ای برتر از خیال و قیاس و گمان و وهم
وز هر چه گفته اند و شنیدیم و خوانده ایم
The Concept of Guardianship (wilāya) in the Iranian Intellectual Tradition From 1800 to 1989, With Particular Reference to the Ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini

Submitted by Leila Chamankhah to the University of Exeter

Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies

As a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies

August 2017

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature:
Abstract

A full study of the conception of wilāya in a variety of juridical trends, theological schools, and mystical doctrines across the Islamic world in general, and in the Shī`a intellectual history in particular, is too ambitious a project to undertake in one thesis. Therefore, the author has chosen to limit herself to considering a handful of intellectual developments in the Shī`a world from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. She addresses a number of issues by delving into the conceptions of wilāya through the examination and interpretation of key texts. The main interest of the author is to study the influence of ibn `Arabī’s mysticism, with regard to the conception of wilāya, on his Shī`a successors and expositors in later centuries. This research also discusses the development and transformation of the conception of wilāya over two hundred years.

In a corresponding approach to Akbarīan mysticism, wilāya occupies a central place in Ṣadrīan ḥikma, and in the thought of the ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and Qum, as the crystallization of this discipline of philosophy. Wilāya is inseparable from imamate and from the status of imāms, namely the wali, ḥujja, and ghawth. In the esoteric School of Shaykhīsm, the conception of wilāya is overshadowed by concepts such as ḥuḫūr (appearance), qiyyāmat (Day of Judgement), intīzār (expectation), al-Qāʿīm, and is finally replaced by the doctrine of Rukn-i Rābi’. A study and critical analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of wilāyat al-faqīh exposes his fascination for the mysticism of ibn `Arabī. However, the politicization of wilāya in Khomeini’s theory can be regarded as the climax of jurisdictional developments dating back to the writings of the jurists of the early Qajar period.
Unlike mysticism, jurisprudence underwent significant changes and revisions in a number of terms, such as *wilāya* in socio-political affairs. Khomeini’s theory was challenged by his student, Ayatollah Montazirī who revisited it, placing more emphasis on the role of people and their rights in the Islamic Government. Montazirī’s reform movement was similarly transformed by Muhsin Kadivar, who finally rejected the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh* in favour of a democratic government.
# Table of Contents

Abstract  
List of Contents  
Acknowledgments  
Transliteration and Usage  

## Introduction  

A. *Wilāyat al-Takwīniya*  
B. Research Questions  
C. Discourse on Method  
   C.1. Skinner’s Conventionalism  
   C.2. Post-Analytic Philosophy and Bevir’s Intentionalism  
D. Definition of Terms  
   D.1. Theoretical mysticism (*ʿirfān-i naẓarī*)  
   D.2. The School of Isfahan (Isfahan School of Philosophy)  
   D.3. *Al-ḥikmat al-Mutaʿālīya* (*ḥikma*)  
   D.4. Khomeinism  
   D.5. The *wilāya* Apparatus  

*pp. 5-6*  
*pp. 7-10*  
*p. 11*  
*p. 12*  
*pp. 13-37*  
*pp. 20-23*  
*p. 23*  
*pp. 23-24*  
*pp. 24-27*  
*pp. 27-31*  
*pp. 31-36*  
*pp. 31-32*  
*p. 32*  
*p. 32*  
*pp. 32-33*  
*pp. 33-36*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter One: Ibn ‘Arabī and \textit{Wilāya}</th>
<th>pp. 38-74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Bibliography, Travels and Works</td>
<td>pp. 39-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. The Perfect Man</td>
<td>pp. 42-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. \textit{Wilāya, Khilāfa, Nubuwwa and Risāla}</td>
<td>pp. 51-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. Ibn ‘Arabī in the \textit{Shī'a World}</td>
<td>pp. 60-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5. Ibn ‘Arabī’s Legacy</td>
<td>pp. 63-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6. Conclusion</td>
<td>pp. 67-70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Two: The \textit{Shaykhī} School and \textit{Wilāya}</th>
<th>pp. 75-131</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1. The \textit{Shaykhī 'Ulemā}</td>
<td>pp. 77-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Historical Context and Intellectual Developments</td>
<td>pp. 84-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Imamate, \textit{Nubuwwa} and \textit{Wilāya}</td>
<td>pp. 91-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. \textit{Imāms} as the Four Causes</td>
<td>pp. 99-105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. The \textit{Shaykhī} Eschatology and the Idea of the Future Return</td>
<td>pp. 105-112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. The Occult Sciences</td>
<td>pp. 112-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. Conclusion</td>
<td>pp. 120-123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Three: The Schools of Tehran and Qum and \textit{Wilāya}</th>
<th>pp. 132-194</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Historical Background</td>
<td>pp. 134-142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī</td>
<td>pp. 142-152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī</td>
<td>pp. 153-162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.</td>
<td>Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumṣīṯī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1.</td>
<td>Wilāya and Khilāfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.</td>
<td>The School of Qum and its Historical Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.</td>
<td>Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshṭīyānī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.</td>
<td>ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Ḥossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7.1.</td>
<td>Wilāyat Nāmīḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Four:</strong> Khomeini, Wilāya and the Influence of Ibn ʿArabī</td>
<td>pp. 195-228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.</td>
<td>Genealogy of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.</td>
<td>Khomeini’s Intellectual Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.</td>
<td>Taʿlīqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fusūs al-Ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ al-Uns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.</td>
<td>The Four Journeys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Five:</strong> Khomeini as the Jurist and Wilāya</td>
<td>pp. 229-276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.</td>
<td>Kashf al-Asrār: A Political Manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.</td>
<td>From 1942 to 1979: Westernization, Modernization and Political Antagonism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.</td>
<td>Walī and the Office of Wilāya in Juridical Texts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4. *Wilāyat-i Faqīh* pp. 249-256

5.5. *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*: Post-Khomeini Era p. 257

5.5.1. Muntazirī, the Movement of Reform and the Evolution of the Theory of *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* pp. 257-259

5.5.1.1. *Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī* pp. 259-262

5.5.1.2. People’s Rights pp. 262-269

5.6. Conclusion pp. 269-272

Conclusion pp. 277-285

Glossary pp. 286-392

Bibilography pp. 293-321
Acknowledgments

This thesis could never have been completed had it not been for the help of a number of people and institutions. First and foremost is my supervisor, Professor Ian Richard Netton, who supported me and gave me his advice at all stages of this endeavour. I also thank my advisor Prof. Robert Gleave for his feedback on the first draft of this thesis. I greatly appreciated the help of the crew of the Midpointe Library, West Chester, Ohio, who provided me with the sources I needed amid much difficulty in finding them. I am greatly indebted to my parents, whose support was invaluable, and had it not been for their generous financial help and encouragement I would not have been able to fulfil this research. I would like to thank my friends Kathy Lamb and Jane Clark who patiently helped me with improving my English in the writing of this thesis.

I dedicate this work to the Iranian Green Movement, whose aspirations will never cease to disappear from our individual and collective memory and will bear fruit one day.

August 2017
Transliteration and Usage

I follow the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) transliteration system for Arabic, Persian and Turkish. I also naturalize other frequently used terms such as Sufi, Sufism, Ayatollah, Khomeini, Allah, imamate, Imamite, names of the cities, names of the Imāms, name of the Prophet, etc. As for the dates, except for the Julian or Georgian calendar, those dates referring to the solar Islamic calendar as it is used today in Iran are indicated clearly by shamsī, and lunar dates are marked by H (Hegira/hijrī-yi qamarī).
Introduction

Guardianship (wilāya/walāya) is a key concept in Islamic theology, jurisprudence and mysticism. Etymologically, it is derived from the etymon of ‘w l y’, which means to place two things next to or close to each other, to the extent that there is no distance between them. ‘W l y’, therefore, means closeness and affinity, whether spatial or spiritual. From the root, there engendered a number of derivatives, such as walāya(sainthood, affinity, sanctity) wilāya (authority, dominion) and mawlā (master, protector, patron). The Muslim scholar of Qurʾānic exegesis and the Arabic language, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502 H/1108 or 1109), in his al-Mufradāt fī Gharīb al-Qurʾān (Terminology of the Peculiar Qurʾānic Terms) emphasizes the significance of ‘closeness and attachment’ in applying the terms wilāya/walāya for something. He translates walāya as domination/victory (nuṣra), and wilāya as authority and incumbency (taṣaddi-ya amr), though he reminds us that both can be used interchangeably; referring to one reality which is to exercise authority and domination over the other, and in the same way, the terms wali/mawlā can embrace both affinity and authority (al-Iṣfahānī, 1413 H/1992, p. 885).

As one of the terms most frequently used in the Qurʾān, wali appears in different ways; as a noun one hundred and twenty-four times, and as a verb one hundred and twelve times. It is divided into two groups: positive/recommended and negative. By using in the term in the first usage, the lawgiver asks believers to be wali of each other, and by the latter, he warns them to reject the domination and authority of non-Muslims. Murtiḍā Muṭaharī calls upon the positive wilāya, walāy-i Ithbāt-i Islāmī (the Islamic
positive \textit{wilāya}), and divides it into two groups: general (ʿāmn) and specific (khāṣṣ). The former refers to the general \textit{wilāya} that is possessed and exercised by every believer, and the latter belongs to the Prophet and his household. \textit{Wilāyat al-khāṣṣah} uses different forms, such as \textit{walāy-i muḥabbit} (the \textit{wilāya} of love), \textit{walāy-i imamate} (the \textit{wilāya} of imamate), \textit{walāy-i zaʿāmat} (the \textit{wilāya} of leadership) and \textit{walāy-i taṣarruf} (the \textit{wilāya} of disposal) (Muṭaharī, 1390, pp. 13-17).

Al-Rāghib, whom I mentioned earlier, brings many verses in which \textit{wali}, \textit{wilāya}, \textit{mawlā}, and other paronymous terms appear (al-Iṣfahānī, 1413 H/1992, pp. 885-887). On the basis of the \textit{Qurʾānic} usages, God is the Protector [\textit{walī}] of those who believe [2: 257, 7: 196, 3: 68, 47: 11, 66: 4] and has bestowed \textit{wilāya} upon every believer [9: 71]. In addition to the divine \textit{wilāya} and the \textit{wilāya} of believers over each other, the \textit{Qurʾān} acknowledges the \textit{wilāya} of the Prophet and the \textit{Imāms}, which is bestowed upon them from God [5: 55, 4: 59, 9: 119], in order to guide people to the righteous path.

In the \textit{Qurʾān}, \textit{awlīyā} have a number of features and are described as individuals who have no fear, nor will they grieve. Muḥammad Hossein Ḥusseynī Tehrānī gives his exegesis of verses sixty-two to sixty-four of the \textit{sūrah} of \textit{Yūnus} which state that “Behold! Truly the friends of God, no fear shall come upon them, nor shall they grieve, those who believe and reverent. For them are glad tidings in the life of this world and in the Hereafter” (Nasr, 2015, p. 558). He maintains that since piety (taqwā) and fearing God come immediately after the description of \textit{awlīyā}, the office of \textit{wilāya} requires a strong faith (īmān), which is only achieved by doing good and avoiding bad. This type of \textit{wilāya} is called \textit{wilāyat al-ilāhīya} (divine \textit{wilāya}), in which the veil (ḥijāb) between the servant (ʿabd) and God, is removed as a result of self-abnegation (Ḥusseynī Tehrānī, vol. 5, 1419
According to him, the term “awlīyā” in these verses refers to those who have attained an exalted kind of faith as the result of their righteous deeds, purification of their hearts, strong piety and remembering God (Ḥusseynī Tehrānī, vol. 5, 1419 H, pp. 37-39). Wilāya equates to blessing, because wali is the resident of the world of unity (Ḥusseynī Tehrānī, vol. 5, 1419 H, pp. 40-41).

Along with the Qurʾān, ḥadīth al-qudṣī is another source of authority for Muslim scholars, specifies the features of awlīyā. According to the famous ḥadīth that relates “My friends are hidden under my mantle (qibāb, hijāb), no one knows them except for Me” (Hujwīrī, n.d., p. 38), the office of wilāya, entails secrecy and latency - unlike that of imamate. Except for the Imāms and the Prophet who are known to people, the holders of the office of wilāya remain hidden from people. In interpreting this ḥadīth, Sufi Muslims have developed arguments regarding the attributes of awlīyā, such as the significance of sirr (inmost being), or maqām al-sīr for understanding the office of wilāya. They argue that awlīyā are owners - or preservers - of divine sirr; and since the Deity desires to keep His secrets, He has chosen awlīyā to preserve them (Himmatī, 1391, pp. 6-9).

The authority of the Prophet and his Sunna including ḥadīth makes the second pillar of Islam and is equal to that of the Qurʾān; a fact which is endorsed by the Book itself, though as Fazlur Rahman is certain, this authority “refers to the verbal and performative behaviour of the Prophet outside the Qurʾān” (Rahman, 1968, p. 52). What follows from this is that the Prophet’s authority, “has been accepted willingly by all people without bickerings in certain quarters, [and] the Qurʾān would not have intervened” (Fazlur Rahman, p. 53). The logical consequence of this is that the Prophet’s
words and behaviour have been an unchallenged authority, “outside the Qurʾān in giving judgments and moral and legal precepts” (Rahman, p. 53). As for the authority of sayings of Imāms, as Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī (d. 1110 H/1698) is certain, the authenticity of the akhbār (lit. sayings, sing. khabar) of Imāms is absolute and definite, because these figures are intermediaries of emanation from God to His people, and therefore their aḥādīth embrace divine knowledge, truths and gnosis which are emanated to people, even to other prophets and angels, through them. In their absence, Majlisī maintains, believers should recourse to their akhbār in order to receive emanation and blessing from Him (Majlisī, n.d., vol. 1, p. 103).

Sayings of Imāms on wilāya/walāya and imamate are scattered throughout the vast body of literature, which is called “ḥadīth compilations”, covering the two genres of kalāmi (theological) and juridical writings. The most well-known of these are the four ḥadīth compilations which constitute the early Imamite doctrine, and in chronological order includes al-Kāfī (Uṣūl al-Kāfī) by Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī (d. 328-9 H/939), Man lā yaḥzaruhu-l-Faqīḥ (for One Who Does Not Have accessibility to Jurist) by Abu Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Bābawayh al-Qumī, commonly known as Ibn Bābawayh (Persianized form: ibn Bābūyi) or al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381 H/991), Tahdhib al-Ahkām (the Refinements of the Laws) and al-Istibṣār (to Ask for Insights), both by Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Ḥassan Ṭūsī (d. 460 H/1067). A number of scholars have drawn upon them to extract the components of the early Imamite doctrine, though the main Imamite sources including ḥadīth compilations are not limited to these four, and include older texts as well. For example the kalāmi text, Başaʾīr al-Darajāt fī ʿUlūm-i Āl-i Muḥammad wa Mā Khaṣṣahum ul-llāh Bihī (Insights into the Degrees, on the Knowledge of the Family of Muḥammad and That with which Allah Endowed Them) by
Al-Shaykh a-Ṣaffār al-Qumī (d. 290 H/902-903) is one of the oldest Shiʿa ḥadīth compilations, in which al-Qumī spreads around one thousand eight hundreds and eighty ḥadīth on different issues, including wilāya from Imāms.

One can add to this tradition countless other texts such as the Book of Sulaym ibn Qays by Sulaym ibn Qays al-Hilālī al-ʿĀmirī (d. 70-76 H/689-695); Uṣūl a-Sita ʿAṣhar (Sixteen Principles) by a number of writers belong to the third century of Hegira/ninth century; The Ṣaḥīḥ al-Riḍā (Book of al-Riḍā, also known as Musnad al-Imām al-Riḍā) which is a collection of two hundreds and forty ḥadīth attributed to ʿAlī ibn Mūsa al-Riḍā (which is one of the first ḥadīth compilations and has been collected by Abu al-Ḥassan ʿAlī ibn Jaʿfar ʿArīdhī, the son of the sixth and the brother of the seventh Imām); A-Zuhd (abstemiousness) and Al-Muʿmin (the Believer), both by Hossein ibn Saʿīd al-Kūfī al-Ahwāzī (2nd and 3rd century of Hegira/ ninth century); and the writings of the Imāmī theologian and transmitter (muḥaddith) Faḍl ibn Shādhān Neyshābūrī (d. 260 H/873). There exist more than twelve ḥadīth compilations transmitting ḥadīth from Imāms including their sayings on wilāya, and all of them are composed before al-Kāfī which belongs to the fourth century. These writings encompass the early Imāmī conceptions of wilāya. Some of them are not available today, but are documented in, and named by later sources.

In terms of the authenticity of the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth, they “constitute the only two authorities, absolute and complementary, to which the faithful should refer for all matters regarding their religion” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 23). These compilations are not studied here, as scholars like Muhammad Ali Amir-Moezzi and Hassan Ansari have drawn upon them to extract the components of the early Imāmī doctrine. As Amir-
Moezzi rightly maintains, “Shīʿism is centered on the notion of walāya/[wilāya]. Shīʿas refer to themselves as ‘the people of walāya (ahl al-walāya), [and] the charisma of īmām, the very nature of his Person, seems entirely focused on this concept” (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 231).

In classical Shīʿa thought, wilāya is firmly tied to the imamate and īmāms are regarded as wali, ḥujja and quṭb. Wilāya is also connected to the notion of the Divine Truth (al-ḥaqq), which is a double-faceted reality and refers to īmāms; the fourteen luminous entities. Wilāya is the esoteric side of the Truth, or the mission of īmāms, as the continuation of the prophetic mission which started with Adam. The mission is divine knowledge (ʿilm) in general, and the true interpretation (taʾwīl) of the Holy Book in particular. So, wali is the only preserver of the meaning of the Book (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 29). In terms of wali as ḥujja (proof), there exists a belief that “the earth can never be without living Proof of God, or else it would be annihilated” (Ansari, 1392, p. 139 & Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 43), therefore, wali/the Shīʿī īmām, has constituted a continuous, uninterrupted, chain of proofs since the beginning of humanity, “a chain that guarantees universal salvation” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 43). Wilāya, as it is portrayed in these sources, is the important component of the early Īmāmīsm, itself a “nonrational esoteric tradition ... which prevailed up to the middle of the fourth/tenth century [and] it represents the pre ‘kalāmīc and pre-philosophical phase of the doctrine” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 28).

One can add more into it by listing features such as generosity, abstemiousness (zuhd), veracity (ṣidq), valor (shujāʿa), precedence in accepting Islam (sābiqa) and ʿilm (both religious and general knowledge) as the attributes of the legitimate leadership
among Shīʿas (Afsaruddin, 2002, pp. 80-112). Afsaruddin argues that the excellences (faḍīlas) that Shīʿa scholars held for their imāms were different from their Sunni counterparts; though both emphasized common attributes as well. Shīʿas mostly believed that “the possession of knowledge, in combination with other virtues” (Afsaruddin, 2002, p. 113), superseded more ‘physical’ attributes, such as lineage to the Prophet or maturity in accepting Islam. ‘Ilm referred to a vast range of categories and embraced taʾwīl (the Qurʾānic interpretation), knowledge of religious precepts and duties, issuing fatwā, legal decision-making, and relating traditions from the Prophet. Along with these definitions, Shīʿa authors emphasized “the esoteric and intuitive aspect of ‘ilm which was granted to Ali [as well as other imāms, as opposed to other Rashidun caliphs] as a special dispensation” (Afsaruddin, 2002, pp. 114 ff).

The possession of esoteric and exoteric knowledge by imāms was an inseparable component of the doctrine of wilāya, and most paramount, by which they demanded fully-professed submission and loyalty of “every human, animal, and inanimate object” in order to win salvation. Therefore, “belief in wilāya demarcates the “saved” from the “unsaved” in all of Creation, making for a holistic worldview in which every living earthly being, non-living thing, and celestial being is subject to, and judged by, this cosmic setoriological imperative” (Afsaruddin, 2002, p. 106). Afsaruddin rightly maintains that “religious knowledge invested in the Shiʿī imām is ontological”, because it has “to exceed, even bypass that of the ordinary person’s; thus it can only be obtained by special divine dispensation” (Afsaruddin, 2002, p. 144).

The concept of light (nūr/noor), or primordial light merits particular attention as well. The ‘light of wilāya’, which is drawn from divine light, was created a few
thousand years before the creation of the world and was stored in every imām (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 30 ff). Wilāya is also a sacred pre-temporal covenant (mithāq/‘ahd, innuendo of allegiance, loyalty), which was taken in pre-eternity, when the pre-existent entities of the Fourteen Luminous entities were created “from the light of His glory”, and their names derived from His own names (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 31 ff). The term al-mithāq is used more than twenty times in the Qurʾān and most probably means “an Alliance between God and humanity, and with the prophets in particular” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 34).

Wilāya is the sacred mission of imāms, and the spiritual and temporal direction of the faithful. It is one of the pillars of the sacred, if not to say of Islam, and its acceptance and submission to it is a precondition for all the rest of the canonical obligations. Amir-Moezzi has listed a number of aḥādīth and sayings of imāms in which walāya is included separately as one of the five pillars of the Faith, after prayers, alms, fast, and pilgrimage to Mecca. Moreover, even the shahāda per se contains walāya, and stands after unicity of God and the prophethood of the Prophet, which testifies to the fact that walāya, as the core of imamate, itself the heart of nubuwwa, is the indispensable complement to the mission of the Prophet; it is the bātin of the zāhir (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, pp. 241 ff).

A. Wilāyat al-Takwīniya

The idea of wilāyat al-takwīniya, or the absolute right of the wali/imām to act upon the cosmos, has a long history in Shīʿa tradition. From the formation of Shīʿism in the early second century, and precisely from the time of the fifth Imām, al-Baqir, there existed a number of companions who claimed the metaphysical attributes and powers
for the *Imāms*, and held extremist ideas on the knowledge of them, for instance, *imām*'s immortality, and attributing peculiar *karāmas* (miraculous grace/charismata) to them. Another extremist view regarding *imāms* has to do with the metaphysical status of the imamate in creating the cosmos and *imām*'s involvement in creation. *Ghullāt* (extremists) had reasons for their beliefs, such as their extreme love and devotion to *imāms*, their enmity and even hatred toward the household of the Prophet, and their intention of promoting promiscuity by removing the *sharīʿa* and introducing *imāms* as God. Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī maintains that these three factors makes an “ominous triangle” which has had a harmful effect on Islam over history (Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, 1385, pp. 77-78).

Regardless of the time of their appearance, one can claim that *ghuluw* is almost as old as *Shīʿism*, and though appearing under different fronts, the core remains unchanged. *Ghullāt* held divine attributes for *imāms*, among them immortality and *imāms*’ involvement in creation are most prominent. As we mentioned above, *Imām* al-Baqir had a number of companions, such as Mughayra-t-ibn Saʿīd, who himself had followers who fabricated false *ahādīth* and incorporated them into the *ḥadīth* books of the companions of the *Imām*. This method of fabricating *ḥadīth*, which apparently began with them, continued during *Imām* al-Sadiq (d. 148 H/765) and reached its climax during *Imām* al-Rida (d. 203 H/818). During the time of the sixth *Imām* it took an organized form, to the extent that people such as Abū Khaṭṭāb formed a group that systematically created false *ahādīth* and incorporated them into the *ḥadīth* books, sending them to different cities. The *Imām* wasted no time in renouncing them, and in some cases even cursed them (Ṣāliḥī Najafābādī, 1385, *passim*).
With regard to the relationship between the idea of wilāyat al-takwīniya and ghuluw, wilāyat al-takwīniya is the crystalized form of ghuluw which has made its way into the conceptions of wilāya from the School of ibn ‘Arabī onward, becoming an inseparable component. Wilāya, therefore, came to be understood relative to wilāyat al-takwīniya; to the extent that other features of wilāya, such as 'ilm, piety, valor, spiritual abstinence and repentance were overshadowed by it. The culmination of this trend is Shaykhīsm and the Schools of Tehran and Qum (which will be discussed in chapters two and three, respectively), in which the fourteen luminary infallible figures are vested with supernatural attributes and are regarded as God’s aids in creating the world. One can relate this development to the “popularization of Shi‘ism” which had been realized by Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī in the Safawid era, and “had secured the religious royalty of the masses” (Amir Arjomand, 1984, p. 219) to hierocracy. The incorporation of Shi‘ism into popular rituals, and the mob’s interest in exotic images and miraculous attributes of imams, should be understood from this perspective.

As the twentieth century drew near, the traditional criterion of wilāya became prominent again, particularly in the writings of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. His emphasis is on piety and asceticism, repentance, and spiritual conduct; hence, God-given attributes such as wilāyat al-takwīniya - as an inseparable component of wilāyat al-khāṣṣah - is eclipsed. Wilāyat Nāmīh (the Book of Wilāya) of Ṭabāṭabā’ī, which contains his conceptualization of wilāya, can be regarded as a return to the classic ʿirfānī tradition, and is significant from this perspective. Khomeinism, another contemporary discourse on wilāya, allocates no room to wilāyat al-takwīniya, because of the prevalence of jurisprudence over other discourses on one hand, and the politicization of wilāya on the other (which will be discussed in chapters four and five).
Addressing early Shīʿa and Sunni sources, including imāms’ aḥādīth (ironically those that have been used by Amir-Moezzi to prove the supernaturality of imāms), Hossein Modarressi develops arguments to invalidate the narratives of the Ghullāt and the idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya. He also shows the reaction of contemporaries of the extremists: “the Imamite scholars and transmitters of hadīth in Qum … reacted very harshly to the Mufawwiḏa’s expansionism” (Modarressi, 1993, p. 34). They started their endeavour by exhorting people to declare: “anyone who attributed any sign of super-humanity to the Prophet or to imāms as extremist and to expel such people from their town” (Modarressi, 1993, P. 34). The people of Qum, in fact, did not differentiate between ghuluw and tafwīḍ, and believed that anyone who attributed supernaturality to imāms to be heretics and nonbelievers (Modarressi, 1993, pp. 35-36).

B. Research Questions

We may identify three main research questions which this thesis will attempt to address. Firstly, how has wilāya (guardianship) been conceptualized during the period of eighteenth to twentieth centuries; with particular reference to the thought of Ayatollah Khomeini? Have the conceptualizations of wilāya remained stagnant and unchanged? And, how has ibn ʿArabi’s theory on wilāya impacted on later scholars?

C. Discourse on Method

This section discusses some trends in the history of ideas that facilitate exploration of the way in which the present study will be carried out. In recent years, “intellectual history” has been studied from different perspectives by many scholars. Intellectual history in its new forms is engendered from trends such as the hermeneutic methods of German thinkers like Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey; the
new literary history of French critics such as Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve; the “new history” of culture which was born in America; and the new historicism of the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce (Kramer, 2004, p. 85).

There are other trends, such as analytic philosophy and post-modernism, that have helped to shape intellectual history. Kramer emphasizes the “eclectic nature” of intellectual history, and argues that it is this “eclectic desire to understand, contextualize, and take seriously the truth claims of every philosophical or cultural tradition [that] has given intellectual historians their distinctive disciplinary identity” (Kramer, 2004, p. 85). Thus, intellectual historians create a dialogue with ideas, cultures, and interpretations of human experience (Kramer, 2004, p. 85).

Having said this, I will first discuss Quentin Skinner’s approach in his book *Visions of Politics*, and focus on factors such as the relationship between language and power, text and historical context, and structure and agency. I will also emphasize the significance of social conventions, the mythology of perennial questions in the history of ideas, and the issues of author’s intentions and motives. Then, building upon Mark Bevir’s critiques on Skinner’s conventionalism, which are reflected in his book “the logic of the History of Ideas”, I will construct a methodology for this research.

**C.1. Skinner’s Conventionalism**

In his *Visions of Politics* Skinner argues that if a historian of ideas wishes to understand any serious utterance, he needs “to grasp something over and above the sense and reference of the terms used to express it” (Skinner, 2002, p. 104). A historian of ideas needs to find means to recover what the agent may have been doing in saying what he said, and therefore understanding what the agent may have meant by issuing
an utterance with just that sense and reference (Skinner, 2002, pp. 140 ff). The significance of language and the speech acts theory, which entailed the history of ideas, brought to his attention the connection of power and language.

In terms of the nexus between these two, Skinner maintains that concepts and beliefs do not have merely communicative power, but authoritative claim and emotional force as well. Besides, Skinner proposes that to uncover the meaning of the past, one should start with investigating the “texture of moral, social and political thinking as it was actually carried on in the past” (Skinner, 2002, p. 6). The result would be a deep interconnection between philosophical arguments and claims to social power (Skinner, 2002, p. 7). In terms of the relationship between structure and agency, Skinner gives priority to agency over structure in social explanation and believes that social agents are able to operate within social structures and shape their world (Skinner, 2002, p. 7). Skinner criticizes common assumptions pursuing perennial themes, eternal questions and universal agendas in the history of ideas, and believes that these expectations have led “to a series of confusions and exegetical absurdities that have bedeviled the history of ideas for too long” (Skinner, 2002, p. 58). Employing Skinner’s terminology, he addresses some dangers, as well as “various kinds of historical absurdity” (Skinner, 2002, p. 59), guiding a historian of ideas to look at historical texts to find “a given author’s doctrines on all the mandatory themes” (Skinner, 2002, p. 59). “The mythology of doctrines” (Skinner, 2002, p. 59), along with “the mythology of coherence” (Skinner, 2002, p. 67) and “the mythology of parochialism” (Skinner, 2002, pp. 74-75), are three main mythologies that can distort a historian of ideas from interpreting past ideas.
Skinner’s methodology is composed of three main components in reading and understanding historical texts. At the first step, after suggesting the primary steps a historian of ideas should tread to better grasp meaning and understanding, Skinner turns to his main elaboration on textualism and contextualism and examines their fundamental tenants. By rejecting the idea of the self-sufficiency of texts, he maintains that by choosing an appropriate method, a historian of ideas will not only be able to give an account of the meaning of what was said in the past, and of “what the writer in question may have meant by saying what was said” (Skinner, 2002, p. 79) - which is the intention of authors - but also will pay due attention to the intentions and purposes of a text per se.

To summarize, a historian of ideas cannot be hopeful of reaching “a sense of the context of utterance” (Skinner, 2002, p. 84) and be optimistic about solving the difficulty of past text; “for the context itself may be ambiguous. Rather, [he] shall have to study all the various contexts in which the words were used – all the functions they served, all the various things that could be done with them” (Skinner, 2002, p. 84). He cannot be wishful in his search for the author’s intention toward the understanding of a given idea, because these ideas and the terms in which they were expressed “are likely to have been used ... with varying and incompatible intentions” (Skinner, 2002, p. 84).

Skinner states that the appropriate focus should be on linguistic context(s), and all the facts about the social context of the given text12 should be embodied “as a part of this linguistic enterprise” (Skinner, 2002, p. 87). The priority of the linguistic context over the social context leads Skinner to claim that the latter should be treated “as the ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings
it might, in principle, have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate” (Skinner, 2002, p. 87). Another important component of Skinner's approach is the term “convention” and its role in the performance of actions in the relevant social contexts. Skinners suggests that in reading the history of ideas a historian should turn his focus from individuals to a more holistic unit, social conventions, and with this, he ties “understanding” to social conventions. Therefore, “grasping what is conventional” (Skinner, 2002, p. 142) does not only mean that a performed action should be understood according to a convention, but rather “includes the wider notion of understanding the established assumptions and expectations of a given culture” (Skinner, 2002, p. 142).

C.2. Post-Analytic Philosophy and Bevir’s Intentionalism

One of the main critics of Skinner's approach, particularly his idea of intention, is Mark Bevir, who has discussed in depth intellectual history from a post-analytic perspective. Bevir defines the logic of the history of ideas as the concern with “the way historians of ideas reason about historical data, not with historical data itself” (Bevir, 2004, p. 8). So, the logic provides historians with “a normative account of reasoning [appropriate to it], not a historical, sociological, or psychological one” (Bevir, 2004, p. 8), or the “conceptual form and content of an ideal type of reasoning” (Bevir, 2004, p. 9).

Like Skinner, Bevir’s approach is inspired by Wittgenstein and the relationship between philosophy and language. On the significance of language, Bevir argues that forms of justifications and explanations involve the study of language rather than reality, because language is a part of reality. In some cases, the study of language ensues
even at the expense of other parts of reality (Bevir, 2004, pp. 11 ff). Bevir explains that the work of philosophers in clarifying the meanings of words, is in principle an effort to unpack the grammar of concepts (Bevir, 2004, p. 14). By language, however, Bevir means “the concepts of ordinary language” (Bevir, 2004, p. 16) than a specialized language; the latter is used in the natural sciences and not in philosophy (Bevir, 2004, p. 16). Therefore, the logic of the history of ideas is “the understanding of the world expressed by a given set of concepts” (Bevir, 2004, p. 26).

Bevir explains that the subject matter of the history of ideas is meaning, and therefore interpretation. By “meaning” he suggests a hermeneutic meaning, in contrast to semantic and linguistic meanings, which denotes being “understood in terms of truth conditions” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27). Hermeneutic meaning leads a historian of ideas to intentionalism, because “the hermeneutic meaning of an utterance derives from the intentions of the author in making it” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27). Distinguishing between “weak intentionalism” and “strong intentionalism”, Bevir explains that a historian of ideas should concern him/herself with the former, as it “allows for the unconscious and for changes of intent during the act of making an utterance” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27), while the latter “regards intentions as conscious and prior to utterances” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27). Bevir concludes that “weak intentions are individual viewpoints” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27), and a historian of ideas studies works “in order to recover hermeneutic meanings understood as expressions of beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, p. 28).

Rejecting contextualists like J. G. A. Pocock, conventionalists like Skinner, as well as atomic individualism of scholars associated with intentionalism, Bevir argues that human beings are able to act creatively in any given social context, while at the same
time recognizing the significance of the social context which necessarily influences what people see, believe, and say (Bevir, 2004, p. 33). Therefore, intentionalism - which is based on individual beliefs as weak intentions or hermeneutic meaning - is compatible with the social context. In terms of his critiques on Skinner's conventionalism, Bevir rejects the central belief of conventionalism (along with Wittgenstein), that “the hermeneutic meaning of a given utterance comes from its conventional meaning” (Bevir, 2004, p. 41). He calls this a “fallacy” (Bevir, 2004, p. 46).

Bevir suggests that in order to establish a theory of meaning in the history of ideas, one should re-define “hermeneutic meaning” through accepting change as a formative component of this kind of meaning. Thus, we have to abandon all attempts to fix hermeneutic meanings by reference to any type of social meaning” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 48-49). Hermeneutic meanings, Bevir argues, are both irreducible to social conventions and to semantic/linguistic meanings, which are abstract and social, and are “defined by what an author meant by a particular utterance on a particular occasion” (Bevir, 2004, p. 50). Therefore, hermeneutic meanings - that only concern historians - derive from intentions (Bevir, 2004, pp. 52-52). One of the key terms in Bevir’s approach is “the expressed beliefs”, which are individual viewpoints or weak intentions, defined as “the meaning an utterance had for its author or a later reader, whether consciously or unconsciously” (Bevir, 2004, p. 171). He maintains that if the task of the historian of ideas is “to study only the meaning of the action” (Bevir, 2004, p. 135), then he needs to concern himself only with the beliefs it expresses (Bevir, 2004, pp. 135 ff).

Bevir uses the term “webs of beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 190 ff) to imply that “the objectivity of a belief depends on its relationship to various other beliefs, [because]
there cannot be any self-supporting beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 190-191). Webs of beliefs, which are “boundless, spherical networks, not hierarchical pyramids” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191), constitute networks of interconnected concepts with the concepts and the connections between them; being defined in part, by beliefs about external reality (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 ff). Bevir believes that we cannot say what constitutes webs of beliefs, but we know that there exists a reciprocal relationship between it and an inherited tradition, because “neither makes sense without the other” (Bevir, 2004, p. 195).

An inherited tradition is a common heritage which already exists, and people adopt their webs of beliefs against it; therefore, individuals are capable of altering the traditions they inherit by changing the totality of the beliefs they hold (Bevir, 2004, pp. 196-197). Here, Bevir emphasizes the possibility of agency and the ability of individuals to not only change an inherited tradition, but also to migrate from this tradition to another (Bevir, 2004, pp. 197 ff). The freedom of agents and their power to adopt this or that web of beliefs, as well as their capability to alter inherited tradition is one of the most fascinating aspects of Bevir’s approach (Bevir, 2004, pp. 199 ff).

In a nutshell, a tradition or social context is “a set of understandings someone acquires as an initial web of beliefs during a process of socialization” (Bevir, 2004, p. 200), in the sense that we cannot conceive of anyone ever holding a belief separate from its tradition as a starting point, yet individuals do respond selectively to it (Bevir, 2004, pp. 200-202). Along with Bevir’s emphasis on the freedom of individuals to interact with tradition and respond to it selectively, another significant aspect of his approach is the idea of fluidity of tradition which stands against essentialists who “equate
traditions with fixed essences to which they ascribe variations” (Bevir, 2004, p. 202). Rejecting Foucault’s notion of episteme and the governance of one single episteme in each epoch, Bevir holds “a plurality of traditions that [are] present at any given time” (Bevir, 2004, p. 211) on one hand, and the power of choice that every historian has to define his traditions, on the other (Bevir, 2004, p. 211).

Having said all this, in the present research, I construct a methodology on the basis of Skinner’s conventionalism and Bevir’s critiques of it; particularly Bevir’s individualism seems to be significant. His emphasis on the role of individuals in selecting a web of beliefs freely, migrating from one tradition to another, or the existence of a number of inherited traditions in every epoch, instead of one dominant episteme, will help us to observe how many different scholars from the eighteenth to the twentieth century have interacted with the intellectual traditions of their time, and stepped beyond them to develop arguments for the conceptions of wilāya. Therefore, from the work of Skinner and Bevir we may identify the following main methodological points which will be deployed in this thesis: the importance of agency over structure, authoritative claim and emotional force of concepts and beliefs, evolution of themes over time, and the role of individuals in adopting their webs of beliefs against an inherited tradition and change it to their liking.

D. Definition of Terms

I use the following terms:

D.1. Theoretical mysticism (‘irfān-i naẓārī): “the type of speculative mysticism or theosophy associated with ibn ‘Arabī as philosophized and systematized by his disciple Qūnawī and the later members of the ibn ‘Arabī School” (Koushki, 2012, p. 30)13, such
as the *ḥakīms* of the Schools of Isfahan, Tehran and Qum. It also found some advocates among letrists such as ibn Turkah Isfahānī.

**D.2. The School of Isfahan (Isfahan School of Philosophy):** “a philosophical and mystical movement patronized by the court of Shah ʿAbbās I (r. 1588-1629), centered in the new Safawid capital of Isfahan, and initiated as part of the wider Safawid cultural renaissance associated with his reign” (Rizvi, 2012, p. 1). The term was coined for the first time by contemporary scholars Henry Corbin (1903-78) and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1933-), and refers to a phase which is marked by the rise in “metaphysical speculation and mystical experience” (Rizvi, 2012, p. 1) as opposed to the juristic hierocracy.

**D.3. Al-ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliya (ḥikma):** refers to the doctrine and philosophy developed by Ṣadr a-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Šadrā, d. 1045/1635-36). In order to understand ḥikma (lit. wisdom) in the Šadrī ţan sense of the term, first we need to know the nature of philosophy in Islam. For Muslim philosophers, philosophy had relevance to practical life, and “was a practice and an art whose goal was wisdom” (Rizvi, 2009, p. 34), and for Mullā Šadrā it pursued the ultimate goal (*summum bonum*) and the highest good “of enlightened engagement (*maʿrifā*) and goodly action” (Rizvi, 2009, p. 34). Therefore, for Šadrā as well as other medieval philosophers, philosophy was regarded as “a religious commitment that obscures the conceptual boundary between theory and practice” (Rizvi, 2009, p. 34).

**D.4. Khomeinism:** By Khomeinism, I mean the dominant political culture of pre-revolutionary Iran which was “built around a political and pragmatist reinterpretation of religious scripture that evolved into revolution, and is neither symbolic of a pre-modern movement nor a post-modern phenomenon”. Khomeinism is different from
traditionalism, as it departs from the Shi'a tradition of political quietism in favor of an activist antagonistic ideology advocating socio-political change. Likewise, it is not fundamentalism, as fundamentalism was generated from American Protestantism. Although it criticizes modernity, it is a modern phenomenon, as Khomeini “insists on some absolute, a priori foundation as the basis of its ideology” (Mahdavi, 2014, pp. 55-56).

D.5. The wilāya Apparatus: one of the key terms here is “apparatus”, to formulate ideas, theories, and doctrines of wilāya into a coherent framework and provide a better understanding of the conceptions of wilāya, as well as its historical functions.14 The term “apparatus” was used for the first time by Michel Foucault as a technical term in his strategy of thought. In an interview about his books, as well as his preference for the new terms such as “apparatuses” and “disciplines”, Foucault explains:

“With the notion of apparatus, I find myself in a difficulty which I haven’t yet been properly able to get out of. I said that the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, etc. The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. In seeking in The Order of Things to write a history of the episteme, I was still caught in an impasse. What I should like to do now is to try and show that
what I call an apparatus is a much more general case of the episteme; or rather, that the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous" (Foucault, 1980, pp. 196-197).

The term “apparatus” was frequently used by Foucault from the mid-1970s onward when he began to concern himself with what is called “governmentality”, or the “government of men”. He never offered any complete definition of the term though, and instead, used the term “positivite” or positivity which is an etymological neighbor of dispositif, though he did not define this term either (Agamben, 2009, p. 3). The Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (1942 - ...), further elaborated on the term, and by referring to “a set of practices and mechanisms (both linguistic and nonlinguistic, juridical, technical and military) that aim to face an urgent need and to obtain an effect that is more or less immediate” (Agamben, 2009, p. 8). What was important for Agamben was the role of the apparatus in the play of power, in the administration of body, of house, and of government, and more generally management (Agamben, 2009, pp. 8-10). Agamben expanded his definition, and called the apparatus:

“literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behavior, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular
telephones, and – why not – language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses – one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face” (Agamben, 2009, p. 14).

For Agamben, there are two great classes: living beings (or substances) and apparatuses, and between them, as a third class, subjects. Subject is the one that results from the relation, or “from the relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses” (Agamben, p. 14), though in some cases these two overlap, and it happens when the same individual, the same substance, can be the place of multiple processes of subjectification. So, as Agamben recapitulates, “the boundless growth of apparatuses in our time corresponds to the equally extreme proliferation in processes of subjectification” (Agamben, 2009, p. 15).

In brief, apparatus is mentioned when different ways of play of power are behind the scene to administer, manage, control and finally subjectify individuals. Addressing Agamben’s conception of apparatus, the theories of wilāya, as will be observed, have been generated over the centuries to control and supervise minds, bodies, actions and practices of individuals, and from this perspective, wilāya has been turned into a machine that demands obedience and forces individuals into becoming believers. Individuals, then, are both the agents of wilāya and at the same time; the subject of this all-masculine apparatus that not only has an ontological nexus to Divinity; but also executes power on behalf of Divinity, therefore, any disobedience targets His dignity and grandeur.
The Introduction should be treated as the foundational chapter for further discussion on *wilāya* throughout this thesis. As observed, it sought to discuss *wilāya* and its roots in Islamic sacred sources, including the *Qurʾān*, *ḥadīth* and statements of the *Imāms*. Research on this term had an etymological aspect too, which was studied in the origin and historical development of *wilāya* as they were cited in the early *Shīʿa* *ḥadīth* compilations. With regard to its status in the *Qurʾān* and *ḥadīth*, it can be concluded that the pair *wilāya*/*walāya* is a well-versed term with a solid foundation in the early Islamic and *Shīʿa* tradition. It was observed that it is around the *wilāya* of *Imāms*, as the only legitimate heirs of the Prophet that, the *Shīʿa* discourse of leadership and authority has been formed. Pertinent to this, is the early *Shīʿa* conceptualization of *wilāya* through which the *Shīʿa* Community has come to identify itself, and through which, historically, it drew its boundaries. In the next chapter, the mystical conceptualization of *wilāya* in the School of ibn ʿArabī will be studied. It will be observed how this term, by being located at the centre of the *Akbarīan* apparatus, finds new dimensions and significantly changes forever the course of theorizing and conceptualizing this term.

---

1 - For all *Qurʾānic* translations throughout this thesis I use, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Others (eds), *the Study Quran, a New Translation and Commentary*, 2015 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers).

2 - This verse is famous as the ‘*wilāya* verse’ and refers to Ali who endowed his ring to a beggar when he was praying. In this verse, the *wilāya* of the Prophet and of *Imāms* are not mentioned explicitly, though *Shīʿa* scholars have interpreted the term ‘*ṣādiqīn*’ (the Truthful) as them. [http://www.islamquest.net/fa/archive/question/fa1817#](http://www.islamquest.net/fa/archive/question/fa1817#) last accessed January 6, 2017.

3 - The abovementioned *ḥadīth* is not mentioned in *Shīʿa* sources, and it is only Sunni mystical sources that have cited it.

4 - Or ordinary believers who have reached the status of self-annihilation (*fanā*) and gained divine attributes (*akhlaq a-llāh*).

5 - Along with the importance of *sirr* in understanding the office of *wilāya*, Sufis have enumerated two other reasons for the secrecy of *awlīyā* under the divine *ḥijāb*. The first one is *awlīyā*’s desire for obscurity (*khanūh*) and their dislike of being known or recognized by people. It is their insistence in keeping themselves hidden from people and choosing an obscure life that preserve them from being known and killed by them (Himmatī, 1391, pp. 9-15). The third reason is that since the interest of the world and its survival depends on the existence of *awlīyā*, they must be unknown. The absence of *awlīyā* is equal to the destruction of the world (Himmatī, pp. 15-17).
tried to decode what Foucault meant by this technical term. See: Giorgio Agamben, used it and illuminated it in their writings. In his essay called "What is an Apparat Turka

According to Skinner, the social context of a given text cannot independently lead a historian of

caused almost all the early compilers of the Shi'a hadith not only to discredit "the so-called Uthmanian Qur'ànic vulgate" (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 231) as something falsified and censured, but also to set forth the idea that the much more voluminous and credited version of the Qur'án, known as 'the Qur'án of the imáms' (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 236), having been disclosed to the Prophet; concerning the walāya of the imáms is the truthful Book and provides "a literal Qur'ànic basis for the political and theological doctrines of the imamate" (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 237).

Hassan Ansari has shown that how the idea of the necessity of hujja has been important in Twelver Imamite, and from the first half of the third century of Hegira, Imamite theologians such as Faṣl ibn Shádhán came to conceptualize the concept of imám and hujja. See: Hassan Ansari, Imamate, in online Dá'yratu-l-Maʾārif-i Buzurg-i Islámi, Vol 10, 1392 (Tehran: Intishárat-i Dá'yratu-l-Mаʾārif-i Buzurg-i Islámi), pp. 137-141 <http://www.cgie.org.ir/fa/publication/entryview/4686>, last accessed 5/1/17.

They were active during Imám al-Baqir (114 H/732) and were hidden among his companions.

A sect within the Ghullát that "abrogated the shari'a and did not consider themselves bound by religious obligations, including prayer" (Modarressi, 1993, p. 35).

According to Skinner, the social context of a given text cannot independently lead a historian of ideas to the recovery of the intentions of author, but only to discovery of the author's past motivations; which is the linguistic context of a certain period of time, when a given text was composed.

Apparatus or "dispositif", in French was a vague concept in Foucault's later thought. He used it quite often, especially from the mid-1970s, when he begins to concern himself with what he call "governmentality" or the "government of men". Both Giorgio Agamben and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), used it and illuminated it in their writings. In his essay called "What is an Apparatus?" (2009), Agamben tried to decode what Foucault meant by this technical term. See: Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus? Translated into English by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, 2009 (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Chapter One: Ibn ‘Arabī and Wilāya

The subject matter of this chapter is the study and critical analysis of the conceptions of wilāya, the seal of wilāya (khatm al-wilāya, also known as the seal of the sainthood), nubuwwa (prophethood), khilāfa (vicegerency), and al-insān al-kāmil (the Perfect Man), in the writings of ibn ‘Arabī (d. 637 H/1240). The focus is on a number of his texts and treatises, such as Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Bezels of Wisdom) ‘Anqā’ Mughrīb (the Fabulous Gryphon) Risālat al-Anwār (Treatise of the Lights) published in Majmū’a Rasā’il (Collected Treatises) and Tajalīyat ul-Illāhiya (Divine Theophanies). To this end, the present chapter starts with the biography, studies, journeys and bibliography of ibn ‘Arabī, followed by his conceptions of the abovementioned terms. The purpose is to show how he was inspired by previous mystics and mystical traditions which would have been available in his time, what he added to the existing traditions, and what he left as his legacy for future generations.

All this is highly relevant to the overall content of this study, because it enables researchers to keep track of the conceptualization of the abovementioned terms, and particularly the doctrines of wilāya and khatm al-wilāya, from the earliest mystics such as al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī in the third century up to the seventh century, when the Andalusian mystic makes them the central concepts of his mysticism. By doing so, it places the researcher in a better position to answer the second question of this study: “whether the conceptualizations of wilāya have remained stagnant and unchanged throughout history”. Addressing the doctrine of al-insān al-kāmil, whose conceptualization pre-dates ibn ‘Arabī,
the intention is to study its conceptual development from ibn ‘Arabi onward, and to delve into this question that how later scholars, here Shīʿa mystics and philosophers, understood it, interpreted it and adjusted it into their doctrinal platform. These two questions are prologues to the major question which are “whether Akbarīan mysticism was inexorable for later scholars, and if not, why the majority of them wanted to interpret him from a Shīʿa perspective”?

As it is already mentioned, for example, on the conceptions of *khatm al-wilāya*, *al-Shaykh al-Akbar* (the Greatest Master) was inspired by *al-Ḥakīm* al-Tirmidhī (d. 295 H/910) and his theory of *khatm al-wilāya*, though ibn ‘Arabī’s contribution on both the concept and the referents of *wilāyat al-‘āmmah* and *wilāyat al-khāṣṣah* are more impressive on later Sufis. In certain areas, such as the theory of the Perfect Man, ibn ‘Arabī retains supremacy over his predecessors and successors.1 *Al-Shaykh al-Akbar*’s legacy, however, is significant and critical to such an extent that subsequent mystics, whether in agreement with him or not, were in different ways influenced by him. Pertinent to this, is his impact on Shīʿa scholars and on the growth and development of Shīʿa mysticism in later centuries, in the sense that ibn ‘Arabī’s intellectual legacy came to be read and interpreted with Shīʿa concerns and interests.

1.1. Bibliography, Travels and Works

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥy al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Arabī al-Ḥatamī (d. 638 H/1240), later known as *al-Shaykh al-Akbar*, was born in Murcia in Andalusia (Arabic al-Andalus) in today’s Spain. When he was eight years-old, his family moved to Seville (Arabic Ishbiliyyah), and his father started an official career there. It was in Seville that ibn
ʿArabī began his primary education with famous teachers on the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, literature and the other related subjects, and received ījāza (authorization) of teaching, as well as khirqa (lit. cloak). It was also at this time, the period of jāhilyya (lit. ignorance) that he, as a teenager “felt drawn in a different direction. He had a presentiment of certain spiritual need” (Addas, 1993, p. 31). So, the young ibn ‘Arabī was “divided between his desire to enjoy the good things of this low world and his desire for God; the period when he had a vague apprehension of the Truth but did not yet know it in its fullness” (Addas, 1993, p. 31).

Ibn ‘Arabī is characterized by his several adventurous journeys to different parts of the Muslim world, as well as having dreams and visions. His journeys were both geographical and spiritual, shaping his personality as the most celebrated ʿārif (mystic) of the Muslim world. There are two viewpoints regarding ibn ‘Arabī’s methods of learning: first, from an early age he became acquainted with numerous shaykhs and benefited from a number of masters, both in Seville and various other Muslim cities; from Islamic Spain to Baghdad and to Konya. These figures, who were mostly ʿārifs as well as a handful of theologians and jurists, impressed and shaped his ideas on ʿirfān (mysticism), fiqh (jurisprudence) and kalām (theology). Among those who impressed him greatly were the Malāmatīyya (also Malāmatīs, from the Arabic word malāmah or blame), who were praised by ibn ‘Arabī as the owners of the most exalted status of wilāya and whose ranks were only comparable to prophethood (Khurāsānī, in http://lib.eshia.ir/23022/4/1507, p. 5).

On the other hand, there are scholars, such as Gerald Elmore who argues that he was not unduly influenced by any personal teacher and therefore can be regarded as “a perfect example of the theodidactic, Uwaysī mystic – a Sufi with no (visible) master among men”
However, there is no room for doubt about his masters initiated him with regular Islamic ʿilm, and as Claude Addas has argued, he “undertook to deepen his knowledge of the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth” (Addas, 1993, p. 44). Addas provides us with the names of his teachers, as well as the legal and spiritual schools that influenced the young ibn ʿArabī (Addas, 1993, pp. 44 ff). Therefore, his journey bears the imprint of both the regular Islamic training he gained from his masters, as well as the illumination (fāṭḥ) which he obtained during a retreat (khalwa), as the fruit of a long period of initiatic discipline (rīyāḍa) (Addas, 1993, p. 35). As mentioned earlier, one of the characteristics of ibn ʿArabī were his dreams and visions of figures such as the Prophet, and Sufis - among them women - all of whom came to inspire him with their words and enunciations. Along with dreams and visions, he received a number of “transcendent inspirations” (Nettler, 2003, p. 5), through which (by his claim) most of his works were revealed to him by God. For example, Ḥiṣn (Meccan Revelations) and Mawāqīʿ al-Nuẓūm (the Stations of Stars) which were later written by him in a short period of time, are among those divine gifts (Khurāsānī, p. 5).

Ibn ʿArabī’s long period of physical, intellectual and religious travel helped him both to teach and learn from others. Through this exchange, he not only achieved “an impressive literary productivity closely linked with his physical movements” (Nettler, 2003, p. 1), but also gained “an original perspective that [as will be shown in this chapter] in later Islam served to re-orientate religious thought, whether Sufī or other, in a most profound way” (Nettler, 2003, p. 2). Settling in Damascus proved to be most beneficial for ibn ʿArabī in several ways. He completed the first draft of al-Futūḥat (Addas, 1993, p. 285), as well as Ḥiṣn (Khurāsānī, p. 7). His intellectual and spiritual experiences blossomed as
well. In addition, he gained “the good will, friendship, and protection offered him by the powerful family of the Banū Zakī ... [a factor that] enabled him to pursue his teaching in complete tranquility” (Addas, 1993, p. 254). He died in twenty-eight of Rabī’ al-Thānī 638/16 November 1240, at the age of seventy-eight, and was buried in the family cemetery of qāḍī (also qāzī, lit. the judge) Muḥy al-Dīn ibn Zakī (Khurāsānī, p. 7).

For the purpose of my research, which is the reading and analysis of the concept of *wilāya* and other related terms in the writings of Ibn ‘Arabī, I have chosen a few of his key texts, such as *Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*, with the glosses of Abu al-‘Alā ‘Afīfī,6 ’Anqā’ Mughrib and *Risālat al-Anwār* (Apostleship of Lights). There are two difficulties with reading and understanding Ibn ‘Arabī’s texts: the intricacies of his texts and the complexities of the Arabic language he uses. Addressing Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought and language, Nettler rightly argues that both his Sufi thought and language are highly complex, in some cases overlapped and ambiguous, and as such, “resist any simple and straightforward understanding” (Nettler, 2003, p. 2).

1.2. The Perfect Man

The intent of the Perfect Man, which constitutes the mystical anthropology of all the ʿīrfānī trends in the Muslim world, is very much indebted to Ibn ‘Arabī and his School. It is well known that it was *al-Shaykh al-Akbar*, who, for the first time in the history of Islamic mysticism, turned the Perfect Man; the archetype, ideal exemplar, the Minor Cosmos (microcosm), and the medium by which Deity looks at His creatures; into a cornerstone of his theoretical mysticism (ʿīrfān-i nazārī). The notion, however, as a number of scholars including Nicholson, Abu al-ʿAlā ‘Afīfī and Takeshita have argued, is almost as old as Sufism.

Masataka Takeshita offers an elaborated elucidation of this notion in the thoughts of ibn ‘Arabī in his doctoral thesis, “ibn ‘Arabī’s Theory of the Perfect Man and its Place in the History of the Islamic Thought”. Along with its historical genealogy, from pre-Islamic traditions up to ibn ‘Arabī, Takeshita explains anthropocentrism as the predominant feature of ibn ‘Arabī’s anthropology, and shows how he used the themes and motives familiar to early Sufism (Takeshita, 1986, p. 8). Although his anthropology manifests obvious similarities to that of the early Christian fathers, “the notion of theology” of the image on the basis of the famous hadith that “God created Adam in His image”, was changed dramatically by Muslim Sufis. Their belief was that, Adam, as the stereotype, was created according to God’s names and attributes, and not according to His essence as opposed to the Christian doctrine. Due to the significance of tawḥīd in Islam, Muslim theologians distinguished between the essence and the names and attributes, and in this way, endowed the latter with an intermediary position between the absolute Godhead and the creature (Takeshita, 1986, pp. 15-17).

Without digging into historical debates on the theory of the Perfect Man prior to ibn ‘Arabī, what is important for discussion here is that it was ibn ‘Arabī who used the phrase “the Perfect Man” for the first time, and mostly used it to describe Adam, who was created in God’s image as His vicegerent on earth. Adam is the khalīfa in terms of the totality (or synthesis) of his status – maqām al-jāmi‘ or kawn al-jāmi‘ (synthetical being) –, in the sense
that "he is the synthesis of the image of God and the image of the universe" (Takeshita, 1986, p. 50). As Takeshita argues, in order to understand the abovementioned theory, one needs to pay attention to both the Judeo-Christian tradition of the theory of the double nature of man on one hand, and the epistemological and ontological functions of reality in ibn ‘Arabī on the other (Takeshita, 1986, pp. 51ff).

As mentioned above, it is with Faṣṣ on Adam that the Akbarīan discussion of the Perfect Man starts. In this first Faṣṣ ibn ‘Arabī talks about the station of man (insān), or the station of the khalīfa of God on the earth, who is the eye of God by which the Deity looks upon His creatures and shows mercy toward them. Therefore, insān is pre-eternal and perennial, he is the Logos (kalima), encompassing His names, attributes and the secrets of creation. The cosmos is created by insān, and its durability and persistency is indebted to him. Moreover, insān is called the Seal (which means the one who brought the wilāya to its highest level), because He seals His treasuries and preserves them by insān (‘Afīfī, 1423 H/2002, vol. 1, p. 50). Insān is different from the angels in that he not only embodies all the names and attributes, but, because he is cognizant of the names and can teach them to angels, he is the more excellent. He also embodies completeness, as he manifests the images of Reality (ḥaqq) and of the cosmos both (‘Afīfī, vol. 1, p. 55).

The Reality is reflected and present in every creature, but it is only the Perfect Man or the Great Man (al-insān al-kabīr) which is regarded as the spirit (rūḥ) and the heart which animate the cosmos, the cosmos being his outward manifestation (‘Afīfī, vol. 1, p. 111). The doctrine of the Perfect Man has drawn the attention of the Shi’a ḥakīms of the post-Safawid era, and as it will be observed in chapter three, both the scholars of the Schools of Tehran
and Qum, adjusted it into their doctrinal creed, here Shi‘ism. Imāms are the Perfect Man, the ḥaqq (which is a Qur‘ānic term, means reality/truth), and ḥaqīqa (lit. rightness, appropriateness). The latter is not a Qur‘ānic term, but is used extensively in the ḥadīth literature about Imāms and their status. Ḥaqq (lit. truth, reality, rightness) have always had a fundamental role in “the quest for wisdom and the happiness of the soul” in Islamic philosophy (Chittick, 2014, p. 4). In the same way, Imāms represent ḥaqq and ḥaqīqa and are regarded as ‘the light of guidance’ and ‘the ship of salvation and happiness (miṣbāḥ ul-hudā wa safīnāt ul-najāt) for their believers.

In the twelfth faṣṣ of the book of Fuṣūṣ, which is dedicated to the Wisdom of the Heart, ibn ‘Arabī discusses the issue of the heart in general, the heart of the Gnostic (‘ārif) in particular, which originates from the mercy of God. The heart not only originates from the mercy He has for His creatures, but also the heart of the ‘ārif is more immense and extensive than His mercy. When God wishes to widen the heart of a chosen ‘ārif, His purpose is that the ‘ārif’s heart contains nothing but the remembrance of God, as He is envious (ghayūr) toward His subjects; there is no room in the heart of the chosen ‘ārif to love any other above God. So, as He manifests Himself in different ways (in different names and attributes), the heart widens and constricts in order to be capable of reflecting different manifestations, and as such, there is no more room for anything but Him (‘Afīfī, vol. 1, p. 120).

The heart of the ‘ārif, ibn ‘Arabī argues, is an allegory of the heart of the Perfect Man, and is the place of the bezel (faṣṣ) of the seal of the prophets. By adopting such an argument, ibn ‘Arabī takes an opposite stance, opposite to what the Folk believe as the status of the heart in receiving God’s manifestation. Remembering Bevir’s conception of the term “webs
of beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 190 ff), and its reciprocal relationship with ‘inherited tradition’ (Bevir, 2004, p. 195), ibn ‘Arabī’s conception of isti’dād (a web of beliefs) as it stands against the common heritage of his time (or, Folk’s common belief in the status of the heart of ārif in accepting tajallī), is an example of the priority of agency over structure, here a common tradition. The priority of agency over structure and people’s capability of altering the traditions they inherit by changing the totality of the beliefs they hold (Bevir, 2004, pp. 196-197) is also emphasized by Skinner (Skinner, 2002, p. 7).

The popular belief among the mystics is that God is manifested in conformity with the preparedness of the servant, but this is not true; as according to ibn ‘Arabī, this preparedness of the servant, isti’dād, “is rather the servant’s preparedness to conform to a particular form of God’s phenomenal appearance. Indeed, this isti’dād is given by God to His servant” (Nettler, 2003, pp. 124-125). Thus, when this preparedness comes to the heart, the heart sees Him in the form in which He is revealed to it. Therefore, the heart of the ārif is the only thing that sees God in everything and worships him in the infinite shapes of His manifestations (Takeshita, 1986, pp. 117-118).

As already noted, ibn ‘Arabī facilitates the idea that the ārif is able to enlarge himself in equal degree to the image upon which God manifests Himself (Afifi, vol. 1, p. 120). By such an argument, the role of the polished heart of the ārif in receiving divine manifestations, and his preparedness to conform with the image of God, are more crucial than divine manifestation per se, though, as stated earlier, the preparedness of the heart is given by God to His servant. Ibn ‘Arabī explains the difference between these two ideas by distinguishing between two kinds of theophanies (tajallī); the first one is called tajallī al-ghayb (the
Theophany of the Unseen/invisible), and the second, *tajallī al-Shahāda* (the Theophany of the Visible).

According to the first type of theophany, the capacity [to receive His manifestations] is endowed to everyone who has a heart, and thereby the hidden and invisible Reality - which is called *huwa*, (lit. he, masculine subject pronoun) and refers to His essence – is displayed in the heart of the ‘ārif. Following this, the second theophany happens. To be more precise, when the capacity to receive His essence is achieved by the heart, at a higher level, the second theophany appears - by which ‘ārif sees God as He appears to Himself in a form given by the place in which He is seen (*ʿAfīfī*, vol. 1, pp. 120-121). Instead of the term “capacity” in receiving *tajallī*, ibn ‘Arabī prefers “the allegory of the mirror”, as the issue of manifestation is more of a polished mirror reflecting upon itself His names and attributes. The heart of the ‘ārifís ordained to accept the images of the names or permanent archetypes (*aʿyān-i thābita*), and the role and importance of the capacity of the heart of the ‘ārif has little place in ibn ‘Arabī’s mysticism (*ʿAfīfī*, vol. 2, p. 146). *Insān*, ibn ‘Arabī argues, is a comprehensive example of the Deity and encompasses His names, attributes and deeds. *Insān* is the microcosm and the spirit which animates the macrocosm, and as such has the authority to act upon the cosmos. Everything in the cosmos praises him, because he is endowed with the reality of the image of God (*ʿAfīfī*, vol. 1, p 199). This doctrine has a reverse as Fazlur Rahman maintains, which is the doctrine of “the universe as the ‘macro-anthropos (*al-insān al-akbar*)’ or ‘macro-persona (*al-shakhs al-akbar*)’”, and Man as ‘micro-anthropos (*al-insān al-ṣaghūr*)’; while the former “patterns man on the Universe”, the latter patterns the Universe on man (Rahman, 1968, p. 149).
Al-insān al-kāmil, is here personified in Ibrahim; the second father of all Muslims, and the mystery of the reality of the Perfect Man (al-Ḥakīm, 1401 H/1981, pp. 30-32), is the gnostic as opposed to ordinary believers (muʾminūn), and has the gnosis (maʿrifā) of the truth of the Book, which contradicts the literal meaning of it. On the basis of the ẓāhirī (exoteric) and straightforward text-reading meaning of the Qurʾān, God is the absolute omnipotent, though in terms of the bāṭinī (esoteric) reading, His omnipotence is "qualified by the very nature of the world He has created" (Nettler, 2003, p. 91), among them the aʿyān-i thābita are important. As Nettler maintains, "the fixed essences [aʿyān-i thābita], which are one stage in an ‘emanating process’ of divine self-expression, determine God’s choices, wishes and abilities” (Nettler, 2003, p. 91), and the gnostic is aware of this truth.

The conception of God and His being determined by His rules, should be understood in terms of the word ‘reciprocity’. Nettler rightly mentions that “God feeds you with your very being, while you feed Him with the order and structure … which determines the manner and specific content of this ‘feeding’” (Nettler, 2003, p. 95). Therefore, the term mukallaf, is understood differently from its standard meaning in the Islamic technical, legal and theological usage. In this usage, the human being is “the object of God’s revelatory commands of belief and action (the taklīf)” (Nettler, 2003, pp. 95-96). For ibn ʿArabī, however, mukallaf means convention or reciprocity, or “the matter is from Him to you and from you to Him” (Nettler, 2003, p. 96). So, “there is a full reciprocity and ontological intertwining between God and man” (Nettler, 2003, p. 96).

This divine-human mutuality and intertwining of relationship, or the absorption of Him in His creation, is designated as "the divine stations which are His names. His being in
the world is His self-expression through the names which are the world and which possess His essence” (Nettler, 2003, p. 100). Profoundly different from traditional Islamic understanding of the concept of God and His relationship with the creation, the Akbarīan doctrine is seemingly the “total identification of God and man through the mutual assimilation of each other’s personal attributes” (Nettler, 2003, pp. 100-101), and is regarded as the foundation of his theory of unity and diversity, or the One and the Many.

Returning to the ʿārif’s (the Perfect Man) attributes, ibn ʿArabī believes that the ʿārif, due to divine injunction and not by his choice, can act effectively in the world through himma (endeavour or determination) (Nettler, 2003, pp. 210-211). Here, ibn ʿArabī emphasizes on the significance of the faculty of imagination (khīyāl), not only in creating God’s image (every ʿārif creates his own God), but also in creating or making things appear in the corporeal visible world (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 81 & pp. 148-158). Himma is pivotal not only because it touches upon the role of the creative faculty of the Perfect Man in actualizing things in the material world, but also because of the stress ibn ʿArabī places on the realm in-between, which is called barzakh or the mundus imaginalis, to be Corbinian. As William Chittick has rightly pointed out, along with the conventional reading of Islam “which conceives of the cosmos as a hierarchy of worlds” inspired by the Qurʾān, ibn ʿArabī adds a new world in-between these two. Chittick evaluates his role in bringing out “the full implications of the in-between realm” as very important, because it was “one of several factors that prevented Islamic philosophy from falling into the trap of a mind/body dichotomy or a dualistic worldview” (Chittick, 2014, p. 11).
This realm is “both unseen, spiritual, and intelligible, and in another respect visible, corporeal, and sensible”, and it is a locus where spiritual beings are corporealed and where corporeal beings are spiritualized. To be more precise, the *mundus imaginalis*, according to Chittick, “is a real, external realm in the Cosmic Book, more real than the visible, sensible, physical realm, but less real than the invisible, intelligible, spiritual realm” (Chittick, 2014, p. 11). When ibn ʿArabī states that the People of the Perfection (*ahl al-kamāl*) by the help of *himma*, can actualize things in the material world, he refers to potentialities of the *mundus imaginalis*, where the spiritual copy of corporal things exists and the Perfect Man actualizes them.

Ibn ʿArabī divides *insān* into three groups: the first and the most honorable one is “the People of the Hearts” or “the Most Perfect ʿĀrifīs”, who are capable of knowing God by intuition and perceptivity (*dhawq*). The second group contains “the People of the Intellects”, theologians or philosophers who are also called “the People of distinguished ideas/thoughts”, who know God by limiting Him in certain images. The third group is the imitators, who follow and trust the prophets and messengers’ teachings of God (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 149). The first group is the referent of the Perfect Man who is the permanent and the most perfect manifestation of God, and from this perspective, there is no difference between divinity and humanity (ibid, p. 190). The Perfect Man, ibn ʿArabī states, is the secret of being and its cause, and it is for the sake of him that His mercy emanates to people (ʿAfīfī, p. 191).

By dividing *ijtihād* into two categories, ibn ʿArabī discusses that the Most Perfect ʿĀrifīs enjoy a kind of *ijtihād* which consists both of religious laws and inspiration from God, while the other kind is achieved by human efforts and endeavours (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, pp. 216-217). They
are endowed with divine knowledge because they are considered “divine words”, and as such have the gnosis of the realities of things as well as the authority to act upon the cosmos (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 221, 260, 271, 279). In explaining ibn ʿArabiʾs conception of ijtihād, Nicholson states that although he “admits the immutability of the Koranic revelation, he claims for Moslem saints the right to modify by abrogation or addition the religious code that is based on ijtihād, i.e. on non-Prophetic authority, and to put aside any ḥadīth in which their inner light detects a flaw” (Nicholson, 1998, p. 159). ʿĀrifs are the Servants of the Time (ʿUbbād al-Dahrī), because every moment He shows Himself to them in a new form and, because the emanation is renewed every moment, ʿārifs, due to their unity with the Reality, are renewed and reborn as well. Not only ʿārif but also the whole existence is renewed by new emanation which happens every moment (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 290).14

1.3. Wilāya, Khilāfa, Nubuwwa and Risāla

Along with the Perfect Man, Fuṣūṣ also contains ibn ʿArabiʾs conceptions of wilāya, khilāfa (vicegerency), nubuwwa (prophethood) and risāla (messengership/apostleship), though before examining them, it is relevant to briefly point to al-Tirmidhī as the preceding figure whose formulations of wilāya and khatm al-wilāya inspired ibn ʿArabi in his elaborations on them. The ʿārif and ḥakīm of the third century, Abū ʿAbdullāh Muḥammad ibn Ḥassan ibn Bishr ibn Hārūn Tirmidhī, offered a systematic discussion on the concepts of khatm al-wilāya and khatm al-nubuwwa. According to Tirmidhī, nubuwwa and wilāya have elements including revelation, words, and spirit (wahy, kalām, rūḥ), along with the hidden knowledge of God, reality, and tranquility (ḥadīth, ḥaqq and sakīna) which form the components of them, respectively (Radtke & O’kane, 1996, 112-117).16
Awliyā are selected by God to this office and their endeavours in attaining wilāya are not as effective as God’s will in choosing them and bestowing on them cleanliness of heart, knowledge of God’s Oneness (‘ilm al-tawḥīd), and knowledge of His favors (maʿrifat al-ālā) (Radtke & O’kane, p. 153). Since the friends of God are gifted with His benefaction (karam), their miracles are generated from His benefaction and they have unconditional faith in Him (Radtke & O’kane, pp. 163-164). Among these friends there is one (khatm al-awliyā), who, due to his close proximity to God, is the most honorable. His sealing is a safe conduit for other awliyā whose honesty and loyalty to God is imperfect. The seal is the greatest saint and has the highest position among people after the Prophet. Khātam, on the basis of his distinguished essence, is different from others and is called the Mahdi, who will appear in End Times and will be the proof of God on other awliyā (Radtke & O’kane, pp. 197-205).

Wilāya, according to ibn ʿArabī, is a pre-existent and perennial office, because walī has two characteristics; he is cognizant of the divine names and attributes, and he is the one who has completed the status of totality (jāmīʿiyah). The status of walīs is one of totality and unity, as he has accessibility to divine knowledge. Walī is higher than the apostles/messengers (rasūls) and the nabīs (prophet), since nubuwwa (prophethood) and apostleship (risāla) are interrupted, but wilāya is everlasting and uninterrupted and, from this perspective, wilāya is a comprehensive status more universal than nubuwwa and risāla (‘Afīfī, vol. 1, p. 64 & pp. 134-135). Despite differences and contradictions, the offices of wilāya and nubuwwa have similarities as well. In Risālat al-Anwār, ibn ʿArabī states that wilāya and nubuwwa have three things in common: attainment of knowledge from its divine source, performance of extraordinary deeds, such as miracles (karāmats or charismatic
power), and having the ability or *himma* to create things in the physical world (ibn ʿArabī, 
*al- Rasāʾil*, n.d., p. 84).

Muḥammad ʿAlī Muḥāhid in his glosses on *Fuṣūṣ*, points out that *wilāya*, *risāla*, and
*nubuwwa* are of the same nature. *Risāla* or apostleship, is an intermediate station between
God and people and therefore He appoints *rusul* to transmit His message to them. So, *risāla*
is an isthmus between Deity and people and should be regarded as a divine gift. On the other
hand, *nubuwwa* is an isthmus between *wilāya* and *risāla*, as God reveals to *nabī* a sharīʿa
which could only be for *nabī* himself; if *nabī* has to convey the message to others he is called
*rasūl*, otherwise he is only *nabī*, which means that his message should be kept hidden. *Rusul*
are also divided into two groups: the first group is to convey the message to people, and is
indifferent about whether people accept it or not; while the second group includes those who
use force to persuade people to accept the message of the *nabī*. In other words, their message
should be spread by sword until people obey and subordinate to them (Muwaḥīd, 1386
*shamsī*, p. 78). The second group of *rusul* needs a *khalīfa* or a successor, who is the owner of
sword, appointment, dismissal and *wilāya* (*ʿAfīī*, vol. 1, p. 207).

Therefore, the second usage of the term *wilāya* is the succession of the prophets, and
from this perspective, the office of *wilāya* reminds us that His mercy to people and the
emanation are not interrupted. *Wilāya* is both a general term for every personification of the
Perfect Man, including prophets and *nabī*, as well as *khalīfas* of the prophets, including the
Prophet of Islam. From this viewpoint, each prophet has a *walī* who inherits his sharīʿa and
seals his religion. He is subordinate to it and executes it. In terms of his succession, *walī* is
the servant of the cause of God and should render his service to His will (‘Afīfī, vol. 1, pp. 97-98 & pp. 162-163).

Nabī and wali both have the right to dispose, as well as the authority to act upon the cosmos, though there is a slight difference between these two types of taṣarruf: wali, or the most perfect ārif has no authority in accepting the right of taṣarruf, but nabī asks for such a right before accepting nubuwwa, because without having such an authority his mission is incomplete (‘Afīfī, vol. 1, p. 129). Apart from the right of taṣarruf, there are other differences between nabī and wali. awliyā are the People of Unveiling (ahl al-kashf), while anbīyā are the People of Informing and Warning (ahl al-indhār awi-l-ikhbār) (Muwaḥḥid, 1386 shamsī, p. 78). Wali is the everlasting and remaining name of God and is more exalted than nabī and rasūl. In terms of the succession of Prophets, the office of wilāya is that of the General Nubuwwa (nubuwwat al-ʿāmm or al-ʿāmmah), and awliyā (or anbīyā’ al-awliyā, lit. walīs who are general prophets), regarded as signs of His mercy to people and are sent to people when a prophet dies (‘Afīfī, vol. 1, p. 135).

Addressing the relationship of nabī and wali, Addas explains that the Akbarīan doctrine of wilāya should be understood with regard to both the esoteric interpretation of the Qur’ānic verses “referring to the individuals in question” (Addas, 1993, p. 277), and the office of nubuwwa. All the awliyā are heirs to the prophets, but “each of them incarnates one particular form of sainthood, the model and source of which are represented by one of the ‘major prophets’” (Addas, 1993, p. 277). Therefore, a wali can be mūsawī, ibrahīmī, ʿisawī, hūdī, Muḥammadī and so on, and every wali is superior to another only with regard to the function he performs (Addas, 1993, p. 126). On the other hand, it will be helpful to recall that
for ibn ʿArabī, sharīʿa (Islamic law) and ḥaqīqa (reality) are identical, as the way of spiritual realization is attained through “strict observance of the Law and scrupulous imitation of the Prophet’s Sunna” (Addas, 1993, p. 271).

Ibn ʿArabī’s conceptions of wilāya include his theory on the sealing/seal of the wilāya. Along with al-Futūḥat and Fuṣūṣ, in ʿAnqā’ Mughrib, as well as in his treatises (al-Rasā’il) ibn ʿArabī develops arguments for the theories of khatm al-wilāya and khatm al-nubuwwa; for Mahdi and his appearance, and for the referent of the concepts of khatm al-wilāya. Since the extent of wilāya is wider than that of nubuwwa and risāla, and wilāya refers to a perpetual station which lasts forever, in the same way, khatm al-wilāya indicates His mercy and implies that if His creatures are not to be deprived of His rahma and blessing, the unmerited favor of His emanation should be descended to them.

Wilāya symbolizes the uninterrupted flow of divine emanation, but since the death of the Prophet, the gate of the prophethood of legislation (nubuwwat a-tashrīḥ) has come to an end, only wilāya (another kind of prophethood) remains, and it is through the awliyāʾ (who realize the office of wilāya) that the spirit of Muḥammad (al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyah) “will continue on its course until the end of time” (Addas, 1993, p. 77). Originally a Gnostic-Manichaean idea which has intruded into Sufism, al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyah - as the highest essence which embodies the attributes and names of God - through Akbarīan mysticism, which made of this light God himself, has become an ‘orthodox’ doctrine at the centre of Sufism. Over time, orthodoxy accepted that the Prophet is the Primal Light in which all the Prophets were foreshadowed, an idea which gave incomparable status to the Prophet of Islam vis-a-vis other prophets (Rahman, 1968, p. 171 & 175). Therefore, according to the
mysticism of ibn ʿArabī, the Muḥammedan Seal is “the comprehensive and integral manifestation” (Addas, 1993, p. 79) of the Muḥammedan sainthood, itself a supreme source of every other form of wilāya (Addas, 1993, p. 80).

Ibn ʿArabī employs the allegory of the silver and golden brick to allude to khatm al-nubuwwa and wilāya, respectively. In this regard, he narrates one dream twice, once in chapter sixty-five of al-Futūḥāt, and for a second time in the fāṣṣ of the prophet Seth of Fuṣūṣ. In this dream, which transpired in Mecca, the Kaʿba plays the central role. Ibn ʿArabī observes that the Kaʿba was built of bricks that were alternately made of silver and gold. The construction seemed to be complete, but when he turns his face towards the side between the Yemenite and the Syrian corners, he notices that two bricks have fallen - one gold and the other silver, one above the other - from the wall of the Kaʿba, making the wall incomplete. In this dream, he saw himself placing the bricks back into the wall, thus completing it. The dreams traced back to a ḥadīth related from the Prophet in which he allegorized the prophethood as a wall and he himself as a brick by which the wall of the prophethood came to be completed and perfected. On the basis of this dream, ibn ʿArabī interpreted that he was the seal of the wilāya and was to complete the wall of the Kaʿba. In fact, ibn ʿArabī observed himself in his dream as both the golden and silver bricks, which meant that he was to fill the missing sections on the wall as the seal of the Muḥammedan wilāya (Muwahid, 1386 shamsī, pp. 79-80).

Since he saw himself in the place of the two bricks and had no doubt that both were his very essence (dhāt), when he woke up he thanked God for showing him his true place - or his type (ṣīnīf) - among his followers, which is both the Apostle of God among the prophets
and the seal of the wilāya among awliyā. In his explanation of the dream, Gerald Elmore points to the fact that the silver brick “is to be understood as representing the Seal’s external dependence on the Prophet’s law, whereas his independent access to the very source of the law is symbolized by the more excellent, golden brick” (Elmore, 1999, p. 149).

Wilāya is the central theme of the ‘Anqā’ Mughrib. In this book, ibn ‘Arabī develops his theory of wilāya as “bodied-forth in its supremely final authority” (ibn ‘Arabī, n.d., p. 80) or the seal of wilāya, and divides it into two types of the seal of the Muḥammadan wilāya (wilāyat al-khāṣṣat al-Muḥammadiya), and the seal of the general wilāya (wilāyat al-ʿāmm or ʿāmmah). Jesus is the Word of God (Kalimat al-Allah), the logos and the seal of the wilāya, though in his second appearance on the earth, he will submit to the Prophet’s sharīʿa as an all-encompassing law. In other words, because the sharīʿa of the Prophet of Islam is the most perfect one and has the station of completeness, it contains all the previous sharīʿa and by following the sharīʿa of the Prophet, Jesus in fact obeys the general rules and principles of all the precedent prophets (ibn ‘Arabī, n.d., p. 4).

Ibn ‘Arabī’s theories of the seal of the general wilāya and the seal of the particular wilāya are coherent and clear. Jesus is the referent of the former and is promoted to a high office in the spiritual hierarchy, which is unique among the major Sufi theorists (Elmore, 1999, p. 144). In explaining the nature of that particular relationship between ibn ‘Arabī and Jesus, Addas maintains that “if Jesus is the Seal of Universal Sainthood, ibn ‘Arabī himself laid claim to the role Muḥammadan Seal [and] only a partial and extremely biased examination of his writings could possibly have incited certain authors to maintain that no formal declaration to this effect is to be found in his writings” (Addas, 1993, p. 79). Addas uses an
example from *al-Futūḥāt* in which he claims that “I am - without any doubt - the Seal of the Sainthood, in my capacity as heir to the Hashimite and the Messiah” (*ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt*, vol. 1, p. 244, in Addas, 1993, p. 79). In his *Dīwān*, according to Addas, *ibn ʿArabī* repeats his claim of the sainthood again (Addas, p. 79).

On the other hand, in different places in the *ʿAnqāʾ*, he “routinely downplays” or even “explains away” (Elmore, 1999, p. 180) the traditional criterion of physical relation to the Prophet, and takes a typical Sufi position in which the seal should be even closer to the Prophet than the *Quraysh*, as it is more a matter of spiritual imamate and *wilāya* than the physical one. Salman the Persian (d. 35 H/656), who was adopted spiritually by the Prophet due to his devotion and religious commitment, bears witness to this fact. Elmore believes that Salman holds the office of *ṣiddīqīyah* (derived from Abū Bakr Ṣiddīq, meaning truthful), which is apostleship with *nubuwwa* and *wilāya* (Elmore, ibid, p. 154). This controversial topic and the two contrasting readings of it will be discussed in the following sections.

The terms *imām* and the office of imamate are used for judgeship and *khilāfa*, interchangeably. In the first usage, *ibn ʿArabī* states that everyone is an *imām* for him/herself, as s/he is the only one responsible for personal decisions. In such a usage, *imām* means judge, or inner voice and conscious, and with regard to its personal usage, it means leader of a family and household. However, if *imām* is used as the leader of a community (*ummah*), the scope of the authority and responsibility of *imām* widens and encompasses everyone in the community under the guardianship, and as such, his order must be obeyed and his voice must be listened by all (*ibn ʿArabī, ʿAnqāʾ*, n.d., p. 78).
In addition, there is another usage of the terms *imām*/*imamate*, which is *imām al-qudsī* or the *holy imām*. The holy imamate is a spiritual status, and is described as “the shining and luminous light” and “a heart which is preferred to the world of *ghayb va Shahāda*”, and as such receives His manifestations in his heart. Hence, when God states that “My heavens and My earth do not encompass Me and place Me in themselves, but the heart of My faithful servant does”, He refers to such a sublime status (ibn ‘Arabī, ‘Anqā’, n.d., p. 79).


For Ibn ‘Arabī, the office of imamate is multi-dimensional and contains both spiritual and political authority and responsibilities, and people come to pledge allegiance to him, as by such an allegiance they in fact pay homage to God; it is He who is conceived as the “supreme *imām*” and “the first followed”. The *imām*, who should be from the household of the Prophet, is His representative and has this honour after the Prophet. Interpreting verse ten of the *sūrat al-Fatḥ* (Victory) “Truly those who pledge allegiance unto thee pledge allegiance only unto God. The Hand of God is over their hands” (Nasr, 2015, p. 1250), ibn ‘Arabī assures us that “this most serious status (*maqām al-ajsam*) will not be effective until *khatm al-awlīyā* from the household of the Prophet and the lineage of Ali takes responsibility of it (ibn ‘Arabī, ‘Anqā’, n.d., pp. 80 ff).

Addressing ibn ‘Arabī’s theories of *wilāya*, *nubuwwa*, the Sealing, and the Perfect Man, the goal was to lay stress on those aspects of ibn ‘Arabī’s mysticism which are relevant to the discussion of *wilāya* by later scholars who discuss it from a *Shi‘a* perspective. Any study on
this, however, would be incomplete if it did not pay enough attention to the political dimensions of his mysticism, and to the messianic ambitions and claims being latent in them. The Akbarīan conceptualization of wilāya has considerable potential for change in the socio-political sphere. The study of practical consequences of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism is beyond the scope of this research, though in chapter four it will be observed how the theories of wilāya and al-insān al-kāmil facilitated Ayatollah Khomeini’s understanding of the role of wali (wrapped in a juridical aura, of course), to claim leadership and authority.

1.4. Ibn ʿArabī in the Shīʿa World

As it is mentioned earlier in this chapter, ibn ʿArabī had a profound impact on Shīʿa mysticism, although the reason(s) why he was so important and Shīʿa mystics wanted to interpret him and his thought from a Shīʿa perspective has yet to be studied. It should be added that his relationship with his Shīʿa exponents was ‘deeper’ than mere interpretation and in fact contains ‘adjustment’ and ‘dissemination’. It is important to note that Akbarīan mysticism in the hands of the Shīʿa mystics, surpassed its original form and transformed into a new apparatus that, while maintaining similarities with and influenced from it, should be treated as an independent philosophical system. To mention briefly, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1336), Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. 787 H/1385), ‘Alā’ al-Dawlah Simnānī of the late seventh and the early eighth century, and the Azerbāijānī ʿārif and poet, Shaykh Maḥmūd Shabistarī of the seventh and eighth century, as well as their students, are notable examples in this regard.

ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, whether in his exegesis on the Qurʾān, or in his commentary on Fuṣūṣ, or in his Futuwwat Nāmih (the Book of Chivalry) has incorporated ibn ʿArabī’s
ideas into a Shi'a framework and argued that, regarding the Muhammedan seal of the wilāya, ibn 'Arabī indicated the Mahdi from the household of the Prophet. In Futuwwat Nāmih, Kāshānī argues that all the prophets “take their status and honor from the seal of the prophets, and the seal of the prophets achieves his dignity from the seal of the wilāya which is his inward” (Kāshānī, n.d., p. 34). Wilāya is the inside of nubuwwa and risāla and is pre-eternal and ever-lasting. The seal of the wilāya resembles a lamp which emanates a streaming light (Kāshānī, n.d., p. 34). In his argument on the status of nubuwwa, Kāshānī argues that nabī holds a two-faceted office, which conveys the message of God to people and establishes a sharī'a, as well as informs people of the Unseen (ghayb) and his gnosis of divine names and attributes. On the basis of the former, he is called nabī and prophet, and on the basis of the latter, he is known as wali. As a Shi'i mystic, Kāshānī believes in the sealing of the Mahdi (the twelfth Imām from the household of the Prophet), and discusses that at the time of his return, he will submit to the sharī'a of the Prophet, though all the previous prophets will be subordinate to his knowledge and his reality. His inward is the Prophet’s inward; he informs people of the Prophet’s sayings and tradition. The Mahdi is the source of the knowledge of all the previous prophets and awliyās and knows their sharī'a (Kāshānī, n.d., pp. 34-35).

Another figure is Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī who is inspired by Kāshānī, though developed the latter’s ideas into an elaborated theory on wilāya and its nexus with tawḥīd. On the office of wilāya, Āmulī brings forth a typical argument which comes to be repeated by later Shi'a mystics: wilāya (obviously wilāya of Ali and his sons), is one of the fundamental principles of the Faith of Shi'ism. Āmulī not only questioned ibn 'Arabī’s conceptions of khatm al-wilāya, but also synthesized Sufism and Shi'ism and integrated them into one concept (Tanhāyī,
One can add to this list the abovementioned Simnānī, whose critiques on ibn ʿArabī’s *wahdat-i wujūd* bore fruit in the formation of an independent ʿirfānī school known as the Unity of Consciousness (*wahdat-i shuhūd*). Although it was left to Ḥamad Sirhindī (d. 1033/1624) to describe Simnānī’s philosophical critiques over the ontological relationship of God to the world and elaborate on it, and *Naqshbandī* Sufi order to adopt it, but it was Simnānī who took initiative in exposing a new doctrine to Islamic mysticism (Elias, 1995, p. 162).

Apart from these figures who were influential in introducing ibn ʿArabī into the Shiʿa world, the *Niʿmatullāhī silsila* (lit. chain) as one of the most well-established Shiʿa mystical schools, is another example whose scholars tried to integrate ibn ʿArabī’s ideas into their ʿirfānī/bāṭinī system. Another Shiʿa mystical tendency, Dhahabī (also Dhahabīyah), has been greatly influenced by ibn ʿArabī and his thoughts have been incorporated into the Dhahabī doctrine. Apart from his influence on the intellectual development of later Sufis, ibn ʿArabī’s ideas, to a large degree, helped facilitate the formation and emergence of a number of Shiʿa messianic movements that appeared in the Muslim world. These movements, which emerged in the Islamic medieval ages - in the interim between the collapse of the Abbasid dynasty in 655 H/1258 and the establishment of the Safawid kingdom in Persia in 907 H/1501 - marked a long period of time in which Sufism (and particularly the *Akbrīan* brand of it) and Shiʿism linked together, fueling one another. The socio-political developments of this time, which are well studied by figures such as Kāmil Muṣṭafā al-Shaybānī are more in depth than the goals of this research, though the main question which was raised earlier remains valid and needs to be studied.
In chapter three of the present research, it will be observed that how Mullā Ṣadrā formed a synthesis of the three intellectual tendencies of his time including Akbrīan mysticism, Shi‘a theology and Islamic philosophy. The ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and Qum who added considerably to Ṣadrā’s philosophical system, should be regarded as the culmination of Shi‘a understanding of ibn ‘Arabī’s mysticism. The prominent ḥakīm of the School of Tehran, Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshi’ī (d. 1306 H/1888) is particularly notable, as he had an undeniable impact on Ayatollah Rūḥullāh Khomeini (d. 1368 H/1989), whose ideas and conception of wilāya will be discussed adequately in chapters four and five of this research.

1.5. Ibn ‘Arabī’s Legacy

As the greatest mystic of the Muslim world whose ideas have attracted philosophers, mystics and theologians from his time up to the present, the questions which arise are “what was it about his ideas that was controversial and made them attractive” and “what made him different from others”. Delving into these questions will help to evaluate his impression on Muslim mystics in later centuries. In a very general classification, one can safely say that ibn ‘Arabī’s ideas are divided into two categories: they are either elaborations on existing ideas that would have been available at his time – ideas like wilāya, khatm, and al-insān al-kāmil – and which he blended with his own and developed them into coherent theories/doctrines; or newly created ideas. The theory of waḥdat-i wujūd (though he never uses this term) (‘Afī, 1423 H/2002, p. 25), and the relationship between Essence (dhāt) and names and attributes (asmā’ wa šifāt) are examples of the second.
Perhaps the most important thing about him and his theoretical mysticism (or speculative Sufism in Rahman’s words) (Rahman, 1968, p. 238), is the nexus between philosophy and mysticism. Ibn ʿArabī, like many other eminent orthodox scholars in the Muslim world, perceived mysticism as an area that can - and perhaps needs to - be philosophized or theorized. Therefore, mysticism, in his hands as well as other “speculative Sufis, is a mode of philosophic thought, except that it seeks to back itself up by a theory of *kashf*, implying a some kind of infallibility” (Rahman, p. 238), and is regarded as the product of a kind of synthesis of the “traditional orthodox *kalām*-theology based on the *Qurʾān* and Islamic doctrine with the purely speculative theology of the Sufi theosophy” (Rahman, p. 238). At the centre of this system, as has been observed, stands the conception of *wilāya*, “without which the doctrine of *kashf* would have collapsed” (Rahman, p. 239).

His students and particularly his disciple and step-son, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 673 H/1274), however, were more influential in elaborating on this brand of mysticism than he was himself. Also, later mystics and *ḥakīms*, like those of the Schools of Isfahan, Tehran and Qum expressed interest and advocacy in adding to this tradition - but it was our scholar whose ideas laid the foundation for theoretical mysticism to be generated. As Melvin Koushki has shown, its footprint can even be found among lettrists such as Ṣāʾīn al-Dīn Turkah Īṣfahānī (d. 835 H/1432) (Koushki, 2012, p. 30). Located in an orderly apparatus, the abovementioned terms and ideas helped following generations, right up to the present, to have a new understanding of the relationship between Deity and the cosmos – including Man – on one hand, and the cosmos as divine manifestation on the other.
As Abrahamov has rightly pointed out, *dhāt* and *asmā’ wa šifāt* are two components of one single problematic which is the question of existence (Abrahamov, 2015, p. 6), and in the Akbarīan School there is a separation between Deity’s *dhāt* - which is unknowable and inaccessible by Man -, and His names and attributes which are attainable by Man’s cognition. Deity is absolute and indivisible, and this division is only employed for methodological purposes. Deity manifests Himself to the Universe/cosmos, and therefore we are able to know Him through His manifestations. The question of the manifestation of Deity is the cornerstone of the theory of *waḥdat-i wujūd* (the unity of being), and as ‘Afīfī maintains, is to explain the relationship between *al-Ḥaqq wa al-khalq*. *Waḥdat-i wujūd* indicates that Reality is one in His Essence, which is called *al-Ḥaqq*, but it is many in His names and attributes and is called *al-khalq*. Allah encompasses everything in His Essence (*jāmi’ li kull-i shayi’ fī nafsihī*): everything has His ingredients, and He manifests Himself in the image of every being, and from this viewpoint, the cosmos by its essence, is nothing but a dream (‘Afīfī, 1423 H/2002, pp. 24-27).

In terms of the relationship between these two, Abrahamov is certain that “God’s Unity is absolute from the standpoint of His Essence, but many from the perspective of the cosmos” (Abrahamov, 2015, p. 7). One can say that with regard to the status of Man (or better to say the Perfect Man), and its relationship with the cosmos and Deity, there exists a triangle: Deity manifests Himself through names and attributes both in the cosmos and in the Perfect Man (Prophets and awliyā have His ingredients in themselves), and as a microcosm, the Perfect Man shares all the characteristics of the cosmos. Despite their similarities, there is a difference between micro and macrocosm which is the capacity of Man to have spiritual journeys, known as the Fourth Journeys (*asfār al-arba‘i*).33
Ibn ‘Arabī mentioned these journeys in the first two volumes of *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah*, though in two different conceptions, and both are different from the reading of Mūllā Șadrā (d. 1045 H/1635-36) which was set forth four centuries later in a book with the same title (Ḥassan Zādīh, 1390, pp. 11-13). The theory of Șadrā which is the dominant reading of an old idea in Islamic mysticism, has in fact been represented by later commentators of ibn ‘Arabī, including ʿAfīf a-Dīn al-Ṭīlmisānī (d. 690 H/1291), ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1335), and Sharafadīn Dāwūd Qaysārī (d. 751 H/1350). As Dāwūd Ḥassan Zādīh has pointed out, the first two journeys of ‘*ila llāh*’ and ‘*fi llāh*’ have been present in Islamic mysticism since its formative years, but it was ibn ‘Arabī who elaborated on them and added one more journey of ‘*baqā baʿd az fanā*’ (subsistence after annihilation) to them. The journey itself, years later, was divided into two separate journeys of *min al-Ḥaqq ila al-khalq-i bil Ḥaqq* and *fi al-khalq-i bil Ḥaqq* by ibn ‘Arabī’s commentators, and finally became perpetuated by Mūllā Șadrā (Ḥassan Zādīh, 1390, p. 9ff) in *al-ASFār al-Arbaʿī*.

Regarding its conceptual development over time, one can safely say that the conception of *ASFār al-arbaʿī*, more as a product of the School of ibn ‘Arabī than of himself, is divided into pre- and post-*Akbarān* time, and has been a source of inspiration for later generations of theologians, mystics and philosophers. Here again, we have ‘webs of beliefs’ – as “boundless, spherical networks, not hierarchical pyramids” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191) – and inherited traditions, as well as the capability of scholar/philosopher in adopting webs of beliefs against common tradition and in changing the tradition they have inherited (Bevir, 2004, pp. 196-199).
Asfār al-arba‘ī, a symbolic sketch of the spiritual journey of Man to his completion (kamāl), has a strong juncture to the stations of wilāya and khilāfa. Regarding these two stations, Dāwūd Qayṣarī distinguishes between the station of quṭbīyat (polarity) and that of the perfect seekers (sālikān-i kāmil). The station of quṭbīyat (or that of the perfected seekers, sālikān-i mukammil) is the last station and is attained at the end of the fourth journey, but the highest station that a perfect seeker can reach, is the third journey or the station of unity and totality (waḥda wa al-jamʿ). Quṭb, a station from where He looks at the cosmos (al-Ḥakīm, 1401 H/1981, p. 517 & 915), has a number of characteristics, but perhaps the most important of all are khilāfa, wilāya and the station of quṭb al-aqtāb which is designated exclusively to al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyah. The spirit of Muhammad is inherited by his successors (not necessarily blood progeny), in the sense that the Prophet’s successors enjoy his wilāya and khilāfa as well. To conclude, according to Qayṣarī, the status of wilāya is achieved at the end of the first journey, the status of khilāfa is gained at the end of the third journey, and quṭbīyat is the highest attained when the fourth journey is completed (Ḥāsan Zādih, 1390, pp. 15-23).

1.6. Conclusion

There result several lessons from the formulations of wilāya in the mysticism of ibn ʿArabī. Although a well-established concept in the deepest soil of Islamic mysticism (al-Ḥakīm, 1401 H/1981, p. 1233), it was ibn ʿArabī who promoted it to a creative construction at the heart of his theory on waḥdat-i wujūd. Wilāya, along with nubuwwa and risāla, shapes a “concentric sphere of activity” (Elmore, 1999, p. 152), and claims to not only cover the sphere of human beings, but also two more modes - the generic and universal. In comparison,
Wilāya is the most comprehensive office and has superiority over the others. After that comes nubuwwa and risāla, which reveal that this classification is on the basis of the priority of the inward over the outward, as wilāya is the esoteric dimension of nubuwwa and risāla, and every nabī and rasūl is a wali, but not vice versa.

In addition to wilāya, another prominent dimension of Akbarī an mysticism is the conception of the Perfect Man as the ideal type, or microcosm, a spirit that animates the cosmos and manifests the wisdom of the all-comprehensive name, and finally a medium – eye, ear, hand – through which Deity shows Himself to His creatures. Although an old concept rooted in the Abrahamic tradition, the Perfect Man found its most elaborated presence in the writings of ibn ‘Arabī. Al-insān al-kāmil, best understood in Western terms as the Divine Logos through which all things are created, stands at the center of ibn ‘Arabī’s worldview and integrates all its disparate dimensions (Chittick, 2014, p. 16). It is a locus in which the Real (ḥaqīqa) has been realized to the extent of the human capacity.

‘Divine Logos’ is an important term in the mysticism of ibn ‘Arabī and needs attention. We know that the Fuṣūṣ is divided into twenty-seven chapters, each of which is dedicated to a prophet or sage, and each of these figures presented as a logos (kalīma) embodying the wisdom (ḥikma) of a specific divine name. So, each prophet/sage represents Divine Logos relevant to his mission and to his existential capacity, though all share ‘the Station of No Station’ (maqām lā maqām), also called ‘the Muḥammedan Station’ which “is full realization of the Reality of Realities; [and] it embraces all stations and standpoints without being determined and defined by any of them” (Chittick, 2014, p. 22). As Chittick is certain, the Perfect Man, which stands “in the Station of No Station, is in effect the human
analogue of Nondelimited Being (Wujūd Muțlaq, also Dhāt Ghayr ul-Mahdūd), which assumes every delimitation without itself becoming limited (Chittick, 2014, p. 22).

Addressing his legacy, Alexander Knysh is right that the Greatest Master and his mysticism are treated by a wide variety of scholars and in different genres of literature, from early biographies to later refutations and apologies, to Sufi writings, to metaphysical and theological debates, and to less theoretical and more empirical works such as Mugaddima of the Tunisian thinker ibn Khaldūn (d. 808 H/1406). Knysh also shows how he was considered differently in the two parts of the Muslim world. In the Muslim West, "his legacy was not considered unique or exceptional" (Knysh, 1999, p. 197), while in the East, his teachings made a great impression on ʿulemā, "who treated him as the foremost exponent, if not the founder, of monistic philosophy (Knysh, 1999, p. 197).

In the East, where Shīʿism has traditionally been more pervasive than the West, his legacy not only inspired many subsequent thinkers, but also caused uproar and outrage due to the doctrine of the khatm. The Eastern ʿulemā, as is the case in the Shīʿa world, have not been simple interpreters and commentators of him, but rather accepted his legacy after examination and question. As Matthew Melvin Koushki has mentioned, the “interpenetration of Sufism and Shīʿism was to strike a particularly deep root in Shīʿa scholarly circles” (Koushki, 2012, p. 72), and it was the rationalist School of Bahrain (7th/13th) that for the first time achieved “a synthesis of Imāmī theology with ibn ʿArabiyan mystic-political thought” (Koushki, p. 72).

In the case of Akbarīan doctrine of khatm al-wilāya, the intellectual and spiritual exchange of ideas occurred when they were adjusted to a Shīʿa context. In this camp, as it is
mentioned earlier in this chapter, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1335) and Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. 787 H/1385) are the most prominent. Ibn ʿArabiʾs influence not only swept borders of mysticism and philosophy, but also found its most overt manifestations in the appearance of a number of messianic and apocalyptic uprisings in the middle ages. Movements, such as Hurūfiyya (also Hurūfīsm), Nuqtawiyya, Niʿmatullāhiyya, Nurkhāshīyya and Mushaʾshaʿīya, are cases in point. These movements were centered on the idea of wilāya and the role of wali in fighting injustice, overthrowing temporal rules and establishing the government of Mahdi on the earth.

The idea of wilāya is the pivotal idea of the School of Shaykhīsm as well, which, as will be observed in the next chapter, came to emerge as an alternative to the mainstream Shiʿīsm, with kasht and wilāya at the centre, though devoid of any liaison between theology and speculative mysticism. Ibn ʿArabi is sporadically mentioned and criticized by the first Shaykhī leader, but Shaykhīsm is far from being a serious reaction or response to the speculative mysticism of al-Shaykh al-Akbar; and rather, should be treated as an esoteric-kalāmi trend which remains constrained to its Shiʿa coffin. The critiques of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsāʾī (d. 1239 H/1823) on ibn ʿArabi are clear examples of interdiscursive critiques and have had numerous equals in the Muslim world. The study and critical analysis of the Shaykhī key texts in order to delve into the conceptions of wilāya, imamate and nubuwwa are the main focus of chapter two, and it will be shown how this school contributes to the existing tradition on wilāya, and related concepts.

---

1 - Reynold Nicholson discusses the impression of ibn ʿArabi on the next generations and particularly shows how ʿAbdul al-Karim Jīlī was indebted to his theory of the Perfect Man. Nicholson adds that both Jīlī and ibn ʿArabi “are inspired by the same mystical philosophy ... [and use] similar methods in order to develop their ideas”. See:

2 - Elmore’s opinion seems to me surprising; since the names as well as the spiritual and legal affiliations of ibn ʿArabi’s masters are well documented. Some of them were a famous Sufi and mutakallim (theologian), a few were illiterate, and some others were at the same time his masters and disciples both. Addas not only enumerates them, but also lists the names of the ḫarāṣī and philosophical schools of his time (Addas, 1993, pp. 44 ff).

3 - Alexander Knys also believes that he not only was not Uwaysī, but also the reason behind his extensive journeys was to study under “the most prominent religious teachers of his time” (Knys, 1999, p. 7).


5 - Khurāsānī claims that ibn ʿArabi wrote the second copy of the book in Damascus, and the first one having been written in Mecca in 599. Khurāsānī, p. 7.

6 - I will refer to the text throughout this chapter as ʿAfīfī.

7 - ʿAfīfī believes that it was Manṣūr Ḥallāj who, for the first time, drew our attention to “the Jewish maxim” that God has created Man on a divine image (ṣūrat al-ilāhīya), and therefore, Sufis err in attributing it to the Prophet of Islam (ʿAfīfī, 1423 H/2002, p. 35).


9 - ʿFāṣ or bezel of [divine] wisdom, in the mysticism of ibn ʿArabi is an allegory for ḥikmat or the esoteric heritage which is inherited to all the prophets and the awāliyya from the spirit of Muhammad (al-haqqat al-muḥammadiyya). Al-haqqat al-muḥammadiyya is the logos carrying ḥikmat from Deity to the prophets and to the awaliyya (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 3). The Fuṣūṣ is mostly “on the nature of God as manifested through prophecy, each of its twenty-seven chapters being attached to the logos (kalima) of a prophet typifying a particular Divine attribute. Since God does not reveal Himself completely except in Man, the first chapter treats of Adam as the microcosm, the Perfect Man, the absolute mirror of Divinity” (Nicholson, 1921, p. 149). Nicholson in this chapter, entitled ‘Some Notes on the Fuṣūṣ ‘l-Hikam’ points to the difficulties he had in reading, understanding and translating ibn ʿArabi’s complicated text and states that “the theories set forth in the Fuṣūṣ are difficult to understand and even more difficult to explain, ... [as] the author’s language is so technical, figurative and involved that a literal reproduction would convey very little. On the other hand, [Nicholson states] if we reject his terminology, we shall find it impossible to form any precise notion of his ideas” (Nicholson, 1921, p. 149). Other non-Arab scholars, such as Sharaf al-Dīn Khurāsānī and William Chittick, both of whom have written entries on “ibn Arabī” refer to this point.


11 - The italic is in the text.

12 - ʿAfīfī explains these two as such: the Reality has two theophanies: the Theophany of the Invisible and the Theophany of the Evidence. In the first theophany, He manifests for His essence in His essence upon His names and attributes and is called the emanation of the more sacred (fayd al-aqdas) (ʿAfīfī, ibid, vol. 2, p. 145). The reason for this theophany is the love of the Deity for His essence which motivates Him to be manifested in divine names and attributes. As the result, permanent archetypes (aʾyān-i thābita) are appeared. In the second theophany, He appears “in the images of the extraneous archetypes” (aʾyān-i khārījī), and is called the emanation of the sacred or fayd-i muqaddas (ibid, p. 145) and as the result the concomitants (lawāzim) of permanent archetypes in the world are appeared. These two realms are contrasted, as the former represents unity and inward, while the latter displays outward and multiplicity (ibid, p. 145). Aʾyān-i thābita have two modulations: the first one is the images of the names and attributes; while the second modulation is designated to the realities of the extraneous archetypes. The emanation happens in both levels.

13 - Though again I should emphasize that the himma of the ārīfī does not stem from his free will or personal choice, but divine injunction; although, even it does, the concept of ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ itself, both God’s and man’s, are “compelled and ordained in the very order of things” (Nettler, 2003, p. 215). Nettler reads: “the divine and human ‘free’ choices and their results are subsumed within the larger universe of metaphysical order and determination – and the choices are then fixed in their own domain” (Nettler, 2003, p. 215).
sainthood. In the case of the person of the Prophet, sainthood (wilāya) is defined in different ways, and the maximal meaning of the term "wilāya" was achieved in the case of Muhammad (ṣ.a.). The Prophet's status is very close to that of angels who worship God and therefore, should be like a dead corpse in the hands of His God (ibid., p. 94). The Prophet's actions are determined by God; he submits to the existing sharīʿa law and accepts that which is equal to its essence and absolute submission to His will. He believed that there is no difference between nabi and rasūl, except for the fact that the latter has a sharīʿa (law) that should be proselytized to his people, while nabi submits to the existing sharīʿa of his time and does not bring a new law. Aside from these differences, there is a similarity in the sense that both benefit from revelation and hence it is obligatory for people to accept them. The office of wilāya, in turn, is devoid of such features; unless when wallī reaches the status of mubaddath which is equal to risāla and nubuwwa. Muhaddath is the one who receives His revelation by inspiration and talks to God through ʿilām. Only in this case, wallī-like nabi and rasūl is immune from sin. Tirmidhī, despite having anti-Shiʿa beliefs, believes that twelve Shiʿa imāms are wallī and immune from sin. See: ibid., pp. 94-99.

16 - Tirmidhī himself was accused of having prophetic ambitions, while he had chosen an obscure life. He believed that there is no difference between nabi and rasūl, except the fact that the latter has a sharīʿa (law) that should be proselytized to his people, while nabi submits to the existing sharīʿa of his time and does not bring a new law. Aside from these differences, there is a similarity in the sense that both benefit from revelation and hence it is obligatory for people to accept them. The office of wilāya, in turn, is devoid of such features; unless when wallī reaches the status of mubaddath which is equal to risāla and nubuwwa. Muhaddath is the one who receives His revelation by inspiration and talks to God through ʿilām. Only in this case, wallī-like nabi and rasūl is immune from sin. Tirmidhī, despite having anti-Shiʿa beliefs, believes that twelve Shiʿa imāms are wallī and immune from sin. See: ibid., pp. 94-99.

17 - For typology of awliyā, see:


18 - The idea of awliyā being selected by God’s will to the office of wilāya and having no right or authority in choosing the course of their life, is very dominant in the Shaykhī/School. Imāms, from a Shaykhī viewpoint, are totally devoid of any power to make any decision, and even their daily actions are determined by Him. They are immune from sin, not because they voluntarily decide not to commit sin, but because they are not able to do sin. From this perspective, their status is very close to that of the angels who worship God involuntarily and not out of their decision. This is discussed further in chapter two.

19 - Tirmidhī emphasizes that by “essence” he means wallī’s absolute and unconditional faith and trust to God, and therefore, wallī’s deeds are not as determinative as his faith and submission. Perhaps, the idea that “believer should be like a dead corpse in the hands of His God” generated from this idea which teaches absolute submission and subordination.

20 - The impact of Tirmidhī on ibn Ḥanbal has been discussed in a number of sources. For a useful study of the impact of Tirmidhī on ibn Ḥanbal, see: Takeshita, Op.cit., 1986, pp. 128ff.

21 - Along with wilāyat al-takwiniyya (Introduction, a, p. 11), the idea of the eternity (azalīyya) of wilāya is also new and belongs to the later generations of scholars. The author’s understanding is that later conceptualizations on wilāya and related terms are intoxicated by Shiʿa extremist movements and ghālī scholars whose contributions to these ideas, as well as further developments of wilāya have not been studied appropriately yet. In the early ages, as we observed in Tirmidhī, wilāya was not understood and conceptualized by wilāyat al-takwiniyya, or the idea of eternity.

22 - Wallīperfect ʿarīf’s close friendship with God results in his powerlessness and absolute submission to His will, a virtue which is absent in the office of nubuwwa. This idea, which is basic and predominant in mysticism, finds its maximal understanding in Shaykhism, and is prevalent in the conceptualizations of wilāya in the Schools of Tehran and Qum, too. They are discussed in chapters two and three of this research.

23 - The Seal of the wilāya “is simply the nāʿīb or substitute for the Seal of the Prophets within the ranks of sainthood. In the case of the person of the Prophet, sainthood (wilāya) is ‘veiled’ by prophecies (nubuwwa); in the case of the Seal of the Saints it is openly displayed” (Addas, 1993, p. 200).

24 - I borrow the term from Binyamin Abrahamov, as I believe it is closer to the meaning and connotations of al-haqqat al-muḥammadiyyah, than the established term “Muḥammedan Reality”. The latter seems to be superfluous.


26 - Italic is in the text.


28 - Focusing on the trio of 'visions, retreats and revelations', Addas maintains that it was at the end of a nine-month retreat in the year 586 H/1190 in Seville that ibn 'Arabi was told he was the *Muḥammedan Seal*, the supreme Heir (Addas, 1993, p. 92). This incident, having been elected as the Seal, is going to be repeated many times later. In the same year (in 586 H) in Cordoba, ibn 'Arabi had a dream in which he is announced "that he has been designated the Muḥammedan Seal; the incident that occurred a few years later at Fes ..." (Addas, 1993, p. 200). In Mecca, he experienced the vision again, and as Addas rightly mentions, what happened in this holy city "marked the definitive and solemn fulfilment of the divine promise, and the recognition by the Messengers of God, ... of the universality of office conferred on the al-Shaykh al-Akbar: a kind of pact of allegiance in the tabernacle of Sainthood" (Addas, 1993, p. 200).

29 - Shaykh Abu al-Makārim Ruṅk al-Dīn ‘Alā’-al-Dawlāwī Ṣimnānī, the "respected theologian, jurist and poet" (Elias, 1995, p. 1), was born and grew up in a turbulent age (Elias, 1995, passim), and was deeply influenced by the visionary experiences and mediational practices of ‘Alī b. ‘Uthmān al-Jamālī and other visionary mystics associated with Kūbrā. Although Ṣimnānī later "systematized their ideas and his own in a complex colour symbolism of subtle substances (*jātā’if*)" (Elias, 1995, p. 1), and despite his importance to the *Kubrawiyyah*silsila, "no surviving Sufi order lists him as its eponymous founder" (Elias, 1995, p. 55).

30 - Shabistari's brightness of mind is revealed by means of his comprehension regarding the complexities of *wahdat-i wujūd* and his skills in adding to ibn 'Arabi's intellectual system. He could be regarded as the representative of a brand of mysticism whose main characteristic was pouring of *‘irfān* into Persian literature as means of expounding and illuminating it. For Shabistari, the rich tradition of Persian literature was a framework through which the intricacies of the Akbarīan mysticism were expressed more fully. In his magnum opus *Gulshan-i Rāz*, which is written in the form of ode (*mathnawi*), Shabistari discusses the main *‘irfān*/*kalām* ideas of the First Emanated, the state of completeness or totality (*maqām-i jāmī*), as well as the theory of the Perfect Man and *wilāya* and *nubuwwa* (Shabistari, n.d., p. 16).

31 - By *wahdat-i shuhūd*, Ṣimnānī means a mystical state, "being a witness to God's essence, attributes, acts and efforts" (Elias, 1995, p. 162) rather than simply a comprising of divine unity and transcendence. Although Ṣimnānī never accused ibn 'Arabī of heresy of antimunism and even referred to him with respect, he was opposed to his ontology in which divine unity and transcendence were compromised (Elias, 1995, p. 97). For Ṣimnānī, there is no possibility of union with the divine, and individuals such as ibn 'Arabī, who appeared to "have reached the second to last stage of the mystical path, ... have stumbled at that point and fallen into the trap of self-delusion" (Elias, 1995, p. 98). Ṣimnānī can be regarded as a *mujaddid* (religious reformer) as well. As Elias rightly maintains, "given the political and religious situation of his time, Ṣimnānī believed that Islamic belief and polity were threatened. This is evident both in the philosophy he espoused and in the sense of urgency which pervades his writings" (Elias, 1995, pp. 162-163). He not only had a great deal of impact on Sufi theories of social and political action, but deeply involved in the political movement of his day, and from this perspective, is very much similar to Ṣimnānī al-dīn Kūbrā (Elias, 1995, p. 160).

These journeys are as such: *min al khalq- ila al-Ḥaqq* (the journey of creation/the creature to the Truth), *bil Ḥaqq- ila al-Ḥaqq* (in the Truth with the Truth), *min al-Ḥaqq ila al-khalq- bil Ḥaqq* (from the Truth to creation with the Truth), and *fi al-khalq- ila bil Ḥaqq* (with the Truth in creation).


Chapter Two: The Shaykhī School and Wilāya

The conception of wilāya, nubuwwa, imamate, the stations of gnosis, and the sealing, was not confined to ibn ʿArabī and his style of mysticism. Almost all of the Shīʿa schools, whether ʿirfānī (like the mystical orders mentioned in the previous chapter) or kalāmī (as in Shaykhīsm which is the interest here), are centred on wilāya and the question of authority as their principal question. From this perspective, Akbarīan mysticism and Shaykhīsm have similarities to each other, and a plethora of literature produced by the Shaykhī ʿulemā over a period of one hundred and twenty years, testifies to the fact that the problematic of wilāya was one of their main questions. Depending on the inclination of the school, however, the conception of wilāya differed. In terms of the research questions asked in the Introduction (B. p. 14), the author seeks to examine if the conceptualizations of wilāya in Shaykhīsm underwent any changes, or remained stagnant, and if its similarities with the doctrine of wilāya in the Akbarīan mysticism should be considered as stagnation.

Similar to the formation of the office of wilāya which has been crystalized in the Akbarīan mysticism, in the Shaykhī School wilāya is the core and the inward essence of nubuwwa and awliyā possess the four stations of bayān, maʿānī, abwāb and imamate (presentation, significatum, gates and imamate). Therefore, imamate and nubuwwa make a double-faceted station: one side facing God and the other side facing people. Pertinent to this, is the station of multiplicity, vis-à-vis that of totality which is exemplified in wilāya and nubuwwa respectively; though each of them represents one
dimension of the reality of *tawḥīd*. In the station of *wilāya*, *walī* expands and manifests the message of *nubuwwa*. *Wilāya* also is an ontological as well as a cosmological status, therefore, it is not only one of the fundamentals of *Shīʿism*, but is also connected to the celestial role and power of the *Imāms*. In the *Shaykhī* School, the Prophet and the *Imāms* are the effective cause (*ʿillat-i fāʿilī*) of creation; and in the absence of their effectiveness, God’s act of creation will not be finalized. From this perspective, *wilāya* is the mode through which God manifests Himself in the cosmos in a modulated manner. In an obvious similarity with the ʿ*īrfānī* understanding of the term, it is *wilāya*, insofar as it is *nubuwwat al-khāṣṣah*, followed by *wilāya* to the extent that it is *nubuwwat al-ʿāmmah*.

The *Shaykhī* ʿ*ulemā* have also written copiously about the notion of the return of the Hidden *Imām*. Leaving aside the messianic implications of notions such as expectation (*intiẓār*), appearance (*zuhūr*), and gate (bāb/the intermediacy of the Hidden *Imām*), what is important for discussion in this chapter is that the *abwāb* are the representatives of the continuation of the “polar motif”, which is both a characteristic of *Shīʿa* thought, and vital in the formation of *Shaykhīsm*. The role of the *Shaykhī* ʿ*ulemā* as the guides and the preservers of the community of believers is merely to be the bearer of the *Imām*’s charisma.

Previous scholars, such as Henry Corbin, have delved into the *Shaykhī* epistemology and Imamology, and more recently other scholars including Denis MacEion, Idris Samawi and Denis Hermann have contributed extensively to the existing tradition on *Shaykhīsm*. This chapter builds on their work in an original way and, through study and critical analysis of key *Shaykhī* texts will show the impact of the *Shaykhī* ʿ*ulemā* on our understanding of the challenging concept of ‘leadership’ in
Shīʿīsm, and how their alternative has influenced, both practically and theoretically, further developments in the Shīʿa world. It will also be observed that there are implications regarding Aḥsāʾī’s intention in bringing an alternative to the mainstream (Uṣūlīsm), proven by a number of facts, including his efforts to redefine ijtihād, as well as the emphasis on his recurring dreams of the Imāms. And last but not least, although Shaykhīsm is an autonomous school of thought and should not be evaluated by later events, it was the Shaykhī conception of notions such as leadership, occultation, eschatology, the future return, and the occult sciences that rendered the formation of the subsequent movements of Bābīsm and Bahāʾīsm.

2.1. The Shaykhī Ulmāʾ

Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm al-Aḥsāʾī (d. 1239 H/1823) was born in al-Ahsa, in the northeast of the Arabian peninsula to a Shīʿa family of Sunni origin in the year 1166 A.H. (1753 C.E.) (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, p. 15). His biography appeared in a number of Bābī and Bahāʾī texts,4 one of the treatises of his successor Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī (d. 1259 H/1843), entitled Dalīl al-Mutahayyarīn (Proof of the Astonished), some encyclopedia entries,5 secondary sources,6 a biography by Abul Qāsim Khān Ibrāhīmī (1388 H/1969) which is written in his two-volume book entitled Fihrist-i Kutub-i Mashāyikh-i ‘Izām (the Publications of Dignified Maters) and in a standard autobiography which is cited in many of his writings, including the voluminous Sharḥ Ziyārat al-Jāmiʿat al-Kabīrā (Commentary on the Grand Comprehensive Visitation). Here, the author is not going to reiterate details of his life, but instead, try to touch upon those aspects which will be of relevance to the debate of
the Shaykhī School in this chapter. In his biographical sketch, there exist three notable points:

He gives an extensive narration of his dreams of the Imāms including the twelfth Imām, in which he benefited directly and immediately from their divine knowledge and divine emanation (fayḍ). In addition, he mentions a number of inspirations in which hidden matters are revealed to him - if only briefly (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, pp. 10-14). Dream is an important theme, both in the formation of the Shaykhī doctrine and in the shaping of the alternative model of leadership, and hence needs closer attention. As Louise Marlow has rightly pointed out, unlike modern societies in which dreams are marginalized, in pre-modern cultures dreams were prevalent and effective. Not only did dreams have “the primary connotation of unreality” (Marlow, 2008, p. 1), they were regarded as “the private experience of the individual dreamer, but also as public events of significance for the larger community in which the dreamer participated” (Marlow, 2008, p. 1).

Regarding the significance of dreams in the Islamic culture in general and in the Shaykhī School in particular, one can ask about the kind of truths a dream conveys, and what the epistemological status of dream is for certain Islamic thinkers. Eric Ormsby is certain when argues that dreams carry “a special imprint of authority, they seem to represent a way of knowledge, and yet, at the same time, they involve neither the communications of the senses nor the inborn certainty of a priori knowledge” (Ormsby, 2008, p. 142), and therefore it was “a form, albeit a shadowy form, of prophecy itself” (Ormsby, 2008, p. 142).
The second point is that, despite Aḥsāʾī’s dreams of the Īmāms and the Prophet, which could be interpreted as “spiritual ījāza’ from them (MacEion, 2009, p. 79), he has been honoured by many authentic ījāzas from his masters to teach and declare fatwā. Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī (d. 1259 H/1843), in Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, Ibrāhīmī in his encyclopedia entry, Mudarris Tabrīzī in Rayḥānat al-Adab (Biographical Evaluation of the People of Epithet and Title), Vahid Rafati in his doctoral thesis, and MacEion have mentioned these ījāzas, as well as the names and the titles of those who granted Aḥsāʾī their permissions (Rashtī, n.d., pp. 51-56, Ibrāhīmī, 1373, p. 663, Mudarris Tabrīzī, 1369, pp. 79-80, Rafati, 1979, p. 41, & MacEion, 2009, pp. 75-80). His effort to seek for permission is an indication of his distaste for being regarded as a scholar devoid of any association with the mainstream tendency. He needed these ījāzas to be able to live a “normal” intellectual life, as did his peers. Corbin, unlike MacEion, however, believes that Aḥsāʾī has never had a teacher, and should be regarded as one of those “perfect believers” who received their knowledge in dreams and visions through the “Invisible Man” (shaykh-i min al-ghaybor rijāl al-ghayb). Corbin cites Aḥsāʾī’s Uwaysī, attributed to Uways al-Qaranī (d. 657 H/1258), who did not find an opportunity to visit the Prophet, but submitted to Islam. According to Corbin, Uwaysīs are more familiar with the reality of Islam and Shi‘īsm than those who have learned it from a teacher (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 25-26), though as already observed, this opinion, with regard to Aḥsāʾī’s numerous ījāzas seems to be futile. MacEion mentions other cases such as his “contempt for Sufism and certain forms of mystical philosophy, in particular the thought of ibn ʿArabi and Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1090 H/1680), his refusal to collaborate closely with the state, and his rejection of the validity of takfīr”, as evidence
that Aḥsāʾī “did not seek to dissociate himself from the *Uṣūlī* tradition, even if his relationship with it was not, perhaps, one of total identification” (MacEion, 2009, p. 78).

The third point is that, it is quite well-known that Aḥsāʾī had a “strong interest in natural philosophy” (Samawi, 1998, p. 42), including chemistry, alchemy and astronomy in general, and the occult sciences in particular. These sciences had confirmation from the *Imāms*, especially the first and the sixth *Imāms* (Samawi, 1998, pp. 32, 42). Aḥsāʾī, as well as his successors and mainly Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī, regarded these sciences as the second source of their esoteric knowledge, which was surely an extension of their direct initiation into knowledge by *imāms*. As Idris Samawi has pointed out, Aḥsāʾī was not only familiar with relevant sources and materials made known at his time, but also in a number of writings he admitted that he practised Occult sciences frequently (Samawi, 1998, pp. 42-43).

Seyyed Kāẓim ibn Qāsim al-Ḥusseynī al-Rashtī (d. 1258 H/1843), mostly known as Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī, was the son of a Seyyed from Rasht, in northern Iran. Information on the life of Rashtī is not as detailed as Aḥsāʾī’s, although MacEion gives a lengthy account in his biography (MacEion, 2009, 107-137). He was appointed as head of the Community by Aḥsāʾī before his death in 1241/1828 (MacEion, 2009, pp. 116-117), and from that time onward he was actively engaged in the affairs of the School. Unlike the aloof lifestyle of his master, Rashtī was politically involved with the Ottoman, as well as with the Iranian officials in Iran and in the *Shī‘a* cities of Karbala and Najaf (MacEion, 2009, pp. 127-134 & Cole and Momen, 1986, *passim*). Rashtī was a prolific writer and wrote extensively on the fundamentals of the *Shaykhī* doctrine. In addition to *Sharḥ Khuṭbat al-Tuṭunjīya* (*Commentary on the Sermon of the Gulf*), he wrote a number of

Compared to Aḥsāʾī, he laid more stress on the occult sciences and especially *jafr*, as a methodology for explaining themes such as imamate and *wilāya* from a *Shaykhī* perspective. As mentioned before, *Sharḥ Khutbat al-Tuṭunjīya* is written by a scholar who tries to illustrate the office of *wilāya* as celestial and as a manifestation of divinity. From this perspective, *wali*, either the Prophet or *imām* (and especially *Imām* Ali), is the bearer of the station of Deity (divinity) as is manifested in His names and attributes. Since Divine Essence is not comprehensible by human gnosis, the Deity manifests Himself in His names (*asmāʾ*), and attributes (*ṣifāt*), and *awlīyā* are the bearers of all these manifestations (*hamīl-i zuhūrāt-i rubūbīya*) (Rashtī, n.d., vol. 2, p. 13). Rashtī acknowledges three stations of Divine Essence (*rubūbīya, nubuwwa*) (which is the station of totality (*maqām al-jāmiʿ*), and imamate (which is the station of multiplicity (*maqām al-taṣīl*)) (Rashtī, n.d., vol. 2, p. 13). In the following, Rashtī’s contributions to the *Shaykhī* doctrine will be discussed further.

Another *Shaykhī* leader is Mullā Mīrzā Ḥassan Gawhar (d. 1266 H/1850), a native of Arasbaran in Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran. He moved to Ottoman Iraq to pursue religious studies. After living in Najaf, he left for Karbala to attend Aḥsāʾī’s classes and, after his death, he became one of the most prominent students of Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, pp. 3-4 & Gawhar, n.d., pp. 3-4). He had *ijāza* from Aḥsāʾī
(Gawhar, n.d., pp. 144-145), and ran his own circle of teaching and training in Karbala, claiming that a number of the later famous ʿulemā had been his students. Gawhar wrote numerous books, including short treatises, and commentaries on theological and juridical topics, such as imamate, nubuwwa, wilāya, and fundamentals of Shīʿa/Shaykhī doctrine. He also wrote refutations on his two rivals: on Karīm Khān Kermānī, entitled ʿRisāla fī Radd-i ʿalā Ḥājj Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī (Refutation on Ḥājj Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī) and on Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Astarābādī, entitled ʿRisāla fī Jawāb-i ʿItirāḍ-i Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Astarābādī (Treatise to Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Astarābādī’s Objection) (Gawhar, n.d., pp. 5-7).

Gawhar and Kermānī were rivals on the issue of the leadership of the Shaykhī School. Kermānī, due to his affinity with the Qajar court, and the reputation, wealth and power which resulted from that position, won the claim. Fortunately we possess detailed accounts of Kermānī’s life. Muḥammad Karīm [Khān] was the son of Ibrāhīm Khān Ṣahīr al-Dawla, the cousin and son-in-law of Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah Qajar. He was born in Kermān in 1227 H/1812 when his father, one of Aḥsāʾī’s advocates, was the governor of Kermān. Yaḥyā Aḥmadī Kermānī maintains that Ibrāhīm Khān ibn Mahdī Qulī Khān ibn Muḥammad Ḥassan Qajar was appointed as the governor of Kerman in 1218 H/1803 in order to restore prosperity to the city after its destruction by the assault of Āḡā Muḥammad Khān Qajar (d. 1211 H/1797) (Aḥmadī Kermānī, 1371, p. 140). After the death of his father, Karīm Khān moved to Karbala to study under Rashtī. He had a number of ʿijāzas from his master, as well as other prominent ʿulemā, and wrote two hundred and sixty books on a variety of topics such as tawḥīd, nubuwwa, imamate, wilāya and resurrection. He died in Negar, a small village in Kerman in 1288 H/1871, and was buried in Karbala (http://www.alabrar.info/).
Kermānī’s contribution to the School can be divided into two interrelated categories. First, he wrote extensively on the concept of the Fourth Pillar (*rukн-i rābi’)*, and tried to theorize it. Kermānī elaborated more on this concept than Aḥsā’ī, Rashtī, and his rival, Gawhar. Second, he Persianized the *Shaykhī* creed, in the sense that until his time, *Shaykhīsm*, both geographically and theoretically, was regarded as more of an Arabic school of thought. His opus in four volumes, *Irshād al-ʿAwām* (the Guidance of the People) is written in Persian and except for a few writings, the rest of his works are written in this language. He composed two of his refutations on the cause of *Bābīsm* in Arabic, but later translated one of them into Persian.

Over the course of one hundred and twenty years, the abovementioned scholars have added to the existing literature on authority and succession of the *imāms*. Furthermore, through their writings, several perspectives of Islam and Islamic intellectual traditions unite. This tree, as was common in other Islamic schools, has its roots in mysticism, theology, jurisprudence, and the *bātinī* dimension of Islam. Fortunately, much has been written by them, so on the basis of their literature we can estimate their impact on intellectual developments and on subsequent actual events. In the following section, the historical and intellectual contexts of *Shaykhīsm* which had their imprints on the formation and later developments of the School will be documented. Then attention will focus on the *Shaykhī* conceptualizations of imamate, *nubuwwa* and *wilāya*, with discussion on how each of Aḥsā’ī’s successors, by focusing on different sections of their master’s heritage, have actually affected the course of events.
2.2. Historical Context and Intellectual Developments

The collapse of the Safawids at the hand of “a rag-tag bunch of tribesmen” (Matthee, 2012, p. 245) resulted in the disintegration of their empire, and the emergence of a number of local governors; though none of them was capable of offering any alternative centre of political power and economic activity. There was a brief Afghān assault, and “Maḥmūd’s death in [1137 H/]1725 was followed by large-scale, long-term chaos that was exacerbated by the rapacious policies of Nādir Shah in the 1730s” (Matthee, 2012, p. 255). It took a full century for Iran to regain a measure of stability, and afterward three dynasties claimed legitimacy in the Safawid’s name, but all of them lacked its mystique and mobilizing power. After a short period of the Afshārs (also Afshārīd, 1736-1796/1148 H-1210) which was followed by the Zand dynasty (also Zandiya, 1750-1794/1163 H-1208), the Qajars appeared on the scene. For the first time in a hundred years they were able to recapture Persia’s integration and relative stability. In contrast to the Safawids, the Qajars failed “to construct a statewide bureaucracy” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 38). They were unable to crush the authority of local communities and their self-administration in favour of a more centralized apparatus; to operate effective economic and financial plans; to build a “viable standing army” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 39); and finally “to recapture the full grandeur of the ancient shah-in-shahs” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 40). Their system, from time to time, was threatened by stiff oppositions which arose from external dangers, local tribesmen, clergymen, communal rivalries, and, fromMuḥammad Shah and Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah onward, social uprisings and movements. Their epoch featured serious discontentment such as Ismāʾīlī revivalism in the form of Āqā Khān Maḥallātī’s (d. 1298 H/1881) revolt;21 the Bābī uprisings announcing jiḥād against the establishment; and the Reuter
Concession which was immediately denounced in widespread resistance by all ranks of businessmen, clergy, and nationalists against it. There was also the Constitutional Revolution of 1907.

These incidents highlight a distinctive feature of the Qajar period: the inability of the establishment to exercise authority and power over society. The court was obviously too ineffective and weak to execute power. Its various drives for modernization and reform, on the contrary, propelled social classes and strata, such as the traditional middle class (bāzārīz), intelligentsia, and a notable group of clergymen, towards the new route of Western links. This contact with the West generated class consciousness, fuelled discontent, and transformed these classes into a “propertied middle class,” who pressured the establishment to share with them the power and resources of wealth (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 58-69 & 2008, Chapter One, pp. 8-33).

Qajar’s economic and monetary situation also merit consideration. There is a tendency among historians of Iranian Studies to depict the social situation of Persia in the Qajar era under the titles of “social disorder”, “social disaster”, ‘catastrophe’, ‘the age of crises’ and ‘the age of decline’. There are two reasons for this; observers are either eclipsed by the glory of the Safawid era, when Persia politically and economically was honored as a superpower (though as Rudi Matthee has rightly discussed, this image does not reflect the truth), or they are tempted to draw such a picture in order to explain the catastrophe and disaster as “signs of moral weakness and the prelude to impending doom” (Amanat, 1989, p. 29), as well as evidence for the coming of
Armageddon (*fitna/malāhi*m); all of these as prerequisites for the return of the Mahdi, the saviour.27

Peter Avery argues that the economic and social situation in these years, in contrast to what is portrayed by Amanat and others, was not that catastrophic. In fact, the country was marked by urbanization and the growth and wealth of the middle class. Avery maintains that the spring of the *Bābī* movement from among the middle class (and particularly mercantile classes), should be treated not as a symptom of an ill economy, but rather “the fostering by the early Qajar kings of the merchants” (Avery, 1965, p. 76) that brought religious tensions to the fore (Avery, 1965, pp. 76-77). It was also at this time that, under the shadow of “the prospering merchant class” (Avery, p. 77), the first foreign contacts after the rise of the Qajars were made. Avery concludes that the urban class, including merchants (and also *ʿulema*), continued to prosper under the early Qajars (Avery, 1965, pp. 77-94).

Along with economic and political contexts, Iran’s religio-intellectual landscape under the Qajars needs to be discussed adequately. Three major discourses marked the intellectual horizon of Persia at this time and their influence continued into the following century: first, the appearance of new trends in *Shīʿa* jurisprudence, including the treatises on *jihād* (known as *jihādiya*) and the birth of *fiqh-i mashrūṭah* (a type of jurisprudence which deals with Constitutionalism); second, the vitality and popularity of different brands of esotericism, including the *Ismāʿīlī* movement, the *Shaykhī* School, and in later years, the two messianic eruptions of *Bābīsm* and *Bahāʾīsm*. The third discourse was the crystallization of the legacy of Mullā Ṣadrā in the School of Tehran. There have been other trends which lie outside the scope of this research, including
different currents of *Shi‘a* mysticism and western philosophy which left their mark on the intellectual developments of this era.

Locating Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsā‘ī’s philosophical activities in the intellectual context of nineteenth century Persia, one comes up with a number of currents which shaped his wide range of ideas and theories. To generalize, his philosophical activities had three sources which have been dominant in the seminaries and madrasas of Persia for centuries: esotericism; developments in *Shi‘a* jurisprudence and their crystallization in the two schools of *Akhbārī* and *Uṣūlī*; and philosophical developments after Mullā Ṣadrā. With regard to esotericism, in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Persia the *bātinī* ideas, and particularly pre-messianic speculations and longings, were intense and in circulation (Amanat, 1989, pp. 93-94), depending on the time and the situation they became activated. By *bātinī* ideas, I refer to ideas such as expectation (*intiṣār*), appearance (*ẓuhūr*), and future return (*rajʿā*) which were signified, and could have found new signifiers in different socio-political contexts and in different times. Other ideas can be added to these, such as *kashf* (revelation), whose importance in the *Shaykhī* School is already mentioned; esoteric interpretation of the *Qurān*; dreams of the *Imāms*; and a hierarchical, hidden, chain of leadership and authority. All of them shaped the components of *Shaykhīsm* as an esoteric school.

Recalling the methodology here, esotericism of the Qajar era manifests a good example of the existence of a web of beliefs that constitutes a network of interconnected concepts which stand against inherited traditions and alter them (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 ff). Webs of beliefs, according to Bevir, have features such as their boundless, spherical, and anti-hierarchical structure, as well as the freedom of the author to choose their
starting point (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 ff). In terms of the relationship between webs of beliefs and the inherited intellectual traditions of every epoch, traditions do not come into being before an individual holds beliefs, but individuals are not tradition-bound and can alter them or migrate from this tradition to that (Bevir, 2004, pp. 193 ff). The Shaykhī School not only pushed the existing, inherited bāṭini tradition of its time to its limit, but stepped beyond it and created a new tradition which has not yet been challenged or discredited by an analogous discourse. In studying the Shaykhī webs of beliefs on messianism and mahdism, on intiẓār and zuhūr, and on utopia, one needs to pay attention to the fact that this web was held against the background of the traditions of their time, where these traditions themselves “derived from people holding webs of beliefs against the background of earlier traditions, and so on” (Bevir, 2004, p. 195).

In terms of development in Shīʿa jurisprudence, and particularly the rivalry between the two schools of Akhbārī and Usūlī, as the second source of Aḥsāʾī's philosophical activities, he was most likely influenced by this rivalry. He, and following him the whole Shaykhī apparatus, took a pro-Akhbārī position with regard to ideas such as ijtihād (the offering of independent effort in the interpretation of the sharīʿa law) and taqlīd (emulation or imitation in sharīʿa-related questions), as well as the role of mujtahids in the Community. A dispute started in the mid-seventeenth century when the influential figure of the Akhbārī movement, Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1036 H/1627) challenged Usūlīsm on its reliance of ijtihād. He mainly criticized the Usūlīs use of 'aql (reason) and ijmāʿ (consensus) as “legal principles” (uṣūl-i fiqh) to conduct ijtihād and therefore recognized the Qurʾān and hadīth as the only legitimate means to reveal the opinion of the Imāms.28
As Denis Hermann has analyzed, for Astarābādī, “these doctrinal developments” have been “influenced by Sunnism and, in particular, by Shāfiʿīsm” (Hermann, 2015, p. 7), and therefore, must be rejected. Hermann is right when he maintains that all “the main currents of Imāmī Shīʿism” from Sufism to Uṣūlism, to Akhbārīsm, and later to Shaykhīsm, should be regarded as responses to the painful absence of the Imām after the Major Occultation (ghaybat-i kubrā) (Hermann, p. 7). In terms of their opposition to the mainstream (Uṣūlism) on ijtihād and, as it will be observed in the following, on the doctrine of the Fourth Pillar (rukn-i rābiʾ), one can safely conclude that, while they tried to maintain their independence from both, the Shaykhīʿulemā appeared “to be the heir of” the Akhbārī movement at a time when it was “in decline following the success it had during the twelfth/eighteenth century” (Hermann, p. 19).

The third source of Aḥsāʾī’s thought was philosophical development after Mullā Ṣadrā. In general, the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā can be classified as process metaphysics as opposed to substance metaphysics. According to the process approach to metaphysics, features such as ‘becoming’ and ‘novelty’ are regarded as the essential description of a metaphysical endeavour. In substance metaphysics, “the fundamental realities of the world are entities (called ‘substances’) with essences which are fixed and unchanging” (Samawi, 1998, p. 10). Plato and Aristotle’s philosophy can be categorized as substance philosophy because it is believed that Platonic ‘Ideas’ and Aristotelian ‘physical and material realms’, as something immaterial and atemporal, are the loci of these entities (Samawi, 1998, pp. 10-11).

In opposition to this is process metaphysics which is based on process and “is characterized by continuous novelty, becoming, dynamism, flux or essential (as
opposed to accidental) motion. It's being is identical to its becoming” (Samawi, 1998, p. 11). Process philosophy/metaphysics, therefore, recognizes both the reality and fundamentality of process (Samawi, 1998, p. 12). Without digging into the details of this classification and its development through history, what is important for this research is to relate Ḥūṣain’s philosophical activities with one of these traditions and to find his intellectual context in the post-Ṣadrīan era. As Idris Samawi maintains, despite the dominance of substance metaphysics in the post-Avicennan time, the process metaphysics found its true revival in the hands of Mullā Ṣadrā; a development which happened “from within the tradition of the falāsafah” (Samawi, 1998, p. 21). His ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliya was a synthesis of three currents, a synthesis ‘within’ Peripatetic metaphysics of ibn Sinā, the illuminationism of al-Suhrewardī, and the philosophical mysticism of ibn ʿArabī. In addition, “Mullā Ṣadrā claimed to have proved the existence of motion in the category of substance, a move that marks the dawn of process philosophy in the tradition of falsafah” (Samawi, 1998, p. 22).

The metaphysical school of Mullā Ṣadrā was the predominant school of falsafah in the post-Safawid era and it remained so until the time of Ḥūṣain. Therefore, despite Ḥūṣain’s critical commentaries on two of Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings, and his critiques on “what he saw as certain leanings towards pantheism in Ṣadrā’s works” (Samawi, 1998, p. 22), Mullā Ṣadrā was the major point of departure for him. In addition to Ḥūṣain’s inspiration from the process metaphysics, as a Shiʿī mutakallim (theologian), his early sources of thinking were revelation and Shiʿa tradition which are both “very process-oriented in nature” (Samawi, 1998, p. 25). Therefore, in the post-Ṣadrīan era, it was almost impossible to find a philosopher who was not a theologian and as such did not need to reconcile faith and philosophy. Pertinent to this, is the prevalence of the
mysticism of ibn ‘Arabi and its impact on the minds and writings of philosophers/theologians of this time. In case of our scholar, he combined both Shi'a kalâm and Mullâ Šadrâ’s process philosophy - despite critical commentaries of him - and had a love-hate relationship with the mysticism of ibn ‘Arabi. Samawi goes further and believes that “delving deeper into the teachings of the earlier Shia Imams/Sages inspired Shaykh Aḥmad to radically transform the metaphysics of Mullâ Šadrâ into a system that is even more dominated by process theme” (Samawi, 1998, p. 25 & unpublished article, pp. 20-23).

After locating Aḥsâ‘ī’s philosophical activities in the post-Šadrīan era and indicating the sources of his thought as it developed over time, attention will turn to the conceptualizations of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate in the key Shaykhī texts, followed by a discussion of the doctrine of wilāyat al-takwīniya and the idea of ‘imām as the four causes’, and thirdly a study of the Shaykhī eschatology and its nexus to the office of wilāya.

2.3. Imamate, Nubuwwa and Wilāya

Henri Corbin uses the term integrity (entirety/totality) to explain the reality of this “divine school of thought.” Shaykhīsm, Corbin writes, is a consistent composition of sharî‘a and spirituality, supporting “a pure and perfect imamology” which is called Shi‘ism. At the centre of this imamology lies the gnosis of imām which is inseparable from the esoteric meaning of the Qur’ān and of the revelation on one hand, and the inward of the previous revelations on the other. Henceforth, the gnosis of imām connects to, and also reveals the reality of divine revelations. The totality of this imamology has three components: the transmitted sources (naql) vs. the intellectual
sources (ʿaql); esoteric interpretation (bāṭinī taʿwil); and a series of sciences such as chemistry, alchemy, and the Science of the Letters (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 2-8). Wilāya and nubuwwa are closely linked, because wilāya is the fruit and reality of nubuwwa. Nubuwwa and wilāya are the stations of the outward and the inward of the Prophetic, as well as of the Qurʾānic revelations, respectively; and wherever the cycle of nubuwwa comes to an end, the cycle of wilāya begins (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 78-79).

Wilāya is the heart, the dominant theme of this imamology and has three fundamental motifs: a: the theme of the cycles of Prophecy [nubuwwa], b: the cycles of Revelation, and c: spiritual sciences of nature. With regard to the first theme, Corbin argues that “Shīʿa gnosis, as an initiatic religion, is an initiation into a doctrine [therefore], walāyat, as an initiation and as an initiatic function is the spiritual ministry of the imām, whose charisma initiates his faithful in the esoteric meaning of the prophetic revelations” (Corbin, 1994, p. 134). Thus, imām is wali, and as such, is the grand master, the master of initiation. There is also a theophanic feeling common to Shīʿism and to Sufism revolving around the office of imamate. The Person of the imām, Corbin writes, is the pre-eminent theophanic form (mazhar). He is the person of the Shāhid, the beautiful being chosen as the witness of contemplation (Corbin, 1994, pp. 133-139).

The Shaykhī belief in the twelfth Imām requires having spiritual faith in him which is a unique experience, bestowing upon the believer a divine blessing and gift. Imām, in terms of a believer’s capability, shows him his own polar orientation which is every single believer’s direction and path of faith (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 78-
The *imāms*, “in their theophanic persons, together with the Prophet and the resplendent Fatima, form the pleroma of the "Fourteen Very-Pure" (Corbin, 1977, p. 59); among them Fatima has the predominant position and role. The eternal figure of Fatima-Sophia is the source of “a cosmic Sophianity,” which has a “threelfold dignity and function”. This includes that she is “the manifested form”, she is all thinkable reality, the pleroma of meanings of all the universes, and she, as “the secret of the world of the Soul, is also its manifestation (*bayān*), without which the creative Principle of the world would remain unknown and unknowable, forever hidden” (Corbin, 1346 *shamsī*/1967, pp. 64-65).

Given this brief introduction, this section starts with the theological conceptions of the notions of imamate, *nubuwwa* and *wilāya* in the writings of the *Shaykhī ʿulemā*. It will start with Shaykh Aḥmad’s oeuvre *Sharḥ al-Zīyārat al-Jāmiʿat al-Kabīra*, a great composition of the divine *ḥikma* indeed (Corbin, 1346 *shamsī*/1967, pp. 78-79), and then will study major texts written by Rashtī, Gawhar and Kermānī. The aim is to show how these notions are linked to one another on one hand, and to the *Shaykhī* epistemology on the other.

In his voluminous *Sharḥ al-Zīyārat al-Jāmiʿat al-Kabīra* attributed to the tenth *Imām*, Ali al-Naqi (d. 254 H/868), Aḥsāʾī, from an esoteric perspective, presents an imamology which is not only tied to the fundamentals of *Shīʿism*, but also is connected to celestial issues. *Awliyāʾ* have four stations. The first is *al-sīr al-muqannā bil sīr* (the secret veiled by the secret), which is also called the station of *tawḥīd* or *bayān*. In this station, *awliyāʾ* are regarded as the manifestations of His names and attributes, as divine essence is not comprehensible by a human being. According to a ḥadīth transmitted
from Imâm Ali, maqâm al-bayân means to know Him as He is in His reality, and know that nothing is similar to Him. This station indicates absolute tawhîd, and is what the imâms explain in their esoteric teaching of divine essence. The second station is maqâm al-maʿānî (the station of significatum), which is termed as sîrr u-sîrr (the secret of the secret, or the hidden of the hidden, bâṭin al-bâṭin). The second station “is the reality of the imâms insofar as they represent and manifest God in the totality of his essence and his names.” The third station is abwâb (gates), the sîrr or intermediacy (al-wisâṭa wa al-tarjuma). They are gates to God, as they facilitate His emanation to people. The fourth station is that of imamate, which is zâhir (apparent) or ḥaqq (reality), while the first station is called ḥaqq al-ḥaqq (the reality of the reality) (Aḥsâʿî, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 42-50).

Relevant to this, is Aḥsâʿî’s discussion of seven stations of gnosis, namely, a: maʿrifat al-ithbât al-tawhîd (the gnosis of monotheism), b: maʿrifat al-maʿānî (the gnosis of significatum), c: maʿrifat al-abwâb (the gnosis of gates) d: maʿrifat al-imâm (the gnosis of imâm) e: maʿrifat al-arkân (the gnosis of Pillars), f: maʿrifat al-nuqabâ (the gnosis of leaders, directors) and lastly, maʿrifat al-nujabâ (the gnosis of nobles) (Aḥsâʿî, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 43). It is noteworthy that in the first volume of the abovementioned Khûṭba, Seyyed Kâẓim Rashtî transmits the same ḥadîth and quotes the same verse (āyah) of the Qurʾân to prove the stations of gnosis, as well as the stations of awliyâ (Rashtî, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, pp. 448-450). Gawhar also develops the same argument to describe the stations of the Prophet and of the imâms (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, pp. 470-474). It would seem that Kermânî is more creative in his debate on the four stations of awliyâ and the sevenfold stations of gnosis connected to it. He not only uses the same ḥadîth and verse of the Qurʾân to develop his argument for the theory of
*maqāmāt* (stations) and *maʿārif* (levels of gnosis), but also goes further and backs it with rational reasons as well. In *Irshād al-ʿAwām*, he looks to be more of a ḥakīm than a Shaykhī mutakallim (theologian), who amply elaborates on the Shaykhī fundamentals. He ties *nubuwwa* with concepts such as *hikma* and justice, maintaining that the prophet’s philosophy of being is to fulfill His justice for people and to reveal divine wisdom (*ḥikmat al-ilāhīya*) for them. Awliyā manifest His names and attributes, and are the intermediaries of emanation, but they have come to preserve social order and civilization as well. Prophets are perceived to be kings of the world, chosen by the Wise Creator (his terminology is reminiscent of a peripatetic ḥakīm), in order to guide people in the righteous way (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 12ff).

The *awlīyā* are also identified with *aʿrāf* (lit. the people of the heights) which is mentioned in the *Qurʾān*, 7: 46-48. On the basis of a number of narratives, the *Imāms* and the Prophet are *aʿrāf*. Aḥsāʾī transmits a ḥadīth from *Imām* Ali (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 44), in which he introduces himself and other *Imāms* as *aʿrāf*, who have a number of functions both in this world and in the hereafter. The office of *aʿrāfīs* to identify the people of Heaven (*ahl al-janna*) and to separate them from the people of Hell (*ahl al-nār*), in the sense that those who accept their *wilāya* are allowed to enter Heaven, and those who deny it will exist in Hell forever. In addition, *aʿrāf* help God in facilitating emanation and assist Him in creating the world. They are also His light and His words (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 48). Kermānī uses the Arabic term ‘*tuṭunj*’ (lit. gulf), to describe the status of *Imām* Ali and one of the proofs of *aʿrāf*, the one who stands at the origin of mercy and/or agony (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, pp. 184-186, 117-125).
In the Shaykhī doctrine, imamate and nubuwwa are closely linked. Imamate is the bāṭin, or inward of nubuwwa. Tuned to the idea of the sealing, Shaykhīsm maintains the necessity of imamate as a complementary station to nubuwwa, and the revealer for the Prophet’s message. Imām is a teacher who instructs believers in the concealed dimension of the message of Islam (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 84). Wilāya is also the station of multiplicity (maqām al-taḥṣil), vis-à-vis nubuwwa which is the station of totality (maqām al-ijmāl) (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, p. 466). In this station, each of them represents one dimension of the reality of tawḥīd (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, p. 475). Walī is to expand and manifest the hidden message of nubuwwa. Communicating a ḥadīth from Imām Ali, in which he calls himself the point under the Arabic letter of “b” (bā), Rashtī names the station of wilāya as rubūbīyat al-thālithah (lit. the third divinity) which is the expansion and manifestation of rubūbīyat al-thānīyah (lit. the second divinity), or the station of nubuwwa. “A” (alif), the first letter of the Arabic alphabet, stands for this station (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 2, pp. 12-13 & Rashtī, n.d., pp. 9ff).

Despite AḥṣāṬ’s commentaries on Fayḍ Kāshānī and on the entire Ṣadrīan tradition, as well as his distaste of mysticism, in the Sharḥ he agrees with the author of Kalimāt and the mystics. Imamate and nubuwwa are always regarded as being a double-faceted station. ‘Azīz Al-dīn [Azīzuddīn] Nasafī in his classic, al-Insān al-Kāmil (the Perfect Man), maintains that nubuwwa has two faces: a face toward God and a face toward people, while walī only looks at God, and whenever he turns his face to people, he becomes a prophet (Nasafī, 1379, p. 316). Thus, wilāya is treated as the core of nubuwwa, the esoteric aspect of it, and a God-oriented status. By looking at the face of God, the walī becomes even more remote and inaccessible to people, and it is the office of imamate which becomes more attainable by believers. Imām has two dimensions:
one toward God and another toward people; though the source of his legitimacy and even popularity, is exclusively divine. Whatever is revealed to the Prophet is revealed to them, and is preserved by them from misinterpretation and misunderstanding (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 51-52). In the general interpretation of the status of nubuwwa, Aḥsāʾī argued that God has chosen the imāms to be guardians and custodians of people in all four positions and to be intermediaries between Him and the people. On the basis of the last position, He has excluded the fourteen immune figures to be His attributes, His names, His blessings, His extensive mercy and also His maʿānī (significatum) (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 52).

In Kalimāt, wilāya is embedded in the doctrine of the Perfect Man (also the Universal Man) (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 188-195), and both wilāya and imamate have two attributes: being absolute and being delimited (muṭlaq and muqayyad), respectively. Hence, there are the absolute nubuwwa and the absolute wilāya, in addition to the delimited wilāya and nubuwwa (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 188-190). Fayḍ maintains that the origin of all creatures is Ḥaqīqat al-Muḥammadīya36, which encompasses all celestial and terrestrial perfections.37 The Universe and human beings are components of it, and have been created to serve it in order to be completed. Moreover, there is no veil between this Reality and God (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 190-191).

Aḥsāʾī’s contention on wilāya and imamate as being reflected in the Sharḥ has the typical resonance with the one which is presented by Fayḍ Kāshānī when he is narrating a number of ḥadīth from different imāms, attempting to make it clear that imamate is not distinguished from nubuwwa, and that the core of both is wilāya. Awliyā
are eligible to receive revelation in all its forms, such as inspirations, visions and dreams. They even receive “the specific revelation”, which so far had been supposed to be an exclusively prophetic attribution. When arguing that truthful and reliable knowledge is the divine knowledge, Aḥsāʾī’s words remind us of Fayḍ’s, when he clarifies that we are eligible to reach divine knowledge by reciting dhikrs (remembrance, repeating divine names), mediation, and purifying our hearts from vice (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 240-241). Wilāya is also an office of authority. Aḥsāʾī acknowledges the complete authority of the Prophet and the Imāms over the life of believers. The wali is one who is more eligible than believers to have authority over their lives, their deaths and their wealth (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 72). Walīgains his power from closeness to, and friendship with God, and that is why the pair wilāya/walāya designates two facets of one reality. Imāms are regarded as the donors of all benefits as well as the swords of revenge (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 58). They are also shāhid (witness of contemplation) from God upon people, and are His luminous lights; since they eliminate the deepest and the most profound dark. They are the holders of the column of light (ʿamūd min a-nūr/noor), through which they are able to watch people and see their actions (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 58-60).

As Corbin explains, in a mystical experience the word “witness” and the figure of the “Heavenly Witness” are designated to the suprasensory personal guide/master, who guarantees “with such certainty a theophany perceived by love alone.” This guide of light is called by a number of names, such as “the Sun of heart, the Sun of certainty, the Sun of faith, the Sun of knowledge, the spiritual sun of the Spirit”. It is he who “carries the mystic up toward the Heavens.” (Corbin, 1994, pp. 84-85, 91-92, 119-120). In the first volume of the Sharḥ, Aḥsāʾī extensively talks about shuhadā and their role:
they are the *imāms*, the witnesses or *hujja* (proof) of God to people and His signs among them. *Hujja*, therefore, is the very secret of *shāhid*, as without it God and His presence would remain in a state of disappearance and abstraction. Thus, *shāhid* could also be regarded as a mirror through which He looks at His people and watches them. Therefore, the *imāms* are His theophanies (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 365-372 & vol. 2, pp. 169-173).

2.4. *Imāms* as the Four Causes

Shaykh Aḥmad’s imamology goes beyond the conventional Shi‘a understanding of the cosmic role of the *Imāms*.39 *Awlīyā* "are the storage (*maʿdan*) of divine wisdom (*ḥikmat al-llāh*, or the eternal wisdom, lit. *ḥikmat al-azalīyya*), from which has emerged *ḥikmat al-ḥaqīqīya* or the sacred substances of *awlīyā* (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 170). *Ḥikma* is a modulated station and has three levels including: *ḥikmat al-ḥaqqīya* (also called *ḥikmat al-llāh*), which is the highest level of *ḥikma*; *ḥikmat al-ḥaqqīqīya* or *awlīyā*’s substances which is a sign of God; and finally, their *wilāya* which has originated from His authority and dominion (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 170). *Ḥikma* or Sophia in the Hellenic literature, as both the method and the final goal, is the gnosis of God, and the *imāms* are to be “understood as Logos, or Word, through which gnosis of God is obtained” (Samawi, 1998, p. 87).

According to Aḥsāʾī, the Prophet and the *imāms* are the Effective Cause of creation; (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 190-194), and in the absence of their effectiveness His act of creation won’t be finalized (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 361-362). Aḥsāʾī’s notion of the idea of *wilāyat al-takwīniyya*, or "the existential and absolute cosmic authority of the *imāms*", is not an innovation, but actually a heritage of the
Sadrīn hikma, and the term specifically used by Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045 H/1635 H) for any “cosmic role for the imāms”40 (Rizvi, 2013, p. 2). Imāms are the trustees of His secret, and the last letter by which His greatest name is completed (Aḥsāʿī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 194-195). Baqīyatallāh (the Remnant of God), which is both a common title for all the Imāms and a specific title used exclusively for the last Imām, carries all the attributes and meanings being implicated by wilāyat al-takwīnīya. Believers not only come to know God by their imāms, but also worship God and praise Him through them. It is through the Imāms that people are provided with subsistence (rizq) and receive death (Aḥsāʿī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 249-250). Aḥsāʿī re-defines the term ‘believer’ (muʾmin) as a person who is examined by belief in awliyāʾ, and argues that submission to awliyāʾ is more obligatory for believers than doing daily prayer (ṣalāt). (Aḥsāʿī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, pp. 54-55, 58-155). Therefore, in the Shaykḥī terminology, blasphemy and faith mean enmity/disobedience to awliyāʾ and obedience to them, respectively (Aḥsāʿī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 228).41

In relation to wilāyat al-takwīnīya, Kermānī argues that the Prophet and the Imāms have two statuses: the apparent authority (qutbīyyat-i ẓāhirī) and the hidden guardianship which is wilāyat al-takwīnīya. Regarding the latter, they enjoy a position by which nothing would be hidden from them and their knowledge is to embrace everything in the Universe. In addition, they are granted absolute authority over the life of believers (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 120, pp. 125 - 128). By focusing on the divine weight of imamate, the Shaykḥī ʿulemā move the Imāms away from the accessibility of believers even further, to the realm of hūrqalyā, and henceforth they need to create another level of being which is qurāʾi ẓāhirah (visible towns). For example, in a statement addressing imāms’ different performances, Aḥsāʿī totally
discharges them from any subjectivity in talking or in keeping silent, in doing *jihād* or restraining from it, and even from killing or being killed (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 235).42 In relation to this, both Rashtī and Kermānī also argue that due to the distance of the Hidden *Imām* from ordinary people (*ʿawām*), they need visible leaders to act as an intermediary between him and his followers (Rashtī, *Ḥujiat al-Bālighah*, n.d., pp. 91ff & *Risāla Dar Jawāb-i Suleymān Khān Afshār*; n.d., pp. 28ff, & Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, p. 50).

On the basis of the verse eighteen of the *sūrah of Sabaʾ* (Sheba), stating that “And We set between them and the towns that We had blessed towns easily seen” (Nasr, 2015, p. 1047), and also *Imām al-Baqir*’s interpretation of the word ‘towns’ (*qurāʾ*),43 Aḥsāʾī argues that the rest of the verse is assigned to jurists (*fuqahā*) “and We measured the distance between them: ‘Journey between them in security by night and by day’” (Nasr, p. 1047). Henceforth, according to this *taʾwīl*, the visible towns are jurists; “who are perceived as being the *Imāms*’ messengers (*rusul*) and transmitters (*naqalah*) to their *Shīʿas*” (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 353, 378-380). Jurists are adherents of the faith, as they spread the message of the *Imāms* and their *ḥadīth* by teaching (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 353). Moreover, they are eligible to receive absolute obedience, because they have been raised to eminency by their closeness to the *Imāms* (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 285).

Aḥsāʾī is not clear on what he means by the word *qurāʾ*44 and it is his successors, especially Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī who shed more light on it. In his *Irshād al-ʿAwām*, which contains the creeds of the *Kermānī Shaykhi* School, Kermānī explains how believers should understand ‘towns’ (*qurāʾ*). According to him, there exist eight
towns; precisely eight stations of knowledge between the Hidden *Imām* and people. Although a reminder of the seven mystical valleys, “the eight towns” are used allegorically to point to the numerous stations a believer should take in gaining knowledge of the *Imāms*. In the middle of their path, believers should stop at the eighth station which is the station of the *Shaykhī ʿulemā*. A group of people, Kermānī states, are at the first station, the gnosis of Islam, which has three dimensions: *sharīʿa* or law, *ṭarīqa* or path, and *haqīqa* or truth. Then come the stations of *nujabā* and *nuqabā*, and finally, there is the station of the Fourth Pillar. It is only through the gnosis of the Fourth Pillar that a believer is able to know his *imām* (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 127-128). The Fourth Pillar came to be assigned as the fourth fundamental of *Shaykhīsm* after unity, *nubuwwa*, and imamate (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 57-61). Kermānī argues that the Fourth Pillar is an indication of the maturation of *Shīʿa* thought, and since that time has not yet come, it stands at the end - after unity, *nubuwwa*, and imamate. For him, the Fourth Pillar is eternal, though it has been hidden hitherto and is revealed now (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 13 & vol. 3, pp. 33-34 & vol. 4, pp. 67-69, 128-129).

According to Kermānī, the holders of the office of the Fourth Pillar are the *Imām*s name, attribute, and remembrance, and therefore, their identity and existence are not intrinsic (*dhātī*), but accidental (*ʿaraḍī*); they are to reveal the *Imām*s light and dignity (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 127-128). The gnosis of the Fourth Pillar, like the gnosis of imamate, is innate, having been gifted to us in the world of the *al-dharr* (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 14, 171-178 & vol. 4, pp. 66-67), and only the people of the heart (*ahl al-ruʿād*) were eligible to submit to it. The office of the Fourth Pillar is given to those who are called *aṣḥāb al-yamīn* (people of righteousness),
sābiqūn (forerunners), and muqarrabūn (intimates), (figures such as Salman the Persian, Abū dhar, and the two last vicegerents of the Hidden Imām), who are commanded to be unseen and veiled. The Perfect Man (or the Perfect Shī‘a/nāṭiq-i wāḥid) is the only eligible figure to hold the office of the Fourth Pillar.48

The Shaykhī interpretation of the office of imamate and its nexus with the Four Causes and wilāyat al-takwīnīya has another component, which is infallibility (ʾiṣma) of the imāms. Aḥsāʾī’s opinions on ʾiṣma are reflected in an independent treatise called Risālat al-ʾIṣma wa Raj’a. Infallibility is a divine attribute; or emanation, which originates from His absolute justice (ʿadl al-muṭlaq), and prohibits its holder to sin. Those who are adorned by it are safeguarded and preserved by His protection. Aḥsāʾī emphasizes that divine grace prevents imāms from relinquishing good and doing bad, in the sense that ʾiṣma necessarily dispossess them from any ability, desire and/or will to sin.49 Rather, the imāms are obligated to observe precepts and to abandon sin (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, pp. 3-5). Quoting Imām Alī, he maintains that by infallibility, the imāms are His tongue and His deed by which He speaks and acts (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 6). From this perspective, Aḥsāʾī ties infallibility with the status of absolute guardianship, which is higher than nubuwwa and entails the station of intermediacy and representation. The holders of the absolute guardianship are granted absolute justice or infallibility; by which they come to be the close companions of God (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, pp. 11 -13).

Infallibility is an inseparable element of representation and designation. God, in the world of the al-dharr, has armed His walīs with infallibility in order to protect them from fault and sin (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 20) and, at the same time, he has prevented oppressors (ẓālimīn) from achieving the covenant of wilāya and imamate (Aḥsāʾī, 1430

103
Moreover, for Aḥsāʾī, infallibility came to be a specifically *Imāmī* attribute; since Twelver *Shīʿa* believe that all prophets are free from (*munazzah*) committing sin, which is distasteful to Him (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 26). Equating infallibility with designation, Corbin argues that these two attributes grant *imāms* both a divine position and a non-temporal ancestry, and that is why the *Shīʿa* meaning of imamate differs from the Sunni understanding of it (Corbin, 1391, vol. 1, p. 402).

In *Risālat al-‘Iṣma wa Rajʿa*, Aḥsāʾī develops an argument for the idea of infallibility of the ‘ulemā. They are *ghawth* (lit. help or aid), and it is impossible for any age to be deprived of them. It is also through them that God looks at His creatures, and it is by them that He helps those who are seeking aid (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, pp. 79-81). Aḥsāʾī coins another concept; *khawāṣ al-khawāṣ* (the most distinguished people), which is designated to the specific vicegerents of the Hidden *Imām*, or *Shaykhī* leaders. This concept describes those highly distinguished figures who are very close to God due to their avoidance of sin (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 129-130), while Kermānī applies the term to both the specific vicegerents, and the whole *Shaykhī* community (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 3, p. 32, 54, 80). It is on the basis of this hierarchical concept that gnosis is classified into four groupings. The first three, which are the gnosis of Deity, of the manifestations, and of the gates, are attainable by *khawāṣ al-khawāṣ* or the *Shaykhī* leaders, but the last one, the gnosis of the *nuwwāb* (the gnosis of the *Shaykhī* ‘ulemā) could be accessible by ordinary people (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 88-140).

The *Shaykhī* ‘ulemā or the gates of the gates of God, who are gifted with the attribute of infallibility, are regarded as the true bearers of the charisma of *imāms*. At
the beginning of this chapter, Aḥsāʾī’s visions and dreams of the *Imāms*, with whom he claims to be in contact, were discussed.54 Having channels of direct contact with Ṣāhib al-Zamān (the Lord of the Age) is important, not only because he receives guidance from the *Imām*, but also because it is a source of legitimacy due to its value and credit. Thus, as the “de facto leader and defender of the faith,” he, as well as the rest of the *Shaykhī* leaders, would be able to “exercise a large amount of charismatic authority” (MacEion, 2009, p. 18 & 23).

2.5. The *Shaykhī* Eschatology and the Idea of the Future Return

The *Shaykhī* ‘ulemā have significantly contributed to the doctrine of the future return of the Hidden *Imām*. In *Shaykhīsm*, notions such as expectation, appearance, and gate (*bāb*/the intermediacy of the Hidden *Imām*), have messianic implications. Abbas Amanat has shown that messianic fervour not only preoccupied the *Shaykhī* literature and practice, but more than that, around the 1830s and 1840s, “premessianic speculations [were] particularly intense ... especially among individual seekers of *ẓuhūr* who were later converts to the *Bāb*”. Based on the writings of “the early *Bābīs*, as well as those of the *Bāb* himself,” Amanat concludes that messianism was both “in circulation” and “also influential in conversions” (Amanat, 1989, pp. 93-94). In fact, out of the *Shaykhī/Bābī* circle, the prophecies and signs toward the advent of the Mahdi were in the same way present and outstanding. “*Ni‘matullāhī* emissaries” and “Persian *Ismā‘īlīsm*” that had experienced a revival in the nineteenth century shared the same speculations (Amanat, 1989, pp. 70-105).

The *Shaykhī* sources promised the immanency of the future return of the Twelfth *Imām* as an event more likely to occur in the near future. Aḥsāʾī, in *Risālat al-*
Hayāt ul-Nafs (Treatise on the Life of Self) which is a treatise on the return of the Prophet, of the Imāms, and of a number of notable Muslim figures, describes their return to this world as the actualization of God’s promise of the establishment of Mahdi’s just government. He uses the idea of the future return to impart the faith of Shi‘ism as the only true sect in Islam. His narratives should not be treated as a standard eschatology, such as Zoroastrian eschatology, or even a Bayānī (Bābī) one; both of which are much more elaborate and rich, but rather as a story in accordance with his Imamology. The question of the establishment of Mahdi’s just government, and its close connection to categories such as resurrection, the hereafter and the judgment, is replaced by a vindictive sectarian battle within Islam. As will be argued, from this perspective, the Shaykhī eschatology should be treated as an eschatology of revenge, being less concerned with the establishment of justice at the end of the world - as the main purpose of any narrative of eschatology - and more concerned with taking revenge on ‘Āshūrā tragedy (Aḥsā‘ī, 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 15-55).

In addition to Risālat al-Ḥayāt ul-Nafs, Aḥsā‘ī elaborated on the future return of the Imāms and the Prophet in the third volume of the Sharḥ, whilst focusing on ‘Āshūrā and arguing that the advent of al-Qā‘im is a preliminary event for the return of al-Hossein. Here again, the third Imām and taking revenge from the Umayyads are the central themes (Aḥsā‘ī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 3, pp. 48-100). Rashtī also addresses ‘Āshūrā and maintains that al-Hossein’s unjust martyrdom is important both in the life of the faith of Shi‘ism, and in the whole history of the preceding prophets and their missions. In a treatise entitled Asrār al-Shahāda, he discusses the Shaykhī eschatology with a particular focus on the city of Karbala, on ‘Āshūrā and its martyrs, and their relations to the previous prophets. According to Rashtī, all the prophets have come to bear
testimony to the imamate and *wilāya* of the Prophet and his household, especially his grandson al-Hossein (Rashtī, n.d., pp. 2ff). Rashtī ties *ʿAshūrā* to the lives of previous prophets to present it as an eternal accident which is rooted in the depth of history, and as such representing good in an eternal battle between good and evil.

In *Sharḥ Ḥayāt al-Arwāḥ*, Gawhar discusses the topic in detail. By distinguishing between *zuhūr* and *rajʿa*, he argues that the appearance of the Hidden *Imām* at a time unknown is called *zuhūr*, while the future return of the *Imāms* is called *rajʿa*. His narrative contains the typical path of events of the *Shaykhī* eschatology in which not only the Prophet and his household will have a future return, but also a number of previous prophets along with their successors (*awṣīyā*), will return to help the son of Fatima in his fateful war with the descendants of Yazīd (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, pp. 598-675). For Kermānī, Karbala is the spirit of the body (the earth), and it is the first city to have been created twenty-two thousand years before the creation of other cities, and is exalted to be the father of all of them. It is also the Intellect (*ʿaql*), the heaven of the earth and the pedestal (*kursī*) of *nubuwwa*, compared with Kufa which is the pedestal of *wilāya* (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, pp. 96-106, & vol. 3, 1267 H/1850, pp. 153-160, 171-203).

Seyyed Hossein Nasr sheds light on the existing harmony between scientific geography and sacred geography. He maintains that since Muslim geographers believed that there was “no sharp distinction between scientific geography - as it is understood in the modern sense -, and sacred geography - in which directions, mountains, rivers, islands, etc., become symbols of the celestial world”, - every clime (*iqlīm*, or sacred city) had a correspondence in the celestial order and “had connected to a planet and a zodiac.
sign” (Nasr, 1992, p. 99). “In Islamic geographical texts”, Nasr explains, “it is believed that there are seven heavens which are not only connected to seven climates, but are also their counterparts. Nasr calls it the combination of “descriptive and symbolic geography”, which had been obtained from ancient civilizations: “the climates, which are the counterparts of the seven heavens, were known to the Babylonians and the Greeks, as well as to the ancient Iranians, who had a concentric rather than longitudinal conception of it” (Nasr, 1992, p. 99). Not only locations “are the terrestrial image[s] of the celestial order” (Nasr, 1992, p. 99), but also events, such as famine and rain, and figures, have metaphysical counterparts.

The Shaykhi eschatology starts with a cosmic chaos which continues with the appearance of Dajjāl (the Islamic anti-Christ), and later al-Sufyānī which has an Umayyad root. In the meantime, some Shi‘a figures return to the scene and are immediately killed by the army of evil. In a complementary explanation to Aḥsā’ī’s, Kermānī suggests an argument for the future return of the Prophet as the last return of all. He puts forward four reasons for this. First of all, since the Prophet is the most distinguished and celebrated (ashraḥ) of all people, his return would be a sealing (khatnī) to any return. Second, as preceding prophets have been only his forerunners, previous returns are regarded as a prelude to his return. Thirdly, he is the universal spirit (rūḥ-i kullī) and the absolute wisdom (aql-i kullī) of the world, and his return would be the last step in the completion of the body. And finally, by his return, the outward and the inward dimensions - bāṭin and zāhir - of his mission will correspond with each other (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 84-85).
The appearance of the Twelfth Imām - which coincides with a number of climatic changes, such as a famine, followed by a heavy rain, in Jumād al-Awwal is an advent from the Unseen which is always referred to in the Shaykhī texts as mundus imaginalus (Corbin, 1391, vol. 1, p. 264) or hūrqalyā: “our walīs in hūrqalyā and will manifest and return to this world from ʿālam al-mithāl” (Aḥsāʽī, 1430 H, vol. 8, p. 421). ʿĀlam al-mithāl is the world that the “spiritual body” of muʿmin (believer, here imām) or the “Anima substantive of the adept” becomes the Earth of his Paradise and also the Earth of his Resurrection (Corbin, 1977, p. 72, 84). From this perspective, the manifestation of the awaited Imām “is not an external event destined suddenly to appear on the calendar of physical time”, it is an event that gradually takes place as “the pilgrim of the spirit, rising toward the world of hūrqalyā, brings about the advent of the awaited imām in himself” (Corbin, 1977, pp. 72-73).

Hūrqalyā (originally Havargalyā) is a key concept in Shaykhī epistemology and anthropology and deserves closer attention. The quest of every seeker is the Orient, thereby orienting himself as “a primary phenomenon of ... [his] presence in the world.” This Orient, however, is not situated on geographical maps, since it belongs to the eighth territory which is not “comprised in any of the seven climes”, and “is in the direction of the north, beyond the north. Only an ascensional progress can lead toward this cosmic north chosen as a point of orientation” (Corbin, 1994, pp. 1ff). The north, first and foremost, is of significance “by a mode of perception,” by “primordial Images, preceding and regulating every sensory perception, and not with images constructed a posteriori on an empirical basis.” The world of archetype-images which precede all empirical data is “the autonomous world of visionary Figures and Forms,” where beings and things are seen, and are given their meaning by the active Imagination. “The Angel
Gabriel of the Qurʾānic revelation, who is identified with the active Intelligence of the Avicennan philosophers, is the mediator through which imaginations are engaged. This autonomous world of visions is called the Earth of Ḥūrqalyā" (Corbin, 1994, pp. 4-16).

In the work of Aḥsāʿī, as Rafati maintains, havarqalyā (the realm of the subtle) has several connotations and is often used synonymously with “the realm of similitudes” (Rafati, 1979, pp. 107-108) or `ālam al-mithāl (also ithmus/barzakh). It is in this territory that the Twelfth Imām along with his fathers, lives and it is also from this world that he makes direct contact with his believers (Aḥsāʿī, 1430 H, vol. 8, pp. 421-22). As his visit is not experimental, his return also takes place in the supersensory world. That being acknowledged, the events of this history are seen to be much more than what we ourselves call facts: they are visions. On the other hand, everything that we call history and value as historical is not seen in Ḥūrqalyā, and is not an event in the earth of Ḥūrqalyā, therefore is devoid of religious interest and spiritual meaning. The orientation of the terrestrial earth toward the celestial pole, confers a polar dimension on terrestrial existence and gives it a direction not evolutionary but vertical, ascensional. The past is not behind us, but under our feet (Corbin, 1977, pp. 89-90).

By the argument that the Imāms’ bodies belong to this world and are deprived of any temporal impurity, Aḥsāʿī maintains that forms, figures and bodies of the world of Ḥūrqalyā have maximal transparency and purity (Aḥsāʿī, 1430 H, vol. 3, p. 107). Aḥsāʿī makes a strict distinction between the “organic, animated body (jasad) ... and ... corporeal mass or volume jīsm)” and by doing so recognizes four bodies for humans: two jasads (A & B) and two jīsms (A & B), which “represent a twofold accidental body
and a twofold essential body” (Corbin, 1977, p. 91). Jasad A belongs to the material perishable world, and jism A is not everlasting and does not belong to the elemental world or to “the Terrestrial Elements.” The second jasad, though hidden in the first jasad (jasad A), is not perishable: it is rather composed of “archetypal elements, the subtle elements of the "earth of hūrqalyā." The second jism “is the essential subtle body, archetypal, eternal and imperishable” (Corbin, 1977, pp. 91-92), and is called jism al-ḥaqīqī or jism al-latīf.62

This body, which is composed of jasad B and jism B, is “seventy times nobler and more subtle than those of the body of elemental flesh in which it is hidden and invisible. It has shape, extent, and dimension, and is nevertheless imperishable” (Corbin, 1977, p. 96). The jasad-i hūrqalyāyī survives in the grave, but the grave is not the “graveyard”; it is “exactly the mystical earth of hūrqalyā to which it belongs, being constituted of its subtle elements; it survives there, invisible to the senses, visible only to the visionary Imagination” (Corbin, 1977, p. 96 & Rafati, 1979, pp. 108-115).63

The idea of the future return is vital in the formation of the Shaykhī School, in the sense that faith (īmān) is conditioned by belief in the future return. Faith would not be complete until believers have true belief in the future return, because belief is a gate leading followers to certainty and assurance. Therefore, by elaborating on the two categories of kḥiṣṣiṣīn (the most distinguished ones) versus kḥāṣṣīn (the specific ones), the Shaykhī ʿulemā argued that those who believe in the future return in general and in the return of the Twelfth Imām in particular, are kḥiṣṣiṣīn and enjoy a higher position than kḥāṣṣīn. “belief in the future return is the reality of submission, [which is] Islam, and one of the signs of the perfect faith” (Aḥsāʾi, 1420 H/1999, vol. 3, p. 100).64 The idea
and the structure of this anthropological hierarchy, as Corbin mentions, “correspond to the idea and structure of an esoteric astronomy; the one and the other exemplify the same archetypal Image of the world” (Corbin, 1994, pp. 62-63).

2.6. The Occult Sciences

The occult sciences (ʿulūm-i khafiya or ghariba) are methodologies used to study and describe the phenomena of the physical world. This kind of science has a long history in the Muslim world and a number of Muslim philosophers, such as Avicenna, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672 H/1274), and Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-ʿĀmilī (known as Shaykh Bahāʾī, d. 1030 H/1621), have famously written about it. In this regard, Avicenna’s treatise called Risāla-yi Shāqūl (the Treatise of Plumb Line) or Shaykh Bahāʾī’s Kashkūl (Analects) are evident examples (Nasr, 1992, pp. 153-157). Matthew Melvin Koushki has researched extensively on the occult sciences (particularly lettrism and jafr), and their history in the Tīmūrid period. Focusing his inquiry on Ṣāʾīn al-Dīn Turka Iṣfahānī (d. 836 H/1432), Koushki shows how, in pursuing his neoplatonic-neopythagorean quest, Turkah deployed “all available means, whether rational or mystical, scientific or magical” to comprehend the twin Books, the Qurʾāṇ and the Cosmos (Koushki, 2012, p. I & pp. 33ff). Koushki argues that Turkah’s lettrism was part of a larger intellectual project in western Iran (mainly Isfahan) and it had three strands: gnostic-messianic, Sufi and intellectual (Koushki, 2012, p. 29).

Seyyed Hossein Nasr observes the usage of these sciences from a mystical perspective and believes that due to the centrality of Unity in Islam, by numbers, letters and figures (all components of the occult sciences), Muslim thinkers wanted to express ‘unity in multiplicity’ (Nasr, 1992, p. 146, pp. 295-296). Here, I will not delve into the
Shaykhī philosophy of the occult sciences and only highlight those parts which connect the occult sciences to the Shaykhī conception of wilāya and nubuwwa. Fortunately, the Shaykhī ‘ulemā have left us with a rich literature, and Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsā‘ī, Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī and Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī wrote several texts on the occult sciences. For them, in addition to its function as a means to decipher the cosmos, the occult sciences have also been regarded as a medium to the gnosis of metaphysical forces, such as stars, jinn, and ghosts.

In Risāla-yi Rashtīya (Treatise on Rashtī), Aḥsā‘ī raises the issue of the occult sciences (in Aḥsā‘ī’s words khamsa-yi muṭḥajaba), including Kīmīyā, Līmīyā, Ḥīmīyā, Sīmīyā and Rīmīyā. In addition, he offers another argument for the idea of jafr; which helps him render his conceptualization on the philosophy of creation, or bid‘. Bid‘ is His will (mashīyāya) and is the first creature of Him. In Islamic philosophy, His mashīyāya is termed as šādir-i awwal or the first emanated. Then the letters were created which are called the second man (ādam-i thānī or bid‘-i thānī), vis-a-vis ādam-i awwal which is His mashīyāya. The letter of “a” (Alīf), which is the first letter of the Arabic alphabet, is the most prominent of all and is called the first invention (ikhtirā‘i awwal) or His act. Other letters are stemmed from Alīf. Alīf also stands for the Prophet Muhammad, the owner of the station of brevity (ijmāl), while “b” (bā), the second letter signifies Ali. “Ba” is the softer form of Alīf and also its description. Henceforth, the office of wilāya is not only regarded as the continuity of nubuwwa, but also it is to disperse and distribute what the Prophet says (Aḥsā‘ī, 1430 H, vol. 8, 353-354).

Aḥsā‘ī states that every letter contains distinctive properties (khāšīyat) which are speculative (fikrīya), verbal (laḥziya), numeral (raqamīya) and figural (‘adadiya).
On this basis, there have been founded the collective nouns of *subḥānallāh*, *al-*
*ḥamdulillāh*, *lā ilāha ila llāh*, and *Allah Akbar*. They constitute the four pillars (*arkān*) of
Islam, each of them representing one dimension of the message of Islam, including
*tawḥīd*, *nubuwwa*, imamate and *Shī'a*. These pillars are the causes of liveliness and
death (*ḥayāt wa mamāt*), maintenance (*rizq*), intellect (*ʿaql*), soul (*nafs*), as well as
emphasizes that the twenty-eight basic letters of the Arabic language have not only
been backed by cosmic forces, but the cosmos itself is perceived to be a “divine text”

This text is composed of single letters, each of which is a symbol pointing to a
feature. Cole tries to makes this “linguistic cosmology” understandable and even logical
by saying that Aḥsāʾī’s contribution has two contrasting poles, simplicity and
complexity, and immateriality versus materiality, which is being successfully
reconciled in a unified and meaningful system. He argues that for Aḥsāʾī “the letters are
elements, so that letter mysticism in this Greco-Arabic tradition is not only cosmological
linguistics but also atomistic physics and a natural, “cosmic” dimension to the alphabet
as symbol can therefore also be discerned” (Cole, 1994, pp. 10-11). Moreover, Cole
maintains that “revisionism and … dynamism” (Cole, 1994, p. 15) embedded in this
system are claimed to not only explain the philosophy of creation, “but it is they that
underlie the mystery of Resurrection. It is here that we begin to see the radical
possibilities in Aḥsāʾī’s thought for the ability of the letters to be recombined,
suggesting that the world need not always be as it is, that it can in effect be spelled out
differently, especially by a messianic figure” (Cole, 1994, p. 10).
Rashtī in Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, in addition to jafr mentions two more occult sciences; the science of elixir and the science of numbers which contain the methodology of gaining knowledge and decoding the secrets of the material world. By transmitting a hadīth from Imām Ali stating that “people know the apparent dimension of these sciences, but I know both dimensions: outward and inward. The outward only contains the Classical Elements such as fire, earth, water and air, while the inward is so strange in a sense that it only brings confusion”. Rashtī argues that these sciences were handed down among the Imāms to the Hidden Imām and his vicegerents during his occultation (Rashtī, n.d. p. 10).

Rashtī’s Khūṭbah is also written from the jafr perspective. Here jafr is a methodology by which believers come to understand the position of the Prophet and his household. In the first volume of the Khūṭbah he tries to give an esoteric interpretation of the first sūrah of the Qurʾān. Ḥamd, meaning praise be to God, is a mirror reflecting divine essence and has two faces: one facet refers to absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) and the second one is a status in which all divine names, attributes and fi’l(act) are manifested (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 51). Ḥamd also stands for multiplicity in which, form (ṣūrat) and substance (māddih) gather. This indicates the most perfected manifestation which is the manifestation of the throne (ʿarsh) in the pedestal (kursī). Rashtī states that this is the position of the twelve astrological signs which stand for the twelve Imāms. Not only the Sun (shams) rotates on its orbit in the throne, but every world has a number of minor and major suns. Shams al-jīmīyāh (the Material Sun), the last of the suns and probably the most perfected one, belongs to the last world which is our world, or the material world (ʿālam-i jīmānī). Shams al-jīmīyāh is called the Sun of Nubuwwa (al-shams al-nubuwwa), and it symbolizes a light
that not only enlightens the material world, but also affects everything in it. Here, *al-shams al-nubuwwa* is in its entirety and multiplicity. The moon also stands for *wilāya* (*al-qamar al-wilāya*). Ḥamd, in its multiplicity, symbolizes the absolute *wilāya* which is a foliage tree with a body and branches (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 52).

Rashtī transmits a *ḥadīth* from the Prophet saying that, “Ali and I are from the same tree, while Fatima is its offshoot, the *Imāms* are the branches, and our knowledge is the fruit of it” (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 53). By knowledge, Rashtī means “the wisdom of the saints” (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 53), or gnosia. It is in gnosia that “knowledge and being coincide; it is there that science and faith find their harmony” (Nasr, 1992, p. 337); as gnosia is the highest form of knowledge in Islam. The Gnostic not only has definite conceptions of the universe, but also “sees all things as manifestations of the Supreme Divine Principle, which transcends all determinations” (Nasr, 1992, p. 337).

The absolute *wilāya* ( *wilāyat al-muṭlaqah*) is the manifestation of the outward face of Ḥamd, while the inward stands for divine essence which is incomprehensible to and unreachable by man. Therefore, Ḥamd, as the name and attribute of God, is designated to the position of absolute *wilāya* which belongs to Ali and his sons (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 57 & pp. 121-2). In relevance to his discussion on *wilāya* and its relation to Ḥamd, Rashtī develops an argument for the understanding of the conception of the Muḥammedan Light ( *al-noor al-Muḥammadīya*) which is also known as the Muḥammedan Reality, the First Intellect, and the First Pen (*al-qalam al-awwal*). This *nūr/noor*, when called *al-aql al-awwal* is a medium through which God speaks to His creatures, and when named as *al-qalam al-awwal* is a tool by which He has created the whole creation. From the Neoplatonian axiom that “from the One (*al-wāḥid*) emanates

Gawhar in *Rasāʾil al-Muhimma fi Tawḥid wa al-Ḥikma* (Important Treatises in Monotheism and Wisdom) develops an argument for the conception of *al-noor al-Muḥammadiya* which is believed to be the divine substance or *nafs al-malakūtīyat al-ilāhīya*. Although it is self-existent, divine substance has originated from intellect (*ʿaql*), and returns to it after its completion (*kamāl*). The intellect, according to Gawhar, is also equivalent to the exalted divine essence (*dhāt a-llāh al-ʿuṣūr*), which is the cause of everything. Therefore, the Prophet’s self (*nafsihī*) is a symbol of *nafs al-malakūtīyat al-ilāhīya* (the intellect), which is the cause of creation. In his interpretation of *bismi llāhi r-raḥmān-i r-raḥīm*, Gawhar, following his master, puts forward that the letter of “B”, which is the first letter of this āyah and symbolizes the status of the Prophet Muhammad, is the cause of the creation and Ali is the point beneath it (Gawhar, n.d., p. 42 & 109).

As an eternal reality, *al-noor al-Muḥammadiya* is both the inner reality of the Prophet and the Logos: “it is the archetype of the whole creation, containing within himself the ‘idea’ of the cosmos just as according to the Gospel of St. John all things were made by the Word of Logos” (Naṣr, 1992, p. 340). *Al-noor al-Muḥammadiya* is the continuity of a perennial spirit over history, and has found numerous instances such as Ali, who is not only the cousin, son-in-law and the successor of the Prophet, but more
than that, the Prophet himself, and also his *walī*. From this perspective, Ali is a mirror reflecting *Muḥammedan* Reality in himself. The chain of *wilāya* and *awliyā*, which is a continuous uninterrupted string, starts with Ali and ends in his grandson, the twelfth *Imām*. Therefore, despite different names and persons, these spiritual figures are bearers of an everlasting reality or primal *noor* which is never extinguished (Naṣr, 1992, chapter thirteen, pp. 337-353 & Elmore, 1998, pp. 82-83 & 187-188).

Like his predecessor, Rashtī also had a love-hate relationship with mysticism, and especially with the school of ʿibn ʿArabī (Lawson, 2005, pp. 125-154). Addressing his conceptualization of the status of the absolute *wilāya*, of *al-noor al-Muḥammadiya*, and of the status of ḥamd which is designated to the Prophet and Ali, he seems to be more of a Sufi than a *Shaykhī* theologian. In the first volume of *al-Khuṭbah* he states that ḥamd is a mirror manifesting His names and attributes, such as greatness, power, and beauty (Gawhar, n.d. p. 122). Here, his words resonate of Akbarīan mystics who observe in the universe nothing but His theophany. The Deity has appeared to the word of ḥamd (a reminder of the word, ‘*kalima*’ in Christianity?) which symbolizes His absolute *wilāya* and due to the modulated-reality of it, the *wilāya* of His chosen people (Gawhar, n.d. pp. 122-128). The name of Muhammad, which is His remembrance and His appearance in a name, is derived from the Primal Word or ḥamd. In the same manner, Ali should be understood as a divine name, and stands for the station of multiplicity (*maqām al-taḥsil*) and His names (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, pp. 402-404).

*Ḥamd* here is the First Emanated and has different names, such as light (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 144), point (*nuqṭah*) (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 143), and the *Muḥammedan* Reality (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 134). The Arabic letter of *Alif*
“a”, is called the lawā of the point. Lawā literally means emblem or flag and Rashtī, by using it for the status of Ali, intends to say that he is the one who represents the Prophet Muhammad’s cause and mission after him (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 143 & Gawhar, n.d. p. 89).

Rashtī’s Khutbah, as well as some of his other writings, such as Asrār al-Shahāda, Rasāʾil dar Jawāb-i Suleyman Khān Afshār, Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, Risāla-yi Hujjat-i Bālighi, Maqāmāt al-ʿĀrifīn, and Waṣāʾṭ-i Āqa Muḥammad Sharīf Kermānī, contain similar themes with those of Aḥsāʾī. Walī is the owner of the column of light (ʿamūd al-noor/ʿamūd min al-noor), through which he sees the lives of people (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 229). He is also a star, indicating His plans and power for His creatures, in the same way that he is the bearer of His mashīyya and divine light for His subjects (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 233). Rashtī distinguishes between two kinds of Divine Majesty (jalāl): the majesty of power (jalāl al-qudra) and the majesty of greatness (jalāl al-ʿaẓīma). The latter exemplifies shams, which stands for the Prophet Muhammad and is higher than the former, which stands for the moon or the absolute wilāya of Ali. The moon (qamar al-wilāya), gains its light/existence from the Sun (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 248 & 250-253 & 385-387).

Constructed on the covenant of wilāya is a house (bayt) which has four columns, each stands for [the acceptance of/testimony upon] His divinity (rubūbiya, also rubūbiyat), the Prophet Muhammad’s nubuwwa, Ali’s wilāya, and closeness and affinity with His friends and enmity with His enemies, respectively (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 2, p. 108 & Rashtī, Ḥujjat-i Bālighi, n.d., p. 73). Each of these levels accounts for one station of gnosis, and the last one, which is the gnosis of the faith of Shiʿīsm, indicates
the office of the specific vicegerency of the Hidden *Imām* (Rashtī, *Hujjat-i Bālighi*, n.d., pp. 91ff). In terms of the theory of the Fourth Pillar, Rashtī argues that in addition to the rightly guided ones (*Rāshidūn*) and trustees (*umanā*), the *ʿulemā* preserve the Faith from deviation and are the sources of divine knowledge. These visible towns are the signs of the path to the holy towns, or the *Imāms* (Rashtī, *Hujjat-i Bālighi*, p. 4). The gnosia to “the People of the Rightness” (*ahl al-ḥaqq*) (Rashtī, *Hujjat-i Bālighi*, n.d., p. 91) and their station is the fourth pillar of *Shaykhīsm*, which is the fourth station of gnosia (Rashtī, *Hujjat-i Bālighi*, n.d., pp. 73-74).

### 2.7. Conclusion

This chapter is indebted to the existing tradition of *Shaykhīsm* although, despite the contribution of the abovementioned figures, the question of *wilāya* and its nexus to *nubuwwa* and imamate, and to the stations of gnosia, has not been studied adequately. For this reason, the chapter sought to study and analyze the main *Shaykhī* texts in order to grasp the intention of the authors by examining their conceptions of *wilāya*. This has directed the study to the following conclusions about the nature of *wilāya* and of the *Imām*’s authority in the *Shaykhī* School:

The *Shaykhī* conception of the notions of *wilāya*, *nubuwwa* and imamate, is a classic one with apparent equivalences within the doctrine of *wilāya* in the School of Mullā Ṣadrā (which will be studied in the next chapter), as well as that of the *Akbarīan ʿirfān* (which was discussed in chapter one); despite the love-hate relationship of the *Shaykhī ʿulemā* with both. In the case of the former, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the *Shaykhī* doctrine of *wilāya* can be regarded as the continuation of the philosophy of Ṣadrā. *Wilāya* is the inward of *nubuwwa* and its continuity, and
furthermore, *wilāya* is the hiddenness of God and hence needs to be mediated through a gate. The office of the *rukn-i rābiʿ* was invented in order to create a bridge between *wilāya* – which, like divinity is unreachable by Man – and people. *Walī (imām)* has a face toward people and a face toward Deity, and is regarded as the manifestation/theophany (*ẓuhūr*) of Him. The issue of manifestation and theophany are *Akbarīan*, and display the continuity of this tradition in the *Shaykhi* School. *Walī* is also *Shāhid* (lit. witness) of God upon people; it is through His eyes that His subjects are watched over. *Shāhid*, as the esoteric version of intermediacy (Corbin, 1391, vol. 1, pp. 507-508), is *ḥujja* (proof); a sign for those who believe in the Day of Judgment and the one who testifies to people on behalf of God. Believers come to understand everything by the help of these *shuhadā* (pl. witnesses), since in the absence of them no one is capable of understanding.

The concept of *ẓuhūr* is important in the *Shaykhi* School and needs closer attention. As Rafati rightly maintains, the concepts of *ẓuhūr, khātamīyya* (sealing), *Qāʾim*, and the Day of Judgment, are given metaphorical interpretations in *Shaykhīsm*, and unlike the mainstream which adheres to the belief that the advent of the *Qāʾim* will occur on the Day of Judgment, the *Shaykhis* believe that the appearance, and not the advent, of the *Qāʾim* ‘is’ the Day of Judgment (Rafati, 1979, pp. 173-174). Without entering into the debate of the nature of the Day of Judgment, I briefly mention that the *Shaykhi* āulemā did not believe that the *Imāmlived* in the *ghayb* (occultation) and would arrive from it, but that he lived among people and would appear, as the Prophet Muhammad did (Rafati, 1979, pp. 175ff).

*Imām (walī)* will become apparent on the Day of Judgment and his appearance is Deity’s manifestation, and since the office of *wilāya* has always represented the
hiddenness of God, now, the person of *imām/walī/Qāʾim* will be regarded as His theophany. It will happen at the end of time, and when the *Imām* appears the boundary between man and God will be removed. Reminiscent of the idea of *waḥdat-i wujūd* of ibn ‘Arabī, in the *Shaykhī* doctrine of *zuhūr*, the unification of God and man is postponed until the end of time, and hence, gains a utopian aura. As it will be observed in the next chapter, the *ḥakīms* of the Schools of Tehran and Qom developed similar arguments to conceptualize the office of *wilāya*, with two significant differences: the influence of *al-Shaykh al-Akbar* is undeniable in their work, and as such they can be regarded as the true students of the School of Mullā Ṣadrā whose metaphysics found a new dimension in their writings. These figures were not only inspired by him, but also significantly added to the conceptualization of it. The other difference is that the *Shaykhī* emphasis on eschatology and messianism – as the continuation of esotericism - is absent in these two schools.

And last, the passive *Shaykhī* millenarianism bore no fruit toward actualizing the *Shaykhī* dreams, as this duty was assigned to Seyyed Ali Muḥammad Shīrāzī (*bāb*, 1235-1819/1266-1850) to declare himself: first, the special vicegerent of the *Imām*, second the *Qāʾim* (who abrogates the Islamic *sharīʿa* and whose appearance ‘is’ the day of Judgment), and finally the new prophet (another continuity with the *Shaykhī* tradition of the denial of the idea of *khātamīyya/sealing*). As has been observed, in *Shaykhīsm* the divine manifestation is postponed until the Day of Judgment, when the *Imām* will appear. Shīrāzī, himself the materialized *Qāʾim*, invented another messianic figure whose personage was said to be the origin of all divine names and attributes as well as divine manifestation. The utopia of the *zuhūr*, having been postponed until the end of time, is once again postponed (two thousand or more years) in the hands of Shīrāzī
(Shīrāzī n.d., p. 62), until the messianic figure of ‘He whom God shall make manifest’ (Man-yuẓhiruḥullāh) (Smith, 2000, pp. 180-181), the promised figure of all religions, will appear.

---

1 - Shaykhīya or Kashfīya, the appellation is due to the fact that kashfor mukāshīfa (the ‘unveiling’ of inner meanings), plays an important role in this school of thought. It is also a point of difference between Shaykhīsm and other schools, though the adjectives of Shaykhī/Shaykhīsm derive from the title of Shaykh Ahmad Aḥsāʾī.

Seyyed Kāzim Rashti, Aḥsāʾī’s successor in Dalīl al-Mutahāyyarīn explains how one should understand Kashfīya in contrast to Bālāsāri, which refers to the rest of Shīʿa. In the Qajar period, BālāsārīVS. Pāyīnsāri explained the notorious dispute between Shaykhs and non-Shaykhs in Iran and Ottoman Iraq. Since the former used to pray beneath the tomb of Imām al-Hossein in Karbala in order to show its extreme respect and love for him, they have been called Pāyīnsāri, literally those who stand beneath the Imāms. For Rashti’s explanation, see: Seyyed Kāzim Rashti, Dalīl al-Mutahāyyarīn, n.d., (n.p.), p. 3 onward. Rashti claims that this name is chosen by God in the world of al-dharr; and refers to believers who, by choosing to leave the void path, walk in the righteous path (Rashti, n.d., p. 17). In this work, I use the terms the Shaykhi School/ulemā, as they are the preferred terms used by the Shaykhs themselves and primarily refer to a theological school of thought which came to find practical and sociological implications as well. Vahid Rafati has discussed the appellation of these terms as well as their implications in his Ph.D. thesis. See: Vahid Rafati, Op.cit, 1979, pp. 47-48.

2 - The year of his death is controversial. In al-Abrār, http://www.alabrar.info/ which belongs to the Kermānī Shaykhism, the date of his death is mentioned as 1241 H/1826. Also, in Rayḥānat al-Adab there exist four years (1241, 42, 43, 44) as the year of his death.


3 - Aḥsāʾī is marked by multiple travels all over the Shīʿa world. He left his village for the Shīʿa shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf at the age of twenty. He settled there until a plague swept these cities. He went back home for a while, and for a second time left al-Ah莎 for Iraq in 1212 H/1797. After staying in Basra briefly, he left Iraq for Iran in order to visit the holy shrine of the eighth Imām in Mashhad. En route to Khorasan, he stayed in Yazd; where he was warmly welcomed by authorities, locals, and ‘ulemā. He left Yazd for Mashhad, and after staying there for a while, returned to Yazd. Apparently, his stay in Yazd was a source of benefit and blessing for him and the city too. As his reputation increased, not only local officials and ‘ulemā but Fath ‘Alī Shah Qajar (d. 1249 H/1834) were willing to meet him. He accepted the invitation of the Shah, left Yazd for the capital, and stayed there for a short time. In Tehran, he engaged in dialogue with the Shah, because he had composed a-Rasālat al-Sulṭāniyya (Majestic Treatise) as an answer to the Majesty’s questions. The treatise is accessible here: Al-Jawāmi’ al-Kalim, nine volumes, 1430 H (Basra: Al-ghādir Publication), vol. 5, pp. 145-160. He also wrote another treatise as an answer to the questions put forward by the Shah, called a-Rasālat al-Khāqāniyya (the Treatise of the Great Khān) which was the title of the second Shah of the Qajar dynasty. In 1234 H/1818, after returning to Yazd, he started writing, teaching, training, and initiating students and disciples, as well as answering various questions presented to him from different places and authorities. On his way back to Iraq, he resided in Kermanshah, next to the borderland of the Ottoman territory, where he was warmly welcomed by Prince Muhammad ‘Alī Mirza Dawlatshāh, the son of Fath ‘Alī Shah and the governor of the city (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1901, vol. 1, pp. 14–18). Aḥsāʾī’s reputation was damaged by the excommunication fatwā which was issued against his ideas on corporal resurrection by Mullā Muḥammad Taqi Baragānī (d. 1263 H/1846) known as ‘the third martyr’. He was therefore compelled to return to the shrine cities. Here for the second time and due to his ideas in the book Sharḥ al-Ziyārat about Imām Ali and his wilāyat al-takwiniyya, he left Iraq for Medina, where he passed away
and was buried in the cemetery of al-Baqī‘ (Aḥṣā‘ī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 19). In fact, and unlike what is mentioned in his book, the main reason for his departure from Iran was not his ideas on Imām ʿAlī’s wilāya, but rather his opinion on the Hidden Imām as lives in the realm of hūrqalyā and specifically his denial of the physical resurrection. Regarding Baraghiān’s excommunication fatwā, Samawi believes that “the spark ignited” by his and his associates “inexorably led to a polarization within the scholastic establishment between the supporters of Shaykh ʿĀḥmad and his detractors” (Samawi, unpublished article, p. 16).

4 - One of the most important texts is The Dawn-Breakers, which is the English version of the Arabic Matāliʿ al-Anwār, having been documented by Nabil Zarandi and translated into English by the late Guardian of the Cause of God (Wali-ya Amr-i llāh), Shoghi Effendi. In this book, Nabil has distorted the Shaykhī chronicles in order to emphasize the emergence of Bābīsm. In this text, events, places and figures are, at times, reduced or promoted to help the reader get familiar with the Bābī cause.

Mullā Muḥammad (Nabil) Zarandi, Maṭāliʿ al-Anwār, (Tārīkh-i Nabil), n.d. (n.p.). And the English translation is:


7 - This collection can be found here http://www.alabar.info/. On the Basis of ʿĪbrāhīmī’s biography, Henry Corbin has composed his Maktab-i Shakhīhz az Hikmat-i Ilāhī-ya Shīrī, (l’ecole Shakhkhein Theologie Shī’ite), translation into Persian and introduction by Ahmad Bahmanyar, 1346/1967 (n.p., Tābān Publication), pp. 14-42.

8 - This book is mentioned as Sharḥ throughout this chapter.

9 - Some sources such as Idris Samawi’s thesis, only mention the names of the three Imāms: the second, the fourth and the fifth. The twelfth Imām is not mentioned at all.


11 - Henri Corbin in his Maktab-i Shakhīhz az Hikmat-i Ilāhī-ya Shīrī, claims that these ījāzas were not solely spiritual, but physical. He narrates a dream of the Tenth Imām by Aḥsā‘ī in which the Imām gave him a number of papers (actually 12 papers) containing the ījāzas from each of the twelve Imāms. Corbin, Op.cit, 1346 Shamsī/1967, p. 22 & 24.

12 - Such a controversy, as we saw in chapter one, was around the sources of knowledge of Ibn ‘Arabi as well, and since the so-called “esoteric knowledge” is a vast area with unclear boundaries and content, no one can admit or disprove whether a certain scholar has received his ʿilm from divine sources or not. Todd Lawson takes a different stance with MacEion and agrees with Corbin. He maintains that “Shaykh ʿĀḥmad made it clear that the only religious authority he would submit to would be the Imāms themselves as opposed, say, to any marja’ al-taqlid of the Usulīs. This also implied that his own knowledge, thus derived directly from the Prophet and the Imāms, was qualitatively superior to that of others”. Lawson, Op.cit, 2005, p. 135.

13 - Todd Lawson in the abovementioned article has elaborated on the nature of the relationship between Aḥsā‘ī and Sufism in general, and Aḥsā‘ī and Mullā Muḥṣin Fāyḍ Kāshānī in particular. As he certainly points out, “it would appear from everything we know of Aḥsā‘ī’s thought . . . and it is certainly not enough . . . that what others consider philosophical sophistication our author himself would view as irreligion, an abuse of the holy laws of intelligence”. Lawson, Ibid, pp. 129 ff.


15 - William R. Newman in his article the Occult and the Manifest among the Alchemists, has looked deeper into the issue. He distinguished between the alchemical theory of the occult and manifest, as opposed to Galeno-scholastic theory, and argues that the former, having originated in the Greek civilization of Hellenistic or Roman Imperial times, and passed through Islam and arrived finally in the Latin West via Jābir ibn Hayyān, is a striking example of the permutation of ideas by virtue of their
transmission. The significant point is that the alchemical theory was radically different from the medical and scholastic literature on occult qualities, though it shared some of the same original sources. According to the alchemical theory, the occult qualities of a substance could become manifest, because they were not by their very nature insensible, and that every material substance has a bātīn and a zāhir (occultum and manifestum in Latin and interior and exterior) and they can invert literally. See: William R. Newman, the Occult and the Manifest among the Alchemists, in Tradition, Transmission and Transformation, F. Jamil Ragep, Sally Ragep and Steven Livesey (eds), 1996 (Leiden, New York and Kohn: E. J. Brill), pp. 173-198.

16 - One can classify Aḥsāʾī's writings into two categories: the first category includes those commentaries, or independent texts and treatises, which are composed by a jurist and committed to the Usūlī tradition and its principles of writing and thinking, though trying to push it to its limits (Lawson, 2005, pp. 127ff). From a philosophical perspective, he was the true heir of some characters of "post-Avicennan philosophy in Eastern Islam, [especially having that] focused on the major part of his attention on the works" of the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā and his school, "as the last major philosophical school predating him" (Samawi, 1998, p. 41). In relation to his commentaries, I should say that the most prominent philosophers of the Sadrīan School are pilloried by him. In this regard, Mullā Ṣadrā's (1045 H/1640) Sharḥ al-'Arshiyya (the Commentary of the Wisdom of the Throne) and al-Mashāʿir (Intelligents) (MacEion, 2009, p. 72, 95), as well as his pupil and son-in-law's, Mullā Muḥsin Fayd Kāshānī (d. 1091 H/1680), are being criticized by him. His comments of Fayd, include more than 2500 verses from his Risālat al-Ilmiyya (the Treatise on Knowledge) as well as other writings of Fayd (MacEion, 2009, p. 72), though, for the detailed list of his commentaries on his contemporary scholars, see MacEion, 2009, pp. 72-73. On the other hand, he made huge efforts to integrate the Shīʿa īmāms' teachings into this tradition (Samawi, 1998, p. 40). It is from this perspective that he laid special stress on his dreams and visions of the īmāms. Aḥsāʾī, through the very personal channel of dreams, is the recipient of the īmāms' divine knowledge on one hand, and its transmitter into the existing philosophical and theological tradition on the other. The second category embraces those writings that could be labeled as his esoteric/allegorical interpretations of some of Qur'ānic verses, as well as central Islamic concepts such as imamate, wilāya, nubuwwa, creation, resurrection, and infallibility (isma). Relevant to this, there are other materials explained by the "methodology of jafr" and the science of the letters. Sharḥ Khūṭbat al-Tutunjiyya by Seyyed Kāzım Rashtī (though it is unfinished), is notable in this regard.

17 - The Khutbah which is "only loosely and inadequately translated as is an Arabic sermon, discourse or oration ascribed to the first Shīʿa Imām Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 40 H/661). It is not found in the well-known compilation of around 400 sermons (and other materials) ascribed to Imām Ali entitled Nahj al-Balāgha compiled in about 400 H/1009-10 by Sharīf al-Raḍī ibn al-Hossein al-Musawi (406 H/1015), or in other well-known collections of materials attributed to Imām Ali. The Khutbah has been infrequently published in the original, although it can be found, however, along with the allegedly Kufa delivered Khutbat al-Bayān also ascribed to Imām Ali in volume two of the Ilzām al-Nāṣib fi Ithbāt al-Ḥujjat al-Ghāʾib (the Commitment of the Constitute to Prove the Ḥujjat), 5th ed., 1404/1984 (Beirut: Mawsūʿat al-ʿAlāʾi of Hāḍī Shāykhʿ Ali al-Yazdi al-Ḥāʾirī (d. 1333 H/1915). Very little studied and seldom commented upon in any language, the Khutbah is a challenging, magisterial oration containing important religious doctrines relating to Shīʿa walāya (on one level Imām centered "divine providence") and high imamology as well, for example, as important Islamo-biblical or Isrāʿīlyāt themes or motifs." Stephen Lambden in: <http://hurqalya.ucmerced.edu/node/296/>, last accessed 02/04/2017. As Amir-Moezzi has argued, there is a great confusion regarding the title and text of the sermon, as it is reported by various authors (Shīʿa and Sunnī) in different periods. The Khutbah is old and a long version of it was already reported "in Nusayrī texts dating from the end of the third century AH" (Amir-Moezzi, 2001, p. 121). Along with the abovementioned ghāli source, the text is mentioned by "the Ismāʿīlī thinker and propagandist, Muʿayyad fil-Dīn al-Shirāzī (d. 470 H/1077)" (Amir-Moezzi, 2001, p. 121), as well as "the Twelver theosopher and traditionist Rajab al-Bursī (d. 814 H/1411)" (Amir-Moezzi, 2001, p. 121) in his Mashāʿir. Shāykh Kāzım, like his predecessor Mullā Muḥsin Fayd Kāshānī in his Kalimāt-i Maknūnah (Hidden Words) and his successor ‘Alī Yazdī Ḥāʾirī in his Ilzām al-Nāṣib fi Ithbāt al-Ḥujjat al-Ghāʾib uses the version of Bursī (Amir-Moezzi, 2001, p. 122).

18 - Perhaps, one of the most prominent differences between Gawhar and Kermānī was the latter's belief in a visible viceroy who is not only accessible to believers, but also carries all the responsibilities of the īmām. Kermānī, focuses on the necessity of the availability of īmām, and since he is not reachable by ordinary people ('awām), there ought to be a nāʿib who actually occupies the īmām's place. The theory of the Fourth Pillar is resulted from such supposition (Kermānī, 1267 H/1851).
vol. 4, p. 13ff). On the other hand, Gawhar, maintains that the occultation of the Imam should be understood by the principle of facilitating fayd (qa'iday-i lutf), which is well-known in the Shi'a theology. Therefore, Gawhar takes it for granted that a Hidden Imam is sensible and his remoteness from his believers is not important. For more information, see: Mullā Mīrzā Hassan Gawhar, Sharḥ Hayāt Arwāḥ (The Commentary on the Life of Souls), 2nd edition, 1423 H/2002 (Kuwait: Jāmi'ay-i Imām Sadiq), pp. 570-581.

19 - MacEion translates rukn-i rābī as "the Fourth Support." (MacEion, 2009, pp. 19ff).

20 - He composed eight refutations on Bābīsm, two in Arabic and six in Persian. His successors, from his son, Muhammad Khān Kermānī, to the last Shaykhi leader of his clan, Abdul Rīḍā Ībrāhīmī, who was assassinated in Kerman in 1358 shamsi/1980, followed his path in getting themselves involved with the causes of Bābism and Bahā'ism. Shaykhism was accused of nurturing the Bābī movement, and it is understandable that by refuting it, they wanted to vindicate themselves of such an accusation. Kermānī has important treatise entitled Khātama-yi Nāṣarīya (the Seal of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah) in which he attempts to make it clear for the Shah that he and his school have been always loyal, both to the monarchy and to Islam. Khātama-yi Nāṣarīya, 3rd edition, n.d., (Kerman: Sa'ādat publication).

21 - Farhad Daftary in his studies on Ismā'īlim in the Qajar period explains how the combination of political power, economic benefit and religious ambition, placed Ḥasan 'Alī Shah, known as Āghā Khān I, forty-sixth Ismā'īlī Imam of the Nizārī Ismā'īlim against the Shah of the time Muḥammad Shah, who himself had appointed Āghā Khān to the governorship of Kerman. As a result of the dismissal of his service, Āghā Khān resisted against the central government in Tehran and finally fled to Afghanistan and India. See: Farhad Daftary, The Ismā'īlis: Their History and Doctrines, 1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 435 ff.


23 - In general, up to the formation of the first messianic movement in the 18th century, there were three main courses of drives for modernization: the first one was led by Prince 'Abbās Mīrzā, the unhappy heir and thus governor of Azerbaijan. His drive had striking military and administrative aspects limited to Azerbaijan and specifically to Tabriz. The second drive was more generalized and nationwide, started from the court in Tehran by Amīr Kabīr. His efforts, like those of 'Abbās Mīrzā's had been inspired by the Tanzimāt reforms in Turkey, but unlike 'Abbās Mīrzā, he successfully won "the confidence of the heir apparent, the future Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah." (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 53). The third phase was initiated by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah himself after the assassination of his prime minister. But these "innovations," as Abrahamian has rightly noted, "instead of driving for rapid change, induced a slow drift toward change; instead of defending the state against external enemies, they were aimed at buttressing the court against internal opponents, and, instead of protecting the economy, they sought to tempt Western interests further into the Iranian economy." (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 54-55 & 2008, Chapter Two, pp. 34-62)

24 - Addressing the modernization process, its effects on the social strata and reactions to it, it is worthy of note that the Shaykhi leaders, and specifically those who founded the Shaykhi School of Kerman, brought to the surface their dissatisfaction with the West in general and the thirst for economic and political change which was common among the mentioned social classes in particular. They not only criticized the whole process of modernization, but also took refuge in the most conservative interpretation of a role a Shi'i leader could ever assume.


27 - Another sociologist of post-Revolutionary Iran has analyzed the causes of the formation of the Revolution of 1979 from this perspective. Sa'īd Ḥajjāriyān, Maw'ūdiyat dar Inqilāb-i Rūssiyeh va Inqilāb-i Islāmī-i Iran (Mahdism in the Iranian and Russian Revolutions), Ph.D. thesis, Tehran University, 1382.

28 - For a historical account of the 'demise' of Akhbarism in the nineteenth century after the treatment it had received in the hands of Āqā Muḥammad Bāqir al-Bihbahānī, (d.1205/1791), and later engagements of some Akhbarī figures in anti-Shaykhi dispute, see Andrew Newman's article in:
Andrew J. Newman, *Anti-Akhbārī Sentiments Among the Qajar 'Ulemā: the Case of Muḥammad Bāqir al-
Khwānsārī* (d.1313/1895), in Religion and Society in Qajar'Iran, Robert Gleave (Ed), 2005 (London &

29 - Probably this dispute provided an opportunity for them to take an independent position, as well as
to present an alternative to both. This could by itself be the subject of a research project.
30 - It was Corbin who coined this term to explain the very characteristic of the Shī'a theosophy. In his
book entitled *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth*, he indicates to this point by saying that “While
prophetology is an essential element of Islamic religion as such, in Shī'a theosophy it is divided into
prophetology and imamology. Beside the prophetic function, which delivers the message of the literal
Revelation, there is the initiatic function, which initiates into the hidden meanings of revelations, and
which is the function of the *Imām*” (Corbin, 1977, p. 58).

31 - “Symbolic exegesis of the [Qur’ān] based on the claim that there is an inner (bāṭin) meaning behind
the external (ẓāhirī) text. By extension, it can be applied to other scriptures, as well as to rituals and the
whole of nature. The theory and practice of this hermeneutical method was elaborated by *isma’īlī
thinkers* (http://www.iis.ac.uk/glossary/b) of the 11th century. According to these writers, “while the
revelation (tanzīl) was delivered by the prophet to all people, the knowledge of its ta’wil rests with the
imām, the sole authoritative source of interpretation, and they considered that this *ta’wil* should not be
disclosed to the masses, lest it be misunderstood” (http://www.iis.ac.uk/glossary/b). It was assumed
that the esoteric and exoteric dimensions of the revelation and of the Qur’ān came together, but in later
centuries, there appeared a number of sects/movements solely on the basis of the esoteric dimension
of the Qur’ān, as well as that of the rituals and teachings. Bella Tendler in her article on the Nūṣayrī sect
has argued that in the Nūṣayrī thought, knowledge only indicate esoteric knowledge and it is accessible
through a properly conducted initiation. See:

Bella Tendler Krieger, Marriage, Birth, and Bāṭinī Ta’wil: A Study of Nūṣayrī Initiation Based on the

32 - In Corbin’s text, cosmic Sophianity refers to *Hadrat Fatima*, because she is Sophia, “which is to say
divine wisdom and power, embracing all he universes”. Corbin, Op.cit, 1977, p. 65, and that is why “the
whole universe of the soul and the secret of the meanings given by the Soul is the very universe and
secret of *Hadrat Fatima*” (ibid).

33 - *Sharḥ* is a commentary on *Ziyrāt al-Jāmī’a-t al-Kabīra*, written at the request of Seyyed Ḥassan ibn
Seyyed Qāsim al-Ḥusseynī al-Ishkwārī al-Jilānī in 1230/1814. The *Ziyrāt* itself is a prayer of the
visitations of the holy shrines of the *imāms* related on the authority of Imām Ali ibn Muhammad Naqi
and is recorded by Ibn Bābwayh (Shaykh Ṣadūq) and Shaykh Abū Ja’far Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-
Ṭūsī. *Sharḥ* is a collection of the most important theological problems in Shī’a thought and, the *Ziyrāt*
itself “is a master work in expressing the status of the *imāms* and Shaykh Ahmad explains its status as
such” (Rafatī, 1979, p. 59). The prayer is famous among the Shī’a and many scholars have written

34 - Ahsā’ī’s explanation of the four stations of *awliyāʾ* is based on a famous hadīth by the sixth *Imām*,
Jafar al-Sadiq which is related by Abū Ja’far Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Farrukh al-Shafār al-Qumīn
Basā’ir al-Darajāt fī Fazā’il Āl-i Muḥammad (Clear Proofs in the Sciences of the Household of
the Prophet and on whatever is designated to them by God), in which the *Imān* says “inna amrinā sīr r ʾa ʾlā
sīr r o muṣṭaṭar, wa sīr r o la yafidū illā sīr r, wa sīr r ʾalā sīr r wa sīr r o muṭannā bil sīr r” (Al-Qumī,
1404 H, p. 28).

35 - There is no doubt that there is only one divinity, but here Rashtī wants to say that the offices of
wilāya and *nubuwawa* share divine attributes and features and that’s why they can be called *rubūbīyat
al-thalālīthah* and *rubūbīyat al-thānīyah*, respectively.

36 - For a Shaykhī explanation of this concept and its nexus to other Shī’a concepts such as infallibility,
the greater infallibility, absolute imamate, absolute wilāya, and polarity (*qutbiyat*), see: Kermānī, 1267

37 - In the Akhbarān School, the presence of the Perfect Man is always regarded as all-encompassing
since, from an outward perspective, it is physical man, but inwardly he comprehends the realities of all
things. See:

72, Issue 2, April 1982, pp. 107-128.

38 - For a discussion of this pair, see:
The difference between these two forms is that it is through their being that He pours down rain on people and on the earth, and grows plants and seeds in it (Ahsā’i, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 75-76, vol. 2, pp. 157-166).

Ahsā’i also instructs his readers to respect awliyā’ and to express absolute obedience toward them in order to gain good morality, a purified soul and closeness to God. (Ahsā’i, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, pp. 271-72) This idea is the idea of modulation or gradation of wilāya which is founded on the gradation of being. Later on, he describes wilāya as the atonement of sins; equating it with water by which impurities will be removed. (Ahsā’i, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 278).

I should emphasize once again that wilāya/walāya, as a modulated status, has two forms: the first one which is specified to the imāms and the Prophet, is a divine gift (or grace) and is donated to them from God. It is He who takes initiative in choosing them for Himself as His friends (awliyā’) and it is on the basis of this affinity that the right of absolute authority is given to them. On the other hand, there is another form of wilāya/walāya which starts from the side of the subject, from bottom to up and is dedicated to those who choose to take this journey to Him. But it is on the basis of the former that the notion of “discharge” is proposed. It is also likely that the main difference between these two forms is the concept of infallibility which is distinctively designated to the first group; the second group of awliyā’ does not benefit from infallibility.

“The imāms are regarded to be the qurā’ī whom are blessed by Allah”.

As an example, Ahsā’i mentions this concept in the second volume of the Sharḥ only once. See: (Ahsā’i, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 217).

From this perspective, it seems that there is no difference between the idea of the Fourth Pillar and the notions of tawallā (friendship/closeness with God and the Prophet), and tabarrā (dissociating oneself from friendship with God’s enemies). In the fourth volume of the Irshād, Kermānī explains that the Fourth Pillar is the most honorable and respected bond (urwa) of the faith; and even stands higher than praying, fasting, alms, Ḥajj and jihād, and that is why it ought to be obliged and observed (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, p. 68). As Corbin has explained, the two principles of tawallā and tabarrā are to be the fundamentals (uşūl) of Shaykhism, whilst, for the mainstream Shi’ism, they are the ḥurū’ (branches). (Corbin, 1346/1967, pp. 91-92).

Corbin has shed light on the office of the fourth pillar and the gnosia related to it. See: Corbin, 1346/1967, pp. 88-105.

Al-dharr literally means ant, and its appellation is that since awliyā’ are the most honorable of all people and the rest of the creatures, everything else is worthless against them. Thus, the whole universe is as big as an ant in their eyes. (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 19). Al-dharr is the earth of resurrection; because it is believed that the world has been generated from Al-dharr, and will return back to it (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 100), though, Kermānī’s explanation on the causes of the creation of the universe as well as on the Al-dharr, is but superstition (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, pp. 46-58).

Todd Lawson explains that in Shaykhism, the imāms are neither human nor divine, “but a different order of being, a separate and distinct species” (Lawson, 2005, p. 138), and the Perfect Man is not the Prophet (contrary to Sufism), nor is the idea presented by the Prophet and the imāms (contrary to the common Twelver Shi’a understanding of the term), but rather, is “the one who recognizes the spiritual and ontological dignity of these figures. It is Salmon and not Muhammad who represents the prototype here” (Lawson, 2005, p. 138).

Ahsā’i uses the words tasāḥub (to capture), or taṣarruf (to possess something/act of disposal) to explain infallibility. Imāms are being held or captured by infallibility, in the sense that they do nothing but good, they say nothing but right, etc. (Ahsā’i, 1430 H, p. 19). By claiming that Imāms are not capable of doing sin, he discharges them from any human attribute, and upgrades them to a level which traditionally belongs to the angels. Kermānī’s arguments are more fascinating. He not only, following his master, upgrades the imāms and the Prophet to the level of the angels, but also, by arguing that they have priority in creation, places them even higher than angels. In this regard, priority in creation res
in the superiority in existence. Kermānī goes beyond and claims that their position is higher than that of the Holy Spirit/Holy Ghost, not only because they were created sooner, but because they are received His grace and His knowledge first. So, the Holy Spirit is their servant which has been sent to serve and protect them (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 3, p. 70, 138-139).

Ahsā’ī recognizes infallibility as a specifically Imāmī characteristic and emphasizes that other schools of thought, such as Ash’arite, Mu’tazilite, Khawārij, etc, do not believe in the infallibility of the Prophet from sin before and after his first revelation, while Imāmī Sect assigns immunity from sin; both major and minor, to the Prophet (Ahsā’ī, 1430 H, p. 28).

The Hidden Imām is also ghawth. It seems that ghawth is a modulated status too which starts from the Prophet and ends in the Shaykhī ‘ulemā including Ahsā’ī himself. Ghawth is a window through which God looks at people, and if the window is closed, there would be no relationship between God and His creatures.

The validity of the hadith has been called under question by a number of scholars such as Mohsen Kadivar. He believes that it should be treated as an example of khabar-i wāhid (singular tradition) as opposed to khabar-i mutawātir (traditions with multiple chains of transmissions), and as such could not be regarded as a basis for the fundamental principle of the Faith. See: <http://kadivar.com/?p=13649>, last accessed 5/2/17.

Kermānī has famously termed “the Rescued Sect” and “the Honorable Sect” to refer to Shaykhism. (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 105, 107).

The phenomenon is called “experiential religion”, and being constructed on dreams, visions and meditations. According to Cole, this feature came to make resemblance between Shaykhism and Shi’ā Sufism (Cole, 1994, p. 15).

All of these events happen during Jumād al-Awwal and end in Muharram, and, as we know, the main Shi’ā events occurred during these months. Focusing on these months indicates that Shi’ā historiography, and not necessarily eschatology in the exact sense of the term, occupies a central place in this text. The Twelfth Imām appears in the tenth day of Muharram in Mecca, where he establishes a just government which will endure seventy years. In the meantime, the third Imām al-Hossein, along with all of his fellows in the battle of Karbala returns to this world. Mahdi is killed by a bearded woman on the seventieth day of his authority. His martyrdom is the beginning of the all-enduring just society and just government (Ahsā’ī, 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 107-112).

The Shaykhī eschatology follows the typical paradigm of the Shi’ā eschatology. As Hussain has argued, the term al-Mahdi has always had a messianic and eschatological sense in Shi’ism, and a considerable body among Imamite applied the title of al-Mahdi in its messianic sense to each imām after his death (Hussain, 1982, pp. 14-15). Besides, the normative signs of the zuhūr, according to Hussain, are common among all Shi’ā sects, including the Shaykhīs. He mentioned five signs: the rise of al-Sufyānī in Syria and his domination for nine months, a rebel called al-Yamānī or al-Qahtānī heading toward Mecca, the revolt of the Pure Soul (Nafs-i Zakiyah) in Medina, the sinking of al-Sufyānī in the vicinity of Medina, and finally, the outcry in the sky which announces the name of al-Qa’im al-Mahdi. All of these happen within one year (Hussain, 1982, pp. 116-117).

Ahsā’ī’s ideas on hūrqiyya are considered in the following texts: Risāla fi al-Ma’ād-i Jismānī (Treatise on Corporal Resurrection) in Javāmī’ al-Kalim (Comprehensive Words), 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 525-533.


Kermānī has a lengthy debate on this concept and its relation to other concepts such as ascension (miʿrāj). See:

Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 128-140. Kermānī goes on by saying that the Prophet and the Imāms’ bodies “are the face (waḥ, of God.” (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 130)


58 - On his research on the Shaykhī doctrines, Vahid Rafati, quoting Muḥammad Muʿīn shows that the term is derived from the Hebrew term habal qarnin and according to this derivation, the correct pronunciation should be havargalyā and not hūrqalyā, as it is common. Aḥsāʿī was not the first to use this term and according to Muʿīn, the term was first used by Shihāb al-Dīn Yāḥyā ibn Ḥabash Suhrewardī, known as Shaykh al-Ishrāq (d. 587 H/1191). See: Rafati, Op.cit, 1979, pp. 106-107. Also, Corbin, on the basis of Suhrewardī’s understanding of the term, has set forth an interesting analysis of it. See: Corbin, Op.cit, 1391, vol. 2, pp. 293-305 & pp. 308-317.


60 - Noteworthy that dividing the earth into “seven climes” as well as “several other divisions”, has a long history in Islam. For more information, see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 1992 (New York: Barnes & Nobel Inc.), p. 106.

61 - Corbin refers to one of the treatises of “the eminent Shaikh Sarkar Agha,” [Abul Qāsim Khān Ibrāhīmī, the fifth successor of Aḥsāʿī], when he says that “one must become an inhabitant of the Earth of Hūrqalyā, a hūrqalyāvī”. See: Ibrāhīmī, Op.cit, n.d., p. 725. Corbin adds that by this statement, Ibrāhīmī wants to teach us that the expectation of the Imām and his return is not “an outward event to be expected sometime in the far distant future; it is an Event that here and now is taking place in souls and slowly progresses and matures there. ... With this conception of eschatology, we come to understand that the whole of history is ‘seen in hūrqalyā’”. See: Ibrāhīmī, ibid, n.d., p. 723.

62 - Aḥsāʿī’s viewpoint in relation to hūrqalyā, resurrection and his debate on the two sets of bodies are not clear and sometimes even paradoxical. For example, in his Risāla fī al-Maʿād al-Jismānī (Treatise on the Corporal Resurrection) Aḥsāʿī maintains that the second substance and corpus is temporal and belong to this world, while the first set is real and original. In the same text, however, he believes that the first set includes all the physical features, as it is additional and accidental, and the second substance and corpus are real (Aḥsāʿī, 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 525-533). For a better analysis see: Yāsir Sālārī, and Mehdi Āfchāngī, Hūrqalyā: Rūykardī Intīghādī bi Shaykhīyah dar Ṭaṭbīq-i Hūrqalyā bar ‘Ālam-i Mithāl (Hūrqalyā: A Critical Approach to Shaykhīsm and the Shaykhī Identification with the Realm of Ideas), Research Journal of Islamic Philosophy and Theology of Shahid Beheshti University, Summer 1391 shamsī/2012, 138-161.

63 - Aḥsāʿī has described the categories of jism, jasad and resurrection in: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim, 1430 H, vol. 8, pp. 375-380, 421-426. Despite having a long history in Islamic philosophy (Corbin, 1391, Vol. 2, 293-305, 308-317), the way hūrqalyā is understood and functions as the abode of the living Imām is new and innovative. The world of hūrqalyā is related to categories of ajāsād/ajsām and of taʿwil, which is “the hermeneutics of symbols, the exegesis, the bringing out of hidden spiritual meaning” (Corbin, 1977, p. 53). Without hūrqalyā there would be no possibility of taʿwil and of “transmuting the material data of external history into symbols, to penetrate to the inner meaning” (Corbin, 1977, p. 53).

64 - For a later discussion on this category, see Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 70-73.

65 - Avicenna’s Risālāyī Shaqūl was published years ago by Rawzanīh Publication in Tehran. Kashkūl, which is in fact a collection (jung) of Shaykh Bahāʾī’s favorite poems and prose, was also published many years ago in Tehran.

66 - Seyyed Kāzīm wrote Khutba from jafr perspective, a methodology by which he analyzes the position of the Prophet, his daughter and the whole Nabawī household. He especially laid stress on the first Imām. This book is published by Lajna-yi Nashr wa Taʾwīzī, Imām Ṣādiq University, Basra, 1421 H/2001.

67 - It seems that compared to the first two Shaykhī leaders, Kermānī wrote less about this, as there is few examples of the occult sciences in his writings, and unlike Aḥsāʿī or Rashtī, he does not develop argument for the conception of the occult sciences. For example, in the first volume of Iršād, he states that these sciences were to help awljā and the prophets to control the world, therefore others should be banned from accessibility to them. These sciences are all stepping out of tradition and have miraculous effects. Kermānī, Op.cit, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 128-129. There result two conclusions: first of all, he redefines the term ‘miracle’ by believing that it is not solely a “divine gift” donated to the chosen ones, but a very human attribute which is being achieved by training, instruction and practice.
Thus, everyone can learn and perform it. The second point is that Kermānī uses *awliyā* in the broad sense of the term to include himself in it, and therefore, being eligible to practice these sciences.

According to the Aḥsāʾī, *simiyā* is the science of subjugation of triple angels and their adherents; since they are responsible for making images, imaginations, and ideas which are emanating down from sky to man. *Līmīyā* is an art of ẓālismān and is concerned with the transformation of evil forces to good forces. *Rīmīyā* is practised to create illusions of what is seemingly impossible or supernatural by using natural means. *Hīmīyā* is the science of stellar evolution, subjugation of stars and other creatures related to them, and are called the science of subjugations. *Kīmīyā* is the science that teaches how to transform and convert metals and minerals, and is called the science of elixir. The interesting point is that Aḥsāʾī, in this text, disapproves witchcraft and other similar magic performances, arguing that all this is forbidden by God, as it is close to polytheism which is supposed to be bigger and more dangerous than blasphemy. But in the same text, he instructs his believers how to practice austerity to get to this knowledge and perform the occult sciences. Aḥsāʾī, Op.cit, 1430 H, pp. 356-369.

This distinction is reminiscent of Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s distinction between the “theophanies or apparitions of divine lights:” those of the Lights of Majesty and the Lights of Beauty. These two refer to the divine beings, though each manifests one dimension of it. Corbin, Op.cit, 1994, pp. 103-104. Here, power and greatness indicate His Essence, though one of them symbolizes *shams* and another one symbolizes *qamar*.

The love-hate relationship of the Shaykhī ʿulemā with Akbarīan ʿirfān is discussed in a number of sources, though the nature of the relationship and the exchanges between the Shaykhī ʿulemā and the ṭakīms of the School of Mullā Ṣadrā are yet to be studied. The one exception is Idris Samawi, who has made it his concern and emphasized it in his different writings.
Chapter Three: The Schools of Tehran and Qum and Wilāya

In line with previous chapters, the subject matter of this chapter is the study and critical analysis of the concept of wilāya in Mullā Ṣadrā’s legacy, having been flourished in the School of Tehran in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Although the School of Isfahan - the inheritor of the doctrine of al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliya - is regarded as the cultivator of the School of Tehran (exemplified in the famous four ḥakīms of Tehran), this new School should be treated as an independent intellectual circle. Moreover, the School of Tehran had a particular distinction; that it was in Tehran “where the Islamic philosophical tradition in Persia encountered Western thought for the first time” (Nasr, 2006, p. 236), and from this perspective, a number of risālas (apologia) written as responses to the Christian priest Henry Martyn (d. 1224 H/1812), should be regarded as signs of this encounter. However, one more century was needed for ‘Alamāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Riʿālīm (the Principles of Philosophy and Realism) to be published.

The members of the School of Tehran included Mullā ‘Abdullāh Zunūzī (d. 1254 H/1838) and his son Āqā ‘Alī Mudarris Tehrānī (d. 1307 H/1889), Mīrzā Abul Ḥassan Jilvih (originally Mīrzā Abul Ḥassan Ṭabāṭabā’ī Zavāreyī Nā’inī) (d. 1314 H/1896), and Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshī’ī (d. 1306 H/1888). There were two other key figures - or to be more precise, transmitters of, and commentators on the Mullā Ṣadrā tradition - who, because of their geographical distance from Tehran, cannot be regarded as the members of the School of Tehran, but as will be observed in the present chapter, heavily influenced the School. These two, namely Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī (d. 1246 H/1830), who was a
resident of Isfahan and not Tehran, and Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī (d. 1289 H/1873) - the most influential figure of the Ṣadrīān ḥikmat and a native and resident of Sabzivar - contributed to the Ṣadrīān legacy in different ways, such as training students, teaching and disseminating the ḥikmat in Persia and Persianate societies, and commenting and glossing on the late Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings.

Their roles, however, were not merely glossing or commenting, but rather reviving and disseminating ḥikmat, ʿīrfān, and in some cases, the Occult in Persia and beyond. If philosophical activities are stretched further to the early twentieth century, individuals such as ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1360 H/1981) are encountered, whose works are the culmination of a type of philosophical activity which is the marriage of ʿīrfān and al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya. It is important to study the intellectual biography of the founding fathers of the School of Tehran as it demonstrates an uninterrupted (or rather, construction of a continuous) tradition, dating back directly to renowned figures of the Safawid period as well as their attachment to the legacy of Mullā Ṣadrā.

One can find different figures, such as Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1197 H/1783), Mīrzā Abūl Qāsim Mudarris Khātūnābādī (d. 1212 H/1797), Seyyed Ṣadr al-Dīn Dizfūlī (d. 1258 H/1842), Seyyed Qūṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad Nayrīzī (d. 1173 H/1760), and many others who taught and practiced ḥikmat, ʿīrfān, and in some cases, the Occult in Persia over two centuries until the School of Tehran was formed in 1237 H/1821.5 As Sajjad Rizvi has pointed out, “the twin pillars of the ḥikmat tradition in the Qajar period became precisely ishrāqī philosophy and a more theoretically minded approach to mystical speculation within the paradigm of ‘philosophy as a way of life’”
(Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 3). This synthesis continued until the early twentieth century, and as will be seen, was manifested in the works and style of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī.

This chapter begins with an account of the historical context of the intellectual developments of the late Safawid to the early Qajar period. Then, by examining key texts of the ḥakīms of the School of Tehran, the conceptualizations of wilāya, imamate and nubuwwa, will be studied and critically analyzed. It will be observed how wilāya finds a new dimension and becomes connected to ontology. Finally, it will be argued that despite noticeable differences between the School of Tehran and its contemporary school, Shaykhīsm, both dealt with concepts such as wilāya, wilāyat al-takwīnīya, imamate and nubuwwa in the same manner. It is also important to note that they are dialectically related; as they are all, including ʿirfān, regarded as ways of reading and digesting Mullā Ṣadrā, even where they are anxious about rejecting his influence. It is worth noting that one vehicle was through commentary on particular types of text and especially some specific hadīth. In terms of the research questions, the author seeks to study the innovations of the ḥakīms of the two Schools of Tehran and Qum in the conception of wilāya (if they had any), as well as the influence of ibn ʿArabī on these two schools.

3.1. Historical Background

At the time when the Shaykhī School was being shaped in the hands of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsāʾī and his successors in the mid nineteenth century, the inheritors of the philosophical school of Mullā Ṣadrā were occupied with reviving and disseminating the teachings of their Safawid master. The relative peace and tranquility brought about by the court, as well as the personal interest of the Qajar rulers in philosophical activities,
bore fruit in the revival and rebirth of *ḥikmat* in the new capital of Tehran. Isfahan preserved its status, both as the matrix of the School and “a vibrant philosophical center” (Nasr, 2006, p. 236), but the establishment of a number of the new *madrasas* in Tehran by notables or courtiers attracted scholars to the capital. The *Marwī* School, which was built in Tehran by Muḥammad Khān Marwī in 1232 H/1821 is one of these new institutions. As Muḥammad Javād Mahdawī Nizhād has discussed, in the thirteenth/nineteenth century, there have been built numerous *masjid-madrasa* all over the country, mainly by courtiers or local governors, and since these buildings were dual-purpose buildings, both mosque and school, one can imagine that the curriculum has been set up to cover the classic religious courses.7

This patronage system was actually a well-established mode of interaction between the court and scholars, as courts either supported *madrasas* financially or encouraged figures to write about a particular subject. For example, most of the refutations on Henry Martyn’s polemic on Islam and the *Qurʾān* were written at the request of the court. Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī began to write his *Radd-i Pādrī* against Martyn at the request of the Shah and ʿAbbās Mīrzā. At the beginning of Nūrī’s book, an entire page is dedicated to Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah and the author praises him profusely for the generous support he provided for the *Muḥammedan* Faith (Nūrī, n.d., p. 4).8

In fact, it was Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah who invited Nūrī to emigrate from Isfahan to Tehran to teach *ḥikmat* there. The Shah, according to Naṣr, wanted Nūrī “to become the central *mudarris* (teacher) of the newly built school” of Marwī (Nasr, 2006, p. 237). Nūrī declined the Shah’s offer, but in his stead, sent one of his prominent students, Mullā ʿAbdullāḥ Zunūzī, whose circles of teaching were regarded as the mark of the
transference of intellectual activity from Isfahan to Tehran. Zuhair Ismāʿīl emphasizes the four madrasas of Sipahsālār, Ṣadr, Dār al-shifā, and ʿAbdullāh Khān as the host of “one of the four founding ḥakīms and thereafter their students. Abu-l-Ḥassan Jilvih taught at Dār al-shifā, Hossein Sabzivārī taught at ʿAbdullāh Khān; Qumshīʾī taught at Ṣadr and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī taught at the Sipahsālār” (Ismāʾīl, 2014, p. 105). Before turning attention to the philosophical activities of the School, the conceptualizations of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought should be discussed briefly. Mullā Ṣadrā is highlighted in order to show the intellectual lineage of his successors, including Nūrī, who came to revive the School of Isfahan.

Mullā Ṣadrā’s entire body of work revolves around the elucidation of what is called by Henry Corbin ‘the prophetic philosophy’. Although this philosophy accepts the idea of sealing, it also maintains that “the final phase of prophecy (nubuwwa) was the initial phase of a new cycle, the cycle of the walāyah or imamate. In other words, the necessary complement of prophetology is imamology, and the most direct expression of imamology is the walayah” (Corbin, n.d. p. 26). The idea of wilāya contains the notion of spiritual guidance which is personified in the twelve immune figures of the household of the Prophet. Thus, wilāya is a twofold notion: the first one, indicates the notion of friendship with God, and the second refers to the functions of imām as the spiritual leader (qutb) of the community of believers (Corbin, n.d. pp, 26-27).

The office of wilāya, however, requires by necessity the esoteric knowledge of the Imāms, who themselves are the representatives of the esoteric aspect of the religion - Islam. As Corbin stresses, it is only the Faith of Shiʿīsm which encompasses both the esoteric (ḥaqīqa) and the exoteric (sharīʿa) aspects of Islam, and as such is regarded as
the manifestation of the unity of the message of Islam as well as the gnosis of it (Corbin, n.d. p. 27). In the light of such understanding, prophetology and imamology are inseparable from each other, and “the most direct expression of imamology is the walayah” (Corbin, n.d. p. 26) which is at the core of the function of ہیجا, whose presence and status testify the continuity of the message of Islam after the death of the Prophet. ہیجا has two main characteristics: it is both pre-existent, taking us back to the gnostic theme of the celestial Anthropos, as well as transcendent (Corbin, n.d. p. 40).

Along with ہیلا, prophetic philosophy has other components, such as esotericism, which not only defend the idea of the esoteric knowledge of the ہم as the continuity of the Prophet’s revelation, but also perpetuate the thought that their teachings come to shape the heart of Islam and Shī‘ism (Corbin, n.d. pp. 36-38). Since the Prophet’s revelation is crystallized in the Book, and “the knowledge of such a Book cannot be grasped by the norms of ordinary philosophy,” then it should be “taken back (taʾwīl)” to its true meaning by the ہم (Corbin, n.d. p. 45). ہم is the owner of the meaning of the Book and the teaching of Islam, and hence is called qayyim bil kitāb or qayyim al Qur‘ān. As will be examined, these notions are repeated over and over again in ہداد texts of the Safavid and post-Safavid eras. It is worth remembering that it is not only the Book that crystallizes “the gnosiology of a prophetic philosophy”, but also the collections of the احادیث of the ہم which contain such a gnosis (ما‘ریفا, also ما‘ریفہ), and it is here that the three “differing modes of higher gnosis, hierognosis” of wahy (revelation), of kashf (unveiling), and of ilhām (inspiration), are interrelated (Corbin, n.d. pp. 51-53).
Hierognosis has a pair which is hierohistory. Hierohistory signifies that in such a context history no longer “consists in the observation, recording or critique of empirical facts, but derives from a mode of perception that goes beyond the materiality of empirical facts” (Corbin, n.d. p. 61). Hierohistory (also meta-history and the sacred history), is a realm to which the Imāms and the Prophet belong, and “the complete cycle” of such a history – “the prophetic periods and the post-prophetic cycle of the imamate or walayah - forms a structure which is not that of some evolutionary process, but which takes us back to the origin”, to the Covenant of Wilāya (Corbin, n.d. p. 62). On the other hand, if the cycle of wilāya endures perpetually, then there should be a living imām who is the true and the last heir of the office of the imamate, “with whom the pleroma of ... [it] is fulfilled”. Along with this kalāmī understanding, there is also an ʿirfānī reading in which the last Imām is regarded as the seal of wilāya, whose status is reminiscent of that of the sealing of prophecy of the Prophet. The notion of the Hidden Imām is intimately connected to an eschatology whose elements, events and actors are all perceived according to the supra-sensible world (Corbin, n.d. pp. 68-74).

Both Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings and his legacy have much to say about the prophetic philosophy and its components, and are manifested in different styles such as original texts, glosses, comments on a number of Shi‘a treasuries of their predecessors, critics, and poetics. Mullā Ṣadrā himself was a prolific writer, and wrote both independent books and treatises, and glossed and commented on several Shi‘a books such as Kulaynī’s Usūl al-Kāfī. His glosses on Kulaynī’s book manifest the typical understanding of the office of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate in the Safavid era. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was during this time that the “exaggerated beliefs” about the status of the Imāms were developed, and Mullā Ṣadrā, among many others, made ample
contributions to notions such as *wilāyat al-takwīnīya*, which is “the existential and absolute cosmic authority of the *Imāms*” (Rizvi, 2013, p. 2). Regarding the philosophy of *nubuwwa*, Ṣadrā’s arguments are backed by a combination of rational approach and *‘irfānī* perspective and terminology. He argues in favour of the necessity of the existence of a number of intermediaries between God and His people. Prophets - intermediaries - are His proof or *hujja*, and if the world needs to remain and people are to be completed, there should be prophets to guide them on the right way (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 *shamsī*, vol. 2, pp. 391-395).

In addition to the rational method that he used to study *nubuwwa*, and from a mystical perspective (obviously Ḥaṭṭī’s School), Ṣadrā argues that *nabī* is the holder of the office of *khilāfat al-kubrā* and is the manifestation of the comprehensive name (*ism al-jāmiʿ* or *Allah*), by which *fayḍ* (emanation) and help emanate from God. The first emanation is called the *Muḥammedan Reality* which is a double-faceted status, inward and outward, each side having the absolute power to act upon the cosmos. Thus, it is by the *Muḥammedan Reality* that Deity manifests Himself to the cosmos (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 461).

Ṣadrā retains the same perspective on the notions of *imamate* and *wilāya* which blend together philosophical method with *‘irfānī* terminology. Narrating *Imām* Ali’s *ḥadīth* from a Sufi source, he states that the only way to know God and achieve true faith is to know *Imām* Ali and his status (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 396, 510 ff). Reminiscent of Shaykh Ḥaṭṭī’s debates on the four stations of gnosis, Mullā Ṣadrā transmits the same *ḥadīth* to develop his argument on imamate: the second station – *maqām al-maʿānī*, or *sīr al-sirr* - “is the reality of the *Imāms* insofar as they
represent and manifest God in the totality of his essence and his names” (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 42-50). According to Ṣadrā, since knowledge of the pure Essence of God is incomprehensible and therefore outside of the realm of human understanding, the only way to know Him is to know those who are acquainted with Him (ʿārifūn bi l-llāh). Prophets and His close friends (awlīyā), are ʿārifūn to His knowledge and His revelation (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shihrūzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 396-97).

Imām is qayyīm bil kitāb or qayyīm al-Qurʾān, which means that he is the only one who knows both the interpretation of the clear passages and also has the ability to clarify the passages in the book which may be unclear. Imām is the preserver of the secrets of āyāt (verses of the Book), and the light of His indisputable evidences. He is the hujja after the Prophet and it is incumbent on followers to obey him (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shihrūzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 396 ff). In a comparison with human physical characteristics, Ṣadrā argues that as each of the organs of a human body requires an imām, whose function is to guide the particular organ on the righteous way, the world also needs someone who demonstrates the difference between the right and wrong. Imām - deputy or khalīfa of God - is the one who calls people to goodness and justice and it is incumbent for people to obey him, because his obedience is submission to God (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shihrūzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 404).

Imamate and nubuwwa are identical and indicate the same and unified reality (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shihrūzī, vol. 2, p. 500), though nubuwwa has a hidden or inward side which is wilāya. Wilāya will never be interrupted, and it is regarded as the continuity of divine revelation which comes to an end by the coming of the last nabī, while closeness to God or wilāya continues to exist until the Day of Judgment (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shihrūzī, vol. 2, p.
Walī does not receive revelation, but is connected to Deity by inspiration (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 456). Wilāya has a higher status than ‘aql (intellect), because it is by the function of the light of wilāya that the light of intellect is shone (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 479). Walī/imām is the Perfect Man and the true ruler of the Cosmos and it is impossible for any age to be deprived of imām (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 488).

In Mullā Ṣadrā’s conceptualization of wilāyat al-takwīnīya, the Imāms are aʿrāf; the superintendent and overseer of the Heaven and the Hell, those who see and know ahl al-nār wa ahl al-janna (people of the Heaven and of the Hell), and are informed of the status of people in both realms (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 540-549). The office of wilāya requires that wali knows the realities of things as they are, and benefits those who are blind (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 576). The Imāms are the owners (awliyā) of His cause and the treasurers of His secrets. By “treasurer,” the people of hikmat, according to Ṣadrā, are those who are able to memorize cognitive images. Metaphorically, the Imāms are perceived to be the treasuries of His knowledge and are “intellectual substances and luminous essences” which are pure - free from impurity and pollution. Therefore, the imāms are intermediaries of His emanation and blessing to people, and they are His words (kalimat al-llāh), which never become annihilated or perish. They are pre-eternal essences and natures (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 616-618).

This brief introduction will hopefully help entry into discussion with the scholars of the School of Tehran, close examination of their texts and study of their ideas to see how they understood and conceptualized wilāya. Regarding the study of the
concept of *wilāya*, three questions will be asked: How does *Nūrî* reflect on *wilāya* and conceptualize it? By what method(s) does he approach this reflection? And, finally, has he added anything to the doctrines of Mullâ Şadrâ?

### 3.2. Mullâ ‘Alî Nûrî

A native of Nur/Noor in Mazandaran in northern Iran, ‘Alî ibn Jamshîd Nûrî’s educational background can be traced back to Mazandaran and Qazvin and later Isfahan. He studied *ḥikmat* with prominent figures such as Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābâdî (d. 1197 H/1783) and Mîrzâ Abul Qâsim Mudarris Khâtûnâbâdî (d. 1212 H/1797) in Isfahan. Bīdābâdî’s circle has been famously known to have “mystical and spiritual practices alongside their *ʿirfānî* orientation in their study of metaphysics” (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 3 citing Kabûdarāhangî). To some extent, Bīdābâdî’s circle has also been influential in the *Shî’a* cities of Iraq (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 3 citing *Rāʾid al-ʿIr̄fān*). Nûrî had other teachers, such as Mîrzâ Abul Qâsim Mudarris Isfahânî (who taught him *ḥikmat* and *kalâm* in Isfahan), and Mullâ Muḥammad Ibrâhîm Gulpâyegânî (Suhâ, n.d. pp. 143-144). Through his teachers and mainly Bīdābâdî, Nûrî associated himself with the prominent intellectual scholars of the post-Safawid era, experts in three branches of *ḥikmat* texts, in mysticism, and in some cases, in the Occult. Moreover, they have not only been teachers and masters of *ḥikmat* and mysticism, but rather practised them (Rizvi, forthcoming, pp. 3-6).

Nûrî had two skills that were common among Persian *hâkîms* at that time: poetic taste and the art of calligraphy. Nûrî has commented on a number of Mullâ Şadrâ’s texts, such as *Kitâb-i Ghaḍâ wa Ghadar* (the Book of Fate and Determination) *ʿArshîya* (of the
Throne) *Shawāhid al-Rubūbīya* (Divine Witnesses) *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* (the Keys of the Unseen) and *Asrār ul-Āyāt* (the Mysteries of Verses). He also commented on Mīrdāmād’s *Nibrās ul-Ḍīyā wa Tiswā’ ul-Sawā* (the Lamp of Light and the Acceptance of the Rectitude.) and glossed on Kulaynī’s *Uṣūl al-Kāfī*. Nūrī has written an ‘īrānī text entitled *Ḥāshīya ’alā Qurrat al-‘Uyūn* (Glosses on Solace of the Eyes) and commented on a number of *aḥādīth* and āyahs of the Qur’ān. He wrote a gloss on *Sharḥ Fawā’id al-Ḥikamiyya* (Commentary on the Theosophical Outcomes) of Shaykh Aḥmad Ahṣā’ī, and a refutation on Henry Martyn’s work, entitling both as *Radd-i Pādrī* and *Burhān ul-Millah*. Over fifty years, he trained a number of students, among them Mullā ‘Abdullāh Zunūzī, Āqā Seyyed Raḍī Māzandarānī, Mīrzā Seyyed Abul Qāsim Sharīfī Shīrāzī, known as Rāz-i Shīrāzī (a *Dhahabi qutb*), Mullā Muḥammad Taqī and his younger brother Mullā Šāliḥ Baraghānī and his son Mullā Ḥassan, as well as Nūrī’s son Ḥassan, Mullā Muḥammad Bāqir Qumshiʾī, Ḥāj Muḥammad Jaʿfar Majhūb ʿAlī Shah Hamidānī, and Ḥāj Mullā Ḥādī Sabzivārī, who were the most prominent (Suhā, n.d. pp. 146-155). Nūrī died in 1246 H/1830 and was buried in Najaf, Iraq.

For research purposes, I have chosen five of his key texts including three glosses on the previous scholars such as *Sharḥ Fawā’id al-Ḥikamiyya* of Shaykh Aḥmad Ahṣā’ī, as well as *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* and *Asrār ul-Āyāt* of Mullā Ṣadrā. I will also study his well-known refutation on Henry Martyn’s polemic as it leads to his conception on *wilāya* and the *Muḥammedan* Reality, in addition to one of his comments which has been written on a *ḥadīth* called *Ḥadīth al-Ḥurānī* (the Ḥadīth of the Light). The reason for this selection is that these five texts manifest Nūrī’s philosophical discourse in its entirety, and all of the main ‘īrānī/kalāmī issues such as *tawḥīd*, the *Muḥammedan* Light, *wilāya*.
and imamate are either discussed via a lettrist methodology, or are debated within the context of the ḥikmat rules and terminology.

Nūrī in his gloss on Sharḥ al-Fawā’id al-Ḥikamīya argues for the modulation of tawḥīd, starting from the highest station having been designated exclusively to the Prophet, to the tawḥīd of the elite, (either awliyā’, who are the people of delicacies, or those who are able to realize complexities, or prophets), to tawḥīd of the people of imagination and imaginative images (aṣḥāb al-wahmiya wa ṣuwar al-khīyāliya), and finally to tawḥīd of ordinary people (Nūrī, n.d., p. 5). Regarding the Muḥammedan Reality/Light, Nūrī has the typical viewpoint of a ḥakīm: the Muḥammedan Reality is described by a number of names and attributes; it is the greatest and the most comprehensive name (Ism al-Aʿzam al-Jāmiʿ), the first emanated, the spirit of the cosmos, the Universal Intellect, the Holy Spirit, Divine Pen, the Perfect Man, and the First Will (Nūrī, p. 31). It is the First Will because it is the first thing that has been created by His reality (bi nafsīhī) and everything else is created by it. It is His light as it is flowing in and illuminating everything (Nūrī, pp. 32-37). As an eternal being, Muḥammedan Reality is assumed to have the absolute cosmic power and authority, and as such, has five stations: the station of providence (mashīyya) of will (irāda); the station of divine decree or qadar; the station of fate or qaḍā; and finally the station of execution or imḍāʾ (Nūrī, pp. 58-59). In this respect, Nūrī transmits a hadīth from the prophet indicating that “we are His creatures and people are our creatures, and their creation and death stand in our hands” (Nūrī, n.d. p. 115).

The Muḥammedan Reality has two stations: the station of Muḥammadiya and of the awliyā’, though in practice, Ali and the Prophet have the same attributes and equal
status. Ali’s status is a double faceted one: He, as a human person, is the Prophet’s son-in-law and cousin, but similar to the Prophet has a pre-eternal reality too, and as such is Ādam-i Awwal, the khalīfa and the Moon of Wilāya for the Muḥammedan Sun (Nūrī, n.d. p. 37). The Prophet and the Imāms have cosmic roles; they are His hands, His eyes, His ears and His tongue, and as such, are regarded as His delegates in the act of creation (Nūrī, n.d. pp. 56-58). Nūrī mixes his ʿirfānī perspective with a lettrist one and presents the well-known argument that the status of wilāya is the status of sirr (the secret), and the status of the truthful integrated limitless point (nuqṭay-i ḥaqīqīya baṣīṭahī). It is integrated in the sense that it is indivisible into different parts, and it is limitless as nothing can confine it, but at the same time it is comprehensive and surrounding (Nūrī, n.d. p. 81).

The second text that is going to be examined here, is Nūrī’s glosses on Maṭāṭiḥ al-Ghayb of Mullā Ṣadrā. The main issue which is discussed in this text is the Muḥammedan Reality. As mentioned earlier, the status of wilāya or ’Alawīyat al-ʿUlyā, which is called Universal Spirit (Naṣṣ-i Kullī), is embedded in the Muḥammedan Reality or Universal Intellect or aql-i kullī. Naṣṣ-i kullī and its relation to aql-i kullī is equivalent to the relation of Eve to Adam and the Tablet (lawh) to the Primal Pen (Nūrī, 1363 shamsī, p. 697). Naṣṣ-i kullī, which indicates the status of Imām Ali through his marriage to the Prophet’s daughter, has been mixed with the Universal Body or jism-i kullī. The household of the Prophet, “which is the fruit of the marriage between naṣṣ-i kullī and jism-i kullī, has the absolute power and authority over the Cosmos” (Rizvi, 2013, p. 3).

On nubuwwa and the status of the Prophet, Nūrī maintains that the Qur’ān is not only his attributes, but also both his reality (naṣīḥī) and the gnosis of his reality
(ma’rifat bi nafsihī), and since the Prophet’s gnosis is equal to His gnosis, then the Prophet’s reality (nafs) is His reality. Muhammad is His reality because the Muḥammedan Reality as the first emanated is the manifestation of His names and attributes (Nūrī, 1363 shamsī, pp. 702-703). Nūrī goes on to say that the Muḥammedan Reality which is the Qur’ānic Greatest Spirit (Rūḥ al-Aʿẓam Qur’ānī), is regarded as divine knowledge and contains the realities of things and their mysteries (Nūrī, 1363 shamsī, p. 705). Nūrī classifies the people of the book (ahl al-kitāb) (those who read and understand the Qur’ān) into four categories: ahl al-‘ibāra (people of word), indicating those who are satisfied with the outward face of the book and do not try to dig into it, ahl al-ishāra (people of indication) or ḥakīms of divine knowledge who are the people of certainty, ahl al-laṭāʾif or awliyā (people of subtles) and finally, the prophets who were assigned a special mission, or anbīyā’ulul ʿzm. Nūrī argues that each category has its own book and sharīʿa, though the last one, or the seal of prophets, enjoys a status in which his book and his laws are universal and comprehensive (Nūrī, 1363 shamsī, p. 697 & Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 491).

In his glosses on Asrār al-Āyāt of Mullā Şadrā, Nūrī develops an argument for the conceptualizations of the Muḥammedan Light and its nexus with divine knowledge. The Muḥammedan Light (or the Primal Pen, lit. Qalam Aʿlā) indicates the reality of the realities of things and Ism al-Aʿẓam al-Jāmiʿ, and as such encompasses Divine Cause. Divine Cause is the station of totality (Jāmiʿīy) and entirety, which means that the Muḥammedan Reality in this station has the absolute and comprehensive authority to act upon the Cosmos because it has divine knowledge (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, pp. 227-230). Nūrī’s understanding of the status of Muḥammedan Reality is analogous to the status of the preexistent eternal logos in Christianity that was with God from the
beginning of time, a primal force through whom all creation sprang and without whom nothing came into being. *Muḥammedan* Reality is called the most Comprehensive Word (*Kalimaya Jāmiʿa*) and through learning it in pre-eternal time, human beings came to learn His names and attributes in their entirety. This initial familiarity of man with the Absolute is also famous as the covenant (trust) of *wilāya*. *Nūr-i Muḥammadī* and *wilāya* are two faces of one reality, or His names, His attributes and His gnosis (Nūrī, 1385 *shamsī* pp. 234-244). *Muḥammedan* Reality is connected to *Qāʿim* and his right of rising and getting up to establish “absolute government” (Nūrī, 1385 *shamsī*, 305). But who will stand up for absolute *khilāfah* and sovereignty and who is *Qāʿim*? Since the *Muḥammedan* Reality (*al-insān al-kabīr*) is a notion representing absolute unity – in contrast to plurality - there should be a number of human manifestations (*al-insān al-ṣaghīr*) or a human person (Nūrī, 1385 *shamsī*, pp. 301-305) who stands as the proofs of the fact that the notion of the Perfect Man is personified and multiplied on the earth. The *Imāms* are regarded as human examples of the ideal type of the Perfect Man and have legitimacy to claim leadership and authority over their believers.

In his debate on the relationship between politics and religion, Nūrī argues that the former’s concern is regulating and organizing daily life, while the latter’s interests are both worldly and heavenly affairs (*maʿāsh* and *maʿād*), and the ruling *ḥakīm* (*ḥakīm ḥākim*) who is embellished with wisdom and walks on the path of intellect should be in charge of politics. Religion and legislation, on the other hand, should be at the hands of *ḥakīm mutaʿallih*, who enjoys divine knowledge and walks on the path of *wilāya* (or the path of love). These two, according to Nūrī, have no relation with one another, like the sky which is far away from the earth (Nūrī, 1385 *shamsī*, p. 337). Nūrī is clear enough:
the *walī* or prophet is the legislator (*shārī‘*), whose status is different from that of a politician whose concern is worldly and ordinary affairs.

*Walī* is *khalīfat al-llāh*, who, by learning divine names and attributes, knows the nature of things and can act upon the cosmos, and his *wilāyat al-takwīnīya* is prior to his *wilāyat al-tashrīʿīya*, which is the right of guidance and regulation (Nūrī, 1385 *shamsī*, p. 341). Transmitting a ḥadīth which refers to *Imām* Ali’s status, Nūrī states that He is *bāb il-llāh* (the intermediary/gate between Him and people), and *sirr al-llāh* (His secret), and His love is blended with Ali’s flesh and blood to such a degree that He is *mamsūṣ fi dhāt al-llāh* (he is fascinated with, or lover of Allah) (Nūrī, 1385 *shamsī*, p. 357). The status of intellect and ḥakīm ḥākim, who rules with the assistance of intellect, is clearly inferior to the status of love, and of the *walī* who is able to see the substance (essences/*a’yān*) of things and their natures, because they are images (*ṣuwar*) of His names and shadows of His attributes, while ḥakīm ḥākim is only able to see the outward face of things (Nūrī, 1385 *shamsī*, p. 369). By such a distinction, Nūrī recognizes two types of authorities and leaderships: the first one, which is functioned by ḥakīm ḥākim can be carried out by everyone who benefits from wisdom, but legislation (*inshā‘*) should only be occupied by ḥakīm ilāhī who is both the cause of creation and of bringing forth laws.

*Walī* is *al-insān al-kāmil* who has absolute authority upon the cosmos and people, and is regarded as His aid in creation. The early understanding of *wilāya*, which was centered around *walī*s closeness to God due to his piety and his efforts to purify himself on the path of *sulūk*, was replaced by a new image of *walī*, he is no longer the close friend of God but God himself. *Walī* is the one who causes creation and from him
everything else is created. Nūrī uses the verb ‘badaʿa’, which means to descend upon something suddenly and unexpectedly, and that is why it is rightful for him to legislate and bring forth laws (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 404). While Nūrī’s distinction between two types of leadership resulted in banishing ḥakīm al-ilāhī from any involvement in politics, and even from ordinary life, his contemporary jurists like Narāqī and Kāshīf al-Ghiṭa’ tried to give a greater role to jurists, but this was not possible until jurists became more and more involved in the everyday lives of believers and in politics.

The next text which will be examined here is Nūrī’s refutation on Henry Martyn. There exist two versions of his refutation on Martyn, called either Burhān al-Milla (Proof of the Faith) or Radd-i Pādrī (Refutation on Pādrī). They are of different lengths, the longer consists of two hundred and four pages, while shorter has one hundred and seventy-six pages. The first one is used here. The present refutation is “the longest piece that Nūrī wrote in Persian” though “it contains considerable passages in Arabic and hence was written for a scholarly audience” (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 18). In Radd-i Pādrī, Nūrī responds to Martyn from a rational perspective and ḥikmat training (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 19) and lays emphasis on wilāya and nubuwwa. His arguments for these two are typical: wilāya and nubuwwa are identical because both have the absolute power and authority to act upon things. The status of nubuwwa requires limitless power, and without it nabī no longer functions. Walī/nabī can act upon things in two different ways: aʿdād and ījāb. By the first one, Nūrī believes that walī is absolutely able to manipulate things and activate their capacities in order to be eligible to receive divine fayḍ. Walī has two faces: one face is turned towards God and the other towards people. His face turned toward people denotes his functions and duties in relation to believers. He exercises the first type of wilāya, which is wilāyat-i aʿdādī. In this phase,
nabī guides people on the right way and brings sharīʿa, while wilāya/taṣarruf-i ījābī enables nabī to accomplish miracles and kirāmat (also kirāma). Miracles manifest divine intervention in human and cosmic affairs and nabī endeavours to accomplish it because he has another side which is his divine dimension (Nūrī, n.d., pp. 17-19).

The text entails a typical understanding of the status of the Perfect Man and its human examples (anmūdhaj-i insānī). The Perfect Man is highly praised with a number of names such as divine light, lawḥ-i qaḍā wa qadar (the tablet of fate and determination), and the column between sky and earth which prevents the cosmos from falling down (Nūrī, n.d., pp. 47-49). Like Muḥammedan Reality, which causes other things to be created by manifesting itself in them, the Prophet - who is one of the human examples of Muḥammedan Reality - has manifested himself in previous prophets and awliyās. Therefore, for their existence, these prophets are dependent on the Prophet Muhammad (Nūrī, n.d., pp. 20, 64-65, 178). In another example, previous Prophets are likened to a mirror reflecting the Prophet's wilāya and nubuwwa. They are appointed by God to enunciate the coming of the prophet of Islam, and as such their religions are regarded as phases of the Islamic faith (Nūrī, n.d., p. 178). Nūrī, like other Shīʿa thinkers, defends the idea that Ali is the seal of the absolute wilāya of the Muḥammedan Cause, and as such he is regarded as the authority for all previous prophets and walīs. They are but images of Ali’s wilāya, as he is sirr al-llāh and a close friend of God (Nūrī, n.d., p. 180).

The last text which is considered here is Nūrī’s commentary on Ḥadīth al-Nūrāniya. There are two accounts of Nūrī’s commentary on the Ḥadīth: the first one is done by Sajjad Rizvi in his lengthy discussion on Nūrī’s life and work, and the second
one is by Ḥāmid Nājī Īṣfahānī, who has evaluated Nūrī’s commentary exclusively. According to Rizvi, Nūrī has a set of Arabic glosses on different ḥādīth of Imām Ali (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 16), including the present ḥadīth, which is also called al-maʿārif bi al-nūrānīya. Along with Nūrī, Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī has also glossed on the ḥadīth (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 17 & Nājī Īṣfahānī, n.d. p. 2). The commentary focuses on the Muḥammedan Reality, the secrets of imamate, the status of the greatest walī or walī al-aʿẓam, and his relation to God.20 Rizvi argues that the “text itself … is similar to other material on the divine nature of the Imām, such as the Expository Sermon (Khuṭbat al-Bayān) and the sermon of illumination (khuṭbat al-nūrānīya)” and “entails an esoteric taste of the literal sense and only arises once a person on the mystical path understands the essentially monistic nature of reality” (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 17). In addition, there is an analysis on monism, the “idea of God” and “the proof for the existence of God” from the Ṣadrīan perspective (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 17).

The manifestation of tawḥīd, the Muḥammedan reality or ḥaqīqat al-ʿalawīyat al-Muḥammadiya, is purified of any imperfection in material objects and shares attributes of divine essence, such as theophany - which is a transcendental station; and therefore, similar to divine essence is capable of manifesting itself in all existential worlds. The Muḥammedan Reality appears in three stations: the station of springing (badʿ) and creation of the cosmos, through which His Will is manifested in Muḥammedan Reality; the station of Universal Intellect or the Primal Pen, or the station of qāb-i qawsayn; and the station of Universal Spirit which indicates the reality of Ali and his status. It is the function of Ali’s reality to manifest itself in previous prophets and animate them to exist (Nājī, n.d., pp. 202-203). Muḥammedan Reality has temporal manifestations (ẓuhūrāt-i nāsūṭī), which are the Prophet and the Imāms; and since
manifestations are regarded as faces of God, these immune holy figures are His face (\textit{wajh al-llāh}) (Nājī, n.d., pp. 199-200). Nūrī brings up the archtypal discussion of different stations of gnosis, and argues that the gnosis of the Prophet and the \textit{Imāms} are the same as the gnosis of God, because they manifest His unity in its entirety. Furthermore, previous prophets are manifestations of \textit{Muḥammedan Reality} (Nājī, n.d., p. 201).

In the entire body of his works – even those which are not examined here – Nūrī thought and wrote within the framework of the \textit{Ṣadrīan hikmat}. In terms of method, he remained faithful to the principle of combining rational perspective - which culminated in his refutation on Martyn, with \textit{'irfānī} terminology, although he added a lettrist viewpoint as well. His gloss on Aḥsāʾī’s \textit{al-Fawāʾid al-Ḥikamīyya} is an example of the prevalence of the \textit{'irfānī} method and lettrism. With regard to the offices of \textit{wilāya} and \textit{nubuwwa} and Nūrī’s conceptions on them, one should conclude that he not only refused to add anything to the doctrines of his masters, but also, by overstating them, ignored other parts of their tradition. Perhaps one can say that he reduced the entire \textit{Ṣadrīan} apparatus into a number of concepts that are examined here. It is the author’s opinion that the study of Nūrī’s works is not by itself of value, if they are not observed as a sign of the existence of a trend in the whole intellectual system of the early eighteenth century: the prevalence of theology, mysticism and lettrism over philosophy and rational thinking. As will be observed in the following, Nūrī was in no way alone on this route.
3.3. Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī

Fortunately, our information of the life and works of Ḥāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, the greatest ḥakīm of the School of Mullā Śadrā and the true reviver of ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliya is sufficient enough. It helps to shed light on his personal and philosophical life, on his contributions to the Šadrīan ḥikmat and on his pupils. Many biographers and/or historians of the history of Islamic philosophy, from Manūchihr Ṣadūghī Suhā in Tārīkh-i Ḥukamā wa ʿUrafāy-i Mutʾakhīr (History of the Contemporary Ḥakīms and Gnostics), to Henry Corbin in his History of Islamic Philosophy, to Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, have written about him and his life. Ḥāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, the son of Ḥāj Mīrzā Mahdī, who himself was one of the great grandsons of Muḥammad Śādiq, a Sabzivārī merchant, was born in 1212 H/1797 in Sabzivar, Khorasan. After staying in Mashhad for ten years, the young Sabzivārī moved to Isfahan, which was at that time the centre of intellectual activity and vitality (Dhukāʾī Sāwajī, 1372, p. 22). In that city, he attended circles with teachers such as Mullā Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Kalbāsī (or Karbāsī, d. 1261 H/1845), and Shaykh Muḥammad Taqī ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ʿĪṣahānī (d. 1248 H/1832). These two had studied with prominent figures such as Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1198 H/1783) and Shaykh Jaʿfar Najafī, Kāshīf al-Ghiṭṭāʾ (d. 1227 H/1812), respectively. His other teachers were Mullā Ismaʿīl Darbkūshkī ʿĪṣahānī (d. 1268 H/1853) and Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī (Rizvi, 2011, pp. 6-7). Suhā, in a quotation from Ḥīrz al-Dīn claims that Sabzivārī was also a student of Mīrzā Muḥammad Ridhā Ḥamidānī, known as Kawthar ʿAlī Shah (Ḥīrz al-Dīn in Ṣadūghī Suhā, p. 164). Addressing Sabzivārī’s direct and indirect teachers, one can stretch back his intellectual lineage to the main Šadrīan ḥakīms of the post-Safawid era,
though he was not a simple student and follower, but a real reviver of the School of Mullā Ṣadrā.

Sabzivārī was a prolific writer. His body of works consists of forty-six writings in the form of glosses, comments and original treatises (Dhukāʾī Sāwajī, 1372, p. 22). Sajjad Rizvi, in his discussion on the life and works of Sabzivārī, divides his works into four categories: “marginalia on the works of Mullā Ṣadrā, original works in philosophy, commentaries on supplications and Persian literature, and works on theology” (Rizvi, 2011, p. 12). Sabzivārī, following a few pilgrimage trips to Mashhad and a ḥajj, and a one year stay in Kerman, finally settled in Sabzivār for the rest of his life. He died in 1289 H/1872 and was buried in Darwāza Neyshābūr. His entire body of works is worth studying, as he not only glossed and commented on his predecessors, but rather, in his original writings, perpetuated ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliya through developing a rational and ʿirfānī approach for the understanding of the essential philosophical notions such as wujūd, quiddity, and substantial motion. In order to maintain the focus of this research, attention will be concentrated on those writings which emphasize the conceptions of wilāya, imamate and nubuwwa. Accordingly, Sabzivārī’s Sharḥ-i Asrār-i Mathnawī (Commentary on the Mysteries of Mathnawī), Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ (Commentary on the Names), Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Ṣabāḥ (Commentary on Ṣabāḥ Supplications) and Sharḥ-i Nibrās al-Ḥudā (Commentary on the Light of Guidance) will be studied, beginning with a brief introduction to the relevant text.

Sharḥ-i Asrār-i Mathnawī, which is a Persian commentary on difficult verses of Mathnawī, the magnum opus of Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 672 H/1274) was "commissioned by the Qajar prince Sulṭān Murād Mīrzā Ḥusām al-Salṭana, the governor of Khorasan
and lithographed in 1285 H/1868 by Āqā Muḥammad Bāqir Tihrānī” (Riḍā Nizhād in Rizvi, 2011, p. 15 & Cooper, 1999, p. 428). As John Cooper has rightly pointed out, ”just as the Mathnawī was a summa of the knowledge of its time bound together by the spiritual teaching which it was used to set forth, Sabzivārī’s commentary is a summa of the knowledge of this nineteenth-century theosopher put to the use of exegesis on the Mathnawī” (Cooper, 1999, p. 428). In this text, Sabzivārī relates philosophical and mystical issues – and mainly the concept of the Perfect Man to Persian literature. In other words, for Sabzivārī, Mathnawī is a mirror through which he looks at hikamī and īrfānī themes and explains them. Furthermore, the sources of Sabzivārī are of a “very broad range,” including the Hellenic and Islamic Peripatetic philosophers, the Persian Neo-Platonists or Ishrāqī philosophers, Arabic poetry (both pre-Islamic and Islamic), and Persian poetry” (Cooper, 1999, p. 428). The text revolves around themes such as the reality of the Perfect Man (or wali), which is symbolized in the Prophet and his cousin, His names and attributes and their personifications, Muḥammedan Reality, and the notions of wilāya and wilāyat al-takwīnīya.

The Perfect Man is the True Ruler (Sultan al-Ḥaqiqi) and the shadow of God, since he presents divine Beauty and Glory. It is he who knows all divine names and, since he manifests them by his example, teaches them to everyone and symbolizes ism al-aʿẓam, which is Allah. Since asmāʿ are the beginning and the end (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 27-52), meaning that everything generates from them and after completion returns to them, it is al-insān al-kāmil who is the material cause of the Cosmos, and as khaliṭat al-llāh has absolute authority to act upon everything: he causes life and death, and as such, is a partner in creation. Sabzivārī continues that the absolute ordinance of wali must be obeyed by all, because wali is a name of God and as such needs to be manifested and
unveiled, and the office of *wilāya* is a perennial and perpetual one and this explains why, unlike *nubuwwa* which is temporary, *wilāya* is an everlasting, universal and modulated status and contains many stations and qualities (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 175-199). Although different, these two statuses are faces of the same reality: one side - *wilāya* - turns towards God and the other - *nubuwwa* – turns towards people, and as such the former indicates unity and totality, while the latter refers to multiplicity (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 466-467).

*Al-insān al-kāmil* (the *Muḥammedan Reality*), is an independent realm along with *lāhūt* (realm of divinity), the world of *aʿyān al-thābita* (fixed/permanent archetypes), *Jabarūt* (realm of souls), *Malakūt* (realm of the intellects), and *Nāsūt* (human realm, though it can sometimes be equated with *al-insān al-kāmil*), and therefore is intimately attached to the reality of the Holy Spirit, which is the Universal Intellect (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 235-239). Here again the typical understanding of the status and qualities of the *Muḥammedan Reality* is observed; which is the first emanated, or the Primal Will, and is created by His essence, though everything else is created from it (Sabzivārī, n.d., p. 391). In interpreting this sentence ‘*insān-i kāmil khudāvand-i dil ast*’ (the perfect man is the lord of heart), Sabzivārī deploys the famous *qudsī ḥadīth* that “the heavens and the earth cannot burden my immensity and grandeur, but the heart of My faithful servant would do”, and argues that the heart of such a servant is His throne (Sabzivārī, n.d., p. 345).

As the true servant of God, it is only he who knows deity and has gnosis of Him. When on the Day of Judgment He comes to unveil Himself, it is only the Perfect Man who can shoulder His grandeur and greatness. So, the only way to get to know the
Perfect Man is by having true faith in him, as he is God’s agent on the earth (Sabzivārī, n.d., p. 447), and as such he is in effect the Kingdom of God personified. In understanding “how the true faith is developed in a believer”, Sabzivārī maintains that the gate of intellect (darwāza-yi aql) is a way towards the sacred sanctuary which is deity (Sabzivārī, n.d., p. 451). So, it is only by the assistance of intellect that believers will have both gnosis to Him and to His agent. It is this researcher’s opinion that there is petitio principia here: in order to know the Perfect Man a believer should have true faith in him, and in order to develop true faith to get to know him and God, a believer should pass across the gate of intellect which is the Muḥammedan Reality or the Perfect Man. It would appear as if everything originates from the Perfect Man and ends in it.

In Sharḥ al-Asmā’ and from a lettrist perspective, Sabzivārī interprets the name of Muhammad and maintains that the first letter of ‘mīm’ indicates the Prophet’s authority and dominion, while the second ‘mīm’ signifies the realm of malakūt or malakūt al-samāwāt, which is the Kingdom of Heavens. These two “mīms are gifted by Him to His Prophet in order to remind us that the Prophet knows both the secrets of authority and the secrets of the Kingdom and Heavens” (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 47). In his debate on the Muḥammedan Reality, Sabzivārī starts with the typology of being and its trilogy including Truthful Essence (Ḥaqq al-Mujarrad), indicating the pure abstract essence of God which is free from any name and attribute; Non-delimited Being (Wujūd al-Muṭlaq) or His deeds; and Delimited Being, (Wujūd al-Muqayyad) which is what he has created, such as the cosmos. Then he argues that the Muḥammedan Reality is the manifestation of His Truthful Essence in His names and attributes, and is also called the Absolute Being (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 56). Muḥammedan Reality also
equates to divine knowledge and/or the Light of Glory which is manifested in the fourteen immune figures (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 399).

On the notion of the Perfect Man and from an ʿīrfānī perspective, Sabzivārī states that Ali is the truthful example, the Human Form (Ṣūrat al-Insānīya) and the personification of it. Sabzivārī praises him by a number of qualities which are typical in his contemporaries and predecessors as well (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī pp. 67-68). With a combination of ʿīrfānī and lettrist methods, he explains that the notion of ghawth, which means help and/or aid, is designated to awliyā or men of God, who manifest either His light or His vigor and power. The members of the first group whose beings are illuminated by His light and compassion are not hidden from people and are not prohibited from revealing themselves, while those of the second group whose beings are embraced by His vigor, are to be hidden (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 101-102).

On the meaning of ghawth, Sabzivārī argues that God has ninety-nine men, and that among them only one is the most prominent; because he knows His knowledge/secrets; he is called qūṭb al-jāmiʿ (which is al-Qāʿim) of the household of the Prophet (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 101-103). As the seven great prophets correspond to the septet planets, the household of the Prophet corresponds the twelve astrological signs too. In the same way, as the previous prophets gain their glory and grandeur from the sun of the nubuwwa of the Prophet of Islam, the whole household of the Prophet gains its light from the moon of the wilāya of Ali (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 104-105 & pp. 550-552 & p. 711). Sabzivārī uses this analogy to conclude that a: the physical world corresponds with the spiritual one and b: the cosmos relies on seven qūṭb and twelve walīs (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 105-106).
Wilāya is fayḍ and equates to divine names descending from Him to His servants. He uses the term infītāḥ which literally means to open/unlock something to indicate the status of wilāya: by the acceptance of wilāya a believer exposes himself to divine fayḍ and blessing (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 129-130). The status of wilāya is different from that of nubuwwa, as walīs is a name of God and has the absolute right and authority to act upon the cosmos. These two are not only different, but wilāya is higher than nubuwwa because it is perpetual and uninterrupted. The reality of the status of walī requires self-abnegation and servitude, in the sense that since wilāya and nubuwwa are two sides of the same reality, the former indicates the divine dimension of this reality and the latter the human worldly dimension of it (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 276-278 & pp. 552-553). Walīs translated with different names, such as the owner, the master, the lord (rabb), the help, the giver, the benefactor (munʿīm), the lover (muḥibb), and the partner (sharīk) (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 530).

Awlīyā are divided into six categories: nuqabā (leaders, directors) who consist of three hundred men and live in Maghrib, nujabā (nobles) who are seventy and live in Egypt, budalā (substitutes) who are forty men and are inhabitants of Sham, akhyār (those who are benevolent) are seven and wandering around the world, ‘amūd (pillars) which are four and are scattered at the four corners of the earth, and finally ghawth (help, assistant) which is one and lives in Mecca (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 550). The imāms are the most beautiful names of God (asmāʾ ul-ḥusnā), without whose recognition God does not accept any action. Transmitting a hadīth from Imām Ali saying that ‘āna asmāʾ ul-ḥusnā, Sabzivārī argues that “name is a sign and these holy figures are the great signs of God”. So, there is no difference between the status of His names and attributes and the status of the imāms, because their recognition is necessary for
Him to be recognized (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 576 & 715). The *imāms* are the authorized representatives (*umanā*) of God who preserve His covenant, which is *wilāya*, and bear witness upon everything (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 671). From a lettrist perspective, Sabzivārī correlates the status of the Prophet to the *Muqatta‘āt* (lit. abbreviated or shortened), or unique letter combinations of the *Qur‘ān*, and argues that these divine words indicate the status of *al-insān al-kāmil* as *khalīfat al-llāh* and the Pillar of the Light of God (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 717).

*Sharḥ-i Du‘āy-i Šabāh* (or *Miḥfāl al-Falāḥ wa Miṣbāḥ al-Najāt*) is attributed to *Imām* Ali and is considered by scholars as an important text.25 One of the main topics of the text is *al-insān al-kāmil* and its human examples, which are the Prophet and *Imām* Ali. *Al-insān al-kāmil* encompasses and manifests the names and the attributes of God. He is the Perfect Ten (*Ash‘ara-yi Kāmila*), because God has ten manifestations in the entire spiritual hierarchy and they are all gathered in the Perfect Man (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 2-7 & p. 25). Sabzivārī explains the status of *Imām* Ali through the term of the Heavens of *Wilāya* (*Falak-i Wilāya*) which contain a number of things, such as the twelve *Imāms*, who correspond with the twelve astrological signs (*shams-i wişāya*) which is the allegory of the Universal Intellect, and *shams-i qā‘im*, who gains his light from *shams-i wişāya*. *Shams-i qā‘im* is the greatest light, the heart of the cosmos, the lord of the stars and the sign of His light (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 22-25).

The office of *nubuwwa* is symbolic of a tree, *Shajarat al-Ţūbā* (the Purified Tree), and refers to the famous *āyah* of the *Qur‘ān* that: “God only desires to remove defilement from you, O people of the House, and to purify you completely” (33:33) (Nasr, 2015, p. 1029), whose leaves are the community of believers who will return to
him on the Day of Resurrection. In this sense, there is an intimate closeness between the reality (nafs) of the Prophet and his ummah (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 73). Sabzivārī believes in the immunity of the Prophet even before his nubuwwa, and touches upon the topic from a pure kalāmi perspective. ʿIṣma is a spiritual quality/faculty which prevents its owner from sinning. This quality is invested in the angels, the prophets and the Imāms. Sabzivārī uses the principle of emanation as the famous principle in the Shiʿa theology in order to discuss infallibility for the Prophet and the Imāms. According to this principle, His kindness and beneficences require Him not only to send prophets and appoint imāms, but also to invest them with infallibility (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 76-83). The holders of the attribute of infallibility are described as the sturdy mountains (jibāl al-shāmikha) of God, His rope (ḥabl), and His proofs, whose love and obedience are incumbent for every believer (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 132).

Regarding the notion of wilāya and its modulation, Sabzivārī in Sharḥ-i Nibrās al-Ḥudāzs mentions the hierarchy of awliyā and maintains that some of them are higher than the others. In analyzing the status of the Imāms, he believes that, as the owner of wilāyat al-takwīniya, they are the eyes and the ears of God – His intermediaries by which Deity descends emanation to the Cosmos (Sabzivārī, 1384, p. 43 & 146). The status of the absolute wilāya contains two offices of nubuwwa and wilāya (imamate), because the realities of wali and nabī are the same (Sabzivārī, 1384, p. 116). Only these purified figures can reach the station of ʿirfān-i tām (the absolute gnosis) of God, because they are the body of tawḥīd and the manifestations of divine names and attributes (Sabzivārī, 1384, p. 136). From a lettrist perspective, Sabzivārī argues that the word of ʿhamd’ in sūrat al-Ḥamd, the first sūrah of the Qurʾān, refers to al-insān al-
*kāmil* and its human examples. *Al-insān al-kāmil* has been created according to the image of God, and as such has both the absolute right of authority to act upon the Cosmos (*wilāyat al-takwīniya*), and the right of lawgiving (or *tashrīʿ*). One of the components of the right of *tashrīʿ* is teaching the names of God to people in order to train them in spiritual conduct (Sabzivārī, 1384, pp. 170-171 & p. 351).

### 3.4. Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī

Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā, then known as *Ṣahbā*, the son of Shaykh Abul Qāsim, was born in Qumshih (now Shahriza), in Isfahan, in 1241 H/1825. After preliminary instruction with his father as well as other teachers in Qumshih, Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā moved to Isfahan to study *ʿirfān* and *hikmat* there. In Isfahan, he attended the classes of notable *ḥakīms* such as Ḥāj Muḥammad Jaʿfar Lāhījī (Langarūdī - also the teacher of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī and Āqā ʿAlī Ḥakīm Mudarris Tehranī), Mīrzā Ḩassan Nūrī, the son of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, and Āqā Seyyed Raḍī Lārījānī (Mazandaranī), who taught Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā rational sciences. Until his departure to Tehran, which was around 1288 H/1871, he taught *hikmat* and *ʿirfān* in Isfahan. His fame, both in Isfahan and Tehran, was in teaching *ʿirfān* and especially *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* of Qayṣarī, though he was expert in philosophy and *Qurān* as well. It seems that his interest in *ʿirfān* was not only a matter of teaching *ʿirfānī* texts or having an *ʿirfānī* taste, but experiencing an *ʿirfānī* lifestyle, in the sense that he was a dervish, having lived *ʿirfān* in practice. He was the worker of miracles (*sāḥib-i kirāmat*), and, according to the testimony of one of his students, had the ability of *ṭayy al-ard* (folding up of the earth). Qumshiʾī passed away in Tehran in 1306 H/1888 and is buried there (Nājī Iṣfahānī, 1378, pp. 19-48).27
Qumshiʾī was a prolific writer and composed numerous books on ḥikam and ḫīrān which are either glosses, comments, or original texts, including a book of poems in Persian under the poetic pseudonym of Șahbā, and a number of books in Arabic. He has glossed on a number of texts, including ibn ‘Arabī’s magnum opus Ḍuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, Khuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (the Excerpt of Ḍuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam) of Qayṣari, which itself is a commentary on the meaning of Ḍuṣūṣ, Tamhīḍ al-Qawāʿid (Scheming of Regulations) of ibn Turka Șișafāni, Miḥṭāḥ al-Uns (the Key of Fondness) of Muḥammad ibn Șamza Fanārī, and two of Mullā Šadrā’s books: Asfār al-Arbaʿi and Shawāhid, and finally Sharḥ-i Ishārāt wa Tanbīḥāt (the Commentary on Indications and Reminders) of Khwajah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ţūsī. He also wrote original texts on a variety of topics such as science, essence and accidental properties (also accident or jawhar wa ʿaraḍ), the Names of the Essence, the Names of the Attributes and the Names of Acts. He wrote a commentary on some parts of Duʿā-yi Ṣahār and an original treatise on a Ḥadīth called Ḥadīth-i zindīq (the Ḥadīth of Heretics). His body of work is composed of eighteen books (Nājī Șiṣafāni, pp. 46-47).

In this collection, what is of use and relevance for the research here is his treatise on wilāya and khilāfa (succession of the Prophet), as it contains important points on the Perfect Man, the Muʿhammedan Reality, wilāya and the sealing of wilāya (or khatm al-wilāya).

3.4.1. Wilāya and Khilāfa

Qumshiʾī’s glosses/critiques on Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd Qayṣari’s conceptions of wilāya and khilāfa can be found in the latter’s comments on Ḍuṣūṣ of ibn ‘Arabī. Qumshiʾī begins with a typology of wilāya and divides it into wilāyat al-kulliyya and wilāyat al-khāṣṣah (general and specific wilāya, respectively). Wilāyat al- kulliyya is
designated to every believer and emphasizes the right and authority that each of them has over the other. This understanding of *wilāya* is connected to the notion of faith as a modulated reality. The second type of *wilāya* is specified to the people of the hearts (*ašḥāb ul-qulūb*), the people of Allah or those who are close to Him because of their practices. These people have experienced self-annihilation in God and are the most perfect. On the basis of the four journeys (*asfār al-arbaʿi‘*) that every believer should take, Qumshi‘ī argues that the last journey, which is “the journey in God by God”, is specifically gifted to the Prophet, his household and his successors, and is called *wilāyat al-muḥammadiya* or the *Muḥammedan Wilāya*. Previous prophets and their successors can also experience this type of *wilāya*, but it is only a state not a station, which means that it is temporary and momentary (Qumshi‘ī, 1381, pp. 61-62).

*Wilāyat al-muḥammadiya* (the station) can be either absolute or delimited (*muṭlaqah* or *muqayyadah*, respectively). It is absolute since it encompasses everything and is not limited by any restriction, and it is delimited because it is specified to one name from among the names of God. Qumshi‘ī uses the absolute and the general *wilāya* on one hand, and the delimited and particular *wilāya* on the other, interchangeably. These stations are also modulated and each of them has a sealing, because it is possible that one scholar from among Muslim scholars becomes *khātam* of the *wilāyat al-muqayyadah* and one successor from among the successors of the Prophet becomes *khātam* of *wilāyat al-muṭlaqah* (Qumshi‘ī, 1381, pp. 62-63). Qumshi‘ī defines the term ‘sealing’ in terms of gradation of *wilāya* and closeness of *walī* to God, so the sealing of the absolute and/or constrained *wilāya* means that *walī* enjoys the highest degree of closeness to God. From this perspective, the Prophet is the truthful *walī*, the absolute *khātam* and the manifestation of the name of Allah, which is the most comprehensive
name. Qumshiʿī argues that when wilāya overcomes a nabī, it eclipses nubuwwa, which means that his nubuwwa becomes concealed under the mantle of wilāya (Qumshiʿī, 1381, p. 64). Wilāya as a divine attribute or the inward of divinity, is regarded as sīrr or the most hidden sīrr; and as such needs to be manifested and unveiled, and that is why it has become manifest in the most comprehensive name of God – Allah. In terms of its relation to the Muḥammedan Reality, Qumshiʿī maintains that divinity is the inward of the Muḥammedan Reality and therefore should be called divine, absolute wilāya (Qumshiʿī, 1381, p. 66).

The permanent archetypes (aʿyān al-thābita) of the Muḥammedan Reality is the same as the permanent archetypes of the awliyās and successors of the Prophet, and as such their wilāya is the same (Qumshiʿī, 1381, p. 67). In accordance with the typical understanding of the office of wilāya, Qumshiʿī emphasizes that wilāya is uninterrupted and eternal, while nubuwwa is a worldly attribute, and from this perspective, nubuwwa is wilāya which has become perfect, and the sealing of wilāyat al-muḥammadiya is the status which embraces the wilāya of previous prophets and their successors. In a concluding remark, Qumshiʿī argues that the sealing of wilāya and the sealing of wilāyat al-muḥammadiya have the same meaning in terms of time and station, in the sense that the seal of wilāya is not only the heir of wilāyat al-muḥammadiya, but also a light (mishkāt), through which all previous prophets and their successors reach the Truth. He is the closest one to the prophet and aware of his secrets and therefore of the secrets of all previous prophets. He is the source of emanation and blessing for every wali and wasī after him (Qumshiʿī, 1381, pp. 67-89).
In terms of method, Qumshi’ī follows a blending of ʿirfānī and rational methodology which is obtained from the Owners of the Taste of Intuition (Adhwāq al-Mukāshifīn), and the People of the Path of Truth and Certainty (Ahl al-Ḥaq wa al-Yaqīn). Khilāfa, as equivalent to wilāya, is a divine status and all provisions proceed from this status. So, it is incumbent for every prophet, whether the seal of prophets or not, to rule in accordance with the ordinances which are ruled by divine names and with permanent archetypes. Qumshi’ī maintains that there should only be one seal of the prophets as he is the qutb of every age and qutb cannot be more than one (Qumshi’ī, 1381, pp. 90-91). In his debate on khilāfa after the Prophet, Qumshi’ī develops atypical arguments for the conception of the status of nubuwwa and its functions, and asserts that the Prophet should declare its cause and invite people to Islam by the use of force, and if people deny this after the proof (ḥujja) is brought to them, it is then legitimate to use the sword. It is necessary for the successors of the Prophet to follow the Prophet as an example and to spread and preserve Islam by the sword. The Prophet’s successor is the source of knowledge and the only legitimate power-holder. Moreover, Qumshi’ī, unlike other mystics, does not believe in the separation of khilāfa between outward and inward – ẓāhiri and bāṭini, and/or between the most learned and the wisest (aʿlam wa aʿqal). He argues that by such a division, the office of khilāfa would be weakened and the community of believers would be dispersed. He adheres to a coherent understanding of the term and functions of khilāfa.30

3.5. The School of Qum and its Historical Background

Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshi’ī (d. 1306 H/1888) is the last ḥakūm from the School of Tehran whose thoughts are examined here. In the final part of this chapter,
study and analysis will be continued of Mullā Ṣadrā’s legacy as it is florished in the School of Qum. Before focusing on the texts and authors, however, it is relevant briefly to review historical developments from the Qajars to their successor – the Pahlavi dynasty. The decline of the Qajars and the rise of Riḍā Khān Mīr Panj31 to the throne, as history proves, was a crucial event for Persia. His policies, from his decision to adopt the new solar calendar in place of the lunar Islamic calendar,32 to the reinstatement of the name of the country to Iran, to the position of women in society, to his ambitions for the modernization of Iran, and lastly, his clash with the clerics, dramatically changed every aspect of the Iranians’ life. Although his legacy remains controversial to this day, these changes, whether defended or criticized, have been so major that in all of these aspects, life in Iran has never been the same since.

The research interest here is Riḍā Shah’s “programme of radical secularizing, centralizing measures” (Cronin, 2007, pp. 71-72), targeted to shake off the position of clerics directly and indirectly. In fact, he clashed with the class of ʿulemā on a number of issues including “the implementation of the ... conscription” law, reorganizing the “judicial system ... along secular lines,” and the introduction of “a civil code” and a dress law (Cronin, 2007, p. 72). As Stephanie Cronin has shown, the imposition of these measures on the society, and especially on the class of clerics, has been never without reaction and resistance from below, as middle ranking clerics led a number of oppositions in different cities, mainly in Shiraz, Tabriz, and Isfahan against the Shah and his policies (Cronin, 2007, pp. 72ff).

Although many ʿulemā had welcomed Riḍā Khān’s appearance on the scene as a hopeful and positive sign for the restoration of the independence of the country, “by
1927 ... [they] were aware that the balance of power between themselves and the regime was about to alter decisively to their detriment” and “although on the defensive, they were bracing themselves for a struggle” (Cronin, 2007, pp. 75ff). With regard to the ʿulemā’s economic status and social prestige in early twentieth century Iran, their discontent with the Shah’s policies is understandable. Secular orientation of Riḍā Shah’s programs aside, his measures, as I mentioned earlier, targeted the ʿulemā’s economic and social situation. By ʿulemā, I mean those jurists who belonged to the ʿUsūlī School of jurisprudence, whose activities were mainly centred on fiqh (jurisprudence) and its principles and, since the Safawid era, have become one of the twin pillars of political power in the country.

If the birth and later existence of “the Shiʿa hierocracy” (Amir Arjomand, 2005, p. 21) was the result of Safawid policies, the superiority of the ʿUsūlī ʿulemā in the pre-Qajar and Qajar eras was mostly due to their victory over their long-lasting rival - the Akhbarī School. Pertinent to this is the ʿulemā’s relationship with the Qajar court and its impact on their subsequent political activities. The rivalry of the two Schools of Akhbarī and ʿUsūlī, as well as the inconvenient relationship between the state and religion, has been the subject of a number of researches. Addressing the former, as Andrew Newman has pointed out, Akhbarīsm actually originated in the Safawid period and, both in and after the decline of the Safawids, attracted attention and animosity within Twelver Shiʿism. The main disagreement between these two was “on the nature of clerical authority in the community [of believers on one hand] and the permitted scope of the relationship between that authority and the established political institution during the occultation [on the other] (Newman, 2005, pp. 155-156).33
During the Qajar period, the *Usūlī ‘ulemā* defended and became involved in the definition of “the authority of the senior clerics over both the jurisprudential and practical affairs of the community as the representatives of the Hidden *Imām* during his absence” (Newman, 2005, p. 168). The core of these efforts was the refinement of the concept of General vicegerency (*nīyābat al-‘āmmah*), “the notion of the senior cleric as the ‘general deputy’ of the Hidden *Imām*, and the notion of a single *mujtahid* with paramount authority among the ‘*ulemā*’. They argued that “the *mujtahid* should exercise” the judicial punishments (*ḥudūd*) “during the *Imām’s* absence”. The culmination of these scholastic efforts was Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣāri’s (also Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī Shūshtarī, d. 1281H/1864) innovation on matters of both jurisprudence and clerical authority which bore fruit in laying the foundation for the concept of *marja‘ al-taqlīd*, the supreme exemplar (Newman, 2005, p. 168).³⁴

‘*Ulemā*’s relationship with the Qajar’s court, as is portrayed by Robert Gleave, has been one of “problematic legitimation of state activities by religious authorities” on one hand, and “the influence of religion on the workings of government, in particular the institutions connected with the judiciary”, on the other. In addition to these, Gleave mentions another reason for the inconvenient relationship between the court and the ‘*ulemā*, which was the “growing independence of mind among the religious classes,” that, in later years bore fruit in a number of ulama-led movements which were openly oppositional to the state” (Gleave, 2005, p. 4). Gleave concludes that “the *de jure* illegitimacy” which was given to the Qajar state by the ‘*ulemā*, especially with regard to the right of defensive *jihād* by the ruler, “was limited and specific” (Gleave, 2005, p. 5).
Having said this, there exists a number of factors here: the superiority of the Uṣūlī ʿulemā over the Akhbāris, the relative weakness of the Qajar state, especially in their later years, and the ʿulemā’s reluctance or perhaps their caution in giving legitimacy to the Qajars. All of these, should be treated as indications of the ʿulemā’s weight and influence in social and political affairs. This situation was sustained until Riḍā Khān came to power in 1299 shamsī/1921. In such a context, it is comprehensible that Riḍā Shah’s policies, which targeted wealth, social situation and the ʿulemā’s accessibility to sources of power, raised opposition and dissatisfaction. Although the Shah won the battle for a short time and the ʿulemā proved not “to be able to arrest or divert Tehran’s centralizing drive” (Cronin, 2007, p. 92), the ultimate winners were members of the hierocracy who not only after the Shah’s departure gained back what they had lost, but for the first time in the life of Shiʿa jurisprudence, took control of the main centre of political power. As a result, the unfortunate years of Riḍā Shah’s presence in power were only a short break in the life of Uṣūlī ʿulemā, as their hegemony, which had endured during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was sustained after the departure of Riḍā Shah and has continued to the present time (Amanat, 1390 shamsī/2011, p. 292). Moreover, Riḍā Shah’s manipulative policies activated political tendencies among the ʿulemā which are visible in the kalāmī and juridical texts of this period of time.

The examination of the key texts of the ʿulemā and ḥukamā of this time demonstrates that notions such as wilāya, nubuwwa, and imamate maintained their centrality, though there seems to be a major shift from the ʿirfānī and kalāmī conceptions of wilāya to the juridical ones; a shift which above all confirms this research’s former analysis of the importance of jurisprudence. In these texts, as we will
see, the question of social leadership of the Shi‘ī jurist is taken for granted, a dynamic that was absent in the writings of the previous ‘ulemā. For the first time the ‘ulemā began to conceptualize and theorize issues such as the question of governance in Islam, the necessity to establish an Islamic government, the notion of wilāyat al-ʿāmmah or a kind of guardianship which should be exercised by the Islamic government, and lastly, the necessity to spread among citizens the teachings of Shi‘isme. Such tendencies, as it will be observed, gain particular prominence in the writings of `Allāmah Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabā’ī of the twentieth century, whose major texts, along with Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī’s, will be examined here. It should be noted that Āshtīyānī’s treatise on wilāya, is centred on wilāyat al-khāṣṣah instead of wilāyat al-ʿāmmah and is very much inspired by Qumshi’ī’s glosses on ibn ‘Arabī.

3.6. Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī

Ayatollah Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī is perhaps better known through his father who was a famous Ayatollah of the Qajar period. Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥassan Āshtīyānī (d. 1319 H/1901), whose participation in the Tobacco Régie and subsequent protest is well-known, was one of the three opponent mujtahids who stood against the tobacco treaty and Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah’s (1275 shamsī/1896) concession which had been granted to Major G. F. Talbot for a full monopoly over the production, sale, and export of tobacco in Persia for fifty years. Along with Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥassan Shīrāzī (d. 1312 H/1894) and Mīrzā Javād Tabrīzī (d. 1313 H/1895), Āshtīyānī sought to repudiate the concession, and in fact it was from his home in Tehran that the fatwā of Mīrzāy-i Shīrāzī was declared and became known amongst the people. Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah threatened him
with exile, but before the Shah’s order was executed, his followers prevented him from leaving the capital.

Mīrzā Ahmad was Āshtīyānī’s youngest son and was born in Tehran in 1300 H/1882. After obtaining preliminary instruction from his father, he continued his studies in rational and scriptural disciplines with other teachers, such as Mīrzā Hāshim Rashti, Mīrzā Ḥassan Kermānshāhī, Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā Nūrī and Seyyed Muḥammad Yazdī, and afterward started teaching at madrasa-yi Sipahsālār. From 1340 to 1350 shamsī (1960-1970) he lived in Najaf, where he met Mīrzā Muḥammad Hossein Nā‘īnī who granted him ījāza of teaching and issuing fatwā. After returning to Iran he became involved in teaching, writing and training students. He passed away in 1395 H/1975 in Tehran and was buried in the shrine precinct of Shah ‘Abd al-ʿAzīm in Rayy, south of Tehran. He was a prolific scholar and has left many writings – altogether sixty-two, in the form of treatises, comments, exegesis, and original texts in various areas such as jurisprudence, theology, ethics, mysticism and ḥikmat; although many of them are still unpublished. He also used to write poetry under the pseudonym of Wālih (lovelorn). Of this lengthy list, two key texts will be examined here, entitled Risāla-yi Sarmāya-yi Saʿādat (Treatise on the Asset of Felicity) in Persian and Risālat al-Wilāya (Treatise on Wilāya) in Arabic (Ostādī, 1383 shamsī, pp. 9-25).

Āshtīyānī wrote Risāla-yi Sarmāya-yi Saʿādat around 1381 H/1961 and by 1389 H/1970 the book has been published five times. It is divided into four sections; tawḥīd, nubuwwa, imamate and maʿād. In terms of method, Āshtīyānī uses a rational methodology blended with transmitted sources in order to develop arguments for the conception of nubuwwa and its status. He maintains that the reasonability of deeds of
God requires him to send prophets to guide people on the righteous way to Him - or perfection, which is the desired rational goal of creation. In other words, sending prophets was necessary to achieve perfection (Ostādī, 1383 shamsī, pp. 137-138). On imamate, Āshtīyānī follows the same method and argues for the status of the Imāms from the perspective of a ḥakīm who believes that the Imāms are the intermediary of divine emanation to people and should be appointed by the Prophet and not by people, as they are ignorant and cannot distinguish between good and evil. He also argues that the Imāms should be the most learned and the wisest (aʿlam wa afdal) of their time. Āshtīyānī concludes that the Prophet not only appointed Imām Ali as his first successor, but also appointed the rest of the Imāms (Ostādī, pp. 142-147).

Āshtīyānī’s detailed discussion on the notion of wilāya, its definition and its typology which is presented in his Risālat al-Wilāya, is very much inspired by Qumshiʾī. Like Qumshiʾī, he starts with the etymological derivation of wilāya which is wali, meaning affinity and closeness, followed by the twin of wilāya (authority, kingship) and walāya (affection and kindness). Āshtīyānī maintains that wilāya dominates everything, whether it is contingent or necessary and, like being, is modulated. Wujūd’s modulation, however, should be understood on the basis of manifestation and the modulation of wilāya should be realized on the ground of its affinity and closeness to the Absolute. Āshtīyānī concludes that the more being/existence manifests itself, the more perfect it is, likewise, the closer something or someone is to God, the more it enjoys the attribute of wilāya. In interpreting this verse “Allah u-ma’a kull shay’, God is with everything”, Āshtīyānī believes that it is the maxim of the status of wilāya and the closest place that a holder of wilāya can have. Wilāya is also intimately tied with faith, in the sense that
the more a believer is illuminated by the light of faith, the more attributes of beauty manifest in him (Ostādī, pp. 335-336).

Wilāya could be absolute and delimited - muṭlaqah and muqayyadah respectively. It is absolute in as much as it is a divine attribute and as such is limitless, and it is delimited because it is designated either to a prophet or to a certain wali, and from this perspective, their wilāya is a part of the absolute wilāya. In addition to this, there is another typology of wilāya which is the classification of wilāya into general and particular. The first type could be designated to any muʾmin (believer) who believes in God and does good deeds as, according to the intensity of his or her faith to God, the believer enjoys the higher station in the hierarchy of wilāya. The second type, however, is specifically allocated to His seekers who have experienced self-abnegation and self-annihilation and they are no longer the cause of their deeds; they have become perpetuated in God. What moves them forward is the love of God and what strengthens them is piety.

Thus, there exist wali-ya muṭlaq and nabī-ya muṭlaq and the latter is designated to the Prophet of Islam, who is the holder of the office of real nubuwwa (nubuwwat-i ḥaqīqīya) as a pre-existent and perpetual office. The Prophet has the absolute right to act upon the cosmos and is entitled the Perfect Man, the Quṭb of Time, the Great Khalīfa, the First/Universal Intellect, and the Primal Man. As for wilāyat-i muṭlaqah one can say that it is the inward of such a nubuwwa and its holder, who is Ali, and has the same and equal status and authority as the Prophet does. Although Āṣhtīyānī adds that every nubuwwa and wilāya is absolute and general because it is an attribute of God and as such should be muṭlaqah, he also reminds us that since the offices of wilāya and
nubuwwa are to be designated to a particular nabī or wali, they are regarded as muqayyada as well (Ostādī, pp. 337-342). On the difference between wilāya and nubuwwa, Āshṭīyānī brings the typical argument that the status of wilāya is pre-eternal, divine and of more inclusive than that of nubuwwa, as nabīs capable of being aware of truths and having knowledge only on the basis of his wilāya. Wali is a name of the names of God whose face is turned towards his Lord rather than towards this world or people (Ostādī, p. 340). Following other Shi'a ʿārifīs and ḥakīms, Āshṭīyānī stresses that the lmāms are awliyā and the successors of the Prophet who are precedent to creation (Ostādī, p. 346).

Āshṭīyānī's Risālat al-Wilāya has similarities with another important treatise on wilāya entitled Wilāyat Nāmih (Book of Wilāya) by Mullā Sulṭān Muḥammad Gunābādī, known as Sulṭān ʿAlī Shāh (d. 1327 H/1909). Gunābādī was primarily a pupil of the abovementioned Ḥāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, but after his conversion to Sufism, for thirty-four years maintained the office of the qaṭbīyat of the Niʿmatullāhī silsila known as Niʿmatullāhī-yayi Gunābādiya. His conversion to Sufism happened as a result of his fascination with the Niʿmatullāhī qaṭb of the time, Muḥammad Kāẓim Isfahānī (d. 1293 H/1876), and with the name in the sect as Saʿādat ʿAlī Shāh (also known as Ṭāwūs al-ʿUrafā, lit. the peacock of the mystics), the thirty-fourth qaṭb in the line of Niʿmatullāhī leaders. Like some of his predecessors, Gunābādī was martyred by a local governor. Both Āshṭīyānī and Gunābādī belonged to the same epoch and despite being affiliated with two different blocks; one an uṣūlī jurist and a ḥakīm and the other a Sufi qaṭb, they developed similar arguments for the conception of wilāya and the office of wilāyat al-khāṣṣah. Sulṭān ʿAlī Shāh wrote a number of books; and among them the abovementioned Wilāyat Nāmih is significant.
The book revolves around the concept of *wilāya*, its reality, its nexus to divine names and attributes, and its relationship with the doctrinal principles of Islam and of the faith of *Shīʿism*. In terms of etymology, Gunābādī sticks with the old twins of *wilāya* and *walāya*, and argues that the former means rule and reign, while the latter indicates friendship and closeness (Gunābādī, 1384, p. 13). *Wilāya* is perennial and pre-existent and is regarded as the inward of *nubuwwa*, and as such is *noor* which has existed since the time of Adam. Along with the allegory of light, *wilāya* is likened to a divine tree (*shajarat ul-ilāhiyah*) whose fruit, after crossbreeding, is joined with *insān*. Therefore, *wilāya* is a benefaction, a *khayr* (good), having come from the divine tree which itself has hybridized with *insān* (Gunābādī, pp. 71-73). Gunābādī calls this type of *wilāya* ‘covenant’ (also *wilāyat al-taklīfiya*), and argues that by the covenant between God and His servants, the heart of the servant will open to the Faith, whilst there is another type of *wilāya* (the absolute *wilāya/wilāyat al-μuṭlaqah*) which is known as Divine Will (*mashīyyat al-μuṭlaqah*) and is the main source of His emanations (Gunābādī, pp. 13-15). As the holder of the status of the absolute *wilāya*, God’s essence remains unknowable to His creatures unless He wills Himself to appear through the mirror of His names and attributes – which is a classical *Akbarīan* argument to both explain His Essence and creation. In this status, He is light which shines or flows over everything, and as such is unified with them. Thus, *wilāya* in this usage is His deed or *mashīyyat al-ilāhiyah* (Divine Will) (Gunābādī, pp. 22-31). *Wilāyat al-taklīfiya*, along with prayer, alms, fasting and *ḥajj*, is a principle of Islam and of the faith of *Shīṣm*, in the sense that by disobeying the *wilāya* of *wali*, a believer steps out of the boundaries of the faith. A believer, Gunābādī maintains, must accept the authority of *wali* (apparently Sufī *qiṭb*) and his right to act upon him (Gunābādī, pp. 34-35).
For Gunābādī, *wilāya* has obvious temporal connotations; *wali* is a ruler who has the right of absolute authority to act upon his people, and by accepting the authority of the ruler, people are secured from suffering and calamity. In the same way, by entering the covenant of *wilāya* a believer is safe from His agony (Gunābādī, p. 37). The interesting point about Gunābādī’s conceptions of *wilāya* is that he excludes women from the referents of the covenant of *wilāya* and salvation. As a result, women will remain in everlasting ignorance and suffering, and along with four other groups of people, are not eligible to receive *khayr* and emanation from God (Gunābādī, pp. 61-63). I interject here that such a belief is in contrast to both the teachings of Islam and of ibn ‘Arabī and his mystical doctrine which has always allocated a room to women. It also bears witness to a development by which ‘i̱ṟfān has increasingly gained a theological and/or juridical aura. On the other hand, if according to Gunābādī, the faith is the fruit of the covenant of *wilāya*, by excluding women from attaining this fruit he argues against the comprehensive and all-encompassing message of Islam.

Āshtīyānī and Gunābādī’s arguments are examples of what German philosopher Jurgen Habermas (d. 1929) has called ‘intersubjectivity’. In addition, it has already been observed that as a result of Mullā Ṣadrā’s synthesis between ‘i̱ṟfān, Shī‘a theology and philosophy, particularly Illuminationist philosophy, the boundary between these areas became blurred and terms such as *wilāya* could have been conceptualized by Sufis, *mutakallims* (theologians) and *uṣūlī* mujtahids in the same way. The only difference was determining the referents; for the former the *wali* was the Sufi *quṭb* and for the latter, it was the *uṣūlī* scholar.
3.7. ‘Allāmah Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabā’ī

Seyyed Muḥammad Hossein Qādī (Qāzī) Ṭabāṭabā’ī Tabrīzī, later known as ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, was born in 1321 H/1904 in the village of Shadabad (or Shadagan) near Tabriz in Azerbaijan (Algar, 2006, p. 327), of the famous clan of Ṭabāṭabā’ī, who trace their genealogies to the second Shī‘ī Imām, Al-Hassan, and specifically one of his progenies called ʿĪbrāhīm ibn ʿĪsā al-Dībāj, known as Ṭabāṭabā’ī.⁴⁰ From his mother’s side, Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s genealogy goes back to the third Imām, al-Hossein. He received his preliminary instructions in Tabriz and then moved to Najaf to complete his education there. He stayed in Iraq for ten years, but due to the poor economic situation, he had to return to Iran and stay in his hometown for ten years. He moved to Qum and resided there for the rest of his life. He passed away in 1402 H/1981 and was buried in the shrine of Ḥāḍrat Maʿṣūma (Fāṭima bint Mūsa al-Kādhim) in Qum.⁴¹ Ṭabāṭabā’ī was a prolific writer and wrote on a variety of subjects such as metaphysics, Islamic ethics, mathematics (in which he was an expert), government and politics in Islam, wilāya and nubuwya, the School of Shī‘ism (maktab-i tashayyu’), resurrection and Islamic anthropology. His exegesis on the Qurʾān, entitled al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr l-Qurʾān, popularly known as Tafsīr al-Mīzān, consists of twenty volumes and was originally written in Arabic. For the study and exegesis of the Qurʾān, Ṭabāṭabā’ī was inspired by his cousin Seyyed ‘Alī Qādī (Qāzī) Ṭabāṭabā’ī,⁴² who had trained him in ‘irfān and in the works of ibn ʿArabī. Sajjad Rizvi maintains that Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s language in his exegesis “is deliberately theological, and in accord with his method he rarely cites extra-Qurʾānic material. Thus he deploys arguments and perspectives from his training in philosophy and ‘irfān to explicate the text but occludes his sources” (Rizvi, 2015, p. 30).
His writings are altogether sixty-three original treatises and books, as well as glosses on different Shi'a texts such as Kitāb al-Kāfī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿālīya, and Kitāb al-Kīfāya (Rizvi, 2015, pp. 46-50). His series of discussions with Henry Corbin (d. 1978) on a number of topics such as Shi'ism, ʿirfān and ḥikmat are notable, as they shed light on different aspects of his thought.43 Besides, Ṭabāṭabāʾī was not unaware of new intellectual trends in the West as he observed in them materialistic perils that could mislead young generations from the path of Islam and Shi'ism, and for this reason he wrote Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Rīʿālīsm on Islamic Epistemology. He also trained many students, most of them later prominent intellectual and political figures who helped the new political and theoretical system founded in post-revolutionary Iran. Among them Murtaḍā Muṭaharī, (who commented on Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Rīʿālīsm, d. 1357 shamsī/1979), Hossein ‘Alī Muntazīrī (d. 1388 shamsī/2009), Muḥammad Hossein Bihishtī (d. 1359 shamsī/1981), ‘Abdullāh Javādī Āmulī, Ḥassan Ḥassanzādih Āmulī and Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, are famous (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1429 H/2008, pp. 44-45).44

In addition to his students who disseminated his thoughts in Iran and other Shi'a societies, his books clearly manifest his ideas on Islamic epistemology, metaphysics in general and Islamic metaphysics in particular, tawḥīd, the School of Shi'ism, and most importantly the notions of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate. So, for the purpose of this research, his key texts including Risālat al-Wilāya (the Book of Wilāya), a very important text on the notion of wilāya and related issues such as spiritual conduct (sulūk), perfection (kamāl), and man’s life in this world and in the hereafter, will be examined. This treatise originally in Arabic, is widely translated into Persian, commented is upon by a number of figures and is published under different titles such
as ’Tariq-i ‘Irfa (the Path of Mysticism) Suluk-i Nafsani (Carnal Conduct) and Wilayat Naimih (the Book of Wilaya). Other texts that will be examined and analyzed here include Tabatabai’s discussions with the French Orientalist Henry Corbin, namely Shi’a: Majmū’i Mudhakirat bā Professor Henry Corbin (Shi’ism: the Collected Conversations with Henry Corbin). There exists another book entitled Insan az Aghaz tā Anjam (Man from Beginning to the End), containing Tabatabai’s ideas on Shi’a epistemology and eschatology. The last two, though separate books, are very connected to each other. They discuss the School of Shi’ism and related issues such as imamate, nubuwwa and wilaya, and particularly the ways Tabatabai develops arguments for the conceptions of them, in works entitled Shi’a dar Eslam (Shi’ism in Islam) and Ma’naviyat-i Tashayu’ (the Spirituality of Shi’ism).

3.7.1. Wilayat Naimih

In his Risalat al-Wilaya, Tabatabai begins with the definition of wilaya, which is leadership and authority as well as closeness and affinity to God. In its second definition, wilaya is intimately tied with the stations of gnosis, in the sense that the more a believer knows God, the closer he is to Him. Tabatabai then turns his attention to the typology of wilaya and its division into wilayat al-‘ammah and wilayat al-khassah (general and specific wilaya, respectively). This division is a typical of the hikmat tradition which has already been discussed adequately in this chapter. What is new in Tabatabai’s arguments on the conceptions of wilaya is that he turns his focus from wilayat al-khassah which has traditionally been central in the hikmat writings, to wilayat al-‘ammah, in the sense that it is actually this type of wilaya which is more important and has priority over another. This shift is intentional, as Tabatabai sought
to reach out to a larger audience; either ordinary readers or young generation, to expose them to the message of Islam and Shi‘ism. This new development should be understood with regard to societal changes in Iran during the era of Riḍā Shah: the literacy rate had been increased, various publishers facilitated the accessibility to ordinary readers of new books which were printed with higher circulation, and women had entered educational establishments such as colleges and universities. Knowledge, here mysticism, was no longer designated to a handful of the elite (khawāṣṣ, here the Imāms), whose status and privileges are believed to be pre-given and pre-exist, but to anyone who sought for it.

In Ṭabāṭabā‘ī’s entire body of work, except for short references to wilāyat al-khāṣṣah, one can hardly find detailed conceptions for the term, and from this perspective, one can maintain that Ṭabāṭabā‘ī’s argument reverses the typical understanding and conceptions of wilāya. Wilāya is neither understood in terms of wilāyat al-takwīnīya, nor even in terms of wilāyat al-khāṣṣah, but only wilāyat al-ʿāmmah, which is accessible for every believer. In Wilāyat Nāmih, he assures that wilāya is a faculty which could be obtained through spiritual conduct (Ṭabāṭabā‘ī, 1390, p. 179). Again, contrary to most of the Ṣadrīan ḥakīms who taught seekers to avoid women as pitfalls on the path to God, Ṭabāṭabā‘ī’s teachings are devoid of any such misogynist connotations. He addresses man in general and promises his audiences that by doing jihād, which is a righteous deed, everyone is capable of reaching the status of wilāya and comprehending the hidden secrets of the Universe. Therefore, the rights of comprehending the secrets are not only designated to the Prophet and the Imāms (Ṭabāṭabā‘ī, 1390, p. 180). It is noteworthy that Ṭabāṭabā‘ī, unlike his predecessors who
used to understand the status of wilāya only in terms of wilāyat al-takwīnīya, does not use this term at all.

Pertinent to this is the term mukhlaṣ. The People of Purity (Ahl al-Ikhlāṣ or mukhlaṣūn, also sābiqūn or ašḥāb al-asrār; lit. the People of Secrets which is wilāya)\(^47\), is one of the most frequent words in Wilāyat Nāmīh and is used interchangeably for awlīyā. By this, Ṭabāṭabā’ī refers to those who grasp the true meaning of tawḥīd and worship God not according to their imaginations, but on the basis of their gnosis of God. So, not only is their worship the most purified one, because it is founded on a true basis which is gnosis, but also everybody can get to know Him and worship Him in an appropriate manner (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1390, pp. 209-210). Mukhlaṣūn have to walk a number of steps, including repentance, self-assessment, meditation, practising silence and seclusion, hunger and retirement, and keeping night vigil (tahajjud) in order to grasp His gnosis. Since the status of wilāya or ikhlaṣ requires turning face to God, to reach this goal, mukhlaṣ needs to process through all the aforementioned stages of spiritual conduct and become self-abnegated in Him. At the final step, the most beautiful names and attributes of God become manifested in them, and like Him they enjoy the absolute right of acting upon the cosmos (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1390, pp. 211 ff).

In terms of method, Ṭabāṭabā’ī in Wilāyat Nāmīh uses the transmitted approach, relying mostly on the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, though in other books he develops rational arguments for the conceptions of wilāya and nubuwwa. For instance, in Ma’nawīyat-i Tashayu’i, Ṭabāṭabā’ī turns his attention to another meaning of wilāya, leadership and supervision, and develops a rational argument for the conceptions of wilāyat al-‘āmmah. Wilāyat al-‘āmmah, is a natural supervision which is both exercised by every
believer over another, and is the undertaking of the administration of social issues such as guardianship of orphans or the sponsorship of the insane. The referent of ِ wilāyat al-ʿāmmah, then, could be both every believer and essential matters which need to be undertaken by a guardian. So, wilāya is a comprehensive term indicating both personal and communal leadership and supervision (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1387a, pp. 70-71).

Here wilāya is an axiom (badīhī), an evident premise to be accepted as true without controversy. Ṭabāṭabāʾī uses this axiom as a starting point for his reasoning to prove wilāya. From this perspective, wilāya or leadership in Islam is natural and no one is to abrogate it: “the abrogation of leadership and wilāya is the abrogation of Islam and original disposition (fiṭra)” (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1387a, p. 86). But who undertakes the guardianship of social and political matters? According to the classification of Ṭabāṭabāʾī, the issue of the formation of government is embedded in the category of social matters and is assigned to any individual who both holds piety and fear of God (taqwā), and has impressive understanding of current social issues. In terms of the form of the government, Ṭabāṭabāʾī recognizes consultative form of government (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1387a, pp. 86-88).

Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s doctrine of wilāya has been the subject of controversy among subsequent scholars. Muhsin Kadivar has discussed Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s ideas on wilāya and government in Shiʿīsm in two of his books.48 According to him, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s conception of wilāya is a typical one (Kadivar, 1378b, pp. 68-378), though his understanding of the term ‘ulu l-amr’ (the guardians of the cause) is different. Kadivar stresses that Ṭabāṭabāʾī in Tafsīr al-Mīzān rejects the common but false assessment that by ‘ulu l-amr’, the Qurʾān means jurists, ʿulemā, khulafā of the Prophet, military officers, or even
the consensus of the *ummah* (community of believers), because this term refers only to the Prophet and the *Imāms* (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 177-178). A similar interpretation is given by Sajjad Rizvi in his abovementioned article on Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in which he explains how Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s conception of *wilāya*, as well as his *Tafsīr al-Mīzān* should be understood as claims to authority, as opposed to the authority of the *fuqahā* (Rizvi, 2015, p. 16). On the other hand, Algar holds a completely different opinion and maintains that Ṭabāṭabā’ī has endorsed the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh* “at the very least in its general outline” (Algar, 2006, Op.cit, p. 347). According to Ṭabāṭabā’ī, “the individual who excels all others in piety, administrative ability (*ḥusn-i tadbīr*), and awareness of contemporary circumstances, is best fitted for this position [the leadership of society]” (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, *wilāyat wa za’āmat*, pp. 91-2 in Algar, 2006, p. 346).

Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s approach is a ‘holistic’ one, in which there is an identification between “the study and spiritual practice of philosophy and *ʿirfān* with the very faith of *Shīʿī*Islam” (Rizvi, 2015, p. 17), and by this, as it is mentioned earlier, he privileges “his areas of expertise over the main pursuits of the *ḥawza*” (Rizvi, 2015, p. 17). This approach is also perceived in his discussion with Henry Corbin, in which he maintains that the faith of *Shīʿī*sm is centered on the notion of *wilāya*; whether it is understood in terms of leadership and authority of the household of the Prophet, or in terms of closeness and affinity to God, and from both perspectives, the abrogation of *wilāya* or negligence from it will end in the abrogation of *Shīʿī*sm (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1387b, pp. 51ff). From the viewpoint of the latter, *wilāya* is the path and the inward of *nubuwwa*, without which the status of *nubuwwa* and its functions would be ineffective and futile. In both meanings, *wilāya* is a perpetual and constant status. Along with rational methodology,
Ṭabāṭabāʿī also deploys transmitted sources to argue for the right of Imām Ali and his sons for the succession of the Prophet (Ṭabāṭabāʿī, 1387b, pp. 268ff).

3.8. Conclusion

We gained some observations from our examination of the conceptions of wilāya:

Mullā Ṣadrā’s legacy flourished in the School of Tehran. The four ḥakīms of this school, namely Mullā ‘Alī Nūrī, Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, Āqā ‘Alī Ḥakīm Mudarris Tehranī and Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshī, not only perpetuated ‘the prophetic philosophy’ in their writings, but also followed Ṣadrā’s approach and terminology (a combination of ‘irfānī and rational method) to develop reasoning for the components of this philosophy, such as imamology, prophetology, gnosiology and the concept of the occultation. Along with the ḥakīms, who were intermediary links between the School of Isfahan and the School of Qum, there were two other generations of students that were either transmitters of the Ṣadrīan philosophy and ibn ‘Arabīan metaphysics to the next generation, or were scholars who were to become the teachers of the School of Qum (Rizvi, 2014, p. 125).

Ḥakīms came to understand and analyze the Ṣadrīan ḥikmat from both philosophical and ‘irfānī viewpoints, and they did that through commenting/glossing, “clarifying the meanings of obscure phrases in their works” (Ismāʿīl, 2014, p. 132), or developing a tradition based “on its own interpretations and a plethora of works were written” (Ismāʿīl, 2014, p. 132). Therefore, their writings were either regarded as a return to original source material (either philosophical or mystical), or as an addition to the existing Ṣadrīan tradition through glossing and commenting on them. From this
perspective, as Zuhair Ismāʿīl maintains, their works, in general, are important to the understanding of ḥikma, as well as to the application of it (Ismāʿīl, p. 132). In terms of their contribution to the conceptions of wilāya, the ʿirfānī reading was dominant, whose culmination, as observed earlier in the chapter, was in the works of Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshīʾī.

The writings of the ḥakīms of the School of Qum, unlike those of their predecessors, do not display the balance between the ʿirfānī and philosophical reading, as each of them represent a distinct dimension of Sadrīan ḥikma. In the works of Ṭabāṭabāʾī, there is a separation between philosophical, mystical and traditional discussions on one hand, and the dominance of the Periphatetic reading of Ṣadrā without the inclusion of theoretical ʿirfān, on the other. In his conception of wilāya, which is best illustrated in Wilāyat Nāmih, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s arguments in contrast to those of Mullā Ṣadrā who had adopted a cohesive approach, are rooted in the Qurʾānic and Shīʿa teachings. In addition, he had earlier shown his interest in Periphatetic philosophy in his two books, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma and Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, which, as Zuhair Ismāʿīl rightly argues, significantly exposed Islamic philosophy to a wider population (Ismāʿīl, 2014, pp. 135-136).

Probably one can refer to this ‘exposure’ as gaining a social aspect of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s teachings, and as Muhsin Kadivar has argued, his thoughts display a mixture of Shīʿa doctrines and social goals of human society (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 45). In volume four of Tafsīr al-Mīzān, Ṭabāṭabāʾī develops lengthy discussions for conceptions such as man and society, Islamic visions of society, and the social nature of human beings (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1394 H/1974, pp. 92-138). Pertinent to this is his emphasis on personal
aspects of the teachings of Islam, such as individual perfection and the concept of *wilāyat al-ʿāmmah*, which is accessible to every believer. These two dimensions, social and individual, are interrelated as individual perfection, in which the status of *wilāyat al-ʿāmmah* is fulfilled only within the Islamic social context. It is also with the figures of the School of Qum that Islamic philosophy gains interaction with Western philosophy, and works such as *Uṣūl-i Falsafa wa Ravish-i Riʿālīsm*, in which Islamic philosophy is presented in a new way, were published. The School maintains this tradition to this day.

There are two more differences between the Schools of Tehran and Qum: for the ḥakīms of the School of Tehran ḥikma was an end in itself, but for their successors in the School of Qum, ḥikma is a "tool to increase the depth of unrelated researches such as political philosophy in the scheme of *walāyah al-faqīh*, (guardianship of the jurist), *Qurʾānic* hermeneutics, ethics and the environment” (Ismāʿīl, 2014, p. 138). Moreover, if the ḥakīms of the School of Tehran enjoyed the Qajar court’s respect and attention, the ḥakīms of the School of Qum took advantage of the well-organized social and financial networks of the late Pahlavi era that sustained them to survive the temporary shock of Riḍā Khān’s secularism.

The Schools of Tehran and Qum are fascinating subjects for scholarly research, but a study and analysis of the conception of *wilāya* has been lacking. The intention of the author is to contextualize *wilāya* and other related terms to see how the ḥakīms contributed to the inherited tradition available to them, therefore, the perspective of this chapter could be regarded as an addition to the existing research. As will be observed in the next two chapters, it was this network, along with Ayatollah Khomeini’s defiance (another prominent figure of the School of Qum with ‘irfānī reading), to the
existing socio-political order that facilitated the actualization of the Ṣadrīān hikmat in Iran. In these chapters, it will be seen how the three currents of mysticism, theology and jurisprudence came together and created a context within which concepts such as wilāya, imamate, nubuwā and vicegerency of the Hidden Imām are understood and actualized.

---

1 - The term "school" was first coined by Henry Corbin and Hossein Nasr “to describe a philosophical movement within a specific location, but one should not assume that philosophical activity at a certain time was confined to these areas. Rather, the term denotes a burst of activity that primarily occurred in a certain place” (Zuhair ‘Ali Ismā‘īl, Between Philosophy and ‘Irfān: Interpreting Ṣadrā from the Qajars to Post-Revolutionary Iran, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Exeter, October 2014, pp. 79-80). Although, as it will be observed further in this chapter, there have been scholars who were not present in a certain place at the time of activity of the School, but significantly contributed to it. For example, the School of Tehran, had two relevant, though geographically distinct scholars, Mullā ‘Ali Nūrī and Mullā Hádi Sabzivārī who did not live in Tehran, but are regarded as members of the School of Tehran.

2 - Karīm Muṭṭahidī in his Āshīnāyī-i Iranian bā Falsafīhā-yi Jādīd-i Gharb (Iranians’ Familiarity with the New Western Philosophies) has given a historical record of Iranian’s intellectual and economic encounters with the West from the Safavid era onward. See: Karīm Muṭṭahidī, Āshīnāyī-i Iranian bā Falsafīhā-yi Jādīd-i Gharb (Iranians’ Familiarity with the New Western Philosophies), 1388 (Tehran: Sāzīmān-i inteshārāt-i Pāzhūhīshgāh-i Farhang va Andishīy-i Islāmī & Mu’āsasī-yi Muṭṭālī-āt-i Tārīḵ-i Mu’āṣīr-i Iran).

3 - Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravišt-i Ri’ālīsm stems from Ṣabāṭābā’ī’s lectures in his classes in Qum before 1332/1945, and consists of fourteen treatises divided into five volumes, which discuss pure philosophical issues from an Islamic perspective. By Ri’ālīsm, Ṣabāṭābā’ī indicates al-hikmat al-muta’āliya against sophism (ṣafṣata) which is manifested whether in Marxism (Dialectical Materialism), or positivism. He calls these two ‘idealism,’ and argues that the most reasonable philosophical school is that of Mullā Ṣadrā which is a synthesis of the two great philosophical heritages; Greek and Islamic (including Peripatetic and illuminationist trends), and is as old as the history of philosophy itself. Ṣabāṭābā’ī claims that Mullā Ṣadrā could reconcile a two thousand year old philosophical dispute, which had started from the Greek, and invent a new philosophical school called al-hikmat al-muta’āliya.

Muḥammad Ḥossein Ṣabāṭābā’ī, Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravišt-i Ri’ālīsm (the Principles of Philosophy and Realism), introduction and footnotes by Muṭṭadā Muṭṭaharī, two volumes, 1364 (Tehran: Ṣadrā Publication). Muṭṭadā Muṭṭaharī’s lengthy footnotes on the book are not descriptions, and as Dabashi emphasizes, in fact tackle the philosophical materialism, “not because of the inherent significance of this school of thought but because it had, through the agency of the Tudeh party, targeted the young people for conversion, [and] such intrusions into the intellectual domain of Islamic scholastic learning had to be challenged philosophically”. Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 1993, p. 155. Dabashi certainly maintains that Muṭṭaharī’s endeavour was to question and refute the validity of one of the materialistic premises which was the idea of relativity of the truth. At that time, as Dabashi argues, Marxism could challenge and rob militant Shi‘ism of both “its metaphysical claim to truth and its ideological claim to political mobilization”. Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: the Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 2006 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers), p. 156.

4 - Hikmat (also ḥikma), means transcendent wisdom and “divine science that combined gnosis (in particular the sapiential and metaphysical Sufi thought of the School of Ibn al-'Arabi, q.v.), theosophy, and philosophy” (Nasr, 1966, p. 907, in Isfahan School of Philosophy, Sajjad Rizvi, 2012, p. 122), and is insisted to have prophetic roots. In the topography of hikmat, one should notice that it was Henry Corbin (d. 1978) and following him Hossein Nasr (1933-) that for the first time situated the idea of
*hikmat* within a certain geographical framework and particularly tied it to the ‘the School of Isfahan’, as representing “the high point of Persian *Shir‘a* civilization” (Rizvi, Op.cit, 2012, p. 122).

5 - The analytical biographies of these masters are reflected in a number of studies: Seyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present; Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy*, 2006 (NY, State University of New York Press), pp. 235-259.


There also exist case studies focusing on individual scholars:


6 - In a general comparison, one can mention the writings of Sergei N. Bulgakov, the Russian Orthodox Christian theologian and philosopher (d. 1944) who has discussed the concept of Sophia, the wisdom of God, from this perspective. Sophia is the intelligible basis of the world – the soul of the world, the wisdom of the nature, the intermediary, or a boundary needed between “the Nothing of the Creator and the multiplicity of the cosmos” (Bulgakov, 1993, p. xvi). “Sophiology” here has similarity with the conceptualizations of *wilāya* in the writings of the *ḥakîms*, and is a multi-dimensional concept. Probably the one important difference is that Sophia is feminine, but *wilāya*, both as a desirable model of leadership and authority, as well as an ontological status, is masculine. Sophia at once is Divine, but at the same time, is in the world, throughout it, in the form of divine energies and spiritual beings, as its boundary (Bulgakov, p. xvii). Bulgakov argues that Sophia (the wisdom of God/the nature of God) is inseparable from Osía (divine substance), and Osía is disclosed and manifested as Sophia. There is also another striking figure, Shekinah (*the Glory of God/refers to manifestation), “in the midst of which God manifests himself” (Bulgakov, 1993, p. 29). Therefore, Osía, Sophia and Shekinah are inseparable and refer to one truth which is Deity. See: Sergei N. Bulgakov, *Sophia, the Wisdom of God: an Outline of Sophiology*, 1993 (Hudson: Lindisfarne Press).

7 - A few of these *masjid-madrasas* belong to pre-Qajar period, and the rest were built in the Qajar era. See:


8 - For a detailed account of Martyn’s job, journey and polemical treatise on Islam and the Qur‘ān, the ‘ulemā and Sufi’s responses, and the encouraging role of the court in writing refutations against him, see:


9 - The term *qayyim bil kitāb* (*qayyim al Qur‘ān*) is used for the first time by Shaykh Shahāb al-Dīn Yahya ibn Ḥabash Suhrāwārdī (d. 587 H/1191) in his book *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* (Illuminationist Philosophy). In his discussions on *nubuwwa* and particularly on the states of seekers’ (*aḥvāl-i sālikān*), Suhrāwārdī maintains that the one who is eligible to rule and govern, is the *sālik* who has the gnosiss of the secret (*hikmat*) of the book, which is hidden by secret (*hikmat*) it has become through this book, indicates divine secrets and truths. Therefore, the one who knows *hikmat* and arises to implement it, is the true *sālik*: Here again, the recurring theme which is inmost being *sīr* plays a central role, as it is by the virtue of the *sīr* that the seeker is distinguished from peers. See: Shahāb al-Dīn Yahya ibn Ḥabash Suhrāwārdī, *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* (Illuminationist Philosophy), translation into Persian by Seyyed Ja‘far Sajjādī, 2nd edition, n.d. (Tehran: Tehran University Publication), p. 401.

10 - *Shir‘a* scholars have described the meaning of the *sīr* and its relation to ontological stations. Mullā ‘Abdullāh Zunūzī maintains that *sīr* is an ecstasy of contemplation (*ḥāl*), between God and His servant, which is hidden from anybody else. In interpreting this *ḥadîth* that “our cause is secret, does not avail it but secret and secret of secret, the secret which is hidden by secret”, Zunūzī mentions that in this *ḥadîth*, *sīr* refers to the absolute *wilāya* and the comprehensive *khilâfa* which is divine side of the cause of God and its human side is *nubuwwa*. The station of *sīr* / *wilāya*, then, is the highest station
(Zunūzī, 1354, pp. 75-80). In the present book, Anwār Jalīyyah (the Manifest Lights) Zunūzī puts forward that the station of tawḥīd, which is sīr̄ and unveiling of the sīr̄; is analogous to the station of wīlāya or invisible/hidden (Zunūzī, pp. 300-301 ff). It seems that the extremist understanding of the status of wīlāya - which was wīlāyat al-takwiniya - had so preoccupied scholars of the post-Safavid era that they came to analyze everything in terms of it. Zunūzī, as do many of his contemporaries and predecessors, turns wīlāya into an incomprehensible fact and therefore outside of the realm of human understanding, whose boundaries are blurred with those of tawḥīd. In the following pages, Zunūzī stresses that by the Truth, Imāms meant the absolute wīlāya which contains all other kinds of wīlāya (Zunūzī, p. 358). Alongside philosophical understanding of the meaning of sīr̄, there was a pure ʿirfānī interpretation of this notion around this period of time that understood sīr̄ and wīlāya the same: “sīr̄ is the source of the hidden intuition and the mine of divine knowledge,” so, wīlāya of the Imāms is their sīr̄. See: Umm u-Salama Beygum Nayrizi, ḫāṭīr al-Kulīyat; Kulīyat-i Masʿūl-i ʿIrāfī-ya Shīʿa (the Comprehensive of Generalities; the Generalities of Mystical and Shīʿa Problems), Mahdi Itikfahr (ed.), 1386 (Qum: Mathbuʾati Din), pp. 172-73 footnotes.

11 - Shaykh Ahmad Ahsāʾī (d. 1239 H/1826) has two risālas entitled al-Fawāʾid or Sharḥ al-Fawāʾid, and they are published in different volumes of Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim (Comprehensive Words). The first one, entitled Sharḥ al-Fawāʾid, is published in the first volume of Jawāmiʿ, and as a lengthy writing (Ahsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 1, pp. 275-635) consists of twelve fāʿida and is written as an answer to the questions of someone called ʿMashhad ibn Ḥossein ʿAli. On the importance of this risāla, Ahsāʾī himself claims that he writes it because none of the ʿulema or ḥukamā prior to him has come to touch upon these questions thus far, and his ability to write it stems from the fact that he is assisted by the esoteric knowledge of the Imāms. The present risāla is mainly on being (or existence or reality, lit. wujūd), His being, or wujūd al-haqq, and the gnosis to His being and quiddity. For the address of the book, see: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim (Comprehensive Words), vol. 1, 1430 H (Baṣra: al-ghadrīr), pp. 275-635. The second risāla entitled al-Fawāʾid fī l-Hikma (the Theosophical Outcomes) is published in the second volume of the same book, Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim and is shorter than the first risāla (Ahsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 2, pp. 175-221), though it discusses the same issues. For more information see: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim (Comprehensive Words), vol. 2, 1430 H (Baṣra: al-ghadrīr), pp. 175-221. Nūrī's gloss seems to be on this particular risāla. Ahsāʾī has three other risālas entitled al-Fawāʾid al-Sabʿa (Septet Outcomes), (pp. 223-251), Fāʿida fī l-Istīshāb (Benefit in Acquiring) (pp. 135-137) and al-Fawāʾid fī Mahānī al-Uṣūl (Benefit in the Foundations of Principles) (pp. 141-173), and they are published in volumes two and six of the same collection, respectively. For more information see: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim, vol. 6, 1430 H (Baṣra, al-ghadrīr), pp. 135-137 & 141-173.

12 - Sufi contemporaries of Nūrī preferred to use the term ‘spring’ instead of ‘creation’ for the appearance of the Muḥammadan Reality. They insisted to prove that creation (khālq), is both general and lower and is signified to lower levels, not to the Muḥammadan Reality which is the highest degree of creation. See: Umm u-Salama Beygum Nayrizī, Op.cit, 1386 (Qum: Mathbūʿat-ī Din), pp. 52-53.

13 - Idrīs Samawi Hamid has discussed Nūrī’s commentaries on Sharḥ al-Fawāʾid al-Hikamiya in his unpublished article Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Zayniddin al-Ahsāʾī (Samawi, unpublished article, Op.cit, pp. 35-38). These commentaries could be regarded as an example of interdiscursive dialogue between two significant scholars, that, despite the “strenuous disagreement” between them over some of Ahsāʾī’s criticisms of Mullā ʿṢadr, Nūrī “still considered him at least equal in stature to his then late teacher Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1197 h/1783 ce), another powerful spiritual personality” (ibid, p. 7). Samawi believes that Nūrī was both an admirer, and a critic of Aḥsāʾī at the same time (ibid, p. 16).

14 - These two ḥadīth of Imām ʿAlī that, “I am the ṣalāt (prayer) of believers” and “I am the qibla of ʿirfān (the prayer direction of the gnostic),” refer to the same point. Nūrī interprets it by saying that since the reality of the essence of imām is the reality of the glorification of God ( ṭasbīḥ), believers by doing everyday prayer which is His glorification, recalls the reality of imām (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 339).

15 - This prophetic ḥadīth which says that: “Ali and I are the fathers of this nation (ummaḥ)” (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 316), mentions the idea of wīlāyat al-takwiniya and the right of wali to have the absolute authority over their believers.

16 - The status of ḥakīm al-dārāʾīs shared both by awdīyā and prophets (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 418).

17 - In the Library of Majīs, the first one is numbered 2065 and the second is 3958.

18 - Henry Martyn was “a chaplain to the military of the East India Company, having served as a missionary in India from 1806 to 1810 and translated the New Testament into Urdu” (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 18), Hindī, and other local languages of India (Isfandiyār, 1387 shamsī, p. 14). In India, he became famous as Pādrī, and it was there when he started controversial disputes with Muslims. H
was known for his negative opinions about Iranians (Isfandiyār, 1387 shamsī, p. 15), though at the same time, he “turned his attention to a Persian New Testament and visited Iran in 1811” (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 18). He sought to present copies of the Persian translations to Fath 'Ali Shah and 'Abbās Ḍīlān. In Isfahan, Shiraz and Tehran he became involved in disputations with some Sufis and a number of 'ulemmā, but never found a chance to visit the Shah. For a lengthy analysis of Henry Martyn’s adventures in the East, See: Maḥmūd Riḍā Isfandiyār’s introduction to Risālay-i Radd-i Pādri, Op.cit, 1387, pp. 4-42.

Maḥmūd Riḍā Isfandiyār has listed all of the refutations on Martyn’s polemical writing against Islam. They were either written by Sufis or ḥakīms such as Nūrī, though the latter apparently does not find mystical responses appropriate and convincing. There exist ten refutations on Martyn altogether, among them Nūrī’s treatise is famous. In addition to Nūrī, Mīrzā ‘Īsā Khān Qā’īm Maqāmār Farhānī (Mīrzā Bozorg whose refutation is one of the first responses to Martyn), Mullā Muḥammad Riḍā Hamidānī (two risālas), Mīrzā Abūl Qāsim Gīlānī known as Mīrzā-i Qumī, Mullā Ṣafī Nūrī, Sayyīd Muḥammad Husseyn ibn Mīr 'Abdul Bāqi Khātūnābādī, 'Alī Akbar Isḥāqī Isfahānī, Muḥammad Bāqīr Bihbāhānī, Hossein 'Alī Shāh Isfahānī and Muḥammad Mahdī ibn Sa‘īd Khalkhālī wrote refutations. Martyn’s polemic has also received a response from the head of the Shaykhschool of Kerman, Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī (d. 1288/1871) entitled Nusrat al-Dīn (Helping the Faith), Nūrī’s controversy with Sufis over their responses to Martyn and his attack on them is an example of misunderstanding between the people of shari‘a and those of ṭarīqa.

19 - It seems that Sufis elaborated more on the issue of the manifestation of the Prophet to previous prophets. For example, the abovementioned Umm u-Salāmeh Beygam Nayrizī in her fami’ al-Kullīyāt states that this manifestation happens with the mithālī body of the Prophet and is not restricted to manifestation in humans, as it also contains a manifestation in the whole cosmos. By his manifestation, people and cosmos will return to their Permanent archetypes. See: Nayrizī, Op.cit, 1368, pp. 59-60 & 63.
22 - Dhuqā’ī Sāwaji’s bibliography of Sabzivārī’s writings is comprehensive, as contains his published and unpublished works both, and in some cases, mentions the published and unpublished volumes of the same text. He also names works that are about Sabzivārī’s life and heritage. See: Murtuqā Dhuqā’ī Sāwaji, Kitāb Shināsiyāt-i Hāj Mullā Ḥādī Sabzivārī (Bibliography of Hāj Mullā Ḥādī Sabzivārī), Keyhān Farhangī, Farvardin 1372, No. 96, pp. 22-28.
23 - Sabzivārī commented on a number of classics such as Ḥikmat al-Ishrat ... of Suhrawardī (d. 1191 H/1777), Shawārīq al-Ḥāʾim (Roaring of Inspiration) of Lāḥijī (d. 1071 H/1661), Zubdāt al-Uṣūl (Gist of Principles) of Shaykh Bahā’ al-Dīn ‘Amīlī (d. 1030 H/1621), Sharḥ Aḥliyya (the Commentary on One Thousand) of ibn Mālik ... of Jalāl al-Dīn Suyūṭī (d. 910 H/1505), and al-Abhāth al-Mufīda (the Fruitful Discussions) of ‘Allāmah Ḥilli (d. 725 H/1325)” (Rizvi, 2011, p. 12). He also commented on the important writings of Mullā Šadrā, such as al-ʿAsfār al-ʿArbaʿī, al-Mabda wa-l-Maʿād (Beginning and Resurrection), al-Shawāhīd al-Rubūbīyya (Divine Witnesses) Mafāṭīḥ al-Ghayb, and Aṣrār al-ʿĀyāt. Among Sabzivārī’s commentators on supplications and literature, one can name Sharḥ al-ʿAsmāʾ (Commentary on the Names) Sharḥ-i Duʿāʾ-i Šabāh (Commentary on the Šabāh Supplications) and Sharḥ-i Aṣrār. He had poetic talent and “composed verse under the pen-name Aṣrār” (Rizvi, 2011, pp. 12-15). He taught and trained a large number of students who were all active in disseminating his heritage both in Persia and Persianate territories (Suhā, n.d., pp. 161-205). Addressing his contributions, he is regarded as “one of the four axial philosophers of the Qajar period who represented the major tendencies in philosophical and rational mystical speculation” (Suhā, n.d., p. 22). Although Sabzivārī never resided in the capital, but studied with scholars such as ʿĀqā ʿAlī mudarris Zunuzī (known as Ḥakīm-i Mudarris, d. 1307 H/1890), ʿĀqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshī’ī (d. 1306 H/1889), and Mīrzā Ṣeyyed Abūl Ḥassan ibn Muḥammad Ṣabdābā’ī Jīlivī (d. 1314 H/1896) and therefore, he is enlisted as a member of the School of Tehran. The only exception to this is Henry Corbin, who has classified him as a member of the School of Sabzivār (Corbin, n.d., pp. 358-362).
24 - John Cooper in his article on Rūmi and ʿHzmat has mentioned the attributes of the Perfect Man. The Perfect Man is the Supreme Sign of the Truth and of the Supreme Theophanic Exposition, and he is an all mirror and illustration of both types of divine Attributes, the transcendental and the immanent. It is

25 - This is the second writing of Sabzivârî after Sharḥ al-Âsmāʾ and was finished in the Ramadhan of 1267, and Sabzivârî himself has commented on it. This text is divided into several parts and for each part the teacher gives a detailed explanation of the literary meaning of the sentences, then he describes the sentence and finally interprets it. According to each sentence, Sabzivârî discusses philosophical, theological and mystical topics (Sabzivârî, 1372 shamsî, pp. 7-9).

26 - A collection of juridical and mystical themes which has been composed and commented upon by Sabzivârî has a poetic style, and is composed of one thousand seven hundred verses, by which the author tried to present juridical problems, as well as to explain the ‘irfān secrets behind them. The text should be treated as a juridical book which is divided into parts (called maḥāfîl), such as purification, prayer, alms, fasting, hajj and marriage. In terms of method, he does not use rational argument, but rather employs ‘irfān terminology (Sabzivârî, 1384, pp. 11-13).

27 - One can trace Qumshi’i’s intellectual lineage back to the Ḥikmat scholars of the post-Safawid era, the very dark years of the devastation of the seminaries of Isfahan as a result of the assault of Mahmûd Afghân. His first teacher, Muhammad Ja’far Lâhijî, was the son of Mullâ Muhammad Şâdiq, who himself was the teacher of philosophy in Isfahan and commented on Mashâ’ir of Mullâ Şadrâ. His son, Muhammad Ja’far, was the student of hakīm Mirzâ Abû Qâsim Mudârris Khâtûnâbâdî (d. 1202 H/1787) and Mullâ Mîhrâb Gilânî (d. 1217 H/1802) (Jalal al-Dîn Humâ’î in Nâjî Isfahânî, 1378, p. 21). Addressing the former, Mirzâ Abû Qâsim was a member of Khâtûnâbâdî clan and they themselves were the children of ‘Allâmah Mahmûd Bâqîr Majîsî. In philosophy, Khâtûnâbâdî was the student of Mullâ Ismâ’îl Khawjûyî and Shaykh Ḍâ Muḥammad Bîdâbâdî, and in jurisprudence the student of Seyyed Bahr ul-Ulûm.

The intellectual genealogy of Bîdâbâdî merits attention as well. Ḍâ Muḥammad Bîdâbâdî (d. 1198 H/1783), was originally from Gilân and his father’s ancestors went back to Shaykh Zâhid Gilânî (d. 700 H/1300). His father moved to Isfahan and settled down in Bîdabâd, a district in the north west of the city of Isfahan, where he got his family name. His son, Ḍâ Muḥammad was born and studied in Isfahan. Along with his fame in rational and scriptural sciences, he was a pious ‘arîf and an expert in the Occult as well. His intellectual activities as a teacher coincided with the devastation of Isfahan in the aftermath of the Afghân assault. He was a reviver of Ḥikmat in the seminaries of Isfahan in the eighteenth century, and used to teach a number of disciplines such as jurisprudence, Ḥikmat, ‘irfān, ethics, and Ḥadîth. He was the most prominent student of Mullâ Ismâ’îl Khawjûyî (d. 1173 H/1759), Mirzâ Muḥammad Taqî Almâ’sî (d. 1159 H/1746) of the Majlîs family and Seyyed Qûţb al-Dîn Nayrizî Shîrâzî (d. 1173 H/1759). For more information about his life and philosophical activities see: ‘Alî Karbâsî Zâdîh Isfahânî, Ḥakîm-i Mutâ’allîh Bîdâbâdî; Iyâ’gâr-i Hikmat-i Shi’a dar Gharr-i Dawâzdahum, 1381 shamsî (Tehran: Pâzûhâshgâh Ulûm-i ‘Însân wa Muṭâlî ‘âtî Farhangî). The second teacher of Qumshi’i was Mirzâ Hassan, the son of Mullâ ‘Alî Nûrî, and I have discussed Mullâ ‘Alî’s life, intellectual contribution and lineage in detail earlier in this chapter. Qumshi’i’s third teacher was Ḍâ Seyyed Ra’dî Lârîjâni (d. 1270 H/1853), who was a practising Sûfî and also observed the Occult, and a student of Ḍâ Muḥammad Bîdâbâdî, Mullâ Muḥammad Ja’far Âbâdî and Mullâ ‘Alî Nûrî (Suhâ, Op.cit, n.d. pp. 261-264 & Nâjî Isfahânî, p. 26).


29 - Qaysarî’s book is called Sharh Fûsûs al-Ḥikam.

30 - Qumshi’i’s understanding of the office of khîlâfâ is reminiscent of Jean Bodin’s conceptualization of sovereignty as an indivisible, coherent, concept. Jean Bodin (d. 1596), the French jurist and political philosopher, is best known for his theory of sovereignty; he was also an influential writer on demonology.

31 - On 21 February 1921, Ridâ Khân entered Tehran with Cossack Brigade, seizing control of the capital in the coup d’êtat, became prime minister in 1302 shamsî/1923 and accessed to the throne in 1304 shamsî/1925.
...was used by himself to author a commentary on a famous supplication and "was supposedly the foundation of...

He obtained...effect on him.


He obtained ijâza of teaching and issuing fatwâ from seven individuals, including his master Mirzâ-yi Nâ'înî (Tabâtabâ'î, pp. 42-43), and was recognized in Najaf as a muftâhid (Rizvi, 2015, p. 10). Algar explains that even though he attained the rank of ijtihad while in Najaf, but "disinclined by temperament to extensive social involvement, he never sought to become a marja' al-taqlîd" (Algâr, 2006, p. 329).

Qâdî himself had promoted a method of exegesis which was called 'tafsîr al-Qur'ân bi-l-Qur'ân', and "was supposedly the foundation of Tabâtabâ'î's method in al-Mizân" (Rizvi, Op.cit, 2015, p. 11), and was used by himself to author a commentary on a famous supellation Du'â' al-Simât (ibid).

32 - From now on, I try to give dates of the years in shamsî(solar calendar) as well.
33 - We have discussed the topic in the previous chapter, 2.2., pp. 20-21.
34 - Abbas Amanat has evaluated the anti- Bâbî and Shaykhi sentiments of the Shi'a 'ulemâ of the mid-Qajar era as a sign of the further intervention of the Usluli 'ulemâ in public affairs, and argued that as a result of the generation of concepts such as marja' al-taqlîd, which gave 'ulemâ confidence and strength, they began encroaching on socio-political affairs. Pertinent to this, is the relative weakness of the Qajars that fostered 'ulemâ's further presence in a number of socio-political turmoils such as the four Bâbî upheavals, the Tobacco Régie protest of 1891, and the Constitutional Revolution of 1907. It is worth mentioning that the Usluli jursists operated with the help of a vast and organized supportive network of financial aid, master-student relationship, religious endowments, and private investments (Amanat, 1390 sh/2011, pp. 291-293).
35 - Though as it will observed in the following, with the exception of 'Allâmâh Tabâtabâ'î.
36 - Such a tendency is remarkable in the works of 'Allâmâh Tabâtabâ'î.
38 - Needless to remind that this is the idea of wilâyat al-takwînîya which has been discussed extensively throughout this thesis.
39 - Chapter four of Wilâyat Nâmih (the Book of wilâya) focuses on the Classes of People (asnâf-i mardum) and their advantage or disadvantage from wilâya. The first class is children, women and some men who are not mentally mature and eligible to benefit from wilâya. Wilâya is not for them and they never have accessibility to it. The second class is composed of the majority of people who are imitators and followers of their ancestors' religion. The third class is agnostics who do not believe in any religion, and the last one is misguided people who accept their religion as the most perfect one. Gunâbâdî maintains that these four types of people are deprived of benefiting from wilâya (Gunâbâdî, pp. 62-63).
41 - Tabâtaba'î's legacy in teaching, writing and training students is rich and significant, though before turning to it, it is probably better to take a look at his teachers in Najaf (Tabâtaba'î, 1429 H/2008, pp. 13-42). He started his education in Iraq attending the classes of authorities such as Ayatollah Abu Hassan Isfahânî, Mirzâ 'Ali Irvânî, Ayatollah Mirzâ 'Ali Asghar [Maliki], and Muhammad Hossein Gharavi Isfahânî Kumpâni (Algâr, 2006, p. 328). Then for eight years he was the student of Ayatollah Nâ'înî (d. 1355 shamsî/1936), who taught him complementary studies in jurisprudence. For 'ilm-i-iţrâj (science of narration), he studied with Ayatollah Kühkamara'î and for Islamic Philosophy he attended the classes of Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Bâdkübî'î (d. 1358 H/1939). Sajjad Rizvi evaluates his studies in philosophy with Bâdkübî'î (himself a student of Seyyed Abu-l-Hassan Īlīvî (d. 1314 H/1896) an Avicennan critic of Mullâ Sadrâ), important and determinant. He believes that Bâdkübî'î "developed his logical and analytic skills, and in order to hone them, directed Tabâtaba'î to study Euclidean mathematics with Seyyed Abu-l-Qâsim Khwânsârî" (Rizvi, 2015, p. 11). Rizvi also gives an account of the sources Tabâtaba'î studied with Bâdkübî'î. See: Rizvi, Op.cit, 2015, pp. 10-11.
42 - Qâdî himself had promoted a method of exegesis which was called 'tafsîr al-Qur'ân bi-l-Qur'ân', and "was supposedly the foundation of Tabâtaba'î's method in al-Mizân" (Rizvi, Op.cit, 2015, p. 11), and was used by himself to author a commentary on a famous supellation Du'â' al-Simât (ibid).
Hādi Khusrushāhī (ed), Risālat-i Tashya‘ dar Dunyāy-i Imrūz; Guftugūyī Dīgar bā Henry Corbin (the Mission of Shi‘ism in the Contemporary World: Dialogues with Henry Corbin), 1387 (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb).

Hādi Khusrushāhī (ed), Shi‘a: Majmū‘i Mudḥākīrāt ba Professor Henry Corbin (Shi‘ism: the Collected Conversations with Henry Corbin), 1387 (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb).

There is also another version of it, entitled: Muhammad Amin Shāhjūyī (ed), Shi‘a: Muṣāhibāt-i ‘Allāmah Ṭabarṭabā‘ī bā Henry Corbin (Shi‘a: the Dialogues of ‘Allāmah Ṭabarṭabā‘ī and Henry Corbin), n.d. (n.p.).

These discussions were also translated into Arabic: al-Shi‘a: Naṣ al-Ḥawār ma‘a Mustashriq Curban, translator: Tawfīq Khālid, n.d. (Beirut: Umm al-Qurā‘ Institute). For an analysis of the scholarly encounter between these two figures, see: Hamid Algar, Op.cit, 2006, pp. 341-346.

There is also another biography of him by his student Ayatollah Ḥassan Ḥassanzādīḥ Āmulī which is published in: Muhammad Bādi‘ (ed), Ma‘navīyat-i Tashayu‘ be Ḍamīmay-i Chand Maqālāy-i Dīgar; 1387 shamsī (Qum: Tashayu‘), pp. 13-28.

These books are published as:


Muhammad Hossein Tarābī′āt, Sulūk-i Naḵšān (Carnal Conduct) translated into Persian by Mīrzā Aḥmad Asadī, 1st edition, 1389 shamsī (Qum: Ishrāq).

Muhammad Hossein Tabātābā‘ī, Wilāyat Nāmih (the Book of Wilāya), translated into Persian by Humayūn Himmatī, 1387 shamsī (Tehran: Rīvāyat-i Fāth).

This type of wilāya, as mentioned earlier, is designated to the Prophet and the Imāms who, in this position, enjoy a number of qualities such as being, aʾrāf, witness, and conveyers of blessing and emanation to people, and/or being emanation per se. For more information see:

Muhammad Hossein Tabātābā‘ī, Insān az Āghāz tā Anjām (Man from Beginning to the End), translated into Persian by Sādiq Larijānī, 1388 shamsī (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb). This book is originally in Arabic and is entitled: Insān wa al-ʿAgīda (Man and Belief), n.d. (Qum: Bāqiyāt).

He stresses that ‘mukhlas’ should be distinguished from ‘mukhliṣ’, those who are still at the beginning of the path, while the former have already abnegated them in Him and reached the status of wilāya (Ṭabarṭabā‘ī, 1390, pp. 209-211).

The first one is the typology of the theories of government in Shi‘a jurisprudence, and the second book is the classification of wilāya. These two are entitled:

Muḥsin Kadivar, Naẓariyāhā-yi Dawlat dar Fiqḥ-i Shi‘a (the Theories of State in the Shi‘a Jurisprudence), 3rd edition, 1378 b (Tehran: Nay Publication).


Once again I should emphasize that Sabzivārī, both is and is not regarded as a member of the School of Tehran. He is regarded as a member, because he was a Ṣadrīn ḡākim, and in fact the most influential one, and a figure “who would later become the most important traditional philosopher of the Qajar period” (Rizvi, 2011, p. 475). On the other hand, he is not regarded as a member because he did not live in the capital. Besides, scholars such as Mullā ‘Abdullāḥ Zunūzī, the student of Nūrī and the father of Aqā ‘Ali ʿAskārī Mūdarrīs Tehrānī, as well as Mīrzā Abū al-Ḥassan Jīlvīh are not studied here because their writings were not relevant to the purpose of this research.

For a discussion of the School of Isfahan, see Sajjad Rizvi’s entry in Encyclopedia Iranica, online version which is published in 2007. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/I%E1%B9%A3fah%C4%81n-school-of-philosophy> last accessed 5/5/2017.
Chapter Four: Khomeini, Wilāya and the Influence of Ibn ‘Arabī

The subject matter of this chapter is the study and critical analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini’s key texts concerning the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. In line with previous chapters, the author seeks to analyze Khomeini’s mystical writings to study his conceptions of wilāya as well as his contribution to both Ṣadrīan philosophy and Akbarīan mysticism. After all, as will be discussed, Khomeini was a student of the school of Mullā Ṣadrā, and the mark of Akbarīan mysticism on his ‘irfān was in large part due to the sages of the School of Tehran; among them Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshī’ī was notable. Parallel to his inspiration from the School of Tehran, Khomeini was largely stunned by al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s mysticism - which was the dominant form of ‘irfān in Shī‘a Iran - directly and through ibn ‘Arabī’s disciples and exponents who had written commentaries and glosses on Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam. Therefore, Khomeini’s familiarity with, and specialization in, Akbarīan mysticism became possible through two channels: the School of Tehran and, ibn ‘Arabī’s non-Shī‘a expositors. He not only glossed on Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd Qaṣṣārī’s (d. 751 H/1350) commentary on Fuṣūṣ, but also wrote commentaries on both Miḥṭāḥ al-Ghayb (the Key of the Unseen) of Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (607or 605 H/1207-673 H/1274), and Miṣbāḥ al-Uṣn bayn al-Ma‘qūl wa al-Mashḥūd (the Lamp of Fondness Betwixt the Sensible and Evident) of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ḥamzah al-Fīnārī (d. 834 H/1430), itself a commentary on Miḥṭāḥ al-Ghayb.

In the following, a brief introduction to the genealogy of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh will be given, and then attention will turn to Khomeini’s glosses on Qaṣṣārī’s text.
entitled *Taʿlīqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (Glosses on the Commentary on *al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* and *Miṣbāḥ al-Uns*). A study and analysis of the conception of *wilāya*, *nubuwwa*, and imamate in his mystical text will be done subsequently. And finally, Khomeini’s doctrine of the Four Journeys, with regard to its roots in both Ṣadrīan philosophy and Akbarīan mysticism, will be studied.

### 4.1. Genealogy of the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*

The theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh* is the official theory of governance and statecraft in post-Revolutionary Iran, and it is based on the four epistemological and anthropological assumptions of guardianship, divine appointment, jurisdiction and absolutism, and defends the unconditional right of just jurists, as the general vicegerents of the Hidden *Imām*, to wield political power over the community of believers. The idea of vicegerency along with the notion of *marjaʿ* and reference to the *ʿulemā* when the *Imām* is not accessible, appears for the first time in the *ahādīth* belonging to the fourth century; when the *ʿulemā* were vested with some of the *Imām*’s authority as his vicegerent in the *Shīʿa* community. However, the *marjaʿ*, “as a referential model for his followers, is peculiar to the thirteenth/nineteenth century *Shīʿa* community” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1994, p. 280).

Kazemi Moussavi has studied the evolution of the notions of *taqlīd* and *mujtahid* (a scholar who is qualified to perform *ijtihād*), and has shown how the former “in its rudimentary form” can be found in the *ahādīth* of the fourth century of Hegira, in its technical sense, or following the “the speculative opinion of a mujtahid in the absence of a specific legal rule”, appears in the post-Mongol era with the *Shīʿa* School of Ḥillah, which provided new definitions for both *taqlīd* and *ijtihād* (Kazemi Moussavi, 1994, p. 280).
He also discusses “the juxtaposition of taqlīd with marjaʿ and the advent of the concept of marjaʿīyyat al-taqlīd in Shi'a juridical thought” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1994, p. 280), which are regarded as developments of the nineteenth century “during which the Uṣūlī structure of the religious hierarchy proposed the obligation of following both the legal opinions and rulings of the most learned mujtahid as a referential model” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1994, p. 280).

From this perspective, there existed two intertwined trends during the thirteenth/nineteenth century: the mandate of the office of fiqāhat (also fiqāha, but not the authority of a single individual faqīh) over the community of believers as the only legitimate heir of the legacy of the Prophet and the Imāms, and the birth of the idea of “the monarchy of the Shi'i king”. Later in the century, the conception of ‘wilāyat-i intiṣābī-yi āmma-yi fuqahā’ was engendered (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 12, footnote, no. 3).

According to this conception, the Prophet and the Imāms are directly appointed by God to the office of wilāya to rule over the ummah (community of believers) and to execute shari'a and the divine laws. On the basis of both transmitted and intellectual sources, in the time of the occultation of the Imām, the just jurists are appointed by God to exercise authority and guardianship over the community of believers. So, the lawgiver is the one who confers wilāya, the just jurists are the awliyā and the people are the ones under the guardianship (Kadivar, 1378b, pp. 80-81). The theory of ‘wilāyat-i intiṣābī-yi āmma-yi fuqahā’ is the predecessor of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, and it is believed that the Uṣūlī ‘ulemā, as general vicegerents, are in charge of worldly interests and the daily religious life of believers. Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī and Shaykh Ja'far Kāshif al-Ghiṭā are the representatives of this narration of the role and
responsibilities of the ‘ulemā. According to Kadivar’s classification of Shī‘a political thought, the theory of ‘wilāyat-i intiṣābī-yi ‘āmma-yi fuqahā should be treated as the dominant discourse of the second age (thirteenth/nineteenth century), and it was in this time that the idea of the political wilāya of jurists was invented (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 13-14).

Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī’s formulation that, the Shī‘a jurisprudence which “could assume the Imām’s authority in its full sense” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 37), is known as ‘wilāyat-i ḥākim’ (the guardianship of ruler). This should be understood in the historical and intellectual context of nineteenth century Persia, as well as in the power competition between the Qajar court and the Uṣūlī ‘ulemā on one hand, and the ‘ulemā and other tendencies such as Akhbārī School, Shaykhīsm, popular Sufism and Bābīsm on the other. In nineteenth century Persia, the authority of the ‘ulemā and their learned hierarchy were challenged by their Akhbārī, Shaykhī, Sufi and Bābī rivals; as all of them proposed several alternative positions, such as wali, quṭb, rukn-i rābi‘ (this doctrine is discussed in Chapter Two), and finally bāb, “whose occupancy required an esoteric initiation which hardly fit into fiqh” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 105). In terms of their uneasy relationship with the Qajars, and despite the fact that the ‘ulemā were reluctant to give fully fledged legitimacy to the court (Gleave, 2005, pp. 41-71), they also did not aim at “furthering the legitimacy of jurisprudents at the expense of weakening the ruling government’s power” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 155). Therefore, one can conclude that the favorable situation for them was a controlled court, crushed rivals and a powerful hierocracy.
Given the above, Narāqī’s theory of ‘wilāyat-i intiṣābī-yi āmma-yi fuqahā’ is widely regarded as the background of Ayatollah Khomeini’s conceptions of wilāya and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.3 There are, however, a number of differences between these two: first, Narāqī believed in general guardianship and Khomeini in an absolute one. Second, Narāqī’s theory is not ambitious enough to assume the political authority for the vicegerent, while the role of faqīh in Khomeini’s theory is political with his authority embracing political affairs as well. This theory, to be more precise, was invented to be stretched into political sphere. Third, Narāqī believes in the collective office of the vicegerency. Fourth, Narāqī does not take the bold step of his successor in interpreting the controversial Qurʾānic phrase of ‘ulu-l-amīr (the guardians of the cause) as the Shīʿa jurists; though both of them use the same ahādīth and argumentations to prove wilāyat al-faqīh on one hand, and believe in divine and immediate legitimacy of the Shīʿī faqīh on the other (Kadivar, 1378b, p. 48).

Having said this, the present chapter will proceed with a review of the intellectual genealogy of Khomeini with particular emphasis on his teachers, his education and his writings on mysticism. Khomeini’s ‘interest’ in ʿirfān, which has so far been a topic of interest for many scholars, needs to be defined and clarified: this interest was not limited to writing ʿirfānī texts and training interested students. More than that, Khomeini lived an ʿirfānī lifestyle and since Shīʿa mysticism after the School of Mullā Ṣadrā has been tightly intertwined with philosophy, both mysticism and Ṣadrīan ḥikma gave Khomeini a wide and rich perspective about Man, his place and his spiritual journeys in this world. It is this “mystical and philosophical outlook” that makes him as “perhaps the greatest, or at least the most influential, Muslim political leader of the twentieth century” (Knysh, 1992, p. 632). Furthermore, as Ridgeon ascertains, for
Khomeini, as for his master Shāhābādī, ‘irfān had significant political implications and was a medium to express socio-political discontent (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 215).

4.2. Khomeini’s Intellectual Background

Rūḥullāh Khomeini’s (d. 1368 H/1989) interest in writing flourished when he was a student. Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar (the Commentary on the Dawn Prayer) which is his first work in ‘irfān, was written when he was twenty-seven years old and attending the classes of Ayatollah Mīrzā Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāhābādī (d. 1369 H/1950) in Qum,4 himself an influential teacher and master who had a great impact on the development of the young Khomeini’s personality.5 Before finding Shāhābādī, Khomeini had other masters in ‘irfān, such as Mīrzā ‘Alī Akbar Mudarris Ḥikamī Yazdī6 who taught him Sharḥ-i Manẓūmīh (the Commentary on Manẓūmīh of Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī).7 After death of Yazdī, Khomeini continued his studies in ‘irfān with Mīrzā Javād Āqā Malikī Tabrīzī8 who passed away immediately after Yazdī (Moin, 1999, p. 42). Khomeini’s presence in Shāhābādī’s classes lasted five or six years.9 Together they would read a number of key ‘irfānī texts such as the abovementioned Miftāḥ al-Ghayb (the Key of the Unseen) of Qūnawī10, Sharḥ-i Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (the Commentary on Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam) of Dāwūd Qayṣarī,11 and Manāzil al-Sāʾīrīn (the Abodes of Travelers) by Khāwja ‘Abdullāh Anṣārī.12 According to Knysh, he also studied Ṣadrā’s Kitāb al-Asfār al-Arbaʿī (Book of Four Journeys) with Shāhābādī (Knysh, 1992, p. 634).

Even a cursory look at his studies in ‘irfān and the texts he read (all of them key mystical and philosophical compositions), shows that from early age Khomeini was committed to a serious training in ‘irfān and metaphysics. Ironically, ‘irfān “had always been to some extent frowned upon by orthodox Islam, as with its supposition of
individual union with God and, in its more extreme form of pantheism, the presence of God in all things, it undermined the orthodox concept of divine transcendence” (Martin, 2007, p. 33), but many clerics like Khomeini and Shāhābādī preferred to start their career with it. Mysticism, due to “it’s more purely spiritual manifestation” (Martin, 2007, p. 33), has always been able to challenge both orthodox Islam and the state. The case of Najm al-dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221) and after him ‘Alā’ al-Dawlah Simnānī of the late seventh and the early eighth century (Chapter One, pp. 31-32), are notable examples of this regard. For these figures, so for Shāhābādī and his student, īrān was not only a matter of self-empowerment, but also social responsibilities. Therefore, īrān was seen “as a means of assuming the hardest responsibilities and duties” (Martin, 2007, p. 34).

However, after the Revolution of 1979, Shāhābādī became famous as “the Philosopher of Nature” (filsūf-i faṭrat) (Shāhābādī, 1386, p. 21). A number of his writings including Rashāḥāt al-Bihār (Trickles from the Oceans) Rashāḥāt al-Maʿārif (Trickles of Gnosis) Shadharāt al-Maʿārif (Golden Particles of Gnosis) and Sīh Risāla-yi Uṣūlī (Three Treatises on Principles of Jurisprudence) have been published, and there have been a few books written about him and his contribution to the Shīʿa īrānī and kalāmī heritage (Shāhābādī, 1386, p. 23). Shāhābādī moved to Tehran, though, Khomeini’s interest in īrān and Ṣadrīan philosophy continued and bore fruit in his practice of īrān and adopting a Sufi lifestyle (Knys, 1992, p. 635 & Ridgeon, 2014, passim). Finally, Khomeini emerged as an expert in theoretical mysticism (Ḥāʿirī, 1381, p. 58).
Another decisive turning point in the intellectual life of Khomeini was his acquaintance with Shaykh ‘Abdulkarīm Ḥā’irī Yazdī (known as Ayatollah Muʿāṣīs, d. 1276 H/1959). He became a student of Ḥāʾirī when he was studying in the ḥawza of Arak which was re-established by Ḥāʾirī in 1333 H/1915. Ḥāʾirī was followed from Arak to Qum by most of his students, including Rūḥullāh Khomeini – then twenty years old (Algar, 2002, p. 6). In Qum, Khomeini continued satḥ (intermediate level of the ḥawzawī schooling) with Ayatollah Seyyed ‘Alī Yathribī Kāshānī (d. 1379 H/1959), Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad ‘Alī Adīb Tehrānī (d. 1369 H/1949), and Ayatollah Muḥammad Taqī Khwānsārī (d. 1371 H/1951), and after five years started khārij with Ayatollah Ḥāʾirī. Once he found Ḥāʾirī, Mahdī Ḥāʾirī claims, he did not attend any other scholar’s class (Ḥāʾirī, 1381, p. 52). After completing three steps of religious education, by the early 1930s, Khomeini became a mujtahid.

As an expert in theoretical mysticism, he wrote extensively on ‘irfān and metaphysics. Along with the aforementioned Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar, which will be discussed in the following, he wrote other ‘irfānī texts, such as Ādāb al-Ṣalāt (the Rituals of Prayer), Taʾlīqat ʿalā Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ ul-Uns (the Glosses on the Commentary on Fuṣūṣ and the Lamp of Fondness), Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd (the Commentary on the Sūrat al-Ḥamd), Tahzīb-i Nafs (Self-Refinement), Jihād-i Akbar (the Greater Jihād), Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya ila-l-Khilāfa wa-l-Wilāya (the Lamp of Guidance toward Vicegerency and Guardianship), and Chihil Ḫadīth (Forty Ḫadīth). Khomeini’s entire body of sixty works, can be divided into seven fields: philosophy and mysticism, theology, principles of jurisprudence, ethics, commentary on the Qurʾān, literature and poetry, and politics and statecraft. His conceptions of wilāya and nubuwwa are cited both in ‘irfānī texts (comments, glosses and original texts) and juridical books.
among his ʿirfānī writings, Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Sahar, Sirr al-Ṣalāt (the Mystery of Prayer), Ādāb al-Ṣalāt, Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd, and Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya (the Lamp of Guidance) are analyzed here to discuss his arguments for the conceptualization of the perfect man, of the office of wilāya and its relation to that of nubuwwa and the doctrine of the Four Journeys.

4.3. Taʿliqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ al-UNS

Taʿliqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam is the product of Khomeini’s classes with his favorite master Shāhābādī in Qum, written in 1355 H/1935, when he was thirty-five years old. 24 The book has two sections: first is Khomeini’s glosses on Qaṣṣarī’s commentary on al-Fuṣūṣ, and the second his glosses on al-Finārī’s commentaries on Qūnawī’s Miftāḥ al-Ghayb. The fact that he wrote glosses on one of the main products of Akbarīan philosophy is itself a witness to his fascination with, and inspiration by, this type of philosophy. The book revolves around typical Akbarīan themes: waḥdat al-wujūd, a’yān al-thābita (permanent archetypes), two kinds of emanations; fayḍ al-aqdas and fayḍ al-muqaddas, ḥādarat al-khams (the Fivefold Presences), the doctrine of the names and attributes (one of Khomeini’s favourite topics, on which he is an expert) and the status of al-insān al-kāmil as the culmination of all names which are reflected in al-ism al-jāmiʿ – Allah. In terms of the method, he blends transmitted sources (including Shiʿa ḥadīth traditions) with examples of classic Persian poetry, and from this perspective he is an heir to the legacy of prominent figures such as Shaykh Maḥmūd Shabistārī and the above-mentioned Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī (chapter three, 3.3., pp. 25-35).
Khomeini asserts his skill and in-depth knowledge of the intricacies of Akbarīan mysticism throughout the text, but since the task at hand is the conception of wilāya in Khomeini’s writings, particular emphasis is given to his arguments for the status of the perfect man and its nexus to the doctrine of divine names and attributes. His arguments are classic: insān (Man) is the manifestation of al-ism al-jāmi’, umm al-kitāb, itself the full theophany of ḥaḍrat-i wāḥidīyya or Divine Essence which stands beyond Man’s capacity to grasp. It is called umm al-kitāb because it is both the intermediary of creation and destruction (khalq wa al-inʿīdām), and since creation and destruction occur continually and uninterruptedly, every moment, by means of al-ism al-jāmi’, and particularly the two names of raḥmān (the Merciful) and qahhār (the Subduer), insān, who is the manifestation of this name, lives in a never-ending process of annihilation and renewal. From a mystical perspective, Khomeini argues, every creature including insān is regarded umm al-kitāb because it encompasses divine commandments such as khalq wa al-inʿīdām. One of the main sources used by Khomeini in the Taʿlīqah, is Duʿāy-i Saḥar (upon which he had written his first ʿirfānī commentary), from which he brings sentences to sustain his arguments for the status of the names, and their zurwa (lit. pinnacle), al-insān al-kāmil.

The synthesis of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism with philosophy and Shīʿa theology which had started with Mullā Ṣadrā and continued into its fully-fledged Persianization in the writings of Iranian sages like Shabistarī and Sabzivārī, now culminates in Khomeini’s glosses on these two important texts. He may not have been innovative and his arguments look old and even reproduced, but they neither detract from the value of his work, nor question his expertise in Akbarīan mysticism. His commentaries on Duʿāy-i Saḥar and his symbolic exegesis of ṣalāt, having been conducted from a Shīʿa
perspective, are indicative of his immersion into the deep ocean of mysticism that provided him with the competencies to look into his Shi'a tradition from a new viewpoint. In the following, and in the study of Khomeini's conception of wilāya, ibn 'Arabī's influence on his thought will be discussed.

4.4. Wali and the Office of Wilāya in the ʿIrfinī Texts

As observed, Khomeini's fascination by the "rationalizing interpretation" of ibn 'Arabī's teachings (Knysh, 1992, p. 636) bore fruit in his Taʿlīqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ al-Uhs. In addition, he was attracted by al-Asfār al-Arbaʾī (the Four Journeys) of Sadrā, as his first exposition to the Ṣadrīan metaphysics. His ʿirfinī texts are written from this perspective and should be treated as an addition to these two traditions. Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Sahar—which is written in Qum in 1347 H/1928 (Khomeini, 1388, Introduction) is a summary of "Khomeini's philosophical studies and spiritual labors" (Knysh, 1992, p. 636). The Duʿā upon which this commentary is written is famous among Shiʿas and is also known as Mubāhila (lit. to curse or take out mercy from someone who engages falsehood or lie). It is believed that it contains divine wisdom and meanings, as a spiritual tie between the lover and the Beloved. Khomeini, like his predecessors, believed that divine names and attributes bridge the gap between Deity and creation, and this is the main reason behind his decision to comment upon Duʿāy-i Sahar, because the Duʿā contains the greatest name (al-ism al-aʿẓam) and the full theophany of God in this name.

Shāhābādī's presence is clearly observable throughout the text, as Khomeini shows his respect and devotion to him and praises him as "the perfect mystic" and "our
master” (Khomeini, 1388, pp. 2-3). The other figure who is mentioned occasionally is Khomeini’s second teacher in ʿirfān, the abovementioned Mīrzā Javād Āqā Malikī Tabrīzī (Khomeini, 1388, p. 21). Khomeini’s concern in this text is to demonstrate “the compatibility of the sharīʿa with Irfan”, as well as his debt to ibn ʿArabī and his inspiration by the Akbarīan doctrine of the perfect man (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 214). He deploys transmitted sources (the Qurʾān and ḥadīth) to develop his argument for the status of insān and his identification with God. As Deity encompasses the names of both Beauty and Glory (ṣifāt-i jamāl wa jalāl), His khalīfa/perfect man, due to his closeness to God, contains antithetical attributes such as lutf (beneficence) and qahr (wrath) and therefore, the office of khilāfa is an all-encompassing one (Khomeini, 1388, pp. 26-27).

His other major ʿirfānī book is Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya ila-l-Khilāfa wa-l-Wilāya, in which Khomeini discusses asmāʾ wa ṣifāt (divine names and attributes) and their nexus to the doctrine of khilāfa. It seems that the book was written immediately after Sharḥ in 1349 H/1930 when he was only twenty-eight, and therefore, suffers from a number of features which are “common to many others early, but not yet mature” texts (Knysh, 1992, p. 636). In terms of the form and writing, as Knysh maintains, the book lacks a “compositional perfection which in Khomeini’s case is the disparity of the parts constituting the discourse, an unnecessary repetition of rather trite metaphysical propositions, and the absence of a clearly defined approach. The impression of immaturity is reinforced by constant references to the Muslim thinkers whose writings determined the course of Khomeini’s reasoning and his overall attitude toward religion” (Knysh, 1992, p. 636 & 648).
One of these Muslim thinkers who is often mentioned and his impact on Khomeini’s thought is clearly visible is Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʿī, the ḥakīm of the School of Tehran whose ideas are discussed at length in the previous Chapter (3.4., pp. 41-47). In different places Khomeini praises him and quotes from “his noble words” (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 57ff). As Qumshiʿī’s conceptualization of wilāya, khilāfa and nubuwwa was noted, he argued in favour of a coherent understanding of the term and functions of khilāfa, and that’s why he was compared to the French thinker Jean Bodin (Chapter Three, p. 47). Following him, Khomeini, both in the present text and his other mystical writings, develops arguments for a coherent, indivisible office of khilāfa whose authority cannot be divided among any other sources of authority. To be more precise, there are no other sources to claim authority and hegemony over believers; it’s wali on one side; who rules on behalf of God, and the cosmos on the other. In a long quotation from Qumshiʿī, who is called “our perfect mystic”, Khomeini argues for the role and duty of the perfect wali after he returned from his fourth journey to warn people of and forbid them from evil-doing (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 87-88).

Using transmitted sources, mainly ḥadīth Qudsī, Khomeini argues that the philosophy behind the appointment of khaliifa/wali by God is His desire to be known and loved by people25, and therefore, al-insān al-kāmil is signified to be the locus of all divine names and their secrets, and as such, the permanent archetype of him (of al-insān al-kāmil) has authority over other permanent archetypes. He is the full manifestation of al-ism al-aʿẓam (or al-ism al-jāmiʿ, the Greatest Name), and since this name encompasses all other names and attributes, the status of khilāfa is total and all-encompassing (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 29-61).
Linked to the doctrine of the permanent archetype(s) (‘ayn/a’yān al-thābitah), are other important notions in Islamic mysticism such as fāyḍ (emanation) and its two manifestations of fayḍ al-aqdas (the Most Holy Emanation) and fayḍ al-muqaddas (the Holy Emanation). One can summarize Khomeini’s theory on the permanent archetype and its nexus to two typologies of emanation as follows: it is through fayḍ al-aqdas that the permanent archetypes come into existence. In other words, the first sign of creation of the permanent archetypes in the presence of divine knowledge happens through fayḍ al-aqdas. Whereas, it is by fayḍ al-muqaddas that the permanent archetypes find external existence in the real world. The difference between these two types of emanation is that the former (the Most Holy Emanation) helps the internal existence of the permanent archetypes be possible, while the latter (the Holy Emanation) externalizes it (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 68-69). The existence of the permanent archetype of the perfect man depends on fayḍ al-aqdas, and that’s why it is the most important of all permanent archetypes, because it is externalized and multiplied through fayḍ al-muqaddas (Khomeini, 1376, p. 70).

Drawing upon the legacy of the School of Tehran, both through Mullā Ṣadrā and his metaphysics and via the abovementioned commentaries on Fuṣṣūṣ, Khomeini develops his argument in the context of the synthesis of wilāya and wujūd (ousia), both of them modulated (mushakkak) entities. As it is observed in the previous chapter, the nexus between wilāya and ousia was one of the main concerns of the philosophers of the School of Tehran and the literature was developed out of the commentaries on the faṣṣ of Seth (faṣṣ Shaythī) in ibn ‘Arabī’s Fuṣṣūṣ al-Ḥikam. The faṣṣ discusses “wilāya as the expiration of the ‘Breath of the Merciful’ (nafās-i raḩmānī)” (Rizvi, 2005, p. 118). It is on this ground that Khomeini articulates his doctrine of the greater vicegerency
(Khilāfa). Khilāfat al-kubrā is under the rule of the name of Allah, and since Allah is a comprehensive name; encompassing both the names of Beauty and Glory, khilāfat al-kubrā is all-encompassing too. Khilāfat al-kubrā is identical to the eternal individuality of the perfect man, and as such, the relationship between it and other eternal individualities is the same as the relationship between the Great Name – Allah, and other divine names.

The reality of wilāya is embedded in the comprehensive status of the Muḥammedan Khilāfa (Khilāfat al-Muḥammadīyah) and as such, enjoys a number of qualities like closeness, love, wilāyat al-takwīnīya and absolute authority. From this perspective, both the status of wilāya and that of khilāfat al-kubrā have the same authority and absolute power to act upon the cosmos. Khomeini calls this ‘to command and to create’ (inshā’ al-amr wa al-khalq), referring to the well-known āyah “Be, and it is” that occurs several times in the Qur’ān. The Muḥammedan Khilāfa is a double-faceted status; in the sense that the office of wilāya is bāṭin (inward), while the office of nubuwwa is zāhir (outward) (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 13-38). The Muḥammedan Khilāfa has a status in which all divine realities and hidden names are aggregated (Khomeini, 1376, p. 51) and is manifested in the office of nubuwwa. In other words, these realities and names are hidden as long as nabī does not exist, but once he is appointed by God he will make them manifest. Since wilāya is the inward of nubuwwa, wali (here Imām Ali and other imāms from the household of the Prophet) is regarded as the manifestation of divine secrets (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 53-61).

Before taking leave of Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya, it is necessary to remember that in this text, Khomeini shows his disagreement with Qayṣarī’s interpretation of ibn ʿArabī.
However, his arguments and reasoning are nothing but a “slight reformulation of ibn ‘Arabi’s favorite themes” which had been stated several centuries ago (Knysh, 1992, p. 643). Khomeini’s other ‘irfānī texts, including Ādāb al-Ṣalāt, Sirr al-Ṣalāt and Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd focus more on the theory of the perfect man. Ādāb al-Ṣalāt which was written in 1361 H/1942 in Qum, contains Khomeini’s ideas on spiritual mysteries of the daily prayer. The book has a pair which is Sirr al-Ṣalāt and is written for the elite (those who have knowledge of ‘irfān), but Ādāb al-Ṣalāt targets a wider audience among ordinary people in order to teach them the spiritual meanings of the daily prayer in simple language. The book contains Khomeini’s ‘irfānī anthropology and his instructions for the seeker who attempts to reach the station of the perfect wali. He makes an argument which is typical of a Ṣadrīan scholar and a jurist: mankind, according to his original disposition (fiṭra) is able to be the manifestation of divine names and enjoys the right of authority and power to act upon the cosmos. He is superior to angels due to his ability and eligibility to learn God’s names and to reach the status of the name of Allah, which rules over the eternal individuality of the perfect man (Khomeini, 1378, p. 206).

Referring to the famous Qudsī ḥadīth which concerns the status of the Prophet: “I take oath that I created the cosmos because of you”27, Khomeini concludes that the creation of the cosmos is a prelude to the creation of the perfect man. When a seeker reaches the station of self-annihilation, he becomes wali and therefore wilāya is the final step, the last journey, in a seeker’s travel to God (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 262-263). At the end of this path, the seeker is able to breach veils and understand whatever has been forbidden to be seen before, such as the secret laws of the Day of Judgment (Yawm al-Dīn) (Khomeini, 1378, p. 272). Along with the Prophet, Ali is the only one who has
reached such a station (Khomeini, 1378, p. 298). To enlarge on this and the four journeys, a sālik endeavoors to reach the station of wilāya in the following way. Addressing the office of nubuwwa and wilāya of the Prophet, Khomeini argues that due to the exalted status of the Muḥammedan Reality, the religion of the seal of the prophets is the most perfect and the most comprehensive one, and not only encompasses the previous religions, but also reveals them in their best manifestations (Khomeini, 1378, p. 309). In explaining the office of wilāya, Khomeini uses the verb kashf (to veil) and indicates that walī (the Prophet and the imāms) is an individual that, due to his closeness to God, can approach all that is exclusively apparent to God, and as such participate in divine knowledge. Enjoyment of the right of kashf endows walī with the right of absolute authority to act upon the cosmos (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 343ff).

Sirr al-Ṣalāt which is Khomeini’s sixth book, was published in 1358 H/1939 (Naqvi, 2015, pp. XIV-XV). Recently, Amjad Shah Naqvi has provided an elegant introduction as well as a translation of the book. Naqvi locates the text in the context of the intellectual developments of Iran’s early modern period, and rightly believes that it should be treated as the outcome of Khomeini’s personal interest in mysticism, ḥikma and theology on one hand, and “the end of a venerable set of religious and scholarly traditions”, on the other (Naqvi, 2015, p. XX). Sirr al-Ṣalāt is also important as it sheds light on the formulation of Khomeini’s political theology through the questioning of prayer and “its link to one’s journey within reality towards God” (Naqvi, 2015, p. XXI), and demonstrates “his concern with askesis and what Faucault called ‘care for the self’ - and ‘technologies of the self’-, as the ways in which humans mediate experience and make” (Naqvi, 2015, p. XXI).
The text draws on an expansive variety of sources from the Qurʾān and ḥadīth compilations, to poetry and theology, ethics and philosophy (Naqvi, 2015, pp. XXII-XXIII). It is a treatise on the inner meaning and dimension of prayer, particularly indebted to two similar works, one by Zayn al-Dīn ibn ʿAlī al-Āmilī known as al-Shahīd al-Thānī (the Second Martyr, d. 911 H/1506) and the other by the aforementioned Qāḍī Saʿīd Qumī (Naqvi, 2015, p. XXIX). Sirr al-Ṣalāt revolves around wujūd and its degrees, and contains Khomeini’s ʿirfānī anthropology which is intimately connected to the modulated stages of reading, comprehending and interpreting the Qurʾān. He classifies five types of reading (qirāʾa), including the reading of ordinary people (ʿāmmah), the reading of the privileged (khāṣṣah), the reading of the people of knowledge (aṣḥāb-i maʿrīfa), the reading of the people of the heart (aṣḥāb-i ghulūb), and finally of the people of wilāya (aṣḥāb-i wilāya). The last one is the most perfect reading and designated to awlīyā who have reached the station of unification with God. Each of them also has inner stages, though Khomeini does not mention them (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 80-81).

The last ʿirfānī text, Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd (the Commentary on the Sūrat al-Ḥamd) contains similar arguments for the offices of wilāya and nubuwwa, the theory of the perfect man, spiritual conduct, and the nexus of divine names and the status of the Muḥammedan Reality. The text is composed of four sections, each of them is written at a different time. The first part which is a concise exegesis of the sūrat al-Ḥamd, the first sūrah of the Qurʾān, was written in 1358 H/1939. The second part could be regarded as a more detailed exegesis of the same sūrah and was written three years later in 1942. The third part contains Khomeini’s lectures on tafsīr al-Qurʾān which were broadcast on Iranian TV in 1980, and the last part is a collection of his remarks about different
sūrahs which had been disseminated in his other books and treatises (Khomeini, 1378 shamsī, p. 3). *Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḵamd* is an Ḵirānī and Ḥikamī exegesis and revolves around the importance of divine names and attributes and their relationship to the status of *indsān*. He deploys names to explain the problematic of unity and its relationship to multiplicity, and this method, as we know, belongs to both the Ḥikmat and Sufi traditions, and not that of theologians.²⁸

Addressing the status of *al-indsān al-kāmil*, he is the pivot of the cosmos (a typical argument which is guided by using transmitted sources), and His *khaliīfā* on earth and turning face toward *indsān* is equivalent to turning face toward Allah, because *indsān* is annihilated in Him. Once again, Khomeini uses the names to explain the issue of sin which is an important question in Islamic mysticism. Addressing these two questions that ‘if *indsān* is *khaliīfāt al-llāh*, why does he commit sin?’ and ‘how one can explain him being sinful’, Khomeini argues that the secret of *indsān* committing sin is because he becomes amused with the multiplicity of the names and his inability to see oneness in all names. Paying attention to the multiplicity of the names (*kathrat-i asmāʾ*) is the Tree of Evil (*Shajarat al-Munhiya* or *Khabītha*) as opposed to the Tree of Good (*Shajarat al-Ṭayyibah*) from which Man has been warned (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 18-27).

As it is mentioned previously in chapter one (1.4., p. 32), ibn Ḵarībī invented the doctrine of names and attributes and their relationship to the Essence for the first time in the history of Islamic mysticism in order to explain the problematic of *badʾ* (spring, creation in the terminology of the mystics). Dealing with this vital question of ‘how one (*wāḥid*), with regard to the fact that His Essence is unknowable and will remain so, can create countless things in the real world’, ibn Ḵarībī sought to approach it by the
doctrine of unity vs. multiplicity. The theory has been used extensively by his successors to describe the gap between deity and people (khalq). All Khomeini’s ‘irfānī texts which were examined here are written from this perspective. As observed in the discussion of Khomeini’s glosses on Qayṣarī’s commentary on Fuṣūṣ, he deploys the doctrine of names and attributes to elucidate the status of Man in the cosmos, and his relation to Deity. For Khomeini, it is a doctrine that can also explain the question of sin committed by Man, the khalīfah al-llāh: he commits sin because he gets stuck in the darkness of multiplicity.

Khomeini’s fascination with Akbarīan mysticism is more apparent when he tries to interpret the word al-raḥmān (the Merciful) in the phrase ‘bism i-llāh-i raḥmān-i raḥīm’. Khomeini quotes al-Shaykh al-Akbar in his book al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah (the Meccan Revelations) in which he says “the cosmos (al-ʿālam) appears by bism i-llāh-i raḥmān-i raḥīm” (Khomeini, 1378, p. 81). Or, quoting Qayṣarī in his commentary on the Fuṣūṣ, Khomeini maintains that al-raḥmān is rabb ul-awwal (the Primal Lord) which is the station of totality as opposed to the station of particularity which belongs to the word al-raḥīm (the Compassionate). Al-raḥīm is nafs-i kullī (the Universal Self) (Khomeini, 1378, p. 84).

In overall assessment of Khomeini’s ‘irfānī wilāya and the status of walī, one can say that he does not mention wilāyat al-ʿāmmah which was very prominent in ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s writings. The importance of this and also its contrast to wilāyat al-khāṣṣah, which is Khomeini’s concern, will be emphasized when we discuss Khomeini’s doctrine of the Four Journeys, as well as the identification of the individual who finishes the last journey. With regard to the centrality of the conception of wilāyat al-khāṣṣah and, the
absence of *wilāyat al-ʿāmma* in Khomeini’s thought, one can safely conclude that he
the faithful disciple of the scholars of the School of Tehran. Wilāyat al-ʿāmma, as it is
elaborated by Ṭabāṭabāʾī, is innovative and unique; in the sense that he not only
switched the centre of gravity from *wilāyat al-khāṣṣah* (the specific *wilāya* which is
signified to the elite; the Prophet and the *imāms*) to *wilāyat al-ʿāmma* (the general
*wilāya* which is accessible by any believer), but also founded his entire philosophical
system on this concept. It is no longer *wilāyat al-khāṣṣah* which is at the heart of his
philosophy, but the type of guardianship that is signified to every believer through his
or her deeds and efforts. Besides, *wilāya* is not a divine gift endowed exclusively to the
*Imāms* and the Prophet, but an attainable virtue which is gained by the good deeds of
believers.

4.5. The Four Journeys

Khomeini’s discussion of the Four Journeys is a different reformulation of the
idea of ibn ‘Arabī; though the latter’s influence is undeniable. It is called ‘a different
reformulation’, because, as it was stated in chapter one (1.4., pp. 34), *al-Shaykh al-
Akbar* only mentions the first two journeys and his conception of them is different from
Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretation which became the dominant reading of the Four Journeys
and influenced later scholars, among them Khomeini (Ḥassan Zādih, 1390, pp. 11-13).
There are two points here: what Khomeini had inherited from his predecessors was
through the commentaries of ‘Afīf a-Dīn al-Ṭīmisānī (d. 690 H/1291), ‘Abd al-Razzāq
Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1335), and Sharafadīn Dāwūd Qaṣṣārī (d. 751
H/1350). It was these figures who elaborated on ibn ‘Arabī’s idea (and not theory) of
spiritual journeys and turned it into a coherent doctrine of the Four Journeys of the seeker. Mullā Ṣadrā’s reading was perpetuated in his book entitled al-Asfār al-Arba‘ī. The second point is that, compared with other themes and concepts, Khomeini’s conception of the Four Journeys is brief and scattered through his ʿirfānī texts.

Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya ila-l-Khilāfa wa-l-Wilāya is one of the main texts containing Khomeini’s doctrine of the Four Journeys. The book was written in 1309 shamsī/1349 H, two years after Sharḥ-i Du‘āy-i Saḥar, when Khomeini was twenty-nine years old. The political implications of the text, as well as Khomeini’s discussion of the asfār al-arba‘ī, have been emphasized by scholars like Lloyd Ridgeon who gives a lengthy account of Khomeini’s reading of the doctrine and its political consequences (Ridgeon, 2014, pp. 213-232). Before starting on an analysis of the text, it is worth remembering that Miṣbāḥ is the only text in which the asfār is discussed in full and, in this book as in Sharḥ-i Du‘āy-i Saḥar, Qumshi‘ī’s influence in evident. In fact, Khomeini’s conception of the Four Journeys is a restatement of Qumshi‘ī’s theory. Qumshi‘ī is praised as ‘the perfect gnostic’ and ‘our great shaykh’. The first journey (min al-khalq ila l-ḥaqq), during which three veils of the carnal soul (nafs), intellect (ʿaql) and his spirit (ruḥ) are breached, starts from leaving creation/people (allegory of worldly attachments) for the delimited Truth (ḥaqq-i muqayyadah). Fanā (self-annihilation) and confession to servitude (iqrār bi ʿubūdīyat) are gained at the end of this journey (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, pp. 205-206).

The second journey (fi al-ḥaqq bil ḥaqq), which is a “traveling from the Truth towards the Truth by means of the Truth” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 215), becomes possible for the traveller because he has reached the status of wilāya as the result of the first
journey. The status of wilāya, Khomeini maintains, is an expression of the traveller’s fanā in terms of his total dissolution of personal identity (dhāt), attributes (ṣifāt) and doings (afʿāl), as well as a journey from delimited Truth to absolute Truth (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, p. 206). The third journey (min al-ḥaqq ila l-khalq bil ḥaqq), which is the station of total sobriety and traveller’s voyage in divine presences (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, p. 206), results in the office of nubuwwa, though the traveller does not enjoy the right of lawgiving (tashrī). The fourth journey (fi al-khalq bil ḥaqq), or the journey from creation to the creature by the means of the Truth, bares fruit in bringing religion and law to the traveller, in informing people of God and of His names and attributes (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, p. 207) and in making “exoteric commands pertaining to the body and, esoteric laws pertaining to the heart” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 216).

Khomeini’s outlook that only the fourteen infallible figures are capable of reaching subsistence with God and finishing the fourth journey which is emphasized in this text (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, pp. 211-212), is in fact a culmination of the Shīʿa interpretation of Akbarīan mysticism and, at the same time, a deviation from the entire Sufi tradition which never restricted spiritual conduct to any specific person. One of the historical reasons for the attraction of Sufism was its exposure to everybody, from any rank, through its emphasis on character building and the hope that every individual can reach fanā fi al-lāh and become a walī by austerity and detachment from world. Quoting Shāhābādī, another influential figure in his ʿirfān, Khomeini maintains that along with the Prophet, Ali was also eligible to bring a new law, but since the Prophet proceeded him and brought Islamic sharīʿa, Ali follows his law (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, p. 212).
The second text in which the doctrine of the Four Journeys is discussed is the abovementioned *Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar*, although Khomeini’s conception of it is brief. Shāhābādī’s influence is visible throughout the text, and is Khomeini’s main source when he discusses the Four Journeys, Shāhābādī is the main source (Khomeini, 1388, footnote, p. 2). Quoting his master and skipping the first two journeys Khomeini mentions that at the end of the third journey, it will become possible for the ʿārif to recognize what makes people good and helps them to be closer to God. Since the ways to reach God are equal to the number of people, the ʿārif will be have to be able to distinguish between these paths and recognize which is the right path for every person. It is also in this station that the ʿārif / walī can legislate (tashrīʿ). Here again, Khomeini clarifies that it is only the first Imām and his sons who have reached this station and are able to bring laws, but since Ali is the successor of the Prophet and has come after him, he has to follow the Prophet’s sharīʿa and submit to it (Khomeini, 1388, footnote, p. 2).

As Khomeini proceeds with the text, he expands on Shāhābādī’s idea and discusses the journeys a traveller should make in order to reach self-annihilation and subsistence with God. In terms of method, he deploys a vast range of ʿirfānī as well as Islamic sources (the Qurʿān and ḥadīth tradition) to explain the Four Journeys, although, unlike Misbāḥ al-Hidāya, the journeys are not discussed separately and in an orderly manner. The last station is ḥadrat-i aḥādiyat (the Presence of Divine Unity) in which other presences, multiplicities (*kathrāt*) and concrete determinations (*taʿayyunāt*) are annihilated. It is the status of sobriety or ‘the Absolute Will’ (*mashīyyat-i muṭlaq*) 30, wherein the traveller is able to observe the unity behind the multiplicity of names and attributes. Khomeini identifies the individual - the Prophet -
who has completed the last journey when Adam “was between water and clay”\textsuperscript{31} (Khomeini, 1388, pp. 12-16).

Khomeini’s discussion of the Four Journeys in \textit{Sirr al-Ṣalāt} is a dialogue of the symbolic value and meaning of daily prayer (ṣalāt) and its importance in the spiritual mission of the seeker. The mystery of prayer is to reach God and by breaching the veils (\textit{kharq-i ḥijāb}), the traveller becomes annihilated in Him (Khomeini, 1390, Introduction, p. 12). In \textit{Sirr al-Ṣalāt}, all journeys are mentioned, albeit briefly and, the author seeks to connect every journey to one of the rituals of the prayers. For example, prostration (\textit{sujūd}) symbolizes total disappearance (\textit{ghayb-i muṭlaq}) from the world, while \textit{tashahhud} (lit. to witness or to testify) stands for sobriety (ṣaḥw) when the traveller returns to the world after being in the station of \textit{ghayb} (Unseen). At the end of \textit{tashahhud}, the traveller testifies to the \textit{nubuwwa} and \textit{wilāya} of the Prophet and his household and finishes the ṣalāt. \textit{Ṣalām} (lit. peace) which is the last step of ṣalāt symbolizes unity vs. multiplicity (or the station of totality) and stands for the last journey (\textit{min al-khalq il al-khalq}) (Khomeini, 1390, p. 114). The present text is the only writing of Khomeini in which he raises the possibility for every believer finishing the spiritual journeys (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 114-115). In other texts, he restricts the Four Journeys to the fourteen illuminated figures. In another text, the afore-mentioned \textit{Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḩamd}, he briefly mentions the Four Journeys without elaborating on them, and maintains that the Perfect Man, who is ‘the Most Beautiful Name’ (\textit{asmā’ ul-ḥusnā}) and ‘the Greatest Name’ (\textit{ism-i a’zam}), is able to reach the last stage or \textit{tawḥīd} which is subsistence (\textit{baqā}) with God (Khomeini, 1378, p. 19).
Ādab al-Ṣalātīs is the last text in which Khomeini discusses the doctrine of the Four Journeys. He distinguishes between two groups of seekers, both of whom have carried out the journey to God (ṣafar-i ila l-ūllāh), although the first group never returns to the world and to people because it dies after finishing the journey. Transmitting the famous ḥadīth al-qudsī that: “My friends are hidden under my mantle (qibāb, ḥijāb), no one knows them except for Me” (Introduction, pp. 3-4), Khomeini argues that the first group will remain hidden under God forever. The second group includes those who return to the world in order to guide people on the righteous path and to restore cities (takmīl-i 'ibād wa taˈmīr-i bilād) (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 347-348). This phrase has caused commentators such as Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād, to interpret it as Khomeini’s intention (as a political ‘ārif) of rising against the status quo to establish an Islamic government (Muḥaqiq Dāmād, n.d., p. 2). Khomeini, however, does not elaborate further on this idea to provide his reader with a more accurate understanding of what he means by this phrase. In addition, there is no convincing evidence to prove that Khomeini referred to himself as the wali who, after returning to creature from God, wants to guide people on the righteous path.

Likewise, there exists no direct indication of “restoring cities” being stated in any other source. It seems that the lens through which Muḥaqiq Dāmād and others are reading this phrase, as well as Khomeini’s intention of having political ambitions to stand for government, is an a posteriori one based on subsequent socio-political developments in the Iranian milieu after the Revolution of 1979. Another example is Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥijāzī (d. 1386 shamsī/2007), whose flattering statements at the dawn of the Revolution, and in Khomeini’s presence, have been renowned for years. He goes far beyond Muḥaqiq Dāmād’s scholastic reading and asks for a global, just government by
Khomeini. Verbalizing what many others had in mind but dared not say, Ḥijāzī calls Khomeini “the Suleymān of the time and Dāwūd of the Age”, and asked him to rise up to establish a global kingdom and to administer justice all over the world. Khomeini responded to Ḥijāzī by saying that: “I fear that if I believe Mr. Ḥijāzī’s statements about myself, they may result in bringing arrogance and personal decline (ḥiṭāṭ) to me. I shall take refuge in Almighty God.”\(^{33}\). Khomeini’s reaction shows that he obviously did not imagine any role and/or responsibility for himself other than rising up against the Shah, of course more as a faqīh than as an ārif, and establishing an Islamic government.\(^{34}\)

To sum up Khomeini’s theory on the asfār, there are two points here: there exists no connection between having a Sufi, or perhaps it is better to say, a spiritual lifestyle on one hand and being an insan al-kāmil on the other. The first one does not necessarily result in the second. Khomeini had followed a spiritual path all his life.\(^{35}\) His interest in ʿirfān was not limited to reading mystical texts or having a mystical training, but rather to declaring that being an insan al-kāmil is not easy to prove. Secondly, Knysh’s analysis that “very probably Khomeini’s four-stage venture is simply a further particularization of ibn Arabi’s vision of an exemplar human destiny and self-fulfillment” (Knysh, 1992, p. 647), does not seem plausible; because ibn ‘Arabī himself is brief about the Four Journeys and only mentions the first two, and Khomeini’s outlook, compared with his other ideas such as wilāya, nubuwwa, the Perfect Man and, most importantly, the doctrine of names and attributes, is short. As for the identity of the individual who completes the journeys, in all his texts examined here, with the exception of Sirr al-Ṣalāt, Khomeini leaves no doubt that only the awliyāʾ (the Prophet and the Imāms) have been able to complete this spiritual venture.
4.6. Conclusion

There are some lessons from this survey of Khomeini’s mysticism and its roots in the Akbarīan tradition. First and foremost, ibn ʿArabī and his apparatus had gained a Shi‘a aura by the time of Khomeini, and the process of adjusting ibn ‘Arabī’s mysticism to the Shi‘a creeds, had in fact started with figures such as ‘Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī, ‘Alā’ al-Dawlah Simnānī, and continued with Shaykh Maḥmūd Shabistorī as well as Shi‘a ʿirfānī orders (Chapter One, 1.4., pp. 31-35). During the Safawid period, as it was observed, the role of Mullā Ṣadrā and his students, particularly Qumshi‘ī, in the process of making the Akbarīan School Shi‘a, was undeniable. The ʿirfānī conception of wilāya (and other related concepts), however, remained immutable and unchanged, and it is from this perspective that Knysh evaluates Khomeini’s ʿirfānī writings as “timeless, in so far as they could have been written three, four, or five centuries ago” (Knysh, 1992, p. 649).

With regard to the forms and content, there is no major difference between his writings and the writings of the ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and Qum, with the only exception of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā‘ī, who, as it was observed in the previous chapter (3.6.1., pp. 57-63), switched the centre of gravity from wilāyat al-khāṣṣah to wilāyat al-ʿāmmah. Another development which had started with ibn ʿArabī and had been firmly established by the time of Khomeini, was the analogy between the humane and the divine, having been crystalized in the theory of the perfect man. The personality of the perfect man is the consummation of the divine plan, “combining in himself both the traits of God, and the features of the engendered universe, [by which] he rises to such a preeminence that he becomes invested with divine ‘deputyship’ (nayāba) and
vicegerency” (Knysh, 1992, p. 649). As it will be discussed in the next chapter, divine deputyship, here through the channel of the Hidden Imam, will play an important role in Khomeini’s juridical theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.

Perhaps as important as ibn ‘Arabī’s influence on Khomeini’s mysticism, is the reconciliation of the two sources of authority (mysticism and jurisprudence) in his thought and personality, each representing a distinct form of authority, although reinforcing each other in different ways. The former emphasizes qualities such as purity of the heart of the leader, piety and devotion; while the latter is an expression of the qualities of justice, knowledge, and wisdom. How did our scholar reconcile these two, when jurisprudence carried a heavier weight and influence than mysticism? One can look for the answer in Khomeini’s charismatic personality, the socio-political circumstances of Iran in 1960s and 1970s, and developments in Shi‘a jurisprudence which had begun in the early nineteenth century. At the same time, mysticism had not undergone significant changes, particularly in terms of the theory of wilāya. Before reading Khomeini’s juridical texts and contextualizing them, both intellectually and from a socio-political perspective, one cannot reach a final answer to these questions, and that’s what the author will do in the next chapter.

However, before turning our attention to juridical wilāya in Khomeini’s writings, it is worth remembering the research questions propounded in the Introduction (B. p. 13). With respect to these questions, in this chapter, the author sought to study how wilāya has been conceptualized in Khomeini’s ʿirfānī texts and how his inspiration by Akbarian mysticism influenced his outlook. It was questioned whether wilāya had undergone any changes during the eighteenth to the twentieth century, and whether its
conception in the writing of our scholar - who stands at the end of this timeline - displays any difference from those of his predecessors. His arguments and the method he deploys, as discussed above, look ageless. Pertinent to this, is his gloss on a number of original ʿirfānī texts that can be ranked as genuine additions to the exiting scholarship on Akbarīan mysticism, though at the same time, remain classic and typical.

1 - Moussavi has discussed taqlīd, ijtihād, marjaʿ, as well as the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh in other articles/books as well. See:

And two more sources that have discussed the topic in length:

2 - Along with Kadivar’s classification of the Shiʿa political thought which is used here, Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi in his book entitled Religious Authority in Shiʿa Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the Institution of Marjaʿ; has also classified the stages of the development of the Shiʿa jurisprudence, but the emphasis is on jurisprudence and not the Shiʿa political thought, though the former can include the latter as well. See:
Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Op.cit, 1996, Chapter 1, pp. 7-44.

3 - There is a number of scholars who regard Narāqī as the forerunner. For example:

4 - Shāhābādī was the son of Shaykh Muḥammad Javād Bīdābādī from Bīdābād, Isfahan; though he is famous as Shāhābādī due to his residence in Shāhābād, a city district of Tehran which is now famous as Jumhūrī Eslāmī Avenue.

5 - Shāhābādī’s political and mystical influence on Khomeini are mentioned in a number of sources. See:
7 - Aqā Mīrzā ‘Alī Akbar Mudarris Ḥikmāt Yazdī (d. 1344 H /1925) was the master of Ḥikmat and ʿirfān of the thirteenth and fourteenth century. He was the student of Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān Qashqāʾī and Aqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshī, both the renowned Ḥakīms of the School of Tehran. It seems that Yazdī was one of the key figures who attached Khomeini to the teachings of Mullā Ṣadrā via the mediation of the School of Tehran. According to the brief note of Khomeini in the introduction of Yazdī’s book entitled Rasāʾīl al-Ḥikamiyya (the Theosophical Treatises) during the years of studentship in Qum, both he and other very young students were very content with the coming of Yazdī to Qum and teaching philosophy and ʿirfān there (ʿulūm-i bātīnī in his words), because at the same time Shaykh ʿAbdurrahim Ḥāʾirī Yazdī taught usūl and jurisprudence (ulūm-i ẓāhīrī) and therefore the students had the opportunity to learn both the ẓāhīrī and bātīnī sciences at the same time (Ḥikami Yazdī, 1372 shamsī, p. 13). Before the Qum years, when Ḥikami Yazdī was living in Tehran and taught at Madrasay-Šaykh ʿAbdul Hossein, figures such as Hossein Qumi Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Hāj Mīrzā Ahmad Āṣhtiyānī attended his circle (Ḥikami Yazdī, ibid, p. 17). Yazdī’s book is published in Tehran in 1372 shamsī by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Wizarat-i Farhang wa Iرشād-i Islāmī).
8 - Mīrzā Javād Aqā Maliki Ṭabrīzī was born in Tabriz and when he was young moved to Najaf to study in the hawza. He studied jurisprudence with Ayatollah Ḥāʾ Ajāʾi Ḥamidānī, usūl with Mullā Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurāsānī and ʿirfān and ethics with Mullā Hossein qulī Ḥamidānī. After returning home from Najaf, he moved from Tabriz to Qum to assist Shaykh Ḥāʾirī Yazdī to establish the hawza of Qum. He died in 1343 H /1924 and buried in the Shaykhān cemetery in Qum. Maliki Ṭabrīzī, 1372, pp. 3-4. His book entitled Aṣrār al-Ṣāḥīt (the Mysteries of Prayer) is published in Tehran in 1372 by Payām-i Azādīdī publication.
10 - In Moin’s book, it is Mafāṭih al-Ghayb (the Keys of Unseen) which is not plausible. Khomeini read Miṭṭāb al-Ghayb of Qinwāi and wrote a commentary on it which is known as Miṭṭāb al-Ghayb wa Mīshāb al-ʾUns (the Key of Unseen and the Lamp of Pondness). For more elucidation on the particular commentary and his impact on Khomeini (Knysh, Op.cit, 1992, p. 635).
11 - Knysh believes that this work, together with the commentary on the Fusūs al-Ḥikam (the Bezels of Wisdom) written by Qaṣṣāʾi’s teacher, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, “are probably the most influential and widely read elucidations of Ibn Arabi’s masterpiece” which had “a profound and lasting effect on Khomeini’s outlook in general and his metaphysical views in particular” (Knysh, Op.cit, 1992, p. 635).
12 - In this book, which in fact is an ʿirfānī exegesis of the Qurʾān, Khawja relates Qurʾanic themes and concepts with one of the spiritual stations in ʿirfān. The point is to show that the Path (ṭariqa) and the laws (shariʿa) are identical. For more information see:
   Mahdi Mutī and others, Jilīvāh-yi Tāfsīr-i ʿIrānī-yi Qurʾān dar Bāb-i Akhlaq-i Manāzil al-Sāʿirīn (the Dimentions of the Mystical Exegesis of the Qurʾān on the Ethics of the Abodes of Travelers), the Journal of Tāfsīr wa Zābān-i Qurʾān, No. 1, Fall and Winter 1391, pp. 99-114.
13 - Shāhābādī started his education with his father Shaykh Muḥammad Javād Bidābādī, himself a student of Shaykh Muḥammad Hassan Ṣafā (d. 1228 H /1813) known as Sāḥib al-Jawāhīr and Shaykh Murtaḍā anṣārī (d. 1281 H /1864). In 1320 Hegira, Shāhābādī moved to Najaf and stayed there for seven years, while he studied with Akhund Mullā Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurāsānī (d. 1329 H/1911), Shaykh Fathullāh Shariʿat (known as Shaykh ul-Ṣarīʿa), and Ayatollah Mīrzā Muḥammad Hassan Khalīlī. After the death of Khurāsānī, Shāhābādī moved to Samarra and attended the classes of Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī (d. 1338 H/1919) who granted Shāhābādī the ʾijāza of teaching and issuing fatwā. Along with Shīrāzī, nine more mujtahids issued Shāhābādī the ʾijāza including the abovementioned Shaykh ul-Ṣarīʿa, Seyyed Ismāʾil ʿṢadr and Mīrzā Khalil Tehranī (Shāhābādī, 1386, pp. 31-33). Before turning his attention to Shāhābādī, Khomeini had another teacher in ʿirfān and ḥikma, and unlike Knysh’s opinion, he learned Asfār al-ʿArbaʿi with Seyyed Abu al-Ḥassan Rafīʿi Qazvīni (d. 1354 shamsī/1976) in Qum, himself a student of ʿAbdurrahim ʿAbdulī Yazdī. See:
   <http://fa.wikishia.net/view/Archivo:B8%3D%DB%8C%DA%AF%DB%A7%DB%99%88%DB%7D%DB%84%DA%DB%83%9B%6D%81%DB%8C%DB%9B%DB%8C%DB%96%8D%9B%8C%DB%8C%DB%8C%DB%8C > last accessed 2/17/17.
14 - Murtiḍa Muṭṭaharī in his ‘Ulūm-i Islāmī (Islamic Sciences, two volumes) has elaborated on the theoretical mysticism and practical mysticism – ʿirfān-i naẓārī wa ʾamālī, respectively. In volume two of the present book, Muṭṭaharī explains that the practical mysticism refers to spiritual conduct (sulāk), and
the way masters initiate young novice in order to help him to access the station of unity with God. So, ‘irfān-i 'amāl talks about a process which ends in self-annihilation or subsistence - baqā' - with God. On
the other hand, ‘irfān-i naẓari is about the explanation or interpretation of existence (wujūd/hastī) and elaborates on the elements of the existence such as God, the cosmos and Man. See:
Murtūdā Muṭaharī, 'Ulūm-i Islāmī (Islamic Knowledge.), vol. 2 (Kalām, ‘Irfān, Ḥikmat-i ‘Amāl), 6th

- Ḥāʾirī himself was the student of Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥassān Shīrāzī (known as Mīrzāy-i Shīrāzī and
Mīrzāy-i Mujaḍḍid d. 1194 H/1814) and other principle teachers, such as Mīrzā Ibrāhīm Maḥallātī,
Shaykh Faḍlullāh Nūrī, Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī, and Seyyed Muḥammad Fīshārākī Ḥisfahānī, all of
them Mīrzā Ḥassān Shīrāzī's associates (Algar, 2002, p. 3). On the death of his mentor, Ḥāʾirī left
Samarra for Najaf to study under the celebrated Ākhund Khurāsānī. After returning to Iran, he resided
in Arak for some eight years (Algar, 2002, p. 4) and then moved to Qum to establish the Ḥawza of
that city (Algar, 2002, p. 6). Algar believes that it was the “matchless” efforts of Ḥāʾirī which turned Qum to
an elevated city as a “position of centrality in the religious life of Persia, almost if not fully competitive
with the shrine cities of Iraq” (Algar, 2002, p. 6). There is also another account for Ḥāʾirī's studies and
administration. See:
Muḥṣīn al-ʿĀmīn, Aʿyān al-Shīʿa (the Shīʿa Figures), VIII, 1403 H/1983 (Beirut: Dār-ul-Taʿārūf lil
Maṭḥāʾāt), p. 42.

- A young student of Ḥawza has three levels to go through to become a mujtahid or a faqīḥ. These are
as follows:
Muqaddamāt (Introductory Level), ṣaḥī (Intermediate Level), and khārij (Advanced Level). It would
normally take seven years to complete muqaddamāt, which consists of the following books: Jāmiʿ al
Muqaddamāt (the Comprehensive of Introductions, fourteen small volumes in Persian and Arabic)
includes Arabic grammar, syntax, logic, method of reading and exercises in conjugation are taught. The
objective of the course is to teach introductory Arabic syntax to the student and to prepare him for
learning the subsequent courses. Along with that, students study Suyūṭī which is mostly on syntax.
Hāshiyāh (Gloss) on basic logic and the new book used in the field is al-Mantiq (The Logic). There is also Muṭawwalah (Detailed, or a summary of it) which teaches rhetoric and speech. The new books used
for the course are Balāghah ( Eloquence) or Jawāhirul Balāgha (the Jewelry of Balāgha). After
Muqaddamāt students are promoted to ṣaḥī and are taught theology and jurisprudence. It takes eight
years to finish this level. Sources such as Maʿālim ul-Uṣūl (Guides of Principles), Qawānīn (Laws)
by Mīrzāy-I Qum on theology, Lūmāʾ (Spangle) by Shahīd Thānī, al-Makāṣib (Transactions) by Shaykh
Murtūdā Anṣārī, Rasāʿīl (Treatises), Kiṭbāyat ul-Uṣūl (Adequacy of Principles) by Mullā Muḥammad
Kāẓīm Khurāsānī, Manzūma and Ishārat (Indications) both on philosophy and mysticism, Bidāyat ul-
Ḥikma (Beginning of Wisdom) and Niḥāyat Ul-Ḥikma (Extremity of Wisdom) on philosophy, Āṣār
(Four Journeys) of Mullā ʿAbbās, Sharḥ-i Tajrīd (Commentary on Tajrīd) and Maqāmāt-i Ḥāʾirī (Stations
of Ḥāʾirī) and Maqāmāt-i Hamīdānī (Stations of Hamīdānī) on Arabic literature. After mastering these
two levels, students start khārij with the object of becoming marjaʿa taqlīd. In the advanced level, other
courses are also taught including: Rījāl, Dirāya, history of Islam, ethics, interpretations and astronomy.

For a socio-anthropological study of the Ḥawza of Qum in pre-revolutionary Iran, see: Michael M. J.
University Press), pp. 31-42 & 77-86. And for the levels of studying and curriculum of the Ḥawza of
Najaf in the early twentieth century, see:
Chibli Mallat, the Renewal of Islamic Law; Muhammad Bager Sadr, Najaf and the Shiʿi International,

- Born in Samarra, studied in Kashan and Najaf, he moved to Qum in 1341 H/1922, and when he was
studying with Ḥāʾirī, found an independent Ḥawza for himself. Along with Khomeini, his other
students were Ayatollahs Maʿshā Ṣafavī and Ayatollah Dāmād. He finally re-settled in Kashan and is
buried there.

- Moin brings in Adīb Khurāsānī which is not plausible. It is Ayatollah Aqā Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAli Adīb
Tehrānī, who was born in Tehran and studied under Shaykh ʿAbdulhusseyn Rashī. Both in Arak and
Qum, Adīb Tehrānī attended the stations of Ḥāʾirī and after leaving Qum and settling in Tehran, taught
usūl and jurisprudence there. He was famous in literature.
<http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Book/View/45232/17329/8-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7-
Born in Khwansar, he moved to Najaf to continue his studies with Ākhund Khurāsānī and Seyyed Muḥammad Kāẓim Ţabāštābā’ī Yazdi (1248-1337 H). After their deaths, he started learning usūl with Ayatollah Muḥammad Hossein Nā’īnī (1276 H/1861-1355 H/1936). He had the ḥijāza of fatwā and transmission of ḥadīth from Ayatollah Ziyā ‘Arrāqī. After returning to Iran, he resided in Qum and started teaching and training students in the Ḥawza. When Ḥā’iri died, along with Ayatollahs Ḥujjat and Ṣadr, he played an important role under their tripartite leadership to protect the Ḥawza from governmental threat.

- I am grateful to the author, Muḥammad Kāmil az Dīdgāh, for supplying me with a copy of his unpublished article years ago when I was still in Tehran. The article entitled wilāyat-i Ḥasan-i Kāmil az Didgāh-i Imām Khomeini (the Guardianship of the Perfect Man in Imām Khomeini’s Thought) and a

---

%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7-%D9%85%DB%AD%D9%85%DB%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%8C%D8%A8-%D9%87%D9%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%A9%DB%8C%DA%98%DB%8C%D8%AA%D9%B7%D9%86%DB%8C last accessed 2/17/17.


22 - The lengthy list of his šīrānī books is available in: <http://www.noorlib.ir/View/fa/CreatorList?SearchText=%D8%AE%D9%85%DB%96%DB%8C%DA%98%DB%8C&D9%86%DB%8C>&SearchKind=%D8%B1%20%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%98%DB%8C%20%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%DB%8C%DA%98%DB%8C%DA%98%DB%8C&LastAccessed=2%2017/17. last accessed 2/17/17.


25 - The actual ḥadīth reference is: “I was a hidden treasure, I loved to be known, therefore I created people in order to be known”. The ḥadīth is not transmitted by any Shī’a ḥadīth compilation, and in Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī’s Bihār al-Anwār (the Oceans of Lights) is mentioned as khabar-i wāhid (a ḥadīth which is transmitted only by one transmitter and it lacks a chain of transmitters), indicating its unreliability; though it is a famous ḥadīth in Sufi literature and has always been used by Sufis. See: <http://www.islamquest.net/fa/archive/question/fa8094> last accessed 2/20/17.


27 - For the ḥadīth and its Shī’a background, see: <http://fa.wikishia.net/view/%D8%AD%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AB_%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%8C%20%D9%8A%DA%99%DA%97%DA%95%DA%95&SearchKind=Creator> last accessed 2/17/17.

28 - Knyssh maintains that Khomeini has hardly had sympathy with “Muslim speculative theologians”, as he mostly took sides with Sufis and sages (Knyssh, Op.cit, 1992, p. 641).

29 - His closeness to, and inspiration by, Qumshi’i is already mentioned.

30 - The Absolute Will is also called ‘the Holy Emanation’ (fayd al-muqaddas), ‘the All-encompassing Mercy’ (rahmat-i wāsī’ta), the Greatest Name’ (ism-i’ a zam) and ‘the Absolute Muḥammedan wilāyat’ or ‘maqām-i ʿalawi’ or ‘qutbiyat’ (Khomeini, 1388, p. 16).

31 - Referring to the famous ḥadīth that “I was prophet when Adam was between water and clay”. Khomeini transmits the ḥadīth from Asrār ul-Sharī‘a wa Atwār ul-Ţariqa wa Anwār ul-Ḥaqiqā (the Secrets of Sharī‘a, the Alterations of the Path and the Lights of the Reality), pp. 46 & 92 in Khomeini, 1388, p. 16.

32 - I am grateful to the author, Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād who supplied me with a copy of his unpublished article years ago when I was still in Tehran. The article entitled wilāyat-i Insān-i Kāmil az Didgāh-i Imām Khomeini (the Guardianship of the Perfect Man in Imām Khomeini’s Thought) and a

---

227
copy of it entitled 'Irfān wa Shahrīyārī (Mysticism and Kingdom) is published in Dīn, Falsafa, Qānūn (Religion, Philosophy, Laws), Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād, 1378 (Tehran: Sukhan publication), pp. 125-141.

33 - Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥijāzī’s statements and Khomeini’s reaction are to be found in this one-minute youtube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66DRInZGH7I>, last accessed 5/10/17.

34 - Ridgeon in his article, Hidden Khomeini points to his email correspondences with Hamid Algar, in which the latter supports the same perspective: “the assertion that Imam Khomeini believed that he had completed the four journeys and therefore, attained the status of insan-i kamil is, I think, unwarranted”. See: Lloyd Ridgeon, Hidden Khomeini: Mysticism and Poetry, in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, (ed), 2014 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 217.

35 - Ridgeon has expanded on this in Hidden Khomeini, ibid, 2014, p. 215.

36 - Ridgeon calls it “the juxtaposition of Khomeini as a faqih ... with that of the mystic who is able to commune with the divine ...” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 213), while Martin calls the former (mysticism), “a subtle unseen authority” which acts behind the visible, “manifest one” (Martin, 2007, pp. 202-3).
Chapter Five: Khomeini as the Jurist and *Wilāya*

The present chapter seeks to study and analyze the juridical *wilāya*, as well as the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, from the perspective of socio-political developments in early twentieth century Iran. The author argues that the changes that can be explained as ‘radical Shi‘ism’ (including, but not limited to, the politicization of Qum seminary, the birth of the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, and the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as a combatant *faqīh*) were not only greatly influenced by transformations in the political arena, but were also reactions to them. Considering the research questions (Introduction, section B. p. 13), the author seeks to explain how the conceptualization of juridical *wilāya* underwent a tremendous shift from being purely juridical, to having a political reading. The jurisdictional changes that had started with Constitutional jurisprudence, now, and in the mid-twentieth century, came to bear fruit in assuming a political role and responsibility for the *Shi‘a faqīh*. Therefore, unlike the ‘īrfānī *wilāya* which has remained stagnant and unchanged, its juridical conception displays the vitality of the *Shi‘a* jurisprudence during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Riḍā Khān’s coup of February 1921 (1299 *shamsī*) was a turning point in the history of Iran. His policies profoundly transformed the face and fate of the country from a politically disintegrated and economically poor society to a unified nation with a centralized political system. The state had a multi-dimensional policy that spanned all aspects of people’s lives, including stabilizing the country, building a strong army, enforcing dress code for both men and women, reforming the language, implementing new party politics, changing the name of the country from Persia to Iran, reorganizing
the fiscal system, and last but not least, implementing legal and judicial reforms. Having centred on ‘secularizing’ and ‘centralizing’ as the essence of these policies, the state became the agent of authoritarian, radical, change in the post-Qajar era.¹

These policies, which symbolized the era, started two or three years after the stabilization of the new dynasty (Cronin, 2003, p. 6). Addressing the state and the clerics, Riḍā Shah’s Westernizing and secularizing policies - which went hand-in-hand with implementation of centralizing policies – affected the whole of the hierocracy. The policies which targeted the hierocracy’s autonomy and financial power, included the state’s intrusion into the judicial domain, the abolishment of the mujtahids’ civil courts and their replacement with a state-controlled judiciary, the confiscation of charitable endowments (awqāf), and the establishment of modern education institutions (which grew in number from the mid-1920s) that rivalled traditional madrasas. These developments undermined the ʿulema’s social status and affected their economic influence (Amanat, 2003, p. 8). It was not only the state’s policies that shook the hierocracy, but also the growth of the secularized or semi-secularized middle classes, and also the popularity of a variety of religious and ideological challenges that negatively affected them. Amanat describes the clerical community of that time as “demoralized and shrunken” and that sought to “reorganize the madrasa and to solidify its network at the national level” (Amanat, 2003, p. 8 & Martin, 2007, pp. 15-17).

The emergence of a tendency toward a centralized marjaʿīyyah under Ayatollah Muḥammad Husayn Burūjirdī (d.1340 shamsī/1961), should be regarded as a “belated, albeit inevitable, response” (Amanat, 2003, p. 8) to the state’s intrusion into the hierocracy’s domain.³ Reaching the goal of having a ‘centralized marjaʿīyyah’, however,
would not have been attainable without first fixing the financial affairs of the ḥawza of Qum (a legacy of ʿAbdul Karīm Ḥāʾirī). To this aim, Burūjirdī followed a disciplined policy of strengthening the economic and financial foundations of the ḥawza, concurrently with increasing the number of students (ṭullāb). In addition, in order to organize more effectively the revenues of the ḥawza, he “had a register drawn up of” (Algar, 1989, p. 6 & Akhavi, 1980, p. 125) all his wukalā (lit. agents, those who were involved in gathering the religious taxes), as opposed to the ḥawza’s voluntary way of organizing financial affairs which had been prevalent before. Another “administrative innovation” (Algar, 1989, p. 6) of Burūjirdī that helped to reinforce the centrality of Qum and the office of marjaʿīyyah, “was his institution of a register of correspondence, permitting the [ʿulemā] at the ḥawza to build up a further network of contacts throughout the country” (Muṭahari, n.d., p. 248, in Algar, p. 6).4

Other initiatives may be added to this list, such as building new madrasas to “demonstrate the compatibility of Islamic commitment with the acquisition of modern knowledge” (Algar, 1989, p. 7), promoting a Shīʿa-Sunnite rapprochement and sending representatives to Muslim and non-Muslim countries. All these, together with maintaining “an almost unwaveringly quietist stance”, helped him to remain “more or less neutral in the stormy political contests of the postwar period” (Algar, 1989, p. 8). Along with the centralized marjaʿīyyah and reorganization of the traditional education institutions, the hierocracy underwent another significant shift, a moving away from the duality of the state-ʿulemā alliance toward fresh sources of raising money and strengthening social solidarity namely the bazaar community, a new class of urban and urbanized poor. These three, “offered a pool for clerical recruitment and an enthusiastic mosque congregation” (Amanat, 2003, p. 8).
The withdrawal of the jurists, mainly Ayatollah Burūjirdī and earlier his peer Ayatollah ‘Abdul Karīm Ḥā’irī (d. 1355 H/1937), into the stronghold of political quietism is also mentioned by Said Amir Arjomand. He maintains that during Riḍā Shah’s reign, the clerics were “too surprised and stunned to react effectively” (Amir Arjomand, 1988, p. 84), and hence they tried not to altercation with the Shah. This perplexity, and at the same time caution, is reflected in a number of political writings, including Khomeini’s *Kashf al-Asrār* (the Unveiling of the Secrets) which was written immediately after the abdication of the Shah. As will be observed in the following, Khomeini wavered between adhering to Constitutionalism or instigating his notion of the ideal of Islamic government. His belief in Constitutionalism, however, meant belief in the second article of the amendment of the constitution (approved 1285 *shamsī* /1906), according to which a council must be formed composed of five jurists to ensure that the legislation of the *majlis* (the Parliament) is not contradictory to the Islamic *shariʿa*. Amir Arjomand believes that the hierocracy maintained its hostility toward Constitutionalism (Amir Arjomand, 1988, p. 85), even in subsequent years, probably because the jurists did not perceive Constitutionalism as something of their own, and their adherence to it was in fact an act of necessity.

In addition to the state’s attacks on the hegemony of the hierocracy, the jurists monitored another threat which was the emergence of secularist tendencies among the society. By ‘secularist tendencies’, reference is especially made to Ahmad Kasravi, whose polemical writings on Persian poetry and literature, as well as on *Shīʿism*, had caused uproar amongst many Iranians, including the hierocracy. For the clerics and mainly Khomeini, Ahmad Kasravi was not a person, but the representative of “the general secularising trend of the times” (Ridgeon, 2006, p. 9), whose critiques on the
Sufi and Shi’a heritage of Iran had raised the need to defend these two pillars of Iranian identity. As Lloyd Ridgeon ascertains, “his steadfast rejection of superstitious beliefs (including Sufism and Shi’ism) and his opposition to the wholesale absorption of Western culture into Iran struck a chord with many Iranians” (Ridgeon, 2006, p. 9). The danger of Kasravi’s anti-Islamic views (which, compared with his anti-Sufi critiques seemed to be more important), caused the radical Shi’a group of Fadā’īyān-i Islam (Devotees of Islam) to shoot him dead in 1946 (1324 shamsī) “during the last session of the preliminary hearings of the heresy charges brought against him” (Ridgeon, 2006, p. 9). Yet it was not only Kasravi who was treated brutally by the hierocracy. To a lesser extent, ‘Alī Akbar Ḥikamī Ṣādīḥ (d. 1366 shamsī/1988), a disciple of Kasravi, was also pilloried by Khomeini. The above-mentioned Kashf al-Asrār, which will be analyzed shortly, was written as a response to Ḥikamī Ṣādīḥ and his ‘assaults’ on Islam and marja’iyyah.

5.1. Kashf al-Asrār: A Political Manifesto

*Kashf al-Asrār* (Unveiling of the Secrets), written in 1321 shamsī/1942-43 as a response to *Asrār-i Hizār Sālih* (One-Thousand Years of Secrets) by ‘Alī Akbar Ḥikamī Ṣādīḥ, should be treated as Khomeini’s first step into the world of politics. At that time he was forty years old. *Kashf* has a polemical tone and in it the boundary between politics and jurisprudence is blurred; in the sense that political issues are discussed from a juridical perspective and vice versa. In 1321 shamsī/1942-43, ‘Alī Akbar Ḥikamī Ṣādīḥ published a short treatise (forty-nine pages) in which he propounded thirteen questions from “Muslim scholars and the People of Knowledge” (*‘ulemā-yi Islam wa ahl-i ma’rifat*), and by doing that, challenged them to reply to him. Ḥikamī Ṣādīḥ never
received any response from them, and therefore published the questions and answers as his own. Although Khomeini’s long treatise (three hundred and forty-one pages) was not sent to him, the work is apparently regarded as Khomeini’s response to Ḥikamī Zādīh. The treatise is dateless; though from the content it can be presumed that it was written circa 1942-1943/1321 shamsī (Khomeini, n.d. p. 2).

Khomeini’s Kashf contains a number of theses and presuppositions:

First: Ḥikamī Zādīh and writers like him are accused of breaking community cohesion by creating division and schism, as well as destroying the “foundations of belief of the people” (Khomeini, n.d., p. 2). Even if the author is anonymous to the reader, from this very first phrase it would be clear that the author has ʿirfānī and juridical concerns. In mysticism, as previously mentioned, unity with God, with nature, and with the cosmos is one of the main concerns of a Sufī. The concept of wahdah (unity) is a central concept around which major mystical ideas are shaped, though since the human reason cannot grasp the reality of God let alone unite with Him, and if humanity ever hopes to know God, He (Deity) has to grasp humanity. In Islamic mysticism, the idea of God ‘coming down’ into the cosmos is prevalent, and it is only in this way, which is “the heart’s imagination”, and not through intellectual efforts, that Man “draws near this God”, and becomes one with Him (Singh, 2003, p. 103). On the other hand, jurists were conceived of as the only legitimate preservers of the community of believers, as well as aides in the prevention of dispersion of the community. By such a treatise, Ḥikamī Zādīh, in Khomeini’s view, has created schism in the unity of Muslims.
Second: Khomeini makes an argument for the defence of hierocracy, i.e. jurists, and maintains that the Shīʿa hierocracy is equal to Islam, and imitation of a jurist (taqlīd) is essential for the survival of the Faith (Khomeini, p. 2 & 4).

Third is Khomeini’s terminology in terms of the frequency of concepts such as nation, Iranian Shīʿism, fatherland and national solidarity (Khomeini, pp. 55ff), and from this perspective, his emphasis on nationalism is in line with the Constitutionalist ʿulemā and is inspired by Riḍā Shah’s measures to unify Iran. Khomeini internalizes Riḍā Shah’s nationalistic discourse.

Fourth: Khomeini’s role in this text is ambivalent between a reformist clergy who speaks about nation (both as a large group of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, and as religion), the importance of the revival of Persian as the Iranian national language, notions such as countrymen and women, and the necessity of reformation (Khomeini, p. 74) on one hand, and a combatant faqīh who advocates the notion of ‘the Government of Islam’ (and not the Islamic Government), as one of the referents of ‘the guardians of the cause’ (ulu al-amr) on the other (Khomeini, p. 109). He is careful not to refer to fuqahā and their role as the founders of such a government, although for the first time Khomeini uses the term government of Islam (ḥukūmat-i Islām). He borrows the rhetoric of both intellectuals and advocates of monarchy to sustain his arguments.

From the former, among them Ahmad Kasravi, he borrows ideas such as ‘pure brothers’ (barādarān-i pāk) and ‘faithful co-religionists’ (hamkīshān-i dīndār) which are both self-appointed, as well as ‘our Persophone Friends’ (dūstān-i pārsī zabān-i mā). After stripping them of their true meaning, Khomeini uses them for his own
purpose to deride Ḩikamī Zādīh and other ‘impure seeds’ including Kasravi and his followers (Khomeini, p. 74).

Fifth: he makes a classic argument according to which belief in the Hidden Imām and his recognition are fundamental principles of Shi‘ism, and since the twelfth Imām is in the Occultation, the establishment of government is indisputable and self-evident (Khomeini, pp. 181ff). Considering the necessity of having government in the time of Occultation on one hand, and the idea of ‘the government of Islam’ on the other, Khomeini plays an ambivalent pendulum-like role, moving between a modern clergy, which believes in the classical separation of politics and religion when the Imām is absent and his interest in the notion of ‘ḥukūmat-i Islām’which violates such a duality.

Accepting the former, he argues that “the intention of the ʿulemā of Islam is not to destroy the foundation of the monarchy, but rather they disagree with a certain person who, according to their understanding, acted in contrast to the interests of the country” (Khomeini, p. 186, 232ff). He maintains that “even every wise person knows that the best government is the one which is founded on the basis of divine rule and justice”, but since the idea was viewed with suspicion by the Monarchy, the fuqahā had to compromise with “this half-government” (nīm-i tashkilāt) and the corrupt system (Khomeini, p. 186) of the Pahlavis. Regarding the importance of establishing a government during the Occultation and Khomeini’s arguments for it, one can come to the conclusion that, unlike his genuine fondness for the Islamic Government, and not merely the Government of Islam, he remains a Constitutionalist and defends the supervisory role of jurists; the one that had been predicated in the amendment of the
Constitution of 1285 shamsi/1907. Khomeini maintains that when the structure is Islamic, he can tolerate the content - the Shah.

An analysis of the kashf will provide a better understanding of the ‘intention’ of Khomeini by the conceptualization of wilāya in his juridical texts. There are two reasons for this: first, the ideas that are brought forth for the first time in this text, will be expanded later in his juridical texts. Second, if we believe that the author has followed a coherent and uninterrupted line of thinking in his life, then, the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh should be treated as the fulfilment of his thought, which is set out in the Kashf. As mentioned, he had always advocated the ideal of the government of the jurist (ḥukūmat-i fuqahā); though he did not reveal it in the Kashf because, Ayatollah Burūjirdī was against any kind of political activity by the ‘ulemā (especially his students) towards the Shah and the regime. The stance of Ayatollah Burūjirdī towards the monarchy, his relationship with both the Shah and with Khomeini, is mentioned in a number of sources. The fact is that whilst he was alive, due to the privileged position he held, the general policy of the ḥawza was to support the monarchy and the Shah.

5.2. From 1942 to 1979: Westernization, Modernization and Political Antagonism

The relationship between the court and the hierocracy became conciliatory in the interim between the abdication of Riḍā Shah and the succession of Muḥammad Riḍā Shah. The hierocracy tried to forget its “old grievances against the first Pahlavi”, and moved on to “an accommodation with the young Shah, who was more than conciliatory while his rule remained precarious” (Amir Arjomand, 1988, p. 85). The clash between them, however, seemed inevitable when the new Shah, under pressure from the United States, launched his reform programme in 1961. The political sociology of the then
White Revolution cannot be considered here, since the task at hand is an analysis of the conceptualization of wilāya in the writings of Khomeini; though in order to contextualize his theory, a brief reference to the events of that time is necessary. An example is the chronology of the Land Reform Bill. The Land Bill of 1959 was ratified on May 17 1960. One year later, on May 9 1961, the Shah dissolved the Majlis and on November 11 1961 he issued an edict ordering the government to implement the May 1960 Land Law. On January 9 1962 the cabinet approved a new version of that law which eliminated most of its defects (Akhavi, 1980, p. 94).

With regard to the agenda of the White Revolution, the conflict between the clerics, headed by Khomeini and the court, was not only a confrontation on the sources of power and re-distribution of political values, but also “had its roots in the clergy’s perception that the government lacked a legal mandate and could only regain it by abiding by the Constitution” (Akhavi, 1980, p. 117). Khomeini saw the Shah’s initiative as “replete with motifs already encountered during the dreadful reign of the first Pahlavi” (Amir Arjomand, 1988, p. 85), and hence started his anti-government protest against it. It was not Khomeini who, by taking a radical stance, tried to provide an alternative vis a vis the regime. The regime’s new decision, as well as the death of Ayatollah Burūjerdi, motivated the ḥawza to take the initiative for a reconsideration of the relationship between the court and hierocracy on one hand, and hierocracy and believers on the other. Concomitantly, was the necessity to reexamine the ḥawza’s organization from the perspective of marjaʾīyyah.

Ann Lambton in her article, a Reconsideration of the Position of the Marjaʿ Al-Taqlīd and the Religious Institution, has studied the office of marjaʾīyyah in the context
of the long-term, historical, relationships between the hierocracy and the monarchy, and the efforts of latter to bring the former under control. Without going too far into examining this relationship, from its beginning after the Occultation of the Imam until the twentieth century, it is more fitting to put it in the context of the short-term intellectual and socio-economic developments of Iran in the first half of the 1340s (1961), and to analyze it as a non-radical reading of the office of marjaʿīyyah and the role of marjaʿ al-taqlīd. However, Khomeini and the writers of Baḥthī Darbāra-yi Marjaʿīyyat wa Rawḥanīyatī (A Discussion on Leadership and Hierocracy), had three things in common: first, they came to the fore after the death of Burūjerdī, who was the main obstacle to any kind of political activity within the hierocracy. Second, they reacted to Burūjerdī’s policies in the ḥawza and the court. Third, they responded to the regime and its efforts to control the ḥawza after Burūjerdī. Burūjerdī’s manner may be termed ‘autocracy’ if not ‘despotism’, because due to his belief in the sole/centralized marjaʿīyyah, the life of the ḥawza was in his hands and he was impatient towards the independent activity of the clerics. The book, however, is composed of ten short articles written by both clergymen and laymen, with particular emphasis on the necessity to reexamine the mutual relationships between the ḥawza and the court, and the ḥawza and the masses. Whilst authors, and mainly Murtīḍā Muṭahhari, highlighted the matchless role of Burūjerdī, it was apparent that they appealed for a more active role, a revival, for marjaʿīyyah and for the relationship between marjaʿ and believers.

Ann Lambton assuredly evaluates the initiative as “the first attempt by a group of writers in modern times in Persia to examine and re-appraise the different aspects of a fundamental issue of the faith” (Lambton, 1964, pp. 134-135), though the writers were not agreed on the ideal government; probably because the ideal government was
not their main concern. Their political preferences, however, covered a wide range from the philosopher king, to the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth, to political quietism, and to violent revolution (Lambton, 1964, p. 135). But since all of them, with the exception of Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, soon lined up behind Khomeini and took a radical stance vis-à-vis the Shah, one can safely argue that perhaps it was only Khomeini who knew exactly what he wanted from his opposition against the regime – Islamic Government.

Baḥthī Darbāra-yī Marjaʿīyyat wa Rawḥānīyyat is also important from another perspective: the Shiʿa jurisprudence and kalām were no longer concerned with concepts such as the perfect man, but “a solution of the problems raised be sought rather in consultation and organization, to emphasize the need for continued growth in the religious institution, and to press the responsibility of the individual” (Lambton, 1964, p. 135). The Shah’s modernizing discourse had impacted on the entire Iranian society including the most traditional, aloof, section of it - the hierocracy -, and therefore, “just as the state began to modernize and reform in organizational terms, so, in parallel, did the religious institutions” (Martin, 2007, p. 28). Shiʿa Islam emphasized the importance of modernization and institutionalization of the ḥawza and of the financial relationships of the clerics and their followers in order to maintain their independence.

Twenty years after Kashf al-Asrār, in a reply to both Ḥikāmī Zādīh and Riḍā Shah, and in line with simultaneous reform movements, Khomeini spoke out against the regime. His radicalization was both a reaction to the White Revolution and the requirements of his followers; mainly low calibre clerics, bazaar and urbanized poor on
one hand, and landowners who had suffered hardship due to land reform on the other. Khomeini, however, used this new opportunity to attack the regime and the Shah. Compared with his peers’ reaction to the regime, Khomeini’s strategy was more inclusive, aggressive and brave. Therefore, Abrahamian’s analysis that he, unlike many other clerics who “opposed the regime because of land reform and women’s rights ... scrupulously avoided the former issue and instead hammered away on a host of other concerns that aroused greater indignation among the general population” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 425), does not seem to be plausible. He attacked the regime on land reform too.

Mohammad Gholi Majd shows how the clerics and landowners from 1959, at the time he revealed his land distribution programme, were able to forge an effective and powerful alliance against the Shah. Among the clerics, Khomeini was the loudest. The opposition to the programme, however, started with Ayatollah Burūjirdī and his fatwā (issued in December 1959), in which it had been declared that the programme of land reforms and other similar measures, were “contrary to the sacred laws of Islam and thus invalid” (Majd, 2000, p. 196). The fatwā had addressed the Majlis deputies and resulted in the enactment of the Land Reform Law of May 1960, but when Burūjirdī died on 30 March 1961, the landlords, who had gathered in the Agricultural Union, on November 1961, appealed to the senior ‘ulemā of Najaf and Qum for help. Majd reports that the ‘ulemā of Najaf and mainly Ayatollah Ḥakīm (Ṣeyyed Muḥsin Ṭabāṭabā’ī Ḥakīm, d. 1390 H/1970), were disappointing in their response to the appeal and instead were encouraging to the court, and to the ‘ulemā of Qum; it was only Khomeini who stood for the rights of landowners and attacked the Shah on both secular and Islamic grounds (Majd, 2000, pp. 204 ff).
Yet, it was after the radical stance of Khomeini and subsequent actions by Ḥassan Arsanjānī (d. 1348 shamsī/1969), which had “provoked and further embittered the religious establishment” that, the clerics took a stance by issuing fatwās (Majd, p. 208). In order to obtain national approval for the new decrees of 17 January 1963, the Shah held a referendum on 26 January 1963 and in response, the Agricultural Union again appealed to Khomeini to elicit his opinion on the new development. His fatwā, which was issued in response to the appeal, removed the possibility of any reconciliation between the regime and the hawza (Majd, 2000, pp. 218-220). Appraising Khomeini’s fiery speeches at the Fayḍiyah School shows how the radical Shī’ a discourse was created by him and used extensively in later years. He took advantage of the latent possibilities of a number of Shī’ a concepts such as wilāya, martyrdom, resistance, and expectation, and went far beyond the limit of the classical dualism of the ‘ulemā and the monarchy. Moreover, he tried to nullify the decision of the Shah by turning to his followers and calling the referendum “compulsory” and flaunting its un-popular aspects. He mobilized people to come to the streets to show their opposition to the regime, but when it was suppressed, he asked them to stay indoors and boycott any kind of interaction with the establishment. A combination of civil disobedience and political struggle having been wrapped in the cover of radical Shī’ism, Khomeini’s defiance was a warm-up for the Islamic revolution.

The land redistribution policy, as already observed, was unconsidered and hasty, and alienated the regime from the landowners, as well as from the hawza and its allies. It had also impacted on the middle class (both new and traditional) by driving it to purchase agricultural lands as an investment, which itself resulted in the loss of savings. Given this, one can safely conclude that the land reforms smashed the
traditional class structure of Iran which had lasted for centuries, and replaced it with resentful landowners (humiliated by their own peasants as well as by the confiscation of their properties), and the radicalized hawza headed by Khomeini (Majd, 2000, pp. 223-224). Thus, at the end of the 1960s, the Shah, representing a corrupt autocrat who had adopted a wrong policy towards his people, endowing rights and freedom to women, by reshaping the culture of the society through modernization and secularization, and by opening the door of the country to foreigners, mainly Americans, had become a ruler without justice (hākim-i žālimi) (Akhavi, 1980, p. 95.).

Khomeini was sent to Turkey on November 4 1964, and almost one year later, on October 1965 he was allowed to move to Najaf, Iraq where he stayed until 1978. It was in this city that he wrote his main juridical texts, containing the conception of wilāya and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. To the degree that the Shah was enforcing his Westernizing and modernizing programmes and, at the same time, moving towards a military dictatorship, Khomeini, sitting in Najaf, was intractable in his opposition to the Shah, radicalizing his tone and attracting the increasingly alien mass to his magnet. Along with writing and teaching in Najaf, his other concern was developing a well-organized network of his students (as a more elaborated version of the old relationship between master and disciples), in order to disseminate his ideas among his followers, to keep his ties with the bazaar, and to push forward the struggle with the regime. All these figures played significant roles in the victory of the Revolution of 1979, among them Husayn ‘Alī Muntażirī (d. 1388 shamsī/2008) whose commitment was notable. Before turning attention to Muntażirī and his services to the Revolution, and later to the newly established government, this chapter will now focus on Khomeini’s conception
of wilāya and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh with regard to its intellectual background in Shiʿa jurisprudence from the eighteenth century onward.

### 5.3. Wali and the Office of Wilāya in Juridical Texts

Addressing Khomeini’s discussion of wilāya and wilāyat al-faqīh, it is necessary to first give a brief introduction to ‘juridical wilāya in general and its background in the writings of the former Shiʿa scholars in particular. ‘The former Shiʿa scholars’, are those figures whose thoughts paved the way for Khomeini’s arguments on the conceptions of wilāyat al-faqīh. These thoughts are:

First, from a juridical perspective, during the Imām’s Occultation no one under normal circumstances, and without a justifiable reason can exercise any kind of wilāya or special prerogative over another person, and every individual is in charge of his or her life. In other words, Islam prohibits believers from interfering in each other’s life, and if one person wants to take custody over another, he or she needs to have a valid religious reason. Following this, there comes another hypothesis that the “jurists cannot claim to be privileged or possess a special mandate to manage the public affairs” (Mavani, 2013, p. 161). In Shiʿa jurisprudence, therefore, it is an axiom to assume that people are wise, sane and eligible to take responsibility for their lives. Quoting Shaykh Jaʿfar Kāshif al-Ghīṭā’, Kadivar concludes that, “this grand jurist of the Qajar period” is considered to be the first one to discuss “the principle of the lack of abdication” of individuals (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 56-57).

Second, similar to the ʿirfānī wilāya which is discussed in the previous chapter, the juridical wilāya has an established tradition in Shiʿa jurisprudence. Briefly, there are twelve types of wilāya, including the Guardianship of the Ruler (wilāyat-i ḥākim), which
are recognized in *fiqh*. Pertinent to this is the belief that where *wali* has not been appointed by the lawgiver, the area needs to be placed under the authority of the Just Jurist (*faqih-i ʿādil*). Historically speaking, this area is called “Islamic market regulations” (*umūr-i ḥisbiya/hisba*), and was the first region in which the term *wilāyat al-faqih* was deployed. Kadivar adds, however, that it is disputable whether a jurist’s authority to take responsibility in this area is generated from the right of *taṣrīf* (disposal) that he possesses, or is a result of his guardianship which is a more comprehensive right. In other words, the term *wilāyat al-faqih* refers to religious and juridical guardianship and presupposes the abdication of those under guardianship; while the acceptance of the right of *taṣrīf* for the jurist does not entail abdication (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 52). *Wilāya*, Kadivar states, necessitates the abdication of those under guardianship as a requirement.

The juridical *wilāya* on *ḥisba*, in the broadest sense of the term, has been discussed for the first time by Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī (Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Mahdī Fādīl Narāqī, d. 1245 H/1829), the prominent scholar of the nineteenth century. In chapter fifty-four of his classic *ʿAwāʾid al-Ayyām* (Achievements of the Years) entitled *An explanation of the wilāya of the ruler and everything on which he has wilāya*, he develops arguments for an elementary type of the theory of *wilāyat al-faqih*. He advocates the typical juridical viewpoint in which no one has the right to exercise authority and guardianship over another and every individual is in charge of his or her own life. This principle, however, is not absolute and unconditional; since God, or the Prophet or one of the *Imāms* can appoint a certain individual as *wali* to exercise *wilāya* in a particular matter. From this perspective, *awlīyā* are many, including just jurists, fathers, and grandfathers from the father’s side, vicegerents (*waṣīs/awṣīyā*), husbands,
lords (mawālī), and deputies (wukalā). These types of awliyā (awliyā of children, wives, properties and clients), have limited wilāya upon one under guardianship, which should be clearly defined in advance (Narāqī, 1375 shamsī, p. 529). Narāqī, however, makes it clear that ʿAwāʾid only refers to wilāyat-i fuqahā who are both rulers (ḥukkām) at the time of the Occultation and the general deputies of the Imāms (Narāqī, 1375, p. 529). Addressing the office of ʿulemā, the chapter is divided into two sections (maqāmān); one section is about the aḥādīth on the right of fuqahā who enjoy the office of general wilāya, and the other on the explanation of fuqahā’s responsibilities on the daily religious life of believers.

Regarding the latter, Narāqī maintains that just jurists are accountable for two things: whatever the Prophet and the Imāms are responsible for, and for whatever belongs to the worldly interests or the daily religious life of believers (Narāqī, 1375, pp. 531-536). In terms of transmitted sources, Narāqī maintains that just jurists are but referents of ulu al-amr (Narāqī, 1375, p. 535), though he stresses that if the affairs of believers are to be administered and the community of Muslims is not to be dispersed, the lawgiver (shāriʿ) must appoint fuqahā in order to be in charge of the worldly interests and the daily religious life of believers (Narāqī, 1375, p. 538). Narāqī lists the scope of authority and responsibilities of fuqahā in the time of the Occultation in the following twelve areas: issuing fatwā, judgeship, ḥudūd and taʿzīrāt,19 wilāya on orphans, wilāya on the abdicated and the one in absentia, conducting marriage ceremonies, wilāya on bodies of the abdicated, adjudication, possessing properties of imām, whatever the imām has had supervision and authority on it, and finally, anything that wali has to intervene in with the discretion of religion or reason (Narāqī, 1375, pp. 539-582).
Recently Dāwūd Feyraḥī in his discussion of the two categories of ‘Constitutionalist Jurisprudence’ and ‘Political Jurisprudence’, has shed light on Narāqī’s conception of wilāyat-i ḥākim. Feyraḥī explains that in Narāqī’s view, there appears to be two types of relationships between human action and the lawgiver’s decree; first, there exists a situation in which no decree has been issued by the lawgiver and second, the lawgiver has given a decree on a particular issue. In terms of the former, individuals have authority to make their own choices, and in terms of the latter, there are five conditions: wājib (fard/farīḍah), harām (sinful/forbidden), mustaḥabb (recommended), makrūh (detestable or offensive act) and mubāḥ (neither forbidden nor recommended, or religiously neutral) (Feyraḥī, 1390, p. 135). Feyraḥī neither explains further the categorization of wilāyat-i ḥākim by Narāqī, nor discusses how he comes to categorize it.

Third, Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī (d. 1281 H/1864), the prominent Shīʿī jurist of the nineteenth century, discusses wilāyat al-faqīh under the category of ‘the Parties of Contract’ (awliyāy-i ʿaqd) in his book al-Makāsib. By ‘the Parties of Contract’, Anṣārī means the guardianship of father and/or grandsire from the father’s side over the abdicated or underage. Kadivar gives examples from several other juridical books, such as ‘Awā’id al-Ayyām of Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī, ‘Anāwīn (Subjects) of Mīr ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Ḫusseynī Marāghi’ī, al-Khazā’in (Treasuries) of Mullā Āqā Darbandī and others who have debated wilāyat al-faqīh alongside the guardianship of jurist over the abdicated and one in absentia (qaṣṣir wa ghayyib). These jurists, Kadivar stresses, have not mentioned the difference(s) between wilāya on people and wilāya on the abdicated and/or the one in absentia, which indicates the unity of meaning and connotation of wilāya in these texts (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 109-110). Kadivar wants to remind us that
Wilāyat al-faqīh, both in the theory of Ayatollah Khomeini and in the texts of the aforementioned jurists, presupposes mahjūriyah (the state of being ward or minor) of one under guardianship and, if the person is not abdicated, underage, or in absentia, then he/she does not need a guardian.

Fourth, Just Jurists are appointed to this office from God. Fifth, Wilāyat al-faqīh in these texts, is discussed as a juridical and not a theological issue. Therefore, the problematic of Wilāyat al-faqīh is not one of the fundamental principles of Shi'a jurisprudence, but a branch (far') of it. It is not one of the fundamentals because there are disagreements both on the existence and the scope of it (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 112). Quoting from Kashf al-Asrār, Kadivar argues that Khomeini is in line with other jurists who discuss this topic from a juridical perspective (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 111-112). As will be observed in the following, Khomeini in the book Wilāyat-i Faqīh; Ḥukūmat-i Eslāmīz (Guardianship of the Jurist; the Islamic Government), maintains that belief in Wilāyat al-faqīh is a principle of the Faith of Shi'īsm and therefore it cannot be regarded as a juridical problematic. Sixth, wilāya encompasses all public areas, including social and political issues. Therefore, addressing the question of eligibility, there is an inequality between those under guardianship and those who enjoy the right of guardianship – or jurists (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 112-114).

5.4. Wilāyat-i Faqīh

From among Khomeini's juridical texts, Wilāyat-i Faqīh focuses on the theory of Wilāyat al-faqīh and the question of Islamic government. In this text, Khomeini is no longer the young and enigmatic scholar of Kashf al-Asrār, but a combatant faqīh who is to establish his utopia on the ruins of Pahlavi kingship. The book is composed of
thirteen lectures given by Khomeini in Najaf during a very short period of nineteen days (from the first to twentieth of January 1970/1348 \textit{shamsī}). Due to censorship in Iran, \textit{Wilāyat-i Faqīh} was published in Beirut, Lebanon, and only available to be used by his followers the next autumn. One year before the Revolution of 1979, in 1356 \textit{shamsī}/1977-78, the book appeared in Iran as \textit{Nāmiʾ az Imām Mūsawī Kāshīf al-Ghiṭā’} (A Letter from \textit{Imām Mūsawī Kāshīf al-Ghiṭā’}) as an appendix to his other book \textit{Jihād-i Akbar} (the Greater \textit{Jihād}).23 In terms of bibliography, the theory of \textit{wilāyat al-faqīh} had also appeared once before in the second volume of \textit{Kitāb al-Bay‘} (the Book of Transaction, both Persian and Arabic volume).24

In \textit{Wilāyat-i Faqīh} Khomeini’s arguments are made on a number of propositions:

First: \textit{wilāyat al-faqīh} is self-evident (badīhī)25 in the faith of \textit{Shī‘ism} (Khomeini, 1379, p. 9) and, “the state’s preservation ... [is] a primary injunction [\textit{al-aḥkām al-awwalīyyah}]”, while “rituals (e.g., the obligatory prayers and fasting) ... [are downgraded to] secondary injunctions [\textit{al-aḥkām al-thānawīyyah}]” (Mavani, 2013, p. 209). \textit{Wilāyat al-faqīh} is inclined to be a \textit{kalāmī} (theological) problematic and in fact is read from this perspective by one of Khomeini’s students Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī (1312 \textit{shamsī}/1933 - ).26 As stated earlier, Kadivar’s reading was grounded on \textit{Kashf} and not on the book \textit{Wilāyat-i Faqīh} (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 111-112).

Second: the whole text revolves around a political (and false) interpretation of the history of Islam, and of the key Islamic and \textit{Shī‘a} terms such as \textit{nubuwwa}, imamate and \textit{wilāya}.

Third: belief in the necessity of the establishment of government in Islam is embedded in the belief of \textit{wilāya}, which is the issue of succession and authority after
the Prophet. Thus, belief in *wilāya* requires attempts to establish the Islamic government and execute Islamic laws (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 20-21).

Fourth: the office of *nubuwwa* is a political one, because the Prophet - the guardian of the cause - was regarded as the head of the executive branch too (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 21-26).

Fifth: jurisprudence (*fiqāha*) is the foundation of Islam, and just jurists are in charge of the affairs of believers (Khomeini, 1390, p. 50). This statement has a presupposition which is the abdication of those under guardianship. In addition, the term “just jurist” has two components: to be expert in the most honourable of all sciences or *fiqh*, and to be just (ʿādil).

Sixth: the just jurists have the same authority and guardianship that the Prophet and the *Imāms* had and therefore it is incumbent for every believer to obey them. Despite the different statuses that the Prophet and jurists have, since their duties are the same and equal, their rights for establishing government is the same and equal (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 50-51ff).

Seventh: by *wilāya* of the Prophet and the *Imāms*, Khomeini means government, authority and administration, and by *wilāya* of jurists he means a contractual non-divine office by which an individual is appointed to take responsibility of the other. Interestingly enough, he equates the office of the *wilāya* of the just jurists to the appointment of custodian for the abdicated (Khomeini, 1390, p. 51).

Eighth: the establishment of the Islamic government is *fard/farīda* (duty) or *wājib al-ʿaynī* for jurists, and they must rise either individually or collectively to fulfil
this mission. Thus, the subject matter of *Wilāyat-i Faqīh* is duties fulfilled by jurists and among them the execution of ḥudūd (divine ordinances, legal punishments) is the most vital (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 52-53ff).

Ninth: in terms of method, he only uses transmitted sources which entail *aḥādīth* of the Prophet and of the *Imāms* which are about the office of the imamate and of the role of ʿulemā as the heirs of the mantle of the Prophet. According to these *aḥādīth*, ʿulemā not only inherit his science, but also his guardianship and power as well (Khomeini, 1390, p. 103). These *aḥādīth* depict fuqahā in the age of the Occultation as “the successors of the Prophet”, “the citadel of Islam”, “the proof of the *Imām* for people”, and “the trustees of the prophets” (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 59-75).

Tenth: In his arguments for the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, Khomeini goes beyond the typical understanding of the office of *fiqāḥa*, in which the two functions of judgeship and issuing *fatwā* had traditionally been recognized for fuqahā (Khomeini, 1390, p. 76ff). He took this a step further and argued for the duty of fuqahā in the establishment of the Islamic government in order to execute the ḥudūd. For Khomeini, judgeship and statecraft are two faces of one coin (Khomeini, 1390, p. 84ff). In fact, Khomeini’s argument that the right of ʿulemā to exercise authority in public and politics, which originates from the office of judgeship, has a well-established tradition in *Shīʿa* jurisprudence; since it was Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413 H/948) who, for the first time, argued that ʿulemā have the right “to run the important office of qāḍī [judge] on behalf of the *Imām*” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 71).

The reason for that is self-evident. Early *Shīʿa* jurists had to cooperate with the Sunni governments in administrating justice, and therefore scholars such as the above-
mentioned al-Mufid and his student Shaykh (Seyyed/Sharīf) al-Murtādā ‘Alam ul-Hudā (d. 436 H/1044) suggested ways to justify and legitimize working under a non-Shī‘a government (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 71). Finally: the Islamic government is a “unique unprecedented” type of governance which could be classified as a constitutional domination in which rulers are conditioned to the Qur‘ān and the tradition of the Prophet (Khomeini, 1390, p. 43). Regarding this, wilāya, which indicates the execution of the religious laws or ḥudūd, is not inconsistent with this interpretation of constitutionalism and is actually the executive dimension of it (Khomeini, 1390, p. 51).

It is not only Wilāyat-i Faqīh which entails Khomeini’s conception of wilāya, as he has elaborated on this theory in al-Rasā’il as well. In this all-juridical text, Khomeini, “relying upon both rational and traditional proofs ... [supports] this case that during the messianic infallible Ima‘m’s prolonged Occultation, the jurisconsult, by virtue of being his indirect deputy, has both the mandate and the responsibility not only to interpret Islamic rulings on matters of devotion and personal affairs, but also in the social realm, and to manage the state’s affair on behalf of the Ima‘m” (Mavani, 2013, p. 180). Therefore, the jurist’s authority is not only regarded as the extension of the Ima‘ams’, but also “reveals the intimate and organic relationship between the imamate and wilāyat al-faqīh” (Mavani, 2013, p. 180). Mavani calls this ‘revolutionizing of the imamate’, “such that it came to be viewed as uninterrupted and continuous (mustamar), with the right to rule assigned to jurists during the Occultation” (Mavani, 2013, pp. 180-181).
In terms of his transmitted methodology, Khomeini mainly focuses on two ḥadīth, one by Omar ibn Ḥanẓalih, famous as ‘Maqbūla-yi Omar ibn-Ḥanẓalih’ (Khomeini, 1368 shamsī/1410, vol.2, pp. 104-107), and the other, known as ‘Mashhūra-yi abī-Khadijah’ (Khomeini, 1368 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 109-111). These are not, however, the only aḥādīth being used by him, but are the most reliable ones. His arguments in Wilāyat-i Faqīh were also developed on the basis of these two ḥadīth, which are about the office of fiqāha and that of the just jurist as the heir of the Prophet and the Imāms; given that just jurists have the right to issue fatwā and sit on the seat of the Prophet to judge among people. On the basis of these two functions, Khomeini argues that if jurists are the heirs of the Prophet, they should inherit his legacy entirely, including the right of governance. (Khomeini, 1368 shamsī, vol.2, pp. 94ff). Khomeini’s other transmitted source is verse fifty-nine of the sūra al-Nisāʾ of the Qurʾān, which says: “O you who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you” (Nasr, 2015, p. 219). In his interpretation of the verse, Khomeini maintains that ulu-l-amr (those in authority) refers to just jurists who occupy the office of political guardianship over people (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 83ff)29.

The idea of rulers as ulu al-amr was not confined to Khomeini, and should be understood in the context of the “Renaissance of Islamic law” (Mallat, 1993, p. 14) which had started in other parts of the Shi‘a world. As Chibli Mallat observes, the ʿulemā of the Najaf seminary, and particularly Muḥammad Bāqir as-Ṣadr as the pioneer whose exegesis was “peculiar in the Shi‘a world” (Mallat, 1993, p. 65), had the same understanding of the Qurʾānic term, though their cornerstone was verse forty-four of the fifth sūrah (al-Māʾidah, lit. the Table Spread). In it, Sadr found “the legitimation of the Islamic state and of the institutionalization of the ʿulemā’s position in it” (Mallat,

253
1993, p. 62). In addition to Sadr, the Egyptian scholar, Seyyed Quṭb (d. 1966), had the same insight and emphasized “the political dimension of the verse, as well as on the foundation of a ‘nucleus’ of the Islamic state in the Qurʾān” (Mallat, 1993, p. 65).

Muhsin Kadivar in Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī (Divine Government) has not only discredited these two, and other similar ṣaḥāḥīth, but has also argued that since in this verse obedience from ulu al-amr comes immediately after obedience to God and to the Prophet, ulu al-amr are not jurists, but the Imāms. He stresses that these three types of obedience are assumed to be equal, therefore the referent of ulu al-amr cannot be just jurists, because they are not equal to the Imāms and the Prophet. He adds that the prerequisite of absolute obedience is immunity from sin (ʿiṣma), which is gifted to the Prophet and to the Imāms. Kadivar concludes that the whole idea of wilāyat al-faqīh lacks rational as well as sufficient jurisdictional foundation, and as such the problematic of the political wilāya of the jurists remains doubtful and questionable (Kadivar, 1378a, passim).

The politicization of wilāya by Khomeini and his thought on the Islamic state, as Vanessa Martin ascertains, “emerged from a debate that had been in progress since the nineteenth century. ... The debate focused not simply on Islam as religion but on Islamic law, Islamic institutions, particularly those of education, and Islam as a political ideology” (Martin, 2007, p. 100), itself as a reaction to Westernization and modernization policies which had started with Riḍā Shah and culminated in the reform programmes of the 1960s and 1970s. During these two decades, the hierocracy had found itself on the defensive (Akhavi, 1980, pp. 91-116 & pp. 132-143), and, as has been observed, other reform programmes that had started simultaneously with the White Revolution and the death of Burūjerdī, neither received a wide circulation among the
population nor accomplished their purpose to affect the regime and conservative clerics. Yet, the theory of Khomeini offered an alternative to the crises of sovereignty and nation-building of the Pahlavi era. As Bakhah states, “the revolution, after all, defined itself in part against what was seen as the Shah’s excessive deference toward the United States and his excessive zeal for Westernization. The revolution, by contrast, stressed Islamic authenticity and identity” (Bakhah, 2011, p. 34).

Khomeini laid particular emphasis on Islamic law and its implementation through the apparatus of the Islamic government as the only sovereign ruler in post-revolutionary Iran. Distinguishing Islamic precepts into two categories of primary and secondary, Khomeini argues that the Islamic government and its laws should be treated as the referents of the former, or ʿāhkām-i awaliyya. For him, the Islamic government led by the just jurist has the absolute authority to issue decrees which not only stand superior to the constitution and the positive laws, but also have power over the precepts of Islam. In a letter to the president of the time, Ali Khamenei, Khomeini is certain that “the most important of divine precepts is the wilāya and government (ḥukūma) of the Prophet which is endowed to him by God and is superior to all secondary precepts. And since the Islamic government is a branch (shuʿba) and continuation of the wilāya of the Prophet, therefore, it should be treated as one of the primary precepts of the religion. Such a government as one of ʿāhkām-i awaliyya, is not only legitimate to suspend the secondary precepts, but also the primary ones like ʿalāt, fasting, and ʿajj, as well”.

Regarding Khomeini’s belief in the status of the Islamic government and of the faqīh, scholars like Moin argued that his absolute power originates from his ʿirfānī
wilāya and stands in contradiction to orthodox Islam in which nothing is above divine rules (Moin, 1999, p. 296). Moin’s outlook on Khomeini’s ʿirfānī wilāya, with regard to our discussion on the latter’s mystical guardianship in the previous chapter, does not seem plausible. Besides, as Ridgeon discusses, Khomeini’s appeal for “the full extent of power that the Islamic government could exercise” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 219), should be understood in the shadow of the events of 1987-1988 in which Khomeini not only finally accepted the priority of the Islamic government over all divine commandments, but also commanded the formation of the Commission for the Determination of the Interest of the Islamic Order (majmaʿ-i tashkhīṣ-i maṣlaḥat-i nizām).

As a jurist, Khomeini believed in political jurisprudence, and since the most central question in political jurisprudence is ‘Islamic government’, his arguments for government in Islam and its legal status in the constitution of the post-revolutionary Iran should be understood from the perspective of a faqīh. The preservation of Islamic government as well as the implementation of Islamic laws were his main concerns. However, Moin is right that Khomeini’s belief in the suspension of primary precepts of Islam contradicts orthodox jurisprudence, but, this does not stem from his position as an ʿārif, but as a statesman who had to deal with the requirements of state-building and constitution-making in post-revolutionary Iran.

5.5. Wilāyat al-Faqīh: Post-Khomeini Era

5.5.1. Muntaẓirī, the Movement of Reform and the Evolution of the Theory of wilāyat al-faqīh

Husayn ʿAlī Muntaẓirī was born in 1301 shamsī/1922, into a humble family in Najaf Abad, twenty-four kilometres to the west of Isfahan. He entered the seminary of Isfahan when he was twelve years old and stayed there for seven years. In Isfahan he
studied with scholars such as Ḥājj Aqā Raḥīm Arbāb (d. 1355 shamsī/1977) and Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥassan ʿĀlim Najaf Ābādī (d. 1344 shamsī/1966), himself the student of Jahāngīr Khān Qashqāʾī (d. 1290 shamsī/1910) and Mullā Muḥammad Ākhund Kāshānī, known as Ākhund Kāsh (d. 1294 shamsī/1914). Before moving to Qum to complete his studies in jurisprudence and philosophy, Muntāẓirī through his masters in Isfahan, was connected to and inspired by two significant intellectual trends of his time: the ʿusūlī jurisprudence which was the predominant juridical school and Șadrīan ḥikmat; though during his entire life, he remained more of a faqīh than a ḥakīm. In Qum, he was acquainted with Ayatollah Khomeini, whose interest and skill in Akbarīan mysticism, Șadrīan ḥikmat and ʿusūlī jurisprudence were discussed extensively in the previous chapter.

During Khomeini’s exile in Najaf, Muntāẓirī was appointed as his plenipotentiary representative and played a key role in disseminating his master’s ideas to his followers in Iran and maintaining Khomeini’s connection with the bazaar. Muntāẓirī was elected to a number of important offices after the Revolution of 1979, most notably leadership of the Assembly of Experts of the Constitution (majlis-i khubrigān-i qānūn-i asāsī), the Friday prayer of Qum and finally, one-time heir apparent to Khomeini. He wrote extensively on jurisprudence, the principles of jurisprudence, political jurisprudence, modern laws and criminal laws. He trained many students, all of whom became in different ways key figures of the Islamic regime, and a few of them in later years, became religious reformers and intellectuals who played important roles in the movement for reform which had started in late 1360 shamsī/1980. From among the latter, one can mention figures such as the late Aḥmad Qābil (also Ghābil, d. 1391.
If it were not for the ceaseless efforts of Muntazirī, the idea of wilāyat al-faqīh would not have been incorporated into the Constitution of the new establishment. Since the task at hand is the study and analysis of the developments of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh in the subsequent years, the debates of the Assembly of Experts of the Constitution in the formative days of the Islamic system, will not be discussed. Much research has been conducted on the role of Muntazirī in the Council and, on the debates of the members on the nature and articles of the new Constitution. Comparing the stances of figures such as Seyyed Muhammad Ḥusaynī Bihishti (d. 1360 shamsī/1981), Akbar Ḥāshimī Rafsanjānī (d. 1395 shamsī/2017), Abu’l-Ḥasan Banīṣadr and Mahmūd Ṭāliqānī (d. 1358 shamsī/1979), all of them members of the Council, Ulrich von Schwerin believes that it was Muntazirī who was “the most senior clerical defendant” of the article on wilāyat al-faqīh (Schwerin, 2015, p. 54). Addressing Muntazirī’s ‘radical’ position on the necessity of incorporating the article of wilāyat al-faqīh into the Constitution, Schwerin clarifies that Muntazirī warned of endorsing a Constitution in which the article is not mentioned; because for him, the goal of the revolution was to have the clergy elected as the head of the State and to write an Islamic Constitution (Schwerin, 2015, p. 55).

Muntazirī’s reading of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh had three phases: the first position he held (from the beginning of his career until 1979), was ‘the collective guardianship of jurists’, which had seemingly been adopted under the influence of Ayatollah Burūjerdī’s concept of wilāya and the role of faqīh in society. Secondly,
Muntaẓirī revised this viewpoint in favour of the single role of the faqīh who is appointed by God and not people and acts as the representative of the Imām during his Occultation. The position was adopted as the official reading of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh and, as has already been observed, incorporated into the final draft of the Constitution. The third position taken by him around 1364 shamsī/1985, shortly before his election to the office of heir apparent to Khomeini37 (the main concern of the research here), looked for a “greater respect of the interests of people and better control of the government” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 86), and can be regarded as a return to his first position. Given this, however, Schwerin is certain that the new position, neither allowed for a democratic reading of the role of people, nor was clear on how respect for the interests of people should be achieved (Schwerin, p. 86).

5.5.1.1. *Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī*

*Dirāsāt fi al-Wilāyat al-Faqīh wa al-Fiqh al-Duwal Islāmī* (Studies on Wilāyat al-Faqīh and the Jurisprudence of the Islamic States), was a series of lectures given by Muntaẓirī circa 1364 shamsī/1985, in which he discussed political jurisprudence and the responsibilities of the just jurist to society and to people. The Arabic edition was published in four volumes, of which two volumes were translated into Persian three years later and published as *Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī*. In the introduction to the first volume of the book, Muntaẓirī uses transmitted sources (the Qurʾān and ḥadīth) to argue that according to a juridical primal principle (*aṣl-i īlā*) Man is created free by his natural disposition and no one has guardianship or authority over another (Muntaẓirī, 1379, vol. 1, p. 111). Quoting from *al-Makāsib* of Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī (d. 1281 H/1864), he maintains that the above-mentioned principle is a juridical axiom and
should be used as a stepping-stone for any juridical arguments; although God, the Prophet, the Imāms, and the just jurist are excluded from this principle as they have right to exercise *wilāya* over people (Muntaẓīrī, 1379, vol. 1, pp. 111-113).

Muntaẓīrī applies evidence from transmitted sources to sustain his arguments for the necessity of having a just government. Man is a social animal by nature, he maintains, and having government is sufficiently self-evident not to require proof (Muntaẓīrī, 1379, vol. 1, pp. 89-90). Therefore, the community of people needs to have a guardian/government (Muntaẓīrī uses both these terms interchangeably) to establish order and security (Muntaẓīrī, 1379, p. 90 ff). In the second volume of the book subtitled, *Imamate wa Rahbarī* (Imamate and Leadership), he lists the qualifications for the ideal Islamic leader according to transmitted and rational sources. Quoting from Muslim philosophers, theologians, jurists like Aḥmad Narāqī and scholars such as ibn Khaldūn, Montaẓīrī develops his arguments for the office of the Just Leader (*ḥākim-i ʿādil*). Using the same *ḥadīth* sources, and also the *Qurʾānic āyah* of *ulu al-amr*, as Khomeini and prior to him Burūjerdi, he argues that during the Occultation of the Imām, the *fuqahā* are regarded as his general vicegerents (*nāʾib al-ʿāmm*) (Muntaẓīrī, 1379, vol.2, pp. 211-218). His interpretation of the term *ulu al-amr* is also reminiscent of his master’s, in that the just jurists are the guardians of the cause and, since the office of *wilāya* is modulated, they stand after God, the Prophet and the Imāms; however, their *wilāya* is confined to the execution of the *sharīʿa* laws and not creating law (Muntaẓīrī, 1379 vol.2, pp. 224-229).

Muntaẓīrī sets himself apart from Khomeini and his theory when he gives people their rights in choosing the leader. He uses the verb *inʿiqād* (lit. to ratify) to argue that
the office of political leadership (imamate in Muntaziri’s words) achieves legitimacy only by the people’s ratification. To this end, he brings a variety of transmitted and rational sources, among them the first āyah of the sūrah al-Mā‘īdah is significant: “O you who believe! Fulfill your pacts” (Muntaziri, 1379, vol.2, p. 286). It is notable because he reads the Qur’ānic term ‘contracts’ (‘uqūd, single. ‘aqd) from a modern perspective and like a contractarian. His argument for imamate as a contract goes beyond the classical term of shūrā (consultation), which had been used by his predecessors to sustain their arguments for the legitimacy of the Islamic government after the Constitutional Revolution. Unlike shūrā, the concept of ‘aqd actively involves people as signatories of the contract that actualizes the office of imamate.

Along with the āyah of ‘aqd, Muntaziri transmits several ḥadīth as well as historical examples of bay‘ah (lit. a sale or a commercial transaction, though in Islamic terminology it is an oath of allegiance to a leader), to sustain his arguments for the new wīlāyat al-faqīh (Muntaziri, 1379, vol.2, pp. 304-326). In contrast to Khomeini’s kalāmī reading, Muntaziri’s interpretation of the theory of wīlāyat al-faqīh acquires a philosophical aura, not only because he is inspired by, and quotes from Muslim philosophers, but also because he offers a new reading of the Qur’ānic term ‘‘aqd’ which endorses the role of people in choosing the leader.

Evaluating Muntaziri’s new reading, Schwerin is certain that although his lectures “clearly showed that he wanted greater respect of the interests of the people and better control of the government, … it remains unclear how this should be achieved” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 86). In addition, the new wīlāyat al-faqīh should not be regarded as a democratic government, nor as a check and balance mechanism to ensure
Muntasirī lacked knowledge of Western philosophy and modern political thought which could definitely have provided him with an understanding of what a modern democratic government looks like. Moreover, in terms of new arrangements such as popular election, democratic checks and balances, and modern understanding of the sovereignty of the state, Shi‘a jurisprudence is poor and unprepared to be exposed to modern questions. Despite this, Muntasirī’s new reading was not only in contrast to Khomeini’s wilāyat al-faqīh which had been incorporated into the post-revolutionary constitution, but also it stood in opposition to “the doctrine of the absolute guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat-i muṭlaqa-yi faqīh) which was adopted as the official doctrine in 1988” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 86).

5.5.1.2. People’s Rights

Muntasirī’s revised theory centres on the concept of people’s rights (ḥaqq al-nās). It seems that Man and his rights had become his main concern after his dismissal from the office of heir apparent in 1368 shamsī/1990. He wrote an independent book entitled Risāla-yi Ḥuqūq (the Book of Rights) on the conception of Ḥaqq (rights) and its place in Shi‘a jurisprudence. The book was written in 1383 shamsī/2004 and discusses the concept of people’s rights from different perspectives, such as natural rights (and the classification of the rights to life, living, and the right of determination), Man’s rights toward society and toward himself, the rights of nations, and the reciprocal rights of Man and society. Distinguishing between natural laws (ḥuqūq-i fītrī) and positive laws (ḥuqūq-i qarārdādī), Muntasirī argues that the latter are man-made laws that oblige an action, describe the establishment of specific rights for an individual or group, and, as a
double-faceted entity, produce both rights and responsibilities. The former (natural laws), however, comprise inherent rights, having been conferred not by act of legislation but by God, nature, or reason (Muntazirī, 1383 shamsî/2004, pp. 11-21).

Quoting Imâm Ali in Nahj al-Balâgha, Muntazirī argues that people’s rights and the rights of God (ḥuqūq-i ilâhî) are inseparable, because in Islamic tradition people’s rights have priority over the rights of God, and are regarded as an introduction to them. The right of human dignity (ḥaqq-i karâmat-i insânî) is one of Man’s essential rights and should act as a foundation for positive laws (ḥuqûq-i mawdû’a). Referring to the Qur’ânî āyah which indicates Man’s exalted status in the cosmos and his office of vicegerency (khaliżat al-lâhî)42, Muntazirī maintains that Man has inherent dignity and respect (karâmat wa ḥurmat) and therefore, their violation is abominable (Muntazirī, 1383 shamsî/2004, pp. 31-39). Turning his attention to positive laws, he makes arguments for the reciprocal rights of people and government and argues that people are obliged by God to choose their rulers (the right of determination) (Muntazirī, 1383 shamsî/2004, pp. 60-63).

Along with Risâla-yi Ḥuqûq, Muntazirī’s conception of people’s rights is cited in another book containing the questions submitted to him by his followers and/or students. Answering these questions, Muntazirī clarifies his stance on people’s rights which had been theorized before, either in Mabânî Fiqhî Ḥukûmat-i Islâmî or in the Risâla-yi Ḥuqûq. Ḥukûmat-i Dînî wa Ḥuqûq-i Insân (Religious Government and People’s Rights) was written in 1387 shamsî/2008, one year before his death, and contains the ideas of a jurist who is at the climax of his knowledge, experience and political activity. On the nature of government and politics in Islam, Muntazirī argues that Ḥukûmat-i Dînî
(religious government or *wilāyat al-faqīh*) is the preferred form of governance and statecraft, although the political leader (the just jurist) is not appointed by God but is an elected ruler by popular election. People use the right of governance (*ḥaqq-i ḥukmrānī*) which has been conferred on them by God to choose *walī* and to remove him from the office whenever he acts against their interests (Muntaẓirī, 1387 *shamsī* /2008, pp. 9-12). Therefore, the office of *wilāyat al-faqīh* does not entail absolute power and an unlimited term (Schwerin, 2015, p. 177).

According to Muntaẓirī, there exists two readings of *wilāyat al-faqīh*. The first one which is called the theory of appointment (*naṣb*), is the official reading and as it sounds, defends the idea of divine appointment of the jurist in which there is no room for the people's right to choose their leader. According to the second reading which is called the theory of [popular] election (*nakhb*) and is Muntaẓirī's principal concern, the guardianship of the jurist is actualized only when people elect him as their leader. This is because the office of *wilāya* entails the right of *taṣrīf*/*taṣarruf* (lit. to take upon one under guardianship) and without the vote of the people, the *walī* will not be able to govern them and take responsibility for their lives. Therefore, the legitimacy of the office of *wilāya* depends on people as the owners of the right of sovereignty. In terms of the form of religious government, Muntaẓirī clarifies that as long as the content is religious and the government meets the spiritual needs and requirements of people, the form can be different, although religious government is founded on the basis of the separation of powers (Muntaẓirī, 1387 *shamsī* /2008, pp. 12-15).

In such a government, the role and the authority of the *walī* is limited to issuing *fatwā* and supervision and he cannot execute laws (Muntaẓirī, 1387 *shamsī* /2008, p.
Muntażirî’s argument for the impossibility of divine appointment of the jurist is founded on a rational (ʿaqlī) basis: it is not possible for him to be appointed by God, because rationally no one is able to prove such an appointment. In other words, human intellect and reason are not enough, and therefore, the divine source of wali’s guardianship remains controversial in the time of Occultation (Muntażirî, 1387 shamsî/2008, p. 15). Montažirî extracts the people’s right of sovereignty from the right of determination, which, as observed earlier in this chapter, is itself a natural law and a part of human dignity (karāmat-i insānî) (Muntażirî, 1387 shamsî/2008, pp. 16-17).

Addressing the significance of people’s rights, Schwerin is certain that while Montažirî “was ready to compromise on the sharīʿa if this was in the interest of the State, he was not willing to sacrifice his principles for the sake of personal power or to close his eyes to the systematic violation of people’s rights” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 88).

Supervision (niżārat) and not guardianship of the jurist is the desirable form of the wilāyat al-faqīh, and it will be achieved only when people are able to elect the leader. In addition to internal mechanisms of checks and balances like justice (ʿidālat), external mechanisms should also be established to prevent the transformation of supervision to guardianship (Muntażirî, 1387 shamsî/2008, pp. 22-23). Montažirî does not clarify what he means by these mechanisms, however, one can imagine the separation of powers is one of them to ensure the people have the right to vote. The faqīh also cannot impose his viewpoint on minority, and therefore, his authority remains confined to supervision of the process of legislation to ensure that the laws which are ratified by the parliament are not contradictory to Islam (Muntażirî, 1387 shamsî/2008, pp. 22-23). His new theory has the potential for rebellion and resistance and allows people to break their contract with government (here Islamic government) whenever they are
not satisfied with it, or, when it rules arbitrarily (Muntaziri, 1387 shamsi/2008, pp. 56-57).

To sum up, Muntaziri’s conception of *wilāyat al-faqīh* needs to be understood in the light of the concept of people’s rights, which enabled him to revise his initial theory in which people were devoid of any subjectivity or agency. However, the appearance of this concept in the terminology of Muntaziri was a necessity of its time. To this end, he started with a juridical axiom that nobody has *wilāya* over the other, because Man is born free. Therefore, jurisdictionally, *wilāya* is not self-evident as Khomeini argued, but an exception. In other words, sufficient rational reasons are needed to prove *wilāya* for a guardian in personal affairs, but the extension of *wilāyat al-faqīh* into the public domain, is not only possible but necessary (*iḍṭirār*) to prevent chaos and disorder (Muntaziri, 1387 shamsi/2008, pp. 144-145). The just jurist gains legitimacy and popularity from election through which his *wilāya* becomes actualized, and since rational reasons are insufficient to prove the divine source of the *wilāya* of the just jurist, *wilāyat al-faqīh* lacks a credible foundation in Islamic jurisprudence. In his quest to limit the powers of the jurist, Muntaziri not only redefined the office of *wilāya* more as supervision and less as guardianship, but also sought to “strengthen the people’s participation in politics in order to safeguard their will and to prevent the abuse of their rights” (Schwerin, 2015, pp. 147-148).

Muntaziri believed in renewing his theory, and the footprint of his era was visible in his revision. He wrote two articles after the victory of Seyyed Muhammad Khatami to presidency in 1997, entitled *Wilāyat-i Faqīh wa Qānūn-i Asāsī* (the Guardianship of the Jurist and the Constitution) and *Ḥukūmat-i Mardumī wa Qānūn-i*
Asāsī (Popular Government and the Constitution), both of them centred on the idea of people’s rights. In the former, he rejected the idea of the absoluteness of the wilāya of the Prophet and the Imāms, arguing that it is only God, and not any individual, that has absolute guardianship over people (Muntaẓirī, 1377 shamsī/1998, pp. 31-65). In the latter work, he maintained that even the Prophet and the Imāms needed popular legitimacy to actualize their wilāya (Muntaẓirī, 1378 shamsī/1999, pp. 171-233). From the time of writing Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī in 1988, until the publication of his last book Ḥukūmat-i Dinī wa Ḥuqūq-i Insān in 2008, in which the imprint of the Green Movement was undeniable,44 Montaẓirī maintained his outlook about the nature of the office of wilāya as being elective and not appointive. For him, wilāyat al-faqīh was equal to wilāyat al-fiqh or the correct implementation of religion in society; a goal which is only attainable through supervision and not guardianship (Muntaẓirī, 1378 shamsī/1999, pp. 181-184).

Muntaẓirī’s ideas were taken further by one of his students, Muhsin Kadivar, whose critiques on wilāyat al-faqīh have, so far, been some of the most serious on this theory. Kadivar criticizes Montaẓirī’s theory both on the basis of the transmitted sources he uses (Maqbūla-yi Omar ibn-Ḥanẓaliḥ and Mashhūra-yi abī-Khadijah),45 and the ways he makes arguments to sustain his thesis. Moreover, he has always been an open opponent of the leadership of Ali Khamenei, whose wilāya stems from the rights given to him in the revised Constitution. Following Montaẓirī, Kadivar believes that from the two rights of judgeship and issuing fatwā, which are traditionally designated to the jurists, as well as the mandate of the office of fiqāhat over the community of believers as the only legitimate heir of the legacy of the Prophet and the Imāms, one cannot bring about the wilāya of any individual jurist, let alone the absolute
guardianship. Yet, if in Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī, Kadivar is doubtful whether the right of governance in the Islamic jurisprudence is extractable from the wilāya of the jurist, or from the area which is called “Islamic market regulations” (umūr-i ḥisbiya/ḥisba) (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 52), in his recent writings he adopts a different stance and questions the whole idea of wilāyat al-faqīh. Both Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī and Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shī‘a were written almost twenty years ago and do not represent the viewpoint of a scholar who, in recent years, has reviewed his initial ideas.

In his recent article entitled wilāyat al-faqīh and Democracy, Kadivar maintains that the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh “lacks any credible religious basis for its deployment in the political sphere” (Kadivar, 2011, p. 219). Studying its background in Shī‘a jurisprudence, Kadivar is certain that “wilāyat al-faqīh has risen out of a sort of false expectation of the purview of Islamic jurisprudence” (Kadivar, 2011, p. 221), and should rather be regarded as

“a reflection of the Iranian theory of kingdom and Eastern despotism in the mind and essence of Shī‘a jurists, which has also been corroborated by the Platonic theory of the philosopher-king. Its absolutism can be traced in the absolute wilāya of the perfect human being in ibn ‘Arabi’s Sufism. It seems that traditional Islamic jurisprudence imbued with such notions as the principle of non-wilāyat, the principle of sovereignty (all people are the masters of their properties), and the principle of consensus (rulership over the people is not legitimate without their consent), cannot be compatible in the public sphere with the notion of wilāyat al-faqīh” (Kadivar, 2011, p. 221).
5.6. Conclusion

Some lessons have been learnt from the conception of *wilāyat al-faqīh* in the juridical writings of Khomeini, as well as its further development in the reform movement initiated by Muntasirī and later implemented by Kadivar:

Unlike mystical *wilāya* which is as old as Islamic mysticism, the idea of *wilāyat al-faqīh* is a new chapter in *Shīʿa* jurisprudence and dates back to Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī’s *al-Makāṣib* which was written two hundred years ago (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 109), though despite its short life, it has undergone transformation. As observed in the previous chapter, by the time of Khomeini, the mystical conception of *wilāya* had already reached its culmination and from this perspective, Khomeini’s contribution looks old. In terms of the arguments he makes and the sources he uses, it is as if it had been written hundreds of years ago. The juridical *wilāya*, in contrast, has gone through a tremendous change; not only in the hands of Khomeini but also his preceding jurists like Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī and Shaykh Jaʿfar Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ. The politicization of *Shīʿa* jurisprudence, which coincided with Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah’s reign (d. 1213 shamsī/1834), in later years led to significant changes, among them the emergence of the constitutional jurisprudence and the formation of the political jurisprudence of Khomeini are notable. Socio-political developments acted as a midwife to facilitate the delivery of the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*. In other words, political jurisprudence and particularly the conception of *wilāya* have been exposed to external environment and for its part, impacted on it as well.

By ‘external environment’ I mean the two political systems of Qajar and Pahlavi, their policies (secularization and westernization), and their relationships with foreign
countries which, in the eyes of the hierocracy, had resulted in the domination of non-Muslims over a Muslim land. Therefore, for the hierocracy, Islam was both a safe haven in which they could take refuge, and a rich source of inspiration that could help them find a solution to the crisis of state-formation and nation-building. Although Khomeini, by the time of the revolution, did not have a “specific vision of the Islamic state” (Martin, 2007, p. 127), his objective from the time of the writing Kashf, was a state governed by jurists. To be more precise, he never gave up his belief in the superiority of the Islamic sharīʿa over all other kinds of laws, nor in the legitimacy of the ‘ulemā as the only legitimate political leaders.

In the case of the political jurisprudence of Muntazirī, the footprint of time is more identifiable. His theory, in contrast to Khomeini’s, underwent considerable change and revision. He had enough courage to review and criticize his ideas to make them responsive to new questions, and from this perspective, he is unique among Iranian politicians. His example, as Schwerin observes, highlights “it’s changing motives and objectives and its internal rules and external limits as well as the evolving role of religious authority and political power in the shaping of the discourse” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 5). Muntazirī’s latest theory, which advocates the idea of the popular election of the just jurist, seems to be a return to a view he had expressed forty years earlier, but the emphasis he puts on people’s rights and on the limited terms of the faqīh’s leadership are new, and can be traced back to socio-political changes in the past two decades of the Iranian politics. Therefore, scholars like Kadivar who have put themselves in anguish to prove that Muntazirī’s theory should be regarded as a continuation of Khomeini’s wilāyat al-faqīh, need to revise their outlook, as these two theories have a resemblance in name only (Kadivar, 1378 a, pp. 148 & 211). Muntazirī’s
revised theory, unlike that of Khomeini, recognizes two sources of legitimacy: divine will and people’s sovereignty.

Kadivar’s example displays an actual break from the existing tradition of political jurisprudence in general, and the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh* in particular; not only because he believes in the incompatibility of democracy (his political ideal) and the guardianship of the jurist (in which he has already lost his hope and belief), but also because he cannot identify any jurisdictional element or heritage in it. Like Muntazirî, his belief in the *wilāyat al-faqīh* underwent changes and finally resulted in total rejection of the right of the just jurist to govern. For Kadivar, this theory is groundless in *fiqh* and its roots should be traceable in areas other than jurisprudence. For him, both as an intellectual and a political activist, the life of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, as a theory and in action, has come to an end. Regardless of its internal paradoxes and inconsistencies, Iran’s existing political apparatus, which is founded on this theory, due to the socio-political developments of time and the weight and force of republicanism as the second wing of the Islamic Republic, is doomed to failure.

Recapitulating the methodology used, all the three scholars whose outlooks on *wilāyat al-faqīh* are studied in this chapter, shaped their ‘webs of beliefs’ as “networks of interconnected concepts with the concepts and the connections between them; being defined in part, by beliefs about external reality” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 ff), against the inherited tradition of their time, though in contact with it. Khomeini and his Sunni peers broke away from traditional jurisprudence by replacing it with a radical reading of some Qur’ānic verses. In the same way, Muntazirî formed his ‘webs of beliefs’ against the official theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh* as the inherited tradition, though he maintained
his loyalty to it. For him, this theory, had been distorted and needed to be corrected by the razor of the reform. Kadivar's gradual, but consistent, move away from the tradition of political Islam resulted in his denial of *wilāyat al-faqīh*. He is still a student of the school of the reform movement, but with no concern or interest in political dimension of it. Addressing the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, Kadivar shaped his ‘web of beliefs’ in contrast to the inherited tradition of his time and with no reciprocal connection to, or exchange with it.

---


5. The text of the constitution is accessible here: <http://m-hosseini.ir/mashrōt/articles-3-278.pdf>, last accessed 3/29/17.

6. ‘Ali Akbar Ḩikami Zādīh, the son of Shaykh Mahdī Qumī, was one of the most well-known scholars of Qum in the early twentieth century. He had such a reputation and popularity to the extent that when Shaykh ‘Abdulkarīm Ḥā’irī Yazdī moved to Qum from Arak, he resided in his home. ‘Ali Akbar, the author of *Asrār-i Hizār Sālih* was a young student in Qum when he started revising his ideas, and was very inspired by Ahmad Kasravi, the notable Iranian linguist, historian and reformer who was murdered on March 11, 1324 shamsī/1946. In the *Asrār*, Ḩikami Zādīh sets forth a number of questions and critiques against Islam, *Shī‘ism* and *Shi’a ‘ulema*.

7. For a historical account of hierocracy in Iran after the Constitutional Revolution to the present time, see: Mehdi Khalaji, *Naẓm-i Nuwīn-i Rawḥānīyyat dar Iran* (the New Clerical Order in Iran), 1389 shamsī/2010 (Bochum: Aida Publication).


9. By ‘intention’, I mean ‘weak intention’ or ‘individual viewpoint’ or ‘expressed beliefs’ which, as it is observed in the Introduction (C.2., pp. 19-24) are equal to ‘hermeneutic meanings’, whose discovery should only be the task of the historian of ideas. To recall Bevir, ‘weak intention’ is “the meaning an utterance had for its author or a later reader, whether consciously or unconsciously” (Bevir, 2004, p.
and therefore, if the task of the historian of ideas is “to study only the meaning of the action” (Bevir, 2004, p. 135), then he needs to concern himself only with the beliefs it expresses (Bevir, 2004, pp. 135 ff).


11 - As Fatemeh E. Moghadam has shown, during the 1960s and 1970s, the rural economy of Iran experienced major structural changes due to two important forces: “deliberate government policies aimed at introducing structural changes in the countryside, and the rapidly growing, industrializing, and urbanizing Iranian economy stimulated by rising oil revenues” (Moghadam, 1996, p. 1). In agricultural policy of the regime which had been incorporated into the White Revolution, three phases were identifiable: land reform of 1962-7 that resulted in massive redistribution of land from landlords to peasants, the establishment of large-scale farms which lasted from 1967-76 and “the acceptance of the status quo in land property relations without any further attempt by the government to alter them” and lasted from 1976 to 1979 (Moghadam, 1996, p. 2). The agricultural policies changed the traditional land relations for ever and resulted in the increased power of the Shah, also paved the way for the Islamic revolution of 1979.

12 - Akhavi mentions another initiative which was conducted shortly before the abovementioned book. He calls it the first reform movement which started immediately after the death of Burújerdí. Akhavi, Op.cit, 1980, pp. 117-119.

13 - For a comprehensive review of the book and the context in which the book is written, see: Akhavi, Ibid, pp. 119-129.

14 - Akhavi has categorized the “pattern of ʿulemaʾs behavior” into four factions of radicals, social reformers, the conservatives, and finally those who wanted to cooperate with the court. Khomeini, as it is mentioned above, was leading the radicals and it seems that the more his status was lower, the more radical his stance was. Akhavi, Ibid, pp. 100-105.

15 - As Vanessa Martin shows, the hierocracy during 1960s had experienced a growing power, and as the country and the state that grew wealthier, so did the clergy. The increased contribution from the believers and the increased number of mosques, madrasas, and religious students testify to the fact that “the clergy remained an important source of referral on personal law and conduct. They also branched out into publishing, the establishment of Islamic societies, and welfare activities, all of which ensured their influence among the ʿShʿaʾ community remained high” (Martin, 2007, p. 24).

16 - With the full name of Dr. Seyyed Ḥassan Arsānǰānī, the minister of agriculture in the cabinet of Dr. 'Ali Amīnī (d. 1371 šamsi/1992), and the main figure who introduced the program of land reform in Iran.

17 - The cabinet of Assādullāh 'Alam (d. 1357 šamsi/1978) issued two new decrees on 17 January 1963. One was the Additional Articles and the other nationalized Iran’s forests and pastures. In order to obtain national approval of these and previous decrees, the Shah held the referendum (Majd, 2000, p. 218).

18 - For the chronology of Khomeini’s exile see this website: <http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Magazine/View/130/3638/17006/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AE%D9%85%D8%8C%D9%86%D8%B8-%D8%B3>, last accessed 3/25/17.

19 - In Islamic Law, taʿzīr refers to punishment, usually corporal, and that can be administered at the discretion of the judge as opposed to the ḥudūd which have been defined by the lawgiver.

20 - Anṣārī discusses the issue in his book al-Makāṣīb (Transactions). Many of his works also centre on ṣāḥīh and usūl al-Ṣāḥīh (the principles of jurisprudence). Al-Makāṣīb is a detailed exposition of Islamic commercial law and is taught in today’s ḥawzas.
Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī in his Wilāyat-i Faqīh; Wilāyat-i ‘Idālat wa Fiqāhat (the Guardianship of the Jurist, the Guardianship of Justice and Jurisprudence), stresses that in the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, the kalāmi and not the juridical reading of the office of wilāya, is preferred.

The phrase ‘kashf al-ghībat’ (to breach the veils) is a reminder of the abovementioned Kashf al-Asrār; or can be indicative of the influence of mysticism on Khomeini. Kashf (to unveil, to reveal) of an obstacle between God and servant is an important topic in Islamic mysticism.

Khomeini discusses wilāyat al-faqīh in Kitāb al-Ray' and there is a reason for that. When he was in Najaf, his old students who had moved with him from Iran to Iraq, asked him to continue his lectures from where they had stopped in Qum and he started his classes with transaction or Bay'. In the following, he broached the topic of the role and responsibility of the Islamic jurist as guardian or custodian of minors and the mentally deranged, in cases where the latter were involved in a transaction. It was at this point that Khomeini intentionally strayed from the normal legal trajectory of his subject matter to advance a political theory” (Rahnema, 2014, p. 89). Ali Rahnema has discussed the topic and its background extensively.


Obviously, reminiscent of Allāmah Ṭabātabā’ī’s definition of wilāya as “immutable law of nature” (Ṭabātabā’ī, 1341 shamsī, p. 75).

Hamid Mavani has the same reading and argues that “it appears that he [Khomeini] regards this concept as part of the madhhāb’s fundamentals, like justice and imamate, that ought to be grouped under “beliefs” rather than as a juridical opinion under jurisprudence. Of course, such a perspective would severely constrain the sphere of tolerance, deliberation, and disagreement on this concept” (Mavani, 2013, p. 183).


Mavani argues that Khomeini’s theory, as well as his understanding of the role and the office of imamate “is primarily political in nature” (Mavani, 2013, p. 9) and stands in contrast to the viewpoint of scholars such as Amir-Moezzi and Corbin who overemphasize Shi‘ism as a “suprarational esoteric tradition” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 19 in Mavani, 2013, p. 9).

Ayatollah Khomeini brings this āyah in al-Rasā’ī as well, though omits the controversial part which is on ulū-l-amr. So, the āyah is cited incomplete. See: Khomeini, vol. 2, pp. 111 - 117.


Along with the aforementioned verse, Şadr interprets the verse on ulū-l-amr as well to sustain his argument that the Islamic state is qualified to be part of ulū-l-amr: Mavani, like Mallat, estimates Şadr’s reading as “novel” which has paved the way for other Shi‘a scholars – such as Husayn ‘Ali Muntazārī – to argue that “jurists have a mandate to govern during the messianic Imām’s concealment” (Mavani, 2013, p. 150). Mavani, estimates Muntazārī’s elaboration on the theory as “quite anomalous in post-Occultation Shi‘a scholarship, [which] expanded the jurist’s scope of power and eliminated the plurality of authority in government ... [though] he advocated a role for the jurisconsult that was based on a social contract between the jurisconsult and the public” (Mavani, 2013, p. 155).

Khomeini’s letter as well as explanation on the concept of hukūmat-i Islāmī’s is stated in this website: <http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Article/View/5350>, last accessed 5/17/17.


Muḥammad Ḥassan Najaf Ābādī was born in 1230 shamsī in Najaf Abyad and entered the seminary of Isfahan to study jurisprudence and philosophy with figures such as Jahāngīr Khān Qashqāyī and Mullā Muḥammad Ākhund Kāshānī. After completing saṭḥ (intermediate level of the hawzawīs schooling), Najaf Ābādī emigrated to Najaf to attend the classes of Ākhund Khurāsānī (1329 H/1911) and Seyyed Muḥammad Kāzim Ṭabātabā’ī Yazdī (d. 1337/1919). He received the ijāza of Fattā from both Khurāsānī and Yazdī and came back to Iran to teach and train students in the seminary of Isfahan. Due to his skill in jurisprudence he became famous as Ālim (lit. learned, erudite scholar).
died in 1344 shamsi/1666 and was buried in Isfahan. He wrote a book entitled Faḍīlat al-Sīyāda wa Faḍā’il al-Sādāt (the Virtues of the House of the Prophet).

<http://www.hawzhah.net/fa/Magazine/View/2689/6585/76779/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%89%91%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%AE%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%81-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%8C>, last accessed 4/21/2017.

35 - The information about Muntazir'i's biography, teachers, studies, books and students are gained through:
36 - The Assembly was founded in the summer of 1358 shamsi/1979, headed by Muntazir, to write a new constitution for the Islamic regime. It convened on August 18 to consider the draft constitution written earlier and completed its deliberations on the rewriting of the constitution on November 15 of 1979. Finally, the constitution was approved by referendum on December 2 and 3 1979 by over 98 percent of the vote. The draft of the constitution was written by Hassan Ibrahim Ḥabibī (d. 1392 shamsi/2003) without any indication to wilāyat al-faqīh. Wilāyat al-faqīh as the form of the new government was incorporated into the final draft of the constitution by the efforts of Muntazir. Muḥsin Kadivar gives a lengthy account of Muntazir'i's stance on the article of the wilāyat al-faqīh in the Islamic constitution in his book Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyāt, Op.cit, 1378 a, pp. 185-187.
37 - Even before Muntazir became appointed as the heir apparent to Khomeini in 1364 shamsi/1985, he had started reviewing his opinion about wilāyat al-faqīh by giving lectures on the theoretical foundations and practical implications of this theory. The lectures were published in Arabic in 1988, though became translated into Persian entitled Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī (the Jurisdictional Foundations of Islamic Government), and is the main text containing Muntazir'i's reinterpretation of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.
38 - Husayn 'Alī Muntazir, Mabānī Fiqhi Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī (the Jurisdictional Foundations of the Islamic Government), translated into Persian by Mahmūd Ṣalawātī and Abu'l-Fadl Shakūrī, 8 volumes, 1367 shamsi(Tehran, Sarāyī publication).
39 - As it is observed earlier in this chapter, Khomeini used the same argument to prove the necessity of wilāyat al-faqīh for believers.
40 - Muḥsin Kadivar insists that Muntazir'i's revised theory is in fact in line with Khomeini's reading of wilāyat al-faqīh and should be regarded as the continuation of the latter's theory, and not in opposition to it. See: Muḥsin Kadivar, Op.cit, 1378 a, p. 148 & 212.
42 - There is a number of āyahs on Man's vicegerency, but Muntazir brings two of them; one in the sūrat al-Asrār (the Night Journey): "We have indeed honored the Children of Adam, and We carry them over land and sea, and provide them with good things, and We have favored them above many We have created" (Nasr, 2015, pp. 714-715). And the other in al-Mu'āminūn (the Believers): "Then of the drop We created a blood clot, then of the blood clot We created a lump of flesh, then of the lump of flesh, We created bones and We clothed the bones with flesh; then We brought him into being as another creation. Blessed is God, the best of creators!" (Nasr, 2015, p. 852).
43 - While in the Mabānī Muntazir maintained that the walis can execute the shari'ā laws. In terms of restricting the rights and the authority of the wali-ya faqīh to supervision and not execution of the laws, Ḥukūmat-i Dini is a more radical book and contains Muntazir'i's latest revision of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.
44 - As Sussan Šlavoshi is certain, the evolution of Muntazir'i's views on state-society relations did not end with the essay he wrote during the presidency of Khatami. She maintains that "the greater the state oppression and violation of people's rights after 2005, the more he objected and distanced himself from his earlier authoritarian position" (Šlavoshi, 2016, p. 44).
45 - As it is observed, Khomeini uses the same methods and sources.
Kadivar’s opinions are cited in his books, *Hukūmat-i Wilāyī* and *Nazarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shī‘a*, both of them used extensively throughout this thesis.

Schwerin, on the basis of *Hukūmat-i Wilāyī* and *Nazarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shī‘a*, which were written long time ago, comes to this conclusion that Kadivar does not provide his readers with his final opinion about wilāyat al-faqīh and leaves it to them to draw their own conclusion (Schwerin, 2015, p. 186). Considering Kadivar’s recent writings, such an outlook does not seem to be plausible.

Conclusion

The present research has had two main objectives: to discuss and analyse the conception of wilāya in certain key texts of the Šī‘a thinkers from Shaykh Āḥmad Āḥsā‘ī to Ayatollah Khomeini with particular emphasis on the influence of ibn ‘Arabī and his mysticism on later scholars. Parallel to this, is the importance of studying the nature of authority in Šī‘a Islam. Has authority in Šī‘īsm, which is crystalized in the concept of wilāya, changed and developed over time (from the eighteenth to the twentieth century)? Or can the fallible, visible, representative/vicegerent of the authority of the Īmām, himself the infallible, invisible, bearer of the esoteric wisdom and divine wilāya, claim the same authority as the Īmām? I lay particular emphasis on ‘authority’ because wilāya is stuffed with the authority and with the right of taṣṣaruf. Wālī is friend, but it is precisely due to his friendship that he can exercise absolute authority. Pertinent to this is the question of whether Šī‘a Islam is a faith (madhhab) of subordination, submission and subjugation.1

The present study gains significant when viewed in light of the transformations that occurred in Šī‘a political thought, as well as in the public life of the community. By ‘transformation’, I mean the politicization of wilāya, and I prefer the term ‘public’ to ‘political’; as the extent of the changes brought about by this marriage embraces a wider realm than polity. As discussed in the Introduction, wilāya has its roots in Islamic sacred sources including the Qur‘ān and Šī‘a ḥadīth compilations, and since in the Šī‘a tradition, the words and behaviours of the Fourteen Illuminate Figures (ma‘ṣūmīn)
have the same authority as the Qurʾān and are binding, the guardianship (both as authority and affinity) of the prophet and the Imāms are of secondary importance after the wilāya of God.

Discussion of the sacred sources helps us to delve into conceptual developments of wilāya over time, and therefore, the present research can be regarded as a contribution to the existing tradition of modern Shiʿa intellectual history. The author sought to focus on the doctrines of wilāya from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, as well as to position debates within historical contexts in an attempt to pinpoint the way that wilāya took on the characteristics of its time, and how it should be read in light of historical developments in every age. The question was asked whether the conceptions of wilāya have remained faithful to the classical understanding of the term, in which the connection between wujūd and wilāya (the ontological notions of this term) was emphasized.

Tracing the fate of wilāya guided the study towards dramatic changes in the history of this concept and to the conjunction of theology and jurisprudence with politics having culminated in the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. Jurists and theologians, as has been observed, were bearers of the change, and therefore, the ontological notion has been replaced by the political one. The last inheritors of the apolitical, classical conceptions of wilāya were the ḥakīms of the School of Tehran, as after them, and from the nineteenth century onward, wilāya came to be understood in terms of the political functions it had. Unlike previous scholars who have focused on the conceptions of wilāya in a particular text or a certain thinker, this thesis advances our knowledge of the subject in an original way by contextualizing wilāya in the intellectual and political
arenas of eighteenth to twentieth century Iran, and from this perspective, it can be regarded as an addition to the existing scholarship in this area.

The pair *wilāya*/*walāya* (meaning authority, dominion, leadership and affinity, sanctity and love, respectively) which brings about the reciprocity of lordship/love (or obedience) portrays an ideal type that, perhaps except for the days of the administration of the Prophet in Medina and the short reign of the first *Shīʿa Imām*, has had no other equal in the whole history of Islam. *Wilāya* is also a modulated (*mudarraj/mushakkak*) term, and Allah himself is the *wali* who bestows mastery and lordship upon every believer. Therefore, the divine *wilāya* is the source of the affirmative *wilāya*, as opposed to the negative one which is the *wilāya* of non-Muslims. The divine *wilāya* is a sacred pre-temporal covenant (*mithāq*/*ʿahd*, of allegiance, loyalty), having been taken in pre-eternity when nothing was yet created. The term *al-mithāq* is used more than twenty times in the *Qurʾān*, and refers to an alliance between God and humanity in general, and between God and the prophets in particular. As observed, *mithāq* is significant in the Imamite tradition; as other conceptual developments have been elaborated around this central concept. *Wilāya* is a mega-term, embracing a number of related terms and ideas such as light, knowledge (hierointelligence in the classic Imamite sources), *ḥuṣja*, and most importantly, Truth (*al-ḥaqq*), among others. It is with the Truth that *wilāya* finds an ontological dimension and connection to *wujūd*. In the Imamite conceptions of *wilāya*, *wilāya* is inseparable from *imamate* and constitutes the cornerstone of Twelver *Shīʿism*, and as such is a *kalāmī* problematic. *Imām* is the proof (*ḥuṣja*) and, the uninterrupted chain of the *Imāms/proofs* started with Adam and ended in the Hidden *Imām*. In this discourse,
wilāya is the face of God (ousia), and is transformed into messianic expectation of zuhūr (Parousia).

In our discussion of the ʿirfānī wilāya, the conceptions of wilāya were dated back to the third century (between 205 and 215 H/820-830), when ḫakīm Tirmidhī developed the idea of wilāya into a coherent theory on the seal of the wilāya, as well as a systematic Islamic theory of wilāya; a measure by which the false claimants of wilāya are distinguished from the true ones. Ḫakīm’s initiative is significant, as for the first time in the history of Islamic mysticism, wilāya is defined as a modulated status, and classified into the two types of walī allāh and walī-yi ḥaqq allāh; each is referred to as a station in the spiritual progress of the walī. Ḫakīm constructs his theory of wilāya on the basis of the concept of the ḥaqq allāh; a term which refers to the domination and kingdom of God over the cosmos. According to this theory, there exists only two groups of people who recognize and submit to His authority, namely walī allāh and walī-yi ḥaqq allāh. The former is a servant; who, by performing his religious duties expects a reward, while the latter beholds God and does not wish to exchange duty for reward. The former is the owner of the status of ʿibāda (service and worship), while the latter holds the office of servitude (ʿubūdīyyah) (Sūrī, 1385, pp. 96-97). 3 Tirmidhī’s main argument is the idea of the modulation of prophethood, starting with Adam and ending with the Prophet of Islam. The office of wilāya is modulated as well and is sealed by one of His most ascetic servants who is not necessarily a member of the household of the Prophet, as the term ahl al-bayt can also refer to people who inherit the spiritual legacy of the Prophet and not his blood.
Ibn ‘Arabī was the heir of such a legacy. His conception of *wilāya* which is studied in the context of the ethics of *wilāya*, *khilāfa*, *nubuwwa* and *risāla*, is analogous to the classic Imamite understanding, as both are perennial, pre-existent, and the face of God (*wajh allāh*). In *Akbarīan* mysticism, *wali* has two features: he is both cognizant of the divine names and attributes, and the one who has completed the status of totality (*jāmi‘iyyah*) and unity. *Wali* is the Perfect Man, and as such the face of the cosmos, and the intermediary between Him and creation. Due to his exalted status, *wali* is the only one who has the privilege of access to divine knowledge; a groundbreaking idea which became the central idea of the theory of *wilāya* in later years, and approached the Imamite understanding of it. *Wilāya*, as a result, intertwined with and became inseparable from ‘*ilm* (knowledge, *ma‘rifā*).

It is the importance of attaining ‘*ilm* from the divine source, as well as the continuity of the office of *wilāya* (unlike that of prophethood and apostleship) that endows it with a sublime status: *wali* is a partner in the science of prophecy. In the *Akbarīan* School, however, *wilāya* can embrace *nubuwwa* which happens when a prophet dies and God sends a *wali* as a sign of His mercy to the people. This mercy, as we observed, is called the general *nubuwwa* (*nubuwwa ‘āmmah*). It was also through ibn ‘Arabī that the idea of *wilāyat al-takwīniya* became an inseparable part of the theory of *wilāya* (which is another similarity with the Imamite tradition), though despite the similarity, it is observed how his idea of the seal (*khatm*) resounded with controversy into the Shi‘a world. Without digging into these disputes again, it is briefly mentioned that the *Akbarīan* idea of the *khatm* and ibn ‘Arabī’s reading of the term *ahl al-bayt*, motivated Shi‘a mystics to achieve a synthesis of their theology with the *Akbarīan* mystic-political thought. Their endeavours had two main characteristics: the
identification of wali and the Shi'a imam to the point that the two concepts of wilāya and imamate were completely merged into one another, and their emphasis on the uninterrupted chain of walis from Adam to the Hidden Imam.

In keeping track of the concept of wilāya in the Shaykhi School, we observed the ways wilāya maintained its central position and began to be understood as the hiddenness of God, mediated by a gate (bāb). The significance of the office of rukn-i rābi‘originates from the fact that God is completely driven away from man's cognizance and wilāya is the latent dimension of Deity, and as a result, it is hidden and unknown. It is important to remember that prior to the Shaykhi conception of the office of wilāya, in the classic Imamite tradition, as well as in the Akbarian School, wilāya was typically understood as the face of God and the outward dimension of Deity. An important development that happened with Shaykhīsm was that the office of wilāya was moved to the corner of the hiddenness of God and turned into a latent, hidden and ever unknown status. It was then that the idea of the 'gate', which is manifested in the office of rukn-i rābi‘, was created as a bridge between the hiddenness of Deity and wilāya on one hand and, wilāya and believers on the other.

The conceptions of wilāya in the ḥikma tradition are tied to a number of factors, such as the doctrine of wujūd (which is the recapitulation of wilāya from the early period), the doctrine of wilāyat al-takwīnīya (predates ibn ‘Arabi), and the authority of the usūlī ‘ulema. Wali is the Imām and the Prophet, who himself is the personification of the Universal Intellect and the Primal Pen, and as such the first being emanating from God. As the heirs of the legacy of the Ṣadrīan ḥikma and Akbarīan mysticism, each of these schools offered their own reading of Ṣadrā’s legacy; the ḥakīms of the Qajar period
went with the ‘īrfānī reading of wilāya, while the scholars of the School of Qum had a philosophical understanding. The culmination of the former, as observed, was the writings of Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī, and that of the latter was the conception of wilāya in the thought of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who, in his reading of the Sadrīan ḥikma distinguished between the philosophical and the ‘īrfānī approaches.

The politicization of the concept of wilāya and its crystallization in the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh should be considered as a result of long-term developments in Shiʿa jurisprudence which started from the early nineteenth century. Beginning with wilāya as marjaʿīyyah and ending in divine kingship, the conception of wilāya in the tradition of political jurisprudence (including constitutional jurisprudence of the early twentieth century), unlike its mystical peer which had remained stagnant and inert, underwent tremendous changes. As an infusion of mysticism into political jurisprudence (chapters four and five), Khomeini’s theory had a number of wellsprings including the Imamite and the Akbarīan traditions, the Platonic philosophy, as well as the rich tradition of kingship in ancient Persia. One can add to it his inspiration by Shiʿa and Sunni scholars who, shortly before him, had already started offering a political reading of some Qurʾānic phrases. In addition, compared with previous theories on wilāya which were studied in this research, the influence of his era on Khomeini’s thought is undeniable, and hence, it should be understood in the context of socio-political ups and downs of pre-revolutionary Iran. Addressing these developments, the author has sought to offer a better understanding of both the ‘īrfānī and juridical wilāya in the writings of Ayatollah Khomeini by comparing the contexts and genealogies of these two conceptions. Since they had different intellectual traditions and backgrounds, they bore fruit in two distinct understandings of wilāya, although the core of both relates to the
same problematic, which is the question of authority and control. From this outlook, the present research is an original contribution to the existing knowledge.

Unlike his predecessors, however, Khomeini invites his readers to submit to the unquestionable and self-evident privilege of the *uşūlī ʿulemā* to establish government in the time of Occultation; a fact which gives his theory a *kalāmī* aura. One cannot call a halt to rethinking juridical foundations, or to the critical analysis of the *Qurʾānic* verses in order to find answers to queries (and dreams) of a questioner, and that is why the theory of Khomeini was not, and should not be, regarded as the maximal understanding of the political role and authority of the just jurist. We called this Khomeinism (Introduction, D.4., pp. 24-25), which indicates the political culture of pre-revolutionary Iran and is centred on political jurisprudence and the theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*. Khomeini trained a number of students whose writings and political activities are indicative of their inspiration by this culture as an alternative to both traditional jurisprudence adhering quietism and the Pahlavi regime.

The conception of *wilāya* underwent a new reading by Hossein ʿAlī Muntaẓirī who, by emphasizing the doctrine of people’s rights, distanced himself from the *kalāmī* reading of his master. His theory is groundbreaking, in so far as the *wilāya* of the just jurist is no longer fundamental of *Shīʿism* and therefore is not self-evident. One needs to bring sufficient jurisdictional evidence (both transmitted and rational sources) to prove the political *wilāya* for the *faqīh*. Besides, his *wilāya* will not be actualized and come into effect until he is elected by popular election. Moreover, his term is limited to a certain period of time which is defined in the constitution and he is only able to supervise, and not to execute laws. From this perspective, the office of *wilāyat al-faqīh*
in Muntazirî’s theory is more reminiscent of the office of presidency than that of religio-political leadership. Kadivar, Muntazirî’s one-time student, in the end completely broke away from this tradition. He argued that this theory, in terms of transmitted and rational sources and the divine source of the appointment of the jurist, is not jurisdictionally verifiable, and therefore should be abandoned in favour of democracy.

1 - Fazlur Rahman has a very helpful discussion on this topic and his critical eye on Shi‘ism would help Shi‘a reader/researcher to reach impartial conclusions. See: Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2nd edition, 1968 (New York: Anchor Books), passim.

2 - Tirmidhî is the first and also the only ‘ārifîn the entire history of Islamic mysticism that coins and uses such a term, as neither before nor after him has this term (wâlî-yi haqq allâh) been used. Besides, he uses this term in only one of his books entitled Sîrat al-Anbiyâ. See: Muḥammad Sūrî, Ḥakîm Tirmidhî wa Nazariyayi Wilâyat, (Ḥakîm Tirmidhî and the Theory of Wilâya), the Journal of Falsaphah wa Kalâm, Vol 4, Winter 1385, p. 96.

3 - Ḥakîm clarifies that ‘ibâda and ‘ubûdiyyab are different as the former refers to the optional tasks of man, while the latter indicates man’s as well as the whole creation’s indigence and dependence on God. Muḥammad Sūrî, Ibid, 1385, p. 96.
Abu al-ʿAlāʿ Afīfī (1314-1385 H/1897-1966), the Egyptian scholar and writer. Upon obtaining his doctorate in philosophy from Cambridge University in 1930, he started teaching at the University of Cairo, and in 1941 he joined the University of Alexandria. His specialization was Akbarīan mysticism.

Abul-Faḍl ʿAbdu Razzāq Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, ?-736 H/1335), the famous mystic of the eight century and expert in both esoteric and exoteric sciences. His commentaries on Fuṣūṣ of ibn ‘Arabī and Manāẓil ul-Sāʿrīn of Khwāja ‘Abdullāh Anṣārī are famous. He exchanged a number of letters with another exponent, and also critic of ibn ‘Arabī, ‘Alāʾ al-Dawlah Simnānī on waḥdat-i wujūd.

Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Mahdī Fāḍil Narāqī (1185-1245 H/1771-1829), the Iranian jurist and poet of the eighteenth century. He issued the fatwā of jihād against Russians in the second Russo-Persian War (1804-1813). Along with ʿAwāʾid al-Ayyām which is in Arabic, he wrote other books such as Miʿrāj ul-Saʿādah on ethics in Persian, Mustanad al-Shīʿa fi al-Ahkām al-Sharīʿa and two books of poetry ʿDīwān ʿAlī.

Ahmad Kasravi (1269-1324 shamsī/1890-1946), born in Tabriz, Iran, he initially enrolled in a seminary in his birthplace, but became a radical Constitutionalist. Later on, he abandoned his clerical training and became an anti-cleric. He was a lawyer, a reformist, and a political activist affiliated with Iran’s Democrat Party. He was assassinated by the radical Shīʿa group of Fadāʾiyān-i Islam (Devotees of Islam) in 1946 (1324 shamsī).

Akbarīan School refers to a school of thought which was developed by a number of ibn ʿArabī’s students such as Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnāwī (607-673 H/1207-1274), ʿAfīf a-Dīn al-Ṭīlmisānī (610-690 H/1213-1291), the abovementioned ʿAbdu Razzāq Kāshānī and Sharafādīn Dāwūd Qaṣṣārī (658-751 H/1260-1350). These figures were influential in elaborating on a particular brand of mysticism centring on the theory of waḥdat-i wujūd. It is needless to say that al-Shaykh al-Akbar never used this term and it was mostly his disciple and step-son Qūnāwī who coined it for the first time.

Akhbārī School of jurisprudence. The Akhbārīs refused to consider reason (ʿql) and consensus (ijmāʿ) as ‘legal principles’ (uṣūl-i fiqh), and therefore recognized the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth. The School was active from the third to the twelfth century, but lost its supremacy over its rival, the Uṣūlī School, after the Safawid period.

Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyāh (with the full name of Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyāh fi al-Maʾrifat al-Āsrār al-Mālikīyyah wa al-Malikīyyah), the most significant book of ibn ʿArabī containing the revelations and intuitions (mukāshiṭ wa shuhūdāt) he received when
he was doing ḥajj. The book is written over thirty-five years and was finished in Damascus in 634 H/1236. *Al-futūḥāt* was published for the first time in 1910 in Cairo, Egypt and was republished in Beirut, Lebanon in 1970. There exists another edition of the book by the Syrian scholar, ʿUthmān Yahyā (1337-1417 H/1919-1997); though only ten of thirty-seven volumes have been published so far.

*Al-habāʾ* (dust), the atomic or cosmic realm in which God hollows out/builds up the bodies of this world.

*Al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyyah*, coined for the first time by ibn ʿArabī, the term refers to the first emanated (šādir-i awwal) or the Greatest Name (*ism-i aʿẓam*). It is the origin of all other creatures and is fully manifested in the perfect man.

*Asfār al-Arbaʿi* (with the full name of *al-Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliya fī al-Asfār al-ʿAqlīyata al-Arbaʿi*), one of the most famous books of Mullā Ṣadrā Shirāzī. The book contains his ideas on *ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliya* and has four chapters, each is named after one of the four mystical journeys.

*Aʿrāf* (lit. the people of the heights), refers to awliyā/imāms. The office of aʿrāf is to identify the people of Heaven (*ahl al-janna*) and to separate them from the people of Hell (*ahl al-nār*), in the sense that those who accept their wilāya are allowed to enter Heaven, and those who deny it will exist in Hell forever.

*Aʿyān thābitah* (lit. permanent archetypes, also fixed entities or essences). Ibn ʿArabī discusses the things known to God as permanent archetypes. These entities are things inasmuch as they are nonexistent in themselves but known to God. They are exactly the same things to the extent that they have been given a certain imaginal or delimited existence by the engendering command.

ʿĀlam-i asghar wa akbar (lit. microcosm or minor cosmos vs. macrocosm or macrocosmos), allegories of the perfect man and the cosmos respectively. As a central idea in Islamic mysticism, it is believed that *al-insān al-kāmil* encompasses all the characteristics of the macrocosm and is regarded as its spirit. He is created according to God’s names and attributes and as such has the authority to act upon the cosmos.

*Bāb* (lit. gate), either refers to an intermediary status between Deity and people or, the Hidden *Imām* and his believers. As a central idea in the Imamite *Shīʿism*, it is believed that the twelve *Imāms* are regarded as *abwāb* between people and God, though in later elaborations, the idea of bābiya (also bābiyat) was extensively used to indicate the intermediary office between the *Imām* - who is in occultation - and believers. The doctrine of bābiya is prominent in Bāṭinī trends such as *Shaykhism*. In addition, in the Akbarīan mysticism *al-insān al-kāmil* (the perfect man) is depicted as a medium by which Deity looks at His creatures.
**Baqā** (lit. subsistence with God, perpetuation). As the last station in the spiritual journey of novice, he recognizes all existence, including him or herself, as being non-existent and of itself, and discovers in his or her consciousness that every being, living and non-living, is a manifestation or shadow of the light of the Divine Knowledge and Existence. *Baqā* is achieved when the servant of God annihilates him or herself in God and takes down all human attachments.

**Baqīyatallāh** (lit. the Remnant of God). It is both a common title for all the *Imāms*, and a specific title used exclusively for the last *Imām*.

**Bāṭinī** (lit. esoteric) meaning or dimension. It can refer to the *bāṭinī* *ta’wil* of the *Qurʾān* or, *bāṭinī* schools like *Shaykhī* or the *Ismāʿīlī* movement. It can also imply the status of *wilāya* as the internal face or dimension of *nubuwwa*.

**Dhāt-i ilāhī** (lit. Divine Essence or Absolute Essence). Also called *al-Haqq* or Reality, is that to which names and attributes belong in their real nature, not as they appear in existence. It denotes the Self (*nafs*) of God and it stands beyond any expression or hint of what the Essence is, since it has no opposite or like.

**Fanā** (lit. total dissolution of personal identity, self-annihilation or extinction). In Islamic mysticism it is believed that the servant of God must die to himself in order to reach subsistence or *baqā*. *Fanā* and *baqā* are correlated.

**Faṣṣ** (lit. bezel). The name of each chapter of the book of *Fuṣūṣ* as it is designated to each prophet. *Faṣṣ* is used in two meanings: the abstract or summary of something and the ring of stone, but in the *Akbarīan* context it implies the *ḥikma* (divine gnosis) of every prophet.

**Fiqh-i mashrūṭah** (lit. constitutional jurisprudence). A type of jurisprudence which deals with Constitutionalism. *Fiqh-i mashrūṭah* emerged around the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1907. Constitutionalist jurists produced valuable literature, among them *Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah* (to Warn the Community and to Distance the Nation) of Muḥammad Hossein Nāʾīnī Gharaʿī (1239-1315 shamsī/1860-1936) is the most notable.

*Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, another book of ibn ʿArabī on mysticism, which is written in the seventh century. *Fuṣūṣ* (lit. bezels) is composed of twenty-seven *faṣṣ* (a metaphor of *ḥikma*), each of them dedicated to a prophet. The author claims that he received the book in dream from the prophet and was commanded by him to write it. It is believed that one hundred and ten commentaries have been written on this book.

**Ghawth** (lit. help or aid). In the hierarchical chain of *awliyā*, the highest status belongs to *ghawth*, who is one (*wāhid*) and it is impossible for any age to be deprived of him. It
is also through him that God looks at His creatures, and it is by him that He helps those who are seeking aid.

**Ghullāt** (lit. extremists). Indicating a group of companions of the *Imāms* who held metaphysical attributes and powers for them, and/or regarded the office of imamate as supra-natural, having been involved in creating the cosmos. They were renounced and in some cases even cursed by the *Imāms*.

**Hadîtîh** (lit. reports) and describe the words, actions and habit of the Prophet Muḥammad. In *Shīa* Islam, *hadîth* includes the sayings of the *Imāms* too, which have been collected in *hadîth* compilations.

**Hakîm** (lit. adept in *al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿālîya* or transcendent philosophy). The term in its contemporary usage gained popularity during the Safawid era and referred to the exponents of the Ṣadrvān *ḥikmat* which was a new school of thought having been founded by Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (979-1045 H/1571-1640).

**Henry Corbin** (1903-1978). French Orientalist and scholar who made a great contribution in introducing *Shīa* Islam into Western thought. His areas of interest were extensive, from the Imamite *Shīʿism* to the Akbarīan mysticism and to *Shaykhīsm*. His conversations with ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī are famous.

**Hossein ‘Alī Muntazīrī** (1301-1388 *shamsī* 1922-2008). The Iranian jurist, human rights activist, student of Ayatollah Khomeini, and one of the most significant figures of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. He was designated as successor to Khomeini in 1985, though four years later and due to a serious disagreement with Khomeini on domestic and foreign policies and, mainly the latter’s *fatwā* of executing thousands of Iranian Leftists prisoners in 1988, was removed from his post. He resided in Qum and became the symbol of opposition to the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor of Khomeini. He died shortly after the Iranian Green Movement in 2008.

**Hūrqalyâ** (originally *havarqalyā*or, mundus imaginalus). The intermediate world or the world of subsistence images. It was Shahâb al-Dīn Yaḥya ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardî (549-632 H/1145-1191) who used it for the first time. In the *Shaykhī* context, it is equal to *ʿālam al-mithāl* or the abode of the Hidden *Imām*, because the *Imāms*’ bodies belong to this world and are deprived of any temporal impurity. Therefore, forms, figures and bodies of the world of *hūrqalyâ* have maximal transparency and purity.

**Ījāza**: a juridical authorization which endows a jurist to issue *fatwā* or narrate *hadîth*.

**Ijtihād**: (lit. physical or mental effort). It is an Islamic legal term referring to independent reasoning or, the thorough exertion of a jurist’s mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question.

**Imamology**: to know the reality of the imamate and prophethood.
Irshād al-ʿAwām (the Guidance of the People), the name of the main book of Muḥammad Karīm [Khān] Kermānī containing the Shaykhī creed.

ʿIṣma (lit. immunity from doing sin or error). In the Shiʿa culture, it is believed that the Prophet, his daughter Fatima and the twelve Imāms comprise the fourteen infallible figures. Infallibility is an inseparable part of the office of imamate and prophethood. Fatima is the mother of imamate and daughter of prophethood and as such shares this attribute with her father and sons.

Jafr, the science of letters and one of the Occult sciences. It is a methodology to interpret divine names, themes and letters.

Kalām (lit. speech/argument). It refers to theological reflection using rational philosophical argumentation to study and express the content of the faith in a coherent manner. A discipline among other religious sciences of Islam such as jurisprudence and mysticism. Free will vs. determinism is one of the main kalāmī subjects.

Kashf or mukāshifa (lit. unveiling the inner meanings). A significant component of the Shaykhī School. The Shaykhī ‘ulemā claimed that they enjoyed the esoteric knowledge of the Imāms which enabled them to unveil the hidden meanings of the scripture and aḥādīth.

Khatm al-wilāya (lit. the sealing of the sainthood). A wali who completes the status of wilāya. The station of the sealing is divided into the seal of the Muḥammedan wilāya and the seal of the general wilāya.

Maqām al-jāmiʿ (lit. the station of totality). In Shaykhīsm, it stands for nubuwwa which is a station after rubūbiya (lit. the station of Divine Essence).

Maqām al-tafṣil (lit. the station of multiplicity). In the Shaykhī School, it stands for imamate which is the last station of gnosis after nubuwwa and rubūbiya.

Marjaʿīyyah (lit. the office of religious reference). In Shiʿa Islam, it is the highest authority on religious laws after the Qurʿān, the Prophet and Imāms.

Murtiḍā Muṭaharī (1298-1358 shamsī/1919-1979). The Iranian cleric, ideologue and philosopher. He was a student of Ayatollah Khomeini and appointed by him to different posts after the Revolution of 1979. He formed “the Council of the Islamic Revolution” at Khomeini’s request, and was the chairman of the council at the time of his assassination in Tehran by a member of the Furqān Fighters.

Mithāq (lit. covenant/trust). A pre-temporal covenant, promise or oath. The notion of such a pledge is rooted in the Qurʿān and was first given to the Prophet Muhammad. In the Shiʿa context, it means wilāya which has been given to the Imāms in the World al-
Dharr and true believers of the Imāms by following them are included in this covenant too.

Naqalāh (lit. transmitters), referring to the Shaykhi jurists/faqīhs.

Naẓariya-yi wilāyat-i intikhābi-ya muqayyada-yi faqīh (the theory of the elective and constrained guardianship of the jurist). The theory is offered by Ayatollah Muntazirī in his book Dirāsāt fī al-Wilāyat al-Faqīh wa al-Fīqh al-Duwal Islāmī, between 1363 - 1368 shamsī (1384-1389/90), defending the dual source of legitimacy of the jurist; both divine and elective. It underwent further reform by Muntazirī to put more emphasis on people’s rights, though the core of it remained untouched.

Ni’matullāhī/Ni’matullāhiyāh. A Sufi order originating in Iran. It gained its name from its founder Shah Ni’matullāh Wali (730-834 H/1330-1430), originally from Aleppo, who settled down in Mahan, Kerman. The ṯariqa gained popularity in Persia and the Indian subcontinent in the post-Safawid era and, during the Qajar period it was popular among the courtiers, but it lost its popularity among the elite after the Constitutional Revolution of 1907. It also split into several different branches.

Quṭb (lit. pole/pivot). In the Akbarīan mysticism, it is equal to ghawth, khalīfa and ṣāhib al-waqt (the Lord of Time). There is one quṭb per era and ibn ‘Arabī calls him apostle (rasūl). Due to his accessibility to divine knowledge, he enjoys wilāyat al-takwīniyya and the right of lawgiving (tashrī) both, though his sultat ul-bāṭinīyah (inward domination) is more important than tashrī, because it enables him to conquer the hearts of people. Quṭb al-aqṭāb is identical to al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadīyah.

Rukn-i rābī’ (lit. The Fourth Pillar). Level of being/gnosis which has been invented by Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī (1225-1288 H/1810-1871), the third Shaykhi leader. Rukn-i rābī’ is love and belief of believers in the Shaykhi ‘ulemā. It should be regarded both as a station of gnosı̇s (ma’rifā) and a religious principle, only through which a believer is able to know his imām.

Sulūk (lit. spiritual conduct). In Sufism, it indicates the path that every traveler (sālik) should take to leave his worldly attachments in order to reach self-annihilation and subsistence with God.

Sirr (lit. secret). Another name for wilāya with an established tradition in the Imamite Shi‘ism and its branches like Shaykhīsm and Shi‘a mysticism. From the classic ḥadīth compilations to the contemporary conceptions of wilāya, wali is depicted as the owner of the secret (ṣāhib al-sirr) and the station of awlīya is that of sirr. Sirr refers to the covenant between God and the Imāms on one hand and the Imāms and their believers on the other, all that testifies to the fact that Shi‘ism has a strong esoteric dimension.
**Tuṭunj** (lit. gulf). In *Kermānī Shaykhīsm*, it indicates the status of Imām Ali and one of the proofs of *aʿrāf*, the one who stands at the origin of mercy and/or agony.

**ʿUlūm-i khafiyyah/gharībah** (the Occult sciences). It is a study of occult practices such as magic, alchemy and astrology, as well as the sciences of numbers and letters, and has been one of the branches of science which has been taught in the classical education system in the Muslim world. It is both significant in the *Akbarīan* mysticism and the *Shaykhī* School.

**Uṣūlīsm.** It is based on the principles of jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) and utilizes *ijtihād* by adopting reasoned argumentation in finding the laws. *Mujtahids* are important because they are capable of independently interpreting the sacred sources as an intermediary of the Hidden *Imām* and thus serve as a guide to the community.

**Uwaysī** (mystics). Related to Uways al-Qaran (29 before *hijra* to 37 H/594-657), who lived during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, but never had a chance to visit him. *Uwaysīs* is a Sufi with no visible master among men.

**Waḥdat-i wujūd** (lit. unity of existence/unity of being), an important term in the *Akbarīan* mysticism which is used frequently by later mystics, though ibn ʿArabi has never mentioned it. According to this doctrine, existence/being is one but its manifestations are many. God manifests Himself through His names and attributes, each of them like a mirror reflecting a reality of His Essence.

**Wilāyat al-ʿāmmah vs. wilāyat al-khāṣṣah** (lit. General and Particular *wilāya* respectively). The seal of *wilāya* in ibn ʿArabi’s mysticism is divided into two types of the seal of the *Muḥammedan wilāya* (*wilāyat al-khāṣṣat al-Muḥammadiya*), and the seal of the general *wilāya* (*wilāyat al-ʿāmmah*). Jesus is the referent of the former and ibn ʿArabi is the referent of the latter. In subsequent conceptualizations, however, *wilāyat al-ʿāmmah* indicates *nubuwwa* and *wilāyat al-khāṣṣah* refers to *wilāya*.

**wilāyat al-faqīh,** the official theory of governance and statecraft in post-revolutionary Iran. Coined by Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, it advocates a kind of political system relying upon a just and capable jurist (*faqīh*) to assume the leadership of the government in the absence of an infallible *Imām*.

**Wilāyat al-takwīnīya** or *wilāyat al-taṣarruf* (lit. existential guardianship), is the right or authority to act upon the cosmos.

**Ẓāhir** (lit. exoteric). The outward or apparent meaning or dimension of the *Qurʾān*, ritual or religious prescriptions, from which the *bāṭin* is educed.
Bibliography

English Books


- Anzali, Ata, the Emergence of the Zahabiyya in Safavid Iran, *Journal of Sufi Studies*, 2013, pp. 149-175.


- Rizvi, Sajjad, Ḥikma Muta‘āliya in Qajar Iran: Locating the life and work of Mullâ Hâdî Sabzavârî (d. 1289/1873), *Iranian Studies* 44.4, 2011.


- Rizvi, Sajjad, Mullâ ‘Alî Nûrî: inheritor and reviver of ḥikmat in Qajar Iran, in *Qajar Philosophy*, Sabine Schmidtke and Reza Pourjavady (eds), forthcoming (Leiden: Brill).


- Singh, David Emmanuel, *Sainthood and Revelatory Discourse: An Examination of the Basis for the Authority of Bayan in Mahdawi Islam*, 2003 (Oxford and Delhi, Regnum International).


Persian Books


- Āshtīyānī, Aḥmad, Bīst Risāla (Twenty Treatises), Riḍā Ostādī (ed), 1383 (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb-i Qum).

- Azmāyesh, Muṣṭafā (ed), Ḥadāʾiq al-Sīyāḥa (the Gardens of Sightseeing), n.d. (n.p.).

- Feyraḥī, Dāwūd, *Fiqh wa Siyāsat dar Irān-i Muʿāṣir; Fiqh-i Siyāsī wa Fiqh-i Mashrūṭih* (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran; Constitutionalist Jurisprudence and Political Jurisprudence), 1390 (Tehran: Ney Publication).


- Himmatī, Amīr Hossein, Tafsīr-i Ahl-i ʿIrfān az Ḥadīth-i Qudsī-ya Awliyā-yī Taḥta Qubābī (Interpretation of the People of Mysticism from the Qudsī Ḥadīth of My Friends are Hidden Under my Mantle), *ʿIrfānīyāt dar Adab-i Farsī*, Vol. 3, No. 12, Fall 1391 *shamsī*, pp. 131-159.


- Jawādī Āmulī, ʿAbdullāh, *Wilāyat-i Faqīh; Wilāyat-i ʿIdālat wa Fiqāhat* (the Guardianship of the Jurist, the Guardianship of Justice and Jurisprudence) n.d. (n.p.).
- Kāshīfī, Mullā Hossein, *Asrār-i Qāsimī dar Īlm-i Kymīā wa Symīā, Lymīā, wa Rymīā wa Hymīā* (Qāsimī’s Secrets on the Occult Sciences), n.d. (n.p.).
- Khājawi, Muḥammad, *Imamate dar Qurʿān wa Sunnah wa ‘Aql wa ‘Irfān* (Imamate in the Qurʿān, the Sunnah, the Intellect and in Mysticism), 1374 (Tehran: Mawlā Publication).


Khusrūshāhī, Hādī (ed), Risālat-i Tashayuʿ dar Dunyāy-i Imrūz; Guftugūyī Dīgar bā Henry Corbin (the Mission of Shiʿīsm in the Contemporary World: Dialogues with Henry Corbin), 1387 (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb).

Khusrūshāhī, Hādī (ed), Shīʿa: Majmūʿi Mudhākirāt ba Professor Henry Corbin (Shīʿism: the Collected Conversations with Henry Corbin), 1387 (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb).
- Mahdawi Nizhad, Muhammad Javad, Guni Shinasi-yu Masjid-Madrasah-ya Dawra-yi Qajar (the Typology of Mosque-Schools of the Qajar Period), Fa'islamay-i Mu'tal'iat-i Shahr-i Iranin, No. 11, Spring 1392, pp. 37-54.

- Mahdi Mut' and others, Jilvihay-i Tafsir-i 'Irfin-yi Qur'an dar Bab-i Akhlaq-i Manazil al-Sa'irin (the Dimentions of the Mystical Exegesis of the Qur'an on the Ethics of the Abodes of Travelers), the Journal of Tafsir wa Zaban-i Qur'an, No. 1, Fall and Winter 1391, pp. 99-114.

- Majlis, Muhammad Baqir, Bi'hur al-Anwar (the Oceans of the Lights), 110 volumes, n.d., (n.p.).

- Mudarris Tabrizi, Mirza Muhammad 'Ali, Rayhanat al-Adab fi Tarajim al-Ma'rufin bil Kunyata awi-Laqab (Biographical Evaluation of the People of Epithet and Title), vol. 1, 3rd edition, 1369 (Tehran: Khayyam Publication).


- Mu'haqiq Damad, Mustafa, 'Irfin wa Shahrîyyari (Mysticism and Kingdom), in Din, Falsafa, Qanun (Religion, Philosophy, Laws), 1378 (Tehran: Sukhan publication), pp. 125-141.

- Mu'hajiq Dâmâd, Muṣṭafâ, Wilâyat-i Insân-i Kâmil az Didgâh-i Imâm Khomeini (the Guardianship of the Perfect Man in Imâm Khomeini's Thought), Unpublished article.

- Mujtahidi, Karim, Āshinâyî-î Irânîân bâ Falsafihay-i Jadid-i Gharb (Iranians' Familiarity with the New Western Philosophies), 1388 (Tehran: Sâziman-i

- Muntāẓirī, Hossein ‘Alī, Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī (the Jurisdictional Foundations of the Islamic Government), translated into Persian by Maḥmūd Șalawātī and Abulfaḍl Shakūrī, 8 volumes, 1379 shamsī (Tehran, Sarāʾīyī publication).

- Muntāẓirī, Hossein ‘Alī, Risāla-yi Ḥuqūq (the Book of Rights), 1383 shamsī/1425 H (Tehran, Sarāʾīyī publication).


- Muntāẓirī, Hossein ‘Alī, Khāṭirāt (Memoirs), 2 volumes, n.d. (n.p.).

- Muntāẓirī, Hossein ‘Alī,Wilāyat-i Faqīḥ wa Qānūn-i Asāsī (the Guardianship of the Jurist and the Constitution), in Dīdgāhhā (Collected Essays), 1377 shamsī/1998 (n.p.).

- Muntāẓirī, Hossein ‘Alī, Ḥukūmat-i Mardumī wa Qānūn-i Asāsī (Popular Government and the Constitution), in Dīdgāhhā (Collected Essays), 1378 shamsī/1999, (n.p.).


- Murtiḍā Muṭahārī, Mazāyā wa Khadamāt-i Marḥūm Ayatollah Burūjirdī (Advantages and Contributions of the late Ayatollah Burūjirdī), in Bahthī

- Muwaḥḥid, Muḥammad ‘Alī & Šamad Muwaḥḥid, Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Bezels of the Wisdom), (commentary), 1386 shamsī (Tehran: Kārnāmih).

- Nabīl Zarandī, Mullā Muḥammad, Maṭālī al-Anwār (Dawn Breakers), n.d. (n.p.).


- Nasafī, ‘Azīzādīn, Kitāb-i Insān-i Kāmil (the Book of the Perfect Man), Marijan Mole (Ed), 1379 (Tehran: Ṭahūrī).

- Nayrīzī, Umm u-Salamah Beygum, Jāmi‘ al-Kullīyāt; Kullīyat-i Masā’il-i ‘Īrfānī-ya Shi‘a (the Comprehensive of Generalities; the Generalities of Mystical and Shi‘a Problems), Mahdī Itīkhār (ed), 1386 (Qum: Maṭbu‘āt-i Dīnī).

- Qumšī‘ī, Muḥammad Ridā, Rasā‘il-i Qayṣarī (Qayṣarī’Treatises), (glosses on), translated into Persian by Seyyed Jalāl al-Dīn Ashtiyyānī, 1381 (Tehran: Mu’asasay-i Pazhūhishī-ya Ḥikmat wa Falsafa-yi Iran).


- Sabzivārī, Hādī, *Sharḥ-i Asrār Mathnawī* (Commentary on the Mysteries of Mathnawī), n.d. (n.p.).


- Shāhjūyī, Muḥammad Amin (ed), *Shīʿa: Muṣḥibāt-i ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī bā Henry Corbin* (Shīʿa: the Dialogues of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Henry Corbin), n.d. (n.p.).

- 314


- Ṣabāṭabā’ī, Muḥammad Hossein, *Maʿnawīyat-i Tashayuʿ* (the Spirituality of Shiʿīsm), 1387a (Qum: Tashayuʿ).

- Ṣabāṭabā’ī, Muḥammad Hossein, *Shīʿa: Majmūʿa Mudḥākirāt bā Professor Henry Corbin* (Shiʿism: the Collected Conversations with Professor Henry Corbin), Ḥādī Khusrushāhī (ed), 1387b (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb).


- Ṭabarāʾī, Muḥammad Hossein, *Insān az Āghāz tā Anjām* (Man from Beginning to the End), translated into Persian by Ṣādiq Lārijānī, 1388 (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb).

- Ṭabarāʾī, Muḥammad Hossein, *Uṣūl-i Falsafa wa Ravish-i Riʿālīsm* (the Principles of Philosophy and Realism), introduction and footnotes by Muṭiḍā Muṭhahārī, 2 Volumes, 1364 (Tehran: Šadrā Publication).


**Arabic Books**


the Degrees, on the Knowledge of the Family of Muḥammad and That with which Allah Endowed Them), Mīrzā Muḥsin Kūchī Bāghī Tabrīzī (ed), 1404 H (Qum: Manshūrāt-i Maktabat Ayatollah al-ʿUzma Marʿashī Najafi).


- Fayḍ Kāshānī, Muḥsin, Kalimāt-i Maknūnah (Hidden Words), ‘Ali ʿAlīzādī (ed), 1390 shamsī/2012 (Qum: Āyat-i Ighrāq Publication).

- Gawhar, Ḥassan, Sharḥ-i Ḥayāṭ-i Arwāḥ (the Commentary on the Life of Souls), 1423 H/2002 (Kuwait: Jāmiʿ-i Īmām Ẓādiq).

- Gawhar, Ḥassan, Rasāʾīl-i Muḥimī fī al-Tawḥīd wa al-Ḥikmat (Important Treatises on Monotheism and Wisdom), Shaykh Hossein Shimālī (ed), n.d. (n.p.).


- Kāshānī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Sharḥ-i Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Commentary on Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam), n.d. (n.p.).

- Khomeini, Ruhullah, *Al-Rasâ’il (The Treatises)*, 2 volumes, 1368 *shamsî*/*1410 H* (Qum: Mu’asasayî Ismâ‘îliyân).


- Nūrî, `Alî, *Mafâṭîḥ al-Ghayb* (Keys of the Unseen), (glosses on), 1363 *shamsî* (n.p.).

- Nūrî, `Alî, *al-Fawâ’id al-Ḥikamiya* (the Theosophical Outcomes), (glosses on), n.d. (n.p.).


- Nūrî, `Alî, *Aṣrâr al-Āyât* (the Mysteries of Verses), (glosses on), 1385 *shamsî* (n.p.).


- Rashti, Kâzîm, *Aṣrâr al-Shahâda* (the Mysteries of Testimony), n.d. (n.p.).


**Websites**

- [http://www.alabrar.info/](http://www.alabrar.info/)
- [http://hurqalya.ucmerced.edu/node/296/](http://hurqalya.ucmerced.edu/node/296/)
- [http://kadivar.com/](http://kadivar.com/)
- [http://www.alfeker.net/library.php?id=1309](http://www.alfeker.net/library.php?id=1309)
- [http://www.aftabir.com/lifestyle/view/67139/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C](http://www.aftabir.com/lifestyle/view/67139/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C)
- [http://www.rasekhoon.net/mashahir/print-108608.aspx](http://www.rasekhoon.net/mashahir/print-108608.aspx)
- [http://www.iranicaonline.org](http://www.iranicaonline.org)
- [http://www.noorlib.ir](http://www.noorlib.ir)
- http://en.imam-khomeini.ir
- http://www.amontazeri.com
- http://honarvarnet.blogspot.com
- http://www.leader-khamenei.com
- http://www.iraniaonline.org
- http://fa.wikishia.net
- http://www.tebyan.net
- http://www.hawzah.net/fa
- http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com
- http://honarvarnet.blogspot.com
- http://www.iis.ac.uk/glossary/b
- http://m-hosseini.ir/
- https://amontazeri.com/
- http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Default
- https://www.youtube.com/
- http://www.majzooban.org/fa/
- http://www.islamquest.net/fa/archive/question/fa1817#