Fundamentals for a cognitive semantics of Latin: Image schemas and metaphor in the meaning of Roman *animus*-concept[*]

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Theories developed in the so-called "second-generation" cognitive sciences have permitted significant advances in our understanding of how human beings find linguistic and other forms of symbolic representation to be meaningful.[1] In particular, since about 1980, research coming from the "embodiment paradigm" in cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics has demonstrated just how much people's ability to make sense of their experience is underwritten by conceptual structures and cognitive processes that emerge from interactions among brain, body, and world. Rejecting any view of cognition as abstract symbol manipulation, embodiment theorists claim that thought – and hence the structure and use of language – is in fact directly grounded in the human body's sensory and motor capacities. To the extent that Classics considers itself a broadly hermeneutic discipline that aims to shed light on the meanings elaborated by members of Greek and Roman society, it therefore seems crucial for classical scholars not only to have an awareness of the findings of this "embodied" cognitive science, but also to incorporate its insights into their interpretive strategies. For this reason, in this paper I introduce certain theoretical constructs from the cognitive interdiscipline – specifically, image schemas and conceptual metaphor – that I

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[1] Differing from traditional "first generation" cognitive science which viewed cognition largely in information-processing terms as abstract symbol manipulation – a view that has been dubbed the 'MIND-AS-COMPUTER' metaphor – the "second generation" cognitive sciences emphasize mental processes as embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended (generally grouped as "4E theory"): see esp. Rowlands (2010); Boden (2008); and Gallagher (2005).

consider key to any psychologically realistic, humanly plausible account of meaning in ancient language and literature (and indeed in ancient culture more generally) and then go on to illustrate their analytic potential through a study of Latin's metaphorical expressions of courage and cowardice.[2]

1. An "experientalist" account of meaning.

What, more precisely, does a psychologically realistic, humanly plausible account of meaning look like? In my view, it is one that adopts an explicitly "experientialist" theory of cognition, committed to the idea that, for human beings, our thinking depends fundamentally on the kind of brain we possess functioning in the kind of body we have in the kinds of physical, social, and cultural environments we typically inhabit (or have historically inhabited).[3] In other words, it is one that views concepts as embodied mental representations deriving their meaning not through their correspondence to objects in external reality, but through their link to human conceptualizing capacities and psychological functions, which are grounded in and deeply constrained by our

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[2] Sansò (2014) 310 states that, "Overall, there has not been much work so far on Ancient Greek within the framework of CL". This judgment may already be somewhat out of date, since one can point to the studies by Douglas Cairns of Greek emotion concepts such as *aidṓs*, *phrikḗ*, and *érōs* in the light of conceptual metaphor theory, or to the analyses that Cristóbal Pagán Cánovas and Georgis Giannakis have given of the Greek poetic images of the "arrows of love" and of the Fates as "weavers", respectively, in terms of conceptual integration theory. Kiki Nikiforidou and Silvia Luraghi have also explained the meanings of the cases and prepositions in Greek in terms of image schemas of spatial relation (and their figurative interpretations), while Rafael Martínez Vázquez and José Miguel Jiménez Delgado have shown that metaphors such as 'EXPERIENCES ARE OBJECTS' motivate the polysemy of many Greek verbs (cf., e.g., *phérō* in its literal and figurative senses). Meanwhile, Bruce Louden and Drew Griffiths have examined the systems of metaphor that underpin certain Homeric formulae.

By comparison, studies of the Latin language and Latin literature in the perspective of cognitive linguistics remain relatively few. Early work by Francisco García Jurado found that the sorts of orientational metaphors cognitive linguists have identified in English ('GOOD IS UP', 'BAD IS DOWN', and so forth) are also present in Plautine Latin. More recently, Luisa Brucale and Egle Mocciaro have described how the senses of Latin *per* develop from a "prototypical nucleus" in the spatial domain to cover abstract domains including causation, instrumentality, and purpose. Chiara Fedriani has produced several studies (including a monograph) of the metaphors underlying Latin's eventive and stative expression (e.g., 'EXPERIENCES ARE OBJECTS', as evidenced by *in dubio sum, sto, maneo, iaceo, haereo*). My own research has focused on how Latin speakers' preferential conceptualization of, for example, the mind, communication, and mistakenness in terms of certain image-schematic metaphors contribute to a distinctively Roman worldview: with organizing effects across different aspects of language, thought, and behavior, metaphorically structured "folk models" actually appear to function as part of the "hidden metaphysics" that defines what it means be a member of Roman society. Important first steps towards what I call a Roman "cultural semantics"; see my concluding remarks in sect. 4.

[3] See esp. Lakoff and Johnson (1980 and 1999); Johnson (1987); Gibbs (1994); and Grady (1997).

bodily nature, as well as by the local and global socio-cultural context.[4] It is therefore one that takes a middle ground between the representationalism and functionalism of the "classical" computational theory of mind in philosophy and "good old-fashioned artificial intelligence" (Haugeland 1985, 112) – that is, any notion that human thought consists in the syntactical manipulation of implementation-independent abstract symbol systems that mentally "re-present" the structures of an objectively existing physical world to the mind – and the "radical embodiment" of enaction theorists like Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela, which proposes a view of cognition as the effect of flat brain-body-action-world systems and which in its strongest forms sees no need for mental representations whatsoever for implementing intelligent behavior.[5]

Such a moderately embodied theory of cognition (cf. Prinz 2008) implies a very different account of meaning than that found in traditional (formal) philosophical and linguistic semantics. Generally speaking, experientialist approaches reject "truth-conditional" theories of linguistic meaning, which posit that an utterance's meaning corresponds to the set of conditions in the world (or in any possible world) for which the utterance can said to be true. Moving beyond the view of defining categories by lists of "necessary and sufficient" features, they adopt a theory of categorization that recognizes classes characterized by nonobjective human perceptual, interactional, or purposive properties.[6] In many cases, cognitive linguists claim that word meaning may not be reducible at all to symbols expressed in amodal, propositional format and arbitrarily linked to their referents. Rather than being represented in the mind as language-like symbols, the meanings of words very often are said to actually correspond (directly or indirectly through figurative interpretation) to gestalt structures of experience or "image schemas". In cognitive

[4] See Wilson (2002).
[5] Maturana and Varela (1987 and 1980).
[6] Cf. Rosch (1973 and 1978); Barsalou (1983); Fillmore (1985); Lakoff (1987); Johnson (1987); Taylor (1989); Atran (1993); Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (1998).

psychology, an image schema is a highly abstract structure of cognition that emerges through human perceptual and sensorimotor interaction with the world – as Mark Johnson (1987, xiv) writes, "a recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience". Image schemas may therefore be visual in nature, e.g., "long, thin shapes, or containers" (Lakoff 1987, 113–14), or more abstract representations deriving from the character of human spatial experience, such as up/down schemas, center/periphery schemas and movement schemas. As cognitive structures that are analogues of (because dependent on the same neural architecture as) sensorimotor experience and thus open to visual and kinesthetic "transformations" in mental space, image schemas provide the inferential patterns that motivate the range of senses typically characterizing the meanings of words.[7]

Image schemas may also be metaphorically interpreted, extending meaning further into abstract domains. According to the theory of conceptual metaphor, it is through the regular metaphorical mapping of bodily-based image schematic structure onto concepts not directly grounded in experience that human abstract thought is in fact possible. Recognizing the all-pervasive character of certain metaphorical patterns in language, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argued (1980, 1999) that the clustering of metaphorical linguistic expressions around many (mostly abstract) concepts in fact reflects inherently metaphorical understandings that speakers of a language possess of those concepts.[8] Speakers of a language talk about abstract domains of experience metaphorically, that is, because they actually conceive of them metaphorically in terms of other (mostly concrete) experiences. In this embodied view of cognition, literal concepts are those formed through bodily interaction with the world, and metaphors are regular projections or mappings of conceptual content – concepts or whole structured domains of knowledge – that occur

[7] See esp. Gibbs and Colston (1995).
[8] Lakoff and Johnson (1980); Lakoff (1987); Johnson (1987); and Kövecses (2005 and 2006).

as a way of mentally representing and reasoning about abstract concepts not directly grounded in physical experience. An important claim of this theory is that metaphorical mappings are not arbitrary and unconstrained, but experientially motivated, typically by their grounding in systematic correlations in phenomenal experience. Image schemas and their metaphorical projections therefore provide a solution to the problem of how linguistic expressions and other symbols acquire their meanings, since in this view all *abstracta* are grounded, at some level, in structures of cognition that emerge from bodily experiences that are directly meaningful to human beings.

It is in this sense, then, that I take cognition and language to be embodied: namely, that human conceptualization, and thus the inferential processes guiding semantic extension, depends in large part on cognitive structures – i.e., images schemas – and construal operations that arise naturalistically from (indeed are analogues of) recurring perceptual and kinesthetic experiences. Through unidirectional mappings of image schematic structure to domains not directly grounded in experience, literal (physicospatial) understanding comes to be extended to abstract reasoning. Because they emerge from, or are grounded in, repeated human bodily movements through space, perceptual interactions, and ways of manipulating objects, image schemas – unlike Fodorian representations (amodal abstract symbols) – are thus directly meaningful representational structures. At the same time, because they are gestalt patterns of experience which capture the structural contours of our bodily interactions with the world (only secondarily imageable "in the mind's eye"), image schemas – unlike enactivist couplings, which do away with mental representations altogether – are inherently multimodal structures that operate beneath consciousness. Cognitive and linguistic embodiment therefore pertains to the fact that figurative

as well as literal understanding is based on at least partial activations of the same sensorimotor areas of the brain.[9]

Consider, for example, that in many languages what we call *anger* is conceptualized as heated fluid in a container. In English, this conceptualization is captured in idiomatic phrases such as *blow one's stack*, *lip one's lid*, and *let off steam*, where the notion of emotional intensity is mapped to that of the liquid's temperature, and anger's effects on the body to the pressurization of the liquid.[10] A version of this metaphor also appears in Latin, as indicated by expressions like *Quinctius quidem adeo exarsit ira* ("Quinctius so 'blazed forth' in anger", Liv. *AUC*. 35.31.13), *mortis fraternae feruidus ira* ("'Seething' with anger at his brother's death", Verg. *Aen*. 9.736), or *ardet et iram / non capit . . . / . . . exaestuat ira* (She (sc. Procne) 'burns' and cannot 'contain' her anger . . . she 'boils over' with anger", Ov. *Met*. 6.610–11, 623). It is the fact that such mappings involve the transfer of an organized system of knowledge from concrete physical experience (namely, how fluids behave in heated, pressurized conditions) to abstract emotional experience (namely, anger) that allows English and Latin speakers to think, and thus talk, coherently about an aspect of human life that may be difficult to comprehend in and of itself. Moreover, talking about anger in terms of hot fluid is immediately meaningful to speakers of these languages, since the metaphor is grounded in the apparently universal human experience of feeling hot and pressurized when angry. Experimental studies have shown that the occurrence of anger coincides with objectively

[9] For the representation of metaphorical mappings in the brain, see above all Feldman (2006). Some early brain imaging studies found no evidence of neuronal co-activation during metaphor processing: see esp. Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006 and Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio 2008. More recent studies, however, point to at least partial recruitment of domain-specific sensory cortex during figurative language processing: cf., e.g., Desai et al. (2011); Lacey et al. (2012); Desai et al. (2013).
[10] See esp. Kövecses (1986).

measurable increases in skin temperature and blood pressure.[11] In this way, (part of) the physiology of anger itself affords a ready image for conceptualizing such experiences in the abstract.[12]

2. Latin's metaphors of courage and cowardice.

Cognitive linguists take as given that complex, culturally situated concepts may in fact acquire their structure and content via whole networks of metaphors. Where a concept is characterized by several distinct metaphors, cognitive linguists argue that these metaphors normally work together to produce a working understanding of the concept's various aspects.[13] While the metaphors may recruit different conceptual materials and so fail to provide a consistent overall image to conceptualization, nevertheless they fit together coherently as a system, each metaphor delivering an understanding of some dimension of the metaphorically defined concept. In this respect, consider Latin speakers' conceptualization of courage and cowardice in terms of *animus*, which is delivered by the system of metaphors illustrated by Figure 1. <Figure 1: Metaphorical source domains contributing to Latin speakers' conceptualization of courage and cowardice.> What this figure shows is the set of images converging on *animus* as a way of expressing the concepts *both* of courage *and* of cowardice: that is, the images that metaphorically capture Latin speakers' understanding of courage and cowardice as distinct but inextricably related aspects of experience. As the figure shows, this understanding is delivered by highly schematic (rather than richly elaborated) images drawn from a limited number of concrete bodily source domains. It also shows that each of these domains provides a pair of contrasting image schemas to conceptualization,

[11] E.g., Ekman et al. (1983); Levenson et al. (1990); Levenson et al. (1991).

[12] See Kövecses (1995). Of course, an increase of blood pressure and skin temperature also characterizes the physiological response associated with other emotions, which is why we find HEAT (and conversely COLD) used metaphorically of a range of such experiences (for instance, affection or lust): cf., e.g., Williams and Bargh (2008); Wilkowski et al. (2009); and, in an ancient context, Cairns (2013) 86–87.

[13] On the character and function of such metaphor systems, see Danesi and Perron (1999) and Kövecses (2006).

mapping reciprocally correlated physical concepts to those of courage and cowardice (as well as their relation).

Let us see in somewhat greater detail what each of these conceptual mappings entails.[14] Take the VERTICAL ORIENTATION metaphor. In this metaphor, *animus* is imagined as a kind of physical object or structure and courageousness corresponds to *animus* being in a state of vertical up(right)ness. Thus, Latin speakers employ verbs referring literally to "lifting up" (*tollere*) or "setting up(right)" (*erigere*) with *animum* or *animos* to convey the meaning we might express in English as "taking" or "gathering" or "plucking up" one's courage or, equally, "giving" or "instilling" or "inspiring" courage. For example, Livy describes Marcellus rallying his men at Nola as literally "'setting up(right)' the spirits of his own men" (*suorum militum animos erigeret*, *AUC*. 23.45.5), while Livy's epitomizer conveys the notion that the Parthians took courage from Crassus' death by saying that they "'stood up' their spirits" (*animos erexerant*, Ann. Flor. *Ep*. 4.9). Similarly, to express that the Trojans became very emboldened, Vergil writes that they literally "'lift up' their spirits to the stars" (*animos ad sidera tollunt*, *Aen*. 9.637) – *ad sidera* representing, according to

[14] Discovering large-scale metaphorical mappings of this sort begins from dictionary and corpus work. Because the linear alphabetical ordering of traditional lexicons tends to obscure figurative associations that structure the semantic system at a higher order than the individual lexeme, reference works like Meissner's *Latin Phrase Book* or the Langenscheidt *Grundwortschatz Latein,* which organize single-word expressions as well as phrasal lexical items under broad subject headings, can often provide preliminary evidence of conceptual metaphors. Alternatively, *n*-gram searches can be conducted for occurrences of target-domain vocabulary items. Careful examination of contextual usages will produce a tabulation of source-domain words used metaphorically of the target in question. Once initial metaphorical relations have been identified in this way, searches must be performed for occurrences of the whole range of vocabulary items belonging to each identified source domain with those of the target domain, in order to establish their degree of conventionalization in the language, as well as their internal mapping structure. (Synonym and antonym dictionaries like Ramshorn's or any of the *gradus ad Parnassum* type are useful here). Metaphors recruiting a highly circumscribed set of source-domain words, or that are restricted to a particular author or time period, or that occur only in fixed phrases, will be of limited relevance in this respect.

Given the overall set of source-to-target correspondences, generalizations can then be made about the conceptual mapping(s) underpinning the linguistic expressions (A search that yields expressions such as *bellum exstinguere* and *cuncta bello ardent* might lead us to posit a conceptual mapping of FIRE to WAR, for instance). In some (less interesting) cases, the mappings may involve only a single source-domain concept and target-domain concept; in others, it will involve whole systems of concepts. For the latter, it will be necessary to determine (possibly relying on statistical frequencies) which of the conceptual mappings is the more central (the metaphor's "main meaning focus": Kövecses 2003), and which are logical entailments of this central mapping based on Latin speakers' conventional knowledge of the source domain. Of course, classification of linguistic expressions as manifestations of any given conceptual metaphor is not always straightforward. Sometimes, an expression may appear to reflect multiple mappings simultaneously. Though this may complicate the analyst's neat categorization, it should hardly be surprising, since experience itself, which provides the grounding of and motivation for metaphors, is not easily segmentable. For an example, see n. 14.

the logic of the metaphor, the maximum of bravery. This is why the author of the *Bellum Africanum* can also describe Caesar as "carrying before himself a 'tall spirit'" (*animum enim altum . . . prae se ferebat*, 10.3) to mean that he was brave, or why the author of the Latin *Iliad* can say that the Greeks and Trojans "'set up straight' their spirits" (*instaurant . . . animos*) to capture the idea that they fight with renewed courage: what is tall and straight is by nature "up" and thus metaphorically "courageous".[15]

Correspondingly, cowardice is construed as a condition of down(ward)ness of *animus*; that is, to behave like a coward is to have one's *animus* oriented in some way "down". Latin speakers therefore use words referring literally to "falling" (*cadere*) or "sending down" (*demittere*) in conjunction with *animus* to convey what we might express again in English as "losing" or "giving up" courage. For instance, to express that the Crustumini lost the conviction to go through with the war they had begun against the Romans, again Livy writes that their "spirits had 'fallen'" (*ceciderant animi*, *AUC*. 1.11.3). Likewise, Caesar uses the construction *animo deficere* (literally, "to break down from courage") to express the idea of losing courage in the face of some difficult circumstance, as in "Marcius Rufus . . . entreated his men not to give up courage" (*ne animo deficient*, *BC*. 2.43.1).[16] Elsewhere, the image of *animus* as "thrown down" (*perculsus*) or simply

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[15] It is possible that figurative usages of *excitare* with *animus* in the sense of "embolden" (cf. Cic. Man. 6.4, *quod maxime vestros animos excitare . . . debeat*; *Resp*. 41.9, *ad animos imperitorum excitandos . . . perfectus*; Anon. *Bell. Afr*. 81.2, *animos eorum excitabat*; Sen. *Contr*. 10.2.17, *non est utile rei publicae excitari hostium animos*) can be accounted for in terms of this metaphor, as well – if we consider the literal meaning of the verb to be something like "build, erect, construct" (cf. Cic. Leg. 2.68, *sepulcrum altius . . . excitari;* Caes. *BG*. 5.40.2, *turres;* Suet. *Claud*. 1, *tumulum*; Sen. *Ep*. 52, *aedificium*; etc.). Alternatively, it may emerge from an ontological metaphor in which *animus* is construed in terms of a human or even animal agent (i.e., "move, stir, shake, set in motion (a person or animal)" > "set the spirit in motion" > "embolden"); this kind of "personification" of *animus* would certainly not have been unusual in Latin (cf., e.g., Sen. *Phaed*. 112, *quo tendis, anime? quid furens saltus amas?*; 163, *animusque culpa plenus et semet timens*, 255–56, *moderare, alumna, mentis effrenae impetus, / animos coerce*). If the latter, it might be better to analyze this image as part of the ENERGETIC MOTION metaphor or even the VISUAL PROMINENCE metaphor of courage, as "causing to move *out*" (*ex-citare*) implies a change from a state of hiddenness to one of conspicuousness. But I am inclined to take *excitare animum* as reflecting a sort of structural metaphor because of expressions like Plaut. *Trin*. 132, *exaedificaret suam incohatam ignaviam*, where "emboldening" is clearly construed metaphorically as "building (up)" *animus* (as if something akin to *oppidum, domum, templum, navem . . .*).

[16] Cf. also Verg. *Aen*. 3.259–60, *cecidere animi*; Ov. *Fast*. 3.225, *tela viris animique cadunt*, Luc. *Sat*. fr. 27.9 = Non. 286M, *re in secunda tollere animos, in mala demittere*; Caes. *BG*. 7.29.1, *ne se admodum animo demitterent*; Sall. *Jug*. 98, *demisso animo fuit*; Caes. *BC*. 3.112.12, *ne negotio desisteret neve animo deficeret*.

"low" (*humilis*) or "lying flat" (*iacens*) is used to convey notions of cowardliness – as, for instance, when Cicero asks of the Gauls, "Do you think, judges, that with their military cloaks and breeches they are behaving at all like cowards", literally, "with their courage sunk down and near-to-the-ground?" (*animo demisso atque humili*, *Font*. 33), or when Propertius exhorts himself to turn from elegiac cowardliness to epic courage: *surge, anime, ex humili; iam, carmina, sumite vires* (2.10.11).

In the images of the STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY metaphor, on the other hand, courage is construed as the wholeness and cowardice as the brokenness of *animus*. Thus, to give courage to a person is, literally, to "make fast" (*firmare* and its compounds) or "tie together" (*colligere*) or "harden" (*indurare*) or "make whole" (*integrare*) the *animus*. In Plautus' *Amphitruo*, for example, Alcmena declares her resolve to endure her husband's absence "with a strong and 'bolted-on' spirit" (*animo forti atque offirmato*, 656). When Caesar assures the Gauls that he will prevent further settlement of their territory by the Germans, this "'made fast' their spirits" (*animos verbis confirmavit*, *BG.* 1.33.1). And Livy recounts that the Volsci and Aequi, under attack by the consul Valerius, "when they had 'tied together' their courage (*animos collegissent*) . . . rallied and held their own" (*AUC.* 3.60.11).[17] At the same time, to deprive someone of courage is to "break" (*frangere*, but also *corrumpere* or *adflictare*) the *animus* – as when once more Livy writes that Postumius, "after depriving (literally, 'breaking') the Aequi of their courage in skirmishing (*cum leuibus proeliis Aequorum animos fregisset*), forced an entrance into the town" (*AUC*. 4.49.9), or when Valerius Maximus tells us that "Hannibal beat down the strength of the Romans more than he 'broke' their courage" (*magis vires Romanorum contudit quam animos fregit*, *Mem*. 3.2.11).[18] The same image

[17] Cf. also Verg. *Georg*. 4.386, *firmans animum sic incipit ipsa*; Sall. *Cat*. 46.3, *confirmato animo*; Liv. *AUC*. 42.60.3, *dum perculsi milites animos colligerent*; Sen. *EM*. 104.22, *hi iubebunt . . . animum indurare*,; Hom. Lat. *Il*. 614–15, *Apollo / integratque animum*.
[18] Cf. Liv. *AUC*. 26.13.1, *fregit animos*; 32.31.2, *animos fregisset*; 38.16.14, *infregit animos*; Val. Flacc. *Arg*. 6.283–84, *corripuit fregitque animos*; Prop. *Carm*. 5.6.51, *frangit et attollit vires in milite causa*; Sall. *Jug*. 31, *piget dicere . . . ut vobis animus . . . conruptus sit*.

likely underwrites, as well, the meaning of the word *murcus* mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus as soldiers' jargon for a coward: *Res Gestae* 15.12.3, *aliquando quisquam in Italia munus Martium pertimescens pollicem sibi praecidit, quos iocaliter murcos appellant*, "Once in a while someone in Italy fearing military service cuts off his own thumb – and they call these men, derisively, *murci*". If, as Edwin Fay has suggested (1905: 398), *murcus* can be derived from *mulcare* ("strike, maul, mutilate"), this word directly figures the coward as someone who is "mutilated".[19]

In the VISUAL PROMINENCE metaphor, courage and cowardice are expressed instead in metaphorical terms of the conspicuousness or hiddenness of *animus*.[20] Hence expressions like *magno animo esse* (literally, "be with a big spirit") or *ingenti animo* ("with a huge spirit") or *praestanti animo* ("with a standing-forth spirit") or *excellenti animo* ("with a towering spirit") that signify courage.[21] This metaphor probably also accounts for formulations in which courage is construed as the "increasing" or "growing" of *animus*: e.g., *praesidio legionum addito nostris animus augetur* ("The spirit 'increases' for our men from the additional support of the legions", Caes. *BG*. 7.70.3) and *veritus ne vanis tot conatibus suorum et hostibus cresceret animus* ("He (sc. Scipio) feared the enemy's spirits would 'grow' by his men's so many futile attempts", Liv. *AUC*. 28.19.16).[22] Conversely, the coward is typically portrayed as "hiding" or "lying concealed" by Latin authors: cf., e.g., *quid ergo ille ignavissimus / mihi latitabat?* ("Why is that utter coward hiding from me?" Plaut. *Trin*. 926–27) and *utrum inclusum atque abditum latere in occulto atque*

[19] The etymology is not treated by De Vaan (2008), nor does *murcus* appear in this sense in the *OLD,* although a possible by-form *murcidus* attested by St. Augustine (*Civ.* 4.16) for the comedies of Pomponius is given with the meaning "lazy, inactive".

[20] Perhaps no principled distinction can actually be made between the mappings of the VISUAL PROMINENCE and VERTICAL ORIENTATION metaphors, since in human experience what is up is typically easier to see and what is down is typically more difficult to see. Here, however, I treat the two metaphors as discrete, to better highlight the systematicity of each mapping.

[21] Cf. Cic. *Deiot*. 36, *magno animo et erecto est*; Caes. *BG*. 7.10, *hostium impetum magno animo sustineant*; Sall. *Ep. ad Caes*. 7.10, *ingentem eorum animum subegit*; Cic. *Phil*. 14.36, *fortissimo praestantissimoque animo exercitum castris eduxerit*; Caes. *BC*. 3.4.4, *Rhascypolis praeerat, excellenti virtute.*

[22] *Crescere animum,* "embolden" may again suggest a metaphorical view of *animus* as a kind of human, animal, or even vegetal entity: see above, n. 12.

ignaviam suam tenebrarum ac parietum custodiis tegere? ("Was he to lurk about in the dark, shut in and hidden, concealing his own cowardice with the safeguards of shadows and walls?" Cic. *Rab*. 21). The archaic word *cussiliris* given by Festus as a synonym for *ignavus* also appears to metaphorize the coward directly as "covering up" or "hiding".[23] Though several etymologies have been proposed, the most plausible derivation is from *cossim in lira*, literally, "cowering (on the thighs) in a furrow", its figurative sense of "coward" thus apparently developing by reference to the threat avoidance behaviors characteristic of some animals.[24]

Finally, in the images of the ENERGETIC MOTION metaphor, courage corresponds to liveliness (of *animus*) and cowardice to lethargy. This can be seen in formulations like *animus alacer* or *strenuus,* literally a "quick" or "lively spirit", as in, for instance, *tuumque simul promptum animum et alacrem perspexi ad defendendam rem publicam* ("I perceived at the same time your 'ready and quick spirit' for defending the Republic", Cic. *Fam*. 3.11.4) or *postquam omnium animos alacris videt, cohortatus, ut petitionem suam curae haberent, conventum dimisit* ("When he (sc. Catiline) sees their 'quick spirits', he charged them to attend to his interest at the election of consuls and dismissed the assembly", Sall. *Cat*. 21.5), and, likewise, in *quod si animo strenuo fecissent, futurum ut aduersarii non possent resistere* ("If they had done it 'with a quick spirit', their foes would have been unable to resist", Nep. *Dat*. 6.4).[25] The converse construal of cowardice as lethargy is well known from uses of *ignavus,* meaning, etymologically, "not active" (*in-gnavus*): e.g., '*conpertum ego habeo, milites . . . neque ex ignavo strenuum neque fortem ex timido exercitum*

[23] I.e., Paul. Fest. p. 50, 13 Müller, *cussilirem pro ignavo dicebant antiqui*.
[24] Walde-Hofmann (1954) I, 162. Cf. Rheden (1907) 699, "die Bezeichnung ist sehr anschaulich, offenbar hergenommen von Vögeln und anderen Tieren, die sich, um such der Beobachtung und Bedrohung zu entziehen, in eine Furche ducken".
[25] Cf. Col. RR. 11.1.17, *cum uigore et alacritate animi praecedentem eum tamquam ducem strenue sequatur*; Caes. *BG*. 1.46.4, *multo maior alacritas studiumque pugnandi maius exercitui iniectum est*; Sen. *Cons. Helv.* 12.8.5, *alacres itaque et erecti quocumque res tulerit intrepido gradu properemus*; Val. Max. *Mem*. 3.2.3, *alacri animo suos ad id proelium . . . cohortatus est*; Caes. *BC*. 3.92.4, *est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur*; Tac. *Hist*. 2.14, *strenui ignavique in victoria idem audent*.

oratione imperatoris fieri' ("'I am well aware, soldiers . . . that a brave army cannot be made of a cowardly one, nor a strong one from a weak one, simply by a speech of its commander'", Sall. *Cat*. 58.2).[26] But the metaphor extends to uses of *segnis* and *iners* as well: cf., e.g., *nec Turnum segnis retinet mora* ("Nor does any cowardly delay hold Turnus back", Verg. *Aen*. 10.308) and *tam sis hostis iners, quam malus hospes eras* ("Be as cowardly an enemy as you were evil a guest!" Ov. *Ep*. 13.44).

As may be seen from these (and numerous other) examples, certain conventional, everyday ways of expressing the concepts of courage and cowardice in Latin are conveyed by metaphors drawing on images of concrete human bodily and physical experience. In these metaphors, images of bodily experience are predicated of *animus* in a regular and consistent fashion as a means of expressing the fact of someone's "having" courage or not. The metaphors are regular in the sense that they organize the figurative meanings of whole semantic fields. Each metaphor, that is, operates at a level of sense making that is supralexical, rather than belonging to the semantic structure of any individual word (e.g., the LIVELINESS metaphor structures the meanings not only of *ignavus* but of the range of terms designating laziness). They are consistent in the sense that they recruit pairs of contrastively related image schemas toward the expression both of courage and of cowardice, each metaphor thereby projecting the relational structure of the literal domain onto the figurative domain. Let me emphasize, then, that from the perspective of the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor, it is these metaphors *per se* that make sense of Latin speakers' talk of courage and cowardice and in fact constitute their conceptualization of these categories vis-à-

[26] Cf. also Cic. *Inv*. 1.92, *indignum esse ab homine ignavissimo virum fortissimum Aiacem necatum*; Liv. *AUC*. 2.46.5*, 'adeo ignauissimos hostes magis timetis quam Iouem Martemque per quos iurastis?'* and 5.28.8, *Postumius suis in tutum receptis cum contione aduocata terrorem increparet ac fugam, fusos esse ab ignauissimo ac fugacissimo hoste*.

vis *animus*. Without these metaphors, Latin speakers would have an understanding of these categories that was very impoverished indeed.

3. Alternative metaphors.

This is not to imply that Latin speakers did not also possess other (and other metaphorical) ways of conceptualizing courage, of course. Evidence indicates that a much wider set of images actually converged on this conceptualization. For instance, courage may be conceived as a sort of substance that "fills" the body, as when Turnus "'fills' the Rutulians with daring courage" (*Rutulos animis audacibus implet*, Verg. *Aen.* 7.475). Or courage may be imagined as a kind of physical object "given" to someone (by the hands), as when again Turnus taunts the Trojans as "the sort of soldiers to whom trust in an intervening moat and the delays of trenches . . . 'give' courage" (*quibus haec medii fiducia valli / fossarumque morae . . . / dant animos*, Verg. *Aen.* 9.142–44) or Athena literally "'hands over' courage to the young man" (*animos iuveni . . . ministrat,* Hom. Lat. *Il.* 396).[27] Courage may also be conceived in metaphorical terms of spatial proximity: Cicero, for example, reporting that his arrival in Cilicia emboldened Cassius, writes that courage literally "came near to" Cassius (*Cassio . . . animus accessit, Att.* 5.20.3). In another frequent metaphor, courage is a kind of fire. Giving courage is therefore setting *animus* aflame (*inflammare* or *accendere* or *incendere animum*), as when Allecto promises to, literally, "'set their spirits on fire' by lust for senseless war" (*accendamque animos insani Martis amorem,* Verg. *Aen.* 7.550).[28] Courage is also sharpness: for instance, Livy recounts that after the capture of New Carthage, Scipio instituted a new training regimen for his soldiers and thus "'sharpened' their bodies and

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[27] However, Valpy 1828, 263 derives *ministro* from *minus* by analogy with *magister* < *magis*, the vocalization of the first syllable paralleling *comminus* and *eminus*.
[28] Cf. Verg. *Aen.* 12.426, *primusque animos accendit in hostem*; Cic. *Man.* 6, *vestros animos . . . inflammare . . . debeat*; Liv. *AUC.* 2.46.7, *accendamus militum animos*; 3.61.8, *accendit animos*; 6.14.10, *accendunt militum animos*; 26.44.8, *ad accendendos militum animos*; etc.

spirits for war" (*corpora simul animosque ad bellum acuebant*, *AUC.* 25.51.7).[29] The overall set of metaphors delivering Latin's concept of courage can thus be represented as in Figure 2. <Figure 2: Overall set of metaphors delivering Latin speakers' concept of courage in terms of *animus*.>

Nevertheless, I believe the VERTICAL ORIENTATION, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, VISUAL PROMINENCE, and ENERGETIC MOTION metaphors can be distinguished from these others in several important respects. To begin with, they are regular and consistent in a way the others are not: that is, as already noted, they structure meaning pervasively across Latin's semantic system, over periods of the language and at different levels of the linguistic code, whereas the others tend to be (usually generically) more restricted. And they recruit images always in pairwise fashion toward the conceptualization of both courage and cowardice, whereas the other metaphors are univocal, tending to focus on the metaphorical characterization of courage alone. For example, while a "sharp" *animus* signifies courage, images of "dullness" typically denote stupidity in Latin (Bettini 2011, 50–51). And while "giving" *animus* to a person or for *animus* to "come near to" a person means being emboldened, the "removal" or "departure" of *animus* signifies instead loss of consciousness or even death.

Perhaps most importantly, the VERTICAL ORIENTATION, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, VISUAL PROMINENCE, and ENERGETIC MOTION metaphors can be distinguished in terms of their grounding in a single, coherent domain of embodied experience. It is hard to imagine a single, regularly occurring situation of human embodiment that includes *all* the dimensions necessary to simultaneously motivate a conceptualization of courage as sharpening, burning, giving, filling, and approaching. Each of these metaphors therefore seems to be independently motivated, and their

[29] Almost exactly the same expression occurs at *AUC.* 35.35.9, *non sineret sub tectis marcescere otio sed educeret et in armis decurrere cogeret, simul animos acueret et corpora exerceret*. SHARPNESS of *animus* may also signify anger, as apparently in Verg. *Aen.* 1.57, *mollitque animos et temperat iras*.

grounding is probably to be sought not in relation to courage specifically, but in relation to the more general psychological and emotional category whose understanding they appear to deliver.[30] By contrast, the VERTICAL ORIENTATION, STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY, VISUAL PROMINENCE and ENERGETIC MOTION metaphors have clear grounding and motivation as a system in embodied experiences of what Walter Cannon termed the "fight-or-flight response". It is easy enough to see how the specific imagistic content of the metaphors is motivated by the set of autonomic physiological reactions and stereotyped bodily behaviors associated with these scenarios.[31] The images of the ENERGETIC MOTION metaphor, for instance, appear to be grounded in felt sensations related to the release of adrenal catecholemines (especially epinephrine and norepinephrine), which prepare the body for quick action by accelerating the heart rate, increasing blood pressure and muscle tensity, and providing additional glucose to the bloodstream as a boost of available energy for rigorous exertion.[32] Because this mechanism actually becomes mobilized in scenarios where an individual has determined that "fight" is the more adaptive course of action – in other words, in "courage" scenarios – liveliness thus affords a ready metaphorical image for understanding this category. On the other hand, the lethargy image is likely motivated by the fact that in "flight" conditions, digestive functioning, muscle contraction, heart rate, and breathing are slowed to preserve metabolic resources, proprioceptively and perhaps objectively perceived as a kind of physical sluggishness taken to be characteristic of – and so a salient metaphorical image

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[30] The BURNING, FILLING, and SHARPENING metaphors each characterize a whole range of emotion concepts. One immediately thinks of Latin elegists' use of "burning" as a metaphor especially for erotic love. It is equally common, though, to find hope and joy – as well as grief and anger – construed metaphorically as fire. And even as "filling" the *animus* means giving courage, it is also possible to "fill" someone or someone's *animus* with other emotion-substances: with love (as, for instance, in Naev. fr. 136, *animum amore capitali compleuerint*) or with superstition (as in Liv. *AUC.* 29.14.2, *impleuerat ea res superstitionum animos*), or hope, or happiness, or longing. "Sharpening" metaphorically captures emotional arousal in general, which is why *acer* and *acutus* often have the sense of "impassioned". The PROXIMITY metaphor has perhaps the widest scope: "coming near to" or "approaching" can express the occurrence of all sorts of mental states, above all "agreement" (as in expressions like *ipse quoque huic sententiae accedo*, Iust. *Dig*. 36.2.12.6).

[31] The classic treatment is Cannon (1953). See now esp. LeDoux (1996); Panksepp (1998); Porges (2011); and Everly and Lating 2012.

[32] For details, see Usdin et al. (1976) and Makara et al. (1983).

for – cowardice. The image may also be grounded in the tendency of human beings to resort to "tonic immobility" or "freezing" in situations of extreme danger, where "fight" is not favorable and escape by feigning death represents the better option.

At the same time, UP(RIGHT)NESS and CONSPICUOUSNESS are apt images for courage because the "fight" scenario entails an increase in apparent height, size, and stability, due to protrusion of the chest and raising of the head and neck brought about by involuntary contraction of the back muscles, along with bracing of the legs. Pupil dilation and horripilation, while enhancing vision and environmental sensitivity, also tend to give an impression of increased size. Images of cowardice as down(ward)ness and hiddenness are instead likely grounded in the typical "flight" behaviors of lying prone on the ground (collapse) and concealment, not to mention the body's attempt to appear smaller (and so less threatening to a predator) by contracting the muscles of the front of the body, pulling the shoulders, head, and spine inward and down. The STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY metaphor may also depend on effects of the release of epinephrine and norepinephrine during "fight" or "flight". These neurotransmitters are known to be related to so-called "phantom limb" perception: their availability to the nervous system has in fact been shown to correlate positively with the onset and maintenance of phantom sensations.[33] One of their effects, in other words, appears to be to induce a perception of the body as an integrated whole (even in cases where the body is not physically whole). If "fight" involves sustained release of these chemicals, this would account for the WHOLENESS image of courage, whereas their diminishment from the bloodstream and nerve fibers in the "flight" scenario could produce a (consciously or

[33] Cf. Allen (1990); and esp. Sherman et al. (1989).

unconsciously) perceived disruption of the "body schema" coming to be interpreted of cowardice in metaphorical terms of brokenness.[34]

4. Concluding remarks.

I have dwelt on the metaphorical structuring of Latin's conceptualization of courage and cowardice via embodied image schemas, and on the likely experiential grounding of these conceptual metaphors, to be able to suggest what I believe an experientialist account of meaning can bring to classical studies. In positing that sense-making emerges from embodied experience, such an approach offers, minimally, a model of linguistic meaning capable of explaining lexical polysemy in a systematic fashion. More than this, though, it offers a model of cultural meaning. In treating figurative associations pervasive and highly conventionalized in the linguistic system as reflecting conceptual (not only semantic) structures, such an approach can help identify the sorts of meanings that Latin speakers will tend to rely on in constructing and in interpreting "texts" of all kinds – including those inscribed through the aesthetic codes of visual representation – and that thus link together Roman society's various imaginative activities into a cohesive signifying order. As one immediate example, consider Trajan's Column. Though it is probably impossible to reduce the meaning of the column and its relief to a single overarching message, Per Gustaf Hamberg's claim (1945, 116–19) that it is meant above all to advertise the emperor's "manly courage" (*virtus*) seems undeniable. In this light, the placement of Trajan's statue at its top seems motivated by the metaphorical understanding of what is courageous as being "up". In effect, the column itself, with what Salvatore Settis called (1988) the constant vertical directional "impulse" of its decoration,

[34] The same effect could be attributed to the release of cortisol by the parasympathetic nervous system, following "fight-or-flight". High levels of cortisol are known to severally disrupt hippocampal functioning, and the hippocampus has often been seen as a crucial brain area in the maintenance of the body schema. See MacLachlan (2004).

literalizes in its physical form the metaphor of courage as up(right)ness. In this sense, the metaphor provides a principle of topographical organization for the construction and decoration of the column, as well as the mechanism of its interpretation.

More broadly, such an approach provides the sort of "experience-near" perspective that has recently been advocated in the study of ancient cultures. An "experience-near" perspective, as we know, privileges "native" ways of knowing and of representing the world, rather than concepts belonging to the observer's own cultural framework (concepts that Geertz 1973, 481–82 calls "experience-distant"). By illustrating how human-universal structures and processes of conceptualization give rise to the idiosyncratic meanings subtending a particular society's symbolic activities, image schema theory provides exactly the sort of language-independent, "etic" framework of analysis that can enable an "emic" accounting of Latin speakers' conceptual system. Especially when combined with a culturally-comparative perspective – since this helps highlight how speakers of different languages may elaborate different metaphorical models on the basis of the same images schemas, or how different languages and cultures capture the "same" concept through sometimes very different metaphorical images. Indeed, comparing Latin's metaphors of courage and cowardice with those from other languages reveals that cultural understandings of these categories are highly variable. In Greek, for example, courage may be conceived as a sort of smoke or vapor in the body (*θυμός* being connected with Latin *fumus* already by Onians 1954, 44–58).[35] Greek speakers also appear to favor animal imagery, especially of the lion, wild boar, wolf, or leopard for courage and of the deer or cattle for cowardice.[36] Many modern European languages

[35] Cf., e.g., Hom. *Od*. 10.461, *θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι λάβητε*; *Il*. 6.256, 7.152, *θυμὸς ἀνῆκεν*; *Od*. 2.315, *ἀέξεται ἔνδοθι θυμός*. See now Caswell (1990) 6–8.

[36] See esp. Schnapp-Gourbeillon (1981) and Lonsdale (1990). The HIDDENNESS metaphor of cowardice in Latin – where the coward is directly likened to the cowering animal – suggests these images are not entirely foreign to Roman culture, either.

conceptualize courage and cowardice instead through "heart" images, often in conjunction with an OBJECT metaphor: cf., e.g., Italian *prendere* and *perdere corraggio*, French *prendre* and *perdre courage*, and German *den Mut finden* and *verlieren*.[37] In Mandarin Chinese, courage is imagined in relation to the gallbladder, however: "gall-capacity (*dan-liang*)" means "courage" and the brave person is said to have a "big gall (*dan-da*)", whereas a coward has a "small gall (*dan-xiao*)".[38] Thus, while Latin speakers' metaphors may be based on experiences shared by presumably all human beings, their privileging of such experiences in metaphorical conceptualization appears to constitute a distinctive feature of their signifying order.[39]

In providing an "experience-near" perspective, such an experientialist approach thus addresses a significant deficit of classical studies: namely, that while the ostensible objective of most research is to reconstruct the meaning(s) of some cultural artefact in a way that conforms as much as possible to historical context, scholars nevertheless tend to analyze the repertory of Roman culture's meanings in terms of categories that belong to their own intellectual and cultural framework. The danger, of course, is not beginning our reflections from such "etic" categories – this is inevitable and in fact necessary – but remaining exclusively within them, viewing them as natural categories that are true in an ahistorical sense and never even minimally questioning whether or how Latin speakers elaborated similar conceptualizations. At the same time, it is obviously undesirable to aim exclusively at the "emic", since this poses the risk of losing any sense of how any particular symbolic configuration is distinctive and meaningful within a larger cultural or linguistic context. As Clifford Geertz wrote (1983, 58), "The trick is *not* to get yourself into

[37] Gutiérrez Pérez (2008).
[38] Yu (2003).
[39] What accounts for Latin speakers' privileged conceptualization of courage and cowardice in such markedly embodied terms is, I would suggest, the particular symbolic affordances that the human body seems to have presented to them for representing and understanding psychological and emotional phenomena of all sorts. I have shown elsewhere the Latin speakers' understanding of most aspects of mental activity: Short (2012) and (2013).

some inner correspondence of spirit with your informants", the result of which would be something like the proverbial "ethnography of witchcraft written by a witch". The trick is instead to involve the etic and the emic in a productive dialectic that highlights where conceptualizations diverge and so avoids predetermining the meaning of cultural forms by subsuming them to presumably analogous conceptual categories.[40]

To be clear. In advocating that Classical Studies incorporate cognitively-informed methodologies, I am not suggesting that scholars need to suddenly start talking about post-synaptic depolarization, dendrodendritic inhibition, and backpropagating action potentials. There is the danger of losing sight in the neuroscientific weeds of how human beings (and not just cognitive systems) go about making sense of their world. Nor am I implying we should view the classical languages as simply a resource for supporting the universalizing claims of some cognitive linguists. In showing that Latin speakers' meanings depend to some extent on cognitive structures and processes shared by all humans, there is the danger of downplaying their sociocultural situatedness. What I am suggesting we need is an approach that does not hesitate to describe Latin speakers' mental contents in scientifically validated ways and in terms of recognized brain-based mechanisms of meaning construction, but that does so at a level of abstraction functional to characterizing what is different about those "contents"[41] – while recognizing, at the same time, that human embodiment can and does impose certain constraints on the proliferation of meaning cross-culturally. This is because the image schemas and image-schematic scenarios that underpin even highly abstract, culturally situated concepts – along with the construal operations of which image schemas are susceptible – are specified by the nature of the human body and by our bodily interactions with the natural and social environment. Opportunities for metaphorical projection are

[40] Cf. Bettini (2009).
[41] Cf. Detienne (2002) and (2005), and Bettini (2009).

also subject to limitation, since mappings of image-schematic structure must preserve the cognitive topology of the concrete source domain in the metaphorical target domain and thus possible figurative relations are constrained by the internal structuring of concepts.[42] Probably even the most imaginative metaphorical images of literary production can be shown to derive from conventionalized patterns of figurative associations (by way of the elaboration, extension, combination or questioning of established mappings: cf. Kövecses 2005). Indeed, to be meaningful in the first place, what is imaginative and creative must relate at a certain order to that which is conventionalized and ordinary.[43]

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[42] For the "Invariance Hypothesis", see Lakoff (1993) and Turner (1990). Brugmann (1990) offers a critical view.

[43] See esp. Lakoff and Turner (1989) 67–72.

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