Educating for global citizenship in Egypt’s private sector: A critical study of cosmopolitanism among the Egyptian student elite.

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Abstract

In an age of globalisation, conflicting identities and cultures continue to remain a source of seemingly intractable conflict. Educative interventions are meanwhile increasing in trend among academics, politicians and multilateral aid organisations. Each regard education as a long-term solution to contemporary social and security issues.

Supporting literature on the relationship between education and identity suggests that formal education has a powerful influence on students’ outlook on life, their loyalties and their identities. This premise suggests that when questioned about global issues, Egyptian students who attend international schools within their own country of origin should show more signs of cosmopolitanism and global mindedness than their nationally educated peers.

Yet, contrary findings to that of prevailing discourse suggest that education’s ability to shape values and loyalties is likely overemphasised when placed in the context of foreign curricula and international education. At times, students of international schools involved in this study showed more signs of nationalism than their nationally educated counterparts, and presented as equally traditional, conservative and ‘anti-West’ as their compatriots. The thesis thus argues that when education is placed within an international framework, its ability to socialise is significantly weakened, as it is faced with considerable firewalls that are yet to be adequately acknowledged in the discussion of post-national citizenship education.

Using a combination of interpretative and critical research methods, rich and original qualitative data was gathered on attitudes and lifestyles of elite Egyptians enrolled at a variety of Egypt’s private international schools. Twenty-two international school educated Egyptian students, and a control group of 21 nationally educated Egyptian students of the same socio-economic background were invited to participate in specially tailored one-to-one interviews to measure their degree of cosmopolitan attitudes. Supplementary participant observations of Egyptian families actively involved in Egypt’s international education community were also conducted to consider the complementarity of the
students’ home lives with their school lives. Focus groups were held with students of international schools to determine their views and attitudes towards global issues and other communities.

All findings from this research were assessed alongside large-scale values surveys including the World Values Surveys and the Arab Youth Surveys. With the large sample size of pre-existing opinion polls, and the unique isolation of curriculum type as an independent variable in this study, it was possible to assess the transformative impact that an international education plays in the expression of values and beliefs of Egyptian students.

The findings of this thesis have multidisciplinary value. For political science readers, the study offers a critical and epistemological analysis of concepts of cosmopolitanism, Westernisation, globalisation and global citizenship. For readers of the Middle East, it is a study into Egyptian youth today and their conflicting identities and loyalties. The Egyptian experience of private international schools and foreign investment is representative of a regional trend, and valuable to those wishing to consider competing narratives for identity in twenty-first century Middle East societies. Finally, it is a study that has an added value to educationists as it explores the role education plays on identity, and more specifically the role of international schools on globalisation and international mindedness.

The growing trend of research and analysis that focuses on increased global connectedness and a culturally converging world makes this thesis an important and timely contribution. In an effort to extend the debate beyond the prevailing macro-analyses of change through globalisation, this thesis stresses the importance of looking at global interconnectivity at the micro-level, and particularly how young people navigate and negotiate their identity within the context of increasingly transnational spaces. Through this endeavour, it has reached a critical evaluation of our current understanding of a ‘post-national’ future, through the attitudes and opinions of some of today’s internationally educated generation.
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Definitions and abbreviations

AICE Advanced International Certificate of Education
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUB American University of Beirut
AUC American University of Cairo
CIE Cambridge International Examinations
CIS Council of International Schools
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GATs General Agreement over Trade in Services
IB International Baccalaureate
IBDP International Baccalaureate Diploma Program
IBO International Baccalaureate Organization
IBMYP International Middle Years Program
IBPYP International Primary Years Program
IGCSE International General Certificate of Secondary Education
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MENA Middle East and North Africa
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TNCs Transnational Corporations
UK United Kingdom
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UAE United Arab Emirates
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Chapter 1 – Introduction

International schools form a privileged sector of education worldwide. It is elite, expensive and exclusive, and once an alumnus of an international school one is not only firmly in the elite minority of one’s nation, but also awarded membership into a transnational elite. Symbolic membership of the latter suggests an instant entry into the global market. With an internationally recognised qualification, graduates of international schools are considered better placed than the majority of global citizens to engage and partake in the benefits of globalisation.

Expatriate communities, and a transient transnational corporate elite, historically formed the bulk of international education’s clientele (Sklair, 2001; 2002; Plotkin, 2013). However, an international qualification is now no longer a domain for expatriate children alone (Brummit, 2012; Bunnel, 2014). Of the estimated 3.7 million students in English-medium international schools around the world, over 2.5 million are local children seeking a quality, English-speaking education as a means of acquiring an internationally recognised qualification (Hayden, Thompson & Walker, 2006).

It is consequently easy to understand why the international education sector has grown so substantially over half a century (Hayden, 2006; Walker, 2015). No longer are a nation’s wealthiest restricted to the prospects of social mobility within their own national borders. Middle and upper classes have increased the demand for international schools, and while at first such institutions predominantly served expatriate families, today’s clientele is overwhelmingly the indigenous citizens of the host nation of an international school (Bunnel, 2008; Walker, 2015).

With so many international schools welcoming nationals of host-countries, how far does an international education alter the way a local student identifies as a national of their country, and a citizen of the world? Does an international education make for a more cosmopolitan identity and a weaker national identity? Better facilities and the promise of globally competitive qualifications are one of many draws for parents wishing to style their children with the skills
to compete for upward, global, social mobility. Yet, schools with international accreditation – predominantly of Western pedigree or origin - also promote an ideological vision for a more cohesive world, built on ‘universal’ liberal democratic principles that may not always mirror those values upheld by the society within which they operate. Can the indigenous students become beacons of post-national, cosmopolitan values in otherwise closed, insular societies, simply because of their education?

Using a combination of interpretative and critical research methods, rich and original qualitative data was gathered on attitudes and lifestyles of elite Egyptians enrolled at a variety of Egypt’s private international schools. Twenty-two internationally educated Egyptian students, and a control group of 21 nationally educated Egyptian students of the same socio-economic background were invited to participate in specially tailored one-to-one interviews to measure their adoption of cosmopolitan attitudes. Supplementary participant observations of Egyptian families actively involved in Egypt’s international educated community were also conducted to consider the complementarity of the students’ home lives with their school lives. Focus groups were held with students of international schools to determine their views and attitudes towards global political and social issues. All findings from this research were assessed alongside large-scale attitude and values surveys, namely the World Values Surveys and the Arab Youth Surveys. With the larger and broader sample of pre-existing opinion polls, and the unique isolation of curriculum type as an independent variable in this study, it was possible to reflect on the transformative impact that an international education may come to play in the expression of values and beliefs of Egyptian students.

Within their own societies Egyptian students, enrolled at local international schools, are often dubbed as Westernised or Americanised by their compatriots, and those who graduate from British, American and Canadian schools in their own country are often mistaken as ‘unpatriotic’; more American than Egyptian, living in a life of privilege. Such assertions are in vogue with discussions of globalisation and the rise of cosmopolitan identities that have gained traction in academic and popular literature over the last half a century (Schumpeter, 1955; Barber, 1992; Nye, 2002; 2004; Friedman, 2000; 2007). As
Chapter two will show, a study of international education cannot be separated from the discussion of globalisation and neoliberal free-markets, for it has come to be synonymous with ideas of education for *global citizenship* or *international mindedness*, both of which are adaptations and innovations of its sister term, cosmopolitanism.

The generations of Egyptians with access to international schooling, as those elsewhere in the Middle East, are products of what the literature refers to as a ‘new world order’ (Smith, 1995) that is witnessing the convergence of cultures via the free flow of cultural products dominated by the prosperous global North. Advocates for this new world theory hail the so-called inevitable transition towards a ‘universal’ culture that is driven by Western liberal values, and a prerequisite for a safer and more stable world. Critics, on the other hand, condemn this phenomenon as a form of neo-imperialism, through which the authenticity of diverse cultures are being chipped away by the consumerism that marks contemporary Western cultures. Whatever one’s stance, the overarching assumption in the literature on globalisation assumes that our world is gradually homogenising; that through the spread of consumer values, traditional values and cultural authenticity are being pushed into the margins of everyday life.

As will be argued in chapter two (with reference to the literature) and further in chapter five (with reference to this study’s findings), international schools in the Middle East, as in Egypt, are almost exclusively Western cultural products. Just as Nike trainers and Apple *iPads*, an international qualification is an imported commodity that signifies purchasing power and high social status. However, such qualifications also suggest that graduates are educated in an exclusive philosophy that sees the world as interconnected, interdependent, and continually merging - economically, politically and culturally. Through Western conceived teaching strategies, students are guided to maximise their intercultural literacy in preparation for an increasingly globalised world (Plotkin, 2013). Internationally educated students are pitted to be the most skilled and primed for an emerging post-national future, with their familiarity of their Eastern roots and their knowledge and apparent appreciation of the Western way of life. This generation that enjoys accessible international education is hoped to be
the bridge of conflicting cultures - cultural hybrids of the new world, and the harbingers of global, and perpetual, peace (Kant, 1983).

Such hopes are grand indeed for a generation that has lived to witness the most mediated conflicts in the world than ever before. The suffering of communities once barely known, are now transferred in real time to the personal smart phones and newsfeeds of this very generation. The world feels smaller than ever before with impressive cross-border communication technology. But, as will be discussed in chapters five and six, this so-called new world order appears to be moving in a more insular direction. How much, as chapter seven will ask, can international and cosmopolitan philosophies in education penetrate and challenge visceral tribal and ethnic loyalties?

The recent regional unrest of 2011, once popularly referred to as the Arab Spring, further confirmed the apt timing for a study that explores identity and perceptions of the ‘Other’ among the region’s youth. The ‘Arab’ identity of the region has never been more widely challenged by ethnic sectarianism and separatist movements, and the heterogeneous makeup of Middle East nations never so blatantly demonstrated as it is today. The political repercussions of the mass protests in the region have already begun to spill out into Europe and the UK, reminding us all of the globalised world we live in, and that nothing is truly isolated.

By focusing on a region that has not only grabbed the attention of the world with the tenacity of the local, educated, and youthful populace, but similarly looks set to witness some of the greatest bottom-up changes to be initiated in this century. It also exposed how little we, as academics, truly knew and understood of civil societies operating across the Arab world. Indeed, much of the discussion that followed the events of 2011 in the region alluded to the long-term contribution and implications of secular education policies in Egypt and Tunisia - the two countries that initially had witnessed the most dramatic political change (Anderson, 2011; Bellin, 2012). Education has increasingly been accepted as a powerful factor for the recent increase in political activity and consciousness in the region (Anderson, 2011; Malik & Awadallah, 2012; Bellin, 2012; Mackell, 2011). How the educational context has contributed to the social
dynamics in the Middle East is a question still wanting to be answered. This study has sought to explore a largely understudied sector of education in the region; one that grows in significance as the private and international market continues to grow.

1.1 A vision for a post-national education

In his quest to establish an educational curriculum that fought the boundaries of the state and the twentieth century limits of national identity, Alexander Duncan Campbell Peterson (1908-1988), first Director General of the International Baccalaureate, had noble intentions - to connect the world, and the people in it, so that peace could prosper and prejudice could perish. Peterson was instrumental in the creation of the International Baccalaureate (IB), a world-renowned international education system that offers international programmes to ‘develop the intellectual, personal, emotional and social skills needed to live, learn and work in a rapidly globalising world’ (http://www.ibo.org; Peterson, 1972).

Having pioneered the concept of international education throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, Peterson’s aspirations gradually became vogue throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as a globally available, reliable and quality-assured education that not only pushed for active, peaceful change, but also sought to meet the growing needs of an increasingly mobile, corporate elite and their accompanying offspring. It became a service that matched the decline of communism, the growth of capitalism and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the twenty-first century belief in the accumulation of wealth, social and global mobility, economic and social development, and the incorporation of middle-income nations into the global economy.

Peterson, with his international reputation and connections, was greatly responsible for the formation of the IB in 1968, carving a transnationally adaptable curriculum for school children from the ages of three to nineteen. Today, the Baccalaureate is a globally recognised pioneer of the ever-expanding and diverse movement now much larger than Peterson’s initial conception (Walker, 2015). While today’s international education sector is
commonly assessed by market-driven empirical value in the context of neoliberal privatisation, Peterson and his colleagues were instead committed to, and motivated by, an ideological mission rooted in the belief that, through education, the world could move from visceral tribalism, to cohabitation and equal world citizenship. It is this ideological imperative that is the focus of this critical study into education for global citizenship.

1.2 Educating for peace

The framework for the IB was based in part by joint research conducted shortly after World War II, in 1948, by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and the Director of the International School of Geneva, Marie-Therese Maurette. The findings of the research (Maurette, 1948), which forms a framework for Peace Education, reflect the agenda of the time, and later, the idealised objectives of education for an international understanding and mindedness. As her vision grew to form a global, parallel service in education, Maurette was joined by peers, such as Stephen Duggan, who came to be known as the ‘apostle of internationalism’ (Reimers, 2013) and first president of the Institute for International Education. A movement, for a revolution in education for peace, was born.

Maurette’s research shed light on an experiment which, as she records, lasted some twenty-five years in which devoted staff members of the League of Nations in Geneva, motivated by their common belief in the institution they had served, set up a school in which their children would be brought up in accordance with the ‘new world’; a world of peace, and with understanding between nations. Not a ‘Utopian’ school, she urges, but a school based on an understanding that each child would return to their home country with a complete and rounded view of the world; with not only knowledge, but with ‘the love and the desire for peace, the feeling of the brotherhood of man’ (Maurette, 1948, p.3). As she sets about answering the question ‘Educational techniques for peace: Do they exist?’ Maurette (1948) reveals the responses of former students after being invited to comment on their experiences and lasting impressions of their time at the school. Their responses reflected the overall
success of the pedagogy that she advocated, and for her and her colleagues, it revealed that education for peace did, indeed, exist.

1.3 Education as a transformative agent

The notion that a school could set to achieve global peace and the brotherhood of man was not simply a utopian dream to Maurette, as she states in her monograph (1948). It was a concept that had taken root from an earlier belief that education possessed qualities towards shaping societies, based on the behavioural theory of nurture and later on the role of education in the consolidation of modern nation-states. If educational conditioning could work so effectively to build a notion of national belonging and citizenship, so too, so the logic goes, can it dismantle ‘violent egotistic nationalism’ (Maurette, 1948, p.2) and replace it with universal compassion and global citizenship.

The connection between education and behaviour had long been acknowledged and as the common people of the modern world achieved a new sense of political consciousness, education grew to become a utility of the elite as opposed to a right for the elite. In this, those in power sought to use mass education to cultivate a sense of ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983), based on national rhetoric and shared collective histories. Education had thereby become an essential tool for state formation.

Modern education remains a valued tool today. Every nation has a national education through which it decides what national identity and citizenship looks like. Through a national curriculum, values and principles are taught to each generation, to cultivate a sense of ‘good citizenship’. Included in the conception of imagined communities is most often decided by the dominant ethnic or social groups in societies. Torres (1998) has criticised theories of citizenship for lacking cultural sensitivity and being developed exclusively by ‘Western political theory’ that by definition is the result of ‘white, heterosexual males who identified citizenship through a process of systematic exclusion rather than inclusion in the polity’ (Torres, 1998, p. 422). This, reflects Torres, is the symptom of centuries of a ‘white, heterosexual male’ dominating political and social power, and thus the conception of ideal citizenship. Torres (1998) called
for a theory of *multicultural* democratic citizenship; one that did not exclude those typically marginalised in neoliberal capitalist societies, such as women, members of minority ethnic and racial groups, working-class people, and ‘individuals lacking certain attributes or skills’ (Torres, 1998, p. 423). Nevertheless, citizenship education continues to be heavily charged with political relevance and driven by political elites (Ross, 2007). As chapter two will illustrate, education policy most often mirrors the political backdrop of a nation, as it cannot be regarded as an agent on its own, nor is it impartial or autonomous to a political or social agenda.

The transformative potential of schools towards society is a relatively new element that educational thought in the 1980s and 1990s had reintroduced into the academic discourse (Guilherme, 2002, p. 5). Whether it be presented as ‘resistance’ (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986; Giroux, 1983; Giroux and McLaren, 1994; Kanpol, 1994; McLaren, 1995), as ‘possibility’ (Giroux, 1992, 1997), as ‘hope’ (Freire, 1993) or as ‘utopia’ (Gadotti, 1996), it aims at promoting the notion of change rather than simply following or adjusting to a particular *status quo*.

However, just as education can be transformative in nature, so too can it be utilised in order to perpetuate that very *status quo*. It is with this understanding that commentators have argued that education has powerful socialising effects on students (Green 1990; Smith 1995; Billig, 1995; Soysal, 2002; Schissler & Soysal, 2004; Ross, 2007). Literature on the subject of education and socialisation has largely agreed that education has a substantial role to play as a socialising force in society, and that it holds a key position in shaping national identities and their orientations (Anderson, 1991; Tawil and Harley, 2004). The school years of an individual and the curriculum used in the classroom, as well as the everyday interactions between teachers and students are believed to play a significant role on identity construction, loyalties and values (Hey, 1997; Archer, 2003; Mac An Ghaill, 1994; Mannitz, 2004). Understanding the intellectual development behind such notions is the focus of chapter two and its political application throughout Egypt’s modern history is illustrated in chapter three.
1.4 Internationalising education

When education is placed into an international framework, such as it is in the present thesis, matters are made somewhat more complex. The nature of international schooling abroad allows for the importation of curricula and teaching methods, as well as the involvement of culturally specific elements, to enter local education systems. Whether a curriculum and teaching method is adapted in order to suit the host country, for example, in the case of today’s most popular international curricula in Egypt, the Cambridge International General Certificate of Secondary Education (IGCSE) and Advanced International Certificate of Education (AICE); or whether it is created for the sole purpose of international application, such as with the pioneering and highly prestigious International Baccalaureate; or indeed whether it is exported abroad with little adaptation at all for an international market; all are considered, broadly speaking, to be international, even though the latter is international only in that it is used in a geographically dispersed market (Thompson, 1998).

Mary Hayden and Jeff Thompson are leading scholars on the study of international education within the field of education research, and they rightly admit that competing concepts and realities of international education and international schools are thinly researched (Hayden & Thompson, 1995). Though for more than half a century, ‘international education’ has been a part of everyday educational parlance, the term remains ill defined. ‘International’, ‘cross-cultural’, ‘global’, and ‘comparative’ education are all adjectives closely associated with the study of international education, with an overarching understanding of the latter as an ‘international cooperation, understanding and exchange’ (Fraser & Brickman, 1968, p. 1) for the ‘preparation of young people to cope with life in an increasingly interdependent world’ (Hayden & Thompson, 1995). Behind this effort for greater cross-cultural exchange is a belief that is rooted in the embracement of ‘global citizenship’ (UNESCO, 1991), and ‘education for international understanding’ (UNESCO, 1968), or as Sampson & Smith (1957) put it earlier, of the post-modern arrival of ‘worldmindedness’ that is now replaced with the more commonly used terminology, ‘international mindedness’.
Having evolved and scaled since Maurette’s early endeavours, the underlying mission behind greater ‘international mindedness’ is still grounded in the desire for better international communication and the avoidance of further large-scale conflict. After all, while international schools have existed for a century, or more, their most dramatic growth occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, during the height of the Cold War and the international fragility that marked the period (Plotkin, 2013). Yet, the ever-expansive international education market cannot be explained by ideological factors alone. As will be discussed in chapter two, the growth in the international market has been equally driven by an increase in the demand for globally agile qualifications, and has thus been as pragmatic as it has been ideological. The ideological impetus of the service’s origins has been distinctly pared down during the process of this growth, with an increased emphasis on the teaching of skills to suit an internationalised business landscape, thereby promoting an intercultural education as a valuable requisite for career enhancement (Starr, 1979).

Consequently, as illustrated in depth in the latter part of chapter two, the field of international education studies has been hampered by ongoing disputes and a lack of consensus among theorists regarding how to define the ‘international’ in international education (Stagg, 2013). What is important to clarify is that this thesis is not a comparative education study, despite the fact that some regard the terms international and comparative education as interchangeable (Crossley & Broadfoot, 1992; Hayden & Thompson, 1995). Specifically, it is a critical study of the private sector of Western-oriented international schools located across Egypt, as elsewhere across the globe, that offers a fee-paying, parallel, education service to both expatriates and host nationals. The curricula used in such schools were designed exclusively from the perspective of the aforementioned ideological ambitions of ‘education for peace’, while the growth of the sector coincided with the increasingly globally mobile environment in which many professionals now operate today, such as diplomats, employees of large multi-national companies and multilateral organisations, and aid workers (Gordon & Jones, 1988).

When defining an international school, the thesis recognises the enormous diversity in a growing and under-regulated sector, and the challenges this poses
to contributing to a deeply contested body of literature. The term ‘international’ has created a degree of debate, due to its ambiguity in meaning and application. For example, what is the difference between a ‘multinational’ school and an ‘international’ school? The latter is loaded, as it has come to be seen as a marker of an ideological mission and philosophy, while the former merely sets to describe the diversity among its student body. Hayden and Thompson (2008) state that irrespective of the difference in opinion about what makes a school international, four areas set them apart from national schools: their curricula, their students, their staff and their leadership and governance. Increasingly though, as the sector expands, the latter three (students, staff, and leadership) cease to be differentiating markers, as more and more indigenous students and staff engage with local international schools. Formal accreditation that has sought evidence for an active commitment to ‘internationalism/ interculturalism in education’ thus becomes a more reliable indicator of an international school (Council of International Schools, 2013).

Regardless of the level of internationality a curriculum deserves, in either case, international schooling has the tendency to blur the lines with regards to agency and the status quo, the cultural context and the presence of any political and/or social agendas. It is without doubt that just as with national education systems and institutions, international education is charged equally heavily with political and social connotations. The questions remain as to what those socio-political implications of the importation of Western-oriented curricula might be; who the agents of the so-called international education are; whether the agents are conscious of the socio-political implications; and who, indeed, benefits from the perceived implications? Ultimately, how is it possible for international education institutions to foster an ‘international mindset’ in a highly nationalised context, where sovereignty over all matters of education remain in the hands of the nation state?

These questions are raised and discussed throughout this thesis. However, the important question that permeates the thesis is that of how far does theory of education, identity and socialisation apply to international education, and how realistic is the attainment of post-national identities through any form of curricula? When students from host countries attend international schools, what
effect does it have on their national belonging compared to their nationally educated peers? Most importantly, has international education assisted us in cultivating a generation of globally minded youth, as Maurette and Peterson had long dreamt? From chapters five to seven, the findings gathered from interviews, focus groups, and participant observations provide useful insights for informing subsequent discussions surrounding such questions; questions that appear to be missing from the current literature on either education and socialisation, or globalisation and nationalism.

1.5 The political relevance of education

The sense of conflicting identities has never felt so strong across the world. In an age of globalisation that has sought to uniform the globe, to call for and engage in greater cross-cultural communication, better social harmony, tolerance and co-existence, identity continues to remain a source of seemingly intractable conflict. And yet, it is difficult to imagine a time in history when education was regarded a more significant enabling force, socially, politically and culturally, than at the end of the twentieth and the dawn of the twenty-first centuries (Guilherme, 2002, p. 3).

A critical study into education and identity is therefore valuable. Today, education is a key issue for politicians at the local, national and international levels. Political slogans such as ‘education for critical consciousness’ (Freire, 1973) and ‘education as cultural politics’ (Giroux) began to surface prior to and as part of the Civil Rights movement in the United States and contributed to education being referred to today as the ‘Civil Rights issue of our time’ (Guilherme, 2002).

In current political circles, education is acknowledged as a means for addressing contemporary social and security challenges. In the United Kingdom, talk of harnessing ‘British values’ as a preventative strategy against religious and political extremism has now been formalised in the UK government’s Prevent strategy (HM Government, 2011; 2015). In 2011, then British Prime Minister, David Cameron, urged in a speech on radicalisation and the causes of terrorism that British Muslims must embrace mainstream values
of freedom and equality. He announced that the doctrine of multiculturalism had “failed” and called for less “passive tolerance” towards divided communities and more “active, muscular liberalism” (Telegraph, 2011). Entrenching education’s role in social and security dilemmas in Britain was the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair in 2014. The investigation unveiled a ‘coordinated agenda to impose hardline Sunni Islam’ across UK schools, and resulted in greater efforts to expand the Prevent programme and training into the education sector. While educationists continue to push back on government efforts to introduce the Prevent strategy in the classroom, fearing the harms it will create on free speech (Guardian, 2016), the debate has placed the relevance of the curriculum to building good citizenship firmly in the spotlight. Whether popular or not, the British government - a global leader in counter extremism strategy - now views schools, more than ever, as key spaces for the positive socialisation and integration of multicultural British society, thereby merging educational reform with national security concerns.

Further afield, and at the heart of much of the global conflict, in the most bifurcated of societies across the Middle East and North Africa, education is widely acknowledged as crucial for rebuilding post-conflict zones and securing national stability and reconciliation. In Lebanon, an Education Reform Plan was launched in 1994, shortly after the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1989 (Abou Assali, 2012). The plan’s ambitious projects sought ‘to build an advanced and cohesive Lebanese society that would allow its children to live their lives in a climate of freedom, justice and democracy’ (CERD, 1994, p. 2). More recently, in Israel, a new civics textbook published in May 2016 sparked controversy when critics accused the editors of dehumanising and marginalising the Arab and Palestinian communities and emphasising Israel’s Jewish identity citizenship over its national democratic citizenship (Times of Israel, 2016). The controversy revealed the sensitive nature of citizenship education in societies of conflict and inter-communal tension.

Nevertheless, education is still widely seen at the policy level as a crucial component in preparing societies for a more peaceful and stable future. To rebuild Afghanistan, UNESCO’s Director General, Irina Bokova, announced a joint initiative with the Afghan government, Fund for Culture, to educate future
Afghans about their diverse cultural heritage and to tackle intolerance. On the same day, former British Prime Minister, the Right Honorable Tony Blair, announced his Global Commitment on Education against Extremism initiative, through which he urged all governments to sign a legally binding commitment to eradicate all hate speech and prejudicial content from within their national curriculum. He likened the initiative to the Kyoto Agreement on climate change and called for a combined and coordinated global leadership effort to set the standard for education against conflict and terrorism (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016).

With the pressure mounting on education institutions to assist in a more secure future, the academic community must be poised to respond to increasing demands for evidence that education and conflict prevention is rightly aligned. Much assumption is built on education-centered rehabilitation initiatives. The greatest assumption regarding the link between education and the promotion of tolerance is that exposure and encounter with other communities and cultures leads to a greater sense of respect towards difference, and a reduction in prejudicial attitudes towards alien communities. Consequently, there is a wealth of projects and programmes, many of them sponsored by international and multilateral aid agencies such as UNESCO, USAID and the World Bank, that centre on increasing exposure to religious and ethnic heritage, beliefs and practices. Harnessing years of commitment to promoting a ‘culture of peace and non-violence’, UNESCO’s new global initiative, Culture: a Bridge to Development, incorporates the Heritage and Dialogue project to promote ‘dialogue for reconciliation and intercultural understanding’ across cultures, and its PeaceEducation project places education systems at the heart of conflict prevention (UNESCO, 2013).

But how much of these efforts are built on conclusive evidence that encountering those from other cultures and communities can reduce the space for prejudice and even extremism to fester? Might it be an assumption that all hostile attitudes towards others are based on baseless perception, not on real experience? And how can education inoculate against hate, when the environments of the students and their everyday reality is still one of communal tensions, inequality and, at times, conflict? Finally, is it even possible to
effectively teach pluralism and tolerance, in undemocratic and intolerant societies? Responses to these questions are developed in the final chapters of this thesis, informed and inspired by the study’s original findings.

The last question - ‘is it possible to effectively teach pluralism in undemocratic societies?’ - is crucially important. Many international schools in the Middle East operate in undemocratic environments, in countries under autocratic regimes. Egypt is one such example. The students of British, American, Canadian international schools in such countries may receive excellent training in democratic, consensual participation in class, and be introduced to concepts of equality, human rights and respect for diversity. However, how far can such lessons be applied in a juxtaposing intolerant society with entrenched everyday practices that do not uphold the same values? Can those values realistically permeate into wider society, or does it in fact create frustration and confusion, or worse, cause one to reside such ideas of democracy and tolerance into the realms of impracticality and idealism, due to a lack of opportunity to reconcile what is taught and what is lived?

For too long, education has been placed on a pedestal among policymakers, with the belief that any education is better than none, and that the more one knows of the world, the more one will like it. It is a naïve response to today’s challenges, especially those of identity, agency and legitimacy, that each requires sophisticated and compelling responses from those in power. Education can do harm, and exposure of diversity does not indefinitely lead to peace and acceptance. The values in research are to understand what can make education harmful, or at least unhelpful? While many of the questions posed above are not directly tested in this thesis, they do emerge throughout the discussions, and are relevant to a critical study of global citizenship education. If a global mindset is deemed more peaceful and inclusive than a national mindset, then how realistically can formal education promote such a frame of mind for future generations? How much of what we know is assumed, and how much is based on evidence? When we begin to scrutinise between what we know based on facts, and what we merely assume, it is then that we are able to acknowledge what of today’s geopolitical ailments are in the realms of an educational rehabilitation.
1.6 From foreign education to international education

The concept of international education in the Middle East has markedly evolved, as it has done globally. However, its early history is important in appreciating the historical relationship between international schools and Middle Eastern societies in particular. In today’s discussions of international education in the Middle East, the bulk of attention is paid to the Arab Gulf states, which have become host to the most recent fertile market for international education. However, the early history of the missionary origins of the region’s most famous institutions - the American University in Cairo (AUC) and the American University in Beirut (AUB) - is so often forgotten.

International education has become marginally less elitist and Eurocentric, and less detached from wider societies than it historically was. However, much of this is due to lessons learned from a long history of foreign education in the region. Indeed, the Middle East has a rich pedigree of foreign elite schooling. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the region hosted a plethora of foreign education projects (Huber, 2015). Predominantly through colonial governance and Christian (and Jewish) missionaries from America, following the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire, many of these institutions exist today as prestigious institutions for international education.

The American University in Cairo (AUC) was itself a product of international networks that merged global visions of empire, American Protestantism and interwar internationalism, which in its earliest formations verged more heavily towards Western cultural supremacy than the celebration of diversity that is now associated with the term, ‘internationalism’. Huber (2015) describes the networks and their institutions as ‘global microcosms’ that began as humble missionary endeavours, but became agents of social engineering, rooted in Western cultural supremacy and the global North’s dominance over trade relations. They sought, through the introduction of a liberal arts education and character training, to construct a regional elite, or the ‘making of men’ in favour of, and loyal to, the world order of the day (McClenahan, 1921; Murphy, 1987).
When missionaries of the Presbyterian American Mission established the AUC University shortly after World War I, it was placed in the centre of Cairo’s administrative hub, in *Midan al-Tahrir* (Owen, 1997). To the west was Egypt’s Egyptian University, and to the east of the Nile stood al-Azhar University, the traditional hub of Islamic higher learning. Adamant to not compete directly with local competitors, the American University stressed that they had not entered the Arab world ‘merely to reproduce or parallel what an Egyptian institution can do’ but instead to complement the pre-existing *eduscape* (Murphy, 1987). Despite this claim, unlike its sister institution in the region, the American University in Beirut (AUB), the AUC sought to recruit a more indigenous student body. As McLenahan (1921) documents:

Applications came from the most influential strata of society […] sons of pashas, Judges of the higher courts, Governors of the provinces, Mayors of cities and towns, and some of the wealthiest land-owners in the country (p.2).

For missionaries, it was a break from the past. No longer were they limited to preaching to the poor and underprivileged. In the Middle East, they had gained access to the most influential people in Egyptian society. How did they do this? And did this demand for a foreign education indicate an early taste for cosmopolitanism among the Egyptian elite of the post-Ottoman period?

The founders of the AUC had adapted and adjusted the original cultural supremacist and deeply missionary model that had shaped its Beirut partner, AUB, and the Protestant Robert College that was established in Istanbul in 1863 (Huber, 2015). Both had inspired the establishment of the AUC in the ‘strategic position’ that Egypt offered (McLenahan, 1921, p. 1), but it had evolved from its pioneering sister institutions as it sought not to impose the West on the East, but to synthesise East and West. It was here where the case for a ‘world in one single location’, and ‘a piece of America in the Middle East’ was so actively engaged. Yet this adaptation was a matter of survival more than an abandonment of cultural supremacy or missionary impetus. The rise in nationalist movements in the region had created real hostility and tension between Christian missionaries who had become increasingly associated with
the colonial powers. It was in this same context that the AUB was encouraged to change its name from the Syrian Protestant College, and missionary institutions re-conceptualised their mission along religiously generic, ‘internationalist lines’ (Huber, 2015). The religious impetus in all official sources were pared down and replaced by a language of modernity and the American vision of universalism (Bickers, 1967; Huber, 2015). The fusion of missionary and American Universalist visions penetrated the institutions, and influenced the Board’s approach to their host countries. Indeed, it is documented that the founder of the AUC, Charles Watson, was inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and born into Cairo’s ‘cosmopolitan’ circles of the nineteenth century (Huber, 2015; Sharkey, 2008).

Thus, the history of the region’s oldest missionary schools illustrate how ideologically the language of internationalism became inextricably linked to the United States, and educational institutions in the Middle East had become an invaluable arm of American soft power (Huber, 2015; Bertelsen, 2012; Ment, 2011; Smith, 1973;). Transformation of the region through education was, by the twentieth century, a well-entrenched concept. Henry Morgenthau, American ambassador in Istanbul, clarified this in his speech:

As for the future, the Near East cannot be intelligently constructed into a civilized (sic) district without education. The people are unable to supply it themselves and unless America undertakes it, it will not be undertaken. (Morgenthau, quoted in Huber, 2015).

The Middle East had became a permanent social project for America, as it had long been for European powers. By the end of the 1920s, the social sciences enjoyed a boost in attention following the economic crisis, and among American sociologists, ideas of social engineering and social planning had become vogue (Huber, 2015). Such academic movements inspired a new philosophy of international education. The construction of a favourable elite in the Middle East was long highlighted in the original objectives of the early missionary education projects, but this idea had become further entrenched as missionaries increased their experience of the region and its people. However, education abroad had not proven to be a success, as men trained in Western institutions
would return home with an ‘education which fitted them for life on the Continent instead of the Levant’ (America’s Outpost, 1921). Instead, transporting the institutions to the Middle East would help ensure that the elite could be trained along Western lines, stay home, and influence their own community.

When understanding the networks of ideas and motives that had come to shape the early rumblings of ‘international’ education, it is clear to see why the terminology remains ambiguous in meaning and in application. Theorists engaged in this field know of its controversial history, and while contemporary discourse has a tendency to imply that international education and cosmopolitanism is a new phenomenon, this rich history of colonial and American missionary beginnings cannot be edited out from a critical analysis of international education today. This brief history also reveals the dynamics of a small but politically and socially powerful sector of learning, and illustrates the incredible connections between studies of educational institutions and political and social science. Such institutions were of such importance to Western powers in influencing the direction and orientation of the region’s elite; active pragmatism towards the institutions’ outward posture and relationship with the structures of power were always necessary.

The necessity for adaptation continues today, as curricula providers face competition from one another to gain access to a lucrative market in the Middle East. All revel in the chance to cultivate a more open-minded society in some of the world’s most closed and conservative communities. As international schooling becomes more accessible, and disengaged with its colonial past, there is an opportunity to harness the access into some of the world’s most challenging societies, break echo chambers and present viable alternatives to inward looking societies and the politics of intolerance. As the world continues to turn to education systems to try to make the planet a more stable place to live for future generations, international schools have already had a head start. Lessons can be gained from research into host nationals in international schools today; who are they, and can we really educate an elite for peace?
1.7 Why study Egypt?

At the time of setting this topic, shortly after the uprisings took place in 2011, society within Egypt was torn apart, becoming politically, socially, economically and religiously polarised. It remains so today. Egypt is, and always has been, in its modern form, a country with both deep and real poverty combined with that of phenomenal wealth, though concentrated among a very small elite that is predominately placed within the commercial cities, Cairo and Alexandria. While over the years the country witnessed an expansion of the middle classes, particularly following President Nasser’s socialist policies in the 1950s and 1960s, the levels of poverty and wealth appears to have grown far quicker and deeper. President Sadat’s corrective economic policies provided more financial opportunities to those wealthy enough to invest in Egypt’s expanding market, and it swiftly helped to shape the country’s commercial elite through capitalism. Those belonging to Egypt’s wealthy minority would later continue to dominate Egypt’s economy under Sadat’s successor, President Mubarak, as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flooded into Cairo, Alexandria, and the coastal cities. As FDI spread across the country, the demand for services that catered to the expanding expatriate communities that accompanied the increase in investment rose. Schools that enabled expatriate families to educate their children with the same standard and content they could receive back home soon became a requisite to ensuring FDI remained at its high. As such, the concept of contemporary international schools reached Egypt, much as it had done across the Gulf, in oil-rich Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iran and Iraq. The 1980s and 1990s for Egypt saw huge expansions of schools marketed for British, American, French and German families, and thus a mushrooming of a parallel international education sector.

At this time, such private, Western-oriented, international schools were typically concentrated within the capital, and as demand expanded, they too stretched out onto the outskirts of the city. With the exception of but a handful, all international schools in Cairo are located a short drive away from the centre, in affluent urban expansion projects such as New Cairo City. As Cairo itself has expanded outwards, many of the schools find themselves engulfed by newly
built tower blocks and the factories of the industrial Free Zones, though once fields and desert surrounded such schools.

Their geographical location, typically disconnected to the bustling centre, is purely strategic - presumably in order to enable the option of expansion as the need for facilities have grown (Bastable, 2015). What is more, many of the schools are in what is, or was, Cairo’s wealthier quarters. While the average city dweller in Egypt lives within a block of high-rise flats, the minority upper class, wealthy, Egyptians reside in villas, located along the edges of the city in self-sufficient, privately secured, compounds. Those who own the plushest villas have emerged the typical clientele of Egypt’s top private international schools. During term dates such families rarely embark on journeys into central Cairo, where a more humble lifestyle dominates. Does such a physical disconnection to the heart of the city have an ideological impact? Their reduced direct interaction with Cairo proper has no doubt contributed to their perceived alienation in the eyes of their less wealthy compatriots. However, how associated to the masses of Egyptians do they, the students themselves, feel in their remote campuses? Many campuses of international schools in Cairo sit in open countryside, on the edge of the city, surrounded by land on which itinerant farmers with their provincial lives make camp, and local shepherds would pass on by with their valuable, but humble, flock. The school grounds are typically gated, with security cameras, high fences and the school’s very own private, armed security guards who patrol the grounds and search visitors before admission into the complex. Such heightened security is increasingly the case since the 2011 unrest, which saw periods of severe insecurity in remote quarters of the major cities. The admittance of offspring of high net-worth Egyptians has similarly come to necessitate high-level security.

There is no study on Egypt, and indeed on any other Arab or Middle East country, that has sought to explore the dynamics at play with international schools and their host countries. Egypt has been severely understudied in the field of international education generally, with only one citable and widely acclaimed research that supports the literature on international education in Egypt, and that is Fatma H. Sayed’s published work, Transforming Education in Egypt: Western Influence and Domestic Policy Reform (Sayed, 2006). Despite
this, Sayed’s (2006) research on the Western influence on education is in fact mostly concerned with the involvement of international aid organisations in the administration of educational policy in Egypt, rather than a specific account of or study into international schools, their practices and implications on society. Sayed does not attempt to explore societal attitudes towards international involvement in education. However, with her background in the American University of Cairo, she regularly alludes to the principles of international education in the country. Regardless, a study into the areas of the international sector and the values and attitudes of those local students who are educated in international schools in a Middle East country is yet to be successfully achieved.

The international system in the region is far from homogenous, however (Hayden & Thompson, 2000). The success rate of international schools and colleges are assumed to vary across the Middle East, and the reasons for a franchise university opening in the UAE might be very different to the reasons for an opening of an international school in Cairo. Likewise, the social backgrounds of those attending such institutions might differ, not just country-by-country, but also between each school and institution. So too might the sponsors of these institutions, and likewise their boards of trustees. Consequently, no findings or conclusions that are made with regards to a study of international schools in Egypt, or elsewhere, will necessarily contribute to any conclusions made on the rest of the Middle East. The generalisability of the observations is limited, given the absence of any system or consensus within the industry. Nevertheless, it is certainly a place to begin searching for some answers - answers that could build a more informed picture of an ever-growing, parallel, system of education and class formation.

1.8 Multidisciplinary value of the study

The findings of this research help to reach a greater understanding of today’s Middle East through an exploration of the educated youth of al-Shaqiqa al-Kubra (the Big Sister), the affectionate term used for Egypt in Arabic for its central cultural and political role in the region, post-independence. Egypt earned its big sister status as a leader of intellectual thought to her neighbouring Arab
states since the early periods of Muhammad Ali Pasha, and her education system became a model for Arab neighbours. Through time, Egypt’s leaders led the region through periods of European engagement before and after the First World War, followed by nationalist independence post-1922, and later Western rapprochement from the 1970s onwards. Egypt is still regarded by many as the heart of the region and the Arab world (Vatikiotis, 1991; Dawisha, 1976; Hourani, 2013). Given the scale and limited scope of the research, the observations made in this thesis cannot be treated as conclusive with respect to Egypt and indeed the rest of the region. Yet, it is symbolically poignant a case study into identity and education in the Middle East.

Thus, to those Arabists concerned with Middle Eastern politics and society today, the observations shed light on the complexity of identity among today’s Egyptian youth. Any research that is built on direct engagement with Arab youth living in the region today with regards to current events offers a valuable resource as we attempt to piece together the puzzle of the region post uprisings. The original and rich qualitative data adds to a void in our literature and informs us of the multiple worldviews competing for attention in this troubled, volatile region. Indeed, the students of today could be leaders of tomorrow. Though the subjects of this thesis are a minority, privileged sector of Egyptian society, these young people are the children of today’s political elite, and they may well follow in their parents’ footsteps and come to shape the regional politics of the future. Understanding the complex journeys of competing identities and critically applying theories from other disciplines into our practice of regional expertise is invaluable.

For Western policymakers, it reveals the perception of the West among a sector of Egyptian society often criticised by their fellow countrymen as being ‘Westernised’ and ‘Americanised’. Egyptian youth enrolled in international schools are regularly accused of being out of touch with the wider mass of Egyptians, and at times, unpatriotic. But quite how far do they embrace this? The curriculum countries export is just as political as it is educational. Whether intended to or not, these schools are spaces of diplomatic value, but they can become negative or poor representations of our values and culture if mishandled. While education and cultural assistance, as provided through the
British Council for example, is but a form of soft power in a world where hard power is becoming all the more urgent, the emphasis is still on power. Soft or otherwise, the access to influence and guide perceptions of Western interests and appreciation of the Middle East region is a privilege and an opportunity that would be foolish to waste. Critically evaluating the evidence put forward in this thesis, alongside the theoretical debates throughout, will be a worthwhile endeavour for those wishing to maximise the impact of our exported curricula.

The findings and discussions that follow are also of multidisciplinary value, as they work towards filling a void in various literatures. The subject of education in the field of political science has only recently (in the last 40 years) gained any marked traction. Before the mid 1960s, it was reasonably difficult to locate a country or regional case study that dedicated little more than a paragraph or two to the role of education in political and social transitions, particularly with regards to the Middle East (Vatikiotis, 1991). Within this upsurge of interest, economists have emphasised the need for investment in human resources and the development of man-power; political scientists the importance of education for nation-building and political development in general; and social scientists the role of education in transforming peoples’ attitudes, beliefs and values (Szyliowicz, 1973). This thesis focuses on the latter two, considering both the role education plays in the building of a sense of citizenship in a community or a nation, alongside its seemingly powerful role in shaping specific attitudes and beliefs in civil society - locally and globally. In other words, this thesis examines, through multidisciplinary discourses, the relationship between identity and education.

Of all the concepts to be examined and assessed in the context of this research, none have been as well established as the education-socialisation nexus. It is the literature on this relationship that has particular relevance when exploring the relationship between identity and education. Given the breadth and generality of the subject of education, as well as so many of the varying approaches and perspectives it incorporates, it is not surprising that conceptual, terminological and theoretical consensus remains highly elusive. But, acknowledging the power of education to construct ideology and attitudes is key to appreciating the past, the present, and the future in education and society,
simply because it remains the most static principle in education, universally. It will become clear that all other theories and perspectives that are covered in this thesis share one aspect; the acknowledgment that education is a socialising utility and that it functions not simply as an object of change, but crucially also as an agent of change.

Thus, to educationists generally, the observations raise some doubts regarding the causal relationship between education and socialisation. Though this thesis initially hoped to support and illustrate the current literature on education and socialisation, this research has found that contrary to prevailing literature, education was not a defining factor of the students’ outlooks on life and identity. By exploring the attitudes and opinions of Egyptian students educated in Egypt’s international schools to that of their nationally educated peers, the educational environment had a minimal variable effect on their values, their identities and their relationship to Western culture, or a cosmopolitan outlook. In fact, home life proved to be a more pivotal factor in their identity and value constructions, particularly when it came to the teachings of religious identity. As such, this thesis sets out to further understand how and why education, in this particular study, appeared to play such an unexpectedly minimal role in socialising the students, when literature clearly emphasises the power and influence education can have on conditioning and socialising children.

The limited role education played as a socialising force in this study may be apparent because this study specifically explored the role of international and foreign curricula on host-country nationals. In this way, perhaps this study exposed the limitations of education because the education and the culture through which the curricula was informed and structured was significantly detached and existed in contrast to both the country through which it functioned, and the students’ own national culture or background. For, if indeed education had a significant power attributed to it in shaping and yielding identities, orientations and values, then the results of this study should have shown clear signs of students having been significantly ‘Westernised’ or, in part, their Egyptian identity considerably weakened in favour of a hybrid of Western-Egyptian ideals and cosmopolitan values. That it did not yield such results begs further exploration into how educational experiences can truly shape identities.
and what conditions and factors must take place in order to widen the scope of education’s role as a socialising force. What it suggests is that education must be complimentary to the students’ lifestyles and customs and must be framed as such in order for significant socialisation of values to be yielded. In the final chapter, a theory of firewalls that can obstruct the impact education has when placed in an international context is proposed. The proposed theory draws on Billig’s (1995) theory of Banal Nationalism to present the everyday persistent challenges that undermine the cosmopolitan ideas of international mindedness transmitted through formal education.

For international education experts and practitioners, this thesis raises important questions for what it means to educate within an international context, and how value-oriented, formal education is transferred in the classroom. What does it mean to teach for global mindedness, and how are we measuring the impact of international education for global citizenship? Important concerns are raised from this small-scale research such as the need to regulate across international schools and the need to develop a deeper understanding of what the ideological deliverable is of international schooling; what is quality international education and is it functioning in economic and, more importantly in the current global challenges, in value terms?

Finally, for those concerned with globalisation such as political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists, this thesis offers yet more evidence for what globalisation is in practice - its achievements and its limitations. The discussions that follow from the observations of this study raise important questions with regards to the agents of globalisation and the active or passive consumers of it. If globalisation is intended to breakdown the restrictions of nationalism and patriotism, then international schooling, as a product or agent, does not appear to be providing an alternative to traditional identity constructs. The question remains as to why that is. This thesis offers some potential explanations based on its findings, and critically evaluates our understanding of the term, and its associated terminology, to date. In chapters two, five, six and seven, themes of globalisation permeate, and it is in these chapters where the weight of critical analysis is made into our approach when discussing globalisation.
Crucially, despite questioning the limitations of power that internationalised education truly has in identity constructions, the thesis does still regard education as a transformative agent. It is thus acknowledges that education, both in history and in present day, has proven its potential to develop and cultivate ideas within society and is consequently a valuable method for social intervention. Yet within the thesis, questions are raised as to how far its transformative abilities and potential can translate when practiced in cross-cultural contexts. It raises the question of the sensitivity of society to the power dynamic within education and the importance for certain qualities to be present and shared between the educator, the educated, and the content and context. Factors such as a perception of shared values and cultural authenticity, and applicability, appear to be crucial in determining a fully receptive relationship between consumer (i.e. the student and parents) and provider (educational bodies, policymakers, teachers). In this way, the need for all parties within the educational contract to have shared common goals and to have a mutual relationship based on a common vision is essential for education to overcome such firewalls and realise its transformative role within cross-cultural contexts, while positively contributing to identity construction and the shaping of values.

1.9 Structure of the thesis

Throughout this thesis, education has been recognised as a transformative agent – politically and socially. In the following chapter (two) this is presented with regards to theory that has come to formulate an understanding of how education has developed as a tool for social construction. Tracing the intellectual discourse on identity formation, the first part of chapter two offers a critical analysis of the literature on national and supranational identity construction, as well as conceptions of national citizenship, globalisation and global citizenship which will each be shown to be relevant for this thesis and critical to an understanding of how education can affect our senses of belonging. In part two of chapter two, the role of education in shaping identity according to existing literature is deeply surveyed. This forms the foundation for understanding the logic behind education for global citizenship and theories that regard education as corrective of social and global issues. In the final part of chapter two, part three traces and assesses competing narratives for
international schooling, and develops theoretical consensus on ‘international mindedness’ towards a working definition for the study.

Once acknowledging education as significant in the process of identity conception according to prevailing theory, the political and social significance of education is illustrated through an Egyptian context of education and social reform in chapter three. It is here where trends in education philosophies and policies under Egypt’s consecutive ruling elites (from the nineteenth century to present) is critically analysed, both in relation to wider social and political dynamics of the time, and of prevailing educational philosophies. Egypt’s journey through modern education demonstrates the sensitivity of education politically and socially, and the importance of understanding education’s potential in developing a collective and individual narrative of the self. The relationship between international schools and the Egyptian government is also covered in the latter of chapter three, which is important in developing an understanding for the increased demand for international education across Egypt. Chapter three will reveal the hostilities towards foreign education, which in part remains today and which dictates a carefully managed but politically charged relationship with the Egyptian government.

Significant challenges relating to the design of this study are crucially discussed in chapter four. A triangulation of various research methods and epistemologies has resulted in a complex but rich methodology that requires guidance in interpreting the unique findings, and some important caveats. In addition, chapter four covers essential discussion of practical and ethical challenges related to the fieldwork, as well as clarification of some ambiguous terminology that is central to this study.

The observations documented in this thesis have generated some unexpected results that appear to contradict the literature on education and socialisation as outlined in chapter two. Thus a critical study into notions of global citizenship education, both in the present context and more generally, has become the main feature of this research. Consequently, while in chapter two a thorough analysis into our understanding of contested notions of globalisation, cosmopolitanism and Westernisation are explored (particularly in relation to
national identity), related discussions continue to feature throughout the second half of the thesis. Notably, in chapters five to seven, theories of cultural convergence and polarisation are crucially revisited in light of the findings. At times, students of international schools involved in this study showed more signs of nationalism than their nationally educated counterparts, and presented as equally traditional, conservative and ‘anti-West’ as their compatriots. This is presented in detail in chapter five and six, alongside reflections both with regards to prevailing literature and preexisting opinion surveys conducted in the region that have generated similar trends.

Finally, in chapter seven, the observations presented in chapters five and six are explored for their significance and a theory is proposed that acknowledges everyday factors that are typically present in host-national students’ lives which, as argued, behave as obstacles to achieving an effective post-national education. These are presented as firewalls, and are informed by observations from the fieldwork in addition to interrelated debates from multi-disciplinary literature.

The consequence of such firewalls is sobering to commentators who call on education for wholesale rehabilitation of global tensions. Yet, by identifying the limits of formal education as a corrective instrument, there can be future discussions of how to combine educational efforts with broader interventions for a more stable and tolerant world. Thus, in the final chapter (Conclusion and Perspectives), important areas for future research is highlighted, as well as further related insight that seeks to illustrate the main takeaways of this thesis.
Chapter 2 – Education and socialisation

This chapter lays out the literature on identity construction as relevant to this thesis and explores the role education plays in the socialisation of an individual. When exploring realities of cosmopolitanism, a familiarity of the complexities and theories on how identities form and how they manifest is important. Such explorations inevitably lead to discussions on the factors and institutions that determine and inform individual and collective identities. This thesis draws the spotlight on education institutions and their role in cultivating a sense of collective identity. Thus an examination of the literature into the connection between education and socialisation is the purpose of this chapter. Such theories are foundational to policies that seek to address social and security challenges through education reform and intervention.

To begin a critical study into the role of education in cultivating cross-cultural coexistence, an interdisciplinary discussion must be had on the role education is believed to play in determining cultural and national senses of belonging. As will be made clear in this chapter, prevailing literature on identity construction suggests that individuals typically form a multitude of identity descriptors that relate to their sense of self and their experiences. Crucial to the discussions of this thesis are determining where national identity sits within this repertoire of identities, and how this informs theories on cosmopolitanism and globalisation. To explore this fully, theories of citizenship are introduced which leads to core questions of this chapter: How is identity and citizenship related; Is citizenship a prerequisite for national belonging, or vice versa; can there be such a thing as global citizenship? In discussions of international education and education for international mindedness, the latter is especially important in attempting to determine the success and efficacy of international education. In other words, how easily can an education towards cosmopolitanism and post-national citizenship be realised in today’s context?

As will be argued in this chapter, an examination of international education and its effects on host nationals cannot be achieved without a measured and critical exploration into theories of globalisation and ‘Westernisation’ more generally,
for the developments of each are strongly linked through Western cultural hegemony. For this reason, discussion of theories and counter-theories of globalisation feature in this chapter and continue to remain relevant beyond it.

As for structure, the chapter can be read in three parts, posing three core questions that are foundational to the thesis. The first - ‘how is identity shaped?’ - is where a multi-disciplinary review of the literature on identity construction is introduced. Here, distinctions will be made of various forms of identities, including those that are believed to be static and deeply set, versus those that are more temporary and ‘weak’. The distinctions raised in the literature welcome a debate on the strength and determinacy of national identities, and pave the way for discussions on supranational identities and cosmopolitan consciousness that will follow.

The second core question explored in this chapter is ‘how far is education important’ in the construction of national and, by extension, supranational, identities? It is here where a discussion of the political significance of education institutions in the development of a national consciousness and society is explored. History of modern-state education systems have entrenched the inextricability of the education-socialisation nexus in education, social and political science literature. Education will be concluded as a recognised transformative agent in the development of national consciousness and citizenship.

The politics of education, while indisputably recognised in reference to national education systems worldwide, is equally present in the context of international education. Yet the presumed post-national ideological posture of international curricula often suggests that international education can be isolated from politics and the political economy. This will be strongly critiqued in the latter and third part of this chapter - ‘Education for post-national socialisation’ - where emerging theories of the drivers of international education will be explored and critically analysed. An in depth discussion of what is meant by the term international education will take place during this section, along with an account of significant new trends occurring in this sub-sector of elite education.
2.1 How is identity shaped?

2.1.1 The psychology of identity: self-identity and collective identity

The study of the ‘formation of identity’ can be traced as far back as Freud’s (1923) ‘id, ego, superego’ of the self. Thus, the earliest literature of value to this discussion belongs in the domain of psychological and psychosocial theory, and most specifically, developmental psychology. It is from Freud’s ego (Latin meaning ‘I’), the largely conscious part of the mind, that subsequent theories of the self have developed. For example, Erikson (1968) applied Freud’s ‘ego identity’ to conceptualise the ‘identity crisis’ (Cote and Levine 2002, p. 95), a move that paved the way for the emergence of further literature that utilised philosophies of the self to help theorise identity and notions of competing identities.

While self is different from identity, or the identity of the person, both are related. Identity in the field of psychology is generally described as the ‘sense of self’. At its core, the self became seen as cognitively organised to channel identities in interactive contexts, with the self regarded as a product of social interaction. Dominating this new direction in literature in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, American pragmatists such as Mead (1934) concluded that there is no sense of self at birth. The individual is not conscious of his or herself and that self is learned or ‘socialised’ by others (Mead 1934, p. 138; Biesta, 1998, p. 91). Subsequently, concepts of the self became defined as a cognitively constructed concept and memory structure (e.g. Anderson, Glassman & Gold, 1998; Catrambone, Bieke & Neidenthal, 1996; Brewer & Hewstone, 2004, p. xi), and identity as cognitively constructed through social interactions and experiences.

2.1.2 Collective identity

By the second half of the twentieth century, an increased interest in ‘collective identities’ emerged within the psychological field. Tajfel’s and Turner’s Social Identity Theory was widely applied, as it asserted that ‘identity represents the conceptual link between individual and society as a whole’ (Tajfel and Turner,
The consequence of which meant that an individual did not just have a personal and inner self, but rather several selves that correspond to wider circles or social groups to which they feel a member, the latter determined by the social-cognitive processes of social categorisation. The distinction between ‘ingroup’ and outgroup’ became important to identity construction, defined in a relative or flexible manner in respect to the activities an individual is engaged in. As Tajfel and Turner explained, different social contexts could create different thoughts, feelings and actions on the basis of his or her personal, family, or national ‘level of self’ (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

In line with Tajfel’s and Turner’s Social Identity Theory, several recent writers have supported the belief of ‘several selves’ in that individuals do not have singular identities but rather a ‘repertoire of different identities’ (Ross, 2007). According to Hall (1992, 1996, 1997) an individual will utilise each of these varied identities, sometimes combining them, depending on where they are, whom they are with, and the particular social context in which they find themselves. Hall also emphasised the occasional contradictory nature of an individual’s set of identities (1992, pp. 276-277). Amartya Sen (2006) appears to support this. A strong advocate for the belief that identities are multi-layered and complex, Sen attacked the ‘fallacy of singular identity’ and argued that to believe that individuals have but one identity is tantamount to ‘forcing them into boxes’ and reducing them to just members of a social group or community (2006, p.176). Listing possible identity associations, Sen further argues how it is entirely plausible that an individual relates to an amalgamation of identities, such as being a feminist, Asian, an Indian citizen, of Bengali heritage, a British resident, a man, an atheist, and a defender of gay and lesbian rights (Sen, 2006, p.19). Gundara (2006) echoes this, providing a similarly complex and often juxtaposing set of possible identity descriptors that can exist in one individual.

Many of the identity descriptors proposed by Sen and Gundara are geographically based, and in many cases, such geographic identity descriptors also dictate a set of other identities. For example, by being an Indian citizen, one also relates to Asian as an identity descriptor relating to self. Other sets of identities could be related to one’s relationship or affinity to others, such as a
feminist, or a defender of gay and lesbian rights, but they are also part of a community and thus are linked to a sense of membership (Ross, 2007).

This complex view of identities as, Ross (2007) describes, ‘a palate of pigments from which colors and combinations can be selected at will’ is not supported by all involved in the literary discourse. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) for example, criticise writers such as Hall for arguing that identities are used and controlled as resources to the individual to meet their contingent needs. Rather, according to Hall’s critics, identity should be held in its ‘strong’ meaning that considers it a fixed notion of the self; unaltered and long lasting. All other understandings of identity are fluid or ‘weak’ definitions of identity. The dominant and fixed notion of national identity is the basis of this critique.

However, proponents of a more fluid conception of identities, such as Hall, do not argue that all identities are forever in flux. Instead, individuals typically maintain a relatively constant collage of identities, each more or less presented in a wide range of social contexts. The diversity of individual and collective identities is presented through social contexts, as identities are expressed in relation to other individuals’ identities. In sync with the Social Identity theory, there is a body of literature that encompasses what are considered standard sociological texts on identity construction that demonstrate the way individuals display various constructions of themselves to different people who enter their social circle. Authors of such literature include Berger and Luckman (1966) and Goffman (1969). Established theorists such as Foucault (1978) have even gone as far as to explain how those identities that may be regarded as naturally occurring, such as sexuality, are likewise products of social interaction.

Thus, social constructivism on identity implies that we develop our identities through a range of social processes, and that each identity descriptor that we come to relate to is socially determined as we define ourselves in relation to others (Ross, 2007). Our audience will also be defining our identity in their terms, based on their perceptions of who they are. In this regard, identity is relative.
2.1.3 National and supranational identity

Research and debates in the late twentieth century on the European Union and the strengths of European identity over national identities have yielded some useful theories that can have interesting implications for identity and citizenship, and identity and globalisation - each being relevant to this thesis. Lutz et al. (2006) found that a growing proportion of young people in the European community has acknowledged, or at least displayed, a partial sense of European collective identity, alongside their national identity. They also found that the sense of European identity varied according to nationality, gender and social class, as well as age. While this supports theories of multiple identities, it also suggests the role supranational identities play. Jenkins (1996) argues that each individual has, within his or her collection of identities, one that is primary or dominant. According to Jenkins, this primary identity can be both independent and inimitable, but also share characteristics with other particular groups. In this, Jenkins follows Berger and Luckman (1966) in distinguishing between identities that have developed through interactions early in life - those that are not necessarily overwhelming or permanent, but primary.

Primary identities are often associated in the literature with national identity. Gellner (1983) stated that ‘a man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears’ (1983, p.6). Similarly, according to Anthony Smith, national identity trumps all others and is fundamental to the individual’s sense of self. While all other collective identities may co-exist, Smith (1991) argues that they rarely are able to replace the need for a national identity:

> Of all the collective identities in which human beings share today, national identity is perhaps the most fundamental and inclusive... Other types of collective identity - class, gender, race, religion - may overlap or combine with national identity but they rarely succeed in undermining its hold, though they may influence its direction. (Smith, 1991, p. 143).

However, according to Ross (2007), national identity is more complex than this. Smith assumes, according to Ross, that identity is based on ‘sameness’. As Smith argues, the members of a particular group are as alike in that they each
share a sense of shared difference from non-members outside the group (Smith 1991, p. 75). However, for some, this is a flawed theory as many studies reveal inconformity over conception of national belonging. In his study of French identity Weber (1976) revealed how rural and provincial French participants did not have a strong conception of themselves as French, and Mannitz (2004) found students in Paris to be unconventional in their notion of ‘Frenchness’. Despite this, Smith’s understanding of national identity implies that it is authentic, based on immediate relationships that confirm sameness.

Benedict Anderson (1991) has described the nation-state as an imagined political community. It is imagined because members will never know most of their comrades and fellow members. However, in the minds of a citizen lives a picture of national communion (Ross, 2007). There is no evidence to suggest, as Smith implies, that there is any consistency as to what this imagination reveals, and how it is constructed. Anderson’s thesis usefully identifies various tools and practices that have been used to foster a sense of shared and jointly imagined comradeship, for example the symbolism of historical events, identified as commonly significant for the nation’s members. Other processes that encourage assimilation and participation in national activities, such as military conscription and education, are ways Anderson suggests consistency in message is achieved that is central to constructing a sense of community.

Green (1990) highlights national education systems as tools through which to reproduce feelings of national identity to sustain national economies. Therefore, education systems were not merely cultural institutions as Anderson refers to them, but also deeply functional. For Smith, however, ‘most governments since the end of the 19th Century have seen it as one of their prime duties to establish, fund and increasingly direct a mass system of public education […] in order to create an efficient labour force and loyal, homogenous citizenry’ (1995, p. 91). On this, Smith is not alone. Soysal (2002) has similarly argued the case that school curricula has assisted in generating national and group identity through promoting national myths and celebrating national heroes as good ‘national character’. According to Billig, this process is ‘banal nationalism’ whereby continued celebrations of certain lifestyles and norms become fixed as habitual or routine and in time become ‘enhabited’ (1995, p. 95).
More will be discussed of the specific role education plays in the construction of a nation-state in the following chapter. However, what is important here is that from these perspectives, identity, from the point of view of nationalism, can be the result of being or feeling the same as others, and expressing continuity with the group, as well as through the sense of being unique, or different from another. It is an apparent paradox of identity- that it can be the result of desire for conformity, or the result of inconformity.

However, Smith (1991) and Gellner (1983) implied that some identities can be fundamental, and that once an individual initiates into a group, an individual declares a fixed affinity with all others of that group. However, some suggest that it is far more transient and inconclusive- and that includes national identities. They may be particularly temporary in childhood and adolescence, according to Ross (2007). This has interesting implications when it comes to educating for a global citizenship and international mindedness.

In fact, some theorists believe that school years often involve children and adolescents creating categories of their own to ‘Other-ise’ their peers, and thereby determine their own identity. Such categories include race (Archer, 2003), gender (Hey, 1997) or class and sexuality (Mac An Ghaill, 1994). This suggests that despite a national belonging, sub-categorisation still takes place, and that full membership into a group is more selective than Smith and Gellner suggest. Mannitz (2004) describes a process of ‘identity management’ amongst migrant descent students in European schools. Mannitz recalls:

> Conceptualisations were negotiated that concerned their own predispositions vis-à-vis the surrounding majority society, together with criteria and views regarding how to assess the presumed cultural differences between their home situations and wider society […] As well as becoming German, French, Dutch or British, these young people have apparently adopted types of globally marketed youth culture. (Mannitz, 2004, p. 308).

This implies a sense of agency of the individual, and negotiating power, with
regards to identity formation. The literature does not clarify whether this is conscious agency or subconscious, but the very fact that internal negotiations appear to take place means that national identity can be dominant in some contexts (and in certain periods), but at other times local or regional identities, or supranational identities, may be more relatable and applicable, such as European, Muslim or part of a globalised youth culture (Ross, 2007; Mannitz, 2004).

As prevailing literature on identity suggests, identity is socially constructed. While it is commonly referred to in the singular, a person’s sense of identity can encompass multiple, sometimes conflicting, reference points that uniquely come together to form their personal repertoire of identities. Identities are also not static. A person can relate to one identity reference point at one time in their life, but disassociate later in their life. In turn, they can form new identities that match their current status. However, it has also been suggested that some identities are more foundational, or primary, than others. National identity is notably regarded in the literature as one such primary identity.

The importance of a national identity has been the subject of much debate in the literature on citizenship. However, few other identity references benefit from an organised system that is designed to nurture and construct the meaning of belonging in the same way that national identities have in the modern world through national education systems. Citizenship education, to use the most obvious element of national education in this context, is the education citizens receive to initiate them into the community of a nation-state, teaching the next generation the rights and duties of a good citizen. However, national belonging is not just nurtured simply through one part of the curriculum. It is constructed, promoted and rewarded through multiple aspects of the curriculum and school life, from history and religious studies, to assembly and sports.
2.2 How far is education important?

It is crucial to engage with the foundational literature that has led to our understanding of education as a socialising and transformative agent. It is a common appreciation in studies relating to mass education that curricula are often a product of the ruling elite. It has been argued before that as particular groups or classes arise and gain power, they build institutions, such as mass education, to maintain and strengthen their influence (Boli, Ramirez and Meyer, 1985). Mass education, in this way, is by definition understood as socialisation, within and on behalf of a given political order, charged heavily with political connotations (Kaplan, 2006). Through the school system, the state acts to promote core values and principles considered requisite for its definition of ‘good citizenship’. What such core values entail can alter according to the trending political rhetoric of a nation, determined by those most dominant groups within the structures of the ruling elite (Katz, 1971; Willis, 1977; Apple 1979; Carnoy and Levin, 1985).

In academic work beginning in the 1990s on the education-society nexus, many scholars started to examine the role of education in state formation, arguing that rather than focusing on the privileged nature of education in the hands of the social elite, the national education system is crucial to the construction and maintenance of state institutions. Green (1990) first linked the establishment and development of nineteenth century education systems to the development of the modern state. He argued that modern education systems were an important means for furthering state development for the purpose of training and conditioning citizens that would maintain the state institutions and infrastructure. As such, education can and should be seen as a major aspect of the wider political system. However, education was also understood as an integral tool to help shape loyalties, exaggerate and spread ideologies to orchestrate a cultural condition favourable to those who control it. Effectively, education was crucial to creating political loyalty and sustaining myths and narratives deemed important to the nation and its initial and continuing unification (Weber, 1976; Gellner, 1983).
The importance of education to the ruling elite is widely acknowledged through the existence of ministries of education in every government structure around the world, and the central role education is said to play in economic, social and political reform (Hill & Fee, 1995; Wong, 2002). Governments maintain sovereignty over national education systems, while major non-governmental and multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, place emphasis on education reform through Millennium Development Goals and Human Development Indexes. It is from this acknowledgement that scholars and government officials alike have each respected the role education plays in modernisation, and for the sake of this thesis, more importantly, social change or socialisation. State schooling was not simply about the development of a literate population or a trained and skilled workforce, but it was wielded just as importantly for the purpose of creating a certain kind of ideal patriot; one schooled in the morals and codes of conduct said to be important to the constructed nation (Mitchell, 2003).

Appreciating the modernisation process of the wider Middle East, its developments over the last 150 years have undoubtedly disrupted the old, ‘traditional’ society and culture (Szyliowicz, 1973; Hourani, 2013; Vatikiotis, 1991). The strong connection between modernisation and Westernisation has been documented. Kiely (2005) notes that from the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the sociological theories of development argued that Third World societies needed to ‘catch up with the West’. In other words, development was reached through a process of modernisation, which by consensus meant the adoption of Western technology and values towards economic growth. Grand theories of development dominated the field, such as Rostow’s argument that all societies eventually experience the same stages of development as they strive towards a modern, consumer society (Rostow, 1960). The emphasis in this process was on professionalism and efficiency; both attributes that had come to be associated with Western lifestyles.

By the 1960s, as Kiely notes, this assumption began to be increasingly contested by the Third World. Leaders and their societies became disappointed by the promises of development, and rogue examples of Cuba and Vietnam inspired a counter-movement that questioned the necessity of Westernisation.
for local development. It is at this time that, according to Kiely, rejection of ‘Western neo-colonialism’ emerged (Kiely, 2005, p. 121). Arguments that all-embracing contact with the West in fact hindered development and allowed the Western world to exploit developing countries, gained traction in the academic and development fields. Western domination, increasingly referred to as neo-colonialism, amounted because Western countries had monopolised the world economy. For this reason, the end of traditional colonialism had not eradicated Western imperialism (Kiely, 2005, p. 121).

The cultural imperialism thesis, as it is now referred, gained attention during the Cold War era, specifically in the context of US intervention and the developing belief that cultural flows, such as Western-dominated media, had a propaganda effect on societies through the promotion of the ‘American dream’ (Tunstall, 1977; Schiller, 1979; Seabrook, 2004). In this way, globalisation became seen as destructive to local cultures. In other words, from a sociological perspective, global interconnectedness has led to a ‘cultural homogenisation’ in favour of Westernisation. As Barnet and Cavanagh (2001) explicitly raise, the role of America became central to modern cultural flows:

With the toppling of the Berlin Wall and the embrace of free market ideologies in former and current communist countries, literally the entire planet is being wired into music, movies, news, television programs and other cultural products that originate primarily in the film and recording studios of the US (Barnet & Cavanagh, 2001, p. 169).

Barnet and Cavanagh, like many among them (for example, Sardar and Wyn Davies, 2004), associate the free flows of Western popular culture and Western products with a deeper cultural significance. The ‘soft’ cultural power of powerful Western countries, according to such a thesis, can be quantified through an assessment of free market access and a society’s exposure to material objects and services that originate from Western countries.

The impact of a dynamic Western culture is undoubtedly evident in the Middle East today, and in his comprehensive account of the process of modernisation in the region, Szyliowicz (1973) highlights the phenomenal change to the Middle
East in particular, as a result of the ‘nonchalant aggression of Western mentality’ (Rivlin & Szyliowicz, 1965). Furthermore, as Szyliowicz (1973) states and is supported by the works of Vatikiotis (1991) and Hourani (2013), education not only constitutes one of the major drivers contributing to the changes that have taken place in the history of the Middle East, but it has likewise commonly been regarded as a powerful tool for socio-modernisation (Szyliowicz, 1973).

Furthermore, mass schooling systems that marked the modern state came to serve and entrench existing power structures. By educating through authority and regulation, national education systems became public sites through which a bourgeois social order was perpetuated, generation upon generation. Arabist historians such as Vatikiotis (1991), Hourani (2013) and Szyliowicz (1973) recall the transformative impact of colonial education systems in entrenching the British and French class system on the indigenous people, and this was touched on in chapter one. Mitchell (2003) explains how national education systems more generally became tools for normalising unequal relations of power and entrenched the rule of dominant classes. Curtis (1988) refers to national education systems as instruments of bourgeois hegemony. For this reason educational historians saw modern education systems as a national project in the ‘creation of social identities’ (Mitchell, 2003).

2.2.1 Education as socialisation

It is the relationship between education and socialisation that places education into the political realm. It is why education is considered such a valuable tool at the hands of those in political power. However, was education always seen in this way - as being central to the development and shaping of society?

What is first important is that education and socialisation are not the same and should not be considered synonymous. However, for some theorists, the two should be considered more in sync than distinct. This belief is founded in the understanding of sociology and how individuals in societies come to feel part of a society. In other words, how do we become initiated into society?
Twentieth century sociologist and educational practitioner, Emile Durkheim (1956), argued that ‘society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity’ and for Durkheim, ‘education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands’ (Durkheim, 1956, p.70). In other words, the initiation of children by adults into society is what Durkheim called education. Durkheim describes such education as a ‘methodical socialisation of the young generation’ (Durkheim, 1956, p.71).

Durkheim appears then to not make any distinction between education and socialisation as, to him, they both serve the same purpose. In fact, Durkheim felt strongly that everything a youth experiences and is exposed to in society is only made possible because society invites him to, and ‘he [the youth] seeks them in a fashion that it prescribes of him’ (Durkheim, 1956, p.75). In short, therefore, Durkheim was a vocal proponent of state influence over education, because simply, the latter was a social function. For Durkheim, should education cease to be in the pervasive control of the state, the results would be the exercise of personal and private beliefs that would breakdown the fabric of society into incoherent multitudes of fragments in conflict with one another (Durkheim, 1956, p.79).

Durkheim failed to distinguish between education and socialisation, even if he believed that they worked together, but for Dewey, those who attempt to make the distinction or clarify the concept of education without constantly referring to its ‘social aim’ and context in which it is embedded, are in Dewey’s view, engaged in a futile exercise (Dewey, 1966, p. 97). In Democracy and Education, Dewey sought to demonstrate how education could not be the sort of process that is defined separately from social experience, and that if it were, then education would proceed to be ‘an unduly scholastic and formal notion of education’ (Dewey, 1966, p. 4). For Dewey, and for many today, it is reasonable to assume that the youth will adopt democratic ideals if fostered by educators, and this rationale is rooted in his foundational belief that education and socialisation do not belong as separate objectives.
Since Dewey, many educationists have suggested that the development of children into democratic citizens is furthered if they are raised in democratic schools. If parents and teachers aim to educate children towards becoming democratic citizens who have respect for the rights of others and to tolerate beliefs (religious or otherwise) that are different from their own (Davies 2009; Webber 2011), the education that children and young people receive must cultivate beliefs and dispositions that oppose radicalism and extremism.

It is of course one belief that has emerged from this concept of education and socialisation being synonymous. However, not everyone agrees that education and socialisation should be seen as one and the same. For some, the failure to distinguish between the two is dangerous for society and for generations who should be educated and socialised and that both require time in the school curriculum. Michael Oakeshott (1971) argued that the substitute education for socialisation has been ‘the greatest of the adversities to have overtaken our culture, the beginning of a dark age devoted to barbaric affluence’ (Oakeshott, 1971, p. 71). By making education a service industry that initiates a child into society and simply serves the purpose to socialise, students fail to become fully educationally engaged in the world’s ongoing civilizing conversation. In other words, Oakeshott proposed the value of educating to learn for the sake of learning rather than for the targeted purpose to serve ‘a nation’ or a society. The difference between education and socialisation is that the former is dedicated to the individual pleasure of acquiring knowledge and the latter views education simply as functional.

2.2.2 Traditionalism versus progressivism

The debate over education and socialisation has in fact now been seen as a debate between traditionalists, like Oakeshott and progressivism, as represented by Durkheim and Dewey. For the traditionalists who differentiate between socialisation and education, the value of personal cultivation through education can only be possible to a class that studied for leisure, and had the money to support it. In other words, this personal cultivation for the sake of learning rather than for learning to serve society was simply a means of distinguishing and distancing oneself from the masses and lay society. The
luxury of being able to study the Classics in order to engage in a cultural conversation was the very purpose of education for traditionalists. And yet for progressives this was exactly the social problem of distinguishing education and socialisation, in that it entrenched the divide between the elite and the working classes, the peasantry and the women. Dewey argued that it was this traditionalist view ‘which split society into classes, some of which are merely tools for the higher culture of others’ (Dewey, 1966, p.98).

The traditionalist and progressive views on the function of education and mass education lie at the basis of today’s dominating political trends of modern schooling, as they are the two broadly opposing philosophies of education. Modern nation states would increasingly take on the progressive philosophy on the education-socialisation nexus but each model of modern schooling would take on different degrees of traditionalism and progressivism and each development in education would be inspired by the range of these models and trends. It will be clear in the next section of this chapter that this debate between traditionalist and progressive philosophies on the socialising role of education is just as lively and significant with regards to international education. Thus it is not a discourse confined to nationalistic agendas, but one that is of equal relevance in conceptualisations of an education that seeks to break down the hegemonies of the nation-state. It was not just about socialisation that traditionalism and progressivism differed. Table 1 (see page 53) details and summarises the key opposing lines of both philosophies.
Table 1: Key distinctions between Traditionalism and Progressivism on the role of education in society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Progressive</th>
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<tr>
<td>Education should be reasonably</td>
<td>Education must be egalitarian.</td>
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<td>authoritarian and hierarchical.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The curriculum should be subject-</td>
<td>It must be child-centered and relevant</td>
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<tr>
<td>centered.</td>
<td>to society’s needs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emphasis should be on content.</td>
<td>Emphasis must be on skills.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Book-based knowledge and accuracy</td>
<td>Experience, experiment and</td>
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<tr>
<td>are essential.</td>
<td>understanding are more important.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rationality and the consideration</td>
<td>Creativity and feelings are more</td>
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<td>of factual evidence should</td>
<td>important than facts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>predominate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of right and wrong.</td>
<td>Right and wrong depend on one’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>There should be an end product.</td>
<td>point of view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The product or knowledge of content</td>
<td>It is the process that matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should be objectively tested or</td>
<td>Criteria provide a framework for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measured.</td>
<td>subjective assessment or tasks based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition is welcomed.</td>
<td>on skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice between different curricula</td>
<td>Co-operation must take precedence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or different types of school is</td>
<td>Entitlement for all replaces choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>essential to maximise individual</td>
<td>and differentiation—equal opportunities can be used to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strengths.</td>
<td>construct equality of result.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

One area of the education debate where traditionalists and progressives agree is in education being a political tool. They differ however on reasons why and how education can be used as a political utility. For traditionalists, education is a subject of the political elite, where they may carve out its content and what is right and wrong. For progressives, education should be a political domain simply because it is a service designed to train citizens and initiate them into society. Therefore, whichever philosophy one holds on education, the political control of education is universally accepted.
2.2.3 Dominating political trends of modern schooling

The model of the modern school today portrays some significant dominant trends and aspects in educational and political theory that should help to clarify education policy and practice globally, striking the relation between education and politics more firmly. It is a useful place to begin appreciating the political involvement in education and the educational involvement in politics. The trends can be divided reasonably accurately into four, as Guilherme (2002) does in her account of educational theory and policy. The key dominating trends, as she highlights, are namely, (a) the conservative; (b) the liberal; (c) the humanistic; and (d) the radical. The trends can also commonly be referred to as camps, yet however different or contradictory they may be, they also share certain features. For this reason, trends or tendencies are more preferable terms, indicating the overlapping nature of each.

Indeed, these trends each have a positivist view on knowledge, offering their most fundamental of similarities. As Guilherme (2002) argues, to a greater or lesser extent, they do not question the ideal of objectivity, the transmission of key texts, the instrumentality of knowledge to technological or industrial progress, or the standardisation of knowledge. A greater comprehension of each is required in order to appreciate the state of education policy and philosophy today, and for the relevance of this paper, the vantage point of this to international education and critical pedagogy and theory.

2.2.3.1 Conservative trend

Neoconservative images of education have been most memorably associated with particular governments such as Great Britain’s Thatcher and Major terms and the terms of Reagan and Bush in the United States (Aronowitz, 2004; Guilherme, 2002, Aronowitz & Giroux, 1993). For those adhering to this trend, education and schooling is used as an instrument for economic growth. Key values within the conservative pedagogy are consistent with industrial forms of discipline and social conformity (Giroux & McLaren, 1989, p. xvii). With regards to cultural transmission, culture tends to be uniform, Eurocentric, according to a Western tradition of superior culture that contributes, as Guilhelme puts it, to a
'cultural capital’ that leaves only those cultural values to be reinforced within schools, regardless of the students’ social and cultural background (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Guilhelme, 2002). Emphasis within this teaching method is on discipline and the adoption of what Wink (1997, p. 151) refers to as ‘the pedagogy of coverage’ with a strict adherence to the parameters of the curriculum. As such, the learning type is often identified as training rather than development (Guilhelme, 2002).

Typically, schools under the conservative instruction are expected to fulfill economic, social and political roles. In other words, to select and prepare competent workers to take part in a strict and rigid hierarchical labor structure; to form individuals that will in time be guardians of the existing social order, moral authority and institutional organisations as predetermined by those in office; and to train disciplined and obedient citizens. While neoconservative systems of education have typically expressed a mission to prepare free thinkers for a free democratic society, it is crucially understood to mean that citizens be prepared to integrate into it rather than transform it (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 187). Consequently, the critical spirit that is so currently growing in vogue today remains not within the scope of neoconservative pedagogies, typically. Importantly, the conservative trend is the most dominant approach to knowledge transmission in modern Western schooling as it is so entwined in today’s free market capitalism, producing a highly individualistic competitiveness in the classroom in order to meet corporate demand (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1993). In the 1990s, Aronowitz and Giroux (1993) argued that this conservative approach to schooling was likely to endure criticism because radical educators had so far failed to provide a compelling counter-vision to the conservative approach to link business and education.

### 2.2.3.2 Liberal trend

Liberal school systems differ from the neoconservative ones primarily in the need of the former to adapt to the evolution of society and characteristically respond to the needs of economic growth. As such, schools born of the liberal trend exist to provide students with the prerequisites necessary for their performance in the labor market and for their social mobility (Guilhelme, 2002)
and seek to enable students to respond and adapt to transformations in society and the market.

Notably, Kanpol ensures that a liberal education system must be a *social efficiency system*, a by-product of an expanding industrialized and bureaucratised society' (Kanpol, 1997, p. 6). Accordingly, schools are sites of instruction for liberalists, and little more. As an ideal, knowledge is objective, value-free and depoliticised. Similarly, culture is consensual in nature and comes as a result of historical agreement. In such parameters, schools strive to be innocent transmitters of a body of technical knowledge and information (Giroux, 1994; McLaren, 1994), and they offer broad exposure to multiple disciplines and learning techniques that can be transferred to various demands.

Typical of liberal pedagogy is the dual emphasis on individual emancipation and communal improvement, to democracy, to scientific progress and to change, with a strong culture of meritocracy that protects the rights of both individual and society while reinforcing the requisites for democracy (Choi, 1995; Kanpol, 1995). It was described by its proponents (e.g. John Henry Newman, Thomas Huxley) as being education ‘for its own sake’ for personal development and enrichment, with the teaching of values at its heart (Harrison, 1954, p. 191), a sentiment that echoes a traditionalist philosophy. However, liberal education lost its prominent position during World War II when an emphasis on mathematics, science and technical training urged a more focused ‘professional’ approach to education. In the US, however, liberal education enjoyed a revival during the mid-20th century as its approach became central to undergraduate education or ‘general education’ (Harrison, 1954, p. 195).

### 2.2.3.3 Humanist trend

Humanists differ from liberalists in their emphasis on humanising schooling rather than on economic progress (Guilhelme, 2002). Humanist pedagogies are often accounted for their *micro* attitude to learning over its *macro* attitude. In this regard, social change is a goal to be obtained through individual self-fulfillment.
The learning process is viewed as more autonomous for its emphasis on individual freedoms, thus offering a more reflective learning environment. The school hierarchy, in comparison to neoconservative school systems, is much less rigid, so that teacher-pupil interaction is seen as more collaborative (Guilhelme, 2002). Similar to the liberal trend, individual action is centralised in the educational process and the school is not politically involved (Choi, 1995; Giroux, 1992, 1994).

Uniquely, humanist pedagogies do not focus on change but rather on 'healing social wounds' (Guilhelme, 2002). Consequently, in reference to humanistic school education, it is wrong to refer to a transformative agency, for agency is neither transformative nor determined. It is important to note here that broadly, international education simultaneously adopts features of the conservative, liberal and humanist trends. For the latter, it is the humanist emphasis on education for 'healing social wounds' that is reflected in international education. Of the liberal trend, the depoliticised efforts are most applicable and recognisable, and of the conservative trend, the functional, education-for-business-need, is undeniably inspired.

2.2.3.4 Radical trend

Radical pedagogies are better understood through a neo-Marxist lens. For the radical discourse, society is seen through an economic lens that determines all relationships in terms of socio-economic class, and school is seen as reflecting this enveloping structure. As such, radical pedagogies are in some way or other related to neo-Marxist theory in education. It offers a deterministic view of the education process, since school failures are to be solved through the transformation of the wider socio-economic structures. Consequently, neo-Marxists as radical educationists are generally suspicious of educational reform (Guilhelme, 2002).

Critically, radical pedagogues regard schools as institutions that inevitably reproduce the economic, social and cultural, static and homogenous, matrices of the capitalist societies (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1986). Characteristically, although neo-Marxist theories of education underestimate the human capacity
for counter-agency inside schools, they acknowledge in depth the political facets of schooling.

The concept of the ‘hidden curriculum’ first addressed by Jackson (1968) and in time developed by Bowles and Gintis (1976) and Apple (1979) is crucial to the understanding of the subtle but overwhelming pressure that society imposes on school life, whether socially, culturally or politically. For all sets of accounts on the effect of the ‘hidden curriculum’, differing emphasis is placed on what is hidden. Overall, however, they agree that generally, institutional biases exist in curricula that perpetuate stigma and the unequal status quo. As such, the basic posits of the radical theories in education is that the school is consciously or subconsciously used for the reproduction of the socio-economic order or capitalist society and its values.

Economy and education (school and workplace), culture and education and the hegemonic state and education (i.e. the intervention of the state in the educational system) (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1986) are all inextricably linked according to radical thought. Consequently, in each incidence, the state is not regarded as a neutral institution, impartially administering education. It is suspiciously recognised as being politically vitiated (Guilhelme, 2002) and infected by sectarian dominant influences. Radical discourse is thus heavily reliant on the concept of ‘hegemony’, as according to Gramsci (1971), thereby explaining political life as an attempt to attain and perpetuate power through an operation of persuasion, consensus and consent (Gramsci, 1971, 1974).

The radical trend serves more as a model for critique of institutionalised education than a constructive model. The contribution of radical thinkers in the literature on education and society, and international education, are valuable in forming a critical analysis of the role of school in identity construction. Indeed, these models of critique and trends are extremely important. Firstly, they suitably illustrate critical approaches to unraveling the relationship between schools and social control. Secondly, they provide a key starting point for appreciating the theoretical limitations that underlie this form of criticism and the need to move beyond it in the search for a more comprehensive and applicable critical theory of pedagogy, particularly when in the context of international
education that puts less emphasis on the nation (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1986, p. 146).

Neither of the aforementioned trends are homogenous in character and nor are they rigid in application. As such, most educational policy is borne of elements captured from a number of these trends and not exclusively from one. International education as a stand-alone sector is one such example. In fact, each of these pedagogical theories have contributed significantly to the development of critical pedagogy, since its theory and practice have emerged in education discipline as a result of much and constant debate, negotiation and confrontation over them. Although, characteristically, critical pedagogy often comes in conflict with its predecessors, it would be impossible to define it without relating it to them in some way (Guilhelme, 2002). Furthermore, no contemporary discussion on education theory and pedagogy can overlook the involvement of critical pedagogy, as it continues to emerge as a contending, reform-relevant notion in educational philosophy and practice (Guilhelme, 2002).

2.2.3.5 The Sociology of Education and critical pedagogy

There is indeed a further trend that has dedicated much influence to the makings of critical pedagogy. This trend is generally referred to as ‘The New Sociology of Education’ (Guilherme, 2002) and consists of the development of sociological studies on education focusing on the school, the school curricula and the teaching or educational practices. It is best known for the work of Young (1971) and Bernstein (1971), Bordieu and Apple (1996). Most research in the area has commonly focused on issues of social status in relation to social stratification and on classroom material, typically on the textbook (Apple, 1996). It has only been in the recent decades that wider ethnographic and anthropological studies have proliferated (Guilherme, 1994).

Current sociological analysis of curricula content and classroom procedures has been addressed under the notion that reality and knowledge are socially constructed, just as is believed of identity. As such, the sociology of education has continued to establish the link between knowledge and power (Guilherme,
2002). Its dominant concerns have characteristically been centered on the selection, stratification and evaluation of knowledge, as well as the questions of status that form key social encounters in the classroom environment (Bernstein, 1971, p. 47, 49). It has aimed at neutralising the forces of power within the school environment through the transformation of educational practice (Bates, 1980; Young, 1971, p. 25). Consequently, the political implications of the sociology of education consist of questioning the status quo but within the limits of the classroom.

By being aware that knowledge is not neutral, that curricula objectives are not value-free, and that the assessment criteria established by the schooling system are not self-evident, teachers and students may adopt a different attitude towards learning and teaching, according to the sociology trend.

As such, critical pedagogy shares many of the concerns of the ‘New Sociology of Education’ and specifically their perspectives on the micro-levels of society (the school). For instance, like the ‘New Sociology of Education’, critical pedagogy recognises the value of both the cognitive and social dimensions of schooling and it emphasises the importance of analysing the political and cultural aspects of the curriculum. Arguably, therefore, it can be stated that the aforementioned precepts of the ‘New Sociology of Education’ are often equally embraced by critical pedagogues. However, they do offer some differences in scope, both in theory and in practice, that make critical pedagogy deserved of its own classification.

It has been said that the ‘multiple, flexible and eclectic nature’ of critical pedagogy makes labeling, defining or describing it rather complex (Guilherme, 2002). Not only is it a suggested pedagogy in practice, but it is also considered to be a movement in its own right, because it is ‘ever-evolving’ (Giroux, 1997, p. xii) and for it not being a monolithic body of theory or practice. Similarly, while it is said to apply a ‘language of critique’ it also engages with a ‘language of possibility’ that strives towards democratic education and social improvement (Giroux, 1992). As Herrera and Torres have put it, critical social theory, from which critical pedagogies are derived, ‘has made impressive contributions to our understanding in the social sciences, particularly linking critique and utopia’
As such, it can be regarded as an attempt at educational and social reform, starting from within the structure and dynamics of the school. Giroux also goes as far to argue against giving a specific definition of critical pedagogy, advising to remain cautious when doing so ‘because there is no generic definition that can be applied to the term’ (Giroux, 1994, p. 131). However, there can be recognized common insights that permeate critical pedagogical discourse and practice, and it is important to be aware them, as international educationists knowingly or unknowingly promote it. It concerns itself with culture, ethics, politics and their interconnectedness (Guilherme, 2002) and urges educators adhering to this form of pedagogy to hold these as central concern.

Culturally, critical pedagogy seeks to question dominant cultural patterns and explores the reasons for them being blindly accepted and unquestioned, and it promotes ethnic diversity and political cultural awareness over the sake of dominant cultural reproduction (Giroux & McLaren, 1994, p. 216). In relation to ethics, questions of human suffering, dignity and emancipation are worries that are central to critical pedagogy (Giroux, 1992, p. 74; Guilherme, 2002). Thus, ethics is embraced as a struggle against inequality and as a discourse for expanding basic human rights (Giroux, 1992). It has to do with individual improvement, social solidarity and public responsibility. The concern for the public and the democratic process leads to another important feature that is often associated with critical pedagogies; the political dimension (Guilherme, 2002; Giroux, 1988, p. xxxii).

Accordingly, through the production of knowledge, the training of skills, self and social development, the ultimate goal of schools, according to critical pedagogues, should be to prepare empowered citizens to live in ‘authentic’ democracies (Guilherme, 2002; Giroux, 1988). As such, critical pedagogy seeks to stimulate the consciousness of individuals, so that they become aware of their political and social realities, and challenge the status quo.

A concern with critical thinking in education is, broadly speaking, teaching students the rules of logic or how to assess evidence independently. This is not new, but is in fact woven throughout Western traditions of education, from the
Greeks to the scholastics right through to the present day. Separate segments of curricula have often been dedicated to such studies, especially at the higher levels of schooling, for instance through subjects like philosophy. The critical thinking movement for education is specifically centered on fostering critical thought in students, particularly linked to rationality and developing this rationality and logic (see Siegel, 1988).

For critical thinking advocates, all of us need to develop our critical thought processes and there is an implicit hope that enhanced critical thinking could have a general humanising effect across all social groups and classes. But, what exactly does it mean to be a critical thinker? Ideally, it means to be more discerning in recognising faulty and weak arguments, hasty generalisations, assertions lacking evidence or coated with bias, claims based on unreliable authority as well as identifying ambiguous or obscure concepts.

As a result, the foundation of critical pedagogy cannot be attributed to one theory alone. It is the result of several theoretical standpoints that reflect critical pedagogy theorists’ intellectual journeys. It takes on board the positions of critical social theory, as its pedagogical counterpart, and Postmodernism as philosophical foundations (Herrera and Torres, 2006), and despite their different standpoints, it views them as complementary with respect to their understanding of culture and the functioning of democracies (Guilherme, 2002).

As far as its educational influences are concerned, critical pedagogy is a combined adaptation of the progressive educational theories and trends of the twentieth century, particularly the radical trend, producing a unique pedagogy. It is also inspired by Dewey’s progressivism, the reconstructionist theoretical insights into citizenship education and most particularly, Paolo Freire’s theory of education (Guilherme, 2002) and critical consciousness, through his most famous work from 1970, Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

It is a discourse of education that is deservedly receiving increased interest in the academic field, and it is especially interesting to see how critical pedagogical practices can fit in the international education system. As will be elaborated further in the next section, one of the main and ambitious claims of
international education is to provide an alternative *liberal* education that seeks to promote democratic values globally (Cambridge, 2011).

However, it is important to appreciate that the theory itself is still young, in that it continues to develop and adapt, and must be considered aside from the political trends of modern schooling discussed earlier. Unlike the conservative, liberal, humanist, and radical trends, critical pedagogy is yet to be widely practiced and initiated into national and international educational policies, due to its revolutionary nature and relatively recent impact. At present, it remains a principle for reform, with elements, such as critical thinking, now increasingly entering the political and academic mainstream.

In many respects, education for ‘world peace’, and ‘global citizenship’ education, is a product of critical theory and critical pedagogy. As will be explored in the following section, international education - with its foundations set in the post-Second World War movement for global peace - seeks to promote generations of tolerant, democratic societies through dismantling nationalism in favour of global partnership and cooperation. Those who spearheaded an education that was free from the constraints of national borders may not have formally identified with a critical social movement, but their beliefs and ambitions were critical, progressive, and postmodern.

However, what makes the international education sector an inauthentic partner of critical theory is its elitist posture, and its connection to neoliberal, market-driven education reforms. Instead, international education has tended to straddle multiple aspects from all aforementioned trends, and subsequently developed an internal debate of its own when wrestling with its theory and application. This will be demonstrated in more detail in the next section, but the purpose of this part of the chapter was to explore the relationship between education and socialisation as set out in the relevant literature. It has been shown that while there have been conflicting opinions of how education can support a society’s growth and modernisation, all have agreed that education has one over-arching purpose; to socialise the individual in society and to lay out the principles of ‘good citizenship’.
Through time, and across borders, the notion of good citizenship, while universally important to carving a nation-state and a sense of purpose and belonging, has been culturally, socially, and geographically contextualised. While there are common overlaps across nations as to what makes an ideal citizen, the principles are dictated by the nation’s sense of history and identity, and crucially, as Benedict Anderson (1983) would call, an imagined community. However, conceptualisations of active and ideal citizenship as discussed in the first part of this chapter have not been as static and fixed as history itself. Rather, the ideals of citizenship in the context of national education systems have long been concerned with the nation-state’s priorities of a given time, which have informed the popularity of educational trends.

While the international education market is diverse and sometimes contradicting, there is no denying that it is a product and service of capital growth and the neoliberal project today - at least as a service that supports and facilitates it but does not create it, per se, although this remains debatable. In the following and final part of this conceptual chapter the theoretical debates surrounding international education are discussed specifically. Attempting to position international or global citizenship education within the broader political trends of modern schooling is important and has been the purpose of this section.

2.3 Education for post-national socialization?

A concern shared by each of the aforementioned trends in modern educational theory is the role of education on the masses. As demonstrated, theories that are concerned with education and curricula are likely to be influenced by ideas concerning the aims and purposes of education and schooling for the nation-state (Cambridge, 2011). What is school for? Is it to socialise the child; to reproduce a national or societal culture; to transmit specific knowledge and skills? Or is it to prepare the learner for higher education or employment?

While each educational trend has its developed responses to such queries, such arguments are made more complicated by the implementation of a curriculum and pedagogy within an international or transnational context. If it is
acknowledged that objectives of schooling include the socialisation of the child and the reproduction of culture, then it needs to be clarified whose culture has been identified as worthy of reproduction in the case of international education, and on what grounds (Cambridge, 2011).

A wide range of organisations have called for the development of ‘global citizenship education’, ‘global education’, ‘international education’, or ‘cosmopolitan’, ‘multicultural’ education, generally through the form of ‘global mindedness’ in schools. These include non-government organisations (NGOs), inter-governmental or multilateral bodies, national governments, the media and the business sectors. They each have different and sometimes conflicting reasons to call for such a development, ranging from sustainable futures, internationalisation of markets, economic integration, skills and knowledge for the global economy, and social justice and inequality. Whatever the motives, each organisation looks to education because they believe it has a role to play in socialising global societies towards their vision for the future.

The social aspect of education is now no longer localised in the same way as it was in the early twentieth century. A post-national citizenship model for schooling has given rise for this very reason, based on a view that schools are part of a global network and so must respond to the flow of information, both of goods and of people (Marshall, 2011; Urry, 2000).

If we strip back international education to instead refer to global citizenship education, we can then appreciate the mood music through which international education operates. The body of work on global citizenship education has been growing, but much of this is based on those who engage with the concept based on the philosophy of cosmopolitanism. This literature often refers to those whose values, orientations, loyalties, knowledge, and norms go beyond the national limits and towards transnational commonalities (Marshall, 2011; Roth, 2007). As Weenink (2008) outlines, cosmopolitan theory offers arguments that can at times be considered within the context of global citizenship education, or using his terminology, ‘international educational activity’, and the idea of building ‘awareness of global connectedness’ and an ‘orientation of
open mindedness towards the Other’ (Weenink, 2008, pp. 189-90). For him, this is where global citizenship education can assist.

2.3.1 Cosmopolitanism

When speaking of collective identities, today’s cross-national communication processes now allow individuals in one space to relate to individuals and communities in another space. W.J.M. Mackenzie attested to this when he wrote:

Those who share an interest, share an identity; the interest of each requires the collaboration of all. Those who share a place share an identity. Prima facie this is a fair statement, whether ‘the place’ is taken to be ‘space-ship earth’; or a beloved land; or a desolate slum or a public housing scheme. (Mackenzie, 1978).

This suggests that space is not a limiting factor. If we return back to Sen’s (2006) list of identity descriptors recalled in section one of this chapter, and the many geographically determined identity factors, we can now understand how an individual can feel simultaneously Indian, and Asian, as well as British and Bengali. ‘Space’ does not need to be physical. It can be abstractedly applied, or imagined. This has some relevance to understanding the logic behind international education and those of it proponents. In other words, to dilute nationalist sentiment, teaching to embrace a more colourful array of geographically associated identities could in theory lead to a more ethnically converged world, widening the scope of relating to others and narrowing the space for isolated communities to retract from the center of global society.

2.3.2 Ideas of citizenship

Sen’s diverse identity descriptors suggest that participation, rather than space or location, is the deciding factor. Literature on citizenship suggests that practice and participation is key to feeling a citizen in a country or community. Citizenship is an important aspect of our identities. As Ross (2007) argues, it is that which determines our political engagement and participation in a
community. In the extract above, Mackenzie (1978) stresses the requirements of collaboration for the formation of an identity. Citizenship and identity are alike in this way. Citizenship is a duty for members of a community. In order for a society to function, the members must participate, and Ross (2007) argues that involvement or participation is an active state. In other words, not simply accepting a label, but acknowledging that there is a role to play. But is this practical?

Legal citizenship may be confined and exclusive, but a broader application of the term, as Mackenzi (1978) implies, can mean that individuals are citizens of several ‘places’. Both formally and by law, those who are citizens of European states are citizens of both their nation-state of origin as well as citizens of Europe, under the conventions of the European Union. Many other individuals also have dual nationality, with rights and duties guaranteed in two countries. In addition, the concept of global citizenship implies that individuals are invited as citizens of the earth. It is marketed as more inclusive than national citizenships, as the latter is often subject to a set of narrow ethnic, religious, and geographic conditions. However, global citizenship is criticized for being impractical and idealistic.

To understand how and if multiple citizenships can work in practice requires an understanding of the term and notion of citizenship. There are many definitions of citizenship, and each has implications for identity. Civil society, according to Hobbes (1651) and Locke (1690) is described as a contractual relationship or social contract between people and institutions; elements that join together to forge person-made law that guarantees civil rights, such as liberty, the right to own property, and freedom of expression. However, the meaning of citizenship has, and continues to be, highly contested among scholars. It has, as a term, a remarkably wide range of uses and application. It can, simultaneously, be invoked to refer to methods of participation, rights and duties, identities and commitments, and statuses. According to Judith Shklar, ‘[t]here is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, [yet] none more variable in history, or contested in theory’ (Shklar, 1991). In fact, in Bosniak’s (2000) view, the term, citizenship, is a classic example of what William Connolly (1993), quoting W.B. Gallie (1956) describes as an ‘essentially contested concept’. Such concepts,
according to Connolly (1993), lead to endless disputes over how accurately to apply them, and citizenship, for Bosniak (2000), is a perfect example of such a concept.

The traditional rights of citizenship were based inextricably on membership to a sovereign state. However, over the course of sixty years, Ross (2007, p. 296) explains how this sovereignty has dissolved, and the state’s control in granting citizenship rights and to determine what rights citizens are afforded has been significantly weakened. Not only has the reality of dual citizenships become more commonplace with greater global movement, certain rights have been internationally protected and placed above matters of the nation-state. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights places an obligation on all signatory or member states to honour greater rights to its citizens. The latter has created bodies that have judicial powers that well surpass that of any member state, thus rendering Human rights no longer a sovereign matter.

In efforts to synthesise and categorise the conflicting interpretations of citizenship as a term, several analysts have proposed frameworks for organising the distinct approaches in defining citizenship. For example, Kymlicka and Norman (1994) have divided definitions of citizenship into three, which they call “citizenship-as-rights,” “citizenship-as-activity,” and “citizenship-as-identity”. Similarly, Heater (1990) distinguishes between “the feeling of citizenship,” “political citizenship” and the “status of citizenship”. Other efforts towards some conceptual organisation of citizenship include Vogel’s and Moran’s (1991) ‘territorial, temporal, social, political and behavioural frontiers of citizenship’. In sum, attempts to structure the debate over citizenship has resulted in attempts to distinguish broadly between legal status citizenship, citizenship as rights, citizenship as political activity and finally citizenship as a form of collective identity and solidarity; in other words, the sentimental type (Bosniak, 2000).

As the nature of citizenship is essentially concerned with the establishment of rights over localities, such realities anchor a movement towards a more globally converged world and set an international moral baseline. However, such
broader definitions of citizenship, which moves beyond the traditional, legal and territorial definitions, require some consideration of communities and notions of belonging. If both identity and citizenship is believed as rooted in participation within a community or group, then how effectively can supra-national identities supersede national, local identities?

2.3.3 The practical limits of global citizenship

Logic suggests that a realisation of supra-national identities depends on how realistic and practical participation is on a global scale. So, what is the framework for participation in a global context? The literature discussed here has suggested that belonging can be imagined, and abstract. Thus, there need not be everyday, real-life interaction to fuel a sense of supra-national belonging. The literature on the concept of cosmopolitanism suggests that identifying as cosmopolitan can be conceptual, symbolic, and rooted in an active, internal paradigm shift, rather than any tangible or real-life interaction. This paradigm shift could be interpreted as participation in the concept itself. Mackenzie alludes to this when he said, ‘those who share an interest, share an identity’ (1978).

Through his examination of Kant’s writings, Sankar Muthu (2003) reminds us that we ‘live in social and cultural worlds of our own making and remaking’ (2003, p. 135). In an essay on the evolution of cosmopolitan identity, Shannan Spisak (2009) argues that human participation and acceptance shapes and perpetuates a culture, and that culture only exists because people participate in it and legitimise it. With this, she believes that cosmopolitan identity, or fluid cultural identities, can evolve through a ‘remaking’. She quotes Hill (2000): ‘cosmopolitanism is the attempt to get rid of a world in which Others are truly noncitizens’ (Hill, 2000, p. 8 as cited in Spisak, 2009). Such a philosophy enforces the notion that individuals are agents of their own identities and affiliations, and that cosmopolitanism is as much a moral impetus as it is a way of positioning one’s identity.

It also implies that the spread of cosmopolitanism will result in a more morally healthy, accommodating and peaceful world. Indeed, the founding text of
Cosmopolitanism, founded on a concept of ‘world citizenship’, is Immanuel Kant’s (1983) essay, aptly titled ‘Perpetual Peace’, which entrenches the connections between post-nationalism and peace.

Cosmopolitanism, however, is not universally celebrated. Critics argue that the idea of cosmopolitanism, in so much as rendering all citizens of the world as an equal object of moral concern, is but a fantasy. Miller (2002) argues that the concept of cosmopolitanism denies the reality that individual citizens have duties and responsibilities that can only realistically be realised on the local level, because of the need to reciprocate in order to feed the sense of duty to another. For this reason, Miller has argued that a cosmopolitan truly rooted in ideas of world citizenship would require the creation of a world government, a notion that he argues could only be an imperialist project ‘in which existing cultural differences were either nullified or privatised’.

Miller is by no means alone in his critique of world citizenship and cosmopolitanism. Indeed, most critiques of world citizenship center on the charge that the very notion of world citizenship is incoherent. In a collection of essays edited by Joshua Cohen (1996) and published under the title, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, Martha Nussbaum’s 1994 essay, titled Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in which she declares herself a ‘citizen of the world’, is challenged passionately by eleven critics of the concepts. For example, Michael Walzer (1996) directly criticises Nussbaum when he states: ‘I am not a citizen of the world, as she [Nussbaum] would like me to be. I am not even aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of it. No one has ever offered me citizenship or described the naturalisation process, or enlisted me in the world’s institutional structures, or given me an account of its decision procedures (I hope they are democratic), or provided me with a list of the benefits and obligations of citizenship, or shown me the world’s calendar and the common celebrations and commemorations of its citizens.” In a similar tone, Amy Gutmann (1996) argued ‘we can truly be citizens of the world only if there is a world polity. Given what we now know, a world polity could only exist in tyrannical form’. Indeed, the famous chastisement of the notion of world citizenship came much earlier, by Hannah Arendt in Men in Dark Times (1968, pp. 81-94) where she wrote: ‘A world citizen, living under the tyranny of a world
empire, and speaking and thinking in a kind of glorified Esperanto, would be no less a monster than a hermaphrodite’ (p. 89).

Balancing the same impassioned moral reservations with concrete impracticalities of such a notion of a world governing state for aspiring world citizens, Amartya Sen (1996) asks, ‘can one be a citizen of the world without there being a world state? There is a legal form of language that excludes this possibility’. However, for Sen, there are some converging aspects that could make such a notion of world citizenship based on a common humanity, plausible. As he states, ‘so many ‘mixed’ concepts- human rights, libertarian elements, just deserts- seem to communicate well enough without being fully tied to the legal sense’. In other words, Sen, though cautious to embrace the term wholeheartedly, sees that citizenship can exist in the absence of institutions that govern it.

For Nussbaum, the phrase ‘world citizen’ was shorthand for a cosmopolitan outlook that expressed loyalty and moral obligations to humanity at large. Thus in declaring herself a world citizen, Nussbaum likely never meant that she could formally be regarded as such based on legal definitions, but rather that she subscribed to a form of moral universalism. Yet at the heart of the debate between Nussbaum and her critics was not the sentiment itself, but rather the practicality and desirability of such a universalism. The debate, as it continues, is also rooted and centered on her use of the concept of citizenship. For her critics, Nussbaum had lost sight of the inherently national characteristics of citizenship (Bosniak, 2000). Ross (2007), as mentioned previously, emphasised that involvement or participation has to be active, and that merely accepting a label without acknowledging and embracing an associated role or duty could not amount to a sense of citizenship to a community- no matter how small or how great that community is.

Citizenship has not always been regarded as a national project. In fact, the history of the concept goes back to classical Greek philosophy in the context of the city-state, or the empire in Roman times (Heater, 1990). However, literary convention continues to regard citizenship as predominantly a national enterprise (Arendt, 1968, p. 81; Bosniak, 2000) and it is this that critics of
cosmopolitanism regularly draw on. Yet there is a body of scholars moving beyond such restrictive conceptualisations of citizenship. The result of which has been the emergence of terms such as ‘global citizenship’, ‘transnational citizenship’, and ‘post-national citizenship’ (Bosniak, 2000). All terms, though intricately different in meaning and application, intend to capture the notion of cross-border identities, relationships and allegiances that can be seen to have emerged during the process of globalisation.

The movement towards conceptualising citizenship beyond the nation-state is an effort to acknowledge the ‘increasingly trans-territorial quality of political and social life’ (Bosniak, 2000). As Bosniak (2000) notes in her essay, there is a body of work on cross-border citizenship models that has grown as the process of globalisation has accelerated. Much of this work addresses the proliferation of transnational political activity in the form of engagement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), cross-border grassroots and social movements, and other supra-national collective efforts in areas such as human rights, environmental preservation, women’s rights and labor rights, and the protection of national ethnic and religious minorities such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace. Keck and Sikkink (1998) described such movements and activities as ‘transnational value-based advocacy networks’.

Such networks have become structural linkages that bond societies together. As ties increase across national borders, people are said to be increasingly taking on commitments and identities that exceed the boundaries of the national society and its membership. Globalisation, in this account, has important imaginative, emotive, and moral effect on us.

However, while a post-national citizenship model is still an emerging concept, can it really be directly correlated to globalisation? In fact, most theorists agree that globalisation, or to paraphrase for clarity, ‘global interconnectedness’ is far from a contemporary phenomenon. To illustrate this, a critical analysis of definitions of globalisation is important.
2.3.4 Globalisation and denationalisation

Among the most important sociological works that attempts to construct a theory of globalisation is Anthony Giddens’ *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990). In it, Giddens defines globalisation as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (1990, p. 64). Similarly, David Held et al. (1999) offers, in what is perhaps the most comprehensive exploration of globalisation to date, a useful definition of the term, as ‘the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual’ (Held *et al.* 1999, p.2). Globalisation is for Held and his co-authors, ‘a process (or set of processes)’ that creates transnational and interregional flows and ‘networks of activity, interaction and exercise of power’ (Held *et al.* 1999, p. 16). Such definitions pay emphasis to the spirit of interconnectedness across and beyond borders, and according to Giddens and others in the field, this process of flows has resulted in a rise of global awareness and consciousness.

But is this interconnectedness something new? As Kiely (2005, p.9) argues, occurrences in one place have always had an impact on events in other places. Old empires, the slave trade, and the establishment of nation states following the Second World War are some examples made by Kiely to bolster this claim. Despite this, there is often an assumption that globalisation is a modern transformational phenomenon. Kiely believes that this may be because of an inherent Western bias in the literature on globalisation. Indeed, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries colonisation was a form of interconnectedness, but it was dominated by Western powers, while for globalisation, it is less clear from where the process is directed. Popular works on globalisation, including Giddens (1990), Tomlinson (2000) and Urry (2002) agree that the direction and origins of global flows today are complex, creating challenges when attempting to pin down its location of origin. Earlier periods of globalisation, such as colonialism, were more accurately regarded as
"Westernisation'. However, contemporary globalisation can still be traced back to Western states, especially the US, by the dominance of its neoliberal, capitalist character.

Further setting contemporary globalisation apart from earlier periods of global flows is the speed and intensity of such flows. The extent to which we can all experience transnational activity is what is novel about globalisation today. It is what David Harvey (1990) refers to when he writes of ‘time-space compression’. In other words, as is often claimed, we live in a shrinking world. Travel is more accessible and affordable than ever, and communication across borders through information and communications technologies (ICTs) allows us to instantaneously connect with people, or experience events occurring in faraway lands through satellite and the World Wide Web (Keily, 2005). In this way, travel and communications are considered transformative agents in the process of globalisation or contemporary global interconnectedness. Castells (1993, p. 20) has argued that the ‘enhancement of telecommunications has created the material infrastructure for the formation of a global economy’. He likens this to past movements in the construction of railways and the development of national markets in the nineteenth century and modernisation era (Castells, 1993).

Communication flows are one thing, but communication has merely facilitated a much greater process that has made such communication technology so in demand, and it is this greater process- centered in political economy- that has catalysed the global interconnectedness that we see today. As O’Brien (1992) contends, financial capital transcended the limits of space over time, as states liberalised financial regulation that eased the movement of money. Communications technologies have simply supported this process by enabling those who were globally mobile to be able to transfer money to new locations at the flick of a switch (Kiely, 2005, p. 13).

Increasing capital mobility, changing forms of state regulation and thus, the shrinking of time and space, are all aspects of a process of neoliberalism, and for that, globalisation should also be seen, not just as a process in and of itself, but also as a by-product; a necessity for market-driven economic reforms. Sassen (1996) explains that ‘economic globalisation has contributed to a
denationalising of national territory’. In linking economic globalization to denationalisation, Sassen is not alone. It is a paradigm that Held et al. (1999) has referred to as the ‘hyper-globalisation’ thesis, in which traditional nation-states are considered implausible business partners in a functioning global economy. Such capital flows, according to this thesis, have eroded the capacity of the nation-state to regulate the market, allowing for a border free world in which capital may travel freely from country to country. Proponents of the hyper mobility of capital are known as neoliberals. In other words, they are those who regard free markets as more efficient than states, in that the former encourages competitive advantage (Kiely, 2005). Traditional nation-states would intervene to protect economically rich sectors from foreign competition, but this, according to neoliberals, would hamper foreign investment and trade and distort the global economy. Instead, for neoliberals nation-states should lower tariffs and limit obstacles to trade and investment to the benefit of all.

Neoliberal economics has its critics, though dominant today, and they typically focus on the social implications of undermining the traditional sovereignty of nation-state. For the likes of Frobel et al (1980), competitive advantage only entrenches the power of already powerful countries, exposing the ‘Third World’ labor markets to exploitation for cheap labour. Nation-states are powerless to prevent this, as any efforts to regulate capital and improve conditions for local society would only result in capital moving elsewhere. The economic stability of a state in the neoliberal age is determined by its hospitality to transnational capital flows. For some however, ‘it is better to be exploited through capital investment than it is to be marginalised through lack of capital investment’ (Kiely, 2005). It therefore suggests that an economic globalisation has created an unequal interdependence, in that no single state has absolute power, and all are compelled to adapt to a globalising world. This explains the causative link between economic liberalisation (or globalisation) and global interconnectedness. In that respect, global interconnectedness is more of an established fact than a set of processes. As Giddens (1999) writes, ‘it is simply what we are’ (p.1).
2.3.5 Globalisation: process or product?

This leads to a semantic but important clarification of what exactly is meant by globalisation. Is globalisation determining or determined? The answer has significant implications, for if globalisation determines social changes, then it is inevitable and there is no alternative. But, if globalisation is determined by other factors (such as economic liberalisation), then it is a contested process, to which there are likely alternative end points. If it were the latter, then it would explain how some individuals and communities feel more interconnected and globalised—indeed cosmopolitan—than do others.

If alternative outcomes do take place within globalisation, then it is surely more critical to explore the nature of these alternatives rather than to assert the value of globalisation, overall. Despite this, globalisation theory tends to conflate the idea of globalisation as an outcome (to clarify, something that requires an explanation) with globalisation as an agent of change itself. In other words, something that does the explaining (Kiely, 2005).

Furthermore, contemporary (neoliberal) globalisation is rooted in political economy; hence any description of economic globalisation requires a mention of the dominance of neoliberalism. As such, the quantitative impact of globalisation dominates the literature. Qualitative assertions of how globalisation has affected personal lives, cultures and societies remain far less readily available. A cultural equivalent of economic globalisation does exist and is important to understanding some of the hostility towards contemporary globalisation within sociology. The terminology and the sentiments implied reveals the subjectivity of this debate. For those who see globalisation as a progressive process, its cultural form is often referred to as cosmopolitanism as discussed above, but for those who are more critical, terms such as ‘neocolonialism’, ‘cultural imperialism’, and ‘Americanisation’ or ‘Westernisation’ are commonly used.

2.3.6 International education: a Western commodity

Few can deny that the international education sector is a Western product, exported across the globe to a range of developed and developing countries.
Just as with any other product, it has a price. International schools are exclusively private institutions, and this allows them to operate in parallel to local national education systems. By purchasing an international education, consumers are promised an internationally recognised qualification; a ticket to global, and social, mobility.

However, as a service of education, it is not just a product. It is also a philosophy. International schools, as will be discussed throughout this thesis, are not based simply on free markets; they are also rooted in an ideology of cosmopolitanism. Unlike the purchase of satellite dishes, which too can be described as an agent (albeit a passive one) of global interconnectedness, international curricula actively promote the ideas of global citizenship. Despite this, there remains a lack of consensus over what is global citizenship education.

2.3.7 Competing agendas in International education

Just as with modern national schooling there exists a debate about the purpose of international education that reflects the well-known traditionalist versus progressive philosophies. The debate over the multiple interpretations of global citizenship education is in turn reflected in the international education sector. Urry (1998) considered the existence of several possible types of global citizenships that can affect how one views global citizenship education overall. For Urry, these can be categorised into four distinct types:

a) Global capitalists who are motivated by global corporate interests which are increasingly taking on a de-nationalised posture;

b) Global reformers, who take on collective responsibility for the planet through an ethics of care;

c) Global networkers who strive towards maintaining and developing professional and leisurely networks and social circles that exist beyond the constraints of national borders;

d) Global cosmopolitans, who develop ‘an ideology of openness towards “other” cultures, peoples, and environments’ and who are concerned
about developing an ‘orientation’ to other ‘citizens, societies and cultures across the globe’ (Urry, 1998, p. 4).

Such pluralism within global citizenship philosophy means of course that clashes between motives are possible, and this has significant importance in conceptualising global citizenship education on a practical level (Marshall, 2009). International schools have had to develop pedagogical responses to this diversity in global citizenships and the agendas that develop as a result. Depending on the driver for global citizenship education, (e.g. whether it be an NGO or a government official) one agenda may be prioritised over others (Marshall, 2011).

These agendas reflect the debate over education and socialisation and the need to conflate or separate their meaning. Global citizenship educationists can all be seen as instrumentalists in that they crucially see education as a transformative agent, and curriculum and knowledge as a means to an end, not as an end in themselves, whether it be for networking, business, reform or greater cultural awareness (Marshall, 2011). Those who are dedicated to international education are committed to creating and cultivating a sense of global citizenship that would not exist without some form of nurturing. It is therefore important to distinguish between the different instrumentalists that call for global citizenship education. These can be broadly divided into market-driven and ideological motives.

2.3.7.1 Market-driven instrumentalists

The most obvious of these instrumentalists are what Young (2008) refers to as the ‘technical-economic instrumentalists’. Like the progressive debate over education and socialisation, the technical-economic instrumentalist posits that ‘the curriculum has always been, albeit selectively, related to economic changes and the future employability of students’ (Young, 2008, p. 22). For them, the curriculum is to be based on the needs of the economy. In other words, it should seek to prepare society ‘for the global more competitive knowledge-based economy of the future’ (Young, 2008, p. 20). However, Marshall (2011) points out that despite their dominance in the shaping of global
citizenship education, technical-economic instrumentalists are not the only instrumentalist agendas at play in the global citizenship education discourse.

2.3.7.2 Ideologically-driven instrumentalists

While the term instrumentalism has often be associated with an economy-driving agenda, Marshall (2011) argues that it is also appropriately applied to those who seek to use global citizenship education on behalf of social justice. This agenda focuses on instilling an ideology in young people so that they may form the values and attitudes that work towards a better, more sustainable future that cultivates students to ‘do good’. The proscription of positive attitudes and behaviour according to the social-justice instrumentalist agenda is also, importantly, situated in a Western, neoliberal and as Marshall argues (2011), an economically stable country context- something that will be explored further throughout the thesis.

Indeed, this relates to one of the most difficult areas when studying international schooling. Due to the absence of consensus over global citizenship education and its purpose, there is great disparity within the international education sector worldwide. The term ‘international education’ can be misleading. The international sector itself faces an ongoing challenge of the absence of uniformity, and this is very much based on the plurality of different types of global citizenships and therefore the diverse interpretations of global citizenship education.

Though the present thesis sets out to explore the socially and culturally relevant practices that are ongoing in international schools in Egypt, it still faces the challenge of identifying the true international school amongst those that lack the requisite international characteristics, and therefore must consider Egyptian international schools in the global context. As such, the need to determine a definition and framework from which to base international schools are paramount, though it is rife with complexities and ambiguities. It is also essential that the calls for global citizenship education and the growth of international education globally be historically, culturally, geographically and politically situated in order for us to understand its agent and its agenda.
2.3.8 Characteristics of the international curriculum

What constitutes ‘international education’ and how international education differs from, say, ‘multicultural education’, are two key questions in international education research (Cambridge, 2011). As Cambridge (2011) suggests, international education can be understood as taking place exclusively in international schools, whereas multicultural education may take place in a variety of school contexts including those in national education systems (also see Walker, 2015). However, in saying so, Cambridge argues that an increasing number of independent schools and schools in national education systems, as well as many international schools, offer an international curriculum such as the programs of the International Baccalaureate. Consequently, it cannot be stated categorically that international schools are where international education exclusively takes place. As such, according to Cambridge (2011; 2003) definitions of international educations depend upon the context at which it is placed. With this, he identifies two contexts or perspectives, the ‘globalist’ and ‘internationalist’, by which to define international education.

2.3.8.1 A globalist perspective

In the literature on international education, terms ‘global’ and ‘international’ are not synonymous, but carry different meaning and emphasis. The globalist approach to international education, promoted by Cambridge (2011) is characterised by the emphasis on global values of free market economics, expressed in terms of the ideology of ‘meritocratic competition’ (Cambridge, 2011; Cambridge and Thompson 2001; 2004) combined with ‘positional competition’. This is accompanied by quality assurance through international accreditation and the spread of global quality standards that are aimed at facilitating the continuity of education for the children of the globally mobile elite clientele (Cambridge, 2011). In sum, globalised international education serves a market that necessitates certification that provides educational qualifications that are portable and thus both global and transferable (Cambridge, 2011).
Importantly, this arrangement also facilitates educational opportunity for the children of the host country clientele—Egyptians, in this case—with aspirations toward upward and global social mobility (Cambridge, 2002). Matthews (1989) proposed a distinction between ‘market-driven’ international schools and ‘ideology-driven’ international schools that reflect the distinctions between instrumentalists made earlier. Cambridge’s ‘globalist’ perspective can be seen to be reference to Matthew’s ‘market-driven’ distinction, while his latter ‘ideology-driven’ proposed category can be seen to be closely related to Cambridge’s alternative ‘internationalist’ approach for international education, outlined below.

2.3.8.2 An internationalist perspective

The internationalist approach is founded upon international relations, with ambitious aspirations of peace and understanding between nations (Cambridge, 2011). It embraces, according to Cambridge, a progressive, person-centered existential educational philosophy that places at high value the moral development of the individual and recognises the importance of service to the community and the development of a sense of responsible citizenship (Crossley, 1999). Characteristically, international education is said to celebrate cultural diversity and promote an internationally minded outlook, or ‘international mindedness’. It offers a transformative discourse which ‘locates all fields of enquiry in a supra-national frame of reference and upholds the cause of peace’ (Rawlings 2000, p. 365).

It is important to understand that these two perspectives do not work easily in conjunction with one another. In fact, often they are seen to contradict the other’s objectives. Indeed, international education has been described as a contested field of educational practice involving two competing perspectives that attempt to reconcile economic, political and cultural or ideological issues and concerns (Cambridge & Thompson, 2001). It is best to see international education as facing a dilemma between these two contrasting objectives for education and how it serves society. To appreciate how internationalist and globalist international education differs, it is simpler to equate the meaning of internationalist international education with ideological objectives and that
constituting mental and moral development, while globalist international education most accurately equates to practical objectives of international schooling to serve globalisation processes and markets. When exploring the role of international education on identity construction, it is most relevant for this thesis to focus on the internationalist ideological agenda behind the growth of international education. However, while it is tempting to compartmentalise, in practice, attempts to isolate the two perspectives in accounting for growth and its effectiveness, such an activity is arbitrary, as all curricula combine to two perspectives, at least when marketing their services (Walker, 2015; Bates, 2011).

2.3.9 Consensus in cosmopolitanism

While the two perspectives offer very different definitions and standpoints of international education, there are some areas of consensus with regards to the general objectives of international education. The concept of cosmopolitan citizenship is central to the discourse of international education, regardless of which perspective one chooses to adopt (Cambridge, 2011). Its very notion suggests a world community to which all of humankind belongs, with mutual interests, and with a consciousness of human rights as universal entitlements (Cambridge, 2011). Cosmopolitan citizenship in a liberal democracy is not an alternative to national citizenship. Instead, understanding citizenship as a function of nationality is considered limited and irrelevant as discussions in chapter two suggests, and according to such theory, ‘globalisation has enabled the development of a consciousness that identity is multiply situated’ (Osler & Starkey, 2005, p. 21).

While the aspirations of international education are great indeed, it has not been met with as much cynicism and suspicion as one might initially expect. Despite the fact that international education is typically a Western oriented initiative (Bates, 2011), international schooling has been proving expansive and popular in host, eastern countries, including Egypt. At present, the number of identifiable international schools globally stands at over 6,000 with the most rapid growth concentrated in Asia (particularly China), Europe and Africa (Walker, 2015; Bunnell, 2014; Brummitt, 2007; 2009). In fact, due to the rapid
growth rate globally, there is now what is known as an ‘international school industry’ (Macdonald, 2006; Bunnell, 2009).

That there should be such an industry expanding should come as no surprise in the view of two distinguishing factors. First, as a result of globalisation, the growth of the middle class in many developed countries has reached a point where it is now sufficiently large enough to support the expansion of such an industry. As reiterated in the World Bank 2007 report, as a result of globalisation, by 2030, 1.2 billion people in developing countries- 15 percent of the world population- will belong to the ‘global middle class’, up from 40 million today (World Bank, 2007). This global middle class is predicted to enjoy international travel, the purchasing of advanced consumer durables such as cars, and ‘attain international levels of education’ (World Bank, 2007).

Secondly, there is growing recognition that education at all levels is now a global service industry worth billions of dollars (Bates, 2011). For instance, in 2007-8 USA overseas revenue from international education was US$ 15.54 billion; UK revenue was US$6.34 billion; Australian revenue was US$6.9 billion and Canadian revenue US$6.5 billion (Maslen, 2009). While much of this revenue was derived from tertiary level study, an increasing percentage of it applies to pre-tertiary study.

2.3.10 Global markets and global education

As was raised previously, while in discourse it is useful to distinguish and separate clashing agendas in international education to highlight the heterogeneity of the sector, in reality international curricula rarely agenda in its purest interpretation. The market-driven motives often merge with ideological agendas for the purpose of curricula competition. The contradictory undertones of the two distinct agendas are thus so often ironed-out that it is hardly noticeable to those who operate within the sector.

As education is widely seen as a vehicle for the transformation of societies, efforts have been increasingly made among transnational corporate (TNCs) giants to steer this vehicle in order to produce both the skills and the disciplines
necessary for TNCs’ global expansion. (Bhanji, 2008, pp. 55-6). Therefore, while historically, TNCs in the field of education confined themselves to supplying products to governments, such as textbooks, more recently they have begun to exhibit interest in moving from providing products to providing a service; embedding themselves deeper in the education systems of societies.

The philosophy behind the TNCs’ greater interest in education is based around building institutional capacity in the developing world in order to allow TNC expansion in those communities (Sidhu, 2007, pp. 221-2). As pressures on governments and international agencies grow in guaranteeing basic education to the 100 million children across the world without access to education (Bhanji, 2008, p. 57), private corporations have identified a niche market. Claims have been made that ‘education without the state’ (Tooley, 1996) will free up the pressure and allow for private provision over state provision as a solution to the expanding problem.

One might ask why TNCs would take on such a hefty responsibility, but the rationale is closely connected to the drives towards greater trade liberalisation and the breaking down of barriers to the operations of these transnational corporations (Dale & Roberston, 2002; Roberston et al. 2002; Roberston, 2003; Sidhu, 2007). Negotiations such as the General Agreement over Trade in Services (GATs) are to place privileged countries with competitive advantage in a position to provide education services, while also opening up the so-called Third World and developing nations to commercial exploitation. The central role of neoliberal ideology in global modernisation and development was introduced in chapter two, but it can be equally linked to education. As Roberston (2003) points out, the new neoliberal provision put forth during the GATs were sponsored by the world’s largest exporters of education, such as the USA and Australia, the EU, Japan and New Zealand.

Improving education benefits the private sector in a number of explicit and implicit ways. Bhanji (2008, p. 68) sums up the benefits as laid out by the World Economic Forum’s 2007 report. Predominant advantages are building a skilled workforce, increasing purchasing power, and improving productivity. The report further highlights that individual firms can look to benefit from greater
engagement with education by developing new markets through collaboration with local partners, test new business models or products and enhance brand reputation through long-term investments and exposure, thereby solidifying a company’s presence in the community. As such, the primary target of liberalisation and engagement with the education sector is the emerging middle class in the developing world.

2.3.11 Expansion of the global middle class

In today’s economic landscape, the expansion of the global middle class in developing countries is one of the most important features. Over the last century, the middle classes have been the most active consumers in G7 nation-states, driving demand in the global economy. However, in European and US societies, the growth of the middle class has slowed, and experts now look to middle classes in Asia for future demand in the global economy, where it is predicted that the economic center of gravity will travel (Kharas, 2011). China is on the verge of becoming a middle class nation, with a predicted proportion of middle class at 70 percent by 2030 (Kharas, 2011). China’s booming middle class over the past decade is shared in other Asian countries, such as India, which Kharas also predicts that, though small in 2011 is likely to be the world’s largest middle class consumer market by 2030 and could add over 1 billion people to the global middle class.

With the global middle class projected to expand from just fewer than 2 billion consumers today, to almost 5 billion by 2013, Asia is at the center of this growth. Middle classes are an important driver of growth as they bolster demand for private goods and services, especially in education, health and infrastructure. But how does Middle East middle classes fair in this global, middle-class expansion?

Post-2011, the subject of the Arab middle classes has been popular, but the field of study has suffered from data scarcity. Shortages in survey data for the study into consumer patterns in Arab countries has resulted in the need to look elsewhere for indications of middle-class behaviour. When studying middle classes in the United States, for example, assessing consumption patterns,
imputed income, education levels and skills are all under consideration. However, where this is not available in the Arab countries, political and professional affiliations have been used as alternatives in assessing the extent of the middle class in the Middle East. Consequently, most studies into the middle class in Arab countries have tended to focus on political behaviour over consumption patterns as a proxy (Saif, 2012). These have included Galal Amin’s work on the political activity of Egyptians during three decades. Similar studies also exist on Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan, adopting the same political affiliation and engagement by-proxy methodology.

The consequences of approaching the study of the middle classes in Arab countries through political behaviour has resulted in estimations of the middle class in the region as implausibly small (typically estimated at just five percent of the population), leading some to suggest that there is no middle class social group in Arab countries.

By developing a new methodological framework for measuring the middle class in Arab countries, a United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA) report found that of nine Arab countries, there was indeed an active middle class, and that while the size of the middle classes in the majority of countries remained stable between the years 2000 and 2010, Egypt saw a reduction in the size of its middle class during this period. In fact, the report notes that Egypt’s middle class had shrank by almost one third during the decade 2000-2010 (Abu-Ismail and Sarangi, 2013). Despite this, the Egyptian middle class continued to spend their expenditure income on education. It was found that in 2011, the middle class spent 3.5 percent on education services, and the affluent class spent 6.9 percent of their disposable income on education (UNESCWA, 2014, p. 92). As income increased, the out-of-pocket share spent on education increased as it did with healthcare. Both health and education were important services to Egyptians of all classes and as with healthcare, the quality of public schools markedly deteriorated (discussed in the following chapter), pushing those who could afford to pay to choose private education.
It might well seem obvious that as income would increase per household, so too would expenditure on education. But this is not an inevitable correlation. In Tunisia it was found that the opposite was the case. Tunisian middle classes spent 2.2 percent on education, while the poor spent 3.2 percent, and the rich spent only 1.9 percent. Therefore, unlike in Egypt where the pattern for education spending as a share of household consumption rose as expenditure income rose, in Tunisia the level of education spending decreased as income increased (UNESCWA, 2014, p. 94). This suggests that the Egyptian middle class are more prepared to spend a greater proportion of their disposable income on quality education than some of their neighbours.

Arab-region focused research into social groups and expenditure suggests overall that the middle classes in each Arab country expand at different rates and place importance to different provisions and services. However, demand for education has always been recognised among societies across the region. As will be shown in the following chapter, a great deal of emphasis was placed on education in modernisation projects and periods post-independence. Asia is undoubtedly a lucrative market for its steady and reliable growth among the middle class. However, due to inaccuracies in the studies of social and economic groups in the Middle East, estimations of the middle class in Arab countries have tended towards undermining the extent of the customer base for private education. In the case of Egypt, not only could the middle class be larger than has typically been suggested, but also consumption patterns and attitudes towards education are quite different to some of its neighbours, which explain the growth in demand among Egyptians towards fee-paying tuition.

The result of the privatisation of education is of course the detachments of education from its local and national roots, and a move away from the historical purpose of education as a consolidating vehicle for national identity and citizenship. Instead, as Roberston et al. (2002) puts it, TNCs and international agencies such as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), seek to rescale governance of education to the global level (Roberston et al., 2002, p. 489), and dis-embedding the individual from his or
her local identity as citizen and instead embedding a new identity as workers and consumers of the international market (Bates, 2011, p. 14).

The context for the development and expansion of international schools is thus provided by the notable and evident growth in middle classes’ demand for education, and a recognition of the value of the international market for education services as well as the prospects for its privatisation and commercialisation (Dale and Robertson, 2002; Robertson, 2006; Lauder 2007). However, the context for the expansion of international schooling is not simply numerical (Bates, 2011). It is also ideological, as we can see from the already vast supply of ideological and philosophical interests aforementioned.

2.3.12 Education for ‘international mindedness’

In the context of cosmopolitanism, international education, for some, attempts to draw a ‘global culture’ for tolerance of difference and peace, seeking a framework of learning through which multiple cultures can be accommodated into the curriculum. Gray (2008) argues that such a framework ‘cannot be the same for every society, or fixed forever. It embodies a type of tolerance whose goal is not truth but peace’ (Gray, 2008, p. 295). Hill (2007) therefore sees international education to be ideologically positioned to ‘integrate students into an international system where differences in culture are the norm. It places an emphasis on a curriculum and teaching approach which will develop skills, knowledge and attitudes necessary to function effectively as citizens of the world’ (Hill, 2007, p. 257-8).

This view of international education is consistent with the ideals of those who initially founded the international schools’ movement, such as the aforementioned A.D.C Peterson and Maurette. In addition, Kurt Hahn, whose establishment of the United World Colleges in response to the Second World War is recalled as a ‘project in education which combined internationalism and peace with the martial virtues of disciplined service to others, together with exposure to the formative beliefs of residential life’ (Sutcliffe, 1991, p. 33). However, in practice, the establishment of a global culture remains controversial.
It has been said that international schools exist in a bubble; free of the local cultural context within which they are geographically situated (Laurette, 2008). The expansion of international schools into a greater variety of countries and importantly, the increasing involvement of nationals and not just expatriates in such schools, as well as the increasing demand from members of the emerging middle classes with localised cultural identities, intensifies the issues over the cultural formation in international schools.

Accommodation of local cultures is now more important than ever in the context of international schooling. While endorsing the role of international schools in promoting international and intercultural education and espousing the tolerance of difference among students, Paul Poore of Harare International School in Zimbabwe noted:

All we have to do is look at the leaders of international education to see that our schools themselves are culturally loaded: they are often founded with the assistance of western governments for the purpose of educating the children of their employees (not to spread multiculturalism); they are largely headed by white educators from the First World who are trained in leadership theories which are culturally biased...they are staffed largely out of necessity by native English speakers, they operate from western liberal humanist curricula often packaged as international; they are more often than not accredited by western agencies which have no real concern with the issue of culture other than the superficial inclusion of host culture in the curriculum; and they pride themselves on the ‘third culture’ of the school which is generally rarely more than a variation of the dominant (usually American or British) culture (Poore, 2005, p. 352-3).

The international education sector has changed from when, in the 1970s and 1980s, it initially flourished, just as the world across which it operates has transformed. International schooling was introduced globally as a service to the internationally mobile groups that existed at the time. However, there existed only two types of groups, each at opposite ends of the socio-economic
spectrum. On the one hand, as Renaud (1991, p. 6) recalls, there were diplomats, servicemen and senior level commercial or business executives. On the other hand, there were the migrant workers, but at the time proportionally less in number than today. Consequently, international schools were introduced in response to a particular stratum of the international mobile population, a grouping that was later termed by Sklair (2001, 2002) as the ‘transnational capitalist class’.

What united and continues to unite these international mobile individuals is their shared experience of impermanence, transience and their consistent readjustment and adaptation to ‘other cultures’. Importantly, they are also united in that they are committed to maintaining their cultural identity, which they anticipate resuming at any given point in the future (Bates, 2011, p. 7).

In fact, studies have even struggled to find any evidence at all that the international mobile individuals enrolled in international schools possessed signs of ‘international mindedness’ or indeed cosmopolitanism (Fail et al., 2004; Zilber, 2004). Evidence suggests that often their interaction with different cultures was extremely limited, referring back to Laurette’s (2008) claim that international schools typically operate in a bubble. Intercultural literacy was so often taken for granted in the shaping of global culture in international schools, and thus the intercultural aspects of international schools are questionable (Poore 2005, p. 353). Poore raises therefore a conflict of international education, if it indeed maintains its claim to foster truly international understanding.

While international schools have typically operated globally at an elite level of Sklair’s transitional corporate elite society, there remain those within the schools who are committed to the concept of a global culture and thereby an idea of global citizenship within a notion of global civil society. This comes into play over the teaching and cultivation of knowledge, skills and attitudes that are concerned with global issues rather than internalised, nationalistic issues. The idea of course, is that this concern for global issues would lead to an ‘awareness of and sense of responsibility in one’s country, on a global scale’ (Roberts, 2003, p. 77). Going further, Bohler has argued for the need to
espouse citizenship through allegiance of local, regional and multinational ‘overlapping communities’ (Bohler, 2008, p. 25). The fact remains as to how easily such aspirations can be achieved alongside the sector’s market-driven philosophy.

Many schools rarely adopt simply one perspective over the other. Instead, what is more common is that international schools uniquely reconcile these contrasting perspectives according to their own individual contexts and aspirations within the host country. For this reason, the community of international schools is so widely heterogeneous because often, each attempt of reconciliation relates to the historical, geographical and economic circumstances of the particular institution in question (Sylvester, 2002).

2.3.13 New trends in international education

Perhaps one of the greatest challenges for research into international education is that the literature has failed to keep up with the changing structure and reality of international education globally. Literature has typically focused on the USA, Europe and ASEAN, but has yet to produce any real insight into the sector operating across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Understanding how the sector has developed in MENA is really quite important, as it does not typically fit with the other regions studied.

In the Middle East, international schooling is loosely defined, and the demographic in those schools are increasingly being dominated not by diplomats’ children or the families of corporate executives, but rather the middle classes of the host countries themselves who are not particularly transient, but have the means to afford an elite education. The international schools that were approached in Egypt for this research all had a majority Egyptian demographic, despite the fact that great efforts were made to find a school with a much larger expatriate community. How this impacted on the delivery of the schools’ international culture remains inconclusive, but the environment it has fostered is explored in the findings of the research, and it goes to show how the international education market has adapted to the demands, and in some cases, diluted its ideological and functional modus operandi.
But this is precisely the problem. Although there has been significant research into expatriate children attending international schools, there is a dearth in any investigation into the children who attend international schools within their own country. And, these are not among the minority. A recent study conducted by Lucy Bailey (2015) sought to redress this imbalance in the literature by researching host country nationals attending an international school in Malaysia. Her analysis was mostly on pedagogies and attitudes between the Malaysian students and their Western teachers and so did not set out to explore the students’ identities and sense of self, but she is one of few who raise the increased dominance of host nationals in international schools across Asia.

The clientele of international schooling is therefore changing. Previous research into international mindedness and international schooling has also often studied foreign students on exchanges abroad. Again this is marginal practice when compared to the vast majority of those families around the world who are part of the international school market but are educated in institutions in their own countries. Indeed those students who are fortunate to gain positions in international exchanges are within a tiny minority around the world, and really are those of the privileged few. Instead, host nationals educated in international schools now make up thousands within a country; a significant number in societies around the world that remain understudied.

The increased demand for international education among host country nationals cannot be separated from the fact that globalisation and the free-market ideal has penetrated the Middle East region’s societies so effectively. While it is clear that there can be a wide variety that fit under the international education sector, the most popular in Egypt is the many international schools with national affiliations, such as American international schools, British international schools and Canadian international schools. What distinguishes such schools to, for example, the French Lycees or the German Gymnasium (those founded to cater for their own nationals while abroad with a view to easing transition back into the education system at a later date), is that their medium of instruction (English) has come to be seen as the international lingua franca, thereby
making the education offered more widely attractive to those from multiple national and linguistic backgrounds (Hayden & Thompson, 2008).

An interesting new form of international school emerging in the market has been franchises of prestigious and well-established schools from a particular national context. Independent schools in England, including Dulwich College, Harrow School, Shrewsbury School and Repton School have established ‘franchises’ across Asia and the Gulf. While these still form a minority of international schools, this trend is growing, and now in Egypt Malvern College looks to establish itself in Cairo in the coming year. Such schools are almost entirely set up to cater to host country nationals who value the prestige attached to studying in such well recognised and respected institutions.

The international school market, in all its diverse forms, has rapidly adapted to both pragmatic demand of upwardly mobile host-national families, as well as ideological motivators committed to offering education that encourages the next generations towards becoming more conscious ‘global citizens’. Most international schools in Egypt today balance both the pragmatic and the ideological objective. Despite the wide array of international schools on offer, Hayden and Thompson (2008) argue that there are some key areas that distinguish international schools from national schools. These include the curriculum that is offered, the student body of the schools, the staff of the schools, and the managements and governance of the schools.

International schools will offer a curriculum that is other than that of the host country in which the school is located. This includes the content as well as how and in what language it is delivered. The nature of the curriculum on offer to the international sector varies. Thompson (1998) proposes a four-way categorisation of the types of curricula for use in international schools worldwide. These include exportation (the marketing abroad of national curricula and examinations); adaptation (where national curricula and examinations are slightly adapted to an international context); integration (where best practice from an array of successful curricula is brought together to form one new bespoke curricula); and creation (when a new curricula is developed entirely for the purpose of an international community). In this thesis,
those applicable to Egypt and the Middle East remain the exportation and adaptation type. However, the International Baccalaureate Organisation is leading in developing a specially created curriculum program to compete in the Middle East where they have faced challenges competing more popular and affordable routes to an international diploma (Bunnell, 2009).

An example of Thompson’s adaptation category is the English medium International General Certificate of Secondary Education (IGCSE). This curriculum is a variation on the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) taken by most 16 year olds in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Originally developed and offered by Cambridge International Examinations (CIE) to schools worldwide, Edexcel, another English awarding body, has also developed another version of the IGCSE more recently. The IGCSE is the most popular and widely available international curriculum on offer in Egypt.

An example of an integrated program is the International Baccalaureate Diploma Program (IBDP). Developed in the 1960s as a pre-university program for 16-18 year olds, the curriculum received input from experts from around the world. It is the most established of the international programs on offer in international schools globally, but in Egypt is less common than the IGCSE, largely due to the premium cost of the Baccalaureate.

What makes the IBDP integrated is that its content was developed with the intended purpose of incorporating into international context and did not begin with any national affiliation. To adapt to growing demand the IB has also developed a Middle Years Program (IBMYP), which is very different in the assessment philosophy of the IBDP and much less reliant on external moderation. The IB’s newest addition is perhaps a good example of Thompson’s ‘creative’ category. The Primary Years Program (IBPYP) came into existence in 1997 and was designed for ages 13 to 12. The curriculum is entirely created for an increased demand for younger age groups to be offered the foundations before embarking on the Middle Years of Diploma programs of the IB.
Issues have arisen, however, and accusations of Euro-centricity of available international curricula have not been uncommon (Hayden & Thompson, 2008). It is an important criticism to address for those providing curricula with an ideologically international objective. For example, which languages should schools choose to offer as media for instruction if it truly aspires to be international in its philosophy and operation? In extension to this, questions have been raised as to how inclusive curricula can be in terms of offering as wide a selection as possible of foreign languages to be studied and examined? This is a dilemma for the schools but also for the organisations providing the curriculum. So far, the debate remains to be one of pragmatism, but will likely in time transpire, if unaddressed, into ideological debate that centers on claims of linguistic imperialism.

The greatest challenge in tailoring international curricula is that by acknowledging the diversity in the world today, those organisations tasked with making curricula relevant to all audiences while remaining practical, is an almost impossible task. Though the sentiment of an international education is admirable, the wide array of the curricula that is available today is limited in its international nature and scope. Debates within the international education community continue to raise doubts in terms of who is the agent of this education that is being marketed as ‘international’; whose history should be taught in an international classroom? Which pedagogy is most appropriate when teaching children of a wide range of cultural and social backgrounds and previous educational experiences? For the latter, most international school teachers today are Western-trained and so the form of pedagogy adopted will most likely emanate from a child-centered philosophy of teaching, reflecting the dominance of progressive debates among education circles in the West (Hayden & Thompson, 2008). What does this make for the meaning of the term ‘internationalism’ and is it not, in this context at least, synonymous with ‘Western’ or ‘Western liberalism’? These questions, as Thompson (1998) argues should be incorporated into the curricula planning process and these issues have become all the more urgent as international education continues to attract a host-nation customer base.
2.3.14 Globalisation and education inequality

Though the emergence of international schools predates the concept of globalization as we now recognise it, it is globalisation that undoubtedly drives the demand for international education today. It is impossible not to view international schools in the context of the forces and effects of globalisation. The dominance of English as the international language, the international dimension of businesses and commerce, as well as the overpowering influence of today’s multi-national corporations, all contribute to the continued and increased demand for a form of education that suits the lifestyles needed of a transient professional elite (Hayden & Thompson, 2008).

Indeed, in part as an effect of globalisation, and the influence it has had on societies worldwide, international schools are now no longer entirely dominated by the globally mobile classes. There is now a significant local customer base of the aspiring middle classes of host nations. The motives of local parents who send their children to international schools is as of yet, unclear. Is it a show of support for globalisation or Westernisation, and indeed do they as parents already have an international or cosmopolitan mindset instilled in them through global Westernisation, increased travel and intercultural engagement? Or are the parents' motives purely pragmatic; seeking an internationally recognised education for their children that will permit them entry to prestigious higher institutions in the developed world? Indeed, while the literature refers to a spectrum of pragmatic and ideological objectives in international education (Hayden & Thompson, 2008), or the globalist versus internationalist objectives of those who set up international schools abroad, the motives of parents too are crucial in this discussion.

In the spirit of democracy, freedom of choice and a market economy, citizens who can afford to send their children to private international schools that might lead to a Western-oriented higher education, which may in turn lead to membership in what Sklair (2001) termed the ‘transnational capitalist class’, should be allowed to do so. However, does this not mean that international schools are becoming a vehicle for entrenching the divides between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’? How does this implicate them in terms of social
responsibility and equality of opportunity? Though these debates are not new and are reminiscent of critiques of private schooling in general, international schools are now well recognised abroad as a sub-set of private education. Was this really what international education was intended to be? A privileged form of education for those lucky enough to receive an international perspective of the world over their national counterparts? There is no doubt that international schools contribute to the schism between private and state education in societies by providing an incentive for an English medium, Western education. Globalisation, through international schooling, is albeit unintentionally, influencing what is valued in societies and what is regarded as quality education.

2.4 Conclusions

Prior to the forces of globalisation, an imagination of community and brotherhood was constrained by the limits of national borders. The world’s communities in this age had evolved from the clan, tribal and/or religious sense of belonging, to a more accommodating national, ethnic belonging of shared history, language and customs. History has shown that education was instrumental to the realisation and entrenchment of these new values and identity formations.

As the world has become increasingly interconnected and globalised, a sense of belonging is attainable beyond the confines of national borders, and imaginations of community have the potential to exceed the limits of ethnic, linguistic and national constructs. Just as the forces of the free-market and international travel have widened people’s horizons, modern-day international education, its growth - originally catalysed by Foreign Direct Investments and global economic growth - has now become a vehicle through which those within one imagined community can learn to communicate with another.

However, for all its potential, international education has its flaws. If it is understood that education, no matter what perspective one holds of its primary purpose, is a socialising tool, then who is it that wields it? If education in its international form seizes to be a nationalist agent, then whose values does it
truly represent and propagate? International education has, rightly or wrongly, inherited the controversies that continue to surround globalisation and capitalism. This is much to do with what international education has come to represent: privatisation, Westernisation, and a service traditionally dominated by the transient, transnational capitalist elite.

How does this environment affect the ideological ambitions of international education, such as promoting peace, tolerance, intercultural understanding and producing future global citizens? Thus far, the literature falls short of addressing many of these important questions. Though through a small-scale study, this thesis attempts to provide some insight into the reality of global citizenship and education. By moving beyond the literature that explores expatriates and Third Culture Kids, this research seeks to fill the void in knowledge of what happens to host national students when they engage with international education at home. What effect does their education have on their socialisation, their sense of belonging, and their identity?

This chapter has illustrated a conviction in the power education has in instilling a set of values, attitudes and identity. The theories are rooted at a time when education was nationally constructed and locally administered. In today’s globalised world, this research looks to assert how far the power of formal education can continue to impact the identities of the students, and importantly, to what extent the role of education in socialisation is maintained when placed in an international setting?

The literature on globalisation, as outlined in this chapter, typically suggests that globalisation is a process that has resulted in a more interconnected and de-territorialised world. It implies, though it is vague on the issue, that this process is an uncontested fact - that people feel connected to one another. Consequently, international education is often analysed through the same political-economic prism. In other words, as the world sees freer markets, increased transnational trade, and greater cross-border communications, this would indicate greater demand for global interconnectedness and the growth of cosmopolitan thinking. The expansion of the international education sector is just another testament to this apparent inevitable change.
However, while globalisation theory is fixated on top-down structures of a globalised world when quantifying its analysis, measuring cosmopolitanism requires a bottom-up approach. Cosmopolitanism is in the people not the institutions or structures. Communities around the world are becoming interconnected, as much as the literature on globalisation has implied. However, this literature has largely focussed on the macro impact of the global integration of economic activity, our shared environmental, health and security concerns. The impact of global interconnectivity on micro levels, such as how young people negotiate identity issues within the context of transnational spaces that increasingly have come to characterise most communities, has thus far been understudied. There are few places on this planet that remain unaffected by the global flows of people, money, and information, in addition to ideologies, cultural tastes and aspirations. But how much really has this made a difference on the individual level? Globalisation theory has yet conceived an answer to this question. This is perhaps because its original theorists had not considered an alternative response to global interconnectedness that does not involve cultural homogenisation.

Theories in education and identity are disabled by similar entrenched assumptions. Any assessment of international education and its role in promoting cosmopolitanism requires an examination of education and socialisation theory. As has been shown, such theories were developed in the context of national, mass education, but international education must be contextualised within this debate. The emphasis on education first, before international, must be addressed, and as a form of education, it is logical that international schools would have the same measured impact on society and identity creation. It is the link between education and identity creation that has made education such a politicised subject, whether it is to educate towards an imagined community of a nation-state, or an international, cosmopolitan, post-national future. Ultimately, the question that will emerge is how effectively can schools teach students to denationalise?

What is also important is to understand where Arab and Egyptian schooling belongs with respect to these political trends. The following chapter will cover
the modernisation process of Egyptian education in detail, exploring the impact the national education project has had on the social dynamics in modern day Egypt and entrenching our understanding of the political and social relevance of education and political science in the context of studies into the Middle East and North Africa.
Chapter 3 - Education in Egypt: Eras in Modern Schooling

Throughout Egypt’s history, recurring trends in education reform are apparent. Education policy and reform has been motivated by a combination of modernisation and development ambitions, efforts for social reconstruction, and national mobilisation - all of which have been restricted by financial constraints. At times, the political elite sought to isolate Egypt from the outside world and the West, while at others it strove to include her in global economic and political developments. Egypt’s education system has always responded and adapted to meet the nation’s current needs. However, all visions that once existed among Egypt’s political elite can be traced in the current system and curriculum. While Egypt maintains a stake in the modern, mutually dependent, political, and economic world order, and globally interconnected markets, her national curriculum still echoes and romanticises the periods of isolationist nationalism. It straddles, often not effectively, pre-modern values with postmodern promises.

In order to understand and appreciate the state of Egypt’s education, and the role of international schooling to Egyptian society today, it is necessary to explore its development alongside the political, social, and economic context that drove education policy from Egypt’s past, through to today. In chapter two, the link between modernisation and Westernisation was raised. It will be clear in this chapter how modernisation through Westernisation came to affect the education sector in modern Egypt. In the construction of a collective identity, modern states have looked to education as a tool. This is well illustrated in the context of Egypt throughout this chapter, where multiple identities - ethnic and religious – once coexisted to be replaced with a powerful, homogenising, collective narrative. Education was a significant, if not central, element in the creation and conception of Egypt’s modern nation-state, and continued to be of great value to her political elite, whether it be those of the colonial powers or the post-independence nationalist regimes. Chapter two also discussed the role of neoliberal free-markets on social and political life. Like her neighbours, Egypt too came to engage and embrace neoliberal economic reforms, and the growth of the private education sector is a tangible example. The timing and nature of the expansion of the private international education sector in Egypt reflects the
country’s political economic reforms and its ‘open-door’ policy to the outside world.

Understanding the value of studying education as a variable for social change and behaviour requires some contextual history of modern-day Egypt’s educational landscape, and the social and political implications of education policies through time. In this chapter, it will be made clear the intrinsic political importance education has had on Egyptian society throughout its years of development into the world economy. By chronologically presenting the role of education in Egypt from the inception of a modern state under Muhammad Ali Pasha through to the state of education in the present day, theories and trends discussed in chapter two will be made visible. It will explore the diverse, alternative routes to education available during the early years of the modern state, the dichotomy that exists between the state and the religious education sector, the growth of informal education, and the rise of international schools from the 1980s onwards. It is important for a reader to appreciate the role education has played in bridging and polarising the communities that form the modern Egyptian nation-state. Without this grounding, subsequent discussions of the findings risk being baseless. Through the discussions in this chapter, it will become clear how education became instrumental to Egyptian political elites in defining citizenship and national belonging. The students who formed the control group for this study were enrolled at schools that exclusively adopted the national curriculum; a curriculum that will be shown in this chapter to be heavily politicised and socialised. The chapter will conclude with a brief outline of the structure of today’s education system in Egypt, with special focus on the state of, and demand for, international education in Egypt.

Given the complex matrix of social, political, economic, and cultural realities in the countries of the Middle East, it is important to avoid over-generalising educational conditions of the region. However, the national educational debate in Egypt reverberates far beyond its borders, leaving a legacy not just in Egypt, but so too in the educational development of its neighbours. Developments in modern Egyptian history such as the emergence and ascendancy of a secular education system, the subordination of religious education to state control, and the cleavage of national thought and identity, have resulted in shaping
educational reform in other Muslim countries (Cook, 2000, p. 488; Vatikiotis, 1991; Hourani, 2013). With a shared history of Western colonialism and the financial and political strains of underdevelopment, nearly all governments in the Middle East are confronted with the same questions of the social, cultural, political and economic relevance of their education.

3.1 The Muhammad Ali era and modernisation (1811 – 1882)

By the end of the eighteenth century, Egypt had become, in reality, an autonomous state set apart from Ottoman rule and in the hands of a revived Mamluk order. Although the Ottoman’s continued to send Ottoman governors to Cairo, and continued to consider it a valuable territory, the Mamluk beys had overcome the Sultan’s representative powers in administrative and financial matters of Egypt. Under Mamluk influence, which was altogether rather unpopular, unstable and oppressive, Egyptian society had no cohesive central government, and operated instead through informal networks of competing Mamluk households, each of whom collected taxes, employed their own troops, and engaged in their own commercial interests with local merchants and European commercial agents (Cleveland, 2004). Indeed, under Ali Bey al-Kabir (1760-1773) Egyptian trade opened up to Britain and France, with Mamluks displaying a willingness to strengthen military prowess by hiring European advisors and purchasing their weapons (Hourani, 2013).

Therefore, even from the late eighteenth century, Egypt was opening up to European influences. This would be a trend that would continue into the nineteenth century. Egypt's links with European powers was further strengthened by the Napoleonic invasion of the country in 1798. Napoleon defeated the unfavourable Mamluk rule in Egypt, but his presence also dragged Egypt into the Franco-British rivalry with the former seeking to disrupt the latter’s communication routes with its Indian colony (Hourani, 2013).

Three years of troubled occupation led by a remaining few of Napoleon’s expeditionary force introduced French engineers, scientists and administrators, along with grandiose plans for new canals and communication links across Egypt and administrative reforms and taxation systems. Though these schemes
were never fully implemented and Napoleon’s men were deeply unpopular within Egyptian society, these years would have a notable impact on the direction of Egypt’s modern state, as they had become exposed to technological capabilities of European power. This exposure to European capabilities would become further entrenched during the joint British-Ottoman expedition that eventually dismissed the French forces from Egypt. Ottoman military commanders would look on to the military capabilities of their British allies and become inspired towards greater technical know-how (Vatikiotis, 1991).

One such military commander would be Muhammad Ali, an ethnic Albanian and second in command of an Albanian contingent that was rallied as part of the Ottoman forces during the expedition to remove French forces from Egypt in 1801. Shortly after the success of the expedition, Muhammad Ali filled the power vacuum as the recognised Ottoman governor of Egypt from 1805 until his death in 1849. For forty years, Muhammad Ali launched Egypt into an intense period of internal development and imperial expansion; refashioning the armed forces, reorganising administration, centralising bureaucracy, kick-starting agricultural production, introducing heavy machinery and technology, and conquering his own empire, which by the 1830s encompassed northern Sudan, the west coast of Arabia, Greater Syria, and sections of southwest Anatolia (Cleveland, 2004).

Muhammad Ali set his ambitions on a project of full-scale state building; making Egypt a military and economic power (Vatikiotis, 1991; Dawisha, 1976). In order to achieve this, he invested heavily into reformulating an education system that could train Egyptians with the necessary skills to realise these great ambitions, and he would commit to bringing the country into beneficial diplomatic and commercial contact with European powers—no doubt inspired by his experiences marching alongside them in the British-Ottoman expedition.

Along with the tangible change that Muhammad Ali Pasha’s vision had accomplished in the making of a modern Egyptian state, from the eighteenth century Egypt had undergone some great social changes too, that had overtime revolutionised Egyptian thought (Vatikiotis, 1991). Following the French
invasion between 1798-1799, Egypt's traditional culture was first subjected to severe tests as the country undertook a series of changes to modify its traditional culture and bring it up to speed with a ‘European way of life’ (Hourani, 2013; Faksh, 1980). But, the most evident social change brought about at this time period was undoubtedly the rapid development of modern secular education, introduced whole-heartedly by Mohammad Ali, and continued after his reign by his hereditary successors (Adams, 1968; Szyliovicz, 1973; Vatikiotis, 1991).

Thus, by the end of the First World War, Egypt had five distinct forms of education:

1. **The kuttab and al Azhari schools.** This was the traditional system which had dominated Egyptian society prior to the nineteenth century and which was permitted to continue side-by-side with the new modern system introduced towards the end of the eighteenth century. The kuttabs were a form of elementary school that has today largely diminished in Egypt. It used to accept boys and girls without limitation as to age and help them to learn to read, write and do basic arithmetic, in addition to learning all or some parts of the Quran by heart. The kuttab system of education began to lose influence as the ulema (religious leaders), and by extension the main religious institution of al-Azhar, lost influence in and its monopoly on social and intellectual life (Gibb and Bowen, 1950; Tibawi, 1972).

2. **The primary, secondary, and higher schools** which collected fees and taught foreign languages. The system was adopted, from Europe, by the rulers of Egypt from the start of the nineteenth century, in order to complement and support economic and military reform that was being modeled against European structures. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1798-1799) introduced an initial impetus for change and modernisation, but this was sustained by Egypt’s Albanian conqueror, Muhammad Ali, who seized Egypt in 1805 and pursued an intense modernising project that mimicked Western military and bureaucratic capabilities. Educational
reform became a necessity to realise such modernising ambitions (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938, p.11).

3. **The elementary, post-elementary and elementary training schools** took no fees and offered no foreign languages. The system was created towards the end of the nineteenth century in order to bridge the gap between the kuttab and the primary school, but it did not enable the progression into secondary school or university (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938).

4. **The free compulsory schools** were established in 1925 in order to meet the provisions of the constitution of 1923. These schools were similar to the elementary schools, but they differed from the primary schools in that they did not take fees and offered no foreign languages.

5. **The foreign schools** functioned on an imported curriculum. These schools had been introduced to Egypt by foreign, secular, and religious groups, and each school varied as to how many native Egyptians were enrolled. American, British and French schools were established by religious groups on missions, such as the American College for Girls in Cairo, which was founded in 1861 by American Presbyterians, as well as Saint Marc School for Boys in Alexandria, which was established by the Lazarists in 1847 but was quickly taken over by the Christian Brothers, and Victoria College in Alexandria, which was established by British laymen in 1902 (Harby and El-Hadi Afifi, 1959) and later became an outpost of Imperial British education in Egypt. The latter sought to free Egyptian education from the influences of the kuttabs and the Jesuits and missionaries, who each, on opposite ends of the spectrum, made the British foreign office uneasy. There were also informal, foreign missionary inspired, educational agencies and services that supplemented the educational missions during this period and onwards (Matthews & Akrawi, 1949).

What is clear is that Egyptian education had become completely divided by those institutions that served Egypt’s modernisation and its engagement with the Western Europeans, and those, on the other hand, that served the
preservation of the traditional Islamic Egyptian culture. However, while they both existed side by side, they operated in parallel to each other, almost as separate entities. It was evident that these multiple and very different systems of education created (within one nation) conflicting attitudes and loyalties (Harby and El-Hadi Afifi, 1959).

The new education system was designed in markedly different ways to the already existing religious system of education, and the country swiftly witnessed the creation of an education system that was modeled on European culture and values and that rivaled the traditional religious one, though not entirely supplanting it (Faksh, 1980). As such, a division into two national education systems had emerged - that of the traditional religious, and that of the modern secular. According to Faksh (1980), this marked the start of a new way of life for the Egyptian people - one that demanded a specially designed system of education to serve it and perpetuate it, while the old way of life continued, in parallel, to maintain its own.

In its early reforms, education as an instrument for Westernisation and modernisation of Egyptian society was confined to a relatively small proportion of the population. Initially, the small and emerging Western-educated reformers attempted to incorporate and foster Western ideas, values and skills into the predominantly traditional, Islamic society (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938). Such attempts were met, however, with extreme resistance, which gradually led to deep dichotomies in Egyptian society.

Each system, as the new developed, served a different class of Egyptian citizen and performed quite a different function from the other (Husayn, 1938, p.64). The traditional schools, based on Islamic teaching methods, continued to provide a rudimentary education for the masses including reading, writing and arithmetic, while the modern state schools provided a secular, European-style education for the existing and aspiring elite (Tibawi, 1972; Faksh, 1980). Indeed, there were also arranged educational expeditions to Europe for those keen to learn of what European culture could bring to Egyptian development. Such expeditions would continue throughout the twentieth century (Matthews & Akrawi, 1949).
The clear split in education created a deeply dichotomised and fractured culture that has arguably persisted to this day (Kerr, 1969; Faksh, 1980). In his early analysis of the effects of centralisation on education in modern Egypt, Galt (1936) explains how the conflict created by two education systems, existing in parallel to each other, had ‘prevented the unification of the national culture’ (Galt, 1936). Indeed, the dual existence of such contrasting forms of education based on conflicting histories, values and traditions greatly perpetuated differences between social classes by, as Taha Husayn recalled, creating an intellectual elite or ‘cultured aristocracy’, who typically monopolised government positions and high-income professions (Husayn, 1938; Faksh, 1980; Qabani, 1945). Husayn eludes in his book, Mustaqbal al Thaqafah fi Misr (The Future of Culture in Egypt), that the leaders of Egyptian education believed that these divisions in education helped to breed two distinct mentalities in the people and thus two ways of thinking on issues and events that arose, arguing that:

The graduate of the Azhar [religious school system] conceives it in one sense, while the graduate of the modern schools conceives it in another sense. Thus the two different graduates agree in neither their thinking nor in their evaluation; nor do they agree in judgment and decision; nor in procedure and action (Husayn, 1938).

This suggests a conscious decision by the elites who believed that this made the literate and educated easier to manage.

Regardless of the motives, the problem implicit with this apparent dichotomy of mind and education, as explained by leading Egyptian novelist, Ahmed Amin, in his personal essays, Hayati (My Life), is what he calls the ‘Missing Links’, or al-Halaqat al Mafqudah. In his work, Amin pleads for a group of thinkers truly at home in both worlds and who could provide a bridge for the two cultures. As he explains, those versed in Islam know of the holy texts and tradition with great detail and precision but remain detached from the realities of the day, while, by contrast, the modern system produces graduates who are familiar with physics, chemistry, and Western philosophical thought, but who lack Arabic fluency and cannot transmit their learning (Amin, 1938).
What resulted, over a short period of time, was that soon this cultural gap between these dual systems of education translated into economic and social inequality in that the graduates of the traditional institutions had a competitive disadvantage in the modern sector of society (Kerr, 1969, p. 183). The new elite became aptly referred to as ‘the French knowers’ (Cleveland, 2004) and as Egypt’s leaders became increasingly committed to European-modeled reforms and as economic and military pressure on the Ottoman empire increased, those who knew the European way of life and their languages were favoured for appointments to the highest and most prestigious posts in both the military command and the civilian bureaucracy.

Those who opposed such reforms, such as the religious clergy, were sidelined. Of course, those who were sidelined would not do so quietly. As Colonel Ahmad Urabi, an Egyptian of peasantry background and a military man who, rather than having been European-educated, trained through the now less prestigious al-Azhar system, would show, the traditionally trained would increasingly represent the voice of the ‘authentic’ Egyptian and inspire national revolt as witnessed between 1879 and 1882 against the European domination of Egypt’s affairs. Such a mass anti-European movement would of course attract the attention of a heavily invested Britain in Egyptian affairs, and preferring to maintain the pliable Khedive Tawfiq’s authority, the Urabi revolt triggered the British invasion of Egypt that would lead to an occupation that lasted until independence in 1956.

3.2 Colonialism, elitism and Lord Cromer (1882-1922)

By 1882, Egypt was, in more ways than ever, a part of Europe. Even before the unrest in Alexandria in 1882, English and French ministers had been invited into the Egyptian cabinet in order to supervise the collection of state revenues and repayment of government debts. However, Britain did not intend to engage in a prolonged occupation and certainly did not intend to take on the task of governing Egyptians (Hourani, 2013). British interests in Egypt were limited to the wider imperial competition with France and the safeguarding of the Suez Canal as a trading root and communication link with India. In fact, Britain had
failed to define its relationship with Egypt, thereby not declaring it a colony or protectorate until after the First World War. It maintained that it was an autonomous province of the Ottoman empire- albeit administered by British Lord Cromer (Vatikiotis, 1991).

Lord Cromer, like the majority of British officials during the Victorian era, viewed non-Western and non-Christian peoples as inferior to Western civilisation, believing that ‘Orientals’ could never develop unless they had mastered the ways of the West (Cleveland, 2004). However, Egypt was quite a special case, and for Cromer, a century was too short to make any changes to Egypt’s crippling shortfalls. In Cromer’s own words, ‘It would be childish to discuss the pattern of the carpet when the house in which it was laid was on fire’ (Baring, 1916, p. 543). Consequently, in many areas of social development vis-à-vis Egyptian subjects, Cromer’s policies were regressive. It was particularly true in the field of education, where he effectively reversed the trend of state sponsored schooling that had been such a pronounced feature of the reign of Muhammad Ali’s successor, Khedive Ismail (Cleveland, 2004). In fact, British policies and attitudes to education in Egypt was the most controversial and most heavily criticised for its profound neglect (Issawi, 1963, p. 96).

Cromer’s restrictive educational policies were based on financial and political reasoning. Egypt’s uncertain financial situation during Cromer’s first years in office had led him to reduce the budget for education (Baring, 1916; Vatikiotis, 1991). As such, many of the specialised post-secondary institutions founded by Ismail were closed down, and enrollments in the primary and secondary government schools were heavily restricted and consequently declined. Furthermore, while Ismail’s government school system took the burden of the costs of instruction, Cromer introduced tuition fees at all levels - a measure that considerably prevented the general public’s access to state education (Cleveland, 2004). Before the British occupation, education in the kuttabs, modern technical and elementary schools were free. However, by 1907, free education was completely prohibited. Poor Egyptians were to go to kuttabs that would be funded at various levels by the endowment of each mosque or church (Cochran, 2008).
Even after Egypt’s financial situation had improved however, Cromer provided only minimal funding for education. According to Cochran, as little as 69,479 Egyptian pounds was allocated to education, of which 12,745 was recovered in school fees (Cochran, 2008: 42; Boktor, 1936, p. 133). Other estimations suggest that in 1905-1906, after twenty-four years of British rule, the proportion of state funding for education remained less that one percent. It only gradually rose to four percent by 1920, and thirteen percent by 1951 (Kerr, 1968). Based on his experiences while serving in India, Cromer had come to believe that providing subjects with access to Western education (especially universities) would create a group of Egyptian intellectuals imbued with nationalist ideals and a sense of frustration over their inferior status in their own homeland (Cleveland, 2004). Therefore Cromer, as Cleveland (2004) confirms, attempted to confine Western education to the training of civil servants and instead directed the bulk of primary school graduates into vocational institutions. Those who were trained to be the secular elite were trained to be English-speaking government bureaucrats. The curriculum of elite government schools encouraged submission to authority and passiveness, with the purpose of limiting independent thought. Wilson (1928, p. 76-77) recalls how some subjects that could have been valuable to creating intellectual graduates were omitted from the curriculum entirely. For instance, ethics was not taught to Egyptians, and neither were economics, philosophy (modern or ancient), and literature (Arabic or European) (Cochran, 2008, p. 45). However, a select few Egyptians were awarded the opportunity to travel abroad to study, just as Muhammad Ali had once arranged. In 1908, a group of Egyptian notables set out to create a university whereby a limited amount of students could study with the support of esteemed lecturers from European universities. Under this scheme, with the support of Prince Fouad, twenty-four students were sent on educational expeditions to Europe to specialise in various subjects and return to offer lectures at the university (Tignor, 1966, p. 338). From this, a committee was formed to encourage future expeditions that allowed Egyptian students to study abroad in European universities, albeit at their parents’ expense. According to Newman (1928, p. 230), 614 students left for Europe in 1914, with more than half studying in Britain, 139 in France and 36 in Switzerland. However, this was perhaps the most elitist of all the opportunities available to Egyptians, in that only wealthy Egyptians could afford to send their child to be
educated abroad. However, the interest of hundreds of Egyptian families demonstrates that education in Egypt, even for those who could afford the best, was not being seen as suited to the needs or the dreams of Egyptians, but rather of the British and their plans for Egypt. However, the expedition to European shores for educational programs marks the first formal arrangements for transnational education in Egypt.

By and large, Cromer was right to believe that one day Egyptians would become tired of their inferior status and grow frustrated of the social conditions imposed on them. Education during British rule had become not just culturally elitist but also an expensive commodity only affordable for the very rich in Egyptian society. According to Judith Cochran, based on accounts during a personal interview conducted in 1983 with former Minister of Science Education, Salah Kotb, in the 40 years of British occupation only one scholarship was awarded to an Egyptian child. According to Cochran’s account, the British Minister, Duncan Dunlop, had awarded the scholarship ‘on the condition that it will never happen again’ (Cochran, 2008, p. 48). The student, Ismail Cabanni, eventually went on to become the Minister of Education and an advocate for reform towards one school for all Egyptians, but the controversy that ensued was said to have led to the threatened resignation of revolutionary nationalist and first Egyptian Minister of Education, Saad Zaghloul.

By 1908, the tide had begun to change in favour of the masses, and nationalism was becoming the spearhead of the revolution. The foreign influence on education had become deeply unpopular because of the elitism that appeared to accompany it. The Egyptians began demanding that Arabic be reinstated as the main language of instruction in Egypt’s primary and secondary schools. In government schools, English and French became compulsory subjects, but so did Arabic. The demands of the locals were finally being heard and at times implemented. British control became increasingly questioned, however, private language and foreign schools continued to use English and French for instruction and all other aspects of British education policy remained, including the curricula, examination styles, and enrollment policies. National education had become a proxy for national sovereignty.
Much of the literature on the period of British occupation describes Egyptian politics after the First World War as a triangular struggle for authority between the British, the king, and parliament (Vatikiotis, 1991; Hourani, 2013, Kerr, 1963; Heyworth-Dunne, 1938; Gibb and Bowen, 1950; Coombe, 1963; Faksh, 1980). Ideological dichotomy as a product of an incoherent education system played its part in perpetuating political fault lines. Parliament generally enjoyed the support of those who had been educated under the modern system of education and who sought to counteract the influence of the British and to limit the power of the king was seen as little more than a puppet of the British (Faksh, 1980). As for education advocacy, this ultimately meant to bridge the independent system of religious education with the now well-established modern, government-controlled, system and to revive the Egyptian heritage. However, in contrast, those among the ulema, or scholarly circles, who typically resisted any change, reactively turned al-Azhar into a ‘royalist bastion’ (Mead, 1967; Faksh, 1980; Vatikiotis, 1991). The mutual alliance between the king and the religious institution further entrenched the divide between the so-called modernists and the traditionalists, thereby isolating al-Azhar from the nationalist movement, and increasingly developing its orientation towards secularism (Adams, 1968; Faksh, 1980). Of course, this was only to open up a new type of division that Trevor Coombe describes as ‘the fissure between the traditional-sacred and the modernising-secular world’ (Coombe, 1963). Closing this fissure was exactly what the nationalist movement in Egypt sought to accomplish.

3.3 Nationalisation of education (1922-1952)

Rather than providing Egyptians with a single path towards the future in education, history had provided a jumble of conflicting educational objectives. Egypt’s education system was disunited and far from comprehensive, and the vast majority of Egyptians were totally illiterate. None of this dampened the rising nationalist spirit, but the nationalists knew that they would need to train future leaders and technicians who could rebuild the country that had been invaded and occupied for 2,000 years (Cochran, 2008, p. 52).

First, education had to be made practical, accessible and free in order to encourage attendance and address the huge levels of illiteracy among the
Egyptian masses. Egyptian officials made a series of attempts to address this immediate problem, but unfortunately lack of resources and finances rendered many of these as failures. For example, by 1923 the new Egyptian constitution called for primary education to be free and compulsory for all children between the ages of 6 and 12. These compulsory government schools prepared students for Civil Service positions for a four-year term, and because there were so few across the country, schools were run according to shifts—morning and afternoon. In 1925-26 there were said to be 762 such schools (Cochran, 2008, p. 53). By 1937, these schools extended their teaching to full days shifts, as 600 additional compulsory schools were added, albeit low on facilities and lacking a uniform syllabus (Harby, 1960, p. 21). However, it quickly became clear that any attempt to further improvement and expansion would be at the grave cost of the Ministry of Education and the compulsory education scheme was swiftly abandoned. There was really no solution that took into account the financial restrictions on the government and the size of the Egyptian population (Harby, 1960, p. 23).

Other attempts to make free education accessible were struck with the reality of financial constraints. In addition to the four-year compulsory schools initiative, the government also sought to expand the number of practical schools that had been created for the lower classes. These schools, known as elementary schools, were for six years of study focusing on graduating students with basic literacy and manual skills or farm work. The schools taught no foreign languages and stressed religion, reading, writing and arithmetic, with the teaching day half that of regular schools. However, the schools were limited in resources and the government allocated a £2 budget for students rather than a £20 per student allocation in the primary schools (Boktor, 1936, p. 258). Further expansion of this scheme was, again, restricted and any growth in this direction was terminated for the lack of good standards in the schools upon inspection. While the schemes had achieved greater accessibility to education, the education received needed considerable improvement that required financial resources not available in order for them to make any dent in illiteracy rates. However, the number of schools did increase in this period, and the length of the school day was extended. Quantity was made a priority over quality.
However, did physical expansion of education and the broadening of opportunities succeed in bridging the gap between the modern educated few and the traditional uneducated masses, and thus contribute to national integration? Indeed, as Halpern suggests, ‘no rulers of the Middle East ever attempted to mobilise so large a mass whose view of the world was so different from their own’ (Halpern, 1965, p. 211). Before 1952, the modern system of education, both foreign and domestic, was elitist in that it had continued to provide education to children of Western-educated middle and upper-class Egyptians (Coombe, 1963; Harby, 1960). The gap between the educated young Egyptians and the illiterate masses consequently widened and the sensibilities of the educated people differentiated them from the masses of their compatriots. This social imbalance was indeed so deep that it had produced serious obstacles to both national mobilisation and social reconstruction (Faksh, 1969). This deep division on outlook and approach toward the modern-day issues confronting the Egyptian polity further divided the elite internally and limited its capacity for joint harmonious action to solve economic and social ills facing the nation. This lack of cohesion in thinking can be related to the political realities of the opposition in Egypt, which included a range from the likes of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the Young Egypt Movement which combined radical nationalist sentiment with Islamic principles, and the Communist party, as well as the ongoing efforts to reinvigorate the dominant Wafd party, and the formation of the Free Officer movement that eventually led to Nasser’s military coup (Kerr, 1968).

Another important aspect of education reform for the nationalists was the need to educate secular leaders for the future (Cochran, 2008, p. 64). Any development in this direction was done through what was left behind from the British public school system that included primary, secondary and university education. The question remained as to which skills and knowledge were required for Egypt’s development, and during this period there was little stability in consensus. As such, the curriculum changed along with the political landscape. The criteria for entering into existing schools and the length of study requisite was determined by government employment needs of the particular year, so any child hoping to engage in a secular career was dependent on the
political climate at the time of graduation. Religious teaching was kept separate from this system, and students of the system continued to be educated in kuttabs and later, al-Azhar university (Cochran, 2008, p. 64).

Foreign language schools continued to operate and educate students, but they mirrored the confusion of the period. A law was passed in 1913 that prevented foreign language school students from entering institutions of higher learning. This move illustrates the degree of the nationalist efforts taking place in the education system at the time. As a result of this law, all students who wanted to study at an Egyptian university had to have earned a government secondary certificate by passing the ‘Thanawiyya Amma’. The law was relaxed a little when in 1923, Law 40 allowed any missionary or foreign language school graduate to sit for the government exams on both the primary and secondary levels (Matthews & Akrawi, 1949). Furthermore, universities and other higher education institutions continued to accept students who had taken the British General Certificate Exam as long as they took an Arabic exam before graduating from university (Iskander, 1972, p. 15). Foreign language schools at the time were quite separate from private schools and indeed the religious kuttabs. They were administered either by foreign embassies or religious missionary groups, typically protestant or American Presbyterians, and their purpose was to educate students with the intention to prepare them for attending higher education institutions in the country of the students’ origins, while promoting Christian values (Matthews & Akrawi, 1949). The schools attracted wealthy Egyptians and, according to Madiha El-Softi (1980, p. 9), the schools created in them a sense of belonging more to the foreign country represented through the school, rather than to their own. The graduating students were well trained in the foreign country’s history, spoke its language fluently and often built careers in their businesses that were located in Egypt.

By 1934, all foreign schools were nationalised. They were subjected to government supervision and the Ministry of Education was to determine the curriculum and the examinations for all grades. Those preparing students for the government examinations now not only had to teach Arabic but also had to follow the Ministry’s curriculum in civics, history and geography. Furthermore, by 1934 all students, of all nationalities and not just those who were preparing
for the government examinations, had to learn Arabic, although the medium of instruction had not been specified (Salama, 1963, p. 15). As such, most of these foreign language schools incorporated the demands imposed from the government, while retaining the language of instruction from before, whether it be French, English, German, Greek or Italian.

This period was an extremely frustrating one for Egyptians who were now in theory independent but in practice remained under British military occupation. The early efforts that were made were significant in attempting to bridge the many different routes available to Egyptians. For example, policies to remove the foreign language from the first and second grades of primary schools were drafted in order to allow the elementary school child to switch over to primary school up to the age of ten (Iskander, 1972; Faksh, 1980). By 1945, such a child would be allowed to sit the primary certificate examination and be exempted from the foreign language examination, and instead, given an extra paper on the Arabic language. These measures paved the way for the elementary school child to go onto a worthwhile secondary school. Furthermore, by 1944, primary school fees introduced by Cromer were successfully abolished (Cochran, 2008). Such bold steps made the earlier dualism less important than in the days when ambitious parents fought to secure their child in the most prestigious primary schools. However, favour over primary schools continued to exist within peoples’ minds, at least with regard to the quality of teaching and curriculum. The education reforms reflected a lot of the power and ideological struggles of the time and the inequality that marked it. Popular resentment towards the corruption and ineptitude of parliament and the King led to growing unrest and rioting. It was this troubling environment in which Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officers conspired to topple the old order and reclaim the authenticity of the nationalist movement.

3.4 Nationalism, socialism and Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 – 1970)

The vast array of educational routes an Egyptian could take ran counter to national solidarity. As we have seen, Egyptian nationalism began to gain momentum from the nineteenth century. However, it was the 1952 revolution
and its aftermath that had lasting effects on the country and region, and the administrative fabric of the national education system.

Though efforts prior to 1952 to nationalise the education system and deepen national unity were present, the policies of the revolutionary regime were by far the most effective. With the revolution, socialism became the framework for Egypt’s development, and this was reflected in the education system. From here on, Egyptian schools were considered the foundation of national unity and an agency for social progress (Harby and El-Hadi Afifi, 1959). The 1952 Free Officer revolution had sought to achieve cultural unity no less than political unity, for, it had perceived the necessity of social and cultural transformation on the way to political revolution and had identified the social imbalance among Egyptians during the course of its colonial past. For the Free Officers, democracy was about equal opportunity, and Egypt’s conflicting education system perpetuated the old elitism they had come to detest.

Socialism and its implementation during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rule, greatly transformed the schools in Egypt and the government’s relationship with education and the people. Administration was centralised and the curriculum was finally standardised, with an emphasis on technical education, science and Arabic. Education policy was designed in order to develop and nurture Egyptian patriotism among the Egyptian masses. As a result, the system of education would become more streamlined.

The dichotomy in Egyptian society and culture was reflected clearly in the political culture of the educated Egyptians. Faksh explains that it was a culture marked by a ‘crisis of identity’, ‘ambivalence’ of attitudes, values and beliefs not only toward the traditional order of society, but also toward the new national order and the elite. In a study conducted by the Bureau of Applied Research of Columbia University on the characteristics of nationalism among Egyptian professionals, the picture of nationalism was a complex one (Cochran, 2008). The findings of the Bureau were based on data gathered from interviews with one hundred and ten Egyptian professionals during the spring and summer of 1951 (Faksh, 1980). According the Faksh, the nationalist sentiment held by the interviewees showed to feature many signs of ambivalence. As he recalls:
On the one hand, the interviewees were strongly oriented toward the West and Western culture, while on the other hand, they felt that they were rejected by the West - scorned, unappreciated, and 'occupied'. In this situation of ambivalence, their nationalism was indecisive in character (Faksh, 1980; Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1952).

On the Bureau's findings, Daniel Lerner (1968) further remarks of a sense of identity conflict and confusion among the interviewees. This, he argued, exacerbated their alienation from the Egyptian masses:

Uncertainty as to their identity, their function to society and their future had obscured a clear vision of themselves in the world and increased their remoteness from the Egyptian masses (Lerner, 1968, pp. 240-1).

The absence of a clear perspective of political nationalism and apparent identity conflict, accompanied by the lack of a clear vision of Egypt's national problems among the educated was a severe handicap to President Nasser. According to Mansfield (1965) it was this apparent disagreement and disillusionment with civilian politicians and administrators over the extent and pace of reform and their orientations, that encouraged the military officers to stay in power and consequently recruit ‘trustworthy men’ (i.e. officers) rather than ‘experts’ (i.e. civilians) for responsible positions in the government (p.120). He likely bases this assertion on Nasser’s own memoirs at the time, where Nasser wrote, ‘Every man we questioned had nothing to recommend except to kill someone else’, and upon consulting Egypt’s experienced leaders, ‘we [the Free Officers] were not able to obtain very much’ (Nasser, 1959, p. 33). Consequently, the direction of the new order was to be entrusted to the loyal, passionately nationalist members of the military junta rather than the fickle and overly exposed and conflicted, educated elite. In the meantime, educational reform would be treated as a mechanism through which a greater sense of unity could be achieved among the Egyptian masses, for it was the education of the previous elite that was believed to have eroded their love for their country and countrymen. Military influence over education was increasingly evident after independence. For example, military training was added to the curriculum and the military was
promoted as an ideal career for young Egyptians. Furthermore, Arabic was hailed as more important than any other subject on the curriculum. According to Rizk (1981, p. 30) students could fail two subjects but still pass the year as long as they passed their Arabic exam with at least 50 percent. In this way, Arabic was treated as a means for the unification of Egyptian society and the erosion of the colonial class system. Before this, Egyptians could enroll in foreign schools and become proficient in foreign languages other than Arabic. Nasser regarded this to be a grave problem in Egyptian society, creating a ‘state of ferment and agitation’ (Nasser, 1971, p. 41). Arabic now became a method to entrench a collective sense of Arab identity.

There is little doubt that since 1952, the expansion of mass education had contributed significantly to the unification of cultural life in the country by at least decreasing foreign schools’ graduates to a much smaller proportion. Following the Suez crisis of 1956, most foreign schools and colleges were either nationalised or placed under tight state control and forced to change their curriculum to conform to the national government system (Faksh, 1980). Prior to the revolution, foreign schools produced the privileged social and cultural elite in Egypt (Faksh, 1980; Matthews & Akrawi, 1949). Egyptian boys and girls who attended these foreign institutions were typically said to have had a poor command of Arabic, and could usually not read or write in Arabic (Kerr, 1968; Dodge, 1961; 1962). The clientele was also to a large extent the minority communities - Copts, Jews, Syrians, and Lebanese as well as Greeks and Italians- and the Egyptian upper classes (Matthews & Akrawi, 1949). According to Faksh, these children felt ‘no sympathy for the great mass of their fellow countrymen and they were best qualified to fill key commercial jobs in the cities requiring fluency in foreign languages’ (Faksh, 1980).

It is not surprising, therefore, that Nasser regarded foreign schools as breeding grounds for the careless aristocracy who were so unpopular during the monarchical period. This deeply influenced his policy of control and administration over such institutions. However, the unpopularity of foreign schools also happened more organically as the general desire in receiving education in foreign schools in Egypt greatly declined as nationalist patriotism inclined. Cochran (2008, p. 71) recalls how before the British, French and
Israelis invaded the Suez Canal, 97,000 students were enrolled in foreign language schools. After the invasion, the number of students at these schools declined considerably to 17,000. The change in taste of Egyptians towards foreigners made life increasingly inhospitable for those living and working in Egypt, and the decline in demand for foreign education saw many British and French teachers leave. Foreign schools across the country closed from October 29th 1956 to January 10th 1957 (Cochran, 2008, p. 71). With the exception of American schools and those under the Vatican administration, all other foreign schools were sequestered. While the American University in Cairo (AUC) remained open for teaching, the university was placed under close supervision by the Egyptian government. The nationalisation of foreign schools certainly helped to ensure greater uniformity in the education system, but it had a profound effect on the government schools that absorbed the students from private and foreign schools, placing huge burdens on overcrowded classrooms, and this significantly reduced the quality of education.

Egypt’s resources were further stretched as Nasser opened up the country’s education system to all neighbouring Arabs and Muslims, as part of his pan-Arabist foreign policy efforts (Vatikiotis, 1991). During this era, Egypt became the most influential military and educational force in the region (Tsourapas, 2016). By February 28th 1958, Egypt, Yemen and Syria had become the United Arab States. Nasser allowed all Arabs and Muslims the right to be educated in Egypt at Egyptian expense as part of the agreement offered to maintain Egypt as the gravitational force in the region (Cochran, 2008). Between 1959 and 1960, it is documented that 2, 259 students representing 57 countries were studying on Egyptian resources, costing the Ministry of Education a staggering £E241000 (Cochran, 2008, p. 70). Coupled with this, qualified Egyptian teachers were loaned or seconded to neighbouring countries (Tsourapas, 2016; Cochran, 2008). The loaning out of teachers to Arab countries such as Libya, Syria, Yemen and the Persian Gulf, was motivated by a belief that Egyptian education model offered a degree of excellence through which neighbouring societies, who were only just beginning to expand their national educational services, could learn (Tsourapas, 2016). The combinations of these gestures placed a huge pressure on Egyptian finances (Boktor, 1963, p. 198), not to mention Nasser's continuing commitment to assisting Arab neighbours militarily.
too. Eventually, however, the dispatch of Egyptian teachers across the region reached a point in which most school curricula in the Arab world had conformed to the Egyptian system (Tsourapas, 2016).

Meanwhile, other efforts to correct the existing ills of Egyptian society and culture and to forge national unity post-revolution involved a huge educational expansion at all levels of the modern system of education (Boktor, 1963; Faksh, 1980). Physical expansion of educational opportunities in Egypt since the revolution was designed to assist the Free Officers’ industrialisation policies across the country, and attempt to attract the masses to the modern government education system over the traditional religious system. Like Muhammad Ali, Nasser needed technicians and scientists in order to support the military that was now the heart of Egyptian patriotism. Educational expansion was certainly huge. In 1952 only 45 percent of children of primary school age attended school. By 1960 the proportion had risen to 65 per cent (al-Ahram, October 20, 1961). By 1967, with a total enrolment of 3.4 million, 80 percent of the eligible children were attending school (New York Times, January 12, 1968). University student enrolment had risen just as dramatically. In 1951-52, there were a documented 35,016 undergraduates, while by 1970-71 it had risen to 152,382 (Central Agency of Public Mobilisation and Statistics, 1972, p. 187). This rise was almost entirely due to the fact that financial barriers no longer represented a serious obstacle to those who were interested in obtaining a university education. By 1962, following a presidential decree, all higher education was made entirely free (Cochran, 2008). The elementary school system that was introduced in 1922 was swiftly abolished in 1953 and replaced with a new primary school system that would take its place in eradicating illiteracy (Faksh, 1980). Primary schools were free and compulsory for boys and girls from the ages of six to twelve (Cochran, 2008, p. 68).

If we believe that literacy allows the individual access to modernity, which the Free Officers certainly believed, then perhaps this was Nasser’s downfall. In spite of all efforts to reduce the illiteracy rate, especially among males, the number of people who could not read or write had continued to increase under the revolutionary regime. In a series of articles on education, literary editor of al Ahram newspaper at the time, Lewis Awad, showed that 75 percent of the
people of Egypt were still illiterate—almost the same percentage as during the last years of the monarchy (al-Ahram, January 26, 1971; February 19 and 26, 1971; and March 12, 19, and 26, 1971). Egypt’s persistent high illiteracy rate at the time accounts for the predominance of traditional cultural beliefs and practices that still posed threats to integrative sentiments toward the nation and the elite.

As a means to address al Azhar’s distinction from the government system, a law was passed in July 1961 that effectively nationalised the institution, thereby integrating the religious system of education with the government’s modern system (Crecelius, 1966). Among the reforms that subsequently took place, al Azhar was transformed into a modern-style university, offering degrees in the full range of scientific and humanistic secular disciplines alongside those of Islamic law and theology (Dodge, 1962; Faksh, 1980). It remained, however, that religious education formed an important means of social advancement for lower-class persons.

Government administrative control over the institution of al Azhar had not entered deep enough into the fabric of the system’s ethos and in spite of rendering the institution but an adjunct of state administration, in many ways, those studying in religious schools and those within the religious circle remained predominantly traditional in their manner of dress, in values and beliefs, and in social behaviour (Faksh, 1980). In this way, Faksh recalls that Al Azhar and its affiliates continued to produce men who were ‘largely out of touch’ with modern Egyptian life and useless to the modern, economically-driven, secular sector.

Despite this, the Nasser era did see an overall standardisation and unification of the education system that had never been seen in Egypt before. The schools had expanded enrollment on all levels, and the sciences and technological education were by far the most popular and heavily subscribed. Education policy was finally beginning to match other domestic policies. However, in many ways, the education had become so interlinked with the military and Nasser’s regional vision, that Egypt’s resources for schools were stretched. Egypt’s military involvement in wars since 1948 and the nationalisation and socialisation
of education deepened the responsibility of the government to finance education. The years for such a public dependent philosophy of education and national growth were limited, and under Sadat, this ethos was gradually reversed in favour of economic growth in an increasingly capitalist world.

Nasser's nationalist vision was not of course limited to education, but rather education was part of a much broader and ambitious project for Egypt and the region. Nasserism was exportable, and with it came Arab-socialism and pan-Arab nationalism. The vision drove Nasser's domestic politics and foreign policies and so with the 1952 revolution, Egypt nationalised foreign assets and established healthy economic relations with the Soviet Union at the disadvantage of the United States (Williamson, 1987, p. 116). Nasser also went to war for his nationalism, but after 1967 Egypt's economy suffered drastically following his greatest defeat at the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which lost Egypt its Sinai oil fields and canal revenues (Williamson, 1987, p. 117). However, during the Nasser period, Egypt's education system was inextricably interwoven in Nasser's ambitious foreign policy objectives. It was not seen as simply remedy for domestic ills, but crucially a bastion for regional unity. How, then, did the Egyptian elite go from exporting Egyptian education to the Arab world, to opening doors once again to foreign education? The answer lies in a combination of global politics and leadership change.

3.5 Sadat and Mubarak: neoliberal reforms (1970-2011)

When Sadat became president following Nasser’s death in 1970, he inherited a deeply wounded Egypt, physically and psychologically. Educating everyone remained a top priority for the regime and Sadat continued to invest in education, upholding the 1971 Constitutional statement of Article 18, which confirmed that education ‘is the right guaranteed by the State’ (Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971). During his time, the Ministry of Education published a working paper on the continued development and modernisation reforms of education in Egypt. In it, the Ministry called for the updating of education in Egypt to respond to the ‘intellectual, political, social and economic developments within Egypt and the world’ (Acedo, Adams & Popa, 2012) Consequently, Sadat committed to the
expansion of education and schools across the country, with a vision for economic development and modernisation.

However, Sadat moved away from Nasser’s pan-Arab socialist policies, particularly with his decision to cultivate relations with the United States and establish communication with international organisations. This became part of Sadat’s *infitah* or the introduction of the ‘Open Door’ liberal economic policies. Sadat’s liberal economic policies led to increased trade with, and aid from, the United States and other capitalist agencies. Sadat’s economic opening sought to provide an alternative vision of economic development to that of Nasser’s popular Arab socialism and his isolationism from the Western world. For Sadat, liberalisation and influx of capital was the key to integrating Egypt into the Western capitalist system. By necessity, this economic policy required an end to Nasser’s anti-imperialism, and Sadat welcomed foreign investors to stimulate the development of the country in all areas, including education. For Sadat, the socialist ethos towards education was right, but in its current state, Egypt could not afford to carry the expense.

Sadat’s Open-Door policy with the West quickly introduced global market-orientated education reforms. His economic policies of encouraging foreign direct investment and stronger relations with the West set the direction for the Ministry of Education’s development plans. Egypt would seek to become a place where private capital investment was attractive, and therefore not only would Egypt’s labour force have to respond to private capital demands but also services would need to be made available to the families of the corporate investors and the workers of multinational companies. However, in its current state, Egyptian education could not withstand such new demands placed on it.

Education institutions that could provide excellent education that was globally recognised, was suddenly in high demand. As foreign, private schools grew in number they became, once again, the means through which to gain higher economic status in an increasingly privatised and globally competitive economy (Vatikiotis, 1991). Graduates of foreign language schools with a competency in English, French or German earned high paying jobs in the private labour market. As Cochran (2008, p. 78) alludes, a secretary early in her career in a
government position could make 70 Egyptian pounds per month, while an English-speaking secretary in a foreign company in the private sector could start with as high as 350 Egyptian pounds. Consequently, the gap between the rich and the poor grew ever wider. Foreign-affiliated Egyptians became wealthier and wealthier, and were more likely to send their children to international and foreign schools as they guaranteed far better quality education than the underfunded and overcrowded government schools. Just as during the British occupation, a new generation of Egyptians began to learn that speaking a foreign language and obtaining foreign education was a ticket to social mobility and better income.

Driving the middle-upper class Egyptians towards fee-paying education in international or language schools was a symptom of the increasingly neglected, underfinanced and quality-poor public education system. Population growth during the 1960s was by now having a direct impact on schools across the country, as the children born during the end of the Nasser era came of age in the 1970s and began to enroll in the government schools. The 1966 census showed an annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent, which stood as one of the highest in the world (Cochran, 2008, p. 76). Enrollment throughout the 1970s grew despite this growth in population (Helmy, 1979, p. 6). Much of the population explosion was testament to the continuing high illiteracy rate among women in Egypt, and again is a stark contrast between the wealthy and the poor, the urban and the rural. For those students who did manage to achieve relative success through the government education system, many graduated with academic degrees without the promised jobs that had marked Nasser’s socialist policies of the past. In widening the space for the private sector in the Egyptian economy, the public sector was narrowing, and the effects of Nasser’s promised job policy was already having detrimental effects on the efficiency of the Egyptian civil service bureaucracy.

However, the education received at the government schools failed to prepare Egyptian students for alternative private sector work, unless they were prepared to train in technical and vocational services, such as plumbing. The latter however remained an unpopular choice, as Egyptians continued to regard technical specialties as less prestigious than academic subjects. The result was
that students would graduate with unrealistic expectations, and government system graduates were at a distinct disadvantage to private, foreign school graduates when competing for private sector jobs.

It was also during this period when the rise of private tutoring began to become the norm. The reliance on the General Secondary exam (Thanawiyya Amma) to determine a student’s educational potential and his/her future resulted in parents seeking private tuition to give their child a competitive advantage, and have greater choice in what subjects they could go on to study at higher education. Private tuition again reintroduced the sentiment of elitism in education, as only those families who could afford to seek extensive tutoring and smaller teacher: student ratios could make use of this service. The practice continues to this day.

This period was marked by the development of a new elite that was commercially driven and had strong ties to the state. As education and social mobility once again became a right exclusive to the rich, economic inequality between the rich and the rest of Egyptian society became evermore entrenched. Alongside Egypt’s transition into the globalised, liberal world, the Egyptian state also became weaker; what Karl Gunnar Myrdal would have called a ‘soft state’, and what Galal Amin, in relation to Egypt, calls a ‘weak state’ (Amin, 2011, p. 15). This weakness was reflected in the relationship between the Egyptian state and the Egyptian people. Amin (2011, p. 15) critiques how the new relationships that emerged during this period between Egypt, the United States, Israel and foreign capital introduced the need for an entirely new mind-set among those wishing to take up high government posts as ministers. While laced with some cynicism, his account is illuminating of the changing times:

Even if some of them had also served in the 1950s and 1960s, they had to be ready to change their skin. For one, they had to be people with no resentment toward American policies in the region, and if they also had a natural weakness for the American way of life and liked to distinguish themselves by leading similar lifestyles, so much the better. It was good if they hated anything remotely connected with socialism, and held or
displayed a strong faith in the free market and in its power to vouchsafe the best economic results. They also had to be people who did not view Israel with the same resentment as did the general Egyptian public, people who liked to call themselves ‘realists’ in their readiness to accept Israel as a fact of life, and people who did not emphasise too strongly with the plight of the Palestinians, but were ready instead to blame them for their predicament. (Amin, 2011, p. 15).

While the government became increasingly distant from the politics of Nasser’s Egypt, they too became increasingly alienated from the Egyptian public. They stopped representing the sentiment of the Egyptian masses. Instead, the Sadat family, unlike Nasser and his wife, represented a close-knit, self-serving minority of Egyptians who saw the benefit of an open market in monetary terms.

Islamist groups flourished in this environment, as they became the symbol of resistance and defiance against Sadat’s unpopular policies. The latter’s concern for the radical left opposition had blinkered his awareness of the Islamist threat that was gaining momentum across society, and especially on Egyptian campuses. Students who were promised public sector jobs under Nasser were now disheartened, as their expectations no longer matched Egypt’s reality. Cochran (2008) writes that by encouraging foreign investment into Egypt, Sadat ‘brought back the foreign occupier-Egyptian poor dichotomy’ (p. 77).

Most if not all the challenges in education and society during the Sadat period persisted on to the Mubarak era. Under Mubarak, relations between the military and the economic or business elite became evermore tightly integrated. Mubarak oversaw throughout the 1980s and 1990s a huge entrenchment of neoliberal economic and social reforms in Egypt. The gradual decay of the national system of education from this period meant that its fate, like the public sector on the whole, had become subject to an open market economy that was dependent on global interests and markets (Mehrez, 2010, p.101).

The Egyptian state had reached the point where it could no longer raise the necessary funds for education reform and the expanding demand for education. Mubarak’s government continued to deepen and extend its relations with the
United States and other Western development aid agencies. Such relationships resulted in a massive intervention in the field of education in Egypt. Since Egypt had signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, Egypt had made it to the top of the list of development assistant recipients, with much of it committed to education reforms.

In 1991, ten percent of total world development assistance was going to Egypt (Mehrez, 2010, p. 101). In her analysis of international development aid for Egyptian educational reforms, Fatma H. Sayed contextualises the reasons behind the extent of financial support provided to Egypt. She states that, from the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and the reshuffling of the global economic and political order, policy makers in the West began to rethink the concept of development, awarding more weight to the human aspect of development (Sayed, 2006). More emphasis was placed in investing in human capital than previously, and as such it highlighted the importance of education for ‘international socialisation’. Sayed (2006) explains that with this, a set of values would be inserted and normalised into Egyptian educational institutions in order to guarantee Egypt’s smooth entry into the international community that was increasingly dominated by powerful multilateral and bilateral, intergovernmental organisations, such as the World Bank, USAID IMF, UNDP and UNESCO, along with the norms and values that they consider to be most important (Sayed, 2006; Mehrez, 2010, p. 101).

Thus, from the 1970s onwards, no analysis of Egyptian state education reform can be done without including an international level of analysis. As Berman (1992) explains, nation-states by the twentieth century had become a part of an interdependent global system that encompassed a network of international aid agencies located almost exclusively in the rich, industrialised global North, that sought to assist poor nations to expand, re-conceptualise and reform their sluggish educational systems. While the national systems of education maintained some autonomy over their goals and projections, the presence of donor agencies introduced a very complex collection of forces and interests that employed significant control over the local policymakers (Berman, 1992, p. 58-59).
In addition to donor agencies, new global actors on the local level included multinational corporations and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Suarez, 2007, p. 7; McNeely, 1995; Terano & Ginsburg, 2008).

In line with global actors, Mubarak followed advice of the World Bank in the early 1980s that ‘advocated a decrease in the amount of government involvement in the educational process, an increase in the private sector’s role, and greater application of market principles to the organisation of the Third World educational systems’ (Berman, 1992, p. 69). Thus, alongside a surge in international funding into education, Egypt witnessed a regionally unparalleled privatisation of the education system, at all levels and in different forms and orientations (Mehrez, 2010, p. 102). As Mehrez states, the emerging private schools represented fewer than 10 per cent of the total number of schools in Egypt. However, such schools became the Egyptian elite’s method through which to avoid an outdated national curriculum, overcrowded classrooms where students received little attention from the teacher, and the rote learning that had become synonymous with the Thanawiyya Amma national certificate. Providing an alternative for the rich, these globally oriented schools included the Cairo American College which offers a US curriculum, the British International School, offering the UK curriculum, the German School offering the German Arbiter and the Lycee Francais du Caire, which offers the French Baccalaureate. Some of the schools would later begin to adopt the renowned International Baccalaureate. The private international sector has continued to expand. This growth coincided with Egypt’s open economy and the state’s encouragement of embracing private education tutoring, attracting a market for growth in an internationally lucrative industry.

Despite an expansion in the private sector, Mubarak remained cautious about decentralising administration of education. National security concerns, especially with regards to the insurgency ongoing from extremist Islamist groups against the state, and the competition posed by non-violent Islamists in providing local provisions for communities to raise political support, considerably dampened any enthusiasm to decentralise education. Sayed (2006) explains that due to the threat to national security, Mubarak approached democratisation on the whole with caution, believing that the Egyptian people
were ‘not yet ready to take on board a comprehensive democracy’ (p.79). Containing and preventing the penetration of Islamists into the national education system became a priority for Mubarak’s Ministry of Education, and justified its central grip on the education system (Sayed, 2007, p.83). In an interview with a Special Advisor in the Ministry of Education in 2008, Hassan El Bilawi, Ginsburg et al. (2010) record him saying: ‘The Muslim Brotherhood [in the 1990s] concentrated on education because education for them is about preparing for the future’ (p.14). In confirmation, Ginsburg et al. (2010) quote the Minister of Education himself, Hussein Kamal Bahaa El Din, in 2008, admitting that the Ministry believed that non-violent Islamists had come to dominate Egyptian schools:

They [the Islamists] banned whatever they thought was against their religious ideas. And they propagated books and topics which are outside the official curriculum…Therefore I took very open and drastic measures to curtail their activities. I began transferring those teachers involved in political activities directed to this [Islamist] movement, outside of the schools […] I cut their contact with students […] The silent majority applauded me very highly, because they were afraid to confront these people. (Interview, Hussein Kamal Bahaa El Din, Minister of Education, February 2008, conducted by Ginsburg et al., 2010, p. 14)

Thus, education swiftly entered the domain of national security under the Mubarak regime, further justifying the retention of centralisation over the education system. The growing concern of radicalisation in remote, long-forgotten areas eventually became a priority for the many donor and international development agencies working in coordination with the Egyptian government. Thus, as Sayed (2007) explains, international agencies directed their attention to rural Upper Egypt and the under-serviced urban slums, fearing that these would continue to be the ‘fountainheads’ for future radical Islamists. The purpose of this move was to supply basic education in such remote areas, before the Muslim Brotherhood could do so, and thus challenge their grip on the locals’ hearts and minds (Sayed, 2007, p. 75). Skepticism towards decentralisation reforms and a preference for central control of the education system persists into present day for much the same reasons. While the private
sector enjoyed a period of growth under Mubarak and Sadat, the Ministry of Education maintain strict control over all institutions.

3.6 Present day: a parallel international offering

Today, the public education sector remains the largest and most popular education route for the majority of Egyptians. Education at all levels (primary, preparatory, secondary and tertiary) is free within government-run schools and universities. However, there are now two types of governmental schools: the regular Arabic schools and what is known as ‘Experimental Language’ schools. The regular Arabic schools offer the national curriculum in Arabic, but do not provide high-level foreign language instruction. Experimental schools, introduced in the 1990s, are public schools that offer instruction of the national curriculum in a foreign language, often English. Languages including French, German, Spanish or Italian is added as a secondary foreign language at the secondary level.

The private school sector in Egypt is increasingly popular as facilities in non-fee paying schools continue to be overly stretched. Private schools in Egypt range from language schools, religious schools and international schools as they have done since the early days. Like public experimental schools, private language schools follow the government curriculum, but the facilities are better and class sizes much smaller. Religious schools may also use the national curriculum, but with an emphasis on Islamic studies.

The alternative Islamic learning system still exists and thrives across Egypt, offering alternative routes to education. Many religious schools are part of Egypt’s official religious institution, al-Azhar. Such schools form an independent network of pre-university sector institutes, known as the Sector of al-Azhar Institutes. Most of the graduates from the al-Azhar system will aim to remain in this system through to higher education, joining the main al-Azhar university. Though the system operates in parallel to the secular national system, the Supreme Council of al-Azhar must answer to the central Ministry of Education. While the al-Azhar network of schools dominate the religious education in Egypt, some religious schools are privately owned and funded, and can be
either Muslim or Christian (Herrera, 2006: 25-52). As for the traditional *kuttabs*, these have been heavily reduced in number, and few exist today. Those that do still operate are limited to only teaching a religious education, and are thus treated as the equivalent of Sunday schools. In other words, they are an informal education that supplements a child’s formal education (Ali, 1985, pp. 147-149).

Finally, the private international schools vary according to the curriculum that is taught and their origins. They are typically British, American, French or German, and many will offer a range of curricula options within one institution. The international schools are the most expensive private schools on offer in Egypt, but even within this sector, there is a wide variety of international accreditation and costs that apply. In order for Egyptian graduates from international schools to continue on to enroll at Egyptian universities, schools must be certified by the Ministry (Abd-Allah, 2006, p. 116; Kassab, 1997, pp. 24-25; Tolba, 2008; Abd-Elsamad, 2007, pp. 85-96).

The number of international schools in Egypt has been rising at incredible speed. From 2003 to 2014 the number of inbound international students in Egypt rose from 27,158 to 47,815, according to the most up-to-date UNESCO statistics, increasing demand for international mobile education that can serve expatriate children.¹ Egypt, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already hosts 4 per cent of the global share of mobile students, many of them from within the Middle East and Africa, according to UNESCO data. However, these figures do not account for the increasing numbers of Egyptian nationals who are now choosing to enroll into the international education sector within their home country. Many international schools officially claim to host a majority local clientele.

International schools have a love-hate relationship with the Egyptian authorities. On the one hand, many owners of international schools look to authorities as crucial to maintaining order and regulation in a mushrooming and under regulated, competitive sector. On the other hand, those practicing in the

¹ Data extracted on 8th January 2017, and obtained from UNESCOs online statistics on
international education market in Egypt find many of the conditions forced on schools restrictive.

In 1997, following a steady rise in international schools across Egypt, the Ministry of Education put forward a number of requirements for schools to receive the license to practice as an international school. A lack of clear criteria resulted in an unprecedented increase in the number of schools adopting the ‘international’ stamp. In interview with a ministry official who was in service from 1999 to 2008, the minister believed that this period of growth also saw a drop in quality among the newly established international schools. Very few of the schools were recognised by independent international accreditation councils, such as the Council of International Schools, and the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, but all were licensed as international according to the ministry criteria. Consequently, in 2010, a decision to halt issuance of future licenses was invoked by the new Minister of Education, Ahmed Zaki Badr. A review was also set out to revisit existing licenses of some schools. The new regulations required prior approval of international accreditation from an independent body and a more rigorous assessment of the curriculum to be used to guarantee that it matched the equivalent standard of the national curriculum and Thanawiyya Amma certificate following graduation of secondary school.

In addition to this, international schools have always had to, and continue to, incorporate ministerial subjects including Arabic, Civics or social studies, and Religious studies according to the national curriculum. All students, whether at international or national school, must pass all three subjects if they wish to enroll into any Egyptian university, and while private schools carry the greatest prestige in Egypt currently, state universities in the faculties of Medicine, Engineering and Law are still regarded more highly than private universities. Entrance into these subjects at Cairo or Alexandria universities is highly competitive, and students who graduate from international schools in Egypt typically seek entrance into these universities upon graduation.

International ‘education hubs’ such as Qatar’s ‘Education City’, which has become home to some of the most prestigious international schools in the
region, and the world more generally, appear to have inspired the current Egyptian government, which reportedly seeks to mirror this success. Recent reports in 2015 suggested that the Egyptian government had announced plans to raise the number of international students enrolled in the country and to market itself as an regional international education hub that caters to Arab and African nations especially (University World News, 2015). While most of this will focus on the post-secondary level institutions, al-Azhar university already practices such a model with students from Nigeria and Malaysia, through the World Association of al-Azhar Graduates (WAAG), established in 2006.²

However, such strategies do not suggest that the government looks to limit its control over education. Total privatisation continues to be an implausible scenario for a regime that is increasingly tightening its grip on domestic daily life. As was discussed in the previous chapter, motivations for engagement with international education can be more market-driven than ideologically grounded. The Ministry of Education shows no signs of loosening its control over private schools and universities, and while the sector may enjoy more years of growth, the institutions that form it are unlikely to enjoy greater autonomy over their internal affairs. In fact, the growing evidence suggests that international curricula designers and providers are having to adapt their content to suit the growing market in non-Western countries rather than host governments adapting to the increased demand for international schools (Bunnell, 2008; Walker, 2015). The IB, as Bunnell (2008) confirms has introduced more Arabic language subjects allowing it to become more accessible to the Middle East market and compete with their curriculum competitors. The British IGCSE, the most popular international curriculum across Egypt, has long offered subjects such as history and literature in Arabic, tailored for the particular host country nationals. Such fusions are now becoming more and more common, and a growing necessity for curriculum providers who look to the Middle East as the most lucrative emerging market in international education (Walker, 2015). The effect this could have on the coherence of the international message in curricula will be discussed further in chapter seven.

² Based on the author’s professional experience working with al-Azhar university.
3.7 Conclusions

As this chapter demonstrates, the education sector in Egypt has witnessed dramatic changes since the modern state was formed. However, what has been consistent is the use of education for political and social means. Each of Egypt’s leaders, from Muhammad Ali Pasha to today, utilised education to carve out their vision for Egypt’s future. Egypt’s educational landscape is both a symptom and cause of the changing politics in the country. For a time, under Nasser, all Egyptians had access to quality education. Teachers were certified, one-classroom and community schools were established for villages with limited access and resources, and most importantly education was centralised in the objectives of teaching loyalty and pride for Egypt. Arabic instruction became the norm and the country worked towards a shared body of knowledge that spoke of Egypt’s shared history.

Both before and after this short period, Egypt had two forms of education, one for the rich and one for the poor. Today, private schools across Egypt teach foreign languages and history of the world outside Egypt. On foreign language schools, Judith Cochran writes that ‘such schools do little to improve Egyptian patriotism or loyalty in the upper-middle class and elite students’. In a 1998 Egypt Human Development Report, it was raised that the diversity of education in Egypt and the growth of the foreign international schooling market is likely to widen the social and cultural gap among young people, and to aggravate problems of national integration (Egypt Human Development Report, 1998-99, p. 8). Today, alongside Egypt’s national and private religious education system, there is a lucrative and ever-expanding international education sector, pandering to the growing needs of the affluent Egyptian family with the financial resources to offer their child the best education available and a step into the world outside of Egypt.

As recalled earlier in this chapter, foreign schools in Egypt before the revolution for independence were seen as producing the privileged social and cultural elite in Egypt. The clientele of such schools were largely made up of Egypt’s minority communities, with a poor command of Arabic. However, today in Egypt’s free-market economy, spearheaded by Sadat and Mubarak in the 1980s and 1990s,
the international education is far more accessible to Egyptians. The majority of private, Western-oriented international schools survive only because so many Egyptians choose to send their children to be educated with an international diploma. The demand from an ever-shrinking expatriate community is otherwise too small for business. The number of expatriates in Egypt today constitutes little, and most of those enrolled in international schools today are of Egyptian nationality, and range from middle to upper class.

As Faksh recalled of pre-revolution foreign school graduates, it is often assumed that the families associated with international schools are highly Westernised and largely detached from Egyptian life, attitudes and sentiments. But these are assumptions based entirely on anecdotes. Due partly to the fact that this sector has been seen as privileged, very little social science research has been done to understand the culture within such small, privileged circles today, and how the schools fit within the wider Egyptian education system. This thesis attempts to explore the consequent misconceptions, and addresses them directly with the students and the families of today’s Egyptian ‘foreign school class’.

Foreign schooling in the Middle East is not what it used to be during the colonial era. It is true that international schooling continues to be dominated by Western curricula exported to Eastern communities. For this, many critics look on with great suspicion that the international education exported abroad could be a form of twenty-first century soft power, or neo-imperialism. However, a look into the stated objectives, missions and philosophies of Egypt’s international schools demonstrates the difference between colonial foreign schools and twenty-first century international schools in Egypt. On highly refined webpages, schools set out their typical visions:

To seek to influence Egypt’s future by producing graduates whose moral and intellectual excellence and consummate abilities will make them highly sought for roles in shaping Egypt’s place in the world;
To make citizens of the world [...] while remaining Egyptian in their personalities and deepest loyalties [...] they will be poised and effective in their dealing with North America;

To create an atmosphere where students will grow to be creative, curious, caring and contributing members of a global community;

To guide them through the process of achieving their future aspirations in a global world [...] where diversity is embraced;

[To] promote the values of a pluralist society [...] foster respect, tolerance and regard for all members of society;

[To teach] essential human values such as honesty, trustworthiness, honor (sic), loyalty, compassion and charity [...] it reaches out to the local community and the wider world and promotes international cooperation and understanding.

In addition to their global mission and values, each accredited international school in Egypt states that despite their ‘British’, ‘American’, ‘Canadian’, ‘German’, or ‘French’ character and curriculum, they are sensitive to their location. As such, all international schools operating in Egypt deliver the Ministry of Education curriculum in Arabic, Egyptian Civics and social studies and Religion to its Egyptian students, and most offer Arabic to their non-Arabic speakers too.

Beyond the vision, mission, ethos and statements of Egypt’s hundreds of international schools, the following chapters explore the results of having engaged with some of Egypt’s internationally educated students and their families to see the impact of an education environment that is rooted in plurality and diversity, and that of global citizenship over national citizenship. While the international sector in Egypt operates parallel to the national sector, the following research joins the students of both sectors in one study of identity, citizenship (global and national), values, and attitudes towards their local community and the ever-changing world around them.
While this study exclusively deals with Egyptian students at private international schools in Egypt, the international education sector is far from limited geographically. In fact, the Middle East has seen massive expansion in the direction of private international education, and some of the International Baccalaureate's original schools came from within the region, notably in Lebanon and Jordan (Bunnell, 2008). Today, the United Arab Emirates is marked as a leading top-five country in the international schools market, followed by Pakistan, China and Japan, with each school boasting more than 200 schools (Walker, 2015). Walker (2015) documents that by 2008, Asia and the Middle East accounted for almost half of the entire ‘international school’ market. In a break from the usual demand from expatriate families, Bunnell (2014) accepts that ‘the majority of students in international schools are seemingly no longer there “by accident”’ (2014, p. 140). The extent of local middle class families discontented with the quality of their indigenous education has spurred this growth in the Middle East and Asia.

However, despite the International Baccalaureate being the most prestigious of all the international education curricula on offer, its popularity in the Middle East is not expanding at the rate of the number of international schools. According to Brummitt and Keeling (2013) 45 percent of the schools registered as international in the Middle East and Asia offered an IB programme or those offered by Cambridge International Examinations that has come to be known as the IGCSE (Brummitt and Keeling, 2013, p. 32). This implies that a majority of schools operating in the two regions with the largest international education market are not offering an internationally accredited curriculum.

The claims outlined above as extracted from the website pages of some ‘international schools’ reveal that while the sector is diverse, the conglomeration of international schools are at least joined by a loosely (albeit ambiguous) shared set of goals and common philosophy (Hayden and Thompson, 1995; Bunnell, 2008; Walker 2015). It is important to note that accreditation of international curricula was taken seriously when selecting the students for participation in this study. While there are many schools across Egypt that have adopted ‘international’ and related terminology in their name, many, as the
literature confirms, are not formally associated with any accredited curricula provider. It was thus important that all schools for this study were accredited by a curricula provider and independent accreditation body such as the International Baccalaureate’s accreditation body, IBO, or the Council of International Schools (CIS) or Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools (MSA). However, the sheer diversity and mushrooming of the loosely defined international sector that is so accurately illustrated in Egypt today indicates a growing demand for international qualifications and an expanding market for international branding in education.

This chapter has shown how the links between education and socialisation work in practice, using the case study relevant to this thesis. It is clear from a historical perspective that education has played an enormous role in carving the nation-state, and it confirms in many ways the assumptions intrinsic in the literature on education and socialisation. In chapter two, it was demonstrated how educational trends adapted to the political and economic priorities of the time. In the context of Egypt, this is made abundantly clear in each period. Many of the nationalistic sentiments introduced by Nasser exist in today’s national curriculum, however the changing world order in the context of the Cold War resulted in key transformations in the educational landscape in Egypt under Sadat, and later Mubarak. Neoliberal privatisation policies do ease pressure for the current regime, but it has created a perception of class division in Egyptian society that Nasser’s socialism had hoped to reverse from the colonial era.

While there is little conclusive evidence to indicate that the existence of foreign, colonial and missionary schools truly had any impact on the values and beliefs of the elite Egyptians who attended them, there is opportunity to study the transformative potential of international schools in a not so different context. Just as with the elite Egyptians enrolled in the American schools of the colonial era, much assumption is made that a Western education results in a Western orientation. It is this assumption that is critically assessed in the following chapter, using original findings from interviews and observations with students of Egypt’s contemporary international schools.
Chapter 4 - Methodology: Design of the Study

The purpose of this section is to outline the research objectives and discuss the methodological and procedural steps undertaken to explore extents of cosmopolitanism among Egyptian students at private, Western-oriented international schools in Egypt. Clarification with regards to the research question(s) and objectives will be covered in this section, in addition to clarification of terminology and definitions of key terms such as ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘Westernisation’ and ‘international schools’. A discussion of the theoretical and analytical frameworks adopted, which has contributed to and justified the research methodology will follow. It is in this section where I reflect on my methodology and acknowledge the specific obstacles and issues that became apparent in the course of the research, as well as a discussion of ethics and validity of samples and the wider applicability of the fieldwork and research. The section concludes by detailing the limitations of the study design and how it could be improved with complimentary work in the future.

4.1 The research question(s)

The research for this thesis has sought to explore the identity constructs of Egyptian nationals who are enrolled in private international secondary schools in Egypt with a view to studying their sense of identity. It is a study into socialisation and education and specifically on how education, within an international context, contributes to the sense of belonging to a local or global community, the adoption and adherence to specific principles, customs and values and the practice of norms and traditions attributed to those identities. By paying focus to international schools exclusively, the research question explores the notion of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and the relationship of curricula to the recipient. As such, the main research question of this thesis is:

Does International education make for a cosmopolitan identity?

Literature, as presented in chapter two, has suggested that education is a transformative agent. Consequently, one’s sense of belonging can be learned.
Schools are regularly regarded in the literature as central to the establishment of an imagined community, and specifically the construction of national belonging and citizenship. The link between the national curriculum and national citizenship and identity is rarely challenged in the literature. However, to what extent is the relationship between education and identity determined when placed in an international context?

The body of literature discussed in chapter two on post-national citizenship, or ‘global citizenship’ and cosmopolitanism, alludes to an emerging movement in the academic debate concerning cross-border identities and belonging. It has been shown in chapter two that this movement has attracted much criticism and debate, with its advocates accused of naiveté or of underestimating the central force of national identity despite today’s globalised world. However, little attention is paid in debates on global citizenship and cosmopolitanism on the role of the international education sector that continues to expand in all corners of the globe, and that claims to educate for ‘global citizenship’.

A number of sub-questions are also relevant to this study. The questions outlined and discussed below help to challenge some implicit assumptions within the research question, and explores the political relationship between international curriculum schools and their host country political dynamics. Many of the sub-questions as presented are practically important for the design of the study, and theoretically valuable.

1. **How Eurocentric is the international curricula? Is it truly international?**

International curricula that are exported to the Middle East and North Africa, such as the British IGCSE and American SATs, are nationally derived curricula, in origin, but adapted for an international audience when exported abroad. Understanding whether the curriculum adopted by international schools in Egypt should be described as ‘Western’ or ‘international’ is an important first step to measuring the role of the education and curriculum in the development of a cosmopolitan mindset and identity. To what extent is it different to a Westernisation of identity and orientations? This requires a definition of both the terms ‘Westernisation’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’. In answering this question,
some investigation beyond what was offered through the schools’ names and their websites was also required. Investigations into the international education sector revealed that the sector is overall under-regulated, meaning that many schools can adopt an international brand while not necessarily offering an internationally recognised curriculum. In Egypt, many language schools have the word ‘international’ in their name, but offer only the national curriculum with a special emphasis on foreign language facilities. Therefore, only accredited international schools were included in the study and interviews with those involved with the construction and implementation of the curriculum such as international bodies, councils and teachers were sometimes undertaken for clarification on details. Students of up to five different international schools across Cairo and Alexandria were used in the study, and all schools offered the British IGCSE, the American SATs or the International Baccalaureate. Two of the five schools offered all three options to the students, which is common of many international schools today. For a detailed discussion of the ‘internationality’ of international schools, with reference to existing literature, see chapter four.

2. How have the schools in Egypt engaged with the international curriculum? How the schools engaged with the curriculum did vary from school to school, but also between classroom to classroom. The discrepancies raised an issue that suggested that simply studying the broad curriculum is not enough in determining its ability to present an international mindset that could affect identity, because while the curriculum may be administered centrally or abroad, the engagement of it and utility of it, particularly when exported, is far less regulated and thus varies. Curricula are often viewed to serve more as a guideline for teachers and those facilitating learning, and can thereby be used in different ways and to varying degrees. As such, engagement with a variety of schools and teachers was important in order to overcome such irregularities between different international institutions operating across Egypt. The analysis would have to apply to as broad a range of Egypt’s international schooling experiences as far as was possible. However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this study in this respect. It
cannot be representative of all international school experiences. For an elaborated discussion of the heterogeneous makeup of international schooling in Egypt and in general, see the chapter one and chapter four.

3. *How have ministerial imposed subjects such as civics studies, religious studies and Arabic affected the teaching of the international curriculum in the schools?* International schools in MENA are not always well regulated but in most circumstances, as is the case with Egypt, the Ministry of Education imposes compulsory subjects on international schools that are required to be taught alongside the international curriculum. These subjects are designed to guarantee that Egyptian students from all backgrounds receive the necessary exposure to core subjects that determine good citizenship and a national consciousness, but also allows them to enroll in Egyptian universities upon graduation. This question is designed to explore to what extent, and to what success, schools include these subjects and how they navigate them alongside the other curriculum commitments. Understanding this was important in order to represent a true and accurate depiction of the educational environment in the international schools. If it is the case that these compulsory subjects play an important role in the students’ weekly arrangements, it added a further dimension when assessing the international attributes of the international curriculum, particularly if the learning objectives were conflicting. Information on this was easily obtained by interviews with the teachers and head teachers in the schools and was typically based on individual experiences. This further validated the need to explore a range of international schools operating across the country in order to fairly reflect the different techniques used when incorporating compulsory subjects into international curricula.

4. *What signs demonstrate ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘Westernisation’?* This was essential when devising the main research question. Assuming that there are signs of either cosmopolitanism or Westernisation, clarification of what these signs might look like was crucial in order to attempt to measure them. This required a consensus based on current literature on this subject as well as the researcher’s own clearly defined attributes to
be considered in the context of modern Egyptian culture too. This could be scaled numerically or assessed entirely qualitatively. More will be discussed below on the challenges when measuring both dependent variables, and distinguishing between them in the study.

5. *Do the students who are interviewed and who are involved in the observations present these signs?* Once it was clearer what would be searched for in order to measure and assess levels of cosmopolitanism, it was possible to look out for the signs during the students’ interviews, their families’ observations and during the focus groups. The presence of the signs consequently helped in answering whether the students involved in the study, and enrolled in international schools in Egypt, presented signs of international mindedness, cosmopolitanism and/or Westernisation.

6. *What other factors could contribute to cosmopolitanism?* It was important to ask this question because there are many factors in today’s globalised world that can affect acculturation and cosmopolitanism, or indeed Westernisation. Considering all other contributing factors enabled attempts to try to isolate these from the sample or to bear them in mind and thus inform the analysis of the results. Factors that could be controlled when sampling the participants included the socio-economic status of the student’s family as well as whether the parents were of mixed nationalities or only of Egyptian nationality, or whether the students had ever lived elsewhere, or had dual nationality prior to the study taking place. Consequently, socio-economic background, based on mean yearly household income, was standardised when sourcing participants for the study, and all participating students had lived their whole lives in Egypt prior to the fieldwork, with no dual or multi citzenships.

7. *How far has the education been responsible for cosmopolitanism, if evident?* In order to single out education’s role in socialising students towards cosmopolitan values, customs and principles, a control group was necessary. This control group consisted of students who shared
attributes with the studied groups of students, but differed only in their schooling experiences. The control group students were therefore all within the same age group, they were of the same socio-economic status, but they all attended school where the national education was used in the classroom. The control group was asked the same questions as their internationally trained counterparts during the interviews. Through this, it was possible to reach a better assessment as to how far international education had affected the identity, values and orientations of internationally educated Egyptian students.

The sub-questions presented above serve the study in that they challenged assumptions and expose issues with terminology, such as the difference between Westernisation and cosmopolitanism, as well as their measurability. They also encouraged a critical analysis of what is understood as international curricula, which proved to be an important practice when analysing the results of the study and understanding why the hypothesis was not proven accurate. The core research question, ‘does international education determine a cosmopolitan identity?’ is deliberately reduced for simplicity, but the sub-questions are a reminder of the underlying complexity of such a study. What was also apparent early in the study was that the literature currently does not provide a coherent answer to many of these sub-questions and thus indicates that there is an untested conviction implied in the body of literature that assumes that education for global citizenship will result in a cosmopolitan identity.

4.2 Hypothesis

A survey and analysis of the literature on education and socialisation, education and citizenship, and identity construction, resulted in an expectation that by comparing the responses to cues and questions from internationally educated Egyptian students and the responses of nationally educated Egyptians, students at international schools would present a greater orientation towards cosmopolitanism compared to their nationally educated counterparts. Thus it has been hypothesised that international education (independent variable) will
be a significant in determining higher scores, and greater signs, of cosmopolitan and international mindedness (dependent variable).

Such expectations have been based on prevailing literature that suggests education plays a powerful role in shaping a student’s values and loyalties, and thereby their identity and cultural orientations. Theories on education and its role in socialisation have been largely undisputed. This has been discussed in detail in chapter two. As education has been identified in the literature as transformative and constructive, the type of education is assumed to affect the type of identity and views students express.

There are thus a series of theoretical links that are explored throughout this thesis. The first and main connection explored is that between education and socialization. However, when exploring the relationship between education and socialisation, studying interrelated links between education and identity, and education and citizenship are equally important. Much of this study is a critical discussion of modern-day competing narratives for identity, and the hypothesis draws on preexisting debates and trans-disciplinary discourses surrounding globalisation and privatisation (of education), as well as cultural and universal values.

Such theoretical complexity requires a proportionate methodological approach that bridges multiple disciplines and utilises an array of research methods to offer the rich qualitative data that is needed when attempting to assert a type of individual ‘mindedness’.

4.3 Design of the study

Developing a study that can proportionately account for the overlying complexity of values, identity and education, first requires clarity on the theoretical or conceptual framework that acknowledges the philosophical and/or ideological context of the research. In a typical sense, these are understood to be either ontological (with views on the nature of reality) or epistemological (views on knowledge, how it is acquired and the extent of its scope). Both are
seen to inform the methodology adopted in any given study (Crotty, 1998; Richards, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).

Indeed, within the methodological discourse, ontology and epistemology are commonly referred to as exclusive entities in need of separate articulation in research literature. In reality however, ontology and epistemology are better seen as mutually implicating while also implicating specific methodological strategies in turn (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Thus, for these reasons, any ontological and epistemological underpinnings of a piece of research are regularly discussed, along with methodology, with reference to a selected research paradigm, which as defined by Guba (1990) is ‘a basic set of beliefs that guide action’ (p.17).

For this thesis, much of the theoretical underpinnings are ontological by nature. For example, the theory that education is a powerful political and socialising instrument states an established fact that permeates throughout the literature on education and socialisation. However, this thesis pushes this concept into an epistemological debate by questioning how we have come to believe this of education, and to what extent this is true of education in an international context. This debate will be discussed in detail in upcoming chapters, but what is important here is that it acknowledges an ontological perspective that dictates the importance of education in the making of a nation-state and a national citizen, and applies it to the concept of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship, with a view to determining how effective education is in a post-national context. The importance of an epistemological approach to the concept of education for socialisation develops during the analysis of the findings.

Similarly, theory on cultural convergence is also treated in the same way. The thesis regards the notion of global cultural convergence taking place as an ontologically derived concept, based on a perceived established fact that cultures are becoming homogenised and standardised through the dominance of Western-oriented cultural products entering diverse communities. Epistemologically, this thesis questions, with the support of the findings, whether this theory is so popular because it is dominated by the argument of global Westernisation, which is largely based on visible and material
observations rather than values-based investigations. Thus, overall, both ontological methods and epistemological methods are important to this thesis.

Choosing to follow Crotty (1998) among others, the term ‘theoretical perspective’, rather than ‘research paradigm’, is preferable in reference to this study and is therefore adopted throughout this research. This is because, as many have argued, the former is often deployed to highlight the idea of sharp contrasts and incommensurability among the many different ways of conceptualising and conducting research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Often, the boundaries and borders that are constructed by researchers and philosophers are regularly contested due to the fact that boundaries between research traditions break down and can become blurred (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 192). In order to position their work, researchers may commonly draw upon three discernable theoretical perspectives. Broadly speaking, these can either be scientific, interpretive or critical. While some researchers may choose to position their research studies as firmly in one or other of these theoretical traditions, many will drift between these orientations. In keeping with a growing trend in modern research literature (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), this thesis can be seen to do just this.

As will be illustrated in detail later in this chapter, the questions during the semi-structured interviews designed for the fieldwork incorporated both the interpretative and critical approach of the study. Questions that sought to understand how the participants viewed themselves in the world, their identity and the values attributive to their culture and other cultures are all interpretive by nature. In addition, the interviews also included questions about the students’ lifestyles outside of school, their attitudes to foreign languages, their political views and their future aspirations. The interviews, in addition to the participant observations and the focus groups, supported the critical sociological approach in this thesis, and were crucial to informing the firewall theory proposed in chapter seven.

Similarly, the theoretical perspectives used in this thesis were multidisciplinary, thus further assisting the critical approach necessary to study the link between education and identity. By incorporating literature from political science, social
psychology, and sociology, an epistemological analysis of widely accepted sociological assumptions about identity, national belonging and global citizenship, was critiqued.

In other words, this thesis is theoretically both interpretive and critical in its theory and choice of methods. In a broad sense, the aim of interpretive research is to develop a deeper understanding of phenomena. Given that the research project belonging to this thesis is one which has a primary focus on, and interest in, people and the knowledge that they form and collect through their lived experience, it is one which is closely aligned with this interpretive perspective. However, given that it also seeks to account for an understanding for the ways in which social, political, economic and historical realities impinge on their lived reality and consequently so too in their process of learning and socialisation, the methodology must therefore consider not only the strategies common among interpretive research but so too with regards to critical (social) research.

4.3 The value of mixed-methods research: Why combine research methods?

The research methods adopted for this thesis each have significant individual value to the discussions that follow. The individual benefits of adopting each research method, in addition to their weaknesses, are explored in full later in this chapter. However, the combination of each method warrants a separate discussion as to the nature of the data gathered through each method, and the relationships between the methods that form the methodology.

There are a number of methodological styles associated with studies that adopt an interpretive orientation, and there are several methods for exploring beliefs, identities and common values. Typically, these involve the gathering of rich qualitative data that relates to individuals’ experiences that will ultimately serve to form the basis of knowledge development in a given research topic (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). Research methods that involve capturing individuals’ opinions, values and practice, as well as the atmosphere and context in which they act and respond, were of priority when applying the techniques through which
knowledge on the subject could be gathered. However, combining methods can attract some challenges when coming to analyse and present the data.

Methodological triangulation often increases reliability and improves understanding (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Striving for validity and reliability in data is paramount, particularly when attempting to use such data to test hypotheses and apply micro-to-macro perspectives for theorisation. What is also important to consider when devising methods for exploration is whether the purpose of the research is to seek to explain, or to describe, cultural characteristics. As this thesis sought to critically engage with the connection between education, identity and values, the methods used were based on a recognition of the complexity and contested meanings of such terms. Efforts have consequently been made, when designing the research, to move beyond techniques that merely describe attitudes and opinions.

Consequently, the original data-collection for this thesis involved a combination of interviews, focus groups and participant observations. The data generated from one method complemented and supplemented the data from another. Towards seeking to understand the relationship between education, identity and values, data that is enriched and supported by a variety of methods matches the complexity of the research question. Interviews and focus groups must rely on what the studied individual(s) tell the researcher, while participant observations enable the researcher to regain control of the field and decide for his or herself what is significant and noteworthy in the participants’ surroundings.

This latter advantage of a mixed-methods approach touches on one of the many challenges that the social sciences face when understanding and explaining behaviour; that is, the relationship between the hard facts of the social world and the ways in which these are interpreted by people (Keating, 2008). Taking the individual as the unit of analysis, rather than say the nation-state or collective society, the chosen methods in this thesis offer data that is unique to each participant. Generating themes and commonalities across each individual adds further meaning to the data, and selecting factors to be isolated (in this case, type of education) stretches the data to explanatory realms, where
it is possible to apply the findings in a broader context of education, identity and values, and perhaps come to generate or contribute theory.

The challenge when operationalising concepts of identity, values, and culture, is that one can fall into the trap of excessive generalisations. It was the tendency for abusive generalisations by past scholars on national characters that made the study of culture and values lose support within field of social sciences (Keating, 2008). The most notorious is perhaps Samuel Huntington’s (1996) thesis on the clash of civilisations that generalised about units that are internally highly diverse, and overemphasised the schisms across various global cultures. Thus, the unit of analysis must depend on the research question itself. For this thesis, the unit of analysis is the student, yet while there is a generalisability to schools and wider society, the data gathered from the fieldwork alone makes this rather tenuous.

To supplement the original data gathered for this thesis, survey data concerning overlapping themes were also analysed. This harder, quantitative data helped to contextualise the rich qualitative findings gathered from the small-scale fieldwork, and sought to assist in upcoming discussions regarding growing trends emerging from values-based investigations across the region.

Surveys are the most obvious research instrument to explore beliefs, identities and common values. However, while triangulation of methods is relatively easy and beneficial, triangulation of epistemologies can be more difficult. Researchers who rely on survey data may conceptualise culture, beliefs and values (and our knowledge of them) very differently to anthropologists or ethnographers who prefer a more ‘zoomed in’ approach through long-term observation and interaction.

While both epistemologies locate culture at the individual level, those who utilise surveys typically conceptualise culture as synonymous with belief and attitudes (i.e. items that can be operationalised by the subject telling the researcher what he or she believes) (Lane & Ersson, 2005) and attempt to make inferences from one level of analysis to another (Seligson, 2002; Keating 2008). Ethnographers rather regard culture broadly as identity, interpretation
and values (Bray, 2004) and while they emphasise the individual as a unit of analysis, they crucially consider the collective as important to explaining and understanding culture as a whole. In other words, culture and identity are intersubjective, and open to interpretation. Surveys, on the other hand, are directed at individuals who are taken out of their social context and then often generalised to the level of society. Yet, ethnographers dispute this practice because, to them, a societal culture is not simply the aggregate of individual attitudes on a series of issues, but is rather recreated and exchanged through real-life social interactions in specific contexts. Hence why researchers can get different results if they look at culture at the micro or macro level (Keating, 2008).

This internal disagreement across social science on how to conceptualise culture, values, and identity, highlights the difficulties in operationalising such concepts for measurement. While it is possible, and often rewarding, to triangulate research techniques to gather data, understanding the tensions across underlying epistemologies that inform various methods is important when attempting to aggregate the various data for analysis. By referencing data from values surveys, the original data collected for this thesis can be supplemented and challenged across a broader and larger sample of Egyptian nationals (typically over 1,000 respondents can be reached through national surveys). This may add some validity and reliability to the discussions that emerge from the data, but each data set; its individual contribution to the discussion; and its idiosyncratic qualities, should be maintained. These are discussed for each method, separately, later in this chapter.

There are also challenges when extrapolating the data from large values surveys, and these must be acknowledged. For this thesis, two separate values surveys were referenced: the World Values Survey (on Egypt) and the ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey. While both surveys have different methodological approaches, they each pose shared challenges when attempting to extrapolate the data.

The World Values Survey is based on a common questionnaire comprising of 290 questions. The questions are designed to measure cultural values,
attitudes and beliefs towards gender, family and religion, attitudes and 
experience of poverty, education, health, and security, social tolerance and trust, 
attitudes towards multilateral institutions, cultural differences and similarities 
between regions and societies. Since its inception, it has further explored 
themes such as issues of justice, moral principles, corruption, accountability 
and risk, migration, national security and global governance. This vast array of 
topics means that of the 290 questions, depth of questioning varies for certain 
themes. Thus, while there are currently 45 questions ascribed to ‘social values, 
attitudes and stereotypes’, there are only twelve questions dedicated to 
‘religious values’. Therefore taking headlines and conclusions directly from the 
survey report will ultimately be misleading. It is important then, when 
extrapolating the data from the survey, that efforts are made to not simply 
extract the data associated with the relevant thematic subsection, but also 
consider the questions that were asked within each subsection, explore the 
specific phrasing of those questions, and whether it is suitable to be aggregated 
alongside the questionnaires and interviews that have been specially tailored 
for this thesis. The same is equally true when utilising the data from the Arab 
Youth Surveys. The interviews used to gather the data for the latter explored 
subjects such as concerns and aspirations of Arab youth, their opinions on the 
economy and foreign affairs, and their attitudes towards religion and traditional 
values. While the World Values Survey focuses more strongly on measuring the 
values of respondents, the Arab Youth Survey is a little weaker on values 
questioning, and stronger on political attitudes, and aspirational subjects 
regarding employment and global mobility. Together, the surveys thematically 
compliment and enrich the original data of this thesis, but neither survey entirely 
explores cosmopolitanism or global mindedness in depth. Thus, it is up to the 
researcher to decode what is relevant, but do so with caution, always 
acknowledging that questions may not measure exactly what this thesis sought 
to measure.

Additionally, while the reference to surveys in this research attempts to address 
and help contextualise the original data from this thesis, the survey data is only 
marginally more representative. In fact, the sample-size for the World Values 
Survey is set to a minimum of 1200 respondents per country. This is significant 
considering the rich thematic data that is generated from the series of surveys,
but as for national representation, surveys in general should not be taken out of context. The samples used for the World Values Survey cover responses from residents (not only citizens) between the ages of 18 and 85, and while all efforts are made to use sampling methods that maximise as many Primary Sampling Units (PSU) in the sample as possible to avoid sampling bias, there is always a risk. Similarly, what is clear from the methodology of the World Values Surveys is that the unit of analysis is the nation state rather than nationality. In other words, respondents that make it into the sample will be representative of all people from the age of 18 and over within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship status or language. This can pose problems if one assumes that all those forming the national sample are of the nationality associated with the country studied. What is more, the sample does not consider the global mobility of each respondent and how this may influence responses to certain questions. It is worth bearing such issues in mind when extrapolating the data for this thesis, as these factors should be considered significant during the analysis.

As for the Arab Youth Surveys, the sample is larger, at around 3,500 each year. However, this large group of respondents comes from 16 different ‘Arab’ countries across the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, for each participating country, the data is based on around two-to-three-hundred respondents. While, often, the data is presented alongside a country-by-country breakdown, the proportion of the samples that relate to Egyptians will not be consistent, and many of the responses could be dominated by the Gulf Arabs respondents. For this reason, only data that was presented with a country-by-country breakdown was used for extrapolation. The benefit of the Arab Youth Surveys however is that it focuses on 18 to 24 year olds. While this is a little older than the participants for this study, it entirely focuses on issues relevant to the region’s youth, and adds a further dimension that is advantageous to cross-referencing alongside the original data. Furthermore, for the Arab Youth Survey, only those that are citizens of the countries studied were eligible for sampling. Despite this, the proportion of respondents from different countries was not standardised across the region. In fact, citizens of the GCC countries accounted for 40 percent of the overall 2017 sample – far more than can be justified on the basis of their overall population compared to non-GCC countries. The UAE, with
a citizen population size of less than two million, and Egypt, with a population estimated at 80-90 million, are both represented in the survey by the same number of respondents. Therefore, weighting for population is flawed in the Arab Youth Surveys.

For these reasons alone, caution should be exercised when drawing too many conclusions from the aggregated data. For this study, the surveys may add some interesting context, and serve to explore the validity of original data and emerging trends, but it must be seen as illustrative rather than conclusive. By situating the data from surveys alongside the data from this original fieldwork, it is possible to position the findings of this thesis within the growing efforts to understand the region, its youth, and the values its people hold most dear.

4.4 The challenges of measuring cosmopolitanism

By far, the most challenging part of the design of this study was deciding how to measure cosmopolitanism. This is more than simply measuring Westernisation, Western orientation or Western acculturation among the students and their families, which itself has long posed challenges in research. There has been a great deal of discussion over the course of the century on the subject of Westernisation. However it is still an unsatisfactorily defined term, and assessing it is extremely subjective. Evaluating acculturation of any culture is extremely difficult because it is so abstract and intangible. Deciding what are signs for cosmopolitan identity and cross-border acculturation in practice was the most difficult aspect of this study and likely the most open to criticism.

During this exploration, methods for measuring Westernisation in the past came to the attention of the researcher. Tools for measuring and scaling degrees of Westernisation among immigrants to the West had been used since the late 1940s (Campisi, 1947) to evaluate the effectiveness of integration of migrant

3 Originals obtained from http://people.ucalgary.ca/~taras_private/Acculturation_Survey_Catalogue.pdf
communities in Europe or America. These have been developed throughout the
course of the last five decades, but there has been a challenge in deciphering a
universal scale that is based on a consensus of measurable signs of
Westernisation. This has meant that there are now a wide array of scales and
questionnaires designed to measure Westernisation among participants. Each
scale or questionnaire shares noticeable similarities with others. Some are
broad and unrelated to a given group or community to be studied, and others
are targeted towards measuring Westernisation among specific communities,
for example, immigrant Chinese or Hispanic communities in the US. The latter
approach was considered by the author to be more favourable in order to
address the nuances of the national and religious cultures. A scale or
questionnaire that was tailored to reflect the studied group seemed more
suitable than attempting to apply a generic scale to a wide range of immigrant
groups or communities. Generically designed surveys that seek to study
overlapping identities and cultural specifics carry the risk of misinterpreting
indicators due to the superficial context in which they were constructed.

What is more, no survey that has been formerly constructed was applicable to
all the requirements and research angles for this study. For example, all scales
appeared to measure Westernisation among minority immigrant groups living in
Western countries, but has not been used to measure majority indigenous
groups living in non-Western countries as this study attempts to do, and neither
does it explore local individuals’ levels of Westernisation in the context of their
own country. As a result, there was no clear metric utility in the literature that
appeared to be suitable for replication for this study.

As such, a set of questions that drew on some of the questions from previous
questionnaires into degrees of Westernisation was created. Therefore, some of
the questions that featured in the interviews, surveys and focus groups were
based on similar surveys that had explored Western acculturation. While doing,
caution was exercised to avoid conflating indicators for Westernisation with
those for cosmopolitanism, and consequently sought to incorporate questions
that specifically aimed to distinguish a cosmopolitan outlook away from
Westernisation indicators.
4.5 Defining cosmopolitan

The literature on measuring cosmopolitanism is equally scarce. To begin with, a definition is required. Efforts were made early on in the study to decipher what one understood about cosmopolitanism, and theories on this were usefully gathered to inform an understanding. These have been presented and analysed in detail in chapter two. However, for the purpose of defining cosmopolitanism for the methodology, this thesis regards cosmopolitanism, unlike globalisation, as exclusively anthropocentric. In other words, while globalisation can refer to an abstract process, institutions, systems and governance, cosmopolitanism lives in people, and whether it is seen as a positive or a negative, it is human beings who are, or are not, cosmopolitan (Beck, 2006; Spector, 2014).

Waldron (2000) defines cosmopolitanism as a ‘way of being in the world, a way of constructing an identity for oneself that is different from, and arguably opposed to, the idea of belonging to or devotion to or immersion in a particular culture’ (p. 1). This is an excellent grounding for understanding subsequent elaborations of the term, which have come to include ideas of worldly belonging, the recognition of universal human equality, and open-mindedness (Spector, 2014). However, as Hansen (2009) argues, cosmopolitanism is more than just open-mindedness as conventionally understood. It rather incorporates what he describes as a ‘reflective’ openness to the world that connotes awareness beyond one’s physical boundaries, mindfulness, and responsiveness to problems and challenges that exceed our own. It is, as he clarifies, a reflective openness to other ideas and perspectives (Hansen, 2009).

The literature has identified several qualities of cosmopolitanism more specifically. Overall, these have tended towards a willingness to engage with other and different cultures and presenting a competency in communicating with alien culture(s) (Saran and Kalliny, 2012). Baldry (1965, p. 122) has described cosmopolitanism as an ‘attitude of mind’, rooted in the belief of unity among mankind. Konrad (1984) regards cosmopolitans as ‘those intellectuals who are at home in the cultures of other peoples as well as their own’ (p. 209). This makes them more open to change, according to Earle and Cvetkovich (1997). Cosmopolitan as a process has also been described as the exportability
and importability, or the flux, of ideas and thoughts (Brennan, 2001). Overall, it is regarded as an outward-looking, multi-contextual and transnational process that is stimulated by a variety of economic, political and religious interconnectedness (Holton, 2000).

Diverse understandings of the meaning and application of cosmopolitanism is the reason for the absence in any widely replicable scale or questionnaire to measure the concept in practice. Few studies that have attempted to measure cosmopolitanism have captured all various contexts in which the concept of cosmopolitanism can be applied. Many have looked into retail and consumer cosmopolitanism, such as Vida, Dmitrovic and Reardon (2005) and Yoon (1998), but these have been limited in their applicability for this study because of the focus on consumer behaviour rather than social and political attitudes and views towards other communities and cultures. However, elements of these methodologies have been useful when informing approaches for this study.

Saran’s and Kalliny’s methodology in measuring cosmopolitanism in the purchasing of foreign products has been particularly useful for this thesis as it focuses on capturing the values of a cosmopolitan consumer. Their indicators, which form their ‘COSMOSCALE’ has been carefully applied to identifying broadly applicable value indicators to assist this research. In their exploratory qualitative research that came to inform aspects of their survey, they found that informants mentioned aspects of cooperation among diverse communities, such as looking at global issues and challenges and learning to build bridges of common good. Others emphasised outward looking behaviours such as reading literature from other cultures, cross-cultural engagement and interactions, welcoming people from other cultures, and using the Internet to learn about other cultures. In this respect, cosmopolitanism referred to the willingness to learn about other cultures, societies and nations (Saran and Kalliny, 2012, p. 285).

Questions were thus borrowed from the first data set of Saran’s and Kalliny’s COSMOSCALE and incorporated into the study as indicators of cosmopolitan thinking. The questions are as follows:
1. I think it’s good to spend time with people who are willing to talk and learn about other cultures.

2. I think interaction with people from other cultures will help us to improve our surroundings.

3. I think the ability to interact with people from different cultures and communities increases my ability to understand different people better.

4. I think being able to interact with people from other communities is an opportunity.

5. I think I respect others’ cultures the way I respect mine.

6. I think if people have a positive attitude toward other communities, there would be less conflict in the world.

7. I think it would be good if I could absorb as many culturally varied experiences as possible.

8. I think to be successful, one needs to use materials, information, knowledge, etc. from other cultures.

9. I am open to the idea of cultural change.

10. I am ready to learn about other cultures through listening, observation, thinking and reflecting.

11. I think political discussions beyond the narrow concerns of culture, nation and self, are valuable.

12. I take delight in being open toward people, places, and experiences from different cultures and nations.

13. I am curious about different people and cultures.
14. I think reading about world events is worthwhile.

(Saran & Kalliny, 2012, COSMOSCALE, Results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis)

The final version of Saran's and Kalliny's COSMOSCALE was designed for marketing purposes, and to study consumer behaviour. Therefore, a full replication of their final methodology was insufficient for this study. The questions above however, with only six questions making it into the final questions for the COSMOSCALE, were extremely useful in developing indicators of cosmopolitan thinking.

The above set of questions were accompanied by a tailored set of further questions as will be laid out below. All responses to the COSMOSCALE questions were scaled using a scoring system of 0 to 3; 0 being equivalent to not agreeing to the question at all, and 3 corresponding to strong agreement to the statement. The highest possible score from the COSMOSCALE was therefore 42, which indicated the highest level of cosmopolitan thinking, and the lowest possible score was, of course, zero. Any score over 28 was considered to be a strong sign of cosmopolitan thinking, meaning that the majority of questions answered were scored 2 or above.

The questions from the COSMOSCALE followed the interview questions where students in this study were open to elaborate on their answers and were not required to respond in any binary, scalable format. This guaranteed that the majority of the data focused on offering in-depth, qualitative and interpretive observations. Given the small sample size reached in this study, it was decided that quantifying all of the responses would be misleading. Rich qualitative data in response to the questions proved to be more insightful, particularly as even from Saran’s and Killany’s admission, the COSMOSCALE is still in need of scale validation using more diverse research contexts (Saran & Kalliny, 2012). Thus, the scores from the COSMOSCALE should be treated as indicative and supportive of all other research methodologies in this study rather than conclusive. The responses from the supporting methods should be taken into
account alongside the COSMOSCALE. This provides a more holistic and critical approach to the research question. In hindsight, it would have been productive to ask the students to reflect on the COSMOSCALE questionnaire after completion. This would have provided even more insight into the students’ attitudes to the subject, and would have enriched and supplemented the data from elsewhere in the study. For any future application of this questionnaire, a final reflection should be encouraged.

4.6 Semi-structured interviews

A total of 43 semi-structured interviews with Egyptian students were secured and conducted between April and May 2014. The initial sample size targeted 50 students altogether, however due to a small number of dropouts, intermittent absences or changes to circumstances, some participants were regrettably unable to continue through to the end of the study.

Of the sample of students finally interviewed, 21 formed the control group, which was made up of those enrolled at an Egyptian state school teaching the standard secular national Egyptian curriculum. The remaining 22 students formed the studied group, made up of those enrolled in one of Egypt's accredited international schools that taught a combination of international curricula including IGCSE, SATs, and/or IB. All students were based in Egypt’s largest urban cities, Cairo or Alexandria, with the majority (62 percent) from Cairo. Though this was not intentional, it reflects the larger number of international schools available in the most populous city, Cairo.

All students involved in the study were Egyptian-born nationals between the ages of 14 to 16. Students involved in the research identified as either Muslim or Christian. There was an option for students to select no religion on the consent forms handed out, or ‘other’ and specify, but all participants chose to select Muslim or Christian. Overall, there were seven students (16 percent of the total 43 participants) who identified as Christian Coptic, while there were 36 students (84 percent) in total who identified as Muslim. When broken down in the two constituent groups of the study - the nationally educated and internationally educated students - Christian Coptic students made up four (18
percent) of the 22 internationally educated students and three (14 percent) of the 21 nationally educated students.

All students involved in the study were from high-income backgrounds, with an average household annual basic income of more than LE 50,000, equivalent to a middle or upper-middle class household. This included, importantly, students who formed the control group enrolled at national curriculum schools. According to figures gathered by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) in 2010-11, those earning LE 50,000+ were among the highest earning households in Egypt. Most families however do have members living abroad, sending money back. Therefore, LE 50,000 only refers to the family income that comes from formal employment.

Gender was not an important variable when selecting the students, but efforts were made to represent both genders as equally as possible in the study. Overall, there were slightly more male students (53 per cent or 23 students) than female students (47 per cent or 20 students) in the sample.

Each interview took approximately forty-five minutes to complete, with an average of five interviews conducted per day for four weeks. Interviewees were welcome to speak in Arabic or in English during the interview, with many initiating in English, and the majority reverting to Arabic when responding to some of the more detailed questions towards the end of the interviews.

Questions were decided before the interviews took place. However there was room left for some divergence, as questions were all open-ended and participants were encouraged to elaborate on their answers. There were three sets or groups of questions divided according to depth of investigation, from lifestyle and aspirations, to social and cultural attitudes, through to the final layer that focused on values and open-mindedness.

To be precise, the primary set of questions dealt with hobbies and interests, favourite music, TV shows, books and pastimes. The secondary set of questions dealt with the nature of the students’ social circles, family, friends, attitudes to foreign languages and religious beliefs, and how it applied to their
daily life. It was also here where students were asked about their futures and where they hoped to live when they are older. The primary set and the secondary set of questions provided the bulk of the ontological and interpretive insights needed to approach the research question, though responses from the secondary set of questions were also informative for the epistemological and critical approach to the research question.

Finally, the tertiary set of questions explored the students’ conception of values, their perception of their own identity, their history, their ancestors, and their perception of Western identity and values. This was crucial for the critical approach to the research questions. Here students were particularly free to elaborate and develop the conversation. Students would be asked about current issues relating to international politics, conflict, and democracy. The tertiary phase of the interview was designed to explore deeper emotions and feelings as well as reach some insight into their perceived cultural and political orientations.

It was also at the tertiary stage of interview that Saran’s and Kalliny’s 2012 COSMOSCALE questions were introduced. These were introduced alongside a set of statements to which students were asked to simply agree or disagree. Unlike the COSMOSCALE, which focused primarily on features of cosmopolitan thinking, the additional set of statements, as outlined below, further sought to explore open-mindedness. It is possible that in a larger scale study, these statements could be reduced either to the COSMOSCALE questions, or an abridged version of them both. The repetition of themes in this section benefited the study in that it helped to account for any contradicting responses from the students and offered a variety of angles through which to gather information on similar themes. However, not all questions were asked in each forty-five minute interview. Having excess questions covering exact or similar themes throughout the interviews was useful when needing to re-phrase questions for extra clarity.

List of questions for structured interviews:

(Primary set- Interests, hobbies, popular culture)
1. What do you like to do on your weekends?
2. Where do you shop for your clothes? What are your favourite brands?
3. Do you like music? What music?
4. Do you watch television? What shows do you like?
5. Do you read in your free time? What is your favourite novel?
6. Do you go on holiday often? Where do you like to travel?

(Secondary set- Language, aspirations, religion, socialising)
1. In what language do you speak at home with your parents?
2. In what language do you speak with your friends?
3. Do you speak any other languages?
4. Are foreign languages important to you? Why?
5. How important is Arabic to you?
6. What do you hope to become?
7. Where do you hope to live in the future? Why?
8. Do you practice a faith? How often do you practice your faith if so?
9. From this list, select three words that you associate with and rank them according to their importance in your life.
   Arab; Egyptian; Muslim; Christian; Atheist/ non-religious; Sunni; Shi'i, Sufi; Coptic; Female; Male.
10. Do you have friends of different religious backgrounds? Why do you/don’t you, in your view?
11. How did you meet these friends?
12. How often do you read English newspapers/magazines?

(Tertiary set- values, beliefs, perception of the West, geopolitics)
1. What does it mean to you to be Egyptian?
2. What are Egyptian values in your view?
3. Do you consider yourself traditional? Why?
4. What values do you think the West shares with Egypt?
5. Is equality important to you?
6. What does democracy mean to you?
7. What are your country’s greatest challenges in your view?
8. How should Egyptian-Western relations be improved?
9. What do you feel it means to be a ‘global’ citizen?
10. Who is/ are your biggest influencers? Who do you admire and look up to most?

Below is the list of statements presented to the students to agree or disagree. These were inspired by the COSMOSCALE questions, but enhanced in order to explore the interviewees’ attitudes to knowledge and disagreement. It explores open-mindedness as well as international mindedness. These questions were initially used by the researcher in her professional role at the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, as part of a baseline questionnaire for the monitoring and evaluation of the Foundation’s Generation Global programme. The questions were designed for 14 to 16 year olds, and written for translation into different languages and application in multiple cultural contexts. Thus, the questions are extremely effective for the purpose of this study. To clarify, not all statements from this list were used in each interview. Many of the statements closely overlap with others on the list, thus it was not necessary to include all 53 statements in interview. Each statement was coded under the theme it was used to measure; in this case, ‘open/international mindedness’ versus ‘closed mindedness’. In addition, some questions were ‘neutral’ as neither indicators for closed or open mindedness. Such questions were used to provide contextual information relating to the respondent, to explore any connections between experience, lifestyle and presentation of open or closed mindedness. For each interview, a variety of statements that indicated openness or closedness were selected, along with a small number of ‘neutral’ statements that determined neither open nor closed mindedness, but could be illustrative along with the other responses. In brackets, it is clarified what each question indicates for a positive or ‘yes/agree’ response be given. A positive response to each question either indicates open or closed mindedness, or neutral to either but informative for both.

1. I am confident discussing my worldview, beliefs and values with others who share my views (neutral)
2. Not all questions have right or wrong answers (Yes = open)
3. Following a religious faith is very restrictive (neutral)
4. I often see many different places of worship in my area (neutral)
5. I frequently see clothing, art or hear music from different religions or cultures in the areas where I live (neutral)

6. Communicating with those of different worldviews, beliefs or cultures to me is enjoyable (Yes = open)

7. We never talk about issues of worldview, belief or values in school (neutral)

8. We never talk about issues of worldview, belief or values at home (neutral)

9. I have a good knowledge of different worldviews, beliefs and values (neutral)

10. I can't understand why people have worldviews, beliefs or values that are different to my own (Yes = closed)

11. I am interested in getting to know people who are different to me, and having them as friends (Yes = open)

12. I can present my own beliefs effectively to people with other worldviews, beliefs and cultures (neutral)

13. Everyone who belongs to a particular worldview, belief or culture will all believe the same thing (Yes = closed)

14. I often hear people in my area speaking different languages from my native language (Neutral)

15. I can see that there might be times when it might be right to struggle violently for what I believe in (Yes = closed)

16. If I suffer a misfortune, I have usually brought it on myself in some way (Yes = closed)

17. Many people in my area are suspicious of people with different worldviews, beliefs or cultures to them (neutral)

18. It is important to stick together with people who are like me (Yes = closed)

19. I am confident about speaking out in class (neutral)

20. I understand why other people’s worldviews, beliefs or cultures are important to them (Yes = open)

21. I feel confident to email someone from another country (Yes = open)

22. It is essential that we have a strong government which makes definite laws (Yes = closed)

23. I am confident in talking to someone from another country (Yes = open)
24. I am only really interested in people who share my worldview/ priorities/ values/ points of view (Yes = closed)
25. I do not like it when other people’s ideas are different from my own (Yes = closed)
26. I have interacted with people in real life who live in another country to me (neutral)
27. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t know what the truth is (Yes = closed)
28. I am confident about talking to others about worldviews, beliefs and cultures (neutral)
29. It is much more important to learn about my own worldview before learning about other peoples’ (Yes = closed)
30. I have interacted on social media with people from another country to me (neutral)
31. I can imagine how people with different worldviews, beliefs or cultures from me will react to important issues (Yes = open)
32. I know about school life in other countries (neutral)
33. People who think about others before themselves seem to lose out in life (Yes = closed)
34. The forces of law and order discriminate against minorities in this country (neutral)
35. It is important for me to know about different worldviews, beliefs and cultures (Yes = open)
36. I have recently spoken to someone with a different worldview, belief or culture to me (neutral)
37. As I progress through school I have stopped even noticing differences in other people. (Neutral)
38. I have had lots of online experiences exploring and discussing different worldviews, beliefs and cultures (neutral)
39. I have friends (both offline and online) who celebrate different festivals to me (neutral)
40. I have lived in places that are different from the place I live now (in terms of community, language, culture) (neutral)
41. People in my school are generally well informed on different worldviews, beliefs or cultures (neutral)
42. When someone’s comments upset me or make me angry, I need to remind myself that this usually has nothing to do with the community that they are from (Yes = open)
43. I have a good knowledge of different branches within various different religious traditions (Yes = open)
44. I have recently communicated online with someone with a different worldview to me (Yes = open)
45. I need to be secure in my own identity, worldview, belief and culture (Yes = closed)
46. I have had lots of real life experiences of different worldviews, beliefs and cultures (neutral)
47. I want to understand the different branches within religious and non-religious traditions (Yes = open)
48. I cannot understand why some people would be violent rather than try to resolve conflict through negotiation (Yes = open)
49. Talking to others helps me make up my mind (Yes = open)
50. Getting too many different views is distracting (Yes = closed)
51. I find it hard to put myself in someone else’s shoes, to feel what they feel (Yes = closed)
52. The reasons there are lots of languages is so that we can all learn from each other (Yes = open)
53. When other people disagree with my views I feel uncomfortable (Yes = closed)

4.7 Advantages and disadvantages of semi-structured interviews

Interviews provide an opportunity for a researcher to meet and engage with the subject(s) of his or her research. They can help to provide detailed information on an individual’s personal experiences and opinions on the topic being researched, but can also offer fascinating contextual information. The one-to-one nature of interviews also offers some additional benefits to focus groups, because they isolate the individual from group and peer pressures, allowing you to get closer to their own personal views and more instinctive responses to your questions (Arksey & Knight, 1999). It is for this reason that interviews were included in this study.
It was decided that given the nature of the research topic and the data hoping to be collected, semi-structured interviews would be best. Having some structure to interviews typically helps to maintain a comparative element to the findings, which was important when comparing internationally and nationally educated participants. The same questions were asked to each student in the study. However, because the interviews were only partially structured, the conversation developed beyond that of the set questions, and was guided by both the interviewer and the interviewee. This offered quite a rich and rewarding atmosphere for honest and thoughtful responses to the questions, and sometimes raised new ideas not initially considered by the researcher before. The space for some divergence from a script allowed these ideas to be explored if necessary, but the structured element guaranteed that all areas were covered despite the divergence. This is essential in order for any comparisons to be made between participants.

A fully structured interview would not have gathered suitable detail on feelings and emotions of the subjects, but at the same time, an unstructured interview would have made a comparative analysis very difficult. The mid-point offered an atmosphere that felt more like a conversation, but provided the necessary direction in order to gather relevant but rich qualitative data.

Despite this, there were notable challenges in adopting one-to-one interviews with students. The school required that their parents vetted students’ participation, and an option was given to parents to sit in and observe the interview of their child. Though no parent opted to do so, this was an important gesture in order to put the parents and school at ease. Occasionally, the teacher would choose to sit in and observe the interviews. Though it slightly altered the atmosphere in the room during the interview for the researcher, students did not appear to be affected by it. Interruptions however were common and disruptive to the process of the interview. A fully structured interview would allow for interruptions much better than informal, semi-structured interviewing techniques do, as a script is easily referred to in order to pick off from where the interview left off after the interruption.
Furthermore, the interviews were all conducted in the students’ schools with the cooperation from school staff. This meant that the exact environment was not consistent throughout the studies. Not only did the students come from different schools, but interviews also had to be conducted in convenient spaces at each given time according to the school timetable. In order to be flexible and as hassle-free as possible for the participants, flexibility was essential to reaching as many students for interview as possible, but this did affect the level of control the researcher had on the setting and environment in which the interviews took place.

Conducting interviews in classrooms is also not ideal, especially when wanting to create an informal atmosphere to support honest and open responses. The researcher was aware that the students treated her as a teacher, and the teacher-student dynamic was only entrenched further by the classroom surroundings. This could have affected the way the students felt they could share openly in the interviews. However, efforts were made to ensure that the tone of the interviews was informal, and no recordings were made of the students.

4.8 Focus groups

As with the interviews, the focus groups were semi-structured. Therefore there were some prior structured and clear questions to help the groups stay on topic. This is extremely important because like general social engagements and interactions, focus groups, if not partly structured, can dissolve into broad social discussions. Also managing the group and its dynamics is important, so that there is not one dominant individual steering the reactions and responses to questions. There is special value placed on collective responses and views, but this needs to be managed so that it reflects the majority of the group and not just one or two domineering characters.

What was good about combining individual interviews with focus groups was that every participant had had a chance to express personal views with the researcher beforehand during their one-to-one interviews. Importantly, the focus groups were held a week after the last of the individual interviews took place,
meaning that there was no risk that the students’ responses in their interviews could be prompted by discussions that had taken place during the focus groups.

Focus groups were only organised for the internationally educated students in the study. This was because the focus of this research was on internationally educated Egyptians. The involvement of nationally educated Egyptians was introduced only for the semi-structured interviews as a control group. There would have been some benefit in involving both groups of students in the focus groups, but this may have created tensions and divisions within the groups and would have consumed a lot more time.

Therefore instead, each focus group consisted of four to six internationally educated Egyptian students between the ages of 14-16 years old. In total, there were four focus groups held after school, and each one lasted for two hours. Two focus groups were mixed gendered, one was female only and another was male only. This was arranged so that there was some variety and incase the male students dominated the discussions, there was a female only focus group that offered a more even dynamic for female students to volunteer their thoughts. It was believed that too many male students in the room would dominate discussions, so the mixed groups also contained an even amount of male students and female students, or if this was not possible, one more female than male.

The topics of discussion were planned before the focus groups took place, and some questions were devised in order to steer the discussions. Each focus group was asked the same questions, but as it was semi-structured, the order of those questions changed, and some subjects were covered in more detail in some focus groups than in others.

The focus groups were designed to deal with more difficult questions to do with geopolitics, development and socio-political subjects.

The questions asked in each focus group were:

1. Do you think that the Middle East will see peace one day?
2. Do you think that Egypt has a role to play in developing the region, or assisting the world?
3. Can any other countries do anything to help? How has the West helped? How has Britain helped? How has America helped?
4. Who is your country's most important ally/allies in your opinion?
5. Is democracy and political reform the answer? And do you think it can work in the Middle East, or in Egypt?
6. What do you think are the reasons for the world's conflicts and problems?

Each question had 20 minutes allocated to a discussion, and because the questions were open-ended, students were able to elaborate on their responses comfortably. The subjects of discussion sought to develop the findings gathered during the tertiary set of questions in the semi-structured interviews.

During the focus groups notes were made, accompanied by the researcher's reflections to the notes after the sessions. Questions were asked to them in English and in Arabic, and students were free to respond in either language, as they felt comfortable. Overall, the focus groups were predominantly in Egyptian Arabic.

4.9 Advantages and disadvantages of focus groups

The main advantage of focus groups for this study is that they provide the opportunity to observe interactions between participants on a targeted topic in a limited time period (Morgan, 1997). Focus groups add a further dimension to interviews in that they are a good way to capture the responses of participants when in a group of people. Sometimes, participants can ‘bounce off’ one another well or comments from others can spark a disagreement that can reveal new areas not otherwise yet explored (Janis, 1982). Therefore, focus groups can often yield new depth in responses that individual interviews may not have covered. The focus group surrounding can also make participants reflect on their views more closely, and may sometimes reveal some conflicting opinions in that individual that they may not have been familiar with but are now more
conscious of. For this reason, focus groups were seen as another way to enhance the findings.

However, the emphasis on group interaction does mean that as a researcher, control over the atmosphere and tone of the interaction is less in your control. Interviews encourage closer, more intimate communication between the interviewer and interviewee. Therefore subtle cues are effective in interviews to steer or guide the conversations. This is far less the case when in focus groups as participants can be harder to guide when in a group environment. Agar and MacDonald (1995) argued that interviews were effective because they put pressure on the interviewee to clarify and elaborate on their remarks, guaranteeing richer and accurate qualitative data. Focus groups, on the other hand, can pose a challenge for the researcher when deciding how much to interrupt and ask for clarification, and thus risk disrupting the free-flow of a discussion, and how much to leave in the hands of the group, and risk losing important depth and clarity in the data.

At times, however, less control is better for the participants, as it offers a more relaxing and natural setting for the participant (Morgan, 1997). The discussions during the focus groups in this study were more in-depth and could cover more advanced topics because the communal effect would help people to share their thoughts without feeling the spotlight on them alone. This was particularly helpful because the questions were a lot weightier than what was asked in the interviews. Had the questions been asked during interview, it is unlikely the respondents would have offered such enthusiasm as was given during the focus group sessions (Morgan & Spanish, 1985).

One of the important questions during the design of the study was whether or not focus groups would produce too similar data to interviews. This topic is something that has been the subject of some debate (Agar & MacDonald, 1995). Contributors to the debate, such as Merton (1987) have suggested that a useful research design is to alternate the order of the focus groups and interviews, with some participants beginning with focus groups and others beginning with interviews. Wight (1994) confirmed that the order of the methods did indeed impact on the participants’ response, finding that those who began with the
focus groups gave markedly different responses in tone and sentiment than those who went straight into interview. Thus, this raised an even more important consideration. Not only does it prove that focus groups do draw different ideas and attitudes out of individuals, but also that the order of the methods used are important. It was decided, therefore, that focus groups would be conducted after all individual interviews were completed in order for the focus groups not to influence the students’ individual responses, as the interviews were particularly important in gathering very personal beliefs and attitudes first. It is also important to consider that participants may express certain things in private, which will not come through in a study that simply uses focus groups. The tendency toward conformity in group discussions for research is an important one in considering the validity of data collected from this method, as is the tendency in some cases for participants to express more extreme views in a group than when in private (Sussman, Burton, Dent, Stacy, & Flay, 1991). The combination of both individual interviews and focus groups was therefore really useful, as Kitzinger (1994) points out, that different personalities respond differently in private and group activities.

In addition to semi-structured interviews and focus groups, a common occurrence among interpretive researchers is the combination of complementary research methods and data, to serve almost to supplement the main methodological strategy (Bogdan, 1973). In the case of the present study, it is mostly the use of participant observations that have been simultaneously adopted, serving to supplement the research and the results of the interviews and focus group findings in this way. Both interviews and focus groups have a common flaw, and that is that they fail to study a participant in a natural environment and rely heavily on what the participant tells the researcher.

4.10 Participant observations

Participant observations are a common method when conducting interpretive-based research. The act of observing the subject(s) of a study has much strength when used in the context of an interpretive sociological framework as it allows the researcher to study an individual or collective group within their natural environment, rather than isolating them from their everyday life
Coming from an interpretive perspective, this strategy for knowledge development became one of the methodologies of choice, with the aim that any results of the observations would serve to complement the research discussions throughout the thesis, adopting an illustrative approach to field work.

Participant observation refers to a research approach in which the main form of activity is characterised by a prolonged period of contact with subjects in the place in which they would normally spend their time (Bogdan, 1973). During the encounters, data, in the form of field notes, is systematically collected (McCall & Simmons, 1969; Becker & Geer, 1957). The purpose of the method is to develop an understanding of complex social settings and complex social interactions and relationships, by viewing them holistically (Bogdan, 1973). Supporters of participant observation argue that by disturbing the natural course of participants’ daily lives and experiences for the sake of isolating them for the purpose of operationalising variables, the true essence or the complex nature of the subject is lost to a ‘preconceived procedure or form’ (Bogden, 1973). Such proponents of the method suggest that the only way to truly and fully understand the complexity of the social life that is to be examined and studied is to immerse oneself in it. While the method has been utilised to test specific hypotheses and to examine theory, as Bogden clarifies, it is more often used to generate theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and to develop understanding of specific organisations; i.e., hospitals and schools (Bogden, 1973; Becker, 1961; Goffman, 1961). DeWalt (2010) clarifies that the purpose of participant observation is to gather rich qualitative information that is concerned with understanding the nature of phenomena, not necessarily in assessing the magnitude or degree of the phenomena. All humans are participant observers in all of their everyday interactions, but few individuals actually engage and reflect on the information that can be gathered for social scientific purposes. In many cases, it provides the context for accompanying methodologies, and this is certainly case in this study.

Overall, the goal of participant observation, as understood by interpretive researchers, is to understand as fully as possible, the situation being studied without disturbing that situation, or altering it too heavily in a way that should
drastically influence their behaviour. In this sense, the researcher is passive to the situation, so not to affect the findings in any discernable way (Malinowski, 1961). A successful researcher will thus consciously seek to be seen as ‘an unobtrusive part of the scene’ (Bogden, 1973) and a person whom the participants can take for granted.

Malinowski’s (1961) credited approach to participant observation indicates the detail that can be gathered from the method if properly employed. He records the most banal habits of his subjects: ‘I could see the arrangements for the day’s work, people starting on their errands […] Quarrels, jokes, family scenes, events usually trivial, sometimes dramatic but always significant’ (Malinowski, 1961). Malinowski’s approach to participant observation was distinguished from his colleagues at the time because he included everyday interaction and observations as significant to his findings, rather than focusing on directed inquiries into preconceived behaviours (DeWalt, 2010, p. 14). As Sanjek (1990) notes of Malinowski, ‘As he observed, he also listened’ (1990, p. 211). In a more contemporary example, Bourgois (1995) recalls of his participant observations: ‘I visited their families, attending parties and intimate reunions—from Thanksgiving dinners to New Year’s Eve celebrations (p.15).

DeWalt (2010) sums up the key elements upheld in the field of ethnographers when applying the method of participant observation:

- Living in the context for an extended period of time;
- Learning and using local language and dialect;
- Actively participating in a wide range of daily, routine, and extraordinary activities with people who are full participants in that context;
- Using everyday conversation as an interview technique;
- Informally observing during leisure activities (hanging out);
- Recording observations in field notes (chronologically);
- Using both tacit and explicit information in analysis and writing (DeWalt, 2010, p. 15).

In the case of this thesis, participant observations were carried out within the context of six families in Egypt, all of whom had only one pre-known
commonality- being directly associated and involved with an international schooling institution within Egypt. In other words, and more specifically, each family would have one (or more) child enrolled in one of Egypt’s accredited international schools at the time of the observations and that child would also form part of the sample of international students for the rest of the study. The observations took place throughout a week-long period for each family, with an average of eight hours a day, with the researcher present in their daily lives. Primary research was carried out into the schools prior to the observations to distinguish between them any characteristics and dynamics within the school structures and value systems that may prove to be of interest when analysing the field notes.

It should be noted that due to the short time frame of the observations (only a week per household), the method used for this study should be seen as what DeWalt (2010) refers to as focused participant observation, in that the observation sought to serve the focus of the thesis, that being the expressions of cosmopolitanism among internationally educated students. As DeWalt (2010) records, the focused participant observation is often done in a short period of time and is typical of emerging applied research strategies that seek the value of anthropological methodologies to add context, but do not wish to present a traditional and entirely anthropological study.

Nevertheless, best practice was followed with regards to traditional participant observations. In keeping with such advice, detailed field notes were transcribed after and not during the observations in order to maintain a relaxed and natural environment for the participants involved (DeWalt, 2010). Included in the notes were to be any descriptions of the appearance of subjects, the gestures and expressions they use, conversations that the researcher listened to and perhaps took part in, and any interesting events that took place of relevance. These were recorded as accurately as possible, and with conversations, the original words were used whenever possible. If the researcher could not remember the exact words, it was noted in the field notes that it was a summary of the conversation. Furthermore, the décor of the participant’s environment can be relevant and so these forms of observations were also noted with focus on any such details that signify religious or cultural orientations, particularly due to
the fact that many of the observations took place within the families’ homes. Feelings, opinions and preconceived notions were occasionally noted wherever and whenever necessary.

**4.11 Advantages and disadvantages of participant observation**

Many of the advantages of participant observation appear obvious to researchers adopting an interpretive framework for their study. Extended periods spent with the people under study enable a researcher to obtain detailed, less orchestrated and therefore perhaps more accurate contextual information about the realities of the participants’ lives.

The time spent with them also allows for the elimination of a researcher’s preconceived ideas or prejudices. After studying the theories and concepts within the academic debate on international education and its relation to elite class structures globally and nationally, it is not surprising that the researcher, prior to the fieldwork, would have developed her own informed understanding of the potential realities she is about to observe. These preconceived ideas may remain subconscious, but by adopting participant observations to develop knowledge on the subject, the time spent with the subjects would allow for a more thorough exploration in the subjects’ lives to understand better their actions, non-actions, and modes of thinking, that would not otherwise have become observable if participants had not been observed in their own natural surroundings and over a longer period of time, than a typical interview could allow.

It is only logical that observable details are far better understood over a longer period of time. As such, by taking part in a form of social interaction, a researcher is able to make greater sense of behaviours, orientations of a group of people and their beliefs, simply by being able to contextualise it alongside factors and variables that could be seen to influence it.

Equally important, through the method of participant observation, a researcher is able to discover and reveal any discrepancies between what participants report to feel or what they believe should happen, and what actually does
happen. This has real relevance to this particular research. It is worth noting that initially, the use of narrative inquiry as the main source of information to illustrate the thesis was considered. While narrative enquiry is indeed a well-acknowledged method within interpretive frameworks of study, it only serves to provide information of what the participants *themselves* said and felt. A narrative inquiry focusing on the ways through which a group of students in international schools in Egypt choose to identify themselves and their educational experiences would certainly have offered valuable insight into their understanding and appreciation of their social and educational circumstances, but it would not necessarily show their social realities. Narrative inquiry works only to have snippets of thoughts of the studied individual. This would help to understand how internationally educated school children in Egypt view themselves but it would not allow for insight into their lifestyle, and the details that I can be gained through participant observation. Observations help me to explore any discrepancies between what participants perceive of their reality, and what an outsider might see.

However, it is important to recognise, as DeWalt (2010) raises, that participant observation is a combination of two different processes. As Bernard (2006) also argues, participant observation is neither pure observation nor pure participation. Psychologists typically use pure observation (see Adler & Adler, 1994; Tonkin, 1984) for the purpose of removing the researcher as much as possible from the scenario in order not to influence the behaviours of the participants. On the other hand, pure participation, also referred to as ‘going native’ (see Jorgensen, 1989), occurs when the researcher sheds the identity as observer or investigator and adopts the identity of a full member of a culture, and thus a full participant. However, while pure observation is used in social science research on occasion (for instance, when researchers tape everyday interactions for later analysis, or observe activities from behind a mirror (DeWalt, 2010, p. 28)), pure participation often results in the inability of the researcher to publish his or her materials, due to a loss of analytical distance (Hinsley, 1983).

This leads to a discussion that should be addressed at this stage with regards to the place of the researcher among the segments of society that is to be studied. In the process of participant observation, a researcher, necessarily and
quite inevitably, develops a degree of empathy with the object of study. This endeavour is for the researcher to become ‘part of the community’, rather than merely seeing it as an ‘object’ of study (Bray, 2008). This practice enables the researcher to build a rapport with the participants and thus aids deeper understanding (Bray, 2008). While doing this however, a researcher is advised to retain his or her own sense of identity aside from their informants. Crucially, in this way, the researcher must preserve a degree of detachment so that he or she may eventually produce an impartial scientific analysis (Hastrup & Hervik, 1994). A researcher’s perspective should ideally become that of both an ‘insider’ (emic) and an ‘outsider’ (etic) (Algar 1996; Roper & Shapira, 2000).

By combining an emic and etic perspective in research, an effective balance between subjectivity and objectivity is achieved (Bourdieu, 1977), allowing for the construction of a holistic understanding of the study and the studied. It is a great deal to expect that the researcher must be able to understand issues from the inside and thus empathise with people’s experiences or viewpoints, while simultaneously analysing them critically and impartially from the outside. For the researcher in the case of this study, frequent visits to the country, alongside the acknowledgement of her national belonging to Egypt and personal links there as a result of her heritage, make the emic perspective of the research responsibilities easily acquirable. Less easy was the ability to remain an outsider in order to stay entirely impartial for analysis, not simply because of her personal, hereditary links, but also because of the inherent preconceptions that come hand in hand with in depth research on the theoretical considerations prior to the fieldwork.

Consequently, building the balance between an insider and outsider perspective was a challenge that was acknowledged early on in the course of the research and was thus far regularly managed, on a conscious level, in order to maintain that emic-etic balance that allows for a more successful participant observation to be had. It is however an element of participant observation that many recognize as a limitation or disadvantage, and thus worth mentioning. Some have regarded the whole concept of participant observation as oxymoronic by nature, as Benjamin Paul notes that ‘Participation implies emotional involvement; observation requires detachment. It is a strain to try to
sympathise with others and at the same time strive for scientific objectivity’ (1953, p. 69).

Indeed, as a researcher who is new to the method of participant observation, deciding on the level of participation during observations seemed crucial. Ethnographers have made efforts to categorise levels of participation as they do recognise the influence this can have on both the researcher’s impartial analysis, and his or her ability to observe. Spradley (1970) defines levels from passive participation to complete participation. According to Spradley’s spectrum, the level of participation during the observations for this fieldwork would be regarded as moderate participation; not quite active participation given that observations did not involve sleeping and living 24/7 with the families. However, the researcher’s emic perspective on the culture being studied, and her familiarity with the culture, did occasionally lead her to becoming an active participant, as their lives were not dissimilar to the researcher’s family lifestyle.

Adler and Adler (1987) developed a slightly different form of categorisation regarding the degree of participation. Their three categories included peripheral membership, active membership and membership. The term membership can be quite misleading as a dual national researcher. With Egyptian heritage and nationality, the researcher of this study by definition is a full member of the culture and nation under study, thus it is tempting to conclude that according to Adler’s and Adler’s (1987) categories, the researcher in this case performed full membership. However, when comparing Spradley’s (1970) categories to Adler’s and Adler’s (1987) categories, DeWalt (2010) concludes that the latter’s full membership corresponds to Spradley’s complete participation, and Spradley’s moderate participation, which most reflects the researcher’s role in this study, corresponds with Adler’s and Adler’s (1987) peripheral membership. According to the Adler’s and Adler’s (1987) definition of peripheral membership, the researcher becomes part of the scenarios, but keeps themselves from being drawn completely into it. They interact frequently enough to be recognised by the full participants as insiders and guarantee firsthand insight, but unlike active members, they do not take on any roles of the full participants. Thus, this definition most accurately describes the position of the researcher in the fieldwork.
While participant observation is a challenging method to master, the addition of observations to the interviews and focus groups allowed some further insight into the nature of the students’ home life and explored an element of their informal educational environment, which became crucial to conceptualising the firewall theories proposed in chapter seven. The findings of the observations, however, were not designed to be conclusive, due to the fact that it was not possible within the time constraints to observe every student involved in the study. It was also not possible to observe a control group of nationally educated students, so in this regard the findings from the observations cannot necessarily be exclusively attributed to the internationally educated cohort within the study. Instead, the observations were made alongside the researcher’s knowledge of traditional Egyptian practices and customs in order to shed some light on how traditional or modern the families’ lives were, and how they balanced their child’s education with that of their own.

Despite limitations of applying the findings from observations more broadly, the opportunity to enter the students’ homes was nonetheless invaluable in contextualising the findings from the interviews and focus groups. The observations provided yet further interesting insight into how Egyptian families navigate any juxtaposing cultures, narratives and viewpoints in the home.

**4.12 Additional supplementary methods**

Where possible, further supplementary techniques have been utilised throughout the course of the research, with the intention to further the understanding and help to illustrate the discussion put forth through the mediums of this thesis. These have typically involved the use of informal interviews, carried out mostly through the means of a conversational technique, with head teachers of international schools in Egypt, governors belonging to the boards of these international schools, relevant members of Egyptian political life, and members of what can be viewed as a transnational capitalist elite, and other relevant stakeholders of the international education system, either within Egypt alone, or on a global level. Each of the individuals selected for these informal interviews have a relevance to the discussions made throughout the
thesis, whether they are members of international education boards, scholars, educationalists, funders of education, or benefactors of it in some way. Their reflections on the subjects discussed in the informal interviews serve an illustrative purpose, just as the findings of participant observations have.

Alongside the adoption of participant observation and informal interviews, official documents and records that have proved to serve an evidential purpose for reference have also served as supplementary utilities throughout the course of discussion and debate. While these materials have not been necessarily taken at face value, they have been used to further understand certain aspects of the study, and are consequently acknowledged and referred to where it is relevant.

An informal review of documents and syllabi relevant to this research, and the insight gathered from third parties during informal interviews have been useful in building and confirming a greater understanding of the international school system in Egypt. This received wisdom permeates this thesis and informs much of the debate.

4.13 Thematic analysis

For this study, a thematic framework for analysis, searching for themes that recur and emerge as significant to the researcher and the participants (Daly, Kellehehear & Gliksman, 1997), was applied. As respondents were encouraged to elaborate and many of the methods used encouraged open-ended discussions, condensing the multiple and varied narratives into themes allowed for patterns to be seen, and as Riessman (2005, p.3) has said, it is useful when theorising according to a number of cases. This is likely because thematic analysis allows for easy comparisons based on shared themes, while also not masking any individual difference or unique narratives (Barkhuisen, Benson & Chik, 2014, p. 78).

Pattern recognition, an essential part of thematic analysis (Fereday & Cochrane, 2006, p. 82), was aided through the coding process. It helped to identify the themes not just through careful reading and re-reading as Rice and Ezzy (1999)
traditionally advise, but also for *ad hoc* logging of themes and a more accurately decoded transcript. This rigorous approach focusing on recurring themes in the data can raise important insight that may not have featured in the original research question(s) (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

However, the coding was only one phase of the analysis process. Initial phases included familiarising oneself with the transcripts in order to be conscious of the breadth and depth of the data. This was quite easy, as transcripts were personally written by the researcher. However, gaps between writing the transcripts and coming to analyse did undermine this process a little, and in hindsight, early phases of analysis could have been done much earlier, while fieldwork experience was still fresh in mind. Despite this, the process of transcribing was in fact a very early phase of analysis as the task itself made the researcher re-live the interviews and thus familiarise herself deeply with the participants and their responses. As Lapadat & Lindsay (1999) state: ‘transcription facilitates the close attention and the interpretive thinking that is needed to make sense of the data’ (p. 82). Therefore, though the process is time-consuming, it is an important aspect of the analysis phase(s). Thus during the process of transcription, initial thoughts and reactions to the participants’ responses were noted down, in line with Riessman’s advice (1993).

All transcripts from interviews, focus groups, observations and supplementary conversations with relevant informers were coded through the qualitative data analysis software, *Nvivo*. This allowed for the findings to be presented through recurring themes and the software made this a much more manageable task (Tuckett, 2005). The data was coded on an *ad hoc* basis. There were no preconceived themes in the coding sheet before the fieldwork began, and nodes were created according to each new theme. The original nodes or themes went through a continuous development process, where some comments within the transcripts were aggregated into alternative nodes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This was a useful analysis process, and enabled some quantified data to be gathered from the qualitative data. As the responses from the interviews and surveys were not scaled, *Nvivo* allowed comparisons between the students’ answers to be more fairly and systematically compared
according to a particular theme. The process overall allowed for a big picture perspective while also retaining the value of the individual cases or data sets.

Following Riessman’s (2008) advice, transcripts gathered from interviews were coded one at a time. Throughout the process of coding, queries that arose during the process were also recorded, as well as noting some initial interpretations of emerging themes from the data. The Nvivo software now makes this much easier to do with a designated notes section. There was also a review stage in the coding process, which involved refining the themes into more succinct categories. For example, during the coding process, nodes of data from the transcripts existed for: ‘romanticisation of Egyptian past’; ‘expressions of cultural supremacy over others’; ‘Defensive of one’s nation’; ‘Rose-tinted descriptions of society, government and culture’. These nodes were created ad hoc to reflect the responses recorded from interviews and focus groups. However, after the initial coding of the transcripts, a tidy-up of the nodes into ‘parent nodes’ was necessary, allowing for broader themes to encompass more narrow observations. Thus the aforementioned nodes were each aggregated into new relevant ‘parent nodes’, in this case, ‘nationalism’. All aggregated ‘child nodes’ as listed above indicated a similar theme of nationalism, and were each expressions of it. This was done both per transcript and across all the transcripts in order not to overly reduce the findings to the extent of losing insight and meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A full list of the coded themes (parent nodes along with relevant and aggregated child nodes) is below.

Table 2: List of coded themes from interview transcripts and focus group notes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent nodes (Main theme)</th>
<th>Child nodes (indicators and sub-themes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>• Romanticisation of Egypt’s past;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expressions of cultural supremacy over others;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defensive of one’s nation;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Cosmopolitanism** | • Rose-tinted descriptions of society, government and cultural norms;  
| | • Suspicion towards outsiders and foreigners.  

| **Cosmopolitanism** | • Interest in/ passion toward learning about other cultures;  
| | • Respect for other beliefs;  
| | • Curiosity towards other worldviews;  
| | • Diverse social circles (e.g. friendships and relationships that include other religious or ethnic communities)  
| | • Advocate of cultural exchanges;  
| | • Desire to learn from other communities;  
| | • Belief in the existence of shared values.  

| **Westernisation** | • Choice of dress (non-tradition, Western inspired clothing, Western brands);  
| | • Engagement with Western popular culture, e.g. British and American films, TV shows, music and literature;  
| | • Shopping habits and preferences, e.g. favourite brands).  

| **Traditionalism** | • Conservative views towards gender-specific roles;  
| | • Practice of traditional customs;  
| | • Positive and rose-tinted depiction of traditional lifestyle
| and values;  
| • Moderation and self-control;  
| • Risk averse;  
| • Hesitance from straying away from expectation (i.e. maintenance of norms);  
| • Conservative views towards social/political change and reform – resistance to change.  
| • Religiosity: expression of practicing a faith, and use of religious beliefs as moral compass.  

| Collectivism  
| • Prioritisation of ‘we’ when speaking of future plans and aspirations;  
| • Value of collective harmony over personal success;  
| • Sense and expression of duty;  
| • Mutual success over individual success;  
| • Expressions of co-dependence;  
| • Collective competition;  
| • Emphasis on family, neighbourhood and community.  

| Individualism  
| • Emphasis on individual, personal competition and self-enhancement;  
| • Expectations of individual rights;  
| • Expressions of independence;  
| • Value of personal goals over group interest (prioritisation of the self);  
|
The final phase of analysis through coding involved the collection of particularly illustrative extracts to supplement the presentation of the key themes in the data. This was important in providing explanatory examples from the transcripts that really brought the coded data to life.

4.14 A question of ethics

The key ethical questions relevant to this study relate to informed consent, dealing with participants that are under the age of 16, and anonymity. In any ethnographic or social science research that crucially deals in close proximity to humans, and particularly children, ethical soundness is of key concern. As a person entering the lives of the people under study, the researcher holds a responsibility to them (Bray, 2008).

4.14.1 Informed consent

Consent of participation in any study is a basic ethical principle in research. Securing prior consent is only valid if the participants are fully counseled on the nature of the research, their role within it, and their continued right to disengage with the research at any stage (Lindeke et al., 2000). For this study, both parents’ and children’s informed consent was sought before their participation went ahead. Obtaining informed consent from the child is in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989), which clearly specifies that children must be involved in any decisions that affect them.

In order for consent to be fully informed, it is essential that there is full transparency with respect to the research objectives and the relationship of the participants to the research. It is a consensus among all ethical boards that consent be treated as an ongoing process (Twycross, 2009). In order to respect and uphold this, the researcher must be able to explain clearly, at any point
during the course of the fieldwork, the subject of the study and the researcher’s interest in spending time with the community. Only then, when the participant fully understands the research objectives and the nature of their involvement, can the consent they give be ethically approved. For every informant involved in this research, whether a part of interviews, focus groups or participant observations, consent was requisite before proceeding. It was also crucial that every participant was informed of their right to retract their consent of involvement in the study at any stage of the research or after. This was reiterated during debriefs and in writing as a condition of the initial consent. Contact details were provided to the participants and their guardians in order to allow for retraction after the fieldwork. In order for full transparency, notes and transcripts were made available to relevant interviewees, with an ongoing option for participants to check the full transcripts from their interview prior to write-up.

The families who were involved in the observations were briefed and debriefed before and after the observation took place, and each family member was made aware that they had the right to exit the process at any time, even after the observations had taken place. In this instance, they had the right to retract their involvement anytime prior to publication of the findings.

There was also separate consent forms issued to participating schools. In this case, the highest serving member of staff provided written and formal consent. Where appropriate, schools were allowed to set conditions to their consent. In almost all cases, schools insisted on separate written parental consent of student participation, as well as anonymity of the school and the students involved. Each demand was strictly complied throughout the study.

The researcher contacted each and every participant prior to the completion of this thesis to offer another chance for the participants to confirm their consent for their transcripts to be included in the final thesis, and each have been offered a copy of the thesis upon its completion. They were provided with a business contact number and email address of the researcher, and a personal UK number for them to reach the researcher at any other time during the course of the writing-up period of the study.
Consent forms were provided in Arabic and English. A third party, for accuracy and clarity, checked translations of consent documents.

4.14.2 Confidentiality and working with minors

As part of prior consent, confidentiality and anonymity in the presentation of the findings was promised to every participating individual. As such, based on the terms of agreement, there are no names attributed to any participants or schools involved in this study. All are anonymous in the presentation of the findings. During the interviews and transcripts, students’ identities were also coded so as not to risk revealing identities should documents be checked by third parties.

Despite all efforts to guarantee confidentiality during the presentation of findings, securing confidentiality while conducting the fieldwork was not so easy. The presence of a member of staff during the students’ interviews was an important term of agreement specified by the participating schools, and a condition to their consent. In such cases, the students’ anonymity and the confidentiality of the interviews process were inevitably compromised. It was decided that occasional staff presence was a reasonable request and that should the student be happy with the teacher’s presence, the benefits far outweighed the costs. Students were made aware prior to their participation and consent that a teacher may enter the interview at any stage and were asked to confirm their consent under such conditions. Members of staff at schools are obliged to safeguard their students as their duty of care. It is unlikely that consent by the schools would have been secured without compliance of safeguarding duties. In this particular case, the benefits far outweighed the costs, as without school participation, this fieldwork would not have access to students or the venues through which to conduct the interviews and focus groups.

Securing complete confidentiality was, overall, a general challenge when operating on school premises and with underage participants. For the occasional interviews that did not have a teacher or member of staff present, the degree of confidentiality was also limited given the environment of the
venue. Interviews were held on school premises, and when alone with students, classroom doors were left open, leaving conversations within earshot of nearby staff. This was intentional in complying with the schools’ requests, however it must be acknowledged as a limiting factor to how far one can promise total confidentiality.

It should be noted that while the researcher was acutely aware of the teacher’s presence in the room during the interviews and focus groups, staff presence appeared less distracting for the students themselves. Students become accustomed to staff oversight. However, presence of staff in some interviews and not others could still pose some differences between the control group and the studied group, and within each group. For the studied group, the dynamic between students and teachers at international schools typically mirrored or reflected that which is customary in Western classrooms. As it is no longer customary in Western classrooms to enact punishments on misbehaving students, it is likewise unheard of within international schools in Egypt. This, however, is not typically the case within Egyptian state schools. For the control group of nationally educated students, the dynamic between teacher and student often felt different and more distant and authoritarian. This, in addition to the varied surroundings for each interview, may have affected the atmosphere and tone of individual interviews. It is important that the researcher is sensitive to teacher-student dynamics and classroom culture for this reason.

In the spirit of confidentiality and anonymity, focus groups were not video recorded due to sensitivities of this type of media, but they were audio recorded after receiving permission from each and every participant of the focus groups, including parents and school staff. On one occasion two students did not feel happy for recordings to take place, and so an audio recording was not made for their corresponding focus group. Instead, transcripts and notes were made during the focus group. While this did prove a difficult task while also trying to manage the focus groups, it was a necessity to comply with the participants’ wishes. Recordings are always preferable when conducting focus groups in order not to lose valuable information. Even audio recordings are able to capture tone and atmosphere that cannot be easily recalled through notes.
4.15 The role of fieldwork in the thesis

Though it has been mentioned previously, it is important to clarify that the nature of the fieldwork undertaken in this study should be seen as illustrative to the discussions in place rather than conclusive. Unlike scientific approaches to sociological research, an interpretive framework inherently emphasises a depth of knowledge that may not offer a large sample of case studies, but because of the long periods of time that is characteristically spent over each case study, observations are in depth and the findings are detailed. This has meant that only a small sample has been possible to manage, but it gives us an in-depth insight into the students and families with all the benefits participant observation techniques, focus groups, and interviews have to offer.

In addition to this, it is worth noting that due to the nature of the subject of study, no findings through any form of fieldwork can really go as far as to be conclusive. The illustrative purpose of the fieldwork suits the nature of the study based on the acknowledgement that no experience can truly be seen to be the same, and no expressed opinion can truly be static and non-changing. Every case, no matter how large the sample, will undoubtedly prove to show just as many differences as they do commonalities. The findings allow us to consider the case studies in a context of the wider discussion and either gather cases that serve to complement the theoretical considerations discussed and analysed in the thesis, or form anomalies that might lead us to question why a given case study deviated from the expectations of the literature and thus discuss them accordingly. The data gathered through this fieldwork was rich and insightful. In order to present findings through the data, it has been necessary to reduce much of it into emerging trends and themes that can be gleaned from engaging with students and families. While a thematic presentation of the findings makes the discussions digestible, some of the granularity of the data is inevitably lost. Efforts have been made to provide a balance between refining the data for consumption while staying true to the messiness that is typically associated with qualitative data.
Chapter 5 - Westernisation: Beyond the visible

Despite decades of conceptualising educational practices towards global citizenship, little progress has been made towards building an independent metric in order to assess the effectiveness of international curricula. This is because determining the effectiveness of the curriculum requires consensus over its overriding mission. As chapter two has revealed, such consensus is yet to exist, and often the competing agendas of market-oriented instrumentalists who support international education for the benefit of supporting an economically interconnected world, contradict those agendas of ideologically-motivated instrumentalists who turn to global citizenship education as a form of peace building.

The belief that Egyptian students of international schools would be Westernised is rooted in theories of globalisation and global youth culture that has been dominated by a body of scholars who believe that the global exchange of products, people, ideas, and identities has resulted in the emergence of a globalised youth that actively responds to, and identifies with, modernised and cosmopolitan, Western culture (Kahn & Kellner, 2003). But where has evidence of such trends originated?

Visibly, students at international schools across the world share many defining traits that support theories of a homogenising global youth culture. The most observable characteristic is that they all belong to their country’s elite and are members of the local middle and upper classes. This gives them significant economic purchasing and consumer power that connects them to the global market. They thus share similar, if not identical, consumer behaviours, with other middle and upper classes around the world. However, does this also mean that elite students around the world will likewise share similar values?

Observable similarities in appearance and behaviour across members of different geographical locations and cultures have led to an emergence of cultural convergence theories in the literature on globalisation; ‘The World is becoming culturally and ethically homogenised’, so the theory goes. The purpose of this chapter is to explore whether the data collected through
interviews and focus groups with Egyptian international school educated students signify support for convergence theories. As will be revealed, much of the evidence-base that has historically supported convergence theories have originated from data collected outside of the social sciences, and have typically emerged from consumer behaviour studies that indicate ‘universal’ consumer behaviour patterns occurring around the world. However, unlike the database generated from consumer and market research, the questions and subjects raised and explored through this fieldwork covered areas where respondents could reveal important insight into deeper value orientations that often contradict their everyday consumer behavioural patterns. Thus, key to this study is to understand and appreciate that measuring individuals’ values and beliefs are more complex than studies into consumer behaviour have typically allowed.

This chapter will predominantly draw on responses from students during one-to-one semi structured interviews, where a control group of nationally educated students offered a useful comparison, and specifically tailored questions were designed to explore the students’ levels of engagement with their local and foreign popular culture and products. Also valuable to this discussion will be observations made formally during the participant observations of students in their home, as well as some informal observations made of the students during the interviews and focus groups.

5.1 Why is the degree of Westernisation important in this study?

As discussed in chapter two, international schooling is just one element of a much larger global transition that has come to explain the emergence of a global culture. Profound changes in today’s world, such as increased cross-border communications through social media, satellite television, and smart phones, all seek to bring corners of the world together, faster and easier than ever before. Multinational companies in fashion, food, and entertainment, international banks, trade associations, and world news services, each increasingly lack a meaningful national identity (Barber, 1992). All national economies are made vulnerable to the inroads of larger, transnational markets,
which has enmeshed nation states into mutual interdependency that has given rise to what Barber has referred to as the ‘market imperative’:

> Shopping has little tolerance for blue laws, whether dictated by pub-closing British paternalism, Sabbath-observing Jewish Orthodox fundamentalism, or no-Sunday-liquor-sales Massachusetts puritanism. (Barber, 1992)

Therefore shared, interconnected markets require a common language, a common currency, and by necessity seek to produce common, predictable behaviours; in other words, the construction of a universal consumer pattern that renegades religious, cultural and national idiosyncrasies to the margins in a working, globally literate identity.

Whether through Hollywood or Silicon Valley, forces of globalisation, such as the media, retail, and in part, private education, has touched almost every part of today’s world, and every large and small community in sight. In Pippa Norris’ and Ronald Inglehart’s *Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World* (2009), they concede in the opening that ‘In June 1999, Bhutan, the Himalayan Land of the Thunder Dragon, became the last nation on earth to switch on television.’ Every nation had, by the millennium, succumbed to the seduction of the electronic invasion, and with it the flow of ideas and information.

The electronic invasion was, of course, not the first time transnational flows of information and ideas took place and have been controversial to the diversity of cultures. During the colonial period in the Middle East and North Africa, observable changes to the indigenous people - such as their choice of dress - inspired local conservative, anti-imperialist movements. The popular adoption of Western fashion statements, such as the cravat and the suit, became symbolic to a way of life; to assimilate with colonial powers. Today, the adoption of Western dress is much less of a political or social statement as it once was, as it has now become so commonplace across local communities. Today, through contemporary globalisation – catalysed by greater communication technology -
a visual change in customs and practices suggest that local communities are being disproportionately influenced by Western lifestyle.

True to this assertion, the Egyptian students featured in this study, both nationally educated and internationally educated, are testament to the influences of Western lifestyles. The male students in this study were typically dressed in trousers and a shirt, branded trainers, hoodies, and some wore caps. While more than half (56 percent) of the female students wore the *hijab*, or Islamic headdress, the majority of students wore fitted jeans, decorative blouses, and their clothes adhered strongly to Western and European styles. Those wearing the Islamic headdress did not appear to adhere to traditional guidelines of female Islamic dress; many improvised and wore jeans like their other female colleagues while others wore long skirts, and their patterned headscarves were colour-coordinated with their designer handbags. These are familiar sights for those accustomed to the contemporary Middle East. It was immediately clear, and not surprising, that each student in this study was outwardly demonstrating an adherence to contemporary Western fashion statements and tastes.

The students’ Western style of dress had indicated where they liked to shop and had suggested an engagement with Western popular culture too. When asked about what their favourite television shows were, students from both groups (internationally trained and nationally trained) mentioned wide-ranging American sitcoms readily viewable over satellite channels. Many of them streamed their favourite shows over the Internet, admitting that they were farther ahead in the series than what was being aired on the satellite channels. Similarly, when asked about their music preferences, students discussed a mix of modern Arabic language and English language songs or artists.

During interviews with the studied group and the control group, the nationally trained students had demonstrated notably less knowledge of English bands and artists when compared to their internationally trained counterparts, and expressed greater interests in locally produced movies and songs. The choice of which local cinemas to attend proved indicative to the students’
preference over local or international movie releases; the more expensive cinemas, located in the newest shopping malls, were most popular with the international schooled students and typically offered a higher proportion of Western movies than the older local cinemas did. During interview, one student from the international group explained: ‘If I was meeting my [male] friends, I would choose to go to a beeah [low class] cinema where there are only Arabic movies – it’s cheaper and some [movies] are great. But if I was taking a girl with me, I would take her to a good cinema where it is clean and thugs like my friends are not around’. Similarly, other female students from the national educated group and international educated group expressed how cinemas that showed Western movies were cleaner and safer than those that were catered for local releases only.

Ultimately, both groups showed a familiarity and engagement with Western popular culture, citing examples such as ‘The Hunger Games’, ‘James Bond’ and ‘Harry Potter’. Thus, as expected, the Egyptian youth of the Twenty First Century, whether nationally educated or internationally educated, have a lot to share with American and European youth.

5.2 Cultural convergence

While the profound changes of cultural Westernisation can be widely observed today, the consequences are far from understood. What happens to places, and the societies’ values within them, once the world connects with such communities? Specifically, do these processes generate a convergence in cultures, and are national, tribal identities threatened? These questions appear to have sparked a lively debate in the literature on globalisation that has persisted for decades.

Critics of globalisation and cosmopolitanism argue that it is a twenty-first century form of Western imperialism, due to the Western dominance in the global market. Rooted in capitalism and neoliberal market politics, globalisation is a process through which Western lifestyles have infiltrated local communities. For such critics, rather than celebrating diversity and the interconnectedness of the world, globalisation, and its cultural by-product, cosmopolitanism, has
homogenised and ‘Americanised’ the world’s eclectic cultures. As such, the so-called global youth culture is merely a process of generational Americanisation.

‘Coca-colonisation’ (Howes, 1996), ‘McDonaldization’ (Ritzer, 1993; Barber, 1995), ‘McDisneyisation’ (Ritzer and Liska, 1997) and ‘Dallasification’ (Liebes and Katz, 1993) are terms that can be found in the literature specific to one side of the debate, and belonging to the most popular camp, now widely referred to in the literature as the convergence theory (Hannerz, 1990; Vertovec & Cohen, 2002; Tomlinson, 2002; Norris & Inglehart, 2009). This view predicts a gradual cultural convergence around Western values worldwide, explained by the predominance of American and other Western retail, media, and banking conglomerates. Information and commercial flows primarily from the global North to the South are expected, according to this thesis, to erode the diversity of traditional values, indigenous languages and local customs.

This theory is a tempting thesis that can explain the commonalities across today’s cultures and societies. The familiarity of youth culture in Egypt to youth culture in the United Kingdom could be convincingly explained through the cultural convergence thesis that holds that the expansion and dominance of multinational companies into global markets, with iconic branding, mass advertising, and products that invoke high status, has encouraged the spread of American or Western economic values.

It is these such economic, or capitalist values (Schiller, 1969; 1976) that are often interpreted by observers to illustrate and evidence a process of cultural Westernisation taking place. Schiller argues that cultural products, familiar to the Egyptian students in this study, such as American TV programs, films and music, have the capacity to shape the values and behaviour of audiences everywhere, ‘turning the world into one vast shopping mall’, and creating new opportunities for Western businesses to exploit local communities (Schiller, 1969, p. 36). International education for global citizenship has thus been accused of being complicit in this movement; the ultimate cultural product that at least supports, if indeed cultivates, a neoliberal cultural homogenisation. An international education in this context is but one purchase that entrenches a consumer further into the global market and the transnational elite.
education is an exclusive consumer good that remains to be reserved for those who can afford its premium price and the lifestyle it has come to represent.

5.3 The ‘foreign language’ imperative

For many lay observers, proficiency in the English language often signifies degrees of Westernisation. Such language proficiencies were strong across the whole sample of participating students, with those from both national schools and international schools demonstrating a clear proficiency in English, and a means of communicating and engaging with Western culture. A higher percentage of international students (37 percent when compared to eleven percent among the national student sample) also demonstrated competence in one other European language - typically French or German.

According to the convergence thesis, societies that integrate into a predominantly American and Western market, will see a dilution in their cultural sovereignty as members of society, with the resources to do so, adapt to navigate and compete in these new conditions. When asked about the importance of learning foreign languages, all students in the study agreed that foreign language skills were important to them and their future, and all expressed motives relating to the job market and the option of travel abroad for work and leisure, indicating that they were cognisant of the need to acquire the skills to function in a globalised world.

The interviews were not designed to test or evaluate the students’ actual language skills but rather their attitudes to developing and using foreign languages. The indications were that the acquisition of language skills was, in both cohorts of the study, economically motivated. All students interpreted the term ‘foreign languages’ to refer to English and other European languages, such as French and German, rather than other Eastern languages, such as Japanese, Turkish, Mandarin, Persian, Urdu or Pashtu. It suggested that they were economically motivated to acquire foreign languages and regarded bilingualism or multilingualism to be a route to affluence and economic prosperity rather than simply for acquiring varied
inter-cultural insight or literacy. It also confirmed their perception of a Western monopoly on economic progress.

The students commonly spoke of their parents having encouraged foreign language training, and expressed pride in their bilingual or multilingual abilities. As many international school students revealed, it was their parents’ decision – not their own decision – to enroll at their school. There was no apparent pattern here to suggest that the international students valued foreign language skills more than their nationally trained counterparts, but they did appear more confident in emphasising their language skills for employment in the future. Most of the students from the international school alluded to travelling abroad to make use of their language skills, and cited future employment as ways they would hope to use their acquired language abilities. The nationally educated sample of students appeared less willing to volunteer their language skills when asked if they would actively seek future employment that required travel abroad or regular use of foreign languages. Most of the control group interviews cited their accent as being their main insecurity, and expressed concerns that ‘nothing will change my Egyptian accent. I can speak fluently and express my ideas well, but I still sound like an Egyptian trying to speak English!’ Such hesitations and self-criticism were not raised by any of the international students but were shared by many of the nationally educated students. In fact, during the focus groups many of the international school students were happy to proceed in English for a while, until debates became more heated. Often, a seamless interchange between English and Arabic occurred. While no focus groups were conducted with the national school students, it is likely that Arabic would have been the preferred medium throughout the focus groups.

The noticeable difference in confidence among the internationally trained students in the study suggested that they practiced English and/or other European languages at home or within their social circles. When questioned, this did appear to be one variable on which the groups differed. The nationally trained students admitted to having minimal exposure to non-native Arabic speakers. Their foreign language teachers were native Arabic
speakers and this was often not the case with the international schools. During the researcher’s visits to international schools based in Cairo and Alexandria, English language teachers were British or American expatriates on the whole, with some exception. Expatriates also conducted French or German classes.

Some differences in ability and confidence with foreign languages should come with no surprise, given the discrepancy in the quality of teaching and resources available in different sectors, as well as the fact that those in international schools are taught predominantly in English. However, when asked in what language they conversed with their parents and grandparents, both internationally and nationally educated students in the sample said they predominantly used Arabic in the home. This was confirmed during participant observation with families of international school educated students. Arabic continued to be the main source of communication between family members. All students involved in the study had both parents who were native Arabic speakers. This was important because having one parent who was not fluent in Arabic could determine what language the student was able to converse in at home and would thus not indicate a choice of language used. For two of the families involved in the home observations, the parents were dual nationals having British or German citizenship as well as Egyptian citizenship. The students from both these families had said in their interview that a combined use of Arabic and English, or Arabic and German was used in the home. However, when observing the two families, one family with British connections and another with German connections, Arabic was still the predominant language used. Though English or German was used occasionally during the observations, the families conversed mainly in Egyptian dialect. Therefore in this sample, despite having had real connections to European countries, Arabic was still the favoured language.

During informal conversations with the parents of the observed families, the researcher asked why they had returned to Egypt. For both sets of parents it was family commitments that had led them to return, but they were also keen to maintain a sense of Egyptian identity in their children too. They saw the latter as an advantage of their return. This may have had some sway on
why Arabic remained the dominant communicative language in the home for the two families, as parents appeared conscious of wanting to bring up their children in an environment that allowed them to develop their Egyptian roots. Regardless of the motives, the observations proved that Arabic was used effortlessly within the home and there was no indication that the parents were actively encouraging the use of Arabic.

However, the decision to converse in Arabic in the home further suggested that the students regarded their foreign language as a skill for employment and global mobility rather than an aspect of their identities. In other words, the acquisition of English and European languages was considered to be instrumental for economic progress.

5.4 Weakness of the convergence theory

Such findings support the thesis that local communities are accustomed to adapting to a Western oriented global economy, which suggests validity in the cultural convergence thesis that places emphasis on the Western cultural dominance in global exchange (McPhail, 1983; 2005). However, while it is true that the ease of movement of currency, goods, services and people across borders has made foreign goods, and the lifestyles they represent, more widely accessible, the convergence theory makes such claims with limited or one-dimensional supporting evidence.

Convergence theorists likely depend on the visible changes that are commonly associated with globalisation. This includes a range of observable evidence already discussed, including fashion, popular culture and entertainment such as music, literature, and the film industry, food and cuisines, and adoption of foreign languages. In all cases, there is undoubtedly a Western hegemony in action, and it is tempting to draw conclusions from such overwhelming, indisputable evidence. For example, the retention of English as the global commercial language as just illustrated, the adaptation of national cuisines to Western tastes, the dominance of American and European record singles in the global music charts, and the European dominance over the fashion industry. All are examples that point towards what has been referred to elsewhere in the
literature as the ‘L.A. effect’ (Norris & Ingelhart, 2009; Galtung; Schiller, 1976; McPhail, 1983; 2005).

For cultural convergence theorists, this so-called L.A. effect is relatively benign until it begins to undermine values and behaviours of local communities in artificial ways. This, they inevitably do. As Norris and Ingelhart (2009) describe, corporations behind the marketing strategies of globally popular brands such as Levis and Nike (brands that could be seen on the Egyptian students in this study) encourage popular consumerism, and ‘sell dreams of personal success, affluence and material gratification’ that enhances the consumerist cycle and the appeal of the Western lifestyle that they have come to represent.

However, the empirical evidence for the link between consumerism and cultural values is weak. A lack of data and evidence is something that characterises the cultural convergence theory. Basing an entire theory on superficial observations can distort the true picture. Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of studies into globalisation, there is a dearth of evidence that can suggest there is any relationship between one’s consumer behaviour and their social, political and economic values.

5.5 Capitalist Peace

Some theories have attempted to connect consumer behaviour with political values. These theories typically predict that the rise of capitalism has a positive impact on global political security. For example, Nye (2002; 2004) argues that American predominance in the market for cultural products presents a valuable development as a form of ‘soft power’, supplementing the power of military strength and resources in U.S foreign policy. In effect, soft power over cultural products can help spread Western liberalism in the way of support for democracy, honouring human rights, and support for free markets, helping the world work in sync and more harmoniously.

Based on a similar principle, Thomas L. Friedman (2000; 2007) argues for the positive consequences of globalisation and the American predominance when he posits that ‘no two countries that both had McDonald’s had fought against
each other since each got its McDonald’s’. He famously argued in his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* that when a country has reached an economic development where it has a middle class strong enough to support a McDonalds network, it would become a ‘McDonalds country’, and will not be interested in fighting wars anymore.

Both Friedman and Nye believe that due to globalisation, countries that have made strong economic ties with one another have too much to lose to ever go to war with one another. Shortly after Friedman’s book was published, NATO bombed Yugoslavia, opening him up to widespread criticism for his short-lived theory. Whether his conclusion is right or wrong, or invalidated by a compilation of wars and conflicts that counter his theory, the thought process is important, because it is based on a broader principle known as ‘capitalist peace’.

Friedman echoes economist Immanuel Kant as Kant writes in his 1795 essay *Perpetual Peace* that ‘the spirit of commerce [...] sooner or later takes hold of every nation, and is incompatible with war.’ Likewise, Joseph Schumpeter (1955, pp. 66-68) reasoned that with the advancement of capitalism, people form ‘an unwarlike disposition’. These very notions imply that through the flow of consumer products, attitudes and values are alterable, and that engagement with the market does indicate an adherence to a set of universal principles and values.

However, theories of soft power, capitalist peace, and McDonaldisation all operate in a context of state actors; in other words, through a paradigm of International Relations rather than *inter-communal* relations. Despite our capitalist age, the world is increasingly unstable, and though there is little traditional outright war between nation-states (evidence that supports capitalist peace theories), complex, multifaceted conflicts between groups, communities, and cultures continue to escalate. Theories for capitalist peace skirt over such realities. Does our interconnected world (albeit driven by the integration into a common market) have the same micro consequences as they do on the macro level? In other words, does economic interdependence and integration result in a more peaceful and stable world?
The cultural convergence theory would likely support capitalist peace theories, not sentimentally, but certainly rationally. This is because, ultimately, though explained through market terms, capitalist peace similarly implies that global communities are intertwined through the common market, making them more integrated and narrowing the cultural idiosyncrasies across local cultures as they become assimilated through their shared consumer behaviour.

However, both the cultural convergence theory and capitalist peace theories attempt to analyse global cultures through macro-analyses. They draw on superstructures to inform their assertions, ignoring the multi-layered and competing sources of information and ideas in local communities. If wishing to devise a geopolitical theory of change, as in the case of capitalist peace theories, then such methodologies are suitable. However, cultural convergence, while the theory itself criticises the homogenisation of local cultures, falls into practicing such homogenisation by not accounting for the irregularities around the world that undermine the theory of wholesale convergence taking place. The evidence base for cultural convergence is as superficial as the consumerist culture it condemns.

Egypt is observably a ‘McDonalds country’ (Friedman, 2000). Her economic development from the 1970s onwards, as explained in chapter three, has opened up the country to the outside world. Firmly integrated into the free market order, the Egyptian middle classes grew and foreign investment and capital flowed into its major urban cities. Urban Egyptian cities host a wide array of transnational companies, and its society is by now accustomed to accessing Western goods and services that are available at a price. Consequently, the purchasing of foreign and predominantly Western products signifies a person’s wealth and social class, and for this reason, it is both a material purchase and an access to a lifestyle. An international education serves in the same way. The acquisition of an internationally recognised qualification is an indicator of social class as well as an access to the outside world, and if promises are fulfilled, upward (global) social mobility.

But, what does this tell us about the values of people today? Schumpeter’s ‘unwarlike disposition’ as a result of our shared capitalism, can in value terms
be simplified as a belief in the value of consumerism, individualism, competition, economic freedom and material affluence. But how much of this is really true on the individual level? Just because the Egyptian state has come to value such ideas, this should not mean that society is shifting towards the same capitalist values and principles, unless there is empirical evidence that this is indeed taking place, which there is not.

At first glance, the students involved in this study, both nationally and internationally educated, share more with the West than they do with their compatriots in upper Egyptian villages. This is because of their consumer behaviour, which is easily observed by any interested onlooker. Middle class Egyptians in Cairo look no different to Middle class immigrant Egyptians living in New York. But how much does consumer behaviour indicate a value-based acculturation? This is where the cultural convergence theory is weak. Cultural convergence theorists look to the world’s communities and see homogenisation, while merely all their observations prove is that consumerism is taking place in an overwhelmingly uniform manner. But how much of this homogenised image is based on superficial observations of societies. What empirical evidence about public opinions and attitudes and values informs this theory of convergence and Westernisation?

An expanding body of research has initiated explorations into public opinions of free markets and economic integration. However, few of these, with the exception of Norris and Ingelhart (2009) look to explore values rather than policy attitudes and opinions, but even then it has a focus on media consumption habits. Many comparative studies have examined public reactions to economic reform in eastern European countries, Latin America and East Asian countries, however polls into attitudes toward free trade, labour markets and economic globalisation tell us very little about what is valued in societies. Very few lay members of society have conceptualised an opinion on free markets and economic globalisations, and asking questions about such specialised subjects seem to be arbitrary when it is hardly relatable to their everyday lives.
5.6 Cosmopolitan ideals

One of the reasons why it is rare to find published studies on values orientations among members of societies is that it is difficult to operationalise and measure peoples’ values and beliefs. In chapter four, a full discussion of the challenges defining cosmopolitanism revealed associated challenges of attempting to measure degrees of cosmopolitanism or international mindedness. Few studies that have attempted to measure cosmopolitanism have captured all various contexts in which the concept can be applied. Many have looked into retail and consumer cosmopolitanism (Vida, Dmitrovic and Reardon, 2005; Yoon, 1998) but these have been limited in their applicability for this study because of their focus, as mentioned, on consumer behaviour rather than social and political attitudes and views towards other communities and cultures. However, elements of pre-existing methodologies can be useful when devising a method for measuring cosmopolitanism in new contexts. Saran’s and Kalliny’s COSMOSCALE (2012) has been particularly useful as it focuses on capturing the values, rather than the behaviour, of consumers. The survey, appropriated for this study, tested for attitudes towards: engaging and interacting with other cultures, welcoming lessons and wisdom from other communities, and cultural change, curiosity, and respect for diversity.

When presented with the questions from the COSMOSCALE (see methodology for full list), there was little variation between the internationally educated and nationally educated Egyptian students. In both cohorts, the students responded positively to the statements provided and scored more than 28 out of a possible 42 for signs of cosmopolitan thinking. Of the 22 internationally educated students, 19 scored 28 or above, with 13 scoring higher than 35. This meant that for more than half of the statements, they strongly agreed. Similarly, of the 21 nationally educated students, 17 scored 28 or above, with 11 scoring higher than 35. This suggests that in general, cosmopolitan messages are conveyed and its preference is widely supported across the sample. The literature has certainly supported this, suggesting that societies are positively engaging with products from other cultures, and that knowledge of different practices is considered advantageous.
These results alone suggest, irrespective of education styles, that Egyptian youth from this sample are displaying cosmopolitan attitudes. However, it does not necessarily mean that either have a cosmopolitan identity. This is one of the drawbacks of current measurement tools for cosmopolitanism. The statements in the COSMOSCALE assess an individual’s interest and willingness to engage with other cultures. However, to say that a positive response to such statements is a sign of adopting a post-national identity remains unsubstantiated.

In fact, despite high scores in the COSMOSCALE, the majority of students in the sample also shared other important, potentially conflicting, qualities as revealed during the interviews. When presented with a set of identity references from which to rank their relevance to the individual, national identity and religious identity featured most prominently.

6.2 Religious and national identity

The literature on identity, as explored in chapter two, suggests that people have multiple identities, and that some identities are more primary and dominant than others. Social constructivist theory, which dominates the literature on identity construction, posits that identity, particularly social identities such as national or ethnic identity, is socially constructed through personal interactions and social institutions. National classrooms are commonly regarded by social and political scientists as active institutions in cultivating senses of belonging and collective identities that are relevant to the national narrative. Thus, it was interesting to first explore whether those Egyptian students educated at private international schools in Egypt identified differently to those Egyptian students educated at national state schools.

During the interviews, students were presented with a list of words that could relate to possible identity categories relatable to their lives. They were each asked to select three words that they relate to most and rank these words according to how they prioritise aspects of their identity. All students placed a word associated with a religious identity within their top two, and all the students’ lists featured ‘Egyptian’ within their top two. The students’ lists
showed how strong national and religious identities were to each student in the study.

The full list of options included words suggesting national, ethnic or racial identities such as Egyptian, Arab, Black, White, Middle Eastern, African. It also included a variety of terms relating to different religious identities, such as Muslim, Christian, Sunni, Shi'i, Sufi, Coptic, atheist. The list also included gender variations, ‘Male’ and ‘Female’. Finally, to account for an international identity reference, ‘global’, ‘international’ and ‘Western’ was also added to the list.

The bar graph below shows the most popular words from the list according to the students’ responses. Words that did not feature on any list, such as race-based terms as well as ‘sufi’, ‘shi’i’ and ‘male’ and ‘female’, have been excluded from the graph for the purpose of simplicity.

Figure 1:

Overall, when presented with the list of options, the most popular expressions of identity were national and religious. The international
students were also not on the whole more likely to select ‘global’ or ‘Western’.

When the students were later asked what they thought ‘global’ and ‘Western’ meant, there were mixed views. For some students, ‘global’ meant to belong anywhere in the world, to be accepted no matter what race, what language or what religion. To other students, it meant to be globally mobile, or to be without a nationality, while for some, ‘global’ and ‘Western’ were synonymous. One student from the internationally educated group responded, ‘they [‘global’ and ‘Western’] are the same. When people say ‘global’ they mean ‘Western’, because the West controls the world [laughs].’ Another nationally educated student remarked, ‘the words are similar, but I think ‘global’ is more positive than ‘Western’. Y’know, more welcoming. I think ‘Western’ reminds me of power and wealth, but global does not have these ideas attached to its meaning. ‘Global’ can mean ‘eastern’ too, maybe.’ Therefore the term global was much too ambiguous for the students to accurately identify with it, or it conjured an association too heavily towards the West.

It is not clear whether the students entered a thought process when responding to this task, or whether they responded to the task instinctively. A term, like ‘global’, may have been seen as quite an unusual word to describe an identity, whereas many of the other words in the list were more familiar, and would likely be more instinctively relatable. The conversation with the students following the task does suggest that students are hyper aware of unintended meanings. It showed a high level of critical thinking, and this was not just unique to internationally schooled students.

What was also clear was that expressions of identity were more likely to be narrowly focused and localised rather than loosely defined and internationalised. The internationally trained students were no more likely to break through localised and narrow associations of themselves. Sectarian references were similarly not popular identity constructs according to this task. This was particularly apparent among the Muslim students. While the Christian students chose to select ‘Coptic’ rather than ‘Christian’, the
majority of Muslim students selected ‘Muslim’ rather than ‘Sunni’, ‘Shi’i’ or ‘Sufi’.

However, comparing the Muslim responses according to internationally educated students or nationally educated students revealed some differences. Only 12 of the Muslim students across the sample selected ‘Sunni’ as well as ‘Muslim’. Among the 12, only three came from national schools, suggesting sectarian distinction was less important to the nationally educated Muslims in the study compared to the internationally educated Muslims. However, for both groups, a sect-based expression of identity was not common and did not feature highly in their prioritised identities.

Incidentally, none of the students who highlighted ‘Sunni’ in their top three chose ‘Arab’. Similarly, none of the students who selected ‘Arab’ in their list had selected ‘Sunni’. In other words, the absence of an ethnic ‘Arab’ expression of identity made it more likely for a student to select a religious, sectarian, identity from the list. If one was to take this as indicative, it could suggest that the two identities are mutually exclusive. However, when asked what their fourth choice would have been, the 12 students who selected ‘Sunni’ in their top three said that ‘Arab’ would have been their chosen fourth on the list. This was true for both the internationally educated and nationally educated students. When asked the same question, those who prioritised ‘Arab’ in their list but did not select a sect-based identity such as ‘Sunni’ (i.e. 25 students in total) all responded with either a gender term, either ‘male’ or ‘female’ as their alternative, or ‘global’. This suggests that those who chose to highlight ‘Arab’ did not relate at all to sectarian identities when presented with options.

Only five of the 43 students who were interviewed selected ‘global’ in their top three, and ‘Western’ only featured in one of the students’ lists. ‘International’ featured in none of the lists. Of those six who selected ‘global’ or ‘Western’ all came from international schools, and for all, it was the third on the list following ‘Egyptian’ and a religious identity. Therefore, an international education was the determining factor for those who highlighted a global identity, and a national and religious identity was still predominant.
Though all six students were internationally educated, they were not all from the same school, but were all from international schools in Cairo, and five of the students were interestingly from the American or Canadian international schools in Cairo. This made up the overwhelming majority of students representing the American and Canadian curricula. The sixth student was at a British international school but enrolled on the International Baccalaureate, rather than the more common international British curriculum, the IGCSE (See chapter two for more details). It does suggest that specific curricula may have slightly greater power at determining an association with a global identity. However, a separate study into the characteristics of the various curricula and their contents would be required before any conclusion could be made. In addition, further follow up with those students and their families suggest that they were also widely travelled, which was not always the case with those at international schools in Egypt. Most families sending their children to international schools in Egypt dedicate most of their exposable income to their child’s expensive education, and thus regular vacations can be quite unusual unless they are among the highest socio-economic cohort in Egyptian society. Therefore, there are a number of explanations to explain this minority of the sample who associated with ‘global’, and the patterns that can be drawn to explain this turnout. However, what is most clear is that despite some association with non-local identities, each student still prioritised a local or religious identity.

Furthermore, four of the six who highlighted ‘global’ or ‘Western’ in their top three also chose ‘Coptic’ or ‘Christian’ in their list, thereby meaning only 2 Muslim internationally trained students chose ‘global’ or ‘Western’, and all but one Coptic Christian chose one of the international identity references. Incidentally, none of the four Coptic students who selected ‘global’ chose to select ‘Arab’ on their top three. The one other Coptic Christian in the sample who did choose ‘Arab’ for his third choice, did not choose ‘global’ or ‘Western’.

Therefore, ‘global’, ‘Western’ and ‘Arab’ never featured on the same top-three list. The Christian student who selected ‘Arab’ as his third choice was
from a national school. The vast majority of Christian students felt Egyptian in their identity first and foremost but did not see this exclusive to a ‘global’ or ‘Western’ affinity. The Coptic student who did select ‘Arab’ was indeed distinct from this pattern, but his national education does not necessarily explain his preference for ‘Arab’ compared to his co-religionists in the sample. Two other Coptic students were also educated by the national curriculum, yet prioritised a ‘global’ identity over a local one.

The higher tendency for Christian students to select ‘global’ could however suggest that their Christian identity makes them more likely to feel part of a global society. What is certain is that the youth today have multiple layers of identity and how they choose to navigate the overlapping identities is deeply personal and unlikely to have been shaped in a formal educational setting alone. However, of the minority who chose to include a non-local identity reference to their list, each prioritised a national and religious identity first, suggesting that they had related to these terms more strongly than they had a global identity.

Therefore, while a majority of the students performed highly in the COSMOSCALE, when self-selecting their identity references, they chose to identify with a community much closer to home. The literature on citizenship and national identity presented in chapter two suggested that national identities are primary, or core identities to an individual (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1991; Jenkins, 1996). Lutz et al (2006) found that a growing proportion of young people in the European community had displayed a partial sense of European identity, alongside a national identity. This not only supported the notion of the coexistence of multiple identities at a given time, but also suggested that supranational identities did not replace national identities. Smith (1991) argued that rarely did other collective identities succeed in undermining national identity. There is no doubt in this study that the Egyptian identity was important to all of the students at the time of their interviews. This was irrespective of the form of education they had received.

However while the prioritisation of their national identity signifies a conscious association, how much does it affect their attitudes and values to both their
own community and the outside world? Like Lutz’s participants, was it possible to uphold a national identity while also displaying a sense of regional or global identity or affinity?

5.6 Conclusion

Through superficial observations of the participating students during the study, it was clear why people might regard internationally educated students in Egypt as a Westernised part of Egyptian society. Their outward appearances and their tastes in fashion and entertainment gave them traits in common with Americans and Europeans as they conformed to notions of the so-called global youth culture. However, such traits did not distinguish them from their nationally educated counterparts. Nationally educated Egyptians of the same socio-economic background conformed to similar, if not identical, characteristics that have come to be associated with the global youth of today.

While it has been tempting to apply such observations in support of the cultural convergence thesis introduced in this chapter, this study has rather exposed weaknesses in the nature of the evidence that is typically used to inform such a theory. Evidence for cultural convergence taking place has been exclusively based on observations and studies based on consumer behaviour. With the lack of any certifiable evidence that consumer behaviour translates into an individual’s social, political and even economic values and culture, the argument made in here was that the evidence for cultural convergence as a result of the forces of globalisation is superficial. Applications of the COSMOSCALE, designed to explore cosmopolitan values within a market context, certainly indicated that the students studied had a respect and willingness to learn about other cultures, societies and nations. However, this could not be translated into having a cosmopolitan identity and set of values through which to guide such an identity. This is further question when analysis of the responses to self identification tasks during interviews reveal that students identified far closer to home than a cosmopolitan identity, according to the literature, would dictate.
In the following chapter, identity and values are further explored using the data gathered from interviews, focus groups and observations, alongside external opinion surveys conducted in the region.
Chapter 6 - International Education and Cosmopolitan values

The purpose of this study has been twofold. First, to understand the latent nature of a cosmopolitan identity and how effectively it is able to replace the need for a national identity, and secondly to explore how much international education can determine the international mindedness believed to be a requisite of cosmopolitan identity. In designing the methodology to explore such queries, the study necessarily exceeds superficial observations that focus on consumer culture, which would otherwise misinform the cultural behaviour of elite, middle-to-upper class, Egyptians. As has just been illustrated in chapter five, it can be tempting to support theories of cultural convergence based on superficially visible indicators, such as the way a person dresses, their lifestyle choices, and their consumption of globally popular goods. However, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the qualitative data generated from the interviews, focus groups, and participant observations, which each provide deeper insight into the students’ attitudes, beliefs, and values. Doing so will help to ascertain whether there are significant differentiating trends across the sample of students to indicate whether the type of education one receives makes a marked impact on senses of belonging, values and identity.

The chapter is thus focused on the central question of this thesis: has an international education resulted in a greater cosmopolitan identity? It does not assume that an international education is the only means to cultivating a cosmopolitan identity. Indeed, the literature presented in chapter two has not identified specific factors that enhance a post-national identity, but simply implies that a trend towards cosmopolitanism exists and that it is inextricably linked to the forces of globalisation. By comparing two cohorts of participants that share socio-economic backgrounds, age, and national identity, but are distinguished by their educational environment, it is possible to isolate education as a variable and observe its agency for change through direct comparisons of responses during interviews of the sample of internationally and nationally educated Egyptians. Focus groups have allowed for more interactive discussions between the studied group of internationally educated Egyptian students. The various subjects for discussion covered during focus groups have provided rich data on the students’ opinions on global and local political and
social issues. The students’ reactions and debates have revealed biases, prejudices, and hostilities that were not exposed so explicitly through one-to-one researcher-participant interactions. Similarly, notes made following home observations with six families connected to international schools in Egypt have offered further evidence and insight into the students’ everyday contexts; their relationship with their parents, values promoted and upheld in the home, and the cultural milieu in which the students have grown up.

Despite efforts to isolate education as the independent variable, there is no way of guaranteeing that other factors will not have played a role in determining the outcomes, in this case, of the level of cosmopolitan association. In an attempt to address one significant impeding factor - the students’ home lives - a limited number of participant observations involving six students’ own families in their homes were conducted over a week per household. The observations made in the home allow for some considerations to be made, using the study’s original data, of the role of the parents and home life that are either in-sync or in juxtaposition to the education received in an international curriculum. Unlike the interviews and focus groups, which have both relayed valuable interpretive data, participant observations have generated critical data that will prove insightful for discussions throughout this chapter and chapter seven.

The themes that are covered in this chapter are by no means exhaustive. The most recurring and dominant themes form the core findings presented in this chapter. In addition to the findings from the original fieldwork, a broader exploration into common findings from existing values surveys will also take place. Efforts to explore cultural, religious and identity indicators emerging from the Middle East and North Africa are being led by larger-scale polling and survey projects. While the rich, qualitative, data from the original fieldwork has generated recurring and significant patterns for wider application, results from ongoing opinion and values surveys provide some useful context that situate the unique observations generated from this thesis. The purpose of introducing external survey data at this stage of the discussion is to explore how consistent the findings from this thesis are with alternative data collection on values and identity in the region. It is not introduced to validate the data from this thesis, but rather to engage with and reflect on the field’s wider efforts in developing a
familiarity with the views commonly held across various elements of today’s Egyptian society.

Developing the discussion initiated in chapter five, the findings relayed in this chapter raise further doubts that a cultural convergence in the form of values is taking place. Even among those that are well placed to receive a cosmopolitan education, traditional identities are predominant. This raises questions as to how practical cosmopolitanism is, as well as concerns that international curricula, for a number of reasons that will be explored further in chapter seven, is not sufficiently cultivating a global mindedness among host-nation students. As chapter five has revealed, the students of national schools and international schools all showed indications of a willingness to engage with other cultures, and scored highly in the COSMOSCALE. However, as acknowledged, the COSMOSCALE, as with other attempts to measure cosmopolitanism, only presents evidence of a ‘willingness’ or ‘curiosity’ with other cultures, beliefs and communities. It does not measure how cosmopolitan the students’ lives are and nor does it indicate internationally mindedness or identity. Furthermore, supplementary evidence drawn from the additional methods adopted for this study suggest that the COSMOSCALE results fail to synergistically relate to the views expressed by the students elsewhere in interview, focus groups and observations. Traditional and narrow identity descriptors - national and religious – have been shown to dominate across the international school educated and national school educated participants. Indeed a theme of nationalism persisted throughout the course of the study, and began to form the first marked difference across the studied and control groups.

6.1 National Pride and Patriotism

As all the students identified with an Egyptian identity, it was interesting to find that this did not universally translate into outright pride, and it was rather an area where the nationally educated and internationally educated students differed. However, it was not in the way expected. When asked to define and describe Egyptian values to the researcher, internationally educated students were overall markedly more flattering than their nationally educated counterparts, often presenting a romanticised image of the Egyptian culture.
At times, the nationally educated students in the study responded with a mocking tone and were jovial towards this question when compared to the responses provided by the internationally educated students. Recurring terms and values suggested by the internationally educated students included ‘hospitality’, ‘generosity’, ‘kindness’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘pride’, ‘solidarity’, ‘hard work’ and ‘honour’. Their responses typically implied affection towards their identity and their cultural heritage. Most of the flattering descriptions of Egyptian values were not once raised by the nationally educated students in response to the same question. In fact the general tone from the control group tended towards the more critical, sarcastic, and trivial. Instead ‘laughter and humour’, ‘resourcefulness’, ‘survival’, and even ‘corruption’ dominated the responses. Some of the latter exposed a degree of frustration towards their country and their people. As one nationally educated student remarked, ‘everything Egypt is proud of is based on its past’.

What was clear was that the depiction of Egyptian culture was markedly different between the two groups. The nationally educated students presented a far grittier image of what it meant to be an Egyptian, while the internationally educated were at least keen to promote their Egyptian identity, and presented it flatteringly. It shows that the same identity can mean different things to different people, including national identities. However, what is most interesting about this finding is that it defied expectations. One would imagine those enrolled in schools with the national curriculum would have a much more refined and glossy image of Egyptian culture that would suggest the influence of the state-sponsored curriculum and citizenship education. Thus a comparison between those not nationally educated and those nationally educated would, by this logic, produce the opposite effects to what the findings actually revealed.

When trying to understand why the international school educated students were overwhelmingly more positive about Egyptian culture and values compared to their nationally educated peers, it helps to introduce findings from the focus groups. The discussions on social issues and politics that relate to Egypt during the focus group sessions add insight into how the students’ Egyptian identity translates into their political attitudes. Overall, the
focus sessions exposed a strong sense of national pride, or patriotism, among the internationally educated students.

For example, when asked, ‘does Egypt have a role to play in developing the region and broker peace?’ the discussions were very revealing, and worked to further illustrate a recurring pattern in this entire study; that internationally educated Egyptians were conscious of their national identity and regional duty. In each of the focus groups, students showed a combination of pride and caution in assessing Egypt’s role in the region. For example, in all but one of the focus groups, students raised the unique respect awarded to Egypt from her regional neighbours. ‘It is known!’ some students exclaimed. ‘We [Egypt] are universally admired because of our long history of civilisation and good leadership’ explained one student. Students echoed this sense of pride in another focus group, where one student urged, with the support of his fellow participants, ‘Egypt is the ‘Big Sister’ of the Arab World, the ‘Mother’ even! All countries know this.’

Despite the students’ clear conviction in their nation’s greatness, the Palestinian cause was one topic that students all believed Egypt should help with more, and again it was expressed through notions of patriotism and at times, pan-Arabism. In more than one focus group, the students expressed a desire to ‘end Palestinian suffering’ and they wished their government would do more to help the Palestinians and ‘stand up to Israel’. Students referred to footage on their social media pages of suffering Palestinians and ‘illegal aggression’ from the Israeli Defense Forces, and they expressed their upset with great zeal during the focus groups. In fact, the topic of Israel and the Palestinians was perhaps the most lively and emotive part of all the focus groups. It is important to note that the time of the focus groups was shortly after the July 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. This is likely to have hardened the students’ opinions given how recently this conflict had taken place. During the focus groups, the students lamented Egypt’s absence in support of Palestinians. In this, the students all made reference to the 1967 war that marked, for them, the last time Egypt had sacrificed the country for the Palestinian cause. In one focus group, this conversation swiftly led to a mention of previous pan-Arab and socialist President, Gamal Abdel Nasser.
As one student said: ‘President Nasser was the last honourable leader of the Arab world, as he made the liberation of Palestine a national priority’. Another student, at the mention of Nasser, added ‘No good Muslim leader could ignore their [Palestinian] suffering. He [Nasser] was a good Muslim leader’. When asked if Egyptians today would support a war with Israel to improve the conditions of the Palestinians, it was surprising that all students in all focus groups unanimously insisted that the ‘Egyptian people’ would ‘embrace a war for the liberation of Palestine’. As one student explained, ‘Palestine is an open wound, and it will not heal until Jerusalem is liberated’.

The views of the internationally educated Egyptian students during the focus groups may seem alarming with respect to Israel and Palestinians. Little knowledge is documented about what new generations of Arabs feel towards the ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict. Unfortunately, as focus groups were not held with the nationally educated Egyptian student participants, it is not clear how much the two cohorts in this study share with regards to perspectives on this issue. For the latter, the Egyptian government has engaged in a very careful representation of the history of Egyptian-Israeli relations, and the Ministry of Education considers Arab-Israeli relations to be a very sensitive matter since Egypt’s normalisation of relations under Sadat. However, what is clear is that the students from this study, educated in Western-oriented international schools, expressed unwavering support for military intervention against Israel, suggesting not only hostility towards Israel, but also a level of optimism regarding Egypt’s military capabilities.

In juxtaposition, students during the focus groups did not feel that Egypt was in any position to help with the Syrian conflict, but believed that if Egypt had got involved early, and advised the Syrian government, the conflict would have been avoided, echoing their romanticised depiction of Egypt. Some explanations raised in the sessions included how it was a civil war and a domestic matter as well as how Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s involvement in the war complicated Egypt’s position. They also believed that Egypt has the same risks to think about at home and if the ‘Islamists’ are pre-occupied in Syria, they will be less likely to cause problems in Egypt. This could have
been different if the focus groups were held again following more recent developments and the continuation of the conflict. Nonetheless, the students’ comments implied that the Syrian conflict was contained, and that its developments were of little relevance to Egypt directly. This was interesting as it was so different to their attitudes regarding the Palestinians, yet it reflects the history of Egyptian-Palestinian dynamics that is not shared with the Syrians. Empathy, in this way, appeared to be reserved for certain groups of people and not for others. It is possible that students were passionate about the Palestinians’ injustice because it not only had endured for so long, but was also perceived as deriving from a foreign entity. Their support for the Palestinians had become an extension of their nationalistic, anti-colonial, expressions, while the Syrian war had not yet been decoded into their national narrative.

During an interview with a female student enrolled at an international school in Cairo, the subject of Israel appeared to cause some upset. Her uncle, as she explained, had fought in 1967 against Israel. She regarded Israel as a terrorist nation and felt betrayed by her country for making peace with the Israelis. Her views were expressed in the context of a particular question during the interview: ‘Do you have friends of different religious backgrounds?’ After being asked to elaborate on her point, the student clarified: ‘I was asked to welcome an Israeli girl to our school as part of an exchange [privately organised]. She was told to shadow me because I think the principal believed it would look good for Egyptian and Israelis to be friends. I told my teacher I would not welcome her; that her father is a murderer, and all her family. I tried to get the students to sign a protest [petition] against the Israeli girl’s visit. We got seven hundred signatures. She was still invited, and she came, but many of us refused to speak to her. Only the foreign [expatriate] students sat with her in class, although even they didn’t like her. Christians, I can be friends with. Of course, Muslims too. But Jews? No, never.’

The particular exchange was not representative of the students’ responses to the question, and answers were rarely this explicitly hostile. In such instances, it is useful to know more about the student. She was educated
exclusively at international schools in Egypt. Her parents had removed her from a Canadian International School and she was enrolled at one of the most prestigious British curriculum schools in the city, thus had received a top international education from her earliest years. All three of her elder siblings had been educated at one of Egypt’s top international schools. Despite her hostility towards Jews and Israelis, she did not express many other concerning views documented during the study, although she did often express strongly nationalist views and also held some negativity towards Gulf Arabs and Saudis in particular. She dressed modestly, but without Islamic headdress. She was a grade-A student, and was proficient in both English and French. All of these factors, however, are not necessarily related, yet they do provide context of some of the backgrounds of individuals educated under an international curriculum. The most significant factor that was known about this student was no doubt her uncle’s participation in the 1967 war, as this was personally raised in the context of her comments. Yet, no doubt there will be other intersecting influencers in her life that may have determined her posture towards other communities, religions and ethnicities. It highlights the intricacies that are inherent in dealing with individual expressions of identity and values and illustrates the impossibility of isolating education type as a factor in value construction. This is discussed more deeply in the following chapter.

Elsewhere in the focus group sessions, students presented an inward-looking, and anti-Western attitude. Students overall believed that Egypt was ‘neutral’ on most issues in the region and that this made the country valuable in helping to resolve conflicts. They believed that Egypt was a valuable source of stability in the region. However, they did not feel so confident about the country’s economic stability and believed this would limit Egypt’s appetite for political involvement in the region. When asked whether other countries could do anything to stabilise the region, students expressed very negative views towards external support, citing Western intervention as ‘troublesome’ and ‘unhelpful’. Students appeared to mistrust Western foreign policy motives and believed that it was the main driver for recruitment to groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. They also believed that countries with leaders who had good relations with Western countries, like America, Britain
and France, were typically unstable and often ‘did bad things to their people’. Echoing the thoughts of his peers across the focus groups, one student believed that ‘Western countries corrupted their [Middle Eastern] leaders’. Another student further explained that ‘the only Egyptian leader who was not corrupt was the only leader who was not friendly to the West’, presumably in reference to the pan-Arab Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Students were also negative towards the Gulf States, but particularly towards Qatar, who some believed ‘manipulated politics in Egypt in favour of the [Muslim] Brotherhood’. Some students did not agree with this, but rather believed that Qatar was more ‘guilty for its bad media coverage of the Arab uprisings as Al-Jazeera stirred the protestors against each other’. What was clear from these views was that the students appeared to echo wider national sentiments as expressed through Egyptian media, which has largely, since 2011, widely regarded Al-Jazeera as an agent of Qatari foreign policy, the latter equally regarded as a destabilising force by many Egyptians for Qatar’s granting of asylum to exiled Muslim Brothers.

However, not all Gulf States were the subject of criticism. Saudi Arabia came up often as a perceived ally to Egypt and a ‘strong force for good’. There were students in the groups who mocked Saudi Arabia’s ‘lack of civilisation’ but this was not so much in relation to the country’s domestic politics but more in reference to Saudi’s foreign policies. One student argued: ‘Saudi Arabia is strong only because of its oil. This is why they [Saudis] are important friends to have. But they are not educated and do not understand the world like Egyptians do. They also have no military power and are puppets of the Americans’. Other students agreed that Saudi Arabia was in a good position to financially assist the region, but that Egypt should advise them on how to spend their money: ‘The Saudi people are Bedouins; they do not know about business and technology, and they do not understand about agriculture that is at the heart of our country’s economy, yet they want to spend their money regardless. So we can show them!’ This was a particularly strong expression of nationalistic sentiment from the students, depicting Egypt as the wise and natural leader among the Arab States, and echoing previous expressions of national superiority and pride.
Russia was also seen to be a potential country to help the region. Some students argued that Russia’s willingness to ‘stand up to the West added to its respect in the region’. Many also expressed some appreciation of Putin for his character and strongman qualities. One student said: ‘I like him. He is strong and he knows how to get what he wants. I think the world needs this to weaken America. But I am sure he is tyrant to his people’. During the same focus group, other students reiterated their appreciation of Putin. One student argued: ‘America want the world to hate Putin. In Egypt we have many Russians who come on holiday, and Putin has good relations with us [Egypt], but the West try to make us scared to talk to him. But everyone is a dictator in the Middle East [group laughs]. We are not afraid [of Putin]’. Consequently, America was the least popular country to assist the region, but Canada was also flagged by the students for being ‘just as pro-Israel’, as was transnational bodies such as the United Nations. In fact, many students expressed distrust towards supranational bodies such as the United Nations, arguing that, as one student put it: ‘The UN is America. When America does something wrong, it [the UN] will never stop them, so this UN is all fake. It is a lie for the Americans and Israelis and no country can stand up to them if they are a UN member’. The other students greeted the student’s views with overall support. Another student added: ‘they [multinational bodies] are all the same! You have UN, World Bank and others – they are all America and they all work together to weaken other states, make them poor, and our leaders always assist in this’. During this conversation, one teacher was present in the room. After the focus group ended, the teacher expressed shock and concern that the students had expressed such hardline distrust towards multinational bodies like the UN. She was concerned that the students had developed such strong opinions about such complicated ideas, and she insisted that the education was not equipped to challenge these ideas: ‘Everything is to pass the exams; if the exams do not talk about multinational bodies, then we [the teachers] don’t talk about multinational bodies. But somebody is talking about these organisations to them, otherwise where would they have these views from!’
The West was almost always treated as one homogenous bloc throughout the discussions, but some students made efforts to differentiate between America and Britain. During one focus group, a student attempted to explain how America was more manipulative towards the region than Britain and that the latter followed but did not lead its policies. However, this comment caused uproar among the other students who argued that Britain was ‘the cause of all the problems in the region’ and that it had ‘colonised our countries’, ‘took our oil’, ‘divided our land’ and ‘promised Palestine to the Jews.’ Most students believed that the source of the problems plaguing the region came from outside rather than inside the region. The common culprits were ‘the West’ and ‘Israel’, and the period of ‘colonisation’ of Egypt and the rest of the region was a common source of frustration.

Few of these statements will be remarkably unexpected by those familiar with Middle East politics. However, there is a need to look beyond the specific points that are made, but rather what those opinions represent in the bigger picture. This was clear having sat in on the focus groups, as the tone of frustration and distrust towards what was gleaned as ‘the West’ shone through and came to dominate the discussions.

When presented with social and political topics of discussion, students spoke from a firmly Egyptian standpoint, and sometimes from an Arab position too. Their clear national orientation deeply informed their sense of alienation from the outside world. Some responses were typically xenophobic and prejudiced, and this appeared to heighten more during the focus groups than during the interviews. The international school students were unexpectedly inward looking when exploring geopolitical issues and relations.

### 6.4 Collectivism

Despite often expressing isolationist ideas with regards to geopolitical dynamics, the students from both cohorts expressed an overwhelming sense of duty towards their neighbours. Their opinions toward the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict strongly illustrated this, but it was also clear from their one-to-one interviews with regards to their daily life.

Throughout the interviews, for example, students from both cohorts demonstrated a strong emphasis on family and society. When the students spoke about themselves, collective speech was more common than individual references; ‘we’ and ‘us’ rather than ‘I’ was far more common when students spoke about democracy, social and political change, future and past challenges.

A collectivistic attitude to their future was extremely noticeable when asking the students about their aspirations and expectations following school. These questions were designed to explore the students' sense of mobility and belonging beyond their community, as well as their interpretation of their role in their family and society. The questions were also designed to explore whether the students saw their international education and foreign language skills as a means for setting up a life abroad.

When asked what they hoped to become in the future, the students’ aspirations did not appear to be any more or less ambitious across the two groups of internationally educated and nationally educated. They each spoke of traditionally well-respected professions in Egypt, including medicine, engineering and law. There were some noticeable differences however. Students from the international schools showed greater variation and originality in their aspiring professions. For example, students within the studied group spoke of politics, business, architecture, philosophy, and artistic professions, all of which went unmentioned among the control group. One male student from the studied, international, group told the researcher how he dreamed of drawing comics for a living but that he could never raise this with his family, and would most likely enter medicine after his exams. Another male student within the international group spoke of how he wished to do business studies at university, but that his family hoped for him to do medicine or engineering instead. A female student at an international school described her plans to enter medical school and become a doctor. When asked what her reasons were for wanting to become a doctor and what
doctor she hoped to become, she clarified that she may only complete the degree and not practice ‘just as her sisters had done’, to begin a family. After some discussion, she explained that this was common practice and that everyone ‘must have a degree even if they do not use it’. Her opinion was validated and expressed by other female students from the nationally educated group, with two from the group expressing similar intentions for the future. However, in the national group, traditional subjects, such as engineering and medicine, were regarded equally highly, and artistic subjects including design or architecture in this sample did not feature at all when expressing their future aspirations. After speaking with a number of the teachers at the schools, it became clear that this was a typical trend among Egyptian families who had grown to regard subjects promoted by the state, such as engineering and medicine, as prestigious and ‘respectable’ subjects, hence the competitive entry into such colleges over others.

During the discussion about the students’ aspirations for the future, it was interesting that though there were variations of subjects mentioned, both groups demonstrated collectivist thinking. Students from both groups expressed intentions to follow their parents’ wishes when choosing their profession, and they based much of their decisions on what was expected of them from others. Even though many expressed desires to study artistic and non-traditional subjects at university, they also believed that when the time came to decide, they would likely choose ‘a more sensible’ subject that their families supported. This was not altogether unusual, except that the researcher had expected the students from the international schools to reveal more signs of individualistic expressions when compared to their nationally educated counterparts. That there were no distinguishable differences between the responses of the two groups suggests that their educational experiences had not directly impacted the ways in which they mapped their future and the direct influences on those decisions.

Expressions of collectivist attitudes continued throughout the interviews, and when asked where they hoped to live in the future, students from both groups voiced an unwillingness to leave home and their families for long periods of time. Expressions of co-dependence occurred almost equally
across the two cohorts of students, and national school students were no more likely to express codependency when discussing their future and society than the international schooled students. Collective harmony and growth - often expressed through the national narrative or family unit - appeared to be favoured over personal success. For example, when asked what are the greatest challenges facing them in the future, students from both groups often interpreted the question by responding with regards to Egypt’s greatest challenges, carrying collective grievances rather than focusing on individual grievances. Even when speaking of unemployment, which many of the students were personally worried about after completing their education, the students often spoke on behalf of the community and wider society; ‘we’ and ‘us’ were more common in their responses than ‘I’.

However, in both groups, many students expressed a desire to leave Egypt periodically for work abroad. Countries frequently mentioned between both groups included the UAE, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, or Australia, with 58 percent of the total sample of students interviewed expressing desires to live abroad in one of these countries should they choose to leave Egypt. Of the 58 percent of students, an almost equal measure from each group (47 percent being nationally educated students and 53 percent being internationally educated students) responded with a desire to work abroad. Therefore, the students’ educational experiences did not appear to have had any direct influence on their decision to try a life away from home in the future.

However, many of the students from the international group displayed greater confidence in achieving a life abroad compared to the students from the national group. The students spoke of friends and family they knew who had successfully established a life abroad, and had discussed their personal connections to people who could help facilitate their travel in the future. In contrast, none of the students from the national group presented their hopes with such confidence, and many spoke of other plans should their hopes prove to be unrealistic. One student from the national group explained how they feared that moving to work abroad is now very difficult for Egyptians, and expressed worries of an increasingly inhospitable European market to
migrants. He referred to experiences of family members attempting to travel for work and finding difficulty receiving visas. He spoke of his uncle’s difficult experiences when living in Germany and his subsequent return to Egypt. This student expressed hesitance when planning a future away from home, and explained: ‘I am happy living in Egypt now. When I was younger, I couldn’t wait to leave because I thought it would give me freedom and experience adult life more. But now, I see that I am best off staying with my family because this country needs educated people to stay and contribute to its economy’.

Students in both groups expressed similar concerns. In fact, during an informal conversation with the deputy head teacher of an international school in Alexandria, concerns of how realistic the students’ expectations for studying abroad following their A-levels were raised. The teacher described an imbalance of dream and reality among the families of students studying IGCSE. She explained: ‘The students work hard to get the best grades so that they can apply to universities in Europe and America, but they find that is not enough and that the system does not allow them to travel easily to study and that funding is essential. But this funding is impossible to get for Egyptian students, and sometimes there are only three awards and thousands of students applying for it.’

The competition to gain a place in university, either abroad or at home in Egypt, offers a uniquely pressurised experience for internationally educated Egyptian students. As the deputy head teacher explained during the conversation, students who graduate from international schools with international diplomas will likely seek a place in a national university, especially for competitive subjects like medicine or engineering. For such subjects, the national universities are considered more prestigious than a private university because of the competition for a place. However, the competition proves greater for students graduating from the IGCSE, SATS or even more so for the IB, because the number of spaces allocated for such school graduates are minimal. For example, while Cairo University medical school may accept 2-3000 students per year, only 10 per cent or 200 of these will be allocated to graduates from international or private schools. As
a result, the students are expected to get much higher (sometimes unrealistic) grades compared to their nationally educated colleagues if they wish to receive a place in a top national university in Cairo or Alexandria. To compound the challenge further, the students who are fortunate to be awarded a place at a state university are typically offered spaces in less popular universities located in smaller cities and towns outside of Cairo or Alexandria, such as Tanta or Port Said. The students are in turn underprepared for the limited resources that are available to them, and the extremely large classroom sizes and lectures they are expected to attend. As was explained: ‘these are students who have become used to clean, well-equipped classrooms with a teacher: student ratio of about 1:30. In state university lectures for medical school, these students will have to adapt to teacher: student ratios of 1:300! It’s impossible.’

Regardless of the reality of their expectations, the students from the sample were clearly ambitious, with hopes to travel and put their foreign language skills to use. However, for those who did not aspire to setting up a life abroad, their reasons were explicit. There were students from both groups who expressed a desire to remain in Egypt and work, and for each of these, their reasons appeared to be rooted in their pride for their nation. One male student from the national group explained: ‘I love my country. I am proud to be from Egypt and I want to reward my country for providing me dignity and the skills to find a job’. Another male student from the international group said: ‘why should I leave? Egypt has everything these other countries have, and more - we have a great history, and God willing, I will make more history for this great country’. A female student from the international group said: ‘I want to stay. I want to give back to Egypt what I took. I want to bring up my children in my homeland, so they can know who they are. I am happy to represent Egypt when I am abroad, but I will not abandon it.’

The concept of abandonment came up a number of times among the students who also expressed desires to live abroad. One of the students from the international group, who had expressed a desire to move to America, said: ‘I will go for money, yes. The jobs are better there and my
skills will be more appreciated. But I will never abandon my country and God willing, I will return when I am rich and old and make a charity.’

Students from both groups demonstrated strong patriotic sentiment in response to this question and once again they demonstrated a clear collectivist attitude regarding their role in society. What was equally noticeable was the fact that neither the nationally trained or internationally trained students were more or less patriotic or collectivistic than the other. Students of both groups expressed a deep sense of imagined community, national pride and collective duty. When presented with the statement, ‘People who think about others before themselves seem to lose out in life’, an overwhelming 98 per cent of all students had disagreed. A negative response to this statement was marked as an indicator for closed mindedness over open mindedness. However, what it appears to reveal more was a collectivist mindset rather than an open or closed one. Incidentally, while 98 percent of respondents disagreed with that statement, a further majority (77 percent) also agreed with the statement ‘If I suffer a misfortune, I have usually brought it on myself in some way’. When elaborating on this statement, one student explained: ‘If I did not ask for advice from my parents or my family and then a bad thing happened, then of course, I brought it on myself! I see many friends make bad decisions and suffer because they do not discuss them, or they hide their actions from loved ones’.

During the home observations, it was clear to see where the students were developing such beliefs. At home, it was common with all the participating families to make decisions together. The development of the children in the household was a clear priority for all families observed, and their children’s education was taken extremely seriously. During exams, the whole family would adjust sleeping patterns, meal times and everyday lifestyles to suit the child undergoing important exams. Younger children were expected to fill in for their siblings in preparing the meals with their mother and other household chores. As one mother explained to her youngest child: ‘you do this now, and your sister will help you in your exams’. Fairness and justice was expressed in terms of sharing the weight with the promise that one’s time will come when the generosity will be returned.
This informal code of justice permeated much of the household during each of the observations. Each member of the family often shared problems, and even the children were well aware of issues concerning their parents and extended family. On one occasion during an observation, the family was notified by an extended member of the family (an aunt and sister of the mother) of a breakdown in an early marriage. Upon the news, plans were changed and the family that was observed sent their eldest son and daughter to intervene on the parents’ behalf until they could join the following evening. The son and daughter, as a duty to represent their family in the mediation, accepted their temporary roles. The attempts for mediation itself not only illustrated the closeness of the extended family in personal matters – something that was observed in all the home observations – but also the preparedness of the young adults to drop all existing plans in order to step-in and represent their parents further indicates the collectivist spirit that was commonly felt during the fieldwork.

While the students across the study typically displayed signs of collectivism, gender appeared to be differentiating variable. Individualist expressions did exist in the data collected during the interviews of both groups, but they only existed in the transcripts of the male participants. Female students from both groups did not express any individualistic values or attitudes, while some male students often contradicted other collectivist expressions with emphasis on and prioritisation of self-enhancement, expectations of individual rights, and expressions of independence and individuality. In fact, the male students were 32 percent more likely to express self-interest and independence than the female students according to the data gathered from the interviews alone. This likelihood only marginally increased when the national school students were only taken into account (34 percent more likely). Thus, there was a significant gender difference emerging in the way students across the sample mapped their futures and made decisions, and this difference was maintained for both the studied and control groups.

The female students were exclusively concerned with community, family and society. Despite this, often while many of the male students acknowledged interests in self enhancement and voiced decisions that they knew to be against
the interests of their family (for example, leaving Egypt to live abroad, or marrying a non-Egyptian) most justified their decisions later by insisting they would return to ‘pay their duty to their country’. For example, one male student from the international group explained: ‘I plan to leave to go to university abroad. I need to do this if I want to be successful. I know my family will not like it, but we cannot easily succeed in Egypt today, and if I stay, I will have to serve in the military, as I am the eldest son in my family. I will leave to avoid my involuntary service. I hope I can come back when I am successful and give back to my family and country’. Thus, though individualistic expressions were noted, few like this one were purely individualistic expressions.

Additionally, students appeared to be conscious of their collectivist values. When asked ‘what values do you think other countries share with Egypt?’, students responded by singling out ‘Western’ cultures as non-family oriented. As one female student from the international group believed: ‘the West and the East don’t share much [values]. They are like opposites actually! I guess we [the East/ Egyptians] are passionate about family and we express our love all the time. I know that the West is famous for not expressing love and family is not so important to Americans and Europeans’. Likewise, another student from the international group stated: ‘I have been to France and Belgium. They are cold and not so friendly. I think it is not their culture to have big families and keep them around all the time. In Egypt, we have big families and share everything together. Even when I marry, my parents will still be involved in many of choices. I think there are some other countries the same as us – like Greece and Italy. But the British, the French and the Americans? They are different’.

6.5 No, to cultural convergence; yes, to cultural polarisation?

Discussions in chapter five raised doubts about the cultural convergence theory and its validity. The findings thus far presented from this study suggest that while outwardly appearing to conform to a Westernised model of globalised youth culture, a more in depth study into the attitudes and personal sense of self among Egypt’s internationally educated youth suggests a much more localised orientation taking place.
The cultural convergence theory has not gone without criticism, despite its overwhelming popularity. An alternative scenario has been suggested by such critics that rather suggest a polarisation of cultures taking place as a result of greater flows of information and ideas through globalisation. This has been nicknamed by some as the ‘Taliban’ effect (Pearse, 2004; Barber, 1996; Friedman, 2000; Norris & Inglehart, 2009). The theory supports the literature that speaks of an increasingly interconnected world; economically, technologically, politically and socially. However, rather than documenting a convergence of ideas and cultures, theorists such as Pearse (2004) predict a process of conscious and active rejection by traditional societies. Cross-border information flows, in this theory, will more likely result in culture wars, predominantly between the global North and South as a result of a backlash against imported Western cultural products. The importation of values such as secularism, individualism, and consumerism will, according to such observers, encourage a return to tribalism in the Middle East and South-East Asia, turning their animosity towards symbols of Western liberalism such as the United States. Such tensions have been popularised by Barber’s and Freidman’s McWorld vs. Jihad and the Lexus and the Olive Tree as introduced in chapter five. Indeed, there can be no discussion of global cultural tensions without mention of Samuel Huntington’s (1996) provocative thesis that alluded to the assumed inevitable ‘Clash of Civilisations’ between Western cultures and other cultures.

In line with the polarisation thesis, exposure to the ‘other’ is believed to provoke countermeasures to reject foreign threats to the traditional culture. A commonly referenced example has been of the behaviour of the Taliban in Afghanistan after they gained control in the mid-1990s. The period resulted in active efforts by the regime to control all media and reduce any foreign influences entering the country. Cultural theorists have come to explain this backlash by suggesting that audiences have the capacity to reinterpret the content of messages that are imported into the country, consequently adjusting their meaning to local contexts and compromising the intended effect of the original message. In other words, they argue that people have the capacity to resist and reject certain messages they do not deem...
authentic to their local context, in the same way that individuals are able to critically read around official propaganda. This is particularly true, according to Norris and Inglehart (2009), when the messages in question reflect values and ideas that are culturally unacceptable to that audience. Consequently, this theory directly undermines the cultural convergence theory, arguing that in fact individuals have far more agency than a cultural convergence theory implies. People are capable of resisting the spread of a uniform Western or American culture, and there are plenty of examples of such resistance.

6.6 Are the findings supported by other large-scale studies?

The small-scale nature of this study restricts the temptation to make any broad conclusions of what these findings say about the state of Egyptian youth and their attitudes towards the pressing issues of the day. What is more, this study specifically sought to understand the identity construction and beliefs of a small stratum of society (the middle to upper classes) and in particular those educated at international schools, which remain in the minority in Egypt. Therefore this further limits the applicability of the findings to wider society. However, this research was partly motivated by the severe dearth in academic study into the views and voices of Arab youth, as well as the shortage of opinion surveys in the Middle East region more generally that focus on values and attitudes.

While no other study into the values and beliefs of Egyptian or Arab students in international, private education, has been done, there have been some high impact opinion surveys conducted in the region that can be of excellent use to this thesis in contextualising its observations. Two public surveys have been particularly useful: The World Values Survey and the ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey. Each survey has its own strengths and weaknesses in respect to its relevance to this thesis, and they each create challenges when attempting to cross-reference the findings with those from this thesis.

The World Values Survey, which began in 1981, studies changing values on social and political life around the world in around one hundred countries,
including Egypt. It is the largest cross-national study into human beliefs and values, and provides a useful resource for cross-referencing some of the themes relevant to this thesis. Wave six of the time-series survey investigations, which covers 2010-2014, is of particular relevance to this thesis as it coincides with the timing of the fieldwork. Many of the themes of the interviews for this study are reflected in the questions that were presented to 1,523 Egyptian participants during the sixth wave of the survey in Egypt. Timing is an important factor when attempting to aggregate data from across various surveys and fieldwork. This is because, when attempting to interpret expressed views and beliefs in a values-focused study, it is important to appreciate how coinciding events could impact participants’ views at the time of interacting. Views often change, as do beliefs, as many are driven by emotions as well as facts. Depending on when fieldwork takes place, certain events could have a significant impact on participants’ responses to certain topics and alter priorities in life. The bulk of the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted between April 2013 and September 2014. For Egypt, this was a particularly turbulent period, shortly following a military coup against a Muslim Brotherhood leadership that had gained a short term in power following the popular Arab-majority uprisings. During this period, domestic politics had left Egyptian society deeply polarised, with those supporting the democratic process and the elected Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammad Morsi, on the one hand, and others supporting the old guard, military, regime that symbolised continuity and stability for the country. Beyond Egypt, the region was also facing another Gaza bombardment by the Israeli government, as well as civil war turmoil mounting in Syria and Iraq, and the growth and spread of ISIS across Syria, Iraq, Libya and the Sinai Peninsula. Thus, this period for Egyptians, and the Middle East more generally, was acutely securitised. In highly securitised contexts, individuals and communities can often appear more insular or cautious, preferring smaller, more intimate groupings, which maximises safety through familiarity. Suspicion and conspiracy theories can especially run rife during deeply insecure periods, thus further exacerbating inwardness.
The annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey series, dating back to 2008, provides perhaps the most comprehensive insight to date on Arab youth and their attitudes to a range of regionally and globally relevant topics. Overall, the survey is based on 3,500 face-to-face interviews with Arab youth from 16 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Together, both surveys overcome the other’s weakness. While the World Values Survey does not focus on a young cohort, the findings can be reduced to Egypt-specific findings, which are of most relevance for this thesis. In turn, the Arab Youth Survey focuses entirely on a young cohort but it is not possible to distinguish the responses from Egyptian participants in all questions. Neither survey looks at education, or the type of education, as a variable across the sample. However, the findings from this study, though based on a small sample, can indicate how much the internationally educated students involved in this study correlate with national or regional opinion surveys.

Despite the value of acknowledging external opinion survey data in this study, the process of extrapolating the relevant data and asserting any meaning from it comes with significant challenges that are not unique to this study. When interpreting and presenting data from values surveys in general, it is always important to seek confirmation beyond headline findings. Often the headlines highlighting key findings are reduced for simplicity and thus can be misleading. It is critical that before interpreting the results, scrutiny must be applied to the phrasing of the questions put to the respondents. Generally, phraseology poses a problem in all cases where researchers put questions to multiple respondents and seek to draw trends from aggregated responses. This is because each individual may decode and interpret the same question in quite a different way, and it is not possible to guarantee that the meaning and intent of each question is understood consistently across the sample, and in the way intended by the researcher. Instead, those who design surveys will pose a series of questions to respondents, while assigning key indicators, which each question is believed to measure. Consequently, when extrapolating the data from the surveys, third parties should be aware that often one is restricted to the designers’ preconceived indicators, and that recorded confirmation of an indicator is
subject to a positive response to the pre-set questions. Understanding the science behind survey data collection is important, therefore, to accurately representing and extrapolating the data for external use.

When designing the questions for interview for the original fieldwork for this thesis, it was clear how phraseology could affect interpretation and thus the nature of the response. To overcome this, interviews were designed to repeat questions that sought the same indicator, but rephrased in order to account for any significant misinterpretation and thus contradictions in the responses. Therefore, the interview transcripts contained a surplus number of questions in order for variety in phrasing. This is also a common practice with surveys, but the same level of nuance is not always ascribed to each topic of questioning and surveys typically explore a wide variety of subject matters and indicators. Furthermore, due to the surplus number of questions (each phrased differently but seeking the same indicator), the total number of respondents per question is often much smaller than the aggregate sample size. This does not pose a problem for data that is presented qualitatively, but in survey data, responses are crucially quantified - usually by percentage proportion - and thus can be misleading if one assumes that the headline findings corresponds to a proportion of the total sample number. Such awareness was particularly important when extrapolating specific data from the World Values Survey, as often percentages of 'yes' and 'no' responses were presented, despite a particular question having only been asked to, for example, ten respondents. If one is not aware of this, the data can seem more significant and representative than it truly is.

Consequently, survey data has its weaknesses, and it cannot simply be introduced to validate the findings from the original fieldwork. Instead, one must be aware of the weaknesses inherent of survey data, present it responsibly, and use it cautiously to contextualise the qualitative data generated from the original methods of this thesis. This helps to develop the conversation and take it out of isolation of the specific research question of this thesis that explores identity, values and education type. Therefore the purpose of the following sections are to highlight commonalities in findings
across other studies, thereby situating the debate more deeply into pre-existing efforts to explore ideas and values that are relevant to this thesis.

**6.6.1 Traditional values and family**

Perhaps the most striking resemblance in the findings of the surveys and this study is that of the Egyptian youth’s attitudes towards traditional values and the influencers on their lives. The 2014 Arab Youth Survey found that a growing number of Arab youth were ‘embracing modern values’ compared to previous surveys. In 2011, the surveyors found that only 17 percent of youth said that traditional values are outdated, but that this had steadily increased to 40 percent by 2013, and 46 percent by 2014. The surveyors believed that the shift in attitudes had coincided with the rise in the use of social media, smart phones and the consequent exposure to new ideas and beliefs through international media.

However in Egypt, 57 percent of participants responded that traditional values meant a lot to them, and believed that they should be preserved for generations to come. This reflects many of the attitudes gleaned from this study of Egyptian students, who expressly embraced their traditional Egyptian values and held them in high esteem, such as the girls who, though highly ambitious, saw that their responsibilities were in the home. This was also evident in the World Values Survey, suggesting consistency in all three studies. For example, in response to the statement: ‘when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women’, a vast majority of the Egyptian participants agreed. Additionally, when presented with the statement, ‘Traditions are important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family’, and asked to rate the statement according to how much they related to it, 46.5 percent and 34 percent regarded it as ‘very much like me’ or ‘like me’. Participants also demonstrated conservative social attitudes that reflect traditional values when asked to do the same to the statement ‘I prefer to behave properly - avoid doing anything one might deem as wrong’, 38.9 percent rated it as ‘very much like me’ and 33.7 percent as ‘like me’, thus indicating a strong relationship to traditional lifestyles and beliefs.
Furthermore, the 2014 Arab Youth survey also found that though there had been a gradual decline in support for traditional values, youth were still turning to their family, parents and sometimes friends for influence on their lives. The survey found that when youth were asked to consider who their greatest influencers were on their lives and outlook on life, two thirds of young Arabs cited their parents, followed by 58 percent citing their family and 46 percent their friends. Religion was also firmly on the list of influencers for Arab youth according to the surveys, with 69 percent and 56 percent of responses in 2013 and 2014. This also correlates with the findings from the World Values Survey in Egypt, which found that family was considered very important to 97.4 percent of respondents, and religion to be very important to 94 percent of respondents. Similarly, in response to the statement ‘one of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud’, 77.1 percent agreed. The role of the family will be discussed further in the following chapter, but this strongly supports the findings from the interviews and the observations, which found family life and parents to be the strongest influencers in the students’ lives. It also reflects the recurring theme noted throughout this study of collectivist attitudes, with an emphasis on family and community.

6.6.2 Attitudes towards democracy

Another overlapping finding was the caution and pessimism attached to the concept of democracy. The 2014 survey found that Arab youth preferred stability above political, democratic, reform in the region, while the 2015 finding found that youth were uncertain whether democracy could ever work in the Middle East. It found that 39 percent agreed with the statement that ‘democracy will never work in the region’, while 36 percent believed it could and 25 percent were unsure. This was some way in line with the findings from the focus groups, where students expressed marked hostility towards the concept of democracy and some believed that a non-Western democratic framework that suits the local culture could be a more suitable alternative.
For example, though the Egyptian students of international schools had positive things to say about democracy during the focus groups, many believed there was a choice between democracy and stability, and that it was an alien concept to the Muslim world. They were adamant that secular politics could never work in a region where ‘Islam is at the heart of the culture’. However, many students were also against any reform that placed Islamists in power and imposed Islamic law. This did create some debate during the focus groups. Even the students who were opposed to political reform towards Islamist ideals believed that if Islamic law were to be executed properly then it could be the basis for a local vision of democracy. However, as one student said, echoing the sentiments of his peers, ‘there is no one on the earth left to interpret sharia law [Islamic law] fairly’. The students believed that ‘Western countries’ would still not recognise it as democracy because it is not ‘Western democracy’. Such comments betrayed both a belief that Western countries hold a great say on the direction of the development of their country, but also a cynicism towards Western intervention and its agenda towards the region. Despite such cynicism, as in the ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Surveys, some students in the focus groups and interviews believed that political reform would help many of the countries in the region. Women’s rights were seen as important, but not the priority by many of the students, including among the female students. Some students felt that Egypt was one of the best countries for women’s rights. Girls argued during the focus groups that in Egypt women are able to leave their home without wearing a headscarf, and compared this freedom to women in Saudi Arabia and Iran, whom they felt lacked basic rights for women. One female student admitted that: ‘I cannot comment on women equality at work and in politics because I have not experienced this stage my life’, but, she affirmed: ‘for sure, Egyptian women are freer than women in the rest of Africa and the Gulf’.

Women equality may not have been a controversial subject for discussion but other equalities were. During one focus group, one of the Coptic students raised the problem of minority groups being mistreated as second-class citizens in their own country. The Coptic student felt that there should be no official religious identity in Egypt, because it gives too much power to
‘Salafi’ Egyptians who wish to ‘intimidate’ non-Muslims. Many of the Muslim students strongly expressed their agreement to this belief, with one student saying, ‘it is our responsibility as Muslims to protect our Christian neighbours’. The word ‘protect’ in this context was interesting, as it still did not place any recognition of Christian Egyptians as equal citizens but as protected people.

Some contradictory views were also gleaned from the World Values Survey when covering the topic of political reform and democracy. While 70 percent of Egyptian participants saw the introduction of a democratic system as ‘very good’, 71 percent also saw that ‘having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections’ as ‘very good’. This shows a conflict in defining and understanding democracy, which could explain some of the contradicting responses. However, what each study shows, including the focus groups for this thesis, is that the concept of democracy in Egypt and the region, irrespective of type of schooling, is highly contested and ambiguous. When asked to rank the importance of elections in a democracy, there was no definitive answer from the participants in the World Value Survey and this was a repeated theme in all of the democracy-related questions during the focus groups and interviews. International school students appeared no more confident on this matter and terminology than the Egyptian national school students.

6.6.2 Nationalism

Expressions of nationalism were not tested in the Arab Youth Survey but did feature in the World Values Survey. As with the findings from this thesis, respondents demonstrated strong national patriotism. When asked ‘How proud are you to be Egyptian’, an overwhelming majority responded positively, with 63.5 percent choosing ‘very proud’ and 33 percent choosing ‘quite proud’. Similarly, when asked if one would fight for one’s country if war broke out, 65.4 percent said ‘yes’. In line with the findings from the interviews for this thesis, this contrasted with their attitudes to global citizenship. When asked to agree or disagree if they see themselves as a ‘World Citizen’, the majority disagreed, with 59.4 percent either disagreeing
or strongly disagreeing, while 60.8 percent saw themselves as ‘part of my local community’. Respondents also displayed distrust towards multilateral agencies when asked to rate their confidence and trust in the United Nations, the majority said either ‘none at all’ with 66.6 percent, or ‘not very much’ with 23.3 percent. This was similar to the attitudes expressed by the students in this study during the focus groups, who each preferred to refer to allies in unilateral terms. In fact, in the 2014 Arab Youth Survey, respondents considered their biggest allies to be their regional neighbours over Western countries, according to the survey. Saudi Arabia ranked the highest in the list of greatest allies. This matched many of the responses from the focus groups of this study.

Similarly, in the 2014 Youth survey, the authors remarked that an entrepreneurial spirit was high and that an increased number of Arab youth hoped to work in the private sector. This fits closely with the students’ attitudes in this study towards foreign language and gaining qualifications that will give them a competitive advantage when they leave school and seek employment. The survey also indicated that the Gulf was an increasingly popular destination for other Arab youth in the region. During the interviews of Egyptian students—nationally and internationally educated—the UAE came up a number of times as destinations for employment.

Also in line with the findings from this study, the 2015 Youth survey revealed that Arab youth viewed the Arabic language as centrally important to their identity. In fact, 73 percent of Arab youth felt this way, but almost half said it was losing its value in the competitive market. The surveyors found that 63 percent of respondents felt that ‘knowing English can advance one’s career more than knowing Arabic’. All the students from this study believed that foreign languages were important but also believed Arabic to be of high value to their lives, using it more than they do English. This was irrespective of whether the students were state educated or internationally educated.

The inward-facing attitudes can be further illustrated from the findings of the World Values Survey that saw respondents distrusting other nationalities. In response to the question: ‘How much do you trust people of other
nationalities, 46.6 percent responded ‘not at all’ while an additional 36.8 percent responded ‘not very much’. The questions used in his study were not as explicit as those presented in the Values Survey, but similar trends did develop with my own participants. However, whenever asked to agree or disagree with the statement, ‘Communicating with those of different worldviews, beliefs or cultures to me is enjoyable’, 41 percent of the students from the internationally educated group disagreed. Similarly, when presented with the statement, ‘it is much more important to learn about my own worldview before learning about other peoples’, a majority of the students in both cohorts (64 percent) agreed. Students from this study admitted to not having much interaction with people from different cultures, and their responses to these questions reflect this. In response to the statement, ‘I have recently spoken to someone with a different worldview, belief or culture to me’, an overwhelming 82 percent agreed.

The 2009 and 2010 Arab Youth surveys also looked at the youths’ attitudes to global citizenship. They found that the feeling of a global identity regardless of ethnic, religious or national background was increasingly relatable for many youth in the region, particularly in Lebanon, Qatar, Oman and Iraq. But the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt paid less importance to this notion in 2010 in comparison to 2009. Only 24 percent of Egyptian youth rated global citizenship as important to them, which was a decrease from a score of 42 percent in 2009. This was still higher than what was found in this study, where only six students identified with ‘global’ as a relatable term for his or her identity.

Arab youth were also found to look close to home for inspiration, and found themselves more influenced by those who were from their country or from the region. In the 2013 Youth survey, only 6 percent said that writers from the West influenced them strongly, and just 7 percent felt to be influenced by Western political figures. In responses to the survey, Arab youth displayed strong national pride and a sense of national identity. This finding certainly overlaps with the impression gathered from this study into Egyptian students, which will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.
6.7 Conclusions

By comparing some of the findings of the large-scale surveys to the findings from this study, it is clear that there were some significant recurring trends. More research needs to be conducted on the attitudes and opinions of youth in the region in order for there to be a greater discussion into the generalisability and validity of the findings. However, it is clear that ideas of nationalism are stronger than one might expect in a generation of an increasingly globalised world. What is more, the urban youth are increasingly finding a balance between their modern interests and their appreciation for their heritage, but what this study suggests is that material engagement with other cultures rarely means disengagement with their own.

The external surveys suggested a growing trend of young people being connected to new ideas and beliefs through the Internet and social media, and smart phones mean that they are always connected to the online world. This was raised as an emerging influence on the youths’ outlook on life. It is an important change that must be acknowledged not just in the region, but globally too. And it is equally important to understand in relation to formal education and the role classrooms still play in a competing space for knowledge transfer.

One of the implications of this study was the little difference found between the nationally educated Egyptian students and the internationally educated Egyptian students on many views and positions. It could suggest that though education was treated as the independent variable in this study, formal education may not markedly determine the youths’ opinions and beliefs as it once did. Perhaps the gatekeepers of knowledge are no longer schools and teachers.

The polarisation thesis may go some way to explaining how exposure to Western cultural products, such as international schools and British and American inspired curricula, has not appeared to have had a particularly noticeable impact on the attitudes and values of the students. While their outward appearance and consumer behaviour gave them more in common
with American and European youth, their values link them to, rather than distinguish them from, their Egyptian compatriots.

However, this assumes that international education is an effective cultural product, as is widely regarded of, for example, the media. The effect of international media as a source of cross-border information flows on societies has been widely acknowledged and explored academically, far more so than the effects of international education on host societies. However, there are a lot of parallels that could make the discussions and debates on the role of the media in globalisation applicable to this thesis too. While the cultural convergence thesis has, in the literature on the media, afforded more supporters, the polarisation thesis has gained traction (Zedillo, 2008; Norris & Inglehart, 2009). However what they have failed to find is systematic evidence from public opinion surveys that can support or refute whether people living in countries such as Egypt, who are regularly exposed to the cross-border flows of information and popular entertainment, absorb and apply the modern (Western) values that travel through the media, such as is argued through the convergence theory. Crucially, does such a process impact values or trust in and accommodation of other nations?

Like the media, international education is a cultural product, and the asymmetrical flow of education trade as an exported foreign product and service means that the flow of ideas and information is directly linked to the disproportionate exportation from the global North to the South. In the literature on cosmopolitanism and globalisation, academics often allude to a social class divide when assessing the effects of the flow of ideas through common markets. Norris and Inglehart (2009) raise this point well, arguing that when measuring the effects of globalisation and cosmopolitan communication, matters are complicated by the fact that both convergence and polarisation can occur simultaneously across different social cohorts. Consequently, the affluent governing elites and intellectuals are typically said to ‘share a similar weltanschauung to their counterparts living in Europe or North America.’ (Norris & Inglehart, 2009, p. 4). In this respect, tensions
can arise between the assumed cosmopolitan elite and the more tradition-oriented and conservative groups living in less affluent rural communities.

Though logical, this is based on an assumption with no particular evidence to support it. This study, having focused the research on the affluent upper and middle classes and the Egyptian elite within that cohort, suggests that evidence does not support the assumption that the elite are more cosmopolitan in their values and beliefs. Thus in answer to the central question of the thesis, ‘has an international education resulted in a more cosmopolitan identity?’ it appears that the ability of an international education to penetrate the latent layers of acculturation - the values and beliefs - has been marginal.

Thus, questions remains: why might an international education not contribute more decidedly towards a development of international mindedness among the participants of this study? Does it suggest a broader problem with the concept of international mindedness, or has the role of education in shaping values and identities been over-emphasised in the socialisation literature? This is the focus of the following, and final, chapter as it attempts to critically assess theories of globalisation, cosmopolitanism and education in light of the study’s findings.
Chapter 7 - Firewalls against Education for Global Citizenship

The late Edward W. Said, fluent in English, French and Arabic, was educated in the Western canon as a student under colonial education in the Middle East. In his memoirs, he recalls of his years at Alexandria's Victoria College:

The school's first rule, emblazoned on the opening page of the handbook, read: ‘English is the language of the school; students caught speaking any other language will be punished.’ Yet, there were no native speakers of English among the students. Whereas the masters were all British, we were a motley crew of Arabs of various kinds, Armenians, Greeks, Italians, Jews and Turks, each of whom had a native language that the school had explicitly outlawed. Yet all, or nearly all, of us spoke Arabic - many spoke Arabic and French - and so we were able to take refuge in a common language, in defiance of what we perceived as an unjust colonial stricture. (Said, 2000; pp. 556-57)

Despite a Western education, Said became known for his hostile posture towards Western intervention in the Middle East, and was famed for his cultural critique of Western Orientalism of the Arab, Muslim world (Said, 1978). He was eloquent in his criticism and disdain for the false cultural representations with which the Western world came to perceive the region and its people, and he accused the West of ‘crude’, ‘essentialised’, ‘Eurocentric prejudice’ (Said, 1978). Said’s privileged education had not made him an advocate for the West’s culture and values, but in his own words, as above, it triggered a spirit of defiance that went on to suffuse his subsequent academic work.

As with Said, the expectation that international school educated Egyptians in Egypt would be more cosmopolitan and pro-West than their nationally educated counterparts was grossly over simplistic. We know through chapter four that international education was partly introduced in order to foster global minds, extend the ‘imagined community’, and build future generations who saw the world beyond territories, tribes, race, and nations (Hayden &
Thompson, 1995). Yet the students in this study, of national and international schools, displayed greater nationalistic sentiment than they did signs of cosmopolitan affiliation, and it was clear to see that values, identity and beliefs are more multi-layered than the market-driven, consumer analyses that dominate literature on globalisation suggest.

In this final chapter a critical examination of the theories on cultural globalisation, cosmopolitanism and the role of education will be conducted in light of the findings from this study. It will explore whether expressions of national identity and traditional values suggest an inherent incapacity for supranational or cosmopolitan identities to replace national identity, and whether the role of education has been over-emphasised in the literature on socialisation. It will be argued that when placed into an international context, or forced into geographical ambiguity, the power of education in cultivating identity and a set of values is crucially undermined.

7.1 Limitations of education and socialisation theory

The Egyptian international school educated students in this study showed little variation in their identity construction to their nationally educated counterparts. Like their peers in state schools, international school educated Egyptians spoke Arabic in the home and with their friends; foreign languages were seen as a skill for employment not for cultural exploration. They were immensely proud of their Egyptian heritage, and if that meant to be critical or derogatory of other countries or communities, their unique educational environment had not appeared to immunise them from harbouring and expressing such prejudicial views. Their views of the West were deeply conflicting - at times the West reflected progress and something to aspire to, while often it was referred to by the students as a homogenous bloc, through a binary ‘us and them’ narrative and was deeply distrusted. Their international school educational experiences appeared not to have challenged those ideas and they harboured overtly negative sentiments towards British, American and European foreign policy towards the Middle East. The majority of the students were noticeably more favourable towards Russia as a friend to the region than Britain or the United States. In fact,
international school educated Egyptians appeared at times to be comparatively more patriotic than their nationally educated peers. They were defensive about Egypt and romanticised its role in the region.

Perhaps as a consequence of such sentiments, the students did not feel part of a global community - at least not an equal member of one. They were proof of intercultural learning taking place on this planet, but they lived within its limits. International education was seen by the students and the families to be a vehicle for employment in a globalised world, but there was a conscious effort towards preserving their identity and traditions. Religion, as this and other studies show, was seen as their moral compass and a reliable constant in their lives.

For the students of this study, global mindedness thus existed purely in economic terms. Politically, socially, and culturally, the students were Egyptian, Muslim, and Coptic, and their imagined community was nationally framed, and at most regionally extended. What the findings discussed in chapters seven and eight suggest is that the relationship between formal education and identity is a consensual one between the consumer and the service provider, and that an international, or Western-oriented education does not necessarily translate into a more international, or Western, orientation. The findings question how central formal education is in determining a person’s outlook on life, but the theories on this maintain that education is important to socialisation. Perhaps then, it is not the content of education alone, but rather the conditions that complement the content of that education that determine how influential school is to an individual.

Decades, or even centuries, of education and socialisation theory have been based on a model of national education systems and their importance to informing and shaping national citizenship to a nation-state (Durkheim, 1956; Dewey, 1966; Webber, 2011). Many such theories have been uncritically applied and repurposed in our conception of education for a cosmopolitan mindedness and global citizenship, in preparation for an imagined post-national future (Young, 1971; Bordieu & Apple, 1996, Bates, 1980). Yet, by
proposing the existence of competing firewalls that undermine the extent of international education for cosmopolitanism, such wholesale reapplications of education and socialisation literature in the context of international education will be questioned. It is argued here that a series of social and cultural barriers (firewalls), according to this thesis, likely had been masked when constructing theories of education and socialisation within the national and local context, but is plain to see when placing education within the international context.

Though few who have formed and contributed to the body of literature relevant to this thesis have sought to contradict present theories on education, socialisation, and the pattern of cultural convergence, the works of Norris and Inglehart (2009) support the findings. While examining the role of cosmopolitan mass media communications on societies, they found a similar trend to that found in this study. Using the World Values Survey results from the mid-1990s to 2007, Norris and Inglehart (2009) argued that interpretations of the survey responses suggest that the polarisation thesis is a more accurate account of cultural change through cosmopolitan exchanges than the convergence thesis (also see Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 133). They found an increasing global divergence in religiosity, with richer societies typically proving to be more secular in their values and practices, and an expanding gap in global attitudes towards gender equality between post-industrial societies and developing nations. They concluded that, irrespective of the importation of foreign cultural products, (in their case: media; in this context: imported international education) the imprint of traditions, such as those values and beliefs found in predominantly Protestant, Catholic and Muslim societies, are typically preserved in the face of social modernisation, even when the centrality and importance of religious practices have faded (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, 2009; Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

This suggests that national identity, values, and lifestyles are more deeply rooted and resistant to change as a result of global culture than is widely assumed. Knowledge of the world reaches the individual in today’s age through multiple sources of information. Benedict Anderson argued that
national cultures and other similar collective identities are shaped by a powerful mélange of common histories, shared languages and entrenched religious traditions that have persisted for centuries (Anderson, 1996). Socialisation theories in the literature have also long insisted that once values and beliefs are acquired early in life from deeply personal interactions with parents and family, teachers and spiritual authorities, and the wider community in which one lives, such formative experiences persist for a lifetime. Subsequent engagement with media, or indeed a re-learning process through formal education, can be too fleeting to shake such enduring core values and beliefs (Grusec & Hastings, 2007). In other words, education is but one of many agents of socialisation and it by no means is the most valuable to an individual. Similarly, education forms only part of a broader learning process through which values are constructed and tested.

7.2 Education’s role in shaping values and identities: is it overemphasised?

This research began with the conviction that education was a powerful socialising instrument for those who had the ability to control it. Within a national context, the local political elite has been the agent of knowledge (Guiherme, 2002). This has had implications for subjects such as history, literature, civics, the language of instruction, and religious studies (Giroux, 1992; Guilherme, 2002). These are the subjects that shape a nation’s culture, create a sense of shared history and identity, while always seeking to guide the student towards a conception of good citizenship. Political scientists who have sought to understand modernisation and social politics have treated education as a variable with transformative potential (Vatikiotis, 1991; Hourani, 2013; Cook, 2000). In line with this, the research conducted for this thesis also viewed education through such a lens.

However, the results have shown that Egyptian students of Egypt’s international schools expressed notably similar attitudes and values to their nationally educated compatriots. This is despite each having been educated in markedly different educational environments and philosophies. What it suggests is that education has not been as definitive a factor in determining
the attitudes and cultural orientations of the recipients as education and socialisation theory would indicate. Does this then suggest that education is overrated in its potential to cultivate attitudes and instill values in those who are on the receiving end of it? Or are there simply important preconditions to support the learning process towards national or post-national consciousness?

In truth, broad conclusions cannot be made on the basis of a small-scale study. What is more, ideas and attitudes are transient; they are marked in the moment of a particular interaction between one and another. Consequently, if the subjects were studied again with the same questions, it is entirely plausible that their answers would differ according to their mood and their circumstances in any given time. As such, it is with great caution that any firm assertions are made as a result of these largely unexpected findings. However, the trends do appear to suggest that the students who were enrolled in international schools were not displaying strong affinities to Western, or other, cultures and neither did they consider themselves international, global or cosmopolitan. Instead, their national identities and religious affinities were just as strong as the nationally educated students, and at times they presented more patriotic sentiments towards their country.

Is it therefore possible that our understanding of education and its relationship with identity is too closely allied to Western philosophical notions of the consolidation of modern nation-states, which insist education is a socialising force? Have such convictions resulted in assumptions that values and identity can be formally and systematically cultivated through school? It is through these fundamental questions that I argue that the inherent limits of education as a corrective, socialising, instrument becomes marginal when placed in a multicultural context.

The theories of education and socialisation discussed in chapter three were based on a premise that education was administered on a local, national level; that the curriculum was culturally crafted to reflect the society in which it sought to influence (Anderson, 1983). Consequently, has our understanding of education in identity and value construction been obscured
by the fact that it is only ever evaluated within a culturally at-home context? If this is so, is education only effective at socialising students when its content complements the sentiments, beliefs and practices of wider society? If so, it is not the curriculum that makes schools a valuable instrument for carving beliefs and attitudes. Rather, it is the combination of contributing factors in a person’s daily life that all work harmoniously toward a unified message, reinforced through their formal education. For education to have any role in an individual’s process of identity formation, it must work in harmony with other influencing forces in the person’s life.

The firewalls outlined in this chapter are in no way exhaustive, but they are based on specific observations from the original findings of this thesis. The premise of the thesis is that predisposed firewalls may restrict the acquisition of new, foreign, ideas being seriously considered by an individual. This is particularly likely if these ideas go against endured and deeply entrenched values that are engrained in an individual’s everyday culture (Liebes & Katz, 1993). Such notions form the basis of this critical examination of the literature.

When conceiving the hypothesis that international school educated Egyptian students would show more signs of cosmopolitanism than their nationally educated peers, formal education and its ability to shape and re-shape values and beliefs was perhaps overemphasised. Though reflective of the literature, the hypothesis was rooted in a Western perspective of school and society. It was thus underestimated how powerful alternative influences, such as family and the home, are in shaping people’s attitudes and forming a firm value-base, which may not always complement international curricula. This leads to the first firewall that has been identified from the findings and observations: the family.

7.3 Firewall one: the family

While the observation of families in their home served as supplementary to the interviews and focus groups, it became an important feature when analysing the significance of the findings, and exploring certain contributive
conditions to help explain unexpected results. The home observations put into context many of the views and beliefs the students had expressed during their interviews and the focus groups, including their collectivistic attitudes and their embrace of traditional and religious values.

The family home was found to be a sanctuary for traditional practices and values and all six families balanced modern lifestyles with traditional customs in their homes. These traditional customs were both religiously and culturally derived. The coexistence of traditional values and modern practices was reminiscent of a distinction made in chapter seven whereby students appeared Western and modern in their dress and consumer behaviour, but presented more complex attitudes towards traditions and Egyptian culture when probed. In the home, this balance was visual and tangible.

All families observed in the study had contemporary modern appliances and technology in the home, including Internet and personal electronic equipment such as Apple iphones, ipads, and laptops. All the families had satellite television, providing access to a range of international service channels. Some of these technologies served religious purposes. For example, one of the Muslim families observed had a clock that was connected to the Internet that called to prayer five times a day and displayed prayer times around the world. Another Muslim family had toilets fitted with automatic ‘halal’ washing facilities, using water to provide the full Islamic cleansing ritual.

Traditional daily rituals were closely and frequently observed in homes of participants. A common Egyptian family tradition on Fridays saw families take a large breakfast together of beans, eggs and cheese. Some families saw elder members circulate the home with bokhour (an Egyptian cultural tradition rather than religious tradition) or incense, to rid the home of evil eye. The Muslim families where this was observed also recited Quranic verses while dousing each member with the smoke from the incense.
In preparation for an upcoming family celebration, the researcher observed a mother in one family arrange a trip to a local seamstress to design tailor-made outfits for the occasion. Though most of the girls wore high-street clothing, they followed tradition for evening wear by visiting the local cloth merchants in the *souk* and finding a tailor to design dresses or suits. This is a common and traditional custom in Egypt not just reserved for the wealthy in society. It is a service enjoyed by Egyptians of all backgrounds, and there are local tailors suited to different social classes.

At times, in some homes, the balance between traditions and modern lifestyles appeared to be consciously mastered. In the kitchen, wives and maids prepared the food for dinner through a combination of modern and traditional methods. When preparing an iconic Egyptian soup made from fresh green leaves, known in Arabic as *mulakhaya*, the women of the household cut the leaves with a sharp traditional curved two-handled knife, rather than blend them in a machine. The traditional method is popular even today as it is believed to be the best way to prepare the leaves despite there being a more convenient method available in modern kitchens. This was a recurrent theme in the kitchens of all the families.

Families typically ate dinner together between four and six in the afternoon, as is customary in Egypt. At this time, traditional gender roles were observed, where mothers prepared the meals, and daughters were expected to help in the preparation and tidying after meal times. Sons were exempt from such tasks, reinforcing traditional gender roles. Gender-specific parental responsibilities were also observed equally across the families. Fathers were the main earners in the family, and most of the mothers worked part-time and were professionals, yet were dominant on all family matters. They were also responsible for the up-keep of the house, and mothers made a clear effort to engage their daughters in preparation for their future roles as mothers and wives.

The décor and layout of the homes also indicated that the families conformed to middle-class Egyptian lifestyles. A typical indicator of this was the layout in all the family homes that included a *saloon*, or separate living
room space, exclusively for hosting guests. This was a separate room to the family living room, and it was furnished with a variety of gold-gilded, elaborate furniture in French renaissance style of traditional Egyptian taste. Traditionally, new wives are gifted with such furniture by the new in laws as a valuable contribution to the couple’s new home. Similarly, all six of the families observed in the study displayed religiously symbolic décor around the home, including crosses and crucifixes in the homes of the Coptic family observed, and mushafs or Quranic scripture in the homes of Muslim families. These were proudly displayed in most of the rooms of the home, including in many of the children’s rooms. These details suggested, at the minimum, a cultural observance of their faith and an attachment to their religious identity.

In addition, an observation of active faith was common with all the families. Practices and rituals included daily prayers, expressions of faith during times of welcoming guests, as well as times of exclamation in speech. One mother was observed telling her children before embarking on their homework to invoke God’s assistance. Mothers of all families, including of the Coptic family, oversaw their daughters’ dress and there were regular interventions observed by the mothers with regards to the religiously appropriate nature of clothing. Sometimes the sons in the family also criticised their sisters for wearing clothing deemed too revealing. At the dinner table, most of the families thanked God for the food they were blessed with, and on Fridays, the Muslim families saw the men in the household attend the jumuah or congregational prayers.

Such observations illustrate the respect for traditions in the students’ home lives. There was no questioning their deep commitment to their Egyptian roots when witnessing the dynamics in their home. Had the home observations not featured in the study, it is unlikely that the level of conservatism in their everyday lives would be accurately documented. It is, however, arguably the most important feature in attempting to account for the unexpected results. Students may spend proportionately more active time at school than at home, but their home life of those observed did not appear to complement or promote cosmopolitan, liberal attitudes and values.
Socialisation theories do identify family and parenting as one of the foundational factors that determine the direction of socialisation in an individual, and this in turn is recognised in the literature on education (Dewey, 1966; Girouz, 1991; Giroux & McLaren, 1989; Bordieu & Apple, 1996; Guilherme, 2002). However, in the context of national education, the role of the family is implied as reinforcing and complementary to the national curriculum (Anderson, 1983; 1991; Weber, 1976; Soysal, 2002; Manitz, 2004). The spirit of the nation lives in the family, after all, particularly through generations that may have received similar, if not an identical, curriculum.

Theories of education and socialisation, however, do not account for the occasions when the child’s curriculum does not match the parent’s values and beliefs, and do not represent their everyday practices at home. The evidence from the literature on Third Culture Kids (TCKs) would suggest that when exposed and educated via competing cultures (their parents’ versus the school’s culture), students develop a ‘third culture’ and cease to belong entirely in their parents’ culture or the culture of their educational experience (Itler & Sisler, 2012; Useem, 1999).

Further research is needed to better understand the nature of the relationship between parent and student when curricula are new, or foreign, to the family. Indeed, the literature on TCKs is neither sufficiently conclusive, often based on anecdotal evidence, and nor is it entirely applicable in this case. Third Culture Kids, unlike host-national students of international schools, are brought up in a cultural context different from their parents’, while the latter are raised in the same cultural context of their heritage but educated according to an alternative culture. The processes of socio-cultural adaptation that occurs among international-educated students vis-à-vis their family thus remains understudied.

Undoubtedly there are various scenarios that potentially occur when children are educated in liberal, Western philosophies, and their parents in conservative non-Western philosophies. As with second and third generation children of immigrant families in North America and Europe, often the child’s hybrid identity and culture influences the parents over time, by challenging
many of their conservative beliefs. However, in these cases, where Western values are at home in a Western culture, the forces for change are multifaceted, and are thus more powerfully felt. However, when Western values attempt to survive in an educational format within a non-Western culture, as is the case of international curricula in Egypt, it is likely to be far less plausible for the minority in the family to override the majority in the family, and the society on the whole, especially in a culture where elders are held with upmost respect.

Parents are important to a child’s growth in any culture, and when asked who their greatest influences and role models were in their lives, all students in this study identified a parent or family member. Thus, in order to understand the children’s views and their values, it is essential to understand their families’. Most importantly, it is necessary to understand what the parents’ motives were for sending their child to an international school in the first place. All parents, when asked, noted pragmatic reasons for sending their child to an international school in their country. Securing the best education available to allow their child to be competitive when seeking employment, to gain foreign languages that will increase their chances of employment in competitive industries, and to have an internationally recognised qualification so that their child always has the choice to live abroad, were recurring considerations. The parents’ reasons were reflected in the students’ attitudes towards the importance of foreign languages, as they all enthusiastically acknowledged the employment benefits of bilingualism during their interviews. Therefore, not only had the parents’ dominant motives for enrolling their children in international schools influenced their child’s perception of the importance of their education, but also ideological motives had not featured in either the parents’ or the children’s justifications for an international education.

Similarly, of all the parents interviewed, the vast majority expressed concerns of their child one day losing touch with their heritage and their ‘Eastern’, ‘Arab’ or ‘Egyptian’ roots as a result of not being educated in state schools. They expressed hope that their children would maintain a good
relationship with their culture, and believed that their home-life contributed greatly to guaranteeing this outcome.

It is thus logical that formal education can be only as effective as far as the home-life supports it. Where the family supports the development of foreign language skills, the students will thrive on foreign language skills. Conversely, where the family is hesitant, the child will be too, due in large part to any counter-conditioning occurring in the home. International schools are particularly vulnerable to this as they are educational institutions that are, irrespective of the prestige attached to them by locals, still considered alien or foreign.

This leads to the second suggested firewall. International schools and the ideas that they promote can operate within a ‘bubble’, contained and easily placed into the periphery of a student’s everyday life if its messages and learning objectives contrast so distinctly from his or her reality. Thus, students’ opportunities to apply a pluralistic worldview in everyday life can become extremely limited, and eventually, it is argued, hinder the learning process.

7.4 Firewall two: contextual relativity of the learning objectives

As in chapter two, a cosmopolitan, international education seeks to weaken the visceral appeal of nationalism; promoting understanding and tolerance of foreigners, and expressing support for the institutions and policies of global governance and multilateral bodies. It supposedly achieves this through holistic teaching and learning strategies that, generally, according to Hill (2000):

- Contain course content that provides an international perspective;
- Recognises that the world is increasingly interdependent;
- Provides activities that bring students into contact with people of other cultures;
• Creates a context for world peace by providing opportunities for many cultures to learn together in mutual understanding and respect. (Hill, 2000).

Learning goals, such as those outlined above, clearly define what it is that the curriculum is expecting students to take from their education and achieve at various stages of their learning. However, translating a goal into reality is rarely an easy task, and standards and goals are far too often ambiguous and all encompassing (Gandal and Vranek 2001). Desirable outcomes require explicit learning techniques. Learning, according to Skelton (2002), is a combination of ‘knowledge’, ‘skills’, and ‘understanding’.

To illustrate, in order to understand the culture of a different country, one needs knowledge about that country and the ability to apply, compare and contrast such knowledge with the knowledge of other cultures. What this means for international curricula design is that it needs to move ideas of international mindedness and cosmopolitanism out of the abstract and conceptual and into the practical, real world. As Skelton (2002) argues, focusing on ‘teaching for understanding and tolerance’ as a defining feature of international curriculum ignores the need to nest both knowledge and skills within the global mindedness paradigm. In other words, students should not simply be taught to understand and tolerate diversity as a principle, but must also be educated on the knowledge of other cultures, and the skills to apply that knowledge and understanding in their lives. Otherwise, as Skelton (2002) argues, education for international mindedness, no matter how compelling and ideal, remains in the abstract.

Learning objectives are thus more likely to remain in the abstract if conditions do not enable the application of skills and knowledge. Contextual relativity as a second firewall is then the host environment of the curriculum. The extent to which pluralism and diversity is supported outside of the school is a determining factor to the ability to apply skills and knowledge, and thus the efficacy of the curriculum overall.
All students in this study, when asked about their social circles and the diversity of backgrounds within their group of friends, wished they had more access to different cultures. When presented with a set of statements, students felt that their lives were not multicultural enough, and therefore disagreed with statements that suggested that they had regular interaction with other cultures. For example, all 43 students disagreed with the statement, ‘I frequently see clothing, art or hear music from different religions or cultures in the areas where I live’. When asked where students feel they are most likely to meet people from different cultures, students from the international schools felt that school was their greatest chance. Students from the national schools did not believe schools were places in which they were likely to come across non-Egyptians, but felt that tourist areas and sometimes sports clubs or naadys were more likely.

All students also agreed with the statement, ‘communicating with those of different worldviews, beliefs or cultures to me is enjoyable’. However, the majority of both international school educated students and nationally educated students expressed a lack of confidence in talking to someone from another country. In fact, almost an equal proportion of both sets of students disagreed with the statement, ‘I am confident talking to someone from another country or culture’. When asked why they thought they lacked confidence, students mentioned language barriers as well as cultural barriers as their main concerns. A majority of students also did not feel they had many real life experiences of interacting with different cultures, worldviews and beliefs. Again, it appeared to make little difference which schooling experience they had had. In addition, only 6 percent of the total sample - all from the international schooling group - had lived somewhere aside from where they lived now in Egypt and with a different language or culture. This showed how minimal their opportunities had been to see beyond Egypt and interact with members of other cultures. It reminds us of how limited schooling for global mindedness can be when the reality is that most local students will not have left Egypt during the course of their education.

The students’ lack of experience with other cultures and beliefs began to show as they continued responding to the statements put to them. When presented with the statement, ‘I can present my own beliefs effectively to people with other
worldviews, beliefs and cultures’, an overwhelming majority had disagreed. When asked why they disagreed, one international school educated student said they had never tried, so would likely not be very good at first. Another student said: ‘no one has ever asked me to do so. We are always the listeners of other people’s views, beliefs and cultures’. Overall, most students disagreed with the statement because an opportunity had never arisen.

When asked to respond to the statement, ‘everyone who belongs to a particular worldview, belief or culture will all believe the same thing’, almost half of the internationally trained students agreed to this statement, suggesting an overwhelming failure to understand the concepts of diversity. Furthermore, 80 per cent of all the students agreed with the statement, ‘I feel uncomfortable when I don’t know what the truth is’. Over half of the international students also agreed that ‘it is much more important to learn about my own worldview before learning about other people’s.’

Therefore, despite an interest in different cultures and an overall projection of open-mindedness throughout the interviews, most students presented some close-minded attitudes that at times contradicted previous statements. It was clear that most international school students, despite their educational setting, were not confident in engaging in multicultural settings on a social level due to a lack of knowledge and skills. It helps explain why, in chapter six, so few students selected ‘global’ and ‘international’ from the list of identity terms most relatable to their lives. If students felt unable to transfer their educational experiences outside of school, it is not surprising that they did not regard themselves as ‘global’ or ‘international’.

The importance of moving the learning process and techniques beyond a simple understanding is supported by the home observations. The students’ perceptions of their ability to meet and interact with other cultures were very accurate. For all of the families observed, there was very little opportunity to interact with even local communities other than their own. Despite the students having referred to their social circles as mixed, from different religious or ethnic communities, their home life saw minimal such interaction. One family’s only interaction with a member of another religious community
during the period of observation was their Coptic *maqwagi*, or ironing man, who came twice a week. Another family offered their home for private lessons two times a week, where their child’s colleagues would come to attend the private lesson by a tutor. For this family, this was one of the rare occasions where interaction with non-Muslim Egyptians had taken place during the observation period.

The neighbourhoods in which the families lived were typically urban neighbourhoods in Cairo or Alexandria. They were not areas particularly known for one religious community, but often families were very familiar in the neighbourhoods, as generations of the same family will have lived there. Coexistence between different religious communities was strong in the area itself, but there was no interaction that went beyond friendly acknowledgment of neighbours. In addition, as is with most residential quarters in Cairo and Alexandria, tourist areas were far away and quite contained. In fact, most Egyptians choose to avoid the busy and expensive tourist areas, and even if this were not the case, an Egyptian not involved in the tourism industry may be unlikely to engage in any meaningful conversation with a tourist. Thus, the scope for intercultural exploration was extremely minimal for the students, irrespective of their international education.

Furthermore, the schools themselves are increasingly more culturally homogenous than ever. With the popularity of the Gulf States for business, there are now far fewer expatriates in Egypt. Political and social unrest also led to many expatriates and foreign businesses relocating. This has meant that it is now common to find an international school in Egypt entirely populated by Egyptian students. In such cases, teachers are Egyptian, but trained to deliver the international curriculum. Many of these teachers may not have left Egypt themselves, but have an excellent grasp of English or another European language having gained a degree in foreign languages. This environment is thus not conducive to applying the international mindedness into practice, and students are faced with learning objectives that are confined to their school life, and deemed irrelevant in their everyday lives.
School life was a well-orchestrated international bubble, but it gave them few lessons for how to navigate their way around their real life interactions; at home, in their neighbourhood, on public transport, in the supermarket. The lessons in the classroom remained theoretical and abstract. The result was that students would most likely subconsciously compartmentalise what is taught and what is lived, and their school lessons could not replace the real life lessons that they received at home, through their parents and their family.

This raises a weakness of international education that is yet to be fully explored. Do international education institutions and their ideological mission require a pluralistic society in order for the message to be meaningful and effective? The typical mission statements of these schools refer to preparing young people for a globalised world as global citizens. However this could not be further from reality for Egyptians today who find little interaction with anyone of a different cultural background. International school campuses in Egypt are now dominated by Egyptian nationals and their student body is far from culturally or ethnically diverse.

Stobart (1989) famously proposed a model based on the idea of concentric circles that explores the levels of intensity of ‘international living’. As presented in the diagram below, Stobart’s outermost circle (1) includes those with a ‘general awareness’ of places and people other than their own national location and community, through classes in school and a general interest through accessible forms of media. Circle two includes those with a slightly greater level of international lifestyle, as those who experience other places first hand through travel during vacations, or perhaps short business trips, while circle three distinguishes those who travel often, stay a little longer abroad but for fixed time periods in another country, while not changing their perception of what is ‘home’. This includes students based overseas for the period of the academic year, or employees living and working in a residential compound supplied by their employer.
The fourth circle of Stobart’s (1989) model encompasses those individuals who have made a more permanent move to another country, and resided abroad for an extended period of time, and are thus exposed to the culture, language and people of another country in such a way that it enables the person to begin to judge and comprehend behaviours and beliefs of others by the standards of the locals rather than their own personal perspectives; this is what Gollnick & Chin (1991, p. 15) refer to as ‘cultural relativism’. Stobart’s ‘international people’, positioned in his fourth inner circle, may live in many countries and commonly speak a number of different languages (Jonietz, 1991).

Figure 2: Stobart’s (1989) concentric circles of ‘international living’ and internationality

(Extracted from Hayden & Thompson, 1995)

The families for whom international schools are most relevant, according to Hayden & Thompson (1995), are typically within Stobart’s third and fourth circles. This is also supported by the literature on Third Culture Kids (TCKs), who are defined by the European Council of International Schools (1993) as ‘neither a product of the culture of the country in which they are studying nor
the country of their legal nationality’ because for most of their lives ‘they have lived in a variety of alien settings’ (p. xiii). Research into Third Culture Kids suggests that such children go on to continue their international involvement, as adaptable beings who feel at home everywhere, or feel at home nowhere, and are what Cotter & Useem (1993) term ‘Adult Third Culture Kids’. Similar terms such as the ‘Global Nomad’ coined by Kingston (1993) or ‘Trans-Language Learners’ (Jonietz, 1991) are equally applicable and relevant in the literature on the effects of international education on transnationally mobile students.

However, Hayden and Thompson’s application of Stobart’s ‘international living’ model to the international education context is flawed. It exposes the stagnation that is endemic in the literature on today’s international education market, as it assumes that the dominant clientele of today’s international education sector is the same as that of the 1980s and 1990s. Hayden and Thompson (1995), though acclaimed in this field quite rightly, were wrong to assume that children of international schools were among circles three to four of Stobart’s model. In fact, as has been noted in most recent literature, for the majority of international schools, indigenous locals of the host country now form the foundations of the demand for international schooling (Walker, 2015; Ranger; 2013; Bray and Yamoto, 2003).

This study is testament that in fact, if applying Stobart’s model today, the bulk of Egypt’s international school educated student body would match the descriptions of circles one and two, at best. Most families of middle-class background in Egypt who send their child to an international school spend the largest proportion of their monthly income on their child’s tuition fees. Travel abroad is rare during the years of their education, and those that do have the luxury of travel are in the minority, and vacations are typically closer to home. The phenomenon documented of Third Culture Kids typically matches those students who leave home to study abroad. These students no longer form the majority of international schooled students. Those from the East who have the means to afford an education in the West are of a very small minority, even among the privileged. The importation of Western cultural good, including qualifications, now makes it viable to receive an
internationally recognised education while never having to leave one’s country. The description of a Third Culture Kid is no doubt accurate, but the children that form the critical mass of the student body in most locally-grounded, international schools abroad do not share the level of intensity of global mobility, and it is likely not their education that drives their ‘global nomadic’ behaviour, but more their life of transience.

Perhaps as we start to witness the international school sector in many parts of the world attract host nationals, adaptations can be made that acknowledge the reality that many of these schools do not operate within pluralistic settings. This in turn begs the question of whether international education as a concept has been adaptable enough over the years, in order to respond to the change in demand and the change in practice. In fact, rather than attempting the mammoth task of forcing the local government and wider society to adopt and welcome cosmopolitan ideals, international education agencies and bodies, and their individual schools, are choosing to adapt to the host nations’ idiosyncratic demands. In order to survive an ever increasingly competitive market, international schools have thus become hostage to cultural relativism.

7.4 Firewall three: hybridisation of international curricula

The international education sector is far from homogenous or standardised. Highly under-regulated, the international education experience is hard to generalise as a result. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East. International education providers in the region find it increasingly difficult to regulate and formalise the system, and the dearth of literature on international education in the Middle East and North Africa reflects this lack of regulation and monitoring (Bunnell, 2008). It is hard to develop a discourse when there is so much variety and little consensus with regards to basic terminology.

Exponential growth in the region’s private international school sector has contributed markedly to this lack of regulation. Yet, the increased competition from an overcrowding sector has forced curriculum providers
and international schools to adapt and apply some flexibility to bend to the local political environment. Adaptations might include structural adjustments such as meeting quotas in hiring local teachers, or adjustments in the content of the curriculum.

Such flexibility to local government demands often risks compromising the learning objectives of an international curriculum (Walker, 2015). Not all countries where international schools operate are democratic and liberal, and this can create tensions with authorities that seek to control or monitor the private sector in education as tightly as it does the public sector. Students in all international schools in Egypt are required to sit ministry-imposed subjects including religious studies, Arabic and civics studies, all of which have assigned resources and syllabi through which the schools are expected to follow.

There is a real need for further research to explore the role these subjects may play in undermining and contradicting any international message. One American head teacher in Alexandria expressed to me the challenges of enduring random ministerial inspections at the school. She admitted to using contraband books and resources on subjects such as evolution, saying the process for vetting such resources through official channels was long and tiresome, yet such texts were important to ensuring a quality-assured education. Potentially controversial material and textbooks were necessarily hidden during inspections in order to maintain harmony with the authorities. Similar techniques, according to informal conversations with teachers, are used in other schools, and many senior members of staff expressed concerns over a growing intrusion from the state with regards to the curriculum.

Such challenges are familiar to those who administer international curricula abroad. During an informal conversation with a representative at the International Baccalaureate in Geneva, parents were also mentioned as sources of tension over the content of the curriculum. The representative recalled multiple incidents where parents placed pressure on the boards to reconsider the learning content.
It is unusual that the literature that has documented the period of rapid expansion of international education from the 1990s (Bates, 2011; Hayden, Thompson and Walker, 2002) has not equally discussed the interrelated period of adaptation and hybridisation of so many international curricula. While the sector has expanded, so too has government interference. In fact, today as Drennan (2002) argues, ‘flexibility in responding to local requirements and interests is at the heart’ of curriculum design and expansion.

For the ideologically driven motivations for international schooling, how much can one reconcile the demands of the nation-state and the parents, with the idealistic outcomes of education for global citizenship and humanity? In doing so, how much of the ideological message is lost? These growing issues in the increasingly complex international education sector look to get evermore complicated as the system becomes increasingly multi-layered with a growing number of stakeholders. There is still work to be done in order to understand the role parents play in forcing adaptations to the ideological orientation of international curricula, as well as the degree to which state interference compromises its posture on certain issues. However, in addition to this, private groups and companies such as GEMS Education, have increasingly carved a stake in and gained influence over international curricula expansion. They now crucially assist in the expansion of clients’ curricula through their private network of schools in given regions. GEMS Education, as an example, operates widely across the Middle East and North Africa and it is becoming increasingly important for competing international education service providers to hire such groups to assist in their expansion into the regions that are most challenging. Such agents with interest in the direction of the development of curricula do not always work in harmony with the ideological motivations for international learning.

For these reasons, hybridisation as a continuing trend in international curricula risks undermining the effectiveness of the curricula on students’ sense of internationality. Too much flexibility to political demands can compromise the outcomes of an international education and lead to the
dilution of cosmopolitanism values in the school and curricula. Skelton (2002) argues that there is a tendency among those responsible for designing international curricula to focus on the practical qualities of the curriculum at the expense of the values.

Upholding an ethos of international mindedness is just as important as widening the accessibility of such an education and developing the structures to allow for its expansion and utility. A dilution of the ideological objectives will render such schools as little more than elitist institutions of private education. As Skelton urges, efforts should be made to ‘capture the hearts of teachers, students, parents, board members and others’ and not just bend willingly to opposing whims (Skelton, 2002). Despite this, there could be something even more deeply entrenched in the conception of international education and curricula design that further undermines their ideological effectiveness. This leads to the fourth firewall, which is rooted in the pedagogical design of all international curricula.

7.5 Firewall four: age group and level of development

Identities and beliefs are rarely ever static and some can be highly malleable. Socialisation theories refer to the foundational years for when values and core identities are shaped through a series of personal experiences (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Sen, 2006; Gundara; 2006). Formal education is only a small part of a mélange of influences, and it is a much more latent phase of development. Thus, an international education is designed to build on a child’s existing consciousness of the self. However, there is an assumption that the earlier a child receives an international education the better, and the least amount of learning time dedicated to the concept of nationhood, the better.

Skelton (2002) argues, using Ken Wilber’s A Theory of Everything (2000) and in particular his ‘developmental holarchy’ model, that the understanding of the ‘nation-state’ is a requisite part of the development of an international perspective. Wilber’s (2000) ‘exterior-collective’ quadrant, according to Skelton, demonstrates the necessity for an understanding of ‘nationhood’
before development towards international mindedness can be met. As Skelton urges, ‘international mindedness transcends but includes national-mindedness’ (Skelton, 2002).

Similarly, by applying Wilber’s ‘interior-individual’ quadrant, Skelton illustrates that development stages in a child’s life are crucial to developing international mindedness. Children need to move through certain stages of personal development before they can be ready or primed to take on the complex ideas that encompass international thinking. Thus, he concludes that determining at what age or particular stage of development a child is in is important to achieving the ideals of education for cosmopolitan identity.

Skelton (2002) raises two areas that I believe are neglected in the field of international education, both academically and on the practitioner’s level. Skelton challenges both the ‘earlier the better’ assumption, and the ‘less nationally orientated, the better’ assertion. Through his application of Wilber’s model of development, Skelton raises yet another potential firewall to achieving international mindedness through education. It may not be that the primary and middle years of schooling are prime for such ideas to be introduced, and until this is defined, the appropriate knowledge, skills and experiences that will cultivate and nurture these progressive ideas, cannot be known. Simply extracting the same methods and principles that are designed to harness international mindedness among eighteen year olds may not be suitable for twelve to fourteen year olds. This will not of course deter parents from sending their children to international schools for the prestige and economic mobility it promises. However, such shortfalls in the design of curricula may come some way to explaining why the unapologetically idealistic visions of cosmopolitan education are not reaping the results, in value terms, as hoped.

However, while socialisation theories recognise the role education plays in shaping values and beliefs, it does not regard formal education as the only source of identity construction. From adolescence onwards, humans are exposed to an array of sometimes competing sources of knowledge and
information. The degree of options now available could render any formal education as peripheral in the process of identity formation.

7.6 Firewall five: competing sources of information

In today’s age of ‘electronic invasion’, there are many competing sources of information. This has led to discussions of ‘cosmopolitan communications’ (Norris & Inglehart, 2009) and cross-border information flows that have assisted processes of global interconnectivity. The flood of open-access information into societies from diverse channels has rendered schools and libraries secondary sources of information for members of today’s global youth. Many of the alternative sources are informal, through YouTube, podcasts, wikis and blogs, as well as through interpersonal connections via mobile phones, instant messaging and social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter. Prior to that, cable and satellite television transmitted ideas and images from one society to another society, giving the impression that the world was like a village, smaller than it had ever felt.

Such developments have informed the theories of cultural convergence that have been challenged in this thesis. Such technologies in cross-border communication are widely assumed to catalyse the standardisation of cultures, ideas and beliefs (Galtung & Schiller, 1976; McPhaill, 2005; Morrell, 2012; Pascale & Maguire, 1980; England & Lee, 1974; Kerr et al., 1964). However, as has already been noted, such theories falsely assume that audiences are essentially passive and have no agency over what sources they choose to use and trust (Elasmar & Hunter, 1993; Elasmer, 2003; Norris & Inglehart, 2009). In fact, cultural theorists have argued that audiences reinterpret the meaning of messages that are imported from foreign media, thus undermining their influences on the individual’s behaviour and attitudes (Thussu, 1998; Ware & Dupagne, 1994; Elasmar & Hunter, 1993, 2003; Elasmar, 2003). Self-gratification behaviour patterns further suggest that people seek out media messages that are consistent with their preferences and values (Blumler & Katz, 1974). This is particularly plausible today given the vast range of choices available and the competition from alternate sources of media and information.
Throughout this study, very little difference was observed between the nationally educated students and the international school educated students with respect to their media consumption habits. Students of both cohorts predominantly received information and news from television or social networking sites. The former were almost exclusively from national or regional talk shows and news channels, and they typically followed the news in their mother tongue, Arabic. Their social networking sites were typically online recreations of their offline social circles. Thereby, what is deemed important to their friends, and by convention shared on the sites, will penetrate the individual’s own personal ‘newsfeed’.

Commentators of the role of social networking in expanding or reducing the scope of inter-cultural engagement refer to the tendency of social networking sites to create echo chambers while giving the illusion that one is connecting to the outside world (Jones, 2015; Lewis, 2015). Students in both cohorts claimed that they very rarely turned to printed press for daily news, and that they preferred to use the Internet to read and share articles of interest on local, regional, and occasionally international, relevance. On occasions where the students did refer to daily newspapers, popular Arabic-language newspapers were preferred, such as Youm al Sabaa.

Students from both groups admitted to reading news online in Arabic and English, but they believed most of their sources of information were local or regional news outlets; Qatari-owned Al-Jazeera Arabic and Saudi-owned al-Arabiya were the most popular regional outlets. Between the nationally educated and international school educated students, there was no difference in media consumption habits. Typically, the students recalled that when international sources were used for information, it was usually only if it had any relevance locally or regionally. For example, one Coptic student explained that for a time she relied on the coverage from ‘British’ (this cannot be confirmed as it may have simply been English language news outlets) online news outlets on the reporting of sectarian violence against Coptic communities across Egypt in 2012-13. She found the coverage on this occasion to be more ‘honest’, indicating her distrust for national news outlets on coverage of minority
concerns. However, even in the case of this one student, her interaction with external sources of news was still concerning local and domestic stories, not global news.

The vast majority of students from the study also said that regular discussions in the home with family took place over domestic and regional politics and social matters, and that this was where most of their critical engagement occurred in relation to current events. This suggested that with respect to their information consumption and their processing of information, the students tended to look closer to home for guidance and influences on their outlooks on life and interpretations of events.

The many competing sources of information and interpretation narratives that enter the lives of the students are a significant firewall in undermining the development of an international perspective through any formal education. While there is no causal evidence to suggest that any of the interactions observed in the homes, or the students’ choices of media, would contribute to intolerance or inward-facing identities, competing sources of interpretation pose an obstacle to restructuring perceptions of other unknown communities, and this contributes to an echo chamber that is increasingly hard to penetrate.

7.7 Banal nationalism

The firewalls, informed by the findings of this study, suggest that education for global citizenship and cosmopolitan identity is a process with considerable inherent obstacles. Those who ideologically promote international education as a force for global social change and peace are fighting against numerous walls of resistance. Using the COSMOSCALE in chapter eight, students displayed a cosmopolitan attitude to other cultures, but throughout the rest of the study they presented strong signs of national superiority, and sometimes intolerance towards other communities. Thus it suggests that while one can embrace an international spirit and recognise its merits, it does not replace the personal sense of national identity.
Trends indicate, from this and other large-scale value surveys, that the likelihood of leveraging one’s differences against a foreign other remains greater and more instinctive than embracing realities of universality. Why, then, is nationalism so resistant to post-national movements for change?

Much of the firewalls aforementioned have one crucial element in common. They almost all refer to a student’s external environment beyond that of his or her school experience. This suggests that the context of the curriculum is important to its ability to resonate and socialise. In describing the nature of a national identity, Billig (1995) urges that analysts search for reasons ‘why people in the contemporary world do not forget their nationality’ (Billig, 1995, p. 7). In response to his own question, Billig bases his thesis on what he terms ‘Banal Nationalism’ - a consciousness of national identity that persists in the background of one’s everyday life. He writes:

In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in the world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. (Billig, 1995, p. 8)

For Billig, national identity embodies all forgotten, daily, and subtle reminders of collective identity. National affiliation is expressed through overlooked habits of social life and interactions, and not the exotic impassioned exemplars of waving flags and fighting for one’s country that occurs only on special occasions. Those who argue that nation-states are declining in significance, and that nationalism is no longer a major force in the face of globalisation, ignore the fact that notions of nationhood are forever playing out and being reproduced in our daily lives.

Thus, could Billig’s banal nationalism be the ultimate firewall to education for global citizenship? When students receive an international education in their own national homeland, they do not cease to be exposed to the daily reminders of their national identity. In other words, the Egyptian student enrolled at a private, Western-oriented international school in Cairo, will still receive the same banal reminders of their Egyptian belonging and identity. A major theme in
Billig’s thesis is that the notions of nationhood are deeply embedded in contemporary ways of thinking, despite arguments from other analysts of the development of a post-modern, globalised world. He criticises social and psychological theories that regard nationalism as merely one form of identity amongst countless others, arguing instead that nationalism is far more than an identity. Crucially, nationalism is a way of thinking; an ‘ideological consciousness’, according to Billig:

In this consciousness, nations, national identities and national homelands appear as ‘natural’. More crucially the ‘world of nations’ is represented as a ‘natural’ moral order. (Billig, 1995, p. 10)

Nationalism, therefore, becomes second nature and engrained in our subconscious because of the repeated exposure of routine ‘deixes’ through national media, the state language and national history and culture, which all continually point to the national homeland as the natural home of the citizen. Accordingly, nationalism is almost an inevitable consequence in today’s world.

Unlike nationalism, cosmopolitanism is a consciously constructed identity, but it cannot erase or replace one’s national identity. The potential for an international education to penetrate the unconscious and overcome the banal nationalism of everyday life among host nationals is unlikely, given this context, and thus this not only helps to explain the direction of the findings of this thesis, but also reveals a super firewall to realising an effective education for global mindedness.

7.8 Conclusion

The findings of this study do not negate the role of education in socialisation. Instead they point to a need to understand what conditions are necessary in order for formal education to contribute to the socialisation and identity of the child. The relationship between education and the educated, or education and society, is more consensual than is implied in the literature. Thus for international education to maintain its reason for being, it will need to cease
operating in a parallel world, and begin to adapt in order to work harmoniously and intrinsically within, not across, local structures.

The power of education as a transformative agent is based on an outdated body of literature that originates from times when mass organised education was typically administered exclusively at the local level, in the nation-state context. Discourse on international education is equally outdated, as it fails to account for the relationship of international schools with host-nation students, as they increasingly become the core of the clientele. Prior to this, international education was reserved for the globally mobile elite. While it was assumed that their cosmopolitan, nomadic outlook on life was the result of the Third Culture Kids’ international education experiences, it is more likely that it was their global mobility and transient lifestyles that made them present as such; something that differentiates them from the more grounded and fixed host-nation student of today’s international learning.

The banality of Billig’s nationalism suggests that efforts towards post-national consciousness will face an inevitable wall of daily nationally reinforcing habits that have become commonplace in modern societies. Any challenges are made greater when an international education is introduced to host nationals who, by definition, are educated within the context of their own homeland. While literature on cosmopolitanism and globalisation hosts a lively debate over the realistic achievability of a post-national global society, it is (international) education that is commonly pitted as the solution to all challenges. Global citizenship appears to rest on a utopian ideal of a post-national future, and relies on a principled curriculum to reverse egotistic, nationalistic sentiments. Yet, for such a corrective curriculum, there is neither compelling evidence of success, nor indeed any consensus of how ‘success’ should be measured or achieved.
Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Perspectives

Superficial observations of cultures and societies around the world led to a temptation to assume that cultures are becoming standardised and homogenised according to a Western, liberal, modernisation model. However, by assessing a sample of Egyptian students that represent a strata of Egyptian elite society that are integrated into the common market as consumers of transnational education curricula, it is clear to see that values, identity, and beliefs are far more complicated than consumer behaviours suggest.

The Egyptian internationally educated students in this study showed little variation in their identity construction to their nationally educated counterparts. Like their peers in state schools, internationally educated Egyptians spoke Arabic in the home and with their friends; foreign languages were seen as a skill for employment not for cultural exploration. They were immensely proud of their Egyptian heritage, and if that meant to be critical or derogatory of other countries or communities, their unique educational surrounding had not appeared to immunise them from harbouring and expressing such prejudicial views. Their views of the West were deeply conflicting; at times the West reflected progress and something to aspire to, while often it was referred to by the students as a homogenous bloc, through a binary ‘us and them’ narrative, and was deeply mistrusted. Their international educational experiences appeared not to have challenged those ideas and they expressed overtly negative sentiments towards British, American and European foreign policy towards the Middle East. The majority of the students were noticeably more favourable of Russia as a friend to the region than Britain or the US. And comparatively, internationally educated Egyptians even appeared at times to be more patriotic than their nationally educated peers. They were defensive about Egypt and romanticised its role in the region.

Perhaps as a consequence of such sentiments, the students did not feel part of a global community - at least not an equal member of one. They were proof of intercultural learning taking place on this planet, but they lived within
its limits. International education was seen by the students and the families to be a vehicle for employment in a globalised world, but there was a conscious effort towards preserving their identity and traditions. Religion was seen as their moral compass and a reliable constant in their lives.

Global mindedness existed purely in economic terms. Politically, socially and culturally, the students were Egyptian, Muslim and Coptic, and their imagined community was nationalistically framed, and at most regionally extended. What these findings suggest is that the relationship between formal education and identity is a consensual one between the consumer and the service provider, and that an international, or Western-oriented education, does not necessarily translate into a more international, or Western, orientation.

Understanding people's worldviews and orientations, and presenting them accurately, is not easy. It is particularly difficult when trying to do so for young minds that are still navigating their identities and building a lens through which to see the world. Indeed, there is no way to comprehensively present a worldview of internationally educated students.

We know that international education was partly introduced in order to foster global minds, extend the ‘imagined community’ and build future generations who saw the world beyond territories, tribes, race, and nations. What we can do in order to understand young people today is talk to them and ask questions that we, ourselves, do not know the answers to. We can judge them according to a Western paradigm, but in reality there is no such thing. When attempting to measure Western acculturation, or global mindedness, the biggest obstacle is defining what that is and whether they mean the same thing. This research has made this quandary strikingly apparent.

However, many of the findings from this study overlap with findings from external, larger-scale, opinion surveys of Arab youth and Egyptian society more generally. Such opinions surveys, such as the World Values Survey, do show Egyptians displaying more traditional, nationalist sentiments than post-modern, cosmopolitan sentiments. That is hardly surprising when this
study has shown that those students who have had an education that has placed a global mindset as a primary objective of the school, also display strong national pride and do not associate with a global identity.

The findings thus question how central formal education is in determining a person’s outlook on life, but the theories on this maintain that education is important to socialisation. Decades of education and socialisation theory has been based on a model of national education systems and their importance to informing and shaping national citizenship. Such theories have been uncritically applied and repurposed in our conception of education for a cosmopolitan mindedness and global citizenship, in preparation for an imagined post-national future. Perhaps then, it is not the content of education alone, but rather the conditions that complement the content of that education that determines how influential school is to an individual. Certainly, the findings have raised more questions than they have answered, but this sets the precedent for more research in this field. Host nationals entering international schools could be the key to understanding how education does and does not work in shaping the ideas and the identities of young people.

For instance, the host nationals of this study have undoubtedly challenged many preconceptions of privileged Egyptians enrolled in private international schools. Whether they are educated through the national curriculum or an international curriculum originating from a Western-based culture, this study has shown that Egyptian students feel Egyptian, have greater affinity to a non-Western world and are invested in its future. Internationally educated students look to the world no less through a tribal lens than their nationally educated counterparts. They show a deep loyalty to their country and are just as likely to view Western cultures with suspicion. They may build the skills to engage with a globalised private sector but they still value their local traditions and customs. They may be open to modernisation and political reform, but Western secular democracy is to them not the answer and religion is still a central aspect of their moral compass. Students may read British novels, watch American sitcoms, but their forces of influence are still
their family and community. These are in many ways all paradoxes that characterise many modern societies around the world.

The presence of foreign education is not new to Egypt or the Middle East region. Foreign schools existed long before now, under the Ottoman Empire and after its dismantlement at the hands of colonial powers. Indeed, Egypt’s relationship with the European education system contributed to her development into a modern state. But post-colonial nationalism made the region an unwelcoming place for Egyptians who had become accustomed to foreign education. Mahmud Faksh’s recollections (1980) of foreign schools before 1952 describes hostility and suspicion towards the privileged social and cultural elite that foreign schools in Egypt had long produced under colonial rule. Faksh claimed that the local boys and girls of the foreign schools spoke no Arabic, and failed to read or write it. He recalled that the graduates of such schools developed ‘no sympathy’ for their fellow compatriots and were nothing more than Egyptian proxies for the occupiers of the land. Indeed, Nasser regarded them to be the ‘careless aristocracy’, but today’s Egyptians of international schools in Egypt remember Nasser’s legacy with passionate admiration; a symbol of their expressive patriotism and their conviction that Egypt will once again command the region to greatness. The Egyptians of today’s private international schools could not be further from Faksh’s descriptions.

This alone should show how different the twenty-first century international education is to colonial private education. Despite the ambiguities surrounding a definition of ‘international education for international mindedness’ and other such slogans, it is clear that the ideological intention is a noble one; to overcome the national, ethnic, religious and racial boundaries that prevent the world’s communities from coming together in peace and harmony. It is an endeavour that could eradicate prejudices and make the world more resilient to conflict in a generation or two.

However, the market-driven environment in which international education also fits has meant that it is also a privileged form of education around the world; not for the masses, but for the elite who can afford the best facilities
money can offer. This is the first stark reality that swiftly sobers the mind. In a rare critical essay on the failures of international schools to foster true democratic and cosmopolitan principles by Marsh and Knaus (2015), Tyson Marsh recalls his experiences as a Principal at an Egyptian American international school in Cairo. Explaining his journey into professional jadedness, he describes how ‘American interests and the manner in which private education in Egypt served as a new market for American textbook companies, for-profit accreditation firms and testing companies that situated Egyptian schools and students as consumers’ undermined any messages of democracy or critical thinking in the international system. He laments how crippled the sector had become through its market-driven partners, and recalls being shut out from future summit meetings organised by the American University in Cairo, as a result of his candid criticisms of all involved in this increasingly lucrative sector (Marsh & Knaus, 2015: 199-200).

Marsh’s anecdotal critique was not just one of the system, but also stretched as far as to question the effectiveness and credibility of the curriculum and its content. This leads to the other sobering thought: maybe an education for international mindedness is not working. The findings of this study suggest that international schools do not appear to have penetrated the value systems of their local students. If the Egyptian students educated in international schools do not feel ‘global’ then why might that be? This thesis has proposed the presence of firewalls, or obstacles, that serve to undermine the ideological message of international education. Marsh implies that the market-driven culture surrounding the international sector has operated as an obstacle against the democratic principles of the curriculum. The previous chapter suggested that the firewalls are more deeply entrenched.

The conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism and the imagination of a post-national future that can be taught both assumes that the process of globalisation has primed this world for such a fate, or what some have called a ‘fatal Americanisation’ (Sahlins, 1999). The debate between whether we live in a converged world as a result of global connectedness or a more
polarised world continues. Yet it has been argued in this thesis that the entire debate is stifled by ambiguities of what exactly is globalisation. Is it an established fact; a result of a process, or it is the process or political project itself? The literature continues to conflate this important distinction. International education has inherited this confusion, as it is implied as both a by-product of globalisation and an agent of it, depending if one sees globalisation as a political process rather than an established fact. On the one hand, proponents of international education for peace and global harmony imply the inevitability of a converging world and thus the urgent necessity to prepare generations for skills to operate in such a world. On the other hand, its educative philosophy implies that global interconnectedness is an evolving political project that must be supported and nurtured in schools in order to gradually chip-away at the inwardness, xenophobic and nation-state thinking of the present, to facilitate the free market conditions of a post-modern future. If one believes that globalisation is the former and thus international education is merely a service to provide the necessary skills to navigate this changing world, then it should be uncontested. However, globalisation is a contested process, hence the mounting evidence that supports a cultural polarisation thesis, and the findings of this study that presents internationally educated students as more inward-looking than cosmopolitan.

Billig’s banal nationalism goes far to explain this, which is why it has been presented as perhaps the ultimate firewall against any formal learning towards a post-national identity. As chapters six and seven have argued, international education does not operate in a vacuum. The context and environment of the students is crucially determining the ability of their education to contribute to their socialisation. Though in chapter two it was clear from the literature that education is widely regarded as an effective and important socialising and transformative agent, all such literature is based on a view of education as a national project. It is not based on any observations of how this applies to an education that is foreign and that operates in an alien national structure and cultural context, and serves an international, rather than a national, project. When in this context, Billig’s banal nationalism becomes overwhelmingly important, because while an education
that serves a national project might reinforce and complement the banal expressions of nationalism in a citizen’s everyday life, an education that serves an international project within that same environment that Billig presents, attempts to overcome those routine reminders of a national identity.

When Billig’s banal nationalism is considered in the context of this study, the findings are somewhat unsurprising. But when globalisation theory, and the cultural convergence theory that dominates the body of literature is relied upon, the findings appear anomalous. For this reason, the polarisation theory appears to be more applicable in this thesis. Even more important than why international school educated students were not presenting as cosmopolitan, is why on occasion, the internationally educated students were more hostile towards all things Western than their nationally educated peers? Did these students begin their internationally educated lives as bitter towards the Western world and nationally identity conscious, or did they develop it, in part due to their educational environment and experience?

Assumptions are rife that exposure to a culture can inoculate against prejudice and negative perceptions, but only if the experiences are all together positive and enlightening, and that there is an active and conscious effort to challenge preconceived misconceptions. While the students in this study were quick to criticise ‘the West’ for its interference in the lives of their people and their region’s people, they also had a strong conviction that what they understood of ‘the West’ was comprehensive and accurate. For their families and their non-internationally educated friends, they were regarded as the one most knowledgeable British culture, American culture, and ‘the West’. It is this conviction of knowledge accuracy of another culture that was most concerning, not least because it was theoretically easy to avoid. Teaching children to have a continual hunger to learn, and to always assume there is more to know, should be a basic framework for education - international or otherwise. Yet the implication of enrolling into a school that includes the word ‘international’ in its name, suggests to the student that through mere membership of the student body, they are now inter-culturally literate and 'Western educated'.
What does an active and conscious effort to challenge misconceptions look like in this context? Firstly, it requires the willingness of curriculum content creators to be brave enough to address contentious topics, not implicitly, but head-on. While the scope of this thesis did not allow for a comprehensive discourse analysis of international curricula content in Egypt’s international schools, access to the syllabi of some subjects for the IGCSE history was made available. As IGCSE is an adapted international curriculum that is customised somewhat to the local environment, the history taught in IGCSE in Egypt was Egyptian history, tested in Arabic, the students’ native tongue. However, it was not a history of Egyptian and British relations which might seem fitting for an exported British curriculum. Instead it was an entirely localised history with the major players either the Pharaohs, Alexander the Great, the Copts or the Muslim conquerors. During the scanning of the curriculum, not once did the years of British rule get covered, accept for a time where the Coptic Egyptians and the Muslim Egyptians were said to have united against a foreign power. Further, exams focused on rule under the Fatimids, the Ottomans, the Romans and Muhammad Ali, and appeared to skip straight to the 1952 Free Officer’s coup, which marked Egyptian independence from colonial rule. Consequently, there was an elephant and the elephant was Britain. In an exported British curriculum, this was profound. It assumed that the students would not come across this history elsewhere if it were not taught at school. Or perhaps it was deemed such an insensitive topic to incorporate into a British-designed curriculum. Irrespective of the reasons, the absence of this subject being dealt with explicitly was, and still is to my knowledge, a missed opportunity. If we are to export the British curriculum, then we must use it to rehabilitate British-Egyptian relations, not by reducing a history of strained relations into irrelevance, but by hosting a conversation on it in which we can partake and contribute.

To create global citizenship and international mindedness for the sake of a peaceful future, global curricula, not just international curricula, should also work to address prejudice in schools. It should be a commitment of all agents involved in formulating educational frameworks and content. National
systems should not necessitate prejudicial beliefs of the other in order for it to succeed in developing an ideal citizen, and a commitment to tackle the areas in global education systems should be encouraged. It is not that by removing prejudicial content that future generations will not harbour prejudicial views of others, but it is that the formal education systems around the world will no longer reinforce a conviction that such views are legitimate.

In this context, international curricula - in other words curricula that does not carry the baggage of reproducing a nation’s history with an other people - is a form of addressing this. However, it remains available to only a few privileged in each society. Whether it has intended to or not, to gain an international perspective of the world, one needs money. This market-driven reality has stifled the potential of an international paradigm in education and peace. Future efforts may be made to work directly with national systems to try to incorporate some of the principles of international mindedness. This research has suggested that an international orientated education experience does not remove a sense of national belonging in host nation children and this could be a reassuring note for national system policy makers reluctant to introduce international mindedness into their curriculum, for fear of it undermining the national project.

The very notion that education can educate for peace and tolerance, not hate and contempt, is a noble one. It is one that should always be on the agenda to be better understood and the concept developed. However, an international education with a local grounding is essential in my view, and an emphasis on the role of local engagement and relativity is increasingly being seen in schools’ mission statements in Egypt. However, in reality they exist in a bubble in their respective host countries. In Egypt, the schools are typically located outside of the main city, often in industrialised spots of the city off a desert road. It can take forty minutes or more to get from residential parts of the city to the school. This, as was explained during school visits, was largely practical. In order for such schools to offer the best range of facilities, schools have had to be built in areas where there is sufficient room for planning, and where land is readily available. This makes
it hard for any routine and positive local engagement to occur, but efforts should be made to maximise opportunities where possible.

Parts of local engagement should also be to adapt the lessons taught in such schools in order for them to have local relevance, and then extend locally relevant lessons to an international case. It refers to what Skelton (2002) argues; that grounding in national belonging may first be necessary before an international paradigm can be successfully introduced. This will make the lessons and messages more relatable to the students and then be applied beyond the boundaries of their own immediate identity. Perhaps then the focus is on compassion for others rather than total international solidarity and citizenship. A compassionate education is universally needed and can be universally applied without the heavy political connotations that the term, ‘international’, occasionally conjures.

Schools can also look to take on a responsibility of widening the influencers in a student’s life. This study showed that the key influencers in a child’s life were their immediate family and parents. While this is normal, it can be quite limiting if one is to try to break the cycle of transferred prejudices. Schools can introduce other local voices on local issues, and host conversations on international topics with a range of local and global voices. It is harnessing the simulation concept in education, where students need to witness something occur in order for them to recognise its importance and their role.

Many of these improvements, however, assume that all of these changes can be applied to a system of schools. However, the literature suggests that these schools are not operating within a coherent system at all. The under-regulated nature of international schools in Egypt had meant that it was very important to guarantee the inclusion of a ‘true’ international school - one that committed to deliver on the ideological impetus behind international education. The decision was made that only international schools with external accreditation would feature in this study. Yet even forms of accreditation are vast and variable, as are the standards and emphases on the pragmatic and the ideological objectives per school.
This may be important when understanding the impact of international education in Egypt. It may well be that the ideological message in schools is not being transferred effectively, or is being lost, while the emphasis is on the pragmatic – in other words, preparing the students for exams and external assessments. This would not be unlikely and would not be a break from the general approach to education in Egyptian schools. Much of this is often dictated to the school by the parents themselves, as they often expect tangible results from a school to which they are paying small fortunes. Fee-paying schools will need to deliver on student progress, perhaps at the expense of transferring a long-term ideological, values-based, message to the students. If this entirely plausible scenario were to be true, it would explain why students were not presenting an international mindedness in interview. More research would need to be done that focuses on teaching instructions and observations of classroom culture to understand the daily emphasis on an international ideological perspective and how, in practice, it is incorporated in classrooms across schools. There are subjects, such as mathematics, where incorporating an international message would be artificial and over-constructed, and there are other topics, such as history, where many of the principles of global citizenship can be naturally relayed in creative ways. Therefore, a future study could explore the teaching of select subjects, including assemblies, which are crucial moments for schools to relay the school’s ethos and values and vision.

What is certain is that there is a clear dearth in similar research that explores attitudes and opinions of host nation students in international schools, and so it is hard to see whether this is a recurring theme in different national contexts or whether it is something unique to Egypt. More research needs to be done to understand the changing demand in international education and whether it has had any impact on the overall product in the end.

National ministries of education are likely to be just as heavily involved as parents in dictating what can and cannot be taught in international schools as is the case in Egypt. This will have had a particularly restrictive effect on how schools adapt their missions to the host country requirements. What is also certain is that the increased number of host-nation families choosing to
send their children to international schools will deepen the governments’ interests in the schools’ curriculum. In Marsh’s and Knaus’ (2015) critical essay on international schooling systems in Egypt and South Africa, Marsh recalls a recurring occasion of preparing for inspections from the Egyptian Ministry of Education:

I recall scrambling before Education Ministry visits, ensuring all incriminating curricular materials were absent from classrooms. I remember gluing book pages to conceal taboo topics such as the Arab-Israeli War, and discarding maps that recognised the Israeli State. (Tyson & Knaus, 2015, p. 196)

Similar methods were confirmed from informants during this study. During a conversation with a head teacher of one of Cairo’s top international schools, the dangers of teaching evolution in class was pointed out. The head teacher explained: ‘The Ministry decides what textbooks are acceptable for the lessons. If the textbook is fine but happens to have a section on Darwin’s evolution theory, then the book is immediately removed from the list of permitted books’. When asked if that meant that she did not teach evolution in the school, she replied: ‘of course I do! All the textbooks rejected by the Ministry were kept. We use them, but we hide them in the roof if an inspector comes.’ The head teacher was frank that she believed this defiance was something common for the American international system, but was becoming less common for the British international system: ‘You'll never find a head teacher of a British school play these games - it's really only the American and Canadian schools now. The British schools play it more by the rules, I suppose, because the British Council has a close relationship with all the schools and so needs to make sure that they tow the line!’

The relationship between the IGCSE schools and the British Council is an important one, but relatively understudied or acknowledged in the academic literature. In the case of Egypt, the British Council is known to have a ‘memorandum of understanding’ with the Egyptian Ministries of Education and Higher Education. According to this ‘memorandum’ the British Council administers all Cambridge (CIE) and Pearson and Edexcel school exams.
The Council’s website describes the relationship as ‘purely administrative’ in order to ensure quality and provide support, guidance and training to the schools, but it no doubt takes on an advisory role too, particularly where dealing with the Egyptian Ministry.

Some history is important here. The ‘British Council for Relations with Countries’ was founded by Britain’s Foreign Office in 1934 to expand British cultural propaganda activities abroad as a method of combatting German and Italian pre-Second World War propaganda (Borjian, 2011). The Council’s funding today is still heavily dependent on grants from the Foreign Office (Phillipson, 2003). According to Phillipson (2003), under the terms of the Royal Charter, the purpose of the British Council was to promote greater and wider knowledge of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and promote the study of English language abroad, while also developing stronger cultural ties between the United Kingdom and her close and far neighbours (2003: 141). Today, the Council embarks on a similar mission: ‘to promote an enduring understanding and appreciation of Britain in other countries through cultural and technical cooperation’ (Phillipson, 2003: 140; Borjian, 2011). Operating in 109 countries worldwide, it has largely good relations with governments. However, the local Councils have been known to experience hostility and accusations of practicing ‘cultural imperialism’.

The British Council’s dysfunctional relationship with the Iranian regime(s) is a case in point. Borjian (2011) documents the hostile relationship with post-Islamic Revolution Iran, and a short period of increased collaboration between 2001-2009. While heavily restricted by the government to work with local schools and universities from the Council’s return in 2001 after being expelled in 1979, the Council was accused by the Iranian intelligence services in 2006 of conducting ‘unauthorised’ socio-cultural and educational activities across the country, including the training of journalists. An official order was later issued forbidding all state-run organisations and educational institutions from collaborating with the British Council and shortly after, the Council’s website was blocked and its English teaching centre shut down (Borjian, 2011). The British Council’s experience in Egypt is unlikely to be this hostile given the strong diplomatic relationship Britain has enjoyed with
the Egyptian regime since the Sadat years. However, the scope for controversy around the activities of the British Council, and the association of regional British international schools, always risk placing the latter into the political domain.

To what extent can the schools be seen as agents of British diplomacy in Egypt, as in the rest of the world? Issues of cultural engagement between local embassies and their host governments are not unique to the British. Neither is the links between embassies and international schools. Pakistan, for example, operates a series of international schools based on the Pakistani curriculum, and has one such school in Cairo, as well as elsewhere in the Middle East. All schools are under the control of the Pakistani Embassies worldwide.

The connection between private international schools and nation-states, whether through embassies or councils, is essential to understanding the constraints of the so-called post-nation world order. Anthony Smith (1995) argued that we are witnessing the growth of regional blocs, where nation-states remain the primary actors, not the emergence of a new world order that transcends states as is often suggested. The observance of the international education sector proves this. If international schools cannot operate autonomously from outside of the nation-state global structures, then how can we conclude that the world is witnessing a new world order that sees nations lose their sovereignty? The governance of new interconnected global systems is still administered and vetted through nation-states. While the privatisation and decentralisation of services once in the hands of national governments, such as education, may well point to the dis-embedding of state control, the extent and direction of the process of privatisation is still inextricably linked to the state. In fact, governments around the world are presenting hostility towards the expansion of the international education sector, with China restricting their nationals from attending international schools at home and the Indonesian government announcing in May 2014 the introduction of a regulatory system to attempt to control the mushrooming international education sector that is increasingly attracting nationals (Walker, 2015).
Furthermore, as prominent French activist, Jose Bove, once insisted, ‘The world is not for sale’ (Bove & Dufour, 2001), and the increased visibility of global products like McDonalds and Coco Cola, and indeed, American or British schools in Egypt or elsewhere, has spurred on anti-globalisation movements. Such movements stand in opposition to the commodification, privatisation and the consequent eradication of cultural diversity around the world. Objections to globalisation does however have a tendency to overly romanticise the non-Western culture, as though in their authentic form, they are impervious to materialism, competition and the desire for modernisation.

In fact, this thesis has argued that such frantic concerns of a loss of individuality in cultures have been the result of superficial observation of lifestyles around the world. The academic of today thinks he can assess the impact of globalisation through the observation of repeated behaviour and routine engagement of activities that reveal nothing more than a universal consumer behaviour. However, one can be both materialistic and traditional or conservative.

In fact, Ronald Inglehart (1977) introduced a term known as ‘post-materialism’ after his extensive study of surveys through which he found that Western societies were switching from materialist values, such as emphasising economic and physical security, to presenting a new set of ‘post-materialist’ values, which instead emphasised autonomy and self-expression, including ‘happiness’ and ‘interpersonal trust’.

Inglehart believed that individuals pursue various goals in something similar to a hierarchical order. Thus, interpreting Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, he argued that people may innately aspire to freedom and autonomy (self-expression values, and post-materialism), but the most urgent needs such as hunger and physical security must be satisfied first (in other words, survival values, and materialism). Such materialistic goals, according to Inglehart, will be prioritised, while as he observed in publics of advanced industrial societies, a shift towards ‘non-material’ goods and post-materialism would occur.
Based on Ingelhart’s distinction between materialism and post-materialism, students from this study, irrespective of their education, presented as typical of materialism. In other words, supporting authoritarian styles of leadership, exhibiting strong feelings of national pride and the willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for the sake of law and order. People’s basic values, according to Inglehart, are largely formed by adolescence, thus societal value change takes place through intergenerational population replacement. Intergenerational value change is not automatic. Rather, it takes place, according to Inglehart, only if society’s younger cohorts experience more secure living conditions throughout their pre-adult years, so that they grow up taking survival for granted (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: 26; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 52). This suggests a very limited window of opportunity for value change.

International curricula are almost entirely created and designed from a Western context of privilege that separates the advanced industrial societies from the developing Third World. The ideological and market-driven agendas of international education both promote and support a post-material paradigm. International education is fixated on self-expression values, and as it has expanded into the volatile regions of the Middle East and Asia, its priorities have come to clash with the lives and realities of its consumers and clientele. Egyptian society has endured decades of insecurity from wars with Israel in the 1960s and 1970s, the insurgencies of the 1980s and 1990s led by violent Islamists, and more recently instability that has followed the Arab uprisings from 2011 and the ongoing insurgency in the Sinai. Intermittently, it has experienced severe shortages in food supplies, and the rise of the cost of living. Such conditions guarantee that basic services remain their priority. The purchase of an international education may indicate a financial ability to cover its costs, but it is inspired by the same survival values.

For this reason, among others, Egyptian students at Western-oriented international schools still relate more to their Egyptian belonging than a cosmopolitan belonging. It refers back to the theory of firewalls and the need to overcome such obstacles in order for international education to achieve its transformative potential. The message received from an international
education does not translate so compellingly in all national and cultural contexts. Marsh (2015) noted during his account with co-author Knaus (2015) that teachers at his school in Egypt worked relentlessly to plan fieldtrips ‘to local historical sites, museums, and workplaces’ to make the education feel real and relatable to the students at the international schools, only to find that ‘the space we were attempting to create was viewed as a threat to the order of schooling in Egypt’. (p. 197)

Students may pass exams and assessments requisite for success in the international curriculum, but this is no indication that value-based content of the curriculum is transformative of the student’s sense of identity. Mitchell (2003) coins it ‘strategic cosmopolitanism’ whereby individuals are motivated not by the ideals of unity in diversity, but by the understanding of global competitiveness and the need to strategically adapt to swiftly shifting personal and national contexts.

In her account of her experiences as a Fulbright professor in Egypt, Maureen Flanagan (2002) describes her difficulties as an alien in a very different educational culture. She explains that ‘while in the U.S. we seek to expand our [...] curricula into a world vision, in Egypt exactly the opposite has been happening’. In fact, like Marsh, many of Flanagan’s anecdotal experiences with Egyptian students at the English-medium department of Alexandria University confirms some of the challenges raised in this thesis. She recalls: ‘One thing that I learned [...] was how open my students were to thinking the worst of American society. They especially wanted to blame the American emphasis on individualism to the exclusion of the family for the ills of its society [...] More than once in talking to Egyptian students and professors I was bluntly told that Americans had no sense of family’ (Flanagan, 2002).

The internationally educated students in this study echoed similar opinions, and this illustrates the strong conviction some students had developed with regards to their flawed ‘knowledge’ of Western culture. Flanagan taught Egyptian graduates of international schools within the English departments of Alexandria University, and occasionally, Cairo University. These students
were among Egypt's most accomplished English speakers, as Flanagan could not speak Arabic herself and thus required a student body who was familiar with classes conducted through the English medium. Yet, as Flanagan (2002) rightly explains, many of the ideas and themes that are translated through an international education conceived from Western cultures, such as individualism, constitutional rights that guarantee freedoms of speech, the absence of an official state religion, and functioning, active, and effective civil society, had no place in Egyptian history. This cultural and experiential dissonance poses incredible challenges in successfully promoting cosmopolitan ideals through formal education. Flanagan describes having to ‘negotiate a tricky path through the minefields of cultural differences and pride’ to avoid accusations of Western cultural supremacy in the eyes of her Egyptian students. This in no doubt reflects the daily challenges facing non-native teachers of international schools, and is inherent in the curriculum itself as mentioned with regard to the IGCSE Egyptian history course. However, it also suggests a reluctance and resistance from students to accept wholesale knowledge from teachers considered to be outside of their community. Flanagan describes, through her anecdotal experience of teaching as the ‘Other’, the very real challenges this thesis raises. When presenting a history and culture not indigenous to the students, education ceases to be a compelling influence on students’ attitudes and beliefs. Formal education may not be so effective at healing the cultural chasms between the West and the East. In fact, it can become a source of protest, and through it, an expression of potent nationalistic consciousness.

Sadly, Flanagan (2002) concluded from her experience that ‘nothing about the events and aftermath of September 11, 2001 had surprised me’. She leaves it as an open statement, unqualified or contextualised in her essay. Her Egyptian students were so prepared to see the dark side of American culture and history, she explains, because that is what their experience, and their communities’ experiences, dictated. She had concluded that the values and cultural heritage of East and West are far harder to bridge than through educational exchanges alone. The key for Flanagan was to teach her
students a future that they could relate to. Yet nothing in Western culture was either achievable or desirable for the students in her classes.

The recent waves of studies on transnational networks, global interconnectedness and flows of cross-border communications, continue to depict a world that is shrinking and converging in values and beliefs. While there is real need to explore and analyse this important phenomenon that is taking place at such a pace, we must also continue to assess the degrees of stoppage, congestion and resistance to the forces of globalisation happening locally. Not only do cultural transfers often occur through a complex network of localised and targeted appropriations and borrowings which may come to undermine the ideological motive of cross-border flows, but also we so often choose a birds-eye view of the world and its changes at the expense of a more forensic study. While the big picture of globalisation and cosmopolitanism is a romantic one, in our readiness to see what we want the most, we risk oversimplifying and homogenising global experiences to the extent of expressing shock when world values are not so easily synchronised and harmonised.
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