monitoring Post and, critically, is the post considered a place of work by those who operated them. Moreover, what is the reason for the imposition of such rigidity in the landscape of the observer?

What the UGMP is not

It is an interesting dichotomy that while most offices start out life as a bland shell, often neutrally coloured, exuding conformity and regimentation; it is not long before personalisation of the blank space begins. Sometimes this is overtly personal – pictures of families or holidays, pot plants and beverage material often being the norm. Considering the micro-landscape, for example the office desk, we can also recognise personalisation. The layout of the computer equipment, pens and the phone position can suggest a right or left handed individual. Pens are an interesting

case in point, often branded with company logos and given out at conferences or when encountering reps, they have the potential to indicate connection, travel and trade. Computers are often personalised, with the desktop and screensavers depicting family holidays or images suggesting certain interests and gender. Essentially the blank canvas of the workspace is coloured by the individual, their specific personal familiarities and the material culture of their society. That familiarity is fragile and can, all too often, be swept away by a change of regime, refurbishment or by the individual leaving. What is clear is that the micro-landscape of an office desk, once occupied, is specific to the occupiers' needs to function within the 'workspace', it is individual and unlikely to be encountered anywhere else. Considering this, is it clear that individuality, regardless of company rules, mission statements or values, ensures a level of 'chaos' prevails in the majority of office based 'workspace'. To a certain extent individuals carry out different tasks within the company, driving a specific micro-landscape, although generally speaking, the sociality of those within the workspace drive its unconformity to a state of chaos. I believe that unconformity excluded the operation of the underground monitoring post and its crew from the 'workspace'.

Moreover, the language used to describe what one is doing can provide an interesting insight into the value placed on that activity. Twenty percent of those responding to the survey cited 'duty' as the activities they performed while in uniform. This is further supported by 55% of correspondents citing a connection with the armed services as a primary reason for joining. Considering the observers' landscape, it appears that we can, through a number of attitudes and personal traits/values, start to recognise the motives for certain activities, especially the micro-geography of the underground monitoring posts.

Reasons for Uniformity

One clear aspect of a highly ordered entity, as identified by my research, is the emphasis on uniformity, especially when considering the layout of the Royal Observer Corp (ROC) underground monitoring post (UGMP). Each post adheres to a strict, specific, geography, and, while this is partly explained by the fact that the UGMP, irrespective of sunken, or semi-sunken construction, is to one design, the fact the same internal geography has been identified at the majority of sites recorded for this projects does appear to present other interpretive opportunities.

Familiarity

The UGMP, until 1990, was lit by a 12-volt light powered by car batteries (Fig.6-10) (ROC#55 noted the charging of batteries as a specific duty of the post crew). In operational conditions there was a distinct possibility that the crew might find themselves in darkness, or operating by torchlight. The layout of the post would, in this instance, lend itself to the continued function of the basic tasking.

Fig.6-10. W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire. The battery box, abandoned in a scene of chaos, still offers a chance to interpret specific activities. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012)

Routine in the guise of a regimented training regime, aligned where possible with military establishments in the locality, serves to reinforce the cognitive aspects of familiarity. It also plays to the requirements of the volunteer, especially those who expressed an interest in the service aspects of the organisation. Constant repetition allows for the development of a unconscious activity map, it also allows observers to operate from any of the 1500+ posts originally located across the landscape without training fade.

Cognitive loading

Introducing such familiarity across the service has benefits beyond the initially apparent operational one. If one considers the primary tasking of the ROC from the 1960s, the detection, monitoring and reporting of nuclear explosions, it is clearly apparent how stressful such an activity would, should the event be real, quickly become. When considering the task during the attack phase and subsequent reporting of effects on the local area it is clear that carrying out all duties becomes more ‘cognitively loaded’. Cognitive loading deals with the ‘working memory’ of brain

function. It is short term and restrictive in its capability to run more than five or six functions at once (Lavie and Hirst *et al* 2004, 339), it is also susceptible to distraction. Moreover, tests have shown that a distractor can have an effect on performance, especially when considering chronology.

If we consider the effect of cognitive loading on an underground monitoring post even the most basic functions required to successfully operate the post, would, had a nuclear device detonated nearby, become increasingly difficult to perform. Training and repetition, coupled with replication of the immediate environment reduces the loading, essentially stripping it bare, ensuring the basic information required by headquarters is more likely to be: a) accurate and b) coherent.

Research through the ROC survey explored attitudes towards actually turning up for duty during a nuclear war. I believe this demonstrates an important aspect of the organisations concerns for the future. Training, no matter how comprehensive, could not shy away from the inevitable fact that, had the unthinkable happened it would have deeply affected decision making. The fact no one answer stood out underpins that view. Although very few indicated that they would definitely be on duty had war broken out.

> I would have done my duty as expected, most corps members would have done the same, the Group control was over manned in that it could operate effectively with 1.5 crews instead of the peacetime 3 crews, it was an expectation that the crews not in the control would look after an[d] advise the families of those that were inside to enhance their chance of survival, Post crews operated in a similar way.
>
> ROC#41, 21 Group, Preston; 22 Group, Carlisle; 23 Group, Durham and 24 Group Edinburgh

> It would have been very difficult to leave loved ones but both my wife and father-in-law had served in the ROC. They understood that I'd do my duty so that took a lot of the potential pressure off me.
>
> ROC#46, 10 Group Exeter.

> Very badly, I think, knowing your family was in danger outside, we were told approximately 40 per cent would report for duty, I was hoping my children would be older, and I would have persuaded them to join too, there were several crew members who were parents and their adult children on my crew.
>
> ROC#36, 23 Group Durham

> To be frank would never have left my children.
>
> ROC#44, 15 Group, Lincoln

This has implications for the order and chaos model developed and presented in Chapter 4. We can no longer reduce the role of the original participants to that of mere automatons, simply placed within a regulated environment and expected to carry out a number of required tasks regardless of external events. It now appears that some recognition of the level of cognitive loading must have been considered when designing the UGMP. It also allows us to challenge to rather static view of the archaeology of the workspace. There is also a differentiation between the aircraft and nuclear reporting roles, one that can be inferred through the specifics of both roles. They also challenge the perceived view of the taskscape, further fragmenting the original thesis into visible and non-visible spectrums.

THE PUBLIC

Whilst members of the public consider the role of any defence related activity to be necessarily clandestine, veiled in a shroud of secrecy, the reality is that the majority of the ROC's operations were enacted in plain sight, as were most members' movements across the landscape.

Encounters with the public while on fieldwork for this project provided a number of interpretations for phase one structures, primarily Orlit posts. Interestingly, whether the post was a type A or B appears to have an effect on that interpretation. As discussed in (chapter 5) it appears the majority of Type A posts were built inland on geological summits rather than plateaus. Subsequently the general consensus was that the structures were sheds to store equipment. Conversely, those encountered near Type B structures suggested that the Orlit functioned as a lookout or anti-aircraft gun platform. This local interpretation appears to be driven by the fact that Type B's are predominantly located a few hundred metres inland from cliff edges.

Interestingly both architectural types were suggested to originate in the Second World War.

The Encounters

The underground component of the Royal Observer Corps has a far more complex archaeological presence in the landscape than that of the Orlit post period. In this instance the function of the organisation is not readily recognisable from the extant archaeological remains or the remnants of material culture available for scrutiny still *in situ*.

Clearly the most obvious of all differences is that the Orlit post, including all subsequent activities, inhabit a space above ground dictating all tasks are atmospherically based. When we consider the role of the ROC during World War II and the similarities of the aircraft reporting role in the immediate Cold War period, it should not come as a surprise that the interpretation of a structures' use is often correct, although many ascribe the Orlit post to a World War II origin. The dichotomy is that while nuclear reporting and monitoring also relies on the basics of sight, sound and direction the activities are enacted underground. Furthermore, relocation to sub-terrainian activities coincided with an increasing awareness of the horrors of nuclear warfare (Clarke 2005, 124). This awareness manifested itself in growing acts of civil disobedience. It also drives a recognisable change in the archaeological record connected to the Cold War in the United Kingdom. The nature of that change is demonstrated late in this project (chapter 8), although a brief introduction is required here. The key driver for the change in the archaeological record is the invention (1952) and subsequent development from 1954, of the hydrogen bomb. Physically, its potential was theoretically limitless (Clarke 2005, 17). Psychologically it shocked many across the world, including Governments and the military alike. At this point it became clear that any attempt to protect the entire population from nuclear warfare was essentially pointless. This realisation was not lost on the public, nor was the sudden construction or conversion of a large number of structures intended to survive an attack. By 1958, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was publicly calling for transparency with Government plans for war (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 82). One of those plans was the relocation of monitoring posts underground for added protection against blast and radiation. In doing so the ROC ceased to be a passive force monitoring the skies above the Orlit Post, they became

implicit in the perceived view of Government self-protection, in the publics' view an opportunity for the chosen few to wait out the holocaust above.

To those experiencing the physical remains of the ROC out in the landscape the encounter is both confusing and difficult to interpret; recently John Schofield (2011, 166) described certain aspects of the Cold War as 'Encoded Places', places that can only be fully understood once all the pieces are assembled (documentation – including operational components - and, possibly personal accounts). Encountering an underground monitoring post out in the field often provides no clue as to what the true function of the small concrete structure, or why it is where it is. Of those recorded on Ordnance Survey maps very few divulge the structures true identity, both adding to the visual deception of the post and forcing visitors to come to their own conclusions as to function. However, with the rapid development of internet interest groups such as Subterranea Britannica or the Fortress Study Group, the location of many posts has become better known. This said, posts are always encountered in isolation (the network dictated they were constructed at least 7km from one another), and subsequently are likely to be interpreted singularly rather than as a component of a national network.

On the rare occasion access to an underground monitoring post is possible the visitor encounters a subterranean world devoid of much of the material culture of the organisation or the temporal periods of its operation. Often the control room has a few centimetres of stagnant water in it, is covered in graffiti and on occasion has also been damaged by fire. It offers no opportunity to interpret the function of the post, the implications of that function had war broken out, nor the life-cycle of the organisation or the volunteer observers whose temporality this space depicts. Those sites that are protected are few and far between. In the South-West there are only two posts, C-17 Veryan, Cornwall, and W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire that are still in prime condition and curated with education in mind. This project has also discovered a number of other sites in the geographical area under scrutiny that are clearly not abandoned or are in the process of refurbishment. Making contact with the owners of such sites has proved extremely difficult, presumably linked to the fact a number of such posts displayed evidence of attempted, and successful, forced entry.

So we are presented with a number of problems. Any attempt to describe or interpret activities purely from the field monuments in the sub-terrainian world of the observer

is frustrated by a number of factors. The primary one is that the observers still adhere to the initiation they undertook on joining the organisation – specifically becoming a signatory of the Official Secrets Act. Closely followed by the problem presented when trying to interpret a monument, specifically the underground monitoring post, that is only 10% visible. To fully understand the abandonment process in this case relies heavily on the input, memories and service of the volunteer observers themselves.

SUMMARY

The aircraft reporting role, described as Phase One of the ROCs' Cold War life-cycle, comprises a series of overt activities enacted in the landscape. The activities are, in the main, readily identifiable via investigation of the extant monuments. The landscape should be considered a restricted landscape, with readily accessible functions. The organisation during phase one of the ROC life-cycle plays to the requirement of the volunteer, stimulating their desire for aviation and the military, supported by annual camps to airfields and recognition contests that both earned badges and kudos. Essentially the key needs of the volunteer appear to be directly catered for by the role required when on duty.

> I wanted to join the Royal Air Force - my father wouldn't let me. He didn't think it was a "proper" job for a young lady. I wasn't fit physically but I wanted to serve. I don't think I would have made the grade at that time, but a friend mentioned that he had seen the ROC and thought of me! I was 18. It was the best decision I ever made - I became independent, self-reliant, confident and I made some of the best friends ever. I got to go to RAF Stations to train and I had the time of my life!
>
> ROC#30, 23 Group, Durham

Going underground had a profound effect on the volunteer cohort of the ROC. Many left the corps citing the lack of aircraft reporting as the main reason to leave (Wood 1992, 221). The social aspects of the Corps were subsequently retained (summer camps and recognition training) and became the key reason for joining the service. Nuclear reporting, then, became a secondary or necessary task, something of a pay off if membership of the group was to be maintained. For the Government the opposite is true. The social structure had a budgetary implication; however, to maintain trained membership the costs were justified.

When we consider the landscape of the observer in Phase Two (1960-1991) a whole new set of problems confronts the interpretation of monuments. Those interpretations are further frustrated by a growing awareness that nuclear warfare has irreparable consequences. The observer landscape is also affected, becoming far more rigid in its appearance. Moreover, activities take on a new level of secrecy, often self-imposed but occasionally due to a change in structures. What we can say is that the observers' taskscape is different from that surrounding it. The ethos of the group is one of duty rather than work, the micro-geography, especially within the underground monitoring post, conforms to that required by a highly ordered organisation and the tasks are simple and ordered with cognitive loading in mind. Put simply the observer becomes automatons' in the government pursuit of defence policy.

Within this chapter I hope I have argued for a specific landscape inhabited by the observers. It is distinct in many ways from the everyday activities enacted by the surrounding population. A population who become increasingly disenfranchised in their say in defence policy. I propose that the two-tier descriptor (Phase One and Two) is accepted as the watershed is chronologically important and has implications for objective five in this project. Furthermore, the opportunity to populate the ROC landscape with personal histories of those who spent many thousands of hours on the posts allows for a far richer contextualisation of both monument and surround taskscape. It also allows for the period when both structural types are utilised by the organisation for whom they were constructed to be recorded. Now this has been done it is possible to discuss the act of abandonment. The next chapter looks specifically at the post-1991 landscape and interprets a number of behaviours through the application of the order and chaos model. I map the regression of activities to a more chaotic period where the landscape is not overtly bound by organisational regulations. I also investigate the motives behind the reclamation of the observers' landscape, in some cases by the observers themselves, a phenomenon that has increased substantially over the period of this project.

CHAPTER 7: THE YEARS OF CHAOS AND A RETURN TO ORDER: MODELLING ABANDONMENT PROCESSES.

> - with regret that the Home Office can no longer justify the continued use of the ROC and Home Department volunteers for the monitoring task.
>
> It has therefore been decided, following consultations between the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence, who share responsibilities for the ROC, that the Corps will be stood down in its operational role.
>
> Mr. Kenneth Baker, HC Deb 10 July 1991 vol. 194 cc391-4W

INTRODUCTION

This chapter investigates the activities being enacted on, and in, the physical landscape of the Royal Observer Corps since the organisation's stand-down in 1991. It relies heavily on the 'order and chaos' model introduced earlier in this thesis and the multitude of field visits over a four-year period (2011-2015). Four key phases of the abandonment process have been recognised through the observation of activities on ROC posts included in the current work. Utilising case studies I present the results of the field survey programme, developing each phase in turn. Each site is introduced with a historiography of the post from first inception through to closure before the post-closure activities are interpreted. Where possible information from former ROC members, curators, post restorers and landowners is used to contextualise the findings. The next chapter will discuss the validity of the findings against current thinking on the abandonment process.

> The redundant posts will be disposed of, and in some cases, if there is a demand by Government authority or local authorities, they will be made available to them. Some of the areas of the posts will be required for agricultural purposes, and if there are any agricultural former owners they will receive priority if they wish to resume ownership of the land where the posts are established. Consideration is being given to the retention, in what one might call a cocooned state, of a number of posts that will come out of service, in addition to the 873 which we are retaining.
>
> The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Ennals), HC Deb 03 May 1968 vol 763 cc1569

> There used to be a small box next to the canteen at Wards. They did have a timber box next to a shed across the road during the war for spotting aircraft – apparently it got quite busy through the war. Sometime later they built a similar sized concrete box on the opposite side of the road. Latter end of the 60s I think, an underground thing

> was built – or is that dug? – that was before Wards built the big rolling mill shed next to it – blocking out most of the view. At the end of the 60s we used it as a waste water interceptor tank. The new canteens over it now.
>
> Personal Recollection from Wards employee and local resident of Sherburn, North Yorkshire.

THE ABANDONMENT PROCESS – INITIAL FRAMEWORK

Number four of the objectives I set for this project is: *Identify the processes involved in the abandonment of structures constructed specifically for the monitoring of the effects of weapons of mass destruction*. To fully answer this the 'order and chaos' model was developed, each with specific criteria of activities and/or actions. The mechanism where by a given criterion is selected and applied to a specific site has been discussed elsewhere (chapter 4), in this chapter those criteria are tested utilising the Underground Monitoring Post (UGMP) of the Royal Observer Corps (ROC), a specific monument type dispersed widely across the landscape of the United Kingdom (fig.7-1).

Fig.7-1. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. Each act of post stand-down activity assumes a level of individualism – but are there markers within this individualism that reveals certain activities in reaction to the structure's original intent? At Avebury the executor of the graffiti on the control room door makes clear reference to nuclear warfare (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012)

The Sample

The sample monuments are restricted to those identified as belonging to phase two of the ROC life-cycle (nuclear monitoring). The underground monitoring post is far more numerous than the phase one aircraft reporting, or Orlit, post, they are constructed to the same basic design both above and below ground and there is a very good chronology for the construction and abandonment of all structures (see Wood 1992 and Dobinson 1998).

The Four States of 'Chaos'

This chronology allows for the duration of different activities, post-abandonment, to be recognised and structured interpretively within the 'order and chaos' model. The fieldwork results are broken down into four components of activities, ruined or destroyed where only the bare infrastructure remains or components of it; transitional – in so much as no curatorial activities have been recognised; covert curation – those sites owned and maintained although not promoted as such; and overt curation – that is those posts retained for educational purposes and only used as such. Through the following sections a sample of the ROC posts, investigated for this project, are summarised prior to a full analysis of the results obtained by field visits, record analysis and testaments from former Royal Observer Corps members are used to underpin the findings where possible.

Underground monitoring posts have been considered for inclusion if they were located within the geographical Home Defence Region 7 (HDR7). This offered a potential 179 posts across the HDR7 landscape. By the time of the first baseline survey for this project a potential 53 posts in Devon had been reduced through demolition to just 14 and of those only 13 were visited as I was denied access to one ROC post. Furthermore, a degree of separation was needed between two substantial groups of posts if any rigour was to be introduced into the result set. The sites in Wiltshire were subsequently selected for analysis; of the 20 originally constructed 10 remained extant in 2013-15, all were visited and recorded. Other sites in the South-West region were visited on an ad-hoc basis. In total 33 sites have been assessed for this project.

Reclaiming The Landscape

One of the most complex, but noticeable, activities currently recognised on ROC UGMPs in recent years has to be the re-adoption of a growing number of posts across the United Kingdom. At the beginning of this project only two posts (Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire and Veryan, Cornwall) in the entire South-West were overtly promoted as sites of educational value and curated as museums. Of those visited during the initial baseline survey a further four in Devon (Modbury, Christow, Tiverton and Drewsteignton) were in some form of curatorial ownership while three more (Brixham, Sharpitor and Stockleigh Pomeroy) had been scheduled due to their location in earlier landscapes.

Between the baseline visits in May 2011 and subsequent monitoring expeditions a number of posts were clearly identified as being in the process of refurbishment. Nationally this phenomenon has expanded exponentially, with information about such work appearing on various dedicated websites and *Facebook*. Naturally this reinvigoration of the ROC landscape is welcome as it appears the number of posts destined to be lost due to abandonment and the chaos elements discussed above, might, in the short-term, be slowing.

Old for New?

The prospect of restoration for ROC posts raises a number of questions: can we consider posts that are restored actually the same as those that were closed in 1968 or 1991? If not, what should we recognise them as? Just what are the motives for restoration and what do those who are restoring consider the underground space to be? Moreover, landowners who, via government disposals, have become the possessor of a former ROC underground monitoring post only have certain options available to them, clearly one was to rent the structure to others. In recent years this has morphed into sales of ROC posts. The primary route of investigation, if we are to answer these questions, has to be in establishing an understanding of the motives that currently drive post restorers. We should also be able to differentiate post restoration from other aspects of a given ROC post’s lifecycle. What follows, then, are case studies intended to underpin my thoughts on the recognisable aspects of any given ROC post and interactions driving the next, and in some cases, last aspects of a post's lifecycle.

The Taskscape Element

A proposed area of interaction between observers and public is indicated on each map used in this chapter. Indicated by a red line and depicted as the 'Taskscape Element', it is a proposed area of activity connected to each post when staffed by the observer crew. The Taskscape Element has been constructed via the framework offered by Tim Ingold (1993) and complemented by site visits, observer accounts and operational considerations such as a post with dispersed elements, a ground zero indicator plinth some distance from the underground monitoring post (D-7, Christow, Devon). Within this red line lie all active aspects of the post when in operation up to the stand-down of September 1991.

A SECRET LANDSCAPE IN PLAIN SIGHT

It appears that whenever a nuclear facility, especially a bunker or any description, is placed up for sale it attracts media attention as the following attest.

> '1 Bedroom Cave House for Sale'
>
> *Rightmove:* 29 May 2008
>
> Safe as houses: Concrete bunker built at height of Cold War to shelter officials from Soviet nuclear strike that boasts metre thick walls and steel blast doors on sale for £350,000 as country retreat.
>
> *Daily Mail:* Published: 12:59, 10 July 2014 | Updated: 14:45, 10 July 2014
>
> Devon house for sale - and nuclear bunker comes free.
>
> *BBC Devon:* Page last updated at 14:37 GMT, Friday, 22 October 2010 15:37 UK
>
> Bunker built to protect councillors from a nuclear attack on Plymouth is up for sale
>
> *Plymouth Herald* | Posted: July 10, 2014

Clearly we are still fascinated by the morbid sense of annihilation that the memory of the Cold War presents some twenty-five years after the conflict was officially declared over – in the general sense at least. Ownership, certainly when it comes to bunkers, is a fairly complex activity, bringing with it a range of tensions, and in this case, a substantial monetary investment. Moreover, it has implications for the Cold War landscape, educational value of sites connected with weapons of mass destruction and the 'order and chaos' model. The motives behind interactions between the public and redundant Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts is the focus of this next section. In it I have used a range of case studies, generated through fieldwork, anonymous questionnaires and face-to-face discussions with those who interact with the ROC posts. All are structured to the four states of chaos I have proposed above. The case studies presented here follow a hierarchy. Of the 53 Royal Observer Corps posts investigated in Devon for this project, 39 were either ruined, or more often, destroyed. It is with this classification that I start, working through the transitional phase, to those sites where order has mostly been restored through a process of covert curation, and final to those sites that most closely resemble order, the overtly curated ROC posts.

RUINED OR DESTROYED

The classification ruined or destroyed represents the majority of ROC post sites across the project area. In this category we encounter the true dichotomy facing structures constructed to withstand the full force of nuclear weapons but not prolonged, unmaintained, periods at the mercy of their environment. Here are the sites that are stripped of all external furniture such as grills or access covers or whose very existence above ground may have been removed, rendering access to the structure below ground impossible unless remote applications are used. Some aspects of the ROC post might survive such as a remotely placed ground zero indicator or fenced and gravelled car park area although on the whole no immediately recognisable features remain. A description of all those sites devoid of any above ground features would be pointless, save the discovery of former post positions using LiDAR discussed previously in chapter 5, although some sites do warrant discussion here. The following case study is restricted to those sites where

components of the ROC landscape remain, although the underground monitoring post is now rendered inaccessible.

Case Study – D-39 Sharpitor, Devon

Post and Location History

The Royal Observer Corps post located at Sharpitor, Devon (original designation 21/L.2) was opened in October 1940 at map reference SX 590731. In June 1952 it was re-located to SX 559703 and in November 1953 was equipped with a Type ‘A’ Orlit post. In April 1963 the post was moved underground, where it was to remain operational until the stand-down of the ROC in September 1991 (Wood 1992, 265).

The ROC post, while technically destroyed, actually does leave a series of extant markers that can be ascribed to the operational days of the site. The foundations of the Type ‘A’ Orlit post are just visible on an outcrop 22m to the south east of the underground post, at 400m ordnance datum observers in the aircraft reporting role would have had uninterrupted views around 360° for at least 15km. There is a pull-in capable of taking at least six cars just off the B3212 to the west of the site and a track marked with large pieces of granite, the majority over 500mm sq., traverses the 60m climb to the ROC post. The underground monitoring post is the only one encountered in Devon that has a semi-sunken underground component. The entrance and vent stacks have been reduced to ground level, although they are still visible; there is no sign of the mounts for either the bomb power indicator or fixed survey meter.



Fig.7-2. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Sharpitor ROC post (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Biography of Sharpitor Post Landscape

Records connected specifically to the post at Sharpitor are difficult to locate due to the involvement of multiple agencies. The records do demonstrate a military involvement in the specific environs of the ROC post and are worth describing here as they indicate some of the tensions encountered when secret and public occupy the same landscape. During the Second World War the area of Dartmoor known as Sharpitor was requisitioned by the Air Ministry for the construct of a radio navigation station for Bomber Command; as with many sites established during this period little survives of the process of acquisition at this time. Post-war is a different story.

As relations between East and West began to breakdown, especially in 1948-49 over the Berlin Blockade, many stations were retained rather than disposed of (Clarke 2007, 63). With the very real prospect of war breaking out the RAF retained much of its wartime estate (Armitage 1995, 195), included in that was the radio and radar network capable of guiding Bomber Command aircraft onto targets in eastern

Europe. By 1955 the equipment at the station required refurbishment, including the replacement of a substantial timber mast with a more substantial steel structure; this is the point where tensions surrounding the military use of sections of Dartmoor enter a very public phase. On 2 February 1955 the proposed steel erection made its way into the House of Commons with Michael Foot requesting the 'Under-Secretary of State for Air - give an undertaking to consult all local interests concerned before any such step is taken' (Radio Mast, Dartmoor, HC Deb 02 February 1955 vol 536 c107W). By the 16 November a growing number of protests over the proposals brought the plans back to the Houses of Commons with still no compromise (Radar Mast, Great Links Tor, HC Deb 16 November 1955 vol 546 c386).

> Permission was granted in 1956, but as a temporary measure, for ten years. And ten years later, the Air Ministry was told that the use must cease in another three.
>
> DPA: Friends of Dartmoor website – Accessed 24 April 2016.

Four years earlier the ROC post at Sharpitor had been relocated to Peek Hill and an Orlit Type 'A' constructed (fig.7-3). No records have so far been located for this construction and it is highly likely the Orlit, a fairly unobtrusive structure, was built with no planning consent as it lay within the Air Ministry landscape. Certainly when Frank Hayman, Member of Parliament for Falmouth and Camborne, raised the question of restricted access it was with reference to Orlit structures the reply was made. The fact the question was asked at all suggests pressure being maintained through public representation.

> Dartmoor National Park
>
> Mr. Hayman
>
> asked the Secretary of State for Air what areas of Dartmoor National Park come within his control; what are their acreages; and to what extent civilians are excluded from these areas.

Mr. Ward

Five Royal Observer Corps posts with an average area of 0.06 of an acre; a radio station at Sharpitor with an area of 1.25 acres; and three acres of land at Harrowbeer which were formerly part of the airfield. Members of the public are excluded from all these areas.

HC Deb 18 March 1958 vol 584 c129W 129W



Fig.7-3. D-39, Sharpitor, Devon. The site of the Orlit post Type 'A' located on Peek Hill (white line); operated when the Corps was still in the aircraft reporting role. (Source: Bob Clarke 26/05/2011)

In April 1963 the underground monitoring post was constructed at the site (Wood 1992, 285), again there appears to be no clear record of this occurrence. What is interesting is the construction method employed at Sharpitor. The ROC post is a semi-sunken type, the only one of its type recognised during the survey of structures in Devon. Considering the local geology, Granite, the likelihood of a fully sunken structure was probably considered remote (fig.7-4).

> R.A.F. Station, Sharpitor (Closure)
>
> *Mr. Carol Johnson*
>
> asked the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to close down the Royal Air Force Station at Sharpitor on Dartmoor, dismantle the equipment and aerials, and restore the site to its natural beauty in accordance with the undertaking given on behalf of his Department in 1956, when this temporary installation in a national park was agreed.
>
> *Mr. Hattersley*
>
> The Royal Air Force Station at Sharpitor is expected to close by 31st March, 1970. The question of removal of installations and equipment and restoration of the land will be considered in consultation with other Departments and local authorities in the normal way.
>
> *HC Deb 19 December 1969 vol 793 cc432-3W* 432W

The closure of the Gee Chain, including RAF Sharpitor, was later reported in Flight International although no mention was made of the disposal of the site (Gee Chain Closure, 26 March 1970). On closure the whole landscape was acquired by the Dartmoor Preservation Association but not before a planning application was placed by the government with a view to changing the use of the site to one aimed at housing young offenders (DPA: Friends of Dartmoor website – Accessed 24 April 2016). After more public objection the idea was refused and the site eventually

cleared in 1972 (Pastscape 2015). The land then containing the former RAF Station was purchased by the Dartmoor Preservation Association, the rest passed back to the successor of the former owner – South West Water (personal email from James Paxman to this author 13/02/2012).

Fig.7-4. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The underground monitoring post was actually a semi-sunken structure due to the challenging geology. (Source: Bob Clarke 06/04/2014)

When members of Subterranea Britannica visited the site in 2001 the structure had already been reduced to just the semi-sunken mound. Both the entrance and vent stack had been reduced to ground level, the material being used to backfill both shafts (Subbrit 27/04/2001). On the 11 February 2002 the whole landscape received statutory protection when the area was scheduled; the underground monitoring post was mentioned in the notice and, significantly, not excluded from it, other features included Bronze and Iron Age coaxial field systems and enclosures and the remnants of RAF Sharpitor (Historic England 1020238).

The Chaos of Abandonment

Sites in the latter stages of their lifecycles present opportunities to observe snapshots of the abandonment process, Sharpitor underground monitoring post is one such opportunity. Considering the wider landscape, ROC involvement is extant, a series of organisational markers still being present. A number experience interaction at the human level, others influence movement through this part of the landscape.

Fig.7-5. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The remnants of the locked traffic post. Hinting at the once controlled landscape. (Source: Bob Clarke 06/04/2013)

The original carpark, located to the south west of the underground post, is now used by visitors and dog walkers, continuing the presence of parked cars in the landscape. The original lockable post preventing vehicular access to the track ascending the moor to Peek Hill is still locked but pushed flat, hinting at a once restricted landscape (fig.7-5). As if to confirm control and restriction the route to the ROC post, once taken by the Observers, remains an important feature. Blocks of granite continue to line the route and vehicle tracks and presumably from the

operational phase of the ROC post, are still recognisable in the area to the north of them (fig.7-6).

Fig.7-6. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The granite lined road through an earlier prehistoric landscape. Vehicle tracks from the time of the posts operational life can be seen to the right of the stones. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013)

While recording the site for this project in April 2013 nine separate groups of people parked in the old pull-in and walked to the summit of Peek Hill, following the stone markers to the top. What makes this important is that the markers are not the most direct route to the summit, taking instead a more even, vehicle friendly, direction. Furthermore, the usual stop-off point is Peek Hill, often people stand inside the remnants of the Orlit post foundations, naturally oblivious to them, and visually scan the moor and landscape surrounding them, again continuing the activity enacted by the observers from the 1950s.

By far the most interesting activity has to be the interaction between the public and the remains of the underground monitoring post. Both entrance and vent stacks had been razed to the ground by 2001, however, the shafts were only partially filled with loose material. The outlines of both are currently visible as rough concrete

rectangles and it is clear they are the remains of something that has been partially removed.

Fig.7-7. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The removal of material from the entrance stack, revealing



the top rung of the steel steps. Top left and bottom left 26/05/2011; top right 01/04/2013. (Source: Bob Clarke)

The baseline visit conducted on 26 May 2011 noted that the entrance stack was almost full to the top with debris and the whole thing partially capped with a large stone. Grass had grown over the edge of this, suggesting it had not been disturbed recently. The vent stack had been, fairly recently, partially emptied. Utilising a section of galvanised pipe (that looked very similar to the pipe utilised as a drain on the entrance stack) someone had begun to remove the fill of the shaft; seven stones of various geological types and chunks of concrete lay just 0.5m to the north-east; they had clearly been placed there. A subsequent visit on 11 June 2012 revealed that some small stones had been removed from the entrance stack, exposing the top rung of the steel ladder. Interestingly most of the material near the vent stack had been re-introduced to the vent (fig.7-7), all except one stone that now lay 32m to the

north-west. No attempt had been made to remove the large stone blocking the shaft of the entrance stack (fig.7-8).

Fig.7-8. D-37, Sharpitor, Devon. The removal and subsequent re-filling of the vent stack. Above and above right 26/05/2011, top left 06/04/2013. (Source: Bob Clarke)

This activity, focussing on both the entrance and vent stacks can be interpreted in a number of ways, primary to that interpretation is the age of the person, or persons, who enacted the interaction at the time. It is highly unlikely that anyone familiar with the layout of an underground monitoring post would attempt to remove the stone fill as they would appreciate the work involved to reach the control room. Furthermore, the vent would have been a very unlikely choice. The recovery of sections of structure (specifically grills and the access hatch) to use on other posts can also be ruled out as they are all utilised at a higher level on the above ground structure than now survives. The probability is that children are those that have been investigating the site, the location is a well-known beauty spot and popular with walkers, the previous tension over the RAF station proves testament to that. The point is, while it is tempting to place substantial meaning on activities enacted on such contentious

sites as these, a mundane reason, such as a child investigating a hole in the ground, should also be considered.

While surveying the earthwork during the final visit of this project a member of the public engaged me in conversation, what was revealed was interesting. On 6 April 2013 a lady appeared enquiring ‘what I was up to’, presumably the surveying equipment had given her the impression that some sort of development was imminent. After a brief discussion covering my work she commented that she had been into the post in the late 1970s. At that time the lady had been the local doctor and had sat on the local Civil Defence Committee. The post, she assured me, had the potential to protect at least fifteen people with food and water for a ‘good month’. Phenomenologically, it is clear that the doctor had had some contact with civil defence, although her knowledge of the ROC post was well off the mark. Moreover, the suggestion that fifteen people might survive, or at least have the rations available to support them, for a month or so is not totally inaccurate if we consider a local authority control in the 1970s (Clarke 2006; McCamley 2002). This, if the account has any accuracy, might help us understand the excessively high number of personnel though to have populated the ROC underground monitoring post. It is highly likely that the doctor had been involved in meetings and small scale exercises connected with civil defence and, moreover, local authority emergency planning. I suggest this is the environment to which the ‘fifteen’ were intended to ‘survive’ as that number in an underground monitoring post would make life extremely unpleasant.

TRANSITION

Transitional ROC posts are those that may have had a period of refurbishment after initial stand-down (Oct 1968 or Sept 1991) or covert curation but are now in states of chaos due to the four aspects of the chaos model I have proposed in chapter 4. They tend to be in poor repair above and below ground, have structural components missing and are generally unsafe. Although, when visited and access was possible, quite a range of material culture connected with the organisation remained below ground. Importantly all ROC posts have experienced a period of transition.

Case Study – W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire

Post and location history

Royal Observer Corps Post Avebury (original designation 23/B.2) was opened in January 1938 at map reference SU 107695. The post was re-sited to SU 104692 (designated 14/M.4) in September 1953 and two months later received an Orlit post. There is no archaeological evidence for the type of Orlit structure constructed at this location although the landscape position of Avebury suggests an Orlit post type 'A' would have been the most likely choice. The site was moved underground in June 1961 and remained operational until September 1991.

Topographically Avebury is located on a small knoll (central point 191.79m above O.D.) known as Wadon Hill (fig.7-9). It stands adjacent to a series of twentieth century specific features, namely a trig point for the Ordnance Survey and a covered reservoir. The post also overlooks the large Neolithic henge enclosure and stone circle to the north at Avebury and to the south-south west the large Neolithic mound of Silbury Hill. Wadon Hill, along with the ROC post, lies within the central zone of the UNESCO designated World Heritage Site. Interestingly the post does not appear in the current management literature although certain military remains are noted, especially those associated with aviation (Simmonds and Thomas 2014, 141).



Fig.7-9. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Avebury ROC post (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Biography of Avebury post-September 1991

Historiography

Again there is a reliance on secondary sources to flesh out the activities enacted on the ROC post at Avebury and whilst part of an internationally recognised heritage landscape, the post receives no statutory protection. Specialist websites do provide something of the posts apparent transition from an ordered space to one of chaos. When members of Subbrit visited the site the post was generally in good order – so much so that technical equipment remained *in situ* (Subbrit 2/5/2001). By 3/4/2005 the post was reported 'vandalised' and water was making its was into the underground fabric of the site (ibid 2/5/2001). The primary visit for this project was conducted on 11/03/2012.

Baseline Assessment

The above ground component of the ROC post at Avebury is surrounded by a typical ministry fence (concrete posts and wire mesh fence, with a small gate) that is in good order. The vegetation inside is unkempt, although a number of daffodils are apparent during the spring.

The structures above ground clearly display some aspects of tension being played out at this site. The entrance stack has been the focus of sustained force, damaging the structure surrounding the entrance hatch to such an extent that the entire assembly, including counterbalance mechanism, has been detached (fig.7-10). Interestingly this is now chained and padlocked to the ground zero indicator mounting attachment, presumably in an attempt to retain this substantial piece of the post on site. Other above ground features are demonstrating light effects of exposure to the weather, predominantly peeling paint, but none of the mechanical damage present on the entrance stack.

Fig.7-10. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. The whole hatch structure has been detached from the entrance stack. The control room below now fills with water. Beyond the compound fence is a reservoir mound, to the top right is Silbury Hill. (11/03/2012 Bob Clarke)

Below ground the post has clearly received attention from a number of visitors. The sump area is full of water, presumably due to the stack hatch being removed, unfortunately the sump pump handle, still present in 1999 (Subbrit 2/5/2001), has been broken off, making it now impossible to remove the water accumulating below. Subsequently the entire floor of the underground monitoring post is now c.100mm underwater (fig.7-11). The only material culture identifiable to the Royal Observer Corps is a battery box, the fold down table and the cupboard. A none standard wall file organiser remains along with various other wall attachments for cables and the like, a folding chair is also present. The underground operations room was insulated with a double layer of polystyrene tiles, part of the attempts to reduce the chill effect from being underground (Jolly *et al* 1979), along with a now waterlogged carpet.

Fig.7-11. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. A view looking down the entrance shaft. Water ingress in the sump area of the entrance stack. The black is stagnant water. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012)

The most obvious interaction has to be the amount of graffiti on all surfaces below ground. At least four episodes are recognisable, some institutionalised – executed by the observers themselves (Lead Observer 31 May 2016 pers comm) - others by later

visitors. The analysis of this particular activity has implications for the interpretation of activities enacted on posts in a state of transition.

The chaos of abandonment

It is clear by the state of the ROC post at Avebury that tensions are at the forefront of activities currently being enacted at the site. That said, it does not appear that that tension is in response to the National Trust (owners of this landscape), rather the symbolic nature of the underground monitoring post itself. Furthermore, it appears that there is a specific nature to two of the three identified graffiti periods, both of which focus on elements of the Cold War. This should not come as a surprise. Wiltshire Council notes on its heritage page: -

> A measure of Avebury's uniqueness is its appeal to a wider variety of people. 350,000 annual visitors are attracted to Avebury, including a large element of international tourists. Pagans also visit the site as a place of contemporary celebration and gathering
>
> (Wiltshire Council 2016).

Within that visitor cohort are many who were, or are may well still be, members of groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, or members of the public who have an extreme view on the role of the military, especially the continued retention of nuclear weapons. It is clear from the surviving evidence that the post has been the focus of attention from the destructive visitor. The entrance hatch had, utilising the records created by the groups mentioned above, been damaged to such an extent that the hatch and surrounding mounting structure was completely detached by 2005. This damage subsequently exposed the post to the ingress of water; with nearly a decade’s worth of rainfall accumulating in the control room. This has, in turn, started the process of decay in all fixtures and fittings extant at the time of my baseline visit.

Non Standard Material Culture

Material culture from the wider, peripheral, population outside the closed, secret world of the bunker is greatly in evidence. At the bottom of the entrance stack are a number of artefacts including plastic drinks bottles, a screwdriver, large plastic paint container lid, two pens and a mass of stones. This behaviour is quite common in transition phase structures and has certainly been recognised on a range of sites utilised in this study. Interestingly at Avebury it possible to sub-divide this deposition of material.

Rocks, by their very nature, do not float. It is therefore reasonable to suggest those located at the bottom of the entrance stack lay where they came to rest, with only minimal disturbance during visitors transitioning between the entrance stack and control room. Bottles, especially plastic drinks ones' float. Considering this it would is more appropriate to suggest the bottle, or any floating object, has been deposited 'somewhere' in the underground structure and has probably drifted to its current position.

The fold out table and cupboard were covered in artefacts that were both ROC or peripherally recognisable. A wooden box, originally containing batteries for radios stands on the cupboard. The box displays descriptive labels indicating the contents and a serial number 'ROC 13' – indicating it came from a central store where others must have been recorded. The lid has been removed and lies on the same surface. A green metal dustpan, laid on the fold out table also appears to be ROC equipment, certainly the object suggests order rather than chaos. On the fold out table there is a range of material, some of which cannot be discounted as drug paraphernalia. Two plastic bags were laid flat, on top were three deep pans, one with the lid fitted, a plastic washing up bowl with a red funnel inside, two lengths of rope were wound up and positioned near the pans.

Between the green dustpan and battery box is an eye irrigation bottle containing sodium chlorate, a blue plastic bottle with no marking, a tin of car engine oil and a tin of 'Glitto'. Scouring powders such as 'Glitto' were routinely used to disinfect toilets until fairly recently, certainly tins of 'Glitto' are common finds in underground structures. There is also a can of multi-grade oil on the top of the cupboard (fig.7-12). 'TescOil' is not on sale today, it is likely that the tin is over thirty years old given that

the car depicted on the can is a Ford Capri, the model ceased production in 1986 (The Capri Club). This might well place the can in the same date range as other, observer introduced, artefacts. Clearly then some form of pre - stand-down activity is apparent.

The most noticeable interaction with the site is the amount of graffiti, mostly executed in spray paint, that now covers the underground structure. On closer inspection there are four groups apparent and all can be phased due using simple stratigraphy or the dates provided by the artist. Two groups have been produced using red and black spray paint, a third is produced by scratching into the polystyrene tiles, the forth using a pencil to write on the structure prior to the tiles being glued on.

Fig.7-12. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. The eye wash and ‘Glitto’ (centre) are both standard equipment from the ordered phase of the post's life-cycle. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012

Dealing with the earliest visible example first provides us with a date to a structural change to the underground space. Executed in pencil is the simple, but most useful, type of graffiti ‘Bob 1/12/87’. Importantly this is written on the emulsioned wall below

the two layers of polystyrene tiles allowing us to say the insulation of the post was carried out no earlier than December 1987 (fig.7-13 below). The primary layer of spray paint has been executed in red and comprises mostly Cold War referenced statements and words. Secondary to this is the black which introduces a number of further statements, plus an additional reference to the *'Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy'* (Adams 1979).

The black overspray's on a number of red words, suggesting a sequence of application. Third are those scratched into the surface of the tiles, these are mostly names with dates. They depict two year dates 07 and 09, all are scratched into the surface of the tiles probably with a key and both truncate the red spray paint (fig.7-14). If we accept these dates as fact it is possible to provide a phase for the transition of the post from the operational to the transitional phase. Just under four years before the structure ceased operations it was insulated with a double layer of polystyrene tiles.

Fig.7-13. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire, The phasing of graffiti south-west wall. Pre-tile phase highlighted in purple, red spray paint then black spray paint. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012)

This was in all likelihood carried out by the observers themselves (although none of the crew remembered it being done) and as the wall was being covered up somebody wrote their name on it. Then sometime between stand-down in 1991 and 2007 two episodes of spray paint occurred. Finally, dates were scratched into the polystyrene tile surfaces, damaging the spray paint in the process.

Fig.7-14. W-3, Avebury, Wiltshire. Three levels of graffiti interaction, north-east wall. Red overlain be black and scratch over that. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/03/2012)

The depictions executed in red spray paint are important, every example found in the underground control room appears to make reference to the Cold War. While not exclusive to the post at Avebury, this is the most overt of Cold War references found in any Royal Observer Corps related structure across the South-West. Whether the graffiti is a clear reaction to the function of the underground monitoring post is the subject of further analysis below. At this point though the red spray paint has to be considered at the very least a latent memory of the period. Very likely manifest through the personal history of someone active, via the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or other such pressure groups, in the Cold War period.

Considering the aspects of chaos driven by a post in the transition phase of its life cycle it is clear that the ingress of water is a key factor in the continued decay of the structure. ROC posts such as Avebury receive substantially more visitors than the majority of other posts in the subject area, advancing a number of facets of transition. The slighting of the structure, breaking into the secret world below and, subsequently reducing the impact of that space by introducing material culture from peripheral zones beyond, are further important markers to the transition of such structures and spaces.

Case Study – D-20 Hornscross, Devon

Post and location history

Royal Observer Corps post Hornscross (original designation21/B.2) was opened in June 1940 at map reference SS 376232. The site was moved to SS 375236 (designated 20/L.2 in April 1944. In November 1953 the site was in receipt of an Orlit post Type 'B', the structure is extant. The site moved underground in June 1960 and remained operational until the post was closed in October 1968 as part of the Governments disbanding of the Civil Defence network and reduction of ROC posts.



Fig.7-15. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Hornscross ROC post (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Topographically Hornscross is located 327 m south of the cliff edge at Bideford Bay and is located centrally to a plateau at 175m above O.D. The site lies just to the south of a minor road in its own compound (fig.7-15). Within the confines are the extant Orlit post, underground monitoring post and a General Post Office marker. A telegraph pole, now reduced, in height, stands on the road side next to the compound; this probably supplied the original communication link to the post.

Biography of Hornscross post-October 1968

Historiography

As with the majority of other sites noted in this project, there is a reliance on secondary accounts through electronic means to ascertain the current movement from order to chaos. The earliest record located thus far was generated by Subbrit on 27/4/2001 as part of their general survey of Cold War sites at the turn of the century. They note that the compound is already overgrown, although photographs from that visit do indicate all, above ground features are accessible (Subbrit: 27/4/2001).

Baseline Assessment

The baseline visit to Hornscross was conducted on 11 May 2011. The underground monitoring post has some non-standard aspects. The ground zero indicator is raised on a plinth that places the mounting point 1.5m above the ground surface and a double step placed next to it for access. Grills are missing from the entrance stack and material culture (bunk bed frames) have been removed and dumped in the undergrowth. They appear to have been there a number of years as the vegetation is substantial in this area. The entrance hatch is deformed, presumably to forced access in the past and now does not close properly. It was not possible to access the vent stack due to the advanced stage of the vegetation (fig.7-16).

Fig.7-16. D-20 Hornscross, Devon. The entrance stack demonstrates a classic example of transition. Vegetation has rendered most of the post inaccessible. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011)

Access to the underground component was possible. The bottom of the entrance stack was partially blocked with material that appears to have been dropped down the shaft. The range of the deposit falling broadly into two categories; natural material and late twentieth century material culture. There is a layer of well decomposed leaf litter across the whole floor, while undulating it has an average depth of 70mm. This primary layer covers and, presumably, fills the sump. Partially embedded in the primary matrix were three large stones while a piece of concrete from the wall of the access shaft also lies on top of the matrix. A number of pieces of wood are also later deposits to the leaf litter, two appear to be rotten sectional of telegraph pole. The truncated pole standing next to the Orlit post is the most likely origin of this, probably discarded on site after being reduced in height. Other, smaller pieces, are from the degradation of the internal fittings, specifically doors, driven by the amount of water now entering the site.

Fig.7-17. D-20, Hornscross, Devon. The sump area of the post entrance. A mixture of leaf litter and items dropped down the shaft have fouled the drainage. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011)

Late twentieth century material culture is also present in these deposits, including the remnants of a portable television aerial and a substantial length of cable attached to it. A *Crunchie* wrapper and plastic soda bottle with an aluminium screw lid are also in evidence. While no date was recognisable on the chocolate bar wrapper, the bottle did have a date (30-8-2004) etched into it (fig.7-17). This bottle was clearly above the leaf litter deposit suggesting a *terminus post quem* for the deposit below. This said, similar depositions of plastic bottles noted at Avebury (noted above) suggested that we cannot securely consider the date of the bottle as a deposition date due to the possibility it may have floated there. Although, it does still provide a structured deposition marker. The door to the store room was jammed a third of the way open. The bottom of the store door was in a very poor state having decayed at least 350mm up the structure, this decay is likely to originate from water entering the post through the unsecured hatch and soaking into the lower deposit of the shaft fill. A number of artefacts were in the storeroom including a very poor condition chemical

toilet, a large sheet of thick polythene and the remnants of the shelving usually supplied as part of the post furniture.

The control room at the time of the baseline visit was dry and sparse. The rear vent and sliding closure plate were in a poor state of repair, both were heavily corroded due to the ingress of moisture (fig.7-18). The fixed survey meter instrument mounting plate in the ceiling was also in an advanced state of corrosion damage. A number of backing battens for cable runs were still in place on the wall, they are in the process of losing their painted protection. The only furniture survival here is the cupboard that usually forms the instrument bench. This has been moved away from the wall and one of the door is damaged. The folding bench is missing although the two mounting brackets are currently on the control room floor and are, again, heavily corroded. Two duck boards, commonly used to stand batteries on (Observer pers comm) are also on the floor (fig.7-19) and two bunk frames are propped up against the wall (a third is discarded outside). A plastic bowl lays directly under the ground zero indicator mount, presumably intended to catch water as it runs down the tube, it is dry and has a substantial filling of wood lice.

Fig.7-18. D-20, Hornscross, Devon. The control room exhibits the effects of damp. Note the deterioration around the vent (top right) caused by vegetation encouraging moisture down the shaft. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011)

An Orlit post Type ‘B’ stands in the north-west corner of the compound. The structure has numerous splits in all cast concrete components, specifically where the local salt-laden air has managed to penetrated the steel reinforcing bars. The majority of fixtures and fittings are missing although the wooden mount for the telephone connection and two mounts for the central instrument pedestal remain.

Fig.7-19. D-20, Hornscross, Devon. ‘Duck boards’ along with two wall mounting brackets for the equipment shelf. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011)

The chaos of abandonment

The recording of Hornscross presents a number of opportunities for the order and chaos model. As the site was released from service at the end of 1968 forty-three years of non-ordered activity has been enacted out on both Cold War structures. In that time a number of activities have taken place, all of which have left a marker indicating one, or a combination of order and chaos components. They also present us with a problem, in so much as most activities are not chronologically specific.

We know from the records of the organisation that the ROC post at Hornscross was closed in October 1968 as part of the Civil Defence drawdown initiated by the Wilson government (Wood 1992, 285; Royal Observer Corps, HC Deb 03 May 1968). This

provides us with a chronological end to the influence exerted on this small compound by a highly ordered entity – in this case the Royal Observer Corps. Identifying that end by the material culture discovered on site is difficult, date markers if present at all can only be ephemeral in date. What is clear is that there is most definitely a recognisable boundary between order and chaos. There is, however, a transitory phase in the abandonment process, one that Hornscross currently displays. A number of items connected explicitly with the organisation remain. These include the chemical toilet, cupboard and bunk beds, although all three are currently transitioning from the realm of utilisation to one of redundancy. Indeed, all three specific artefacts, indicative of the structure and organisation they represent, are a reflective microcosm of the space they were intended to inhabit.

One artefact, discovered in the compound, can be considered an example of the contrast between public and secret, visible and hidden or, to a lesser extent, core and peripheral. A number of underground monitoring posts were kitted out with three beds, two as bunks and a single (Wood 1992, 222). Today those posts overtly curated tend to only have two present as the third makes it difficult to move around due to the restricted space. At Hornscross two bunk frames remain in the underground post, they are corroded, due partly to the damp atmosphere but remain recoverable (fig.7-20). The third is located above ground a few metres away from the entrance stack. This frame is in an advanced state of decay. Corrosion has reduced 25% of the frame to oxidised powder, the rest of the structure is severely compromised (fig.7-21). Vegetation is growing through the framework and the leaf litter is steadily burying what components are left.



Fig.7-20. (left) fig.7-21 (above). D-20, Hornscross, Devon. The demise of the bunks, an event reliant on positioning; exposure to the elements has encouraged rapid deterioration. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/05/2011)

It is also apparent after analysing the paint used below ground, to state that the ROC post has undergone a phase of covert curation. The original paint colours for posts usually comprised white or pale blue gloss on all doors, frameworks, furniture and cable runs. At some stage in the life of Hornscross all cable runs and door frames have been painted white, this has been executed using emulsive paints rather than oil based. In the following years this has become damp and started to peel off revealing the gloss surfaces below.

It would appear that only the casual, interested visitor now descends the ladder into the world below, others may wish to do so but find the prospect daunting, electing instead to drop items down the shaft to aid guessing the depth. It is also likely that the more readily available Orlit post might reduce the requirement to explore the underground monitoring post, offering a safer although just as exciting prospect. The current overgrown state of the compound ensures that any investigation by the casual visitor is likely to be undertaken cautiously. Trackways within the compound allow us to chart movement through this macro secret landscape and may hint at some of the depositional activities recognised on site, something that has been increasingly difficult to recognise at the majority of sites investigated during this project.

The square compound is located to the south of a minor road between the hamlets of Northway (600m to the east) and Sloo (200 m to the west) and covers 232.25 sq.m. The Orlit post stands towards the north-east corner while the underground component is located in the south-west quarter. The only access currently is through a small gap in the undergrowth from the road.



Fig.7-22 (left) looking south towards the rear of the compound and the underground element of the post. Fig.7-23 (right). Looking north towards the road, note Orlit ladder and legs. Access in both directions is restricted by vegetation. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013)

The only visible sign of the post structure beyond the compound is a truncated telegraph pole and the partially hidden vestiges of the Type ‘B’ Orlit. Once inside the confines of the compound movement is restricted by the density of the undergrowth, dominated by fast growing bramble, nettles and bracken (fig,7-22 and fig.7-23). Growth is restricted slightly underneath the Orlit structure, although the ground surface is still difficult to access; other areas are only accessible due to casual visitors trampling down vegetation, creating a specific route to the underground monitoring post entrance stack. It was only when the site was accessed early

enough in the growing year (1 April 2013) that it became possible to access the ground surface, then a number of aspects of peripheral material culture were recognised.

Transition Reviewed

Of all the facets recognised during the fieldwork, the markers recognised on sites in transition are, by far, the most representative of archaeological site creation. They are also the most informative when considering the abandonment process and conversion of the 'secret' to the 'public'. The two sites utilised as case studies here also demonstrate some of the pit falls when interpreting sites in general. Two structures with the same intended utilisation, operated by the same highly organised group, display quite different levels of activity. Moreover, it is likely that the level those human activities are driven or influenced by other monuments in the underground monitoring post's surrounding landscape. Avebury, as noted above, accepts hundreds of thousands of visitors a year, a large majority of whom will ascend Wadon Hill to view both the large henge enclosure to the north and overlook Silbury Hill to the south. It is not unreasonable to suggest quite a number of those who do access this vantage point also interact with the overtly prominent ROC post. Hornscross, on the other hand, is located in a tranquil, under-populated area of Devon, a landscape unlikely to be visited by those with similar motives to those visiting Avebury. Subsequently, there is less interaction with the underground world at Hornscross. Those who do venture towards the back of the overgrown compound appear to explore the secret world below by dropping objects into the darkness to see how deep it is rather than physically enter it.

Transition appears to have no chronological basis as both case studies have different official lifecycles. Hornscross was closed during the rundown of Civil Defence services in October 1968 (Wood 1992, 284); Avebury was retained until September 1991 (ROC observer pers comm). Impressions out in the field would suggest otherwise, the advanced state of decay and attention from destructive visitors' point to Avebury having been abandoned first, when in reality the opposite is true. So sites in the transition phase of their order and chaos lifecycle can be further categorised when considering their closeness to populated areas or landscapes that see large interaction with the general public. Whether the site is hidden from view or

overtly placed in the landscape appears to have little bearing on activities enacted on them, indeed the more overt the ROC post, the more destructive the activities.

COVERT CURATION

Covert curation covers those ROC posts owned by a group whom are not specifically educationally driven. The key motivation appears to be one of commemoration although ownership is often centred around the needs of the individual or group. This aspect of the chaos model is the fastest growing of all those recognised in this project, it has implications for the continued survivability of field monuments and, I suspect, is partially driven by financial incentives in a number of cases.

Case Study – D-3 Bampton, Devon

Post and location history

Royal Observer Corps Post Bampton (original designation 22/X.1) was opened in September 1938 at map reference SS 960234. The post was re-sited to SS 973187 (designation 10/Y.3) as part of the Orlit upgrades from November 1953. There is no archaeological evidence for the type of overground post, however a previous reference to two legs of a Type ‘B’ did appear on a specialist website in 2000 (Subbrit 30/09/2000). While the legs were not extant during site visits for this project the landscape position of Bampton coupled with the geography suggests an Orlit post type ‘B’ would have been the most likely choice here. The site was provided with an underground monitoring post in October 1961; the post was to remain operational until September 1991.



Fig.7-24. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Bampton ROC post (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Topographically Bampton stands centrally to a small plateau (central point 278m above O.D.). Structurally it is a typical underground monitoring post with the exception that the ground zero indicator is mounted on a brick plinth (0.75m high). The post is 22 metres due west of a road called Vanpost Hill and 2.75m higher than it – effectively obscuring the ROC post from the road. Thirty metres to the south-east is a small quarry-like scoop out of the verge of the road, large enough to park several cars in and likely to have been utilised by the ROC post crew during activities. At the northern edge of the proposed carpark are a set of concrete steps with a stainless steel handrail, ascending the 2.75m up from the road onto the plateau.

Biography of Bampton post-September 1991

Historiography from Secondary Sources

No official information regarding the transfer of the Bampton ROC post has been located as yet however, it is likely the site was offered back to the original landowner during the immediate post- stand-down period. Assessing images currently lodged

on interest websites it appears that the Bampton post remained essentially intact (fig.7-25) until 2003 (Subbrit 30/09/2000). Then, sometime between 2003 and 2008 the fence surrounding the compound was breached and the north-west concrete corner post removed. Soil was then piled onto the post, burying the entrance stack to the level of the hatch and completely covering the bomb power indicator and fixed survey metre above ground mounts. The ventilation stack was not buried during this event. The ground zero indicator plinth had then been pushed over towards the north lying on top of the soil dumped on site. The entrance hatch was still accessible, although it had been substantially damaged prior to 2008 (fig.7-26).

Fig.7-25. D-3, Bampton, Devon. The post as it appeared in 2002. A decade after stand-down the post appears to be in a state of covert curation. (Source: Robin Ware)

Fig.7-26. D-3, Bampton, Devon. The scene at the post in 2008. It is feasible that this decay had started by 2003. (Source: Mark Russell)

A further line of interaction with the post and the surrounding landscape was initiated in 2009 when the post was included in the United Kingdom's Geocaching Database.

Geocaching has become a nation-wide phenomenon over the last decade or so, driven by the increased availability of hand-held Global Positioning Systems for sports activities and, of course, dedicated online sites covering geocaching locations across the British Isles. Interestingly, the current web page describes the post, utilising the information from the Subbrit web record, including a photograph of the post when still complete in 2001. It then goes on to suggest 'There is no need to enter the field where the bunker is related' (Geocaching, 11/01/2009) as the cache is actually located by the steps with the steel handrail that leads from the road. Naturally those who visit the geocache are likely to visit the post too and, may well interact with it on a more than passive note.

On 10 August 2010 the ROC post at Bampton was offered for sale, appearing on a web page with the domain name http://nuclearbunkersforsale. Blogspot.co.uk/ . The sale price is not available, although the post is noted as being freehold and having a 'claw-back' clause of 30% should the land be redeveloped in the next five years. Imagery included in the sale document again relies on photographs from the Subbrit investigation a decade earlier.

Baseline Assessment

The first baseline visit for this project was conducted on 27 May 2011. It was clear from the outset that some form of human activity had occurred between 2008 and 2011, the ground zero indicator plinth had been rolled further north until it came into contact with one of the extant concrete fence posts (fig.7-27). The north and western sides of the entrance stack, especially around the vent had been partially removed. This activity had removed spoil material from the very corner of the entrance stack indicating intended, rather than animal, interaction. The northern side of the spoil heap was also partially removed, this time with the aid of a mechanical bucket. This activity had pushed over the bomb power indicator mount although the fixed survey meter mount appeared undamaged. The entrance hatch had been removed, replaced with a piece of old kitchen unit with the warning 'DANGER – NO STEP – Do Not Remove – STEEP DROP' marker penned on the upper face.

Fig.7-27. D-3, Bampton, Devon. By the time of the baseline survey for this project the process of abandonment had taken a positive turn. Soil was being removed and items' of post furniture restored. (Source Bob Clarke 27/05/2011)

The chaos of abandonment

Considering the factions of the 'order and chaos' model it was clear the ROC post at Bampton was suffering destructive visits, exhibiting redundancy and reduction processes through the removal of items and destruction of the fence line reducing the posts overall landscape impact. All events and activities are components of the abandonment process identified in the model utilised in this thesis. The act of burying the site is more difficult to interpret, especially since the event did not cover the entrance such that there was no access to the structure below. It is possibly that it was an act of protection for the monument, covering many of the parts of the structure that could be removed. Certainly the indication from the baseline visit was that the ROC post at Bampton was in an advance state of ruination, it was deteriorating due to the ingress of water, sections had been removed from site, while others were damaged and the whole compound was covered in advance stage vegetation. What happened next was totally unexpected.

An interim assessment of Bampton was planned for the following year, due, in part, to the potential for further activity to be enacted during the next twelve months, this assessment was conducted on 12 June 2012 (fig.7-28). Two aspects stood out. Firstly, the spoil covering the site had been all but removed, only a small amount a few centimetres deep remained in the southern area of the compound. Secondly, the ground zero indicator plinth had been re-erected on the entrance stack. This refitting of a substantial block of brick, concrete and metalwork could only have been undertaken with the help of machinery. More activities involved the replacement of the temporary board covering the entrance way with a fully functional hatch. There was still evidence of destructive acts, specifically, all concrete fence posts, apart from the three extant comer posts, had been removed. There was no evidence for either the soil or posts close to the site, again suggesting the help of machinery. From the evidence above ground it was clear that the structure had moved from a state of ruination and destruction to one of adoption and reinstatement, that said the lack of public information means post is not currently overtly curated, allowing me to place this site in the covert category.

Fig.7-28. D-3, Bampton, Devon. When compared with (fig.7-25 and 7-26) the move back to order is clear. The reconstruction of the Ground Zero Indicator and refurbished entrance hatch are both markers of a covertly curated post. (source: Bob Clarke 12/06/2012)

Case Study – D-7 Christow, Devon

Post and location history

Royal Observer Corps Post Christow (original designation 21/F.2) was opened in July 1940 at map reference SX 867800. The post was re-sited to SX 831831 (designation 21/G.1) as part of the Orlit upgrades from November 1953. There is no archaeological evidence for the type of overground post although the landscape position of Christow coupled with the geography suggests an Orlit post type 'B' would have been the most likely choice here. The site was provided with an underground monitoring post in September 1960; it was to remain operational until September 1991.



Fig.7-29. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Christow ROC post (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Topographically Christow stands centrally to a small knoll (central point 255m above O.D.) known as Barton Down (fig.7-29). Structurally it is a typical underground

monitoring post with the exception that the ground zero indicator was mounted on a concrete plinth (1.2m high) 75m to the west of the underground section. Interestingly the landscape, especially the visible aspects, is very different today from those when the ROC post was first constructed. The 1958 edition Landmark Information Group sheet of the Ordnance Survey indicates a structure – interpreted as the Orlit post by this project – just a few metres east from a track cutting across the Down and on the same position as the later underground monitoring post. Moreover, the terrain within the surrounding 400m is depicted as marshland with occasional scrub. At the time of the first baseline visit on 05 June 2011 the complete area was covered in dense evergreen trees reaching at least 25m. On later edition maps a small layby is depicted off the still extant track, at the same position as the earlier Orlit and later underground monitoring post.

Biography of Christow post-September 1991

Historiography from Secondary Sources

No official information has been uncovered through a search of records concerning the post- September 1991 history of the site. Specialist websites do, however, have some detail although much of it overlaps records generated from site visits orchestrated for this project. What can be said with some certainty is that the post was essentially intact above and below ground when visited on 12/08/00 (Subbrit 27/04/2001). At this time the ground zero indicator was still standing on its 1.2m plinth.

Christow does allow us to gauge something of the investment now needed to own an underground monitoring post; on 10 September 2012 the post was sold by online auction. As this particular sale was handled by a specialist estate agent the records are substantially more visible than those offered through private sale such as at Bampton (above). Advertised by Unique Property, the post also appeared on the auction website eBay® ensuring the maximum coverage. Again the sales details were a direct lift from the Subbrit web page record of the post in 2000 (Subbrit 27/04/2001), although the imagery was up to date, mirroring the state previously encountered during the final visit to the site on 2 April 2013). What is enlightening and surprising in equal measure, is the price the underground structure realised. Starting bids were asked in the region of £9000; the post finally realised £17,901 (Unique Property Bulletin, No.2, 2012). Bearing in mind the vandalised state of the

post on two earlier visits (described below) it is surprising so much a financial investment was made.

Baseline Assessment

The first baseline visit for this project was conducted on 05 June 2011. It was clear from the outset that a destructive element of human activity had been on site, evidence included the ground zero indicator plinth now lying prone to the east of its original position. On the underground site artefacts in the form of ROC magazines and highlighter pens had been brought to the surface and lay discarded 5m to the north of the entrance stack.

The entrance stack displayed damage around the entrance hatch such that the casting for the hatch had been broken (fig.7-30). This was probably caused by the removal of the concrete covering it and the edge of the stack. Internally the structure appeared waterlogged – access was not possible due to a scaffolders plank being roped to the access ladder – and the louvres on both the entrance and vent stacks had been damaged.

Fig.7-30. D-7, Christow, Devon. The entrance stack at Christow ROC post. Evidence is clear that a concerted effort has been made to enter the post forcibly. Note also damage to the wooden vent (Centre right) (Source: Bob Clarke 05/06/2011)

Interestingly the louvres were manufactured from wood raising the possibility that they were post-stand-down additions as original fittings were normally either steel or aluminium. The surrounding tree canopy had reduced the light hitting the ground in the area of the post reducing much of the undergrowth although there was a substantial wood ants nest on the southern section of the post. This active mound over 1m high was reducing the magazines discarded on site very rapidly and made initial recording unpleasant. The surface features had been painted in black matt paint and there was a photoelectric cell adhered to the top of the vent stack with wires through the vent down into the structure.

Fig.7-31. D-7, Christow, Devon. The entrance stack at Christow in the process of refurbishment. The hatch has been removed and the hole covered by a multitude of metalwork, all padlocked to the first rung of the ladder. (Source: Bob Clarke 12/06/2012)

The chaos of abandonment

The underground monitoring post at Christow appears to be the focus of tensions within this particular landscape. Prior to the baseline visit in June 2011 little is known about the site's history. The report filled by Subbrit on their dedicated website dates from a visit in 2000 and further images are only ascribed to 2011 and appear to date to a similar time to the first recording visit. Again the destructive visitor appears to be

clearly evident although the process of reduction appears to lack specific organisation. Damage to the wooden vents on both the entrance and vent stacks appear to be acts of destruction rather than attempts at removal. The damage around the entrance hatch suggests attempts to gain access rather than remove the hatch for use elsewhere.

A second visit on 12 June 2012 found the site in the process of refurbishment. The damage around the entrance hatch was substantially worse, with substantial parts of the structure now missing. The hatch had been removed, however access was now impossible due to a complex mixture of corrugated tin sheet and re-bar wired and padlocked to the steel ladder inside the post (fig.7-31). The damage to the wooden louvers on the entrance stack remained although the vent stack had been re-wired and a further small photoelectric cell fitted and wired into the bunker below. Interestingly the yellow bin that appears in pictures dating to 2000 depicting the inside of the post was now on the surface.

Fig.7-32. D-7, Christow, Devon. The totally refurbished entrance stack. The post was in the process of being sold at this point. (Source: Bob Clarke 02/04/2013)

A further visit on 02 April 2013 presented a different picture again. This time the repairs to the vent stack louvers had been damaged again, while those on the

entrance stack had been repaired and appeared in a good state of preservation. The entrance hatch had been refurbished, sporting both new lock lugs and a new paint finish, whilst the concrete around the top of the entrance stack had been repaired and repainted (fig.7-32). Furthermore, the entrance hatch now displayed the details of the owner, who, when referring to available secondary sources (above), was by the time of my last visit, the previous owner.

Covertly curated sites in context

Covert curation is, by far, the most multi-faceted of the two components of chaos connected to the ownership of ROC monuments. The number of posts changing hands at the time of the fieldwork suggests that this phenomenon is on the increase, an assumption supported by the physical evidence currently encountered in the landscape, indicating there is more than one motive for this interaction.

I have concluded there is more to this level of interaction than just remembrance. In some ways the groups or individuals who acquire ROC posts can be likened to those who, three decades earlier, were happy to volunteer their spare time to what they considered a greater cause. One could argue that this drive to own sites connected to the Cold War is fulfilling a personal desire or requirement for 'personal' organisation or regementary activities. During the period 1948-68 over 350,000 civilians were in uniformed voluntary roles with the Civil Defence Corps, Auxiliary Fire Service and, crucially, 25,000 of those were members of the Royal Observer Corps (Grant 2010, 72).

Figures for the number of retirements and new starts are unavailable although the survey I conducted indicates – via age and attestation profiling - that there was a steady flow of volunteers into the organisation right up to the stand-down in September 1991.The connections between redundant ROC posts and groups or individuals connected with military history and/or re-enactment will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter, although it is appropriate here to note that this activity is specialist enough to have an impact on the ROC landscape at local, regional and national level. To consider the level of impact on the post and its transition from order to chaos, requires a reorganisation of the material culture of the originator organisation to one more in line with the current ownership regime. Physical markers are in evidence; however, it would appear that the search for originality is stimulating a behaviour akin to a 'property boom' as both posts are

artefacts connected with the Royal Observer Corps have risen dramatically over the last decade (Facebook Post Restorers Group).

The following entries are a direct result of the following question I posted on the group page (noted above) on 13 May 2016. A number of pieces of equipment feature, although the Bomb Power Indicator is clearly a difficult item to obtain (fig.7-33): -

> *A general question for you all. Has the increase in bunkers under restoration forced an increase in the cost of original equipment and fittings. Best wishes Bob.*

Comment.

> Definitely Bob. Back in 2008 I was able to get a GZI, BPI, probe rod and FSM dome for £800. You'd not get that now!
>
> Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:44pm

Comment.

> yep, as well as the intrest [sic] in all things cold war
>
> Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:44pm

Comment.

> Like NAME REMOVED has already said, there has been a marked increase in the price of equipment which started around 2009. Since then the price of even the smallest item has trebled, in part due to the amount of restorations and new collectors.
>
> Like · Reply · 1 · May 13 at 5:48pm

Comment.

> Cost of bunkers has gone up too. My local one, which was bought for a couple of K back in the 90's sold for 22,500 two years ago. Sadly, he's not done a thing with it, it's all overgrown, it's been broken into and it's filling with water
>
> Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:54pm

Reply

Bob Clarke Hi NAME REMOVED, thanks for that. Do you know if the post reverted back to the landowner after stand down?

Like · Reply · May 13 at 5:56pm

Comment.

I believe it did

Unlike · Reply · 1 · May 13 at 6:01pm

Comment.

My first bpi cost thirty quid. smile emoticon:)

Like · Reply · 2 · May 13 at 10:09pm

Comment.

increase in price is one main reason I have made so many replica items. I would rather drop a £30 fake than a now £1K original bpi for example

Unlike · Reply · 2 · May 13 at 11:20pm

Fig.7-33. A Bomb Power Indicator – on loan from the ROC Museum (now defunct) to Great Bedwyn post. As the respondents noted (above) this item is now worth £1000. (Source: Bob Clarke 26/05/2012)

Looking beyond the two case studies used for this category a number of other posts in the Devon dataset display covert curation. ROC post Modbury demonstrates tensions between the landowner and the restoring group. The post has a

photoelectric cell attached to the ground zero indicator stack and indicates repairs have been undertaken in the vicinity of the entrance hatch. However, this evidence of restoration is in sharp contrast to the steady erosion of the post immediately beyond the structure's footprint. The compound concrete posts have been pulled up and dumped on the central section of the underground monitoring post (fig.7-34) and the radio securing mounts are also out of place. Ploughing has reduced the footprint of the post and compound dramatically, a lynchet is recognisable along the west and north side of the site indicating the original position of the compound fence line.

Fig.7-34. D-27, Modbury, Devon. The central area of the ROC post at Modbury is covered in the debris of the compound fencing. Ploughing also continues to erode the site. (Source: Bob Clarke 02/04/2013)

Fig.7-35. D-9, Drewsteignton, Devon. The area inside the compound is now being filled by trees and shrubs. This activity is increasing the visibility of the post on the skyline. (03/04/2012 Bob Clarke)

At Drewsteignton a completely different approach has been taken. Here the compound remains intact however, a number of trees have been planted inside the fence line (fig.7-35). A notice near the gate declares ‘nothing valuable inside’ and provides a telephone number; to date no successful contact has been made via this number. The modification of the landscape in this location is obvious, trees both seclude the post from view, naturalising the landscape, while simultaneously removing the one activity the post was intended to act out in war – observation of phenomena connected with nuclear detonation.

Post restorer numbers are in such ascendance that they now have a large online presence, although requests to join or solicit a response have been met with silence in the most part, mirroring the early efforts of this project; during the initial year of research proved difficult to engage any former members in conversation about the organisation to which they belonged. This ‘secretive’ element has eased somewhat

recently as members of distinctly separate groups slowly coalesce removing barriers as they do so, so much so that I have been initiated into a group specific to post restoration on Facebook (Facebook Post Restorers Group), enabling a dialogue to be constructed over covert curation.

The key problem with ascribing ROC posts to an activity suggested to be 'secret' or covert is how we actually recognise a site is covertly curated. I suggest certain markers/activities are recognisable; all manifest themselves on the ROC posts utilised in this study and that fall into this type, although some are obviously subtler than others. While this method of interpretation may not be 100% accurate applying it has allowed me to increase the accuracy of this proposed behaviour. The behavioural markers and motivations demonstrated as an increase in covertly curated sites, including the effect it is having on the, now officially abandoned, ROC landscape, is the focus of the following chapter.

OVERT CURATION

Overt curation is a point in the lifecycle of the ROC post that indicates a specific group, usually the last Royal Observer Corps members to inhabit the space when operational, now maintain the post. The activities are specific with motivation to educate the public at the top of the group agenda. Moreover, the sites are publicised as a form of living museum, hold open days where the public are encouraged to visit, encounter the 'secret' world below and experience the conditions under which an observer would work during wartime. The following two case studies are examples of overtly curated posts.

Case Study – W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire

Post and Location History



Fig.7-36. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Great Bedwyn ROC post (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

The Royal Observer Corps post at Great Bedwyn (original designation 23/B.3) was opened in January 1938 at map reference SU 278648. It was a typical pre-World War II structure comprising a watching and instrument area surrounded with railway sleepers and earth mounded up as extra protection, late in the war a shed for the crew to shelter in was also built (Observer 15 post account 30 August 2015 pers comm). It appears the post was retained and regenerated in the 1947-8 rebuild of the Corps. The post was re-designated in November 1953 (14/I.4), although no evidence has come to light as to whether an Orlit structure was provided. The post was moved in September 1959 and provided with an underground monitoring post in August 1961. It remained in operation, as 15 post reporting to Winchester, until stand-down in September 1991 (Wood 1992, 316).

Topographically Great Bedwyn underground monitoring post is unusually placed. The primary activity of the post crew was to monitor the direction, height and power of the nuclear blast, all essentially observational activities. The post at Great Bedwyn is located next to a water pumping station, in a valley running north-east/south-west, overlooking a railway track and the Kennet and Avon Canal. The lowest point of the valley is 110 above O.D. with the post located at 123.8m above O.D. To the north the ground rises to 176m O.D. in less that 800m, while to the south it reaches 157m above O.D. in just over 1000m. Effectively the post can only monitor two directions – interestingly those areas include Oxford to the north east and Salisbury, with high concentrations of military stations and bases in the close vicinity. While no actual reason for the ROC post's move to the current location has been identified the landscape position of the underground monitoring post and its restricted view-sheds have to be suggestive of intentional placing. The post stands in a compound 24 by 12 metres (fig.7-36), contained within is the underground monitoring post and a large concrete base, the site of a timber hut until 2006. Access to the compound is through a substantial metal gate capable of accepting a vehicle, a sign declaring the owners as the Ministry of Defence hangs on the gate.

Biography of Great Bedwyn post-September 1991

Historiography

When the Government stood-down the Royal Observer Corps posts in September 1991, Great Bedwyn post was retained as part of Crown Estates until disposed of in January 2012 (Marlborough. News 24 January 2014). The current owners are Ramsbury Estates, a subsidiary of a landholding firm in Luxembourg. The ROC crew have been renovating the site for display since 2004 and the post now opens for pre-booked groups (fig.7-37) and once a year for a fund raising barbecue. The annual cost of renting the site is currently set at £500.

Fig.7-37. W-5, Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. Devizes Museum visit to Great Bedwyn post 26/05/2012. A donation was made of £50 to help the upkeep of the post. (Source: Bob Clarke)

Many posts are situated in isolated areas, often far from populated areas, this is not the case for 15 post. It is located next to a busy, if minor, road and with the continued exposure of many posts on the internet, especially when still full of expensive to replace equipment, the crew are justifiably nervous of potential break-ins. Accordingly, the crew regularly request any images of their post on the internet are removed, interestingly this was how I made contact with the group as they were quite anonymous at the time of the initial work for this project. According to the lead observer the post had only been broken into once and that had been during the early 1980s when the post was operational. Then the only damage was the wooden door to the monitoring room and the wet weather gear was stolen. Interestingly Group headquarters , on learning of the incident, suggested the crew leave the door unlocked from then on in – presumably to save on repairs (Lead Observer 15 post 28 March 2016).

The Chaos of Abandonment

An initial visit to the site on 8 February 2012 revealed above ground features in pristine condition, no corrosion and a layer gloss green paint in good condition; the compound and grounds it contained were also in good order. This is deceiving. A team from Subterranea Britannica visited the post during their recording of Cold War sites across the United Kingdom, they paint a very different picture, describing a site in decay rather than curation. The online record dates the visit on 9/10/1999, just over a decade after the ROC post was closed. It reports that the concrete around the top of the entrance stack was damaged, there was a substantial timber hut at the western end of the compound – used to store car parts – and four Citroen cars were parked between it and the underground post (Subbrit 02/05/2001). By 2006 the hut had burnt down and a year later the remnants had been cleared, compound grass cut, a new gate (with MoD sign) fitted and the post restored.

Since the current restoration team, comprising original members of the post crew, have rented the site it has been maintained to a very high standard. The casual visitor is presented with a monitoring facility that looks, to all intense and purpose, like a site still operational, and that is the intention (fig.7-38) – 'hence the sign on the gate that mirrors the original that was on the gate when we actually were operations' (Lead Observer 15 post 30 August 2015 pers comm).

Fig.7-38. W-5, Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. The restored interior of the underground monitoring post. The majority of equipment seen here was retained at stand-down, other pieces are either manufactured or bought from internet sites. (Source: Bob Clarke 25/05/2012)

Case Study – C-17 Veryan, Cornwall

Post and Location History

The Royal Observer Corp post located at Veryan, Cornwall (original designation 20/T.2) was opened in January 1940 at map reference SW 913388. In 1953 it was re-designated 11/F.1 at the same location however, I have been unable to substantiate whether an Orlit post was provided at this time. The ROC post was re-sited to SW 920375 in September 1962 – operating out of a redundant World War II 'Starfish' control room until the post was provided with an underground monitoring post in July 1963 (Observer 67 post 18 October 2012 pers comm). The post remained in operation until stand-down in September 1991.



Fig.7-39. Landscape aspects in the immediate environs of Veryan ROC post. Note interaction with remnants of World War II Starfish site (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Archaeologically the current ROC post is just a few meters from the cliff on Nare Head overlooking Veryan Bay, providing almost unequalled views in 360° (fig.7-39).

The underground monitoring post is just one component of a twentieth century military landscape in this area. This particular landscape was formally used as a decoy site for Plymouth in the Second World War. Although very little is recognisable today the control centre remains extant, being used briefly in 1962-63 by the ROC. The centre is currently covered by a large heap of soil although suggestions have been made to the current owners, the National Trust, that is should be uncovered and presented to the public as part of a wider passive defence landscape that includes the ROC post (Observer 67 post 18 October 2016 pers comm). The underground monitoring post is of a standard type with no additions. Access to the post is via a long track originally connected to the earlier World War II decoy site.

Biography of Veryan post-September 1991

Historiography

> In 1994 the Truro Branch of ROCA [Royal Observer Corps Association] decided they wanted to acquire a post, do it all up and equip it as a small item of ROC heritage. We attempted to buy Penryn ROC Post but were outbid. We then looked around at leasing and found that the National Trust owned Veryan Post. We entered into a peppercorn rent lease and repaired the post and opened it up as a museum in 1996.
>
> Extract of email from Lead Observer Veryan post: dated 10/06/2011
>
> At that time the post opened as a museum all Health and Safety, public liability insurance and maintenance was the responsibility of the post crew. The required revenue was generated via donations when the post was open to visitors. By 2004 the insurance premiums were far more than the post generated in revenue and it looked like the site would have to cease public visits. Negotiations with the National Trust resolved the situation through a transfer of responsibility. We [The post crew] terminated our lease, allowing the post and, subsequently, the liability for insurance to revert back to National Trust control. We then joined the National Trust and signed up as

volunteers thus negating the need for separate Health and Safety and public liability arrangements.

A précis of a conversation with the Lead Observer on 18 October 2012 during a National Trust Open Day at the post

The post is now opened at certain times of the year, often coinciding with other natural history or conservation initiatives (fig.7-40). This particular open day (18 October 2012) was part of the 'Rosedale Festival'. Since Veryan post has been open as a visitor attraction it has enjoyed the patronage of *c*.1600 visitors. All are pre-booked, however, people do arrive unannounced whilst the post is open. The Royal Observer Corps post members elected to maintain a presence at 67 Veryan Post and where possible educate the public regarding the organisation that they were justifiably proud. To date there had only been one attempted break in – that was unsuccessful.

Fig.7-40. C-17, Veryan, Cornwall. Members of the public being briefed by the Lead Volunteer Observer on the function of the Ground Zero Indicator. A unique solution to the management of this site has ensured the post remains as an important educational asset. (Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2012)

The chaos of Abandonment

The opportunity to recognise any impact on the ROC post due to abandonment is difficult, primarily because of the restoration work carried out by the Veryan team. Certainly the post had been all but abandoned after 1991, although it was kept under a watchful eye by a few of the former observers who lived locally. Five years on from stand-down the process of restoration started, apparently the biggest issue was the corrosive aspect of being very close to the sea. The post now receives regular anti-corrosion inspections and is protected by a thick layer of gloss green paint. One aspect that could quite easily be overlooked is the lack of a fence around the post. When this small piece of landscape reverted back to the National Trust the fence was removed along with the concrete posts, thus neutralising an obstacle to physical encounters. While this event was not intended as attempt to make the post less visible in the landscape (National Trust Warden 18 October 2011 per comm) it probably helped reduce the number of destructive visitors to the site.

Overtly Curated Sites in Context

Overtly curated sites present a number of complex activities, not least the tensions between those who wish to commemorate the efforts of the Royal Observer Corps and those intending to enter the underground world without permission. Clearly visibility is a key aspect of how people interact with both sites. At Great Bedwyn the post crew employ an authoritarian approach, maintaining a high security fence, replicating original signage suggesting military ownership and policing (fig.7-41), where possible, imagery and information that appears on the internet or in published works. This approach creates a rigid dichotomy between ‘public’ and ‘secret’ – reinforcing the conditions to which the Great Bedwyn post was originally established and in so doing promote an atmosphere of control and covert activities even though the post is now promoted as an educational resource.

Fig.7-41. W-5, Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire. The intention at Great Bedwyn, is to provide an impression of MoD ownership and continued operation. The sign presents an air of permissive entrance for the public. (Source: Bob Clarke 4/08/2012)

Veryan post appears to have a far more liberal approach to how interaction with the public is managed. The above ground components of the monitoring post are fully exposed to all aspects of the chaos component although, position in the landscape, closeness to settlement, roads and the use of the surrounding landscape all play their part in determining the severity of each aspect. What the post does not do is promote itself as a military installation, the removal of the fence reduces the visual impact and lends to the benign appearance of the entrance and vent stack (fig.7-42). Thankfully it would appear that the tactics employed on both sites have, thus far, gone some way to ensuring destructive visitors are few and far between.

Fig.7-42. C-17, Veryan, Cornwall. The National Trust has removed the traditional barrier to entry – the fence – reducing the landscape impact to a far lower level (compare with Fig.7-41 above) (Source: Bob Clarke 18/10/2012)

Is this Chaos?

Overtly curated sites offer different interpretation of 'chaos' as a state. The secret world of the nuclear monitoring post, when penetrated by the public, brings with it a form of chaos not readily visible, the secret space is now no longer controlled. Where once only the initiated signatories of the Official Secrets Act were allowed now the uninitiated are provided unconditional access. As post crews describe their craft to those now encased in the concrete-lined subterranean control room, they are inducting visitors into a world they had until visiting, only been partially aware. And this is the key reason for the curation of both posts. In the Royal Observer Corps online survey for this project the question was posed 'What made you want to join the Royal Observer Corps?' Of those who completed this section 26% cited a will to help community and country, it would appear natural then that a number of former members would be interesting in promoting the organisation today especially when considering the humanitarian aspects of air raid and fallout warning. Overt curation is

not the only curatoral activity enacted on ROC posts. It is to the more complex phenomenon of covert curation that we now turn.

THE EFFECTS OF SCHEDULING ON THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD

Applying such a rigid framework thus far takes no account of those sites that are under official protection, the scheduled sites. Between the construction of any given ROC post and the subsequent decommissioning of the post (be that 1968 or 1991) the owner/operator of the whole network was, as introduced previously (chapter 3), a highly ordered organisation. Any major deviation from that highly ordered path could render the post, in times of crisis, useless. Beyond stand-down the fate of each post has been radically different, as demonstrated above, although one specific activity – that of national legislative preservation – appears to have no bearing on the state of preservation actually encountered on site. Why that might be is complicated, although this is a valid and important aspect of this study as the situation has implications for the sustainability of a valuable educational and social resource going forward.

A number of ROC posts nationally are subject to statutory protection through scheduling, within those monuments visited and recorded for this project four are under that legislation. They are wide spread and all except one, Skipsea post, North Yorkshire, are implicated in the notice via other monuments in their immediate landscape. Beyond Skipsea (Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring post and World War II visual spotting post, 200m north of Southfield House, List No. 1021192) no other ROC post has been included in the scheduling system in England purely on its own merits. A brief look at Historic England's records indicate 23 ROC posts noted in scheduling, an extremely small representation if we consider the number of posts built in Devon and Cornwall during the underground phase of the organisation. Basically 6% of the total of underground monitoring posts in Devon (52 by 1965) are currently scheduled. No structures in Wiltshire (24 constructed) are, to date, protected and of those ROC posts structures visited across England for this project (33), only one more was encountered (Pickering post, North Yorkshire, described in chapter 5).

A Resume

Utilising the four states of preservation I have developed to classify aspects of the abandonment process referenced as chaos it becomes immediately apparent that

scheduling has little effect on the state of preservation. Indeed, the state of other attendant monuments noted in the scheduling does in some cases have influence on the later contemporary archaeology.

ROC post D-6 Berry Head, Devon

The Royal Observer Corps landscape at (D-6) Berry Head, overlooking Torbay, underpins this assumption. The following extract from the scheduled notice (Berry Head Fort and battery and Hardy's Head Battery, List No.1017322) notes the site specifically. However, as the site was first scheduled on 9 November 1950, long before either the Orlit or underground monitoring post it is clear a judgement of value implicitly connected to the monuments of the Royal Observer Corps has to have been made later. It is likely that the ROC monumental landscape was added at the last amendment incorporated on 14 March 2000.

> Berry Head figured again in the 20th century defence of Britain with the erection of a Royal Observer Corps post within the monument during World War II and the construction of an underground Cold War monitoring post in 1959-60.
>
> Berry Head Fort and battery and Hardy's Head Battery, List No.1017322

Fig.7-43. D-6, Brixham, Devon. The multi-phase site at Berry Head components of a noted scheduled landscape. The emphasis here is in public education. (Source: Bob Clarke 25/05/2011)

The site, owned by Torbay Council, maintains the ROC structures to a high standard. The underground monitoring post is empty; however, it receives regular maintenance above ground. With the fence removed the public now have direct access to the post, including the opportunity to climb on the entrance and vent stacks; signage indicates the structure's intended use. The World War II and 1950s Orlit posts have been reused as a bird watching point, again maintaining the structures intended role, and in so doing, maintaining the structures themselves. Public access and education is the key driver for the curation of the whole of Berry Head, information boards and a visitor centre enhance the learning experience for those who visit (fig.7-43). The attendant ROC posts form another tangible link with the military's continued use of this specific landscape and are incorporated as such. The maintenance of the ROC structures falls into the health and safety remit of the council, who has an obligation to its visitors, hence the post being well maintained (Torbay Berry Head Warden, pers comm 25 May 2011). The signs describing the role of the ROC in this landscape place this post into the overtly curated group.

ROC post Y-3 Pickering, North Yorkshire

The multi-phase landscape connected to the ROC at Pickering was first entered on the schedule on the 22 March 1962, although it is the most recent amendment, dating from 07 July 2000, that included the ROC itself (Beacon Hill ringwork siege castle and Royal Observer Corps post, List No. 1019091). A substantial generalised description covering the development of the landscape from World War II to the end of the Cold War, along with structural descriptions of all ROC monuments is included in the notice. Interestingly the notice also includes the following: -

> A wooden fence extends around the Orlit and underground posts, defining the area originally under military control. This fence and all the other remains of Royal Observer Corps posts are included within the monument.

Beacon Hill ringwork siege castle and Royal Observer Corps post, List No. 1019091

Fig.7-44. Y-3, Pickering, North Yorkshire. Both the Orlit post 'A' and underground monitoring post form part of the scheduling of this site. Note the post and rail fence, also part of the scheduling notice. (Sources: Bob Clarke 01/11/2014)

This is not the usual pattern of fence utilised when defining an area for a post, indeed it was placed around the site just after stand-down (Pickering site owner pers comm) and one wonders what brought the monument inspector to the decision to include it in the notice (fig.7-44). The post itself has received the attention of a post restorer over the last six years, he holds the lease on the structure from the current landowner, but was unwilling to share details of the arrangement. Furthermore, I enquired as to how the current occupier deals with the restoration of a scheduled ancient monument given the constraints, "– the repairs was [sic] like for like so they did not affect the monument in any way." (Pickering site owner pers comm). Currently the post is painted bright green, parts of the Orlit post also displayed this colour, fresh paint raises the awareness of the site being in some form of 'ownership', although no external information is present to indicate either the use or the history of the site. This post is clearly currently a covertly curated site.

ROC post D-41 Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon

The landscape in which an underground monitoring post stands is an ancient one. Known as Raddon Hill, monuments include a causewayed enclosure, Bronze Age enclosures and field systems and a small univallate enclosure from the Early Iron Age. The site was first scheduled on 23 December 1997 after a series of excavations demonstrated the national importance of the site (Raddon Hill: A Neolithic causewayed enclosure and later hillfort, List Number: 1016259).

> Situated near the centre of the causewayed enclosure is an underground monitoring post of the Royal Observer Corps. The post, now decommissioned, was Station 20 of the ROC Exeter 10 Group, Stockleigh Pomeroy. It survives in good condition and is included in the scheduling.

> Raddon Hill: A Neolithic causewayed enclosure and later hillfort, List Number: 1016259

Fig.7-45. D-41, Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon. The weather and lack of maintenance is adding to the overall degradation of the site. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013)

The ROC post at the time of the baseline visit on 26 May 2011 discovered a site in a state of disrepair. Situated on top of Raddon Hill at 217m O.D. the post is totally exposed to the elements and, fourteen years after initial scheduling is now in a poor state. Corrosion around all ferrous metal is in an advanced state and a combination of rain and frost is reducing the integrity of all concrete joints, most noticeable being the step for the entrance stack. The entrance stack had been modified to prevent access to the control room below. This required a steel band, 2.54cm wide, being bent over the hatch and secured on both sides to the concrete structure, this had been cut allowing access once again, although, only once the hatch had also been deformed by forced entry. Around 60% of the compound fence posts were extant, with remnants of wire mesh still visible between a few uprights. The general state of this post, far from being in 'good condition', has moved into a transitory phase (fig.7-45).

ROC post D-39 Sharpitor, Devon

The Royal Observer Corps landscape of Sharpitor has already been introduced through the case study presenting posts in a state of ruined or destroyed (above). Here I focus solely on the implications of scheduling, and in this case the dichotomy it presents. The scheduling notice includes the following:-

> The structures and buildings associated with RAF Sharpitor were dismantled after operations ceased, but enough remains to provide an insight into this unusual and significant military base. The civil defence bunker provides a further dimension to this site and is one of a comparatively small number to survive intact.
>
> Prehistoric coaxial field system and cairns, an historic enclosure and part of RAF Sharpitor, situated on and around Peek Hill, List Number: 1020238

At the time of the baseline study (11 May 2011) all above ground features had been removed to the level of the mound surface although still visible in the case of the

vent and entrance stack. When the inspector visited the site, the date first scheduled is recorded as 11 February 2002 so presumably visited sometime in 2001, there is every possibility that the structure was indeed, ‘intact’. The online record created by Subbrit places their record to 27/04/2001, the post had been destroyed by that date according to this, leaving just the underground portion of the structure extant. The question is whether the inspector visited the site in the window between extant and destroyed or not, I suggest the post was still complete at the time as the remnants of the post are clearly in a ruinous state, something I am sure would have been noted at the time.

Fig.7-46. D-39, Sharpitor, Devon. The earth mound surrounding the semi-sunken structure of the underground monitoring room. The removal of all surface features has rendered the post a difficult to interpret site in an already multi-phase landscape. (Source: Bob Clarke 11/05/2011)

It is likely the decision to remove the above ground structural elements was partially driven by the pressure being exerted locally to return the site to moorland, removing all aspects of the military incursions into the landscape. Clearly the remains of recent conflict are the subject of tension, redundant military structures, especially those from the recent past (post World War II especially) are difficult to demonstrate that they have a value. Considering the politicised history of RAF Sharpitor (presented above), it is perhaps surprising that anything remains of the underground monitoring post (fig. 7-46). The interesting point here is that the ROC post at Sharpitor is a reflection of the wider military landscape in which it sits – a landscape of military ruin.

Comparing this with the very different situation at Berry Head, where the series of posts are considered both an integral part of the military landscape and an educational resource, it is clear to see why the scheduling of the two sites can only be considered on their own merit.

A 'Scheduling' Pattern?

It is clear from the observations made during this project that the imposed legislation applied when a scheduled notice is served appears to make little, or no difference, to the state of preservation encountered on site, moreover, the landscapes to which each site is attributed is often complicated by wide archaeological diversity. Key to the continued upkeep of ROC monuments appears to be how the surrounding landscape is valued, interpreted and presented. A post is more likely to receive statutory protection if it can be linked to similar land usage as is the case at Berry Head. A military application demonstrates longevity of activity, especially if this has a 250 year or more chronology. It follows then that if that military landscape is disrupted then the ROC monument might also be in a similar state as at Sharpitor. Considering Cold War structures generally, they are, by their very nature often subtle, unobtrusive sites in remote or difficult to access locations. That said, scheduling does have wider implications for the preservation of an appropriate number of monuments for future generations, the challenge is how we encourage the upkeep of such contentious monuments, especially with landowners who have inherited such structures through land return.

IMPLICATIONS AND NARRATIVES – A BRIEF SUMMERY

In this chapter I have sought to present the results of the fieldwork in such a way that a number of distinct facets to the chaos side of the 'order and chaos' model was recognisable. Considering the results at face value it is clear there are aspects that can be explored. Currently the four blocks utilised here, overtly curated; covertly curated, transitional; and ruined or destroyed appear to have weight. Overtly curated sites are slowly in ascendance as the value of a number of posts is recognised by both small groups of often ex-observers, and perhaps more importantly, national bodies. So do these posts represent or accurately reproduce the operational status

of the post during the Cold War? At first sight this is true, although the real experience for the public must be that opportunity to descend into a dark and secret world where once volunteers awaited the end of the world. This phenomenon is one of the foci of the next chapter.

Covertly curated sites are increasing (as the online groups being formed attest to), indeed they appear to be causing something of a boom in the exchange of both material culture connected with the organisation and the bunkers themselves. This too has implications for the survival of other posts further down the life cycle post-stand-down. Although it is not enough to suggest the reduction processes through the removal of fixtures and fittings should be restricted to, or be considered to indicate, the recovery of material culture to furnish other sites or be for material gain. The number of artefacts abandoned in or near the posts attest to that. Occasionally artefacts become pawns in the activity being enacted at the time and are summarily discarded in a casual manner at the cession of activities.

Those sites in the transitional stage of their life cycle are clearly moving towards total destruction and ruination, however, as I discovered at more than one post, there is a possibility of reprieve from the inevitable. That reprieve is clearly due to the escalation of the value of the post itself. The physical fabric of the post at a number of locations now appears to be changing hands at ever increasing prices. What and why this is appears to be a mix of ex-observers who wish to maintain that link with the activities they once performed. Moreover, those who would have joined the Royal Observer Corps, had it still been in existence, also fall into this category. The motives offered to join the Corps are now played out by ownership of a post. This is not restricted to the ROC, any number of military enthusiasts are extant in the United Kingdom, the number of re-enactors testifies to that. Not everyone aspires to own a bunker. Old tensions, when connected to sites connected to mass destruction do attract the archaeology of opposition. The graffiti is especially useful in this case, suggesting more of a reaction to the structure than society at large.

The real question is can we accept gaps in site histories of a decade at a time. And if we do are we able to provide a reasonable narrative in which different behaviours can be recognised? A large part of the ROC estate, especially immediately post-

abandonment, has no recognisable narrative or historiography. That said, I do feel the chaos model does flesh out some of these gaps. One thing the bunkers offer is a metaphor for the Cold War itself. These structures provide perceptions of survival underground that are compounded by the slow rates of decay found inside the secret world, although when viewed now they are heterotopian worlds, landscapes of survival that had no halcyon end for those inducted into the ROC.

The next chapter places the results under scrutiny demonstrating the importance of such considerations when studying building with contentious histories. It also seeks to validate the results against a theoretical framework concentrating on the processes of abandonment and the motives behind the volunteer.

Chapter 8: Discussion

Introduction

The previous chapter has demonstrated that a range of diverse activities are being played out at monitoring posts connected to the Royal Observer Corps. These are, in the main, radically different to the activities expected to be carried out at the posts during their operational phase. The question is, do these activities tell us anything new about the behaviours, attitudes and values of those who now interact with the ROC posts? This author believes they do. In the chapter that follows justification will be made for the conclusions drawn already, futher it will demonstrate why this study should be considered a new direction for recent and military archaeology, one that has implications for the study of the recent past.

Why The Royal Observer Corps - A Summary?

In the last chapter I demonstrated how it was possible to recognise differing states of preservation of similar structures via a mix of fieldwork and engagement with those who operated and inhabited them. A number of key chronological factors were required to devise a testable model, one that could act as a framework for mapping the abandonment process. With the date of every underground monitoring post's construction, opening and closing, known, the Royal Observer Corps was clearly an appropriate medium to test out aspects of the project. The study was expanded to include the earlier Orlit post series, meaning all field monuments designed for the ROC, although exclusively connected to the Cold War, were brought into the study. That said, the sample of Group Headquarters structures available for study was too small (two Bath and Exeter) to provide any meaningful contribution. The headquarters structures, while appearing in this project as part of the archaeological study, were not monitored for behaviours.

The ROC had a national footprint and even though there are only two types of monument attributed to the field operation (Orlit and underground monitoring post) of the organisation, the number of structures was still in excess of 2000. The abandonment of each ROC post forms part of national, organisational and personal archives; the organisation was in operation during living memory and a substantial number of its group members are still available for comment. This extends to members of the public who also lived through the Cold War. The records of the Royal Observer Corps could be interrogated (if extant) and, probably most

importantly, the organisation was, in the main, a voluntary organisation opening up the possibility to discuss behavioural activities focussed on motivation.

ABANDONMENT

Considering all the attributes and chronological milestones the ROC offered, I decided this organisation would be a good vehicle on which to test out a number of theories connected with the abandonment process. The process of abandonment is well served in the current range of literature, indeed, one could argue that all sites studied through the process of archaeology are the study of abandonment as no site is predominantly an account of current activity, more the study of the remnants of evidential aspects of a process, activity or event separated by chronology. Contemporary archaeology allows the researcher the opportunity to combine a range of humanities based disciplines with the historiography of the same site, through contemporary records and personal accounts it should be possible to achieve a blended outcome (a combination of all routes of investigation), providing better fidelity due to the reduced timeframe offer by the contemporary nature of the group under study.

Most prominent in this field is probably Michael Schiffer; with a number of publications and papers on the subject of site formation, he takes an almost manifestoed stance on the way formation processes should be investigated (Schiffer 2010, 31) demanding the principles of the process '– could and should be explained through – ethnological processes' (*ibid* 2010, 31). If a domestic site is the focus of investigation then this would seem obvious, even within an industrial or military/authoritarian setting, ethnographic evaluation and comparison would serve the researcher well. With a highly ordered group such as the Royal Observer Corps, ethnography takes on a new dimension.

The archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps, like any other organisation, presents material culture specific to that organisation. This material culture is interwoven with both artefacts from outside the organisation and the activities enacted by those who populate this secret landscape. To understand the formation process demanded by a study of abandonment one first has to strip down the observations made during investigation. This basic premise drove development of the order and chaos model that has, with refinement, been utilised in the interpretation of all fieldwork results in this project.

Utilising the new model, it has been possible to reorder the landscape in a way that makes the secret, or invisible, visible to the wider populous. Schiffer suggests the abandonment process connected to activities beyond the initial purpose of a given structure, especially '-when reuse is uncommon, materials in the archaeological records abound' (2010, 34). Attempts to explain the cultural material left on site and build scenarios from that material is standard archaeological practice and supports Schiffer's comments when taken at face value. Unfortunately, the premise that the last occupant of a site or structure leaves material 'abound' is not correct when considering sites of high order - especially those of militaristic in form. Often little, if anything, is left behind when military sites close down. All equipment is accounted for and returned to storage, often leaving only the infrastructure of the site, its buildings and fittings (light switches, door handles, coat racks, cupboards and chairs). These have no overt identity marking them out from those items found in wider society. From a point of study this means that initial encounters with ROC posts are a complex subject, however, this does help with the order and chaos model.

The equipment list, layout and any subsequent modifications to the structure (such as the fitting of radio to create master posts) is well represented in the archival record. This has allowed a greater confidence to be placed on the results this project has demonstrated. Results have, subsequently, much greater detail, allowing for a number of new recommendations from this study. Further, it has implications for re-enactment and remembrance, both forms of ordered activity undertaken alongside normal daily routines, and the demonstrable worth of representative sites from the Cold War to both the academic community and wider public at large.

The Importance of Abandonment in Contemporary Archaeology

The place of abandonment, or the recognition of it, in the archaeological record is key to the understanding of site development. Although, the further back into antiquity one goes the more difficult it becomes to place a specific activity chronologically. For example, a Romano-British farm standing empty might show evidence of later 'squatters' lighting a fire in the room that once had a mosaic floor. Pottery may date the abandonment of the structure to the early fifth-century, the burnt floor may have no direct evidence, placing the event 'sometime after abandonment' (Price 2000). My issue is that that might be one hundred years

afterwards, especially since both events are not precisely dated. In the case of contemporary archaeology one would not expect this to be much of a problem, especially if we are considering the twentieth century and the records available. However, this is not the case, especially when the work is concerned with the military or highly organised groups of a clandestine nature. Records, while more copious than in previous periods, are still incomplete. Moreover, archives covering many subjects bound by the Official Secrets Act also remain closed to scrutiny under what is known as the 'thirty-year rule' (Schofield 2005, 38)

Archives and Oral Histories

With the written archive lacking much detail, we need to rely on more living human subject methods of investigation. I have noted throughout this project that the Royal Observer Corps were a mainly volunteer force; this is important as joining the organisation was a structured activity requiring background checks, signing of the Official Secrets Act and commitments of both time and effort through promotional exams. While records, if they are extant, should hold basic personal details, a copy of the Official Secrets Act as signed by the volunteer and a service record (posts stationed on; courses attended; promotion and awards); it does not allow for personal motivation, reasons for joining and belief systems of the individual. The only way to access these aspects is through dialogue with those who were members of the organisation. This is a phenomena available only to the researcher concerned with contemporary archaeology. Work in this specialised field has included an archaeological and oral survey of RAF Spadeadam, Cumbria (Wilson 2007) and Second World War commemorations in Devon (Walls and Williams 2010) as well as the project presented here.

Utilising the hard-won information from the Royal Observer Corps members has provided this project with an extra dynamic. Accounts covering the various facets of the day-to-day activities/duties enacted out on the ROC posts have served to place the observer in both a landscape and taskscape context (Ingold 1993). They also open to wider debate the concept of managing mass destruction rather than stopping it, usually through arms control, as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament demanded. The validity of capturing oral testimony as a research tool for contemporary archaeological research is not in question here, and certainly the returns utilised here have been most useful, they also allow a wider, more balanced

view of the Cold War period, especially across voluntary activities such as the ROC and CND.

THE ABANDONMENT MODEL

A primary objective of this project was to develop a model that could provide a framework on which to place observed activities recorded through fieldwork. Now at the end of this work was the order and chaos model a valid proposition? I consider it was. The next section provides justification of the conclusions drawn from the fieldwork results, providing further context for the Royal Observer Corps posts and the implications for further study in this area. What follows is a discussion surrounding the concept of order up to and including the initial abandonment of the Royal Observer Corps network of nuclear monitoring posts across the United Kingdom.

Order

The regime covering what is recognised as order has been extensively covered in Chapter 4; suffice to say organisations run along militaristic lines, heavy in ritual, regulation and obedience, and with a specific material culture linked to both task and belief leaves potential markers in the archaeological record. Often such groups have their own architecture and landscape presence such as security fencing, all reaffirming heterotopic worlds beyond the visible. Interpretations of activities and size by those not initiated into the organisation can be wide of the mark, usually driven by other disenfranchised groups - in this case the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament - all exacerbated by signs threatening offences under the Official Secrets Act.

So why a heterotopic view? Michel Foucault suggested six states or levels of heterotopias, primary to this was an activity born out of crisis and deviance (1967); a place or location where those non-initiates are excluded (Scham 2001, 187). If we take the two terms literally then ‘crisis’ is reference, in this case, to the Cold War, while ‘deviance’ covers nuclear warfare, something the majority were excluded from controlling. I would suggest we also consider the underground monitoring post as an object of specific material culture, itself displaying crisis and deviance via restricted access, while unfamiliar or contentious activities are undertaken in the secret world below.

Narratives of Order and Stand-down

If the whole idea of joining a highly organised group is to carry out instrumentalist activities (repetitive training for a common goal), then the personal histories captured through singular accounts should contain views of the same; encouragingly the results revealed much more than a rigid narrative along Royal Observer Corps lines. The personal accounts from those who returned questionnaires supplied a wealth of information covering motives for joining, attitudes towards nuclear warfare, their view of protest groups and what they would have done had war broken out. None of this would be available through official channels.

Contextualising the Royal Observer Corps routine activities allows behaviours to be recognised in the life-cycle of the organisation; more importantly the accounts suggest that even a highly ordered organisation has a chaotic element. Subsequently, when considering the actual abandonment of underground monitoring posts, one cannot be certain of the level of equipment removed, nor the material culture from the organisation that was left on site.

The point is, we have, through archives, both national and private, the date of the stand-down of all 1,562 underground monitoring posts across the British Isles. The official ROC history provided to each observer during training, notes 686 posts were closed in the 1968 Civil Defence Review (ROC 1989, para 162), while the remainder closed on 30 September 1991 (Wood 1992, 240). A visit to an ROC post in the landscape cannot, on structural form alone, ascertain which date the site was closed. As I have already stated, from personal experience, the close down of any militaristic establishment is managed with the same efficiency as when the site was in operation. Only material culture not expected to hold value or reuse is left on site. In the case of the underground monitoring posts this is usually furniture. Interestingly, any material introduced by the observation crew is also left behind. These two points need expanding as they are important to the interpretation of behaviours both during and after operations, defined here now as order and chaos phases.

ROC Material Culture as Indicators

Military equipment and buildings are owned by the government, although, the responsibility for their upkeep, especially being ‘fit for purpose’, is often devolved down to lower ranks. Having an ‘inventory’ is part and parcel of any Highly Ordered Entity and service life in general (I had several in my time in service). Naturally, when

the ROC underground monitoring posts were closed all equipment had to be accounted for and returned to a central point. How much of it actually was returned is not available for scrutiny, although, taking into consideration the amount of equipment that passes through online auction sites, I would suggest it was clearly not 100%. Schiffer developed a model investigating the life-cycle of 'durable objects' in 1972, it still holds validity when considering ROC posts during the crossover from order to chaos.

A member of the public encountering an ROC post today would struggle to interpret the subterranean space without prior knowledge of the organisation who created and inhabited it. They would, however be able to differentiate between what the Ordnance Survey often noted as a 'covered reservoir' and a space designed for human activity. This is because, on the whole, a number of artefacts specific to the design of the post are abandoned on site. These include bunk bed frames, wooden cupboards and shelves and the chemical toilet. Such items have little value outside of the control room and, as such, are left *in situ*. This abandonment of infrastructure was suggested by Binford (1979, 264) to often represent low cost, bulky items, a case that certainly explains those items encountered on sites post stand-down. What is unfortunate for this study is that the types of bulky items left in the underground monitoring posts are identical - there was no change in type or pattern across the life-cycle of the ROC, so this type of material culture can only be ascribed specifically to the organisation, it cannot provide a period when the site was abandoned (1968 or 1991). There is, however, one piece of equipment, or rather the wooden crate that contained the equipment, that does help; the hand operated air raid siren. The siren was a standard piece of equipment for all underground monitoring posts, intended to be used to warn the local area around the ROC post of air attack. Interestingly five crates, minus the siren, were discovered in posts investigated for this project, all had a refurbishment date of 1972 on labels; all were in posts that were in operation until 1991. While no record of a re-equip of the sirens has been so far found, it would appear that sirens collected in from the stand-down of either the Royal Observer Corps posts or the Civil Defence Corps in 1968 were refurbished and then re-issued. The point is, we do have a marker that differentiates between 1968 and 1991, as long as that piece of ROC material culture remains in the structure. As the siren is missing the crate has little value and thus conforms to Binford's suggestion on the abandonment of low cost, or bulky items (1979, 264). I suggest we can now

complement this by suggesting items of little, or no, intrinsic value can also be added to this list.

Evidence for Observers

Evidence for human interaction beyond the chemical toilet also remains in a large number of posts; this is often a mixture of issue, and non-issue, material. Looking at one specific piece, the observer mirror, allows us to look at an aspect of the lesser researched aspects of the Royal Observer Corps. Mirrors were present at W-1 Alderbury; W-2 Avebury; W-5 Great Bedwyn, all in Wiltshire and C-0 Veryan, Cornwall. The question must be, what need is there for a mirror in an underground bunker? Well primarily the Royal Observer Corps was a uniformed service and as such had its own requirements located in *AP 3306: Regulations for the Royal Observer Corps*. The relevant aspects of the dress code were extracted and placed in all training material and included 'Patterns of Uniform for Observers' (Chap 3, para 64) and 'Badges of Rank for Observers' (Chap 3, para 65). Furthermore, *AP 3306: Appendix 'B': Code of Discipline paragraph 1. Code of Offences against Discipline states* 'K. Loss or damage of clothing or personal equipment - (1) Loses, or wilfully or negligently damages, or fails to take proper care of any article of clothing or personal equipment - '. Suddenly the need for a mirror makes more sense. In a highly ordered organisation the mirror plays a part in the maintenance of appearances, an extremely important part in the visuality of members, intent to follow orders and maintain a task-focussed activity. Interestingly, the mirror's also hides an act of remembrance.



Fig.8-1. An observer mirror at W-1 Alderbury, Wiltshire. Note the Air Ministry monogram with the King's Crown burnt into the frame along the bottom (Yellow Arrow). (Source: Bob Clarke 17/07/2013)

The reverse of every mirror has, stamped into the wooden frame ‘A and M’ with a depiction of the Kings Crown in between (fig.8-1, above). This item clearly has earlier origins than the underground monitoring posts, it also pre-dates the construction of the Orlit post network in 1954/55. Taking that into consideration there is a very real possibility that the mirrors that were used in underground monitoring posts, presumable issued through the late 1950s and early 1960s, were war stock. They are also missing from any equipment lists or post inventories so far located in the records that survive. More than one observer noted, through conversation, the mirrors link with the war (Veryan and great Bedwyn).

This is important. It demonstrates a simple, but effective, method of remembrance, a time when the Royal Observer Corps had a far less contentious role to play in the defence of the United Kingdom. It also serves to legitimise the nuclear reporting role through connection with past observation duties. Legitimacy is a requirement of all highly ordered organisations; outwardly the entity projects an impression of

essentialness, ‘The men and women of the Royal Observer Corps have a vital part to play in the network of services planned to protect our nation against the results of an attack’ (ROC 1985). Inwardly, the ROC maintained their traditional aircraft reporting tests and competitions, links with the RAF and specific uniform, even though none were relevant when the nuclear reporting task forced the observer crews underground. Furthermore, the history of the Royal Observer Corps and the part it played in the protection of Britain was an intrinsic component of the training system for new members.

Beyond the issued material culture of the Royal Observer Corps lies a backdrop of items that reaffirm the wider society that the ROC sought to serve. Such items are a product of the peripheral aspects of the world beyond the highly ordered heterotopic world of the underground monitoring post. They serve as a reminder to both the researcher and the observers as to why they are members of such a highly ordered organisation. These items include soft seat cushions and, more representative of the military ethos instilled in all those who serve, a teapot, kettle and other drinks-brewing paraphernalia.

Non-conformity on Site

One of the key factors driving the choice of the Royal Observer Corps and its field monuments for this study was the organisation's inherent requirement for procedures, rules and regulations. It has been suggested that the role of the volunteer observer was one of functionality, the adherence to regulations with an almost obsessive focus on ‘doing ones’ duty’. Utilising Tim Ingold’s theoretical taskscape (1993), I have been able to illustrate a process-led activity base, utilising specialist instrumentation, to perform specific tasks involved exclusively in the monitoring of the use of weapons of mass destruction. The material culture of the organisation provides this information in structured detail through the printed material now lodged in official and private archives. Interestingly, the observer as an entity is far removed from the process, almost to the point of an automaton.

The reality is that people are a key part of the operation. The organisation relied totally on the behaviours and attitudes of volunteers and their training and adherence to rules and regulations. If the monitoring posts did not provide the correct information, in the correct format, then the whole national network would effectively descend into chaos. It should not, then, come as a surprise that even though the

operation of an underground monitoring post would be expected to run at peak efficiency in times of crisis, elements of personal modification and non-regulation equipment is, sometimes, discovered on posts. The assessment of W-2 Amesbury, Wiltshire demonstrated material that was clearly involved in the running of the post during the operational phase of its life-cycle that was neither non-issue, nor standard, equipment (fig.8-2).

Fig.8-2. W-2 Amesbury, Wiltshire. This object is clearly ‘home made’, that said, it has a task focussed purpose. The three holes align with those to mount the ground zero indicator, as do the four points of the compass. The actual use is unclear. (Source: Bob Clarke 27/07/2016)

Considering the examples above, I suggest that when investigating the period prior to abandonment of any highly ordered organisation's facilities a number of points need to be considered. The more obvious statement is a knowledge of the group, its processes and means of carrying out its tasks. Beyond that, consideration must be given to the wider aspects of the society to which the organisation serves as material from this will enter the enclosed space of the group; more importantly, this is likely to be left on site at the point of abandonment as it often has no intrinsic value, or use,

beyond the person who introduced it onto site in the first place. Fixtures and fittings, including furniture, often remain; again they are low cost items and in the main are specifically manufactured for the underground monitoring post, negating any real opportunity for reuse. In the case of highly organised groups with multiple sites across the landscape a recognition of official equipment becomes easier to identify, primarily due to the lack of pattern change throughout the organisation's life-cycle. This has especially been the case one ROC posts.

I now move on to the point of abandonment and beyond, bringing the ROC underground monitoring posts up to date by formalising the chaos aspects of my model.

CHAOS

Chaos as required by the current model is considered to be a state where by activities of a natural or human nature interact with a given site in an unstructured way. Indeed, Sandra Scham noted: -

> Searching for difference and diversity in congruence with the loss of fixed points implied by the postmodern agenda, however, may create something of a chaotic situation for many archaeological interpreters.
>
> (Scham 2001, 185)

It is clear that rather than follow set procedures, activities follow individual agendas, introducing both change to the site and material from the peripheral area surrounding the once secret ROC post. The justification for the model (fig.8-3) by discussing the ‘transition’ stage of the theory first; this stage influences all other states and one that all ROC posts have passed through since their stand-down.



Fig.8-3. The order and chaos model, demonstrating the paths a structure can take during its life-cycle. (Source: Bob Clarke)

The Transitional Path

In my categorisation of chaos and the formalisation of a framework allowing for the different strands of abandonment, I suggest all ROC posts enter a state of 'transition' after initial abandonment. This places the ROC posts in the landscape in a kind of limbo, a state where maintenance is withdrawn but the secrecy surrounding the post remains. The compound usually becomes overgrown, with weeds at first, although it does not take long for more substantial growth the take hold; within three years the site quickly becomes obscured from view, reinforcing the air of secrecy surrounding the post and the function it once performed. As long as the structure remains un-compromised, attrition from most components of chaos (animal, vegetation, meteorological) have little effect in the immediate abandonment process. What really causes damage, leading to the rapid deterioration of the operational space below ground, is the removal of vent covers on the surface and damage to the entrance

hatch, especially through forced entry (fig.8-4). This damage led deterioration can only be caused by human interaction.

Fig.8-4. D-47 Whitestone, Devon. The hatch at this post has been damaged to such an extent it will not close beyond the point illustrated here. (Source: Bob Clarke 03/04/2013)

When categorising ROC posts in a state of transition it should be remembered that the structure concerned may have been through a number of overtly and covertly curated stages as well. Clearly then, transition is neither final, nor is it a one-off event. Transition appears to be the central part of the abandonment process when connected to highly ordered organisations; from here other states are launched. Transition, in my view, is also the key to understanding the bridge between secret and non-secret. It is here that interactions are at their most diverse; often with recognisable activities overlapping, sometimes over a number of years.

Mapping Abandonment - Some Physical Markers

Clearly it is not enough to simply point out that some form of human interaction has occurred between the time of a ROC post's official closure and the baseline survey (and subsequent) visits undertaken for this project. It is also unwise to try and imply,

from condition alone, that levels of interaction encountered on a site visit belong specifically to that location, or that those posts in the poorest state have been abandoned the longest. The fieldwork clearly demonstrated that location had, at least, a hand in the level of interaction displayed by the ROC post fabric recorded across the project area, but that location needed other areas of public interest in its environs, especially landscapes and historical/archaeological sites. How this additional involvement is mapped, and interpreted, is important as it currently appears a level of disenfranchisement (Scham 2001, 190), most notably demonstrated in the Cold War period by the mass membership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), might still be visible in a small number of cases.

Pre-1991 Operational Phase

Typically, nothing remained of any of the acts of destruction carried out during the Cold War itself - suffice to say posts were often tampered with. Of those ROC members canvased for this project 22.8% reported damage to posts during the nuclear reporting task (Phase Two monuments); one favourite activity appears to have been to glue up the locks on the posts, although more extreme activities included the complete destruction of posts by setting them on fire. Indeed:

> It was felt at the time that C.N.D did not understand the R.O.C role in U.K defence role, and as such "They" felt that we (The R.O.C) were an enemy. I had heard stories of C.N.D pouring petrol and such items down our bunkers when personnel were inside and on duty and threatening the Crew to set the bunker and them on fire. These stories may have been propaganda against C.N.D but it totally changed my former opinion of C.N.D being a friendly organisation.
>
> (ROC#57, 17 Group, North Wales)

Whatever the level of subjectivity and inferred organisational ‘propaganda’, 59.6% of correspondents to the Royal Observer Corps survey provided a negative view of CND’s actions. To date it has been impossible to disentangle any activities of CND from that of the ROC that date earlier than September 1991 (The final ROC post abandonment phase). The reason for this is simple. As a highly ordered organisation the ROC outwardly transmitted an aura of control - especially when connected to the immediate landscape of the underground monitoring posts - any vandalism or graffiti was quickly repaired or removed. The story of the ‘hot war’ between the ROC and CND appears to survive, in the main, in the personal histories of those involved at the time. Beyond the control of the ROC the story is a little different.

What can we deduce from interactions after stand-down in 1991? Do any ROC posts display evidence of activities driven by a memory of the Cold War 25 years after its end. The results from two posts do, indeed, have markers indicative of the Cold War, however, one of these, W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire, is also in a landscape of high visitor interaction. With substantial numbers attracted to the Avebury Henge site nearby, it is likely that the depictions in the underground monitoring room are Cold War in essence, although, it would be unsafe to suggest they were a direct reaction to the secret space they inhabit. D-47, Whitestone, Devon, by comparison, has a simple depiction of the CND Peace Symbol, in among a number of more rudimentary graffiti illustrations. I believe this is more important than the mass of overtly Soviet orientated graffiti at Avebury. Unfortunately, this singular convincing symbol is a long way from suggesting an act of remembrance for the Cold War; Avebury is also so clearly directed towards remembrance of the Soviet Union that it too is unlikely to represent a memory of the Cold War, it is more than likely a reaction to the underground space. Graffiti in this context (former military buildings) has been discussed previously and it is worth re-visiting that here.

Harrison and Schofield suggested recently that ‘art also represents a form of reconfiguration after military and other closed and inaccessible sites are abandoned’ (2010, 190). In essence this is true, many spaces are subject to graffiti, probably the most recognisable Cold War site being the Berlin Wall. Here the monolithic appearance and oppressive height of the structure was relegated to a mere backdrop by the artistry that was placed on it (Baker 1993; Dolff-Bonekämper 2002). This is, however, an exception. The Wall was a symbol of the ideological struggle between East and West, its overt presence in not only the city but also in the memories of people who were entering their late teens in that period, underpinned everything they experienced afterwards (Schuman and Rogers 2004).

It is not appropriate to accept that graffiti should be considered merely as a way of resetting a space once enclosed by a highly ordered group. Granted, graffiti is now an accepted aspect of the urban landscape, indeed, it actually holds a value in some circumstances (Banksy in Bristol and the South-West being a point in question). Graffiti is more opportunistic than that. To suggest the activity is in some way disrupting a space once connected to order is also unsafe. As noted previously, those acts of graffiti executed during the operational phase of the Royal Observer Corps are now lost, they demonstrate a period of intent, a decision process intent on

challenging the organisation or authority. To consider the same ‘intent’ when investigating sites in later periods of the structures life-cycle is unwise. At W-3 Avebury, Wiltshire, the overtly Soviet leanings of the symbolism depicted are interesting, whether they are a reaction to the space is still unclear, and likely to remain so. One thing is clear, there is a social and interpretive value to recording wall art, both contemporary to periods of operations and any period of abandonment (Schofield 2005, 76). The problem is graffiti only survives in underground monitoring posts that are in a transitional phase, and when it does there is no clear direction of interpretation, save to say the act is both a symbol of non-regulated activities and a marker of the sites life-cycle that signals decline and chaos (fig.8-5).

Fig.8-5. W-7 Sutton Veny, Wiltshire. This graffito is a classic example of a non-regulated activity. Note there are at least two phases of graffiti inside this structure. The text at the rear is below the rust stain - in this case making the deterioration mapable. (Source: Bob Clarke 07/07/2013)

The Unknown - Interaction with the Secret

If interaction through graffiti is considered to be neither specialised, nor planned then can we recognise anything that does indicate a behaviour that is generated by the underground monitoring post. It is worth remembering before we investigate the post- stand-down world of the ROC that structures connected to weapons of mass destruction were the subject of wild interpretation during the Cold War too;

> On one occasion during a weekend exercise in Northern Ireland I was dispatched to a monitoring post that was besieged by a throng of CND protestors. While talking to them the post hatch swung open and they all flung themselves to the ground, apparently convinced that a missile was about to be launched from the 'silo'.
>
> ROC#14, Bath headquarters and a post in Birmingham

The phenomenon is not isolated to this project, others have encountered such in their work, Strange and Walley noted during their research on Cold War monuments in Yorkshire that '- we have encountered hostility, incomprehension and accusations of poor taste in response to our attempts to discuss the heritage value of Cold War sites,' (2007, 159). Clearly, there are many facets of interpretation when considering Cold War monuments, interestingly, I suggest what Strange and Walley encountered was as much to do with the political landscape at the time of their work, just as the recollection from ROC#14 was of the 1980s. Today, tribute to those who fell during military action in the Twentieth century focusses the national psyche on 11 November and the annual remembrance parade. Conflicts have a beginning and an end (although, facets of a conflict are often amorphous) and with an end comes acts of remembrance. Monuments are raised to the dead, while battlefields become increasingly the focus of thanatourism (Schofield 2005, 89; Baldwin and Sharpley 2009, 186; Walls and Williams 2010, 50; Schofield 2011, 49; Carman 2013, 98). The Cold War, especially when remembrance is the focus, is a step change beyond what has gone before. The issues surrounding a 43 year 'conflict' are discussed later in this chapter, however, it is important to briefly explain the reason for that 'step change' here.

A War Too Long

World War II, as fought by the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth, is, as an event, recognisable, still relevant as living memory, is a component of personal or family histories; is nationally commemorated and has become well catered for through museums, sites and acts of remembrance. Chronologically, it is well defined within one decade (1939-45) and is further punctuated by a number of high profile engagements (Dunkerque; Battle of Britain; North Africa; D-Day) and those in turn can be reduced further to specific actions as identified by the researcher or the public as required. The Cold War follows a similar path in all but length. The beginning and end is well known from 1948-91 (although, there is debate over what constitutes the actual end date) and there are a number of recognisable points

(Korean War; Hungarian Uprising; Berlin Wall; Cuban Missile Crisis; Vietnam). What differs, in the United Kingdom, is the lack of tangible evidence available for study, the continued use of many military sites until very recently and, most importantly in my opinion, the fact that 43 years is just too long for contemporaries to visualise. Underpinning all this is a distinct lack, in the United Kingdom at least, of evidence traditionally linked to 'conflict' (death, memorials, damage). The only thing keeping the Cold War in the public eye was increasing acts of civil disobedience by public pressure groups and, confusingly due to the political leanings of the Soviet Union, the Labour Party. Basically, publicity and exposure enacted by the disenfranchised.

Out in the Field

Encountering a Royal Observer Post, either phase one (Orlit) or phase two (underground monitoring post) in isolation in the landscape is problematic unless one is familiar with the organisation or purpose of the structures. As previously noted, the Orlit post - especially a Type 'B' - draws a fairly universal interpretation connected with observation. Interestingly, a number of encounters with the public found that these sites are also always interpreted as being connected to World War II rather than the Cold War.

The interpretation of the underground monitoring post is far more complex. Notwithstanding the deception, intended or otherwise, through depiction on the Ordnance Survey, the post gives away little in the way of intended function from the above ground structures. Often surrounded by a fence, forming a barrier between the sparse concrete structures and those outside, and in so doing reaffirming the map depiction (if one exists) of a utilitarian function (Ingold 1993); the site inside the fence is heterotopic in interpretation - a reservoir, underground, water, danger, prohibited access - all feature. Of course a number of these assumptions are correct and while 'assumption' has been suggested to be a key part of '- the post-use interpretative process.' (Schiffer 2010, 31). I believe it should only be accepted as a last resort.

On more than one occasion material was evident at the base of the entrance shaft that had clearly been dropped from above. At W-2 Amesbury, Wiltshire, a substantial amount of loose concrete in blocks, along with other material, had been introduced into the structure. The fieldwork has demonstrated that this activity, the dropping of material down the entrance stack, informs two interpretations. Firstly, the

heterotopic, or secret world below, is clearly viewed with trepidation. If the visitor has no light, or understanding of the structure, caution and curiosity become the more likely motivators. To drop stones down the entrance allows a level of investigation without risks to be played out. Secondly, the fact that this material, plus other items, remained *in situ* for the majority of my site visits across a number of ROC posts, indicates a site in transition.

Fig.8-6. W-3 Amesbury, Wiltshire. Debris dropped from the entrance hatch above mixed with items of material culture from the operation of the underground monitoring post. The fire blanket and green bucket were both standard issue to the ROC, the drinks can, water bottle and small tin of paint are not and have been introduced from outside the secret domain. (Source: Bob Clarke 27/07/2016)

Transition Reviewed

Royal Observer Corps posts in states of transition are, by far, the most representative of archaeological site creation*;* they are also the most complex to understand. The taphonomy of the material culture left on site, and introduced through later visits, does allow a lose chronology to be built. That said, the movement of objects is not always clear. The underground monitoring post, D-20 Hornscross, Devon, is just such a case. The post was introduced as a case study in Chapter 8; it has had a complex history, being open for just eight years (1960-68), before closure as part of the Civil Defence cuts that year. From there the post has had at least two states of transition and one of covert curation. The ROC landscape

includes an Orlit post (type B) as a forerunner to the underground structure. Material found within the suggested taskscape (Ingold 1993) for this structure is a mix of abandoned and decaying ROC material culture and that introduced from outside the organisation, more representative of the curious visitor than a destructive one.

Fig.8-7. D-20 Hornscross, Devon. The abandoned chemical drums located within the compound. Note the metal pipe to the lower right of the drums. This is the drain pipe from the entrance stack of the underground monitoring post. This would require significant force to remove. It is now 20 m from its intended location. (Source: Bob Clarke 01/04/2013)

The post stands in an extant compound, close to a minor road. The last visit to the site on 1 April 2013 noted an assemblage of recently introduces material into the compound; furthermore, the compound under, and around, the Orlit post had been disturbed, revealing more evidence for activities during episodes of transition. The material included five 25 litre plastic drums of 'Pre-Dip' chemicals supplied by *Evans - Livestock Management*. The supply date for all five was 2010, however, the drums did not appear until a minimum 27 months later. Interestingly, the drums had not been emptied and dumped in the compound; one demonstrated damage consistent with being shot with a shotgun - presumably this happened during the 27-month period. This can be reduced somewhat as the previous two visits did not note the

drums; this allows us to consider involvement in the compound to be trimmed down to an 11-month window of deposition. The presence of the drums allows for quite a tight date to be ascribed, indeed, this follows Schiffer's basic flow model developed to demonstrate the life history of an artefact (2010, 22), with one exception Schiffer does not cater for re-use in a totally different direction to that of the primary intended use. At D-20 Hornscross, an artefact has been manufactured for a primary use, in this case liquid containment, before entering a secondary use, that of a target. This 'transactional' activity is important as it demonstrates the diversity of uses that can be recognised through the study of modern material culture. I suggest artefacts have a 'secret life-cycle', a period where the physical aspects of the object attest to something additional to the original functuality. In the case of the five barrels, only one has shotgun pellet damage, yet all five are dumped at the site; can, or should, we infer an association between the life-cycle of all five drums? I consider this an appropriate direct in cases as obvious as this, it is likely both damaged and undamaged drums have a similar life-cycle - the damaged drum is likely to have been on top of the rest at the time of the shot.

Where the situation becomes infinitely more complex is when material of a specific nature is discovered on site, that is completely devoid of connection to the structure itself. At D-20 Hornscross, a deposit of pornographic material was discovered. It comprised a badly decayed *Club* magazine and a DVD cover, also from *Club*. Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain a date for either item as they had both been damaged by water. This opens up an interesting avenue of research. The literature concerned with the deposition of such material is very sparse indeed, although, as Jane Juffer noted in 1998 'porn [is] still defined mainly as a male genre-' (1998, 170); if that is the case then what we encounter on site must be predominantly 'male orientated' too. Whether this is the case or not is difficult to support with the current project, it does, however, point to an interesting avenue of research, post this work.

One last example from D-20 Hornscross is a drinks can. Drinks cans present us with a modern dichotomy. Mass produced on a daily basis, drinks cans are among the most prevalent of modern deposition indicators, their appearance across the landscape and subsequent modifications, are well known. Unfortunately, they are another, under investigated archaeological indicator. Papers are extant, although, as must be the way with any modern artefact still in production, are dated by the

production and design of the time. In 1993 D.B.S. Maxwell noted in his paper *Beer Cans: A Guide for the Archaeologist: -*

> ‘beer cans are of potentially great value for dating both later historic sites and intrusive components in prehistoric sites. Changes in beer can morphology and design are well documented, meaning that determining the age of a beer can to within a few years of production is a distinct possibility.’ (Maxwell 1993, 91).

Nearly 25 years later Maxwell’s hopes of a datable sequence have been exceeded. This is, in part, a direct consequence of the modern obsession with understanding where food stuffs are produced, packaged and distributed. Mass-produced items such as drinks cans might appear to be simple clones of one another, in reality each one is different. The uniqueness can often be found on the base of a can, or in the case of plastic drinks bottles, etched around the shoulder of the bottle.

The can found within the compound at Hornscross was a 440 ml can of ‘Cider: Specially selected by Spar’. On the base of the can was a batch number L8157/2, below this was a best before date BBE 06/07. This information has the potential to provide a manufacturer, the date of manufacture down to the second, and the likely period in which it was consumed. Furthermore, the can has a singular opening fixed tab, this would also help with dating if the rest of the label on the can was illegible.

The point is, that just one ROC post in a state of transition has a wide range of activities enacted in its confines. Hornscross provides just one example of the diversity that can be implied utilising material culture from the wider social group. Below ground it is a similar story. Beyond the damage-led deterioration I have introduced above, there is also the interaction with the space created below ground. Those who venture into this world are often surprised as to how small the subterranean aspects really are (conversation with a group of visitors to C-1 Veryan, Cornwall on 18/10/12 and W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire on 04/08/13).

A post in the transitional state is a dangerous thing. Often they contain water, usually due to hatch damage, this is often stagnant, contains dead animals and probably human waste too. The material dropped down the shaft creates a very real hazard if the wrong footwear is worn and, unless a torch it taken, the control room is pitch black. The interesting point is, it does not stop people entering the ROC posts and the evidence suggests they do this multiple times. The most prevalent of non-Royal Observer Corps finds is the humble tea light, a small candle (2.5cm in diameter)

contained in an aluminium foil tray. Over 80% of underground spaces accessed for this project had tea lights in the reporting room, I suggest these demonstrate clear intent to investigate and, for a short while, occupy the once secret space below.

Towards a definition of Transition

So do Royal Observer Corps posts in a state of transition display evidence of a segregation between order and chaos? Unfortunately, the existence of a noticeable change in condition, material culture and human interaction is not readily obvious. Psychologically, there is a boundary between the world of the secret, with activities dictated by rules and regulations, and the processes of the peripheral, or surrounding society. This boundary is indistinct, as material introduced by the observers themselves often remain after the strip out of equipment at stand-down. Unless this material can be accurately ascribed to the organisation who created the space under investigation, accurate dating of a deposit is often frustrated. The length of time a ROC post has been in a state of transition, or abandoned, cannot be ascertained from the organisational material culture extant on site as the same, bespoke, pattern of low-cost, bulky furniture, was utilised across all sites. Using the deterioration of ROC posts and their subsequent state, post stand-down, is also an unsafe route to building a sequenced and chronological account of activities. What makes transition a valid proposition is the gulf between order and chaos.

An organisation that is highly ordered, runs on military rules and regulations and is instrumentalist in its training regime aims to influence the operation space it inhabits. Records survive that demonstrate how the control was to be executed and who was responsible for which part of the process enacted on the site. The state of transition is one of disorder - or chaos. Interactions are spurious, unplanned and often destructive, all aspects unrecognisable in the ordered world of the Royal Observer Corps. So there is a tangible way of recognising the transitional phase of chaos.

Ruined or Destroyed

Of all the phases of chaos I have proposed ruined or destroyed is the most final of activities. It is here that the majority of posts have finished their life-cycle. It is important to remember that posts that are now, not visible in the landscape may still have a subterraneous presence. They may also have elements of the primary function in the immediate landscape including, carparks, pathways and remotely placed ground zero indicators. If the former post was located on grazing, moorland

or a managed site there is also the potential for the site to be discovered remotely, the most successful technique so far appears to be LiDAR.

LiDAR



Fig.8-8. Chippenham, Wiltshire. A noticeable scar remains where the underground monitoring post once was. (© Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2015. All rights reserved.)



Fig.8-9. Bere Alston, Devon. This landscape demonstrates the complexity that can be encountered. The yellow circle indicates a Type 'A' Orlit post, now used to shelter livestock, while the red circle indicates the location of the, now demolished underground monitoring post. The northern edge of the compound is the linear feature running east-west. (© Environment Agency copyright and/or database right 2015. All rights reserved.)

As the two sites above demonstrate, it is possible to ascertain the landscape position of, at least some posts, utilising LiDAR; although, this is not a given for all sites. The first consideration has to be the extent of LiDAR cover. Currently the Environment Agency owns the largest selection of results, all are available through ‘open public access’ offering resolution from 25cm to 2m. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom is not totally covered as the surveys so far carried out were originally undertaken to map areas susceptible to flooding. Furthermore, the remnants of an underground monitoring post could have been completely erased, especially if the ROC post was destroyed in the mid-1990s and the land is under plough.

The Geophysical Angle

Beyond LiDAR the use of geophysical survey can also produce encouraging results when studying Cold War subterranean sites. In 2010 a team from Durham University surveyed the castle headland at Scarborough, North Yorkshire. Over 3ha of the outer bailey, an area containing a wide range of monuments - from the prehistoric to the twentieth century - was surveyed, this included the position of a destroyed Royal Observer Corps post.



Fig.8-10 Geophysical survey of the outer bailey of Scarborough Castle, North Yorkshire. In the second block from the bottom right is a Roman signal station. To the top left of the forth central block from the bottom is the ROC post (large red circle in central image. (Source: Durham University 2010, report 2378)

The location of the ROC post was well known at the time of the survey, what is interesting is the sheer amount of material around the site, presumably from the re-enforcing bars within the structural concrete.

> A particularly large and intense magnetic anomaly (m11) near the northern limit of the survey area almost certainly reflects a structure which was too deep to be detected by the particular resistance probe configuration used in this instance. This structure is almost certainly a 1960s Cold War bunker used by the Royal Observer Corps (ROC).
>
> Durham University 2010, para 6.6.



Fig.8-11 Extract of magnetic survey at Scarborough Castle. The shape of the underground monitoring post is clearly visible inside the white circle. A higher reading on the bottom right of the post shape (indicated by the red arrow) suggests the metal ladder is still extant. (Source: Durham University 2010, report 2378)

A Definition of Destroyed

The term 'destroyed', when used in conjunction with the order and chaos model, relates to a Royal Observer Corps structure that has no above ground component still visible in the landscape. This constitutes the majority of underground monitoring posts, certainly this was the case for 39 ROC monitoring posts in Devon. As noted above, other evidence for the sites former existence can, occasionally, still survive. However, the most effective way to locate such sites is through remote sensing techniques.

Ruination

Ruined status is a point at which the post is unlikely to recover. A point where destructive activities include the removal of surface features through vandalism of for re-use at other posts. To reach ruined status a set number of specific criteria must be met. These are; all surface structures to be devoid of vent covers; at least one of

the two instrument fixture points removed (either fixed survey meter or bomb power indicator) and the entrance stack or vent stack are missing. Crucially, there has to be some vestige of evidence left at the post's location.

The ruined structure D-39 Sharpitor, Devon (discussed in the case studies in the previous chapter) has lost all four points of the visible surface structures (entrance and vent stack, bomb power indicator and fixed survey meter point), however the post was a semi-sunken construction due to the granite geology. Subsequently the monitoring room is buried under a 1.5m high earthen mound that remains extant. Moreover, while the surface structures have been removed they still have a visibility on the surface. These set points indicate that the post can be classified as ruined.

The post at Sutton Veny, Wiltshire is a classic case of a post in a ruined state. The post was closed in 1968 as part of the Civil Defence reduction in October that year. It is a semi-sunken structure located at the end of a small track. The entrance stack is damaged around the hatch and both vent grills are missing. Both the fixed survey meter and bomb power indicator mounts are removed, as is the vent stack in its entirety. The subterranean space below is devoid of nearly all vestiges of the original fixtures and fittings except, strangely the frame of the bunk beds and the sump area has a number of large rocks lying in it.

My point is that from this scene of chaos one can still partially interpret the site. There is no annotation on the Ordnance Survey map indicating a post or ‘covered reservoir’, even though it might appear so as it is semi-sunken. The hatch now locked, must have been unsecure at one time as the debris suggests at the bottom of the shaft. I suggest that the site was probably accessed at the same time, dropping stones indicates a depth and the absence of water. In the nuclear reporting room there is the remains of a bunk (one part is assembled) along with a few introduced items (a sheet of corrugated tin and a sheet of asbestos) there is at least two phases of graffiti. The ROC post then is interpretable; the ladder suggests access is a part of the function and it has evidence of material culture displaying extended periods of habitation. Whether the solitary visitor interprets a pseudo-military purpose or not in the first instance is not the issue here, the fact they can connect it to subterranean activity, involving extended periods of shelter is more so.

Ruined or Destroyed - A Justification

The category ‘ruined’ is self-evident. Physical markers remain at the site and still allow a level of interpretation and the site is often recorded on the Heritage Environment Record (HER) (certainly this is the case for Devon and Wiltshire). With access to archival material it is possible to ascertain the type of feature and its purpose. Those structures classified as ‘destroyed’ open up a specific debate on the continued recognition of structures, or sites, no longer extant. Before continuing, I should note that the positions of all underground monitoring posts that are devoid of surface features, are recorded on the Wiltshire and Devon HERs. So as this is the case does it not negate a demand for any further research involvement? I believe it does not.

Put simply, the Royal Observer Corps primary function was the reporting of aircraft (in phase one activities) and, later, nuclear reporting and monitoring (phase two). No post worked in isolation, each became part of a group of two to four posts, those posts reported to a group headquarters, who, in turn, reported to sector headquarters and the Home Office. We must accept that there were 1,563 underground monitoring posts built across the British Isles; what is critical is that we continue to regard the Royal Observer Corps network as just that, a network. If we do not, then any narrative of organisations such as this become disjointed. As an example, any investigation of a railway route, or branch-line, would necessarily note the position of all stops, junctions and stations, along with any other features connected to that narrative. This would be further expanded to note passenger numbers and population areas close to, and utilising, the railway network. Similarly, any work on pillboxes from World War II cannot discuss features in isolation, to do so leads to miss-interpretation as they, like the ROC posts, are designed and placed in a specific landscape position. It is not enough to simply record the position of a, now removed, feature. To adequately discuss the landscape of a highly ordered organisation (both the examples above are such) one has to understand the entire network. In chapter 5, I investigated the reasons why an Orlit post type, ‘A’ or ‘B’, had been built in a specific location. The choice of post was dictated not by how far the observer could see, but what the immediate topography around the post was, coupled with a consequence of the relatively new tactic of aircraft flying low and fast. The point is, not all Orlit posts are contained on the HER, indeed I have to date, found no evidence as to how the distribution of both types was finally carried out. This provides an incomplete picture of the landscape in 1955, a critical point of

change in the British Cold War landscape (discussed in detail later), subsequently any account of the early reformation of the Royal Observer Corps in their final years as an aircraft reporting organisation, receives little attention, as a number of accounts suggest (McCamley 2002; Cocroft *et al* 2003, 175; Osborne 2004, 189). As part of the order and chaos model the ruined or destroyed status is a valid proposition.

COVERTLY CURATED POSTS

Covertly curated posts, that is posts that are in private ownership but still promote an air of secrecy and low information, are a growing phenomenon. During the fieldwork for this project a number of sites have changed ownership, while a few (D-3 Bampton; D-7 Christow; D-19 Holsworthy; D-27 Modbury, all in Devon are known examples) have undergone refurbishment or more accurately, restoration. Interestingly, this type of activity appears to be on the increase however, motives for such behaviour was difficult to ascertain, however, the increase in ROC post restoration sites on social media have started to shed light on such behaviours.

Hiding in Plain Sight

This category of the order and chaos mode presents us with a problem. By its very nature the owners of sites classified as covertly curated must reveal as little about the post as is possible, especially the physical appearance of the post above ground. This was juxtaposed with the field work which required at least one physical marker to demonstrate that the ROC post was being curated. A number of tactics have been employed across the network, intending to continue the air of an abandoned space while attempting not to draw attention to the site; unfortunately; attention, often from destructive visitors, is becoming more of a regular occurrence.

Tactical Hiding

The range of methods employed on site, and noted in the survey for this project, to reduce the possibility of damage took many forms. At one end of the scale D-27 Modbury, Devon, had had the compound fence removed and all the supporting concrete posts uprooted and dumped in the area between the entrance and vent stacks, across the three visits undertaken by this project the vegetation was allowed to grow through this material, steadily reducing the shape of the physical aspects of the post. This removal of the compound fence to reduce the physical attributes is

employed on at least one site in the overtly curated category (C-17 Veryan, Cornwall, discussed in the previous chapter), it certainly reduces the visibility of the ROC post. What indicated the site was covertly curated was a substantial padlock and chain through a pair of non-standard, heavy duty, brackets attached to the entrance stack; there was also a photoelectric plate attached to the ground zero indicator location point, with a wire passing through the vent nearby and down into the post. Presumably this was charging a battery of some sort, that would power the 12 volt lighting in the nuclear control room.

A further post in this category, D-7 Christow, Devon also had the fence removed, the surrounding vegetation was allowed to flourish, hiding the post from a track that ran nearby, and it too had a photoelectric cell fitted, this time on the vent stack. On the baseline visit it was clear the post had been broken into, and fairly recently as the smashed casting around the entrance hatch was still partially attached and debris from the top of the hatch was extant at the place of damage. The next two visits chronicled a blocking of the entrance to deter visitors and then a complete refurbishment of the hatch and its attachments. The owner then painted contact details on the hatch top. Initially, this was considered a way of negating the damage being caused - it was actually because of a change of ownership eight months earlier. To date no email or phone call has managed to make contact with the owners.

Covert Behaviour

Understanding the physical markers of ROC posts that are covertly curated is clearly important, however, other aspects also require interpretation. What attracts an individual, or group, to the possibility of owning and/or restore such a specialised structure, especially one connected so implicitly with such a contentious subject? And what effect and meaning does this have on the landscape? Taking the second point first, it is important to establish what a landscape of defence actually means, especially in the context of the Royal Observer Corps. The organisation during the Cold War was a passive defence force - that is it reacts to threats and attack from other, non-British, forces; it has neither the capability nor orders to take the offensive. Moreover, when considered as part of the wider defence landscape they ‘can act as containers for rich social and cultural life’ (Gold and Revill 1999, 235).

To answer the question of ownership we should first understand the essential aspects of the ROC staff tasking prior to stand-down. Considering the Royal Observer Corps specifically we can conclude that the organisation during its life-cycle was both low risk to volunteers, although it still offered a rich historical narrative, coupled with a sense of belonging through the wearing of uniforms. Equally important was the groups continued links with the military, specifically the Royal Air Force. A point that was specifically highlighted through recruiting literature. Michel Foucault suggested we might also view such needs as a 'block of capacity-communication-power' (1982, 787). Moreover, he proposes a state where power exerts a range of processes, essentially 'enclosure; surveillance; reward and punishment; the pyramidal hierarchy' (ibid 1982, 787), basically a match for the highly ordered organisation.

Noting this, there are clearly benefits between the needs of the individual and the needs of the organisation - neither would function if either participant were not prepared to adhere to strict policies of operation. The volunteer, or spare-time, observer was, in all likelihood, a person who requires a formal structure to the organisation they are joining. This trait was identified by Wardell, Lishman and Whalley when asking the question *'Who Volunteers?'* as part of study into community care. With formal structure comes structured training, structured activities and structured time on duty. That the organisation attracted the right sort of applicant is demonstrated by the number of respondents to the ROC survey that spent many years in the Royal Observer Corps (graph.8-1).



Graph.8-1 A demonstration of the length of service given by observers as researched in this project. The results show nearly 80% of respondents provided more than a decade of service and of those 30% were more than two decades. (Source data from ROC survey to be found in the appendices)

The majority of those who now own and covertly curate ROC posts conform to, at least some of, the traits mentioned above. The point is, the organisation may have been disbanded, however, the history, structures and material culture survive and are, in the main, still accessible to those who wish to 'belong' to such an activity. This belonging, or more accurately, remembrance of a highly ordered group, through re-enactment, is nothing new, indeed, following in former military footsteps has been more a spectacle in the United Kingdom for decades, it is also, unsurprisingly, an activity that 'spans diverse history-themed genres' (Agnew 2004, 327).

'Secret' a Viable Activity?

What is clear about re-enactment in the United Kingdom is the rich diversity now on offer for public consumption. Vanessa Agnew suggests the rise in popularity of re-enactment (certainly through the last decade of the twentieth century) is 'coupled to a 'broader public interest in history' (2004, 328). Clearly we have moved away from this in the last 15 years. Re-enactment, or living history, has taken on a new dimension, one that follows the commercial trajectory of heritage 'authorities', especially The National Trust and English Heritage. English Heritage, as a government entity, was divided on 1 April 2015, the legislator arm becoming Historic

England, while English Heritage became a charitable trust, responsible for the management of over 400 historic properties (English Heritage 2014). It is this arena that the commercial value of staged re-enactments now playout. The size of historically based re-enactment events and their attendant visitor numbers demonstrate something of the commercial viability of such proceedings. The point here is that the majority of re-enactment is carried out under the public's gaze, is publicised as accessible and promoted as spectacle, those who covertly curate Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts are, in the main, the complete opposite.

What Went Before

I suspect we should not consider those who now inhabit the space once dominated by rules, regulations and secrecy, as re-enactors, more as custodians. The key point here is that of those ROC posts recognised as, or suspected of, being covertly curated, are not outwardly promoted or publically accessible. An enquiry on the Royal Observer Corps Facebook page brought few, although significant responses. Twenty-two people responded to the question 'What is your motivation to restore old posts?' After removing the general, off topic chatter often generated on social media (eight), five cited nostalgic reasons; a further two were interested in locational values (likened to a garden shed or 'coolest den') while seven noted the preservation of sites for historical or heritage purposes. Clearly this is not enough of a sample to provide any real, auditable or manipulative data, although, the generalities are interesting; remembrance of the organisation now gone, followed by a remembrance of one's personal history appear, in this small instance, to be key elements.



Graph.8-2. The reasons for joining the Royal Observer Corps who were canvassed for this project. (Source data from ROC survey to be found in the appendices)

The survey completed by those who were members of the ROC enquired as to why correspondents had elected to join the organisation. A substantial number (36.6%) responded that they were doing their duty; a further 6.6% indicated specifically that they liked the idea of joining a secret organisation. The rest cited links with the military, interest in aviation and family membership as their primary motivations (table.8-2 above). On the whole it appears that an altruistic outlook was one of the key reasons for joining a highly ordered group. We should not be surprised that at least one third of ROC members considered membership to be duty. It would also appear that those who now covertly curate monuments also see it as their 'duty' to preserve historical aspects of the past, of those who responded as such, only two noted this was for educational purposes. Clearly more research is needed, although, I am prepared to suggest that similarities are apparent between both groups. The act of protection for the United Kingdom allows for a personal feeling of worth and provides reward (Wardell, Lishman and Whalley 2000, 238). I propose we consider protection of the nation and national heritage a similar activity. This is a culturally based behaviour, where the overarching activity is the preservation of national symbolism, often through the continuation of past histories, both national and personal.

So Who Are The 'Modern' Observers?

The modern observers are those, I suggest, who would be the potential volunteers for that group, had the Royal Observer Corps survived into the twenty-first-century. Opportunities for such activities, or more importantly the groups which were available to join have been substantially reduced since the end of the Cold War. By 1991, the ROC had stopped taking in new members; the reserve aspect of the main British Forces was also put on hold as numbers of full time regulars were cut through 'The Strategic Defence Review' published in 1998. Furthermore, the range of opportunities offered by the Territorial Army changed dramatically. What had once been a fairly safe bet (deployment around the United Kingdom and parts of Europe, mainly Germany) changed dramatically.

> 176. The Review has also identified scope for some wider organisational improvements and efficiencies. The Army's administrative structure in the UK will be reshaped. The administrative structure of Territorial, Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations will be adjusted to match that of the Regular Army. This will produce a closer linkage between the administration of Regular and Reserve forces as well as some running cost savings. We will be consulting widely on these and other changes to the TA.
>
> Strategic Defence Review (1998) para - 176.

Aligning both Regular and Reserve forces actually meant that those who were in a reserve occupation could now expect to be deployed into Afghanistan and Iraq on six-month tours, the same as the regular forces. This was to have a major impact of those ready to enlist.

> The slump has bolstered claims that potential recruits have been put off by the controversy over the Iraq war and by the Government's new strategy to give the TA a greater but riskier role in frontline fighting. One-10th of the British military personnel sent to Iraq have been TA, with several killed.
>
> The Independent. Sunday 27 March 2005

I am not suggesting that joining the Royal Observer Corps during the Cold War was a 'soft option', I propose that one reason for joining the Territorial Army during that conflict was to protect the British Isles, its institutions and fabric through defence of the mainland. The possibility of 'going on the offensive' required a completely different military ethos to be constructed. Certainly, the wars the United Kingdom has been involved in since the end of the Cold War have been a major contentious

issues, with public opposition and vocalisation reaching national proportions (fig.8-13 Below).

Fig.8-12. A Stop the War protest in central London on 22-2-2007. Notice how a number of issues are represented here, an indicator that this protest has anti-establishment leanings too. (Source: Bournemouth University)

While the potential lethality of nuclear warfare was, throughout the last half of the twentieth century, rallied against, in general terms it also found a sort of equilibrium - an accepted component of European life. Those who were born in the 1950s and 60s, were born into a world already divided between East and West, aligned and non-aligned countries, communism vs capitalism. These contentious situations appear not to be as dangerous to those who did not experience the build-up of tension over them. Of course they do feature large in the life of those who were around at the time. This is another example of recollected memory, phenomenology and age not only being linked, they may also influence choice moving forwards (Schuman and Rogers 2004).

Drawing this all together, I suspect that if we look at the ages of the majority of covert curators that we would discover a group, at least partially dominated by people who remember, through their early teens, the early to mid- 1980s and the protests connected with the deployment of cruise missiles at two bases in the United

Kingdom, the decision to replace Polaris with Trident missiles, and the build-up of Royal Air Force aircraft.

As the Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts were stood-down (September 1991), as were other spare-time activities in the quasi-militaristic world of the British establishment, a whole outlet for those who were interested in engaging with such activities was discontinued. As Michel Foucault noted appropriately:

> Discontinuity …the fact that within a space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things in a different way.
>
> Foucault 1972, 50

It appears likely that those posts that are increasingly taken into covert curation are likely to change hands regularly, especially as they now have a monetary value too. This is an aspect of Foucault's suggestion (above). What was once an outwardly looking defence structure aimed at warning and monitoring is, today, a financial consideration involving such activities as financial profit, investment and gain; with that comes protection of assets, secrecy over those assets that are remote and curation of authenticity, usually through the acquisition of material culture connected to these endeavours.

It is the opinion of those who look after posts that this activity has inflated the price of once redundant equipment, indeed, any material culture once connected to the organisation (see chapter 7 for a detailed discussion surrounding this subject) appears to bring premium prices on internet auction sites. This level of material acquisition also has an effect on the current Royal Observer Corps landscape. While the chance of discovering anything inside any of the underground monitoring posts that can be classed as salvageable is extremely remote now, some architectural features are vulnerable. The removal of entrance and vent stack grills and in some cases the hatch and counterbalance mechanism is now forcing posts from a state of transition to one of Ruin and if left unchecked, possible destruction. At least two post restorers have verbally described removing steel vents from other 'old posts', so the practice is being enacted out on the posts.

The activity brings forward a dichotomy, if we consider the activities of those who own/restore underground monitoring posts as 'curatorial' surely the act of removal of material from other sites contradicts this suggested behaviour. We can view this in a number of ways, are we seeing a new aspect of the life-cycle of the ROC posts?

One not originally catered for when they were first constructed? Certainly the ROC post landscape was familiar with abandonment prior to stand-down in 1991 as the reduction of their numbers in 1968 has already shown. What is new here is that no new material culture from the organisation is being maintained or manufactured. Of course Schiffer has already noted the existence of 'lateral-cycling' in a systemic context, involving heavy focus on recycling or material reuse (2010, 22). This activity, I suggest runs a little deeper than simple reuse.

Those that are not directly involved in the restoration of posts are also, in the main, curators through their own personal history. A large amount of material must still reside with ex-observers, especially the ephemeral aspects, (ID cards, Log Books, Training Notes, Local and Group Orders, Recruitment Material, Photographs, Uniforms) indeed the majority of official material used in this project has been gifted to me on the understanding it will be passed, on completion, to the Royal Observer Collection at the RAF Museum Cosford. The reasons for this are interesting. Just why do people keep mementos from previous associations with highly ordered groups, and what are the implications for this study?

The answer lies within the memory of the individual, not the 'existence' of the artefact in question. In 2011, Zachary Beckstead *et al,* investigated the process of remembering through war memorials. They demonstrated that an object that has no intrinsic value can, through cultural processes, acquire a high value to certain individuals (2011, 194). This sentiment echoed another paper, also published in 2011, by Nicky Gregson *et al,* where the ongoing social lives of material culture, especially that generated by the military, can pass through many 'value regimes' (2011, 301). What is critical to this project is the understanding that alongside aspects of memory regeneration, personal histories and belonging must now come intrinsic value. Indeed, 'value', as included in both papers talk specifically about memory value, rather than financial - unfortunately, we must consider this too. What is clearly a conduit to another time, a tangible reminder of past deeds, must also be seen as something that blurs the boundary between order and chaos, destabilising the boundary between civilian and military life (Gregson *et al* 2011, 305). Returning to my original question - Who are the covert curators? I suggest we can now start to identify their traits, interpret some of their activities and demonstrate an impact on the landscape.

Covertly Curated - Fact or Fiction?

The influence of those involved in the renovation of underground monitoring posts, in a state of covert curation, are influencing how the monuments that remain in the landscape transit between one state and another. The activist in this category is altruistic in character, although the activities undertaken at Royal Observer Corps sites are more than often an investment opportunity as much as an act of remembrance. The number of posts currently passing through various hands via both internet auction sites and estate agent offices, before and after restoration, suggest this trait is on the increase; just as Gregson *et al* suggested (2011, 301) there is a value regime, this is one such driven by the restorers themselves. This is not the case for those who overtly curate posts for remembrance and educational purposes, it is to this final aspect of the order and chaos model I now turn.

OVERTLY CURATED POSTS

Overtly curated underground monitoring posts are the most straightforward of sites to interpret. Two sites within the project area, W-5 Great Bedwyn, Wiltshire and C-1, Veryan, Cornwall, both case studies in the previous chapter, are currently the only known posts to be overtly curated, that is promoted openly in media outlets as being available for inspection by the public. I suspect this will change over time as more posts become established through the covert curation route and networks of co-operation are built.

So What Makes Overt Curation Different?

A key aspect of overtly curated sites is to make the 'secret' accessible and by so doing, enhance the visitors' knowledge about both the Royal Observer Corps and the real dangers faced by the entire population throughout the Cold War period. This contentious issue lives on in the personal histories of a large majority of the adult population. The tensions between those who operated the Royal Observer Corps network and other, defence orientated functions was played out across the media of the day; the most recognisable being the women's peace camp at RAF Greenham Common. As discussed in chapter 3 of this project, the arbitrary stand-down of the ROC caused the once secret organisation to become completely disenfranchised (74% of those who returned questionnaires viewed the Stand-down in 1991 in a negative light).

What is important here is that those who elected to refurbish and open their posts to public scrutiny were the same observers who had operated the same posts during the Cold War. While covertly curated posts still exude an air of secrecy, probably linked to protection of an investment coupled with a number of egotistical and requirements of the owners, overtly curated ROC posts open to the public do not. In the previous chapter I noted this classification does employ tactics to deter the destructive visitor (signage and removal of compound fences), although, the site of the post is readily advertised through a number of media formats and as such is not secret in any way.

Interestingly, the rise of the Cold War site as public history follows Wayne Cocroft's original set of parameters concentrating specifically on Cold War Structures and their preservation (2001). Indeed, 20 Group Headquarters structure at York, North Yorkshire, was one of the first Cold War sites to be scheduled, the designation going through in May 2000 (Emerick 2003, 46). Since then a number of sites have become 'available' for public consumption, culminating with the opening of the National Cold War Museum at Royal Air Force Cosford, Shropshire in February 2007 (RAFM 30/11/2016).

Public Re-Alignment?

The results of the public survey provided an interesting situation regarding the question 'For over 40 years successive British Governments spent millions of pounds building 'nuclear bunkers' around the country. What do you think was the true purpose of these structures?' from 178 returns the overall division was 87 positive answers; 88 negative and 1 no answer. When the results took age into consideration, using Schuman and Rogers collective memories principle (2004), the results remained fairly static - generally a 50% split on whether a structure was altruistic or egocentric towards the population.



Graph.8-3. The Cold War survey indicated that the correspondents were divided equally over whether the bunker had a good or bad purpose (Blue positive reason/use; Brown negative reason/use). (Source data from Cold War survey to be found in the appendices)

What the data above tells us is that there are a lot of people who are clearly still sceptical about the function of one of the archetypal structures from the Cold War period. This makes the role played by the ROC posts that are aimed at education even more vital. I believe we have reached a watershed, especially when it comes to Royal Observer Corps posts. That a number of ROC posts will prevail beyond the life-cycle of the observers themselves is not in question; the opportunity to present a more balanced view of the period as experienced in the British Isles will become far more problematic..

The Disenfranchised View

It appears the effect of the stand-down on a good majority of the Royal Observer Corps members had a lasting effect. It is probable that the reasons for ex-observers re-manning their original posts has something to do with way their organisation appeared to be promoted after stand-down. In fact it appears a lack of visibility and recognition was the main motivation for both overtly curated posts in this project being brought into the public arena. Now those who decend into the secret world of the Royal Observer Corps can experience first hand what an underground monitoing post would have looked like during the organisations operational phase. They are also inducted into a world that, if the samples from the survey are anything to go by, they clearly considered was constructed for the perpetuation of the 'select few', rather than for any public good.



Graph.8-4. Of those who indicated they were serving at the time of the 1991 stand-down, 74% had only negative things to say about the event. It has to be remembered that this survey was conducted over 20 years after the stand-down event. Clearly, the effect still has an impact on the ROC psychology. (Source data from ROC survey to be found in the appendices)

Order and Chaos as a Workable Model

From the outset of this project I believed there was potential in the Royal Observer Corps to demonstrate that a certain set of behaviours could be recognised in the extant landscape. Initially this comprised a structure aligned the familiar core and periphery model so often used to describe the introduction and usage to coinage to Iron Age Britain (Cunliffe 1981). In the event, although the core and periphery model has potential, it is a very basic tool; however, it does allow for certain aspects of highly ordered groups to be separated out.

Subsequently, in chapter 4 I described the layout of the two facet system when applied to large landscapes (airfields), the size allowing for easy recognition of activities both sides of the security fence. Beyond the fence lay a series of areas were specialist, organisationally reliant, activities were both contained and performed. These activities are linked to the overall mission of the site under

investigation. Dependant on the position and activities enacted these increase, or decrease, in level of control of the individual. Using an airfield landscape it is possible to recognise areas of complete conformity to rule, regulations and military ethos; these activities are classified as highly organised operational space. Other areas move through lower levels of control until activities are almost indistinguishable from those enacted outside the security fence, in wider society. What is important is how the material culture of both the core and peripheral aspects interacts. If we revisit the diagram demonstrating the facets of order, linked to material culture (fig.8-12) it is clear to see the closer to a highly ordered space one becomes, the more rigid the activities prescribed and the less complex the material culture and attendant deposition. In the natural order of things, the areas where aircraft operate should have no primary archaeological record indicating that was the case.



Fig.8-13. The flow of complexity when matched to highly ordered operational spaces. Note the level of complexity reduces the close one gets to total control. (Source: Bob Clarke)

The challenge was to apply the model to sites that were a) abandoned and b) smaller and more numerous in the landscape. This is why the Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring posts became the focus of this project. I believe the choice of structures was a fortuitous one; core aspects provided a uniform structural type in all locations, a known narrative life-cycle of the organisation and a large number of observers still available for comment. Utilising this the chaos part of the proposed framework was developed. The results of this development work allows me to suggest that the order and chaos model appears to hold validity. The model has been effectively applied to the ROC posts, bringing much new information about the last 25 years of the organisation's field monuments, those who still interact with the posts and the behaviours they display. Following this project, it is intended to return to the airfield landscape in an attempt to refine the framework for larger, infinitely more complex, sites.

Technology or Historiography

Alongside the study of the process of abandonment, which is the main focus of this project, I decided the Royal Observer Corps and other organisations from the same chronological period might have something to offer the study of the monumental composition of the contemporary landscape. Subsequently, the fifth research question set the goal to *'Construct a more appropriate chronology of the Cold War, relying on the archaeological record currently extant in the United Kingdom.'* My reasons are simple, currently the archaeological record does not mirror the current accepted view of a multi-phased political period. I consider it to be far more appropriate to recognise a landscape and monuments driven by technology; its influence is much more notable than the political periods suggested through leadership challenges, agreements on arms control and political posturing through armed conflicts via proxy such as Vietnam (1955-75) and Afghanistan (1979-89). Some, especially Afghanistan, had far reaching consequences; two Olympic Games were substantially effected as first Governments from the West boycotted the Moscow Games in 1980 (Jefferys 2012), then in a classic display of Cold War 'tit-for-tat', Eastern Bloc countries boycotted the Los Angeles Games four years later, indicating that 'chauvinistic sentiments and an anti-Soviet hysteria [was] being whipped up in the United States' (Burns 1984). Considering just these few events, it is easy to see how the historiography of the last half or the twentieth century has had the potential to be driven by rhetoric and propaganda. Especially since the

landscape of the Cold War was neither open or discussed outside the closed heterotopian world of the organisations who presided over its continuance.

Interestingly, the boycott of Olympic Games is unlikely to leave any archaeological marker attributable to the Cold War; the stadium and venues were built and the games went ahead. Granted, some level of record through the material culture of the Olympics will survive, although, one would have difficulties recognising 'boycott' within any analysis of the material now. Observations, through field visits and the first public survey, conducted for this project, suggest we are at an impasse, one that should be considered an attribute of recollected memory, phenomenology and age (Schuman and Rogers 2004).

The Public Results

The first round off public engagements were described, along with the question set, in chapter 3. The initial findings proved disappointing with no revelatory information coming forwards. Once the analysis had been conducted it became clear that a connection between events and age was visible. Schuman and Rogers suggest that experiences of large events during 'adolescence or young adulthood' have a lasting impression on the personal histories of any individual, this they consider is the 'critical period' (2004, 218) (graph.8-5).



Graph.8-5 Schuman and Rodgers 'Critical Period'. Those who remembered the Civil Defence Corps (1948-68) clearly follow the trend of adolescence or young adulthood at the

time the organisation was in operation. (source data from Cold War survey to be found in the appendices)



Graph.8-6. Here the results for the Berlin Wall being erected and removed are juxtaposed. These results are from the same survey and demonstrate again the alignment of results when considered with Schuman and Rodgers 'Critical Period' (2004). (source data from Cold War survey to be found in the appendices)

Interestingly, Wayne Cocroft suggested in 2001 that '- it is helpful to split the Cold War into a number of chronological periods.' This was followed in 2003 with an assertion that at least three periods were recognisable - a first Cold War; a period of equilibrium, or détente after the Cuban Missile Crisis; followed by a second Cold War - covering a period of 43 years (Cocroft *et al* 2003, 9). Unfortunately, I do not think this process of dividing the Cold War into chronological periods dictated by the historical narrative adequately describes the archaeological landscape. Furthermore, different organisations have their own life-cycle and in a conflict that lasts as long as the Cold War we must accept that the archaeology is necessarily multi-faceted.

A Correct Chronology?

When consider the landscape archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps two types of monuments are extant in the field. The Orlit posts, interacting with a skyscape, visually recognisable, overt and familiar, described as phase one monuments in this thesis. And the underground monitoring posts, subterranean, subjects of subterfuge,

secretive (and difficult to interpret), phase two monuments. The decision to move underground was taken after the publication of the Strath Report in 1955. This, in turn, described the very real horrors of the new 'H-bomb' and its attendant radioactive fallout. The Strath report is the watershed between phase one and phase two monuments. From here on in the ROC posts were increasingly operated from below ground.

Other organisations were also affected by the report. Indeed, a number of high profile operations we disbanded at this time, including Anti-Aircraft Command and the War room network. Other complex organisations were brought into being at this time, specifically the Regional Seats of Government, although they too underwent substantial transformation and location changes until the end of the Cold War (Clarke 2005). My point is, we should consider groups in isolation, with their own monument life-cycle, rather than try and structure a chronological framework for Cold War monuments that is driven by the political landscape. A key perimeter of the order and chaos model is the understanding of the organisation's historiography from the outset. It is only following the recognition that a technological change, in this case the development of the Hydrogen Weapon, forced a change in the landscape of the Royal Observer Corps that the correct chronological framework can be recognised.

Summary

In this chapter I have made the case for the development of a new, detailed, model intended to inform the researcher, through fieldwork, about aspects of the abandonment process as experienced at a specific type of Cold War monument. I believe the framework developed has potential in a number of areas and should be accepted as a tool for the investigation of contemporary and twentieth century archaeological sites. The model relies on a known level of organisational history and an awareness of modern material culture. Once these parameters are known the observation of behaviours out in the field can be used to explain the actions recognised on site, producing a much more structured and detailed account of the life-cycle of the monument.

Chapter 9: CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

I have, through this project, identified a number of tangible lines of investigation connected to the abandonment process. The work has centred on the field archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps and the organisations, purpose-built, structures of the Cold War period. It has become clear through this project that we cannot simply say a structure is abandoned without first knowing something of the primary group who inhabit the space a building creates. This covers all types of organisations; in this case I utilised a group that operated along military lines, although, it relied heavily on volunteers to operate efficiently. Those same volunteers are available for comment, as is a large body of incomplete archival material, some of it official, other parts in private and personal historical contexts. The subject matter – nuclear warfare and Government sanctioned mass destruction – are contentious issues and still cause tension twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War. Utilising a number of research avenues, I have been able to demonstrate the validity of the order and chaos model I believe this does, with further refinement, have the potential to influence the way we view organisations that follow instrumentalist activities.

The initial concept of order and chaos was intended to demonstrate a two-tier model, or more accurately, framework on which to base the transition from the highly ordered world of nuclear reporting to the ultimately more random activities enacted on Royal Observer Corps posts once the primary usage had been abandoned. This proved to be a naïve concept; it became clear through fieldwork and engagement with the public that the ROC landscape, both pre- and post-abandonment, was infinitely more complex than this.

'Ordered' Order?

The project discovered the concept of 'order', that is a site, or location, utilised by a highly ordered group as part of an activity bound by rules and regulations, cannot be considered a singular activity. Over the period of the Cold War the Royal Observer Corps underwent a substantial change in its operational outlook. Importantly here, this changed both the landscape monuments and the recruitment tactics, suggesting that organisations that have a rigid structure still require a degree of flexibility in their overall policy. The years of 'order' experienced by the ROC were actually punctuated

by substantial developments in the craft of the Cold War. Subsequently, tactics, equipment and, ultimately, the volunteer experience, underwent dramatic change.

A level of change management was expected from the outset; however, the effect this had on recruitment and the ways in which the service was promoted were not. Suffice to say technological advances impact the field archaeology of the organisation, this is nothing new. What is new is the way in which the government retained aspects of redundant practice in an attempt to attract volunteers. It would appear that even in rigid organisations there is an opportunity for chaos; there is often a dichotomy between actual purpose and information outwardly projected – in this case a tangible link with aviation and the skyscape – although the actual task was ultimately underground. Furthermore, once a human is introduced into an environment, personalisation of that space will occur, regardless of rules or regulations. Indeed, this should be considered a universal concept.

'Moving' to Chaos

The move to understanding an abandonment of a structure challenged a number of pre-conceived concepts, especially those discussed by Michael Schiffer. Once the field results were analysed it became clear that the chaos of human activity did actually display a number of set patterns. I proposed four main streams of interaction with underground monitoring posts – human, animal, meteorological, and vegetation – all types can work in combination or singularly. Considering human activity, I initially proposed a level of visitor – curious or destructive – although, this did not adequately explain many observations nor did it explain the material culture discovered during field visits. The realisation that chaos has a number of structured elements has provided a greater level of fidelity to be achieved.

Through the application of the chaos side of the model I have been able to demonstrate that an expected life-cycle of a Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring post is not straightforward. A given structure passes through a number of states, although, this is not a linear path. The four states and their primary routes of interaction are demonstrated in the simplified diagram below (fig.9-1).

Key Findings

To summarise the model: all structures, once the intended structure is removed enter a period of 'transition'. This has no chronological implications, although, through interaction and the deposition of non-organisational material culture, that is items not associated with the function of the Royal Observer Corps, it is the most complex of the states archaeologically. From this point ROC posts either enter a state of 'ruined or destroyed', although I have demonstrated that even a 'destroyed' post will leave some evidence of its former landscape position. A post might also enter a period of covert curation, that is an occupation of the underground monitoring post by an individual, or group, who, in the main, are egotistical in their outlook and probably financially driven. It is important to note that the fieldwork discovered sites moving from transition to covert curation and covert curation to transition. Again, this has no chronological marker.

Those ROC posts that are overtly curated are, in the main, likely to remain in a curated state for the foreseeable future. It is here that the most authentic experience is offered to a, still sceptical, public. It occurs to me that there is also the potential for covertly curated posts to move into the public arena in time, more work is needed here. The final classification – statutory protection – contains posts displaying all other levels of classification. Interestingly, the state is connected to the surrounding landscape – basically the more modern the landscape, the better preserved and maintained the ROC post. There is clearly a management issue being played out here; again more work can be undertaken in this area, and not just on twentieth century monument preservation. An assessment of a given landscape to include all monuments, including those from contemporary periods, would benefit the management plans in the future, and in so doing slow the attrition some sites are currently suffering.

Engaging with The Public

A key part of the research for this project involved the engagement of the public, primarily to ascertain their perceptions of the Cold War. The first, paper based, survey, was in hindsight, naive in its question set. That said, utilising the process devised by Schuman and Rogers (2004), it was possible to recognise formative memory and world events. This turned out to be fortuitous as I was able to calibrate following question sets using this theory. The results in certain areas proved useful

and I consider this an essential part of any investigation into subjects of a contemporary nature.

The ROC survey provided extremely useful material, covering attitudes and the minutiae of operations across a broad spectrum of the groups Cold War activities. The important aspect here is that a number of activities were uncovered that would never be apparent through the official record. This led to the conclusion that, as mentioned above, even the most regimented of organisations can have a chaotic element to them, an important point when studying such groups.

Why is the Order and Chaos Model Important?

Utilising the order and chaos model has demonstrated that research linked specifically to groups who are highly organised in their practice has the ability to provide much more detailed accounts of that group. This is achieved through a structured approach to field monuments, noting specific non-organisation material culture that are likely to be missed by high-level narratives. Beyond this, a study of the extant archives, the organisations own history and, more importantly, the personal histories of those who enacted the tasks dictated by the governments should be considered a key part of the model. To contextualise such highly ordered groups with the memories of those who 'fought' in the Cold War is to demonstrate the activities of three generations and places them in a specific taskscape (and skyscape).

The monuments out in the field are now the focus of a multitude of activities, some natural, although the majority are the direct or secondary consequence of human activity. Utilising the four-tier abandonment model of chaos it is not only possible to discuss the process-led life-cycle of a specific monument type from the Cold War, it also allows the movement of same to be followed through multiple usages, often in the same location. What is recorded on the majority of Heritage Environment Records is simply a statement of highly organised use; from stand-down very little, if anything, is noted. The order and chaos model has allowed me to substantially complement the record, far from still being considered a secret the ROC underground monitoring posts are now much more in the light.

What Now?

Developing the model around such a limited sized structure (the underground monitoring post) was a risk. The findings relied, to a certain point, on the concept of

core and periphery, both separated by a security fence, which could have struggled to demonstrate differentiation between public (outside) and secret (inside). In the event the order and chaos model demonstrated that a high level of detail can be ascribed to such a scenario.

The next step is to apply the same research concept, tactics and methods to a multi-phase military site. With multiple uses being displayed throughout the life-cycle of the majority of structures and areas on an MoD airfield the challenge will be to select the most appropriate routes for the characterisation of periods, operational connection and interaction with the surrounding landscape.

Last Words

I submit the concepts and models I have developed in this thesis to scrutiny, acknowledging that a number of aspects are modifications of current academic thought. The structure of the order and chaos model, utilising a multi-faceted framework aimed at specific organisations, their former members and the activities enacted both prior to, and after, abandonment is something new. I am convinced choosing this direction has greatly increased the possibility of recording a more balanced, detailed, inclusive life-cycle for a group of poorly understood monuments of the Cold War. It is simply not appropriate to describe such monuments in the context of their past, intended, life-cycle; they remain a feature of the British landscape, interaction continues in and around them. We must be prepared to understand that post-organisational aspect of our military landscape if we are ever to face the reality of our destructive past. I believe the order and chaos model is one such vehicle, continued research will develop the concept for additional sites.

End of Volume One

Landscape, Memory and Secrecy:

The Cold War Archaeology of the Royal Observer Corps

Volume 2 of 2

Submitted by Robert Clarke to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Archaeology in December 2016.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature…….

ABSTRACT

This project covers the development of a model framework intended to allow researchers of the archaeology of the Cold War to recognise a range of behaviours played out on military sites. The order and chaos model developed and utilised in this thesis introduces a heterotopian landscape populated by the Royal Observer Corps. Through a process of archaeological fieldwork a number of behavioural traits are recognised and discussed here for the first time. The group in question is fully researched, providing a historiography of the practice played out during the groups life-cycle. The landscape archaeology is discussed and contextualised by narration from the volunteers who once operated the posts. A range of case studies are introduced confirming the validity of the order and chaos model and potential for application elsewhere. Finally, the findings are discussed in detail and a proposal for the next step in the research are revealed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervision team, Prof. Oliver Creighton, Prof. Stephen Rippon and Dr. Hajnalka Herold for their support, patient, insight and firm hand throughout the last six years.

I also extend my thanks to the staff of the many Historical Environment Records across the south-west, Historic England (formerly English Heritage) and the National Trust for supplying records and brokering access to sites across the study area. My family for their unstinting support over the last few years and all those who dedicated so much of their time to the pursuit of peace, no matter what form it took politically.

This work is dedicated to the Royal Observer Corps spare time members who have enlightened a, once dark, world and the late Prof. Mick Aston, who started me on this road back in 1997 with the comment “Well if you consider that to be archaeology, then so be it”.

Bob Clarke

December 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND GRAPHS

No. 1: Literature Review

No. 2: Methodology

No. 3: Populating a Heterotopian Landscape

No. 4: Order and Chaos

No. 5: Landscape Archaeology

No. 6: The Landscape of the Observer

No. 7: The Years of Chaos and a Return to Order

No. 8: Discussion

Graphs

ABBREVIATIONS

AAOR - Anti-Aircraft Operations Room

AMO - Air Ministry Order

ATS - Air Transport Service

BPI - Bomb Power Indicator

CBA - Council for British Archaeology

CDC - Civil Defence Corps

CND - Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

DS - Domestic Space

FOD - Foreign Object Damage

GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters

GDA - Gun Defended Area

GPO - General Post Office

GZI - Ground Zero Indicator

HC - House of Commons

HDN - Home Defence Network

HDR - Home Defence Region

HER - Heritage Environment Record

HMS - Her Majesty's Ship

HMSO - Her Majesty's Stationary Office

HODS - Highly Organised Domestic Space

HOOS - Highly Organised Operational Space

LiDAR - Laser Indication and Detection Down Range

MOS - Metropolitan Observation Service

NAAFI - Navy, Army, Airforce Families Institute

PRO - Public Record Office

RAF - Royal Air Force

ROC - Royal Observer Corps

ROCA - Royal Observer Corps Association

SAM - Scheduled Ancient Monument

UGMP - Underground Monitoring Post

UKWMO - United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation

VHF - Very High Frequency

WAAF - Women's Auxiliary Air Force

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Anti-Aircraft Operations Room

A central control where a number of automatic guns in an area known as a Gun Defended Area were operated. The structures are semi-sunken, two storey blockhouses. They were operated by Anti-Aircraft Command, a component of the Royal Artillery. The organisation was disbanded in March 1955.

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

A network of three powerful radar stations intended to detect missile launches from the east and compute their trajectory and intended target. The site in the United Kingdom, RAF Fylingdales, gave rise to the phrase ‘Four Minute Warning’.

Bomb Power Indicator

A visual indicator located in the control room of every underground monitoring post, operated by a baffle plate at the surface. Standard equipment the BPI measures the blast force of the pressure wave as it passes over the post.

Carrier Control Point

The United Kingdom had a network of 250 carrier control points - usually in police stations - each fed by information from the ROC and other government sources. From here it was possible to initiate over 7000 powered air-raid sirens and 9000 over warning devices nationally.

Civil Defence Corps

The Civil Defence Corps was a mainly voluntary organisation funded by Central Government between 1948-1968, although organised on a county level and the responsibility of that unitary authority. It comprised a number of specialist departments including warden; ambulance; rescue, control and welfare. By the early 1960s the organisation had over 300,000 members.

Defence of Britain Project

The Defence of Britain Project was a long running recording project managed by the Council for British Archaeology. The initial concept was to record all military remains in the United Kingdom. Eventually the task became so massive the project was downgraded to just those sites from World War II.

Fixed Survey Meter

An electronic instrument capable of recognising the ionisation of the atmosphere and subsequent radiation from a nuclear weapon once detonated. Standard equipment on underground monitoring posts.

Ground Zero Indicator

A drum-like device used to capture the direction and height of the nuclear flash. Operates like a pin-hole camera. Standard equipment on every underground monitoring post.

Gun Defended Areas

An air defence network operating heavy anti-aircraft, and later, missiles. The United Kingdom was divided into thirty-three Gun Defended Areas. The structure was disbanded in March 1955.

Home Defence Region

The United Kingdom was divided, during the Cold War, into eleven Home Defence Regions. This form of decentralised government reduced the country to a number of self-controlled regions managed from two control centres by an appointed junior minister. The key purpose was to maintain the machinery of government had central government become incapacitated.

Orlit Post

The Orlit post was an overground observation point for aircraft reporting. It was constructed using pre-cast concrete panels manufactured to a design by Messrs'. Orlit, Bedfordshire.

Rotor Project

The Rotor project was the regeneration of the radar network post- World War II. In several phases the construction phase of Rotor was the biggest capital works for a generation.

Underground Monitoring Post

The form of post used by the ROC during the nuclear reporting role. It comprised a control room, utility room and entrance stack with steel access ladder. The whole structure was buried at least 10ft (3.04m) below ground.

United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation

The government organisation responsible for warning the public and authorities of air and nuclear attack. The ROC fed information to it during phase two of its Cold War life-cycle.

APPENDIX 1: DEVON ROC POSTS

The following section comprises a catalogue of those Royal Observer Corps posts that were assessed as part of this thesis.

How to use this section

A yellow masthead signifies the start of a unique record. Each Royal Observer Post is presented with geographical information, including original post numbers. A pictorial description of the constituents of each structure, followed by a record of observations on each visit. The relevant aspects of the condition of the structure are assessed against the order and chaos criteria, and an assessment of the material culture encountered is undertaken.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS9736818758	Site Code	D-3
Height	285 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 72150
Geology	Exeter Group (EXE)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled

(D-3) Bampton, Devon. The post at Bampton has recently undergone refurbishment moving it from a transitional site to a covertly curated one. (Top Left) Depicts the entrance stack at the baseline visit, before refurbishment. (Top Right) Depicts the entrance stack post-refurbishment. (Bottom Left) is a general arrangement of the, now refurbished, post. (Bottom Right) Shows the location of the extant steps to the site. Note the telegraph post above, this was connected to the post. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	September 1938	Post Number	22/X.1 (Wood 1992, 284)	Org. Group	No.22 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated		Yes	Post Number	10/Y.3 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	October 1961	Post Number	9/E.3 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.9 Group Yeovil
Amalgamation of Groups 11 & 10					Group 1973	No.9 Group Yeovil
	Close	September 1991	No at Closure	32 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	No.9 Group Yeovil



(D-3) Bampton, Devon. The post at Bampton has recently undergone refurbishment moving it from a transitional site to a covertly curated one. The landscape also contains a set of concrete steps up from the road to the field above. Although now overgrown, they still have the stainless steel handrail attached. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 27 May 2011	D-3 is a fully-sunken ROC post. It stands inside the remnants of a concrete posted fence and close to a set of concrete steps, inc. a hand rail, that the observers would use from the road to access the site, a traverse of c.5m. The Structure has been buried. This was not recent as the material is well compacted. Also it must have covered the hatch as the inner walls of the ladder shaft are stained red. The percolation of water through the soil cover has caused this. Some areas have, recently, been re-excavated, this appears to be planned interaction, not animal activity. The hatch is missing, however it would have been in place on burial. The GZI is a tower type, it has been dislodged and lies next to the entrance stack. The vent tower is also partially buried, no attempt has been made to dig it out as yet. It looks like this site is in an advanced state of abandonment with parts of it missing or destroyed and the site open to the elements.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 27 May 2011	
Human	Land use currently arable. The fact the compound fence is extant (apart from the section where the re-excavation has been undertaken) suggests that since closure the site has not been considered an obstruction. Although the ROC post has, in the past been used as an area to dump soil. The extended GZI has been toppled and the original hatch cover has been removed. So we could be seeing three different activities, including systemic deposition through the recycling of the hatch, the destructive visitor and an attempt to remove the site from the landscape by burial. One side of the soil overburden has been partially removed – presumably by machine as the BPI pipe is bent towards the centre of the site following the slop cut into the soil. Further the partially buried entrance stack has been dug out by hand.
Animal	No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this visit.
Meteorological	The key problem with this site is the lack of hatch. Currently a board bearing the warning “Danger No Step – Do Not Remove-Steep Drop” is the only cover for the entrance shaft. No entry was attempted however, it was evident that the site contained water.
Vegetation	Overgrowth encroaching on site, currently just weeds but has the potential to become thicker.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 12 June 2012	D-3 Bampton ROC post was visited in June 2012 – one of only four assessed that year. The baseline visit established that the site was under threat, primarily by neglect but some parts of the structure had specifically been removed. Further the site inside the ROC post had been almost completely buried by soil. Surprisingly the situation had changed dramatically between visits. The GZI stack was back in place, a refurbished hatch had been fitted and the site overburden had been dug away.

Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012	
Human	The ROC post does not show any destructive elements, although a level of order has now been restores. It is likely that the site will attract a little more attention now it has been fully exposed making it more visible.
Animal	No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this visit.
Meteorological	Nothing outwardly visible however, the step has a split between it and the entrance stack (this was masked by soil on earlier visits). There is also a crack in the concrete that holds the hatch outer frame on top of the stack. Frost action could remove this.
Vegetation	Only light vegetation.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 1 April 2013	D-3 Bampton appears to have had little interaction between visits. Some slight damage has occurred, although this is more likely the effects of weather than any human activity.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 April 2013	
Human	The ROC post does not show any destructive elements. It is likely that the site will attract a little more attention now it has been fully exposed making it more visible. The missing section of concrete now offers an opportunity to try and access the site.
Animal	No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this visit.
Meteorological	The crack on the entrance stack has now become a fracture, with the loose material now missing. This has exposed the steel frame in one corner. As this corrodes it will start to lift further sections of concrete.
Vegetation	Only light vegetation.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	The standard four point layout, remnants of the compound & gate are evidence.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	Investigation of the underground aspects of the ROC post were not investigated during the baseline visit due to the depth of water noted. Further attempts have been frustrated by the locked hatch.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	A set of steps from the road up to the site survive, along with a aluminium handrail.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SX9446256534	Site Code	D-6
Height	65 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 42876
Geology	Berry Head Member (BHD)	Status	Scheduled: SAM 1017322



(D-6) Brixham, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Bottom Left) World War II observers post, now partially below ground (behind grass bank and wall), on top an Orlit post Type 'A'. (Top Right) underground monitoring post. (Top Left) general arrangement of all three ROC posts. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/G.3 (Wood 1992, 284)		No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	No			Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	Nov 1960	Post Number	10/K.2 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
Amalgamation of Groups 11 & 10.					Group 1973	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	Sept 1991	No at Closure	57 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	No.10 Group Exeter



(D-6) Brixham, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. Location of post within scheduled area, note Victorian Fort details at bottom centre and top middle. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 25 May 2011	D-6 is a semi-sunken UGMP. The structure was once surrounded by a fence however this has been removed to allow access for the general public. The general condition of the structure is good – it is well maintained, a covering of grey deck paint protects the site from the elements and stops those who wish to explore the ROC post from injuring themselves. Some areas of metalwork, especially the louvers on the vents, do show some signs of corrosion, although considering the exposed nature of the site and its proximity to the coast, the damage is slight. Close by is a WWII Observers Post and 1953 Orlit Post type 'A'. All three structures are provided with interpretive signage for visitors.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011	
Human	The area has a high number of visitors annually and the site is located on the edge of a large population area. Berry Head is a popular place in the landscape with many coming to walk dogs across the peninsular. There is a café located just 150m to the west of the site, placing the ROC post in clear view of park warden staff every day of the week. In one hour 69 people walked past the site, 24 of whom wandered off the path to look at the structure, read the notice board and/or climb on the ROC post.
Animal	Slight attention by rabbits.
Meteorological	Due to the fact the site is maintained regularly the is little evidence of degradation of the concrete elements of the structure. However, some of the metalwork – especially that manufactured from ferrous metals - is showing signs of corrosion.
Vegetation	The area is well-maintained ensuring vegetation is not effecting the ROC UGMP.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 2 April 2013	The site appears to be in similar condition to the base line visit (25 May 2011). There are no additions or removal of features.

Order and Chaos Observations on 2 April 2013	
Human	Someone has placed a brick on the entrance cover of the ROC post. This activity has been noted on other sites. In one hour 47 people walked past the site, of whom 15 left the path and investigated the site. Most just read the notice board whilst 3 physically interacted with the ROC post.
Animal	Slight bare patches through the turf due to rabbits.
Meteorological	There is an increase of corrosion on the metal vents on both the entrance stack and vent. Otherwise in the same condition as 25 May 2011.
Vegetation	No discernible increase in encroachment.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Beyond the standard four point layout no further material culture is evident.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	As the ROC post is closed down and locked - and following a protracted discussion with Torbay Council as to access and H & S concerns (confined space etc.) – I have decided to take the word of the wardens that the ROC post is completely empty.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	22m to the south of the Underground Monitoring Post is a multiphase monument spanning the entire period of ROC aircraft reporting. An Orlit Type 'A' post from 1953, is built on top of a 1941, pattern ROC Post. The Orlit has been modified to become a bird watching facility. The wartime structure is constructed of local stone along the east, south and west faces although the north face is breeze block. The entrance is protected from the weather by a breezeblock wall, presumably built in 1990 as 'ROC 1990' is incised into a large piece of concrete in the enclosed area. Phasing is visible on the side elevation. The pre-cast concrete lid of the early WWII structure is clearly evident at the eastern end of the site.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SX8292482972	Site Code	D-7
Height	267 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 72189
Geology	Trusham Mudstone (TTMU)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled

(D-7) Christow, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Centre Left) The detached ground zero indicator plinth. (Top Right) underground monitoring post. Note the vent stack is almost obscured by undergrowth. (Bottom Right) Steps down from the track to the underground monitoring post. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/F.2 (Wood 1992, 284)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	Yes	Post Number	21/G.1 – 10/V.3 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	September 1960	Post Number	10/F.2 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
Amalgamation of Groups 11 (Truro) & 10 (Exeter).					Group 1973	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	September 1991	Post Number at Closure	32 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	No.10 Group Exeter

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 25 May 2011	D-7 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands in an area of dense managed woodland, it has a number of dispersed features and is – despite the efforts of a number of private owners – is in poor condition. The Ground Zero Indicator is 35 metres to the west, concrete steps allow access to the site from the adjacent track. There is evidence of forced entry on the entrance stack with c.50% of the concrete securing the hatch missing and the casting securing the hatch is broken. The louvers on the entrance stack are a non-standard wooden type, probably part of a later refurbishment of the ROC post. Material, presumably from inside the structure, is spread around the site.



(D-7) Christow, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. Location of post within scheduled area, note the ground zero indicator is not located with the post. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011	
Human	The local settlements are small – Christow is only 820 strong at the last census. However, there is evidence of sustained efforts to entre the site by force. The entrance hatch is partially detached and the louvers, which appear to be a later addition (they were always steel in those that remained in use), are smashed. A number of artefacts are spread around the site – presumably from below – these include magazines & papers, a highlighter pen and a other writing material. Two levels of agency are present here. Firstly, the site is in the curatorship of individuals or a group who recognise the history of the site. That would account for the paint scheme, replaced louvers and photoelectric panel on the top of the vent stack. Secondly the destructive visitor category. The site has clearly received the attention of a group or number of individual's intent, and clearly just prior to this visit successful, in gaining access to the ROC post. Interestingly there was no evidence of the material culture of drinking (soft or alcohol).
Animal	There is a massive wood ants nest a few metres to the west of the site. It was so big I had to vacate the site after just 15 minutes as they objected to my presence.
Meteorological	There is evidence of corrosion on a number of the ROC posts ferrous structural members. The damage around the hatch is allowing excess water into the structure, causing degradation of the rendering inside the access shaft and adding to the water that is ingressing the sub-terrainian aspect of the site.
Vegetation	The site is overgrown, primarily with blackberry, although bracken is also in evidence.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 13 June 2012	The site is an a worse state than when the baseline visit took place. More material and an attempt to cover the damage across the top of the entrance stack.

Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012	
Human	More material has emerged from the ROC post and is spread in the immediate area. Everything noted in the prior visit, apart from the remnants of magazines and papers has been moved or is no longer evident. Clear tensions are displayed here by the conservers and the destructive visitor. That tension manifests itself through acts of destruction countered by acts of defence through the re-securing of the entrance lid. Currently the original hatch has been removed and a rather elaborate set of steel ropes, corrugated tin sheet and, reinforcing steel bar is padlocked to the steel ladders in the entrance stack.
Animal	Wood ants are still there – but not in such large numbers thankfully.
Meteorological	Difficult to ascertain, however the hatch whilst impossible to remove, is not a snug fit, water could easily ingress the site.
Vegetation	The site is overgrown, primarily with blackberry, although bracken is also in evidence.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 2 April 2013	The site has been refurbished. No damage is evident on the entrance stack and other areas have been repainted.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 2 April 2013	
Human	This visit discovered that the site had been refurbished. Clearly the act of curation, and possibly remembrance, is strong in the group that owned it. The entrance stack had a new hatch and supporting structure cemented into place, the louvers had been replaced and repainted and rubbish had been cleared away. Although the material used to cover the entrance at the last visit lay just 15m to the north. The hatch now has a request to respect the site and some contact details (which have not returned any requests for information). There was also a small stone placed in the hatch lid.
Animal	No ants nest.
Meteorological	Non-evident.
Vegetation	The site is overgrown, primarily with blackberry, although bracken is also in evidence.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Non-standard layout. Ground Zero Indicator (GZI) is located away from site. There is a lot of material movement across the site. Most of it appears to be non-standard issue equipment or materials used in the securing/protection of the site from destructive visitors.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	As the site is curated it is likely that a number of original features remain in the UGMP. As yet I have been unable to raise a response from the details written on the hatch.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	As noted above the site is non-standard in its layout. The GZI is located within the 100m radius.

Activity Recorded at the Entrance Stack. 25 May 2011 – 2 April 2013

Geographical Information			
NGR	SX7122190919	Site Code	D-9
Height	278 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 72236
Geology	Meldon Shale (MS)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled

(D-9) Drewsteignton, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. The post is prominently located and is visible from the road. This might account for the current owner planting trees and shrubs inside the compound. Unfortunately, if this is the case it appears to have had the opposite effect. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/F.3 (Wood 1992, 284)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	No	Post Number	10/O.4 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	August 1960	Post Number	10/F.1 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
Amalgamation of Groups 11 & 10.					Group 1973	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	September 1991	No at Closure	30 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	No.10 Group Exeter



(D-9) Drewsteignton, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. The post is prominently located. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 26 May 2011	D-9 Drewsteignton ROC post is a fully-sunken site. The compound and ROC post are in good order – the site is curated. The site stands on top of an elevated area and is clearly visible on the sky-line. There are a number of intentionally planted saplings across the site and a mature juniper is growing central to the compound.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011	
Human	This site is curated. There does not appear to be much destructive activity on the site, although it is possible the sign with the current owners contact details alludes to problems in the past. The statement 'nothing valuable inside' tends to back this up. Intentional planting of trees will, in time, change the appearance of the site.
Animal	No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this visit.
Meteorological	There is a crack in the concrete that holds the hatch outer frame on top of the stack. Frost action could remove this.
Vegetation	Naturally encroaching vegetation was not recognised, however the trees recently planted could cause long-term problems to the structure.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 3 April 2013	The ROC post has changed little from the visit two years ago. The site is still curated – all external features have received a coat of paint recently. There appears to have been no destructive interaction.

Order and Chaos Observations on 3 April 2013	
Human	No destructive interaction visible. The site has been repainted recently – including the removal of slight surface corrosion – a plant pot has been placed over the FSM, presumably to stop the ingress of water.
Animal	No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this visit.
Meteorological	There is a crack in the concrete that holds the hatch outer frame on top of the stack (noted on last visit). Frost action could remove this.
Vegetation	Naturally encroaching vegetation was not recognised, however the trees recently planted could cause long-term problems to the structure.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Standard layout.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	Unable to raise a response from the owner, although the fact it is curated suggests a number of features are present.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	None.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS3499103859	Site Code	D-19
Height	165 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 72298
Geology	Bude Formation (BF)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled



(D-19) Holsworthy, Devon. (bottom right) The Orlit post type 'A' not rotten door bottom caused by the cattle that graze in the field. (Top Right) a general shot showing the position of the Orlit post in relation with the underground monitoring post. (Middle Left) the entrance stack. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	June 1940	Post Number	21/K.1 (Wood 1992, 285)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	No	Post Number	20/L.3 – 11/B.1 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1953	No.11 Group Truro
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	September 1960	Post Number	10/C.3 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
Amalgamation of Groups					Group 1973	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	September 1991	No at Closure	10 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	No.10 Group Exeter



(D-19) Holsworthy, Devon. Holsworthy is an elevated, multi-phase site contained within a compound. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 1 May 2011	Two phase site (UGMP and Orlit Type 'A'. both in a state of transition. Compound visible, but damaged.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 May 2011	
Human	Nothing visible
Animal	Cattle have pushed over the fence and are disturbing the ground around the structures.
Meteorological	Corrosion is at an advanced stage on some metal surfaces and the FSM is corroded through.
Vegetation	Grass - kept down by grazing.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 1 April 2013	State similar as previous visit.

Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013	
Human	Again no obvious interaction.
Animal	More cattle damage
Meteorological	none
Vegetation	none

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	A type 'A' Orlit post survives on site. The door is rotten and stiff to open. Some cables and wooden mounting features survive. The instrument mounting plinth survives but is badly damaged. Underground monitoring post is in average condition. As noted previously the fixed survey meter mount is badly corroded.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	No access - welded shut.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	Non noted.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS3752623607	Site Code	D-20
Height	190 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 57763
Geology	Bude Formation (BF)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled

(D-20) Hornscross, Devon. The whole site is almost consumed by undergrowth. Although, there enough visitors to the site, probably to access the Orlit Post, to keep open a gap in the hedge. The underground monitoring post is open and chaotic. The site has been in a covertly curated stage at some time in its life-cycle. Currently it is in transition. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	June 1940	Post Number	21/B.2 (Wood 1992, 285)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	No	Post Number	11/A.1 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1953	No.11 Group Truro
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	June 1960	Post Number	11/A.1 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.11 Group Truro
	Close	October 1968	Post Number at Closure	11/A.1 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	



(D-20) Hornscross, Devon. Due to the overgrown nature little of the site can be safely accessed. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 25 May 2011	A compound containing an Orlit Type 'B' and an underground monitoring post. The compound is very overgrown, making it almost impossible to reach all the above ground structures.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011	
Human	It is clear this site attracts investigators/visitors. There is a path worn between the road and the entrance hatch. Material inside the structure indicates work after 1991 has taken place including at least one coat of white emulsion. The Observer Room door and bunks being arranged as they are supports this.
Animal	Animal No obvious animal damage was noted however the remains of a rabbit were in the Observer Room.
Meteorological	Meteorological Currently the site is dry although there is a substantial amount of material at the bottom of the entrance, the sump is full of leaves and the hatch is broken and will let in water.
Vegetation	Vegetation Vegetation is the main threat hear. The entire compound it extremely overgrown. The corrosion evident in the vent and FSM cannot be investigated due to the cover. Meteorological The site is close to the coast but is well protected by the vegetation

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 13 June 2012	The site continues to disappear in the undergrowth. This is, in turn, starting to damage the entrance stack.

Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012	
Human	Light material is being left at the site (cans etc) but no damage appears to be happening.
Animal	None visible
Meteorological	Water ingress into control room. Corrosion below.
Vegetation	Growth - especially ivy, is starting to pull off rendering.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 2 April 2013	Pornography and chemical drums have been dumped on site.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 2 April 2013	
Human	Just material as noted above.
Animal	None noted
Meteorological	Light deterioration
Vegetation	Very dense towards rear of compound now.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	The compound fencing survives around the whole site. As does a stub from the overground telephone system. The Orlit Post Type 'B' is in good condition, including the ladder and a few aspects of the wooden fixtures. The Underground monitoring post is difficult to reach and the vent sack now impossible.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	Below ground the furniture, and a number of other, low cost items are still present. Someone has repainted the structure in emulsion. This, since becoming damp, has started to peel back off the walls. The door frames are rotten at the bottom, suggesting periods stood in water.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	Nothing noted.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SX6766854690	Site Code	D-27
Height	172 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 72305
Geology	Mid-Devonian Limestone (MDVL)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled



(D-27) Modbury, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1000. Location of post in rural area. (Bottom Left) Entrance stack with raised ground zero indicator plinth and steps to it. These steps appear unique in the south-west. (Bottom Right) Vent stack with master post attachments. (Top Right) General shot of the post, note the fence posts uprooted and dumped on the underground monitoring post. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/H.1 (Wood 1992, 285)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	Yes	Post Number	10/R.1 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	Sept 1959	Post Number	10/E.1(Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
Amalgamation of Groups 11 & 10					Group 1973	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	Sept 1991	No at Closure	50 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	

(D-27) Modbury, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;2500. Location of post in rural area. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 26 May 2011	D-27 Modbury ROC post is a fully sunken UGMP. The site is curated although the compound and above ground environs are in a state of disrepair. The ROC post stands in an area of arable farming which appears to be ploughed regularly, this has started to develop a lynchet on both sides of the compound. The compound concrete posts have been uprooted and dumped on the site. The ROC post has a number of 'non-standard' features.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011	
Human	An interesting dichotomy. On the one hand the ROC post is in curatorship, presumably by someone who has an interest in the ROC. Whilst on the other hand the landowner is steadily removing evidence of the surrounding compound and ploughing as close as possible to the extant features. The vent stack fixtures demonstrate D-27 was a master post. No evidence of any guide rope fixtures for the aerial were noted, presumably they have been removed.
Animal	Nothing noted
Meteorological	All above ground features appear a little frost damaged. This will get worse if not attended to.
Vegetation	It is now difficult to remove vegetation off the site as the dumped compound posts are in the way. This will cause problems in the future.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 2 April 2013	D-27 ROC post has changed little from the baseline visit. The above-ground structure outer paint is steadily deteriorating. The surrounding landscape had been recently ploughed exposing the radio mounts.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 2 April 2013	
Human	There appears to be little in the way of external interaction beyond that of the two agents already identified. Currently the removal of evidence from the surrounding area is continuing. What started as removal of most of the compound now includes the mounts for the master post aerial. One mount has been removed from its original position, now lying with the up rooted posts. A further mount is still in location but has been damaged by the plough.
Animal	None recognised
Meteorological	Rain and frost action continues to degrade the site.
Vegetation	As noted previously, if not cleared encroaching vegetation will become a problem.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	A four point layout with some additions. The GZI is elevated by what can only be described as a local modification. It is so poorly constructed the instrument mount is built up to make it level. A series of four steps allows the observer access to the GZI.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	No access has been gained.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	One aerial mount is still in place.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS 9288111613	Site Code	D-37
Height	241 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 72343
Geology	Crackington Formation (CKF)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled



(D-37) Sampford Percival, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. (Bottom Right) an Orlit post Type 'A'. The structure has been modified, new roof and double doors fitted. The structure does not fit with the suggested layout this project has discovered. It is suggested that the Orlit is from another location. (Top Right) Vent Stack (Top Left) Entrance stack, note lack of grills and reflectors attached to structure.. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

(D-37) Sampford Percival, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. (Bottom Right) General arrangement of site (L) Orlit type 'A' (C) Radio Shack (R) Entrance stack. (Top Right) Radio Shack. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	August 1940	Post Number	22/X.4 (Wood 1992, 285)	Org. Group	No.22 Group Yeovil
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	Yes	Post Number	10/X.2 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	August 1960	Post Number	10/X.2 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	October 1968	No at Closure			



(D-37) Sampford Percival, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. The site is a mixture of original underground monitoring post, relocated Orlit type 'A' and new radio shack plus attendant aerials. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 25 May 2011	D-37 ROC post was closed in 1968. From the mid-1970s it has been home to a local radio ham club. Subsequently some modification has occurred on site. An 'A type' Orlit post stands in the corner of the compound. It has had the roof line raised by around 20cm. A large timber shack is also on the site – potentially a clubhouse – and the ROC post is utilised as an aerial stand. A further aerial has been erected in the corner of the compound.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 25 May 2011	
Human	The site has been taken over by a local radio ham club. They have modified areas of the compound and both extant structures. The UGMP appears (above ground) to be is fairly good condition considering this was one of the 1968 abandonments. The Orlit post has been extensively modified to provide a store for the site. Originality is probably less that 50%. There is no evidence of the BPI. The entrance stack has a number of reflectors stuck to it. Presumably this is to help cars on the site see the structure. This might also explain the big chunk of concrete missing from the corner facing the entrance. The new use of the site means' currently, the ROC post is maintained, however, it will also attract visitors. That said no vandalism was noted on this visit.
Animal	None noted.
Meteorological	None noted.
Vegetation	The compound is well maintained with little evidence for vegetation encroachment.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 1 April 2013	The nature of the structures have changed little. The Orlit and shack have received a new coat of paint and disabled access has been laid in from the road into the shack. The aerial masts have been moved. The one attached to the FSM looks, to all intense and purpose, redundant. A new extendable mast is anchored into a large concrete pad next to the entrance stack. The aerial in the corner has gone.

Order and Chaos Observations on 13 June 2012	
Human	No outwardly destructive visitors appear to have been on site since the last visit. The Radio club is modifying aspects of the site, erecting aerials and laying in new paths.
Animal	None noted.
Meteorological	As noted previously.
Vegetation	As noted previously.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Standard four point post. Orlit Type A, and compound in good condition.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	No access. Have tried to engage the club in conversation for last two years – no reply.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	Nothing noted.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS8854403156	Site Code	D-41
Height	217 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER:
Geology	Cadbury Breccia (CYBR)	Status	Scheduled 1016259



(D-41) Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Left) Entrance stack with vent stack beyond, not poor state of compound fencing (Top Right) entrance stack showing damage to hatch and, now broken, metal band attempting to close off the entrance. (Top Right) Vent stack showing master post fitting and pavement slab on top of stack rather than the shallow eves lid. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/D.3 (Wood 1992, 285)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	Yes	Post Number	10/X.3 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	June 1959	Post Number	10/D.2 (Wood 1992, 285)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
Amalgamation of Groups 11 (Truro) & 10 (Exeter).					Group 1973	
	Close	September 1991	Post Number at Closure	20 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	No.10 Group Exeter



(D-41) Stockleigh Pomeroy, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Location of post within scheduled area. Note the structure is depicted as a 'Covered Reservoir' here. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 25 May 2011	D-41 ROC post is a fully sunken structure. The structure stands relatively exposed to the elements in an are of pasture. The post and its compound is in poor condition even though it stands inside a scheduled area and is noted in the schedule. Extract from scheduling notice:- **Name:** Raddon Hill: a Neolithic causewayed enclosure and later hillfort **List entry Number:** 1016259 'Situated near the centre of the causewayed enclosure is an underground monitoring post of the Royal Observer Corps. The post, now decommissioned, was Station 20 of the ROC Exeter 10 Group, Stockleigh Pomeroy. It survives in good condition and is included in the scheduling'. The exposed nature of Raddon Hill has ensured very quick degradation of the structure. A local modification to the entrance stack has been made to try and keep people out of the UGMP. Both it and the copper straps on the vent stack for the master post aerial earth have been snapped.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011	
Human	It is clear from the damage on the site that a level of interaction beyond the 'interested' visitor is in progress. The snapped steel strap on the entrance stack and breaks through the Master Post earthing straps must have taken some effort, they are certainly not a natural event. The ROC post is situated on the top of the highest hill in the area and is silhouetted against the sky – making the location visible from a good 5km away.
Animal	The area is routinely grazed and this is having an effect on the monument. The concrete pad surrounding the entrance stack is exposed and undermined in a number of areas.
Meteorological	The exposed nature of the site and lack of repair to the rendering is starting to have an effect on the structure, the continual rain and freeze cycle is beginning to loosen structure in a number of areas. The step has lifted away from the main structure.
Vegetation	The area is grazed so vegetation id confined to short grass.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 1 April 2013	Very little change to the ROC post. The entrance hatch has been secured down by tying bailer twine across both locking lugs.

Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013	
Human	Beyond trying to secure access to the ROC post there appears to be no further involvement from visitors.
Animal	The area is routinely grazed and this is having an effect on the monument. The concrete pad surrounding the entrance stack continues to be exposed and undermined in a number of areas.
Meteorological	The exposed nature of the site and lack of repair to the rendering is starting to have an effect on the structure, the continual rain and freeze cycle is beginning to loosen structure in a number of areas. The step continues to split from the main structure.
Vegetation	As noted previously.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Standard four point layout with master post fittings and aerial anchor points.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	Access on baseline was not attempted as site was under water (c.2m). water still present in 2013.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	Compound with extension extant, however little of wire retained.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS5306224049	Site Code	D-46
Height	164 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 55066
Geology	Cracklington Formation (CKF)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled

(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. Left) Entrance stack, note amount of material strewn around and non-standard gate to compound. (Right) Entrance stack to underground monitoring post, note the overgrown area behind obscuring the vent stack. (centre) Location of a ministry pattern fencepost suggesting the original compound was much bigger at one time. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/B.1 (Wood 1992, 286)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	Yes	Post Number	11/A.3 (Wood 1992, 286)	Group 1953	No.11 Group Truro
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	October 1960	Post Number	10/A.2 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.11 Group Truro
Amalgamation of Groups 11 & 10					Group 1973	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	September 1991	Post No at Closure	11 (Wood 1992, x)	Group 1991	No.9 Group Yeovil



(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Position of underground monitoring post at Torrington, a mainly rural location Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 1 May 2011	D-46 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands on the boundary of two fields and 50 metres off a minor road. The compound is extant, although the fence is probably not original. The area inside the compound has been used to store/dump various implements of farm machinery, broken telegraph poles (presumably once connected to the site) and various other as yet unidentified objects. The compound is also densely overgrown towards the vent area of the ROC post. All metal surfaces show signs of corrosion (just surface), the step into the entrance stack has moved and the BPI is missing. All louvers are steel and extant, as is the FSM.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 May 2011	
Human	There does not appear to be much destructive action on site. However, it is clear the compound is a convenient place to dump material, maybe for this reason the compound fence is maintained. All material appears to be agriculturally related.
Animal	Very little evidence for animal action on site. Some rabbit pellets on the concrete surround of the entrance stack.
Meteorological	Structurally the site appears quite sound, the ROC post is not too exposed and corrosion, whilst evident, does not appear too advanced.
Vegetation	The vegetation cover comprises course grasses and very mature brambles. This will, in time, destroy the integrity of the structures on site.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 1 April 2013	D-46 ROC post appears to have changed over the last two years. No further material has been dumped on the site. The vegetation noted at the far end of the compound is extant, ready in a few weeks to take over the site again.

Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013	
Human	Little additional interaction is noted. No material dumped on the site previously has been moved or added to.
Animal	Nothing beyond the attention of passing rabbits.
Meteorological	Condition appears broadly the same as previously. Slight corrosion and flaking paint but that is it.
Vegetation	Vegetation much as before just earlier in the growing season. The vegetation cover comprises course grasses and very mature brambles. This will, in time, destroy the integrity of the structures on site.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Standard four-point layout within compound. Non-standard gate fitted.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	No access
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	At least on concrete post demonstrating a probable vehicle park.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS5306224049	Site Code	D-46
Height	164 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER: 55066
Geology	Cracklington Formation (CKF)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled

(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:500. Left) Entrance stack, note amount of material strewn around and non-standard gate to compound. (Right) Entrance stack to underground monitoring post, note the overgrown area behind obscuring the vent stack. (centre) Location of a ministry pattern fencepost suggesting the original compound was much bigger at one time. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/B.1 (Wood 1992, 286)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	Yes	Post Number	11/A.3 (Wood 1992, 286)	Group 1953	No.11 Group Truro
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	October 1960	Post Number	10/A.2 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.11 Group Truro
Amalgamation of Groups 11 & 10					Group 1973	No.10 Group Exeter
	Close	September 1991	Post No at Closure	11 (Wood 1992, x)	Group 1991	No.9 Group Yeovil



(D-46) Torrington, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Position of underground monitoring post at Torrington, a mainly rural location Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 1 May 2011	D-46 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands on the boundary of two fields and 50 metres off a minor road. The compound is extant, although the fence is probably not original. The area inside the compound has been used to store/dump various implements of farm machinery, broken telegraph poles (presumably once connected to the site) and various other as yet unidentified objects. The compound is also densely overgrown towards the vent area of the ROC post. All metal surfaces show signs of corrosion (just surface), the step into the entrance stack has moved and the BPI is missing. All louvers are steel and extant, as is the FSM.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 1 May 2011	
Human	There does not appear to be much destructive action on site. However, it is clear the compound is a convenient place to dump material, maybe for this reason the compound fence is maintained. All material appears to be agriculturally related.
Animal	Very little evidence for animal action on site. Some rabbit pellets on the concrete surround of the entrance stack.
Meteorological	Structurally the site appears quite sound, the ROC post is not too exposed and corrosion, whilst evident, does not appear too advanced.
Vegetation	The vegetation cover comprises course grasses and very mature brambles. This will, in time, destroy the integrity of the structures on site.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 1 April 2013	D-46 ROC post appears to have changed over the last two years. No further material has been dumped on the site. The vegetation noted at the far end of the compound is extant, ready in a few weeks to take over the site again.

Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013	
Human	Little additional interaction is noted. No material dumped on the site previously has been moved or added to.
Animal	Nothing beyond the attention of passing rabbits.
Meteorological	Condition appears broadly the same as previously. Slight corrosion and flaking paint but that is it.
Vegetation	Vegetation much as before just earlier in the growing season. The vegetation cover comprises course grasses and very mature brambles. This will, in time, destroy the integrity of the structures on site.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Standard four-point layout within compound. Non-standard gate fitted.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	No access
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	At least on concrete post demonstrating a probable vehicle park.

Geographical Information			
NGR	SS6199809435	Site Code	D-48
Height	168 metres	HER Ref.	Devon HER:
Geology	Bude Formation (BF)	Status	Not Listed/Scheduled



(D-48) Winkleigh, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1;500. (Bottom Left) General view showing complete compound. (Top Right) Entrance stack showing general poor condition of weatherproofing paint (scales 1m & 2m). (Bottom Right) Vent stack with fittings indicating that Winkleigh was a master post with radio fitted. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Chronology						
A/C Post	Open	July 1940	Post Number	21/C.2 (Wood 1992, 284)	Org. Group	No.21 Group Exeter
A/C Post Relocated	Yes/No	Yes	Post Number	10/M.3 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1953	No.10 Group Exeter
Underground Monitoring Post	Open	November 1962	Post Number	10/C.2 (Wood 1992, 284)	Group 1968	No.10 Group Exeter
Amalgamation of Grps 11 & 10					Group 1973	
	Close	September 1991	Noat Closure	15 (Wood 1992, xi)	Group 1991	No.10 Group Exeter



(D-48) Winkleigh, Devon. Location of structures. Scale: 1:1250. Note the underground monitoring post is north of the main wartime runway. Taskscape element depicts area that observers in the course of their duty and the general public could inhabit the same space. (©Crown Copyright/database right 2014. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service)

Visit Profile	
Baseline Visit Overview 26 May 2011	D-48 is a fully-sunken UGMP. The ROC post stands just12 metres from the northern edge of the east-west runway on the former site of Royal Air Force Winkleigh, North Devon. The compound fence is extant, as is the gate and all ROC post features (entrance stack; GZI mount; BPI mount; ventilation stack and Fixed Survey Meter mound. Generally the condition of all surface features is good; slight corrosion is evident on some features. The airfield is now an industrial and residential site. Material is already being dumped at the site – it is only a matter of time before the visibility of this site becomes obscured.

Order and Chaos Observations on Baseline Visit, 26 May 2011	
Human	The ROC post is remote from major population centres, although industrial and domestic development on both the airfield site and associated village is likely to impact the ROC post in the next few years. The post was constructed just 3.5 years after the closure of the station (December 1958), following a trend noticed predominantly in Wiltshire where three are located on RAF Station. Detritus ranging newspapers to an old tyre were noted on this visit. The ROC post probably does attract the odd visitor although there is little evidence that they are 'destructive' in intent.
Animal	No evidence of animal damage was recognised on this visit.
Meteorological	A small amount of rendering and splits in the concrete structure are noted – presumably frost action – this will continue to increase in impact if no mitigation work is undertaken.
Vegetation	Vegetation is very much in evidence with considerable grass/weed overgrowth. There are also a number of blackberry's in evidence, these will cause problems if not checked. Grass is growing in the joint between the step and main entrance point – again this will continue to open the joint if not checked.

Visit Profile	
Visit Overview 1 April 2013	The ROC post inside the compound appears a lot tidier. The grass has yet to start growing in earnest but clearly material noted on the last visit has been removed.

Order and Chaos Observations on 1 April 2013	
Human	It now appears the site is in curation. There was little indication of this last time, however the compound has been tidied up, with most of the material noted last time removed. Immediately outside the fence of the compound heaps of tyres are growing. They are unlikely to encroach on the site as there is a large expanse of concrete to fill – much easier.
Animal	Nothing noted
Meteorological	Some splits in the rendering of the structure are noted, paint is also peeling badly. The GZI is badly corroded but the entrance hatch is in good order.
Vegetation	Once it gets into the growing season the site might well be totally obscured.

Material Culture of the ROC	
Above Ground (within original compound)	Traditional four points. Compound extant. Master post although no examples of aerial points visible.
Below Ground (confined to UGMP only)	No Access.
Additional Material Culture (within 100m radius)	None noted.

APPENDIX 2 - PUBLIC COLD WAR SURVEY RESPONSES

The following section comprises the responses made, via the internet, to the Cold War survey prescribed during this project. Each section comprises two questions. The whole responses set is also provided as a spreadsheet in Appendix 4.

Entry Id	For over 40 years successive British Governments spent millions of pounds building 'nuclear bunkers' around the country. What do you think was the true purpose of these structures?	The development of an independent nuclear deterrent was promoted by successive Governments as essential to maintaining the British way of life. Was this a justified claim?
1	Government protection - cirtainly not ours!	Well we didn't have nuclear warfare so I suppose it worked. Didn't stop all the other wars around the world though.
2	To appease the public in thinking the Govt. were doing something. In reality it was just gesture politics. NOTHING could have helped if Mutually Assured Destruction was initiated.	I think we (British) (politicians) wanted to pretend we were on the world stage. In reality, in the depths of the cold war, it was CCCP and USA.
3	To keep themselves safe so they could carrying on ruling us (even if most of us would be dead). To provide a communications system if above ground facilities were destroyed in a large scale attack. To protect military equipment, such as aircraft, rockets, etc. and to store medical equipment, emergency food supplies, etc. for civilian use.	Apart from giving our Government (the illusion of ??) a degree of status in international affairs we probably no longer deserved it had no military value as such because we could never have used it without the Americans say so. The cost far outstripped the value to us.
4	I can't speak for the Brits, but I remember when a number of Americans built bomb shelters. Most Governments think it's their obligation to do something and a majority of the time it solves nothing at tax payer's expense.	In my view it prevented WW3 and slowed the spread of socialism. Without the nuclear deterrent, the soviet would have invaded Europe.
5	To provide a hiding place for a privileged few who would aim to co-ordinate the efforts of those dying outside.	Completely.
6	To create a survivable self contained network infrastructure from where the country could be run and controlled in the aftermath of a nuclear attack	It created the arms race that ended in a kind of stalemate and forced the treatise that we have in force today
7	To keep local administration going after nuclear war	Not at all, any deterrent effect would have come from the US stockpile of weapons
8	The purpose was to provide safety for people in the event of a nuclear attack taking place. The bunkers were underground and built to resist radiation. Some bunkers were built only for important people such as royalties and politicians. whilst spending millions of pounds, the ordinary man on the street would have been very lucky indeed to have access to a nuclear bunker.	I think it was successful as Great Britain and its population did not suffer from the devastation of a nuclear attack, that was being threatened.

9	To preserve some sort of functioning government, and to enable some form of 'community' to emerge post conflict and rebuild a society.	Well, haven't yet had a nuclear conflict, (except 1945 in Japan) looks like there's still time though - Iran??? - si I guess we still need that requirement to fire back
10	To give shelter so that after an attack, Government/Command and control systems could still function	It ensured that if the war did turn 'hot' then it was pretty much guaranteed everything would have been destroyed, so no-one wanted to really start anything
11	To maintain the existing government, protect the rulers. Certainly not for the 'little people'.	Very little as we wained in influence. It was a pissing contest where size was important and we only had a weenie. We were always Runway 1 for the Yanks. (mind you I ran a 'shoot a yank for Ho Chi Minn week' whilst at uni) Probably illegal to try that now.
12	To provide secure radiation proof structures for the war time emergency government, regional councils and the UKWMO to operate from in the event of a Nuclear war.	As it was never used it is difficult to tell. However, the fact it was never used is perhaps an indication of its success !
13	To save the elite government flunkies and their families while the rest of us peasants died a long horrible death from radiation, lack of water and food	It worked we are still here, although the nuclear bombs are still about
14	Supposed to be command and control centres for the local area, could also be used to house members of the local Masonic lodge in times of crisis!	Haven't seen any mushroom clouds around so must have done the job!
15	Control of the country post-nuclear strike	In terms of there being no significant threat from Russia and the lack of nuclear warfare since WWII, completely successful. In terms of keeping out other cultures that are a threat to our way of life, the deterrent deterred no muslims.
16	In the event of war using nuclear weapons, the survival of various individuals and our way of life was paramount. People who had a socially valuble position such as Government, military doctors, chemists, farmers and the like would be able to: 1) Orchestrate a retaliation and 2) Begin to rebuild. Bunkers would also be used to house commodities associated with survival and objects that would represent a potential social record. Similar to housing works of art during the blitz...	The British way of life exists, hence the deterrent was successful. The subsequent question, "Would the British way of life have been challenged if no nuclear deterrent were present?" would be more revealing. If we didn't posses a nuclear deterrent, would the Eastern block come knocking? I think it's a vital part of our evolution. The Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated that. Nuclear arms continue to decline. It's the real madmen that are the concern now....
17	Air Defence	I don't believe anything done by the Britsih Government in the global sense had or has any deterrent impact.
18	for key personnel to survive a nuclear attach	Must have worked since we havent been attacked

19	1. Protect and provide base for those tasked with managing the recovery of the nation post strike. 2. Provide protection for resources (food, water comms) required for regeneration. 3. Provide protection for armed forces required to defend against attacking forces.	1, Successful in that it was not used (and hence a deterrent). 2. Successful in generating the prestige associated with those countries holding nuclear armaments. 3. Successful in enhancing the credibility of NATO. 4. Successful in avoiding the release of nuclear weapons through the threat of mutually assured destruction.
20	Royal Observer Corp Posts, ROTOR stations, Regional command centres, all to keep the country infrastructure upheld in the event of nuclear conflict.	Mutual Assured Destruction means to me that we were kept in a state of stalemate with other superpowers. We all mutually forced each others hand, and I don't really know if things could have happened any other way.
21	To ensure the continuing abilility of the government to govern. To ensure communications, both military and civilian. To afford protection to selected people. To make sure something was left behind!	Well, it worked....didnt it? Although, I often think that it wasnt so unllike the postures adopted by the major powers before WW1, building vast armies and in so doing deterring an attack. However, after actually seeing and meeting Warsaw pact personnel in tthe flesh and seeing their equipment I do wonder how credible the threat was.
22	To protect the chosen few from nuclear fallout	Unknown really, was never used, but I doubt it would have stopped the USA and the USSR trying to destroy each other....
23	To protect citizens in the case of nuclear warfare from enemy countries	Successful- we have never had a nuclear attack in Britain
24	To command and control activity after/during a nuclear war.	Essential. Once created you can't de-invent and we need maximum threat to deter use
25	At the most basic level, I guess the purpose was to protect some people, assets, information or wealth from nuclear attack. Which people, assets, information and wealth is the interesting question. The bunkers are obviously not large enough to protect and sustain the entire population, so a choice would have to be made. One would hope for a cross section of the community, import historical artefacts, assets that would be essential for rebuilding? But I am sure that in reality the average man with his family would never see the inside of a bunker in the event of an attack!	It’s better to have a gun and not need it, that to need a gun and not have it.
26	To maintain government control and civillian life throughout the period of 'fall-out' following a nuclear attack.	Less successful than the US Air Force bases spread throughout the country (such at at Greenham Common).

27	To provide a shelter for council and government officials so that law and order could be maintianed after a nuclear attack	very successful
28	As far as I'm aware to offer some protection to local dignatories, Councillors, certain military personnel VIP's etc	For me very important as well as successful as we had to present a country and its people who weren't going to give up their way of life. I suppose many younger people who aren't familiar with those times will probably think it wasn't important.
29	An attempt to ensure that some semblance of authority would remain to direct our response in the event of a nuclear attack. It was also done as an attempt to convince the USSR that we were prepared for any attack.	Difficult to say. We didn't have a war, so you could argue that it was a factor. However, the major factor was certainly the US's nuclear deterrent. Would the USSR have attacked UK if we hadn't had our own deterrent? I believe it is extremely unlikely given the presence of so many Americans and American military facilities on UK soil (eg the early warning system at Fylingdales).
30	Local command and control centres from which the surrounding area could be run in the event anyone survived a nuclear strike.	We are still here!
31	Command and control, esp. political after the bomb.	In no way what so ever. I do not belive the situation would have been any different.
32	Protection against decapitation strikes	Totally
33	To protect the population in the event of nuclear attack.	About as successful as the deterrent of other nuclear nations.
34	I knew of civil defence shelters that claimed to protect against radio-activity from the fall-out of nuclear weapons, bombs or missiles. Were shelters and bunkers the same item? This question could be revised to include approximately or even precisely how many nuclear bunkers were constructed and for what precise figure, rather than just "millions", which in retrospective sounds minor. On the other hand, /bunkers/ suggests protection for elites only, not for the masses, while /shelters/ might serve a different public.	The enemy (namely, the USSR) eventually collapsed when it tried to match NATO's military productivity. That was the required outcome and the deterrent achieved it. Communism went down the plug-hole and the whole world was done a favour.The point of an /independent/ deterrent was to signify deterrence to a redundant degree. The redundance was positive.
35	As places that people 'higher in society' (politicians, councillors, landed gentry) could shelter in the event of a nuclear attack.	I'm not sure it really made any difference.
36	To 'protect' themselves and others in the event of nuclear war.	Well, there was no nuclear war so I guess you could say it worked, but whos to say

		it was the deterrent or whether noone would have used them anyway.
37	They were for government ministers, MPs, civil servants and others deemed too useful to die in the open in the event of nuclear war.	It may have been succesful for a time (there was no alternative test case, i.e. no nuclear deterrent) but recent desires for nuclear weapons/programmes in North Korea and Iran, suggest the problem has not gone away! The British way of life has no value when set against the deaths if millions.
38	Their purpose was to maintain the structures of government in the event of a nuclear war, and to form a basis for any possible recovery after it	It worked: we're still here
39	Regional Centres of Government and Military control and communication centres,	Very ~ it kept the USA under control [at least before we relied on them for the weapons]
40	To fuel paranoia	Errr - it can only be judged as 'successful', ie it helped maintain the Britishway of life, if you accept that that was genuinely the primary reason for developing nuclear weapons (your use of the phrase 'nuclear deterrent' is not without problems here, of course). Personally, the idea that possessing nuclear weapons 'maintained the British way of life' is nonsensical.
41	To provide somewhere for the those in power & deemed "VIPS" to shelter in the event of a nuclear attack. Although (thank goodness) this has not happened, I do believe people really believed it was a real threat during the cold war, irrespective of whether or not that was actually true.	Difficult question! I suppose given the fact that during the last cold war nuclear war was averted would suggest it was successful. However, there are new powers today with uranium enrichment programmes and I think the world is more unsettled now than ever before. As far as maintaining the "British way of life" there are many other things that have led to wholesale changes in our society over the last 20-30 years - and not for the better sadly.
42	To offer domestic reassurance of preparedness against the brinksmanship policy of a global nuclear deterence.	Irrelevant, the opposing superpowers held the balance of power. UK's independent contribution was a post-Colonial posture to diminished influence in foreign affairs.
43	Bunkers were bult for various reasons: 1 To ensure that the governmental 'machine' survived a nuclear strike to be achieved through constructing bunkers to house a series of regional seats of government (local bureaucrats, heads of emergency serices etc). From which attempts to coordinate reconstruction, food and fuel	I think the fact that the Soviet Union and the West never directly engaged in hostilities speaks in favor of the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction.

	supplies would be based. 2 To ensure the survival of central governemt authority (PM etc). 3 To house the Royal Observer Core who would monitor airbursts & plot fall out. 4 To act as munitions dumps.	
44	Protecting civil servants and local government and police from nuclear strikes on towns and cities. A system for local administration was designed and would have been run by protected individuals in aftermath of nuclear strike from such nuclear bunkers. On any rational analysis this was a farce, and when people found about them they were seen as farcical.	In my view the nuclear deterrent did not help maintain the British way of life, and those western European countries that did not develop an independent deterrent were not compromised. The point of the nuclear arsenal was to maintain British standing in world affairs and relations with the USA, and helped perpetuate what was essentially a delusion about british world standing.
45	To accommodate Regional Seats of Government in the event of nuclear attack.	The use of mutually assured destruction worked well, the Second World War and the devastation that brought with it were still clear in the minds of many - repeating that tenfold was not an attractive option for any of the opposing sides.
47	To protect people neccessary to run the infrastructure of the country in the event of a nuclear attack. This included National and Local Government officials.	You can look at it two ways either it was successful because we have never had a nuclear war or it was unneccessary because we have never had a nuclear war. Neither view can be proven it is just one of those things!
48	reassurance	impossible question to answer!
49	to maintain civil authority and therefore control of the country	It was never used so some would view that as a success. In truth it was about power and Britain's place in the world
50	Survival of essential personnell; government, scientists, forces	Unsuccessful given the rise in alternative methods of war - terrorism for example. Successful in that there were no large scale nuclear wars.
51	To allow government to continue during and after a nuclear attack	The fact that western powers other than the USA had nuclear weapons may have helped control the worst extremes of US policy
52	To protect high level government officials and the upper classes and store food for them etc in the event of nuclear war	Well we didn't have a nuclear war however, now we have pandas in Edinburgh Zoo perhaps that will stop Scotland from being over run by pandas?? Who knows?
53	To protect government officials and other from direct nuclear attack. Other buildings (such as ROC posts) helped to forewarn and detect attack	Not so successful, deterrents are hard to compare when you don't know what your neighbour/enemy has up their sleeves!

54	Survival of the chosen few!	Not.
55	As command and control centres so that some kind of civil authority would be maintained if there ever was a nuclear war.	It is all part of maintaining Britain's illusion that it is still a great power. The suggestion is that 'the independent deterrent kept the peace for 40 years'. In truth this asumption is highly questionable: Britain's 'independent' deterrent could not have existed without the USA. Russia's post-war defence strategy was probably based on their fear of another invasion fron the west, and the belief that they needed satellite states (inclusing Germany) to their west to protect them. It probably never intended to invade Western Europe
56	To allow the continuing functioning of government and services in the event of a nuclear attack.	I don't think we can tell, as there is no way to test its success. I think that the standard answer would be that we didn't end up having a nuclear war, so the deterrent worked. In addition, I think there was a need to not be seen as a client state.
57	To protect civil administration / government in the event of any mass destructive war	Confused question. The deterrent worked: it forced the USSR to spend more than its capability to equal the west. Our society evolved peaceably, democratically over 45 years while the Soviet society imploded in 1989 and still hasn't fully developed out of authoritarianism.
58	Some were military command bunkers, some were national and local government emergency bunkers, some were built to protect stored nuclear missiles, some were for launching nuclear missiles, some were for monitoring hostile missile attacks. As far as I'm aware none were for protecting the civilian population from attack!	A tricky philosophical question! The British Isles weren't attacked, so some would say that the deterrent was successful...I would prefer to say that this was down to diplomacy, the role of the UN, the dwindling influence of Britain as an international power, relationships with the US and membership of NATO. However an independent nuclear deterrent doesn't seem to have been a factor in the invasion of Granada or the Falklands!
59	To provide places of refuge for key personnel. EG. government and military.	In the middle ages the biggest and strongest guy was the chief. The cold war was mainly about USA and Russia trying to assert that they were the biggest and strongest.

60	To allow the elite to shelter and continue to govern. However.... experience of more limited destruction in WWII suggests that they couldn't rely on the 'excluded' to carry on regardless... Supposed secret but all related to 'bombproof' microwave tower links - where they grazed earth was where bunkers were! Also persistent rumours (now increasingly admitted) of underground shelter in Box tunnel - fast train from Windsor and near Bath (Defence decentralisation centre)	Well - we didn't have a total war (nuclear or potentially escalating to nuclear)
61	To shelter regiononal and national government, and the armed forces, in the case of a nuclear attack.	Completely useless. The British way of life changed significantly over this period, and in many ways for the better.
62	To protect high ranking government officials and for seats of administration in the event of nuclear attack.	
63	if the government really believed there was a nuclear threat it was to preserve the powers that be in safety. If you believe that nuclear weapons were there to threaten countries in the communist system and prevent it spreading further, then it was either paranoia or propaganda	This question is badly framed. If you mean how sucessful was the deterrent in terms of the implied propaganda function you seem to be making in your first sentence, then, yes it was. I assume you don't mean deterring the Soviets from annahilating us?
64	To allow local (and national) government officials to carry out their work in the event of a nuclear attack. Communications, distribution of food, etc.	It was MAD, but it worked, because you would have to be MAD to have tried anything agauinst another nuclear armed power.
65	To prevent blast and radiation damage to key workers and infrastructure increasing the viability of retaliatory action so reducing the utility of nuclear strike upon Britain.	About as successful as windmills are at reducing global warming. In other words, mass scares like this are often driven by astute marketing people who stoke up fear to create a demand. Like Nuclear war, there is a real threat from CO2, but this has been vastly exaggerated by various groups using this for their own ends. All governments have to say policies were a success ... they therefore post rationalise it in terms of something nebulous like "preserving a way of life" - in reality it was a practical response blown up.
66	I think these were primarily for 'important folk' such as those directly tasked with organising life after a nuclear attack. The bunkers were supposed protected from nuclear attack/fallout and the designated people would be directed there in the event of an attack. They would then carry out their work from these bunkers.	At the time it could be seen as very successful as nuclear war was averted (it was seen as a real threat).

67	To allow government/civil service to retreat to them in the event of a nuclear attack to keep the country running (although if the public weren't allowed in, would there have been any nation left to run?)	Well the British way of life was maintained - there has been no immediate threat of invasion of mainland Britain since World War 2. But then the Argentinians weren't put off invading the Falklands so they obviously didn't think the British would use their nuclear weapons.
68	The Cold War was a non-event centering on fear and perception arising from an ideological struggle of two superpowers. Doing somethng concrete (pun intended) soothed cognitive dissonance of the public pertaining to the the futility of surviving a nuclear event. This was the purpose of promoting the idea of nuclear survivability and building of shelters for the public.	Very. It kept the Cold War cold for 40 years and limited the hot wars like Korea and Vietnam to conventional weapons.
69	To provide a safe space for essential government structures, institutions and personnel (e.g., Kelvedon Hatch) - I would imagine that they were emphatically NOT intended to protect ordinary civilians.	I have a fundamentally different perspective on world politics. While some state and non-state actors may have been deterred, Israel wasn't, India and Pakistan weren't, and the US remains the only state to have used nuclear weapons in anger. And it is entirely plausible that other states sought nuclear defences themselves because of the nuclear capabilities of countries like the US and the UK (cf. the October 1962 Missile Crisis)
70	To preserve a network of 'seats of government', plus other critical infrastructure, to run the country after 'the bomb' dropped.	Well, we're all still here, so I guess the principles of Mutally Assured Destruction worked ... but I'm not convinced that it wasn't more by luck than good judgement in the end!
71	Supposed protection for government officials, the military, and ruling elite	Look at Britain now! Being undermined by human rights stuff, Brussels directives, and liberal attitudes
72	National command structure survivability. What a silly question.	Eminently, as witness that we are discussing it freely, and not in American English any more than in Russian.
73	The purpose was to allow key governmental structures, offices and personnel (civil and military) to survive in case of a nuclear attack in order both to coordinate a military response by using British nuclear capability and to lead the reconstruction of the country after.	Partially successful. It had a psychological role in preserving a certain degree of independence for Britain in the field of foreign affairs. Moreover, it had positive spin-off on the civil nuclear industry. But it is questionable the fact that large sums were appropriated to a nuclear deterrent which, in fact, could not be used if not in combination with the one of the USA.

74	The government and civil service were going to go into them in there was a nuclear attack - there's been a Peter Hennessy book about it recently. I don't know what the point would have been of going down there because there would have been no people left to govern over and not even the land would have been worth living.	We can't tell - don't know what would have happened if we hadn't had one. In that it convinced British politicians, media and much of the public that we were a first rank world power when actually we'd stopped being one very shortly after WW2, it had a very detrimental effect - we'd have done much better if we'd accepted that we were equivalent to Scandinavian states or Canada in foreign policy terms and focused on building a fairer society at home.
75	To create secure facilities for and after nuclear attack, to be used by the government and other establishment elements.	It's impossible to say-they were never used so it could be argued they did deter a nuclear attack...on the other hand, it didn't stop the Falklands being invaded.
76	To maintain government in the transition to war and in the month long post-strike phase, when living above ground would be difficult. Also to protect key members of the populace and keep them in useful groups for tackling the management of the surviving populace post-strike.	Hard to say, ultimately we came very close to annihilation during the Bay of Pigs. That was averted by diplomacy not bombs. MAD may have been good for the British way of life, but the American hegemony over us politically affected us dramatically culturally, and in the case of less powerful states the Cold War was shifted from the West into being played out in smaller client states as a "hot war".
77	To maintain continuity of government and to preserve the way of life of the privilaged few post apocalypse. IN the eyes of some it might have appeared to be a way of preserving the British way of doing things and British cultural identity.	Some success, but much acquiesence to the American way of life.
78	Maintenance of central government elements, in some form or other, depending on who or what survived. Also the survival of elements of Local Government.	100% We 'won' didn't we? I mean, there's no soviet union now. But there's still over 17,000 warheads out there. It is an allusion to this that this aspect of the 'cold war' is simply not there anymore.
79	Civial an Military admin and command	very as there were no major conflicts directly between the major nations in volved
80	To allow some form of government to continue; also to monitor radiation, to provide storage for records, and in some places to provide HQs for command of forces (not least the R class boats) and of civil power.	I have no memory of any government proposing that it helped the British way of life. They did propose that it might help prevent us being invaded by Soviet armies, but the truth of that is very dubious. It certainly gave us a seat at the top table, not least in UN, and ensured that UK and France were at least informed by USA. And probably helped purchase intelligence sharing. Also of course the ability of UK to survive a first

		strike and still allow the US to operate planes might have been significant.
81	To protect the upper echelons or at least allow them to die in a more structured fashion...	We're still here...
82	To provide protection against nuclear weapons for core teams of civil government personnel, and some military liaison staff, who would be responsible for governing their regions following a nuclear attack.	As we didn't suffer a nuclear war in Europe I'd say it was totally successful. Although Britain had a close alliance with the United States there is a strong chance that the US would not protect Europe against a Soviet nuclear strike, instead allowing Soviet domination of Europe to protect the US homeland.
83	Some of them were military command posts to ensure the survival of a retaliatory capability. But mostly, I believe, they were "regional seats of government" in which a cadre of local civil servants and worthies were supposed to survive to administer the smoking remnants of the country after the nuclear exchange was over.	Totally. The Cold War lasted 40-odd years and at the end of it our way of life had been neither overthrown or destroyed.
84	They were intended to ensure government and administrative functions survived any nuclear attack, however I doubt their effectiveness; either the shelters would have been targeted, or there would have been nothing left worth governing anyway! It always seemed strange to me that county councils and similar were regarded as being worthy of these levels of protection. Guess the politicians who held the purse strings though they were important enough to justify building the bunkers.	We did not have an independent deterrent, we were and are still too reliant on the USA; semi-independent maybe. Was it effective? Possibly. We went to the brink (Cuba 1962) and possibly it was fear of mutual destruction that kept fingers off red buttons! When the documents are released in 100 years time we may know the answer to this question. I think the deterrent was a qualified success.
85	The bunkers provided "hardened" secure locations from which it was hoped that regional government could operate following a nuclear strike on the UK. In exercises I worked from one in Lancashire and one in Fife (now a museum).	We didn't have a nuclear war and cold war never turned hot so- yes - it was successful.
86	Some were Regional Centres of Government, some munitions/armaments related, some were civil defence stores.	Perfectly!
87	To provide a refuge for some in the event of nuclear attack, based on an assumption of sufficient warning. Also politically it was	What 'british way of life' was envisaged? Nuclear devastation would surely have a negative if not final impact on any human lifestyle. I suppose we still don't have

	a gesture: government looks after the civilian population.	much evidence as to whether the deterrent did deter, or whether other external factors were more significant. I really don't know.
88	To maintain systems, monitor the environment and to save lives in the event of a nuclear strike.	Very.
89	Multiple purposes. Military, command & control. Includes radioactive monitoring (ROC posts) . Civil defence inclu. provision for national & local Govt. Communications. Storage - inclu. Govt held supplies inclu. food stocks etc. Private - small number of purpose built 'private' shelters; also some industry & factory based.	At the time this seemed ridiculous and still does to large measure. At the same time, in retrospect, there is a feeling that perhaps there was after all an element of truth?
90		
91	To theorectically allow government both national and local to exist if the worst should have happened.	Our deterrent was more for maintaining national self restpect during the post ww2 empire decline.
92	to protect people who where deemed as worthy of saving in the case of nuclear war and protect the establishment	very limited as a deterant it did however give the uk a sense of importance and later a slight sense of indipendance from the USA
93	to allow those who thought they were more important than the rest of us to last a little longer after the bomb dropped.	Faurly
94	To protect people in case of nuclear war breakout	Yes, we needed to have a detterent so we weren't taken adavantage by of those who have nuclear threats
95	To give protection in a nuclear war to people important enough to get a spot in the bunker.	Yes, as by all having nuclear weapons, there is a deterrent from fighting wars the scale of WW1 and WW2 again because the escalation of conflict will bring the likelyhood of nuclear war higher.
96	To protect the Cabinet and high ranking officials in the event of a nuclear attack, allowing continued governance of the UK and not a degradation in to a Mad Max style apocalypse.	Britain's nuclear deterrent was probably unnecessary given the protection the United States granted the UK with its much larger nuclear arsenal. However it's

		nice to have just in case we get a chance to use them.
97	I think the true purpose of these structures was as launch sites for nucleur missiles and to protect the rich & important people	I dont think so. as To me the british way of life doesnt mean having a nuclear deterrent. It just seems like an excuse to me to have a WMD.
98	the true purpose of the 'nuclear bunkers' well i honestly dont know. i would guess that a few were actual bunkers to protect people (starting with the rich/powerful and infulentional) some of the other structure could have been places to store/hide nuclear weapons or for detection equipment.	again i dont no, because the british way of life has changed and evoled into what it is now, and i have no way of truely what it was like back then. i would assume to somed extend that the claim was justified, the world was moving forwards and england needed to get nuclear weapons to stiil be taken as worth force, how ever this may of not been the right course to take. we dont no what would of happened if good old britain tried not to get involved.
99	To store data and records for the British Government in case of a nuclear war, it could contain all the history and laws etc. To protect important people of society such as the Royal Family and the Prime Minister. The bunkers would be used to sustain life for a long enough period for the fallout to reduce.	Yes i believe so. If Britain did not keep up and develop Nuclear weapons then other countries may have seen them as a weak target (our army is smaller than most countries as it is) and we could have been invaded. However with nuclear weapons any threat could be matched equally or greater in scale so it is beneficial to have this deterrent. Prevention is better than cure.
100	to protect people from nuclear warfare and to show other countries that we were ready if someone was to strike	
101	The purpose of the nuclear bunkers in my opion was a a diterent to show our enimies of the time that if they were to strike, we could contuine our day to today life and that we have the possiblity to strike back.	This is a justified claim, if we didnt have the nuclear deterrents then we could have been scared into following the comminst way of life or even on the flip side the yanks way of doing things, so it was a justified claim.
102	To show that Britain could take anything that could potentially be thrown at them and readily back the americans if needed. The bunkers could also be used as storage too.	No a nuclear deterant is not essential to a british way of life as the British got on fine before hand and there is no real need for nuclear wepons.
103	To relay where/when nuclear weapons stuck and triangilate which cities were struck. Also to measure fallout etc.	At the time, yes, due to the placement of so many US bases in the UK, it would be a prime target for pre-emptive strikes from the USSR.

104	I feel they were built for national security primarily, but this was most likely not the only factor. popularity among voters would be another factor and boosting the economy with the construction industry would be another advantage. this would also help win votes.	In the context of the cold war, with the contant threat of nuclear war a deterent for a country like Britain seemed necassary. But since the end of the cold war and a seriously reduced nuclear threat a nuclear deterent seems like an expensive, outdated carry over from the paranoia of the cold war.
105	Local councils used funding to make massive new offices for tiny bunkers under them other then that for I assume for protect from nuclear bombs.	I reckon it was used more for staying envoled in world events. Which as a declining empire you could say it was maintatining the brittish way of life as we still saw our selves as a world world power though in day to day life no really.
106	defensive/dissuasive	Probably, yes, in the context.
107	I have absolutely no idea!	Sorry! Don't know!
108	I don't know about these bunkers - if they exist then one presumes that they are to protect officials in event of nuclear attack.	If we weren't a nuclear power then we wouldn't be encouraging others to be a nuclear power. However without nuclear power we are probably a greater target in the event of nuclear war. But define what you mean by 'British way of life', I'm unsure if this elusive concept is maintainable by anything - or even if it exits.
109	Hard to say. It probably started as a genuine response to a perceived threat, but then became one of those things no government could be seen to be cutting back on...	No, other than in so far as the 'British way of life' seems to include regular foreign wars or disputes.
110	To alleviate people's fears and concerns; propaganda that if the worst should happen, the UK would be safe	Hindsight is so easy! We can all say No it wasn't, because we've not been in the situation where we've had to activate the threat. Yet.
111	To allow for certain select survivors to run the country as best as was possible after nearly everyone else had been wiped out in a horrific nuclear armageddon.	No so much specifically a "British" way of life as much as a deterrent again western civilisation being wiped out by the communist east. Also, given that the US was pretty much the west's superpower, the UK's development of nuclear weapons could be seen as a way of promoting itself as a viable superpower, even though its days as an imperial power were over. So as much for propaganda as anything.

112	to look after themselves and their families and those in positions of power	In some ways yes, as people need to know that the country can fight back if attacked and given Britain's position in the world (it has a few enemies) this does seem a necessary tactic. If Britain was to become less involved in world affairs then it would be better not to have any weapons, thus presenting itself as a peaceful state which would also hopefully deter attack.
113	To maintain critical national infrastructure nodes in the event of a nuclear attack - so as to better ensure an effective retaliatory capacity, nuclear or otherwise, and therby help enforce the initial effects of deterrence. It clearly also had a psychological effect too - giving off a signal as to the immanent, daily seriousness of nuclear warfare to the populace, and to suggest that Britain is not vulnerable to potential enemies, that it is prepared .	Yes, Britain, rightly or wrongly, formed part of a nuclear umbrella that did provide a deterrent effect against the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in the earliest and final stages of the Cold War. Whilst the Immediate justification had to be a defence of the British way of life, this would only be achieved as part of an interlocking set of deterrence structures. Whether the claim that the deterrent was "independent" or not, in light of the this context, is clearly up for debate.
114	To ensure the survival of particular individuals, mostly government officials, and - perhaps optimistically - try to ensure the continuity of government.	Yes, in so far that Western powers as a whole generally did not want to build a sufficient conventional force to resist Soviet convetional forces and a nuclear deterrent was a 'cheaper' option. Likewise having an independent deterrent was worthwhile unless one wanted to rely upon American willingness to suffer damage to their own homeland to ensure the independence of Western Europe.
115	I think they were genuinely to protect people and organisations, but only those regarded as 'important'. There was very little if anything for the common person. eg if you visited Finland at that time everyone knew what to do in case of a nuclear attack and had mini bunkers and protected rooms associated with their housing. So the British government merely tried to protect 'important' things and people - which of course leads to endless discussion of who and what was classified that way !	It may be difficult to put oneself back into that time. However as I am an oldie and lived through it I can confirm that in the 1950s and 1960s particularly we thought a nuclear attack was imminent at any moment. There had been the Cuban crisis etc. Many of us marched to Aldermarston to try to promote disarmament, but it needed both sides to disarm, so the British govenrment did a good job of trying to persuade us that the Russians never would disarm, and so we needed ours.
116	To give the public confidence.	As someone who worked in the navy in the cold war, it felt that this was a justified claim.
117	To provide shelter for citizens from the immediate effects of a nuclear attack from the USSR. But your question: 'true purpose' indicates to me that you are suggesting	As it turns out, it was. The danger was not only that the USSR might use the arsenal or that a nuclear war might be started by accident, but also that a

	there may have been other, ulterior motives.	nuclear USSR could be emboldened and belligerent if unopposed.
118	To protect key members of the public and government who would need to survive a nuclear attack. It seems unlikely that everyone would survive, so the government must have built them to protect those they needed to prioritize. I was also not aware that such bunkers existed.	I am uncertain about this, but this is probably more due to my own lack of knowledge of Britain during the Cold War, but I would have thought that an unprovoked nuclear attack upon the UK was very unlikely, and that if such an attack ever occurred, that the NATO allies would have provided a swift response/retaliation.
119	I don't know. In their thinking, probably a mix of wanting to be seen to take on the enemy and be seen to be needed; also a genuine fear of nuclear attack.	I can never decide.
120	To provide shelter for people in case of a nuclear attack. Or perhaps to store nuclear weapons in.	I don't think it is possible to argue that nuclear weapons are essential to maintaining the British way of life. I think it probably felt, in the time of the cold war, to be an essential element of national security but I think this is an overstating of the extent of nuclear tensions at the time in reality.
121	To provide shelter for a selected elite in the event of nuclear conflict.	We will never know. But the truth is despite the bay of Pigs and a number of other less famous stand offs, nuclear war did not happen. On a pragmatic level therefore, the policy may have been deemed to work. The maintenance of the British way of life however may have been adversely affected by a policy that involved our citizens being complicit in behaviour which may have led to the destruction of humanity. The role of the CND marches and later, the Greenham Common protestors in highlighting this also set a sobre tone.
122	To protect the elite, govt, royalty, national secrets.	At the time, this may have seemed reasonable. Britain has always seen itself as a major player although it was the USA that found itself in a stand off with Russia in the early 60s. Looking back it seems ridiculous.
123	Protect the national infrastructure and send a message that we intended to prevail.	Well, there was no nuclear war so maybe you could claim it was successful. However, only once weapons have been completely disposed of can we say that with any confidence.
124	To protect themselves and key documents/equipment if the worst was to happen.	Not sure

125	Protecting government, so as to exercise control on a chaotic situation outside.	I would question its independence. My understanding is that the US has (had?) an effective veto on its use. Its purpose is more a political one of making sure the UK 'punches above its weight', 'sits at the top table' etc.
126	Storage of weapons we will need in the future. Nuclear war is unavoidable and the more bunkers we have the better it looks in defending ourselves and our allies, War is war and it will never change, having these bunkers helps research and development in multiple fields, such as science and tech, helping us progress as a country for the future.	Yes, if we did not have a deterrent, things could've gone awry. (They still could)
127	To be used as command and control points for a nuclear war/outbreak should one arise. Also to allow the Government to have a safe place to continue operating from so that the UK didn't fall into complete chaos in the event of Nuclear War. There were also a network of monitoring stations built designed to detect a nuclear missile launch/detonation, and these would all be communicating with the larger command and control bunkers.	Yes I believe this was a justified reason for an independent nuclear deterrent as having a nuclear capability makes the UK a more threatening target, therefore would be safer as the Eastern Block wouldn't want to attack a country with a Nuclear capability, as the retaliation could be fatal. Even though there was an essence of preparing for war, and a mutual feeling of adversity, there was also a mutual feeling of not wanting to launch a weapon for the sake of their own nation.
128	Personally I would like to believe that the bunkers were initially designed to house as many individuals including civilians as possible however to a degree I believe that the bunkers were only truly designed to house government figures and people considered important to the wants of the authority figures as opposed to regular civilians.	I believe that while other nations have nuclear weapons it is essential that we have some as well, however I would like to believe that we will be able disarm at some point in the future. At the time of the cold war it was essential to have a nuclear deterrent while other countries did as well.
129	in the event of an attack they would contain supplies technology and select people to restart which would be pointless really.	if the British way of life is annoying the Russians and still being able to to it because of MAD then yes. however we could easily live our life without them such as almost every other country currently does.
130	To provide a increased nuclear deterrent capability in response to the soviet union and the iron curtain. Pressures from our allies (USA and NATO) to show support and strength against the soviets would also provide a catalyst for building such structures all over the country.	A difficult one, I believe it was due to the complex world we live in where unfortunately a nuclear deterrent in my mind was needed after that period of uncertainty. however we are not alone with our allies - NATO,USA,EUROPE - I don't now whether we can justify spending billions on nuclear with such finical problems we are in?

131	I believe they were for, housing/protecting important individuals, monitoring the country in the event of a nuclear attack and as a storage facility	Yes, without the nuclear deterrent we put ourselves at threat from attack from a nuclear armed country. they are an essential part of Britain's defence force
132	Government self preservation.	Well i would suggest it has worked so far.
133	Any government has a duty to protect the population - to the best of its ability. An important consideration is ensuring that there is some form of effective administration which will survive any attack. The Cold War was 'fought' very much in the dark as we had only two practical examples of nuclear attack to use as a baseline. The RSGs were an attempt to ensure that at least a few would survive to provide a skeleton administrative system. Whether it would have worked was fortunately never put to the test.	It was essential to justifying a place on the UN Security Council. I don't remember it being used as being required to maintain the British way of life.
134	To provide a safe place for local government officials.	Yes.
135	Maintaining power structures in the event of nuclear attack, and providing a sop to the idea that nuclear conflict was survivable	No
136	Provide safe shelter for important people (eg: Queen, politicians) as well as serving as safe military command posts in the event of a nuclear strike.	Given the circumstances, yes, however moving away from the cold war I feel this is less important (although still probably needed to some extent)
137	To provide an area of relative safety; if any nuclear payloads were ever dropped on British soil.	If there ever was a threat towards Great Britain we could use the nuclear deterrent as a deterrent towards any opposition countries.
138	To protect government officials, military personnel and other VIPs in the event that nuclear weapons were launched, allowing the UK to continue to retaliate even after most of the population had been killed, and to allow those in the bunkers the possibility of surviving after the nuclear war. They also likely contained supplies such as food, medicine, clean water (or ability to clean water) weapons and ammo to be used either in the case of nuclear war, or be used to create a resistance movement should the UK be taken over by a hostile force.	Yes, as many counties were developing nuclear weapons, we needed to make sure there was a reason for them not to launch nuclear weapons at the UK, however I don't believe it was necessary to create as many weapons as we currently have, since one is enough to do massive damage and hence only a few would be needed to act as a deterrent, more than one would be required so that they could act as a deterrent to multiple nations.
139	To make people FEEL safe.	Yes because we haven't been attacked by anything nuclear since. No because we may never have been attacked.

140	To protect the British government, and the population in the event of a nuclear attack form the soviet union. Also the strategic placement of government / military bunkers would ensure if one is destroyed, another sector would be able to control that sector and the rest of the country.	To a degree but after 1945, America stopped sharing this technology with England so it was a competition to prove to America that England was a nuclear equal and could be trusted with this technology and that great Britain was still great. But the major force behind the development was to have a nuclear weapon to stop Russian aggression.
141	To provide a safe environment for a government to operate from and also for essentila services workers. Water, Power, telecomms , broadcasters etc	Yes, we needed and still do need an independent nuclear deterrent. Otherwise we could be defenceless if the USA decided to abandon the UK in the event of war
142	I believe that the main purpose of these structures was to show Britain's independence in the arms race alongside the defence against and development of the nuclear weaponry. In showing independence Britain kept itself on the map so to speak. As well as this, in coalition with the American Government, Britain could be used as a West to Mid East war platform, moving the nuclear frontline closer to potential threats from both the Mid East and Russia.	I don't believe that it was essential to the British way of life, Britain could have functioned without the independence of our own nuclear power however, I believe it was essential for Britain to be taken seriously and was a good way of not becoming reliant on America for protection - placing us on a stronger standing in international affairs.
143	Primarily for those in government to be able to state that they were doing something (regardless of its efficacy), but also to provide a base for any post-attack "rebuilding", and to create a base from which any post-attack society may be built.	No. Britain's nuclear deterrent was never particularly credible. Barring Polaris, the means of delivery was ineffectual, and the numbers of Polaris were irrelevant once NATO was established.
144	the ones here (NI) were left derelict at Stormont, with the odd covert security meeting held, though the Ballykinler ones were used for much more sinister reasons by 'security' forces during the 70s. Mostly, as far as I can see, they weren't used, at least the civil service ones.	No. It was a political 'keeping up with the stars and stripes Jones's.
145	Preservation of a selected few.	Bit of posturing that did give us a little credibility.
146	Part solution to regional paranoia about post disaster control.	Difficult to answer in view of hindsight complexities, but in short fear/paranoia can be a more significant factor than any realistic threat, the further one goes back then the more justifiable becomes the clinging to a perceived deterrent.
147	To reassure the public and those in power that a nuclear war could be survived	No. The military expenditure kept the economic structure favouring the military as it had done for some time, which could be argued furthered the British

		Way of life, but the 'deterrent' was a provocation, not a defence
148	To protect a selection of the community to be safe and survive in the event of a nuclear attack. For observational purposes - look out for potential missile threats.	yes, at the time the country was being threatened with nuclear attacks. In order to,protect the nation and people of the uk, I believe a deterrent was essential . A means of non feeling powerless.
149	To protect the chosen few from neuclear attack , to monitor the safety of the environment afterwards and to re populate the planet .	Since we didn't descend into a neuclear conflagration one might assume so .
150	To provide a nucleus of command posts to control the assumed anarchy of a post nuclear war while incidentally giving themselves refuge	probably not, but need to look at other nations perceptions. Policies based on perceptions not facts
151	To maintain government and military operations.	Yes.
152	I imagine they were designed to maintain a government structure, a military function, and ensure some form of population survival in the event of a nuclear war.	I have no opinion on this at this time, and will probably quiz you on it next time we meet! On a serious note, I would need to take an 'essay' approach to this question and would look for evidence for and against the statement - this would probably be related to the extent and nature of the perceived threat. Having had some personal experience of AWRE Aldermaston, I would say that the ability to conduct a nuclear test, for perceived threatening countries to detect, is essential for the deterrent to be effective.
153	To provide a refuge for the chosen few, corrupt politicians and the rich.	No it wasn't. The deterrent gives us a lever to make potential adversaries think twice however, you just need to take a look around to see that the British way of life is being rapidly eroded quite successfully by successive weak and spineless governments who are too scared to stand up for the British people.
154	To house those they thought would be beneficial to run a survivor government	Yes
155	Regional Seats of Government. To create a secure housing for government in the case of a nuclear attack, so that the country could continue, with some leadership.	Too philosophical for me. Probably- not going naked into international debates

156	The significant planning and expenditure reflected the Government's desire to preserve national identity and to survive - whatever the latter meant.	With the benefit of hindsight, I think yes. It was essentially a conflict between 'us' and 'them'. Irrespective of whether it worked or not, it was imperative to have a strategy that hinted at continuation.
157	To try to allow a coherent government to remain in the event of such a war, with the aim of directing recovery (if possible!) after the fact. Also to allow military staff to exercise command and control over the country's response to any attack.	Probably not. It was done as 'feelgood' propaganda, to show that the Government was taking the Soviet threat seriously and, of course, it allowed our politicians to be involved at the highest levels in NATO and the UN.
158	Shelter, should nuclear war happen. Not sure they would work though.	Not really. If anyone fires a nuclear weapon, we're all stuffed.
159	To save their own asses. Certainly not for the population as a whole. The idea was for local government etc to run on for a few short weeks post bombing...	No, the USA will bomb any in retaliation in the event of a nuclear war. The reality is the the UK will be paying for it for years to come.
160	Fear and self preservation with a dis-regard for the rest of the population.	Yes, it was part of a line of deterrents created to counter act the perceived threat from Russia.
161	Certainly in the 80 ' s we really did this no there was a threat from the Russians. The country was split even then as to the best way to deal with it. We lived near the Peace Camp at Molesworth in Cambridgeshire and knew the people at the camp protesting about the storage of Cruise missiles there. We felt we were just a launching pad for the Americans and joked about the last party we'd have when the warning went off. Pretty black humour a lot of the time and a real sense of danger.	It may have been. We didn't feel the cruise missiles made us independent. I was a member of CND but am not so sure now. On balance I think it helped and I still think there is no trusting the Russians. Look at the way they are behaving now. Saying one thing and doing another. But I don't think there are the worry as far as nuclear stuff goes. And having an independent deterrent isn't going to help against nutter terrorists.
162	Provide shelter for key persons in order to ensure some structure of government after a conflict.	No. Britain enjoyed the privilege of protection from the USA during the post war period and an independent deterrent wasn't necessary but was desirable to ensure our continued position in the world order, ie one of the allied victors.
163	In the event of a nuclear attack officials and others would be able to maintain some contact, intelligence, and control and monitor situations and conditions and events from a secret location.	To protect the British way of life, I suppose so yes.
164	From what I know about these, which isn't that much, I'd say they had various functions. Some seem to have been designed to ensure at least the short-term survival of specific people in the case of nuclear attack, others to serve as information-gathering stations to help	It was justified in the terms of the time, when attitudes and knowledge were rather different. I don't think it would be possible to justify such a decision without room for doubt, simply because it relies on risk assessments and judgements about things that never happened - so

	manage retaliation and confirm casualties and impacts without much emphasis on the health of occupants.	we can't be sure if any of those assessments were accurate or not.
165	As part of the nuclear deterrent - to prove to our enemies that we were prepared to fight - and continue to operate after a nuclear attack. If we had not built these structures the enemy would have doubted our resolve to actually launch or retaliate using our own nuclear devices.	I think it did (and to a certain degree stll does) kept the UK at the top table. I think it ensured our independance but at the same time because of SIOP did bring a degree of risk that we could be targeted because of America.
166	Secure structures where the selected few would be able to survive.	Yes, I believe so
167	To house weapons and protect key personal from a nuclear attack.	Yes, as if we did not have we were more at risk. Having these weapons does act as a deterrent to other nations.
168	To allow the UK Government to govern, police, communication and survive a limited nuclear attack. There would have been regional control allowing a nuclei of centres from which a more normalised form of command and control would be able to develop...assuming they have not all been targeted!	Initially yes as we were not fully aware of the forces and effects of nuclear weapons. However over time it became clear that an 'overkill' retaliatory defence was not required, but this was not filtered down as there was political ground to be held by promoting an overly strong "defence".
169	to preserve their power in the event of a nuclear war.	no. if we'd all stop killing each other and live and let live, there'd be no need for mutually assured destruction.
170	To create a sense that 'something was being done' (for the ones in Yorkshire I know of), so I suppose partly for propaganda purposes	Not in my opinion, no
171	To reassure people with the (false) possibility that nuclear war was survivable.	No
172	To protect those who would run the defence effort	Not really, if they ever had to use it then its purpose as a deterrent had failed
173	To create a network of communications and protective spaces to allow thoughs chosen for the task to direct and monitor action leading up too and following a nuclear threat or attack	Given what was going on in the rest of the world, it was probably the best option available at the time
174	To protect civilians in the case of nuclear attack	Yes
175	To house local and central government authorities to co ordinate administration and control following a nuclear attack. It may be worthwhile to note that the government also held stockpiles of food in depots across the country to help feed the	On balance yes. One could have sheltered behind the US enormous nuclear capability, but this would hardly have been supportive of the western liberal democratic alliance.

	population, in the event of a breakdown of supplies, following a nuclear attack.	
176	To protect the government, administration and the monarchy. the rest of us would have perished.	Probably, but mutually assured destruction was madness. Better dead than red!
177	To prop up an elite. however temporary the design use of the structures collectively they would have played a part in keeping communications and awareness open for a select few.	Possibly, it kept many in work, although rental of said devices is purportedly paid to the US. In what way was it considered independent? All allies had a vested interest, surely? Instil fear & maintain control (& collect taxes!)
178	To protect members of the government in the event of a nuclear attack.	No, providing we can share a nuclear deterrent.

Entry Id	The Cold War dominated four decades of British life; in that time a vast defence orientated manufacturing industry developed. Many communities relied heavily on the defence industries for work. Do you think reliance on such industries, both here and abroad, perpetuated the Cold War?	Did you or your family play any part in the Cold War (civil or military service; volunteer groups (WRVS, CDC, Royal Observer Corps etc.)? And if so could you describe what the activity was?
1	today it is destruction financially - i'd be tempted to say money drives everything - it is our ideological heritage after all!	Royal Air Force. Working on aircraft mostly in the UK.
2	I think there were benefits to the world from the cold war. A derivitive, "The Race for Space", Soviet vs US superiority brought many innovations and benefits.	None, but subsequently have surveyed sites.
3	Not sure I would agree with the word prosperity - we spent a lot of money but got little value from it. We have only ever actually used conventional forces and we probably spent too much on these given our relative size as a nation.	Not that I am aware of apart from being slightly concerned at times like the Cuban missile crisis that a nuclear war might kick off
4	Yes	I was in the USAF stationed at Burtonwood during the Berlin Airlift and later served 16 months during the Korean War. Worked as an Aerospace Engineer on a number of missle programs
5	This question does not make sense to me.	No

6	It was necessary as it showed the world that little old britain could hold it's own in this time of threat, and it enabled great leaps forword in technology development.	Both my parents moved to Swindon from London to work at Plesseys guided weapons division(Mr Turner one of the bosses was a relative/uncle of dad i think) where dad was a design/planning engineer and mum worked on assembly. My dad also after the war and before moving to Swindon worked for the government in covert operations to do with designing and field operation of spy location devices and the such, we are still trying to get further information about these activities.
7	I dont quite understand this question. I wonder how much the investment in weapon systems acted to boost the economy. Was this even a part of Govt economic strategy?	None that I know of
8	yes, whilst we felt the threat was real , industries almost bloomed in preparation, shipping, forces, and the military were supported by additional funding, which in turn meant employment to many people and posperity.	No, although I do remember watching the TV with news reporting on Greenham common, and nuclear war heads being hidden or transported. so we were not actively involved but understood the implications of what was happening.
9	Yes, pity we don't still have the industry and jobs	Yes - ROC observer in 1960's
10	I think so, although it would have all been in vain if the war did turn 'hot'. as everything would have been destroyed..	Not that I know of
11	Sorry do not understand the Question??????????????? I followed the Beatles and Stones	My father was in the airforce. I went to Hong Kong during the Korean War. My very first memories are of the Kowloon ferry. Later I hear (divorce) my father went to Christmass Island and my half brothers say he got his cancer there. Died in his early 50s I think.
12	Up to a point. In order to maintain the "deterrent" and protect the public at large it was necessary to spend large amounts of money. This country never had the capabilities of say, the USA who spent (and still do) almost obscene amounts on Defence and deterrence. However, the threat from the Warsaw Pact was real and potentially deadly and to have spent nothing would have been morally reprehensible.	I served in the Territorial Army (1st bn The Wessex Regt) from 1978 to 1981 and could have been called on to fight in the frontline in Germany if the ballon had gone up. I also served in the Royal Observer Corps (Avebury Post) from 1982 to 1991 and likewise, would have had to leave family and home to serve in an underground monitoring post if the need had arisen. I also worked for the MOD at RMCS from 1977 to 1979 and for Vickers Plc (Defence contractor) from 1979 to 1987.

13	I think it did, we are very good at building for the defence industry, after the cold war ended we lost most of the manufacturing employment in this country	Myself, my brother and 5 other relatives in the military
14	Economic prosperity is always a good idea, we could do with sending the bombers over again and crippling European production!	Defence just about covers it!
15	Yes.	RN Officer 1973 - 1993, Fleet Air Arm from 1978. Father worked for Bristol Siddley/Rolls Royce on Bloodhound and Tornado.
16	Absolutely. War is the mother of invention. When threatened, innovation becomes highly valued. New and inventive ways to kill one another is instinctual, bred into us; bound to our DNA. We don't have a choice. When threatened, biology teaches us that we flee, freeze or fight. We fight to survive. Economic prosperity is a positive by product.	No.
17	I suspect this is a rather simplistic question - many other things impacted on economic propserity and the cold war threat was perhaps a part of it. In terms of justification, there probably was a threat - so 'yes'.	I was a British citizen - so 'yes'. Also I spent 9 years in Germany located in Germany as part of the UK military 'occupation'; 5 of these years were spent around 10 km from East German border. Our advice on seeing a band of Russians was to 'move eats with a bottle of vodka'
18	it certainly fuel'd it	no
19	In 2005 the proportion of the defence budget spent on the independent nuclear deterrent was between 2 and 4% - this doesn't seem unreasonable.	3 years service in 1 (BR) Corps.
20	To a certain extent the defence industry was just reacting to a potential threat. Things like TSR2 brought the potential for a lot of work for people, but I don't know that the knock on effects to the economy were all that great. I don't know much about it though.	My Grandfather was head of Cine Photography at an experimental establishment airbase, responsible for a lot of the filming and still photography of many experimental aircraft, including V bombers and TSR2 during testing. My father, mother, maternal grandfather and paternal grandmother all worked at the same airbase.
21	Again, referring back to my last answer I do sometimes wonder just how credible the threat actually was. However, there is no doubt that the 'threat' was a good deal for our defence and the associated industries.	I joined the RAF in 77. We wewre stioll very much 'fighting' the cold war. Exercises concentrated on beating off attacks by the Warsaw Pact. I can also recall at least 2 occassions when we

	May I quote Ocean Colour Scene: 'Profit in Peace'	went to ' 1 step away' from an actual war footing.
22	I don't knpw	My father worked at GCHQ, at first as a radio operator, he didn't tell us much about what he did, in fact I picked up more from other people employed by them in the pub. As far as I know when being a radio operator he listened to morse code being transmitted by the russians
23	It is difficult to know for sure if things would have been different if the money had not been spent	Not that I am aware of
24	Yes	I served as part of the BAOR in Germany for 12 years
25	I don't think I fully understand the question (my knowledge of the subject is next to nil). If you mean that the threat stimulated industry and this was a good thing, then I agree and think that is one good side effect! There will always be a challenge for humanity – war, famine, disease, environmental change etc. Humans seem to work best when threatened – hence all the innovations during times of war.	None
26	Not sure.	No.
27	Probably....it kept mant peolpe employed	No
28	I believe the threat justified economic prosperity as it offered work to millions, also many people would have remembered how leading up WW2 Britain had relaxed its military manufacturing capability hence it was fully justified. The prosperity of the British people was essential to my mind in helping moral. Was the average British worker consious of the threat of destruction? Surely his main concern was providing for his family.	My father did not have any direct role but played a very small part by attending civil contingency local planning meetings.

29	Probably. It certainly allowed many UK defence industry and allied manufacturing companies to develop a lot of equipment which they also sold across the world, thereby helping the UK's economy. Indeed, that often seems to have been the telling factor in the placement of many defence contracts, when superior (usually American) equipment was ignored in favour of the offering from a UK company. These days, European and worldwide anti-competitive legislation is supposed to prevent this.	I was an Fighter Controller in the RAF and responsible for controlling UK fighters when they flew to intercept any USSR aircraft that attempted to penetrate UK airspace. Another role, allied to that, was the identification of all air traffic approaching UK airspace in order to produce what was called the Recognized Air Picture. Towards the end of the Cold War, I was stationed in West Berlin, where we monitored and analysed East German and Russian aircraft manoeuvres over East Germany.
30	War is always good for the economy, especially if you win it!	My father did national service in the 1950s. Ahem, ahem...
31	Not quite sure of what you mean by economic prosperity. it was useful to line the pockets of the businessmen and thier tame politicians.	My father was in the army (Pay Corps) as was I (Royal Greenjackets). I spent 2 years in Berlin in the mid 70s, in what was the largest (if war happened) POW camp in the world.
32	Yes	No, apart from emotional support
33	It justified the prominence of manufacturing and defence industries, which led to economic prosperity.	No, we played no part.
34	The alternative was disarmament, which, if it had been unilateral as the delusionists of Greenham Common had wanted, would quite likely have provoked the attack that the deterrent deterred. (The preamble to the question is inaccurate: the Cold War began in 1945-46 and wound down after the Soviet collapse. That's a few years more than four decades. Doesn't accuracy matter?) Further, the threat of nuclear destruction didn't end with the end of the Cold War.	Anyone who was alive then played a part, even those who never knew there was such a war as the Cold one. You need to revise your question in favour of the specific.
35	I had actually never thought of this link, sorry.	If it counts: I was not a paid up member of CND but went on marches a few times.
36	The government could have invested the money in other manufacturing industries instead. Creating at least as many jobs and much less fear.	I wore my 'nuclear power, no thanks' badge and went on one or two demonstrations.
37	No.	No. We lived in a small village, peacefully, but my husband was worried during the Kennedy/Gorbachev confrontation over Cuba and suggested stock-piling essential foods and taking

		refuge in a railway tunnel if the situation worsened.
38	It's not a simple relationship: recovery from the austerity of the late 1940s also played a large part, as did increasing globalisation. Like the 'space race', spin-offs from Cold War industry were extremely important in the rise of prosperity	No. We were simple peasants in Somerset.
39	A good explanation of this cycle can be found in 'The Year of the Angry Rabbit' by Russell Bradon. Governments cannot find money to support peaceful production but it can always find the cash to support wars [look at current activities]	Old friend[now deceased] worked at Maralinga in Austrasli when they were performing 'safety tests' on nuclear devices.
40	It also dominated political life, and many other things too. I'm not sure where you get 'economic prosperity' as a result of the Cold War from.	Eh? We read the newspapers, watched the news, and probably joined in the general anti-soviet bloc sentiment for a while.
41	Not quite sure what you mean here. Yes I suppose a side effect of the decision to maintain certain defences was the creation of employment within our country. Are you suggesting that the reason for saying we needed such defences was to create work? I don't know whether that's true or not.	No
42	The threat existed independent of the industrial policy, but was a political convenience for expanding the UK post-war economy.	None.
43	Was it a period of economic properity? I beg to differ: Britain was still subject to rationing until 1953. I admit that there may have been a brief period of prosperity in the 1960s and mid 1980s but on the whole Britain suffered economically in the 1970s and the recession of the early 1980s.	No.
44	Not sure there is a direct connection in the way posited between spending and the threat of destruction.	No direct involvement. I was involved in protest movements against Cruise and Trident missiles, and in favour of nuclear disarmament.

45	Firstly I would say that the Cold War began after the Russian Revolution, but that is an asides. I would say the threat of destruction did justify the prosperity - it was a fact, it was happening and it had to be dealt with.	Not that I am aware of.
47	That argument could be taken for any industry connected with producing things for war. We still produce weapons, vehicles, technology for the purposes of war, some of it we sell abroad. Is conflict around the world being perpetuated because of these industries? probably it is, but to what extent? again we will never know.	My parent were peace activists, part of CND, does that count?
48	people want to perpetuate things they get used to so yes, but perhaps not deliberately	not that I know of
49	No, but it did have an effect on what work the government gave the defence industries, and the political factors about jobs in defence industries play a huge role, e.g. the Clyde shipyards from the 70's onwards	No
50	Business always preys/profits/uses on current fears; in the same way screening equipment - for travel hubs etc - is a growth industry now. It was probably understandable that there would be another 'growth industry' following the end of WWII - and the way in which the war with Japan ended.	My father was in the Air Force and we lived in Germany for a while. I do vividly remember the public information leaflets about what to do in the event of a nuclear attack. They were very scary for a child.
51	No	No
52	Probably	I don't know. My father worked for the MOD for some of this time but obviously I don't know what he did. He moved side ways into Forensics and laterly the Health and Safety Exec cos he didn't want to spend his life working on bigger and better ways to kill people.
53	Perhaps, in a post WW11 world, it did. However this was the norm for Brits for years before, the Cold War seems to essentially been a carry on for those who may have been out of work after the wars.	Nope!
54	No.	Protest through CND.

55	Yes. Eisenhowber warned of the danger of the 'Indusrial-Military Complex' back in 1961. Now that Communism is no longer a realistic threat, a new one 'militant Islam' has been devised to to keep it going.	No.
56	Not in Britain, but I think it might have in other parts of the world.	No.
57	No. And yesterday's defence industries have laid the foundations for today's world-beating technical industries like Rolls-Royce, BAE Systems, Vickers, Qinetic.	Yes, my father helped to build the Mid-Canada Line, which was a radar doppler trip-wire system to detect soviet bombers flying in from the Arctic. We also saw the B52 bombers from the SAC base at Duluth flying over us to their Greenland station.
58	I think that the powerful UK armaments industry was actively lobbying ministers and influencing government policy, so may well have had an impact on perpetuating the Cold War, however I think that the US and Soviet governments were the drivers, not the British government. The rapid collapse of Soviet power in the Warsaw Pact countries in the late 1980s was a clear indicator that the Cold War was a political construct.	Only as potential civilian targets! I was active in CND as a young adult and took part in protest marches in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a student a number of friends were actively involved in the Greenham Common peace camps.
59	Yes. That said it did promote considerable opportunies for product development and created employment opportunites. The British econamy arguably was enhanced by the cold war.	Not that i am aware off.
60	Yes. I am especially reminded of the 'Lucas' incident, where Unions produced a detailed (and workable) plan for re-orienting activity; onley for it to be rejected out of hand...	Only as potential targets - though one distant relative didserve in the Observer Corps
61	To a certain extent, yes. However, post-CW defense has shown that we are perfectly capable of identifying other threats, such as 'the war on drugs' and 'the war on terror'.	I, and my husband, have been involved professionally with the heritage of the cold war.
62	Very likely.	None

63	Badly framed question. Should be in two parts. One - did the industrial and commercial interests that developed, eg arms manufacture and technology, then yes. 2) Of course communities relied on it for employment, but foreign policy is never made in the interests of working people and their communities. However no doubt this employment would have been the basis for political support of the cold war and nuclear weapons in various communities and the labour movement.	No.
64	Yes, especially in America and the USSR. Perhaps less so as far as the UK was concerned - but BAe still focused on military work.	no - we thought there was little point in planning on living in a nuclear winter. If it happened we would be part of what was atomised.
65	Yes. But so too did the political elite and NGOs like green peace. Compare and contrast the response to global warming and nuclear war (indeed look at the nuclear winter for a direct connection). Both are a massive socio-allergic reaction to a small stimulus with a massive allergic type reaction that far outweighs the actual problem. Both have capitalists raking in huge profits from spreading fear. Both are doomsday scenarios and both have been proven to have been "overdone". But at least nuclear weapons were made in the UK -- windmills are built abroad!!!	My father was a director of the rocket station in Woomera and went on to work at GCHQ. I was always comforted knowing we would be the first place to get a direct nuclear hit and therefore never worried about the nuclear winter (the ideal cure for global warming!)
66	I don't know, it could have done. i don't know enough about the economic/political reasoning at the time.	No.
67	No, didn't the Cold War continue until communism in Europe ceased? I don't think people at the time could envisage a world where those countries weren't under Soviet rule so I don't think British leaders consciously thought/planned to undermine reform there just to keep home industries going. I don't want to be that much of a cynic!	Not directly. My parents left Hungary in 1974 as they did not want to bring their children up under communism. I am sure they did not expect the regime to fall apart 15 years later - after all it had been in place almost all of their lives.
68	While the public relied on Civil Defence for salvation, the military relied on steady investment in the technological imparative (using technology to gain advantage at any cost). This perpertuated the Cold War and the military-industrial complex. The Cold War ended when the Soviet were bankrupt	Everyone alive that feared Soviet domination played a part in the Cold War. I participated with Duck and Cover drills at school.

	and unable to keep up with western military spending.	
69	Yes. More than that, they also influenced our ways of life - we are led to believe that these industries are honorable and essential, not militaristic, violent and environmentally catastrophic.	My parents were teachers - my mother [West] German, my father British. So they 'played a part' - in terms of cultural relations between former enemies now both part of the West - but not in what might conventionally be implied by such a question.
70	Yes, I'm sure it did to some extent.	Not directly no, although my parents both grew up in the shadow of 'the bomb' and it definitely had a profound effect on the first three decades of their lives, which has had a small knock-on psycological effect on me - it's subtle, but that 'you never know what might happen in the future' doomsday-thinking is there nevertheless.
71	Same as in any `war`	No - although my parents voted for successive govs with the weaponry. Actually my (fantastic) uncle was a Morse Code operator - very hush hush!
72	No. The sodding Soviets perpetuated the Cold War, full stop.	We're traditionally a Service family, and, additionally, my uncle was a civil servant during the period. To that extent, we were as involved as every British subject was, but no more so, really.
73	No at all. While there were communities and groups living off defence expenditure, Cold War was essentially an exogenous phenomenon for Britain. This is testify by the rapid shrink of defence expenditure after 1989.	I was too young to play any role. My family was left wing and supported anti nuclear campaigns.
74	Almost certainly - no politician wants to close a plant in their constituency - and there's enough evidence of corruption and kickbacks between Westminster and the defence industry to suggest that the links were a lot deeper and higher-level too.	Not that I'm aware of - my aunt and some of my mum's friends used to go on CND marches (so you could say they were involved in the Cold War in terms of protesting against it) but didn't have any organisatonal role, as far as I know.
75	No, politics perpetuated the Cold War; the defence industries were a byproduct.	My father worked in one of the defence industries; other family members were active in CND.

76	Yes, the military build up (similar to the 1980 and 90s build up of the financial sector) skewed the economies of the 1960s and 70s, and their ultimate downsizing and regulation was seen as counter to the previous Zeitgeist - but had to happen because of an economic rebalancing which saw the financial toppling of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. The West the only needed wars in Cold War client states of the middle east to also topple its economy (2006-11) during following hubristic Gulf Wars.	My mother was a Greenham common woman.
77	I find this very difficult to resolve. In some ways I suspect it might have, butg on the other hand the threat appeared to be very real. However, this perception probably owed something to defence industry propaganda.	No. Just worried about it!
78	Again, quite do you think the Cold War was about. The defence industry has always been something of a self perpetuating beast, why do you consider that during the cold war this aspect of it is any different to it is now. If you are asking the question to ask was this a pressure in prolonging the Cold War then that is plainly a leading and erroneous question. In short, no.	N/A
79	No	I was in the Army
80	You say it dominated life; it didn't much feel like that. It was simply a condition. We didn't, except for a few luvvies, spend our days wondering about the fourminute warning. There is really no evidence that British armament had any serious effect on the Cold War at all; though it certainly provided work.	Yes I did, and no I can't. Suffice to say I was a member of the Royal Naval Reserve, 1960 - 1983, ending as Lieutenant Commander.
81	Could well have been a factor. Some people presumably became very rich on the back of all this fear...	No
82	No, I'd say it was vice versa.	Yes, father in Royal Navy.
83	To some extent yes, but I don't think it was the principal influence in perpetuating the Cold War.	I was a member of the Royal Naval Reserve and was prepared to be mobilised in the event of a possible attack.

84	No. Once the Cold War ended, if the defence manufacturing industry was so important to the UK a reason would have been found to keep it going. Also, major defence cancellations at the height of the Cold War (eg TSR2) would not have happened.	Yes, but I'm still bound by the Official Secrets Act! I think I'm allowed to say I worked at Royal Ordnance Factory Burghfield (for about two years in a clerical capacity) where warheads for Polaris and Chevaline missiles were manufactured. My Father played a role as an MoD Policeman, notably at Greenham Common, and also at Orfordness in Suffolk.
85	No. The cold war perpetuated heavy investment in defence. Once the threat receded the expense has subsided.	Yes. I was a regimental NBC officer in The Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry, trained at Winterbourne Gunner. My operational role was Reconnaissance Squadron Leader in 51 Highland Brigade and my troops observed Russian Spetznaz deploying into Scotland from the west coast. When not serving in the TA I was a physics teacher.
86	No. Political tensions prolonged it.	Father was a GPO Telephone Engineer, also Royal Corps of Signals TA 1946-62. One cousin also GPO. Two uncles Royal Corps of Signals for National Service. Two cousins in RAF early '70s One cousin in RN early '70s.
87	The argument about defence and employment appears before and after the CW period. Perhaps such communities did perpetuate it in government thinking. Personally, it passed me by.	No.
88	No.	No.
89	Possibly. Some communities and politicians clearly did place great store on what were generallly 'high tech' industries providing major local sources of employment. Even so, the end of the Cold War took most by surprise - it was so swift, so unexpected and so wholesale, & as such precluded any attempts by lobbyists to perpetuate.	No - apart from living through it and being scared by it at the time!

90	Have not a clue. But the way that you ask the question leads to the answer that you are wanting.	no
91	Jobs equals votes, so perhaps a large defence industry helped perpetuate the cold war. Soviet Russia on the other hand didn't need peoples votes.....	My father was in the Royal Signals 1947-1949 and worked in telecommunications for the the G.P.O. thereafter. I remember him telling me about working with radar and listening stations along the grampian coastline.
92	yes but not as much as in the USA which is in effect a war time economy	member of the armed forces and the ta during the cold war, I later met many x Warsaw pact mebers on digs and traded stories this was very intresting as the simlarties out did the difrances
93	No idea.	Ask your tutora bout the Official Secrets Act and who it applies to - it really does include you.
94	No people will always try to take control be it of another country or another person so the war was inevitable	N/A
95	It would not have perpetuated it if it was one sided, but the two sided arms race made it logical at the time to build the industry, giving a vicious circle.	Parents grew up during Rhodesian Civil war, a cold war proxy conflict.
96	The need for manufacturing orientated economies to continue developing new products forced the arms race through both free market growth and a military need to not be outdone by the Ruskies. The continued production of war materials forced nations to compete, requiring greater levels of production to pay for it all, resulting in a spiral of military power.	They were alive during it.
97	Possibly as people both here and abroad could have been preparing for the cold war and, in their minds, Assuring themselves it was going to happen. I think if everyone relied less on the denfense industry it may have been a different story.	No.

98	yes probably	no they didnt (as far as i know)
99	i don't believe so. I think it was such a side effect of the cold war. Increasing tensions are what caused the cold war to continue with increasingly bold moves such as Russia moving missiles into Cuba. These moves meant the countries needed more weapons and munitions so there was more production. The production didnt lead to the cold wars continuation.	No i don't think so.
100	possibly as some communities would have relied on the war to survive and if the cold war had ended these industries and communities might not have been able to survive	not sure
101	I believe, the world as a whole should remove all nuclear war heads from readiness and scale back their deterrrents as there is no need at this moment in time or ever, as it would cause total destruction. Rather spending money on nuclear warfare prepration, the goverment should spend the money on improving infrascture.	Not that i know of.
102	Following the cold war many countries felt the need to keep up the defence industry for both nuclear and non-nuclear incase any future attacks came from other countries such as Soviet Russia or terrorist organisations. The uses could also be used as scare tactics if threats occured. The Tridant programme was due to be scrapped recently but they were overturned as it could leave britain without long range nuclear misslies.	No
103	Having a constant state of fear is almost the same as a perpetual war in regards to consuming human labour and commodities. This kept people in jobs until the later eras when people wanted a higher state of living. So to some extent, war was good for business and good for governments.	One grandfather was in the Navy on HMS Unicorn during WW2 & the Korean war, and moved to the RAF until the late 50's. Other grandfather was in the Army until the 70's and one grandmother was a radar operator during WW2 up until the late 50's.

104	While I feel it may have been a motivator for the continued tension of the time, I dont feel that that succesive governments would all adopt this strategy without using it to critisise each other or risk the scandal. I also feel that governments would not put national security at risk for short term gains in the economy.	None of my family played any particular role in the cold war.
105	To an extent yes	Granddad was working on anit air misseles in cyprus Dad bases in germany in the 70's in the RAF
106	Yes, but it was not the only/main factor.	Not as far as I know!
107	Maybe!	No
108	Maybe - it's not like I can have a look at Defence records to work that out and have an opinion.	Don't think they did.
109	Undoubtedly - and continues to accelerate British and American involvement in foreign adventures. (Though having said this, the fact that the arms race effectively bankrupted the USSR means that our large defence industries also contributed to the Cold War's ending...)	Other than being alive in the 80's no...
110	I have no idea, sorry	None that I know of, though I wouldn't be surprised if my sister took part in CND rallies
111	No. Every war had benefits for certain industries, but I don't believe any war would have been perpetuated whilst it was ongoing as the threats would have outweighed those benefits.	No.
112	No, like most wars it is a positive side affect, but is very much out-weighed by the negative affects of war.	no

113	Yes, these industries became a key part of national life and they established sociocultural patterns that normalised the permenant preparation for war - this inertia undoubtedly lengthened the conflict.	None.
114	Insofar that the cold war ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and it's Communist dictatorship, that would be a no. If anything the defence build up beginning under Carter and during the Reagan years accelerated that process.	I and my immediate family were simply mainly alive during that period. My grandfather had some involvement being a fluent Russian speaker, but hard details are lacking.
115	I don't think so, simply because vast arms manufacturing and large-scale employment in the arms industry continues to this day. So at the end of the cold war the customers merely changed slightly but the activity didn't. So I don't think of itself it particularly perpetuated the Cold War.	This question is not clear and far too wide ! Do you mean officially in some way ? If you mean were we involved in arms manufacture or GCHQ or something - well we won't answer that !! We all payed a part in one way by being alive at the time ; and by working anywhere the Cold War could be relevant. eg as a student I organised a group to help support Czech students who were marooned outside their country when the Russians marched into Prague. Does that count ?
116	Only if you believe in conspiracy theories.	Yes. I was a WRNS Officer from 1972-1978. I was a cryptographer.
117	Yes, I do. Vested interests certainly played a part.	No.
118	I certainly think that such subsidized communities were more likely to support the Cold War, since their own livelihoods depended so heavily upon those incomes.	My family are from Spain, a part of NATO but not a key player in the conflict, so I doubt any of them played any role in the Cold War aside from being simple and passive supporters of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism in general.
119	I am sure these economic and technological aspects had a role, which quite like ly eclipsed 'ideology.'	No direct part to my knowledge
120	Yes. I think The Cold War became a habit. The initial threat of nuclear war subsided reasonably quickly but the perceived threat or the lingering sensibilities remain for much longer. Taking all this into account, continuing the employ people in such work seemed like a reasonable thing to do.	No.

121	I think the military/industrial complex created in response to the tensions generated by the cold war was so huge that ending it or changing its direction was inevitably a very slow process. Given its massive influence in relation to economic performance, political capital and power relationships on either side of the iron curtain, it must have fought for survival long after its actual value to the societies sponsoring it had diminished and eventually disappeared.	I was directly involved in CND and as a student, joined marches and demonstrations against nuclear armament.
122	Research and development will have had a knock-on effect for general manufacturing industries eg teflon from space research. The argument about job creation could be used for coal mining but that didn't stop the govt destroying the mining industry for political reasons. I think reliance on arms trade is still going on today and is not just an aspect of the cold war. There is an argument that if President Kennedy had lived, the cold war and relations with Russia may have taken a different turn for the better.	No.
123	Yes to a cirtain degree. MPs with large manufacturing and defence industries in their constituancies must have lobbied to a level.	no
124	Possibly, hadn't thought about it before	No
125	I think the UK was and is a relatively small player in this, but the military/industrial complex in the US certainly had a role.	No
126	Yes and No, relying on it for work is good for jobs and as a career but it also helped stoke the rumours of WW3, the only things that made people nervous was the military exercises that had all of the defence companies shipping all of the deterrents and weapons to a number of places as if they were actually going to war, the façade of war scared people but exercises were essential in understanding how good our defences and reaction times could be.	I think so, Stationed in Germany for support if anything kicked off.

127	The Cold War was going to happen regardless of whether or not defence manufacturing was there or not. Heightened tensions after the Second World War were what sparked the Cold War, and events afterwards were just occurrences due to the tensions between the nations there after. Yes, military production and capabilities were a major part of the Cold War, however there would've been tensions with or without the arms race, however it goes without a doubt that military production didn't help matters during this period.	My Grand Father was a MOD Policeman at the RAF Munitions Depot Chilmark, where certain weapons and bombs were stored and sent out from, to keep them safe from persons not authorized to see them. My Grand Mother worked on the admin team at RAF Chilmark and signed the munitions in and out as they were distributed out to the air stations. My other Grand Father was in the Royal Navy.
128	Possibly. Unfortunately I do not know enough about the subject to have a truly informed opinion, however I do believe that simple arrogance and childish actions promoted the cold war and a need to out do each other.	My family were not involved in defence.
129	yes of course. people worked in defence and so talked about what they did and why they did it. they would want to keep their jobs and believe they are doing right and this goes forward into politics to invest more and more in defence provoking a response	no not that I'm aware of
130	Yes I believe it would have sustained the cold war with a number of financial and social reasons from this prolonging it even more. Businesses	Not that I am aware of NO
131	Possibly but I don't know enough about the topic to properly comment	I did not have family in any of the listed groups
132	I would imagine so.	ROC - ON A SMALL UNDERGROUND POST.
133	The perceived threat from the Warsaw Pact necessitated a minimum level of military commitment by the NATO membership. It only maintained a force level sufficient to ensure a defensive capability that would make the losses inflicted on a WP attack unacceptable. The West could only cope with the scale of WP forces by developing a qualitative superiority, which helped sustain and develop our high-tech defence industries.	British Army. Mostly committed to NATO European theatre.
134	No.	Father was in the RAF
135	Absolutely. It still is the case, as jobs are used to justify the expense of perpetuating the expense on a British nuclear force.	Some members of my family were involved in the intelligence services

136	Yes, war (or the threat of war) = profits for all parties involved. The escalation of tensions would have only amplified this.	To my knowledge, no member of my family was involved in the cold war.
137	I think that the dependency upon the defence industry did perpetuate the Cold War, as communities saw little alternative to replace their reliance upon this industry.	I do not know of any input that my family had in the Cold War.
138	Quite possibly, since each nation perceived the others as having large defence industries and hence perceived this as a very war like stance, meaning that they were reluctant to begin cutting back on their own industries for fear that this would leave them open to attack. However I don't believe this dependence was solely responsible for the perpetuation of the cold war, I think it was in part due to a paranoid attitude towards other nations which made everyone believe that this defensive industry was required.	Not to my knowledge.
139	yes	My father was in the RAF from 1960 to 1980.
140	Yes without the advancements from each industry the cold war advanced from different stages from attacks from a propeller aircraft, to ICBM's where bombs could be launched in minuets with out these development the competition between the western world and Russia would have stopped. But since developments came bombs got bigger and the threat increased, the cold war would continue to get more heated and more deadlier.	My father was a technician in the RAF, but dropped out early due to medical reasons. But he did some construction work on a American Strategic Air Command base and he was watched 24/7 under machine gun guard by military police. Even though its a small part its still part of the war effort in building the infrastructure.
141	I am sure that elements of the deference industry perpetuated the Cold War by perhaps overstating the threat	No
142	I don't know enough about this part of the Cold War. I can see that it would have pushed the war on in that with more armaments the fighting intensified and was able to spread further. Of course this would have a knock-on effect on communities where the priority of work would change and also no doubt the war effected economies adversely in this time and as a result required more business (in this case war related) to bolster what had been taken.	Don't know a lot about my family history unfortunately.

143	Undoubtedly. This is still going on, with the manufacture of defence products totally unsuited to what we are now told is the enemy (see, for example, Jeremy Corbyn's disagreement with trade unions on Trident, and the unions' justifications). This was particularly true in the United States, where fear is a major electoral vote winner. (I don't see this as a grand conspiracy theory, more just a slight disconnect between business ethics, goals and the end products of that business)	Yes. Father was in BAOR (was stationed in Berlin through Able Archer), mother was WRVS. Brother and two uncles in army. I was in the Royal Naval Reserve. I left shortly after I joined CND.
144	Most certainly. Though it was a parasitic relationship between weapons manufacturers and attitudes of workers (ref Bombardier/Mackeys/Shorts here)	No, unless CND counts :P
145	Does appear with hindsight that the investors behind the arms industry were prolonging matters for a profit at any price.	If it moves salute it, if it doesn't move pick it up, if it's too big to pick up, paint it.
146	In a broad sense how could it not? (Sorry, bit of a cop out my tea is ready!)	No.
147	Yes. Even now, people defend military spending on the basis of the communities that it supports, rather than any actual benefit it provides.	My grandmother, my mother and I were all active protestors
148	maybe. Whilst work was generated for many people, I would not like to say whether this actually perpetuated the Cold War. Maybe it did I, maybe it didnT.	no
149	This is certainly a point of view which may have some credibility, however having lived through it I can assure you there was nothing 'phoney' about the concern and fears of the public at large .	No , but many people were part of the civil defence movement , and regularly had training in first aid etc .
150	If all the technology and money had been devoted to harness tidal or wave energy we would be a lot better off now. But I expect the arms manufacturers would not have made so much money. We deplore war - hot or cold - while trying to get contracts to sell fighter planes and complaining about job losses	Some as members of CND, you did not ask if the part played supported it!
151	Almost certainly, without an arms race there can be no industry, without the industry there can be no arms race.	Father National Service followed by 37yrs with MOD. Myself and 2 x brothers in RAF. Myself 30+yrs in MOD.

152	Another interesting question and one I can't answer without data. I know that some unions today oppose the scrapping of Trident because jobs are at risk, so i would not be surprised if economic pressures did help to prolong tensions during the cold war.	No
153	Yes - the cold war was good for the defence industry.	Military service - Royal Marines, Royal Air Force - Fortress Germany, RAF Laarbruch and Bruggen
154	No	Yes served with the army as crew of a main battle tank
155	Difficult to say. Russia was not friendly to the west and probably needed standing up to/facing down	I went on a CND march from Aldermaston to London. This is a point of view that is not really represented in your questionnaire.
156	No. The fear of destruction and the desire to survive and/or win was paramount. Everything else - industries included - sprang from that.	No
157	Yes. When a large proportion of your GDP is tied to the production of military hardware and munitions, as is particularly the case for the US (even today!), it is very likely to sway political decisions. Also, because of their strength at that time, the defence industry companies were able to bring greater pressure to bear on the civil servants, military personnel and politicians involved in decision making. However, a beneficial bi-product has been more and quicker technological advances.	Both my spouse and I served in the Royal Air Force as Ground Defence Fighter Controllers and were also involved with the software maintenance, development and procurement of various air defence, radar and aircraft computer systems.
158	Yes.	Not unless camping at Greenham to protest nuclear weapons counts.
159	I believe the munitions industries have paid into government and encouraged warfare for their own enrichment.	None, I am a pacifist.
160	Industry and capitalists always benefit from wars, either actual or possible. Perpetuating the possibility maintained the need, therefore maintaining the industry.	No activity, but being born in 1950, I can remember life during this time.

161	No. Rather a slanted question. Of course the communities relied on the ordinance factories. As they did on the coal and steel communities. But no one has saved the latter.	CND. and we were there when Hesletine came in with the tracked vehicles and put up the razor wire at Molesworth.
162	The Cold War was almost a self fulfilling prophecy in that the governments on both sides promoted the apparent danger from our enemy to justify the spend on defence. However, military spend is often the best value in terms of driving development and technology forward in the country, so yes, I guess it did perpetuate the Cold War.	No.
163	The Cold War was a technological race as well as industrial, contributed to capatilism the space programme was built around defence. Secrecy, lack of trust yes I think it did is my answer. Everyone benefited in some way and we all grew suspicious of each other.	Spouse based in Germany at end of Cold War and used to base excersises on an invasion from Russia for example
164	Yes, but I am not sure this ever became the deciding factor in its continuation. From what I have read, the political climate was key throughout.	Not that I know of.
165	Not in the uK. I believe it did especially in the US and Soviet union. I think US scaremongering did, and still does perpetuate Cold war industries/defence such as keeping redundant Missile silos operating just to appease politicians in the states concerned.	Father and Brother were in the Civil Defence I was a member of the ROC from 1981- 95 I served in a monitoring post at Ashbury 3/45 Post as the post instructor before transferring to 3/38 Post Buckingham as the Chief Observer. When the posts were stood down in 1991 I transferred to the Nuclear reporting cell at High Wycombe. I was the Chief Observer/Team Leader until final stand down in 95 During most of this time my civilian occupation had me working at RAF Fairford, Greenham Common, High Wycombe (Daws hill) and RAF Upper Heyford.
166	No, I think the reliance on weapons manufacture still continues, people will always seek out a threat to their national security.	Probably, but nobody would have been told what the activities were.
167	Yes, as more people were involved in the action via this	No

168	No. It was perpetuated by politics and the need to let people think that there was an 'immediate' threat. Yes there was a threat, but it would have been much more limited in its retaliation.	Yes. ROC RAF (Inc HQC&C + BRIXMIS)
169	It certainly played its part, you can see the way they're sparring round each other now that they're desperate to get it all started again, mainly because they think there's money to be made.	think my dad helped design some of the weaponry as he worked in pcb design.
170	I dont think I know enough about this - but certainly, as now, there is more money in war for arms makers, than in peace	No
171	Yes. I also think wiser job creation options should have been pursued.	No, not that I'm aware of. Some of my family survived the Holocaust though.
172	Yes,	No
173	No, not at all, I dare say that there were thoughs who had a vested interest financially to keep political tensions high purely for profit and gain, but I think that with time the ways of the world changed both politically and financially with the inevitable decline in the industry the cold war suported	Yes my father worked in communications, developing and installing radio and listening stations in thhe UK and mediteranean areas for foreign office research & development establishment(f.o.r.d.e), government communications & wireless service(g.c.w.s), GCHQ and then the Plessey company at various locations in uk.
174	Potentially	No
175	Maybe. The argument that jobs may be lost is still being made in relation to the debate on whether to replace Trident. The need to preserve jobs cannot be the basis for the continuance of the possession of weapons of mass destruction, although there may be other valid reasons to have a nuclear capability.	My father did national service after WWII, in addition to his wartime service. I had a minor role in relation to the winding up of government buffer stocks of food.
176	It meant that there was greater support for the policy amongst the general public so did contribute to the policy carrying on for longer in the absence of meaningful 'peace' talks.	No, but I did go on a Greenham Common march.
177	Of course. Every single state in the US has a stake in the arms industry, which perpetuates votes & maintains the fear factor.	Civil in radio communications.
178	Possibly.	No

Entry Id	Is too soon to investigate the Cold War? Some think we should be protecting sites now as they force us to confront the period both personally and nationally. What do you think?	The Cold War is currently a taught component of a number school qualifications. Do you think we should a)teach it in a worldwide context; b) concentrate on the British story; c) not at all? Please give some context to your answer.
1	I think we should look at the period from a British point of view and start now wjilst there is still the oportunity to speak to those involved.	On the British view. There were great advances in technology, I think taking the global view loses the personal aspects of the period.
2	This was a part of the history of Mankind. I vehemently believe that Cold War sites should be classed (archaeologically) alongside other site that have the classification of "Ancient Structures"	Bob, I've taught it to Primary Year 6 (10-11 year olds) they love it, Space Race, Spying etc. I concentrated on US vs Soviet, with a little of British involvement. China etc. I overlook. Children seems to like the tit-for-tat propaganda.
3	We should investigate now because already a lot of evidence and sites are being lost.	Concentrate on the British experience but within a Global context. The things that children are most likely to be able to see and experience will probably found in their local area or in museums.
4	Scholars too often love to rewrite history to suit their individual political views. I'm not sure there is any value in maintaining relics of past events. People tend think "we're not that dumb" proceeding to make equally dumb mistakes.	I would teach it as a world wide event with emphasis on the context of the thinking at the time. Unfortunately, too many events are looked at in the context of today's thinking(heavily influenced by the individual professor's view) applying today's idea of right and wrong.
5	I think we should protect and preserve at least some of the material. I don't have enough idea of the scale to have an opinion on how much of it we should preserve.	If we choose to teach it - there is a lot of competing stuff - it should be in a worldwide context. Two reasons. It was probably impossible (then) to have a 'small' nuclear war. I'm not sure it's possible now. In either case radiation would certainly affect many other countries, if not the whole world.
6	I think investigation sooner that later is advisable as it will stop the remaining sites and infrastructure from being let to fade away and information about this era from being swept under the carpet	I think it should be taught in a worldwide context as it will put the efforts made in/by this country into perspective, especially when students can see and compare what other countries friend or foe also invested during these times.

7	We should be recording and preserving now, before things disappear. We should be able to identify 'iconic' sites and types of monuments to be preserved. We can concentrate resources / expertise on a small number of site that can be chosen as being 'representative' rather than leaving it to chance. Perhaps we can also choose examples that can be made sustainable.	a - has to be in a worldwide context. Particularly as a part of the strategy was to bankrupt the USSR - making the arms race as difficult to win as possible
8	The cold war is part of our history and should be investigated. over time history is lost through inaccurate accounts of failing minds, or crumbling buildings leading to lack of actual evidence. People are still alive today who can offer real and valid accounts of life and work during this period. Personal recollections are important alongside national agenda and evidence of structures. History needs to be retold as accurate as possible to the younger generations so they can learn from past historical events.	World wide history in order for children to understand the wider picture of nuclear attacks- to include what other countries had in the way of weapons, why GB felt under threat ? Then looking at how Britain managed this period in history to include bunkers, voluntary services, and also look at any structures within their locality that may have survived the period of time.
9	No time is to soon, lets get it recorded, stuff disappears much quicker these days with the rush for redevelopment	Yes and in a global context, it was a global conflict
10	I think it's worthwhile time to be investigating it, With the current instability in the middle east over nuclear weapons its a pertinent time. Plus many of the buildings and stories from people who were around at the time are being lost	I think both a and b, the British story is not one normally covered in much detail when compared to events such as Cuba or the proxy wars in Vietnam etc
11	Depends I think the regional bunkers should be kept The big listening posts also but smaller ugly concretebits should be allowed to be reused as land fill. For me the greatest benefit of the end of the cold war is that The Romanoffs are now saints and Mother Russia is again becoming Holy Mother Russia. I had a Russian TV crew (on Stonehenge) in my bungalow two weeks ago. (I have only ever voted Liberal (once Commie).	A as that still has influence today. Now that China will dominate us all (I am reading my Mandarin now). It would be good to see the cold war taught through the surrogate wars/Africa.
12	If we leave studying the cold war for future generations there is the danger that their interpretations will be second hand so to speak and based on subjective ideas and political correctness. It is vital that as much as is possible is recorded and protected now to ensure that an accurate record is made, that cannot then be "re-interpretated" in the future.	Whilst it is important for there to be global overview, in order for the subject to be studied in its proper context, I think the main emphasis should be on how the Cold war was played out in this country and how it affected every section of society as a whole. I think your book "4 Second Warning" should be the basis of the standard school text book on the subject !

13	If we wait any longer what is left will have been destroyed, Why wait until all there is is a best guess when we can have conclusive evidence	I would start with a would wide context and then focus it down to the British story, that will be more relavant to the students. Thats how I did history and there was nothing wrong with that. This way will also allow the student to aquire useful demo tools from family and friends that were involved.
14	These sites are historic and interesting and give an unusual view at government thinking and deserve protecting!	A, the cold war was the major formative event that has led us to where we are now, the political coming and goings need explanation so the same clanger isn't dropped again!
15	It may be too soon but what time scale is correct? We should protect a representative selection of sites.	It can only be relevant in the broad context of world history.
16	Everything is history. Everything should be recorded. Valuable lessons are supposed to be learnt aren't they. If there's no record then it's easy to suggest it never happened, or easy to forget. It's a valuable teaching tool to pass knowledge on to future generations. If knowledge weren't retained, we wouldn't have had the Cold War in first place.	The is a unilateral question. It should be taught in the context of world history. It marks a point in evolution (post WWII) where man had the power to exterminate himself (he still does). It marks a transition from fear to a dawn of greater communication and potential understanding.
17	History starts today	History in Britsih schools is initially too global; important to get a sense of British history first then plave it in European, then global context. The 'Cold' War is a bit of a misnomer though as I don't believe there was any period with no actual conflict taking place.
18	All history should be preserved to teach other generations what happend whether right or wrong outcomes were acheived	I think it should initially be taught at world wide level to get an overview then contentrate on the British element. this will enable students to get a fuller picture and for them to form their own opinions on the subject
19	Example sites should be preserved for educational purposes as the Cold War is now history for the majority of UK's inhabitants. The sites are unlikely to ever achieve the heritage status of other historic buildings as they will never provide an entertaining family day out as a medieval castle might.	Worldwide context as the ideologies behind the opposing sides must be appreciated to understand the subject.

20	These bunkers and other sites are no more or less significant to the history of warfare in the UK than the average castle ruins, and should be affected the same protection. Why they are not proper heritage sites I will never know.	To teach it with regards to the british would bring it home to the children, and hopefully mean its a bit more "on the doorstep" than more remote and distant events like the building of the pyramids. However I think seeing how America and Russia were coping during the cold war would provide good balance even if it wasn't the main focus.
21	In my opinion, we dont deal enough with Modern History. As we take lessons from the past I feel that the lessons we can draw from the more recent past are far more pertenant.	Definatley in a Worldwide context. As our role on the world stage diminishes I feel that it is important to show that once, in the recent past, we were pretty big hitters on a worldwide stage.
22	It would be good to preserve some of the things.... It might help us to discover some of what went on.....	A) there really is no reason to tell it from a British point of view, or an allies. I believe that the USSR had just the same fears as we did. In the end there were no winners or losers.
23	Its not something I have considered before and don't feel I know enough about it	Worldwide context- it is important that history is taught not just from a British perspective if we wish our students to become critical thinkers
24	It's essential to keep at least a few examples restored for historical reference	It should be included in the history curriculum. I think a view of all sides with a lean toward why we acted as we did
25	There is no doubt, the cold war will be one of the most important periods in history. Why would you wait until the history deteriorates and knowledge is lost?	It is a mistake to narrow learning to a single perspective. To not tell the whole story is an outdated idea. We (as a society) tend to look down on countries that employ information control and have a 'minister of information' lurking whenever we pay a visit!! We pride ourselves on freedom of speech and free press, this is no different. Of course highlight Britain's role, national pride is important, but the big picture is the primary focus.
26	Historically we've been too quick to rid ourselves of controversial, secret or industrial built heritage. I think it's essential to see it, explore it, teach and learn about it, and to address it face on in an honest manner.	It may be easier to identify with 'British' Cild War history. Being able to visit sites of interest would be useful. But teaching within a 'vacuum' of the global story is only half the real story.
27	Archaeology starts yesterday. more reseacrh sgoudl be done whilst it is still in the memorty of those who took part	The world wide contect. Th eimpact on global and Europen politics through the 50s and 60 s shoudld be talk together with the legacy that we still live with

28	I think it is important we should remember this period in our recent history and therefore protecting & preserving sites is worthwhile in helping recall that period to future generations	I believe we should teach it in a worldwide context in order that future generations realise the suffering that went on in Eastern Europe and Russia. Not forgetting the important part played by USA in the cold war especially the Cuban crisis
29	As a keen archaeologist, I believe it is never too soon to protect any site of significance for future generations.	a. You cannot do the topic justice without a worldwide context. By all means give greater emphasis to the UK's involvement, but the major protagonists were the US and USSR, so anything less than worldwide would be meaningless.
30	People are your best resource, the people who served and the people who suffered. Sites are good but they make a lot more sense after you have spoken to the people who used them, especially as they will have been cleared of any sensitive hardware by the time most of us get to look at them!	A world wide context with British case studies, after all, they are generally the closest sites to visit.
31	we need to be recording them now, while they are still intact and the people who ran them can give oral records.	Like all history we need to give it in a wider context so it can be seen in the round, with a closer look that how it effected Britian.
32	It is not too soon to investigate, provided it is done objectively. Classification of sites is totally warranted	A. British Cold War history is too narrow. Context is everything
33	I don't think it's too early to investigate the Cold War, and anything that can be done to help us better understand the Cold War, such as protecting these types of sites now, should be considered.	A. Teaching it in a worldwide context within Britain will inevitably include the British story. The teaching of all types of history is necessary.
34	The collapse of the USSR and the ditching of Communism was the great under-reported and neglected story of the later C20th. Since the collapse, some, not all, communist state archives have opened up. Some have since closed again. Some scholars have already seized the opportunity to access these temporarily opened archives and published their findings on that basis. If all former communist state archives open and remain open, the investigation can continue. But remember that the present-day independent states of Communist Eastern Europe are now beyond the formerly centralized control and have not closed their archives. What the situation requires	Context: I hadn't heard that it is a new subject. Can anyone explain why it would be new? Then again, since the majority of people during the Cold War years lived their lives as if there were not any such thing as a Cold War, even though coastal cities were within 12 minutes of submarine-launched missiles, it's no real surprise to hear that the Cold War is either a forgotten subject or someone's idea of a new one. Question (A), answered affirmatively, would subsume (B). Question (C) is in line with Henry Ford's "History is bunk."

	is an investigation and spotlighting of what former communist state archives are open and where, country by country; in short, an inventory. I can't imagine what scholars are so timid as to suggest that the world should wait.	
35	I think it's extremely important to investigate: to explore how far propaganda is actively used to promote government aims and wishes even when it isn't totally apparent, how far populations can be manipulated into believing certain situations and how far propaganda/manipulations begin to take on a life of their own. I'm speaking with reference, of course, Iraq/WMD, Al Quaeda, the Muslim "threat" etc etc.	I think it should be taught in a world wide context - or it has no context! Perhaps with some emphasis on the British story as familiarity can help engage students in learning - but yes - it needs to be taught within the context of world wide post war politics.
36	I don't think it is too early. There is already a new generation or two who have grown up without the alleged threat of nuclear attack and there are still many people alive to tell them about it.	We should definitely teach it in a worldwide context. The attacks we were scared of would have come from outside the country and it was mainly the USA and USSR who were the main protagonists.
37	I think we have to confront all periods of conflict in order to teach us to avoid, if possible, such situations. So, sites should be protected. However, they are generally not aesthetically pleasing like castles and hillforts, a lesson in itself.	I think, as someone interested in prehisory and the medieval period including warfare then, that too much about recent dreadful events e.g. the Holocaust is taught; however I recognise the importance of this teaching, which includes the years of the Cold War. It should be taught in a worldwide context. My personal views are coloured by knowing, living through and reading about these events. Everyone should know about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The terrible destruction of these communities is the only lesson we have of the effects of nuclear weapons,

38	Of course we should be (and are) protecting Cold War sites now. While often unsightly and unpreposessing, the 40 year military stand off in the 20th century is a huge part of our cultural heritage. We (in North Somerset) are currently recording a (minor) naval weapons development site of Cold War date: I don't necessarily expect the general public to appreciate the importance of these sites now, but if we don't protect some, they will never have the opportunity.	The Cold War, and all its offshoots like the proxy wars in Africa, the space race, the tensions between China and India (and the USSR and China) all formed the backdrop to 20th century life. Although the threat has been replaced with that of ecocastrophe, it was still a political and general driver of national life. Yes, the British story should be told in schools, but set in the context of the global story.
39	Rewriting history is more difficult than demolishing Cold War [or subsequent] military instalations. If it came to a choice preservation should take precedence over investigation although how you can do one without the other I dont know	In simple terms yes but I would have thought there needs to be an international context before the british story can make sense. Biggest fear is who will do the teaching ~ the last thing we need is an Irvin holocaust denial type spin with a left wing apologist approach to the threat coupled to a imperialist coulored view of the response.
40	Investigating the cold war isn't necessarily the same as 'protecting sites'. In any case, invesitgating and protecting 'sites' gives a false picture of what the COld War was all about. It wasn't about places as such.	Please give some context to your questions. Of course it should be taught, but if this questionnaire is anything to go by, I'm concerned about it being taught in too simplistic a manner. How can the Cold War be taught purely froma British perspective?
41	It isn't something that should be ignored - theoretically we're supposed to learn from history although ironically history shows us that we don't seem to! We should be protecting sites now as even if they're not investigated now, they should be there for the future to make sure it isn't a period of history that's forgotten.	It should be taught in a worldwide context as it was a global issue of which Britain was a part. To teenagers today it is already "history" and something they can't remember themselves. Unfortunately history is not taught well at schools in general these days and as this is very recent history, it would take a really good unbiased teacher to give pupils/students the opportunity to think about it and form some independent opinions. The other thing is that it can't be taught in isolation - to understand the events and why people thought and did what they did, you need to understand what happened before the cold war. This is the same for anyone studying WW1 or WW2 or pretty much any 19th/20th century history in particular.

42	Significance of Cold War sites can be determined now, at a time when issues of vulnerability can be strategically managed. Distance of time won't change significance, but could result in the loss of structures that might be worth preserving. Should be pro active in conserving structures that demonstrate the paradox - folly of UK policy and the brilliance of technical innovation.	a) and b) together. Without the worldwide context the particular character of the British story is meaningless. The British perspective is essential if understanding is to be relevant to a British audience.
43	It is important to study and protect these sites now while we can still obtain 1st hand accounts of what went on. A lot of Cold War sites are vulnerable, some to derelection and demolition as they were built with a specific purpose in mind and therefore are difficult to adapt to other uses. Other sites such as former airfields suffer the same issue but also suffer from the threat of redevelopment as business parks. Therefore we must act now to record, study & where appropriate designate sites for protection.	The Cold War should be taught in schools in a British & worldwide context. It is an important part of what still influences political decisions and policy in both east & west. Learning about the arms race, MAD and the nuclear hair trigger upon which both sides exisited for 40 years will help to ensure that the past does not repeat itself. (It cold be argued that old Cold War posturing and attitudes are making their way back into Russian & US politics).
44	It is never too soon to investigate an historic event, and I would be amazed if that was the view of modern historians. The point about the sites is a different one. Some sites should be preserved, but they need to be interpreted and put in context.	It need to be taught in a worldwide context, otherwise it would be a bit pointless in my view.
45	I would support the latter opinion. It is too easy to pass off the Cold War and its infrastructure as being a time we don't want to remember. But it has shaped the world we live in today, much more than any other period of our past.	Only on a worldwide context - we need to teach the whole story - not just about the 'goodies' and the 'baddies' which unfortunately is all too often the way the Cold War is perceived.
47	Lets investigate, but I would say that I am an archaeologist!	Definitely a, you cannot teach a worldwide subject focussing on one country. I think it would be fair to highlight the British story but it would need to be placed in it's context. I have seen how Americans teach the history of the space race in American High Schools and it is very misleading only showing the American view.
48	the same issues are present in the world today, yes we definitely need to protect sites and think about what they mean	a - worldwide is the only way to understand (most things)
49	The cold war is over but it had an effect on buildings, infrastructure and people. It is therefore vital to record and in certain cases protect and learn from surviving sites	A and B. Its a worldwide event with particular British issues. It therefore should be about the geo-political power play and focus on issues relating to the UK

	before the people who worked there are lost.	
50	I think some sites should be preserved; many have already been destoyed or converted to alternative uses. Physical remains are a very important way of learning and remembering.	It should be taught and it is possible to teach both the British and worldwide perspectives - it was a global event so needs a global perspective.
51	I think we should be protecting sites in order that there is something to study in the future	The cold war needs to be taught on a world wide basis. It is important as many contemporary problems have their origins in the Cold War
52	The early warning stations in Shetland are already being lost and some were quite interesting in the landscape. Some are currently in the process of being scheduled. In a Shetland context that is important as it was part of life up here.	In a worldwide context not a Thatchers Britain context - although the whole thing around how it brought down Neil Kinnock and the Labour Party is quite interesting too
53	ABsolutely - protect sites now, we are well within the 30 year rule for most. I may be biased (did my dissertation on cold war bldgs and also have done research into the area for Historic Scotland) but these buildings WILL be lost if we don't do anything soon.	A & B. You can't understand the Brit position without knowing the greater context, what was happening all over the world. It would be like teaching canadian history and missing out on the who native thing.
54	Select key sites for protection and document the rest.	I taught it 30 years ago in secondary schools in England and Germany. I still think its a vital part of C20 history and don't see how you can do b without a!
55	It is never too early to re-examine historical events, and to question the assumptions of the recent past. It might even prevent similar mistakes being made in the future.	Its a worldwide topic so it should be understood in that context
56	I think that we should be protecting sites and also recording the stories and thoughts of people involved (on both sides of the fence). Too often we have assumed that we don't need to consider recent events because 'everyone knows about that', except that they don't. Especially when the sites were secret. We need to understand the context in order to understand why people made the decisions they did.	I think we should teach it in a worldwide context, whilst allowing people to see how and why that context affected Britain. Tis allows to understand past decisions and reflect on whether the context has changed to the point where we can make different decisions. Examples of decisions now and in the near future could relate to the retention of Trident and to nuclear power. People who grew up during the Cold War were constantly told of the destructive capability of nuclear warheads and I

		think that this has been developed into a fear of all nuclear uses.
57	Some scholars should take a running jump... You can investigate and protect whatever you like, provided you set out intersubjective research criteria.	a) Yes, see Q4 above; b) how can you understand the British story without the context of the USA story, which provided the bulk of the impetus, funding, hardware, technology transfer, etc? c) Are you really suggesting that we don't study modern history??
58	I agree that it's too important to ignore and indeed this is a citical period for investigating and understanding the Cold War in Britain. The dismantling of many Cold War military bases has been underway for some time and we are in danger of loosing the local knowledge of what went on at a number of sites. The fragility of the protest camps and of other traces of political protest should also be an important consideration.	I think that it's important to understand both the international context and the national and local story. The Cold War impacted on everyone who lived through it in a broadly similar way to the Second World War; as we loose the generation who lived through the Second World War, direct and personal experiences of the Cold War will become more important as a way of engaging school children in making the connection between world events, politics and individual people's lives.
59		It is very important that we learn from the cold war and apply these lessons to our day to day and future plans.
60	It is importnat to conserve some physical artifacts before all destroyed - we are only just beginning to appreciate this with respect to WWII structures. E.G. Caerwent WWII propellant factory became US depository for Nukes when De Gaulle kicked US/NATO out of France - special structures erected for storage.	Need to be careful to avoid EITHER slanted history OR airbrushing out. (C) would count as airbrushing, to my mind. Difficult to talk sensibly just looking at UK role (as advanced platform for NATO missiles?)
61	Undoubtably, access to records and other resources (such as oral histories and sites of significance) will change over time, with some becoming available, and others closed - the new resources will facilitate new interpretations. Using historical and archaeological approaches to understanding can be confrontational, but also can facilitate change, and bring closure.	Definitely worldwide: all history post 1600 (or so!) is in a context of global networks and global issues, such as colonialism and post-colonialism, commodification, and capitalism. Children should be taught the big picture as one of a number of frameworks, and also to practice history and archaeology at the family and community levels.

62	I think we should protect a representative sample of sites.	I think it needs to be taught, and both in a worldwide context and showing the 'British, story.
63	Scholars and historians have of course been investigating the cold war, thats an odd question. If you narrow your question to what you're saying about protecting the sites, then yes they should be preserved, its part of the historical landscape. But I don't think its about forcing people to confront the period personally! would academic historian or archaeologists really want to do this? They might want to enable people to think critically about this period, present an interpretation where people can see what evidence they cite for it etc.	Is it? I thought people were complaining all kids learn about is Stalin and Hitler. However, yes, it should be taught. a) of course, howe on earth could it not be taught in a world wide context. It was the policy of the USA primarily and Britain, now fatally weakened as an imperial power followed on its coat tails.
64	Kids these days seem to know very little about the C20th. Many know nothing of the Falklands conflict (a mere 25 years ago). The learn about WW1 as part of the national curriculeam, but what stop at 1939?	context is all important - no-one did anything in isolation. The cold war only makes sence when you look at the global view.
65	Is it too early to investigate the archaeology of windmills? Having gone to Denmark to investigate early windmills, I can hardly say that investigating something as ancient as the cold war is too old.	See below
66	I think it is an interesting period, and by its very secretive nature much of it is completely unknown to most people. I think it is too soon considering all the other stuff that could be protected.	I think it should be taught in a worldwide context as the whole idea of a nuclear deterrent was based on what the 'other' country had or didn't have, and this would give children a better understanding of the issues involved both for this country and abroad.
67	We should be protecting sites now. It is difficult to assess the significance of recent history so perhaps some sort of temporary designation may be appropriate, i.e. protect now and reassess in 30 or 40 years, but it may not be practical.	We should teach it - a worldwide context would be best as the actions of successive British governments only make sense (or not) in relation to what was happening in other countries at the time.

68	We have been continually investigating the Cold War since it began in 1946. It opened itself to analyisis immediately because it was based upon fear and perception and these elements naturally open themselves to introspection. The question of preservation is a management issue after they have been identified. Identifying them through investigation cannot wait as many have already been demolished.	It has to be taught in a worldwide context. Concentrating on the British narrative perpetuates the ideology of the Cold War by isolating it to one perspective, one perception. That reinforces fear.
69	We should investigate and confront sites, discourses, representations, beliefs, practices and materials from this era as we would any other. We should certainly not brush it under the carpet, assume that we were the good guys or assume that we 'won' the Cold War	Teach it in a worldwide context, otherwise its significance as a North-South set of conflicts (as opposed to the hegemonic 'East-West' narrative) can never be fully exposed. Pupils are mostly already immersed in 'British' cultural discourses about world politics - this is a chance to break them out of such habits. In any case, the 'British' story would have to include, for example, decolonisation in Africa and Asia - both because of UK intervention in those regions, but also because children in British schools are from these regions, so it is a crucial part of how they ended up in the UK and how and why the UK is as it is today.
70	Protect, protect, protect. Quite apart from the fact that it's NEVER too early investigate our past, I fear for the future of many of these 'ugly, concrete carbunkels'. What possible right does this generation have to summarily decide that an entire category of monuments are, effectively, too ugly and useless to be worthy of preserving? What treasures are we robbing from the next generation? This type of thinking happens with every generation, who struggle to see the value in their parents' history but have no trouble in valuing their grandparents' history - just look at how hard Sir John Betjemen had to work to preserve St Pancras station, a towering monument to Victorian neo-gothic architecture that would outrage the general public today should it be torn down...	a - teach it in a worldwide context. War these days is global, and the lessons learnt from the Cold War are relevent to modern geopolitical situations too. The British response is a subset of that story, and we should focus on that in schools too else pupils will feel that the subject is detached from our modern lives - you need to root the subject in the 'little stuff' that's close to home to make it come alive i.e. to make that direct link between the weird concrete carbunkel at the bank of the local park to the Cuban Missile Crisis et al.
71	History is now as well as before - everything should be studied	World wide - especially USA with its McCarthy era etc

72	No legitimate historian ever says 'it's too soon to study' something; it may well be too soon to reach quite all the eventual conclusions. Equally, this candy-floss language w/r/t 'confronting the period' sounds like redbrick socialist balls to me.	It can hardly be taught without context. Concentration upon the British context seems necessarily obvious. Mind, if the usual leftish idiots are to teach it in the state schools, it might be best to give it a miss altogether.
73	I do believe that Cold War can be studied now. While some aspects of that experience will become evident in the future decades, this does not mean that a lot of research can already be done now. I am strongly in favour of protecting sites related to Cold War to allow both historians and the general public a better grasp of what Cold War represented for Britain and British people.	I do believe that it is legitimate to study Cold War using both an international and a domestic approach. While many phenomena related to Cold War can be regarded as "exogenous" from a British point of view, they interacted with British realities and produced specific trends and realities. Specific research questions can be addressed with a more narrow approach, obviously. But, for the sale of eaching, I would regard a mix approach as the most worthwhile to develop a general grasp of the topic.
74	The 1990s are already a different historical era so of course the Cold War is one...	In a worldwide context. Young people need to know the things the British governments and governments of other capitalist states acquiesced in in the name of protecting the freedom of generatons who were yet to be born...
75	The longer we leave it before we start preserving sites and investigating the Cold War, the more evidence (both physical and personal) will be lost.	It makes sense to place it in a worldwide context, however the national story and how it effected the UK also needs to be told
76	It is imperative to protect and understand this legacy not only because it is reminder of the history of the period, but also toe explain the legacy of the Cold War politically today as it still shapes world wide politics. The Cold War was a hot war as far as many countries were concerned, as the influence of the super powers still shapes nations, their policies, who their rulers are, and ultimately their fates.	a and b, the world wide story is essential to understand how we put ourselves in such an extreme position. The local story tells of the psychology of the Cold War on individuals. e.g. the postmaster who is prepared to leave his wife and children to die in order to man an ROC bunker - which he does often without telling his family.
77	We should be protecting sites now to preserve evideence for future analysis. These are the hillfort remains for the future.	It should be taught in schools within a worldwide context. Only in this way, can Europe's dependence on American military might and know-how be fully appreciated.
78	Do they?? Have you told Peter Hennessy this? or perhaps asked at the numerous HE establishments running courses on the subject? It's growth area!	In a worldwide context with an emphasis on our National and Local preparedness.

79	we should be protecting the sites now while we still have the people who maned them around and can help with the right interpretasion of them and small bits if kit be it manuals hard wear and equipment will come to light	worldwide as with all wars if we push them under the carpet and forget them we are doomed to make the same mistakes time and time again
80	There is a major difference between investigating the Cold War and preserving sites. Heritage is process not product! And I am not sure at this waving of a national flag yet again, it was an international matter. Lowenthal would remind us of the need to forget. But presumably stirring it all up will get lots more British schoolchildren to hate foreigners, and buy the Daily Mail.	Certainly in a worldwide context, or at least a European context. Indeed I am shocked that such an option does not occur to you. Be aware that I was taught the Geography of Europe at 3 points in my education, but never east of the Iron Curtain. But for my parents Europe was a single place. As my father said as he was dying and I told him that Poland was free, he gripped my hand and said, 'I went to war for Poland'. The Poles call it the 50 years war, 1939-89.
81	The sites are an important part of our heritage and should help us to remember and hopefully learn lessons from our past.	a) Important to understand how it came about and what impact it had on those generations of people involved.
82	It's never too early to record and investigate any subject. The lack of documentary and archaeological records about WW2 sites in Britain, including contemporary social history, illustrates the need to do this work as soon as possible. About the Cold War specifically, there are two parts to any investigation - gathering information and interpreting it. Some may want to leave the interpretation for a while until the period can be viewed objectively, however the earlier that the information gathering process begins the more chance it has of collecting relevant facts.	Concentrate on the British story. This does not mean minimise the worldwide context, however the British story will probably be more interesting to students and encourage them to learn about the Cold War.
83	Preservation of Cold War relics and structures is important, but not for the reasons advanced above.	Mainly (b) but, of course, that can only be done really effectively with a bit of (a).
84	The Cold War played a huge role in our history and as such it needs to be impartially studied. The relics of this period are as historic as any other site built but not used for its intended purpose (eg the Palmerston Forts) and are as deserving of protection. Their recent provenance does not reduce their historical importance.	The Cold War was worldwide; it should therefore be taught in a worldwide context. One area cannot be studied in isolation. Britain's role is mainly that of the 'US aircraft carrier off Europe'; our forces were a valuable adjunct to those of the USA, but the real war (sometimes hot, sometimes cold) was between the USA, Russia and China.

85	Our response reflects the assessed threat level and our capabilities. We are where we are because of the assessed threat and the state of our national finances. I would be quite happy to see the cold war topic included in contemporary history and we are still one of the few world nuclear powers.	Competition for curricular time is hotly contested. I think the inclusion of the cold war is certainly worthy of a mention alongside WW1, WW2 and other recent conflicts.
86	I agree with the latter point as a military archaeologist.	It was taught in Modern Studies in schools in the late 1970s! I did both O level and Higher Modern Studies in that period. The Cold War was taught as a world-wide phenomenon then, and should be now.
87	It's certainly not too soon (how old are those scholars?) Sites do need to be preserved, but on a basis of rational selection. If this is not done, they will be lost. So much relatively recent material has gone that we have a better representation of Roman and medieval military sites than civil war or WWI defences.	I favour a), but that applies to history generally: some national emphasis to relate to, but within the bigger picture. Any such addition to the curriculum should NOT be designed by politicians or their cronies. Personal context: Alevel 'modern' history tentatively reached the 1920s; CW was not mentioned. As a '60s teenager and keen newspaper reader I had no awareness of it in any historical sense.
88	The Cold War deserves as much attention as any other part of the historic environment, and the physical remains should be recorded, protected (designated) where appropriate, managed and interpreted / promoted to raise awareness and understanding. Oral histories should be recorded.	Should be taught from the British perspective in a European context.
89	It's never too soon to try and better understand the C/W and its legacy. As such we should be investigating and protecting now.	A & B together. It provides a vital context for today - both in terms of the UK and the world.
90		

91	It must be preserved as a lesson to what extremes polical and national mistrust can be taken to.	It need to be taught in a world wide context so the pupil can understand why a relatively small country such as ours went to such great extremes in wepons production and troop deployments. Europe until the 2000's, the far and near east up to the late 60's.
92	I think that while they are an important part of our past and they should be protected that the denial of the post war period and britians decline is endemic in offical circles and shows up in lack of funding for conservation of not only these structurs but more noticably in our lack of concern of our industrial heratige.	the cold war is a world wide event (which is not yet over) and as such while we should exmine british history of the event it should be exmined as part of a globel conflict which will give persective to britains part.
93	Depends what you mean by protect. Save them in an archaeological sense, or keep them available for tr-use?	Definitely c. the average teacher has too much difficyulty getting to grips with historymeven at the mosr basic level, and this is a complicated subject.
94	No it was never to early as we could find out how communication between the countries broke down in such a way that a war was needed	teach it from a worldwide context with special focus on the british story behind it
95	Never too soon to investigate past events. Nothing wrong with confronting important issues.	Broadly worlwide, with a focus on the things that influenced the British actions. It needs to be taught as otherwise
96	It's never too soon to investigate the truth of what has happened.	A worldwide context. The story of Britain alone would be pretty uneventful. "Sat in the middle, woefully underprepared economy and military, didn't do a lot."
97	I think the sites should be protected so we can study what happened and what could have happened in depth. This could lead to a better understanding to avoid anything like this happening again.	I think that the cold war should be taught in schools from a worldwide perspective with emphasis on the british story as we know more about it and children in schools can relate more to britian than other countries. this gives them a view on what happed worldwide but gives them something they can relate to in more depth.
98	yeah it couldnt hurt, we have saved other war sites from history, why not embrace and learn from the cold war	teach them all the facts about it

99	I think it should be investigated. We do not want to forget what happened (such as ww2) because it allows us to learn from the mistakes and realise it did actually happen. If we confront it now we can see how it all escalated and how it can be prevented in future, e.g. instead of intimidating others with weapons they can discuss issues diplomatically and sort out their differences. If we forget about it there is a danger it may happen again, the cold war has set an example, a precedent.	a) History needs to be shown from both sides so that the reasonings behind it can be seen. If there is only one side shown this will lead to being Biased, and this will result in biased views, which is one of the main factors that contributed to the Cold War! Seeing things from other peoples views is what is needed in politics and diplomacy which will hopefully prevent any future tensions like the Cold War.
100	i don't think its to soon to investigate the cold war	i think we should teach it in a world wide contex to show the reasons why other countries got involved and not just the uk's view on it
101	Its never to soon, to investigate a war because the longer we leave it, the harder the truth will be to find out amd we will never work out if it was ever worth all that money.	I beleve we should teach it, world wide, all the stories from all the diffent point of veiw. This is a resent subject and a relivent one to our way of life so it should eb taught in great depth as it will give children an idea of early 20th centry life and it covers a great varitey of subjects, that can be taught, I.E. nuclear science, geography and the changes in society.
102	It is not too soon to investigate the cold war as it is a major part of history where the world could have been on the brink of destruction, therefore should not be forgotten but possibly not all the sites at they are often ugly derelict buildings. Some should be protected and have artifacts from the period but some could be made usable again to make the most of space.	We should teach the cold war in schools because it can show the economic and psycological effects it had on the nation as well as how close the war was to escillating out of control changing the face of the earth as we know it. I the cold war is taught in schools it could be used to prevent anything similar happening again or to be used to spot warning signs of anything like this happening again.
103	We should definitely protect sites as learning from history stops us from making the same mistakes again.	a) As it's one of the most fascinating periods of history, as it's a relatively recent event, school children can learn first hand from people who lived through that era. It was one of the most well documented periods in history, and can lead to other subjects such as: The Apollo programme (and the off-shoot inventions). Communism v. Capitalism. Literature. The berlin wall/airlift. The Stasi. How current political tentions came about. The formation of Israel. The West/East's involvement in arming sides in The Yom Kippur war/Vietnam/Afghanistan etc. The advancement of technology & science etc.

104	I feel it is necassary to protect as many major cold war sites as possible because these allow a generation of people who never experienced the tensions of the time to experience what it was like and see the political and social context of the terbulant period of history. I also feel that investigating the cold war is necassary now because it is important to study the mistakes and acomplishments of the era so that the future is made better. It is also important to study it while the information is relativley fresh so that there is plenty of detail for future generations to learn from.	I feel that it should be learned about in a worldwide context because it was a period that affected most of the world and sparked numerous conflicts throughout the world. Britain was not the only nation affected by the tension.
105	We should, though it will be embrassing for all nations envoled.	A) I studied it at college and and it gave me a good understanding to world politics, Brittish politics and a basic understand ideology. It is easier to say I can't think of any cons of learning it.
106	It's not too soon to investigate it, obviously as time goes by perspectives will change but it is certainly time to start preserving some of the key sites, or else it might be too late.	a) Teach it in a worldwide context, definitely (maybe look at foreign propaganda, how it was reported in the press etc.). Not just the standard US/British view, but also the Soviet Union perspective, and tensions within the two big blocks. How it affected worldwide economy and cultures.
107	It is never too soon to start investigating any historical event.	Teach it in a worldwide context
108	No - investigate away if we are able to gain access to records/ sites. If someone did then I might be able to answer the questions above more fully!	It depends upon what we are excluding from the curriculum in order to include this. If taught, it should probably be from a worldwide perspective to enable budding historians to appreciate history from a wider viewpoint. The cold war probably shaped national identities and perceptions of national identities today so it doesn't seem an unreasonable subject to include, especially as there is a wide variety of fiction on the subject which may well distort understandings of the most probable historical narratives.
109	Never too early to look at things in detail. Some representative sites would be worth preserving.	Definitely should be taught, and should be widely contextualised. I went to school in Germany in the 80s, so the narrative was more complex than I suspect presented in Britain - the division of the country, the fall-out of WWII etc. Evenso, there was a big gap between WWII and the cold-war; the SE Asian wars mostly ignored, the continuous narrative from WWI to the Cold War not established etc. I do think

		history should be presented in terms of long narratives, rather than separate episodes, and certainly a narrow or national focus is inevitably simplifying.
110	Never too soon to investigate, but implementing findings should be sensitive.	Anything we teach should be taught in context of the impact on the world. Only giving the British impact is biased and ill-informed. We can be forgiven for concentrating on our own history, as long as it is all put in context (e.g. 4 lessons for UK, 1 lesson for world). But then, I am a social scientist! We should also ensure we give an honest viewpoint: Not everything that Britain does is right Not everything which Britain does incorrectly is done for wrong reasons What else was going on at the time to affect the decisions? Teaching history is so complicated because it is never black & white; how far back in history does one have to study to determine the real cause of a war, for example?
111	The Cold War is already history and as much as possible of its remaining artefacts and architecture should be preserved and/or recorded. We are in a position to choose how to present that period of history to future generations rather than them relying on whatever random bits of archaeology survive. I don't think that "confronting" that period is an issue; rather the ugliness of its remains and the recency of the period are a barrier to people thinking that Cold War remains deserve to be preserved.	Yes it should be taught, but then there are hundred of other topics just as valid. But certainly I'd say the teaching of it as part of an overview of the 20th Century is more valid to British school kids than studying the unification of Germany or the repeal of the Corn Laws.
112	no it is not too soon, history is history it cannot be ignored.	It should be placed in a world wide context, which then focuses in on Britain. I believe the war is taught far too much from an American perspective.

113	It is not too soon, this was a truly vast paradigm of human existence that profoundly affected those who lived through it and which continues to shape global geopolitics today: understanding how and why it came about, how and why it was sustained, and how and why it came to an end, will provide valuable information for the conscious planning of a brighter, more peaceful future. Protecting sites should form part of these efforts to consider and evacuate the impact and legacy of the Cold War.	Yes, with the emphasis on A. The Cold War was a global event that marked the moment when Britain was no longer in a position to shape the world independently. It is thus important to explain how Britain fitted into this new world order, and how global events that were precipitated in this historical period are still affecting our world today - and thus, Britain's place within it.
114	It's not too soon - particularly since we have greater access to both documentary evidence and living memories - but it should be understood that many looks are unlikely to be detached due to connections with current politics and so on, and consequent emotional engagement. The preseveration of historical sites is certainly valuable (and with some of the aforementioned bunkers is already taking place), the notion that we need to 'confront' the period seems a loaded term that displays the emotional engagement I referred to above.	It's not that new a topic - certainly not for A-levels, where some course engaged with it back in the 90s. It should certainly be taught, as a period that continues to have a significant influence today. I do not see how it can be effectively taught without including the worldwide context - Britain after all was not one of the primary actors as its empire declined.
115	No it is not too soon. It was a very important period which is good to begin to understand historically, and while people who lived through it are alive to give personal witness. As for sites - I struggle to think which you might mean ? Christmas Island or Bikini atoll ? ! If there is a nuclear bunker somewhere in England fine - but I'd need some further guidance about what is intended here to give a proper reply. (Sorry - I guess you have archaeol sites that I don't know about)	Yes it should be taught, but surely it can only be taught in a worldwide context. Britain was only a small part of it often hanging on the coat-tails of the USA. However history is often taught using local examples in order to make it relevant to students. So the British story needs to be included - but in my view it should be taught with the focus on the global context but also showing what it meant for Britons at the time.
116	It is inevitable that the Cold War will be perceived differently in future generations. It is useful to start now while there are still people who lived through it.	World-wide context. It is part of and sets the context to the change in Britain since the Second World War and Britain's place on the global stage.
117	No, it is not too soon to investigate the Cold War. Select sites should certainly be preserved for future generations. In comparison, the bunkers on Jersey are today a reminder of WWII and some of them are preserved.	In the modern era, it should be a). My son in year 10 notes a lot of anti-Americanism in the school curriculum and the way it is presented. By 'a worldwide context' what is needed in a non-nationalistic narrative. The USSR's story should also be told.

118	In some places it is essential to investigate the Cold War. An example that springs to mind is Germany, where academic studies and a general public analysis can assist with understanding their reconciliation. However, somewhere like the Ukraine, which is still suffering from the aftershock of the Cold War (and is currently undergoing riots between pro-Western and pro-Russian factions), it is perhaps too son.	A worldwide context is crucial for understanding this conflict.
119	Now is especially the time to investigate and preserve, before it's all lost.	This country does not teach us well about our past, and is rather solipsistic. Schools should teach about (b) our role in the Cold War, but of course there is great competition between different topics on the curriculum.
120	It's over 20 years since the Cold War ended - I think it is essential that the Cold War is investigated. I think we should be forced to confront the period as it is an essential part of our history and has shaped our country probably more than we realise.	I was taught the Cold War as part of my GCSE syllabus (exams taken in 1998). I thought it was fascinating. It was taught in the content of 20th Century History which included both World Wars, the Cuban Missile crisis and The Cold War. To be taught this subject in this context was really interesting and took the story right up to the fall of the Berlin Wall (one of my earliest international memories). I think it should be taught in a worldwide context with consideration given to other experiences apart from the British experience. I think it is almost impossible to teach The Cold War by just focusing on the British story. As a former teacher, I know that it is subjects like these, with multiple stories and perspectives, that really engage students.
121	It is never too soon to throw light on the darker areas of the past.	I think we should be teaching our children about this period from both a world wide and a British perspective. I am struck forcibly by the ridiculous truth that my own kids know more about the Tudors and Stuarts than they do about the fifties and sixties which have been so important in shaping the world in which they now live. It seems to me that the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the war in Vietnam are more relevant to understanding the world in 2013 than the Spanish Armada and the exploits of Sir Walter Raleigh!

122	Don't understand the question.	Worldwide context is important for understanding the cold war as it involved 2 major world powers.
123	Study all conflict in detail - remembering to describe the ever-expanding effects of it on the civilian population.	A) But with a little more concentration on the British story.
124	Don't understand the question	a) as need to see from different perspectives
125	It's never too soon. By all means protect some sites- a few are already open as private museums and the National Trust have Orford Ness. I don't see why they or English Heritage shouldn't have some more, just as they open Victorian workhouses, tenement flats and author's houses as examples of a moment in history.	(a) If ever a story was international in scope, it's this. Proxy wars between the communist world and the capitalist one caused havoc all over the globe.
126	No, its never too soon for anything, the quicker we look at things the better research and knowledge we could gain from it and the better our defences could be,	Worldwide context, I hated history at school because it only taught me about the British hardships and our victories, I hated it, I wanted to know more about worldwide conflicts and important things around the world, I had to gain multiple text books to learn about other countries conflicts which I think is wrong, the more knowledge we have about the world as a whole and not just focusing on our own battles and conflicts, the better. we should stand untied and see what went wrong in certain things so that if any situation arises, we know where people stand, weak or strong in different aspects, like the saying, knowledge is power, and power is what gives us the upper hand, what's the point in knowing the Tudors inside and out when we can learn about the American civil war, or the Sri Lankan civil wars sands so forth.

127	I feel the Cold War should be investigated and preserved now otherwise I fear in the near future there will be very little left to conserve, so we should start now before its too late as it is a key part not only in national history, but also World History. The Cold War is often overlooked by the upcoming generations, and I feel education for the future generations is important so that they learn the lessons of the past, and I feel this education would and could be aided with preservation of sites and features from the period.	I believe we should cover the World Wide context for all, as the key points here could aid future generations in understanding the wider world and what can happen if things go wrong to try and prevent these things from happening again. I do also feel however that if people are further interested after the general Global Overview, there should be the opportunity to delve deeper into the British perspective and see how much the Cold War influenced Great Britain. But I definitely agree with the view that everyone should be the taught the Worldwide Context.
128	I think it is important to learn from our mistakes and appreciate that a cold war style situation is not something that is favourable.	A - I believe that we should teach it in a worldwide context. I think it is important to understand all perspectives of the situation and I believe that it is important to understand things that happened in the past in order to learn from mistakes. As well as this the cold war is an interesting subject and having interests is highly important in my opinion.
129	yes we should protect sites and items now! there are lots of things missing from WW2 like planes and tanks that were deemed surplus and were destroyed and no real ones exist. that to happen again would be stupidity. whilst people are still alive they should answer to real questions everyone wants to know and not just ait until they die before looking at the history.	A you cannot just give one side of a story although that is always going to happen here. however when possible you should give all sides of the story, ignoring history is idiotic and leads to mistakes been made again.
130	No I believe we should investigate ,understanding how we reacted in the past in numerous scenarios would give us better guidance in possible future problems. It also incredibly interesting subject	I think we should teach it at school in with a smaller emphasis on worldwide context and more on the British aspect or story. I also find it a interesting subject much more than some of the boring subjects like 1920s America which I was taught at school. It is overlooked throughout GCSE and school but I think plays such an interesting part in our current history and more importantly world wide politics and diplomacy.
131	No I think that it now falls into the category of history and should be looked into	A, because there was a lot more than what just went on in Britain
132	No we should learn the lessons.	Concentrate on the UK aspect.

133	As a military archaeologist I am keen to ensure that Cold War 'remains' are properly recorded but I'm not part of the preserve everything camp, though representative examples should be preserved.	The 'war' was being prosecuted on a worldwide basis with nuclear ballistic submarines deploying in the polar, Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Espionage was also conducted on a global basis. Then there are the periodic 'proxy wars' to be considered. I think the scope is too great to be covered other than at a most superficial level. Much of the detailed material is still to be released and historians will be constantly revising as new material is released. We can probably cover the British / NATO Europe story reasonably accurately with current information.
134	Yes.	B.
135	Absolutely. It is never too soon, particularly where the historical period has as much political resonance now as it did at the time	It certainly should be taught, but it will make no sense without the worldwide context. Children need to understand the geopolitical framework because it makes the period explicable, and also helps to understand where we are now.
136	Not at all, we need to learn from the past to deal with the future - especially given the current situation of rising tensions.	A - teach in a worldwide context. Too often we focus on British involvement in all of history in a very biased view. Much of history taught in schools is quite ignorant to the global context.
137	I don't think that it is too early to study the Cold War, as it was such a critical period of our nation's history.	a) I think it is important to teach the worldwide effect that the Cold War had, rather than just focussing on the British story; as many countries had an input.
138	No, I don't think it's too soon, but I think it needs to be done carefully, as not to damage the sites or cause offense or upset to those involved. But I think it is important that we do investigate these sites so that we can learn the lessons of the past and try to avoid the same situation happening in the future, as if it does happen again it may not remain cold as the cold war did.	I think it is important to try and take an impartial stand point where education is concerned, teach from a worldwide context as this allows us to learn the lessons from all nations and prevent getting so close to annihilating ourselves again.
139	It's not too soon. Many things can be learned from the technology made by all sides and still secrets could be shared to progress the human race as a planet; rather than as a group of countries.	Everything should be taught in a worldwide context. Only biased views can come from looking at only one side. Unfortunately all history is written by the conquerors and never by the suppressed.

140	I believe its essential to be investigated, since it has shaped the world today. It shows us how far we have come and how close it was to mutually assured destruction, it should be preserved and taught now and in the future.	I think both England's part since it teaches you about your nations history and the part we played. Also the world stage because it give you a larger perspective of the world and also it doesn't give you a bias perspective of only a British opinion.
141	We should investigate Cold War structures while many of them are still available	It should be taught in a worldwide context but including sections on how if affected the British way of life.
142	I think that it is almost never too soon to begin recording and preserving parts of history, in a lot of ways I wish this practice had been properly thought through earlier in our history. Documenting and recording/ finding out about the past in non-destructive ways leaves everything there and open for the future and it will be the future generations looking back at this that will matter. In the cold war case, the history is already disappearing.	Definitely teach it in a worldwide context, nothing should be left out and all history and view points should be taken into account. If only the British story was heard then valuable view points and truths will be missed and without the whole picture it would be very easy to misconstrue the events and justifications surrounding the actions and decisions that shaped the Cold War.
143	Definitely not! I am a local authority historic environment officer, and I regularly argue (with varying degrees of success) that Cold War heritage assets should be protected. I give lectures on the archaeology of the Cold War to local societies, and the reaction to these talks is always very positive. I have also been thanked for telling these stories by two Operation Grapple veterans and the widow of a pilot who did a lot of QRA duty. The Cold War is responsible for the economic situation we are now in, and we are not going to move on from that until we confront it. The Germans claim the UK is still fighting the Second World War, and that will remain the case until we face up to the realities of what the Second World War and Cold War did to Britain economically.	a) Yes - The parochial belief that "We won" is untrue (q.v. China...), and unhelpful. We should, as a nation, face up to the fact that we sold off a lot of technology extremely cheaply, then economically devastated the country attempting to deal with the consequences of that (including keeping up with developments on what we sold). Similarly, the idea that the Warsaw Pact were a sprawling, faceless aggressor, with NATO bravely standing her ground in a 1914 Belgium/BEF style just does not stand up to impartial scrutiny.
144	Tricky one - we have come full circle in bullshittery, creating a new cold war , likely to deflect from the red hot ones around the globe. Before current political regime, there was a good chance of objectivity, now, not so sure.	Worldwide. Too much regionality in such a topic is dangerous, can lead to jingoism. Education at secondary level needs re-examined too, of course. And yes, tell the story as long as the truth is told, with flaws on all sides.
145	Some of the artifacts date from 1945 so it is not too early to investigate. A lot has been lost already.	World context is best as most governments are lying bastards, so with both sides of the story the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

146	It is never to early to engage with public history, the first draft of which features in contemporary forms from diaries and letters to reportage. I agree about the selection and protection of particular sites, this process needs to be carried out whilst those that inhabited these areas can closely advise.	It being a global issue worldwide context is essential, as would be the British experience. There is very little history followed up from the curriculum where pupils get to engage direct with those that took part, and living memory strands are surely one of the most appealing ways to draw young people into imaginative engagement.
147	Its never too soon. Our perspectives will change over time, but this perspective is as valid as one from the future.	Its important to teach it in worldwide context. There is far too much focus on 'the British story' in our history teaching, as if it were possible to separate out our Cold War from another. The British Story also tends to lionise any narrative - it becomes the story of British achievement or 'pluck' not a wider story in which we were pawns.
148	i think there are so manysites that it would be difficult to select which ones should be preserved. Other people may argue that sites should not be protected as it is then a constant reminder of the Cold War. Some sites are also in disrepair and there has to be consideration over cost versus preservation.	Teach it in a world wide context.
149	I think it may be appropriate to look at the period now and to protect some sites, especially whilst there are still some of those who were involved alive .	If you are to teach anything it should always be in context , not in isolation , otherwise you don't get a true representation .
150	Valuable to record memories - imagine having personal thoughts wondering if building Stonehenge worth the effort - but our memories are not accurate and there is need to stand back to see bigger picture and where the bit of jigsaw fits in our narrative. Collect now, interpret then reinterpret later	I don't know what or how it is included in school curriculum but in general I would say nothing should be taught solely from British point of view. That comes from schooling when loads of the map was pink and that was thought to be quite proper. A colonial attitude that has had to be unlearnt.
151	As an historical event with both physical and documentary evidence, efforts should be made to preserve for posterity and future generations to learn from and study.	As an event that happened on an international scale I feel that to keep the subject in context it has to be taught on a worldwide context. To not teach it would be like denying that it happened at all.
152	I agree that we should be protecting these sites, and with the reasons given for doing so.	It is a good subject to teach because it is relevant, and because an analytical approach might challenge widely held beliefs, particularly given that parents and grandparents will have lived through the period. Such an approach would require a worldwide context.

153	I think that the cold war is part of our history that should not be allowed to be erased. Sites should be protected and where possible opened to the public.	We should teach the full picture giving equal credence to both warsaw pact and allied sides to provide the most honest picture , warts and all.
154	No that would be a waste of time and money	Teach it in a world content and hope that the people teaching stick to facts and figures
155	it probably is too soon. I was too young to really remember the Berlin airlift, and grew up in a climate of the fear of total mutual destruction. There can be no people around that can be objective on that period. Stalin was a lunatic with no compassion for human life; whether military might was the only response is something I can not say	I think it is too recent. It is impossible to talk about it without having Putin and the present USSR (?) at the back of one's mind. It fits in with M Gove's original suggestion that children should be taught that until the Romans arrived Britain was populated by primitive savages. The only way that the subject can be taught is in a chauvinist way, it is a poisoned chalice and potentially indoctrinates another generation
156	No. It is very timely, and should be a valid part of the contemporary archaeology movement. Archaeological approaches offer means of interrogating this phenomenon when much of the historical documentation is still classified.	The Cold War era was one of the defining periods of the C20. It is essential that it is taught to students at all levels. It was a global phenomenon, so in my opinion it cannot be the focus of a solely British story. It has to be set in a worldwide context, in order to understand the defence networks and the global political, social and economic drivers. The global context then is also essential to understand the conflicts of today.
157	It is much too easy to overlook fairly recent events and thus they can be lost for future generations. Some work is being done now, but what is done mostly seems to be carried out by volunteers. It would be good to think that by confronting and recording the issues we would learn from them. Regrettably, history tells us differently, and the same mistakes are made time and again.	History is always written by the victor! Of course, in this case there were really no winners, but the story should certainly be told. While we should naturally concentrate on the British side of the story, it would have no real meaning unless placed in a worldwide context. The divisions that developed as early as the latter part of WWII, particularly the American-Russian antipathy and distrust, are important in understanding how and why the Cold War came about. My personal view is that effectively, there was a game of one-upmanship between these two main protagonists which dragged everyone else along. Our own actions therefore were largely predicated on what the US was doing and so our own role should be seen within that context.

158	It's never too early to look at how sites play a role in the way we understand ourselves and the recent past, near future.	We should definitely teach in global context.
159	These sites should be treated as one would a medieval castle.	This must be taught in a worldwide context.
160	Its never too soon to investigate a potential archaeological site. The information gained today will be invaluable whenever tomorrow happens.	It should be taught as both a worldwide situation and the resulting British response.
161	Not too soon to investigate. Always good to look while the people who were there on both sides are still alive.	Definitely needs to be taught in a worldwide context. Even if from a British point of view. After all people acted with the knowledge that they had at the time. It is no good having hindsight and not putting that in context too.
162	It's not too soon. The post war period shaped the UK's direction for many decades and we still live with the culture and opinions that were created at that time. The physical evidence are an important part of this history. In the same way we preserve the physical evidence of two world wars we should guard against loosing the physical evidence of this important period of history.	Worldwide context. It is important to understand what the state of the world was at this time, particularly the anti communist rhetoric in USA and how this shaped the feeling in the world as a whole.
163	Yes defiantly, it effected everyone u recently saw a small plot of land in the Scottish highlands for sale which included a underground Cold War bunker room for £7000 - I don't like sites being sold off but think we deserve access for me it's modern history	Yes I remember my brother being based at Greenham common in the 80's and the hippies that used to protest st the fence against the nuclear weapons we had. I think it caused world wide fear of a Third World War and ultimate destruction of the planet. Yes we should teach it the kids need to learn about how the world developed after the Second World War how governments behaved secrecy spying on each other. We were all at risk and we spent huge amounts of money no doubt
164	I agree - these sites should be considered and where relevant preserved now. As a keen visitor to heritage sites including York's nuclear bunker, I think they tell us important stories about the recent past that should not be ignored.	I do not know much about school curricula so can't give a very specific answer, but I would inherently prefer a model that divided time between (a) and (b). Overall I think the cold war period an important one to cover because of its significant relevance to understanding recent and current political relationships and ongoing debates about the British commitment to defence, the budget etc.

165	No, investigate now while people can still remember their experiences and the general fear of the era.	Currently the worldwide context is being taught, personnally I think more emphasis should be given to how many people in this country were involved in cold war industries/defence. What did you do in the cold war Daddy!
166	I don't think it's too soon.	It shoulkd be taught in a world wide context. I don't believe for a moment it was just the USA, Great Britain and the former USSR.
167	No, it is important these sites are investigated and understood before they are lost and it is to late. It is an important part of our history	In a worldwide context, history in school tends to focus on one nation to much!! It is important to understand from all points of view
168	We should be protecting key sites, that show the best of each function, for example there is no need to protect and preserve every ROC post or Command, however, good examples must be protected. The same must also apply to the CCC, and to an extend certain RSG C&C Bunkers (such as Kelvedon Hatch or even teh RGHQ at Chilmark)	It should be taught in a wider context, based on military and geo-political theories. For example what were the precursors to the Cuban Missile Crisis not just in the UK and the US, but what was the USSR game plan. Teach wider context thinking now and that will allow future generations to be able to take a wider view and to seek / find solutions that remove the blinkered standpoint.
169	it's never too early to start thinking sensibly.	I often think all history taught at school has a national bias, no matter what country you live in - people should grow up understanding what's lead to the country they live in being as it is now.
170	No, never too soon	I'm not sure we can be sure of/trust a 'British story' about this - I think, as with much history the underlying drivers are complex and we are often aware of only one part of the story
171	Not too soon. Yes we should.	Both history essential for us to make wise decisions and we're in a global world now.
172	We should investigate fully As any other period of history	We have a duty to teach both sides so young people today can evaluate the actions of their government
173	I think that as a part of our resent history it and they are a valuable source of information both historically, politically and archaeologically that should be both taught and studied in the main stream schools to allow people to understand and make the choices that take us into the future.	a). because we all live in a world where technology has made it's information available all over the world and it's impact on us as a global peoples.

174	It is not too soon. It's always important to investigate history not matter how recent. In fact, it could be argued that the more recent the history, the more relevant it is to current political climates.	b) concentrate on the British story, though within a worldwide context. Focus in school I found was far too obsessed with USA vs USSR- it's important to realise that other nations were vastly effected too, and since we are in Britain, primarily our own involvement needs to be understood in order to fully understand our current relationship with the West and the East.
175	Not too soon. Some sites should be preserved as part of our heritage and for educational purposes.	a). No man is an island!
176	Protect them now. Many sites get dismantled as soon as they are no longer needed. Much of the WWI & 2 infrastructure would have been interesting to see now.	Worldwide context with a leaning towards our (British) role. Much of the madness around leaving Europe is because of our little island mentality and the next generation should be though to think more widely.
177	There is a whole generation growing up, unconnected with little awareness, very similar to Aparteid where "it was nothing to do with me" prevails. Protecting sites can be important dependent upon significance. Confronting the period smacks of arrogance and a similar biased belief on both sides that fear will prevail.	Is it? I have not seen it in a Primary education context, at least not as prevalent as other periods of study. I feel it should be covered, yes, for a general level of understanding, however it should be taught in a worldwide context to allow for reflection and affect upon a variety of nation states & cultures.
178	I think we should investigate.	It should be in a worldwide context.

Entry Id	Have you any other thoughts on the subject?
1	Greater engagemeny in schools with British history. Often the pupils are taught the negatives, I am sure much has comeout of the period that was positive.
2	Should have more research.
3	I think many people would benefit from visiting places like Boscombe Down, if they could be opened up, just to get a better understanding of the things we were doing in the 50's and 60's to supposedly defend ourselves.

4	An example if how history gets distorted is current criticism of the nuclear bombing of Japan in WWII. Critics ignore the facts that substantially more people were killed in the fire bombings in Tokyo or several German cities as well as the millions of both Japanese and Allied people that would have been killed if Japan had been invaded. Unfortunately histories are rarely written by people who were there.
5	I cannot really see any circumstances where a war (hot or cold) is a good thing. The difficulty of stopping what we started in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that. Even so, some good does come out of it. Despite the pressure to make weaponizable discoveries, the cold war resulted in inventions and discoveries that are of peace time value.
6	I have been on several courses and read books on this subject and visited quite a few cold war sites while carrying out my work duties (I work for Thames water) around the countryside in wiltshire,gloucestershire, berkshire and oxfordshire, and also while on holiday, in fact you don't seem to be able to go anyware and not discover some kind of structure or site assosiated with the last war and the cold war, especially if you keep your eyes open. The sad fact is that a gould many of these sites are being just left to go to rack and ruin an will soon disapear altogether in no money or interest is afforded to them.
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	Not really.

12	Although still quite recent, the Cold War is slowly slipping from the collective memory. There is a danger that if not studied and recorded, structures will be lost and the reason they were built will be forgotten. We should not glorify the period, but rather remember it objectively and ensure that the paranoia of that era is never allowed to happen again.
13	I have found it an interesting subject and so has my nephew who had a cold war history session in his Junior school and quized both myself and brother on the subject
14	The cold war was the final act in the century long formation of the modern world and should be taught in an historical context alongside ww1 and ww2 and the rest of the skirmishes that filled the 20th century!
15	I never felt really concerned that the Russians would blow us to pieces, perhaps because I'm a natural optimist. I'm certainly more concerned that the insidious creep of religious fanaticism will destroy a largely tolerant and inherently generous British lifestyle.
16	Nuclear energy epitomises Man and his duality. A brilliant achievement. A source of unlimited power, set to release us from the dependence upon fossil fuels. Harnessed as a weapon and used to keep us alive comfortably, whilst simultaneously used to prevent further loss of life via deployment in Japan and as a future deterrent. Mutually Assured Destruction sums it up. A toy in Dystopia...
17	None at all
18	Nope not untill this survey, we loose sight of such important subjects/politics/economy etc when things are no longer 'news topics'
19	In the current era where most of warfare is of an asymmetric nature and the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely to occur, the continuation of an independent nuclear deterrence could be questioned. Deterrence relies on a rational approach to war fighting and those nations now developing nuclear weapons are unlikely to be rational; furthermore, it seems unlikely that the UK will ever embark on operations independently as opposed to in a coalition. Looking back at recent history, nuclear weapons do not seem to have deterred numerous countries in embarking in conflict with UK or her allies. Having said all that, the future is uncertain and abandonment now might be somewhat premature.

20	No, thank you. JL.
21	
22	No
23	It seems now that warfare/intelligence is aimed at the Middle East/China- these are seen as modern threats, rather than Russia etc...
24	A fascinating time where the world was held to ransom by the might of the superpower. It proves substantially that there is power in wealth. Through threat and fear we established peace? It worked...go figure
25	I am no expert on this subject - so these are my uninformed opinions! Most of the questions could trigger a six hour debate and clearly need further consideration. Bloody interesting subject, I should go and read some books!!
26	Growing up in the 1980s I felt the tail-end of the annimosity of the Cold War. It was confusing as a child - why did countries who fought together to beat Nazi Germany and Imperialist Japan turn so quickly on eachother? By 1989 and the fall of the Berlin wall It was obvious we were living through changing times (more so than the 1960s?).
27	
28	

29	Only that we are currently wasting a huge amount of money on an unnecessary nuclear deterrent, largely just so our politicians can feel important and retain a seat "at the top table" of world affairs.
30	People who did not live through it have no idea of the dread we lived in. Global warming with its threat of sea level rises over the next 100 years is nothing, we only had four minutes before we all got wiped out. That is a feeling I doubt archaeology will ever be able to recreate, unless we turn the world into a Cold War theme park and hand out big red buttons to people with extreme but opposed political views!
31	What a total waste of time and money it was, the only people who profited was the military/business in the states. The losers were Eastern Europe as the Russians tried to compete at their expense.
32	Objectivity, objectivity, objectivity
33	
34	Teaching just the Cold War would result in too short a view. Begin it earlier and include Collectivization and the Ukraine famine, the Terror, WWII, the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland, and Stalin's egotism and paranoia (we know too little about the mind of Stalin). Forget about convergence and the stance of the non-judgemental, make Timothy Snyder's Bloodlands staple reading, remember that the Cold War was worth winning, and that it was indeed won by the right side, Gorbachev's disclaimer notwithstanding.
35	
36	

37	It is probably obvious from my comments that I think discussion not warfare is the better option. 'Romantic' past warfare has recently been exposed as horrific by weapon and other studies. This is a good outcome. Two great uncles were killed in the First World War. The family stories and my great grandmother's grief have influenced ny views as has the fact that I had small children during the Cold War.
38	I'm a curatorial archaeologist: of course I feel strongly about this. Cold War studies are where WW2 studies were in the early 1980s, but no-one would now deny the importance of understanding the archaeology of WW2. Neither sets of monuments were ever used, but the reason I have never had to fight in a war is the existence of nuclear weapons and the Cold War (and human common sense).
39	Given the 'nasties' that were used in some of these installations [asbestos, chemicals etc] preserving and maintaining them might well be cheaper that a proper decomissioning process.
40	Are you familiar with the extensive historical and anthropological literature on the impact of Cold War policies on the funding of scientifiac and academic research in the United States? This sort of approach, which for the most part avoids concrete, seems a much more interesting line of enquiry to me. What impact did the Cold War have on modern conceptions of the Cold War itself?
41	I can see this is a bit of a thorny issue to some. In some ways, it would be fascinating for young people to learn about this as they could have first hand accounts from people involved which is a fantastic way to spark interest. On the other hand, a lot of "national secrets" are still "secret" in law because it's so recent. It is also something that would affect some people very personally in the same way as digging up WW2 sites is still painful for many - although we're not talking about the same scale regarding death and destruction - there were some dark moments and I can really understand some saying it's too soon to be doing research that may re-open old wounds. Additionally, there will be people that were directly involved that now have a new life and I can understand they might not want things raked up just now. Great care and sensitivity would need to be taken as we're talking about something that's within living memory with participants still alive and well today.
42	

43	I think the above covers most bases.
44	
45	
47	The cold war is a fascinating subject, many of the sites and artefacts that are remnants of that period in our history are being eroded or destroyed and need adequate recognition. Education, information, ownership, understanding these are all things that will help people value a unique part of our past.
48	
49	
50	
51	
52	I am a pacifist and I have no time for 1 and 2 ww stuff (a real yawn!) but I find the Cold War far more interesting - I don't know if that is because I lived through it or ???
53	I was forwarded this survey, never seen Part 1. I have just spent 7 minutes doing this and have no idea why, other than the pure fact that I loive OCld War architecture and bunkers and stuff.

54	Put 'From Yalta to Vietnam' on reading lists of not there already.
55	
56	
57	You seem to think that the Cold War is a hot potato? It happened, so get over it.
58	
59	Are we not currently in a cold war with Iran?
60	
61	

62	
63	I remember the day when my late father remarked upon the death of Stalin. I was six. Whatever the crimes of Stalin he had not forgotten that Hitler would not have been defeated without the military organisation and industrial production the Soviet system was able to command, and the heroism of the russian people. It was too late for our family which perished in the ghetto of Kaunas(Kovno). Too much weight is given to celebrating the victory of DDay and the allies, but the western front was only launched when the allies were getting worried that Stalin was getting too far into central Europe. Looking at the way victory was interpreted is an important precursor to studying the cold war and the attitudes that informed it.
64	
65	According to age concern 23,000 people die of the cold each year. In the next century that suggest that 2.3million people in Britain will die and early death due winter cold. There are been around 1million deaths due to motor cars (or is it 500,000). The cold war killed, how many? Global warming -- latest figures suggest that on the whole people have benefited from the slight warming seen in the 20th century. Evidence suggests that we are on the verge of a new Maunder Minimum ... in the 1690s during the last maunder minimum something like a quarter of Scotland's population died from cold. In the worst year on record, 2,300 people died from heat in the UK, and 23,000 across all Europe. Yet we live in a world that is terrified of getting a little bit warmer. More importantly, how will the public and politicians perceive the threat of a new Maunder Minimum. Like the cold war and global warming (and swine flu ... millennium bug) will these be blown up out of all proportion netting capitalist entrepreneurs (aka scamsters) billions. How do we stop the poor in Britian seeing ever rising fuel costs which undoubtedly kills, and stopping the rich raking in money from flogging scams to the public? Every scam has a core of truth surrounded by a sugar coating of hysteria. Only through careful historical research is it possible to detect this sugar coated layer of hysteria which the scamsters have and always will use, and only when the public are given the tools will they be able to stop future scams.
66	
67	The Cold War already feels like ancient history. It seems very strange that people were so afraid of 'the Bomb', something that seems so remote, when people get on with their daily lives with the current more likely possibility of suicide bombers in Britain. As a child I really wasn't aware there was any danger and even read books like 'When the Wind Blows' by Raymond Briggs and 'Z for Zachariah' (a rather dull set book in school) without connecting them with the idea of a nuclear disaster here.
68	I have managed cultural resources for the US Army since 1991 and immediately began to address Cold War sites. My email is joseph.murphey@us.army.mil. We developed a methodology for Cold War identification and assessment in the late 1990s.

69	The Cold War is commonly taught as a conflict between East and West, but the 'hot wars' within the Cold War might lead us to investigate otherwise...
70	I adore it and I wish I knew more. I see a beauty and majesty in these monuments, but I struggle to convey my enthusiasm of them to others who simply see a useless, ugly, decaying lump of concrete that would be better off in landfill. I'm particularly drawn to the paradox between their strength (i.e. the robust nature of the raw materials involved in their construction - concrete, steel, etc) and their fragility (through lack of maintenance, lack of modern uses, perceived ugliness, obselete purpose, etc).
71	The threat of nuclear annihilation did prey on me as a teenager (early 1970s) - then from it being done by error - now by terrorists or looney religious nuts (all religions), or by barmy leaders
72	Yes, but they are far too broad for a survey. I shall no doubt write another book.
73	I do believe that the Cold War was a defining moment in European history. A moment which has still an impact on the contemporary world. Therefore scholars should engage with it.
74	
75	The Cold War should not be treated as a 'closed period', it was the result of WW2 whilst many of the worlds current political and military conflicts have their roots in it. It has to be seen as a product of a very different world whilst being a strong influence on the current one.

76	
77	The cold war is a vitally important part opf our cultural heritage. It impacted on Europe in a dramatic way, and the subsequent instability in many parts of the world can be directly attributed to the vacuum left after the demise of the East/West standoff.
78	Yes, lots.
79	groups like owers need to be proactive and get the subject out there to the public and govermunts
80	You use the phrase Cold War as if it was well understood at the time with a beginning and an end. Maybe it had an end, but these were simply the conditions of life. Only since 1990 have we realised how stable were those conditions for 4 decades.
81	
82	
83	

84	My family lived near Aldermaston and close to Greenham Common; we joked that we did not fear a nuclear attack as we were so close to these major targets that we would not feel a thing - instant oblivion! It was a time of suspicion and fear; a necessary time, but one I am relieved is over.
85	The profile of the Volunteer Reserve Forces as part of our community is definitely worth of curricular inclusion.
86	
87	Tangentially, if we can expect some commemorative events soon for 1914/18 perhaps it's a good time to propose a project and attract funding as follow-on from the Defense of Britain survey. That could address preservation of some monuments and include (if not already done) some oral history.
88	
89	
90	I was a young boy living in Miami, FL, USA during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I remember the talk on the TV about what the effects from a missile attack would be. To me it sounded like the end of the world was coming. I remember the Civil Defense alerts on the TV and the radio. I remember the talk on TV, and the news stories about people building personal nuclear fallout shelters in their homes and backyards. The news went into great depth about just how difficult it would be to protect your family from either the blast or the fallout. And how they encouraged family drills anyway, just in case it happened. One of the local buildings mounted an air raid siren which they tested every Saturday at noon for two minutes. The sound seemed to come through the walls of our apartment when it went off. I remember the drills in school where we all go under our desk and kept our heads down. I remember thinking what a waste of effort that would be as the classroom was in an older building and had a wall of glass windows that would shatter and the glass would shred us. Latter they started moving us into the hallway during drills. I remember that I started to use the closet under the stairs as my play area. Looking back I would guess that that was my reaction to the fear that the news stories had caused me personally.

91	The more we learn from history the less likely, hopefully, is that we would make the same mistakes again.
92	the past starts here
93	
94	
95	
96	Russians would have won if they invaded before the 70s.
97	Not really...
98	
99	I believe that there is a lot of stuff that is not known about which also contributed to the cold war. Some events are not fully understood, such as the bay of pigs operation, where the CIA trained Cuban rebels to invade and kill Castro an ally of the Russians. However, the CIA knew they were outmanned and outgunned yet they sent the troops anyway with the risk of retaliation and this does not make sense to me.
100	

101	It was an expensive but worth while time as it protecdted our life style and caused advances in many fields
102	It has helped us further develop nuclear wepons but so long as lots of different countires have nuclear wepons then there will never be world piece and there will always be the need to be on standby for any eventuality.
103	This period of history definitely needs more attention as it is such a defining moment of world history.
104	The cold war was a very terbulant and important part of the 20th century that should be studied indepth, within schools and outside. I feel that looking into not only the facts and events, but also the ideoligy of both sides and the politics of diferent countries should be studied.
105	I find it a very interesting subject.
106	
107	No

108	
109	
110	No more thoughts. I presume you had filtered out your e-mail addresses to only send this to British nationals, because I imagine the opinions would vary greatly per nationality, even if they were living in Britain during this period.
111	The Cold War is kind of unique for "wars" in that not much actually happened. Compared to say the First and Second World Wars, where millions of died, the Cold War was a conflict of ideologies. That nothing much happened makes it harder to engage with as a period of history, despite the fact that the period saw the potential to wipe out billions of lives. Nevertheless, the remaining architecture sum up the prevailing political ambitions of the country during a certain period of time in the same way medieval castles do, for example. It's just not easy persuading people that Cold War remains have as much value.
112	

113	The Cold War is already the subject of an odd form of nostalgia, Soviet style memorabilia and tv documentaries that aesthetise the imagery of the period are becoming increasingly common in the west. Whilst there is nothing essentially wrong with any of this, it would be good to recognise just how frightening and bleak this period of human history was for many people at many times. Therefore, efforts to better understand that Cold War, to evaluate its legacy, may help to better highlight these far less "glamorous" moments that bring the essential tragedy of this period into relief.
114	It's an important period that needs to be kept in mind as the context for much of the latter half of the 20th century, particularly as some public discussions about events in that period (for example, US involvement in the Middle East) tend to forget that context and place those events in a vacuum.
115	I guess your questions might have been differently framed if all respondents were of my age group or older. 'Personal atitudes' to the Cold War were of course greatly influenced by living through it rather than hearing about it second-hand. Above all I think I remember people being genuinely very scared in the 1950s, 60s & early 70s. They had seen the effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and were terrified that the wrong hand on the button in USA or Russia might spell total conflagration for us all. I remember reading an article in a magazine one day which asked if there was anywhere in Britain you could live to avoid the risk of nuclear fallout if a British cold war establishment were targetted (remember we had all the USA airfields and listening stations as well as our own). They couldn't actually find anywhere as there were so many scattered around ! No use being in the Highlands as they built nuclear submarines near there; no use being in Wales as plenty of bases there; Aldermaston and Greenham glowing red in the south; Filingdales and Menwith up in Yorkshire; vast USA air bases in east Anglia and so on and so on....
116	I am surprised to find myself history.
117	Ultimately the Cold War was an expression of the opposition between Capitalism and Leninist Marxism. In terms of victory, Capitalism proved more economically powerful and able to overwhelm the USSR's industrial and scientific capabilities.
118	
119	None spring to mind.

120	
121	Only that we need to learn the lessons that the cold war has to teach us about the human condition and its propensity for self -destruction as well as for the most remarkable acts of self sacrifice and nobility.
122	
123	No
124	
125	

126	Not really
127	
128	I think the cold war is a highly interesting subject and I certainly enjoyed learning about it in GCSE history. I think It is important to learn about the history of humanity and the cold war is certainly a significant time period.
129	it is a very interesting section of history which I find was always under taught in school and not mentioned too often.
130	I find the subject truly fascinating however I studied history at school and never even touched on this subject.
131	
132	No.

133	In some respects this was a world-shaping struggle, the full ramifications of which we can probably not fully assess accurately. It must be an important study topic as it shaped the present political and economic world every bit as much as WW2.
134	
135	Study of the Cold War is a very important development and I wholeheartedly support the initiative
136	
137	
138	No
139	The name of this 'conflict' should be renamed The Cold Threat!
140	None
141	

142	I feel that all history should be taught, throughout history you can see blatantly obvious links between different time periods and civilisations which have helped the development of technologies, landscapes, architecture - the list goes on. Studying only one period of history or one event in history allows for the ability to go into detail however, it doesn't always allow for the inter-historical links to be taken into account and they could have a profound effect on interpretation.
143	I use the Cold War as an example of how we do our job as local authority historic environment officers - it is a brilliant vehicle for explaining that everything has a significance, but a lot of material can be recorded, rather than preserved. This is as true of the Bronze Age as it is of the Cold War. It also explains clearly why any post-medieval archaeology is significant: the disconnect between historic sources and personal experience is not always obvious, but (for example) it becomes very clear when comparing ROC bunkers with what ROC officers would have done in the event of an attack. One thing which has become clear, though, is that it is difficult to explain that significance to designation officers at Historic England...
144	
145	The cold war had the potential to and came very close to anhillation of the human race. It's mistakes should be analysed in great detail so as not to repeat them.
146	I'll give you more on this if required, sorry, I shouldn't have started this on a Saturday tea time.
147	Great to see you doing this work. Its amazing how quickly the Cold War has faded from our collective memory, and yet it underpins so much of today's politics.
148	my knowledge of the Cold War as a small child, my mother did stock pile food and spoke of needing a cellar, which we didn't have. The literature protect and survive is actually laughable, not in the light of knowledge and further information. The common person would most definately have perished.
149	As someone who was just 13 during the Cuba crisis it was a terrifying time , I would not like our grandchildren to have to live with the threat of a neuclear war hanging over them .

150	I remember going to a talk that included instructions to wash your curtains in some mixture with fire-retardant properties and similar instructions along with your stock piling baked beans under the stairs to hold out against a nuclear winter. As I and many others knew this was total nonsense and regarded such advice on the same level as Dad's Army depending the country. Most people would not survive without clean air and water even if surviving initial blast. Was astonished during year in US in 60s when people said weren't we worried as we were nearer Russia. I don't remember ever being really worried - too busy with small children
151	If you don't learn about history how can you learn from it and progress as a culture.
152	
153	
154	No
155	
156	The Cold War is under valued as a subject. Every initiative to place this important period within a wider understood context should be welcomed.

157	
158	
159	It should be taught that the whole thing was a waste of time, stress,money etc. it was politically motivated and remains so.
160	Is history repeating itself, but this time its North Korea ?
161	Becoming increasingly pacifist but we can't lie down in front of the people who aren't. They take our rational stance as weakness. I don't think we need Trident but keeping the subs unarmed is pretty silly. We've already got an aircraft carrier with no planes! I've no idea what we should do but current activities are very depressing.
162	
163	Only that I think you should promote this more to schools - how it effected us all we tested nuclear weapons with British soldier as witnesses as did the Japanese and Americans in the 50's our soldiers and families suffered as a result very little taught on this.
164	

165	
166	Not at present
167	
168	BRIXMIS was fun!
169	we need to learn the lessons that lead us constantly trying to kill other people and stop doing it.
170	
171	We are in danger of not learning anything from our past in terms of war.
172	
173	I have studied some aspects of the cold war both historical and archaeological and had familial contact via my father, also I have seen first hand both here and abroad the state that some of the cold war sites are being allowed to get into by neglect and vandalism. I think that some sites and artifacts need to be preserved for future peoples to visit and study so that they can make their own sense of it.
174	
175	The cold war was a major event, threatening the existence of our race.That its outcome did not result in hot war is a major triumph --although of course danger remains while nuclear weapons continue to exist.

176	
177	The predominant factor of the Cold War was fear in my experience. The war machine mentality of successive cash generating governments filtered belief & coerced one into reaction against a perceived enemy. How it went for the "other side" I have little knowledge however this was a part of it was it not? Suspension of belief, & perpetuation of negative fear.
178	No

APPENDIX 3 - ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS SURVEY RESPONSES

The following section comprises the responses made, via the internet, to the Royal Observer Corps survey prescribed during this project. Each section comprises two questions. The whole responses set is also provided as a spreadsheet in Appendix 4.

Entry Id	What made you want to join the Royal Observer Corps?	To which group did you belong?
ROC#1	I was in the TA in 1981 and felt it wasn't really me. I still wanted to serve my country and remembered having met someone who said he was in the ROC. I looked up the ROC and what I found out seemed interesting, so I applied to join	14 Group. Winchester
ROC#2	My initial interest was in aircraft and aircraft recognition. I later became interested in military strategy and cold war procedures.	10 Group ROC
ROC#3	A friend was a member and I was interested in aviation so I decided to join	11 then 11
ROC#4	I had just left the Army Cadets as an adult Sergeaqnt Instructor and was looking around for another volunteer job. I thought the work the ROC did was important in the event of an attack as we warn the population of dangers of nuke dust clouds as well as helping the Government forces.	10 Group
ROC#5	Being interested in aircraft and aviation from early childhhood Was a founder member of 781 squadron Air Training Corps and constant badgering from an ROC observer. Turned down from RAF aircrew with poor eyesight	11 Truro & 10 Exeter
ROC#6	My late father worked for Post Office Telephones at the start of WW2 and looked after phone communications for 24 Group, Gloucester. He joined the corps also. After he had completed war service in the Army he rejoined the corps. I joined in 1958 at age 15.	12 Group

ROC#7	Being Ex Royal Air Force i felt it was an interesting and woth while hobby to join .	At 1st 11 Group then 10Group
ROC#8	joined because my husband was in the corp and wanted to do something differant.	10 group
ROC#9	I joined in late 1962 with The Cold War at its height, the Cuban Crisis had only recently been resolved. I felt that I could contribute something without having to give up my job and join the services.	No 10 Group Exeter
ROC#10	I wanted to `do my bit` for the defence of our country. I was invited to join by the Leading Observer of Callington `C3` post. Later I changed jobs and went to Plymouth where I was attached to Plymstock post.	11 Group
ROC#11	My father was a long serving member so I was well aware of it having been on exercises since the age of three. At sixteen it was a source of pocket money and interest, the latter being my main reason for continued service as I moved around the country with education and work.	23,1,21,9,16,17
ROC#12	I left the army and some family connection to the ROC . Seemed like a good idea at the time.	21
ROC#13	Me and my four grammar school friends were 14 years of age and the local ROC post held their meetings in the town's RAFA club. It was thus the only place where we could drink pints of beer at least once a week. (The minimum age limit was 16, but nobody asked for birth certificates and we lied - so sue me!)	12 Group Bristol

ROC#14	I was sixteen and at school. I was looking for a new hobby and, moreover, I had been pressured by a parents to get a part time job. I didn't fancy any of the traditional schoolkid jobs i.e. shop work, newspaper delivery, etc. By chance, I saw an advert for the ROC in a local newspaper. I toured the HQ. It looked like interesting work; it appeared somewhat clandestine as I would have to sign Official Secrets Act, another pulling point was that it seemed vaguely connected to the RAF. Furthermore, I would meet lots of people, the commitment was one night a week and a few weekends, ... I got paid for it. I signed up immediately.	Bath HQ and a post in Birmingham
ROC#15	I wanted to do something to help the country plus I was interested in the armed forces.	"% Group Ayr
ROC#16	I joined ROC in 1976 when the Soviet Union was flexing its muscles and the future looked bleak. Because of my age (then 37) I doubted if I would be called-up for military service. One day whilst pondering on what to do I saw an article in The Daily Telegraph which featured the appointment od Air Cdr Howe as Commandant ROC. I was amazed as I assumed that the Corps had been stood-down in 1946. I applied to join was accepted and had the best 15 years of my life. I started as Post Observer and at stand-down in 1991 I had attained the rank of Observer Captain, Southern Area Commandant.	12Group ROC

ROC#17	Two reasons:- Friends and relations were members, therefore I had a basic interest in the organisaton. I had/ have a lifetime passion for aircraft and apart from the recognition aspect, I knew about the RAF visits and flights available to members of the Corps.	12 Group/ 22 Post
ROC#18	I was asked by my Daughter to take her to the H.Q.at Poltimore Exeter as she was intrested in joining, i was invited to stay for the evening she decided not to and i joined instead.	Exeter 10 Group
ROC#19	I had always had an interest in the RAF - father and uncle both served. One Saturday lunchtime, when I was 18, I saw a public information film on the television about the ROC. It seemed to have everything to attract me - links with the RAF, RAF blue uniform, important and secret role, also being a self contained organisation rather than a reserve of something else. The ROC was doing a vital job not done by anyone else and all performed by volunteers. I applied straight away, but because of lack of vacancies (probably a hang over from the 1968 cuts) I tried again the following year and was duly enrolled.	30 Post No. 2 Group Horsham.

ROC#20	Nuclear Physics was one of my specialities as a higher education lecturer and was alerted to the existence of the ROC through running in service courses for teachers on radioactive materials. At the time (1971), most ROC members found this subject "boring" - they were mainly aircraft recognition experts. I soon took on the job of post instructor to try to bring interest in radioactivity. I	8 Group Coventry
ROC#21	I served in the Royal Navy from 1959 – 73. On leaving I spent time studying and developing my civilian career, I then looked for a TAVR role as a spare time activity with purpose and the espirit de corps that I had experienced in the Armed Services. The ROC was mentioned by a former member when I was working on a project in Maidstone. At that stage I had never seen the ROC advertised or promoted, I enquired and declined to enrol on a Post as the duties did not seem challenging enough. I was then invited to visit the Control and as that demonstrated a more active range of duties I joined a Control Crew During my time in the Royal Navy (from the age of 16) I had been brought up on the concept of MAD (mutually assured destruction) as the best way to avoid a nuclear war. The ROC seemed to be the only line of defence and protection for the civil population if peace talks failed	No 1 Group Maidstone
ROC#22	Looking for an opportunity to serve in a worthwhile way following my National Service in REME. Interested in the Cold War and thought that we as a country should be prepared for an eventuality - luckily no war happened.	No. 5 group Watford then No. 7 Group Bedford
ROC#23	Dear Bob You may be interested in the work which I carried out to get Seaton Town Council/East Devon District Council to get a new road in Seaton, Devon, named Royal Observer Way. Work is still going on with and by Seaton Town Council to have a sign placed at the Seaton Down Hill picnic area which will include a reference to both an above and below ground post near to this area. Please contact me on my email irving.roberts@mypostoffice.co.uk should	5 and 7

	you be interested in learning more. Irving Roberts former member of the ROC	
ROC#24	My twin brother was a member and took me to an open night in Group HQ, after this visit I was interested in becoming a member and eventually joined as a Post Observer I was 17 years old .	25 GRP AYR
ROC#25	An interest in the secrecy surrounding the nation's defence, and a desire to become part of that system and "do my bit" should the worst ever happen. I was aware that the ROC existed (but not the UKWMO) before viewing an ROC stand at an RAF Stafford open day in the mid-1970s. As far as I remember, it was at that stand that I picked up the leaflet to enquire about joining the Corps.	16 Group, Shrewsbury and 15 Group, Lincoln before returning to 16 Group.
ROC#26	My uncle served in the ROC,he told me what they did.I was interested in planes and the RAF.On further research the idea of serving with a small group on a post attracted me and the thought fo helping the countyr	lincoln 15 group

ROC#27	Basically because I had always wanted to join the RAF, but in my day (the 1960s) girls "didn't do that sort of thing" and were steered towards nursing/teaching and the like. I saw a poster of people in RAF uniform and decided to give it a try. I thoroughly enjoyed the work and the challenge, as I had done nothing like that before, and it gave a very shy person a great deal of confidence to be treated as a valuable member of the Corps. When I was considering joining the Corps, I asked my father, who was ex-RAF and in favour of my joining the RAF, his opinion, and he encouraged me, saying that they had done a fine job during the war.	Oxford, Winchester & Bedford
ROC#28	Family connection. My father served in the war and I was interested from then.	16 Group. Shrewsbury
ROC#29	wanted to serve	24
ROC#30	I wanted to join the Royal Air Force - my father wouldn't let me. He didn't think it was a "proper" job for a young lady. I wasn't fit physically but I wanted to serve. I don't think I would have made the grade at that time, but a friend mentioned that he had seen the ROC and thought of me! I was 18. It was the best decision I ever made - I became independent, self reliant, confident and I made some of the best friends ever. I got to go to RAF Stations to train and I had the time of my life!	23 Group Durham

ROC#31	At the age of 15 (as the Corps' minimum age was in 1964) I had a straight choice between the Scouts and the Boys' Brigade and asked an ex-Boy's Brigader for his advice. I found he'd joined an organisation called the Royal Observer Corps, which, to my surprise, not only provided the uniform for free but actually paid you to attend, rather than requiring subs. To a young lad, whose only source of income was a paper round, it was a no-brainer, especially when, following the recent Cuban missile crisis, I'd come to expect a nuclear war within my lifetime and worked out that I'd rather spend it "underground" in an ROC control room, than in a Scout hut.	I joined 18 Group, Leeds in 1964 at their control in Yeadon and stayed there until it closed in October 1968. I then transferred to the group control of 20 Group, York, where I stayed until stand-down in September 1991.
ROC#32	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/
ROC#33	Russian Threat against UK Experience/training before enlisting to RAF as Air Prop Tech until Eurofighter idea was delayed so ended my career plan.	No.1 Grp HQ, 31 Post
ROC#34	At the time, I envisaged joining the Royal Air Force when old enough. My Mum suggested that we should all join the ROC as a family in order to give me a start in the military world. I also wanted to be involved in the defence of the country.	16 group and NRC Northwood

ROC#35	A friend persuaded me. I wanted to do my bit for my country, but did not want to join up full time for the armed services. I knew it would be good for my CV and career, as well as having a good social aspect.	Bristol Group Control
ROC#36	I intended to join the Royal Navy, from a careers talk at school ,however I didn't do that, which I always regretted, I happened to see an advert for the ROC, and felt it would be a worthwhile thing to do, as it was part time, and I was quite concerned about the Cold War.	23 group, Durham HQ
ROC#37	Just went along to find out more as she was interested	28 group dundee
ROC#38	Always associated (by relatives) withR A F. Interested over many years with military aircraft and when 'Cold war' was intensifying felt I needed to "do my bit"	16 crew 3
ROC#39	My mother was already a member	10 Group HQ
ROC#40	Friendship, curiosity (quarterly attendance payment also quite useful for a teenager) and enjoyment from the first meeting onwards. As understanding of the role of the corps dawned a sense of duty and community service developed.	Initially 22 Carlisle
ROC#41	A desire to do something, it was really a hobby initially and it was instigated by my college physics teacher.	Preston (21) Carlisle (22) Durham (23) Edinburgh(24)
ROC#42	I did a job at 10 group hq and could see the benefits.	10 group
ROC#43	Failed to get into the RAF	07 Bedford Crew 1

ROC#44	As an ex-WRAF it was a way to get back in uniform.	HQ 15 Group
ROC#45	I was ribbing a warning officer about that he was going to Doom watch and it was a bunch of nonsence. He told me to come a long and see what was what. He said he would take me to the warning team meeting and a ROC meeting. I went to both, being 22 at the time I found the warning team stuffy and too old but was so warmly welcomed by the ROC group that I decided to go to the Intext exercise that following weekend. I was so amased and joined up.	13 group SWA
ROC#46	I wanted to do something to serve the country. I had a passion for military aviation and was in the Air Cadets at school. My eyesight prevented me from joining the RAF so part-time service in the ROC was a good alternative.	10 Group Exeter
ROC#47	After my RAF service ended, and my reserve commitment was completed, I needed a hobby or at least something of interest to do. My manager at the time was a member of the Corps and invited me along to one of the meetings. It just so happened that they were having a 'Quiz' night in preparation for their annual Master Test. What I realised was that 90% of the questions asked, I actually knew the answer too. The reason being that whilst in the RAF I was in Air Defence and the ROC was as you might say the final customers of the Air Defence Network. So I joined.	9 Group Yeovil
ROC#48	Family tie and looking for a useful spare time occupation.	17
ROC#49	Parents would not let me join army or Navy and I could join ROC at 17 without their permission.	31Gp Belfast
ROC#50	I would have liked to join the WRAF but my father didn't approve so I went into engineering and I (think - 1964) I applied to an advert. I visited the Coventry Group HQ, which was a fairly recently built sub-surface building and was shown round by Jack Matthews, my soon to be Crew Officer. Half-way round I decided it probably wasn't for me; too complicated and very little to do with the aircraft in which I was interested BUT for some reason I don't understand I found myself signing on the dotted line one of the best things I have done - 30+ good years and a husband.	8gp(COV) & 2gp(HOR)

ROC#51	through friends speaking about it though it was a worth while organisation to look into 23 years later still thought the same	22 group
ROC#52	My aunt had been in for many years and i went along to see what she did and i joined for something to do for myself for a break from the family one night a week ..	23 group 41 post
ROC#53	I was taken to an open night in AYR 25 Grp HQ by my twin brother who had joined the ROC [Post]. After seeing HQ I decided I was interested in joining ROC.	25 Grp AYR
ROC#54	Friends were in and so was my father.	3 Group Crew one
ROC#55	I grew up in the 70's/80's under the 'shadow of the bomb'. I did not like the thought that a foreign power could take everything away from the UK at the touch of a button as simplistic as that sounds. I found out about the the ROC having read a book called 'War Plan UK' and their role during a nuclear attack. I decided that I wanted to do something that would help to protect the country and my family and friends, should the unthinkable happen. It may seem niieve but I believed I was doing the right thing.	No 2 Group (Horsham) - The best :)
ROC#56	I wanted a worthwhile hobby, after Scouts, and was unable, for health reasons, to join the TA. A friend of my father's was in the ROC, and arranged for me to visit the North Wales HQ. I loved what I saw, and joined immediately.	17 Group, North Wales

ROC#57	To serve and help protect our nation while it was a risk	28 Group Dundee
ROC#58	My uncle was in the ROC. after chatting to him I decided to join.I liked the links to the RAF	15 Group

Entry Id	Could you describe some of the duties you undertook during your time in the ROC?	What would you say was the greatest advance made in the equipment used during your time in the Corps?
ROC#1	Underground Post duties: Not in any particular order. These comprised of monitoring the various instruments we had which could record a Nuclear blast and Fallout etc., Making the relevant report via the landline, filling out the appropriate form. Changing the GZI papers, sounding the air raid warning and fallout alarms (in theory only; we never actually sounded them). Mobile monitoring by car in the surrounding countryside. Using the generator set to charge the batteries.	Radiation monitoring equipment. When i joined in 1982 we still used monitors designed in the 1950s. Within a couple of years we had very modern lightweight and easy to use equipment. Interestingly, these monitors still look modern now, 30 years later.
ROC#2	Initially I worked on a post carrying out the aircraft role then when the Corps went nuclear I carried out the nuclear role on several posts. For a time I also worked in a nuclear Control (Ops Room) and was the Duty Officer. Latterly I was the team Officer at a nuclear reporting cell, later an NBC Cell.	The greatest advance was undoubtedly the Message Switch located at Group Controls. This allowed all manner of different routings for messages to pass around the ROC/UKWMO network. A smaller advance was the introduction of radios at some posts to enable information to be passed even if the telphone nectwork broke down.
ROC#3	I learnt to use ROC equipment ie BPI,GZi, FSM etc. I took part in regular exercises dealing with nuclear war scenarios.	Very little|! Radios were introduced at a late stage and a much improved FSM and FSM trainer were provided.
ROC#4	Observing and judging hieght of clouds and wind direction. Telephoning that information on to Master Post(I think).	I was only in the Corps for one year.1990 to stand down 1991.

ROC# 5	Joined as an Observer in 1954. Promoted to L/Obs in 1956 to become Post Instructor just in time to begin instruction for new UKWMO role. Knowledge of chemistry & physics helped enormously. Continued as C/Obs in same role Admin done by L/Obs. Continued Post's deep interest in aircraft and aircraft recognition Organized trips to Farnborough air shows and other international events. Encouraged local organizations to visit post. Organised air experience flights from RAF St Mawgan,and glider flights with ATC. Set and presented Plymouth and Cornwall aircraft recognition tests 1960-90. Hosted various units from RAF St Mawgan	The introduction of Radiac instruments following the rudimentary equipment used for the aircraft reporting role
ROC# 6	Gloucester ops room was a secondary training base only and all personnel travelled to other groups, (Bristol, Oxford, Yeovil, Truro) for live exercises. In my service time the aircraft reporting roll had all but finished and I was only involved on the nuclear side of things.	Teleprinters replacing speech between groups.
ROC# 7	All under gound post duties	Introduction of the teletalk
ROC# 8	all duties including training the rest of the crew as Leading Observer.	Tele talk
ROC# 9	My job took me around the country relocating each time. So I spent time on Posts and the Group controls. I was also attached to ADOC and NRC later to become NBC when we were refered to as "Specials" as we were attached direct to the Military. Duties on Group controls were varied from being Post plotter to the Triangulation team which pinpointed where a nuclear device had gone off based on information supplied from the Posts. Also logging the radiation readings and recording the "hot" spots. At ADOC we would advise of the threat of attack and await any confirmation of attack which would come up through the system initiating at the posts. At NRCs we would advise our "customer" of the attack and give information as to where the radiation was liking to go and at what strenth.	Telephonic communications improved and the use of Data transfer by Teleprinter.

ROC# 10	We were in continuous training during the 14 years I served. In 1959 we were still concerned with Aircraft recognition as well as Nuclear side. The aircraft was later dropped when we were concerned with nuclear attack detection	Radio
ROC# 11	All Control room duties (plotting, telling, traingulation, keyboard operations) in both the telephone and message switch eras. All aspects of post operation. Plotting and other duties at ADOC (ROC cell there).	Introduction of Message Switch.
ROC# 12	I mainly help man a post with 6 others . Main duties included Meta Bravo reports , Coms with GHQ , Mobile monitoring. As well as taking my basic test .	The Swiss air filter system that never happened.
ROC# 13	Post Observer 12/K2 Penarth Post Observer 12/F2 Llanishen/Lisvane Group Staff Officer (Obs Lt) 22 Gp Carlisle Group Staff Officer (Obs Lt) 31 Gp Belfast Deputy Group Commandant (Obs Lt Cdr) 16 Gp Shrewsbury Operations Training Officer (Obs Lt Cdr) HQROC Personnel Services Officer (Obs Lt Cdr) HQROC	Introduction of Message Switch (MSX) digital data-transfer and SX2000 EMP-hardened countrywide vox communications in the 1980s
ROC# 14	At HQ: -communicating with posts -recording data from different posts -working alongside members of the warning team -helping to map fallout patterns -running messages for commander -miscellaneous duties -attending training In posts: -monitoring instruments -recording date -reporting to HQ -attending training	I cannot comment as I was not aware of any development in equipment.
ROC# 15	I started off as an Observer on a post and then quickly moved to Leading Observer, Chief Observer and then to a Group Officer responsible for 5 posts.	The improvement is communications from the old teletalk to a much more efficient system. In addition the comms at headquarters from the use of tapes to VDU's greatly increased efficiency.

ROC# 16	As a Post member I undertook nuclear intrumentation and meteorolgical observations. Weekly winter training was undertaken in Maindy Barracks, Cardiff and in the spring Summer and Autumn I attended the Post on a weekly basis to help with Post maintenance, There were three major NATO excercises during the year when the Post had to be fully manned to play-out the excercise scenario. I became a Group Officer in charge of a Cluster of five Posts in the East Glamorgan and Gwent area. This involved recruitment, the supervision of training, admin and man management. I was advanced to Observer Commander as Group Commandant 12 Group and was responsible for 31 Posts and the undergound Group/ Sector Control at Lansdowne. My last advancement was to Observer Captain as Southern Area Commandant and was the head of five groups, 130 Posts and an establishment of 2500 Observers. My job was to ensure the Area's morale was maintained, the training was uptodate, the officers were efficiently doing their job and that Southern Area was in a fit and proper state to provide the necessary service to HMG. I also had the privilege of presenting the ROC Medal and Clasp to qualifying members.	For the Posts the introduction of the PDRM to replace the old mechanical Fixed Servey Meter and, had the programme had been rolled out nationally, the introduction of 'Lowe' Post ventilation equipment. The Group Controls had all their old punched tape comms system replaced by an electronic message switching system similar to the current email system. All Nuclear data and messages could be routed and re-routed around the UK to avoid any damaged area.

ROC# 17	i was an ordinary Observer rank in our post but I eventually had responsibility as a crew leader. The crew leader helped with induction and settling in of new members; also during exercises organised duty rotas during our shift and made the hand-over report to the relief crew.	Undoubtedly the main advances were in the means of communicating. Better telephonic equipment was installed during the mid 1980s. Updated general warning receivers were introduced in the late 80s. Training and major monitoring equipment (or devices??) remained strangely primitive but we were assured that they were effective. Radiation monitoring equipment was also improving by Stand-Down. Post comfort and ventilation was never good, we did many self-help projects to get around this. Also, personal radiation protection was never properly considered or issued. Our Post team was very lucky because our meeting/ training room was sited inside an RAF Station which was shared by Special Forces personnel, they took an interest in us and provided equipment and training well above and beyond that provided in the Corps' Standard Operating Procedures; our whole post team had CBW Suits.
ROC# 18	I took part in most of the duties and as a leading observer i was responsible for training in all departments.	I would say that the introduction of the computer for communications, it was far in advance of the telephone and ticker-tape i used when i joined but we still retained the underground telephone lines because of the electromagnetic pulse caused by a nuclear attack.
ROC# 19	Everything involved as a post Observer, Leading Observer/Post Instructor and Chief Observer/Head Observer. For details please see ROC Training Manual - not room here !	I think the most important to a post was the improvement in communications when the private wires were installed and the teletalk replaced by the loudspeaker telephone. The radio was available so infrequently that I never received the full benefit from it. What should have been vital to post was ventilation pumps. My post was involved in most of the testing and proving of the Luwa pump. It was amply proved that without forced ventilation the carbon dioxide levels would have made the posts uninhabitable in a shutdown situation. Really everything stood or fell on this and it was scandalously neglected. Mention should be made here of Obs Commander Roy Bent

		who was the driving force behind the need for forced ventilation.
ROC# 20	Observer on post, then post instructor. Promoted to Group Officer (Obs .Off, then Obs Lt) in 1975. Responsible for the organisation and training of personnel in five posts and also instructional duties at annual training camps and weekend courses	Simplified instruments (radiation meters etc) and better communications although radio sets which actually worked only came in just before stand-down
ROC# 21	Observer 1980 - 82 Post Display Plotter BPI Plotter Triangulation Feeder Triangulator Group Information Orderly Group Information VDU Operator Log Chart Teller Log Chart Plotter Display A Teller Display A Plotter Display B Teller Display B Plotter Display E & T Teller Display E & T Plotter NB Tote Teller NB Tote Plotter Data Orderly Warning Key Board Operator Leading Observer 1982 - 85 Post Supervisor Triangulation Supervisor Data Supervisor Operations Table Supervisor Chief Observer 1985 Display Supervisor Group Information Supervisor Observer Officer & Observer Lieutenant 1986 – 91 Duty Officer Administration Officer	Introduction of the Message Switch and the SX2000 exchange. The later allowed contact with all Groups and removed the blockage on information at Sector Control

ROC# 22	Served on Great Offley post as an Observer, Leading Observer and then Chief Observer. Later become a Group Officer in No. 7 Group.	When Offley Post become a radio (master) post. And had a electic generator, mechanically petrol operated, for charging the post battery.
ROC# 23	Post observer and later group officer in charge of six posts.	Will discuss.
ROC# 24	Started as Post Observer becoming a Post Instructor until 1991 Stand down when I transferred as an Observer to local NRC until their stand down in 1995	Introduction of tele printers in GRP HQ,S upgrading of Post communications and radiac instruments
ROC# 25	I started on an underground monitoring post in 1976. This was 35 post (F1 post) in 16 Group at Market Drayton. I then moved (c.1979) to Nottinghamshire and was a member of a nuclear reporting cell (I believe it was one of two NRCs in 15 Group) at RAF Bawtry on the Nottinghamshire/Yorkshire border. Upon returning to live near Stafford (c.1981), I persuaded the officers at 16 Group to allow me to join the group control at Shrewsbury (despite the long travelling distance) as this work was more akin to the role I had been trained in at the NRC. They were reluctant at first, as the idea was to have people serving near to their place of residence (and there were several monitoring posts a lot nearer than Shrewsbury Group Control) - however, they agreed to allow me to serve at Shrewsbury on Crew 3. For the monitoring post, duties involved all those associated with posts apart from those performed by the Leading and Chief Observer. At the NRC our team performed functions which were a combination of plotting nuclear bursts (and associated fallout plumes) and some of the duties which would have been carried out by the UKWMO warning teams had we been at an ROC control rather than an RAF control room. In a nutshell, we were receiving information from the ROC control at	My later years were at Group Control, so I can't comment on the advances made in the equipment at monitoring posts. As far as the control was concerned, I would say the replacement of the punched tape machines and teleprinters with VDUs and dot matrix printers, and the replacement of the telephone switchboard (with cord and plugs) with a computerised system. This technology was introduced some ten years after similar systems had become available commercially; I believe the delay may have been owing to both expense and the need to make the sensitive electronics resistant to the effects of the EMP (electro magnetic pulse) generated by nuclear weapons.

	Lincoln, interpreting it, and providing reports and advice to the control at RAF Bawtry. Within the Group Control at Shrewsbury I trained in practically every job, especially Post Display Plotting, Triangulation, Display A and B plotting and Switchboard operating. Some of the other jobs involved a knowledge of the air conditioning plant operation and the complexities of the communications centre (originally on "torn tape", later on VDUs). I was promoted to Leading observer and then trained others in the Traffic Centre, particularly the computerized Message Switching system that had by then been introduced. The jobs were so diverse; I can always give more information if you need it - please feel free to e-mail: m.kenzie@tesco.net.	
ROC# 26	As part of the crew manning Lincoln 17 post Roxton.As an Observer then as Leading Observer and finally Chief Observer.I was then promoted To Observer Officer in charge of 5 monitoring posts	I served the last 8-9 years of the ROC there wasn't much change in equipement.The new WB1400 was a big improvement,not having to listen to the old one ticking away.
ROC# 27	Initially I worked in 3 Gp Oxford Group Control, and in time, learned all the non-supervisory jobs. I was promoted Leading Obs, and later Chief Obs on Crew 3. On promotion I became a Group Officer in 14 Gp Winchester, with responsibility for four posts adjacent to Reading. Two years later I applied for and was appointed to the post of Group Commandant, 7 Gp Bedford, where I remained until stand down in 1991.	Although somewhat unpopular at the time, it would have to be the message switching, which raised the technology from teleprinters to what began to look like computers.
ROC# 28	Triangulation Supervisor Display Supervisor. (Leading Observer)	The use of main frame computers.

ROC# 29	post obs met reporting and radio	the food
ROC# 30	Initially I was trained on all aspects of the crew. Post Display Operator - taking radio messages from the posts at regular intervals. Telephonist - learning to use the archiac, even then, switchboard - but I am proud to say that I mastered it when some could not and could still use it today! Display board marker - where you had to learn to write backwards so that the Ops room staff could read all bomb messages as they were written. Comms room - where initially all messages were sent and received by telex tape - punched holes in tape - latterly by fledgling computers!! Triangulating the post information given by radio on a main board up on the balcony so that others could use the information for a safe passage through our geographical area. Going outside (sometimes in chemical/biological suits) to check these instruments and change papers etc., look at the weather for the wind direction etc., and then after all that, each crew had to do their turn with the cooking and the plant room maintenance. It was great!!!!	computers. We went from telex tape that was punched holes, then written information to computers - made a big difference.

ROC# 31	Throughout my 27 years with the Corps, I remained a member of a control crew, first as an Observer, undertaking all non-supervisory roles, before becoming a Triangulation Supervisor, with the rank of Chief Observer in 1972. I then became Group Information Supervisor when the post was created during a reorganisation, with the additional roles of crew training and later, assistant to the Crew Officer. I was promoted to Crew Officer in 1982, with the operation role of Duty Officer and peacetime duties of managing, supporting, training and motivating a control crew of a couple of dozen volunteers. A role I undertook until stand-down in 1991.	Without doubt, the greatest advance was the Corps' evolution away from purely manual "telling" and recording of information to the "information technology" we take for granted these days, as brought about by the Corps' adoption of the Message Switch for the input, dissemination and storage of its data and messages.
ROC# 32	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/
ROC# 33	Post Maintenance. Intelligence gathering/reporting Participating in regular training/exercises. Exam tests Radio/Comms operator Installing equipment above ground i.e GZI	Better comms/radar equipment at time Corps was stood down.
ROC# 34	Undertook Observer duties at my post (56 post) during weekly meetings and exercises. Attended Summer camps at RAF Scampton.	The change from aircraft recognition to the nuclear priorities and communications

ROC# 35	As a C/obs I was a trainer during weekly meetings, and a supervisor during operations. I did every job an observer, L/Obs and C/Obs could have done.	I'm not sure if the newer technology actually improved efficiency or reliability. The replacement of punched paper tape for data transmission was probably the best at operations rooms.
ROC# 36	At HQ, we all trained as Post display plotters, receiving information from the posts, regarding, bomb bursts, they were plotted by the triangulation team, and recorded on displays, fallout readings were also received from the posts, and plotted on displays, and log charts, I was a display B plotter, mainly, which was a local area map. The log charts were in a graph, the information was shared between groups.	When we had computer terminals installed, and a newer switchboard
ROC# 37	mobile monitoring reporting on exercise changing gzi papers weather reporting charging batteries and any other duties asked of us.	Not much changed in my time
ROC# 38	Group H Q logging of post supplied info for plotters.	Clearer communications
ROC# 39	Plotting nuclear fallout during exercises, maintaining info boards	No idea - only served 2 years before joining WRAF
ROC# 40	Centre duties, Observer, promotion to C/Obs (triangulation) then Crew Officer. Promotion to Group Commandant and then Area Commandant (Western Area)	Communication systems
ROC# 41	Initially I was control room Observer, I manned the post comms, worked in the data centre, plotted on the displays. I then moved with work and became a Post observer, I undertook all roles in the post, reading the FSM and reporting to Control, changing GZI papers etc. I then moved back to the control as the day job changed. I was quick promoted to Data supervisor, and eventually I applied for an officer role, I was successful and became a Group officer in charge of a cluster of posts. The natural inclination after a year or so was to become a full time officer, so i applied and was successful becoming a Group Staff Officer at 23Grp ROC Durham, I was responsible for the facilities management of all the building, training of all personnel and organising Group training sessions for	Communications equipment we moved from old tickertape telex type machines to state of the art hard wired comms. Even the radios used by master posts were quite good for their day.

	the NCO's and officers in specific tasks. Eventually I was again promoted to Observer Lieutenant Commander and posted to 24 Grp Edinburgh as Deputy Group Commandant. responsible for the day to day operation capability of the whole group and its TTW effectiveness	
ROC# 42	Fire/security also on camp , everything that was needed for training and on exercise from manning the comms to the posts to making tea.j	Not upgrading from electromechanical to electronics for communication , which would have been highly suscepical to EMP.
ROC# 43	General duties in the Grp HQ inc security fire marshal	Computerisation of the message switching and data handling
ROC# 44	A bit of everything	Teleprinters
ROC# 45	Display A & B plotter, Dislay A & B Teller. Post display plotter (AT a push, disliked that job) some trianglation.	It went computerised,
ROC# 46	My time in the Corps was spent on a post. My duties were standard post observer work monitoring the post instruments etc.	Telecommonications.
ROC# 47	During the course of my service with the Corps, I managed to cover all the tasks that were associated with a Group Control. Post Display Plotter, Triangulation Centre, Comms Centre, Switchboard. Display A, B & E Plotters. Not only as an Observer but also as a supervisor and eventually ended up as Crew Officer. When the UKWMO were short of bodies I also stood in as part of the Warning Team. If the crunch had come, I was Duty Officer designate due to my proximity to Group Control.	The updating of the Radiac Survey equipment, and the introduction of the SX2000 communications equipment which did away with the necessity of the PBX1A switchboard.

ROC# 48	Triangulation, display superior at Group HQ. Reached the rank of Chief Observer so a lot of administration and training duties.	Replacing punch tape with computers.
ROC# 49	All Observers were Post Display Plotters in communication with 3 - 6 posts. As a Leading Observer I was in communication with all posts in our group. In my role as a Chief Observer I was a Triangulation Supervisor and pinpointed, as accurately as possible, where the bomb bursts had exploded. Most observers were also Long Range Board Plotters, plotting bursts on screens for the scientists to translate	The move to VDUs
ROC# 50	Started at COV as Obs plotting on the Main Table, a mix of aircraft and Nuclear plotting also Long Range Board, plotted fallout on log charts. Promoted L/Obs Floor Supervisor, C/Obs Triangulation Supervisor - calculating position,power,height of burst, Assistant Duty Controller. Appointed Crew Officer running crew of 5 NCOs & 30/40 Obs. Moved to HOR appointed Obs on a Post acting as 2 or 3 Observer. Appointed Obs at Northwood NRC initially plotting data on reverse of transparent screen, Appointed L/Obs calculating wind triangles from Met data and drawing these on front of screen to show fallout. Appointed NRC Officer responsible for 3 NCO's and 15-20 Obs. Appointed Obs at NRC in Portsmouth dockyard learning the new NBCC duties. Appointed Crew Officer till stand-down.	There were so many changes over my 30 years, it was probably a bit like 'dads army' in the early days (and arguably) more enjoyable, with pretty basic equipment. Communication and equipment improved but the majority of the work relied very much on manual telling and plotting. Living/survival changes such as air-conditioning etc in HQ buildings, investigations into ventilation equipment for posts, ration packs etc. I am not sure I can separate 1 individual item. I will say that the techniques we had to go 'back' to when the main body of the Corps stood-down were worrying - no remote instruments all done by visual inspection!!
ROC# 51	ops room post controller ,triangulation supervisor. plus other jobs as and when required. OBS officer posts then crew officer group HQ	the use of computers in the ops room
ROC# 52	I wasn't in long before ROC was disbanded so i was still learning. I took part in training days at the post where i manned the radio, set up the equipment and took readings from the GZI .	I wasn't in long enough to notice any advancements.
ROC# 53	Started as Post Observer then promoted to Post Instructor L/OBS. 1991 Stand Down I transferred to NBC/NRC .	Introduction of new radiac instruiments and PW Lines for better communications.

ROC# 54	Triangulation Team	Equipment with Civilian Standard Batteries.
ROC# 55	1. Monitoring radiation levels 2. Monitoring the BPI (Blast Pressure Indicator) 3. Changing the GZI papers (Ground Zero Indicator) 4. Changing water in the post 5. Charging the batteries 6. Decorating the post so it looked spic and span! 7. Undergoing lots of training and drills 8. Taking part in national and local exercises 9. Going on camp (Fabulous experience) 10. Visiting the Luftmeldakorpset in Denmark (There was a fantastic relationship with these guys and it is worth exploring in your thesis). 11. Monitoring and reporting the weather 12. Aircraft recognition training 13. Reporting diplomatic number plates on cars	Nothing really changed during my short time in the Corps
ROC# 56	Basic Observer duties, such as Post Display Plotter, Displays A & B Plotting, Teleprinter Operator, Displays A & B Telling. In fact, every Observer position. Progressed through the ranks to Chief Observer, and was Training new Recruits, and experienced Observers. At Stand Down, I was the Traffic Supervisor, on Crew 3.	Most certainly, the introduction of the Message Switch (MSX). Communication between Group & Sector Controls was almost instantaneous - dependent upon the transfer speeds through BT Lines, and did not rely on outdated punched tape machinery.
ROC# 57	Basic training and instruction including during NATO exercises , annual Camps (1988 & 1990) mobile monitoring , basic Post maintenance , taking part in annual Master Test.	Radiac Survey Meter
ROC# 58	After 9 months I was promoted to Leading Observer Whose duties were Post instructor.Later on I was promoted to Chief Observer carrying out the admin for the post. I was a Group Officer at stand down with the rank of Observer Officer.	I was on on a Post the equipement was quit basic.I would say the updated Carrier Receiver would be the best. We didn't have to listen to the constant ticking sound of the old one.

Entry Id	If the 'balloon had gone up' how do you think you would have coped knowing everyone you held dear could be in grave danger?	What were your feelings towards members of the peace movements such as CND?	How long did you serve in the Corps? Please indicate your first and last year i.e. 1976-1987.
ROC #1	With difficulty. It was something we all discussed, but none of of us could honestly say what we would do. We weren't subject to Military law so I think some desertion would have occurred.	Well intentioned and sincere but, out of touch with reality. Surprisingly most members of the ROC I knew had quite a bit of sympathy with their cause but, not their methods.	1982 - 1991
ROC #2	I honestly thought that the best way I could help my family in time of a nuclear war was to man my ROC place of work and carry out the role for which I had been trained. I was an officer and I never doubted that I could not cope with the pressures that would have arisen.	I thought they were misguided but respected their different beliefs. I very much thought they were wrong in resorting, at times, to physical violence to put their beliefs over to the public and the government of the day. For example CND set fire to more than one ROC post.	1953 -1995
ROC #3	This was discussed at times and arrangements for families of those on duty would be implemented by other post members. However nothing formal had been decided.	No animosity was felt, in fact it would have been good if nuclear weapons had been abandoned.	1966-1995
ROC #4	I am a loner and would not have bothered too much about my sisters or parents.As a member of ROC I would have had a short life anyway.If no nuclear threat to us we were meant to go out and look for hazadous areas and then report back.We had no NBC suites or masks.	I believed they were backed by the USSR and that they did not realise that we were there to warn the local population as well as the Government.	1990-1991
ROC #5	I am sure that the majority would have agreed to man the post. Those not at the post on Attack Warning Red would have been aware of the beast method of protection for their families individually and collectively	MY PERSONAL opinion is that every individual has the right to have and express his/her own belief. I think that the CND were mistaken in its beliefs and I supported the actions of the British government in having a nuclear detterant but I bore the CND no animosity	1954-1990

ROC #6	Can't really say but would have done my best to cope.	Pardon my French - A load of w***ers!!	1958 - 1976
ROC #7	This question I always asked my self,probally i would have stayed	Not a lot	1963 1991
ROC #8	my immediat family was also in the corp	they were very nieeve with their heads in the sand	1978-1991
ROC #9	It would have been difficult. I would not be able to do anything about the what was to happen, but I was hopeful that we could mitigate some of the effects by being able to warn people of the threat.	I felt they were deluded and the 2nd World War was partially caused through not standing up to an aggressor at an earlier stage. I felt the USSR was aggressive and wished to dominate the whole of Europe and CND were doing just what Chamberlain had done in theThirties which was appeasement. That hadn't worked.	1962-1995
ROC #10	I was very much aware of what was at stake.I had discused the possibilities with my wife who agreed with me that what I was doing and should go and do my duty to protect others Yes, I was prepared.	CND members annoyed me, I am sure some were paid to cause trouble. When `non-nuclear` tests were being carried out near my home in early 60`s , CND `protesters` were staying at the same hotel as the MOD police.	1059-1973
ROC #11	With a great deal of difficulty, especially after I married and had children.	Ambivalence. They were entitled to their view. The biggest concern I ever had was that they would obtain entry to a post and then refuse to leave.	1963-1991
ROC #12	I think I would have put it to the back of my mind , carried on with the job in hand . As i said earlier I'd just left the army and my mind set was almost unaware of the realish threat. O that and being young . However the reaction to the little letter,MARKED HQ 21 GROUP .Royal Observer Corps. Transition to War - To be opened on Receipt of Activation Message. Went do rather less favorablely with close family, friend couldnt get there heads around that little one.	By the nature of our job and what we were up to. To say we had the same goal would be to far from the truth. The only thing was we couldnt tell them what we were up to , They didn't understand .	1990-standdown 1991

ROC #13	As part of Transition to War strategic planning I had always made local arrangements for my wife and children to be in the safest possible location with a supply of water and food.	Totally benign feelings mixed with mild amusement at some of their naive misconceptions. On one occasion during a weekend exercise in Northern Ireland I was dispatched to a monitoring post that was besieged by a throng of CND protestors. While talking to them the post hatch swung open and they all flung themselves to the ground, apparently convinced that a missile was about to be launched from the 'silo'.	28 years service (1963 - 1991)
ROC #14	Both my parents had been in the army. My father worked for the MOD. We discussed the possibility of nuclear attack and what preparations could made against nuclear fallout in the house. I would have no doubt coped like any other young person. The ROC quanitfied and measured the unthinkable but it did teach me not to be afraid. I understood that people could survive even with very basic anti-fallout precautions.	At school, we had a cohort of teachers who promoted CND. We also had CND protests at the Bath HQ when we had weekend long exercises. I found many of the pro-CND teachers to be career activists, many were bullies and all seemed incapable of understanding with US-Soviet realpolitik nor of presenting an objective viewpoint. For this reason, I never disclosed my ROC work to classmates or teachers.	1982 -1989
ROC #15	This was a major concern however I felt that what we were training for would be of great value to both the military and civilian authorities.	While I respected their views I found it most annoying when they targeted posts and damaged our facilities.	1972-1991
ROC #16	I laid contingency plans with my wife who ensured our larder held three weeks supply of food at all times. In the garage were empty plastic water containers which would be filled at the first signs of the 'balloon going up.' Neighbours, friends and family members were briefed to provide mutual support. That was all that could be expected. As a Senior Officer my major concern was how many Observers would report for duty and how many would have to be reported to the Police	I held no strong anti-feelings towards them, until they started to interfere with my Observers duty. Stupid acts like Supergluing locks to stop access to Posts, breaking fences and even breaking into and ransacking Posts.This was very demoralising to my Volunteers who took great pride in their Posts. As Group Commandant 12 Group I took the bull by the horns and in 1988 I arranged an Open Day for the public. I knew the CND would turn-up and they did, in force. They took the conducted tour throughout the Control building and we impressed our visitors on the life saving tasks that with which we were charged. We showed them that we were not the warmongers they thought we were. Towards the	1976 - 1991

		end of a very successful Open Day the CND contingent made a 'sit down' protest in front of the admin office. I took the opportunity to thank them for visiting us but mentioned that at 5.30pm we would be locking the high security gates and going to our homes. At 5.25pm they arose en masse and trooped out of the gate like lambs, bless em! I subsequently was at pains to explain to the CND people that we were there in case some idiot started a Nuclear war, were the Nuclear ambulance or fire engine, hopefully never to be used but there just in case. They had no answer to that other than nuclear disarmament.	
ROC #17	Few of us truly believed that there would be a need to call us to active service despite the stupidity of the Regan/ Thatcher attitudes, most of us saw the end of the proper "threat" as being after the 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis was resolved. Our Post had a team plan based on using some of our homes, close to the post and clear of the town area. This would provide collective shelter for our immediate families.... We never did make a test run of the plan nor did we (or at least I did not) tell our families about this.	Most of us had no issues or problems with such organisations. Our hope was that we need never have to properly exercise our skills; so did CND, etc. but at a far more fundamental level. During exercises our post was picketed by a local peace organisation on occasions. I was quite happy to chat about our status as being a local point of information and help and not being a military organisation, also my belief that we would never likely be used in reality seemed to help. I think uniforms were a misleading aspect of our purpose. The only time we had any issue with protesters was when one of my colleagues stood at the entrance to the post and made loud suggestions about the women needing to be home to cook dinner for their husbands. This was not well received and caused an hour's worth of noisy protest. For other reasons, this member did not last long in the Corps.	1981 to stand down.

ROC #18	It was something i think we were concerned about, but if the worst came i think i would have responded as this is what i had trained for.	The Peace movements we encounterd at the H.Q. at Exeter unfortunately did not understand what we were about ,some of them thought we held nuclear weapons in the building, at times we allowed members in to explain our roll in the defence of the Country.	1983-1991
ROC #19	It was a duty I had signed up for. I could help more by doing that duty.	Unprintable. They attacked and vandalised my post. To have 20 or 30 people shouting 'Warmonger' at me was not a nice experience. After all our training we were under no illusion as to the effects of nuclear war. We hoped our work would help to mitigate them by giving people warning. The CND were attacking the wrong target. We probably hated the thought of nuclear war every bit as much as them, but we were doing something practical about it.	1971 - 1987
ROC #20	Hopefully would have been more forewarned of need for fallout room etc at home and hence able to obtain materials needed. This problem made publications such as "Protect and Survive" rather unrealistic once made public. Can picture the queues at B & Q	Tried to convince them that they were unrealistic - multilateral nuclear disarmament yes, unilateral no. Objected to their vandalism before exercises - eg. superglue in padlocks. Pleased to have taken part in a school debate about nuclear disarmament - opposite a local CND activist. Wiped the floor with him !!	1971 to 1991 (stand-down)
ROC #21	It was an improvement on the Royal Navy as at least you were near home. You would know from the Display A & B plots the level of danger	They didn't appreciate that we were not an armed service. We had a similar objective of avoiding a nuclear war. I could not understand the "Better Red than dead" mentality	1980 - 1991
ROC #22	As a group officer I would have a duty to serve. Being single it would have helped.	Some were sincere in their beliefs, others I guess were politically motivated.	1965 - 1978
ROC #23	Will discuss	Ambivolent.	1965-1978
ROC #24	This was always the question know one really liked having to answer . My view was being trained to help provide warnings to the general Public as part of UKWMO could only help . Thankfully the Cold War	Being in a democratic country everyone has the right to protest but did not agree with CND tactics when damage etc was carried out on ROC Posts , Controls etc .	1963 -- 1995

	preparations never got made operational.		
ROC #25	Not having been in the Corps during the Cuban Missile Crisis, I had never given this a lot of thought. I got married in 1988 and my wife immediately joined the ROC in order that we wouldn't be separated in a war situation. As for the rest of my family, I would have prayed that the role I was performing would be of help in assisting their survival. This is a particularly difficult question to answer - it is almost impossible to know what feelings I would have had during a war, and whether these would have had a detrimental effect on my operational abilities.	I was in sympathy with the CND, but believed that unilateral disarmanent was not the way to avoid conflict. As long as the US Air Force was based here and we were supplying intelligence to the USA, the UK would have been targeted by the Eastern Bloc whether we had nuclear weapons of our own or not. Morally I am a pacifist, but realistically I believe in the strong defence of our nation. I consider the present conflicts we are involved in (i.e. in the Middle East) as "overstepping the mark" in defending the UK despite the reasons given for our forces being sent there.	1976 - 1991
ROC #26	It would have been difficult.On our Post we tried to arrange a system where we would have moved the families concerned to other observer's houses.	Misguided fools.They injured people in our Group.We weren't armed.I think they were just trouble makers and by some of their actions weren' t a peace movement	1979-1987
ROC #27	I may not have coped particularly well emotionally, but I think that the training would have enabled me to set an example to others and to continue to do my job. That's what my parents' generation did during the Second World War, when serving personnel were losing families and homes during the blitz. Although on a different level, I believe that people with a sense of duty would have reacted in the same way, and their family members who remembered the war would have expected it.	Misguided! Minority and pressure groups always have a point, but they don't always look at the big picture, and tend to emphasise only a part of the overall scenario.	1975-1991
ROC #28	I really don't know. Was always a worry.	Felt they were misguided but did not feel any antipathy towards them.	1980 - 1991
ROC #29	YES	each to there own	1981 - 1991

ROC #30	I have thought about this long and hard and many times. Different when just you and hubby and the rest of the extended family - but when I had my son, Dec 1990, that first exercise in the spring was a bummer. My husband would have been deployed to Germany as British Army of the Rhine and I would have been called into the Durham HQ - my mum and dad would have had our son, I think I would have gone, knowing he was in safe hands and I would have told them what to do so far as I could. Always on the look out foor good "hiding places"!!!!!	Hmmh. Durham is a university city and therefore attracts "causes". I was disturbed that the leader of CND was a member of the clergy. We reguarly had "protesters" outside our Group HQ. I remember, shortly after I had joined, that our Obs Cmdr being really exasperated with these people, who thought that we were harbouring all the "toffs and theirs" in our bunker. I was a runner that day and was requested to bring in a delegation to let them see who was working in the bunker and our conditions. Suffice it to say we did not have any further bother with CND after that!	1980 - 1991
ROC #31	During my early years with the Corps, I was a single lad and had resigned myself to it being a straight choice between the Corps or call-up to the armed services in the event of hostilities. As both options carried the requirement to leave any loved ones at home, I had no issues turning up for duty with the Corps, especially as by so doing I would be working to warn the civilian population (and hence my own loved ones) of the after effects of any nuclear exchange. I also believed that by demonstrating that the country was preparing and training for the aftermath of a nuclear attack, I might in some small way be helping to reduce that threat by demonstrating to any potential enemy that my country was taking the matter seriously I then met my wife through the Corps (there were six married couples who had met in the Corps in my crew at one time or another) and knowing that she too had a place “in the bunker” removed any concerns I may subsequently have had on that score. After having children, there was a time when some comfort was found in knowing that the control had plans for how and where to house the crews’	Our county’s demonstration of its nuclear preparedness, through organisations such as the ROC, was an essential part of our nuclear defences and as such will have given second thoughts to any aggressor who sought to take-out or take-over “America’s Aircraft Carrier” and may have helped to deter the USSR’s expansion of its “Finlandisation” of Europe. In peacetime, the ROC had no operational role, being instead merely a training unit, preparing civilian volunteers to provide an essential service during wartime. However, by demonstrating that the UK was preparing and training for nuclear war, the Corps was nevertheless part of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and as such thought by some peace activists to be almost as legitimate a target as the nuclear weapons themselves. Despite this association, I viewed the peace movements’ actions against us as misguided and misinformed and would have preferred it if they had seen our organisation as some form of insurance, were their well-intentioned efforts to fail. Alas it was not to be and their attitude towards us was a distraction we could have done better without.	27 years, man and boy. 1964-1991

	families communally, though by that time, the world had moved on and, coupled with the knowledge I has assimilated in my time in the Corps, I thought nuclear war to far less likely. Eventually the children were of an age when they could join the Corps in their own right, and indeed one of them managed just that shortly before stand-down. You must also appreciate that although all Corps members were expected to do there bit in the event of an emergency, the controls and posts were to be operated on a shift system during the run-up to a nuclear exchange and it would be whichever team was in the building at the time of hostilities that would be "locked-down" for the duration. It was therefore not impossible that, despite all the years of training, I could find myself on the wrong side of the steel door and have to spend Armageddon at home.		
ROC #32	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/	
ROC #33	Lots of factors to consider and safe survival still viable depending on location, i felt just as vulnerable as them in a nuclear bunker. I was too young 16/17 years okd to worry about family.	I felt that they were right to protest, until the chain of threat is broken peace cannot proceed. It helped the peace process and public views.	89-91
ROC #34	My mum and sister would have been with me in the bunker. I would have been concerned about friends and other people, but would have done my duty as required. I grew up with the constant threat of a nuclear strike and accepted that it may happen	Well meaning, but blinkered, pacifists who seemed to refuse to understand that the defence of our country could include necessary conflict. I went on to join the police instead of the RAF and had lots of contact with Greenpeace and CND. They refused to see that the world was not nice and fluffy and that	1983-1985

	and we would just have to deal with it.	sometimes, maintaining a strong armed presence would give the UK an advantage should we have to enter a theatre of war	
ROC #35	By doing our job properly we were giving everyone else a better chance of surviving. Most friends, family and the public preferred to not think about it or prepare for it.	I had no problem with their beliefs.	1976-1991
ROC #36	Very badly, I think, knowing your family was in danger outside, we were told approximately 40 per cent would report for duty, I was hoping my children would be older, and I would have persuaded them to join too, there were several crew members who were parents and their adult children on my crew.	I thought they were very naive, if not well meaning, I could see their point of view, but I didn't agree with it, I think nuclear disarmament would make us very weak, I see them as a deterrent, a necessary evil.	1984 -1991
ROC #37	I was told they would be looked after	Didn't worry about them, thought they were will informed	1981 1991
ROC #38	very debatable. We had training on this and lots of all weekend 'lock-down' exercises	idiots but entitled to their point of view as long as not interfering with me or family	1978 - 1982
ROC #39	Yes - my mother and sisters were all members	None	1978 - 1980
ROC #40	Honest answer! Not sure as final duty station some 100 miles from home. Plans made but?	Supportive of the aims of MUTUAL disarmament but frustrated by the simplistic approach of most members and angry and contemptuous of the violent minority.	1964-1972 and 1975-1991
ROC #41	I would have done my duty as expected, most corps members would have done the same, the Group control was over manned in that it could operate effectively with 1.5 crews instead of the peacetime 3 crews, it was an expectation that the crews not in the control would look after an advise the families of those that were inside to enhance their chance of survival, Post crews operated in a similar way.	My personal feeling were that we hoped they were successful in their campaigns, I felt we were on the same side, just perhaps going about things in a different way. I don’t think I met a Corps member who hoped to do the job for real.	1972 - 1992
ROC #42	With great difficulty but would have.	Misguided but good intentions.	1974-1990

ROC #43	Good question to be honest I don't know as I didn't have to do it for real. In reality probably not very well. Always wondered how many would stay during the run up to war. Do not know what I would have done	Had no issue with them.	mid to late 90 to stand down
ROC #44	To be frank would never have left my children.	Have always been pro CND	1980-1981
ROC #45	At the time I had no children so I was ok with it.	I was very anti nuclear warfare and was in sympathy before I joined. Once I had an understanding of the corps, I felt they were uninformed.	1987-1991
ROC #46	It would have been very difficult to leave loved ones but both my wife and father-in-law had served in the ROC. They understood that I'd do my duty so that took a lot of the potential pressure off me.	Somewhat contemptuous. I felt that they were too idealistic with little sense of the practical. Nuclear disarmament would have been wonderful if every nation did so but that was never going to happen. Unilateral disarmament would not have made us any safer.	1977 - 1991
ROC #47	Not sure, I was asked on my promotion board whether I would turn out if a nuclear war started. I said that I hoped that I would, but could not give a guarantee. I also asked them the same question, but received no answer. I was a little lucky that towards the end of the ROC era, my wife was also a member which made the decision a little easier.	As long as they demonstrated peacefully I had no animosity towards them. I did not agree with CND, but applauded all movements associated with world peace.	1973 - 1991
ROC #48	Always felt anxious about this but never felt that the nuclear button would be pushed by either side!	They had the right to their point of view! We only came into contact with them once and things were amicable.	1980 -1991
ROC #49	Having been asked this in an earlier course I said I would volunter but life changes like marriage and babies changed my opinions. It was therefore suggested that I could have a role similar to that of an ARP and give advice to civilians in my local area.	I totally disagreed with them. I think they had less knowledge than they thought. We were doing a job and I think we better understood the implications than they did.	c1968 until c1991 25 years

ROC #50	Personally this would have changed over the years, early on I wouldn't have had a doubt about going, it would have been very difficult looking at the display seeing where the bombs/fallout were, but it would have been too late then. Later when I had children then I wouldn't have been able to leave as my husband was also ROC.	Disillusioned - but most of them were peacefully protesting because they felt impotent, there was nothing else they could do. Very few had any idea what the ROC were about, they thought the posts were huge underground bunkers for privileged people. Of course there were the fanatics, some posts had super glue poured into the locks etc. and some were regularly picketed.	1964 - 1995
ROC #51	my wife and son were also in the ROC and the other members of my family were 100 % behind me and knew the ROC had the ability to save many	they had the right to there opinion as I was mine	1965 to1987
ROC #52	I don't think I would have coped very well, as i would have wanted to stay with my children.. But i do think i would have done my stint to the best of my ability.	I agreed with the principal, but was not at all sure the practicalities, I didnt like the idea of nuclear war, but i also understand the need for some kind of deterrent.	1989-1991
ROC #53	Our training tried to help you realise that the ROC role could help if attack was made on UK . This helped .	UK is a democratic country so CND /peace movements allowed to operate but did not agree if they broke the law.	1963 to 1995
ROC #54	Difficult but my father said to just get on with it and be professional. Not an easy option.	Kept quiet about being in the ROC at Work. though know of people who were assaulted spat at had damage done to vehicles etc	1976- 1988
ROC #55	I felt that if I wasn't doing what I was doing in the Corps they would have less chance of survival. I had arranged a plan with my immediate family that would maximise their chances of survival should the 'balloon had gone up'. I still have dreams/nightmares about nuclear attack and the consequences it might have on my family and friends.	We wanted the same things as them, that being that nuclear war never happened. They protested against it to influence political decision; we formed part of the deterrent against it. Two approaches to reach the same goal.	87-89
ROC #56	I think I would have coped. I was trained by great Instructors, who left us in no doubt as to what would be happening outside the Control.	They had their own opinions - most very misguided. Our Officers, when they could, allowed us to invite these groups to the Control, to educate and inform them of our Role. Most of them left with a changed attitude.	1970-1991

ROC #57	As best I could, at least with my training I would be able to assist somehow in their safety, by providing information on property protection & water & food storage , advising on not leaving property until ALL CLEAR on Radiation fall-out contamination 22 days after last Nuclear Blast.	It was felt at the time that C.N.D did not understand the R.O.C role in U.K defence role, and as such "They" felt that we (The R.O.C) were an enemy. I had heard stories of C.N.D pouring petrol & such items down our bunkers when personnel were inside & on duty and threatening the Crew to set the bunker & them on fire. These stories may have been propaganda against C.N.D but it totally changed my former opinion of C.N.D being a friendly organisation.	1986-1991
ROC #58	It would have been difficult but we had a plan where all the families would look after each other.	Mis-guided fools	1982-1991 standdown

Entry Id	Were you serving at the time of the stand down? If you were, what were your thoughts on the way it was conducted (be as frank as you like)?	Are you, or did you ever consider joining an ROC association? Please give reasons why you did or did not join.	Finally, do you think the role of the ROC should be taught in schools, and if so why?
ROC #1	I had resigned 5 months earlier, so just missed it ! Frankly, I wasn't surprised. The reason I left was because for the last two years or so I felt we were being slowly wound down. Exercises were cut short, promised new equipment never materialized etc., plus a general feeling that we were not really required anymore.	I joined the ROCA a few years ago but didn't renew my membership last year as no-one would ever contact me to advise when the next meeting was being held. This made me feel unwelcome so I left.	Why not. It was an integral part of this country's defence forces, albeit in a passive role. It proved vital in 1940 and would, I'm sure have been just as vital if war had broken out with the USSR in the 50s,60s, 70s or 80s.
ROC #2	Yes, I was serving at the 1991 and 1995 stand downs. I thought the 1991 stand down was handled very badly. Many observers had no inkling of stand down and the first they saw of it was on Ceefax. Many thought that all their volunteer effort was not appreciated. The 1995 stand down was handled much better and although NBC training had gone very well, many members of the NRCs were not surprised when stand down came.	I joined the ROCA in 1991 on general stand down. I joined because I wanted to continue in some form the 'espirit-de-corps', friendship and interests, which I found existed in the ROC and I thought this would be continued in the ROCA. I was right !	The ROC was always a very secretive organisation and the general public knew very little of its work. Now some 20 years post stand down, the ROC is better known largely because there is great interest in the Cold War. I think the role of the ROC should be taught in schools but only in the overall context of WW2 and the Cold War. The important role of the

			Corps in WW2 is often completely overlooked and knowledge of this should be spread more widely.
ROC #3	Yes I was serving. I do not think it could have been conducted in any other way. I do feel however that the posts should have been retained on a care and maintenance basis as who knows what might happen in the future.	I joined ROCA to keep in touch with ROC friends.	Yes it should be taught as part of the history of this country.
ROC #4	I was shocked.	I joined the ROCA initialy because last time they were disbanded and later reformed they had no record of previous members.I thought that by being a member of the association, if the Corps was reformed again I could rejoin.I have now been in the association for 20 years.	Yes.To highlight its work with radar and the RAF during the war and to educate them about the once secret cold war organisations and bunkers.
ROC #5	No I had retired in May 1990 having derved since 1954 and having gained the Commandant ROC commendation. It was probably a co incidence that the ROC stood down within a year of my retiirement. The actual stand down was somewhat inconsiderate.The ROC was cast aside like a worn out boot	I am a member of ROCA Truro branch and enjoy the company of those who speak the same language although I did not join until I came to Fowey to live. Our branch is lively and well supported with some very interested topics mostly from in house and i have been able to contribute from myphotographic collection and aviation knowledge	Most certainly. The younger generation should have a much wider knowledge of British history and especially of the people who have contributed so much to that history which uas allowed them to live in the free and relatively rich environment which so many take for granted 36752 Denis Ellery
ROC #6	No.	I joined 12 Group ROCA on the day it was formed becoming Treasurer and Membership Secretary. On moving to Cornwall in 1990's joined 10 Group ROCA.	Yes, it should be mentioned as children should be aware that there were other organisations as well as the Home Guard.
ROC #7	Yes ,a bit shocked but thought it would come anyway	i am in the Royal Observer Corps association.	Not really

		companionship with the rest of ex observers	
ROC #8	yes. disgusted by the way it was announced to the nation before tell the members first.	I Have joined. and started our own branch in our area with the help of my husband who has since died. I am still the hon sec for our branch	I think we should get a mention as part of the countries past history.
ROC #9	I was serving at the time in 1991 and the NRCs continued until 1995 whilst the Corps as such had stood down.We continued to wear the uniform and as such I have to confess to being somewhat confused as there seemed to me to be a mixed message of the threat has gone but maybe it hasn't.	I have joined a ROCA group. It is a means to keep in touch with others members and have a get together. The ROC was always a medium in which you met new people and we did have our get togethers then.	I think the whole Cold War and how it came about should be taught in schools and the part which the ROC played in the 2nd World War and would have played had the disaster happened.
ROC #10	NO	I am a member of ROCA. It is only in the last 4 years that I found the ROCA existed.	Yes, sadly ancient or modern history are not being taught widely in our schools. Its all about `Dont mention the War`,that was old hat. The cold war was a real theat,it could happen again. Hitler,Stalin, the Cold war, is more important than Oliver Cromwell.
ROC #11	I still think the politicians sold the Corps down the river. Having said that the standown was conducted well by the fulltimers even though they were loosing their occupations. My only remaining niggle is that we were locked out of our own control immediately the announcement was made - hardly a show of trust to loyal volunteers.	Yes but I didn't. For me it was all over with Standown and I went on to join the RN Auxilliary Service for three years until it too was disbanded.	Yes it should be mentioned in the overall context of voluntary service and the extent and role of the organisation created both for WW2 and the Cold War, but I don't think the ROC is a major topic.

ROC #12	Yes i was serving at the time , It came a bit out of the blue. even thou 12 months earlier I'd had a conversation on the day Berlin wall had come down saying it was going to cost jobs. As it stands the goverment is worried about a nuclear threat , limited to small dirty bombs . If only now they had re-deployed us into some other job then there would have been more know how about, in the current climate. At the time the navy were after ex observers . then that department went out the window . So you could keep in the same line of work anywhere.	Yes I am a member of ROCA. I lapsed for about 10yrs but having stopped what I was doing I realised I was part of somthing that never got much recognition anywhere , I be as young as i am it help me after leaving the Corps to move on into thing i couldn't have got into other wise. Now the MOD , Fighter Command and the Home Office want little to do with ex members , the therefore its up to us to look after our own . The ROCA does that and Educates as well.	Of course it should . If people were going to help protect others , threw a shadowie part of UK history and the Second World War then it need to be added in the classes. Museums need to show more. ie Imperal war museum north . How can anybody not no about somthing that has remained hidden from view for years , and offered a service to all around but never took any glory and praise in the later years except by being stood down .
ROC #13	Headquarters Royal Observer Corps. As Personnel Services Officer I was i/c Human Resources involved in placing all wholetime staff in alternate employment with other government departments or organising redundancy/retirement courses. My private feelings were of a deep personal loss of a cherished lifetime vocation and losing contact with so many close friends and colleagues.	I have been a fully paid up member of the 16 Gp Shrewsbury chapter of the ROC Association since the association was first formed in 1986	Without doubt. It was a totally unique organisation that melded volunteer civilians into a disciplined, proficient and dedicated body that could hold its own against any professional military force and would have provided the population of the UK with its best possible chance of survival in the event of nuclear conflict. Unsung and barely acknowledged throughout its 70 year existance, there has never been another organisation quite like it anywhere in the world. Former Obs Lt Cdr Adrian Angove adrian_angove@btinternet.com
ROC #14	I was working abroad when the ROC stood down. I was sent a newspaper cutting by my father to let me know that the ROC had ended. I instinctively understood it has to be shut down as there was no need to retain a cold war service (albeit it a cheap one). Beyond that, I cannot comment.	I would be happy to join one - I enjoyed my time with the ROC. I had the privilege of working with retired commanders who had been active in World War Two and who were superb models of people management and efficiency. I also worked	I think it should only be taught if it fits into the syllabus and context.. The only context I could see is the Cold War and UK preparation for nuclear attack. I don't think you would need to teach about the ROC outside of a

		with many people from very different backgrounds. I have fond memories of the ROC.	definitive historical context and syllabus.
ROC #15	I was very saddened at stand down and felt let down by the government of the day who cast us aside without any attempt to devise a new role for the Corps. I understand the difficulty that HQ ROC was placed under as regards the secrecy surounding stand down.	I am a full member of the ROC Associa tion and have been active in promoting the Corps and our Association through displays, events etc.	I feel that the Cold War era has been a fairly neglected area and should be more widely known. This obviously includes the vital role played by the Corps during the Cold War but equally their role in the defence of Britain during World War Two should also be highlighted
ROC #16	Yes I was Southern Area Commandant at the time of stand-down and had the very sad task of saying an official good-bye to 2500 Observers. There were tears and tantrums galore. The RAF did its best to find an alternative task for us they even sent two Wing Commanders on a fact finding tour of the country to listen to ideas. As Senior Officer it was very difficult to maintain morale as rumour swept the Corps. But the plain fact was there was no new role for the ROC that the UK Government wanted to fund. I know that the way the news of the stand down was announced in Parliament and to the nation by a embargoed CEEFAX message was deeply resented by Observers who thought each one should have notified by personal letter. An impractical task but you try telling that to an Observer who spent twenty years on ROC service. On reflection I think we made the best of an emotional,	As Group Commandant 12 Group in 1985 I was charged by Air Cdr Horrocks Commandant ROC to start a 12 Group ROCA which I did and I made sure that I had membership number is No1, which I still have, i am now Chairman of Cardiff & Newport Branch	The role of the ROC could be taught in schools as an example of the big society, where 12000 UK citizens volunteered to undertake a difficult and dangerous task for the service of the country. The role of the ROC and why and when would have to be explained to the pupils who might find it strange that there was no pay (except for the small cardre of full-time officers, I was by the way a volunteer) and only limited travelling expenses. The free uniform and an annual week at an RAF Camp for extra training plus the great and lasting camaraderie were the only perks. However in contrast to our current highly materialistic world the esprit de corps was fantastic, people loved being in the ROC despite everything and that is why there was so much adverse reaction to stand-

	distasteful but necessary decision.		down, ROC members took it very personally.
ROC #17	I was shocked by the speed of notice and action over the enacting of the stand-down of the Corps. The puzzlement of even full-time officers who did not know or understand what was happening served only to increase feelings of resentment and uselessness. I felt as if I was being scrapped.	Our local post cluster quickly established a continuing series of meetings as social and learning history events but soon some of us took on a role in the process of local monitoring of background radiation levels for the local authority Emergency Planning Officer.We formed a branch of ROCA very quickly and I remain in the organisation.	I definately feel that the ROC should be included in the teaching of recent history. It was a feature of 20th century warfare that Ordinary Civilian people in our countries became direct victims or in some industries, targets of interest. The Observer Corps was founded in response to bombing raids of WWI and developed as a civilian organisation (albeit under military administration) which had a very important role in WWII. This role survived the growth of technical sophistication which began in the late 1950s and became adapted to the threat to civilian populations posed by nuclear weaponry. We survived the disbanding of the Civil Defence Corps and other similar organisations, thriving until the 1990 stand-down. I believe that the ROC stands as the last organisation of civilian

			volunteers which had a role in modern warfare. Our current military is very sophisticated, highly trained and service needs are beyond the capacity of volunteer conscripts. The ROC was skilled and trained in a set of unusual and remarkable activities which bridged the military and civilian services and as such is the last of the true volunteer Civil Defence Services. Modern history teaches about the experiences of participants or observers of events from a personal perspective and the role of civil volunteers is one which is more relevant to the range of experience or expectation of any citizen. This alone makes the knowledge of the Corps important. The fact that ordinary people had and were prepared for a role in nuclear warfare is exceptional and important, that knowledge must not be allowed to fade. I was a Cold War Warrior and proud of it! Best wishes with your project, Bob. Regards, John MacNaughton
ROC #18	From what i understod it was decided by the Ministry at the end of the Cold War to stand down members of the R.A.F.as uniformed members attached to the R.A.F i think we fitted the bill instead of front line troops.	Yes i did join the association i made a lot of frends in the corps and did not want to loose touch with them, i am serving as the Chairman of Exeter Group and if i can help in any way please call me on Exeter 01382 438956.	Yes i do as it was an essential part of the defence of the Country during the second World War.

ROC #19	Not serving then, but friends told me it was not well handled and left an unpleasant taste. Glad that all my memories were very happy ones.	Was a member for about 20 years, but left because of distance to events. Also the feeling that old times cannot be recreated especially as almost all of my old friends have since died.	Yes, as part of the traditional British volunteer ethic which, apart from 'Dads Army' seems to be generally unknown.
ROC #20	Yes. Think that the UK Government was optimistic in the view that the World was a much safer place. Suspect that saving money was the main reason. For a short time, it was planned to replace us with some spherical automatic direction finding pressure gauges which were to be installed nationwide (described by me in an article for the ROC Journal under the title "A Load of Balls". System had two drawback - it didn't seem to distinguish between air bursts and ground bursts and. I'm told was found not to work at all !!	Am Secretary and programme planner for a section of the Coventry ROCA. Also a member of AEROC. My view of the national ROCA is that it is too concerned with formalities, constitutions etc which are of little interest/concern to most foermer members of the ROC	Yes. I have visited one school in Cheshire to give my talk "From zeppelins to ballistic missiles - a history of the ROC and regularly give the talk in my area to groups such as RBL, Probus, Round Table etc
ROC #21	Abysmal – I read about it in the Daily Telegraph before being told officially. I had to answer questions from my Crew without any briefing. The anger was dissipated by the Royal Review at RAF Bentley Priory. I may be biased as I was the Officer selected to receive the new Royal Banner from Her Majesty the Queen	In No 1 Group all serving Officers joined in order to set up the Group ROC Association Branches. As such I was 01/007, the seventh member in No 1 Group. I am currently the Group Chairman. (I am also the Deputy Chairman and Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the ROC Benevolent Fund)	Yes • The Cold War was a significant period in our history that has shaped the current political situation in Europe • The role that volunteers can play in the community • Duty to your fellow citizens is an integral part of a civilised society • Chernobyl taught us that borders are no protection against nuclear fallout. We need to plan for nuclear accidents and possibly a foreign war where nuclear weapons are used. We need to prepare for every eventuality • Negotiations require a position of strength and conviction. Appeasement will always lead to a worsening position • MAD (Mutually

			Assured Destruction) that prevented attack during the Cold War holds no fear for some as demonstrated by suicide bombers • The ROC was one of the first classless groupings that I had encountered. On my Crew I had a lorry driver and an analytical chemist who enjoyed ach others company on a training evening. They would never have met in any other circumstance. Each tended to gravitate to tasks in which they excelled and respected the skills the other could demonstrate. • The Annual Training Camps drew personnel from across the whole of the UK. Breaking many misconceptions that may have been inbred (such as a North/South divide) If you wish to ask further questions than please do not hesitate to contact me Eur Ing Terry R A Giles BSc BA MSc CEng HonFCIBSE FIMechE MBIFM 120 Perry Hall Road Orpington Kent BR6 0EF Telephone 01689 839031 email terryrgiles@btconnect.com
ROC #22	No	Joined ROCA in the 1990s I think, can't be sure of the date. Still a member. Currently aiming to get the ROC recognised in Seaton, Devon. Have had some success in getting a road named 'Royal Observer Way', Other recognition of former below-ground post.	Yes. before the very valuable service of the volunteers is forgotten. To emphasise the volunteer spirit to serve the country.

ROC #23	No	Am a member.	Will discuss.
ROC #24	Found out from Newspaper before receiving official confirmation . Could have been handled a lot better . Think the stand down method made a lot of long term members of the Corps decide to having nothing more to do with it or its Association .	Joined before stan down in 1991 and have been active in Association ever since .	Yes as the Cold War is part of modern history and in 2012 young people are astounded when they hear the number of adults who were willing to join a voluntary organisation like the ROC and serve the Queen and Country .
ROC #25	I was serving at stand down. I remember writing to Paddy Ashdown asking him if something could be done to reverse the decision - it should be remembered that Iraq at that time was building a "super gun" with a range said to encompass Paris. I thought it was very premature to stand the Corps down so soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Taking into consideration the investment during the 1980s in upgrading the monitoring equipment and communications within the Corps and the insignificant annual costs of running the UKWMO/ROC compared with the armed services, made people question just what was behind the government's thinking. Kenneth Baker as Home Secretary had, in the ROC, a large body of volunteers who would have welcomed the chance to retrain in whatever role was appropriate for the changes in our defence structure. The way in which the government handled the stand down (i.e. suggesting that if anyone was interested, then we could always join the ATC or a new home defence	I joined 16 Group ROCA at about the time the Corps was stood down. The ROCA had been established a few years earlier to enable social contact to be maintained with retired members. I joined so that I could meet up several times a year with my friends from the ROC, otherwise I would probably have lost contact altogether given that I lived a long way from the group control and most of those manning the control lived in Shrewsbury or surrounding villages.	Not specifically the ROC, but the financial, political and logistical problems faced in defending this country during a cold war should certainly be taught. It is almost impossible to discuss this subject without the UKWMO and ROC being mentioned as "The eyes and ears of the RAF". To discuss the exact role of the ROC would be extremely complex, especially as it was one of many civilian defence organizations involved in the Cold War, e.g. the Civil Defence Corps and AFS (until 1968), the WRVS, UKWMO personnel, the network of regional seats of government (later sub-regional controls and then SRHQ/RGHQs) etc.

	corps -I forget the exact name of this latter organization) was rather undiplomatic and almost without exception it was a body-blow to those who had given so much over the years. To the best of my knowledge, very few joined these alternative organizations. We were also told that nuclear monitoring could be done by automated equipment (RIMNET - set up in 1988 following the Chernobyl disaster) and this was perceived as particularly tactless. A human can be asked to carry out any task in a war situation such as assisting those in need or (for instance) transporting medicines or other supplies from area to area. A piece of equipment has no flexibility to perform any role other than that for which it was designed, and a comparison like this bordered on the ludicrous.		
ROC #26	Yes we all thought it was done too quickly without any thought for what could happen in the future.We were a very cost effective organisation with a ferrific morale	I did join the ROCA for short time after stand down.I sarted to suffer from ulcerative colitis and for a long time I was too ill to go out	Yes as part of our most recent history,in what was a kind of war and could have had serious consequences.Also to show the younger generation how people had pride in their country
ROC #27	Yes. I'm not sure that it could have been done much differently or any better. As in the current economy, it all comes down to money, and when it runs out, there is little that can be done. I was not party to any "inside information" on the decisions or the methodology, but I think that we all saw something coming, and dealt with it in the best way that we could.	I have been a member of the three Group Associations (OXF, WIN & BED) since stand-down, and still am. I served on Bedford committee for a number of years, including time as vice chairman, but living in Norfolk eventually made it too much effort for too little achievement. Having moved to Norfolk, I also joined No 6 Gp Norwich Association.	Yes, if only to show that people have a sense of duty and that the spirit evident during both world wars was not in vain, and lives on. "Big Society" or not, there are always people who will rise to the occasion and give all that they can for something that they believe in - particularly the values and the freedom of their country.

ROC #28	Yes. Appalled at the way it was handled. The way that no thought of how the Corps could have been given another role did not do the government of the day credit.	Yes. Joined to keep contact with former colleagues.	Certainly the Cold War should be taught and the ROC, and the other volunteer organisations, would have played a vital part if the worst had happened.
ROC #29	same post as I joind	yes was a member before standown	YES as part of social history
ROC #30	Awful. Totally in the dark. The Queen was giving us our new colours in the July and the day before the local press ran the story that we were being disbanded. We actually went down to RAF Bentley Priory the next day to represent the Group and see the colours given by the Queen. Everyone was in devastated and totally gobsmacked. The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh walked amongst us after the parade (when we were having tea) and HM did not leave us in any doubt about her anger at the decision. She was not pleased. HM mentioned that her father, the King, had taken herself and Princess Margaret to the post at Harrow on a few occasions and she was very proud of the assocaition. Very, very emotional day, especially when we had the BBMF fly past at the end. Never forget it.	Yes, I joined the Durham/Northumberland Association on disbandment - still a member today. I think it is a very worthwhile association and that in the future, the government may very well need our knowledge.	I don't know about teaching the role of the ROC in schools, although I do think it should be taught as part of WW2. It is an important turning point in the Battle of Britain. Without the ROC, we wouldn't have won that battle and inevitably, the war. I would love to speak with you - I was one of the youngest members of the Corps at the time - contact me via ian.watson31@virginmedia.com or 07752 257 625. Marie Watson ex-Ldg Obs(W)

ROC #31	When peace broke out all over Europe; the writing was on the (Berlin) wall for the Corps. Even before then, our role (and expense) had come into question as it became increasingly unlikely that we would ever be called into service. Our buildings and infrastructure were well overdue for refurbishment and upgrade and in an age of increasing health and safety, some of our practices were becoming questionable. It had also become apparent to me that, unless our buildings were secured and guarded properly, any civil unrest following the outbreak of war would see our posts and controls overrun and occupied by a population demanding shelter, which would render us unserviceable. The members of the ROC had, by that time, enjoyed many happy years but the Corps was unlikely to be kept going just for its own benefit. With hindsight, I'm surprised that we were not found out any earlier and that we got away with it for as long as we did. Once the dreaded review had reported, our days were well and truly numbered, but in typical ROC fashion, the wind-down happened slowly, which gave both the sparetime and fulltime members of the Corps the necessary time to arrange a smooth transition into mothballs. In all fairness, I think the process was handled as well as it could be.	It would have been unforgivable for me not to join the Royal Observer Corps Association. Indeed, I was offered a "section" of 20 Group ROCA for my crew but we instead decided to go it alone and run our own social group post-stand-down in an effort to keep the unit together and retain our own autonomy, but with obvious links to the Corps' official association. This has now continued for over twenty years, though has diminished in size and content, from over 30 members meeting several times a year to (since our 20th anniversary) a single annual reunion attended by a dozen and a half. However, I have remained a member of the ROCA throughout this time and still support its activities. Though interest and membership of the organisation have declined over the years, the ROCA nevertheless still provides a vital and necessary link between the ROC and the present time.	I doubt the ROC deserves to be taught as a subject in its own right, but within the context of the cold war period as a whole, I would be disappointed if we did not get a mention. In 1964, at the age of 15, I joined a "secret organisation" with the word "Restricted" stamped on the top and bottom of every page of its training material. The Corps was little known of then and enrolment was done more by word of mouth than as a result of public knowledge (though I later found that this was more to do with budgetary constraints). We were a little known and little understood part of the UK's nuclear defences, yet would have provided a useful and necessary function were we ever called upon to do so. It would indeed be a pity if knowledge of the Corps and its role died along with its members. We volunteers, who gave so freely of our time, for so long, deserve better than that.

ROC #32	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/	DnYuLp fqzkgxhshpgc, [url=http://hsevqmaavqti.com/]hsevqmaavqti[/url], [link=http://llbpjkqxlmxh.com/]llbpjkqxlmxh[/link], http://mwdfcumaymsh.com/
ROC #33	Yes, came as a big shock and effected immeduatly, no time messing around wasting money so was efficient in that respect but volunteers could have been signposted to other organisations such as Air Cadets or Army Cadets instead.	Yes I am, to keep our history alive.	Yes, but not for any particular reason over and above any other service (armed or volunteer) as we all had great history with an interesting story to tell.
ROC #34	No	Am a member	Yes, understanding the steps we in the UK had to take in order to protect it's citizens will help generate a sense of pride in this country; something I feel is sadly lacking in this day and age.
ROC #35	I was not upset, it felt like I'd helped to win the Cold War. There is no good way to deliver bad news about the ROC not being offered any future role. After a while I was glad to have my spare time back.	I've only recently joined ROCA to share memories and help its heritage. I didn't want to join ROCA for its social events. Good friends I made during my time with the Corps are still in contact, we didn't need ROCA to help us keep in touch.	No more than any other service. In terms of our country's military history, the ROC was only a very small (but important) part. If Army, Navy and RAF history were ever taught in school, ROC might deserve a mention, but I can't see it happening.
ROC #36	Very badly treated, I believe there was an election due, we were advised not to vote Labour as they would stand us down, in the event it was the Conservative government that made the decision. We had no real warning, only informed on our training night, and that was that, we were all very upset at the way we were informed.	I did consider joining, but they are aimed at different groups, I believe,and as I moved away to live in Bristol, I wouldn't have known any former members in this area, I may join in the future, but I am a member of a FB group, which I enjoy	Yes, as part of a history lesson, not many people seem to be aware of their role. I also think , in comparison to other countries, the U.K. Was ill prepared, really, and we didn't even have any public shelters, when I was at school, a teacher thought us about the Cold War, and the effect nuclear weapons had on humans, it was very shocking to me, but I think that was part of the reason I decided to be part of civil defence.

ROC #37	Very disappointed	Did join	Yes as it is cold war information
ROC #38	No. Emigrated 1982 Stupid idea and political decision. Not logically thought out.	overseas (still am) and costly after overseas removal and other costs. Still in touch with few people.	yes, in history. Just like D Day landings and air raids. I lived thru all. Now 77 year old.
ROC #39	No	No - not interested as I was only in for 2 years	Maybe the earlier role of aircraft spotting
ROC #40	Yes, Handled disgracefully, lacking compassion, sympathetic organisation and, above all, an appreciation of the commitment and dedication of the thousands who had served or were still serving Queen and country, both full time and part time members.	Joined on creation of the assoc. To enable retired and (as it turned out) stood down members continue friendship, retain pride of service and share memories. Also, since stand down, to protect and communicate the history of the corps.	Yes, it is a shining example of community service to the nation by ordinary folk. It also played an essential role in home defence during the 39-45 war. It's role should be acknowledged and understood.
ROC #41	24 GROUP EDINBURGH (RAF Turnhouse) the stand down was appalling, as a full time officer I had in my safe two numbered envelopes which I could not open until instructed to do so by Senior staff officer at HQROC, and then only the envelope I was instructed to open, the second was to be returned unopened. When I was given the instruction to open are the speech by Earl Ferrers, I was astounded, at the loss of an organisation that cost a shade under £10milion a year to run, that gave nationwide coverage and all the goodwill it embedded was to be stood down. But it also meant that I had no way of informing all my Observers, Chief and Leading Observers personally so many found out through the media, which led to unnecessary bitterness and resentment.	I am a ROCA member, and I still meet with my old comrades, Facebook has been superb in rekindling old friendships Its a chapter of my life that I was proud of, I met some wonderful dedicated selfless people who were very professional in their approach to the task. I would not like to lose that link.	Maybe not the ROC specifically but certainly the cld war should be taught and the Corps role was key within that, should the worst ever have happened.
ROC #42	no had left by then	Did consider but due to family had no spare time.	YES it should be, history need taught so people know what really went on in the world,

ROC #43	Yes handled shambolic feelings angry and gutted normal training night one night locked out the next no warning no one told anything. Very bad	Served on Grp committee at founding of ROCA. Not a member now due to other commitments	Unsure. Would need to be done in context with role during WW2 then on to the nuclear role and how it tied in the overall defence plan for the country
ROC #44	No	No	Yes as it's part of our history
ROC #45	Yes I was serving at the time of stand down. I was very unhappy as I still felt the threat was still out there. It was done quickly and without much consulation.	I joined the ROCA 13 group, we met for many years afterwards. It was keeping that contact with folk who we all knew.	No I work in a secondary school, there is too much on the curriculum now and to be frank, Pupils would not be interested!
ROC #46	Yes I was. I thought it was a short-sighted decision which didn't save a huge amount of money. There was a useful role for the ROC to perform then and I think there still is today.	I thought about it but only joined a Facebook group recently.	Yes, the role of all the voluntary and full time defence organisations should be taught. People need to know of the sacrifices that others were prepared to undergo for the country as a whole.
ROC #47	I served until the bitter end, bitter being the operative word. The government were very short sighted in just abandoning 12,000 plus volunteers, with no real recognition of their service or the contribution that they would have made to the overall defence of the civilian population if the balloon had gone up.	I am a member of ROCA, but not active. When the Corps stood down, my local ATC Sqn asked me to join them as their Adj which I did. Stayed a civvy for some 2 years before taking a commission in the RAFVR(T) and eventually becoming a Sqn Commander. Served from 1991 to 2006.	I think the ROC should be mentioned when teaching about the Cold War, but not in great depth. There would be a very strong chance that the younger generation would regard them as the Cold War 'Dad's Army', not something that would be appreciated by ex members.
ROC #48	Yes. Apalled with the way that it was done. The Corps could have continued as a voluntary 'civil defence' type organisation but no thought was given to this by the Home Office.	Yes Still an active member to keep in touch with ex colleagues.	As a general part of WW2 and Cold War history but wouldn't expect more than that. More important that it's role is recognised in museums etc.
ROC #49	I was serving at standdown. I thought we were treated despicably. We were given no information and there were no rumours re a standdown. No information was forthcoming from higher echelons. I got a phone call from a colleague who saw the information re standdown on Teletext.	I am presently still a member of 31Gp ROCA. I joined to keep in touch with friends and colleagues.	I never gave this much thought but yes maybe it should be taught as it was a part of our history and we too had a role in The Battle of Britain

ROC #50	Yes-pretty disgusted, it seemed to come out of the blue I remember being totally bowled over and angry. Obviously the Corps had been a large part of mine and my comrades lives and felt as if we were just being dumped for no real good reason we were cheap (finance wise) and efficient. There were rumours that the Regiment (RAF) were looking for another role although I'm fairly sure they didn't take it up.	I was a late joiner, ROCA was started when the Corps still existed so with a family and the Corps I didn't have time, also apart from the days in COV I wasn't near enough to the social scene. I am a member now, Coventry Group, so even further away as I'm on the South Coast. I attend the annual reunion and other odd occasions such as the Arboretum. The reasons for joining are easy to keep in touch with former colleagues especially as I moved around.	I certainly do - but not just the WW2 role which for children I'm sure would be more exciting. Certainly should be part of cold war studies and there are becoming more and more restored sites that can be visited, I think many of the children would be surprised at how small the posts were and there were people willing to stay down there for 2/3 weeks. They might also find the whole system laughable - no computers, ipads etc. EMP!
ROC #51	no but felt this was a slap in the face to all the members myself I left because of the attitude of the fulltime officer at the time who did not like the fact that I was a personal friend of the commandant he was unaware of this a the time	yes but never go round to it but I keep in touch vie face book and friends	yes the observer corps are one of the forgotten forces of ww2 did Churchill not say during the battle of Britain thank god for the ROC plus we had Obs on board ships all during the war
ROC #52	Yes i was, I was a bit dissappointed that it came to an end as i was just beginning to understand what i was being taught and why, I was only 20 at the time i joined.. Dont have an opinion as to how standdown was conducted didnt really affect me.	I did join the ROCA for a while, but work/ family life priorities took over so i never continued	Yes i do ..they were a part of our history and did a major role during the war. their efforts should be aknowledged.. I had never heard of them until i joined my Aunt and most people i know have not but they deserve to be known about even if it is only in a small part
ROC #53	A difficult time and whole time staff had to try and make it as painless as possible.	I joined ROC Association prior to stand down in 1991 and still belong to ROCA and have attended local and National events.	I believe the Cold War is now part of school curriculum and ROC role should be included in this.
ROC #54	No was not serving at standown	Yes and no applied to join never heard back from them so moved on.	A good idea as a peoples history what men and women did in WW2 and the cold war period may help them understand why things are the way they are.

ROC #55	I left before stand down. I was very sad to hear that it had. The ROC was 'very cheap' to run compared with other aspects of the military and did an amazing yet unrecognised service to the country. It is lovely to see that people are now taking an interest in our history and its part in the Cold War. It was drummed into us to be secretive in what we did and I'm sure that is why no one really knows until recently about what we did or were prepared to sacrifice should the unthinkable happen.	I joined the ROCA to reconnect to a voluntary organisation that was very special. Social media has made it very easy to stay in touch and connected with others. We had a very special form of camaraderie forged through training for the unthinkable, knowing that should it happen, we could only rely on each other to do our duty and serve others.	There is not one school in the country that is further than 10-14 square miles from an ROC post or command centre. The environment that schoolchildren are living in now was very much in the front line of the Cold War, especially if it turned hot. The wars that they see on the TV nowadays must seem so far away from them and yet, some 30 years ago, their schools and homes could have been so very easily on the front line. I think it is important for school children to know what people such as the ROC were prepared to do to try and protect the country and its inhabitants and to know the threat that their grandparents and parents grew up under. I am greatly encouraged to see so many volunteers 'keeping the flame alive' by restoring posts to ensure that our history remains alive and that people appreciate what we did. We did not serve in the military, protect our country with arms, and become eligible for a 'Veteran's Badge' ; we did however, serve in the ROC and protect our country in perhaps a passive way, something equally worthy of recognition by the government and those who enjoy peace in the UK today.

ROC #56	I was a Chief Observer at Stand Down. I thought it was despicable, how we were told, and the reasons we were given. The whole Corps cost only £2 million/year, and the country lost the ability to call on over 12,500, fully-trained volunteers, who could have been given other duties, such as Flood Warnings.	I was one of the Founder Members of the North Wales Royal Observer Corps Association. We formed in 1989, which was before the National ROCA was even thought of.	Yes, I do. All young people should know of the Service given, over 60 years, by the dedicated Volunteers of the ROC. My daughter was fascinated, when she visited Hack Green, the "Secret Nuclear Bunker", as she was only 9, at Stand Down, and didn't really understand what we had been Members of (her Mother was a W?Obs for 6 years, too)
ROC #57	YES I felt the stand-down (by Tom King?) was very hasty and didn't take into account the continuing threat that remains to this day of a potential strike to the U.K by Atomic / Nuclear weapon systems from another nation(s) or rogue nation state or terrorist group(s)	I am a current member of my local R.O.C.A 28 Group	Yes, as the Cold War was by it's very nature & name..... a war.
ROC #58	Yes I thought it was abit abrupt.it seemed like we were an embarrassment to the goverment.	I joined the ROCA at a later date. I was ill for 15 years b ut I missed the comradeship of the Corps so I joined the ROCA. It was a wonderful organisation.We were like one big family especially on our post-17 Post Roxton	I don't think the modern generation would be much interested.A lot of the feeling at the time was we were only doing it so we had protection in case of war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, D. (1979) *Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy*, London, Pan Books.

Agnew, V. (2004) What is Reenactment, *Criticism*, Vol.46(3), Special Issue: Extreme and Sentimental History, pp - 327-339.

Anderton, M. (2002) Management on Modern Military Sites, in Schofield, J., Johnson, W.G., & Beck, C.M. *Material Culture: The Archaeology of Twentieth Century Conflict*, One World Archaeology, Vol. 44, Routledge, Abingdon.

Andrén, A. (1998) *Between Artefacts and Texts: Historical Archaeology in Global Perspective*, Plenum Press, London.

Armitage, M. (1995) *The Royal Air Force: An Illustrated History*, Brockhampton Press, London.

Arthur, M. (2005) *Lost Voices of the Royal Navy*, Hodder, London.

Bailey, G., Newland, C., Nilsson, A., Schofield, J. (2009) Transit Transition: Excavating J641 VUJ, *Cambridge Archaeological Journal*, Vol. 19(1), pp – 1-27.

Baker, F. (1993) The Berlin Wall: Production, Preservation & Consumption of a 20th-Century Monument, *Antiquity*, Vol.67, No.257.

Baldwin, F. and Sharpley, R. (2009) Battlefield Tourism: Bringing Organised Violence Back to Life, pp – 186-206 in Sharpley, R. and Stone, P.R. (eds), *The Darker Side of Travel: The Theory and Practice of Dark Tourism*, Aspects of Tourism, Channel View Publications, Bristol.

Beck, C.M. (2002) The Archaeology of Scientific Experiments at a Nuclear Testing Ground, in Schofield, J., Gray, W. and Beck, C. (eds) (2002) *Matérial Culture: The Archaeology of Twentieth Century Conflict*, One World, Vol.44, Routledge, London and New York

Beckstead, Z., Twose, G., Levesque-Gottlieb, E., Rizzo, J. (2011) Collective Remembering through the materiality and organisation of War Memorials, *Journal of Material Culture*, Vol. 16, pp - 193-213.

Brown, T.C. (2013) *Flying with the Larks: The Early Aviation Pioneers of Lark Hill*, National Trust, Stroud

Brunken, R., Plass, J.L. & Leutner, D. (2003) Direct Measurement of Cognitive Load in Multimedia Learning, *Educational Psychologist*, Vol. 38, pp 53-61.

Brunskill, R.W. (1999) *Timber Building in Britain*, Victor Gollancz, London.

Burchall, L.N. (2010) Emphasis on the Public, *The Public Historian*, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp – 62 – 68.

Burns, J.F. (1984) Protests are Issue: Russians Charge ‘Gross Flouting of the Ideals of the Competition, *New York Times*, 9 May 1984.

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (1981) *Have You Ever Wished You Were Better Informed?: Facts Against The Bomb*, Nottingham for Nuclear Disarmament.

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (1982) *The Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons*, Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons.

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (1983) *The Christian & Nuclear Weapons*.

Campbell, D. (1982) *War Plan UK*, Paladin, London.

Cann, A., Dimitriou, K., Hooley, T. (2016) *Social Media: A Guide for Researchers*, University of Derby, Research Information Network.

Carman, J. (2013) *Archaeologies of Conflict*, Debates in Archaeology, Bloomsbury, London.

Carroll, S. (2004) 'I was Arrested at Greenham in 1962': Investigating the Oral Narratives of Women in the Anti-Nuclear Committee of 100, *Oral History*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Poetry and Power, pp – 35 – 48.

Chandler, S. (2005) Oral History across Generations: Age, Generational Identity and Oral Testimony, *Oral History*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp – 48 – 56.

Chapman, J. (2006) The BBC and the Censorship of The War Game (1965), *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.41, No.1, pp 75-94.

Clark, J. (2000) A Better Explanation of Hereditary Inequality, In Dobres, M., & Robb, E. (eds*) Agency in Archaeology*, Routledge, London, pp – 92 – 112.

Clarke, B. (2005a) Cold War Monuments in Wiltshire, *Wiltshire Archaeological & Natural History Magazine*, Vol. 98, pp – 1-11.

Clarke, B. (2005b) *Four Minute Warning: Britain's Cold War*, Tempus Publishing, Stroud.

Clarke, B. (2007) 10 Tons for Tempelhof: The Berlin Airlift, Tempus Publishing, Stroud.

Clarke, B. (2009) *The Archaeology of Airfields*, History Press, Stroud.

Clarke, B. (2009a) *The Illustrated Guide to Armageddon: Britain's Cold War*, Amberley Publishing, Stroud.

Clarke, B. (2010) *Remember Scarborough: A Result of the First Arms Race of the Twentieth Century*, Amberley, Stroud.

Clarke, B. (2014) An Early Cold War structure in Wiltshire, *Wiltshire Archaeological & Natural History Magazine*, vol. 107, pp. 241–246.

Clarke, B. (2015) Watching Brief at the Stop Butts, MoD Boscombe Down, Salisbury, Wiltshire 5-7 May 2015, Boscombe Down Conservation Group, BDCG 2015-5-1, July 2015, unpublished client report.

Clay, L..D. (1950) *Decision in Germany*, Country Life Press, New York.

Cocroft, D.W. (2001) *Cold War Monuments: An Assessment by the Monuments Protection Programme*, English Heritage, London.

Cocroft, D. W. (2007) Defining the National Archaeological Character of Cold War Remains, in Schofield, J. and Cocroft, W. (eds), *A Fearsome Heritage; Diverse Legacies of the Cold War*, One World Archaeology, No. 50, pp – 107-129.

Cocroft, D.W. and Alexander, M. (2009) Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Orford Ness, Suffolk: *Cold War Research & Development Site, Survey Report, Research Department Report Series,* No. 10-2009, English Heritage.

Cocroft, D.W. and Newsome, S. (2009) Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Foulness, Essex: *Cold War Research & Development Site, Survey Report, Research Department Report Series*, No. 13-2009, English Heritage.

Cocroft, D. W., Thomas, R.J.C., ed. Barnwell, P.S. (2003) *Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989*, English Heritage, Swindon.

Creighton, O., Cunningham, P. and French, H. (2013) Peopling Polite Landscapes: Community and Heritage at Poltimore, Devon, *Landscape History*, 34:2, 61-86.

Darvill, T., Saunders, A., Startin, B. (1987) A Question of National Importance: Approaches to the Evaluation of Ancient Monuments for the Monuments Protection Programme in England, *Antiquity*, Vol. 61, pp – 393-408.

David, B., McNiven, I., Manas, L., Manas, J., Savage, S., Crouch, J., Neliman, G. & Brady, l. (2004) Goba of Mua: archaeological working with oral tradition, *Antiquity*, Vol. 78, pp – 158172.

Dobinson, C. (1998) *The Cold War (Twentieth Century Fortifications in England, Volumes XI, 1 and 2*), Council for British Archaeology, York.

Dobinson, C., Lake, J. and Schofield, A.J. (1997) Monuments of War: Defining England's 20th- century Heritage, *Antiquity*, Vol. 71, pp – 288-299.

Dolff-Bonekämper, G. (2002) The Berlin Wall: An Archaeological Site in Progress, in Schofield, J., Gray Johnson, W. & Beck, C.M. (2002) *Materiel Culture: The Archaeology of Twentieth Century Conflict, One World Archaeology*, Vol. 44, pp- 236 – 248.

Durham University (2010) Scarborough Castle, Scarborough, North Yorkshire, *Archaeological Services Durham University*, Unpublished client report 2378.

Emberley, J & Landry, D. (1989) Coverage of Greenham and Greenham as 'Coverage', *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp – 485-498.

Emerick, K. (2003) The ROC HQ Acomb: Presenting the Recent Past, in *Conservation Bulletin*, issue 44, English Heritage, pp – 45-46.

English Heritage (2003) *Twentieth-Century Military Sites: Current Approaches to their Recording and Conservation*, English Heritage.

English Heritage (2014) 2013-14 English Heritage Annual Report and Accounts, Customer Services, Swindon

Fairclough, G. (2007) The Cold War in Context, in Schofield, J., Cocroft, W. editors, *A Fearsome Heritage; Diverse Legacies of the Cold War*, One World Archaeology, No. 50, pp – 19-32.

Finch, S. (1986) Socialist-Feminism and Greenham, *Feminist Review*, No. 23, pp 93-100.

Fiorato, V. (2007) Greenham Common: The Conservation and Management of a Cold War Archetype, in Schofield, J., Cocroft, W. editors, *A Fearsome Heritage; Diverse Legacies of the Cold War*, One World Archaeology, No. 50, pp – 129-154.

Foot, W. (2003) Public Archaeology – Defended Areas of World War II, in *Conservation Bulletin*, issue 44, English Heritage, pp – 8-11.

Foucault, M. (1967) *Des Espace Autres*, Trans. Miskowiec, J. (1984) Architecture/Mouvement/Continuite.

Foucault, F. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language*, Pantheon Books, New York.

Foucault, M. (1982) The Subject and Power, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 8(4), pp - 777-795.

Gold, J.R. & Revill, G. (1999) Landscape of Defence*, Landscape Research*, 24: 3, pp.229 – 239.

Gonzalez-Ruibal, A (2008) Time to Destroy: An Archaeology of Supermodernity, *Current Anthropology*, Vol 49, No.2, pp – 247-279.

Grant, M. (2010) *After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain*, 1945-68, Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke.

Green, K. (2014) Use of a Digital Archive: The Archaeological Data Service, *The Archaeological Review from Cambridge*, vol. 29(2), pp – 226-243.

Gregson, N., Crang, M., Watkins, H. (2011) Souvenir Salvage and the Death of Great Naval Ships. *Journal of Material Culture*, Vol 16(3), pp – 301-324.

Grinrod, J. (2013) *Concretopia: A Journey around the Rebuilding of Post-war Britain*, Old Street Publishing, Brecon.

Ground Zero (1982) *Nuclear War: What's in it for you?*, Methuen, London.

Halpern, P.G. (1994) *A Naval History of World War I*, Routledge, Abingdon.

Harrison, R. & Schofield, J. (2010) *After Modernity: Archaeological Approaches to the Contemporary Past*, Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. & Riley, M. (2005) Landscape Archaeology, Heritage and the Community in Devon; an Oral History Approach, *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, pp – 1 – 23.

Hennessy, P. (2003) *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War*, London, Penguin Books.

Higgs, R. (1994) The Cold War Economy: Opportunity Costs, Ideology and the Politics of Crisis, *Explorations in Economic History*, Vol. 31, pp – 283-312.

Hilliard, L. (1986) Local Government: Civil Defence and Emergency Planning: Heading for Disaster?, *The Modern Law Review*, Vol.49, No.4, pp 476-488.

Holborow, W. (2003) Historic Military Aviation Sites, in *Conservation Bulletin*, issue 44, English Heritage, pp – 32-33.

Holyoak, V. (2003) Military Aircraft Crash Sites: Management Guidance, in *Conservation Bulletin*, issue 44, English Heritage, pp – 34-35.

Hughes, J. (2003) The Strath Report: Britain Confronts the H-Bomb, 1954-1955, *History and Technology*, Vol.19, No.3, pp 257-275.

Ingold, T. (1993) The Temporality of the Landscape, *World Archaeology*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 152-174.

Jackson, J. (1988) *The Berlin Airlift*, Patrick Stephens Limited, Wellingborough.

James, N. (2002) The Cold War, *Antiquity*, Vol. 76, pp – 664 – 665.

Jeffries, K. (2012) Britain and the Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, *Sport in History*, Volume 32, 2012 - Issue 2: Britain, Britons and the Olympic Games, Taylor and Francis.

Judt, T. (2005) *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, London, Pimlico.

Juffer, J. (1998) *At Home with Pornography: Women, Sexuality, and Everyday Life*, NYU Press.

Kean, H. (2010) People, Historians and Public History: Demystifying the Process of History Making, *The Public Historian*, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp – 25-38.

Kirby, R.K. (2008) Phenomenology and the Problems of Oral History, *The Oral History Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp – 22 – 38.

Kohan, C.M. (1952) *History of the Second World War: Works and Buildings*, HMSO, London.

Kristeva, J. (1982) Approaching Abjection, *Powers of Horror*, Columbia University Press, pp – 1-31.

Lake, J. (2002) Historic Airfields: Evaluation and Conservation, in Schofield, J., Gray, W. and Beck, C. (eds) *2002 Matérial Culture: The Archaeology of Twentieth Century Conflict*, One World, Vol.44, Routledge, London and New York.

Lake, J. (2003) *Twentieth-Century Military Sites: Current Approaches to their Recording and Conservation*, English Heritage, Swindon.

Launius, R.D. (2009) Abandoned in Place: Interpreting the U.S. Material Culture of the Moon Race, *The Public Historian*, Vol. 31, pp – 9 – 38.

Lavie, J., Hirst, A., de Fockert, J.W., Viding, E. (2004) Load Theory of Selective Attention and Cognitive Control, *Journal of Experimental Psychology*: General, Vol. 133, No. 3, pp - 339–354.

Laware, L.M. (2004) Circling the Missiles and Staining Them Red: Feminist Rhetorical Invention and Strategies of Resistance at the Women's Peace Camp at Greenham Common, *NWSA Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp – 18 – 41.

Lennox. S. (2004) Constructing Femininity in the Early Cold War Era, pp – 66-80, in Mueller, A. (ed) *German Pop Culture: How "American" is it?*, University of Michigan Press.

Liddiard, R., Sims, D. (2012) A Piece of Coastal Crust: The Origins of a Second World War Defence Landscape at Walberswick, Suffolk, *History,* Vol. 97, pp - 402-30

Liddington, J (1989) *The Long Road to Greenham: Feminism & Anti-Militarism in Britain since 1820*, Virago, London.

Marshall, Y., Roseneil, S., Armstrong, K. (2009) Situating the Greenham Archaeology: An Autoethnography of a Feminist Project, *Public Archaeology: Archaeological Ethnographies*, Vol. 8, No. 2-3, pp – 225-245.

Massie, K.R. (1991) *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the coming of the Great War,* Random House, New York.

Maxwell, D.B.S. (1993) Beer Cans: A Guide for the Archaeologist, *Historical Archaeology*, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp - 95-113.

McCamley, N. (2002) *Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers*, Pen & Sword, Barnsley.

Morgan, K.O. (1992) The Twentieth Century (1914-1991), in *The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain*, ed. Morgan ,k., Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Morgan, K.O. (1992) *The People's Peace: British History 1945-1990*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Morris, R. (2003) The Archaeology of Conflict, in *Conservation Bulletin*, issue 44, English Heritage, pp – 2-3.

Moshenska, G. (2007) Oral History in Historical Archaeology: Excavating Sites of Memory, *Oral History*, vol. 35, pp – 91-97.

Mowthorpe, C. (1995) *Battlebags: British Airships of the First World War: An Illustrated History*, Alan Sutton Publishing, Stroud.

Myers, A.T., (2011) Contemporary Archaeology in Transit: The Artefacts of a 1991 Van, *International Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 15, pp – 138 – 161.

National Audit Office (2011) Management of the Typhoon Project, Ministry of Defence, Report No. HC 755 – Session 2010 – 2011.

National Railway Museum (2007) 2000-8035: Engineering Drawings and Records from the Melton Constable Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon Works, Version 2.0, Trustees of the National Museum of Science & Industry, ref. Code GB 0756 2000 8035-8036.

Oldcorn, B.D. (2010) *Dry Tree in Chiaroscuro*, Unpublished MPhil Dissertation, University of Exeter.

Osborne, M. (2004) *Defending Britain: Twentieth-Century Military Structures in the Landscape*, Tempus, Stroud.

Osborne, M. (2008) *Pillboxes of Britain and Ireland*, Tempus, Stroud.

Patch, H., van Emden, R. (2007) *The Last Fighting Tommy: The Life of Harry Patch, The Only Surviving Veteran of the Trenches*, Bloomsbury, London.

Perry, S., Beale, N. (2015) The Social Web and Archaeology's Restructuring: Impact, Exploitation, Disciplinary Change, *Open Archaeology*, Vol.1, pp - 155-165

Phythian, M. (2001) CND's Cold War, *Contemporary British History*, Vol.15, No.3, pp - 133-156.

Popkess, B. (1980) The *Nuclear Survival Handbook: Living Through and After a Nuclear Attack*, Arrow, London.

Price, E. (2000) *Frocester: A Romano-British Settlement, Its Antecedents and Successors*, Gloucester and District Archaeological Research Group, Gloucester.

Pye, A.R. & Slater, W.D. (1990) *Berry Head Fort, Brixham: An Archaeological Survey,* Exeter Museum Archaeological Field Unit Report No. 90.10.

Radar Mast, Great Links Tor, HC Deb 16 November 1955 vol 546 c386

Rathje, W.L., Murphy, C. (2001) *Rubbish!: The Archaeology of Garbage*, University of Arizon Press, Tucson.

Riley, M., Harvey, D., Brown, T and Mills, S. (2005) Narrating Landscape: The Potential of Oral History for Landscape archaeology, *Public Archaeology*, pp – 39-50.

Saunders, N. 2002 The Iconic 'Culture of Shells' in the Great War and Beyond, in Schofield, J., Gray, W. and Beck, C. (eds) *2002 Matérial Culture: The Archaeology of Twentieth Century Conflict*, One World, Vol.44, Routledge, London and New York.

Scham, S.A. (2001) The Archaeology of the Disenfranchised, *Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory*, Vol. 8 pp – 183 – 213.

Schiffer, M.B. (1972) Archaeological Context and Systemic Context, *American Antiquity*, Vol. 37(2), pp – 156-165.

Schiffer, M.B. (2010) *Behavioural Archaeology: Principles and Practice*, Equinox Handbooks in Anthropological Archaeology, London, Equinox Publishing Ltd.

Schofield, A.J. (2003) Military Archaeology: Past Practice – Future Directions, in *Conservation Bulletin*, issue 44, English Heritage, pp – 4-7.

Schofield, A.J. (2005) *Combat Archaeology: Material Culture and Modern Conflict*, Duckworth Debates in Archaeology, Gerald Duckworth and Co. London.

Schofield, A.J. (2011) *Aftermath: Readings in the Archaeology of Recent Conflict*, Springer, New York.

Schofield, A.J., Anderton, M. (2000) The Queer Archaeology of Green Gate: Interpreting Contested Space at Greenham Common Airbase, *World Archaeology*, Vol. 32, No.2, Queer Archaeologies, Taylor & Francis Ltd. pp 236-251.

Schofield, A.J., Cocroft, W. editors, (2007) A Fearsome Heritage; Diverse Legacies of the Cold War, *One World Archaeology*.

Schofield, A.J., Lake, J. (1995) Britain's Defence Heritage, *Conservation Bulletin* No. 27 English Heritage, pp – 12-13.

Schofield, A.J., Cocroft, W. (eds), (2007) *A Fearsome Heritage; Diverse Legacies of the Cold War*, One World Archaeology.

Schofield, A.J., Gray, W. and Beck, C. (eds) (2002) *Matérial Culture: The Archaeology of Twentieth Century Conflict*, One World, Vol.44, Routledge, London and New York.

Schuman, H., Corning, A. (2012) Generational Memory and the Critical Period: Evidence for National and World Events, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 76, No.1, pp 1 - 31.

Schuman, H., Rodgers, W.L. (2004) Cohorts, Chronologies, and Collective Memories, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 68, No.2, pp 217 – 254.

Simmonds, S., Thomas, B. (2014) *Stonehenge and Avebury World Heritage Site: Management Plan Consultation Draft*, Stonehenge and Avebury WHS Steering Committee.

Steane, J. (2003) *The Archaeology of the Medieval English Monarchy*, Routledge, London.

Strange, I., Walley, E. (2007) Cold War Heritage and the Conservation of Military Remains in Yorkshire, *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, Vol. 13, No.2, pp 154-169.

Taylor, W.J. (1999) 1. Historical Background, in Royal Air Force Historical Society, *Royal Air Force in Germany 1945-1993*, Staff College, Bracknell.

Thomas, R. (2003) POW Camps: What Survives and Where, in *Conservation Bulletin*, issue 44, English Heritage, pp – 18-21.

Thompson, E.P., Smith, D. (1980) *Protest and Survive*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

Titcombe, E. (2013) Women Activists: Rewriting Greenham's History, *Women's History Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp – 310-329.

Tusa, A., Tusa, J. (1988) *The Berlin Airlift,* Atheneum, New York.

Uzzell,D. (1998) The Hot Interpretation of the Cold War, In *Monuments of War: the Evaluation, Recording and Management of Twentieth-Century Military Sites*, English Heritage, pp – 18-21.

Vining, M. (2007) Shaping Military Women Since World War II, in Schofield, A.J., Cocroft, W. eds, (2007) *A Fearsome Heritage; Diverse Legacies of the Cold War*, One World Archaeology.

Walker, W. H. and Schiffer, M. B. (2006) The Materiality of Social Power: The Artefact-Acquisition Perspective, *Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp 67-88.

Walls, S., Williams, H. (2010) Death and Memory on the Home Front: Second World War Commemorations in the South Hams, Devon, *Cambridge Archaeological Journal*, Vol 20(1), pp – 49-66.

Wardell, F., Lishman, J., Whalley, L. (2000) Who Volunteers? *British Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 30, pp- 227 – 248.

Welch, C. (2010) The Spirituality of, and at, Greenham Common Peace Camp, *Feminist Theology*, Vol. 18(2), pp – 230-248.

Wilford, H. (1998) The Information Research Department: Britain's Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No.3, pp 353 -369.

Wilson, D.C (1995) The Analysis of Domestic Reuse in Historical Archaeology; in, Skibo, J.M., Walker, H.W., Nielsen, A.E. (eds) *Expanding Archaeology*, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.

Wilson, L.K.(2007) Out of the Waste: Spadeadam and the Cold War, in Schofield, J., Cocroft, W. editors, *A Fearsome Heritage; Diverse Legacies of the Cold War*, One World Archaeology, No. 50, pp – 155-181

Wiltshire Council (2016) *Avebury World Heritage Site*, Chippenham.

Wohlstetter, A. (1959) *The Delicate Balance of Terror*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jan., 1959), pp. 211-234, Council on Foreign Relations.

Wood, D. (1992) *Attack Warning Red: The Royal Observer Corps and the Defence of Britain 1925 to 1992*, Carmichael and Sweet, Portsmouth.

Woodward, R. (2004) *Military Geographies*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Yanay, G.V., Yanay, N. (2008) The Decline of Motivation? From Commitment to Dropping out of Volunteering, *Nonprofit Management & Leadership*, Vol. 19, pp- 65 – 78.

Young, J.W. (1993) *Cold War Europe 1945-1989: A Political History*, Edward Arnold, New York.

Zimmerman, L.j., Vitelli, K.D., Hollowell-Zimmer, J. (eds) (2003) *Ethical Issues in Archaeology*, Society for American Archaeology, Altamira Press.

Internet Sources

Beacon Hill ringwork siege castle and Royal Observer Corps post. List entry Number: 1019091 https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1019091 accessed 23 May 2016

Berry Head Fort and battery and Hardy's Head Battery. List entry Number:1017322 https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1017322 accessed 23 May 2016

Council for British Archaeology. (2002) http://old.britarch.ac.uk/projects/dob/review/index.html accessed 27 November 2010.

Daily Mail: 10 July 2014 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2687308/Cold-war-concrete-bunker-Devon-sale-country-retreat.html#ixzz41ghf1sDl -Accessed 04 February 2015.

Dartmoor National Park, HC Deb 18 March 1958 vol 584 c129W, Written Answers (Commons) – Royal Air Force, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1958/mar/18/dartmoor-national-park#S5CV0584P0_19580318_CWA_95 - Accessed 14 January 2016.

DPA: Friends of Dartmoor website 2016, The Sharpitor Story, http://www.dartmoorpreservation.co.uk/the-sharpitor-story/ – Accessed 24 April

English Heritage List entry Number: 1017322, http://list.englishheritage.org.uk/resultsingle.aspx?uid=1017322 Accessed 10/10/2014.

Facebook Post Restorers Group, https://www.facebook.com/groups/316328808541964/ - Accessed 30 May 2016.

Foucault, M. (1967) Of Other Spaces (1967), Heterotopias, http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html Accessed 06/03/2012.

Geocaching, 11/01/2009 https://www.geocaching.com/geocache/GC20HCW_r-o-c-in-devon-bampton-1961-1991?guid=8958409e-5781-4e01-b097-bc7ae822eef9 accessed 13 May 2016

Historic England 1020238, Prehistoric coaxial field system and cairns, an historic enclosure and part of RAF Sharpitor, situated on and around Peek Hill, https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1020238 - accessed 12 March 2016.

http://www.wiltshire.gov.uk/artsheritageandlibraries/museumhistoryheritage/worldheritagesite.htm - Accessed 28 March 2016.

https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1970/1970%20-%200586.html – Accessed 16 January 2016.

MoLAS. (2010) http://www.museumoflondonarchaeology.org.uk/English/ComLearn/ComExcav?shoreditch Park.htm Accessed 19 December 2010.

'Parishes: Pickering', in A History of the County of York North Riding: Volume 2, ed. William Page (London, 1923), pp. 461-476 http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/vch/yorks/north/vol2/pp461-476 [accessed 9 February 2015].

Pastscape 2015, Historic England, http://www.pastscape.org.uk/hob.aspx?hob_id=1454628&sort=2&rational=m&recordsperpage=60&maplat=50.51182527&maplong=-4.03614648&mapisa=1000&mapist=os&mapilo=-

4.0361&mapila=50.5118&mapiloe=w&mapilan=n&mapios=SX556700&mapigrn=70050&mapigre=255650&mapipc=# - Accessed 23 April 2016.

Prehistoric coaxial field system and cairns, an historic enclosure and part of RAF Sharpitor, situated on and around Peek Hill, List entry Number: 1020238 https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1020238 accessed 23 May 2016.

Raddon Hill: a Neolithic causewayed enclosure and later hillfort. List entry Number: 1016259 https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1016259 accessed 23 May 2016.

Radio Mast, Dartmoor, HC Deb 02 February 1955 vol 536 c107W, House of Commons Debate, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1955/feb/02/radio-mast-dartmoor#S5CV0536P0_19550202_CWA_16 – Accessed 16 January 2016.

RAFM (30/11/2016). http://www.nationalcoldwarexhibition.org/ Accessed 30 November 2016.

Rigby, A. (2002) Sign of the Times, Peace News, Sept- Nov, iss. 2448 http://peacenews.info/node/3598/sign-times accessed 12/04/2015.

Rightmove: 29 May 2008 http://www.rightmove.co.uk/property-for-sale/property-17997839.html - Accessed 02 February 2015

Royal Observer Corps underground monitoring post and World War II visual spotting post, 200m north of Southfield House. List entry Number: 1021192 https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1021192 accessed 20 May 2016.

Subbrit 02/05/2001 http://www.subbrit.org.uk/rsg/roc/db/988811384.011001.html accessed 24 May 2016

Subbrit 27/04/2001 http://www.subbrit.org.uk/rsg/roc/db/988399666.034003.html - Accessed 23 April 2016.

Subbrit: 27/4/2001 http://www.subbrit.org.uk/rsg/roc/db/988399666.020002.html - Accessed 02 January 2016.

Subbrit: 30/09/2000 http://www.subbrit.org.uk/rsg/roc/db/988399666.002001.html - Accessed 02 January 2016.

The Capri Club, http://capriclub.co.uk/Capri-History - accessed 04 March 2016

Media

The Independent (Sunday 27 March 2005) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/recruitment-crisis-for-ta-poses-severe-threat-to-army-530082.html Accessed 30 November 2016.

BBC Devon: 22 October 2010: http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/devon/hi/people_and_places/newsid_9118000/9118123.stm - Accessed 03 January 2016.

Marlborough.news 24 January 2014 http://www.marlboroughnewsonline.co.uk/news/all-the-news/2567-crown-estate-s-savernake-sell-off-ownership-of-wiltshire-farmland-moved-to-luxembourg - Accessed 10 November 2015.

Plymouth Herald: July 10 2014 http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/Bunker-built-protect-councillors-nuclear-attack/story-21447720-detail/story.html#ixzz41grorrSf – Accessed 03 January 2016.

Anon (1947a) 6 March, ROC Recruiting, Service Aviation: Royal Air Force and Naval Aviation News & Announcements, *Flight International*, pp-202.

Anon (1948) 25 March, ROC Recruiting, Service Aviation: Royal Air Force and Naval Aviation News & Announcements, *Flight International*, pp-342.

Anon, (1970) Gee Chain Closure, 26 March, *Flight International*, January – June 1970,

Anon (1950) 20 April, Twenty-Five Watchful Years: R.O.C. Celebrates its Silver Jubilee: The King Becomes Air Commodore-in-Chief, *Flight International*, pp-482-3.

Anon (1956a) 1 June, Service Aviation: Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm News, *Flight International*, pp-692-3.

Anon (1958) 27 June, ROC Goes Underground, Service Aviation: Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm News, *Flight International*, pp-904.

Anon (1956b) 27 July, The ROC and Nuclear War, Service Aviation: Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm News*, Flight International*, pp-175.

Anon (1946a) 5 September, Correspondence, Safety First: Grim Prospects and How to Avoid Them, *Flight International*, pp-254.

Anon (1945) 6 September, ROC in which A=B, Correspondence, *Flight International*, pp-268.

Anon (1947b) 18 September, Service Aviation: Air Force, Naval and Army Flying News, *Flight International*, pp-242.

Anon (1955) 30 September, Service Aviation: Exercise “Beware”: Illustrated with Sketches by Gordon Horner, “Flight” Photographs, *Flight International*, pp-569-70.

Anon (1961) 23 November, Service Aviation: Air Force, Naval and Army Flying News, *Flight International*, pp-798.

Anon (1946b) 26 December, Recruiting Extension for ROC, Service Aviation: Royal Air Force and Naval Aviation News & Announcements, *Flight International*, pp-29.

Primary Sources

10G/163/Ops, 31 August 1978, Operational Procedures – Posts, Headquarters No. 10 Group, Royal Observer Corps, Poltimore Park, Exeter, Devon, EX4 0BB.

Air Ministry Order (1945) N.517. - Stand-Down of the Royal Observer Corps - Messages of Congratulations and Thanks (A.763171/45/S.5.-8.5.45.).

Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (1982) Peace and Disarmament: A short guide to British Government Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Dd.8298515 Pro.17896.

Civil protection (1986) *Community Adviser Training Course*, HMSO, London.

Civil Defence Handbook No.10, (nd), Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack, Wt.3551 K6000, S.O. Code No. 34-386-10.

Civil Defence Pocketbook No.2 (1958), Military Support in Civil Defence, S.O. Code No. 34-386-2*.

Emergency Planning Review, HC Deb 10 July 1991 vol 194 cc391-4W, Written Answers, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1991/jul/10/emergency-planning-review#S6CV0194P0_19910710_CWA_228 – Accessed 10 November 2015.

Henderson, A. (1951) HC Deb 06 March 1951 vol 485 cc240-326, text block 247 - 248.

HMSO (1959) *The H-Bomb: What About the Millions of Survivors?* Wt.32133-P3995 125M, March/59, Central Office of Information.

HMSO (1963) *Advising the Householder on Protection About Nuclear Attack*. Central Office of Information.

HMSO (1980 reprint of 1976) *Protect and Survive*, Dd. 0018872 Pro. 14347 K1200, Central Office of Information.

HMSO (1983) *Civil Defence: Why We Need it*, Dd 8295100 Pro 17171, Central Office of Information.

HMSO (1983) *The Balanced View: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control*, Dd 8298516 Pro 17895, Central Office of Information.

Home Defence College (1976) Elected Members Seminar, Course Handouts, 29 Feb - 3 March 1976.

Home Office (1976) *UKWMO*, Dd 085337, Pro 7986, 11/76, Central Office of Information

House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2015-2016, Strategic Financial Management of the Ministry of Defence and Military Flying Training, Eleventh Report.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1955/nov/16/radar-mast-great-links-tor - Accessed 16 January 2016.

JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) (1955) The ‘H’ Bomb Threat to the UK in the Event of a General War. January 13, 1955, NA CAB 158/20, JIC (55) 12 (Revise).

Jolly, E.J., Bloor, R.G. & Litchfield, D. 1979, Atmosphere Control Studies in a Royal Observer Corps Post, *Institute of Naval Medicine Alverstoke Hants*, INM Report No. 59/79 – Unclassified.

Manual of Civil Defence (1956) Volume 1, Pamphlet No.2, HMSO.

Manual of Civil Defence (1959) Nuclear Weapons, Vol.1, Pamphlet No.1, S.O. Code No. 34-375-1-59.

Ministry of Defence (nd) A Nuclear Free Europe? Why it Wouldn't Work, Main Titles Ltd.

R.A.F. Station, Sharpitor (Closure), HC Deb 19 December 1969 vol 793 cc432-3W, Written Answers (Commons)-Defence, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1969/dec/19/raf-station-sharpitor-closure - Accessed 14 January 2016.

Royal Observer Corps (1972) Basic Training Syllabus: Post Personnel, ROC/151/1/Air.

Royal Observer Corps (1985) ROC Journal, Vol 27, No.1, Ministry of Defence.

Royal Observer Corps (1988) Transition to War: Administrative Instructions, N0. 2/88, EDI/105/1/OPS 1 June 1988.

Royal Observer Corps (1989) Standard Operating Procedure No.2 Group and Sector Controls, Issue 4 May 1989, UKWMO.

Royal Observer Corps (1991) ROC Journal, Vol 33, No. 9/10, Ministry of Defence.

Royal Observer Corps (1989) Standard Operating Procedure Joint Annexes, Issue 3 May 1989, UKWMO.

Royal Observer Corps (nd) A Worthwhile Spare-time Service, Recruitment leaflet, HQ No. 13 Group Carmarthen.

Royal Observer Corps (1989) Standard Operating Procedure No.3 NRC, Issue 3 May 1989, UKWMO.

Royal Observer Corps (1989) Training Manual, 5th Edition February 1989, UKWMO.

Royal Observer Corps, HC Deb 03 May 1968 vol 763 cc1562-70 1562 House of Commons Debate http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1968/may/03/royal-observer-corps#S5CV0763P0_19680503_HOC_315 – Accessed 03 January 2016

Royal Observer Corps, HC Deb 03 May 1968 vol 763 cc1562-70, House of Commons Debate, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1968/may/03/royal-observer-corps#S5CV0763P0_19680503_HOC_317 – Accessed 15 July 2014.

Strategic Defence Review (1998) Modern Forces for The Modern World, HM Government White Paper.

The ROC – Meet the Special Service With Something to Give (November 1985), Publication 417, Central Office of Information, London.

The ROC – *The Service with a Difference* (December 1979), Publication 417, Central Office of Information, London.

The ROC – *The Service with a Difference* (May 1984), Publication 417, Central Office of Information, London.

YEO/635/COMMS, 23 March 1982, Post Communications – Re-organisation, No. 9 Group Headquarters, Royal Observer Corps, Yeovil, Somerset, BA20 2QQ.

End of Volume Two