Exploring the Mechanisms and Dynamics of Politically-Motivated Youth Movements in Palestine: A Bourdieusian Perspective

Submitted by Amal W.M. Nazzal to the University of Exeter
As a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Management Studies
In June 2017

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.
Acknowledgements

Undertaking this PhD has been a truly life-changing experience for me and it would not have been possible to do without the support and guidance that I received from many people around me.

First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my first supervisor, Dr. Lindsay Stringfellow, for her excellent guidance and support and for her friendly company throughout this PhD to help me accomplishing my PhD thesis. I greatly appreciate the support and encouragement which I received from Professor Mairi Maclean who initially introduced me to the study of social movements in organisation studies, and who guided me through the early part of my PhD journey before she left University of Exeter. I would also like to warmly thank my second supervisor Dr. David Guttormsen for his support and encouragement. Without my supervisors’ guidance and constant constructive feedback this PhD would not have been achievable.

I gratefully acknowledge the funding received towards my PhD from University of Exeter to pursue my PhD and attend international conferences. I would like to thank University of Exeter and its dedicated and supportive staff for providing me with all the needed facilities, different learning experiences and friendly environment. Second, I would like to thank all of the participants and activists in Palestine for their input, contribution and inspiration which they enrich me with. I would also like to say a heartfelt thank you to my Mum, Dad, Maram, Mousa, and Salah for always believing in me and encouraging me. And finally to Yaseen, who has been living with me through this challenging period, and who continuously encourages me to follow my dreams and passion.
Abstract

This thesis draws on a Bourdieusian perspective to explore the organisational mechanisms and dynamics in Palestinian politically motivated social movement. The consequent body of literature often lacks an integrated comprehension of Bourdieu’s theory, and his three main concepts: field, habitus, and capital. Little has been understood about Bourdieu’s concepts in social movement context to understand the activists’ behaviours, practices, and practical reasoning in structuring their choices and practices. Being inspired by Bourdieu, the researcher relationally analyses and bridges between different subjectivist and objectivist perspectives on social structures and agents’ practices through employing the relational tool-kit of Bourdieu. To further understand the dynamics, mechanisms, and interorganisational and intraorganisational relations in social movements, an interpretive approach was used to gather context-rich data from ordinary activists, core activists and organisers.

Findings showed that fields of practices, both external and internal, have specific doxa and species of capital, which shape the rules of the game inside this field, and its relationship with other fields. Data collected found that the ‘state field’ enjoys the most dominant doxa in the Palestinian context, which is deployed to legitimise the oppression of the politically-motivated youth movements that were studied. The external and internal fields’ doxa have a crucial influence on agents’ early socialisation, forms of capital, and field’s positioning. This variation and difference between the activists’ habitus caused multiple modes of domination and conflictual dynamics inside the movement itself in relation to features such as political credibility, recruiting parochialism, ideological conflicts, and repertoires of contention. This study contributes to a more dynamic understanding of the habitus as an open mediating concept and a reflexive space which transforms the activists’ behaviours and actions in some incidents.

The findings have implications for social movement practitioners, and other relevant stakeholders such as activism groups and bodies, pressure groups, unions, and human rights and civil society associations. It is suggested that future research examining
politically-motivated social movements should consider ethnographic methods to capture multiple observational data and contextual findings. In addition, it is suggested further examine habitus mechanisms in reproduction, change and transformation times.

**Keywords:** Bourdieu, social movements, Palestine, habitus, field, capital
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<td>SMS</td>
<td>Social Movement Studies</td>
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<td>SM</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

Overview of the Research

1.0 Introduction

This thesis draws on a Bourdieusian perspective to explore the organisational mechanisms and dynamics in Palestinian politically motivated social movements. This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It begins with a discussion of the background of the research and the nature of the substantive research problem. An outline of the research aim, objectives and methodology is presented. A brief summary of the contents of the chapters of the thesis are also presented.

1.1 Background to the Research

This research is primarily concerned with the organisational mechanisms and dynamics in Palestinian politically-motivated social movements. Positioned in the field of organisation studies (hereafter OS), this thesis discusses the relevance of Bourdieu’s theory of practice for relationally capturing various organisational practices, mechanisms and dynamics in politically motivated social movements. Bourdieu rejects the opposition between structure-agency, macro-micro, objectivism-subjectivism antinomies, and urges researchers to bridge and transcend these oppositions into a broader knowledge framework, which he calls it the ‘general science of practices’ (Bourdieu, 1977a). Therefore, this research believes that Bourdieu’s theory of practice will allow the researcher to overcome this structure-agency dualism through reconceptualising both the internal and external relations in organisations which allow us to investigate multiple relations, processes and dynamics within social movements per se and within its wider social context.
Bourdieu (1977) has rarely been used to theorise social movements\(^1\), however, this thesis proposes that Bourdieu’s theory of practice is particularly well-suited for a fruitful conceptual cross-fertilisation between the Bourdieusian theory of practice and the theorisation of social movements. This marriage is able to address problematic issues pertaining to agency and structure, mobilisation, recruitment, conflictual relationships, mechanisms and reproduced structures in understanding different aspects of social movements (Bourdieu, 1986; 1992).

Moreover, rooted in the field of OS, this thesis is novel in deploying the three main concepts of Pierre Bourdieu; field, habitus, and capital (Bourdieu, 1986; 1990), in order to capture various interorganisational and intraorganisational relations, organising processes, and organisational networks in a politically motivated social movement.

Despite increasing interest in organisational analysis towards the work of Bourdieu (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Golsorkhi et al., 2009), Golsorkhi et al (2009:1) mention that “the consequent body of literature often lacks an integrated comprehension of Bourdieusian theory and therefore fails to fully exploit its potentialities”. Whilst field and capital are familiar concepts in organisation research, and are highly valuable to understand social movements, the third concept in Bourdieu’s triad, habitus, has been applied to the study of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and social movements (Crossley, 2002; 2003; 2011) only a handful of times. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that the concept of habitus offers a powerful means of linking micro-and macro level processes in organisational theory. However, in OS research, habitus has been mainly studied within the framework of the organisation which the habitus is embedded in. A limited number of scholars, for example Nick Crossley, have employed the concept of habitus in a social movement context to understand the activists’ behaviours, or their practical reasoning in structuring their choices (Crossley, 2002; 2003).

Historically, there has been a shift in social movement theorisation from the structural-functionalist perspective to the emergence and articulation of new social movements (hereafter NSM). The structural-functionalist standpoint was once the dominant account of movement emergence, but its popularity has dwindled due both to changing perceptions of social movements, and the numerous empirical criticisms that have been made by social movement theorists (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Theories of

\(^1\) Bourdieu’s work has been used in some social movement studies (see Bilic, 2010; Crossley, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008)
breakdown, structural strains, and relative deprivation have been critiqued for their limited focus on ‘macro changes’ and structural variables (see Durkheim, 1933; LeBon, 1960; Sighele, 1899; Trade, 1903), leaving no explanation as to how participants coalesce or how activities spread between locales. The organisational level of analysis was largely ignored, and holistic analyses of a movement’s processes, dynamics, resources, strategies and life cycles were theoretically and empirically under-researched (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 2006; McAdam and Scott, 2005).

By the mid-1960s, demands were growing for a theory that could capture the new characteristics of social movements, which involved a different generation, new types of conflicts and changing mechanisms. Socio-structural changes within post-industrial society and the new, diverse and more fluid characteristics of protesters’ values, beliefs and social class also helped to generate NSM approaches. Simultaneously, OS and Social Movement Studies (hereafter SMS) experienced an active and flourishing interchange of learning between the two disciplines (McAdam and Scott, 2005). However, social movement scholars (Davis, McAdam, Scott, and Zald, 2005) reveal that, until very recently, few scholars have bridged OS and SMS (see Campbell, 2005; Clemens and Minkoff, 2004).

This thesis bridges this gap by recognising the importance of applying theories and concepts of OS to develop a comprehensive conceptual framework that identifies the emergence, mobilisation, dynamics and outcomes of social movements. This study contributes to the theoretical development of both areas of scholarship and provides a cross-fertilised understanding to better integrate and synthesise the possibility for rapprochement with these theoretical perspectives. For example, Bourdieu’s concept of field contributes in a better understanding of the different fields of practices which influence the movement’s emergence and dynamics. The concept of field enables an understanding of the ways in which social movements are related to their environment as well as the types of relationships they have with each other and other agents, groups and institutions. Moreover, the concept of habitus provides a relational understanding of the activists’ structured structures, behaviours, and practical reasoning. Moreover, Bourdieu has little to say about habitus change or habitus transformation, therefore, the thesis promises a theoretical contribution which underlines the consequences of activism during the ‘post-activism’ stage through examining the habitus change or habitus transformation.
Furthermore, the most influential theory/model which reflects insights from organisation studies to our understanding of formal organisation is resource mobilisation theory (see Zald and McCarthy, 1977; 1978). It focuses on the effectiveness of social movements by examining their organisational bases, resource accumulation, mobilisation infrastructure, and linkages between the movement and other actors (see Zald and McCarthy, 1977; 1978). This model analyses movements as Social Movement Organisations (hereafter SMO) and stresses that movements are best conceptualised as professional, or modern, SMOs relying on the affluent middle class for funds, entrepreneurial leadership, and organisation.

A number of criticisms can be raised here. First, like other social movement theories, resource mobilisation theory reflects the general dualisms in the research of social movements. Social movement theories either highlight the role of the outside structures and resources, or the constructive and cognitive actions of actors. Clearly, resource mobilisation theory adopts an objectivist approach to understanding the influence of outside structures and resources on social movement emergence. This theory finds difficulties explaining how important cognitive or relational aspects such as values, feelings or behavioural dimensions relate to social movements. Second, in describing agency, this theory treats agency in a similar manner to rational choice theory. Resource mobilisation theory understands social actors’ behaviour as rational, goal-oriented, self-interested and institutionalised strategic behaviour. Therefore, to understand agency in any terms other than rational strategic action is a central problem of resource mobilisation theory.

Third, resource mobilisation theory is limited in analysing movements as only structured, institutionalised, professional movements. This understanding could face difficulties when exploring organisational practices and processes in informal ‘alternative’ mobilisations, such as grassroots struggles and resistance against repressive authorities, or even an emergent mobilisation. Therefore, by studying this type of ‘alternative’ non-hegemonic form of politically-motivated movement, this research contributes towards an understanding of the processes of organising and the diverse dynamics in these types of movements (Della Porta, 2014; Howley, 2008; Klandermans

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2 Most influential social movement theories are political process theory (Tilly, 1978); resource mobilisation theory (Zald and McCarthy, 1973; 1977); framing (Snow and Benford, 1988); and collective identity (Mueller 1992; Friedman and McAdam 1992).
and Staggenborg, 2002). It will also face difficulties to explain messy practices in informal mobilisation rather than real deliberation and decision-making processes in formal structured movements. By focusing on Palestine, this study also contributes to the relative dearth in organisation studies scholarship examining organisational practices from the global south, which has typically been side-lined by Western/Northern perspectives. Exploring the politically-motivated social movements in Palestine brings rich theoretical and empirical findings and insights. Facing a double repression in Palestine, from the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian Authority, positions them as a different and unique political field with a particular variation of hegemonic dominant doxa, which makes studying this field a particularly rich research experience.

1.2 The Palestinian Context

Within organisation studies we hear relatively little about Palestine. Therefore, this section is going to outline the historical, political, cultural, and economic context this thesis is embedded in. This section provides the reader with a solid understanding of the Palestinian historical context, in addition to the current socioeconomic situations and challenges. Firstly, the history of Palestine is going to be briefly outlined, alongside a summary of its political background. Secondly, the cultural and social background of Palestine will be discussed.

1.2.1 Historical and Political Background

The starting point of the struggle is referred to by most authors as beginning with the events of 1948 and the establishment of Israel. Palestinians refer to the events of 1948 in terms of the subsequent expulsion of roughly half the Palestinian population from their homes. They also relate to the destruction and Judaisation/de-Palestinisation of hundreds of Palestinian villages during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949, referred to as the Nakba, or ‘catastrophe’. Palestinians also describe their present conditions of life under Israeli settler-colonialism as a continuation of those events. The Israeli historian and socialist activist, Ilan Pappé, clarifies in his book ‘The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine’ that between 1896 and 1948, hundreds of thousands of Jews resettled from Europe to what was then British-controlled Palestine, including large numbers forced out of Europe during the Holocaust. Masalha’s (1992) book ‘Expulsion of the
Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionist Political Thought’, explains how the agenda of ‘transferring’ Palestinians was, and is, in the Zionist political thought (Masalha, 1992). From the founder of the Zionist movement, Theodor Herzl, to the main leaders of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine, cleansing the land was seen as valid option. As one of the movement’s most liberal thinkers, Leo Motzkin, put in 1917:

*Our thought is that the colonisation of Palestine has to go in two directions: Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel and the resettlement of the Arabs may seem at first unacceptable economically, but is nonetheless practical. It does not require too much money to resettle a Palestinian village on another land.*

Zionism emerged in the late 1880s in central and eastern Europe as a national revival movement, prompted by the growing pressure on Jews in those regions either to assimilate totally or risk continuing persecution (Khalidi, 1971; Pappé, 2004). By the beginning of the twentieth century, most of the leaders of the Zionist movement associated this national revival with the colonisation of Palestine. Until the British mandate in Palestine that lasted thirty-one years, Zionism was a blend of nationalist ideology and colonialist practice. Zionists made up no more than five per cent of the country’s overall population at that time (Pappé, 2007).

In 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, gave the Zionist movement his promise to establish a national home for the Jews in Palestine. By the end of the 1920s, it was clear that this proposal had a potentially violent core, as it had already claimed the lives of hundreds of Palestinians and Jews. Two uprisings had taken place, in 1929 and 1936, in the form of a popular rebellion by Palestinians in opposition to the growing Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the expansion of their settlements (Pappé, 2004). After three years of Israeli attacks on the Palestinian countryside, the British military subdued the revolt. The Palestinian leadership was exiled and many of the Palestinian villagers involved were arrested, wounded, or killed (Khalidi, 2006). The absence of most of the Palestinian leadership and viable Palestinian fighting units gave the Jewish forces in 1947 an easy route through the Palestinian countryside.

According to many historians (Khalidi, 1971; 1992; 2004; Masalha; 1992; 2003; Pappe, 2004; 2007) continuous, well-planned, and systematic ethnic cleansing of 750,000
Palestinians happened between 1940 and 1949, until the state of Israel was declared in 1948. In addition, the Israeli forces turned 750,000 Palestinian civilians into refugees. Between 1947-1948 a massive section of the Palestinian population was internally and externally displaced\(^3\). The ongoing Palestinian experience of forced displacement has never stopped. Today, it is estimated that there are more than 7 million Palestinian refugees and internally displaced Palestinians. This number includes: 5.7 million 1948 Palestinian refugees and their descendants, 940,000 refugees displaced in 1967, an estimated 335,000 Palestinians were internally displaced in Israel, and an estimated 129,000 internally displaced Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. To the present day, Israel continues with its ethnic cleansing strategies. For example, from July 2010 to July 2011, Al-Araqib\(^4\) has been destroyed over 20 times as part of Blueprint Negev, a plan to bring 250,000 Jewish settlers to the Naqab. Today, more than half of the Palestinian people continue to live outside Palestine as refugees, denied their right to return to their homes [Source: BADIL Resource Center 2011\(^5\)]

Returning to the political and historical timeline, in 1964 the Arab League founded the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in an attempt to keep control of the Palestinian arena and Palestinian activism. In 1969, Yasser Arafat became the chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, where he was preeminent among the founding leaders of the Fateh movement in Kuwait. Finally, in 1996 Arafat was elected the president of the Palestinian Authority (hereafter PA). Arafat dominated the Palestinian political scene for over two generations, where he deserves credit for some successes. However, Arafat could be blamed for some of the failings of Fateh, the PLO, and the PA, but was not solely responsible for these failings. It is important here to point out that Fateh was remarkably successful in dominating Palestinian politics from soon after its establishment in the late 1950s until Arafat’s death (Khalidi, 2006).

Moreover, the political structure of the Palestinian society can be understood through its varied political parties and organisations. As explained, Fatah, formerly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, is a secular Palestinian political party and

\(^3\) Internally displaced Palestinians (IDP) are originating from that part of Palestine in which Israel was established on in 1948, who were displaced from their homes during the 1947-49 Nakba, but remained inside what became the State of Israel. These Palestinians are not allowed to hold the Palestinian identity/passport and hold the Israeli passport instead of being externally displaced. During Nakba more than 750,000 Palestinians were ethnic cleansed for the purpose of establishing Israel outside Palestine and were prevented until today from returning back to their homes and country.

\(^4\) Al-Araqib is a Bedouin village in the Naqab located in Northern Palestine.

the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organisation (hereafter PLO) which was established in 1959. In 1967 a Palestinian political dissent party, which is considered a Marxist-Leninist secular political party, had been established, which is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (hereafter PFLP). Other dissent parties, such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (hereafter DFLP) and the Palestinian People’s Party (hereafter PPP) had been established in the 1970s. Later in 1987, the Islamic fundamentalist organisation, Hamas, was founded.

In December 1987, the first Intifada, a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation and its illegal expansion in Palestine, had begun and lasted until the Madrid Conference\(^6\) in 1991. The uprising began in the Jabalia refugee camp\(^7\) after an Israeli soldier truck collided with a civilian car, killing four Palestinians. Out of this incident, a popular movement arose, involving civil disobedience, general strikes, refusal to work in Israeli settlements, refusal to pay taxes, and refusal to drive Palestinian cars in Israeli settlements. It also involved boycotts of Israeli civil institutions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and widespread throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails at the Israeli Army and its infrastructure within the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Said, 2000; 2004). Over a six year period, Israel killed an estimated 1,162-1,204 Palestinians. Between 23,600 and 29,000 Palestinian children required medical treatment from Israeli beatings in the first two years. Among Israelis, 100 civilians and 60 Israeli soldiers were killed, and more than 1400 Israeli civilians and 1700 soldiers were injured (source: B’TSELEM: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories).

The promise of the Madrid conference in 1991 and the Camp David Summit in 2000 was to bring peace to the region, but it failed dramatically and another intifada started in 2005. The second intifada caused high numbers of causalities among civilians as well as combatants: the Palestinians through numerous suicide bombings and gunfire, and the Israelis through tanks, gunfire, air attacks, and numerous targeted killings and leaders’ assassinations (Khalidi, 2004; Said, 2000). The death toll, including both military and civilian, is estimated to be about 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis.

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\(^6\) Madrid Conference was a peace conference held in Madrid on 30\(^{th}\) October 1991, hosted by Spain and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. This conference was an attempt by the international community to revive Israeli- Palestinian peace process through negotiations.

\(^7\) Jabalia refugee is a Palestinian refugee camp located 3 kilometres north of Jabalia in Northern Gaza.
In February 2005, the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit took place to end the second intifada, when the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed to end this episode. However, Israeli occupation and Palestinian resistance did not stop in the following years. It is important to mention that the total number of Palestinian political prisoners in Israel is 6,279; out of this number there are 465 administrative detainees, 300 children, and 65 female prisoners. All these political prisoners are facing harsh and humiliating conditions, such as isolation, and restrictions on their access to family visits, medical services, and education.

The so-called ‘Palestinian-Israeli conflict’ has drawn considerable attention over the decades from the world’s media, as well as policy makers, political analysts, scholars from the academic community, and people and activists from all over the globe. Some academics define “the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an existential conflict between two people, two identity groups, each of which claims the same territory for its national homeland and political state” (Kelman, 2007:288). Others would argue that the mainstream narrative of the ‘Palestinian-Israeli conflict’ does not represent balanced forms of power and authority, and therefore the case should be looked at, and analysed from, a colonised-coloniser perspective, rather than a conflict of two balanced powers (Tartir, 2013). The Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which began with the Oslo Accords in 1993, has failed continuously for several reasons. Khatib (2011: 23) specifies the reasons which led to continuous failure of the peace process as; “the asymmetry of power between both sides; the weak Palestinian negotiation performance; the division between the inside and outside Palestinian leaderships; the Israeli inflexibility and lack of interest in sustainable peace; the involved actors’ different readings and interpretations of the agreements clauses; the limitations of the third parties problematic involvement; the bias of the United States

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8 An administrative detainee is a procedure that allows Israeli occupation forces to hold prisoners indefinitely on secret information without charging them or allowing them to stand trial. The secret information or evidence cannot be accessed by the detainee nor his/her lawyer, and can according to Israeli military orders, an administrative detention order be renewed for an unlimited time. The court issues an administrative detention order for a maximum period of six months, subject to renewal.

9 All of these key issues regarding political prisoners could be found out in the Prisoners Support and Human Rights Association’s website and documents http://www.addameer.org/

10 The Oslo Accords took place in 1993. The Oslo Accords are a set of agreements between the government of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The Oslo Accords aimed to achieve peace through fulfilling the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and recognition by the PLO of the State of Israel, and the recognition by Israel of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and as a partner in negotiations (Freedman, 1998).
in favour of Israel and its exclusive domination on the process; and finally the expansion of the Jewish settlements/colonies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”.

For many Palestinians, the two decades of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations resulted only in an expansion of the Israeli settler-colonial occupation, the entrenchment of the apartheid status, and the evaporation of the Palestinian peoples’ dreams to establish their future independent state, which would be on only twenty two per cent of the historic area of Palestine (Khatib, 2011). In 1993, the Oslo Accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is an interim self-governing body, established to govern the Gaza Strip and Areas A and B of the West Bank which were created as a consequence of the 1993 Oslo Accords. As figures 4.1 and 4.2 shows (B’TSELEM, 2012), the PA was designated to have exclusive control over both security-related and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas (Area A) and only civilian control over Palestinian rural areas (Area B). The remainder of the territories, including Israeli settlements, the Jordan Valley region and bypass roads between Palestinian communities are under the Israeli control (Area C). The administrative responsibilities accorded to the PA were limited to civil matters and internal security, and did not include external security or foreign affairs. Although Area A is controlled by the PA, Israel has allowed 588,000 Israeli settlers to settle in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and has established around 99 fixed checkpoints in the West Bank, in addition to the 288 surprise flying checkpoints (B’Tselem, 2013). All of these military checkpoints harden and obstruct Palestinian people’s movement in between their cities, villages, universities, etc. in their everyday life. Palestinians are also forbidden to establish any form of public transportation like airport, port, or trains. Some Palestinians are also forbidden to travel outside Palestinian as a result of their political activism, without any legal foundations.
In the Palestinian legislative elections on 25\textsuperscript{th} January 2006, Hamas emerged victorious and nominated Ismail Haniyeh as the Authority's Prime Minister. However, the national unity Palestinian government effectively collapsed when a violent conflict between Hamas and Fatah erupted, mainly in the Gaza Strip. Subsequently, the Gaza Strip was ruled by the Hamas government from 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2007 until today. In the West Bank, Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Hamas-led government and assigned Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister. This action was not acceptable to Hamas, and resulted in two separate administrations, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West bank and a rival of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. The reconciliation process to unite the Palestinian governments has achieved some progress over the years, but has failed to produce a re-unification.

All direct aid the PA was suspended on the 7\textsuperscript{th} April 2006, as a result of the Hamas victory in the parliamentary elections. Before Hamas’ victory, the PA received financial assistance from the European Union and the United States (approximately USD$1 billion combined in 2005). Previous research has mentioned the institutionalised corruption in which the PA’s political and economic structural systems are embedded. Dana (2015) points out the particular features of the corrupted political system, which the PA and its institutions are accused of. As this research is studying social movements
in the West Bank and not in Gaza, the relevant government to be discussed and analysed is the Palestinian Authority, therefore, the study will not discuss the governing authority in Gaza, which is Hamas. More about the PA context and its relationship with the Palestinian popular and other political parties is going to be further discussed in the analysis Chapters.

1.2.2 Palestinian Socio-economic Context

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics\(^\text{11}\) (hereafter PCBS), the Palestinian population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, inclusive of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, was estimated to 6.08 million people in 2014. As this thesis studies social movement in the West Bank, all the provided information under this section focuses on the socio-economic context in the West Bank. According to the Central Intelligence Agency\(^\text{12}\), the population in the West Bank was estimated as 2,747,943 in July 2017. 83% of the population in the West Bank are Palestinian Arabs and 17% are Jewish. The 83% Palestinian Arab population is 80-85% Muslim and 1.0-2.5% Christian. In late 2015, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is estimated to be upwards of 588,000: 382,916 in the West Bank and 205,220 settlers in Israeli neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem.

The continuous illegal building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank goes against international law,\(^\text{13}\) and the Israeli highly restrictive economic policies continue to disrupt labour and trade flows, affecting the territory’s industrial capacity, limiting imports and exports, and constraining Palestinian private sector development. The PA economic situation relies heavily on foreign donation aid for its budgetary needs and economic activity. Therefore, a lack of economic capital in the PA political field facilitates the continued expressions of power, domination and political intervention by Israel. Haddad (2016) shows how any serious Palestinian autonomy was deliberately designed to fail from the beginning. He argues that Palestine has become a very


\(^{12}\) Central Intelligence agency [Online] [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html] [Assessed: 12\(^\text{th}\) September 2017]

\(^{13}\) The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits countries from moving population into territories occupied in a war. The United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the International Committee of Red Cross, the International Court of Justice and the High Contracting Parties to the Convention have all affirmed that the fourth Geneva Convention does apply to in the case of the illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
profitable business for any number of engaged actors from donors to Western states. Many Western donors in the 1990s and now claim that they are acting in good faith through funnelling more money into the PA, and yet after decades of ‘entrenched cronyism and Israeli occupation, at what point should the money simply stop, the PA be abolished, and Israel forced to manage its own occupation and the people with it?

Elizabeth Young (2006) writes in the Washington Institute, Improving the Quality of U.S. Middle East Policy that the economy of the Palestinian quasi-state is highly dependent on Israeli decisions and policies on trade, Palestinian workers in Israel, and the tax revenue Israel collects. This has a number of consequences. Firstly, all Palestinian exports and imports must pass through Israeli control to get checked to ensure no arms are smuggled. Many of the exported consumer products and humanitarian aid have been spoiled in trucks while waiting for the Israeli crossing points to reopen after twenty or thirty days.

Second, 22% of employed Palestinians work in Israel or in Israeli settlements. According to the World Bank, in the year 2000 the Palestinian economy was one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world. Third, as part of the complicated economic relationship between Israel and the PA outlined in the 1994 Paris Protocol\(^{14}\), Israel collects a duty on any foreign imports destined for the West Bank and Gaza, and additionally collects a value added tax (VAT) on goods and services from Israel destined for the Palestinian territories. In response to these economic and political restrictions, a Palestinian-led movement for freedom, justice, and equality was founded in 2005. The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement is the broadest Palestinian civil society coalition that calls for boycotting, divestment, and the application of sanctions against Israel. It represents the three major components of the Palestinian people: the refugees in exile, Palestinians under occupation in the West

\(^{14}\) The Protocol on Economic Relations, also called the Paris Protocol, was an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), signed on 29th April 1994. Originally, the Protocol on Economic Relations was meant to remain in force for an interim period of five years. As of 2016, however, the Protocol was still applicable. Essentially, the Protocol integrated the Palestinian economy into the Israeli one through a customs union, with Israel to control all borders, both its own and those of the Palestinian Authority. Palestine remains without independent gates to the world economy. The protocol regulates the relationship and interaction between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in six major areas: customs, taxes, labour, agriculture, industry and tourism. In addition to the Tax system where Israel collects and transfers to the Palestinian Authority the import taxes on goods that were intended for the Occupied Territories. Israel may unilaterally established and change the taxes imposed on important good. For example, if Israel raises its VAT, Palestine has to follow it. The Paris Protocol (2012) B’TSELEM: The Israeli Information Center for human rights in the Occupied Territories.
Bank and Gaza Strip, and the discriminated Palestinian citizens living within the Israeli state.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite the hardship of the economic situation in Palestine, the status of education shows a promising picture. Since 1948, education has served as a central means to empower the Palestinian struggle and help them to face the economic capital dependency through cultural capital empowerment (Heiberg and Ovensen, 1993; Turner and Shweiki, 2014). This is despite having an insufficient schooling infrastructure, a lack of adequately trained teachers and lecturers, and a lack of access to schooling in marginalised areas, which have been caused by the Israeli occupation, Palestinians enjoy 96.3\% of literacy\textsuperscript{16} (PCBS, 2014). Women have made great strides in literacy over the past two decades, with the rate jumping from 78.6\% in 1995 to the current 94.1\%. Amongst males, 98.4\% are literate.

Finally, the Palestinian culture is influenced by multiple cultures and religions, which have been embedded in the history of Palestine. Cultural contributions in the fields of art, literature, music, poetry, theatre, costume, and cuisine express the Palestinian identity, despite the geographical separation between the Palestinian territories, Palestinians in Israel, and Palestinian refugees in the diaspora. More about the Palestinian socio-economic context is going to be clarified in the Analysis Chapters.

1.3 Research Problem and Contribution

In light of the research gaps outlined above, the purpose of this research is to explore the organisational mechanisms and dynamics in politically motivated social movements in Palestine, guided by a Bourdieusian approach. The rationale is that by conducting the study within politically motivated social movements, the dialectic relationship between subjectivity and objectivity would be bridged. This promise of bridging this dualism is going to be employed through considering social movements as dynamic social spaces which are characterised by a specific logic, structure, relations and valued forms of capital. In addition, the researched social movement is always understood in relation to other fields, such as the economic field and the political field. Moreover, to understand

\textsuperscript{15} More about the BDS movement could be found on its website [Online] \url{https://bdsmovement.net/} [Assessed 15\textsuperscript{th} September 2017]

\textsuperscript{16} This rate is even higher than that of the UNDP 2014 “high human development” category average.
different mechanisms and dynamics in social movements, the thesis is keen to operationalise and analyse the different structured practices in the movements, how they become structured, how were they reproduced, and how they could structure other structures?

That being said, and being inspired by a Bourdieusian relational mode of thinking, this thesis pursues a promising avenue to overcome the structure/agency dualism within the social movement discourse, and to understand the crucial relationship between structure and agency in producing and reproducing objective meanings through the actions and interaction of agents.

Rooted in the field of OS, this thesis captures hidden organisational practices and mechanisms in these non-hegemonic, loosely organised ‘alternative’ politically motivated social movements. Moreover, this study contributes towards better understanding through developing a comprehensive conceptual framework that identifies the emergence, mobilisation, dynamics and outcomes of social movements.

1.4 Research Objectives and Methodology

Guided by this aim, the specific objectives which emerged over the course of the study were:

- *To relationally describe the various fields of practice, by analysing the ways in which these fields are interrelated in politically motivated social movement.*

- *To better understand the dialectic relationship of subjectivity and objectivity in politically motivated social movement by examining the agents’ practical reasoning, habitus, in this context.*

- *To further understanding the dynamics of competition, conflictual mechanisms and power struggles through examining the agents’ habitus, acquisition of forms of capital and field positioning.*

- *To examine the various internal processes and organisational relations in the political field per se, through employing the Bourdieusian theory of practice.*
A rigorous in-depth qualitative research framework was designed to allow the researcher to capture detailed, descriptive and comparable data on politically motivated social movements. Presentation and justification for the primary research approach is outlined in Chapter Three.

1.5 Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is presented in six chapters. Having outlined the contents of the thesis in Chapter One, Chapter Two reviews the shift in theorising social movements from a structural-functionalist perspective, to the conceptualisation of new social movement (NSM), and resource mobilisation theory. A review of the extant literature highlights some of the present tensions and gaps in knowledge concerning social movements. This Chapter reviews and outlines Bourdieu’s relational perspective, drawing attention to how the relationships between structure, habitus and social struggle can enhance our understanding and theorisation of social movements. The Chapter concludes with an overview of the promising avenue to overcome the structure/agency dualism within the social movement discourse guided by the Bourdieusian approach.

Chapter Three outlines the research aim and objectives and discusses in detail the interpretive approach underpinning the research and justifies the decisions made in the research design with respect to data collection, sampling and analysis.

Chapters Four and Five present an analysis of the data collected for this thesis. Chapter Four focuses on the analysis of institutionalised fields (external) and internal fields of social movements, and the ways in which these fields interrelate. The analysis also underlines the importance of habitus as a powerful analytical tool to understand and theorise the research data during different phases of the movements’ life cycles. The Palestinian political context is outlined in this chapter to provide a solid understanding for the reader throughout the analysis.

Chapter Five analyses in more detail the processes, dynamics, conflictual mechanisms and organisational relations of the investigated social movements. The first section of the chapter provides an analysis of the interorganisational and intraorganisational relations through understanding different modes of domination in a comprehensive Bourdieusian framework.
Finally, Chapter Six summarises key aspects of the thesis and discusses the implications of the findings on social movement practitioners and other relevant stakeholders such as activism bodies. Finally, the limitations of the study are highlighted and suggestions are made for future research.
CHAPTER TWO

Social Movements

2.1 Introduction

Social movements are about resistance and change, where they have been significant in the moments of change and evolution. They are understood as collectives which are concerned with changing political, social, cultural, and personal structures to bring substantial change into a social structure. Social movements have been analysed and conceptualised from various perspectives, which have offered either too broad or too narrow definitions according to many social movement theorists. However, it is generally agreed that social movements are ‘collective’ ventures of mobilisation which emerge out of dissatisfaction with current experiences of life, or structural social arrangements that actors seek to change and reformulate.

At first, social movements were widely viewed as a form of societal disintegration which threatens the social fabric and destroys many social arrangements. Protesters have been portrayed as irrational, malintegrated, and even psychopathological actors who are motivated by a desire for rapid change and social disintegration (see Durkheim, 1933; LeBon, 1960; Sighele, 1899; Trade, 1903). Later on, crucial industrial and social radical changes have produced a new wave of theorising called new social movements (hereafter NSM) (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). NSMs brought different loci of conflict and issues; struggle over the quality of the everyday, individual self-realisation, cultural reproduction, and social integration which, in turn, is what motivates this study. This chapter presents a literature review on social movements, and explores the organisational mechanisms and dynamics in Palestinian politically-motivated social movements. Rooted in the field of organisation studies, this thesis discusses the relevance of Bourdieu’s theory of practice for relationally capturing various organisational practices, mechanisms and dynamics in politically motivated social
movements. Moreover, this research deploys the three main conceptual concepts of Bourdieu; field, habitus and capital.

Moreover, this research proposes that there can be a fruitful connection made between social movement theories and Bourdieu’s theory of practice, allowing a reconceptualisation of both the internal and external relations in organisations which allow us to capture multiple relations, processes and dynamics within social movements per se and within its wider social context. Being inspired by a Bourdieusian relational mode of thinking, this study argues that activists’ practices in social movements can be deeply comprehended and investigated as structured and structuring, practical and engaged social activities. The Bourdieusian perspective is seen as a promising avenue to overcome the structure/agency dualism within the social movement discourse, and to understand the crucial relationship between structure and agency in producing and reproducing objective meanings through intentional actions and interaction of agents.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. First, the early structural-functionalist theorisation of social movement discourse is outlined, followed by a discussion of the theorisation of the ‘new social movement’. The main approaches of NSMs such as political opportunity, resources mobilisation, framing, and collective identity are presented and critically explored. Second, Bourdieu’s theory of practice and his main theoretical concepts of field, habitus, and capital are proposed as analytical tools to better understand social movement theories and activists’ practices. Third, the chapter moves to synthesise how social movement theories and the various structural and individualistic approaches could be viewed and explored from a Bourdieusian relational lens. Finally, the chapter explores how Bourdieu’s theory of practice enriches our understanding of social movements as structured and structuring structures, in addition to capturing the role of activists’ practices within social movements.

2.2 Social Movements: From Structural-Functionalism to Second Wave of Movement Theorising

Social movements were significant in different moments of change and evolution, in situations such as the French revolution and the North American labour movements (Zirakzadeh, 1997), and in the contemporary context, in social movements such as the
Arab uprisings, the indignados movement in Spain, the anti-austerity protests in Italy, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States (Castells, 2010). Social movements have been studied and analysed from different perspectives which makes the conceptualisation of ‘social movements’ a topic of much debate amongst scholars (Diani, 1992). Whilst nonviolent and democratic civil rights movements could be seen as social movement (Chong, 1991), so could the German Nazi Party of the 1930s (Arendt, 1951; Fromm, 1941; Hoffer, 1951). Interest groups, political parties, protest groups and coalitions could be (mis)understood as social movements, whilst they are not according to the sociologist Mario Diani (1992). This misunderstanding of categorising a distinct process as a social movement and thereby aligning them with revolutions, religious sects, political organisations, or campaigns, could lead to a terminology ambiguity and theoretical uncertainty, as the sociologist Mario Diani argues in several works (Diani, 1992; 2003; 2004; Diani and Bison; 2004). Besides the various proposed definitions, a conceptual consensus could be observed in characterising social movements as being collective-joint action (Zirakzadeh, 1997), change-oriented (Jenkins, 1981), based on informal networks of shared beliefs and solidarity (Diani, 1992) which could have some degree of organisation and temporal continuity (McAdam and Snow, 1997).

At the end of 1940s, sociologists deemed social movements as random, isolated, irrational, emotional and even psychopathological occurrences (Arendt, 1951; Hoffer, 1951; King, 1956; Kornhauser, 1959; Lipset, 1963). The mass society hypothesis, theories of crowd behaviour and mass psychosis all describe the participants of social movements as being not fully integrated societal members who aim to dissolve the social fabric and destroy desirable social arrangements (LeBon, 1960). Meanwhile, other sociologists such as Herbert Blumer (1969), Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian

17 The sociologist Mario Diani proposes in a number of pieces (Diani, 1992; 2003; 2004; Diani and Bison; 2004) a synthesis definition of what he thinks is a comprehensive conceptualisation of social movement. After analysing the main theoretical and empirical contributions of remarkable theorists of social movements like; Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Charles Tilly, Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci. Diani defined social movements as ‘networks of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in a political and/or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity’ (1992: 13).

18 These theories reflect classical perspectives which operate largely on both a social psychological level and functionalist structural level. The traditional argument within these theories is that social movement are by-products of rapid change and social disintegration which are triggered by strains, wars, economic downturns, and alike (see LeBon, 1960; Trade, 1903; Sighele, 1899; and Durkheim, 1933). Recent proponents usually view movement participants as irrational, malintegrated, alienated, and even psychopathological (see Hopper, 1950; Hoffer, 1951; Kornhauser, 1959; Lipset, 1963; King, 1956; Arendt, 1951). Participants are characterised by a kind of detachment, isolation, weak cultural integration mechanisms and lack attachment to secondary group structures and social ties. Thus, mass society theorists argues that within minimal level of social integration and group membership, integrated organisations such as religious groups, political parties, community organisations, trade unions, and voluntary associations, the occurrence of extremist activities and mass movements cannot be prevented or restrained (Morris and Herring, 1984).
(1957) rejected these psychology-based theories and argued that these spontaneous gatherings of individuals served a purpose in producing emergent collective identities through the actors’ social interactions which Blumer (1969) referred to as symbolic interaction19.

At that time, symbolic interactionism and collective behaviourism approaches gained a distinctive position in understanding social movements and the formation of new forms of collective identity. These approaches called attention to the emergence of new norms in the ‘adoptive behaviour’, processes of self-regulation and the spontaneous processes of social learning and creativity in collective behaviour (Blumer, 1951; Turner and Killian, 1987, originally 1957). In the early stages, a structural functionalism approach had been adopted to explain the emergence of collectivities, protests and movements. Scholars such as Durkheim (1933), Talcott Parsons (1969), Robert Merton (1968), Neil Smelser (1962), James Davies (1971) and Ted Gurr (1970) are all known for adopting structural-functionalist orientation to interpret the genesis of collective behaviours. ‘Mass-society’ and ‘breakdown’ theorists believed that emergence of collectivities and protests are symptoms and manifestations of the disintegration, detachment, isolation and loose cultural and social integration to secondary group structures and social ties. Therefore, proponents generally viewed movement participants as irrational, malintegrated, alienated, and even psychopathological actors who are motivated by a desire for rapid change and social disintegration, which are triggered by strains, wars, economic downturns, and the like (LeBon, 1960; Trade, 1903; Sighele, 1899; and Durkheim, 1933).

One of the landmark theoretical contributions to interpret the genesis of social movements is Neil Smelser’s account of different sorts of ‘structural strains’ or ‘grievances’. In his book ‘Theory of Collective Behaviour’, he provides a synthesis by applying a grand theory which argues that existence of prior structural conditions, i.e. ‘structural strains’, are essential to explain the occurrence of a specific episode of collective behaviour. Thus, when people panic because they face some extreme danger or sharp deprivation such as an inflationary price rise, or suffer from injustice or

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19 Blumer’s argument based that human beings not only react to each other’s actions, instead they interpret and respond based on the meanings which they attach to such actions mediated by the use of symbols (Blumer, 1969; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). His symbolic interactionist perspective looks at the spontaneous form of collective action and behaviour as a form of collective behaviour where routines of normal, institutionalised behaviour might be broken through social creativity in the new forms of ‘symbolic interaction’. Symbolic interactionism views meanings as social products that are formed in and through the defining activities of the interaction between people.
inequality in existing social arrangements, they are experiencing a kind of ‘structural strain’, which in turn produces specific collective behaviours such as panic, craze, the outburst of hostility, or a movement to reform (Smelser, 1962). Smelser’s theoretical framework was known as the ‘value-added model’. His structural theoretical model contributes towards a better understanding of the specific structural conditions that must combine and interact, in a defined pattern, to determine more specifically which behavioural collectivities might occur, and which other possibilities could be ruled out (Smelser, 1962).

Another structural-functionalism theory which investigates the emergence of social movements is ‘Relative Deprivation’ (hereafter RD). Gurr (1970) is one of the outstanding recent proponents of RD theory, alongside Davies (1962), Runciman (1966), and Crosby (1976) who all argue that RD is a term used to reflect the tension that occurs from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, which leads people to violence. The discrepancy between what individuals believe they should have and what they have actually acquired leads to the frustration-anger-aggression mechanisms that provide the basic motivational link between RD and the potential for collective violence (Crosby, 1976; Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Although frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, if the anger is induced by sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt frustration, aggression will quite possibly occur, a point underscored by Gurr (1970).

The structural-functionalism standpoint was once the dominant account of movement emergence, but its popularity has mostly fallen out of favour due to both changing perceptions of social movements and numerous empirical criticisms by NSM theorists (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Theories of breakdown, structural strains and relative deprivation have been mainly critiqued on their limited focus on ‘macro changes’ and the subsequent psychological changes in individuals. In other words, they have paid little attention to the ‘nuts and bolts’ of social movements. No explanation was provided

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20 Smelser’s theoretical framework, the value-added model, focuses on specific structural conditions that must be combined and interacted to determine more specifically which episode of collective behaviour might occur. He concludes that six conditions are essential for a particular kind of collective behaviour to emerge. The model maintains that the interaction between structural conduciveness, the peculiarities of a particular society, specifically structural characteristics, create different opportunities and avenues to protest; structural strain, the actual underlying causes of complain, as inequality, injustice; generalised beliefs, the role of ideology and ideologists in shaping the way protest and complain is understood by actors; precipitating factor, the specific sparks that ignite protest; mobilisation for action, how to bring the affected group into action and; social control, the way established authorities encourage, prevent, interrupt, deflect or inhibit collective behaviour, produce collective behaviour episodes (Smelser, 1962).
regarding how participants coalesce or how activities spread between locales, for example. Another substantial criticism which the classical approaches received was related to their empirically unproven but implicit assumption that collective behaviour or protests are automatic reactions towards a strain or stressful event (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

2.2.1 Second Wave of Movement Theorising

Until the middle of the 1960s, social movements were conceptualised as dangerous collective behaviours which might be threatening to the social order if it had been left uncontrolled. Furthermore, the collective behaviour and strain theories failed to capture the new characteristics of protests and protesters. A shift occurred in the social movement discourse due to the emergence of a new generation of movement specialists and activists. Rule (1988) shows that activists in, for instance, black and student movements, had proved that they were rational and competent individuals, who collectively seek change, articulate social problems and create a sense of consciousness. They were remarkably pragmatic in their politics, civil and non-violent in their interpersonal behaviour, and ethical in their principle and long-term social goals. This unpredicted phenomenon made the new generation of social theorists respond more sympathetically to these protest movements and, in turn, their theoretical judgement of movements as irrational and absurd occurrences have been shifted and changed (Rule, 1988).

The pivotal turning point, as Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1985) argue, was the emergence of the post-industrial society or the ‘modern society’ after the Second World War. Many strong, institutionalised, and reformist social democratic labour movements in countries of Western Europe had been established by the support of various social democratic parties that were concerned with creating a political consensus of what constitutes ‘welfare’ (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). Simultaneously, the rhythms of modern life, in other words, the day-to-day social interactions in heavily-industrialised cities had produced a wealth of local associations that facilitated people to meet, discuss common grievances, and plan collective actions. For instance, a higher incidence of urban migration was witnessed from southern African-Americans to cities in the North during the African-American civil rights movements (Zirakzadeh, 1997). This emergence of the post-industrial society reflected fundamental shifts in social structure,
which it was argued produced so-called ‘new social movements’ (Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 1985). These post-industrial movements were called ‘new’ social movements to distinguish them from the conventional, institutionalised ‘old’ social movements. This distinction was driven from the scholars’ belief, explicitly the advocate sociologist Alain Touraine (1977, 1981, and 1985), that these new movements engage different actors, different loci of conflict and different issues than those of the industrial society.

NSMs struggle over the quality of the everyday life rather than politics of class. ‘The crisis of class’ of the industrial society, as Eder (1985) put it, is not what these new social movements struggle over. On the contrary, they represent the transition from an industrial to a knowledge-oriented post-industrial society, which produces these new ‘post-materialistic’ values. Habermas (1981) considers NSMs as a silent revolution heralding new forms of conflicts in society which shift the ‘old politics’ of economic, social, and domestic, to the ‘new politics’ of quality of life, individual self-realisation, cultural reproduction, social integration and human rights. Moreover, NSMs consciousness of social class is derived by cultural determinism and subjective consciousness rather than social-structural determinism and objectivist understanding (see Eder, 1993).

Moreover, Offe (1985) argues that there are structural determinants for those who are likely members of NSMs or who might otherwise support them. According to Gouldner (1979), NSM activists tend to occupy the same type of structural position in social space and share similar characteristics that are typical to the position occupied. The mobilisation of NSMs is seen to be more connected to new middle class actors, ‘petite bourgeoisie’, who are skilled in knowledge production rather than means of labour production (Eder, 1993). They have emerged alongside the growth of higher education and new professional, managerial, administrative and technical occupations which, in turn, separate them from the working class (Habermas, 1981; Kriesi, 1989). Social-structural changes within the post-industrial society and the new changeable characteristics of protesters’ values, beliefs and social class have generated NSMs approaches. This chapter will now briefly present the most influential new theories, namely: political process theory (Tilly, 1978); resource mobilisation theory (Zald and McCarthy, 1977; 1978); framing (Snow and Benford 1988); and collective identity (Mueller 1992; Friedman & McAdam 1992).
2.2.2 New Social Movements: Dualisms between Structure and Agency

Social movement theories vary in their interpretation of whether it is the outside context that enables mobilisation or it is the collective identity of a movement. Husu (2013: 22) who studies Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology to social movement research, mentions that “because each of these approaches pays attention to different elements of social movements, they are not mutually exclusive approaches, but rather complementary. The different social movement approaches reflect the general dualisms in social sciences. These dualisms usually concern the relationship between structure and agency, objectivism and subjectivism and material and ideal aspects of the social world”. Therefore, each perspective adopts an approach that explores either the role of outside structures and resources, or the normative and subjective perceptions of agents. Thus, these approaches can be identified according to what they think of the relative influence of social structures and individual actions.

An early conceptualisation of the political process theory was introduced by the political scientist, Peter Eisenger, who conceptualises the role of ‘political opportunity’. He finds that the incidence of protest is related to the nature of the political opportunity structure, which he defines as “the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (Eisinger, 1973: 25). Political opportunity could be understood as the openness within a political system, in other words, when it is more vulnerable and receptive21 (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1989). Although the likeliness of social movement formulation in an open political system is largely higher, Eisenger (1973) stresses that the relationship between these two variables is not purely linear and direct22. Later, the concept of ‘political opportunity’ was comprehensively theorised by Tilly (1978) in introducing the new ‘political process model’ of social movements. Since then, the concept of political opportunity has

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21 Eisinger (1973) explains that some American cities in late 1960s had witnessed extensive riots about race and poverty because urban governments were more open more conventional political inputs and citizen participation. In addition, McAdam (1999:79) “describes the historical processes that affect the mobilization of the civil rights movement within the years 1876–1954. These processes concern different aspects such as the decline in cotton farming in the South, the increased resources of African Americans, and mass migration to the northern cities from the rural South that shifted political structures and created, thus, opportunities for successful insurgent action”.

22 The relationship between these two variables is not purely linear and direct, so some social movements and revolutions were successfully formed and mobilised even in closed political system. Empirically, Kurzman (1994) presents crucial findings regarding the Iranian revolution which is certainly stood out in the absence of any facilitative changes in the objective structure of political opportunities. McAdam and Snow (2007) revealed that Kurzman adds to the general social movement theory by reconsidering the relational between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ definitions of political opportunity. In the Iranian Revolution, the political opportunity ‘door’ was closed, still, open it. Similarity, the recent examples of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions of 2010 and 2011, respectively (Castells, 2010).
become a staple of social movement research. The political process model argues that the study of social movements is the study of the collective and political processes it generates.

Political process theorists as Charles Tilly (1979), William Gamson (1975) and Anthony Oberschall (1973) see that the real dependent variable in social movement is collective action. Political process proponents emphasise that movement activists are excluded from the interests of polity members, which means they do not have routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the legitimate government. Therefore, movement members rationally engage in collective action and its accompanying tactics as vehicles to pursue group interests. It is the struggle for power between polity members and challenges that give rise to collective action (Tilly, 1978). Therefore, we could conclude that political process theory observes that it is the political context and nature of a country’s political structure that largely predict favourable opportunities for emergence. Political process theory emphasises the role of the outside structures and the mechanisms affecting the emergence, action and outcomes of social movements. The criticism which this theory faces was its limitation to only explain the outside context of social movements, which either enables or obstructs mobilisation and its outcomes (see Meyer, 2004). That being said, political process theory faces difficulties while dealing with the issue of agency, although the theory acknowledges the importance of the grievance interpretation and the cognitive processes of actors. However, the challenge is to mediate between wider societal structures and the cognitive aspects of actors, as this relationship has been poorly explored.

Resource mobilisation theory pays more attention to the internal aspects of the movement than political process theory. It focuses on the effectiveness of social movements by examining its organisational bases, resource accumulation, mobilisation infrastructure, and linkages between the movement and other actors (Zald and...
McCarthy, 1977; 1978). Max Weber’s studies of charismatic authority, institutionalisation and styles of leadership (see Weber, 1978) have laid the path for the construction of resource mobilisation theory, known as ‘McCarthy-Zald’s organisational-entrepreneurial model’. The McCarthy-Zald model reflects insights from organisation studies to our understanding formal organisations because this model treats the formal organisation as the unit of analysis (Morris and Herring, 1984). McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1213) mentions “Resource mobilisation theory examines the variety of resources that must be mobilised, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements”. The model stresses that movements are best conceptualised as professional movements relying on the affluent middle class for funds, entrepreneurial leadership, and organisation. That is, these professional, or modern, social movements can increasingly find needed resources outside of their own self-interested membership and organisation.

These resources can be drawn from outside elites because it is they “who control larger resource pools” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1221). That being said, the efficiency and achievements of such movements depend on the efforts of small professional movements organisations guided by entrepreneurs rather than on the intensity of grievances held by the oppressed group (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). However, even though the resource mobilisation theory is resource-centred, in that the success or failure of a movement is explicitly based on whether resources actors may possess, it describes agency in a similar manner to rational choice theory\textsuperscript{25}. Resource mobilisation theory was the first, subsequent to the earlier classical social movement paradigm, to understand social actors’ behaviour as rational, goal-oriented, self-interested and institutionalised strategic behaviour. Therefore, understanding agency far from rationality and strategy is problematic for a theory such as resource mobilisation theory.

Resource mobilisation theory and political process theory adopt an objectivist approach to understand the influence of outside structures and resources on social movement emergence. These theories face difficulties describing and explaining how crucial normative and cognitive aspects such as ideas of justice, meanings or values relate to

\textsuperscript{25}Rational actionists, mainly Garnovetter (1978) and Olson (1965) argue that movement participation is guided by utilitarian, cost-benefit calculations as consequences of rational self-interested rational choice by movement participants. The rational action approach rejects that movement and protest activities are guided by irrational impulses, instead they are guided and motivated by utilitarian logic and rational choice.
social movements. These factors may ultimately motivate the processes of framing and the emergence of a collective identity. In general, constructivist approaches such as framing and collective identity pay more attention to emotional, normative and cognitive perspectives of agents. Framing focuses on the constructive role of agents in interpreting and selecting symbols and discourses (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). The concept of frame is driven from Goffman’s concept of frame which is understood as an interpretation scheme. For Goffman, frames make it possible “to locate, perceive, identify, and label numerous occurrences in an organised and meaningful form” (Goffman 1974: 21). In the context of social movements, agents and actors employ the concept of framing through their practices and processes. For example, diagnosing problems and framing it such to be approached from a framing perspective, as well as suggesting specific solutions and strategies (see Husu, 2014). Framing does not view actors as self-interested and driven by calculative goals as resource mobilisation theory does. Rather, Husu (2014: 24) finds that “actors are normatively orientated in that they take part in social movement action because they find a movement’s causes important to them, but they are also rationally evaluative in their aspiration to attract the widest attention or achieve the best outcomes possible.”

Whilst framing emphasises the constructive approach of better understating grievance interpretation, the collective identity approach focuses on group’s shared sense of self, commitments and values, its locations and solidarities, and ways of being and doing (see Mueller, 1992). Collective identity pays attention to the agents’ subjective experiences, feelings, identifications, and the motives behind the mobilisation. The central question for this theory is how any type of movement is formed in a process of active meaning construction, arguing that without collective identity, there can be no mobilisation or social movement (Husu, 2014). That being said, the collective identity approach can be seen as a constructivist approach interested in the processes of constructing collective meanings and identities. Scholars argue that the subjective understanding of the self is constructed in movements, which will have the capacity to create loyalty and commitment to the movement, and which furthermore have the power to induce transformative experiences for actors (see Friedman & McAdam 1992; Mueller 1992).

In the light of the renewed interest in the cultural and social dimensions of protest, there has been both the generation of new analytic concepts and the revival of older ones;
namely ideology, tradition, collective identity, and rhetoric. Polletta (1998) argues that studying movement narratives can capture the determinants and consequences of social action better than non-narratives and static sociological concepts like ‘society’ and ‘structure’. Polletta stresses that an analysis of movement narratives and stories can shed light on how collective identities, framing and collectivities are formulated, how people are persuaded to participate before the establishment of a formal organisation, and the role of instrumental framing efforts. Moreover, the political anthropologist James Scott argues that oppressed people construct ‘hidden transcript’ to challenge those in power. Scott (1985) argues that the political history of oppressed people cannot be understood without reference to infrapolitics. He calls the hidden transcripts, infrapolitics, which are expressions of dissident political culture reflected in daily conversations, folklore, songs, jokes, and other cultural practices. These infrapolitics are constructed in oppressed communities and expressed through forms and acts of resistance and survival.

Scott’s notion has been explored in subsequent research, for instance, Kelly (1993) explores how infrapolitics could enable scholars to recover and understand the oppositional practices of black working people during the age of Jim Crow as a form of everyday resistance at work and in public spaces. He points out how African Americans created bonds of mutual networks, community, and a collectivist identity that shaped black working-class strategies of resistance and political struggle in the age of Jim Crow. In addition, Faue (1990) asks us to look more thoroughly at the family as a central institution in forming and reproducing political ideologies and identities of class, race, and gender. In a similar manner to Kelly, Faue highlights how black mothers and grandmothers in the age of Jim Crow were arming and teaching their children values and strategies that could help them to survive and resist race, class and gender oppression. Overall, Kelly (1993) suggests we should shift our focus from formal, organised politics to infrapolitics where hidden transcripts provide rich insights to understanding the ideological and cultural foundations for constructing a collective identity of resistance. Practically speaking, in the age of Jim Crow, some trade unions and political organisations succeeded in mobilising segments of the black working class because they, at least partially, articulated the grievances, aspirations, and dreams that remained hidden from the public view. Thus, Kelly emphasises the existing relationship between infrapolitics, organised resistance, and public and collective action. Everyday life experiences and cultural discourses are valuable infrapolitics that should not be
underestimated in forming collective identities, everyday resistance and political strategies.

In essence, both the framing and the collective identity approach face similar limitations. While, both theories recognise the constructivist and subjectivist elements in social movements, they are limited in their relation to the social and cultural perspectives and wider social processes. Framing pays attention merely to the constructive aspect of actors in protesting. Questions such as how social problems and strategies are framed in a political protest would be a central issue for framing theory. Therefore, understanding the role of social and cultural conditions and structures in which actors exist is a challenge for framing approach. It tends to be of more interest in the actors’ active meaning-construction processes, rather which the social conditions within which meaning-construction processes takes place. In other words, these approaches neglect the influence of the structural conditions on actors’ ways of perceiving, feeling and doing things, and merely focus on the emotional and cognitive perspectives to the process of meaning-construction (see Snow and Benford 1988, 1992, Husu, 2014).

Framing and the collective identity approaches contribute in a better understanding of social movements by explaining specific aspects. Despite the different emphasis of various social movement approaches, the importance of synthesising these views and overcoming their inherent dualisms is generally agreed (see Bilic, 2010; Crossley, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Goldberg, 2003; Husu, 2014). Therefore, it is crucial to understand that in order for mobilisation to happen, specific and suitable social conditions and mechanisms are needed as well as the constructive processes of agents in interpreting, framing and forming collective identities. Yet the theorisation of social movements to date lack the capability to deal with the dualisms between agency and structure, and objectivism and subjectivism different aspects of social movements. According to Crossley (2002b), social movement theory cannot develop a general theoretical framework that takes into account these dualisms. Therefore, this study suggests Bourdieu’s powerful theory of practice to be particularly well-suited to address, in the first instance, the problematic issue pertaining to agency and structure, and the objectivist and subjectivist aspects of social movements. In addition, this study draws on Bourdieu’s theory of practice through employing the fundamental concepts of Bourdieusian theory, namely field,
habitus and capital as analytical tools and vital mechanisms that enable the researcher to bridge both of the objectivist social-structural determinism and subjectivist-cultural determinism in social movements.

2.3 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice: Habitus, Field and Capital

Pierre Bourdieu was a French sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher. He was a prolific writer and extraordinarily productive researcher, who published more than 30 books and 340 articles. He founded and directed of his own research centre, the Centre de Sociologie Européenne as well as starting his own sociological journal, *Actes de la Recherché en Sciences Sociales*, and establishing his own collection of more than sixty books with the French publishing house, Editions de Minuit (Swartz, 1997). Bourdieu was influenced by many theorists including Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss (Jenkins, 2002; Swartz, 1997), all of whom helped him to elaborate his own comprehensive evidential and theoretical contributions and outstanding interpretations of social structures and agencies practices. For example, two towering intellectual figures who influenced Bourdieu’s work Jean-Paul Sartre and Claude Lévi-Strauss. For Bourdieu, these two intellectuals represent opposite types of knowledge; Sartre the subjectivist and engaged humanist, and Lévi-Strauss the objectivist and detached scientist. Both approaches shaped Bourdieu’s intellectual and professional orientation. Moreover, both models are crucial for understanding the kind of synthesis that Bourdieu develops in his several works.

Moreover, these two approaches were two radically different approaches for Bourdieu for understanding social practices. While Sartre focused on the role of the freely choosing, creative, undetermined consciousness of the individual subject, Lévi-Strauss emphasised the causal power of structures which operate beyond the consciousness of agents to shape their choices. Bourdieu sees his work as an effort to "move beyond the antagonism between these modes of knowledge, while preserving the gains from each of them" (Bourdieu, 1990; 25). Therefore, Bourdieu acknowledged this paradigmatic opposition the roots of a broader, and more fundamental, opposition that structures all intellectual thoughts and stances in the development of a genuine social science of practices (Bourdieu, 1990; 43).
In light of the latter, one of the important themes throughout Bourdieu’s work is the subjectivism/objectivism antinomy. He frames his rejection of these opposing views by criticising subjectivist and objectivist forms of knowledge and substantialist view of reality that he believes pervade them. Bourdieu saw this subject/object dualism manifested in several different forms of social sciences which reflect the opposition between interpretive and positivist approaches to social reality. Whilst subjectivism includes micro interactions and methodological individualism, objectivism, on the other hand includes functionalism, structuralism, and forms of empirical work that focus exclusively on macro-level concerns. According to Bourdieu, each approach offers valuable insights into social life but remains skewed if considered separately. Thus, he argues that these various oppositions must be transcended and integrated into a broader knowledge framework, which he calls a ‘general science of practices’ (Bourdieu, 1977a). Swartz (1997) highlights how ‘practice theory’ recognises that the system has a powerful impact on shaping human actions, but it is also aware of the relevance of how agents manoeuvre within these systems and processes. The theory is keen to address how systems are produced and reproduced, how change can occur, and the influence of individual action in this process.

Further, more than being a coherent theoretical school such as structural-functionalism or Marxism, the theory of practice is characterised as being concerned with the relation between structure and agency in producing and reproducing objective meanings through intentional actions and the interaction of individuals (Swartz, 1997). According to Bourdieu, a ‘dialectical relationship’ exists between the objective structures and the cognitive and motivating structures, which they produce and which tend to reproduce them (Jenkins, 1992). Bourdieu was emphatic that social life cannot be simply understood by the aggregate of individual behaviour. Nor does he accept that practice can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or supra-individual ‘structures’, as the metaphysics of objectivism would interpret it (Jenkins, 1992). This rejection could be also understood by his continuous attempt to transcend the sterility of the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism. That being said, Swartz argues (1997:9) that Bourdieu wants to “transcend this dichotomy by conceptualising action so that both micro and macro, or voluntarist and determinist dimensions of human activity are integrated into a single conceptual movement rather isolated as mutually exclusive forms of explanation”.

To enable this dichotomy to be resolved, Bourdieu introduces the notion of ‘*habitus*’ as a bridge building exercise across the explanatory gap between these two extremes (Jenkins, 1992). Habitus is meant to overcome the central dualism in social sciences and to correspond to the dualism between social structures and the cognitive structures of social actors. Habitus is structured and produced through long processes of inculcation through a person’s lifetime, including early socialisation, schooling and formal education that predispose agents to act and react in certain ways in particular situations. Therefore, habitus is both a structuring structure, in which it organises practices and the perception of practices, and a structured structure, in that the principle that organises the perception of the social world is itself the product of an internalisation of the social world26 (Bourdieu, 1984).

Habitus focuses on the objective structures, such as institutions, social relations and resources, which become embodied and internalised in the cognitive structure of agents, and which are then further realised through our practice (Husu, 2014). Although Bourdieu does not view human behaviours as pre-programmed automatous acting, he stresses that our human behaviours are driven by ‘habitus’, conceived by Bourdieu as the ingrained and socially constituted dispositions of social classes that lead actors to make choices and decisions that produce existing social structures and status distinctions (Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning (Bourdieu, 1977).

Field is another spatial metaphor in Bourdieu’s sociology. Field defines the structure of the social setting in which habitus operates, as a network or configuration not between the concrete occupants themselves, but rather the objective relations between positions (Bourdieu &Wacquant, 1992). He posits that society is constructed of interlocking and multi-layered social fields within which agents interact. Fields, or social spaces, can be viewed as structures of differences between individuals, groups and institutions, while the positions of the agents are based on the distribution and possession of capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Fields are not hard or rigid constructions, instead,  

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26 In Bourdieu piece *The Logic of Practice*, he defines habitus as “The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organising action of a conductor.” (Bourdieu: 1992: 53)
boundaries between fields are permeable and relational to one another, with a nested configuration. ‘To think in terms of field is to think relationally,’ Bourdieu stresses (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1990:96). Fields include this configuration of relations between actors and their relative positions – with differential resources, power and command of capital as part of these configuration and interaction (Haluza-Delay, 2008). This also implies that everything taking place in a specific field is to be understood with regard to the specific relationships between different positions, not only through the actors’ interaction within this field (see Bourdieu, 2005a). As Swartz (1997:124) points out, “fields are ‘tightly coupled’ relational configurations where change in one position shifts the boundaries among all other positions”.

Moreover, Bourdieu fields are considered as fields of struggle and sites of resistance as well as domination, one being relationally linked to the other. Bourdieu considers conflict to be the fundamental dynamic of all social life where struggle of power exists. Logically, actors struggle over the very definitions of what are to be considered the most valued resources in fields. In other words, fields are arenas of struggle for legitimation, where social mechanisms of symbolic power and symbolic violence are employed to secure the social integration of an arbitrary order (see Stringfellow, Shaw and Maclean, 2013). Bourdieu argues that fields are struggles between those in dominant positions against those in subordinate positions, and the struggle for occupying the dominant position is a struggle for some degree of monopoly power over the definition and the unequal distribution of capital. These capitals or resources within fields become the object of struggle and function as a ‘social relation of power’ (Bourdieu, 1987). Therefore, Bourdieu argues that the possession of resources and capital play a critical role in determining positions within a field. Bourdieu conceptualises different kinds of capital, economic capital, wealth, income, and property; cultural capital, knowledge, culture, and educational credentials; symbolic capital, honour, prestige or recognition and social capital, social relations and networks (Bourdieu, 1986).

Having presented Bourdieu’s key concepts of habitus, field and capital, an overall conceptual framework of Bourdieu’s general science of practices is proposed to give a better understanding of the theory of practice. Bourdieu’s theory of practice conceptualises actions as the outcome of a relationship between habitus, field and capital. First, Bourdieu resists reducing practices to the independent effects of habitus,
capital or field. For Bourdieu, all his master concepts do not stand alone but in combination produce practices. Strictly speaking, he does not offer a theory of field, or habitus or capital as a stand-alone perspective. Bourdieu sees all his master concepts as linked relationally (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Second, and in addition to understanding that the combination of these three significant ‘thinking tools’ is what produce practices, this combination is an ‘interrelational’ one. Swartz (1997) summarises how Bourdieu criticises incessantly the substantialist thinking, which privileges substances over relationships, for it treats the properties attached to agents as forces independent of the relationship within which they act. He rejects all approaches that would attempt to establish a direct, unmediated identity between theoretical concepts and practical reality. Bourdieu maintains that the social sciences should deal with cultural and social relations, and thus an adequate social science must construct concepts that mediate the relationship between fundamentally different, theoretical and practical types of knowledge.

Thus, Bourdieu advocates ‘relational mode of thinking’ which emphasises building variables into ‘systems of relations’ that are differentially and hierarchically ordered (Swartz, 1997). Therefore, and in addition to the promise of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to overcome the addressed dualisms in social movement discourse, the comprehensive relational understanding of how field, habitus and capital are related to each other is vital and theoretically important to understand social movements thoroughly.

The next section addresses the relevance of Bourdieu’s work and organisation studies. As discussed earlier, an increasing interest and research collaboration have taken place between organisational studies and the work of Bourdieu (see Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Golsorkhi et al., 2009). Nevertheless, extant literature reveals the lack of comprehensive integration of Bourdieusian theory and therefore fails to fully employ it and use its theoretical and empirical potentialities (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). Therefore, the next section discusses how organisational studies could fully exploit the theoretical and empirical possibilities inherent in a relational perspective in Bourdieu’s comprehensive framework, to better understand the multiple relations, processes and dynamics within a social movement per se and with its relation with its larger social context.


2.4 Bourdieu and Social Movements: Considering Movements in Terms of Field, Habitus and Capital

In this thesis, it is proposed that Bourdieu’s theory is particularly well-suited for a fruitful conceptual cross-fertilisation between a theory of practice and the theorisation of social movements. This marriage is able to address problematic issues pertaining to agency and structure, and the role of objectivism and subjectivism in understanding different aspects of social movements. For many, the central concepts of Bourdieu’s theory of practice can be used to provide an effective and interesting basis for the analysis of social movements (see Bilic, 2010; Crossley, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). There are aspects in the social world that are independent of actors’ representation of them, and the social world according to this objectivist scientific analysis, should be approached from the outside, empirically observed, measured and mapped out (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In social movement research, Husu (2014) highlights that political process theory could be the closest to this definition. This theory denotes how the emergence of social movement relates to the outside context and processes, which either create or obstruct possibilities for political mobilisation. The role of social context and how processes influence social movements could therefore be understood to be independent of actors’ representations of them. Whether actors are aware or not of outside context and processes, or whether they consciously influence or control them, outside context does exist and processes do take place.

Viewed another way, the external context has the capacity to influence or guide actors’ practices (Bourdieu, 1989). Yet, social movements do not emerge independent of actors’ representations, and their conscious and interpretative processes. Thus, it is necessary to consider the external world as an object of actors’ perception and interpretation, otherwise they would not exist. In particular, framing and collective identity approaches reflect these subjectivist accounts in social movement research. The social movement theorist Touraine (1981) argues that human societies, in addition to their capacity to reproduce themselves or even adopt themselves through mechanisms of learning and political decision-making, are able to develop their own orientations and to generate their objectives and their normativity. Therefore, the way individuals perceive and interpret leads to what they do, which has real critical consequences on the social world. For these reasons, actors’ subjective point of view is a central focus of scientific
analysis. For these reasons, this research draws on Bourdieu’s framework to overcome dualisms in social movement discourse, in addition, to provide a powerful new set of tools with which to analyse precisely how social movements structure, and are structured by, the larger social configurations in which they are embedded in and the actors’ cognitive perception and interpretation.

Bourdieu’s theorisation of field, habitus and capital is fruitful and valuable analytic tools to synthesise different social movement approaches into a coherent whole. Rooted in the field of organisation studies, it takes all –habitus, field and capital- to connect micro and macro levels of analysis that should concern all organisational research (Crossley, 2002b, 2003; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). In the study of organisations, Swartz (2008) points out that while Bourdieu’s concept of field is gaining inroads, habitus is seldom mentioned. Accordingly, dynamics of fields are partially understood without the dispositions of habitus and capital of actors to generate practices. Moreover, it is very common to come across research which applies just one of Bourdieu concepts to some empirical object, rather than deploying a relational perspective to analyse the three Bourdieusian master concepts- habitus, capital and field- integrated into a single study. Dobbin (2008) critiques the American organisational theorists, in particular, for picking up components of Bourdieu’s ideas and concepts from here and there, ignoring by doing so, the great power and richness of integrating Bourdieu’s theory of individual (habitus), theory of social structure (field), and theory of power relations (various forms of capital).

However, Emirbayer and Johnson (2007) provide an exceptional study in approaching all three Bourdieu’s pillar concepts to propose a relational approach to the study of organisations. Their comprehensive piece of work could be described as the best presentation of Bourdieu’s complex theoretical framework to the application to the study of organisations relationally.

2.4.1 Bourdieu and Organisations: A Relational Approach to Social Movement

In Mustafa Emirbayer’s (1997) article, ‘Manifesto for a relational sociology’, he proposes the relational perspective to be a compelling alternative to the ascendant perspectives of substantialism, self-and interaction, and variable-based sociologies. Whilst a substantialist approach conceives of the social world as consisting primarily of
substances or processes, in static ‘things’ and substances (things, beings, essences), a relational perspective sees relations between terms or units as pre-eminently dynamic in nature and as unfolding processes rather than as static ties among inert substances. Emirbayer clarifies that ‘things’ are not assumed as independent existences. As things are understood in terms of relations, structures and societies are considered as empty abstractions apart from the several elements and relations of which they are composed. Karl Marx (1978: 247) for instance was a profoundly relational thinker, arguing that ‘society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand’. He further observes that ‘capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons which is mediated through things’ (Marx, 1977: 932). Similarly, Bourdieu argues for a relational view. Bourdieu sees the relational method to be the ‘major contribution’ of structuralism to social sciences, and in fact considers relational thinking as fundamental to all scientific thoughts.

Bourdieu maintains that the social sciences should deal with cultural and social relations; therefore, an adequate social science must construct concepts that mediate the relationship between fundamentally different, theoretical and practical types of knowledge. Theoretically and empirically, the implications of the relational approach are capturing both of the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels of inquiry which allow a reconceptualisation on a continuum level of inquiries from ‘macro’ to micro’ (Emirbayer, 1997). For Bourdieu, the relational method stands opposed to positivism and methodological individualism. He sees the relational method as the basic tool for imposing the necessary epistemological breaks with both subjectivist and objectivist form of knowledge. In addition, he argues that relational method provides the basis for substantive positions as culture, lifestyle, class analysis, and popular culture. As a point of method, Bourdieu analyses cultural practices as structured relationally. Therefore, as this research is looking to overcome the objectivism/structuralism dualisms in social movement theories, the study intends to deploy Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus and capital as mechanisms to relate how these concepts are into relations with social movements.

Over the last thirty years, there has been an increasing interest in organisational analysis for the work of Pierre Bourdieu. However, the extant literature often undermines the implications of a fully comprehensive Bourdieusian theory (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). Similarly, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) call for an organisational analysis that would
fully exploits the theoretical and empirical possibilities inherent in a relational perspective in Bourdieu’s comprehensive framework, “Organisations must always be situated within the matrices of relations, the relational context” (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008: 5). They reveal that Bourdieu’s framework carries with it many promising implications for the study of structures of interorganisational and intraorganisational relations in organisation. Bourdieu’s framework allows one to reconceptualise interorganisational relations within a field as structures of power, to explore how these organisational processes and dynamics unfold according to their own relatively autonomous logic and to comprehend ways in which such processes and dynamics are influenced by developments in external fields. In addition to sketching the implications of Bourdieu’s framework for interorganisational analysis, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) have also sought to show that this comprehensive framework carries with it promising implications for the analysis of intraorganisational relations. It allows a reconceptualisation of each individual organisation as a more or less temporarily stable structure, in addition, it lets one to analyse systematically the complex relationship between the individual organisation and its larger social context. This fruitful Bourdieusian reconceptualisation of both interorganisational and intraorganisational relations in organisation allow us to capture multiple relations, processes and dynamics within social movement per se and with its relation with its larger social context.

In recent decades, the concept of field has been used frequently in organisational analysis. It’s the concept of organisational field that has been typically referred to by DiMaggio and Powell as a set of organisations active in what they call “a recognised area of institutional life” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:64). Organisational fields include not just one type of organisation, but all the organisations that play one role or another in influencing and shaping a specific field. The particular value of this conceptualisation appeals to many organisational theorists, however, the potential utility of the field concept has been diminished by its application solely to the level of organisational field (Swartz, 2008). Emirbayer and Johnson (2008:22) stress that “a truly unified field-based framework for organisational analysis must bring the field-theoretic approach to bear, not only on the analysis of clusters of organisations, but also on the analysis of the social configurations in which organisational fields are themselves embedded”. This means that any field, one consisting of, for example, two or more organisations, must be conceptualised as a configuration of relationships not between the concrete entities.
themselves, e.g., the specific organisation at hand, but rather, between the nodes those entities happen to occupy within the given network or configuration. These points or positions in organisational space and the forces binding them together constitute (from a synchronic perspective) a *structure* or a *temporary state of power relations* within what is (from a diachronic perspective) *an ongoing struggle for domination* over the field (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008:6).

### 2.4.2 Bourdieu and Social Movements

This thesis is not the merely research in marrying Bourdieu theory of practice and social movement research. As illustrated by several other works, Bourdieu’s theories have provided fertile ground for social movements studies, for instance see: Haluza-DeLay (2008) on the concept of habitus in the environmental movement; Diani (1997) on social capital and social movements; and Crossley (1999a, 1999b) on mental health movements; see also works by Eder (1993), Bloemraad (2001) and Tugal (2009). Other authors draw on Bourdieu to construct a synthesis between different social movement theories and/or to transcend dualisms in movement research, such as Crossley (2002a, 2002b, and 2003), Emirbayer and Goldberg (2005), Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) and Bilic (2010). The concept of field enables an understanding of the ways in which social movements are related to their environment as well as the types of relationships they have with each other and other agents, groups and institutions. Therefore, social movements should not be understood in a rigid, static way, but rather as a relational analytic tool that can give insights into different types of situations (Husu, 2013). Moreover, the organisational practices and mechanisms in these types of movements, like those of political grassroots struggles and resistances, are usually hidden from the view of hegemonic structuralist management scholars and social movements’ theorists. Therefore, by studying this type of ‘alternative’ non-hegemonic form of politically motivated movement, this research contributes towards an understanding of the processes of organising and the diverse dynamics in these types of movements.

First, Crossley (2002b) highlights the different social spaces in which social movements operate depending on their area of expertise. In this sense, if a civil rights organisation specialises in judicial issues, it operates in the judicial field. Crossley adds that movements “are required to play a different game in each of these fields” (Crossley,
2002: 180). For instance, the economic field may be essential to some social movements so that they can benefit from the economic logic of profit-making and find supporters and sponsors from businesses. In social movement theory, the resource mobilisation model of McCarthy and Zald (1997) links the success or failure of social movement with the mobility of resources, linkages of social movements to other groups and the dependence of movements upon external support. The former model emphasises the need of social movement activists to play different games in various fields based on the movements’ logic, structure and needs.

In addition, Bourdieu (2005b) believes that the journalistic field is increasingly influential to represent a positive and supportive manner in media. Goldberg (2003) adds that the media plays a crucial role to the success of the movement because it disseminates representations and shape public opinion. In this sense, collective identity theory pays the same attention to a group’s shared sense of self and solidarities. It takes into account the subjective experiences, identifications, feelings and movies of actors behind the mobilisation. Thus, it makes a difference when strong, shared, unified and powerful collective identity and image of a movement is portrayed to media and public opinion, than a divided and disconnected identity. Therefore, social movements could be considered as social phenomena which enjoy their own laws of functioning, specialism, logic and structure, which in turn mean it makes sense to think of movements themselves as organisational fields (see Bourdieu, 1993, Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008).

Moreover, actors in movements who possess a great volume and composition of capital, which is needed in a specific game, can control and influence the game more, and gain the capacity to produce the recognition of the legitimacy of capital distribution amongst the other contending parties. However, actors with less capital are able to produce effects to a certain extent. If not, there would be no game (see Husu, 2014). Like the concept of field, the concept of capital has enjoyed widespread use in organisation theory and studies. The value of economic or social capital is constituted by its past and present uses, by the structure of the field(s) in which it is deployed, and by its specific differences vis-a-vis other types of capital. “The relational nature of capital is only partially grasped even by the many studies that see it as emerging from the relations embodied in social networks” (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008:3). For example, while social capital in particular is often analysed as a property of networks and would
therefore seem to escape the problem of substantialism, the study of social networks sheds little light on the processes by which the value of social capital is produced in the first place, a process that occurs above and beyond the formation and reproduction of concrete social network ties (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). As Bourdieu puts it, “capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 101). The following section is addressing different forms of capital in social movement literature.

Whilst field and capital are familiar concepts in organisational research, and are highly valuable to understanding social movements and social capital in particular, the third concept in Bourdieu’s triad, habitus, has been applied to the study of organisations only a handful of times. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argued over a decade ago that the concept of habitus offers a powerful means of linking micro-and macro level processes in organisational theory.

As Crossley argued, “habitus, as both structured and structuring, a product and producer of social worlds, for example, captures both the embodied-performative aspect of social structures and the mechanism whereby they are transmitted across generations and through historical time” (Crossley, 2003:43). Habitus, as Bourdieu himself states it, contains the ‘genetic information’ which both allows and disposes successive generations to reproduce the world we inherit from our parents’ generations. This circular conception of reproduction in which social structures structure habitus, in turn, structure social structures, are constantly in process, but still, subject to change. In order to understand these constant processes of change, Crossley (2003) in his research paper ‘from reproduction to transformation’, argues that we need to note, and study how innovation actions by embodied agents can both modify existing structures and generate new ones, breaking the circle of reproduction. Indeed, changing and resisting societal structured structures in order to engender change is the ultimate aim of social movement. Thus, activists’ habitus could be considered as structured and structuring structure, as Bourdieu (1992) defines it. Crossley (2003) concludes that the activists’ habitus is structured through activists’ involvement in protest and activism. It is the same habitus which leads activists to continue in activism and thus to contribute to the perpetuation of activism as a social practice; the activist habitus is thus a structuring and structured structure. It is generated by structured movement practices and it generates structured movement practices. Therefore what particularly strengthens the marriage
between the concept of habitus and social movement research is that it shows that this
disposition of habitus is generated, shaped and structured through engagement in
activism, as Bilic (2010) mentions.

Moreover, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) highlights the crucial role which habitus
playing in linking between past fields to present fields through the individual activists
who move from one to the next. Each new arrival brings to the field a habitus formed
under specific past conditions, some will be shared with others and some will be
completely contradictory. Similar and different habitus structure different judgement
and practices in various ways in organisational life. Therefore, Emirbayer and Johnson
(2008) encourage researchers to shed light on how the concept of habitus could
contribute to shaping and changing organisational structures through the various
microprocesses of individuals’ behaviour. In addition, Bottero and Crossley (2011) find
that habitus is shaped by concrete interactions and relationships. Bottero and Crossley
(2011: 5) mentions that “Actors in a similar position to one another are more likely, as a
consequence, to interact and therefore to influence one another, such that they develop
similar habitus”, or what Bottero and Crossley (2011) called, shared habitus.

Bourdieu (1985) agrees that homologies and similarities with structural positions and
relations between agents are behind having similar dispositions. Bourdieu refers to “sets
of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and
subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions
and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances”
(Bourdieu, 1985: 725). Still, the mechanism by which social position shapes habitus has
never been clarified (Bottero and Crossley, 2011). Therefore, it needs to be explored
what social movement agents have in common with regard to social positions, volume
and composition of capital, and habitus, in order to shape habitus, generate resources,
and mobilise.

Following a Bourdieusian perspective, this study considers social movements as
dynamic social spaces characterised by specific logic, structure and need, which in turn,
it makes sense to think of them as organisational fields of ongoing struggle and power
relations. In addition, this research argues that activists’ habitus is generated by
structured movement practices and it generates structured movement practices, which in
turn, offers a powerful means of linking micro and macro level of processes in
organisational theory. Moreover, and rooted in the field of organisation studies, this study provides a deeper analysis and a different perspective of how to look at the ‘alternative’ non-hegemonic type of organisations such as social movements, political grassroots struggles and resistances, and voluntary organisations. This interchange between organisational studies (hereafter OS) and social movement studies (hereafter SMS) (McAdam and Scott, 2005) provides a better theoretical development and contribution of both areas of scholarship. OS has become increasingly interested in dynamics occurring outside the organisation, first material resource and technical features, then political, and, more recently, institutional and cultural forces. The focus in OS studies has moved to understand the politics of organisational and institutional change, in addition, to the relevance of movement activism and grassroots mobilisation inside the organisation. Similarly, SMS also been revived because of increased recognition of the environment – not just as contexts breeding alienation or a sense of deprivation, but as the source of resources, including movement members and allies- as a locus of opportunities as well as constrains. SMS theorists have increasingly come to recognise the importance of organisations, organising processes, and organisational networks (see McAdam and Scott, 2005; McAdam, et al., 2006). While social movement scholars (Davis et al., 2005) reveal that, until very recently, few scholars have bridged organisational and social movement studies (Clemens and Minkoff, 2004; Campbell, 2005), this pioneering study applies theories and concepts of OS and SMS to better understand the different mechanisms and dynamics in social movement literature. This study contributes to the theoretical development of both areas of scholarship and provides a cross-fertilised understanding to better integrate and synthesise the possibility for rapprochement with these theoretical perspectives.

2.4.3 Forms of Capital in Social Movements

Bourdieu argues that fields are struggles between those in dominant positions against those in subordinate positions, and the struggle for occupying the dominant position is a struggle for some degree of monopoly power over the definition and the unequal distribution of capital. These capitals or resources within fields become the object of struggle and function as a ‘social relation of power’ (Bourdieu, 1986). Therefore, Bourdieu argues that the possession of resources and capital play a critical role in determining positions within a field. Bourdieu conceptualises different kinds of capital, cultural capital, knowledge, culture, and educational credentials; symbolic capital,
honour, prestige or recognition; economic capital, wealth, income, and property and social capital, social relations and networks (Bourdieu, 1986).

Forms of capital are characterised as both appropriable (Coleman, 1990) and convertible (Bourdieu, 1986). For example, social capital is appropriable in the sense that an actor’s network of, say, friendship ties can be used for other purposes as information gathering (Coleman, 1990). In addition, social capital can be ‘converted’ to other kinds of capital, into human, cultural and social capital. In Bourdieu’s (1986) seminal work on the forms of capital, he proposes that in order to better understand the structure and functioning of the social world it is crucial to introduce capital in all its forms. Bourdieu argues:

Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of nobility (Bourdieu 1986: 241).

That being said, this thesis is not only interested in exploring different forms of capital within these researched movements, but also to better understand the mechanisms and the processes of convertibility conditions. Within social movement literature, it was surprising to note that symbolic, cultural and economic forms of capital have been rarely examined in social movement literature. Yet, social capital has been largely examined (see Diani, 1997; Rammelt, 2011; Teney and Hanquinet, 2012).

Social capital understood as the goodwill that is engendered by a fabric of social relations, and that can be mobilised to facilitate action. Intuitively, social capital represents goodwill, which refers to the sympathy, trust, and forgiveness offered to us by friends and acquaintances (Adler and Kwon, 2002). While several broadly similar definitions of social capital had been offered, there are some nuanced differences (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Some definitions focus on external relations, which have been called
‘bridging’ forms of social capital, as a resource that inheres in the social network tying a focal actor to other actors (Bourdieu, 1985; Portes, 1998; Burt; 1992). Another perspective focuses on internal ties within collectivities, such as nation, organisation, community, known as ‘bonding’ social capital which focuses on collective actors ‘internal characteristics’ which give the collectivity cohesiveness and facilitate achieving the collectivity’s goals and performance (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Shaw and Stringfellow; 2006 and Stringfellow and Shaw, 2009).

Social capital pays more or less institutionalised networks and connections that can be employed in order to accumulate other forms of capital such as economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Diani’s (1997) research is one of the exceptional studies that explore the possibility of understanding social capital as an outcome of social movements. Diani (1997) reveals the importance of social capital as social linkages which create new opportunities for exchange and communications, increase mobilisation capacity, create new movement subcultures and political opportunities, and can be influential in cultural change among different social environments. Diani’s treatment of social capital as an outcome of social movement is a structural functionalist approach which depends on the structural positions which the actors occupy within a network. Diani suggests a mesolevel perspective to explore how changes in the structural location of movement actors in social networks could influence the political decisions or the solidarity and bonds among movement actors. For instance, he concludes that the nearer the agent is to the centre of the network structure, where an increased density of ties and resources exists, the more the agent controls exchanges and enjoys influence and power. Beside the structural-functionalist treatment of social capital that Diani (1997) employs, the concept of social capital was substantially analysed. Diani (1997) considers in a limited way social capital as social ties which are based on mutual trust and recognition.

Bourdieu (1986:51) defines social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable networks of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ or in other words, to membership in a group. Portes (1998:3) argues that Bourdieu’s analysis of social capital was “the most theoretically refined among those that introduced the term in other contemporary sociological discourses. His treatment was instrumental, focusing on the benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of participation in groups and on the
deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource”. Bourdieu’s definition focuses on both facts, that first, social capital is generated from social relationship itself that allows agents claim access to resources possessed by their associates. Second, social capital is also about the amount and quality of those resources which are not natural given; instead, they must be constructed through investment strategies (Bourdieu, 1986).

Moreover other scholars such as the American sociologist James Coleman and Putnam have written intensively about the concept of social capital. For example, Coleman (1987) represents social capital as a valuable resource because it involves the expectations of reciprocity, and provides wider network relationships that are governed by high degree of trust and shared values. Putnam’s contribution to social capital was recognised globally through his book ‘Bowling Alone’ where he claims that social capital is a crucial element in building and maintaining national democracy. He defines social capital as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits” (Putnam, 1995: 67).

Social capital has been considered in social movement research as a sociological concept that has been identified as both an important resource facilitating social movement mobilisation (Rammelt, 2011) and a significant outcome produced by social movement activities (Diani, 1997). Teney and Hanquinet (2012) highlight that social capital increases the capacity for political participation and actions and thus enhances the likelihood for individuals to be politically engaged. Moreover, the importance of social networks is widely acknowledged in social movements’ studies. Actors within a movement share social relations and ties, communicate with others, coordinate their efforts, pool their resources and act collectively. Rammelt (2011) reveals that many quoted definitions of social movements describe them as informal networks, based on solidarity and a shared collective identity which mobilise among activists.

Moving to cultural capital, Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital reflects many different resources such as general cultural awareness, schooling system, education credentials, verbal facility, and aesthetic preferences. Initially, Bourdieu develops his concept of cultural capital from his research about unequal scholastic achievements of children originating from families with different educational though similar social origins
Cultural capital is analysed by Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986) as existing in three different states. First, cultural capital exists in an *embodied state*. This cultural capital is an internalised disposition through an individual’s early socialisation processes. This involves works of art, music, and works of popular culture.

Second, cultural capital exists in the *objectified* form referring to objects, such as books, works of art, and scientific instruments, which require specialised cultural abilities to use. Third, cultural capital exists in an *institutionalised* form, by which Bourdieu means the educational credential system. Bourdieu places great importance upon the growth of the higher education system and the role it has come to play in the allocation of status in the advanced societies (Swartz, 1997).

Symbolic capital is another important form of capital. Bourdieu borrows substantially from French structuralism and its linguistic model in formulating his sociology of symbolic forms. For example, he draws from Saussure’s model of language to argue that the fundamental logic of symbolic processes and systems, beginning with language itself (Bourdieu, 1991a). Bourdieu uses the conceptual language of symbolic capital, violence and power to emphasise the legitimation of power relations and power function within a specific society (Swartz, 2013). Bourdieu argues that symbolic capital refers to the “esteem, recognition, belief, credit, confidence of others” (Bourdieu, 2000:166) and represents the accumulated authority to be able to exercise symbolic power. This symbolic power is the “capacity to shape perceptions of social reality by imposing cognitive categories through which we understand the social world” (Swartz, 2013). Symbolic power is about an imposed, internalised or incorporated power that is unquestionable, taken-for-granted, natural and internalised through a process of naturalisation. This fact of symbolic power existence produces symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is “misrecognised obedience in that symbolic power is accepted as legitimate rather than an arbitrary imposition. In that sense, Bourdieu argues that symbolic violence is “a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely, misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling” (Bourdieu, 2005a:1-2).
It worth mentioning that in numerous other places in his work Bourdieu gives conceptual priority to economic capital. Although he does not explicitly define economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986), but makes reference to it being the most material form of capital, mentioning monetary profit, private property, and wage labour as some its forms. That being said, this thesis in interested to investigate which particular forms of capital have been used, accumulated, or converted in this movement. Knowing the different forms of capital in this thesis will allow us to better understanding relations of power between the activists and the other structures around them, and between the activists themselves. Moreover, it will help us understand the different inherited institutionalised and embodied cultural capital which the activists have. This understanding provides a deeper explanation of the different structural positions which the activists have and the forms of symbolic power, and maybe symbolic violence, which the activists could practice or experience.

The next chapter outlines the research aim and objectives and discusses in detail the interpretive approach underpinning the research and justifies the decisions made in the research design with respect to data collection, sampling and analysis. Moreover, the role of the researcher, the notion of ‘reflexivity’, some relevant ethical considerations and an overview of data analysis are going to be also discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER THREE

Research Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This Chapter begins by outlining the research aim and objectives which emerged from the literature review and during the research process. Research philosophy is briefly discussed, justifying the use of qualitative methods within an interpretive framework. Whilst there is a need to explore different organisational dynamics and mechanisms in politically-motivated social movements, the study adopts and explains the Bourdieusian concepts of fields, habitus, and forms of capital, and the relational mode of thinking as a foundation of data and as a lens through which to conceptualise and compare the findings with extant theory. This research used the qualitative technique of in-depth interviews, to collect detailed, descriptive and comparable data on the politically-motivated social movement’s organisational dynamics and mechanisms. Moreover, the rationale of deploying in-depth interviewing is explained. In addition, Bourdieu’s (1992) notion of ‘reflexivity’, the role of the researcher, and some relevant ethical considerations are also discussed. The evaluation of qualitative data, analysis techniques, and an overview of data analysis are also explained in this Chapter.

3.1 Research Aim and Objectives

OS scholars have become increasingly interested in the dynamics, mechanisms and environment of social movement studies. OS studies have shifted towards understanding the politics of organisational and institutional change, in addition to the relevance of movement activism and grassroots mobilisation inside the organisation. Similarly, SM studies also been revived because of increased recognition of the environment. SM theorists have increasingly come to recognise the importance of
organisations, organising processes, and organisational networks (see McAdam and Scott, 2005; McAdam, et al., 2006). Yet, researchers have to adequately bridge these two disciplines together. SM scholars (Davis et al., 2005) reveal that, until very recently, few scholars have bridged organisational and social movement studies (Clemens and Minkoff, 2004; Campbell, 2005). Therefore, this study applies theories and concepts of OS and SM to better understand the different mechanisms and dynamics explored in the social movement literature. This study contributes to the theoretical development of both areas of scholarship and provides a cross-fertilised understanding to better integrate and synthesise the possibility for rapprochement with these theoretical perspectives.

First, in order to capture various interorganisational and intraorganisational relations, organising processes, and organisational networks in politically-motivated social movement, this study is one of the rare studies (see Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008 and Golsorkhi et al., 2009) which employs the three main concepts of Pierre Bourdieu; field, habitus, and capital (Bourdieu, 1986; 1990). Despite the increasing interest in organisational analysis in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the subsequent body of literature often lacks an implication of a fully integrated and comprehensive Bourdieusian theory. Therefore, and as discussed in Chapter Two, this present research employs the three Bourdieusian conceptual tools, fields, habitus and forms of capital, to capture various organisational processes, conflictual dynamics, and behaviours through understanding different fields of practices, identifying the agents’ biographical and social trajectories (habitus), and exploring the type and value of accumulated forms of capital which agents have. It is important to highlight here that the researcher is employing Bourdieu’s theory of practice as ‘theory of method’. In other words, Bourdieu’s tool-kit, habitus, field and forms of capital, are employed as analytical tools to better to better understand social movement theories and activists’ practices.

Second, this research believes and adopts the relational mode of thinking which Bourdieu advocates, and the logic of the ‘systems of relations’ between social structures and agents’ practices in producing and reproducing objective meanings through practices. This present thesis believes that social practices and different dynamics in social movements could not be understood without relationally exploring the relationships between field, habitus, and capital. Therefore, the researcher of this thesis suggests the relational mode of thinking to better understand the fields of practices.
which the newly emerged social movement would emerge from, the various fields which the agents came from, and to better understand any other fields of practice which might influence the movement’s emergence and mobilisation. Moreover, a relational approach would give us a deeper analysis of the various habitus which the activists have acquired through early socialisation, experience and learning, in relation to the activists’ positioning in different fields and their accumulation of various forms of capitals. Third, and by relationally employing the Bourdieusian tools and theory of practice, this thesis aims to overcome the subjectivism/objectivism dualism in social movement studies.

Moreover, in contrast to positivist research, in which precise objectives are specified before collecting and analysing data, these broad research aims guided the initial stages of the research. More specific research objectives emerged as the researcher combined relevant empirical findings with existing theoretical knowledge. In applying the Bourdieusian theoretical framework to the phenomena observed and recorded in the field, the following aim and objectives emerged:

3.1.1 Aim

This thesis draws on a Bourdieusian perspective to explore the organisational mechanisms and dynamics in Palestinian politically-motivated social movement.

3.1.2 Objectives

To relationally describe the various fields of practice, by analysing the ways in which these fields are interrelated in politically motivated social movement.

To better understand the dialectic relationship of subjectivity and objectivity in politically motivated social movement by examining the agents’ practical reasoning, habitus, in this context.

To further understanding the dynamics of competition, conflictual mechanisms, and power struggles through examining the agents’ habitus, acquisition of forms of capital and field positioning.

To examine the various internal processes and organisational relations in the political field per se, through employing the Bourdieusian theory of practice.
Having outlined the focused series of objectives that emerged, discussion will now turn to a brief outline of the research approach, which was guided by these research objectives, and by the nature of the problem under investigation.

3.2 Research Philosophy

This section outlines the research philosophy which guided the study. There are a number of factors which underline paradigm choice in research. Ontology and epistemology are two important elements of the philosophy of knowledge which need some clarifications. Generally speaking, epistemology is about *the way we know things* when ontology is about *what things are* (Crotty, 1998). “Ontology is the study of being. It is concerned with ‘what is’, with the nature of existence, with the structure of reality as such” (Crotty, 1998:42). Guba and Lincoln (1998) argue that the researcher has his/her own set of beliefs about the nature of reality. Identifying which ontological stance does the researcher hold help the researcher establish the nature and form of reality he/she wishes to pursue. Broadly speaking, there are three overarching philosophies of science; positivism, realism and interpretivism. Positivism is centred on the belief that a reality exists and can be objectively discovered. The positivist ontology argues that the purpose of science is to uncover the truth and make it to be able to control and predict. During the twentieth century, positivism became, and remained for a long time, the dominating philosophy of science (Guba and Lincoln, 1998).

Constructionism, or interpretivism, is a very broad and multi-faceted perspective which holds that world and knowledge are created by social and contextual understanding. For constructionism, reality –or at least selected parts thereof - is not something naturally given, it is precisely socially constructed. This philosophical approach explores how social constructions happen, and how social phenomena are socially constructed and driven by ‘disclosure’ rather than theory-orientation (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). According to realism, both positivism and social constructionism are too superficial, unrealistic and anthropocentric. This philosophical approach asserts that there is a world independent of human beings, and also that there are deep structures in this world that can be represented by scientific theories.
Moving to epistemology, epistemology deals with ‘the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and general basis’ (Hamlyn, 1995:242). Maynard (1994:10) explains epistemology as ‘epistemology is concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate’. Therefore, it is important in conducting research to identity, explain, and justify the epistemological stance which this present research adopted.

According to Crotty (1998), there are quite a range of epistemologies. However, objectivism, constructionism, and subjectivism are three core epistemologies which this thesis focuses on. When we believe that the tree in the forest is a tree, regardless of whether anyone is aware of its existence or not, then we are holding an objectivist epistemology. Objectivist epistemology holds that meaning, and therefore meaningful reality, exists as such apart from the operation of any consciousness. In this objectivist view of ‘what it means to know’, understandings and values are considered to be objectified in the people we are examining as researchers. Another epistemology, constructionism, rejects this view of human knowledge, and holds that there is no objective truth waiting for us to discover it. Truth, meanings, values and believes come into existence in and out of our engagement with the realities in our world. Meaning is not discovered but constructed. The third stance is the subjectivism epistemology which stands that meaning does not come out of an interplay between subject and object but is imposed on the object by the subject. Here the object as such makes no contribution to the generation of meaning. Crotty (1998) argues that constructionism meaning is constructed out of something (the object), whereas in subjectivism meaning is created out of nothing.

After explaining the different ontological and epistemological stances, this research is driven by the interpretivist ontological stance and a constructivist epistemological stance. Crotty (1998:10) reveals that ontological issues and epistemological issues tend to emerge together, “to talk of the construction of meaning is to talk of the construction of meaningful reality. Because of this confluence, writers in the research literature have trouble keeping ontology and epistemology apart conceptually”. That being said, the interpretive tradition, which is rooted in constructionism, believes that there are multiple realities, that reality is socially constructed, and it is dependent upon the perceptions of individual, social actors. Moreover, constructionism beliefs that meaning is constructed
and understood through the social actors’ engagement and interactions through the realities in our world. Meaning is not discovered but constructed. An interpretivism approach is concerned with the world of ‘lived experience’, which should not be stripped of its context and meaning. The interpretive tradition is well established in the social sciences and it has been considered one of the leading research strategies employed to understand the relationship between organisational identity, organisational constructs, and organisational processes, particularly how the former influence the interactions between organisations (Ravasi and Canto, 2013). From a social movement methodological perspective, qualitative methods have a long tradition (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002; Diani and Eyerman, 1992), but still, the interpretive paradigm, in particular ground theory, has thus far received scarce, if any, attention in the field. Grounded theory for example still remains at the margins of social movement studies (Della Porta, 2014). This neglect could be linked to the fact that scholars have seldom investigated some of the aspects that fit best with ground theory research strategy – perceptions, identities, emotions and, more generally, the cultural dimensions of protests – when it comes to social movement research (McAdam, 1994).

One issue arises from the interpretivist ontological stance is the presentation of the Bourdieusian conceptual framework which demonstrates that the researcher is engaged with prior theoretical understanding which might be construed as contrary to a truly interpretivist ontological stance. The present research is informed by Finch’s (2002) understanding of how to undertake empirical research. “To undertake empirical research which is informed by prior theoretical understanding, but which is not so much determined or constrained by this understanding that the potential for making novel insights is foregone” (Finch, 2002: 57). Theory regarding social movements, Bourdieusian conceptual tools and empirical findings about how social capital could be generated in a social movement helped the researcher determine what to research and how to research it. A position of relativism is assumed, in that this research accepts different constructions and aims to search for ‘ever more informed and sophisticated constructions’ (Lincoln, 1990). Findings relating to organisational dynamics and mechanism in politically-motivated social movement are being consciously sought, and as phenomena are gathered, the conceptual framework will be returned to and re-examined in light of these.
In this sense the research is akin to a reflective spiral (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000) which is similar to the approach of the ‘dance’ of theory and data. This approach will help overcoming the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity which has been highlighted as important by Bourdieu (see Swartz, 1997) and many researchers who investigated social movements (see Bilic, 2010; Crossley, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Goldberg, 2003; and Husu, 2014).

The aim of this research is to explore and generate understanding rather than test existing theory. This approach enables the researcher to generate new and alternative theories in an emerging field. The interpretive approach adopted begins with a conceptual framework and seeks to explore social movements and will continually reflect on the data collected in relation to the conceptual framework. This approach is neither wholly deductive nor inductive; this stance aligns with an Abductive interpretivism (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000). Abduction starts from an empirical basis, just like induction, but does not reject theoretical preconceptions and is in that respect closer to deduction. It combines strategies in a cyclic process that allows for movement between theorising and doing empirical research (Eco, 1990). The next section discusses the theoretical framework developed to understand this phenomenon and address the thesis aim and objectives.

### 3.3 Research Design

#### 3.3.1 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this research deploys Bourdieu’s theory of practice to better identify different fields’ of practice, how they interrelate together, and to describe how these social spaces, fields, could affect the movement’s emergence and growth. Moreover, this theoretical framework of Bourdieu will allow us to observe the conflictual dynamics and the internal mechanisms in the movement itself through further exploring the various activists’ habitus and what forms of capital do they obtain, or seek to accumulate. This comprehensive and relationally-built theoretical framework will enrich our understanding of the various organisational mechanisms, dynamics and processes of politically-social movement in the movement per se, and within its wider social structures.
This theoretical framework was developed based on the three main conceptual concepts of Bourdieu; field, habitus and capital, as conceptual tools to be utilised to address this research aim and answer its objectives. Being inspired by a Bourdieusian approach, the researcher has acknowledged the ubiquity and the proven utility of the theory of Bourdieu in organisational research. Everett (2002: 93) argues that Bourdieu’s work “allows the articulation of levels of analysis, which is one of the difficulties in traditional organisational theory. It also allows repositioning of the agent within the organisational context (Golsorkhi and Huault, 2006) by exceeding the dichotomy between cognition and behaviour that prevent the understanding of organisational behaviour (Everett, 2002). The work of Bourdieu also concerns the notion of power which he said is a relational process. In other words, the organisation is rooted in a "field of relations" (Drummond, 1998) and positions of actors are inter-related” (see Ihlen, 2005). Moreover, the concept of habitus has also allowed us to better understand the behaviour and decisions of individuals who are not always the product of rational calculation but are also determined by the device field-habitus-capital (Khanchel and Ben Kahla, 2013).

The present research adopts Bourdieu’s methodology “social praxeology” to better understand the data collected and the findings (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992:11). Bourdieu suggests that a praxeological double reading is firstly based on an “objectivity of the first order”, and secondly on an “objectivity of the second order”. The objectivity of the first order examines the distribution of material resources, determinant relations, and the species of capital in a field. It takes as its focus that which can be observed, measured, and mapped. In conducting such a reading, it is usual to think in terms of two moments of analysis: power analysis and relationship mapping (Wacquant, 1989; see Grenfell & James, 1998, for examples of field analysis). But this first double reading of Bourdieu’s says little about the will of the agents in the field, and so it is necessary to also look at the social phenomenology of society to adopt, that is, a perspective of “objectivity of the second order”. This perspective involves coming to terms with that which cannot so easily be measured, namely, the symbolic templates of practical activities, mundane knowledge, subjective meaning, and practical competency (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The interpretivist approach of this research advocates this praxeological double reading, in order to focus on the power and relations analysis from one side and to focus on the categories of perception and appreciation and the lived experiences of social agents. The second focus may also be viewed as an
analytical moment known as disposition analysis where researcher attends to the habitus of agents (Wacquant, 1989). Researcher has also suggested that habitus can be investigated by examining its structuring components, that is, by examining the language and discourse of social agents, and the struggles over these components (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Moreover, this research proposes that Bourdieu’s theorisation of field, habitus and capital are valuable analytic tools to synthesise different social movement approaches into a coherent whole. Rooted in the field of organisation studies, it takes all – habitus, field and capital – to connect micro and macro levels of analysis that should concern all organisational research (Crossley, 2002b, 2003; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). In the study of organisations, Swartz (2008) points that while Bourdieu’s concept of field is gaining inroads, habitus is seldom mentioned. Accordingly dynamics of fields are partially understood without the dispositions of habitus and capital of actors to generate practices (Swartz, 2008). Dobbin (2008) critiques the American organisational theorists, in particular, for picking up components of Bourdieu’s ideas and concepts from here and there. In support of this, it’s very common to come across research which applies just one of Bourdieu concepts to some empirical object, the author David Swartz reveals that it’s rare to find a study that deploys a relational perspective to analyse the three Bourdieusian master concepts- habitus, capital and field- integrated into a single study (Swartz, 2008). Therefore, this research is novel in acknowledging and employing the great power and richness of integrating Bourdieu’s theory of individual (habitus), theory of social structure (field), and theory of power relations (various forms of capital) in a relational approach to the study of social movement. The following section focuses on the operationalisation processes which the researcher adopts to operationalise these Bourdieusian conceptual tools and how these tools are going to be studied and explored in this present study. Moreover, the following section explains the interview questions which are related to operationalise these conceptual tools, and the interview questions designed to measure these conceptual tools in order to unveil new aspects and deeper understanding.

3.3.2 Fields

Fields, according to Bourdieu, are “networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over resources, stakes
and access” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1990: 96). Bourdieu posits that society is constructed of interlocking and multi-layered social fields within which agents interact. Fields could be viewed as structures of differences between individuals, groups and institutions, while the positions of the agents are based on the distribution and possession of capital (Swartz, 1997). This thesis adopts Bourdieu’s way of operationalising and studying fields. When Bourdieu was asked how one might carry out the study of a field and what are the necessary steps in this type of analysis (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1990: 104), he explains that there are three necessary and internally connected moments in any analysis in terms of fields. First, the researcher needs to “analyse the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power. Second, one must map out the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate form of specific authority for which this field is the site. And third, one must analyse the habitus of agents, the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalising a determinate type of social and economic condition, and which find in a definite trajectory within the field under consideration a more or less favourable opportunity to become actualised” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104-105).

Therefore, the interview questions were guided by this Bourdieusian approach. The researcher asked the participants about different external and internal fields which they are in relation with or embedded in. The research aimed to identify the field of power within all these fields, seen as the most autonomous field, which will have the most powerful and legitimate doxa and logic of the unquestioned. Moreover, the researcher was interested to identify different internal fields such as the early socialisation field (Swartz, 1997) which is the family, the political field in political organisations, political committees etc. The researcher was open to allow any new emerged data regarding the fields to emerge during the interview and the coding process later on.

Moreover, this thesis is keen to understand the structure and the dynamics of a field, and therefore one should look at the power relations that structure society or, to be more precise, which structure each field within society and the relations between fields. Organisational theorists (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) used the concept of organisational field to refer not just to one type of organisation, but all the organisations that play one role or another in influencing and shaping a specific field. The particular value of this conceptualisation appeals to many organisational theorists, however, the
potential utility of the field concept has been diminished by its application solely to the level of organisational field (Swartz, 2008). Therefore, the researcher of this present thesis was aware that the movement should not be understood in a rigid, static way, but rather as a relational analytic tool that can give insights into different types of situations (Husu, 2013). That being said, the researcher was not separating different fields from each other, and was aware to ask if there is any embedded relations and shared doxa in between some fields. At different points during the interview, the participants were asked relational questions in between the fields, such as how field X which the participant is related to could influence field Y, or how field Y affects the participant’s own opinion, behaviour, know-how, etc.

Further, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008:6) stress that “a truly unified field-based framework for organisational analysis must bring the field-theoretic approach to bear, not only on the analysis of clusters of organisations, but also on the analysis of the social configurations in which organisational fields are themselves embedded”. This understanding of organisational field carries with it many promising implications for the study of structures of interorganisational and intraorganisational relations in organisation. Bourdieu’s framework allowed the researcher to reconceptualise interorganisational relations within a field as structures of power, to explore how these organisational processes and dynamics unfold according to their own relatively autonomous logic and to comprehend ways in which such processes and dynamics are influenced by developments in external fields. To further explore the interorganisational relations within the movement, the research discussed many issues with the participants in regard organisational processes and procedures which took place in the movement. The goal of the movement, its demands, strategies, policies, tactical plans, participants’ roles and duties, meetings, decision-making process, internal elections, conflicts’ dynamics, problem solving procedures, and gender relations were all crucial topics which were discussed during the interview to unveil various interorganisational relations in the movement.

In addition to sketching the implications of Bourdieu’s framework for interorganisational analysis, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) have also sought to show that this comprehensive framework carries with it promising implications for the analysis of intraorganisational relations. It allows a reconceptualisation of each individual organisation as a more or less temporarily stable structure, in addition, it lets
one to analyse systematically the complex relationship between the individual organisation and its larger social context. Questions related to the relations between the movement and other movement were posed, between the movement and other governmental bodies or political parties were also discussed. The researcher argues that this fruitful Bourdieusian reconceptualisation of both interorganisational and intraorganisational relations in organisation allow the researcher to capture multiple relations, processes and dynamics within social movement per se and with its relation with its larger social context.

Moreover, as it was mentioned in Chapter Two, fields are arenas of ongoing struggle, they are occupied the dominant and the dominated, two sets of actors who attempt to usurp, exclude, and establish monopoly over the mechanisms of the field’s reproduction and the type of the power effective in it (Everett, 2002). This configuration of power relations which constitutes a field can be rigorously analysed in terms of distinctive capital profiles. Therefore, the researcher of this present thesis was keen to explore different conflictual dynamics and struggle in between the two movements’ activists, and in between the activists themselves within the same movement. The used interviewing technique explored those who are able to exercise some degree of monopoly power over the definition and the distribution of capital (Swartz, 1997). Therefore, some of the interview questions were designed to explore the various types of capital which the activist enjoys. Moreover, it was mentioned in extant literature that power relations over occupying a position occur between the established agents and the new arrivals in the fields (Swartz, 1997). Established agents tend to pursue conservation strategies while challengers opt for subversive strategies. Bourdieu in fact speaks of three different types of strategies; conservation, succession, subversion. Conservation strategies tend to be pursued by those who hold dominant positions and enjoy seniority in the field. Strategies of succession are attempts to gain access to dominant positions in a field and are generally pursued by the new entrants. Finally, strategies of subversion are pursued by those who expect to gain little from the dominant groups. Therefore, the researcher was keen to interview activists with different background, gender, geographic location, role of participation and type of movement, in order to capture different relations of power and strategies to purse capital and power.

All of these strategies were acknowledged while trying to understand how existing actors in a field or new entrants to that field are using different strategies to gain power
and occupy positions. However, it is not merely the power relations between established agents and new arrivals which create struggle in the field. Fields itself impose on actors specific forms of struggle. Both of the dominant establishment and the subordinate challengers share a tacit acceptance that the field of struggle is worth pursuing in the first place. Bourdieu refers to this deep structure of fields as the doxa. Every field presupposes and produces a particular type of illusion, which Bourdieu defines as a belief or acceptance of the worth of the game of field. Entry into a field requires the tacit acceptance of the rules of the game, meaning that specific forms of struggle are legitimated whereas others are excluded. Capturing and identifying the doxa is not an easy task. Exploring an unquestionable and take-for-granted logic could be difficult to reveal. However, the researcher was keen to dig deeper by posing some probing questions to capture hidden facts, believes and logics.

The field concept leads to an emphasis on aspects of the structuring of the social world that can be usefully transferred to the organisational analysis. Ultimately, we can say that the notion of field allows the clarification of relationships that movements and organisations have with their immediate environment and also a better understanding of their inner mechanisms and dynamics. Field analysis, therefore, directs the researcher’s attention to a level of analysis capable of revealing the integrating logic of competition between opposing viewpoints. This analysis encourages the researcher to seek out sources of conflict and struggle in this research domain, related that conflict to the broader areas of class and power, and identity underlying shared assumptions by opposing parties. For fields to operate there must be agents with the appropriate habitus to make them capable and willing to invest in particular fields. New arrivals to the fields must pay the price of an initial investment for entry, which involves recognition of the value of the game and the practical knowledge of how to play it.

27 The idea of the doxa resonates with Durkheim’s concept of the ‘collective consciousness’. A crucial difference in that doxa is field specific rather that the representation of a tacit system of understandings for the entire society.
28 One of the basic points which Bourdieu stresses on is that behaviour in fields is interest driven. Bourdieu wants to stress that actors, regardless of their positions, are complicit in accepting the rules of the game in which they play. Moreover, he stresses that his acceptance goes unacknowledged, or ‘misrecognised’, for the most part (Bourdieu, 1991).
29 Gerth and Mills (1964) wrote an important research that there has not yet received sufficient treatment in Bourdieu’s work is identifying the types of habitus that attract individuals to particular fields. In other terms, and outside of Bourdieu’s conceptual language, is the issue of trying to understand the connection between ‘character and social structure’.
30 Bourdieu argues that those in subordinate positions are these because they have not fully mastered the rules of the game (Swartz, 1997).
3.3.3 Forms of Capital

Like the concept of field, the concept of capital has enjoyed widespread use in organisation theory. Rooted in the field of organisation studies, this study aims to explore various forms of capital which the activists have been inherited from their early socialisation upbringing, schooling systems, affiliation with some social and political organisation, etc. The researcher believes that all forms of capital are interconnected (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), as they are not pluralistically distributed to be studied separately. Therefore, this research acknowledges different types of capital as it should be noted that each form of capital has a different degree of liquidity, convertibility and susceptibility to attrition.

Accordingly, we can say that there are many fields as there are forms of capital. Therefore, the researcher was keen to comprehensively understand the specific internal logic which each field, and the different species of capital valued and change over time in a particular field. This acknowledgment was particularly suited to understand mechanisms for structuring and power relations, and the practices of different actors within the organisational field. For organisational researchers this means seeing the organisation as embedded in a ‘field’ of relations (Drummond, 1998), one wherein actors constantly struggle to accumulate ‘capital’, that fleeting form of power whose value is always and only ever field specific. Therefore, we could assume that actors in movements, who possess a great volume and composition of capital which is needed in a specific game, control and influence the game more and gain the capacity to produce the recognition of the legitimacy of capital distribution amongst the other contending parties. However, actors with less capital are able to produce effects to a certain extent. If not, there would be no game (see Husu, 2014).

The interview’s questions were designed to identify the forms of capital which the activist has, and to track the appropriability and convertibility of capital in relation to the field which the activist is positioned in (Bourdieu, 1986). Social capital, as explained in Chapter Two, can be defined as the forms power and the resources that stem from networks of relationships. As the structural dimension of social capital have received more empirical attention than the relational dimension, the researcher was keen to capture the structural dimension of social capital (see Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Rowley et al., 2000; Moran, 2005) and the relational dimension of social capital. The
questions have not only restricted on the structural position of movement’s activists within certain social movement spaces, the relative position of these spaces and their cultural networks within broader social circles have been also explored. Hence, this research aims to obtain substantial and robust understanding of interpersonal and relational features of network ties, rather than merely focusing on the structural facets of a network.

Addressing the concept of social capital and social networks in the interview has helped to capture data about social movement mobilisation (Rammelt, 2011), significant outcome produced by social movement activities (Diani, 1997), key social relations and ties, communication techniques with others, coordination between efforts, pooling of resources and acting together. Within social movement literature, it was surprising to note that symbolic, cultural and economic forms of capital have been rarely examined in social movement literature, in contrast to social capital (see Diani, 1997; Rammelt, 2011; Teney and Hanquinet, 2012). This thesis is also interested in exploring the embodied, objectified, and institutionalised cultural capital through addressing questions of early socialisation, schooling system, educational credentials, tastes, music, habits, and lifestyles. Another subset of cultural capital is linguistic capital. An embodied form, linguistic capital is acquired primarily through the family, the mother tongue, and is manifest in and measured through linguistic style. This style is evident in one’s ability to demonstrate competence in the use of magisterial, scholarly, or bourgeois language. Moreover, the economic capital is going to be captured through understanding the different social classes which these activists come from, and if they own any private property, monetary assets or profits, and how they can define their financial position or salaries.

Finally, the research is also aware to capture forms and meanings of symbolic capital which might arises out of the other forms of capital, but only when the arbitrariness of the possession and accumulation of these other forms is misrecognised (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The researcher is keen to track any form of prestige, esteem, renown, reputation, and personal authority (Cronin, 1996). Another way of saying this is that the other forms of capital are converted to symbolic capital the instance they are deemed legitimate. Therefore, the research is interested to capture processes of appropriability and convertibility with the different forms of social capital. Most importantly, symbolic power and violence are also present in the structure of the interview to allow a space for
capturing imposed, internalised, and incorporated power of unquestionable, taken-for-granted, and naturalisation logics.

Having examined different forms of capital, we can now better understand Bourdieu’s (1989) suggestion that the distributions of agents in social space, fields, are dependent upon the volume and structure of capital they possess. Of course, this distribution is never static, as the field is always in a state of flux. Bourdieu also adds that even though individuals always try to maximise their possession of their preferred form of capital, they tend to have an interest in the reproduction of those conditions most conductive to that preferred form.

_The different sections must tend to invest the capital which they may transmit in the market that is capable of guaranteeing for it the best yield. . . . Those sections which are richest in cultural capital are more inclined to invest in their children’s education at the same time as in cultural practices liable to maintain and increase their specific rarity; those sections which are richest in economic capital set aside cultural and educational investments to the benefit of economic investments._ (Bourdieu, 1977a: 502)

As a result, individuals often work to discredit “the form of capital upon which the force of their opponents rests and often try to valorise the species of capital they preferentially possess or support” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 99). It is also important to mention too that Bourdieu’s notion of capital allows him to develop a fairly complete notion of class. Breaking with the Marxian notion of class, Bourdieu extends the idea of capital to all forms of power, whether they are material, cultural, social, or symbolic. This addition allows for a more comprehensive examination of social stratification and “class” antagonisms by allowing “class difference” to account for gender, race, and other differences. This in turn facilitates the search for “unity within difference”, though it may also constrain explorations into these specific forms of social life (McCall, 1991; Everett, 2002). What is truly interesting and contentious about this conception of the social world is that not only is one’s position in social space dependent on the _always changing_ capital one possesses, but one’s identity is also dependent on one’s accumulated capital. To understand this connection between social space, capital, and
individual identity, it is necessary to consider the third tool of Bourdieu’s conceptual tool-kit, “habitus”.

3.3.4 Habitus

Whilst field and capital are familiar concepts in organisational research, and are highly valuable to understanding social movements and social capital in particular, the third concept in Bourdieu’s triad, habitus, has been rarely conceptualised in organisation studies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and social movements (Crossley, 2002; 2003; 2011). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argued over a decade ago that the concept of habitus offers a powerful means of linking micro-and macro level processes in organisational theory. The habitus then is intended to provide the mediating link between social structure (the macro) and individual action (the micro). In being this analytic bond which links between the individual behaviour and social structure, habitus could be considered as both personal and social. Khanchel and Kahla (2013: 92) says further explains “It is personal because it is acquired, structured and restructured through experience. It is social, because it is highly linked to the context of the field and the position of the agent inside this field.”

Operationalising habitus in research studies has to deal with the complexity and ambiguity of the concept itself (DiMaggio, 1979). Although Bourdieu asserts that habitus is inculcated primarily by early childhood experience and early socialisation processes, habitus is also transformed by subsequent experience and it is influenced by all aspects of both the family and societal settings (DiMaggio, 1979). Therefore, the researcher spent a decent amount of time with each participant to speak and reflect on his/her own biographical and historical experiences through sharing with the researcher their early socialisation processes and initial exposure through different social fields such as their family, schooling, university experience, previous political activism, etc.

Moreover, previous research argues that the initial habitus, which is formed through early socialisation, is durable (see King, 2000). But since habitus is also transformable, we are never sure what difference this durability makes, or under what circumstances it makes a difference for what phenomena. Moreover, habitus has been also subject to widespread criticism, mainly on the basis of its latent determinism (Jenkins, 1992; Lane; 2000). For example, King (2000) in his practical critique of the habitus has
pointed out that habitus is incompatible with Bourdieu’s practical theory, and it retreats quickly into objectivism. This sharp criticism and the continuous debate about the concept of habitus and its operationalisation highlight the complexity and difficulty of theorising habitus. However, this researcher’s stance is that habitus cannot be viewed as merely deterministic, as habitus plays a crucial role of being an open space for resistance, change and transformation in some situations (see Cornbleth 2010; Harris & Wise, 2012; Lee & Kramer, 2013). Processes of change and transformation in the nature of habitus are possible. A habitus is not static or eternal, because habitus is a combination of the social actor’s deeply ingrained identity and his or her less fixed, occupational identity (Meisenhelder, 1997). Therefore, the interview’s questions were tracking some changes and transformations within the participants’ behaviours, opinions, networks, and practical reasoning. The interviews paid attention to the changes within the habitus because the experiences to which the habitus is constantly subjected are many and varied, most of which are reinforcing, but many are modifying (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The researcher was also keen to track and observe any changes in habitus resulting from changes in the field, and to observe changes in habitus if the kinds and proportions of and struggles over capital in the field change.

That being said, the researcher paid attention to the fact that habitus is constitutive of the field. Because habitus works in a dialectic fashion, as an infinite yet strictly limited generative capacity, as determinism and freedom, as conditioning and creativity, and as consciousness and the unconscious (Bourdieu, 1990). As Bourdieu (1988: 784) notes: “The field, as a structured space, tends to structure the habitus, while the habitus tends to structure the perceptions of the field”.

Moreover, the researcher assumed that habitus may be manifest in different ways. It could be structured as a unifying cultural code ‘collective habitus’, an internalised cultural code ‘dispositional habitus’, or as the practice of a characteristic style ‘manifest habitus’ (Nash, 1990). These ideas of “the field structuring the habitus” and “unifying and internalised cultural codes” surface in Oakes et al’s (1998) organisational research. It should be also apparent that in saying ‘unconsciously’ habitus implies a degree of social determinism. That is, Bourdieu’s understanding (1977a) is far from a rational actor. In fact, fundamental to Bourdieu’s approach is a challenge to methodological individualism and the notion of the free and independent subject. Bourdieu sees that social actors are not just objects guided by rules or codes, yet their habitus encourage
them to pursue a particular strategy suited to the needs of their field (Everett, 2001). Therefore, this research acknowledges that habitus can also operate as guidance system (Drummond, 1998) producing strategies where social actors do weigh their ‘interests’ prior to any action. Habitus in this sense is Bourdieu’s attempt to overturn, or at least reconcile, the subject-object duality.

Moreover, habitus, as Bourdieu himself states it, contains the ‘genetic information’ which both allows and disposes successive generations to reproduce the world we inherit from our parents’ generations. This circular conception of reproduction in which social structures structure habitus, and in turn, structure social structures, are constantly in process and change. In order to understand these constant processes of change, Crossley (2003) in his research paper ‘From reproduction to transformation’, argues that we need to note, and study how innovative actions by embodied agents can both modify existing structures and generate new ones, breaking the circle of reproduction. Indeed, changing and resisting societal structured structures in order to engender change is the ultimate aim of social movements. Thus, activists’ habitus could be considered as structured and structuring structures, as Bourdieu defines it (Bourdieu, 1992). Crossley (2003) concludes that the activists’ habitus is structured through activists’ involvement in protest and activism. It is the same habitus which leads activists to continue in activism and thus to contribute to the perpetuation of activism as a social practice; the activist habitus is thus a structuring and structured structure. It is generated by structured movement practices and it generates structured movement practices. Therefore what particularly strengthens the marriage between the concept of habitus and social movement research is that it shows that this disposition of habitus is generated, shaped and structured through engagement in activism, as Bilic (2010) mentions.

Moreover, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) speak out about ‘organisational habitus’ and its crucial role in linking between past fields to present fields through the individual activists who move from one to the next. Each new arrival brings to the field a habitus formed under specific past conditions, some will be shared with others and some will be completely contradictory. Similar and different habitus structure different judgements and practices in various ways in organisational life. Therefore, the researcher can shed light on how the concept of habitus could contribute to shaping and changing organisational structures through the various microprocesses of individuals’ behaviour. In addition, Bottero and Crossley (2011) find that habitus is shaped by concrete
interactions and relationships. Actors in similar position to one another are more likely, as a consequence, to interact and therefore to influence one another, such that they develop similar habitus- or what Bottero and Crossley (2011) called, *shared habitus*. Bourdieu (1985) agrees that homologies and similarities with structural positions and relations between agents are behind having similar dispositions. Bourdieu refers to “sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances” (Bourdieu, 1985: 725). Still, the mechanism by which social position shapes habitus has never been clarified (Bottero and Crossley, 2011). Therefore, the researcher was keen to explore what social movement agents have in common with regard to social positions, volume and composition of capital, and habitus, in order to shape habitus, generate resources and mobilise. Various forms of habitus such as shared habitus (Bottero and Crossley, 2011) and acquired habitus (Nash, 1990) are important to be captured.

Finally, with organisation again, Drummond (1998) tried to link the social theories of Bourdieu in the context of organisation, and made the novel suggestion that habitus should be seen as composed of “narratives”. This is because narratives, or stories, are things of culture. For organisational researchers, this suggestion provides not only an opening for an investigation of “organisational habitus”, through an investigation of organisational narratives, but also a more general link between Bourdieu’s theory and the concepts of organisational culture, leadership, conflict, and change. Based on Drummond’s (1998) findings, this researcher argues that exploring habitus can explain a lot about the organisational habitus (culture), enacted habitus (leadership), the imposition and resistance of habitus (conflict), and the destruction and replacement of habitus (change). Moreover, Bourdieu’s theory of action provides means of linking these often isolated concepts through employing the relational mode of thinking. Having thoroughly examined how the concept of habitus could be studied in organisations, precisely in social movements, this study argues that activists’ habitus is generated by structured movement practices and it generates structured movement practices, which in turn, offers a powerful means of linking micro and macro level of processes in organisational theory.

### 3.4 Unit of Analysis and Selection of Participants
In the present research, the aim is to explore various mechanisms and dynamics, processes and procedures, behaviours and practical reasoning in politically-motivated social movements. Therefore, the unit of observation is the Palestinian political context, in particular the Palestinian youth movement. The Palestinian political environment is rich and historically complex where political parties and ideologies contain high level of diversity such as the Islamic resistance movement (Hamas), the Palestinian liberation movement (Fatah), and other leftist parties such as the popular front for the liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the democratic front for the liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and other political parties and social movements. The unit of analysis was the activists who participated in the politically-motivated Palestinian Youth movements which emerged after the Arab revolutions ‘uprisings’ in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. The 15 March movement, the Independent Youth Movement, and the Palestinians for Dignity movements are the three movements that the researcher addressed and decided to research in details. Qualitative research is known of its support of non-probability sampling methods, such as purposive sampling, judgemental or snowballing sampling (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Qualitative studies are not interested or concerned with generalising from a sample to a population and focus instead on selecting cases that will generate insight about the phenomenon of interest. Small samples of people who are nestled in their context and can be studied in-depth are sought out (Miles and Huberman 1994). For example, the reason is that purposive sampling allows cases (people, incidents, organisations, communities etc.) to be selected because they are information rich and illuminative (Patton 2002).

Therefore, respondents were selected using both purposive and snowball sampling. Purposively, the respondents were selected for interview based on their diverse characteristics and their relevance to understand the addressed research objectives, with additional new respondents selected on the basis of emerging properties and theoretical saturation, resulting in forty interviews. Gender, age, location, type of movement and position were some of the criteria considered in the sampling process. The research sample includes organisers, activists and central actors of these three groups and other new participants in the new social initiatives/campaigns. Full details of the sample are featured in Table 3.1.

The selection of participants was facilitated through the researcher’s networks and familiarity with the field’s norms and considerations. The researcher acknowledges her engagement and participation in the movement for about five months before she left for
the United Kingdom for her Masters studies in 2012. The researcher acknowledges that this engagement in the movement facilitated the process of recruiting participants as it has its advantages in terms of access and trust. Being engaged in this movement supports the researcher in terms of participants’ accessibility (Carson et al., 2001), familiarity with the network, and trusted relations with the participants. The former reasons empowered the researcher in collecting deeper insights, precise interpretations and valuable experiences, without ignoring the moral obligations related to the researcher’s integrity and the participants’ informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, which are going to be discussed later. Moreover, it was not only the past personal involvement of the researcher in the movement, the researcher is also a Palestinian researcher who conducted this research in a field that she was born, raised and lived in for long period of time.

In order to achieve the research aim and objectives of capturing context-rich data and the mechanisms and dynamics, in politically-motivated social movement, are produced/reproduced, purposive and snowball sampling were used. Additional new respondents were selected on the basis of emerging properties and theoretical saturation; the former to examine the validity of characteristics and analytic categories and to consider links, associations and relationships of the emerging categories, while the latter is to assure that more collected data would not generate any relevant new insight, until fifteen in depth- interviews were conducted. The researcher conducted forty in-depth interviews with different activists as it shows in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1: Overview of the Participants and their Movements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activist Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Movement Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dalia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lina</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Core Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husam</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadi</td>
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<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Core Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zain</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Core Activist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nada</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Activist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sami</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Activist</td>
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<td>Madi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>15th March</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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3.5 Data Collection: In-Depth Interviews

3.5.1 Rationale

This research adopts an interpretive approach using the qualitative technique of in-depth interviews to collect detailed, descriptive and comparable data on social movements, mechanisms, dynamics and networks over the life cycle of various, related politically-motivated social movements in Palestine. This following section discusses the context of the youth movements, and explains the methods used to collect data.

Regarding the context, this research investigates politically-motivated Palestinian Youth movements which emerged after the Arab revolutions ‘uprisings’ in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. In February 2011, in Ramallah, a group of young activists calling themselves 15th March movement came together. The short-lived 15th March movement lasted for around seven months. Simultaneously, another group of young activists gathered under the name of the ‘Independent Youth Movement’ which lasted for almost sixteen months. Following on from this, the majority of the activists in both movements, as well as other new participants, joined together under the name of ‘Palestinians for Dignity’, a movement which itself lasted for one year. After the decline of ‘Palestinians for Dignity’, new social initiatives and campaigns were created by former activists from the aforementioned movements, and further new activists joined these as well. These can all be seen as loosely organised, short lived, and thinly documented movements, often lacking reliable databases and archives, or even list of constituent members.

The organisational practices and mechanisms in these types of movements, like those of political grassroots struggles and resistances, are usually hidden from the view of hegemonic structuralist management scholars and social movements’ theorists. Therefore, by studying this type of ‘alternative’ non-hegemonic form of politically-motivated movement, this research contributes towards an understanding of the processes of organising and the diverse dynamics in these types of movements. Methodologically, in such cases, social movement scholars highly encourage the
adoption of interpretive methods such as interviewing, as a methodological tool in studies where the goals are exploration, discovery, and interpretation of social events and processes (see Della Porta, 2014; Howley, 2008; Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002). By focusing on Palestine, this study also contributes to the relative dearth in organisation studies scholarship examining organisational practices from the South/East, which has typically been side-lined by Western/Northern perspectives.

Moreover, the political nature of this Palestinian movement contributes to the discourse of social movement autonomy from the state. Böhm et al. (2010), for example, highlight the way in which demands for autonomy are embedded in various social, economic, political and cultural contexts, including the state, which give rise to both possibilities and impossibilities of autonomous practices. In the present research, activists not only fight for determination and organisational self-management from the state, but from double repression; from the occupying Israeli state and the Palestinian National Authority. This context thus allows a rare insight into the complex notion of autonomy in social movements that has the potential for both empirical and theoretical contributions.

3.5.2 Structuring Depth Interviews and Data Collection

In this study, the researcher used in-depth interviews to generate, challenge, clarify, elaborate and reconceptualise understandings of social movements. Interviewing is one means to access the required breadth and depth of information through gaining access to key movement participants (Blee and Taylor, 2002), and to counteract the biased availability of documentary material which is produced by official, prominent, educated and wealthy leaders about social movements (Thompson, 1988). Through interviewing, the study succeeded in accessing behind-the-scenes voices, such as women, lower-class participants, and other ordinary participants and activists. Gaining information from a broad range of social movement members greatly enriched the study themes and categories that were generated from the responses of diverse participants in the investigated movement. Moreover, based on the different rhythms of emergence, growth and decline in this movement, interviews allowed the researcher to capture these rhythms over the life cycle of the various movements. The essence of in-depth interviews that they allow the researcher to get inside the respondents’ minds and enter
into their perspective to understand feelings, values, meaning, interpretations, and personal experiences that are difficult to collect in other ways (Patton, 1990).

The data collection period lasted for five months, from September 2014 till January 2015, mostly in Ramallah, Palestine. The researcher is familiar with the locality, and the process of gaining access to informants was facilitated by through her established network of relationships in the region (Carson et al., 2001). Respondents were selected using both purposive and snowball sampling. Purposively, the respondents were selected for interview based on their diverse characteristics and their relevance to understand the addressed research objectives, with additional new respondents selected on the basis of emerging properties and theoretical saturation, resulting in forty interviews. Gender, age, location, type of movement and position were some of the criteria considered in the sampling process. The research sample includes organisers, activists and central actors of these three groups and other new participants in the new social initiatives/campaigns.

In the interviews, a semi-structured schedule was used, although the researcher allowed flexibility for respondents to digress, and also used prompts and probes to deepen the discussion and ensure she had correctly interpreted their responses (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The researcher conducted five in-depth sensitisation interviews to enhance theoretical sensitivity, testing the emerging themes and refining the interviewing protocol. All interviews were audio- recorded and varied in duration from 90 minutes to 150 minutes. Forty interviews were conducted with selected participants using purposive and snowball sampling (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Additional new respondents were selected on the basis of emerging properties and theoretical saturation; the former to examine the validity of characteristics and analytic categories and to consider links, associations and relationships of the emerging categories, while the latter is to assure that more collected data would not generate any relevant new insight, until forty in depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted (Carson et al., 2001).

In the study, in- depth interviewing was based on a semi-structured schedule ‘discussion prompt/interview guide’ which was organised around the research aim and objectives of the study. The interview guide is shown in Appendix 3. The interview structure was divided into six sections, section one concentrated on the participant’s upbringing, family and schooling education. Section two discussed the university life of the
participant, his/her social networks and early activism. Section three focuses on exploring the reasons and motives behind joining the movement, while section four looks at the different organisational dynamics, recruitment procedures, and relationships with the PA, political parties and other key politicians. Section five tries to bring out the activists’ opinions and thoughts about the other movement’s activists and the reasons behind their failure to merge together. At the end, section six discusses the decline stage of the movement and the personal experience of the activists in this movement.

Respondents were questioned extensively and in-depth with a room for more flexibility to digress and to probe to ensure that the information received from respondents reflected what they actually experienced (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991) and explored in their internal reality (Carson et al., 2001). The open-ended nature of the semi-structured interviewing made it possible for the respondents to generate, challenge, clarify, elaborate and recontextualise understandings of social movements. As social movement scholars reveal, the usefulness of semi-structured interviewing in social movement research as a common methodological tool in studies where the goals are exploration, discovery, and interpretation of social events and processes (Plows, 2008; Howley, 2008; Della Porta, 2014).

3.5.3 Reflexivity and the Role of the Researcher

Bourdieu’s main methodological contributions come from his emphasis on “reflexivity,” on the need to consider the researcher’s relation to the research object. Bourdieu’s call for reflexivity is a call to acknowledge the way in which the researcher’s knowledge about the world influences research claims, and to acknowledge what the researcher brings with him/her of personal and social biases to the object of inquiry (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu argues that every sociological inquiry needs a critical reflection, or what Swartz (1997:271) called ‘reflexive return’ on the social determinants and social conditions that make the inquiry possible. He stresses that the relationship between the researcher and the object should be observed and controlled so that the position of the researcher is not unwillingly projected into the object of the study and the subject’s relation to the object, what Bourdieu (Wacquant, 1989:33) calls “participant objectivation”.

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As discussed before, the researcher acknowledges her engagement and participation in the movement for about five months before she left to the United Kingdom for her Masters studies in 2012. The researcher acknowledges that this engagement in the movement facilitated the process of recruiting participants as it has its advantages in terms of access and trust. Moreover, it was not only her personal participation, the researcher is a Palestinian researcher who conducted this research in a field and social/cultural and political context that she was born and raised in, and lived in for long period of time. This leads us to Bourdieu’s notion of reflexivity and the need to consider the researcher’s relation to the research object (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). The researcher acknowledges that she brings with her the structured structures, habitus, of her early socialisation and learnt experiences which might play as social biases to the object of inquiry. The researcher acknowledges that her gender and age, as a 29 years old female researcher, might distort or changed some data imparted and narrated to her because of her age and gender. For example, some men might not share with the researcher particular political thoughts because the interviewer is a young female researcher.

Moreover, Bourdieu’s drew our attention to the social class and position of the researcher bias, which he calls it, field location. The researcher acknowledges that she was brought up in a lower-middle social class household. However, she went to prestigious private school in Ramallah where she was cultivated with distinguished cultural capital, languages, and close networks with Palestinian upper-middle and upper social classes. The researcher was aware of her own trajectory through social space which endows her with a unique set of early dispositions, primary habitus, and a particular sense of practice (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). Yet, she is also equipped with a secondary habitus, more specific than the primary one which is the result of her belonging to an academic field in which her capacity for reasoning and theorising was constituted. The researcher acknowledges the position in the field which she holds as an academic scholar who occupies a current academic position in one of the British universities to conduct her PhD studies. The researcher has been aware of the higher position which she occupies in the academic field in relation to other participants. This latter point highlights the intellectual bias which Bourdieu argues about (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). This intellectual position within the intellectual field is formed through the framework structured by acquired dispositions, the primary and the
secondary habitus, and through the presuppositions that form the doxa of the researcher’s academic field (Golsorkhi et al., 2009).

Therefore, acknowledging all of these biases and reflecting upon them are all challenges that the researcher hopes she has countered with a strong self-reflexive component. The assumption that guides this thesis is that reflexivity, or ‘the process of reflecting critically on the self as researcher, the ‘human instrument’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2000, 183), is a central axis of the research process, and a mechanism central to the ethical engagement with the realm of activism. The researcher was aware to operationalise reflexivity ethically and constructively. First of all, being aware of all the discussed biases which the researcher acknowledged gave the researcher tools for distinguishing zones of necessity and of freedom, and thereby for identifying spaces open to moral action (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu argues:

“The more aware they [as the researchers] become of the social within them by reflexively mastering their categories of thought and action, the less likely are to be actuated by the externality which inhabits them.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:49).

Therefore, it is through reflexivity where the researcher neutralises her scholastic reason and academic doxa, which requires the naturalisation of a set of ‘reflexive’ predispositions. Golsorkhi et al (2009:787) propose that this naturalisation must be a collective process: “Reflexivity has to be two-pronged. It has on the one hand to focus on current presuppositions that constitute the doxa, and on the other, it has to take on board the inherent momentum of this doxa. Reflexivity is a never-ending process since the structure of a field, the positions of agents within the field, the distribution, in volume and nature, of the different sorts of capital, are also ever changing. Reflexivity is an attitude that immunises researchers against the consequences of myths such as that of the rational, free-willing social scientist who, because she can reflect on her own work and keep ‘context’ at bay, is by no means influenced by the social conditions of the production of knowledge.”

3.5.4 Ethical Considerations
The researcher has been guided not only by codes of ethics and ethical conduct (Milan, 2014), but also by moral and professional obligations which are the personal moral codes that defend research participants against unethical behaviour before, during and after conducting the research. This research addresses sensitive political concerns where the researcher has taken privacy, anonymity and confidentiality into consideration (Neuman, 2006) to build trust and honesty ties between the researcher and the participants (Malthaner, 2014). The researcher has ensured anonymity by protecting subjects’ identities by discarding the name and the addresses of subjects and referring to them by pseudonyms (Neuman, 2006). Anonymity is crucial in such a sensitive researched topic like political activism in Palestine which has experienced considerable political turbulence and civic unrest in recent years and is not purely democratic countries to be totally open for political criticism. In this regard Malthaner (2014:186) said: “In the context of authoritarian regimes and violent conflicts, these consequences can be severe, either because participants may be identified as members of armed groups, oppositional movements, or as dissident intellectuals … Consequently, the protection of participants’ identity, precise locations of research, etc., must be given highest priority”.

The researcher has struck a balance between these ethical considerations; the need to protect the vulnerable participants who may be put at risk from the exposure of the research data and findings. Confidentiality has been respected by protecting the data collected in confidence and keeping it secret from the public (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Confidentiality may protect subjects from physical harm, especially from secret police and government in this research context (Neuman, 2006). Thus, all previous ethical concerns have been taken as a priority in conducting this highly ethical and solid research.

Moreover, the participants were informed about the context and overall purpose of the research and procedures of the study and their right to voluntarily participate, and hence, informed consent was achieved. All participants have signed their informed consent after they voluntarily accepted participation in the in-depth interviews. Copies of the informed consent forms in Arabic and English are shown in Appendices 1 and 2. All the participants explicitly agreed that the interview could be recorded for verbatim transcription and data assurance. The researcher has the right to use and publish the data, but must protect participants’ identities by discarding their names and refer them by fake names to assure anonymity (Neuman, 2006).
3.6 Evaluation of Qualitative Data

Evaluation of qualitative data is controversial and debatable. Evaluating qualitative data in terms of validity and reliability is often seen as inappropriate or irrelevant (Guba and Lincoln 1998). To pursue rigorous and trustworthy research, the researcher must try to ensure credibility, dependability conformability and transferability criteria to present a convincing research that is academically and methodologically rigorous (Guba, 1981).

First, credibility was achieved by adopting well established operational measures, in-depth interviews, implemented deeply and intimately (Yin, 1994; Carson et al., 2001) and used constant comparison method in data analysis that was successfully utilised in previous comparable studies (Mattoni, 2014). The researcher was able to target relevance, representative and rich sample (Carson et al., 2001). It was keen to establish a rapport in the opening moments to achieve familiarity and honesty in informants (Pitts, 1994; Silverman, 2001). In addition, iterative questioning and member checks strategies were followed to obtain greater transparency (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Lincoln, 1995). Thus, researcher was able to link the current research findings/emerging themes to the existing theoretical body (Silverman, 2001) to contribute with congruent results with reality.

Secondly, the employed methodologies, in-depth interview, were justified and specifically their appropriateness, in-depth methodological coverage was described to allow the reader, or future researcher, to assess the extent of research practices’ properness and effectiveness to ensure dependability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Thirdly, the concept of confirmability is the qualitative researcher’s comparable concern to objectivity. Miles and Huberman (1994) consider that a key criterion for confirmability is the extent to which the researcher admits his/her own predispositions/biases and recognise of methods’ shortcomings.

Finally, since the findings of this qualitative research are specific to a small number of particular environment and individuals, it is hard to demonstrate the findings and conclusions to a wide population, which may affect its transferability (Merriam, 1998). Nevertheless, the researcher supports the similar argument of Stake (1994) and Denscombe (1998) who suggest that, although each case may be unique, it is also an
example within a broader group and, as a result, the prospect of transferability should not be immediately rejected.

### 3.7 Overview of Data Analysis

All data has been collected in Arabic. After the data has been transcribed and coded, and the constant comparison method was used to develop thematic categories in relation to the research questions. NVivo was used to organise the data for coding and categorising. Nvivo is a software package for qualitative data analysis and organisation. This software was useful in facilitating the use of multiple coding for blocks of data. Nvivo enabled the researcher to sort out coded chunks of data, and assisted in recoding or uncoding blocks of data and organising code into sets that could be compared more easily.

Data analysis was an ongoing process which happened in the interviews themselves as the researcher made notes on key incidents. All data were transcribed, coded and categorised (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) and the constant comparison methods was used to develop thematic categories in relation to the research objectives (Silverman, 2000). The process of coding and analysis through the derivation of themes was inductive and iterative, informed by grounded theory expectations of data analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) but also following Layder’s (2005) recommendation of engaging with both data and theoretical concepts. Thus, once the data was collected and transcribed, single words, descriptive phrases, or longer textual material were assigned to emerging codes. Codes were then condensed into themes (Kvale, 2009).

Informed by grounded theory expectations of data analysis, the data analysis was developed in three district stages; open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 2008). The first interaction between the researcher and her empirical data consists in sessions of open coding that break down the texts into small segments. Open coding, also called ‘initial coding’ (Mattoni, 2014), allows the researcher to explore the data while keeping a rather open mind, receptive to all the clues and hints that the data might provide. The open coding process provided the researcher with a number of codes attached to the texts under investigation. When open coding enters a more advanced stage, the researcher recombines the data segments into broader groupings around the same analytical category. At this step, the relationships between codes became crucial for the researcher, therefore, the exploration of
relationships amongst codes is at the centre of axial coding. At this stage, specific conceptual categories began to emerge due to the recombination of codes disseminated in the documents.

As the research advances in axial coding, the discovery of relationships between different codes brings forward certain categories and pushes back others (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In other words, some of the codes appear as more important to the researcher, in terms of their frequency and centrality, than others. After exploring the linkages among different codes developed around the same category, the researcher moves towards another level of abstraction, the selective or focused coding, which elaborates more general categories that acquire a significant and relevant role in the analysis. A further stage also involved refining different levels of analysis when relating the categories to Bourdieusian concepts. At this stage when no new codes, patterns or themes emerge, theoretical saturation was reached, as Corbin and Strauss (2008) described. After reaching theoretical saturation, the researcher presented the emerged codes and categories. Table of Codes and Categories is shown in Table 3.2.

The next following chapters, chapter four and five, present an analysis of the data collected for this thesis. The following chapter presents an overview about the participants and the life cycles of the social movements in Palestine. The chapter focuses on the analysis of institutionalised fields (external) and internal fields of social movements, and the ways in which these fields interrelate. The analysis also underlines the importance of habitus as a powerful analytical tool to understand and theorise the research data during different phases of the movements’ life cycles.

Table 3.2: Codes and Categories from Analysis of Interview Data

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| HABITUS | CHANGE | STRUCTURED AND STRUCTURING | HABITUS | TRANSFORMATION |
CHAPTER FOUR

External and Internal Fields of Practice

4.0 Introduction

This chapter is divided into two main sections: challenging the dominant logic and invoice vs. radical habitus. The first section opens by providing a concise overview about participants and the life cycles of the social movements they joined. This section describes in more detail the dominant doxa of the political fields and how these fields are interrelated. This part of the chapter considers challenging the dominant logic of the institutionalised fields of the social movements, and the ways in which these institutionalised fields interrelate, categorised by political field doxa and perceived political opportunity. Social movement theory and Bourdieusian concepts are used to analyse data collected during the in-depth interviews. In addition to the data collected from the conducted interviews, this section presents and analyses varied data from different media sources, official documents, organisation’s report, speeches, newspapers and online articles.

The second section of the chapter discusses the notion of habitus which emerges in a number of different forms in the analysis. The finding and the subsequent data analysis underlines the importance of habitus as a powerful analytical tool to understand and theorise the research data during different phases of the movements’ life cycles. Therefore, this part of the chapter discusses ‘novice vs. radical habitus’ level of analysis, and the ways in which these two types of habitus have affected the activists’ perception, practical reasoning and acting in different situations. This level of analysis is further sub-categorised into cultural capital and biographical and historical trajectories.
4.1 Overview of the Social Movements’ Life Cycle

In February 2011, after the Arab revolutions ‘uprisings’ in Tunisia and Egypt, a group of young activists organised supporting protests of the Tunisian and Egyptian people in Ramallah, Palestine. Instantly, they came together and called themselves 15 March movement which demanded the end of Fatah-Hamas split\(^{31}\) in the Palestinian territories. Core activists and organisers of the 15 March movement were quite known to the public. Zain, Faris, Hadi and Farid were four core activists who started mobilising their networks both offline and online to demonstrate in support of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. Friends and relatives of these core activists joined the movement such as Lina, Dalia, Hana, amongst others. Spontaneously, in these offline demonstrations, some of the core activists started chanting to end the conflict between the two main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, and unify them. The Palestinian police dispersed and prevented several demonstrations in support of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, physically assaulted the activists, detained some and confiscated camera’s footage. Inside the 15 March Movement, ideological conflicts and personal interests between the activists played a crucial role in troubling the movement’s continuity.

The short-lived 15 March Movement lasted for around seven months. Simultaneously, another group of young activists from different political and ideological backgrounds gathered under the name of the ‘Independent Youth Movement’ (hereafter IYM). Core activists who initiated IYM were; Abir, Sara, Mazen and Adam, then later, other activists from their networks and outside it joined the movement such as, Ali, Yaseen, Habib, Salma, amongst others. This movement’s activists were protesting against the economic policies of the ‘Palestinian National Authority’ (hereafter PNA) or the ‘Palestinian Authority’ (hereafter PA). Internal group clashes were less noticeable compared to 15 March movement, which was a reason for IYM to last for almost sixteen months. After a period of tension and political credibility accusations towards some activists between the two movements, the majority of the activists in both movements, as well as other new participants, joined together under the name of ‘Palestinians for Dignity’ (hereafter PFD), a movement which itself lasted for one

\(^{31}\) Fatah-Hamas split/conflict: also referred to as the Palestinian Civil War, which was a conflict between the two main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, resulting in the split of the Palestinian Authority in 2007. After the Hamas’ legislative victory in 2006, relations between Fatah and Hamas were marked by sporadic factional fighting. This became more intense after the two parties repeatedly failed to reach a deal to share government power. As of August 2007 the Palestinian Authority became split into two polities, each seeing itself as the true representative of the Palestinian people – the Fatah-ruled Palestinian National Authority and the Hamas Government in Gaza.
Further year. After the decline of PFD, new social initiatives and campaigns were created by former activists from the aforementioned movements, and further new activists joined these as well. Therefore, the data demonstrates a wave of multiple politically-motivated youth movements emerged in Palestine from January 2011 until September 2013.

Findings demonstrate different rhythms of emergence, growth, division, unrest and decline in these movements. Each phase in these movements’ life cycle enjoyed particular mechanisms, organisational dynamics and network structures which the subsequent analysis discusses, compares and critiques. These movements can all be seen as loosely organised, short lived and thinly documented movements with unreliable databases and archives. Only limited research has examined these types of movements (Klandermans and Staggenborg, 2002). The organisational practices and mechanisms in these types of movements, like those of political grassroots struggles and resistances, are usually hidden from the view of hegemonic structuralist management scholars and social movements’ theorists. Therefore, by studying this type of ‘alternative’ non-hegemonic form of politically-motivated movement, this research contributes towards an understanding of the processes of organising and the diverse dynamics in these types of movements, which social movement studies have been rarely tried to explore (see Howley, 2008; della Porta, 2014). Findings demonstrate detailed, descriptive and comparable data on social movements, mechanisms and networks over the life cycle of these various politically-motivated social movements in Palestine. Moreover, findings present data from a broad range of social movements’ core and ordinary activists to enrich the study themes and categories.

4.2 Political Field Doxa

In order to comprehensively explore these politically-motivated movements, one should study and analyse relevant political fields which are in relation, directly or indirectly, to the emerging movements. Being inspired by a Bourdieusian perspective, these political fields are studied in relation to each other, and how episodes of stability and change affect the dynamics of other related political fields. In this research, the Palestinian political context is understood in terms of various political fields or what Fligstein and McAdam (2012) described in their book ‘A Theory of Fields’, as institutionalised fields,
or strategic action fields. “Strategic action fields are fundamental units of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors, individual or collective, are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared understandings about the purpose of the field, relationships to others in the field and the rules governing legitimate action in the field” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012:6). Fligstein and McAdam (2012) add that each of these institutionalised fields has its own specific internal logic, doxa, different species of capital, rules of the game, incumbents, challengers, and governance units. This research argues that understanding and analysing a field doxa could be a complex and a challenging task. Yet, capturing this internal autonomous logic of the field, which serves to legitimate and naturalise the logic and the rules of the game, is crucial to understanding the different mechanisms and dynamics in specific fields. This understanding will enrich, in particular, the unquestioned and the taken for granted logics, and the relationship between different fields. Therefore, this section starts with conceptualising the Palestinian political field doxa as it emerged from the data collection and subsequent analysis. Through reading this section, the reader should be able to have a better understanding of the Palestinian political context and its political parties which played an important role in constructing and shaping the Palestinian political field.

4.2.1 Double Repression

The data and subsequent analysis reflect different modes of domination which coexist in the field of power, the state. According to Bourdieu’s conception of the state, he links the state with the concept of field of power, which represents the upper reaches of the social class structure, where individuals and groups bring considerable amounts of various kinds of capital into their struggle for distinction and power. These struggles are polarised between holders of economic capital and cultural capital. The state, however, is an arena of struggle for statist capital32, which is power over other types of capital, including economic capital and cultural capital, over their ratio of exchange and their reproduction (Bourdieu, 1994). In this Bourdieusian understanding of the state, Abir, an IYM core activist, was frustrated in terms of power, domination and struggle over different forms of capital. With anger and determination she said:

32 In describing the logic of modern state development, Bourdieu sees progressive concentrations of physical capital (physical coercion), economic capital, informational (or cultural) capital, and symbolic capital. From these concentrations emerges statist capital, a special type of capital, a kind of metacapital.
They [referring to the state’s beneficiaries] ate the country, seriously ate it [...] they left bits for us and for the majority of the Palestinians. They are controlling everything in this country and leaving no space for us to breathe freely [...] you have money, status and power, then you can live in this country. You do not, they want you to shut up your mouth and live blindly. This is how it works here [referring to Palestine].

Abir’s comment alongside other data collected, corresponds with Bourdieu’s understating that power is not concentrated in the state power per se but in the field of power (Bourdieu, 1996). As discussed previously, Bourdieu describes the distribution of power as forms of capital distributed over a set of field arrangements, and in an increasingly diversified field of power. Bourdieu (1996: 386) writes:

... no longer incarnated in persons or even in particular institutions, power becomes coextensive with the structure of the field of power, and it is only realised and manifested through an entire set of fields and forms of power united by a genuine organic solidarity, and thus both different and interdependent.

Therefore, the comment above reflects that feeling of power and domination structured and embedded with all the state institutions and the entire set of fields. An important note to be raised here is the political condition of the Palestinian ‘state’ and its particularity. The Palestinian ‘state’, as discussed previously, could be considered as a quasi-state, as there is no Palestinian state in the sense of fully institutionalised state with its entire state elements. The PA is an interim self-government body established to govern specific limited territories. This being said, the political nature of this Palestinian movement contributes to the discourse of social movement autonomy from the state. Böhm et al. (2010), for example, highlight the way in which demands for autonomy are embedded in various social, economic, political and cultural contexts, including the state, which give rise to both possibilities and impossibilities of autonomous practices. In the present research, activists not only fight for determination and organisational self-management from a non-state, but from double repression; from the occupying Israeli state and the Palestinian National Authority. This contribution to the discourse of social movement autonomy from the state is going to be explored later.
4.2.1.1 Fields Interrelation: The Issue of the Tunisian/Egyptian Regimes and Israel

In addition to the data collected from in-depth interviews, the analysis of the political field’s interrelations was largely examined through examining and analysing media sources, official documents and speeches, newspapers, and online articles. The data collected and the subsequent analysis suggest that the PA political field is hierarchical and dependent on Israel. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) define the relations between institutionalised fields as encompassing three types: unconnected, hierarchical or dependent, and reciprocal or interdependent. The links between fields are shaped by a number of factors: resource dependence, mutually beneficial interactions, the sharing of power, information flows, and legitimacy. Where no obvious links exist between fields along any of these dimensions, we can say that fields are unconnected. Before analysing the relations between the PA and Israel institutionalised fields, this section provides a quick glimpse into the relationship between the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes and Israel. The findings indicate the fear of the PA, and their strong refusal to acknowledge the surprising Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. The following explains where this fear came from.

After the demonstration of support for the Egyptian revolution, some core members decided on the 15th of March as the day to launch the 15 March movement and ask for an end of the split between Fatah and Hamas. In the meantime, other activists who also perceived this political opportunity decided to mobilise and start a hunger strike in the centre of Ramallah on the 13th of March. Hamed, who initiated the hunger strike activity says:

We [referring to the strikers] were thinking about what could be the most influential method to mobilise people for 15 March launching and how to attract media attention [...] we [around 10 male activists] decided to start a hunger strike. We decided to stay on strike until the end of the split [Fatah-Hamas split]. On the 15th of March, I received a threatening call from the Palestinian security or intelligence forces telling me not to join the hunger strike group. I was shocked, and because I am stubborn enough and it sounded like a challenge, I decided to join the hunger strikers [...] I took my pillow, tent and cover and drove down to Ramallah on that night.
Hamed’s comment and the subsequent analysis explain that the PA and all its police units were terrified that a Palestinian Spring would start. Data collected underlines the police’s repression in sabotaging the hunger strikers by arresting some of them, destroying the tents which the strikers were staying and sleeping in, and threatening and abusing the activists. Mazen, an IYM core activist and a hunger striker, had been physically and emotionally abused by the PA police. His statement sums up this sentiment:

*The police haven’t only physically beaten us; it was beyond what was apparent in the streets. Many of us, and I am one of them, were abused and threatened behind the scenes[…] a friend of mine who works in a bank told me that they [PA security police] were asking to get our bank statements and saving accounts’ numbers. Some of us were threatened with being fired from our jobs, or one time that they would break their legs, but the worst was threatening the female activists by calling their male relatives and making moral accusations’*

These comments provided by Hamed and Mazen and the subsequent analysis indicate the PA’s strong fear that the Arab Spring’s ‘infection’ would be transmitted to the Palestinian political field. This fear could not be understood without understanding the relationship between Israel and Tunisia, and Israel and Egypt. As briefly discussed before, the relationship between Israel and the PA could be analytically classified as a hierarchical dependent relationship between the two fields. This means that higher order groups (Israel) can sometimes command lower orders groups (PA), and that these relations can be cooperative as well as hierarchical. The nature of the relationship and closeness between Israel and PA is going to be further analysed in the following section. As Israel is the dominant field in relation to the PA, the relationship between Israel and Tunisia and Israel and Egypt explains much about the relationship between the PA and both Tunisia and Egypt. It was interesting to note that most of the activists were shocked and surprised by the massive mobilisation in Tunisia. With surprise and enthusiasm, Omar, an IYM activist, said:

*A Revolution in Tunisia! Can you imagine? Such a revolution in Tunisia will absolutely give us [referring to the Palestinian youth] a positive boost to protest and get mobilised […] Tunisia has been always an ally and a friendly close country to the Palestinian and their cause […] it’s difficult to see them [Tunisians] revolting and stand silent.*
Omar’s comment and the collected data underline the unique political relationship which Tunisia has with Israel. Tunisia is an Arab country which is not directly involved with Middle Eastern security issues related to Israel. For the first time, an Arab society could have decided the nature of its relation with Israel. In 2014, a debate over the degree of normalisation with Israel was going on in Tunisia. The debate focused on whether or not authorisation should be granted for Israeli tourists to visit the country (Ghiles-Meilhac, 2014). After the Tunisian revolution in 2011, the Tunisian constitution was renewed and specifically mentioned the Palestinian issue. The Tunisian constitution illustrates the fact that the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation clearly remains very high in the public agenda of such a young democracy. On page 3 of the Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014\(^3\), the preamble stated that Tunisia stands ‘with the people of the world; achieving victory for the oppressed everywhere, for the people’s right to self-determination and for rightful liberation movements including the Palestinian Liberation Movement; and fighting all forms of discrimination and anti-human racism including Zionism’. The draft constitution contains another article criminalising any form of ‘normalisation’ with ‘Zionism and the Zionist state’. That being said, the Tunisian revolutionary spark was an initial motivation for the Palestinian youth to mobilise, but an initial fear for the PA and the Israeli government as well.

Due to the instability in the Tunisian state field, this did not awaken or threaten the Israeli government and the PA as much as the Egyptian revolution did. Zain, a 15 March core activist’s comment was indicative the data collected. He commented:

*If Tunisia [referring to the Tunisian revolution] was only a pinch for the PA, Egypt [referring to the Egyptian revolution] is the harshest slap […] like the most unexpected slap ever. There is no way that the PA would support or even allow anyone to support such a revolution […] This [referring to the Egyptian revolution] would change the whole political situation.*

Media sources, including newspapers and TV news in Israel, indicated the close relationship between Israel and the Egyptian government. Israel was asking for a ‘prayer for the health of Mubarak’. An online news article published by Israel’s daily newspaper, Haaretz, and written by the Israeli journalist, Aluf Benn, half a year before the outbreak of the Egyptian revolutions, presents perhaps the most accurate description

\(^3\) The Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014, translated by UNDP and reviewed by International IDEA, distributed on constituteproject.org with content generously provided by International IDEA [Online] Available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf [Accessed: 23 February 2016].
of the nature of Israel's position and its relations with Egypt during the reign of Mubarak. He states that ‘of all the world's statesmen, the one closest to Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, is the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.’ Benn then cites a highly placed Israeli source to confirm that the ties between Mubarak and Netanyahu ‘are much closer than they seem’ for Egypt. Egypt has become a strategic ally of Israel rather than Iran, as well as Israel’s primary supplier of energy. Egypt has also given Israel a strategic edge and ensured its stability, security and peace which reduced the burden of Israel’s security budget, allowing for a decrease in the size of the Israeli army. A central factor that facilitated Israel’s success in achieving many of these policy objectives has been the presence in Egypt of a regime founded on corruption and tyranny, similar to systems of governance in other Arab countries. There should be no surprise then, with this context in mind, that Israel opposed the Egyptian and other Arab revolutions from the first moment, firmly holding to its support for the stability of the corrupt and tyrannical regimes (Benn, 2010).

Based on the latter, the relationship between Egypt and Israel is considered hierarchical and dependent in favour to Israel. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) explain that all dependent institutionalised fields are embedded in a dense latticework, including fields governed by state actors. These relationships create dependencies between fields that normally serve to stabilise all affected strategic action fields. But these same dependencies are also the most common source of crisis in fields. Significant and crucial changes in the related Egyptian field disrupted the routine operation of the field in question. Analysing and understating these various relations between the institutionalised-state fields define stabilities and changes in these fields in relation to any change in one of the fields. As both the Egyptian political regime and the PA are hierarchal and dependent to Israel, Israel was keen to stabilise any changes in these two fields, especially in the PA institutionalised field. Since the PA is under the guardianship and donations of Israel and US to manage and smooth the continuous, systematic and illegal Israeli occupation in the West Bank, the PA and its preventive security forces manage to oppress these newly emerging movements, as the following section explains.

4.2.1.2 Interrelating Fields: The Case of the Palestinian Authority and Israel
Understanding the Palestinian political doxa requires a deeper analysis of the hierarchical and dependant political relationship between Israel and the PA, and the Palestinian political field per se. The PA was designated in the 1993 Oslo Accords as an interim self-government body established to govern specific limited territories. Within this political arrangement between Israel and the PA, the collected data confirms that the PA is a hierarchical and dependant political field to Israel, as the PA is highly economically dependent on Israel and US donations and guardianship. Longstanding Israeli closure policies continue to disrupt labour and trade flows and the territory’s industrial capacity, limit imports and exports, and constrain private sector development. The PA for the foreseeable future will continue to rely heavily on donor aid for its budgetary needs and economic activity. Therefore, lacking the economic capital in the PA political field assures the power, domination and political intervention by Israel. This means that higher order groups (Israel) can sometimes command lower orders groups (PA), and that these relations can be cooperative as well as hierarchical.

Abir’s comment, an IYM activist, was typical of other respondents’ view on the Palestinian economic and political situation. She made the following sarcastic comment about her view of the PA economic and political dependency:

This is not a state; this is a state of international aid, a begging state. I do not know what can I call it? Is it possible that a state does not have its right to import, to export, to fly, to sail, to move, or even to protect its citizens and boarders? Oh excuse me, which boarders? There is no such thing [...] the PA, like others [referring to some journalists and researchers] said, is an agency of the Israel occupation in the West Bank.

Calling your country ‘an agency for occupation’ reflects the insecurity, lack of trust and respect which the activists feel towards the PA as a governing body. Therefore, this research found that facing an economically dependent quasi-state which is in relation and collaboration with a powerful autonomist political field such as Israel might complicate the movement’s autonomy. Israel is keen to stabilise the PA’s institutionalised logic, as it has a keen interest in its stability and calmness. Abir’s comment and the previous data presented underline the factors which shape the hierarchal and dependent relationship between the PA and Israel such as; the economic
dependency, mutually beneficial political and economic interactions, the information flows, and the modes of power and legitimacy that Israel is practicing on the PA.

That being said, the political nature of this Palestinian movement contributes to the discourse of social movement autonomy from the state. Böhm et al. (2010), for example, highlight the way in which demands for autonomy are embedded in various social, economic, political and cultural contexts, including the state, which give rise to both possibilities and impossibilities of autonomous practices. In the present research, activists not only fight for determination and organisational self-management from a non-state, but from double repression; from the occupying Israeli state and the PNA. This double repression situation has the potential for both empirical and theoretical contributions. Data collected and subsequent analysis underlines the impossibilities of autonomy that activists could not overcome to challenge this hegemonic logic of oppression and political dependency.

Findings suggest that the PA political field does not enjoy any form of autonomy. In contrast, the PA’s political field, with all of its institutional and non-institutional power spaces, is politically and economically hierarchal, and dependent on an established autonomist state, i.e. Israel. For some participants, the collaboration and political dependency, which the PA structurally embedded in, is clear and noticeable. Ibrahim, an IYM activist, says:

_We [activists] knew that Israel has been and will be always the solid backbone of the PA intelligence forces and police. If the PA police could not arrest me, the Israeli forces will [...] can you imagine how much protection Palestinians enjoy from their own police and authority? [...] it’s not an authority, it’s a puppet between Israel hands and decisions. As simple and silly as this!_

**4.2.2 Occupation Management**

Details on the growing security cooperation between the Israeli government, the Palestinian Authority and the United States were explained continuously and publicly (Silver, 2016; White, 2009b, 2012). For example, it was reported that thirty-nine of the Palestinian detainees interviewed were arrested and interrogated by the PA before being arrested by Israeli forces (Silver, 2016). In one case, which was reported to the online
publication *Electronic Intifada*, the American journalist Charlotte Silver reported that a 21 year-old youth, Adi Awawdeh, was detained by the PA for 70 days, during which he was physically and mentally tortured. Just a week after he was released, Awawdeh was arrested by Israel. When he arrived, his Israeli interrogator showed him his file from the PA and said, “Here’s your file. It’s all ready. Do you want to add anything and save us some time?” (Silver, 2016: 2).

This logic can be summarised in the statement of Mahmoud Abbas, the de facto leader of the Palestinian Authority in the occupied West Bank, to Israeli journalists and business people, that his collaboration with the Israeli occupation forces is “sacred” and would continue whether the Palestinian populace agree or disagree (Abunimah, 2014).

White (2009b) in his paper ‘The Palestinian Authority’s authoritarian turn’ explains one of the American-Israeli strategies in funding, man-powering, training and weaponry the PA security forces by implementing Dayton’s plan\(^34\) in the West Bank. White (2009b: 2) writes that “Dayton started work with the Palestinian security forces at the end of 2005. While ostensibly charged with general reform of the PA security forces, it became apparent that the US was intent on building up Abbas-loyal PA forces in order to directly confront Hamas”. These forces were mainly trained to practice internal suppression, mainly on Hamas supporters and loyalists, and ‘protect the PA’. According to some activists, Dayton reflects something else, Abir, an IYM activist, says:

> Who do you think the PA police and intelligence forces are? Dayton’s thugs [...] if the Israeli forces could not arrest you that day, the PA will happily do the job [...] this is not our government, this is a ‘government’ sponsored by its occupation and coloniser.

According to some activists’ views and White’s (2009b: 6) article, the PA’s security agencies in the West Bank were trained to “persecute resistance elements and provide Israel with intelligence with which to arrest or assassinate resistance leaders”. If there was any doubt about the real purpose of these forces, Dayton’s statement revealed much. Dayton stressed to *The Jerusalem Post* in December that the trainees are taught over and again that they are not here to learn how to fight against the Israeli occupation. In light of this joint Palestinian-Israeli agreement, the Ramallah-based political leadership, dominated by Fatah, and the PA security forces, were becoming increasingly

\(^{34}\) From December 2005 to October 2010, Dayton served Israel as the as the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel-Palestinian Authority.
authoritarian, encouraging a culture of militarised policing and a lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law. PA forces had been arresting members of groups who oppose the official ‘peace process’ and, in particular, detaining those who were either open, or simply suspected, members and supporters of Hamas. Claims were being made of torture at the hands of Mahmoud Abbas’ Preventive Security forces and General Intelligence (White, 2009b). Hundreds of civilians were transferred to military courts without legal procedures, in breach of Palestinian law and international norms. The ICHR’s (The Independent Commission for Human Rights) annual report for 2008 recorded 111 complaints of torture or mistreatment in detention in the West Bank. On 31st January 2009, the British newspaper *The Daily Mail* ran a story under the dramatic headline: ‘Financed by the British taxpayer, brutal torturers of the West Bank’. The article reported how the British government’s Department for International Development had given £76 million in 2008 to the PA for what it called “security sector reform.” Once the figure is broken down, £3 million went directly to the PA police, while £17 million paid the salaries of the PA’s array of security organisations, including the Presidential Guard’s intelligence service and the feared Preventive Security Organisation. The former indicates the relation of power which the American and Israeli governance are practicing on the PA, by injecting and controlling its economic capital.

In conclusion, the data collected, which included various media sources and online newspapers, strongly suggest the kind of doxa in which the PA is structurally embedded. The PA’s political field doxa could be described in terms of repression, persecution, forms of resistance (White, 2009b), institutionalised corruption (Dana, 2015), and dependency on an Israeli logic of occupation and colonisation which legitimates and naturalises the PA logic and rules of the Palestinian political field. Bourdieu refers to doxa as a deep structure within fields (Bourdieu, 1991), or what other authors have previously referred to as ‘institutionalised logic’. The word doxa is used to denote what is taken for granted in any particular society, it is the unquestioned truths, or the experience by which the natural and social world appears as self-evident. Every field presupposes and produces a particular type of illusion, which Bourdieu defines as a belief or acceptance by members of the field of the worth of the game (Bourdieu, 1991).

Moreover, the Palestinian quasi-state could be referred to as the *incumbents* as Fligstein and McAdam (2012) in their book. In every field, incumbents are those actors who
wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests and views tend to be heavily reflected in the dominant structured institutionalised field. Thus, the purposes and structure of the field are adapted to their interests, and the field positions in the field are defined by their claim to maximise their share of material and status rewards. For 23 years, since the Oslo accords were signed between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the PA institutionalised logic has been producing order and social restraint by indirect, cultural mechanisms, and direct, coercive social control (Jenkins, 1992). The former production of systems of symbolism and meaning that are experienced as legitimate and unquestionable served the PA logic over time without being questioned or resisted. That means that the PA doxa has been presupposed and produced ‘realities’ of oppressing any forms of resistance, continued its economic dependency, and assured the ‘security’ of Israel throughout piecemeal concessions, occupation management and political collaboration, without being questioned.

4.2.3 Retired Opposition

Scott (2011) posits that field settlement and stability is achieved when broad agreement on a set of rules and ‘institutionalised logics’ come to be shared by most actors in the field. In political theories, opposition politics is the philosophy of non-agreement or opposition to a prevailing idea, such as the government’s logic and policies. Therefore, challengers, such as political dissenters or political activists, are forms of challengers who are willing to challenge the dominant logic to better their positions, and even change the rules of the game. In the Palestinian context, the leftist and independent Palestinian forces failed to seize an opportunity to establish themselves in the Palestinian streets after the Fatah-Hamas disagreement in 2007. Instead, Palestinian politics has become more entrenched than ever before in the bipartisan political system.

In his book ‘Palestinian Left: Where To?’ , the Palestinian sociologist Jamil Hilal (2010) reveals that leftist forces and leftwing political parties have been fixated on appearing neutral in the conflict between the two parties, which has not been well-received and accepted by the Palestinian public. In his article ‘The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian Left’, Balousha (2013:2) said that “During the 1970s, Palestinian leftists were the most prominent force in Palestinian politics, but their influence began to ebb
with the fall of the Soviet Union, which had provided them with political, ideological and financial support. During the latter half of the last century, Fatah managed to absorb much of the leftist current. Not until the present moment had the leftists been able to emerge from under Fatah’s large umbrella of influence, which also encompasses the Palestine Liberation Organisation.”

Moreover, the analysis clarifies that ideological background of most of the youth-led movements was leftist oriented. While the vast majority of the 15 March Movement activists were politically independent and liberal, many members of the Independent Youth Movement (IYM) were politicised and had linkages, and some of them membership of, a particular leftist political party, which is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). These different political ideologies and backgrounds played a crucial role in internal struggles and conflicts between the activists. Having different historic and experiential trajectories, and politicised habitus differentiated the activists, in terms of how they perceive, conceive reason and act in this emerging field, which is going to be analysed and explored later.

According to some IYM activists, the political involvement was crucial experience to shape and influence their politicised habitus. Sali, who is an IYM activist, was raised up in a politicised family which deeply believed and supported the leftist political party, the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP). When she was a university student, she was politically mobilised and active enough to be elected as the head of the youth party of the PPP at Birzeit University. She expressed her resentment of her political party after several episodes in which they had marginalised her role and disregarded her abilities. Sali’s comment below illustrates evidence of the dissent dilemma in marginalising the role of youths within their political parties and their failure to contain politicised youths, Sali expressed:

> In 2012, when the revolutionary wave broke out and youth groups began to work, I felt that politicised involvement within a specific political party is not my thing. Back in time when I was deeply involved in my party, I realised that this party contradicts itself from what they are saying and promising and what they are actually doing on the ground. The turning point was when I saw my

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35 Youth parties at Palestinian Universities are the youth branch or gathering of the main political party where politicised students promote for their political party and mobilise students in favour of their political party.
political party, and I am referring here to heads and officials in the party, were accusing these activists of being outsiders, spies, or have western agendas and so forth. Some of these activists were friends who I knew in the University and I witnessed many of their patriotic activities without having a political body [...] on May 2012, I officially resigned from the party, cut all my ties with them, and happily joined the IYM with these dedicated friends and activists.

This comment supports the subjective reasons for the decline of the Palestinian left which have been related by Hilal (2010). This author explains that many members of the leftwing parties blamed the leadership of the left, which lacked young faces, for jeopardising the process of renewal in various party structures, and for depriving the youth of the opportunity to occupy leading positions, and for preferring office work to work at the popular level to organise, mobilise and educate. The latter reflects another side of the Palestinian political doxa regarding the retired Palestinian left and political dissenters.

In another book ‘The Palestinian Middle Class’, Hilal (2006) analyses the transformation of the Palestinian middle class political role. After the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority worked on transforming the leading political role of the Palestinian middle class leaders, who strongly led the Palestinian First Intifada, into a more bureaucratic institutionalised role which served the political logic of the Palestinian Authority. The previously grounded active political role which Palestinian middle class leaders played in strategising Palestinian liberation ambitions was systematically eliminated. In Bourdieu’s logic, the Palestinian Authority worked on offering more economic capital and prestigious symbolic capital to shift these middle-class politicians’ positions into another political field which accepts the PA institutionalised logic and doxa. By doing this, the PA political field secured its field stability from any dissent bodies or opposition voices.

Data collected suggests how Fatah-led Palestinian Authority doxa succeeded in marginalising the potentially powerful and influential role of the Palestinian middle class, by offering prestigious governmental state positions, tempting managerial roles in NGO’s, etc. Both Sali and Mazen shared the same view of the Palestinian left’s failure in encouraging their youth members and provide them with opportunities. Mazen who has been a politicised activist in the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP), and a former political prisoner for five years, expressed his anger about the rigid left leadership in his political party:

... Nayef Hawatmeh\textsuperscript{36} who is still in charge after more than 49 years as a head of a Palestinian leftist political party and boast about the Arab Spring! Which Arab Spring is he talking about? If he really believes in change, peaceful political renewal over authority, and so forth, he must have some shame and step down to bring new blood to this retired party.

These comments confirm the ossification of the organisational structures of the leftwing parties. The finding points out a lack of interactive communication between the rank and file and the leadership, and between various party organisations and the people with whom they are supposed to interact. The organisational structures of the left remained, by and large, confined by their rigid internal composition, oblivious to their obligations towards the national and democratic struggle. The former reason was sufficient enough to alienate their youth members and make them seek other more responsive and vivid structures and environments. This realisation expresses the kind of political doxa that the Palestinian left currently finds itself embedded in. One of the critical consequences of Oslo, as White (2012: 3) explains, which prevented the left from playing its national and social role was “the ‘professionalisation of NGOs’, and the huge role these organisations have had in encouraging certain types of Palestinian agency, while marginalising or delegitimising others”. The establishment of NGOs created a marketplace that competes for funding. It is influenced by donors’ priorities which exclude a wider public that participates in determining priorities and national agendas (White, 2012). These NGOs influenced the remoteness of the left from popular action, and led their struggles towards foreign funding agendas rather than the left’s national and social priorities. Hilal (2010) reveals that these professional organisations played a role in stripping the left of its experience cadres and leadership.

4.3 Youth Disenfranchisement

\textsuperscript{36} Nayef Hawatmeh: a Palestinian politician who is the general secretary of the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) since its formation in a 1969 split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), of which he was also a founder.
The occupied Palestinian territories are traditionally characterised by a high degree of political organisation. Today, the trust and legitimacy of the two main political parties, Fatah and Hamas, have been questioned by Palestinians as a result of internal strife, authoritarian modes of governance and lack of political progress. The data collected points out that Palestinian youth in the West Bank have serious reservations about regional governance. Many interviewees describe the governance in the West Bank, PA, with political favouritism towards the Fatah-led political party. Data collected highlights the illegitimate role played by personal networks, in providing people with jobs and money based on their personal relations rather than merit. Interviewees complain that belonging to the ‘wrong’ political faction makes it hard to get working position in the Palestinian market. Therefore, the role of Palestinian youth in Palestinian politics, especially national politics, could be described as marginalised and disenfranchised.

Hana, a 15 March core activist, underlines the youth’s worry and anxiety about the absence of the Palestinian national leadership. The demand to end this geo-political split between the two main political parties was crucial. With anger she commented:

*Is it a political monopolistic game going here? [...] Each party [referring to Fatah and Hamas] is governing ‘it’s geographic’ part and leaving the populace [...] they [referring to leaders of both parties] tore us apart. After the split, people from both sides became hating and disregarding of each other. They made us enter this dark cave and left us there struggling alone.*

Similar to Hana’s demand of ending up the political disagreement between Fatah and Hamas, in order to unite the Palestinian government, other comments were made such as ‘*ending the split is a national must*’ (Lina), or ‘*you feel Palestine is shredded between these two dominant parties*’ (Sara).

The ‘split’ which these comments refer to was a consequence of the Palestinian elections which took place on 25th January 2006. As previously discussed, the national unity of the Palestinian government has been collapsed when a violent conflict between Hamas and Fatah erupted, mainly in the Gaza Strip. After this harsh conflict, Gaza Strip was taken over by Hamas in 2007. The PA’s President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Hamas-led government from Gaza and appointed Salam Fayyad as a Prime Minister. This move was not accepted by Hamas, thus resulting in two separated administrations, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas-led government in
the Gaza Strip. The reconciliation process to unite the Palestinian government achieved some progress over the years, but had failed to produce a re-unification.

Moreover, the above comments underline the political disunity and lack of a united leadership which the new generation in Palestine is worried about. Linking the aforementioned comments to the notion of social capital, they underline the decline of Palestinian social capital, in terms of a lack of trust and increasing hatred between politicised people from the two main political parties. In her book *The Role of Palestinian Political Elite in the Formation of the Social Capital* Abu-Zaher (2013) reveals that the conflict between Fatah and Hamas in 2006 depleted Palestinian social capital dramatically. The research findings show a severe decline in levels of trust between individuals in general, and towards the PA’s institutions, unions, civil society organisations, and the international donating bodies. After the split in 2006, the study points to the aggregate loss in membership in voluntary organisations. Therefore, and to assure popular trust and support in West Bank, the PA worked on increasing the number of civil society organisations. In contrast to Putnam’s (2000) claim that an increase in civic engagement through increasing the number of civic organisations frames and revives social capital, within the Palestinian context it can be seen how politicised social capital can be. A sense of discontent and dissatisfaction was expressed by Palestinians about how politicised many civic organisations became in serving particular politicised interests rather than promoting culture of democracy and human rights (Abu-Zaher, 2013). This finding provides some support for previous research which has discussed social capital risks (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Strong solidarity with ingroup members may produce overembeddedness in relationships which reduces the flow of new ideas into the group/party, resulting in parochialism and inertia.

The split between Fatah and Hamas in 2006 instigated by the political elite, caused widespread alienation amongst the youth, and paralysed many organisations. The finding provides some support to a report published by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre NOREF in 2012 ‘Palestinian Youth and the Arab Spring’. The report highlights a shared perception among Palestinian youths that the Palestinian political elite has taken control over the definition and modes of resistance, and aims at being its sole representatives in face-to-face talks with Israel and the international community (Christophersen, Høigilt and Tiltnes, 2012).
Unlike during the first intifada, ordinary people at the grassroots level were discouraged from taking things into their own hands by the post-1993 political elite, which aspired to represent the resistance. The Oslo agreement and its institutional framework facilitated such a development. As the Palestinian sociologist Jamil Hilal (2011:1) writes:

Since Oslo, the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ... have been marginalised and effectively absorbed into the Palestinian Authority ... the self-governing body with limited powers established in 1994. Meanwhile, the PLO’s sectoral and professional associations – the mass and trade union organisations of students, women, workers, engineers, teachers, writers and journalists, among others – gradually lost the role they used to play of engaging all parts of the Palestinian people in the national struggle for liberation.

This also comes in Bourdieu’s book ‘On the State’ (2014) when he defines the state as ‘monopoly of the professionals’ where fields become increasingly monopolised by competing professional groups each developing its own forms of capital to maximise its material and symbolic interests. Moreover, the findings show that young people have serious reservations about governance in the West Bank, and perceived a culture of authoritarianism. Most importantly, the data collected and subsequent analysis underlines the widespread culture of fear with regard to political activity in the West Bank, which makes politically-conscious youths think twice before they engage in critical political activities.

Long-standing factionalism and authoritarian tendencies in the PA political doxa has increased criticism in regard to democracy, freedom of expression, human rights, and corruption. This finding refers to the logic of ‘monopolised resistance’ between the bipartisan political party system of Fatah and Hamas. Data collected underlines that political credibility and patriotism were merely accepted and believed in through the engagement and involvement of the institutionalised political field of a political party. Yaseen, an independent political activist who refused to join any political party, worked on politically educating himself through intensive reading, and watching news, documentaries, and political analysis on television. Yassen expressed the accusatory sentiments he felt from the PA police and some areas of public opinion when he was joining the IYM movement:
It was kind of accusation that you are politically independent, or there is no political body that you belong to. People were directly referring us [the independent activists] as external agents who have foreign agendas or these ones who want to ruin the country, as if it’s not already ruined!

This comment supports the general findings which emphasise the efforts taken by the PA security and its intelligence forces in falsifying activists’ intentions, diminishing their political credibility, and criticising their reputations and morals. Bourdieu (2014: 221) agrees that a state is also defined in terms of the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, where the monopoly of symbolic violence is the condition for the possession and exercise of physical violence. These politically emerging movements were challenging the taken-for-granted internalised discourses of the dominant doxa coming from the state authority and dominant discourses in the society. The activists were challenging the PA’s dominant doxa through their own heterodox discourses. The activists expressed what they heard being said about them by the police and the public opinion, comments were made such as ‘they are immoral guys and girls’ (Nada), or ‘the girls stay till 12 pm in the streets, then all of them go to the bar together’ (Farid), or ‘all of them work in NGOs and USAID institutions’ (Faris).

These comments underline what Bourdieu called doxa and the active role played by these taken-for-granted assumptions and practices in the constitution and maintenance of power relations. His theory of symbolic power claims that all forms of power require legitimisation. Bourdieu understands symbolic violence as the capacity to impose, not voluntarily most of the time, the means for comprehending and adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power in disguised, taken-for-granted forms (Bourdieu, 1991). Symbolic violence which is a similar concept to the Marxist idea of ‘false consciousness’ whereby people internalise, accept, respect and fight with the order of the world as they find it without questioning, even with the most intolerable conditions of existence which can so often be perceived as acceptable and even natural. This deeply embedded structures of taken for granted, field doxa, which have been internalised symbolically violently, suppressed the activists’ heterodox discourses from successfully emerging in between these dominant fields.

For example, masculine domination was one of the power relations which Bourdieu examines the deep embeddedness of symbolic violence in it (Bourdieu, 2001). In her
comment below Salma underlines two institutions which female activists typically felt have played a role in this type of reproduction:

... There were many masculine dominating practices and the police was the main cause of this. First, it was new and frightening for the PA to see Palestinians demonstrating against its presence, and the easiest way to persecute and frighten us was to harass the women in the movement, because it’s such a taboo in our society. The harassment wasn’t only verbal but also physical, especially when the number of the protesters was high, and no one can notice what’s happening. Female activists were threatened, verbally and physically harassed by the intelligence forces who were dressed up as civilians in the demonstrations. Unfortunately, some females stopped joining us to our meeting or demonstrations after their male family members knew what happened to them or got these calls from the police.

In his examination of masculine domination, Bourdieu argues that structured institutions such as the state, school and family play a crucial role in reproducing gender inequality and masculine domination. Masculine domination was practiced by the PA institution and the Palestinian family institution over female activists. As Salma commented ‘it’s such a taboo’ which could be understood as dominant social doxa which the activists did not feel able to challenge or change. Later in the analysis, different structures of masculine domination will be further examined and analysed.

Moreover, the findings found that it was not only the public which exploited the dominant doxa of oppressing the activists, but also the local media. Husam who is a journalist and activist in 15 March comments:

While we were demonstrating in the streets, many local journalists started collecting their material to fabricate it and publish it in their own ways. For example, while we were thousands demonstrating in the streets, they were reporting hundreds only. So for us, it was better not to publish about the movement in the local media channels than to promote fabricated news.

The data and subsequent analysis have found that the dominant social and cultural contexts have weakened and suppressed the movement autonomy by denouncing its activists, violating the activists’ honour and morals, especially women, and harm the movement’s reputation and intentions. The PA took advantage of many misrecognised
and unquestionable symbolic order of gender, social class, political hierarchy inequality to oppress the movement from getting independent and autonomist. In addition to this direct technique of denouncing the activists, the finding provides support that the riot police have spread rumours that the protesters are paid and receive money from outsiders. The interviewees mentioned that they were labelled and called as ‘drunks’ who only enjoy Ramallah’s bars. In her article, Linah Alsaafin (2012:2) mentions that all of these techniques of denouncing and scandalising the activists are mechanically used in the Arab region institutionalised logic, not only within the Palestinian context:

_We’ve seen this before when the Mubarak regime were denouncing the Egyptian protesters, Assad’s regime denouncing the Syrian protesters, the Hamed regime denouncing the Bahraini protesters, Qaddafi denouncing the Libyan protesters as druggies addicted on hallucinatory pills. It is disappointing in the sense that this reaction, wholly expected and accounted for, is exhausting unoriginal._

### 4.4 Perceived Political Opportunity

The Arab revolutions were the initial spark that motivated the Palestinian activists’ to get together and mobilise, are examined in this research as external fields which are related to the movements’ emergence and mobilisation in Palestine. The Arab Spring was a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that began on the 18th December 2010 in Tunisia with the Tunisian Revolution, and spread throughout other Arab countries; Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. The protesters shared some techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies, as well as the effective use of online social media. The majority of these uprisings were Arab youth and unions who protested in the streets against dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations, political corruption, economic decline, unemployment and extreme poverty (Khalaf and Khalaf, 2011). Many of the demonstrations were met with violent responses from authorities, as well as from pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators. A major slogan of the demonstrations in the Arab world is ‘the people want to bring down the regime’. And that is what happened in some cases. In Tunisia for example, a day after the self-
immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian president, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, stepped down on 14 January 2011, after 23 years in power. In the same month, the Egyptian Revolution, started on the 25th January 2011. Millions of protesters demanded the overthrow of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak who stepped down after 18 days of demonstrations during the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

Some political scientists and social movement theorists relate the occurrence of revolutions/movements to the nature of the political opportunity structures, or the political opportunity. Political opportunity could be provided as an analytical explanation to examine the openness within a vulnerable and receptive political system, or the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to and manipulate the system in order to revolutions/movements to emerge (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1989). An important question which theories and models of social movements have rarely tried to answer is to what extent are theories and models of social movements applicable in highly repressive socio-political settings? Theories and models of social movements have been developed in liberal democracies. While episodes of contentious politics in undemocratic regimes constitute the lion’s share of contentious politics events worldwide, it is revealing that a small number of studies attempt to apply political opportunity structure in repressive, authoritarian-like political environments (Alimi, 2009).

Zain, who is a core activist and organiser in 15 March movement, discussed the early steps of this new wave in Palestine:

*In January 2011, we were witnessing a new revolutionary youth spirit in our oppressed Arab world. On TVs we were watching Tunisian and Egyptian youths demonstrating and asking bravely for their own rights, it was moving and inspiring. I remember on that day when Ben Ali [Zine el Abidine Ben Ali] stepped down, I was watching this with my friend Faris in the café and directly we thought about organising a supportive protest. We started by telling our close networks, and then created a Facebook page to announce for the demonstration. On that evening, Faris was threatened from the Palestinian police to delete the event […] under pressure, he did.*

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37 Mohammed Bouazizi: was a Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 by the age of 26, in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation that he reported was inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides. His act ignited the Tunisian Revolution. The public’s anger and violence intensified following the Bouazizi’s death, leading then the Tunisian President, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, to step down on 14 January 2011, after 23 years in power.
In light of the aforementioned comment, Faris himself said:

...on that day [the day when Faris created the Facebook event for the supporting protest] the Fatah-led Palestinian authority arranged for another demonstration at the same time, like around 4:00 pm to block our demonstration and threatened me over the phone to delete the event because it was obvious that I was the admin of the Facebook event [...] we felt like any attempt to support this revolutionary spirit will be repressed from the Palestinian authority and maybe other sides.

These comments provide support for research which has shown the theoretical mismatch between the structure of political opportunities and popular perceptions of political opportunities. Charles Kurzman (1994) who studied the emergence of the Iranian revolution of 1979 under the authoritarian Iranian regime points out the theoretical mismatch between the structure of political opportunities and popular perceptions of political opportunities. Back in 1979, the Iranian state was not particularly vulnerable to revolution, but the popular perceptions of the Iranian people considered the coercive power of the state to be intact right up to the end. Similarly, Goodwin and Jasper (1999) emphasise the importance of paying more attention to the process by which movement activists come to perceive opportunities rather than the emphasis on structural ‘openings’. In other words, the state’s coercive power and repression could be acknowledged by activists as perceived opportunities to increase their militancy to challenge these structures. After several days, the activists succeeded in arranging a protest to support the Egyptian revolution in front of the Egyptian embassy in Ramallah. Neither of the Tunisian nor the Egyptian flags was allowed to be raised in that protest. On the same day, Hadi commented how it was opportunistic during the demonstration to process forward and initiate a slogan for Palestine:

On that day [in the protest of the Egyptian revolution] I was with another friend chanting to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and their people. Then, I told him [the friend] that we should chant something for Palestine, it’s our time. Spontaneously, I suggested chanting the slogan of ‘people want to end the split’. Without even discussing it together, I went at the front of the demonstration and my friend went at the end of it and we started chanting this slogan loudly. Everyone was repeating that slogan [...] when I left home I found more than 25 Facebook pages titled ‘people want to end the split’.
These comments and the subsequent analysis support Charles Kurzman’s analysis of perceived political opportunity and popular perception. During the revolutionary outbreaks, Palestinian youth were witnessing and supporting the breakdown of long-lasting Arab popular silence, and the logic of oppression, repression, patriarchy, and authoritarianism. Similarly in the West Bank, Palestinians are facing the domination and oppression by the Fatah-led Palestinian authority and its security forces, the culture of militarised policing, and the lack of human rights, economic opportunities, and national unity. This collective popular perception exists between Palestinians, especially Palestinian youth, but in different perceptions and beliefs. In a later section, the analysis describes the different mechanisms of translating this perceived political perception or opportunity, in relation to the various activists’ habitus. Habitus, which is a structuring and structured, long process of inculcation during the activists’ lifetime, including their previous political activism, political upbringings, and politicised networks, form and produce specific forms of habitus that predispose activists to act and react differently, in terms of supporting revolutions or initiating to mobilise crowds. In other words, the notion of habitus as a bridge to overcome the structure/agent dualism can enrich our understanding of how different historic and experiential trajectories of activists play a crucial role of how these activists perceive, conceive reason, and act while perceiving their political opportunity.

4.5 Novice vs. Radical Habitus

In this section, and in order to bring a more reflective and dynamic analysis, the subsequent analysis shows how activists from each movement identify their movement and reflect on the other movements in the field. Activists in each movement were able, upon deep reflection and discussion with the researcher, to share and become reflexive on their own experiences. They were able to talk about different mechanisms and dynamics used during the movement’s cycle and reflect on phases of success and decline. As the study is researching two movements, a number of participants became reflexive and philosophical when recounting their own experience in their movement and how this experience differs from the others’ experiences in the other movement. Participants discussed their movement’s political ideologies, social class, and the different mechanisms they used for organising, recruiting and confronting.
As discussed previously, habitus in Bourdieu’s work refers to a system of embodied dispositions which generate practice in accordance with the structural principles of the social work. Bourdieu introduces the notion of habitus as a bridge to correspond to the dualism between social structures and the cognitive structures of social actors (Bourdieu, 1990). Although habitus has been rarely conceptualised in organisation studies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and social movements (Crossley, 2002; 2003; 2011), DiMaggio and Powell (1991) argue that the concept of habitus offers a powerful means of linking micro-and macro level processes in organisational theory. A limited number of scholars, such as Crossley (2002; 2003) have studied the concept of habitus in social movement to conceptualise the activists’ practical reasoning and different behaviours.

This limitation of theorising and operationalising habitus in research studies has to deal with the complexity and ambiguity of the concept itself (DiMaggio, 1979). Although Bourdieu asserts that habitus is inculcated primarily by early childhood experience and early socialisation processes, habitus is also transformed by subsequent experience and it is influenced by all aspects of both the family and societal settings (DiMaggio, 1979). Previous research argues that the initial habitus, which is formed through early socialisation, is durable (see King, 2000). But since habitus is also transformable, we are never sure what difference this durability makes, or under what circumstances it makes a difference for what phenomena. Moreover, habitus has been also subject to widespread criticism, mainly on the basis of its latent determinism (Jenkins, 1992; Lane; 2000). For example, King (2000) in his practical critique of the habitus has pointed out that habitus is incompatible with Bourdieu’s practical theory, and it retreats quickly into objectivism. This sharp criticism and the continuous debate about the concept of habitus and its operationalisation highlight the complexity and difficulty of theorising habitus. Therefore, this research clarifies how the habitus was captured through the biographical and historical/experiential trajectories of the activists. The researcher spent a decent amount of time with each participant to speak and reflect on his/her own biographical and historical experiences through sharing with the researcher their early socialisation processes and initial exposure through different social fields such as their family, schooling, university experience, previous political activism, etc. The latter criticism of habitus is going to be explored further in the discussion chapter.

The finding discloses that the notion of habitus emerges in a number of different forms. As habitus proves its ability to capture continuity and change in agents’
behaviours and actions (Reay, 2004), the findings and subsequent data analysis underline the importance of habitus as a powerful analytical tool to understand and theorise the research data during different phases of the movements’ life cycles. Therefore, this part of the chapter discusses the ‘novice vs. radical habitus’ level of analysis, and the ways in which these two types of habitus have affected the activists’ perception, practical reasoning, and acting in different situations. This level of analysis is further sub-categorised into cultural capital and biographical and historical trajectories. The finding suggests that 15 March activists have a novice type of habitus while IYM activists have a more of a radical habitus. While habitus is structured and embodied through different biographical, historical, and experiential trajectories, the data and subsequent analysis discuss how such different trajectories play various roles in shaping and structuring the novice or radical habitus in different ways. This part begins by comprehensively analysing why the researcher argues that 15 March activists have a novice habitus while IYM have a radical habitus and how this argument was developed from the empirical data.

4.5.1 Institutionalised Cultural Capital

As discussed before, the analysis shows that the ideological backgrounds of most of the activists in these youth-led movements were either from leftist or liberal-oriented ideological backgrounds. Whilst the vast majority of 15 March activists were politically independent and liberal, many members of the IYM were politicised, with linkages, and sometimes membership of, a particular leftist political party, which is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The social positioning of the vast majority of the activists is either in higher or lower middle social class. As discussed previously, 15 March Movement was the first youth gathering after the Arab revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. The 15 March core activists came together straight away, and called themselves 15 March Movement which demanded the end of the Fatah-Hamas split in the Palestinian territories. Core activists and organisers of 15 March were quite well known to the public. Zain, Faris, Hadi and Farid were four core male activists who started mobilising their networks both offline and online to demonstrate in support of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. Zain’s comment below underlines the nature of these closed, embedded networks:
We all [15 March core activists] graduated from the same school, we know each other quite well, we know how each one of us think, see things and even act in some events [...] this mutual understanding among us was serving as a zone of comfortability and trust.

The interview data confirms that close networks ties such as kinships and friendships were essential elements in grouping these core activists together. The structure of the core network in 15 March could be described by its overembeddedness through ties of kinships, friendships and relationships. As the previous comment points to, Zain, Faris, and Farid were close friends for years, graduating from the same high school, Ramallah Friends School\(^{38}\), and had already been participating in some social and political activities together. Zain’s comment also highlights the shared habitus which he thinks is mutual and unquestionable. Later, the findings demonstrate the inter-organisational conflicts which existed between the 15 March activists themselves, where a crucial role is played by the network’s embeddedness and close ties.

This close, core group had also expanded to include and recruit close friends and relatives. At later stages, Hana, who is Zain’s sister and eventually the girlfriend of Farid, joined the movement. Lina, who was Farid’s ex-girlfriend before Farid, met Hana in the 15 March movement, and is a close friend of Dalia and Madi, whom Lina mobilised to join the movement when she was still in a relationship with Farid. Therefore, overembeddedness, and structure of this close network, influenced different practices and mechanisms in the 15 March movement. This aspect will be discussed further in chapter five.

The vast majority of the 15 March activists made comments related to the fact that they were close network, from an upper middle class background. Dalia who was a 15 March activist but not a core one, made a comment which was indicative of this group:

> Core activists in this movement [15 March movement] are elites who went to the same school, Ramallah Friends School [...] they belong to the Palestinian upper middle social class, they are economically comfortable, and some of them have even continued his/her Masters or PhD degrees abroad.

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\(^{38}\) Ramallah Friends School: is a prestigious private school in the city of Ramallah in the West Bank. This school is considered as an elite schooling institution based on its high fees, the Americanisation culture and educational curricula.
This comment highlights some of the different forms of capital which the 15 March core activists enjoy from their position in the upper middle social class. First, this comment and the subsequent data describes that the 15 March core activists benefit from possessing what might be seen as distinguished institutionalised cultural capital. The aforementioned prestigious private school, Ramallah Friends School, is an elite schooling institution into which Palestinian upper class and high middle social class parents enrol their children. The Americanised educational curriculum, western educational culture, and the language used in this particular private school distinguish its students with different credentials and educational qualifications, ‘institutionalised cultural capital’ which classifies and differentiates its students socially and culturally. Bourdieu argues that institutionalised cultural capital exists in educational credential systems which are today decisive in reproducing the social class structure and increasing social stratification (Bourdieu, 1977b). Second, as Bourdieu argues, school is an instrument for the reproduction of the family’s acquired habitus which objectively certifies the domination of a cultural code in society (Nash, 1990). This homologous relationship between the school system and family that reproduces the dominant form of cultural capital, reveals much about the nature and logic of the primary field, the family, which these activists came from. The early socialisation experiences in both the family and the schooling system, internalises structures of dominant cultural codes which shape the activists’ habitus in a certain way. It was not only the institutionalised cultural capital, but also the economic capital which these activists enjoy, as they belong to this privileged social class. Moreover, the configuration of the various forms of capital is related and relational, and therefore the aggregate of the actual (inherited) or potential social networks (social capital) which these activists’ possess is socially instituted, and guaranteed from their nuclear family field.

Through deep reflection and discussion with the researcher, Adam, who is an IYM activist, reflected on the latter point:

*I believe that each social class has its own privileges and interests to defend and fight for. It was clear that activists from 15 March belong to the Palestinian upper middle class [...] let me break it down for you here. For example, the mother of Faris is a politically privileged woman who enjoys her*
own international ties in political activism. Zain’s uncle is a government minister. Farid’s father is a well-known intellectual and so on. Who we are talking about now are their sons and daughters who realised that everything in this country [referring to Palestine] is political, even the social capital is political.

The comment highlights the relational perspective which Bourdieu advocates when looking at structures and societies. Bourdieu refuses the objectivist and unidimensional images of social class stratification, and encourages a relational view to understand social relations within social classes. That being said, the distinguished acquired habitus, the forms of capital, and the field which core 15 March activists are positioned in are all linked and interrelated. As mentioned, the internalisation of this specific kind of habitus is relational to both types of institutionalised field, the family and the school, which these core activists are positioned in, and orientate the forms of capital they acquire and seek to accumulate. On that account, we can observe and examine social class as a field which is in relation to other fields, and which has its own struggles, capitals and rules of the game. Therefore, this Palestinian upper middle social class which the comment refers to, and which emerged from the analysis, could be analysed as a field which enjoys its distinguished cultural, social, economic, and most likely symbolic, forms of capital within the Palestinian society.

4.5.2 Embodied Cultural Capital

In addition to the institutionalised cultural capital, the data underlines the role of the embodied cultural capital in distinguishing the 15 March activists from other activists. Bourdieu refers to embodied cultural capital as an ensemble of cultivated dispositions that are ‘inherited’ and internalised by individuals through socialisation. This holds to taste, clothing, mannerisms, music, works of arts, etc. Thus, cultural capital exists in an embodied state as well as institutionalised state. Participants were able to discuss with the researcher different forms of embodied cultural capital which they observed among other activists. Sali, who is an activist in IYM, reflected why it was difficult for her to get along or even accept the members in 15 March:

_Honestly, I don’t like them [referred to some of 15 March activists], they are different from us. One of them was Dalia for example. We went to the same_
high school for one year and she was wearing a veil back then. After a year, she went for an educational exchange programme in the USA to live with an American family and learn there. Once I met her again at the University [Birzeit University] I was absolutely shocked. She looked like totally Americanised, and she was always trying to ignore me and denying that we knew each other. This contradiction in her personality made me lose trust in her, and you know she joined 15 March movement [...] they [referring to some activists in 15 March] were born with a silver spoon in their mouth, they haven’t suffered from poverty and real struggle, they haven’t known what does it mean to wake up one day without having money to pay for public transportation to go to your university. These kids were coming to the university [Birzeit University] by their private cars [...] they go to the most prestigious restaurants and cafés and wear fashionable branded clothes. I am referring here to a specific social struggle and hatred maybe; because these people [some activists in 15 March] haven’t experienced the real popular resistance, then how would I believe in their intention?

This prolonged comment of Sali highlights different crucial points. First, this comment strongly highlights and reaffirms Bourdieu’s use of habitus to identify class-specific dispositions. In *Distinction* (1984) Bourdieu explores how the class structure of society becomes internalised in distinct habitus, which accounts for class differences across a broad range of tastes and lifestyles. This comment explains the different embodied cultural capital which activists from IYM sensed and realised, such as the different tastes and lifestyles. Second, the use of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the aforementioned comment points towards the ‘shared habitus’, where individuals who internalise similar life chances share a similar habitus, which identifies them in a collective and stratified sense. Bourdieu writes that “the practices of the members of the same group or, in a differentiated society, the same class, are always more and better harmonised than the agents know or wish” (Bourdieu, 1990: 59).

Third, some parts of the comment such as ‘lose trust in her’ or ‘how would I believe in their intention’ leads to thoughts of how these internalised dispositions, or habitus, tend to get externalised in actions and impressions. Therefore, the data demonstrates that the concept of habitus offers a powerful means of linking transitions from micro- and macro-levels of analysis. In the aforementioned comment, the concept of habitus
allows us to understand how a class habitus and a shared habitus are structured, through objective elements such as a prestigious education, western credentials, Americanised culture and different lifestyles and tastes, which are internalised in activists’ perceptions, practical reasoning, and actions. In here, the habitus can be considered as a structured and structuring structure, allowing for a relational analysis that can overcome the structure/agency dualism in social movement theory. Hadi’s comment, 15 March core activist, explains the latter conclusion:

My engagement in different social and cultural NGOs and youth campaigns made me aware of my urgent role to participate in this social and political movement [15 March movement]. This movement was an opportunity to spell out my thoughts, political criticisms and inspirations.

Another interesting lens for inquiry are the participants’ awareness and realisation of the ‘social struggle’ in between the two groups, the 15 March and the IYM. Like Sali, other participants were experienced and aware to see and evaluate where 15 March activists socially and structurally came from. Mazen, an IYM activist, had an intense experience as a political prisoner for five years in an Israeli jail and had been active politically himself. He reveals that the different embodied social classes and political backgrounds between the two movements could never serve as a fruitful ground to coalesce or coexist:

The impression that I concluded at the end was as follows; not even today or tomorrow or after ten years ahead we [referring to the two movements] can work together [...] there’s a social class struggle that would never be solved between us [...] they themselves [15 March activists] revealed that they don’t want to revolt against the Palestinian Authority. It was obvious later, and I am not accusing here as much as I am talking about facts and information, that core activists in 15 March were in contact with the secret intelligence forces, and they [the intelligence forces] were telling them [15 March activists] that we [IYM activists] are members in the PFLP who are planning to revolt against the PA and get them [15 March activists] trapped in this [...] You can’t meet the President and meet the oppressive intelligence forces, and then pretend later that he [the Palestinian President] is not representing you, what kind of logic is that?!
In his comment, Mazen also confirms the class-specific habitus and the shared habitus which strongly distinguish the practices between the two groups. What is strongly stated in this comment and the previous comment by Sali is the participants’ realisation of the ‘social class struggle’ which blocks any collaboration in terms of social or political activism between these two groups. The participants’ comments are in line with Bourdieu’s perspective in terms of how they think about social stratification. Bourdieu holds a highly stratified view of the social world in which individuals and groups struggle to maintain or enhance their relative standing within a hierarchically structured social space (Bourdieu, 1985). Therefore, for him social inequality is rooted in objective structures of unequal distribution of types of capital. The comments of Sali and Mazen refer precisely to this ‘unsolved’ social class struggle between the two groups, which is deeply embedded in the objective structures forming the 15 March core activists’ habitus, and which become internalised and expressed in their practices and being.

Although Bourdieu grounds social distinctions in objective structures, he also rejects strictly objectivist approaches to social inequality. He is sharply critical of all attempts to conceptualise class primarily in terms of position in the social relations of reproduction (Bourdieu, 1985). He argues that social space is multidimensional, and cannot be reduced to a single causal mechanism such as the economy. He argues that:

*Social class is not defined solely by a position in the relations of productions, but by the class habitus which is ‘normally’ (i.e., with a high statistical probability) associated with that position* (Bourdieu, 1985:372).

This alternative understanding of social relations opens the space up to include forms of symbolic and social accumulation within social class analysis. The data and the aforementioned comments of Sali and Mazen, shed light on the multidimensional analysis of social class that Bourdieu advocates. Therefore, the 15 March core activists are not only defined as an upper middle class according to their position in the social relations of production and reproduction, but also according to their social and symbolic forms of capital such as their lifestyle indicators, tastes, and gender.
4.6 Biographical and Historical Trajectories

Unlike the vast majority of the 15 March activists who are positioned in the Palestinian upper middle social class, the vast majority of IYM belong to both the Palestinian lower-middle social class and the working class. Most of the IYM activists obtained a Bachelor degree from a Palestinian university but did not pursue any further qualifications. The biographical and historical trajectories of IYM activists were mostly shaped by their politicised family, political activism and politicised networks.

4.6.1 Politicised Family and Upbringing

Findings showed that the majority of IYM activists were born in a politicised family, in particular leftist ones. The 15 March activists, by contrast, had not generally been exposed to this politicised structured experience. The vast majority of the 15 March activists were politically independent and liberal. The data and subsequent analysis confirm that some IYM members were politicised and had linkages to, and sometimes membership of, a particular leftist political party, which is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This affiliation with PFLP was used by the 15 March activists against activists in IYM, by accusing them of being under the control of, and dependent on the leftist political party (PFLP). The interviews confirmed the political ties which some IYM activists had with this particular leftist political party. Many IYM activists were openly discussing these historic-politicised ties with pride and appreciation. Sara, one of the core activists in IYM, is the daughter of a well-known Palestinian Marxist politician, and the secretary-general of the PFLP, Ahmad Sadat. In 2002, Sadat was imprisoned by the Palestinian Authority, then arrested by Israeli forces who have imprisoned him in Israel to the present date. Sara herself comments:

*Since an early age I was connected to these political ties. Even though my dad has been a political prisoner since 2002, he has been always keen to establish this political awareness and environment in the house. When we were [her siblings and herself] young, my dad was politically educating us about what homeland is and who these Palestinian politicised characters are, in addition to his continuous encouragement to make us read left-wing, or translated Russian literature etc. This kind of upbringing and my deep connection with my dad made me like this path he chose and love following it.*
Similarly, Hamed who is an activist in IYM, remarked the following when he is asked to reflect on his biographical and historical experiences:

*In the first intifada*\(^39\) in 1987, the Israeli forces prevented tailoring or selling Palestinian flags in shops and factories or even raising the flags up. My mom, who is a housewife and a local tailor back then, was tailoring the flags for the Palestinian rebels in secret. This happened when I was a kid who was witnessing these rebels entering our house and had some quick talks with my mom and dad about the political situation [...] then later on, I realised that the fancy settlements on the opposite mountain of our village are Israeli settlements which are built on the lands of my grandparents, and who ever question or challenge this logic will be imprisoned as what happened with my uncle [...] all these pictures and ideas became a part of my memory till now.

The finding illustrates the clear difference between the biographical and historical experiences/trajectories between the 15 March and IYM activists. These two comments by Sara and Hamed underline the early socialisation process of shaping the IYM activists’ habitus in a particular ideological and political way. These comments and the subsequent analysis provide evidence on the impact of this politicised socialisation in early life, which happens through family in structuring and producing the IYM activists’ habitus. The findings support empirical studies that have also pointed to the importance of the family system as an agency of political socialisation (Crossley, 2002; 2003). The analysis supports previous research findings that have shown that being born in a more political household increases the likelihood that one will become an activist (Rootes, 1986; Crossley, 2000). It was notable that the role of the family and a politicised upbringing were explicit in shaping and structuring the IYM activists’ habitus in a certain political and ideological way. The findings clarify that the biographical and historical trajectories of these activists’ parents was radicalised, experienced, and characterised by a high level of risk in their activism. This ‘radical habitus’ was inherited through the early political socialisation of IYM activists.

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\(^{39}\) The first Intifada, or First Palestinian Intifada was a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, which lasted from December 1987 until the Madrid Conference in 1991, though some date its conclusion to 1993, which the signing of the Oslo Accords.
The notion of the radical habitus was developed by Crossley (2002a; 2002b; 2003). Crossley (2002c: 58) mentions that the notion which he develops “overlaps with McAdam’s (1988, 1989) account of ‘alternation’ in his study of the biographical impact of participation in the ‘Freedom Summer’\(^{40}\) project. He found that activists who had participated in Freedom Summer were radicalised as a consequence of this and were therefore more likely to remain radical and to become involved in further struggles of various sorts. Participation in movement activity had a politicising effect on participants and disposed them towards further activism”. What this research labels ‘radical habitus’, shares similarities with the process described by Crossley. Crossley (1999b) argues that identifying agents who, by virtue of previous experience, are already experienced and radicalised, who are bringing their experience, in the form of internalised dispositions, into the political movement the researcher is studying. In the present research, the participants’ stories can add through the definition of the ‘radical habitus’ the impact of the radical biographical trajectories that mark their family structure and upbringing, and which act as radical internalised dispositions. Therefore, this research proposes that the family’s ‘genetic information’ or ‘acquired habitus’ allows and disposes the successive generations such as Sara, Hamed, and other activists in the IYM, through the circular conception of reproduction in which the family structure structures the activists’ habitus in a more radical way.

4.6.2 Political Activism

Beside these long processes of inculcation occurring over the lifetime of the activists which internalise their radical habitus, other objective structures predispose the activists’ habitus to perceive and act in certain ways in particular situations, Salma comments:

> From the first beginning it was the role of my family and the activities they got me involved in. I assume because they [parents] strongly believe in these political ideologies, they encouraged me to join organisations, student committees or youth reading groups which can indirectly pass to us these particular beliefs and ideologies. After this phase, I came to realise that it’s not

\(^{40}\) As Crossley (2002c, 69) puts it as a note “Freedom summer was one of the early projects of the black civil rights movement in the USA, in the early 1960s. It involved predominantly middle-class students from elite universities in the north spending a summer in the south, where they attempted to help black voters to register and become aware of their rights. It achieved infamy when, at a very early stage, three of these youths were murdered by racists. McAdam (1988) has written a book-length account of this event”. 

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only what I inherited from my parents, but also its my own character and passion which were driving me to get involved politically and understanding this world from a political sense.

In the aforementioned comment where Salma’s radical habitus was structured through her family field, her radical habitus travels and transcends with her to new fields of similar structural positions and relations with agents who have similar dispositions. The data collected serves to underline how the involvement and participation in objective structures, such as politicised youth organisations, student committees and political parties, structured the activists habitus with similar ideological and political views to those inherited from their parents. The above comment calls us to think how these objective structures become internalised as personal dispositions, or habitus, and then become externalised in actions, impressions and ideologies that reproduce the objective structure of social class. This finding alongside the subsequent data analysis provides support for the powerful analytical role of the habitus in relationally linking and bridging the micro-macro level in order to overcome the structure/agency dualism in social movement theory.

Participants’ data, along Salma’s comment, helps to provide a better understanding of how a particular habitus, is structured under specific past conditions, which urges the activists to perceive and act in different ways than other activists with different trajectories. In addition, this understanding highlights the crucial role which habitus plays in linking past fields to present fields, when moving from one field to the next (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Therefore, this researcher proposes that each new arrival brings to the field a habitus formed under specific past conditions, some of which will be shared with others and some of which will be completely contradictory. Data collected interprets that both the radical and novice habitus of the activists, relationally transcend through different fields in a dynamic process of internalising the objective structures and structuring the activists’ perceptions and actions. Hana, 15th March core activist, says:

*I was brought up knowing that my uncle is a politician who cares about politics [...] but my nuclear family, as mom and dad, weren’t that involved in politics. My mom is a school teacher and my dad is a trader [...] I think my political awareness was developed at my university, which is kind of late I can say now.*
It wasn’t very preferred to get involved into politics at school [referring to Ramallah Friends School] [...] University was the place which I met in it different politicised people who helped me in shaping my political thoughts.

The above comment marginalised the family role in the activists’ early political socialisation. For example, Hana referred to other objective structures and politicised networks which she establishes during her graduate studies. Data collected points out that IYM activists’ family radical political socialisation process was more apparent and effectual than 15 March. 15 March nuclear families have not played a role in shaping any forms of radical habitus, on the contrary, it was a political socialisation towards novice habitus. Data collected proposes that many of the 15 March activists who belong to the Palestinian upper middle class have experienced a kind of ‘safe’ and novice political socialisation upbringing. The latter could be relationally linked to the concept of field. As discussed before, 15 March parents are keen to reproduce their novice habitus to be homologous with the logic of their field and the dominant cultural capital which distinguish them socially. This logic of ‘safe’ upbringing is crucial to structure and maintain 15 March activists’ habitus within safe type of activism which corresponds with 15 March parents’ logic and fields. In the next chapter, the data analysis and discussion are going to reveal why 15 March family fields are homologous with the wider political logic and doxa of the PA.

4.6.3 Politicised Networks

The data show that the vast majority of IYM activists experienced similar past conditions which led to their radical habitus being structured similarly. In addition, the data show that similar structural positions are also embedded in structural networks. It was interesting to learn that some IYM activists shared politicised structural networks before their engagement in IYM, as Ibrahim comments:

I knew most of the activists in IYM, some of them are close friends of mine and my family, others I worked with in the same politicised student committee at the University and some of them are my comrades of the same party.

All the aforementioned comments from IYM activists Sara, Salma, Hamed and Ibrahim were referring to their engagement in a particular political party, the PFLP.
Similarly, other participants in IYM such as Adam and Malik mentioned their affiliation, politicised networks and relationships with the PFLP. While other activists who were politically independent such as Abir, Hamdi, and Osama were considered to be ‘party friends’ based on their strong relationships with some politicised activists in IYM. Some IYM activists such as Mazen and Sali are also considered as ‘political friends’ because they have affiliations with similar leftist, Marxist political parties such as the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

This finding supports recent research by Bottero and Crossley (2011) which proposes that the habitus is shaped by concrete interactions and relationships. Actors in a similar position to one another are more likely, as a consequence, to interact and therefore to influence one another, thus developing a similar habitus— or what Bottero and Crossley (2011) called, shared habitus, as previously discussed. The vast majority of IYM activists enjoy homologies and similarities with regard to their structural positions and their social relations, which leads to them having similar dispositions. Bourdieu refers to “sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 725). Still, the mechanism by which social position shapes habitus has, by the present research endeavour, not identified prior research clarifying this (Bottero and Crossley, 2011). Therefore, this research clarifies what social movement agents have in common with regard to social position, their volume and composition of capital, and fields, in order, to structure habitus and practices.

Moreover, it was notable within the data collected from IYM activists and the comments made by 15 March activists about IYM that most IYM activists were presenting a radical identity by ‘presenting’ a radical self. A radical presentation of self is part and parcel of the radical habitus. Crossley (2002) argues that radicals very often want to be seen as radicals and project themselves as such, but that doesn’t mean that they are not radicals or, indeed, that what they say about themselves is not both honest and verifiably true. Omar’s statement sums up this radical self-presentation:
We [IYM activists] did truly believe that we will cause a shock between the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people. We thought that we would be able to mobilise the masses and speak on their behalf in the streets [...] I was surrounded by politicised knowledgeable activists, enthusiastic, dedicated and determined [referring to IYM activists]. We thought for a ‘long’ while that we are the change which our country has been waiting for.

Omar’s comment sheds light on the idea of being an activist with radical profile. His comment reflects a degree of conformity to an ideal, concerning the experience and the know-how of political activism. Conceptualised along Bourdieusian lines, the radicals present themselves as the ones who ‘feel’ the game and know how to play it. It was apparent that the different historic and experiential trajectories of the 15 March and IYM activists differentiated them, in terms of how they perceive, conceive reason, and act in these politically motivated movements. This radical habitus could be also characterised as an ‘experienced habitus’. Politicised upbringing, political imprisonment, ‘high-risk’ political activism and a longstanding involvement in radical politics were objective social structures which structure and reproduce a specific form of ‘experienced habitus’. These structures are embodied and internalised and then further realised through practices, know-how and the organisational dynamics of the activists. The data demonstrated that IYM activists argue that they have the know-how to play the game effectively in the field. Following Bourdieu, this experienced habitus can also be considered as a form of resource. We might argue that the activists’ habitus constitutes, for them, an embodied cultural capital which is of value in the protest game, or perhaps rather an embodied ‘protest capital’ which is of value in the movement’s game, logic and needs - or as Crossley (2002: 53) calls it ‘movement capital’.

This finding challenges a theory like the resource mobilisation theory, which has difficulties explaining these internalised embodied-performative forms of resources. As was pointed and explained in Chapter 2, resource mobilisation theory adopts an objectivist approach to understanding the influence of outside structures and resources on social movement emergence, without paying attention to the important role of internalised, embodied-performative forms of resources, such as the protest or movement capital. Moreover, cognitive and relational aspects recounted in Omar’s comment, such as enthusiastic feelings, determination and togetherness, are not
adequately recognised under the logic of an objectivist structuralist theory such as resource mobilisation.

Another challenge is related to Bourdieu’s understanding of cultural capital as inherited through the parents’ cultural backgrounds. Some scholars (Lo, 2015) argue that Bourdieu’s understanding of cultural capital is understood as the dominant cultural capital which is linked to the elite social field, as signal of status and legitimacy, more that the non-elite fields. In most of Bourdieu’s writing he stresses that it is useful to think of culture in the form of educational credentials, as a kind of capital (scholastic capital) that can be purchased with time, energy, and money, and then exchanged for occupations with high status and incomes (Bourdieu, 1977b). The findings demonstrate that cultural capital might be accumulated from the education system of schools and higher education. Moreover, the definition of cultural capital in Bourdieu’s most influential writings, as Lamont and Lareau (1988: 156) define it, is considered as “widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviours, good and credentials” used for cultural exclusion.

In a prior research, Lo (2015) has discussed that the concept of cultural capital is not able to understand the agency and creativity of the dominated41. This researcher develops the concept of ‘unrecognised cultural capital’ (UCC) to theorise how certain cultural competencies, specific to the dominated, can facilitate their everyday resistance. UCC is theorised as cultural resources that have little symbolic value but that nonetheless may be used by the dominated to acquire other valuable resources and push back, to some extent, forces of domination. Protest/movement capital which IYM activists acquired could be considered as the knowledge, informal know-hows, or cultural styles that are not recognised as valuable by other activists, in this field the 15 March activists, but can be used to pursue resources or facilitate practices that are useful to the dominated, IYM activists. Hamed, an IYM core activist, made a comment which pinpointed this challenge within Bourdieusian theory:

   Yes we [IYM activists] may have not studied in prestigious schools and Universities, or even have that perfect English accent, but we know quite well

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41 In Bourdieu’s later works, he uses the concept ‘the dominated’ to refer to the working class and other groups who are similarly deprived of economic and cultural capitals, including women and stigmatised minorities (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 82). It is in this sense that the researcher use the term ‘dominated’ in this study.
how to act on the ground, how to confront, handle dilemmas and mobilise [...] the street is the parameter of your know-how in political activism.

This comment perfectly reflects that cultural capital is not only exclusive to high-status, broadly-valued cultural resources which fuel the social reproduction of domination. This unrecognised cultural capital (hereafter UCC), non-elite cultural resources, perform important roles in non-elite fields which can be mobilised for domination and legitimacy within non-elite fields.

The data analysis described that forms of cultural capital, such as protest capital, were obtained and accumulated through ‘alternative’ educational structures such as politicised organisations and committees, and political imprisonment. This protest or movement capital can be seen as a specialised form of practical capital within the newly emerged political field. It is a form of capital required by all activists in order to resist, organise, and mobilise. However, data collected reveal that 15 March activists who lack this specialised type of capital suffer from different messy interorganisational practices. Yet, the research argues that this protest capital was only valued within the intraorganisational relations in the IYM field, but was not valued within the interorganisational relations in the larger Palestinian political field. In other words, UCC was only valued within non-elite fields (IYM fields) and not the elite fields of the 15 March movement and the upper middle class. By contrast, other forms of capital, such as the social and symbolic capital which 15 March activists enjoy were more valuable according to the distinguished social positioning they have within the Palestinian upper-middle social class.

The following chapter analyses in more detail the processes, dynamics, conflictual mechanisms and organisational relations of the investigated social movements. The first section of the chapter provides an analysis of the interorganisational and intraorganisational relations through understanding different modes of domination in a comprehensive Bourdieusian framework. The second section of chapter five goes back to the notion of habitus again to provide a better understanding of the post-activism phase.
CHAPTER FIVE

Modes of Domination

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses in more detail the processes, dynamics, conflictual mechanisms and organisational relations of the investigated social movements. The first section of the chapter provides an analysis of the interorganisational and intraorganisational relations through exploring the different modes of domination identified within a Bourdieusian framework. This first section of the chapter considers modes of domination in these social movements, categorised by processes of conflict, repertoires of contention, and reproduced inequalities.

The second part of the chapter goes back to habitus again to provide a better understanding of the post-activism phase, through examining how the habitus can change through internalising new embodied dispositions or through transforming this structured habitus differently. This section on habitus change and transformation explores the ways in which activists acquire new aspects to their habitus, and maps out the ways they develop new strategies based on their transformed habitus, particularly in a newly emerged political field.

5.1 Processes of Conflict

The processes, dynamics and mechanisms of social movements are all organisational practices that reflect the movement’s interorganisational and intraorganisational relations. Previous studies have called for an organisational analysis that fully exploits the theoretical and empirical possibilities inherent in the relational perspective advocated within Bourdieu’s comprehensive framework (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Yet, despite increasing interest in organisational analysis adopting the work of Bourdieu, the consequent body of literature often lacks an integrated comprehension of
Bourdieu’s theory, and therefore fails to fully exploit its potentialities (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). Moreover, the only social movement theory which brings organisational analysis into its core theorisation is the Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT). However, this theory is limited in analysing structured, institutionalised Social Movements Organisations (SMO).

Therefore, exploring organisational practices and processes in informal ‘alternative’ mobilisations, such as grassroots movements and resistance against repressive authorities, or even an emergent mobilisation within the RMT theoretical framework, faces difficulties. This theory also faces difficulties explaining the messy practices in informal mobilisation, as opposed to the deliberation and decision-making processes in formal structured movements. Another criticism facing RMT is the difficulties in explaining how important cognitive or relational aspects, such as values, feelings or behavioural dimensions relate to social movements. Plus, in describing agency, this theory treats agency in a similar manner to that of rational choice theory. Resource mobilisation theory understands social actors’ behaviour as rational, goal-oriented, self-interested and institutionalised strategic behaviour. Therefore, to understand agency in any terms other than rationality and strategy is a central problem of RMT. Therefore, rooted in the field of organisation studies, this research discusses the relevance of Bourdieu’s theory of practice for relationally capturing the various organisational practices, mechanisms and dynamics within these politically motivated social movements.

In addition, most of the New Social Movement theorists stress that these movements which began to emerge in the 1960s, including student movements, the New Left, and later environmental, feminist, and antinuclear movements, thought it crucial to avoid bureaucratic organisations (see Goodwin and Jasper, 2003). In other words, organisational forms are one area in which many activists have tried to change the way their societies do things, in anticipation of the kind of future they envision. In a Bourdieusian sense, that could be described as challenging the hierarchal social order of reproduction into a new transformative form.

The interviewees expressed their preference towards egalitarian structures which encouraged everyone to participate in decision making processes, mobilising and coordinating. The activists were open to providing ‘alternative’ organisational processes
and dynamics, in order to avoid the traditional trappings of bureaucracy, such as paid members, experts, hierarchy, impersonal rules, and division of roles. This avoidance and aversion reflected conscious circumvention of the ossifying organisational structures and rigid institutionalised logics that characterised most of the Palestinian political parties, and which blocked any free spaces for creative alternatives to emerge in the political field. Abir, an IYM activist commented:

One of our main purposes in this movement was to bring something new into the Palestinian street. People [referring to the Palestinian popular] are tired, disappointed and frustrated from our political parties in general, and we don’t want to be a new political form or party [...] it is why I got engaged in this open horizontal movement.

In addition, Sami, a 15 March activist, said determinately:

I’ve been against being politicised since an early age, so it was crucial to me to get involved in a horizontal unstructured type of movement [...] I don’t want anyone to give me orders or commands.

At first glance, the description and impression which the activists provided about their approach towards organising, recruiting and mobilising can be seen as open and egalitarian to all members. Upon probing and discussing this further with participants, conversations began to uncover alternative, more conflictual practices and mechanisms which were being practiced in these movements. This does not mean that the activists had conflictual intentions that were opposed to egalitarianism and fair treatment among other activists, but the research argues that these conflictual dynamics and mechanisms occurred because of different political ideologies, acquisition of different forms of capital, misrecognised logic and various positioning within different fields (see Sutherland, Land, and Böhm, 2013).

5.1.1 Political Credibility

Political credibility turns out to be a critical standard to evaluate one’s integrity, reliability, transparency and honesty. It was interesting to find out how activists were evaluated as ‘politically credible’ or not based on different reasoning and perceptions.
The analysis finds that the reasoning behind this kind of evaluation towards activists’ credibility can be traced back to social class struggle and ideological conflict between the activists in the two movements. Although IYM activists did not say it explicitly, it was implied that being politically credible means being a politicised person who has his/her affiliations with a specific known political party. Moreover, some particular aspects, like being a political prisoner or having a long history of ‘high-risk’ political activism was considered to gain extra credits towards activists’ credibility. For example, Hamed, a core IYM activist, who had been a political prisoner for two years in an Israeli jail, made the following comment about the ‘unknown’ 15 March activists:

*Who are they [referring to 15 March core activists mainly]? I haven’t heard their names ever before in any political activities [...] They were new for us [referring to IYM activist] and that by itself was kind of questionable or maybe ‘suspicious’ if I am allowed to say that.*

This comment points to a type of capital which IYM activists believed that the 15 March activists did not have. It is political capital, which Bourdieu considers as a subtype of social capital. And because social capital becomes a political capital only in the context of a political field, this kind of credit and collective trust or ‘reputational capital’ becomes important to secure political trust amongst others, and to be able to mobilise support for your political group or party (see Swartz, 1997). The latter finding is a good example of capital convertibility. Social capital is converted into political capital in the context of political field. Moreover, this converted social capital, political capital, empower the activists who own it to dominate this political field as political capital is unequally distributed.

Moreover, the type of political capital which the aforementioned comment referred to is a delegated form of political capital. This type of political capital refers to the authority granted by a political organisation. For IYM activists, their own power and political credibility came to them by means of organisational delegation. Their political capital originates in, and is attached to, their organisational position in the political party rather than to who they are. Linking this to the concept of field, the political organisations, along with students committees and political parties, which IYM activists belong to reflect how homologous fields (the radical early socialisation of
IYM and their political organisations) could be linked between past fields to present fields (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008) through a type of habitus which corresponds smoothly between homologous fields which are structured on similar logic and rules.

On the other hand, this organisational hierarchal transmission of political capital was problematic for most 15 March activists. As discussed previously, the Palestinian political field, and its political parties, had been continuously failing to collaborate, and therefore the 15 March activists’ definition and understanding of being political credible is to be politically independent with no affiliations with any political party. Faris’ statement was clear in this respect:

*We [15 March core activists] refused to recruit any politicised activists. For us, having any politicised member will lead by default to an intervention and influence from the political party which the member is engaged in and of course its agenda and interests [...] at some point, I realised that Hamed [referring to one of IYM core activist] was getting some guidance and delegation from his political party without saying this in public [...] working with politicised activists means working with their political party for me, and I have no trust in our political parties.*

From another perspective, the affiliation and engagement of some 15 March activists with foreign NGOs, like the USAID, also made it problematic for people to trust the activist’s political credibility, or was sometimes perceived as threatening these activists’ sense of patriotism. Malik, an IYM activist, shared his view of being suspicious regarding some 15 March activists’ organisational affiliations and delegation:

*Honestly it was shocking to see an employee of a worldwide NGO like the USAID leading and organising this movement [referring to 15 March movement]. Like seriously man, the USAID? Do you know what their average salary is? Do people have a clue that they [USAID employees] should sign a contract to explicitly renounce Palestinian resistance, which they called it terrorism in Palestine?*

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42 For many Palestinians working and getting engaged with an NGO like the USAID could be a ‘patriotic’ dilemma. The contract which the comment refers to is the USAID’s ‘terrorism clause’ which requires all of the organisation’s
This finding implies that the activists’ different organisational affiliations caused conflictual mechanisms between the activists. Activists from both movements perceive past and present organisational affiliations according to their own practical reasoning and embodied structures of understanding. In general, activists from both sides concluded that any organisational affiliation and involvement would lead to some form of organisational delegation, or organisational dependency, either to the radical political party, or the NGO’s foreign agenda. The data underlines the activists’ beliefs, and sometimes fears, that the organisational hierarchical capability to transmit and influence the social capital into political capital. This finding supports Swartz’s (2013) argument, that unlike capitals in other fields, social capital becomes political capital, or in Bourdieu’s own, social capital is converted (Bourdieu, 1986) into political capital, only in the context of a political field. This means that for resources to become valued forms of capital, they must become instruments and objects of struggle in structured areas, or fields. Capital as a ‘social relation of power’ is constituted in and by a field, where it is one of the stakes in, and instruments of, struggle. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1991:101) consider that a capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field.

Therefore, in this field of a political movement, where social relations of power were apparent, the activists of both movements strived to accumulate social and political capital to excel and be distinguished. In other words, activists struggled to mobilise and recruit social capital to politicise this capital and accumulate more of it. Moreover, the political field has a special relationship to social capital that distinguishes it from other fields. Unlike other fields where there is also struggle over ideas, such as the scientific, literary, or religious field, political capital needs to appeal beyond its boundaries for mass support (Bourdieu, 1991c). Political capital is, in fact the capacity to mobilise social capital and needs to reach beyond the boundaries of the political support.

aid recipients to affirm that they will not fund or take part in terrorist activities (Gyeney, 2001). The ‘patriotic’ dilemma for some Palestinians in affirming this ‘terrorism clause’ is the explicit and implicit declaration to renouncing all forms of Palestinian resistance as they are considered forms of terrorism according to the USAID organisation standards. In addition, the USAID has been also labelled by some Palestinians to have a little genuine sustainable development, a political agenda of punishing Palestinians through freezing and cutting the US support (Gyeney, 2001), and a strong pro-Israeli agenda of funding Israel’s apartheid projects, such as the apartheid road construction which is a segregated road network in the West Bank planned to segregate roads between Palestinians and Israelis by leaving the main roads for exclusive use by Israeli settlers (Cook, 2010).
It is important to point out here that the analysis of power is situated at the core of Bourdieu’s sociology. In his book ‘Symbolic Power, Political and Intellectuals’, Swartz (2013) argues that the ‘political’ sociology of Bourdieu is rooted in Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, violence, and capital which empathises the crucial role that symbolic forms play as resources that reflect, constitute, maintain and change social hierarchies. Bourdieu’s sociology enriches our understanding to the more influential forms of power that operate through the social hierarchies, symbolic categories and classifications that connect everyday life to prevailing structures of power (Swartz, 2013).

Swartz (2013) also emphasises that the concept of political field is elaborated in a few seminal papers of Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s work has not devoted considerable attention to the internal mechanisms of the political field per se. His emphasis has been more on identifying when and how the political field impinges on fields of cultural production (see Bourdieu, 1991b; 1991c). The political field, like other fields, is a space of struggle for legitimate political power; an arena for competition between agents (individuals, groups, institutions, the state and so on) who participate and compete in varying degrees in the struggle for political power and authority. Therefore, this thesis is interested in defining and describing the Palestinian dominant political field and the newly emerged political movements. In addition, as Bourdieu has elaborated political field in a few seminal papers, this thesis pays attention to explore the different processes of conflicts and the internal mechanisms in the political field such as political credibility and recruiting parochialism.

5.1.2 Recruiting Parochialism

The previous comments by Hamed, Faris and Malik highlight the ‘recruiting parochialism’ which each movement had. The data clarifies that new entrants were not allowed to join the movement unless they were politically checked, according to the standards of the core activists in both movements. On that account, Adam, who is an IYM core activist, comments and reflects on the political views of 15 March as a movement, and their hostility towards the political parties, which caused recruiting parochialism in the 15 March movement:
15 March activists hold kind of hostility for all political parties. I can partially understand this hostile feeling and where it’s coming from but I can’t buy it fully. They [15 March activists] were against the core idea of a political party, or structuralism or any kind of authority, as if they were calling for an anarchist kind of understanding [...] this understanding is chaotic for me and leads to nowhere in our society [the Palestinian society].

And in respect of the relationship between the leftist political party (PLFP) and IYM activists, Adam said:

Unfortunately, the left political parties in general did not understand and welcome these fresh youth movements and support them. Personally, I think that the middle leaders and officials in the PLFP were responsible for not containing our movement [referring to IYM] and support it although they were in delegation to do so from the upper leaders and officials of the party. The upper leaders in this party officially delegated the middle leaders to support, guide, financially support, protect and lead our movement in case it’s required.

As discussed previously about the political field doxa, this comment points towards the ossification of the organisational structures of the leftwing parties, and the lack of interactive/productive communication between different hierarchal ranks in the party. The rigid and idle internal composition, which Adam refers to, deprived IYM activists of their political opportunity to occupy leading positions, even in another political field. This might be also understood in terms of field struggle between the PLFP political field, and this newly emerging political movement. The analysis suggests that PLPF, as a political field with its own particular ‘rules of the game’ and its own doxa, refused implicitly to support this new youth movement for fear of destabilising its own cohesion. Change and allowing new blood to enter any of its organisational dimensions was resisted and refused by those who were advantaged by the field’s rigid logic and idle internal composition.

Moreover, the data highlights the ideological conflict and competition between the two groups. Activists in both groups, as players in this political field (game), fought over symbolic dominance and ideological control of this field. With reference to the IYM activists, whilst most of them were politicised activists in the leftist political parties
such as PLFP, PPP or DFLP, other participants in the IYM had their affiliations and politicised networks within the same political party, and others were considered as the ‘party’s friends’ for holding similar leftist-Marxist ideologies. Therefore, it is notable in the analysis that the vast majority of IYM activists held leftist beliefs and political ideologies, and some of them presented themselves as politically leftist. On the other hand, all the 15 March activists, with no exception, were not politicised, and their beliefs and political ideologies were more liberally oriented. These two types of political ideology were not easy to harmonise in the same political field. Habib, an IYM activist, reflects on the difference he felt towards the liberal orientation which most of the 15 March activists had:

*I would consider them [referring to IYM activists] liberals. It’s not merely because they ask for individualistic demands of freedom and liberality, but most importantly the social class they came from. Upper-middle social classes are privileged enough to think as individuals instead of collectivities.*

When reflecting upon these ideologies, leftism and liberalism, one can find major differences in the two schools of thoughts and their practices. Whilst leftist political ideology supports social equality and egalitarianism by flattening hierarchies and dismantle established orders to ‘free’ the masses from hierarchical order imposed from upper social classes, liberalist political ideology advocates for different programmes of liberty such as, freedom of speech and freedom of markets (Heywood, 2012). Liberalism could be seen, for example, as supporting the capitalist economic and political system. It also means believing in and defending the Western heritage of the free market and individualism which would be radically refused by leftists.

### 5.2 Repertoires of Contention

The findings provide some support for research which has studied the processes whereby particular techniques of protest are selected from societal ‘repertoires of contention’ (Crossley, 2010). Charles Tilly originally developed the concept of ‘repertoires of contention’ to address the question of how activists choose particular methods of protest from amongst the general repertoire available in their society (Tilly, 1978). By using Bourdieu’s approach to analyse processes of repertoire selection,
Crossley (2010) concludes that particular groups or agents, are affected, in the first instance, by their specific biography and historical factors (habitus), which shape their processes of practical reasoning and repertoire selection.

As mentioned in the previous comment made by Mazen, an IYM core activist:

_You can’t meet the president and meet the oppressive intelligence forces, and then pretend later that he [the Palestinian president] is not representing you, what kind of logic is that!_

Mazen refers to and critiques the fact that Faris, a 15 March core activist, accepted and met the Palestinian president in the name of Palestinian youth. Faris himself has completely different logic behind his visit, and advocates more of a ‘diplomatic’ relationship with Palestinian policemen:

_Our vision [referring to 15 March activists] was not to confront the policemen and its intelligence forces, we only want to confront the Palestinian Authority. You can weaken the Palestinian Authority by building bridges with the police [...] while demonstrating, I was chatting with some policemen, to try to explain what I think, and tell them that we are not here to confront you. While others [refereeing to some IYM activists] were confronting and swearing at the police._

The two comments above by Mazen and Faris highlight the different choices of ‘appropriate’ techniques of protest, which the activists chose, according to their habitus, field and forms of capital. Therefore, the analysis suggest that it’s not only the activists’ habitus which shapes the choice of protest technique and repertoires of contention, but the field and forms of capital are relationally involved with this practical reasoning of making such a choice.

For example, Faris belongs to a Palestinian upper middle class family, which was able one day to send him to the elite private school, Ramallah Friends School, and later on to Stanford University in the United States for his Bachelor and Masters studies. As discussed before, we can argue that his political habitus was shaped by biographical and historical factors, which gave him a privileged social positioning and a desire to be politically independent with no affiliations with any political party. He revealed
himself that his political activism had not exceeded participating in some international solidarity movements and supporting the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement (BDS)\textsuperscript{43}, and that he does not want his political activism to be confrontational. Faris’ political positioning is typical to other activists’ positioning in the 15 March movement, which could be labelled as low-risk political activism which has ‘safe’ type of confrontation (playing the game safe).

It is clear how Faris biographical and historical trajectories (habitus) gave him specific way of perceiving and choosing particular methods of protesting from amongst the general repertoire available in the Palestinian society. Faris’ case was interesting enough to go viral in the international media. *Time* magazine, for example, published an article entitled ‘A New Palestinian Movement: Young, Networked, and Nonviolent: Rejecting the past, young social-networking rebels embrace nonviolence’ (Klein, 2011). The article focused on and boosted Faris’ valuable cultural capital, pointing out that he was a graduate of Stanford University who has a double major in physics and international relations. Joe Klein, a Jewish political columnist for *Time* magazine, started his article by describing Faris as one of the movement’s leaders and as the *face* of the new Middle East. Taking this international perspective into account, the safe and low-risk repertoires of contention, which reflected Faris’ and other 15 March activists’ novice habitus was seen as more acceptable and was celebrated by the international media.

However, the data collected shows that Faris’ personal decision to meet the Palestinian President was not approved of or even discussed with the other 15 March core activists. Lina, Dalia, and Nada all made comments related to their disagreement with and disappointment at the role. Lina’s comment was indicative of this group. She expressed with anger:

*Can you just imagine that on that day, I went back home, logged into my Facebook and found all of this news and criticism about Faris’ visit without having a clue of what happened. I just felt clueless and a fool at that time […]*

\textsuperscript{43} Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement (BDS): is a global campaign attempting to increase economic and political pressure on Israel to comply with the stated goals of the movement: the end of Israel's occupation and colonisation of Palestinian land and the Golan Heights, full equality for Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, and respect for the right of return of Palestinian refugees.
when I asked him why, he claimed that it was only a personal interview which he was invited to and that’s why he did not tell the group. Nonsense! His act put us [15 March activists] in a very critical and embarrassing situation with the other group [IYM], the people in the streets, and even with our members in 15 March. Who is he to represent himself in front of the media? Was he elected democratically? Has anyone agreed on this? And which new Middle East face is he representing? Nonsense! Seriously!

Lina’s comment above alongside other data collected highlights what Sutherland, Land and Böhm (2013:10) called “anti-leadership” stance. Sutherland et al (2013) explain that anti-leadership stance against individual leaders can lead to domination, conformity, and over dependence. The paper (Sutherland et al., 2013:10) explains where this rejection comes from by arguing: “this rejection has a more ideological basis, as it is fundamentally against democratic-participative principles. The concept of an individual leader is therefore redundant, as it makes for an undemocratic and non-participative environment, where only a select few represent the organisation, and all others are reduced to the role of passive followers”.

The finding points out that some activists, such as Faris who became a leader and played the role of presenting this movement in front of the media, without being democratically elected, was because of Faris cultural capital, such as skills, knowledge, or language. The next section continues to theorise how network gender composition legitimises some male activists, for example Faris, to overtake their position as males in the movement and symbolically violating others’ who lack these form of capitals such as female activists.

5.2.1 Network Gender Composition

Lina, Dalia, and Nada’s frustration and disappointment can be understood and explained from a number of different perspectives. First, according to all the latter females’ comments, Faris was overtaking and exploiting his position as a male core activist in the movement, undemocratically and forcibly. In a Bourdieusian sense, Faris was attempting to accumulate social and symbolic forms of capital for himself, by leveraging his inherited institutionalised cultural capital, masculinity and his central structural position in the movement. Therefore, competitiveness and conflictual
relationships emerged between the activists. This finding confirms a previous research by Maclean and Harvey (2006) which argues that business elites within elite communities were ruling and competing over taste, linguistic capital and social capital continuously to reproduce and regenerate themselves through cultural and social reproduction patterns to reproduce existing social structures and status distinctions (see Maclean and Harvey, 2006; Maclean, Harvey and Chia, 2010). The findings disclose that 15 March activists who belong to the elitist upper-middle social class showed evidence of a higher degree of competition over valued forms of capitals. Non-elite activists had very little possibility for enacting change, as they lack some valued forms of capital such access to elite political networks, linguistic capital and dominant cultural capital.

Second, the findings show that the gender composition of the core activists’ network was related to masculine intraorganisational dynamics and practices that were evident in both movements. For example, the core network of the 15 March was initially established only by four males; Zain, Faris, Hazem, and Farid, while the IYM core network was established by three male activists, Anas, Hamed and Mazen, and two female activists, Abir and Sara. This difference in the network structures of the movements in terms of gender balance influenced the relations of power practiced in each group. Ironically, the representation of females in the ‘liberal’ movement, 15 March, was zero. Lina, a 15 March activist, expressed her anger of how this masculine power influenced recruiting new members, which caused what has been discussed previously as ‘recruiting parochialism’:

It is just Zain, Faris and Farid who were in charge of who could join our group, where we can meet and when, what we will plan for, who is good and credible, who is bad and dangerous [...] I felt that I am invisible at the end, do I stepped out.

Faris’ actions, in meeting the Palestinian President and personally contacting the media without discussing these activities with the movement’s members, were perceived as exercising power and masculine domination, which are embedded and internalised structures in a patriarchal culture, such as Palestine. When Faris was asked about these actions, in particular, he tried to explain why the media targeted him in person, and why he acted the way he did:
I think it all go back to the first demonstration in support of Egypt where I got arrested in it by the PA police. Second, I was the admin of 15 March activists’ Facebook page [...] any quick search on the internet can show up my name, and that’s why I was chosen by the media I think [...] In regard to the international media, I think I was chosen up because of my good English language, and I was also keen to build relationships with international media such as New York Times, Time Magazine, The Economist [...] Back to the masculine practices which I was accused of, I think there is something structural here. The females in our group should be also aware that the media and the politicians were approaching us [15 March male activists] and not the females [...] What I meant by structural here is that regardless of the effort that the females tried to put and invest in, in any occasion when some political officials want to invite us [15 March activist], negotiate with us or arrange anything with us, they were approaching the males only [...] I agree with you, it is a structural problem in our society [...] even some female politicians and influential women such as Khalida Jarrar 44 and Amal Khreisheh 45 were approaching the male activists and not the females. This was surprising for me.

Faris’s comment points out the masculine domination which is embedded and internalised structurally within the Palestinian culture. Female politicians and feminists like Khalida Jarrar and Amal Khreisheh inherited these embedded structures of masculinity and patriarchal which were internalised in their own habitus through specific biographical and experiential trajectories, and then externalised in these mentioned masculine practices. Surprisingly, it was not only the males who were responsible for such masculine domination; it was the females as well. Both of Khalida Jarrar and Amal Khreisheh who fight for women’s political participation, and the need for women representation to parallel their countless struggles and sacrifices for national liberation, exclude, marginalise and practice symbolic violence and domination towards the movements’ female activists.

44 Khalida Jarrar is a Palestinian feminist, human rights activist and senior lawyer for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). She is a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).
45 Amal Khreisheh is the General Director of the Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD).
As discussed previously about the political field doxa and the ossification of the organisational structures of the Palestinian left-wing parties, the data shows the superficial role which feminist politicians and human right activists were playing at their liberal and leftist organisations. The findings support what has been discussed previously about the decline of the Palestinian left. Such masculine practices and the exclusion of women from political participation were practiced by both males and females, and this deprived young Palestinian women of opportunities to occupy leading positions. In Bourdieu’s sense, these female figures are agents who became familiarised with the PA institutionalised logic and the field doxa of masculinity, symbolic violence and domination. By securing the domination of this logic, the PA’s political field and logic is more stable, as it is able to block out any dissenting bodies or opposition voices. Therefore, this research finds that masculine domination and the gender composition of the core activists’ networks were crucial factors in choosing or depriving particular methods of protest from amongst the general repertoire available with the activists’ society.

Further, the case data support the mainstream leadership approach, where individuals became leaders, as Faris case, due to their charisma and/or cultural capital, such as skills, expertise, languages or knowledge. Sutherland, Land and Böhm (2013) discuss that in some incidents, individual leaders might take over leadership role, which is crucial for the formation, growth, and successes of SMOs. However, these individual leaders should not assume this leadership position as a permanent one, they should distribute leading roles such as role rotation by stepping back as others would take the lead, which was not in Faris case.

5.2.2 Rules of the Game

Back to the ‘appropriate’ use of repertoires of contention, one interesting question could be posed here. Why do privileged activists, like those in 15 March movement, interested in becoming involved in political activism? Through deep reflection and discussion with the researcher, Adam, who is an IYM activist, openly discussed in detail why he thinks elite activists in 15 March movement might get politically involved:
I believe that each social class has its own privileges and interests to defend and fight for. It was clear that activists from 15 March belong to the Palestinian upper middle class. Let me break it down for you here. For example, the mother of Faris is a politically privileged woman who enjoys her own international ties in political activism. Zain’s uncle is a government minister. Farid’s father is a well-known intellectual and so forth. Who we are talking about now are their sons and daughters who realised that everything in this country [referring to Palestine] is political, even the social capital is political [...] their involvement in this movement reflects their ambition to enjoy a political role which they are looking forward to have in this kind of involvement [...] and be aware, this political role does not necessarily be confrontational, actually it can’t be confrontational; it’s just need to be there. Therefore, this crucial difference which you [the researcher] will notice in your subsequent analysis strongly stopped the two groups from getting emerged in one [...] in our movement [IYM] we didn’t believe in any approach rather than the confrontational one, but you should be clever enough to confront without getting smashed, literally smashed!

A part of this comment was used previously to address the forms of capital which the 15 March activists have. Social, cultural, and symbolic capital are forms of resources and capitals which were inherited by the 15 March activists, and currently, they are in a position to protect these forms of capital and accumulate more of it. This finding provides support for Crossley’s (2010) research which has shown that different levels of capital impact back upon the habitus of the agents, and the degree of efficacy they ‘feel’ for what is possible to pull off successfully, of what they ‘know’, or at least believe that they know, and whether they have those resources or not. On the other hand, Mazen mentions that the only role which IYM can take is a confrontational one. This choice of protest technique has to do with the levels of capital which the IYM activists have available to them. The know-how and the ‘protest capital’ are the forms of capital which IYM have available to them in this political field.

Moreover, and linking what has been discussed to the notion of field, the data confirms that the 15 March movement was immediately contained and supported by well-known upper middle class Palestinian activists and scholars, such as a wealthy and recognised urologist who studied in Cairo and was a member of the Palestinian-Jordanian
delegation at the Washington-Madrid talks. Another was a Palestinian legislator, activist and scholar who was an influential leader during the First Intifada, and who served as the official spokesperson for the Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East peace process, and had been elected numerous times to the Palestinian legislative Council. In addition, there was a famous Palestinian scholar who is currently a fellow in Politics as St. Edmund Hall, lectures at the University of Oxford, and is the director of the MPhil in International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations.

In his book ‘The Palestinian Middle Class’, Hilal (2006) analyses the transformation of the political role of the Palestinian middle class. After the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority worked on transforming the leading political role of the Palestinian middle class leaders, who strongly led the Palestinian First Intifada, into a more bureaucratic institutionalised role, which served the political logic of the Palestinian Authority. The previously grounded active political role which the Palestinian middle class leaders played in strategizing the Palestinian liberation ambitions was systematically eliminated. Hilal (2006) reveals that the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority succeeded in marginalising the powerful and influential role of the Palestinian middle class by, for example, offering prestigious governmental state positions, tempting managerial roles in NGO’s, and offering more economic capital and prestigious symbolic capital. In a Bourdieusian sense, the Palestinian authority focused on offering and tempting with more forms of capital to shift these middle-class politicians and leaders into different are with the political fields which accepts the PA institutionalised logic and doxa. By doing this, the PA political field secured its stability from any dissenting bodies or opposition voices.

We can push this analysis one step further by arguing that 15 March activists ‘felt’ their struggle was located in different fields to those of the IYM activists. The 15 March activists were more connected and related to fields where privileged and elitist Palestinian politicians, activists and scholars are positioned. From day one, and during the 15 March activists’ early socialisation process, their habitus was structured to be dispositioned and related to this elitist political and social class field. The analysis interprets that most of the 15 March parents belonged to this political field in a way or another, and worked towards passing this logic on to their sons and daughters. Most importantly, this Palestinian privileged middle class field had its own political logic,
rules, regularities and evaluation of different forms of capital. Being part of this field means accepting its logic, rules, feel of the game and safe techniques of protest.

Therefore, it was notable that the logic of this field impacted on the 15 March discourses, feel for the game, and their selection of particular repertoires of contention. From this perspective, we can understand why a confrontational stand against the Palestinian Authority was out of the 15 March field’s logic. This is because such a stand, in simple terms, serves against the interests of this elitist field, and might threaten this field’s stability and interests. In other words, the 15 March and IYM activists act and choose their techniques of protest according to their fields’ logic in which they are positioned in the present, and wish to belong to in the future.

Reflecting back to the biographical and historical factors that shaped the activists’ choice of different techniques of protest, the second point to address is that these choices are also shaped by factors such as the activists’ know-how, familiarity with the struggle, and identifications. As was discussed before, the notion of ‘habitus’ emerged in a number of different forms in this present study, one of which was based around the prior experiences of the activists, whom Crossley (2010) would define as ‘career activists’, who have a great deal of campaigning experience to draw from in their struggles, and who are ‘tuned in’ to protest so they tend to be constantly developing their skills and knowledge. For instance, Hamed an IYM activist remarked:

I was a political prisoner for two years and I can understand how harsh things could be in a political movement. Working with activists who had political experience was a common ground that assured mutual understanding between us, but working with activists who had no clue how to work politically was hard and moved us backwards sometimes. They [the unexperienced activists] were arguing for long time, reacting spontaneously, and confusing us in many critical situations [...] I was astonished that day when they [referring to some 15 March activists] demonstrating in the streets holding flowers and whistling to symbolise ‘peace’ in order to get attention from the masses. Where are we? In Hawaii!

In relation to the latter comment, Zain, one of 15 March core activists, admitted that the majority of those in the 15 March movement were politically inexperienced and their
practical know-how was very limited. These types of activists Crossley (2010) defines as ‘novices’:

*Some of the activists who were active members in political parties were better in communicating with others and mobilising them. They had this unique way of approaching people and convincing them. Plus, their experience helped us in confronting the Palestinian Authority and their harsh repression.*

These comments underline the radical vs. novice, the experienced vs. unexperienced, habitus. Moreover, these comments referred again to the concept of ‘unrecognised cultural capital’ (UCC) (Lo, 2015). The UCC which the comments highlighted could be considered as the knowledge and informal know-hows of movement’s practices, mobilisation procedures and political awareness of street politics. These UCC are not recognised as valuable forms of capital by other activists such as the 15 March activists in this given field.

### 5.3 Reproduced Inequalities

According to Bourdieu, societies are fields of struggle, which can be viewed as structures of differences between individuals, while the positions of the agents are based on the distribution of capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). He argues that society is constructed of interlocking and multi-layered social fields within which agents interact and where social practices are reproduced. During the period of data collection, the researcher devoted a section in the interview to discuss issues concerning reproduced inequalities or any forms of domination which activists felt or experienced during the life cycle of both movements. The data finds that 15 March females associated themselves more with masculine practices than IYM females. It was surprising to note that the movement with the liberal political ideology experienced high level of masculinity, but it was not surprising to find that liberal women fought against it. This form of symbolic power emerged as embedded power in some of the discourse of the 15 March male activists, and the general dynamics at work within the 15 March movement. Nada, one of the 15 March female activists, says with anger and frustration:
I reached a point where I was extremely frustrated by the male activists in our group. They were not aware about how ‘masculine’ they were being with us. For example, they were informally meeting in the ‘male’ cafes which we can’t go to. Terrible as it sounds, some decisions were made and taken into consideration according to these informal meetings, let’s call it ‘males hanging out’ as if it’s a formal meeting. This was extremely frustrating.

The males whom Nada was referring to in her above comment were 15 March core activists: Zain, Faris and Farid. Zain has a different viewpoint why they were ‘forced’, as males, to play this role on occasion:

The type of females in our group was hard to work with. They were interpreting many of our [referring to 15 March males] behaviours and actions as being masculine, but actually they weren’t. For example, it was hard to let them stay till 12am or 1am at night or swear badly at the policemen, this is too much for our conservative society [...] sometimes we [15 March males] were hearing insulting comments about the way they [15 March females] dress, speak or act, and that was harming the image of the movement sometimes [...] they [referring to 15 March females] were prioritising the gender issues over some pragmatic political issues which sometimes was problematic in our everyday work and meetings [...] I realised later that when you are oppressed both politically and socially, your reaction will be harsher and more violent.

The aforementioned comments of Nada and Zain shed light on many aspects in relation to gender inequality and masculine domination. The analysis conceptualises these masculine practices as embedded and internalised structural practices, which are inherited from a patriarchal culture. The social institutions, such as religion, society and state, maintain gender inequality to reproduce masculine domination. Bourdieu has a lot to say in this respect in his book ‘Masculine Domination’ (2001). Although Bourdieu provides a new approach to theorise gender inequality through understanding the historical mechanisms that accomplish the ‘dehistoricisation’ and ‘enternalisation’ of sexual difference, his theoretical framework ignores gender transformation and change in the phases of social movements and revolutionary events. This theoretical gap could be predicted when someone knows that Bourdieu himself evinced no faith in social/revolutionary movements’ capacity to affect change outside situations of
systematic crisis, believing that the reproduction of the social order is so embedded in people’s habitus.

Moreover, Bourdieu’s analysis of masculine domination could be criticised from the reflexivity notion that he proposes himself (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu’s main methodological contributions come from his emphasis on “reflexivity” on the need to consider the researcher’s relation to the research object. Bourdieu’s call for reflexivity is a call to acknowledge the way in which the researcher’s knowledge about the world influences research claims, and to acknowledge what the researcher brings with him/her of personal and social biases to the object of inquiry (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

Bourdieu argues that every sociological inquiry needs a critical reflection, or what Swartz (1997:271) called ‘reflexive return’ on the social determinants and social conditions that make the inquiry possible. He stresses that the relationship between the researcher and the object should be observed and controlled so that the position of the researcher is not unwillingly projected into the object of the study and the subject’s relation to the object, what Bourdieu (Wacquant, 1989:33) calls “participant objectivation”. That being said, we might be critical of Bourdieu’s lack of reflexivity in his analysis of masculine domination. First, as a male, Bourdieu tends to lack the ability of cultivating a critical awareness of his gender positioning as a male in this particular inquiry of analysing masculine domination. Bourdieu should have identified his personal dispositions which influence and infiltrate his own concepts and methods of analysing masculine domination notion. This lack of reflexivity could be also noticed as a central concern in Bourdieu’s work on Algeria (see Bourdieu, 1977; 1990, Swartz, 1997).

Second, Bourdieu identifies field location as a second source of bias that the sociologists and researches must confront. He argues that the position of the researcher is always mediated by the position of the researcher in his/her field of cultural production. Therefore, this thesis argues that Bourdieu’s analysis of masculine domination in choosing the particular case of ‘Kabyle’ society is rooted in Eurocentric/Orientalist epistemologies, about the essential and fixed patriarchal nature of Arab/Muslim culture and religion and its role in determining the position of women in Arab/Muslim countries. In this way, other factors shaping women’s experiences,
such as political economies or imperialist geopolitics, are ignored (El Said et al., 2015).

The data explains that the 15 March females associated themselves more with masculine practices, and that these masculine practices were not practiced by all 15 female activists in the same way. Analysis shows some evidence which supports an argument that female activists who enjoy more forms of capital, and are positioned in elitist social fields, experienced less masculine domination than female activists who possessed less valued forms of capital, and belonged to a lower social class in relation to the former configuration. Lina summarises this observation as follows:

*It was clear that no one can talk with Hana or disturb her at all in that sense [referring to masculine practices]. Why? First, she’s Farid’s girlfriend. Second, she’s Zain sister. Third, she’s a PhD researcher at one of the best American universities. Fourth, she is a lawyer. Fifth, she’s the daughter of that particular family, I will stop here […] males would count to ten before talking and arguing with her, but it would be easier for them [male activists] to dominate other ‘types’ of women […] she [referring to Hana] was surrounded by men who can protect her from their own masculine practices. Isn’t this cynical?*

Lina’s comment highlights other factors shaping women’s experiences in experiencing masculine domination. In addition, data collected and Lina’s comment point to what Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2012: 343) called ‘elite-mass linkages’ which operate “at the micro-level of social interchange, have a key role to play in connecting the micro with the macro and are crucial for strategic agency within the field of power”. Maclean et al (2010) emphasise that these elite-mass linkages shifts our emphasis from the vertical differentiation of perceived power within organisations, to the interorganisational relations in social spaces where different types of dominant agent mingle freely.
5.3.1 Habitual Familiarity

The interview with Sara, an IYM activist, was reflexive while she was explaining her own experiences with some of the 15 March females in a social campaign which happened after both the 15 March and IYM movements had declined:

We were both males and females in this social campaign and I think the females in 15 March movement were more into liberal thoughts about gender equality, which are more individualistic I think. Yes, I understand that there should be equal gender rights, but in case it wasn’t the case, things should be handled gradually […] I think females in 15 March were very sensitive in that sense that they were waiting for a dramatic change in our patriarchal culture.

This comment highlights how the ‘inexperienced habitus’, which was previously discussed, played a role in ‘allowing’ these masculine practices to get reproduced in the 15 March and not in the IYM. It is important to mention here that the researcher is not arguing that there was no symbolic power practiced by male and female IYM activists, but that it was not explicit and notable, as it was with the 15 March movement. The analysis suggests that IYM female activists did not experience any perceivable masculine domination for two main reasons. First, the data collected confirm that IYM members enjoy a greater degree of ‘habitual familiarity’ between themselves due to their ‘similar’ politicised networks and compatible political ideologies. As discussed previously, IYM biographical and experiential trajectories (habitus), were politically socialised and structured through the family and through political organisations which shared a similar and familiar logic. This habitual familiarity shared habitus, it is proposed, influences the possibility for masculine practices to emerge within the IYM movement. This latter argument reaffirms how embodied dispositions related to the habitus, could be a bridge to correspond to the dualism between politicised structures, and the cognitive and behavioural structures of social actors, in this case, the IYM activists (Bourdieu, 1990).

Second, as the analysis has previously pointed out, IYM female activists experienced different forms of political activism, and built their own practical reasoning on how to deal with certain sensitive moments. The data collected confirmed that IYM female activists enjoyed possessing ‘protest capital’ and the know-how of dealing with
intraorganisational dynamics like these, or they knew and understood how to play their game. Lo (2015) argues that this unrecognised cultural capital (UCC), as a non-elite cultural resource, performs important roles in non-elite fields. They can be mobilised for domination and legitimacy within non-elite fields and help us to conceptualise better the field effects of everyday resistance. The analysis confirms this recent research by Lo (2015) by arguing that in the movement field, experienced habitus and protest capital function as a cultural capital that facilitates the avoidance of masculine domination, and is the same with recruitment and problem-solving.

In addition, the researcher of this thesis argues that IYM male activists were also aware and experienced not to cross these ‘red’ lines. It was notable that IYM male activists acknowledged and perceived the rules of the game. When Adam, an IYM male activist, was asked to reflect on why masculine practices and domination were not noticeably practiced by IYM male activists, and if his behaviour would change if he was allowed to:

*I think we [IYM male activists] could not practice masculinity for two main reasons. First of all, the women would not allow us to cross these lines, and that was clear in their attitude, self-presenting, awareness of their roles, and so forth […] I think the second point is our own awareness and respect to their [IYM female activists] own role and involvement in this movement […] Sara and Abir for example are highly respected social and political activists whom I cannot overtake their role or even oppress them because I am a male […] who am I to do so? They [Sara and Abir] are much way stronger to get oppressed by 'me'.*

Most importantly, and as Adam’s comment highlights, UCC facilitates the agency of everyday resistance, which can be mobilised for domination and legitimacy within non-elite fields (Lo, 2015). Therefore, this researcher proposes that it is not only differences in institutionalised cultural capital and other valuable forms of capital between 15 March and IYM, which can explain differences in domination and symbolic power between the two groups. Non-elite cultural resources perform important roles in non-elite fields. The data and subsequent analysis confirmed that the IYM field (non-elite field) contains certain types of cultural resources which have little symbolic value but that nonetheless may be used by the dominated to acquire other
valuable resources. Factors such as an experienced habitus allow agents to push back to some extent the forces of domination and masculine practices.

In addition to the intraorganisational dynamics of reproduced inequalities, the activists experienced reproduced inequalities in terms of the interorganisational dynamics between the two movements and the PA's logic of domination. As mentioned before, after a long period of tension, there were accusations made about political credibility towards some activists in both movements, and following non-stop violence from the PA police, the majority of the activists in 15 March and IYM movements, as well as other new participants, joined together under the name of Palestinians For Dignity (hereafter PFD), a movement which itself lasted for another further year. Most of the interviewees agreed that one big incident was a major reason behind the decline of PFD movement, a moment in which the PA and its intelligence forces physically assaulted and insulted some of the female activists in a particular demonstration. This demonstration was arranged by PFD activists to protest against the meeting between the PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz⁴⁶ in Ramallah.

Moreover, Linah Alsaafin (2012) a Palestinian journalist and activist, writes in this regard and shares similar anger with these activists. In her online article First-hand: Ramallah protests against Mofaz meeting attacked by PA police, thugs, she reveals some facts about Mofaz’s involvement in the ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ in the West Bank. This operation, which started on 29th March 2002, resulted, in a massacre in the Jenin refugee camp in the north of the West Bank. On the 4th November 2002, Mofaz was appointed as the Israeli Defence Minister. Under his charge, the Israeli occupation forces committed many war crimes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, resulting in the death of more than 1,705 Palestinian civilians, and the imprisonment of a further 5,312 Palestinians.

That being said, for Abbas to meet with Mofaz in Ramallah in the PA was seen as a severe insult, and a blow to every Palestinian household that had sacrificed so much as a result of the Israeli occupation. Yusef, an IYM activist, shared his opinion and feelings with a sense of frustration:

⁴⁶ Shaul Mofaz, an Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and a former soldier in the Israeli army who commanded from July 1998 to July 2002.
Is he [PA Prime Minister] crazy? How come he would meet a certified war criminal like Mofaz? What is he trying to tell us and which peace process is he talking about? These fallacious negotiations between the PA and Israel have been running for years and years [...] Israel has never stopped building settlements, arresting Palestinians and killing civilians [...] we must protest against this normalisation with all means possible.

The data confirms the institutionalised logic, or doxa, which the PA is structurally embedded in. The PA’s political field doxa could be described in terms of repression, where any form of resistance is silenced, and there is a dependency on the Israeli logic of occupation and colonisation which legitimate and naturalise the PA logic and rules of the Palestinian political field. Therefore, any challenge or resistance against this embedded doxa is refused by most actors in the institutionalised field. A meeting like the one held between the PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz in Ramallah tries to affirm this logic of naturalising relationships with Israel’s politicians and continuing the negotiations.

For many Palestinians, especially Palestinian youths, this dominant logic should be resisted. Therefore, they were not silent, apathetic or unaware of affirmation on a doxa which oppress and repress them. In that sense, Bourdieu (1977:168) says “the truth of doxa is only ever fully revealed when negatively constituted by the constitution of a field of opinion, the locus of the confrontation of competing discourses – whose political truth may be overtly declared or may remain hidden, even from the eyes of those engaged in it”. Some of the data collected suggest that the PA institutionalised and dominant logic could be characterised as the doxa which is taken-for-granted and unquestionable, as discussed in chapter four. However, the dissenting voices of questioning, refusing, resisting and acting against this established order of naturalising the dominant doxa could be characterised as heterodox beliefs. Other data suggest that 15 March and IYM activists are embodied with heterodoxy beliefs to resist the PA dominant doxa. Bourdieu mentions the concepts of doxa, orthodoxy and heterodoxy, but not much have been discussed about the relationship between these three different concepts, how heterodoxy beliefs and actions could emerge within a dominant doxa and logic, or if heterodoxy beliefs would be resisted and repressed by dominant objective structures, and how (see Bourdieu, 1977; Shusterman, 1999).
Before the Abbas – Mofaz meeting took place, dissenting voices condemned the meeting and accusing President Mahmoud Abbas of being a traitor. Facing the police officers, the protesters were chanting against the normalisation of this political visit. The female activists were situated at the front to prevent any sudden outbreak of violence from the police’s part on the male activists, but it didn’t make a difference. The police kept shoving the protesters back, with some of them falling down and being in danger of getting trampled on. A few policewomen were brought in as well, and they shared in the pushing and shoving. Jana, a PFD activist, narrates angrily the events which she experienced along with other PFD female activists:

_That demonstration was awful, literary awful. We [PFD activists] went in a demonstration against Mofaz’s visit regarding the political negotiation with Israel. When we were marching and chanting, suddenly we faced the riot police who were armed with shields and beating batons. What was more surprising is that we were only girls at the front lines facing the riot police and all the male activists were behind us. Slowly, we tried to break their line to keep marching, but they were extremely aggressive and brutal that time. These thugs [PA police] started swearing badly at us, beating us with their sticks everywhere, even between our legs [...] we couldn’t stand in silence, we started badly swearing back and hitting them with our hands._

This finding confirms that PA police, riot police, intelligence units and even the plain clothes police were physically violent. The data collected showed that the riot police were not only uniformed policemen but also plainclothes officers and intelligence units, who were beating up, harassing, dragging and arresting the activists. Yasmin, a PFD activist, was shocked by the uniformed police brutality and violence. She experienced a traumatic experience which she recounted that she would never forget:

_When I was protesting in Mofaz protest, I noticed my friend being dragged away by four thugs, and they looked like normal citizens watching us. I immediately ran after them and tried to squeeze my body between my friend and the thugs so that they wouldn’t arrest him. I was pushed back forcibly by the thugs and I couldn’t reach him. I rushed forward again and one thug started yelling at me with a plethora of insults. I yelled back at him to release_
my friend [...] at one moment, the same thug who was screaming at me, drew his arm and slapped me hard across the face, in the daylight on one of Ramallah’s busiest streets, shouting at me ‘Whore! Prostitute!’ [...] I do not know what to say now, getting slapped like that can break your soul, I would have preferred being beaten on the ground rather than this bitter insult [...] I can’t describe the humiliation I felt at the moment, the rage that swept through me as I tried to go after the thug, screaming at him that his day will come at my hands one way or the other. People were pushing me back, telling me to calm down. I turned on them, shouting at them for just standing there not doing anything, not going after the thug themselves [...] my sister came and put her arms around me and led me inside one of the ambulance cars because I was lashing out at everyone in my sight [...] I cried for twenty seconds, just to get it out of my system. I have never been slapped across the face before. That was such an insult that I will never ever forget or forgive till the last day of my life. I Promise.

Yasmin became slightly tearful as she was remembering and narrating her bitter experience in that demonstration. Her face was on fire and her energy was full of rage. Yasmin’s incident was not the only case of violence with the police. The data collected discloses other episodes of acute beating which left some activists with horrible bruises and injuries. Abir, an IYM activist, reflected on the escalation of violence and the unexpected police brutality:

We [activists] were threatened and oppressed by the police and its intelligence forces in previous protests, but this one [Mofaz demonstration] was kind of different. They [PA riot police] were ready to beat us harshly, arrest anyone or even kill someone if it was required [...] their eyes were full of hatred and violence. What happened on that demonstration was deliberate. It was not the police acting spontaneously to the activists’ demands; it was a direct and determined violent act on peaceful protesters that came from highest commands.

In addition to this violence, what was surprising to notice while collecting data was the dramatic media propaganda which harshly affected all of the activists. In the subsequent days, the local papers, websites, radio and social media were flooded with
spokespersons, mainly those representing the PA security forces, denouncing the protesters as ‘an outsider group who carry a foreign agenda.’ Another official spokesman for Fatah told one radio station that he had certified information that the protesters had nothing to do with national actions but were vandals (Alsaafin, 2012). In Jana’s narration of her experience with other female activists in the protest, she explained why all of this happened:

[…] what happened that a journalist recorded these moments when we [refereeing mostly to the female activists] were fighting against and swearing at the police riots and then he fabricated the video to a local TV and it all went viral on social media. The recorded video was cut and edited to show only these moments when we were swearing and beating the policemen. After that video and other photos went viral on Facebook and YouTube under the name of ‘shame on these girls’, ‘bitches of Ramallah’, ‘these girls do not represent Palestine and Palestinians’, the majority of the public opinion was against us, swearing at us and being ‘ashamed’ how Palestinian girls could be that ‘rude’ [...] we were threatened by the police and some thugs to get arrested and beaten any moment of time if we were seen in the streets [...] we [herself and another activist] stayed at home for around ten days.

The data collected suggest various mechanisms and procedures which a dominant logic dox would practice through its institutionalised bodies to oppress any potential for heterodoxy beliefs. The data explain that the message of the PA dominant logic was clear; any potential for challenging this logic was going to be oppressed by any and all means. The subsequent analysis shows some of the techniques and mechanisms which the PA employs to ensure the stability of its logic, and to put a stop to any incidents of resistance or the emergence of any new protest fields such as these. The comments refer to some techniques and processes which the PA dominant logic employs through its governmental security bodies of police, riot police, intelligence agencies and plainclothes officers. The latter body of plainclothes officers, was particularly problematic and frightening for the activists. Theorising and understanding the state is centred on the study of power (Swartz, 2013). Bourdieu conceptualises the modern state as an elaboration of Weber’s classic and widely used institutional definition of the state as holding the monopoly of physical violence over a specific territory. Weber (1978:54) writes that “a compulsory political organisation with continuous operations
…will be called a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order”. This latter finding elaborates Bourdieu’s theoretical work and contributes towards the producing mechanisms and procedures of heterodoxy, and towards a better understanding of the violent mechanisms which a dominant doxa might practice to sustain and reproduce.

The findings in this study support Weber’s conceptualisation of the state. The state’s administrative staff, such as the plainclothes police officers, or the undercover police, or those whom the activists preferred to call ‘thugs’, were wearing citizens’ clothes to avoid detection by any of the activists who might notice or observe them. The plainclothes were used especially to infiltrate between the activists and disguise the activists’ identity and to gain the trust of the activists to learn more and confirm confidential information. The data also disclose that plainclothes police were spying the activists in the demonstration and suddenly dragging particular activists outside of the demonstration in order to arrest him/her. Moreover, the data collected also reveal that plainclothes police officers engaged in a lot of verbal and physical sexual harassment in these movement fields. Many of the female activists confirmed they had been harassed physically and verbally. The agents in the plainclothes police were swearing profusely at the females and physically harassing them by purposefully touching them on sensitive parts of their bodies. These sexual practices and harassments were mainly used to frighten the female activists so they would not participate in the protest. The PA institutionalised dominant logic took advantage of this misrecognised symbolic order of gender inequality to symbolically and physically abuse and violate females’ honour and morals, in order to harm the movements’ ‘reputation’ and intentions. This finding provides some support for a research which found that when women enter public spaces of resisting hegemonic structures, they face a range of measures to control and exclude them, and to shame their bodies in public spaces, including proposed dress codes, death threats, violence and sexual assaults (El Said et al., 2015).

In relation to the reproduced inequalities and masculine domination, Jana, a PFD activist, who had previously narrated with anger the events which she experienced along with other PFD female activists in the Mofaz demonstration. After the video was
fabricated and went viral on social media, the public rage was unexpected. The public started denouncing, shaming and using profanities aimed towards these girls:

 [...] we were threatened by the police and some thugs to get arrested and beaten any moment of time if we were seen in the streets [...] we [herself and another activist] stayed at home for around ten days and none of the activists even asked about us. Sadly, some of the activists blamed us, denied that we belong to this movement in front of the public and asked us to deny that we belong to the PFD movement [...] they were not only males who hold this view, some women [female activists] were against us as well.

This comment is interesting as it reflects how it is not only male activists who could be seen as reproduced agents with a structured habitus which allowed them unquestionably to practice masculinity and symbolic power towards the female activists in the same group, but also females. Surprisingly, the data and the subsequent analysis find that some female activists are embedded and internalised with masculine and patriarchal structures of domination where they externalise these structures in the way they behaved towards excluding other female activists and denounce them. The data indicate that masculine and symbolic power practices in PFD movement exclude the females from decision making, marginalising their organisational/participatory role and shaming their bodies in public spaces. Jana’s comment points to a crucial point about the women’s body as key sites of control and contestation in socio-political transformation.

Rana, who joined the PFD after the 15 March and IYM had joined together under the name of ‘Palestinians for Dignity’ heard this comment from a policeman when she was caught distributing some brochures to announce a forthcoming protest:

 [...] on that day I was distributing brochures in the streets with other activists to announce for the following-day protest [...] at some point we got separated and I stayed with another female activist in one of Ramallah’s secondary streets. A police car stopped us and asked us forcibly to get inside. Under their shouts and threats we did get inside the car [...] at the police station I felt absolutely insulted and humiliated [...] the way the cops were looking at me and to the way I dressed was disgusting, knowing that I was wearing a pair of
jeans and a T-shirt, nothing more [...] after they investigated us and on our way out of the office, one of the cops stopped me and told me with mean eyes and humiliating face and body expressions ‘It’s better if you remove your nose piercing to show me and your society that you belong to a respectful movement, go now, go!’

Not far from the bold statement of the cop, saying ‘the type of the females in our group was hard to work with’ Zain’s previous comment implicitly associating ‘these females’ with boldness and courage of breaking the segregation norms observed by the ‘acceptable or respectable’ woman.

5.3.2 Hierarchy of Structures

According to Bourdieu, societies are fields of struggle which can be viewed as structures of differences between individuals, while the positions of the agents are based on the distribution of capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). He argues that society is constructed of interlocking and multi-layered social fields within which agents interact and where social practices are reproduced. Another form in which the structure of power and inequalities was reproduced was hierarchy. Amer, one of the activists who was not a core activist in the PFD movement, but had still joined in the movement for seven months, said the following:

Well, I realised at some point that we weren’t all equal. These differences weren’t obvious when we first started. But when I was arrested by the Palestinian police because I was participating in these demonstrations [the demonstrations which were asking to dissolve the Palestinian Authority], I was left in jail for one month without anyone of the activists asking where I am, or maybe noticing that I disappeared. And even when they knew that I was in jail, no one thought about visiting me and talking with a lawyer to let me out - that was a hard experience for me. And let me add here, that once, when one of the well-known activists was arrested he was out of jail in less than 24 hours simply because he is the son of a well-known intellectual and a politician in the country.

Rana who joined the PFD said with mockery:
They weren’t taking me seriously, and this is because I was the youngest. No one was asking me what I think or how I feel [...] I felt that I am just a number which they want to account to mobilise more people, sorry I meant numbers!

Besides gender inequality, it was apparent in the research findings that there was inequality in the structure of power where various sources of inequality, including social positioning, age, ownership of various forms of capital, and geographic origins were reproduced in the dynamics and processes of the movement. The forms of capital which the activists in the previous comments were referring to, incorporated cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital, have positioned the other activists in a different, more-privileged positions where he/she can practice symbolic power and domination. This differential positioning legitimises the practice of power and domination over the most valued resources in this field.

Therefore, this study argues that the comprehensive theoretical framework of Bourdieu allows us to reconceptualise these interorganisational relations, such as the reproduced, unequal structure of power within the movement’s field, to explore how these organisational processes and dynamics unfold according to their own relatively autonomous logic (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008), or what Bourdieu calls field doxa. The structuring power of this internal logic or field doxa explains how social movements tend to reproduce dominant discourses and inequalities even whilst fighting for change.

5.3.3 Geographic Centralisation

Another form in which the structure of power and inequalities was reproduced was the geographic variable and the focus on Ramallah. As previously mentioned, this research investigated three politically-motivated Palestinian youth movements, namely the 15 March, the IYM and the PFD. All of these movements emerged, mobilised and declined in Ramallah. Even after the decline of the last movement, the PFD, the new social initiatives and campaigns which were created by former 15 March, IYM and PFD activists, as well as new activists who joined in, were also centred in Ramallah. Ramallah is a Palestinian city in the central West Bank located 10 km north of
Jerusalem. Currently it serves as the de facto administrative capital of the ‘State of Palestine’.

In an online article published by The Guardian entitled ‘The insider’s cultural guide to Ramallah: ‘a misunderstood cosmopolitan bubble’, Christina Ganim (2015) highlights the social and cultural life in Ramallah, and how it is different from other Palestinian cities. Ganim mentions that Ramallah has become a free, open social space for Palestinians, especially youths, to escape occupation and the restricted movement that is experienced in other cities like Jerusalem. Ramallah is a very paradoxical place, known and recognised as a bubble. In her article, she mentions the first female-focused radio station ‘Radio Nisaa’, Women’s Radio in English, which provides a platform for dialogue and entertainment, whilst also raising awareness of women’s opinions on social, cultural, entrepreneurial and political matters in Ramallah. The article also highlights the artistic aspect of Ramallah through various performances of visual art, classical concerts and hip-hop performances. Nightlife in Ramallah is the epicentre of Palestinian nightlife, with cafes, pubs, lounges, and bars, all within easy reach in Ramallah.

The researcher was not previously aware of the influence of geography on the dynamics and mechanisms of the various movements’ mobilisation until some participants outside Ramallah pointed to its importance. Unlike most of the IYM activists who live in Ramallah, Hamdi and Omar are two IYM activists from Hebron and Tulkarm who were encouraged by the IYM core activists from Ramallah to mobilise others in their cities. The interviews showed that core IYM activists worked on expanding their movement’s network and geographic location by mobilising activists from other Palestinian cities like Hebron, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, etc. Some activists like Hamdi and Osama were part of the IYM core activists’ politicised networks and friendship ties, who were asked to mobilise youths from their geographic locations. Hamdi who is originally from Hebron, on the south of the West Bank, but lives and studies in Tulkarm and Osama who lives in Tulkarm which is on the north of the West Bank, both experienced different reproduced hierarchical social structures within the IYM. Hamdi shared and expressed the following comment about the activists who joined him in Tulkarm:

*We were like a family; happy, compatible and tolerant [...] many activists stayed at my place which became like a hostel at the end. I was jumping between*
The comment reflects the togetherness and compatibility which the activists in Tulkarm experienced. The data collected underline that those activists who are from other geographic areas like Hebron and Tulkarm experienced better harmony and more compatibility with the movements’ dynamics and mechanisms than those activists based in Ramallah. The analysis suggests that the dynamics of power and domination, masculine practices and hierarchy were more intensive and explicit in each of the movements in Ramallah. This later finding could be referred to as the ‘cosmopolitan bubble’, which is Ramallah.

Ramallah is considered as the de facto capital of Palestine as it has been institutionalised in this position through all of the Palestinian Authority governmental headquarters and most of the international NGOs and embassies being established there. Many representative offices that serve as the embassies for foreign countries already operate in Ramallah, the President and the Prime Minister both have their offices in Ramallah, and so do the parliament and all the government ministries. Taraki (2008) discusses in her article the paradoxical case of Ramallah as one of the consequences which the Israeli closure regime has produced. In an online article in the Jerusalem Post47 entitled ‘Palestine’s new bride’, Khaled Abu Toameh (2010) poses a question that many Palestinians could ask: is the transformation of Ramallah into a modern and flourishing city part of an Israeli ‘conspiracy’ to make them forget about Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state?

This description of Ramallah explains the different logic and life styles of Ramallah compared with other Palestinian cities such as Hebron and Tulkarm. Therefore, the relationship between IYM activists in Tulkarm and Ramallah was not pleasant. Hamdi summarised the problem as follows:

47The Jerusalem Post is a broadsheet newspaper based in Jerusalem. Formerly regarded as left-wing, the paper underwent a noticeable shift to the right in the late 1980s. The Jerusalem Post aims to provide balanced coverage of the news along with views from across the political spectrum, focusing on Israel, the Middle East, the Jewish world and interfaith relations.
I feel that kind of ‘indignation’ towards IYM core activists and ‘leadership’ in Ramallah, they visited us few times and then totally forgot about us [...] in those days when we [activists from Hebron] were travelling by buses from Hebron to Ramallah for three hours, no one of them [referring to IYM activists in Ramallah] cared if we are tired or not, if we need to eat or rest [...] some of our guys were poor enough to buy a sandwich from Ramallah or stay in one of its expensive restaurants or hostels [...] it sounded to us that activists in Ramallah were mobilising us far away from Hebron to Ramallah to increase the protest crowd in Ramallah, nothing more.

This comment reflects the geographic field which IYM activists were positioned in and the influence of this ‘bubble’ on their way of understanding and behaving.

Even the decision making process was much centralised. We were receiving orders and commands on when, where and how to protest and get mobilised from the ‘leadership’ of Ramallah [...] they [referring to IYM activists in Ramallah] were not aware of the particularity which we are living here in Tulkarm; people are more conservative in here, girls cannot protest in public easily and the police intelligence system is horrific in here [...] Ramallah would never and could never be a revolutionary city, it’s much too elitist to be so.

The last comment in here points out to many reasons of the decline groups in Tulkarm. Mainly it was the Palestinian police and its intelligence forces. Osama was also referring to the inclusion of the Fatah faction between the activists and how this inclusion affected the group and caused their decline.

5.4 Structured and Structuring Habitus

As discussed previously, habitus in Bourdieu’s work refers to a system of embodied dispositions which generate practices in accordance with the structuring principles of the social world. The previous discussion underlines how habitus deploys a bridge to correspond to the dualism between social structures, such as political and social
institutions, and the cognitive structures of the activists (Bourdieu, 1990). Bourdieu (1990:53) defines habitus as “systems of durable, transposable, dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.”

From Bourdieu’s definition of habitus, it could be understood that habitus has a deterministic nature. Habitus has been a popular concept to explain the mechanism of stable reproduction of social structures. In general, habitus helps to understand the subtle mechanism of maintenance of social structure through the interaction between social structure and social agency. Therefore, this deterministic nature of habitus has been a subject to widespread criticism on the basis of its ‘latent determinism’ (Jenkins, 1992; Lane, 2000). Bourdieu himself evinced no faith in the capacity of social movements to effect change outside situations of systematic crisis, believing that the reproduction of the social order is so embedded in people’s habitus.

Bourdieu’s work and philosophy could uncover the influence of the structuralist logic of binary oppositions which Bourdieu’s adopted from Durkheim’s sacred/profane dualism (see Swartz, 1997), we can argue that there is grey areas and uncertainties about life chances which would be internalised that do not necessarily fit the fundamentally dichotomous boundaries that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus presupposes. Swartz (1997:107) argues that “habitus is fairly resistant to change, since primary socialisation in Bourdieu’s view is more formative of internal dispositions than subsequent socialisation experience. There is an ongoing adaption process as habitus encounters new situations, but this process tends to be slow, unconscious, and tends to elaborate rather than alter fundamentally the primary dispositions”.

The researcher of this thesis stands behind the philosophy that habitus could not be merely deterministic, as habitus plays a crucial role of being an open space for resistant, change and transformation in some situations. There have been several researchers who have adapted this latter stance and refuted the criticism of the deterministic habitus through exploring the different phases of habitus change and transformation and its transforming processes (Cornbleth 2010; Harris & Wise, 2012;
Lee & Kramer, 2013). They have attempted to prove that habitus is not deterministic, but fluid enough to be changed in a new social setting or a new field.

This research agrees with the former approach that the concept of habitus represents an open mediating concept between practices and structures, rather than a ‘close’ structurally determinative construct. That being said, how can movements transform rather than reproduce its practices, structures or even inequalities? Few answers have been provided to this question. While Crossley provides the concept of radical habitus to transform a movement, Landy (2015) agrees and adds that *exogenous shock* is a key factor in field’s change and transformation. Data collected clarified that the experience in these movements was a turning point event for some activists, a traumatic experience for others, or even a regrettable phase for others. Therefore, it was interesting to observe how this exceptional experience has different consequences on activists.

While agreeing with the latter point of Landy’s (2015) that exogenous shock or traumatic experiences can transform habitus rather than reproducing it, the researcher argues that previous literature does not explain the actual process of habitus change and transformation. Data and subsequent analysis describe different processes and mechanisms of changes in the activists’ habitus. Therefore, this analysis level considers structured and structuring habitus, categorised by habitus change and habitus transformation. Most importantly, the researcher suggests that it is hard, most probably impossible, for habitus to be entirely ‘reproduced’ during exogenous shock or traumatic experiences without any changes, if not transformations. Therefore, one could ask why some activists’ habitus have been slightly changed and reproduced while others’ habitus have been transformed. How these changes and transformations on habitus are relationally linked with the activists’ field positioning and the different forms of capital which they acquire. This section is dedicated to further explore these questions.

This section explains the ways and the different situations in which activists’ habitus is either changed (reproduced) or transformed, and the ways in which activists develop new strategies based on the transformed habitus, particularly in a newly emerged political field. This section is also keen to make a distinction between habitus change, which mostly leads to habitus reproduction, and habitus transformation, although some
previous literature has used them interchangeably (see Hyejeong, 2013; Lehmann, 2013; Mills, 2008). Most importantly, this section is keen to further discuss how field and forms of capital would relationally influence the process of habitus reproduction or habitus transformation, which some previous literature have under-researched while exploring habitus transformation (see Hyejeong, 2013; Lehmann, 2013; Mills, 2008).

Habitus change or habitus transformation is a different changing mechanism or transformative trajectory which might reproduce existing structures or newly produce dispositions and structures. Based on the data collected and subsequent analysis, the researcher proposes that habitus change is about that slight change which the activist might feel through a change in his/her acknowledgement, perception, feeling or emotion but without transforming this change into practice. In other words, the researcher proposes that habitus change could be partly a reproduction, as objective structures could not entirely be reproduced, in times of exogenous shock or traumatic experiences, without any slight or even marginal changes.

That being said, the researcher argues that habitus transformation is a deeper psychological process of transforming the individual habitus based on experiencing an intense and a transforming personal and/or structural experience. Precisely, habitus transformation is about the practical and practiced changes which transform the structured habitus. Previous literature and studies have not discussed this essential difference between habitus change and habitus transformation. Moreover, previous literature has used the two terminologies correspondingly and superficially (see Crossley; 2003; Mills, 2008; Hyejeong, 2013; Lehmann, 2013).

It is important here to highlight recent research by Schneider and Lang (2014) which shows that habitus transformation does not necessarily go along with relevant levels of ‘alienation’ from ‘old habitus’. In other words, it is not necessarily that habitus transformation will lead to replacing the old habitus by another new habitus, but rather, habitus transformation is about habitus diversification, which means describing and conceptualising the ways in which ‘social climbers’ deal with adaptions and transformations when crossing social boundaries. This research adopts this open understanding of habitus transformation and diversification, which makes us focus on the strategies of bridging across different habitus instead of the rather limited perspective on the cleavage between them. Conceptualising and understanding this
difference allow us to understand why some activists develop new strategies and mechanisms based on their alternative acquired habitus, while others do not. It would also help us better understanding the consequences of activism (McAdam, 1989). The following categorisation level shows more about this distinction between habitus change and habitus transformation and the different modes and processes which characterise the two concepts.

As discussed before, understanding this difference between habitus change and habitus transformation provides a better understanding to the internal mechanisms of the political field per se. Although Bourdieu has elaborated the concept of the political field as an arena of struggle for political power in a few seminal papers, his work has not devoted considerable attention to the internal mechanisms of the political field (see Swartz, 2013). His emphasis has been more on identifying when and how the political field impinges on fields of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1991b; 1991c). Therefore, this thesis contributes towards an understanding of the different mechanisms and dynamics in the political field while habitus is being transformed and not only changed.

Moreover, most previous studies merely pay attention to social structures, such as educational institutions, as a social arena where agents experience the change of habitus. Bourdieu supports this idea by arguing that habitus can be changed through the contact with total institutions such as prisons and boarding schools, which scholars later call ‘institutional habitus’. But still, habitus transformation has not been studied and explored in newly emerged political and social movements. In other words, if the transformation of habitus is to be conceptually generalisable, as previous research supposes, habitus change should be observed not only through social and political institutions but also through non-institutional daily lives. Previous studies do not consider the possibility of habitus transformation of agents in their daily lives (see Cornbleth, 2010; Reay, David, & Ball, 2001). Thus, some unanswered questions should be raised about the habitus modification; how habitus transformation takes place in daily lives and how it alters individuals’ life experiences. It might be important to look at how activists go through habitus transformation in daily life and whether their habitus can truly be shaped and transformed beyond family and school, which researchers and scholars have rarely examined.
5.4.1 Radical Habitus Reproduction

Some of the initial evidence in the findings which suggested that the radical habitus reproduces itself was the clear refusal made by core IYM activists to coalesce with the 15 March and other activists under PFD movement. Habib’s comment sums up this:

I just attended one meeting in the PFD group, and after one of the activists [referred to one of IYM core activists] asked to be deleted from the mailing list, I followed him […] I had no interest to continue protesting and meeting with activists who I have totally different ideological thoughts and who belong to a different social class.

Abir, an IYM core activist, was even more expressive about the negativity she felt that a potential transformation in her habitus would occur if she joined with the 15 March activists in PFD:

Honestly saying, I felt it might hurt me [...] like hurt my political profile [...] my radicalism and political thoughts cannot accept or fit in any shape with their [referring to 15 March and other activists] fluid thoughts and political hopes [...] I cannot see myself there!

These two comments by Hamid and Abir, as core IYM activists, illustrate what this researcher has termed ‘dogmatic radicalism’. As was clarified and discussed previously, the notion of ‘radical habitus’ is used in this research in a similar way to that identified and developed by Crossley (2002a; 2002b; 2003). This researcher proposes that identifying agents who, by virtue of previous experience, are already experienced and radicalised, and are bringing that experience, in the form of internalised dispositions. Moreover, the subsequent analysis suggested that most of IYM activists, especially IYM core activists, were radicalised in terms of having an experienced habitus, which could be also characterising the IYM radical habitus. Politicised upbringing, political imprisonment, ‘high-risk’ political activism and a longstanding involvement in radical politics were objective social structures which structure and reproduce a specific form of ‘experienced habitus’. However, the sociologist Nick Crossley who developed the concept of radical habitus ignores the disadvantages of having a radical habitus or the consequences of activism while having
a radical habitus. The data defines that radical habitus could be dogmatic enough to prevent habitus transformation and preserve habitus reproduction instead.

This also urges us to think about the role of agency in terms of willingness and openness towards transformation. Crossley (2003) suggests that we need to note, and study how innovative actions by embodied agents can both modify existing structures and generate new ones; breaking the circle of reproduction. Indeed, changing and resisting the structured and structuring elements within society in order to engender change is the ultimate aim of these social movements. Mazen, an IYM core activist, expressed with a sad voice and depressed facial expressions his disability to come up with any innovative actions to break this reproduction circle:

*I offered all what I own […] but after all, it is like I am kind of depressed after this experience […] do not get me wrong please […] in general I still believe in our just political struggle and our people’s will, but I can say that on the personal level I am exhausted and depressed […] this experience opened my eyes widely and made me realise that we are living in a musty marsh full of dirt and grubbiness […] and what we [referring to IYM activists] did in IYM movement is only like throwing a small tiny stone in the ocean. End of the story.*

Another finding to highlight is that the interview data drew the researcher’s attention to the fact that the radical habitus reproduction could be better understood in relation to the activists’ field. A politicised upbringing, political imprisonment, ‘high-risk’ political activism and a longstanding involvement in radical politics positioned hard-core IYM activists in radical political field which is considered as high-risk activism by all governmental bodies, including both the PA police and the Israeli army. Being in a political field where you might experience high-risk activism could increase the activist’s tendency to reproduce his/her habitus rather than transforming it. In other words, being in such a field could increase the tendency to reproduce the structured habitus rather than transforming it because of the consequences which high-risk activists could face. Jana, a PFD radical activist, lost her job in a café after the accusations and scandals of the recorded video which has been spread all over the social media, and expressed with pain and regret:
What else do I have to lose? My family? What is left to threaten me with? I think my loss in this experience is huge and unbearable [...] I don’t know what to say [...] I don’t want to turn into drama now, but I just want to delete this tape from my memory [...] I will just tell you this now, I thought twice before accepting your invitation for the interview [...] believe me, it was such an overwhelming traumatic experience for me.

5.4.2 Agents of Change

The interviewees talked, shared and reflected on their own personal experiences within these particular movements. They shared stories about their social and political activism in general, and covered other aspects such as: the lessons had learnt; changes in their personal and activism behaviours; their political and ideological beliefs; their attitudes and motivation; their networks’ expansion and/or reduction; and finally their hopes and/or despairs. The emotional tones and deep reflections in this part of the interviews varied greatly between different activists whilst they were sharing and reflecting on the experience itself, and their own personal experiences. Talking about his experience, Zain, a 15 March core activist, commented:

We are known faces to the public now [...] not only the public if you want [...] government, institutions, and both local and international NGOs [...] some of us have been invited to apply for conferences, papers talks, visits, and even scholarships [...] I was known as a socially active person at University, but not an ‘Activist’ [...] it made me think to be honest, what does it mean to be an activist, how come I became called as such? [...] I am happy to be called so, but I am just wondering what happened?

Zain’s comment touches on a crucial point which is related to the processes of change which these activists felt. Zain cognitively felt the change in his social role when he became known as an activist. In addition, he acknowledged this change more through the judgment of other social institutions, such as the public, government, and NGOs. The researcher here proposes that if the habitus is created through social, rather than individual processes, then the change of habitus is social as well. In other words, Zain’s cognitive recognition and understanding of his habitus change would not be recognised without the social structures’ and networks’ acknowledgement of this
habitus change. This latter conclusion reaffirms the habitus’ bridging role between the objective structures and the agent’s cognitive understanding.

As discussed previously, the possibility of habitus change or transformation have been rarely discussed in previous studies (see Cornbleth, 2010; Reay, David, & Ball, 2001). Farid and Faris, both 15 March core activists, brought up more insights about the new techniques they adopted in their everyday life. Farid commented:

*After I heard how harsh the public was after they knew that we [referring to some 15 March core activists] often go to bars and clubs, I almost stopped going there to consider this point seriously [...] it is like you need to sacrifice for your future political activism and career [...] it is not only your personal desires it’s the role you are playing as an activist who is expected to be as near as possible to the public and their sufferings.*

While Faris added:

*I started reading continuously and educating myself about Palestinian politics, Palestinian parties, Palestinian history and struggle [...] also about other resisting and popular struggles in the world like the Black Americans civil resistance, South-African struggle, and the Chinese and Russian revolutions [...] these readings are a Must as I am calling myself now an activist [...] I do not want to embrace myself of being ignorant regarding many issues or get underestimated by those well-educated activists.*

These three comments by Zain, Farid and Faris, who are all 15 March core activists, serve to underline the willingness of all of these activists to acquire what was theorised and discussed previously as protest ‘movement’ capital or unrecognised cultural capital (UCC), as Lo (2015) defines it. The 15 March activists perceived and understood their deficiency and that they needed to acquire an experienced habitus or embodied unrecognised cultural capital which is of high value in the protest game. The data collected indicated that some of the 15 March activists pushed themselves to acquire more know-how and protest experience, which many of the IYM activists already possessed. Being politically and socially educated, and culturally accepted within Palestinian society’s norms and values, were considered to be valued if
somewhat unrecognised capitals that the 15 March activists were keen to acquire and adopt. Therefore, the researcher proposes that the 15 March activists valued the unrecognised, experience-based cultural capital in their everyday life, and developed new processes and strategies to acquire this new embodied dispositions, which can truly be shaped and transformed beyond family and school, which researchers and scholars rarely examined (see Cornbleth, 2010; Reay, David, & Ball, 2001). This argument could be also approached from the theoretical lens of accumulating the most valuable forms of capital in the field. The experienced habitus and protest know-how were valuable forms of capitals which 15 March started changing their old habitus to acquire these new forms of habitus.

5.4.3 Career Activists

The former comments and other data collected highlight particular characteristics of the activists’ roles, responsibilities, limitations and expectations. Husam, a 15 March activist, made the following comment about how the activists became ‘career activists’ in different activism fields:

If you look at it like this, all the activists in the country [Palestine] are known and could be counted on your hand [...] It’s like we [referring to 15 March activists] are specialised activists now, everyone has been known in his/her type of activism [...] now I know who to call when I need an advise related to boycott […] if I need to arrange for a political talk or small conference, I would call X, Y, and Z. Most of us understood after all these experiences [referring to 15 March, IYM and PFD movements] that we have a special interest in social, cultural and political activism which we are related to and know a lot about after these experiences […] although we are not many but still we should not underestimate this accumulated knowledge and expertise, we could be leaders and well-known names in these different fields.

An interesting theoretical contribution which could be made in relation to what have been discussed, is the tactics of what the researcher calls ‘downward borrowing’ of social mobility where the 15 March activists borrowed UCC from non-elite fields. This could be explained by social mobility theory, which conceptualises the movement of individuals, families, households or other categories of people within or between
layers or tiers in an open system of social stratification (Prais, 1955). The movement can be in an upward direction, to attain better social status within higher social strata, or downward, where social mobility occurs when an individual or a group move downward to a lower status or social class. Similarly, Bourdieu has a lot to say about social mobility, social positioning and how the accumulation of different forms of capital to move on up the ladder of social order, but not moving down to borrow non-cultural capitals from non-elite fields (see Bourdieu 1984, 1985). Most importantly, the downward borrowing mechanism is practiced to borrow valued capitals without alienating the privileged upper middle class which the 15 March activists belong to. Data collected explains that UCC, informal know-hows, protest capital, and symbolic capital, have been valued more from 15 March activists. This latter point affirms the appropriability of the unrecognised cultural capitals in the political field (see Adler and Kwon, 1992; Coleman, 1990). The UCC has become more valuable and have different uses and interests within the political field, which made it more desired from elitist activists.

The author proposes ‘downward borrowing’ of social mobility as a more appropriate concept to conceptualise the strategies which the 15 March activists, who belong to higher social class in relation to IYM activists, adopted to only ‘borrow’ non-cultural capital and mechanisms of know-how from the lower social-class movement, the IYM, without risking or alienating themselves from the upper-middle class field.

5.4.4 Experienced Trajectories and Lessons Learnt

The data and subsequent analysis shows that activists’ experiences and lessons learnt varied across different levels; personal, political, and organisational. The data collected clarify that those experiences were translated as new embodied dispositions in the activists’ habitus. The activists deeply reflected, both positively and negatively, on their experiences and reflected on many experiential trajectories they experienced. Adam, an IYM core activist, shared his personal experience and the lessons he learnt. Adam commented:

*This experience [referring to his experience in IYM] had hugely exhausted me [...] it took from my personal time, my family and friends time [...] sometimes we were staying till 2:00 am in our meeting, we were working days and nights*
but still I can say that this experience had dissolved and demolished any ‘individualistic’ attempts inside me [...] this experience gave me a rich knowledge about our generation, about the youths’ needs and hopes in Palestine [...] it brought that awareness how complicated our reality is, how big the responsibilities in our country are and how short the time is [...] it introduced me to new, good, and cultural people whom I can call now friends.

Adam’s comment reflects both the positive and negative sides of his experience. Interestingly, both Adam and Lina shared with the researcher that the lessons they learnt were experienced as new embodied dispositions. Lina explained one small but important lesson she learnt from this experience:

> It might be funny to hear, but this experience taught me how to listen then to speak up. This was a great practical lesson for me in this movement which could protect me from many clashes with others.

However, not all of the experiences and learnt lessons were positive and constructive. Some of the personal experiences were destructive and frustrating. Hamdi, an IYM activist from Hebron, was let down by one of the activists and learnt how to be more socially intelligent in picking up new friends and networks. Hamdi explained:

> Now I can say I learnt more about things and people. I know more now how some activists think and act, both the activists in our group and other groups [...] I know who I can work with for a long period of time with dedication and commitment and who might let me down easily [...] I was not aware of this before, I just experienced all of this in this movement.

Faris, Amer and Jana for example, have experienced very harsh and emotionally heavy experiences based on judgements being made about them, bias and reproduced hierarchy experienced from other activists, the government and the public. Faris remarked:

> I assume my harshest lesson was all the accusations blown in my face of being a media freak! Yes I was paying a lot of attention to be a media face in this movement, but after that [...] I mean when we were in one movement [referring
to PFD] I didn’t give a S*** [...] but all the same accusations were still there [...] I felt some people [referring to some activists] were afraid of letting me get engaged and attend some core meetings with them based on this bias judgement.

The previous lengthy discussion about Jana’s experience showed that she negatively reflected on her experience, as she was let down and harshly scandalised by both the PA and some PFD activists. She concluded with frustration and regret:

*I will never ever work with those activists again, never [...] that’s it [...] enough, I knew them all - in and out [...] it’s not easy to trust them again [...] I will never be with them in one group even if they were with God!*

Moreover, some of the data collected serve to underline the organisational lessons that were learnt which the activists experienced as well. Sali, an IYM activist, commented:

[...]I can say that I got a humble experience of how movements work, how to avoid clashes and solve personal problems smoothly [...] but what it is more important is that I felt that we [IYM activists] understood the political game of the PA and its dirty tactics clearly [...] we can tell now who are the plainclothes police from the way they dress and behave [...] how to react legally if one of the activists got arrested for example [...]believe me, knowing all of these tactics is crucial and couldn’t be gained without experience.

In contrast to Sali’s organisational experiences and lessons, Husam, a 15 March core activist, believed that the 15 March activists, in general had not gained any organisational experience because if they had, they would have implemented this organisational experience into the movement’s dynamics and procedures:

*I don’t believe that we [15 March activists] had moved any organisational step forward [...] we were not learning from our organisational mistakes and unfortunately repeating them [...] all of our reactions were reacting back to the PA actions, which was weakening us [...] what should be done in the future is to conceptualise the organisational big pictures, rules, codes and procedures, and then implement all of these on the ground.*
Although Husam in his above comment concentrated on the importance of the organisational dimension in social movement, Mazen in his interview discussed how the decline of all these movements could destroy the structure and the shape of the movements, but not existence of the activism network:

Yes the experience was hard and harsh [...] I lost trust in one of my best friends in this experience, but still I do not regret it [being engaged in the movement] [...] we [referring to IYM] argued a lot, fought against each other and contradicted, but now I think we are more matured [...] I feel more mature now after this experience, both socially and politically [...] Although the movement has declined, but I still believe that the network is still there [...] we [referring to all activists] are still active in our own domains. Although there is no structure which contains us now, but the network of activism which we all belong to could gather us any moment again.

The finding confirms that the activists’ have experienced different experiences and lessons learnt varied among different levels; personal, political and organisational. The data collected proposes that those experiences were translated as new embodied dispositions in the activists’ habitus, and have resulted in some changes in structuring the activists’ habitus slight different.

5.5 Habitus Transformation

As discussed previously, the researcher proposes a distinction between habitus change and habitus transformation in this study, although some literatures have used the terms interchangeably (see Crossley; 2003; Mills, 2008; Hyejeong, 2013; Lehmann, 2013). As discussed, the researcher proposes that, based on the data collected and subsequent analysis, that a conceptual difference exists between habitus change and the process of transformation, which should be clarified and distinguished. The data suggests that the processes of habitus change or transformation is related to the type of habitus which the activist predisposed. The analysis suggests that activists with rigid political thoughts and a radical habitus were more likely to reproduce their radical habitus rather than transforming it. On the other hand, activists with novice ‘reformist’ habitus were more likely to transform and reform their habitus. It is important to clarify here
that not all of IYM activists were radicals; on the contrary, it was interesting to note that some of the IYM activists were flexible in opening up their structured habitus for transformation. But it was clear that the core IYM activists were radicals by default. This latter conclusion could be referred to the IYM core activists’ intensive political activism and involvement, as it was discussed previously.

5.5.2 Novice Habitus Transformation

If we think about it from the other side, most of the 15 March activists were keen to get involved in low-risk political activism. The 15 March activists, who belong to the elite upper-middle social class, prefer to defend and fight for their social positioning privileges through low-risk political activism, which is a ‘safer’ type of confrontation (playing the game safe) without risking their capital. This finding also assures the relationship between the habitus transformation and the field, which the 15 March activists are positioned in. The political field for the 15 March activists was safer to transform their habitus, adopt new mechanisms, and continue their safe activism. As discussed before, the PA has worked on transforming the leading political role of the Palestinian middle class leaders, who strongly led the Palestinian First Intifada, into a more bureaucratic institutionalised role, which serves the political logic of the PA. In Bourdieusian logic, the PA offered economic capital and prestigious symbolic capital to shift these middle-class politicians’ positions into another ‘diplomatic’ political field, which was accommodating towards the PA’s institutionalised logic and doxa. Therefore, the 15 March activists acknowledged the open and safe space which they enjoyed if they want to transform their habitus to accumulate more valued capitals in this newly emerged political field. Data collected found that a transformation in the habitus of 15 March activists was necessary to initiate new social and cultural initiatives and campaigns which affirm their political logic, rules and regularities.

However, this research finding contradicts with McAdam’s findings about the political and personal consequences of ‘high-risk’ activism. Research by McAdam (1989) examined the political and personal consequences of ‘high-risk’ movement participation, which is not extensively looked at in the social movement literature at present. McAdam’s (1988, 1989) account of ‘alternation’ in his study of the biographical impact of participation in the Mississippi ‘Freedom Summer’ project found that activists who had participated in Freedom Summer were radicalised and as a
consequence of this they were therefore more likely to remain radical and to become involved in further struggles of various sorts. Participation in movement activity had a politicising effect on participants and disposed them towards further activism. In contrast to McAdam’s findings about the political and personal consequences of ‘high-risk’ activism, the data and subsequent analysis suggest that radical activists who had participated in the IYM did not remain radical and stopped getting involved in further activism. Data collected demonstrate that IYM worked on minimising their political activism due to the high-risk activism consequences, threats and police/state violence. Therefore, the data reveal that the core IYM activists experienced a habitus change rather than a habitus transformation, wherein they tend to reproduce their habitus instead of challenging many risky political consequences. The research argues that McAdam ignores the field’s consequences and riskiness on the activist personal and political consequences.

5.5.3 Post-Activism

Nevertheless, McAdam’s study supports the data collected about the political consequences and activism of the 15 March activists and some ‘reformists’ from the IYM and PFD. The interviews data clarified that many social and cultural initiatives and campaigns were initiated after the decline/failure of PFD movement. Husam, a 15 March activist, answered the question of where does he thought the 15 March, IYM and PFD movements had disappeared to:

*I can agree with you that the whole youth movements scene has finished or declined but not the individuals, not their visions or established networks, all of this is still there somewhere [...] for example some activists in our group [referring to 15 March] including myself started ‘Nadawat Falastinieh’ [Palestinian seminars in English] where we discuss in groups rich social and political books, articles, talks etc. [...] other activists initiated ‘Al- Multaka’ [the Forum in English] which is also an important and vivid social and cultural initiative [...] others worked on other political campaigns like ‘love under apartheid’[^48], ‘Prawer won’t pass’[^49], and other BDS campaigns.*

[^48]: Love under apartheid is a campaign which brings awareness about social stories which represent the real struggles of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, apartheid and siege.

[^49]: ‘Prawer Won’t Pass’ is a campaign against the compulsory military service imposed on the Palestinian Druze community.
Husam’s comment highlights what McAdam (1989) calls the attitudinal and structural consequences on an activist’s personal life and activist careers. Attitudinally, as a consequence of the activist’s involvement, the activist is more likely to move from the activism experience to become more committed to activism than even before, thus laying the attitudinal foundation for ongoing involvement. However, McAdam argues that the effects of activism are not merely attitudinal. He argues that the political experience leaves many of the activists ‘careers’ tied to organisational and personal networks and relationships that help sustain activism. The series of positive relationships linking organisational or personal ties to subsequent activism suggests the critical role of structural embeddedness in sustaining activists’ careers.

Similarly, Salma, an IYM activist, reflects on her experience at Al- Multaka [the Forum in English]. Her comment underlines the attitudinal and structural consequences of her activism with her activist network:

*Our [referring to some IYM activists] plan was like this, if we fail in politics we can start with social campaigns or cultural initiatives where we can mobilise more people [...] asking someone to join you for a cultural or social talk is more accepted I think than asking him to join you for a demonstration where he might get arrested, beaten and risk his life [...] you know, playing it safe is more accepted to the public [...] and I think this is one of the reasons why we started the ‘Forum’*

Salma’s comment underlines an important finding about the habitus transformation within the political field of activism into a social and cultural field of activism. Previous studies have not explored whether an activists’ activism continues within the same high-risk political field or if activists tend to change their field of activism. This gap in the previous research is understandable as scholars ignore the relationship between the consequences of activism, and the level of risk present within the activism field. Salma’s comment highlights the activists’ tendency to move into a social and cultural field, where it is safer, in order to mobilise more people. Nada, a 15 March activist who initiated the *love under apartheid* campaign, spoke about the Palestinian political particularity within political activism:
I had attended many youth meetings and conferences in Egypt and Morocco [...] as Palestinians in Palestine we cannot separate between what is social and what is political [...] yes we can work socially and culturally but with an emphasis on bringing back the trust in the political work [...] people lost their trust in anything political and are afraid of getting engaged in politics in any form [...] I think we need to re-think how can we embedded political awareness and engagement within the social and cultural activism.

The emerged data highlights this need of separation among some activists of what is political and what is social and/or cultural. While extant literature mention the role of organisations, in particular, social forums as important political open spaces in radically transforming politics, and consequently society as well (see Böhm, Sullivan, and Reyes, 2005, the findings disclose that activists were seeking to avoid political engagement within those new social campaigns, forums, and initiatives. Böhm et al (2005) argue: “politics is always already connected to questions of organisations”. The researcher of this paper argues that the activists attempt to avoid the political discourses and engagement within these new campaigns or initiatives, although it is connected and embedded to their activism as Böhm et al (2005), to avoid the high-risk political activism and play safe within safer political fields.

Moreover, Nada’s comment highlights what previous studies refer to as everyday resistance (see Scott; 1985; Faue; 1990; Kelly, 1993). Everyday resistance, or what the political anthropologist James Scott calls ‘hidden transcripts’, was referred to in Nada’s comment through the injection of political awareness into social and cultural practices. This latter finding finds parallels with Scott’s (1985) concepts of hidden transcripts, or infrapolitics, which are created in aggrieved communities and expressed through culture, in addition to the daily acts of resistance and survival. Infrapolitics manifests itself in daily conversations, folklore, jokes, songs, and other cultural practices. Scott implies that the political history of oppressed people cannot be understood without reference to infrapolitics. Data collected underlines the reformists’ tendencies to embed different infrapolitics through cultural and social practices to decrease exposure to riskiness in the political field. This latter observation was not acknowledged by McAdam (1989) as he has not looked at the type of activism fields which the activists move into after their high-risk activism experience.

50 The paper does not mean by organisation here as merely political institutions
Moreover, engaging infrapolitics in social and cultural initiatives and campaigns could be considered as strategies of non-institutional ‘daily lives’ of political mobilisation. The findings confirm the reformist activists’ ability in transforming their habitus in their daily lives. However, the data show that the activists’ habitus transformation and their continuation in activism have personal consequences as well. As discussed previously, the findings reveal that the degree of competition over valued capitals is higher and fiercer among elite activists than non-elite. Non-elite activists have very little possibility for enacting change as they lack some valued forms of capital such as, economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. Lina, a 15 March activist, made the following comment to reflect the amount of implicit power struggle and competition among 15 March field which was found to be harsher than the struggle for power amongst non-elites in IYM:

> It’s sarcastic you know [laughs] just to know the fact that someone who was protesting with you and who you were spending long hours with discussing and meeting, got a scholarship because he is such an Outstanding profile in political activism [...] you know he is an Activist now [sarcastically] I was astonished when I read his CV online where he wrote that he was the leader of our movement, problem-solver, and all this nonsense [...] like really? Is that why he joined us?? [...] Annoying, really annoying.

The comments made by Jana and Lina reflect the higher tendency towards competition over valued capitals in relation to the social positioning of the activists. The analysis explains that many elitist activists personally benefited from this experience and have been awarded scholarships, research visits, conferences and talks in other countries as Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, United Kingdom and the United States.

Theoretically speaking, linking the previous findings to Bourdieu’s theorisation of the habitus as a structured and structuring structure could provide a better understanding of the mechanisms and dynamics of the structuring process of the habitus, which previous research almost totally ignores. As Bourdieu argues, “habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organises practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure: the principle of division into logical classes which organises the perception of the social world is itself the product of internalisation of the division into social
classes”. (Bourdieu, 1984: 166). As discussed, all of the activists joined the movement with different structured structures due to their long processes of inculcation, including socialisation, formal education, institutions and social relations, which become embodied and internalised in their cognitive structure and practices. However, Bourdieu also argues that habitus is a structuring structure as well which opens up the transformation potential which Bourdieu believes in.

Although Bourdieu does not view human behaviours as pre-programmed automatous acting, he stresses that our human behaviours are driven by ‘habitus’, conceived by Bourdieu as the ingrained and socially constituted dispositions of social classes that lead actors to make choices and decisions that produce existing social structures and status distinctions (Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning (Bourdieu, 1977). That is, habitus shapes, but does not determine our life choices. In this sense, habitus transcends “determinism and freedom, conditioning and creativity, consciousness and the unconscious, or the individual and society” (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 54-55). Regarding the critique directed at Bourdieu’s work given the structuralist language, some of Bourdieu’s texts provide more space for agency than others. In some of his later works, such as The Weight of the World (1999), “… there is a great deal of striving, resistance and action aimed at changing current circumstances as many of the poor and dispossessed, interviewed by Bourdieu and his colleagues, search around for ways of changing and transforming their lives” (Reay, 2004: 437).

The following final chapter summarises key aspects and findings of the thesis and contextualises the analysis presented. The next chapter discusses the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of the findings for policymakers and activists in social movements. Finally, the limitations of the study are going to be highlighted and recommendations are made for future research.
CHAPTER SIX

Concluding Remarks, Recommendations and Limitations

6.0 Introduction

This thesis explored the organisational mechanisms and dynamics within Palestinian politically motivated social movements. This chapter draws together key findings and contextualises the analysis presented. Further, the thesis has presented evidence which indicates that the organisational mechanisms and dynamics in a social movement must be viewed holistically, if the dialectic relationship between subjectivity and objectivity is to be understood. Therefore, it has been argued that the exploratory approach adopted, inspired by the Bourdieusian relational thinking, was appropriate and fruitful for bridging different subjectivist and objectivist perspectives on agents’ practices, behaviours, and practical reasoning, in structuring their choices.

The particular focus on exploring organisational practices and processes in ‘alternative’ non-hegemonic mobilisation, such as grassroots struggles and resistance against authorities, helps to contribute rigorous theoretical contributions to the social movement literature in a relatively under-researched context, which provides a very different view from that of hegemonic structuralist scholars and typical social movement theories. Moreover, by focusing on Palestine, this study also contributes to the relative dearth in organisation studies scholarship examining organisational practices from the South/East, which has typically been side-lined by Western/Northern perspectives.

Acknowledging research limitations, the chapter concludes by offering recommendations for future research and discusses the practical insights and potential impact the research can generate for social movement practitioners, and other relevant stakeholders such as activism groups and bodies, pressure groups, unions, and human rights and civil society associations.

This chapter is designed to answer the four research objectives which were identified in chapter one. By doing so, this thesis fully exploits the theoretical and empirical possibilities in the relational perspective as permitted by Bourdieu’s comprehensive
framework. Four objectives were identified for rigorous inquiry, and discussion will now turn to each of these objectives, considering the extent to which they have been achieved and how the findings to emerge inform the theoretical foundations of this thesis.

6.1 Fields of Practice

Objective 1: To relationally describe the various fields of practice and the ways in which these fields are interrelated in a politically motivated social movement.

Social movement theories vary in their interpretation of whether it is the outside context that enables mobilisation or it is the collective identity of a movement. As each of these approaches pays attention to different elements of social movements, they are not mutually exclusive approaches, but rather complementary. A structural functionalist approach often has been adopted to explain the emergence of collectivities, protests and movements. The structural-functionalist standpoint was once the dominant account of movement emergence, but its popularity has dwindled due both to changing perceptions of social movements, and the numerous empirical criticisms that have been made by social movement theorists (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Theories of breakdown, structural strains and relative deprivation have been critiqued for their limited focus on ‘macro changes’ and structural variables (see LeBon, 1960; Trade, 1903; Sighele, 1899; and Durkheim, 1933), leaving no explanation as to how participants coalesce or how activities spread between locales. The organisational level of analysis was largely ignored, and holistic analyses of a movement’s processes, dynamics, resources, strategies and life cycles were theoretically and empirically under-researched.

The different social movement approaches reflect the general dualisms in social sciences (Husu, 2013). Being inspired by a Bourdieusian relational mode of thinking, this thesis has explored a social movement’s emergence by overcoming the dualism in between structure and agency, objectivism and subjectivism. This thesis found that any analysis of social movement emergence would be incomplete without counting and analysing the external and internal fields of practice. Therefore, the first objective aimed to describe the external and internal fields of practice and the relations in between them.
6.1.1 External Fields

The findings in this thesis explained that field doxa is an essential factor in shaping the type of relationship between different fields. Beside a number of factors which Fligstein and McAdam (2012) define to decide the relations between institutionalised fields, this thesis found that a profound analysis of the different fields’ doxa is crucial. The findings of this thesis have given explanations that understanding a field’s doxa can bridge, on one hand, the dualism between the structure of external fields, the rules of the political game, different species of capital, and the dominant logic, and on the other hand, the constructive actions of the actors and challengers, through understanding their early socialisation fields, oppositional doxa, perception and action.

The first dominant field explored was the ‘state field’, or what was called in this thesis ‘quasi-state’ in regard to the particular political situation in Palestine. Drawing on Bourdieu’s writing about the state, which conceptualises it as a field of power, this thesis agreed that power was not concentrated in the state per se but in the field of power (Bourdieu, 1996). The PA political field and dominant logic were understood in the sense of field of power. It was surmised that the coercive power of the PA is not limited in the PA political field only but also depends on Israel’s field, which the PA field is in a hierarchical and dependent relationship with. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) define the hierarchical and dependent relationship between institutionalised fields, but the substance, nature and mutually accepted internal logic were not explored in their analysis. This thesis found that a hierarchical and dependent relationship between fields could not be sustained or stabilised without a mutual consensus on the field’s doxa among all benefited actors within the two different fields. The first major factor of this hierarchical relationship between the PA and Israel was the economic capital. The study provided evidence that the PA is highly economically dependent on Israel and US donations and guardianship. The data collected confirmed the severe economic dependency which the PA is embedded in with Israel, which led by default to political dependency and managing and smoothing the logic of domination and occupation.

A key finding of this thesis is about providing a better understanding of the field’s doxa, especially a hierarchical and dependent one. This thesis found more out about the

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51 Fligstein and McAdam (2012) define the relations between institutionalised fields as encompassing three types: unconnected, hierarchical or dependent, and reciprocal or interdependent. The links between fields are shaped by a number of factors: resource dependence, mutually beneficial interactions, the sharing of power, information flows, and legitimacy. Where no obvious links exist between fields along any of these dimensions, we can say that fields are unconnected.
dynamics and mechanisms of sustaining and stabilising a hierarchical and dependent relationship between fields. This study explored and explained how a hierarchical and dependent relationship cannot be sustained or stabilised without a mutual consensus over the field’s dominant doxa among the field’s actors. Scott (2011) posits that a field’s settlement and stability is achieved when broad agreement on a set of rules and ‘institutionalised logics’ come be shared by most actors in the institutionalised field. The findings clarified that the PA-Israel hierarchical relationship is nested through the dominant doxa of economic dependency, institutionalised corruption, the oppression of any forms of resistance, the assurance of Israel’s security throughout piecemeal concessions, occupation management and political collaboration. Bourdieu (1996: 386) also affirms the latter when he empathises that “power becomes coextensive with the structure of the field of power, and it is only realised and manifested through an entire set of fields and forms of power united by a genuine organic solidarity, and thus both different and interdependent”.

Although the PA is not an established state with an entire assemblage of institutionalised elements, findings still demonstrate that the PA struggles to accumulate *statist* capital, “which is power over other types of capital, including economic capital and cultural capital, over their ratio of exchange and their reproduction” (Bourdieu, 1994: 4). In this respect, the findings also contribute to discourses concerning the autonomy of social movements from the state. As discussed in Chapter Four, Böhm et al. (2010) highlight the way in which demands for autonomy are embedded in various social, economic, political and cultural contexts, including the state, which give rise to both possibilities and impossibilities of autonomous practices. This study provided evidence that activists not only fight for determination and organisational self-management from a non-state, but from *double repression*; from the occupying Israeli state and the Palestinian Authority. Findings illustrated that the PA political field does not enjoy any form of autonomy; in contrast, the PA political field, with all of its institutional and non-institutional power spaces, is politically and economically hierarchal and dependent on an established autonomist state, which is Israel. Moreover, there was evidence that Israel was attempting to stabilise the PA’s institutionalised logic, because of its own interests in its stability and calmness. That being said, it was found that the *impossibilities* of autonomous practices to challenge this hegemonic logic of oppression and political dependency within the Palestinian political field are higher
than the possibilities of autonomous practices. This unique *double repression* situation has the potential for both empirical and theoretical contributions.

Moreover, another external political field which was defined in this study is the left field. The findings in this study described that the PA field and its dominant logic worked towards securing the field’s settlement and stability, by creating broad agreement on its sets of rules and ‘institutionalised logic’ to be shared and accepted by most actors in the field. Marginalising and eliminating the voices of political dissenters and left wing politicians was achieved through establishing a hierarchical and dependent field relationship between the PA and the opposition field. It was interesting to note how the PA worked towards offering more economic capital and prestigious symbolic capital to shift middle-class politicians’ and leftist leaders’ positions into another political field which accepts the PA institutionalised logic and doxa. The study found that the PA succeeded in marginalising the powerful and influential role of the Palestinian middle class by offering prestigious governmental state positions and tempting managerial roles in NGO’s. Moreover, the PA worked towards the so-called ‘professionalisation of NGO’ where these non-governmental organisations have had a huge role in encouraging certain types of Palestinian agency whilst marginalising or delegitimising others. These NGOs influenced the remoteness of the left from popular action and struggle, as they had to rely on other foreign funding agendas rather than the left’s national and social priorities. By doing this, the PA political field secured its stability from any dissenting bodies or opposition voices.

Furthermore, the finding in this thesis explained that the dominant logic of the PA was reproduced in the ossified organisational structures of the leftist institutions and political parties, through their rigid internal composition. It was found that many left wing political parties had alienated and marginalised their youth, by disregarding their abilities, marginalising their political role, and pushing them out and forcing them to seek other more responsive and dynamic structures and environments. Similarly, the analysis defined that the ideological background of most of the youth-led movements was leftist oriented. Whilst the vast majority of the 15 March Movement activists were politically independent and liberal, many members of the Independent Youth Movement (IYM) were politicised and had linkages, and some of them membership of, a particular leftist political party, which was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Therefore, most of the youth-led movements’ activists were marginalised and disenfranchised from their leftist political institutions.
The study described that Palestinian youth have experienced a culture of authoritarianism and fear, political marginalisation and disenfranchisement, through witnessing the political favouritism towards Fatah-led political party. Furthermore, the research findings showed a severe decline in Palestinian social capital given the low levels of trust between individuals, in general, and particularly towards the PA’s institutions, unions, civil society organisations, and the international donating bodies. This long-standing factionalism and the authoritarian tendencies in the PA’s political doxa increased the level of criticism amongst Palestinian Youth in regard to democracy, freedom of expression, human rights, and corruption. The crucial question which this thesis addressed was to what extent are theories and models of social movements applicable in highly repressive socio-political settings? The findings provided evidence demonstrated through the PA’s dominant logic of oppression, repression, patriarchy and collaboration with Israel. The question of how a political or social movement can possibly emerge if situated in highly repressive political structures and setting was explored. Building on Kurzman’s (1994) findings, it was identified that the emergence of the Palestinian politically motivated movements was referred to the youths’ ‘perceptions’ of the political opportunities rather than the emphasis on structural ‘openings’ as there were none in the Palestinian political field.

However, the thesis found that vulnerability and openness within the Egyptian and Tunisian governmental political fields during the Arab uprisings was a crucial motive for the Palestinian youth to mobilise. This latter finding emphasises that all the external, institutionalised fields of the PA, Israel, Tunisia and Egypt, are embedded in a dense latticework. The close and dependent relationships between these fields create dependencies between fields which normally serve to stabilise all affected institutionalised fields. From a Bourdieusian perspective, this could be referred to as field homologies. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 105-106) conceptualises “the relations among relatively autonomous fields in terms of ‘structural and functional homologies’”. Fields are homologous to homologous to the extent that they develop isomorphic properties, such as positions of dominance and subordination, strategies of exclusion and usurpation, and mechanisms of reproduction and change (Swartz, 1997). However, as Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argued, it was found that these same dependencies are also the most common source of crisis in the Palestinian political field. Significant and crucial changes in the related Tunisian and Egyptian fields disrupted the routine operation of the Palestinian political field. Therefore, the analysis
of the various relations between the institutionalised fields defined stabilities and changes in these fields, in relation to any change in one of the fields.

Moreover, this thesis proposed that it was the dominant logic of oppression and authoritarianism, embedded within all these institutionalised fields, which was challenged by Arab youths in Tunisia, Egypt and Palestine. That being said, this thesis contributes to Kurzman’s understanding of the mismatch between the structure of political opportunities (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1989) and popular perceptions of political opportunities (Kurzman, 1994). The researcher of this thesis argues that other fields in relation to the field in question could hugely affect the challengers’ perceptions of political opportunities, especially when most of the actors in these related fields are sharing broad agreement on a set of rules and institutionalised doxa of repression. One more finding, which Kurzman’s functionalist-structural analysis neglects, is that challengers do not perceive political opportunity in the same way. An analysis of agency is needed in Kurzman’s model to capture how actors, challengers, perceive and understand these political opportunities differently. This thesis bridges this dualistic theoretical gap, and contributes to a better understanding through explaining and analysing the different mechanisms of translating political perceptions or opportunities, through analysing the various activists’ internal fields, habitus, acquisition of forms of capital and field positioning. This latter theoretical and empirical contribution is further discussed in the following section.

Moreover, the findings in this section highlighted many causes behind the movement’s decline. One seminal moment for decline was discovered to be the large demonstration arranged by PFD activists to protest against the meeting between the PA’s President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz in Ramallah. The findings clarified that the PA and its intelligence forces physically assaulted and verbally insulted some of the activists, in particular the female activists, in this particular demonstration. In Chapter Five, the events of this demonstration were narrated and fully explained. It was understood from the participants’ perspectives that this meeting between the PA’s President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz in Ramallah was another attempt to affirm this logic of repression, the persecution any forms of resistance and the naturalisation of relationships with Israeli politicians, and the continuation of what participants saw as the fallacious negotiations.
The findings uncovered that PA police, riot police, intelligence units and even plainclothes police officers were both physically and symbolically violent. It was found that many activists had experienced traumatic violent experiences with the PA plainclothes police and intelligence units. The findings uncovered that many of the female activists were harassed both physically and verbally. Sexual harassment in particular was used to frighten the female activists and prevent them from participating in the protest. The findings showed that the PA institutionalised dominant logic exploited the misrecognised symbolic order of gender inequality to symbolically and physically abuse and violate females’ honour and morals to harm the movements’ ‘reputation’ and intentions.

In addition, what was surprising to notice while collecting data was the dramatic media propaganda, which had a profoundly negative effect on all of the activists. Local papers, websites, radio, and social media were flooded with spokespersons, mainly those representing the PA’s security forces, denouncing the protesters as an outsider group who carried a foreign agenda.

### 6.1.2 Internal Fields

This thesis dedicated substantial amount of time and effort with each participant to explore the internal fields which are rarely explored in field analysis literature (see Emirbayer and Johnson, 2007; Fligstein and McAdam; 2012). It was found that the nuclear family field was a crucial internal field which shaped the 15 March and IYM activists’ habitus through the early socialisation processes. It was interesting to note how the family field affected the structuring of the activists’ habitus through different biographical and historical trajectories. For most of the 15 March activists, the findings showed that the schooling system and a distinguished upbringing to ‘belong’ to the upper middle class, embodied through lifestyle and taste, were crucial instruments for reproducing the family acquired habitus which certifies the dominant cultural code of Palestinian society. Therefore, these internal fields were not only defining the type of fields of practice in objective one, but also overlap the structured structures, habitus, which has been early socialised and adopted in these internal fields.
Objective two: To better understand the dialectic relationship of subjectivity and objectivity in politically motivated social movement by examining the agents’ practical reasoning, habitus, in this context.

It was found that 15 March activists enjoyed distinguished institutionalised and embodied cultural capitals, which shaped their particular ‘class-specific habitus’, where it could be easily shared and be better harmonised with other members who are positioned in the same distinguished class. This was indicated when it was found that the structure of the 15 March core network was characterised by overembeddedness. All of the 15 March core activists were networked through kindship, friendships and relationships, all of whom belonged to the same upper middle class. Building on Bourdieu’s relational perspective (1985) of social class as multidimensional social space, which is based on social relations of reproduction, this thesis understood this upper middle class not only in an objectivist and unidimensional stratification approach. That being said, the distinguished acquired habitus, the forms of capital, and the field in which core 15 March activists are positioned, were all linked and interrelated.

Therefore, this Palestinian upper middle social class was analysed as a field, which has its own struggles, rules of the game and enjoys distinguished cultural, social, economic, and most likely symbolic forms of capital within the Palestinian society. The embodied and internalised distinguished positioning of 15 March activists was externalised in their actions, impressions, perceptions, and practical reasoning. The finding illustrated that the 15 March activists have a novice type of habitus, whilst IYM activists have a more of a radical habitus. Objective two addresses this latter point about activists’ practical reasoning which was shaped through different biographical and historical trajectories. Objective two aimed to examine the activists’ practical reasoning through understanding their logic of practice, their acquisition of different forms of capital, and their field positioning. Therefore, in order to achieve and partially answer objective two, the type of habitus, different field positioning, early socialisation processes, and forms of capital must be understood.

Unlike the vast majority of the 15 March activists, who are positioned in the Palestinian upper middle social class, it was found that the vast majority of the IYM belong to both the Palestinian lower-middle social class and the working class. IYM activists’ biographical and historical trajectories, embodied through their habitus, were mostly shaped by their politicised family, political activism and politicised networks.
In a similar fashion to the 15 March, the IYM’s nuclear family field was an important internal field, which shaped the activists’ habitus through their early socialisation processes, but in a different way. IYM activists experienced politicised upbringing through their early socialisation. This finding supported the empirical studies which point to the importance of the family system as an agent of political socialisation (Crossley, 2002; 2003). The data and the subsequent analysis supported previous research which had shown that being born in a more political household increases the likelihood that one will become an activist (Rootes, 1986; Crossley, 2000). It was notable that the role of the family and a politicised upbringing were explicit in shaping and structuring IYM activists’ habitus in a certain political and ideological way. The findings clarified that the habitus of the IYM activists’ parents were radicalised, experienced, and characterised by high levels of high-risk activism. This ‘radical habitus’ was inherited through early political socialisation to IYM activists.

It was concluded that the different historic and experiential trajectories of the 15 March and IYM activists differentiated them, in terms of how they perceive, conceive reason and act in these politically motivated movements. This radical habitus could be also characterised as an ‘experienced habitus’. A politicised upbringing, political imprisonment, ‘high-risk’ political activism and a longstanding involvement in radical politics represent objective social structures, which structure and reproduce a specific form of ‘experienced habitus’. Experienced habitus, informal know-how, a feel for the protest game, and cultural styles, which were not recognised as valuable resources in elite social fields, were all considered in this thesis as non-elite cultural resources or as Lo (2015) suggests; unrecognised cultural capital (UCC). The understanding of these internalised embodied-performative forms of resources (UCC) in that way provided two theoretical implications for the RMT and Bourdieu’s understanding of high-status, broadly-valued cultural resources, which fuel the social reproduction of domination. These two theoretical implications are going to be discussed later in the theoretical implications section.

6.2 Modes of Domination

The findings in this thesis provided an analysis of the processes, dynamics, and conflictual mechanisms in the researched social movements. This section of Modes of Domination answered the interrelated and intersectional following objectives. Although
Objective two has been partially answered in the latter section, the findings in this thesis described that modes of domination, dynamics of competition, and conflictual mechanisms could not be fully explained and achieved without understanding the agents’ practical reasoning, habitus, forms of capital and field positioning. Because of the overlapping analysis between these objectives, the findings are presented together in the forthcoming discussion.

**Objective 2:** To better understand the dialectic relationship of subjectivity and objectivity in politically motivated social movement by examining the agents’ practical reasoning, habitus, in this context.

**Objective 3:** To further understanding the dynamics of competition, conflictual mechanisms and power struggles through examining the agents’ habitus, acquisition of forms of capital and field positioning.

Modes of domination and conflictual mechanisms in this thesis were identified as political credibility, recruiting parochialism, symbolic dominance and ideological conflicts, and repertoires of contention. It was found being perceived as politically credible, or not, was a crucial criterion for the activist’s and newcomers’ political credibility, honesty, and trust. The analysis found that being political credible, for IYM activists, meant being a politicised person who has his/her affiliations with a specific known political party. The study found that the type of political capital which IYM activists referred to was delegated political capital, which is granted by a political organisation or party. One the other hand, this organisational, hierarchical transmission of political capital was problematic for most of the 15 March activists. The 15 March activists’ definition and understanding of being political credible is to be politically independent, with no affiliations with any political party.

This thesis uncovered another aspect of the conflictual mechanism which was recruiting parochialism. The findings showed that this mechanism depended on an evaluation of political credibility, which was previously discussed. Second, it was found that new entrants were not allowed to join the movement unless they were politically checked according to the standards of the core activists in both movements. It was interesting to note that mechanism of political credibility and recruiting parochialism were relationally linked to the types of internal fields which these activists came from. Most of the IYM activists came from a more radical and politicised background, which
shaped their radical habitus. The findings disclosed that this radical structured habitus was externalised in the IYM activists’ reasoning and practices of accepting and refusing the non-politicised activists or new comers.

In other words, the IYM activists’ radical habitus was reproduced in their hierarchical and structured recruiting processes. The data also clarified an implicit refusal by the PLPF to contain or support this fresh, vivid youth movement which might resist and challenge the stability and rigid logic of its own doxa. One the other hand, the internal fields which the 15 March activists came from involved playing the ‘safe game’, and therefore recruiting politicised activists was seen as something too risky, and outside of their safe zone. For example, the safe and secured affiliations and engagements which some 15 March activists had with foreign NGOs, like the USAID, were highly problematic for radical fields like the IYM political field.

Third, the symbolic dominance and ideological conflicts between the leftist-Marxist and liberal ideologies was a field of struggle between the two groups. The researcher concluded that ideological conflicts rose up from the fundamental difference between the two schools of thoughts and practices. Liberalism could be seen as supporting the capitalist economic and political system. It is also believing and defending Americanised and Western principles of free market and individualism, which are somewhat aligned to an Americanised educational curriculum and western educational culture, which the 15 March had embodied through their schooling system. This individualistic ideology was radically opposed by leftists.

Fourth, the finding found that repertoires of contention indicated certain dynamics and processes through which particular techniques of protest are selected amongst the general repertoire available in the society. It was exposed in this study that it was not only the activists’ habitus which shaped the choice of protest technique and repertoires of contention (see Crossley, 2010); the field positioning and forms of capital are in relation with this practical reasoning of making such a choice. The findings demonstrated that it was the ‘feel of the game’ and the rules of the game which guided the activists’ protesting techniques.

The 15 March and IYM activists ‘felt’ their struggle in different fields, although ostensibly they are struggling together in the same political movements field. It was discovered that the 15 March activists were more connected and related to fields where privileged and elitist Palestinian politicians, activists and scholars were positioned.
Through their early socialisation processes, the findings demonstrate that their habitus was structured to be dispositioned towards, and related to, this elitist political and social class field. The analysis explained that the 15 March parents belonged to this political field, in a way or another, and worked towards passing on this logic of low risk activism and ‘playing it safe’ to their sons and daughters. Most importantly, the Palestinian privileged middle class field has its own political logic, rules, regularities and evaluation of different forms of capital. Being into relation to this field means accepting its logic, rules, feel for the game, and safe techniques of protest.

Therefore, it was notable that the logic of this field impacted on the 15 March discourses, feel for the game, and the selection of repertoires of contention. From this latter lens, it was understood why a confrontational stand against the PA was outside of the 15 March field’s logic. On the other hand, it was found that the only role which the IYM could take was a confrontational one. This choice of protest technique had to do with the levels of capital which IYM activists had available to them. Know-how and ‘protest capital’ were the forms of capital which the IYM had available to them in this political field. In addition, the IYM more associated themselves with being radical. Their politicised upbringing, political imprisonment, ‘high-risk’ political activism and a longstanding involvement in radical politics, were all objective social structures which structure and reproduce a specific form of high-risk and confrontational protesting techniques. In summary, the study concluded that the 15 March and IYM activists acted and chose their techniques of protest according to their fields’ logic in which they were positioned in at the present, and the fields which they wish to belong to in the future.

6.4 Internal organisational processes and relations in the political field

Whilst Bourdieu has elaborated the concept of political field as an arena of struggle for political power in a few seminal papers (Bourdieu, 1991b; 1991c), his work has not devoted considerable attention to the internal mechanisms of the political field (Swartz, 2013). Therefore, the latter section of modes of domination and this section provide some preliminary attempts to examine the internal mechanisms and dynamics of the dominant political field, the oppositional political field, the newly emerged political field, and the dynamics between the dominant and oppositional doxa.
Objective four: To examine the various internal processes and organisational relations in the political field per se, through employing the Bourdieusian theory of practice.

The findings in this thesis provided an analysis of the some internal organisational processes and interorganisational and intraorganisational relations in the researched social movements. This section answered objective four by clarifying some processes and reproduced relations and behaviours in the political field per se. The findings explained that reproduced inequalities and habitus change or transformation are crucial processes and relations in the political field. First, in theorising the reproduction of social inequality within a social movement, the organisational level of analysis has been largely ignored, and extant theoretical and empirical research lacks a holistic analysis of a movement’s inequality patterns which are embedded in agents’ behaviours and social interactions.

This thesis found that masculine domination, hierarchy, and geographic centralisation were reproduced inequalities which caused conflictual mechanisms and dynamics, and hugely influenced the movements’ decline. Masculine domination was high conflictual and problematic, and female activists’ experienced and suffered domination from both the male activists and the masculine, patriarchal Palestinian culture. It was surprising to find that liberal 15 March females associated themselves more with masculine practices than IYM females. The finding uncovered that acquiring valuable forms of capital and having a better field position can explain how certain females were saved and protected from masculine domination. This latter point examined how inequalities, such as masculine domination, were reproduced differently according to the acquired capital and field positioning of the female activists.

For example, it was found that having an ‘inexperienced habitus’ in political activism played a role in ‘allowing’ these masculine practices to get reproduced in the 15 March and not in IYM. Moreover, the study concluded that IYM female activists did not experience any masculine domination for two main reasons. First, it was found that IYM members enjoyed more of what the researcher terms ‘habitual familiarity’ between themselves and the males in their movement, due to their ‘similar’ politicised networks and compatible political ideologies. Second, the IYM females benefitted from acquiring and using UCC, as a non-elite cultural resource, and this helped their know-how and feel of how to play their political game in everyday resistance. This thesis discovered
that UCC performs crucial roles in non-elites fields, through resisting modes of domination such as masculine domination, as well as recruitment and problem-solving.

In the case of the 15 March, although liberal 15 March females associated themselves more with masculine practices than IYM females, not all of the 15 March females experienced the same domination. Findings showed that female activists who enjoyed more forms of the dominant cultural capital, and were positioned in elitist social fields surrounded by male relatives, such as boyfriends or brothers, experienced less masculine domination than female activists who own possessed less valued forms of capital and belonged to a lower social class in relation to this particular cluster.

One last important finding in relation to masculine domination was based on the network gender composition. It was found that the gender composition of the core network (core activists’ network) was related to the masculine intraorganisational dynamics and practices in both movements. It was found that the core network of the 15 March was initially established by four males only, whilst the IYM core network was established by three male activists and two female activists. This difference in the networks structures, in terms of gender balance, influenced the relations of power practiced in each group, masculine power and other organisational issues such as recruiting new entrants and taking decisions.

Second, hierarchy was also a reproduced inequality which was uncovered in this study. It was found that there was inequality in the structure of power where various sources of inequality, including social positioning, age, ownership of various forms of capital, and geographic origins were reproduced in the dynamics and processes of the movement. This differential positioning legitimises the practice of power and domination over the most valued resources in this field. The third form of reproduced inequality was the geographic centralisation of Ramallah. The IYM activists who experienced this form of hierarchical inequality were activists located in other geographic cities such as Tulkarm and Hebron. The finding clarified that those IYM activists from Hebron and Tulkarm experienced more harmony and more compatible dynamics and mechanisms within their localised movements than activists in Ramallah. This was related to the particularities of Ramallah’s lifestyle, logic and subculture, as a ‘cosmopolitan bubble’ which has become the financial and political centre of the Palestinians. In summary, the findings in this section highlighted many
internal processes and behaviours of reproduced inequalities and organisational relation in the political field.

6.5 Habitus: a reproduced structure vs. an open space for transformation

This thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the representation of habitus an open mediating concept between practices and structures, rather than a ‘close’ structurally determinative construct (Cornbleth 2010; Harris & Wise, 2012; Lee & Kramer, 2013). The findings explained the ways and the different situations in which activists’ habitus is either reproduced, changed or transformed, and the ways in which activists develop new strategies based on the transformed habitus, particularly in a newly emerged political field. Habitus change or habitus transformation is a different changing mechanism or transformative trajectory which might reproduce existing structures or newly produce dispositions and structures. Based on the data collected, the researcher proposed that habitus change is about that slight change which the activist might feel through a change in his/her acknowledgement, perception, feeling or emotion but without transforming this change into practice. In other words, the researcher proposes that habitus change could be partly a reproduction, as objective structures could not entirely be reproduced, in times of exogenous shock or traumatic experiences, without any slight or even marginal changes. However, the researcher argues that habitus transformation is a deeper psychological process of transforming the individual habitus based on experiencing an intense and a transforming personal and/or structural experience. Precisely, habitus transformation is about the practical and practiced changes which transform the structured habitus. This distinction which the researcher proposed between habitus change and habitus transformation challenged some previous literature and studies which have used the two terminologies correspondingly and superficially (see Crossley, 2003; Mills, 2008; Hyejeong, 2013; Lehmann, 2013).

The finding uncovered that some activists have acquired new embodied dispositions based on their habitus change. For example, the findings showed that the 15 March activists valued unrecognised and experienced cultural capital in their every-day life and developed new processes and strategies to acquire these new embodied dispositions, which can truly be shaped and transformed beyond family and school, a fact which is rarely examined by researchers and scholars (see Cornbleth, 2010; Reay,
David, & Ball, 2001). As discussed before, understanding this difference between habitus change and habitus transformation provides a better understanding to the internal mechanisms of the political field per se, which Bourdieu has not devoted considerable attention to the internal mechanisms of the political field (see Swartz, 2013).

That being said, an interesting theoretical contribution which this study made was exploring social mobility tactics, which this researcher calls ‘downward borrowing’, where the 15 March activists borrowed UCC from non-elite fields. Most importantly, the downward borrowing mechanism was proposed as the most appropriate term for conceptualising the strategies which the 15 March activists, who belong to higher social class in relation to IYM activists, adopted to only ‘borrow’ non-cultural capital and the mechanisms of know-how from the lower social-class movement, the IYM, without risking or alienating themselves as members of the upper-middle class. Moreover, it was found that activists had experienced and learnt from personal, political and organisational events and processes, in both positive and constructive, and negative and destructive ways.

As discussed before, understanding this difference between habitus change and habitus transformation provides a better understanding to the internal mechanisms of the political field per se. Although Bourdieu has elaborated the concept of the political field as an arena of struggle for political power in a few seminal papers, his work has not devoted considerable attention to the internal mechanisms of the political field (see Swartz, 2013).

The data analysed suggest that the processes of habitus change or transformation are related to the type of acquired and socialised habitus which the activist has through birth, early socialisation and socialised life trajectories. The research argued that activists with rigid political thoughts and a radical habitus were more likely reproduce their radical habitus than transform it. On the other hand, activists with novice ‘reformist’ habitus were more likely to transform and reform their habitus into an adapted form. For example, radical IYM core activists tend to feel and acknowledge the change they experienced but they rejected and resisted transforming this into a new practiced habitus. This latter finding was related to the high-risk consequences which core IYM members faced, and the disadvantage of the habitus characterised by ‘dogmatic radicalism’ in being flexible and open to transformation.
On the other side, the findings demonstrate that the 15 March activists and some other activists, whom the researcher tends to call reformists, open up their structured habitus for transformative and re-structuring processes. The findings disclosed that field risk, for the latter activists, tended to be lower and more secure which encouraged the activists to transform their habitus into other ‘safe’ field of activism. This differentiation allows us to understand why the 15 March and reformist activists developed new strategies and mechanisms to continue their activism and accumulate more capitals within new fields of activism, based on their transformed habitus, and why core IYM radicals tended to resist this transformation, to decrease the potentially risky consequences of their high risk activism.

In sum, it was also interesting to note that the 15 March activists had higher tendencies of competition over valued forms of capital in relation to their social positioning, while non-elite activists had very little possibility for enacting change, as they lacked some valued forms of capital such as, economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. The findings showed that many elitist activists have personally benefited from this experience and have been awarded scholarships, research visits, conferences and talks in other countries.

6.2 Theoretical, Methodological and Practical Implications

6.2.1 Theoretical Implications

This thesis has explored connections between various literatures: social movement literature; Bourdieu’s (1977a, 1986, and 1990) conceptual framework of field, capital and habitus; and the methodological implications of capturing the data concerning a social movement’s dynamics and mechanisms. The findings have a number of theoretical implications for each of these fields. Building on extant social movement literature, this thesis addresses the central question of the structure-agency dualism in the social movement literature. Whilst the structural-functionalist standpoint was once the dominant account of movement emergence (see LeBon, 1960; Trade, 1903; Sighele, 1899; and Durkheim, 1933), its popularity has dwindled due both to changing perceptions of social movements, and the numerous empirical criticisms that have been
made by social movement theorists (see McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Rooted in the field of organisation studies, this thesis provided a relational understanding to the structure-agency dualism through examining the various external and internal relations in social movements, which allowed the researcher to capture multiple relations, processes, dynamics and organisational mechanisms, within the social movement per se, and with its relationship to the wider social context.

The thesis employed the three concepts of the Bourdieusian triad, namely, field, capital and habitus, and this provided a crucial understanding of the interplay between structure and agency, in producing and reproducing objective meanings through the intentional actions and interaction of agents. This study adds to extant research on political opportunity theory (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1989) and perceived political opportunity (Kurzman, 1994; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999). The study provided more insights of how agents perceive political opportunities differently, in relation to their internal fields, habitus, and acquisition of different forms of capital. This latter theoretical contribution provides a better relational understanding of the structural-functionalist political opportunity theory in examining social movement emergence. In addition, it contributes a rich descriptive and relationally analytical exploration of the variances amongst agents who perceive political opportunity differently.

This thesis also contributes to a more subjective understanding of resource mobilisation theory (Zald and McCarthy, 1977; 1978) in social movement literature. This thesis highlighted the RMT’s structure-agency dualism, and its inability to explain how important cognitive or relational aspects, such as values, feelings or behavioural dimensions, relate to social movements. Moreover, the thesis found that RMT is limited in analysing movements only as structured, institutionalised professional movements. The RMT model stresses that movements are best conceptualised as professional movements, relying on the affluent middle class for funds and entrepreneurial leadership, and where resources can be drawn from outside elites because it is they “who control larger resource pools” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1221). RMT understands resources as valuable resources only within elite fields. It has been repeatedly acknowledged in this thesis that a crucial and powerful role was played by non-elite cultural resources in non-elite fields. This latter finding supports extant literature of UCC (Lo, 2015), hidden transcripts (Scott, 1985) and everyday resistance (Faue, 1990; Kelly, 1993). This understating of unrecognised cultural capital in non-
elite fields explained some messy, subjectivist and relational practices and processes that were found in this informal youth movement, which RMT has difficulties to explain.

The understanding of these internalised embodied-performative forms of resources (UCC), in that way, provided some theoretical implications for RMT and Bourdieu’s understanding of the high-status, broadly valued cultural resources which fuel the social reproduction of domination (Bourdieu, 1986). Moreover, this thesis contributes a theoretical contribution which underlines the consequences of activism during the ‘post-activism’ stage, as the thesis identifies scarcity of prior work within the ‘post-activism’ literature within the social movement literature (McAdam, 1989).

A fundamental contribution of this thesis was achieved by adopting the conceptual framework of Bourdieu across his vast range of scholarly work (1977a, 1986, and 1990). Bourdieu’s works shed new light on the social movement literature by better explaining the structure-agency dualism and the various interorganisational and intraorganisational relations in social movement per se, and organisation studies in general. The thesis contributes towards Bourdieu’s social theoretical work in four ways. First, whilst Bourdieu has elaborated the concept of political field as an arena of struggle for political power in a few seminal papers (Bourdieu, 1991b; 1991c), his work has not devoted considerable attention to the internal mechanisms of the political field (Swartz, 2013). This thesis thus provides some preliminary attempts to examine the internal mechanisms and dynamics of the dominant political field, the oppositional political field, the newly emerged political field, and the dynamics between the dominant and oppositional doxa. Second, this thesis contributes to Bourdieu’s discussions of how cooperation and competition between actors actually structures fields, rather than Bourdieu’s discussions at the level of individual actors who find themselves in fields. This thesis proposes different mechanisms, techniques of protest, and forms of domination which emerge in a collective social movement.

The third contribution is related to the nature of relationships between fields, especially political ones. Whilst Bourdieu was very aware of the fact that fields were connected to one another, he rarely theorised the linkages between fields and the dynamics that could result from the interactions between fields. In general, he has little to say about the architecture of the fields beyond the general view that they contain positions that are

52 Bourdieu mentions homology between fields in terms of ‘structural and functional homologies’ in some works Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) and Bourdieu (1984).
structured by the relative power of actors. For this thesis, these linkages were fundamental to an understanding of stability and change in existing institutionalised fields. The thesis uncovered the linkages and relationships between the external fields, and between the external and internal fields as well. This analysis contributes to a better understanding of dependency, stability, and dominating logics in between the different fields. Theoretically, this thesis contributes in a better understanding of how the dominant doxa of fields could be relationally shared between external fields in the political context, and how a heterodox logic of resisting this dominant logic of fields’ homology could be emerged. On this account, this thesis provides empirical and theoretical contributions to the impossibilities of autonomous practices while facing double repressive and dominant institutionalised fields.

Fourth, although Bourdieu provided a particular approach towards theorising gender inequality, through understanding the historical mechanisms that accomplish the ‘dehistoricisation’ and ‘externalisation’ of sexual difference (Bourdieu, 2001), his theoretical framework ignores multiple issues. First point to highlight is that Bourdieu could be criticised of his lack of reflexivity on his analysis of masculine domination. First, as a male, Bourdieu tends to lack the ability of cultivating a critical awareness of his gender positioning as a male in this particular inquiry of analysing masculine domination. Bourdieu should have identified his personal dispositions which influence and infiltrate own concepts and methods of analysing masculine domination notion. This lack of reflexivity could be also noticed as a central concern in Bourdieu’s work on Algeria (see Bourdieu, 1977; 1990, Swartz, 1997). Second issue is that Bourdieu ignores the gender transformation and change in phases of social movements and revolutionary events. The findings of this thesis found some support that UCC and habitual familiarity in non-elite fields act as obstacles against masculine domination. More interestingly, the findings clarified that masculine domination was sometimes practiced and reproduced by females who had internalised these masculine structures of inequality. Third issue to address is Bourdieu’s field location bias, which he defines as a source of bias that sociologists and researchers must confront, which he fell into himself. Bourdieu’s analysis of masculine domination, in choosing the particular case of ‘Kabyle’ society, is rooted in Eurocentric/Orientalist epistemologies, about the essential and fixed patriarchal nature of Arab/Muslim culture and religion and its role in determining the position of women in Arab/Muslim countries. In this way, other
factors shaping women’s experiences, such as political economies or imperialist geopolitics, are ignored (El Said et al., 2015).

Fifth, Bourdieu himself evinced no faith in social/revolutionary movements’ capacity to effect change outside situations of systematic crisis, for the reason that the reproduction of the social order is so embedded in people’s habitus. In this thesis, it was proposed that the concept of habitus represents an open mediating concept between practices and structures, rather than a ‘close’ structurally determinative construct. Moreover, this thesis provided some findings about the disadvantages and negative sides of a radical habitus, in terms of the potential for the transformation of an agent’s habitus and field of practice. This latter contribution was largely ignored by the sociologist Crossley (1999b; 2003).

Moreover, the conceptual tools of the Bourdieusian theory of practice; field, capital and particularly habitus, provide a better, more rooted understanding of the activists’ organisational practices, as structured and structuring practices in social movements. This relational mode of thinking, which Bourdieu advocates, helps overcome the structure/agency dualism in social movement theory, which helps to challenge the dominant and hegemonic frames of organisational analysis by looking at rooted micro-processes and organisational practices between activists in an ‘alternative’ non-hegemonic politically-motivated movement.

Overall, this thesis proposes that, in line with recent organisational research interest in Bourdieu (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Golsorkhi et al., 2009), his theory of practice provides significant promise for a rich, contextualised understanding of politically-motivated social movements. This thesis provided a cross-fertilised understanding to better integrate and synthesise the possibility for rapprochement with OS and social movement theoretical perspectives. This thesis enriches organisation studies research with a better understanding of the political dynamics occurring outside the organisation, such as the political, institutional, and cultural forces. Moreover, this study provided some support to the issues of political activism and grassroots mobilisation inside the organisation, which increasingly challenge corporations and formal organisations (Bakker et al., 2010).
This thesis provides implications not only for policymakers and for activists in social movements. Interest groups, charities, pressure groups, and grassroots mobilisation inside organisations are all forms of informal organisations which this thesis contributes to practically.

For social movement policymakers and activists, this thesis proposes benefits and new relational insights to better understand various processes and dynamics in social movement activism in general and politically-motivated social movement in specific. This thesis helps the social and political activists to be better aware of the dominant logic and the dominant bodies which they are facing. It is crucial for activists to be aware that they are facing and challenging a dominant logic which is embodied and nested in different structures and actors. For example, activists should acknowledge that they are not only facing the state as an institutionalised unit of governing and dominating, they are facing the ‘state’ field of power. This field of power is embedded and imposed its dominant logic to different structures and agents such as, some of the left political parties, Palestinian upper-middle class, and media.

Additionally, the findings show many conflictual processes and modes of domination in social movement which the core activists in particular should be aware of. As it was discussed previously, this thesis has shown that each activist in the movement is seeking to maximise his/her own forms of capital and enhance his/her own field positioning. This sociological point of view alerts the movement’s activists about some individualistic attempts to dominant other unprivileged activists, such as women, lower-class activists, and other ordinary activists. Core activists should be aware of these individualistic struggles and reproduced inequalities in order to design protective procedures, policies and programmes.

Moreover, this thesis urges policymakers and activists to be more aware of their own structures, forms of capital and habitus. Activists are encouraged to deeply reflect on their early socialisation and upbringing, social class, political affiliations, used language, cultural practices, gender and field positioning. This thesis researcher acknowledges the structured nature of these structures, but still, the research believes that activists and social changers are actors who can actively reflect on their structures and habitus. These ones, the activists, have chosen to mobilise and engage in social
movements to open a space for their own habitus freedom and reflexivity, in order to mediate these structures and transform them. That being said, this thesis urges the activists to acknowledge the structural and attitudinal political consequences of their political engagement, and try to challenge and transform these consequences, as much as they bear and tolerate, into new initiatives and campaigns.

Therefore, this thesis recommends a reflexive thinking and practices from the activists on their structures and habitus. This thesis proposes that this recommended reflexivity on the activists’ structures could minimise/control some conflictual dynamics such as political credibility, recruiting parochialism, contradictory techniques of protest, masculine domination, and newcomers’ exclusion. Moreover, this thesis brings more insights about the post-activism experience.

Moreover, this thesis highlights the importance of the organisational dimension which the activists should be aware of the ready for. How to mobilise people? How to address the media? How to communicate with key politicians? How and who will be charge of publicising the movement to the media? How the movement is using social media and digital platforms effectively? How to have good contacts with human right advocates and lawyers? How to react to the PA police violence and harassments? How to deal with arresting cases? How to be more horizontally organised? How to internally discuss, plan and decide democratically and fairly? How to engage all activists, including unprivileged ones. All of these questions and issues are highly crucial for social movement emergence, mobilisation, expansion, and achievement.

6.3 Limitations

There are limitations in this thesis, as it is common with any robust social theoretical enquiry. The most common limitation in this interpretivist qualitative research is the question of generalisability. Although the research is not looking to generalise the findings and results of this research as much as providing a deeper and richer understanding of mechanisms and dynamics in social movement, the findings might be applicably limited to the unique setting of Palestine. For example, one can argue that the theoretical contributions and finding that the researcher of this thesis suggests is quite limited to the particular political situation in Palestine as the double repression.
Moreover, access to resources, particularly time, is a constraint on most research. The data collection period lasted for five months, from September 2014 till January 2015, mostly in Ramallah, Palestine. If the researcher was given longer time to conduct this research, new insights, categories and codes would have been emerged to enrich this study. Moreover, given longer time for data collection would expand the sample to include other participants such as key politicians, journalists, policymakers, human right activists and advocates, politicians and even ordinary people. A larger sample would contribute in gaining more information from a broader range of actors which will greatly enrich the study themes and categories. Moreover, there was a geographic limitation. This research mainly dealt with activists from Ramallah. This reason could be simply referred to the fact that all of these youth movements have emerged in Ramallah. However, as the emerged data referred to under the code ‘geographic centralisation’ which has been discussed in chapter five, the geographic factor influenced the dynamics and conflictual mechanisms of the movements’ mobilisation. Therefore, if the researcher was given longer time to access other geographical places in Palestine that would enrich some codes such as geographic centralisation and the hierarchical structures between the activists from different geographic places, outside the bubble of Ramallah.

Since the researcher data collection period took place in September, the research examined the mechanisms and dynamics in politically-motivated social movement that took place in a past period of time February 2011 – August 2013. Therefore, the researcher posited that using semi-structured interviewing technique would be a useful way of capturing process and the impact of time. Therefore, the accuracy and completeness of recall bias are possible limitations of the findings. Possible problems occur due to faulty memories, oversimplifications and rationalisations, subconscious attempts to maintain self-esteem due to needs for acceptance, achievement and security, and social desirability (Cox and Hassard, 2007). Drawing on Cox and Hassard’s (2007) exploration of retrospective research methods, their limitations in producing an entirely ‘truthful’ picture of the past may not be of such concern if the researcher is concerned with the nature of reality from the position of the participant. The ontological position of this thesis was interpretive and thus emphasised the importance of participants’ perceptions and interpretations of their previously lived realities. Therefore, if it happened that the researcher collected the data during the lifetime of the movement, an ethnographic study would be more recommended.
Moreover, findings are dependent on the truthfulness of the data in which they are grounded and so the possibility that data collected from participants was not truthful must be considered. Moreover, the field of social movement studies demands a special engagement with the ethical dimensions of research. Although, the researcher was also aware and responsible of the participants’ confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity, there is a certain degree of risk associated with political dissent in authoritarian countries. Bringing activists under the spotlight and disclosing activism dynamics might expose activists to surveillance, as well as repression, and personal threats. Therefore, providing limited, short-cuts, and untruthful data must be considered.

Milan (2014) mentions that “participants in social movements are typically highly invested subjects who tend to expect from the researcher, and might even demand, some sort of political alignment with the principled ideas they embody. Access to the field might occasionally be negotiated on this ground, even by those movements whose political views the researcher might disagree with”. It happened that five activists refused to get engaged in the research when they were asked for an interview without providing reasons. The researcher is referring their refusal then to either their confidentiality and privacy or their awareness of different political engagement between them and the researcher.

On that account, the researcher would take this opportunity in this section to reflect on her background and engagement as a researcher. The researcher acknowledges her engagement and participation in the movement for about five months before she left to the United Kingdom for her Master studies in 2012. The researcher acknowledges that this engagement in the movement facilitated the process of recruiting participants as it has its advantages in terms of access and trust. Moreover, it was not only the personal participant, the researcher is a Palestinian researcher who conducted this research in a field and social/cultural and political context that she came from and live in for long period of time. This leads us to Bourdieu’s notion of reflexivity and the need to consider the researcher’s relation to the research object (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). This thesis researcher acknowledges that she brings with her the structured structures, habitus, of her early socialisation and learnt experience which might play as social biases to the object of inquiry. The researcher acknowledges that her gender and age, as a 26- female researcher, might distort or change some data imparted and narrated to her
because of her age and gender. For example, some men might not share with the researcher particular political thoughts because the interviewer is a young female researcher.

Moreover, Bourdieu’s drew our attention to the social class and position of the researcher bias, which he calls it, field location. The researcher acknowledges that she was brought up in lower-middle social class. However, she went to prestigious private school in Ramallah where she was cultivated with distinguished cultural capital, languages, and close networks with Palestinian upper-middle and upper social classes. Moreover, the researcher acknowledges the position in the field which she holds as an academic scholar who occupies a current academic position in one of the British universities to conduct her PhD studies. The researcher has been aware of the higher position which she occupies in the academic field in relation to other participants.

Therefore, acknowledging all of these biases and reflect upon them are all challenges which the researcher hope that she came along with a strong self-reflexive component. The assumption that guides this thesis is that reflexivity, or “the process of reflecting critically on the self as researcher, the ‘human instrument’, is a central axis of the research process, and a mechanism central to the ethical engagement with the realm of activism” (Lincoln and Guba, 2000, 183).

Moreover, the researcher also believes that an interview can sometimes be a ‘second chance’ to do something. Having been given the time to reflect on something the participants did, they try to make sense of their behaviours by rationalising their actions. They are not consciously lying, since they believe what they are saying is true, but their explanation for their behaviour, with hindsight, may be very different from what they actually felt at the time. Additionally, collecting data from different participants have been useful to enrich the study themes and categories that were generated from the responses of diverse participants in the investigated movement. Gaining the perspectives and insights of others would be particularly useful for understanding external institutionalised fields. It would have been useful to interview other stakeholders such as politicians, governmental bodies, and journalists.

Furthermore, interviewing was useful to access the required breadth and depth of information through gaining access to key movement participants (Blee and Taylor,
2002), and to counteract the biased availability of documentary material which is produced by official, prominent, educated and wealthy leaders about social movements (Thompson, 1988). Through interviewing, the study succeeded in accessing behind-the-scenes voices, such as women, lower-class participants, and other ordinary participants and activists. However, different interviewer biases might occur during the semi-structured interviews. For example, the research might give out some unconscious signals or clues that guide participants to give answers expected by the interviewer. Confirmation bias might occur as well to support pre-conceived beliefs and thoughts of the researcher.

Finally, translating and transcribing the interviews from Arabic to English was not an easy task for the researcher. Some of the words, idioms and jokes were difficult to translate in the same native language sense of humour, fear, anger or sarcasm.

6.4 Recommendations for Future Research

This thesis has defined many future research areas which future researchers are encouraged to address. These future research recommendations are dedicated to Bourdieuian scholars, same as social movement and organisation studies scholars and researchers. Based on the thesis limitations, scholars are highly encouraged to conduct an ethnographic study approach if they are examining social movements rooted in OS. An ethnographic study will allow the researcher to capture multiple observational sources of data, across time, space and persons, in order to gain richer ongoing data about movement dynamics and agents’ practical reasoning (Della Porta, 2014). Oral history method and narrative interview techniques are also crucial methodological means of capturing the expression of subjective experience in narrative and metaphor (Maclean, Harvey, and Stringfellow, 2016). Stringfellow et al (2016: 2) points that oral history method unlocks the subjective understanding of experience by low-power actors among the non-hegemonic classes by facilitating “the emergence of a bottom-up perspective that shines ‘new light on unexplained sides of the daily life of the non-hegemonic classes’.

Moreover, future researchers are encouraged to expand their sample of the study to include multiple research participants such as key politicians, journalists, policymakers, human right activists and advocates, politicians and even ordinary people. It is also
recommended to take the sufficient time while conducting such an intense research and include different geographic places if they are involved.

Furthermore, the concept of habitus should be further operationalised and examined in future research. Habitus was one of the most difficult Bourdieusian concepts to operationalise and capture. Therefore, future researches about how to operationalise and examine habitus, and the mechanisms of habitus reproduction, change and transformation are encouraged. Most importantly, Bourdieusian scholars are urged to further study the mediating nature of habitus and its role on freedom and reflexivity. The latter recommendation would challenge the criticism of habitus determinism.

For SM and Bourdieusian scholars, it is suggested that examining unrecognised cultural capital or how agents utilise these non-cultural resources in non-elite fields, provides a better explanation for ‘unrecognised’ resource mobilisation and its’ circulation among different actors in social movement fields. This thesis suggests one mechanism of ‘down-borrowing’, but further mechanism and strategies of utilising non-cultural capital are encouraged.

Moreover, this study was keen to examine cases of movement engagement and mobilisation. It is highly important for future researches to examine cases of disengagement and refusal to participate. This latter examination enhances the understanding of social movement researchers and practitioners in designing and developing better recruiting and mobilisation procedures and programmes. Given that the findings of this study described the importance of reproduced inequalities, it is suggested that protective procedures and strategies should be explored, as well as further examination of the role of elites in creating and/or reproducing structures of inequality.

Finally, and while being inspired by a Bourdieusian perspective, future researchers are encouraged to examine the possibilities of coordination and collaboration between fields, rather that only focusing on conflictual dynamics.
6.5 Summary

This chapter has presented an overview of the argument developed by this thesis before presenting a summary of the findings which were generated, and the implications which these have. Attention was explicitly drawn to the limitations of the research before detailing the recommendations which the findings of this research make for social movement policymakers, activists, and academic researchers.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Informed Consent of Form in English

INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPANTS

Title of the research: Exploring the Mechanisms and Dynamics of Politically-Motivated Youth Movements in Palestine: A Bourdieusian Perspective

This thesis draws on a Bourdieusian perspective to explore the organisational mechanisms, dynamics, processes and social networks in Palestinian politically motivated social movements.

I, ________________________________, agree to be involved as a participant in the research titled above which is being produced by the researcher Amal Nazzal to attain her doctorate degree from University of Exeter. I am aware as a participant that data will be gathered through conducting in-depth interviews. The interview is expected to last one hour, and I am happy to tape the interview by the interviewer. I am aware that I have the right to refuse to answer any questions, and may stop the interview at any time, without justifying why.

Therefore, I confirm that I have been told of the confidentiality of information collected for this research and the anonymity of my participation; that I have been given satisfactory answers to my inquiries concerning research procedures and other matters; and that I have been advised that I am free to withdraw my consent and to discontinue participation in the project at any time without the need for an explanation.

Moreover, the researcher from her side will be the only one who has access to the tapes and transcripts of the interviews. The participants will be given a copy of the first draft of this researcher paper upon to his/her request. Moreover, the original tapes will be destroyed after the PhD has been awarded, as will any anonymous transcripts remaining.
Name of the Interviewee _________________________________

Participant’s Signature _________________________________

Researcher’s Signature _________________________________

Date ______________________ Place _________________________________

If you would like more details on the research please contact me at: an305@exeter.ac.uk
If you have any further questions, concerns or complaints please contact:L.J.Stringfellow@exeter.ac.uk[Supervisor]
or v.p.wimalasiri@exeter.ac.uk[ethics representative].
موافقة المشاركين/ المشاركات المُسمى للمشاركة في البحث

عنوان البحث: استكشاف الميكانيكيات والآليات التنظيمية في النشاط الاجتماعي للحركات الشبابية الفلسطينية: نظرة بوردوزية.

يهدف هذا البحث لاستكشاف الميكانيكيات والآليات التنظيمية في النشاط الاجتماعي للحركات الشبابية الفلسطينية من نظرة بوردوزية. كيفية توليد وانتاج رأي الال الاجتماعي في الحركات الشبابية الفلسطينية، ودور منظمي/منظمات ونشطاء/ناشطات هذه الحركات في تكوين الشبكات الاجتماعية من خلال الاختراق في الحركات الشبابية الفلسطينية.

أنا،___________________، أ وأافق على أن أشارك في هذا البحث الذي اقتام عليه الباحثة

أميل لبذل درجة الدكتوراه من جامعة إكستر-بريطانيا. إنني على دراية بأن جمع المعلومات سيتم عن طريق مقابلات غير هيكليّة المتوقعة لغاية سامع من زمن. أعلم بأن الباحثة ستقوم بتسجيل صوتي لمقابلتي. أنا أيضًا على علم بأنني في الحق في رفض الإجابة عن أي سؤال والإنساب في المقابلة ككل في أي وقت أريد دون إبداء أي أساس متوقعة بالنسبة.

ولذلك فإنني أؤكد كمشارك/ة في هذا البحث، أن عملية البحث ستتضمن لي سرية المعلومات المقدمة من طرفي واستخدامها لأغراض البحث فقط، وعدم الكشف عن هويتي كمشارك/ة. كما أنني حصلت على إجابات مرضية عن استفساري في متعلق برفض البحث وآمر أخرى. وأؤكد أن مشاركتي في هذا البحث طوعية لا إجبارية وأنني أمتلك الحرية لقبول أو رفض استكمال المشاركة في أي وقت دون الحاجة لتفسير الأسباب.

بالإضافة لذلك فإن الباحثة هو الشخص الوحيد الذي يمتلك التسجيلات الصوتية للمقابلات ومعلومات المقابلات المفرغة ولا أحد سواها يتم إعطاؤه للمشاركين والمشاركات في البحث نسخة من أول ولا تقم بحسب مشاركة. سيتم التخلص من جميع التسجيلات الصوتية بعد نيل درجة الدكتوراه، كما وستبقى المقابلات المفرغة مجهولة الهوية.

اسم المشارك/ة

توقيع المشارك/ة

توقيع الباحثة

الباحثة

التوقيع

النهاية: إذا كنت ترغب في مزيد من التفاصيل حول البحث يرجى الاتصال بي على العنوان التالي:
Appendix 3: Semi-structured Interview Guides

Section One: upbringing, family and education
- Can you tell me about your family, where do you live? What about your upbringing?
- Which schools have you been sent to? How was your experience there?
- Do you agree that you have experienced a kind of politicised upbringing through your parents or family members?
- Did you have social/cultural/political activities when you were young (before university)?

Section Two: University life and social networks
- Have you been engaged in any kind of activism at the university? What about it?
- If so, were you surrounded by networks and people which you knew before university?
- What kind of activism was it? Can you tell be about one particular activity which you did? How was it?
- Do you think that this network of activism which you were/or are still involved in belong to a particular political stance? Ideological thoughts?
- If so, was this ideological ‘harmony’ between the activists beneficial for network building, mobilisation, building trust, etc.

Section Three: Movement involvement: reasons and motivation
- What do you think about the ‘Arab Spring’? And why do you think it took place in 2011?
- Do you think the Palestinian street and popular got affected? How?
- What role has the Palestinian Authority played after the Arab Spring emergence?
- You are a core activist/an activist in this particular movement, what were the reasons and motivations behind your involvement?
- How did you know about this youth movement? Were they part of your networks? Did you know any of them before?
- Can you tell me if you were mobilised by any of the core activists in this movement? How the procedure went?
- How did you get involved and along with the other activists? How were the dynamics of work, harmony, or trust?
- Can you remember one of the closest activists to you? Without telling me his/her name, can you tell me why that person was that close to you?
- Have you known more activists in the movement, during demonstrations, meeting, etc.? How did you get along with them?

Section Four: Organisational dynamics, procedures, and networks

- Was there a specific and clear organisational chart or plan in this movement?
- Have the organisers/core activists set any strategies of actions, plans, emergency plans, or key contacts?
- How the roles were distributed? Was it clear which role were you playing? Tell me more about it please?
- Did you feel or observe any kind of power or dominance from any of the activists upon you or upon the others? If so, can you tell me how this role was legitimised, accepted, or resisted by the other activists?
- Was there any masculine domination which you felt or observed? Was it resisted or not?
- What do you think about the female activists’ involvement? Was there any obstacles regarding their involvement?
- How can you describe the trust between you and the other activists?
- Were you (the activists in the same movement) share same political stances? Or ideological thoughts as yours?
- How the newcomers were mobilised and attracted to get involved?
- Were there any particular rules/lines of not accepting some activist? In other word, who was welcomed, and who was not?
- What were the techniques of protesting? When do you decide to organise a protest? Based on what?
- How the PA police reacted against your demonstrations? Can you tell me more about the clashes between the two sides?
- Did the PA play a role in preventing/blocking the movement from growing and getting widely mobilised?
- Was there any contact with other Palestinian political parties? Or key politicians? Human right activists?
- How was the role of the media or journalists in the media coverage about the movement, PA violence, or arrestment incidents?
- How the financial issues were managed in the movement? Was there any external funding?

Section Five: The other movement
- What do you think about the other movement? What do you think about the activists themselves? Do you know them personally?
- Do you think that the other activists in the other movement share same ideologies or political stances? Same social class? Lifestyle?
- What do you think about the motives of the activists in the other movement?
- If it happens one of the activists from the other movement asks to join your movement, will he/she be welcomed?
- Why do you think the two movements, IYM and 15 March, did not succeed in joining one movement which is Palestinians for dignity?

Section Six: Decline of the movement
- How was your experience in this movement?
- Have you dropped out from the movement before it declined? If yes, why?
- Any learnt lessons which you like to share?
- Do you regret getting involvement in this experience?
- What have you lost in this experience?
- Have you personally changed? Have you political stances changed?
- Do you have another political opinion or perspective about the Palestinian cause after this experience?
- Is there hope in these youth politically-motived youth movements? Why?
- Have your social/political activism stopped after this experience? Why?
- If not, have you got involved other initiatives/campaigns
Appendix 4: Codes and Categories from Analysis of Interview Data

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### Appendix 5: Overview of the Participants and their Movements

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Appendix 6: Transcript Example

Interview #1
Dalia
Female
28 years old
15 March activist

Section One: upbringing, family and education

I\textsuperscript{53}: Can you tell me about your family, where do you live? What about your upbringing?

P\textsuperscript{54}: When I was 13-14 years old, in the second Intifada, I was involved as a volunteer in the Red Cross and I was dealing with wounded people, I even saw martyrs, so this experience affected me a lot. When I was in the tenth grade, I went to the USA to participate in an educational programme. Being far away from home and represent Palestine and its history to the audience urged me to get more engaged in knowing more about Palestine history and the Israeli occupation. And from that point, I became more interested in politics and I decided to study either media or political science. In Birzeit University, I studied media and sociology, and during the university I began my actual activism. In 2007, I began going to Baleen demonstrations as a photographer and step by step I began to go periodically. In 2009, when Bassem Abu Rahmeh, a photographer, activist and friend of mine, was shot and I stopped my political activism for many reasons – it’s was overwhelming experience and a kind of trauma.

I: Do you agree that you have experienced a kind of politicised upbringing through your parents or family members?

P: it was not through my parents actually, it was kind of my political activism and my interest of what was happening around me politically and socially.

Section Two: University life and social networks

I: Have you been engaged in any kind of activism at the university? What about it?

P: As I told you before, my university activism was with popular committees in Baleen where I was engaged in peaceful demonstrations with other activist. Plus, the nature of my study at the university encouraged me to keep updated with what is happening in Palestine, in order to discuss politics at class and getting engaged with politically aware and knowledgeable activists.

\textsuperscript{53} I refers to the interviewer
\textsuperscript{54} P refers to the participant
I: If so, were you surrounded by networks and people which you knew before university?

P: not all of them before the university actually. I knew some activists friends when I was a volunteer in the Red Cross, but later they were more my university friends and networks.

I: Do you think that this network of activism which you were/or are still involved in belong to a particular political stance or ideological thoughts?

P: well, this is hard to answer honestly. But generally speaking, I do not think that my network of activism at university belong to a specific political stance – we were diverse I assume. You know what, I am just remembering now that no one of us cared to ask or know which political parties we belong to at that time.

I: what about ideological thoughts, way of living, etc.?

P: well I can say that most of us were open-minded people, liberal kind of. I can’t find anything more specific.

I: If so, was this ideological ‘harmony’ between the activists beneficial for network building, mobilisation, building trust, etc.

P: yeah it was kind of, I can say that it helped us to keep motivated and feel safe among each other.

Section Three: Movement involvement: reasons and motivation

I: What do you think about the ‘Arab Spring’? And why do you think it took place in 2011?

P: It’s the influence of the Arab Spring, that there is an oppressed Aran nation which is revolting and saying no to its government, that was inspiring enough for the Palestinian youths. And that’s why there were some supporting demonstrations for Tunisia and Egypt which had been hugely oppressed by the Police [referring to the Palestinian Police].

I: Do you think the Palestinian street and the popular got affected? How?

P: well absolutely, as I told you the supporting demonstrations were signs. But know I am thinking that those demonstrations were reflecting a particular political stance and ideologies maybe; mainly the leftist and the liberals, and who are politically independent. So we can say now, that it was not the whole Palestinian street and popular, but still these people reflected a representative sample of the population.

Talking about my experience when the Arab Spring began, I participated in the supporting demonstrations where I met some people I know and other I was introduced to. In that time, I was brainstorming and thinking with other friends to start something collective as the situation was so bad! I started a Facebook page called ‘I am Palestinian’ and we were in contact with some youths in Gaza, and we arranged for a meeting with our friends and friends of friends and we sat the date of 15th of March. Relatively, there were some roles distribution, but this movement didn’t last long. Some
of the activists I know from the street, like X, I know him by name on social media because he is very active, but I did not know him in person before. While being in the streets, lots of barriers had been removed and it was much easier to build networks.

*I: What role has the Palestinian Authority played after the Arab Spring emergence?*

P: oppressing people. What else? These revolutionary moments in Tunisia and Egypt had frightened the PA a lot. We can ignore that the PA has a tight relationship between with the Egyptian government. And I think they [referring to the PA] planned on oppressing and ending any form of supporting these demonstrations as we discussed.

*I: You are an activist in 15 March movement, what were the reasons and motivations behind your involvement?*

P: it’s my social and political activism. I was not that far from activism as told you. Therefore, after the Arab Spring, I rapidly started this Facebook page and began inviting people to it. I feel these issues hugely affect me and I have to take a role in them.

*I: Can you remember one of the closest activists to you? Without telling me his/her name, can you tell me why that person was that close to you?*

X was very close to me. He was humble and cooperative, and he was one of the few males in the group who joined us [referring to the females] to stop any masculine practices. He became a close friend at the end.

*I: Have you known more activists in the movement, during demonstrations, meeting, etc.? How did you get along with them?*

Yeah sure, I got to know some new activists, but I got along with some and others not. You know, it’s also the chemistry between people, I mean some of them were good and trusted, but we could not be that close because we think differently and express about ourselves differently.

**Section Four: Organisational dynamics, procedures, and networks**

*I: Was there a specific and clear organisational chart or plan in this movement?*

P: No it was not that structured. There was a secret group on Facebook where the admins of the pages where in it. And at meetings, we were discussing how we will work, what are the next events, how we will be mobilised, in which directions. We were meeting to discuss how we will work, shall we make videos, what are the demands, design T-shirts or not. In that time a group that we know decided to go for a hunger strike to give the situation a serious atmosphere and that you are not a bunch of youth who are wasting their time. In that time in the streets, we realised that there were other group in the streets Independent Youth Movement (IYM) which out of know where decided to call themselves, the independent youth movement without asking us. And for us they were more engaged in politics and they were leftists who might have agendas.
I: How the roles were distributed? Was it clear which role were you playing? Tell me more about it please?

P: the roles were distributed on the activists’ skills, expertise and knowledge. We arranged committees in media, law, logistics, and planning – but it was not that professional and structured. Plus, there was a negative overlapping between us in some tasks as it was not clear who is doing what and when.

I: Did you feel or observe any kind of power or dominance from any of the activists upon you or upon the others? If so, can you tell me how this role was legitimised, accepted, or resisted by the other activists?

P: yes from some activists actually. Some of the activists were meeting other groups and the Palestinian authority without even asking us. Five to six members were meeting together and taking the leading role without telling us anything of these meetings. At the same time, we were the ones who were in the streets and who were beaten from the Police. These core activists who were ‘leading’ the movement were saying that they have guys who they sent to the streets! As if we are their soldiers and we are waiting for their commands. I was totally against this dominant attitude. And sometimes, we knew it by accident that they were meeting others without us or without even telling us. Their excuses were that they were invited in person, but to us, we interpreted that they crossed that line because we allowed them to speak for us and represent us in the media.

I: Was there any masculine domination which you felt or observed? Was it resisted or not?

P: Some of them were seeking leading roles and others were thinking they were superior, especially males. In addition, the girls were many in the group, like most of them were girls. We were actively chatting in the streets, getting beaten and hurt, but these meetings were represented only by males. As if we [referring to the female activists] will do the hard job and they will play the one man show thing. That was depressing.

At some point, two friends of mine and me felt that there was something wrong in these masculine dynamics of shutting us put, therefore, we brought this issue up at the meetings, but it was too late for these males to get the point that they were wrong in the way they were dealing with us and how negatively that behaviour affected the movement itself.

I: How can you describe the trust between you and the other activists?

At first, there was what I can call it ‘blinded trust’ between us, because we were all friends from the same network.

I: What were the techniques of protesting? When do you decide to organise a protest? Based on what?
P: I can say that our techniques to protest were reactive and not active. In other words, our protests were based on whether the PA police oppress the demonstrations or arrest any of the activists. That’s why we were kind of lost.

I: How the PA police reacted against your demonstrations? Can you tell me more about the clashes between the two sides?

P: It was bad! Literally bad, I do not know what to say… there were a lot of oppression, threats, harassment and beating. It was planned by the PA to end this scene of demonstrating and going against the current political situation.

I: Was there any contact with other Palestinian political parties? Or key politicians? Human right activists?

P: As I said there was kind of contact with the Palestinian authority, and the Palestinian President. Some of the activists were meeting key persons as, Hanan Ashrawi, Hana el Masri and others. But I am not aware of any other.

I: How was the role of the media or journalists in the media coverage about the movement, PA violence, or arrestment incidents?

P: There was not that big media coverage from international channels, only local ones mainly.

I: How the financial issues were managed in the movement? Was there any external funding?

P: It was only personal funding, no external funds at all.

Section Five: The other movement

I: What do you think about the other movement? What do you think about the activists themselves? Do you know them personally?

P: Well let me first tell you that core activists in this movement [15 March movement] are elites who went to the same school, Ramallah Friends School, which is really prestigious. They belong to the Palestinian upper middle social class, they are economically comfortable, and some of them have even continued his/her Masters or PhD degrees abroad. Although I was a member in 15 March but I was out of this circle, same as other activists.

On the other side, most of IYM activists came from the same political background, leftists. The same ideologies shared between them, and I assume that being engaged in politics provide you with a more organised sense and methods on the grounds.

I: If it happens one of the activists from the other movement asks to join your movement, will he/she be welcomed?

P: Well, it is difficult to answer. If I was to decide I would definitely allow this person to join my movement. And this is the assumption that we are a horizontal movement which mobilise people to join. However, as there is a core closed network which legitimises its role in leading this movement, I think they will be the ones who will accept or reject the newcomers – and I think it happens with one case.
I: Why do you think the two movements, IYM and 15 March, did not succeed in joining one movement which is Palestinians for dignity?

P: Different ideologies, different political backgrounds and different social classes I think. We tried to join one movement, we tried hard, but I think both of the objectivist and subjectivist reasons in the Palestinian political context played an important in ending this movement.

Section Six: Decline of the movement

I: How was your experience in this movement?

P: To me 15th March was a testing ground of who we are and what we can work on.

I: Have you dropped out from the movement before it declined? If yes, why?

P: No, I stayed till PFD was dissolved. Some of the people left the political activism, and others stayed in the network and kept being active in different terms- we are still friends at the end.

After we decided to end 15th of March, we evaluated the experience and all of us were dissatisfied from what happened. The persons who stayed in the network, IYM, realised that they were wrong in the way they treated us. So we arranged for a meeting between the two groups and to think how to unite together in a bigger scale (because we can’t get power while we are separated). Then I was in a contact with the IYM and I suggested lets meet and unite in ‘Palestinians for dignity’. But still, some people have questions on others, the ones who weren’t in the movements and weren’t from this community and backgrounds. The PFD was a mailing list actually, and new people also joined the movement of ‘Palestinians for dignity’ which is basically begun working for the hunger strike of the prisoners, the protest against negotiations, and the visit of Mufaz. Then I travelled to the UK for my masters. In PFD we planned to arrange a committee and to go for a place to brainstorm, release stress and refresh. But still, it wasn’t that successful.

I: Do you regret getting involvement in this experience?

P: No never. I would repeat it as well.

I: What have you lost in this experience?

P: It is not about losing something; it is how much overwhelming this experience was. I experienced some hard times, getting depressed at some moments – that’s all.

I: Have you personally changed? Have you political stances changed?

P: There was a kind of frustration like why you didn’t succeed in changing something? On the general scene, there was a new think in Palestine. It was the first time to occupy a public space in Ramallah and next to the PA. This feeling among the people that we can demonstrate and occupy a space. So, I can tell that my network has increased and I became friend with some of them. But while I was in Britain from 2012-2013, there was an event like ‘Bab-el shams’ which was such an inspiring event.
I: Is there hope in these youth politically-motived youth movements? Why?

P: Yes we can, but you are in a big conflict her in this country. There’s no leadership to guide or lead the national project and we have the elites’ conflicts of not being able to do anything, and this dispersion between what we are working on and even we are geographically separated. And the occupation succeeded in creating many diverse conflicts in your life, it’s in our daily life practices.

I: Have your social/political activism stopped after this experience? Why?

P: Yes, I do. I am still active in the popular committees, an active BDS supported, and I keep updating myself with all the political, social and cultural events which are taking place in Palestine. I also use social media and my Facebook account to spread the word about political issues.
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