

# **Parody and *Parōidia*: A Study in Literary Genre and Mode**

By

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## *Abstract*

This thesis explores the relationship between the genre of Greek poetry called *parôidia* and parody as a literary mode. I argue that the poetics of *parôidia* as genre are inextricably linked to the poetics of parody as mode. This argument produces a new methodological approach to the concept of parody, which recognizes its idiosyncratic nature. Since everyone has different ideas about what parody is, there is no absolute definition of parody. Instead, I use approaches drawn from cognitive linguistics and poetics to illuminate the parodic script, a set of terms commonly used to explain parody's effect but which in themselves do not define parody. This methodology is supported by an appendix that analyses the terminology of parody in Greek (*παρωδία*, *παρωδή*, etc.). I argue that the noun *παρωδία* is only ever found with a generic meaning before the first century BC. The main body of the thesis examines six poems from this genre, *parôidia*, to demonstrate how this genre influenced Greek ideas about parody. This thesis is the first literary study of all of the major poems belonging to the genre. Furthermore, it is the first study of parody to appreciate fully the importance of this genre for notions of parody. While most studies of parody have centred on Greek Comedy, I show that this genre, which has been almost entirely left out of discussions of parody, is essential for the development of parody as a mode.

As the first detailed literary study of the genre *parôidia*, the central chapters provide new interpretations of the genre's most important poems. In several of these, I show how the poems engage in different kinds of satire. For instance, Timon uses Sceptic philosophy against the dogmatic sophists, and Archestratus uses tropes drawn from the figure of the comic *mageiros*. In other chapters, I argue that the humour of the poems derives in part from their manipulation of the audience's expectations. Thus the *Batrachomyomachia* leads us to anticipate divine intervention, but uses this expectation to create humorous reveals at the end of the poem. In each chapter, I aim to show specifically how the poem's parody of epic contributes to its construction of meaning. The conclusion then brings these chapters together to present the bigger picture of Greek conceptions of parody that emerge from these discussions. What links the poetry of a Sceptic philosopher and a shit-stained nobody from Thasos? Are there any similarities between the espousal of fine cuisine in Archestratus and the absurdification of the *Batrachomyomachia*? I conclude by making three claims: 1) parody's allusive form must be understood as multifaceted and can be approached through several frameworks; 2) parody is not inherently critical of the text it parodies, but can use the

process of parody as a framework for satirizing other figures; 3) although frequently regarded as a “low” or “playful” form, parody incorporates its supposedly inferior literary position into its construction of meaning. *Parōidia*, I argue, is not only a product of its specific literary and cultural context but also contributes to the shaping of parody in Greek thought.

## *Table of Contents*

<i>Abstract</i>	iii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
<i>Abbreviations and editions</i>	viii
<i>Introduction and definitions</i>	1
<i>Parôidia</i> as genre	5
<i>Parôidia</i> as mode	20
1. Hegemon of Thasos	38
Disgusting Lentil-Soup and comic poetics	40
Hegemon's failure and the biographies of the poets	50
A shit-stained somebody and an argument <i>ad neminem</i>	57
Conclusions	62
2. Matro of Pitane's <i>Attikon Deipnon</i>	65
Bad etiquette, bad politics	69
The Homeric feast	91
Conclusions	106
3. Archestratus of Gela's <i>Hedypatheia</i>	109
Sicilian cuisine in the 4th century	111
Archestratus' satire	116
ἀβρόδαις τράπεζα: Archestratus' synaesthetic poetics	139
Conclusions	149
4. The <i>Batrachomyomachia</i>	150
Divine retribution and audience expectation	155
Dressing and undressing the animal heroes	165
Conclusions	182

5. The <i>Galeomyomachia</i>	184
Reconstructing the poem	185
The first one bites the dust	189
An army of country mice	196
Renewed strength and doomed mice	199
Conclusions	202
6. Timon of Phlius' <i>Silloi</i>	204
The structure of the <i>Silloi</i>	206
Timon's literary influences	213
Striving for enlightenment: satire, parody, and ἔρις	218
Fictionality, poetry, and philosophy	228
Conclusions	241
Conclusions	244
Appendix 1: Definitions of $\pi\alpha\varrho\omega\delta\alpha$	257
Appendix 2: Parodists through the ages	275
Bibliography	282

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## *Abbreviations and editions*

### EDITIONS OF TEXTS

- Archestratus of Gela Olson, S.D. and Sens. A (2000) *Archestratos of Gela: Greek culture and cuisine in the fourth century BCE*, Oxford.
- Athenaeus Olson, S.D. (2006-2012) *Athenaeus: the learned banqueters*, Cambridge, MA.
- Batrachomyomachia West, M.L. (2003) *Homeric hymns, Homeric apocrypha, and lives of Homer*, Cambridge, MA.
- Bion of Borysthenes Kindstrand, J.F. (1976) *Bion of Borysthenes: a collection of the fragments with introduction and commentary*, Uppsala.
- Callimachus *Aetia* Harder, A. (2012) *Callimachus: Aetia*. 2 vols., Oxford.
- Crates of Thebes Lloyd-Jones, H. and Parsons, P. (1983) *Supplementum Hellenisticum*, Berlin.
- Galeomyomachia Perale, M. (forthcoming) *Adespota Papyracea Hexametra Graeca: Hexameters of Unknown or Uncertain Authorship from Graeco-Roman Egypt*, Berlin.
- Hegemon of Thasos Olson, S.D. (2006-2012) *Athenaeus: the learned banqueters*, Cambridge, MA.
- Iambic and elegaic poetry West, M.L. (1992) *Iambi et elegi Graeci: ante Alexandrum cantati*, 2 vols., Oxford.
- Matro of Pitane Olson, S.D. and Sens. A (1999) *Matro of Pitane and the tradition of epic parody in the fourth century BCE: text, translation, and commentary*, Atlanta.
- Parôidic fragments Brandt, P. (1888) *Corpusculum poesis epicae Graecae ludibriæ: fasciculus prior continens parodiae epicae et Archestrati reliquias*, Leipzig.
- Timon of Phlius Di Marco, M. (1989) *Timone di Fliunte: introduzione, edizione critica e commento*, Roma.
- Fragments of Greek comedy Kassel, R. and Austin, C. (1983-) *Poetae Comici Graeci*, Berlin.

## ABBREVIATIONS OF GREEK TEXTS

Abbreviations of Greek texts throughout follow those of Liddell and Scott, with the exception of the following:

<i>AD</i>	Matro of Pitane's <i>Attikon Deipnon</i>
<i>BM</i>	<i>Batrachomyomachia</i>
<i>GM</i>	<i>Galeomyomachia</i>
<i>Hed.</i>	Archestratus of Gela's <i>Hedypatheia</i>

## TRANSLATIONS

All translations, unless otherwise specified, are taken from the Loeb Classical Library, with the exception of Matro of Pitane and Archestratus of Gela, where translations are derived from the editions of Olson and Sens.



## *Introduction and definitions*

This thesis explores the relationship between the genre of Greek poetry called *parôidia*, a body of hexametrical literature that parodies epic and other genres, and parody as a literary mode. My central claim is that the poetics of *parôidia* as genre are inextricably linked to the poetics of parody as mode. This claim is reflected, at a foundational level, in the Greek language itself: *παρωδία* as a term initially refers to the genre *parôidia* (e.g. Arist. *Poet.* 1448a9-14 and Chamaeleon fr. 44 Wehrli) and this genre later gives its name to the mode of parody. However, while this semantic overlap is central to the interaction between parody as mode and *parôidia* as genre in Greek thought, it also causes us problems in clarity. How do we distinguish between *παρωδία*, with its different meanings and connotations, parody as mode, and *parôidia* as genre whilst being clear to which concept we are referring? For the purposes of this thesis, I shall use the terms in the following way: the transliteration *parôidia* (and adjective *parôidic*) will refer to the genre; *παρωδία* and cognate words will be maintained in the Greek to signify only the Greek terms themselves; and parody (and the adjective *parodic*) will refer to parody in the modern sense as a mode.

What parody means to the Greeks has long been of interest to scholars, especially of Greek comedy. The classic treatment of parody in comedy is Peter Rau's *Paratragodia*, which remains the most comprehensive treatment. While Rau's primary focus was a categorization and analysis of comedy's engagement with tragedy, he also tried to avoid two potentially reductive claims about parody, the contrast between form and content and the division of parody into "pure comedy" and "critical/polemic parody".<sup>1</sup> While the study of parody in Greek comedy has long been dominated by parody of tragedy, already implicit for instance in Rau's title, more recently scholars have begun also to recognize the significance of comedy's parody of epic.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, one recent trend in current approaches sees parody (primarily that of tragedy and satyr drama) as integral to dramatic

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<sup>1</sup> Rau (1967) 11-2. The latter dichotomy remains a problem in Silk (1993), which I discuss in more detail later in this introduction. Rau ultimately (p. 12) defines five aspects of parody that he believes crucial for his study: 'Eine Parodie ist nach fünf Gesichtspunkten zu betrachten: nach (1) der Vorlage (Gattung und Besonderheit); (2) der Form; (3) der Pointe; (4) der Haltung der parodierenden Person; (5) der Tendenz.'

<sup>2</sup> Platter (2006) 108-42 deals only with Aristophanes and is interested in the cultural authority of epic and oracular language, while Revermann (2013), who takes a broader view, sees a difference between paratragedy and para-epic, formulated in terms of game theory between zero-sum and pareto optimal situations.

competition and comedy's claim to a meaningful status within the *polis*.<sup>3</sup> While not wishing to ignore historical specificity, the aim of this thesis is to use the genre *parōidia*, which has been almost entirely left out of such discussions of parody,<sup>4</sup> to explore larger trends that emerge from a genre whose corpus spans at least half a millennium. In doing so, this work also develops our appreciation of the genre itself. Since the sillographic and *parōidic* fragments were collected in two volumes by Wachsmuth and Brandt,<sup>5</sup> only one monograph has been published that treats the whole genre.<sup>6</sup> Bertolín Cebrián's book takes a historical approach that tries to differentiate between comic epic, parody of epic, and beast epic, but the methodological problems in the approach and handling of material make it of little value.<sup>7</sup> By contrast, Enzo Degani's introduction to a reprinted and translated edition of Brandt has contributed more significantly to our overall understanding of the genre in general, and some studies of individual poems have usefully analysed them as part of the corpus.<sup>8</sup> This thesis, however, will be the first literary study of all of the major poems belonging to the genre. By resituating *parōidia* at the centre of an analysis of Greek parody, this thesis adopts a new approach to this multifaceted concept.

To demonstrate the connections between the poetics of *parōidia* as genre and parody as mode, the structure of this work will in part reflect one of the most important elements of my understanding of parody. Individuals create and develop different answers to the question of what parody is. Since it follows that there is no single or absolute definition of parody, I posit that we would expect to find that different poems reflect slightly different aspects of the same cultural concept. The structure of this thesis develops from this position. Each chapter treats different poems by different poets, combining a thematic and chronological structure (as far as can be established), each of which tells a different tale about parody in the Greek world. At the same time, readers will notice that, despite the many differences, my analysis of the poems does reveal several strands that connect the different chapters. That these chapters all differ in some important regards from each other is then a reflection of my claim that parody itself is multifaceted and idiosyncratic.

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<sup>3</sup> Ruffell (2011) 316: 'Both intertextual and parodic claims interact with explicit comic metapoetics to stake a political and ideological claim, while while also serving to construct the stories, plots, and worlds of Old Comedy.' Likewise Sells (2011) 283: 'paratragedy and parasatyrism do more than amuse, they are the means by which Old Comedy negotiates (what it perceives to be) its special status in the fifth-century polis.'

<sup>4</sup> A good example of this negligence is the volume on Homeric parody by Acosta-Hughes *et al.* (2011), which features only one chapter on any of the poems I study here, and which mostly covers the same ground as Wackernagel (1916).

<sup>5</sup> Wachsmuth (1885) and Brandt (1888).

<sup>6</sup> Bertolín Cebrián (2008).

<sup>7</sup> For instance, he frequently treats late evidence such as Polemo on Hegemon as biographically accurate, and there is no reason (especially given the evidence of Strabo and Martial) to believe that poems like the *BM* were intended as children's literature. For criticisms of the approach, cf. Olson (2010).

<sup>8</sup> Especially Olson and Sens (1999) for Matro, and Sens (2006) and Holst (2006) for the *BM*. Glei (1992) has also contributed to our understanding of the genre's early development.

It is the task of the conclusion to draw these strands together, and from this position we can see more clearly elements of the Greek concept of parody emerge. While this will be treated in full later, two examples of the bigger picture may help at this stage. Perhaps the clearest strand is parody's association with satire. However, while this later comes to be intimately associated with a satire of the parodied text, throughout *parôidia* the parody of epic is instead a tool for the satire of external figures (chs. 1-3 and 6). Another aspect to Greek notions of parody is narratological. Parody is the linguistic phenomenon of two fictional worlds colliding, or overlapping, and in two chapters we see what ambiguities this causes for the *fabula* of a *parôidic* poem and how this can be used to humorous effect (chs. 4-5). The conclusion does not aim at completeness, but provides a number of new perspectives that will hopefully form the basis of further study.

Since this thesis explores what we can learn about ancient parody from an analysis of the genre *parôidia*, many of the chapters are interested in different ways in the reflexivity of the poems. This reflexivity takes different forms in different chapters: I argue that the poems invite us in some cases to reflect on matters pertaining to poetics (metapoetry; see chs. 1-3), in others on the relationship between poetry, fiction, and reality (metafiction; see chs. 5-6), or alternatively on the similarities and differences between the poem and the festival context in which it was produced (metafestival; see ch. 3). Although the reflexive nature of parody has frequently been commented upon by scholarship, it is worth outlining here how my approach differs from others.<sup>9</sup>

The main difference between the approach here and previous scholarship is the extent to which parodic reflexivity is inherently either self-reflexive (or self-parodic) or open to the same criticisms as those it purports to level against the parodied texts. If a parody is imagined to "mock by imitation", then its very mimetic qualities seem to necessitate that the parody is itself open to the same criticisms.<sup>10</sup> While this may well be a valid and important question in some texts, it is less frequently a concern in the poems I study here. The key point of difference is that scholars who view parody as implicated in its own criticisms primarily treat parody as creating a form of dichotomy in which the parody is situated directly in contrast with an individual parodied text or group of texts. As we shall see throughout this thesis, this is problematically reductive. In my analysis of *parôidia* I move away from understanding the poems only in their relation to Homer, preferring instead to approach them in their immediate literary context. So, for instance, I argue that, in the *Silloi*, Timon draws on language commonly used in Hellenistic literary criticism in his satire of philosophers in a manner that invites us to reflect on the relationship between a poetic text

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<sup>9</sup> For notions of reflexivity in studies of parody, see Markiewicz (1967), Poirier (1968), Rose (1979), esp. 61-106, and (1993) 91-9, and Hannoosh (1989).

<sup>10</sup> This question is explored especially by Hannoosh (1989), who views reflexivity and by extension self-criticism as inherent to parody.

and the experiential world. We cannot, that is, appreciate the reflexivity of the *Silloi* only from the perspective of its relationship with Homer. Our extant examples of *parôidia* are less concerned with Homeric poetry in an abstract sense, but rather they more commonly reflect on *current* poetic concerns, including the place of Homer within contemporary literary and aesthetic thought.

The strategies whereby parody can be understood as reflexive differ substantially. While some may regard such reflexivity to be virtually inherent to the form,<sup>11</sup> certain strategies can be identified that encourage such reflexive readings. Poets may refer to themselves, their audiences, or the performance or text itself, as for instance in the opening of the *BM*, which expresses the poet's prayer concerning the performance of a physical text. We may find references to other poets or allusions to other texts, in the context of which the current poem is to be understood (e.g. Matro fr. 7). Alternatively, scene types or vocabulary can be used that can refer to poetic practices, such as the widespread figurative use of gastronomic language (taste, consumption, etc.). The texts studied in this thesis cannot be said to conform to a single strategy through which we are invited to understand the poem as metapoetically or metafictionally;<sup>12</sup> while the majority of cases studied in this thesis fit into the different categories above, in each chapter I justify my specific approach to the reflexivity of the text on the basis of the specific needs and context of the poem.

This remainder of this introduction will lay the groundwork for the subsequent chapters by analysing what we know about the genre *parôidia* and my theoretical approach to parody as mode. The discussion of the genre *parôidia* establishes the corpus of the genre and its key features, while the subsequent section establishes the methodology used throughout. Since throughout this thesis I claim that each person conceptualizes parody differently, our methodology should recognize and account for these differences. I therefore study the vocabulary used in the context of parody to establish a linguistic framework for the Greek concept of parody.

The approach to parody adopted here, which emphasizes its fluid and multifaceted nature, draws on some cognitive approaches to genre. Like a genre, parody can be understood as a form of category; examples of parody possess similar features, but people frequently disagree on what fundamentally defines parody, or makes it unique; and like a genre, individuals can possess a key example of parody against which other parodies are measured.<sup>13</sup> The subsequent sections draw especially on two aspects of the cognitive theories of genre: family resemblance and “dominant” or

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<sup>11</sup> E.g. Hannoosh (1989); Rose (1993) 91-9 is more careful to claim that not all parody is metafictional, and not all metafiction is parodic.

<sup>12</sup> Although Rose (1979) and (1993) uses metafiction more abstractly, I differentiate throughout between metapoetry, which is primarily concerned with poetics, and metafictionality, whereby we are invited to consider the relationship between the text and the experienced world.

<sup>13</sup> For instance, contemporary examples that have been particularly influential for modern conceptions of parody are the films of Zucker, Abrahams, and Zucker, such as *Airplane!* (1980) and the *Naked Gun* trilogy (1988-1994).

“salient” features.<sup>14</sup> Family resemblance originates with Wittgenstein’s treatment of games. Games possess similarities in some regards and not in others, and no one feature can be identified as common to all games. Thus, Wittgenstein suggests that the network of similarities in games can be viewed in the same way as the similarities between family members.<sup>15</sup> As has already been noted for genre, parodies share common, identifiable features but all differ from one another.<sup>16</sup> Aristophanes’ parody of Euripides might appear different from the *BM*’s parody of epic, but somehow they share enough similarities to be classified together.

“Dominant” or “salient” features are perceived similarities between texts that can be used for generic classification. Rotstein, for example, regards dominant features as ‘features that at some historical point are perceived as primary for the identification of literary types.’<sup>17</sup> Thus, for example, while the comic was perceived as a dominant feature of parody around the 1960s in the works of Yunck and Markiewicz,<sup>18</sup> Hutcheon’s book on parody caused a shift that led to irony being viewed by scholars as more dominant.<sup>19</sup> In the subsequent sections, I use these two approaches in order to re-examine the surviving corpus of *parôidia* and to consider what the “dominant features” of parody were in Greek literature from a linguistic perspective.

## ΠΑΡΩΙΔΙΑ AS GENRE<sup>20</sup>

This section revisits what we know about the corpus of *parôidia* as a genre, what can be said about the authors and their works and what the main features of this corpus are. It will be first necessary to clarify which authors and works can be classified as falling within the corpus and under what terms, before we can turn to the primary features of the corpus itself.

### Defining Parodists

Defining the key characteristics of a genre is a task fundamentally associated with delimiting its corpus. However, there is no single or straightforward method to identify objectively which

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<sup>14</sup> A cognitive approach to genre that incorporates these concepts amongst others is adopted by Rotstein (2010) 3-24, to whom this discussion is indebted. The other approaches she adopts, “chunking”, “embodiment”, and “script” are for different reasons less relevant to the material under consideration here.

<sup>15</sup> Wittgenstein (1968) 31-2.

<sup>16</sup> For the application of this approach to literary genres, cf. Fishelov (1993) 53-68.

<sup>17</sup> Rotstein (2010) 10.

<sup>18</sup> Yunck (1963) and Markiewicz (1967).

<sup>19</sup> Hutcheon (1985) followed by Dentith (2002) and others.

<sup>20</sup> This section is complemented by ‘Appendix 2: Parodists through the ages’, which gives a table detailing all known authors and texts of *parôidia* according to century and the full texts of the inscriptions discussed in this section.

authors can be said to belong to a genre. Instead, three approaches have become prevalent.<sup>21</sup> The first two, the “narrow *parôidia*” and “extended *parôidia*”, are based upon determining features of individual works consonant with elements identified as “*parôidic*”. “Narrow *parôidia*” would operate ‘within a paradigm of distinctive features,’ and would be consistent with ancient definitions, while “extended *parôidia*” would operate ‘within a paradigm of salient features, family resemblance, and prototypes.’<sup>22</sup> These terms rely on two potentially problematic foundations. Firstly, ‘a concept of the genre comes first determining the extent of the corpus. To avoid circularity, an external point of reference is needed.’<sup>23</sup> Secondly, distinctive and salient features are not necessarily peculiar to a single genre. Many iambic elements identified by Rotstein, for example, are also applied to *parôidia* (e.g. σπώπτειν and λοιδορεῖν) and / or to concepts of parody in general (e.g. χλευάζειν). The third category of identification, the “received *parôidia*” focuses instead on authors whose works are explicitly linked to *parôidia* in antiquity. ‘The word “received” thus not only alludes to the attempt to base the corpus on explicit evidence, but also acknowledges that explicit evidence depends very much on which authors were “received into” (ἐγκριθέντες) the genre by Hellenistic scholars.’<sup>24</sup>

In this section, I shall primarily focus on notions of “extended *parôidia*” and “received *parôidia*”, as, unlike *iambos*, *parôidia* does not have an explicit or extensive ancient definition. Perhaps the closest we come to an ancient definition of *parôidia* would be that of Aristoxenus in the 4th cent. (fr. 136 Wehrli), who refers to works (termed παρωδαί) that engaged with hexameter poems to a funny end (ἐπὶ τὸ γελοῖον). While this goes some way towards helping us understand the corpus, this definition is not especially widespread in antiquity and the phrase ἐπὶ τὸ γελοῖον might be considered unhelpfully vague. In order to avoid the charge of circularity regarding the use of “extended *parôidia*”, I will first consider the attributes of two authors who can be regarded in some sense as prototypical for *parôidia*. This approach draws on work such as that of Vardi, who argued that ancient accounts of authors follow a scheme of a constant core with a more flexible periphery.<sup>25</sup> While this too is problematic for the genre *parôidia*, it provides the best starting point available for our inquiry.

*Parôidia*, since it is a genre much less frequently discussed in ancient sources, does not have the same kind of quasi-canonical structure found in the discussion of other genres. For different reasons, however, two authors (Hegemon and Euboeus) appear to have reached a near-canonical status by the end of the 4th cent. BC. This status is then reified by the most thorough surviving

<sup>21</sup> Here I draw upon the work done on the corpus of iambic poets by Rotstein (2010) 25-57.

<sup>22</sup> Rotstein (2010) 26, defining “narrow *iambos*” and “extended *iambos*”.

<sup>23</sup> ibid. 25.

<sup>24</sup> ibid. 26.

<sup>25</sup> Vardi (2003) 131-52, particularly 140, followed by Rotstein (2010) 27-34.

discussion of the genre in Polemo. These two authors, then, will provide the basis for establishing an initial set of salient features that allow us to consider which authors can be said to fall within the “extended *parôidia*”.

**Hegemon of Thasos** (5th cent.) becomes prototypical for the genre very quickly, as he seems to have been the first victor in a competition in *parôidia* in Athens. He thus serves as Aristotle’s first example of a writer who imitates inferior men (*Poet.* 1448a9-14), and is subsequently discussed at length by his student Chamaeleon (fr. 44 Wehrli). He is known from the latter to have written a *Gigantomachy*, and he also composed a *Deipnon/Deipna* (Ath. 1.5a), which was likely also a *parôidia*, as well as comedy entitled either *Philina* or *Philinna*.<sup>26</sup> After claiming that Hipponax was the original founder of the genre, Polemo tells us specifically that Hegemon was the first to enter competitions for *parôidia* and that he was frequently successful in Athens.<sup>27</sup> Polemo is then also the most important source for the surviving 21 lines of Hegemon’s poetic output.<sup>28</sup>

**Euboeus of Paros** (mid. 4th cent.) was also a fairly prototypical figure for the genre *parôidia*. In Athenaeus, Cynulcus claims that Euboeus is the most famous parodist,<sup>29</sup> and in his quotation of Polemo Euboeus features at the beginning (where he is described as learned) and the end (where his poetry is described as witty).<sup>30</sup> It is also clear that he was influential within decades of his own lifetime, as he appears to be positively mentioned by Alexander Aetolus (fr. 5.9-10 Magnelli),<sup>31</sup> Matro (fr. 7.1-2), and Timon (fr. 2). The only surviving lines of his poetry, two short fragments from

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<sup>26</sup> Two lines of this play are quoted at Ath. 3.108c, calling it *Philinna*, while Polemo (fr. 45 Preller) refers to it as *Philina*. Athenaeus also says that Hegemon was said by some to be an author of Old Comedy (Ὕγήμων ὁ Θάσιος... ὃν τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ κωμῳδίᾳ τινὲς ἐντάττουσιν - Ath. 1.5a-b). Storey (2011a) 271 suggests that there may be two Hegemons, one author of *parôidia* and one of comedy, since the *Suda* (η 53) mentions a Hegemon from the time of Demosthenes, whose “plays include *Philinna*”, and since ‘the title suggests rather a hetaera play of the sort familiar from the fourth century.’ This suggestion, however, is unlikely given that the evidence of Chamaeleon demonstrates that Hegemon was known as an author of comedy in the 4th cent.; cf. Bagordo (2014) 105.

<sup>27</sup> τούτων δὲ πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς Ἕγήμων καὶ παρ’ Αθηναίοις ἐνίκησεν ἄλλας τε παρῳδίας καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ - fr. 45 Preller.

<sup>28</sup> Polemo quotes all of the lines of this fragment, although the final four are also quoted by Chamaeleon (fr. 44 Wehrli).

<sup>29</sup> πολλοί τινες παρῳδιῶν ποιηταὶ γεγόνασιν, ὃ ἔταιρε· ἐνδοξότατος δ’ ἦν Εὔβοιος ὁ Πάριος - Ath. 15.698a.

<sup>30</sup> καὶ τὸν Βοιωτὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν Εὔβοιον τοὺς τὰς παρῳδίας γράψαντας λογίους ἀν φήσαιμι διὰ τὸ παίζειν ἀμφιδεξίως... ὃ δὲ Εὔβοιος πολλὰ μὲν εἰρηκεν ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν χαρίεντα - fr. 45 Preller.

<sup>31</sup> It is somewhat unclear what is meant by Εὔβοιώ τέρψεται οὐδ’ ὄλιγον. Should we read it as “[he] will take considerable pleasure in Euboeus” (pace Olson) or “[he] relishes Euboeus not at all” (pace Lightfoot)? While Magnelli (1999) *ad loc.* argues for the latter, Polemo’s introduction of the quotation, that both Euboeus and Boeotus are learned (λογίους) and that they were both well known in Sicily (ὅτι δὲ ἦν τις περὶ αὐτοὺς δόξα παρὰ τοῖς Σικελιώταις) suggests at least that Polemo took the lines as a positive comparison.

a poem perhaps entitled *Battle of the Bathmen*,<sup>32</sup> display a greater use of whole lines from Homer than found in Hegemon (the fragments parody *Il.* 1.275 and 1.277), similar to that found in Matro.

On the basis of their early influential status and their place in Polemo's discussion of the genre, these two authors can be classed as the *parôdic* core around which the remainder of the corpus can be classified.

Two authors are mentioned as writers of *parôidia*, although these attributions are likely instances of pseudo-*prôtos heuretês*. The attempt to find literary precursors to later genres and ideas is very common in Greek literature and so need not be taken as positive evidence that the authors really wrote in this genre. One scholiast, for instance, links Homer with sillographic poetry on the basis of Thersites' mockery of the Achaean chiefs.<sup>33</sup> The hexameter fragment of **Hippomax** (6th cent.), quoted by Polemo as evidence that he invented the genre,<sup>34</sup> must fall into this category, as has already been noted by Andrea Rotstein.<sup>35</sup> Into this category we should also place the claim that **Xenophanes of Colophon** (c. 565-470 BC)<sup>36</sup> wrote *parôidiae*. One fragment of his work (fr. 22 D-K) is said by Athenaeus to have been "in his *parôidiae*" (Χενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος ἐν παρωδίαις - 2.54e), and several texts refer to a work by Xenophanes entitled *Silloi*, which is likely the same work.<sup>37</sup> Whatever form Xenophanes' work took, it certainly had an influence on Timon's *Silloi* (see ch. 6); however, this association is also likely the cause of the retrojection of the title *Silloi* onto Xenophanes' hexameter poetry and also the association between his work and *parôidia*.<sup>38</sup> Both of these authors, then, cannot be placed in the corpus of *parôidia* although their work likely influenced the genre.

**Hermippus** (second half 5th cent.) is mentioned by Polemo as having also written *parôidiae*.<sup>39</sup> The phrasing here certainly suggests that Polemo was thinking of works separate from comedy, by

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<sup>32</sup> The precise title is unclear; Athenaeus refers to it as ή τῶν βαλανέων μάχη while Eustathius calls it ὁ στασιασμὸς ἐν βαλανείοις. The recurrent use of μάχη/-μαχία in *parôdic* titles suggests that Athenaeus' is the more probable.

<sup>33</sup> ἥδη δὲ οὐ Ξενοφάνει, ἀλλ’ Ὁμήρῳ πρώτῳ σίλλοι πεποίηνται, ἐν οἷς αὐτός τε τὸν Θεοσίτην σιλλαίνει καὶ ὁ Θεοσίτης τοὺς ἀρίστους - Σ *Il.* 2.212.

<sup>34</sup> εὑρετὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ γένους Ἰππώνακτα φατέον τὸν ἱαμβοποιόν - fr. 45 Preller.

<sup>35</sup> Rotstein (2010) 46.

<sup>36</sup> For a discussion of the dates, see Degani (1988) 1021-2.

<sup>37</sup> e.g. Σ Ar. *Eq.* 408 and Σ *Il.* 2.212. Additionally, Diogenes Laertius mentions hexameter works by Xenophanes that may also refer to the same work (γέγραφε δὲ ἐν ἔπεσι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἱάμβους καθ’ Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ὁμήρου, ἐπικόπτων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ θεῶν εἰρημένα - 9.18).

<sup>38</sup> The suggestion that the title *Silloi* was retrospectively given to Xenophanes' poetry has been suggested by Mansfeld (1993).

<sup>39</sup> πεποίηκε δὲ παρωδίας καὶ Ἔρμιππος ὁ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ποιητής - Polemo fr. 45 Preller. We possess 10 titles (although the *Suda* claims he wrote 40) and 94 citations of his comedy, for which see PCG s.v. *Hermippus* pp. 561-604. He is also known to have written *iamboi* and West's edition of elegiac and iambic fragments gives 6 fragments of iambic poetry and 3 of uncertain genre. For a discussion of the evidence for his iambic output, see Rotstein (2010) 48.

contrast to Epicharmus and Cratinus, who are only said to “use” *parôidia* in particular plays.<sup>40</sup> Two hexameter fragments in his comic output (frs. 63 and 77) suggest the influence of *parôidia* on his work and may support the evidence of Polemo. Hermippus, then, can be located within the “received *parôidia*”.

Aristotle in the *Poetics* refers to two authors who have a claim to a place in the corpus of *parôidia*. **Nicochares** (5th cent.) is mentioned alongside Hegemon of Thasos at 1448a9-14. However, Aristotle’s phrase ὁ τὰς παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος is most easily understood to refer solely to Hegemon himself.<sup>41</sup> In light of the absence of supporting evidence, there is no reason to consider Nicochares in the corpus of *parôidia*. By contrast, Aristotle quotes two hexameter lines parodying Homer that are attributed to the elder **Eucleides of Athens** (5th cent.? ).<sup>42</sup> However, the context and genre of these lines are uncertain. As Rotstein has noted, for instance, compounds formed from the name of a poem, song or genre with -ποιεῖν (e.g. Aristotle’s ιαμβοποιεῖν here) are generally not used figuratively.<sup>43</sup> Although Degani has suggested that these lines belong to *parôidia*,<sup>44</sup> neither the lines themselves nor our sources are sufficiently reliable for an accurate assessment.<sup>45</sup>

Although nothing is known of his output, **Boeotus** (early/mid. 4th cent.) frequently appears alongside Euboeus. For instance, they are both said to have been clever writers of *parôidia* by Polemo,<sup>46</sup> and they are mentioned together by Alexander Aetolus, who seems to imply that they have a similar appeal.<sup>47</sup> Also mentioned in connection with Euboeus, although this time by Matro (fr. 7), are several authors whose works are otherwise unknown: **Hermogenes**, “the noble Phillips”, and a certain **Cleonichus** (all perhaps 4th cent.). All of these authors can reasonably be situated in the “received *parôidia*”.

**Archestratus of Gela** (mid. 4th cent.)<sup>48</sup> wrote only one poem of which we are aware, the *Hedypatheia*. The generic status of this poem, however, is unclear. Athenaeus frequently cites Archestratus without any generic affiliation, although the *Hed.* is described as όαψωδίαν (4.162b) or as ἐπικόν (1.4e). There are two principle arguments for including the poem in the corpus. Firstly, Archestratus’ poem is mentioned in a work on comedy by Lycophron, arguing that the title

<sup>40</sup> For the terminology here, see Appendix 1.

<sup>41</sup> This interpretation is argued for more extensively in Appendix 1.

<sup>42</sup> οῖον Εὐκλείδης ὁ ἀρχαῖος, ως χάριον δὲ ποιεῖν εἰ τις δώσει ἐκτείνειν ἐφ' ὅποσον βούλεται, ιαμβοποιήσας ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει - 1458b6-9.

<sup>43</sup> Rotstein (2010) 45-6.

<sup>44</sup> Degani (1988).

<sup>45</sup> Rotstein (2010) 46-7 similarly argues that the evidence is inconclusive based on the ambivalence of the sources.

<sup>46</sup> καὶ τὸν Βοιωτὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν Εὔβοιον τοὺς τὰς παρωδίας γράψαντας λογίους - Polemo fr. 45 Preller.

<sup>47</sup> ὃς δὲ Βοιωτοῦ / ἔκλυεν, Εὔβοιώ τέρψεται οὐδὲ ὀλίγον - Alex. Aet. fr. 5 Magnelli; cf. n. 31 above.

<sup>48</sup> For the dating of the poem, see Olson and Sens (2000) xxi-ii, who provide a more balanced argument for the dating of the poem than Dalby (1995).

was the *Gastrology*.<sup>49</sup> It is possible that Lycophron included this work in his text due to the perceived similarities between Archestratus' poem and comedy. While in ch. 3 I argue that Archestratus does draw on comedy, we cannot say for certain that this is why the poem was mentioned by Lycophron. However, the fact remains that there are sufficient stylistic elements in his poem – the reworking of epic, humorous neologisms, etc. – for us to be able to place him at least within the “extended” corpus.

**Matro of Pitane** (late 4th cent.)<sup>50</sup> is the author most frequently cited as a parodist (*παρωδός*), primarily by Athenaeus (who once (1.5a) confuses him with Matreas of Alexandria) and Eustathius.<sup>51</sup> He can therefore be firmly placed within the “received *parōidia*”. Of his original corpus, the only poem to survive to any great extent is the *Attikon Deipnon* (AD), although we know of at least one more gastronomic poem.<sup>52</sup>

In the late 4th and early 3rd centuries, *parōidia* that satirized philosophical ideas seems to have become popular. From the Cynic school came **Crates of Thebes** (4th-3rd cent.) and **Bion of Borysthenes** (4th-3rd cent.),<sup>53</sup> who likely drew on the Cynic trend of using minor or sub-literary genres as a self-fashioned low or outsider position from which to critique society and literature.<sup>54</sup> We possess 11 hexameter fragments by Crates, although we know little about their narrative context. Given that these fragments reflect salient features of *parōidia*, and since we also possess the circumstantial evidence of Diogenes Laertius who introduces one of these fragments with the verb *παρωδέω* (Diog. Laert. 2.118 = Crates SH 347),<sup>55</sup> he can be confidently placed in the corpus of “extended *parōidia*”. This may also be applicable to Bion on the same grounds,<sup>56</sup> although this attribution must be more tentative given that we possess only two fragments (frs. 7 and 15 Kindstrand = 227-8 SH) in hexameters.

**Timon of Phlius** (early and mid. 3rd cent.)<sup>57</sup> is connected with *parōidia*, although it is unclear to what extent there was a consensus about the genre of the *Silloi*. Diogenes refers to Timon’s poem as both *iambos* and “in the form of *parōidia*” (9.110-111), and Athenaeus describes him as a sillographer (1.22d). While he cannot therefore be confidently placed in the corpus of “received *parōidia*”, the

<sup>49</sup> οὗτως γὰρ ἐπιγράφεσθαι φησι Λυκόφρων ἐν τοῖς περὶ κωμῳδίας - ap. Ath. 7.278a.

<sup>50</sup> For the dating of Matro, see Olson and Sens (1999) 3-5.

<sup>51</sup> Ath. 15.697e, 2.62c, 2.64c, 4.183a, 4.134d-7c 14.656e-f; Eust. *Comment. Ad Hom. Il.* 1.482.17, 3.829.6, 4.12.19, *ad Hom. Od.* 1.7.2, 1.389.35, 1.435.22.

<sup>52</sup> Frs. 2-6 are gastronomic in theme but do not come from the AD; cf. Olson-Sens (1999). Fr. 7 could derive from a gastronomic poem, although there is no indication of this.

<sup>53</sup> For the life of Bion, see Kindstrand (1976) 3-20.

<sup>54</sup> Branham (1993) 449.

<sup>55</sup> Note that this verb is not used specifically to refer to the genre *parōidia*, but its use by Diogenes does suggest that he to some extent recognized similarities between Crates’ work and other parodies.

<sup>56</sup> Diogenes also introduces fr. 7 with the verb *παρωδέω* at 4.52.

<sup>57</sup> On the dating of Timon, see Di Marco (1989) 1-14, Clayman (2009) 15-21.

attribution of the *Silloi* to “extended *parôidia*” is more secure. We know from Athenaeus that Timon situated his work with regard to Euboeus (15.698a = fr. 2) and the poem shares dominant features (most notably satire, shared with Euboeus especially) with *parôidia*.

**Hipparchus** (3rd cent.) is primarily known as a comic author, but Athenaeus also provides us with two fragments of an *Egyptian Iliad* probably written by the same poet.<sup>58</sup> We are told very little about this work and the emphasis on food in these fragments is more likely due to Athenaeus’ bias rather than being representative of the original poem. While a couple of the words and phrases are taken from Homeric *sedes*,<sup>59</sup> the lack of context and small sample size makes a classification of the poem into the corpus of “extended *parôidia*” uncertain.

The *BM* (2nd/1st cent. BC)<sup>60</sup> is generally regarded as the sole complete example of *parôidia*, although it is never referred to as such within antiquity. However, this may not be surprising given that the ancient sources are also divided over its authorship and date, with most attributing it to either Homer or Pigres.<sup>61</sup> Even the title frequently differs.<sup>62</sup> However, the poem does display similar features to other examples of *parôidia* and so can be included with the corpus of “extended *parôidia*”. This classification is also justifiable for the papyrus fragment of the *GM* (papyrus prob. 2nd cent. BC).<sup>63</sup> These two poems may have been part of a wider network of “animal *parôidai*”, as the *Suda* mentions other poems, including an *Arachnomachia*, *Geranomachia*, and a *Psaromachia*.<sup>64</sup> However, these are only known to us as titles, and we can only guess what form they may have taken.

Several other fragments have been transmitted to us without an author or title. Many are quoted in the work of Athenaeus,<sup>65</sup> although others derive from Aristotle,<sup>66</sup> and one fragment comes from an etymological codex.<sup>67</sup> Two additional fragments survive through Dio Chrysostom’s 32nd oration (frs. 8a and b). The final *parôidic* fragment is contained in Galen’s *Protrepticus* (cap. 13 p. 35-7 Kühn).<sup>68</sup> Too little information exists about the majority of these poems to be classed within

<sup>58</sup> Ath. 3.101a and 9.393c.

<sup>59</sup> 496.1 *SH* καλὰ πρόσωπα is found at *Il.* 19.295 and *Od.* 8.85, 15.332; cf. *Od.* 18.192. 497.1 *SH* Αἰγυπτίων is only found in that position in the line, at *Od.* 14.263 = 17.432.

<sup>60</sup> For the dating of the *BM*, see Wackernagel (1916); cf. Wölke (1978), Glei (1984).

<sup>61</sup> For the attribution to Homer: Martial *Epig.* 14.183, Statius *Praef ad Silv.* 1, Anth. Graec. App. 90, Thomas Magist. *Ecl nom. et verb. Att. α 2, π 284*; for Pigres, see esp. Plutarch *De Herodoti Malignitate* 873f.

<sup>62</sup> βατραχομαχία, μυομαχία, μυοβατραχομαχία, and βατραχομυομαχία are all attested; see for example *Suda Lexicon o 251*, *Vita Proculea Homeri* 102.

<sup>63</sup> Originally published by Schibli (1983) and subsequently by West (2003).

<sup>64</sup> *Suda o 251*; cf. *Suda Vita Homeri* 102.

<sup>65</sup> Ath. 6.270c and e, 13.571b.

<sup>66</sup> *Rhet.* 3.1412a29 and one has been restored from the Arabic version of the *Poetics* as 1457a34.

<sup>67</sup> Cod. Vossianus Etym. Magn. s.v. βροτολοιγός.

<sup>68</sup> Some parts of the fragment are quoted, and others are paraphrased. The fragment has been “restored” by Haupt (1873).

the corpus of the “received *parôidia*”,<sup>69</sup> although many might be classed amongst the “extended *parôidia*”.

### **Characteristics of the genre**

Now that we have explored the limits of what can reasonably be included in the corpus of *parôidia*, we can look in more detail at its key characteristics. In scholarship, two definitions of the genre have been prominent. First, despite its age, is Householder’s classic formulation: ‘a narrative poem of moderate length, in epic meter, using epic vocabulary, and treating a light, satirical, or mock-heroic subject.’<sup>70</sup> A more recent trend has been to label *parôidia* as *Eposparodie*, which follows Degani’s summary of the evidence of the fragments: ‘La parodia, come genere, nacque e si diffuse come *Eposparodie*.’<sup>71</sup> Both of these definitions focus primarily on *parôidia*’s engagement with epic. While this is certainly the most prominent and distinctive feature of the genre, in this section I would like to explore in more detail what we gain from appreciating the bigger picture.

The fragment of Alexander Aetolus that features Euboeus and Boeotus is a good example of why this might be necessary (fr. 5 Magnelli). While on the one hand he does mention parody of epic as a distinguishing feature of Boeotus’ work (*εὗ παρὸ Ομηρείην ἀγλαῖην ἐπέων* - 6), he also provides an important testimony that reflects a perception of the kinds of subjects covered in these poems (*πισύγγους ή φῶρας ἀναιδέας ή τινα χλούνην / φλύοντ' ἀνθηρῆ σὺν κακοδαμονίῃ* - 7-8). While in part Alexander seems to be making a point of the contrast between Homeric verse and low content (*ἀγλαῖην* by contrast to *ἀναιδέας*, *φλύοντ'*, and *κακοδαμονίῃ*), the lines are nevertheless a significant reflection of how the genre was received.<sup>72</sup> Moving beyond the label *Eposparodie*, that is, provides us with a more rounded picture of *parôidia*. In this section, I shall focus on two facets of the genre in particular: firstly, the performance and reading contexts of the poems; secondly, the literary context and *parôidia*’s engagement with other genres. The latter in particular draws on recent scholarship that has significantly increased our understanding of the interaction

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<sup>69</sup> The one exception is fr. 4, the quotation of which is capped by Athenaeus with the phrase ὡς τις ἔφη τῶν παρωδῶν. For this one fragment, therefore, we have grounds to place it within the “received *parôidia*”.

<sup>70</sup> Householder (1944) 3.

<sup>71</sup> Degani (1983) 22. He does go on to consider that Oenopas was a parodist, following the evidence of Aristoxenus fr. 136 Wehrli. I do not think that Aristoxenus is using *παρωδὴ* in a generic sense in this fragment (for the argument, see Appendix 2).

<sup>72</sup> This fragment even throws into relief Sens (2006)’s categorization of Hellenistic *parôidia* into three groups based on their primary subject matter: “battle narrative”; “philosophical” parodies; and “gastronomic” parodies.

between different genres, especially in the 5th and 4th centuries.<sup>73</sup> These two approaches help to illuminate how *parōidia* functioned in its own context and supports my analysis throughout this thesis which argues that *parōidia* was more concerned with current literary concerns than past literature.

#### *Audiences and readers*

The best evidence for the performance of *parōidia* derives from the didaskalic record. This evidence is also corroborated by testimonia from the likes of Polemo. From a combination of these two, we can confidently say that *parōidia* was performed in a range of festival contexts throughout Greece over a potentially long period (possibly 5th century BC to 2nd AD). However, this does not mean that all of our texts were originally performed in this context, and they may also have been performed or reperformed in symposia. Finally, despite the paucity of evidence, it is likely that some authors wrote with an eye to their reception in books.

There are four inscriptions in which parodists may be mentioned performing in a category of poetic competition. Two of these provide fairly secure readings of parodists' involvement in *mousikoi agônes*. *IG XII* 9.189, from Eretria sometime after 340 BC, mentions parodists alongside rhapsodists, *aulos*-singers, and *kithara*-players and their accompanying singers as contestants in the contests (lines 10-11), and goes on to specify that the parodists received the smallest prizes: 50 drachmas for the winner and 10 for the loser (lines 20-1). Secondly, *IG XI<sup>2</sup>* 120, from Delos in 236 BC, although highly fragmentary does mention at least one parodist (line 48).

In two further inscriptions, the presence of *parōidic* performances has been supplemented to the text. *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2311 is a prize list for the events of the Great Panathenaea around 380 BC, surviving in two fragments. Rotstein has recently suggested that fragment B of this inscription should be restored to include performances of *synaulia* and *parōidia*.<sup>74</sup> As helpful as this restoration would be for filling in the gaps of our limited knowledge about *parōidia*, for our purposes we should note that Rotstein's basis for her suggestion is in part doubts concerning the previously suggested comparison with the programme of the Artemisia and in part using categories that are already attested in connection with Athens and the Panathenaea. It would be highly circular to construct a history of *parōidic* performance from an inscription restored on the basis of the history of *parōidic* performance. Finally, in *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2153, a 2nd-3rd cent. AD ephebic inscription,  $\pi\lambda\alpha\varphi\delta\omega\iota$  is the most

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<sup>73</sup> The edited volume by Bakola, Prauscello, and Telò (2013) covers comedy specifically in a variety of contexts; for tragedy and comedy, see Foley (2008), Zuckerberg (2016); Shaw (2010) and (2014) discusses the interaction between comedy and satyr drama; Hanink (2014b) covers tragedy, comedy, and satyr drama.

<sup>74</sup> Rotstein (2012) 102-5.

likely reconstruction, as the space only allows for a single letter.<sup>75</sup> Given the very late dating of this inscription, if this restoration is correct, it would be highly suggestive of the continued lifespan of *parôidia* as a competitive genre, and this is indeed how the inscription has been interpreted by Degani.<sup>76</sup>

The performance of *parôidia* as a separate category in the *mousikoi agônes* of several Greek cities is confirmed by the poems and testimonia concerning the parodists. In Hegemon fragment 1, it is already clear that the original text was publicly performed during a competition, as Hegemon himself says that a *mina* drove him onto the performance stage but that he won only 50 drachmas among the Athenians.<sup>77</sup> We also know from the testimonies of Chamaeleon and Polemo that Hegemon performed in Athens.<sup>78</sup> If, then, Hegemon's performances in Athens took place at the Panathenaea, this context helps us make sense of the intervention of Athena at the end of the fragment and her use of the ὁάρδος (for its supposed etymological association with rhapsody).<sup>79</sup>

From this evidence, it is clear that *parôidia* was performed in *mousikoi agônes* at various festivals throughout Greece, potentially over a long period (5th cent. BC until 2nd cent. AD). It is unlikely to have been consistently performed over this period, but seems to have flourished particularly from the late 5th to the end of the 4th century. As Rotstein has suggested, rather than simply parodying epic, as is commonly thought, *parôidia*'s performance at the Panathenaea and elsewhere would have invited poets to parody the whole range of rhapsodic material, including not only Homer and Hesiod but also Archilochus.<sup>80</sup> An analysis of the competitive performance context suggests that we should go beyond viewing *parôidia* as being simply *Eposparodie*, but as part of a more diverse literary context.

By contrast, it is also important to remember that this is not the only possible context for the production of *parôidia*. Not only does the approach adopted thus far not take reperformance into account, but we also have some good evidence for the performance of Archestratus' *Hedypatheia* in symposia. Although we cannot be certain for what context this poem was written, one fragment of Clearchus attests that already by the end of the 4th cent. it was popular in symposia, as he contrasts the "degenerate" people in his time, who are devotees of Philaenis and Archestratus, with

<sup>75</sup> Rotstein (2012) 109; cf. Robert (1936) 251-4, who suggests that *IG XII8 87* also refers to *parodic* competition on the basis of the word σπουδογέλοιος.

<sup>76</sup> Degani (1983) 21.

<sup>77</sup> The fragment is quoted in full in ch. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Chamaeleon fr. 44 Wehrli: ἐν δὲ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ οὗτω σφόδρα τοὺς Αθηναίους ἐκήλησεν, ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ πλεῖστα αὐτοὺς γελάσαι, καίτοι ἀγγελθέντων αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τῶν γενομένων περὶ Σικελίαν ἀτυχημάτων; Polemo fr. 45 Preller: τούτων [sc. παρωδιῶν] δὲ πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς Ἡγήμων καὶ παρ' Αθηναίοις ἐνίκησεν ἄλλαις τε παρωδίαις καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ. Note that the reference to the *thymelê* is Polemon's own modernization; cf. Pöhlmann (1972) 153 n. 52.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. also the phrase κακῶς κακὰ ὁαψωδοῦσιν (9).

<sup>80</sup> Rotstein (2012) 109-10.

those who engage in the more serious and erudite discussion of philosophy (fr. 63 Wehrli).<sup>81</sup> At the same time, it would appear that this poem was also available as a book. In the fifth book of *On the Good and Pleasure*, Chrysippus refers to people who learn poems by the likes of Archestratus and Philaenis by heart. That this process of memorization is also part of Archestratus' own rhetoric in the poem may suggest that he expected (however humorously or ironically) his audiences also to read his poem.<sup>82</sup>

Although some *parôidic* poems became rare and obscure,<sup>83</sup> other authors enjoyed more success, with editions of their books surviving into the Imperial period.<sup>84</sup> Together with the circumstantial evidence of Archestratus' *Hedypatheia*, it is likely that some *parôidic* authors also had an eye on a potential readership. Timon of Phlius, for instance, whose *Silloi* were originally structured in three books, is a particularly good candidate in this regard, especially considering the awareness he demonstrates in the poem for the transmission and availability of books.<sup>85</sup> Despite the likelihood that some *parôidic* poems were originally performed in symposia or circulated as books, however, we should not overstate the case here. From the didaskalic evidence, it would appear that performance in *mousikoi agônes* remained the main context for *parôidia* into the Imperial period.

### *Parôidia and other genres*

How different genres interact, develop out of or alongside each other has long been of particular interest in scholarship. Indeed, it can in part be traced back to Aristotle's *Poetics*, in which he sees tragedy and comedy as derived from epic and iambic poetry respectively.<sup>86</sup> Comedy's relationship with *iambos*, amongst other forms of generic interaction, has been the centre of much recent scholarship.<sup>87</sup> Very little, by contrast, has been said about the place of *parôidia* in this generic network.<sup>88</sup> Focusing particularly on *parôidia*'s relationship with comedy and *iambos*, I shall begin by outlining the contexts in which they interacted. I shall subsequently analyse *how* they interacted

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<sup>81</sup> For a discussion of the performance context of this poem, see P.S Martin (2016) 146-7.

<sup>82</sup> ἐκμανθάνειν τ' αὐτοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ κτᾶσθαι τὰ περὶ τούτων γεγραμμένα Φιλαινίδι καὶ Αρχεστράτω καὶ τοῖς τὰ ὄμοια γράψασιν - Chrysipp. Treatise XXVIII fr. 5 ap. Ath. 8.335b; cf. *Hed.* frs. 5.2, 37.5-6.

<sup>83</sup> E.g. Matro's *AD*; Athenaeus claims to quote Matro's *AD* at such length "because of its scarcity" (διὰ τὸ σπάνιον - Ath. 4.134d-7c)

<sup>84</sup> Euboeus, for instance, is known to have written four books of *parôidiae* (Ath. 15.698a-b).

<sup>85</sup> πολλῶν δ' ἀργυρίων ὀλίγην ἡλλάξαο βίβλον, / ἐνθεν ἀπαρχόμενος τιμαιογραφεῖν ἐδιδάχθης - fr. 54; βιβλιακοί - fr. 12.

<sup>86</sup> παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας καὶ κωμῳδίας οἱ ἐφ' ἔκατέρων τὴν ποίησιν ὁρμῶντες κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ τῶν ίάμβων κωμῳδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγῳδοδιάσκαλοι - *Poet.* 1449a2-5.

<sup>87</sup> See particularly Rosen (1988a) and (2013), Zanetto (2001), E. Bowie (2002); cf. n. 72.

<sup>88</sup> Wilkins (2000) 354-68 and Rotstein (2010) 45-7, 54-7 are notable exceptions.

and how an appreciation of this interaction benefits our understanding of *parôidia* in general. In this analysis, I have been influenced by Alastair Fowler's work on generic transformations. Among the categories he outlines for the development of genres, several involve some interaction with other works.<sup>89</sup> When conceptualized as *Eposparodie*, for instance, we might frame *parôidia* as a kind of counterstatement, 'a diametrically opposed masterpiece,'<sup>90</sup> whereby a text or genre reacts against or acts as an answering voice to another genre. Two of Fowler's categories will prove helpful for my discussion here: combination, the addition of generic repertoires to form a new genre or text; and change of scale, which is defined as either *macrologia* or *brachylogia*, the extension or contraction of generic elements respectively.

There are three main grounds for suggesting that some kind of relationship existed between *parôidia* and comedy and/or *iambos*: performative, authorial, and perceived. Firstly, that is, *parôidia* shared a performative context with *iambos* and perhaps later occasionally comedy; secondly, some authors of *parôidia* also wrote comedy and/or *iambos*; and, finally, in some sources there is a perceived association between these genres. Regarding the final category, we should note that ancient scholars are not always the best witnesses, sometimes divorced by several centuries from the writers they discuss, and cannot be taken as inherently reliable.

The performance of different genres in the same festival context may certainly be said to contribute to some form of generic interaction (compare, for instance, the relationship between comedy and tragedy). As we have already seen, Archilochean *iambos* and *parôidia* shared a performance context at the Panathenaea and provides a strong starting point for a consideration of their interaction. Indeed, Andrea Rotstein has already suggested that publicly performed *parôidia* was not simply *Eposparodie*, in the sense of the parody of *only* epic, but encompassed the parody of all of the rhapsodized poets, that is poets whose poetry was performed in rhapsodic competitions.<sup>91</sup> I shall develop her argument further regarding the *parôidic* fragment of Hegemon in chapter 1, where I suggest that Hegemon draws on tropes common to several rhapsodized poets, including Archilochus. As we shall see, it is not simply the shared performance context that drives Hegemon's relationship with Archilochus, but it may also have been influenced by their shared connection with Thasos. Although the evidence for a shared performance context for *iambos* and *parôidia* is stronger during the 5th and 4th cent., IG II<sup>2</sup> 2153 (2nd-3rd cent. AD) also suggests that at some point comedy and *parôidia* could be performed at the same festival. It is, however, unclear

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<sup>89</sup> A. Fowler (1982) 170-90.

<sup>90</sup> Guillén (1971) 146-58, cf. A. Fowler (1982) 174-9.

<sup>91</sup> Rotstein (2012); Plato *Ion* 530d-31b mentions Hesiod and Archilochus in addition to Homer as poets whose poetry was performed rhapsodically. For further references, see P. Murray (1996) *ad loc.*

from the state of the text whether these are newly written or old performances, and so we cannot say with much confidence what kind of relationship this may have entailed.<sup>92</sup>

In the *Pros Timaeon*, Polemo claims that some authors wrote both comedy and *parôidia*, including Hermippus and Hegemon (fr. 45 Preller). Although Hermippus is not otherwise known to have written *parôidia*, the evidence for Hegemon is much stronger, as he is also mentioned putting on a play by Chamaeleon (fr. 44 Wehrli). Additionally, we have some evidence that Hermippus wrote *iamboi* (e.g. Ath. 2.76c and 15.700d). While the composition of different genres by the same author does not inherently mean that they are related, the thematic connections between the *parôidic* and comic fragments of Hegemon for instance may be indicative of some overlap in generic interests.

Finally, we have a good amount of suggestive evidence that there was a perceived relationship between *parôidia* and comedy / *iambos*. The evidence is clearest in the fragment of Polemo discussed above, in which he claims that Hipponax was the founder of the genre (an example of pseudo-*prôtos heuretês*), and then tells us that Epicharmus in some of his plays and Cratinus in the *Euneidae* “used” *parôidia*.<sup>93</sup> Likewise Chamaeleon in a treatise *On Old Comedy* refers to fragment 1 of Hegemon’s *parôidic* work in order to explain his nickname, Lentil-Soup (fr. 44 Wehrli), and the correct title of Archestratus’ poem is discussed in Lynceus’ own treatise on comedy (fr. 19 Strecker = Ath. 7.278a-b). While none of these testimonies are certain evidence for the genres’ interaction, the combination of the performative, authorial, and perceived associations between the genres is highly suggestive of some connections between *parôidia*, *iambos*, and comedy.

If we are correct to posit a relationship between these genres, what kind of relationship was this? Here I shall focus on four elements that are shared between *parôidia* and comedy and/or *iambos*: thematic concerns, formal elements, language, and metre. I am not suggesting that such generic interaction was necessarily unidirectional or came from a single source. Rather the opposite: some features are found in all three genres, and there is some evidence that the influences did not simply go from one genre to another, but was part of a dynamic process of interaction.

There are several themes found in *parôidia*, comedy, and *iambos* that could suggest that they interacted in part through these shared interests. It is not necessary to cover all of these themes in detail, and so I shall focus here on the most glaring shared topic: gastronomy.<sup>94</sup> Not only is food

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<sup>92</sup> For the performance of comedy in the Imperial period, see Graf (2016) and Peterson (2016) with further bibliography.

<sup>93</sup> κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ Συρακόσιος ἐν τισι τῶν δραμάτων ἐπ' ὀλίγον καὶ Κρατῖνος ὁ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ποιητὴς ἐν Εὐνείδαις.

<sup>94</sup> Other shared themes include fable and perhaps also philosophy, if Scythinus’ *Peri Physeōs* (apparently a versification of Heraclitus) was connected with his iambic poetry.

the subject of Matro and Archestratus' poems, but it is also prominent in Hegemon's work.<sup>95</sup> Food and drink is already a recurrent concern in *iambos*: we might compare, for instance, Ananius fr. 5, which describes which foods are best in which season, with Archestratus' *Hedypatheia*, which frequently mentions the seasonality of particular dishes.<sup>96</sup> From the perspective of comedy, we might think of the figure of the *mageiros*. John Wilkins has already noted the similarities between Hegemon and the comic *mageiros*,<sup>97</sup> and in chapter 3 I explore in more detail the similarities between the persona of Archestratus and comic *mageiroi*. Furthermore, there is evidence that some comedy was influenced by the treatment of gastronomy in *parôidia*. The hexameter cookbook of Plato Comicus' *Phaon*, for instance, displays a number of similarities with Archestratus (fr. 189), and the cook in Strato fr. 1 speaks in a densely Homeric manner reminiscent of *parôidic* works in general. While the precise relationship between these passages and *parôidia* is unclear, one character in Dionysius certainly expresses more open criticism of Archestratus' gastronomic authority.<sup>98</sup> It would seem, then, that *parôidia* incorporated, or combined in Fowler's terms, comedy and *iambos'* interest in gastronomy into its repertoire.

While comedy, as a dramatic form, has a very different kind of narrative form to *parôidia*, the formal, narrative elements of the genre are closer to those of *iambos*. Ewen Bowie has suggested that narrative is an essential component of *iambos*, and that, if this is correct, this would 'diminish the importance within *iambos* of that element which has most often been seen as linking it closely with comedy, abuse.'<sup>99</sup> While this may be a point of contrast between comedy and *iambos*, it could be a point of overlap between *iambos* and *parôidia*. As an example, let us consider Hermippus fr. 4. Although only two lines of tetrameter, the fragment tells of a journey in the first person; while this fragment likely owes some debt to a play with Odysseus' travels and is stylistically similar to comedy (especially σπληνόπεδον), the kind of narrative told is structurally reminiscent of Hegemon's fragment, although there he is returning home, not travelling.<sup>100</sup> However, we possess too little of the narratives of *parôidia* and *iambos* to discern any strong influences.

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<sup>95</sup> Not only did he write a (probably *parôidic*) *Deipnon* or *Deipna* (Ath. 1.5a), but it is also emphasized in our only fragment of his *parôidia* (N.B. ll. 10, 14-5, 20).

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Archestr. frs. 29, 31, 33-7. For food and drink in *iambos*, see also Archil. frs. 120, 124, 167, 194 (also fr. 2, which is elegiac), Hippon. frs. 26 and 26a, 128, 155, Anan. fr. 3.

<sup>97</sup> Wilkins (2000) 355: 'Notable elements here are the mild scapegoating of Hegemon, the personal narrative, and the self-mocking presentation of the narrator, all of which will have analogues in the speeches of *mageiroi* and parasites in Middle Comedy.' Although I should note that many of these features might also connect Hegemon's *persona* in this fragment with the iambic poets. For further on the connections between Hegemon and comedy, see ch. 2.

<sup>98</sup> Αρχέστρατος γέγραφέ τε καὶ δοξάζεται / παρὰ τισιν οὔτως ὡς λέγων τι χρήσιμον. / τὰ πολλὰ δ' ἴγνωντε κούδε ἐν λέγει - fr. 2.24-6.

<sup>99</sup> E. Bowie (2002) 36-7, building on the argument of E. Bowie (2001).

<sup>100</sup> Cf. perhaps also *Margites* fr. 1.

It is possible to observe several linguistic features that are common in *parôidia*, *iambos*, and comedy. In all of these genres, for instance, we find the use of obscenity,<sup>101</sup> sexual innuendo,<sup>102</sup> and neologisms.<sup>103</sup> However, the similarities here should not be overstated. While such features are present, on the basis of the surviving material we would have to conclude that in *parôidia* there was much less obscenity and sexual humour.<sup>104</sup> The use of such humour seems, in this case, to be a contraction, or *brachylogia* in Fowler's terms, in favour of other elements, such as wordplay or epic parody.

Finally, it is possible that occasionally poems including dactylic hexameters were termed *iamboi*,<sup>105</sup> which could suggest that some iambic poetry could be viewed in some sense as a fore-runner to *parôidia*. The best example of this is Polemo's statement, citing fr. 128, that Hipponax is the inventor of *parôidia* (εύρετὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ γένους Ἰππώνακτα φατέον τὸν ἱαμβοποιόν - fr. 45 Preller). Scholarly approaches to this fragment have treated it as either parodying epic,<sup>106</sup> or designed to evoke magical incantations.<sup>107</sup> I would not treat this as an "either/or" situation, but rather as "both/and"; the fragment can well be understood as blending together epic and magical language in a playfully allusive or parodic manner. For our purposes, however, Polemo's quotation of the fragment is a witness to how Hipponax' poem could be understood. Hipponax' use of hexameters can easily be viewed, in combination with other poems such as the *Margites*, *Epikichlides*, and the hexameters of Xenophanes, as precursors to the development of *parôidia*. This influence is most clear in Timon, who has Xenophanes (whom he describes as Ὄμηραπάτης in fr. 60) guide him in the underworld. If we are right to see the use of hexameter in *parôidia* as developing from such works, some of which combined hexameter and iambic meters, this would be a

<sup>101</sup> E.g. Hegem. fr. 1.2 - πολλοῖσι σπελέθοισι, Archest. fr. 11.1 - τὴν ἀφύην μίνθου.

<sup>102</sup> Διὸς εὐχετ' ἐν ἀγκοίνησι μιγῆναι - Matr. AD 39, πόρναι θαυματοποιοί - 121, perhaps also fr. 6; Archest. was also associated with sexual pleasure by Daphnis the Ephesian at Ath. 3.116f-17b (οἱ περιπλεύσας τὴν οἰκουμένην τῆς γαστρὸς ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν γαστέρα φησι), cf. Olson and Sens (2000) n. ad fr. 39.

<sup>103</sup> Neologisms can be found in numerous parodic authors. In Archedstr., some are designed to appear "high" in style (e.g. ισοχρυσος, ἐλειότροφος - fr. 16, στρογγυλοδίνητος fr. 5.11, στενοκύμων - fr. 17.1) and are perhaps comparable to comedy's parodic neologisms, while others are more purely comic, e.g. κουφαττελεβώδη - fr. 24.14 and ἀλαζονοχαννοφλύαροι - fr. 59.12. Neologisms are also found in Matro (φυκόθροιξ - AD 26, χονδροφυής - AD 27, ὄψιφόρος - AD 47, ἀνθεσίχρως - AD 51, ἡβητής - AD 78) and very common in Timon of Phlius (there are over 40 in the 135 fragments of the *Silloi*, e.g. ὄχλοάρεσκος - fr. 34, λαβάρογνος - fr. 18, and πλατυρημοσύνης - fr. 35). For Timon's use of neologisms, see Clayman (2009) 131-2.

<sup>104</sup> It is quite possible that this may be a bias from the surviving material. Matro's AD would a good candidate for more sexual humour if this poem had survived in full.

<sup>105</sup> Rotstein (2010) 45-7.

<sup>106</sup> Gerber (1970) 300 says 'Hipponax parodies Homer,' West (1974) 30 calls it 'parody,' Knox (1989) 118 'a ludicrous travesty of Homeric style.' Masson (1949) 315-9 suggested that the victim is Arete (usually assumed to be Bupalus' mother on the basis of fr. 12: οἱ μητροκοίτης Βούπαλος σὺν Αρήτῃ) and that the poem was a parody of the *Odyssey*.

<sup>107</sup> Faraone (2004).

case of *macrologia* as *parôidia* extends both the use of the hexameter and then ultimately also engages even more closely with epic verses.

In this section, I have proposed a number of ways in which we can reconstruct the interaction between *parôidia* and genres other than epic. While some of my claims here must be made cautiously, as we do not possess sufficient evidence to examine the question in detail, the picture of *parôidia* that emerges more generally is of a genre that is closely engaged with contemporary comedy, especially during the fifth and fourth centuries. We also see the genre's ties to *iambos*, in terms of its performance context as well as as a development of *iambos'* personal narratives, and its extension of the use of hexameter in works such as the *Margites*.

### *Just Eposparodie?*

I began this discussion of the characteristics of *parôidia* by considering the definitions of Householder and Degani, both of whom emphasize the genre's relationship with epic. While I do not contend that the description of *parôidia* as *Eposparodie* (one of the most widely used descriptions of the genre) expresses the genre's most characteristic feature, in the sense of what makes it different from comedy or *iambos*, we should avoid reducing the genre to "just" *Eposparodie*. My analysis of the genre's performance context and interaction with other genres is intended to demonstrate aspects of the genre *other* than its parody of epic. In particular, I have emphasized how *parôidia* engages closely with contemporary literature and performance. At the Panathenaea and other festivals, it is not just epic that is being parodied, but rhapsodic performances more generally. Similarly, *parôidia*'s shared use, for instance, of gastronomy as a metaphor for poetic production (which I shall discuss in more detail in chapters 1 and 2) clearly expresses how this genre is not simply rehashing old material, but involved in current poetic concerns. Throughout its long performance history, extending perhaps even into the Imperial period, *parôidia* remains a reflection of the changes occurring across Greek literature.

### ΠΑΡΟΙΔΙΑ AS MODE

Now that we have explored the limits of our knowledge of *parôidia*, we can move onto a discussion of the mode of parody. In this section, while parody can be understood as a transhistorical term, I argue that we must approach the notion of parody primarily with specific reference to the language in which parody is described by the Greeks. Parody, from my perspective, is transhistorical with culturally and temporally specific instantiations. In order to understand how the Greeks understood parody, therefore, we must look at how they describe it and the terms with

which it is associated. My approach is based in two theoretical approaches drawn from cognitive linguistics and cognitive poetics, namely the ideas of “construal” and “script”. These approaches allow us to see how an individual’s understanding of parody is always an expression of their subjectivity. This extends to scholarship on parody; as I shall show, scholars’ analyses of parody are always based on their own preoccupations. At the same time, the notion of script suggests that our ideas about parody are shaped by cultural preconceptions, an approach which explains why particular ideas are frequently associated with parody. We possess, that is, a set of expectations about parody, which we can label the parodic script. Each individual expression of what parody is is guided by this notion of script but the choice of particular terms rather than others is a form of construal. The rest of this section will then turn to examine the particular set of terms through which ideas about parody are expressed in Greek thought, including laughter, mockery, play, nonsense, and irony.

### **A cognitive approach to parody**

A major question we face when trying to analyse how the Greeks conceived of parody is how different our own perspective is. To what extent is parody embedded in a specific culture, in a single time and place? As we shall see, answering this question helps us to answer associated problems facing the definition of parody. In this section, I argue that, while we can apply the term parody transhistorically, a full appreciation of its nuances requires an approach that recognizes its specific temporal and cultural connotations.

Since the application of modern terms to ancient literature is a widespread problem, a comparison with another approach that uses modern terminology in this way is helpful for analysing its limitations. Ralph Rosen, for instance, rationalized the application of “political mockery” to ancient literature thus:

To say that Aristophanes engages in political mockery is to say that the poet does something that we have observed in other poets as well, and in so doing we presuppose the existence of a structuring system that transcends historical localization. Aristophanes’ political mockery may take a different form from Juvenal’s centuries later, but we are still able to identify both as examples of a similar phenomenon.<sup>108</sup>

For Rosen, we can apply modern terminology transculturally and transhistorically because political mockery, to take his example, is identifiable through comparison to other instances that

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<sup>108</sup> Rosen (2007) 16-7.

we, as readers, bring to bear in understanding each text. We therefore implicitly conceive of a ‘structuring system that transcends historical localization.’<sup>109</sup> Although this is to some extent true and necessary for literary criticism, it does not negate the importance of a culturally specific understanding. Greek comedy, for instance, is frequently discussed in terms of ὄνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν,<sup>110</sup> while Roman satire is often couched in the language of *libertas* or *simplicitas* (Hor. *Serm.* 1.4.5, Quint. 10.1.94, Mart. 1.*praef.*7-9).<sup>111</sup> Likewise for parody, while irony is at the centre of Linda Hutcheon’s influential book on parody, we shall see that only once in antiquity is parody directly associated with irony (Agathias *Hist.* 173).<sup>112</sup> Therefore, although unlike Hutcheon I think we can define parody transhistorically insofar as it is recognizable and the terminology according to which parody is construed is frequently similar, we must understand parody as principally a culturally specific phenomenon.

Throughout this thesis, I maintain that parody is a subjective concept that is influenced by the time and place in which it is produced. This position on the inherently subjective nature of the term parody can be clarified with reference to two approaches drawn from cognitive approaches to language and literature. First is the notion of “construal”, a term that ‘was introduced to capture aspects of conceptualization that cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of the object of conceptualization but require reference to a *subject*’s perception, choice, or point of view.’<sup>113</sup> The way in which situations can be differently construed vary considerably, and numerous different frameworks or means of categorization for the notion of construal have been proposed.<sup>114</sup> For our purposes, Aristoxenus’ comparison of *parōidia* to the kitharodic poetry of Oenopas will clarify several different aspects of construal: ὡσπερ τῶν ἔξαμέτων τινὲς ἐπὶ τὸ γελοῖον παρῳδᾶς εὗρον, οὕτως καὶ τῆς κιθαρῳδίας πρώτος Οἰνώπας (fr. 136 Wehrli). If we focus on how the word παρῳδᾶς in this sentence is construed (in Appendix 1 I consider what precisely this word might mean), we find three elements of construal. Firstly, it is established *in relation to* the work of Oenopas (ὡσπερ... οὕτως καὶ); secondly, it is perceived at a level of granularity, in that Aristoxenus means not παρῳδᾶς in general but specifically παρῳδᾶς of hexameters; and finally, it is given a particular descriptor (ἐπὶ τὸ γελοῖον), which brings out an individual (but not every)

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<sup>109</sup> A similar approach is taken by Silk (2013) with regard to the concept of genre. Using the example of the extreme contrast between the repertoires of Old and New Comedy to demonstrate the problem of identifying κωμῳδία solely through contextual markers, he says (p. 24) ‘the example makes it evident how necessary it is to confront these issues from a perspective wider than a historically delimited “single culture”’.

<sup>110</sup> Halliwell (1984) discusses ancient interpretations of this term.

<sup>111</sup> For *libertas* in Roman satire in particular, see Braund (2004).

<sup>112</sup> Hutcheon (1985).

<sup>113</sup> Verhagen (2007) 58.

<sup>114</sup> Langacker (1987) 116-37 and (1993), Talmy (1988) and (2000), Croft and Cruise (2004) 40-73, Verhagen (2007).

feature of the term.<sup>115</sup> While, therefore, we might find Aristoxenus' comparison here helpful, the notion of construal allows us to see more clearly how his description of  $\pi\alpha\varrho\delta\grave{\alpha}\varsigma$  is designed to fit his specific context.

While the notion of construal helps us to see how individual articulations focus on specific features of parody rather than the entire range of meanings attributable to it, the idea of a "script" allows us to go beyond an analysis of these articulations as fundamentally idiosyncratic and to clarify how certain descriptions of parody are motivated by a shared sense of parody as a cultural phenomenon. A script or schema 'is a socioculturally defined mental protocol for negotiating a situation.'<sup>116</sup> These situations (provided we have some knowledge of them) evoke a certain set of expectations that we use to comprehend how we should respond to them. A script, like a genre, may include core and peripheral features.<sup>117</sup> They also may be complementary: as I have already noted, the language used to describe some parodists overlaps with that used to describe comedians or iambic poets. On the one hand, therefore, we might speak of a "parodic script" that is constituted of some common means by which parody is construed (play, mockery, and so on); on the other hand, as we shall see, parody may itself be part of another script.

These approaches help to explain why modern scholarship frequently differs in its analysis of parody. Even on points where scholarship agrees, e.g. parody as a form of intertextuality, there are significant differences in approaches. A brief analysis of some of the current approaches to parody, from Classical scholarship and beyond, underlines the point made above that a more flexible, cognitively informed approach to parody develops our understanding of usage.

The central point of convergence between different theories of parody might well be termed parody's intertextuality. Parody always creates some kind of relationship between itself and (an)other text(s). In ancient discussions of parody, this intertextual aspect takes different names. It may for instance be referred to as imitation (Lat. *imitatio*, Grk. μιμήσις), such as in Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* where he describes  $\pi\alpha\varrho\delta\grave{\eta}$  as *canticis ad aliorum similitudinem modulatis* and *uersificationis ac sermonum imitatione* (9.2.35). Alternatively, a later influential formulation of parody as transformation is reflected in a scholiast to Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, according to which parody is the change from tragedy into comedy (ὅταν ἐκ τραγῳδίας τι μετενεχθῇ εἰς κωμῳδίαν - Σ Ach. 8).

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<sup>115</sup> This latter facet of construal is variously termed as selection, prominence, attention, or attention/salience in the bibliography above.

<sup>116</sup> Stockwell (2002) 77.

<sup>117</sup> Take for instance Stockwell's example of the "pub script": this script involves particular features (a bar, beer pumps, chairs, tables, etc.) and actions (ordering at the bar, payment at the bar, etc.). Some features of the pub script, however, are more optional. There may or may not be a pool table or darts, a live band, a pub quiz, and so on.

This balancing act performed by parody, between imitation and alteration, nevertheless has been understood in different ways. The Russian Formalist Tynyanov, for instance, conceived of parody's intertextuality as the creation of a "double-planed" work, that is to say that the text operates both on a surface level and on the level of the intertext, creating alternative possibilities of meaning.<sup>118</sup> Bakhtin, to a certain extent following Tynyanov, conceived of parody as "double-voiced".<sup>119</sup> Unlike Tynyanov, however, Bakhtin places a greater emphasis on the oppositional elements of parodic intertextuality, for instance between high and low in the Carnival. More recently, by contrast, Chambers, reacting to the dichotomization of parody into specific and general, claimed that too much emphasis has been given to specific parody.<sup>120</sup> Both Tynyanov's "double-planed" and Bakhtin's "double-voiced" parody suffer from this problem. Parody can be described as "double" anything only if there is a correlation between the parody and a *single* parodied text. It might be better, taking into account a broader concept of parody that is potentially both general and can incorporate *numerous* parodied texts, to describe parody as "multi-voiced". Already we can see how parody can be construed as imitation or alteration and how this very facet is open to a range of interpretative possibilities on the basis of the wider context and aims of the text.

Beyond understanding parody as a form of intertextuality, scholarly approaches differ considerably. Fundamentally, these approaches define parody according to the needs of their analysis, rather than providing insights into the concept in a more general sense.<sup>121</sup> Two brief examples of scholarship on Aristophanic parody demonstrate this point. Simon Goldhill, for instance, uses parody as a springboard for considerations about recognition, knowledge, and the inversions of Bakhtinian carnivalesque.<sup>122</sup> While his focus remains principally on literary parody, Goldhill's focus throughout the chapter is on the relationship between the poet's voice and the other institutions of the city, what he calls the "contest of public voices". His analysis of Aristophanic parody, therefore, is directed by these wider considerations.<sup>123</sup> Thus, his association between parody and "comic inversion" is a form of construal that allows him to frame his analysis

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<sup>118</sup> Tynyanov (1921); cf. the discussion of Rose (1993) 117-23. The contrast between these two planes is often connected with the Formalist view of parody as a force for the "refunctionalization" of old literary tropes.

<sup>119</sup> Bakhtin (1973), (1981); cf. Rose (1993) 125-70.

<sup>120</sup> Chambers (2010) 47-56.

<sup>121</sup> Hutcheon (1985) is more explicit than many about the limitations of her own approach to parody, which is focused on 20th cent. art forms and denies the applicability of her approach to other time periods (e.g. on p. 10), a fact all too frequently glossed over by classicists.

<sup>122</sup> Goldhill (1991) 167-222, esp. 201-22.

<sup>123</sup> See for instance p. 206: 'Parody and comic inversion are inherently linked: in the Aristophanic "world upside down", as I have already discussed, institutions such as the Assembly and Law-Courts, public figures such as poets, generals and orators, rituals of social behaviour and rituals of religious observance, all fall under the general rubric of an inversion or distortion of an assumed model, set in a new context, for comic effect - a rubric that remains the starting point for definitions of parody.'

of Aristophanes' poetic voice. Alternatively, we might say that this association is influenced by the Bakhtinian script, that approaching Aristophanes from the perspective of carnivalesque shapes his and our response to Aristophanic parody.

For Ian Ruffell, too, parody in Old Comedy is implicated in comedy's competitive voice.<sup>124</sup> However, while comedy parodically responds to tragedy in a way that negotiates the value of their respective contributions to political discourse, for Ruffell this is effected in a wholly different way. Parody is part of comedy's metafictionality; parody's double-coding is not just an act of "self-disclosing fiction"<sup>125</sup> but is used for other ends including the development of the plot. Parody is a useful tool in comedy's arsenal precisely because 'the central distinction between the intertextual and the parodic is that in the latter there is a marked incongruity involved in the appropriation. Such incongruity creates the dynamic central to humour.'<sup>126</sup> Ruffell construes parody according to his broader theoretical approach to Old Comedy, especially humour theory which is evoked in his emphasis on incongruity. As he says, 'at the heart of joke lies an incompatibility or implausibility, or, in stronger cases, it features empirical or even logical impossibility.'<sup>127</sup> In this description of the joke, Ruffell draws on Palmer's reaction to incongruity theories of humour, according to whom the model of "incongruity" may be problematic as they fail to account for the differences between humour and metaphor.<sup>128</sup> Palmer therefore proposes that a joke can be analysed through two moments:

1. a peripeteia, a shock or surprise that the narrative constructs for us;
2. a pair of syllogisms, leading to contradictory conclusions:
  - a. that the process is implausible
  - b. that the process nonetheless has a certain amount of plausibility, but that this is less than the implausibility.<sup>129</sup>

Palmer's model may also be useful for understanding parody: not only does parody involve the realization of difference from a known model but it forces its interpreter to recognize the negot-

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<sup>124</sup> For instance, Ruffell (2011) 359: 'Just as comedy's self-reflexive acknowledgement of its theatrical and festive context involves extensive comparison to other key sites of ideological formation, so too comedy's metafictional interaction with tragedy is concerned to bolster its own voice in this fragmented political discourse.'

<sup>125</sup> Ruffell (2011) 359, citing Doložel (1989) and Eco (1989) and (1990) 76.

<sup>126</sup> Ruffell (2011) 326.

<sup>127</sup> *ibid.* 110.

<sup>128</sup> Palmer (1987) 36-7. Ruffell (2011) 85 notes that Palmer's preference for implausibility is useful because 'a calculus of plausibility can also explain why the same instance can seem funny to some and not to others.' This might fruitfully be extended to instances of parody where the very presence of parody might be in doubt, such as in some Euripidean tragedies.

<sup>129</sup> Palmer (1987) 43, quoted by Ruffell (2011) 84.

iation of similarity and difference with that model which is analogous to the recognition of plausibility and implausibility in the joke. Parody can therefore be usefully understood as primarily, if not essentially, humorous.<sup>130</sup> While Ruffell's approach is useful for understanding parody, it does not (aim to) tell us anything about how parody is conceptualized, which is the focus of this thesis. None of the approaches to parody I have discussed here should be labelled as "wrong". Instead, I have tried to demonstrate how their divergences can be understood as a form of construal, which underlies each articulation of the notion of parody.

I have argued thus far that parody should be understood primarily through an approach that is culturally specific and which recognizes the importance of individual subjectivity in the conceptualization and articulation of the notion of parody. The advantages of this approach are that it makes greater sense of how and why scholarship frequently disagrees about the meaning of parody and it places the focus on how individuals' ideas about parody are informed by their specific cultural context. Having established this framework for approaching the different ways parody can be conceptualized, let us now turn to several of the major terms through which ideas about parody are articulated.

### *Laughter*

We have already seen, in the discussion of Aristoxenus fr. 136 Wehrli above, the earliest connection between parody and laughter.<sup>131</sup> This association is not uncommon in other sources. Diogenes Laertius connects laughter and parody in his life of Bion (4.52), for instance, and in one of Tzetzes' poems parodies are described as one of the causes of laughter in comedy.<sup>132</sup> Laughter is also attested as a response to *parōidia*, when according to Chamaeleon the Athenians found Hegemon's *Gigantomachy* so funny that they laughed a lot despite the performance occurring on the day the news of the Sicilian expedition's failure arrived.<sup>133</sup> Zeus in the *BM*, perhaps acting as an internal

<sup>130</sup> It is worth noting in this context that many of the key Greek terms associated with parody that I discuss in this section are also frequently associated with humour. For a survey of the major theories of humour, see Buijzen and Valkenburg (2004) and Liebermann *et al.* (2009). For the association between play and humour, see for example Hershkowitz (1977) 140-1.

<sup>131</sup> It should be noted that γέλοιος (or γελοῖος) can be ambiguous, primary meaning either 'mirth-provoking, amusing' or 'ludicrous, absurd,' for which see LSJ s.v. γέλοιος. Occasionally, like words for play (e.g. παίζω), γελοῖος is contrast with σπουδαῖος, e.g. ἄνευ γάρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα ... μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν - Pl. Lg. 816d. The frequency with which παρῳδία is associated with γελοῖος, γέλως, and γελάω suggests that often the laughter-inducing qualities of parody is meant.

<sup>132</sup> τὸ τοῦ σκοποῦ δὲ πλάσμα καὶ λέξις ἄμα / παρεισφοροῦσιν ἡδονὴν κωμῳδίαις / καὶ τὸν γέλωτα τοῖς ὅμιωνύμιοις πλέον / ἐσχηματισμένον τε καὶ παρῳδίαις - *Versus de poem. gener.* 2.76-9.

<sup>133</sup> ἐν δὲ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκήλησεν, ώς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ πλεῖστα αὐτοὺς γελάσει, καίτοι ἀγγελθέντων αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τῶν γενομένων περὶ Σικελίαν ἀτυχημάτων - fr. 44 Wehrli.

audience,<sup>134</sup> laughs sweetly at the gathering armies (ἡδὺ γελῶν - 172) and some guests at a symposium in a fragment of Matro laugh at a lost speech (fr. 5.1). Connected with this we might also note the association between parody and the “comic”.<sup>135</sup> This association is made by Hermogenes (*Peri Methodou Deinotētos* 34) in a treatise on oratory and seems to be a way of incorporating humour into the rhetorician’s repertoire.<sup>136</sup>

Laughter remains an important means by which parody is construed, and has been influenced by figures such as Julius Caesar Scaliger.<sup>137</sup> More recently, however, Bakhtin has been an important exponent of the connection between parody and laughter. Although at times he seems to waver between defining parody in terms of laughter and separating the two concepts further, when discussing the carnivalesque figures of the rogue, clown and fool, he says:

Their laughter bears the stamp of the public square where the folk gather. They re-establish the public nature of the human figure... This creates that distinctive means for externalizing a human being, via parodic laughter.<sup>138</sup>

The discussion of parodic laughter in the context of the Carnival invites us to see parody as possessing an important sociological function, part of the carnivalesque’s temporary social and religious inversions. In a sense, Bakhtin’s vision of parodic laughter is not dissimilar to the laughter imagined by Chamaeleon at Hegemon’s *Gigantomachy*. Not only does it have the power on the level of a whole audience to direct their collective response but it can even invert or suppress a normal reaction (grief at the loss of family and friends).

Laughter and the comic are among the most widely used terms to “define” parody in the ancient world. At the same time, laughter itself is a difficult notion to pin down. While for Bakhtin and in anecdotes such as that of Chamaeleon, laughter can be imagined principally as a social phenomenon; at the same, laughter can be as idiosyncratic as parody itself.

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<sup>134</sup> For internal audiences, see Taplin (2000).

<sup>135</sup> We should be careful, however, to avoid the easy slippage between laughter and humour in general terms. Laughter can be approached from a wide range of different perspectives and is not always indicative of humour nor can it be described as a coherent category, as emphasized for instance by Attardo (2016).

<sup>136</sup> Speaking comically is divided into three: τὸ κατὰ παρωδίαν σχῆμα, τὸ παρὰ προσδοκίαν, τὸ ἐναντίας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς εἰκόνας τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων.

<sup>137</sup> Scaliger (1561)'s definition of parody: *est igitur parodia rhapsodia inversa mutatis vocibus ad ridicula retrahens.*

<sup>138</sup> Bakhtin (1981) 159-60. Later (p. 166) he claims that “parody”, “joke”, humour”, “irony”, “grotesque”, “whimsy”, etc., are but narrowly restrictive labels for the heterogeneity and subtlety of the idea’ of prosaic allegorization that is introduced by figures such as rogue, clown, and fool.’

## *Mockery*

While there are many Greek terms for mockery of varying kinds, many of these are associated with parody or *parôidia*. One clear example of this connection is found in a scholium on Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, where a parody of Euripides is categorized as σκώπτων.<sup>139</sup> At the same time, Eustathius associates parody with χλεύη (*Comment. ad Hom. Il.* 4.639), and the work of Euboeus seems to have been known for its mockery of the Athenians, as attested by Athenaeus.<sup>140</sup> Additionally, this connection between parody and mockery appears particularly evident in the lexical entry for παρωδοῦντες in Hesychius.<sup>141</sup>

Other terms, however, appear much less commonly. Outside of Hesychius' gloss, for instance, parody is rarely associated with ψόγος (Eustath. *Comment. ad Hom. Od.* 9.473 and *ad Il.* 4.476 are rare exceptions), which is perhaps due to the close association between ψόγος and *iambos*. Likewise, parody and *aischrologia* do not appear to be conceived together.

Timon's *Silloi* garners particular attention, which reflects how his strain of satirical attack was conceived. Diogenes Laertius' description of the poem says that Timon abuses and insults the dogmatic philosophers (πάντας λοιδορεῖ καὶ σιλλαίνει τοὺς δογματικοὺς - 9.111) and he introduces fragment 35 with the claim that Timon ridiculed the Academics (τοὺς Ακαδημαϊκοὺς ὁ Τίμων οὕτω διασύρει - 4.67), while Athenaeus introduces Timon's famous fragment describing the Museum in Alexandria as the "bird-cage of the Muses" as a form of mockery (ἐπισκώπτων - 1.22d) and the *Suda* describes the *Silloi* as a form of ψόγος.<sup>142</sup> Aristocles' description of the *Silloi*, which is clearly influenced by his critical stance on Timon's philosophical views in general, construes the poem as a troublesome parody (ἀργαλέας παρωδίας) and βωμολοχία, as well as claiming that it slandered all philosophers ever (βεβλασφήμηκε πάντας τοὺς πώποτε φιλοσοφήσαντας - Aristocl. ap. Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 14.18.28).<sup>143</sup>

Furthermore, we find that this notion of parody as mockery filters through into the poems themselves. Take, for example, parod. adesp. fr. 1:

τοῖς δ' ὁ κόλαξ πάμπρωτος ὑφαίνειν ἥρχετο μῶκον.<sup>144</sup>

<sup>139</sup> οὗτος οὖν σκώπτων Εὐριπίδην προσέθηκε πρωκτὸν παρὰ προσδοκίαν - Σ Ar. *Ach.* 119, parodying E. fr. 858; for scoptic mockery cf. Σ Ar. *Nub.* 64 and Eustath. *Comment. ad Hom. Od.* 1.5, 1.172, 2.260.

<sup>140</sup> οὗτος ἐστιν ὁ καὶ Αθηναίοις λοιδορησάμενος - 15.698a.

<sup>141</sup> παρωδοῦντες· παρατραγῳδοῦντες. χλευάζοντες. ἡ ψέγοντες - π 1026. It is possible, given the gloss of παρωδοῦντες as παρατραγῳδοῦντες, that the other associations here are at least partially motivated by comedy.

<sup>142</sup> ὁ γράψας τοὺς καλουμένους Σίλλους ἦτοι ψόγους τῶν φιλοσόφων βιβλία γ' - τ 631 Adl.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. also the *Suda*'s entry for σίλλος: σίλλος γὰρ ὁ μῆμος, ἡ ὁ μῶκος καὶ κακολογία. καὶ ὁ χλευασμός - σ 410 Adl.

<sup>144</sup> "And for them the parasite first of all began to weave his mockery."

The mockery instantiated by the parasite, which replaces Nestor's advice in the Homeric original,<sup>145</sup> might well be interpreted as a *mise-en-abyme* for the work from which the fragment derives, especially given the association between the parasite and the poet.<sup>146</sup> Unfortunately, however, the lack of context for the passage restricts our interpretation.

From this brief survey, however, it is clear that the association between parody and mockery is frequently articulated differently from more recent conceptions. Rather than positing that parody is inherently critical of its target and uses parodic mockery to achieve this, what we see in these descriptions of parody and *parôidia* is that parody is frequently used as a tool for a satirical take on another figure (Euboeus and the Athenians, Timon and the dogmatists, etc.). In several of the subsequent chapters (e.g. chs. 1-3 and 6), we shall see that, although we might term *parôidia* *Eposparodie*, it is not explicit about mockery of Homer or epic but sets its satirical sights on more contemporaneous targets.

### *Play*

The description of different kinds of poetry as “playful” is far from uncommon, with perhaps the most famous in antiquity being Demetrius' statement that, if one could imagine a poet writing a playful tragedy, then he would be writing a satyr drama.<sup>147</sup> On the one hand, this is situated within a differentiation of the uses of charm and laughter, but on the other it seems to evoke how satyr drama “plays with” tragic motifs and myth. Similarly, Eustathius quotes a parody of a Homeric phrase, transformed in a typically *parôidic* gastronomic manner, explaining that the phrase is a witty and playful praise of what in Attic would be written τρίγλη.<sup>148</sup> Likewise, Polemo praises the work of Euboeus and Boeotus on the grounds that they are playful in a double-edged or ambiguous way and that they are better than their predecessors.<sup>149</sup> What however, does it mean to say that parody is “playful”?

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<sup>145</sup> τοῖς δ' ὁ γέρων πάμπλωτος ὑφαίνειν ἥρχετο μῆτιν - *Il.* 7.324

<sup>146</sup> See ch. 2 on the presentation of Matro's narrator and Chaerephon in the *AD* for further on the associations between the poet and the parasite. It is also possible that the context of the Homeric original here may have played a significant part in the humour, since Nestor in *Il.* 7 is giving his advice to the Achaeans after a meal.

<sup>147</sup> οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπινοήσειν ἀν τις τραγῳδίαν παιζουσαν, ἐπεὶ σάτυρον γράψει ἀντὶ τραγῳδίας - *De Eloc.* 169.

<sup>148</sup> ὅτι δὲ οὐ τρίγλαν ἀλλὰ τρίγλην Αθηναῖοι διὰ τοῦ ἡτα προφέρουσιν, οἱ παλαιοὶ δηλοῦσιν. διὸ καὶ ο παρῳδήσας νέος τὸ "Κίλλάν τε ζαθέην" εἰς τὸ "τρίγλαν τε ζαθέην" ἔπαιξε μὲν ἀστείως εἰς ἔπαινον τρίγλης, οὐ μὴν ἐλάλησεν Αττικιστί - *Comment. ad Hom. Il.* 3.730; cf. Eustath. *Comment. ad Hom. Il.* 2.40, 2.573, 4.60, 4.462, 4.476, Σ Luc. *Tim.* 53.

<sup>149</sup> λογίους ἀν φήσαμι διὰ τὸ παιζειν ἀμφιδεξίως καὶ τῶν προγενεστέρων ποιητῶν ὑπερέχειν ἐπιγεγονότας - Polemo fr. 45 Preller.

Scholarship on parody frequently refers to notions of play, and more recently it has received more attention, such as by Sadrian and Chambers, whose book is even subtitled “the art that plays with art”.<sup>150</sup> What is still lacking, however, is what this might mean for the way parody is conceptualized. While in the past the most influential work on play focused on creating a more formal definition,<sup>151</sup> Sutton-Smith has tried to demonstrate what he calls the rhetorics of play in a manner that is more consonant with the approach to parody I adopt here. Although not all of the rhetorics Sutton-Smith proposes are found in antiquity, the value of using them to understand how parody is conceptualized as play in antiquity can be demonstrated through a couple of examples: the rhetoric of play as the imaginary, the rhetoric of self, and play as identity.<sup>152</sup>

First, let us take the rhetoric of play as the imaginary. Connected by Sutton-Smith with the emergence of the Romantics, this rhetoric centres on the notion of play as the driving force of innovation, originality, and creativity.<sup>153</sup> In connection with parody, we might for instance say that the text’s divergences from its original, and the interaction between them, that creates parody’s playfulness. This rhetoric seems to underlie Polemo’s description of Euboeus and Boeotus as learned on the basis of their double-edged play ( $\deltaι\alpha\tau\omega\pi\alpha\iota\zeta\epsilon\iota\alpha\mu\phi\iota\delta\epsilon\xi\omega\varsigma$ ), in that it is their innovation, by contrast to their poetic predecessors, that marks their *parōidia* out.

Secondly, the rhetoric of self focuses on the subjective play experience of the individual that forms the focus of the notion of play as “fun”.<sup>154</sup> In connection with literature, and parody specifically, the rhetoric of self is connected with the text as a pleasurable experience. Although this rhetoric is common in a range of Greek literature, it does not appear in an explicit way in connection with parody. We might, however, compare this approach with the opening of the *Culex* (although this must be more tentative given the linguistic barrier). The beginning of this poem focuses on the language of play (*lusimus* - 1, 3; *ludum* - 4; *ludere* - 36), which has been connected by Peirano to the poem’s interaction with Vergilian poetry.<sup>155</sup>

At the same time, the example of the *Culex* demonstrates the connections between the notion of parody and the rhetoric of play as identity. As opposed to the rhetoric of self, this term applies to the role of play in the construction of communal identities.<sup>156</sup> In the case of the *Culex*, this rhetoric is connected with the poem’s self-identity and in particular with its place in the bucolics of the

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<sup>150</sup> Sadrian (2010), Chambers (2010).

<sup>151</sup> The foundational works on play are those of Huizinga (1949) and Callois (1961).

<sup>152</sup> Sutton-Smith (1997).

<sup>153</sup> *ibid.* 127-50.

<sup>154</sup> *ibid.* 173-200.

<sup>155</sup> Peirano (2012) 57: ‘the playful tone of the opening of this work... is consonant with the parodic character of its main story.’

<sup>156</sup> Sutton-Smith (1997) 91: ‘The rhetorics of identity focus on the use of play forms as forms of bonding, including the exhibition and validation or parody of membership and traditions in a community.’

Vergilian corpus and its connections with Epicurean philosophy.<sup>157</sup> The same rhetoric is used by Plutarch when he describes Pigres writing the *BM* "playing and talking nonsense" (ἐν ἔπεσι παίζων καὶ φλυαρῶν ἔγραψε - *De Herod. Malign.* 873f). In this case, the rhetoric of identity is used as a means of distinguishing Plutarch's writing from the frivolous work of Pigres. The *BM*'s playfulness is a means by which Plutarch negotiates his cultural identity.

### *Nonsense*

Although only rarely explicitly associated with parody, nonsense is a highly charged way of describing parody and parodic works. It is fundamentally associated with competing notions of literary value in particular; while on the one hand some of the poems studied here revel in their supposed lowliness (e.g. ch. 1), others (notably Archestratus and Timon) stake their own individual claims to value, claiming to provide some kind of meaningful contribution. We can see this association between parody and nonsense, for instance, in a passage of Eustathius, in which he refers to a parody of a Homeric line that thematizes the notion of nonsense (2.183):

καὶ οὕτω μὲν Εὐρύμαχος πρὸς τοὺς μνηστῆρας κατάρξας ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ μωκίας τῆς εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, ἵνα ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἀρμόττῃ παρωδικῶς τὸ, τοῖς δ' ὁ κακὸς πάμπρωτος ὑφαίνειν ἥρχετο λῆρον, ὁ δή τις ἐπὶ κόλακος ἀστείως ἐποίησε παρωδήσας Ὄμηρικὸν ἔπος τὸ, τοῖς δ' ὁ γέρων πάμπρωτος ὑφαίνειν ἥρχετο μῦθον, καὶ γράψας οὕτω· τοῖς δ' ὁ κόλαξ πάμπρωτος ὑφαίνειν ἥρχετο μῶκον.<sup>158</sup>

The passage is rather puzzling one, as the hexameter line τοῖς δ' ὁ κακὸς πάμπρωτος ὑφαίνειν ἥρχετο λῆρον is not from any known text. Either Eustathius has not mentioned his source or it is his own adaption of the other *parōidic* fragment (parod. adesp. fr. 1).<sup>159</sup> Whatever its provenance, in this context Eustathius uses the line as a kind of parodic gloss on *Od.* 18.349-55, with λῆρον directed primarily towards Eurymachus' words. At the same time, λῆρον acts as a self-conscious

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<sup>157</sup> For the Epicurean elements of the *Culex*, see Chambert (2004).

<sup>158</sup> "And thus Eurymachus made a beginning of mockery directed against Odysseus in the symposium for the suitors, so that one might parodically accord to him [Eurymachus] the line – 'and for them the wicked man first of all began to weave his nonsense' – a line that someone wittily wrote against a parasite, parodying the Homeric line - "and for them the old man first of all began to weave his speech" – and wrote thus: 'and for them the parasite first of all began to weave his mockery'." [trans. my own]

<sup>159</sup> This passage of Eustathius is not given as a *testimonium* for the *parōidic* line by Brandt (1888), Degani (1983), or Olson-Sens (1999), who only cite Ath. 5.187a. Eustathius' use of the subjective ἀρμόττῃ seems to rule out the possibility that this is an athetized Homeric line.

comment on the way in which Eustathius is playing with the Homeric lines and the *parôdic* fragment quoted above. Both Eurymachus' speech and Eustathius' parodic line are λῆρος.

One of the poems studied in this thesis is especially associated with ideas of play and nonsense. As we have already seen, Plutarch uses the *BM* as a stick with which to beat Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea (*De Herod. Malign.* 873f):

τέλος δέ, καθημένους ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἀγνοήσαι μέχρι τέλους τὸν ἀγῶνα τοὺς Ἑλληνας,  
ῶσπερ βατραχομαχίας γινομένης, ἦν Πίγονς ὁ Αρτεμισίας ἐν ἔπεσι παιζων καὶ  
φλυαρῶν ἔγραψε, σιωπῇ διαγωνίσασθαι συνθεμένων, ἵνα λάθωσι τοὺς ἄλλους.<sup>160</sup>

In this context, the accusation that the poem is playful nonsense is clearly pejorative, based on the dialectical opposition of playfulness and seriousness.<sup>161</sup> To be nonsense in this context is to lack any literary value. At the same time, the attribution of the poem to Pigres rather than to Homer denies the *BM* any claims to literary worth on the basis of authorship as well as dating the poem to the same period as the Persian wars.

Plutarch's denigration of the *BM* can be fruitfully read against Martial's poem on the same poem, which uses similar language to a very different end (14.183):

*Perlege Maeonio cantatas carmine ranas,  
et frontem nugis soluere disce meis.*<sup>162</sup>

Once you have read the *Batrachomyomachia*, claims Martial, you will be able to appreciate his own work. The word *nugis* in the epigram conveys a similar meaning to that expressed by φλυαρῶν in Plutarch - a trifling, "unworthy" subject.<sup>163</sup> However, while Plutarch uses this to denigrate, Martial reclaims the power of such poetry.

Martial and Plutarch's opposing views on the nonsensical or "nugatory" properties of the *BM* can be understood from the perspective of Sutton-Smith's rhetoric of play as frivolity. As Sutton-Smith says, 'the label "frivolity" is... an abuse of some kinds of play on behalf of other kinds of

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<sup>160</sup> "And finally at Plataea he says that the Greeks sat idle knowing nothing of the battle till the end, as though it was like the battle of frogs and mice which Artemisia's son, Pigres, playfully and nonsensically composed in epic metre, and they had made an agreement to fight in silence so that the others would not know about it." [trans. Frendo adapted]

<sup>161</sup> See for example X. *Smp.* 1.1, Pl. *Lg.* 647d; for the collocation of play and nonsense, cf. Pl. *Prt.* 347d.

<sup>162</sup> "Read through the frogs sung in Maeonian song and learn to relax your brow with my trifles."

<sup>163</sup> Note that just as φλυαρία is sometimes translated as nonsense, Lewis and Short's dictionary gives nonsense as one potential translation of *nugae*. Cf. Plaut. *Pers.* 4.7.7, *Most.* 5.1.38.

play, because that is what is politically suitable for some dominating groups.<sup>164</sup> However, the rhetoric of frivolity also creates its own antithesis, an anti-rhetoric, where the frivolity of a work of literature can be lauded as a selling point. ‘The true trickster,’ as Sutton-Smith says, ‘is so frivolous that he can invert frivolity.’<sup>165</sup> Plutarch’s criticisms of the *BM*, from this perspective, make sense as a form of differentiation, using the *BM* to criticize Herodotus against whose account Plutarch’s text is implicitly contrasted. By the same token, Martial’s self-alignment with the nugatory aspects of the *BM* fit into his broader strategies of basing the playfulness of his poetry upon other examples, such as the mime artists Thymele and Latinus, the jests of soldiers at triumphs, and poetry that invokes the spirit of the *Saturnalia* (Mart. 1.4, 7.8, 11.15). Furthermore, in 1.4 we see how this anti-rhetoric of frivolity in Martial is extended to ideas we have already discussed here in relation to parody, such as joking (*iocos*), mockery (*derisorem*), and play (*lusus*).

### *Irony*

As I have said already, the connection between irony and parody differs significantly between ancient discussions and modern scholarship, with the only example of the words being used in close association being found in Agathias (*Histories* 173), in a story about the rhetorician Zeno:

ποιητικὰ γὰρ παράδει ὄημάτια καὶ ἀνεβόα ἐπὶ τῆς συγκλήτου βουλῆς ὥσπερ εἰρωνεύμενος, ὡς οὐχ οἶόν τε αὐτῶν μόνω γε ὅντι ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτὸν ἄμα πρός τε Δίᾳ τὸν ἀστεροπητὴν καὶ ἐρίγδουπον καὶ πρός γε Ποσειδῶνα τὸν ἐννοσίγαιον διαμάχεσθαι.<sup>166</sup>

According to Agathias, this is all the result of a quarrel between neighbours, Zeno and Anthemius. Anthemius had been tormenting Zeno with various mock-natural disasters, earthquakes, thunder, and lightning, and when Zeno discovered what had been going on, he begins “parodying” poetic expressions and shouting in front of the senate, “as if being ironic”, saying that as a mere mortal he could not contend with Zeus the Lightener and the Thunderer and with Poseidon the Earth-shaker. Although this is clearly a speech made in anger (ὑπ’ ὄγγῆς), it is also demonstrably humorously exaggerated and ironic. Zeno understands that the events were caused *not* by Zeus but by his neighbour and he dissimulates (a core meaning of εἰρωνεία)<sup>167</sup> real distress. This ironic tone

<sup>164</sup> Sutton-Smith (2001) 207.

<sup>165</sup> ibid. 211.

<sup>166</sup> “He began declaiming in fact in mock poetic style before the senate, saying that it was impossible for him a mere mortal to contend single-handed at one and the same time with ‘Zeus the Lightener’ and ‘Loud-Thunderer’ and ‘Poseidon the Earth-Shaker’.” [trans. Frendo (1975)]

<sup>167</sup> LSJ s.v. εἰρωνεία A.

becomes parodic through his use, or appropriation, of divine epithets from poetry. It is precisely this dissemblance, saying one thing and meaning another, that is central to irony's role in parody.

This account of parody as irony fits well with Hutcheon's now foundational definition of parody as 'a form of repetition with ironic critical distance.'<sup>168</sup> For Hutcheon too, the ironic aspect of parody is a means of highlighting (inter)textual difference: 'It is the fact that they [parody and parodied] *differ* that this parody emphasizes and, indeed, dramatizes. Irony appears to be the main rhetorical mechanism for activating the reader's awareness of this dramatization.'<sup>169</sup> The difference between parody and parodied that is dramatized through parody's ironic process causes us to recognize the literariness of the text and the ontological contrast between the reality of the text and the reality of the reader.

However, while this passage suggests that irony could be associated with parody in antiquity, it nevertheless remains the case that they were not commonly conceived of together, and so from a modern perspective we should be aware that describing parody as ironic brings with it an idea more prevalent in modern and postmodern thought.

### **A new approach to parody**

In this section, I have tried to focus on the different ways in which parody could be conceptualized in Greek literature by showing that discussions of parody necessarily involve a form of construal, or in other words that the terms in which authors describe parody are fundamentally based in their own subjective perspective. Accounts of parody in the ancient world do not attempt to delineate an all-encompassing definition of the term, but rather are necessarily circumscribed by the context and aims of each individual text. While it is reasonable to speak of parody as a trans-historical term, if we wish to understand how parody is conceived, we must look to the specific ways in which it is discussed in a particular context. What emerges from this discussion is that the language used to describe parody in Greek literature frequently has parallels in modern scholarship and thought. While certain construals of parody are perhaps now more popular (e.g. irony), the different terms associated with parody can be described as reflecting a flexible "parodic script".

In order to clarify my own position, I would like to contrast this approach with that adopted by Chambers. On the one hand, Chambers' approach highlights several important points. I have already discussed, for instance, his rejection of the dichotomy between specific and general parody is useful for avoiding a reductive view of parody. He describes parody as "multistable", by which he

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<sup>168</sup> Hutcheon (1985) xii.

<sup>169</sup> ibid. 31.

means that ‘parody alone commonly offers up the possibility of actually perceiving complementary dualities’ that he frequently depicts using the *Yin* and *Yang* symbol.<sup>170</sup> This multistability can be fruitfully contrasted with terms such as “double-planed”, since Chambers’ complementary dualities go beyond a potentially restrictive view of parody in the “strict” sense of direct, verbal allusion and incorporates more successfully instances of parody that draw upon multiple sources simultaneously.

However, Chambers’ book suffers from two major problems: expansiveness and over-defensiveness. Chambers’ primary objective, besides redefining parody, is to rescue parody from the low critical esteem it has received.<sup>171</sup> While this attitude might be considered admirable, it is not feasible both to challenge this perception of parody and critically to discuss texts written while this view was pervasive. Part of what parody meant for Eliot and Joyce was precisely that parody is a lower medium of writing, and we should not try to ignore or change that when discussing the application of the technique.

Secondly, his definition of parody seems overly expansive. His principle defining characteristics of parody are that it is banging, binding, or blending, with various subcategories within these major techniques. While these terms could be fruitfully used as means of understanding particular parodic effects, he largely disregards terms such as irony and metafiction, describing them as having ‘significantly compounded the overall noise level, and adherents with a stake in these potentially competing explanations are not likely to abandon ideas that have long informed what they have thought and written.’<sup>172</sup> Instead, he opts for a course that views parody as having the broadest possible scope. His conceptualization of a wide-ranging form of parody has problematic consequences; for example, he is happy to apply parody to pieces of literature that he says do not acknowledge their own parodic nature.<sup>173</sup> However, if authors and their contemporary audiences do not think of a text as parodic, can we apply the term to it? We might at least have to alter our definition of parody to accommodate contemporary conceptualizations of what these authors were doing. I therefore describe Chambers’ approach to defining parody as overly expansive because he attempts to widen the horizons of parody in general terms without consideration of specific localization.

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<sup>170</sup> Chambers (2010) 27-39 in particular, although multistability is used throughout. Quotation from p. 31.

<sup>171</sup> This is noted, for example, by Dentith (2011) 191: ‘Chambers, unfortunately, devotes his critical fire more towards rectifying the low critical esteem afforded to parody than to developing analyses of the parodic elements in *The Waste Land* or *Ulysses*.’

<sup>172</sup> Chambers (2010) 193: ‘In the twentieth century, the rise of modernism, with its relentless preoccupation with formal experimentation and demand for innovation, led to tidal waves of mostly unacknowledged parody in all of the arts.’

<sup>173</sup> ibid. 177.

In general terms, then, Chambers' approach to parody has been to prioritize his own understanding of parody and disregard attitudes held (by authors, audiences, and scholars) towards it. My approach is in many ways, then, an inversion of his, as I wish to prioritize attitudes towards parody as a means of understanding how audiences and readers would have reacted to parodies in the Greek world. As we have seen, this approach does not restrict our view of parody to a single perspective, but, by acknowledging the importance of perspective and subjectivity in the definition of parody, we can recognize how parody was conceptualized in specific contexts.

By considering how parody is construed in specific circumstances, we have begun to see the parodic script, that is the concepts with which parody is conceptualized and expressed. Parody evokes a set of terms that might come readily to hand, if we were required to explain it. By the same token, parody is part of other scripts. Let us take, for instance, the opening of Julian's *Caesars* (otherwise known as the *Symposium* or *Cronia*). From the outset, we are told that the setting is the Saturnalian festival (*Κρόνια* in Greek), the time when the god allows merrymaking (ἐπειδὴ δίδωσιν ὁ θεὸς παιζεῖν - 306a). Julian apologises to his interlocutor that he has no ability for telling funny or enjoyable stories (γελοῖον δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τερπνὸν οἴδα ἐγώ) and doesn't want to say something ridiculous (*καταγέλαστα*). He goes on to clarify his position and ask whether he should relate an enjoyable myth (306b):

Πέφυκε γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐπιτήδειος οὔτε σκώπτειν οὔτε παρωδεῖν οὔτε γελοιάζειν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ χρὴ τῷ νόμῳ πείθεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ, βούλει σοι ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει μῆθον διεξέλθω πολλὰ ἵσως ἔχοντα ἀκοῆς ἄξια;<sup>174</sup>

Throughout this opening, numerous concepts are imagined as closely related – laughter (γελοῖον / γελοιάζειν), enjoyment (τερπνὸν), ridicule (*καταγέλαστα*), play (*παιζεῖν* / *παιδιᾶν*), mockery (σκώπτειν), and parody (*παρωδεῖν*) – and placed together on the basis of the shared context of the Saturnalia. This association of ideas based on a given context is a clear example of contextual dependency, according to which context influences the way in which we express ourselves.<sup>175</sup> The context of the Saturnalia influences the kinds of activities Julian mentions, and this ultimately affects the story he tells, as the symposium itself fits comfortably into the script of the Saturnalia.

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<sup>174</sup> “For by nature I have no turn for raillery, or parody, or raising a laugh. But since I must obey the ordinance of the god of the festival, should you like me to relate to you by way of entertainment a myth in which there is perhaps much that is worth hearing?”

<sup>175</sup> Stockwell (2002) 76: ‘the selection of words in a sentence, and the meanings derived from sentences, depend not on a dictionary-like denotation of these strings of words but on the sets of ideas and other associations that the words suggest in the minds of speakers and hearers.’

All of the activities mentioned by Julian here, then, are chosen based on the context. At the same time, they are all appropriate in this context because they are all perceived as in some sense similar. Play, parody, mockery, laughter, and so on fall into Julian's category of "activities licensed by the Saturnalia" because they are already conceptually comparable. It is not unsurprising, then, that the same concepts that fall within the Saturnalia script are also part of the parodic script. We should note that these cultural associations are not the same as cultural equivalences – parody is *associated with*, not *equal to*, laughter in Greek thought. Concepts such as laughter, play, and mockery are used to explain or construe parody in particular contexts.

To summarize, this thesis approaches the concept of parody as a culturally and temporally specific concept. While parody is transhistorical, insofar as the terms associated with it are common across many cultures, it is best understood with reference to the language in which the Greeks couched or explained the term. I have suggested that these ancient explanations of parody are not attempts to explain parody in a complete sense, but are forms of construal grounded in their specific context and the aims of the text. The subsequent chapters of the thesis will use this approach to parody to analyse the genre *parōidia*. Since my approach is based on the notion that parody means different things to different people, I anticipate that these analyses will produce different results from one chapter to another. Indeed, such a result will be a reflection of my claim that parody is a fundamentally subjective concept. In the conclusion, I will consider the wider implications of these case studies, and we shall see that many of the ways parody is construed in antiquity have their basis in common threads found in *parōidia*. *Parōidia*, I claim, not only is produced by its specific literary and cultural context but also contributes to the shaping of parody in Greek thought.

## CHAPTER 1

### *Hegemon of Thasos*

In the intensely agonistic Greek world, how does one deal with failure? Despite the thousands of poetic competitions for which we have evidence, relatively few examples of failures survive. Although this is perhaps not a surprise, the examples that we do possess are important reflections of poetic values and the strategies of poets' personae. The same applies to a poet's self-correction, for instance in Hesiod's accounts of Strife or Stesichorus' *Palinode*.<sup>1</sup> Responses to failure in antiquity, that is, reveal or underline key features of a poet's own self-presentation and construction.

In this chapter, I examine how Hegemon of Thasos responds to failure in our only surviving fragment of his *parōidic* poetry. In this fragment, the poet explains how, on returning to his homeland, he was pelted with shit and criticized by the people because he had lost a competition in *parōidia* in Athens. Although he begins by claiming that he will retire from the poetic profession, the fragment ends with a reaffirmation of his poetic ability by none other than the patron goddess of the Panathenaea itself, Athena. Because the fragment is not well known, it is worth quoting it in full here:

ἐς δὲ Θάσον μ' ἐλθόντα μετεωρίζοντες ἔβαλλον  
πολλοῖσι σπελέθοισι, καὶ ὡδέ τις εἶπε παραστάς·  
“ὦ πάντων ἀνδρῶν βδελυρώτατε, τίς σ' ἀνέπεισε  
καλὴν <ἔς> κρηπίδα ποσὶν τοιοῖσδ' ἀναβῆναι;  
τοῖσι δ' ἐγὼ πᾶσιν μικρὸν μετὰ τοῦτ' ἔπος εἶπον· (5)  
“μνῆ μ' ἀνέπεισε γέροντα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντ' ἀναβῆναι  
καὶ σπάνις, ἥ πολλοὺς Θασίων εἰς ὄλκάδα βάλλει  
εύκούρων βδελυρῶν, ὄλλυντων τ' ὄλλυμένων τε  
ἀνδρῶν, οἱ νῦν κεῖθι κακῶς κακὰ όαψωδοῦσιν·

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<sup>1</sup> For Hesiod's different accounts of Strife, see *Op.* 11-26 and *Th.* 225-6. Stesichorus' *Palinode* has been considered a reaction to an initially negative audience response (e.g. Biles (2011)), although others, such as Sider (1989) and Kelly (2007), have suggested that his *Helen* and *Palinode* were part of a single poem (against which see Davies and Finglass (2014) 308-12). Either way, Stesichorus' poem involves a reformulation of poetic values. For a self-correction mid-poem, cf. Pindar *O.* 1.23-58. For self-correction in archaic poetry more generally, see Scodel (1996).

οῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σιτοῖο μέγα χοη̄ζων ἐπίθησα. (10)  
αὐθις δ' οὐκ ἐπὶ κέρδος ἀπείσομαι, εἰς Θασίους δὲ  
μηδὲνα πημαίνων κλυτὸν ἄργυρον ἐγγυαλίξων,  
μή τίς μοι κατὰ οἶκον Ἀχαϊάδων νεμεσίσῃ  
πεσσομένης ἀλόχου τὸν ἀχαϊνον ἄρτον ἀεικῶς,  
καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπη σμικρὸν τυροῦντ' ἐσιδοῦσα· (15)  
“ώς φίλη, ὡνὴρ μὲν παρ’ Αθηναίοισιν ἀείσας  
πεντήκοντ’ ἔλαβε δραχμάς, σὺ δὲ μικρὸν ἐπέψω.”  
ταῦτά μοι ὄρμαίνοντι παρίστατο Παλλὰς Αθήνη  
χρυσῆν ὁάρδον ἔχουσα καὶ ἥλασεν εἴπε τε φωνῇ·  
“δεινὰ παθοῦσα Φακῆ βδελυρά, χῶρει ’ς τὸν ἀγῶνα.” (20)  
καὶ τότε δὴ θάρσησα καὶ ἤειδον πολὺ μᾶλλον.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter aims to reveal the strategies of the poet in response to his failure, his transformation in just over 20 lines from a nobody into a somebody. In doing so, we see on the one hand how Hegemon uses language and rhetoric recognizable from comedy. By contrast to Aristophanes, however, Hegemon's use of comic language is highly self-deprecating: he is disgusting (*βδελυρός*), and his poetry small. In particular, however, in this fragment Hegemon draws on the metaphorical language of gastronomy, which was pervasive in Old Comedy, portraying not just his poetry but himself as a poor dish (*Φακῆ*). This language, however, is also used as part of a satire of the Thasians. Hegemon himself is part of a much bigger socio-economic problem. In addition to his use of comedy, I shall demonstrate how Hegemon uses not only epic, but also the wider tradition of rhapsodic poetry. In the second section, I analyse how Hegemon situates his persona in relation to the lives of the rhapsodized poets, that is those poets whose work was performed in rhapsodic competitions. On the one hand, his strategies underline the highly troped nature of many of these lives – drawing on traditional images of the poor poet, for instance; on the other, the fact that even

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<sup>2</sup> “When I came to Thasos, they hoisted numerous lumps of shit and began to pelt me with them, and one of those present spoke thus: ‘O foulest of all men - who convinced you to go up onto the lovely stage with feet like these?’ But I addressed this one little word to all of them: ‘A *mina* of silver convinced me, old and unwilling though I am, to go up, along with my poverty, which drives many Thasians into cargo-ships, well-barbered wretches, destroying and destroyed, who now do a bad job of performing bad songs there; this is what convinced me, in my desperate need for food. But I will not go away after profit again, but will hand over glorious silver to the Thasians, doing no one harm, lest one of the Achaean women in my house express resentment against me when my wife bakes Demeter’s bread too meagerly, and when one of them says, seeing the tiny cheese-cake, ‘My dear, your husband got 50 drachmas in Athens by his singing - but you baked something small!’ And as I was pondering these things, Pallas Athena stood beside me with a golden wand in her hand, and she struck me with it and made a speech: ‘Although you have suffered terrible things, wretched Lentil-Soup, enter the contest.’ And then I got my courage up and sang much louder.”

authoritative poets, such as Homer and Hesiod, supposedly suffered many of the same problems faced by Hegemon provides him with culturally valued models, aligning his own position with the greats of Greek literature. In the final section I focus specifically on Hegemon's use of τις-speeches: it is a τις who addresses him in the opening of the fragment, and he is afraid one of the women in his house (τις) will criticize him. Through a comparison with such speeches in Homeric epic, I argue that here they serve to anonymize Hegemon's critics, who in turn serve as a foil to Hegemon himself, who ends the fragment looking forward to poetic victory under the patronage of Athena herself. Given the allusion to Odysseus in the latter part of the fragment, this really is a story of zero to hero.

## DISGUSTING LENTIL-SOUP AND COMIC POETICS

According to most of the ancient sources, Hegemon wrote comedy as well as *parōidia* (Ath. 1.5a-b, Chamaeleon fr. 44 Wehrli, Polemon fr. 45 Preller).<sup>3</sup> It is natural, therefore, to consider the possibility that Hegemon's writing of each was informed by the other. It is even more natural when we also take into account the report that other comic writers, such as Epicharmus, Cratinus, and Hermippus,<sup>4</sup> either wrote *parōidia* or used it in their plays. In this section, I analyse several of the poetic strategies employed in our fragment to argue that Hegemon uses several strategies common in comedy to define his own poetic practice.<sup>5</sup> I shall focus especially on Hegemon's use of gastronomic metapoetry, social satire, and the language of βδελυρός. From this discussion, we can see how Hegemon uses language, both literal and metaphorical, to define his poetic identity in the mould of the poor poet and underdog championed by a goddess.

Of the three elements I shall discuss, gastronomic metapoetry is the most securely associated with comedy specifically. Matthew Wright has recently shown that fifth-century comedy is the first place that metaphors associated with food are applied to poetry.<sup>6</sup> Among the numerous possible examples, a fragment of Strattis' *Phoenissae* in which Jocasta tells someone (possibly her sons Polyneices and Eteocles) not to add perfume when boiling lentil soup provides an interesting example (*Phoen.* fr. 47):

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<sup>3</sup> For a fuller discussion of Hegemon's comic career, see the Introduction.

<sup>4</sup> Polemon fr. 45 Preller ap. Ath. 15.698a.

<sup>5</sup> It is of course possible that these strategies were also used to a similar effect in Hegemon's own comedy, but in the absence of any substantial fragments, a more general approach is the best we can do.

<sup>6</sup> Wright (2012) 129-40.

παραινέσαι δὲ σφῶν τι βούλομαι σοφόν  
ὅταν φακῆν ἔψητε, μὴ πιχεῖν μύρον.<sup>7</sup>

Adding perfume to lentils, Athenaeus explains (4.160b), is a common proverb which Strattis' Jocasta here inverts (comparable to the modern idiom "you can't polish a turd"). Lentil soup was not a rich fare and may have been associated with giving bad breath.<sup>8</sup> As Miles notes on this fragment, the addition of perfume to a lentil soup would also have made it inedible.<sup>9</sup> Although we have little idea of the context of this fragment, there is good reason to suspect that the fragment can be read metapoetically.<sup>10</sup> Strattis' *Phoenissae* seems to have closely interacted with Euripides' play of the same name, a fact seen in fragment 47 through the word-for-word quotation of Jocasta (E. *Ph.* 460).<sup>11</sup> More generally, however, the play appears to have been highly conscious of its own interaction with tragedy, not only depicting Dionysus, who also describes his situation as if he were hanging on a branch like a fig, in a fragment that at once points to the use of the *mechanē* and seems to echo the opening of Euripides' *Hypsipyle* (κρεμάμενος ὥσπερ ισχὰς ἐπὶ κράδης - fr. 46.3),<sup>12</sup> but also providing us with the earliest extant usage of the verb *παρατραγωδῆσαι* (fr. 50). Finally, Aristotle explicitly states, in a discussion on classing smells (*De. Sens.* 5.443b30), that Strattis employed the proverb to mock Euripides (ἀληθὲς γὰρ ὅπερ Εὐριπίδην σκώπτων εἶπε Στράττις, “ὅταν φακῆν ἔψητε, μὴ πιχεῖν μύρον”). All of this would suggest that the fragment expresses some form of metapoetic joke, perhaps that poor quality poetry (or poetry like Euripides'?), perhaps in contrast to the speaker's *sophos* advice,<sup>13</sup> cannot be made artificially better.

Food plays a vital role in Hegemon's fragment. In his reply to his antagonist, Hegemon claims that he was driven to the stage by his poverty (*σπάνις* - 7) and he speaks of his great need for food.

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<sup>7</sup> "I wish to give the pair of you sound advice: when you are boiling lentil soup, don't pour in any perfume."

<sup>8</sup> For the appearances of lentils in comedy, see Wilkins (2000) 13-6. At Ar. *Pl.* 1004-5 (ἐπειτα πλουτῶν οὐκέθ' ἥδεται φακῆ· / πρὸ τοῦ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς πενίας ἀπανθ' ὑπήσθιεν), the lentil is clearly considered the food of the poor, while Pherecrates' *Corianno* fr. 73 suggests that they make one's breath smell bad (μή μοι φακούς, μὰ τὸν Δί', οὐ γὰρ ἥδομαι· / ἦν γὰρ τράγη τις, τοῦ στόματος ὄζει κακόν).

<sup>9</sup> Miles (2009) 191-2.

<sup>10</sup> As Orth (2009) 208 notes, frs. 47 and 48 seem to reflect the Euripidean scene in which Jocasta tries to conciliate her sons, but that Strattis certainly did not follow the structure of the Euripidean model is clear enough from the *deus ex machina* of fr. 46. Additionally, the *deus ex machina* itself, as he notes, is typically Euripidean and may suggest a play on Euripidean tragic style.

<sup>11</sup> We know from Athenaeus that Strattis retains Jocasta as the speaker of the fragment: κατὰ τὴν Στράττιδος τοῦ κωμῳδιοποιοῦ Ιόκαστην, ἦτις ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Φοινίσσαις φησίν· παραινέσαι... μύρον. For further discussion, see Miles (2009) 190-2.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Orth (2009) 210-11.

<sup>13</sup> For the poetic associations of *sophia*, see the conclusion below.

(σίτοιο μέγα χρήζων - 10);<sup>14</sup> Hegemon is also concerned that his poor poetic performance will bring shame on his family through his wife's inability to bake a sufficiently large cake (πεσσομένης ἀλόχου τὸν ἀχάϊνον ἄρτον ἀεικῶς... σμικρὸν τυροῦντ' - 14-5). There is also the issue of his nickname, Lentil-soup (*Φακῆ*). Clearly, throughout this fragment, Hegemon's poetic ability is both driven by and equated to food. On the one hand, Hegemon is very explicit about his gastronomic drive to produce good poetry and win the competition. Prizes mean money, and money means more and better food. It is no surprise, then, that his nickname is *Lentil-soup*, a food that partially reflects the poverty that drives his poetic production. On the other hand, Hegemon's failure to produce good poetry is also directly associated with his wife's ability to produce good cake. His low income means she makes a small cake, which in turn reflects badly on him. It is not just, then, that food drives him to produce poetry, but that his productions in turn affect his own life. In this case, it is perhaps less the case that 'life imitates art far more than art imitates life,' as Wilde would have it, but rather that they are mutually influential.

Finally, there is his nickname. In addition to the name Lentil-soup supporting his poverty-stricken persona, the soupy element also reveals something about Hegemon's poetics. Matthew Wright has suggested that, when Dionysus compares his desire for Euripides to a longing for pea-soup at *Ra*. 59-67, the word ἔτνος 'seems to be a specific metaphor for the sort of boring old jokes that one has heard a thousand times before.'<sup>15</sup> If pea-soup denotes a hodgepodge of old jokes, then Hegemon's nickname 'is meant to suggest that his works are literary concoctions, boiled up (as it were) from the verses of other poets.'<sup>16</sup>

While the metaphor of food to refer to poetry can be securely associated with comedy, the language of βδελυρός and social satire, which are connected in the Hegemon fragment, are not only prominent in comedy but invite us to raise wider questions about the generic influences on Hegemon's poetry. During the fifth century, the use of βδελυρός and other cognate words are

<sup>14</sup> The A manuscript of Athenaeus gives οῖς καὶ ἐγώ μετὰ τοῖσιν τὰ χρηζῶν ἐπιθησα, the final word of which is given correctly as ἐπιθησα by P. Jacobs, basing his conjecture on *Od.* 17.557-9 (τῶν σὺ μάλιστα / χρηζεις· σίτον δὲ καὶ αἰτίζων κατὰ δῆμον / γαστέρα βοσκήσεις), proposed reading ὡς καὶ ἐγώ μετὰ τοῖς σίτου χρηζῶν ἐπιθησα, which was in turn altered by Meineke to οῖς καὶ ἐγώ μέγα τοι σίτου χρηζῶν. Finally, Brandt proposed reading οῖς καὶ ἐγώ σίτοιο μέγα χρηζῶν ἐπιθησα, which is also followed by Olson and Sens (1999) and Olson (2006-12). Certainly, the evocation of *Od.* 17 would fit with the intervention of Athena later in the fragment, and so either σίτου or σίτοιο would appear justified (although we do not know whether Hegemon would have used the Homeric genitive in -οιο). I tentatively follow Brandt, although I do not necessarily agree with him that οῖς necessarily or only refers to the Thasians, as he suggests *ad loc.*, given the repetition of a verb for persuasion. I would rather see Hegemon as conflating his emulation of the Thasians with the causes that drive them all. Since I remain hesitant to follow Brandt's proposal, I do not build any arguments directly from this line, although in cases I suggest that my reading of the fragment would be further supported, if his proposal were correct.

<sup>15</sup> Wright (2012) 94, comparing its use here to Callias fr. 26.

<sup>16</sup> Wright (2012) 94.

relatively uncommon. The earliest attested usage of any such word is βδελύκτροποι to describe the Furies at Aeschylus *Eu.* 52 (cf. A. fr. 230). It is also found relatively commonly in the Hippocratic Corpus (*De Aff. Int.* 26, *De Purg.* 83, *De Morb.* 2.40) but remains most common in Old Comedy, where it is found in the fragments of Aristophanes, Eupolis, and Epicharmus. Furthermore, in comedy it possesses the broadest semantic range. Naturally, it can be used to express genuine disgust, the core meaning of the term.<sup>17</sup> However, it can also be a trait that is desired by the comic protagonist in some contexts. This meaning is clear, for example, in the very name of Bdelycleon, whose disgust for Cleon is portrayed broadly positively. We can also see the same dynamics at work at Ar. *Nu.* 440-56, when Strepsiades says that he is happy to endure anything provided he can acquire various nefarious qualities, including being βδελυρός. Similarly, at *Knights* 191-3, when the slave Demosthenes attempts to persuade the sausage-seller that he can be a great politician and he claims that to be a successful politician you have to be ignorant and βδελυρός (ή δημαγωγία γάρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ / ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲ χρηστοῦ τοὺς τρόπους, / ἀλλ' εἰς ἀμαθῆ καὶ βδελυρόν). Later in the same play, the chorus exclaims in response to Cleon ὡ μιαρὲ καὶ βδελυρὲ κράκτα (304), a phrase that ironically reveals the paradox of the positive and negative connotations of the same word. The connotations of disgust in *Knights*, it would seem, rely on its ambiguity.

We find the same semantic range in the Hegemon fragment: he is called the most disgusting of all men by the anonymous man of line 2, Hegemon himself then describes the poor Thasians in their cargo-ships as well-shaven and disgusting, and the final twist is that Athena describes him as disgusting Lentil-Soup. In the first two cases, βδελυρός is clearly pejorative, particularly the emphatic superlative βδελυρώτατε. Hegemon's reply turns his own characteristics, or at least those attributed to him, to the other Thasians, assimilating himself into the problem he projects onto Thasian society. He is disgusting because he follows the example of their disgustingness; his poetry, and feet, are bad because they perform bad songs badly too.

Accompanying the emphasis on disgust in the Hegemon fragment, we also find that the "smallness" of Hegemon's poetry is repeatedly stressed. Firstly, in reply to the anonymous critic of line 2, Hegemon gives a "small word" in reply (πᾶσιν μικρὸν μετὰ τοῦτ' ἔπος εἶπον - 5). Additionally, we find the repeated statement of his wife's cake's small size (εἴπη σμικρὸν τυροῦντ' ἐσιδοῦσα - 15, σὺ δὲ μικρὸν ἐπέψω - 17), which should perhaps be viewed in contrast to Hegemon's "great" need of food (σίτοι μέγα χρήζων - 10). On one level, this is clearly a self-

<sup>17</sup> This is the standard meaning as the word is used by the orators. See for example And. 1.122, Is. 8.42, Dem. 22.52, Aesch. 1.105. At Plato *Rep.* 338d, Socrates is called βδελυρός by Thrasymachus, where the intended meaning is clearly negative and is dismissed by Socrates. Similarly its only appearance in the remains of satyr drama available to us, in Achaeus *Alcmeon* fr. 12, describes the speaker's revulsion on seeing the Delphians who are described as makers of *karukkē* (καρυκκοποιοὺς προσβλέπων βδελλύσσομαι).

conscious comment on Hegemon's failure to be victorious in the *mousikoi agônes*: a small prize produces only a small cake, which is not able to satiate a great hunger. In more general terms, it suggests that Hegemon is consciously constructing a self-deprecating persona. He is a disgusting figure whose epic verses (N.B. ἔπος in l. 5) can only ever be small. The final phrase of the fragment, ἦειδον πολὺ μᾶλλον, could suggest that, after the intervention of Athena, Hegemon surpasses his former μικρὸν ἔπος, singing much *more*. Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that throughout the rest of the fragment Hegemon flags up the diminutive aspect of his poetic output. This does not necessarily mean that it is small in length, especially given that we have no idea how long performances of *parôidia* might have been,<sup>18</sup> but rather expresses a reflexion on the smallness of *parôidia* itself. This is suggested especially if we contrast Hegemon's *parôidic* poetry with the songs of the other Thasians. Even if the songs they sang were as bad as Hegemon implies (although this is clearly also a rhetorical trope), they are nevertheless said to be performing in the rhapsodic competitions (οἱ νῦν κείθι κακῶς κακὰ όαψωδοῦσιν - 9). Hegemon didn't just come second, he came second in the genre with the lowest prize at the *mousikoi agônes*!

The polysemic use of βδελυρός, combined with the self-effacing strategy of diminutive poetics, is only a part of Hegemon's response to his critics. On the one hand, he criticizes them in turn for their own βδελυρία; on the other, he expands his response into a short skit that satirizes the socio-economic situation of the Thasians. The integration of criticism into counter-criticism is well-known from comedy, in which the criticism of one's rivals was a major part of the comic competition.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, like Hegemon's disgusting feet (although this is also clearly metapoetic), the poet's body is a common focus for mockery in comedy and satire in general.<sup>20</sup> We might think of Aristophanes' famous baldness, to which Eupolis refers in his claim that he gifted the *Knights* to the "baldy" Aristophanes (τῷ φαλακρῷ - fr. 89) but which is also used by Aristophanes himself (*Eq.* 560, *Pax* 767-74), at times in contrast to the trend of growing long hair common amongst the Athenian rich. Alternatively, Dicaeopolis remarks in *Acharnians* on Euripides' habit of lounging around, clearly the cause of Euripides' crippled characters.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, comedy insistently asserts its authority and ability to make *useful* social criticism. This is perhaps most famously exemplified

<sup>18</sup> Matro's *AD* runs to 122 lines and is clearly incomplete, while the c. 300 lines of Archeistratus' *Hedypatheia*, which may originally have totalled around 1200, may not even have been intended for the same kind of audience.

<sup>19</sup> Bakola (2008), Ruffell (2002), Biles (2002) and (2011). Perhaps the most famous example of a comic poet's assuming the role assigned to him by his critics is the presentation of the drunken Cratinus in *Pytine*, for which see also Rosen (2000).

<sup>20</sup> See, for instance, Wright (2012) 123: 'An author's bodily appearance, dress or other mannerisms could be used figuratively as a way of describing or evaluating his writing.' For the poet's body in Roman satire, cf. Barchiesi and Cucchiarelli (2005).

<sup>21</sup> ἀναβάδην ποιεῖς, / ἐξὸν καταβάδην; οὐκ ἐτὸς χωλοὺς ποιεῖς - *Ach.* 410-11; cf. the presentation of Agathon as effeminate in *Th.*, for which see below.

through the punning invention of τρυγωδία, a combination of tragedy and the lees of wine (τρύξ), and which Dicaeopolis in the *Acharnians* says knows just things too (τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἶδε καὶ τρυγωδία - *Ach.* 500).<sup>22</sup>

So, in Hegemon's ability not only to take the muddy jokes others sling at him, but also sling his own mud back, and his integration of this into a broader social satire, we can certainly detect at least a trace of the comic. To what extent, however, is this representation of Hegemon and his criticisms of the contemporary Thasian socio-economic situation borrowed simply from comedy? The way Hegemon deals with his critics not only recalls, as I have shown, the comic association of the poet's body with his "corpus", but also the vicious satirical attacks of *iambos*. I shall argue later that Hegemon, particularly through his connections with Thasos, is interested in redeploying some of the details of Archilochus' biographical tradition, but for the current consideration Hipponax fits the satirical jostling in this fragment particularly well. Hipponax' dispute with the brothers Athenis and Bupalus is well known from antiquity (*Suda* 2.665.16 Adler and Pliny *NH* 36.4.12). Metrodorus of Scepsis' *On the art of training*, quoted by Athenaeus (12.552c-d = *test.* 19 Dg; cf. Ael. *VH* 10.6 = *test.* 19a and Eustath. *ad Hom. Il.* 23.844 = *test.* 19b), records a particular story that Hipponax was small and thin, but nevertheless was muscular enough that he threw an empty oil flask a very great distance (Ἴππώνακτα τὸν ποιητὴν οὐ μόνον μικρὸν γενέσθαι τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ λεπτὸν, ἀκρότονον δ' οὕτως ὡς πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ κένην λήκυθον βάλλειν μέγιστόν τι διάστημα). Although Metrodorus tries to explain this as a feat of strength given that light objects do not travel far, it is likely that he has not understood the joke in what was originally a Hipponactean fragment. Light objects might not travel far, but the strength needed to throw one is much less. Hipponax' claims to strength, in this context, are self-ironizing. If this is correct, as Ralph Rosen argues, 'the setting must have been one in which the iambographer was pitted initially as an underdog against a self-assured ἐχθρός'.<sup>23</sup> The emphasis on physical appearance throughout the testimonium is then seen as part of the original poem's allusion to the altercation between Odysseus and Euryalus in *Od.* 8.<sup>24</sup> Hipponax' redeployment of Homeric scenes,<sup>25</sup> the emphasis on physicality, and the ironic feat of throwing a light object all present more or less close parallels with

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<sup>22</sup> For the use of τρυγωδία in comedy, see Taplin (1983). For the idea that comedy provides useful instruction for the Athenian citizens, cf. *Ach.* 655-8 (with Olson (2002) *ad* 633-58).

<sup>23</sup> Rosen (1990) 11-5, quotation from 13.

<sup>24</sup> For remarks about physical appearance in the Odyssean scene, note particularly Laodamas' description of Odysseus at *Od.* 8.134, 136-7, Euryalus' speech at ll. 159-60, and 164, by contrast to Odysseus' remarks at 8.169-77.

<sup>25</sup> For further possible Homeric resonances in Hipponax, see Rosen (1990). The use of Homeric poetry in *iambos* may be traced all the way back to Archilochus, for which see Seidensticker (1978) and Swift (2015); Barker and Christensen (2006) and Swift (2012) also consider the role of Homeric poetry in the new, elegiac Archilochus poem.

Hegemon's position here. These parallels suggest a certain amount of influence from two genres both intimately connected with satire.

A further feature commonly found in the fragments of Hipponax that could equally well be applied to Hegemon here is scapegoating. In Hipponax, the *pharmakos* ritual plays a significant role: not only does someone else suggest that Hipponax should be pelted with stones as a *pharmakos* (fr. 37), but this accusation is in turn flipped and used against Hipponax' detractors (frs. 6-10). Indeed, the *pharmakos* ritual is so common in Hipponax that his poetry was used as a major source for Tzetzes' discussion of the ritual (*Chil.* 5.728). Hegemon, by contrast, is less concerned with scapegoating as a specific ritual, rather the more general process of an individual's ostracization from a group. We need not assume by any means that Hegemon is drawing on Hipponax. Indeed, John Wilkins has noted that the scapegoating of Hegemon is one of several features that is reminiscent of speeches Middle Comedy.<sup>26</sup> Instead, the analogy of Hipponax merely helps to illustrate the dynamics of Hegemon's satire.

Whatever the precise relationship between the different genres and their influence on Hegemon, the one certain fact is that there is a strong element of satire in the fragment under consideration. Hegemon's satirical activities are also suggested by the spurious story reported by Chamaeleon (fr. 44 Wehrli ap. Ath. 9.406-7), according to which Hegemon was spared the litigation of certain "artists of Dionysus" (τοὺς περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνίτας) through the intervention of Alcibiades. Although Storey dismisses this anecdote as a mere "doublet" of Alcibiades throwing Eupolis into the sea for his production of *Baptai*,<sup>27</sup> it is unusual for a poet to be saved prosecution from *poets* by a *politician*. Normally, it is the other way around.<sup>28</sup> Whether or not there is any credibility to the story, it does suggest that Chamaeleon, who, presumably, had access to much more of Hegemon's poetry that we do, could plausibly present Hegemon as someone whose poetry was satirical enough to cause outrage in the injured party. Indeed, the fact that Platonius' treatise *Peri diaphorras kômôidiôn* argues that Alcibiades' dealings with Eupolis were a significant factor in the development of comedy from Old to Middle, i.e. from political satire to escapism (ἴσμεν γοῦν τὸν Εὔπολιν ἐπὶ τῷ διδάξαι τοὺς Βάπτας ἀποπνιγέντα εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν ύπ' ἐκείνου εἰς ὃν καθῆκε τοὺς Βάπτας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὀκνηρότεροι πρὸς τὰ σκώμματα ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐπέλιπον οἱ χορηγοί),

<sup>26</sup> Wilkins (2000) 355: 'Notable elements here are the mild scapegoating of Hegemon, the personal narrative, and the self-mocking presentation of the narrator, all of which will have analogues in the speeches of *mageiroi* and parasites in Middle Comedy.'

<sup>27</sup> Tzetzes *Proem.* 1 (= Eupolis *Baptai test.* iv K-A); cf. Aelius Aristides *Or.* 3.8. For the story, see Storey (2003) 101-3.

<sup>28</sup> Compare also Aristophanes' claims of legal action by Cleon, for example at *Ach.* 377-82, 502-8, and 515-8. Cleon is most likely to have used the procedure called *einaggelia* and has been much discussed by scholarship; see for example Halliwell (1980), Atkinson (1992), and Sommerstein (2004).

demonstrates that these story types, whatever their historical veracity, are attached to poets whose poetry was viewed as satirical.

If Hegemon is being deliberately satirical, who is the butt of the joke? One answer must be the Thasians. Hegemon's satirical take on them is clear particularly from the phrase εὐκούρων βδελυρῶν (8). Although it is clear that this adjective properly derives from the verb κείω, the precise meaning is debatable.<sup>29</sup> Does this mean that they had short hair or that they were well-shaven? Given that they are said to be poets too, I would argue that the claim that they are well-shaven contains more satirical bite given its association with excessive grooming, a negative trait that goes back to Paris. The association between shaving and dandyism is well established in the satiric tradition, going back to Archilochus, with whom I shall suggest in the next section Hegemon has a strong affinity.<sup>30</sup> Further, being well-shaven was a source of mockery for poets in the late fifth century, such as Agathon in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*. When confronted about his looks by Euripides' Kinsman, Agathon claims that it is uncouth to see a poet who is wild and shaggy (ἄλλως τ' ἄμουσόν ἐστι ποιητὴν ἵδεῖν / ἀγρεῖον ὄντα καὶ δασύν - 159-60), citing Ibucus, Anacreon, and Alcaeus as forerunners in the trend.<sup>31</sup> In this context, the description of the Thasians as εὐκούρων evokes the notion that they were effeminate and trying desperately to fit into a laughable Athenian artists' scene.

Hegemon goes on to state that he will return the money he has won to the Thasians, μηδένα πημαίνων (12), a joke that must rely on the irony of performance. Although we do not yet know why Hegemon decides to return to the *mousikoi agônes*, the very fact that he is once more performing this very poem does imply some kind of twist that will return him to the fold. The statement that he intends to do no-one harm, in this case, must ring hollow in his audiences' ears, especially as he has just been criticizing the Thasians once more. πημαίνω, then, marks the metaphorical violence, the satire, of Hegemon's poetry, a violence he claims to be renouncing. The idea of physical harm as a consequence of satirical poetry is relatively common. Two fragments of Hipponax, for example, refer to physical violence intended for Bupalus.<sup>32</sup> The narrative of violence in Hipponax' poetry is in effect enacted in performance. Although πημαίνω is not commonly used metapoetically, there is one passage in Aristophanes that might suggest that it could be interpreted

<sup>29</sup> It does certainly not derive from κοῦρος, producing the sense of "grown up boys", as Bertolín Cebrián (2008) 47 mistranslates the word. Olson (2006-12) diplomatically translates as "well-barbered". My interpretation of this word has benefitted much from discussion with Sebastiano Bertolini.

<sup>30</sup> οὐ φιλέω μέγαν στρατηγὸν οὐδὲ διαπεπλιγμένον / οὐδὲ βοστρύχοισι γαῦρον οὐδ' ὑπεξυρημένον - Archil. fr. 114.1-2, a fragment that was still well known in the Imperial period.

<sup>31</sup> Austin and Olson (2004) *ad loc.* note that δασὺς usually refers to body hair and especially to hair growing around the anus.

<sup>32</sup> Λάβετέ μεο ταιμάτια, κόψω Βουπάλου τὸν ὄφθαλμόν - fr. 120, ἀμφιδέξιος γάρ εἰμι κούκ ἀμαρτάνω κόπτων - fr. 121. Note that these fragments are not necessarily from the same poem.

thus. At *Ach.* 842, the chorus say that Dicaeopolis will not be underbid by others in his new market (οὐδ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὑποψιῶν σε πτημαῖνεῖ τι). Given that elsewhere in Aristophanes we find the idea of poetry as a cheap fare (e.g. ὃς ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς δαπάνης ὑμᾶς ἀριστίζων ἀπέπεμπεν - *Eq.* 538), the chorus at this point may be foreshadowing the metapoetic ending of the play in which the predicted victory of the play is acted out through Dicaeopolis' celebrations. Hegemon is certainly not claiming, as Aristophanes may be doing in the *Knights* and to a lesser extent in *Acharnians*, to be offering his audience a richer dish. Instead, he is employing a performative irony. We know that Hegemon's protestations that he is giving up his poetic activities are false and we can therefore appreciate that, even as Hegemon claims not to intend any future harm, he is once again engaging in precisely the same satirical activities he claims to be abandoning.

Poverty is not the only grounds for criticism against the Thasians; poverty makes them self-destructive. If thus far, Hegemon has been merely using Homeric or HomERICALLY stylized language to express his criticisms, now he makes a more direct allusion through the phrase ὀλλύντων τ' ὀλλυμένων τε (8). Different scholars, however, have suggested different passages to which Hegemon may be alluding. Olson and Sens, for instance, note that the phrase is similar (through the ever illusive cf.) to Homer's ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων, which forms part of a more extended passage that is repeated in the *Iliad* (4.446-51 = 8.60-5).<sup>33</sup> I would prefer to connect Hegemon's phrase with a passage cited by Brandt as one of his so-called *Homeri loci similes* (όλλύντας τ' ὀλλυμένους τε - *Il.* 11.83).<sup>34</sup> Although in a different case, this phrase does occur in the same metrical *sedes* as Hegemon's phrase. Additionally it is worth taking into account the context of this latter passage, in which Zeus, blamed by the Greeks for giving victory over the Trojans, looks down onto the battlefield, onto the slayers and the slain. By alluding to this passage, Hegemon seems to take on the vantage-point of Zeus himself. Despite the criticisms of his actions, he remains aloof (cf. the description of Zeus, ὁ δὲ νόσφι λιασθεὶς, at *Il.* 11.80) and uses his position to look back at the Thasians. From this point of view, Hegemon adopts the higher, aloof position of Zeus to imply his superiority at precisely the moment when he claims to be "persuaded by them".

Although Hegemon is clearly and explicitly satirizing the Thasians (and Thasian poetics) for their poverty, it is also worth taking into consideration the cause for the Thasians' poverty. Their poverty can be traced back to 465/4 BC,<sup>35</sup> when according to Thucydides, they rebelled against the Delian League. As Hornblower has remarked, it is likely that Athens was in fact the aggressor in an

<sup>33</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) 9 n. 17.

<sup>34</sup> Brandt (1888) *ad loc.* does not comment on the effect of this "locus", but simply translates the phrase in this context as 'qui se invicem perdunt.'

<sup>35</sup> Although not certain, the "rebellion" of the Thasians described by Thucydides can be dated relatively securely with the aid of the scholiast to Aeschines. For a discussion of the evidence, see Hornblower (1991) *ad* 1.100.1, whose account of the events of 465/4 I follow here.

economically-driven war over a quarrel concerning the trading posts and mines possessed by Thasos on the Thracian mainland (χρόνω δὲ ὅστερον ξυνέβη Θασίους αὐτῶν ἀποστῆναι, διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θράκη ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ἢ ἐνέμοντο - 100.2). Previously the Thasians gained economic benefits from the mainland that, if we believe Herodotus, were substantial (between 200 and 300 talents in revenue according to Hdt. 6.46.2). After the Thasian attempts to get Sparta on side had failed, they lost all of their possessions on the mainland and the mine (Θάσιοι δὲ τοίτω ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ὡμολόγησαν Αθηναίοις τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν, τὴν τε ἥπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες - 101.3). While it is unclear precisely what Thucydides meant by χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι, from 443 the Thasians were certainly paying dearly, 30 talents per year in tribute (the highest tribute known, equivalent to Aegina). The heavy Athenian tribute paid by Thasos, alongside the fact that upper-class Athenians owned land on Thasos itself,<sup>36</sup> eventually led to another Thasian revolt in 411. Again according to Thucydides, this was brought about by Thasian exiles in the Peloponnese when Diitrephe installed an Athenian oligarchy there (8.64.1-4).

If Hegemon is performing in Athens (note that our only evidence of *paroïdic* competitions during the 5th cent. BC is from Athens), is there a more subtle bite to his satire here? I.e. given the Athenian implication in causing Thasos' poverty, are the Athenians the real targets? Before we can answer this, we must also consider the time of the performance: was this fragment written *before* or *after* 411 BC? While it is clearly impossible to know the answer to this latter question, it is one that we must bear in mind given that our only dated performance of Hegemon is that of his *Gigantomachy* in 413 BC. Although the story is clearly suspect, it does fit within the range of Hegemon's possible dates.

Perhaps the key to the question is Athena's phrase, δεινὰ παθοῦσα. Who is the cause of Hegemon's suffering? Within the narrative of the fragment as we have it, the answer is the Thasians pelting him with shit.<sup>37</sup> As is suggested for example by the Mnesiepes inscription, the judgement that cost him victory might also be the source. Alternatively, if she is referring to his poverty, that is caused primarily by his Thasian roots, although we know that those derive from Athens itself. Without further evidence, I do not think that we can assert with much confidence that Hegemon was implicitly satirizing the Athenians or even merely those associated with the

<sup>36</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 426 ll. 45 and 144, and see Osborne (2000). For the significance of this for the events of 411, see Hornblower (2010) *ad* 8.46.6 n. on ἐξ ὕν τὰ πλείω and *ad* 8.64.4 n. on καὶ τὴν Θάσον ἀποστῆσαι.

<sup>37</sup> For a rival poet being pelted with shit, cf. Ar. Ach. 1163-73 where the chorus cursing imagine Antimachus, walking home, cold, being hit on the head by a drunkard and in the darkness picking up a freshly shat turd, missing his target, and hitting Cratinus instead. As Olson (2002) *ad* 1171-3 notes, part of the humour there lies in the parody of the stock Homeric scene, in which a fighter misses but hits someone else.

oligarchic coup. We might note in passing, however, that if this were the case, the choice of Athena as a patron goddess would become much more pointed. Claiming (however fictitiously) to have the support of Athens' patron goddess, particularly in the context of her own festival, might have been a ruse to avoid repercussions. Secondly, I would suggest it is possible that, even if Hegemon isn't trying to satirize Athenian (oligarchic) involvement in the financial ruin of Thasos, there is a hint that he could satirize the Athenians with the divine approval and support of their own patron goddess.

In this section, we have seen how Hegemon deploys techniques common in comedy in his reaction to failure. On the one hand, the close identification between his poetic output and food – it drives his production, its success is reflected in his wife's baking, and it even constitutes his nickname – allows Hegemon to use the metaliterary metaphor to define, or redefine his poetic identity in the face of defeat. On the other, the language of disgust functions to shift the blame for his defeat away from the poet himself, incorporating his bad poetry into a wider social problem. This provides the basis for his socio-economic satire of the Thasians – poor people who produce poor poetry. The intervention of Athena at the end of the fragment finally marks Hegemon himself out as destined for greater (or at least μᾶλλον) things. In both cases, the comic techniques found in the fragment form part of Hegemon's poetic definition of his own identity, especially in contrast to the other Thasians.

## HEGEMON'S FAILURE AND THE BIOGRAPHIES OF THE POETS

It is well known that, while numerous elements of ancient biographies are extrapolated from the author's poems,<sup>38</sup> some stories can be reapplied from one author to another. One clear example is from ps.-Acro's comment on Hor. *Ep.* 6.13-4 (*qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener / aut acer hostis Bupalo*), which offers an account of Hipponax' rivalry with Bupalus. Ps.-Acron correctly identifies the *acer hostis Bupalo* as Hipponax but goes on to relate one story about Hipponax, that he sought to marry Bupalus' daughter and was scorned because of his ugliness (*Hipponactem significat qui Bupali filiam nuptum petiit et pro deformitate contemptus est*). While Hipponax' alleged ugliness is a

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<sup>38</sup> See especially M.R. Lefkowitz (1981) viii: 'ancient biographers took most of their information about poets from the poets' own works.' Cf. Fairweather (1974) for the fictional elements of ancient biographies. More recently, Graziosi (2002) has focused on an analysis of the early reception of Homer.

common part of his biography (and indeed comparable to Hegemon's disgusting feet),<sup>39</sup> nowhere do we find another reference, within Hipponax' work or within the biographical tradition, to Bupalus' daughter or a marriage. Ps.-Acron goes on then to relate that Bupalus (although he does not mention Athenis) painted Hipponax as ugly and that Hipponax' responding poetry was so vicious that Bupalus hanged himself (*quo ille furore commotus tali eum carmine perculit ut se laqueo suspenderet*).<sup>40</sup> Even if the first part of Ps.-Acron's story about Bupalus' daughter was likely caused by the misapplication of Horace's term *gener*, the story that Bupalus committed suicide as a result of Hipponax' verse is clearly created on the analogy of Archilochus and Lycambes' family (*testim.* 19-32 Dg). In the previous section, too, we saw that the story of Hegemon and Alcibiades may have been created on the analogy of Eupolis. Such similarities between the biographies of poets frequently derive from the perception of a relationship between the authors involved, be it generic, intertextual, or stylistic. Furthermore, similarities can in turn be exploited by others wishing to model themselves upon a particular set of poets or against a general poetic background. In this section, I shall demonstrate that Hegemon uses the biographies of the rhapsodized poets (i.e. those whose poetry was performed in the rhapsodic competitions) to construct a narrative arc for his persona.

By contrast to an allusion to the life of a specific poet or individual, I am suggesting that Hegemon draws more broadly on features common to several poets' biographies. Part of the result of this process is that such features appear clichéd or stereotypical. Additionally, while some biographical details derive from the author's own works, others derive from a wider tradition. Consequently, I am not arguing that Hegemon makes specific allusions to the works of other poets to create this effect, but rather that we can identify story types that can be viewed, in the performance context of the poem, as reminiscent of the biographical tradition of the rhapsodized poets. Additionally, the absence of sufficient evidence from the fifth century means that we cannot be certain that every passage I adduce as examples of the same story type would have been known to Hegemon's audience. However, this need not be the case; it would be quite sufficient for the audience either to be familiar with certain specific examples, many of which can be traced back to

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<sup>39</sup> For Hipponax' ugliness, see Pliny *NH* 36.4.12 (*Hipponacti notabilis foeditas uultus erat*), Aelian *VH* 10.6 (λέγουσι δὲ καὶ Ἰππώνακτα τὸν ποιητὴν οὐ μόνον γενέσθαι μικρὸν τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ καὶ λεπτόν), and Metrodorus of Scepsis *FGrHist* 184 F 6 ap. Ath. 12.552c-d (Μητρόδωρος δ' ὁ Σικήψιος ἐν δευτέρῳ Περὶ ἀλειπτικῆς Ἰππώνακτα τὸν ποιητὴν οὐ μόνον μικρὸν γενέσθαι τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ λεπτόν); cf. *Suda* ii. 665.16 Adler ([Hipponax] γράφει δὲ πρὸς Βούταλον καὶ Ἀθηνιν ἀγαλματοποιός, ὅτι αὐτοῦ εἰκόνας πρὸς ὑβριν εἰργάσαντο).

<sup>40</sup> The same story is related by Pliny, upon whom Ps.-Acron may have drawn, although if so the latter makes no mention of Pliny's objection to the story (*quod Hipponax indignatus destrinxit amaritudinem carminum in tantum ut credatur aliquis ad laqueum eos compulisse; quod falsum est, complura enim in finitimiis insulis simulacra postea fecere, sicut in Delo*).

each author's poetry, or for them to recognize more general patterns or formulae.<sup>41</sup> In this section, then, I argue that several elements common in the biographical traditions of the rhapsodized poets can be identified in the fragment of Hegemon: poverty, divine inspiration, and rejection by his countrymen. Through these *topoi*, we see how Hegemon is able to mock the stereotypical nature of such biographies and to use their cultural authority, especially within the context of the Panathenaea, as a basis for his own victory and memorialization.

Firstly, poverty is a big joke in this fragment that works on numerous levels. When asked *who* persuaded him to enter poetic competitions (3-4), the answer is not who, but what (6-9). The word τίς implies that an individual person is expected. However, it is answered with a feminine noun which simultaneously grammatically agrees with but logically disappoints the expectations of the question. On a more subtle level, there is a pun, which has been discussed by Sebastiano Bertolini.<sup>42</sup> Although editors are surely right to reject μνῆμα as the correct reading given that Hegemon goes on to blame σπάνις,<sup>43</sup> the enjambement of the latter is clearly pointed, and itself hints at the fact that at first we cannot tell whether it is a *mina* persuading him or a chance to be remembered, μνῆμα, a meaning further encouraged by the alpha of ἀνέπεισε.<sup>44</sup> Although both the excessive desire for cash (φιλαργυρία) and glory (φιλοτιμία) could be dangerous traits, it is rare that φιλαργυρία is portrayed at all positively.<sup>45</sup> This, in combination with the enjambement of σπάνις, certainly suggests that the primary joke is Hegemon's self-centred attitude. At the same time, the pun suggests that Hegemon may be hinting at both of these poetic clichés simultaneously and suggesting a blurring of the two. How distinct are these drives, especially when victory in the poetic contests not only confers fame but also a cash prize?

In the following section, I shall explore the memorializing implications of this pun further by looking more closely at the fragment's anonymous speakers. For now, however, it is worth noting that poetic memorialization is an extremely common *topos*. The use of the cognate verb μιμνήσκω, for instance, frequently appears in the opening or at the end of the Homeric hymns.<sup>46</sup> Poverty, too, is a very common theme in poetry appearing from the archaic period onwards and also appears in several of the rhapsodized poets. Perhaps the most famous is Hesiod's statement in the *Works and*

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<sup>41</sup> In some cases, however, I do argue that Hegemon specifically alludes to certain passages.

<sup>42</sup> In his paper entitled 'Nonsense and *Eposparodie*: between ambiguity and polysemy' presented at the Ancient Nonsense conference at the University of Exeter on 23rd July 2014.

<sup>43</sup> μνῆμα... καὶ σπάνις would make little sense. The conjectures of editors, such as λῆμμ', proposed by Jacobs and followed by Brandt, and λῆμ', put forward by Meineke seem unnecessary. Originally, the line would read MNHMANEΠΕΙΣΕ, which clearly shows the ambiguity.

<sup>44</sup> Additionally, the accentuation of the words remains the same on both readings, further contributing to the effect.

<sup>45</sup> See, amongst various examples of a negative φιλαργυρία, Isoc. 8.96 and Democr. 222.

<sup>46</sup> *Hom. Hymn* 3.1 cf. 546, 4.580, 6.21, 7.1-2, 10.6, 19.49, 25.7, 27.22, 28.18, 29.14, 30.19, 33.19.

*Days*, where he states that his father fled not from riches but from poverty (οὐκ ἄφενος φεύγων οὐδὲ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ὅλβον, / ἀλλὰ κακὴν πενίην - *Op.* 636-7). The specific connection with naval travel (ώς περ ἐμός τε πατήρ καὶ σός, μέγα νήπιε Πέρση, / πλωΐζεσκ' ἐν νηυσί, βίου κεχομένος ἐσθλοῦ - 633-4), and the idea that Hegemon, like Perses, was looking to try and bring home *kerdos* (ἴν' οἴκαδε κέρδος ἀρηται - 632) provides some support for linking these passages more closely. That is, we might argue that Hegemon fashions his own persona after Hesiod's exhortation to his brother Perses, attempting (though failing) to bring home *profit*.

Another important poetic figure for Hegemon's depiction of his dire straits must also be Archilochus,<sup>47</sup> as his father Telesicles was associated with the foundation of a Greek colony on Thasos and Archilochus' poetry makes several references to Thasos itself.<sup>48</sup> During the 5th century Critias, as reported by Aelian (*VH* 10.13), criticized Archilochus for giving away too many of his bad points in his poetry, and amongst these is the revelation that he left Paros for Thasos because of poverty and that on his arrival Archilochus made enemies of the inhabitants of Thasos too (αἰτιᾶται Κριτίας Αρχίλοχον ὅτι... καταλιπὼν Πάρον διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἀπορίαν ἤλθεν ἐς Θάσον, οὐθ' ὅτι ἐλθὼν τοῖς ἐνταῦθα ἐχθρὸς ἐγένετο). From this perspective, Hegemon may well be the next step in the chain: Archilochus' poverty drives him to Thasos, where he freely criticized the Thasians, while Hegemon is then forced to leave Thasos also out of poverty and when he is criticized by the Thasians, he answers in kind.

Although seemingly less directly associated with Hegemon's situation in this fragment, the presentation of Homer as either poor or even as a beggar is common in the biographical tradition. Indeed, as early as Pindar we find the story that he was so poor that he had to give away the *Cypria* as dowry for his daughter (fr. 265 S-M). Similarly in the *Vita Herodotea*, we find several stories relating to Homer's poverty: the shoemaker Tychius is said to take pity on Homer, the blind beggar (αἰτέοντα τυφλόν - 107-9), while one of the kings of Cyme is said elsewhere to have rejected Homer's request to be fed at public expense (141-66).<sup>49</sup>

Hegemon, therefore, blames poverty for his poetic venture partially because it links him into a broad poetic tradition of "the poor poet", and this tradition also closely aligns his persona with significant poetic and rhapsodic figures. The pun on μνῆμα becomes particularly ironic, as it reveals that the poets who have attained the most μνῆμα were also driven by their need for a μνῆ.

<sup>47</sup> For the performance of Archilochean poetry in rhapsodic competitions, see Ford (1988), Bartol (1992), Rotstein (2010) 263-6, and Lavigne (2008) and (2016).

<sup>48</sup> For a discussion of Archilochus' life and poetry, Carey (2009) 152-60 provides a good summary. Stephanus of Byzantium *Lex.* s.v. Θάσος mentions an oracle given to Telesicles to colonize Thasos. For Thasos in Archilochus' poetry, see frs. 20-2.

<sup>49</sup> For the poverty of Homer, particularly in connection with his blindness, see Graziosi (2002) 150-9.

Divine authorialization was already a poetic cliché by Hegemon's time and surviving examples of the trope are found in a wide spectrum of literature. Hesiod is again perhaps the most famous example, whose scene of divine authorialization is utilized as a model by numerous later poets. In the *Theogony*, Hesiod describes the appearance of the Muses who give him a *sképtron* and breathe into him a divine voice (αἵ νύ ποθ' Ήσιόδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν, / ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ' Ἐλικῶνος ὅπε ζαθέοιο... καὶ μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὅζον... ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν / θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα - Th. 22-34). While in the *Theogony* Hesiod is given a *sképtron*, Hegemon is instead whacked with a *rhabdon*. In addition to the joke that he is hit with instead of given the rod, the change in vocabulary is clearly important given the performance context. Athena, the patron goddess of the Panathenaea, hits him with a symbol of rhapsodic performance, since *rhapsodia* was sometimes thought to derive from the *rhabdon* which they carried.<sup>50</sup>

Archilochus too, when on his way to sell a cow at market, comes across some women with whom he engages in jocular banter.<sup>51</sup> As it is reported in the Mnesiepes inscription, the women suddenly disappear, cow and all, leaving behind a lyre as a symbol of Archilochus' new artistic talents ([έη]θέντων δὲ τούτων αὐτὰς μὲν οὐδὲ τὴν βοῦν οὐκέτι [φ]λανερὰς εἶναι, πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν δὲ λύραν ὁρᾶν αὐτόν). The banter, that involves some jesting, also acts as a kind of aetiology for the subject of Archilochus' verses. Similarly, as we shall see, Athena's words to Hegemon in this fragment are paradigmatic for Hegemon's poetic agenda.

Some of the lines towards the end of the fragment also parody lines from the Homeric epics, through which the divine authorialization is clarified as a form of inverted *nostos*. The clearest example of this is in line 19 (χρυσῆν όάβδον ἔχουσα καὶ ἥλασεν εἴπε τε φωνῇ), which may recall *Odyssey* 16.172 (ἥ καὶ χρυσείη όάβδω ἐπεμάσσατ' Αθήνη), where Athena uses her golden wand to reinvigorate Odysseus just as she does for Hegemon.<sup>52</sup> This is also a reversal of the amusing parody in line 13, where Hegemon speaks almost word-for-word a line originally spoken by Penelope.<sup>53</sup> Through these parodies, Hegemon plays with ideas of Odyssean *nostos* and the ploys and ruses used to effect it. Hegemon, that is, has Athena re-enact Odysseus' *nostos* as a way for him

<sup>50</sup> See Heraclitus fr. 42 D-K and Pi. I. 3.55-7; cf. Graziosi (2002) 23. Scholars have since pointed out that this etymology is not possible, for instance Knecht (1946) and Else (1957) 28.

<sup>51</sup> λέγουσι γὰρ Αρχίλοχον ἔτι νεώτερον ὄντα πεμφθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς Τελεσικλέους εἰς ἀγρόν, εἰς τὸν δῆμον δὲ καλεῖται Λειμῶνες, ὥστε βοῦν καταγαγεῖν εἰς πρᾶσιν... ὡς δ' ἐγένετο κατὰ τὸν τόπον, δὲ καλεῖται Λισσίδες, δόξαι γυναστακας [ι]δεῖν ἀθρόας. νομίσαντα δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων ἀπιέναι αὐτὰς εἰς πόλιν προσελθόντα σκώπτειν, τὰς δὲ δέξασθαι αὐτὸν μετὰ παιδιᾶς καὶ γέλωτος καὶ [έ]περωτῆσαι. For Archilochus' initiation scene, see Miralles and Pòrtulas (1983) 61-80, Hawkins (2009), Ornaghi (2009) 133-56. Divine initiation scenes seem to have been a fairly regular feature of archaic *iambos*, as Hippoanax too encounters the figure of Iambe, for which see C.G. Brown (1988), Rosen (1988b), and R.L. Fowler (1990).

<sup>52</sup> For the allusion, see Olson and Sens (1999) 9.

<sup>53</sup> μὴ τίς μοι κατὰ οἶκον Αχαιάδων νεμεσήσῃ ~ μὴ τίς μοι κατὰ δῆμον Αχαιάδων νεμεσήσῃ - Od. 2.101.

to leave his home, not to return to it. The *actual* effect of Athena's words and actions, on the other hand, recalls not the *Odyssey* but the *Iliad* in line 21, where the opening of the line, καὶ τότε δὴ θάρσησα, recalls almost exactly the same hemistich used to describe Calchas after Achilles assures his safety from Agamemnon's criticisms of his prophesy (καὶ τότε δὴ θάρσησε - *Il.* 1.92). In the context of a scene in which Hegemon is authorized to speak to the Athenians once more, the alignment of Hegemon's persona with a prophet is especially fitting.

Thirdly, I want to discuss civic rejection. Hegemon's return to Thasos seems to be designed to resound with the rejection of Homer and Archilochus from various places. Aside from his ignominious departure from Paros, the example of Archilochus is well known from the third column of the Mnesiepes inscription. Although highly fragmentary, its gist is clear. Archilochus performed an improvised song (φασὶν Ἀρχίλοχον αὐτο]σχεδιασ[ - 19-20) at a festival of Dionysus (implied by Βάκχον ἀμείλιχον at 49), that was considered by his audience to be "too iambic" (ἰαμβικώτεροιν - 38). As a result, he didn't win the competition. Presumably angry at the injustice of this a god causes the citizens to become impotent (μετ' οὐ πολὺν] χρόνον γίνεσθαι... ἀσθενεῖς] εἰς τὰ αἰδοῖα 42-4) and when they seek the cause of their suffering from an oracle, they are told that they must honour Archilochus (τίπτε δίκαις ἀνέμοις κεχρημένοι ἡδὲ βίηφι / ἥλθετε πρὸς Πυθάνα λοιμοῦ λύσιν ἀιτήσαντες / οὐκ ἔστιν πρὸιν [Βάκχον ἀμείλιχον ἐξιλάσασθαι / εἰς ὅ κεν Αρχίλοχον Μουσῶν θεράποντα τίητε - 47-51).

Homer, by contrast, seems, according to the ancient tradition, to have been rejected by many cities. Indeed, in the *Laws*, Plato uses the widespread fact of Homer's rejection as evidence that he cannot have anything terribly useful to tell us.<sup>54</sup> If he had, Plato argues, surely Homer would have had followers? Additionally, in one of the Homeric epigrams, Homer is said to have been rejected by the city of Cyme, which is handy as he seems not to want to stay there anyway (οἱ δ' ἀπανηνάσθην ἴερὴν ὅπα, φῆμιν ἀοιδῆς, ἀφραδίη. τῶν μέν τε παθῶν τις φράσσεται αὔθις... οὐδὲ ἔτι μοι φίλα γνīα μένειν ἴεραῖς ἐν ἀγυιαῖς Κύμης ὁρμαίνουσι - *Epigr.* 14 = Ps.-Hdt. *Vit. Hom.* 14).

There is an interesting common element between the two traditions, retribution: Archilochus' listeners are made impotent by their impotent judgement, and Homer in the epigram says that one of the men will remember the moment later when they are in trouble. The retribution in Archilochus is also facilitated by the divine. Although we don't know what happens after the end of Hegemon's fragment, the usual narrative structure of these biographical traditions, especially if we

<sup>54</sup> ἀλλ' οἴει, ὃ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οὗτος τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὄμηρος, ἀτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκειν δυνάμενος... Ὄμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἔκεινοι, εἴπερ οὗτος τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὄντησαι ἀνθρώπους, ἡ Ἡσίοδον ὁρψωδεῖν ἀν περιμόντας εἰων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἀν αὐτῶν ἀντείχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἡνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἀν ἐπαιδαγώγουν ὅπῃ ἤσαν, ἔως ίκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν; - 600c-e.

also take into account Athena's potentially ominous phrase δεινὰ παθοῦσα, could suggest the possibility of a similar retribution inflicted on the Thasians. Even if Hegemon doesn't specifically narrate a retribution, the possible implication of one is still relevant, especially for his current audience. In other words: "You know Athena's supporting me this time; so if I don't win, you know what happens."

In our surviving fragment, Hegemon fits comfortably into the mould of the wandering poet, a form of professionalized poet who travels to perform.<sup>55</sup> Such figures frequently display similarities in style and strategy, many of which are parodied in general terms by Aristophanes (V. 904-57).<sup>56</sup> Some of these Hegemon shares, such as poor clothing,<sup>57</sup> diversification (after all, Hegemon was known for comedy and *parōidia*), and blending into tradition; others are inverted or distorted, such as inflating one's worth (Hegemon is old and unwilling) and praise of the city (if indeed part of the satire is directed at the Athenians). Frequently, the end game for such wandering poets was to acquire renown or even to be honoured by a city.<sup>58</sup> In this section, I have argued that at least some elements of the similarity between Hegemon and such figures is part of the point and that, in particular, Hegemon models his persona on the most relevant poetic figures for his performance context: those poets whose work was performed by the rhapsodes in Athens. Such alignment between his and the rhapsodized poets' personae provides a traditional form of authorization even in the face of failure (if *even* Homer was turned away from cities, it is not as problematic for the same to happen to Hegemon), reinforced by the direct intervention of Athena herself. Simultaneously, the self-conscious blurring of the poets' biographies produces humour at their expense: the idealized notion of the poet's fame is reduced to a basic need for money and food and the similarities between different biographical traditions are revealed as stock clichés.

Hegemon's journey is also the opposite of a *nostos*, moving as it does away from his home in Thasos whilst parodying Odysseus' own epic *nostos*. What starts as a form of civic rejection, one traditional motif of the wandering poet and indeed a motif that *effects* the poet's wandering, ends by looking forward to the poet's incorporation into the fabric of another city. If on the one hand the implications of the civic rejection narrative Hegemon evokes is to threaten his current audience with divine retaliation should he lose again, it also hyperbolically looks forward to the city honouring him when he is victorious.

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<sup>55</sup> For the figure of the wandering poet, see Hunter and Rutherford (2009), in which Hegemon is briefly mentioned (p. 14).

<sup>56</sup> For a discussion of many of these techniques and the Aristophanes passage, see R.P. Martin (2009).

<sup>57</sup> Ar. V. 915 with Dunbar (1995) *ad loc.* This is obviously taken to a rather shitty extreme in our fragment.

<sup>58</sup> See for instance the boasts of Empedocles fr. 112 D-K; cf. Hunter and Rutherford (2009) 3-4, influenced by Guarducci (1929).

## A SHIT-STAINED SOMEBODY AND AN ARGUMENT AD NEMINEM

In this final section, I want to explore further Hegemon's concern with memorialization by looking in more detail at the contrast between the figure of the poet and the other speakers in the fragment. In particular, I argue that the use of τις anonymizes Hegemon's critics and that the poem is partially an argument *ad neminem*, a critique of a specific individual or individuals in the same sense as an argument *ad hominem* but in which the refusal to name its addressees forms the crux of the criticism. In the surviving fragment, τις is used thrice (2, 13, 15) to refer to anonymous figures. The significance of these anonymous persons is foremost to form a contrast with the way in which Hegemon constructs himself as a *somebody*, and not just somebody. This is achieved in a more pointed manner given that Hegemon uses the same τις constructions that we find in Homer. Additionally, as Hegemon attempts to forge a unique literary identity, he is also asked who, τις, persuaded him onto the stage. The fragment actually offers us two answers to this question that frame the fragment. There is Hegemon's first answer, which is eventually superseded by the intervention of Athena, whose divine authorialization of Hegemon's poetic performances also acts as another answer to the initial question. His first response sets himself up as a nobody until Athena intervenes and makes him a somebody. I shall thus demonstrate that the Hegemon fragment creates a dichotomy between the anonymity of the Thasians and the fame and fortune that Hegemon seeks.

The anonymous figures of the fragment both introduce τις-speeches and these speeches are constructed in a similar manner as the τις-speeches of Homeric epic. In Homer, this device has been studied by several scholars, most recently Irene de Jong, who divided τις-speeches into "actual" and "possible".<sup>59</sup> It is worth revisiting this device in Homer before returning to examine the similarities with Hegemon's fragment. De Jong argues that the actual τις-speeches 'offer the hearer/reader the opportunity to get a glimpse of the mind of the masses, which are normally bound to silence in epic'.<sup>60</sup> Thus, for example, when the Greek and Trojan soldiers offer a private prayer following the sacrifice that precedes the duel of Menelaus and Paris (*Il.* 3.297-302), Homer allows us to see the anti-war feeling of the majority of the troops.

I would like to go further than de Jong's analysis of these passages by asking why such moments are expressed using the word τις, rather than simply saying "the Achaeans" or "the Trojans". My suggestion is that τις itself reflects the anonymizing function of these passages. That

<sup>59</sup> de Jong (1987) 81; cf. also Hentze (1905) and J.R. Wilson (1979). Actual τις-speeches: *Il.* 2.271-8, 3.297-302, 3.319-24, 4.81-5, 7.178-81, 7.201-6, 17.414-9, 17.420-3, 22.372-5; potential τις-speeches: 4.176, 6.459-62, 6.479, 7.87-91, 7.300-2, 12.317-21, 22.106-8, 23.575.

<sup>60</sup> de Jong (1987) 82.

is to say, the indeterminacy of the speaker also helps to reflect its message. When the soldiers pray for an end to the war at *Il.* 3.297-302, for example, we as the audience know that it is far from the end. In addition to reflecting the soldiers' anti-war feeling, or rather as a function of that feeling, the anonymization of the speaker through the τις-speech reflects the anonymity that would ensue from their attitudes. This attitude of anonymity is set in stark contrast with the speech of Agamemnon that is concerned primarily with τιμήν (286, 288) and ποινῆς (290). Thus the leaders of the Greeks as named characters are concerned with their honour, while the anonymous soldiery have no such concerns and thus have no qualms about a quiet, anonymous life.<sup>61</sup>

We find a similar situation in *Iliad* 7. When lots are thrown into Agamemnon's helmet in order to decide who will duel Hector, the soldiers pray to Zeus hoping that Ajax, Diomedes, or even Agamemnon win (Ζεῦ πάτερ ἡ Αἴαντα λαχεῖν, ἡ Τυδέος νιόν, / ἡ αὐτὸν βασιλῆα πολυχρύσοιο Μυκήνης - 7.179-80). While de Jong's interpretation of the passage focuses on the increase of suspense, I would suggest in addition that the anonymity of the speaker serves as a foil for the fame of the hero chosen. This seems to be confirmed by what follows. Ajax accepts his lot and asks his φίλοι to pray for him, and the subsequent τις-speech confirms this. The Greeks pray that Ajax be granted the victory or, if Zeus does not want Hector to be defeated, that both men receive equal force and glory (δὸς νίκην Αἴαντι καὶ ἀγλαὸν εὖχος ἀρέσθαι· / εἰ δὲ καὶ Ἐκτορά περ φιλέεις καὶ κήδεαι αὐτοῦ, / ἵσην ἀμφοτέροισι βίην καὶ κῦδος ὅπασσον - 7.203-5). The anonymous speaker is an externalized means of reflecting on the glory of others.

On the other hand, potential τις-speeches are embedded in another speaker's words, imaginary speeches that *might* be spoken by someone else about the speaker. As de Jong has demonstrated, these speeches are designed to reveal more about the inner thought of the main speaker than the anonymous figure invoked to express them.<sup>62</sup> However, they also feature the same dichotomization of the famous and the anonymous for which I argued in the case of actual τις-speeches. This is most clear in the example of *Il.* 7.89-90, where the anonymous passer-by sails past the Hellespont and notices the burial mound of the man defeated in the duel shortly to take place (ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηώτος, / ὃν ποτ' ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιμος Ἐκτωρ). Hector, under the pretence of praising his opponent (ἀριστεύοντα), complements his own victory, which he then makes explicit in the phrase τὸ δ' ἐμὸν κλέος οὐ ποτ' ὀλεῖται (91). As I have suggested, the anonymity of the man who notices serves as a foil for the fame which follows the duellers. Fame and reputation are the concerns of potential τις-speeches elsewhere too. When Hector bewails the fate in store for Andromache, he anticipates someone recognizing her as the

<sup>61</sup> We might compare also the significance of naming in the cyclopean scene of *Od.* 9. Odysseus must name himself to gain the glory and recognition he seeks.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.* 76-80.

wife of Hector ("Εκτορος ἦδε γυνὴ ὃς ἀριστεύεσκε μάχεσθαι / Τρώων ἵπποδάμων ὅτε Ἰλιον ἀμφεμάχοντο - 6.460-1), and her former fame will be all the more painful by contrast to her current position. Similarly, Hector prays to Zeus that Astyanax will be as great a warrior as himself or that someone will say a much better fighter than his father (καὶ ποτέ τις εἴποι πατρός γ' ὅδε πολλὸν ἀμείνων / ἐκ πολέμου ἀνιόντα - 6.479-80). The imaginary speakers of these potential speeches are a literal externalization of Hector's own fears about his own reputation. He therefore envisions others confirming his own reputation in the future.

In the Hegemon fragment, the two τις-speeches conform to the two Homeric types: the first is an actual speech, in which the anonymous person standing nearby reflects, as in the *Iliad*, the feelings of all of the Thasians (2-4); the second is a potential speech, in which Hegemon externalizes his fears and hopes that none of the Achaean women in his home will criticize him (13-4) and that none of them will say that although he won 50 drachmas, his wife could only bake a small cake (15-7). As in the Homeric examples, both of these speeches reflect the way Hegemon tries to construct his own persona in response to his previous failure and in a way that will ensure more success in the future. Hegemon is initially confronted by an anonymous man who challenges his motives for ever thinking that he could make it on the stage. As I have already noted, his response blurs the boundaries between his desire for cash (μνῆ) and glory (μνῆμα).<sup>63</sup> While on one level the joke is that famous poets themselves were very poor, on another the quest for fame and fortune in the literary world are interlinked. Winning the prize in the *mousikoi agônes* gives you both. Hegemon's response, then, simultaneously jokes with the biographical traditions of the rhapsodized poets whilst also making a ludic yet apparently serious statement about Hegemon's desire for glory. He wants to become more than just "somebody standing nearby". His response to the τις-speech, then, throws the two figures into sharp relief. On the one side we have the critic, just a somebody, and on the other Hegemon, who might still be just a somebody, but wants to be more. This is both effective counter-criticism (my critics are just nobodies, not even worth naming!) and poetic self-positioning.

As we progress through the fragment, Hegemon says that he will not go away looking for profit any more (*αὐθις δ' οὐκ ἐπὶ κέρδος ἀπείσομαι* - 11) but instead he will give his *renowned silver* to the Thasians (*μηδὲν πημαίνων κλυτὸν ἄργυρον ἐγγυαλίζω* - 12). This description of the silver not only looks back to the pun of line 6, but also suggests that in addition to giving up the physical rewards of his poetic endeavours, he is also forfeiting the metaphysical one, his reputation. The

<sup>63</sup> Similarly, we find a joke about money-grabbing poets in Ar. *Pax* 696-9. Hermes asks after Sophocles and Trygaeus replies that he has turned into Simonides, because "to make a profit he would go to sea on a wicker mat." The joke is unclear (for a discussion, see Olson (1998) *ad loc.* and Sommerstein (1985) *ad loc.*), but Simonides was infamous for his avarice (e.g. Pl. *Hipparch.* 228c, Arist. *EN* 1121a7). The idea of the money-grabbing poet seems also to be associated with poets' travels, which seems to be the case here too.

explanation of this is where we find the second τις-speech. He renounces poetic fame so that no-one will criticize him. The second τις-speech clearly follows the same pattern as the imaginary τις-speeches in Homer, reflecting the internal concerns of the speaker. In this case, however, Hegemon builds an entire imaginary scenario around the speech. He is worried that someone (τις) from the Achaean women in his home will criticize him when they see the small cheesecake prepared by his wife (σμικρὸν τυροῦντ' ἐσιδοῦσα).

The line, μή τίς μοι κατὰ οἴκον Αχαιάδων νεμεσήσῃ, almost verbatim repeats a line spoken by Penelope in the *Odyssey* (μή τίς μοι κατὰ δῆμον Αχαιάδων νεμεσίσῃ - 2.101 = 19.146 = 24.136), in which she claims that it is necessary for her to complete the shroud for Laertes before remarrying, lest she incur the criticism of other Achaean women. Given the associations between spinning, weaving, and poetry in Homeric poetry and beyond,<sup>64</sup> it is possible that already in Homer the phrase contains an implication that Penelope is trying to avoid the kind of criticism common in iambic or perhaps more generally “blame” poetry. Either way, it seems that here Hegemon (re)interprets Penelope’s words metapoetically. He has already received public shaming in the opening lines of the fragment, and here he attempts to avoid further, poetic mockery. The irony, as I have said earlier, is that we know Hegemon will return to perform poetry. Even as the words fall from his mouth, he is abjuring them. When he says that he wishes to avoid criticism, i.e. not to be mocked in the poetry of others, he wishes to become a nobody. His reassumption of the poetic mantle offers him the opportunity both to criticize and also be criticized. To be criticized in public, however, you have to be famous enough to be *worth* criticizing. And what’s more, he will give as good as he gets: criticism travels both ways. But again, by denying his critics a name, he circumvents offering them glory through his poetry. It is also possible, if we accept ἀεικῶς at the end of line 14,<sup>65</sup> that the connection between the shame he will feel at such criticism from those in his own household and his singing is made clearer through the similar sounds of ἀεικῶς and ἀείσας at the end of lines 14 and 16. If this reading is correct, it further strengthens my metapoetic reading of the lines by intimately associating his shame with his song.

By refusing to name his critics, Hegemon also denies them any fame of their own. When Athena intervenes and authorizes Hegemon’s continued poetic performance, his critics are silenced for good. Hegemon will be somebody. His critics, however, will remain nameless nobodies. Thus, I would argue that Hegemon employs a similar technique to Homer’s τις-speeches. In both, the anonymity of the speaker serves as a foil for those against whom they stand in contrast. In the *Iliad*

<sup>64</sup> For the metapoetic qualities of spinning and weaving in Homer, see Pantelia (1993). For further comments on the metapoetic metaphor of weaving, see in ch. 4 my comments on *BM* 181-5.

<sup>65</sup> Although this reading, first proposed by Wachsmuth, has been accepted by most editors, including Brandt (1888), Olson and Sens (1999), and Olson (2006-12), it bears little similarity to the text transmitted by *A*, ἐν οἴκοις. We therefore should not take ἀεικῶς for granted as correct.

the contrast is between the soldiery and the leaders; in Hegemon it is between poets and their critics. In the fragment, the τις-speeches are developed into a coherent critique of nameless enemies, or an argument *ad neminem*.

This strategy is comparable to the poetry of Callimachus, especially his response to the Telchines at the opening of the *Aetia*. Indeed, there are numerous points of contact between the strategies of Callimachus and Hegemon: the emphasis on smallness in Hegemon (μικρόν) finds a parallel in the contrast between the many thousands of lines on heroic tales rejected by Callimachus in favour of smaller verses (ἐν πολλαῖς ἥνυσα χιλιάσιν / ἡ ....]. ους ἥρωας, ἔπος δ' ἐπὶ τυτθὸν ἐλ[ίσσω - 1.4-5; cf. h. 2.106] and between fatness and thinness (πάχιστον... λεπταλέην - 22-3); both critique poetic rivals, which in Callimachus is partially achieved through comparisons with animals (ἐνὶ τοῖς γὰρ ἀείδομεν οἱ λιγὺν ἥχον / τέττιγος, θ]όρυβον δ' οὐκ ἐφίλησαν ὄνων - 29-30); and in both, we find the use of both literary and divine authorialization (Τελχῖνες... νήιδε]ς οἱ Μούσης οὐκ ἐγένοντο φίλοι - 1-2; Απ[ό]λλων εἶπεν ὁ μοι Λύκιος - 21; cf. fr. 2 and 2d). It is, however, the Telchines, chthonic figures who belonged to the pre-Olympian past,<sup>66</sup> who are especially pertinent to the understanding of Hegemon's argument *ad neminem*. Whether or not the Telchines are supposed to represent Callimachus' real rivals,<sup>67</sup> the choice to refer to them only indirectly employs the same onomastic strategy as in Hegemon. Although Callimachus' engagement with his critics is perhaps more complex, involving intricate mythological and literary references as Hellenistic poetry is wont to do, the procedure is fundamentally the same. Like Hegemon, Callimachus both avoids naming his critics and simultaneously uses them to define his own style of poetry. In Hegemon's case, however, as I have been arguing, this is bound up in conceptions of fame and fortune. Through the pun and the reference to glorious silver, Hegemon closely identifies poetic victory with glory, and thus the progression of the narrative, from ignominious departure from the field to glorious, divinely rooted return marks the projected victory and thus glory Hegemon will achieve. The τις-speeches not only engage with Homeric style, as I have suggested, drawing on both the so-called real and imaginary types, but is chosen specifically to highlight the ultimate glory of Hegemon by contrast to the nobodies who have tried to put him down.

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<sup>66</sup> Acosta-Hughes and Stephens (2002) 241; the Telchines as mythological rather than pseudo-historical figures also appear in bk. 3 in fr. 75.65-9.

<sup>67</sup> There has been much debate about whether or not Callimachus' rivalry with the Telchines refers to a historical rivalry, perhaps with Antimachus' *Lyde* as suggested by Cameron (1995) 277-89. For an overview of the different views, see Harder (2012) *ad loc.*; cf. Massimilla (1996) *ad loc.*, Schmitz (1999), and Spanoudakis (2001). Similarly, I do not suggest that behind each τις in Hegemon there lies a real, identifiable person. When I say that Hegemon refuses to name his critics, I mean as a poetic device.

## CONCLUSIONS

To conclude this chapter, I would like to compare the rhetorical strategies I have argued are at play in the fragment of Hegemon with those deployed by Aristophanes in response to the first *Clouds*, a subject that has received renewed interest in recent scholarship.<sup>68</sup> Both Aristophanes' and Hegemon's responses to failure share a geographical and temporal locality, and they are both implicated in the agonistic poetics of the competition; while this does result in the employment of some similar strategies, the differences are as stark as they are illuminating. Both, for instance, claim not to be writing something grand, although Aristophanes' version is also qualified by rejecting banal jokes as well ( $\muηδὲν παρ’ ήμῶν προσδοκᾶν λίαν μέγα, / μηδ’ αὐτὸν γέλωτα Μεγαρόθεν κεκλεμμένον - V. 56-7)$ ).<sup>69</sup> Likewise, both claim divine support from the patron god of the festival ( $\nuὴ τὸν Διόνυσον τὸν ἐκθρέψαντά με - Nu. 519$ ). More tellingly, however, both poets imagine satirical poetry as a form of violence and both refer to their personal appearance. However, while Hegemon renounces violence (or at least claims to) against the Thasians in general, which reflects the socio-economic drive of his satire, Aristophanes' more political satire is directed against one person ( $ὅς μέγιστον ὄντα Κλέων’ ἔπαιστ’ εἰς τὴν γαστέρα - Nu. 449$ ). Regarding appearance, Aristophanes too mentions hair; unlike other, more pretentious poets, does not give himself (h)airs, a reference to his own baldness as much as to the long, elaborate hairstyles of contemporaries ( $καγώ μὲν τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ ὁν ποιητὴς οὐ κομῶ - Nu. 545$ ).<sup>70</sup> In both authors, that is, the critique of their opponents' appearance is part of the poet's own self-definition in contrast to them. Aristophanes is *not* long haired; Hegemon is *not* well barbered. Although such claims are frequently far from straightforward, as frequently poets attempt to have their cake and eat it,<sup>71</sup> we can nevertheless see a shared rhetoric at play.

The differences between the two poets are also highly revealing in light of the reading of the Hegemon fragment I have presented here. For instance, while Hegemon claims to have been "old and unwilling", forced into poetic competitions by necessity, Aristophanes maintains that, despite losing with the *Clouds*, he is clever and has important things to say. In both the revised *Clouds* and the *Wasps*, the language of *sophia* and *kainotēs* is central to the rhetorical force of the parabases (*Nu.*

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<sup>68</sup> See in particular Telò (2015) with the response of Sommerstein (2016), Biles (2011) 167-210, and Platter (2006) 63-107.

<sup>69</sup> For Megarian humour being associated with lowbrow humour here, see Sommerstein (1983); cf. Eup. fr. 261. As Biles and Olson (2015) *ad loc.* note, the use of  $\gammaέλωτα$  here too may carry negative associations (as elsewhere: *Nu.* 539, 560-2; *Ra.* 1-2; *Ec.* 1155-6).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Sommerstein (1982) *ad loc.* for the pun on  $\kομῶ$ , following Borthwick (1979).

<sup>71</sup> To take one example, Platter (2006) 84-107 argues that, despite Aristophanes' claim not to be writing anything too grand, the *Wasps* 'actively reaffirms the aesthetic and intellectual allegiances of *Clouds'* (p. 86).

520-6, 575-6; V. 1043-5, 1049-50).<sup>72</sup> In particular, in the eupolideans of the *Clouds* parabasis, *sophia* and poetic victory are closely associated (οὗτω νικήσαμί τ' ἐγώ καὶ νομιζούμην σοφὸς - 520).<sup>73</sup> The logic of this rhetoric leads Aristophanes to blame the audience themselves (Nu. 525-6; V. 1016-7); Aristophanes *deserved* to win (ἴττηθεὶς οὐκ ἄξιος ὅν - Nu. 525), and so his defeat *must* have been the audience's fault. By contrast, Hegemon avoids mentioning the original audience, shifting the narrative of response to the Thasians instead. Through their different responses to their own audiences, we see their differing strategies in responding to failure more clearly. By contrast to Aristophanes' self-aggrandizing approach that attempts to reaffirm the poetic qualities of *sophia* and *kainotēs*, Hegemon adopts a rather extreme form of self-deprecation that forms part of a narrative of divine authorialization and emphasizes his satirical manoeuvrability.

Additionally, while both Aristophanes and Hegemon use their names to discuss both themselves and their poetic opponents, their onomastic strategies differ substantially. While Hegemon, as I have argued, deliberately avoids naming his rivals, Aristophanes is frequently happy to pick out individuals. However, rather than necessarily attacking those responsible for his defeat, Aristophanes seems to have focused on those against more contemporaneous rivals (e.g. the attacks on Eupolis, Phrynicus, Hermippus, and Plato Comicus in the parabasis of *Clouds* at 551-9).<sup>74</sup> By contrast, while this fragment becomes the key testament to Hegemon's enduring nickname, Aristophanes merely plays with mentioning himself as the best comic poet. For instance, in the parabasis of *Peace*, the chorus initially deride those who praise themselves in the anapaestic section of a parabasis, but go on to say that, if it is fitting to honour the best (ἄριστος) comic poet, then the poet says he is worth of high praise (734-40). Although he doesn't name himself directly, Aristophanes' name is suggested by the use of *ἄριστος*, making himself the object of high praise.<sup>75</sup> A similar strategy might well have been used by Hegemon (= leader, commander, or guide), but is rejected in favour of the nickname "Lentil-soup". This difference underlines the contrast in the strategies employed by the two poets: Aristophanes' self-aggrandizing "best poet" and Hegemon's self-deprecating, disgusting soup.

One final consideration I would like to address derives from Mario Telò's recent book, in which he argues that, in the plays that respond to their failure of the *Clouds*, Aristophanes displays an aesthetic discourse that he calls "proto-canonical". This term is problematic as we cannot speak of

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<sup>72</sup> For poetic *sophia*, see Griffith (1990). As Wright has shown (2012: 25-30), such language can also be double-sided.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Biles (2011) 180: 'any claims [Aristophanes] has to *sophia* depends on the outcome of the envisioned contest.'

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Biles (2011) 184-5.

<sup>75</sup> For a discussion, see Rawles (2013) 182-3.

a literary canon in the fifth century;<sup>76</sup> however, the performance of works such as Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus at festivals such as the Panathenaea does reflect an acknowledgement, at a civic level, of the cultural significance of these poets and a level of appropriation of their poetry by the city. Additionally, as we have seen, the trope of poetic memorialization is already well established in the 5th cent. and we could justifiably speak of poets envisaging the longevity of their own poetry. Hegemon's intertextual relationship with the biographies of the rhapsodized poets, as already discussed, partially situates Hegemon within a poetic tradition whose authority and value is guaranteed by their performance at the Panathenaea, whilst simultaneously poking fun at the stereotypical features of such lives. Additionally, the pun in the phrase μνῆ μ' ἀνέπεισε (or μνῆμ' ἀνέπεισε) conjures the possibility of Hegemon's own poetic memorialization. While I would not go so far as to assert that Hegemon is espousing a "proto-canonical" aesthetic discourse in this fragment, we can see some of the kind of proto-canonical strategies Telò discusses at play.

In response to his competitive failure, Hegemon takes on a starkly and self-consciously inferior persona. He becomes the latest in a long line of poor poets, with his very nickname epitomizing his humility. At the same time, he uses this position to gain the upper hand through a variety of techniques. The manipulation of common *topoi* in the biographical traditions of the rhapsodized poets do not so much make his parodic standpoint highly adversative or competitive against the targets of his parody; instead, by assuming the same position as these poets, he in fact (ludically) gets them on his side in a competition that is consistently directed against his rivals. Although we know that these critics are from Thasos, Hegemon systematically avoids naming them. Thus, as Hegemon himself assimilates his persona with the literary giants of the Greek world, and perhaps pointedly with Archilochus, the poet well known for his own criticisms of Thasos, as well as having his poetic authority guaranteed by the intervention of Athena, his critics become nobodies. Their previous criticisms are quoted by Hegemon only to serve as a foil for his renewed poetic efforts. Not content with merely beating his outspoken critics into submission, Hegemon also engages in some satirical attack of Thasos as a whole. Parody is central to Hegemon's reversal of fortune. This is particularly clear through the use of the biographies of rhapsodized poets, whose implicit support through appropriation drives the narrative arc of the fragment. The same dynamic is at work in Hegemon's use of τις, whether or not this is operating only on a sub-conscious level. By adopting or parodying the techniques and standpoints of poets so great that their poems were being performed at the Panathenaea itself, we turn from laughing at the shit-stained singer presented to us in the opening lines to laughing *with* him.

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<sup>76</sup> For the early development of the canon, or the process of canonization, during the latter half of the 4th and 3rd centuries, as well as the history of the term "canon", see Pfeiffer (1968) 203-7.

## CHAPTER 2

### *Matro of Pitane's Attikon Deipnon*

Matro's *AD* is the most explicitly political surviving *parôidic* poem, concerning, as it does, a dinner hosted at the house of the prominent orator, Xenocles. Unlike Archestratus' well-travelled, supposedly impartial narrator, Matro is an invited guest to a dinner, who would otherwise be eating cheap bread; instead of gastronomic didacticism, we get an insight into the private lives of two leading Athenian politicians. The central focus of the lines quoted by Athenaeus, which break off as Stratocles brings in the evening's sexual entertainment, is a catalogue of varied and extravagant dishes. This chapter explores the relationship between Matro's political satire and his Homeric parody, asking how this poetic form contributes to the poem's personal attacks. Additionally, we shall see that the institution of the symposium itself is more than simply the poem's setting; Matro incorporates common sympotic features into the portrayal of his hosts, which adds further bite to his ridicule.

There are two major questions surrounding Matro's *AD*, however, that underpin the argument presented here: the performance context and dating. Regarding the performance context, we can only make a tentative guess based on the limited internal evidence. The vocative address to the assembled audience ( $\ddot{\alpha}νδρες$ ) in line 116 certainly suggests that some form of original performance context was expected. Our only more detailed clue comes from the opening of the poem, when Matro tells us that Xenocles' dinner was in Athens and that he went there "as well" ( $\eta\lambda\thetaov \gamma\grave{a}\eta\kappa\grave{a}kei\sigma\varepsilon$  - 3). However, this cannot be read straightforwardly as a statement that the poem was performed outside of Athens. For one thing, the parody of *Od.* 6.164, which fits into Matro's self-stylization as an Odysseus figure, may override the logical sense. Olson and Sens suggested that this is simply a literary device, 'designed to allow an Athenian audience to listen to a report about events in their city supposedly delivered to a different group of people somewhere far away.'<sup>1</sup> While this is certainly possible, perhaps a more straightforward solution would be to understand  $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\iota\sigma\varepsilon$  as referring generally to Xenocles' house, i.e. the setting of the dinner, rather than to Athens in general. Although this leaves  $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\iota\sigma\varepsilon$  without a direct antecedent in the text, this seems to make better sense of the line, which is to emphasize that Matro was personally present at the proceedings of the dinner. Performance in Athens seems more likely given the influence of Attic

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<sup>1</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) 32.

linguistic features in Matro's text and the literary context. In the final years of the 4th century, direct or personal political satire seems to have been popular, as for instance in the comedies of Philippides (below; cf. fr. 26, which may imply that Stratocles was presented onstage) and Archedicus (fr. 4).<sup>2</sup> In this context, Matro's *AD* would be hardly out-of-place. Thus, although doubtless the poem was also re-performed elsewhere and perhaps disseminated in a book, the subject matter, elements of dialect, and its literary context strongly support Athens as a performance context.

Based upon the individuals named in the poem, the *AD* cannot be dated any earlier than the late 320s,<sup>3</sup> although after this point there is some debate. Based on the assumed life of Chaerephon, the secondary role of Stratocles, and the dating of Xenocles' career to 346-306, Wilamowitz argued that the poem can be firmly dated to the regime of Demetrius of Phalerum (317-307 BC); Olson and Sens, meanwhile, argue for a date between 307 and 301 BC.<sup>4</sup> The latter is much more convincing, especially since Xenocles and Stratocles held greater political significance during this period and this date fits better with our wider understanding of the satirical takes on the associates of Demetrius Poliorcetes (cf. the discussion of Philippid. fr. 25 below).

The significance of the dating lies in the poem's immediate political context. Dating the poem between 307-1 BC places it during the period of the democratic revival in Athens under Demetrius Poliorcetes. After the death of Antipater, his successor Cassander turned control of Athens over to Demetrius of Phalerum, who ruled as a kind of philosopher-king from 317-307. In 307 Demetrius was driven out of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes, whose father Antigonus Monophthalmus had declared that all Greek cities should be free. Democracy was thus restored to Athens with the help of Stratocles (*Plu. Demetr.* 11.1), after which the Athenians heaped numerous honours upon

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<sup>2</sup> For Philippides and Archedicus in general, see Major (1997) 47-8; for Philippides see Philipp (1973), while Habicht (1993) has discussed the politics of Archedicus. More recently, Henderson (2013) situated the two poets (at p. 259) in a general discussion of Athenian political comedy. Although he argued that what he defines as political comedy ('a particular type of play that took a recognizable and more or less coherent political stance on actual public issues' at p. 249) appeared only infrequently, his distinction between what does and does not count as political is often questionable. Konstantakos (2011), by contrast, has argued oversimplistically that 4th century comedy saw 'the eclipse of political comedy' (p. 182). I here use the term 'personal political satire' to refer to plays in which a single or a small group of named individuals are mocked, which appears with relative frequency throughout the fourth century but which seems to have moments of particular popularity, as in 307-1.

<sup>3</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) 3-4 analyse the individuals mentioned. The two athletes mentioned in l. 42, Astyanax and Antenor, only came to prominence in the latter half of the 320s. Astyanax was most likely victorious in the *pancratia* at Olympia in 324, 320, and 316 BC, while Antenor (of Miletus or Athens) was victorious also in the *pancratia* in the panhellenic games as a boy and then again at the Lenaea in Athens in 320 and at the Olympia in 308 BC.

<sup>4</sup> van Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1923) 75, Olson and Sens (1999) 4. Wilamowitz's assumptions about the lives of Matro's *dramatis personae* are not always tenable (for the political life of Xenocles, for instance, see below); Garcia Soler (2003) 66-8 also discusses the dating of the poem in relation to its guest stars, but his conclusion that Matro himself lived between the 4th and 3rd centuries is unhelpfully vague.

Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonus, setting up gold statues, creating new tribes with their names, weaving them into the *peplos* produced for Athena, and so on.<sup>5</sup> When Demetrius returned to Athens in 304/3 to drive back Cassander, he was allowed to take up residence in the *opisthodomos* of the Parthenon, where according to Plutarch he held wild parties and had sex with both prostitutes and citizens' wives (Plu. *Demetr.* 23.3, 24.1-3; cf. *Demetr.* 14.2-3).

Into this context we can situate the two principal political figures in Matro's poem, Xenocles and Stratocles. Xenocles, who is first mentioned in an inscription dating to 346/5 (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 3019*), had been an associate of Lycurgus in the 330s and 320s, who was strongly anti-Macedonian (e.g. Lycurg. fr. 10.1, D.S. 17.15.1, Plu. *Mor.* 841e). He later appears as an *agônothêtes* at the Lenaia in 307/6 (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 3073.2; 3077.2*) and again in 306/5 when he was given 140 talents by Antigonus to help Athens resist Cassander (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 1492.99-103*). At an unknown date, he was victorious with a chorus of Phrynic dancers (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 3026*). Stratocles is likewise well attested as a supporter of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonus. It was Stratocles' motion, for instance, that rearranged the calendar to facilitate Demetrius' initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries all at once (Plu. *Demetr.* 26). Stratocles, in particular, was implicated in Demetrius Poliorcetes' debauchery (Plu. *Demetr.* 11.2-3), to such an extent that Plutarch quotes a passage of the comedian Philippides claiming that it was intended as criticism of Stratocles (fr. 25; for Plutarch's comments, see *Demetr.* 12.4 and 26.3):

ο τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συντεμάων εἰς μῆν' ἔνα,  
ο τὴν ἀκρόπολιν πανδοκείον ύπολαβών  
καὶ τὰς ἑταίρας εἰσαγαγών τῇ παρθένῳ,  
δι' ὃν ἀπέκαυσεν ἡ πάχνη τὰς ἀμπέλους,  
δι' ὃν ἀσεβοῦνθ' ο πέπλος ἐρράγη μέσος,  
τὰς τῶν θεῶν τιμὰς ποιοῦντ' ἀνθρωπίνας.  
ταῦτα καταλύει δῆμον, οὐ κωμῳδία.<sup>6</sup>

Conspicuous in these lines by his absence is of course Demetrius Poliorcetes, for whose sake Stratocles had taken these different measures. Although Philippides as a supporter of Antigonus' rival Lysimachus had his own agenda for these lines,<sup>7</sup> we see in these lines a more specific tension.

<sup>5</sup> SEG 25.149, 30.69, D.S. 20.46.1, Plu. *Demetr.* 10.2-11.1, 12.1-2, 13, Alex. fr. 116.4-5. For a more detailed history, see Habicht (1997) 67-81, esp. 71-3 on Stratocles' role, and Olson and Sens (1999) 29-31.

<sup>6</sup> "The man who trimmed the year down to a single month, who took over the acropolis for an inn and brought his whores in to live with the virgin goddess, on whose account the hoar-frost froze our grape-vines, because of whose impiety the *peplos* was torn down the middle when he converted the gods' honours into human ones. *These* are the things that ruin a people, not comedy."

<sup>7</sup> cf. *IG II<sup>2</sup> 657.9-26*, Plu. *Demetr.* 12.5.

The final line implies that Stratocles had accused a comedian, perhaps Philippides himself, of “destroying the people”. This may have involved “real-world” consequences (as Aristophanes’ clash with Cleon supposedly did) or Philippides may simply have suggested that such a “real” clash was taking place in order to suggest that his comedies were “serious”. Either way, a papyrus fragment that likely derives from Homerus Sellius’ 2nd cent. AD text Περιοχαὶ τῶν Μενάνδρου δραμάτων (*P. Oxy.* X 1235) supports the idea that this fragment of Philippides reflects a real or fabricated *contretemps*.<sup>8</sup> This papyrus contains what purports to be historical information on the performance of Menander’s plays. When discussing his *Imbrians*, we are told that it was billed for the Dionysia of 302/1, but that the festival did not take place as Lachares had become tyrant (ἐξέδωκεν εἰς ἐργασίαν [εἰς] Διονύσια, οὐκ ἐγένετο δ[ὲ διὰ] Λαχάρην τὸν τυραννή[σαν]τα - lines 107-11). This claim is highly problematic, as Lachares could not have established himself as tyrant at the time. Lara O’Sullivan has convincingly argued that, while the information concerning the supposed date of the production of the Menandrian play is likely derived from official records as the language here deploys the standard phraseology of *didaskalia* (οὐκ ἐγένετο), the explanation was extrapolated, in the style of the Hellenistic scholars, from other sources.<sup>9</sup> If this is correct, Philippides fr. 25 may reflect part of the literary background around which later scholars fabricated a story of the political disruption of the Dionysia. Both Xenocles and Stratocles, then, were associated closely with Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes, with Stratocles in particular being strongly implicated in Demetrius’ sexually and gastronomically transgressive private parties, and both were either directly involved in the production of poetic *agônes* or presented as blaming certain kinds of poetry for its political commentary. The public involvement of Xenocles and Stratocles in both the political and poetic spheres of Athens, I shall argue, is at the heart of Matro’s satire.

Although the satirical flavour of the *AD* has long been recognized, precisely how this functions within the poem has been left unexplored. In Olson and Sens’ recent commentary, for instance, they state that the poem ‘is most easily interpreted as a direct attack on Stratocles and his circle, who are portrayed as gluttonous “Knights of the Dinner Table” precisely in the mould of the (at least allegedly) increasingly erratic and politically dangerous Demetrius’.<sup>10</sup> This chapter seeks to develop a more detailed picture of how Matro’s satire functions, particularly by situating the poem in the context of its cultural and satirical context. In the first section, I focus primarily on a literal reading of the portrayal of the diners, arguing that they appear in the mould of overindulgers, a figure common in satirical poetry and oratory of the 5th and 4th centuries. In the second section, I

<sup>8</sup> For the attribution, see Zuntz (1955) 138 and Jocelyn (1980) 387-400.

<sup>9</sup> L. O’Sullivan (2009).

<sup>10</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) 32.

turn to a more metaphorical approach to Matro's catalogue of food. Here I outline the different ways in which the metaphor of text as food appears in Greek literature, especially comedy, to suggest that Matro's parody of epic can be read as a form of consumption and regurgitation. In this context, the presentation of the various dishes can be envisaged as a kind of literary game that is in keeping with the poem's sympotic setting, a game in which the diners reveal how far from their heroic models they have fallen. In both sections, however, I shall also emphasize how Matro manipulates the poem's sympotic theme, drawing especially on the idea that symposia reveal the participant's true nature, and how the parody of epic works with this manipulation of sympotic themes. Matro's parodic process emerges from this discussion as not simply re-enforcing the political satire, but in fact as central to its claims.

### BAD ETIQUETTE, BAD POLITICS

In the tradition of Greek satirical poetry, there is a long and well-established connection between the personal, that is especially the moral and ethical, and the political. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the supposed feud between Aristophanes and Cleon. In this section, then, we shall explore further how Matro critiques his hosts by focusing on this ethico-political angle. I shall begin with an overview of the different ways in which the symposium has been used as a locus of critique, focusing especially on comedy and fourth-century oratory. As we shall see, these attacks frequently draw on recognizable figures, such as the overindulger and the parasite. Additionally, I shall outline two of the facets of the symposium itself, namely competition and role-play, which I shall argue in this chapter Matro draws upon throughout the poem. In the subsequent section, I shall turn to the representation of the diners, including Matro himself, to demonstrate how they are portrayed in the same transgressive mould, with insatiable appetites for food, drink, and sex. Their competitive behaviour, always fighting (in the model of Homeric heroes) for the best foods, I argue, is best understood as a form of role-play, as the symposiasts project their desire to emulate the heroes of the past. The poem's satire, then, gains traction from the chasm that separates these gluttons from the heroes they are imitating, thereby also aligning Matro's parody of epic with his satirical aims, but also from Matro's supposed "victory" at the end of the catalogue of food.

## Politics in and out of the symposium

The symposium, the setting of the *Attikon Deipnon*, is highly political from some of its earliest incarnations onwards.<sup>11</sup> For example, as Levine put it, 'the poetic language of the Theognidea describes the *polis* in terms of a symposium and the symposium in terms of a *polis*'.<sup>12</sup> So when Theognis prays for Zeus to protect the city, he also includes a wish for Apollo to keep their tongues and wits straight and that the harp and pipe may play holy music, and this prayer is concluded with a exhortation for libations and pleasant conversation.<sup>13</sup> This prayer clearly combines wishes for the city at large with those within the symposium, focusing on speech, music, and conversation. The symposium also is frequently portrayed in literature as a locus of moral exempla, either for good or ill.<sup>14</sup> Here, therefore, I shall outline in what ways the symposium can be considered political, with special emphasis on the kinds of negative political figures that might be encountered therein, and what role the symposium plays in political satire and critique in the 5th and 4th centuries, before focusing particularly on the elements of sympotic activity I shall argue are most relevant to Matro's own portrayal.

The question in what sense the symposium is political has in much scholarship been intimately tied up with the question of who attended them. Is the symposium a microcosm of the *polis* only in an elite sense, attended solely by the elite, or were symposia also attended by non-elites? Certainly, the symposium is a closed-off space, physically and socially,<sup>15</sup> a fact that lends itself to the manner in which symposia constructed group identities. That some symposia were also associated with tyrannical plots also heightens the potential of viewing the symposium solely as an elite event.<sup>16</sup> However, sufficient evidence indicates that a symposium could be hosted or attended by any citizen, certainly throughout the 5th and 4th centuries.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Throughout I shall follow the convention of using the term symposium to refer to both the eating and drinking parts of the entertainment, while *symposion* will refer specifically to the drinking party only.

<sup>12</sup> Levine (1985) 176.

<sup>13</sup> Ζεὺς μὲν τῆσδε πόληος ὑπειρέχοι αἰθέρι ναίων / αἱεὶ δεξιτερὴν χεῖρ' ἐπ' ἀπημοσύνῃ, / ἄλλοι τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοί· αὐτὰρ Ἀπόλλων / ὁρθώσαι γλῶσσαν καὶ νόον ἡμέτερον. / φόρμιγξ δ' αὖ φθέγγοιθ' οἴρον μέλος ἡδὲ καὶ αὐλός· / ήμεῖς δὲ σπονδὰς θεοῖσιν ἀρεστάμενοι / πίνωμεν, χαρίεντα μετ' ἀλλήλοισι λέγοντες, / μηδὲν τὸν Μῆδων δειδιότες πόλεμον - Thgn. 756-63.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example: ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἵσθι· κακοῖσι δὲ μὴ προσομίλει / ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' αἱεὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔχεο· / καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν / ἵζε, καὶ ἀνδανε τοῖσ', ὃν μεγάλη δύναμις - Thgn. 31-4; Ὄταν οἷμαι δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχη, καὶ πορρωτέρῳ τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῆ, τοὺς ἀρχοντας δή, ἀν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ὥσι καὶ πολλὴν παρέχωσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς - Pl. R. 8.562c-d; for the institution of the symposium in Pl. Lg., see Tecușan (1990).

<sup>15</sup> For the sympotic space, see Bergquist (1990).

<sup>16</sup> For the association between the symposium and tyranny, see O. Murray (1990).

<sup>17</sup> See for instance Schmitt-Pantel (1990), (1992) Fisher (2000); cf. the argument of Jones (2014) that *skolia* were associated primarily with festivals and non-elite symposia, in the latter of which contexts the form originated.

A secondary question, relevant to our later discussion, is whether this reality is reflected in literary symposia. Symposia scenes were common for instance in comedy, although again scholars disagree over how elite comic symposia were. While some consider the comic symposium as a primarily elite setting,<sup>18</sup> others have resisted this view.<sup>19</sup> The stumbling blocks for the elite view of comic symposia are that it is not certain that all symposia in comedy were presented in elite terms, nor that, even when comedians mock particular elite figures through their sympotic activities, such as Callias in Eupolis' *Kolakes*, such *ad hominem* attacks should be taken as criticisms of the elites, or the elite symposium, more generally. However, most of those in the latter group, those who do not view the comic symposium as associated with any particular social group, would accept that certain comedies (such as Eupolis' *Kolakes* and Phrynicus' *Komastai*) do associate the symposium with the aristocracy.<sup>20</sup> Instead of viewing the comic symposium, then, as either elite or non-class specific, we might suggest that the aristocratic or elite symposium was a recognizable stereotype that comedians could activate to criticize either individuals or elite symposia (particularly their potentially dangerous or even tyrannical elements).<sup>21</sup>

Whether or not we view comic symposia as elite, we can nevertheless view its attendees through the manner of their presentation. Certain stock figures recur in such scenes. Those most pertinent to the discussion of Matro's *AD*, as we shall see, are the figures of the overindulger and the parasite. The former is a broad category which incorporates a number of subgroups, all of which share similar features. As described by Davidson, because such overindulgers consistently gave in to their bodily desires, they 'were known as the *akolastoi*, the uncorrected, the unchecked, the unbridled, or the *akrateis*, the powerless, the impotent, the incontinent.'<sup>22</sup> Relevant subgroups of the overindulger so defined are: the *opsophagos*, who is characterized primarily 'not in the quantity of his consumption nor in its exotic refinement... but above all in the intensity and immediacy of his desire';<sup>23</sup> the drunkard, who is typified by excessively frequent social drinking as

<sup>18</sup> Pütz (2007), for instance, although noting that some evidence for "lower class symposia" exists, argues that (xi n. 8 and *passim*) 'most symposium-scenes in comedy are rather modelled on aristocratic parties.' An unpublished essay by Ian Ruffell, written in 1995-6, also argues that the comic symposium is an elite institution.

<sup>19</sup> See Wilkins (2000), especially 202-56, and A. Bowie (1997), who states (p. 3) that 'in Aristophanes the symposium is not associated exclusively with any particular social class.'

<sup>20</sup> Wilkins (2000) 207, for instance, admits that 'some plays, to be sure, appear to present the symposium as an institution of the elite' and A. Bowie (1997) 3 points to Ar. *Pax* 839-41 for his statement that 'the formal symposium seems to have belonged largely to the wealthier classes.'

<sup>21</sup> The majority of scholarship on symposia in comedy, as well as my examples here, focus on the 5th cent. For a broader approach that focuses on the staging of symposia more generally, see Konstantakos (2005). My suggestion that comedy does not need to portray the symposium as an exclusively elite context in order to be able to satirize some symposia as elite, however, applies throughout the 5th and 4th centuries. As we have already seen, for instance, Philippides refers to Demetrius' sympotic activities as part of his satire.

<sup>22</sup> Davidson (1997) 143, and more generally 139-82.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.* 146.

well as deep and often unmixed drinking (cf. Demosthenes' coinage ἀκρατοκάθων, e.g. at Ath. 6.246a); and the devotee of sex, who can be divided into the “womanizer”, in Davidson's terms, whose identifying feature was not not of engaging in sex *per se*, or even sex with *hetairai* and prostitutes, but frequently adultery, while the *katapugôn* and the *kinaidos* are characterized, not by their passivity in sex,<sup>24</sup> but their excessiveness and lasciviousness.<sup>25</sup>

The parasite, on the other hand, is principally defined by the fact that he is uninvited,<sup>26</sup> or in need of special invitation, and does not contribute to the cost of the meal.<sup>27</sup> One of the earliest attestations of the figure that would later become the parasite is the figure of Pericles in Archilochus fr. 124b:

πολλὸν δὲ πίνων καὶ χαλίκορητον μέθυ  
οὔτε τῖμον εἰσενείκας < >  
οὐδὲ μὲν κληθεὶς < > ἥλθες οἴα δὴ φίλος,  
ἀλλὰ σεο γαστήρ νόον τε καὶ φρένας παρήγαγεν  
εἰς ἀναιδείην.<sup>28</sup>

When they enter comedy, first attested in Epicharmus (e.g. fr. 32), they are named *kolakes*, and the term *parasitos* is adopted later from the original title of officials in religious ceremonies.<sup>29</sup> With respect to their appetites, parasites resemble the *opsophagos* or the heavy drinker. This is already exemplified in the fragment of Archilochus, which emphasizes the volume of *unmixed* wine (πολλὸν... χαλίκορητον μέθυ). Likewise, just as the glutton's most important features are his stomach and throat,<sup>30</sup> Archilochus claims that Pericles is led astray by his γαστήρ. They are characterized as consistently hungry (e.g. Crat. fr. 47, Diphil. 95, Antiphan. fr. 249), they eat as

<sup>24</sup> This was the argument of Dover (1989) and Foucault (1992); cf. the review of Davidson (2001).

<sup>25</sup> As argued by Davidson (1997). See, for example, the first use of κίναιδος at Pl. *Grg.* 494e.

<sup>26</sup> I refer to parasites as he for simplicity, as the overwhelming majority of parasites in Greek literature (and Chaerephon in the *AD*) are male.

<sup>27</sup> We should note, however, that there is no straightforward line between diner/upper class and parasite/lower class. On the contrary, the example of Eup. *Kolakes* demonstrates that a range of men could be portrayed as parasites. Protagoras (frs. 157-8) is said to eat and drink heavily, and the mention of Alcibiades in fr. 171 may suggest that he too was sponging off Callias in this play.

<sup>28</sup> “Although you consumed a large quantity of unmixed wine, you did not contribute to the cost... nor again did you come invited... as though a friend, but your belly led astray your mind and wits to shamelessness.”

<sup>29</sup> The development (or, as he sees it, decline) from *kolax* to *parasitos* is described at length by Diodorus of Sinope (fr. 2) and Athenaeus (6.234c-5f), and has been discussed by Wilkins (2000) 71-4 and Corner (2013a) 46-51, who includes in his discussion the Homeric πτωχός, who also shares a number of features with the parasite. Some scholars, e.g. P.C.McC. Brown (1992), Millett (1989), and Fisher (2000), see a difference between the parasite and the flatterer, although their arguments have been well countered by the discussion of Corner (2013a) and (2013b), who notes that even Athenaeus (at 6.234c) admits there is not much difference between the parasite and flatterer.

<sup>30</sup> For the significance of the stomach and throat, see Wilkins (2000) 70 and Worman (2008).

much as possible, ideally more than anybody else (thus Lucian (*Parasite* 5) says that the parasite's art is: *παντὸς ἀπέλθοι πλέον ἔχων*) and are prepared to do anything for their feed (or, as the chorus of Eupolis' *Kolakes* put it at fr. 172.11-2: *εἰτ’ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐρχομεσθ’ ἄλλυδις ἄλλος ήμῶν / μᾶζαν ἐπ’ ἄλλόφυλον*). This can frequently include (self-)humiliation, flattery, or making jokes. Thus, for example, Eupolis' chorus goes on to say (fr. 172.12-3): *οὐ δεῖ χαρίεντα πολλὰ / τὸν κόλακ’ εὐθέως λέγειν, η̄ ἱκφέρεται θύραζε.*

Aside from their shared attitude towards their appetites, the overindulger and parasite share one further feature, that is their transgression of normative civic and sympotic rules. This approach draws on the ambivalent position of the symposium itself, as outlined recently by Corner:

Rather than representing a withdrawal from the agora to the *andrôn*, the symposium brought the outside in. As a function of the symposium's mediation of *oikos* and *polis*, the *andrôn* mediated between the domestic interior and the civic exterior. As a space of male nonkin homosociality, the exclusivity of the *andrôn* within the house respected the seclusion and integrity of the household and the man's role as master of the *oikos*. The life of the *polis*, however, required the reconciliation of a man's household interests with his place in the civic community. He had to transcend narrow private interest and identify with a larger common, public interest. The symposium's exclusion of the productive world of the *oikos* at once protected the integrity of the household and integrated a man into the reciprocity of an egalitarian nonkin community of liberal pleasures that transcended private household interest. The symposium brought the world of the city, including its antiproductive sexuality, into the house, taking the symposiast in his own dining room out of his household and into the city.<sup>31</sup>

This view of the symposium as an intermediary space, between *polis* and *oikos*, however, is an ideal not always borne out in literature, comedy and *parôidia* especially, both of which derive humour from the tensions that result when this ideal sympotic activity is transgressed. The figures of the overindulger and the parasite are important figures in this transgression. One of the central tensions in the discourse of the parasitism, for instance, is that between the parasite's idleness and his craft.<sup>32</sup> While, on the one hand, the parasite's wheedling and flattery can be described as either *ἐργασία* or *τέχνη*,<sup>33</sup> on the other his idleness and uselessness is central to many discussions of

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<sup>31</sup> Corner (2011) 78-9.

<sup>32</sup> This paradox is usefully explored by Corner (2013a) and (2013b).

<sup>33</sup> E.g. Alex. fr. 121.10, Diphil. fr. 76, Alciph. 3.11 .4, 3.25.4, 3.35.2, 3.40.2, Luc. *Par.* 7). For the *τέχνη* of the parasite, see also Tylawsky (2002) 51.

parasites.<sup>34</sup> However, the parasite is useful in his uselessness insofar as he reveals what is considered socially useful.<sup>35</sup> The *akolastos*, by contrast, is presented as a dangerous member of society in economic terms, as he is frequently thought of as squandering his wealth or “destroying” his home completely (e.g. ὁ Ἰππονικου Καλλίας ἐδόκει τὰ πατρῷα διεσπαρκέναι εἰς ἀσέλγειαν - Σ Ar. Av. 283).<sup>36</sup> It emerges from this overview that both the figures of the overindulger and the parasite transgress democratic civic norms. While they share a similar attitude towards their appetites, their dangers take different forms: the parasite is the guest whose idleness offers no return for their inclusion at the feast, while the *akolastos* threatens to destroy the *oikos* entirely.

It is frequently, though not exclusively, these transgressive figures who can be found in satirical or critical presentations of the symposium. I have already mentioned that the symposium is frequently used for satirical effect in comedy, and during the fourth century we also find an individual’s participation in and behaviour at symposia a target of critique in oratory. Such portrayals both help to situate Matro in his wider literary context and act as useful *comparanda*.

Perhaps the best known example of a play themed around the symposium is Eupolis’ *Kolakes*, produced at the City Dionysia in 421. This play focused on Callias, son of Hippoönus, who, after his father’s death, lavishly spent his inheritance on extravagant dinners and drinking parties, inviting to his house a number of experts, especially sophists, such as Protagoras and Melanthius, who were, along with (the rest of) the chorus, the *kolakes* of the title.<sup>37</sup> Although we cannot reconstruct the play to any great degree,<sup>38</sup> the *testimonia* give the impression of a play whose focus was the mockery of the host. One good example is a scholiast on Aristophanes’ *Birds* (= test. iii):

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<sup>34</sup> Plutarch, for example, compares parasites to an ape with regard to their ability to perform useful work (*Quomodo Adulator* 64e): ὡράς τὸν πίθηκον; οὐ δύναται τὴν οἰκίαν φυλάττειν ως ὁ κύων, οὐδὲ βαστάζειν ως ὁ ἵππος, οὐδὲ ἀροῦν τὴν γῆν ως οἱ βόες· ὑβριν οὖν φέρει καὶ βωμολοχίαν καὶ παιδιάς ἀνέχεται, γέλωτος ὄργανον ἐμπαρέχων ἔαυτόν. οὔτω δή καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οὐ συνειπεῖν οὐ συνεισενεγκεῖν οὐ συναγωνίσασθαι δυνάμενος, πόνου τε καὶ σπουδῆς ἀπάσης ἀπολειπόμενος. For parasites and idleness, see esp. Corner (2013a) 55-8.

<sup>35</sup> Thus Corner (2013a) 44 drawing on Roman and Tomiche (2011) 158.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Davidson (1997) 183-210.

<sup>37</sup> The individuals named in various fragments as Callias’ *kolakes* might have been characters in the play, off-stage individuals whose activity was only described, or members of an individuated chorus. For a discussion of the possibilities, Napolitano (2012) 18-21 and Olson (2016a) 34-5.

<sup>38</sup> Olson (2016a) 33-40 strikes an essential note of caution on the attempts to reconstruct the stage action, contra Napolitano (2012) and Storey (2003) 179-97.

ο Τιππονίκου Καλλίας ἐδόκει τὰ πατρῷα διεσπαρκέναι [εἰς ἀσέλγειαν add. codd. : del. Renkema]. κωμῳδεῖται δὲ εἰς ἀσέλγειαν καὶ ως ληφθεὶς μοιχεύων ἀπέτισε χοήματα. κεκωμῳδηκε δὲ αὐτὸν ίκανῶς Εὔπολις ἐν τοῖς Κόλαξι.<sup>39</sup>

It cannot, of course, have been literally true that Callias spent *all* of his inheritance on "his wantonness", as the scholiast puts it<sup>40</sup> nevertheless, the idea that the play thematized the way Callias spent his inheritance is borne out by the frequent specifications of prices, money, and gold.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, much of the satire must have been directed at the *kolakes* themselves, well exemplified by the hyperbolic language of the chorus (e.g. frs. 172 and possibly 173 if spoken *in propria persona*). Further, the specific expertise of invited individuals was likely also a target of humour (e.g. Protagoras in fr. 157b). In this play, then, we see both stereotypical satiric targets of the symposium, the overindulger (Callias, perhaps others, such as Alcibiades; cf. fr. 171) and the parasite (in the chorus and other hangers-on). That such personal behaviour, whether implicitly or explicitly, has an ethico-political dimension, as we have seen, further supports the view of the *Kolakes* as political satire.<sup>42</sup>

While Eupolis' play seems to have dealt with both dining and drinking, two homonymous plays from the 5th cent., Phrynicus and Ameipsias' *Komastai*, seem to have focused especially on the drunken revelries following the *symposion*. The latter's version can be securely dated, based on the *argumentum* to Aristophanes' *Birds* (a play it defeated), to 415/4, and thus in the immediate shortly after the prosecution of the Hermocopidae (416/5). Precisely to what extent this major

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<sup>39</sup> "Callias the son of Hipponicus seemed to have dissipated his inheritance ["on wanton behaviour" add. manuscripts : del. Renkema]. And he is mocked for his wantonness and for the fact that he was caught in adultery and had to pay money to get himself off. And Eupolis makes considerable fun of him in his *Kolakes*" (text and trans. Olson).

<sup>40</sup> Olson (2016a) 36 rightly notes that the dramatic reduction of Callias' fortunes by 387 (recorded by Lys. 19.48 *et al.*) 'must instead be connected with the collapse of his mining interests after the Athenians lost access to Laurion after 413 BCE, and presumably with a downward spiral of call-in loans, seizures of mortgaged property, and the like that followed.'

<sup>41</sup> One hundred drachmas worth of fish *alone* (δραχμῶν ἔκατὸν ἵχθυς ἐώνηματι μόνον - fr. 160.1), gold and silver being stolen from the house (162), one hundred drachmas for dinner and another mina on wine for the *kolakes* (165), a payment of ten talents (168; this was either paid to Alcibiades or as some kind of recompense; see Olson (2016a) *ad loc.*); contrast the alimentary and fiscal behaviour of a deceased individual (Hipponicus remains the most likely) in fr. 156. I would not go as far as Storey (2003) 180, however, in saying that the plot 'turned on' the squandering of Callias' inheritance.

<sup>42</sup> For a political reading of the play, see Napolitano (2005) and (2012) 32-42, although he sometimes reads more deeply into the portrayal of Callias than the fragmentary state of the play would allow. Storey's inclusion of *Kolakes* among plays that he views as 'not overtly "political" but rather social' (2003: 341) seems to underestimate the significance of the financial emphasis of the play (the misuse of invisible wealth), the undemocratic figure of the parasite (useless, non-contributory), and the inter-connectedness of the sympotic and political spheres.

event informed the action of the play, however, is impossible to tell.<sup>43</sup> Less certain is the date of Phrynicus' play, although given that it supposedly mentions the martial character of Laespodias, who was a general in 414/3,<sup>44</sup> a date in the same proximity is fairly likely. Many of the fragments, again, do not explicitly make the connection with the political sphere, unless we also include fr. 61 (which is a strong but nevertheless uncertain candidate), in which a speaker addresses Hermes advising him not to fall over and break something off, providing a source of slander for another Diocleides, who accused Andocides of being one of the Hermocopidae.<sup>45</sup> Even if neither of these plays were directly about the Hermocopidae, it seems likely that they were produced in their shadow, again emphasizing the way that comedies could fictionalize and present well-known or infamous sympotic events.

We even find this practice extending into the fourth century with Mnesimachus' *Philip*, a satire of the Macedonian king.<sup>46</sup> This play must have been produced in the years immediately following the embassy, which included Demosthenes and Aeschines, to the eponymous Philip II of Macedon in 346 BC. The play clearly involved a lavish banquet (fr. 9) and mocked the Pharsalians (fr. 8), who were being supported by Philip. Additionally, the speaker of fr. 7 is presented as braggadocious, wildly claiming that his people dine on swords, sit on shields, and are wreathed in catapults.<sup>47</sup> While some believe that the speaker here is Philip himself, or perhaps another of the Macedonian top brass,<sup>48</sup> others prefer to view him as Demosthenes.<sup>49</sup> While there are grounds on both sides, the linguistic arguments seem to favour the latter. Not only might we expect non-Athenian speakers in comedy to possess an accent, as Papachrysostomou emphasizes, but the bombastic language throughout matches Aeschines' portrayal of his oratorical style (e.g. 3.72, 116-7, 2.110). Furthermore, Demosthenes was also a target of Timocles, who describes him as eating catapults and

<sup>43</sup> For Ameipsias' *Komastai*, see most recently Orth (2013), who remains mostly impartial on the question of the play's politics: 'Nicht mehr überprüfen lässt sich, ob es sich bei Ameipsias' *Kōmastai* um ein ganz unpolitisches, heiteres Stück handelte... oder ob hier in mehr oder weniger verdeckter Weise auf den Hermokopidenskandal des Vorjahrs... angespielt wurde' (p. 251-2).

<sup>44</sup> Phrynicus' play mentions Laespodias according to Σ Ar. Av. 1569 (fr. 17). For Laespodias, see Th. 6.105 and Develin (1986).

<sup>45</sup> Meineke suggested that the fragment derives from either *Monotropos* or, more likely, from *Komastai*. For the most recent discussion of the play, see Stama (2014), who favours a dating shortly after the summer of 414, with Brandes' suggestion (1886: 37) of 413 being attractive. Storey (2011b) 54-5 remains unhelpfully vague regarding the date, but thinks that the events surrounding the Hermocopidae would have been too dangerous a topic for comedy.

<sup>46</sup> For fourth century comedies whose titles affirm their satire of a foreign king or tyrant, cf. Eubulus' *Dionysius* and Philemo's *Pyrrho*.

<sup>47</sup> ἀρ' οἵσθ' ὄτιὴ πρὸς ἀνδρας εστὶ σοι μάχη, / οἱ τὰ ξίφη δειπνοῦμεν ἡκονημένα, / ὥψον δὲ δᾶδας ἡμμένας καταπίνομεν; / ἐντεῦθεν εὐθὺς ἐπιφέρει τραγήματα / ἡμῖν ὁ παῖς μετὰ δεῖπνον ἀκίδας Κορητικάς, / ὥσπερ ἐρεβίνθους, δορατίων τε λείψανα / κατεαγότ', ἀσπίδας δὲ προσκεφάλαια καὶ / θώρακας ἔχομεν, πρὸς ποδῶν δὲ σφενδόνας / καὶ τόξα, καταπάλταισι δ' ἐστεφανώμεθα - fr. 7.

<sup>48</sup> E.g. Webster (1970) 64 and Konstantakos (2011) 167-8.

<sup>49</sup> Papachrysostomou (2008) 212-3, following Breitenbach (1908).

spears in a manner reminiscent of Mnesimachus († ὁ Βοιάρεως / ὁ τοὺς καταπάλτας τὰς τε λόγχας ἐσθίων - fr. 12.4-5). The humour in both of these passages lies partially – whether the speaker of Mnesimachus' fragment is Demosthenes or Philip – in the conflation of what goes into and comes out of the mouth.

The satire of Demosthenes by Timocles and likely also Mnesimachus is particularly striking when read in contrast to one of Demosthenes' own speeches, *On the False Embassy*. This speech, which claimed that Aeschines was in the pay of Philip and serving him rather than Athens on the embassy of 346, dedicates a portion to a discussion of a banquet hosted by Philip in which Aeschines took part. The sympotic theme is initially introduced when Demosthenes imagines Aeschines making an appeal to the shared bond of the embassy: "where is the salt? Where the table? Where the libations?" (*ποῦ δ' ἄλες; ποῦ τράπεζα; ποῦ σπονδαί;* - 189). However, this does not, Demosthenes argues, excuse them from wrongdoing. The aim of this criticism is made starkly clear through the introductory and concluding remarks. At first, Demosthenes says: "To show you, then, that these men are the basest and most depraved of all Philip's visitors, private as well as official,— yes, all of them,— let me tell you a trifling story that has nothing to do with the embassy."<sup>50</sup> Sympotic action reflects moral stature. Such is the apparent irrefutability of this logic, at least in Demosthenes' rhetoric, that at the end of this digression he asks what sort of life Aeschines will claim to have led, when his true character has just been laid bare.<sup>51</sup> The negative portrayal of Aeschines centres around the abuse of an Olynthian woman brought in by the host, Xenophon, and is driven by their alcoholic consumption (196-8). This is contrasted with the actions of the comic actor Satyrus at another of Philip's celebrations at Olynthus itself. Satyrus begs for the daughters of his friend Apollodorus of Pydna, who had been taken captive, to be given to him to marry to respectable men (192-5). *On the False Embassy*, in this episode, reveals the ability of a critic to attack the ethics and morals of an individual and set them in a highly politicized context (i.e. if this is the kind of man Aeschines is, think what kind of ambassador he made).

Elsewhere in Demosthenes' speech, too, we see the conceptual power of the sympotic *hetaireia*. According to his account, despite swearing that he was physically unable to travel with the embassy, Aeschines supposedly left Athens for Macedonia, where he joined in Philip's victory celebrations with its garlands, singing, and drinking.<sup>52</sup> This action, according to Demosthenes, is proof of Aeschines' support of Philip. The communality of the sympotic experience, that is, and as we have seen, forges connections between individuals or between *oikoi*, and such connections were

<sup>50</sup> ἵνα τοίνυν εἰδῆθ' ὅτι οὐ μόνον τῶν δημοσίᾳ ποτ' ἐληλυθότων ως Φίλιππον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἴδια καὶ πάντων οὗτοι φαυλότατοι καὶ πονηρότατοι γεγόνασι, μικρὸν ἀκούσατέ μου ἔξω τι τῆς πρεσβείας ταύτης - 192.

<sup>51</sup> ποίον οὖν ἐρεῖς βίον δν ποῦ βεβίωκας; ἐπεὶ δὲ γε βεβιωμένος σοι τοιοῦτος φαίνεται - 200.

<sup>52</sup> συνεστεφανοῦτο καὶ συνεπαιώνιζε Φιλίππω καὶ φιλοτησίας προύπινεν - 128.

often political. To present Aeschines as going out of his way, contrary to his affidavit, to join Philip's celebrations, especially those over the defeat of the Phocians, Athenian allies, is to present him as fundamentally anti-Athenian.

An individual's attendance at and behaviour in the symposium, then, was a frequent stick with which prominent figures could be beaten by comedians and orators alike. As we have seen, numerous different aspects of sympotic behaviour could be specifically targeted, whether that is drunkenness (in Demosthenes and the *Komastai* plays), excessive food consumption (Eupolis' *Kolakes*), or behaviour generally (Mnesimachus fr. 7). What elements of the symposium, then, are singled out in the *AD*? While generally the focus of Matro's satire is on the food at Xenocles' house, a theme prominently announced at the start of the poem (1-2), he incorporates numerous other elements of the symposium into his portrayal. Before we return to analyse the *AD* in more detail, I would like to outline two particular sympotic tropes that will be pertinent to my discussion, competition and role-play.

The competitive spirit often found in the symposium has long been recognized. While perhaps most obvious in games such as *kottabos*, in which participants could compete for kisses, drinks, and the like, more recent emphasis in scholarship has been on the competitive nature of sympotic speech. As Pellizer noted, 'the *logos sympotikos*, at a certain point in the gathering, comes to assume the role of a contest, a demonstration which each member is expected to make of his ability and his technical and executive capacities, whether great or small, both in solo performance and in choral singing.'<sup>53</sup> One of the most common features of such competitive language are the *skolia*, games in which one symposiast would either quote or produce a line or couplet to which another would have to respond. The point is not simply to give a response, but specifically to give one that "caps" the previous statement in some way.<sup>54</sup> Some attempt to portray the goal of such activities as edification, eschewing certain types of texts or passages for the sake of propriety (e.g. Plu. *Quest. Conv.* 711e, 712b-d), although this is a rather idealistic, and idealizing, perspective. Rather than a straightforward chance to show one's *paideia*, such games involving *skolia* might simply be an opportunity for the kind of play characteristic of the symposia.<sup>55</sup>

Such games not uncommonly involve epic poetry. In a revealing, if suspect, anecdote, the *Suda* informs us that Pigres (also accredited with writing the *BM*) inserted pentameter lines after each

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<sup>53</sup> Pellizer (1990) 179.

<sup>54</sup> For *skolia* and competition, see Collins (2004). "Capping", as a key element in this game, and as it appears in Aristophanic comedy, has been discussed by Hesk (2007).

<sup>55</sup> Ion of Chios fr. 27.5-8 provides a typical example of the exhortation of play in symposia.

line in the *Iliad*.<sup>56</sup> Although not directly associated with the symposium, this literary game features many characteristic features of sympotic games, not least the notion of “capping”. A more complex literary game is recounted by Athenaeus (10.458a-9c): contestants were expected on demand to recite a Homeric or iambic line that either starts and ends with the same letter, one that is asigmatic, or whose first and last syllables combined produce a name or other utensils. One common punishment for failure in such games was to drink a cup of wine mixed with saltwater without taking a breath (cf. Antiphanes fr. 75). Similar such games are also attested in Clearchus (fr. 63 Wehrli), whose idealized symposia of the ancients (by contrast to the modern trend of quoting Archestratus or Philaenis) involved quoting epic or iambic lines to which the other player had to quote a line by another author with a similar sentiment, a specific number of syllables, or with a number of lines that used particular combinations of letters and syllables; a player might also be asked to name a leader from the Catalogue of Ships, or a city in Asia or Europe beginning with a certain letter. That such games are principally a test of education is clarified by Clearchus' comments: “the game thus required considerable thinking and was informative about how well-educated each member of the group was” (ῶστε τὴν παιδιὰν μὴ ἀσκεπτὸν οὐσαν μηνύματα γίνεσθαι τῆς ἑκάστου πρὸς παιδείαν οἰκειότητος).

While Athenaeus' Homeric quizzes are a clear opportunity to show off one's erudition, the claim to be a *pepaideumenos* is just one example of a wider sympotic phenomenon, role-playing. By role-playing I do not simply refer to the kind of game that occurs, for instance, in the scene between Philocleon and Bdelycleon in *Wasps*, where a specific identity is played specifically for the purpose of the game (καὶ δὴ γάρ εἰμ’ ἐγώ Κλέων, / ἄδω δὲ πρῶτος Αρμοδίου - 1224-5), but also more generally to the symposiast's projected identity. Symposia, and especially the consumption of wine there, are frequently considered as the place where the mask falls, revealing the symposiast's true self. In the opening of the second book of the *Laws*, for instance, Plato begins by considering whether “the discerning of men's natural dispositions is the only gain to be derived from the right use of wine-parties” (τὸ κατιδεῖν ἀξιον πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἔνεστ’ ἐν τῇ κατ’ ὄρθὸν χρείᾳ τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ συνουσίᾳς - 652a).<sup>57</sup> At the same time, as Robin Osborne's analysis of sympotic pottery has demonstrated, the symposium was also a locus of identity projection.<sup>58</sup> The attendance of a symposium was, therefore, a double-edged sword. The symposiast's public persona could be put

<sup>56</sup> ὃς τῇ Ἰλιάδι παρενέβαλε κατὰ στίχον ἐλεγεῖον, οὗτο γράψας· μῆνιν ἀειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Αχιλῆος / Μούσα· σὺ γὰρ πάσης πείρατ’ ἔχεις σοφίης. Collins (2004) 136 dates Pigres to the 2nd or 1st cent. BC, taking Pigres as a serious candidate for the authorship of the *BM*, although the *Suda* is likely referring to the son of Artemisia, *qua* Plut. *De Herod. Malign.* I view this attribution of “Homeric elegies” to Pigres as highly dubious.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. κάτοπτρον (γάρ) εἴδους χαλκός ἐστ’, οἶνος δὲ νοῦ - A. fr. 393.

<sup>58</sup> Osborne (2007).

to the test, such as by riddles, games of *paideia*, or mockery; his “true nature” could be revealed, especially if drinking to excess; or he could play, or put on, an entirely different persona altogether. These conflicting identity games could be viewed as a source of tension, for instance if participants take offence at sympotic mockery, or it could be perceived, as Clearchus does above in the case of edifying games, as a mutually beneficial process.<sup>59</sup>

What I have attempted to explain in this section is the role of the symposium and its use in Matro’s literary context. Some symposia are able to forge connections between individuals and between *oikoi*; in others, transgressive behaviour, such as overindulgence and parasitism, has wider, ethico-political implications that reflect social and political values. Furthermore, it is such transgressive behaviour that is frequently used as a source of mockery and personal satire by comedians and orators. How you speak, how you act, and what and how you eat at a symposium matters; it can define who you are in others’ eyes. It is in this context, then, that we turn to consider how Matro presents the diners at Xenocles’ symposium.

### **Competitive consumption and the glorious gluttons**

As I said at the start of this chapter, the satiric nature of the *AD* has long been recognized, and this section aims to clarify more precisely how Matro’s satire functions through the presentation of the guests at the dinner. I shall first demonstrate that the diners can be described as overindulgers or parasites, the key transgressive figures of the symposium. Their behaviour within the symposium, I shall show, is consistently competitive, as they fight each other for the most, and the best, foods. Additionally, I shall argue that Matro’s narrative of the symposiasts’ competitiveness, especially through the Homeric parodies, can be usefully understood as a kind of sympotic role-play. The notion that the diners act like Homeric warriors at the Banquets of the Blessed, that is, is not simply the lens through which Matro presents the dinner, but is part of how Matro presents their own self-portrayal. At the dinner on which this poem is supposedly based, the diners acted as if they *really were* Homeric heroes, and Matro then reflects this in his choice of literary form. By viewing the poem’s parody thus, the humour is enhanced as literary form and personal satire are interconnected.

Throughout the poem, the diners are depicted as overindulgers in all the primary senses that term evokes in the context of the symposium – eating, drinking, and sex. Their gluttony is

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<sup>59</sup> Collins (2004) 63-83 discusses the notions of play and seriousness in sympotic poetry games through the sociolinguistic approaches of Labov (1972) and Kochman (1983). While this is a valuable discussion, this approach seems to require a more critical analysis of the wider applicability of the sociolinguistic theories. Such a discussion, however, is beyond the confines of this chapter.

particularly emphasized in the section of the poem we possess through the greatly extended catalogue of foods. Matro frequently emphasizes the size of several dishes (37, 44-5, 59, 61, +81t) and their number (48-9, 60, 95). The claim of the opening line, that the dinners were much-nourishing and very numerous (*πολυτρόφα καὶ μάλα πολλά*) is hardly sold short. Matro also varies the speed of the catalogue, sometimes centring on individual dishes to focus on their particular quality, sometimes firing them off in quick succession giving the impression of a consistent onslaught. At one point in particular we see the voraciousness of the diners (66-8):

ἀστακὸς αῦτε λιλαίετο θωρήσσεσθαι  
ἐν μακάρων δείπνοις· τοῖς δαιτυμόνες χέο’ ἐφέντες  
ἐν στόμασίν <τ’> ἔθεσαν καὶ ἀπήγαγον ἄλλυδις ἄλλον.<sup>60</sup>

This passage immediately demonstrates how the diners in general terms are presented as *opsophagoi*. The diners cannot wait to get their hands on the food before them. This rush, a classic sign of the *opsophagos*, is reinforced by the *hysteron proteron*: while logically one would take the food away before eating it, here impatience gets the better of the guests. Further, the phrase *χέο’ ἐφέντες* evokes Homeric expressions that always describe violent assault.<sup>61</sup> The final phrase, each going off in different directions, may also be telling. Although a common Homeric phrase, occurring in the same *sedes* at *Od.* 14.35, it is also used in a gastronomic context by Eupolis, where the chorus of *Kolakes* describe going off to the dinner of a rich man they have fawned on (*εἴτ’ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐρχόμεθ’ ἄλλυδις ἄλλος ἡμῶν / μᾶζαν ἐπ’ ἄλλόφυλον* - fr. 172.11-2). In each case, the phrase seems to describe the process of many people trying to grab as much food as possible. Although it is not entirely clear, the phrase seems to underline the greater estimation of personal consumption (an “every man for himself” approach) over the communalities that is *supposed* to lie at the heart of the symposium.

Such eager participation even extends to the food itself through the various semantic associations created by the verb *θωρήσσεσθαι*. While on one level the humour depends upon the ambiguity of the *θῶραξ*, which could refer both to a piece of armour and to the body of a crustacean (e.g. Arist. *HA* 526b5, 529b26), the verb *θωρήσσω*, restricted in Homeric poetry to mean

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<sup>60</sup> “And a lobster too was eager to fortify himself in the banquets of the blessed. The diners laid their hands on these things and put them in their mouths and took them off in various directions.” (trans. Olson and Sens, adapted)

<sup>61</sup> E.g. *Il.* 1.567, *Od.* 1.254, 13.376; cf. Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*

"arm for battle", can also mean "intoxicate" (e.g. at Thgn. 413, 470, Pi. fr. 72.1).<sup>62</sup> The lobster is then simultaneously using its body as a sort of natural defence against its would-be attackers/consumers and wishing to get drunk with them. The image of the diners as *opsophagoi*, then, is pervasive in these lines, with everything from the setting to the diners' actions to even their own food reflecting the immoderate mood.

Likewise in their drinking habits the diners give away their excessive tendencies. In the few lines of the poem we possess that refer directly to wine consumption, deep and disorderly drinking is emphasized (109-10):

κοητὴρ δὲ Βρομίου ἐκεράννυτο, πίνετο δ' οἶνος  
Λέσβιος, οὐ δὴ πλεῖστον ἀνήρ ύπερ ἄνδρα πεπώκει.<sup>63</sup>

Not only does Xenocles serve one of the best renowned wines in the Greek world (cf. my discussion of Archestr. *Hed.* fr. 59 in chapter 3), but emphasis is also placed upon the quantity of wine drunk, which we have seen was a key element in the portrayal of the Greek drunkard. Not only have the guests all drunk large quantities even before the second tables are brought in (note the pluperfect *πεπώκει*), but the quantity of wine is emphasized by the iterative imperfects, *ἐκεράννυτο* and *πίνετο*. Further, this consumption is explicitly competitive as each attempts to outdo the other in their bibulousness, an image that should be contrasted with the idealistic view of the symposium in which the *ἄρχων* or *βασιλεὺς* controls the flow of wine and each man drinks the same quantity. The overall picture of the guests, then, is one of repetitive and competitive heavy drinking that characterizes drinking to excess. In the realms of both food and drink, the guests at the dinner display their uncouth manners, typified by greedy eating and binge drinking.

For some, even the presence of courtesans transgresses good practice. Plato, for instance, claims that, although common to symposia of vulgar men (*τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων*), the proper symposiast (*καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται*) should be able to rely on his education and be entertained through conversation alone (*Prt.* 347c-e). So when Stratocles at the end of our fragment "drives" in the prostitutes (*πόρναι δ' εἰσῆλθον, κοῦραι δύο θαυματοποιοί, / ᾧς Στρατοκλῆς ἥλαυνε ποδώκεας ὅρνιθας ὡς - 121-2*), the lustful implications are immediately clear from the very first word. Calling the women *πόρναι* rather than *έταιραι* immediately lays aside any pretence that they are there for chaste entertainment, which is only

<sup>62</sup> For the ambiguity of the verb, see Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*, cf. LSJ s.v. θωρήσσω A I and II. For a similar play on the meanings of this verb, see Ar. *Ach.* 1134-5 and *Pax* 1286. The modern phrase "to fortify oneself" comes close to expressing this same wordplay, as Matthew Wright suggested to me.

<sup>63</sup> "A mixing bowl of Bromius was mixed, and Lesbian wine was drunk, a great deal of which they had drunk, one man surpassing another."

reinforced by the *double entendres* of the subsequent lines. It is likely, therefore, that the prostitutes here were presented in a similar manner to the ἀνηλακάτοι γυναικὸς mentioned in another poem by Matro (fr. 6.2), where the joke suggests she is present primarily for sexual purposes.<sup>64</sup>

The sexual role of the prostitutes is emphasized further by several innuendoes. Line 122, for instance, parodies *Il.* 2.764 (τὰς Εῦμηλος ἔλαυνε ποδώκεας ὄφνιθας ὡς), which describes the best horses of the Achaean army. The comparison between the prostitutes and Homeric horses may have been humorously appropriate, given that some of the terminology of prostitution occasionally associated prostitutes, or particular sexual positions, with horses.<sup>65</sup> It is possible that the Homeric parody here may have been proleptic of a recurrent metaphor throughout the sympotic part of the poem. In this context, too, we should note that the verb ἔλαυνε is sometimes used as a metaphor for sex (e.g. Ar. *Pax* 711, *Eccl.* 37-9, 1082, Pl. *Com.* fr. 3.4), resulting in the implication that Stratocles was already fucking or soon to fuck the prostitutes.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, the adjective θαυματοποιὸς likely denotes not only their abilities to entertain with tricks, like Callias' slave-girl in Xenophon's *Symposium*,<sup>67</sup> but also their sexual accomplishments.<sup>68</sup> Finally, we may see an echo of Hesiod's description of the Muses as κοῦραι Δίος (occupying the same metrical *sedes*) in line 121, given the humorous elision elsewhere in the poem between the food at the banquet and the gods. This may recall the use of courtesans as musical entertainment (cf. Matro fr. 6) while the sexualization of the women in these lines acts contrary to such connotations. The chance that they might not just be sexual objects rapidly becomes slim. The allusion may also be a humorous inversion of the descriptions of the muses that are reminiscent of prostitution (e.g. ἀ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδής πω τότ' ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις· / οὐδ' ἐπέρναντο γλυκεῖαι μελιφθόγγου ποτὶ Τερψιχόρας / ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι ἀοιδαί - Pi. I. 2.6-8; note especially ἐργάτις and ἐπέρναντο).<sup>69</sup> In short, the prostitutes that Stratocles "drives" in at the end of our version of the

<sup>64</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*, following Brandt (1888). Whether or not in the latter case the woman ever played the *skindapsos* whose peg at least was unoccupied is unclear.

<sup>65</sup> We might think, for example of the sexual position named the κέλης (and the verb κελητίζω) named for a racing horse; cf. the term ἵπποπορνος, for which see Kapparis (2011).

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*, following Schweighäuser (1801-7).

<sup>67</sup> Compare also the wedding of Caranus the Macedonian, at which according to Lynceus of Samos there were women who tumbled naked among swords and blew fire out of their mouths (θαυματουργοὶ γυναικὲς εἰς ξίφη κυβιστῶσαι καὶ πῦρ ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἐκριπίζουσι γυμναί - Ath. 4.129d); cf. the tumblers (κυβιστῆται) of Od. 4.17-9 and the θαυματοποιὸς of Demad. fr. 8, Plu. *Lyc.* 19.2, Thphr. *Char.* 27.7.

<sup>68</sup> As Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.* put it: 'there may nonetheless be a quiet, humorous suggestion that these were particularly accomplished whores, capable of performing marvellous, seemingly supernatural acts in the course of lovemaking.'

<sup>69</sup> For further possible connections between the Muses and prostitutes, see J.S. Morrison (1956) 145-6; cf. Plu. *Amat.* 748e-f, who relates that a joint festival of the Muses and Eros (the *Erotidia*) was celebrated every 4 years at Thespiae.

AD strongly associate the festivities with sexual excess, with Stratocles taking a prominent, active role, reminiscent of the lasciviousness of the *kinaidōs*.

The symposiasts, then, are presented as overindulgers in every sense – gastronomic, oenological, and sexual. Invited to the dinner also we find the other sympotic figure often associated with the transgression of social norms, the parasite. The figure of Chaerephon appears in contemporary authors, particularly comedians, in which his gluttony is well known.<sup>70</sup> In Matro's AD, Chaerephon very much remains true to type. By looking at his gluttony in more detail, we shall see that Matro presents Chaerephon in a similar manner to the other diners. While customarily the figure of the parasite stands in contrast to the other diners, a negative image of how the remainder should behave, the similarity of Chaerephon to the other diners serves Matro's satirical agenda in reflecting how Xenocles, Stratocles, and the rest have fallen to the parasite's level. Chaerephon appears in two sections of the poem (7-10, 98-101):

αὐτὸς δὲ Ξενοκλῆς ἐπεπωλεῖτο στίχας ἀνδρῶν  
στῇ δ' ἄρ' ἐπ' οὐδὸν ίών· σχεδόθεν δέ οἱ ἦν παράσιτος  
Χαιρεφόων, πεινῶντι λάρω ὅρνιθι ἐοικώς,  
νήστης, ἀλλοτρίων εὖ εἰδὼς δειπνοσυνάων.<sup>71</sup>

Χαιρεφόων δ' ἐνόησεν ἄμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω  
ὅρνιθας γνῶναι καὶ ἐναίσιμα σιτίζεσθαι.  
ησθιε δ' ὥσθε λέων, παλάμη δ' ἔχε τὸ σκέλος ἀμνοῦ,  
ὄφρα οἱ οἴκαδ' ιόντι πάλιν ποτιδόρπιον εἴη.<sup>72</sup>

Both of these passages reveal Chaerephon's ravenous hunger that is typical of literary parasites. The comparison between Chaerephon and a seagull already plays on his gluttony, with which sea-gulls are frequently associated (e.g. Ar. *Eq.* 956, *Nu.* 591, *Av.* 567, *Cerc.* fr. 4.3-5). Then, the subsequent line is reminiscent of the description of the suitors (*ὅει*, *ἐπεὶ ἀλλότριων βίοτον νίπτοινον ἔδουσιν* - *Od.* 1.160), a fitting description for a frequently unwelcome consumer of

<sup>70</sup> Antiph. fr. 197.3-4, Alex. frs. 213, 259, Nicostr. Com. fr. 26.3, Timocl. fr. 9.3-4, Tim. Com. fr. 1.2-3, Men. frs. 55, 215, 225, 265, Apollod. Car. fr. 29; cf. Lync. ap. Ath. 13.584e, Machon frs. 3-4. Arnott (1996) *ad* Alex. fr. 213.1 argues that all of these references can be dated between c. 325-310 BC.

<sup>71</sup> "Xenocles himself went about, inspecting the ranks of men, and came and stood on the threshold. Close by him was the parasite Chaerephon, a man resembling a hungry sea-gull, starving, and well acquainted with other people's dinings."

<sup>72</sup> "Chaerephon looked back and forth at the same time to recognize the birds and feed on what was allotted him. He ate like a lion, and he held a lamb's leg in his hand, so that it might serve as his dinner when he went back home."

others' food without any contribution. In the second passage, the ornithological theme is again picked up by the knowledge Chaerephon displays, which echoes the claims in comedy that parasitism is a form of τέχνη (e.g. Alex. fr. 121.10, Diphil. fr. 76). Even in these two short passages, then, Chaerephon is characterized as a typical glutton, an expert only of what to eat and how not to contribute towards it. So skilled is he, indeed, that in line 101 he is said to acquire so much that he has a second meal for when he gets home.

Excessive consumption, then, characterizes the diners in general, and this applies equally to the narrator. After arriving with a great hunger (3), he consumes eagerly throughout the poem. Occasionally, he makes distinctions between what is or is not worth eating (rejecting foods at ll. 17, 57-8, and 83-4). Matro's similarity to the other diners is epitomized in the way that he forcefully grabs at the sturgeon (τῶν δ' ἄρ' ἔλοψ... οὐ πλήρης περ ἐών κρατερῶς παλάμη ἐπορέχθην - 69-70). There is one figure, however, to whom Matro appears especially apposite – Chaerephon. The similarities between the poet and the parasite abound.<sup>73</sup> Within the poem, the narrator tells us that he will have to return to servile bread (γευσάμενος δ' ἔκλαιον, ὁ τ' αὔριον οὐκέτι ταῦτα / ὄψομαι, ἀλλά με δεῖ τυρῷ καὶ μάζῃ ὅτορῷ - 91-2), a social status well in line with that of the parasite. We might also note in this regard that, according to Ath. 6.244a (= Call. fr. 434), Callimachus included a Chaerephon amongst the authors of *Deipna* in the *Pinakes* on the basis that he had written a prose treatise of 375 lines in the form of a letter to a fellow parasite, Cyrabion/Epicrates, and which began ἐπειδή μοι πολλάκις ἐπέστειλας.

Additionally, two elements of the Homeric parody in the poem support the association between the two figures. Firstly, they are both described using lines that parody the figure of Polyphemus. At the beginning of the dinner, lines 15-6 describe Matro eating all sorts of dishes, including purse-tassel bulbs, asparagus, and oysters in a parody of the cyclops' ravenous feasting (ἀλλ' ἥσθιον εἴδατα παντα, / βολβοὺς ἀσπάραγόν τε καὶ ὄστρεα μυελόεντα ~ ἥσθιε δ' ὡστε λέων ὄρεσίτροφος, οὐδὲ ἀπέλιπεν, / ἔγκατά τε σάρκας τε καὶ ὄστέα μυελόεντα - Od. 9.292-3). The same passage, although this time focusing on the comparison between Polyphemus and a lion, is later used to describe Chaerephon, in line 100 quoted above. This comparison is then extended through the use of ποτιδόρπιον, a rare word that is only used in Homer of Polyphemus (Od. 9.234, 249, thereafter used at A.R. 1.1209). In the same passage, Chaerephon's knowledge of birds

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<sup>73</sup> Others have suggested associations elsewhere in Greek literature between the parasite and the poet. Some, for example, have stressed that κόλαξ was used as a derogatory term for "actor" (e.g. "flatterers of Dionysus"), for which see Whitmarsh (2000) 312; others, such as Worman (2008) 26, 41-2, building on the argument of Nagy (1999) 229-31, have argued that the Odyssean beggar figures the blame poet, which also translated into the iambic persona of the hungry, clownish outsider. For the parasite's performance of himself, see Fehr (1990) 186-7. A particularly instructive example is the metaliterary joke made by a parasite in Alciphron (3.35.2), who gives up parasitism to take up comic acting in the role of the slave.

parodies the ornithomantic abilities of Halitherses (ὅρνιθας γνῶναι καὶ ἐναίσιμα μυθήσασθαι - *Od.* 2.159). The shift from μυθέομαι to σιτίζω also reflects the parallels between Chaerephon and the poet. The verb μυθέομαι can be used to refer to poetic practice, such as when Hesiod uses it paradigmatically to establish the veracious tone of the *Works and Days* (ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέοη ἐτίτυμα μυθησάμην - 10). In recalling the Homeric original, Matro's phrase invites us to consider how closely the storytelling abilities of the parasite, whose reliance on stories and jokes to entertain is well documented (e.g. Philippus in X. *Smp.*, cf. *Ath.* 6.241b-d), are to those of the poet himself.<sup>74</sup>

All of the diners, including the narrator and the parasite Chaerephon, transgress the usual rules of the symposium. They eat huge quantities of food, excessively and violently and not at all moderately. The equality between individuals that so often lies at the heart of the ideal, orderly symposium is entirely absent. Already, then, we see part of Matro's ethico-political agenda that portrays the diners, and perhaps especially their hosts, as indulging in τρυφή.<sup>75</sup> Their implications of their specific comportment, however, can be explored further. As we shall see, the competitiveness with which the symposiasts eat and drink is well understood in the context of the competitive spirit of the symposium, although in this poem the theme is misplaced and we see some of the potentially violent repercussions of sympotic competition in their desire for food.

We have already seen some of the rivalry between the symposiasts in their consumption of wine (109-10, esp. ἀνὴρ ὑπὲρ ἄνδρα), quoted earlier. This contravenes one of central, normative sympotic principles, that the company should elect a symposiarch who judges the pace of the drinking and that all drink equally.<sup>76</sup> At the same time, however, the ability to drink large quantities made numerous figures in antiquity notorious. According to Polemo (fr. 79 Wehrli), for instance, Diotimus of Athens was nicknamed Funnel (Χύνη), as he would put a funnel into his mouth and drink wine non-stop as it was poured in.<sup>77</sup> Such behaviour was also frequently competitive. In Euripides' *Styleus*, for instance, Heracles challenged the ogre to a drinking competition (κλίθητι καὶ πίωμεν· ἐν τούτῳ δέ μου / τὴν πεῖραν εὐθὺς λάμβαν' εἰ κρείσσων ἔσῃ - fr. 691). Likewise, Alexander the Great supposedly held a drinking competition, in addition to athletic and musical competitions, for the Indian philosopher Calanus. The man who won this, Promachus, apparently drank four pitchers of unmixed wine and survived for four days, while 35 contestants

<sup>74</sup> The parasite figure was also one that received abuse, for example *Od.* 18.8-111; cf. numerous figures in Alciphron, e.g. *Epist.* 3.2.3, 3.3.1, 3.4.3-4, 3.9.2-3. Although Corner (2013a) 49 calls this 'a travesty of the bard's places at the feast,' this too is a common feature of humorous and *parōidic* poets, such as Hipponax being threatened with stoning (ἐκέλευε βάλλειν καὶ λεύειν Τιππώνακτα - fr. 37, perhaps so cf. fr. 41) or Hegemon of Thasos being pelted with shit.

<sup>75</sup> For the politics of τρυφή and its development in the 5th and 4th cent., see Kurke (1992) 105-6.

<sup>76</sup> See for instance Alex. fr. 21, X. *An.* 6.1.30, Pl. *Smp.* 213e; cf. Arnott (1996) *ad* fr. 21, Dover (1980) 11.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. the testimony of Aristus of Salamis (*FGrH* 143 F 3 = *Ath.* 10.436e) that Diotimus was a well-known drinker.

died on the spot.<sup>78</sup> The drinking competition is, then, a recognizable trope of excess, frequently associated with other kinds of social outrages such as the seduction of free women (ascribed to Charidemus of Oreus by Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 143 = Ath. 10.436b-c) and sexual abuse of boys and women (the actions of Nysaeus, according to Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 210), or might have other medical side-effects, such as poor vision.<sup>79</sup> The widespread connection between heavy drinking and immorality or illness clearly demonstrates the ethical issues at stake in the *AD*. While sympotic competition could be a positive, even edifying experience, certain kinds of activities such as drinking should not usually be competitive. When they became so, this behaviour is highly indicative of the ethical and political character of the individuals in question.<sup>80</sup>

During the dinner itself, the diners' desire for the food in front of them frequently becomes competitive and sometimes violent. For instance, at one point Matro spots a flat dish left in a clear spot, containing a blackbird (85-7). Matro's reaction, and its relationship with that of the other diners, is telling: "Nor was it in fact untouched, and others desired it" (*οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἄροτε αἴθικτος ἔτην, πόθεον δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι - 88*). Being the first to get one's hands on a dish is especially prized by all present, and the humour here is strengthened by the implicit comparison between the dish and a virgin girl through the adjective *αἴθικτος*.<sup>81</sup> While this aggression between different diners for the most part is harmless, principally being expressed through military metaphors or allusions to Homeric battle scenes, at one point in the poem the violent potential of what should be friendly sympotic competition becomes clear (28-32):

τῇ δ' ἐγὼ ἐν πρώτοις ἐπέχον κρατερώνυμα χεῖρα,  
οὐδὲ ἔφθην τρώσας μιν, ἀασε <δὲ> Φοίβος Απόλλων.  
ώς <δὲ> Στρατοκλῆ, κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο,  
τρίγλης ἵπποδάμοιο κάρη μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχοντα,  
ἄψ δ' ἐλόμην χάρμη, λαιμὸν δ' ἀπληστον ἄμυξα.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>78</sup> Chares of Mytilene (*FGrH* 125 F 19 = Ath. 10.437a-b). Athenaeus then goes on to quote other authorities for similar competitions.

<sup>79</sup> Apparently suffered by the Sicilian tyrant, Dionysius the Younger, according to Aristotle (fr. 605.1; cf. Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 283a, Theophrastus fr. 548 Fortenbaugh).

<sup>80</sup> The piquancy that the political dimension adds to such excessive drinking is well demonstrated by Theopompus F 210: *οὐκ ὀλύγων γὰρ ἥδη γενομένων ἀσελγῶν περὶ τὸν βίον τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ τοὺς πότους οὐδένα νομίζω τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ὅντων οὔτε ἀκρατέστερον οὔτε λιχνότερον οὔτε δοῦλον γεγονέναι μᾶλλον τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἰ μή, ὕσπερ εἶπον, Τιμόλαον.*

<sup>81</sup> As Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc. note*, this adjective is commonly used of virgins (e.g. *E. Hipp.*, *Hel.* 795, *Ion* fr. 11).

<sup>82</sup> "I was among the first to put a strong-clawed hand to it, but I did not wound it before the others; for Phoebus Apollo led me wrong. But when I saw Stratocles, the powerful raiser of fear, holding the head of the horse-mastering red mullet in his hands, I snatched it back with martial ardor and scratched his insatiable gullet."

The military metaphor in these lines is immediately established with ἐν πρώτοις, while the speed with which the narrator acts is established through the allusion to strong-hoofed horses (κρατερώνυχας ἵππους in the same *sedes* at *Il.* 5.329, 16.724, 732). However, he faces resistance on both the divine and human levels. First, Apollo steps in, either acting against Matro or defending the red mullet.<sup>83</sup> Secondly, and more violently, he faces Stratocles. Stratocles is introduced with a fairly generic heroic description, κρατερὸν μῆστωρα φόβοιο, which is used in the same metrical *sedes* of numerous epic figures (*Il.* 6.97 = 278 of Diomedes, Hes. fr. 129.15 of Perseus(?)). A particular connection in their interaction seems to be made with the figure of Hector. Firstly, the description of Stratocles eating a red mullet parodies Andromache mourning over the dead Hector (“Εκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο (v.l. ἵπποδάμοιο) κάρη μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχουσα - *Il.* 24.724); subsequently, while χάρη is a common part of Homeric vocabulary, it is only used in this *sedes* of Hector at *Il.* 7.285. The parody of Andromache’s mourning acts proleptically, as Stratocles shortly thereafter must nurse his injured gullet, and it is instead the narrator himself who takes up the mantle of Hector’s battle-lust. The action in the final phrase, scratching the gullet, as Olson and Sens have noted, must refer to the narrator scratching Stratocles’ throat as he snatches the red mullet away. Given the associations between physical and metaphorical violence for the expression of literary satire (cf. μηδένα πτημαίνων - Hegem. 1.12), we might be tempted to see this as a metapoetic expression of Matro’s satirical programme, approaching a literal form of “cutting satire”.

The interaction between Matro and Stratocles in this passage is not only indicative of the competitiveness between the diners in the poem, but also reflects the extent to which Matro’s parodies inform our reading of their actions. Our image of the diners’ behaviour, that is, is not narrated directly but is always filtered, or focalized, through the epic world to which it stands in parodic contrast. This is not merely generic colouring (i.e. the Homeric parody is not present simply due to convention), but rather adds meaningfully to the satirical point. The description of Stratocles as a “powerful raiser of fear”, for instance, finds echoes in the description of several epic heroes. On one level, the humour of such characterizations derives from the thematic incongruity

<sup>83</sup> The precise action is unclear due to a corruption in the text. A gives τρώσας ἵνα εἴασε, while CE suggest τρώγειν εἴασε. While τρώσας μιν has been universally accepted now, the second verb is debatable. Olson and Sens’ text, printed above, follows Scaliger’s ‘palmary emendation,’ as printed in most editions, although Condello (2002) 146-7 suggested ἔρυσσε δέ, demonstrating the verb’s close association with Apollo in Homer (e.g. *Il.* 5.344, 11.363, and 20.450). While appealing, the emendation is more difficult on palaeographic grounds. Condello also does not give any reason why Apollo might be associated with the red mullet, which might be a problem if Plutarch is right to say (at 2.966a and 983e) that Artemis or Apollo are sometimes called τριγλοφόρος. Other sources, however, such as Hegesander of Delphi (fr. 39), say that it was carried in processions at festivals of Artemis (cf. Pl. Com. fr. 189.20-1, where the red mullet is sacred to Artemis on the grounds that it “hates hard-ons”). For my purposes, the presence of conflict on either reading is the central point.

between the military context of the epic original and the gastronomic subject of the *AD* (although we may also recognize that such military metaphor is not uncommon in sympotic contexts). The humour of the passage is increased, however, if we view the narrative in the context of sympotic role-playing. As we have already seen, role-play is common in sympotic games and symposia are frequently imagined to reveal the symposiast's true identity. The comparisons between Stratocles and epic heroes invited by the parody may therefore be understood as a form of role-play.

Such a reading is supported if we compare how sympotic behaviour can be interpreted in other comic symposia. In Alexis' *Parasitos*, for instance, one fragment from an expository monologue describes the habits of the titular parasite (fr. 183):

καλοῦσι δ' αὐτὸν πάντες οἱ νεώτεροι  
Παράσιτον ὑποκόρισμα· τῷ δ' οὐδὲν μέλει.  
δειπνεῖ δ' ἄφωνος Τήλεφος, νεύων μόνον  
πρὸς τοὺς ἐπερωνῶντάς τι, ὥστε πολλάκις  
αὐτὸν ὁ κεκληκὼς τὰ Σαμοθράκι εὔχεται  
λῆξαι πνέοντα καὶ γαληνίσαι ποτέ.  
χειμῶν ὁ μειρακίσκος ἐστὶ τοῖς φίλοις.<sup>84</sup>

After opening with what becomes a standard formula for introducing the parasite character,<sup>85</sup> the speaker describes the parasite as a "mute Telephus". While the mute Telephus is a fairly common image during the fourth cent.,<sup>86</sup> here the parasite's silence becomes a sympotic joke. That is, his silence marks the lack of customary sociability expected of diners, while simultaneously working within the game of sympotic role-play. This is then also mixed with the common trope of sea and seafaring imagery, as the Samothracian gods are likely invoked for the belief in their ability to prevent shipwreck, and the image of the parasite as a storm is also fairly common.<sup>87</sup> This fragment demonstrates, then, how sympotic behaviour can be viewed and presented as heroic role-play.

Another example of this process in Matro's poem is useful for clarifying the point. At the start of the dinner, in his first appearance Xenocles struts around, acting more like a στρατηγός than a

<sup>84</sup> "All the younger men refer to him by the nickname "Parasite"; but he doesn't care. He eats dinner like a mute Telephus, nodding to people who ask him a question, but not doing anything else, so that his hosts routinely repeat the prayers offered to the gods from Samothrace, asking that he eventually stop blowing and calm down. The boy affects his friends like a storm."

<sup>85</sup> Antiphanes fr. 193, Anaxipp. fr. 3, Plaut. *Capt.* 69-70, *Men.* 77-8; cf. Arnott (1996) 543.

<sup>86</sup> See, for instance, Amphis fr. 30.6-7, Arist. *Poet.* 1460a32; Arnott (1996) *ad loc.* also associates the image particularly with Aeschylus' *Mysoi* and his penchant for long-silent characters.

<sup>87</sup> For the Samothracian gods as preservers of initiates from shipwreck, see Com. Adesp. fr. 255.15 Austin, Theophr. *Char.* 25, Call. *Epigr.* 47 Pf. For the association between parasites and storms, see Alex. fr. 47.4 and other names of parasites, e.g. Κεραυνὸς and Σκηπτός (Anaxipp. fr. 3 and Antiph. fr. 193).

ὅγτωρ as he inspects the ranks of men (*αὐτὸς δὲ Ξενοκλῆς ἐπεπωλεῖτο στίχας ἀνδρῶν* - 7). This line parodies *Iliad* 3.196 (*αὐτὸς δὲ κτίλος ὡς ἐπιπωλεῖται στίχας ἀνδρῶν*), part of Priam's description of Odysseus during the *Teichoscopia* inspecting the Greek troops. The same Homeric line is parodied by Timon of Phlius to describe Cleanthus (*τίς δ' οὗτος κλίτος ὡς ἐπιπωλεῖται στίχας ἀνδρῶν* - 41.1), where the joke rests on the comparison of Odysseus with a κτίλος: while in the original the simile depends on Odysseus' noble gait, Timon's parody compares the philosopher Cleanthus' features with a famously stupid animal.<sup>88</sup> In Matro, however, the emphasis must be on the action, the inspection of the troops. Xenocles is trying to act heroically<sup>89</sup> but in reality he is merely getting his ducks in a row (although these are not brought in until line 95).

How, then, does such an interpretation enhance our understanding of the *AD*? As we have already seen, for instance in the capping games of Aristophanes' *Wasps*, sympotic role-play may be manipulated for satirical purposes and this is what I suggest is happening here. The different roles assumed by the diners as the meal progresses plays out a kind of behavioural capping game, as each person assumes different heroic personae. Matro presents the diners' epic pretensions as just that, pretentious, and in a manner that hints at the distance, rather than the similarity, between the diners and the epic heroes of the past. The final move in this game is Matro's, since at the end of the meal the narrator makes a move that trumps the rest, becoming a stuffed Homer (115-20). These lines form the climax of Matro's claim to fullness (cf. 93, a parody of Ajax at *Il.* 16.102-3), which stands in contrast to his initial hunger at l. 3. Being sated marks Matro's success in this gastronomic game, as he is able to consume as much food as possible.

When we scrutinize further the representation of the "Knights of the Dinner Table", as Olson and Sens put it, we can see how Matro portrays the diners as insatiable gluttons in every possible sense; it is not simply food they crave, but all the trappings of the symposium, including drink and sex. Through the parodies of epic, Matro portrays them as role-playing Homeric heroes. In the satirical context of the poem, however, such play-acting falls flat, as their true characters are revealed. Rather than doing proud justice to their models, the diners appear more bombastic, all pomp and no circumstance. Unlike some other satirical critiques of sympotic behaviour, then, Matro uses the Homeric parody itself as part of his satirical presentation of the symposiasts. Perhaps rather than "Knights", "Heroes of the Dinner Table" might more fully capture this angle of Matro's satire.

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<sup>88</sup> Cf. di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*

<sup>89</sup> It may be relevant too that in the Odyssean context Priam is admiring Odysseus. Is Xenocles' imitation of Odysseus trying to encourage the same kind of visual admiration?

## THE HOMERIC FEAST

Food and consumption play an important role in the Greek imagination and can be used figuratively to discuss questions of poetics, morality, or education amongst others. In this section, we turn from the representation of the diners themselves to the presentation of the food. In particular, I shall suggest that the meal laid on by Xenocles is presented metapoetically and as an important part of Matro's satirical aims. In the first section, I establish the metaphor of text as food in 5th and 4th century poetry (especially comedy) and its applicability to Matro's poem. This will be developed through an analysis of the riddling techniques used by Matro in the description of some of the foodstuffs. The evocation of riddles, I contend, is motivated partially by the connection between parody and riddles and also by the sympotic subject matter. Finally, I consider how this figurative approach to the poem's food intersects with the *AD*'s satirical thrust through a close analysis of lines 95-7, which evoke the Homeric lines supposedly inserted by Solon. In its late 4th century context, in which the rhetoricians (like Xenocles) frequently quoted Homeric poetry and Greek tragedy for rhetorical and political ends, the evocation of the contentious lines of Homeric poetry critiques the political situation of contemporary Athens, setting it in contrast to the Athenian heroic past. It is precisely this construction of distance that emerges as a key factor in Matro's parodic and satirical strategies.

### The edible text and the poet-consumer

The association between poetry and food is well established and has a long tradition in Greek literature. Perhaps one of the most famous examples that explore this association in different ways is Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae*, the very text in which the extended fragment of the *AD* is quoted. In the introduction to the epitome, Athenaeus' epitomizer summarizes thus: this is the sort of delightful feast of words this marvellous chief literary steward Athenaeus introduces (τοιοῦτον ὁ θαυμαστὸς οὗτος τοῦ λόγου οἰκονόμος Ἀθήναιος ἡδιστον λογόδειπνον εἰσηγεῖται - 1b). In this section, I shall briefly outline two facets of the metaphor of food for literary production and consumption, focusing chiefly on the fifth and fourth centuries, which saw an explosion in the metaphor's popular currency: the edible text (and by extension poet as chef) and the poet-consumer, which explores poetic intertexts through gastronomy.

The metaphor of literature as food or drink was developed and widely used in Greek comedy especially. The metaphor could be used in various ways, either to champion or condemn different poetry or poetic styles. For instance, in a metadramatic fragment of Metagenes' *Philothytes*, the poet

(or a stand-in) says that he is changing the plot scene by scene, so that he can feast the audience with many side dishes (*κατ' ἐπεισόδιον μεταβάλλω τὸν λόγον, ώς ἀν / καιναῖσιν παροψίσι καὶ πολλαῖς εὐωχήσω τὸ θέατρον - fr. 15*). According to this angle, the poet is a kind of chef, providing the audience either with needed nourishment or fine cuisine.<sup>90</sup>

This metaphor cuts both ways, so that comic *mageiroi* may be in their turn likened to poets. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, these tropes are manipulated by Archestratus in the *Hedypatheia*. For instance, a *mageiros* in a play by Euphron says that the chef does not differ from the poet, as both require skill (*οὐδὲν ὁ μάγειρος τοῦ ποιητοῦ διαφέρει / ὁ νοῦς γάρ ἐστιν ἐκατέρω τούτων τέχνη - fr. 10.15-6*).

At the same time, poets are frequently imagined as consumers in their own right. One famous example is Pindar's image of the gluttonous Archilochus in *Pythian 2* (54-6):

εἶδον γὰρ ἔκας ἐὼν τὰ πόλλ' ἐν ἀμαχανίᾳ  
ψογερὸν Αρχίλοχον βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν  
πιαινόμενον.<sup>91</sup>

Although this passage does not make any particular claims about Archilochean intertextuality, already in Pindar we can see the applicability of the metaphor of text as food to poets themselves and the close association between a poet's consumption and their poetic output. In particular, the description of Archilochus as growing fat implies a continued state of gluttony that in some ways is a distortion of Matro's narrator's desire for satiety. This is strongly influenced, as Deborah Steiner has demonstrated, by the close association between what goes into and what comes out of the mouth.<sup>92</sup>

If an author or a text may be imagined as a kind of food or drink to be consumed, then by extension poets who are imagined consuming the work of other poets are implicitly influenced by what they have consumed. While this metaphor is developed more explicitly later, there is a well-known anecdote concerning Aeschylus that utilizes the food as text metaphor. According to Athenaeus, Aeschylus used to claim that his tragedies were steaks cut from Homer's great banquet (*τὸ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ λαμπροῦ Αἰσχύλου, ὃς τὰς αύτοῦ τραγῳδίας τεμάχη εἶναι ἔλεγον τῶν*

<sup>90</sup> For the different aspects of this metaphor in comedy, see Wright (2012) 129-39.

<sup>91</sup> "For standing at a far remove I have seen Archilochus the blamer often in dire straits as he fed on dire words of hatred."

<sup>92</sup> Steiner (2002); cf. Worman (2008). For Pindar's presentation of Archilochus here, see also C.G. Brown (2006).

‘Ομηρου μεγάλων δείπνων - 8.347e). Although very unlikely to be genuine,<sup>93</sup> this does demonstrate how the metaphor of text as food could be manipulated to express notions about authorial interaction, dependence, and intertextuality.

In comedy, of course, the metaphor is pushed further than the anecdote about Aeschylus. In one fragment, for instance, perhaps from the *Gerytades*, Aristophanes creates a pseudo-recipe using the now canonical Greek tragedians (fr. 595):

β.[...] ἔπειθ' ύπ[.....]εναν[.....]φ.[.....]  
ε[...]ο .[...]χ[...] δὲ Σοφοκλ[έους] λαβών  
πα[ρ]’ Αἰ[σ]χύλου ν.[...]ρ ὅσον ..[.]. εσθ’, ὅλον  
Εὐριπίδην, πρὸς τοῖσι δ’ ἐμβαλεῖν ἄλας,  
μεμνημένος δ’ ὅπως ἄλας καὶ μὴ λάλας.<sup>94</sup>

Although fragmentary, this passage clearly describes a pseudo-recipe for “cooking up” a tragedy.<sup>95</sup> The different tragedians are used in various quantities that reflect perceptions about differing levels of intertextual dependence. Poets, in short, do not simply produce food for their audiences, but the nourishment they provide can be used and reused (or consumed and re-consumed) by others.<sup>96</sup>

One final, disgusting twist to the use of this metaphor illustrates the diverse functions to which the notion of the poet-consumer can be put. In Aelian’s *Historical Miscellany*, the third century BC painter Galaton is said to have depicted Homer being sick, with the other poets drawing on his vomit (Γαλάτων δὲ ὁ ζωγράφος ἔγραψε τὸν μὲν Ὁμηρον αὐτὸν ἐμοῦντα, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλοὺς ποιητὰς τὰ ἐμημεσμένα ἀρνομένους - 13.22). This image, by focusing especially on the corporeal,

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<sup>93</sup> This metaphor is not as far as I am aware found anywhere else in 5th cent. Greek tragedy and the word τέμαχος only appears in literature later than Aeschylus. The natural assumption would be that this derives from a later source, especially given the interest in contrasting scales (note that “slices” are almost exaggeratedly small, where dishes might have sufficed). Matthew Wright (2012: 134) has plausibly suggested that this may have derived from a comedy.

<sup>94</sup> “Then [...] and taking [...] of Sophocles, from Aeschylus [...] as much as is [...], Euripides entire, and on top of these throw in some piquancy, but make it piquant, mind you, not multiloquent.” This fragment is listed as Com. Adesp. 12a by Demiańczuk (1912), who cautiously suggests an attribution to Aristophanes (“fortasse Aristophane”), who also suggested the following supplement in l. 2: ἔπειθ’ ὅσον δραχμὴν δὲ Σοφοκλέους. The attribution of the fragment to the *Gerytades* was suggested by Körte and Kuiper, and has been followed cautiously, e.g. by Henderson (2007).

<sup>95</sup> Thus, for instance Demiańczuk (1912) 95: ‘Docere videtur poeta, quomodo cena poetica ex Aeschylo Sophocle totoque Euripide sit praeparanda.’

<sup>96</sup> This aspect of the metaphor is also discussed by Gowers (1993) 83 and Bartsch (2015), who emphasizes its “cannibalistic” implications in Roman satire.

physicality, and consumption, draws as much on the notion of the poet-consumer as on the common Hellenistic (and Roman) image of the Homeric sea or fount.<sup>97</sup>

As we have seen, the basic metaphor of text as food is reused and transformed in a wide variety of contexts. Matro too, as we shall see, manipulates this image in a variety of ways, although I would here like to exemplify his technique through one example, the blending of gastronomic and sexual desires. At the start of the *AD*, for instance, Matro describes the north wind falling in love with Xenocles' loaves (3-6):

ηλθον γὰρ κἀκεῖσε, πολὺς δέ μοι ἔσπετο λιμός.  
οὐδὴ καλλίστους ἄρτους ἵδον ἡδὲ μεγίστους,  
λευκοτέρους χιόνος, ἔσθειν δ' ἀμύλοισιν ὁμοίους·  
τάων καὶ Βορέης ἡράσσατο πεσσομενάων.<sup>98</sup>

The final two lines here parody *Il.* 10.437 and 20.223, lines that are also parodied in a different fragment with a similar effect (fr. 3.3-6):

βολβίνας θ', αἱ Ζηνὸς Ὄλυμπίου εἰσὶν ἀοιδοί,  
ας ἐν χέρσῳ θρέψε Διὸς παῖς ἔσπετος ὅμβρος,  
λευκοτέρας χιόνος, ἰδέειν ἀμύλοισιν ὁμοίας·  
τάων φυομένων ἡράσσατο πότνια γαστῆρ.<sup>99</sup>

In both of these fragments, the humour partially depends on the conflation of gastronomic and sexual desire.<sup>100</sup> In the former, there is also the assimilation of the act of eating with the scent, as Boreas falls in love *while they were baking*. In the latter, the reason for choosing the belly has caused

<sup>97</sup> For the Homeric sea or fount, cf. Call. *Hymn* 2.106 (although note Cameron (1995) 273-4), Ov. *Am.* 3.9.25-6, Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 24, Quint. 10.1.46. For this image of Homer vomiting as a reworking of this tradition, see Brink (1972) 555, although Webster (1964: 144-5) prefers to see Aelian's description deriving from a satirical epigram that 'wilfully misinterpreted' an image of Homer as a river-god pouring water from his mouth. The discussion of Traill (1998) 217-8 is more balanced. If the passage of Lucian's *Charon*, in which Homer's poetry is so forceful it stirs the waves and makes him seasick and he vomits up more poetry (7), is also inspired by Gelaton's painting, this would lend further credence to the more satirical interpretation.

<sup>98</sup> "For I went there as well, and a great hunger accompanied me – where indeed I saw very large and lovely loaves of bread, whiter than snow, with a taste that resembled wheat-paste cakes; the North Wind fell in love with them as they were baking."

<sup>99</sup> "And the bubbles, which are the singers of Olympian Zeus, which the child of Zeus, the endless rain, raised on the mainland, whiter than snow, like wheat-paste cakes in appearance. my lady Belly fell in love with them as they were growing."

<sup>100</sup> For this conflation, see also ll. 22, 24, and 38-9.

more difficulty in interpretation.<sup>101</sup> One explanation, which would also help to explain Matro's decision to alter the structure of the hexameter from the model,<sup>102</sup> would be to see a play on γαστὴρ as meaning both stomach and womb.<sup>103</sup> If so, we may also recall the common Homeric phrase πότνια μήτηρ (as for instance at *Il.* 1.357, *Od.* 6.30, 18.5, *et al.*), so that the line plays not just on the literal growth of the vegetables in the ground, but imagines the pleasure they give in the stomach as being equivalent to a mother's love for her child as it develops in the womb.

Moreover, both of these passages can be read through the lens of the poet-consumer trope we have just discussed, as in both the narrator's own position and emotions are influenced by the food itself. In the first passage, the poet is described as ravenous (*πολὺς δέ μοι ἔσπετο λιμός*) in a manner following epic precedent. Although the parody alters the original λαὸς to λιμός, Matro retains a strong proximity to his Odyssean forebear, since food is a recurrent feature in the poem as Odysseus attempts to acquire food and avoid becoming food himself.<sup>104</sup> His desire is almost framed as an extension of the Odyssean leitmotif, although here he is hungry for food that looks and sounds Homeric. The numerous parodies of the poem in effect regurgitate Homeric poetry as the narrator seeks satiety. Similarly, in the latter the narrator's stomach (metonymically standing in for the poet himself) falls in love with the food in a confusion of gastronomic and sexual desire. The poet, reduced to a body part (almost literalizing Muses' address to Hesiod at *Th.* 26, γαστέρες οἶον), becomes capable only of consumption and it is now his food, the bubbles, that are singers.<sup>105</sup>

These examples demonstrate briefly the way Matro innovates on a well-established *topos*. The humorous conflation of gastronomic and sexual desires emphasizes the desirability of food whose description is modelled on epic verses and the poet's desire for the food seems to shade into his "consumption" of epic. In the following section, we shall see how Matro combines the metaphorical force of the food Xenocles lays before his guests with the sympotic theme of the poem itself.

<sup>101</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.* comment: 'It seems odd that the stomach should become enamored of the βολβῖναι as they are growing rather than as they are being cooked... but Matro is not much concerned with logical niceties of this sort.' The problem led Meineke to suggest θυομένων or ύομένων as alternatives.

<sup>102</sup> Note that in *AD* 6 Matro more closely follows the Homeric model (*τάων καὶ Βορέης ἡράσσατο βοσκομενάων*). Nor can this change be accounted for as *metri gratia*, as Matro could just as easily have written: *τάων καὶ γαστὴρ ἡράσσατο φυομενάων*.

<sup>103</sup> LSJ s.v. γαστὴρ A II. This meaning is already attested at *Il.* 6.58; cf. Thgn. 305, Hdt. 3.32, Pl. *Lg.* 792e.

<sup>104</sup> For the significance of food in the *Odyssey*, see Bakker (2006) and (2013).

<sup>105</sup> cf. καριδές θ', αἱ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου εἰσὶν ἀοιδοί - *AD* 63; the joke in both cases is obscure and the line must have been modelled on a lost exemplar.

### Playing with one's food: riddles, gods, and fish

Throughout this thesis, we see how parody in Greek literature plays with notions of the divine, from Hermes' aid for the mice in the GM to Athena whacking Hegemon on the head with a golden staff. In the gastronomic sphere, too, Archestratus imagines how, if the gods eat barley groats, Hermes would buy them on Lesbos (fr. 5.6-7). Matro takes this a stage further and we frequently find particular foodstuffs being described not just simply in heroic language, but as figuratively being gods themselves. In this section I shall analyse a series of mythological comparanda, and I shall argue that these evoke the kind of riddles that, as I discussed earlier, were common in symposia. One effect of this riddle technique is that Matro is playing a complex literary or mythological game with the audience, challenging the audience to recognize densely packed allusions.

The passage in which these riddles and allusions become most complex is in lines 33-45:

ἥλθε δὲ Νηρῆος θυγάτηρ, Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα,  
σπιτή εὐπλόκαμος, δεινὴ θεὸς αὐδήεσσα,  
ἡ μόνη ἰχθὺς οὖσα τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν οἶδε.  
καὶ Τίτυὸν εἴδον λίμνης, ἐρικυδέα γόργον,  
κείμενον ἐν λοπάδεσσο· ο δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κεῖτο τραπέζας.  
τῶ δὲ μετ' ἵχνια βαῖνε θεὰ λευκώλενος ἰχθὺς  
ἐγχελυς, ἡ Διὸς εὔχετ' ἐν ἀγκοίνησι μιγῆναι,  
ἐκ Κωπῶν, ὅθεν ἐγχέλεων γένος ἀγροτεράων.<sup>106</sup>  
παμμεγέθης· τὴν δ' οὐ κε δύ' ἀνέρες ἀθλητῆρες,  
οἵοι ἄρ' Αστυάναξ τε καὶ Αντίνωρ ἐγένοντο,  
ὅηιδίως ἐπ' ἄμαξαν ἀπ' οὐδεος ὀχλίσσειαν.  
τρισπίθαμοι γὰρ ταὶ γε καὶ ἐννεαπήχεες ἥσαν  
εῦρος, ἀτὰρ μῆκός γε γενέσθην ἐννεόργυιοι.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>106</sup> Condello (2002) 149-50 suggests editing this to ἀργοτεράων, which would then reflect the fatness and heaviness attributed to the eel in antique ichthyology (e.g. Hippocr. *De Diaet.* 48.8ff., Gal. *De Reb. Bon. Mal. Suc.* 6.796.5ff., Hices. ap. Ath. 7.298b, Ath. 8.355d). Although this reading is quite possible, it does not significantly impact upon my argument here.

<sup>107</sup> "The daughter of Nereus, silver-footed Thetis, arrived, the cuttlefish fair-tressed, a feasome, speaking goddess, the only fish, who knows white from black. And I saw Tityus, the famed conger eel of the sea, lying in stewing-pots; he lay over nine tables. In his tracks came a white-armed goddess-fish, the eel, who claims to have spent time in the arms of Zeus. She was from Copais, whence comes the race of wild eels, and was very large; not even two athletes, men such as Astyanax and Antenor were, could easily have lifted her onto a cart from the earth; for they were three spans and nine cubits / wide, and nine fathoms in length."

First through the door is the daughter of Nereus, the silver-footed goddess Thetis (introduced with a near whole-line borrowing from *h.Ap.* 319: Νηρῆος θυγάτηρ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα). Her association with cuttlefish is based on the story, told in a scholium on Lycophron's *Alexandra* and a scholium on Apollonius' *Argonautica*, that Thetis tried to avoid Peleus by changing shape but was caught eventually in the form of a cuttlefish.<sup>108</sup> However, this is not the only possible mythological association Matro makes for the cuttlefish. The same line that supposedly provides the answer to the previous one (Thetis = cuttlefish) also intertextually introduces one, perhaps even two, other mythological models. The most certain association here is with Circe, as line 34 effectively parodies a line frequently used to describe her (Κίρκη ἐνπλόκαμος, δεινὴ θεὸς αὐδήεσσα - *Od.* 10.136 = 11.8 = 12.150). However, virtually the same time is also used once with reference to Calypso (ναίει ἐνπλόκαμος, δεινὴ θεὸς αὐδήεσσα - *Od.* 12.449). It is possible that here Matro is playing with the numerous similarities between the two goddesses in the *Odyssey*, deliberately creating ambiguity around the "actual" referent.<sup>109</sup> The riddling opening line introduces a mythological reference that could be considered sufficiently obscure without adding further Homeric allusions. Such mythological games evoke sympotic riddles and the kind of Homeric quizzing found in Athenaeus I have already discussed and, as we shall see, invite us to glimpse the "true identity" of the sympotic players.

In addition to the mythological elements, Matro's description of the cuttlefish adds further levels of (humorous) complication. The cuttlefish is said to be the only fish to know black from white (ἢ μόνη ιχθὺς οὖσα τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν οἶδε). There are two possible explanations of this joke.<sup>110</sup> The scholia at Ar. *Eq.* 1278-9 explain a joke there by reference to a proverb, οἶδε τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μέλαν, used of those capable of making basic intellectual distinctions. Matro would, on this reading, be sarcastically praising the cuttlefish's intelligence (cf. perhaps the obscure remark of

<sup>108</sup> Χείρωνος δὲ βουλαῖς ὁ Πηλεὺς κατέσχεν αὐτὴν εἰς παντοίας μιρφὰς μεταβάλλουσαν ἔαυτὴν καὶ ἐμίγη αὐτῇ ἐν εἴδει σηπίας - Σ Lyc. 175, p. 85 Scheer, ἀκρωτήριον ἐν Ἰωλκῷ, οὕτω καλούμενον διὰ τὸ τὴν Θέτιν ἐνταῦθα εἰς σηπίαν μεταβληθῆναι διωκομένην ὑπὸ Πηλέως - Σ A.R. 1.582. Degani (1995) suggests further affinities between the two including: the possibilities that the epithet ἀργυρόπεζα recalls the cuttlefish's famed white "feet" (cf. Arist. HA 523b22-32), that the description of the cuttlefish as εὐπλόκαμος (for the cuttlefish having tresses cf. Opp. H. 2.122) brings to mind Thetis' flowing locks (e.g. at Il. 4.512, 16.860, 18.407), and that Thetis' cunning and ability to transform into different shapes (see for example Soph. fr. 618.2 Radt) has a partner in the cuttlefish's ability cunning (cf. Opp. H. 1.312, 2.120, 3.156, 4.160) and to use ink to conceal itself (Arist. HA 612b28-35, Plu. Mor. 978a-b). Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.* also note that fish and other seafood are elsewhere described as children of Nereus (e.g. Euphan. fr. 1.2, Anaxandr. fr. 31, adesp. com. fr. 1146.37). Whether or not we think that the audience were expected to, or were even able to, recognize all of these other parallels, the mythological connection seems to be the primary link between the two figures. Matro seems deliberately to be playing a mythological riddle game with the audience, into which it is possible to read further.

<sup>109</sup> For the similarities between Circe and Calypso, see Nagler (1977) and (1996), whose titles are borrowed from the same line Matro uses to assimilate them.

<sup>110</sup> For further details on both of these explanations, see Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*

Charmus of Syracuse on a stuffed cuttlefish: σοφή, σοφὴ σύ - Ath. 1.4b). Alternatively, the phrase could be explained through the contrast between the colour of the fish's ink (said to be θολός, e.g. by Arist. *HA* 621b29, 33) and its flesh (cf. *et nigrum niveo portans in corpore virus / lolligo* - Ov. *Hal.* 131-2). This latter explanation could be extended to refer to the fact that cuttlefish ink was sometimes used for writing (Pers. 3.13, Auson. *Epist.* 12.76) and that the term for writing-ink was τὸ μέλαν (Pl. *Phdr.* 276c). Although this is noted by Olson and Sens, they do not point out the fact that this joke would work best for a reader, since a reader's task is to understand τὸ μέλαν on the page in front of them.<sup>111</sup>

A similar game of riddles and allusions is being played in the discussion of the two types of eels. Firstly, the conger eel is likened to Tityus, who was condemned to Tartarus for trying to rape Leto (*Od.* 11.576-81; cf. Euph. fr. 105 Powell, where Artemis was the intended victim). Accordingly, the lines in which the conger is described parody Homer's description of the torture of Tityus (καὶ Τιτυὸν εἶδον, Γαίης ἐρικυδέος νίόν, / κείμενον ἐν δαπέδῳ ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κεῖτο πέλεθρα - *Od.* 11.576-7). Olson and Sens have also noticed the amusing, if darkly humorous, similarity between the two: Tityus is condemned forever to be pecked at by vultures, rather like the fate of the conger here.<sup>112</sup>

In this case, however, there seems less to associate the conger with Tityus mythologically. Indeed, a certain level of interchangeability in this instance is suggested by the fact that Matro parodies the same Homeric lines in a description of a cucumber (καὶ σικυὸν εἶδον, γαίης νίόν, / κείμενον ἐν λαχάνοις· ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἐννέα κεῖτο τραπέζας - fr. 4). In both cases, the parody is used in part hyperbolically to emphasize size.<sup>113</sup> In fr. 4, however, there is an additional joke that, while Tityus was actually, according to myth, the son of Gaia, cucumbers are afforded the same description because they grow in the ground.<sup>114</sup> On the other hand, far from suggesting the genericness or interchangeability of the parody in these cases, we might see Matro alluding to his own work in one or other fragment, as there seems to be a marked contrast between the well-known gastronomic desirability of the conger, which is listed in at least 10 catalogues of seafood,

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<sup>111</sup> Note that this does not necessarily contradict Olson and Sens' argument that the *AD* was intended for performance (for which see above), but could suggest that Matro also had one eye on a reading culture.

<sup>112</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*

<sup>113</sup> Although Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.* note that 'real congers do in fact grow up to 2-2.5 meters in length' (cf. Eudox. fr. 318 Lasserre), the significance must be that the size of the fish is impressive.

<sup>114</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*; cf. Antiph. fr. 180.3, Xenarch. fr. 1.5. They do not note, however, that part of the joke also rests on the near convention of describing foods as sons of divine figures, for which see the discussion of the πλακοῦς.

by comparison to the cucumber, which is only rarely mentioned and occasionally advised against.<sup>115</sup>

Whether or not the comparison between the conger and Tityus is warranted on mythological grounds, there is less doubt about such an affiliation in the case of the *enkelos* (freshwater eel). Here again the name, the answer to the riddle, is delayed until the start of the second line, and the *enkelos* is initially introduced with a phrase which occurs several times in Homer to refer to Telemachus or Odysseus following in Athena's footsteps (ο δ' ἔπειτα μετ' ἵχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο - *Od.* 2.406 = 3.30 = 5.193 = 7.38). However, while in the Homeric models the mortal follows the goddess, here the goddess is the follower. This is perhaps meant to be reminiscent of the story, according to Pindar, that Tityus was pursued by Artemis in revenge for Leto (καὶ μὰν Τίτυὸν βέλος Αρτέμιδος θήρευσε κραιπνόν, / ἐξ ἀνικάτου φαρέτρας ὄρνύμενον, / ὅφρα τις τᾶν ἐν δυνατῷ φιλοτάτων ἐπιψαύειν ἔραται - *P.* 4.90-2), in which case the allusion to Tityus in the preceding lines may be designed at least partially as a mythological set-up for the subsequent transition. The goddess-*enkelos* in question, however, possesses a trait which is exclusively reserved for Hera (λευκώλενος), a joke which can be explained by reference to the white flesh of the eel when stripped (cf. λευκόχοως... / ἔγχελυς - *Eub.* fr. 34.2-3). The association between Hera and the *enkelos* may at first glance be continued in the following line (39), which bears no little similarity to Hera's own claim to sleep in the arms of Zeus (Ζηνὸς γὰρ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσιν ιαύεις - *Il.* 14.213). However, Alcmene can also claim the same position (γείνατ' ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσι Διὸς μεγάλοιο μιγεῖσα - *Od.* 11.286), a phrase that also uses the same verb that for Matro carries a humorous *double entendre*.<sup>116</sup> Despite both of these potential allusions, the line bears closest similarity to a line Odysseus used to describe seeing Antiope during the *neygia* (ἢ δὴ καὶ Διὸς εὔχετ' ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσιν ιαῦσαι - *Od.* 11.261). Again, then, we see a complex series of potential parodies that involves the audience in a riddling game to identify and understand these allusions.

In this case, however, the game operates on a biological as well as mythological level. Several scholars have suggested that the claim that the eel "sleeps in the arms of Zeus" refers to the belief that eels lacked genitals and reproduced through rain-water (Arist. *HA* 570a6-24), especially in light of the fact that Matro elsewhere refers to rain as the child of Zeus (Διὸς παῖς ἀσπετος ὅμβρος

<sup>115</sup> For the cucumber as food, see Ar. *Pax* 1001, Phryn. Com. fr. 26; cf. Diocles of Carystus fr. 121 Wellmann, who mentions eating cucumber at the start of a dinner, but advises against doing so. Of course, without knowing the chronology of Matro's poetry it is impossible to infer the directionality of any such allusion, although I personally would favour the *AD* being chronologically earlier. The joke would then be that the mediocre cucumber is compared to the eminently desirable conger.

<sup>116</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*: 'μιγῆναι... allows for a useful ambiguity between μείγνυμι in the sense "have intercourse with" (regular in Homer) and "have contact with" (i.e. as Zeus holds the eel in order to eat it).'

- 3.4).<sup>117</sup> Alternatively, it is possible that, in light of the frequency with which eels are described as virgins and their generally obscure reproductive lives,<sup>118</sup> Matro is deliberately playing with the euhemeristic approach to mythological unions between women and gods.<sup>119</sup> This is suggested particularly by the eel's boasting (*εὐχετ'*), which could be read as highlighting the claim's own fictitious hyperbole, challenging the reader to question how far we read into the text or how much we believe it.

Thus far in the description, the *enkelus* has adopted various Homeric or divine guises. From line 40 onwards, however, the emphasis shifts towards a hyperbolic description of the eel's size and origin. Rather than being compared here to famous mythological figures, the eels take on more incidental roles. At first, they are compared to the wild race of mules from Eneti (ἐξ Ἐνετῶν, ὅθεν ἡμιόνων γένος ἀγροτεράων - *Il.* 2.852), before they shift again to resemble the stone with which Hector breaks down the Achaean wall (ὸξὺς ἔην· τὸν δ' οὐ κε δύ' ἀνέρες δῆμου ἀρίστω / ὁριδίως ἐπ' ἄμαξαν ἀπ' οὐδεος ὀχλίσσειαν, / οἵτι νῦν βροτοί εἰσ'. ὁ δέ μιν ώέα πάλλε καὶ οῖος - *Il.* 12.447-9). Finally, the description of the Copaic eels is rounded off with a comparison between the contemporary athletes Astyanax and Antenor and the Homeric Otus and Ephialtes (ἐννέωροι γὰρ τοί γε καὶ ἐννεαπήχεες ἥσαν / εὖρος, ἀτὰρ μῆκός γε γενέσθην ἐννεόργυνοι - *Od.* 11.311-2). At the same time, however, the use of the rare word *τρισπίθαμοι* seems to refer to Hesiod's description of how long a segment should be for a wheel of a cart (*Op.* 426, where it is in the same metrical *sedes*), given the claim in the previous line that the athletes Astyanax and Antenor were precisely not strong enough to lift it onto a cart.

These lines, and the complex layering of mythological references they contain, I argue, evoke the world of the symposium through the use of techniques common in sympotic games and riddles. We might note in particular the use of linguistic word-play (e.g. in *λευκώλενος*), the delayed positions of the solutions (either at line-end or enjambled), and apparent paradoxes (e.g. *αὐδήσσα*, the "speaking" fish).<sup>120</sup> On an extratextual level, this turns the text itself, and its parodies, into a kind of game for the audience (after all, in the Introduction we saw that "play" is a term commonly associated with parody). At the same time, however, such games tell us more about the players themselves. As I noted earlier, symposia and sympotic games are frequently

<sup>117</sup> See most recently Degani (1995) 424, Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*, drawing on the arguments of Peltzer (1855) 55, Paessens (1856) 25, Brandt (1888) 79.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. παρθένου Βοιωτίας - Eub. fr. 34.1, νύμφα ἀπειρόγαμος - fr. 64.1, Κωπάδων κορᾶν - Ar. Ach. 883. For the discussion of eel reproduction in antiquity, see Arist. GA 741a29-35, HA 538a, 570a, 608a5-7, Plu. Quaest. Conv. 637d, Antig. Hist. Mir. 80.1, Opp. H. 1.513-21.

<sup>119</sup> Condello (2002) 149; for such euhemeristic approaches, cf. E. Bacch. 29 with Dodds (1960) *ad loc.*

<sup>120</sup> For the use of word-play and paradoxes as common elements of riddles, cf. ch. 4 on the crabs.

imaged to reveal the inner characters, the “true natures”, of the symposiasts themselves. Here, the diners are implicitly contrasted with the epic heroes of the past.

At the end of this passage, the focus on the enormous size of the eel is emphasized by saying that not even two athletes like Astyanax and Antenor could have lifted it onto a cart. This comparison begins at the onomastic level, as Matro humorously chooses contemporary athletes whose names coincide with weak Homeric figures,<sup>121</sup> ironizing the phrase οῖοι ἀρά... ἐγένοντο (and by extension the description of the eel as *παμμεγέθης*) and immediately putting Matro's contemporary world on the level of only the weakest Homeric heroes. This distance between hypertext and hypotext is emphasized further by the parody of *Iliad* 12, which itself distances “men nowadays” (οῖοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσ') from the Homeric subject matter. Matro's parodic world is therefore at an even further remove, one step away from Homer's own time and another from Homeric heroes. The strongest men of Matro's day (ἀθλητῆρες here forms a counterpart to the Homeric δήμου ἀρίστω) are likened to the weakest of Homer's warriors, from whom we are reminded that we are long removed. This distancing technique humorously derides Matro's co-diners, whose martial consumption is set in ironic contrast with true Homeric heroes.

The riddle, then, is a recurring technique used throughout the poem. So too at the end of the catalogue, in describing the *πλακοῦς*, we find the same techniques at play. The name of the dish under inspection is only revealed at the end of a two-line introduction which both hints at and delays or obscures the answer.<sup>122</sup> Thus, ξανθὰν is appropriate both for flat-cakes in general (cf. ἄρτοι ξανθοί - Xenoph. fr. B 1.9) and a child of Demeter, to whom the epithet was attributed (e.g. *Il.* 5.500, *h.Cer.* 302), while the description through familial relations is itself common to riddles (e.g. Archestr. fr. 5.14, 37.2, 50.3, Stratt. fr. 2, Philyll. fr. 4, Eub. fr. 75.10). This technique, I have argued, is fittingly drawn from the world of the symposium itself and is used to further the characterization of the guests. As in the previous section, where I focused on the use of role-play, we see through the symposium an exposure of the pretensions of the symposiasts, supposedly reflecting their inner selves, the face they hide from the public. As we engage in the sympotic game, we see the gulf that separates the Homeric and contemporary worlds. It is this distancing effect, created through Matro's use of parody, that I would like to explore further in the next section, as we turn to consider the political implications of using the Homeric text for satirical ends.

<sup>121</sup> Astyanax is of course Hector's son, who, although Hector has great hopes for him (*Il.* 6.476-81), is put to death by the Greeks (*Il. Parv.* fr. 21.3-5, E. *Andr.* 9-11, Tr. 719-25); Antenor is a Trojan elder who offers good advice (esp. *Il.* 7.347-53) but who can no longer enter combat (*Il.* 3.148-51). For the joke, cf. Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*, following Meineke (1858-9).

<sup>122</sup> The *πλακοῦς* is also the subject of a riddle at Antiph. fr. 55.7-11: ξουθῆς μελίσσης νάμασιν δὲ συμμιγῆ / μηκάδων αἰγῶν ἀπόρροουν θρόμβον, ἐγκαθειμένον / εἰς πλατὺ στέγαστρον ἀγνῆς παρθένου Δημοῦς κόρης, / λεπτοσυνθέτοις τρυφῶντα μυρίοις καλύμμασιν, / ἡ σαφῶς πλακοῦντα φράζω σοι.

## The politics of the Homeric text

Throughout Greek literature Homer and Homeric epic has been coopted for various ideological claims. So, for instance, when Herodotus dates Homer as having lived 400 years before him (2.53), making his life 400 years after the Trojan War (2.145), Herodotus not only defines his position, learnt apparently from the priestesses at Dodona, against other competing claims about Homer's date, but also stakes a claim about his own work and its value.<sup>123</sup> In this section, I shall suggest that Matro draws on the famously contentious passage of the *Catalogue of Ships* regarding the Athenian presence at Troy to enhance his satire by highlighting the disjunction between the epic heroes of the Homeric world and the diners. They lie back and gorge themselves in stark contrast to the Homeric heroes; in a sense, Athens has no leaders at Troy because they are instead feasting. Making matters worse, in this passage the diners tuck into food imported from the enemy. Here Matro's poem can be usefully viewed in the context of the rhetoricians, who similarly use tragic and epic extracts as part of their political manoeuvring.

Throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, we have a range of evidence for the different political contexts in which the use and quotation of epic and tragic poetry was common. In particular, we find certain authors institutionalized through the establishment of a state text and the quotation of poetry was common in rhetoric.<sup>124</sup> Indeed, so widespread was such quotation that Aeschines (1.141) tries to pre-empt accusations of literary snobbery by saying that, since his opponents are bound to bring poetic testimony to bear to support Timarchus' behaviour (ἐπειδὴ δὲ Αχιλλέως καὶ Πλατούκλου μέμνησθε), he will respond in kind (λέξομέν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς περὶ τούτων).<sup>125</sup> A brief discussion of the politicization of poetry such as tragedy and epic in the fourth century will allow us to see to what extent, and how, epic formed part of the political landscape as well as granting us an appreciation of the literary context in which Matro's *AD* should be viewed. We should remember, after all, that Xenocles is introduced as a rhetor. I shall focus particularly on Lycurgus due to his political ties with Xenocles and Stratocles.

During the 5th and 4th centuries, as written texts became increasingly available, the Athenians in particular attributed great cultural prestige to particular texts through their admission to the

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<sup>123</sup> For a discussion of the passage, see Graziosi (2002) 111-8. She argues, for instance, that (p. 117): 'Herodotus defines his own work in relation to that of Homer, and claims that it is intrinsically different, in that it is concerned with "truth".'

<sup>124</sup> The use of poetic quotation in oratory has been well studied in recent scholarship. See esp. Hanink (2014a) 25-59, Scodel (2007), Ford (1999), P.J. Wilson (1996), Ober and Strauss (1990). For a rare dissenting voice against the value of poetry, see Isoc. 11.38-40.

<sup>125</sup> For the accusation of literary snobbery, see Ober and Strauss (1990) 252. This kind of accusation is part of the "rhetoric of anti-rhetoric" common in Greek oratory, for which see Hesk (1999).

archive.<sup>126</sup> According to ps.-Plato, a state text of the Homeric poems was already created by Hipparchus (τὰ Ὄμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί - *Hipp.* 228b). Although scholars debate the precise date of this institutionalization of Homer, its significance was strongly felt, and it is possible that Lycurgus' establishment of an Athenian state text for the three canonical tragedians was based on the Homeric precedent.<sup>127</sup> The Lycurgan legislation for tragedy also demonstrates the potential for literature to become part of contemporary political power play, as the law 'marked an attempt on the part of men such as Lycurgus to publicise the three great tragedians as unique products of Athens and to affirm that, as such, both the poets and their poetry were inseparable from Athenian institutions and history.'<sup>128</sup> In the late fourth century, that is, state control of literary heritage becomes an important factor in Athenian identity politics.

The implications of this context for how Homeric and tragic poetry was understood becomes clearer when we turn to the rhetoricians. The quotation of poetry in oratory was primarily used for positive or negative *exempla*, always mutually reinforcing to give an impression of consensus.<sup>129</sup> When used negatively, however, orators refrain from naming names (e.g. D. 21.149, And. 1.129).<sup>130</sup> Additionally, poetry could fill in the gaps left by the law,<sup>131</sup> it had the same legal force when read out by the clerk (ἀναγνώσεται ύμῖν ὁ γραμματεὺς τὰ ἔπη - *Aeschin.* 1.147),<sup>132</sup> or could be likened to oracles (Lycurg. 1.92, *Aeschin.* 3.136). Perhaps the most illuminating example for our purposes is the introduction to the Homeric quotation in Lycurgus' *In Leocratem* (1.102):

βούλομαι δ' ύμῖν καὶ τῶν Ὄμήρου παρασχέσθαι ἐπῶν. οὕτω γὰρ ύπελαβον ύμῶν οἱ πατέρες σπουδαῖον εἶναι ποιητήν, ὥστε νόμον ἔθεντο καθ' ἑκάστην πεντετηρίδα τῶν Παναθηναίων μόνου τῶν ἀλλων ποιητῶν ὁμοφωνεῖσθαι τὰ ἔπη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας, ὅτι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων προηροῦντο.<sup>133</sup>

<sup>126</sup> For a discussion of the archive, see Whitmarsh (2004) 106-58.

<sup>127</sup> Scodel (2007) 150; cf. Hanink (2014a) 66. For a discussion of what the texts included, see Prauscello (2006) 68-77; cf. ps.-Plu. *De Or. Vit.* 841-2.

<sup>128</sup> Hanink (2014a) 67. For the use of tragedy and tragic actors in the political interaction between Athens and Sparta in Lycurgus' time, see Hanink (2014a) 68-73.

<sup>129</sup> Scodel (2007) 136: 'the authority of the different poets seem to be mutually reinforcing; selection allows the speaker to imply that all the poets agree and that their views are transparent.'

<sup>130</sup> P.J. Wilson (1996) 317. On the Andocides passage, see also MacDowell (1962) *ad loc.*

<sup>131</sup> E.g. οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόμοι διὰ τὴν συντομίαν οὐ διδασκων, ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττουσιν ἀ δεῖ ποιεῖν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων ἐκλεξάμενοι, μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμπείθουσιν - Lycurg. 1.102.

<sup>132</sup> Perlman (1964) 167, Fisher (2001) *ad loc.*

<sup>133</sup> "I want also to recommend Homer to you. In your fathers' eyes he was a poet of such worth that they passed a law that every four years at the Panathenaea he alone of all the poets should have his works recited; and thus they showed the Greeks their admiration for the noblest deeds."

This passage immediately precedes a quotation of a portion of Hector's speech at *Il.* 15.494-8, thereby skilfully setting Lycurgus' quotation of Homer into his broader argument. His comment on the Homeric lines is that the Athenians emulated them (*τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἔργων ζηλοῦντες* - 104) and were ready to find not just for their fatherland but all of Greece (*οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος*).<sup>134</sup> However, the quotation also fits into Lycurgus' broader rhetoric about piety and the gods (*ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἄξιον θεωρῆσαι τὸ θεῖον, ὅτι τοῖς ἀνδράσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εὑμενῶς ἔχει* - 96; cf. 94). In the Homeric context, Zeus has just intervened to save Hector from Teucer's arrows (15.458-65), an event on which Hector comments directly before the lines quoted by Lycurgus (*ὅεια δ' ἀρίγνωτος Διὸς ἀνδράσι γίγνεται ἀλκή* - 490).

However, it is not simply the Homeric text itself, but its performance at the Panathenaea that is manipulated by Lycurgus here. In particular, he situates the rhapsodic performances of Homer within both a legal and specifically democratic Athenian context. It is not simply that Homeric poems are performed at the Panathenaia (in the *Hipparchus* (228b), for instance, Hipparchus is said to have forced, *ἡνάγκασε*, rhapsodes to perform), rather Lycurgus points specifically to legislation (*νόμον ἔθεντο*), the so-called "Panathenaic rule". Secondly, rather than attributing the instantiation of such performances to either Peisistratus (cf. Cic. *De Or.* 3.137) or to Hipparchus (cf. ps.-Pl. *Hipp.* 228b, Ael. *VH* 8.2), Lycurgus ascribes to *ύμῶν οἱ πατέρες* the wisdom to recognize Homer's worth (*σπουδαῖον*) and the establishment of a performance context for the Homeric poems. As Hanink concludes, 'the interpretation of the poetic past which Lycurgus presents again serves to align the historical values of the forefathers with his own civic vision and cultural agenda'.<sup>135</sup> This functions not only by aligning the passage with his broader rhetorical concerns, but also by situating this within a democratic, religious performance context.

From this passage of Lycurgus' speech, we can see how, in Matro's literary and socio-political context, Homeric poetry can be recontextualized to serve politically charged aims. It is often difficult to discern, however, how politically charged any given moment of the poem might be without the kind of rhetorical context provided by the Lycurgan speech. Towards the end of the catalogue, we are invited to consider the political implications of Matro's parody when he alludes to a well-known controversy in the Homeric text (93-7):

νηδὺς δ' οὐκ ὑπέμαινε, βιάζετο γάρ ό' ἀδέεσσι·  
δάμνα μιν ζωμός τε μέλας ἀκροκώλιά θ' ἐφθά.  
παῖς δέ τις ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν τρισκαίδεκα νήσσας,  
λίμνης ἐξ ιερῆς, μάλα πίονας, ἀς ὁ μάγειρος

<sup>134</sup> For the significance of patriotism in the speech, see also Steinbock (2011).

<sup>135</sup> Hanink (2014) 54.

Θῆκε φέρων ἴν' Αθηναίων κατέκειντο φάλαγγες.<sup>136</sup>

Lines 95-7 parody, with the insertion of an addition line in the middle, one of the few verses in Homer to mention Athenians (*Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα [τρία καὶ δέκα ΣΑ] νῆας, / στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἴν' Αθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες.* - *Il. 2.557-8*).<sup>137</sup> In antiquity, it was said that these were interpolations by Solon and not originally Homeric at all (*Plu. Sol. 10.1, Str. 9.394*), inserted to support Athens' claims to Salamis. The well-known controversy of these lines invites us to read the lines here in the context of Athenian use of the Homeric text as part of a political agenda. Indeed, Olson and Sens have already suggested that there may be some satirical bite to this reference in the invocation of Athenian control over Salamis.<sup>138</sup> The Athenians had laid claim to the island of Salamis from the 6th century but it had accepted a Macedonian garrison in 318 BC (*D.S. 18.69, Paus. 1.35.2*). Although they do not explain this point in great detail, one possibility is that to acquire foods from a territory that was traditionally Athenian but which had fallen into foreign hands would have been viewed as unpatriotic.<sup>139</sup> The whole of the passage, however, constructs a more sustained reference to Ajax, as lines 93-4 parody his flight from battle (*Αἴας δ' οὐκ ἔπ' ἔμιμνε· βιάζετο γὰρ βελέεσσι· / δάμνα μιν Ζηνός τε νόος καὶ Τρῶες ἀγανοὶ* - *Il. 16.102-3*). Matro *qua* Ajax in the opening lines is defeated by the sheer quantity of food before him.

The subsequent parody then perverts this military metaphor, replacing the *νῆας*, for which Athens was famed until the Battle of the Echinades, with *νήσσας*. Athenian military prowess is reduced to one single dish at an extravagant feast.<sup>140</sup> The other significant change from parodied to parody is that from the original Homeric verb *ἵσταντο* to *κατέκειντο*. While in Homer the ranks of the Athenians stood ready for battle, Matro's fellow diners merely lie down to enjoy their unheroic life of luxury. As in the previous section, then, we see a contrast between the prowess of epic heroes and the gluttony of the symposiasts. It is in this context that the controversy over the

<sup>136</sup> "My stomach did not endure this, for it was hard-pressed by fullness; black broth and boiled pigs' trotters were overcoming it. A slave brought thirteen ducks from Salamis, from the sacred sea, very fat ones, which the cook served where the ranks of the Athenians were reclining."

<sup>137</sup> Elsewhere Stichius and Menestheus appear as Athenian lords (*Il. 13.195-6*) and Athena returns to Athens from Phaeacia (*Od. 7.80-1*).

<sup>138</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*: 'If Matro's poem was composed after 318 (as seems likely), the reference to the Iliadic passage may have some political point.'

<sup>139</sup> Political boycotts of this sort are common in both antiquity and the modern day. Perhaps the best known example from the Greek world is the Megarian decree, which banned Megarians from the ports of the empire and all Attic *agorai*; for a discussion of the dating of this decree, see Stadter (1984). Elsewhere (e.g. *Ar. Pax* 974-1015), peace is associated with the renewed availability of foods in the *agora*.

<sup>140</sup> It may be significant that the number of ducks in Matro exceeds the number of Ajax's ships in the vulgate Homeric text, although it is quite possible that Matro's edition of Homer read *τρία καὶ δέκα* as Pamphilus did (cf. Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.*). Alternatively, however, Matro may have literally one-upped his Homeric counterpart.

originality of the lines aids our interpretation. The joke is fuelled by the possibility that the diners here are imitating fake, absentee Homeric heroes. As in the case of the athletes Astyanax and Antenor, the diners even fail to be the worst of the Homeric characters, and in this case they may not be Homeric at all. The implication here is almost that the Athenians were not at the Trojan War at all, but instead were bunking off to enjoy a nice dinner. Indeed, they are even eating the enemy's food. Thus, while Lycurgus attempts to paint the Athenians as the inheritors of Homeric ἀλκή, Matro distances his contemporaries from the world of the epic past, even hinting at the possibility of an Athenian absence from the war itself.

## CONCLUSIONS

What, how, and with whom politicians and public figures eat is an important part of their public persona and is frequently part of satirical discourse both in antiquity and today. We need only think of Ed Miliband's bacon sandwich, David Cameron's (fictive?) Cornish pasty, or Donald Trump's Taco bowl.<sup>141</sup> At the same time, such satire is grounded in historically specific norms and values. In this chapter we have seen how Matro portrays the diners as overindulgers – gastronomically, oenologically, and sexually – a portrayal that works well within the tradition of satirical poetry such as comedy. Furthermore, Matro uses the epic parody framework of *parōidia* to present the “inner selves” of the symposiasts as they jostle and compete in their absurd emulation of Homeric heroes. The more they act the hero, the less heroic they appear.

I would like to conclude this section by considering the wider implications of my argument and how we might interpret Matro's strategies in the performative context of the Panathenaea. In particular, I would like to draw on the argument of Ian Ruffell in an as yet unpublished essay from 1995-6. In this paper, he argues that the comic dramatization of the symposium should be considered metafestive, i.e. that comedy implicitly contrasts its presentation of the symposium with the festival contexts of the Lenaean and City Dionysia. In particular, he reads the comic symposium as a largely elite activity, which is set against the democratic values enacted in the festival. This contrast is then read in the context of comedy's claim to have a central place in the construction of civic value. However, while Ruffell has focused on elite versus non-elite, in this chapter I have interpreted the *AD* primarily in terms of the civic gustatory discourse and the transgression of such norms.

I suggest that Matro's relationship with the Panathenaic festival context may also be fruitfully understood from the perspective of metafestival. My argument for this connection focuses on two

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<sup>141</sup> Withnall (2014); Wintour and Wainwright (2012); Mazza (2016).

elements of symposia and the Panathenaea which are related but could be set in opposition: feasting and poetic performance. Both the symposium and the Panathenaea involved consumption and in both cases the distribution of the food was ideally intended to be equal and fair.<sup>142</sup> As we have seen, however, sympotic behaviour might not live up to such civic ideals. Additionally, the expensive fish and other dishes of the symposium might be contrasted with the sacrificial meat of the festival.

While poetic performances were undoubtedly an important part of the entertainment at both festivals and the symposium, there was also an antagonistic relationship between these two performance contexts and this was at least partially driven by the similarities between the two modes of performance.<sup>143</sup> In one of the most famous elegiac attacks on epic, Xenophanes outlines proper behaviour at the symposium and attempts to exclude certain kinds of song that involve Titanomachies or Gigantomachies (οὐ τι μάχας διέπει Τιτάνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων / οὐδὲ <τι> Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων, / ἡ στάσιας σφεδανὰς – τοῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστιν - B1.21-3). The final phrase is especially telling, as it evaluates different kinds of poetry in terms of didactic value (what is or is not χρηστόν). Although much later, the first poem of Ovid's *Amores* provides a different kind of view of the antagonism between sympotic and rhapsodic performance. Not only does the poem begin with the famous metrical joke of Cupid stealing a foot (1-4), but ends with an acceptance of his “new” metre and theme with the imperative to “surround your golden temples with shore-loving myrtle” (*cingere litorea flauentia tempora myrto* - 29). This mention of myrtle refers to another parallel between sympotic and rhapsodic performances, although it is a myrtle branch rather than a χάρδος that is passed around in symposia.<sup>144</sup>

We can see, then, the parallels between the consumption of food and poetic performance in both the symposium and the Panathenaea, at which Matro's poem was most likely performed, as well as the potential ways in which such parallels could be used to highlight the difference and antagonism between the two institutions rather than their similarity. It is precisely this potential for contrast that I suggest is activated, if we understand the *AD* as performed at the Panathenaea. The competitive eating and drinking emphasized throughout the poem, for instance, stands in stark contrast to the values of equality instantiated in the fair distribution of meat in the festival. Furthermore, when viewed from the perspective of metafestival, the description of the prostitutes at the end of the poem as θαυματοποιοί assumes additional significance. Although especially apropos for the prostitutes given the sexual innuendo, the adjective normally refers to the kind of

<sup>142</sup> For feasting at the Panathenaea and other Greek festivals, see Wilkins (1991), who emphasizes the derivation of δαΐς from δαίνυμι; for the Panathenaic festival more generally, Parker (1996) 89-92.

<sup>143</sup> Collins (2004) 135-46 outlines ‘the perceived tension between rhapsodic and sympotic performance in the sixth century and thereafter.’

<sup>144</sup> For the myrtle branch at symposia, see Collins (2004) 138.

gymnastic entertainment common in symposia and weddings.<sup>145</sup> Such gymnastic performances also took place, however, at public festivals, including those in Athens.<sup>146</sup> Of particular interest is the evidence of IG XI 2.120, which bears witness to both gymnastic and *parōidic* performances in the same context (lines 47-8, text of inscription in Appendix 2). We might therefore read the description of the prostitutes as θαυματοποιοί metafestively in comparison with either specifically gymnastic performances or more general forms of entertainment to be performed in the same festival context as the *AD*.

Whether or not we adopt this metafestive approach to the poem, however, what I have shown in this chapter is that the satirical drive of the poem is not simply through the description of the sumptuous feast laid on by the host, but rather that Matro portrays the diners as gluttons in every sense of the word. His parody of epic throughout the poem intersects with the poem's sympotic theme. Thus, we can read the parodic catalogue, for instance, as a kind of riddle, whose solution not only playfully tests the audience but also reveals the true nature of the symposiasts themselves, highlighting the gulf between their pretensions, play-acting Homeric heroes, and their real inadequacies.

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<sup>145</sup> In X. *Smp.*, for example, there is a hired dancer described as τῶν θαύματα δυναμένων ποιεῖν (1.16), and, in a letter to Lynceus of Samos, Hippolochus of Macedon reports that during the wedding of Caranus the entertainment included θαυματουργοὶ γυναῖκες, who performed tumbling tricks among swords and blew fire from their mouths (Ath. 4.129d).

<sup>146</sup> IG XI.2 110.34, 112.22, 113.28, 115.25; for performances in Athens, cf. Pl. *R.* 514b, *Lg.* 658b-c, Isoc. 15.213, Arist. fr. 83, and possibly also *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 757 although the phrase θαύμασι νικήσας there may not signal the existence of formal competitions.

## CHAPTER 3

### *Archestratus of Gela's Hedypatheia*

Satire, especially personal mockery or attack, is a recurrent feature of *parôidic* poems. Hegemon takes aim at his countrymen, the Thasians; Euboeus was known for his lampoons of the Athenians; Matro's *AD* makes a mockery of contemporary politicians; Timon's *Silloi* portrays philosophers as morons. While the narratological, humorous, and linguistic techniques used to effect this satire always differ from poem to poem, the essential core remains the same. Further, frequently *parôidic* satire is an important part of how the authors define *themselves*. Hegemon is *not* one of the Thasians who perform bad rhapsodic poems badly; Matro is *not* an extravagant spender in the mould of Xenocles; Timon's Scepticism separates him from both his philosophical forebears and contemporaries, who labour under their various delusions.

Archestratus of Gela's *Hedypatheia*, on the other hand, is not normally viewed as particularly satirical. This has mostly been due to the consistent didactic tone. Archestratus always presents himself as a poet who knows what is best.<sup>1</sup> He can tell you the best place and season to get a particular fish, because he has been there, done that. At the same time, he both knows and is very vocal about what you should not eat and how not to prepare your food. His version of the elegant dinner-table (the ἀβρόδαιτι τραπέζῃ of fr. 4) does not only instruct you on what to eat, where to get it, and how to prepare it, but occasionally allows for a tirade against those foolish enough to hold a different opinion.

Recent scholarship has attempted to situate the *Hed.* in various different literary and culinary contexts. The key question has been to what extent scholars view the poem as possessing a "serious" didactic message, i.e. whether the recipes in the poem read as instructional guides.<sup>2</sup> Although scholars frequently differ in approach, with some primarily interested in Archestratus' contribution to culinary culture while others are more interested in its literary background,<sup>3</sup> it would not be controversial to summarize the current scholarly position as recognizing that both the parodic and culinary elements of the poem meaningfully contribute to the poem overall.

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<sup>1</sup> For the presentation of the narrator in the *Hed.*, see P.S Martin (2016), esp. 148-59.

<sup>2</sup> What constitutes seriousness, especially in the study of Greek comedy, has long been a matter of debate. Cf. Introduction n. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Most recently, for instance, Soares (2016a) and (2016b) argues that Archestratus does make a meaningful contribution to the history of food and cooking; cf. the edition of Wilkins and Hill (2011). On the other hand, Olson and Sens (2000), although they do not overlook the culinary aspects of the poem, appear to focus more on the poem's literary aspects.

In this chapter, I will develop this consensus further, although I attempt to achieve this by focusing on the poem's literary concerns. In particular, this chapter asks how Archestratus' criticisms contribute to the rhetorical effect of the poem, that is how they contribute to the *idea* that Archestratus' poem genuinely has something serious to say. To develop this approach, I draw principally on the sociological approach of Pierre Bourdieu, which helps to explain how socio-logical narratives drive forward and reinforce social distinctions. Different tastes in food can be explained by Bourdieu's use of the term *habitus*. As he explains, 'the structures characteristic of a determinate type of conditions of existence... produce the structures of the habitus which become in turn the basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent experience.'<sup>4</sup> *Habitus*, that is, describes the set of characteristics of a section of society that in turn shape how that section of society acts, reacts, or experiences different phenomena. In practice, this means that different cultural tastes, as for instance in food, are largely influenced or determined by an individual's place within a specific society. One key facet of *habitus* is that they are 'structuring structures,' in the sense that they are perpetuated without necessarily presupposing 'the orchestrating action of a conductor.'<sup>5</sup> Thus, while *habitus* continue to be structured by environmental factors, such as geography or economy, they can nevertheless be perpetuated through *distinction*, the ability for self-definition to be construed through negation:

'Tastes (i.e., manifested preferences) are the practical affirmation of an inevitable difference. It is no accident that, when they have to be justified, they are asserted purely negatively, by the refusal of other tastes. In matters of taste, more than anywhere else, all determination is negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance ('sick-making') of the tastes of others. 'De gustibus non est disputandum': not because 'tous les goûts sont dans la nature', but because each taste feels itself to be natural – and so it almost is, being a habitus – which amounts to rejecting others as unnatural and therefore vicious.'<sup>6</sup>

Central to this chapter, then, are the dual claims that both Archestratus' criticisms of, or distaste for, other types of food or food preparation, as well as *how* such distaste is expressed, are key factors in defining of what he *does* approve. A brief example of this is nicely encapsulated in Clearchus' discussion of Archestratus (fr. 78 Wehrli). He claims, that is, that Archestratus was taught by a certain Terpsion. Who precisely this was, or whether or not he even existed,<sup>7</sup> the fact

<sup>4</sup> Bourdieu (1977) 78.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 72.

<sup>6</sup> Bourdieu (1984) 49.

<sup>7</sup> Olson and Sens (2000) xxix suggest that this figure may be Socrates' Megarian follower by the same name (Pl. *Phd.* 59c, *Tht.* 142a-3c; as we shall see later, for a comic *mageiros* to claim a philosophical figure as their instructor is not unknown). Wilkins (2000) 349 n. 138 expresses some doubt that such a figure even existed.

that his book (apparently the first *Gastrologia*) instructed students what foods to *avoid* (διακελεύσθαι τοῖς μαθηταῖς τίνων ἀφεκτέον) is suggestive of the importance of negation for tastes in food.<sup>8</sup>

This chapter will focus on the latter facet of the poem, its aggressiveness, in order to elucidate more clearly the satirical influences on the *Hed.* In particular, I will focus on how Archestratus defines his own literary and culinary project in relation to Sicilian and South Italian cuisine, as they are the foremost objects of his derision. I shall begin the chapter with a short summary of what we know about this particular school and a general view of how Archestratus responds to it, before looking more specifically at the particular techniques, already well-known and represented by fifth and fourth century comedy, at his disposal. Here I suggest that Archestratus portrays himself as a comic *mageiros* by drawing on comic linguistic features and common tropes of the *mageiros*. Through his criticisms, Archestratus portrays his opponents as lacking the expertise that he himself possesses, reserving for his critiques of them the most negative aspect of the comic *mageiros*, their *alazoneia*, and at points even claiming that they are insane. The picture that emerges from this is a more satirical Archestratus, whose intelligence and skills, both culinary and literary, are confirmed by his separation from the mindless idiots (i.e. the Sicilians *et al.*) who hold alternative opinions. The implications of this approach can then be drawn out in the final section, in which I suggest that Archestratus' consistent emphasis on simplicity can be defined by what it is not. Specifically, simplicity is defined as "not elaborate", which acts as a rejection of excess, and "not sharp", an avoidance of harsh criticisms (or, to use a different metaphor, "biting satire"). The latter in particular stands in contrast to the satirical critique of the Sicilian school, although such a disavowal of "unnecessarily harsh" criticism is a common feature of ancient satire. On my reading, Archestratus' simplicity is not limited to food, but pervades every aspect of the symposium. Archestratus' poem aims at "teaching pleasure" in a synaesthetic way that includes all of the sights, sounds, and smells of the symposium, including his own poetry.

#### SICILIAN AND ITALIAN CUISINE IN THE 4TH CENTURY

Before we turn to Archestratus' own criticism of the Sicilian and South Italian styles of cooking, it is worth asking two interrelated questions: firstly, how do his criticisms compare to other references to these culinary schools in the fifth and fourth centuries? Secondly, to what extent do these literary references reflect real practices? We should treat these two questions separately, since it is

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<sup>8</sup> It is possible that, if this work existed, it was more concerned with other reasons (e.g. medical) for avoiding particular foods, but given that the only other texts about food and cooking from this period are culinary, this is unlikely.

not necessarily the case that the realities of Sicilian and Southern Italian cuisine (note that this is already a gross oversimplification – what we are really talking about is the cuisine of the elite!) are accurately reflected in our sources (who are primarily Athenian or Athenocentric) perceptions. Every author (Archestratus included) has their own agenda which impacts upon their portrayal of Sicilian cooking. This distinction is especially important given the paucity of evidence for Sicilian and Southern Italian cooking practices. We have scattered references to Sicilian food culture and *mageiroi* in 5th and 4th cent. comedy and some other literature; some references in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* to particular writers of cookbooks; and we possess fragments of Philoxenus' *Deipnon*. In this section, I show that Archestratus' depiction of Sicilian and Italian cooking is in line with the general perception of these schools in other literature, extravagant and strongly spiced. Based on our evidence, these perceptions seem to have had some basis in historical reality, although the distinction remains fundamentally subjective.

Well before the notion of the “Sicilian table” reaches Attic comedy, food is already a strong presence in some plays of Epicharmus.<sup>9</sup> In one of his better attested plays, for instance, the *Marriage of Hebe*, we find a catalogue of shellfish (fr. 40), spoken by one or more gods, with numerous other fragments mentioning other types of fish (e.g. frs. 44, 47, 49-51), numerous types of breads (fr. 46), and Poseidon is even said to bring fine fish in Phoenician merchant-ships (fr. 48). One of the earliest references in Athenian comedy to “the Syracusan table”, meanwhile, Aristophanes' *Daitales*, immediately sets a tone that is maintained over the coming century, closely associating both Sicily and Southern Italy (esp. Sybaris) with luxury and self-indulgence.<sup>10</sup> Sybaris in particular has a long association with excessive forms of luxury: Phrynicus mentions a *sybarismos* of pipers (fr. 67), although it is unclear precisely what this should mean, and in Aristophanes' *Peace* “acting the Sybarite” or “telling Sybarite stories” appears in a list of pleasures one can enjoy during peace time, after festivals and feasting.<sup>11</sup> This association between Sybaris and luxury is confirmed elsewhere, extending to all forms of luxury, such as the story that Alcisthenes of Sybaris had a very expensive robe woven and put on display in Lacinium at a festival of Hera (Arist. *Mir.* 838a15-21) or the tale in Herodotus that Smindyrides, trying to court

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion of food in Epicharmus, see Wilkins (2000) 320-31. We should note that the majority of the surviving fragments of Epicharmus derive from Athenaeus, and so how representative they are of his work is questionable. In the *Marriage of Hebe*, at least we can be confident that the marriage banquet was fairly significant.

<sup>10</sup> ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἔμαθε ταῦτ’ ἔμοι πέμποντος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον / πίνειν, ἔπειτ’ ἄδειν κακῶς, Συρακοσίαν τραπέζαν / Συβαρίτιδας τ’ εὐωχίας καὶ "Χῖον ἐκ Λακαινᾶν" / τευλίκων μέθυ ήδέως καὶ φίλωστ - Ar. *Dait.* fr. 225.

<sup>11</sup> ὅδη γὰρ ἐξέσται τόθ’ ύμιν / πλεῖν, μένειν, κινεῖν, καθεύδειν, / εἰς πανηγύρεις θεωρεῖν, / ἐστιάσθαι, κοτταβίζειν, / συβαριάζειν, / “ιοὶ ιοί” κειραγέναι - Ar. *Pax* 339-45. The scholiast on this passage also notes that Epicharmus apparently used the verb συβαριάζειν to mean “tell Sybaritic tales” (fr. 215).

Agariste the daughter of Cleisthenes, brought with him 1,000 cooks and fowlers (6.127.1; cf. Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F 9).<sup>12</sup>

This perception of excessive luxury as characteristic of Sicily and Italy is also found in Plato and Xenophon. In the *Republic* (404d-e), for instance, Plato dismisses Sicilian cuisine as overly elaborate on the basis that it engenders disease, and in the *Gorgias* he denigrates the famous Sicilian author of a cookbook, Mithaecus.<sup>13</sup> In Xenophon, luxurious food is specifically associated with the kind of food favoured by tyrants. In his dialogue between Simonides and the Sicilian tyrant Hiero, the eponymous figure singles out the kind of extravagant food to which the tyrant has unlimited access: "have you observed all those pickles and sauces that are put before despots – acid, bitter, astringent and so forth?"<sup>14</sup> This perception that Sicily and Italy were characterized by different forms of excessive luxury and tyranny continues to be attested into the 2nd and 1st centuries BC, such as in Posidonius' *Histories* (*FGrH* 87 F 7 ap. Ath. 542b).

The testimony of Xenophon also reflects ideas about the flavour of Sicilian cooking: acidic, bitter, and astringent. Although Xenophon is referring to dipping sauces rather than other kinds of preparation,<sup>15</sup> this perception of strong flavours is supported more generally by fragments of comedy, such as a fragment of Cratinus Junior's *Gigantes*, which has a figure comparing the fragrant odours of a chasm to a frankincense merchant or Sicilian chef,<sup>16</sup> or the cakes of Antiphanes' *Dyspratos*, which are seasoned with the Sicilian arts.<sup>17</sup>

In Archestratus' poem, we find both of these ideas about Sicilian cooking, as well as an emphasis on cheese that is not as prominent elsewhere.<sup>18</sup> Excessive elaboration and luxuriousness is criticized especially in the preparation of the hare (fr. 57.7), and instead Archestratus consistently emphasizes the desirability of simple preparations. Regarding sharp or pungent flavours (in the final section of this chapter, I shall discuss Archestratus' use of δοιμὺς further), the most widely

<sup>12</sup> Many of these stories are quoted and discussed by Athenaeus at 12.541a-42b. We should note, however, that, although these stories may not have been used as evidence of *hubris* leading to the fall of Sybaris, as argued by R.J. Gorman and V.B. Gorman (2007), they nevertheless do reflect the perception of luxury surrounding Sybaris.

<sup>13</sup> ὡσπερ ἀν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὄψοποιάν συγγεγραφώς τὴν Σικελικήν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἀρτούς θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον - Pl. *Grg.* 518b.

<sup>14</sup> τί γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Ιέρων, τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα μηχανήματα κατανενόηκας, ἀ παρατίθεται τοῖς τυράννοις, ὀξέα καὶ δοιμέα καὶ στρυφνά καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφά - *Hiero* 1.22. In his reply, Simonides describes such concoctions as "unnatural" (*παρὰ φύσιν*), which resounds with Arch.'s emphasis on the natural qualities of fish (e.g. frs. 37.5-7 and 10.9).

<sup>15</sup> We might compare in this regard Polyphemus (commonly situated in Sicily) from Cratinus' *Odyssseis*: εἰς ἄλμην τε καὶ ὀξάλμην κατ' ἐς σκοροδάλμην / χλιαρὸν ἐμβάπτων - 150.3-4. For ὀξάλμη in particular, see Dalby (2003) 294; cf. Ar. V. 331.

<sup>16</sup> οἴκει τις ᾧ ἔσικεν ἐν τῷ χάσματι / λιβανωτοπώλης ἢ μάγειρος Σικελικός - fr. 1.3-4.

<sup>17</sup> Σικελῶν τε τέχναις ἡδυνθεῖσαι / δαιτὸς διαθρυμματίδες - fr. 90.

<sup>18</sup> For Archestratus' use of ingredients more generally, see Soares (2016b) 65-91.

criticized ingredient is vinegar, which is avoided or said to be detrimental (e.g. frs. 24.8, 38.8, 46.13-4). It is occasionally admitted (fr. 23.5-7, as a dipping sauce), although even then sometimes only for hard fish (fr. 37.3-5). In the case of fragment 37, too, there is a sting in the tail, as the sharp flavour of the vinegar is likened to the Homeric phrase “pierced with sharp bronze” (δομεῖ δεδαϊγμένον ὄξει ~ δεδαϊγμένος ὄξεϊ χαλκῶ).<sup>19</sup> Vinegar might be necessary to help soften tough fish, but it still tastes like a blade to the heart. Silphium, another strong flavour, is reserved for tough fish (fr. 50) or rejected outright (fr. 46.14). In these regards, then, Archestratus reflects generally held opinions about the excesses and flavours of Sicilian and South Italian cooking.

What is more unique in Archestratus is the focus on the use of cheese. This is explicitly associated with the Sicilians and Italians in fragment 46,<sup>20</sup> and criticized again elsewhere (e.g. 36.7 and 57.8-9). At other times he does admit the use of cheese sauces for tough or hard fish (frs. 37.3-6, 50), although these fish are *naturally* inferior to those that are soft (φύσει - fr. 37.5, 7). The latter are treated more simply with a little salt and olive oil (fr. 37.8-9; cf. 38.4). At other times, cheese is admitted only in small amounts (βαιω̄ ξύσματι τυροῦ - fr. 49). The excessive use of cheese seems to be singled out but nevertheless it is imagined to be part of the problem of excessive luxury typical of this cuisine.

To what extent, then, are such perceptions of Sicilian and Italian cooking an accurate reflection of any reality? To answer this, we must turn to cookery books. Our knowledge of the earliest of these comes, like our fragments of Archestratus, from Athenaeus. However, while Athenaeus devotes some significant space to engaging with the problems Archestratus presents – on the one hand, he is a great authority on food; on the other, Athenaeus is critical of his tendency towards excessive luxury – less space is given to the writers of prose cookbooks. Despite our limited knowledge, however, it would appear that, at least during the fifth and fourth centuries, the majority of cookery books were being produced in Sicily and Southern Italy.<sup>21</sup>

During the 5th and 4th centuries, Mithaecus, already mentioned by Plato, stands out as especially influential. Despite his apparent significance, however, we only possess one fragment of his work, a recipe for a *tainia* or ribbon-fish, which involves removing the head and cutting it into steaks before smothering it in a sauce of cheese and olive oil.<sup>22</sup> Cheese was a common feature of

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.*

<sup>20</sup> μήδε προσέλθῃ σοί ποτε τούτῳ ποιοῦντι / μήτε Συρακόσιος μηθεὶς μήτ' Ἰταλιώτης· / οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται χρηστοὺς σκευαζέμεν ἵχθυς, / ἀλλὰ διαφθείρουσι κακῶς τυροῦντες ἀπαντά / ὄξει τε χαίνοντες ὑγρῷ καὶ σιλφίου ἀλμῇ - 46.10-4.

<sup>21</sup> A valuable summary of the evidence, much of which is treated more briefly here, can be found in Soares (2010).

<sup>22</sup> Μίθαικος δ' ἐν Ὀφαρτυτικῷ, ταινίᾳ, φησίν, ἐκκοιλίξας, τὰν κεφαλὰν ἀποταμών, ἀποπλύνας καὶ ταμῶν τεμάχεα κατάχει τυρὸν καὶ ἔλαιον - Ath. 7.325f; for Mithaecus cf. Ath. 7.282a (mentioning the wrasse, or *alphēstikos*).

many dishes from these regions: Heracleides of Syracuse's (4th cent.) loaf, called the die (κύβος), is seasoned with anise, cheese, and olive oil;<sup>23</sup> Hegesippus of Tarentum's (4th cent.) take on the Lydian *kandaulos* contains stewed meat, bread crumbs, Phrygian cheese, anise, and a fatty broth;<sup>24</sup> and Glaucus of Locris' (4th cent.) sauce *hyposphagma* contains stewed blood, silphium, boiled-down grape must or honey, vinegar, milk, cheese, and fragrant minced herbs.<sup>25</sup> Beyond the fifth and fourth centuries, the influence of such a culinary approach is evident also in the works of Erasistratus (3rd cent.) and Epaenetus (end of the 2nd cent.).<sup>26</sup> In these dishes, we also see the prominent usage of strong tasting herbs such as silphium and anise.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, other pungent flavours such as vinegar are not uncommon.<sup>28</sup> While it would seem that the perceptions of the Syracusan table, as Aristophanes put it, has some kind of basis in the kinds of dishes cooked for the elite in Sicily and Italy, the very nature of ancient "recipes", if we can even call them that, makes any historical distinction between Archestratus and those he criticizes impossible to certify. That is, we have seen that the distinction frequently lies in the quantity used, but such quantities are always vague and subjective (a little vs. too much).

As we have seen here, then, Archestratus shuns overwhelming spices and excessive cheese, depicting them as extravagances that ruin the natural quality of dishes. To use these ingredients in the wrong context is to "destroy" the dish (ἀπόλωλεν - fr. 38.8, διαφθείρουσι κακῶς - fr. 46.13), drawing on a common hyperbole (at least in comedy).<sup>29</sup> This contrast between Archestratus and other Sicilian cookery writers seems to be a deliberate choice, defining Archestratus' simple style against (what was perceived) a common contemporary trend. Certainly, such is the opinion of Carmen Soares, who views the *Hed.* as a sincerely didactic poem whose purpose is de 'não...

<sup>23</sup> πόθεν ίμιν εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ κύβοι, οὐχ οὓς ἀεὶ μεταχειρίζεσθε, ἄρτοι εἰσὶ τετράγωνοι, ἥδυσμένοι ἀννήθω καὶ τυρῷ καὶ ἐλαΐῳ, ὡς φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ἐν Ὀψαρτυτικῷ - Ath. 3.114a.

<sup>24</sup> καὶ κάνδαυλον δέ τινα ἔλεγον οἱ Λυδοί, οὐχ ἔνα ἀλλὰ τρεῖς· οὕτως ἐξήσκηντο πρὸς τὰς ἥδυπαθείας. γίνεσθαι δ' αὐτὸν φησιν ὁ Ταραντῖνος Ἡγήσιππος ἐξ ἐφθοῦ κρέως καὶ κνηστοῦ ἄρτου καὶ Φρυγίου τυροῦ ἀνήθου τε καὶ ζωμοῦ πίονος - Ath. 12.516c-d.

<sup>25</sup> καὶ Γλαῦκος δ' ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν Ὀψαρτυτικῷ οὕτως γράφει· ὑποσφαγμα δ' αἷμα ἐφθὸν καὶ σίλφιον καὶ ἔψημα ἡ μέλι καὶ ὄξος καὶ γάλα καὶ τυρὸς καὶ φύλλα εὐώδη τετμημένα - Ath. 7.324a.

<sup>26</sup> For the former, see Ath. 7.324a; for the latter, Ath. 14.662d. Although the relationship between these later authors and their earlier counterparts is unclear, Athenaeus links Epaenetus and Heracleides of Syracuse in their evaluation of different animals' eggs (2.58b).

<sup>27</sup> For silphium, see Arndt (1993) and Dalby (1993); Olson (2006-2012) translates ἄνηθον as anise, although it is more commonly dill (anise usually being spelt ἄνησον). However, these two are similar in name, appearance, and culinary use, which led to some confusion, for which see Dover (1968) *ad Ar. Nub.* 982 and Arnott (1996) *ad Alex. Lebes* fr. 132.5 ἄνηθον. For the use of dill and anise in Greek cooking, see André (1961) 203. For the use of strong tasting herbs and spices in early cookbooks, cf. Epaenetus' use of silphium, cumin, thyme, savory, coriander, and more in one dish (Ath. 14.662d), and Erasistratus' *hyposphagma*, which is similar to Glaucus' (Ath. 7.324a).

<sup>28</sup> Again, both Epaenetus and Erasistratus refer to the use of vinegar (cf. above).

<sup>29</sup> See, for instance, Alex. fr. 180.1-2 (ἥμιοπτα μὲν / τὰ κρεάδι ἐστί, τὸ περίκομψ' ἀπόλλυται) and Aristopho fr. 7.1 (καὶ μὴν δίεφθαρταί γε τοῦψον παντελῶς).

apenas de ensinar a distinguir a boa da má comida (frg. 36, vv. 4-5), mas de desmitificar a ideia corrente de que o requinte gastronómico (siciliano) se resume à confecção de preparados complexos e fortemente temperados.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, we should be careful not to overstate Archestratus' uniqueness. Some of his recommended styles of preparation are very similar to those found elsewhere and even the rejection of excessive cheese sauce and the like can be found in near-contemporaneous authors.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, Archestratus' practices may well have been closer to the Sicilian school than he would have liked to admit. Instead, what is clear is that he draws on the perceptions of luxury and strong flavours and spices that were current in other literature in order to distinguish himself from them. In the subsequent section, I turn to examine in more detail the kind of techniques Archestratus employs for this purpose. These techniques, I argue, give the poem a satiric edge that both sharpens the humour of the *Hed.* and help to define Archestratus' poetry within its culino-literary context.

#### ARCHESTRATUS' SATIRE

As I said in the Introduction, while authors often use common techniques, the specific satirical form adopted in a text differs from author to author. This section, therefore, attempts to elucidate the different techniques used in the *Hed.* and how similar these are to techniques used elsewhere, especially in Greek comedy. I shall suggest that the strong parallels, both linguistically and thematically, between Archestratus' satire of the Sicilians and the satire of Greek comedy, especially as used by 4th cent. comic *mageiroi*, are indicative of a close relationship between the two. Just as comedy is influenced by Archestratus,<sup>32</sup> Archestratus is in turn influenced by comedy. I shall begin by giving a brief overview of the stylistic features we find in Archestratus' criticisms, before moving onto two thematic features, which we shall see are closely related: knowledge, skill, and philosophy; and nonsense and madness.

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<sup>30</sup> Soares (2016a) 488.

<sup>31</sup> The recipe for the bonito (fr. 36) is virtually identical to that of Sotades (fr. 1.26-9). For the rejection of cheese sauces, compare Philemon fr. 82.4-7. Soares (2016a) does not claim that Archestratus is a culinary innovator, but rather that he develops and enhances attitudes found elsewhere (p. 481): ‘considerando que esta leitura da obra de Arquêstrato não confere ao autor um estatuto de pioneiro, mas sim de potenciador de práticas e mentalidades atestadas em autores anteriores, contemporâneos e posteriores.’

<sup>32</sup> For the influence of Archestratus on Athenian comic poets, see Wilkins (2000) 363-8, esp. his conclusion that ‘the cookery book and Archestratus’ parody, both of which came from Sicily, readily came to mind when a comic poet in Athens wished to give sententious views to his stock cooks’ (p. 367); cf. Dalby (1995), who tries to use the references in comedy to date the *Hed.*

## Linguistic features

Archeistratus' style, as has already been recognized, is a *Kunstsprache*, constructed primarily out of epic language, and Attic and Doric dialects, with occasional forays into other forms of both high and low poetic diction and a small amount of recognizably technical language.<sup>33</sup> There are four features of Archeistratus' language that are used to denigrate others, and I have categorized these as follows: off-hand rejections, compound forms, diminutives, and obscenity. Many of these I suggest are influences from comedy, although it is possible that others may have been more generally colloquial influence.<sup>34</sup>

Off-hand rejections: while Archeistratus not infrequently and quite specifically delineates the negative qualities of foods to be avoided, others are rejected *tout court* in a more off-hand manner. Fragment 9 consists of a brief dismissal of a range of παροψίδες (βολβῶν καὶ καυλῶν χαίρειν λέγω ὀξυβάφοισι / ταῖς τ' ἄλλαις πάσῃσι παροψίσι), while fragment 39 rejects a Pontic dish, *saperdēs*,<sup>35</sup> and those who praise it, saying that the food can "go to hell" (σαπέρδη δ' ἐνέπω κλαίειν μακρά - 39.3). The former phrase, χαίρειν λέγω, probably part of a transitional passage,<sup>36</sup> is common in a range of poetic and prosaic literature (Ar. *Th.* 64, Antiph. fr. 88, E. *Hipp.* 113, 1059, Hdt. 4.112, Pl. R. 406d, etc.).<sup>37</sup> The latter, on the other hand, seems to have a slightly stronger force, and is only found in comedy and satyr drama (e.g. Ar. *Eq.* 433, V. 584, Ec. 425, Pl. 612; E. *Cyc.* 174, 340, 701; cf. Hdt. 4.127).<sup>38</sup> Elsewhere, however, κλαίειν is standardly used with ἔᾶν, λέγειν, or κελεύειν.<sup>39</sup> The use of ἐνέπω, which is drawn from the language of epic, creates a humorous disjunction between high and low registers. Both forms are also part of the language of the *mageiros* or the dinner table: χαίρειν is used in a similarly dismissive way by Matro's narrator

<sup>33</sup> For the style of the *Hed.*, see Olson and Sens (2000) lv-lxi. For a discussion of what constitutes technical language, cf. Willi (2003), esp. 51-95, while for the use of the term "register" in linguistics, see Dickey (1996) 12-4.

<sup>34</sup> Stevens (1976) 4 defines colloquialism as 'not merely words and expressions that are likely to occur in ordinary conversation... but the kind of language that in a poetic or prosaic context would stand out however slightly as having a distinctively conversational flavour.' This is of course somewhat subjective, and meaning and context are important indicators. Here I am not trying to make a strong differentiation between comic and colloquial influences, especially as comedy is one of our main sources for colloquial language. My interest throughout this chapter is the influence of comedy on Archeistratus, although we should bear in mind that at a linguistic level there is some ambiguity.

<sup>35</sup> Sources differ on what the *saperdēs* is: Dorion ap. Ath. 3.118b and Euthydemus ap. Ath. 7.308e identify it as the κορακίνος, while Parmenon of Rhodes ap. Ath. 7.308f claims that it is the πλατιστακός; for a full discussion, cf. Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.*

<sup>36</sup> Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.*

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Stevens (1976) 26.

<sup>38</sup> Biles and Olson (2015) *ad Ar. V. 583-6* describe it as 'a blunt colloquial expression.'

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Stevens (1976) 26.

(ἀμοτάριχον ἔων χαίρειν, Φοινίκιον ὄψον - AD 17),<sup>40</sup> while the *mageiros* of Plato Comicus' *Phaon* maintains that, if you have two grilled octopuses, to hell with the boiled one (ἢν ὅπται δὲ δύ' ὁσ', ἐφθῆ κλαίειν ἀγόρευε - 189.19). These off-hand rejections, then, seem to give Archestratus a comic or colloquial tone, which in fragment 39 is set against the language of epic.

Compound forms: we find numerous negative compound forms, two of which contain a form meaning "nonsense" (ήδυσματόληρος - 46.18 and ἀλαζονοχαυνοφλύαρος - 59.12). Of these, the former is formed in a similar manner to other compounds attested in comedy (see, for instance, the use of χοησμωδόληρος in Plato Comicus' *Sophistai* (fr. 161) and κρόνοληρος in adesp. com. fr. 751), while the other, as I shall discuss later, draws on a figure familiar from comedy, the *alazôn*.

Additionally, new coinages are also used as wordplay, another common technique in comedy. In fragment 57, for instance, the basic meaning of κατάχυσμα as anything poured down over something else. That term, however, presages a downpour of other compound terms with the prefix κατα-. These latter terms (κατάτυρα and κατέλαια), by contrast, refer to excessive use of particular ingredients (cheese and olive oil respectively), based on the meaning of the prefix that implies waste or consumption.<sup>41</sup> While Olson and Sens suggest that this prefix was chosen in part for 'the jingle' with καταχύσματα,<sup>42</sup> I would suggest that the syntax (all of the terms are connected with καὶ) blurs the meaning, so that all sauces appear to be inherently wasteful and excessive.

Many of these coinages could also be usefully contrasted with more "high-brow" compounds, typical of dithyrambic poetry.<sup>43</sup> As Gregory Dobrov has argued, highfalutin language is typical of comic *mageiroi*, who are drawing specifically on dithyrambic language.<sup>44</sup> It is, then, comically fitting for Archestratus to create his own compound forms, one of the most identifiable features of such dithyrambic style, as a stick with which to beat those he wishes to criticize. Certainly, it should be noted that Archestratus does also at points use linguistic innovations in a similar manner.<sup>45</sup> At times, these serve to further the general style of a passage (e.g. in fragment 16).<sup>46</sup> At

<sup>40</sup> Olson and Sens (1999) *ad loc.* note that the reason is not given by Matro for his rejection, although it may be because it is foreign; perhaps something similar is at play here, given the similarity of the phrasing.

<sup>41</sup> LSJ s.v. κατά in compos. VII; cf. καθιπποφέω, καταζευγοφέω, and καταλειτουργέω.

<sup>42</sup> Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.* suggest that the terms are 'probably to be taken [as] "rich in cheese" and "rich in oil"', respectively, with the prefix (chosen in the first instance for the sake of the jingle) both signalling that the seasonings are poured down over the food and at the same time doing its usual Archestratean duty of intensification.'

<sup>43</sup> This is nicely reflected in a comment in Antiphanes' *Tritagonistes*, in which someone praises Philoxenus for using ὄνόμασιν ιδίοισι καὶ καινοῖσι (fr. 207.2-3).

<sup>44</sup> Dobrov (2002) 187: 'Middle Comic poets made their cooks speak the dithyramb in an effort to impart to their character certain qualities which were not relevant to a tragic chorus, but rather associated in the fourth century with the dithyramb as avant-garde;' for the language of the comic *mageiros*, cf. also Nesselrath (1990) 283-309.

<sup>45</sup> E.g. στρογγυλοδίνητος (fr. 5.11) and στενοκύμων (fr. 17.1).

<sup>46</sup> The compounds ισόχωνσος and ἐλειότροφος in this fragment fit within the fragment's more general use of the language of ritual initiation; cf. Olson and Sens (2000) vliii.

other times, however, they seem to be used to further Archestratus' criticisms. For instance, in fragment 59, following his use of ἀλαζονοχαυνοφλύαροι, which depicts those who disagree with him in the mould of the *mageiros'* *alazoneia*, he refers to the fine wines of other cities as βοτρυοσταγή ἔρνη (17). While the use of a *hapax* so shortly after a criticism of others for similar qualities might be considered hypocritical, they seem on closer inspection to support Archestratus' point. The lines (quoted in full in the following section) claim that Archestratus knows how to praise Thasian wine and wines of other cities, but that nevertheless Lesbian wine is best. The lines discussing Thasian and other wines include the three particular stylistic elements Dobrov identified as common to the comic *mageiros*: new compounds, coordination rather than subordination, and periphrasis and metaphorical language.<sup>47</sup> Not only is βοτρυοσταγή a dithyrambic compound, but οἴδα... εἰπεῖν αἰνῆσαι τε καὶ οὐ με λέληθ' ὄνομῆναι (17-8) forms a tautological coordination, and ἐτέων ὥραις is mildly periphrastic. By contrast, Archestratus' praise of Lesbian wine, in his opinion the best, is over in a single, straightforward line (ἀλλ' οὐθὲν τᾶλλλ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς πρὸς Λέσβιον οἶνον - 59.19). The point, then, is that Archestratus is saying that not only could he praise other wines, but that he could use the kinds of linguistic phenomena characteristic of those who do praise other wines. His praise of Lesbian wine is stylistically opposed to this, which is underlined by the recurrence of ἀπλῶς.

These compound forms show a clear influence from comedy.<sup>48</sup> Not only are they formed in a similar manner to many comic compounds, but they also contain typically comic language and are frequently used for humorous purposes.

**Diminutives:** Diminutive forms are rare in the *Hed.*, making their appearance more striking. As we have it, the poem contains only two diminutives, which are closely collocated: ἵχθυδίων and ὄψαρίων (46.15, 18). While they are not uncommon forms *per se*,<sup>49</sup> the context in which they appear – part of Archestratus' criticisms of the Sicilian and Italian schools of cookery – suggests that they are being used with a derogative tone.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, they help to distinguish the poetic tone. Diminutives are never used in tragedy, but are found occasionally in satyr drama and frequently in comedy.<sup>51</sup> These diminutives, then, do not only aid the derogatory tone of the passage, but give the impression of a lower or more colloquial register.

<sup>47</sup> Dobrov (2002) 186.

<sup>48</sup> As already noted by Meyer (1923) 166-7, discussing compound forms in both Philoxenus and Archestratus: 'der Hauptgrund ist doch gewiß der, daß die Schilderung eines solch splendiden Mahles stark ins Lächerliche gezogen ist. Wir haben etwas Komisches vor uns.'

<sup>49</sup> Both forms are used in non-derogative contexts: for ἵχθυδίων, Theopomp. Com. fr. 62.3, Sotad. Com. 1.22-3, Philem. 100.5, Macho 28; for ὄψαρίων, cf. Pl. Com. fr. 102.2.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Soares (2016a); for the derogatory tone of the fragment, cf. Soares (2012a) 45-6.

<sup>51</sup> See, for instance, P. O'Sullivan and Collard (2013) 447 n. 12, Slenders (2012) 165.

Obscenity: obscene humour is relatively rare in the remains of *parōidia*. Two notable instances are the opening of the fragment of Hegemon of Thasos, when he is pelted with shit, and the end of (what we possess of) Matro's *AD*, when Stratocles “drives” in the prostitutes. Even here, the terminology used is euphemistic or uncommon. There are, however, two potential instances of obscenity in the *Hed.* Fragment 11 opens with an imperative to “smear small fry with shit” ( $\tauὴν ἀφύην μίνθου$ ). While this could be taken metaphorically,<sup>52</sup> the original sense of the verb, occasionally found in comedy (e.g. Ar. *Ra.* 1075, *Pl.* 313), must be the source of the humour. Both scatophagy and the use of shit in general are common insults in Greek comedy and often a source of satire: Cleon is said to eat shit in the underworld (*Pax* 47-8) while, in a more metapoetic mode, the chorus of *Acharnians* imagine Cratinus being pelted with fresh shit ( $οὐ δὲ λίθον βαλεῖν / βουλόμενος ἐν σκότῳ λάβοι / τῇ χειρὶ πέλεθον ἀρτίως κεχεσμένον· / ἐπάξειεν δ' ἔχων / τὸν μάρμαρον, κἄπειθ' ἀμαρτῶν / βάλοι Κρατῖνον - Ach. 1168-73$ ).<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, the humour here is paralleled in other comic *mageiroi*. In Damoxenus' *Syntrophoi*, the *mageiros* sneers at his uneducated peers and tells his interlocutor to cover them in shit and send them packing ( $μινθώσας ἄφες - fr. 2.15$ ). Similarly, the *mageiros* of Sosipater's *Katapseudomenos* dismisses all but Boedion, Chariades, and himself saying “fart on the rest” ( $τοῖς λοιποῖς δὲ προσπέρδου - 1.12$ ). The use of shitting and scatophagy for satirical purposes in comedy, and by comic *mageiroi* especially, suggests that we should retain the original sense of the verb not only for the humour of the passage but also for its satirical edge.

From a brief analysis of the linguistic tone set by Archestratus' criticisms of other people and cuisines, we can see that the poet uses a range of techniques common in comedy and to comic *mageiroi* in particular. While in some cases the tone may be colloquial rather than specifically comic, there are recognizable influences from comic satire in particular.

### **Knowledge, skill, and philosophy**

The answer to the question “was cooking a  $\tauέχνη$  during the 4th cent. BC?” depends entirely on which perspective you take. While in the *Gorgias*, Plato describes cookery as  $\kappaομιδή ἀτέχνως$ ,

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<sup>52</sup> As Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc. do.* The metaphorical usage of this verb may be the origin of its misuse at Luc. *Lex.* 12, for which the eponymous figure of the dialogue is mocked by Lycinus.

<sup>53</sup> For scatophagy, see Henderson (1991) 192-4 and Wilkins (2000) 28-9. For the metapoetic significance of shit, see Wright (2012). References to scatophagy extend into Menandrian comedy, e.g. *Sam.* 427 and 550. For a discussion of the meaning here, see Sommerstein (2013) *ad 427*.

especially in contrast to medicine,<sup>54</sup> in the *Republic* the distinction between the τέχνη ιατρική and the τέχνη μαγειρική is elided somewhat.<sup>55</sup> In comedy, however, the value of cookery as a τέχνη is frequently and in numerous ways expounded, almost always at great length and much to their interlocutors chagrin.<sup>56</sup> In Athenion's *Samothaikes*, for instance, the *mageiros* claims that his τέχνη has made the greatest contribution to piety (οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντων ἡ μαγειρικὴ τέχνη / πρὸς εὔσεβειαν πλεῖστα προενήνεχθ' ὅλως - 1.1-2) before explaining in great detail mankind's progression from cannibalism through sacrifice and the development of the art (τὸ προσφιλοτεχνεῖν - 25; cf. τὴν μαγειρικὴν τέχνην - 16, 26) ultimately to the foundation of the *polis* (οὐλος / ἡθροίζετ', ἐγένονθ' αἱ πόλεις, οἰκούμεναι / διὰ τὴν τέχνην, ὅπερ εἴπα, τὴν μαγειρικὴν - 36-8).<sup>57</sup> Perhaps even more ambitiously, the *mageiros* of Sosipater's *Katapseudomenos* claims that, although there are many who claim to be a *mageiros* when they know nothing (πάντες σχεδὸν / εἶναι μάγειροι φασιν, οὐδὲν εἰδότες - 3-4), a true *mageiros* should be correctly brought up from childhood to know the powers of the art and to know all the branches of knowledge systematically (ἐκ παιδὸς ὀρθῶς εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα' εἰσιγμένον, / καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις κατέχοντα καὶ τὰ παθήματα / ἄπαντ' ἐφεξῆς εἰδόθ' - 7-9), including astrology, architecture, nature, and warfare.<sup>58</sup>

In addition to expounding on the art of cooking as an extension of or basis for other cultural skills and developments, *mageiroi* frequently appeal to teachers or authorities, sometimes also mythological ones such as Nereus (Anaxandrides *Nereus* fr. 31),<sup>59</sup> or act as teachers for others. Thus, in Euphron's *Adelphoi* fr. 1, a *mageiros* addresses a student (and names prior ones), while the *mageiros* of *Synepheboi* (fr. 10) claims to be a pupil of Soterides. Perhaps one of the *mageiros'* grandest claims, however, especially given Plato's rejection of the μαγειρικὴ τέχνη in the *Gorgias*, is to the field of philosophy. Already in Euphron's *Adelphoi*, the seven students of the speaking *mageiros* are likened to the Seven Sages (οὗτοι μετ' ἐκείνους τοὺς σοφιστὰς τοὺς πάλαι /

<sup>54</sup> ἔλεγον δέ που, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὄψιοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίᾳ, ἡ δ' ιατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὖθε θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὥν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ιατρική. ἡ δ' ἐτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἀπασα, κομιδὴ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν - 500e-501a. For the discussion of medicine and cookery in the *Gorgias*, see also Plastira-Valkanou (1998).

<sup>55</sup> R. 332c. Cf. Soares (2012b) 43: 'Não se trata, neste passo, disso, pois continua se a insistir na nítida separação entre esferas de acção dos dois domínios de saber.'

<sup>56</sup> For a systematic discussion of the comic *mageiros'* skills, see Wilkins (2000) 396-403; for the *mageiros* in general, cf. Berthiaume (1982).

<sup>57</sup> Athenion is writing much later than Archestratus (poss. 1st cent. BC; see New Pauly s.v. Athenion [5]), although the fragment draws on a discourse concerning whether or not cookery is a *technē* that goes back at least to Plato.

<sup>58</sup> This fragment is quite similar to Nicomachus *Eileithuia* fr. 1, which claims that the cook requires also the skills of painting, astronomy, geology, and medicine. For the connection between the *mageiros* and the general in particular, see also Dionysius *Thesmophoros* fr. 2.11-8 and Posidippus of Cassandrea fr. 29.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Euhemerus' claim (ap. Ath. 14.658e-f) that Cadmus was also a cook.

γεγόνασιν ἡμῶν ἐπτὰ δεύτεροι σοφοί - 1.11-2). Meanwhile the *mageiros* of Damoxenus' *Syntrophoi* claims to be the student of Epicurus himself (Ἐπικούρου δέ με / ὁρᾶς μαθητὴν ὄντα τοῦ σοφοῦ - fr. 2.1-2).

What the evidence of comedy suggests is that, in whatever esteem cookery was held in society, claims to genius were very important for the comic *mageiros*, and there was clearly much humour to be gained from such hyperbole. Fields of expertise and the specialization of knowledge play a major role in this portrayal, and it is against this backdrop that I would like to approach Archestratus' mockery of others' intelligence, since comic *mageiroi*'s claims are not only intensely hyperbolic but also highly competitive. This is particularly clear from Posidippus of Cassandra's *Anablepon* (fr. 1):

εγὼ μάγειρον ἀναλαβών ἀκήκοα  
τὰ τῶν μαγείρων πάντ' ἀ καθ' ἐκάστου κακά  
ἀντεργολαβοῦντος ἔλεγον· οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐκ ἔχει  
ὅινα κριτικὴν πρὸς τοῦψον, οἱ δ' ὅτι τὸ στόμα  
πονηρόν, οἱ δὲ τὴν γλῶτταν εἰς ἀσχήμονας  
ἐπιθυμίας ἔνια τε τῶν ἥδυσμάτων,  
κάθαλος, κάτοξος, χναυστικός, προσκαυστικός,  
καπνὸν οὐ φέρων, πῦρ οὐ φέρων. ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς  
εἰς τὰς μαχαίρας ἥλθον· ὃν εἶς ούτοσὶ<sup>60</sup>  
διὰ τῶν μαχαιρῶν τοῦ πυρός τ' ἐλήλυθεν.

In the world of comedy, it is almost literally cook eat cook. While here the criticisms are filtered through the perspective of the prospective employer, attacking the abilities of others as a means of grandstanding is a common feature of comic *mageiroi*. We have already seen, for instance, *mageiroi* say we should fart or shit on those with inferior culinary skills. Whether or not this is a comic representation of the kind of real-life arguments that are reflected in Archestratus remains open to question. What I aim to demonstrate here is that Archestratus draws upon comic representations of culinary rivalries and their common thematic concerns. In particular, I shall demonstrate that Archestratus attacks his opponents' intelligence, denying them any claim to ἐπιστῆμη, which is a

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<sup>60</sup> "When taking on a *mageiros* I have heard all the insults they said against each other in competing for work: one does not have a discerning nose for a cooked dish, another has a foul palate, another has polluted his tongue in unseemly desires for flavourings, all salt, all vinegar, too sweet a tooth, too likely to burn the meat, can't bear the smoke, can't bear the fire. From the fire they turned to knives. This man here has been through the knives and the fire." [trans. Wilkins]

rare quality and therefore highly valuable. This allows Archestratus to establish a ideological-cum-philosophical contrast between himself and the Sicilian school.

One of the key notions that underpins Archestratus' satirical attacks on the knowledge of others is that the excellence of a given food is not subjective, as we might think, but entirely objective. This assumption of objectivity allows the narrator to set out his opinion as established truth, and thus any dissenting voices must be incorrect. The only point where Archestratus might be considered to accept a more subjective view of culinary tastes is in fr. 15.<sup>61</sup> However, by echoing scientific language in his analysis, Archestratus establishes a tension between the generalized, subjective view of taste and his own expertise:

τὸν δ' ὄνον Ανθηδών, τὸν καλλαρίγην καλέουσιν,  
ἐκτρέφει εὐμεγέθη, σομφήν δὲ φορεῖ τινα σάρκα,  
κᾶλλως οὐχ ἥδεῖαν ἔμοιγ', ἄλλοι δ' <                >  
αἰνοῦσιν· χαίρει γάρ ο μὲν τούτοις, ο δ' ἐκείνοις.<sup>62</sup>

Despite the confused state of the tradition,<sup>63</sup> the general sense of lines 3-4 is clear: in other respects, as far as I'm concerned, the hake is no good, although others love it; for some enjoy one thing, others enjoy another. The kind of general, gnomic statement expressed in line 4 is commonly found in Greek literature.<sup>64</sup> In particular regarding food, a character of Astydamas' *Heracles* compares the variety required by a poet to please different parts of his audience to the variety of the feast.<sup>65</sup> The commonality of this statement is not, however, a guarantor of its seriousness. Indeed, Olson and Sens suggest that 'the poet's acknowledgement that individual tastes vary is not a serious assertion of the validity of views that differ from his own but a contemptuous dismissal of them.'<sup>66</sup> While

<sup>61</sup> See, for example, Wilkins and Hill (2011) *ad* fr. 14: 'Archestratus acknowledges different opinions in others with "some like this, others that": he is not as dogmatic as might be thought.'

<sup>62</sup> "As for the hake, which they call the '*kallaria*', Anthedon raises a nice big one, but some of its flesh is spongy and in other respects as well it does not please me, although others <      > praise it. For one person likes this sort of thing, another that."

<sup>63</sup> At the end of l. 3, A has ἄλλ' ὑδαίνουσαν while CE have ἄλλ' οἰδαίνουσαν, both of which are nonsensical. Numerous emendations have been suggested, all of which are variants of ἄλλοι δ< - - x >. The most suggestive for my argument is Ribbeck's suggestion, ἄλλοι δὲ μιν αἰνῶς / αἰνοῦσιν, which would support the idea that we should not necessarily take the subsequent phrase straightforwardly. However, we need not accept Ribbeck's suggestion for my argument.

<sup>64</sup> E.g. ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοιστν ἀνήρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις - *Od.* 14.228, τερπνὸν δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἵσον ἔσπεται οὐδέν - *Pi. O.* 8.53, ἄλλ' ἄλλος ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἥδεται τρόποις - *E. fr.* 560 Kannicht.

<sup>65</sup> ἄλλ' ὡσπερ δείπνου γλαφυροῦ ποικίλην εὐωχίαν / τὸν ποιητὴν δεῖ παρέχειν τοῖς θεαταῖς τὸν σοφόν, / ἵν' ἀπίη τις τοῦτο φαγὼν καὶ πιῶν, ὅπερ λαβών / χαίρει <τις>, καὶ σκευασίᾳ μὴ μί τῆς μουσικῆς - Astydamas *TGrF F 4*. For the metapoetic claim that variety is positive, cf. Metagenes *Lover of Sacrifices* fr. 15.

<sup>66</sup> Olson and Sens (2000) *ad* 15.3-4.

their suggestion certainly fits better with the view of the controlling Archestratean narrator for which I have argued elsewhere,<sup>67</sup> they do not wholly explain the effect of this “contemptuous dismissal”. We can explain this fragment's dismissal of other's praise of the hake by considering it in the context of Archestratus' claims to exert knowledge. The fragment opens with the geographic expertise and the knowledge of local names of fish, which we have come to expect from a poet who has travelled the world in pursuit of the best foods.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, the adjective σομφίν is a technical, scientific term used for porous as opposed to dense flesh (e.g. Arist. HA 492b33, 493a15-6, 496b3, and 587b24).<sup>69</sup> We can thus see in this fragment a tension between the more scientific approach adopted by Archestratus and the clichéd generalization of the poetic tradition. The implication would therefore be that, although some people *do* praise the hake, we will be able to recognize Archestratus' superiority, which is based upon a more detailed basis than the nameless “others”, whose opinions are humorously undermined.

Fragment 46 contains perhaps the most sustained attack on the expertise of the Sicilians and Italians (46.10-18):

μηδὲ προσέλθῃ σοί ποτε τοῦφον τοῦτο ποιοῦντι  
μήτε Συρακόσιος μηθεὶς μήτ' Ιταλιώτης·  
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται χρηστοὺς σκευαζέμεν ίχθυς,  
ἀλλὰ διαφθείρουσι κακῶς τυροῦντες ἄπαντα  
ὅξει τε όαίνοντες ύγρῷ καὶ σιλφίου ἀλμῇ.  
τῶν δὲ πετραίων ίχθυδίων τῶν τρισκαταράτων  
πάντων εἰσὶν ἄριστοι ἐπισταμένως διαθεῖναι  
καὶ πολλὰς ἰδέας κομψῶς παρὰ δαιτὶ δύναται  
οὐφαρίων τεύχειν γλίσχων ἡδυσματολήρων.<sup>70</sup>

Archestratus' critique here operates on two levels: first, he banishes the Syracusans and Italians from even the vicinity of the cooking process (μηδὲ προσέλθῃ σοί ποτε) on the grounds that they

<sup>67</sup> P.S Martin (2016).

<sup>68</sup> The fact that Dorion ap. Ath. 7.315f identifies the ὄνος not with the γαλλερία (i.e. the καλλαρίη) but with the γάδος, that is the fact that Archestratus' information may be wrong, is not important for our present concern, which is the rhetoric rather than the accuracy of Archestratus' account.

<sup>69</sup> cf. Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.*, who also note the use of σομφὸς with a parodically medical colouring at Alex. fr. 129.10.

<sup>70</sup> “Let no Syracusan or Italian come near as you are making this dish, for they do not know how to prepare top-quality fish but utterly ruin them by covering everything they cook with cheese and sprinkling it with liquid vinegar and silphium-flavoured broth. They are the very best, however, at preparing some of the thrice-damned rockfish knowledgeably, and at a feast they are capable of cleverly devising many types of sticky little dishes full of seasonings and other nonsense.”

do not know how to prepare excellent fish; second, he damns them with the faintest praise possible, telling us that what they *can* cook are the thrice-damned rock-fish and sticky sauces full of nonsense, both of which are made explicitly inferior to the excellent fish Archestratus prefers through comic language and diminutives (for which see above).<sup>71</sup> These two parts are interlinked, however, through the emphasis on their lack of knowledge and understanding. They do not know (ἐπίστανται) how to prepare excellent fish and they can only prepare “knowledgeably” (ἐπισταμένως) the rock-fish and they cleverly (κομψῶς) prepare the sauces. The adverbs in the latter part of the fragment underline the sarcasm of the phrasing, giving the Sicilians an “expertise” only in the case of little fish and little sauces that are undesirable, sticky (only ever negative in the *Hed.*),<sup>72</sup> or even nonsensical. κομψός is quite commonly used to describe *mageiroi* and those who act like *mageiroi* (e.g. ἥκουσας ώς μαγειρικῶς / κομψῶς τε καὶ δειπνητικῶς / αὐτῷ διακονεῖται; - Ar. *Ach.* 1015-7; ὁ πρῶτος εύρων κομψὸς ἦν τραγήματα - Alex. fr. 190.1), although it is frequently used in a hostile sense, as must be the case here (e.g. E. *Supp.* 426; compare πρὸς Διόδωρον ιόντας / τὸν σοφὸν - fr. 24.19-20 below). The invocation of cooking as an ἐπιστήμη, the theoretical part of a practical skill,<sup>73</sup> is especially striking. For a poem fundamentally concerned with expressing knowledge about food, ἐπιστήμη and cognate words rarely appear. Indeed, they only elsewhere appear where specialist knowledge is either being imparted (σαφεῖ τάδ' ἐπίστασο δόξῃ - 5.10) or imported (ἔστω δ' ἡ σοὶ ἀνὴρ Φοῖνιξ ἢ Λυδὸς ἐν οἴκῳ, / ὅστις ἐπιστήμων ἔσται σίτοιο κατ' ἥμαρ / παντοίας ἴδεας τεύχειν - 6.1-3). Their appearances in the poem, then, seem charged with a culino-ideological significance.

What, then, is the ideological significance of culinary knowledge in the poem? While in fragment 46 the Sicilians’ lack of knowledge is unambiguously spelled out, elsewhere knowledge is presented as a rarified possession through the trope of “few people know”. This occurs twice in the fragments we possess (frs. 39.3-5 and 24.13-20):

σαπέρδη δ' ἐνέπω κλαίειν μακρά, Ποντικῷ ὄψω,  
καὶ τοῖς κεῖνον ἐπαινοῦσιν· παῦροι γὰρ ἵσασιν  
ἀνθρώπων, ὃ τι φαῦλον ἔφυ καὶ κεδνὸν ἔδεσμα.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>71</sup> κατάρατος is found frequently in comedy as a term of abuse (e.g. Ar. *Pax* 33, Pherecr. fr. 155.8, Nicostr. Com. fr. 22.3, Amphis fr. 30.4), and comedians also describe dishes as being ruined (e.g. καὶ μήν διέφθαρται γε τοῦψον παντελῶς - Aristophon fr. 7.1). For the undesirability of rock-fish as food, cf. Anaxipp. fr. 1.33-7, and for the distrust of cheese sauces, see Philem. fr. 82.4-7.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. fr. 57.

<sup>73</sup> For which see Snell (1924) 87, cf. Olson and Sens (2000) *ad* fr. 5.10. For cooking as an ἐπιστήμη, cf. ἐπίστασαι τὸν σαῦρον ώς δεῖ σκευάσαι - Alex. fr. 138.1.

<sup>74</sup> “But I say to hell with *saperde*, a Pontic dish, and those who praise it. For few people know which food is wretched and which is excellent.”

ἀλλ' οὐ πολλοὶ ἴσασι βροτῶν τόδε θεῖον ἔδεσμα  
 οὐδ' ἔσθειν ἐθέλουσι ὅσοι κουφαττελεβώδη  
 ψυχὴν κέκτηνται θνητῶν εἰσὸν τ' ἀπόπληκτοι,  
 ὡς ἀνθρωποφάγου τοῦ θηρίου ὄντος. ἄπας δὲ  
 ἰχθὺς σάρκα φιλεῖ βροτείν, ἃν που περικύρσῃ.  
 ὥστε πρέπει καθαρῶς ὅπόσοι τάδε μωρολογοῦσι  
 τοῖς λαχάνοις προσάγειν καὶ πρὸς Διόδωρον ἴοντας  
 τὸν σοφὸν ἐγκρατέως μετ' ἐκείνου πυθαγορίζειν.<sup>75</sup>

The idea that culinary excellence is a rare trait possessed by only the few is far from unique to Archestratus; rather, it is a standard *topos* of the comic *mageiros*. A fragment of Hegesippus' *Adelphoi*, for instance, opens with Syrus saying that much has been said by many about cookery (βέλτιστε, πολλοὶς πολλὰ περὶ μαγειρικῆς / εἰρημέν' ἔστιν - fr. 1.1-2) and requests that his interlocutor demonstrate something new. The *mageiros* in turn claims that only he has achieved culinary perfection (τὸ πέρας τῆς μαγειρικῆς, Σύρε, / εὐρηκέναι πάντων νόμιζε μόνον ἐμέ - 4-5; cf. τὸ πέρας σοι λέγω - 10).<sup>76</sup> Similarly, the *mageiros* of Damoxenus' *Syntrophoi*, supposedly a student of Epicurus, claims that his teacher was the *only* person to know what the Good is (implying at least partially gastronomic pleasure) (εἶδε τὰ γαθὸν μόνος / ἐκεῖνος οἶόν ἔστιν - fr. 2.62-3), while in Sosipater's *Katapseudomenos* the *mageiros* says that many of those who claim to be cooks do not know anything (πάντες σχεδὸν / εἴναι μάγειροι φασιν οὐθὲν εἰδότες - fr. 1.3-4) and that there are only three "real" *mageiroi* left (τρεῖς ἡμεῖς < . . . > / ἐσμὲν ἔτι λοιποί, Βοιδίων καὶ Χαριάδης / ἐγώ τε - 10-12). A similar *topos* is that of the *prōtos euretēs*. Thus, the speaker of Alexis fragment 190 refers to the man who invented *tragēmata* as clever (ό ποῶτος εὐρῶν κομψὸς ἦν τραγήματα - 190.1), while the *mageiros* of Euphron's *Adelphoi*, in a twist of the *topos*, mentions that he was the first to figure out how to steal food without being hated for it (ἐγὼ δ' ὄρῶν τὰ πολλὰ προκαειλημένα / εὗρον τὸ κλέπτειν πρῶτος, ὥστε μηδένα / μισεῖν με διὰ τοῦτ' - fr. 1.13-5).

Archestratus differs from these *mageiroi*, however, in his use of epic parody, as both of his examples of "few people know" draw upon epic language as a means of situating the *Hed.* in relation to its epic paradigms. In fr. 39, the phrase παῦροι γὰρ ἴσασι echoes Hesiod's *Works and*

<sup>75</sup> "But few mortals know about this divine food, and those mortals who have the sense of a foolish locust and are insane refuse to consume it on the ground that this beast eats human beings. But every fish likes human flesh, if it encounters it somewhere. Therefore it is clearly appropriate that those who talk this sort of nonsense keep company with vegetables and go to the wise Diodorus and temperately play the Pythagorean along with him."

<sup>76</sup> For the idea of τὸ πέρας as gastronomic perfection, cf. Posidipp. 26.17.

*Days*. While the closest reminiscence is ἄλλος δ' ἄλλοιντι αἰνεῖ, παῦροι δέ τ' ἵσασιν (824), which occupies the same metrical position,<sup>77</sup> the preceding lines frequently emphasize the point that “few people know” (παῦροι δ' αὐτεῖς ἵσασι - 814, παῦροι δέ τ' ἀληθέα κικλήσκουσιν - 818, παῦροι δ' αὐτεῖς μετεικάδα μηνὸς ἀρίστην - 820). The fragment follows a similar logical structure to the Hesiodic section: just as Hesiod goes on to say that the man who knows all these things is happy and blessed (εὐδαιμων τε καὶ ὅλβιος, δις τάδε πάντα / εἰδως - 826-7), so Archeistratus turns from the rejected Pontic *saperdēs* to the mackerel and in turn the tuna acquired in Byzantium. If we follow Archeistratus’ advice, we can eat a dish that is very good and soft (ἔστι γὰρ ἐσθλὸν / καὶ μαλακόν - 39.9-10). In this fragment, then, Archeistratus seems to live fully up to Athenaeus’ description of him as the Hesiod of epicures (Αρχέστρατος ὁ τῶν ὄψιοφάγων Ἡσίοδος ἢ Θέογνις - 7.310a), modelling his authoritative knowledge against the many ignoramuses after Hesiod’s own construction.

Fragment 24, by contrast, opens by establishing a contrast between the limited mortal knowledge (βροτῶν) and the divine qualities of the food (τόδε θεῖον ἔδεσμα).<sup>78</sup> Here, however, it is not Hesiod, but Homer, that is parodied, as the phrase ἀλλ' οὐ πολλοὶ ἵσασι βροτῶν recalls Glaucon’s words to Diomedes in *Iliad* 6 (πολλοὶ δέ μιν ἀνδρες ἵσασιν - 6.151). The Homeric echo here self-consciously marks the *Hed.*’s distance from Homeric epic. Unlike Glaucon’s revelation to Diomedes of the well-established fact of his heritage, Archeistratus’ poem reveals little known knowledge to a small and carefully selected group. Archeistratus here may even be claiming that his poetry is more valuable, as it teaches not tales of well-known heroes but little known, and thus more valuable, knowledge. Both of Archeistratus’ claims or criticisms that “few people know”, and that he is implicitly amongst those few, situate the poem not only against those who claim to have knowledge but do not, but also by the *Hed.*’s similarities to and differences from its epic models.

This positioning of the poem against epic is then developed further in subsequent lines using common satirical tropes from comedy. Firstly, Archeistratus brands his rivals, those who will not eat the saw-tooth shark, with the compound form κουφαττελεβώδη, which consists in part of the adjective κούφος (used of foolish people, e.g. at Ar. *Ra.* 1396 and Men. *Pn.* 14),<sup>79</sup> and the locust,

<sup>77</sup> Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.* note the reminiscence but do not explore the implications in much detail.

<sup>78</sup> For the idea that food is divine or quasi-divine in the *Hed.*, see frs. 5, 14, 16, 21, and 40.

<sup>79</sup> The reading of the adjective is somewhat uncertain, as our manuscripts have attempted to amend what they saw as a corrupt text (giving κούφην τε λεβώδη at 4.163d and κούφαν γε (καὶ CE) λεβώδη at 7.310d. Bentley, the first to recognize that these readings most likely derive from an original compound adjective, suggested either κουφαττελεβώδη or κεπφαττελεβώδη. I here follow Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.*, who note that the latter is further from the paradosis. However, it is worth noting that, even if κεπφαττελεβώδη is the correct reading (in which case the adjective would mean "of a storm petrel or a locust" [trans. Wilkins and Hill (2011)]), the adjective would retain the comic associations I suggest, as the κέπφος (for which see Thompson (1947) 137-8) is used as a synonym for "fool" at Ar. *Pax* 1067, *Pl.* 912.

ἀττέλαβος,<sup>80</sup> which is occasionally associated with those who lack intelligence which must surely be its significance here (cf. οὐδ' ὅσον αἱ ἀκρίδες τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας - Luc. *JTr.* 31). The focus on mental deficiency is confirmed by the description of these people as ἀπόπληκτοι, meaning mentally paralyzed and thus insane (used in a similar sense by Strato Com. fr. 1.35, Men. *Asp.* 239, *Pk.* 496;). The connection here with mental illness in particular is strengthened if we compare with Herodotus (λάθοι ἀν τοι μανεὶς ἡ ὁ γε ἀπόπληκτος γενόμενος - 2.173) or Demosthenes' *Against Phormion* (μὴ γὰρ οἴεσθε με οὕτως ἀπόπληκτον εἶναι καὶ παντελῶς ματινόμενον - 34.16). All of this suggests that Archestratus is focusing his criticisms in particular on the mental incapacities of anyone who disagrees with him, implying that they are not just unknowledgeable but insane.

These attacks provide an authoritative basis for Archestratus' defence of eating the saw-tooth shark. The concern that a mad person might raise, so Archestratus' logic goes, is that such animals eat humans. Concerns about fish consuming humans in Greek literature had a rich and long history.<sup>81</sup> Archestratus' response turns the tables, associating the specific concerns about one man-eater to *all* fish. If, therefore, you refuse to eat one fish on these grounds, you'll have to become a vegetarian as they are all at it! By shifting the argument from "this fish eats humans" to "all fish eat humans", Archestratus attempts to present us with a dichotomy: either we do not eat fish at all (impossible for someone pursuing the life of luxury) or we eat all types of fish. This argument effectively bridges the gap between his attacks on the mental capacity of the κουφαττελεβώδη and the Pythagoreans, as to eat animals that had eaten humans was a taboo occasionally associated particularly with that school.<sup>82</sup> The supposed logical progression of the passage is then marked by the phrase ὥστε πρέπει καθαρῶς as Archestratus turns the focus onto the Pythagoreans, a move already anticipated by the use of ψυχὴ in line 17. Although in the context the meaning must be "mind" rather than "soul",<sup>83</sup> Archestratus plays on the double meaning of the word and its associations with the Pythagorean theory of metempsychosis.<sup>84</sup> Thus, the nameless individuals who have the sense of a foolish locust are more closely associated with the Pythagoreans and *vice versa*.

<sup>80</sup> Hesychius (α 8181) glosses ἀττέλαβονς as ἀκρίδας; cf. Davies and Kathirithamby (1986) 144-5, Beavis (1988) 62-4.

<sup>81</sup> Purcell (1995) 133-4. For references to man-eating fish in lit., see *Il.* 21.122-7. It is also mentioned by Pindar (ἰχθὺν παιδοφάγον - fr. 306); cf. *Hdt.* 6.44.3, *Pl. Com.* fr. 57, *Alex.* fr. 76.1-4.

<sup>82</sup> For the taboo of eating a man-eating creature, see Parker (1983) 357-64, and for the associations between this argument and the Pythagorean prohibition against eating red mullet, cf. Aelian *NA* 24.2. In comedy, the reluctance to eat large and thus potentially man-eating fish was sometimes presented as a rustic prejudice, for which see Antiph. frs. 69.10-2, 127.1-6.

<sup>83</sup> Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.*, cf. *LSJ* s.v. ψυχὴ IV 4.

<sup>84</sup> cf. Wilkins and Hill (2011) *ad fr.* 23: 'Mention of the soul leads to Pythagoras' theory of the transmigration of souls and his followers' refusal to eat meat and fish because of their close relationship to humans and their possessing a soul.'

However, when attacking the Pythagoreans, Archestratus shifts his approach somewhat. Instead of calling them stupid outright, he sarcastically refers to Diodorus as “the wise” ( $\tauὸν σοφόν$ ) and describes him “temperately” playing at being Pythagoras ( $\varepsilonγκρατέως πυθαγορίζειν$ ). Pythagoreans are commonly mocked in fourth-century comedy for their vegetarianism (e.g. Antiph. frs. 158, 166.6-8, Mnesim. fr. 1, Alex. fr. 201; for the verb  $\pi\upsilon\theta\alpha\gammao\bar{r}\iota\zeta\epsilon i\nu$  in particular, see Antiph. frs. 133.1, 225.8, Alex. fr. 223.1). One fragment of Aristophon's *Pythagorean* is especially instructive (fr. 9):

πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, οἰόμεθα τοὺς πάλαι ποτέ,  
τοὺς Πυθαγοριστὰς γινομένους ὄντας ύπτāν  
έκόντας ἡ φορεῖν τρίβωνας ἥδεως;  
οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐδὲν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ·  
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ ἔν,  
τῆς εὐτελείας πρόφασιν εύροντες καλὴν  
ὅρους ἔπηξαν τοῖς πένησι χρησίμους.  
ἐπεὶ παράθεται αὐτοῖσιν ἰχθῦς ἡ κρέας,  
κὰν μὴ κατεσθίωσι καὶ τοὺς δακτύλους,  
ἔθέλω κρέμασθαι δεκάκις.<sup>85</sup>

The key joke in this passage is that Pythagorean philosophical precepts were part of a pretence that justified the philosophers' poverty. The trope of philosophers being poor and greedy is already well attested during the fifth century, and here the idea is expanded and applied to the Pythagoreans.<sup>86</sup> Desire and willingness ( $\eta\delta\epsilon\omega s$  and  $\epsilon\kappa\sigma\tau\alpha s$ ) are rejected as plausible explanations for Pythagorean philosophy and contrasted with necessity ( $\varepsilon\xi \alpha\bar{n}\acute{a}g\kappa\eta s$ ). Thus, by extension, the fragment assumes the desirability of eating fish and meat when necessity does not restrict one's access. We find a similar kind of reinforcement of the values of good living in fragment 24, although here the Pythagorean belief in not eating meat is ascribed not to lack of resources, but to stupidity. Additionally, the sarcastic description of the Pythagoreans as wise and temperate uses

<sup>85</sup> “Do we, by the gods, think that the ancient Pythagoreans, who really were Pythagoreans, were dirty because they wanted to be, or enjoyed wearing rough robes? None of this is true, in my opinion. Instead, they didn't have anything, so they were forced to find a good excuse for their shabbiness and impose standards that worked for the poor. But serve them some fish or meat, and if they don't consume their fingers along with it, I'm willing to be hanged ten times.”

<sup>86</sup> Poverty is a trope deployed in Ar. *Nu.* (see for instance l. 179 with Dover (1968) *ad loc.*) and Socrates is similarly portrayed as poor and/or a thief in Eup. frs. 386 and 395 and Ameipsias fr. 9 (cf. Olson (2007) *ad F 1-2, 4*); in Eupolis' *Kolakes*, Protagoras is portrayed as greedy (e.g. fr 157.3). For these tropes in Aristophon's play, cf. frs. 10 and 12.

the same rhetorical strategies that we saw at play in the depiction of the Sicilians and Italians in fragment 46. Far from being wise and temperate, that is, the implication is that their supposed wisdom is really folly. In particular, the Pythagorean diet is cast as a form of *enkratēia* (ἐγκρατέως - 24.20), which was a significant part of the Greek morality of self-restraint.<sup>87</sup> Here, however, the positive virtue is transformed into a joke. Usually *enkratēia* applies to restraint with regard to what might otherwise be dangerous appetites (e.g. food or sex);<sup>88</sup> here, by contrast, *enkratēia* leads to the Pythagoreans passing over the kind of dishes Archestratus promotes as divine (θεῖον - 13). Diodorus' supposed wisdom thus is revealed to be a form of idiocy.<sup>89</sup> In both Aristophon and Archestratus, the espousal of good life is reinforced by exposing Pythagorean philosophy as either deceptive or misleading.

This association between Archestratus' culinary opponents and the Pythagorean school in fragment 24 prepares the ground for a different form of culinary pseudo-philosophy, which is eventually explicitly espoused in the symposiastic part of the poem (fr. 60.19-21):

οὗτω τοι δεῖ ζῆν τὸν ἐλεύθερον ἢ κατὰ γῆς  
καὶ κατὰ τοῦ βαράθρου καὶ Ταρτάρου ἐς τὸν ὄλεθρον  
ἵκειν καὶ κατορωρύχθαι σταδίους ἀναρίθμους.<sup>90</sup>

These lines draw upon an easily recognizable commonplace of poetry, to enjoy life while you can, hyperbolically exaggerating it as to produce a near-philosophical statement idealizing gustatory pleasure.<sup>91</sup> The idealization of pleasure over (the fear of) death becomes intimately associated later with Epicurean philosophy.<sup>92</sup> It is not surprising, then, that shortly after his quotation of this fragment, Athenaeus describes Archestratus as a forerunner of Epicurus (ώς Ἐπικούρω τῷ σοφῷ

<sup>87</sup> For notions of *enkratēia*, see Foucault (1992) 63-77.

<sup>88</sup> e.g. Pl. *Rep.* 430e, Arist. *EN* 1145b12-4. Such a meaning can of course also be mocked; see, for example, Machon 37: τῶν κωβῶν δ' ἀπέσκετ' ἐγκρατέστατα.

<sup>89</sup> One of the key features of comedy's satire of intellectuals in general was their supposed intelligence (see, for instance, Beta (2004) 264-6). It is not surprising, from this perspective, that both philosophers and cooks were accused of *alazoneia* (e.g. Protagoras in Eup. *Kol.* fr. 157). For comic satire of intellectuals, see esp. Imperio (1998), Carey (2000), Zimmermann (1993) and (2006) 106-19.

<sup>90</sup> "That is how a free man ought to live, or else go down unto destruction beneath the earth and beneath the Pit and Tartaros and be buried countless stades deep."

<sup>91</sup> For the commonplace, see for example Mimn. fr. 1.1-2, Choerilus Iasius(?) *SH* 335.1-2: εὖ εἰδῶς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν ἔεξε / τερπόμενος θαλίησι θανόντι σοι οὐτὶς ὄνησις, Philetair. fr. 7.1-6: τί δεῖ γὰρ ὅντα θνητόν, ἵκετεύω, ποιεῖν / πλὴν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν βίον καθ' ἡμέραν, / ἐὰν ἔχῃ τις ὄπόθεν; ... εἰς αὔριον δὲ <μηδὲ> φροντίζειν ὁ τι / ἔσται, Amphis fr. 8: πίνειν, παῖξε· θνητὸς ὁ βίος, ὀλίγος οὐπὶ γῇ χρόνος· / ἀθάνατος ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, ἀν ἄπαξ τις ἀποθάνη.

<sup>92</sup> Epicurus (*Ep. Hdt.* 81) begins the Epicurean trend of association mental disturbance (the opposite of *ataraxia*) with fear of the gods and fear of death. Later, as Tsouna (2009) 260-1 discusses, Philodemus is the first 'explicitly to dissociate a *carpe diem* attitude from one's true enjoyment of present pleasures' (cf. *De Elect.* 17.3-20).

τῆς ἥδονῆς καθηγεμῶν γενόμενος - 3.101f). While it is clear that Athenaeus is anachronistically retrojecting Epicurean philosophy onto Archestratus,<sup>93</sup> I am suggesting that the lines are designed to evoke philosophical claims about the best kind of life. Athenaeus' association between Archestratus' poetry and Epicurean philosophy is invited, therefore, by the philosophical overtones of lines such as these. By evoking philosophy in this way, these lines self-consciously draw on the trope of the comic *mageiros* who claims to have an affinity with philosophy. Euphron, for instance, compares his students with the Seven Sages (*Adelphoi* fr. 1.11-2), and a *mageiros* in Damoxenus' *Syntrophoi* claims to be a student of Epicurus himself (Ἐπικούρου δέ με / όρας μαθητὴν ὄντα τοῦ σοφοῦ - fr. 2.1-2). *Mageiroi*, that is, can (believe themselves to) be philosophers, and it is after this fashion that Archestratus here produces an ideology of gustatory pleasure.

Two passages of Homer may lurk in the background to Archestratus' exhortation to pleasure. The first is *Od.* 9.5-11, in which Odysseus claims that no time is more pleasant than festivity and feasting. The second is Achilles' famous words in the *Nekyia*, that he would rather be a servant on earth than rule over all of the dead (βουλούμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐών θητευέμεν ἀλλω, / ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ω μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη, / ἡ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν - 11.489-91). While neither of these is clearly referred to in this passage, what they demonstrate is the kind of epic precedent on which Archestratus may have built.

In this section, we have seen how Archestratus focuses his criticisms of others on their intelligence. By denying them a culinary ἐπιστήμη, except in the case of fish too poor to consider eating anyway, Archestratus sets himself up by contrast as "one of the few" in the know. He even associates his detractors – who are classified as mad – with the idiocy of Pythagorean philosophers, the stock comic butt of jokes, which likewise serves as a foil to Archestratus' own pseudo-philosophical statement of culinary ideology.

### Nonsense

Several times in the *Hed.*, we find Archestratus using nonsense (λῆρος, μωρολογία, and φλυαρία) used as a form of accusation or dismissal. Here I wish to interrogate the poet's use of this term to ascertain more precisely not simply *what* is being described as nonsense but also *to what effect*. As we shall see, nonsense accusations in the *Hed.* are fundamentally about competing notions of value and anti-value. Archestratus defines as nonsense authors and dishes that he regards as without value. By contrast to Archestratus' own expert narratorial voice, speakers of nonsense are presented as lacking intelligence, and indeed occasionally referred to as insane. While I have

<sup>93</sup> Supposedly the association between the two goes back as far as Chrysippus (fr. 709, SVF iii.178, ap. Ath. 3.104b).

argued throughout this chapter that Archestratus draws on the language of comic *mageiroi*, he reserves negative aspects of these figures, primarily their *alazoneia*, for those he criticizes, while Archestratus himself is implicitly portrayed as the pinnacle of the μαγειρικὴ τέχνη. Nonsense culinary suggestions, on the other hand, are inutile in the sense that they do not contribute towards the life of luxury Archestratus espouses.

In the most recent discussion of nonsense accusations in comedy, Stephen Kidd has suggested that nonsense could be associated with a number of different notions.<sup>94</sup> While his approach to the concept has important ramifications, his approach presents us with a methodological difficulty. Given that nonsense seems to be associated with different notions in different contexts, how do we discern the specific implications of any given use of the term nonsense?<sup>95</sup> I would suggest that the cognitive approaches I used to analyse parody in the Introduction can also be fruitfully applied here. Like parody, the implications of nonsense can be discerned by the specific way in which it is construed in a particular context, and particular "scripts" can evoke particular connotations of nonsense. In a general sense, however, to refer to a rival's speech act as nonsense is to attempt to deny its value, although the specific value involved varies dependent on context. This is clear if we compare Kidd's example of Isocrates with the comic poet Xenarchus. In the *Philip*, Isocrates uses nonsense to create a dichotomy between speech that is nonsense and that which is useful (τοὺς βουλομένους μὴ μάτην φλυαρεῖν, ἀλλὰ προῦργον τι ποιεῖν - 13). This contrast is primarily directed by his wider aims, such that utility is figured in terms of a speech's ability to persuade its primary audience. In Xenarchus' *Porphyra*, a speaker contrasts poets and fish-sellers in terms of their ingenuity. Poets never come up with anything new (οὐδὲ ἐν / καινὸν γὰρ εύρισκουσιν - 1-2), while there is no race more profound or depraved than fish-sellers (τῶν δ' ιχθυοπωλῶν φιλοσοφώτερον γένος / οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἀνόσιον - 3-4), a point which is then demonstrated by a tale of ingenuity (5-16). This contrast is fundamental to the point of the opening phrase, that the poets are "nonsense" (οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ (φησὶ) λῆρός εἰσιν - 1). The point is not that nonsense is connected with *kainotēs*, but rather that nonsense is simply the opposite of whatever the speaker values in that context. In both instances, that is, the specific connotations of nonsense are contingent upon the contrast between value and anti-value.

In Archestratus' *Hed.*, by contrast, there are two interrelated notions of value against which speakers of nonsense are contrasted, both of which are established in the opening of the poem:

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<sup>94</sup> Kidd (2014).

<sup>95</sup> Olson (2016b) raises a similar problem from a philological perspective. Here I suggest not that these problems with Kidd's argument should lead us to reject them entirely, but that we need a more explicit methodology for deciding what kinds of meanings can be considered significant in any given context. Like my discussion of parody in the Introduction, nonsense is a flexible term that is always adapted to the specific context.

firstly, the discussion of different dishes is determined by the premise of “where each food <and drink> is best” (*ὅπου ἔστιν ἔκαστον / κάλλιστον βρωτόν τε <ποτόν τε>* - fr. 3); secondly, the poem is a display of the expertise of the author (*ἱστορίης ἐπίδειγμα ποιούμενος* - fr. 1). In this section, however, I suggest that we are invited at different points in the poem to associate Archeistratus’ accusations of nonsense with two concepts identified by Kidd: madness and drunkenness.<sup>96</sup>

In the instances where Archeistratus refers to objects as nonsense, we see the contrast between what foods are and are not valued (frs. 25.1 and 36):

ἀλλὰ παρεῖς λῆρον πολὺν ἀστακὸν ὄνοῦ.<sup>97</sup>

εἰ δ’ ἐθέλεις καὶ τοῦτο δαήμεναι, ὡ φίλε Μόσχε,  
ὄντινα χρή σε τρόπον κείνην διαθεῖναι ἄριστα,  
ἐν συκῆς φύλλοις καὶ ὀριγάνῳ οὐ μάλα πολλῇ.  
μὴ τυρόν, μὴ λῆρον· ἀπλῶς δ’ οὔτως θεραπεύσας.<sup>98</sup>

In both of these fragments, *λῆρος* refers to foods or seasonings which are rejected as unfit. Although, as I have mentioned, Greek words for nonsense usually refer to speech (perhaps especially *φλυαρία*, which derives from the verb *φλύω*, “babble”),<sup>99</sup> they are occasionally used to refer to both actions and objects, in which case the item’s inutility is emphasized.<sup>100</sup> The most pertinent example for Archeistratus is the comic poet Alexis, who describes food that produces too much scent and not enough flavour as *λῆρος* (fr. 263),<sup>101</sup> although medicine that has no effect can be described as *φλυαρία* (e.g. Galen *De Comp. Med.* 13.391) and dildos, on the grounds that they provide pleasure but not procreation, are called *φλυαρία*, *λῆρος*, and *ὕθλος* (Austin CGPR fr. 62, Ar. *Lys.* 159). In what sense, we must therefore ask, are these foods regarded as useless? While one might, for instance, define a food as useless if it provides no nourishment, in the *Hed.* a food is useless if it does not provide sufficient pleasure. This is particularly clear in fragment 36. After saying that there is no way to ruin the bonito, Archeistratus rejects cheese and other “nonsense” as

<sup>96</sup> For a discussion of these, cf. Kidd (2014) 26-9, 40-3.

<sup>97</sup> “But pass over much rubbish and buy yourself a lobster.”

<sup>98</sup> “But, my dear Moschus, if you nonetheless want to know the best way for you to prepare this fish [the bonito], the answer is: in fig leaves and a bit of marjoram. No cheese, no other nonsense! Treat it simply, as I have described.”

<sup>99</sup> Beekes (2010) s.v. *φλυαρέω*. *φλύω* originally refers to the bubbling of liquids but is also used to mean “overflow with words” or “babble”, e.g. at A. *Pr.* 504, *Th.* 661; cf. *LSJ* s.v. *φλύω* A II.

<sup>100</sup> Kidd (2014) 20: ‘when one wishes to apply *phluaria* or *lēros* more metaphorically/pejoratively to an object, it is precisely this aspect of uselessness which is being implied.’

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Arnott (1996) *ad loc.*: ‘this coda to a string of nouns implies that they are all trumpery.’

an opportunity to provide what instead is the best method, marked by the reuse of the culinary keyword, ἀπλῶς. Similarly in fragment 25 the gustatory value of the lobster is emphasized several lines after the rejection of λῆρος (*πάντων ἀρετῇ τε κράτιστοι / ἐν Λιπάραις* - 25.4-5). In these examples, then, we see that, when foods are described as nonsense, questions of value as regards the life of luxury are at issue.

In the other instance in the poem where a form of λῆρος applies to an object, we can see the connection between value, pleasure, and knowledge. In fragment 46, Archestratus rejects the expertise of the Sicilians and Italians for making the grey mullet and sea-bass, saying that they are only fit to make rockfish and “sticky little dishes full of seasonings and other nonsense” (*όψαρίων τεύχειν γλίσχων ἱδυσματολήρων* - 46.18, quoted at greater length above). As I have already shown, in this fragment Archestratus focuses on creating a distinction between himself (as narrator) and the Sicilian school by focusing on notions of knowledge, specifically ἐπιστήμη. This argument is complemented if we consider the compound form *ἱδυσματολήρων* as indicating anti-value. Just as, in Archestratus’ rhetoric, an object is λῆρος if it does not provide the most pleasure, the same criteria apply to methods of preparation. The logical result, then, is that those who are incapable (i.e. insufficiently knowledgeable) of preparing foods in the best way, are only fit for preparing food that is in any case incapable of providing the most pleasure.

The connection between knowledge (or lack thereof) and nonsense is clearer, however, when these terms are applied to individuals and their speech. We have already seen, for instance, in fragment 24 how Archestratus shifts from criticisms of those who would refuse to eat the saw-tooth shark to the Pythagoreans by attacking their mental faculties. The satiric irony here, of course, is that comparison to a philosophical school is designed further to undermine, rather than strengthen, our perception of such people’s intellect, a depiction that is emphasized through the term *κουφαττελεβώδη*. As the fragment shifts its focus to the philosophers, however, the non-shark eaters are described as *όπόσοι τάδε μωρολογοῦσι*. The associations between nonsense and madness specifically are evoked through the way in which these figures are construed, that is through the adjective *ἀπόπληκτοι*. By depicting them thus, Archestratus can strengthen this notion that those who disagree with him aren’t just wrong or even stupid, but more emphatically that they are insane. This is nicely contrasted with the figure of Archestratus himself. Not only does he throughout present himself as an ultimate arbiter, but the word *μωρολογέω* itself is most commonly used in prose, sometimes by intellectuals of those with whom they disagree (e.g.

Chrysipp. fr. log. 109 von Arnim).<sup>102</sup> If, then, Archestratus is trying to create the impression of a (pseudo-)intellectual argument, this would allow him to strike a pose in stark opposition to the insanity of those he is attacking.

Now that we have seen how Archestratus mobilizes the connections between nonsense speech, anti-value, and madness, we can see more clearly how this is incorporated into his use of comic satire and especially the connection with the comic *mageiros*. The context of this final criticism, the evaluation of the qualities of different wines, also lends itself to the association already noted between nonsense and drunkenness (fr. 59.5-20):

τὸν τ' ἀπὸ Φοινίκης ἰερῆς τὸν Βίβλινον αἰνῶ,  
οὐ μέντοι κείνω γε παρεξισῶ αὐτόν. ἐάν γὰρ  
ἐξαίφνης αὐτοῦ γεύσῃ μὴ πρόσθεν ἐθισθεῖς,  
εὐώδης μέν σοι δόξει τοῦ Λεσβίου εἶναι  
μᾶλλον, ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτο χρόνου διὰ μῆκος ἄπλατον·  
πινόμενος δ' ἥσσων πολλῶ. κεῖνος δὲ δοκήσει  
οὐκ οἴνω σοι ἔχειν ὅμοιον γέρας, ἀμβροσίη δέ.  
εὶ δὲ τινες σκώπτουσιν ἀλαζονοχαυνοφλύαροι  
ώς ἄδιστος ἔφυ πάντων Φοινίκιος οἶνος,  
οὐ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖς <                >.  
ἔστι δὲ καὶ Θάσιος πίνειν γενναῖος, ἐὰν ἢ  
πολλαῖς πρεσβεύων ἐτέων περικαλλέσιν ὕραις.  
οἶδα δὲ κὰξ ἄλλων πόλεων βοτρυοσταγῇ ἔρνη  
εἰπεῖν αἰνῆσαι τε καὶ οὕ με λέληθ' ὄνομῆναι.  
ἄλλ' οὐθὲν τἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄπλως πρὸς Λέσβιον οἶνον.

<sup>102</sup> Suggestively, the verb also occurs in the same metrical *sedes* in adesp. parod. fr. 3 (τέτλαθι δὴ πενίη καὶ ἀνάσχεο μωρολογούντων· / ὄψων γὰρ πλῆθος σε δαμᾶ καὶ λιμὸς ἀτερπτῆς). In both cases, the verb signals the speaker's resistance to the foolish speech of others. Lack of context for this fragment, however, limits our ability to infer whether or not the speaker here is also posing as an intellectual. The invocation of penury is not dissimilar to Matro (AD 91-2), and poverty is not necessarily a hindrance in humorous texts to pretensions of intellect.

The criticism of those who would mockingly assert that Phoenician wine is the best is in fact summed up in a single – albeit long – word: ἀλαζόνοχαυνοφλύαροι. This word, formed from the constituent parts ἀλαζών, χαῦνος, and φλυαρία, not only draws again on the idea of nonsense speech as valueless, but presents them in the mould of a drunken comic *mageiros*, who is more verbose than actually knowledgeable.

The context of this fragment, the discussion of wine, also evokes the script of the symposium, in which inebriation (and by extension drunken rambling) plays an important role. The accusation that proponents of Phoenician wine speak gibberish, then, is fitting in that gibberish is also the result of excessive wine consumption. Furthermore, a frequent characteristic of drunken nonsense is emptiness. Thus Plutarch glosses the phrase τὴν γοῦν μέθην οἱ λοιδοροῦντες φιλόσοφοι λήρησιν πάροινον ἀποκαλοῦσιν with τὸ δὲ ληρεῖν οὐδέν εστιν ἀλλ' ἡ λόγω κενῶ χρῆσθαι καὶ φλυαρώδει (*Quaest. Conv.* 716f). More specifically, drunken speech can be defined by what it is not: it is not “useful”. Thus in Aristophanes *Knights*, when the slave Demosthenes suggests to Nicias that they drink themselves to death, since they may stumble on some useful plot (ἴσως γὰρ ἀν χρηστόν τι βουλευσαίμεθα - 86), the outraged Nicias asks: πῶς δ' ἀν μεθύων χρηστόν τι βουλεύσαιτ' ἀνίρῳ (87), reflecting a particular and hostile attitude towards drunken speech. While nothing in the term ἀλαζόνοχαυνοφλύαροι explicitly evokes inebriation, that is, aspects of its meaning are especially fitting in the context of a discussion of wine and symposia.

The emphasis on inutility and emptiness in particular is confirmed by the use of χαῦνος. Although it properly means “gaping” (through its derivation from χαίνω, a variation of χάσκω), when used metaphorically it means empty or frivolous and is used by Solon amongst others to refer to others’ speech (χαῦνα μὲν τότ' ἐφράσαντο - 34.4) and mind (σύμπασιν δ' ὑμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος - 11.6). It is also fairly commonly found in comedy, even appearing in several comic compounds (e.g. χαυνοπολίτης - Ar. *Ach.* 635, χαυνόπρωκτος - *Ach.* 104). Here, too, we find the specification that utility is defined in terms of pleasure, as the claim Archestratus mocks is that Phoenician wine is *sweetest* (ἄδιστος).

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<sup>103</sup> “I also praise the Bibline wine from holy Phoenicia, although I do not rank it equal to *Lesbian*. For if you are previously unacquainted with it and taste it for the first time, you will think it more fragrant than *Lesbian*, for it retains this quality on account of its tremendous age. But when it is drunk, it is much inferior, whereas *Lesbian* wine will seem to you to share the rank of ambrosia rather than of wine. and if some emptyheadedbrainlessbullshitartists mockingly assert that Phoenician wine is best of all, I pay them no attention <      >. Thasian wine as well is good to drink, if it is the eldest by many lovely seasons of years. I am able to mention the vine-shoots dripping with grape-clusters from other cities as well, and am not unaware of how to praise and name them. But the others are just nothing compared with *Lesbian* wine, although some people like to praise what they have in their own land.”

The first component of the word, ἀλαζών, provides the emphasis on drunken and useless speech with a comically satirical clarity. As discussed by MacDowell, the ἀλαζών is a common figure from comedy, who boasts to have greater abilities than he really does.<sup>104</sup> That their speech claims to have significance but does not have any recalls also the significance of ἐπιστήμη, and the claim that the Sicilians do not possess it. While the ἀλαζών might well be an attendee of a dinner-party, as in the case of Protagoras in Eupolis' *Kolakes* (fr. 157), ἀλαζονεία is more prominently a feature of the comic *mageiros*. One chef in Posidippus' *Choreuousai* even tells his students that in the art of the chef the most important spice is this – bullshit (τῶν ἱδυσμλατῶν / πάντων κράτιστόν ἔστιν ἐν μαγειρικῇ / ἀλαζονείᾳ - fr. 28.3-5). The importance of bullshit to the figure of the *mageiros* is well recognized by Athenaeus, who devotes two discussions (7.288c-93e and 9.376c-83f) to the discussion of the ἀλαζονεία μαγειρική.<sup>105</sup> At his most extreme, Athenaeus says that the entire tribe of chefs are bullshitters (ἀλαζονικὸν δ' ἔστι πᾶν μαγείρων φῦλον - 290a). Thus, while Archestratus is recognizably deploying many strategies common in the language of the *mageiros*, he nevertheless foists their negative characteristics onto his detractors, who are cast in the mould of the kind of *mageiros* who is loud and boastful without the skills to back it up.

The description of the naysayers as ἀλαζονοχαυνοφλύαροι, in short, depicts them as boasters, whose futile bullshit not only makes them look like the buffoonish comic *mageiros* but also is recognized and called out by Archestratus himself. This latter point, the contrast between the idiotic bullshitters and Archestratus himself, is clearly evoked in the rest of the fragment. In the opening, Archestratus puts a great deal of emphasis upon a detailed examination of the different qualities of Lesbian and Bibline wines. After providing the pseudo-epic origins of the different wines, Archestratus contrasts the fragrance one experiences at the sip (*γεύσῃ*) of Bibline wine with the superior quality of Lesbian when drunk more deeply (*πινόμενος*).<sup>106</sup> We also find an emphasis on the importance of age (*χρόνου διὰ μῆκος ἀπλατῶν* - 9) and fragrance (*εὐώδης* - 8). The close focus on the comparison of tastes in the opening of this fragment is significant for the emphasis it places on Archestratus' gastronomic ability, which is continued by the repeated claims to knowledge (*οἶδα... οὐ με λέληθ'*). We might even read the formula "I praise Bibline... although I do not rank it equal to Lesbian" as a challenge to the Hesiodic reference to Bibline wine (*ἀλλὰ τότ' ἥδη / εἴη πετραίη τε σκιὴ καὶ Βίβλινος οἶνος* - *Op.* 589), an assertion of Archestratus' expertise against

<sup>104</sup> MacDowell (1990) 289: 'I conclude that an ἀλαζών in Old Comedy is a man who holds an official position or professes expertise which, he claims, makes him superior to other men; he exploits it, normally in speech, to obtain profit, power, or reputation; but what he says is actually false or useless.'

<sup>105</sup> For Athenaeus on the *mageiros*, see Wilkins (2000) 408-10. The importance of *alazoneia* to the comic *mageiros* was also recognized by Arnott (1996) 21-2.

<sup>106</sup> For the contrast between sipping and drinking full cups, see Olson and Sens (2000) *ad fr.* 59.6.

the didactic poet *par excellence*. The careful analysis in these lines depicts Archestratus as a specialist to be contrasted with the ἀλαζόνοχαυνοφλύαροι, whose speech is empty and futile.

Nonsense words, then, are at the extreme end of the general depiction of Archestratus' gastronomic opponents as lacking intelligence. It is not simply that they are unintelligent, that is, but the categorization of their speech as nonsense marks them as mentally unhinged and / or drunk, and as lacking utility. They are, in short, just like comic *mageiroi* in their boastful bullshit, their *alazoneia*, leaving space for Archestratus to present himself as the pinnacle of the μαγειρικὴ τέχνη.

As a conclusion to this section, I would like to make a comparison with a fragment of Dionysius of Sinope's comic play *Thesmophoros*. In this fragment, I suggest we see a conscious reflection of and challenge to Archestratus' own criticisms of others. Thus far, that is, I have argued that Archestratus uses satirical tropes that were common to comic *mageiroi* during the fourth century and beyond, specifically portraying his opponents as less intelligent than him, and occasionally implying that they are insane. Furthermore, in fr. 59 we saw how Archestratus portrays them using one of the common criticisms of *mageiroi*, namely as bullshit artists. He does not draw on every satirical trope, however, but focuses on those that further his particular aims, portraying himself in contrast to those he criticizes as an expert of the good life. It is striking, then, that the very same rhetoric is inverted back onto Archestratus himself by the *mageiros* of Dionysius (fr. 2.24-9):

Αρχέστρατος γέγραφέ τε καὶ δοξάζεται  
παρά τισιν οὕτως ὡς λέγων τι χρήσιμον.  
τὰ πολλὰ δ' ἥγνόηκε κούδε ἐν λέγει.  
μὴ πάντ' ἄκουε μηδὲ πάντα μάνθανε  
† τῶν βιαίων ἐσθ' ἔνεκα τὰ γεγραμμένα,  
κενὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτε ἦν οὐδέπω γεγραμμένα. †<sup>107</sup>

The speaker of the fragment immediately sets out his judgement of Archestratus in the same terms we have already seen, with the central concept being utility (*τι χρήσιμον*). Utility is, just as I have argued for the *Hed.*, defined in terms of pleasure (*οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ τὴν τούτων χάριν / ἔχεις ὁμοίαν οὐδ' ἵσην τὴν ἥδονήν - 2.22-3*). Despite the similarity in their aims, however, the *mageiros'* criticisms of Archestratus use the same rhetoric used by Archestratus himself. He claims that he is ignorant (*ἥγνόηκε*) and even that his speech is nonsensical (*κούδε ἐν λέγει*).<sup>108</sup> This fragment,

<sup>107</sup> "Archestratus has done some writing, and there are people who think he's got something useful to say. But he's mostly ignorant, and he talks nonsense. Don't listen to everything or try to learn everything † because of violent action what's been written is more hollow than when it hadn't been written. †"

<sup>108</sup> For the idea of οὐδὲν λέγειν as nonsense, see Kidd (2014) 17 with n. 7.

then, demonstrates the ubiquity of the satirical strategies I have been discussing in Archestratus. Just as Archestratus deploys the strategies commonly found in comedy and is responding to the *alazoneia* of the comic *mageiros*, we find the same strategies used as a response to Archestratus. An interesting facet of this fragment, however, is that the *mageiros* does not explicitly disagree with Archestratus on specific methods, as Archestratus does with the Sicilians, but rather much of the emphasis is on the necessity of tailoring the meal to the guests (*τὸν μάγειρον εἰδέναι / πολὺ δεῖ γὰρ αἰεὶ πρότερον οἵς μέλλει ποεῖν / τὸ δεῖπνον ἢ τὸ δεῖπνον ἐπιβλέψῃ μόνον - 2.2-4*). This fits into two related themes of the *mageiros*, the rejection of cookbooks and specialized tailoring to individual guests.<sup>109</sup> The debate about the role and skill set of the *mageiros* during the fourth century, that is, is not as unidirectional as Archestratus might lead us to believe. While he focuses on methods of preparation, others place greater value elsewhere. What remains, however, is the important role of criticism and satire, as we saw earlier in Posidippus fragment 1, within which the role of intellect has great value.

Through this comparison with Dionysius, we can see how Archestratus should be situated in the context of the comic *mageiros*. His critique of them is critiqued in turn. Two final elements help us to see how this jostling is imagined in specifically satirical terms. Dionysius' *mageiros* talks of violence (*τῶν βιαίων*), which could easily be taken as reference not to physical violence but the metaphorical, literary violence of satire. Similarly, in fragment 59, Archestratus suggests that the *ἀλαζονοχαυνοφλύαροι* are *mocking* (*σκώπτουσιν*) when they argue for Phoenician wine. The use of this verb could equally well apply to Archestratus himself here, so that he is seen as answering mockery with mockery. On my reading of the *Hed.*, we are presented with a poet who uses the same or similar techniques, both linguistic and thematic, as those with whom he is engaging as a means to present them as insane while he fashions himself as the ultimate arbiter of gustatory pleasure. With this established, we can now turn to what the implications of this view are for our understanding of Archestratus' poetics.

## ΑΒΟΔΑΙΣ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ: ARCHESTRATUS' SYNAESTHETIC POETICS

As I said at the start of the chapter, Archestratus' attacks upon others are part of a strategy of self-definition. This idea is supported if we understand Archestratus' promotion of a specific type of food as a form of *habitus* in Bourdieu's terms, so that his criticisms can by extension be understood as a means of distinction. In this final section, I shall therefore turn to consider what precisely this

<sup>109</sup> For the rejection of cookbooks, compare Sotades fr. 1. For the idea that the *mageiros* must tailor dishes to his guests, Anaxippus fr. 1; similarly, a *mageiros* in Menander (fr. 409) receives complaints from his employer for preparing dishes too elaborate for the context.

means for Archestratus' poetic self-definition. He might be "not in the Sicilian school", but what does this mean in practice? As I shall argue, the association between culinary and poetic ideologies builds upon a *topos* already present in the comic *mageiros*, whom we have already seen Archestratus drawing upon. I suggest specifically that Archestratus espouses a synaesthetic approach to pleasure,<sup>110</sup> by which I mean that all aspects of the sympotic experience, of which his poem is an important part, are treated through the same, or virtually the same, rubric. Thus, the food, drink, symposiasts, setting, poetry, and more are all approached in a manner typified by the rhetoric of simplicity and restraint. Simplicity is here defined in two ways, as "not elaborate" and "not sharp".

We have already seen the extent to which Archestratus draws upon common tropes of comic *mageiroi*, such as their claims to expertise and their criticism of others. Thus far, however, one final *topos* from this literary world remains unexplored: the *mageiros*-poet. We have already seen that the comic *mageiros* attempts to legitimize his expertise through a number of comparisons between cooking and other areas, such as martial leadership, medicine, and philosophy. However, when it comes to the *mageiros*-poet, comic writers are also drawing on the well-established metaphor of poetry as food. The suggestion that often emerges is that cooks or cookery writers are well suited to poetry or generally similar to poets. Thus, in Alexis' *Linus*, Linus tells Heracles that Simus, supposedly a cookery writer turned tragedian, is the best cook among the tragedians and the best tragedian among the cooks (*τῶν μὲν ὑποκριτῶν πολὺ / κράτιστός ἐστιν ὄφοποιός, ως δοκεῖ / τοῖς χρωμένοις, τῶν δ' ὄφοποιῶν ὑποκριτής* - fr. 140.14-6). The claim is made even more explicitly by a *mageiros* in Euphron, who says that the chef does not differ from the poet, as both require skill (*οὐδὲν ὁ μάγειρος τοῦ ποιητοῦ διαφέρει· / ὁ νοῦς γάρ ἐστιν ἔκατέρω τούτων τέχνη* - fr. 10.15-6).<sup>111</sup> In the *Hed.*, I suggest, Archestratus develops this comic *topos* through his use of the metaphor of food as poetry. Both his espousal of simplicity and his rejection of elaboration and sharpness can be read in this context as not only promoting (however ironically) a culinary ideology but also a poetic one.

Significantly, however, this metaphor does not work in isolation but is part of a wider claim for simplicity in all areas of the symposium, which includes his own poetry.<sup>112</sup> It is precisely within this synaesthetic approach to the symposium that I want to situate Archestratus' poetics. This

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<sup>110</sup> For a discussion of synesthesia, see Butler and Purves (2013).

<sup>111</sup> Similarly, the chef in Damoxenus' *Syntrophoi* fr. 2 compares cooking with music, as both require harmony.

<sup>112</sup> For the performance of Archestratus' poem in the symposium, see the Introduction and P.S Martin (2016). We certainly have anecdotal evidence (Clearchus fr. 63 Wehrli) that the poem was performed in symposia within decades of its composition.

sympotic synaesthesia is most programmatically stated in fragment 4, which almost certainly comes from towards the beginning of the poem:<sup>113</sup>

πρὸς δὲ μῆ πάντας δειπνεῖν ἀβρόδαιτι τραπεζῇ·  
ἐστωσαν δ' ἡ τρεῖς ἡ τέσσαρες οἱ ξυνάπαντες  
ἢ τῶν πέντε γε μὴ πλείους· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη  
μισθοφόρων ἀρπαξιβίων σκηνὴ στρατιωτῶν.<sup>114</sup>

Here the ἀβρόδαιτι τραπεζῇ metonymically represents everything about the sympotic experience. This reading is invited not only by the fact that τράπεζα frequently serves just such a metonymic purpose (earlier, for instance, I mentioned the Συρακοσίαν τράπεζαν as used in Ar. *Dait.* fr. 225), but the adjective modifying it already points to the feast for which the table will be used, as well as playing on the more common term ἀβροδίαιτος, which refers to all aspects of life (see, for instance, Th. 1.6.3-5). It is, however, the ἀβρός part of this word which carries a strong ideological meaning. As discussed by Leslie Kurke, ἀβροσύνη is used in the sixth century to describe a ‘distinctive aristocratic lifestyle’ which had its origins in the East, that encompasses clothing, long hair, gold, perfumes and oils, wine, and song.<sup>115</sup> In the final decades of the fifth century and into the fourth, however, ἀβροσύνη is for the most part replaced by τρυφή. Nevertheless, where ἀβρός and ἀβροσύνη remain used during the fourth century is in sympotic contexts (e.g. Pl. *Smp.* 404c). Even here the word retains its negative connotations. Thus when, in Xenophon’s *Symposium*, Antisthenes maintains that his leisure is τὸ ἀβρότατόν γε κτῆμα (4.44), he is also careful to distance himself from expensive displays of consumption such as fancy dishes and expensive wine (4.41). The continuing negative connotations of ἀβροσύνη, as well as its associations with both τρυφὴ and (significantly for us) ἡδυπάθεια, are well demonstrated by a fragment of Antiphanes’ *Dodonis* (fr. 91):

πόθεν οὐκήτωρ, ἢ τις Ιώνων  
τρυφεραμπεχόνων ἀβρός ἡδυπαθής  
οὐχ λος ὥρμηται;<sup>116</sup>

<sup>113</sup> For the structure of the *Hed.*, see Olson and Sens (2000) xxiv-xxviii.

<sup>114</sup> “Everyone should dine at a single table set for an elegant meal. Let the total company be three or four, or at any rate no more than five; for after that you would have a mess group of rapacious mercenary soldiers.”

<sup>115</sup> Kurke (1992) 96.

<sup>116</sup> “Whence its inhabitant? Has some pampered, luxury-loving crowd of Ionians wearing rich garments set off?”

While ἀβροσύνη might have retained a negative meaning in many cases, however, Archestratus seems unconcerned with these connotations. Indeed, the significance of ἀβροσύνη in the *Hed.* is well demonstrated by its other occurrence, when it is used to describe the perfect cooking time for loaves (λευκὸς ἀβραῖς θάλλων ὥραις τέρψει παρὰ δεῖπνον - fr. 5.18). This transferred adjective (for clearly the important point is that the loaf is ἀβρός) seems to imply that the positive qualities of the food almost extend abstractly to the time at which they are served (cf. a similar scenario in Philox. *PMG* 836e.20 - ἐρέβινθοι... ἀπαλαῖς θάλλοντες ὥραις). Within the immediate context, however, it is also worth noting that in fr. 4 Archestratus deflects to some extent the potentially negative connotations of ἀβροσύνη by the careful delimitation of the sympotic *hetaireia*: no more than 5 people allowed. This minimalist exhortation – larger numbers at a symposium are not uncommon<sup>117</sup> – suggests a rhetoric of restraint, even simplicity. A small symposium could be argued to be less wasteful of an individual's invisible wealth than a large one. Additionally, the characterization of larger symposia as “a mess-group of rapacious mercenary soldiers” suggests that the ἀβροσύνη of Archestratus' symposium extends to behaviour.

At the end of the symposium, too, ἀβροσύνη remains important, this time encapsulated in the garlands, perfumes, and incense (fr. 60.1-5):

ἀεὶ δὲ στεφάνοισι κάρη παρὰ δαῖτα πυκάζου  
παντοδαποῖς, οἵς ἀν γαίης πέδον ὄλβιον ἀνθῆ  
καὶ στακτοῖσι μύροις ἀγαθοῖς χαίτην θεράπευε,  
καὶ σμύρνην λίβανόν τε πυρὸς μαλακήν ἐπὶ τέφρην  
βάλλε πανημέριος, Συρίης εὐώδεα κάρπον.<sup>118</sup>

While much of this is typical of the symposium, it nevertheless marks the event as regulated and orderly.<sup>119</sup> This order is marked by the different positive adjectives – a variety of flowers, fine perfume, soft ash, and fragrant smells – while the disordered symposium may be marked by the upsetting and spilling of the same things.<sup>120</sup> It is also possible, although Archestratus does not

<sup>117</sup> E.g. Ath. 15.671a-b, Sopat. fr. 20 Kaibel, Ar. V. 1220-1, 1301-2.

<sup>118</sup> “Always cover your head at a feast with garlands of every variety with which the earth's rich plain blooms, and treat your hair with fine perfumes dispensed in drops, and all day long cast myrrh and frankincense, the fragrant fruit of Syria, upon the fire's soft ash.”

<sup>119</sup> Compare, for instance, Xenoph. fr. B1, Pl. Com. fr. 71.1-9, Nicostr. Com. fr. 27, Alex. fr. 252, Matro *AD* 104-10.

<sup>120</sup> One famous example is the chorus of *Acharnians* description of Polemos at a symposium (981-6): ὅτι παροινικὸς ἀνήρ ἔφυ, / ὅστις ἐπὶ πάντ' ἀγάθ' ἔχοντας ἐπικωμάσας / ἡργάσατο πάντα κακά, κἀντερεπε καξέχει / καμάχετο καὶ προσέτι πολλὰ προκαλούμένου / “πῖνε κατάκεισο λαβὲ τήνδε φιλοτησίαν” / τὰς χάρακας ἥπτε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ πυρὶ, / ἐξέχει θ' ἡμῶν βίᾳ τὸν οἶνον ἐκ τῶν ἀμπέλων.

stress this, that the importance of treating the head with perfume (which, again, we note is done in moderation, i.e. in drops) may be to prevent excessive drunkenness. We know from the Hellenistic medical writer Philonides that applying oily substances to the head was thought to decrease the wine's force.<sup>121</sup> The delicate use of perfume might then add an extra level of restraint and simplicity to the proceedings. We also see here the importance of smells to Archestratus' sympotic order, as εὐώδης frequently marks the positive values of both wine (59.8) and ingredients (11.9, 24.10, 46.6, 49.2).

Other pleasures of the symposium are hinted at. One recipe for a naturally soft sargue, for instance, is said to contain the peak of pleasure (τὴν ἀρετὴν... τῆς τέρψιος - 37.9). Although the meaning is clear, the use of τέρψις rather than ἡδύτης hints at sexual as well as gastronomic pleasure, a view that may be supported by the common use of food items as aphrodisiacs elsewhere (as in Plato Comicus' *Phaon*).

In short, then, Archestratus' poem goes beyond the limits ascribed to it in fragment 3 (to tell ὅπου ἔστιν ἔκαστον / κάλλιστον βρωτόν τε <ποτόν τε>). It seeks to regulate the number of attendees at the dinner and their behaviour, the food, the drink, some of which may arouse sexual pleasure as much as a gastronomic one, and the sights and smells. The poem too, partially due to its regulation, is part of the experience. It acts as a display of research (ίστορίης ἐπίδειγμα - fr. 1), a phrase that both points to the poem's didactic pretensions and its sympotic context.<sup>122</sup> The pleasures of the symposium can then be defined by what they are not, an attempt to distinguish Archestratus and his companions against anyone who acts differently. In particular, the poem defines such pleasure as "not elaborate" and "not sharp".

Excessive elaboration is an accusation made against a particular kind of preparation typical of the Sicilian school – high levels of cheese and spices. It is especially associated with gluttonous, animalistic consumption, which reflects on the morals of consumers and producers alike (fr. 57):

τοῦ δὲ λαγώ πολλοί τε τρόποι πολλαί τε θέμιστες  
σκευασίης εἰσίν. κεῖνος δ' οὖν ἔστιν ἄριστος,  
ἀν πίνουσι μεταξὺ φέρης κρέας ὀπτὸν ἔκαστω,

<sup>121</sup> φησὶν γὰρ ὁ Φιλωνίδης ἐν τῷ Περὶ Μύρων καὶ Στεφάνων τὴν ἀφορμὴν τοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐν τοῖς πότοις λιπαίνειν ἐντεῦθεν γενέσθαι· τοῖς αὐχμῶσι γὰρ τὰς κεφαλὰς εἰς τὸ μετέωρον ἔλκεσθαι τὸ λαμβανόμενον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν πυρετῶν διακαιόντων τὰ σώματα τέγγουσι τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπιβρέγμασιν, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ ξηρόν, ταύτῃ δὲ καὶ πολύκενον, ὅρμὴν τὰ παρακείμενα λαμβάνῃ. τοῦτο δὴ λογισάμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πότων τὴν εἰς τὸ μετέωρον τῶν οἰνων φορὰν ὑποπτεύσαντες ἐπεσπάσθησαν κεφαλὴν λιπαίνειν, ὡς ἐλάσσονος <τῆς> βίας γενησομένης, εἰ ταύτην προτέγξαιεν. προστιθεὶς δ' ὁ βίος ἀεὶ τοῖς χρειώδεσιν καὶ τῶν εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ τρυφὴν ἀγόντων ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν μύρων χρῆσιν ὥρμησεν - Philonides ap. Ath. 15.691f-2b

<sup>122</sup> For the connection between ἐπίδειγμα and cognate terms with the symposium, see P.S Martin (2016) 156-7.

θερμόν, ἀπλῶς ἀλίπαστον, ἀφαρπάζων ὄβελίσκου  
μικρὸν ἐνωμότερον. μὴ λυπείτω δέ σ' ὁρῶντα  
ἰχῶρα στάζοντα κρεῶν, ἀλλ' ἔσθιε λάβρως.  
αἱ δ' ἄλλαι περίεργοι ἔμοιγ' εἰσὶν διὰ παντὸς  
σκευασίαι, γλοιῶν καταχύσματα καὶ κατάτυρα  
καὶ κατέλαια λίτην, ὥσπερ γαλῆ ὀψωποιούντων.<sup>123</sup>

The line between positive and negative models of consumption in this fragment are not entirely clear, but Archestratus' language remains significant for drawing out the conceptual differences. The fragment begins with a play on our expectation of a (pseudo-)ethnographical commentary on the "manners and customs" of the hare which is disappointed by the enjambèd *σκευασίης*.<sup>124</sup> It is significant here, however, for reminding us of Archestratus' wide travels (fr. 2) and for emphasizing the possibility of "getting it wrong", i.e. the preparations that are not ἀριστος. What follows, then, is a contrast between the right way of preparing the dish (again featuring the ideologically charged term *ἀπλῶς*) and the alternative methods of preparation, which are *περίεργοι*.

On the one hand, we could read this fragment metapoetically. For instance, *σκευασία* is used to refer to a range of activities, including poetics (e.g. καὶ σκευασία μὴ μί’ ἡ τῆς μουσικῆς - Astydamas fr. 4 = Com. Adesp. fr. 1330, which also plays on a comparison between cooking and poetics). This slippage between the poetic and culinary can then be extended to Archestratus' description of the different methods. If we read this recipe metapoetically, we should also consider that the insistence on the serving it hot (θερμόν), although not unusual for Greek culinary tastes,<sup>125</sup> may be significant in light of the common use of frigidity (*ψυχρός*) in comedy to describe poems or poets.<sup>126</sup> The alternative methods of preparation are *περίεργοι*, an adjective which is also frequently used for negative evaluations of literary style from the fourth century onwards (e.g. Aeschin. 3.229 and D.H. *Lys.* 14). This reading is further supported by the common association between what goes into and comes out of the mouth. Deborah Steiner especially, drawing on the

<sup>123</sup> “Diverse are the manners and the settled customs of the hare’s preparation. But it is best if while the others are drinking you bring around roasted meat to each man, hot and seasoned with salt alone, pulling it off the spit while it is still a bit on the rare side. Do not let it trouble you when you see the juice dripping from the meat, but eat it greedily. The other ways of preparing it are, in my opinion, much, much too elaborate – sauces made of sticky things and over-rich in oil and cheese, as if they were preparing the dish for a weasel.”

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Olson and Sens (2000) *ad loc.*

<sup>125</sup> Athenaeus (1.5e-f), for instance, records stories about those who used different techniques to eat their food hotter, and therefore also quicker, than anyone else.

<sup>126</sup> For the metaphorical use of temperature for literary criticism in comedy, see Wright (2012) 108-10. However, as should be cautious about Archestratus' use of θερμός here as Wright notes that θερμός is not used for the same purposes elsewhere.

work of Gregory Nagy, has demonstrated that in Pindar ‘those who engage in abuse and blame poetry within epic and lyric texts are repeatedly portrayed not just as eating, but as devouring their food in a particularly animalistic and/or cannibalistic fashion.’<sup>127</sup> The image of the blame poet as an animalistic devourer finds an echo in the weasel who would devour the elaborate dishes in this fragment. Weasels are imagined as food thieves, for instance Semonides’ weasel-woman (κλέπτουσα δ’ ἔρδει πολλὰ γείτονας κακά, / ἀθυστα δ’ ἵρᾳ πολλάκις κατεσθίει - 7.55-6). The kind of indiscriminate eating typical of the weasel matches also the indiscriminate, excessive use of sauces by the Sicilians.

We might, however, read Archeistratus’ critique here, in particular the use of *περίεργοι*, as making a more synaesthetic statement. Already in the image of Semonides’ weasel-woman, we are told that there is nothing at all pleasurable about her (κείνη γὰρ οὐ τι καλὸν οὐδὲ ἐπίμερον / πρόσεστιν οὐδὲ τερπνὸν οὐδὲ ἐράσμιον - 51-2) and that, despite her mad desire for sex, she is sickening (εύνής δ’ ἀληνής ἐστιν ἀφροδισίης, / τὸν δ’ ἄνδρα τὸν παρεόντα ναυσίη διδοῖ - 53-4; note particularly the association again with the stomach). The weasel is the opposite of everything pleasurable, making it the perfect antithesis for Archeistratus. The description of such preparations as *περίεργοι* in turn allow us to pinpoint more precisely what Archeistratus objects to. The base meaning of *περίεργος* involves excess of different kinds, such as excessive interest in others’ business (meddlesomeness, e.g. Isoc. 5.98, X. *Mem.* 1.3.1) or wasted labour (Hdt. 2.15, 3.46). *Περίεργία*, in a sense, represents much of what Archeistratus is pushing back at with the carefully managed ἀβρόδαις τράπεζα, trying to avoid accusations of *τρυφή*.<sup>128</sup> The perfect dish is not excessively luxurious (rather, it is “simple”) in the sense that it expends only the necessary energy for the best quality, eschewing elaboration as unnecessary, even futile. To define the elegant table as “not elaborate” is precisely to (try to) deflect accusations of *τρυφή*, in all senses.

One of the key recurrent criticisms that we have seen throughout this chapter is the use of vinegar, which is often described as pungent (*δριμὺς ὅξος* - 23.6, 37.4). The modifying adjective *δριμύς* helps us to see the synaesthetic potential of what is being discussed here and clarify precisely what is “wrong” with vinegar in Archeistratus’ eyes. Although commonly considered primarily a facet of taste (e.g. Arist. *De An.* 420a29-b4), Ashley Clements has recently demonstrated that it is fundamentally a nasal experience with a basic meaning of something like ‘a flush of nasal irritation/heat/prickling pain/presaging tears’.<sup>129</sup> Used in a wider context, it can refer to expressions and behaviour (e.g. Ar. *Eq.* 629-31, *Ra.* 562), smells (Ar. *Pl.* 689-93), and speech (E. *Cyc.* 104).

<sup>127</sup> Steiner (2002), drawing on the first edition of Nagy (1999).

<sup>128</sup> We might also compare this with Amphis’ *Pan* (fr. 29), which claims that a frugal dinner is one that produces no bad, drunken behaviour (ἀτελὲς δὲ δεῖπνον οὐ ποεῖ παροινίαν), as Archeistratus is similarly cautious to avoid violent behaviour in the symposium.

<sup>129</sup> Clements (2013), quotation from 83.

That is to say it could govern any of the major areas of the symposium we have seen Archestratus attempt to control and regulate. Its particular applicability to vinegar, however, is in the pun of vinegar / sharp (cf. Lat. *acer*). In Plato's *Timaeus*, what is called δοιμύς is said, in part, to rise from the tongue through the nose to the head, *cutting* anything it touches as it goes.<sup>130</sup> It is the sharp, cutting qualities of vinegar, that is, that make it δοιμύς and thus off-putting.

We should note, however, that when the adjective δοιμύς appears, it is not always negative. The key distinction between its acceptability or otherwise, however, is in quantity. When used simply as a dipping sauce or with poor quality fish (e.g. fr. 23.5-6 and fr. 37.3-4) it is tolerated, but rejected when it is poured over the top (e.g. fr. 46.13-4). This distinction is nicely exemplified in fragment 38, concerning tuna. The "proper" way involves sprinkling it with salt and basting it in olive oil, served with a pungent brine dipping sauce (ἀλσὶ μόνον λεπτοῖς πάσας καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἀλείψας, / θερμά τ' ἔδειν τεμάχη βάπτων δοιμεῖαν ἐς ἄλμην - 4-5); however, Archestratus continues, if you serve them sprinkled with vinegar, they are ruined (ἄν δ' ὅξει ύάνας παραθῆς, ἀπόλωλεν ἐκεῖνα - 8). This distinction between dipping sauce and pouring sauce is another reflection of the excesses (or in other words the *περιεργία*) of the Sicilian school. At the same time, the sharpness of vinegar makes it a suitable metaphor for satire itself. Horace, for instance, attempts to avoid being too cutting in his satire (*ridiculum acri / fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res* - *Sat. 1.10.11-5*; cf. 1.4.46). The general thrust of this chapter thus far, which has attempted to situate the *Hed.* within the context of satirical poetry, should be taken, fittingly enough, with a pinch of salt. In avoiding excessive δοιμύτης, that is, Archestratus wishes (at least) to claim that his poetry is satirical *within reason*. It is "not sharp" in a similar move to Horace's *Satires*, whereby some (most likely those on the receiving end) might well say he is too sharp, as Horace's own critics suggest (*sunt quibus in satura videar nimis acer* - 2.1.1); however, the claim throughout the poetry is that the sharp edges have been removed.

This synaesthetic approach I have taken to Archestratus' idealized symposium is complemented if we compare the *Hed.* to the later tradition. Poetic sweetness, a concept intimately bound into the poem through its very title (*Hedypatheia*), is an important concept in the articulation of the function of didactic poetry in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* and Horace's *Ars Poetica*, and food also plays a significant role in Roman Satire. A comparison with these two trends allows us to see how Archestratus' poem fits within a wider tradition of didactic and satirical poetry, and how it situates itself within that tradition.

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<sup>130</sup> τὰ δὲ τῇ τοῦ στόματος θερμότητι κοινωνήσαντα καὶ λειαινόμενα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ξυνεκπυρούμενα καὶ πάλιν αὐτὰ ἀντικάοντα τὸ διαθερμῆναν, φερόμενά τε ὑπὸ κουφότητος ἀνω πρὸς τὰς τῆς κεφαλῆς αἰσθήσεις, τέμνοντα τε πάνθ' ὅπόσοις ἀν προσπίπτῃ, διὰ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις δοιμέα πάντα τοιαῦτα ἐλέχθη - *Ti. 65e4-66a2*.

Pleasure is of course the heart and soul of the *Hed.* The poem may well be a pseudo-Herodotean ιστορίη, as the opening proclaims, but it is structured and focused around pleasure. The relationship, however, between pleasure and didacticism is notoriously fraught. Famously, Lucretius, working with the traditions of Epicureanism, compares the didactic poet to a doctor who puts honey around the rim of a cup of wormwood, so that his young patient cannot taste the bitterness.<sup>131</sup> Horace, by contrast, champions a different model, according to which the aim is poetry that is both useful and pleasurable.<sup>132</sup> In both of these versions, *dulce* and *utile* remain fundamentally distinct ideas, a notion already exploited (to poetry's disadvantage) by Plato.<sup>133</sup> It is here that Archestratus is distinguished. In the *Hed.*, the central function of the poem, or at least so it claims, is to *teach sweetness*. The poem's poetic charms, that which delights the reader in Horace's terms, is part of the means by which it instructs. *Dulce* and *utile* are virtually indistinguishable, and the poem's *utilitas* is in teaching what is *dulce*. Archestratus is working within a tradition of Greek poetry according to which (good) poetry is sweet and can be instructive. Even in one of Archestratus' primary didactic models, Hesiod, the muses are ἡδυέπειαι (Thgn. 965) and their voice flows sweet from their mouths (τῶν δ' ἀκάματος χέει αὐδὴ / ἐκ στομάτων ἡδεῖα - 39-40).<sup>134</sup> Part of the poem's playfulness lies in this metaphor of poetry as sweet, as Archestratus makes sweetness both the form and (purported) aim of the *Hed.*

Despite the fact that this aim, teaching sweetness, is entirely antithetical to those of the Roman satirist Persius, the aims by which they achieve their starkly differing goals are surprisingly similar.<sup>135</sup> Persius defines his satires as telling truths that people don't want to hear (esp. *Sat.* 1), drawing as he does so on Stoic principles that are reflected in a traditional, vegetarian Roman diet (e.g. *Sat.* 3.55, 5.62-5) and even using the same (if inverted) metonymy of the table for the meal and its associated morality (*tecum etenim longos memini consumere soles / et tecum primas epulis decerpere noctes. / unum opus et requiem pariter disponimus ambo / atque uerecunda laxamus seria mensa - Sat.* 5.41-4). Food in Persius has a fundamentally ethical dimension; overeating and eating luxuriously not only reflect a person's character but can also induce physical illnesses, for which Persius' own

<sup>131</sup> nam ueluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes / cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum / contingunt mellis dulci flauoque liquore, / ut puerorum aetas improvida ludificetur / labrorum tenus, interea perpotet ararum / absinthi laticem deceptaque non capiatur, / sed potius tali pacto recreata ualescat, / sic ego nunc, quoniam haec ratio plerumque uidetur / tristior esse quibus non est tractata, retroque / uolgs abhorret ab hac, uolui tibi suauiloquenti / carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram / et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle, / si tibi forte animum ratione tenere / uersibus in nostris possem, dum percipis omnem / naturam rerum ac persentis utilitatem - DRN 4.11-25

<sup>132</sup> omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci, / lectorem delectando pariterque monendo - AP 343-4.

<sup>133</sup> Cf. Liebert (2010).

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Heath (1985) for a challenge to the notion that Hesiod's poetry is primarily didactic.

<sup>135</sup> For the use of food in Persius generally, see Bramble (1974) 45-59, Gowers (1993) 180-8, Bartsch (2015).

*Satires* are a cure.<sup>136</sup> Two elements of his poetics in particular, however, are useful for understanding Archestratus: notions of madness and the use of vinegar.

As in the *Hed.*, madness is a recurrent feature in Persius' satire. For instance, the reprimanded student of *Satire 3* is diagnosed with sores (113-4), and as a result of his symptoms he is said to say and do things even mad Orestes would think insane (*dicisque facisque quod ipse / non sani esse hominis non sanus iuret Orestes* - 117-8; cf. 5.143-5). One cure for such insanity that is frequently lauded is hellebore.<sup>137</sup> Cures, however, are notably absent in Archestratus, and the reason for this lies in the difference between the two authors' purported aims. Persius, apparently unconcerned with creating a pleasurable experience for his audience, claims that his poetry is a cure for a moral, ethical, and societal problem; Archestratus, to return to the terminology of Bourdieu, is attempting to create a distinction between himself and his followers on the one hand and his critics (esp. the Sicilian school) on the other. For Persius, madness is a symptom to be cured; for Archestratus, it is something that marks out inadequate gastronomic authors.

The use of vinegar as a metaphor for satirical poetry is also a notable feature of Persius, although here it is both used very differently and serves to define Persius' satire in a very different way. In an attempt to distinguish between legal freedom and true freedom, Persius responds to a freedman with the statement that his ears have been cleansed with biting vinegar (*Stoicus his aruem mordaci lotus aceto* - 5.86) and likewise elsewhere an imaginary interlocutor warns of the effects of "biting truth" on tender ears (*sed quid opus teneras mordaci radere uero / auriculas* - 1.107-8). As Emily Gowers comments, 'instead of soothing his readers, he stings them with a biting solution of vinegary truth or purges them with hellebore.'<sup>138</sup> Although here the purpose of the vinegar is primarily medicinal rather than gastronomic, its effects on the audience (sharpness/pain) are similar. While Persius only holds back his vinegary solution in cases where it is too late to be effective (cf. *Sat. 3.63-9*), Archestratus' restraint is a marker of his supposedly simple style. His avoidance of pungent vinegar in the *Hed.* is, like the restriction of the sympotic line-up to five people, a sign of order and balance. Vinegar is only used sparingly, and only on the kind of dishes – and the kind of people – that deserve or need it.

Naturally, it is unsurprising that Archestratus and Persius' aims differ, as they occupy almost dichotomous extremes on the philosophical/ideological spectrum. On the one hand, Archestratus is even said to have been the inspiration for Epicureanism; on the other, Persius is consistently and markedly Stoic. However, it is precisely this extreme opposition that has driven my comparison, as, despite their differences, the basic techniques and metaphors they use are the same and allow

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<sup>136</sup> See Bartsch (2015), esp. 74-84, for the relationship between food and illness in Persius.

<sup>137</sup> For the theme of madness and the function of hellebore in Persius, see Bartsch (2015) 84-8.

<sup>138</sup> Gowers (1993) 181.

us to clarify the points I have made about the *Hed.* earlier in the chapter. On my reading, both poets use food in an ideologically charged way, and both to some extent define themselves by contrast to other kinds of lifestyle. They both claim that those who differ from them are, or run the risk of being, mad, and both use vinegar as a metaphor for the satirical “sting”. While in Persius gastronomic excess is explicitly associated with physical and mental wellbeing, emphasizing especially Persius’ *Satires* as a kind of medicinal and philosophical answer to societal problems, Archestratus’ criticisms of others as insane are part of a strategy of distinction, and his avoidance of excessive vinegar is a marker of the kind of restraint that typifies his entire endeavour. This project (whether we take it seriously or not) breaks down the distinction between pleasure and didactic value which we find elsewhere, instead championing pleasure as a didactic end in itself. All aspects of the symposium, including behaviour, smells, food, wine, and poetry, are implicated in this idealization of pleasure, creating a sympotic synaesthesia that is defined by opposition, “not elaborate” and “not vinegary”.

## CONCLUSIONS

This chapter set out to examine Archestratus’ criticisms of others, especially the Sicilian school, as a means of recontextualizing the *Hed.* within the context of Greek comedy, especially the figure of the *mageiros* that became prominent during the fourth century BC, and of exploring how Archestratus defines his poetry through the notion of distinction. I have suggested in particular that the *Hed.* is more satirical than usually recognized by scholars, and that many of its satirical strategies draw upon common *topoi* from Greek comedy. The figure of the *mageiros* has proved influential for shaping Archestratus’ criticisms, not only as Archestratus deploys many common tropes, such as the philosophizing *mageiros* who claims numerous forms of expertise, but also as a figure of mockery, so that Archestratus can also depict his denouncers as *alazones mageiroi*. At the same time, we cannot view the *Hed.* as principally satirical. Indeed, if we take the restrained use of vinegar, one of the key culinary features that as we saw marks Archestratus out from the Sicilian school, as a metaphor for the cutting edge of satirical poetry, the poem seems to claim a balance between its satirical and instructive elements. This use of vinegar is also one of the key means by which Archestratus defines the *Hed.* through distinction. His poetry is “not sharp” and it is “not elaborate”, two key claims that help us to understand his emphasis on simplicity. These definitions, I have suggested, are not straightforward, one-to-one metaphors (simple food = simple poetry), but is rather part of a broader network as all elements of the symposium are brought under the same rubric, all contributing towards a definition of the ἀβρόδαις τράπεζα.

## CHAPTER 4

### *The Batrachomyomachia*

If one were to describe the *Batrachomyomachia* (BM) as a poem in which a battle between frogs and mice is initiated upon the death of one of the mice and which is eventually ended by an army of crabs sent by the gods, the poem might appear utterly absurd to some readers. Indeed, such has often been the evaluation of the poem since its composition, from Plutarch's scornful description of the poem as playful nonsense (*παιίζων καὶ φλυαρῶν* - Plu. *De. Hdt. Mal.* 347a) to scholarship of the last century which has sometimes viewed it as 'a poem of... irredeemable mediocrity'.<sup>1</sup> While in part this view derives from the poem's self-consciousness about small animals imitating epic giants, more recently the poem has been positively received as a witty poem that engages not just with Homer epic and Aesopic fable but also the ancient scholarship of Homer. Further, it has also been mined for deeper meanings as scholars have sought to find an *epilogos* for this "epic *logos*".<sup>2</sup> Thus far, however, scholars have failed to reconcile the poem's engagement of other literature with the function of humour in constructing such relationships. In this chapter, I shall argue that a greater appreciation of the poem's humour permits us to appreciate the qualities for which the poem has frequently been maligned as integral features of the poem's poetics.

There are two techniques employed by the poem in which I am principally interested: the negotiation of audience expectation and the characterization of the animals. These techniques are simultaneously humorous and a vital part of the poem's self-definition. In the first section, I take a narratological perspective that examines how expectations are set up and then frequently disappointed, focusing especially on Psicharpax' pivotal dying speech (93-8). In particular, I aim to show that the humorous incongruity between our expectations and the narrative highlights a tension between the expectations created by fable and epic, and that this humorous disjunction invites us to consider the problems of using the paradigms of other texts as a guide for the action of the poem.

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<sup>1</sup> Dowden (1980) 136. Martial and Statius (14.183 and *praef. ad Silv.* 1 respectively) have by contrast viewed the playfulness of the poem as a positive feature.

<sup>2</sup> Sens (2006) and Holst (2006) have elucidated the BM's relationship with other *parôdic* poems; Vine (1986) and Camerotto (1992) explored in detail the BM's interaction with Homer and other archaic Greek epic; Kelly (2009) and (2014) argues that the poem alludes to debates among the Alexandrian scholars; Most (1993) and Scodel (2008) both see a deeper or more "serious" (*ernst*) message in the poem. For a discussion of their arguments, see my discussion of the arming scenes below.

I shall then turn to consider how the poem characterizes its protagonists. The action of the poem is driven primarily by the anthropomorphization of the animals – for the most part they speak and act like humans. More specifically, through the various parodies they speak and act like Homeric heroes. This is most clear when we examine scenes such as the arming scene, in which the play with Hellenistic scholarship on Homer actively invites us to reflect on the literary conventions that underpin the poem’s anthropomorphism. By contrast, when the poem highlights the “real-life” elements of the animals (skin, fur, paws, etc.), we recognize the poem’s fictionality, animals dressed up as Homeric heroes. Thus, I argue that the moments of theriomorphization act as meta-fictional moments. These theriomorphic moments culminate in the entry of the crabs at the end of the poem, who are introduced with a riddle that focuses solely on their bodies. What unites these two aspects of the animals’ characterization is the notion of absurdification, the adoption of literary tropes only to reveal their conventionality. The poem consistently breaks these conventions, as there is almost no impediment to what the poem can represent with these animals – they can even fight on after death.

The concept of “absurdification”, which underlies my argument here, requires explanation. In the most basic sense, absurdification is a form of poetic process that is not simply absurd but through parodic engagement with other literary texts *makes* the supposedly realistic elements of these texts absurd, a term with a close affinity to anti-realism. In part, this process serves to demonstrate the limitations of the poetry with which it engages. Of course, the construction of anti-realism depends upon the contradiction of realism. The relationship between any given text and the ontological world has been a matter of great dispute. In the last century, however, the work of Watt has proved fundamental. Watt identified several “narrative procedures” that allow us to identify a realist mode of writing: (1) the rejection of literary convention and the creation of the impression of fidelity to life; (2) the creation of characters who act not according to literary types, but according to a particularized real-life background; (3) an emphasis on the importance of time, which manifests itself in the creation of a causal chain of events for the plot and the development of characters over time. In addition to the logical sequence of development over time, the realist mode possesses a particularized portrayal of space.<sup>3</sup> Scholarship since Watt has demonstrated that the creation of what we might call “realism effects” through these “narrative procedures” is not the same as being “true-to-life”, since such procedures are nevertheless restricted by their fictionality. ‘A mode of writing cannot by itself constitute a positive relationship to something outside the work.’<sup>4</sup> Watt’s procedures are nevertheless useful, not for considering how a text attempts exactly to replicate reality, but how a text attempts to construct *the appearance* of replicating reality.

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<sup>3</sup> Watt (1957).

<sup>4</sup> Lamarque and Olsen (1994) 312.

Watt does not, however, note the fact that similar ideas about fictional realism can be found in antiquity, particularly in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Most obviously, Watt's first narrative procedure echoes Aristotle's statement that poetry does not relate actual events but the kind of events that are *possible* (φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰσημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἀν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός η τὸ ἀναγκαῖον - *Poet.* 1451a36-9). Although formulated differently, the similarities between Watt's impression of fidelity to life and Aristotle's events that happen through probability (τὸ εἰκός) or necessity (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον) are clear. In terms of character, Aristotle diverges from Watt somewhat. While Watt dichotomizes literary types and characters drawn from particularized real-life backgrounds, Aristotle (*Poet.* 1454a24-8) insists that a character must be like us (ὅμοιον) and consistent (όμαλόν). We can see in both cases that what is being aimed at is the impression of realism. For Watt, realistic characterization is strongly defined against literary tropes, as we shall see is also the case in the *BM*; for Aristotle, however, even a character who comes with a great deal of literary baggage (as most tragic characters do) can be realistic provided they act in consistent ways with which we can identify.<sup>5</sup>

Additionally, however, Aristotle shows an awareness of the limitations of realism. Although he says that there should be nothing irrational in events (ἀλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν - *Poet.* 1454b6), he admits that the whole pursuit of Hector in *Iliad* 22 would seem to us ridiculous if staged (ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἔκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἀν φανείη - *Poet.* 1460a13-4). Indeed, much criticism of the Homeric epics revolved around picking out moments of inconsistency or improbability. Pseudo-Longinus, for example, argues that the *Odyssey* must be a product of Homer's old age, since he wanders into the realm of the fabulous and incredible (τὸ λοιπὸν φαίνονται τοῦ μεγέθους ἀμπωτιδες καν τοῖς μυθώεσι καὶ ἀπίστοις πλάνος - *De. Subl.* 13). We can see, then, that realism is central to discussions and criticisms of poetry in antiquity, and particularly discussions of Homer.

The origins of much of this discourse of realism likely derives from the Hellenistic period, in which a form of poetic realism was strived for.<sup>6</sup> One scholium to Homer ( $\Sigma$  *Il.* 14.342-51), for instance, which likely derives from Hellenistic thinking,<sup>7</sup> divides poetry into three types (τρόποι):

<sup>5</sup> We might class Aristotle's approach as "mimeticist": all of the individual techniques mentioned – probability, necessity, likeness, and consistency – fall under the broader term of *mimesis*. This approach was also adopted by numerous other authors in antiquity, e.g. Plu. *De Aud. Poet.* 17e-18f on poetry as μιμητικὴ τέχνη.

<sup>6</sup> Zanker (1987) in particular has argued that Alexandrian poetry was characterized by its interest in poetic realism, which he sees as a response to the Alexandrian need for cultural continuity with mainland Greece. While there are several problems with the way Zanker defines realism, for instance in the blurring of what he calls the "everyday" and the "low" (133-227), which are not necessarily equivalent, some of his discussion resounds with Watt's procedures, especially (1) and (2).

<sup>7</sup> J.R. Morgan (1993) 188-91 suggests an origin in Peripatetic literary theory, while Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004) 139-40 is more cautious but nevertheless situates the line of thought in a Hellenistic context.

one type imitates reality, the second derives from imagination based on reality, and the last goes beyond reality through imagination. As the explanation for the final type makes clear, the contrast the scholiast perceives between reality ( $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha$ ) and imagination ( $\phi\alpha\ntau\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$ ) derives from the difference between fantastic elements such as Cyclopes, Lastrygonians, and divine matters and an “everyday” experience of the world. Indeed, unlike Watt but like Aristotle, the scholiast has no qualms suggesting that literary stereotypes, such as the misogynist or parrhesiast, belong in the type that imitates reality. Numerous aspects of Hellenistic poetry could be argued to reflect a tendency towards a realist form of poetics, although one element may be worth revisiting here. Zanker suggests that the Alexandrian interest in *aitia* is a reflection of realist tendencies, as realism attempts to relate its subject to the present.<sup>8</sup> Alternatively, however, we could view this from the perspective of Watt’s third narrative procedure, with its emphasis on the creation of a causal chain of events. As we shall see, the *BM* responds to such literary criticism and practice in constructing its own anti-realist world.

The concept of literary absurdity (or anti-realism) has been tackled most thoroughly in respect to classical literature by Ruffell. While he is right to highlight the problems faced by the simplistic notion of realism vs. fantasy in the audience conceptualization of fiction, I think that his statement that ‘realism is not a criterion for fiction or determining audience reaction’ goes too far.<sup>9</sup> As I have been trying to emphasize, my discussion of anti-realist elements in literature depends not so much on a stable or identifiable relationship between a text and ontological reality, but rather the impression of “the realistic”, itself a fictional construction. This “realistic” effect is similar to what Ruffell calls ‘transworld identification,’ in which an audience can recognize elements of the experienced world in the fictional one, for instance the recognition of the historical Cleon in the character of the Paphlagonian. As he says, ‘not only are fictional characters separate from their actual counterparts, constructed out of textual or performative details supplemented by contextually appropriate selections from the audience’s cultural encyclopedia, but transworld identification is also a function of contextually appropriate identification of similar properties.’<sup>10</sup> As we shall see in the subsequent sections, in the *BM* the animal characters for the most part maintain a façade of heroism that redeploys the conventional epic means of realism; it is, ironically, when the poet invites us to make transworld identifications between the characters of the poem and “real” mice, frogs, and crabs that the supposed epic realism breaks down in the face of their “true” animal identities. Ruffell’s application of fictional theory to Old Comedy also highlights a further element that is important for my study of the *BM*’s use of humour: ‘the general principle of

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<sup>8</sup> Zanker (1987) 6-7.

<sup>9</sup> Ruffell (2011) 43, drawing on Doležel (1989).

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.* 49.

the audience abandoning the belief-world in response to performance evidence provides a straightforward framework both for initial construction of an anti-realist world and its redefinition.<sup>11</sup> In the case of the *BM*, the fictional belief-world is redefined several times: by the initial inactivity of the gods, the resurrection of Psicharpax, and the final intervention of Zeus.

Absurdification, then, not only deliberately breaks Watt's "narrative procedures", but also flaunts them by drawing attention to the break. Before moving onto the *BM* itself, it is worth demonstrating what I mean through a couple of examples. In the televisual parody created by Charlie Brooker, *A Touch of Cloth*, when DI Jack Cloth is finally persuaded to re-join the force in the second series, he decides to go undercover (hence *Undercover Cloth*) to get closer to Maccratty's crime ring. To gain Maccratty's trust he gives him a bag of heroin stolen 'from the Vice Squad tuck shop' before his decision to return. Cloth is confronted by Asap Qareshi, who points out that Cloth stealing the heroin makes no sense because he stole it from the police before deciding to work for them again and says 'it's against all established rules of narrative!'<sup>12</sup> By breaking and flaunting the standard, realistic literary conventions, Charlie Brooker demonstrates that his absurd parody is not restrained by such rules. Its absurdity allows it to do anything it wants. A similar sort of technique is at play when the poet of the *BM* reintroduces Psicharpax, the cause of the battle, into the middle of the battle itself, although this breaks Watt's procedures in a different, and arguably less explicit, way.

Another useful example for my discussion of the *BM* is the narratorial voice of Spike Milligan's first novel, *Puckoon*. In the first chapter, the central protagonist Dan Milligan rolls up his trousers only to be disappointed by the 'two thin white hairy affairs of the leg variety' he finds beneath. In response to his cry of 'Wot are dey?', Milligan is engaged in conversation by the author himself, who informs him that although they are the author of these unsatisfactory appendages, they will 'try and develop them with the plot'.<sup>13</sup> Again, although this is a rather different kind of absurdity, creating a world in which the author can apparently speak directly to his characters, this opening is pertinent for the way in which Spike Milligan not only uses absurdity, but does so to shape our expectations about the novel, as Dan Milligan's relationship with the author frames the work. The end of their relationship, however, turns out very differently from that set out in the first chapter. After wrapping up the plotlines ('in fact each and every character in the picture returned to his or her own ways'), we return to find a Roman soldier, Milligan, 'hanging from a tree with a rusty organ pipe lodged over his head.' The figure complains, 'you can't leave me like this!' only to

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<sup>11</sup> *ibid.* 51.

<sup>12</sup> Brooker (2013). Note that part of the humour here derives from our recognition of "that doesn't make sense" as a stock phrase in police drama: surely a policeman wouldn't do anything illegal!

<sup>13</sup> Milligan (1965) 9.

receive the authorial reply, which also ends the novel, ‘Oh, can’t I?’<sup>14</sup> The play with literary convention, particularly concepts of character development and endings, that is evident in Spike Milligan’s novel not only helps us to see absurdification in action, but also exemplifies the central role of audience/reader expectation in its creation. While the *BM* may use very different techniques to reach it, we can see the same underlying principle at work.

#### DIVINE RETRIBUTION AND AUDIENCE EXPECTATION

The narrative of the *BM* turns out very differently from its audience’s expectations. From the opening of the poem, we expect to hear a tale of a battle in which the mice go triumphant, and we suspect that the gods themselves will become involved to right the injustice of the death of Psicharpax. What we get instead is the gods’ absence from the main battle, and they eventually intervene on the “wrong” side, saving the frogs from destruction. This section will analyse the effect of this misdirection, arguing that the gods’ absence and then their failure to intervene successfully contributes to the humour of the poem. Additionally, I suggest that the narrative misdirection found in the poem picks up on a tension between epic and fable, as each genre portrays the role of the gods in achieving justice differently. While we anticipate an epic framework for the structure of the narrative, the questioning of justice commonly found in poetic adaptions of fable provides us with an alternative framework through which to make forecasts about the action of the poem.

Before we begin this analysis, it is worth briefly outlining how readers and audiences make predictions about texts. Every reader of a text makes a series of expectations about its content. Even when reading this thesis, the reader anticipates particular content, lines of argument, and level of raucous entertainment. As Umberto Eco put it: ‘the *fabula* is the result of a continuous series of abductions made during the course of the reading.’<sup>15</sup> These abductions are made on the basis of various kinds of information, such as different kinds of subdivision (chapter or sub-chapter) or more explicitly in the form of direct warnings, hints, or allusions. Additionally, such forecasts might be made by resort to intertextual frames, drawing for instance on literary *topoi* or generic norms. Forecasts of this sort Eco calls inferential walks, made by the Model Reader to understand and anticipate the text.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, we should note also that the disappointment of expectations is not inherently anti-realist *per se*; frequently literature relies on

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<sup>14</sup> ibid. 156.

<sup>15</sup> Eco (1979) 31.

<sup>16</sup> Eco (1979) 32-3. The Model Reader is fundamentally a semiotic construct that aimed to recognize the active role of the reader whilst ‘re-asserting the essential control of the text and its codes over the reader’s interpretations,’ as Doležel (1980) 182-3 put it.

misdirection to create suspense, for instance. Instead, my argument is that the humour in the *BM*'s disappointment of expectation lays bare the generic expectations upon which such forecasts are made and it is this exposition that contributes to the anti-realist aesthetics of the poem.

The *Iliad* itself provides useful example for how Eco's notion of inferential walks works in practice.<sup>17</sup> At two points in the poem (8.470-7 and 15.49-77), Zeus, whose plan is said to be shaping the narrative from the proem (1.5), articulates predictions concerning the coming narrative. Initially he declares Hector's pre-eminence on the battlefield and the death of Patroclus; then subsequently he predicts Hector's rout of the Achaeans, refers again to the death of Patroclus and also of Sarpedon, and the death of Hector himself. However, despite these and other predictions, Zeus' plan is not always an entirely reliable guide.<sup>18</sup> Instead, the narrator uses several methods that create an audience anticipation that is eventually upset, such as delaying anticipated events or moving the narrative in an unexpected direction. Such vague or deceptive predictions, as James Morrison has discussed, have 'the potential to unsettle the audience's preconception of how the story will proceed.'<sup>19</sup> This very notion, "the audience's preconception", is in the case of the *Iliad* based on the wider epic tradition, which the Model Reader in Eco's terms uses to make forecasts about the development of the narrative. Achilles' repeated claims to be considering leaving Troy are read by the audience against the expectations of tradition, that he will kill Hector and in turn be killed by Paris. However, while in the *Iliad* these frequently serve to engage the audience in an active negotiation of the epic tradition, we shall see that the *BM* manipulates audience expectation for humorous purposes, although these too involve us coming face-to-face with the problems of such inferential walks.

### Narrative misdirection and absent gods

By contrast to the *Iliad*, the narrative direction of the *BM* is entirely unknown to a first-time reader. Thus the opening lines are essential for shaping our initial expectations.<sup>20</sup> There are three things we are told in the proem that shape our expectations going forward: (1) the subject of the poem is described as a boundless conflict ( $\delta\eta\varrho\nu\ \dot{\alpha}\pi\varepsilon\iota\varrho\varepsilon\sigma\iota\eta\nu$  - 4), which suggests immense size, whether geographically or temporally; (2) in the same line, the war is said to be the war-rousing work of Ares ( $\pi\omega\mu\kappa\lambda\omega\nu\ \varepsilon\varrho\gamma\nu\ \mathcal{A}\omega\eta\varsigma$ ), a phrase that raises the spectre of the role of the gods; and

<sup>17</sup> Much of this analysis is indebted to J.V. Morrison (1992).

<sup>18</sup> As, for instance, Barker and Christensen (2013) 47 note: 'Zeus's will is not accomplished in a straight-forward way.'

<sup>19</sup> J.V. Morrison (1992) 4.

<sup>20</sup> While the proems of epic do not provide a direct and complete description of the poem to come, what they do tell us is generally accurate and usually in-line with the tradition. The absence of tradition means that the predictions implicit in the *BM*'s proem provide an initial orientation for the audience.

finally (3) it is implied that the mice will be victorious in line 6 ( $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\varsigma \mu\nu\epsilon\varsigma \dot{\epsilon}\nu \beta\alpha\tau\varrho\alpha\chi\omega\iota\sigma\iota\nu$  ἀριστεύσαντες ἔβησαν). In this section, I shall suggest that all of these expectations are revealed as false or misleading, focusing especially on expectations (2) and (3), as divine involvement directly shapes the ending and ultimate victors.

One scene in the poem in particular picks up on these expectations (2 and 3) and develops them in a way that gives them a sense of authority that is ultimately shown to be misplaced: the dying speech of Physignathus (93-7):

οὐ λήσεις γε θεούς, Φυσίγναθε, ταῦτα ποιήσας,  
ναυηγὸν ρίψας ἀπὸ σώματος ὡς ἀπὸ πέτρης.  
οὐκ ἂν μου κατὰ γαῖαν ἀμείνων ἥσθα, κάκιστε,  
παγκρατίῳ τε πάλῃ τε καὶ εἰς δρόμον· ἀλλὰ πλανήσας  
εἰς ὕδωρ μ' ἔρριψας. ἔχει θεὸς ἐκδικον ὅμμα.<sup>21</sup>

When we hear this speech, we anticipate that its predictions concerning the remainder of the narrative will be accurate on the basis of the trope of the prophetic dying speech. This speech type is common from a range of genres. Probably the most famous cases in Homer are those of Patroclus' foretelling of Hector's death (*Il.* 16.851-2), followed by Hector's prediction of Achilles' death (22.356-60); additionally, the only speaking animal in the Homeric epic, Achilles' horse Xanthus, foretells Achilles' demise (19.404-17). Similar speeches are also common in fable, and we might note in particular that in Babrius 60 this kind of speech is delivered by another dying mouse. Further, the frame for the fable of the mouse and the frog in the tradition of the Aesopic *Vitae* is significant. According to the *Vitae*, Aesop tells this fable when he is about to be killed by the Delphians; thus, the mouse's speech acts as a synecdoche of the entire fable within the *Vita*. In this context, then, we might justifiably anticipate that what we are told here will be a reliable guide to the coming narrative. The speech, then, seems to confirm the idea, already suggested by the proem, that the poem will see the mice victorious over the frogs and that the gods will become involved, likely siding with the mice and helping them to victory.

This expectation seems to be deliberately picked up when Zeus calls the gods together. When asking whether any of the gods will go to the aid of the mice or the frogs, he specifically asks Athena whether she is going to defend the mice ( $\mu\nu\sigma\iota\nu \eta \varsigma' \alpha\pi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\xi\eta\sigma\omega\sigma\alpha \pi\omega\epsilon\nu\sigma\eta;$  - 174). Athena then emphatically shoots down the possibility of her intervention in the mice's favour (οὐκ

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<sup>21</sup> "You will not escape the gods' notice, Puffjawe, in doing this, casting me shipwrecked from your body as if from a rock. You would not have got the better of me on land, you villain, in the pankration, in wrestling, in running, but you led me astray and cast me into the water. God has an avenging eye."

ἀν πώ ποτ' ἐγὼ μυσὶ τειρομένοισιν / ἐλθοίμην ἐπαρωγός - 178-9) and goes on to remove the chance of any divine intervention at all (ἀλλ' ἄγε πανσάμεσθα, θεοί, τούτοισι ἀρήγεται, μὴ κέ τις ύμειών τῷθῇ βέλει ὁξυόεντι - 193-4). Although this might seem problematic, the mice are able even without the gods' help to gain the upper hand and by around line 267 the mice are on the point of destroying the frogs entirely. At this point, the gods become involved; however, it is not to help the mice, as Psicharpax had requested, but to save the frogs. Further reversals of our expectations follow: firstly, Zeus suggests that Ares or Athena intervene (274-6) but is informed that neither has the strength to stop the mice (278-9);<sup>22</sup> when Zeus then throws his thunderbolt (the specification that it is the same one as he used against Capaneus, Enceladus, and the wild tribe of Giants at 283-4 serves only to support our anticipation of the success of this action) he fails (ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ἀπέληγε μυῶν στρατός - 290); not only does he fail, but he achieves the opposite of the intended result as the mice fight even harder than before (ἀλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον / ἵετο πορθήσειν βατράχων γένος αἰχμητάων - 290-1); it is finally only through his second intervention that he is successful in routing the mice, but this success itself contravenes the claim in the proem that the mice will be triumphant.

These various reversals make this passage unique in all Greek literature. Within the space of 20 lines two gods are said to be incapable of intervening and a *deus ex machina* fails to the point that it achieves the opposite of the *desideratum*. At the level of language and syntax, the incongruity between the events of the poem and our expectations is marked by the if-not counterfactual of lines 268-9, which West prints after 291.<sup>23</sup> Such if-not situations occur frequently in the *Iliad* and usually mark the near death of a hero or the near defeat of an army, as here.<sup>24</sup> In particular, they commonly mark the intervention of the gods, including once Zeus using thunder and lightning to scare the Greeks.<sup>25</sup> All analyses of this if-not phenomenon emphasize its defining role for the narrative itself.<sup>26</sup> Morrison, however, has argued that this formula is 'the most explicit acknow-

<sup>22</sup> Note also that Athena's epithet, πολεμόκλονον, not only increases our perception of her efficacy, but recalls its usage in the proem (occurring in the same *sedes*). The word occurs only rarely elsewhere, e.g. at Orph. H. 32.2.

<sup>23</sup> The verb ἐξετέλεσσαν in 268 seems out of place following 267, and so it is quite possible that these two lines originally followed 291, as line 292 is a variant of the if-not situation. Whatever the original text, my main point here concerning the function of the counterfactual at this stage of the narrative stands.

<sup>24</sup> Near death of a hero 11x; the near defeat of an army 11x. For an analysis of all of the passages, see de Jong (2004) 70-5.

<sup>25</sup> 8.130-2; for other divine interventions, see 8.217-8, 12.290-3, 16.698-701, 17.319-25, and 21.544-6. Additionally, the scholiasts' comment at *Il.* 2.155-6 on the if-not *deus ex machina*, as Athena spurs Odysseus to prevent the Greeks from fleeing Troy altogether, is instructive: εἰς τοσοῦτον προάγει τὰς περιπετείας ὡς δύνασθαι θεὸν μόνον αὐτὰς μεταθεῖναι. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ τοῖς τραγικοῖς μηχανάς εἰσηγήσατο.

<sup>26</sup> Bassett (1938) 100-2 suggests that they mark the situation as critical for the audience; Kullmann (1956) 42-8 and Reinhardt (1961) 107-10 see them as a way of changing the course of the narrative; and de Jong (2004) 78-81 argues that they confirm the status of the narrator (NF1) as a reliable presenter.

ledgement that the narrative has moved in such an unexpected direction,' which in the case of the *Iliad* means in a direction contrary to tradition.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, here the if-not situation marks how close the narrative comes to extending beyond the control even of the gods, an entirely unanticipated move.

What is the effect of this narrative misdirection? In the following section, I shall analyse the different literary expectations underlying Psicharpax's speech, unpacking the significance of audience's literary knowledge; here, however, I would like to emphasize what such misdirection means for the poem's self-definition. The humour that the poem derives from the consistent disruption of our expectations at the end of the poem marks its narrative trajectory as anti-realist in the sense of being unrestrained by what we would usually expect, or our normative narrative expectation. In this sense, it is not dissimilar from Spike Milligan's narrator at the end of *Puckoon* saying "oh can't I?" The *BM* pushes at the limits of what kind of narrative can be told. Gods can have insufficient strength; a *deus ex machina* can fail.

More specifically, it could be argued that the narrative misdirection in the poem picks up on the athetization of passages in the scholiastic tradition on the grounds that they are false. One good example is Zeus' prediction in *Il.* 15; although he says that the Trojans will fall upon the ships of Achilles (15.63-4), the situation never becomes this extreme. For this reason, the passage was athetized in different ways. Zenodotus, for instance, athetized 15.64-77 on the grounds that these lines too much resemble a Euripidean prologue.<sup>28</sup> However, others athetized the entire speech (56-77), part of the reasoning for which was the inaccuracy of Zeus' prediction.<sup>29</sup> Part of the underlying assumption here must be that these pronouncements come from Zeus himself, and so cannot be inaccurate. If we see this insistence on narrative consistency in the background to the *BM*'s misdirection and disruption of expectation, a possibility made more likely by the poem's engagement elsewhere with Hellenistic scholarship (for which see below), part of the humour here derives from a knowing nod to a tradition of poetic scholarship that demands narrative consistency. The poem's freedom from normative narrative expectation would then be framed as a conscious response to, and rejection of, Alexandrian literary criticism.

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<sup>27</sup> J.V. Morrison (1992) 60.

<sup>28</sup> Σ 15.64c; Euripidean prologues were criticized for anticipating too much of the plot. For a discussion of the passage, see Nünlist (2009) 39-40.

<sup>29</sup> ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι εἴκοσι δύο... ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ "φεύγοντες δ' ἐν νηυσὶ πολυκλήϊσι πέσωσι / Πηλείδεω Αχιλῆος" - Σ 15.56a; cf. ἀθετοῦνται ὡς περισσοὶ εἴκοσι δύο στίχοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρεστοὶ Ἡρα, καὶ οὐκ ἐμπίπτουσι ταῖς ναυσὶν Αχιλλέως - Σ 15.56b, ὅτι ψεῦδος - Σ 15.63-4. Likewise, the description of Patroclus lying by the ships in *Il.* 8 was athetized for similar reasons: τό τε ἐπιφερόμενον ψεῦδός τι ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ στείνει μάχονται - Σ 8.475-6.

## God's avenging eye

Now that we have established that the text of the poem sets up and disappoints expectations by suggesting the victory of the mice and the involvement of the gods and reversing these expectations, we can consider the intertextual frames that inform our reading of the poem. In particular, we have seen that the speech of Psicharpax is a pivotal point for constructing our expectations for the coming battle. In this section, then, I would like to explore further how his speech, especially the phrase ἔχει θεὸς ἐκδικον ὄμμα, a phrase which emphatically may end the entire speech,<sup>30</sup> draws upon the epic and fabular intertexts of the poem. I argue that we can discern a tension between these two frames, as the role of the gods and justice differ substantially in the two genres.

Two components of this phrase are worth further consideration. Firstly, the invocation of the gods in Psicharpax' speech is an innovation from the Aesopic tradition. Here, as in the fable, the mouse claims that there will be retribution for the frog's actions. However, the emphasis on the divine in Psicharpax' speech,<sup>31</sup> although not unknown in fables in general (see for example Aesop 67 Perry - κἀν ἀνθρώπους ἐπιορκοῦντες λάθωμεν, ἀλλὰ τόν γε θεὸν οὐ λήσομεν), is remarkable here for its deviation from the original fable and creates an expectation that the gods will appear and aid the mice to victory.

Secondly, the word ἐκδικον in this speech echoes the mouse's own wording in the Aesopic fable.<sup>32</sup> Clearly, the borrowing of this word helps to shape our expectations of how the poem is going to progress, especially as we have already been told in the proem that the mice are going to be victorious. However, the shift from the Aesopic verb (ἐκδικέω) to an adjective as used here creates ambiguity. While the adjective ἐκδικος can mean "maintaining the right" or "avenging" in

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<sup>30</sup> One further line is transmitted, ποίνην αὖ τείσεις σὺ μιῶν στρατῷ, οὐδὲ ὑπαλύξεις, but may not be original. For a discussion, see Hosty (2014a). The reader should note that I have only been able to consult Hosty (2014a) for his commentary on ll. 67-97, shared at a workshop in Oxford on 22nd March 2014.

<sup>31</sup> This emphasis on the divine would be heightened if we read οὐ λήσεις γε θεούς in line 93. This reading is followed by West (2003) but not by Glei (1984) or Hosty (2014a). For Glei, the alternative reading of δολίως fits into his reading of Psicharpax' speech as misunderstanding that Physignathus' actions were not deliberate (96-7), while Hosty points out the δολίως is the *lex difficilior*. Although this reading would contribute to my point here, it is not necessary for the central claim that the focus on the divine is an innovation by the poet.

<sup>32</sup> The different traditions of Aesopic *Vitae* and the oral elements in the Aesopic tradition in general make it difficult to tell in what form the poet of the *BM* knew the fable of the frog and mouse. *Vita W* reads ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπό σου νεκρωθήσομαι, ἐκδικήσομαι δὲ ὑπὸ ζῶντος, while *Vita G* reads νεκρὸς ᾧν ζῶντά σε ἐκδικήσω. It is possible that the direction of influence travels from the *BM* back to the fable, although, as Hosty (2014a) ad 92-8 notes, the motif of a remark from a dying or doomed protagonist is characteristic of fable in general. Given that within the tradition of the *Vita Aesop* tells this fable when he is himself doomed, it seems reasonable to imagine that, unless it was originally told at another time, which seems unlikely, the fable always contained some kind of dying remark, even if it did not use the verb ἐκδικέω.

a similar capacity to the verb, it can also mean the very opposite, “lawless” or “unjust”.<sup>33</sup> While the former meaning is the more natural in the context, the ambiguity introduced through the adjectival form here opens the possibility of reading the presentation of justice in the poem against the fabular tradition, in which notions of justice are frequently not straightforward. For instance, in the Augustana collection, some scholars have perceived an anti-religious sentiment.<sup>34</sup> However, the picture of divine punishment for misdeeds is not consistent, and gods most typically punish wrongdoers when their pre-eminence is disrespected.<sup>35</sup>

This ambiguity we find in the Augustana tradition is more explicit if we consider the tradition of poetic adaptations of fable, as found for instance in Hesiod, Archilochus, and Callimachus. To start at the beginning of the tradition, the fable of Hesiod’s *Works and Days* is famously addressed both towards intelligent kings (202) and towards Perseus (213) and concerns justice directly. Simultaneously, however, the fable brings into question whether one can use an *ainos* that tells a story about animals as a means of expressing a truth about the power of justice. When Hesiod later exhorts Perseus to take heed of justice again (ὦ Πέρση... καὶ νῦ Δίκης ἐπάκουε - 274-5), he goes on to say that this is a law for humans (τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων - 276) while animals do not have justice at all (ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηροῖ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετενοῖς / ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ Δίκης ἐστὶ μετ’ αὐτοῖς - 277-8). This poses a retrospective challenge to our initial interpretation of the fable. While Adrados reads these lines as confirming Hesiod’s criticism of the hawk’s victory,<sup>36</sup> the lack of justice in the animal kingdom here suggests an inherent problem with using *ainoi* at all to express ideas not contained within the animal world. A similar message is also expressed in the fable of the frog and the scorpion: just as the frog should have known what to expect from a scorpion, so the nightingale, and indeed Perseus who is at least one of the the *ainos*’ possible audiences, should not expect to find δίκη from the hawk.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, Aristophanes may perhaps have been drawing on the idea of animals being without concepts of justice in the *Birds*. At the very beginning of the play, Euelpides informs the audience that the Athenians are always

<sup>33</sup> LSJ s.v. ἔκδικος II, citing the BM for the former meaning; cf. ἥξει τις τούτου χρόνος ἔκδικος - AP 12.35. For the latter, LSJ s.v. ἔκδικος A, for example at S. OC 920: οὐ γὰρ φιλοῦσιν ἄνδρας ἔκδικους τρέφειν.

<sup>34</sup> See for instance Dumont (1989). Some fables feature men trying to avoid accomplishing vows, who are not always punished (e.g. 34 and 178 Perry).

<sup>35</sup> Thus Zafiropoulos (2001) 136-7: ‘It seems that the collection, although it is conscious of the possibility and power of divine intervention and therefore is “religious”, allows interaction between the divine and the human spheres only when the predominance of the former is disrespected or violated by the latter.’ Cf. 28, 44, 61, 100, 102, 106-7, and 239 Perry.

<sup>36</sup> Adrados (1999) 158.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Sampson (2012) 473: ‘by distinguishing animal and human natures according to the criterion of *dikē* nearly one hundred lines after the fable’s conclusion, it implicitly rejects the parallelism of animal and human natures initially encouraged by the fable: the assertion that there is a different *nomos* for mankind and that only beasts eat one another (276–80) not only reinterprets the fable but effectively inverts its meaning.’

harping on their lawsuits (Αθηναῖοι δ' ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δικῶν ἄδουσι πάντα τὸν βίον - Av. 40-1) and that Peisetaerus and himself are searching for a peaceful place (τόπον ἀποάγμονα - 44).<sup>38</sup>

The alternative to this interpretation would be to suggest that δίκη in lines 276-80 is a different kind of δίκη from that expressed in the fable, that is the δίκη of the Iron Age. When describing the men of the Iron Age, he says that they are χειροδίκαι (189) and that justice will be in their hands and reverence not exist (δίκη ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδώς / οὐκ ἔστι - 192-3).<sup>39</sup> Whatever our precise interpretation of the fable here, we must clearly take account of both of these passages to understand Hesiod's *ainos* fully.

The temporal position of Hesiod's fable, that is at least traditionally if not actually at the start of the tradition of poetic adaptations of fable, made it a significant intertext for later adaptations. For example, in Archilochus' fable of the eagle and the fox (frs. 172-81), it has been argued that Archilochus is deliberately responding both to Hesiod's fable and to the claim that animals do not possess δίκη.<sup>40</sup> This argument focuses chiefly on an interpretation of fr. 177 (Stob. 1.3.34 = Clem. Strom. 5.127.1), and in particular upon the transmission of the third line:

ὦ Ζεῦ, πάτερ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος,  
σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὁρᾶις  
λεωργὰ κάθεμιστα, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων  
ὑβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει.<sup>41</sup>

For the line in question, West prints καὶ θεμιστά;<sup>42</sup> however, recently Sampson has argued that we should accept the transmitted reading printed above. As he points out, 'on purely philological grounds, emendation is unnecessary: the reading ἀθέμιστος is not only supported by the manuscript tradition, but its usage is also well attested in the Archaic period.'<sup>43</sup> The result of reading the line thus is that we are made to see humanity from an external perspective.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, we are able to appreciate the meaning of Archilochus' fable beyond its relationship with the biographical

<sup>38</sup> Law courts rarely appear in fables, as in 56 and 200 Perry; there may also be a critique of institutionalized justice in 227 Perry. For appearance of legal institutions in the Augustana tradition, see Zafiropoulos (2001) 117-9.

<sup>39</sup> Van Dijk (1997) 131, who also notes that in the Aesopic fable commonly said to bear greatest resemblance to that of Hesiod, we find the phrase τὴν ἐν χερσὶν ἔτοιμην βοράν.

<sup>40</sup> This argument was originally made by Irwin (1998), but see more recently Steiner (2012) and Sampson (2012).

<sup>41</sup> "Zeus, father Zeus, yours is the rule in heaven, you oversee men's deeds, wicked and unlawful, and both the violence and the justice of beasts are your concern." [trans. Gerber adapted]

<sup>42</sup> West (1992).

<sup>43</sup> Sampson (2012) 468; the adjective θεμιστός, by contrast, is not attested until later.

<sup>44</sup> Of course, the use of animals in *iambos* for humorous effects also travels in the other direction, looking down on animals as lower forms, most famously in Semonides fr. 7 W.

tradition surrounding his relationship with Lycambes,<sup>45</sup> and see how Archilochus uses the animal perspective of the fox to undermine or question the normative ontological hierarchy of gods-humans-animals.<sup>46</sup>

Callimachus then picks up on both Hesiod and Archilochus' fabular adaptions in *Iamb* 2, most explicitly through the fox's supplication of Zeus that strongly recalls the situation in Archilochus fr. 177 (*Iamb.* 2.1-10):

Ἡν κεῖνος ούνιαυτός, ὡς τό τε πτηνόν  
καὶ τοὺν θαλάσση καὶ τὸ τετράπουν αὔτως  
έφθέγγεθ' ὡς ὁ πηλὸς ὁ Προμήθειος

· · · ·

τὰπὶ Κρόνου τε καὶ ἔτι τὰ πρὸ τη[  
λ . . ουσα και κῶς [.]υ σ[.]νημεναις . [  
δίκαιος ὁ [Ζε]ύς, οὐ δίκαι[α] δ' αἰσυμνέων  
τῶν ἐρπετῶν [μ]ὲν ἐξέκοψε τὸ φθέ[γμα  
γένος δὲ τ . ντ . [.] . ρον - ὕσπερ οὐ κάρτ[ος  
ἡμέων ἔχόντων χήτεροις ἀπάρξασθαι -  
. . .]ψ ἐς ἀνδρῶν<sup>47</sup>

The opening lines of the poem themselves invite a comparison of Callimachus' poem here to the world and traditions of fable, as the temporal setting evokes a standard fabular trope – the time when animals spoke like humans.<sup>48</sup> This setting also, of course, foreshadows the direct reference to Aesop at the end of the fragment (*Iamb.* 2.15-7). If Archilochus uses the perspective of the fox to question the δίκη of men, then Callimachus in these lines takes the next logical step – questioning the δίκη of Zeus himself. The emphasis on δίκαιος in line 6 seems to respond in particular to Archilochus' own formulation. Archilochus' fox claims that the justice of animals is his concern; Callimachus says that while Zeus is just, he has judged wrongly in this instance. The outcomes of

<sup>45</sup> This is the central point of Irwin's argument. For instance, she argues (1998: 181) that 'The assertion of *dike* in the animal world also has a function in Archilochus story: such an assertion heaps abuse upon Lycambes who has no *dike* and therefore is *worse* than an animal.' For other interpretations that focus on the biographical tradition, see Hawkins (2008) and Gagné (2009).

<sup>46</sup> Sampson (2012) 472.

<sup>47</sup> "It was a time when birds and creatures of the sea and four-footed animals could talk in the same way as the Promethean clay ... in the time of Cronus, and even before ... Just is Zeus, yet unjust was his ruling when he deprived the animals of their speech, and – as though we were not in a position to give part of our voice to others – (diverted) it to the race of men."

<sup>48</sup> cf. ἐπὶ τῆς δὲ χρυσῆς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ζώων / φωνὴν ἔναρθρον εἶχε καὶ λόγους ἥδει / οἴους περὶ ἡμεῖς μυθέομεν πρὸς ἄλλήλους, / ἀγοραὶ δὲ τούτων ἦσαν ἐν μέσαις ύλαις - Babr. *Prolog.* 1.5-8.

each plea are also directly contrasted: in Archilochus justice of a kind is served; in Callimachus the opposite occurs.<sup>49</sup> All in all, poetic adaptions of fables frequently employ the animal perspective and didactic function of the fable format in order to reconfigure or challenge conceptions of δίκη.

In addition to the constantly shifting grounds of δίκη, all of these adaptions of fable share a further common feature, which is a statement about the role of poetry or the poet. In Hesiod's *Works and Days*, this metapoetic function of the fable is invoked at least partially through a play between ἀηδόνα and ἀοιδόν. Indeed, the hawk even calls the nightingale an ἀοιδὸν (208). Thus, some have seen one meaning of the fable as the conflict between Hesiod and the kings.<sup>50</sup> Archilochus' fable can also be said to dramatize a poetic conflict between the Archilochean fox and the Lycambid eagle, particularly through the use of the verb ἐρήμησθα (fr. 172W).<sup>51</sup> Finally, the Callimachean fable of *Iambus* 2 can be read to dramatize a conflict between differing registers of poetry. If we read λέγουσα in line 5,<sup>52</sup> then Callimachus depicts the fox as speaking as opposed to the swan's song, a contrast which signals a marked difference in their literary character. Secondly, and more famously, Callimachus' reversal at the end of the poem is to reveal his targets as his literary contemporaries who have inherited the voices of overly loquacious animals.

In short, in the poetic fable tradition we find two common threads: the animal perspective can be used to bring into question δίκη, and the fables themselves frequently depict the different animals as embodying different kinds of literary registers, often also as a means of reflecting on a "real" literary conflict between the poet and his contemporaries that acts as the frame. These two commonalities allow us to appreciate how this intertextual frame develops our understanding of the *BM*. I have already suggested, for instance, that the narrative misdirection caused by this speech can be understood in the context of Alexandrian literary criticism and its desire to achieve consistency in the Homeric poems. This reading is complemented by the revelation that what appears to be narrative misdirection in fact builds on a well-established literary trope, that of questioning δίκη in the poetic adaptations of fable. This technique, deriving additional humour from using intertexts to reveal that an apparent incongruity with expectation is in fact founded in the literary tradition, is typical of the *BM*. For instance, the apparent incongruity of Athena persuading the gods *not* to become involved in the battle, as they might be wounded, draws on the

<sup>49</sup> The passages of Archilochus and Callimachus are connected thus by Steiner (2010) 99.

<sup>50</sup> Most recently, Steiner (2012) 4: 'the overlapping roles of poet and legislator are not only consistent with the account of kings and poets in *Theogony* 81-103, but also correspond to the proem of the *Erga*, where Zeus emerges as poet and lawgiver both.'

<sup>51</sup> For this line of argument, see Hawkins (2008).

<sup>52</sup> The most recent advocate of this reading is Steiner (2010) 102, who claims without citation that this is the reading of 'commentators.' She goes on to argue for this generic differentiation between the fox and the swan. Both Acosta-Hughes (2002) and Pfeiffer (1965) print the text as above.

wounding of several gods by Diomedes in *Iliad* 5.<sup>53</sup> Using the poetic adaptions of fable as an intertextual framework for understanding the misdirection and reversals of expectation in the poem thus helps us to see the different layers at which the humour is functioning.

On one level, the narrative reversals problematize the literary convention of the prophetic dying speech. In both epic and the Aesopic fable, these predictions always come true, either within the narrative itself or, in the case of Achilles, within the epic tradition widely known to the audience. This is the only instance in Greek literature where such a prediction fails to manifest itself. As the poem progresses, therefore, we are forced to rethink our initial understanding and interpretation of Psicharpax' dying words as a failure of literary convention. The effect of this is emphatically, and ironically, metafictional.<sup>54</sup> We only fully recognize the literariness of such a speech only when it fails. However, this is just one of different literary tropes whose conventionality is exposed. The gods too are revealed as less reliable guides to the action and less efficacious actors in it. Justice too is revealed to be a semiotic construct, reduced to a literary convention. As is almost always the case, we only ever see justice through the characters' focalization, rather than in a narratorial voice.<sup>55</sup> We might, therefore, be justified in asking whether justice is just as artificial as the rest of the poem. Finally, I have suggested that the narrative misdirection also evokes Alexandrian scholarship and their insistence on the consistency of the Homeric plot. Behind all of these levels of humour lies Eco's term "inferential walks", different intertextual frameworks through which we understand the action of the poem. However, such travels are consistently problematized, as there is no frame that permits us accurately to predict one of the most unpredictable poems in Greek literature. For this poem's parody, convention is a weapon in its arsenal in a playful literary game.

#### DRESSING AND UNDRESSING THE ANIMAL HEROES

The depiction of the animals, too, is not straightforward. While there may be a temptation to attempt to find a consistent division between the portrayal of the different sides of the battle (epic vs. fable; *Iliad* vs. *Odyssey*; Greeks vs. Trojans), the characterization of the animals is consistently fluid; the same figure may appear similar to several Homeric figures within a few lines. Additionally, we find a tension throughout the poem between the portrayal of the animals in their guise as

<sup>53</sup> Similarly, her closing exhortation, that the gods should sit back and enjoy the show ( $\pi\acute{a}n\tau\epsilon s\,\delta'\,\o u\vartheta\alpha\nu\theta\epsilon v\,\tau\epsilon\varrho\pi\omega\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha\,\delta\eta\tau\iota n\,\o\varrho\omega\tau\iota\tau\epsilon s$  - 196), recalls the Homeric gods watching human events (e.g. 20.136-7, 8.51-2).

<sup>54</sup> For the notion of metafiction here, cf. Lodge (1992) 206: 'metafiction is fiction about fiction: novels and stories that call attention to their fictional status and their own compositional procedures.'

<sup>55</sup> In the *Odyssey*, justice is frequently viewed through the perspective of Odysseus' exploration of new lands through the formula  $\eta\,\o\,\gamma'\,\nu\beta\varrho\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\,\tau\epsilon\,\kappa\alpha\,\ddot{\alpha}\gamma\iota\iota\o\,\o\bar{u}\delta\,\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\iota\,\eta\,\phi\l\delta\,\xi\epsilon\tau\iota\,\kappa\alpha\,\sigma\phi\iota\,\nu\o\o\,\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\,\theta\epsilon\o\delta\j\iota\,\eta\,\mu\epsilon\tau\iota\,\ddot{\alpha}\gamma\iota\iota\o\,\o\bar{u}\delta\,\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\iota\,\eta\,\phi\l\delta\,\xi\epsilon\tau\iota\,\kappa\alpha\,\sigma\phi\iota\,\nu\o\o\,\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\,\theta\epsilon\o\delta\j\iota$  (6.120-2 = 9.175-6, 13.201-2); cf.  $\eta\,\mu\epsilon\tau\iota\,\ddot{\alpha}\gamma\iota\iota\o\,\tau\epsilon\,\kappa\alpha\,\ddot{\alpha}\gamma\iota\iota\o\,\o\bar{u}\delta\,\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\iota\,\eta\,\phi\l\delta\,\xi\epsilon\tau\iota\,\kappa\alpha\,\sigma\phi\iota\,\nu\o\o\,\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\,\theta\epsilon\o\delta\j\iota$  - 8.575-6.

Homeric heroes and their “real-world” counterparts, that is to say mice and frogs as experienced in the extratextual world. After briefly demonstrating how these two elements of the portrayal of the characters in the *BM* are thematized in the opening of the poem, this section will focus on two scenes in particular, the arming scene and the entry of the crabs, to explore the implications of the intertextual and “real-world” sides of the animals in the poem, which can be categorized as anthropomorphization and theriomorphization. I demonstrate that their anthropomorphization allows a reflexive commentary on the nature of poetry, while the moments of theriomorphization act as metafictional moments, breaking the fictional fourth wall.

In the very first scene of the poem, which introduces the protagonists for the first third of the poem, Physignathus and Psicharpax, the identity of the poem's characters are both inseparable from epic and problematic because of the epic resonances. While the opening of the narrative echoes the introduction of many fables (*μῆς ποτε διψαλέος* - 9), the epic resonances in the characterization of the frog become quickly apparent as he is described as *πολύφημος*, which might easily be mistaken for his name. The allusion to the eponymous Odyssean character becomes clearer in his opening questions (*ξεῖνε, τίς εἰ; πόθεν ἥλθες ἐπ' ἡιόνα; τίς δέ σ' ὁ φύσας* - 13 ~ ὃ *ξεῖνοι, τίνες ἔστε; πόθεν πλεῖθ' ύγρὰ κέλευθα* - *Od.* 9.252) and the subsequent offer of guest gifts (16). This description, however, turns the scene into a neat inversion of the Homeric tale as, instead of the landlubber Polyphemus approached by Odysseus, fresh from his sea voyages, we have a “Polyphemus” who is *λιμνόχαοις* (12) approached by a mouse fresh from surviving perilous adventures on land (9-10). This inversion of positions connects the presentation of Physignathus-cum-Polyphemus here with Hellenistic poetry, as whether or not Polyphemus could swim was at issue within Hellenistic responses to and scholarship on *Odyssey* 9.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, this issue seems to be picked up again later when Psicharpax assumes that “Polyphemus” only lives in water (*σοὶ μὲν γὰρ βίος ἔστιν ἐν ὕδασιν* - 33).

Having introduced Physignathus as a Polyphemus-like character, it is not long before we find out his actual name, Physignathus “son of Peleus”.<sup>57</sup> These explicit acts of naming (or renaming?) open the door to further alternatives. The difficulty faced by the reader, given that the poem is mostly constructed from an interwoven series of Homeric and epic lines and phrases, is in deciding what constitutes a “significant” reference.

The problem is well epitomized in line 16. The offer of guest-gifts superficially maintains the allusion to the *Odyssey*, although we discover later that this exchange of *xenia* is highly fraught. This danger, however, might be anticipated, as in the Aesopic fable on which the poem is based,

<sup>56</sup> Compare Theoc. *Id.* 11.54-5, 60-1 with Posidippus fr. 19.8 Austin-Bastianini; Hunter (2004) 103.

<sup>57</sup> This play on the word for mud, πηλός, may have been a common source of humour; we find a similar joke in Euboeus' *Battle of the Bathmen*, fr. 1.

the frog deliberately deceives the mouse into the journey over the waters. Similarly in epic, offers of gifts are not always what they seem. For example, when Hera approaches Sleep as she plots to trick Zeus, she utters a phrase identical to that found here: δῶρα δέ τοι δώσω (*Il.* 14.238). Additionally, the phrase ξεινῆια δῶρα, once used in Odysseus' famous and final lie (καὶ οἱ δῶρα πόρον ξεινῆια - *Od.* 24.273), told to his own father, was later picked up by Apollonius and used in the context of Medea's plan to deceive her brother Apsyrtus, in order for the Argonauts to secure a safe voyage home (καὶ πολλὰ πόρον ξεινῆια δῶρα - *Arg.* 4.422). Given these potential resonances, should we be anticipating ranine deception and danger for Psicharpax down the line? Alternatively, we might take a very different reading of the phrase, as Alexander Sens has done.<sup>58</sup> He reads the phrase δῶρα δέ τοι δώσω as a reference to *Il.* 22.341 (δῶρα τά τοι δώσουσι πατήρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ) while the phrase ξεινῆια πολλὰ καὶ ἐσθλὰ he claims 'combines, via the common element of πολλά, the phrase ξεινῆια πολλά, used by Homer at *Od.* 4.33 in the same metrical position, with the clausula πολλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,' and that in this instance ξεινῆια is specifically used to recall κειμήλια, with which the phrase πολλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά is used in 4 out of 7 instances in Homer (*Il.* 9.330, 24.381; *Od.* 15.159, 19.272). To complicate matters still further, these are not the only parallels scholars have found in these lines.<sup>59</sup>

What, then, should we make of all of these possible references? One possible answer is suggested by the opening of Psicharpax's reply, in which he asks the point of the question, as his identity is obvious to all kinds of men, gods, and animals (τίπτε γένος τούμὸν ζητεῖς; τὸ δὲ δῆλον ἀπαστιν / ἀνθρώποις τε θεοῖς τε καὶ οὐρανίοις πετενοῖς - 25-6). The latter line in particular ironizes Psicharpax' comment by hinting at the possible dangers of a conspicuous identity. For a mouse to be δῆλον to birds might prove his undoing – in fact, in the Aesopic fable Psicharpax' dead body is snatched up by a bird. As Sens argued,<sup>60</sup> this reading is supported by the allusion to *Iliad* 17.675 – a line all the more memorable for the *hapax* ύπουρανίων – where Menelaus is likened to a bird that sees everything, including a hare that is then promptly killed. The pun on γένος, race and species, thus reminds us that these are animals “playing at” Homeric heroes (or perhaps “imitating giants” as in line 7). The façade of the poem's anthropomorphized portrayal of the animals is dropped, revealing the animals beneath.

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<sup>58</sup> Sens (2006) 231-2.

<sup>59</sup> Hosty (2014b), for instance, considers parallels between this scene and those of Glaucus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 6 and Asteropaeus and Achilles in *Iliad* 21.

<sup>60</sup> Sens (2006) 236-8.

The Europa simile, later in the poem, provides another example of the problem of identifying the animals with epic or mythological figures (78-81):<sup>61</sup>

οὐχ οὕτω νώτοισιν ἐβάστασε φόρτον ἔρωτος  
ταῦρος, ὅτ' Εὐρώπην διὰ κύματος ἥγ' ἐπὶ Κοήτην,  
ώς μὲν ύψωσας ἐπινώτιον ἤγεν ἐς οἴκον  
βάτραχος ἀπλώσας ὡχρὸν δέμας ὕδατι λευκῷ.<sup>62</sup>

This simile formulates a complex set of intertextual parallels for the surrounding scene, which sets up two main models of identification. Firstly the simile's use of Europa may recall her portrayal in Moschus' *Europa*. Moschus' version is echoed in the use of γηθόσυνος in line 64 (Mosch. *Eur.* 117) and also in line 65.<sup>63</sup> However, the use of γηθόσυνος might also recall its usage in *Odyssey* 5.269. The irony of the word, since Psicharpax will not be glad when he returns home, 'is increased, however, if one recognizes a specific thematic reminiscence of the *Odyssey*, where the hero's joyous departure from Calypso's island soon gives way to shipwreck: read against that passage, attentive readers understand what Physignathus does not, namely that, like Odysseus' raft for the epic hero, the frog will prove a less than secure mode of transportation for Psicharpax.'<sup>64</sup>

In order to understand the full implications of the simile here, however, we must note the use of the negative, prominently placed at the start of line 78.<sup>65</sup> Europa as a model for identification is specifically problematized by the fact that she is not a model. Europa's status as a negative paradigm itself has an epic precedent, recalling her unique appearance in Homer, where Zeus' desire for Hera is *not* like the desire he had felt for Europa amongst others (*Il.* 14.315-22). In both cases, the negative paradigm emphasizes the distance between two narratives. However, while in the *Iliad* the past comparison serves to emphasize Zeus' current desire, here it is the current situation that is distanced from the past. Our appreciation of the simile is enhanced further if we consider it in the context of the widespread use of similes in Hellenistic poetry to reflect upon literary theory.<sup>66</sup> Read thus, the simile self-consciously highlights the complexity of the identification of the animals

<sup>61</sup> The text surrounding this passage is problematic. While Ludwich (1896), followed by West (2003), transpose the simile to follow l. 66, Hosty (2014a) *ad* 78-81 has pointed out that, if we delete the more spurious lines 74-7, these lines can naturally follow l. 73 without the necessity of moving the lines when this move is not supported by the manuscript tradition.

<sup>62</sup> "It was not like this that the bull carried his love burden on his back, when he carried Europa through the waves to Crete, not as when the frog raised the mouse on his back and set off to take him home, extending his yellow body on the clear water."

<sup>63</sup> BM 65 καὶ νῶτ' ἐδίδου, cf. Mosch. *Eur.* 100 οἱ πλατὺ δαίκνυε νῶτον.

<sup>64</sup> Sens (2006) 240.

<sup>65</sup> Wölke (1978) 114.

<sup>66</sup> See, for example, Kouremenos (1996) 234 n. 3 and bibliography.

with epic figures. On the one hand, the frog's yellow body emphasizes his distance from his mythological counterpart. On the other, we are invited to recognize that the narrative of the poem is not like the smooth waters and jumping dolphins that usually characterize the presentation of Europa's ride. Instead, it is the third figure in this scene, the water snake, in a tripartite structure typical of the poem generally,<sup>67</sup> that characterizes the scene as exactly the opposite.

These two scenes, then, the meeting of Physignathus and Psicharpax and the Europa simile, both thematize the identification of the poem's characters with epic or mythological figures. However, in both cases such identification is far from straightforward. Psicharpax asks directly why we are trying to find out who he is; we are invited to compare the water travel with Europa and the bull, but at the same time told that they are *not* comparable. Instead of a straightforward process of identification, we see that the animals are anthropomorphized through literary convention and allusions, and these allusions invite us to make comparisons with the parodied text. These identifications are problematized when the poem reminds us of the characters' animal nature: the frog's yellow skin or the mouse's danger of being eaten by a bird of prey. In the following two sections, I will tease out the implications of this contrast between the characters' anthropo- and theriomorphic sides. Firstly, I shall suggest that the anthropomorphization of the animals allows for a reflexive commentary on the literary convention in general and challenges an overly "realist" attitude towards the nature and purpose of poetry. Secondly, the animals' theriomorphization in turn acts as a metafictional comment on literature in general by breaking the fiction and reminding the audience that these are mere animals. Both of these sides contribute to my overall argument that the poem absurdifies literary tropes.

### **The arming and battle scenes**

As we have seen, the anthropomorphization of the animals is frequently achieved through literary conventions and allusions. In this section, we shall look at how the *BM* engages with one important epic convention, the arming scenes (124-31, 161-5):

κνημῖδας μὲν πρῶτον ἐφῆρμοσαν, εἰς δύο μοίρας  
όρηξαντες κυάμους χλωρούς, εῦ δ' ἀσκήσαντες,  
οὓς αὐτοὶ διὰ νυκτὸς ἐπιστάντες κατέτωξαν.  
θώρηκας δ' εἶχον καλαμορραφέων ἀπὸ βυρσῶν,  
οὓς γαλέην δείραντες ἐπισταμένως ἐποίησαν.

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<sup>67</sup> Esteban Santos (1991) 65.

ἀσπὶς δ' ἦν λύχνου τὸ μεσόμφαλον· ἡ δέ νυ λόγχη  
εὐμήκης βελόνη, παγχάλκεον ἔργον Ἀρηος·  
ἡ δὲ κόρυς τὸ λέπυρον ἐπὶ κροτάφοις ἐρεβίνθου.<sup>68</sup>

φύλλοις μὲν μαλαχῶν ἀμφὶ κνήμας ἐκάλυψαν,  
θώρηκας δ' εἶχον καλοὺς χλοερῶν ἀπὸ σεύτλων,  
φύλλα δὲ τῶν κραμβῶν εἰς ἀσπίδας εὗ ἥσκησαν,  
ἔγχος δ' ὀξύσχοινος ἑκάστῳ μακρὸς ἀρίρει,  
καὶ κόρυθες κοχλιῶν λεπτῶν ἐκάλυπτε κάρηνα.<sup>69</sup>

The full-scale repetition of the arming scene for both animals must in part serve to illustrate the differences between the two species. This is evident, for instance, in the differences in the materials used to construct the animals' armour. The mice use more man-made objects – the lid of a lamp or a needle – while the frogs' armour is constructed entirely from vegetation.<sup>70</sup> There may also be a contrast in the verbs used to describe the arming: the emphasis in the arming scene of the mice would be on their creation of their own armour, even if their process is somewhat destructive (*κατέτρωξαν*); meanwhile, the frogs are primarily concerned with *hiding* their bodies away (*ἐκάλυψαν, ἐκάλυπτε*). It is difficult, however, to make this claim with great confidence, since each scene possesses textual corruptions likely derived from the other, so that distinguishing what phrases were originally only applied to only the frogs or only the mice is difficult.<sup>71</sup> While this characterization of the different species would make sense given that the mice are victorious over the frogs, the textual problems of the passage make reading too far into such a comparison problematic.

Instead, recent scholarship has focused on how the scenes engage with the Homeric text and its reception in Hellenistic literary criticism. Adrian Kelly has argued that the overall structure, that is

<sup>68</sup> "First they fitted on greaves, breaking in half and fashioning well the green bean pods that they had set upon and gnawed during the night. They had corslets from straw-sewn hides that they had made skilfully after skinning a weasel. Their shield was the bossed lid of a lamp; their spear a long needle, bronze work of the War god; and the helmet on their heads the husk of a chickpea."

<sup>69</sup> "They covered their shanks in mallow leaves; they had fine corslets from green mangelwurzels; they fashioned cabbage leaves well into shields; each had a long needle-rush held firm for a spear; and helmets from thin snail shells protected their heads."

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Sticker (forthcoming) 6-7, who sees a contrast between *Kulturpflanzen* used by the mice and *Sumpfpflanzen* used by the frogs.

<sup>71</sup> For example, the contrast between the mice as creators and the frogs as hiders is partially based on the reading of the final two and a half feet of line 125. Here *a* reads κνήμας ἐκάλυπτον (possibly taken from l. 161) while *l* reads εὗ δ' ἀσκήσαντες (as printed by West but possibly derived from εὗ ἥσκησαν of l. 163). Cf. the possible interpolations of 121 and 123, and the different textual traditions in the second hemistich of 124 and the majority of 165. For detailed discussions of all these lines, see Glei (1984) *ad loc.*

the order of items used (greaves - breastplate - shield - spear - helmet), acts as a commentary on the debate between Alexandrian scholars over the arming scene of Paris (*Il.* 3.330–8) as well as the Homeric scene's reception in the arming scene of Aeëtes in Apollonius' *Argonautica* (3.1225–34).<sup>72</sup> In a scholium on the transmitted version of the Homeric text (which gives the order: greaves - breastplate - sword - shield - helmet - spear), we are told that Zenodotus altered the text, removing lines 334–5 (sword and shield) before adding another line (388a) reintroducing the shield (producing the overall order: greaves - breastplate - helmet - spear - shield).<sup>73</sup> In the *Argonautica*, Apollonius follows Zenodotus in not having a sword but then adds a Homeric change to Zenodotus' text, placing the spear in the originally Homeric position at the end of the scene (producing the order: breastplate - helmet - shield - spear). The *BM*, then, follows Apollonius and Zenodotus in omitting the sword, but unlike Apollonius retains the greaves and also departs from both Apollonius and Zenodotus by keeping the Homeric position of the shield before the helmet, perhaps following from the observation of another scholiast that it was physically impossible to put on the shield after the helmet due to the strap.<sup>74</sup>

Kelly suggests that 'the *BM* outdoes Apollonius in following Zenodotus' items more closely, so here its poet attempts to go one better again, not simply by repeating part of the same scene as the *Argonautica* does, but constructing a "hyper-Homerism" and repeating it all.'<sup>75</sup> Iris Sticker, by contrast, has objected to this logic on the grounds that, in the Hellenistic period, shields were used without straps and so Zenodotus' edition can be viewed as a modernization of the Homeric text, and this modernization is then followed by Apollonius.<sup>76</sup> Even if Zenodotus' version of the text is considered a form of modernization, his alterations to the text were seemingly not accepted on these grounds by many scholars, notably Aristarchus.<sup>77</sup> Indeed, scholiasts commenting on Homer as well as other poets frequently object to just this sort of anachronism, where characters who belong in the epic past use objects or concepts that belong to the poet's own age.<sup>78</sup> Sticker's attempt to explain away the problem of the arming scenes, although she does importantly attempt to understand these passages in their specific context, misses the point that such arguments are

<sup>72</sup> Kelly (2014), drawing on Rengakos (2001)'s discussion of Apollonius.

<sup>73</sup> As Kelly (2014) 411 points out, the removal of the sword is likely on the grounds that Paris does not use a sword in the duel; cf. Nickau (1977) 175.

<sup>74</sup> Σ A (Ariston.) *ad Il.* 11.32: πρὸ δὲ τῆς περικεφαλαίας ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν ἀσπίδα, ώς ἀν δι' ἀναφορέων χρωμένων ταῖς ἀσπίσιν, ὁ δὲ Ζηνόδοτος ἐπὶ τοῦ Αλεξάνδρου τὸν ὄπλισμὸν ἐνήλλαχεν.

<sup>75</sup> Kelly (2014) 413.

<sup>76</sup> Sticker (forthcoming) 4–5. Cf. Nickau (1977) 175, who calls it 'eine "Modernisierung" des homerischen Schemas.'

<sup>77</sup> ὥστε ἐναντίως τῷ Ὀμηρικῷ ὄπλισμῷ ἔχειν· πρὸ τῆς ἀσπίδος γὰρ φανήσεται ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν περικεφαλαίαν καὶ ξίφος μὴ ἔχων - Σ A (Ariston.) *ad Il.* 3.334–5a.

<sup>78</sup> Σ A (Ariston.) *ad Il.* 18.219a; Σ AGeT (Ariston.) *ad Il.* 21.388a; Σ Pi. P. 4.34b, 342; Σ A. Th. 277a; Σ E. Hec. 254, 573, *Med.* 233. Cf. Nünlist (2009) 118.

implicated in the question of poetic aesthetics. I would therefore prefer to interpret the arming scenes in this poem as part of the *BM*'s poetic reflexivity by asking why the *BM* poet should want to engage with these Homeric scholars in the first place.

The answer to this question must lie in the purpose of such scholarship. In both of the major arguments that could be levelled against Zenodotus' version of the Homeric text, namely the impossibility of putting on a shield over a helmet or creating an anachronism through his modernization of the text, the underlying aesthetic principle is concerned with the level of realism expected of poets and poetry. Do we expect the manner of the arming scene in Homer to be directly replicable in the real world? Are heroes from a bygone age allowed to use materials and objects not available to them in the past? One of the criteria for much Alexandrian poetry and literary criticism is the assumption that poetry *should be* realistic. These scholars assume that Homer would not write an arming scene that could not be directly reproduced in the real (or experienced) world. Many of the key terms and techniques identified in the scholia (especially ἐνάργεια, ἔμφασις, and πιθανότης) would be significantly more problematic if Homer's narrative was not bound by some rules of realism.<sup>79</sup> When ancient scholars, from Plato and Aristotle onwards, pose questions (*ζητημάτα*) about Homer and his poems, they comment implicitly or explicitly on the realistic nature of such poetry. When this is transposed onto frogs and mice, however, the supposed realism is undone. So rather than necessarily 'alluding to – and agreeing with – this scholarly fallout,'<sup>80</sup> in fact the *BM* challenges the poetic assumptions such a fallout is based upon.

This line of argument accords closely with another phenomenon discussed by Kelly elsewhere, that is the reappearance of Psicharpax and others – despite having been killed – in the midst of the battle scene and the peculiar case of Prassaeus drowning a dead mouse (*Πρασσαῖος δ' ἐσιδῶν ποδὸς εἴλκυσε νεκρὸν ἔοντα / ἐν λίμνῃ δ' ἀπέπνιξε κρατήσας χειρὶ τένοντα* - 232-3). Kelly argues that these scenes, like the arming scenes, engage with the scholarly attempts to correct the Homeric text, in this instance at points where heroes such as Pylaemenes are killed before reappearing later in the text.<sup>81</sup> Although Kelly generally reads this interaction straightly, describing the scene as 'a sustained passage of critical commentary,' in a note he suggests that the *BM* poet may be 'poking fun at those scholars, for their critical acumen is humorously exaggerated in the patently absurd context of the *BM*, where the somewhat chaotic combat resists the kind of military

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<sup>79</sup> For the terminology of the scholiasts, see Richardson (1980). For their association with the effects of realism, see de Jong (2005) 5, cf. Nünlist (2009) 190-1.

<sup>80</sup> Kelly (2014) 412.

<sup>81</sup> In the example of Pylaemenes, the Paphlagonian king is killed at *Il.* 5.576-9 but mentioned again, this time mourning for his son, at 13.658.

sense that Alexandrian scholarship sought in Homer.<sup>82</sup> I would like to push this latter interpretation further. However, rather than military sense, I would emphasize that, as in the arming scenes, the humour here is directed primarily at the aesthetics of realism that underpins the Alexandrian criticism. By re-introducing characters back into the battle narrative, particularly when this is kicked off by the revival of one of the central figures of the poem, is not just funny (although we should note also that this kind of humour is certainly not antithetical to the idea that the scene functions as ‘a sustained passage of critical commentary’) but challenges our entire conception of what can happen in this poem. Not only is death not an impediment to the characters’ role in the action, but causality – Psicharpax is fighting to avenge his own death! – does not always apply in this poem. The *BM* poet pointedly does not play by the rules and standards set by the Alexandrian scholars concerning realism, but flaunts them in some of the most ostentatious ways possible.

In making this argument, I do not mean to suggest that the poem is anti-war or anti-Homeric. Indeed, the focus of my claims is helpfully clarified in contrast to two articles which have tried in different ways to understand the implications of the poem’s engagement with Homeric epic and to draw out a broader meaning from the poem, a sort of fabular *epimythos*.

Firstly, Ruth Scodel compared what she sees as the “anti-heroic” outlook of the *BM* with that in the *Cypria*: ‘wars are fought for trivial or fictional reasons, caused and continued by fools, liars, incompetents, and crooks.’<sup>83</sup> While Scodel does point to some serious problems with the motivation for the war in this poem, her suggestion that the poem reflects an “antiheroic” stance seems to me to conflate too far the audiences of the *Cypria* and the *BM*. Whether the *BM* was written in the 2nd or 1st cent. BC, the notion of heroism that underpins poems such as the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and *Cypria* has changed or developed substantially. Additionally, it is difficult to see how this battle is, or could claim to be, representative of war in general. While aspects of the poem could be drawn into a more generally moralizing message – the frogs, for instance, are easily misled into a war by the hornswoggling Physignathus – the lack of any firm dating for the poem, and thus the absence of a direct political context in which to view the poem, should make us cautious of readings that attempt to find a generalizing, large-scale political message in the *BM*.

Another scholar who has sought for “seriousness” in the *BM* recognizes just this point.<sup>84</sup> Glenn Most argues that the arch of the poem’s narrative moves from the individual character to the mass

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<sup>82</sup> Kelly (2009), particularly p. 49 with n. 33.

<sup>83</sup> Scodel (2008) 234.

<sup>84</sup> The idea of literary “seriousness” is extremely fraught, for which see Silk (2000) 301-49. While Scodel (2008) carefully avoids such terminology, she nevertheless attempts to argue that the *BM* conveys an “antiheroic” message. Most (1993), as his title suggests, is looking for a certain kind of seriousness (*ernst*), which Silk would describe as ‘honest’ seriousness.

army, and thus ‘zur Politik, zum Krieg, ja hin zu Lug, Trug und Gewalt.’ However, rather than arguing that the *BM* is anti-war, Most recognizes that the poem is, at its core, a literary parody and that ‘als solche nicht so sehr Kritik an einem politischen Phänomen, sondern vielmehr an einem literarischen: dem Kriegsepos.’<sup>85</sup>

While I think that Most is right to emphasize the literariness of the poem, I think that his approach is too heavily influenced by the parodic theories of the Formalists and especially Bakhtin. This leads him to react in my view too strongly to the view that the *BM* is “pure fun” (*rein Spaß*) and instead to seek a deeper (*ernst*) meaning in the poem. For one, this leads him to argue that the poem is actively critical, in a pejorative, mocking (*Verspottung*) sense, of *Kriegsepos*, by which he primarily means the *Iliad*. This is because he believes that the parodist ‘kann seinerseits eine implizite Kritik des Eigentlichen naheliegen, ein versteckte Polemik, die die spezifisch parodische Form der Komik, nämlich die *Verspottung*, einschließen kann.’<sup>86</sup> Thus, for Most, ‘werden die Mäuse also als hervorragende iliadische Landkrieger gekennzeichnet, erinnern die Frösche dagegen vielmehr an die Welt und Werte der *Odyssee*’.

There are two problems with Most’s argument. Firstly, the dichotomy between “fun” and “serious” is overly simplistic. As scholars such as Huizinga have noted, play (or fun) is not antithetical to seriousness (or honesty).<sup>87</sup> Secondly, Most’s reading of the poem tries too hard to find an opposition *within* epic, which overlooks the other literary influences on the poem. Instead, I suggest that it is more fruitful to situate the poem within the context of Hellenistic literary aesthetics. In this context, we can appreciate that the target of the humour is not Homeric epic, as I have argued throughout this section, but rather Alexandrian scholarship. As we have already seen several times in this thesis, Homer is not the target of poetic mockery but the means by which it is achieved. The poem, as we have seen, defines its anti-realist aesthetics in contrast to the judgments and criticism of the Alexandrian school and it is through the allusion to Homeric *problémata* that this is effected.

### The crustaceous conundrum

The metaphor of bodies to describe different kinds of poetics is well known from ancient stylistic theory.<sup>88</sup> Throughout the *BM*, we find frequent references to the bodies of the animals. In what may

<sup>85</sup> Most (1993) 38.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. 28, my emphasis.

<sup>87</sup> Huizinga (1949). Silk (2000) 309-10 similarly criticizes the approaches of de Ste Croix (1972), Heath (1987), and Henderson (1990) on the basis that ‘they include to assume that seriousness and humour come in separate packages.’

<sup>88</sup> See, for example, Worman (2009).

be one of the most paradigmatic examples, the armies, and especially the mice, are compared to the Giants and Centaurs (*γηγενέων ἀνδρῶν μιμούμενοι ἔργα Γιγάντων* - 7; *οἵος Κενταύρων στρατὸς ἔρχεται ἡὲ Γιγάντων* - 171). Part of the humour here of course is in the vast difference in size, a contrast that reflects the grand, bombastic power of epic and the miniature protagonists of the *BM* itself. The very bodies of the animal protagonists, that is, reflects the poem's own diminutive self-definition. In this section, I shall argue that, while the parody of Homer focuses on an anthropomorphic view of the animals, the moments when we see the "real" nature of the animals break the fictional spell. It is ironically when we see the animals as real animals, their fur or yellow skin for instance, that we recognize the fictionality of a poem whose world is driven by the animals' anthropomorphism. This metafictionality contributes to the anti-realism of the poem, as we are forced to recognize the absurdity of frogs and mice playing at being Homeric heroes. This argument is best exemplified in the entry of the crabs, a description that, as we shall see, focuses solely on their physical appearance.

The arming and battle scenes are, in general, the points of highest anthropomorphization for the animals, in part because they are stock epic scenes. By the very end of the battle sequence, however, Zeus has decided that he must intervene. We have already seen that his first attempted intervention goes awry. His successful second attempt, however, deserves further attention (294-300):

ἥλθον δ' ἐξαίφνης νωτάκμονες, ἀγκυλοχῆλαι,  
λοξοβάται, στρεβλοί, ψαλιδόστομοι, ὀστρακόδερμοι,  
όστοφυεῖς, πλατύνωτοι, ἀποστίλβοντες ἐν ὕμοις,  
βλαισοί, χειροτένοντες, ἀπὸ στέρνων ὄρώοντες,  
οκτάποδες, δικέραιοι, ἀχειρέες,<sup>89</sup> οἵ δὲ καλεῦνται  
καρκίνοι· οἵ ḥα μῦων οὐρὰς στομάτεσσιν ἔκοπτον  
ἡδὲ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας· ἀνεγνάμπτοντο δὲ λόγχαι.<sup>90</sup>

The poem at this point marks out its own innovation through the emphasis on the suddenness with which the crabs appear (*ἥλθον δ' ἐξαίφνης*; cf. *ὔδρος δ' ἐξαίφνης* at 82, where this suddenness emphasizes the break from the fable tradition). As I have emphasized in this chapter, the appearance of the crabs is entirely unexpected, since from the beginning we are expecting the mice

<sup>89</sup> West (2003) prints ἀτειρέες.

<sup>90</sup> "And there came of a sudden creatures with backs hard as anvils, bent of claw, walking aslant, squinting, scissor-mouthed, shell-skinned, bony-natured, flat-backed, gleaming-shouldered, bandy-legged, with tendons for hands, peering from their chests, eight-legged, twin-feelered, lacking hands: those known as crabs." [trans. West adapted]

to be victorious. In my discussion of their appearance, I shall address two questions that arise from this: (1) why should the *BM* poet choose crabs? (2) Why are they introduced in such a riddling manner?

The answer to the first question may lie in the fact that they are sent by the gods, since crabs are closely associated with a number of Greek gods. Crabs are sometimes reported to have been made by Poseidon himself (*Neptuno debere genus, populosus in undis cancer* - Manilius *Astronomics* 2.5.221), and one crab in particular supported the hydra against Heracles, as has been depicted numerous times, and as a result is sometimes said to have been taken to heaven by Hera and made part of the Cancer zodiac symbol (Eratosth. *Catast.* 2, Manilius *Astronomics* 2.5.32). We might even see a link in the *BM* between the crab and Zeus in particular. In addition to the coins on which Zeus is depicted on the obverse with a crab on the reverse, the crabs of Tenedos, according to Plutarch, bore the image of the double-axe, the sign of the Asia Minor Zeus (ὧσπερ ἀμέλει Σελινούντιοι ποτε χρυσοῦν σέλινον ἀναθεῖναι λέγονται, καὶ Τενέδιοι τὸν πέλεκυν ἀπὸ τῶν καρκίνων τῶν γιγνομένων περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Αστέριον παρ' αὐτοῖς· μόνοι γὰρ ως ἔοικεν ἐν τῷ χελωνίῳ τύπον πελέκεως ἔχουσι. καὶ μήν αὐτῷ γε - Plu. *De. Pyth. Or.* 399f-400a).<sup>91</sup> Such is the association of crabs with divine figures that Deonna suggests that crabs are ‘a sign of strength and domination.’<sup>92</sup> If this association lies behind the choice of the crabs, then their connection to Zeus and their victory over the mice, which returns order to the natural world (to the extent that they prevent the complete annihilation of frogs), would make perfect sense. We could also associate this argument with the comparison between the armies of the mice and frogs with the Giants. The Giants are the cosmological baddies *par excellence*. Given that we are reminded of the comparison between the armies of the mice and the Giants shortly before Zeus hurls his thunderbolt (282-3), the threat that the mice pose in their ability to evade the power of Zeus’ thunderbolt is humorously cosmological. This cosmological threat is only finally defeated by the crabs, and perhaps is meant to echo the cosmogonical order imposed by the gods’ victory in the Gigantomachy. If, then, we were right to suppose that the crabs on some level represent dominion in their association with the divine, their intervention and victory could be seen as the re-establishment of divine order that was threatened when the mice ignore the thunderbolt initially sent by Zeus to bring the battle to a close.

To the extent that parodies could be described as “codes” to be broken, references to be understood, they function in a similar manner to riddles. Indeed, in Appendix 2 I have discussed one of the earliest uses of a word cognate with *παρφδία*, where we already see the connection with

<sup>91</sup> This was generally called the *πέλεκυς*, but in Labranda was called *λάβρων*.

<sup>92</sup> Deonna (1954) 62. Deonna also collates both the literary and numismatic evidence for associating crabs with the gods.

riddling (κούκέτι παρωδοῖς χρησόμεσθ' αἰνίγμασιν - E. IA 1147). We have also already seen (ch. 2) how Matro of Pitane structures some of the introductions to dishes in Xenocles' banquet in a riddling manner (e.g. ἥλθε δὲ Νηρῆος θυγάτηρ, Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα, / σηπίη - Matro AD 33-4). The riddle, then, is one potential parodic strategy. It should not be wholly surprising that this technique should appear in the *BM*.

Animal riddles in particular were a popular topic of riddles and enigmas in the *Greek Anthology* (e.g. 14.19 [louse], 36 [fish]). Two animal riddles may be particularly relevant in this context. First, in an epigram of Statilius Flaccus (*AP* 6.196) we find a riddle about crabs, where they are dedicated to Pan by the fisherman Copasus. Secondly, one version of Homer's death involves his inability to solve a riddle told to him by some boys about lice.<sup>93</sup> If the *BM*, then, is tapping into riddling or enigmatic poems such as those found in the *Greek Anthology*, what effect does this create? In a recent discussion of riddles, Luz claimed that 'a riddle of the kind we find in the *Greek Anthology* is a description of an object or a situation which disguises this object by certain means or devices with the aim to puzzle the recipient.'<sup>94</sup> The devices which she discusses are metonymy/analogy, puns/wordplay, paradoxes, and myth.

We can see at least some of these techniques being used in the *BM*'s description of the crabs. Some of the adjectives and phrases used, for example, could also mislead the audience or reader by recalling other types of animals. The adjective στρεβλοὶ refers either to the idea that crabs are squinty-eyed, also attested in Aristotle's *Historia Animalium* (ὅτι [sc. οἱ καρκίνοι] εἰς τὸ πλάγιον βλέπουσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι - 6.527b8), but primarily means twisted or crooked, which fits with their being bent of claw and bandy-legged.<sup>95</sup> Describing the crabs as ὀστρακόδερμοι, however, is even more ambiguous, and even potentially misleading. While this adjective is sometimes used in reference to some crabs,<sup>96</sup> it can refer also to other animals such as snails and shellfish as well as eggs.<sup>97</sup> Indeed, sometimes crabs are said to be the opposite of ὀστρακόδερμος; for example, at *HA* 4.523b5, Aristotle refers to crabs as an example of τὸ τῶν μαλακοστράκων. Not only, then, is the description of the crabs as ὀστρακόδερμοι ambiguous, but potentially misleading as not all crabs

<sup>93</sup> The story is told in ps.-Plu. *Vita Homeri* 4, where Homer dies as a direct consequence of his inability to solve the riddle (ὅπερ οὐ δυνηθεὶς συμβαλεῖν Ὄμηρος διὰ τὴν ἀθυμίαν ἐτελεύτησε). The same story is told in ps.-Hdt. *Vita Homeri* 34-6, although the author denies the causal link.

<sup>94</sup> Luz (2012) 98.

<sup>95</sup> West (2003) and Glei (1984) both translate it as 'squinting', while the *LSJ*, s.v. στρεβλός A, cites the usage for the meaning of crooked. The fact that arguments can be made on both sides re-enforces the idea that such an ambiguity of meaning may be intended.

<sup>96</sup> ἐκδύνουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ καρκίνοι τὸ γῆρας, οἱ μὲν μαλακόστρακοι ὄμολογοι μένως, φασὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὀστρακοδέρμους, οἵον τὰς μαίας - Arist. *HA* 7.601a16-8.

<sup>97</sup> For the former: ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα· τοιαῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅν ἐντὸς μὲν τὸ σαρκῶδές ἔστιν, ἐκτὸς δὲ τὸ στερεόν, θραυστὸν οὖν καὶ καρακτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ θλαστόν· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τῶν κοχλιῶν γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀστρέων ἔστιν - Arist. *HA* 4.523b8-12; for the latter: τῶν δ' ὡῶν τὰ μὲν ὀστρακόδερμά ἔστι καὶ δίχροα - Arist. *HA* 1.489b14.

were thought of as hard-shelled. We find that the same ambiguity exists in the use of the word βλαισοί, which is also used by Aristotle to refer, on the one hand, to the hollow parts of a bee's hind leg (τούτους δ' ἐκμάττουσιν εἰς τοὺς μέσους, τοὺς δὲ μέσους εἰς τὰ βλαισὰ τῶν ὄπισθίων - HA 8.624b1-2), and on the other it is used to describe the legs not of a crab, but a lobster (βλαισοὶ δ' ἀμφότεροι τῇ θέσει - HA 4.526a23-4).

While some of the descriptors in the introduction of the crabs are designed to throw the audience off the scent, others are neologisms that are nevertheless based upon descriptions of other types of animals. This is the case, for instance, for the adjective πλατύνωτοι. The idea of an animal being described as "having a broad something-or-other" is far from unique. Bees can be described as broad-bellied (πλατυγάστωρ - Arist. HA 5.553b10, 8.624b25), some birds have a broad tongue (πλατύγλωττα - Arist. HA 2.504b3), sheep can be broad-tailed (πλατύκερκοι - Arist. HA 7.596b4), and one venomous beast is described as flat-headed (πλατυκέφαλος - Philum. Ven. 32.2). The same effect is created by the adjective ἀγκυλοχῆλαι, which seems to be formed in a similar manner to ἀγκυλογλώχιν, used to refer to a cock at Babrius 17.3, and ἀγκυλόδειρον, by which Oppian describes an ostrich (*Hal.* 4.630).

The descriptors of the crabs in the *BM*, then, are both carefully modelled stylistically on the description of animals in general and at the same time are designed to misdirect any learned audience members or readers who are well acquainted with technical discussions of animals such as that of Aristotle. This characterization of their introduction fits well with the wordplay that is common to the riddles of the *Greek Anthology*. Furthermore, adjectives such as νωτάκμονες, "backs hard as anvils", ψαλιδόστομοι, "scissor-mouthed", and possibly also χειροτένοντες, if it means "having tendons for hands",<sup>98</sup> make use of the kind of analogies also used by riddles.

We can see some further influence from riddles in the use of paradoxes. For instance, the concept of an animal "peering from its chest", ἀπὸ στέρνων ὁρώντες, evokes a deliberate paradox. Furthermore, I would argue that the influence of riddles on this description would help us to explain a textual problem that still remains problematic. In line 298, the manuscripts all print ἀχειρέες besides Y which transmits ἀχειλέες.<sup>99</sup> Glei has already noted the problems with this reading: 'formal ("ἀχειρέες ob numeros necessarium, sed semibarbarum est pro ἀχειρες" Herwerden 175) und inhaltlich (Widerspruch zu v. 297 χειροτένοντες) bedenklich.'<sup>100</sup> However, it

<sup>98</sup> The translations here are taken from West (2003). In the case of χειροτένοντες, West assumes the word is a compound of χείρ and τένων, while Glei (1984) *ad loc.* takes the latter part of the compound from τείνω, thereby translating it as "handvorstreckende".

<sup>99</sup> It is not surprising to find a reading here that asserts the crabs' lack of lips, which has been used by editors as an objections against reading ἀγκυλοχεῖλαι in l. 294 and χειλοτένοντες in l. 297. See for example Glei (1984) *ad loc.*

<sup>100</sup> Glei (1984) *ad loc.*

is also difficult to justify the alternative suggestions of modern scholars, either Nauck's ἀτειρέες or Ludwich's ἀχηρέες. For one, both of these readings would make the word the only part of the entire description that does not refer to the corporeal peculiarities of the crabs. While the formal objection of Glei can be explained as a Homericism applied to a non-Homeric word, a technique also used by other parodists,<sup>101</sup> the apparent contradiction between χειροτένοντες and ἀχειρέες can be explained as a deliberately paradoxical enigma. To describe the claws of the crabs as χειροτένοντες has a clear meaning, but it remains true that crabs do not actually possess *hands*. Within the context of the *BM*, however, and in the context of a riddle, they can be said to possess hands, or at least hand-like appendages. The audience draws upon the same suspension of disbelief to understand the description as they do a few lines later, when the crabs are said to cut the tails, hands, and feet of the mice (οἵς ὁμοί μυῶν οὐρὰς στομάτεσσιν ἔκοπτον / ἡ καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας - 299-300). The riddle plays on the anthropomorphization of the animals in the poem as a way of creating an apparent paradox.

The description of the crabs' entrance into the poem, then, employs numerous techniques common to riddles such as those found in the *Greek Anthology* in order to mislead and confuse the audience. The effect of this, in part, is to increase the humour, when the crabs are finally and explicitly named. I wish to argue, however, that there is another important element at play in the crustaceous conundrum. As I have already mentioned, if we accept the reading of ἀχειρέες, then the central, unifying element in the riddling description of the crabs is the focus on their bodies. This emphasis, I suggest, should be read through my argument outlined above that the *BM* uses the moments of theriomorphization as a metafictional tactic that reveals the artificiality of the poem's anthropomorphic tendencies. In this light, the introduction of the crabs is the point at which the entire fiction of the battle thus far is shattered. I have already discussed in detail the arming scenes as a point at which the poem defines its poetics against the scholiasts' approaches. Here, however, the arming of the mice is revealed in any case to be carried out in vain, as their weapons and arms are completely useless in the face of the anvil-like, natural armour of the crabs (ἀνεγνάμπτοντο δὲ λόγχαι - 300). Indeed, the parody of the Iliadic phrase ἀνεγνάμφθη δέ οἱ αἰχμὴ (Il. 3.348, 7.259, 17.44) seems almost to mock the continued efforts of the mice to act like Homeric warriors.

The description, however, just as it stands emphatically at odds with the anthropomorphized heroism of the battle thus far, also evades any attempt at simple theriomorphization. The misleading phrasing of the riddle, that I have argued complicates the identification of the crabs before they are named, also gives the impression of a weird conglomeration, a hybrid animal that seems

<sup>101</sup> Matro of Pitane, for instance, creates βελέεσσι out of the Homeric original, ἀδέεσσι, at AD 93. For the construction, see Olson and Sens (1999) 37.

to incorporate elements of others into itself. As a result, we view the crabs as a form of “other”, simultaneously recognizable and unknowable. This othering effect is an important part of the dynamics of riddles in general. Take, for example, the riddle about smoke (*AP* 14.5):

εἰμὶ πατρὸς λευκοῖο μέλαν τέκος, ἀπτερος ὄφνις,  
ἀχρὶ καὶ οὐρανίων ἵπτάμενος νεφέων·  
κούραις δ’ ἀντομένησιν ἀπενθέα δάκρυνα τίκτω·  
εὐθὺν δὲ γεννηθεὶς λύομαι εἰς ἀέρα.<sup>102</sup>

In this riddle, various methods are used in an attempt to disguise, or “other”, the answer. It is framed in familial language (*πατρός*, *τέκος*, *γεννηθείς*) alongside the juxtaposition of black and white. It also incorporates the paradoxical language (*ἀπτερος* *ὄφνις*... *ἵπτάμενος*) and wordplay (*κούραις*) we have seen in the *BM*. All of these images, however, are distractions from the imagery closest to the real answer (*οὐρανίων...* *νεφέων*, *ἀέρα*) so that the answer will seem to be something other than smoke. This alienating effect, then, is an important part of the *BM*’s strategy in describing the crabs and how this description borrows from the poetics of riddles.

Finally, some parts of the description of the crabs recalls phrases from epic itself. For example, *ἀγκυλοχῆλαι* almost puns on the Homeric description of eagles as *ἀγκυλοχεῖλαι* (*Il.* 16.428, *Od.* 19.538, 22.302),<sup>103</sup> their gleaming shoulders borrow Homeric vocabulary (*ἀποστίλβοντες* *ἀλείφατος* - *Od.* 3.408), and the final reveal borrows from Hesiod’s *Works and Days* (*οἱ καλέονται / ἡμίθεοι* - *Op.* 159-60).<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, the entire description is a parody of the long lists of epithets afforded some characters in epic, the longest of which is Thersites’ three line entry (*Il.* 2.217-9), although most do not extend over one line.

The results of all these lines of inquiry suggest that the poet of the *BM* describes the crabs using numerous techniques borrowed from riddles, but on a semantic level continues its Homeric parody whilst also creating neologisms that are themselves stylized after technical, zoological descriptions.

So how does the passage negotiate the integration of epic, neologistic, and riddling elements? There are, I suggest, two answers, both of which re-affirm the absurdifying poetics that has been

<sup>102</sup> “I am the black child of a white father, a wingless bird, flying even to the clouds of heaven. I give birth to tears of mourning in pupils that meet me, and at once on my birth I am dissolved into air.”

<sup>103</sup> This joke was presumably not appreciated by the authors of manuscripts that transmit the reading of *ἀγκυλοκεῖλαι*.

<sup>104</sup> Camerotto (1992) *ad loc.* also suggests that *ἀποστίλβοντες* ἐν ὕμοις produces the effect of Hes. *Sc.* 468, *σκυλεύσαντες ἀπ’ ὕμων*, and similarly *ἀπὸ στέρωνων ὁρώντες* producing the effect of *ὑπὸ στέρωνοι τανύσσεται*, *Od.* 5.346, 373, *Il.* 4.106, *Hom. Hymn to Hermes* 43. There does not seem to me, however, to be any strong connections between these passages, and the reminiscences are not overly strong.

espoused throughout the poem. On the one hand, the very form of the riddle embodies a rejection of the Aristotelian ideals of τὸ εἰκός.<sup>105</sup> Riddles go out of their way to present ordinary objects in an improbable way. This understanding of riddles can be seen in Ptolemaeus Grammaticus' differentiation between παραβολή and παράδειγμα. While παράδειγμα is taken from animate affairs and those that have taken place (ἐμψύχων ἢ γεγονότων πραγμάτων), παραβολή is taken from lifeless and illogical animals (ἀψύχων καὶ ζώων ἀλόγων). Ptolemaeus goes on to explain that the παραβολή and the riddle, αἴνιγμα, describe dark speech which is difficult to understand but which can be comprehended with much wit and soberness (τὸν σκοτεινὸν καὶ δυσκατάληπτον λόγον τὸν μετὰ πολλῆς ἀγχινοίας καὶ νήψεως νοεῖσθαι δυνάμενον - *De Diff. Voc.* π 121). The description of riddles as dark and difficult to comprehend, as well as its association with the ἀψύχων καὶ ζώων ἀλόγων of παραβολή, supports my suggestion that the introduction of the crabs with a sort of riddle heightens the improbability and suddenness of their arrival through a deliberately illusive style. Just as the improbable, indeed impossible, return of Psicharpax and others to the battlefield reflects the poem's absurdification of Homeric *problēmata*, the riddling description of the crabs acts as a ridiculous yet reflexive comment on the improbability of their arrival.

An alternative answer lies in line 301 (τοὺς καὶ ὑπέδεισαν πάντες μύες, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔμειναν), a line that parodies the Olympian gods' fear of Briareus and the restoration of Zeus to power in *Iliad* 1 (τὸν καὶ ὑπέδεισαν μάκαρες θεοὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔδησαν - *Il.* 1.406). The comparison of the effect of the crabs on the mice to that of Briareus on the gods suggests that they effect a restoration of divine order. This not only supports my suggestion above that the crabs are introduced because of their association with numerous gods and as a sign of strength and domination, but also is supported by the last part of the line. Instead of loosing Zeus' physical restraints, the mice run away, something they emphatically did not do earlier (ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ὡς ἀπέληγε μῶν στρατός, ἀλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον / ἵετο πορθήσειν γένος βατράχων ἀγερώχων - 290-1). The crabs, then, create an ironic resolution and restoration of order. As the poem comes to a close, it characteristically breaks the suspension of disbelief, reminding us of the artificiality and ridiculousness of it all. Zeus' power is parodically reaffirmed – that is, not really affirmed at all – and at the same time the poem's own narrative arc, that was *supposed* to tell of victorious mice, ends with their emphatic defeat (οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔμειναν, / ἐξ δὲ φυγὴν ἔτοποντο - 301-2). None of it makes much sense, but then again, it wasn't really supposed to.

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<sup>105</sup> See, for example, Arist. *Poet.* 1451a36-9: φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἀν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

## CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this chapter, my approach to the *BM* has emphasized the role of humour in constructing poetic meaning. I have argued principally that the poem adheres to an anti-realist aesthetics, which is defined by the continuous transgression of conventional rules of narrative. What begins as a boundless conflict (*δῆστιν ἀπειρούστην* - 4) is ultimately revealed to last a single day (*πολέμου τελετὴ μονοήμερος* - 303). On the one hand, this anti-realism is evoked through the poem's consistent play with literary conventions. This has been seen, on the one hand, in the way that the overarching narrative of the poem sets up certain kinds of expectations, both through indirect hints in the text and intertextual possibilities (Eco's inferential walks), only later to disappoint these expectations. On the other, stock epic scenes such as the arming scene appear in the *BM* in a way that invites us to reflect on literary aesthetics and Hellenistic scholarship. In both cases, literary conventionality and the underlying aesthetic principles (such as logic and consistency) are exposed as a limited framework for poetic practice. The *BM*, by contrast, flouts the rules of logic, reason, and causality as a means of critique, especially of Alexandrian scholarship and poetry. From this perspective, the poem absurdifies its literary targets, making the poetic principles upon which such poetry and scholarship is based seem absurdly arbitrary. Additionally, as I have emphasized, this process must be viewed primarily from the perspective of Hellenistic literary aesthetics. Much of the humour in the poem, as we have seen, derives from the construction of apparent incongruities with conventional expectation that are revealed to have their foundations in the literary, and frequently Homeric, tradition. If we think that Zeus must be all powerful, or that we are right to expect divine intervention, Zeus' false prediction of *Iliad* 15 and the Alexandrian backlash to the possibility of divine fallibility shows how wrong we might be.

Additionally, the tension between anthropo- and theriomorphic sides in the portrayal of the animals allows us to explore the poem's metafictionality in a different regard. Again, here the arming scenes are representative of the poem's parodic strategies, clothing the animals – so to speak – in the garb of Homeric heroes. This technique, using clothing as a part of the parodic process, is familiar to us from other parodic texts. In Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, for example, Dicaeopolis feels the need to go and visit Euripides himself as well as borrow the *exact* props and clothes from his *Telephus* in order to effectively take on the role he requires.<sup>106</sup> By contrast, it is, as we have seen, the theriomorphic moments, when the animals' true selves are revealed, that allow

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<sup>106</sup> For the use of clothing as part of Aristophanes' paratragic technique, see Robson (2005). In the *Acharnians*, the emphasis on Euripidean rags (*όάκιον*) also functions as a reflection of his literary style. As noted above, however, the textual problems make any attempt at discerning a stylistic difference between the frogs and mice's armour highly fraught.

the fiction to be broken and allow us to recognize the conventionality of many of the literary tropes. The crabs in particular, who do not conform at all to the standard behaviour of the animals dressing in armour and fighting with needles, literally break up the fight. The mice's armour and weaponry prove entirely useless in the face of their bizarre bodies. These bodies, which through the use of riddling techniques appear familiar and alien, in a sense "undresses" the mice and frogs, revealing the literary conventionality upon which the parody is based. Each time we are reminded that the parody is a literary trick using a mixture of standardized tropes and specific reminiscences, the *BM* calls audience's attention towards the artificiality of these literary tropes and its own literal unmasking of them. By approaching the *BM* from a humour-oriented perspective, we see how the poem transforms poetic convention into an absurd world inhabited by undying mice and cryptic crabs.

## CHAPTER 5

### *The Galeomyomachia*

The *Galeomyomachia* (GM) is a poem discovered on papyrus dated to the 2nd or 1st cent. BC, which was first published in 1983 by Schibli,<sup>1</sup> since which time it has received relatively little attention from scholars. Several scholars have produced editions of the text, most recently Marco Perale, whose forthcoming edition I follow here.<sup>2</sup> Detailed literary-critical work on the poem, however, has been lacking.<sup>3</sup> What we do possess is a poem of 60 lines, with an almost complete lacuna between lines 32 and 50. The papyrus opens with the death of a mouse, Trixos, who is mourned by his wife. This causes the mice to gather at the behest of Hermes, which momentarily worries the weasel. Finally, we see the end of a catalogue as the mice conglomerate and are being addressed by the old Myleus as the papyrus breaks off. However, we do not know when it was written or by whom, or what else happens in the poem.

My approach to the GM in this chapter might be usefully compared to that in the previous chapter, as the two poems present us with similar questions concerning the use of generic tropes and the manipulation of audience expectations. The key difference here is that the fable on which the GM is based already features a war. This means that the poem can be understood at a narrative level as an adaptation.<sup>4</sup> We are dealing with a “knowing” audience, in Linda Hutcheon’s terms,<sup>5</sup> for whom Aesopic fable was a central pillar of early education. At the same time, it is unclear whether or not this adaptation was “true to the original”. Does the outcome of the war here *have* to be the same as in the version familiar to its ancient audiences?

Throughout this chapter, I argue that the poem playfully explores the possibility of an alternative ending to the battle. While the weasel assumes that the mice are *αἰγομόροιστι*, several aspects of the poem bring this assumption into question, especially the role of Hermes. The way in which

<sup>1</sup> Schibli (1983). An HD image of the papyrus is now also available to access online here. <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/a/apis/x-3034/6946r.tif>.

<sup>2</sup> West (2003); Lloyd-Jones (2005); Perale (forthcoming). I am indebted to Marco Perale for sharing his edition with me.

<sup>3</sup> The only detailed discussion of the poem outside of the editions is Jarko (1985), who focuses especially on the death of Trixos and dates the poem to the 2nd cent. BC. Fusillo (1988) and Sens (2006) have also discussed the relationship between the GM and the BM.

<sup>4</sup> This approach is based on the work of J. Lefkowitz (2009) and Hutcheon (2006), who are discussed in more detail below.

<sup>5</sup> Hutcheon (2006) 120: ‘The term “knowing” suggests being savvy and street-smart, as well as knowledgeable, and undercuts some of the elitist associations of the other terms in favor of a more democratizing kind of straightforward awareness of the adaptation’s enriching, palimpsestic doubleness.’

this ambiguity is created operates in a similar way to the narrative misdirection of the *BM*, namely that it is through the use of generic tropes and patterns that audience expectation is created and manipulated. However, in the *BM* generic tropes are used to create what we might term a positive expectation, by which I mean that the evocation of tropes seemed to support our expectations only then to have those expectations dashed by the development of the narrative; by contrast, in this poem the tropes are negative in the sense that they frequently seem to work against our expectations based on the traditional fabular narrative.

I shall begin with a discussion of the remains of the poem, what we can safety assert about its narrative, as well as the potential references to the poem in the *BM*. This will then form the basis of a detailed discussion of three scenes in the subsequent sections. In the first section, I analyse the death of Trixos and its aftermath; in the second, I turn to the end of the papyrus and the description of the mice in the catalogue; and finally, I consider the reaction of the weasel to the mustering of the mouse army. These scenes, as we shall see, evoke a number of epic and fabular tropes – such as the catalogue, deceptive female speech, mice as cowards, or “knowing your place”. Many of these tropes thematize different models of behaviour. Trixos’ wife, for instance, berates him for exceeding his bounds and making himself known to the weasel. Through these tropes, we are invited to consider how the animals should, could, and will behave as the poem progresses. On the one hand, the fragmentary nature of the text means that we cannot state with absolute certainty what the outcome of the battle will be; on the other, through the contrast between the adaptation of a known story and the interplay of generic tropes in the poem ancient audiences, I argue, might well have been asking the very same question.

## RECONSTRUCTING THE POEM

Given the highly fragmentary state of the papyrus, we must begin with what we can discern from what we possess of the poem’s narrative. Even this is a highly fraught exercise. From Schibli’s original reconstruction of the first line, which identified only an epsilon in front of the word γεῖκο[ς] followed shortly thereafter by ως and ending in οντες, West suggested reconstructing Μοῦσά μοι ἔννεπ]ε γεῖκο[ς] ὄπιως [πολέμ]ου [κρυ]όξν[τ]ος, although I shall suggest here that Perale’s version (Μοῦσά μοι ἔννεπ]ε γεῖκος ὄπιως μ[ύες προβα]λοντες) is preferable. While the first half of West’s suggestion has been accepted by Perale, at the end of the line he suggests ὄπιως μ[ύες προβα]λοντες. If West’s reconstruction of the first hemistich is correct, we possess the opening line of the poem, in which circumstance the stichometric Δ (= 400) in the margin of column ii indicates the overall number of verses on the roll rather than the number of lines in the

GM itself.<sup>6</sup> Although West's supplement is ambitious, the claim that this is the start of the poem is ultimately convincing, since the syntax of the line as reconstructed fits with opening invocations in epic and parodies of epic. Particularly instructive is a comparison with Hippoanax' parodic invocation in fr. 128:

Μοῦσά μοι Εὐρυμεδοντιάδεω τὴν ποντοχάρυβδιν,  
τὴν ἐγγαστριμάχαιραν, ὃς ἐσθίει οὐ κατὰ κόσμον,  
ἔννεφ', ὅπως ψηφῖδι <κακῆ> κακὸν οἴτον ὀλεῖται  
βουλῇ δημοσίῃ παρὰ θῖν' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο.<sup>7</sup>

This fragment follows the same syntactic structure as the opening of the GM: the verb ἐνέπω principally governs the subject of the song (the son of Eurymedon/*neikos*), which in Hippoanax is qualified by a long description, and this is then followed by the clause introduced by ὅπως as an adverb of manner.<sup>8</sup> A similar structure occurs in the opening of the BM, in which the poet prays that the Muses bring the boundless conflicts to the ears of all mortals (δῆριν ἀπειρεσίην... εὐχομενος μερόπεσσιν ἐς οὖατα πᾶσι βαλέσθαι - 4-5), a phrase that corresponds with the invocation of the Muses here, which is similarly qualified and explained in a phrase opened by πῶς (6).

Less convincing, however, is West's reconstruction of the remainder of the line, [πολέμ]ῷψ [κρου]όεν[τ]ος, since it does not seem to fit the reading of the papyrus.<sup>9</sup> Perale's alternative, μ[ύες προβα]λόντες, is more attractive given that in Homer προβαλόντες is likewise used in the same metrical *sedes* governing ἔριδα, a near synonym of νεῖκος (*Il.* 11.529).<sup>10</sup> My reading of the syntax of the line nevertheless differs a little from Perale, who does not take νεῖκος as the object of ἔννεπε.<sup>11</sup> Following the parallels of Hippoanax and the BM discussed above, I would render the line: "Sing to me, Muse, of hostility, how the mice, throwing themselves into it...".

Following the opening invocation and announcement of the poem's subject, we have an account of the war's first casualty, Trixos (3-18, see below), whose death parodies that of Protesilaus in *Iliad*

<sup>6</sup> I.e. the GM would have been preceded by a poem (or poems) of approximately 300 lines.

<sup>7</sup> "Muse, as for the son of Eurymedon, the sea-Charybdis, the knife in the gut, who eats in a disorderly fashion, tell me how the wretch will die a wretched death by stoning by the popular will beside the shore of the barren sea."

<sup>8</sup> Cf. LSJ s.v. ὅπως A.

<sup>9</sup> From an examination of an HD image of the papyrus, I would say that the ending -οντες is fairly well discernible.

<sup>10</sup> This strategy of textual reconstruction is similar to that proposed for the BM by Hosty (2014b) 1012, who emphasizes how 'appreciating the subtlety with which the BM poet alludes to and manipulates its heroic models can pay dividends in terms of resolving the text.'

<sup>11</sup> He translates the line as follows: "Sing to me, Muse, of how, once casted the strife, the mice...".

2. The subsequent lines are more greatly damaged, but the focus certainly shifts to the divine realm (οἱ μὲν δαίνυντο θεοὶ κατὰ [μα]κρὸν Ὄλυμπον - 19), and in particular Hermes, who rouses the mice to battle (θεοῦ αἰσχα συνῆγεν / [πάντας] ἐπὶ στρατιὰν - 23-4). The weasel notices this and gives a short speech, which suggests a confidence that the fight will go her way.<sup>12</sup> Lines 30-1 are badly damaged, although from what remains it seems the weasel takes up a position near, inside, or beside the root of a tree ( $\pi\omega$ ]θμέν' ἐλαίης). West, who reads μέγ[αν] δ' ύπ[ο] τ[υθ]μέν' ἐλαίης, suggests that the weasel is concealing itself under the trunk, which seems incongruous given the newfound strength of the weasel in her speech; on the other hand, Perale in a note suggests as a tentative reconstruction εἰσῆλθεν κ[α]δόδύγτ' ἔ[ς πω]θμέν' ἐλαίης, which would perhaps be parodying Theognis 1035 (καταδὺς ἐς πωθμένα λίμνης).

From lines 32-50, the top of column ii, we have next to no knowledge of what is going on. When the text resumes at 51, it is clear that we are at the end of a catalogue detailing the mouse army. How long might this catalogue have originally been? Given that catalogues are frequently very formulaic in their introduction of discrete items, we might be justified in trying to fill some of the gap.<sup>13</sup> When the text begins again (quoted below), the catalogue is principally a parody of the Iliadic *Catalogue of Ships*. The individual group is specified by the location they inhabit, with the location in the accusative immediately before the generic verb ἐνέμοντο. This formula is typical of the Homeric catalogue (e.g. οἱ δὲ Πύλον τ' ἐνέμοντο καὶ Αορίνην ἐρατεινὴν - 2.591; cf. 496, 499, 531, 605), although in addition to νέμω, Homer also frequently uses ἔχω (e.g. 581, 584, 585, 603, 607, 608) and ναίω (e.g. 511, 522, 593). Given the formularity of these constructions, we may expect to find similar phrases in preceding lines. Two good candidates for catalogic entries are the opening of lines 42 and 47, both of which open with οἱ. If these were the opening of catalogic entries (thus reading οἱ[ in 42 and οἱ δ'[εῖχον(?) or οἱ Δ[ in 47), each entry would have elaborations of similar lengths, between 2-4 lines. A further suggestive feature is the *paragraphos* above line 42. If this is being used to mark structural divisions within the text,<sup>14</sup> the start of a catalogue would be one logical place for this, although we should note that there is no indication of another *paragraphos* at the end of the catalogue, and so its precise function cannot be determined.<sup>15</sup> If this hypothesis is correct, this leaves a space between lines 32 and 41 in which to describe the activities of the weasel,

<sup>12</sup> The mice are αἰνομόοισι in l. 28, in l. 29 the weasel says that she too can be filled with courage ([ἀλκῆς] δὴ καὶ ἔγωγε νέ[ης] ἐμπίμπ[λα]μαι ἥτοο), and she rejoices (κ[ε]χαρομένη) in l. 30. If the reading of West and Schibli, δειμαίνω, in l. 27 is correct, it is possible that the weasel's initial fear is overcome quickly. For a discussion, see the section 'Renewed strength and doomed mice'.

<sup>13</sup> For the formulaic structure of many catalogues and the basis of the terminology I use for catalogues here, see Sammons (2010).

<sup>14</sup> In his analysis of the *paragraphos* in Greek literary prose texts, W.A. Johnson (1994) 65 notes that 'in hexameter, it is sometimes found as a divider between sections of the text.'

<sup>15</sup> There is another *paragraphos* visible in fr. f below line 2.

perhaps explaining *why* the weasel has taken off towards the tree, and then to shift the focus back onto the mice.

Finally, after the mice have gathered together, they are addressed by Myleus, a Nestor-like figure who begins speaking as the papyrus trails off... From what we can tell, however, he seems to use his father to introduce a (perhaps moral or martial) paradigm against which the current situation should be evaluated or as the source of a prophecy (ἱδη ἐγώ τάδε [π]άντα, μύες, παρ[ὰ πατρὸς ἀκούσας / ἡμετέρου - 59-60).<sup>16</sup> One possibility is to read Myleus' speech against the Aesopic fable (165 Perry). In the Aesopic version, frustrated that the weasels were constantly victorious over them, the mice call a council in which they decide that the key factor is their lack of leadership, and so generals were duly appointed. These leaders distinguished themselves through crests on their helmets. In the subsequent battle, the mice are routed and, while most could scamper back to their holes, the generals' helmets prevented them from passing through the narrow entrances, and as a result they were devoured. Although it is unclear how close to the Aesopic version the GM was, it is possible that Myleus used the death of Trixos and past encounters with weasels to propose the mice elect (the ultimately ill-fated) generals. The fable as we have it emphasizes the frequency of the mice's encounters and losses, which would well suit the use of the past as a motivating factor for current change.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, the catalogue immediately preceding his speech seems to be based around the rubric of the geographical groups who gathered for the battle ([ο]ἱ Σπάρτην ἐνέμοντο... οὗτοι ἄρ' ἡγεμέθοντο - 51-3), by contrast to the Homeric model in which Homer specified that he is going to name the *leaders* of the Danaans (οἵ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν - 2.487; cf. 493). Part of the catalogue's humour may derive from reading it intertextually against the Aesopic version of the fable, with the point of the joke being precisely that there are no generals to name. This would then pave way for Myleus' speech afterwards, in which the necessity of such Homeric figures (by implicit contrast to the nameless animals of fable) is emphasized.

The other fragments of the papyrus do not help us any further in reconstructing the plot. Fragment f may refer once more to the role of Hermes (12) and the appearance of the letters αϙῳ[ may be a reference to chariots, although this is very uncertain. Neither is an intertextual

<sup>16</sup> The evocation of Myleus' father seems to be an appeal to the authority of the past similar to the role of paradigms in Homer. Alden (2000) 22, for instance, describes them as follows: '[a paradigm] communicates a fact from the past which seems compatible with the present, and by doing so, it explains why people act as they do, or why they must act in a certain way.' Similarly West (2003) 263 n. 10: 'Presumably what this wise elder had from his father was either a prophecy relating to the present conflict (compare *Odyssey* 8.564ff., 13.172ff.) or the memory of an older battle that held useful lessons.' I add the possibility of a moral *exemplum* on the basis of Nestor's advice and good intentions (see for instance: ὁ σφιν ἐν φρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν - *Il.* 1.253, which exactly parallels line 58).

<sup>17</sup> The story is related in 165 Perry. Note the use of imperfects and esp. the phrase ἀεὶ δὲ οἱ μύες ἡττώμενοι ἐπεὶ συνῆλθον εἰς ταῦτον.

approach particularly helpful for understanding the ending of the poem. In Theodore Prodromos' 12th century drama the *Catamyomachia*, the violence wrought by the cat is stopped by a falling roof beam in a *deus ex machina*, although there is no compelling evidence to suspect that the GM was known to or influenced this play.<sup>18</sup> More helpful might be the references to weasels in the *BM*, although these are unhelpfully inconsistent and it is impossible to tie them to the GM with any certainty. Troxartes' reference to a son who was caught and killed by a weasel outside their hole (τρώγλης ἔκτοσθεν ἐλοῦσα - 114) may refer to a death in this poem, although it might just as easily refer to the fable, in which the generals were killed because they were unable to enter their holes due to their elaborate helmets. Similarly Psicharpax, at the beginning of the poem, is said to have just escaped the close danger of a weasel (γαλέης κίνδυνον ἀλύξας / πλησίον - 9-10), which may have marked the *BM* as a successor to the GM. However, it is again difficult to be certain that this refers to the poem rather than to the fable or the common enmity of weasels and mice. Both of these instances would nevertheless support the idea that the mice are defeated, as they are in the fable. By contrast, in the arming scene of the mice corselets are made from the skin of a defeated weasel (128), which would suggest a tradition in which the mice are more successful. Again, however, this reference is too unclear to support an argument for the outcome of this poem. Even if the mice are more successful and do kill at least one weasel, this would not mean that they win the war. In short, while the fragment does provide a clear opening narrative, which draws on easily recognizable epic tropes, such as the catalogue, we cannot make any accurate predictions about the outcome of the poem.

#### THE FIRST ONE BITES THE DUST

Much of the surviving material from the poem deals with the death of the war's first casualty, Trixos. Given how short the proem appears to be, perhaps only 2 lines, the detail given to the impact of Trixos' death is quite significant.<sup>19</sup> A comparison with the *BM* shows broadly where the interest in this moment lies for the narrative, and provides a useful starting point for further examination: in the narrative of the *BM*, we have detailed explications of the meeting between Psicharpax and Physignathus (9-64) and the ride over the water leading up to Psicharpax' death

<sup>18</sup> On the contrary, the *deus ex machina* in the *Catamyomachia* was likely inspired by the *deus ex machina* of the *BM*. For the influence of the *BM* in Prodromos' play, see ll. 71-3: οὐκ οἴσθα, πῶς τὸν πρὶν συνιστῶντες μόθον / πρὸς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν γαλῶν καὶ βατράχων, / καὶ συμμάχων κράτιστον εἶχομεν νέφος;); cf. Hunger (1968) 40.

<sup>19</sup> While it is possible that this contrast could suggest that the opening of the papyrus is not the start of the poem, as already noted the audience would know the story and so an extended proem may not have been necessary. Compare Babrius' version of the fable, which also establishes the situation in 2 lines (γαλαῖ ποτ' εἶχον καὶ μύες πρὸς ἀλλήλους / ἀσπονδον ἀεὶ πόλεμον αἰμάτων πλήρη - 31.1-2).

(65-99), which is immediately followed by the congregation of the *agorê* at dawn (103-9). By contrast, here the death of Trixos is narrated briefly (3-6); instead, the emphasis is on his death's impact upon those left at home. The scene shifts briefly to an image of his past life (9-10) before returning to the present in which a messenger reports his death to his wife and we see her reaction (11-8). The different narrative levels and inset speeches provide a contrast to the mice's reaction to the death of Psicharpax in the *BM* (ώς δ' ἔμαθον τὴν μοῖραν, ξδυ χόλος αἰνὸς ἀπαντας - 102). In this section, I analyse how Trixos' death and its impact creates expectations for the narrative to come through the use of literary tropes. I argue that Trixos' death, as the first death of the war, could be taken as suggestive of the fate of the other mice. Even their champion cannot get the upper hand. Furthermore, his wife's subsequent speech, in which she chides Trixos for his bravery, establishes a behavioural paradigm for the rest of the narrative. However, this moral is problematized through the poem's use of literary tropes, such as dangerous or deceptive female speech. What emerges from this discussion is the development of a tension between two different codes of behaviour: on the one hand, epic expects the poem's protagonists to fight and die for glory; on the other, fable suggests that it is futile to struggle against those stronger than ourselves. This tension, we shall see, is played out in different ways as the poem progresses.

While Trixos' wife, as we shall see, establishes a paradigm for the action and narrative of the poem, the death of Trixos itself provides an insight into the contrast between the characterization of the different species. That is to say that, while the image of the weasel devouring Trixos is brutal and animalistic, Trixos himself is described in anthropomorphizing terms as a boxer and champion of the mice (3-10):

[κ]αὶ ...[...] πο[λ]λῶι προμάχιζεν ε[...]... Τρίξος  
[πη]δήσας· πυκτής [γ]ένετ' ἐμ μύε[σ]σιν ἀριστος,  
[ἀ]λλ' οὐ μιν πάλιν αὗτις ἐδέξατο πατρὶς ἀρουρα.  
πρῶτον γάρ μιν ἐλοῦσα γαλῆ μέσσον διέβρυξεν·  
τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀμφιδρυφῆς ἄλοχος οἴκωι ἐλέλειπτο  
[το]ωγλαίωι {ἐν} θαλάμωι, φρεσὶν αἰμύλα πόλλ' εἰδυῖα  
[Κνι]σέωνος θ[υ]γάτηρ καὶ ἐλίσσετο πολλάκι Τρίξον·  
["μ]ή μή 'ναντα γαλῆς, ἀλλ' ἐμ μύεσσι γεγώνει."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> "And... (by much?) Trixos was fighting as the champion... having sprung up. He was the best boxer among the mice. His native father-land, nonetheless, received him never more, since the weasel caught him by the middle first and devoured him utterly; his wife, her cheeks torn in grief, was left at home in the holey chamber. She knew many guileful thoughts in her mind, the daughter of Kniseon, and time and again she used to entreat Trixos, saying: 'Never, never, make yourself heard in front of a weasel, but only among mice.'"

The opening two lines of the passage are badly damaged, and the reading should be taken with caution. Although West and Perale both translate *προμάχιζεν* as fighting in the front lines, the sense is clearer if we understand Trixos as the champion of the mice.<sup>21</sup> In line 4, he is certainly described as the best of mice at a particular activity. If Perale's reading, *πυκτής*, is correct, the humour derives from Trixos' anthropomorphization; alternatively, if we were to accept West's *χορδῆς ἀοί[π]ακτὴ[ο]*, the joke relies upon the common depiction of mice as food filchers. The former is more convincing, however, both because it is better motivated by the pugnacious context, fighting as a champion, and because the phrase *έλοῦσα μέσσον* (6) approximates the phrase *μέσον λαμβάνειν*, which was part of the technical language of wrestling.<sup>22</sup> The fight between Trixos and the weasel, on this reading, is conceptualized as a wrestling match, and despite Trixos' superiority over the other mice, his ability avails him nothing when compared with a weasel. The anthropomorphization of Trixos as a wrestler can be read against the more animalistic image of the weasel devouring him in the subsequent lines. *βρύκω* is frequently associated with gluttony and ravenous consumption, such as that of the Cyclops (*έφθα καὶ ὄπτὰ καὶ ἀνθρακιᾶς ἀπὸ <θερμὰ> χναύειν βρύκειν* - E. Cyc. 358; cf. 372) or the greedy Lampon (*βρύκει γὰρ ἄπαν τὸ παρόν, τρίγλη δὲ κὰν μάχοιτο* - Crat. fr. 62). More specifically, it can be associated with animalistic hunger, such as that of the lion in Babrius 95 (*κάκεῖνος ἐστενάξε τὸ στόμα βρύκων* - 95.45). Here the verb is intensified further to underscore the weasel's violence and voraciousness. This contrast between the two creates the humorous, if rather pathetic, image of a mouse that stands no chance against the weasel's violence, and the implications of this distance are explored through the figure of Trixos' wife.

Line 7, which introduces the "daughter of Smokey", parodies *Il.* 2.700 describing the death of Protesilaus and the impact upon his wife (*τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀμφιδρυφῆς ἀλοχος Φυλάκη ἐλέλειπτο*).<sup>23</sup> The subsequent line describing the "holey bedchamber" can then be read as a (darkly) humorous twist upon the *δόμος ἡμιτελῆς* left by Protesilaus; the nibbled holes (*τρώγλαι*) in Trixos' bedchamber reproduces, albeit in a humorously incongruous fashion, the incomplete home of Protesilaus. The physical absence of Protesilaus that makes the house not a home is reduced to more literal rodent damage. However, it is unclear how far the resemblance between Trixos' wife

<sup>21</sup> This is the primary sense of *προμαχίζω* in Homer, e.g. at *Il.* 3.16 and 20.376. The prefix *προ-* therefore has the connotation of priority of rank rather than physical position; cf. LSJ s.v. *πρό* D I 2.

<sup>22</sup> Schibli (1983) *ad loc.*; cf. Poliakoff (1982) 40ff. For the portrayal of a mouse as a wrestler, cf. BM 95-6: *οὐκ ἀν μου κατὰ γαῖαν ἀμείνων ἥσθα, κάκιστε, / παγκρατίω τε πάλη τε καὶ εἰς δρόμον.*

<sup>23</sup> Janko (1985) 57-8 objects to the identification of Trixos with Protesilaus on the grounds that there are some significant differences between the contexts and consequences of their respective deaths (e.g. that the ἀκτὴ Schibli read in l. 4 differs from the plain of Scamander). However, allusions to Homeric lines in *parōidia* as we have seen throughout this thesis are not bound by such strict logic.

and Protesilaus' may have gone. Most references to Protesilaus' wife take her to be Laodamia, who commits suicide out of grief, an aspect that is absent here.<sup>24</sup> Instead, how the poem diverges from the traditional image of Protesilaus' wife is more instructive for understanding the poem. Firstly, she is characterized as dangerously intelligent in line 8; then her subsequent plea to Trixos can be read against Andromache's attempt to prevent Hector from facing Achilles in *Iliad* 6 as well as against a common form of fabular morality, that it is futile to fight against those stronger than ourselves. As we shall see, however, adaptations of fables, far from straightforwardly adopting this kind of essentialist morality, frequently problematize or play with such fabular moralizing.

The description of Trixos' wife as φρεσὶν αἰμύλα πόλλ' εἰδυῖα (8) associates her with dangerous and deceptive speech, especially that of women. In the *Works and Days*, the manner in which a πυγοστόλος woman can deceive man is αἰμύλος (μηδὲ γυνή σε νόον πυγοστόλος ἐξαπατάω / αἰμύλα κωτίλλουσα - 373-4); likewise in the only occurrence of the synonymous αἰμύλιος in Homer, it describes how Calypso is keeping Odysseus from returning home (αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοῖσι καὶ αἴμυλοισι λόγοισιν / θέλγει - *Od.* 1.56-7).<sup>25</sup> In both cases, the concern is that a woman who is αἰμύλη works against what the man should be doing. Thus, the γυνὴ πυγοστόλος is raised as part of a discussion of how to look after one's goods (364-80), as she will drain your wealth (τεὴν διφῶσα καλιήν - 374). Similarly, Calypso's αἰμύλιος words are preventing Odysseus from returning home and gaining *kleos*. Through this description, that is, we are primed to see the wife's words here as deceptive and contrary to what masculine social codes expect.

By contrast to Calypso, through her knowledge of many αἰμύλος matters Trixos' wife attempts to keep Trixos *at* home, not *from* home. This matches the situation in *Iliad* 6, when Andromache approaches Hector inside the walls of Troy. Like Trixos' wife, Andromache makes a speech in which she pleads for Hector to stay inside the walls and not to fight Achilles (406-39). This is just one example of a fairly common trope in epic wherein female characters attempt to prevent the action of men on the grounds that they might die.<sup>26</sup> If, then, we view this scene from this perspective, both the characterization of Trixos' wife and the scenario from his earlier life seem to prime us to suspect that Trixos' wife's words run contrary to the standards expected from epic heroes. In this context, that is, she is introduced as an uneasy figure. However, it is especially

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<sup>24</sup> The precise manner of her suicide changes in different iterations: see Hyg. *Fab.* 104, [Apoll.] *Bibl.* 4.3.30, Ovid *Her.* 13, E. frs. 646-57. Alternatively, in the *Cypria* his wife was called Polydora, daughter of Meleager (*Paus.* 4.2.7 = *Cyp.* fr. 22), although little is known about her.

<sup>25</sup> It is also used to describe Hermes at *h.Herm.* 317 and Zeus' deception of Metis at *Hes. Th.* 890. In the latter case, there may be some deliberate irony in the male deception of the female Metis through deceptive, αἰμύλιος speech.

<sup>26</sup> Compare, for instance, Hecabe and Priam (*Il.* 24.193-227); in the *Aeneid*, Juturna employs a different strategy to prevent Turnus from entering the battle (12.222-56).

through the resonance with fable that her words assume a paradigmatic force for our understanding of the poem's narrative and action.

Briefly put, her words reiterate the idea of "knowing your place" or "not exceeding your bounds"; of course a mouse cannot contend with a weasel – it is not in its nature. This moralizing message assumes a piquantly humorous hue given that Trixos' name is most easily understood as derived from τρίχω, which connotes a shill cry, usually of animals. By his very name, Trixos is likely to blunder and make himself heard by a predator.<sup>27</sup> On the one hand, the superiority of weasels over mice would be obvious from real world experience. Like the contrast between anthropo- and theriomorphism I explored in the previous chapter, Trixos' wife's speech might be seen as underlying the absurdity of a mouse acting like a wrestler/Homeric hero.

On the other, her essentialist message chimes strongly with many of the readings of ancient fables.<sup>28</sup> This can be traced back to the *ainos* of the *Works and Days*, in which the hawk describes the nightingale as δαιμονίη in a negative sense, and says that it is foolish to contend with those stronger than yourself (ἀφρων δ' ὁς κ' ἐθέλη πρός κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν - 210). At the opposite end of the spectrum, many examples of similar such fabular messages can be found in the works of Babrius and Phaedrus. For instance, one of Babrius' fables tells of a lizard that attempts to equal a serpent in length. Rather than succeeding, it bursts apart in the middle (διαρράγησι φασιν ἐκ μέσου νώτου / δράκοντι μῆκος ἔξιονμένην σαύραν - 41.1-2), producing the moral that imitation of one's superiors can lead to harm.<sup>29</sup> A similar story is narrated by Phaedrus, of the frog who attempted to imitate the size of a cow. Each time the frog puffs itself up, it asks its children which animal is larger (*tum natos suos / interrogauit an boue esset latior* - 1.24.4-5), until finally it bursts (*nouissime indignata, dum uult ualidus / inflare sese, rupto iacuit corpore* - 1.24.9-10). The moral in this instance, as in Babrius, is that a weak person trying to imitate a powerful one can come to harm (*inops potentem dum uult imitari perit* - 1.24.1).<sup>30</sup> Both of these fables rely on the assumption that we have a set place in the world, which we cannot – and by extension should not attempt to – go beyond. Similarly, the words of Trixos' wife suggest that there is a right place and a wrong place to make oneself prominent, lines that are drawn here according to species.

All of this supports the presentation of Trixos' wife as an anti-epic or anti-heroic figure, whose deceptive feminine wiles attempted to work against Trixos' heroism, his role as *promachos*.

<sup>27</sup> In this regard, we might compare how Psicharpax claims that his γένος is known to all, even potentially predatory birds, at BM 25-6.

<sup>28</sup> For the notion of respecting one's limits in the Augustana collection of Aesop, see Zafiroopoulos (2001) 71-80; cf. 82-3, 104, 125, 132 Perry, all of which show the fruitlessness of fighting against stronger opponents.

<sup>29</sup> For similar such morals in Babrius, cf. 28, 32, and 39.

<sup>30</sup> For similar morals in Phaedrus' fables, cf. 1.27, 3.6, 5.9. For a rare assertion of the opposite, that even a slave can achieve greatness, in the epilogue of bk. 2 Phaedrus uses the example of the statue of Aesop in Athens to demonstrate that *patere honoris scirent ut cuncti uiam / nec generi tribui sed uirtuti gloriam* (2.9.3-4).

However, Trixos does become a δεῖπνον for the weasel, just as the hawk threatens to do to the nightingale in Hesiod. Trixos' death, that is, could be read as a failure to live up to epic standards and thus as a confirmation of a fabular perspective. That Trixos' death is the first act of the poem, and indeed the cause of the war, gives this scene a paradigmatic status. Are the rest of the mice similarly doomed by their essential inferiority? A humorous tension in this view emerges if we consider that the parody of Protesilaus simultaneously highlights how epic his death is. It is through death that the epic hero gains his glory. This is highlighted by the opening of Antiphilus of Byzantium's epigram about Protesilaus himself (Θεσσαλὲ Πρωτεσίλας, σὲ μὲν πολὺς ἀσται αἰών, / Τροίᾳ ὁφειλομένου πτώματος ἀρξάμενον - AP 7.141.1-2). In proving his wife's fabular perspective right, Trixos attains an epic form of glory. Instead of straightforwardly suggesting that this poem will be a pseudo-epic battle that re-enforces an essentialist fabular morality, the humorous irony raises questions about the narrative trajectory of the poem. To what extent should these different genres inform our reading of its action and characters? The effect of this is emphasized if we also take into consideration the difficulty of taking the essentialist perspective of fable straightforwardly, especially in the poetic tradition.

Many of the fables in which we find essentialist messages (especially strong vs. weak) are not straightforward. In the case of Hesiod, we have to read the presentation of "might is right" against the opening frame of the *ainos*, which claims that it is told for kings (νῦν δ' αἰνοί βασιλεῦσ' ἐρέω, φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς - *Erg.* 202). The kings of the *Works and Days* are those who have been responsible for the crooked judgements that are the cause of the conflict between the poet and his brother Perses. Through the fable, then, 'the poetic ego delivers a challenge to the kings acting in their judicial/rhetorical capacity.'<sup>31</sup> In a similar fashion, in Babrius the emphasis on the power of one's superiors can be read against the prologue of book 2, which opens with an address to the son of king Alexander (ὦ παῖ βασιλέως Αλεξάνδρου - 2.*praef.*1),<sup>32</sup> and the insistent claims to have removed the sting of iambic verse.<sup>33</sup> How we read Babrius' collection, that is, constantly faces the question of how we understand both his iambic verse (is it really harmless, or is this just a pose?)

<sup>31</sup> Steiner (2012) 4.

<sup>32</sup> For my purposes here it does not matter whether this is a genuine historical figure or not, nor whether this is the same as the figure of Branchus in the preface of bk. 1. Luzzatto and La Penna (1986) argue that they must be thought of as the same figure given the line ἐκ δευτέρου σοι τίνδε βίβλον ἀείδω (2.*praef.*16), followed by Holzberg (2002) 60. At one time it was thought that "King Alexander" might be Alexander Severus, although this has now been disproved on the testimony of ps.-Dositheus. For an attempt to find a real historical figure lying behind these names, see Perry (1965) xlviii-l, although Hawkins (2014) 88 n. 3 perhaps rightly suggests that they may be fictional. The important point here is that the collection at least claims to be directed towards royalty, i.e. one of those with power.

<sup>33</sup> μελισταγές σοι λωτοκηρίον θήσω, / πικρῶν ίάμβων σκληρὰ κῶλα θηλύνας - 1.*praef.*18-9; καὶ τῶν ίάμβων τοὺς ὄδόντας οὐ θήγω, / ἀλλ' εὖ πυρώσας, εὖ δὲ κέντρα ποηνύνας - 2.*praef.*14-5. Hawkins (2014) 93-110 argues that these claims, far from being directly applicable to the collection, invite us to consider Babrius' engagement with the iambic tradition, and particularly with Callimachus.

and his relationship with a supposed royal patron. Finally, in the case of Phaedrus, we again have questions of his relationship with the ruling Roman family,<sup>34</sup> but more challenging is Phaedrus' generic self-consciousness. In the prologue to book 3, Phaedrus explains to Eutychus the origins of the fable: a slave avoided punishment for speech critical of his betters by cloaking them in a fable.<sup>35</sup> According to Phaedrus' account, fable is always hiding its real meaning and always comes from a position of inferiority against the stronger. To read fable as straightforwardly promoting an essentialist view of social status from this perspective is frequently problematic.

The difficulty of reading a fundamentally essentialist viewpoint into fables is reflected in scholars' attempts to find a socio-political stance in ancient fable. Some, most recently DuBois,<sup>36</sup> have argued that fables naturalized human social inequality by paradigmatically linking it with the "natural world". By contrast, others have viewed fable as expressing the views of the lower classes and slaves but with a more subversive force.<sup>37</sup> This latter view has frequently focused on the figure of Aesop, who might be envisaged as an anti-intellectual force in his dealings with Delphi or the philosopher Xanthus.<sup>38</sup> More recently, however, scholars have emphasized the difficulty of seeing the fables we possess as popular culture, since authors of literature in antiquity are almost exclusively from the elite end of the social spectrum.<sup>39</sup> Rather than viewing all fable and fabular adaptations through a single ideological lens, an alternative approach to the GM might be through the argument of Jeremy Lefkowitz, who emphasizes the importance of adaptation.<sup>40</sup> Lefkowitz emphasizes that adaptations of fables are made by authors whose own agendas are as important or more important than any "original" meaning or ideology.<sup>41</sup> The advantage of using

<sup>34</sup> The title of the collection as transmitted claims that Phaedrus is the *libertus* of Augustus. Certainly, in the epilogue of bk. 2 Phaedrus takes the pose of an (ex-)slave in claiming to be the Roman Aesop (*quodsi labori fauerit Latium meo, / plures habebit quos opponat Graeciae* - 2.9.8-9). On Phaedrus' identity, see Champlin (2005), esp. 98-101.

<sup>35</sup> *seruitus obnoxia, / quia quae uolebat non audebat dicere, / affectus proprios in fabellas transtulit, / calumniamque fictis elusit iocis* - 3.praef.34-7.

<sup>36</sup> DuBois (2003) 170-88.

<sup>37</sup> E.g. Rothwell (1995).

<sup>38</sup> This view can be traced back to the influential work of Perry (1936); similarly, Winkler (1985) 279-86 views Aesop's anti-intellectualism specifically in the context of Imperial Greek literature, while Kurke (2003) takes a more diachronic approach but nevertheless sees an ideological critique in the story of Aesop at Delphi.

<sup>39</sup> E.g. Avlamis (2010) 1-46, drawing on the work of Chartier (1987) and who emphasizes also evidence for an elite readership of fables in antiquity; also Kurke (2011) 1-49, who eschews "popular" and "elite" culture in favour of Burke's reformulation of "great" and "little traditions" (see especially (1978) 28). Cf. Hall (2013), who sees fable as possessing the ability to speak to both popular and elite audiences. As we shall see, the ability of fables and adaptations of fables to speak to different kinds of audiences opens a space for a degree of ambiguity about the "real" meaning of fable (if one could speak of such a thing), and this ambiguity can itself be manipulated to different ends.

<sup>40</sup> J. Lefkowitz (2009).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 5-6. Lefkowitz goes on to use this approach to analyse the use of fable both in other genres (Aristophanic comedy and Callimachus' *Iamb* 2) and versifications of fable (Phaedrus). Cf. Hutcheon (2006) 20: 'like classical imitation, adaptation also is not slavish copying; it is a process of making the adapted material one's own. In both, the novelty is in what one *does with* the other text.'

this approach here is that, although we can recognize common features of adaptations of fable elsewhere and the ideological work to which these adaptations of fable are put, emphasizing the importance of the specific context of the work over a universal fabular ideology helps us to understand the *GM* on its own terms.

Returning to the death of Trixos, then, I have argued that his death and its reception by his wife play an important paradigmatic function in the poem, given its position within the narrative (likely at the start of the poem and certainly as the symbolically charged first casualty) and due to its resonance with an essentialist viewpoint commonly found in fable. Trixos' wife's warning that mice should not contend with weasels is provided an authoritative force through its position, in that her statement has seemingly just been proved right by her husband's death, and through our own knowledge of real mice and weasels, which underlines the absurdity of the situation. However, this authoritative force does not mean that, if the mice follow Trixos' lead, they will necessarily suffer the same fate. Instead, the didactic value of fable, which is widely assumed in antiquity,<sup>42</sup> must be read against the poem's parody of epic. Trixos' death epitomizes the poem's collision of epic and fable: he gains an epic death that is memorialized in poetry (albeit a parody), and at the same time his failure to defeat the weasel confirms his wife's fabular moralizing. It is the tension between these two codes of behaviour that the poem's narrative will explore. By recognizing the importance of adaptation, we can more easily understand the essentialist perspective of fable in the broader context of the poem and in the context of its parody of epic in particular.

#### AN ARMY OF COUNTRY MICE

As we have seen, much of the gap between lines 32 and 50 took the form of a catalogue of mice, the end of which survives when the papyrus resumes. In this section, I examine what kind of mice constituted this catalogue and what their purpose was. As in the *agorê* of the mice in the *BM*, war is a foregone conclusion of their meeting. However, in this fragment the text puts emphasis on detailing the kind of animals present. In this section, I shall suggest that the contrast between country and city at the end of the catalogue of mouse troops evokes the well-known fable of the country and city mouse and its concomitant espousal of a safe life over one of danger. This effectively replays Trixos' wife's warning – to know one's place is to stay safe and stay alive – and creates anticipation for the upcoming council.

The contrast between the city and the countryside is principally established at the end of the catalogue (51-4):

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<sup>42</sup> Fable, for instance, was an important facet of Greek education. See for instance Marrou (1956) 173 and T.J. Morgan (1998) 220-1.

[ο]Ἴ Σπάρτην ἐνέμοντο [Π]ύλου θ' [ερ]ὸν πτολ[ίεθρον·]  
οὐτε γὰρ εἰς πλίνθους οὔτ' εἰς ὁρ[ο]φὴν[ν] ἀν[έβαινον,  
ἀλ<sup><λ></sup> ἐν ἀρουραίοις πεδίοις ἐγέμοντ[ο κ]αὶ ὕλαις  
οὗτοι ἄρ' ἡγερέθοντο γαλῆ[ς] ἐς φύλοπ[ι]ν αἱ[νήν].<sup>43</sup>

The elaboration in lines 52-3 emphasizes that the mice are from the country and picks up upon the description of Hermes' trip to gather the mice together. In his voyage he goes to a *τρασιά*, a type of basket for figs, fruit, and cheese to be left out to dry in the sun,<sup>44</sup> and in lines 22-3 references to a field with grapes (*ἄγροῦ σταφὺ*) and perhaps also a vineyard (*αμπελεῖῶνα*) set the scene in a strongly rural context. In the catalogue, however, the emphasis is on a contrast between town and country. In particular, the phrasing of the contrast evokes a common contrast between town and country mice, as a scholiast on Aristophanes makes clear (Σ Ar. V. 206): while town mice were commonly known as "roof-mice" (*μῦς ὁροφίας*) as they could take shelter in the tiles of Greek houses, country mice were "field-mice" (*μῦς ἀρουραῖος*). From one perspective, the gathering of an army of field mice may be reminiscent of the tale in Herodotus, in which a large quantity of field mice devoured the strings and quivers of an Arabian army (2.141). In this context, however, the specificity of this contrast evokes the fable of the town and country mouse, a popular tale in antiquity.<sup>45</sup>

While different iterations of this fable explore its possibilities in different ways, the fable is frequently discussed for its contrast between city and country as equated with luxury and poverty respectively.<sup>46</sup> In this case, however, it is the poem's moral – sometimes but not always stated explicitly in a formal *epimythium* – that helps us better to understand the allusion here. The rustic mouse always expresses a desire for a life free from danger.<sup>47</sup> This moral emphasizes the importance of survival at all costs that is repeatedly found in fables.<sup>48</sup> One common variant of this moral

<sup>43</sup> "Those who inhabited Sparta and the holy citadel of Pylos; for they did not climb on bricks or roofs, but inhabited the rural plains and woods. These, then, were they who were gathered for dreadful battle against the weasel."

<sup>44</sup> Schibli (1983) *ad loc.*; Eup. fr. 488, Sem. fr. 39, Ael. NA 3.10.

<sup>45</sup> Aesop 352 Perry; the tale is also told by Horace (*Sat.* 2.6) and Babrius (108).

<sup>46</sup> This contrast is frequently established prominently at the start of the fables: *rusticus urbanum murem mus paupere fertur accepisse cauo* - Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.80-1; μῦνον ὁ μέν τις βίον ἔχων ἀρουραῖον / ὁ δ' ἐν ταμείοις πλουσίοι φωλεύων - Babr. 108.2-3. For a reading of Horace's poem that emphasizes the contrast between urbane luxury and rural simplicity, see for instance Rudd (1966) 252 and Harrison (2013).

<sup>47</sup> "haud mihi uita / est opus hac" ait et "ualeas: me silua cauosque / tutus ab insidiis tenui solabitur eruo" - Hor. *Sat.* 2.6.115-7; ἔχων τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα μεστὰ κινδύνων. / ἐγὼ δὲ λιτῆς οὐκ ἀφέξομαι βώλου, / ύψος τὰ κοίμνα μὴ φοβούμενος τρώγω - Babr. 108.30-2.

<sup>48</sup> For this message in the Augustana collection, Zafiroopoulos (2001) 52-7.

is frequently formulated as “being obscure is safer than being recognized”.<sup>49</sup> This idea not only reformulates the same moral expressed by Trixos’ wife, but has particular resonance with the fable on which the poem is based. In Babrius’ version of the war, the *epimythium* states that it is safer to live in obscurity than distinction (*εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἀκινδύνως / τῆς λαμπρότητος ηὔτελεια βελτίων* - 31.23-4). If, therefore, we see the allusion to the fable of the country and city mouse as an evocation of the moral of that fable, then the end of the catalogue may recapitulate the warnings of Trixos’ wife. That is, the kind of mice gathered for the battle are those usually associated with the avoidance of danger and with the dangers of being distinguished. Their actions in the gathering and the coming battle can then be read against the morals of fable, explicitly expressed by Trixos’ wife and reiterated in the allusion to the fable of the country and city mouse. Indeed, one of the few things we are told in the opening two lines is that the mice will stand together and offer resistance to the weasel (*κατέ]ναγτι γαλῆς ἔστη[σ]αγ ἀ[ολλεῖς* - 2). The situation here might usefully be read against the background of fable 70 Perry: an oak and a reed dispute over their strength and, when a strong wind blows, the reed avoids destruction by bending, while the oak resists and is uprooted. In part, this fable gives a warning about the dangers of resistance (*ἀντιστᾶσα*) in the face of a powerful enemy. Will the resistance of the mice here prove similarly ill-fated?

Thus far, however, our reading of the passage does not factor in what has happened between the death of Trixos and the gathering of the mice. Most importantly, we have now been informed of the role of Hermes in gathering the army (*θεοῦ αἵσα συνῆγεν* - 23). This phrase invites us to entertain the possibility of a victory for the mice, despite their usual defeat, as the *αἵσα* of a god is generally associated with glory or victory. Thus, in *Iliad* 17, the Argives almost extended beyond the *αἵσα* of Zeus in routing the Trojans (*Αργεῖοι δέ κε κῦδος ἔλον καὶ ύπερ Διὸς αἵσαν / κάρτεϊ καὶ σθένεϊ σφετέρω* - 17.321-2), and Achilles claims that he has been honoured by the *αἵσα* of Zeus (*φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἵσῃ* - 9.608). With such divine will behind them, these rustic mice may be able to overcome the wild weasel. This interpretation would be especially attractive if Schibli’s reading of *εῷμ* in fr. f line 12 indicates a reappearance of Hermes in the narrative.<sup>50</sup> Either way, the involvement of Hermes is unlikely to have been limited to the mustering scene. The change in context forces us to reconsider how the catalogue scene functions. On the one hand, the allusion to the fable of the country and city mouse gives us a model of behaviour (the country mouse’s preference for a safe life) against which to judge the characters here; on the other, the role of Hermes makes any straightforward prediction about the inevitable failure of a force of mice resisting a more powerful weasel problematic.

<sup>49</sup> For instance, Babr. 4, 64, Phaedr. 2.7; cf. Babr. 65.

<sup>50</sup> See Schibli (1983) *ad loc.*

As in the case of the narration of Trixos' death, we face two interrelated problems: firstly, at a narratological level, should we expect the customary defeat of the mice in light of the cowardice typically attributed to the country mice that constitute the army? Alternatively, does the intervention of divine will suggest that the narrative here will by necessity take a different course? (After all, we have already seen in the last chapter that divine intervention is not always a certain guide.) Secondly, at the level of characterization and action, we are invited to read the action of the characters through the moralizing of fable. Although they are emphatically country, and not city, mice, this does not necessarily mean that they will act as country mice usually do. The use of generic tropes here again engages us in a process of negotiation. In what ways and to what extent is the action of the poem grounded in fabular stereotypes?

#### RENEWED STRENGTH AND DOOMED MICE

While the mice gather their forces, the weasel looks on and addresses herself in a short monologue. Like Zeus as he looks down at the gathering armies in the *BM*, the weasel's reaction helps to reify our own reaction and interpretation of the forces. While Zeus views the army from a literally god's eye view and compares the troops to their epic counterparts, the weasel has more immediate, personal concerns. This section focuses on her monologue, in which the weasel contrasts herself with the mice along generic lines. The unheroic mice, who are imaged to be doomed to failure, are aligned with their fabular identity while the weasel images herself as a heroic fighter in a battle arranged by Ares himself. However, as in the previous sections, this speech too cannot provide any secure reading for the narrative. The weasel's speech resounds with epic scenarios in which characters misunderstand the direction of the narrative. It is precisely this narratological ambiguity that I suggest the poem is exploring. The weasel's speech reminds us that, according to the fable, the mice will lose, but it does so in a manner that corresponds with an epic trope of actorial misunderstanding, leaving us guessing in what direction this poem will take the narrative.

While we see Zeus' inner thoughts in the *BM* indirectly, the weasel in this poem is given a short monologue, expressing her concerns about the gathering army (25-9):

[ ±7 ]ς γαλέη καὶ ἔ[ῶ]ι π`ούσελέξατο θυμῷ·  
“[ῶ] μοι ἐγώ,] τί ποτ’ ἄρ[α] μύ[ες σ]υνελέχθεν ἀολλεῖς  
[.....], μὴ δ’ αὖ πολ[έμ]ου μέγα νεῖκος ἀέξηι  
[Ἄρης] αἰνομόροισι μυστὸν [καὶ ἔ]μοι περὶ νίκης.

[ἀλκῆς] δὴ καὶ ἔγωγε νέ[ης] ἐμπίμπ[λα]μαι ἦτορ.<sup>51</sup>

The speech begins by expressing concern about the gathering army, and the possibility that Ares may be involved in their congregation, but ends with a reaffirmation of the weasel's self-confidence. Of particular interest are the terms in which the weasel contrasts herself and the mice in line 28. The mice are described as *αἰνόμοοι*, which not only recalls the ill-fate of Homeric figures,<sup>52</sup> but also the fable (the *αἴνος*) on which the poem is based. In this fable, of course, the mice lose. A similar joke may be at play at the end of the catalogue of mice (*οὗτοι ἄρ' ἡγεόθοντο γαλῆ[ς] ἐξ φύλοπ[ι]ν αἱ[νήν - 54]*). For whom will the battle-din be *αἰνός*? By playing with the near-homophonous terms, the poet raises the possibility of reading the mice with the fabular tradition, sadly (*αἰνός*) doomed by fable (*αἴνος*). Trixos has, as we have seen, already challenged this reductive characterization of the mice, mere pawns to the weasel's queen. In this phrase, *αἰνομόοισι μυσὶν [καὶ ἐ]μοὶ περὶ νίκης*, that is, the weasel assumes that the mice are doomed and the weasel will ultimately be victorious.

This is clarified further in the subsequent line, in which the weasel seems to express a renewed strength. This new *ἀλκὴ* with which the weasel fills her heart associates her with epic heroes by contrast to the fabular mice. That is, while *ἀλκὴ* and its derivative adjective *ἀλκιμος* are common in Homeric epic, they are rare features of Aesopic fable. Indeed, in the few appearances it does make, *ἀλκὴ* is not a simple show of heroic strength. In the opening of the fable of the lion and the fox, for instance, we are told that the lion is old and no longer able to sustain itself through strength (*λέων γηράσας καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος δι' ἀλκῆς ἔαυτῷ τροφὴν πορίζειν - 147 Perry*), while in the fable of the deer and the lion the *ἀλκὴ* of the two animals is contrasted (*ἀλκὴ γάρ φασι ἐλάφῳ ἐν τοῖς ποσὶν καὶ λέοντι ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ - 76 Perry*).

How does this contrast, that is between the "fable-fated" mice and her own more epic, musteline strength, affect our reading of the narrative? As with the previous passages I have considered, there are no straightforward answers that this passage provides for the structure of the narrative to come. However, lines 27-8 seemingly fit into a common epic trope, which may inform the way that the poem constructs our anticipation. The weasel likely assumes that a god, most probably Ares or Zeus, is behind the bellicose gathering of the mice.<sup>53</sup> To whichever god she

<sup>51</sup> "And the weasel counselled her heart: 'Oh my lord! Why on earth have the mice gathered *all* together? ... that Ares has roused the great strife of war for victory between the sadly doomed mice and me. Yet I too can fill my heart with newfound strength.'"

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Il.* 22.481, *Od.* 9.53.

<sup>53</sup> Άρης was originally suggested by West (2003) and accepted by Perale (forthcoming). Although reconstructed, the attribution of the events to a god is the most likely in the context and, since there is limited space on the papyrus, Ares or Zeus seem most likely.

ascribes the mustering of the army, the weasel is almost certainly wrong, as misattribution of divine agency is a common trope in Greek literature from Homer onwards. Frequently such misattributions are caused by a wider misunderstanding of the role of the gods in the situation and often have negative repercussions for the speaker. For instance, when Odysseus blinds Polyphemus, Odysseus attributes his punishment to Zeus on the basis of Polyphemus' transgression of *xenia* (*σχέτλι'*, ἐπεὶ ξείνους οὐχ ἄζεο σῷ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ / ἐσθέμεναι· τῷ σε Ζεὺς τίσατο καὶ θεοὶ ἄλλοι - *Od.* 9.478-9). However, the only divine figure mentioned here is an unspecified δαίμων (381). A little later in the narrative, however, Odysseus thinks Zeus is now plotting to kill his comrades and destroy his boats (οὐκ ἐμπάζετο ιρῶν, / ἀλλ' οὐ γε μεριμνήσειν ὅπως ἀπολοίατο πᾶσαι / νῆες ἐύσσελμοι καὶ ἔμοι ἐρίγρες ἔταιροι - 9.553-5). The assumption of divine agency and support in this instance, that is, leads Odysseus to make a hubristic act of his own that leads to trouble.<sup>54</sup> This discrepancy is more extreme in prayers; the prayers of impious characters frequently go unanswered.<sup>55</sup> We might also compare in this regard the prayer of Psicharpax in the *BM*, whose assumption that the gods are on his side ultimately proves wrong (97) with disastrous consequences for the mouse army. If the weasel's speech follows this trope, our knowledge that such situations frequently prove disastrous for the speaker would support a reading of the narrative that sees the mice victorious, perhaps due to the added assistance of Hermes. In this scenario, the weasel's description of the mice as αἰγόμόροισι and her renewed strength would take on a piquantly humorous tone.

However, there remain no guarantees regarding the direction of the narrative. Indeed, I would suggest that the ambiguities we have seen are themselves part of the poem's productive use of the fabular and epic traditions. Again, a comparison with the *BM* is useful here. In that poem, the adapted fable does not involve a battle and so we would not know anything about the direction of the narrative of the battle without the proem. Instead, here we read the poem against the backdrop of a fable in which the mice are defeated, and the proem leaves the outcome of the battle entirely open, merely describing the poem as the narrative of the mice squaring off against the weasel. Where the *BM*, as I argued, creates expectations that are eventually humorously disappointed, this poem builds upon an implicit intertextual relationship with the Aesopic fable in a narratologically complex or problematic way by using numerous strategies that suggest the battle could go in a different direction from the original. How close to the original text, we must ask, does an adaptation have to stay?

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<sup>54</sup> For the disjunction between human assumptions about divine justice and the gods' own views as narrated in Homer, see Winterbottom (1989) and Rutherford (1986).

<sup>55</sup> Mikalson (1989) 86-7.

## CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this chapter, I have emphasized the importance of the process of adaptation in our understanding of the *GM*. In her book on adaptation, Linda Hutcheon has noted that the pleasure of adaptation derives not solely from the recognition of similarity, but also in the differences. As she puts it, ‘adaptation appeals to the “intellectual and aesthetic pleasure” (DuQuesnay 1979: 68) of understanding the interplay between works, of opening up the text’s possible meanings to intertextual echoing.’<sup>56</sup> However, while at a narrative level this poem is an adaptation of a specific Aesoplic fable, the poem also features parody of epic and utilizes generic tropes drawn from both epic and fable. My analysis of the *GM* here has suggested that through its interaction with fable and its parody of epic, the poem invites us to recognize this very process of adaptation. In each of the three scenes we have considered we have seen that the question of the poem’s direction has not been automatically assumed (i.e. that the mice will lose as in the fable), but rather that this teleology is frequently brought into question. In the scenes focused on the mice, for instance, their action is always mediated through the mouse stereotypes of fable – they are small, weak, and prefer a life without danger. How then, we ask, can they hope to defeat the weasels here? One answer is in their divine aid, a feature absent from the fable but drawn instead from epic. Our knowledge of the normal narrative of the fable is at odds with the epic tropes, such as the gods and the catalogue, that feature prominently in the poem. The conflicting interactions between the poem’s intertexts, fable in contrast to epic, results in narrative ambiguity: is this still the same story we are used to?

Furthermore, in the mouse scenes our questions about the direction of the narrative are also tied into the presentation of the characters and the way that they choose to act. In her analysis of the *BM*, Ruth Scodel emphasizes the significance of the fact that both sides of the war are traditionally prey rather than predators and suggests that this is especially significant for our reading of the poem’s anti-war mentality.<sup>57</sup> In this poem, however, the prey decide to fight back. Whether or not this action is doomed to failure ( $\alpha\iota\nu\mu\omega\eta\omega\zeta$ , in the weasel’s terms) is an issue that is negotiated in the different scenes. Trixos’ death may act as a paradigm for the mice’s inevitable failure, warned as he was by his wife that mice should not make themselves known to a weasel. In the second scene, however, we must read the echo of the fable of the country and city mouse against their changed situation. They have the backing of a god. Our expectations about the direction of the poem are different depending on which of the literary tropes we choose to prioritize. This, I argue, is precisely the point. We are not given any sure guide or means to anticipate the outcome of the

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<sup>56</sup> Hutcheon (2006) 117.

<sup>57</sup> Scodel (2008).

poem. In the case of *GM*, the pleasure of the adaptation is that, from a perspective that negatively evaluates deviations from an idealized original, it all might go horribly wrong.

## CHAPTER 6

### *Timon of Phlius' Silloi*

Timon of Phlius has been the subject of much discussion in scholarship, as he provides an essential, if complex and often problematic, perspective on Pyrrho and early Scepticism. Amongst his numerous works, his only known work of *parōidia*, the *Silloi*, was most widely quoted in antiquity, principally by Diogenes Laertius, Athenaeus, and Sextus Empiricus. Current scholarly approaches tend to be interested primarily in the *Silloi* either from a philosophical or literary perspective.<sup>1</sup> This chapter, by contrast, attempts to reconcile philosophical and poetic approaches to the poem, arguing that we can gain a better appreciation of the *Silloi* by understanding how Timon combines philosophical and literary tropes and techniques. Through this approach, we are better able to see the multivalency of his parody of epic, including both Homer and Hesiod, as well as the basis for his satire of other philosophers. In particular, we can see how Timon differentiated himself not only from other Hellenistic schools of thought, but also from other early Sceptics such as Arcesilaus. The framework of the *katabasis* in the poem and the parody of epic, I argue, are fundamental for expressing his view of Scepticism in the poem.

Although the views of early Sceptics are unclear, partially due to the fact that Pyrrho produced no works himself, there are three aspects central to Scepticism that are evidenced in Timon's *Silloi*: debate, opinion, and tranquility. The role of philosophical debate in Sceptic philosophy takes several forms, culminating in its place in Sextus Empiricus' five modes: if there are equally strong arguments on both sides of a debate, we cannot choose between these two sides and must instead resort to a suspension of judgement ( $\epsilon\piοχή$ ).<sup>2</sup> In practice, many Sceptics such as Arcesilaus used debate to demonstrate the failings of any dogmatic statement.<sup>3</sup> Timon, as we shall see, opposes the use of dialectic and criticizes the eristic tendencies of its proponents. Rather than promoting any dogmatic views themselves, Sceptics favoured  $\epsilon\piοχή$ , the suspension of all judgement. All dogmatic beliefs, from this perspective, are misleading not because they are necessarily false, but

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<sup>1</sup> For a philosophical approach, see for instance Long (1978), and Decleva Caizzi (1981); for a more literary approach, see esp. Ax (1991). Clayman (2009) is more attentive to the balance between the two approaches than most.

<sup>2</sup> καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας ἐστὶ καθ' ὅν περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος πράγματος ἀνεπίκριτον στάσιν παρὰ τε τῷ βίῳ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εύρισκομεν γεγενημένον, δι' ἣν οὐ δυνάμενοι αἴρεισθαι τι η̄ ἀποδοκιμάζειν καταλήγομεν εἰς ἐποχήν - S.E. PH 1.165.

<sup>3</sup> For Arcesilaus' dealings with Zeno, for instance, see Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* 14.4.8 and Cicero *Ac.* 2.15-6, 76-7; cf. Thorsrud (2009) 45-50.

because they cannot be demonstrably proven. Thus, instead of knowledge, all dogmatists really possess is unsubstantiated opinion ( $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ ). Throughout the *Silloi*, which culminates in an address to Pyrrho that focuses on his freedom from servitude to mere opinion ( $\lambda\alpha\tau\omega\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \delta\o\xi\omega\n$  - 48.2), philosophers are critiqued based on their (inherently unsubstantiated) dogmas. Finally, there is tranquility ( $\alpha\tau\alpha\varrho\alpha\xi\iota\alpha$ ). In some accounts, such as that of Sextus Empiricus,  $\alpha\tau\alpha\varrho\alpha\xi\iota\alpha$  is brought about by  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\omega\chi\jmath$ .<sup>4</sup> It is often unclear, however, precisely how  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\omega\chi\jmath$  (and by extension  $\alpha\tau\alpha\varrho\alpha\xi\iota\alpha$ ) is achieved, such as whether for instance it is brought about normatively or causally (i.e. by disposition).<sup>5</sup> However this was supposed to have been achieved, the idea that tranquility is produced by suspension of judgement seems to have been the hallmark of Pyrrho's philosophy.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the *Silloi* seems to have put the question of achieving tranquility through  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\omega\chi\jmath$  at centre stage, as Timon asks Pyrrho how he was freed from opinion (fr. 48). In practice, this must have been connected with his promotion of tranquility. Furthermore, several of the character assassinations in Timon's satire also function as a rejection of their philosophical dogmas, since an individual's disposition can be regarded as damaging for their ability to decide issues.<sup>7</sup>

This chapter begins with two sections that establish a framework for analysing the text itself. Firstly, I shall discuss what we can know about the structure of the poem, arguing that we cannot extend our reconstruction much beyond the evidence provided by Diogenes Laertius. Secondly, I will consider Timon's literary influences. While Xenophanes and the parodist Euboeus are explicitly named as models for Timon's work, we also find that the quotation and adaptation of Homeric verses by Cynics and even Pyrrho himself provide a model for considering how Timon's Homeric parody can be viewed as part of his philosophical agenda. The final two sections of the chapter consider two major strands in Timon's satire of the philosophers in the underworld. Firstly, I argue that his criticisms of *eris* are aimed at the use of dialectic, and that Timon champions

<sup>4</sup> έστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οίονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἣς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ισοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχήν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν - S.E. PH 1.8.

<sup>5</sup> On this problem in S.E., see Thorsrud (2009) 126-36, who argues that the causal or dispositional is favourable as it does not require attributing any negative dogma to the Sceptic. The habitual suspension of judgement leads to  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\omega\chi\jmath$  becoming a disposition. Timon's own *Pytho* is also said by D.L. to have demonstrated Pyrrho's disposition (N.B. καὶ ὁ Τίμων δὲ διασαφεῖ τὴν διάθεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐν οἷς πρὸς Πύθωνα διέξεισιν - 9.67).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Thorsrud (2009) 35: 'Pyrrho's most important contribution to the history of Scepticism is to present our cognitive limitations in a positive light as the route to a good, tranquil life.'

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the fourth of Aenesidemus' ten modes, which is defined by S.E. thus (PH 1.100): έστι δ' οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἥλικίας, παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις καλούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν τὰς διαθέσεις. Whether we are sane or insane, healthy or ill, waking or sleeping, etc., all these circumstances affect and limit our perception and judgement. These circumstances also are the cause of dispute (PH 112), which we cannot settle. Clayman (2009) 144 makes a similar point, although I do not think that Timon is necessarily suggesting that 'the disposition of the practitioner is the sole criterion for judging a philosophy' as she implies. Instead, Sceptical disposition seems to be imagined as a production of  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\omega\chi\jmath$  rather than *vice versa*.

*aphrasia* as a route to achieving *epochê*. Secondly, I argue that many of the descriptions of philosophical dogma draw on language that was also used in Hellenistic literary criticism. These terms are almost exclusively concerned with the truth-value of particular claims and the potentially dangerous effect of false statements on the audience. In this light, we can see how Timon presents these dogmas as unable to provide access to the truth and thus as dangerous, enchanting views that can deceive the unwary listener. I conclude by comparing Timon's combination of poetic and philosophical agendas with those of Crates of Thebes, a near contemporaneous parodist. Although they draw on different schools of philosophical thought, their philosophical satire centres on many of the same terms (e.g. τῦφος and ἔρις). Additionally, both parodists draw on traditional notions of utopia as a means of expressing their philosophical views in contradistinction to those of others, and in both Homeric parody is an important component in the expression of this philosophy.

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE SILLOI

Our understanding of the *Silloi* is limited by the fragmentary evidence. The basic information derives from Diogenes Laertius (9.111-2):

τῶν δὲ Σίλλων τρία ἔστιν, ἐν οἷς ὡς ἀν σκεπτικὸς ὁν πάντας λοιδορεῖ καὶ σιλλαίνει τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἐν παρῳδίας εἴδει. ὃν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοδιήγητον ἔχει τὴν ἐρμηνείαν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον ἐν διαλόγου σχήματι. φαίνεται γοῦν ἀνακρίνων Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον περὶ ἐκάστων, ὁ δ' αὐτῷ διηγούμενος ἔστι· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ τῶν νεωτέρων· ὅθεν δὴ αὐτῷ τινες καὶ Ἐπίλογον ἐπέγραψαν. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ταύτα περιέχει πράγματα, πλὴν ὅτι μονοπρόσωπός ἔστιν ἡ ποίησις.<sup>8</sup>

According to Diogenes' evidence, the first book took the form of a monologue, after which Timon enters into a dialogue with Xenophanes. This overall structure fits broadly with our knowledge from the few securely locatable fragments, as fragment 3 seems to have been spoken by the

<sup>8</sup> "There are three books of *Silloi*, in which, since he is a Sceptic, he mocks and abuses all of the dogmatists in the form of a *parōidia*. Of these the first is expressed in the first person, and the second and third are in the manner of a dialogue. Indeed, he is represented interrogating Xenophanes of Colophon about each of the philosophers, and Xenophanes describes them to him; in the second book he asks about the older philosophers, while in the third he asks about more recent ones. For this reason some have entitled it the 'Epilogue'. The first book encompasses the same material, except that the poem is a monologue." [trans. my own]

character Xenophanes himself.<sup>9</sup> Diogenes' claim that the second book treated older philosophers while the third dealt with more recent also rings true. Identifiable fragments from book 2 treat Protagoras (fr. 5) and an unknown philosopher suggested to be Pythagoras or Heraclitus (fr. 4),<sup>10</sup> while those from book 3 cover Ariston the Chian (fr. 6) and Epicurus (fr. 7).<sup>11</sup> Diogenes' summary, then, seems to be the only reliable information we have for the structure of the poem.<sup>12</sup> Attempts to go beyond Diogenes' account have drawn either on the structure and style of the *nekyia*,<sup>13</sup> or have attempted to group fragments based on scenes. In this section, I shall delineate how far I believe we can progress in reconstructing the structure of the poem and demonstrate the inadequacy of interpretations based on supposed scenes. It will emerge that we cannot go much beyond Diogenes' account, except to posit a potential frame for Timon's *nekyia*.

One of the primary questions to address is the framing for Timon's katabatic journey. Diels originally proposed that the *nekyia* began in book 2, an argument subsequently followed by Di Marco, for whom Timon established his reasons for heading to the underworld during the first book.<sup>14</sup> Clayman, by contrast, suggests that there was a catalogue of philosophers in book 1 that constituted the introduction to the rest of the *nekyia*.<sup>15</sup> This is based on the similarity between fr. 1 (ἐσπετε νῦν μοι ὅσοι πολυπράγμονές ἔστε σοφισταί) and the opening invocation in the *Catalogue of Ships* (ἐσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Όλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι - *Il.* 2.484; cf. Hes. *Th.* 114). There are several problems, however, with Clayman's interpretation. Firstly, it is unclear whether the sophists are the subject matter or the addressees of the invocation, taking the place of the Homeric muses. Secondly, Timon is addressing living people, all those who *are* busybody sophists. Thirdly, if as she suggests, Timon saw Pyrrho in book 1 (ἀλλ' οἶον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον - 9.1), why engage Xenophanes as a guide? The simplest solution is to suggest that at least part of book 1 establishes Timon's pretext and descent. This is supported by a comparison with comedy, by which Timon was likely influenced,<sup>16</sup> in which several plays establish a contemporary context that act as

<sup>9</sup> οὐτε μοι ἡ Τεῖη μᾶζ' ἀνδάνει οὔτε καρύκκῃ / ἡ Λυδῶν, λιτῆ δὲ καὶ αὐαλέη ἐνὶ κόγχῳ / Ἐλλήνων ἡ πᾶσα περισσοτρόφητος οἰζύς. We know from Athenaeus (4.159f-60b) that the fragment comes from book 2 and Wachsmuth (1885) 155-6 suggested that the lines were likely spoken by Xenophanes; cf. Clayman (2009) 87, although it is unclear why this should derive from his 'opening speech.'

<sup>10</sup> For the information that frs. 3-5 derive from bk. 2, see Ath. 4.159f-60b, 10.445d-e, Eustath. *in Il.* 14.320, S.E. *Adv. Math.* 9.56-7. For the philosopher being satirized in fr. 4, see Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*

<sup>11</sup> For the information that frs. 6-7 derive from bk. 2, see Ath. 6.251b and 7.279f.

<sup>12</sup> The importance of Diogenes for understanding the structure of the *Silloi* is in some ways comparable to ps.-Apollonius' *Bibliothekē* in relation to Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women*. The major difference between the two is that Diogenes is more explicit about book structure, while ps.-Apollonius provides more opportunity to understand the ordering of the women in the poem. For the structure of the *Catalogue of Women*, see West (1985) 31-124, esp. 32-5 for the *Bibliothekē*, and Osborne (2005).

<sup>13</sup> In particular, Ax (1991). The recognition of a *nekyia* goes back to Meineke (1843) 6-7.

<sup>14</sup> Diels (1901) and Di Marco (1989) 22-7.

<sup>15</sup> Clayman (2009) 78-85.

<sup>16</sup> For instance, as I note below, several common comic tropes regarding philosophers are found in the *Silloi*.

a motivation for their journey (e.g. Ar. *Gerytades*, *Frogs*, Eupolis' *Demoi*). Fragment 1 may even be the best source we possess for rationalizing this pretext. If, that is to say, the fragment is addressed to the philosophers, Timon must be asking them for information. A reasonable hypothesis would suggest that, not finding an adequate answer to his questions amongst the world of the living, Timon descends to the underworld searching for his answer. Additionally, a reasonable guess at his question would be something along the lines of his questions to Pyrrho in fr. 48. However, it is not necessary to assume that this would have comprised the whole of book 1, although further speculation about the structure of the opening book seems groundless.

If the *Silloi* begins in the world of the living, it is possible that Timon returns there at the end of the poem. Two fragments are candidates for belonging to this part of the poem, as they concern philosophers who were likely still alive when the *Silloi* was written.<sup>17</sup> Firstly, fragment 41 asks for the identity of Cleanthes, who did not die until 232, and so he was likely still alive. Given that the fragment is interrogative ( $\tauίς δ' οὐτος$ ), it is most reasonable to attribute this to the dialogic portion of the poem. It is possible, therefore, that, Timon and Xenophanes continue their discussion after meeting Pyrrho, either returning to the world of the living or looking up somehow from the underworld. Additionally, fragment 12 concerns those still alive and being raised in Alexandria. The characterization of them as  $\deltaηριόωντες$  suggests a level of continuity between the portrayal of those in the underworld and those still living. This fragment could either derive from the opening section of the poem, book 1, or from a similar context to that of fragment 41. Because of the paucity of the evidence, however, we cannot say much about how these fragments fit into the broader structure of the poem.

Beyond this, we cannot elucidate the structure of the poem with any certainty. Numerous scholars have attempted to reconstruct certain scenes in the poem, but, as I shall now show, these efforts face several problems.<sup>18</sup> Based on the surviving fragments, three scenes have been suggested by different scholars: a *logomachia*, possibly involving some kind of contest,<sup>19</sup> a fishing scene, in

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<sup>17</sup> The dating of the poem is still contentious, but see Di Marco (1989) 29-32. The suggestion that Arcesilaus was still alive when the poem was written and called down to the underworld is ingenious but finds no support in the fragments that pertain to him. It would be more likely for the poem to have been written after his death in 241.

<sup>18</sup> The process of reconstructing plot or scenes from fragmentary evidence is notoriously fraught. In the case of reconstructing the plot of lost comedies, for instance, the evidence of Athenaeus is not reliable, as has recently been shown by Olson (2015).

<sup>19</sup> The *logomachia* was proposed first proposed by Weland (1833) 55, and elaborated by Wachsmuth (1885) 44-6 and Diels (1901) 183; for more recent discussions, see esp. Di Marco (1989) 27, Clayman (2009) 95-101. The fragments that are adduced in support of the existence of this scene are fr. 22 (discussed below), which asks who started philosophical strife, the personification of Strife in fr. 21, other fragments concerned with *eris* (e.g. 8, 10, 47, and 50), and the pseudo-military language of fragments such as 45 ( $\muέγα σθένος$ ) and 24 (Anaxagoras as  $\alphaλκιμον$   $\etaρω$ ).

which philosophers were portrayed as fish,<sup>20</sup> and an *agora* scene involving buying and selling ideas.<sup>21</sup> These different suggestions are open to one or more of the following objections, so that accepting these scenes as they are currently proposed is impossible: irreconcilability with the evidence of Diogenes, methodologically unsound use of intertexts, and a flawed philological approach. While it may in some cases be possible to propose an emended scene that does not fall foul of these objections, I suggest that a more straightforward explanation would be to suggest that these scholars have not identified scenes but rather recurrent metaphors and tropes in Timon's satire.

As already discussed, the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, that books 2 and 3 are divided broadly between older and more contemporary philosophers, is supported by the fragments that can be securely assigned to those books. However, fragments attributed to the supposed scenes frequently do not take this into account and attribute a wide range of fragments into a single scene that would, on Diogenes' evidence, have originally belonged to two separate books. For instance, the *logomachia* would have contained Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, and Pyrrho. Given that Pyrrho must belong to book 3, as he is the end point of Timon's quest and certainly falls into Diogenes' category of τῶν ὑστέρων, it is unclear precisely how this scene would plausibly fit into the structure of the poem. This irreconcilability with the evidence of Diogenes forces us to rethink the practicalities of this scene. Certainly the poem displays a great interest in dispute, as evident from the personification of Eris in fragment 21. However, even fragment 22, a parody of *Il.* 1.8-10 that asks for the origin of philosophical dispute, need not be viewed as part of a scene dedicated to a discussion of *eris*. Instead, it might just as easily be part of an aetiology that serves partially to explain the recurrence of and interest in this theme throughout the poem.<sup>22</sup> Irreconcilability with the secure evidence of Diogenes, then, is a problem for the reconstruction of several proposed scenes; while it may be possible to emend the scene to fit Diogenes' account better, this would leave several

<sup>20</sup> The fishing scene is discussed by Diels (1901) and Helm (1906) 303-5. Di Marco (1989) 28 has numerous objections to the scene proposed. Fragments frequently associated with this scene are fr. 30, provided we read πλατίστακος rather than πλατίστατος in line 1, fragment 31, in which the leaden Menedemus weighing down Arcesilaus is interpreted as a piece of tackle, the swimming of fragment 32, the flesh and bones of fragment 52 (ὁλίγον κρέας, ὄστέα πολλά), and more spuriously the interpretation of the γυργαθός in fragment 38. For a more detailed discussion of fr. 31, see below.

<sup>21</sup> The *agora* scene was originally proposed by Clayman (2009) 101-5. Rather than the sale of individuals, the scene in Timon would have seen philosophers either selling off their own ideas (such as Empedocles in fr. 42, N.B. ἐπιδευέας, and Menedemus in fr. 29, note esp. ἀναστήσας), being described as money-grabbers (λαβάργυρος of Prodicus in fr. 18), and buying up ideas for rehashing in their own works (e.g. πολλῶν δ' ἀργυρίων ὀλίγην ἥλλάξαο βίβλον, / ἔνθεν ἀπαρχόμενος τιμαιογραφεῖν ἐδιδάχθης - fr. 54.2-3 of Plato). In addition to these more straightforward pecuniary fragments, the description of Socrates as a stone-cutter (λαξόος - fr. 25.1) and the language of the marketplace utilized by Pythagoras (σεμνηγορίης ὀριστήν - fr. 57.2) may have formed a part of such a scene.

<sup>22</sup> Certainly fr. 12 demonstrates clearly enough (δημιώντες) that, even if we were to accept the proposed scene, the theme of debate cannot be limited to a single scene.

fragments relevant to the scene unaccounted for. It might be better, in this instance, to see a connection between the fragments that does not involve collocation of the fragments in a single scene.

The reconstruction of some scenes has been promoted through a comparison with other texts, especially the work of Lucian. Thus, the fishing scene is imagined to have been the inspiration for the end of Lucian's *Piscator*, in which Parrhesiades catches false philosophers using figs and gold as bait (*Pisc.* 47-52). The theory maintains that, without a literary model to explain its presence, the end of this dialogue appears incongruous with the rest of the text.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, the *agora* scene is claimed to have inspired one of Lucian's works, this time the *Vitarum Auctio*, in which Zeus and Hermes sell off philosophers from the main schools as slaves, including scepticism (27).<sup>24</sup> The difficulty of accepting the influence from Timon on Lucian in the manner assumed is that it takes no account of Lucian's own contribution nor his use of sources. A recent article by Ian Storey, for instance, has emphasized the difficulty of reconstructing the plot of lost comedies on the basis of Lucianic works.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, even if we accepted that Lucian is drawing on the *Silloi* in these works, it would follow that the original scenes in Timon would look somewhat different to their Lucianic counterparts. It is methodologically unsound, therefore, to take the evidence of Lucian as supporting evidence for the existence of a scene in Timon.

Finally, sometimes even the text of the fragments itself poses significant problems for the attribution of a fragment to a particular scene. Textual emendations by scholars wanting to associate certain fragments with the supposed fishing scene, for instance, appear little more than flights of philological fantasy. Without any direct evidence for the existence of the scene, any textual emendations that attempt to make sense of a given fragment on the basis of its inclusion in the scene risk argumentative circularity. To take one example as a demonstration of this methodological problem, let us consider fragment 31:

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<sup>23</sup> Other specific points of contact between the *Silloi* and Lucian's work are the piscine pun on Plato (πλατίστακος in Timon fr. 30, cf. ὑπόπλατος in *Pisc.* 49) and the bony or spiny features of certain philosophers (όστέα πολλά - fr. 52, cf. ἀκανθώδεις καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἐκτετραχυσμένους, ἔχινων δυσληπτοτέρους - *Pisc.* 51).

<sup>24</sup> If Timon's *Silloi* did in some manner inspire both of these Lucianic texts, it must surely be significant that in the *Piscator* Parrhesiades, one of Lucian's pseudonyms, must formally defend himself against allegations made on the basis of the *Vitarum Auctio* (among the numerous references to the previous text, Plato complains that, in addition to speaking ill of philosophy herself, Parrhesiades had insulted the assembled group, saying εἰς ήμᾶς ὕβριζες, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀποκηρύττων σοφοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ἐλευθέρους (4)).

<sup>25</sup> Storey (2015) 178: 'We cannot use Lucian to say with confidence what was in a lost comedy. We should expect variation and expansion rather than parody, and this is especially true in terms of Lucian's favorite themes of rhetorical flourish and philosophic debate.'

τῇ γὰρ ἔχων Μενεδήμου ύπὸ στέρνοισι μόλυβδον  
θεύσεται ἢ Πύρωνα τὸ πᾶν κρέας ἢ Διόδωρον.<sup>26</sup>

The interpretation of this fragment depends primarily on the interpretation of the Homeric models and of the verb at the beginning of the second line. The recension deriving from Numenius, followed by Di Marco, transmits the verb θεύσεται, while in Diogenes we find θήσεται, which is printed in the *SH* by Lloyd-Jones and Parsons.<sup>27</sup> Kassel, by contrast, suggested δύσεται, which aligns it more closely with fragment 32, which Diogenes tells us came a little later in the text (διαλιπῶν αὐτὸν ποιεῖ λέγοντα - Diog. 4.33).<sup>28</sup> After demonstrating the inadequacy of emending the text in order to align it with a scenic interpretation, I will suggest that we can more productively read the fragment by recognizing the multivalency of the parody in these lines. Thus, we open a greater range of hermeneutic possibilities that increases the humour by recognizing the competing scripts that underlie Timon's satire and provides a new perspective on the textual problem.

The case for the inclusion of this fragment in a fishing scene is the use of μόλυβδον and the reading of κέρας for κρέας, since at *Il.* 24.80-2 μολυβδαίνη (a Homeric *hapax*) is used to refer to the sink of a fishing line while κέρας is a floater (ἢ δὲ μολυβδαίνη ἱκέλη ἐς βυσσὸν ὅρουσεν, / ἢ τε κατ' ἀγραύλοιο βοὸς κέρας ἐμβεβανία / ἔρχεται ὡμηστῆσιν ἐπ' ἵθυσι κῆρα φέρουσα).<sup>29</sup> Additionally, scholars point to the first line as a parody of *Od.* 5.346 (τῇ δέ, τόδε κρήδεμνον ύπὸ στέρνοιο τανύσσαι), in which context Leucothoe tells Odysseus to leave his raft and swim to shore. According to this interpretation,<sup>30</sup> Arcesilaus is being doomed (reading Kassel's δύσεται) by the fishing tackle that he thinks will save him. The two major problems with this are that it does not seem to make much practical sense (why is the sinker "under his chest") and that Kassel's proposed verb is clearly adapting the text to fit a preconceived interpretation and unnecessarily departs from the transmitted readings.

Alternative readings that see this as part of the fishing scene are similarly fraught. Long, for instance, reads θεύσεται assuming that Arcesilaus will hurry to Pyrrho or Diodorus with leaden Menedemus under his chest. However, one cannot take the two philosophers as direct objects, forcing us to accept the emendation of either Casaubon (εἰς for ἢ) or Meineke (ἢ <’ζ>), both of which similarly alter the transmitted text solely to fit the interpretation. The alternative is to understand Arcesilaus as a fisherman rather than a fish, so that Diogenes' verb θήσεται refers to

<sup>26</sup> “He [Arcesilaus] will run there, having the lead of Menedemus at his heart, or that mass of flesh, Pyrrho, or Diodorus.”

<sup>27</sup> Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (1983) *ad* 805 *SH*.

<sup>28</sup> Kassel's reading is followed by Clayman (2009) 109.

<sup>29</sup> Haskins (1891) discusses the ancient evidence for fishing tackle.

<sup>30</sup> Following the interpretation of Clayman (2009) 109-11.

the preparation of a lure, which similarly forces us to alter κρέας to κέρας.<sup>31</sup> However, this is difficult to justify in the context of Numenius' statement that Arcesilaus gained his eristic abilities from Menedemus (Τίμων δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ Μενεδήμου τὸ ἐριστικόν φησι λαβόντα ἐξαρτυθῆναι - *ap.* Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 14.5), as the lead no longer is acting as a sinker and consequently it is a rather bizarre image. Arcesilaus is a fisherman with lead under his chest, preparing lines for fishing.

What we see emerge from these different readings are problematic philological grounds for emendation, as they justify the text on the basis of the fishing scene, and the fishing scene is only evidenced by the emended fragments. Di Marco's text is clearly preferable, as it relies primarily on transmitted readings, and explains the problems of the passage on their own merit rather than hinging upon preconceptions about the text. In his reading of the passage, the lead of Menedemus is not a sinker but a device used by rhetoricians for developing the diaphragm.<sup>32</sup> This not only helps to explain Numenius' comment above but also the contrast between Menedemus and Pyrrho. Menedemus' dialectics are negative because they slow you down, literally and mentally (slow and slow-witted).<sup>33</sup> We can even develop Di Marco's interpretation further, as it provides us with a greater appreciation of the multivalency of the parody of *Od.* 5.346. The shipwreck referred does not need to involve literal swimming, but is instead better understood as a metaphor for failure to secure wisdom.<sup>34</sup> On this reading, the humour derives precisely from the shift in context, equating Arcesilaus' situation with Odysseus' shipwreck and swim to shore. This interpretation also explains the reference to the μόλυβδον. At the point where this appears in the *Iliad*, it is part of a simile that explains the speed with which Iris speeds down to earth, like the speed at which the iron sinks to the depths. The force of the lead weighing down Arcesilaus' wits is humorously exaggerated through the comparison with the speed of a goddess.

In my reading of fr. 31, we need not assume the existence of a fishing scene; instead, Timon's use of shipwreck imagery through the Homeric parody is metaphorical and directly related to his satire of Menedemus and Arcesilaus' use of dialectic. The main advantage of this approach is that it does not resort to the kind of circular logic employed by those scholars who emended the text to fit their own preconceived interpretations.

<sup>31</sup> Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (1983) *ad* 805 *SH*: 'Arcesilaus velum piscibus letum adparat, plumbum habet Menedemum, cornu Pyrrhonem vel Diodorum conficiet.'

<sup>32</sup> Di Marco (1989) *ad* 31 and 32; cf. Plin. *NH* 34.166, Suet. *Ner.* 20.1.

<sup>33</sup> Compare Ar. *Nub.* 129-30, where Strepsiades is concerned that someone as forgetful and slow as him will not appreciate precise arguments (πῶς οὖν γέρων ᾧν κάπιλήσμων καὶ βραδὺς / λόγων ἀκριβῶν σκινδαλάμους μαθήσομαι;). Pyrrho, by contrast, is "all substance"; cf. εἰκάζω, τί θέλεις; ὀλίγον κρέας, ὀστέα πολλά - fr. 52.

<sup>34</sup> This metaphor is even attested elsewhere in the *Silloi*. See fr. 66, in which an anonymous student despairs for his failed schooling, echoing a line Odysseus speaks when shipwrecked (οἴμοι ἐγώ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι σοφὸν ἔνθα γένηται - 66.2 ~ ὦ μοι ἐγώ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται - *Od.* 5.465).

In this section, then, I have argued that we cannot reconstruct the structure of the poem much beyond the account of Diogenes Laertius. It is probable that Timon framed his katabatic journey with a discussion of contemporary philosophers, which motivated him to seek out Pyrrho for Sceptic enlightenment, although few fragments can be securely placed within this context. The scenes that other scholars have seen in clusters of fragments cannot be reliably substantiated. Instead, these “scenes” are better understood as thematic concerns and recurrent metaphors, which help us to understand in greater detail Timon’s satirical motifs. This suggestion does not require us to fit disparate philosophers from two books into a single context. Additionally, this interpretation makes better sense of Timon’s influence on Lucian, as it leaves space open for Lucian’s own innovation in creating humorous scenes by concretizing metaphorical language in Timon.

## TIMON’S LITERARY INFLUENCES

According to Diogenes Laertius’ biography, Timon was closely associated with a range of contemporary writers, including Alexander Aetolus and Homer of Byzantium, and was himself φιλογράμματος (9.113). While Timon’s wide ranging interests in different kinds of literature are well attested by the range of his output, both in better attested texts like the *Silloi* and *Indalmoi* as well as the other forms of literature Timon is said to have written,<sup>35</sup> the full range of literary influences on the *Silloi* has not yet been fully appreciated. In this section, therefore, I shall briefly outline the main literary influences on Timon as well as the place of literature in philosophical and especially Sceptical thought.

The clearest literary influence on Timon is Euboeus, whom Polemo tells us was mentioned in the first book of the *Silloi* (μνημονεύει δ’ αὐτοῦ Τίμων ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Σίλλων - fr. 45 Preller = fr. 2). Two factors seem to favour the probability that Euboeus acted as a positive model in the poem. Firstly, Polemo cites Euboeus as the parodist who was held in highest esteem (ἐνδοξότατος δ’ ἦν Εύβοιος ὁ Πάριος), and it seems unlikely that, had Timon critiqued Euboeus, Polemo would have cited the *Silloi* as evidence in this context.<sup>36</sup> Secondly, Timon seems to have had a close association with Alexander Aetolus (D.L. 9.113), who also seems to have praised Euboeus and Boeotus as Homeric parodists (εὗ παρ’ Όμηρείην ἀγλαῖην ἐπέων... ὃς δὲ Βοιωτοῦ / ἔκλυεν,

<sup>35</sup> ἐγνώθη δὲ καὶ Ἀντιγόνω τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Φιλαδέλφῳ, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ἱάμβοις αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖ... ἀπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων εἰ σχολάζοι ποιήματα συνέγραψε· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπη καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ σατύρους (καὶ δράματα κωμικὰ τριάκοντα, τὰ δὲ τραγικὰ ἔξήκοντα) σίλλους τε καὶ κιναίδους - D.L. 9.110. Note that it is unclear how reliable some of the information is here, although he does go on to claim that Timon provided material for the tragedies of Alexander Aetolus and Homer of Byzantium in particular (9.113).

<sup>36</sup> For Euboeus’ popularity, see the Introduction.

Εύβοιώ τέρπεται ούδ' ὄλιγον - fr. 5.6-10 Magnelli). If, as seems reasonable, this reference to Euboeus was made during the proem,<sup>37</sup> Euboeus was likely a highly influential, even paradigmatic, poetic figure for Timon. Although we know so little of Euboeus' poetry that discerning his influence on the *Silloi* is difficult, Polemo's characterization of him as having lampooned the Athenians (οὗτός ἐστιν καὶ Αθηναίοις λοιδορησάμενος) is a likely candidate for his appeal to Timon given the close association Diogenes Laertius makes between Timon and λοιδορία (e.g. σκεπτικὸς ὃν πάντας λοιδορεῖ καὶ σιλλαίνει τοὺς δογματικοὺς - 9.111). If this is correct, Timon's allusion to Euboeus served not only in some way to authorize his Homeric parody but also his satirical standpoint.

One other fragment that is indicative of Timon's engagement with the contemporaneous literary culture is fragment 12, well known for its use of the phrase "birdcage of the Muses" (Μουσέων ἐν ταλάρῳ - 12.3) to describe the Museum. The precise meaning of this term, and the fragment more generally, however, is unclear. Alan Cameron, for instance, has argued against the more traditional view that it supports the idea of the Alexandrian poets as isolated in an ivory tower.<sup>38</sup> For my purposes here, however, one important point to note is that the comparison between the Alexandrian poets (or philosophers, as Athenaeus calls them at 1.22d) and birds is not unique to Timon but is also found in Callimachus first iamb (κέπφ[ - 1.6]). Likewise, the emphasis in the fragment of Timon on competition (ἀπείριτα δηριόωντες - 12.2) appears in the same poem, as attested by the *diegesis* (ἐ]ριζεσθε - 21). Although Timon almost certainly treated these characterizations in a different way to Callimachus, what is clear from this comparison is that Timon was aware of his literary milieu and the ways in which it was being characterized.

Timon, it seems, was part of the Hellenistic literary scene through his connection with the Pleiad and is aware of the *parōdic* context of his Homeric parody. At the same time, the use and parody of Homeric verse by philosophers was a well-established tradition by Timon's time. This began with Xenophanes, who clearly has an important role in the *Silloi* not only as a presocratic precursor to Sceptic philosophy but also as a literary model. Additionally, Homeric parody is found in more contemporary Cynic poetry, such as that of Crates of Thebes and Bion of Borysthenes, and Pyrrho too is reported to have employed Homeric poetry in different ways to express his philosophical views.

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<sup>37</sup> Clayman (2009) 84-5 suggests that, since 'references to famous predecessors and royal patrons would both be likely to appear in a proem, though it could be a proem introducing books two or three,' both fr. 2 and D.L.'s assertion that Timon was known to King Antigonus and Ptolemy Philadelphus belong to book one. Although, as she notes, this is less certain in the case of Timon's royal connections, Polemo is explicit in stating that Timon's reference to Euboeus was past of book 1.

<sup>38</sup> Cameron (1995) 31-2.

The influence of Xenophanes on Timon seems to be twofold: poetic and philosophical. On the one hand, Xenophanes can be imagined as sort of literary predecessor: although, as I argued in the Introduction, Xenophanes did not write *parôidia* himself, some of his poetry could easily be imagined as a forerunner to *parôidia*. Athenaeus, for instance, attributes to Xenophanes the composition of a *parôidia* (2.54e). Additionally, among the hexameter fragments of Xenophanes, several discuss Homer and Hesiod (21B10-2 D-K) or criticize the anthropomorphization of the Greek gods (21B14-5 D-K).<sup>39</sup> This is in-line with his appearance in the *Silloi*, wherein he is praised for his criticisms of “Homeric deceptions” (frs. 59 and 60, discussed below). Xenophanes’ hexametrical poetry, then, is clearly an important poetic and philosophical influence on the *Silloi*, whether or not it was viewed in generic terms as *parôidia*.

In the Cynic tradition, the use of Homeric parody is (a) associated with the genre *parôidia* and (b) part of an independent poem in which *parôidia* was the predominant mode. Cynic philosophers rarely wrote treatises, preferring principles of action over a more theoretical philosophical outlook.<sup>40</sup> They nevertheless did not eschew literature completely, but incorporated literary quotation and parody into *chreiai* as part of their daily lives. As has been noted, this adoption and adaptation is highly performative and works within the literary tradition of comedy, *iambos*, and *parôidia*.<sup>41</sup> Two brief anecdotes reported in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Diogenes the Cynic illustrate especially well just how closely this cynic practice is to those deployed by parodists (D.L. 6.53):

Μειράκιον εῦμορφον ἀφυλάκτως ιδόν κοιμώμενον, νύξας, “ἐπέγειραι,” ἔφη,  
μή τίς σοι εῦδοντι μεταφρένω ἐν δόρυ πήξῃ.

πρὸς τὸν πολυτελῶς ὄψινοῦντα,  
ωκύμορος δή μοι, τέκος, ἔσσεαι, οἴ’ ἀγοράζεις.<sup>42</sup>

In both of these instances, Diogenes parodies Homeric lines by slightly altering or punning on particular words (*εῦδοντι* for *φεύγοντι* from *Il.* 8.95 and *ἀγοράζεις* for *ἀγορεύεις* from *Il.* 18.95). In the first instance, the humour also depends on a *double entendre*, effected through the use of military language as a metaphor for erotic language, so that *δόρυ* refers to the penis and

<sup>39</sup> For Xenophanes’ criticisms of Homeric and Hesiodic gods, see Warren (2007) 42-50.

<sup>40</sup> To the extent that Long (2005: 624) says that ‘it would be false to the nature of the Cynic movement to abstract a *purely* theoretical set of notions from the Cynics’ deliberately bizarre styles of behaviour and literary expression.’

<sup>41</sup> Sluiter (2005), whose focus is the similarity between cynic performance and comedy and *iambos*, and Usher (2009), who notes the similarity to *parôidia*.

<sup>42</sup> “On seeing an attractive young boy in an unguarded pose, he nudged him and said: ‘Get up, in case, while you are asleep, someone pierces you from behind with a *spear*.’ To another who used to buy expensive dinners he said: ‘Your purchases, my boy, will make you short-lived!’” [trans. my own]

μεταφρένω to the arse. The similarity of this technique to that used in *parôidia* is clear from a brief glance at Timon's *parôidic* precursor, Euboeus. Fragment 2, for instance, which parodies *Il.* 1.275 and 277, relies for its humour on the pun on the name Peleides, son of Peleus/Mud (μήτε σὺ τόνδ', ἀγαθός περ ἐών, ἀποαίρεο, κουρεῦ / μήτε σύ, Πηλείδη).

This parodic style is developed further by other Cynics. Crates of Thebes, for instance, seems to have written a *parôidia* that bears some close stylistic similarities to Timon's own work. For instance, while Timon developed the *nekyia* theme much further than Crates did, we do find the same parodic uses of the Odyssean *nekyia*'s catalogic style, as both authors use the formula "And I saw him".<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the two poets both satirize the philosophical delusion of others (τῦφος) and their quarrelsomeness (ἔρις).<sup>44</sup> I shall return later to the similarities between the strategies of these two poets, but for now I wish to emphasize how the *Silloi* fit into this literary context.

The final figure to consider here is Pyrrho, who stands much closer to Timon's aims. Indeed, Pyrrho appears to be influential not only for Timon's philosophical perspective, but also for his literary endeavours. While he famously did not write anything down himself, Pyrrho is often said to have been fond of Homer (e.g. S.E. *Adv. Math.* 1.271-2), or at least particular Homeric lines (D.L. 9.67, which singles out *Il.* 6.146 and 21.106-7).<sup>45</sup> Unlike the Cynics, however, Pyrrho does not adapt Homeric lines for humorous effect but rather applies a Sceptic outlook on Homer and use lines amenable to Sceptic reinterpretation as *exempla*.<sup>46</sup> It is also unclear whether Pyrrho's Homeric leanings were mentioned in the *Silloi*. Either way, however, this tradition provides important para-textual information, through which we can read Timon's poem. From this perspective, Pyrrho acts as both the ultimate aim of Timon's katabatic quest and the inspiration for its form.

In order to see the influence of these traditions on Timon's poem, let us consider two anecdotes about Timon that reveal his associations with Polyphemus and the Cercopes. In the biographical tradition, we are told that Timon only had one eye and therefore called himself a cyclops.<sup>47</sup> This is clearly derived from a literalizing reading of one of Timon's works,<sup>48</sup> and given the Homeric parody of the *Silloi*, this poem seems a likely candidate for its origins. Warren proposed a

<sup>43</sup> For Crates: καὶ μὴν Στίλπων' εἰσεῖδον - 347 SH, καὶ μὴν Μίκυλον εἰσεῖδον - 349 SH; cf. for Timon: ἀλλ' οἶον τὸν ἄτυφον ἴδον ἡδ' ἀδάμαστον - 9, καὶ Φοίνισσαν ἴδον - 38.

<sup>44</sup> For τῦφος, see Crates 350, 351.1, and 355.2, and Timon frs. 9, 38 and 60; for ἔρις, see Crates 347.3 and Timon frs. 8, 10, 21-2, 28, 47, 50, 66.

<sup>45</sup> For Pyrrho's use of Homer, see Decleva Caizzi (1981) ad T20 and T21.

<sup>46</sup> For Sceptic interpretations of Homer, see Zellner (1994) and Zerba (2009), (2015). There was also a tradition according to which Homer was the founder of Scepticism, for which see D.L. 9.71: ταύτης δὲ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἔνιοι φασιν Ὄμηρον κατάρξαι, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων παρ' ὄντινοῦν ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως ἀποφαίνεται καὶ οὐδὲν ὄρικῶς δογματίζει περὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν.

<sup>47</sup> τοῦτον ἐγώ καὶ ἐτερόφθαλμον ἥκουσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν Κύκλωπα ἐκάλει... - D.L. 9.112

<sup>48</sup> A clear example is the victory of Hesiod in the *Agon*, which must derive from *Op.* 650-9. Cf. M.R. Lefkowitz (1981) 120. For the early history of biographies of poets, see Momigliano (1993) 25-7.

philosophical explanation for this association, focusing on the depiction of the cyclopes in Homer as ἀθέμιστοι (*Od.* 9.106; cf. 114-5), a facet picked up in the scholia.<sup>49</sup> It may be precisely this ιδιοπραγία (note D.L.'s characterization of Timon as ιδιοπράγμων at 9.112) that inspired the affiliation. Additionally, Warren suggests an epistemological slant, either associating Polyphemus' blinding with Democritus' philosophical freedom when blinded (cf. *Cic. Tusc.* 5.114) or being "one-eyed" as a metaphor for Timon's ability to live 'without full and uncritical acceptance of sense-impressions, but who nevertheless recognised the inevitable phenomena of experience.'<sup>50</sup> Without more precise details, it is difficult to judge between some of Warren's suggestions, but it does certainly appear that Timon likely gained some philosophical point from his cyclopean connections.

Alternatively, we might explain Timon's association with Polyphemus from a literary perspective. From the *Odyssey* itself onwards, the potential associations of the cyclopean scene with satire have been notable.<sup>51</sup> Hipponax, for instance, seems to have used cyclopean associations in a fragmentary para-epic narrative.<sup>52</sup> However, from the end of the fifth century, we have more evidence of cyclopean narratives in humorous or satirical genres and registers.<sup>53</sup> Philoxenus' *Cyclops*, for instance, was reported to have been an attack on the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse, with Philoxenus adopting the role of Odysseus to Dionysius' Polyphemus.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, the figure of Polyphemus as a singer in his own right becomes a trope in the Hellenistic period: poetry becomes Polyphemus' only solace in his lovelorn plight.<sup>55</sup> We have also already seen how Matro combines within a single line Odyssean and cyclopean models as part of his narratorial self-fashioning (ἀλλ'

<sup>49</sup> πῶς ὑπερφιάλους καὶ ἀθεμίστους καὶ παρανόμους εἰπάν τοὺς Κύκλωπας ἀφθονα παρὰ θεῶν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν λέγει τὰ ἀγαθά; ὁητέον οὖν ὅτι ὑπερφιάλους μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἀθεμίστους δὲ τοὺς μὴ νόμῳ χρωμένους ἐγγράφω διὰ τὸ ἔκαστον ἴδιον ἀρχεσθαι - Σ ad *Od.* 9.105; ἀθεμίστους λέγει οὐχ ὡς ἀδίκους, ἀλλ' ὡς μὴ θέμιδος ἥτοι νόμου χρήζοντας εἰς εὔρεσιν τοῦ καλοῦ. ἥσαν γὰρ ἀγαθοί - Σ ad *Od.* 9.112.

<sup>50</sup> Warren (2002) 125-8.

<sup>51</sup> Rosen (2007) 117-41 analyses the scene in the *Odyssey* from a satirical perspective; see esp. his comment (p. 121) that in this scene 'Odysseus emerges as a much more complex mocker, whose behavior generates comedy tinged with a moral ambiguity that seems at times even to risk alienating the audience.'

<sup>52</sup> ψωμὸν- fr. 75.4. For an analysis of the mythological models in the scene, see Alexandrou (2016).

<sup>53</sup> For a discussion of the cyclops in this period, see Hordern (2004).

<sup>54</sup> συνεμέθυε δὲ τῷ Φιλοξένῳ ἡδέως ὁ Διονύσιος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἐρωμένην Γαλάτειαν ἐφωράθη διαφθείρων εἰς τὰς λατομίας ἐνεβλήθη· ἐν αἷς ποιῶν τὸν Κύκλωπα συνέθηκε τὸν μῆθον εἰς τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν γενούμενον πάθος, τὸν μὲν Διονύσιον Κύκλωπα ὑποστησάμενος, τὴν δ' αὐλητρίδα Γαλάτειαν, ἐαυτὸν δ' Όδυσσέα - Athen. 1.6e-7a; cf. Σ Ar. *Plut.* 290. Hordern (1999) points out that the anecdote in Ath. does not say directly that Philoxenus' poem was intended as a satire. However, as Rosen (2007) 155 suggests: 'As is typical of biographical claims of this sort, the evidence is late and indirect, and we have no way of judging its authenticity, but, as we shall see below, it is persistent across a variety of sources and reveals much about the explicitly satirical potential of the Cyclops story.'

<sup>55</sup> ὡς ἀγαθὸν Πολύφαμος ἀνεύρατο τὰν ἐπαοιδάν / τῷραμένῳ· ναὶ Γᾶν, οὐκ ἀμαθῆς ὁ Κύκλωψ· / αἱ Μοῖσαι τὸν ἔωτα κατισχναίνοντι, Φίλιππε· / ἥ πανακὲς πάντων φάρμακον ἄ σοφία - Call. *Epigr.* 46.1-4; Theoc. *Id.* 11.1-8.

ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμεν, ἀλλ’ ἥσθιον εἴδατα πάντα - 15).<sup>56</sup> By associating his poetic persona with Polyphemus rather than with Odysseus, Timon both reflects a broad trend within Hellenistic literature and reacts against the more traditional figure of the satirist.

The second figures with which Timon seems to identify his poetic persona are the Cercopes, two brothers who tormented people with tricks, who were eventually removed by Heracles, and who were the subject of a pseudo-Homeric poem.<sup>57</sup> According to Diogenes Laertius, when Timon saw Arcesilaus walking through the marketplace of the Cercopes, he asked: “What business have you to come here, where we are all free men?” (φασὶ δὲ αὐτὸν Αρκεσίλαον θεασάμενον διὰ τῶν Κέρκωπων ιόντα, εἰπεῖν, “τί σὺ δεῦρο, ἐνθαπερ ήμεῖς οἱ ἐλεύθεροι;” - D.L. 9.114). The humour here seems to revolve around Timon’s assumption of the mocking licence of the Cercopes against the ‘unliberated pseudo-Skeptic’ Arcesilaus.<sup>58</sup> There is even a possibility that Timon’s self-affiliation with the Cercopes goes beyond the possibility of opening up comic licence and extends to a (pseudo-)etymology for the *Silloi* themselves. According to a scholiast on Lucian’s *Alexander*, the names of the Cercopes were Sillus and Tribalus. Given that the scholiast traces his account of the *Silloi* back to Cratinus’ *Archilochoi*, it is possible that these names date back to at least the fifth century, in which case Timon’s allusion to them may have invoked a potential etymology for his own work.<sup>59</sup>

An appreciation for the literary influences on Timon, therefore, not only increases our understanding of his place in the tradition of *paroïdia* but also allows us to recognize how the quotation of Homeric verses could be used during the Hellenistic period for philosophical ends. The impact of this context is particularly clear in Timon’s use of the cyclops, which seems to reflect both literary and philosophical concerns. As we shall see in subsequent sections, this interrelation between literary and philosophical concerns is deployed by Timon in a number of ways throughout the *Silloi*.

## STRIVING FOR ENLIGHTENMENT: SATIRE, PARODY, AND ἜΠΙΣ

Strife, *eris*, as a part of philosophical discourse, has a long history. For Heraclitus, *eris* was a fundamental part of the cosmic world (frs. 8 and 80). Over time, however, *eris* came primarily to

<sup>56</sup> See ch. 2.

<sup>57</sup> For the attribution of the *Cercopes* to Homer, see ps.-Hdt. *Vita Homeri* 24 and Proclus *Vita Homeri* 9.

<sup>58</sup> Clayman (2009) 13, following von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1881) 44 n. 1.

<sup>59</sup> “ὑπὲρ τοὺς Κέρκωπας”. οὗτοι ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ διέτοιπον Οἰχαλιεῖς ὄντες γένος Σίλλος καὶ Τριβαλός ὀνομαζόμενοι, ἐπίορκοι καὶ ἀργοί, ὡς Κρατῖνος Αρχιλόχοις - Crat. fr. 13. Clayman (2009) 77 makes this association with Cratinus’ play, although she assumes that the name does date back to Cratinus. This is not the only way to explain the meaning of *silloi* and it is more commonly associated with the verb σιλλαίνω.

represent philosophical debate. So, in Lucian's *Piscator*, Parrhesiades (quoting *Il.* 18.507-8) can proclaim that he will reward those philosophers who are best at *eris* (41) and a representative of the academics can then boast that the Academics are the best contenders (δείξομεν γὰρ οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ ὅσον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσμὲν ἐριστικώτεροι - 43). In this section, I shall argue that Timon anticipates Lucian's satire of the eristic Academic school, especially through his critique of Arcesilaus, who became head of the Platonic Academy. The attack on philosophical *eris* is primarily a critique of dialectic, against which he situates his own philosophical perspective, according to which *epochē* leads to *aphōnia* and then ultimately *ataraxia*. This view is promoted especially through a similar kind of reinterpretation of Homeric verses that in the last section we saw attributed to Pyrrho. Additionally, I argue that we can view Timon's attack on *eris* from the perspective of the tradition of satirical poetry. Timon's own criticisms are a form of *eris*. While it might appear that Timon is guilty of inconsistency, I shall argue that in the *Silloi* Timon is enacting the process of reaching Scepticism. He uses eristic arguments to counter the validity of *eris* itself until he finally meets Pyrrho in the underworld and learns how to achieve *ataraxia* from him.

Numerous philosophers in the *Silloi* are criticized for their eristic tendencies. Euclid, for instance, is described as an ἐριδάντης who inspired ἐρισμοῦ in the Megarean school (28.2-3), dogmatic philosophers are addressed as fashioned from ἐρίδων and στοναχῶν (10.2, discussed in the following section), and Protagoras knows well how to quarrel (ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδώς - 47). The destructive capabilities of *eris* as presented by Timon are well reflected in fragment 66:

φῆ δέ τις αἰάζων, οἵα βροτοὶ αἰάζουσιν·  
οἴμοι ἐγὼ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι σοφὸν ἔνθα γένηται,  
πτωχὸς μὲν φρένας εἰμί, νόου δέ μοι οὐ ἔνι κόκκος.  
ἢ με μαθεῖν φεύξεσθαι οἴομαι αἰτὺν ὀλεθρον;  
τοὶς μάκαρες μέντοι καὶ τετράκις οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες  
μηδὲ κατατρώξαντες ἐνὶ σχολῇ ὅσσ' ἐπέπαντο.  
νῦν δέ με λευγαλέαις ἐρισιν εῖμαρτο δαμῆναι  
καὶ πενίῃ καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα βροτοὺς κηφῆνας ἐλαστρεῖ.<sup>60</sup>

In this passage, the parody of the *Odyssey* is an important backdrop for understanding the presentation of *eris*, as it clarifies the metaphorical force of the wailer's complaints. He despairs

<sup>60</sup> "And someone spoke, wailing just as mortals wail, 'oh me oh my, what do I suffer? What wisdom is there for me there? My mind is beggarly, and I don't have even a grain of sense. Do I really think that I've learned to avoid sheer destruction? By contrast, three and four times blessed are those who have nothing nor have gnawed away in schooling everything they possessed! Now my destiny was to be overcome by baneful strifes and by my poverty and everything else that drives mortal drones.'" [trans. my own]

that his search for wisdom has failed, echoing the length of time Odysseus worries it will take for him to reach his home (ὦ μοι ἐγώ, τί πάθω; τί νῦ μοι μήκιστα γένηται - *Od.* 5.465), the concern that he may not escape destruction aligns him with the doomed suitors (ἀλλά τιν' οὐ φεύξεσθαι δῖομαι αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον - 22.67), and those not financially burdened by philosophical schools are as lucky as those who perished during the war at Troy (τοὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις, οἵ τότε ὄλοντο - 5.306).<sup>61</sup> The result of this student's association with the dogmatists is an overwhelming *eris* that recalls Odysseus' potentially deadly fate (νῦν δέ λευγαλέω θανάτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀλῶναι - 5.312). *Eris*, here, is parodically equivalent to death itself.

The reasons why Timon singles out *eris* for particular mention are twofold. Firstly, in order to argue with someone it is necessary to take a side in an argument. This position involves adopting either a positive or negative dogmatic position. While some Sceptics would say that they adopt this position only for the purposes of refuting the dogmatic beliefs of others, this clearly does not sufficiently impress Timon. Thus, in fragment 50 the otherwise unknown Philo stands out among Pyrrho's students because he does not engage with either *eris* or *doxa* as others do (ἢ τὸν ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων αὐτόσχολον αὐτολαλητὴν / οὐκ ἐμπαζόμενον δόξης ἐρίδων τε Φίλωνα). Secondly, Timon regards engaging in philosophical dialectic dangerous as it may also lead to a speaker pandering to his audience. Such flattery is problematic for a Sceptic as it is more concerned with persuasion than rigorous analysis. This emerges in fragment 40, which focuses on the flattery of Ariston of Chios (καὶ τις Αρίστωνος γέννης ἀπὸ αἰμύλου ἔλκων; cf. D.L. 7.161), and fragment 34, which depicts Arkesilaus being driven crazy by the adoration of the crowd (ἢ λέματον δεικνύντες, οθούνεκεν ὄχλοαρεσκος - 34.3).

Arkesilaus is also singled out in fragment 33, although textual problems significantly hinder our ability to grasp the main point:

† καὶ νέον μηλήσεις † ἐπιπλήξεσιν ἐγκαταμειγνύς.<sup>62</sup>

Despite the problematic state of the first hemistich,<sup>63</sup> the overall sense of the line is clear from the context in Diogenes Laertius, that Arkesilaus was similar to a satirist (ἐπικόπτης θ' ἵκανως καὶ παροησιαστής· διὸ καὶ πάλιν ὁ Τίμων ούτωσὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ· “καὶ – ἐγκαταμειγνύς” - 4.33-4). We shall return later to consider how this might inform own reading of Timon's own satire, but here it is worth considering the tone of the fragment. Despite various attempts to emend the line, it is

<sup>61</sup> The allusions in the fragment are helpfully discussed by Clayman (2009) 115-6.

<sup>62</sup> The state of the text makes translation difficult. The only certain phrase, ἐπιπλήξεσιν ἐγκαταμειγνύς, we can translate as “mixing in criticisms”.

<sup>63</sup> For a review of the different readings, see Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*

unlikely that the state of the text permits us to make any reliable interpretation as to whether “mixing in criticisms” was intended as a positive or negative point.<sup>64</sup> Rather than basing our interpretation on unnecessary conjectures, we have to understand the fragment in the context of the poem. Clayman suggests that this line is praising Arcesilaus, and situates it in the context of other fragments that are not wholly negative (frs. 5, 46, 59-60). However, these other fragments all describe presocratic philosophers, who are not held up to the same standards of Scepticism as contemporaries, especially one of Pyrrho’s own students.<sup>65</sup> Additionally, this interpretation makes little sense in the context of Timon’s other criticisms of Arcesilaus, which also focus on his rhetorical abilities (esp. frs. 31 and 34). Instead, I would argue that this fragment too should be understood in the context of Timon’s criticisms of *eris*.

The question still remains, however, why Timon criticizes Arcesilaus so frequently. Although it is too early to speak of Pyrrhonists and Academics as clearly drawn, distinct subcategories of Scepticism, there nevertheless does appear to be a distinction drawn between Timon and Arcesilaus in terms of Scepticism. The most logical basis for this differentiation, as articulated in the *Silloi*, is in their attitudes towards dialectic. Arcesilaus was well known for his engagement in dialectic, especially with the Stoic Zeno with whom he argued over issues of epistemology and the possibility of apprehending kataleptic impressions.<sup>66</sup> Given that Timon repeatedly criticizes Arcesilaus for his public speaking (i.e. flattery in fr. 34) and rhetorical training (the lead weight in fr. 31), it would appear that Timon disapproves of a Sceptic adopting a dialectic approach. Instead, we know from Aristocles’ criticisms of Timon’s account of Pyrrhonsim that the adoption of *epochê* was said to lead to speechlessness and ultimately tranquility.<sup>67</sup> The result of the Sceptic suspension of judgement for Timon, that is, is connected with the absence of engagement.

This contrast between eristic dialectic and silence is made clear in two fragments with epic precedents. In both of these fragments, we shall see that Timon’s use of Homeric and Hesiodic verses engages in a similar kind of Sceptic reinterpretation that we saw attributed to Pyrrho in the previous section. The main difference is that it is through the differences between the original texts and the fragments of the *Silloi* that we see Timon rewriting Homeric poetry in line with his Sceptic perspective.

The distinction between speech and silence is made most explicitly in fragment 22:

<sup>64</sup> As Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.* rightly says that we have reached a ‘impasse testuale.’ Any arguments built on the basis of an emendation to the text would likely become circular.

<sup>65</sup> This contrast in approach is implicit in Xenophanes’ apology that he was born too long ago to appreciate every Scepticism (*πρεοβυγενής τότ’ ἐών καὶ ἀμενθήσιτος ἀπάσης / σκεπτοσύνης* - 59.3-4); cf. Long (1978) 82.

<sup>66</sup> For this argument, see Cic. *Ac.* 66-7, 77; cf. Thorsrud (2009) 45-50.

<sup>67</sup> τοῖς μέντοι γε διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν, ἔπειτα δ’ ἀταραξίαν - Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 14.18.4.

τίς γὰρ τούσδ' ὄλοῑ ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;  
Ἡχοῦς σύνδρομος ὄχλος· ὁ γὰρ σιγῶσι χολωθεὶς  
νοῦσον ἐπ' ἀνέρας ὥρσε λάλην, ὀλέκοντο δὲ πολλοί.<sup>68</sup>

In these lines, we see a clear parody of the opening of the *Iliad* (1.6-10):

ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε  
Ἄτρεῖδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς.  
τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;  
Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς νίος· ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆς χολωθεὶς  
νοῦσον ἀνὰ στρατὸν ὥρσε κακήν, ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί.<sup>69</sup>

The *Iliad* begins with a community in crisis, as a result of Agamemnon's decision to reject Chryses' plea despite the approval of the Achaeans (1.22-4). Apollo's subsequent anger and infliction of a plague leads to the first assembly, instantiated by Achilles, where possibility of dissent from Agamemnon is first explored. This meeting has serious ramifications for understanding forms of dissent throughout the remainder of the poem. Indeed, Barker argues that the *Iliad* 'institutionalizes dissent within the heroic community,' in contrast to the *Odyssey*, which 'radically challenges and undermines that positive outcome of contest.'<sup>70</sup>

The way that Timon appropriates and alters these lines is instructive for our understanding of the presentation of *eris* in the *Silloi* and how Timon parodies Homeric lines to lend them a Sceptic spin. Rather than the people suffering for the mistake of an individual, it is the people themselves, the ὄχλος, who are responsible for rousing strife. Instead, the contrasts in the *Iliad*, between Achilles and Agamemnon and between the king and his people, are reframed in terms of noise. The crowd are linked with the personification of Echo, who is associated with excessive noisiness,<sup>71</sup> and they raise a babbling illness, which plays on the Homeric adjective *κακήν*, and which conjures associations between philosophical talk and nonsense and especially those between

<sup>68</sup> "Who then brought these men together to fight in destructive strife? It was the close-following crowd of Echo. For, angry with those who were silent, it roused the babbling illness against them, and many people kept dying." [trans. my own]

<sup>69</sup> "From the time when first there parted in strife Atreus' son, lord of men, and noble Achilles. Who then of the gods was it that brought these two together to contend? The son of Leto and Zeus; for he, angered at the king, roused throughout the army an evil pestilence, and the men were perishing."

<sup>70</sup> Barker (2009) 23.

<sup>71</sup> e.g. at Ar. *Th.* 1078-96. Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.* also suggests that here Echo should be understood as noise (*rumore* or *frastuono*), although he does not make the association with the Aristophanic personification.

nonsense and madness.<sup>72</sup> That this illness is associated with death may also remind us of the student in fragment 66, who worries that they have not learnt to avoid destruction. This excessive speech is contrasted with the recipients of the crowd's anger, those who remain silent (*σιγῶσι*). In short, while in the *Iliad* the strife is driven by an external motivating force, Apollo's anger, in the *Silloi* it is debate *itself* that motivates philosophers, as *eris* begets *eris*. Here νοῦσος does not lead to ἔρις, νοῦσος is ἔρις.

This fragment is closely associated with fragment 21, to which fragment 22 was originally closely situated within the poem, according to Clement of Alexandria.<sup>73</sup> In this fragment, we again see a contrast between silence and philosophical "babble" as Timon draws on both Homeric and Hesiodic precedents for his personification of Eris:

φοιτᾶ δὲ βροτολογὸς Ἔρις κενεὸν λελακυῖα  
Νείκης ἀνδροφόνοιο κασιγνήτη καὶ ἔριθος·  
ἵ τ' ἀλαὴ περὶ πάντα κυλίνδεται, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα  
ἐς βροτοῦ ἐστήριξε κάρη καὶ ἐς ἐλπίδα βάλλει.<sup>74</sup>

The fragment clearly parodies Homer's own personification of Eris (Ἐρις ἄμοτον μεμανῖα, / Ἀρεος ἀνδροφόνοιο κασιγνήτη ἐτάρῃ τε, / ἵ τ' ὀλίγη μὲν πρῶτα κορύσσεται, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα / οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξε κάρη καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ βαίνει - *Il.* 4.440-3). In the original context, there is a contrast between the advancing Danaans, who remain silent (429-31) by contrast to the Trojans, whose clamour is likened to the bleating of ewes (433-7). The contrast between noise and silence in Homer is picked up by the phrase κενεὸν λελακυῖα, which recasts the scene in terms of philosophical nonsense.<sup>75</sup> This recontextualization suggests that Timon is putting a Sceptic spin on the original Homeric passage. Just as the silent Greeks defeat the loud Trojans, Sceptic *aphrasia* is superior to all other dogmas. The Homeric battlefield (Eris walking upon the earth) is then recast as the human mind (κάρη) and philosophical dogma is trivialized as mere "hope", ἐλπίδα.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup> For the association between garrulity (*lalein, adoleschein*) and nonsense, see Kidd (2014) 38-40 and for nonsense and madness, see Kidd (2014) 26-9. Certain forms of nonsensical speech were also discussed as medical symptoms, for which see Kidd (2014) 40-3. Cf. also ch. 3 for nonsense terms in Archeistratus.

<sup>73</sup> παγκάλως γάρ ὁ Φλιάσιος Τίμων γράφει: "φοιτᾶ - βάλλει" (fr. 21). ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ύποβὰς ἐπιφέρει: "τίς - πολλοί" (fr. 22) - Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.1.11.4-6.

<sup>74</sup> "The bane of man goes to and fro, Eris, babbling emptily, the sister of man-slaying Neike and her servant, who, blind, rolls around everywhere, but then she sets fast on a mortal's head and casts him into hope." [trans. my own]

<sup>75</sup> For emptiness in the *Silloi*, see frs. 11, 20, and 48.2.

<sup>76</sup> The negative connotations of the term here aid the portrayal of the negative philosophical associations of *eris*, for which see Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*

At the same time, however, the personification of Eris here, presented as the sister of Neike, seems to refer to Hesiod's account of Eris in the *Theogony*, where Eris begets Νείκεα (229). This version was itself supposedly rewritten in the *Works and Days*, which presents two different Erides (11-3):<sup>77</sup>

οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαιῶν  
εἰσὶ δύω· τὴν μὲν κεν ἐπαινέσσειε νοήσας,  
ἡ δ' ἐπιμωμητή· διὰ δ' ἄνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν.<sup>78</sup>

Even more explicitly than *eris* in Homer, Hesiod's programmatic discussion of the Erides addresses competing concepts of social value. The discussion of the two Erides is framed by Hesiod's announcement of the major narrative thread of the poem, Hesiod's didactic role regarding Perses (ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρση ἐτίτυμα μυθησαίμην - 10, ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα τεῶ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῷ - 27), and the closing address to Perses is linked into personal negotiation of the two Erides (28-9). Good Eris rouses even the helpless man to work (ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὄμῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἔγειρεν - 20), since it inspires a competitive spirit that is productive specifically in an agricultural and poetic context (21-6). Bad Eris, on the other hand, which rejoices in evils (κακόχαρτος), fosters wars (ἢ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει - 14), and drives men to quarrels in the assembly (νείκε' ὀπιπεύοντ' ἀγορῆς ἐπακουὸν ἔόντα - 29). Hesiod, then, establishes a direct contrast between legal wrangling (retrospectively its own form of πολυπραγμοσύνη) and farming (cf. 30-2).

If we see Hesiod's two accounts of Eris in the background to fragment 21, we can more fully appreciate Timon's satire of *eris* in the *Silloi*. Timon's vision of Eris is the Hesiodic bad Eris, who is associated with legal quarrels (νείκε' ὀπιπεύοντ' ἀγορῆς ἐπακουὸν ἔόντα / ὡρη γάρ τ' ὀλίγη πέλεται νεικέων τ' ἀγορέων τε - 29-30). Furthermore, by re-singularizing Eris, Timon implicitly denies the Hesiodic account of a socially productive form of *eris*.

Against this insane crowd of noisy philosophers, one figure in the poem is not engaged in the same philosophical *eris* as others, Pyrrho (fr. 8):

οὐκ ἀν δὴ Πύρρωνί γ' ἐρίσσειεν βροτός ἄλλος.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> For the idea that the *Works and Days* rewrites the *Theogony*'s account of Eris, see Gagarin (1990) 174, Zarecki (2007) 7-10.

<sup>78</sup> "So there was not just one birth of Strifes after all, but upon the earth there are two Strifes. One of these a man would praise once he got to know it, but the other is blameworthy."

<sup>79</sup> "No other mortal at all would contend with Pyrrho." [trans. my own]

There is some debate, however, between two interpretations of this fragment: on one reading, no mortal can contend with Pyrrho because he is exceptionally adept at speaking. This argument draws principally upon the tale, reported by Diogenes Laertius, that Pyrrho outdid others both in extended argumentation and cross-examination (ἐν τε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς κατεφρονεῖτο διὰ τὸ <καὶ δι>εξοδικῶς λέγειν καὶ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν - 9.64).<sup>80</sup> However, in light of the use of silence as a counterpoint to philosophical babble above, Cortassa's interpretation, that no mortal would contend with Pyrrho in the *Silloi* because he refused to engage, appears more convincing.<sup>81</sup> This reading depends upon reading the line in the *Silloi* against its Homeric model, *Il.* 3.223, where Antenor tells Priam that none could contend with Odysseus in speech (οὐκ ἀν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος).

Di Marco objected to Cortassa's reading of the line on the grounds that the verb ἐρίζειν in Homer does not possess the same specific connotations of "to contend in speech" but means more generally "to rival".<sup>82</sup> Instead, he sees the line as establishing Pyrrho as a model of φρόνησις or σοφία on the basis of Aristocles' use of the figures of stupidity, Coroebus and Meletides, as a contrast to Pyrrho in this fragment.<sup>83</sup> While Di Marco is right to point towards Timon's portrayal of Pyrrho as a model of intelligence here, he seems to underplay the significance of the Homeric parody. Firstly, one might object to Di Marco's concerns on the grounds that Timon need not necessarily use the verb in exactly the same sense as Homer. Timon's other use of ἐρίζειν in fr. 47, for instance, seems to refer to Protagoras' verbal dexterity (implied in the quotation context of D.L. 9.52-3). Secondly, the context of the fragment in the poem may have made the association with speech explicit. Thirdly, the context of the Homeric model supports his claim that Pyrrho was being used as a model of intellect. Antenor makes it clear that, although Odysseus acted in a manner that would induce one to think him an idiot (φαίνεις κε ζάκοτόν τέ τιν' ἔμμεναι ἄφρονά τ' αὐτῶς - 3.220), his verbal abilities were exceptional. The contrast of appearance and reality in Antenor's description of Odysseus becomes a trope of satirical poetry, such as Archilochus' preferred general (fr. 114) and Hipponax' ability to throw a *lekythos* (T19 and 19a Dg).<sup>84</sup>

<sup>80</sup> This interpretation ultimately derives from Wachsmuth (1885).

<sup>81</sup> Cortassa (1978) 152-5, esp. 153: 'mentre nessuno poteva contendere con Odisseo perché egli era troppo abile nel parlare, con Pirrone nessuno poteva contendere perché egli non parlava affatto!'

<sup>82</sup> Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*, citing *inter alii* Od. 4.81-2, 8.370-1, Il. 15.321.

<sup>83</sup> ή διὰ τί Τίμων φησίν. "οὐκ – ἄλλος;" οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον Πύρρωνα θαυμάσαι τις ἀν ἡ τὸν Κόροιβον ἐκεῖνον ἡ τὸν Μελητίδην, οἵ δὴ δοκοῦσι μωρία διενεγκεῖν - Aristoc. ap. Eus. Praep. Ev. 14.18.16-7 (T57 Decleva Caizzi). Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*: 'Eppure la scelta di note figure di stolti... come personaggi rispetto ai quali, una volta accolto il principio scettico dell'indiscriminabilità delle cose, Pirrone non può essere ritenuto superiore, lungi dall'essere casuale, è strettamente collegata alla rappresentazione polemica di Aristocle i due, Corebo e Meletide, sono introdotti come paradigmi di segno negativo in alternativa al Pirrone ammirato ed esaltato da T.: essi evidentemente incarnano e mostrano in forma esasperata la qualità opposta a quella che T. aveva attribuito a Pirrone.'

<sup>84</sup> For a discussion of the contrast in Hipponax between appearance and reality, see Rosen (1990) 11-5.

As we saw regarding fragments 21 and 22, then, Timon uses the multivalency of parody to rewrite the Homeric line from a Sceptic perspective. Odysseus serves as an example of the Sceptic argument of the unreliability of appearances that forms the basis of Sceptic suspension of judgement. For Pyrrho specifically, Odysseus is a complex model: like Odysseus, Pyrrho is the antithesis of being ζάκοτος and ἄφων; Pyrrho's intelligence, however, stems from the avoidance of philosophical disputation and all of the negative connotations that brings in the *Silloi*. Within the *Iliad*, Odysseus is a major figure for the configuration of the utility of verbal *eris* in debate. Timon's Pyrrho rewrites the value of the Odysseus' intelligence, rejecting him as a model for valuable debate in favour of Pyrrho's Sceptic detachment.

Thus far, I have argued that Timon's satire of the philosophers as overly eristic focuses especially on a negative depiction of dialectic, which involves pandering to the audience and the adoption of false *doxa*. Additionally, it is in this regard that Timon distances his approach to Scepticism from that practiced in Plato's Academy as epitomized by Arcesilaus. Against the backdrop of all these eristic philosophers, Pyrrho stands out for refusing to engage in their futile efforts. Furthermore, we have seen that Timon frequently uses his parody of epic to revise epic according to Sceptic philosophy. Currently, however, Timon may well be argued to be open to a charge of inconsistency.<sup>85</sup> Timon is attacking philosophers for being eristic, but his own satire is an eristic form. The problem is most clear, if we consider the criticism of Arcesilaus in fragment 33 for "mixing in criticisms". In the remainder of this section, I aim to demonstrate that such inconsistency is not necessarily problematic, as it is not an uncommon feature of either Sceptics or satirists. Additionally, I shall suggest that the teleology of the poem may even be designed as an ultimate vindication of Timon's championing of *aphrasia* in contradistinction to *eris*.

While Timon in the *Silloi* consistently uses *eris* to refer to philosophical arguments, *eris* might equally well be understood to refer to his satire, itself a form of *eris*. The association between *eris* and satirical poetry extends back to the scene between Thersites and Odysseus in *Iliad* 2. Thersites' words show the close association between the satiric mode and terms such as *neikos* (νεικείεσκε - 221, νείκεε - 224), *oneidos* (ὡνείδεα - 222), and *eris* (ἐριζέμεναι - 214).<sup>86</sup> It is far from clear, however, that Thersites is unequivocally a foundational figure of the satirist. Indeed, Rosen has argued that, while Thersites is certainly engaged in *psogos*, his words fail and that it is ultimately Odysseus who

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<sup>85</sup> Here I am indebted to a discussion of the problem with Dr. Gabriele Galluzzo.

<sup>86</sup> Nagy (1999) 259-64 analyses the scene from the prospective of the poetic traditions of praise and blame, focusing especially on the language of blame poetry, and concludes that (p. 263) 'the story of Thersites in the *Iliad* surely stands out as the one epic passage with by far the most overt representation of blame poetry.' Cf. Rosen (2007) 119: 'Although Thersites offers the most explicit example in Homer of a psogic discourse - a form of marked speech that owes its internal logic to the social practices from which it derives - other Homeric characters also adopt satirically abusive roles that seem equally imbued with poetological significance.'

emerges as ‘a true satirist.’<sup>87</sup> To whatever extent we view Thersites as a “successful” or “true” satirist, however, the significance of the language used to describe his speech as a model of a “poetics of mockery” remains clear. In the scene between Irus and Odysseus, for instance, another scene that can be interpreted from a satirical perspective,<sup>88</sup> Irus warns that their *eris* may develop from a verbal to physical confrontation (ἀλλ’ ἄνα, μὴ τάχα νῶιν ἔρις καὶ χερσὶ γένηται - 18.13). In his study of the language of blame poetry, Nagy also demonstrates the close relationship between *eris* and other terms commonly associated with satirical poetry, such as *neikos*, *oneidos*, *phthonos*, and *mômos*.<sup>89</sup>

The influence of this eristic satire is seen in its endurance into the imperial period. Horace *Epode* 4, for instance begins with a declaration of a direct, personal emnity typical of satire:

*Lupis et agnis quanta sortito obtigit,  
tecum mihi discordia est.*<sup>90</sup>

Here Horace aligns his persona with an iambic tradition of satire.<sup>91</sup> The wolf’s discord with the lamb, that is, recalls the name of Lycambes, the wolf-walker, as well as the Aesopic fable of the wolf and the lamb along with the iambic resonances of *ainos*.<sup>92</sup> The subsequent application of this to Horace’s current situation inverts the Archilochean model, setting up the poet as a Lycambes. The *discordia* between them is the inspiration for and subject of Horace’s iambic mode of poetics.

At the same time, Horace’s relationship with Archilochus also offers a good example of how satirists frequently deny their own satirical agendas (in this case as in many others an iambic agenda). In *Epistles* 1.19, Horace claims to be the first to bring Archilochean poetry to Latium, but only his “spirit and meters” and not his “content and words that harried Lycambes”.<sup>93</sup> Such denials can even be traced back to Archilochus’ own poetry (καὶ μ’ οὐτ’ ἴαμβων οὐτε τερπωλέων

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<sup>87</sup> Rosen (2007) 67-116 and 117-20, quotation from p. 120.

<sup>88</sup> For Odysseus and Irus as in some sense proto-satirical figures, see Nagy (1999) 228-32, Rosen (2007) 136-9; additionally, Rosen (1990) 15-7 discusses the Odyssean scene as a model for Hippo. frs. 121-2 and 132.

<sup>89</sup> See, for instance, the table at Nagy (1999) 223-4, which focuses on the occurrences in Pindar and Bacchylides.

<sup>90</sup> “Whatever discord obtains, through fate, between lamb and wolf, it’s so with you and me.”

<sup>91</sup> For Horace’s relationship with the iambic tradition, see recently Barchiesi (2001), Harrison (2001), Watson (2002), A. Morrison (2006), Katz (2008), T.S. Johnson (2012).

<sup>92</sup> For the role of *ainos* in iambic poetry and its reception, see Acosta-Hughes (2002) 152-204, Steiner (2012), Hawkins (2014). For fable in Roman satire, see Marchesi (2005).

<sup>93</sup> *parios ego primus iambo / ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus / Archilochi, non res et agentia uerba Lycamben* - Hor. *Epist.* 1.19.23-5.

μέλει - fr. 215) and are found in numerous other authors.<sup>94</sup> However, rather than denying that he is not performing satire, Timon attacks the notion of *eris* altogether. Although this to some extent displaces eristic speech onto his targets, we cannot fail to be aware that we are encountering the same kind of eristic speech in the poem itself.

Many Sceptics also faced charges of inconsistency. Timon himself, as we shall see later, was accused of inconsistency in the *Pytho* by Aristocles. This charge most frequently associates Sceptics with the negatively dogmatic belief that knowledge is impossible. One cannot *know* that knowledge is impossible without incurring a charge of inconsistency.<sup>95</sup> One response to this criticism is that it is possible to make use of eristic arguments without committing oneself to the validity of eristic. This would allow the Sceptic to adopt eristic arguments for the purposes of refutation, even refutation of eristic itself, without being guilty of inconsistency. Once the argument has been won, the Sceptic can abandon the strategies used to reach the conclusion. This argument makes good sense of the *Silloi* and its relationship with satire. Frequently satirical attacks are read as being premised on the satirist adopting the moral high ground. This, however, cannot be straightforwardly the case here. If Timon began the poem from the position of Sceptic *ataraxia*, there would be no need for the *katabasis*. Instead, Timon's purpose in the poem must be the search for *ataraxia*, which he learns from Pyrrho. If this is the case, Timon achieves *aphrasia* and *ataraxia* at the end of the poem, and this ending effectively enacts Sceptic *aphrasia*. This would resolve the appearance of inconsistency as well as make sense of how Timon fits within the tradition of satirical poetry and the teleology of the poem.

In this section, I have argued that *eris* in the *Silloi* is central to understanding Timon's satire of the philosophers and especially in the differentiation between his own approach to Scepticism and that of Arcesilaus. However, many of the fragments that focus on *eris* also reveal how Timon shifts and reinterprets epic verses in a Sceptic context. Homeric and Hesiodic parody in the *Silloi* are tools for the articulation of Sceptic philosophy. Timon's is always the Hesiodic bad Eris, which impedes the philosopher from attaining any understanding of the silence of Sceptical life. Additionally, we can understand the theme of *eris* in the context of satirical poetry. However, his Sceptic and satirical agendas are aligned in his quest to find Pyrrho. The teleology of the poem ultimately vindicates his satirical attacks on other philosophers and enacts the Sceptic principles Timon promotes.

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<sup>94</sup> For instance, Ovid in the *Ibis* repeatedly threatens a *really iambic* next poem (*postmodern, si perges, in te mihi liber iambus / tincta Lycambeo sanguine tela dabit* - 53-4; *postmodo plura leges et nomen habentia uerum / et pede quo debent acria bella geri* - 643-4). For such dissimulations in iambic poetics, see Hawkins (2014) 32-185.

<sup>95</sup> For this argument and Sceptic responses to it, see Thorsrud (2009) 4-6.

## FICTIONALITY, POETRY, AND PHILOSOPHY

While Timon's criticisms of *eris* focus on the manner in which philosophical debate is conducted, we also find several recurrent terms in the satire of philosophical dogma. In this section, I analyse these terms and how they characterize both the philosophers attacked and the *Silloi* itself. They fall into two types: firstly those that describe the relationship between the dogma and the truth, and secondly those that express concern over the dangers of such dogma on others. As we shall see, when Timon describes a dogmatic belief as "made-up", this is part of a move that aims to demonstrate its inefficacy. However, that such dogma is not true does not prevent it from being dangerously enticing or persuasive, and so the Sceptic should avoid these deceptive ideas. Furthermore, I shall demonstrate that Timon uses the same terminology as used in Hellenistic literary theory (e.g. φαντασία and γοητεία), especially that which focuses on the utility of poetry for expressing truth. I shall end this section by considering what it means for Timon to write Sceptic poetry at all. Poetry should, according to the standards of most philosophical schools, either express truth in some way, i.e. be beneficial for its audience, or not be written or read at all. For a Sceptic, who suspends judgement over all matters, this question is more complex. I argue that Timon's response in the *Silloi* is to use the language of fictionality to highlight the text's own impossibility – Timon did not really go to the underworld to find Pyrrho. This strategy underlines Sceptic *epochê* by self-consciously recognizing that it is not making any direct claims about reality.

What we mean by fictionality in this context must be understood in relation to Sceptic philosophy. The central thrust of Timon's satirical take of philosophers and philosophical schools is premised on the rejection of the unsubstantiated arguments these philosophers promote and the ultimate adoption of *epochê*. Therefore, if we suspend our judgement over epistemological and perhaps even metaphysical questions about the nature of reality, what counts as fictional? One answer might be to say that things and spaces that lie beyond what is usually accepted to be (or appears to be) within experiential possibility, such as what we can see or feel, can be regarded as fictional. While this need not be the only way to decide whether or not something is fictional from a Sceptic perspective, it does help us to explain what fictionality might mean in the context of the *Silloi*. Any statement that is made, for instance, about a place that someone cannot have visited – such as Timon's visit to the underworld – can only be regarded as "made-up" ( $\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{e}vov$ ), a term that frequently lies at the heart of Greek conceptions of fictionality.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Note that this is not necessarily the same as saying that such a place *does not* exist, which is a dogmatic claim about which the Sceptic would be forced to suspend judgement as long as there is equipollence in the arguments for and against it.

In this section, I shall argue that Timon uses language that does not refer only to his judgement of philosophical matters but which are also terms drawn from Hellenistic literary criticism. These terms primarily focus on the fictionality of poetic texts (e.g. *πλάσμα*, *φαντασία*) or the effects of this fictionality, their ability to enchant or deceive the listener (e.g. *ἀπάτη*, *γοητεία*). The former, as we shall see, are the antithesis of the Sceptic adoption of *epochê*, while latter are criticized for their ability to make someone believe a philosophical *doxa* that is not true. While these terms refer in the first instance to the fictionality of a philosophical idea (e.g. Plato's Forms below), assimilating philosophical dogma to "made-up" poetry, they also serve as reminders of the fictionality of the *Silloi* itself. This fictionality emerges primarily through the setting in the underworld. While most *nekyias* are set in the mythic past, Timon's contemporary descent appears more markedly fictional.

This argument, aligning philosophical and poetic readings of the text, is well founded in the Hellenistic literary criticism. Many Stoics, for instance, would concede that poetry could express truth or could be beneficial for its audience. In one of Dio Chrysostom's orations, for instance, Zeno is said to have shown that Homer wrote some things in accordance with truth, others with opinion.<sup>97</sup> Thus, poetry has the capacity for beneficial instruction of the auditor.<sup>98</sup> This was in turn followed later by Plutarch, although the Stoic view was vigorously rejected by Philodemus.<sup>99</sup> The question of whether poetry has any moral or didactic value is primarily concerned with truth values. What kind of truth can poetry express and how does it do so? The terms by which this is achieved are the same terms used for the analysis of philosophical arguments in prose and dialectic. One cannot, that is to say, separate the language of analysis regarding poetry's didactic value in Hellenistic literary theory from that of the analysis of philosophy itself. This is true even for the Epicureans, who argue that poetry cannot express philosophical truth. In approaching how Timon uses terms to criticize the epistemological value of a philosophical claim, therefore, we are right to be conscious of the extent to which poetry itself can be subjected to the same kind of analysis.

As I have said, the terms used by Timon that are used in both philosophical and literary criticism can be divided into two groups: those that focus on the fictionality of poetic texts (*πλάσμα* and *φαντασία*) and those that focus on the effects of this fictionality (*ἀπάτη* and

<sup>97</sup> ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν [τοῦ] Όμήρου ψέγει, ἅμα διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ μαχόμενος ἐν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι - 53.4.

<sup>98</sup> See, for instance, De Lacy (1948) 251: 'The ultimate criterion of a poem must inevitably be its contribution to the good life;' cf. Kyriakou (1997) 273-4.

<sup>99</sup> ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοῖς μὴ δοκοῦσι σιλοσσόφως μηδ' ἀπὸ σπουδῆς λέγεσθαι χαίρουσι μᾶλλον καὶ παρέχουσιν ὑπηκόους ἔαντοὺς καὶ χειροήθεις, δῆλον ἐστιν ἡμῖν - *De Aud. Poet.* 14e; cf. Philod. *De Poem.* 5.6. For Philodemus' attitude to poetry in the context of Epicureanism, see Asmis (1995a) and (1995b) and Sider (1995).

γοητεία). Analysing these two groups separately allows us to see more clearly how they fit into Timon's philosophical satire and what they mean for our understanding of the poem.

In his critique of Plato, whose name is a great source of puns in the *Silloi*, the intersection between literature and philosophy is clear (fr. 19):

ώς ἀνέπλασσε Πλάτων ὁ πεπλασμένα θαύματα εἰδώς.<sup>100</sup>

The basic criticism of Plato here, as reflected by Athenaeus, is the fictionalization of dialogues,<sup>101</sup> that the dialogues did not occur and so their content is valueless. The criticism is intensified through the reference to θαύματα, which likely recalls the θαύματα of the *Republic*, puppets and puppet shows (514b, 602), the lowest representations of reality. To claim that Plato fictionalized even these moves Plato's model of perception one critical step in the direction of absurdity.<sup>102</sup> This interpretation can be pushed further if we recognize a reference to Plato's own estimation of literature and its relationship with truth and the Forms, which may be recalled in Timon's phrase πεπλασμένα θαύματα. When in *Republic* 10 Plato addresses the ability of literature – principally poetry – to be beneficial for living one's life, he creates a metaphysical hierarchy with reference to the Forms. In this estimation, literature takes the lowest slot, a mere imitation of the sensible world (595c-7e).<sup>103</sup> Timon's satirical take on Plato's dialogues, then, is centred around the relationship between literature and truth, as viewed from a Platonic perspective. Plato's dialogues are depicted as failures from the perspective of Platonic philosophy itself.

Furthermore, this critique is given a piquant twist in the Platonic puns, ἀνέπλασσε and πεπλασμένα. These terms, and the cognate noun πλάσμα, have long been associated with the negative philosophical portrayal of fiction dating back to Xenophanes (οὐτὶ μάχας διέπων Τιτήνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων / οὐδέ <τε> Κενταύρων, πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων - fr. 1.22-3 D-K). Additionally, Plato himself uses πλάσσω in reference to made up stories by contrast to true history (τὸ τε μὴ πλασθέντα μῦθον ἀλλ' ἀληθινὸν λόγον εἶναι πάμμεγά που - *Ti.* 26e) as well as to the power of stories to shape people's souls (πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μῆθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ

<sup>100</sup> "How Plato refashioned them, the expert of made-up wonders." [trans. my own]

<sup>101</sup> ἄλλοι δέ φασιν ὡς ἀναγνούντες ὁ Γοργίας τὸν Πλάτωνος διάλογον πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας εἶπεν ὅτι οὐδὲν τούτων οὔτ' εἴπεν οὔτ' ἥκουσε [παρὰ Πλάτωνος]. ταῦτά φασι καὶ Φαιδωνα εἰπεῖν ἀναγνόντα τὸν περὶ Ψυχῆς. διὸ καλῶς ὁ Τίμων περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔφη· "ώς – εἰδώς." Παρομενίδη μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐλθεῖν εἰς λόγους τὸν τοῦ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτην μόλις ἡ ἡλικία συγχωρεῖ, οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιούτους εἰπεῖν ἡ ἀκοῦσαι λόγους - 11.505e-f. Timon's criticisms of Platonic dialogue are also found in fr. 63: ἐνθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων αἰτιᾶται τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπὶ τῷ οὕτω καλλωπίζειν τὸν Σωκράτην πολλοῖς μαθήμασιν. "ἢ γὰρ" φῆσι "τὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μεῖναι ἡθολόγον".

<sup>102</sup> Clayman (2009) 103-4.

<sup>103</sup> For this view of *mimesis* in Plato, see P. Murray (1996) 3-6.

τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν - R. 377c).<sup>104</sup> That these terms are also puns on his name give them a pseudo-aetiological pretence, as though Plato's name guaranteed the fictionality of his dialogues.

To describe philosophical writings and dogmas as a kind of *πλάσμα*, as Timon does with Plato here, is to distance them from the truth in the same terms as poetry's own ability to express truth was analysed. This association between philosophy, *πλάσμα*, and truth-value is clarified further in fragment 10:

σχέτλιοι ἄνθρωποι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,  
τοίων ἔκ τ' ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν πέπλασθε.<sup>105</sup>

As is made clear by the context of Aristocles' quotation of the fragment,<sup>106</sup> here we have an unknown speaker addressing a group of philosophers or philosophers in general. The lines primarily draw on an Empedoclean reflection on the woeful fortune of humanity (ὦ πόποι, ὦ δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος, ὦ δυσάνολβον, / τοίων ἔκ τ' ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν ἐγένεσθε - 31B124), combined with a quotation of the Muses' first words to the shepherds in Hesiod's *Theogony* (κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον - 26). In the Empedoclean context, the phrase specifically addressed the inevitability of *eris* for the human condition.<sup>107</sup> Here, however, the shift from the Empedoclean verb to *πέπλασθε* marks how these philosophers have been misled by false logic and dialectic. The associations between the verb and non-truthful discourse, that is, signals their epistemological failings.

The speaker, whether this is Timon or Xenophanes, is contrasted against these "wretches" through the allusion to the *Theogony*. The allusion refers to the moment when the Muses proclaim their abilities both to tell the truth and lies that resemble the truth (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν

<sup>104</sup> Cf. καίτοι ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὐκ ἐπίστασθε πότερον οὕτω γεγένηται ἢ πέπλασται ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν - Andocides 4.23

<sup>105</sup> "Wretched men, base disgraces, mere bellies, from what great strifes and wailing you have been fashioned!" [trans. my own]

<sup>106</sup> ἐν αἷς [sc. παρῳδίαις] βεβλασφήμηκε πάντας τοὺς πώποτε φιλοσοφίσαντας. οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τοὺς Σίλλους γράψας καὶ λέγων· "σχέτλιοι – πέπλασθε" - Aristocl. ap. Eus. Praep. Ev. 14.18.28. The causal γὰρ here suggests that the fragment is being introduced as an example of Timon's philosophical badmouthing, and so it is likely that ἄνθρωποι here specifically addresses philosophers. This is probably also the case in fr. 11 (ἄνθρωποι, κενεῆς οὐήσιος ἐμπλεοὶ ἀσκοί). The two fragments were quoted together by Theodoretus (*Graec. Affect. Cur.* 2.20), which could suggest either an original textual proximity, context, or tone. Again, the context of Theodoretus implies that Timon is addressing philosophers specifically rather than humanity in general: καὶ Τίμων δὲ αὐτοὺς (sc. φιλοσόφους) ὁ Φλιάσιος, ὁ Πύρρωνος ἔταῖρος, ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις ἐτραγῳδησεν [ἐπαρῳδησεν Usener]. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ μάλα πολλῶν ὀλίγων μνησθήσομαι· "σχέτλιοι – ἀσκοί". Within fr. 11, furthermore, the intratextual resonance of κενεῆς with depictions of philosophical empty-mindedness also supports this reading.

<sup>107</sup> See, for instance, Solmsen (1965) and Drozdek (2003).

ἐτύμοισιν ὄμοια, / ἵδμεν δ' εὗτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι - 27-8).<sup>108</sup> The ability both to recognize and specifically to speak the truth is the key differentiator between the speaker and his audience here. The re-emergence of *eris* here, then, is a reminder of Timon's satirical take on philosophical dialectic that I discussed in the last section. Forms cognate with *πλάσμα* in the *Silloi* are used to evaluate philosophical ideas, and more specifically philosophical speech and writing, with regard to their abilities to discern the truth. As often with poetry that is labelled as *πεπλασμένον*, philosophical speech that is described as a kind of *πλάσμα* is characterized as unable to offer a guide to the truth.

The same problem can be found in Timon's treatment of *φαντασμός*, where the key question is whether or not one can discern between what can be shown to be false (fr. 45):

ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνὸν  
Ζήνωνος πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος ἡδὲ Μέλισσον  
πολλῶν φαντασμῶν ἐπάνω, παύρων γε μὲν ἥσσω.<sup>109</sup>

Scholars' interpretations of this fragment have been varied, in part due to two textual problems in the passage.<sup>110</sup> Whatever the force of the final phrase, however, the significance of the phrase πολλῶν φαντασμῶν ἐπάνω has thus far not been fully appreciated. While the fragment ultimately ends with a condemnation of the Eleatics Zeno and Melissus, the final line is clearly more ambiguous. As we saw with *πλάσμα*, *φαντασμός* refers to philosophical dogma. Because no dogma has been demonstrated to be true to the Sceptics' satisfaction, all dogma is misleading and based on appearance rather than truth. *Φαντασμός* not only gestures towards the differentiation of appearance and reality<sup>111</sup> but also the philosophical imagination. The point is not simply that dogma is based on appearance rather than reality, but that it is a mere fantasy derived from wild imaginings. While Melissus seems to be praised for his arguments against certain dogmas, the contrast between many and few plays on his unitarian philosophy, which is just another form of *φαντασμός*.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Lügner (2013).

<sup>109</sup> "The great, indomitable strength of double-tongued Zeno, the censurer of all, and Melissus who was superior to many fantastical appearances, but weaker than a few." [trans. my own]

<sup>110</sup> I retain here the text of Di Marco (1989), which accepts the emendation of Meineke (1860: 330) that corrects Μέλισσον in the manuscripts of Diogenes to Μέλισσον, cf. Pratesi (1986) 55-6. Additionally, *contra* Cortassa (1978) 149-51, Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.* rejects the reading εἴσω for ἥσσω found in Diog. F in l. 3 on the grounds that ἥσσω + gen. is well attested by contrast to εἴσω.

<sup>111</sup> The connection between *φαντασία* and τὸ φαίνεσθαι is apparent from Arist. EN 1114a32: πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι.

In Hellenistic literary theory, φαντασία and cognate terms are associated with the ability of literature to represent events and in doing so evoke emotion in their audience.<sup>112</sup> One scholiast to Homer, for instance, schematizes poetry into three groups based on their use of truth or imagination.<sup>113</sup> Here φαντασία is directed contrasted with ἀληθεία, just as in this fragment philosophical φαντασμοί are implicitly rejected for not being epistemologically viable.

Furthermore, φαντασία is also used to refer to vivid representation, i.e. that produced when the poet is drawing on imagination rather than truth. This sense was principally used by the Stoics and derives broadly from Aristotle (*De An.* 427b27-28b9; cf. *Rhet.* 3.1411b26-12a11), although it is also associated with views of literature that emphasize entertainment.<sup>114</sup> This association between imagination as drawn from the mind of the poet and its effect on the audience can also be found in Timon's satire of Parmenides (fr. 44):

Παραμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον,  
ὅς οὐ ἐπὶ φαντασίας Ἀπάτης ἀνενείκατο νώσεις.<sup>115</sup>

Here the negative force of φαντασία for philosophical interpretation is stated explicitly in its association with Ἀπάτη, the personification of which plays on Parmenides' own personifications in his poetry.<sup>116</sup> Φαντασία is dangerous for a philosopher because it is deceptive. Such deception is dangerous specifically in the context of speech. Like φαντασία, ἀπάτη is closely associated with the manner in which audiences and readers were perceived to understand fiction. This of course dates back at least to Gorgias' claim that the deceiver is more just than the non-deceiver and the deceived more wise than the undeceived (ὅτεν ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος - 23 D-K).

Gorgias' claims about the deceptive capacity of poetry are also associated with another strand of ancient literary criticism. In the *Encomium of Helen*, he discusses the power of poetry to invoke emotion in its audience (ἥς [sc. ποίησις] τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος

<sup>112</sup> For φαντασία in Hellenistic literary theory, see Russell (1981) 108-10, Kyriakou (1997) 272-3, Schenkeveld (2005) 224.

<sup>113</sup> τρεῖς δέ εἰσι τρόποι, καθ' οὓς πᾶσα ποίησις θεωρεῖται· ὁ μιμητικὸς τοῦ ἀληθοῦ... ὁ κατὰ φαντασίαν τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν δεῖ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἐξετάζειν... τρίτος δὲ ὁ καθ' ύπέρθεσιν ἀληθείας καὶ φαντασίαν, Κύκλωπες, Λαιστρογόνες καὶ ταῦτα τὰ περὶ θεῶν. - *S ad Il.* 14.342-51.

<sup>114</sup> Schenkeveld (2005) 224; Eratosthenes (ap. Strabo 1.1.10), for instance, maintains that every poet aims at ψυχαγωγία.

<sup>115</sup> "And the strength of high-minded Parmenides, of no diverse opinions, who introduced thought instead of Deceit's imagination." [trans. my own]

<sup>116</sup> E.g. Δίκη (28B1.14 D-K), Ἀληθείη (28B1.29, 28B2.4 D-K), and Πειθώ (28B2.4 D-K). For Timon's strategy of referring to specific lines or stylistic elements of other philosophers in his satire of them, compare the allusion to Empedocles 31B124 in fr. 10.

πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής - 9). However, Gorgias here is hardly setting out a systematic theory of poetry and we must understand his comments in the context of his broader claims about the power of *logos*. Indeed, in the section immediately preceding this, Gorgias suggests that, if Helen were deceived by *logos*, she can easily be extricated from blame (εἰ δὲ λόγος ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπολύσασθαι ὥδε - 8). The power of poetry to evoke emotion is one way of explaining Gorgias' claim that λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν. Likewise, the subsequent argument builds on his claims thus far. Like poetry, incantations have the ability to give pleasure and remove pain by enchanting and persuading the soul by trickery. This is then said to take two forms: errors of the soul and deceptions of opinion.<sup>117</sup> Poetry, then, functions in a very similar manner to magic and enchantment.<sup>118</sup>

In Scepticism too we find concerns about the power of such trickery and enchantment. Sextus Empiricus, for instance, discusses a technique used by magicians, whereby bystanders are tricked into seeing people appear to be copper-coloured or black by smearing copper rust or cuttle-fish ink on the lamp wicks.<sup>119</sup> This example is used as part of his demonstration of the inability of our senses to perceive the world accurately, as we can be so easily tricked. Trickery is a concern for the Sceptic because it can deceive us into believing incorrect impressions and arguments that are “enchanting” are all the more dangerous for our susceptibility and credulity. We find this in the *Silloi* in the attack on Pythagoras, which associates enchantment, deception, and opinion (fr. 57):

Πυθαγόραν τε γόητας ἀποκλίνοντ' ἐπὶ δόξας  
θήρη ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων, Σεμνηγορίης ὀαριστήν.<sup>120</sup>

As Di Marco has demonstrated, the satire in the opening of the fragment depends on Timon's modelling of Pythagoras after Plato's *Sophist*, particularly the focus on the hunt (θήρα ἀνθρώπων - 222b-c, 231d, etc.) and illusory speech (234c, 235a, etc.).<sup>121</sup> Pythagoras' inclination towards enchanting *doxai* is dangerous because of the potential for others to be deceived and ensnared by

<sup>117</sup> αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπωιδαὶ ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης γίνονται· συγγινομένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπωιδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἐπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείαν. γοητείας δὲ καὶ μαγείας δισσαὶ τέχναι εὑρηνται, αἱ εἰσι ψυχῆς ἀμαρτήματα καὶ δόξης ἀπατήματα - 10.

<sup>118</sup> For Gorgias' claims about poetry and the difficulty of reconstructing a coherent perspective, see Halliwell (2005) 396-7. In particular, Gorgias' use of θέλγω to describe the work of enchantment resounds with traditional representations of poets, for which see *Od.* 1.337, 12.40-4, 17.513-21, *Pi.* N. 4.3, *A. Pr.* 73, *Pl. R.* 601b1-4; cf. de Romilly (1973).

<sup>119</sup> καὶ γε οἱ γόητες χρίοντες τὰς θρυαλλίδας ἵψα χαλκοῦ καὶ θολῷ σηπίας ποιοῦσιν ὅτε μὲν χαλκοῦς ὅτε δὲ Μέλανα φαίνεσθαι τοὺς παρόντος διὰ τὴν βραχεῖαν τοῦ μιχθέντος παρασποράν - S.E. PH 1.46.

<sup>120</sup> “Pythagoras who inclines towards enchanting doctrines for the hunt of men, the friend of Seriousdiscourse.” [trans. my own]

<sup>121</sup> Di Marco (1983) 76-7, (1989) *ad loc*; cf. Pratesi (1985) 52-4. For a similar critique of Pythagoras, see Lucian *Somn.* 4: γόητά φασι καὶ τερατουργὸν ἀνθρωπὸν, ὃ ἀλεκτρυών.

the same ideas. The danger of persuasive opinion, then, echoes the concerns we saw in the previous section concerning dialectic; if winning over an audience is perceived as the same as being right, persuasion and flattery take precedence over truth.

At the same time, in light of the close ties between incantation and poetry, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of the phrase γόητας δόξας. As we have seen, the power of enchantment is frequently conceptualized from the perspective of the enchanter, by deceiving their opinion or causing an error of the soul. This likewise applies to the deceptive or magical power of poetry, where it is poetry's capacity to mislead someone that makes it dangerous in the eyes of some. Throughout the *Silloi* Timon elides the distinctions between *doxa*, *epistêmê*, and *katalepsis* that were fundamental distinctions in other schools, such as in Zeno's Stoicism.<sup>122</sup> For a Sceptic, that is, impressions are not accurate, and so they do not lead to knowledge, but only to opinion. The phrase γόητας δόξας thus invites us to see how similar philosophical dialectic is to the cognitive processes of reading fiction. Both invite us to believe we can attain a form of knowledge, and both are designed to enchant the listener.

Another figure whose words are associated with the power of enchantment is Socrates. Here, however, his mocking tendencies also do something else (fr. 25):

ἐκ δ’ ἄρα ἀπέκλινεν <ό> λαξόος ἐννομολέσχης,  
Ἐλλήνων ἐπαοιδός, ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας,  
μυκτήρ ὁητορόμυκτος, ὑπαττικός εἰρωνευτής.<sup>123</sup>

If the description of γόητας δόξας in fr. 57 invited us to reflect on the processes of experiencing fiction, here Socrates takes up a more active role in the process. As Di Marco has noted, this description of Socrates not only recognizes his significance for later philosophical thought, extending his influence even to the Greeks as a whole, by picking up on a *topos* already found within Plato's own writings (e.g. *Smp.* 215c, *Phdr.* 77e-8a, *Men.* 80a-b), but also carries the negative connotations associated with a form divorced from reason.<sup>124</sup> The form of ἐπαοιδός, however, invites us to see the similarities between the ἐπαοιδός and the ἀοιδός: not only does Timon use an unusual form of the word, ἐπαοιδός rather than ἐπωδός, that makes the similarity between the two clearer, but ἐπωδός can also refer to the use of song (e.g. Pl. *Lg.* 903b). This description of

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<sup>122</sup> For the tripartite division as a means arriving at knowledge, see Frede (2005) 296-300.

<sup>123</sup> "From these the stonemason turned aside, that prater about laws, the enchanter of Greece, who revealed subtle arguments, the sneerer trained in rhetoric, the mildly Attic dissembler."

<sup>124</sup> Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*: 'Solo in apparenza, tuttavia, l'espressione di T. suona come una lode per Socrate.'

Socrates, then, seems to invite us to recognize Timon's own role in the fictional construct, the poet who debunks enchanting philosophical views and the philosopher-enchanters.

Thus far, we have focused on how Timon uses these terms as part of his satirical presentation of the philosophers in the poem. Two figures, however, stand out from the crowd in this regard, Xenophanes and Pyrrho. While Xenophanes is praised for his Sceptic inclinations, he is nevertheless criticized for his dogmatic beliefs and so remains a more ambiguous figure; Pyrrho, on the other hand, is presented as being totally free from deception and persuasion.

Presumably when Xenophanes is first introduced to the poem, his ambiguities and flaws are clearly expressed (fr. 60):

Ξεινοφάνης ύπάτυφος, Όμηραπάτης ἐπικόπτης  
† ἔα τὸν ἀπάνθρωπον θεὸν ἐπλάσατ' ἵσον ἀπάντη  
ἀσκηθῆ < ^ ^ - > νοερώτερον ἡὲ νόημα.<sup>125</sup>

In the first line, Xenophanes is differentiated from the majority of the philosophers Timon discusses. Unlike them, he is ύπάτυφος, somewhat undeluded.<sup>126</sup> The subsequent phrase, 'Όμηραπάτης ἐπικόπτης,<sup>127</sup> which is explained by Sextus Empiricus as meaning that he ridiculed Homeric deceit (όμηραπάτης δὲ ἐπικόπτης, ἐπεὶ τὴν παρ' Όμήρῳ ἀπάτην διέσυρεν - *PH* 1.224), is clearly positive, as it draws upon Xenophanes' criticisms of the theological implications of Homeric and Hesiodic poetry (πάντα θεοῖσ' ἀνέθηκαν "Ομηρός θ' Ἡσίοδός τε, ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν - fr. 11 D-K). This criticism of course relies upon the assumption of the essential truth-value of Homeric poetry. It would seem that, although happy to reinterpret Homeric lines within a Sceptic framework, Timon would not claim that Homeric poetry expressed a historical or theological truth or that its narrative is true.

The humour of the phrase is heightened if we appreciate that the *hapax legomenon* derives from the Homeric *hapax* ἐπικόψων, used in the same metrical *sedes* at *Od.* 3.443, where it describes the felling of an ox in sacrifice. Given that Xenophanes' criticisms of Homer and Hesiod are primarily theological, the pseudo-religious tone provided by the association with *Od.* 3.443 here establishes

<sup>125</sup> "Xenophanes the somewhat undeluded, the striker of Homeric deceits, † oh he fashioned a god far from man, equal on every side, unscathed... more intellectual than intellect." [trans. my own]

<sup>126</sup> LSJ s.v. ύπό in comp. II defines the prefix as 'denoting what is in small degree or gradual,' which suggests Xenophanes' close proximity to the Sceptic ideal is key. Note also that D.L., who only quotes l. 1, introduces the line saying: Ξεινοφάνης... ἐπανεῖται πρὸς τὸν Τίμωνος (9.18).

<sup>127</sup> Όμηραπάτης is the reading of Sextus; Diog. FP(pc) reads ὄμηραπάτην, while Diog. BP(ac) suggests ὄμηροπάτην.

Homeric poetry as a sacrificial cow whose slaughter – or debunking – provides more accurate understanding of the divine.

While this is a more positive representation than the majority of the philosophers in the *Silloi*, Xenophanes is still marked out as a dogmatist.<sup>128</sup> Indeed, in the following line there is an implicit disapproval of the divine figure that Xenophanes puts in the place of the epic gods. This god is said to be fashioned, ἐπλάσατ, which as we have seen is generally associated with unverified opinion rather than truth. Xenophanes' ability to “cut through the Homeric crap” thus assumes the danger of replacing Homeric ἀπάτη with Xenophantic ἀπάτη. This danger is later realized in Xenophanes' apology in fr. 59.2-4: δολίη δ' ὁδῷ ἐξαπατήθην / πρεσβυγενὴς τότ' ἐών καὶ ἀμενθήριστος ἀπάστης / σκεπτοσύνης. Here too it is the god Xenophanes has fashioned that has led him astray (ὅπη γὰρ ἐμὸν νόον εἰρύσαιμι / εἰς ἐν ταῦτο τε πᾶν ἀνελύετο· πᾶν δέ οἱ αἰεὶ / πάντη ἀνελκόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν ἴσταθ' ὄμοιην - 4-6). Timon's language here then possesses a double edge: cutting through poetic deception is portrayed as positive, in line with the negative depiction of ἀπάτη throughout; simultaneously, we must avoid replacing deception with deception.

Finally, we come to Pyrrho himself. When he is first introduced, he alone is described as ἄτυφος by contrast to those pressed down by the pains of *doxa* and legislation (fr. 9). Perhaps shortly afterwards, Timon addresses him directly (fr. 48):

ὦ γέρον, Πύρρων, πῶς ἡ πόθεν ἔκδυσιν εὗρες  
λατρείης δοξῶν κενεοφροσύνης τε σοφιστῶν,  
καὶ πάστης ἀπάτης πειθοῦς τ' ἀπελύσαο δεσμά;  
οὐδὲ ἔμελέν σοι ταῦτα μεταλλῆσαι, τίνες αὖται  
Ἐλλάδ' ἔχουσι, πόθεν τε καὶ εἰς ὅ τι κύρει ἔκαστα.<sup>129</sup>

Timon's opening rhetorical question emphasizes Pyrrho's distance from many of the hallmarks of bad philosophical discourse: he is free from service to *doxa* and from the empty-mindedness of the sophists. Clearly, this picks up on the negative portrayal of *doxa*, the emptiness of philosophers and

<sup>128</sup> Cf. Cortassa (1982) 428-9 n. 1: ‘Si è quasi sempre esagerato da parte degli interpreti... ed vedere un atteggiamento positivo di Timone nei confronti di Senofane. Se è vero che sembra riconoscere dei meriti a Senofane (questo è dovuto, probabilmente, anche a motivi letterari, che Timone vedeva forse in Senofane l'iniziatore del genere letterario da lui... per attaccare i filosofi dogmatici), è altrettanto chiaro che il poeta scettico lo accusa di dogmatismo, come conferma l'autorevole giudizio di Sesto Empirico (*Pyrrh. Hyp.* 1.223 sgg.).’

<sup>129</sup> “Oh old man, Pyrrho, how and whence did you find an escape route from slavery to the opinions and empty-headedness of the sophists? And how did you free yourself from the chains of every deceit and persuasion? Nor were you concerned with carefully enquiring what winds hold Greece, whence and whither each one blows.” [trans. my own]

philosophical argument throughout the *Silloi* (for κενεός, cf. frs. 11, 20.2, 21.1), as well as the programmatic opening phrase πολυπράγμονες σοφισταί. By contrast to these, Pyrrho seems to be modelled on the Odyssean swineherd Eumaeus, as line 4 is modelled on his reply to Telemachus that he has no news of the suitors as it was not his concern (οὐκ ἔμελέν μοι ταῦτα μεταλλῆσαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι - *Od.* 16.465). Eumaeus here is clearly being reinterpreted as a Sceptic figure, and Clayman is right to point to Eumaeus' epistemological uncertainty as an important facet of this interpretation of his character.<sup>130</sup> The immediate applicability of this line in particular to Pyrrho, however, must surely be Sceptic *ataraxia*. The representation of Pyrrho here makes him the perfect Sceptic, as he is free from all the delusions of others, and this is reflected in the way this fragment combines all of the key terms we have been examining in this section – opinion, deceit, persuasion, and plausibility.

The difficulty of reading all these criticisms of other philosophers is, as in the previous section, that Timon may be guilty of similar crimes against philosophy and literature. For instance, Di Marco expresses a discomfort with Timon's criticisms in fragment 19, with which we began in this section, as it applies at least equally, if not more so, to the *Silloi*.<sup>131</sup> To conclude this section, then, I would like to consider this objection. The answer, I believe, lies precisely in the significance of the fact that the language we have been examining was also an important part of the language of literary criticism, particularly regarding the truth of and in literature. Di Marco's concerns are shared with Aristocles, whose criticisms of Timon's *Pytho* are reported by Eustathius (Aristocles *ap.* Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 14.18.14-5), and which are a useful lens through which to consider this problem of inconsistency:

ἄρούν οὐκ εὐλόγως ἀν τις αὐτῷ ταῦτα συγγράφοντι παραστὰς εἴποι· “τί, ὡς πονηρέ,  
ἐνοχλεῖς σεαυτῷ ταῦτα συγγράφων καὶ ἂ μὴ οἰσθα διηγούμενος; τί γὰρ μᾶλλον  
ἐνέτυχες ἢ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες αὐτῷ καὶ διαλέχθης ἢ οὐ διαλέχθης;” αὐτός τε ἐκεῖνος ὁ  
Θαυμαστὸς Πύρρων ἄρα γε ἤδει τὸ διὰ τί βαδίζοι Πύθια θεασόμενος; ἢ καθάπερ οἱ  
μεμηνότες ἐπλανᾶτο κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν, ἥνικα δὲ ἤρξατο κατηγορεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς  
ἀγνοίας αὐτῶν, ἄρα γε φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ καὶ τὸν Τίμωνα παθεῖν τι καὶ

<sup>130</sup> Clayman (2009) 114. She also notes (cf. 44-6) that a swineherd in particular is a fitting model for Pyrrho given the story in Diogenes, citing Eratosthenes' *Peri Ploutou kai Penias* as his source, that he lived piously and used to take poultry and pigs to market (9.66). It is possible that this story ultimately derived from Timon himself, perhaps in the *Pytho*, in which case we might see an attempt to construct a more or less consistent picture of Pyrrho across Timon's works.

<sup>131</sup> Di Marco (1989) *ad loc.*: ‘Si stenta a credere T., assiduo frequentatore dei classici ed autore egli stesso di un poema costruito su un’*inventio* di totale fantasia - nientemeno che una catabasi all’Ade -, criticasse Platone proprio in ordine alla cornice esterna delle sue opere; e, d’altra parte, Θαύματα è termine inappropriato, in ogni caso eccessivo, per la censura di incongruenze o falsificazioni che dal punto di vista strettamente filosofico appaiono di scarso significato.’

συγκαταθέσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ἡ μὴ προσέχειν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπείσθη, πῶς ἀντὶ χορευτοῦ φιλόσοφος ἐγένετο καὶ τὸν Πύρρωνα διετέλεσε θαυμάζων; εἰ δὲ συγκατέθετο τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἄτοπος ἀν εἴη τις αὐτὸς μὲν φιλοσοφῶν, ἡμᾶς δὲ κωλύων.<sup>132</sup>

The problem, in essence, is: can a Sceptic write literature? If sceptics truly believe that any given thing is no more likely to be true than not to be true, to the extent that *aphasia* is the Sceptic ideal, then all written or spoken language, including all literary forms, are either unnecessary or in fact misleading if they attempt to make any ontological or epistemological claims. In the case of the *Pyrho*, Aristocles sees an hypocrisy: Timon either did or did not meet Pyrrho at the Pythian temple and was or was not persuaded. Sceptic historiography, that is, cannot exist as it is based on “what truly happened” and no good Sceptic would ever claim to have that knowledge or would claim that such knowledge is itself unknowable. It seems logical, from this perspective, that Pyrrho himself never wrote his thoughts down.

In that case, why did Timon write anything? Or how did Timon attempt to negotiate the problem of Sceptic literature? I suggest that the language of literary criticism that we have examined in this section can be read metafictionally. By highlighting the problematic relationship between philosophical dogma, truth, and deception, we are invited to consider where the *Silloi* themselves stand in this regard. Unlike Aristocles’ criticisms of the *Pyrho*, however, we would not say “either Timon did or did not go to the underworld”. If, as I argued at the start of the section, something that is beyond the usually accepted realms of experiential possibility can be defined as fictional within a Sceptic framework, the underworld setting of the poem is a marker that the poem makes no direct claims about the truth of its own narrative. To return to the example of Timon’s satire of Plato’s dialogues, as the context of Athenaeus’ quotation made clear (11.505e-f, quoted above), the point of contention is that the dialogues do not represent what *really* happened. The point here, by contrast, is that the *Silloi* does not represent any reality. If we read the language we have examined in this section metafictionally, that is, we are repeatedly reminded of the central point of contrast between Timon’s Scepticism and the dogmatism of the other philosophers. Their *plasmata* claim to be true; Timon’s do not.

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<sup>132</sup> “But if someone stood by him as he wrote these things, would it not be reasonable for him to say, ‘Why, Rogue, do you make trouble for yourself writing these things, describing what you do not know? Why did you meet him rather than not meet him; and converse rather than not converse?’ And that amazing Pyrrho himself, did he know why he was going to see the Pythian festival or did he wander along the road like a madman? And when he began to criticize men and their ignorance, are we to say that he spoke the truth or not? And that Timon was affected in some way and agreed with these arguments or did not assent to them? And if he was not persuaded, how is it that he became a philosopher instead of a choral dancer and how is it that he has continued to admire Pyrrho? And if he agreed with the things that were said, he would be out of place philosophizing himself, but preventing us from doing so.” [trans. Clayman]

In this section, then, I have tried to demonstrate two central points: on the one hand, Timon uses a number of key terms to expose the inaccuracies of philosophical dogma. These terms are primarily concerned with the truth-value of particular claims and their reception by others. The latter of these is dangerous as the *doxai* endorsed by philosophers are attractive to us, as they appear plausible and philosophers are able to use trickery to deceive their audience. On the other hand, I have argued that we can situate the *Silloi* in opposition to such philosophical imaginings by recognizing that the text's narrative is self-consciously fictional, and thus cannot make any direct claims about the truth of what is presented therein. This strategy aligns Timon's satire of other philosophers with his Sceptic position. The *Silloi* demonstrate how one can write a poem without making any direct truth claims, essentially enacting the Sceptic view of metaphysical indeterminacy.

## CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that Timon's philosophical and poetic agendas can be understood as complementary, that his poetic techniques inform his expression of Sceptic philosophy and *vice versa*. Here, I would like to demonstrate that this argument is not surprising when considered in the context of other philosophical poetry from the Hellenistic period. In particular, we shall see that in the work of Crates of Thebes, who was writing *parōidia* almost contemporaneously, we find the same kind of combination of philosophical and poetic aims, albeit that Crates' poetry is informed by Cynic rather than Sceptic philosophy. Additionally, we shall see that both of these poets utilize traditional notions of utopia in order to express these ideas.

There are several reasons why a comparison between Timon and Crates is apropos: like Timon, Crates wrote in a range of genres, such as elegies, tragedies, and *parōidia*, and his style is even praised by Diogenes Laertius (6.98); additionally, their satirical takes on contemporary philosophy share a number of features, such as a focus on τῦφος and ἔρις.<sup>133</sup> Here, however, I want to limit my comparison to one particular fragment, 351 SH, since both here and in the *Silloi* these philosopher-poets use epic parody and satire to delineate a utopian vision of philosophical life. In this fragment, Crates describes a city whose inhabitants are not foolish (μῶρος), parasites (παράσιτος), greedy (λίχνος), or sexually rampant (πόρνης ἐπαγαλλόμενος πυγῆσιν), and which in more general terms is free from war and excessive wealth or fame (οὐχ ὅπλα κέκτηνται περὶ κέρματος,

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<sup>133</sup> For τῦφος, see Crates 350, 351.1, and 355.2 SH, and Timon frs. 9, 38 and 60; for ἔρις, see Crates 347.3 SH and Timon frs. 8, 10, 21-2, 28, 47, 50, 66.

οὐ περὶ δόξης).<sup>134</sup> This city is situated specifically in (surrounded by, so to speak) the middle of wine-dark delusion (μέσω ἐνὶ οἴνοπι τύφω), and no undesirables are able to sail there (εἰς ἣν οὔτε τις εἰσπλεῖ). Like the *Silloi*'s use of the Odyssean *katabasis*, Crates' Pere is based upon the parody of *Od.* 19.172-3, from one of Odysseus' Cretan lies.<sup>135</sup> Furthermore, as I have argued with regard to Timon's underworld, both of these settings highlight the fictionality of their respective texts. By aligning his fictional island with a famous poetic lie, that is, we are invited to recognize the fictionality, or the impossibility, of Crates' construct. However, while in Timon the metafictional language underscores the Sceptics' *epochê* with regard to metaphysical and epistemological questions, in Crates the ultimate joke is in the name Pere itself, the travelling bag (*πήρα*) that was one of the main markers of the Cynic and visually represents the Cynic adoption of an ascetic lifestyle.

Additionally, both of these spaces draw on traditional notions of utopia. While Crates draws on the kind of utopian visions that extend back to Hesiod (*Op.* 109-201), while Timon draws on the nostalgic reminiscences of the past that are present in many utopias. In particular, however, the satirical purposes to which utopias are put by both poets are more immediately reminiscent of Greek comedy, where both automatist utopias and *katabaseis* were regular features.<sup>136</sup> Like Timon, that is, Crates uses the utopian theme and its spatial separation from the inhabited world to construct a place that reflects the positive aspects of his philosophical school and defines this space in contrast to the delusions (*τύφος*) of others. While in the *Silloi* the delusions of philosophers are the result of their eristic habits and their dogmatic, "made-up" beliefs, the utopian land of Pere is premised upon the Cynics' rejection of custom and their embrace of a more natural life.<sup>137</sup> In this regard, we might analyse Crates and Timon's poems from the perspective of Foucault's discussion of heterotopias, which are related to utopia.<sup>138</sup> In describing the relationship between a heterotopia and other places, Foucault says that 'either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory... Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as

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<sup>134</sup> Compare also in this regard the diary of a profligate quoted at D.L. 6.86.

<sup>135</sup> That this lie is based upon a description of Crete is also significant given that this is where Plato would situate Magnesia in the *Laws*.

<sup>136</sup> Note in particular: ἀλλὰ θύμον καὶ σκόρδα φέρει καὶ σῦκα καὶ ἀρτοὺς - 351.5 SH. We might compare the kind of utopian worlds presented in Cratinus' *Ploutoi*, Crates' *Theria*, and Teleclides' *Amphiktyones*, of which the latter two exploited Empedoclean and Pythagorean philosophy. For these and other utopian plots in comedy, see Ceccarelli (2000) and Ruffell (2000) and (2014).

<sup>137</sup> For these elements of Cynicism, see Desmond (2008) 77-161.

<sup>138</sup> Foucault (1986) 24 distinguishes between utopias as 'sites with no real place' and heterotopias as 'effectively enacted utopias.' While some later scholars would deny that utopias can challenge societal order, e.g. P. Johnson (2006) and Topinka (2010), the satirical opportunities provided by utopian literature is well demonstrated by Greek comedy.

meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled.<sup>139</sup> From this perspective, on the one hand, the utopian elements of Timon's portrayal of Pyrrho as the ultimate Sceptic seems to correspond with the latter option: Pyrrho's *ataraxia* throws into relief the quarrelling and misguided dogma that characterizes those in the underworld as well as Timon's own contemporaries (e.g. in fr. 12). On the other, this utopia, like Crates' *Pere*, is not just an *eutopia* but also self-consciously an *outopia*. The language of fictionality used throughout the poem makes us aware of its own fictionality in a way that reflects the illusory nature of philosophical dogma.

This comparison with Crates not only throws many of the arguments of this chapter into relief, but also demonstrates that we have to analyse the poetic and philosophical aims of these poets together rather than separately. When analysing the satirical force of the *Silloi*, for instance, I have argued that, on a philosophical level, the presentation of *eris* is designed to distance Timon's Scepticism not just from other philosophical schools, but also from the dialectic strategies of Arcesilaus. In contrast to what would become Academic Scepticism, Timon espouses ἐποχή as a route to ἀφωνία and thus ἀταραξία. The poem and its satire enacts Timon's own path to enlightenment, and as he learns from Pyrrho how to achieve ἐποχή, the end of the poem enacts his abandonment of *eris* in the form of satire in favour of speechlessness. Similarly, the role of terms such as *πλάσμα* or *γοητεία* in Timon's satire is both philosophical and literary. On the one hand, we have seen that all philosophical dogma is criticized in the poem as "made-up" on the basis of the Sceptic's position of ἐποχή: if nothing can be satisfactorily proven as true, it must be made-up on the basis of *doxa*. These positions are nevertheless dangerous because they are enticing, and can therefore persuade individuals to believe unfounded claims. On the other hand, the language used is that of Hellenistic literary theory. This doubling serves to conflate the philosopher with his text as well as making us aware of the poem's own poetic strategies. In writing a poem about a *katabasis*, Timon is clearly not making any direct metaphysical claims – he did not *really* go to the underworld. Instead, Timon's use of literary terminology highlights the poem's distance from any philosophical claims about reality, underlining the Sceptic suspension of judgement. The *telos* of Timon's satire, its end-point, ultimately enacts the Sceptic ideals that underlie the satire itself.

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<sup>139</sup> Foucault (1986) 27.

## *Conclusions*

I began this thesis by claiming that the poetics of parody in Greek literature was inextricably connected to the poetics of the genre *parôidia*. To demonstrate this, I have established that parody is conceptualized in different ways by every reader and every audience. These different views can be seen through the specific ways in which parody is construed, since an individual's articulation of parody inherently reveals something of their attitude towards what parody is. These different conceptualizations, however, are not hopelessly irreconcilable. Different attitudes towards parody are generally sufficiently similar that we are able to recognize examples of parody across different times and places. Nevertheless, the specific ways in which parody is construed within a given cultural context is essential for understanding what parody means within that culture. This theoretical basis is vital as it means that each individual example of parody can be said to exploit different aspects of the wider idea that is parody. The thesis has then progressed by providing new readings of six surviving examples of the genre *parôidia*. Generally speaking, my readings of these poems have differed substantially. It is the job of the conclusion to bring these different strands together, and to suggest how my analyses help us to understand the development of the concept of parody in Greek thought. What precisely is it that links the poetry of a Sceptic philosopher and a shit-stained nobody from Thasos? Are there any similarities between the espousal of fine cuisine in Archeistratus and the absurdification of the BM? Here I suggest several routes that connect these different poems and their use of parody. At the same time, I fully anticipate that readers will find other avenues that are not explored here. Indeed, for them to do so is to demonstrate my underlying point about the subjectivity inherent in the definition of parody.

Before we turn to the different threads that I suggest connect these textual studies, we should first note the limitations of this kind of approach. In particular, we should be cautious when analysing a highly fragmentary genre. Not only do the majority of the chapters in this thesis tackle poems that are in one way or another fragmented – either by quotation culture, which itself skews our evidence, or by papyrological remains – but there are numerous poems and authors' works either that we do not possess at all or of which so little remains as to be of little value when trying to tackle wider questions. Euboeus and Boeotus are notable amongst these, given the apparent significance of their poetry, at least according to Polemo. In order to link the subsequent sections more closely with ideas about parody in general, therefore, I attempt wherever possible to connect my discussion not only with the different ways in which we saw in the Introduction that parody

was construed in Greek literature, but also with scholarly discussions of parody. Thus, I aim to demonstrate that the threads that I suggest connect these different chapters are not unique to the poems that I have studied in this thesis but raise wider questions about what parody means and the different ways in which it has been interpreted.

In particular, there are three significant conclusions that emerge in different regards in the subsequent sections: 1) the allusive nature of parody cannot be reduced to a single interpretative framework but can be reimagined in numerous ways; 2) parody is not simply critical of the text it parodies, but can use the process of parody as a framework for satirizing other figures; 3) although its parasitism means that it is frequently considered a “low” or “playful” form, parody incorporates its supposedly inferior literary position into its construction of meaning. It is by being (perceived as) “low” that parody is able to engage meaningfully with questions of politics, philosophy, and literary aesthetics.

## PARODY'S NARRATIVE WORLDS

The experience of parody necessarily involves a recognition of one text's relationship to one or more other works, and this process of recognition, reinterpretation, and evaluation has been central to many discussions of parody in scholarship. Using terminology of fiction theory, Ian Ruffell put this process thus:

‘In addition to using one or more intertextual frames (or parts of a cultural encyclopedia), as sources to construct its fictional worlds, or make predictions about future states of the fictional world, there is a double-coding of the text or performance, which invites the audience to read double. That is, parody requires the parsing, construction, and interpretation of both the immediate, fictional world and one or more secondary parodic worlds... both of which have their own sets of sub-worlds (knowledge, intention, belief). These worlds are not formally or conceptually separate, but the secondary world both is and is not part of the fictional world; there is both opposition *and* appropriation.’<sup>1</sup>

Part of the difficulty in comprehending parody is that the parodying and parodied texts must be understood in conjunction and that it is not always possible to differentiate between the analysis of the world of the parody and the world of the parodied texts. In short, sometimes we do not know where the world of the parodied text's influence on the current *fabula* begins or ends.<sup>2</sup> This problem

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<sup>1</sup> Ruffell (2011) 321.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the tension between alteration and imitation in ancient discussions of parody discussed in the Introduction.

is compounded in many of the texts studied here, where the poem only survives in fragments or on papyrus. To what extent, for instance, did Timon's *katabasis* follow from Odysseus' example and how would this affect our understanding of the poem? This example, however, is hermeneutically barren, since none of the surviving fragments of the *Silloi* give us any idea how Timon's descent was narrated. In order to answer the question of how such instances develop our understanding of the poem, however, it is worth considering how readers use intertextual knowledge in their negotiation of a text.

One way in which a narrative relates both to its readers and to past narratives is explored by Jauss' discussion of the aesthetics of reception.<sup>3</sup> Every response to the text, according to Jauss, is essentially historically and socially situated. Our background provides what he calls our horizon of expectations, which is made up of our previous experience of literature and society. In part, this set of expectations allows us to see the 'social, or society-forming, function' of literature,<sup>4</sup> a point to which I shall return in later sections of this conclusion. The significant point here, however, is how narratives build on past experiences. This facet of the reading experience is developed further by Umberto Eco. While Jauss focuses on the text at an abstract level, Eco focuses more closely on the experience of the text as a temporal experience; for instance, we read a book chapter by chapter.<sup>5</sup> In order to make forecasts, i.e. to guess as to what happens next, the reader resorts to intertextual frames, which utilize our previous experiences with other texts to anticipate the events of the narrative with more accuracy.<sup>6</sup> The specific frames that are activated by the reader, however, can be guided by the text. For instance, the genre of the text affects how we anticipate the development of the *fabula*. Eco's inferential walks in particular, then, help us to specify how readers process the text.<sup>7</sup> In the case of parody, however, the humour frequently derives from an incongruous interaction between what we expect and what we do not.

Although the narratives of *parōidiae* are frequently fragmentary or lost, in two of the chapters of this thesis we have seen how this theoretical aspect of parody has been explored or utilized in different ways. Both the *BM* and the *GM*, I have suggested, self-consciously play with different kinds of expectations. In both cases, this is a result of the poem's engagement with both epic and fable. The *BM* begins by telling us that it is the poem about a battle in which the mice are vic-

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<sup>3</sup> Jauss (1970).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 32.

<sup>5</sup> Eco (1979) 31: 'the *fabula* is not produced once the text has been definitely read: the *fabula* is the result of a continuous series of abductions made during the course of the reading. Therefore the *fabula* is always experienced step by step.'

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 32: 'In order to make forecasts which can be approved by the further course of the *fabula*, the Model Reader resorts to intertextual frames.'

<sup>7</sup> HUTCHEON (1985) 22-3 applied Eco's inferential walks to our understanding of parody, although here I suggest some of the ways in which parody differs from Eco's model.

torious, but it ends with their slaughter and rout. Likewise, we expect Psicharpax' dying speech to work, because that is "just what happens in epic". Meanwhile, the GM seems to assume from the start that the war will turn out as it does in the fable (and how we would expect it to in real life), with the weasel victorious. This is also the assumption of the weasel. On the other hand, we know that the mice are now being supported by Hermes. Although using epic as an intertextual frame might lead us to suspect that the mice will meet with more success, this outcome is hardly a dead cert. The question that faces both the original audience as well as us as reconstructors of a badly damaged papyrus is: what will be the punchline? Is the point to portray Hermes as ineffectual, in a similar manner to Zeus in the *BM*? Or is the poem going to get some milage from its diversion from the fabular outcome?

Both poems, then, evoke literary conventions, inviting particular inferential walks, only to disappoint them in surprising ways. Through this process, not only do we recognize that these tropes are just literary constructs, but we are also forced to confront our own reading strategies. Why is it that we accept standard literary tropes in our reading practice? If part of the humour of these poems is at the expense of the conventionality of epic and fable, then another part is at the expense of the reader that blindly accepts them. Parody, then, engages us in a process of thinking about how we understand literature and the kinds of expectations it creates.

#### HIDDEN MEANINGS AND MULTIPLE CODINGS

Connected to the narrative doubling that parody enacts is the way more generally that parody presents meaning as operating on two levels. Take as an example the opening lines of Matro's *AD*, where the subject of the poem is announced as the much-nourishing dinners laid on by the host Xenocles (*δεῖπνά μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολυτρόφα καὶ μάλα πολλά, / ἀ Χενοκλῆς όγτωρ ἐν Αθήναις δείπνισεν ήμας - 1-2*). Here the humour relies on our recognition of the replacement of the Odyssean words *ἄνδρα* and *πολύτροπον*. To what extent, however, is this poem also the song of a man? It is, on the one hand, a first-person narrative, and so the poem could be imagined as *his* story. Alternatively, the poem could be envisaged as about the man hosting the dinner, Xenocles. From this perspective the man (*ἄνδρα*) is virtually inseparable from the dinner (*δεῖπνα*). This interpretation is more attractive, I would suggest, as it underlines a fundamental part of the poem's satire. One aspect of the *AD* is that aspects of the symposium, such as what is served or how one comports oneself, reflects the true nature of the symposiast. The question underlying the analysis of this example is: to what extent does the original text inform our understanding of the parody?

We have seen in some of the chapters how parody's multiple codings are thematized in different ways. Some texts, that is, invite us to recognize the problem of identifying one figure, line,

or situation with another through the parody of the latter. One of the major ways in which this is achieved is through the evocation of riddles or enigmas. As we saw, the way in which several dishes are described in Matro's *AD* employs strategies common to riddles, a strategy that is especially fitting in the context of a dinner, given that riddles and other such games were common features of symposiastic play.<sup>8</sup> On one level the enjambement of the names of different foods onto the line that follows their introduction (e.g. τῷ δὲ μετ' ἵχνια βαῖνε θεὰ λευκάλενος ἵχθος / ἔγχελνς - 38-9) is a delaying strategy. During the opening line, we must guess the name of the food based on a mixture of zoological, mythological, and literary information. This play constantly invites us to recognize a meaning that is not immediately apparent through other forms of identification.

While in Matro the self-conscious play on parody as riddle is fitting given the sympotic context of the poem's narrative, for the *BM* the idea that parody is a means of expressing "hidden meanings" of some kind is already present in fable. This is made most explicit in the preface to the third book of Phaedrus' fables, where he claims that fables were invented in order to hide meanings that, because of his slavery, a slave could not state outright (*seruitus obnoxia, / quia quae uolebat non audebat dicere, / affectus proprios in fabellas transtulit, / calumniamque fictis elusit iocis* - 3.praef.34-7). Like riddles, which Ptolemaeus Grammaticus described as dark speech which is difficult to understand but which can be comprehended with much wit and soberness (τὸν σκοτεινὸν καὶ δυσκατάληπτον λόγον τὸν μετὰ πολλῆς ἀγχινοίας καὶ νήψεως νοεῖσθαι δυνάμενον - *De Diff. Voc.* π 121), fables are another means of saying things indirectly. Indeed, even the word *αἴνος* is etymologically linked to *αἴνιγμα*.<sup>9</sup> While the *BM* begins by toying with the way in which we identify characters with those from Homeric epic – Physignathus for instance appears to be a Polyphemus before he is punningly revealed as "the son of Peleus" – the poem ends with the long introduction of a bizarre species of creature. Despite their apparent alien features, they are ultimately revealed as crabs. Just as the physicality of the crabs self-consciously reveals (and revels in) the animal behind the armour, these *parōidiai* seem to invite us too to reflect on what kinds of meanings poetry has – is it realistic? Didactic? – as well as what kinds of meanings lie beneath the surface.

Just as riddles both allude to and hide the "real", signified, meaning, parody's inherent intertextuality means that, while on the surface saying one thing, another meaning lies hidden underneath. This approach is echoed in Bakhtin's approach to parody. As he puts it in the *Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics*:

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<sup>8</sup> For the association between play and parody, see the Introduction; cf. also the collation of play and parody in a sympotic context in Julian *Symp.* 306b.

<sup>9</sup> Beekes (2010) s.v. *αἴνος*.

'all these phenomena [parody, stylization, *skaz* (a form of Russian oral narrative), and dialogue], despite very real differences among them, share one common trait: discourse in them has a twofold direction – it is directed both toward the referential object of speech, as in ordinary discourse, and toward *another's discourse*, toward *someone else's speech*. If we do not recognize the existence of this second context of someone else's speech and begin to perceive stylization or parody in the same way ordinary speech is perceived, that is, as speech directed only at its referential object, then we will not grasp these phenomena in their essence: stylization will be taken for style, parody simply for a poor work of art.'<sup>10</sup>

The difficulty parody poses, as Bakhtin sees it here, is that in order to interpret parody properly, we have to recognize the second voice which underlies it. In the *BM* and the *AD*, however, we see that the recognition of parody itself produces further problems. To say that parody has a "twofold direction" avoids the problem of how those two directions interact. How do we understand these two voices? Are they equipollent, or is one more dominant than another? When framed as a riddle, the implication may be that as interpreters we are trying to use our pre-existing knowledge in order to "solve" the surface meaning of the text, trying to find what the referent of the text is. On the other hand, if we are thinking of fable from Phaedrus' perspective, then the "real" meaning is not the surface one, or Bakhtin's "referential object of speech", but rather that which is hidden beneath it. The different ways in which this problem can be framed reflects the different ways it is played out in texts. The question of how parody manipulates different voices is fundamental to the polysemy of parodic texts.

#### PARODY, MOCKERY, AND SATIRE

Many of the poems I have discussed in this thesis involve satire of some kind. However, satire is a broad term that encompasses a wide range of different relationships between texts and individuals. One frequent position adopted by the satirist, for instance, is a defensive position: the satirist positions himself as the object of an unwarranted and unjust attack or other offence by an individual, and this provides them with the moral high ground from which to launch their own attack. While common examples of this are easily found in many genres – think of Archilochus and Lycambes or Aristophanes and Cleon – it is comparatively less common in *parôidia*. Hegemon of Thasos adopts a similar position to this, as the fragment opens with a critique of his poetry by an unnamed Thasian, although his satire also rests on the balance between a satirical portrayal of the

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<sup>10</sup> Bakhtin (1984) 185.

Thasians' poverty in lines 7-9, whilst at the same time claiming not to be doing any harm (μηδένα πηματίνων - 12). Given the wide range of ways in which satire appears in ancient texts, what kind of satirical tropes and techniques appear in our texts?

The potential that parody critiques, mocks, or attacks the text it parodies is a frequent concern. Let us take, for instance, the case of Aristophanes' famous parodies of Euripides. In the scholia, we see that this kind of parody is frequently interpreted as a mocking attack by Aristophanes on Euripides (e.g. οὗτος οὖν σκώπτων Εὐριπίδην προσέθηκε πρωκτὸν παρὰ προσδοκίαν - Σ Ar. *Ach.* 119, parodying E. fr. 858). This kind of satire, however, is almost entirely absent from *parōidia*. If the parodists studied here are described by ancient sources as mocking anyone, it is not Homer. Euboeus, for instance, is said to mock the Athenians by Polemo (fr. 45 Preller), and most strikingly one of the dominant features of ancient discussions of the *Silloi* is the remark that Timon lambasted the dogmatic philosophers (e.g. D.L. 4.67, 9.111, Aristocl. ap. Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 14.18.28, Ath. 1.22d, *Suda* τ 631 Adl.). We cannot, it seems, claim that *parōidia* mocks Homer, or epic in general.

Alternatively, it may prove more fruitful to look to the satire of the parodist's contemporaries. This approach, indeed, is supported by the anxieties about the dangerous potentials of laughter in Greek literature. Although we have to remain cautious here about the elision of humour and laughter, turning to consider Greek attitudes to laughter can be helpful here, as laughter is frequently imagined as possessing a social function (for good or ill). To laugh at satire, especially as a group in an audience, is a visible action that threatens to undermine another's social position. This is a concern only for those who are present, either immediately or contextually. To mock Homer, by contrast, lacks the satirical punch, because Homer could never care. The tension between laughter as a "playful" act of social bonding and the kind of mocking, or "consequential", laughter that might impugn another's person has been well demonstrated by Stephen Halliwell.<sup>11</sup> It is not that these two are wholly distinct categories, but rather that they are open to interpretation from multiple parties.<sup>12</sup> Complementary in many ways to this approach is Ian Ruffell's recent argument that, in comedy for instance, it is humour that forces us to do the kind of cognitive work that results in productive meaning in the text.<sup>13</sup> To satirize someone else is not "just funny", that is, but is an important facet of the production of meaning in a text. How, then, do parodists satirize their contemporaries?

One important aspect of satire is the act, or absence, of naming. In Timon's *Silloi*, for instance, philosophers are not just consistently named, but their very names are used as part of the satire itself. One prominent example of this is Plato: in fragment 19, part of the humour lies in the play

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<sup>11</sup> Halliwell (1991) and (2008), esp. 19-38.

<sup>12</sup> Halliwell's example of this slipperiness is Demosthenes' *Against Conon*.

<sup>13</sup> E.g. Ruffell (2008).

on Plato for πλάττω/πλάσμα (ώς ἀνέπλασσε Πλάτων πεπλασμένα θαύματα εἰδώς). His name intimately links him with the faults of his own philosophical dogma, which in this case is the “made-up” quality of the Forms. Such play with names and the meaning of names is not uncommon. Hipponax, for instance, played on the similarities between Bupalus and βουφαλλός.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, despite the implied number of diners in Matro’s *AD*, we are told the names of the two most politically significant figures but few others. Equally important, however, is the absence of naming. This is particularly significant, I argued, for Hegemon, who deliberately leaves his critics anonymous (τις). This absence of naming provides a stark contrast with Hegemon himself, who is given a nickname by Athena at the end of the fragment. The absence of names also seems marked in Archeistratus’ *Hed.* In this poem, to be named is given weight through the authority of the narrator: he only ever gives names positively, as in the case not only of the two primary addressees, Moschus and Cleandrus, but also Agathon (fr. 7.9). To be named is to be included in Archeistratus’ *hetaireia*.

Another common satirical trope that we have seen in a number of these texts is the pretence of not actually doing satire, or downplaying its severity. I have already mentioned in this section Hegemon’s gambit, claiming not to be harming anyone whilst actually launching upon a critique of Thasos and the Thasians. However, I have also argued that we see this trope in Archeistratus. In this poem, Archeistratus programmatically sets out the best dishes and drinks, creating the “delicately adorned table” (ἀβρόδαιτι τραπέζη - fr. 4). Dishes that are rejected from this idealized symposium, however, are frequently described as pungent (frequently δοιμύς). This is not only a rejection of a particular flavour of food, but also a flavour of literature. As we saw, it is not just the taste of the food that has to be just right: there are also the smells and sights of the symposium, and the behaviour of the guests. Everything must be just so, including the entertainment. The rejection of pungent foods also implies a rejection of excessively satirical or critical voices. While Archeistratus is perfectly happy to criticize others’ methods of preparation, he professes to reject excessively critical language. To use another culinary metaphor, albeit one typical of satirical poetry, Archeistratus has his cake and eats it.

If Homer is not used as an object of satire, we would be justified in asking why poets turned to *parōidia* as a means by which to express their satire. What is it that makes satire in this genre different from comedy or *iambos*? This question is especially pressing if we consider again that authors of *parōidia* were also known to have written in both of these other genres. In several of the chapters here, I have argued that the parody of epic meaningfully adds to the satire presented in different poems. In Matro, for instance, I argued that the parody of epic is not simply the manner

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<sup>14</sup> Rosen (1988c).

in which the narrative is told, but that the parodies reflect the pretensions of the diners. As we saw, such role-play is not uncommon in symposia, although here it serves to underline Matro's satirical point. Not only are the diners pompous asses, but they also do not act with the decorum one would expect of a symposium, where everyone gets their fair share.

In short, *parōidia* is frequently satirical. While this satirical aspect may be the basis for the notion that parody itself is inherently somehow critical of the text it parodies, which develops considerably through the comments on Aristophanes' parodies of Euripides, through an analysis of *parōidia* we see that it is not the case that parody *is* satire (although in some cases it may be), but that parody *facilitates* satire. Furthermore, satire in *parōidia* is never *just* about the object of the satire; it always also tells us about the poem itself.

### *PARŌIDIA AND HOMERIC RECEPTION*

Parody's relationship with the parodied text has been a constant source of concern in scholarship and wider discourses. Isaac D'Israeli's essay on parody, for instance, begins with a story about a lady of *bas bleu* celebrity, who apologizes to one of her friends, an 'elegant poet,' when he was to be present at the same time as another of her friends, a parodist described as the "serious bard's mock *umbra*".<sup>15</sup> Although her concerns ultimately turn out to be ill founded, the story neatly reflects the notion that parody involves a criticism or attack of the parodied target. Given that Homer was certainly not beyond reproach even from an early date (e.g. Xenophanes), we would be justified in asking whether *parōidia* provides us with insights into the reception of Homer from a critically engaged perspective.

As we saw in the previous section, however, *parōidia* is not *Eposparodie* in the sense that it is critical of epic. On the contrary, Homeric and Hesiodic poetry is frequently coopted for the purpose of satirizing the poet's contemporaries. Nevertheless, many of the poems reflect attitudes towards epic, and especially towards Homer. This is most explicit in Timon's description of Xenophanes, the only explicit criticism of Homer extant in *parōidia*, as Όμηραπάτης (fr. 60). Rather than challenging the authority of epic, for instance, Hegemon uses the authoritative position of rhapsodic performances, including those of Homer, as a means of situating his own persona. In particular, the parody of *Od.* 16.172-6 presents Hegemon as an Odysseus-like figure, who is authorized by the goddess to perform in poetic competitions. The shift from σκῆπτρον to a χάρδον underlines the significance of the festival context for this authorization, and the interplay

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<sup>15</sup> D'Israeli (1835) 245.

between Hegemon and the rhapsodic performers. The authority of Homeric poetry is confirmed by Hegemon's alignment of his persona with Homer's own biographical tradition.

While the status of Homer as poet may remain intact in this example, elsewhere we find that the status of the Homeric text is more open to evaluation. This is primarily a facet of the Hellenistic period with the development of scholarship on the Homeric text. That such editorial choice could be open to criticism from an early stage is reflected in an anecdote regarding Timon of Phlius. When asked by Aratus where to acquire a reliable copy of Homer, he replied that you need to acquire an ancient copy, not one from their time that has been corrected.<sup>16</sup> In the *BM*, however, this engagement takes a different form. Building on the work of Adrian Kelly,<sup>17</sup> I have argued that the allusions to scholarly debates about the Homeric text in the arming and battle scenes are made to appear absurd in the context of the poem's own narrative. These debates frequently depend on a preconception that Homer's narrative was realistic, at least in the sense that it could be reproduced in the real world: for instance, people cannot come back from the dead. In the context of a miniaturized poem about frogs and mice fighting over a misunderstanding in the death of Psicharpax, it would be utterly ridiculous to start getting caught up in petty questions such as "can you put a shield over a helmet?"

Questions of realism are also at the centre of Timon of Phlius' use of Hellenistic scholarship. As I have argued, many of the terms Timon focuses on in his satire of the dogmatic philosophers are also terms widely used in Hellenistic literary criticism. Some of the terms revolve around metaphysical questions and the relationship between the text and the world (e.g. πλάσμα), while others are problematic for the Sceptic since they somehow trick others into adopting beliefs about the world that cannot be adequately justified, at least according to the Sceptic (e.g. γοητεία). Rather than necessarily focusing on the Homeric text, Timon uses Homeric verses to critique in some sense the language of literary analysis. Timon claims not to be interested in writing a poem that follows the Platonic notion that poetry is a *mimesis* of reality. Instead, his Sceptic poetry highlights and plays with the absence of any "real" or factual narrative precisely because the Sceptics should suspend judgement on such metaphysical questions. In both of these cases, what is at stake is not the Homeric text *per se*, but rather how Homeric poetry was being received. *Parōidia* is, in a sense, a kind of second-order reception, a reception that reflects on how the Homeric text was being received.

Scholarly interest in the reception of Homer in recent decades supports and complements this approach, which has emphasized the importance of the historical context of the audiences and

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<sup>16</sup> φασὶ δὲ καὶ Ἀρατὸν πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ πᾶς τὴν Ὄμηρον ποιήσιν ἀσφαλῆ κτήσαιτο, τὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἀντιγράφοις ἐντυγχάνοι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἥδη διωρθωμένοις - D.L. 9.113.

<sup>17</sup> Kelly (2009) and (2014).

readers in the process of reception. In an examination of the earliest stages of Homeric reception, Barbara Graziosi has argued that 'precisely because they are fictional, early speculations about the author of the Homeric poems must ultimately derive from an encounter between the poems and their ancient audiences.'<sup>18</sup> The meaning of the Homeric poems, and the very name Homer, then, are not static but are directed by the concerns and interests of the time. This becomes even more clear if we consider Laurence Kim's more recent book about the reception of Homer in Imperial Greek literature. As he says, 'exploiting the tension between Homer's capacity as poet and historian becomes an ideal way of wryly commenting on the *Greek Imperial* obsession with the past and satirically undermining commonplace claims to the poet's authority and sagacity.'<sup>19</sup>

Likewise, in multiple chapters of this thesis we have seen that parody is less frequently about the aesthetics of the original from the point of view of its original production, but rather that it is more concerned with the cultural and social status of Homer and the Homeric poems. The intertextual facet of parody can always be understood as a form of reception in broad terms. However, these examples demonstrate that parody's reception of another text is never direct, but is always mediated by wider concerns about poetry or literature more generally.

#### NUGATORY POETICS AND THE ANXIETY OF PRIZE MONEY

While, as we have seen, satire is an important aspect of *parōidia* in terms of creating the impression that the genre has social *gravitas*, or something to say, we frequently find that parodists profess that they are not writing significant work. It is important to note here, however, that such claims are far from straightforward. Not only are such claims framed in different ways, whether that is drawing on contrasts between serious vs. playful, big vs. small, good vs. bad, or high vs. low, but they are also frequently inseparable from claims about the significance or importance of the work. To represent oneself as a poor poet never goes unqualified.

These kinds of claims, that the poet is not writing or performing serious or high poetry, might well be understood from the perspective of Bloom's anxiety of influence. Bloom seeks to explain literary history primarily in terms of literary influence, so that poets' reactions to their predecessors drives the imaginative aspects of their work.<sup>20</sup> While it is easy to think of this anxiety in strongly diachronic terms – for instance as it is applied to Greek Imperial literature that harks

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<sup>18</sup> Graziosi (2002) 3.

<sup>19</sup> Kim (2010) 3, my italics.

<sup>20</sup> As clearly expressed in the opening of Bloom (1973) 5: 'poetic history... is held to be indistinguishable from poetic influence since strong poets make that history by misreading one another, so as to clear imaginative space for themselves.'

back to ideas of the Classical<sup>21</sup> – the anxiety of influence can also be understood from a generic perspective. One well known example is the opening of Ovid's *Amores*, with the claim that Ovid intended to write of “more serious” epic material but was thwarted by Cupid's theft of a foot (1.1.1-2). While this might also speak to Ovid's relationship with epics such as the *Aeneid*, this joke also hinges upon the notion of generic hierarchy. The very choice of the genre in which a poet writes can produce an anxiety of influence. This is pertinent especially to *parōidia*, if we consider the epigraphic evidence for its performance. *Parōidia* is the genre with the lowest prize in the *mousikoi agônes*. The proof of the generic hierarchy is in the payment (and then in the eating in the fragment of Hegemon). This notion, that *parōidia* is a “low genre”, emerges in a number of ways in the different poems studied throughout this thesis.

To begin with the author I have already mentioned, food is of course an important factor in defining Hegemon as poor, both economically and poetically. However, this is already reflected in the way that he was treated by the Thasians upon his return. While we do hear of some negative treatments of poets by audiences,<sup>22</sup> I doubt that few would disagree that throwing shit is a particularly extreme form of disapproval. This opening act gives rise to one of the dominant portrayals of Hegemon throughout the fragment, namely as disgusting. The figure of the disgusting Hegemon raises the possibility of disgust as an affective response to his poetry. In this context, we might consider, then, Korsmeyer's aesthetic theory, which suggests that disgust and fascination combine in what she calls “the sublate”. This term, derived from chemistry, is the opposite reaction to the sublime; in aesthetics too, therefore, the sublate inverts the sublime.<sup>23</sup> As the course of Hegemon's poem demonstrates, the sublate poetic figure can be raised and exalted. Whether this precisely constitutes an inversion of the sublime, as Korsmeyer would have it, is difficult to demonstrate from what survives. What is clear, however, is how the fragment of Hegemon inverts the idea of his poetry as disgusting.

Furthermore, as I demonstrated in chapter 1, Hegemon repeatedly focuses on the notion of “smallness”. Not only is his reply to the anonymous Thasian critic a “small speech”, or even “small epic” (*μικρὸν ἔπος* - 5), but the cake that his wife bakes is also criticized for its size (*σμικρὸν τυροῦντ* - 15). This idea that *parōidia* is “small epic” is literalized, in a different way to the cake made by Hegemon's wife, in the *BM*. At the outset of the poem, the animals are compared to Giants (*γηγενέων ἀνδρῶν μιμούμενοι ἔογχα Γιγάντων* - 7), a comparison that serves to highlight

<sup>21</sup> See, for instance, Whitmarsh (2001) 41-89.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. Pl. *Ion* 535e, *Prot.* 323a, D. 19.337.

<sup>23</sup> Korsmeyer (2011). As she puts it elsewhere (2008: 373): ‘although disgust induces recoil, it also stimulates that curious second look, a perverse dwelling on the properties of the object of disgust.’ Korsmeyer's terms have been used by Hawkins (2016) to analyse the similarly revolting visage of Aesop, at least as it is presented to us in the *Vita Aesopi*.

their miniature stature in contrast to figures who are stereotypically epic. This comparison occurs twice more times in the poem: once when Zeus looks down at the gathering armies (*οῖος Κενταύρων στρατὸς ἔρχεται ἡὲ Γιγάντων* - 171), and once again when Hera suggests that Zeus halt the mouse army by throwing the very thunderbolt he had used against the Giants (*ἢ τὸ σὸν ὅπλον / κινείσθω· οὐτω γὰρ ἀλώσεται ὃς τις ἄριστος, / ὡς ποτε καὶ Καπανῆα κατέκτανες, ὅβριμον ἄνδρα, / καὶ μέγαν Ἐγκέλαδόν τε καὶ ἄγρια φῦλα Γιγάντων* - 280-4). At regular intervals throughout the poem, then, we are reminded of the small scale on which the poem functions by contrast to grand, thundering epic. This diminished scale also plays out in other ways. Despite the claim in the proem that the battle will be “boundless” (*ἀπειρεσίην* - 4), the poem turns out only to last a single day (*μυονήμερος* - 303). Furthermore, the events take place around a λίμνη, a fittingly diminutive version of the standard metaphor, the “sea” of epic.

To analyse many of these poems in terms of “nugatory poetics” is to consider how these poems self-define. The term is drawn from the Latin word *nugae*, a term widely used to describe idle or foolish poetry.<sup>24</sup> A poem, therefore, might be described as nugatory either by others as a criticism or in the poem itself as a self-deprecatory tactic. Neither of these possibilities, however, are objective. When a poem self-identifies as nugatory, this move is always relational, in the sense that it defines the current work in terms of normative values of aesthetics, ideas of genre hierarchy, or quasi-canonical works such as Homeric epic. At the same time, they are never straightforward or uncomplicated, but always invite us to reconsider and negotiate pre-existing values, or in Jauss’ terms our horizons of expectation. *Parōidia* may only deserve the smallest prize, but it may also have the last laugh.

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<sup>24</sup> This term I draw from a conference I shall be hosting at the University of Exeter with Sam Hayes in May 2017.

## APPENDIX 1

### *Definitions of παρωδία*

It is not always straightforward to determine what precisely is meant when an ancient text refers to *παρωδία*, *παρωδή*, *παρωδέω*, *παρωδικός*, *vel sim.* Do these terms always refer to the same core idea? Given that these terms are in use from about the end of the 5th cent. BC until well into and beyond the 5th cent. AD, the answer to this question is unsurprisingly negative. One of the most comprehensive studies of these terms is that of Householder from 1944, although numerous other scholars have subsequently explored different aspects of the terminology.<sup>1</sup> Many of these studies have tried, for instance, to explain the word *παρωδία* from an etymological perspective (*παρά* + *ῳδή*); while valuable, this approach can ultimately only tell us so much, as the usage of the different terms over the centuries is hardly constrained to any “true” etymological sense of the word. We might also note in this regard that the majority of the appearances of terms cognate with *παρωδία* come from the 2nd cent. AD and after. In this appendix, I shall analyse the different ways in which *παρωδία* and cognate terms are used in Greek (and occasionally Latin) literature. While this forms an important context for understanding my study of *parōidia* as a genre, my study here functions primarily as a reference point for my analysis of the genre and mode that form the core of the thesis. Since the usage of *παρωδία* is not limited to these meanings, the inclusion of such a study as an appendix is intended to function as a reference point, not only for this thesis, but for the understanding of *παρωδία* more generally.

Here, I shall take a slightly different route through the evidence, although many of my conclusions are similar to those of Householder. The term *παρωδία* and cognate words appear to possess three main meanings: as a generic label for poetry at least originally performed at public festivals; as roughly equivalent to the modern term “parody”, although with the specification of *verse* parody (i.e. parody *of* verse and *in* verse); and as a more general term for literary imitation and plagiarism, particularly within the context of the use of verse quotations either altered or paraphrased in a prose text. Unlike Householder, however, I suggest that we find some slippage between these definitions. For example, I argue below that in Lucian’s use of the verb *παρωδέω* we can see how Lucian gains traction from two different meanings, *παρωδία* as parody and *παρωδία* in rhetorical treatises, as Lucian’s satire (e.g. in *Jupiter Tragoedus*) is partially directed

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<sup>1</sup> Householder (1944), followed by Lelièvre (1954), Koller (1956), Pöhlmann (1972), and Degani (1983).

towards contemporary trends in oratory. I also argue that we are able to trace parts of the development of the terminology. For instance, *παρωδία* is used for several centuries solely with reference to the genre *parôidia* (a poet of which genre is a *παρωδός*), and it is only later that the other meanings develop.

I shall begin with a close focus on the first few occurrences of words cognate with *παρωδία*, from the 5th and 4th cent. BC, which will provide a basis for a more general analysis of the different strains of meaning found across the different centuries.

The two earliest occurrences of the word *παρωδία* that refer to exponents of a particular genre are found in Aristotle's *Poetics* (1448a9-14) and a work referred to by Athenaeus as *Peri tês Archaias Kômôdias* (fr. 44 Wehrli) by Aristotle's student Chamaeleon. In Aristotle, the term comes towards the beginning of the work and establishes three different ways that poetry represents people:

καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας,  
καὶ [τὸ] περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον Ὁμηρος μὲν βελτίους,  
Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὄμοίους, Ἡγῆμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος <ό> τὰς παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος καὶ  
Νικοχάρης ὁ τὴν Δειλιάδα χείρους.<sup>2</sup>

Here, Aristotle claims that while Homer represents (μιμεῖται) better people and the tragedian Cleophon represents people the same as us, Hegemon of Thasos, "the first man to compose παρωδίας", and Nicochares, "the author of the *Deiliad*", represent worse people. Given that Aristotle here is attempting to demonstrate how different types of poet (i.e. poets who write in different genres) represent people by *mimêsis*, it is logical that just as Homer stands in for epic poets and Cleophon for tragic poets, Hegemon and Nicochares are also intended to be seen as paradigms of one genre, or two genres similar in Aristotle's eyes. However, while Aristotle thinks that the names of Homer and Cleophon speak for themselves, the latter two poets require further elucidation. The passage therefore raises two questions: who are Hegemon and Nicochares, and what does their work tell us about what Aristotle means by *παρωδία* here?

Of Hegemon's slender extant work, one fragment (all of which is quoted by Polemo fr. 45 Preller; Chamaeleon fr. 44 Wehrli quotes only ll. 19-21) consists of 21 hexameter verses in line with Householder's definition. Additionally, when Polemo quotes the fragment of Hegemon in his *Pros Timaeon*, his wording recalls Aristotle's: τούτων [sc. παρωδιῶν] δὲ πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς

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<sup>2</sup> "In dancing too, and in music for aulos and lyre, these variations can occur, as well as in prose writings and metrical works without melody: for example, Homer represented superior people, Cleophon those like ourselves, Hegemon of Thasos (the first composer of parodies) and Nicochares (author of the *Deiliad*) inferior characters."

ἀγῶνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς Ἡγήμων καὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἐνίκησεν ἄλλαις τε παρωδίαις καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ. While the reference to τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς is a modernization of Polemo's after rhapsodic performances had been moved to the theatre,<sup>3</sup> the phasing found in both Aristotle and Polemo, supported by our knowledge of Hegemon's work, suggests that Hegemon was the first recorded victor in a competition for a genre called παρωδία.

Although we cannot be certain, the other author referred to here is probably the same as the comedian Nicochares.<sup>4</sup> Of the 28 fragments and 9 titles have come down to us, we only know of comedies, and none of the fragments are written in hexameters. Furthermore, he is only ever described as a comic poet by the *Suda* and Stephanus of Byzantium (*Eth.* 390.2). I would suggest, therefore, that we are not dealing with a *parôidia* at all, but with a comedy with a para-epic bent.<sup>5</sup> It is by no means necessary that the *Deiliad* was set in a parallel Trojan War. However, even if it were, this is not a problem. Of the 9 play titles by Nicochares surviving, 7 have mythological tones,<sup>6</sup> and it is not unknown for comedies to be set in the Trojan War.<sup>7</sup> If this suggestion is correct, then the καὶ connecting Hegemon and Nicochares is meant to indicate a distinction between the poets – Hegemon the writer of *parôidiae* and Nicochares the comic playwright.<sup>8</sup> Aristotle's wording does not necessarily lend itself to the assumption that both poets wrote the same kind of poetry. Indeed, following Homer and Cleophon, the names of Hegemon and Nicochares would represent one hexameter poet and one dramatic one. This makes it highly likely that Aristotle is indeed referring to the comedian here. Either way, what remains clear is that in this passage Aristotle is using παρωδία to refer to a specific genre. If Aristotle's information derives from the *didaskalic* records, then this generic meaning of the word dates back to the 5th cent. BC., and the evidence of Aristotle is fairly consistent with the surviving records for *parôidia* as a competitive genre.

Hegemon also makes an appearance in Chamaeleon's work, where the phrasing is similar to that of Aristotle. However, in Chamaeleon this is used to preface a quotation of part of our sole *parôidic* fragment of Hegemon (ll. 18-21):

Χαμαιλέων ὁ Ποντικὸς ἐν ἔκτῳ Περὶ τῆς Ἀρχαίας Κωμῳδίας· Ἡγήμων ὁ Θάσιος <ό> τὰς  
Παρωδίας γράψας Φακῆ ἐπεκαλεῖτο καὶ ἐποίησεν ἐν τινι τῶν Παρωδιῶν.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Pöhlmann (1972) 153 n. 52.

<sup>4</sup> For the life and work of Nicochares, see Orth (2015) 11-115. Orth remains sceptical about the identification of Nicochares in Aristotle with the comedian, for which see his note on test. 5.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of para-epic in Greek comedy, see Revermann (2013).

<sup>6</sup> *Agamemnon*, *Amymone* or *Pelops*, *Galateia*, *Heracles Gamôn*, *Heracles Chorêgos*, *Lakônes*, and *Lêmniai*.

<sup>7</sup> See Wright (2007).

<sup>8</sup> For this use of καὶ, see Denniston (1934) 292 ad καὶ I (8).

<sup>9</sup> "Chamaeleon of Pontus in Book VI of *On Old Comedy*: Hegemon of Thasos, the author of the *Parodies*, was nicknamed Lentil-Soup and wrote in one of his *Parodies*."

The quotation here functions as a demonstration of Hegemon's nickname, Lentil-Soup. As in Aristotle, the use of *παρωδία* here is a generic marker, as is evident from the remainder of the quotation: Chamaeleon goes on to provide an anecdote about Hegemon providing the audience of one of his comedies (διδάσκων κωμῳδίαν) with stones and inviting them to throw them if they do not enjoy his play.<sup>10</sup> This is followed by the qualification that he was most highly esteemed for his *parōidiae* (i.e. in opposition to his comedies): εὐδοκίμει δ' ὁ ἀνὴρ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς παρωδίαις. The evidence of Aristotle and Chamaeleon affirms that in the fifth and fourth centuries, the noun *παρωδία* refers to a specific genre with its own performance context in Athens, if not elsewhere.

The other early references to words cognate with *παρωδία* are more problematic. In Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis*, the key problem is that the specific form of the adjective is unique and occurs nowhere else. The other instance, a short passage of Aristoxenus, provides the earliest attested use of the noun *παρωδή*. As I shall argue, these terms, as well as a passage in Alexander Aetolus, can be understood as possessing a fairly consistent meaning, namely referring to poetry or song that "counters" or "responds to" other poetry. This interpretation has the benefit of making most sense of the available evidence, although it does not attempt to demonstrate that we have secure grounds for arguing that this meaning derives closely from an "original" sense of the term based on etymology. Let us begin with the earliest and most problematic source, Euripides' *Iphigenia in Aulis*:

ἀκουε δή νυν· ἀνακαλύψω γὰρ λόγους,  
κούκέτι παρωδοῖς χρησόμεσθ' αἰνίγμασιν.<sup>11</sup>

This passage is part of a transition between the preceding stichomythic conversation between Clytemnestra and Agamemnon and her own longer speech. The implication in these lines is that they should no longer try to keep hidden what is really going on, and speak to each other plainly. The usual interpretation of these lines is that the phrase *παρωδοῖς αἰνίγμασιν* effectively is the opposite of clear speaking. The adjective is thus often translated as "dark" or "obscurely hinting" in an attempt to characterize the riddles themselves.<sup>12</sup> While we can find parallels for a similar

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<sup>10</sup> This anecdote is the major reason for its quotation at this point in the *Deipnosophistae* (9.406d-407c): Democritus threatens the chefs, warning them not to go on talking and let them eat in case they – like Hegemon – are pelted with stones. He shortly thereafter explains what he knows about *ballētus* through this quotation of Chamaeleon.

<sup>11</sup> "Listen, then! I shall speak plainly, no longer in distorting riddles."

<sup>12</sup> Stockert (1992) *ad loc.*, for instance, suggests "dunkel andeutend, indirect anklängend"; cf. LSJ s.v. *παρωδός*, Degani (1983) 16.

meaning in the term *παράμουσος* (e.g. At A. Ch. 467 or E. Ph. 786), the description might make more sense if we understand it in the context of the passage, that is the transition between stichomythia and monologue. Understood from this perspective, while *αἰνίγμασιν* characterizes the manner of the speech, that is indirect reference without clear meaning, *παρωδοῖς* refers to the consistent response of stichomythia that is preventing a coherent explanation. We might translate the phrase, then, as “countering riddles” or “riddle after riddle”. This definition of the term here is close to the suggestion of Pöhlmann that *παρωδία* originally contained the broad definition of literary imitation (‘nach dem Vorbild von’).<sup>13</sup> This suggestion, however, must remain tentative at best, given that we find no other use of this adjective in Greek literature.

If we understand *παρωδοῖς* in the passage of Euripides as referring to the repeated responses, song in some sense “answering” or “countering” song, this approach may help us to understand other early uses of terms cognate with *παρωδία* better. This is the case, for instance, if we consider a passage of Aristoxenus (fr. 136 Wehrli *ap.* Ath. 14.638b):

ὅσπερ τῶν ἔξαμέτρων τινὲς ἐπὶ τὸ γελοῖον παρωδὰς εὗρον, οὕτως καὶ τῆς κιθαρωδίας πρώτος Οἰνώπας.<sup>14</sup>

The main problem in comprehending this passage is that this is the only extant use of *παρωδὰς* from the 4th cent. BC and does not appear again for several centuries. Are we to understand from this that some works by Oenopas were referred to with the generic title of *παρωδία* or *παρωδή*? If not, does *παρωδὴ* here refer to what we would call “parody” or is the meaning more general?

The answer to the first question, I suggest, is negative. On the one hand, we have no evidence that *παρωδὴ* ever carries a generic force.<sup>15</sup> On the other, our other evidence for the work of Oenopas provides no support for this suggestion (although this necessarily carries the dangers of an argument *ex silentio*). Athenaeus on one occasion, naming him Oenopas, tells us that he produced imitations of *κιθαρωδίαι*, including one in which he portrayed Polyphemus whistling and Odysseus babbling (Κύκλωπα εἰσήγαγε τερετίζοντα καὶ ναυαγὸν Ὀδυσσέα σολοικίζοντα - 1.20a).<sup>16</sup> While this work likely possessed a parodic tone, Athenaeus’ phrasing does not support

<sup>13</sup> Pöhlmann (1972). Householder (1944) and Lelièvre (1954), by contrast, argue that the generic meaning of the word came first. This may well be true and I do not think that gaining an understanding of what *παρωδοῖς αἰνίγμασιν* means in Euripides necessarily helps us to determine the early development of the meaning of the term.

<sup>14</sup> “In the same way that some people made up parodies of hexameter lines in order to be amusing, so too Oenopas invented parodies of citharodic performances.”

<sup>15</sup> Of Householder’s two examples (1944: 9) of *παρωδὴ* carrying the generic force of *παρωδία*, one is here and the other is at Ath. 2.54e, where we should read *παρωδίαις*.

<sup>16</sup> Interestingly, the authority for this information is again Aristoxenus (fr. 135 Wehrli).

the suggestion that it belonged to the genre *parôidia*. Instead, this work is mentioned among a list of imitative works, which range wildly in genre and include magicians (Xenophon and Cratisthenes), comedians (Eudicus), dithyrambists (Straton of Tarentum), and even pseudo-philosophers (Matreas of Alexandria). It seems highly unlikely that we can connect these disparate performances with the genre *parôidia*.

In order to answer the second question, we must consider whether we can find any evidence for the abstract meaning of parody in contemporaneous literature, since the word *παρωδή* itself does not appear again for many centuries. The most convincing evidence for this comes from a fragment of Strattis' *Phoenissae*, in which a speaker refers to another performing paratragedy (ἐγώ γὰρ αὐτὸν παρατραγωδῆσαι τι μοι - fr. 50). Without any context, it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what is meant here. We do nevertheless know that the play engaged closely with tragedy, specifically Euripides' *Phoenissae* (fr. 47, for instance, is spoken by Jocasta).<sup>17</sup> It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that the verb *παρατραγωδέω* here refers to a practice we can identify with parody. We find a similar use of *παρά*, although here as a preposition rather than a prefix, in a fragment of Alexander Aetolus (fr. 8.5-8 Magnelli):

ἔγραφε δ' ὡνὴρ  
εὖ παρ' Όμηρείην ἀγλαῖην ἐπέων  
πισσούγγους ἢ φῶρας ἀναιδέας ἢ τινα χλούνην  
φλύοντ' ἀνθηρῇ σὺν κακοδαιμονίῃ.<sup>18</sup>

The writings to which Alexander here refers is the genre *parôidia*, as is confirmed by the subsequent reference to the authors Euboeus and Boeotus. This passage is thus an important source for our knowledge of the genre, as it reflects the kinds of subject matters that were perceived as common in the genre's formative period (for which see the Introduction). What is more significant for our purposes here, however, is the phrase *παρ' Όμηρείην ἀγλαῖην*. Like Strattis' *παρατραγωδῆσαι*, this phrase is a reflection of the parodic interaction between one work and another. This use of *παρά* as a preposition is later found more commonly in the Aristophanic scholia, who use the phrase *παρά τά*, sometimes also specifying the author or text parodied, as shorthand for "these lines are a parody of the following".<sup>19</sup> What we see, therefore, is that *παρά*, as both prefix and

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<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of Strattis' use of tragedy here, see Miles (2009) 183-202, and more generally Telò (2014) 121-4.

<sup>18</sup> "The man composed good parodies of Homer's glorious works – cobblers, or brazen thieves; or some eunuch babbling a lot of crazy, florid words."

<sup>19</sup> E.g. *S. ad Ar. V. 709, 1420; Lys. 188, 520, 963; Ran. 18, 93, 102, 282, 665, 931, 1185, 1320, 1425, 1471, 1475, 1478.*

preposition, begins to be used during the late 5th and 4th centuries to refer to a literary practice that is identifiable with our notion of parody.

This evidence suggests the possibility that *παρωδὰς* in Aristoxenus refers to what we would identify as parody. The difficulty remains, however, that this form of the word does not appear again for many centuries, and so there is no absolute evidence that *παρωδὴ* in the 4th century means “parody” rather than “counter-song”. One objection to taking *παρωδὰς* here as “parodies” would, for instance, point to the clarifying phrase ἐπὶ τὸ γελοῖον. Is this phrase clarifying what is meant, producing a periphrastic expression for parody as “counter-songs with humorous intent”, or does it serve to emphasize the tone of the works referred to in order to explain Aristoxenus’ point about the work of Oenopas? A comparison with another definition of parody, albeit 2000 years its junior, seems to support the latter interpretation. The definition of parody by Julius Caesar Scaliger, in his *Poetices Libri Septem* of 1561, is strikingly similar to that of Aristoxenus: *est igitur Parodia Rhapsodia inversa mutatis vocibus ad ridicula sensum retrahens*. However, it is also likely that Scaliger was influenced by Athenaeus’ own work (the *Deipnosophistae* was first printed by Marcus Musurus in Venice in 1514), and so this must be treated with care.

Ultimately, it is impossible to be certain precisely what Aristoxenus meant by *παρωδὰς*, but from this analysis of the early uses of terms cognate with *παρωδία* we can make certain conclusions with some confidence: firstly that the term *παρωδία* itself is thus far exclusively used to refer to the genre *parōidia*; also, there is a growing consciousness of the literary mode of parody, which we find instance as a self-conscious reflection in Strattis’ *Phoenissae*. More tentatively I have also suggested that in Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Aulis*, the phrase *παρωδοῖς αἰνίγμασιν* may be best understood as reflecting the manner in which parody is responsive, a song sung in response and perhaps also in opposition.<sup>20</sup> These conclusions provide a valuable starting point for a more general analysis of all the terms cognate with *παρωδία*.

## 1. ΠΑΡΩΔΙΑ REFERRING TO GENRE

As we have already seen, in the only two times we find the word *παρωδία* during the 5th and 4th centuries (Aristotle and Chamaeleon) the meaning is generic, referring to the genre *parōidia*. Several questions nevertheless remain: where else does *παρωδία* refer to *parōidia*? Does *παρωδία* always refer to *parōidia*? Are other terms used to mean *parōidia*? To answer these questions, I shall look at three groups of texts: firstly, I shall examine Polemo of Ilium’s 12th book *Pros Timaeon* (2nd cent. BC), which is the only surviving extended passage that treats the genre *parōidia* in detail

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<sup>20</sup> Cf. ‘Gegen die ωδὴ’ - Koller (1956) 18.

(apart, perhaps, from Chamaeleon whom we have already discussed); secondly, there is the inscriptional evidence for performances of *parôidia*,<sup>21</sup> finally, we shall look at authors who quote the fragments of *parôidia* or quote Chamaeleon and Polemo discussing *parôidia*, that is Athenaeus and Diogenes Laertius. From this discussion, several points emerge: *παρωδία* is used only to refer to a genre, *parôidia*; *παρωδέω* does not precisely mean “to write *parôidia*” but is used with a generic colouring; and *παρωδός* always refers specifically to authors of *parôidia* in the inscriptions and almost always in Athenaeus.

When we consider the first two groups I am focusing on, we see that the language used to describe the genre *parôidia* is very limited at least until the 2nd century BC. On the one hand, the noun *παρωδία*, which, aside from the usages we have already considered, only appears in Polemo before the turn of the millennium, is only ever found with a generic meaning; on the other, *παρωδός* (as a noun rather than an adjective as in Euripides above) is only found during the same period in the inscriptional evidence to refer to a writer of *parôidiae*. Additionally, we find no verb that means “to write *parôidia*”, but rather the same kind of periphrastic constructions as we have already seen in Aristotle (*τὰς παρωδίας ποιήσας*) and Chamaeleon (*τὰς Παρωδίας γράψας*).

According to Athenaeus, in his 12th book *Pros Timaeon* (fr. 45 Preller) Polemo discusses those who write *parôidia* (Πολέμων δ' ἐν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ τῶν πρὸς Τίμαιον περὶ τῶν τὰς παρωδίας γεγραφότων ἴστορῶν τάδε γράφει - 15.698b). This presumably refers to a technical discussion of the genre, since Polemo traces its roots to a *prôtos heuretês* and discusses those authors who use parody. In Athenaeus’ introduction, we also find the same periphrastic phrase used by Chamaeleon, “to write *parôidiae*” (*παρωδίας γράφειν*). Throughout this fragment of Polemo, *παρωδία* refers to the genre *parôidia*. First, Polemo mentions Boeotus and Euboeus, who are said to have written *parôidiae* (*τὸν Βοιωτὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν Εὐβοϊον τοὺς τὰς παρωδίας γράψαντας*); additionally, Epicharmus is said to “use” *parôidia* a little in some of his plays (*κέκορηται δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ Συρακόσιος ἐν τισι τῶν δραμάτων ἐπ' ὄλιγον*), as did Cratinus in his *Euneidae*, a phrase that seems to refer to identifiably *parôidic* passages in comedic plays rather than whole productions of *parôidia*; later Polemo names the comic poet Hermippus as a “composer of *parôidiae*” (*πεποίηκε δὲ παρωδίας καὶ Ἐρμίππος ὁ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ποιητής*); finally, in his discussion of Hegemon, we are told that he won with numerous competitions at Athens in *parôidia*, including once with a poem called the Gigantomachy (*παρ' Αθηναίοις ἐνίκησεν ἀλλαις τε παρωδίαις καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχίᾳ*). This evidence suggests that the word *παρωδία* bore a specifically generic meaning until after the 2nd cent. BC. Additionally, we find no evidence that during

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<sup>21</sup> A full transcript of all these inscriptions is given in the Appendix 2. For a discussion of what these inscriptions tell us about the genre and its performance contexts, see ‘*παρωδία* as genre’ in this Introduction.

this period the verb form *παρωδέω* was in use. Instead, we find only the periphrastic constructions *γράφειν/ποιεῖν παρωδίας*.

The inscriptional evidence, perhaps unsurprisingly, provides a different story. Parodists are referred to in at least three inscriptions: a decree from Eretria c. 340 BC (IG XII 9.189), one from Delos dated to 236BC (IG XI 2.120), and one from Attica from the 2nd or 3rd cent. AD (IG II<sup>2</sup> 2153). In the final inscription, we are dependent on the restoration of the first letter, although given that there is only space for one letter in front of the surviving letters [.]*αρωιδοι*, an initial pi is most likely.<sup>22</sup> In every case, we find the term *παρωδὸς* used to refer to practitioners of the genre. The only potential exception to this rule is IG VII 414 from Oropos. In the second line of this inscription, we find a reference to a certain Pamphilus (Πάμφιλος Αθη[ναῖος]), although we lack any further information about his victory on this occasion. If the sigma preceding his name is the final letter of *ποιητὴ[ς]* (or *ποιητή[ς]*), there is space for 9 or 10 letters. However, although *παρωιδίας* is a possible reconstruction here, the pleonasm *παρωδίας ποιητής* is not otherwise attested and Preuner's supplement (*προσωιδίου ποιητή[ς]*) is more probable, since it has greater support in inscriptional evidence.<sup>23</sup> *παρωδός*, then, appears to have been the standard term for a poet of *parōidia* across the centuries.

A broader range of vocabulary is found in reference to parodists and *parōidia* in the works of Athenaeus and Diogenes Laertius. I shall therefore tackle each term separately.

**παρωδός:** this is used by Athenaeus 12 times, and never by Diogenes Laertius. In 5 cases, it is used of Matro of Pitane, in all but one of which cases hexameter verses are quoted. The exception to this rule is when Athenaeus is discussing authors who wrote works about dinners (where Matro's name is confused with Matreas of Alexandria),<sup>24</sup> where it is almost certainly to one of Matro's *parōidiae* named *Deipnon* to which we are referred. On another occasion (13.571b), a hexameter line is said to derive from 'one of the parodists' (ώς τις ἔφη τῶν παρωδῶν). On the other 6 occasions, however, it is used to describe Sopater, the author of *phlyaces*, and whose iambic, not hexametric verses are quoted. While this causes us significant problems in understanding what Athenaeus may have meant by the word *παρωδός*, he does make some differentiation between the two. While Matro is only ever referred to in generic terms as a *παρωδός*, Sopater is frequently described as a φλυακογράφος or φλοιακόγραφος (e.g. at 3.86a, 14.644c, 702b). Similarly, while quotations of Matro's poetry are introduced with ἐν (ταῖς) *παρωδίαις* (e.g. at 2.64e, 3.73e, 14.656e), Sopater's work is cited either through the title of the work (e.g. *Bacchis* at 4.158d-e) or this title is

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<sup>22</sup> Robert (1936) 251-4, cf. Rotstein (2012) 109 n. 82. For a more detailed discussion, see 'παρωδία as genre'.

<sup>23</sup> Rotstein (2012) 110-2.

<sup>24</sup> For which, see Olson-Sens (1999) 3.

accompanied by the word δράματι (e.g. δράματι Εὐβουλοθεομβρότω - 3.86a).<sup>25</sup> This would suggest that Athenaeus recognized some kind of formal, generic differentiation between the works of the two authors. There are, therefore, two possibilities for understanding Athenaeus' use of παρωδός: (1) Athenaeus viewed those passages he quotes where he describes Sopater as a parodist as very similar to *parōidia* as a genre, perhaps due to conscious self-stylization by Sopater himself;<sup>26</sup> (2) the term παρωδός no longer exclusively carried the same generic implications that we find in the inscriptional evidence.

**παρωδία:** Athenaeus uses this noun 7 times: 3 times referring to Matro, always quoting hexameter verses; 3 times referring to Polemo's *Pros Timaeon*; and once of Xenophanes of Colophon (Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος ἐν παρωδίαις - 2.54e), where he quotes nearly five lines of hexameters (fr. 22 D-K). Diogenes Laertius, on the other hand, only uses παρωδία once at 9.111 (ἐν παρωδίαις εἴδει), when discussing the *Silloi* of Timon of Phlius. The majority of the occasions on which Athenaeus refers to παρωδία seem to refer straightforwardly to the genre *parōidia*. However, its application to the poetry of Xenophanes and Diogenes Laertius' phrasing require closer attention.

At 2.54e, Athenaeus quotes Xenophanes' hexameters with the phrase ἐν παρωδίαις, although it seems unlikely that Xenophanes wrote this poetry in the genre of *parōidia*.<sup>27</sup> So why does Athenaeus call him a parodist? This kind of attribution usually marks the genre or title of the quotation that follows it. However, *parōidia* cannot feasibly have had its own competition in the *mousikoi agônes* at the time Xenophanes was writing. Instead, there are two plausible reasons to believe that Athenaeus was misguidedly using the word παρωδία in a generic sense. Firstly, this may be a case of pseudo-*prôtos heuretêς*; in book 15, Athenaeus will go on to quote Polemo who similarly claims that Hipponax was the founder of the genre *parōidia*, and so it is not unreasonable to suggest that we have something similar here. Additionally, at some point some of Xenophanes' poems circulated under the title of *Silloi*, a name that most likely derives from rather than gives its name to Timon of Phlius' *Silloi*.<sup>28</sup> The association between these two texts could easily have led to generic confusion. The term παρωδία here then remains a marker of genre, although we need not suppose that Xenophanes' work was labelled as such in the 6th cent. BC.

<sup>25</sup> This may be a significant difference between Athenaeus' references to the works of Sopater and Matro, as Matro's works are repeatedly introduced with the phrase ἐν (ταῖς) παρωδίαις (at 2.64c, 3.73e, 14.656e).

<sup>26</sup> This seems plausible given some features of Sopater's poetry. His repeated emphasis on lentil-soup (frs. 1, 14, 19-20) could be a self-fashioning after Hegemon, for example, and his criticism of philosophers in fr. 6, a topic otherwise unknown in *phlyaces*, could have been influenced by the popularity of philosophical parody such as Timon of Phlius.

<sup>27</sup> The manuscript tradition of Athenaeus here compounds the problem, as CE write ἐν παρωδαῖς. It is possible that Athenaeus wrote ἐν παρωδαῖς, in which case Athenaeus can be even more securely said to reserve παρωδία for generic usages. However, modern editors (e.g. Olson and Kaibel) generally agree on παρωδίαις.

<sup>28</sup> This was suggested by Mansfeld (1993) 398-9, who describes the title *Silloi* as 'Timonesque.'

Diogenes, as I have said, only once uses the noun form *παρωδία*, in his description of Timon's *Silloi* (9.111): τῶν δὲ Σίλλων τρία ἔστιν, ἐν οἷς ὡς ἀν σκεπτικὸς ὁν πάντας λοιδορεῖ καὶ σιλλαίνει τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἐν παρωδίας εἴδει. In addition to suggesting an etymology for the title of the poem, this sentence suggests something about the genre of the *Silloi*. However we understand the phrase ἐν παρωδίας εἴδει, the word *παρωδία* itself is most easily explained as a generic term. It remains unclear, however, whether the phrase should mean "in the genre of *parōidia*" or more generally "in the style of" or "after the fashion of *parōidia*", since ἐν εἴδει rarely is used to refer to genres.

Whatever this tells us about Diogenes' characterization of the *Silloi*, it would appear that he nevertheless still uses the word *παρωδία* in its generic meaning. In both Athenaeus and Diogenes Laertius, then, *parōidia* retains its generic meaning.

**παρωδέω:** this verb form occurs only rarely (D.L. at 2.118, 126, 4.52, 63 and Ath. 8.364b). Although Householder argues that the verbal form is not used with a generic colouring,<sup>29</sup> it is used by Diogenes followed by a quotations of hexameter poetry by Crates of Thebes and Bion, and the lines in question share salient features with *parōidia*.<sup>30</sup> One of the quotations of Crates (at 2.126) is immediately followed by one of Timon of Phlius (fr. 22, with the introduction ὁ δὲ Τίμων οὗτως), and Diogenes' use of the adverb οὗτως could imply that Diogenes saw Timon in this fragment too as *παρωδῶν*. The final instance (4.63-4) is part of Diogenes' life of Carneades. There Diogenes relates an anecdote derived from Favorinus' *Miscellaneous History*, that when Carneades' pupil Mentor (who was trying his hand with Carneades' own *pallakē*) attended a lecture, Carneades whilst speaking directed a parody towards him (μεταξὺ λέγων παρώδησεν εἰς αὐτόν). The subsequent quotation is comprised of 2 lines of Homer (*Od.* 4.384 and 2.268 = 401) followed by one line in iambic trimeter (τοῦτον σχολῆς τῆσδ' ἐκκεκηρυχθαι λέγω). Mentor then stands and gives his response, another quotation of Homer (*Il.* 2.52). Two elements of this anecdote are worth noting. Firstly, it seems clear that Diogenes is not using the verb in a generic sense. No other poem that can securely be placed in the corpus of *parōidia* makes use of iambic verses as well as hexameter ones. Additionally, Carneades, as Diogenes goes on to tell us, left nothing in writing, except some of his letters to King Ariarathes (4.65). Instead, the verbal quipping in this anecdote is better understood in the context of quotation of (especially Homeric) verses by the likes of the Cynics and even Pyrrho. Nevertheless, such use of verse by philosophers certainly has an influence on some parodists (in chapter 6, for instance, I consider Timon's parodic techniques from this perspective), and Diogenes' use of the verb *παρωδέω* may well have been influenced by the

<sup>29</sup> Householder (1944).

<sup>30</sup> For the question of whether or not Crates and Bion should be included in the corpus of the genre, see 'Defining parodists' in the Introduction.

similarity between this anecdote and the strategies of parodists like Crates and Timon. The second point to note is that *παρωδέω* is rarely used with the preposition *εἰς* as it is here.<sup>31</sup> While *παρωδέω* must still refer primarily to the quotation of verse lines, the use here also comes close to meaning “mock by parody” or “create a parody directed at”.

The suggestion that Diogenes’ use of the verb *παρωδέω* here was influenced by the similarities between his anecdote and the salient features of *parōidia* finds support in the verb’s use in Athenaeus (8.364b). Here it is used to introduce a quotation from the *Cheiron* attributed to Pherecrates (fr. 162).<sup>32</sup> Although this is a comic quotation, it is perhaps significant that it is written in hexameters and parodies Hesiod and Theognis. Again, then, we see the verb used only with reference to lines that display markers of *parōidia*, primarily hexameter and parody of epic.

From this discussion, we can see state several points with some confidence: *παρωδία* is used until at least the 1st cent. BC solely to refer to the genre *parōidia* and subsequently until around the 2nd cent. AD primarily with the same meaning (even if the attribution of a work to that genre is faulty); *παρωδέω* never means “to write *parōidia*” but that its use sometimes reflects salient features of the genre; finally, that *παρωδός* in the inscriptive evidence always refers to authors of *parōidia* but this may not always be the case in Athenaeus.

## 2. ΠΑΡΩΔΙΑ MEANING PARODY

Thus far, we have seen that the noun *παρωδία* only bears a generic meaning until at least the 1st cent. BC. It is only in later texts, such as the Aristophanic scholia and Quintilian,<sup>33</sup> that its meaning has been extended to refer to a wider range of activities.<sup>34</sup> On the one hand, it is used to refer to the mode of parody; on the other, it is used (primarily in rhetorical treatises) to refer to the quotation of verse in oratory. While I do not think that it is anachronistic to translate *παρωδία* and cognate terms as parody (I argue for the transhistoricity of the term parody in the Introduction, “*παρωδία* as mode”), there is one important difference between the Greek use of *παρωδία et al.* and the

<sup>31</sup> At D.L. 2.126 we find a similar sense, although without the use of the preposition: ὅθεν αὐτὸν Κράτης *παρωδῶν* φησι.

<sup>32</sup> The authorship of the *Cheiron* is debated throughout antiquity. For a discussion and further bibliography, see Storey (2011a) 494-7.

<sup>33</sup> The dating of the Aristophanic scholia is a significant problem that cannot be fully tackled here. The passages I adduce here, however, are not attributed to named individuals and so cannot be dated securely. In the absence of any parallel meaning for *παρωδία* as “parody” between the 3rd and 1st cent. BC, I suspect that it would be very difficult to demonstrate satisfactorily that any comments from the scholia using this term date from the Hellenistic period.

<sup>34</sup> For these later meanings, see for example Σ Ar. Ach. 8, 119, Eq. 214, 1290, where the meaning is “parody”; Quintilian at Inst. Or. 6.3.97 uses the term in reference to the use in prose works of verses similar composed imitating familiar ones. Cf. Householder (1944) 9.

contemporary usage. Even when *παρωδία* and cognate words mean parody, they are being used to refer specifically to the parody of *verse*. While parodies (in the modern sense) of prose texts surely existed in Greek literature (the works of Lucian would be a popular example), they do not seem to have been conceived as *παρωδία*. Thus, the so-called rhetorical definition, which Householder gives as to ‘quote verse in prose with partial prose paraphrase or with prose alterations to suit the new context,’ is a clear development from its usage to refer to the parody, for humorous or comical effect, of verse.

As we have already seen, the use of *παρωδή* to mean parody may date back to around the time of Aristoxenus. However, this meaning is most commonly found in scholia, particularly those of Aristophanes. As I shall demonstrate, the most common terms used for this purpose are the noun *παρωδία*, which in later centuries carries a broader meaning than the generic meaning already discussed, and the verb *παρωδέω*. The Aristoxenean term *παρωδή*, if it did really mean parody in the 4th cent. BC, is only rarely found, and *παρωδός* (excepting perhaps the application of the term to Sopater in Athenaeus) is never found with this more general meaning. Indeed, even when Quintilian uses *παρωδή* in a sense which could be identified as parodic (at. 9.2.35, discussed below), it seems that the meaning parody is an older term that has been superseded (or which has degenerated, from Quintilian’s perspective) by the rhetorical meaning. It is possible, then, that the rarity of *παρωδή* in surviving literature may in part be due to the fact that it mostly fell out of use.

**παρωδέω:** As I said, the most common usage of this word group to mean “parody” is perhaps unsurprisingly found in the scholia, most commonly the Aristophanic scholia. While it is unnecessary to discuss every occurrence of *παρωδέω* in these scholia in detail, it is worth demonstrating the kind of textual references which the scholiasts describe as parody. In the hypothesis of Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, for example, the scholiast demonstrates an awareness of how, dressed in the rags of Telephus, Dicaeopolis parodies his defence argument (*καὶ στολισθεὶς τοῖς Τηλέφου χακώμασι παρωδεῖ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον*). While this example displays an awareness of a parody that extends over an entire scene, taking a direct accusative, other examples from the scholia focus more specifically upon individual parodied lines. In these cases, the verb frequently takes a preposition: it can take *ἐκ / ἐξ* of the author or text parodied (Σ Ar. *Ach.* 120, *Eq.* 214, 221, 1251, *Nub.* 1415, *Vesp.* 1064, 1234, *Pax* 126, *Pl.* 87, 90, 253), or more occasionally *ἀπό* (Σ Ar. *Eq.* 1099, 1329), and once the scholiast claims that the line is a parody of Alcaeus which is directed against Cleon (*ἐκ τῶν Ἀλκαίου δὲ παρωδεῖ εἰς Κλέωνα ώς μαινόμενον* - Σ Ar. *Vesp.* 1234). They are able, then, to identify not only individual lines that have been parodied, but sometimes techniques used to effect it (Telephus’ rags) and infer the target of the joke (Cleon).

The other major location in which *παρωδέω* might be said to refer to parody in the modern sense is in Lucian, where the verb occurs three times. In each of these instances, the verb refers, as

it does in the Aristophanic scholia, to parodies of verse. Thus in the *Apologia*, the narrator cites two lines of Euripides (*Med.* 1078-9) that have been "parodied a little" (μικρὸν παρωδήσασαν - *Apol.* 10).<sup>35</sup> The alterations Lucian has made to the Euripidean lines, particularly the shift from θυμὸς to πενία, have all the hallmarks of parody as Medea's famous spirit is reduced to poverty, a common feature of parodic authors.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Lucian's Charon is said to be good at parody (εὖ γε παρωδεῖς) by Hermes after constructing a hexameter line by combining the opening half of *Od.* 1.50 with the second half of *Od.* 1.180 (νήσῳ ἐν ἀμφιρύτῃ; βασιλεὺς δέ τις εὐχεταὶ εἶναι - *Char.* 14).

However, Lucian's use of παρωδέω is not only concerned with the process of parodying different verses. On occasion, Lucian takes advantage of two meanings of the term, parody as mode and parody as rhetorical technique. This can be seen most clearly in *Juppiter Tragoedus*. Zeus is preparing to give a speech to the rest of the gods, as he is concerned that humans will stop worshipping them after having heard a debate between two philosophers, the Epicurean Damis and the Stoic Timocles. When the gods are all assembled, Zeus reveals to Hermes that he is unsure what to say and has forgotten the opening of his speech (14), which was supposed to present "a very beautiful countenance", alluding to Pi. O. 6.3-4 (ἀρχομένου δ' ἔργου πρόσωπον / χρὴ θέμεν τηλαυγές). In its place, Zeus then suggests beginning with his famous Homeric opening from *Il.* 8 (κέκλυτέ μεν πάντες τε θεοὶ πᾶσαί τε θέαιναι - 8.5). In response to these suggestions, Hermes says that Zeus has given us enough parodies (ἴκανῶς καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πεπαρώδηται σοι τὰ πρῶτα). Hermes' reaction, referring to Zeus as "parodying" his sources, is an objection on rhetorical grounds, referring to Zeus' verse openings as "tiresome versification" (τὸ μὲν φορτικὸν τῶν μέτρων). In part, the description of Zeus' proposed openings as parodies (πεπαρώδηται), when he seems to be suggesting direct quotation, evokes the idea that the suggestions are laughable; indeed, when Zeus earlier suggested using metre to Hermes to call the assembly, Hermes says that he is concerned that he will become a laughing stock (ῶστε διαφερῶ τὸ κήρυγμα ἢ ύπερομετρα ἢ ἐνδεῖ συνείρων, καὶ γέλως ἔσται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀμουσίᾳ τῶν ἐπῶν - 6). Instead, Hermes suggests that Zeus modify one of Demosthenes' speeches against Philip, since "that is the way most people make speeches nowadays" (οὕτω γοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ νῦν ὅγιορεύουσιν).

Our appreciation of this dialogue in the context of Greek imperial rhetoric is enhanced if we consider *Juppiter Tragoedus* in the context of Lucian's other works. For instance, Zeus describes Hermes' suggestion as a rhetorical shortcut (ἐπίτομόν τινα ὁγιορείαν). This phrase echoes

<sup>35</sup> καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἶα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, / πενίας δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.

<sup>36</sup> Matro's narrator, for example, complains that tomorrow he will return to cheese and "servile bread" (*AD* 91-2) and Athena in the *BM* complains that she has to pay off her sempster (184-5).

Lucian's satirical take on rhetorical charlatans in the *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, in which the unidentified speaker, who is trying to persuade a young student to take the easy path to rhetoric rather than the steep, difficult one, describes the former route as cut very short (ἐπιτομώτατος - 3).<sup>37</sup> Hermes proposes, that is, a rhetorical shortcut typical of the degraded orators of the time, and Zeus doesn't seem know any better. The type of advice Hermes suggests, imitating Demosthenes (Zeus ultimately takes his cue from the first Olynthiac), also has parallels elsewhere in Lucian. In *Bis Accusatus*, Rhetic's speech against the Syrian orator begins with a quotation from Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, subsequently followed by the first sentence of the third Olynthiac (26).<sup>38</sup> Like the advocates of the easy path in *Rhetorum Praeceptor*, here Rhetic supposes that speaking powerfully and being admired and applauded by the audience is a positive marker for the orator, and claims to have made the Syrian rich (27-8; cf. *Rh. Pr.* 2 and 6). Imitation of Demosthenes, that is, in both *Bis Accusatus* and *Jupiter Tragoedus*, is a marker of short-cut style, trendy oratory, which is in the latter contrasted with the more learned use of poetic models.

**παρωδία:** This noun possesses the same basic meaning as παρωδέω when it is used by the Aristophanic scholiasts. A good example of this can be found in the scholiast on *Acharnians* line 8. Commenting on Aristophanes' phrase ἄξιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδι, the scholiast comments: τοῦτο παρωδία καλεῖται, ὅταν ἐκ τραγῳδίας μετενεχθῇ εἰς κωμῳδίαν, before explaining the Aristophanic phrase as a parody of Euripides' *Telephus* (κακῶς ὅλοιτ' ἀν· ἄξιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδι). This example provides the clearest statement of the Aristophanic scholiasts' use of parody: when something is altered from tragedy into comedy. This formulation is repeated virtually word-for-word in the *Suda* (π 715): Παρωδία· οὕτω λέγεται ὅταν ἐκ τραγῳδίας μετενεχθῇ λόγος εἰς κωμῳδίαν. In these examples, we see not only how similar a meaning παρωδία has to our "parody", but also a significant difference which is at least partially dependent upon the context. The scholiast is only interested in lines taken from tragedy and used in comedy (cf. Hesychius' gloss of παρωδοῦντες as παρατραγῳδοῦντες). While other scholiasts, as we have already seen, refer also to parodies of Alcaeus (at V. 1234), Hesiod (at *Pl.* 87, 90, 253), and Archilochus (at *Ach.* 120), the principle interest is in verse parody.<sup>39</sup> As I argue at greater length in the Introduction, the specification of verse parody is the most striking difference between the Greek term παρωδία and what we mean by parody.

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<sup>37</sup> In this text, Lucian seems to be satirizing both the traditional style of rhetorical training and those who use trickery to fake this training by appealing to audiences' tastes; for recent approaches to the text, see Cribiore (2007) and Gibson (2012).

<sup>38</sup> For a discussion of this dialogue, see Goldhill (2002) 80-107, (2009) 232-4.

<sup>39</sup> Other occurrences of the noun used by the Aristophanic scholia can be found *ad Ar. Ach.* 119, *Eq.* 214, 1290, *Nu.* 1272.

**παρωδή:** After its appearance in Aristoxenus, where I have argued that the term means either parody in our sense or more generally a kind of counter-song, this word is rarely used again and not found until Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* (9.2.35):

*incipit esse quodam modo παρωδή, quod nomen ductum a canticis ad aliorum similitudinem modulatis abusive etiam in uersificationis ac sermonum imitatione seruatur.*<sup>40</sup>

Quintilian here differentiates between two different meanings of *παρωδίη*: one is apparently incorrect (*abusive*), referring to imitation in verse or prose; the other is a name derived from an earlier meaning (*nomen ductum*), songs sung in imitation of others. The latter definition, part of Quintilian's discussion of prosopopoeia, is closer to the rhetorical definitions of *παρωδή*. The former, on the other hand, must be considered more carefully. Is Quintilian referring to the genre *parōidia* or to a more general technique or mode, that of parody? There are two reasons that we might suspect the latter interpretation more plausible: firstly, the description of *παρωδαὶ* as songs made up in imitation of others fits well with the notion of parody in Greek literature as specifically verse parody; secondly, the phrasing here is remarkably similar to that found in Aristoxenus. However, while Aristoxenus refers specifically to parodies of hexameter poems, and thus peripherastically to the genre *parōidia*, here the meaning is left more open. It seems to be the case, then, that by *παρωδὴ* Quintilian understands not a specific genre of hexameter parodies of epic, but the general concept.

Terms cognate with *παρωδία* are commonly used to mean parody and are frequently used in connection with humorous genres and especially comedy. However, as we have seen here, the term is restricted to verse parody, that is parody *in* verse and *of* verse. Frequently when such terms are used to describe a quotation or specific line of verse (e.g. in the Aristophanic scholia or Diogenes Laertius), we frequently find that such verses share salient features with the genre *parōidia*, such as thematic connections, the use of hexameter, or the parody of epic. This suggests, on a linguistic level, that *parōidia* helps to shape Greek notions of parody, which is the argument made throughout this thesis. Additionally, we find instances where there is a slippage between *παρωδέω* meaning parody and rhetorical definitions of *παρωδία*, as in Lucian's dialogues. While this appendix tries to delimit the different meanings of *παρωδία* and cognate terms, that is, these meanings themselves are not always fixed, and authors in antiquity could gain mileage from exploring the associations and boundaries between different meanings.

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<sup>40</sup> “We thus have what begins to be a sort of Parody. (This is a term derived from songs made up to imitate others, and so used by Catachresis for imitations in verse or prose.)”

## 3. RHETORICAL DEFINITIONS OF ΠΑΡΟΙΔΙΑ

The final category of meaning, the rhetorical definitions of *παροδία*, covers a range of related techniques. In rhetorical treatises, that is, *παροδία* or *παρωδή* are defined in somewhat different terms by different authors. We have already seen one rhetorical meaning in Quintilian, “imitation in verse or prose” (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.35). This is not untypical of rhetorical definitions, which tend to focus on the incorporation of verse and sometimes also prose into oratory. Already in Quintilian (i.e. 1st cent. AD), however, there is a suggestion that this is a more recent development in the meaning of the term and is still treated with suspicion or outright opposition in Quintilian’s classification of it as *abusivae*. Despite Quintilian’s opposition, however, definitions of parody recur in rhetorical treatises in later centuries. The earliest example of this is in Hermogenes’ *Peri Methodos Deinotētos* (2nd-3rd cent. AD), in which Hermogenes defines two ways of using verse in rhetoric, one of which, *κατὰ παροδίαν*, is defined thus (30):

ὅταν μέρος εἰπών τοῦ ἔπους παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ λοιπὸν πεζῶς ἐρμηνεύσῃ· καὶ πάλιν, τοῦ ἔπους εἰπών ἔτερον ἐκ τοῦ ιδίου προσθῆ, ώς μίαν γενέσθαι τὴν ιδέαν.<sup>41</sup>

This definition is reminiscent of Quintilian’s “imitations in verse or prose”, although here the focus is primarily on the quotation or adaption of verse only. According to Hermogenes, in the parodic method of verse quotation in rhetoric either one simply quotes a verse alone in a prose context or one adds another in order to better express one’s point.

It is not necessary to discuss all of these definitions in great detail, but it is perhaps worthy of note that the language used to describe this method is not consistent. Quintilian uses *παρωδή* for imitations in verse and prose (9.2.35), although when discussing *παροδία* he only mentions the use of verse (6.3.97); Hermogenes as we have seen uses *παροδία*, whilst Olympiodorus, in a commentary on Plato, uses the phrase *παρωδῆ παρωδεῖν* (*in Plat. Alc.* 113c). The major difference between the different rhetorical definitions of *παροδία* is the extent to which this use of verse in prose is considered humorous or comic. In some cases, there is no suggestion that humour is the intended function of rhetorical parody, whilst in others a comic effect is made explicit. Hermogenes, for example, discusses parody as a sub-section of τοῦ κωμικῶς λέγειν (*Peri Meth. Dein.* 34). While, therefore, there is no absolute or single rhetorical definition of *παροδία*, it is a clear development out of the earlier meanings. It is still (primarily) associated with the use of verse and sometimes retains a humorous element.

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<sup>41</sup> "Whenever, after quoting part of another's verse, he expresses the remainder in prose; and again, after quoting part of a verse, he adds another of his own, so that the thought becomes unified."



## APPENDIX 2

### *Parodists through the ages*

Since the evidence for the genre *parôidia* is quite scarce and has rarely been collated, this appendix is designed for the sake of convenience to provide detailed information regarding the authors and texts of *parôidia*: who wrote what and when, and how do we know about it? This evidence is presented in two forms: first I have created a table detailing our information about the authors and texts that survive, and secondly I have collected the epigraphic evidence. All of these authors and texts, as well as the epigraphic evidence, has been discussed more fully in the Introduction, alongside which this evidence should be read.

Several points are worth noting regarding the table of evidence. Firstly, I have excluded authors for whom we have insufficient (or too little) evidence, as discussed in the Introduction confidently to situate within the corpus of *parôidia*, such as Hipparchus' *Egyptian Iliad* and those texts only known to us by names, e.g. the *Arachnomachia*. Since the dating of the authors and texts is frequently unknown or vague, the placement of many of the authors should be taken with a pinch of salt. Within each century I have attempted to reconstruct something approaching a chronology, with the works of unknown authorship placed at the end, although much of this is guesswork and open to reinterpretation. The work of Crates and Bion have been placed in the third cent. BC, although, as noted in the Introduction, their work likely spanned the fourth and third centuries. The works of unknown authorship have been dated only on the basis of the *terminus ante quem* based on the date of the author who has cited them. For authors whose works have been more frequently discussed and cited, such as Timon's *Silloi* or Archestratus' *Hedypatheia*, I have not given every reference but attempted to choose a representative sample of authors and citations.

Appendix 2

Dates	Author	Parōdic works	References
5th cent. BC	Hegemon of Thasos	<i>Gigantomachy, Deipnon(?)</i> , fr. 1.	Arist. <i>Poet.</i> 1448a9-14, Ath. 1.5a-b, 3.108c, Chamaeleon fr. 44 Wehrli, Polemo fr. 45 Preller, Suda η 53
	Hermippus	Unknown	Polemo fr. 45 Preller
4th cent. BC	Euboeus	<i>Battle of the Bathmen</i>	Alex. Aet. fr. 5.9-10 Magnelli, Ath. 15.698a-b, Eustath. <i>Comment. ad Hom. Il.</i> 4.462, <i>ad Hom. Od.</i> 1.389, Matro fr. 7.1-2, Polemo fr. 45 Preller, Timon fr. 2
	Boeotus	Unknown	Alex. Aet. fr. 5 Magnelli, Polemo fr. 45 Preller
	Hermogenes	Unknown	Matro fr. 7.2
	"the Phillips"	Unknown	Matro fr. 7.3
	Cleonichus	Unknown	Matro fr. 7.4-6
	Archestratus of Gela	<i>Hedypatheia</i>	Antiphanes fr. 45(?), Ath. 1.4d-e, 3.111e-12b, 7.278a-b, 285b-c, 295f, 314f, 327d-e, 9.383b, Chrysippus SVF III frs. 199-200, 709, Clearchus frs. 63 and 78 Wehrli, Dionys. Com. fr. 2.24-6, Justin <i>Apologia</i> II 15.3
3rd cent. BC	Matro of Pitane	<i>Attikon Deipnon</i> , frs. 2-7	Ath. 1.5a, 2.62c, 2.64c, 4.134d-7c, 4.183a, 14.656e-f, 15.697e, Eustath. <i>Comment. ad Hom. Il.</i> 1.482.17, 3.829.6, 4.12.19, <i>ad Hom. Od.</i> 1.7.2, 1.389.35, 1.435.22.
	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. fr. 5 Br.	Arist. <i>Rhet.</i> 3.1412a29
	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. fr. 6 Br.	Arist. <i>Poet.</i> 1457a34
	Crates of Thebes	poss. <i>Paignia</i>	Apul. <i>Apol.</i> 22, Ath. 4.158b, Clem. Alex. <i>Paed.</i> 2.10.93.4, <i>Strom.</i> 2.121.1, D.L. 2.118, 2.126, 6.85, 6.86, 6.90, 6.92 Marc. Antonin. 6.13.4, <i>Olympiod.</i> <i>In Plat. Phaed.</i> 6.2, Plu. <i>Mor.</i> 125f, 546a, 830c, Stob. <i>Flor.</i> 3.1.98
	Bion of Borysthenes	Unknown	D.L. 4.46-58, Eudocia Augusta <i>Viol.</i> 235, Favorinus <i>Omn. Hist.</i> fr. 66 Barigazzi, Nicias Nicaeanis <i>FHG</i> IV p. 464, Plu. <i>De Vit. Pud.</i> 7.531e, <i>Mor.</i> 11.82e
	Timon of Phlius	<i>Silloi</i>	Aristocl. ap. Eus. <i>Praep. Ev.</i> 14.18.14-6, 28, Ath. 1.22d, 4.159f-160b, 6.251b, 7.279f, 10.445d-e, 15.698a-b, D.L. 1.34, 2.6, 2.19, 2.55, 2.66, 4.33-4, 42, 6.18, 7.15-6, 9.109-115; Galen <i>in Hippocr. Epid.</i> VI <i>Comm.</i> 2.42 p. 112 Wenkebach, <i>De Empir. Subfig.</i> p. 62, Numen. ap. Eus. <i>Praep. Ev.</i> 14.6.5, Plu. <i>Num.</i> 8.8-9, <i>Dion</i> 17.2-4, <i>De Virt. Mor.</i> 446b-c, S.E. <i>PH</i> 1.223-4, <i>Adv. Math.</i> 1.53-5, 7.9-10, 11.141, 11.171-2, Suda σ 410, τ 631

Appendix 2

Dates	Author	Parôidic works	References
2nd cent. BC	Unknown	<i>Galeomyomachia</i>	None
1st Cent. BC	Unknown	<i>Batrachomyomachia</i>	Suda o 251, <i>Vita Proculea Homeri</i> 102, Plu. <i>De Herod. Malig.</i> 873f, Mart. <i>Epig.</i> 14.183, Stat. <i>Praef. ad Silv.</i> 1, Anth. Graec. App. 90, Thomas Mag. <i>Ecl. nom et verb. Att. α 2, π 284.</i>
1st cent. AD	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 8a Br.	Dio Chrys. 32.81-4
	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 8b Br.	Dio Chrys. 32.4
2nd cent. AD	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 9 Br.	Galen <i>Protrept.</i> cap. 13
	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 1 Br.	Ath. 5.187a
	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 2 Br.	Ath. 6.270c
	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 3 Br.	Ath. 6.270e
	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 4 Br.	Ath. 13.571b
12th cent. AD	Unknown	Parod. Adesp. 7 Br.	Etymologicum Symeonis vol. 1 p. 508

Evidence from inscriptions**IG II<sup>2</sup> 2311. Fragment A, Column I (Shear 2003)**

(0a)	heading: musical games	
(0b)	[όαψωιδοις]	
(1)	[ - -	πρώται] στ[έφανος
	[ - -	δε]υτέρωι
	[ - -	τ]ρίτωι
		κιθαρωιδοις.
(5)		πρώται στέφανος
	X	θαλλο χρυσοῦς
	¶	ἀργυρίο
	XHH	δευτέρωι
	[¶]H	τρίτωι
(10)	HHHH	τετάρτωι
	HHH	πέμπτωι
		ἀνδράσι αὐλωιδοῖς.
	HHH	πρώται τούτ[ο στ]έφανος
	H	δευτέρωι
(15)		ἀνδράσι κιθαρισταῖς.
	¶	πρώται τούτο
		στέφανος HHH
	[ - H]H	δευτέρωι
	[ - ]H	τρίτωι
(20)	[ - H]	αὐ[ληταῖς.]
	[ - -	πρώται τούτο στέφανος
		δευτέρωι

[Prizes for musical contests]

Fifth: 300 drachmas

[Rhapsodes:]

Men *aulos* singers:

[First:] a crown...

First: a crown worth 300 drachmas

Second...

Second: 100 drachmas

Third...

Men *kithara* players:

*Kithara* singers:

First: a crown worth 500

First: a crown

(and?) 300 drachmas

of olive worth 1,000 drachmas

Second: 200 drachmas

and 500 silver drachmas

Third: 100 drachmas

Second: 1,200 drachmas

*Aulos* players:

Third: 600 drachmas

First: a crown...

Fourth: 400 drachmas

Second...

IG II<sup>2</sup> 2311. Fragment B, reconstruction by Rotstein (2012)

[ - - τρίτωι  
     \*συναυληταῖς]  
 [ - - πρώτωι τούτῳ στέφανος]  
 [ - - δευτέρωι]  
 [ - - τρίτοις]  
     παρωιδοῖς  
 [ - - πρώτωι τούτῳ  
     στέφανος]  
 [ - - δευτέρωι]

Third...  
*Aulos players]*  
 First: a crown...  
 Second...  
 Third...  
 Parodists:  
 First: a crown...  
 Second...

## IG XII 9.189 (ed. Rhodes and Osborne 2003)

[θ]εο[ι]

Ἐξήκεστος Διοδώρου εἶπεν· ὅπωρ ἀν τὰ Αρ-  
 τεμίαια ὡς κάλλιστα ἄγωμεν καὶ θύωριν ὡς π-  
 λεῖστοι, ἔδοξεν τεῖ βουλεῖ καὶ τοῖ δῆμοι·

[...] τιθεῖν τὴμ πόλιν ἀγῶνα μουσικῆς ἀπὸ χιλίων (5)  
 δραχμῶν τεῖ Μεταξὺ καὶ τεῖ Φυλάκει καὶ παρέχει-  
 ν ἀρνας τεῖ πρὸ τὴν Αρτεμιοίων πέντε ἡμέρας, τ-  
 ούτων δὲ δύο ἐγκίρτους εἶναι. ἔρχειν δὲ τῆς μο-  
 υσικῆς τετράδα φθίνοντος τοῦ Ανθεστηρι-  
 ᾱνος μηνός, τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν τιθεῖν ὁ αψωιδοῖς (10)  
 αὐλωιδοῖς, κιθαρισταῖς, κιθαρωιδοῖς, παρωιδοῖς,  
 τοὺς δὲ τὴν μουσικὴν ἀγωνιζομένους πάντα[ς]  
 ἀγωνίζεσθαι προσόδιον τεῖ θυσίει ἐν τεῖ αὐλεῖ. ἔ-  
 [χο]ντας τὴν σκευήν, ἥμπερ ἐν τοῖ ἀγῶνι ἔχουρ[ι].  
 [τὰ δ]ὲ ἀθλα δίδοσθαι κατὰ τάδε· ὁ αψωιδοῖς ἑκατὸν εἱ- (15)  
 κοσι, δευτέροι πεντήκοντα, τρίτοι εἴκοσι· αὐλωιδοῖ παιδὶ πε-  
 ντήκοντα, δευτέροι τριήκοντα, τρίτοι εἴκοσι· ἀνδρὶ κιθαρι-  
 τεῖ ἑκατὸν δέκα, δευτέροι ἐβδομήκοντα, τρίτοι πεντή-  
 κοντα πέντε· κιθαρωιδοῖ διηκόσιαι, δευτέροι ἑκατὸν  
 πεντήκοντα, τρίτοι ἑκατόν. παρωιδοῖ πεντήκοντα, δευ- (20)  
 τέροι δέκα. σιτηρέσιον δὲ δίδοσθαι τοῖς ἀγωνισταῖς  
 τοῖς παραγενομένοις δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρης ἑκάστοι ἀρ-  
 ξαμένοις μὴ πλέον τρισὶν ἡμέραις πρὸ τοῦ προάγωνος, μέ-  
 χρι οὖ ἀν ὁ ἀγῶν γένηται. [τὸν δὲ ἀγῶνα τιθόντων οἱ δήμ- (25)  
 αρχοι ὡς ἀν δύνωνται δικαιότατα καὶ ζημιούντων  
 τὸν ἀτακτέοντα κατὰ τὸν νόμον· παρέχειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς  
 χώρους ἰερέα κριτά, βοῦς, πάντα τὰ ἔτη· συντελεῖν δὲ  
 τοὺς χώρους εἰς τὰ κριτὰ καθάπερ Ἡράοις· τὰ δὲ δέ-

οματα λαμβάνειν τῶν ιερείων τοὺς τὰ κριτὰ παρέχ- (30)  
 οντας· τοὺς δὲ τῶν ιερῶν ἐπιστάτας κρίνειν τὰ ιερέα  
 κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ ἐπιμισθοῦν, ἀν {<sup>27</sup>ἀν? add. p.VII}<sup>27</sup> τις μὴ παρέχει τ-  
 ᾧ χώρων· πωλεῖν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ιεροῖς τὸν βολόμενον ὅτι  
 [ἀ]μ βόληται ἀτελέα μὴ τιθέντα τέλος μηδὲν μηδὲ πρ-  
 [ῆ]ττεσθαι τοὺς ιεροποιοὺς μηδὲν τοὺς πωλέοντ- (35)  
 ας· τὴν δὲ πομπὴν καθιστᾶν τοὺς δημάρχους ἐν τ-  
 εἰ ἀγορεῖ, ὅποι τὰ ιερεῖα πωλεῖται, πρῶτοι μὲν τὰ δ-  
 ημόσια καὶ τὸ καλλιστεῖον, ἔπειτα τὰ κριτά, ἔπειτα  
 τῶν ἴδιωτῶν, ἐάν τις βόληται συμπομπεύειν· συμπο-  
 μπευόντων δὲ καὶ οἱ τῆς μουσικῆς ἀγωνισταὶ πάντ- (40)  
 ες, ὅπως ἀν ὡς καλλίσσῃ ἡ πομπὴ καὶ ἡ θυσίη γένηται·  
 ἀναγράψαι δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐστήλει λιθίνῃ καὶ στῆσ-  
 αι ἐν τοῖς ιεροῖς Αρτέμιδος, ὅπως ἀν κατὰ τοῦτα γί-  
 γηται ἡ θυσίη καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τεῖ Αρτέμιδι εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χ-  
 [ρό]νον, ἐλευθέρων ὄντων Ἐρετρίέων καὶ εὗ προητόγ- (45)  
 [τ]ῶν καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων.]

Gods. Execestus son of Diodorus proposed: in order that we may celebrate the Artemisia as finely as possible and that as many people as possible may sacrifice, resolved by the council and people. The city is to arrange a competition in music with a budget of 1,000 drachmas to the Moderator and Guardian and provide lambs there for five days before the Artemisia, two of them being choice of animals. The 27th of the month Anthesterion is to be the first day of the music, the music competition is to be for rhapsodes, singers to the pipes, lyre-players, singers accompanying themselves on the lyre, and singers of parodies, and those participating in the musical contests are to take part in the processional hymn for the sacrifice in the court with the paraphernalia which they have in the contest. Prizes are to be given in the following way: to the rhapsode 120 (drachmas), to the second 50, to the third 20; to the boy aulos-singer 50, to the second 30, to the third 20; to the adult kithara-player 110, to the second 70, to the third 55; to the adult kithara-singer 200, to the second 150, to the third 100; to the paroidos 50, to the second 10. Maintenance is to be granted to the competitors who are present of a drachma a day for each of them, beginning not more than three days before the pre-competition event and continuing until the competition takes place.

## IG XI 2.120 ll. 46-50

Καλλικλῆς Νικοστράτου Βοιώτιος —————  
 Ἀθηναῖος· θαυματοποιο[ί]· Νουμήνιος Λυσιμαχεὺς τετράκις, Θρασ——  
 Θηρασιάτης —————α——ας τρίς —————ΟΣ.. παρωιδός [——τε]-  
 τράκις· ψάλται· Δημήτριος μετὰ προσωιδίου, Κλεόστρατος μετὰ προσω[ιδίου].  
 τραγωιδιῶν ποιητής [—————Δ]ελφός? Φιλτέας

Callicles the Boeotian, son of Nicostratus[  
 the Athenian. Acrobats: Noumenius Lysimacheus four times, Thras[  
 Therasiates[ ]three times[ ]parodist[  
 four times. Dancers: Demetrius in processional song, Cleostratus in processional song;  
 poet of tragedies[ ]Philteas the Delphian?

IG II<sup>2</sup> 2153

— #7#7#7 —  
 — ων —  
 [ἀ]κροά[ματα]  
 [κ]ωμῳδ[οί] (5)  
 [Σ]τράτων να.  
 [Β]ασιλ<ι>κός?  
 ἀρχαιολο —  
 [Α]σιατικός  
 [π]αρῳδοί  
 [Α]ὐλος να. (10)  
 [Ε]ὐτύχη[ζ]

— —  
 singe[rs]  
 [c]omedia[ns]  
 Straton  
 Basilicus?  
 performers of old favourites  
 Asiaticus  
 [p]arodists  
 [A]ulus  
 [E]utuche[s]

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