‘Criminality, Pure and Simple’:
An Analysis of Violent Opposition to the Police in the 2011 English Riots

Submitted by Stuart Scrase to the University of Exeter
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Signature: .................................................................
For Laura,

I could not and would not have done it without you.
Abstract

In 2011 five days of rioting spread across many English towns and cities. David Cameron, then UK Prime Minister, described these events as ‘criminality, pure and simple’, inhibiting serious examination of what happened and justifying harsh punitive sentences for rioters. This thesis explains and counters the naïve individualism that underpins the discourse of ‘criminality’; but further argues that such discursive acts are representative of a broader problem within the social order that is causally implicated the violence in 2011.

In contrast to the popular and sociological approach of analysing the singular ‘riot’, ‘riot actions’ are conceptualised as the foci of analysis, and in turn argued as acts of resistance generated by the organisation and practice of power within the social order. Thus riot actions are conceptualised and function as a symptom and entry point by which analysis can better get under the skin of the social order and understand its failing.

Arguing for violent acts against the police as symptomatic of the social order’s failure, the thesis examines instances of these in the 2011 and 1980s riots. The thesis explores and compares the involvement of race, exclusion, social identity, and police during and across these periods. It further examines how neoliberal forms of exclusion have shaped the possibilities of riotous actions, before performing a situational analysis of video footage of the 2011 riots.

To facilitate this approach the thesis develops a theory of action/resistance through an account of the production of agency. The theory connects Bourdieus theorisation of habitus and disposition, utilises an expressive understanding of shame and self-esteem, and Butler’s notion of performativity. Thus we seek to understand how structured experiences, in particular social and economic exclusion, become meaningful to those excluded, and how this shapes violent acts as meaningful performances.

The thesis argues that resistance is generated through power relations, which amongst many rioters, are failing to reproduce the sense of self-worth
required for identification with and engagement in, the social order. From this standpoint, then, riotous resistance cannot be explained as distinct from the social order, which shapes agency’s ‘necessary scene’, but as rational and emotional responses to it.

The emergence of neoliberalism and individualism in the 1970s and 1980s created an epistemological and thus ontological shift, reshaping how disrespect and disempowerment is experienced and understood by excluded groups. These shifts or emergences have diminished the capacity of socially and economically excluded groups to generate Politicised identities and forms of resistance. Consequently, rather than ‘criminality’ - a moral condemnation - the 1980s and 2011, saw an increasing emergence of individualised - rather than Politicised - forms of resistance against the social and political order. Individualised resistance to power within the social order is ‘performed’ through short-term goals that momentarily re-arrange these power relations with regards to the self and police. In these behaviours, structurally produced shame and anger are expressed, social identities are formed and realised through a common complaint and goal, and the self achieves value through attacking or confounding the police.

**Definitions**

The terms ‘riot’, ‘the rioters’, ‘unrest’, and ‘disorder’ all have problems. ‘Riot’, implies a single event, alongside picking up normative connotations of chaotic and criminal behaviour. ‘Disorder’ implies irrationality through a lack of order, and positions riot actions in a negative comparison to the dominant group’s accepted norms of behaviour. ‘Unrest’ perhaps has similar connotations, implying a disruption to the normal, peaceful state of affairs, and thus misses the possibility that the events witnessed are an escalation. All these terms will be employed for lack of better, common terms, but function as interchangeable and simply as identifiers of the subject matter.

The thesis draws on a distinction between ‘political’ and ‘Political’. This will be elaborated in the thesis, however for the sake of reference they are defined
here. The capitalised ‘Political’ refers to all relations of power that shape and structure social existence, such as the distribution of resources. Thus one can be Politicised in that they have an understanding of themselves and their action within these relations. The term ‘political’ refers to the conventional understanding of voting, protesting and so forth, but it will be argued functions normatively to justify certain types of action as acceptable. This enables a distinction to be made between concepts of protestors and rioters. To protest is to speak to the legitimated political sphere and articulate a claim for change. A rioter is not ‘political’ because they do not speak to the political sphere but against it; nevertheless, rioters can be Politicised in that they have a structural understanding of the causes of their actions.

‘Violence’ is an important term to the thesis and should simply be noted that here it only refers to the intentional aim of physical causing harm to another being, although attacks on police property will also be discussed. This is not to say acts of destruction of objects are not violent, rather, that violence against a person (the police) is simply the focus of the thesis.

Finally, ‘race’ and ‘class’ are also important terms for the thesis. The concept of ‘race’ does not refer to any biological, or indeed ‘trait’ of any individual or group. Rather ‘race’ and ‘class’ denote two particular forms of social practice: firstly, they refers to a cognitive structure that enables and frames affective prejudice and discriminatory behaviours (or forms of disrespect) based on perceived differences; secondly, these concepts may also be similarly employed as a form of identification, and thus may be utilised to internalise disrespect or resist it (Hall et al., 1980). Ethnicity, while a problematic term, is used simply to locate the subject of topic with regards to the topic of race.
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1. Introduction

1.1. Five Days in August

In August 2011 rioting broke out across the country causing millions of pounds worth of damage, injuries to many police and public, and the arrest and prosecution of thousands of rioters. The violence emerged during a protest in Tottenham, north London, over the death of a young, black man, Mark Duggan, at the hands of police. Duggan had been shot and killed during a police operation on the 4th of August. Disbelief in the police account in which Duggan supposedly shot at police, and disrespectful treatment of Duggan’s family, prompted a protest march by family and friends. On the 6th of August the march began from Broadwater Farm estate to Tottenham police station on the main high street, Tottenham High Road.

It was from this protest that the first instances of violence would emerge, resulting in clashes between the public and police, along with the destruction of police and commercial property. Through social media and television news it became apparent that the police were struggling to maintain their control over the streets (HAC, 2011: 28; MPS, 2012).¹ This perception enabled the disorder to emerge in other areas resulting in looting, vandalism, and violent clashes with police around Tottenham’s borough of Haringey on the 6th of August.

On the 7th, violence, vandalism, and looting again emerged, this time in five of London’s boroughs (Guardian & LSE, 2011 MPS, 2012: 14; THO, 2011), before on the 8th and 9th saw similar instances in 22 of London’s 32 boroughs, as well as outside the capital in towns and cities around England, including Birmingham, Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Nottingham and many more, seeing some form of collective violence. However, by the 10th of August, the last day on which rioting occurred, the disorder was petering out, with only a few isolated occurrences around the country.

¹ Referring to reports published by the Home Affairs Committee and the Metropolitan Police Service
During these five days an estimated 13,000 to 15,000 individuals (RCVP, 2011: 11) attacked police, vandalised and burnt public and private property, and looted a variety of stores, from high end electronic retailers, to designer brand and high street clothing stores, even to pound stores. In London alone, up to 16,000 police officers were reportedly deployed on the 9th of August (MPS, 2012: 17) and damages and losses to business were estimated to be around the £300 million mark (Dodd, 2011).

1. Framing ‘The Riot’

Unsurprisingly, the dramatic nature of the events meant images plastered television and social media screens showing rioters framed by burning vehicles, buildings ablaze, high streets littered with broken glass and overturned bins. News articles described scenes in which “hordes of balaclava-clad yobs stormed shops, setting fire to businesses indiscriminately” (Wardrop, 2011). Little reflection was needed. When control had been regained the response of politicians and media was to condemn and seek to punish these violent and immoral thugs and opportunists: they needed to be taught a lesson (e.g. Gabbat, 2011; Hastings, 2011).

The problem was framed as one of a ‘feral underclass’ (Clarke, 2011); young, violent men clad in hoods, bandanas, and tracksuits, only out for themselves. The serving Prime Minister, David Cameron was unequivocal: “This is criminality, pure and simple, it has to be confronted and defeated” (Cameron(a), 2011). Of course, the conservative panic over society’s moral breakdown was not the only issue on the agenda.

News media criticised the police’s responses for standing back and observing greedy rioters. This was not the fault of the brave individual officers, but rather the culture of political correctness (PC) and fear of being seen as racist had hamstrung the brave bobbies (Green, 2011; MailOnline(b), 2011). Thus, the PC culture had enabled the immoral mob to take what they pleased from hard working business owners. What was needed to solve the moral breakdown was tough and harsh action.

The discourse was turned into practice and the penal arm of the state was
‘empowered’ to act in a way that its police could not have. All night courts were run to facilitate the large number of cases, and the justice system was harsh, not to mention potentially illegal as politicians allegedly interfered with the judicial process (Baird, 2011). Those rioters who were caught received ‘severe’ sentences often for minor involvement, with one barrister criticising the courts as suffering from a ‘collective hysteria’ (BBC(a), 2011).

1.1.2 Consumer Riots?

One of the principle arguments made about the disorder in 2011 is that they were ‘consumer riots’ (Bauman, 2011; Treadwell et al., 2013; Moxon, 2011; Zizek, 2011). These draw on the fact that much of the rioting appeared to be the looting of consumer goods, and in particular than many rioters took the opportunity to steal designer or fashionable brands. The argument was made that rioters had been taught to desire these brands as a means to achieve status and self-worth; yet these rioters were economically excluded.

While it is certainly the case that these arguments hit on something relevant to the disorder in 2011, they also have arguably produced misleading and homogenising conclusions. For instance, data on recorded crime revealed that 51% of crime was recorded against commercial premises (THO, 2011: 4). Alongside media accounts of widespread looting, this seems to have justified the notion that it was all about consumerism. However, the media accounts are notoriously unreliable, picking up on the most dramatic incidents or shaping the narrative to fit their political ideology.

Moreover, the figure that also reveals that almost half of recorded crime was not against commercial premises. Indeed, of these not all were looted (e.g. Reicher & Stott, 2011 64-68%). Platts-Fowler (2013) also points out that the category of ‘looting’ conflates a number of potentially different social meanings, such as material gain, status related acts, and expressions of resentment towards and/or power over authorities; as one man from the 1992 LA riots put it: It wasn’t a matter of ‘I got something for free’. It was a matter of ‘I’m taking from the white man. How do you like us now?” (Reicher & Stott, 2011; 44%).
Simply put, while clearly looting played an important part, to describe 2011 as ‘consumer riots’ is simplifying, homogenising and inaccurate. Indeed, one could argue that emphasising the looting, particularly with regards to the luxury and branded goods often targeted, enabled an easier moral judgement of ‘the rioters’ through their ‘greedy’ and apparently apolitical behaviour.

1.1.3. Criminality: Repression or Resolution?

So did the government resolve the issues and causes behind the riots? Did it even try to understand what happened? The answer would appear to be no. Thus, whether one can simply ‘confront and defeat’ behaviour and thus resolve the causes of the riots through imprisonment is certainly up for question. More worrying was the complete absence of will to explore and understand what had prompted the violence: “It was common or garden thieving, robbing and looting. And we don’t need an inquiry to tell us that” (Cameron, cited in Platts-Fowler, 2013: 18).

Indeed, assertions that rioters were greedy individuals out for themselves, handily ignore that the police were explicitly and repeatedly targeted during the violence, or that complaints about aggressive and disrespectful policing by rioters might be worth noting (Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011). But the police were not the only consideration that seemed swept under the carpet.

In the weeks and months after, data continued to emerge revealing that both areas and participants were disproportionately from poverty (Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011; MoJ, 2011b; THO, 2011). In turn, race and racism were implicated through the disproportionate involvement of young black men; this in turn, appeared to connect and corroborate the complaints about police alongside data that revealed the disproportionate targeting black people by police (Guardian & LSE, 2011; MoJ, 2011b).

For the coalition government however, none of this was relevant because the riots were not political. They were not about the recently implemented ‘cuts’ to public and youth services, they were not about ‘poverty’, and they were not about ‘racism’. It was about ‘behaviour’, ‘indifference to right and wrong’, and
an ‘absence of self restraint’ (Cameron, 2011b). In fact the only data Conservative politicians appeared to draw on was that the majority of arrestees had criminal convictions.

This appeared selective to say the least, not only because all evidence that might question the ‘criminality’ thesis was neglected, but as Ball and Drury (2012) point out, the data was heavily skewed. The police were making the majority of their arrests by identifying individuals through prior criminal records and CCTV. In other words, it was not that all rioters were criminals, but that the rioters who were the easiest to identify, locate and arrest, were those with criminal records.

1.1.4. Criminality, Power and the Social Order

What the response to the rioting in 2011 represents is not a search for understanding and resolution, but an attempt at concealment and repression. However, to assume the discourse of ‘criminality’ is only an attempt to conceal is to misunderstand the on-going relation between rioting and the social order. For Foucault, “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (2004: 15).

In other words, the social order is a particular organisation of power and distribution of resources established in the first instance through the exercise of violence, and maintained through politics. It is the war of rich and poor, the powerful and weak, the have and have-nots.

This may be a particularly dramatic framing, and politics is not necessarily always about domination, but there is some truth in this. The social order is a hierarchy that seems particularly resistant to significant change. The current free market capitalist ideology, despite rhetoric of freedom and democracy, has seen inequality soaring to Dickensian standards (Tyler, 2013: 7).

Although often thought of emotional, irresponsible outbursts, this thesis will seek to show that rioting is actually a contest occurring within the social order, a form of resistance to the exercise of power. In Foucault’s (2004) terms, the riot is a moment when the underlying conflict that politics seeks to conceal breaches the surface of the social order, and power and privilege responds by seeking to protect itself.
‘Criminality’ then is not simply a response to the riot but part of a relation that produces the riot. It is an example of power seeking to reproduce itself in the face of a threat. It is an act that seeks to delegitimise challenges and justify the organisation of power and privilege through condemnation. And it is a discursive act that, because of the potential threat to its legitimacy, seeks to shore up and justify its capacity to command and to use violence against those so condemned (Arendt, 1970: 40-1). Thus, to understand the violence in 2011 we cannot just look at the actions of the rioters, nor can we treat ‘criminality’ as simply a response to these events; rather we must understand both the events and discourses as a process and outcome of the social order.

1.1.5. Overcoming Criminality

What we require then is a way to analyse the violence, to counter the discourse of ‘criminality’, and to expose the relations that are producing the conflict. Of course, there are many who have sought to do this and one popular explanation emerged in my own interactions at conferences, on social media, and in some journalistic and academic analyses.

To generalise and simplify, a little unfairly, these arguments framed the rioting as ‘political action’, if not necessarily well articulated (e.g. Penny, 2011; Guardian & LSE, 2011; Stott & Reicher, 2011). However, this is not the solution we are looking for. The problem with these accounts is not that they lack evidence, rather the contrary. What is the problem is how they seek, to different extents, to frame this evidence by engaging in a game set by those in power.

To argue that the riots were ‘political’ is to respond to ‘criminality’ in its own terms, and set by the neoliberal logic of individualism. ‘Criminality’ focuses on ‘behaviour’ rather than cause, utilising naïve logics of ‘free will’ to present rioters, not as having genuine discontent produced by their position in the social order, but as immoral and selfish (Tyler, 2013; Wacquant, 2010). The problem is that political-criminal debate is a game of legitimation not exploration, relying on notions of acceptable types of articulation and action in order to dismiss claims for justice and change. By engaging in this debate one seek to fit the rioters’ actions within a framework that shows them as ‘rational’
and acceptable (Akram, 2014: 382).

Thus to argue for riots as political action is to engage in a losing battle: “Riots are, by definition, improvised and chaotic. They do not present a “finished thesis” and it is absurd to judge them in terms of political coherence” (Millington, 2016: 713). Thus, when rioters do not articulate themselves in a clear manner, or when their actions seem not to have strategic goals, or when they use violence, they are easily framed as immoral, selfish, and ‘criminal’. Moreover, claims of ‘political action’ in the face of looting consumer goods, enables an easy dismissals by those who seek to defend the status quo: “These riots were not about government cuts: they were directed at high street stores, not Parliament” (Cameron, 2011(b)).

‘Criminality’ emphasises the action itself, not the structural cause of that action; and thus riotous actions are dismissed not by the whether there may be a cause for discontent, but simply by how discontent is expressed. What is required is that we move beyond the implicit and normative values in these terms, and understand how ‘rationality’ and thus the so called ‘criminal’ actions of rioters are something produced through social structure.

### 1.1.6. Overcoming ‘The Riot’

As this discussion has implied, rioting cannot be understood adequately without locating as within the relations and processes of power of a social order. This leads us to problems with the concept of ‘the riot’. Brubaker and Cooper (2000), when talking of identity, warn of the dangers of utilising categories of practice in analysis; that is those concepts generated in and through everyday use for the purpose of subjective narratives. For instance, because someone identifies as part of the ‘working class’ does not mean that an actual group exists that can be clearly and coherently identified. Nor does it necessitate that working class means the same thing for all those who identify as part of it.

‘Riot’ is a category of practice. Observers have shaped the concept in order to make sense of a series of often surprising, temporally limited, violent actions that threatens the social order of which they are part. Thus, when Le Bon first
talked of ‘the crowd’ (1996: 56), he could not help but imbue it with his class-based fears of the unwashed ‘masses’ and the threat they posed to the social hierarchy from which he benefitted. Indeed, during the 18th Century, ‘riot’ and ‘mob’ were generally applied to ‘any unlawful assembly or hostile activity’ violent or not (Gilmore, 1993: 17).

‘The riot’, or notions of the ‘mob’ have been defined in contrast to what they are not; thus it is disorder in contrast to order, violent in contrast to peaceful, and criminal in contrast to political. It has sought to define the violence before analysing it and from the position of power, leading to assumptions that riots constitute irrational action and temporally limited ‘outbursts’ (Smelser, 1962). In defending the social order, like ‘criminality’, the concept of ‘the riot’ closes off paths necessary to situating the actions of rioters in their appropriate context.

This is not to say that no one has developed useful theories or nuanced and insightful accounts of rioting, however, but unless we reject the concept of ‘the riot’ as the focus on analysis we will always be limited. The problem is the forms of behaviour that constitute ‘the riot’ are symptoms of the social order’s failure to generate the norms and behaviours necessary to reproduce itself. The violence itself constitutes a rupture in the skin of the social order, a moment when an underlying illness is revealed. To seek to analyse that rupture alone is to miss the point: we can start with the symptom, but we must go beneath the skin.

1.2. The Thesis

The aim of this thesis is in part to contribute to political and sociological approaches and understanding of ‘riots’. Of course, the point is not to analyse ‘the 2011 riots’, but rather to develop a theoretical approach that enables the analyst to use instances of rioting as a means to understand the failure of society to reproduce itself. The primary action selected here is the violence against the police. This is because the emphasis on ‘criminality’, and indeed on looting and consumerism has tended to push this aspect of the rioting into
the background (Newburn et al., 2016(a): 7).

Moreover, it should also be acknowledged that the police are not an isolated actor, but rather are part of the machinery of the state and representatives and authorities of the social order (Bland et al., 2001; Loader, 1997). Thus their role and position and the resulting trust and legitimacy, or lack thereof, sits in a non-linear relation of effect with the social order itself. Consequently, attacks on the police are not simply connected to the police, but are tied in with the broader structure and power relations within society. The violence against the police then, functions as an access point to follow the causal tendrils out into failure within the broader social order.

Through the analysis of riot actions as forms of resistance, we step out into the social order, and in particular the emergence of neoliberalism and individualism. These factors have shaped the extent and manner in which social and economic exclusion occurs, resulting in shifting stereotypes of the super-exploited group away from explicit racism, to moral categories of ‘underclass’ and ‘criminality’. In turn, while the police function as a focus of ire in the rioting, they are only the tip of the iceberg: a tangible and visible means by which the social order as a whole disrespects and excludes those it stereotypes.

2.1 Chapter Structure

Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the methodological approach and issues, and also gives an idea of how the research shaped the understanding to be developed here. The thesis takes a mixed method approach to explore and connect a wide range of factors, utilising ethnographic work, quantitative data and qualitative research on the riots, reports and secondary data on social and economic policy and police practice. Chapter 3 ‘Riots or Resistance’ will review the literature around both riots in general and the 2011 riots, noting the problematic framing through the concept of the riot.

The review of theories and literature sets up the theoretical discussion in Chapter 4 ‘A Theory of Resistance’. To move past ‘criminality’ and ‘riot’ theories, a theory of resistance will be developed. One of the key factors to
countering the discourse of criminality will be to demonstrate how resistance that appears ‘apolitical’ is driven by discontent, which in turn is generated through the structure of society.

I will principally utilise Bourdieu’s (2000) understanding of structure or capitals, Scheff’s (2000) theorisation of shame, Honneth’s (1995) concept of disrespect and struggle, and Butler’s (2004) notion of performativity. The theory of resistance will argue that the social structure becomes meaningful through emotions, in particular the way it shapes experiences as shameful and creates the conditions of agency. This will enable us to better understand both the riot actions and their production evolving together, and reveal the Political nature of ‘criminality’. Moreover, by acknowledging these broader boundaries or connections, we can also learn by extending beyond the immediate instance of rioting in 2011, and examining similar forms of resistance occurring during the rioting of the 1980s.

We begin the substantive analysis of riots in Chapter 5 ‘Anti-Police Riots’, which realises the critique of ‘the riot’ demonstrating that 2011 was not a singular event, but connected to the 1980s riots. By examining these two riots together the thesis will note both the similarities in types of action and context, the role of race, and social and economic context. Specifically it will note the similarities in the attacks on and perception of the police, exploring why this might be so.

This leads us to Chapter 6 ‘Fucking Up The Feds: The Politics of Criminality’ in which we examine and breakdown the changing form of resistance and power during the 1980s and 2011 violence. Here we observe a shift in the 1980s away from Politicised understandings and identities oriented to positive notions of ‘black’, towards individualised forms of resistance. The notion of ‘individualised resistance’ is developed to account for the production of apparently ‘apolitical’ behaviour by the social order, and connects this to the emergence of neoliberalism.

Chapter 7 ‘Neoliberalism: the Expansion of Disrespect’ makes the argument that while riots have always been a response to exclusion, the individualised resistance we see emerging in the 1980s and becoming the
principle form in 2011 is the consequence of a particular historical moment and, for lack of better term, ideology. The chapter examines how Neoliberalism has expanded disrespect and disempowerment through social and economic exclusion, and more importantly, shaped the way these are experienced and can be responded to through the new ‘underclass’ stereotype, and limiting the possibility of resistance through an individualistic ontology. It further highlights how the structuring of education and employment for those underprivileged, produces shame and encourages the rejection of and resistance to the legitimated social order.

Chapter 8 ‘Keeping the Order: Stop and Searching the Underclass’, reconnects us to the role of the police, how they become a prime target for collective violence, and how they are implicated in the social order’s production of resistance and violence. This occurs though the circular relation of disrespect and disempowerment, over-policing and resistance. This feeds forwards into the performative and expressive violence against them.

Chapter 9 ‘Performative Violence: Overcoming Disrespect and Disempowerment in 2011’ uses the novel method of ‘situational analysis’ (Collins, 2008) using video footage to bring together the discussion and counter the notion of ‘criminality’ through the reading of rioters actions within the situational dynamics. What this analysis reveals is that rioters responded to power relations that were producing disrespect, utilising the police as a means to perform a new social order in which they were dominant.

Chapter 10 ‘Resisting Neoliberalism: The Youth Project in Hackney’ offers a preliminary discussion of the way out of this reinforcing cycle of exclusion and disrespect through a discussion of how a youth project in Hackney sought to deal with these issues. It argues that central to overcoming the problems dismissed and concealed as criminality, is an emotional understanding of practice in education and employment. However, it also argues that what is lacking throughout society is the structural or Politicised understandings and identities necessary to break the cycle and enable the social order to adequately reproduce itself.
2. Methods: Framing and Conducting the Research

2.1 Introduction

The initial project began as an analysis of the 2011 riots, however, as the introduction revealed, this has changed. While initially the project had been conceptualised as exploring the 2011 riots through data and ethnographic research, this became impossible. Theoretically, as has been pointed to, general approaches to riots are problematic, while interviewing rioters was a particularly difficult task, not only for myself, but apparently for others in a similar positions.

Thus a new approach was required that utilised multiple methods and foci of analysis, with the aim of understanding the problem within the social order that riot actions represent. Of course, analyses of riots have been conducted before without recourse to the rioters’ voices themselves, and instead sought to understand sets of relations or conditions related to the riots, such as the community, social and economic exclusion, involvement with crime, or interactions and perceptions on the police (e.g. Keith, 1993; Lea & Young, 1982). Thus an exploration of the communities, relations, and conditions can, in and of itself, prove invaluable to understanding why rioting emerged.

In turn, the riots of 2011 provided quantitative data produced by the state, with three major reports commissioned into the riots, as well as some academic and other investigations that managed to speak to the rioters. These reports provide a limited account of rioters’ voices, complaints, perspectives, and values. The benefit of this is that we can reinforce and move beyond from identifying blunt factors (poverty, crime, ethnicity, police-community relations etc.) to develop an understanding of how these have impacted upon individuals, and provide a more nuanced understanding of the relation between social context and the situations of riots. This connects us to the broader social analysis in which we use findings from the analysis of riot actions to explore through ethnographic work and secondary research, and how riot actions emerge from and respond to the social order.
Finally, while access to riots as they happened has largely been impossible without the luck of being present, the development and proliferation of recording technology alongside the internet has meant that researchers can now access and analyse the actions of rioters. However, proponents of this method (Collins, 2008; Nassauer, 2012) argue that this method alone can explain acts of violence. The method is employed differently here.

Thus I also carry out a situational analysis of the attacks on, or confrontations with, the police. Yet, rather than in isolation, this method will be used to bring other forms of research together through analysing acts of resistance. This enables us to understand the actions of rioters within the larger context that is largely to some extent excluded in analyses of riots, and to provide a more grounded counter-narrative to the discourse of criminality. However, to begin I will discuss the practical problems I had regarding contacting rioters. This will lead into the approach taken to mitigate these problems, a discussion on the principle sources of data on the 2011 riots, the situational analysis, and finally the ethnographic aspect of the research.

2.2. A Lack of Rioters

The most obvious means to achieve nuanced understandings of the contexts within which the riots are seated is ethnographic research focused on rioters, their values, logics, and perceptions and feeling with regards to the police, understood as embedded within their social context. The initial aim was to try to make contact with rioters through multiple routes. My first attempt was to make direct contact with prosecuted rioters through the justice system; however, the freedom of information request made to the Ministry of Justice was rejected due to the personal nature of information.

Another direct contact approach that I employed was to search the media and internet for details of any involved, and through personal contacts who knew rioters. For the few rioters that I managed to obtain enough details to be able to locate, there was no response to my attempts to contact them. Similarly, I also spoke to personal contacts (friends, former colleagues) in London, one of
which initially informed me he knew three rioters who would be willing to be interviewed. However, before the interviews occurred they changed their mind, which my contact stated, was to do with the risk of prosecution.

The final method I employed was to make contact with individuals or institutions involved in the communities that experienced rioting, with the aim of talking to them, but also that they may be able to initiate contact between myself and rioters. However, despite emailing, phoning, or turning up to many private or council run organisations around London, from youth organisations to those working with gangs or disadvantaged young people, the majority of my attempts were ignored while the rest were rejected on the contentious nature of the research and risk of prosecution for the interviewees. While I did find some people willing to speak to me, the only partial success (in contact, but not in gaining interviews with rioters) came from the youth project discussed below.

Indeed, contact with rioters was extremely difficult, which I realised was a problem many in similar positions to myself were having. Through a personal contact I was given the email of one of the researchers who interviewed rioters for the Reading the Riots project, and who was now engaged in her own PhD project on the same topic. I contacted her explaining the problems I was having, to which she responded that despite her previous position she was also unable to gain interviews with rioters, and had also received a number of enquiries from students and researchers having similar issues to myself. It appeared that despite the initial willingness of rioters to speak to the media and researchers, as time had gone by there was an increasing refusal to do so.

The partial success with regards to contacting rioters came in 2015, with a youth project on a housing estate in Hackney, north London, which would ultimately provide the majority of my data – although not through rioter interviews. Initial contact was made with Polly (black, 30s), one of the managers, simply by turning up at their administrative base and explaining what I was doing. Initially she proved resistant, yet upon offering to volunteer for the project Polly agreed to allow me access. She informed me that four
young men at the project had participated in the 2011 riots, however, she also warned that I might not get any interviews, and described how Channel 4 News had come to the project to interview the young people about the 2011 riots. The young people attending the project, as a group, had refused to speak to them, and the reporters left empty handed.

Polly introduced me to one rioter (black, male, 19) in the middle of the common room surrounded by other young people, and asked the young man to talk to me about the riots before leaving us to talk. However, it quickly became clear he did not want to speak to me; as soon as the riots were mentioned his expression shifted to what I thought was annoyance and exasperation. After a few moments of trying to speak to him, with the aim of getting an informal conversation going, all I had received was monosyllabic answers, until he stated it began in Tottenham and that I should go and look there (in other words, politely telling me to go away). Realising he would remain unwilling to talk to me, I thanked him and left him alone.

This formed the start of my realisation that the problem was more than the risk of prosecution, but in part a lack of trust, and also that people generally, often did not want to talk about the riots. Upon being informed that I was researching the 2011 riots, Carla, one of the founders, asked sarcastically, ‘so you’re here to write your book?’ The implication was that I was only interested in what I could gain for myself. A second young man, Mark (black, early 20s) who volunteered at the project and had attended at a younger age, did result in an interview. Yet despite agreeing to be interviewed, he made the same expression of annoyance when the riots were mentioned, and it was clear that he did not trust me.

Mark was not particularly forthcoming, nevertheless, he did offer insight into his worldview, albeit without much elaboration and further revealed a mistrust of me. Although Polly had not make it clear if Mark had rioted I had the impression this was the case, however, given the above context and that he had not mentioned it himself, I decided not to push the issue of his involvement. Nevertheless, this interview was useful because as Wolcott (1999) argues, and we will see below, a lack of trust that inhibits an interview
is not without meaning, especially when considered in the context of whom the interviewee perceives the interviewer to be.

In time, I perceived that there were three issues inhibiting my research into the riots. Firstly, and most obviously, was the risk of prosecution to rioters. Secondly, by the time my research commenced there appeared to be a feeling of exasperation related to outside interest in the riots amongst people from communities that saw rioting. This, I felt, was based on a perception that the riots had been over-discussed and that this was all anyone such as myself wanted to speak to them about. Finally, and underpinning the latter, I also felt there was a view that people ‘like me’ – researchers, journalists, of white and middle class appearance – were only interested in these communities when something bad happens, such as the riots. In other words, I was seen as an outsider and was not to be trusted based on previous experiences with others ‘like me’, who had only taken what they needed.

2.3. Re-Framing the Thesis – Data

The question then became how to re-frame the research to circumvent this problem. Despite the difficulties I discovered, there does exist significant data on the riots, albeit not without problems. Firstly, there is the publically available quantitative and basic demographic data on those rioters arrested and prosecuted, on the types of backgrounds and areas that these rioters came from, and those areas that experienced rioting. The first problem is that the data on participants is partial and cannot be taken as representative, and neither does it breakdown who attacked the police. Nevertheless, I am not seeking representivity, only common and significant factors; therefore, simply in an absolute sense, the data on rioters does reveal information about a significant number of those who were involved and provides us with an idea of the ‘faces in the crowd’ (Keith, 1993: 97).

2.3.1. Quantitative Data

The overwhelming majority of quantitative data derives from the Home Office (THO, 2011) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ(a), 2012), who compiled their information regarding individuals arrested and reported crimes, and those
prosecuted, respectively. The Home Office report was produced in October 2011, and thus represents an immediate response to the desire for information about the riots and rioters. However, while it offers the most comprehensive view of crimes recorded, regarding arrests it can only be considered partial as many had not been processed through the courts, some would not be, and arrests were on-going. The Ministry of Justice’s report was produced in the following year, allowing for a greater amount of riot (3,103) cases to be brought before the courts and therefore represents more reliable and conclusive data as the evidence against those arrested could be assessed (MoJ(a), 2012: 4).

2.3.2. Reports and Research

In addition to the state produced data, there were three major reports published on the 2011 riots along with excerpts of interviews with rioters. The Guardian and London School of Economic (2011) published Reading the Riots study. This was perhaps the most comprehensive report and provides the most substantial evidential base. Utilising quantitative-qualitative mix the research sought to understand and explain why the riots had occurred. It consisted of a mixed methods approach by a large team of researchers and analysts, utilising quantitative and qualitative data, involving over 270 rioters, many of whom had not been arrested for involvement. Their aim was saturation with regards to obtaining interviewees, and importantly, despite the methods of rioter identification (i.e. most were not contacted through the justice system) the report states that the demographic make-up of their

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2 However, the report acknowledges that only 85% (2,646) of these had reached a conclusion at the point of publication, and 16% of those concluded were either dismissed or acquitted (MoJ(a), 2012: 4). Yet these dismissed or unfinished cases remain included in the data, thus what the report’s figures reveal should be understood as only indicative. A further problem that will be discussed later is the lack of breakdown or comparison between demographics and ‘crimes’ committed. Most relevant here is that there is only one figure provided regarding the targeting of the police, which is that it constituted 6% of all crimes recorded (THO, 2011: 4). I made a freedom of information request to the Ministry of Justice regarding the demographics of those arrested for these acts, but was refused due to the cost exceeding the limit set for such requests.
interviewees runs broadly parallel to state produced data, thus strengthening the value of utilising state produced evidence.

One of the most useful aspects of the report was the publication of excerpts of their interviews with rioters (found in a number of articles published in *The Guardian* by either Carter, Clifton, Lewis, Newburn, or Prasad, all published in 2011). However, rather than complete interviews, these either relate to a certain issue/topic (i.e. gangs or stop and search) and thus group together quotes from a number of different rioters, or form ‘rioter profiles’: a number of quotes from a particular rioter that the study found representative of a common perspective or complaint amongst rioters.

While obviously useful, and we can take such quotes as representative of a broader perspective than simply that of the particular individual, there clearly are some limits. Specifically, if we are seeking to understand a particular rioter there may be relevant information not published, or the profile may have focused on looting, for instance, and we cannot know whether the same rioter was involved in attacking the police. I did contact the study through the LSE to enquire about access to full transcripts, however, this was refused as they were still using the data to publish.

Morrell, Scott, McNiesh, and Webster (2011) also produced *The August Riots in England Understanding the Involvement of Young People*, a report for The National Centre for Social Research. The authors conducted a mixed research programme looking at young people’s involvement and their perspectives on the riots. Their research employed some statistical analysis on those arrested, analysis of dynamics occurring in areas where rioting took place, and case studies of five areas in which rioting occurred alongside two unaffected areas, that functioned both as control groups as well as providing a comparative aspect.

In the qualitative component, interviews were conducted with around 30 young individuals per area (206 overall), seeking a rough split with regards to ethnicity, gender, and age, relative to the location’s diversity. Where possible, group discussions/interviews were also conducted with young people and also ‘community stakeholders’ (51 individuals). For the unaffected areas, the
authors spoke with 54 individuals in 6 focus groups (ibid: 11).

Of the three reports this appeared the most theoretically adroit (although it does not set out its theoretical perspective), looking at factors and relations that appeared to encourage or inhibit participation, rather than focusing simply on what the rioters stated. The authors further note that explanations of behaviour given by participants are often partial and perhaps biased; to counter this they sought to combine such explanations with descriptions and logics of others, including both participant and non-participant young people, as well as ‘community stakeholders’ who brought in relevant experiences from, and understandings of the communities.

Another major report was carried out by the Riots, Communities, and Victims Panel (from hereon, and sourced as RCVP) established by the government and entitled 5 Days in August (RCVP, 2011 10-11) which held meetings with a number of communities that had experienced rioting about what they saw as the issues behind the rioting, combining this with some statistical analysis of the riots. Of the three reports I found this one the most problematic as it does not considers how it frames or utilises the data, or consider issues such a partiality, with regards to how and from whom data was gathered, and ultimately leads the report to make some broad assumptions.

This mixture of reports and state produced data created opportunities for insight, in that I could get an idea of the types and backgrounds of individuals that had participated, and some idea of the situations and social contexts. In turn, the reports highlighted local knowledge and opinions, and gave the principle sources of rioters' voices along with claimed motivations and causes of participation, as well as access to logics and values through their descriptions of the riots, again connecting us to the broader social context. Nevertheless, there are also problems with this information.

The first of which is that the basic demographic data provided by the reports in conjunction with the voices of rioters is limited at best to basic categories, and sometimes not all information is given. Furthermore, with the partial exception of The National Centre for Social Research (Morrell et al., 2011), the interviews and exploration of the data appear to have focused on ‘the
riots' (i.e. what happened and what rioters did), their complaints, and motivations to riot. Thus, what is neglected is in depth study of relations that stretch out beyond the riot.

Nevertheless, the reports are useful in that they can corroborate aspects of the state produced data, as well as providing information other than in a blunt numerical form. Furthermore, all can be seen to largely agree in their findings, highlighting certain issues that could be used to frame the focus of the ethnographic research. However, it should be noted that the RCVP (2011) problematically makes the assumption that anti-police sentiment was largely only relevant in Tottenham, whereas rioting beyond this was about looting (as will be shown, this is a rather large simplification and contradicted by a number of forms of evidence).

Newburn et al. (2016 (a) & (b)) produced academic articles which explore the perspectives and motives of rioters utilising the data of *Reading the Riots*, of which Newburn was one of the lead investigators, and thus had full access to the transcripts. These articles support the general findings of *Reading the Riots*, but provide a fuller, and more theoretically developed account.

The most substantive ethnographic research from academia (interviewing over 30 male rioters from London and Birmingham, most of these connections were made during the riots at which the researchers were present) comes from social psychology (Treadwell, Briggs, Winlow, and Hall, 2013). In contrast to the major reports, the authors argued for consumerism being the primary cause, and against the importance of police to the rioting. However, this again neglects a significant amount of evidence to the contrary.

Consequently, although it would of course provide more rigorous data if I had been able to speak to rioters, there is significant evidence that can be utilised to garner an understanding of ‘faces in the crowd’ (Keith, 1993) and to connect the situation to the social context, or the particular sets of practices and relations between rioters and the police, law, and social and economic exclusion.
2.4. Re-Framing the Thesis – Video Footage

One other means which helps us to diminish the partial lack of voices from the rioters, as well as providing a valid approach in and of itself, comes from the proliferation of video recording on smart phones, and websites such as YouTube for posting videos. Consequently, journalists or members of the public recorded some events in the 2011 riots, giving visual and some audio access to moments of the riots as they occurred. Video footage enables the researcher to look for expressions, body language, actions, alongside who is doing what and to whom, in order to garner some understanding of what occurred and how events progressed (Collins, 2008; Nassauer, 2012).

Previously then, the only methods available to researchers were ethnographic and quantitative gathering of data, post riot. These methods are still important as video footage has its limitations. The principle issue with situational analyses is that the researcher will have to interpret actions and expressions, and without other forms of data regarding who the individual is and how they think to inform these interpretations, will ultimately risk making assumptions based on the researcher’s perspective. Thus the approach taken here has been to develop an understanding through forms of data in conjunction with the video footage.

There are of course some other limitations relating to the process of recording, not least that the video capture of events is not systematic. In turn, sometimes footage is edited or cut by those posting online, and due to the partial and sporadic nature of the recordings, all of which firstly makes providing a chronological account difficult.

Similarly, the events that are recorded by public observers are potentially the most dramatic and interesting moments, and may exclude what else was occurring in the area and more broadly across the country. This potentially creates ‘unknowns’ as to whether the events are representative, what was included or excluded by the frame and focus of the cameraperson, and indeed those posting may not always give information as to where the recording occurred. However, in the chapter utilising the video footage I will argue that we can mitigate some of these concerns.
Considering my own role in choosing the data, I cannot help but make certain selections and therefore define what is observed, whilst exclude certain interpretations and events. However, the aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of everything that occurred in 2011, but principally to show the development of violence against the police in Hackney, and to highlight relevant and reoccurring actions and behaviours within the confrontations. It should be noted furthermore, that I did not simply select the footage and then move onto ethnographic research, but rather, my understanding of the footage and social context developed in tandem.

In terms of selection, my first approach was simply to view as many videos as I could locate through the internet, mostly on YouTube, but also on other sites. Following the initial search I began to select the footage by area. I sought to identify areas in the events happened where possible; sometimes this was information given with the posted footage and on others I sought features that identified locations (e.g. road names, shops) before locating them through Google Maps.

Relevance and similarity between different events was also a factor when considering footage beyond Hackney (i.e. type of interaction with the police, how the encounter played out, displays and types of action). However, the type of rioter was not a factor in selection due to the fact that in almost every video I came across those attacking the police held similar demographic markers – principally young men, often dressed in hoodies or tracksuits, and disproportionately black although with a significant amount of white participants.

Overall, I estimate I viewed well over 100 different scenes of rioting, noted relevance, and at later points returned, selected and recorded 15 pieces of footage (many containing multiple scenes) for the analysis. My numbering of the videos relates primarily to the chronological ordering of Hackney and then largely by their appearance in the chapter. I have also included a map of Mare Street highlighting where incidents in the footage occurred, and photos from the 2011 riots all of which are stills of the footage, which serve simply to give the reader a fuller idea of the situation.
For the primary selection I obviously focused on those videos that showed conflict or confrontations with the police, while I also managed to locate footage that captured confrontational moments between rioters and police prior to the outbreak of violence in Hackney. Within the selection of conflict between rioters and police, I also looked for commonalities in behaviour; so for instance, I use a number of pieces of footage in which rioters involved displayed similar body language or expressions towards police.

The point in taking this tack is, again, not to examine the riots as a whole, nor even state that this explains the attacks on the police as a whole, but to explore how the attacks on the police emerge in resistance to the organisation of power in the social order. This is important evidence in part because they show moments in which the social order ruptured, and allows us to analyse actions as socially meaningful and produced (Bourdieu, 1985; 2003; Butler, 2011), rather than as simple ‘criminality’.

In addition, the benefit of a situational analysis is that it provides a form of evidence that is in some ways more reliable than others. In one sense, simply by bringing in visual accounts of the riots we counter the hegemonic media representations of these acts. Furthermore, while statistical data is notoriously open to interpretation, and statements and claims of rioters and communities are vulnerable to dismissal under the logic of post-hoc justifications (e.g. Zizek, 2011), the attacks on the police are of the moment – this is what happened and how.

This is not to say there is no interpretation of the footage, but rather, we can observe the actions of rioters as ‘performance’. Judith Butler’s (2011) notion of ‘performativity’ is particularly useful with regards to performing situational analysis through video footage. Butler’s concept forwards that actions are normative in that actors respond to a structural understanding of who one should be and how. However, similar to what Paul Willis (1990: 10) termed ‘symbolic work’, all action is also productive, an act of power so to speak, which can change those understandings and identities by acting on and

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through the organisation of power.

The notion of performativity conceives of structure as power-relations as per Foucault (2004); Butler (2011) is interested in how gender roles are constructed and imposed, and how this power comes into play through an individual’s actions, which both play out and play with these roles. Social structure is inscribed in bodies through action; by performing these identities the actor both re-inscribes the social structure, and becomes that identity through a display to themselves and others that ‘this is what I am’.

In other words, the actions visible in the footage are in part symbolic, and tell us about the social structure they respond with and to. By developing an understanding of the actors, their actions become discernable or legible. Whether it be violence, gestures, or emotional displays, these function as expressions in the moment which draw from and reshape the social structure or power relations they emerge from. In other words, this advances on Collins’ (2008) use of emotions by understanding agency as possible because of the social structure.

Here then the performance of actions through power represents and reveals Bourdieu’s (2000; 2003) dispositions – cognitively framed, affective drives, shaped through prior experiences relating to one’s social position in the world. In each action the individual expresses their affective response shaped by the prior experience, either to reproduce it in some way, or to overcome it. As ‘performativity’ indicates, these actions make sense and are expressed through a cultural and normative repertoire: “everyday gestures are [cultural performances] because they signify everyday identity to others and for ourselves” (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 43).

To analyse video footage of the rioting then we need to understand the actions as performance with power. A performance draws on experiences and their emotional content, and relies on certain roles and relationships with those they are performing with, in order to express these emotions. By examining and understanding who the rioters are? Who are they acting with? How do they perceive the other? What do they do? And what do they seek to achieve? We can explore how structure inheres in action, and develop an
account as to how the social order is implicated in resistance to it.

2.5. Ethnography – Going Beyond the Riots

As we will see, for those that we know were involved significant amounts came from impoverished and over-policed areas, which also formed the majority of areas that saw rioting. The majority of research took place in the boroughs of Hackney and Haringey (which includes Tottenham) both of which fit these area profiles, and as the data and footage will show, both saw significant amounts of rioting. The two other interviews I conducted and gained through personal contacts both came from areas (Bromley and Peckham, south London) that had similar profiles and also saw rioting in 2011.

While Tottenham is important because this is where the riots began, Hackney also saw rioting on the third day, including a significant amount of anti-police action. However, while the focus on Hackney in the video footage was due to available sources, this coincided nicely with the ethnographic research. Combined with the relevance of these areas to providing a context to the riots, I have also lived in Haringey (Tottenham’s borough), north London for over five years, enabling easy (geographical) access to both Tottenham and Hackney for research purposes (my current location sits close to the border between Haringey and Hackney, while prior to this I lived roughly a mile away from Broadwater Farm and two miles from Tottenham).

2.5.1. The Youth Project

As noted the majority of research occurred at a youth project in Hackney, in an area called Stoke Newington. The same area was part of Michael Keith’s (1993) research in the 1980s, due to rioting occurring in the area and the history of antagonistic and confrontational relations between the black community and the police. The area appears to have seen a significant drop in crime and poverty, comparing my experience there with Keith’s descriptions (I was told that it would have been very risky for me to enter the estate alone 5-10 years ago), likely due in part to rapid gentrification in Hackney.
Nevertheless, despite being located in a now ‘trendy’ part of Hackney, the project is located on a largely poor estate built after the Second World War. The estate is comprised mostly of small blocks of red brick terraces or concrete flats, while the youth project’s space forms part of a community centre at the base of a tower block. The project itself has a small, rather dilapidated, outside concrete space where the younger children sometimes play.

After entering through the foyer, the office stands to the right, followed by its two main rooms ahead and to the left. One of these rooms is mostly used for events or classes while the other forms the main common room. The main part of the common room holds a table tennis and a pool table, along with an Xbox, seats and sofas. The far end of the room branches out like a T into two sections, one section forms a small kitchen where meals are cooked each evening, while on the other side is a study area with a few computers, however, prior to my research the building had been broken into and these had been stolen.

All the volunteers and workers were from Hackney, many of whom attended the project at a younger age. All were either black or mixed ethnicity, aged between late teens to around 50, and a roughly equal mix of genders. The young people were again from the local area, roughly equal in terms of gender, but slightly more diverse with the majority being black, but also some white from differing ethnic backgrounds.

The project was set up in the early 1990s by Jane and Carla, two black women, both now in their early 50s. Jane and Carla began the project by speaking to police in order to identify young people who were involved in crime before making contact. After gaining a level of trust with these young people, they managed to start an informal youth club using sheds on an estate in Hackney. This would later evolve in to the youth project, which took on charity status and was founded in the late 1990s. Jane seems to be the principle driving force of the two; her daughter Polly, who now is one of the principle managers, described how Jane had been in a gang by the age of 10,
but as an adult managed to train for and become a youth worker in the 1980s with the aim of helping young people avoid the route that she took.

When I visited in 2015, the project was in some respects a simple youth club, giving space to young people aged between 10 and 19 (although the project has also stated 21 on some of its media) to hang around, chat, and play games. I had no research-based interaction with anyone under the age of 18 other than simply being present and observing (and at all points during my research there were youth workers present), and only interacted with younger individuals when playing pool or participating in a group activities.

At the project’s height in the early 2000s it ran three sites around Hackney, the largest having around 60-70 young people attending each night. However, due to cuts in funding and the increased privatisation of funding routes, the project is now limited to one site for the young people and a small administrative office. It gains use of the property through Hackney council which also utilises it for other youth organisations, whilst the majority of its funding is now achieved through charities and private organisations. During my time there the number of young people varied, but I would estimate that usually there were between 15 to 25, and most of the time had 3-4 youth workers present, although this could occasionally vary in either direction. Workers were checked under the Disclosure and Barring Service, and trained to ‘Safeguarding’ standards to protect the young people and children.

2.5.2. Research with the Project

The research at the youth project consisted of interviews and participant observation over a period of 6 months attending usually twice a week. My time was mostly spent in the common room, observing how young people interacted with each other and the youth workers, as well as informal chats in which I talked with the youth workers, while interviews were conducted in the office. All interviews conducted were with youth workers, in part because there was a general sense of suspicion and resistance to engaging with me amongst the young people, although this did decrease after some time and occasionally played pool with them.
My choice to attend twice a week was largely shaped by consideration for the youth workers. For instance, while Polly was always willing, generous, and interested, she was also a single mother as well as the manager for the project, and thus was exceptionally busy. Despite being my first contact, she was one of the last people I managed to interview and did so despite having her two young children waiting to leave for home. Polly was not an exception, even those without the responsibilities of parenthood continuously had to deal with other issues, tasks, or speak to and interact with the young people. Thus my time there was clearly an unneeded distraction and I did not wish either to become a nuisance, or damage the already precarious acceptance of my presence. This in turn meant that instead of ‘interviews’ I generally proceeded to have informal chats when the workers were not too busy.

The value of the project to the thesis is that it was situated in a poor estate in Hackney and four young people present had been involved in the 2011 riots, and thus it offered access to a microcosm of the social order and values that occur in deprived areas of Hackney, and were tangibly linked to the riots. While the project did not discriminate in terms of who could attend, many of the attendees had problems which included social and economic exclusion (e.g. from poor families, failing in formal education, single parents, parental and sometimes personal drug problems) and some had involvement in crime and violence. Indeed, its role or aim was described to me by one volunteer as ‘keeping kids on the straight and narrow’, and thus sought to help children with their home and personal lives, and educational performance as a means of preventing involvement in crime.

Consequently, the economic and social issues, and values and logics occurring on the estate and visible in the project and its approach to rectify them, were part of the context that shaped rioters’ dispositions, or specifically, shaped the choice to attack the police plausible or desirable. Although I could not participate in their world, observation allowed me to some extent to imagine or place myself within research subjects’ logics and modes of

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4 On a number of occasions early on I explicitly asked and in principle an interview was agreed too, however, this was always at ‘another time’.
perceptions, through observed interactions that were facilitated by the information gathered from youth workers (Gobo, 2008; Pink, 2010).

Importantly, what provides further credence to the research developed through the project is that, more than just working with young people and issues of crime and criminalisation (Jane, one of the founders, sometimes worked as an advisor to prisons on gangs) all of the workers have lived in Hackney for most or all of their lives, and many had attended the project before volunteering as adults. Thus these individuals were local ‘experts’ and could provide a practical understanding of the social context and how it shaped individuals’ choices and values, based on the issues of young people they had dealt with as well as through their own experiences at an earlier age.

The participant observation and interviews/chats complemented each other in that I could observe how the context of social and economic exclusion interacted or shaped concrete situations, and develop an understanding of the relation between the ‘macrostructural’ and affective dispositions (Wacquant, 2010: 9-10), as the perceptions, drives, and values they applied to some situations. In this line, another aspect enabled particularly by the youth project was that it allowed me to see what problems it sought to deal with and how. In other words, rather than simply seeing the structural ‘problems’, the project gave insight into how this translated into a lack for the young people and how such issues might be rectified.

For instance, much of the project’s success in getting individuals to engage in education or employment seemed to come from the trust and emotionally rewarding relationships built between the young people and workers. The sense of belonging produced and the self-esteem some clearly felt after achieving in, for instance, educational tests/scores, revealed not only that this is something they often lacked either at home or school and was sought out at the project, but that it relates to their engagement, or lack thereof, in legitimated social practices (formalised education, employment), both in that
‘success’ encouraged further engagement and to some extent seemed to inhibit the move towards ‘the streets’ and crime.5

Through the youth project I learned or gained a number of valuable insights, perhaps the most important came in relation to the social context and dispositions of young people coming from backgrounds of social and economic exclusion. Firstly, my impression was that there existed a common mistrust or resentment of the legitimate or dominant order, of which I was seen to represent (through my appearance of a white, middle-class researcher from a university). This mistrust was a general factor, rather than specifically related to the police, likely shaped through the long running history of experiences of the black community at the hands of often racists state institutions.

In turn, I began to understand the causes of this through the project, some of the people I interviewed outside of the project, and through reading published accounts through the media from people in these areas. However, what also made sense of what I was seeing was the parallels with my own experiences with education and employment. Despite my appearance or ‘researcher identity’, I grew up in a single parent family, in a working class town in the Midlands. While in some ways my experiences were very different than growing up on a deprived estate in London, in other ways there was significant overlap.

My experiences of high school as boring, irrelevant, and even to some extent shameful due to my low grades, paralleled what I was seeing at the project. Relatedly, the resistance, or ‘bad behaviour’, some were displaying at school similarly seemed to be emerging from a refusal of education, both due to the lack of rewards and stimulation, but also by refusing to engage failure was

5 It should be noted that the project clearly did not, nor could not succeed all of the time. In part this relates to the fact that the problems they are dealing with in young people relate to their ‘lifeworlds’ (Atkinson, 2010) – the views, logics, and values based on the broader social context they exist in, thus the project can only provide a space that offers a partial replacement. These factors mean there will always be the chance that some will not ‘succeed’. As I will discuss later, I interviewed one volunteer – Mark – who spoke as if his criminal engagements were behind him, yet after my research had finished I discovered by chance in the media that he had been arrested for carrying a large amount of cocaine, and sadly, days later was killed in a drug related argument.
you choice, not your stupidity. In other words, I was able to empathise with the young, and to use this to better understand what the project sought to do and the difficulties faced by these young people.

Indeed, like many in areas such as Hackney, I left school with no qualifications to speak of and ended up in a Work Experience Centre through the unemployment office. For a few years, I hung around with a group for whom petty crime and violence were not things to avoid but things to brag about, and where the police were similarly not respected (although I personally engaged relatively little in these activities, and had few interactions with the police).

Furthermore, while I spent little time unemployed during this period, I had jumped between low paid, low status jobs until at aged 26 I decided to try university. Indeed, what prompted me to try university was in part, the frustration at a stream of dead end jobs that either ended in my quitting or being fired. Another factor was that my elder sister had gone to university so as a mature student, having left home at 16 and become a traveller; thus her perspective was more open and less constrained by working class ‘common sense’.

This was in contrast to my circle, in which university was generally not considered worthwhile or achievable. Thus her actions opened university up as a ‘plausible’ opportunity for me. Indeed, even with this advantage and the feeling that I was intelligent enough to attend university, the whole world was particularly intimidating at the beginning, particularly meeting middle-class young people who clearly had a better education than I. My initial response to the feeling of low self-worth was to resist through performing my more masculine working class identity.

Consequently, I could understand how aspects of the social order would be implicitly or pre-reflexively closed off. Moreover, I understood, in part, why representatives of the legitimated social order, such as myself, might be

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6 The response of people to discovering I was going to university was often negative in someway. For instance, my employer at the time questioned whether I was capable, while the response of some peers was ‘why?’ However, there were others, and family that supported me.
understood as threatening. The response of closing down and refusing to engage, could be interpreted as hostility, particularly if stereotypes of these young people are accepted, however, my experiences revealed that what actually drives this form of resistance is power and the potential to shame.

Thus, in part due to my own experiences, what became apparent to me was that while the police may have been a focal point for some rioters, the resentment or mistrust seemed to stem in part, from a broader set of encounters with state or civil society organisations. As with experiences of high school and initially at university, the disadvantage and stereotypes produce a sense of rejection, mistreatment, and low self-worth.

Rather than engage, the drive is to resist and to reject those who make you feel angry. Indeed, as mentioned, the police were similarly disliked in my circles, and some I knew identified and boasted about their criminal activities. Indeed, I find it hard to imagine that, had the 2011 riots happened around my friends and myself at aged 18, we would not have similarly engaged and enjoyed it. Consequently, the research evolved to examine how individuals were being alienated through practises of education, employment, and contact with the police and justice system, and how these fed into, or intersected with each other.

With regards to the interviews, in total for my research, I spoke in depth to 12 individuals, conducting 7 semi-structured interviews (4 at the youth project), and a further one that was cut short due to external circumstances (also at the youth project). The interviews at the project were conducted with Maria (mixed ethnicity, late teens, had attended, now employed at the project), Mark (black, early 20s, had attended before volunteering), Lim (black, early 20s, had attended, now volunteered), and Polly (mixed ethnicity, 30s, daughter of founder Jane, manager). The interview that was cut short was with Carla (black 50s, one of the founders). Similarly, I held conversations with a number of workers, questioning them on what they did at the project, its value, and issues and what they thought, most substantially Polly and Lim (above), Jane (black, 50s, one of the founders), and Ray (black, male 50s, volunteered at the project).
All of the interviews aimed at an unstructured format, however, I did have a list of questions to facilitate should this approach not work, and would principally describe them as semi-structured, given the general resistance to discussions on the riots (the exception being Polly, who largely drove the interview). All took a conversational style using principally open-ended questions, with the aim of enabling the interviewee to drive the production of information (what they saw as relevant, felt most strongly about, and to use their own terms and meanings rather than my own) as much as possible without losing direction (Conti & O’Neill, 2007; Gillingham; 2005). The interview lengths varied from between 30 minutes to an hour and a half, depending on the willingness of the subject; two of the interviews were recorded with audio, while for the others I took notes either due the context/environment being unsuitable (e.g. background noise) or because, particularly once I perceived the mistrust of me, I felt recording may have had a negative impact on the flow of the interview and the information produced.

2.5.3. Other Sources of Research

Due to stop and search being highlighted in the data, and in particular the strong sense of anger at the police amongst rioters, I sought out individuals who worked in, or would have knowledge of, this subject and the impact on young people. I also sought out stakeholders or workers in the local communities – both for their local expertise, and initially for the potential to connect me with rioters – and individuals, with experiences of structural factors that were highlighted by data on the 2011 riots (e.g. education, unemployment, involvement with crime) with the aim of understanding their experiences and how these shaped them.

The main source I gained access to in this light was the civilian stop and search monitoring group for the borough of Haringey. The group works with police and the public to try and understand the problems and improve how stop and search is carried out. One of the principle methods was a ‘know your rights’ campaign as a means to defusing hostility between young people and police either through a lack of knowledge or misinformation. I spoke to Ben

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7 I also tried to contact a similar group in south London but received no response.
(black, 50s), who ran the monitoring group in 2014, and I had planned to interview him. Instead, he invited me along to a nation wide amateur boxing event at which they were running a stall. The context made interviewing him and those present impossible, as we were located in a large hall sometimes with boxing matches occurring, and crowds of people wondering about.

Nevertheless, I spent a day and half with the Ben and some other individuals (most significantly Aisha – a volunteer, black, female, late 40s) involved and managed to speak to them informally, in which we talked about issues around stop and search and police-public relations in Haringey, mistrust in the police and justice system, and the impact and consequences on those subject to stop and search. Ben spoke to me about some of his personal experiences, some related to earlier involvement in crime, but principally of being stop and searched which he described as having happened ‘hundreds’ of times.

During the boxing event Ben also conducted a survey of 43 young people regarding whether they had been stop and searched (28 had), their experiences and feelings, and how they felt about the police, some of which I observed through Ben’s recordings and also the preliminary results of the survey. His experiences and knowledge were particularly useful because not only has he experienced stop and search personally and been involved in crime at an earlier age, he has also spoken to many people of all ages, ethnicities and genders in his role in liaising with police and running the monitoring group.8

With regards to local experts I also interviewed Steve twice, a black man in his 50s and a central figure in the community of the Broad Water Farm estate, where Mark Duggan had lived and Steve had grown up. While I contacted Steve regarding his work and knowledge of the community over many decades and with young people from the estate, he also had worked with

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8 Ben also told me to talk to Mike, a police officer, stating ‘he’s one of the good ones’, (apparently implying that the majority were not). Mike was a police constable involved in organising the boxing event. While we spoke briefly about stop and search, he did not have much time to spare, and offered to meet up again. However, he did not respond to any further attempts at communication.
police to improve community relations, thus not only did he provide a local ‘expert’ perspective on the impact of forms of exclusion on young people, he was also informed on the issues around stop and search. Although it was clear he was not willing to too give up much of his time, he did agree to speak to me and I conducted an interview in his shared office.

Two other interviews I conducted gained through personal connections, were with Ned, a white male in his mid-20s, and Nick a black male in his 40s, both from different areas of south London which saw rioting. The initial aim of these was to gain an insight into experiences of education in impoverished areas that experienced rioting, and develop the understanding I was generating from the youth project. This later became a partial focus in part due to the necessity of including other foci that I felt were important to understanding the context. Nevertheless, both offered insights into the attitudes and experiences growing up in such areas and conditions, and both were perhaps the most forthcoming due to the personal connection between us.

The insight gained from Nick was principally in his experiences of home life and education and how this disadvantaged him in society at large. Nick’s relevance to the project was principally in regards to his family’s class position and ‘culture’ of education and context of poverty, and how this disadvantaged and diminished the value of education for him and his siblings, some of which ended up with drug addictions and involved in crime. In turn, as a black man, we also spoke about his perception of police.

Ned, who I had become acquainted with outside of the research, agreed to be interviewed on his experiences of secondary school, which he had mentioned to me before.⁹ The interview was particularly relevant, albeit not for the reasons I had expected. Ned comes from a middle-class background but

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⁹ Perhaps because of our personal connection and openness with me, Ned gave a far more nuanced, but similar, account than I had achieved in other interviews broaching the same topic. Through his descriptions and reminiscing of his school experiences and descriptions of the social ‘code’ and worldviews, he revealed a context in which problems with the police and rejection of law emerge, and how breaking the law became part of his everyday existence and social structure. Apart from reinforcing the relevance of exclusion through education, his account fed into the developing theorisation that many young people experiencing social and economic exclusion were shifting away from the values and norms of legitimated society, and developing forms of capital that opposed the law and valorised conflict with the police.
attended a poorly performing school, where many of the students lived on poor estates. My aim had been to speak to him about his relative lack of success in the education system and the problems of the school, however, what emerged developed and complimented what I had learnt from the youth project. The school, rather than enabling and encouraging students to participate in legitimate society, appears to have contributed to the development of a ‘criminal’ set of values and practices which encouraged and saw opposition to the police as a means of gaining status. I also made a freedom of information request for Ofsted reports on the school in order to corroborate and back up his account of the situation and context at the school.

In order to add greater depth to understanding and due to the reconceptualization of riot analyses, I also examine the 1980s riots through secondary data and research. I also consider rioting and the social context or structural conditions in the 1980s, not least because many areas of the 2011 riots, including the two focal points of my research (Haringey and Hackney), also saw rioting in this period. Sahlins (1994) argues for the value of historical ethnographies; these can synthesise field experiences with the history of the community, revealing continuity, change, and the relation between worldviews or logics of meaning, and macrostructural factors.

4.5. Conclusion

The focus on the police as a target of violence in 2011 emerged from the multiple methods of gathering data, which developed in tandem and complimented each other, strengthening emerging themes or foci for investigation. In turn, these also began to reveal the problem with the concept of the riot and trying to explain what occurred without embedding action in the social order. Each of these methodological approaches function together through a theoretical perspective in which the situational dynamics and

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10 Statistics and research on the riots, video footage of the same, interviews and participant observation, as well as my understanding of the perception of police developed through living in north London.
choices (captured by video footage and data) becomes manifest through structural forces (captured by the data and ethnographic research).

The methodology and framing seeks to deploy the situations of the riots to generate a contextualised picture of the social/structural processes and practises related to the symbolic and normative views of and around police and law outside of the events of 2011. In part, this approach evolved from the necessity and difficulties created by the lack of access to rioters, but also because the broader social context began to emerge as a causally relevant to attacking the police. I have sought to show that by utilising the data and available research on the 2011 and 1980s riots, in conjunction with an analysis of aspects of the rioting as it occurred through video footage, we can understand the situation of the riots as resistance emerging from and to the social order.

A final note is that what I argue must be taken with the awareness that this cannot explain the ‘the riots’ or ‘the rioters’. Firstly, the thesis focuses on one particular act, attacking the police; secondly, there may be other structural factors involved not highlighted by the data on 2011, or excluded due to scope, and that the aspects that are considered may interact with these other processes and impact differently on those involved. Thirdly, no project can account for the individual specificity of each rioter and how this shapes personal experiences and shapes choice. Consequently, the thesis and methodological approach should be acknowledged as developing a fuller and more nuanced context with which to understand the aspect of attacking the police, and how such an act could become plausible and desirable given the ‘opportunity’.
3. Riots or Rioting?

Riots, along with other forms of social unrest, are dramatic, traumatic, and often surprising occurrences, occurring with relative frequency throughout human history. Consequently, rioting has been subject to much discussion and analysis throughout the years. Generally speaking, however, until the latter half of the last century explanations of them have tended to come from, and reflect the position of the dominant powers of whichever society they took place in (Bagguley and Hussain. 2008). In other words, riots were explained principally through the ‘pathologies’ of the poor or the ‘mob’ mentality (e.g. Le Bon, 1996). The shift has come as academic analyses have become increasingly more complex and distanced from the subjective positions of power holders.

This is not to say that these explanations have disappeared however, rather, now these explanations or acts of labelling tend to come from mainstream media and politicians. Nevertheless, issues remain within academic theories of riots. To generalise, these issues either conceptualise riots as a single event or the crowd as a single actor, or fall back to a form of socio-economic determinism (Newburn et al(a)., 2016: 2).

The aim in this chapter is to discuss riot theories, and their usefulness and problems with regards to approaching analysis of such events, and in turn to locate the approach taken here within the literature. The discussion of theories of riot and crowd violence will then move, taking the same general themes, into the events and accounts of rioting in 2011. In particular, I will aim to show how conceptualising events as a singular 'riot' is problematic; and that we also need to go deeper than many approaches attempt, to look at the generation of dispositions, or preferences, values, and logics, in order to understand how the choice to attack the police was made.

3.1 Theorising a Riot

One of fundamental problems with analysing the series of events that constitute a riot, is that of ‘the crowd’. Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 12)
distinguish between objectification, as a process through which groups can construct, and treat as real, imaginary identities and boundaries; and reification where a group is thought to, and treated as having characteristics which do not belong to it. Groups may talk as if there is a consensus, and that all ‘members’ belong, but the reality that exists, and that should be the focus of analysis, is the processes through which individuals come to engage in collective action. To do otherwise, and treat the objectification as truth, is to reify the crowd, and naturalise the apparent coherence of identity and narrative (ibid.). In terms of analysis, the effect is to produce a singular narrative of what happened and why, when the events, actions and individuals being described are much less clear or coherent.

Further problems arise with the search for simple or singular explanations. According to Horowitz (2002) analysts theorising violence have problematically tended to explain the event by employing categorisations that focus on the manner in which disorder is manifested. In the case of collective violence, doing so can assume a homogeneous event and, in the case of the 2011 riots, would miss the behaviours which cut across these boundaries.

When we look beyond singular definitions we tend to find the actions involved in the rioting tends to be different, involving differing motivations amongst participants, and varied or random target-selection including violence directed against groups, institutions, property, or a mixture of these. Consequently, when looking at the literature on rioting, we also tend to end up with very different explanatory theories of analysis allowing for multiple, and sometimes contrary, interpretations of the same events.

3.1.1 The Simple Riot

One novel approach to analysing violence of all types, rather than riots or crowd violence alone, comes from Randal Collins (2008). Collins proposes that we can understand the emergence and form of violence through the situational dynamics alone, arguing that violence pushes against our natural tendency to find solidarity and belonging. For violence to occur then, something must overcome this threshold inhibiting violence, and this is found in the situational dynamics. Collins proposes a number of situational pathways
that ultimately enable one side to become emotionally dominant, and the other submissive, thus, in an asymmetric sense, achieving a form of solidarity and enabling violence to occur.

They method of analysis utilises video footage, amongst other forms of data, to reconstruct the situational dynamics through the actions taken, and emotions and expressions displayed, with the aim of identifying and mapping out the dynamics of the situation. However, despite this useful methodology, the theoretical issues and framing is problematic. Collins argues that humans are hard-wired to avoid violence, and thus in all but a few cases (e.g. professional killers) the individual’s background, and relations with the target are dismissed as irrelevant, or at best, setting up the situation.

Apart from the failure to consider large amounts of research into violence that reveals the importance of individual experiences (e.g. Gilligan 2003; Palishkar, 2005), or the consideration of emotions as something that references past experiences, and prompt future actions (e.g. Damasio & Damasio, 2006; Honneth, 1995; Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Scheff, 2000), is that ultimately Collins (2008: 136) falls back on the same linear, causal logic that Cameron employs. He argues, for instance, that because all people in poverty do not commit violence, then it cannot be a cause of violence. Of course, what matter is not ‘poverty’, but how poverty translates and interacts with other factors to become an experience.

Hobsbawm and Rude’s (1970) approach might be thought of as the opposite to the depoliticising narratives of politicians in 2011. The authors frame riots as political action seeking redress and change, a mode of voting by violence, so to speak. While of course, some examples of collective violence may adhere to this theory, such as the UK miners’ strikes in the 1980s, or their analysis of rural discontent in the 1830s, it does not consider that many riots never articulate political goals or complaints (Waddington, 2003).

Arguably, all riots are political in the sense that they stem from socio-political conditions (Reicher & Stott, 2011; Younge, 2011), but this does not necessitate that they are political action or seek forms of redress. Putting political action where it is not, cannot be conducive to effective and
informative analysis because it subsumes relevant causal factors in explaining behaviour. This is because in its connection to action, ‘political’ is not an explanatory concept, but perhaps implicitly justifies it. Thus, rather than being able to counter naïve discourses of ‘criminality’ or ‘the mob’, it operates on the same terms by seeking to legitimise riots through the type of action, rather than trying to understand the causes of action.

The unifying concern I have with the above approaches is that each to some extent effectively diminishes the role and relevance of the experiences and subjectivities of individuals as socially embedded actors, or fits them into a pre-defined explanatory framework. However, similar problems emerge when the analyst takes the crowd, or collective behaviour, as the principle focus.

3.1.2 Riots and the Crowd

If one were to employ Durkheimian (1995) theory the analyst would seek to understand how the presence of a crowd created an increasing sense of mutually reinforcing effervescence. These explanations are relevant to explaining the momentary emergence of violence, but it is dangerous to consider the emotion generated by the experience of belonging and acting as part of a group as causal in a primary sense. This is because such a position cannot explain why in other group contexts riots have not occurred, and it can only partially explain the attraction of those not initially involved and spatially separated, to join the crowd and commit violence.

Turner and Killian (1987) recognised that a crowd was not homogeneous, but that it may contain some degree of coordinated action. Similarly, Reicher’s (2001; 1996) theoretical perspective can be positioned as dealing with inter-group conflict and social or crowd identity. However, despite criticising the reification and pathologisation of crowds by other theorists, these flaws to a lesser extent remain.

For Reicher and Turner and Killian (1987), an individual’s identity becomes subsumed or shifts to the social one through a process of identification, or realisation of a common position, during the event, which then becomes the measure of behaviour (Bagguley and Hussain. 2008: 34-5). This more
A nuanced approach allows a social identity to be understood as emerging from historical forms of identity that individuals share, rather than simply the crowd as generating group sense and action through effervescence.

Nevertheless, while such an analysis may hit on relevant points and to some extent includes pre-existing norms, the overemphasis on ‘social’ identity and its emergence still limits the consideration of the influence of everyday norms and values, and in turn offers little theoretical route to understand how these were shaped and were involved in riotous action.

A feeling of groupness may emerge and be important in bringing together different people and enabling the riot, but this does not necessitate that a group, and common norms and values exist. Focusing on the crowd as an actor not only homogenises participants, the construction of norms through the everyday is neglected.

3.1.3. Moving Beyond a Riot?

David Waddington’s ‘flash point’ model (2003) is arguably more comprehensive in its movement beyond the immediate violence of the riots and simplistic views of the crowd. For Waddington a six-level approach (2003: 14-20) better grasps the complexity of, and interrelation between, causal factors of large-scale violent acts. To perform this, not only should the analyst seek to understand the context of the riot, but also subjectivities informed by external social, economic and political forces.

Waddington’s ‘structural or macro-sociological’ level focuses on material and social inequalities in the larger society; thus inequalities in power and their affect on the subjects of study, such as the opportunities available to them for earning money. His ‘political or ideological’ level takes into account the manner in which a culturally or politically disaffected group is treated by the state institutions. This level could examine how the media and commentators represent the group, their aims, or aspirations, or how they are policed. The ‘cultural’ level refers to the inter-subjective set of ideas and norms by which the group governs themselves in specific situations.
As Keith (1993: 81) points out, however, there lies a danger in locating diverse forms of collective violence under one explanatory framework because it risks de-emphasising the importance of, or simplifying individual motivations in relation to their social context. King (1995: 638-9) similarly criticises Waddington for separating the three levels of structural, political/ideological, and cultural, when in practise it is difficult to see where these levels end and separate. For instance, the objective inequalities of the structural level rely on the cultural understanding the group has of itself.

The problem for Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 30) is that Waddington aims to create a theoretical framework to explain group violence through generalisations, and thus again assumes a homogeneous crowd. Moreover, they argue Waddington’s approach risks conflating what may be very different actions and individuals, such as football hooliganism, picket line action, and urban riots (ibid.). We should further note that the conflation here is not simply between different types of crowd action, but different types of action within ‘the crowd’. A single explanatory framework for collective violence runs the risk of subsuming relevant details in the attempt produce a singular theory and account of events.

Perhaps the problem is in trying to isolate the different levels without a theory of how these intersect in individual experience to generate subjectivity, as the messy reality will always involve a complex interaction. Thus while Waddington perhaps provides a comprehensive approach to analysing ‘riots’, his structuring of analysis assumes that we know that there is a ‘group’, a consensus of ideas, actions, and history as well as, for the project here, placing too much emphasis on the immediate circumstances that triggered the riot.

Similarly, focusing on ‘ethnic’ riots, Horowitz represents a sociological and psychological perspective on rioting. His aim is to provide a systematically theorized approach to ethnic riots, discussing the factors involved in shaping group violence such as the social boundaries and identities which delimit the behaviour of rioting for a particular group. For instance, Horowitz notes how in every ethnic riot there is target selection. To explain these selections Horowitz
examines ‘target choice’ (2002: 5): A choice is perceived as ‘natural’ to the attackers, meaning there is reason to attack one group. The nature of the choice is suggestive of the reasons for violence, for instance, pre-existing racial prejudices: “The ethnic riot thus provides clues, not only to the character of violence, but to the substance of group relations.” (Horowitz. 2002: 8).

Problematically riots may not hold easily definable groups. Horowitz’ mode of analysis focuses primarily on the acts of violence occurring between two or more pre-existing groups; and although he does not reify group identity, the nature of his focus means he does not articulate how to explore in depth, conditions, relations, and perspectives which shape subjectivity outside of groups or riots.

3.1.4. Resistance and the Social Order

Another approach incorporating crowd behaviour, relative deprivation, group immersion and frustration-aggression theories is that of Smelser’s (1962) Theory of Collective Behaviour. Smelser argues that riots are the result of ‘social strain’ felt by disaffected groups, causing disruption and deviant behaviour within an integrated and self-balancing order that is society. Moving past the problems focusing on the immediate and situational factors of collective action, Smelser’s structural-functionalist approach usefully argues for the examination of norms and values of individual participants allowing for a fuller understanding of how the intersection of conditions and dispositions to act enabled the collective violence to occur.

However, while this approach certainly moves beyond single-cause explanations and appears looks deeper at the subjectivities of the rioters, it ultimately fails because it adheres to certain assumptions. One, for instance, is that riots are irrational and deviant action within a society conceived as a single entity and encompassing all people within its defined boundaries. The problematic assumption of an enclosed social order may have meant theorists have rejected Smelser’s idea in favour of the more isolated view of riots.

However, the problem with Smelser’s (1962) conceptualisation was not that he sought to understand instances of violence within or in relation to the social
order. Instead, it was that he first assumed this social order was enclosed and self-balancing, and secondly, he viewed that order from his position of power, leading to the notion that riots were aberrations and outbursts. What is excluded by these assumptions is that the power relations of the social order might be the cause, and the rioting the response to this. Indeed, the very idea of a riot suggests not an aberration, but a revelation that the social order is failing to self-balance. Moreover, taken from the position of power, Smelser also neglects that riot participants might feel his social order as alien and repressive.

Indeed, Engels’ (2005) notion of rebellion highlights an aspect that Smelser neglects. For Engels, resistance relates to the form of consciousness in whose rebelling; the working class were not part of the social order as Smelser would have it, but exploited by it. Engels highlights the differences in rebellion by arguing that those engaged in crime were resisting society, but lacked the collective consciousness or identity of the working class, enabling them to unite. Rather than irrational action in a unified society, rioting is shaped by the identities of those resisting and the socio-economic relations that underpin them.

Ferrell (2001), while not explicitly discussing riots, examines forms of anarchic resistance, from the Wobblies to graffiti, as responses to the regulation of social and public life, inhibiting the creative potential of individuals. Ferrell’s analysis points us to two important considerations in rioting; on the one hand, how forms of power, or government regulation, are shaping the experience of individuals and prompting resistance. On the other, Ferrell importantly notes acts of destruction are in themselves creative, and respond to the repression and inhibition of creativity. Thus, unlike theories of riots, Ferrell points us to how acts of resistance can only be understood as an aspect of relations that exceed the moment of violence, and how the violence itself is not mindless destruction but an attempt at reorganisation of the social life.

Merton (1938) and later Cloward and Ohlin, (1969) also considered strain in society, albeit not related specifically to riots. These ‘anomie’ theories argued that rather than part of the social order, criminal or delinquent subcultures in
which the norms of the social order are rejected, develop in response to strain within the order. This strain is created by discrepancies between aspirations and the means to achieve these, and thus tends to emerge in lower class, urban areas. While there is merit to this approach, it makes misleading assumptions, in particular that.

Agnew (2012) criticises these anomie approaches for assuming the lower classes have middle class aspirations. Agnew argues that it is not a mismatch between aspirations and possibilities that generates delinquent behaviour, but the inability to avoid ‘painful or aversive conditions’ (ibid: 33-6). Thus, relevant factors are parental rejection or neglect, negative relations with teachers, discrimination and victimisation. Agnew thus takes an important step to connecting social structure with forms of resistance to it by moving beyond blunt assumptions of and about social class, to understand how types of repeated and patterned experiences generate anger.

3.1.5. Cultural Criminology, Historical Sociology, and Riots

The approaches of anomie or the similar cultural criminology approaches, tend not to focus on rioting, although they can be utilised. Lea and Young (1982) are worth mentioning for their analysis of riots in 1981. The authors’ develop the position that poverty, political and cultural marginalisation, and economic and social exclusion led to cultures of despair, alienation, anger, and increasing crime in black communities.

This facilitated the stigmatisation of these communities as ‘criminal’ and dangerous, resulting in oppressive and discriminatory over-policing, and a collapse of consensus policing. The authors argue this lead to a vicious cycle as one reinforced the other, before erupting into rioting through particular events, such as the oppressive and discriminatory stop and search operation, ‘Swamp 81’ (ibid, 18-9).

However, while Agnew (2012) takes a significant step forward by identifying the production of anger, the theoretical development is lacking. Similarly, Lea and Young also do not adequately bridge the gap between structure and agency. Ray (2014) however, usefully incorporates the notion of shame, and
through this anger at a sense of mistreatment. In turn, Ray argues shame and anger need to be turned into action; thus he draws on the notion performativity. Here violence becomes a way of performing shame and anger generated through norms and power relations within society.

Keith’s (1993) historical sociology looking at the riots in the 1980s argues for a focus on the trigger incident as symbolically important in the pre-existing relations between communities and police, and the spaces in which these occur. Keith also describes rioting as moments of ‘spontaneous rationality’ (1993:185), or a sudden escalation of relations and practices that exist outside of the events. Thus while Keith considers evidence pertaining to the riots of the 1980s, he does this in order to identify and further research causal relations, practices, and values located in the prior experiences of rioters.

Keith performs one of the most insightful ethnographies with regards to the 1980s riots, and his argument for the emergence of behaviours out of the social context is convincing. However, while Keith’s approach significantly informs the one taken here, his focus is principally on relations between the police and the black communities from which the riots emerged. Problematically, Keith dismisses the value of cultural criminology approaches, arguing that these approaches homogenise and stigmatise black communities, and thus neglects the role of relations between the excluded and the social order.

In a similar vein, Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 28) criticise Lea and Young for pathologising certain localities and their inhabitants by focusing on ‘street-culture’ and ‘criminality’. However, while it Lea and Young may homogenise rioters, Bagguley and Hussain reject their argument altogether based, in part, on the normative term of ‘criminality’.

As we have seen with Agnew (2012) and Ferrell (2001), transgressive behaviours are responses to the practice of power, and thus a failure in society itself. Rioting is a transgressive forms of behaviour, thus the aim becomes to understand how behaviours emerge that require or valorise the transgression of another set of rules enforced by those in power, or indeed, prompt the use of violence towards those representatives of power.
Rather than criminalising, or expressing a ‘breakdown’ of culture, we seek to understand the generation of resistance, connected and responding to larger political and economic relations. In this sense, I would argue that Lea and Young (1982) are pointing to how the social order is producing its own failure to maintain itself, particularly through policing and political, social, and economic marginalisation. In other words, they are not ‘blaming’ or ‘othering’ young black men, but politicising conceptualisations of ‘criminality’ that seek to frame individuals as being morally pathological.

Nevertheless, the criticisms also have some relevance in that there is the tendency to generalise across communities and assume criminal resistance is what underpins the rioting. While I believe the basic focus on cultural responses to forms of exclusion is worthwhile, there appears little effort to understand how this differentially impacts and shapes those marginalised, and the subsequent translation into different choices and actions. With regards to understanding unrest, this results in the simplification of explaining ‘the riots’ through ‘criminality’, albeit removed of its stigmatising and moral condemnation.

Despite what I would see as the partially flawed criticism of Lea and Young, Bagguley and Hussain (2008) do, along with Keith, provide one of the most nuanced approach to explaining riots. Examining the Bradford riots in 2001, they argue against creating a general theory or model of crowd behaviour to avoid reification or participants and events, simplification, and decontextualizing motivations. Instead the authors argue for placing violent disorder in its social and historical context, before moving on to examine the rioting in complex ways, creating questions from the empirical data available.

To do this they argue for examining riots in the context of what preceded and proceeded events (ibid: 177). They argue that riots are contested events, and consequently exploring them only in terms of what participants state happened is problematic as it relies on subjective assertions and interpretations of events, particularly so when one tries to impose a single coherent narrative on events.
While I think that Bagguley and Hussain provide a viable, and certainly more effective approach than most discussed above, arguably neither Keith (1993), or Bagguley and Hussain (2008) attempt to go deep enough and to explore the production of everyday subjectivity outside of the rioting to be analysed, and thus cannot provide detailed accounts of the translation of social context or structure into action.

While these approaches explore the choices made by riot participants, they do not explicitly investigate how the broader practices and experiences of participants have shaped the construction of agency as cultural criminology does. This is particularly noticeable when Bagguley and Hussain (ibid: 176) locate explanation for some actions in ‘short term opportunities’, but do not theorise what constituted that possibility as a relevant or desirable ‘opportunity’.

Perhaps this is the reason Bagguley and Hussain assume ‘criminalisation’, rather than explanation, when considering Lea and Young’s argument; because they partially fail to recognise the historical framing of the choice in socio-culturally generated values and logics. Indeed, only Ray (2014), adequately grasps the connection between structure and agency through his incorporation of shame, anger, and the logic of expression, enabling the translation of structure into agency and the avoidance of the pitfalls of ‘the riot’.

3.2. The 2011 Riots

Now that we have begun to locate our approach to resistance rather than riots, we can begin to look how the actions of 2011 have been understood. The point here is to explore how the riots have been explained both in the media, political, and academic commentary and analysis. In arguing for what has been lacking in these explanations, I will also seek to justify and further develop my particular approach.

3.2.1. The Social Media Riot?

Regarding the events of 2011, much was made of social media, in particular, Blackberry messenger, as an important factor in explaining the riots (e.g.
MailOnline, 2011; The Economist, 2011). While such sources can shed light on events (i.e. video footage posted online which will be utilised here), arguably, social media’s involvement represents nothing fundamentally new to riots, nor causally relevant.

For instance, the similarities between the 1980s and 2011 riots are striking, the only difference is the speed of transmission facilitated by technology. As Waddington explains, three months after the 1981 riots in Brixton, “the Toxteth (Liverpool) riot of 3–6 July broke out. One day later, Manchester’s Moss Side erupted and there were disturbances in Handsworth, Birmingham and dozens of other British towns and cities” (2003: 80). The cause of these outbreaks was related to the common underlying conditions, discontent, and the dispositions these produced; whereas the ability to communicate (i.e. newspaper and news coverage) only allowed these common feelings to be perceived, activating already learnt dispositions, and perhaps encouraged violent action by making it seem possible.

Regarding social media then, the relevant difference between rioting in 1957, the 1980s, and 2011 was not in its causal role, but only in the speed and scale of transmission. Communication is not only always present in rioting or any collective action (albeit in different forms), it is a necessary function as a means of it spreading. Yet it is not related to the causes, or the factors that allow rioting to occur other than in an immediate, enabling sense.

3.2.2. Apolitical Riots and Criminality

The events of early August 2011 took much of the UK by surprise. What seemed to cause the alarm was the apparent arbitrary nature of the violence and ‘greedy’ looting performed by so many (e.g. Cameron, 2011; Clarke, 2011; Gabbat, 2011; Hastings, 2011). The media and politicians threw about terms such as ‘thugs’, ‘feral’, and ‘underclass’. While further explanations were proffered, for instance, the rioters were largely members of violent ‘gangs’ (Samuel, 2011) this was soon challenged by statistical information on arrestees revealing a relatively small involvement of gang members (THO, 2011: 18).
Similar accounts from academics have also emerged. Carroll (2012) provides a marginally more complex version of the above thesis, arguing that the riots are the result of a ‘spoilt brat mentality’. Apart from the clearly derogatory tone, lack of any substantial evidence, and the homogenising generalisation, arguing that the welfare state is the single or primary cause of the behaviours seen, is problematic to say the least. To highlight the issue with this perspective we might simply ask, what about those rioters who were employed or in education?

To assume that one factor defines a culture, or that there is one culture, excludes the myriad of issues faced by areas of poverty and how these affect those subject to them. The general implication of these positions is that the only possible cause for this ‘underclass’ and the greed and aggressiveness ‘displayed’ are bad parenting, liberalism and its lack of discipline and responsibility, and soft punitive responses to crime in general (Allen & Taylor, 2012). Of course, it might be asked, ‘if the parents are to blame, then who is to blame for them?’ and ad infinitum. Or similarly, if it was simple ‘criminality’, then should we not look at the societal relations that produced so much of it?

The coverage largely sought to tell a particular narrative of ‘moral collapse’ of parts of society, leading some to argue for punitive solutions as a preventative measure for this moral failure (e.g. Shipman & Walker, 2011). Rather than proffering any realistic solutions based on the conditions and context that people might face, this position assumes punishment alone will alter behaviour because the problem is one of individual morality.

The reasons for this are up for debate. Tyler (2013) argues that the demonization of the rioters was employed to further a neoliberal economic agenda; Pearson (2012) situates the moral panic over the 2011 riots within a context of historical amnesia and cultural pessimism over youth behaviour. While for Wacquant (2010: 46) such discourses aim to depoliticise events by shifting attention away from the historical and cultural experiences of ghettoization, to the ‘pathologies’ of the participants.

Regardless of the motive, what is excluded is the possibility that there is any dysfunction within the claimed social order or status quo, or that the rioters
held to different value-systems, and that these might have resulted from the manner in which the ‘social order’ – taken simply as the norms of behaviour, modes of practise, doxic ideas of success, and values – is constituted.

Indeed, it is worth briefly deconstructing the concept of criminality here. Adapting Marx’s (1990) economic argument, that any social order must be able to reproduce the conditions of production, enables us to understand the role of the discourse of ‘criminality’. This term, as with any form of moral condemnation, functions as a normative mechanism of the task of social reproduction, a category of practise that aims to condemn and in doing so produce shame in those who think to transgress the social order’s rules.

However, if it employed as it was in 2011, ‘criminality’ likely only serves to reinforce the differences and problems without understanding why the events took place. If we empty the concept of its normative content – that is the subjective position of those empowered and benefiting from the rules, positing that the breaking of their rules as ‘bad’ – what we are left with is simply a willingness to transgress certain rules. For analytical purposes then, the term ‘criminality’ is useless as it cannot explain why people are willing to break the law. What is required is a mode of analysing those relations which position the dominant social order’s rules as illegitimate or normatively powerless; in other words the relations and practises that produce value systems and doxic ideas which oppose and enable the transgression of the social order.

3.2.3. The Political Riot?

Similar to Hobsbawm and Rude’s (1970) position, some argued the riots were an unarticulated revolution, an emotional outpouring of discontent (e.g. Penny, 2011; or see Ryan, 2011 for discussion). This argument posits that the rioters wanted change but did not have the knowledge and understanding to articulate their complaints and organise political action. Given the spark for the riots occurred during a protest march over the shooting of, what was popularly interpreted as, a ‘black’ man by police, this argument seems to have some credibility.
Indeed, many rioters, when asked, stated they were discontent and angry with the police, fed up with the lack of opportunities, and sourced the recent cuts as relevant to discontent (Guardian & LSE, 2011). Furthermore, *Reading the Riots* provided data showing that the majority of participants were from impoverished areas (Datablog, 2011). However, to employ this data to argue for a single meaning of the riots, or as a direct explanation, homogenises and over simplifies events.

Yet, even if we ignore the problems with homogenisation, the actions of rioters do not easily fit into ‘political action’. To make this point we should simply note that the attacks on the police appeared to have no larger aim. Moreover, the riots did not always hold to the pattern of violence against police, as across the country 51% of crimes recorded were against commercial premises (THO, 2011: 4).

Problematically, the political action perspectives seem to argue on the basis of what observers would have liked 2011 to be, and ignore the significant amount of people acquiring goods, the targeting of local shops and, albeit a small amount, members of the public. Moreover, as we have noted, this position engages in a game of legitimation with ‘criminality’, and does not seek to analyse.

In contrast to those that sought to either politicise or depoliticise, there were voices providing a more nuanced perspective. Journalist Gary Young (2011) argued the riots were Political, but not because there was a coherent political goal, rather simply that: “When a group of people join forces to flout both law and social convention, they are acting politically”. Reicher & Stott put this another way: “riots are political in the sense that they both reflect and reorganize power relations between groups in the societies in which they materialize.” (2011: 45%).

Rather than utilising the political-criminal dichotomy, the argument here is predicated on the view that regardless of whether riot participants had political points or desired change, they stem from socio-political conditions and it is these that require investigation. So while we must consider the political
elements, we should not make the mistake of those who assume that political change was a desired, albeit unarticulated, goal.

3.2.4. The Consumer Riot?

Moving towards a more academic front, some early responses positioned the riots as consumerist outbursts (e.g. Moxon, 2011; Sumner, 2012; Zizek 2011). Zygmunt Bauman (2011) argued that rioters were consumerism’s ‘have-nots’, inculcated into the desires for the latest goods and brands, believing that through these objects they can achieve dignity and meaning. However, this possibility of generating life-meaning is denied to them through economic exclusion. Consequently, they took the opportunity to rectify their exclusion when the police were perceived as having lost their ability to control.

Moxon (2011) argues for avoiding assumptions about who the rioters are and why they acted, by examining the acts of commonly witnessed moments of the riots. While in principle Moxon’s break down of the riots into themes – the initial moment of the riot in response to the trigger, the acquisitive moment, and nihilistic moment of destruction – are a step forward in dealing with the complexity of the events of 2011, they do have problems.

Indeed, if we are to avoid assumptions then beginning with ‘nihilistic’ seems contradictory to say the least. Furthermore, within this category there is no distinction between violence against police or state representatives and that directed at private actors. Violence against police appears located, for Moxon, in the initial moment, or the shift from protest to riot, however, this makes assumptions of its own because violence against the police continued far beyond the start of the rioting in Tottenham, and thus contradicts his assertions of a largely consumer riot. Perhaps then it is better then to look at violence against police as an act in its own right.

A better developed and evidence based argument for a consumerist riot comes from Treadwell, Briggs, Winlow and Hall (2013). Operating during the riots in London and Birmingham the authors managed to speak to over 30 male rioters of varying ages, as well as managing to generate follow up interviews and spend time with rioters post event (ibid: 3-4). The authors
forward that for the rioters they spoke too, revenge against the police was a secondary reason, if not an excuse, for the primary motivation of self-gain.

Rather than enact political goals, or express political discontent, the temporary absence of order created by the rioting was utilised to collect consumer goods. But the point Treadwell et al. make is not that the consumer motive was simply the primary one, rather that the symbolic consumer ideology provided the totalising frame for action (ibid). At the same time, economically excluded from the practices of the social order, crime becomes a mode of achieving this self-improvement, and from the very beginning, the framework of choice inhibits the possibility of political action or complaint.

While their argument is compelling and has explanatory significance, it may not be representative, especially given the origins of the riots and the attacks on police that followed. Furthermore, what Treadwell et al. (2013) do not account for are the structural and social conditions outside of consumerism on their research subjects’ perspectives, and how exclusion and alienation may result in the police constituting what Wacquant calls “the last ‘buffer’ between them and a society that rejects them, and which they therefore view as ‘the enemy’” (2010: 33). Consequently, what is ignored is how other relations or conditions may have influenced rioters’ actions to the point where attacking the police and breaking the law was deemed acceptable, or even offered another means of social improvement.

Larry Ray (2014) provides the most developed take on the consumer riot perspective, largely avoiding the flaws discussed above. By focusing down on shame produced through social and economic exclusion in a consumer society, Ray argues that the looting was a performative moment. While consumers took goods as a form of consumer practice, the utilisation of shame and anger enables Ray to avoid the constraining embrace of a ‘consumer riot’, and argue that rioters were performing confrontations with authorities that rejected and shamed them. Thus, while Ray’s focus is on looting, he provides a nuanced take that avoids dismissing aspects of the rioting that do not fit simply within the framework of material gain.
Sociological critiques of consumerist explanations can also be enlightening here, not least because they complicate single or homogenising explanations. Platts-Fowler (2013) employs statistical data to challenge the consumerist riot theory, arguing that while some may have got involved for material gain, a significant number of other factors and evidence needs to be considered. In seeking to understand the social unrest, we need to consider how cuts to welfare, youth initiative funding, economic conditions and large amounts of unemployment, likely to have driven involvement, and also that the nature of the policing during and at the beginning of the riots likely became symbolically important in relation to previous experiences of policing.

Furthermore, Platts-Fowler notes how ‘looting’ is a pejorative terms which conflates numerous different types of activities, which include material gain, and, as Ray (2014) also argues, expressions of power over authorities. Similarly, McDonald (2012: 20) argues that we see different aspects amongst the looting in 2011, from instigators who are prepared to smash windows, to those that follow, and also styles of acquiring goods, while Harding (2012) argues that some of the acquisitive acts in 2011 were symbolic, aimed particularly at gaining reputation on the street. Thus while looting and consumerism are clearly relevant, we should not use this to label the riots as simply ‘consumerist’.

Reading the Riots (2011) provided the greatest breadth in analysis of the events of 2011. Conducted as a joint study between LSE and the Guardian newspaper, the study sought to generate an expansive account of what occurred during the riots, and at a speed that would ‘maximize’ the effect of the research on public and political debate (ibid: 2). Speaking to 270 rioters, combining qualitative interviews with statistical accounts, the study argued for both the influence of consumer ideology, discontent and anger at police and government, and simple opportunism, thus providing evidence that questions explanations of the riots through a consumer/political dichotomy.

However, the manner of qualitative investigation arguably did not move beyond reporting what the rioters stated, and thus may be vulnerable to
Zizek’s (2011) earlier criticism where rioters justify their actions, post-hoc. The study also, therefore, failed to really draw conclusions, beyond such factors as mistreatment by police and economic exclusion, as to the production of motivations to riot and the relation of these to larger systemic relations.

Having said this, Newburn, Deacon, Diski, Cooper, Grant, & Burch (2016 (a) & (b)) worked on the projects and through the same data, perform an enlightening and more theoretically grounded analysis of rioters motivations in academic articles. In particular they note the clear and sometimes visceral sense of anger directed at the police, feelings of liberation and expressions of empowerment in getting revenge on the police and, a broader sense of alienation from society.

In addition, this evidence is largely corroborated by two other major reports on the 2011 riots - by the National Centre for Social Research The August Riots in England Understanding the Involvement of Young People (Morrell, Scott, McNiesh, and Webster, 2011) and 5 Days in August An Interim Report on the 2011 English Riots, by the government commissioned Riots Communities and Victims Panel (RCVP, 2011) – which both argued, to differing extents, for connections to anger with the police, consumerism, and alienation.

Reicher and Stott (2011) performed a broader, but more nuanced situational analysis than Collins (2008) theory forwards. The authors brought together a large amount of online footage (CCTV, public recordings) of the 2011 riots, locating them temporally and spatially where possible. Along with other forms of secondary evidence, this enabled them to not only see patterns in chronology, but also how certain types of action developed and varied across areas.

Reicher and Stott (2011: 70-72%) acknowledge that their analysis should not be understood as explaining the riots as a whole, but rather as examining, in the main, whether the discourse of criminality and opportunistic looting has accuracy. In contrast, they forward the rioting occurred against a background of recession, lack of opportunities, and discrimination. This would lead to increasing resentment and anger in poorer areas when coupled with aggressive policing.
In stressing that the riots were not about ‘criminality’, Reicher and Stott argue that factors such as police relations and lack of economic opportunities foster ‘grievances’ that motivate the different forms of action (ibid: 74%). While I largely agree with this statement, it is limited in its nuance because it leans towards a direct form of complaint or contest, and does not consider what effect these relations have over time at a pre-reflexive level. Consequently, not only is the connection between the structure of social space and action assumed, ‘criminality’ is largely dismissed or put aside without a deeper exploration of whether, and to what extent a rejection of law was involved.

What the following chapter seeks to do, is to develop beyond concepts of ‘the riot’, and to understand how the organisation of power in the social order is productive of agency and action. However, rioting groups together not any form of behaviour, but a transgressive or non-conformist act. Thus what is required of our theoretical approach is to explain how the social order is generating resistance to itself.
4. A Theory of Resistance

4.1. Introduction

Sociological approaches of riots have tended to offer theories that explain riots as a single phenomenon and often somewhat detached from the society in which it occurs. While these theories offer some useful aspects and observances, what often occurs is a reification of ‘riots’ as a thing in themselves, or rioters are conceptualised as a specific group defined by their involvement, and with a tendency to focus on how the particular spatial setting or temporal organisation facilitated or triggered the rioting.

The problem with reifying riots and rioters is that it will risk confusion between what may be very different individuals and actions. We cannot assume that the attacks on the police that we seek to explore are driven by the same motivations as looting. Furthermore, while a focus on the immediate conditions may be important in explaining how the rioting emerged at that point or investigating how to improve responses to rioting (e.g. in policing tactics), they cannot explain how the choice to riot came about and made those particular conditions something worthy of examination. By focusing on the event itself, the context that makes riots meaningful and made rioting possible are to some extent neglected.

Instead of attempting to explain or produce a theory of ‘riots’, these temporally contiguous and socially related actions should be framed as both a warning of problems within, and an opportunity for insight into, society. The reason for this is, as Marx (1996) once argued, if a society fails to reproduce the basic economic conditions for production, it will break down. Indeed, Merton (1938) made a similar point when he argued that strain within a social group will inhibit conformity to culturally defined goals and social norms of behaviour, and prompt transgressive behaviours.

Riots are made up of transgressive acts, and thus a symptom of a social group’s failure to reproduce itself. This is particularly the case with regards to the attacks on the police, as it is these who are supposed to maintain that
social order. Thus what we should seek to examine is not the narrative tool – the reified, singular ‘riots’ – but particular types of ‘action’ as embedded in, and emerging from a social and historical context that we seek to understand. Rather than a theory of riots, we need to begin with a theory of action. Taking this tack, we can use the riots to better understand a particular historical point in society, and in doing so better understand the attacks on the police by situating them in the context from which they emerge.

4.1.1 Structure of the Chapter

To set out the theory of action and approach we begin with the discourse or logic of neo-liberalism; that is the politicians’ and media’s attempt to ‘explain’ the rioters’ actions by neglecting the impact social structure may have and pathologising rioters through moral condemnation. This is then contrasted with the general left leaning explanations, which as Newburn et al. (2016) point out, may account for structure but fail to avoid issues of determinism, implanting structure directly into agency, and assuming that injustice equals political action. We then critique Keith’s (1993) conventional understanding of riots, noting, that while it moves avoids relying on either ‘free will’ or determinism, it leads him to exclude the broader social relations.

This discussion provides a useful means of approaching the issue of structure and agency, and summarily demonstrates the necessity of understanding riot actions as emerging from their social context. Bourdieu (1985; 2003) provides this connection through his notion of ‘habitus’, providing us with the broad theoretical framework of how social structure inheres and is reproduced through everyday interactions. However, Bourdieu does not fully or clearly elaborate how social strife and contest occurs at an emotional level, leading to a relatively rigid social structure. This, in turn, limits the understanding of the development of new social structure and values and norms through a certain inflexibility in his conception of dispositions.

In other words, Bourdieu gets us so far, but to understand resistance rather than conformity, we need to go deeper. This theory of resistance will be developed through a consideration of emotion, particularly shame and self-esteem, as a mechanism through which social structure has relevance or
influence. In particular, Honneth’s (1995) notion of respect/disrespect provides the core understanding of how social resistance or struggle is produced. Following this I will consider the specific structural role and position of the police in the production of disrespect, and the manner in which this can connect or shape affective dispositions towards them.

The final aspect that requires theorising is how this understanding of structure’s impact on dispositions translates into agency. Butler’s (2011) notion of performativity compliments the expressive understanding of action and will be incorporated into the broader theory. Performativity particularly lends itself to making sense of the riot actions we observe through video footage discussed in the methodology. We begin then, through a discussion of two polar, implicit theoretical positions on the 2011 riots, the free agent on the one hand, and structural determinism on the other.

### 4.2 Structure versus Agency

As discussed in the introduction, there have been two broad ways in which the 2011 riots were constructed as an event. On the one hand there was the dominant mainstream response typified by the David Cameron’s ‘criminality’ while on the other, more left wing perspective, was the framing of the riots as political, rebellion, albeit unarticulated. Dealing with the mainstream narrative first, we can note that Cameron (2011a; 2011b), among others, argued that rioters were selfish, immoral thugs. At the time, Cameron was the Prime Minister of a neo liberal government that justified its political reforms and greater shift to free market capitalism on the logic of the free, possessive individual (Hall, 2011). In this logic the freedom of the individual is constricted only through interference by other actors, and agency is viewed as unencumbered by ‘fantastical societal forces’ (Atkinson et al., 2012: 8).

In other words, neoliberalism relies only on a concept of negative freedom: if a choice is ‘free’ it is uninfluenced by any external factors and thus, no examination is required because it is the individual that is the cause of the act. As Wacquant (2010) argues, those who utilise this logic to condemn groups of
individuals as ‘criminals’ or ‘underclass’, reveal more about themselves and their position of dominance than their subject matter. While it must be the individual that makes a choice, we should not assume choice is a simple exercise of a utopian ‘free will’. Instead, we must seek to understand how that choice to attack the police was made, and this requires understanding ‘choice’, not as ‘free’, but as shaped by experience and social structure.

Yet here care must be taken too; the less popular left wing interpretation of 2011 was that the riots constituted a political rebellion (e.g. Penny, 2011). As Newburn at al. (2016) point out, these explanations assume riot actions are simply expressions of rioters’ sense of injustice at the system they are exploited by. What makes structural analyses determinist is the conceptualisation of the actor, which supposes stability and uniformity in action deriving from common forms of structure – from this perspective injustice equals political action. Taking from Merton, Marsh (2010) argues that a theory of action needs to account for the instability of action, and this can be achieved through understanding the subtle and nuanced ways in which a multitude of structural factors intersect in the individual through experience.

Consequently, through their assumptions both perspectives leave a theoretical and explanatory ‘gap’ connecting structure and action. On the one hand the neoliberals have an assumed actor free from any external influence, thus the rioters are simply immoral; while on the other, the actor becomes only a vessel, a direct translator of the structure, and the rioters are simply political and just. Consequently, neither perspective can hope to adequately understand or resolve the issues driving the rioting, either because (for neoliberals) there is no explanation beyond the thuggery of the individual, or because the left cannot conceive of how exclusion might impact on agency other than to make it political.

4.2.1 The Broader Social Context

A more nuanced perspective that partially accounts for the gap between structure and action is that of Michael Keith’s (1993) analysis of the riots in the 1980s. Utilising data on the rioting to direct enquiry, Keith mapped out the relations between black communities in London and the police in detail, noting
how these antagonistic, often hostile and violent interactions shaped the way many black people saw and felt about the police. This, he argues leads to a sense of injustice, a view of police and policing as illegitimate, and a strong resentment and drive to contest ‘policing’.

However, while I value Keith’s analysis, his focus on relations between the black communities and the police alone means he neglects the larger social context of the riots which shaped those communities and the interactions with police. Keith (1993: 16-7) heavily criticises ‘left realist’ or anomie approaches to the 1981 riots in which a criminal culture is seen to develop through social and economic exclusion amongst black communities. He argues that there is no evidence for a substantially greater amount of ‘black’ criminal acts, and that the approach produces a ‘stereotypical’ young, black criminal.

Problematically, Keith makes certain misleading assumptions. Firstly, because the focus was on black people/communities in light of the largely black rioters in the 1980s, this implies for Keith, that the argument of such approaches is that black people should commit more crime generally. However, the anomie or strain (e.g. Merton, 1938; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969) approach makes no distinction between ethnicity, other than ‘race’ as one mechanism of exclusion, only that if certain groups are alienated there will be a tendency to reject the dominant social norms of behaviour, often law.

Furthermore, Keith assumes anomie theory seeks to explain complete individuals, thus arriving at a generalisation of an entire group. This may or may not be the case, but I would argue that what should be explored is simply the negative influences over the normative aspect of law and the dominant society’s values. One example is that of Stuart Hall and colleagues (1980: 347) who demonstrate that, in socially and economically excluded black communities in the 1960s and 70s, there was a variety of dispositions towards the law; from those who found value through the transgression of it, to those who did not but empathised with others who broke it. The point they make was that certain structural relations were diminishing the value of law and the sense of belonging to society, which did not lead to a single type of actor or action, but there was commonality or similarity in the types of response of the
black community.

Keith’s (1993) criticism means he neglects the impact of the broader social context, and makes the mistake of trying to understand what shaped the attacks on the police through interactions between the police and the black community alone. Due to their position in the social order, the police have a complex and non-linear relation to society. The police’s actions can influence the way people view society, and society can shape the way people view the police (Bradford, 2015; Loader, 2006; Wacquant, 2010). In other words, we must also consider how those individuals involved in attacks on the police are treated by other institutions linked to society, and how this shapes their disposition towards the police and law as part of the state apparatus or larger society.

What Keith lacks is a theory of action, particularly emphasising the manner in which social structure interacts with affective mechanisms. Through this we can develop a framework to understand how larger and seemingly distinct social processes becomes implicated in nuanced ways in dispositions to attack the police, but do not determine behaviour. Thus, rather than begin with an approach to police-community relations and resistance, we begin with a theory of action before focusing down to examine how the police are tied into the broader social structure and implicated in the attacks upon them.

In turn, this will enable us to historicise the construction of rioters’ choices to attack the police as “a social rationality that takes due stock of past experiences” (Wacquant, 2010: 50). In other words, what we require is a theory of action that accounts for the influence of structure or system, but rather than removing choice, understands how such factors are a part of choice and make choice possible. We begin then with Bourdieu, who provides the broad theoretical framework that counters simplistic neoliberal notions of the ‘free individual’ but also avoids determinism through his concept of ‘habitus’.

4.3. Capital as Social Structure

Before we begin with trying to connect structure to agency, we should define
the terms. Agency simply means that capacity to choose and act, structure is more complex. Social structure can be seen as the patterned, or regular social arrangements, be it formalised institutions, social norms, or common modes of cognition and affect. Importantly, we should be careful not to reify structure as a thing in itself; Collins (2005: 5-6) argues that when we talk of the macro or largest level of social structure, we are simply abstracting and generalising what occurs at the micro level – the specific interactions.

This is ultimately similar to Foucault’s conceptualisation of power: it is not something that exists in or above an individual, but occurs ‘only in action’ and influences another’s behaviour (2004: 15). In other words, structure refers to patterned and repeating relationships of force, exercised on individuals by individuals through interactions, which influences or limits their action, and which we, the analysts, generalise from.

Pierre Bourdieu enables us to theorise and incorporate how these forms of interaction creates the basis of agency, by constructing values, modes of perception, and forms of behaviour. In particular here, will help us begin to theorise how a violent opposition to the police might emerge through acceptable or valued forms of behaviour towards them. Bourdieu’s concern is to highlight the manner in which the ‘structure of social space’ or ‘field’ (as a particular formation of structure) is constituted by the accepted forms of ‘capitals’ and how these are reproduced through, in, and by the individual and their habitus – or sets of dispositions (Bourdieu, 2003: 19; 1985).

Capital simply means something that an individual has and can invest for the sake of reward and to generate further capital. While economic capital (monetary or material wealth) is the commonly known form, Bourdieu distinguishes between types of capital (1986b). For Bourdieu there are two further principle types of capital: ‘cultural’ and ‘social’.

Each of these refers to less physically tangible means of ‘production’; social capital is less relevant to the thesis but refers to the connections an individual or group may have and be able to draw upon in the pursuit of her goals (i.e. forming networks of contacts who can do favours, create opportunities, and so forth) (Bourdieu, 1986b: 248). Cultural capital refers to objects and practises
that are socially valued by particular groupings or classes of individuals, and thus an individual’s investment in accumulating cultural capital (i.e. gaining educational qualifications and knowledge) provides social rewards, such as status. It is this form that relates most closely to the issue of choice.

One of Bourdieu’s (1986a) famous examples is how being part of particular social class shapes what actions/objects you see as valuable and therefore to be displayed or enacted. For instance, an object (a fine wine) can display status and position within the group, but so can a practise utilising this object (display of knowledge or appreciation of fine wine). An actor who invests in learning or appropriating knowledge of the object and how to display it is rewarded when they do so by the social esteem or respect of her peers. As this suggests, capitals function symbolically because it is what the practise or object means to those observing that defines whether the individual will gain in social standing.

It is the distribution and types of capital that define the ‘immanent structure’ of the social worlds we inhabit (Bourdieu, 1986b: 242). Another way of talking about the ‘immanent structure’ is through the concept of ‘social space’, or a ‘field’ as a specific and delimited occurrence of this. A field can be understood as analogous to a geographical space, but rather than physical distance between objects as the manner of differentiation, it is the social features – the forms and distribution of capitals – of each individual’s position which mark out the difference or characterise the positions and thus the structure of a field (Bourdieu, 2000: 134; 2003: 6).

4.3.1. The Field and Habitus

The concept of field provides a way of examining structure, but as part of agency and action. The concept posits a relational social world through conceptualising a series of objective, interconnected positions occupied by individuals (Bourdieu, 1985: 16-18; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2005: 97). These positions are determined by the amount and type of capital each individual has in relation to others and the valued forms of capital in that specific field. In other words, the amount and forms of capital an individual has within that specific social field or structure determines, in the first instance, what those in
each type of position are capable of doing and the rewards, or lack thereof, that can be gained through certain practises or displays. Just as economic capital is valued through its function within a market, so cultural capital is valued through educational, political, and social systems (Bourdieu, 1986b: 242).

A field therefore, firstly determines a class of individuals, not in a Marxist sense of a unified class or the alternative false consciousness, but as a grouping of individuals who occupy and have roughly similar positions and opportunities. This could be the more conventional understanding, such as the working classes defined by their relative lack of economic capital and their practice of particular forms of cultural (e.g. doing ‘hard labour’) capital, or ethnic minorities for similar reasons.

Why it does not presuppose class unity, or ‘group’, in the Marxist sense, or remove individual differentiation, is because any social space provides an epistemological foundation for how we understand and act within that world, much as with structuralism. Yet it differs from structuralism in that it cannot be considered separately from the concept of ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1985; 2000; 2001), which sits in a non-linear relation of production to a field, removing any notion of determinism. Unlike structuralism, social structure for Bourdieu is only ‘objective’ because it presents itself to those within it as such; it is the ‘nature’ of reality and beyond an individual’s control, so to speak.

By shaping the opportunities and rewards available to them, social structure enables certain types of habitus or class based tastes and values to be formed through action. In its function as a structuring force (through the valued forms and distribution of capitals) over what can be performed and achieved, and what will be valued, a field constitutes the base framing of an individual’s experience of what is practical or achievable, and what is socially valued (Bourdieu, 2001: 104). Through experiences within a field we gain an informational, practical, and value base to thought and action found in common ‘schemes of perceptions, appreciation and action’ (Bourdieu, 200: 138). In other words, a field ‘disposes’ individuals in similar positions to certain forms of viewing and valuing the world, other actors, and their behaviours,
and subsequently shapes their understanding of how they should and want to act in the world.

Dispositions that emerge as practices or tastes can, in turn, be mapped onto social space – i.e. football and the working class, or golf and corporate class – which simultaneously function symbolically, signifying one’s position in that social space (Atkinson, 2010: 55-6). The implication here is that it is not simply the possession or lack of signifying objects and ‘embodied’ dominant forms of capital that determines and distinguishes ‘classes’ and forms modalities of inclusion and exclusion. Instead, it is how this lack is interpreted and enacted by individuals in relation to objects, displays, or markers of that position.

Each aspect of capital, habitus, and field is defined by, and exists in relation to the other. Just as capitals form the field that we will be confronted by, so our experience of the field will shape our habitus or understanding of which capitals are valuable, and how to utilise the forms accessible to us. In turn, through shaping our habitus we (re)produce those forms of capital and who can be included and excluded. The theory that Bourdieu forwards, moving past the subjective/objective or agency/structure divide, is that one’s habitus is the subjective appropriation of elements of the objective social structure; that is to say, the structure inheres in choice, or becomes part of, the individual through sets of ‘dispositions’ or predilections for certain behaviours and objects learnt through the rewards we receive, and in turn is reshaped by their actions.

4.4. Developing Bourdieu

Yet, there are three issues to be dealt with before continuing on to how Bourdieu helps us with the riots: firstly, and most simply, the argument here is interested in actions towards the police, a particular actor, rather than the logics of a whole habitus and field. One means of resolving this is to focus down on the relevant disposition towards the object of police and its production in a field. Nevertheless, this does requires looking beyond the interactions with the police, but only to understand how this interacts with the symbolic meaning of the object of ‘the police’. Of the two further theoretical
issues, the first revolves around whether Bourdieu’s theory explains the motivation to act or is deterministic, and the second relates to a limit in his theoretical conception of ‘field’.

4.4.1. Determinism or Predisposing Rioters?

The issue here regards a partially flawed critique of ‘habitus’ as deterministic, which is worth dealing with here because it elaborates the level at which the habitus-field-capital nexus functions, and its validity as an approach to understanding the conditions of choice to attack the police. Sayer (1999: 407; 412; 416) criticises Bourdieu for his lack of acknowledgment, or subsumption of intentionality, reason and reflexivity through the concepts of ‘instrumental’ or ‘strategic’ action and ‘distinction’. Similarly, King (2000) argues that habitus overemphasises ‘objective’ forces and their impact on agency, leading to a deterministic view of agents.

These arguments, while arguably valid to some of Bourdieu’s explanations which might give too much focus to the structure, firstly miss the point that if we are to explain common behaviours or actions we must, to some extent, generalise beyond the behavioural specificity of each individual, and search for the context behind common forms of behaviour.

Secondly, Sayer and King both ignore his use of the term ‘pre-reflexive’ (2000: 99), which positions structural influences happening prior to and enabling, not excluding or preventing, conscious reflection or choice (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). In other words, these critiques miss the point that habitus is not determined behaviour or ‘rule’ following, but rather describes how the “oppositions inscribed in the social structure of the fields serve as the support for cognitive structures [...] which make it possible to produce ethical, aesthetic or cognitive judgments.” (Bourdieu. 2001: 105). Or simply put, without mapping out the entire experiences and social structures an individual participates in, the exploration of dispositions can explain why an individual might choose and value one thing rather than another.

In describing habitus, what Bourdieu calls a ‘feel for the game’ or similarly ‘illusio’ refers to the implicit understanding and valuation, or a form of agency,
that does not require conscious calculation – although it may be utilised – in order to act because of “a fundamental belief in the interest of the game and the value of the stakes” (Bourdieu, 2000: 11; 1985: 14; 1990: 12). In other words, we may question our values, logics and beliefs, but often we act, even consciously, without examining this base.

Importantly, the ‘feel for the game’ should not be understood as a means-end calculation, but rather as an expressive act achieved through the moment. Drawing on Dewey, Honneth (1995: 136) argues that emotions are not simply expressive of some inner state prior to actions, but occur through and are dependent on action and the learnt expectations one has regarding the outcome. Consequently, it is not that an individual engages in the practise of fine wine because they consciously evaluate the social rewards (although it may often seem, or even be, the case), but because their observation or experience of the rewards have shaped their interests; the experience habituates or disposes them, and the practise becomes valued in and of itself and forms a preference in choice. Similarly, it is not whether rioters did or did not consciously choose to attack police that we are interested, but rather how they became disposed to do so.

4.4.2. Rejecting Capitals: Race and Class

King and Sawyer’s critiques of Bourdieu, while flawed, are understandable particularly in light of the next issue that requires discussion – the notion of a field. While I will not utilise ‘field’ in the analysis, it is worth discussing to develop beyond the limits of Bourdieu’s theory. Perhaps the largest problem with this concept is its rigidity. Bourdieu tends to talk of specific fields as defined by sets of power relations, such as academia, and thus specific practises, values, and goals (2000: 143). While it was argued that Bourdieu avoids determinism, his theory does tend towards a certain ‘singleness’ of an actor – that is, if you are within a field your habitus is shaped specifically towards that field. This is problematic theoretically, but also for the thesis here, as it fails to explain how someone located in social space, but lacking capital might develop dispositions outside of, or even that oppose those forms of capital.
Lahire (2011:15-7) criticises Bourdieu for building the concept of habitus on an analysis of a ‘weakly differentiated’ society, and not accounting for the contradiction this may bring when the subject exists within a society with ‘highly differentiated’ groups. In other words, there is a certain limitation in the fluidity of the subject in which their position in relation to the forms of capital might create ‘mutations’, so to speak, and begin to change the social structure itself. Through Bourdieu’s rather static or enclosed notion of the field he de-emphasises (rather than excludes) the possibility of cultural and value-based shifts through the ambiguous or amorphous position a group might have. What Bourdieu’s concept of field lacks therefore, is found in Bell Hooks’ theorization that the margins of societies are not simply sites of deprivation, but a site of possibility and a social ‘space of resistance’ (1990: 341).

In other words, individuals who are excluded through their lack of valued forms of capital and defined by the dominant society in this way, do not necessarily accept this identification of them and may resist these forms of exclusion. Neither is this to say that divergence constitutes a complete disconnect from the larger set of capitals; for instance, the working class remained to some extent within society through practises of employment and the market (Hoggart, 1992). What Bourdieu misses then with his rigid concept of social space, is how resistance can be generated rather than conformity.

For instance, issues of both ‘race’ and ‘class’ can be connected to the 2011 riots, and conceptualising them through capital and distinction is a useful way of understanding how such categories function and to what ends. Both race and class can be conceived of as forms of capital, with skin colour, accent, style of dress and so forth, operating as the objectified and symbolic forms of that capital, and thus a means of distinction. Those with the markers of the white, middle or upper class are included, and become able to exclude those without. Thus a Bourdieusian ‘class’ is created in that a group, however it is defined and distinguished, is located in social space in such a way as to present those individuals with roughly similar opportunities, or lack thereof.

A working class accent might be interpreted as a sign of stupidity by those whose accent is associated with intelligence, or as Wacquant notes how black
males have become synonymous with crime and violence: “so that, unless they display the trappings of middle-class culture, they are de-facto barred from bordering white areas” (2010: 57). In other words, we have markers and logics of distinction. What these are is objectively arbitrary; they emerge in relation to the current social hierarchy and serve to maintain it through acts of distinction, and justify it through logics of superiority/inferiority.

An act of racial or class-based discrimination is an act of distinction that marks out individuals for differential social respect and status and thus treatment with regards to the practice and distribution of economic and material resources. In other words, ‘race’ and ‘class’ are cognitive and emotional categories through which the dominant group justifies the relative positions in the social hierarchy, and enacts economic and social exclusion (Bulmer & Solomos, 1999; Hall et al., 1980; Lee, 2017; Tyler, 2013).

Subsequently, the creation of Bourdieusian ‘classes’ also denotes that race and class imply a related lived experience – as those being differentiated from the ‘norm’ – along with the production of dispositions (Bulmer & Solomos, 1999). Yet, to assume that the dispositions of ethnic minorities or lower classes simply accept and go along with these forms of structural exclusion would to be problematic to say the least. Of course, Bourdieu does not make such an assumption, but his theory cannot adequately explain the resistances that dominated groups have repeatedly shown to their exclusion.

It is perhaps because Bourdieu does not develop or explore the emotional content implied in concepts like ‘disposition’ or a ‘feel for the game’, that he does not appear to fully recognise this issue. To elaborate this idea in relation to the riots as resistance we can turn to emotion and look beyond Bourdieu. While emotion is certainly present in Bourdieu’s work, he fails to adequately theorise the relation between these and social space, in particular the notions of (dis)respect, the self-esteem-shame nexus, and why classes of individuals might reject some dominant forms of capital and create their own. These emotions seem particularly relevant to the notions of distinction and cultural and symbolic capital, as it is these that enable social rewards or status, and habituate us to value certain forms of capital.
4.4.3 Shame and Self-Esteem

From a sociological perspective, Scheff (2000) defines shame as a set of self-oriented emotions (principally embarrassment & humiliation, but incorporating fear and anger) created through viewing ourselves from another’s eyes. Shame is produced through a discrepancy between an ideal self (imagined) and the experienced self (how one is treated), but importantly, that this discrepancy represents a threat to the 'social bond' (Scheff; 2000: 96-7; also see Turner, 2007). Palshikar (2005: 5430) extends this definition further, arguing that shame occurs when a social order’s norm about the self is violated or reversed - for instance, losing one’s ‘manliness’ by being ‘feminised’, leading to a situation in which one is judged as not up to the standard.

More than just a stimuli-response mechanism, individuals become sensitive to potential situations that might lead to such judgement, and learn to anticipate these situations and adapt their behaviour. To call this conscious or calculative would be misleading, instead shame is ‘subtle and pervasive’ in that it is not necessarily understood as a mechanism in a system of social sanctions, but rather over time becomes ‘unspeakable’ and implicitly ‘compels’ or habituates action (Scheff; 1988: 396; 2000: 90). Thus to some extent, shame functions at the dispositional or pre-reflexive level and operates in response to acts of distinction.

As this also implies, and it is important to note here, shame sits in a relation to self-esteem both of which are implicitly tied with cultural capital, providing “a nexus between the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to personify them” (Pitts-River, 1965: 23; Bourdieu, 1965: 211; Scheff; 1988: 396). We are driven to rectify the situation of shame and achieve self-esteem, not simply because we want to remove/avoid the negative feeling, but because we want to a positive sense of self through the approval of the group (Honneth, 1995: 131).

However, while shame functions to maintain the social order as an affective mechanism of sanctions, as with ‘criminality’, it is also possible that it will have “corrosive effects for the underlying normative order” (Palshikar, 2005: 5431).
The reasons for this is because shame is, in part, an aversive emotion – that is we will try to rectify the situation so as to not experience shame again, either by changing our behaviour to conform or secondly, as Bradford (2015: 106) argues, rejecting the social order’s ability to judge them, and finding other routes or processes to negate shame and produce self-esteem. In other words, it is self-esteem that generates Merton’s (1938) conformity to norms and aspirations, and it is shame that holds the potential to create their rejection.

4.4.4. Structure, Affect, Resistance

The removal or degradation of one’s status or honour is a particularly social act. To reduce status, or perform ‘evaluative degradation of certain patterns of self-realization’, is to inhibit the possibility of those individuals finding positive self-significance within that community and its social practises (Honneth, 1995: 134). It is this affective reaction to disrespect, and the struggle for self-esteem against shame, that is the motivational basis of all human social struggle, conflict, and resistance (Honneth, 1995: 164).

Honneth’s conceptualisation of the social acts behind these affective states as ‘respect’ and ‘disrespect’, sits neatly with Bourdieu’s understanding of capital and distinction, and can function as perhaps the primary affective mechanism through which social structure comes to inhere in habitus. As Honneth points out a ‘successful relation-to-self’ requires the ‘intersubjective recognition of one’s abilities and accomplishments’ (1995:136). If an individual is unable to access the practices and capitals that enable such recognition, a feeling of inadequacy may result. Here self-esteem and shame are linked explicitly to recognition. That is to say, it is the esteem gained from successful exercises of cultural capital, or the disrespect for a lack, exclusion, or failure, that habituates us to desire or find value in the practise.

As with Bourdieu’s discussion of capitals, who is distinguished and how, are obviously not objective features but particular formations of prejudice shaped by the historically specific social hierarchy, that made these visual cues and categories socially pertinent (Hall et al., 1980). If enough individuals find value in these categories their acts will create the micro-foundations of one aspect
of the abstraction we call ‘social structure’; individuals who have the relevant visual markers are singled out for dis/respect and economic in/exclusion, which presents itself to those experiencing these rewards or punishments as an ‘objective’ feature of the social world.

Those individuals, in turn, will experience this either as social recognition and self-esteem, or alternatively a sense of inadequacy or disrespect (Hall et al., 1980; Honneth, 1995; Tyler, 2013). Through repeated and patterned interactions such as these, an individual experiences recognition or disrespect which shapes how they see their position in the social group, or indeed, whether they see themselves as part of the group at all, and prompt some form of action aimed at rectification.

4.4.5. Self-Esteem through Practice and Empowerment

However, ‘dis/respect’ should not be understood only as symbolic acts of distinction, but also in terms of embodied capital, or what the exclusion implies in terms of the individual’s capacity for action. In other words, it is not only about telling individuals they are not good enough, but intertwined with this, it is about preventing individuals from participating in practices, or capitals, that enable self-worth to be built. Honneth (ibid: 132-3) highlights this element of disrespect in which the individual is denied autonomy over their body, either physically or socially, and consequently loses confidence in the self to be capable of effective action.

This might be considered an existential form of self-esteem; Heine, Proulx, and Vohs (2006) argue that meaning exists in the relations between objects, such as hammer and nail. Practice and efficiency with these relations leads to “[f]eelings of subjective certainty with regards to these meaning frameworks [which] provides people with confidence regarding how they should behave” (Heine et al., 2006: 96).

Hannah Arendt (1970) made a similar, albeit more socio-politically oriented, point with her concept of ‘power’, which is not that of ‘command-obedience’ but what she saw as an innate part of humans as political beings: “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is
never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together” (1970: 44).

In other words, power for Arendt is the capacity of humans to act, through organising and co-operating, to shape the social world; it is not a means but an expressive end, perhaps similar to concepts of positive political freedom. Power’s importance, for Arendt, is in its capacity to fulfil humanity’s ‘faculty of action’, that which makes us ‘political beings’: “it enables him to get together with his peers, to act in concert, and to reach out for goals and enterprises that would never enter his mind” (Arendt, 1970: 82). Perhaps more importantly, it enables individuals to organise to overcome unfavourable conditions, such as disrespect and exclusion. To be part of ‘power’ then, is to be politically and socially potent – to believe in your capacity to affect change.

While Arendt does not explore the foundations of ‘power’ in emotions, her conceptualisation fits with that discussed above; Arendt’s concept of ‘power’ refers to participation in politicised and organised action, and is based on an inherent capacity and drive in humanity; the drive pushes us to achieve a sense of control over the social world and to feel recognised by others. To be disempowered in Arendt’s terms is, in affective terms, to feel impotent and thus constitutes as existential form of disrespect, and to be vulnerable to disrespect.

It is through these affective mechanisms that structural forms of exclusion shape experience. Through the affective mechanism of shame and self-esteem we have now connected structure through disrespect and disempowerment to dispositions. The negative experience of shame creates a drive to achieve a state of self-esteem, and it is through action that this affective disposition is expressed and potentially resolved. This is not to say an individual ‘must’ react, or in particular ways, to resolve their negative state, because we are capable or acting against or overruling our feelings. The point is simply that it creates a disposition in which certain actions become preferential or desirable. However, to explain resistance we must go further than noting the relation between affect and structure, and also consider the cognitive correlates if we are to develop this theory fully.
4.5 Structure, Affect, and Resistance

Merton (1938) argues there are a number of potential reactions to the ‘strain’ of social and economic exclusion, ranging from outright rebellion to apathy and retreat. As noted, Merton did not adequately theorise the generation of resistance (Agnew, 2012). Although not developed by her, Butler’s (2004; 2011) notion of ‘performativity’ enables us to understand the role structure has in conjunction with the expression of affect.

Action is not simply means-end oriented, but enables the achievement of a valued self. Identity is made possible through social structure or power relations, but is not determined by them; rather the actor plays out these relations through the body reproducing norms of behaviour, or resisting through acts that challenge and refuse power relations: “I feel good breaking the law. Laws are made to control people” (Graffiti artist Omar, quoted in Ferrell, 2001: 182).

Similarly, Honneth (1995: 163) and Ferrell (2001) point out that the experience of disrespect does not necessarily shape the nature of the resistance, which could be, for instance, an anarchist union movement, graffiti, or a riot which may have no particular goal at all. These responses are expressive in that they use oppressive power relations to articulate a response, although not necessarily an end goal or political claim. The point Honneth (1995) makes is whether it is politicised and organised resistance or not depends on certain cognitive conditions. The subjects need to ‘recognise’ they are a group facing this type of experience, and to be able to reflexively frame the recognition of disrespect as an injustice through an intersubjective framework of interpretation.

In other words, to act on an ‘injustice’ requires a disposition that enables the experience to make sense as an injustice. In turn, their actions in response to this rely on the perception of certain types of action as plausible and worthwhile. If Politicised or political action is the outcome then the subjects have organised, shifting from powerless, impotent, and discriminated, to empowered: a group acting in concert to improve their situation (Arendt, 1970).
We can return to the issues of both ‘race’ and ‘class’ to see the intertwined nature of the disrespect and resistance. As noted, to be marked out for inclusion or exclusion by ‘race’ or ‘class’, whether one realises it or not, is to shape one’s lived experience and thus dispositions. Those of the dominant group valorise what they have (or what they believe they have), and tie their self-worth into these markers of capital, for instance, associations between white skin and civilisation in the British Empire, in contrast to and over what they believe others lack: “the Negro race can only be humanised and civilised by Europeans” (quoted in Cole, 2016: 29). Those lacking the markers of capital are excluded, rendering them powerless and disrespected through the interactions that condemn and refuse them access to social or material resources.

It is these power relations that enable the oppressed to formulate resistance. If a grouping of individuals realise their common form of exclusion, they can resist this form of capital/distinction and overturn their shame through the very same category that enables their exclusion. Indeed, these categories, such as specific articulations of race or class based identities, are fundamental to countering forms of the exclusions they are shaped by (Bulmer & Solomos, 1999: 5). In Butlerian (2011) terms, the recognition of the form of exclusion enables the performance of resistance to and through those power relations. Without categories of ‘black’ there could be no ‘black power’ or ‘black is beautiful’ as means to resist the disrespect and disempowerment.

4.5.1 Excluding Politics in Practice

Exclusion and shame necessitates an adaptive behaviour, in such cases where it produces resistance however, it does not necessitate politicised action. Indeed, to understand this we should first note that ‘political action’ is a normative concept rather than purely a descriptive one. As a description ‘political’ only refers to action aimed at change within and to a particular social order, but it implies a certain moral justification or subjective value in the type of action (Akram, 2014). In other words, ‘political’ implicitly contrasts with ‘criminality’; if resistance no longer aims at the legitimated social order, it can be vilified and condemned, and no longer requires explanation.
To utilise ‘political action’ in its normative sense neglects Deranty and Renault’s (2009) argument that increasing social and economic exclusion creates the possibility that society’s political space becomes increasingly irrelevant to those excluded. In other words, the forms of performance not seek to perform and re-articulate power within the legitimated structure, because this is not understood as an effective means to express and overcome discontent. Indeed, as this relation escalates, so does the potential that the whole public and political sphere becomes irrelevant or oppressive to those excluded.

We can elaborate the relevance of this point by noting that to be excluded implies symbolic disrespect by labelling individuals, as with Cameron’s ‘criminality’, the implicit connections between ‘black’ and danger and criminality (Hall et al., 1980; Wacquant, 2010) or indeed the problematic concept of ‘underclass’ (Tyler, 2013). Such stereotypes also imply derogatory treatment, such as the aggressive policing of blacks, or teachers responding to working class children as stupid. In these cases, those disrespected are made to feel inferior, and thus either not part of, or not an equal in the group.

This does not necessitate depoliticised action, but that the ‘power’, in Arendtian (1970) terms, that resides here is sending the message to certain individuals that they are not included. Consequently, the processes of ‘power’ in the social order are at best ineffective or irrelevant to them, and at worst oppressive. Problematically, if an act of resistance is not ‘political action’, then it risks being labelled ‘criminality’. But as we have seen, because an action does not seek to perform through or within the dominant power structure, is because this power has excluded them, rendering participation ineffective.

Indeed, if an excluded group is resisting through attempts that seek to rearrange that power structure to achieve respect, such protest or acts of civil disobedience, then this is foundationally identical to action that aims within the power structure. The same could be said for rebellion, the difference not being the cause but being the use violence. In other words, to perform political action, removing the normative connotations of the term, is simply refers to those less excluded.
However, as we have seen it is also possible that the repeated experience of disrespect and inability to engage also holds the possibility to make action aimed at any change within the society pre-reflexively irrelevant. An absence of engagement, ineffectiveness, or indeed, the experience of shame through engagement in the political processes or forms capitals, will shape the disposition to not engage. For those that are told they do not belong, or are not equal, who see no way to express and overcome their discontent, the increasing risk is that their actions will no longer speak to that power but simply against it.

4.5.2. Neoliberalism and Individualism

To further understand why non-political action is produced we must also look at how these structural exclusions are experienced and interpreted. On the one hand, as discussed earlier, the repeated experience of shame and the irrelevance of the political sphere to the excluded may produce apathy, or indeed, anger and a rejection of the social group and its values (Gilligan, 2003; Palshikar, 2005; Merton, 1938). Another factor that may inhibit the political action and organisation of resistance, is individualisation.

Individualism, as noted earlier is a logic inherent in neoliberalism, however, these terms are not without problems. Without developing a full critique of these concepts, we can note that because the ideology of neoliberalism relies on a model of the individual as self-interested, utility maximisers, and it is often assumed that people actually become and behave as such (Barnett, 2010). Indeed, neoliberal critiques tends to assume a distinct line between two sets of values, those of public, communal, and perhaps altruistic, and those private, egoistic, and individualistic.

Of course, neoliberalism and individualism did not suddenly emerge in the 1980s, nor are values so clear cut and simple; ego and self-interest have always shaped concerns. Rather than creating a distinct set of values, individualism should be conceived of as a sort of cultural weighting that promotes some, and diminishes other forms of understanding. In terms of impact on disposition, it promotes an increased emphasis on the self as the source and reason for behaviour and achievement to the neglect of structure.
With this, individualism conceals certain power relations, and thus limits the possibility of performing with or against them.

Neoliberalism can be considered a set of economic and social practices that promote at the pre-reflexive level, an individualistic mode of perception and logic. This ‘shapes dispositions because, rather than simply egoistic concerns, by diminishing structural understanding it tends to increase shame – as blame or inadequacy of the self – whilst also inhibiting the value or visibility of resolution through change to the social structure.

However, the depoliticising impact of individualism is also broader than this. Anomie theory proposes that individuals become alienated from the normative social order when in a supposedly meritocratic and free society framed by an individualistic outlook. People come up against the contradiction of structural exclusions along the lines of class, race and gender (Rock, 2007: 9-10). The problem is that the diminishment of the awareness of social structure necessarily diminishes the ‘consciousness of social justice’ (Honneth, 2007: 89; Bauman, 2000: 35). It conceals the categories that resistance occurs through.

As we have mentioned, this is important for the overcoming of racism or classism through the affective and cognitive realisation of a common injustice, and the formation of a collective identity to counter the disrespect such experiences imply. Collective resistance in this regard is not simply a pragmatic tool with which to reach a goal, but is in itself an act of empowering or overcoming shame and inadequacy through constructing a new relation-to-self as part of a social group (Arendt, 1970; Honneth, 1995: 164). Through this group, individuals can unite and perform acts of resistance together that seek to re-articulate norms (Butler, 2011)

4.5.3 Shame, Impotence, and Violence

The point in noting the lack of political action is not for its own sake, but rather to note that such action is that of individuals who are pre-reflexively disempowered within democratic society. To be depoliticised is to be made impotent with regards to social order to the point that any consideration of
action aimed at the political sphere occurs as negative affect: apathy or aversive responses. The impact of depoliticisation is more than just disengagement, but may have a toxic impact on the social order and even lead to violence as a cathartic action.

On the one hand, the disjuncture between the capitals encouraged and rewarded by society, and the shame – rather than a politicised and righteous anger – felt for failure to live up to these ideals, can ultimately lead to psychological and cultural rejection of the doxic ideas and goals of society. This context further holds the potential to produce alternative values and practices – or capitals – which generate social recognition and esteem outside of, or even through transgression of the dominant norms and values which shame them (Bourgios, 2003; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969; Hall et al., 1980; Rock, 2007: 9-10; Skegg, 2010).

While on the other, and tied in with this process of alienation, is violence as a destruction of, or seizing of power. In contrast to her notion of empowerment as a means and end in itself, Arendt (1970) argues violence stems from and responds to the frustration of power, and can be used to destroy a repressive power. Arendt’s point is also that in such cases violence becomes the means of overcoming impotence, an intense response to the frustration of individuals’ inherent need to be empowered: “riots in the ghettos and rebellions on the campuses make ‘people feel they are acting together in a way that they rarely can’” (1970: 83). Or in Butlerian (2011) terms, violence, through performing the destruction of power for those who have been excluded from it, structures and enables the effective release of pent up emotion.

To be driven to perform violence then, is to channel emotions that prompt expression and resolution but have no other means, no power, by which to overcome or rectify the causes of shame and discontent. Indeed, that violence is connected to shame should not be surprising. For Scheff (2006) violence is always a consequence of unacknowledged rage and shame. Any form of disrespect will produce shame, although it can be reconstructed as an ‘injustice’. However, if disempowering and disrespectful relations continue without resolution, and become cognitively repressed and framed as a flaw of
the self, it tends to produce anger and rage as a drive to overcome the issue. As Gilligan (2003) notes, feelings of impotence or inadequacy may be exercised, and perhaps even be experienced as pleasurable, through performing violence – an act which firmly establishes the superiority of one (the self) over another. Importantly, as we will see, this does not have to target those responsible.

If the available cognitive structures cannot position the experience of disrespect as an injustice, shame as a failure of the self will be the response. If this continues, it represents a potent and dangerous situation that might very well result in violence. Nevertheless, even at this point it would seem that violence can be avoided if those experiencing shame have institutionalised or organised means by which they can act to overcome shame. This may be through ‘political action’ or indeed, through other forms of collective resistance which constructs a new and positive relation to self through mutual recognition of injustice (Honneth, 1995). However, if these possibilities are lacking then the opportunities to negate this dissonance is closed off from agency. With the institutional routes are closed off, or collective resistance is not possible, then the subject is made to feel impotent and shame and anger may produce rage, prompting violent action as a means of establishing superiority.

4.6. The Police, Legitimacy, and Resistance

What we have then, is a theory of how patterned actions of individuals form what we term social structure, which is referred to as such because of the way it structures experience and action. What is required before we attempt to utilise this theoretical position to analyse acts of rioting, is to contextualise this in relation to the police, the object of violence, and to show how they are both part of, and shaped by the broader structural relations of neoliberalism. The police in this light, should be understood in Butler’s (2011) terms, as a particular organisation and concentration of power relations that not only structure experience, but function as a structure by action can be performed and emotion can be expressed.

4.6.1. The Symbolic Power of the Police
It is important to note that the police are representatives of the state and social order (Bradford, 2015: 106; Loader, 2006; 1997). This is to say that the actions of other state or societal institutions may impact on how the police are perceived. To be labelled and disrespected by a government may mean that the hostility this potentially produces become associated with the police. In turn, as Keith (1993) notes, the police are not distinct form society and its prejudices and stereotypes, but a part of it. Thus the moralising and pathologising discourses of criminality and underclass will likely shape the behaviour of the police towards those who hold such markers, as is this ‘group’ who are ‘dangerous’ and to be policed. The police then, form a particularly tangible means by which the empowered exclude and disempower.

The police, however, are not just any institution but one that holds a particular position in society, and with it unique powers. The police, as part of the state, occupy a particular location in the societal or ‘bureaucratic’ field, “laying claim to authoritative nomination and classification” of who is good or bad, in or out (Wacquant, 2004: 8). Ultimately, this positions the police in certain relations of power over others, and provides them with a particular form of cultural capital, or legitimacy, enabling them to shape the field and construct symbolic meanings about those within it.

Utilising Bourdieu’s concept of habitus but emphasising its emotional content, Loader (1997; 2006) argues the police’s legitimacy functions as a symbolic power to compel certain behaviours and operates via a set of ‘dispositions’: “inculcated through instruction, habit and routine, as power misrecognized as such, even exercised by those who are subject to it” (Loader, 1997: 3). This commitment to obey or trust is principally affective or pre-reflexive; trust cannot be based on rationality alone as by definition to ‘trust’ is to act without enough knowledge to know the outcome (Barbalet, 2001).

In turn, this trust in the police allows them to say something, to symbolically represent people and their status and position, through their actions (Bradford, 2015: 105-6 & 111). It is because of the police’s position in relation to feelings of security that the police have the power (although not
uncontested) to judge and define for the dominant society what is “normality/deviance, inclusion/exclusion, us/them” (Loader, 2006: 210; also see Bradford, 2015: 111). For instance, when making an arrest, observers who trust in the police may see the arrestee as a potential threat to their security or simply as ‘criminal’, and the individual being arrested may recognise this judgement of them and feel ‘disrespected’ and ashamed.

Here then is the first important implication of the police’s symbolic capital: the police hold the ability to label and ‘disrespect’ people and to produce ‘affective sensations’ (shame or feelings of inadequacy) that make it possible for an individual to realise that recognition is being withheld from them (Honneth, 1995: 136; Bradford, 2015: 107). In other words, through society’s imagined judgement, the police hold the symbolic power to criminalise, or promote shame, and to contribute to the exclusion of individuals from legitimated capitals through which a positive sense of self can be produced. This may produce shame and perhaps anger, but it also produces the possibility that, over time, some may come to reject the police and society’s ability to judge them as a means of avoiding these negative emotions.

To put it simply, if trust, obedience, and legitimacy can be generated, so can mistrust, disobedience, and opposition. The point Bradford (2015: 107) makes is that if an individual perceives they have been targeted based on who they are, or treated substantially differently because of who they are, they will question the neutrality of the police, whether they are accorded the rights of group membership, and whether the police are actually there to protect them. Fair treatment by the police is connected to trust and legitimacy, and consequently, compliance with the law, while unfair treatment can result in cynicism towards the law, a lack of cooperation with police, and even resentment through the police’s actions being understood as an injustice (Bradford, 2015: 109).

As Honneth (1995: 163) argues, such resistance will take different forms (e.g. political, symbolic, violent) depending on how this experience take form through power relations, and what forms of action they find plausible or acceptable. Consequently it may take the form of a normative rejection of that
society, its rules and representatives, and even a violent opposition to those that are seen to deny recognition as a means to negate or overcome feelings of shame and inadequacy (Gilligan, 2003: 1150; Palshikar, 2005: 5431; Scheff, 2006).

Indeed, through these interactions a form of social identity may emerge which takes as its uniting premise opposition to the police. Stott and Reicher (1998b) detail the way in which hostile interactions between England fans and Italian police resulted in a symbolic understanding of the police as illegitimate and a threat. Consequently, England fans who had not previously intended violence, began to unite in opposition to the police as an unjustified aggressor. Yet this is not the end of the implications, because there also exists the possibility to shape dispositions towards the police through constructing them as a violent threat and oppressor.

4.6.2. The Police and the Monopoly of Force

In addition to the normative role of the police, the state’s monopoly on force, in part enacted through the police, creates the position in which they “stand simultaneously as a guarantor of, and threat to, citizen security”, and which one occurs may depend on who it is that is being policed (Loader, 2006: 208; Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 440). In other words, the police’s position and organisational structure provides them with a form of social capital through which they can bring to bear superior force, for instance through powers of arrest or stop and search.

Firstly, this creates the possibility to deny individuals the autonomy of their body potentially producing shame and a loss of trust in oneself to be capable of action (Honneth, 1995: 132-3). In turn, this produces an affective drive through anger, to re-establish a positive sense-of-self. Furthermore, if a rejection of the legitimacy of norms or law exists amongst a body or class of people, this shifts the understanding of the police from a legitimate actor that provides protection, to an oppressive force which functions as a threat to security. Once this occurs policing may be perceived as hostile action, as the issue becomes one of policing without consent: “Any police action, sensitive or senseless, [becomes] likely to be opposed” (Keith, 1993: 125; also see

Taking this argument further, rather than protectors the police may come to occupy a position that is understood more like an occupational power, enforcing rules that are not believed in over a subjected population (Bradford, 2015: 111-2; Hall et al., 1980: 329-30). Once these oppressive power relations are in operation and generating shame and anger, the possibility to perform their reversal and generate self-worth exists. When considered in this light, the police’s powers of arrest or stop and search can play an important role in shaping them as a valid target of violence.

Here specifically we see the possibility that the police, as a symbolic meaning and an object of action, become something that might be worth attacking. By performing violence against the police, the possibility exists to overturn everyday oppressive power relations and exercise the sense of impotence and inadequacy generated through these power relations. The proof, however, is in the pudding. Next, we need an approach that can incorporate this nuanced understanding, into an analysis of riot actions.

4.7. Conclusion

The two positions of the neoliberal politicians and left wing commentators could be seen as the two extremes in the game of legitimation: the simplistic, free individual on one side, and the structurally determined individual on the other. Of course, the majority of explanations do not fall into these traps but there is a tendency to emphasise one or the other, and this is arguably due a lack of theorisation of the mechanisms that connect structure and agency.

A further problem was the notion of the ‘riots’, as seen in Keith’s (1993) analysis. The danger in this concept is that it de-emphasises the emergence of rioting from the everyday society. Theories of riots, through the focus on the ‘event’ neglect relevant relations that the theory of affective resistance reveals. This was, in part, because explanations and theories leave a ‘gap’ between agency and structure. The point was made that rather than a ‘riot’ we should look at the events as social actions much like any other, the only core difference being that these actions did not reproduce the social order and
norms, but transgressed them.

In order to bridge this gap we began with Bourdieu who enabled us to think about the relation between structure and agency. The position was developed through Bourdieu’s notion of ‘capital’, that the structure, or ‘objective field’, is constituted by the actions of those who accept and participate in forms of capital. Thus structure presents itself to the individual as a force through the interactions they have with others, for instance, the repeated and patterned experience of discrimination. Bourdieu thus provides the core idea as to how structure comes to be, and in turn shapes agency and action at the pre-reflexive level, or what Chambers & Carver (2008: 45) called agency’s ‘necessary scene’.

Despite these useful theorisations, it was noted that Bourdieu’s work held a certain rigidity that edged close to determinism, and which left little room for resistance to dominant forms of capital. By focusing on affect we could remove the rigidity of Bourdieu’s theorisation. In particular, the nexus of self-esteem and shame was argued as the mechanism by which society’s values and ideals could take hold, or be rejected in agency. In other words, this provides the key to the generation of resistance.

Honneth’s (1996) theorisation of ‘disrespect’ was particularly useful here, as it not only framed the modalities through which a society might directly and indirectly produce shame in individuals (e.g. labelling and forms of exclusion), Honneth forwarded that shame was the affective drive behind social resistance. In other words, the aversive response, the desire to re-establish a positive sense of self, prompts resistance to the acts of disrespect.

This form of shame relates to a feeling of inadequacy, however, shame can also connect with disempowerment. Here, to lose the confidence that one can act effectively in world can produce a particular potent form of shame. This may happen physically, such as acts of violence against the self which perform the victims inadequacy. In turn, Butler’s (2011) notion of ‘performativity’ developed the understanding of action as the performance with and through power relations; resistance utilises the very power relations that generate disrespect, to express emotion and perform identity.
Finally, we looked at neoliberalism and its underpinning logic of individualism and the impact of these upon the form that resistance takes. The logic of individualism removes structure from consideration. However, this is also an operational logic in society, which, rather than simply making people selfish as is sometimes assumed, encourages shame as structural causes of social failures are not acknowledged, making it more likely to be internalised as a flaw of the individual.

In turn, mechanisms that can overcome the sense of shame are also diminished or removed as the dominant modes of perception and cognition neglect causes outside of the individual. The possibility of performing resistance to disrespect is diminished as the individual is disempowered ontologically. Without understanding of the power relations that cause disrespect, how can one seek to re-articulate them? Thus, race or class are not only the modalities through which structural exclusion manifests, but the forms of identity that reference structural inequality and can be utilised to diminish feelings of shame, to organise action, and to resist modalities of disrespect.

Without such types of categories shame is lodged deeper, internalised as the self is felt as inadequate or inferior. In turn, political modes of resistance are lost as it is the self that requires changing, not society. The problem here, it was argued, is that violence often becomes a means to express and overcome feelings of shame particularly when related to disempowerment. A violent act firmly establishes the superiority of the victor, and the impotence of the victim.

With the theory of action and resistance set out, the next task was to specify and connect this to the police as an actor in a particular social position connected to the state. Thus shame and anger generated by other representatives of the state may spill over into relations with the police, and visa versa. Moreover, the police’s position in society enables them to label and condemn members of society as in or out, citizen or criminal. This role enables them to reproduce society’s stereotypes and to disrespect individuals, producing shame. The police’s monopoly of force provided by the state
structure, also enables the police to physically remove agency from individuals through their powers of arrest or stop and search. Thus, the police have the potential to operate as a potent means of disrespect, particularly to excluded groups. Indeed, such may be their impact that they generate processes of positive identification through performances that overturn these relations.

5.1. Introduction

When large amounts of people engage in violence directed at society’s proclaimed peacekeepers, it is a sign that something is wrong within the social order. Indeed, if large amounts of people engage in any form of behaviour whereby the rules that define that social order are transgressed, this is a sign that the order is failing to reproduce its conditions of existence. In other words, the violence is the moment where the skin of that social order ruptures, and the pressure building is released. In this light, it becomes important not to explain the rioting per se, but rather to understand the rioting as part of a social process. What the forms of action within a riot offer are a means to investigate this underlying problem. Moreover, where we see similar types of action occurring within riots elsewhere, these can function as informative and offer a comparative aspect.

With this in mind, this chapter begins to explore violence against the police during rioting, emerging in the 1970s, escalating dramatically in the 1980s and, although reducing in the intervening periods, occurring again in 2011. The 1980s was a period marked by social and economic turmoil in Britain, and not least by the regular outbreak of violent clashes between the police and the public. However, in popular narrative the 1980s have been framed as ‘race riots’, while as we have seen 2011 was framed as driven by ‘criminality’. Consequently, these two symptoms are positioned as distinct and unrelated events. Indeed, in an act that neatly distanced the rioters in 2011 from the clearer cause of injustice, such as in the 1980s, Cameron (2011) stated: “These riots were not about race”.

However, it is important to understand that the events of 2011 are not distinct from the riots of the 1980s. The difference in how they are framed should not be taken as defining. While the narrative of ‘race riots’ won out in the 1980s, the very same discourse of ‘criminality’ was used as politicians and media attempted to delegitimise rioters complaints. This is not to say the riots are
identical or the same phenomenon, but rather, that if we go underneath the narratives of ‘race riots’ and ‘criminality’ and avoid singular notions of ‘the riot’, what we find is these acts of violence against the police, separated by three decades, are connected to the same, but shifting, historical processes of disrespect and disempowerment.

We begin with a descriptive accounts of the rioting. The aim here is simply to provide the reader with an overview and to draw out some parallels and differences, setting up the analytical discussion. This begins with an examination of the events that triggered the rioting, as these tend to constitute symbolic instances of the underlying discontent, and thus, point towards the failure of the social order. The parallels in the role and the understanding of the police are discussed, before the chapter then seeks to complicate the narratives and understandings of the rioting in the 1980s and 2011, noting how neither fits easily into the categories of ‘race riot’ and ‘criminality’ imposed.

We will also examine similarities and differences between participants. The key purpose here is to complicate the understandings of the involvement of ‘race’. The problem is that in 2011 race was successfully dismissed as causally irrelevant in contrast to the 1980s. Yet the data does not support this. What is required is a more nuanced understanding incorporating structural and identity based notions of race, and avoids reifying racism as a thing in itself, rather than as a modality of social and economic exclusion.

5.2. The Emergence of Anti-Police Rioting: 1970 to 1985

Prior to the 1970s, rioting tended to take the form of inter-ethnic, or racially motivated clashes between civilian groups.\(^\text{11}\) Waddington (1992: 74) notes that after this point instances of collective violence take the form of clashes between black youth and the police. This posits a shift or change in the context that shapes the manner in which disorder emerges, and who

\(^{11}\) For instance, the Notting Hill riots of 1958 constituted racist attacks on the Caribbean population, which emerged from the context of the socially and economically excluded white population competing for limited resources in employment, housing etc. with a relatively recent influx of Caribbean immigrants forced to live in the same impoverished areas. Racist perceptions and logics located blame for the white populations suffering on the ‘underserving’ immigrants (Pilkington, 1988).
constitute the actors.

However, this perhaps overstates the change as in 1981 the Southall riots were started by racist skinheads who attacked Asian residents, which then escalated into violence between Asian youth, skinheads, and police (Ball, 2012: 29; Keith, 1993: 61-2; Lea & Young, 1982: 17-8). Nevertheless, there was a paradigmatic shift in which the police went from intervening in racially motivated inter-ethnic clashes, to becoming the primary targets of collective acts of violence.

Although violent confrontations were relatively commonplace between police and black youth, perhaps the most notable early occurrences were in the 1976 and 1977 Notting Hill Carnivals. While initially set up to promote understanding between Caribbean immigrants and the white population, by the 1970s the carnival had become symbolic of ‘blue verses black’ confrontation (Keith, 1993: 124). During the clashes with police the crowd chanted anti-apartheid slogans connected to black resistance against the white establishment in South Africa (Gilroy, 2013: 552; Keith, 1993: 124; Waddington, 1992: 74).

Yet relatively speaking, these events failed to garner much attention. It would be the 1980s that would explosively bring these types of events to public attention, and would see the frequent emergence of clashes between predominantly black youth and police all across the country. However, despite the media furore, while some clashes were labelled as riots, other, generally smaller scale encounters were often neglected (Ball, 2012; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992).

The first of these riots erupted in Bristol in 1980 on the 2nd of April in St. Paul’s, an inner city area with a significant ethnic minority population, and took the form of clashes between youth, largely black, and police and some looting and/or vandalism of shops. Initial clashes occurred after a police raid on a cafe resulting in officers being attacked with stones, police cars vandalised, one set on fire, and a police van overturned (Ball, 2012: 290-7). Although numbers of participants are not clear, the initial confrontation would swell the crowd, with estimates given of ‘thousands’ (ibid). The police would ultimately
be forced to withdraw from St. Paul’s, which would then see selective vandalism and looting and four buildings would be set on fire. These were the bank, post office, unemployment office, and a rent office, popularly viewed as external or oppressive of the community (Reicher & Stott, 2011; Ball, 2012: 396-7).

The violence would be popularly understood as the ‘St. Paul’s Riots’, however, this neglected the fact that violent clashes with police also emerged in other areas of the city, not least the largely white estates of Southmead on the 3rd and 4th, and in Knowle West on the 4th and 5th of April, which were dismissed as ‘copy cat riots’ (Ball, 2012: 26-7). While the clashes in Bristol, or St. Paul’s at least, seem to have garnered more attention than those at the Notting Hill Carnival, immediate interpretations by police and media dismissed the disorder in Bristol as a ‘one-off’ (Ball, 2012: 30). However, this was not to be; in the following year riots erupted in Brixton, south London, another area with a significant ethnic minority population.

The initial clash in Brixton came when police apprehended a young, black male who was running through the streets (Waddington, 1992: 81-3). The young man had been stabbed, which led to a crowd gathering who interpreted the situation as another incident of police brutality. Despite this developing into a clash between police and around 100 members of the public, the disorder did not continue beyond this immediate situation; however, a decision was made by the police to continue to implement a planned stop and search operation ‘Swamp 81’. The next day another stop and search again drew crowd, which would escalate into three days of violence, resulting in 415 police officers injured, 122 police vehicles, and 145 buildings damaged (Ball, 2012: 27-8).

Keith (1993: 101) notes the differences between the different days of rioting in Brixton 1981. The first day of rioting consisted exclusively of conflict between a black group and the police; on the second day the disturbance went on for longer, was more varied in the types of participant, and included arson and looting; the third day there was again both looting and attacks on police but less extensive due to the large police presence. Indeed, similar to St Paul’s,
rioting often targeted businesses that were perceived to be hostile or to exploit black people (Waddington, 1992: 87).

Brixton would also see rioting again in 1981 on the 10\textsuperscript{th} and 15\textsuperscript{th} of July which occurred after the emergence of other riots around London. While again, these saw violence targeting police, Keith (1993: 152) argues the difference between the April and July riots is that the earlier involved, in the main, locally based individuals. In July the conflict between the police and public seems to have involved a broader section of the black community than in April. Moreover, large numbers of people appear to have arrived from outside the area to have joined the rioting and, in particular, looting.

Brixton was obviously not the only place to experience rioting in 1981, with rioting occurring in 16 of London’s boroughs, largely involving attacks on the police or their property, but also accounts of looting and vandalism (Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992). Not least among the areas which saw rioting were the boroughs of Hackney and Haringey, which were both were in the top nine boroughs for arrests (Keith, 1993: 55-6). While both these riots were underreported and lack data, Keith manages to draw a picture of events in Hackney, while one journalist Harrison (1992) was also present for some of the rioting.

Events in Hackney were preceded by increased tension after earlier riots in Southall, West London, and only a 2-3 miles away in Haringey, Wood Green and Finsbury Park, where large groups of young men smashed up ‘stalls’ and ‘mugged’ people (Harrison, 1992: 347). The 8\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th} of July saw isolated incidents where two police cars were stoned, before on the 10\textsuperscript{th}, the principle day of the rioting in Hackney, a jewellery store was broken into (Harrison, 1992; Keith, 1993: 150). However trouble did not spread beyond these isolated incidents until the police closed down a café, which Keith describes as a ‘social focus’ of the surrounding black community (ibid).

The gathering crowds displayed resentment of the police’s action, and around a couple of hours after the café had been closed a petrol bomb was thrown at police and an Argos showroom, and running battles ensued between the police and crowds of principally young black men (Harrison, 1992; Keith,
1993: 151-2). Police charged but were initially pushed back, before managing to take control of the area of Sandringham Road and disperse rioters. However, after initial clashes with police, the disorder would spread and Harrison witnessed looting by both white and black young men.

Neither was rioting confined to London, with other cities in 1981 seeing collective violence including Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Derby, Leicester, Nottingham, and Leeds (Bagguley & Hussein, 2008; Ball, 2012: 30; Lea & Young, 1982; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Waddington, 1992: 80). Although much of what went on is not recorded, Ball notes that Toxteth in Liverpool began with an arrest of black man, leading to a street confrontation with police, before escalating into four days of rioting, resulting in, among other things, 355 injured police and 244 arrests (Ball, 2012: 28-9). As the violence in Toxteth subsided, Moss side in Manchester saw rioting, most notably with an attack by over one thousand individuals on a local police station (ibid: 30).

While riots and clashes would continue to occur throughout the decade, another notable year for anti-police riots was 1985. Clashes between police and generally young, black men would again break out in Handsworth, Birmingham and Brixton and Tottenham in London (Davis, 1989; Fazakarley, 2010; Waddington, 1992). Tottenham’s riots notably broke out on Broadwater Farm estate on the 6th of October, Mark Duggan’s estate. The Broadwater Farm riots began after building tensions, but in particular, the death of a black woman in a police raid on her home and a protest march the same day to the local police station (Davis, 1989; Waddington, 1992: 91-2).

Despite some scuffles, serious violence would not break out until later that evening when police attempted to enter the estate in force. The actions would result in violence between the police and largely black, young men who had gathered on the estate, but the crowd would swell with others from outside coming to the estate to join the fight (Davis, 1989; Parry et al., 1985; Waddington, 1992). In the ensuing battle, rioters attacked and pushed police back and out of the estate, killing one officer, Keith Blakelock, who fell to the floor in the police’s retreat and was struck repeatedly with bladed instruments.
Alongside the death of PC Blakelock, in one night, fifty officers were injured, and two police were treated for gun shot wounds (Parry et al., 1985).

The 1980s (and to a lesser degree the 1990s) would continue to see similar forms of disorder, often in the same areas, and often involving confrontations between police and young black people. However, the scale would not reach that of 1981 or 1985 again until a series of riots in northern English towns in the early 2000s. However, rather than violence directed explicitly at police however, these appeared similar to the violence seen in Notting Hill in 1958 (Pilkington, 1988), and in Southall in 1981 (Ball, 2012: 29), taking on the form of racially based clashes instigated by racist far-right groups, with the ensuing violence occurring between Asian youths, white racists, and the police who were seen by both sides as partisan (Bagguley & Hussain, 2008). However, in 2011 the police would again become a focus of violence across the country.

5.2.1 2011 Riots: Looting and Police

The scale of rioting in 2011 would take mainstream society by surprise, and unlike the 1980s was framed as about the looting rather than the attacks on the police. However, while as has been argued, while looting does appear to have formed the dominant type of act, to assume it was all about consumerism is problematic.

In total, the rioting lasted five days, spread at an unprecedented speed, involved an estimated 13-15,000 rioters, resulted in over 4,000 arrests (RCVP, 2011: 11), and while initial estimates put the cost to the country at £200 million (Reuters, 2011), this soon appeared conservative, with the Metropolitan Police estimating that in London alone the riots resulted in £300 million in damages (Dodd, 2011).

As noted the rioting had begun on the 6th of August after a protest march from Broadwater Farm to a police station in Tottenham, north London. Violent clashes on Tottenham High Road would continue throughout the evening, emerging in different areas of Tottenham’s borough, Haringey, with two shopping areas being looted, and violence re-emerging on the 7th in the area on (Morrell et al., 2011THO, 2011). The realisation that the police were
struggling to control events appears to have allowed the rioting to spread as people took to the streets and organised gatherings on social media.

The 7th also saw rioting emerge in Enfield, six miles north of Tottenham. It began with small skirmishes around 7pm, before escalating, although mainly took the form of looting (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 16-7). Rioting also emerged in Brixton, south London, during a music festival. Initially it took the form of clashes with police before shops were broken into which continued for several hours. Elsewhere some minor skirmishes broke out in Oxford Circus, Hackney and Waltham Forest.

The 8th was perhaps the most intense of the five days of rioting; sustained violent clashes with police and wide-scale looting would occur all over London, with Reading the Riots (ibid) reporting 22 out of the 32 boroughs experiencing some form of rioting. The Metropolitan Police reported rioters attacking police with machetes and petrol bombs (MPS, 2012: 43 & 76). The rioting began at 5pm in Hackney, preceded by a stop and search operation and resulting in violent clashes with police and some apparent looting.12

Rioting also emerged for the first time outside of London, mainly in the Midlands, but also Liverpool, Bristol and other towns in England. The 9th of August saw more rioting outside of London, in Manchester, Bristol, Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds and others. The framing would again focus on the looting, noting the prevalence of disorder occurring in central shopping areas. However, this would underplay the fact that looting was often preceded by violent conflict with the police (Morrell et al., 2011: 4). Ultimately, rioting beyond London revealed similar scenes of clashes with police, looting and vandalism, before the police largely regained control on the 10th.

5.3. The Iconic Events: A History of ‘Duggans’

So were the riots of the 1980s and 2011 unrelated and completely different

12 Although shops were broken in to, it is unclear to what extent this occurred for the purposes of looting, or to what extent it related to gaining missiles to attack the police. As we will see in the video footage, Chapter 9, early incidents of breaking into shops appear to have been utilized to gain missiles (video 2).
events? Was one about racism and the other about consumerism or criminality? Perhaps the best place to begin to answer these questions is to examine how the rioting begins. Reicher and Stott argue for a useful way of conceptualising events that ‘trigger’ rioting: that in the emergence of rioting, a common feeling – sometimes focused on a particular actor or institution – enables individuals to unite, which is often brought to the fore through an ‘iconic’ event (2011: 28%; RCVP, 2011: 42).

They use the term ‘iconic’ because rather than simply ‘triggering’ the rioting, these types of event are symbolic and connect that moment to a common underlying discontent. The event spreads its tendrils outwards, connecting to memories of both personal experiences and historical accounts of disrespect and unexpressed anger, which enable individuals to identify with each other through a common discontent.

The context from which the rioting emerged in 2011 - a protest against the police’s behaviour in causing and responding to the death of a black man\textsuperscript{13} - is informative not just in reference to the immediate moment, but because it reveals a connection to a history of mistreatment and deaths of black people during interactions with the police, and that have been largely ignored, or situated as largely only relevant to disorder in Tottenham (e.g. RCVP, 2011).

It was this broader historical context of mistrust and expectations of abuse form the police that shaped the immediate interpretation of events by people from Tottenham as police lying over for what some were seeing as an ‘execution’ (IPCC, 2011; Israel, 2011). Contradicting what could be seen as the RCVP’s (2011) comforting claim for the dominant political order and police, this interpretation also existed beyond Tottenham (Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011), and moreover, did not appear to alter with time.

Maria - a young mixed race woman from Hackney I interviewed in 2015 - explicitly connected the shooting of Duggan, mistreatment by police, and the riots: “So I think that whole thing was retaliation to police over like what they

\textsuperscript{13} Duggan was actually a mixed race man with a white mother and black father, but it was popularly interpreted, both in the media and locally, as the death of a ‘black’ man, symbolically locating the events within a context of black deaths and mistreatment at the hands of the police.
do over years, especially that they killed Mark Duggan and he didn’t have a weapon, that the case innit?” The common opinion amongst those I spoke to – that the police were in the wrong and had tried to hide their actions, in Maria’s case by planting/lying about a gun – reveals the broader context with which actions of the police have come to means something particular to black communities. This perception was grounded partly in the views that the police had done this before ‘over years’, were often discriminatory, and this time was no different.

The incident surrounding Mark Duggan’s death was often seen as symbolic of rioters’ own experiences, and connected with a narrative of police illegitimacy and brutality (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 18; Morrell et al., 2011: 5). Indeed, as the video footage will reveal, violence emerged on the 8th of August in Hackney in response to a police operation beginning with stop and searches, before attempting to forcefully close down the main high street in the area.

A brief look back at the 1980s reveals that similarities between the type of anti-police action that “encapsulate[d] all that leads people to become disaffected, [and] angry” (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 38%). In other words, the events that precipitated riots were interpreted as extreme actions, but representative of, and located within a broader context of discrimination and mistreatment by the police.

In 1981, riots in Moss Side (Manchester), Toxteth (Liverpool) and Handsworth (Birmingham) were all preceded by stop and search operations targeting the local population, generally young black men (Waddington, 2003: 90). In 1985 Toxteth would see rioting again after a protest over the arrest of four black men, and Handsworth after a dispute over a parking ticket between police and a black man (Ball, 2012; Fazakarley, 2010; Waddington, 1992).

Brixton’s first riots in April 1981 began after a police officer stopped a young black man who had been stabbed and was running through the streets, the interpretation of the on-looking public was that the police were trying to kill him (Waddington, 1992: 81-3). The following day disorder erupted again following ‘Swamp 81’, a stop and search campaign that predominantly targeted black individuals (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 245; Keith, 1993: 152; Phillips & Bowling,
Stop and search, at the time colloquially known as ‘sus’ laws,\(^{14}\) had for a long time been used to harass minorities, particularly, although not exclusively, young black men (Ball, 2012; Bradford, 2015; Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Keith, 1993; Lea & Young, 1982; Waddington, 1992).

Amongst the communities that saw rioting in the 1980s, a relatively frequent response to police operations and in particular stop and search, was crowds of people gathering, questioning, and resisting the police’s actions (Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992). Ultimately, such actions suggest that the police are neither trusted nor viewed as legitimate, and thus are challenged often resulting in violence. Brixton’s second riots in July 1981 came after an aggressive raid on a number of houses by police in an area known as a ‘frontline’ between police and the black community; the raids would cause damage, finding nothing, and were seen as ‘revenge’ by police for the earlier riots (Ball, 2012: 170-1; Keith, 1993: 131).

Bristol’s rioting in the previous year began in the context of a police raid on a cafe in St. Paul’s, another ‘frontline’, with the aim of finding alcohol and cannabis on the premises (Ball, 2012: 285-8; Reicher & Stott, 2011). The cafe had a history of police raids and in 1979 had lost its liquor licence, which was popularly viewed as an act of police racism. Ball (ibid) notes that the police came in force for what was a small cafe, acted aggressively to customers who had done nothing wrong, and arrested the owner and one man found with alcohol. Ultimately perceiving the incident as a police ‘robbery’ and another injustice, the crowd intervened (ibid).

The rioting in Hackney in 1981 was preceded by a number of incidents of minor disorder, indicating raised tensions; however, again the iconic event would also be a police raid on a café, which Keith describes as a ‘social focus’ of the surrounding black community (ibid: 151-2). This was another area that had been a focus of confrontation between the police and the black community, and once again, this event was perceived as another example of

\(^{14}\) ‘Sus’ refers to suspicion, as the power allowed the police to stop, search, and even arrest based on their suspicions.
the police injustice. However, in light of the regular emergence of rioting, often left underreported, what is also worth noting is that, as Keith (1993: 70) argues, the riots of 1980s were neither novel nor fundamentally different to the ‘everyday’ experiences on streets of London.

Rather what some of these occurrences did represent was both a quantitative and qualitative increase in the scale and seriousness of violence and vandalism. During his research Keith found that it was not uncommon for police to be confronted by hostile crowds, largely black, sometimes being attacked and losing the arrested parties to the crowd, (ibid: 145). These would often result in clashes but escalation was facilitated by a moment that appeared symbolically important, and enabled a group of people to gather and unite.

Waddington (1992: 80) notes that many instances of disorder involving violence against the police were under-reported, particularly between 1982-4. Similarly, Ball (2012) notes that throughout July 1981 there were around 200 instances of disorder across the country, only a few of these would become large enough to be labelled ‘riots’. In other words, despite the apparent sudden appearance of large-scale disorder, ‘riots’ were not aberrations or truly unexpected to anyone paying attention to what was occurring in the everyday.

Indeed, it is not surprising then that the death of black individual resulting from interactions with police often formed the ‘iconic event’. Such an event would clearly constitute the most extreme outcome of interactions between black individuals and the police, and would also function as the most extreme instance of disrespect – that black people’s lives are without value. Thus, Brixton was to see rioting again in 1985 after the shooting and paralysation of a black woman, Cherry Groce, during a police raid on her home in search of her son (BBC, 2014; ICI, 1989: 222), and again in 1995 after the death of black man in police custody (NYT, 1995).

The Brixton riots in 1985 were followed closely by disorder at Broadwater Farm in Haringey. One week prior to the violence at Broadwater Farm police had positioned themselves at the main entrance to the estate and conducted
a stop and search operation on people entering. This seemingly served to raise tensions and antagonise local residents, with complaints relating to the arbitrary nature and abusive treatment by police (Davis, 1989). However, the iconic event was again the death of a black person, Cynthia Jarrett, when police raided her house ( BBC, 2014; Moxon, 2011; Waddington, 2003: 91-2). 

The raid had come after police had arrested her son for assaulting a police officer after a stop for an out-of-date tax disk. Not only were the charges of assault not believed, but it was widely believed that police had illegally entered his mother’s flat, using his keys and without a warrant, and pushed her to the floor. The police claimed Cynthia Jarrett died of heart failure, nevertheless, it was another death of a black person at the hands of the police and would prompt a hostile response by the community (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 38%; Waddington, 2003: 91-2).

5.3.1. Beyond the Iconic Event

As we have seen, Duggan’s death was framed by politicians and one major report (RCVP, 2011) as largely irrelevant to the rioting outside of Tottenham, and thus utilised to argue that the police’s behaviour was not causally involved – instead it was about looting and greed. Other than the rather obvious political motive of diminishing the state and police’s role, this narrative is made possible by the amount of looting and by the admittance of some rioters that they did not care or know about Duggan (e.g. Slovo, 2012: 29; Treadwell et al., 2013: 5).

However, to make such an argument not only homogenises all rioters, it neglects evidence to the contrary; for instance, while some rioters appear not to have cared or thought about Duggan, this was not the same for all rioters. Duggan was often referenced around London and to a lesser extent outside London; moreover, discontent with police behaviour appears to have remained a relative constant (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 18; Morrell et al., 2011: 5 & 27). As Morrell et al. (2011: 5) point out, although Duggan is mentioned less outside of London, police behaviour remained a relative constant reference point.
Such events and the response to them highlight the interpretive framework through which the police are viewed. This interpretive framework tells us about how the perception of the police has been shaped at the pre-reflexive and affective level. In turn, this connects to the experiences of the individuals and the context that made these events meaningful. In other words, we see that black communities particularly, but not alone, perceive any police actions, legitimate or not, with suspicion and often respond as if that action was an aggressive or hostile act.

Maria, like any of us, cannot know if police actually planted the gun, but she believed they did. The community of Tottenham, or beyond cannot know if the police murdered Mark Duggan, but many appear to have believed they did. The death of Cynthia Jarrett perhaps could have been pure coincidence, but residents of Broadwater Farm did not believe it so. Indeed, perhaps most telling is the young black man who had been stabbed in Brixton, 1981. Upon realising the man had been stabbed the police had tried to get him to a hospital; however, not trusting the police, the wounded man had tried to get away and the gathering onlookers made the assumption that the police were trying to kill him (Waddington, 1992: 81-3). In both the 1980s and 2011 then, the object of the police was prompting hostile affective responses prior to, and shaping, reflection or interpretation.

5.4. The ‘Nature’ of the Riots: 1980 to 2011

5.4.1. Looting and Criminality?

While the 1980s were framed as about ‘race’ and thus ‘political’, 2011 would become the ‘consumer riot’ of greedy criminals (Cameron, 2011; Clarke, 2011; RCVP, 2011). Rather than fundamentally different however, these were simply different outcomes of the contest between those voicing discontent and those seeking to maintain the status quo. Indeed, despite the lack of comprehensive coverage, there is evidence indicating that a not insignificant amount of looting occurred in the 1980s riots (Fazakarley, 2010; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992). This is not to argue against the important role of racism in
the 1980s, but rather to point to the complexity of riots that is concealed by
the narrative clarity and political contest that occurs after the events.

The 1980s saw similar attempts to frame events as about criminal behaviour,
with politicians and media repeatedly seeking to frame rioting throughout as
about black communities’ ‘criminality’, ‘greed’, and even their biological
inferiority and cultural incompatibility (Ball, 2012: 32-3; Fazakarley, 2010;
Jackson, 2003: 146; Nassy Brown, 2005: 63; Scraton, 1982: 34). Indeed,
despite what would now be considered the blatant institutional racism of
police and the state in the 1980s, Thatcher, in strikingly similar terms to
Cameron’s response to 30 years later, stated the disorder was simply a ‘spree
of naked greed’ and ‘criminal violence’ (quoted in Jackson, 2003: 146).\footnote{15}

Despite these discursive attempts, it appears that this narrative did not stick in
the long term. This is likely due to the iconic events that provoked riots, the
continuous involvement of black individuals, an increasing rejection of racism,
attacks on the police appearing to form the vast majority of riot actions as
opposed to looting, and accounts from rioters, witnesses, reports, and
academic research all implicating issues of police discrimination, racism, and
depprivation (e.g. Ball, 2012; Davis, 1989; ICI, 1989; Harrison, 1999; Keith,
1993; Lea & Young, 1982; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Scarman, 1982; Thomas,

Despite the similarity in terms of iconic event in 2011, the response was again
that the riots were about looting, greed, and criminality (Cameron, 2011;
Clarke, 2011; RCVP, 2011), and this time it stuck. In comparison with the
1980s, this claim was at least better supported by data demonstrating the
greater amount of looting that occurred in 2011, with 51% of recorded crimes
being recorded against commercial premises in the 2011 riots (THO,
2011:13). Firstly, however, we must be careful not to assume that looting is
simply about the acquisition of goods, but is also a social act with meaning
(Platts-Fowler, 2013). For Ray (2014) looting in 2011 functioned as a form of
symbolic resistance, a display that rejects the law and authority that excludes

\footnote{15} Thatcher’s Home Secretary would also state the rioting in Handsworth in 1985 were
instances of ‘criminality’ (Fazakarley, 2010).
them.

Moreover, similar to Bristol in 1980, Reicher and Stott (2011: 64%) note that in Ealing, West London, in 2011, shops, boutiques, and cars considered external or oppressive of the local community were smashed but not looted. Indeed, while looting appears to have been the dominant type of act in 2011, it should be noted that the police’s categorisation of recorded crimes which is used to quantify the amount of looting, also includes ‘damage to premises’ (THO, 2011: 13). That damage was done to commercial premises does not actually necessitate ‘looting’, but might also indicate forms of vandalism and thus potentially relate to anger at, or alienation from dominant society. The point here is firstly that once we begin to look beneath the surface, the picture is much more complicated than the initial narratives we are offered.

5.4.2 Anti-Police Riots?

The riots of the 1980s have been popularly framed as anti-police violence carried out by black communities while the smaller amounts of looting that occurred were pushed to the background; 2011, however, has reversed this neglect, and it is the attacks on police that have been pushed to the back of the picture.\textsuperscript{16} As with the looting, the minor role of attacks on police appears to be supported by official statistics for 2011, which posit that the targeting of police or their property constituted just 6% of recorded crime during the riots (THO, 2011: 4). However, this figure is arguably even more problematic than that which is used to imply looting. How attacks on the police or property were recorded, and what exactly constituted this category of act, is problematically not detailed.

For instance, is it the case that crowds hurling missiles are recorded as a single crime, multiple crimes, or at all? Were the police recording each incident of an individual throwing a missile at them? Or each time an individual attacked them but was not arrested? Moreover, were attacks on

\textsuperscript{16} Generally, those who took this position only accepted the role of anger against the in Tottenham (Cameron, 2011; RCVP, 2011). This argument seems to imply in Tottenham was ‘justified’ by Duggan’s death - for to say otherwise might be too politically damaging - whereas elsewhere there can be no possible reason for attacking the police other than immorality of rioters.
police stations or vehicles by large groups recorded as a single crime? Or what about attacks on police vehicles by crowds as they were driving? It would seem unlikely that the police, under attack and under resourced, could accurately quantify or record these as crimes.

Furthermore, the only partially useful figure with regards to prosecutions in 2011, which might be more informative regarding the number of participants, is that of ‘violent disorder’ (an act involving 3 or more individuals), which applied to 18% of all those sentenced (MoJ(a), 2012: 6). While it may indicate a greater involvement of violence, unfortunately this is not broken down by target thus we do not know to what extent this occurred against the police, and who or how many were involved. Consequently, the official statistics provides us with very little useful information about violence against police, where it happened, or who committed such acts.

However, if we take other forms of data the attacks on the police in 2011 seem to take a more prominent role. Of the three major reports, two identified police-relations as important and relevant beyond Tottenham (Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011: 4-5). Specifically, Reading the Riots reports that 85% of their 270 interviewees rated the police as an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ factor in why the riots occurred, identifying feelings of injustice and discrimination (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 18).

Newburn et al(a). (2016: 7) who worked on the Reading the Riots study state the ‘overwhelming’ finding in 2011 was a sense of anger towards the police. The report also found that many people around the country referring to the police as the ‘biggest gang’, emphasising that many thought the police to be a ‘law unto themselves’ (ibid). By comparing their results to the British Crime Survey the study found that nationally 56% of respondents stated that the police were doing a good job compared to 7% of rioters interviewed (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 20). In particular, ‘stop and search’ was particularly emphasised by many as a source of discontent (ibid: 19-20).

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17 No figures regarding arrests for ‘attacks on the police’ were available.
18 I made an FOI request to the Ministry of Justice regarding this breakdown, but was refused on the grounds that it would exceed the apportioned cost due to gathering and collating information from different organisations/forces.
Moreover, a brief examination of anecdotal evidence also indicates a similar picture: the Metropolitan Police reported wide-scale violence and the use of weapons and petrol bombs against them, along with 217 injuries to officers (MPS, 2012; RCVP, 2011: 26).\(^\text{19}\) Indeed, as in the 1980s, 2011 saw multiple instances of rioters specifically targeting police stations and property (e.g. Carter(a); 2011; Carter(c), 2011; Prasad(c), 2011), and descriptive accounts from police concur, with one inspector stating: “I’ve not seen violence on that scale, or that much hatred for the uniform.” (Slovo, 2012: 24).\(^\text{20}\)

Utilising a situational analysis of video footage in 2011, seeking to identify locations and the different types of actions in riot footage, Reicher and Stott (2011: 64-5\%) argue that the extent of clashes with the police varied by area, but was present in many. This violence, they argue, was about displaying power as an end in itself, indicated by signs of pleasure amongst the rioters (ibid: 58\%). Other rioters corroborate this sentiment. In a news-television interview (on YouTube) during the riots, one young, male rioter from Manchester (covering his face) stated:

[I’m here] to piss the police off, you get me [...] The police nicking [arresting] for stupid things mate, and this is our payback cos they can’t do nothing to us today. (Manchester riot, 2011, 0.57).

Similarly:

They [the police] mostly aggravate teenagers these days, and they'll stop you for no reason, and they'll rough you up [laughs], just rough you up for no particular reason. People were screaming out: ‘This is for Mark [Duggan].’ (male, Tottenham, Carter(f), 2011)

These remarks parallel complaints made throughout the 1980s (Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Harrison, 1992; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992). Indeed, Sheldon Thomas, a black man who rioted in Brixton 1981 and now works to

\(^{19}\) While this figure is much smaller than the injuries to the police in the 1980s, with Brixton’s first riot in 1981 alone nearly doubling this figure (Ball, 2012: 27-8), this is not necessarily meaningful due to 30 years of improvement in police tactics and equipment, meaning the likelihood of injury is reduced.

\(^{20}\) For similar accounts from officers noting the hostility and violence they faced see MPS, 2012.
get young men out of gangs and crime, described his experience: “When the first of our bricks hit the meat wagon (the police van), that was it [...] This was going to be our night, this was payback for years of systematic bullying and exploitation” (black male, Thomas, 2012: 120). These rioters clearly express anger in relation to the police and their treatment of them, and, in part, their purpose seems to have been to get ‘payback’. Indeed, in both periods it is the opposition to the police that enabled rioters to come together: “You can have an anti-police riot without systematic looting, but you can’t have systematic looting without an anti-police riot.” (Reicher and Stott. 2011: 73%)

5.4.3. The Meaning of the Police: Babylon and Gangs

We can begin to better understand this opposition to the police, and provide further evidence for the central role of police, by examining each period’s common and derogatory terms for the police. In the 1980s the police were often referred to as ‘Babylon’ in black communities (e.g. Harrison, 1992: 359; Thomas, 2012). The term derived from Rastafarianism, a political/religious movement that saw repatriation to Ethiopia as the solution to Western discrimination and the powerlessness visited upon black communities (Gates Jr, 1976: 310).

The meaning comes from the Old Testament and connects to a powerful, oppressive force (the state or city of Babylon) and references injustice or enslavement visited upon a people, against which they should struggle. While the term Babylon is still employed today, or has re-emerged in London slang, this was not the term commonly employed in 2011 and appears to be disconnected from its politico-religious origins. However, the term that was commonly employed – the ‘biggest gang’ (Clifton(b), 2011; Guardian & LSE, 2011: 18; RCVP, 2011: 67) – has a similar meaning.

Newburn et al. describe the emotional and cognitive underpinnings of the ‘biggest gang’ as being “profoundly distrustful of the police, often viewed the police service monolithically as a single, hostile force” (Newburn et al.(b), 2016: 15). One rioter stated that a gang meant those who ‘intimidated’ the public, and according to him the police were the ‘worst gang’ (Guardian &
The similarity is straightforward: both the ‘biggest gang’ and ‘Babylon’ position the police as a dominant, oppressive force, and it is this position and the treatment this implies that constituted a focal point of struggle and for the release of their anger. However, the difference is also telling; while Babylon connects both to the experiences an ideology of resistance emerging from black communities, the biggest gang retains the emphasis on domination but lacks any reference to the experiences of an ‘us’ and instead references a criminal structure – the police are simply the most powerful and resented.

5.4.2. Social Identity and the Common Enemy

As these terms begin to suggest, the police were not simply a target but actually played a central role in producing the rioting through a common opposition: “the genesis of conflict derives from the relationship between the identities (and the associated understandings) of different groups” (Stott & Reicher, 1998a: 512). In both the 1980s and 2011 the broader disorder was made possible through groups of people joining together to challenge the police through the intersubjective view of police as illegitimate and a source of disrespect.

In the 1980s riots this unification was often possible due to the sense of black identity and the connections between this and feelings of injustice at racist treatment by the police. As we have seen, these conditions resulted in the relatively regular occurrences of crowds of largely black people gathering to protest or resist police stop and searches and arrests (Ball, 2012: 266; Harrison, 1999; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992).

Harrison recalls of his time in Hackney in 1981 that there was a lot of talk amongst young men of the “matter of group honour: the police, as a clan, had humiliated young blacks, as a clan, and clan revenge had to be exacted” (1992: 352; also see Ball, 2012; Keith, 1993). Similarly, Thomas (2012: 120) describes how when the riots first began his ‘posse’ united with another, violent Brixton gang, and under the direction of their leader, attacked the police. Their experience as black people at the hands of the police overcame
their own rivalries.

In other words, it was not simply a race-based identity that enabled individuals to unite, but rather anger at the police both contributed to the formation of notions of ‘black’ identity, and functioned to produce resistance to the police and state. Indeed, as we began to see with the iconic events, there was a common disposition towards the police. This disposition was one of mistrust and resentment, and appeared to unify rioters in opposition to the police.

The importance of connecting the police (and state) to the formation of identity and resistance, is that we can note that, to some extent, this process was also producing social identities across ethnicities in Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, and London (Ball, 2012; Bloom, 2012: 108; Harrison, 1992; Keith, 1993). Ball (2012) in particular notes that in Bristol many white young men were experiencing similar hostile treatment by police, and empathising with black people, often their friends, albeit over their qualitatively worse treatment by the police.

In 2011 we see the police play a similar role in uniting rioters. Again, we can note that the ‘opportunity’ was not mindless, but rather as the 2011 the Home Affairs Committee stated: “The single most important reason why the disorder spread was the perception, relayed by television as well as new social media, that in some areas the police had lost control of the streets” (HAC, 2011: 36). Once it was perceived that the police had lost their power, people gathered to ‘test reactions’ and the first riot successes encouraged others to do the same (RCVP, 2011: 12).

This does not necessarily indicate that the police were universally disliked or that every rioter was motivated to ‘test’ the police, as rioters may have used the situation for looting. Nevertheless, it does suggest that for many rioters the police had de facto authority, but lacked legitimacy or de jure authority. In other words, there was no disposition to obey, rather it was only the threat of force preventing the riots from spreading.

Thus, for some rioters the perception that the police lost control may have simply enabled them to get caught up in excitement of the moment, or even to
go explicitly go looting; yet there were those who utilised this situation as an opportunity to attack the police. In Croydon, south London, the police received information that calls were being circulated on social media to join up to ‘fuck the feds’ (MPS, 2012: 73-4). In Hackney, as we will see from footage in chapter 9, it was the presence of the police on the main high street that caused people to gather and eventually violently oppose the police (Video 1). *Reading the Riots* reported that often “A sense of a common enemy, a common cause, brought members of gangs from different territories” (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 22). Others specifically reported different or rival ‘estates’ working together, and even overcoming ethnic rivalries, to fight the police (Clifton(a); 2011; Prasad(a) 2011).

In other words, what began in Tottenham through clashes with the police facilitated a sense of unity in other locales around the common opposition to police, strong enough to overcome other enmities. However, unlike the 1980s where small scale incidents of disorder were, with relative frequency, breaking out between largely black people and the police, in 2011 it seems the police had to be perceived to lose control before violence could emerge. Moreover, this time we see a social identity form across a much greater mix of ethnicities, with race-based identities appearing not to play a central role (Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011).

What this brief examination suggests is, in the 1980s, the existence of a group or sense of an ‘us’ that exists prior to interactions with the police, but also in connection with an opposition to the police. Thus, rather than only the most extreme acts, any police action in relation to the black community brought with it the potential for violent resistance. In 2011, however, it was the police’s loss of power and the demonstration of this in the riot itself, that united and empowered individuals to act “together in a way that they rarely can” (Arendt, 1970: 83). In other words, in 2011 the riots appear to have functioned as a proto-Political moment, creating a social identity through the realisation of common enemy and purpose, and the plausibility of attacking the police: "You saw enemies become friends just for one day," (Newburn, et al., 2011).
5.5. Demographics of the Riots

To explore this difference we need greater depth regarding who was involved. Thus far, we have demonstrated that the police not only formed a focus of violence in both periods of rioting, but that it was the common anger at police that, in part, enabled the unification of individuals and acts of collective violence. However, in noting the centrality of identity, hostile dispositions towards police, and factors such as race, we should also examine who was involved and what such demographic factors might mean.

5.5.1. Age and Gender

While the complexities of the topic at hand will mean that gender will not form a theorised aspect of the discussion, it is worth noting that one principle aspect that appears to match between the two periods is that of the disproportionate involvement of young males. In 2011 the statistical data, reveals the significant over-representation of males in the offence of disorder (violent disorder, public order and breach of the peace) with 803 men to 50 women arrested across the country (THO, 2011: 18). While this is not broken down by attacks on police or property, video evidence (see list in bibliography) of attacks on the police reveal in all cases an over-representation of males.

Similarly, in 2011 the MoJ (a, 2012: 3) report that those aged 10-17 and 18-20, constituted 27% and 26% of those brought before the courts respectively, and only 6% aged over 40. In London, those in the age categories 10-17 and 18-24 made up 23% and 48% of arrests respectively (The Guardian(a), 2011: Annex table A6, A7, A8, & A10).

21 During my research evidence did suggest conceptions of masculinity, and notions of dominance and violence, that were interacting with experiences of exclusion, hostile policing, and shame. However, the evidence was suggestive rather than conclusive, and given the complexity of the topic it was decided this would not form an aspect of the discussion. In turn, it would also be worth exploring further the role of gender stereotypes, such as the expectations of violence from men as opposed to the ‘carer’ stereotype of women, in shaping stereotypes of the ‘criminal’.

22 Males were over-represented in all forms of crime in the 2011 riots; however, relatively speaking this over-representation was greater in terms of the offence of disorder (for which 24% of all males were arrested as opposed to 12% of females arrested), rather than for looting, (75% of females arrested were for acquisitive crimes, as opposed to 57% of males).
Gender and age and its involvement in the 1980s is generally under discussed or not referenced, and I was unable to find statistical data on gender in arrests/involvement in the 1980s. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence does support a similar predominance of young males; for instance, Keith (1993) notes that while there is no neat definition of ‘the rioter’, violence clashes tend to occur between young black men and the police. Harrison’s (1992) witness account similarly reveals mainly young men rioting in Hackney in 1981. Waddington (1992: 81-3) further notes that it was largely young, black men who gathered and were shouting at police prior to the rioting in Brixton. Finally, Ball (2012) also points out that the crowd that formed in response to the raid on the café in St. Paul’s was predominantly male.

Furthermore, we can also note that in 2011 complaints about police harassment and expressions of anger regarding the police, tend to indicate that it is young men, mostly black, who are being targeted by the police (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 4-5; MoJa, 2012: 3; The Guardian DataBlog, 2011: Annex table A9; THO, 2011). Analysis of antagonistic relations with police, harassment of members of the black community, and excessive stop and searches, all reveal that it is young men who have generally been principle target of police (Ball, 2012; Clancy, Hough, Aust, and Kershaw 2001; Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Hall et al., 1980; Harrison, 1992; ICI, 1989: 226; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992). To put it simply there is a correlation: it appears that young men are often the most targeted group for over-policing, and it also is young men who have disproportionately attacked the police.

5.5.2. Race in the 1980s

In the 1980s, the nature of the ‘iconic events’ that precipitated the above attacks on police, the disproportionate involvement of black men in the riots, and indeed, the over-policing and young black men, are more than suggestive as the causal involvement of racism. Yet despite this, the notion that race and racism were causally implicated was not immediately accepted. Indeed, while the dominant perception of the events of the 1980s appears to have, over time, become understood as a series of ‘race riots’, originally this was not so clear cut (for a fuller discussion of competing discourses see Ball, 2012).
For instance, competing efforts to frame the 1980s riots can be found in the response of the dominant group: Thatcher’s government propagated both explanations of ‘criminality’ (Jackson, 2003: 146), and paradoxically, explicitly racist arguments focusing on the problematic culture of immigrant groups, a perspective taken even further by the likes of Enoch Powell (Ball, 2012: 33-4). However, despite these attempts to depoliticise the rioting, the perspective that they were about racism has, in the long term, largely won out.

While the statistical data available is partial, the evidence over the involvement of racism is clear. The violence in Notting Hill in the 1970s was accompanied by chants of ‘Soweto’, connecting the problems of apartheid South Africa to the racial discrimination of London (Gilroy, 2013: 552). Indeed, Thomas makes this same comparison: “We ran out into Brixton High Street, and what we saw reminded us of TV footage of Soweto in 1976, where there were thousands of black people on one side of the road and the police on the other” (2012: 120).

From what we can know of events in London, attacks on the police appear to have been carried out in the main, by young black men; specifically, Keith notes that in Brixton first riots, 80% of those arrested for attacking the police were black (Keith, 1993: 104). Moreover, St. Paul’s in Bristol, Brixton, Haringey (Tottenham/Broadwater Farm), Hackney (Dalston and Stoke Newington) in London, Handsworth in Birmingham, Toxteth in Liverpool, and Moss Side in Manchester all had higher than average ethnic minority populations and were the focus of racial tensions prior to the rioting (Ball, 2012; Davis, 1989; Keith, 1993; Scraton, 1982; Waddington, 1992). However, while there are clear parallels in the attacks on the police between the two periods, when we examine the data for the involvement of race in 2011 we again see the indications of the involvement of race, but its extent and impact is much less clear.

5.5.3 Race in 2011

The state produced data discussed here comes from The Home Office (THO, 2011) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ(a), 2012). These reports compile data on those arrested, prosecuted, and crimes recorded. While state recorded
data allows a more comprehensive examination of the numbers and demographics involved, we should briefly note that these are not representative. The main issue, which is that police made the majority of arrests through identifying known subjects on CCTV footage (HAC, 2011: 8-9), leading to a bias in the arrest process (for a fuller discussion see Ball and Drury 2012). Moreover, as noted, there is no demographic breakdown of the attacks on the police, meaning we cannot know what types of people were typically involved in this type of act. Nevertheless, it does provide the best available opportunity to develop an idea of those involved, and this can be supported by qualitative data and accounts.

The data available on the 3,051 brought before the courts reveal that 41% self-identified as white, 38% as black, 12% as of mixed origin, and 7% as Asian, (MoJ(a), 2012: 4). However, nationally these figures cannot tell us much as the ethnic make-up of areas where disturbances occurred results in large differences in the ethnic make-up of rioters. The number of individuals brought before the courts in London by June 2012 was 2194 (MoJ(a), 2012: 13); of these 627 (33%) identified themselves as ‘white’, 855 (46%) classified themselves as ‘black’, and 222 (10%) as of mixed backgrounds.23

Unlike the 1980s therefore, we seem to see a much greater involvement of white individuals. Yet despite this shift, if we consider this in relation to the ethnic make-up of London, it does suggest that the structural experiences of racism that come with being a black person influenced involvement. London in 2011 had a population of just over 8 million, of these ‘white’ constituted around 4.8 million, ‘black’ just over 1 million, and ‘mixed’ ethnicity just over 400,000 (Nomis, 2011). Looking at these figures we can note that despite being over 4 times less numerous than the white population, as well as making up roughly 1/8th of London’s population, black people constituted nearly one half of all participants brought before the courts in London, while those of mixed ethnicity constituted less than 1/16th of the overall population, but formed 1/10th of all participants.

23 Similar figures are also provided by The Home Office (THO, 2011) and Reading the Riots (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 13; The Guardian, 2011: Annex table A9).
Indeed, almost all of the boroughs that saw rioting in London have significant ethnic minority, and in particular black, populations (The Guardian DataBlog, 2011: Table 1.14 courts). Furthermore, as of the 12th October 2011, every borough in London had seen more black people brought before the court than any other group, while in each case white people formed the second largest group (The Guardian DataBlog, 2011: Table 1.12 courts). Of course, I have noted the potential bias in the process of making arrests may have led to an over-representation of young black men in the data. However, if this is the case it also serves to reinforce the notion that structural racism is a relevant factor.

Findings from qualitative research back up such a perspective. All three major reports note the prevalence of complaints against the police across ethnicity, but specifically from black individuals against the police, particularly noting the use of stop and search against black males, (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 4-5 & 18-20; Morrell et al., 2011: 5-7 & 13; RCVP, 2011: 71). In conjunction with the statistics, this seems to paint a clear picture. Yet there is a problem which relates to the fact that none of the three major reports distinguish between ‘race’ as a structural factor of exclusion, and ‘race’ as a lived category in self-worth and identity formation.

Indeed, Reading the Riots found that unlike the 1980s, 2011 was generally not conceived of as a ‘race riot’; instead, the study found what tended to group participants together was rioters were ‘generally poorer’ (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 4-5). Yet, despite this finding, the study fails to examine the complex role race seems to have played. The question of ‘race’ in 2011 is generally left under-explained and ‘racism’ only appears to be understood as an issue in relation to policing. The question is not asked, if race only relates to the police (or indeed, only in Tottenham as RCVP weakly argue), why do we see amongst rioters both a disproportionate involvement of black youth and a significant over representation of markers of poverty and exclusion.

5.6. Complicating Race

Despite de-politicising discursive attempts to the contrary, there is no doubt that in both periods, race and racism were involved. Indeed, if it were the case
that the 2011 riots were ‘not about race’ (Cameron, 2011b), the involvement of black rioters in London should represent something closer to 13%, in line with the ethnic make up of the city. Instead, in terms of involvement ‘black’ constitutes the largest ethnic grouping in London, and second largest in England. Nevertheless, I want to point out that the narrative of ‘race’ and ‘race riots’ have problematically inhibited understanding of the broader social processes, and arguably enabled the likes of Cameron to dismiss ‘race’ as a relevant factor in 2011.

Simply put the involvement of race and racism has been oversimplified in the 1980s, and underplayed in 2011. The point is not to downplay racism’s role, but rather to help us understand the changing levels of involvement by ethnicity, and the changes in forms of resistance between these two periods. Neither 2011 nor the 1980s were ‘race riots’, but riots about disempowerment and disrespect manifesting in historically specific ways relating to the modalities of exclusion/distinction.

5.6.1 Same Place, Different Time?

One interesting piece of evidence that not only reveals the interconnectedness of the 1980s and 2011, but also helps us complicate the explanations of the periods of rioting, is that many of the areas that saw rioting in 2011 were the same places that had seen rioting in the 1980s. Salford in Manchester, St. Paul’s in Bristol, Toxteth in Liverpool, Handsworth in Birmingham, Chapel Town in Leeds, and in London, Brixton, Hackney, Haringey, Walthamstow, Acton, and Peckham to name a few, all saw rioting in both periods.

Indeed, this comparison reveals part of the problem with analysing a ‘riot’ as a temporally closed off process, and how the narrative construction hides the interconnectedness of these events. As with 2011, in the 1980s these ‘riots’ often occurred in response to earlier events in different locales, often involved attacks on the police, and often by black and marginalised youths in the inner cities of England (Ball, 2012; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992).

Indeed, if we stop trying to analyse the narrative construction of temporally
and spatially delimited ‘riot’, we will begin to note that the 1980s and 2011 rioting, while separated by up to three decades, are both historically specific symptoms of the same ongoing processes. Taking this logic, it is not that the 1980s were about race and 2011 was not; the issue is why, if we see the data indicating the involvement of race and racism in both periods, did the 1980s produce race-based resistance, yet in many of the same areas and estates, 2011 did not?

5.6.2 Social and Economic Exclusion: 1980s

The re-occurrence of rioting in the same areas in 2011 is not a coincidence, but a common response to the on-going social and economic exclusion. Indeed, looking underneath ‘race’ reveals this is what structurally grouped both black and white rioters. This is particularly visible in both the ethnically mixed St. Paul’s and largely white Southmead, in Bristol.

Whilst having a different ethnic make up, both had higher than average numbers of semi or unskilled labour, although St. Paul’s had less skilled workers (Ball, 2012: 219). In terms of long-term unemployment Southmead was slightly higher than average, whereas St. Paul’s was 3 times that of Bristol, arguably due to the combined impact of recession and racial discrimination; however, perhaps more importantly, both areas had huge rates of youth unemployment (under 25) with some locales or wards in these areas reporting over 80% (Ball, 2012: 224-5).

Similarly, the area of Hackney (Dalston/Stoke Newington) that saw rioting also had a large ethnic minority population, but again only 27 per cent of families in 1981 had a ‘head’ from a Commonwealth country (Harrison, 1992: 371-2). Again, the issues faced by this community related to poverty, deprivation and disrespect, with Hackney ranked as the poorest borough in London in the 1980s (Keith, 1993: 35) after a massive declining in manufacturing jobs in the 1970s (Harrison, 1992: 50-1).

In Liverpool Wally Brown, a black man and member of the Liverpool 8 defence committee set up to mediate between the community of Toxteth and government/police after the riots, stated: “The Thatcher government did very
little in actually putting in real jobs, improving the housing, improving the quality of life for black people in Toxteth (Playing the Race Card, 1999). Similarly, Scraton analysing the situation at the time argues that no realistic attempt has been made to alleviate the poverty and unemployment “which has trapped the black community” (1982: 25). White communities, albeit to lesser extents, also shared these sorts of conditions and experiences, resulting in the possibility of identifying with the black community through similar experiences: “Blacks and Whites joined in common cause against the police” (Nassy Brown, 2005: 65; also see Tyler, 2013).

5.6.3. Social and Economic Exclusion: 2011

Turning to 2011 then, we can again note that it is not simply the same areas that are seeing rioting, but the same economic and social conditions. The Home Office reported that of the areas that were affected by disorder in 2011, 42% were in the top quartile for the most deprived areas (THO, 2011: 9), while 55% of the areas that experienced rioting were ranked in the worst 10% of areas in terms of long term unemployment (RCVP, 2011: 55).

Utilising both their data and that from the Ministry of Justice, Reading the Riots argues that around 59% of arrestees came from the most deprived 20% of areas in the UK, while only 3% came from the richest areas (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 14).\(^{24}\) Nationally, as of February 2012, 46% (151) of those aged 10-17 brought before the courts lived in the ‘10% lowest income areas’ (NYA, 2012: 3); while of the 192 10-17 year olds brought before the courts in London, 82 (43%) were in the lowest income decile, a further 41 (21%) and 33 (17%) in the second and third lowest decile respectively (The Guardian, 2011: Table 4.10b).

As of 28/09/11, 1,344 individuals had been found guilty for disorder related crimes before the courts, 78% of these were confirmed as registered on the Department of Work and Pensions database (Gavin, 2014: vi). While in later figures regarding the total amount of those brought before the courts, 40% of adults were claiming a DWP benefit and 35% were claiming out of work

\(^{24}\) RCVP (2011: 11) similarly calculates that 70% of rioters prosecuted came from the top 30% of most deprived postcodes.
benefits, compared to the national average of the population of 15% and 12% respectively (The Guardian, 2011: table 4.1 & 4.6). While for London, 40% of those arrested were unemployed (THO, 2011: 18). In other words, a greater amount of involvement appears to correlate with greater levels of poverty and deprivation. Thus, as with the 1980s rioters are grouped together by indicators of exclusion or the fact that rioters were ‘generally poorer’ (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 4-5).

The more comprehensive, although still flawed, data available for the 2011 riots has not only allowed better insight into the conditions of rioters, it has also enabled better understanding of the forms of exclusion. For instance, it was not just employment and poverty that grouped many rioters in 2011, but also education. Thus, while the link could be made that riot hit areas and black communities in the 1980s were more likely to be underperforming in education (Harrison, 1992), Reading the Riots found specifically that rioters in 2011 were more likely to be educated to a lower standard than the general population (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 14).

Gavin notes that compared to the average population, 10-17 year olds brought before the courts were not only more likely to have been excluded from their schools, these individuals consistently performed worse over a series of educational measures (Gavin, 2014: vi; NYA, 2012: 3-4). While RCVP reports that 66% of the same group have special educational needs (3 times higher than the population), 36% had been excluded from school at least once, and for those who had taken GCSEs only one in 10 achieved 5 A-C grades compared to the population average of one in two (RCVP, 2011: 30).

The point is simply this: as practices and capitals can be mapped onto the social space through the position of class, such as football and the working class (Atkinson, 2010: 55-6), so to can riotous behaviours be mapped to the most excluded and disrespected of a society. What we will see in any riot that aims at the police or state is a greater involvement of those most disempowered and disrespected. We see a greater involvement from the black dominated groups because of their position in the social hierarchy below the excluded white working class, constituting a ‘super-exploited’ and
disrespected section of the dominated stratum (Hall et al., 1980: 389-90).

5.6.4. ‘Race’ or Disrespect?

To note the similar conditions of rioters, black and white, in the 1980s is not to
say that structural stereotypes of ‘black’ did not result in being excluded to a
greater extent from social and economic resources. Moreover, nor should this
be taken to mean that ‘racism’ does not imply a different lived experience. The
point is simply that what makes race and class important is not the logics that
underpin them, but the manner and extent to which these are utilised to
reproduce the social hierarchy, and necessarily to exclude and thus
disrespect individuals.

The value in making this point becomes clearer when we try to explain the
rather messier 2011 riots, which as we have seen also indicates the role of
structural racism, but alongside an increasing involvement of white individuals
and a reduced identification of ‘race’ as an issue. We cannot simply argue that
2011 were ‘race riots’, but we also cannot simply dismiss the involvement of race – what is required is a more nuanced way of picking out the involvement
of race. As has been argued race is a logic of exclusion/distinction connected
to the social hierarchy that groups individuals together, and a related form of
identity (Bulmer & Solomos, 1999; Lee, 2017). Consequently, logics of
exclusion shift in order to maintain the social hierarchy and relations of
privilege and disadvantage. As these shift, so Bourdieusian class changes
and along with it the experiences and forms of identification of those grouped
and excluded.

Indeed, while the 1980s was clearly about race, the lines were not as evident
as one might expect. In St. Paul’s, Bristol the anger at the police produced a
form of solidarity amongst the community that cut across ethnicity (Ball, 2012:
442). Reicher and Stott (2011: 41%) similarly argue the Bristol riots were
related to a ‘local identity’ or community and a shared feeling of being
exploited by police and the state.

Why there was solidarity across ethnicity relates to the fact that the popular
view of St. Paul’s as a ‘black area’ was mistaken; in 1981 it was a poor, inner
city area with a mixed-ethnic population, with only around one third of households being of Caribbean, African, or Pakistani descent (Ball, 2012: 217). In addition to the complexity of St. Paul's, Knowle West and Southmead, which also saw rioting were a predominantly, although not exclusively, white estates. Yet despite two days of rioting and the police reporting that in Southmead “gangs of youths numbering some two hundred smashed several large shop windows and stoned police officers” (ibid: 26-7), this part of the rioting has been largely ignored and media coverage focused almost exclusively on the ‘black’ riots of St Paul's.

Of course, London specifically did involve a significant amount of black-police confrontations, but importantly, not all these riots were the same and nor did the data produce an ‘average rieter’ neatly defined as ‘black youth’ (Keith, 1993: 97). Bloom argues that Brixton and the riots in the 1980s were depicted as about immigration through the focus on black youth, “but the kids on the street were black and white” (2012: 108). Indeed, while obviously a large proportion, that 80% of those arrested for attacking police were black nevertheless indicates a significant involvement of non-blacks in the violence (Keith, 1993: 104).

Harrison provides anecdotal support in Hackney, where he interviewed people around the community, and found that it was common amongst the white youth to express hate for the police: “this sus law that the coloureds say they’re always getting picked up on, that’s been going on for years” (white, female, Hackney, in Harrison, 1992: 348). While this suggests an ethnic division and a dismissal of ‘coloured’ complaints, it nevertheless points to hostile relations with police, moreover, not all white, excluded individuals felt the same.

Harrison (1992: 351) spoke to a group of about 50 young men, mostly black but with some white, who complained of unemployment, racism, but the main source of discontent was with police. Ball (2012: 76) argues that mass unemployment during the 1980s and the ‘post-school dole queues’, was a unifying force amongst inner city black and white youth. Harrison also witnessed rioting in Hackney and notes a white man confronting police, a
Issues of racism were also clearly important in the Toxteth riots in Liverpool, with reports from many organisations of daily harassment and abuse of black people by police throughout the 1970s (Scrton, 1982: 25). As Tyler (2013) notes, despite the similarity to London’s anti-police riots, these riots took place amongst predominantly white communities and took a similar form of clashes with the police. This might underplay the level of black involvement, but nonetheless, a black participant in the Toxteth riots was interviewed on television and described what he witnessed:

Hundreds of White people started converging into the community at about five, six in the evening [...] They come to join up with the Black youth [...] they suffer the same sort of brutality but the only [difference] is they don’t get called niggers. (quoted in Nassy Brown, 2005: 65).

The point to make is not that racism was not central, but that ‘race riots’ tends to imply an issue about black and white; whereas, for the rioters what we appear to see is an issue about black and the (white) state/police. Moreover, because the contention is about the state or police, this is an issue sometimes that enables black and white rioters to overcome racialised divisions against a common enemy.

As the last quote suggests, both blacks and whites were being excluded and disrespected, but for black people this was happening on a greater scale, to a greater extent, and involved greater stigmatisation. The point here is that to focus only on the racialised aspects of the riots, or to assume the riots are about ‘race’ alone de-emphasises what makes the category relevant and enables the lesser exploited white group to empathise and identify with black rioters – disrespect and disempowerment (Hall, 1980: 338).

Taking this more nuanced look at the 1980s riots enabled us to better understand the apparent paradox of race in 2011. What 2011 represents is...
the conclusion of the process emerging in the 1980s – the constitution of a super-exploited group across racial lines, and thus potentially the beginnings of a shift in forms of identification. Thus, we do not see a complete change from the 1980s, but rather a significant increase of the involvement of white rioters in 2011. Furthermore, as with the 1980s rioters hail from, often the same, socially and economically excluded areas that have been subject to over-policing. Thus we see an increase in white individuals complaining about police, but the complaints remain similar: “I can't relate to being a black killed, because I'm a white man still alive, but I could relate to injustice within the police force” (male, 33, Liverpool, Prasad(e), 2011).

5.7. Discussion

What appears clearly important in both periods of rioting are relations with police. Despite being three decades apart, violence directed against the group formed a significant focus of resistance, and clearly related to negative experiences at the hands of police. Indeed, it seemed to be the opposition to police that enabled the moment of unification, or social identities, in both the 1980s and 2011. However, to focus solely on the police in both periods is to ignore the larger context that data and research on the riots reveal and which make the police a target of violence.

What the analysis of the riots and factors emerging from data suggests is that, in the 1980s it is social and economic exclusion that is key to the rioting, and race functioned as the dominant modality of exclusion. In 2011 it appears again the social and economic exclusion is driving the rioting, but the dominant modality is not clearly about race. Thus, while race is involved in both periods of rioting the difference between the 1980s and 2011 riots is that, in the latter, there is both a greater mix of ethnicity and the lack of clear identification of and through race.

Framing this shift through the Bourdieusian notion of ‘class’ enables us to understand that ‘race’ is a means of making distinctions between people that utilises certain markers; thus ‘race’ can change and still be relevant. The shift
we see implies that many of the rioters in 2011 constitute a ‘super-exploited group’ previously occupied largely by black individuals (Hall et al., 1980). However, in 2011 the facts of increased ethnic heterogeneity, suggests the markers of the super-exploited group, or the means by which they are distinguished have shifted. If this is the case, then we should be able to note a parallel shift in terms of society’s stereotypes away from ‘racism’ as a means of distinction, and ‘race’ based identities, but simultaneously maintaining a new modality of exclusion. However, before we move onto this, to connect behaviour into the social order requires that we take a deeper look at the forms of resistance occurring.
6. ‘Fucking up the Feds’:

The Politics of Criminality

1. Politicality, Pure and Simple?

In 1965 the Watts riots in the US began with an iconic event involving a stop by police on a black person, before erupting into clashes between the black excluded communities and police. As one journalist put it:

There must have been a feeling of *release*, as they could now give vent to the anger which they had suppressed for so long. Mingled in with the other emotions must have been the feeling of *power*: did they not put the police, who until then were inviolable, on the defensive? (Greaves, quoted in Waddington, 1992: 87)

Amongst the usual, uncritical or politically motivated condemnations that seem to follow every act of disorder, this statement stands apart. What is perhaps so insightful about this quote is not only how it frames action as an affective and expressive response, but that by doing this it moves past the limiting understanding of politics and criminality that are generally employed by outsiders to judge rioters’ actions.

Here we see the moral dichotomy of ‘politics’ and ‘criminality’ overcome. We see violence without political purpose, but couched in an understanding of disempowerment. We see how the violence may have lacked forethought, but is nevertheless understood through anger and repression. The statement, without condemning, understands how collective acts of violence and law breaking may liberate without being ‘political’. Simply put, this journalist recognised that one does not have to be ‘politicised’ for violence to be Political.

The important point to make here is that ‘political action’, stripped of its normative connotations, simply means that which works at the maintenance or organisation of the social life within the norms of the legitimised political sphere, or as Gamson puts it: action based on ‘a belief that influence is
possible and necessary’ (1968: 48). If you vote, write to an MP, sign a petition, or even engages in protest, you aim at producing some state of affairs with regards to the organisation of the social world, and you do so through legitimised and institutionalised practices.

On the other hand, ‘Politics’ is what underpins and makes possible ‘political action’ but is not confined to it. For Jenny Edkins, (1999) ‘the Political’ is what forms the moment of potential choice between different forms of social organization, but does not necessitate action through institutionalized and legitimised spheres. Thus certain relations of power are Political, while to be Politicised implies an understanding of the how the relations of power impact upon social organisation. Importantly then, Political action does not require the legitimised sphere to act through and indeed, may even oppose it.

This is an important distinction to make when trying to understand the forms of resistance we see during rioting; the narrow conception of ‘politics’, when functioning as a normative label, it neglects to account for the role of power in legitimising and shaping action. Because of this neglect, any actions that seek change outside of the accepted sphere risks being categorised and delegitimised as ‘criminal’. However, when ‘criminal’ behaviour is stripped of these normative connotations and power it is simply any action for any reason, which rejects and transgresses the normative rules of the legitimised social order.

Thus, ‘criminality’, when referring to collective acts of resistance or violence is action that opposes or seeks to re-organise power relations, but rejects the institutional means and norms of the dominant order. In this light the Watts riots, whether they fit with ‘criminal’ or not, were Political: a contest over, or resistance to, the exercise of ‘power’ of the dominant and legitimised social order.

Prior to any political action or even any Political understanding, all resistance is prompted by acts of disrespect by those empowered (Honneth, 1995). All riotous actions are Political in that they are expressive of shame and anger,

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25 Edkins does not use the capitalized ‘Politics’; this is done here to better distinguish between the common, normative usage and the expansive concepts utilized here.
generated through the dominant social order. Thus, it is in the emotions of rioters in response to relations of power that we find the ‘Politics’ of the riots. Consequently, to better comprehend the meaning of action in the rioting in 2011 and the 1980s, we need to understand the attacks on the police as an expressive struggle that sought to overcome, in that moment, power relations that work against a positive sense of self.

However, we also need to understand the role of power or the social structure in shaping the form resistance takes. Firstly, we must be careful not to ignore that the spontaneous nature of rioting makes political organisation difficult (Millington, 2016: 713); thus an apparent absence of clear goals may not necessitate a lack of Political understanding or identities. Furthermore, why ‘political action’ is understood by rioters as an irrelevant or implausible choice but violent retaliation against the police is not, cannot be explained by morality – an effect of power – but by the experiences of those rioters. If any actions are not ‘political’ in the smaller sense, this should not delegitimise resistance but provide us a starker warning of society’s failure to reproduce itself – that these individuals have been shaped in such a way that they are disposed to not seek change within or through the political system, but to transgress its rules.

We begin with the 1980s, exploring the context of black communities which will enable us to make sense of the forms of resistance that emerge during the riots. These are principally Politicised rebellion, and individualistic resistance or ‘criminality’. Both these behaviours stem from the same affective response to long term social and economic exclusion, and both can be understood as a form of resistance to the stigmatisation and low self-esteem that comes with acceptance of one’s position in the social hierarchy.

This exploration not only enables us to comprehend the commonalities and differences between these behaviours, it also connects us with the 2011 riots and enables us to complicate the assumption of the ‘criminality, pure and simple’. Using rioters’ discourses we can see how ‘criminality’ is actually a form of individualised resistance, in contrast to collective and Political forms, to the disrespect and low self-worth experienced, and indeed, how violence
functions as a form of politics to those excluded.

The final section then seeks to explore this shift to more individualised forms of resistance that begins to be visible in the 1980s riots. The discussion evaluates the role of consumerism, the lack of effective political representation, and lack of Politicised discourse, in producing more individualised forms of resistance that more easily can be labelled ‘criminality’.

6.2. The Politics of the 1980s

To understand how the 1980s saw widespread rioting we need to shift focus to understand how the widespread forms of exclusion, principally through the modality of race, shaped the lived experience of people who held the appropriate markers of distinction. While it was argued in the previous chapter that race is a logic of exclusion, here the historically produced meaning of ‘race’ becomes important to understand in that it shapes the forms of disrespect and exclusion experienced, and in turn the resistance amongst the excluded populace.

Caribbean immigrants arriving in Britain in the late 1940s quickly faced widespread and severe racist discrimination. Situated in the context of an extreme housing shortage post World War 2, black immigrants were largely forced to find accommodation in the bomb damaged and overcrowded inner city, working class areas of London, where ‘rent sharks’ who could exploit the trapped market were only too keen to offer disgusting housing at high prices (Green, 1979; Penketh, 2000: 16; Pilkington 1988: 52-4).

Discrimination was not simply limited to housing but occurred in all spheres of life including employment and education, and helped by newspapers regularly running articles stoking white fears about black immigrants (Gates Jr, 1976; Jackson, 2003: 138-42; Penketh, 2000; Pilkington, 1988: 87-90). Indeed, alongside generally lower pay and fewer opportunities, later economic downturns in the context of widespread and accepted racial discrimination meant it was black people who lost their jobs first (Hall et al., 1980; Pilkington, 1988: 87-90).
Simply put, the black population of Britain was not only faced long term and entrenched exclusion from the practises of economic capital, but also from obtaining and engaging the dominant white forms of cultural capital (e.g. educational qualifications). Biological and colonial racist stereotypes that had originally emerged to justify enslavement and colonialism had cast black people as supposedly less intelligent, uneducated, savages and so forth (Jackson, 2003: 135-8; Penketh, 2000: 13; Pilkington, 1988: 88-90). This shaped early forms of exclusion in Britain, however, this stereotype began to shift in order to maintain the privilege of the white working class with whom Caribbean immigrants now competed for employment and housing. New meanings were added to the stereotype, with black people becoming framed as dirty and unkempt, more prone to accidents, or requiring more supervision than white workers, and ‘lazy, unresponsive to discipline and truculent’ (Cole, 2016: 36; also see Penketh, 2000: 17; Pilkington, 1988: 88-90).

While of course, there was some change in material conditions in the following decades, particularly with regards to the housing problem, ultimately it would be small and the conditions of high unemployment, few opportunities for respectable or economically rewarding employment, and poor housing would continue (Hall et al., 1980: 329-30). In turn, the later restructuring of the economy in the 1980s to a neoliberal market would result in the suffering of some groups more than others, particularly blacks, women, and poorer communities (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage. 2012: 7-8; Keith, 1993: 235). The result of long term exclusion based on logics of race was black people largely living in urban ‘ghettos’, and a position, in class terms, at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Lea & Young, (1982: 14-5) argue that the generation of young black people excluded from employment is not simply an issue of deprivation, but ‘a crisis for the political process’. The problem is, they point out, that engagement in politics had been based on access to the processes of labour and capital, thus those excluded lack the institutional and social means by which to express discontent and create change. The political process increasingly becomes irrelevant and pre-reflexively excluded as a choice or means by which to express and overcome discontent.
Politically impotent and beset by systemic and strong discrimination marking them out as ‘different’ or ‘inferior’, black communities in the 1950-60s were showing signs of rejecting legitimated society and its rules, and the emergence of oppositional values, behaviours and movements as a means to cope with their situation: “As a collective solution, the option of assimilation has not only been officially closed by white society, but blacks have actively closed the door on it themselves, from the inside” (Hall et al., 1980: 355). The result was generations of black people that were born in Britain who were rejecting the social order:

Even though I was born here I don’t belong here and I don’t call myself an Englishman. I don’t call myself nothing to do with the English race (young, black, male, in Hall et al., 1980: 354).

Political and social resistance built from the harsh reality many faced took the form of, among other things, the ‘Black Power’ movement ideologically connected to the Black Panthers and Malcolm X in the USA who explicitly rejected white society. Rastafarianism also emerged as the ‘religion of the oppressed’ connecting black youth back to their Caribbean ‘roots’ and calling for a repatriation of black people to Ethiopia (ibid: 357; Gates Jr, 1976: 310).

These movements not only presented Political forms of opposition to racist exclusion, they functioned culturally and symbolically through language and music. Emerging as forms of resistance to the disrespect and stigmatisation of white society, such movements re-articulated notions of ‘blackness’ that could produce self-esteem: “In part because of its sense of isolation and powerlessness, Black London defines itself through its own instruments.” (Gates Jr, 1976: 308). These tools enabled a positive form of identity that distinguishes black people from white society and its stereotypes.

However, as black communities sought to empower themselves through a rejection of white society, it’s values and schemes of judgement, so white society increasingly began to frame blacks as a violent and criminal threat to the social-fabric (Cole, 2016: 39; Hall et al., 1980). The response of white society was to increase stigmatisation through greater emphasis on the threat of immigration, moral panics over forms of supposedly ‘black crimes’ such as
muggings, and increasing calls to aggressively police black communities (Cole, 2016; Davis, 1989; Gunning, 2010; Hall et al., 1980; Lea & Young, 1982; Penketh, 2000). However, as noted power relations are not only implicated in stereotyping and disrespect, but shape the possibilities and plausibility of resistance.

One consequence of this cyclical long-term exclusion by, and rejection of white, British society was an increasingly ambiguous relation to crime. With prospects of unemployment or low-paid and low-status work, “[y]outh’s battle to be free from ‘shit work’ was buoyed up by an ill-defined but nonetheless alternative conception of social life, affirmed in the unruly, dissident (sub)culture” (Gilroy, 2013: 552; also see Harrison, 1992: 292, Hall et al., 1980). In other words, excluded from legitimated capitals, young blacks were investing their own social systems as a means of resisting the stigma and low self-esteem white society imposed upon them. The notion of a ‘hustler’ was defined as a positive and semi-political way of being (Hall et al., 1980). Rather than ‘professional’ crime, ‘hustling’ utilised illegal and informal markets to earn economically in whatever means available, outside of the legitimated markets and capitals from which they were excluded (e.g. selling drugs or stolen goods).

Hustling functioned as ‘survival strategies’ in relation to economic hardship, from a generation rejecting what they saw as demeaning, oppressive, and socially unrewarding roles that their parents had accepted (Hall et al., 1980: 355; Thomas, 2012: 115). By rejecting both the positions and standards of white society, and by displaying disrespect for that society and its norms, self-worth and positive identities were being re-articulated. Those who had measures of success in this line of work gained status and cultural capital, indicated by the term applied to such hustlers: ‘cool cats’ (Hall et al., 1980: 352).

However, while driven at the pre-reflexive level by the same experiences of disrespect, criminal behaviours and identities were ‘semi-Political’, an expression of anger that lacked or perhaps rejected the structural understanding that came with Political identities. Engels defines this as an
individualised form of ‘primitive rebellion’: “The criminal could protest against the existing order of society only singly, as one individual” (2005: 478). In other words, criminal behaviour for Engels was struggle without ‘class consciousness’. If we remove Engels’ concept from the constraints of the Marxist reification of class, criminality in this light is the expressive rejection of society’s normative and physical regulation. What makes it individualised resistance is that it lacks the cognitive underpinnings needed to develop a collective identity through common experiences and aims, that might produce Politicised struggle (Honneth, 1995).

These forms of struggle are underpinned, in the first instance, by the motivation to re-establish a positive sense of self. Unlike political action, the belief that the legitimised or institutional means can produce change and self-worth is pre-reflexively absent. While unlike movements connected to ‘black power’, the re-articulation of identity remains implicit. What distinguishes ‘hustling’ or ‘criminality’ from Political identities, is the difference in the capacity to generate a collective belonging and action, be it ‘working class’ or ‘black’:

Few young blacks consciously choose crime as a form of political revenge against white society. But consciousness and motives do not work in that way. [...] driven into one of the few remaining strategies for survival open to them, they develop a collective definition of their situation; and, in doing so, they draw on the available reservoir of charged feelings and emotions about racism and its system (Hall et al., 1980: 359).

In other words, Hall et al. are talking about a pre-reflexive and affectively driven opposition that takes shape through the subjective experiences and available and understood forms of action to those caught in such a situation. For some, performing Politicised ‘black’ identities did not function to generate adequate resistance, to express the anger or overcome the shame. Instead the practice of hustling ‘made sense’, or perhaps seemed to more effectively enable the expression of the build up of negative affect through action. As more young black men accepted and performed these non-Political logics and
identities so too did white society accept the evidence of ‘black criminality’. This reinforced the sense of threat to white privilege and connected with fears over immigration, increasing the strength of prejudice and escalating aggressive policing and other forms of exclusion (Cole, 2016; Hall et al., 1980; Penketh, 2000). As the recession of the late 1970s hit, and Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal government stepped up the reorganisation of the economy and society, so the forms of exclusion and disrespect grew. The 1980s erupted into violence.

6.2.1 The Politics of the Rioting

The manifold ways in which black individuals were excluded from, and disrespected by, society clearly led to a pervasive, widespread anger and sense of injustice. It was these emotions and the understanding of the structural injustice that gave the 1980s their Political character. It was the exclusion and exploitation leading to deprivation and crime that Politicised Steve during this period and led him to seek change through legitimised engagements: ‘I was amazed that people could continue to live like this’. Although his mistrust of police was still present when I spoke to him, Steve’s Politicised viewpoint even persuaded him that he had to put aside his anger and work with the police to improve relations. This, he felt, could limit the impact of over-policing on engagement with crime.

Similarly, for Nick as a young boy watching the rioting on TV, it was clear that black people were ‘second class citizens’ in a white society, and that the riots ‘were about us’. Indeed, when I spoke to Aisha (black, female, late 40s) she connected the experience of black people to the slave trade and colonialism: ‘we’ve had it for centuries’. These perspectives and emotions were visible in the riots as well.

As noted, the first outbreaks that began to catch the attention of the broader society were those in the Notting Hill Carnival in 1976 and 1977. If a statement of ‘political’ intent or orientation was needed, the chanting of ‘Soweto’, connecting the violence in London to political and anti-apartheid violence breaking out across South Africa, should have done it. Speaking on his experiences in the 1980s, Sheldon Thomas (2012: 120), would also
equate his involvement in the 1981 Brixton riots with that of Soweto, and the rage he experienced as a young black man.

The connection for Thomas was in his experiences as a black child and young man in a white, racist state, and the common sense of disrespect and anger this produced. Thomas at one point describes his reaction to watching *Roots*, a documentary film series on American Slavery broadcast in the late 1970s – it was the first time he heard of the African slave trade: “The next day at school, it was obvious everyone had seen ‘Roots’ […] It was at this point I stepped up to lead the revolt in school, because I felt so violated, so hurt, so in pain, so angry” (2012: 116). Thomas was not the only rioter who watched the documentary: “we’re fighting for our forefathers […] We’ve been watching *Roots*. They used us here for twenty years, now they got no use for us, they want us out.” (secretary, 17, rioting in Hackney 1981, in Harrison, 1992: 352).

What is also revealing of the Politicised nature of the 1980s riots were the presence of organised groups, often mobilised around the issues of racism and policing, and engaging in discursive acts to frame the riots or raise awareness of issues. For instance, during the 1980s in Hackney a number of black focus groups organised the *Police Out of Schools* campaign in an attempt to limit what was seen as the toxic impact of interactions between police and young black people (ICI, 1989: 226).

In response to the rioting in 1981, the *Brixton Rastafarian Collective* stated: “the police were no longer protecting the people […] They were in fact a force of occupation within the Brixton area” (quoted in Keith, 1993: 31); similarly, *The Black Liberation Front*26 stated: “we consider the uprisings of the summer 1981 as well as those since the 1970s as legitimate self-defence actions” (ibid: 92). Indeed, this was not limited to black mobilisation, with one resident revealing the Political context amongst the multi-ethnic riot in Liverpool: “People say ‘Toxteth riots’ or ‘Liverpool 8 uprising’ depending on their politics”

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26 The BLF was a pan-African, radical socialist organization founded in London 1971, and among other aims, sought to develop black Political identities and forms of resistance to racist exclusions.
(Ball, 2012: 28). However, it is worth noting that what the above discussion reveals is not the ‘politics’ of the 1980s riots – these groups were not utilising the legitimated routes of action – but the ‘Politics’: this was about rebellion.

6.2.2 Anti-politics in the 1980s Riots

To frame the 1980s riots as ‘political’ in the smaller sense is problematic in part because this supposes a ‘descriptive unity’ and essentialist identity attributed to a fictional actor ‘the crowd’ (Keith, 1993: 53). But more importantly, framing these riots within the political/criminal papers over or misses important processes occurring. The Black Liberation Front reveals this contradiction by its very naming, and not least in its view of the police as a form of ‘occupation’. Similarly, the Brixton Rastafarian Collective saw the riots as ‘legitimate self-defence’, while for many the Toxteth was an ‘uprising’, not a riot.

These all contain Politics in the larger sense of the term because they respond to and rely on an understanding of power relation and the exclusion and mistreatment of themselves as a group. But they also speak to alienation from the political process – change to some extent is not envisaged within the social order but by breaking away from it or through violent opposition. Due to the disempowerment and disrespect experienced by the black community in white Britain, political action was increasingly being excluded at the pre-reflexive level – ‘democracy’ was not working and was not an option.

This is of course, not to deny that members of the black communities were not engaged in political action, but rather that increasing numbers of black individuals, and some white, had given up on the legitimated system: “we were not going to allow a system to repress us” (Thomas, 2012: 115). Thus, as noted previously, Rastafarianism saw the solution as repatriation of the black members of British society to Ethiopia, and violent opposition to police and the state that sanctioned them was considered ‘legitimate’ (Gates Jr, 1976: 310; Keith, 1993: 92). In other words, these movements and organisations spoke of rebellion or revolt: Political action that explicitly aims at

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27 Liverpool 8 refers to the postal code of the area, Toxteth was the term popularly used by media.
the overthrow or removal of relations of domination.

Thus, framed around and in response to the issue of race and racism, and through notions of black identity, resistance and rebellion was formulated. Harrison’s accounts of the riots in Hackney revealed the distinction between the police as a ‘clan’ in opposition to ‘clans’ of black individuals, and heard a young boy advocating using ‘guerrilla tactics’ (Harrison, 1992: 352). Similarly, Keith talks of certain streets in Hackney, Brixton, and Notting Hill, all of which saw rioting in the 1980s, as ‘front lines’ and were often the sites of police conflict with young, black men from the area (1993: 20-2). For those involved in criminal activity and the more politicised elements of the black community in Brixton, Railton Road was commonly understood as the ‘front line of defence against the police’ and as a source of black solidarity (ibid: 27).

At the ‘front line’ in Hackney, an investigation into the death of a black man at the local police station, found it was ultimately ‘isolated from the community’ by decades of mistreatment and violence towards black individuals, resulting in its perception as more like an enemy outpost, a place to be avoided (ICI, 1989: 240). However, as Keith’s study of ‘front lines’ suggests, opposition to the police and state is not always articulated in Political terms.

Again, this was a form of resistance was seen in white working class individuals as well. Ball notes in areas such as St. Paul’s in Bristol there was a multi-ethnic form of resistance happening, often emerging through ‘subcultures’ connected to Caribbean culture, such as Rastas, skinheads, and punks, but also through mass unemployment and the common experience of the ‘post-school dole queue’ (ibid: 76 & 261-5). These youth movements, rather than specifically black youth, were regularly having negative experiences with police, and in turn, rejecting their authority. Thus, faced by similar conditions and treatment by the police, sections of the super-exploited white working class were also viewing the police as an enemy or occupying force:

It’s insulting that [the police] are being paid, that these people we’ve got nothing in common with, that have got nothing to do with Southmead. [...] They was coming in seeing that we was behaving.

6.2.3 ‘Criminality’ in the 1980s Riots

What the 1980s riots make clear is that there were groups of individuals being disrespected to the extent that it produced violent resistance. For many, this took the form of revolt or rebellion, however, as we have seen crime was also produced as a form of resistance to disrespect and exclusion. As with the more Politicised forms of rebellion, this both brought and emerged from a specific relation with the police. Davis (1989) and Lea and Young (1982) both argue that violence against the police in the 1980s was driven by the interconnected processes of exclusion, stereotyping of black youth as criminal, and a drive to aggressively over-police. Davis (1989) notes the manner in which over-policing symbolically reinforces motivations to over-police by criminalising black youth. For Lea and Young (1982) these antagonistic relations contribute to criminal behaviours, drove much of the rioting, and in turn reinforce motivations to over-police.

However, criminal forms of resistance were occurring across ethnicity, but the greater amount of black people rioting appears to correlate to the greater extent to which, as a group, they were stigmatised and excluded. One rioter in the predominantly white area, Knowle West, Bristol saw the St. Paul’s riots as a mark of respect and reveals that opposition to authority was something to valorise: “you’d gone from thinking we were the hardest area in Bristol and they’d kind of jumped ahead of us [...] it was kind of a respect thing I suppose ‘cos they’d had a pop at the cops...” (quoted in Ball, 2012: 370). Similarly, the issue of excluded and stigmatised youth in Liverpool during the 1970s and 80s was also generating crime and conflicts with police: “One gang we know has given the police an ultimatum to lay off within two weeks or they fight back. It could lead to civil war in the city” (Margaret Simey in 1971, Labour councillor for Liverpool, quoted in Scraton, 1982: 24).

In Hackney, Harrison (1992: 356) found that both black and white youth ‘hate
the police’, that the recent economic conditions had led to increases in crime, and that it was these excluded and angry youth that were rioting. Ball (2012: 432) found that in the areas that saw rioting – two predominantly white estates/areas and the ethnically mixed St. Paul’s – the impact of the long term exclusion exacerbated by the economic crisis of the late 1970s had led to informal survival strategies, resulting in increased negative contact with, and resentment of the police.

Indeed, despite Thomas’ (2012) explicit awareness of racism and motivation through a sense of injustice, his resistance or struggle was not ‘political’ and moreover, seemed to blur the lines between rebellion and ‘criminal’. For instance, while he saw the riots as an ‘uprising’, at the same time he speaks of forming gangs to defend themselves from police (2012: 113). However, these gangs were not just about conflict with the police, but created rivalries between gangs in Brixton which would be overcome during the riots as they faced off against their bigger, common enemy.

Consequently, 1981 was in some respects a battle and in some respects, ‘revenge’. Supporting this blurred context, it was not the black political figures that Thomas valorised, rather he recalls looking up to the Yardies’ – gangsters from Jamaica “with an ‘I don’t-give-a damn’ attitude” towards the white crime families – because “it was again showing the establishment […] we were running things” (Thomas, 2012: 118). In other words, the relations of power oriented around race and racism were impacting on Thomas differently.

6.2.4 Criminality: Rebellion without a Cause?

Indeed, it is perhaps in Thomas (2012) that we see the role of power in producing and shaping different forms of resistance. Through his personal experiences of racism and learning of slavery Thomas felt shamed, treated and valued as unequal, and thus angry. Thomas clearly does not see the white political system as relevant, but rather as a means of black oppression. That he has been disempowered means there is no resolution to his anger through the legitimated system, and like the Black Liberation Front or the Brixton Rastafarian Collective, ‘political’ action is excluded and the legitimated political system is opposed. However, while both rebellion and criminality
function as an anti-politics, they are also clearly different.

The issue of racism and Thomas’ identification as ‘black’ functioned as the source of his resistance and struggle, as with these more Politicised groups. Yet at the same time he seemed to lack direction and organisation, and partook in individualised resistance. Politicised black identities seem to have enabled others to unite and/or organise, such as in the Black Liberation Front, and empower themselves to counter the stigma of white society. However, for Thomas it was a mix of his anger relating to personal and historical experiences of racism and the gang structure that better enabled him to express and perform the emotions he felt.

The forms of rebellion then, appear to be an explicitly articulated rejection of the political sphere and rules of that social order. These movements utilise Politicised modes of identification that symbolically reorient the very means by which they are excluded and grouped - ‘black’. Thus, drawing on what could be positioned as ‘theirs’ and positive in contrast to white society, through language/dialect, music and religion, sections of black community performed their positive and different identities and rejection of the white legitimated social order and norms (Gates Jr, 1976: 308).

Part of this re-orientation occurs through alternative conceptions of the social order in which the relations of power that locate them as a super-exploited group are removed. By doing so, these groups resisted the disrespect visited upon them, and provided alternative means to generate self-worth. As the white ‘working class’ had done previously with notions of hard labour and organisations such as unions (Hoggart, 1992; Lea & Young, 1982; Solomos & Back, 1994), so movements emerge around black identities that resist the stigmatisation of the dominant order.

However, as with the early working class movements, the disenfranchised position of the black communities meant their movements often saw no alternative than reject or even to violently oppose the dominant order (Lea & Young, 1982: 14). While the white working class movement had hard won gains, such as unions, which empowered them as a group to participate in the organisation of the social order, this possibility was fast being retracted by the
emergence of neoliberal, or laissez-faire economics. White working class communities were beginning to have the carpet pulled from under them, while for black communities, the carpet was taken away before they had put a foot on it. Thus, in developing forms of resistance, black movements articulated themselves against an order that offered them nothing but exclusion and stigma.

‘Criminality’, or individualised resistance then, is also produced by a situation of disempowerment and disrespect, and similar to rebellion, constitutes a rejection of the legitimated society and its norms and values (Agnew, 2012; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969; Merton, 1938). Indeed, extreme forms of exclusion in the white working classes had also generated different forms of ‘criminality’ which found means and processes of positive identification that operated outside the law. Speaking of the white working class Teddy Boy movement that emerged in the 1950s, George Melly stated:

The fights and cinema riots, the gang bangs and haphazard vandalism were produced by a claustrophobic situation. They were the result of a society which still held that the middle classes were entitled … to impose moral standards on a class whose way of life was totally outside its experience. (quoted in, Brake, 2003: 74)

However, without a Politicised form of identification there can be no constructive articulation of an alternative and no symbolic re-appropriation of the modality by which you are grouped and excluded. The processes of identification as ‘Teddy Boy’ enabled an overcoming of the disrespect and stigma imposed by middle-class society through a rejection of behaviours and rules, and thus removed the possibility of shame and feelings of low self-worth. However, it also suggests the failure of the ‘working class’ identity to adequately incorporate white youth’s struggle. Without a Political bridge to frame the individual’s discontent and stigmatisation through a collective or structural understanding of the problem, no alternative can be articulated, and the shame and anger felt can only be expressed through an individualised form of action that displays a rejection or disrespect of those rules and authorities.
The performative transgression of the rules and the opposition to police becomes a positive factor in the construction of identities and opens up a plausible form action, as was the case in Paris’ 2005 riots in the banlieue: “Violence and public unrest are their only possible and effective means of struggle” (Lapeyronnie, 2009: 38). Criminality, or individualised resistance, is an affective and rational response to disrespect and disempowerment where there is a lack of a cognitive means – or ‘semantic bridge’ (Honneth, 1995) – to connect and develop Politicised understanding and action. In other words, Sheldon Thomas’ form of resistance in Brixton 1981 was not simply due to his and black people’s exclusion from the politics of British society, but an increasing inadequacy of Politicised identities to enable the expression of ‘rage’ that he felt.

It was the combination of the experience of disrespect and disempowerment as a black man in a white society, that produced “such rage and bitterness” (Thomas, 2012: 120). By resisting – rioting, forming gangs – Thomas appears to have sought empowerment in the only way he could see was available to him, or perhaps the only way that justified and adequately performed his anger and rage. Thus the expressive and performative acts of violence sought to overcome the disrespect and shame in a more individualistic sense, rather than seeking ‘justice’ or change: “Many of us now wanted nothing more than to take revenge” (Thomas, 2012: 115).

Ultimately, the 1980s revealed the beginnings of a shift away from political and Politically articulated behaviour, the start of the loss of ‘bridges’ that enabled collective resistance. Indeed, for some of those in the community this was visible prior to the rioting and the consequences were expected:

unless the black community as an oppressed minority discovers its strength as a movement which can exert political pressure […] Our future here is bleak. It’s hard to predict violence […] but the situation is deteriorating very badly. There’s a lot of tension, just below the surface. (Social Worker, black, Brixton, quoted in Gates Jr, 1976: 315).

In other words, the conditions for black people growing up in Britain in the
1970s and 1980s was one in which plausible solutions to the disempowerment and disrespect experienced were increasingly failing to be articulated through a plausible, Politicised identity. The impact of this was to fail to offer young people a cognitive means to express or overcome the affective impact of the same disempowerment and disrespect being visited upon them.

Unlike prior generations which tended to feel a sense of duty to British society, young blacks were increasingly rejecting British society altogether (Hall et al., 1980). Consequently, more explicitly 'criminal' behaviours and identities were emerging throughout the 1970s and 1980s in black communities, due to “positive search for identity and survival in the harsh conditions of the inner city” (Lea & Young, 1982: 8). Rather than Politicised anger, in Hackney, the long term impact of disrespect and disempowerment was increasingly generating, even amongst school age children, ‘alternative system of values, rewards, and punishments working in diametric opposition to the school’s formal values” (Harrison, 1992: 292).

Thus, alongside the Political aspects and identities that were involved in the rioting, we also saw individualised resistance. Importantly, this is not conceived as immoral ‘criminality’, but rather an individualised form of anti-politics. A situation in which the political world is not only pre-reflexively rejected as a plausible medium for change, but where individualisation has impacted upon the capacity of Politicised identities to adequately enable expressive action which overcomes the sense of anger young people were feeling. Next we seek to connect the apparently ‘apolitical’ resistance in 2011 to that of the 1980s. We begin by looking at the forms of resistance and the relation to Political understandings, and then seek to highlight some processes which an explain this shift.

6.3. The Politics of Criminality in 2011

In the 1980s riots the legitimised political sphere was increasingly becoming irrelevant to the ‘struggle’ of young, principally black, and excluded
individuals. The relations of exclusion, disempowerment, and sense of disrespect this generated, not only produced anger but inhibited the expressive overcoming of the sense of disrespect through the legitimated political sphere. These exclusionary power relations were made manifest through different forms of anti-politics, firstly, in the Politicised rebellion which resisted and opposed the legitimated order. But these also manifested in what Engels (2005: 478) saw as individualised protest, or struggle without class consciousness - crime.

The 1980s were a period of great change and the shifts we see in Thomas were just the beginning. Indeed, Lea and Young’s (1982) point in 1982, that the black working class had been excluded from representation and action in the processes of labour and capital, would foreshadow the expansion of this super-exploited group. The ideological restructuring of the market and destruction of labour power by Thatcher’s government, which has just begun, would increasingly push the white working class into a position similar to that which black communities had been facing for years (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage. 2012; Clement, 2012; Reay, 2006).

By 2011 those resisting police and society through individualised means constitute a more ethnically diverse group. More important is that, in contrast to the 1980s, the notion that the riots were understood as about ‘race’ or ‘class’ was largely absent. While class and race were mentioned by rioters, these did not seem to function as a Political form of identity or enable the unification of rioters. As we saw it was the common opposition to the police that appeared create the realisation of a common purpose and unite rioters. Indeed, in 2011 rather than identities oriented to notions of race or class, some individuals were identifying as ‘criminal’:

I’m not law abiding like … [I’m here] to piss the police off, you get me (young male, Manchester riot, 2011, 0.57)

I am here ‘cos I’m a criminal man, fucking, that is what I do (male, Treadwell et al. 2013: 10)

You think there's no job out there for me, so you think fuck it, going
to go out on the road and steal and sell drugs, do whatever to get your money. (Rioter described himself as a ‘natural criminal’, young male, Birmingham, Carter(g), 2011)28

As we can see, this form of identification certainly has similarities to the notion of the ‘Hustler’, connecting to survival strategies and to positive forms of identification: ‘natural criminal’. Moreover, while any identification as ‘criminal’ at minimum implies a rejection of the authority of the police, for the first rioter his purpose in rioting is explicitly to ‘piss the police off’. Indeed, alongside the evidence of widespread exclusion amongst rioters, there is quantitative support for the widespread involvement of individuals who rejected the social orders normative regulation of behaviour and authority of the police.

The Home Office reported that the areas that were affected by disorder were typically those with generally higher crime rates (61% in top quartile) (THO, 2011: 9). Connecting this to issues of exclusion, the Riots, Communities, and Victims Panel reported a correlation between areas with greater level of deprivation and higher numbers of crimes during the riots, and moreover, that 71% of rioting occurred in areas that were ranked lowest for social cohesion (RCVP, 2011: 61-2). In addition, nationally, 71% of the adult male population brought for prosecution had prior criminal records, compared to 28% of the adult male population in general.29 Importantly, Reading the Riots’ data, based on a smaller sample but mostly including individuals not arrested, generally agrees with the court data, albeit slightly lower at 68% (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 14).

Looking at a different demographic, 45% of males prosecuted aged between 10-17 also had prior conviction comparing to just 2% of the general population (Gavin, 2014: v). In turn, 41% of all age groups brought before the courts had 5 or more previous criminal offences (MoJ(a), 2012: 16), while Casciani (2011) calculated that the average for those with prior convictions was 15,

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28 The identification of ethnicity in these sources is sporadic and generally left unstated. However, we can note that the previous chapter revealed the greater mix of ethnicities involved in the riots, with ‘black’ making up the second highest number of arrests (although in proportion to population this grouping is ranked highest) in contrast to the 1981 riot in Brixton of which around 80% of total arrests for attacks on the police were black individuals.

29 I could not locate figures for London on prosecutions.
however, these are not necessarily for serious crimes. Importantly, we should not argue that these individuals constitute a professional criminal class as per Cameron (2011); as Casciani points out the majority of convictions relate to theft or breaching orders, whereas only just over 14% of convictions relate to more serious crimes of violence, robbery, or burglary. In other words, what these figures indicate is what Morrell et al. (2011: 7) found during their research, that of a ‘low-level criminality’, demonstrating an increased willingness to transgress the law.

The point here is that we see the involvement of significant amounts of young men who appear to be rejecting society’s standards and values or are at least coming into increased contact with the law. Of course, blunt numerical data cannot reveal anything in itself, which is why it could be used to support Cameron’s claim of ‘criminality, pure and simple’. However, Cameron ignored the data we saw in the last chapter revealing social and economic exclusion, disengagement from the system, a lower sense of belonging, and a lack of aspirations within legitimate society. Taking these into account, the implication is that disempowerment and disrespect are causally involved in creating opposition to the values, rules, and representatives of dominant or legitimated society.31

Thus, rather than indicating the simple and uniform notion of ‘mindless criminals’ or ‘consumer’ rioters, this data reveals the lack of alternative identification processes by which individuals can generate self-esteem and a drive to resist the disempowerment and disrespect experienced through exclusion. However, perhaps the difference with regards to the ‘hustler’ is that identification as ‘criminal’, while also about resistance, seems to lack the Hustler’s position as semi-Political (Hall et al., 1980: 357). Paralleling the distinction between ‘Babylon’ and the ‘biggest gang’, the ‘criminal’ identity lacks the reflective consideration of action enabled by notions of black identity and understandings of racism. Thus, rather than ‘immorality’ or a complete

30 For example, failing to comply with Anti-Social Behaviour Orders.
31 For similar findings and arguments see Bourgios, 2003; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969; Fenwick & Hayward, 2000; Hallsworth, 2013; Hayward, 2004; Sutherland & Cressey, 1960; Wacquant, 2009.
absence of Politics, what we commonly and clearly see amongst rioters is individualised forms of resistance: to be a criminal, to attack the police.

Supporting this more complex notion of individualised resistance, Morrell et al. (2011: 7-8 & 34) found that a number of factors shaped involvement, not least notions that certain ‘criminal behaviours’ were ‘less wrong’, experiences of poverty, ‘little sense of ownership or stake in society’, and ‘cynicism/anger towards politicians [and] authority’. On the other hand, factors that inhibited involvement were being stakeholders in the community, having aspirations and prospects, and alternative forms of identity such as religious belonging (ibid). Indeed, Clive Bloom (2012: 106) argues that both religion and Political Islam have proved remarkably effective in countering crime in impoverished and excluded communities, by providing a sense of belonging, self-worth, and thus shifting behaviour away from illegal and violent practices.

6.3.1 Expressive Politics

If we examine the discourses of rioters, the presence of this Political context, albeit not an identity, is visible in the expressive or affective drive nature of the struggle and to differing extents in rioters’ perspectives:

Literally amazing, like. When people are actually going at the [police] vans themselves […] There's] a general feeling of being let down by the government. […] they don't like or trust the way the government works (young male, Liverpool, Carter(a), 2011)

There was people there to get on a rob [loot], there for the spectacle, there to have a go at police. And then people there for all of the above. We hate the police, hate the government, got no opportunities ..." (male 22, unemployed, Manchester, Clifton(c) 2011)

Both rioters explicitly reference political factors and connect government with police and their discontent. In turn, there is a sense of an excluded ‘us’ or ‘we’ in these discourses and there are signs of an anti-politics - change is not sought because the government and police are not ‘trusted’. However, in contrast to Thomas, the anti-politics and the ‘us’ lacks a unifying identity – this
is not about black people, this is not about racism.

While race based identities in the 1980s may have enabled to come together in opposition to the police, as we saw previously, in 2011 it appears it was only the common anger and dislike of police that enabled a social identity to emerge seemingly in the moment. The sudden realisation of strength and common enemy suggests that for some at least, the ‘us’ was a realisation produced by the riots, rather than something existing prior to them.

Thus, in the above quotes we see an individualistic perspective in operation, but not completely so. This individualistic perspective is much clearer in other rioters:

it's fucking my area … these fucking shops, like, I've given them a hundred CVs … not one job … That's why I left my house [...] yeah, maybe I have got a bit of hate in my heart … against the authority (22 male, unemployed, London, Prasad(g) 2011)

What is notable is that this rioter again has an element of the Political in his discourse. However, unlike the quotes above the discontent appears much more personal as the rioter expresses anger at not being given a job, and his dislike of the ‘authority’ and police. Indeed, this rioter goes onto discuss being made to feel ‘worthless’. Thus the Political relations and discontent felt seem to be understood in a more individualistic sense than the first set of quotes. Moreover, there is also no articulation that either emphasises change, or indeed, an understanding of the systemic origin of their discontent. Instead, this rioter has learnt to ‘hate’ authority.

However, perhaps the clearest indicator of individualised anti-political resistance visible in many of the rioters discourses, is that action is not collectively framed but about the self. Rather than an idea of the ‘legitimate self-defence’ of a community or group, overwhelmingly attacking the police in 2011 was about a release of emotion, as with Thomas (2012) in the 1980s, ‘revenge’ as ‘therapy’. It is in their dispositions that the Political is found, seen through the expressive nature of their descriptions which reveal the connection between the violence and disempowerment and disrespect: it was
‘literally amazing’ to attack the police.

6.3.2 Anti-Police Violence as politics in 2011

In the 1980s anti-police violence was both Political and anti-political. Similar can be said of the 2011 riots, which largely occurred in areas with high crime and poverty rates and a context of over-policing. However, with the loss of Politicised identities, as we began to see in Thomas in the 1980s, so diminishes the capacity to bridge “the impersonal aspirations of a social movement [with] their participants’ private experiences of injury” and enable a collective identity (Honneth, 1995: 163).

Without this collective identity to organise around and through, not only will the necessary Political movements required to generate change not materialise – or at least lack support – individuals from excluded communities will be unable to overcome the disrespect and shame experienced through collective organisation and empowerment. Collective resistance in this regard is not simply a pragmatic tool with which to reach a goal. It is an expressive and performative action which can overcome feelings of shame through social support, belonging, and empowerment (Arendt, 1970; Butler, 2004, Honneth, 1995: 164).

But with politics and Political identities pre-reflexively excluded, ‘criminal’ behaviour and violence becomes the expressive means by which to exercise and overcome the sense of shame and anger. Consequently, those who attack the police in 2011 reveal an anti-politics in their rejection of the norms and rules of behaviour. The Political is present through the relations of power that both shaped their dispositions to resist, and function as the performative means of resistance. Despite the lack of ‘empowerment’ as a collective, individualised expressive acts of violence overturn power relations and function as “a cleansing act […] that cures the oppressed of their ingrained feelings of inferiority” (Palshikar, 2005: 5431):

Fuck up feds’ … It felt like it was on a leash for years and it felt like we’ve come off the leash (male, student, 20, London, Prasad(a), 2011)
like someone was holding onto your shoulders in like a hug for a long time and then they just let go, like, no drugs could make you feel like this [...] you felt invincible in a way (rioter in 2011, 18, male, London, Newburn et al.(a), 2016: 5).

we violate [them] like they violate us, this was our way of getting revenge ... For once we had the police and government scared, for once they felt like we felt. (Prasad(c), 2011).

The euphoric expressions and the sense of release, mixed with anger, indicates they were overcoming prior relations in which their expectations for a positive sense of self were not being met (Honneth, 1995:136). The sense of shame was finally overcome through a performative conflict in which ‘violating’ the police displayed and demonstrated the police’s vulnerability in contrast to the rioters ‘invincibility’. By becoming superior, rioters overcame prior experiences of shame and enabled the released pent up anger: ‘we’ve come off the leash’.

Moreover, while the manner in which they expressed their discontent is individualised – emphasis is placed on their personal experience rather than a collective injustice – at the same time this is also appears to constitute an emerging Political moment. These rioters felt empowered through becoming a collective and acting in concert to change, if only for a moment, those power relations that cause discontent:

I could feel like, that the air was, it wasn't how it normally was, it was like an unspoken kind of feeling just floating around. It actually made me feel really strong. It made me feel really powerful. (Carter(d), 2011).

It seems the sense of power produced through a realisation of common opposition and success in overturning resented relations of power, at least contributed to a sense of a collective ‘we’ that we see in discourses. Prior conflict lines, be it ethnicity or estate, were overcome through the emotional release and overcoming of relations that had disempowered them. Indeed, the experience of unification and Politicisation can be a powerful one. The quote
below comes from a protester in the USA, but parallels and perhaps expands on many of the rioters’ statements:

by yourself, singly, you’re powerless. You’re subject to violence, you’re subject to death, you’re subject to a lot of aggressions and harassment … And that’s what makes it so powerful, that you feel that you’re reclaiming the space, that by yourself is not yours. (Women’s Critical Mass activist, quote in Ferrell, 2001: 91).

In other words the moment of the riots where rioters overcame the police achieved a primordial version of Arendt’s ‘power’. The individualised resistance that formed part of the everyday could never quite ameliorate the sense of stigma and inferiority or reverse the relations of power. However, together, through their mutual enemy, rioters realised their common cause and power. This sudden reversal and empowerment of rioters achieved their expectations of a positive self through punishing the police, and pleasure was experienced:

I was happy. I was overjoyed. Because it just felt so good … I was just like, 'Yes, you gonna get taught a fucking lesson now.' (male, student, 20, London, Prasad(a), 2011)

We smashed the police station at the bottom of Park Road and for me that was, I'll never forget that, never forget that. (male, 30s, unemployed, Carter; 2011, I knew…’)

In other words, the violent acts were individualised in that they expressed and sought to overcome the causes of personal discontent, but they were also Political in that they were produced by, but more importantly sought to “reorganize power relations between groups in the societies in which they materialize.” (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 45%). Because these relations were Political, those excluded had a common enemy and a common purpose. The rioting, for a moment, created the bridge between the individualised discontent, and a rudimentary realisation of the common cause. Having mapped out this individualised form of resistance, we need to explore how this type of resistance, rather than a Politicised form, could be produced.
6.4. Attacking the Police: from 1980 to 2011

6.4.1. Consumerism

As noted, what is perhaps the most obvious indicator of difference between the 1980s and 2011 riots was the substantial increase in looting. This has led to the argument that 2011, unlike the 1980s, was a consumer riot and in turn can be utilised to explain the individualistic or ‘apolitical’ actions of rioters (Bauman, 2011; Moxon, 2011; Zizek, 2011). The most developed and evidenced version of this argument with regards to the 2011 riots came from Treadwell et al. (2013). The argument makes a two-fold contribution to explaining the riots: firstly, that consumerism promotes an individualistic worldview in which the self becomes the focus of improvement or overcoming discontent, rather than politics. Secondly, that economic exclusion in a consumer society constitutes a form of social exclusion and disrespect.

This argument posits that consumerism constitutes one of the dominant and most widespread practices of achieving a positive relation to the self (Bauman, 2011 & 2000: 76; Hayward & Young, 2007: 112; Treadwell et al., 2013). By associating forms of social status with a product, the practice of consumerism creates the logic whereby material gain and display achieves the ‘idealised self’ and produces self-esteem (Bauman, 2000; Dittmar & Drury, 2000: 113; Wernick, 1983 & 1991: 23 & 61; Williamson, 1983: 19). However, as Hayward (2004) argues, the paradox of modern capitalist societies is that amongst the economically excluded it generates strong ‘feelings of alienation’, through over-exposing them to mainstream consumer culture.

The issue is not only economic, but symbolic. The exclusion from economic capital prevents or limits access to the signs of worth that run through consumerism. Supporting this notion, during my research in impoverished areas in north London, many identified the importance of looking good, having the right brands, or material gain. While Lim, Mark, and Steve all mentioned the importance of appearance for young people, Ned described how the clothes and brands you wore at school would impact upon social status. For
Maria: “like everyone has to dress nice and stuff”.

The habituation into doxic notions of success and status, combined with exclusion through the inability to effectively practise and obtain markers of economic capital, produces a form of ‘ontological insecurity’ (Hayward & Young, 2007:112; also see Honneth, 1995: 137). This was highlighted by Polly who described how most young people she knew spent their money on clothes, trainers, and gave a particularly telling example of a few young men she knew who had ‘flashy cars’ but could barely afford the petrol to run them.

They had the cars because it was important to their status and image in the local area. In part, Polly thought this was to do with the recent gentrification in the area and the increased visibility of wealth, thus as Bauman (2000) argues, comparison with the self is no longer defined by which class you belong to, but is applied to those most ‘successful’ in society. However, supporting Treadwell et al.’s (2103) argument, Polly was talking about the pressures of young people to engage in crime.

Each of the examples Polly gave were objects that, alongside the pragmatic purpose, may also function as a display and thus say something about the person’s status. Indeed, revealing the move away from ‘working class’ as a Political and positive identity, one rioter revealed the shift in the process of maintaining self worth:

> we’re in a working class area so if you turn around in your I dunno hundred pound trainers an’ say ‘Oh look at these what I got yesterday’ people gonna think ‘Ra this guy’s top guy in the school cos he got the best trainers’. So that can in a way put you in a different – different calibre or class whatever in your school area. (Slovo, 2012: 53).

What is particularly noticeable about the importance placed on material goods in relation to social recognition today is that any evaluation - positive or negative - is attributed to the individual: ‘this guy’s top guy’. Poverty has shifted from something excluded groups had to deal with, to symbolising the ‘inferiority’ of the individual. Through the individualising pressures of material
gain and display to achieve status and respect, we can see how such factors become pre-reflexively important and ‘working class’ loses the capacity to resist low self-worth. The expectations are no longer to ‘labour’ and cope with difficulty (Hoggart, 1992), but to display the right brands.

Polly contrasted this need to display with her experiences of being young in 1980s Hackney. For Polly it was okay to ask for help from neighbours, describing a community network of ‘aunties’ or friends of her mother who she could go to if there was a lack of food at home. These seem to have functioned as a local community with a set of norms and expectations that acknowledged their class and race based conditions as an injustice, providing emotional and practical support to each other, and enabling Polly not to feel disrespected by experiences of poverty. Today, she noted, it is not okay to ask for help from neighbours as this demonstrates inferiority.

Indeed, the scale of looting as well as the targeting of designer brands suggests this is an important factor (MoJ(a), 2012: 6; THO, 2011; Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011; RCVP, 2011: 46). According to Reading the Riots a number of retailers were mentioned again and again by interviewees, such as Foot Locker (which sells trainers), PC World, mobile phone outlets, and not least JD Sports, which lost £700,000 of stock (Roberts, 2011: 26%).

Talking to young people from the communities, RCVP (2011: 104) noted that brands that were mentioned and viewed as important not status tended to be ‘luxury’ or ‘designer’, such as Louis Vuitton, Nike, Apple, and Diesel.

Indeed, many rioters in 2011, to some extent, appear to have rejected the legitimated forms of cultural capital and economic practise (e.g. education, employment), but not economic capital per se as a function of generating self-worth. Perhaps because, as Hayward (2004) argues above, of the pervasive and encompassing message of consumerism. This is particularly visible through Treadwell et al.’s interviewees who mention exclusion from legitimate means of economic gain alongside the importance of material gain and display:

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32 I could only locate this in E-format without page numbers, thus provide the % as a general location of the source.
I am 23, never had no job, been in care, in Brinsford, Glenn Parva. I got fuck all to lose man, fucking Babylon [police] can't do shit anyway, fuck them. We run this town now, not them pricks man, I am gonna take as much as I can get. I want to get watches man, I want me a fucking Rolex. (Treadwell et al. 2013: 11)

The only people round me with cars and money, they’re dealers. Look at the cars on their drives, man, and it fucking shows crime pays, man. Now I am gonna have me some of this. (Treadwell et al. 2013: 10-11)

This drive to obtain and display material goods contrasts with law for those economically excluded, which functions as an inhibition to material gain outside of legitimated routes. Consequently, law contrasts with the understood modalities to develop and maintain a positive sense of self, and may become normatively devalued and potentially resented. Indeed, there is support for this perspective from other sources, such as the rioter who revealed that law had no normative power when he referred to looting as ‘just business’, or another rioter asked on a television interview if he felt guilty: “No cos I’m watching my plasma that I just got (laughter). Feels like Christmas came early.” (London Riots, 2011, 3.43).

There is much to take from Treadwell et al., (2013) and as we have seen, there is evidence that supports the importance and role of consumerism; not least the way in which consumerism has shaped the affective and pre-reflexive concerns and understandings of the excluded (and included). Again, this was supported in my findings. However, to argue that consumerism is the defining feature of the 2011 riots is a simplification which ignores similarities with the 1980s, homogenises rioters, and draws too strong a conclusion with the notion of consumer riots.

Indeed, the notion that looting was simply about self-gain lacks nuance. For some it certainly seems to be the case that looting was the primary or only motive, but this does not exclude that, as Harding (2012) argues, some acts of looting in 2011 functioned symbolically at gaining reputation on ‘the streets’; or as Platts-Fowler (2013) notes, that looting may often operate as an
expression of power over resented authorities. By breaking the ‘authority’s’ rules in front of them, one challenges their resented position of power.

As we saw in the previous section, there were a number of rioters who spoke of both looting and attacking the police, and indeed, expressed a sense of release with regards to their actions in general. Even in their own quote above, Treadwell et al. neglect the fact that one ‘looter’ explicitly expresses a discontent or anger with the police and satisfaction at overturning power-relations with them, achieved by looting: “Fucking Babylon […] fuck them. We run this town now, not them pricks man” (Treadwell et al. 2013: 11).

6.4.2 Anti-politics in 2011?

What appears to provide support for the consumer riot claim is the shift from the more Politicised actions in the 1980s, to apparent lack of both Political organisations and discourses in 2011. Indeed, we can note that in 2011 there were no organisations speaking out like that of the Black Liberation Front, and no politico-religious, or equivalent cultural, movements to that of Rastafarianism which explicitly speak to the Political context of excluded groups.

However, while this may in part, be attributable to consumerism’s diminishment of political forms of identification, to assume this is the only influence or indeed that the causal relation is linear, would be too simple. Indeed, this alone could not adequately explain both the anti-politics and the move towards criminal forms of resistance we saw in the 1980s riots, prior to the emergence of a strong consumer culture. Problematically, the over-emphasis on consumerism ignores the pre-reflexive rejection of politics that occurs through exclusion and alienation itself, and the complex ways in which this might occur.

Social exclusion tends to devalue accepted forms of engagement with society, such as politics, as the experience of disempowerment renders them

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33 There were of course, some people who spoke of the problems faced by young people in excluded communities, such as black journalist and activist, Darcus Howe, Sheldon Thomas (2012), and Stafford Scott (2011), community activist in Broadwater Farm. However, in general there appeared to be a qualitative and quantitative difference in the level of political articulation and organisation.
increasingly irrelevant to the social questions of the excluded (Deranty & Renault, 2009: 43, Hall et al., 1980). Thus as we saw in the 1980s, excluded classes often do not present their complaints to the political system, and discontent is expressed through practices and actions external and often in opposition to the legitimated social order.

Why the capacity of notions of black identity were ceasing to function to overcome the sense of disempowerment cannot be answered easily. Born in Britain to Jamaican parents, Nick felt there was a disconnect between the two generations. Nick and others also thought that first generation immigrants showed a deference or loyalty to the British state, an acceptance of their exploitation that did not speak to the later generations’ experiences (Hall et al., 1980; Pilkinson, 1988; Thomas, 2012). One youth worker in 1970s Brixton though the lack of black people in positions of power meant that “our children assume we are of little or no account and refuse to accept our discipline” (Gates Jr, 1976: 308).

However, there was also a certain lack in the capacity of political movements to speak to the young (Gates Jr, 1976: 315; Lea & Young, 1982; Penketh, 2000). From Nick’s description it seemed like the means to resist the disrespect felt through racism were present in the community, but the means to empower young people were not. On the one hand, he recalls more explicit talk of experiences of racism than today, which he felt helped unite the Caribbean community: ‘people were tighter’. But on the other hand, what Nick felt was not transmitted was the ‘sense of being in a struggle together’, of passing on the torch.

Nick, in part, felt this was to do with ‘ownership’, in which the elder generation thought they had done the hard work, while his and younger generations ‘had it easy’. Whatever the mix of relations, for the young black people growing up in the 1970s and 1980s, the older black generations were increasingly being understood in a negative light and therefore to some extent unable to shape the struggle: “we were not going to be like our parents, we were not going to allow a system to repress us” (Thomas, 2012: 115).

Indeed, Nick’s perspective rung true with what I had seen in my research.
While the youth project and Steve all provided services that were fundamental if we want to prevent alienation, crime, and rioting, there was a lack of Political dialogue. I saw no education regarding structural disadvantage or history of struggles being passed on to young people; there was no talk of racism and the disadvantages they might face.

This was supported by a distinction I noted during my research between the generations. While all of the elder generation (above 30 years) I spoke to explicitly identified and expected racial stereotyping by the police, and more often than not acknowledged the social and economic context behind involvement with crime, the younger generations tended to frame the discontent in more personal or individual terms, or mistreatment by the police as an issue of the particular police involved. Indeed, this individualised understanding seen in many rioter discourses, appears relatively common. The British Youth Council’s (2011) online survey finding that over half of the young people who responded identified the 2011 rioters’ ‘lack of respecting right and wrong’ and ‘lack of respect’ as significant causes of the riots.

This is not to argue for a clear line between the two generations, as modes of perception do not work in such clear ways – certainly Lim and Maria both had some understanding of the larger issues (particularly given their position in dealing with the problems of other young people). Nevertheless, there was a difference, and one which can be seen when we compare the two most extreme examples of each position: Aisha, a black woman in her late 40s who I met at the civilian stop and search monitoring group; and Mark, a black man in his early twenties, who volunteered and had previously attended the youth project in Hackney.

The informal interview/conversation with Aisha barely required me to ask any questions, other than an initial mention of my research on the police and the riots, before she set out how she saw the problems. Her perspective was well formulated, confident of the justness of her position, and one which framed black people as being systematically exploited and excluded, both by white society and their representatives, the police, and as noted she even connected this back to colonialism and slavery.
On the other hand, Mark felt differently; his errors in his life (getting into trouble with the police, and on one occasion being taken to court, although he did not state the nature of the charge), were down to him and being ‘young and stupid’. His response with regards to the motivations of rioters, although short, was to claim that the rioters were like him, irresponsible and out for themselves. In turn, when I asked what he thought about police racism, he simply responded: ‘If a policeman is an arsehole or a racist, then he’s going to be one when he does his job’.

In other words, Mark was using the ‘bad apple’ argument, and despite acknowledging some racism occurred in policing, he did not perceive racism as a political problem or as pertaining to the riots. Mark did not account for structural conditions and how this might have shaped his, rioters, or even the police’s behaviour, but rather blamed ‘bad’ policemen, the rioters, and even himself. Of course, how this impacted on Mark’s sense of self was not clear given his limited willingness to engage with me. However, we can note that of all those I interviewed, he was the most mistrustful towards my researcher identity, suggesting a stronger sense of rejection of legitimated society.

Indeed, when looking for organisations and charities that work with young people around the issues of exclusion and poverty in such areas, I began to note that these all tend to be framed through the individual and coping with the symptoms of exclusion. For instance, the organisations 100 Black Men/Women in London, appears to provide an invaluable service in inspiring confidence, aspirations, and self-esteem in young black people. However, this occurs through notions such as developing ‘leadership’ and ‘presentation and communication’, each of which seeks to empower the individual to overcome problems, not to motivate young people to deal with the wider structural issues that produce a lack of confidence. Thus, this may help for the specific child but not for future generations. This is not a criticism of the organisations per se, but perhaps of an individualised society that increasingly neglects the political sphere as a means of change.

6.4.3 Political Representation

Of note in this regard is the shift from legitimised political representatives of excluded black or local communities leading up to the 1980s, to politicians who seem distinct from the communities they represent by 2011. Take for instance, a Councillor and later MP for Haringey, Bernie Grant, a black man who was seen as a hard left politician. In response to the Broadwater Farm riots in 1985 he stated: “What the police got was a bloody good hiding”.\(^{35}\) Simply put, as part of the community he understood the violence was a response to the relation between police, society, and the black community in Tottenham. On the other hand the MP for Haringey in 2011, David Lammy, a locally born black man, seemed to tow the mainstream line, stating: “The vast majority of people in Tottenham reject what has happened here last night”, he went on to state the events had been carried out by ‘mindless, mindless people’ and unlike the riots of 1985 it was not about the police, ‘this was an attack on Tottenham’\(^{36}\).

In other words, although Lammy would acknowledge some of the underlying problems, he largely took the position of mainstream politicians and morally condemned the rioters.\(^{37}\) This condemnation is more than just problematic in itself, but indicative of a separation between the legitimised political representation of these areas, and excluded sections of the community. Unlike Bernie Grant who functioned as a spokesperson for black people in Haringey and thus provided a connection and means by which discontent could be articulated through the political system, Lammy blamed, demonstrating the lack of means by which the excluded are represented.

This again, returns us to the importance of considering what underpins modalities of exclusion such as racism - the maintenance of relations of privilege and disadvantage. Indeed, rather than seeking to overcome the issues highlighted by anti-racist movements, it is arguable that those benefiting from their position in the social hierarchy sought to incorporate and

\(^{35}\) For instance, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/706403.stm or https://www.theguardian.com/news/2000/apr/10/guardianobituaries.obituaries

\(^{36}\) See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVEQFsY7pY

\(^{37}\) Lammy also homogenised and simplified what ‘respectable’ members of the Tottenham thought, portraying a unified and straightforward understanding of local opinions.
silence the voices that opposed it.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, it may be the case that what we see in 2011 is the culmination of the process that Sheldon Thomas (2012)\textsuperscript{39} identified in his youth, where black leaders and spokespersons in the 1970s were increasingly taking governmental or official positions and losing touch with those they sought to speak for. Agreeing with Thomas, Lea and Young argue the introduction of ‘ethnic politics’ by the dominant white society in the 1960s and 1970s, diminished the capacity to form political resistance, as “[a]rticulate members of the black community were channelled off into the political vacuum of Community Relations Councils” (Lea & Young, 1982: 17).\textsuperscript{40}

For angry and disrespected young people the political sphere, and indeed, to some extent even Political movements, could no longer adequately offer a mechanism through which to express the anger: “our community leaders […] had no idea about our anger, hate, and worst of all the violence that was to come” (Thomas, 2012: 114). By 2011 this process, shaped by the increasing dominance of consumer society and norms, appears to have come to fruition and not only political action, but Political understanding, has become increasingly irrelevant: I don’t talk politics with them […] Young men like me think politics is a middle-class hobby (young person, rioter, Manchester, Morrell et al. 2011: 42).

\textbf{6.5. Conclusion}

What we have seen throughout this exploration of the forms of resistance seen during rioting in the 1980s and 2011, is that there has been an

\textsuperscript{38} It should be acknowledged that the protection of privilege is far more complex than I can give space to here, and in no way is the argument being made that the dominant group simply form a conscious and intentional group cynically oppressing the lower echelons of society. Rather, this point should be considered inline with the broader argument being made throughout this thesis, that of the pre-reflexive nature of prejudice in maintaining privilege through shaping interpretation of events and stereotypes of individuals with certain markers. For instance, see Neil’s (2003:71) comparison between the Scarman and later MacPherson Reports, and how the change in ‘regimes of truth’ regarding race, first inhibited and later enabled the acceptance of institutional racism as a feature of the police.

\textsuperscript{39} Supporting the notion that positive role models who articulate Political means of resistance can help, Bernie Grant would actually take Sheldon Thomas (2012) under his wing and help him out of the gang lifestyle. Today, Thomas works to help young people in similar situations to those he experienced, escape violence and gangs.

\textsuperscript{40} , Bernie Grants seems to have been an exception even in the 1980s and not only is still spoken of positively in Tottenham today, but was renowned for his radical politics and it seems was also considered a problem for the establishment and even an embarrassment to the Labour Party.
increasing shift away from legitimated society. The social order is failing to maintain itself because the affective responses to exclusion and stigmatisation have no means to be expressed other than in violent opposition to the system. This was already apparent in the 1980s when resistance was articulated as rebellion and anti-politics. However, perhaps even more dangerous for the social order was that which has been labelled ‘criminality’, but can be understood as a form of resistance without the bridge that enables the Political understanding and collective organisation seen in the rebellious movements.

Without this form of Political understanding and identity to resist and overcome disrespect and disempowerment, all that is left is an individualised rejection of the normative rules. Expressive and performative displays of disrespect to the authorities provide esteem through the transgression of law, and reject the capacity of society to judge and disrespect. It was this form of resistance that was prevalent in the 2011 riots. Here the sense of disrespect and disempowerment was the same as the 1980s, but the violence was increasingly individualised, a personal expression of anger and rage which could not adequately be dealt with in the day to day.

The rioters of 2011 largely seem to have lacked the issues of racism or class to unite around and form identities that could resist the stigma and low-self worth the felt from exclusion. Without these, violence as a momentary overturning of power relations, was all that was left to them. Yet in the riots, the common and potent anger against the police – the most visible, tangible, and importantly, present oppressor – enabled rioters to achieve a moment of empowerment, where together they could make the police feel as the rioters do in the day-to-day.

In trying to understand this shift we noted the importance of consumerism and the lack of realistic political representation or Political identities had shaped an individualistic approach to the world. These factors inhibited the expression of discontent through logics and identities that framed their condition structurally, and through modalities that could re-articulate their sense of self through a new and Politicised group. However, to focus down on particular relations and
seek to explain the attacks on the police through these alone, neglects how logics such as individualism or lack of Politicised representatives and movements interact with exclusion in education and employment. Neither individualism nor the shift in political representation simply occurred out of the blue, but emerge from larger social processes.
7. Neoliberalism: The Expansion of Disrespect

7.1. Introduction:

The similarities between the attacks on the police in the 1980s and 2011 riots were clear. Both were justified as a response to long term aggressive and disrespectful over-policing. Both appear to have been committed principally by young men, and in both decades these young men appear to have disproportionately come from backgrounds of poverty, unemployment, failure in education, and were more likely to have felt disconnected or alienated from society.

The 1980s revealed that the contexts of exclusion and over-policing were intertwined. Through society’s operant stereotypes of the lower ranked, the police reproduced society’s social hierarchy or relations of privilege and disadvantage by criminalising and over-policing principally black, but also white, communities. Consequently, if the analysis of the 1980s taught us anything it is that to gain an understanding of how those who are supposed to keep the peace once again became the focus for violence in 2011, we cannot confine ourselves to relations between the rioters and police but must understand what underpins and shapes this conflict.

While the last chapter examined the forms of resistance in rioting, connecting this to the larger social context, this chapter develops the account of the role of the social order in generating individualised resistance. Firstly, this chapter explores the broader social, political, and economic processes which have both shaped, and been shaped by, individualistic logics with the impact of increasing the type of resistance we saw in 2011. Secondly, to connect the gap between structure and agency, the chapter will explore how the exclusions in education and employment, identified amongst rioters, translates into shame and disrespect, and how this also contributes towards individualised forms of resistance.

As we will see, the emerging dominance of neoliberalism and its emphasis on individualism and meritocracy has resulted in an increasing shift away from forms of prejudice/stereotypes that explicitly reference social structure (class
and race) in their justification of (dis)advantage. On the one hand, neoliberal educational and economic policies created a more ethnically heterogeneous super-exploited group, such as we saw in the data on 2011. On the other, the individualistic and meritocratic logic of (neo)liberalism rendered ‘race’ and ‘class’ based forms of exclusion morally problematic, or unable to perform the function of justifying the privilege of the dominant groups.

Thus, racist expressions and stereotypes were repressed, as black individuals apparently ceased to be the dominant targets of exclusion. However, the social and economic inequality that this stereotype had justified remained – black people did not and were not allowed en mass move up the social hierarchy. Thus, the argument will be made that the drive or need to justify relations of privilege and disadvantage, that is prejudice, was re-formed into the ethnically inclusive, moralising, and ‘morally acceptable’ category of the ‘underclass’ (Tyler, 2013).

Yet, as Bulmer & Solomos (1999: 5) argue, identification in terms of ‘race’ is necessary to resist ‘racism’. Individualism did not simply shape the way individuals thought about their exclusion, it shaped the very visibility of that exclusion. Without explicit forms of structural distinction, rather than moral forms, it becomes harder to create a bridge between the personal experiences of shame and anger, and that of people ‘like you’. In other words, individualism has impacted in multiple ways; on the logic of exclusion, on the visibility of those forms of exclusion, and as we saw in the last chapter, on how shame and disrespect is processed.

7.2. From Class to Underclass

7.2.1 Economy

Prior to the 1970s white working class children had relatively stable, albeit class and gender based, expectations (Clement, 2012; Reay, 2006). Working class boys would expect to leave school for factory apprenticeships, or perhaps join the police or military, while for girls the options were generally restricted to nurses, shop assistants, or house wife. Despite clear
discrimination and an educational system that reproduced disadvantage, the white working classes’ path into and through society offered stability and some measure of economic security.

The late 1970s and 1980s saw the restructuring of the market in the name of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘efficiency’, resulting in deindustrialisation and loss of manual labour jobs, the privatisation of public services, the weakening of trade unions, the removal of apprenticeships, and loss of the possibility of a ‘job for life’ (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage. 2012: 7-8; Clement, 2012).

On one side of this ideological shift, neoliberal policies beginning with Thatcher focused on the notion of ‘choice’, and claimed to free individuals from the restraints of state legislation by turning services and welfare into quasi-consumer markets (McMahon, 2007). This was claimed to create efficiency through competition, and unburden the taxpayer from the inefficient bureaucracy of the state and the freeloaders in the benefit system. Supposedly ending the questionable ‘something for nothing culture’, the guarantees of the welfare state, such as social housing or unemployment benefits, began disappearing, leaving those the most disadvantaged increasingly vulnerable to market forces (Atkinson, 2012; Atkinson, Roberts & Savage, 2012).

The other side of neoliberalism’s laissez-faire argument called for deregulation of the market itself in order to enable the full benefits of competition to create economic growth. The reality, however, was not de-regulation but rather disguised state intervention, or regulation on the side of capital in order to remove restrictions to wealth accumulation by business (Lipman, 2012: 244). This meant the removal of protections on waged labour, an acceptance of a certain amount of unemployment in order to make a readily available and cheap labour force, limitations on striking, and reduction in certain taxes whilst increasing others, such as VAT (Value Added Tax), which disproportionately impacts on those with the lowest incomes (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage, 2012; Avis, 2014).

One impact of this process was to disempower the white working class by removing their traditional access point and bargaining route from the
processes of political engagement; labour power increasingly ceased to have a say in the organisation of social life. As Lea and Young (1982) pointed out in 1982, for black communities this was a ‘crisis for the political process’. Harrison notes in Hackney that the increasing economic weakness of workers in manufacturing, translated into political weakness: “The more they needed a pay rise, the less they could afford to take industrial action” (1992: 55). In other words, black communities were increasingly being joined by members of white working class, in being disempowered and unable to seek change through the legitimated political system.

The other related implication was to push the white working class into even closer proximity to black communities in terms of economic status and stability. Beginning in the 1970s but accelerating in the 1980s, neoliberalism would breakdown the white working class structure with secure employment opportunities and economic stability, in order to produce ‘flexible labour’. While this may benefit business, as Avis (2014: 67) points out, this is because risk is shifted from the business and the economy to the individual worker. The result was increased insecurity for the worker, a reduction in power or bargaining capacity, and thus increasing exploitation in a situation where any safety offered by the state is being increasingly withdrawn.

The impact of such policies and attempts to globalise the British economy meant recession and increasing poverty in the most disadvantaged areas, specifically those that relied on manual labour. Success for business in the neoliberal economy meant shedding labour costs by reduction in jobs, wages, and even moving production to countries with cheaper labour sources. The idea of ‘flexible labour’ does not mean the individual simply becomes flexible, but rather the labour pool becomes flexible. Thus, working class areas suffer when businesses migrate but the labour force is unable to adapt.

Harrison (1992: 50) notes that Hackney in the 1970s saw a 40% drop in manufacturing jobs between 1973 and 1981, the principle sector providing employment for residents. This process would reshape the city through the distribution of wealth, and creating ‘new urban geographies of exclusion and marginalization’ (Lipman, 2012: 249). As Atkinson (2012) found during his
ethnographic research into economic insecurity, the impact of neoliberal policies and cuts has been an increase in negative affect amongst those ‘closest to necessity’; coping strategies were buying cheaper foods thus decreasing nourishment, giving up cars, selling possessions, and working longer hours: “words like ‘anxious’, ‘stressed’, ‘worried’, ‘unhappy’, or ‘feeling a failure’ speckled the participants’ accounts” (Atkinson. 2012: 26).

Ultimately, the impact upon the lower end of the social hierarchy was material and existential insecurity and disempowerment. The gains won by the white working class movement were being withdrawn, and with this the class distinction between white and the under-privileged, black working class. Thus, as the last chapter demonstrated, in the 1970s and 1980s the black communities, excluded on class and race based lines, suffered most; yet, increasing numbers of the white working class were pushed into similar levels of poverty and insecurity.

7.2.2 Education

Despite the rhetoric of ‘fairness and responsibility’ and giving ‘talent and ambition’ the opportunity to develop and achieve regardless of a person’s background, upon entering government in 2010 the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition introduced a period of austerity which targeted the worst off in UK society, both economically and educationally (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage. 2012: 5). Perhaps the most famous cut in the context of the 2011 riots was that of Educational Maintenance Allowance or EMA, which provided a small contribution to poorer students in non-compulsory education. Yet this was simply one amongst many; the recession that hit in 2007 and the subsequent austerity programme saw cuts in welfare, education, and youth resources across the board.

As is the case with cuts to public services in an unequal society, the need for services is not uniformly distributed, and it is those already economically and socially excluded who suffer the most (Atkinson. 2012: 14). Reay (2012: 34-5) argues the recent austerity program has disproportionately impacted on poorer students and institutions, with those on free school meals having support cut by £370 per year, while schools in deprived areas have had to cut
services such as careers advice and extra support for low performing children, and youth services decimated, with Haringey seeing 8 out of 13 youth centres closing and a 75% cut in youth funding (Cooper, 2012).

While certainly implicated in the 2011 riots however, these are only the most recent round of reduction in services. Moreover, while they may have had an immediate impact on young people, these cuts did not have the time to shape alienated dispositions through long term experiences of disrespect. Again, the exclusion and disrespect faced by young people today can be better understood if we return to the 1970s and 1980s.

Arguably the British educational system has always functioned as mechanism to reproduce the social hierarchy. The basic logic of providing certificates to students, ultimately functions to create distinctions between members of a social order. In effect, the system creates a privileged minority with the cultural capital to gain prestigious positions and higher incomes in contrast to the rest. As Harrison (1992: 291; also see Reay, 2006) notes, the education system has always been based on class-based forms of knowledge and practice: “instead of compensating for disadvantage, British education reinforces it and perpetuates it” (Harrison, 1992: 278).

Simply put the education system was designed to reward what the middle and upper classes had, and exclude those that lacked it. Working class parents who have not succeeded in education, who hold little practical experience of subjects and skills, or place little value in educational success, at best cannot adequately prepare their children, and at worst reproduce their own lack of value in the system (Atkinson, 2010; Reay, 2012: 43). Moreover, the education system failed to account for the geographical accumulation of deprivation and educational disadvantage. Thus, in areas with high ethnic minorities and concentrated deprivation, like Hackney, Harrison found that schools struggled under the weight of the difficult tasks they faced: “the average level of ability and behaviour is so poor that every school […] is a dump school compared with a suburban comprehensive” (ibid).

For the white working class, the stability and wide availability of manual labour
employment routes meant this was less of a problem pre-1970s. The same could not be said for Caribbean immigrants who have been excluded from accessing educational and economic capital from the very beginning. Thus the black working class formed the super-exploited group (Hall et al., 1980); the bottom class, rejected and offered nothing by society. However, once neoliberal regulation and recession began to change things, education became far more important in terms of gaining employment. Thus the inequalities that underpin the system, but had only been fully felt by the black population, began to impact the white working classes.

Due to the individualistic ideology of ‘choice’, deindustrialisation, and the requirements of ‘flexible’ labour, educational qualifications increased in importance with regards to gaining employment. Under the ideological purview of neoliberalism, the education system would facilitate a meritocratic society allowing the most talented to rise to the top in a system where all could compete against all. Amongst other reforms, the National Curriculum was introduced in 1988 along with competition between schools and students, whereby standardised testing functioned as economic measures of performance that could be rewarded through funding (Beckmann & Cooper, 2005; Clement, 2012). Schools could now be measured against each other, rewarding institutions for doing well and encouraging lower performers to improve.

While these policies began with Thatcher, the flaw was perhaps most visible in the late 1990s when Tony Blair’s New Labour continued and increased the Conservative focus. New Labour took the competitive logic even further and compounded the hidden structural disadvantage by ‘naming and shaming’ failing schools and emphasising ‘standards of literacy’ (Sammons, 2008: 654-655). Problematically, the emphasis on ‘standards’ – a blunt, decontextualised measure of performance – ignored a plethora of structural disadvantages that might have contributed to lower performance.

Neoliberal educational policy has also ignored the impact of poverty. In the UK social inequalities have a markedly high impact on student performance (Atkinson, 2010; Beckmann & Cooper, 2005; Clement, 2012; Reay, 2006 &
Indeed, using a longitudinal study and regression analysis of children born in 1970, Bynner and Parsons (2002: 298-300) show that those unemployed and with little educational qualifications are more likely to have had a low birth weight (suggesting lower standard of nutrition and poverty), grown up in inner city housing estates, been on free school meals, and come from families on benefits.

But the disadvantage faced by poor and working class children is not just from their background, however, but also compounded by the schools they attend. In the competitive system, failure in the educational race does not mean help for those lagging behind, but penalisation. Rather than overcoming disadvantage, the pseudo-meritocratic system rewards schools for excluding students who are failing or disruptive by better positioning them in the league tables. Not only does this mean that, as the external pressures on schools have increased, so has the number of children excluded (Beckmann & Cooper, 2005: 479); but also this has functioned to further stratify the school system.

Good publicity in league tables attracts the better prepared, or privileged students; lower positions in the league tables mean parents with the cultural and economic capital to send their children elsewhere, do so. Consequently, failing schools in areas of poverty can only attract those most unprepared for the education system, resulting in a cyclical relation of deterioration (Atkinson, 2010; Lipman, 2010: 245-6; Reay, 2012; Sammons, 2008: 655). The competition between schools in the attempt to attract students and maintaining funding has explicitly shifted to a system that creates winners and losers. The losers are ‘dump’ or ‘sink schools’ where the most disruptive, disadvantaged, and the worst performing children end up (Harrison, 1992; Sammons, 2008: 654).

In other words, neoliberal policies have not done anything to solve the reproduction of inequality and exclusion that the education system has produced. Instead neoliberalism has exacerbated these inequalities by hiding the impact of deprivation and the social hierarchy on performance. The result has been, as Reay (2006: 295) puts it, to shift the white working class from
‘educational outsiders’ to ‘outsiders within’: everyone competes and is measured against each other, but not everyone starts from the same position.

Disadvantaged young people would now have to enter an increasingly insecure and competitive market place, which allocates rewards to individuals based on their achievements in a system operates on an implicit class system. Of course, this system to some extent already existed for the super-exploited black communities up until the 1980s. What neoliberal educational policies have ultimately achieved is to expand disadvantage and the super-exploited group.

7.3. From ‘Black’ to ‘Underclass’

In 2011 we saw, in contrast to the 1980s, a more ethnically mixed group individuals attacking the police produced by the expansion of the super-exploited group. However, we also saw less identification around notions of race or class, and an increase in individualised resistance. This did not emerge out of nowhere but reflects changes in power in the social order. Thus, we need to understand the way in which notions of race changed with these material changes.

Race and class are two forms of distinction by which the social hierarchy, or privilege and disadvantage, was maintained; the stereotypes that functioned as forms of distinction served as justifications for these relations of privilege/disadvantage, delegitimising representatives and behaviours of the excluded (Lee, 2017; Skeggs, 2004). The result of neoliberal policies has been to increase poverty and insecurity amongst the most vulnerable, whilst simultaneously removing the economic and social stability of the white working class. While explicit racial prejudice meant that previously black groups constituted as the bottom group, the destruction of the class structure shifted more white people into similar conditions. At the same time ideological changes were occurring through the increasing emphasis on individual choice and meritocracy, tied up in the justification of laissez-faire capitalism.

Beginning in the 1960s, liberal ‘meritocratic’ society was increasingly
positioning racial and to some extent, class-based hierarchies as moral wrongs under the logic of equality of opportunity for all (Clement, 2012; McKoy, 2001). However, racial prejudice does not simply disappear because the category of ‘race’ is no longer normatively accepted (Bulmer & Solomos, 1999: 5). What is important was not why one’s group was superior to another, but simply that they were. As James Baldwin put it so potently in the Civil Rights era, the ‘race problem’ in America was not black people, but white America’s social and psychological need to invent ‘the nigger’ (Baldwin, 1998: 718). In other words, with the increasing multi-ethnic super-exploited group, and the meritocratic myth, the neoliberal social order required a more suitable form of stereotype to justify relations of privilege.

7.3.1. Shifting Logics of Exclusion

As we have seen, the last four decades have expanded the exclusions and inequality that were produced by ‘race’ and ‘class’ as categories of distinction. Simply put, the moral rejection of the categories of ‘race’ and ‘class’ has not been accompanied by the dissolution of the social hierarchy and inequality that was justified by them. Thus while the particular categories may slide into the background, this simply implies that the form of making distinctions between groups has shifted. This new form of distinction requires a stereotype that does not contradict the liberal morality of equality and ideals of a meritocratic society.

Indeed, we began to see such a change in the last chapter, which demonstrated how racial stereotypes of black people had shifted to fit the changing context, starting from the colonialist logic of biological inferiority before moving to ‘black criminality’. This shift in stereotype did not simply result from changes in understanding of ‘race’, but also from the material context; shifting from enslavement and colonisation outside of British society, to exclusion and stigmatisation within British society. As we have seen, this shift produced rejections of, and forms of resistance to, white British society, such as the Black Panthers, or the acceptance and valorisation of semi-criminal roles like the ‘hustler’.

The very consequences of widespread stigmatisation and exclusion began to
be utilised as evidence for the justifiability of that exclusion, as the black population was morally demonised through associations with poverty, problem estates, and unemployment (Penketh, 2000: 20). Black resistances, alongside media portrayals and panics about ‘black crime’, produced fear amongst the dominant groups of a loss of their privileged position and sense of identity, which had been pre-reflexively constructed through “the superiority of white culture” (Penketh, 2000: 10; Hall et al., 1980). Indeed, Thatcher herself expressed this exact sentiment, implicitly framed through racial prejudice, but underpinned by a need to protect white privilege:

The British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile (Thatcher, quoted in Cole, 2016: 39).

Resistance to a white dominated social hierarchy and its stigmatisation of black communities resulted in a change in stereotype; from one where blacks were simply inferior and thus justifiably lower down the pecking order, to one in which blacks were increasingly criminalised and viewed as “on the wrong side of the moral divide, part of the alien evil that threatens the security of the white world” (Gunning, 2010: 37). Rather than simply justifying the position of blacks in society through biological inferiority, which was increasingly being rejected as a logic with any scientific or evidential base, the different behaviour of the excluded became to be framed as a moral and physical threat that needed to be ‘policing’ (Lea & Young, 1982: 10-11). The flaw was not in their biology but their morality.

However, with the increasing shift to a (neo)liberal, meritocratic outlook and the notion of equality of opportunity, and the increasingly ethnically mixed super-exploited group, discrimination through concepts such as race and class were considered morally wrong. Liberal policies which sought to tackle racism, however, were doomed to failure for the very same neglect of structure we saw above. These policies did so by focusing in all the wrong places, and arguably ended up simply repressing explicit racism without tackling the structural source of the prejudices.
For instance, the introduction of ‘ethnic politics’ gave no actual power away, but put up a façade of change (Lea & Young, 1982). ‘Racial Awareness Training’ in state institutions in the 1960s and 1970s assumed racism could be solved by making individuals ‘aware’ of their prejudice (Penketh, 2000: 25-6); similarly, liberal notions of multiculturalism (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995) frame the problem as one of culture clashes that can be overcome by dialogue. Problematically, such approaches ignored the role of structural (dis)advantage in prejudice (Cole, 2016: 38; Penketh, 2000: 25; Skeggs, 2010). Thus, rather than resolve the inequality that fed racism and classism, the particular modalities were suppressed.

Once race and class could no longer be utilised to justify the sense of superiority and position of the dominant in the social hierarchy, the affective, or pre-reflexive prejudice required a new cognitive form of distinction that would side-step any moral dissonance with the liberal worldview. In other words, liberalism required a stereotype that concealed its very basis and role in the hierarchy. The ‘underclass’ does such a job by shifting emphasis away from something beyond the control of the individual (biology or socio-economic position) to something morally wrong with the individual (criminality).

The individualistic logic that argues those who achieved their wealth did so simply by hard work, simultaneously conceals the impact of structure on social position and inequality, which becomes a matter of poor individual choices or laziness. The ‘underclass’ enables distinctions to be made between those ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, the ‘hard workers’ from the ‘parasites’, but it does by drawing on implicit stereotypes of black people and ‘white trash’ (Tyler, 2013: 186 & 188-9).

The point to make is that ‘underclass’ does not constitute a disjuncture or separation from what went before, but rather should be understood as a cognitive (re)construction of the stereotypes of ‘black’ and ‘class’. The new stereotype draws on previous reservoirs of prejudice, and brings together the markers previously associated with these categories. So now a black man, if he dresses in a way that does not transgress middle class norms he may,
more often, avoid being judged as dangerous. However, if he combines the correct markers – speaking the London patois, dressing in a hoody, and so forth – he will likely be judged and treated as criminal. The same will apply to a white man, with the obvious exception of skin colour. Thus the shift from ‘black’ and ‘class’ to ‘underclass’ enabled certain affective prejudices to be maintained; avoided moral contradictions now associated with ‘race’ and ‘class’; adapted to the shifting economic and social circumstances that were producing a more ethnically mixed dominated group; and thus protected the social hierarchy and privilege that accompanies this.

7.3.1. Enacting the ‘Underclass’

Of course, to say that the ‘underclass’ is utilised as an explicit mode of distinction would be to defeat what it achieves – the concealment of discrimination. Rather, ‘underclass’ to some extent refers to the moral condemnation of anyone who fits the profile. Indeed, New Labour’s ‘NEETs’ (18-24 year olds who are ‘Not in Employment, Education, or Training’) is one example of how such prejudice is implemented. ‘NEET’ constitutes a quantitatively measured and thus morally ‘neutral’, but functionally similar concept to the ‘underclass’.

As Clement (2012) points out, those grouped this way are actually a consequence of the above changes to industry and education, the failure to account for the impact of disadvantage, and the stigmatisation for failing. Yates et al. (2011) highlights the variety of backgrounds that are unproblematically grouped together, making single resolutions unlikely to succeed. Yet the purpose of these terms, as McMahon (2007) argues, is not to resolve but to reconstruct or ‘rediscover’ so called ‘social problems’ in order to attribute easy ‘solutions’. While NEETs are seemingly identified by their structural position, it is actually the behaviour of NEETs (economically unproductive, anti-social, etc.) that is the main concern.

Indeed, even where New Labour explicitly identified structural disadvantage with regards to ‘NEETs’, ‘solutions’ focused not on changing the structure that disadvantaged them, but as with earlier liberal anti-racist initiatives, by focusing on the individual; or in other words, not on the what causes ‘low
ambition’, but on the ‘low ambition’ itself (Avis, 2014: 64). Indicative of this pathologisation was New Labour’s policy of offering counselling and training programs (Bynner and Parsons, 2002) in an effort to turn them from work shy and unproductive, into economically active members of society. Of course, once this fails to achieve results, it ultimately provides proof of the hidden stereotype, because, ‘Why if we have done so much for the socially excluded are they still behaving so badly?’ (McMahon, 2007: 28).

As has been pointed out previously, neoliberalism did not create the exclusion and stigmatisation of those positioned at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Rather, what I have begun to explain above is what we saw in the difference and emerging process between the 1980s and 2011: a more ethnically mixed group to some extent rejecting the norms, values, and authority of society. Part of this came through concealing economic and social disadvantage, resulting in members of the white working class being pushed into the position of super-exploited previously reserved principally for the black population. However, neoliberalism also shifted the modalities by which individuals are distinguished and excluded, leaving the exclusion intact but removing the explicit means by which it occurs. This also has an impact on the lived experience of exclusion.

7.4. Lived Experience

As with ‘black’ and ‘criminality’ in the 1970s and 80s, ‘underclass’ is not simply a stereotype plucked out of the air; it is a simplification and misdiagnosis of behaviour, and a generalisation that groups socio-economically positioned individuals. Moreover, it does not simply symbolically frame an individual, but shapes the treatment of them by society. Thus in seeking to expose the anatomy of the ‘underclass’, and how this mechanism is implicated in attacks on the police, we must look at how individuals experience exclusion and stigmatisation and how this generates the resistance we saw in 2011.

Utilising a longitudinal study, Yates (2011: 16) points out that among young men with low socio-economic status, those with ‘misalignment and uncertainty
in aspirations', were significantly more likely to finish school without qualifications and end up unemployed. Low performance and experience of education alongside experiences of unemployment has been shown to connect to involvement in crime and disengagement from the legitimated system (Atkinson, M. 2012; Bynner and Parsons, 2002; Carrabine et al., 2014: 377; Skeggs, 2010; Tyler, 2013). Indeed, Agnew (2012: 33-4) notes that crime in the US, rather than correlating with social class, has been found to be highest amongst those who have low educational and occupational expectations, and have been subject to “harsh, demeaning and unfair treatment by parents and teachers as well as those who find school ‘boring’” (ibid: 34). In other words, those who are taught not to expect to do well tend to be those resisting norms of the social order.

While this was also the case in the 1980s, and thus led to increases in crime, we cannot ignore the increases in individualised resistance in 2011. Prior to the educational reforms discussed above, the system explicitly operated on and excluded individuals on class and race lines. Thus while it stigmatised white and, even more so, black working classes, the recognised existence of these groups enabled forms of resistance whereby young people could appropriate certain positive identities. These enabled young people to some extent, to negate the stigma and disrespect through belonging to alternative forms and standards of valuation tied to identities of ‘black’ or ‘working class’ (Hall et al., 1980; Harrison, 1992; Hoggart, 1992; Willis, 1979).

The impact of neoliberal changes to education and the economy has been to expand these exclusions and forms of disrespect. In part, this has occurred through the concealment of structural disadvantage, which both exacerbated and expanded economic and social disadvantage. In education specifically, the competitive system also began to increasingly attribute ‘failure’ to the student alone.

Without the cognitive means to frame the shame experienced as an injustice, or understand oneself as part of a group that rejects legitimated society’s ‘education’, and to create processes of identification that can produce a positive sense of self, shame will be increasingly experienced and
internalised. Excluded from or disadvantaged in the legitimated forms of education, individuals will have no way to overcome this shame and re-establish a positive sense of self. Thus, they will increasingly reject the dominant norms, values, and authorities; instead they will valorise what they attributes they have, and even those practices which enable them to express their anger at authorities (Atkinson, 2010; Reay, 2012).

### 7.4.1. Education and Disrespect

Agnew’s (2012) findings that delinquency correlates with low aspirations and experience of disrespect picks up on both interconnected aspects that shapes the rejection of legitimated society and different forms resistance to it – shame and identification. The aim of the youth project in Hackney is to give disadvantaged young people the help and assistance that most others in society take for granted. By doing this they seek to counter the disrespect and disempowerment imposed on young people through exclusion and stereotyping.

One of the principle means they seek to achieve this is through facilitating success in education and, in turn, gaining meaningful employment: “the major goal is to help kids from the ‘hood’ in terms … try to adapt to society, modern society and help them develop erm, qualifications or if they’re interested in certain activities, dance, knife awareness, fashion, etc” (Lim). The reason for this is that many of the young people come from the sorts of economic pressures and family circumstances we have described above, and lack the skills and ‘confidence to succeed’ (Mark).

Many children at the youth project came from single parent families who could not provide the time and/or a pragmatic understanding of educational skills and practices necessary to succeed in the system. While at the most extreme, other young people came from contexts where drug addiction or violence was common, resulting in situations of neglect in which educational performance understandably suffered. Adolescence is a key time in the formation of identity, and through peer relationships an individual can experience “group belonging, acceptance, solidarity and social affirmation” (Robertson, 2002: 73). Thus these conditions alone can be particularly alienating for children,
producing experiences of rejection, insecurity, and humiliation resulting in a particularly low sense of self-worth (Gilligan, 2003; Ray, 2016: 349; Reay, 2006).

However, these conditions also mean that many of the children lacked the implicit and basic understanding of how to engage with the legitimated system. This did not simply extend to educational subjects but to the very basic knowledge required to interact with the social system. For instance, the project often dealt with young people who did not understand how to open a bank account, or more worrying, why they might need one. Thus, to attempt to engage with the legitimated social order is, from a very early point, something not understood and intimidating.

Not having the necessary cultural capital also does not simply mean that they are less skilled or knowledgeable in the valued and required forms of practice; the notion of capital implicitly references both the idea of social reward or respect. This is fundamentally important to understanding the generation of self-esteem and dispositions to engage with what may otherwise be an alien and intimidating system. In other words, the key issue that related to the (anti)educational and societal dispositions of young people that the project sought to overcome was low self-esteem.

For instance, all the young people seemed relaxed and outspoken within the project, yet this was in stark contrast with their interaction with me (or rather my researcher identity). Particularly towards the beginning the young people often closed down, stopped smiling, and even refused engagement. My position was as an outsider and threat to their self-worth; it is not hard to imagine that many might respond in a similar, albeit more familiar, manner to teachers and other authorities/representatives in society.

Indeed, this was a problem the youth project often had to deal with as education was often seen as something unpleasant and not worthwhile.41 The education system is implicated in processes that produce low-self esteem rather than enabling positive forms of identification, thus the youth project

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41 For similar finding see Atkinson, 2010; Harrison, 1992; & Reay, 2006
often worked with young people who are disengaging and rejecting the values of the system. These problems tend to begin at home. As with Harrison’s findings in the 1980s, the home life was significantly impacting upon children’s engagement with education: “Many teachers notice how children are more disturbed on Monday mornings, after weekends of domestic conflict” (Harrison, 1992: 288).

It is important to note that this is not purely a consequence of neoliberalism itself. Harrison details how home life and lack the knowledge, educational drives, and good practice of the middle-classes in 1970s and 1980s Hackney meant not only that many young people were semi-literate, but that the amount of social issues faced meant “the inner-city school cannot afford to regard itself as a purely educational institutions” (Harrison, 1992: 283).

Indeed, this seemed like a description of the project, but that alongside taking on functions of the family, it was also taking on functions of the school. As we have seen above, the social and economic changes brought about my neoliberalism has expanded and exacerbated shame and disadvantage.

When I asked Lim how home life and lack of confidence impacted on young people at the project, he relayed one particularly potent example. Lim described one young woman who came from a single parent, low-income family that had not given her the practical knowledge or values to engage with education. To add to this, Lim stated she was often the primary care giver for her young brother while her mother was at work.

Her school performance was particularly low and had been marked out as a disruptive and poor student, and on a number of occasions had been excluded “she gets into fights in school, she’s always having tantrums”. As such she had developed or been assigned a behavioural disorder that Lim could not specify: “she’s been given a title, let’s just say”. At the time she began attending the project, the young woman had become hostile to authority (parent and teachers), had low attendance at school, and outside of school was beginning to engage in drugs and get involved with other forms of crime.
The account given by Lim suggests a mix of all the issues discussed previously, and their impact upon a sense of self-worth; the context of poverty and a difficult home life, a lack of cultural capital, fed over into stigmatisation at school both as an object of condemnation and through a failure to generate mastery experiences. This led to a rejection of the value of education and its authority over her, and produced behavioural issues with anger or violence. While the account lacks first hand detail, we can explore how such issues shape experience and disposition through other informants.

7.4.2 Family and Cultural Capital

One particularly illuminating example of the issues relating to family and education came from outside the project and reveals the continuity between the 1980s and contemporary experiences of exclusion in an individual’s life. Nick (black, male mid-40s) comes from a large, poor family in Peckham, south London - which experienced rioting in 2011. Nick is clearly an intelligent man and during the two interviews took quite an analytical approach to his own life and family; however, he has largely failed in an education system that measures the forms of practice he has never acquired. When I asked him about his school he described it as ‘pretty ordinary’, however, of his family none have succeeded academically, and some of his brothers ending up involved in drugs and crime.

While the school seems to have been neither high nor low in its performance, it was Nick’s family and the world of a poor black community that he identified as the problem. To some extent he resented his family’s approach to education and academic performance. He told me how throughout his life he has felt the pressure from his family to not display intelligence; questioning family viewpoints brought criticism of Nick for acting superior.

Nick’s description of his home life seemed to fit what Atkinson found in working class communities: “Alienated by a system that esteems what they had little of […] many thus developed […] oppositional attitudes” (2010: 89). Thus, rather than encourage Nick’s engagement, he noted that practically engagement with education was inhibited. In particular, the home lacked any books or anything he might find intellectually stimulating, but perhaps most
telling is how he recalled that at an early age often not being able to do his homework due to lack of materials, and regularly searching the house for pencils and any sort of paper to work on. Harrison describes similar conditions:

the typical Hackney […] semi-skilled or unskilled worker's home, offers few toys and books; fewer outings and holidays; shortage of personal space for play or study; and shortage of attention from parents (Harrison, 1992: 278).

For Nick's family, engagement with formal education was largely seen as something you had to do, but doing well was not seen as an achievement, and indeed could be understood as a negative. He told me that even today, despite some members of his family occasionally saying they are ‘proud of his intelligence’, he consistently feels the pressure to not display it. In other words, Nick was struggling with the contradiction between what seemed to be his desire to learn, and the family/cultural norms which devalued and disadvantaged him in relation to middle-class forms of education.

This seems to have affected Nick, because he also admitted being insecure and struggled with who he was and how he saw himself. However, this was also related to his experiences in education, both at school where he failed to achieve good grades, and later where he also tried to attend university as a mature student. At university he stated he struggled to fit in with academic practise, received low marks, and dropped out in the second year.

Despite his family context, Nick had the basic drive to engage with education, but it seems he lacked the embodied cultural capital, or practical know-how, which would have enabled him to reproduce the required middle-class forms of educational displays measured by standardised tests or essay writing. Instead, he experienced disrespect through failure. Thus structural disadvantage is not only given institutional and concrete form through the assessment process, it also implies the child will more likely experience damage to self-worth through failure they can do little about.

Nick’s family background does not contain any of the more serious issues of
violence, drugs or neglect that some young people faced at the project. Nevertheless, the stigma attached to his intelligence in his community alongside his failed attempts to engage with education meant Nick could not develop a sense of self-worth and positive identity through the legitimated system. Instead of being rewarded, Nick lost confidence in his capacity to act, to be good at something, and to achieve or become what is socially valued by the larger or local society (Honneth, 1995; Robertson, 2002).

7.4.3. Exclusion in Education

What matters of course, not simply the student’s context but the school and how the behaviour of the institution and its representatives impacts on young people. Simply put, without belief, encouragement, and support students will not be able to gain mastery experiences, or generate self-worth through legitimated forms of practice. In turn, that they ‘fail’ and understand their self and their abilities in this light, means they will also fail to build a sense of self-esteem through, and value in, the socially valued categories and practices of the dominant order (Reay, 2012).

As Harrison’s research demonstrated, the issue of underfunded schools contributing to students’ rejection of the system is certainly not new to neoliberalism. However, the individualised logic and competitive structuring of relations has meant an increased inability for children to resist this stigma through alternative structural identities. In an ethnographic study in London, Lucey and Reay found that many of their 450 disadvantaged children were feeling ‘pathologised’, underperforming, and rejecting education:

the lack of access to representations through which positive identifications can develop, generated negatively framed and defensive identities among the working-class students [and] which were expressed through shame, disavowal and dis-identification (quoted in Reay, 2012: 39)

This may occur through children being labelled as ‘problems’ rather than given greater attention and support. Or it may occur through an under-resourced and under-performing school, or what has been termed ‘sink’

Despite having some of the wealthiest wards in London, Haringey has consistently been ranked amongst the worst boroughs in terms of indices of deprivation, structural disadvantage, and crime (London’s Poverty Profile(b), 2015; North & Donnelly, 2014: 4; UKCrimeStats(f)). This has unsurprisingly impacted upon educational performance. In 2010, Haringey’s secondary educational performance was below the national average, with some schools having less than 15% of their students achieving 5 or more GCSEs at A to C level (North & Donnelly, 2014: 6).

While for 2009-10 at primary school level, Haringey was the fourth worst performing borough with just under 30% of children age 11 failing to achieve basic standards in Maths and English at key stage 2 tests (Hackney was ranked the worst borough) (MacInnes et al., 2011: 78). Steve argued that the problem related to stigma and stereotypes around schools and the area, leading parents who can afford it to take their children elsewhere along with an evacuation of teachers: “good teachers don’t go to ‘bad areas’”.

Take for instance, Downhills Primary School in Tottenham. One teacher at this school spoke of their campaign against the government forcing it to become an academy due of its low performance. While the teacher admitted their results were not up to the standards of other schools, she argued this was impossible given the conditions and limited resources they had, and in protest against the unfair context had boycotted key stage 2 tests in 2010.

Corroborating much of what the teacher argued, a 2011 Ofsted report (Kessell, 2011) stated that poverty was high amongst pupils, and the school received significant numbers of children who spoke English as a second language, with over 40 different languages spoken at the school. The school was located in an area with high levels of poverty and crime, and had many

42 I attended a talk in 2013 where one of the teachers from Downhills spoke about the pressure the Conservative/Liberal government was putting on schools to become academies or ‘free schools’ entitled: How Can We Stop the Tories Wrecking Education? Alan Gibbons, Jess Edwards & Downhills School campaigner [https://marxismfestival.org.uk/downloads/marxism-2013-timetable.pdf](https://marxismfestival.org.uk/downloads/marxism-2013-timetable.pdf)
disruptive students with social problems stemming from home life. The report stated that quality of teaching was ‘variable’, resulting in inconsistency in the learning progress, although on the other hand, the same report found the views of parents to be overwhelmingly positive. This seemed to support the teacher’s claim that they were underperforming in the standardised testing, but were having a positive impact with children and in the community, given the conditions they faced.

Regardless of the reality of teaching provision, given the structural conditions faced it would seem the school should be expected to perform below the national average. Yet, rather than increased funding to cope with the additional pressures faced over other schools, the competitive system meant they were being penalised and pressurised. The result was less help for already disadvantaged children, putting teachers under greater stress, diminishing the quality of care and education, and an increased likelihood that these children would be unable to succeed in the dominant order. Indeed, a year later another Ofsted report43 found that conditions at the school had deteriorated and it was forced to close, reopening as an academy.

Without amelioration through support, the impact of these sorts of conditions on young people can be particularly negative, leading to a rejection and disengagement with the system. As Harrison (1992: 287-9) notes in the 1980s, two ‘dump’ schools in Hackney had children with issues such as illiteracy and partial literacy, anger and violent behaviour, truancy sometimes reaching 50 per cent, substance abuse, and vandalism. The impact of the exclusion and stigmatisation of children in the context of social and economic deprivation meant a rejection of the education system and its authorities: “world of street life invades the schools.” (Harrison, 1992: 289).

Today, the problem is compounded by the competitive system which creates a circular relation: the low self-worth amongst students leads to behavioural forms of resistance, which in turn leads to them being stereotyped, then further stigmatised along with the school which drops in the tables, funding,

43 See petition ‘Closure of Downhills Primary School, Tottenham’ https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2012-03-22/debates/12032276000017/ClosureOfDownhillsPrimarySchoolTottenham
and leading parents who have the capital, to go elsewhere. Ned (white, late 20s) attended St John Rigby’s (south London) - what could also be described as a ‘sink school’, albeit due to a particular context.

When Ned began attending the school he described it as having a ‘reasonable’ reputation, however, the head teacher had been funnelling a large amount of school funds into her own account, leaving the school in debt. While the school did receive some aid, this was not enough to get it out of debt and was left to attempt to rectify it’s own situation in a competitive market place. The result was falling pupil numbers, lack of materials, increasing debt, deterioration of standards, and teachers leaving and being replaced by constant series of substitutes (Buckley, 2001).

Indeed, Ned’s parents who had the capital to relocate him, wanted to put Ned into a better school once the deterioration of St John Rigby began, but Ned, already part of that world and trying to belong, wanted to and fought to stay. The situation got so bad that after Ned left the school attempted to rebrand itself to improve its reputation, but a few years later was closed down due to the level of debt and continuing drop in student numbers. An Ofsted report was produced during Ned’s time in 2001, a year after the former head was dismissed and criminally charged for theft of school funds.

While it notes that improvements had been made, the report states that “all aspects of the college had been badly neglected, many of the teaching and non-teaching staff and the pupils and parents became severely demoralised and almost one third of the teachers left or resigned” (Buckley, 2001: part A). The report goes on to note that the school has issues with behaviour and attendance of ‘a significant minority’, ‘rowdy behaviour’, ‘vandalism’ and GCSE results below the national average. In turn, parents reported concerns with ‘poor behaviour and bullying’, a ‘continual turnover of teachers’ (ibid), and approval ratings had dropped significantly (ibid: part C).

The school drew children mainly from the boroughs of Bromley and Croydon

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44 e.g. See Hill, J. ‘Head Teacher’s Legacy Jeopardising School’, in News Shopper http://www.newsshopper.co.uk/news/661292.headteachers_legacy_jeopardising_school/

45 The report does not contain page numbers therefore I source by sections.
(Buckley, 2001), both of which saw rioting in 2011. Although the school had children from a mix of socio-economic backgrounds, Ned stated there were many from poor estates, particularly one ‘white working class estate’ in Bromley, and another estate in Croydon where many of the black children came from. Ned described both areas as being ‘rough’, and the children would hang around in groups, in part, defined by which estate they came from. While initially this was not a serious issue, the deterioration of the school saw an increase in criminal behaviours and vandalism.

Ned described the young men from these estates forming gangs, getting involved in fights, and engaging in crime. The main group of black children from Croydon formed a gang called ‘TMS’ (The Money Stealers), which would get into fights, carry out muggings, sell stolen goods and similar, while the white estate Ned described as ‘like Shameless’ a TV show which depicts a poor, criminal, ‘underclass’ in Manchester.

Indeed, the prejudice or lack of care of teachers was made visible through their treatment of students who, black and white, appear to have become viewed as ‘underclass’, or amoral and criminal. Ned stated that very few teachers ever got the respect of the children and thought that they viewed the students as ‘not worth it’. He described how some teachers would attempt to assert control over students by embarrassing them, calling them out in class and making them look stupid. Others teachers might simply ignore students, most did not know the students’ names, and Ned even described one substitute who started a fight with a student when his authority was challenged.

Unsurprisingly, Ned felt that neither his peers nor himself would ever ‘be a high achiever’ and described his time at St John Rigby as ‘barely an education’. Indeed, the increase in disrespect experienced by the students seems to have gone hand-in-hand with an increasing disrespect of the school, with Ned stating that it was common to misbehave, insult teachers, and even tag (graffiti) class room walls when teachers left the room. Ultimately, Ned found that the way to develop self-esteem and a positive identity was not through academic performance, but through joining those who were
displaying a lack of concern for rules and the school, and a proficiency with violence or minor forms of crime.

The problems Harrison found in the 1980s are exacerbated by competitive educational policies that result in situations where young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, who require extra support, encouragement, and aid, are penalised. As with Ned’s experience this translates into neglect and disrespect, and facilitates a downward spiral, whereby students lose respect for the school and teachers, and the teachers stigmatise and disrespect students.

Problematically, individualistic and moralised logics fail to understand what shapes young peoples' behaviour, and only reinforce stereotypes of ‘stupid’, ‘lazy’, or ‘trouble’, and create a cycle of exclusion. Similarly, without Politicised and structural understanding and identities, young people will struggle to resist the sense of shame and low self-worth, leading to a rejection of dominant values, authority, and an undirected anger (Ray, 2014: 121).

Through her wide experience both working in and researching on, youth work Robertson (2002: 74) argues the function of a youth worker or teacher is not just to teach, but both to support and believe in the young person. Supporting this, improvement in Haringey’s educational record in 2014 was attributed in part to the increased emphasis of “instilling self-confidence and belief in their pupils” (North & Donnelly, 2014: 7). The report interviewed teachers who, agreeing with what respondents had said to me, argued that demonstrating belief in pupils meant the students believed in themselves. Negative messages from the teachers or parents, shaped through assumptions and stereotypes of students, schools, or even area, often reinforce the perception that you are stupid, you cannot achieve, or as Ned thought, ‘not worth it’.46

Shame is an aversive emotion; it disposes us to avoid similar experiences (Scheff, 1988 & 2000). Thus shame in education means engagement risks becoming a negative factor; while for those excluded and disadvantaged, particularly in a competitive system, failure and thus shame is always on the

46 Also see Atkinson, 2010; Reay, 2006 & 2012; Robertson, 2002
table. For those like Ned or many at the youth project, the rejection of school authority and legitimated practice constitutes a dispositional shift that prevents/limits future experiences of shame by negating both the standards by which they are judged, and the capacity of authority to judge them. Of course, this process of exclusion does not end with education, but spills over into employment.

7.4.4 Employment

When we examine the transition from education to work for those structurally disadvantaged, what we generally see is severe disadvantage in education and employment alongside stigmatisation within these systems and by society in general. The changes in education coupled with increasingly scarce and unrewarding employment opportunities and decreasing protection through welfare, has created a system that increasingly offers nothing but economic lack and insecurity, socially unvalued roles, and low self-esteem (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage, 2012; Avis, 2014; Clement, 2012).

In turn, perhaps the largest misrecognition in successive neoliberal governments’ attempts to ‘solve’ these problems is the assumption that waged labour is ‘pivotal to the assimilation of young people into society’ (Avis, 2014: 69). Such a logic supposes that improvements in educational achievements or training will enable young people to gain work, and thus prevent their disengagement from the system.

The paradox, of course, is that what constitutes ‘waged labour’ and the poverty and lack of dignity this implies, is part of the problem created through neoliberal policies. Indeed, this is one of the differences between the 1980s and 2011; in the former, for the white working class at least, failure in education did not doom an individual to low-paid work or unemployment, and the shame that tends to accompany these.

Harrison (1992) found that it was common for young men in Hackney to leaving school early to start full-time work. Willis’ (1979) seminal study demonstrated how young working class men were resisting the stigma imposed by education and society, by finding self-worth through the creation
of identities around notions of ‘labour’. As Hoggart (1992: 48-54) put it, working class identities and practices functioned both to defend from and to demonstrate disrespect of those with power over the working classes, such as police, teachers, and managers.

Stigma was experienced in education and in relation to the authorities of society, but the shame and low-self worth could be resisted through the possibility of relatively economically rewarding employment, the attribution of social value to manual labour, and thus engaging in an alternative process of positive identification within the legitimated social order. However, Harrison also notes that times were changing and the previously readily available and rewarding jobs in Hackney were beginning to dry up.

As we saw, neoliberal policies removed this possibility. McKenzie (2012: 137) found in an area of Nottingham that also saw riots in 2011, that the only options open to many are ‘low-skilled’, ‘low-paid’ work, and these may not provide the ‘valued identity’ needed to make them feel part of the dominant society. As with education, the youth project sought to develop the employment possibilities and dispositions in their young people; again due their backgrounds and home life, many came to them already rejecting the dominant forms of capital and with little awareness of the opportunities and practical skills required to operate in the conventional employment market.

Beyond education, the project sought to open up opportunities from very basic help such as with CVs and bank accounts, to making connections with organisations that offer grants to young entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, no matter the success they may have with an individual in terms of getting them to engage and to achieve educationally, their capacity to shape their possibilities beyond education is limited. For the majority of young disadvantaged people from Hackney or Haringey the economic rewards of employment are limited at best.

In gentrifying Hackney, as of 2014-15 the average rent was equivalent to 76% of the poorest quartile’s income; 38% of private renters were claiming housing benefit; and 42% of all young people come from families where tax credits are
needed to top up income (London’s Poverty Profile(b), 2015).\textsuperscript{47} While for 2009-11, 16% of all residents were classified as low-paid (below the living wage) and just under 17% of working-age individuals were claiming out-of-work benefits (ibid).

Similarly in Haringey in 2014-15, which also has an extreme wealth divide, 35% young people are from families claiming tax credits and 52% of private renters were claiming housing benefits (London’s Poverty Profile(c), 2015). While in 2009-11 over 15% of the working-age population were claiming out-of-work benefits, and just over one quarter of residents were classified as in low-paid work (ibid). If the objective situation regarding return (qualifications, paid work, can achieve expectations) for investment (attending school, interviews, working) in legitimated forms of cultural capital, is so weak, then we should expect to see dispositions that do not prompt engagement.

Indeed, questioning the notion that better training and waged work are the solution to the NEET ‘problem’, between 2010 and 2014 in Haringey educational performances increased, yet at the same time inequality and disadvantage have increased (North & Donnelly, 2014: 7), and while it may be the case that unemployment has dropped in both Hackney and Haringey since 2010/11, low paid work has increased by a greater proportion in both cases (London’s Poverty Profile(b) & (c), 2015). For those socially and economically excluded, this data suggests a significant and increasing tension between the earning potential available to people and the costs of living in these boroughs. However, as we will see, to talk of employment in economic terms will miss not only the impact of exclusion but also the forms of exclusion that push people away from legitimated forms of practice.

Nick is one whose failure to achieve in the education system has left him marginalised and apathetic about engaging with the legitimated system. As a consequence, he does not feel motivated to gain employment at the level that is available to him (low-paid, insecure labour). However, to understand Nick and indeed, the affective impact of these experiences better, we must also

\textsuperscript{47} Figures for these measures were not available for years closer to 2011 in either Hackney or Haringey.
account for social forms of exclusion and stigmatisation. Nick’s exclusion does not simply occur through an objective lack of qualifications, but also through an alienating process and judgement which operates on markers of the ‘underclass’: “when you walk into a shop, a job interview, an area, it’s how you are made to feel”.

Nick was talking about the perception of, and response to him as a black, unemployed man without qualifications. The stigma and shame Nick experiences when trying to engage through job interviews and even the unemployment office, the sense of being judged as lesser, can only diminish his desire to do so. Thus, when Nick reflects on his position he states he ‘should’ find employment, but simultaneously he feels apathetic and unmotivated and thus pre-reflexively resists such action.

Consequently, for a number of years after education Nick was ‘in and out’ of employment in low paid and low status roles (for instance, stage hand/labouring in theatre companies, video shop assistant). Ultimately, in many of Nick’s positions he worked long hours without much economic benefit, simultaneously, also experiencing a low sense of self-worth. For instance, he originally thought working for theatre’s might, in contrast to other positions he had worked, both be interesting and provide a career; yet the reality of the role was a little more than a ‘dog’s body’, and Nick saw little chance for progression. In later life Nick gave up and had been unemployed for a number of years.\textsuperscript{48}

Merton (1938: 678) might define Nick’s response as ‘defeatism’ or ‘retreatism’, where the individual has continually failed to attain society’s goals by institutional means, but cannot partake in illegitimate means due to normative

\textsuperscript{48} However, in a second interview I did with Nick in 2017 he revealed he has since tried to re-enter employment. Nevertheless, his experience is arguably reinforcing the disposition to reject and give up. He has begun gaining some experience and developing his CV by volunteering for a legal charity. Nick was already feeling bored and frustrated by the basic administrative role, and expressed despondency about the realities of improving his position given his age (mid-40s) and lack of qualifications, or how, if he continues to work, he could ever become economically comfortable.
or practical concerns with breaking the law, thus seeks escape. However, this is perhaps not quite nuanced enough, as Nick despite to some extent fitting this category, Nick does not completely reject the legitimised goals or means completely. Perhaps this is due to Nick also has a Political/structural understanding of himself as a black man unfairly disadvantaged.

However, as we have seen, despite Nick’s awareness of racism, he was not involved in any form of political struggle or group and thought this was lacking amongst black communities. To some extent this awareness allows Nick to resist the stigma of himself as an object of disrespect; yet at the same time he cannot overcome the disrespect felt through exclusion from practices. For Nick, there is no possibility of empowerment through struggle, or self-worth through mastery experiences and identification, and thus, no possibility of change or improvement.

Indeed, rioters depict similar experiences and dispositions to Nick: “When you go down the Jobcentre, they give you this look … It’s this sick look.” (rioter in Ray, 2014: 129). However, as we might expect, one difference from Nick is that generally amongst the rioters there is a tendency to reject the norms and values along with the institutionalised practices of society: “I want good gear, but I don’t want some shit job, I don’t want some fucking training course. I don’t wanna work for some prick. I want to get up when I want, have a smoke, have a few tots [drinks] and do fuck all” (Treadwell et al. 2013: 13).

7.4.5 ‘White Man’s Money’

While Nick still saw legitimate work as the only acceptable, albeit implausible, alternative to unemployment, Ned described a rejection of ‘work’ more akin to that of some of the rioters. Ned used two interesting terms when talking about how he and his school peers saw their future: ‘legit (legitimate) work’ and ‘white man’s money’, both being to some extent interchangeable and having the same basic meaning as ‘shit work’ (Gilroy, 2013). When I asked him to explain the terms, he stated that ‘white man’s money’ did not refer to any work within the system, but to the low status employment that was seen as available to them.
The example I was given of ‘white man’s money’ was of working at WHSmiths (e.g. a cashier), which was understood as the realistic opportunities for Ned and his peers in the dominant social order. The lack of value and possibility for positive identification through the ‘legit’ route, meant it was to some extent pre-reflexively excluded from consideration. Indeed, like those of the working class, their “movement into work was guided by the pre-reflexive expectations, orientations and valuations of the habitus” (Atkinson, 2010: 92). However, whereas for Atkinson’s interviewees their dispositions and expectations as working class directed them within the legitimated employment system, for Ned’s peer group work was expected to come through illegal routes.

Corroborating this construction of expectations and orientations, Ned stated that those that took this route, or tried to succeed in the ‘legit’ world were disparaged as ‘neeks’, a blending of nerd and geek. In other words ‘white man’s money’ provided little in terms of economic gain and self-worth, and thus the practise had become shameful and normatively rejected. The connection to ‘white’ money implied an exploitative practice – getting paid by the ‘white man’, or legitimated society, for work that had little economic reward and gave no status.

Indeed, this is not an uncommon finding in excluded communities where to take on ‘shit work’ “may diminish local respect and status carries far too much risk, and too much loss” (Mckenzie. 2013: 4.7; also see Hall et al., 1980; Bourgios, 2003; Wacquant, 2010). While it cannot be stated with accuracy - as Ned did not know the origin of the term - the aspect of ‘white’, and its connection to ‘legitimacy’ seems to imply the historical experience of non-white or black people being discriminated against by a predominately white social order. However, paralleling the shift from ‘black’ to ‘underclass’ in stereotypes and exclusion, for Ned the term functioned beyond the boundaries of racial experience and was used by himself and other white people facing similar experiences of exclusion and rejecting the legitimated system. Thus, it appears that neither structural identities of black or working class were functioning amongst Ned’s group.
In turn, rather than simply the desire for consumeristic objects generating self-worth, for Ned this rejection of work was tied into the valorisation of criminal means which enabled positive forms of identification. This often connected to the capacity to obtain the necessary economic wealth, such as petty theft and selling pirated goods on the black market, yet Ned also took part in graffiti. As with the working class identity and ‘labour’, each of these functioned as forms of capital and processes of identification through which he could develop self-esteem through peer approval in accepted forms of behaviour, and relatedly, resist the disrespect he received from authorities through the transgression of their rules.

The practice of graffiti was particularly important in terms of status and identity. If you did not have a ‘graf’ it was considered ‘weird’: ‘almost like not having a Christian name’. Ned spoke specifically of how he once put a large ‘dub’ on a wall outside the school so the teachers and students would all see it as they entered significantly increased his status. In other words, graffiti could be seen as about disrespecting the authorities, and thus both refusing the disrespect they experienced, and constructing a sense of self-worth/identity through the approval of peers.

Indeed, the relation to disrespect is supported by the fact that graffiti increased in the school as the conditions deteriorated. Furthermore, the school eventually responded by getting a local respected graffiti group, FDP (Fuck Da Police) to paint the property. After this students policed themselves preventing the work being painted over. This is notable in part because the group, which Ned described as like ‘celebrities’, defined themselves nominally through opposition to police and authority. Indeed, although Ned had relatively few negative engagements with the police, he noted that being arrested constituted a ‘badge of honour’, and reminisced about the respect he gained after one occasion were he was taken out of school by a number of armed police who had mistakenly been informed he was carrying a gun.

Importantly, this parallels Thomas (2012) in the 1980s, where it was not the

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49 A ‘graf’ or ‘tag’ refers to the nickname of the artist, and functions as a type of signature painted on the walls.

50 A ‘dub’ is a 3D version of the artist’s graf.

51 He had been seen with a realistic pellet gun prior to school.
‘political’ opposition that he valorised and shaped his process of identification and resistance, but the criminal – the ‘Yardies’.

Furthermore, Ned’s relation to graffiti is also revealing because it was about power. Once FDP had painted the school it ‘belonged’ to Ned and his peers, as opposed to before this where the school alienated and disrespected them and they marked it. Indeed, when asked why he engaged, Ned stated that tagging a building or location was ‘like you owned it, it was yours’. Graffiti, in other words, was a ‘performance’ (Butler, 2004; 2011). It demonstrated his rejection of legitimated power and its inability to control him. It made Ned ‘feel powerful’, functioning as a form by which disrespect was resisted in the everyday context of disempowerment. The point is that all Ned’s peers were not simply criminal, nor were they ‘immoral’. Rather, these activities form modalities of resistance, a means to overcome the disrespect experienced.

7.5. Conclusion

In exploring the social processes that shaped the attacks on police we have set our sights on the broader social structure. The purpose has been to provide a more nuanced understanding of the forms of resistance we saw in 2011 and the 1980s riots, and to counter neoliberal, moralising and individualising discourse, propounded by the likes of Cameron. Importantly, these discourses are not external responses to the context of the riots. The act of de-Politicising and pathologising the rioters, was just another symbolic construction, or act of power, that occurs through education and employment, and sought to maintain the social hierarchy.

The stigmatisation of lower ranked groups is of course, not new. As we have seen, black communities in Britain have been excluded and stigmatised since their arrival. What changed was the quantitative expansion of the super-exploited group through re-structuring the market and education and, in effect, concealing relations of privilege and disadvantage. The emerging logic of a meritocratic, capitalist society – alongside scientific dismissals of ‘race’ as a concept – produced a moral logic that rejected the categorisation and
judgement of individuals by factors beyond their control. Ideologically, ‘race’ and ‘class’, and their ‘isms’ were no longer acceptable.

Neoliberalism then, constitutes a particular re-organisation and re-framing of the relations of privilege and disadvantage. Previously it was black people who had constituted the ‘underclass’, those who had been socially and economically excluded, stigmatised and criminalised. By 2011 this super-exploited group had expanded to include members of the white working classes. While the stigma had always existed, the removal of the logics of race and class, along with the white working class’ social, economic, and political structure, diminished the possibility of resistance.

In the 1980s we saw that black resistance was already emerging from a disempowered context, and thus producing anti-politics through Political resistance and individualised resistance. However, for the white working classes, the loss of manufacturing, unions, and the notion of ‘labour’ meant that this group could no longer achieve economic stability. Neither could it resist the stigmatisation of the dominant groups within legitimised society through the political process or through the working class identity. Thus, many were forced into the social position previously reserved largely for black communities: excluded, stigmatised, and disempowered.

The neoliberal re-structuring of the market and education system has diminished the capacity of Political identities and forms of resistance. Thus it is increasingly difficult for the shame and low-self worth to be overcome through legitimised means, or even through Political identities and movements. Instead, individualised forms of resistance emerge which disrespect legitimised authority and its representatives, and offer the excluded positive forms of identification.

Thus rather than simple criminality, or even simply the consumer ideology, the point is that society is excluding young people through stigmatising them and preventing their engagement in processes of positive identification through legitimised practice. In a broad sense, this firstly occurs through the production of mistrust and anger, which will influence of the sorts of relationships that will be constructed with authorities or representatives of the
legitimated system; and secondly, that by inhibiting the resistance and overcoming of the affective impact of disrespect and disempowerment, violence becomes increasingly likely to be justified. However, these also feed directly and specifically into relations with police, which provides the final key in understanding why we see symptoms of the social order’s breakdown.
8. Keeping the Order:

Policing the Underclass

8.1. Introduction: Why Stop and Search?

In the last chapter we saw how social and economic conditions created through neoliberal policies had created a context in which groups of people were categorised as the ‘underclass’ or ‘NEETs’, facilitating their exclusion through policy and the experience of shame and disrespect at the hands of the social order’s representatives.

The point in discussing the broader context was, of course, to argue that we cannot understand the context of over-policing without understanding both the stereotypes generated by society, and the exclusion and disrespect enacted through these self-same stereotypes. In this chapter we seek to examine how, and to what effect, neoliberalism and the underclass stereotype impacts on policing. In particular, we will examine how the intersection of policing with resentment and exclusion, could shape the choice to attack police in 2011 as subjectively rational, or reasonable and desirable.

The motive for a detailed focus on stop and search is, in part, simply because all the major reports on the 2011 riots to note, to differing extents the relevance of stop and search. Alongside this we also find a sense of anger at police, a perception of them as a gang and an oppressive factor in public space, and reports of abuse and mistreatment. Furthermore, we also examine whether ‘underclass’ has replaced ‘black’ as the dominant stereotype in policing, and stop and search – due to its contentious nature – is one of the most researched aspects of policing.

Indeed, research and data on stop and search also supports such a focus, suggesting that stop and search is having a particularly significant and negative impact on individuals’ perception of the police. Firstly, due to its fundamental role in police-public interaction, stop and search is indicative of, and impacts upon, the broader state of relations between the police and
communities: in 2004 the Chairperson of the Metropolitan Police Authority’s Scrutiny Panel described it as the ‘litmus test’ of police-community relations (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 251).

In 2011/12 there were just over 1.1 million stop and searches countrywide, resulting in around 100,000 arrests (a consistent rate of 9% since 2009) (MoJ(b), 2013: 37-9). The reality is that 9 times out of 10 the individual stopped was not involved in any criminal activity. While this may not necessarily represent a failure of stop and search in its own terms, as eliminating suspicion and thus preventing unnecessary arrests is a valid goal (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 243; HMIC, 2013: 4), unless such searches are managed particularly carefully, what this represents is a clear potential for what was identified in data on the riots: the feeling of harassment and being unjustly targeted.

Indeed, since the 1980s data has demonstrated the net impact of police initiated interactions with citizens in public spaces has been a reduction in the trust and perceived legitimacy of the police (Bradford, 2015: 108; also see Miller et al. 2001: 78). This impact is arguably because, as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary (HMIC)\(^{52}\) point out, “[t]he powers to stop and search people are some of the most intrusive of those available to the police” (HMIC, 2013: 11). Moreover, supporting a broader contextualised view of over-policing, stop and search has been shown to disproportionately impact upon ethnic minorities and socially and economically excluded groups (Bradford, 2015: 113; Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Goodchild, 2013: 5; HMIC, 2013: 41; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 11)

However, rather than simply point out that stop and search is a cause of discontent amongst excluded communities, the aim here is to understand it as a mechanism of disrespect that impacts at the pre-reflexive level, and feeds from the power relations implied in the social hierarchy. This will enable us to better understand the extent to which experiences of stop and search could

\(^{52}\) The HMIC is an independent body set up to inspect and report on the police, and produced a report on stop and search across the country by reviewing police procedures, evidence and data produced by constabularies, interviewing officers, and performing a public survey of individuals who have been subject to stop and search.
have shaped the choice to attack police as plausible and worthwhile in 2011, and in turn, counter the assumptions that the riots were about ‘criminality’ and nihilistic “attacks on the forces of order” (Cameron, 2011b).

The investigation will demonstrate how stop and search can constitute a form of disrespect and disempowerment. Firstly, the stereotype of the underclass enters the practice of stop and search through the prejudice and judgement of police officers. This is enabled by a legalistic definition and regulation of powers that fails to account for police culture and training, leading to profiling and disproportional amounts of stops on the type of individual we know to have been involved in the 2011 riots: young men, often black, in poor areas or estates. This not only creates a sense of being targeted, but also implies prejudicial treatment of those stopped, often leading to direct acts of disrespect including insults and violence.

However, stop and search also implies being rendered powerless or impotent, which when experiencing aggressive or disrespectful treatment becomes a particularly shameful experience; in turn, as we have noted, shame is an aversive emotion which, without resolution, may produce anger and prompt violence. In 2011, when individuals attacked the police, in part, it was the expression of the anger and shame built up through negative experiences with police. By attacking the police they could reverse the power relations found in stop and search, and perform a new identity in which they were the dominant. The first call in understanding the nature of these interactions is the development of the power to stop and search.

8.2. Stop and Search - Regulations and Reality

The term 'stop and search' refers to a set of powers given to the police for the purposes of detection and prevention of crime under different justifications (i.e. terrorism, violent crime) (PACE 1984, 2011). Without these powers, the police would officially be unable to exercise control over an individual without making an arrest (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 243; HMIC, 2013: 4; PACE 1984, 2011). Originally the powers were defined under the 1824 Vagrancy Act,
which gave the police the power to stop, search, arrest, and even prosecute, based largely on their ‘suspicions’ (leading to the informal name of ‘sus’ laws) or under the logic of ‘loitering with intent’ (Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 435). This arguably allowed the prejudices of the police to be framed as ‘suspicion’, leading to oppressive policing of society’s ‘other’, generally those most excluded and unneeded such as ethnic minorities and the working class (Davies, 1989; Hall et al., 1980). Despite the questionable nature of policing, serious public concern around the powers and their abuse did not begin growing until the 1970s (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 244), before being causally implicated in the rioting of the 1980s (Keith, 1993; Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 435; Waddington, 1992: 80).

In response to growing public concern and increasing conflict with black communities coming to a head in the 1980s, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE 1984, 2011) sought to introduce safeguards against discriminatory use of the powers, such as removing ‘loitering with intent’, and defining ‘reasonable suspicion’ (Faiza & Farrell, 2005: 84). Subsequently, ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘grounds’ for a stop and search was defined as an ‘objective basis’ based on relevant ‘facts, information, and/or intelligence’, and which cannot be supported by ‘personal factors’ such as ethnicity, age, appearance, or even knowledge of previous convictions (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 253; PACE 1984, 2011: 5-6).

The powers enable police to detain an individual, and perform a search of the suspect’s body regardless of whether the police know if the subject has broken the law, and forcibly detain the individual should they refuse. With regards to carrying out the search, the officers can check the pockets, and around collars and similar areas, but more serious searches such as undressing the suspect are not permitted, unless the suspect is taken to a police station or van (PACE 1984, 2011). However, despite this attempt to tighten regulation, stop and search was implicated in rioting in the late 1980s, the 1990s, was further singled by the MacPherson report highlighting institutional racism in the police (Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Keith, 1993), and of course, was implicated in the 2011 riots. To unpick these problems, we first need to explore exactly how the powers structure interactions.
8.2.1 Removing Agency

The powers given under PACE to stop and search rely on the police’s “capacity to legally exercise coercive force” (Carrabine et al., 2014: 349). While necessary, the other side of this coin is that stop and search enacts a particular form of asymmetric power relation that removes the capacity of the subject to control what happens to them - or simply put, it removes their agency while subjecting them to an intrusive procedure.

Asymmetric power-relations constitute situational dynamics that structure the situation to create a relation of order ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ (Collins, 2005). The order-givers are those that dominate the interaction, provide its direction and focus, and largely determine the results; order-takers on the other hand are required, perhaps forced, to take part. As Collins (2005: 113) points out, this asymmetric power structure is, in itself, potentially alienating as the order-takers may have to pretend, or perform ‘ritualistic’ but empty, acquiescence.

Ultimately, such situational dynamics mean the subject of a stop and search has extremely limited agency. The order-taker’s only tangible influence over proceedings is whether they submit to a search, or resist and be forcibly searched and potentially arrested. Problematically, as Honneth (1995: 132-3) points out, to deny the autonomy of an individual over their body is a particularly shameful experience, as it renders them impotent and the world threatening and uncontrollable. This issue can be particularly damaging is the subject of the search does not trust in the police to fulfil their role as protectors (see Bradford, 2015; Keith, 1993; Loader, 2006; Quinton, 2015: 75; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 11). Without trust or legitimacy there is no consent to police and it will be very difficult for a stop and search to be perceived as anything other than an oppressive and invasive act forced upon the individual (Keith, 1993: 143; Wacquant, 2010).

The regulations on stop and search to some extent recognise this inherent problem, and propose to minimise the potentially negative experience such an exercise of power may produce (PACE 1984, 2011: 4-6 & 20). In particular, PACE sets out that the officers enacting the search should identify/introduce themselves, explain to the suspect the reason for stopping them, and provide
the subject of the search with a report thus better enabling them to make a complaint if they feel this is necessary (Home Office, 2014). The principle aim is to make it a co-operative experience; the primary means proposed to negate the intrusiveness of the procedure is for the officers to convince the individual to willingly subject him or herself to the search. Consequently, the loss of agency and the negative experience may be negated or diminished if the individual feels the police are acting in a justified manner and has ‘chosen’ to be searched (Bradford, 2015: 111).

Yet while these regulations may work or improve the outcome of a search in some cases, the nature of the interaction is particularly problematic as the offer clearly and logically represents a spurious choice – ‘you will choose to comply or we will force you’. In other words, such interactions carry an inherent risk of escalation and distress, particularly (as we will see later) given that stop and search is regularly not carried out in accordance with these regulations (HMIC, 2013).

8.2.2 ‘Suspicion’ and Exclusion

The next point regarding how stop and search structures situations takes into account the regulations on ‘reasonable suspicion’. This concept is particularly important because, as we will see, it is through this that larger society’s stereotypes come into play. It was argued in the last chapter that approaches to any form of prejudice must deal with the structural disadvantage created by larger society. Unless the social hierarchy and stereotypes of larger society change or are reduced, it is difficult to see how this cannot result in the aggressive over-policing of excluded groups.

However, it is also the case that police regulation enables or allows these prejudices to enter into the practice of officers. In 1984 the introduction of PACE sought to bring in a burden of proof by defining ‘reasonable suspicion’ as based on actual evidence, aiming to bring an end to clear and long term misconduct by police (Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Faiza & Farrell, 2005: 84; Hall et al., 1980; Home Office, 2014; Keith, 1993: 130; ICI, 1989: 198-201). Yet despite this attempt to reign in malpractice, stop and search continues to cause discontent, and police still abuse their powers. The HMIC (2013: 6)
found that despite the many problems with police forces’ partial and problematic recording of stop and searches, 27% of all cases that year had no reasonable grounds to carry out searches, suggesting the figure could be much higher.

The first issue with regards to PACE is that it seems police do not always know the regulations that define what their powers are and how to act. In 2013 the HMIC found that many officers did not understand that the “establishment of reasonable grounds for suspicion, [should be] based on specific and not general information” (HMIC, 2013: 40), the report went on to note widespread malpractice and misuse of the powers. Indeed, according to the HMIC (ibid: 43), the majority of police officers across the country had received no training in stop and search powers since joining. In turn, the training that was received by officers focused only on how to implement the powers safely, but not fairly or effectively.53

However, a more foundational problem is that the ‘legalistic’ definition provided by PACE fails to account for the ‘discretionary judgement’ and culture of the police (Bland et al. 2000: 3; Faiza and Farrell, 2005: 85). In 1970 and again in 1989 reports into police practice noted that the legalistic formulation of the police’s powers was too inflexible to deal with the multitude of different tasks and complex situations on the streets (Bland et al., 2000; Carrabine et al., 2014). What was required was a more nuanced understanding of policing and training of police officers to enable them to better deal with the social complexities faced on the street: this did not happen. Instead PACE simply tried to resolve the prior problems of stop and search by providing clearer definitions.

Problematically, the police are neither immune nor separate from larger society and its social and political context, including its prejudices (Keith, 1993). Thus, while ‘discretion’ might be necessary and useful in the application of powers to differing situations, Carrabine et al., (2014) note that

53 In a smaller study Faiza and Farrell (2005: 91-2) found that there was even confusion about what constituted ‘training’ amongst the officers they surveyed in a commuter town on the edge of London: 40% stated they did not know if they had received training in the last 12 months, while only 16% stated that had received training by the published guidelines.
this allows malpractice to creep in. Faiza and Farrell (2005: 85) argue that ‘discretion’, viewed as a ‘practical judgement’, creates the opportunity or possibility for officers to exercise their prejudices through supposedly pragmatic decisions. A 2001 investigation into stop and search commissioned by the Home Office found, in practice, what constitutes grounds for a stop and search is often simply the opinion of the individual officers involved (Miller et al., 2001: 77). In other words, through ‘suspicion’ the police often ‘police’ utilising society’s stereotypes about who ‘needs’ to be policed.

The point here is that the legalistic format does not account for the nuanced ways in which people are socialised into prejudice built around the social hierarchy, or indeed, that the police might be particularly at risk of forming prejudices due to the fact they are often forced to deal with those stereotyped by society in difficult and sometimes aggressive situations (Carrabine et al., 2014). The formulation of PACE appears to rely on the assumption that by simply defining the issue clearly, any problems will be resolved.

Unfortunately, prejudice is an affective disposition and thus operates at the pre-reflexive level meaning it is not always recognised as such (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Lieberman et al. 2003; Schreiber & Iacoboni, 2012). By only defining police behaviour, rather than seeking to shape it through practice and training, stop and search allows the prejudices of society and thus the police, to be manifested as legitimate behaviour. Consequently, the police function as a structural, or repeated and patterned, means of exclusion and disrespect.

8.2.3 Suspicion: Race, Class, Area, and Criminality

Quinton (2015: 70), one of the researchers on a report into stop and search produced for the Home Office, argues that officers had ‘considerable latitude’ with regards to interpreting and applying the information at hand. For many officers ‘suspicion’ simply meant whether the individual fitted their profile of a ‘criminal’ and thus, according to many, searches were justified even if they found nothing on the ‘suspect’. Indeed, Keith (1993) found similar

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54 Research from Miller et al., 2001; interviewing 198 officers and observation of over 565 hours of police patrols, witnessing 58 searches and 191 stops (Quinton, 2015: 58).
during his ethnographic work in the 1980s in which police justified searches of black people even if nothing was found.

According to the 2001 report, officers stated they were not prejudiced but rather making decisions based on experience and practical knowledge (Miller et al., 2001: 77). Yet as Quinton (2015: 73-4) notes that while they found that explicit racism had reduced drastically since the 1980s, they did find implicit and explicit racial cues being used in the generation of 'suspicion', implying officers were mis-recognising their own racial prejudice. That racial prejudice remains in operation in the police is backed up by the HMIC’s investigation (2013: 40-41), quantitative data that shows for the period of 2011/12, black people from age 10 upwards were 6 times, and Asian or mixed ethnicity 2 times more likely to be subject to a stop and search, and that black people over the age of 10 were 3 times more likely to be arrested (MoJ(b), 2013: 11-12).

Yet, to consider prejudice only in terms of race is to ignore that skin colour is simply one form or mechanism by which exclusion and discrimination operates, and by which individuals distinguish themselves as above others (Bulmer & Solomos, 1999: 4; Lee, 2017: 660). Without acknowledging the functional and arbitrary role of stereotypes, and different ways in which individuals are distinguished, we will miss how prejudice can change and blur over time.

As we have discussed, race and class are no longer able to perform the function of justifying privilege and disadvantage for (neo)liberal society. Instead, the emergence of the ‘underclass’ as the dominant stereotype and excluded group has ultimately functioned to disguise privilege and disadvantage. Taking a more nuanced view of prejudice when considering the data on stop and search is revealing of how this stereotype appears to be operating in policing.

Current measures of disproportionality are problematic because they tend to

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55 This has been consistently an issue for many years, and indeed in 2004 similar figures were produced (Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 435; also see Clancy, Hough, Aust, and Kershaw 2001: 3; Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 244-5).
focus on racial prejudice and miss, for instance, profiling within and across ethnic categories such as working class, youth, males, unemployed, area/estate etc. (Delsol and Shiner, 2006: 258). Indeed, the problem with using a ‘white' benchmark against which to measure disproportionality is that it tends to prove simple racial discrimination by failing to capture those white groups and specific sections of ethnic minority communities that are also over-policed.

As Quinton (2015) pointed out earlier, their findings suggested that police were profiling on what markers they saw as ‘criminality', and racial cues operated as a part of this stereotype. Delsol and Shiner (2006) found from their research that significant numbers of white secondary school students were being stop and searched, and generating similar complaints regarding their treatment to those coming from black communities. In turn, Clancy et al. (2001: 3) found that gender and age were important factors in disproportionality, because across ethnicity it was males under 30 who were most consistently stopped.56

Indeed, this is backed up by data from the Metropolitan Police57 which reveals that from the period from September 2016 to August, 2017, ‘men' constituted over 93 per cent of all stop and searches; the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 constituted just under 57 per cent of all searches; finally, while ‘black' and ‘Asian' respectively constituted the most targeted groups in relation to resident population, ‘white' made up the second highest group after ‘black' in terms of total volume, constituting just under 40 per cent of all stop and searches. On the other hand this may vary depending on area, for instance, in a report examining equality in Haringey during 2012, ‘black' then ‘white' constituted the most targeted groups in relation to resident population (Goodchild, 2013: 6).

The data supports Bulmer & Solomos’ (1999: 5) argument that the prohibition

56 Indeed, those I spoke to regarding stop and search tended to frame the problem of profiling in terms of young, black, and men. However, it was also acknowledged that police were targeting young men of other ethnic backgrounds, and profiling by style of dress and area or estate. In other words, those working with young people in excluded areas were identifying the same demographic markers found in data on rioters, as those used by police to profile and over-police.
57 Data taken from the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Stop and Search Dashboard' on 20/09/2017 https://www.met.police.uk/stats-and-data/stop-and-search-dashboard/
of racial categories does not mean the prejudice itself will disappear, but rather the affective drive will be structured through new forms of distinction. In other words, we need to be careful not to simply assume ‘race’ is the only means by which prejudice is enacted, or indeed, that skin colour or ethnicity are not operating as one potential, even central, marker of a stereotype in conjunction with dress, age, gender, and area.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, race and class lines have been blurred in part through the neglect of structural relations and expansion of poverty and exclusion. Yet perhaps the most visible incidence of this new stereotype came with New Labour’s concept of NEET (Clement, 2012; Sammons, 2008) which functions as a formulation of the young underclass to justify interventions in education, employment, and the Criminal Justice System.

Part of this intervention came through Tony Blair’s Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), which enabled police to target individuals under civil law, thus loosening the requirements of evidence and avoiding due process (Carrabine et al., 2014; Squires, 2006). Problematically, the “definitional ambiguities about what, exactly, constitutes [anti-social behaviour] may reinforce racist and discriminatory interpretations of youthful behaviour” (Squires, 2006: 160). Thus while the Ministry of Justice do not provide information regarding ethnicity, we can note the presence of two potential markers of the ‘criminality’ stereotype; between 2000 and 2013 86% (20,836) of ASBOs were issued to males and 21% were issued to individuals aged under 18 (MoJ(d), 2014: 1).

Moreover, while an ASBO does not constitute a criminal sentence or record, if an individual fails to comply with the terms of the order they can be incarcerated for up to 5 years (MoJ(e), 2014). This is not just in theory; from 2000 to 2013 53% of ASBO breaches resulted in custodial sentences (MoJ(d), 2014: 4). In other words, not only may individuals end up in prison without committing any crime, it opens up certain forms of behaviour and types of individual to criminalisation based on stereotypes and the moral

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58 The report does not distinguish between other age groups.
judgements of the police.

Similarly New Labour’s ‘Respect Agenda’ brought in ‘pseudo-legal’ controls that, in conjunction with ASBOs, effectively repealed certain aspects of PACE that had sought to prevent malpractice. The Respect Agenda enabled police to target young people who gathered in urban spaces (Tyler, 2013: 198); problematically, one reason PACE was introduced was in order to remove the police power to arrest for ‘loitering with intent’. This power meant police could stop, search, and even arrest based on no evidence other than the police’s suspicion that the individual was in a public space and up to no good (Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 435). Thus New Labour affectively removed this control.

Again, the result is the criminalisation of those stereotyped and economically excluded by the social order. One way the recent austerity program has had an impact has been to push young people in areas of poverty onto the streets. For instance, in Haringey, 8 out of 13 youth clubs were closed prior to 2011, which according to Steve, were already spread thinly over an entire borough (also see Cooper, 2012). The problem is manifold in impoverished areas. Young people not only generally lack the economic means to pay for services, but in such areas there tends to be a greater incidence of young people coming from problematic home lives. Indeed, both Steve and the youth project spoke of these problems amongst the young people they dealt with. However, cuts to public, and in particular, youth services, means more young people are forced onto the streets.

Factors such as these not only increase the likelihood of young people being drawn into crime, they open young people up to targeting and abuse by the police. Steve, who regularly worked with the police, argued that they often profiled individuals depending on their location meaning young men, dressed in hoodies and tracksuits, in stereotyped estates, ticked the majority of the boxes. Consequently, in impoverished estates hanging out on the streets functions as another sign of ‘criminality’ or danger. Thus, instead of being ‘tough on the causes of crime’ as New Labour promised, they simply became tough on socially and economically excluded youth (Squires, 2006: 163).

Ultimately it seems that society’s stereotypes have shifted, and with it police
profiling or understanding of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Thus, today, police target those marked as ‘criminal’ or ‘underclass’ through a mixture of gender, age, skin colour, dress style, and area. Indeed, this was precisely Maria’s experience who was searched twice when hanging around with black, male, friends on her estate: “for that to always happen cos of the way you dress or the people you hang out with”. While for Ben the further issue was that because the police profiled, they often targeted the ‘good kids’.

Problematically, not only do none of the above visual markers ‘black’, ‘male’, ‘young’, ‘estate’ necessitate ‘criminality’, the manner of dressing (hoodies, tracksuits, trainers) is a common style or fashion amongst young people in areas such as Hackney and Tottenham. In this light, the fact that 9 out of 10 stop and searches are carried out on individuals doing nothing illegal becomes fundamentally problematic. Those being stopped and often treated as criminals and in a hostile manner are often just young people who are not breaking any laws, but happen to hold markers popularly associated with the ‘underclass’ or ‘criminality’.

8.2.4. Accountability

The final structural concern I want to consider with regards to stop and search is not so much what it does, but what is often absent. Accountability refers to the extent to which the police can be held to be responsible for failures to achieve the required standards of behaviour of fairness, respect, and neutrality (Bradford, 2015). Without adhering to this standard, interactions with police will likely produce negative emotional responses amongst those stop and searched, prompting a response and that requires expression to overcome any disrespect experienced.

Thus accountability is important not simply to rectify a wrong or limit police malpractice, but to structure the interaction so as to enable the expression of negative emotions, such as shame and anger. In other words, procedures of accountability provide an expressive mechanism by which the subject of the search is empowered, theoretically enabling them to overcome negative emotions.”

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emotions *within* the legitimated system. Without accountability, any negative emotions will be repressed due to the dominant capacity of the police to exercise force and may seek expression outside of the system.

To enable the accountability of the police force PACE (2011; Home Office, 2014) requires that every subject of a stop and search to be issued with a copy of a report of the search, detailing, among other things, the officers’ name and why the stop was made. The purpose of issuing a report is to better enable complaints to be made regarding the police’s behaviour or if it is felt that the purpose of the stop was not legitimate. However, as we have already noted when discussing the problems of the legalistic forms of regulation, the police do not always follow procedure.

The HMIC’s investigation found that 37% of those surveyed stated they had not been told the reason why; 51% said the officers failed to identify themselves; 41% said no form was filled out in their presence; and 50% said they were not informed of their right to have a copy of the form (HMIC, 2013: 30). Indeed, Ben who ran the stop and search monitoring group stated that it was common for subjects of searches to not receive notice of the search. Furthermore, Ben and Bland et al. (2001: 30) found that many of those who had been stop and searched were not aware of their rights, nor that police were required to provide them with a report, suggesting that it was not common practice. In turn, this influences the perception of accountability and thus trust in the police (also see Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 10; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 10 & 15).

What I have demonstrated briefly in the above discussion are three key aspects that structure the interactions between police and the public in stop and searches. On the one hand, the powers provided to detain and forcibly search an individual mean that the police, by carrying out a stop and search, are disempowering the subject and thus without care may cause shame. The second structural consideration relates to the definition and application of ‘reasonable suspicion’, alongside the discretion allowed to officers in the field. The regulation and lack of training around this issue created a mechanism by which broader society’s stereotypes could be exercised as ‘practical
judgement’, thus forming an aspect of exclusion and reproducing prejudice.

Finally, the notion of accountability, or lack thereof, is important because it may counter the disempowerment created by the forced nature of searches, and enable individuals to expressively overcome any negative emotions produced by unfair treatment or profiling. Without accountability there is no institutionalised mechanism to release any anger and shame such interactions might produce.

The implication of all this is that police seem to be heading into potentially invasive and embarrassing encounters with little or no institutional means, or understanding of how to interact to alleviate or reduce these negative emotional consequences, resulting in “inappropriate or, in some cases, unlawful practices” (HMIC, 2013: 7; also see Bland et al. 2001: 28). In other words, since its inception, stop and search has often been practiced in manners that produce unnecessary and particularly negative experiences amongst those subjected to it, and it is to the experiential side that we turn next.

8.3. Experiencing Stop and Search

The problems with stop and search have been well detailed, and indeed, so have the complaints made by members of the public. The purpose in examining the actual experience of stop and search, rather than aggregating or reiterating complaints and statistics, is to elaborate on what is often left implicit in such critiques, and demonstrate how such experiences can shape the disposition to attack the police. The value of this approach is not only to bridge the explanatory gap between the structure and agency, but in demonstrating the complex way causal relations affect dispositions it can counter the moral condemnation of attacks on the police as mindless attacks on the forces or order (Cameron, 2011).

The structure of this section to some extent mirrors the structuring of experience. We begin with the base condition that shape experiences of stop and search, the removal of agency. Following this we step out and consider
how different factors come into play, intersect, and further impact on the experience, starting with legitimacy or the perception of the police, violent treatment, and finally prejudice and stereotypes. What I will show is that this form of experience shapes individual dispositions towards the police in which violence is not only appropriate but cathartic and constructive in overcoming the negative sense of self.

8.3.1 Powerlessness and Impotence

At its base dynamic, stop and search forces the situation in which an individual has either to submit to the police and an invasive search procedure, or is subject to a greater form of violence followed by a search or arrest. According to Ben (monitoring group) the sense of powerlessness is not uncommon amongst those stop and searched, and notably further exacerbated by the lack of accountability discussed above. Ben spoke of many people who had talked to him about their negative experiences of stop and search, stating that many came to him because they ‘felt helpless’ and did not know what to do in terms of resolution.

Maria (stop and searched twice) felt that stop and search produces a situation in which the subject is potentially made to feel powerless and angry: “you’re gonna get frustrated […] you’re gonna want to retaliate, but obviously you’re not gonna want to cos you know you’ll get arrested”. As Honneth (1995: 132-3) argues, the denial of the autonomy of the body produces a loss of trust in oneself to be capable of action by reducing the reliability, predictability, and control one has over the self in the social world.

The result is to prevent the expectations of a positive sense of self being met, or in other words feelings of insecurity, impotence, and inadequacy. During Ben’s survey of young people’s experiences of stop and search, individuals commonly described how they were made to feel ‘humiliated’, ‘violated’, ‘angry and afraid’, or a mix of these. While ‘humiliate’ clearly connects to shame, perhaps most informative is the terms ‘violate’. This connects us to breaking or transgressing a boundary of the self that is considered

sacrosanct, and in turn through its etymological origins, to violence: something forced upon an unwilling victim.

Thus, to be rendered powerless over your own body is not only a particularly negative and shameful experience, it prompts certain forms of action (through anger or fear, for instance) in order to meet one’s expectations of control required for a positive sense of self (Gilligan, 2003: 1150; Palshikar, 2005: 5431). The problem is, of course, that with stop and search the anger has no way to be expressed ‘cos you know you'll get arrested’ (Maria) or be subject to a greater violence. The rendering of an individual as powerless necessitates that shame turns to anger and ‘builds up’ (Ben), either being repressed or seeking other routes.

Indeed, Ben also noted, supported by Bradford’s (2015: 111-2) findings, that this often led to young men in particular seeking their ‘own justice’, seemingly as a means to exercise or overcome their feelings of powerlessness and inadequacy and express the repressed anger. Steve similarly described how this anger builds ‘until it is boiling [...] like a bomb case’, making a compressing gesture with his hands, waiting for the right trigger to release. The impact of this form of interaction and outcome is particularly visible in the description of a black man in his 40s who had been stopped between 20-25 times:

all of a sudden, these people around us sprang into action and I was held against the wall. My wife was held. There were cars screeching, loads of police cars, and everything [...] The impact it had on me was huge, huge; and it was negative. I felt that I needed a shower after. I felt really inadequate (non-rioter, Open Society Foundation, 2013: 4)

The quote reveals how the stop and search removed his capacity to act and respond to this threat, particularly to his family. The man clearly felt ashamed and ‘inadequate’ because of his inability to resolve or deal with the situation and would go on to describe how his sense of shame turned into anger: “I was

61 For similar finding or sentiments see (Bradford, 2015: 108; Newburn et al.(a & b), 2016; Prasad(c & e), 2011; Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 14).
When we consider that stop and search can often be a repeat experience for those stereotyped it becomes easy to understand why Steve used the term ‘boiling’, as such powerful emotions require expression. However, as noted the negative impact of the loss of agency can be ameliorated by ‘good practice’. Had the police approached the man quoted above and explained why they wanted to search him, it might have resulted in a very different experience, and perhaps he would not have felt ‘inadequate’, and later ‘absolutely fuming’. Yet the structuring of experience does not solely derive from the powers given to the police, but rather how this base principle interacts with other factors. The first port of call is the police’s ‘legitimacy’, for while stop and search can produce mistrust in the police, mistrust of the police also shapes the experience of stop and search.

8.3.2 Legitimacy

A number of those I spoke to highlighted the problem of mistrust and a disposition to resist or oppose the police. While Weber (2009: 78) assumes that the state ‘successfully’ exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, as we saw in the 1980s, this is not necessarily the case. The issue here is that even prior to the search occurring the police’s powers may be perceived as illegitimate, and thus constitute a form of violence (Arendt, 1970). In other words, rather than the police being empowered by the people they police, they are empowered over them, and any exercise of power is likely to be perceived as oppressive and the spurious choice presented in stop and search is revealed for what it is.

In other words, “[a]ny police action, sensitive or senseless, [becomes] likely to be opposed” (Keith, 1993: 125; also see Bradford, 2015: 109; Loader, 2006: 208). As we have seen previously, those who are being over-policed in communities such as Hackney or Tottenham are often those who have come from communities that have a long history of conflict with the police and contexts of social and economic exclusion. Unsurprisingly, mistrust in the police remains high in these communities (e.g. Bradford, 2015; Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Hall et al, 1980; Keith, 1993; Quinton, 2015; Stone & Pettigrew,
Displaying this cultural mistrust when discussing stop and search, Nick (black, male, 40s) expressed his doubt as to whether the police could act fairly stating he would always ‘have questions’ about who and why they were being stopped. Steve revealed how this context comes into play with the police when he, rather poignantly, highlighted a contradiction occurring in Tottenham. Parents are ‘protecting the next generation’ by preparing their children for what are seen as the realities of policing – unpleasant and discriminatory experiences. At the same time, this exacerbates the conflict between police and young people by teaching them to fear and resent the police.

For Ben, part of what the stop and search monitoring group sought to achieve was to reduce young people’s hostile reaction to police during a search in order to limit the possibility of escalation into conflict and arrest. By teaching young people their rights and what the police could legally do, Ben thought the implicit hostility towards police could be focused into managing the encounter and achieving a better outcome. Maria, Ned, Polly, and Aisha also mentioned this cultural sense of mistrust or dislike of the police, which not only came from parents but from peers. As individuals have bad experiences with the police, so they tell their friends weaving their experiences into this broader, intergenerational narrative around the police as hostile and a threat. This occurs to the point that, as with Nick, one does not even to have experience particularly negative interactions with the police to have serious doubts about their intentions.

As this suggests, the narrative functions to generate expectations and prompt emotional dispositions, preparing individuals for negative experiences at the hands of police. This leads to what Quinton (2015: 75) described in Hackney as an ‘us against them’ mentality, in which the police were viewed as an ‘occupying force’. In my research this disposition was made particularly visible for me by Nick, who not only expressed expectations of police utilising

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62 Also see Delsol & Shiner, 2006; HMIC, 2013: 11; Open Society Foundation, 2013: 16; Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 14; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 11
violence unjustly, but I also witnessed him tense or tighten up and lower his voice as two police officers walked past us on the street, despite the fact that in no way could Nick have been perceived as doing something wrong or ‘suspicious’.  

Unfortunately, this mistrust, while justified, contributes to the vicious cycle where any stop and search will likely become a negative experience, and any negative experience with the police simply corroborates the narrative and perception of police. The point here is that the illegitimacy of the police implies a set of expectations by the subject that harm will occur through the police’s exercise of their powers, and that they will be exercised unfairly or unjustly against them. In such a context, stop and search – which relies on ‘suspicion’ rather than evidence – will always struggle to avoid a negative emotional response as the subject is rendered impotent.

8.3.3 Violence and Violation

As has been noted, simply because stop and search disempowers the subject, this does not necessitate that they are made to feel impotent. Good practice and trust in the police can ameliorate this negative aspect of the experience. Nevertheless, it does render subjects vulnerable and thus any negatives in the experience are likely to be amplified. Unfortunately, the relevance in connecting society’s stereotypes to police practice is not simply to show that they profile by types of individual. A stereotype implies not only judgement but discriminatory treatment; indeed, the purpose of negative stereotyping is to justify exclusionary treatment. For Maria the way police profiled was connected to the treatment of the profiled:

and it happens so much where people get arrested for things they haven’t done, and for that to always happen to cos of the way you dress or the people you hang out with […] if it’s always happening you’re gonna get frustrated especially if police come to you with a bad attitude or treat you bad

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As Maria’s statement suggests the problem of profiling is more than just the targeting of individuals, but also the differential treatment in the interaction based on the perception or stereotype in play. In other words, it is not just the repeated stopping of certain types of individuals that we must concern ourselves with, but the behaviour of the police implied by the prejudice. At the most extreme is the use of physical force and even violence on those being searched. This is particularly important because it takes the loss of agency to its extreme conclusion – you will be physically mistreated and you have no power to resist.

Two of the accounts I want to give both happened to young black men in north London and were relayed to me by Ben and Steve. Steve described a recent interaction where his son (mid 20s, black) was pulled over while driving home. The stop happened late at night, around one hundred meters from his home in Tottenham. The officers signalled for him to stop on a quiet suburban street, then exited their vehicle and proceeded over to Steve’s son.

The question was asked why he was driving about late at night, but the assumption was apparently already made that he was doing something illegal. One officer grabbed the keys from the car, dragged him out and ‘threw him about’, before forcefully inserted fingers into his mouth looking for drugs. After finding nothing, rather than returning the keys, the officer threw them into the street. No report was given, the officers made no attempt to identify themselves, and did not attempt to gain consent for the search.

Ben told me of an event during the Notting Hill Carnival where his nephew, a black man in his early twenties, was dancing in a crowd of festival-goers. Ben’s nephew was aggressively approached by a number of police, apparently because he had alcohol and they thought he might be violent. According to Ben the police were particularly hostile, and there was little reason to suspect his nephew as he was simply one person amongst a crowd of people drinking and dancing during the procession. When his nephew resisted the stop and search an officer punched him, knocking him unconscious, before handcuffing him.

Here again, not only did the police apparently utilise unnecessary violence,
the reason for suspicion were perceived to have lacked any foundation in evidence, and again no record of the stop was made/given, although perhaps this is because it ultimately became an arrest very quickly. Ben was also threatened with arrest when he tried to intervene on his nephews behalf, however, he then managed to take a photo (which he showed to me) of his nephew unconscious, suspended by his arms, which were handcuffed behind his back.

Steve was clearly upset and angry as he told me his son’s story, however, perhaps because Ben was present at the event his reaction was much clearer. Although Ben was not the subject of the police’s intervention he was particularly animated and angry when he described events to me. While he did not explicitly state it, his clear desire to prevent his nephew being physically abused coupled with his sense of disempowerment, understandably, generate a lot of anger and resentment which had remained with him. Indeed, his involvement in the monitoring group appeared driven by his need to overcome the sense of powerlessness he had experienced on more than one occasion, as he told me later ‘I can’t be a victim … I don’t care who it is, I’m not scared’.

Unfortunately, the use of violence coupled with the situation of powerlessness is a particularly potent method of generating a sense of inadequacy, fear, and anger. Such interactions firmly establish the dominance of one side and the inferiority of the other, and damage the victim’s confidence in their ability to protect and exercise control over the external world (Honneth, 1995: 132-3; Gilligan, 2003; Palshikar, 2005).

Yet perhaps this is most damaging in terms of the relation with police and society when it occurs to children. Indeed, it is worth noting that is not unusual for children to come into encounters with police: in 2012 26% of all stop and searches in London were carried out on 10-17 year olds (Open Society Foundation, 2013: 23-4). Thus, further to the above examples, I witnessed the pursuit of a young white boy, around 10-12 years of age, during my research at the youth project. I had walked past the boy and a friend earlier as I entered the project, at which point they were playing outside on the youth project’s
grounds that border the street.

The moment itself occurred later on during an interview I was conducting with Carla. We had heard shouting from outside, and exited the office into the foyer to investigate. At this point the boy ran around the corner and into the foyer at speed, being chased by two police officers. The closest officer was shouting aggressively as he attempted to grab the boy, missing him as he came through the open door. The boy ran a short way into the building before one of the community workers, Ray, stopped him, put his arm around and calmed the boy, and took him to talk to the officers who had ceased the chase.

The police stated they were present because there had been some ‘trouble’ in the area (although they did not state what this ‘trouble’ was) and had asked the boy what he was doing. The boy stated he ran because he thought the police would Taser him, while the police stated they had just tried to talk to him. It would seem strange for the boy to run simply because the police asked him a question, nevertheless, it was unclear how the initial interaction had played out, but there are some useful points to take from this.

Whatever instigated the chase, it led to a situation in which a young boy was clearly frightened by the police, and such experiences are likely to make the boy fear future encounters with police and perhaps resent them for the fear they produce in him. Secondly, it was clear he already did fear the police, suggesting the role of either previous experiences with them, or supporting the notion of an anti-police narrative. Given that he mentioned that he thought the police would Taser him, it could have been that he had heard accounts of police using Tasers. This might explain, if it was the case that the police only asked a question, why he had run from them.

While what further struck me at the time was the aggressiveness (shouting, facial expressions) with which the police pursued the young boy who was clearly scared, and what might have occurred had the youth worker not been

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64 Although when I asked Ray he did not know if the boy had prior negative experiences with the police, he did think it might be due to stories about negative experiences that he had heard.
there to calm the situation down and prevent a forceful apprehension. The effect of these sorts of experiences on anyone, but especially children, is particularly worrying as these are the most formative periods, shaping “group belonging, acceptance, solidarity and social affirmation” (Robertson, 2002: 73).

Even with Ray’s intervention, the experience of the boy shapes expectations where a violent force can descend on him in any public space, and seemingly for no apparent reason. Consequently, such experiences could easily shape the police as a hostile threat and produce a sense of exclusion, which again could connect to broader society. One rioter in his 30s from London, corroborates this, speaking of an experience with police around the age of 12 where he was thrown into a police van, called ‘nigger’, beaten and spat on - he went on to state he had not forgiven the police or gotten over his anger (Prasad(e), 2011).

This last quote from the rioter reinforces the notion that the violence exercised in stop and search cannot be understood as distinct from the process of stereotyping and excluding. Negative stereotypes and affective prejudice enable the discriminatory and violent behaviours discussed above by framing types of individuals as inferior to justify their exclusionary treatments, even when this is a young boy. When constructed as ‘criminal’ or threatening violence is justified to “keep the power structure intact against individual challengers – the foreign enemy, the native criminal” (Arendt, 1970: 47). However, violence is only the most extreme act of disrespect produced by this process, next we turn to the ‘message’.

8.3.4 Criminalisation

The police are symbolically connected to the state and society, and also given the power to speak for the state and society (Wacquant, 2009). Thus, one side of this coin means a message is potentially sent to the individual being searched that the police believe they are ‘criminal’ and not wanted as part of society. While the other side implies that a message is also potentially sent to ‘society’, or any observers, that this individual, and perhaps this type of individual, is dangerous and criminal (Bradford, 2015; Hall et al, 1980; Loader,
On the one hand then, a stop and search potentially constitutes a form of disrespect by symbolically refusing and inhibiting social recognition. While on the other, it sends a message that individuals like the one being searched are dangerous, contributing to the reproduction of the self-same stereotypes and exclusions. Indeed, those being targeted for stop and search recognise this and experience it as a symbolic refusal of worth. One complaint from the monitoring group’s survey was that police failed to give any or adequate reasons for the search, which many took to mean they were stopped because of their appearance.

Indeed, one reason has become so overused by police that it is almost a cliché: ‘you fit the appearance of a suspect’. Not only is this found in many reports (e.g. Open Society Foundation, 2013; Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000), commonly mentioned during my research, it was also common knowledge to myself prior to carrying out any investigations. Indeed, some time ago in my mid-twenties a group of friends and myself were subject to a stop and search, albeit a very amicable one, for that very reason. Our perception was that the likelihood of our group fitting a description of suspects was small, and thus the officers had used it as an excuse to stop a group of men late at night. The problem is that such a reason is now never believed, as a student from Tottenham noted: “The description always fits me” (Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 10).

This is particularly important because society’s stereotypes and hierarchy are also reinforced and transmitted through the police’s behaviour, whether it is violent actions, assumptions of guilt, insults, or the sense of moral superiority. The affective impact of this is to shape they way in which you perceive yourself within society, and the way society looks at you. Nick described the treatment of black people by police throughout his life as making him realise he was a ‘second class citizen’. Subject also highlight similar in their descriptions of stop and search:

They get cocky with you. They get like they think they’re a lot higher than you (Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 15).
They automatically think I've got a knife. How do you think that makes me feel? (rioter, 19, Black, Tottenham, Prasad(c), 2011).

One 22-year-old black male surveyed by Ben who had been stop and searched ‘about 30 times’, stated “sometimes you get police officer who you can tell straight away they've already judged you and then they come with a certain attitude […] I don't feel good”. Common complaints given about stop and search during the monitoring group’s survey were that police were ‘rude’ and ‘talked down to’ them, while what was commonly suggested by those surveyed as ways to improve stop and search was to ‘be polite’ or ‘friendly’, and importantly to be ‘respectful’.

Through Butler’s (2011) concept of performativity, we can better describe what is occurring. A stop and search is a performative act that reproduces and re-establishes the power relations and roles of the social order. The act of singling an individual out, of implying negative judgement of them, and of mistreating them, is to perform society’s distinctions. Through the experience the police identify themselves as dominant and within the social order, and the subject is forced to identify as inferior, disempowered, and unwanted.

Indeed, we only need to recall Ben’s account of his nephew or Steve’s accounts of his son being searched, the police’s treatment of them and what message that sent. In the case of Steve’s son, the police assumed he had drugs, that they could physically mistreat him, and even when nothing was found they threw his keys away. The message being sent by police, as the representatives of the social order, is that ‘you are criminal, not an equal, and do not belong with us.

This aspect of assumed superiority/criminality, along with the treatment this tends to imply, clearly creates the potential for shame as social recognition is being denied. When surveying the wider research into stop and search, this perspective is all too common. The research carried out for the Home Office (Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: vi) found that accounts of more positive experiences of stop and search were characterised by politeness on the part of the officers and acceptable reasons being given for the stop as opposed to feeling unfairly targeted.
While on the other side, it is not uncommon to find sentiments such as that expressed by one student in Tottenham, who reported that they were made to feel ‘guilty until proven innocent’ (Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 11), or a young male rioter who stated that his experiences of stop and search had made him “feel like I'm not a part of this society” (Prasad(c), 2011). Indeed, utilising survey data, Bradford (2015: 106-7)\(^{65}\) found a lower sense of belonging to society amongst profiled and over-policed groups, and this sense of alienation was found to have increased the likelihood of participation in the 2011 riots (Morrell et al., 2011: 7).

In other words, the targeting and mistreatment of young men during a stop and search appears to be leaving many feeling disrespected, stigmatised, and rejected by society. For Tyler (2013), the impact of such treatment on the dispositions of those subject to them is the creation of a contradiction between the need or drive for a positive sense of self, and the identity imposed through the performative treatment of them as something of little worth. The internal battle is between the shame imposed upon them and the drive to re-establish self worth: “[The police] call us little shits and little bastards […] I hate feeling like people are judging me” (rioter, Lewis, 2011). The result is anger which requires expression: “I hate them” (ibid).

8.3.5 Besieging Communities

In all the previous aspects of stop and search space and temporality, that is the concentrated and continued exercise of the powers, has been somewhat implied. However, in this section I will make it explicit, for it is not simply that it happens, but that it continues to happen in certain areas, and this has a particular impact. Research has repeatedly noted that contact generated by the police results in lower confidence and trust in the police, this is particularly notable in areas which are the focus of over-policing (Bradford, 2015: 108; HMIC, 2013; Miller et al. 2001: 78).

‘Acquired space’ refers to the notion that a place takes on meaning due to the interactions that occur within it (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 114). It is the

geographic organisation of norms and expectations; thus in one sense space or place is a marker by which we set out possibilities and probabilities through affective responses. Thus, focused and long-term over-policing in areas or estates produces an oppressive feeling. This is particularly problematic in light of powers given under the ‘Respect Agenda’ and that remove requirements of due process, such as ASBOs (Carrabine et al., 2014; Tyler, 2013). Even more so when we recall that in these areas it is often young people who are already struggling with disrespect and disempowerment imposed by the larger social order, that are pushed onto the streets.

Indeed, this was one of the most concerning things regarding the boy I witnessed being chased by police - he was playing on the grounds of the youth project, but was not safe from police intervention. On another occasion I witnessed a stop and search in Wood Green, a shopping area of Haringey that saw looting in 2011. The stop happened at a busy crossroads where four young, black men who were ‘hanging around’ before a police car pulled up and two officers got out. The officers proceeded over to the young men, spoke briefly and lined them up with their hands placed against the wall and legs spread, before performing the search. The young men were allowed to go on their way after the search found nothing, and I saw no record being provided of the stop.

The corner on which this occurred was known at the time as a spot for drug dealing and had been targeted by police for operations. However, given the young men were not seen ‘dealing’ and the police found nothing on them, this appeared to be suspicion based not on ‘objective’ information, but on a stereotype – four young black men were present on a corner with a ‘reputation’.

While the police did not use excessive force during the stop and search, there were certainly no niceties, and the officers pushed and cajoled the men into position. Although I could not hear what was being said, clearly the men were not willing participants. Instead, they appeared to resist through a sort of passive non-compliance, forcing the police to manoeuvre them into position, as well as displaying a general disrespect to the police through their body
language. Ultimately, the men appeared to be doing nothing wrong, resented the police's intervention in their daily life, and their behaviour suggested that resistance was desired and would be acted on if it was felt as plausible.

The point to bring out of this is that even such relatively benign police actions make it very difficult to view the police as anything other than a threat to those who fit the ‘profile’. Such experiences likely reinforce the idea that each time you enter public space there is the risk you will be targeted and rendered powerless to prevent an invasive and potentially embarrassing encounter: “When you’re not doing anything, just hanging with your friends, any group of kids, they will harass them ... people don’t respect the police. (Young person, Tottenham, Morrell et al. 2011: 42)

Such events are a common problem; Maria spoke of her surprise at being searched when she was just hanging about on her estate. The youth project sought to provide a place after school and during the evenings that would provide an alternative to hanging out on the streets. This not only was more likely to keep their young people out of crime, but also reduced the possibility that they would come into negative contact with the police, thus limiting the possibility of what Stone and Pettigrew (2000: 12) found – that repeated stop and searches ‘aroused strong feelings of anger and victimisation’. 66

As we saw with Brixton in the 1980s, the feeling of being targeted and harassed leads to a sense of oppression pervading public spaces; similar sentiment can be found with regards to 2011, a feeling that you cannot live your life without concern or fear of intervention by the police: “We feel we can’t walk down the street. We feel it’s their [police] streets.” (rioter, 17, male, white, London, Newburn et al.(b), 2016: 13). Steve argued that his estate, amongst others, had been stereotyped as violent and criminal, and it was this understanding that the police operated on when entering. On the estate, Steve argued, police viewed almost anyone with suspicion. Thus the area itself becomes part of the profile or stereotype and those who live there, particularly young men, become aware of and have to live with the police as a

66 For similar findings see: Bradford, 2015; Carter(f) 2011; Open Society Foundation, 2013: 30; Prasad(c), 2011.
potential and constant threat.

That people become used to it obviously does not mean it becomes less unpleasant for those subject to a constant possibility of police intervention – in the USA ‘stop and frisk’ produces similar responses: “That's bad! Y’all hear what he said? 'We used to it'? That's like you got used to somebody trying to punch you in your face every day when you come outside” (Devereaux & Spencer, 2013). This form of policing becomes, for some, an everyday oppressive factor, a reminder of your exclusion, and a possibility that one has to some extent accept and negotiate.

The point to take away from this is not just that the over-policing of certain areas implies profiling of young people on the street, or simply an increase in the types of negative encounters described above; but that the police become an everyday oppressive factor, or threat in public space. In turn this feeling of oppression feeds over into relations and interactions with larger society and its representatives. The public space itself produces a disposition in which the expectations implied by the anti-police narrative are brought into play each time a young person leaves their home or club. While of course there are a mixture of causes, that ‘Kids come to [the youth project] aggressive, hostile, and mistrustful’ (Jane) is a dispositional stance to a world where there are many threats, not only or simply violent ones, but existential threats to self-worth, and one of these is the police.

8.4. Performing Anger: Accountability or Riot

Emotions tell us something about the situation we are in, what to expect and what responses are ‘appropriate’, based on prior experiences and to what extent our expectations were or were not met (Damasio & Damasio, 2006; Honneth, 1995: 136). In turn we ‘express’ or fulfil these emotions through actions that seek to achieve these expectations, or resolve the contradiction between expectations and a positive sense of self that occur in negative interactions.

We do this by ‘performing’ (Butler, 2004; 2011) with power relations and roles in ways that seek to achieve an adequate expression. Emotional responses
occurring through negative interactions with the police will attach to the object of the police (Ray, 2016), shaping expectations of future interactions involving violence and disrespect, and pre-reflexively disposing or prompting certain forms of re-action in order that the individual can be better prepared and respond appropriately.

Consequently, individuals who produce such affective body states want resolution; the purpose of anger or shame is to prompt forms of action that change or prevent the negative emotional experience (Scheff, 1988: 396; 2000: 90). This change or prevention is brought about by the performance of alternative power relations and roles. Of course, this is not a possibility when agency has been removed, thus, as Steve put it, anger builds up until it is ‘boiling … like a bomb case’. The point is, to expand Maria’s earlier quote, the expression of the negative emotion through action is suppressed:

if police come to you with a bad attitude or treat you bad you’re gonna want to retaliate, but obviously you’re not gonna want to cos you know you’ll get arrested. So I think that whole thing [the riots] was retaliation to police over like what they do over years.

Maria not only notes the connection between the emotional response of negative treatment and the loss of agency, she also points to what this prompts: ‘retaliation’. Other have argued the same:

that riot was a release of tension. The two main things were obviously the killing of Mark Duggan, but also the oppression that led to it. The years of police just hassling us while we’re just trying to do our thing (black, male, Tottenham, non-rioter, Open Society Foundation, 2013: 30)

The sensation of powerlessness is likely to be acutely felt during a negative experience of stop and search. The very moment you are being wronged, be it an insult or violence, and are driven to ‘retaliate’ or prevent such an experience, is precisely the moment when you have lost the capacity to do so. Indeed, Steve and Ben also thought the death of Duggan was the trigger, the straw that broke the camel’s back, with Steve comparing to the riots in the
1980s: ‘Same kind of cocktail and same trigger’. This combines with what Bradford (2015: 109) argues from his findings; that repeated stop and searches are problematic because they build up the sense of being wronged, and produce ‘lasting damage’ to relations with police.

This is where accountability in stop and search and the police generally is, or should be, relevant because it empowers individuals. In Arendt’s (1970) terms it allows individuals to participate in power, to shape the social world, and to overcome and reorganise relations of disrespect. However, the lack of accountability means, as Ben had found with many he had spoken to who wanted to do something but did not know what or how, that the feeling of ‘helplessness’ remains. If the individual feels mistreated, a procedure to rectify, or bring about ‘justice’, provides a form of resolution or agency that enables the negative emotions to be expressed or overcome through a performance of roles in which the police are not superior, but admonished for their actions. In other words, if the police were felt to be accountable, if there were feasible means to carry out complaints, and if it was felt this would make a difference, this may alleviate or assuage the build up of discontent and powerlessness, resolve shame before it becomes anger, and provide a route for rectification and justice, rather than retaliation.

Unfortunately, mistrust in the police complaints system is high, perhaps largely due to the police being required to investigate the police (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 252). Indeed, even a black police officer who had been subject to repeated stop and search and decided to complain, described the process as difficult, lengthy, and frustrating (Open Society Foundation, 2013: 6 & 14). Both Aisha and Ben argued that making complaints was generally ‘pointless’, demonstrating mistrust of the system as a whole.

In other words, police accountability is low at best, and pre-reflexively excluded as a route of action at worst. Thus, without resolution through the justice system, all that is left to the powerless individual who seeks resolution and to express their discontent, is retaliation and perhaps violence. Of course, in everyday stop and searches and the loss of agency this implies, it ultimately means that this is not a realistic option. Physically, you can only
provide a sort of symbolic resistance to disrespect the police during the stop and search as I witnessed with the four young black men – being rude, hostile, forcing the police to work harder.

But this is not enough to express and resolve the sense of impotence and disrespect. Thus the anger and desire to overturn these relations of power and disrespect ‘builds up’, ‘boiling’, seeking a release, an opportunity:

   Everything the police have done to us, did to us, was in our heads. That’s what gave everyone their adrenaline to wanna fight the police ... because of the way they treated us, we was fearless (rioter, 19, male, black, Bromley, south London, Newburn et al.(b), 2016: 10)

   and they’ll [police] rough you up [laughs], just rough you up for no particular reason. People were screaming out: ‘This is for Mark [Duggan].’ They were shouting it out (rioter, male, Tottenham, Carter(f), 2011)67

8.5. Discussion

As I have argued, the ‘opportunity’ to riot in 2011 was created by the perception that the police had lost control, and thus their ability to arrest and exercise dominant force over the rioters. This situation constituted an opportunity for rioters to perform alternative power relations and roles with police that were being repressed by the social order in the everyday experience. The drive to alter the organisation of power was prompted by the affective impact of social and economic exclusion, but focused particularly through personal and narrative accounts of police discrimination and brutality. This connection could happen because of the way in which the police operate on and through the social order’s exclusions and logics of distinction. The police, simply put, respond to, and reproduce the prejudices of the privileged.

In the above discussions, the police have either been hostile, or utilised violence or excessive force, and have been perceived to do so without

67 For similar quotes see (Carter(a & c); 2011; Manchester riot, 2011, 0.57; Morrell et al. 2011: 32; Prasad(a & e), 2011)
reasonable justification. Whether it is simply an aggressive and forceful approach or actual violence, the instances represent normative violations of the self. These are violations because the expectations regarding the autonomy of self and ability to protect yourself are not met. The result is a significant emotional impact, be it shame, fear, anger, or as often seems to be the case, a mixture of each.

When the police lost the capacity to render subjects impotent in 2011 the ‘opportunity’ arose, and those suppressed emotions could now be expressed through performative actions that reorganised power relations with police. The desire to overturn shameful relations with police, to take back power, to reproduce self-esteem, and to get ‘revenge’ or ‘payback’ – to “violate [them] like they violate us” (rioter, in Tyler, 2013: 197), had pre-reflexively shaped the choice to act. Thus, the choice to attack the police was, for many, already reasonable and desirable, and what made August 2011 different from the everyday was only the context that made the choice plausible.

As the accounts of stop and search suggest, one does not have to identify as ‘criminal’ to have attacked the police, rather, they have simply been subject to experiences that prompt resentment, anger, and a desire to rectify these contradictions or injustices, yet are simultaneously prevented from doing so. Of course, to assume stop and search was the only factor involved in shaping this choice would be too simplistic, indeed, we might note that not all those who have been subject to negative stops and searches were involved in attacks on the police (e.g. Open Society, 2013). Rather, as has been argued, in conjunction with social and economic exclusion, over-policing provides a particularly potent mechanism that shapes one’s disposition towards the police, and reinforces the stereotypes of the social hierarchy.
9. Performative Violence:
Overcoming Disrespect and Disempowerment in 2011

9.1. Video Resistance

The 2011 riots have been and gone, yet, with the relatively recent emergence and proliferation of video capture technology, and sharing sites such as YouTube, we now stand in a situation where we may still observe and analyse rioting after the fact. The benefit of a situational analysis is that provides a more detailed and direct means to analyse acts of rioting than other forms of data can. Rioters cannot rationalise or misremember their actions in video footage, and neither can the complexity of these acts be lost as with blunt quantitative data. Instead, it remains ever present for repeated viewing and analysis. In turn, the topics of the previous chapter can now be brought together and understood through these actions in order to better bridge the gap between structure and agency.

Butler’s (2004; 2011) notion of performativity allows us to analyse action as socially structured without producing a stimuli-response or determinative account. Rather, performative acts, much as with Bourdieu’s (2003) notion of disposition, enable us to understand how power relations structure experience and become agency’s ‘necessary scene’ (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 45). In this light, the riots were not simply a response to rioters’ experiences of disempowerment and disrespect, rather as with any action, these drew on this ‘past’ with the aim of creating a ‘future’, an idea which extends out from the now and seeks to shape what will be (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 374-5). For the rioters, each act that confronts the police expresses their affective disposition and achieves an idea of themselves in relation to the police that is repressed in the everyday.

By examining these actions through the notions of performativity and expressive action, the problematic and moralising divide of political/criminal action can be avoided. We can connect and support the structural experiences developed in previous chapters through rioters’ responses to the
police actions, and what they seek to achieve in their own. Thus, while rioters’ actions may not have expressed themselves in the normatively acceptable terms of ‘politics’, this is not due to a lack of disempowerment and disrespect. Rather, the particular development of structural forms of exclusion previously discussed has inhibited the adequate functioning of democracy through producing individualised forms of resistance.

9.1.1. Carrying out the Situational Analysis

I begin with Tottenham and the emergence of rioting out of a protest over the shooting of Mark Duggan by police. Unfortunately, there is minimal useful footage available of the initial day of rioting on the 6th of August, and none of the days between the shooting and the riots. The principle source is a report that sought to assess police actions and strategy, by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS, 2012). Following Tottenham, we will move onto the rioting in Hackney to examine how the riots emerged there and the form it took. During this discussion I will also move away to consider footage of events in other areas where this connects with what we are seeing in Hackney.

The core analysis here examines events in Hackney that occurred on the 8th of August leading up to, and during the violence. Much of the footage I could locate came from this area, often involved conflicts or encounters between the public and police, and of all the footage viewed provided the best opportunity for a rough chronological ordering. The majority of the footage can be found on YouTube, either from news organisations such as Vice, or posted by members of the public who either filmed, or more likely, compiled the footage as many seem to utilise a selection of footage from different cameras.

The partial examination of Tottenham and the development of events in Hackney establish the causal relevance of the police both to the possibility of rioting emerging, and relatedly, the immediate development of the conflict. The chronological account in Hackney enables a more nuanced understanding of how the police’s actions connect back to experiences of

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58 The Metropolitan Police Service report was conducted by a police review panel, which gives an account of the events on the 6th of August, the police’s understanding of the situation in the days leading up to the riots, and some reports from officers on the ground.
disrespect, prompting anger and resistance. We also examine acts of looting as taunts to the police and direct confrontations with police emerging in Hackney, but also in a number of other locales. These acts of resistance are driven by the expressive nature of anger and shame, and function as a means to overcome or reverse power relations with police. In reversing these power relations rioters demonstrate to themselves and the police that the relation is no longer one in which they are inferior.

We further examine a common form of gesture made by rioters to police that functions in the same way as physical acts of resistance; this leads us into a discussion of the individualistic form of resistance we are seeing. For while the multiple forms of resistance to police feed from relations of disempowerment and disrespect, these aim at a personal resolution to discontent, ‘revenge’ and displaying their superiority, rather than any structural change.

9.1.2. Qualifications

Before beginning, we must first acknowledge the potential partiality of footage in terms of what those recording chose to capture, ignore, and post. One obvious concern is that those events filmed or selected for posting would likely be the most dramatic. This in turn, raises questions as to what was excluded through this process. Unfortunately, the extent to which this impacts on the footage is unknown, nevertheless, this does not mean such evidence is useless.

Firstly, the footage from Hackney enables us to provide a rough chronological account meaning that rather than viewing isolated and dramatic incidents, we can see multiple events in the same area and the progression of the situation towards violence. When discussing footage beyond Hackney it will be, in part, to reveal that there exist multiple accounts of similar forms of action and behaviours, indicating their relevance. Furthermore, the footage discussed are arguably not the most dramatic moments, but rather the milder end of confrontations with police; for instance, the police report being attacked with petrol bombs, knives, and machetes on multiple occasions, none of which we will see here (MPS, 2012: 41-3 & 86).
The major qualification that needs to be made is that in this chapter I am seeking to highlight and explore certain common actions and expressions of rioters when attacking the police. The aim is not to explain the totality of violent action against the police, nor the totality of possible intersecting factors or dispositions to do so. Rather the point is to ‘make sense’, or bring together in the moment, the broader structural forces and dispositions into the action of the riots.

In this sense the chapter both functions as evidence as to the validity of previous discussions, as well as developing and advancing a fuller account of the violence. Thus, in contrast to Collins (2008) and Nassauer’s (2011) notions of situational analysis, it is important to note this chapter does not stand alone as an argument or evidence. Instead, it seeks to demonstrate how the context of the everyday inheres in the moment of violence against police, constituting a ‘performance’ and a process of identification through resistance. It is through this analysis that we can overcome the problematic de-Politicisation that sought to represent rioters as immoral, mindless criminals.

9.2. Setting the Scene: The Build Up to Rioting in Tottenham

The evidence deployed here pertains to the days between the death of Mark Duggan, a black man, on the 4th of August, and the beginning of the rioting on the evening of the 6th in Tottenham, and how these events were interpreted by people in the local community. Rather than analysing events and behaviours, as there is little footage to enable a useful observation of behaviours, the main purpose is simply to the set the scene and to provide evidence of the context from which the riots initially emerged.

In the moments leading to his death, Duggan was travelling in a taxi near his home of Broad Water Farm, Tottenham. He had been targeted for a police operation under the belief that he was carrying a gun (MPS, 2012: 20). Armed police stopped the taxi, Duggan seems to have got out, and moments later the police fired at him, resulting in his death later at the scene (Vasagar,
As we have noted, the death of Mark Duggan constituted an ‘iconic’ event to the community of Tottenham, rather than a simple ‘trigger’ of violence, in that his death at the hands of police symbolised or “encapsulate[d] all that leads people to become disaffected, [and] angry” (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 38%). More than just another example of police abuse of black people, Duggan’s death connected to the broader historical context in which disrespect is visited upon black people, by demonstrating that their value is such that they can be abused and killed by the police.

In this historical context, the police’s failure to clarify and adequately communicate to the public what occurred seems to have exacerbated the situation and built tension between the police and local community. It was misreported that Duggan had fired upon police first, leading to a return of fire as the cause of death – which appears to have been widely disbelieved by the community. Moreover, the police had also failed to officially inform Duggan’s family of his death, resulting in their discovery through a newspaper article, which would ultimately motivate the original protest (IPCC, 2011; Israel, 2011; HAC, 2011: 5-7; RCVP, 2011: 11; Vasagar, 2011). In turn, later reports in newspapers on the 4th and 5th contradicted earlier accounts, stating that Duggan had been held down and shot (MPS, 2012: 24 & 29).

As a consequence, public anger towards the police in Tottenham was reported to have increased following the death of Duggan (MPS, 2012: 29; RCVP, 2011: 41). Some expressed the view that he had been ‘executed’ by police, and others claimed that the gun found at the scene had been planted by police (IPCC, 2011; Israel, 2011; MPS, 2012: 29). Signs of resentment towards the police and increasing tension began to emerge, with the Metropolitan Police Service reporting that on the 5th and 6th of August officers near or at the scene of Duggan’s shooting experienced insults and veiled threats from the public (MPS, 2012: 34). The Metropolitan Police review board stated that police reports from this period “gave a clear indication of raised

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69 This disbelief would be corroborated after the rioting when it was revealed that the bullet found wedged in a police radio supposedly fired by Duggan, was a police issue bullet.
tensions and anti-police sentiment.” (ibid), however, it was decided that level of tension could be addressed by “local police working with the community” (ibid: 28).

On the 6th of August a protest march, motivated by mistrust over Duggan’s death and specifically the failure of police to contact the family, walked from Duggan’s home on the Broadwater Farm estate to Tottenham High Road Police Station, around one mile away (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 16-7; HAC, 2011: 5-7; MPS, 2012: 22). The march, led by Duggan’s family, friends and community representatives, arrived at 17.23 with the Metropolitan Police Service estimating around 100 people present; the family left at some point around 20.00 hours, shortly before the violence began (Morell et al., 2011: 14; MPS, 2012: 32 & 37). However, the initial numbers would increase significantly.

In this context certain interactions occurred between the police and the public that seem to have escalated tensions. For instance, during the protest the Metropolitan Police did not seek to refute the story or clarify that the narrative in the article – that Duggan had fired first – was not their position (MPS, 2012: 24). Furthermore, those leading the protest perceived that the ranking officer at the scene was not senior enough to deal with their complaint (Israel, 2011; MPS, 2012: 32; RCVP, 2011: 40). No higher-ranking officer would arrive before the family left, leaving protesters feeling disrespected and ignored.

During the protest barriers were also erected by police outside the station, according to police to ‘provide protesters with a designated area’ (MPS, 2012: 28). However, it is unclear if this was communicated to the protesters. In addition, later on police officers would form a line outside the station (RCVP, 2011: 41), and at some point during the protest riot police took position on Tottenham High Road (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 51%).

Located in the broader context of mistrust and disempowerment of the local community, the anger over current situation,70 protesters appear to have interpreted these actions as disrespect, resulting in raised tensions. One man

70 For instance, see BBC news interview with two community leaders involved in the protest: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlpSzy03bE
present stated: “still no answers have been delivered. And now it seems like the whole objective of today is for [the police] to defend that police station” (25, male, black, Tottenham, Newburn et al., 2016b: 7; also see Reicher & Stott, 2011: 51%).

Finally, one seeming situational trigger for the emergence of wide scale violence (not acknowledged by the MPS’ report) came when the police apparently struck a young woman who was either confronting the police line or not moving as the police tried to clear the crowd (Morrell et al. 2011: 15; RCVP, 2011: 41; Reicher & Stott, 2011: 51). Although it is not clear at what time the police struck the woman, or whether it was only a rumour, news spread throughout the crowd and it does seem to been the final catalyst enabling rioting to emerge.71

As with the death of Duggan, this likely formed another act that demonstrated the disempowerment of and disrespect shown to the community (in that the police could and would exercise violence with legal impunity). Once Duggan’s family left the Metropolitan Police report that the situation then escalated quickly, and at around 20.20 riot police were under missile attack. The senior officer at the scene described his officers as facing “unprecedented levels of violence that developed without warning” (MPS, 2012: 42). Of course, what is lacking in this discussion is the analysis of actions; for it is here that the power relations, experiences, and dispositions are brought into play.

9.3. Starting the Riots in Hackney

The rioting in Hackney saw large amounts of anti-police action (Kay. 2011; Reicher and Stott. 2011: 64%), yet the violence did not emerge from the particular context of a protest as with Tottenham. Rather, it seems to have

71 Footage of riot police attacking a young, apparently black woman (she is not visible) in Tottenham does exist, during which a crowd are shouting at the police to stop. However, it is unclear if this was the same incident. Or moreover, when this happened, as it may have occurred after the rioting had begun. The reason to suspect this it is nighttime in the footage, and the rioting is thought to have started around 8pm, which, in August, should be still daylight. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YX9qZVsMQP8&oref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D%3D7%3D%7%7EY9qZVsMQP8&has_verified=1
occurred between police who attempted to close down public access to Hackney’s principle high street, Mare Street, and the locally based public who were present (MPS, 2012: 64). Thus here we have the case whereby violence occurred against the police without any prior group mobilisation over a specific issue, providing a different angle at which to examine the perception of police, their actions, and the resistance of rioters.

The majority of violence occurred on the 8th of August in Hackney, north London - the third day of the riots (MPS, 2012: 15-7). Although the Metropolitan Police state that on the basis of intelligence received violence was expected in Hackney, with the exception of some skirmishes, the 7th seems to have seen relatively little disorder (MPS, 2012: 52). On the 8th however, widespread violence would occur after the Metropolitan Police put a strong police presence in the central area of Hackney. Mare Street is similar to Tottenham High Road, in that it forms a long and major thoroughfare through the centre of Hackney, as well as the principle high street of the area. The map below provides the chronologically ordered locations of all the major incidents discussed on Mare Street.

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72 The police also cancelled a carnival in Hackney on the 7th located near the youth project.
9.3.1 Map of Mare Street Conflict

1. The general area where the police assemble and organise, carry out the stop and search, and where riot police begin to push south.

2. First resistance to police by a group of young men.

3. Vandalism of police cars.

4. Resistance of young man on side street, direction rioters are pushed who break into a Tesco store.

5. Large crowds display anger and resist police; JD Sports is broken into; first explicit clashes between rioters and police.
9.3.2. Confronted by Police

Although the Metropolitan Police make no mention of their tactics in Hackney, for the 8th of August others report the use of: “Aggressive stop and search operations in Mare Street, Hackney, on the Monday afternoon, [which] led to a confrontation between crowds of commuters and shoppers and riot police” (Kay, 2011). We begin with footage of one of these searches and which seems to have contributed to the emergence of rioting in Hackney, where a group of around 6-8 white police stopped and searched, and apparently arrest, two black men in the street (video 1 & 2).

We join the event after the initial stop has occurred, and can hear and see that there are numerous onlookers around as both men are forcibly handcuffed and searched. In other footage of the same event, a black man passing by stops briefly and accuses the police of already ‘assassinating’ one man, referencing the death of Mark Duggan (video 2). The detained men are agitated, aggressive, and express what would seem to be exasperation and anger towards the police. While the conversation between police and the two men is not clear, we hear one man stating: “Arresting me for what? What’s your reason for arresting me?” Although we do not know the reasons the
police provide for the detainment, it is clear that the men do not understand why, believe they are being treated unfairly, and provide partial resistance by non-compliance, forcing the officers to cajole and physically move them.

Here then we see Nassauer’s mechanisms for building tension, ‘spatial struggles’, whereby one group is perceived to have unjustly transgressed on the other’s space, building tension (2012: 33). Mare Street is both a public space, and a place where the men would see themselves as justified in utilising. Consequently, the police’s actions serve to refuse them free access and demonstrates both their disempowerment and functions as an act of disrespect.

Moreover, space requires social meaning to make transgression possible and the response of the black men reveals this meaning. Understood as performative, the men’s resistance functions as a refusal of the identity imposed upon them – they do not accept the situation of inferior, or the police’s capacity to control them in this space. Yet at the same time the police’s dominant capacity to exercise force inhibits a fuller achievement of their expectations of a positive sense of self – they can reject the ‘authority’ or legitimated power of the police, but they cannot overturn the relations by which they are dominated.

9.3.3. Confronting the Police

We now move on to an event more directly related to the emergence of rioting, which seems to occur principally as a result of the strategy of police and the public’s resistance to this. Video 1 shows footage of police gathering and organising, some in full riot gear, before beginning to close off Mare Street. At this point there seems to be no violence or resistance, however, there are plenty of onlookers visible. We then observe riot police pushing forward in what seems an attempt to clear the street.
Rather than clear the street however, the police end up facing a line of young, mainly black men, dressed largely in hoodies and tracksuits (also see video 2). An ensuing standoff occurs with some taunts from the men; when the police try and push forward the men give ground, but not without resistance and cajoling. We see some stand, or brace against the riot shields. One of the men is seen in brief conversation with a riot officer (see picture), and while the conversation is inaudible, the man’s manner is derisive, he nods and agrees with what the officer has said in an apparently sarcastic manner.
Following this, one officer pushes out sharply with his shield causing most to react aggressively but back away slightly. The exception to this is one man who stands forward from the others, stating ‘stop pushing me’. He stands directly facing the police, bracing against shoves from riot shields. At this moment something is hurled at the police from the back of the group causing a momentary separation of the two sides. When the police move forward again the same man refuses to move whereupon he is struck with a shield.

(Video 1: A man resists the push forward by riot police – point 2 on map)

For Butler (2011), actions are performative in that they constitute a process of identification, an act of being that signifies one’s identity to the self and others. The police’s actions constitute a performance of the everyday power relations, much as we saw occurred with stop and search. Indeed, as with the stop and search earlier that day, the police have sought to take control of the space and again, the body language of the men who confront the police line, is not simply charged, but expresses resentment, hostility, and a lack of fear. These power relations and concomitant identity are beginning to be refused.

These men blur the line between non-compliance and violent resistance, particularly the one who ‘squares’ his body to the police shield and accepts the aggressive thrust by police. There can be little doubt they are rejecting the authority of the police, but they are also beginning to resist the physical domination of the police. The police have entered Hackney and sought to take control of public space, and have met with those who are beginning to
challenge their power. This is a performance of, on the one hand, the rejection of an identity in which the young men are compliant, inferior subjects, and on the other, of a bubbling up of a positive identity that cannot be expressed in everyday relations with police.

Later footage (video 1) of events at the railway bridge, 100 meters north from the confrontation between the men and the riot police, reveal the next step in this emerging resistance. This film documents the vandalism of two unmanned police cars by a number of men.

All of those involved in the destruction are again, young men, both black and white, dressed in tracksuits and hoodies, some with their faces partially covered. One aspect of this video that is interesting is the element of display in the vandalism. Although the police are not in shot, it is highly likely, given their heavy presence in this area, the two police cars, and their later re-emergence in this space and beyond, that they were observing.

The rioters do not quickly and efficiently destroy the cars, but relatively unhurried kick and strike the cars with bricks, sticks and dustbins, whilst some jump on and kick at the parked car. One implication of this event is that the rioters were performing, taunting, and expressing their anger towards the
police. The acts of vandalism are also accompanied by cheers from the on-looking crowd, and at one point in Hackney someone from the crowd shouts ‘cover you faces’ suggesting a broader support for opposition towards the police.

This is not the only footage of its kind; video 12 show a remarkably similar scene that related to the emergence of rioting from the protest in Tottenham, and reveal the same casual destruction (MPS, 2012: 32). As in Hackney, we see the same demographics and displays, and support from the observing crowd.

Instead of human targets, in both Tottenham and Hackney police vehicles become the first victims of concentrated violence by rioters. These incidents occur early on when the emerging rioters still perceive the police as the dominant force, and thus are unwilling to challenge them directly. Importantly, these form the first performances that do more than demonstrate their resentment of authority, but enable the rioters to overcome the sense of inadequacy and inferiority produced in their everyday life. The leisurely destruction not only refuses power relation, it displays a lack of fear of the police.
9.3.4. ‘We Ain’t Moving!’

Returning to Hackney, (video 1 & 4) we observe a situation that seems to occur both temporally and geographically close to the vandalism of the cars. If the chronology is correct, this event occurred after the police retook control of the space where the cars were vandalised.73 In this footage, after a charge forward by police, followed by officers shouting commands at the public to move away, a black man,74 perhaps in his early-to-mid twenties, seems to want to fight the riot police.

(Video 1: A man aggressively approaches the police closing off access to Mare Street – point 4 on map)

The man purposefully approaches the police who have closed off Mare Street forcing the public into a side street and is clearly aggressive, walking towards them with a threatening posture, before his friend and another man, who tells him that it is ‘not worth it’, pull him away. To this the man replies ‘I got nowhere to fucking go, blud’. He then turns knocks aside the camera we are viewing events through, telling the cameraperson to stop filming him, and walks out of shot.

The next scene (videos 1 & 4) captures two black men, seemingly in their 30s, peacefully resisting the closure of part of Mare Street and attempts to move them and the crowd. The footage seems to capture the moments after the events...

73 The bus in the background of the picture sits next to the vandalized cars, while we look on from a side street.
74 To the right of the picture, dressed in a black jumper and cap.
police had regained control over the area in which two police cars had been vandalised, and have now closed off that area of Mare Street, but not long before the emergence of wide scale rioting. At one point (video 4) we hear someone say to the police: “Do you live here? So, how about we go to your ends [area]?”

After a brief scattering resulting from a push by a police line across Mare Street, crowds of people stand around close to the now largely stationary police line. The clear impression is that, as with the last clip, they are opposing the police closing off the street. Some gesture and large amounts of noise is heard from the crowd, while one or two angrily remonstrate with officers. At points the video focuses on the two black men who speak to police in the line, apparently trying to reason with them, with one putting his hands up to reveal his non-violent intent and even offers a hug to an officer.

(Video 9: A man shows his non-violent intentions to a line of riot police on Mare Street – point 5 on map)

The footage is cut and shows small numbers of police making short charges, briefly scattering the crowd. There are no visible attempts to engage in violence by the crowd, nevertheless, there is a sense that those in the crowd are upset. At some point later in the day, once the rioting has begun, we see both men on what seems a side street resisting the police who are attempting to clear the street with police dogs. The men are being jostled, pushed, and
occasionally struck with shields (videos 1, 2, 3 & 4). The scene is cut and we re-join with one of the men alone speaking to the camera. He complains about being hit with a truncheon, stating ‘that’s how they is dealing with us down here. We ain’t moving!’

We see the two men in a later scene, now re-united, but more agitated and refusing orders by the police to move. They stand in front of a police officer and dog ordering them to move, one shouts: ‘Tell me to move! Tell the white man to move!’, gesturing towards the (presumably white) cameraman we are viewing events through. After being pushed up the street by another officer who joins to help, one of the men again complains to the camera that the police told them to move and then ‘set the dogs on us’ stating that he has been bitten four times as well as hit by the police. The other, at another point (video 3) states:

Half the people in this community have all got a story to tell about the fucking police and individual brutality […] So when they come out on our streets and try and tell us we must do what we’re told, and we’re all together, what the fuck they expect? We ain’t going nowhere.

9.3.5. Why Resist the Police? ‘what the fuck they expect?’

The police, by turning up en masse, by stop and searching the public, and by taking formation and pushing forward along Mare Street, not only utilise force but perform the everyday power relations and identities with the public. Because of this the police repeatedly come up against resistance from the public. Ostensibly they were there to prevent a riot; instead they triggered one. The question is then, why resist the police’s attempts to take control of Mare Street? And why vandalise the police’s cars? Rather than retreat to naïve individualistic accounts, we need to understand how the choice to resist became plausible and desirable.

It is important to understand that Mare Street is not just a geographic space, but has meaning in relation to the police’s exercise power within that space. Space functions implicitly as part of the structure of what can(not) and
should(not) be done, and by whom (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 88; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008: 70). In other words, ‘acquired’ space upon which we operate – as opposed to its geographic foundation – is an expression and outcome of social process (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 114). Its social relevance comes only in performative action and the norms expressed through it – who has the right to be here, what can be done here, and to whom. The almost immediate, albeit partial, resistance from the public in Hackney then, suggests that the police should not have been there, and should not be exerting force – this was not their ‘ends’ and the role performed by the police, ostensibly to maintain the social ‘order’, is refused.

Indeed, recall the individual who stated to the police ‘how about we go to your ends?’ Or similarly, one of the black men refusing to move: ‘they come out on our streets and try and tell us we must do what we’re told.’ While we could not analyse the situation fully in Tottenham, it is worth noting a piece of footage (video 15) that captures a similar resistance by crowd of people hurling missiles and chanting ‘Whose streets? Our streets!’ to a line of riot police on Tottenham High Road. The perception of many clearly seems to be that the police are not legitimate representatives of residents, are keeping an ‘order’ that they reject, and have no right to control them in their ‘ends’.

What this evidence indicates is that it was the police’s presence in communities that have rejected their authority, that appears to have generated anger and prompted the rioting. Indeed, both Steve and Nick noted on seeing the footage that if the police had wanted to prevent rioting – assuming it was going to occur – they should not have gone themselves. Steve thought they should have sent youth workers, Nick simply questioned: “If the police fucked off, would people have gone home?”.

Of course, it is not just that the police were present, but that their actions are performative of identities and power relations. Thus, we must also consider the message being sent by the police’s actions. As noted, the police turned up en masse, armoured, carried out stop and searches, and preceded to forcefully attempt to close off Mare Street prior to any violence occurring. This appears to have re-enforced to the residents of Hackney, that the police saw
them as morally open to the exercise of force, and were being treated unequally: ‘tell me to move, tell the white man to move’ (video 3).

As we have seen previously, this approach whereby the police act as if individuals with certain markers (skin colour, dress style, location) are morally open to violence is not uncommon. The police were performing the everyday identities, but these everyday roles were those that bring disrespect and disempowerment. Watching these interactions, Steve criticised the police generally for not being patient and understanding the ‘massive history’; Nick stated his concern was for reprisal against the public resisting, that he was willing them to get out of the way of the police. When I asked him why, he thought that many officers saw ‘these people’ as ‘not part of any society they want to belong to’.

9.3.6. Build Up and Release

Simply put, the police’s presence in Hackney was enough to get a negative response because of the way people feel they are treated and viewed. In addition, the police’s actions reinforced this; performing the disempowered and unequal state of residents in their space and constituting another instance of ‘disrespect’ by normatively violating of how residents felt they should be treated (Honneth, 1995). Thus, the attempt of police to forcefully take control of Mare Street, functioned in much the same way as an iconic event – connecting back to prior experiences with police, and extending forward through an idea of how they felt relations should be.

Once this connection had been made, each action of the police seemed to increase the emotions and energy building up tension, drawing on the reservoirs of unresolved emotion and discontent. For instance, recall that initially the two black men seen in location 5 resisted the police, but did so in a friendly manner. Later they are agitated and angry as each new act of disrespect builds and draws on prior experiences of disrespect: ‘Half the people in this community have all got a story to tell about the fucking police’ (video 3). This is the context that Steve referenced whereby the broader context of disrespectful policing and exclusion by society, mixes as instances of unfair treatment and inequality, producing anger, ‘building up […] like a
bomb case’.

In other words, this is not ‘criminality’ and it is by no means simple. Rather individuals were connecting back to the shame and anger generated through instances of social and economic exclusion, and of over-policing. The build of emotion that desires action constitutes reaching for a future in which these occurrences cannot occur, in which the relations with police are reversed. Of course, retaliation cannot come in the everyday ‘cos you know you’ll get arrested’ (Maria).

However, once the first group of young men were not arrested, it was no longer ‘the everyday’. The legitimated social order was creaking under the pressure of the discontent and anger it produced. As the tension and emotional energy built, urging expression, each act of resistance that did not end in arrest opened up the pathways for action. The fear of reprisal from the ‘biggest gang’ was diminishing; the would-be rioters were drawing on their anger and becoming empowered.

In this light, the unmanned police cars enabled the cathartic expression and release of the energy implied in shame and anger, through violence. It is this moment that the Bourdieusian ‘dispositions’ (2000: 150) produced in the everyday social order can be actualized. By vandalising the cars the rioters’ resistance rupture the skin of the social order through a subversive performance (Butler, 2011) that played out, for the first time, the new social order.

Similar to Ray’s analysis of looting in which “the performativity of violence [functions as a] moment of emancipation from shame and the release of emotion and energy” (2014: 133), the rioters expressed their anger through violence, and in doing so began to articulate a new social hierarchy in which the police were below them. Thus the violent destruction of the vehicles was performative of these police-public relations more clearly than any other form resistance we’ve seen so far. The vandalism explicitly stated to the police, to the onlooking crowd, and most importantly to themselves: ‘you cannot control us; you have no power over us; and you are not better than us’. Of course, the violent resistance did not end with police cars.
9.4. The Riot Begins: Looting Against the Police

The area of Mare Street captured in much of the footage discussed above, as far as can be told, is where the widespread rioting in Hackney begins (Reicher & Stott. 2011: 59%). This area, where much of the contention over who can legitimately control the space occurs, seems to provide the trigger from which violence spreads around Hackney.

Returning to video 1 & 4, riot police carry out a charge close to the vandalised cars on Mare Street, forcing a scattering of the crowd. At some point after this, rioters begin to break into a high street store, JD Sports around fifty meters away from the police line. Similar to before, all of those actively trying to break in are young, male, similarly dressed, and contain both white and black individuals.

(Video 4: Rioters attempt to break into a store on Mare Street in view of riot police – point 5 on map)

75 Specifically, point 5 on the map appears to be where the resistance finally shifts from refusals to move and destruction of vehicles, to violence against the police.

76 Although it is not possible to be certain, the individual in the grey hoody at the front (see photo above) appears to have been one of those vandalising the police cars, and also present in the first confrontation between a group of young men and riot police.
Of course, this does not constitute an act of violence against the police, but to assume this is irrelevant potentially misses signs as to why some rioters may have attacked police. *Vice News* (video 2) notes that the police charge split the public into two groups. Some are pushed off east into a side street (point 4), which leads to the local Tesco, and others were pushed south on Mare Street (point 5). Both groups ended up breaking into stores. In the footage covering JD sports we see the man in the grey hoody take a stool from the store and hurl it at police, while those who broke into Tesco were calling for individuals to get missiles to attack the police.

With regards to JD Sports, the police are looking on and the rioters are clearly aware of this as they repeatedly look to the right of the frame to where the police are positioned. It seems to be the case that they were concerned for their own safety from violence or arrest and perhaps a desire to gain material goods; however, the danger in not examining actions as expressive and performative reveals itself here. For if it was simply pragmatic action aimed at material gain, why do it in front of the police?

One possibility is that the act of breaking the law in direct view of the police, constitutes, as McDonald (2012: 20) argues, a symbolic act or a challenge to the power and ability of the police to control them. It utilises law, that is the rules that constitute the social order, to reveal their rejection of that and perform their identity as outside and against it. Thus the act means potentially ‘you cannot control us’, but perhaps more importantly, ‘we reject your rules and order’.

Indeed, moving outside of Hackney we see other similar examples whereby the act of looting is mixed up with confrontations with police. The first piece of footage (video 8) covers one end of a narrow high street in Ealing, West London, and is filmed from a window situated above the shops. The scene begins with perhaps eighteen to twenty rioters walking or slowly jogging about the street.

No police are in shot at this point but it is likely that they are visible to the rioters. A number of the rioters seem to occasionally turn their focus as if they are checking something, and also shout insults – although it is difficult to tell
with the high levels and multiple sources of noise. In particular, one rioter seems to shout ‘1,2,3,4,5 cops...’, while another rioter can also be seen carrying something (maybe a bottle) out of the frame of the video, when he reappears it is gone, seemingly thrown at the police.

Six rioters then congregate and wait around a high-end electronics retailer while one of them begins to strike and kick the window. As the others join in kicking at the glass we hear shouting, followed by seven police, some with riot gear, charging up the street. The rioters disperse, throw some missiles, and keep a safe distance until the charge slows. We see two men perform a gesture of raising the arms to their side and shouts of ‘What? What?’ The implication of this gesture seems to be, if verbalised, something along the lines of ‘What are you going to do about it?’. However, the rioters continue to back away and concede the street with little meaningful resistance.

Video 9 presents a similar scene in which rioters wait and taunt riot police who have blocked off a high street in Camden, north London. Superior numbers of rioters wait at the crossroads, seeming to want access to the high street, and the same gesture of arms raised to the side are made repeatedly. After a short while the police make a charge scattering the rioters across the junction, however, as before rioters do not ‘flee’ but keep a safe distance. Banging is then heard and the camera pans round to the street below our vantage point where a number of rioters are attempting to break into a shop, perhaps a hundred meters from the police. The attempt does not last long however, as the police continue their push and the rioters retreat again.
9.4.1. Performing Empowerment

The above examples where rioters attempt to break into high street stores in view of the police, also in Clapham (video 10) where riot participants stand beside a shop with smashed windows and a few sporadically engage with the police, and similar scenes in Birmingham (video 11) reveal the often interrelated nature of violence against police and acquisitive acts.

Interestingly, in all these videos where looters confront the police we see the same demographic markers we found with the stereotyping and profiling. Almost all are young, male, principally black and white, and wearing hoodies, tracksuits and similar. In contrast, a brief view of footage showing acts of looting where the police are not present often reveals a greater variety in terms of gender, age, and ethnicity. In turn, this distinction in demographic

77 Birmingham reveals an apparent parallel with Hackney. The rioting appears to start with police en masse attempting to clear a central shopping area, resulting in instances of resistance through non-compliance, and later in clashes with police and damage to shops.
78 For example see footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lx-OGUWN_Zu
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ed0QjJL9sYQ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xS8kTQkJfE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1g6lQ4UuOE
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/london-riots+content/video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5sqf1OGsE
markers also is present in terms of type of action performed. Those smashing windows, breaking doors, and being the first to enter into shops, generally seem to have the same demographic markers as those attacking the police; whereas those who seem to wait until others have broken into shops before looting, again, often constitute a more demographically mixed group.

Despite the fact that the primary activity in these clips seems to have been to acquire goods, not only were the police attacked with missiles in some, in videos 8 and 9 gestures which challenge and offer violence (which we will discuss later) are employed. Ultimately alongside breaking the law, these gestures – through the offer of violence – signify a lack of fear and reject the claimed legitimacy of the police and their use of force (Cloward & Ohlin, 1969: 2; Hayward & Young, 2007:111).

To emphasise the police here is not to diminish the importance of the motivations to loot, rather, at minimum, what these scenes show is that the police were normatively powerless – that the rioters did not care about breaking the law. Yet the question arises: if the sole aim was to obtain goods then why confront the police at all? Or why attempt to break into shops meters from them, and not make an easy escape as soon as they show up? Thus, we might go further and argue that the rioters were expressing anger, dislike, and derived positive emotions from taunting and challenging the police. In other words, by displaying the police’s inability to stop them, and through breaking their rules in front of them - in essence, rubbing their faces in it.

However, we should also recall the police practically and normatively representative of the social order that has disempowered and disrespected those in communities such as Hackney. The law which the police keep is what constitutes the social order in the first instance; thus to challenge the police and to break the law, is to perform one’s rejection of that social order. Indeed, it is worth noting that around London targets included public buses, private cars, media vans, and commercial premises from which looting could not occur, such as ‘rich’ boutiques and cafes, carpet and furniture stores, and more (Kay, 2011; Moxon, 2011; Reicher & Stott, 2011 64-8%).

At minimum, what we can say is that in Hackney Tesco and JD Sports were
morally irrelevant when it comes the permissibility of violence, and perhaps functioned as a preferred target. While motivations may have been pragmatic, the rioters also overturned the everyday power-relations in which they are the weaker and treated as inferior, and through that action becoming who they believe they should be (Butler, 2011; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969: 2; Hayward & Young, 2007:111; Honneth, 1995; Merton, 1983; Ray, 2014).

Importantly, as we have seen in multiple instances of, and data on stop and search, rejection of education and its representatives, and of those who hold the markers of legitimated society such as myself, this process of resistance and identification is performed in the everyday. However, the power relations of the everyday, that is the social order, mean this can often only occur to a limited extent. Those who take this resistance furthest outside of the rioting, are those who identify as criminal and perform crime as a means of overcoming disrespect through the rejection of the imposed identities.

Thus, even when we have those identifying as ‘criminal’ this cannot be understood morally and is certainly not ‘simple’, but intertwined with power and exclusion, where to break the law produces a positive identity and sense of self: “I am here ’cos I’m a criminal man, fucking, that is what I do.” (Treadwell et al. 2013: 10). In line with the notion of Butler’s (2011) subversive ‘performance’, Hayward (2004: 149) argues that deviant behaviours function for the agent as liberating, a means of ‘self-transcendence’. The disposition produced by exclusion from the social order, but repressed by that order, is released from its shackles.

Their actions reconstruct and demonstrate the new relations of power between the two sides, the new social order. Through this performance the stigma visited through the everyday, and imposed upon them by police, is thrown off as rioters acquire a new and ‘successful relation-to-self’ (Honneth, 1995: 136). Thus by breaking the law or vandalising property rioters performed their empowerment, gain status and self-esteem:

I am 23, never had no job, been in care […] I got fuck all to lose man, fucking Babylon [police] can’t do shit anyway, fuck them. We run this town now, not them pricks man, I am gonna take as much
as I can get. (looter, in Treadwell et al. 2013: 11)

When you go down the Jobcentre, they give you this look … It’s this sick look. And now I’m like: ‘You think you rule? Look who’s ruling now’ (looter in Ray, 2014: 129)

9.5. Violence Against the Police

9.5.1. Anger and Pleasure

We now move on to explore the direct use of violence against the police. In videos 5 and 6 (both capturing events in the same area and time period) we see a continuation of the violence in Hackney, however, the rioting has spread beyond Mare Street and we find ourselves in a residential estate. The scene (video 5) begins with crowds of people milling about a street with some vehicles burning and assorted rubble strewn about. Again we see a similar demographic make up – principally young men, a mix of black and white individuals, and a common style of dress incorporating hoodies and tracksuits. As the scene progresses we observe a running and sporadic engagement between police and the rioters. The riot police that are present seem to be attempting to gain control of a street by employing a tactic where they enact a shield charge, back away, before returning charge again (see video 6).

However, rather than clearing the streets, the rioters seem to toy with police, a bit like a game of cat and mouse. The general feeling coming from the scene is that the rioters are enjoying it, there is cheering, whooping, and even laughing directed at the police. As the police pull back after a charge, the rioters respond by enacting their own mock charges. One man places his arms in the air either as an offer of violence, or perhaps a sort of celebration of victory as the police back away, and we hear applause from some of the crowd.

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79 Video 14 also captures moments of events in the same area, and the wide spread damage caused by confrontations between police and rioters.
In this scene there is little sign of tension, instead, the rioters seemed relaxed given the context, and tellingly seem to be enjoying taunting the police. Although they are retreating from the police charges, this seems not to be due to fear, but is part of the ‘fun’ as they retreat before returning to taunt, cheer, and throw missiles. In other words the police’s tactic is ineffective, and the rioters seem to be enjoying revealing the police’s impotence.

Yet we should not assume this is simply about pleasure, indeed given the presence of aggressive shouting directed towards police, the use of bricks, bottles and similar as missiles, it seems positive emotions are being derived from the cathartic expression of discontent or anger. Honneth (1995: 136) argues negative emotions such as anger, are produced through the failure in interactions to meet normative expectations; conversely positive emotions, such as joy, relate to the exceeding of expectations or desires through interactions.

The build up of anger and shame creates or increases the potential for positive emotions if the performance can adequately express these drives, and in doing so exceed one’s previously negated normative expectations over
how you should be treated. Indeed, we see both forms of emotion in relation to each other suggesting an ‘existential pursuit’ that overturns prior or everyday oppressive relations and conditions (Fenwick & Hayward, 2000: 34). By avoiding the police’s charges before returning to taunt them, the rioters perform the police’s disempowerment and return the disrespect, releasing anger and overcoming shame: “for once they felt like we felt.” (Rioter quoted in Tyler, 2013: 197). Through these acts the rioters were no longer the underdogs, but dominant: they were “breaking up the police when normally the police break us up. Taking shit, we was taking shields from them and taking shit. Everyone was happy, I was happy” (rioter in Ray, 2014: 130).

9.5.2. Escalating the Violence

In the next piece of footage we will see a glimpse of a sudden and serious escalation in violence. Video 7 captures events at what seems a large junction in Hackney, connecting perhaps three roads, again in a similar residential area. Although we cannot know for certain, that the police appear in greater numbers and in more control, suggests this occurs after the above clashes. As we join the shot, an isolated police officer deflects a missile thrown by a rioter at close range. In the background numerous other riot police are advancing. Bins are overturned in the street and jeering can be heard from crowds of observers/rioters in the background and out of shot.

Again there is the suggestion that riot participants are also experiencing pleasure and excitement, although it is not so clear as in videos 5 and 6. As the police advance the rioters run, unwilling to directly engage the police, they employ missiles and attack or taunt from safe distances, giving the impression of a running battle. Unlike the previous scene, with the police now in the ascendancy the rioters seem unable to play and taunt in the same way. Thus, that the rioters keep their distance seems more directly related to staying out of harms way. Nevertheless, we should also note that in all these selections the rioters are fighting an opponent who is both better armed and less manoeuvrable thus suggesting this tactic may be defined by the context, as well as concerns for their own safety.

One interesting incident during this footage occurs when an isolated officer,
perhaps unaware of his/her colleagues advancing from behind, makes a dash to the right of the camera shot. We hear cheers and laughter the camera pans sharply right to reveal that the officer has fallen to the ground. Riot participants quickly surround the officer and, from another source of footage (video 2), we see the officer was attacked, tripped and kicked while on the ground, before being protected by arriving police resulting in the rioters dispersing. Unlike the previous scene where rioters only taunted and hurled missiles, here we see the clear indication that at least some of the rioters are willing to engage in close quarters violence, given the opportunity.

(Video 2: An isolated officer is tripped and attacked while on the ground)[80]

To note similar scenes, this appearance of vulnerability and escalation in violence is also visible in other footage taken outside of Hackney. Video 7 (an unknown area) reveals another attack on the police that, while still employing missiles alone, feels much more personal and ferocious than the previous account. As the police retreat from the attack, missiles are hurled. The body language of the rioters in shot also suggests much more adrenaline and aggression, and enjoyment and laughter is not observed. We hear shouts of ‘get at them’ and ‘fuck you’, although it is difficult to understand which group they come from. While we do not view the start of the charge, or whether the

[80] The poor quality image is due to the camera moving quickly in video 2, while in video 7 this incident is only captured as the officer is rescued. Consequently, this was the clearest image I could garner.
police were retreating as a tactical decision or because of the attack, it is noticeable that the police are attacked until their retreat ends, at which point the attack loses momentum.

Similarly, in Woolwich, South London (video 12) we also see a police retreat. Again, we are at a junction, this time at a major crossroad leading to the principle shopping centre of Woolwich; however, unlike the previous footage the situation largely seems calm, with the exception of a small number of rioters taunting the police. Eight riot police form a line preventing access to the road that we, as the viewer, are positioned above. Further past the police are a significant number of people occupying the junction.

Perhaps what is most interesting in this clip is that the dynamic suddenly changes when the police begin an unforced retreat whilst holding a line formation. Clearly energised by the police’s actions we hear sudden and large increase in shouting from rioters, accompanied by the arrival from off screen of even more riot participants, perhaps thirty to forty in all, hurling planks of wood, road signs, and metal objects at the hugely outnumbered police.

(Video 12: The retreating police suddenly come under attack)
9.5.3. Violence as Politics

As with the failure of police to arrest those resisting in Hackney prior to the rioting, the fall and retreats make violence a plausible path to release their anger and overcome shame, as the rioters realise the police’s capacity to exercise dominant force is diminished. As Ray argues, rioters enacted “performative violence [in order] to produce [a] social transformation by staging rituals of confrontation” (Ray, 2014: 128).

The fall or weakness of the officer creates a sudden shift or escalation that can be utilised to achieve an end that otherwise remained elusive. As they kicked the fallen enemy, chased the retreating police, rioters sent the message and realised themselves that they were stronger, that they could hurt the officer: “now I’m like: ‘You think you rule? Look who’s ruling now’ (rioter in Ray, 2014: 129). Thus the opportunity is not mindless violence or immoral ‘criminality’, but a performative act (Butler, 2011) that re-establishes self-worth through demonstrating to the ‘biggest gang’ that they are no longer on top.

The rioters’ resolution utilises violence because, on the one hand, long-term disempowerment and disrespect has shaped other routes, such as political action, as irrelevant to ‘social transformations’. While on the other, violence not only enables the release of energy tied up with anger, it achieves domination over another individual and thus “cures the oppressed of their ingrained feelings of inferiority” (Palshikar, 2005: 5431). In other words, with action within the legitimated political or social spheres pre-reflexively excluded, to express and overcome their discontent, violence becomes the only ‘effective means of struggle’ (Lapeyronnie, 2009: 38).

However, without the articulation of Politicised identities and projects that seek to re-organise power, this form of resistance can only be temporary. Indeed, that rioters did not follow through on retreating police once they halted, may be related to the fact that these acts, while collective, constitute individualised forms of resistance. The violent display had achieved what each individual was driven to – a position of dominance and control of the space – while any further attack against a better-armed opponent risked
injury, the loss of dominant position and identity, and thus shame.

**9.6. Gesturing to the Police**

The notion of performativity posits that “everyday gestures are [cultural performances] because they signify everyday identity to others and for ourselves” (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 43). While actions are practical but have symbolic meaning, gestures directed at the police are explicitly communicative of their meaning. Thus, gestures perhaps can be even more informative of the relational identities and power relations being acted out in that moment. Indeed, as we have noted, in all the above footage where rioters clash with police, we see gestures being made as taunts. While these gestures take different forms, the meaning is generally the same. For instance, we often see rioters raise their arms and use their fingers to beckon the police to ‘come on’; similarly we also see rioters more specifically make a boxing stance when facing the police, although they do not then attack (videos 6 & 7).

Yet perhaps the most telling gesture is where a rioter raises their arms to the side making a cross shape with their body and shouts “What? What?”. In each of these gestures the meaning functions to challenge the police to come and try to stop the rioter. In Hackney (video 6) rioters gesture and taunt the police, we hear shouts of ‘What? What? What?’, and we see one briefly make a cross with their body. Once the police commit to a short charge the rioters move out of range, and then continue to taunt the police.

In video 7,81 one man faces off directly in front of the police line, repeatedly makes a partial raising of the arms,82 bouncing on his feet and shouting ‘What? What?’. He is also observed later, alone in front of the now advancing police, making a boxing stance before running at the last minute. In Ealing, west London (video 8) two rioters make this gesture but keep their distance from the slowly advancing police, again shouts of ‘What? What?’ is heard. In

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81 This is an unknown location in London.
82 The partial raising of the arms appears to be due to the close proximity to the police, and to expose himself too much would truly make him vulnerable.

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Camden, north London (video 9) we see a number of rioters make a similar gesture as the police block off the high street. In Woolwich, south London (video 12) two individuals raise their arms and taunt the police line whilst keeping just out of striking range and again the same shout is heard. Later, once the police retreat slows, the rioters slowly drop off and one rioter again makes the gesture to the police.

![Image of rioters taunting police](image)

(Video 7: A rioter mimics a boxing stance to advancing police)

When I asked Nick and Steve what this gesture meant they indicated it was an offer of violence and a challenge to ‘come and have a go’. However, while it might be employed to start violence, we can point out that these gestures or displays constitute taunts or challenge the police to ‘stop me if you can’. As Nick pointed out, they were ‘taking the piss’. In each case the rioter does not confront the police but backs away or stays just out of range, likely because the latter is better armed and organised. Thus, there is recognition that the rioter cannot completely overturn the power relations, but the gesture does reveal the police’s inability to utilise their dominant position.

The gesture further performs the rioter’s lack of fear of the police\(^83\) – thus referencing back to prior relations in which fear and thus dominance is the norm. Intertwined in this, the gesture also functions as an act of disrespect.

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\(^{83}\) Running from the police, of course, may indicate that they are actually afraid, however, the important point is not whether rioters actually felt fear – which we cannot know – but that they are seeking to display a lack of fear.
towards the police, both diminishing the police’s power and authority, and saying – despite the refusal to engage in close quarters violence – ‘you are not better than us’. In other words, the gesture is not simply an offer of violence or a challenge. Rather, like the game of cat and mouse we saw earlier, it is a performative act of overcoming the police by displaying a lack of fear and the police’s disempowerment.

9.6.1. This is Personal: Performative Resistance in 2011

Importantly, this functions as an individualised form of resistance because the change achieved is momentary and for the self. Indeed, we can better understand this through a contrast with a similar, but Politicised action from a different riot/protest. The woman pictured below is being hit by a water cannon, taken from the Taksim protests in Turkey, while the photo next to her portrays a rioter from 2011 making the now familiar gesture.

(A female protester in Turkey and a rioter in Ealing (video 8) make a similar gesture towards police)

In both these pictures we see the same cross shape being made, but the performative meanings contain important differences. In each case the offer of the body for violence is made, implying that the individual resisting does not fear the police, and that their authority is de facto, rather than de jure. However, the woman accepts the violence of the police; on the other hand, the man is in the process of backing away from the police (just out of shot).

84 Taken from The Times of Israel: http://www.timesofisrael.com/turkish-police-retreat-from-gezi-park-as-protesters-pour-in/
The purpose with the woman’s display is Political. It appears the aim is to contrast the police’s use of violence with her non-violent stance, and thus she opens her body to physical harm. Her gesture functions as a symbolic challenge to be read by society. It calls for social and political change by revealing the domination in the social order; and it exposes the police as oppressors through their illegitimate use of violence. On the other hand, the man, as with the other rioters described, seems to use the gesture as a form of disrespect by issuing a challenge to the physical power of the police. He does not accept harm to himself for the symbolic meaning this generates, but offers his body to perform their inability to exercise force or control over him. In other words, while the woman’s action seeks long-term change to the power relations that will impact others than her self, the man seeks change in his personal relation to the police and to cause emotional harm to the police.

Consequently, while the origin of the discontent in both cases is clearly Political as they both challenge the legitimacy of the power being exercised over them, the difference seems to be that the rioters’ gesture in 2011 contains no Political message or purpose. This suggests that for the rioters there is no ‘semantic bridge’, no race or class based identity, that adequately enables the expression of their affective drive, or cognitively connects the discontent of the different actors to create a collective identity (Honneth, 1995: 163). Of course, the apparent paradox is that this individualised resistance came through collective acts of violence.

9.7. Individualisation and Proto-Politicisation

As we have seen in the discourses of rioters there was a collective identity or an ‘us’ emerging through a common opposition to the police in 2011. However, what is largely absent in contrast to the 1980s riots is a pre-existing, structural based and collective identity. That is while there were some mentions of being ‘black’ or ‘working class’, these did not appear to function Politically, and did not unify rioters around a common cause and complaint. While these individuals shared common socio-economic positions and thus experiences of exclusion, particularly of negative interactions with police, the collective identity appears to have emerged and overcome other divides
through the revelation of a common anti-police position. This can be supported by footage where we see evidence for an emerging social identity through a realisation of a common cause.

Indeed, we can view the emergence of the social identity through the development of the situation in Hackney. The small group of young men (video 1) provides the first recorded instance of collective resistance, however, most people present are simply observing the spectacle. Later, a large crowd gathers to observe the vandalism of the police cars. Some are journalists and we might suppose some are there for the spectacle, however, some of whom are now beginning to vocalise support for the vandalism.

After the police push forward and re-take this space we see more individuals resisting and remonstrating with police; again this largely appears as individualised resistance from those wishing to express their anger. Nevertheless, there are more and more people joining in the resistance. At point 5 on the map particularly, we see large groups beginning to line up in front of the police line. The people present appear to be realising their common opposition and numbers, facilitated by more and more individuals displaying their opposition and anger. In turn, as it becomes clear with each instance that the police are not in control, so more individuals become emboldened as the possibility of opposing the police becomes increasingly plausible.

Videos 5 & 6 taking place after the outbreak of violence in Hackney show a large number of people who have joined together in a common opposition to the police. It would be reasonable to expect that this larger group is made up from smaller friend groups; nevertheless, given the size it is likely that many are strangers to each other. During the conflict we can hear shouts or snippets of conversation from the crowd, such as calling the police ‘fucking wankers’ and ‘fuck the feds’, along with a few more strategic statements such as ‘push them back’, and ‘... if everyone comes together ...’.

Yet despite the common aim and common perception of the police, and the strategic statements from the crowd, the tactics of the rioters seem to be largely uncoordinated. Instead, the nature of the resistance appears to be
defined by the actions of the police and the individuals’ pleasure in taunting them. No serious attempt is made to push the police out of the area or overrun them; rather the rioters enjoy taunting and avoiding the police charges, before returning to hurl missiles and repeat. Indeed, in no other footage I observed did rioters push their advantage. Instead, the interaction serves to satisfy the expressive and performative needs of the rioters’, which could be achieved without risking injury through close combat.

Indeed, contrasting the development of events of 2011 to accounts from the 1980s is revealing. The actions of the rioters could be more organised, driven, and purposive. In Bristol in 1980 (Ball, 2012) rioters actually succeeded in running the police out of the area. While in Brixton’s first riots in 1981, rioters built barricades and fought off police advances, preventing them taking control of the central area (Waddington, 1992: 82).

Perhaps most telling, however, is the ease and regularity with which collective resistance emerged. Unlike the gradual build up in Hackney in 2011, Keith (1993: 29 & 130) notes that in the 1980s resistance in Brixton would often occur if the police were pursuing a subject through the area or carrying out a stop and search. Similarly, in Hackney in the 1980s, police raids, a heavy police presence, stop and searches, and arrests all ran the risk of generating conflict with residents, with the police often losing those they are seeking to arrest to the hostile crowd (ibid: 143). Ball (2012: 236) similarly reports that crowds regularly formed in St. Paul’s to protest police arrests, and sometimes intervening.

What made this spontaneous and collective form of resistance possible was the pre-existing and structural identity that grouped potential strangers together. Through a notion of ‘black’ identity and common cause, particularly in relation to an oppressive police force, individuals knew what side they were on before anything had happened. It was the clear situation of racist discrimination and domination that shaped race as a modality of resistance against racism (Hall et al., 1980: 347).

As we saw in Sheldon Thomas’ (2012) individualised acts of resistance, the awareness of racism enabled rival gangs to join together quickly when the
chance to attack the police was presented to them. Thus, in 1980s Hackney the ‘common sense’ position was ‘blue versus black’ the police were oppressive of the black community and ‘in a conspiratorial alliance with the malevolent state’ (Keith, 1993: 124 & 38). In 2011, the common sense position seems to have been the police were a malevolent force, but the unification of groups and individuals against the police was something surprising and inspiring, constituting the formation of a proto-Political moment:

I also remember clearly people ‘Stick together, stick together’ against the police … It was like people didn’t know each other but they were in a team. (Mother, 22, London, Prasad(f), 2011)

no one was really concentrating too tough who’s going through the ends, who’s that or where this persons that’s from, they just concentrating on the feds, that's all. Unity, yeah, that's what I'd call it, unity (Newburn et al. 2011).

In other words, the violence seems to have revolved around a shared disposition to overturn relations with police and get ‘revenge’, rather than a Political understanding or cause. As with the game of cat and mouse in Hackney, and the destruction of police cars in which rioters demonstrated the impotence of the police, any Political goal was lacking. The performance was for themselves and the police; to overturning relations of disrespect and disempowerment and, if only for a moment, be on top of the hierarchy. However, as each individual performed this resistance the symbolic message was transmitted: ‘unity’. Rioters began to realise the their common cause, of belonging, and the possibility of empowerment through “acting together in a way that they rarely can’” (Arendt, 1970: 83).

9.8. Conclusion

While some have argued that a situational analysis can explain violence in itself, this can only result from a neglect of the complexity of structure and its role in creating agency. Rather, what I have sough to do is utilise the situation of the riots to support and advance the perspective developed through
evidence on the riots and the broader social processes and context that this led us to.

The first and clearest finding was that in Hackney, Tottenham, and in some other locales, the police were not simply in the way of rioters, but a focus of anger and violence. In Tottenham the conflict emerged from the context of the death of Mark Duggan, and mistrust of the police. While in Hackney, the police’s arrival and actions were interpreted as hostile and illegitimate, and resulted in escalating tensions and anger. Such interpretations and acts of resistance cannot be understood by labels of criminality, nor can they be framed as consumeristic, but as we have shown require an understanding of how experiences of disempowerment and disrespect shaped the plausibility and desirability of violent action.

Situating the police and rioters’ actions in this context, the resistance became comprehensible as performative acts that drew on reservoirs of discontent. Rioters displayed a rejection of the police and their authority, challenged power relations, and further opened up the plausibility of violent resistance. Whether it was the destruction of police property, the transgression of law in front of the police, taunts and challenges to mock the police, or direct uses of violence against them, rioters sought to reverse the social order’s organisation of power.

This resistance was driven by emotions that stretched backwards into a history of social and economic exclusion and police profiling, through the moment in 2011, and reached forward to a state of relations and a sense of self, in which the shame could no longer occur. Rather than criminality this was Political. Anger from unresolved shame drove individuals to resist, to carry out acts that were both cathartic and performative.

One of the most telling signs during the riots was that of a common gesture of making a cross with the body. As a performative act, the gesture played on the power relations it emerges from; the police as formally dominant were offered the body of the rioter precisely because the police were unable to stop the rioters who hurled missiles and kept out of range of the less mobile police. However, rather than seeking to reorganise the social order in the long term,
and to make a Political claim against the police as the Turkish protester did, rioters in 2011 only sought to demonstrate the police’s impotence. Thus, as with the game of cat and mouse and the use vandalism to taunt the police, what was achieved was a momentary experience, in which power roles were reversed for the individual.

Importantly, this is not to criticise the rioters. Rioters’ were not immoral or mindless, but disposed to act in a subjectively rational way to overcome the disrespect experienced. In much the way those empowered engage in the political sphere to achieve a desirable state of relations. Firstly then, this analysis demonstrates that as with all forms of resistance, Political and even political, each instance emerges from discontent generated through the organisation of power. Similarly, each draws on these prior experiences and seeks to bring about a desired ‘future’. The difference then, is not in the moral permissibility imposed by those in power, but in possibilities of action found in the necessary scene of agency, and in the effectiveness and impact of these particular forms of action.

Moreover, the ineffectiveness of individualised resistance in realising a more permanent reorganisation of power is, like shame and anger, something produced by the social order. Responsibility, if we are to locate it, lies with those who seek to maintain and expand their privileges, and with it the disadvantages that produce so toxic a result. For if individuals are unable to understand the structural cause of their discontent, they unable to challenge the privileged. This may be an advantage for those empowered, but it signals the death knell for democracy.
10. Resisting Neoliberalism:  
The Youth Project in Hackney

10.1. Learning through Success

Thatcher’s moral condemnation of rioters in 1981 and Cameron’s remarkably similar statement of ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Cameron, 2011) three decades later, represent a problem that permeates modern British society. The discussion thus far has been to bring together the contribution of this thesis in extrapolating the relations that are both concealed and shaped by neoliberalism’s individualistic logic and practice, and providing an alternative account of why individuals have been attacking the police.

The task of exposing and understanding the causes of resistance to the social order is the first step in resolution. However, as the complexity of topics discussed in the thesis suggests, this problem is not one that is easily resolved. The benefit of an improved understanding of riotous actions as symptoms of social breakdown can only come through the understanding it enables of alternative forms of resistance.

I had originally sought out the youth project in Hackney as a means to understand why young people had engaged in rioting. However, the project did not connect me to rioters, and while it did teach me of the social and economic context of rioters it did more than just reveal the impact of exclusion. Instead, insight gained at the project often came due to the observation of their successes. Through these successes I began to understand not only the problems the youth project sought to deal with at an affective level, but how these might be overcome. In other words, the project revealed the social failure through its successful resistance to it. This is not to say the project has created the perfect means of resisting exclusion, for through engagement with the types of resistance occurring in the riots, I also began to see what the project lacked to develop their form of resistance further. What follows constitutes a preliminary discussion on practical solutions revealed by the research.
10.2. The Affective Project, School, and Home

Improvements in relations between the police and excluded groups would clearly benefit society and those over-policed. However, the conflict with police is an effect of power; without resolving the underlying exclusions this method will only limit the damage caused. Disempowered and disrespected groups will likely always clash with the police in some form due to the cyclical relations of exclusion, stereotyping, and resistance. Rather, as we have seen, the two key areas in which change could be made are education and employment. This is of course, nothing new, but it is how the youth project approaches the problem that is both most telling and constructive.

The youth project states in its pamphlet that they aim “to bridge the gap between disadvantage [sic] youth and the rest of society”. While the project does not spend much time seeking to explain or articulate this ‘gap’ in anything other than a rudimentary form, through my observations of their practice it is clearly relates to the affective disposition to engage. In other words the project seeks to take young people, often from the difficult underprivileged backgrounds we have discussed, and produce the disposition (Bourdieu, 2000), that is the value in and capacity, to engage in the legitimated practices of education and employment.

The education of young people has for a long time, and arguably still is, conceptualised in terms of knowledge accumulation by students who are understood as passive receptacles, while emotions as both underpinning knowledge and creating motivation have been neglected (Beckmann & Cooper, 2005: 485; Fobes & Kaufman, 2007; Race, 2006: 5-9).

Many of those who attended the youth project were young people who had not only disengaged from, but were actively rejecting education due to repeated experiences of disrespect. As we have seen previously, this disadvantage begins at home when parents lack the educational capital or time to help their children, or indeed, involve more serious issues that result in neglect. Thus the youth project cannot afford to simply be a youth club, but must also take over some functions of education and the home if it is to successfully help young people ‘bridge the gap’.
Although the project articulated its goals in direct and simple terms, the workers’ knowledge and practice constituted a nuanced understanding based on experience with excluded and angry young people. In Bourdieusian terms, what the project aimed to develop were legitimated forms of cultural capital (drive to, and achievement of, ‘good’ educational practice and qualifications); in Butlerian (2004) terms, the project sought to reposition individuals in relation to the social order’s power relations, that they may take on and perform identities through them, rather than in opposition. Simply put the project seeks to empower the young person, to give them agency to achieve for themselves, and by doing so shape the individual to and through positive affective experiences in education and employment.

10.2.1. Security & Safety

Outside of the project, many of the young people experienced situations in which they felt judged as inadequate, either in school, at home, by police, or even in the competitive world of the streets whereby small missteps or failures to respond in the appropriate manner, may result in a loss of reputation. However, shame not only impacts during the negative experience, but as argued, we also develop a pre-emptive response whereby actors anticipate and avoid situations that might cause shame (Scheff, 2000: 97).

If one’s experiences with authority figures or representatives of the legitimated order are repeatedly negative, then each new interaction with one of these individuals represents a possibility for shame, disposing them to close down. Thus, young people at the project become defensive and mistrustful, as was evidenced by their reaction to my researcher identity as a white, middle class man from a university. When I was present at the project young people, particularly the elder teens, repeatedly displayed suspicion and mistrust. Early on I drew suspicious whispers – ‘who’s that guy with the big hair’ – and looks and saw young people withdraw in my presence.

In one instance, I played a game of pool with a young black boy of around 11-12, who would not speak to me for the entire game. Indeed, he had not really wanted to play me but the system was ‘winner stays on’, and he was next in line. The impression I got was that the young people were worried that
refusing to play against me might reflect badly upon them, by suggesting they were afraid of me. Whatever the case, the young people closed down in order to avoid any potentially problematic interactions, were unsure of my purpose, and based on prior experiences and narratives, expected negative judgement from me. This not only limited potentially shameful interactions, but by performing their rejection of me they were displaying my inability to make them feel shame and thus disempowering me before I could do so to them.

What was particularly interesting for myself, despite the difficult context, was that I was essentially experiencing a role-reversal of my time in compulsory education. My experience was different, growing up as I did in a white working class area in the Midlands. Nevertheless, I did see parallels. For instance, I recall closing down and refusing to engage in class, because if I tried I might look stupid, but if I refused the teachers’ ability to judge me, ‘took the piss’ and acted up, it became my choice to fail and I could gain esteem from peer approval. Thus I acted out, insulted teachers and broke the rules in order to disempower those adults who might shame me, and to establish self-worth through accessible and plausible practice.

As we have seen, this mistrust and insecurity inhibits engagement in the legitimated forms of practice and capital. Yet, despite the young people’s reaction to me the youth project had managed to diminish this tendency to shut down and instead enable young people to engage. The first step was providing a feeling of security. When talking to Steve about his youth work in Tottenham, he thought that the first and most important role was simply to provide a safe space for young people where they can socialise off the streets. Once this is achieved, ‘then you can think about education and other things’.

Part of providing a safe space is to simply give young people somewhere away from the dangers and temptations young people face on the street, but it also is about producing a feeling of security that removes the anticipation of shame, and thus underpins and enables achievement of a positive sense of self. The youth project in Hackney did just this in the small property it utilised.
As with Steve, Lim\textsuperscript{85} explained that “the first thing you gotta realise is that [the project] is a youth club, so it's like a place where everyone just come together, talk to each other, just play games together, interact with one another”.

The project’s main room was a simple space where young people hung out with their friends. They could play on the X-Box, pool table or table tennis, sit and play board games, or simply talk and hang out. Indeed, this space was almost always a hive of activity when I was there as young people ran about, shouted and laughed, and sometimes argued. What was clear in the chaos was that they were relaxed.

Unlike the streets (and for some even the home) where there exists the potential for violence and shame,\textsuperscript{86} first and foremost the project enabled young people to feel free to express themselves. There was no threat of violence or signs of tension during my time there (other than relating to myself or other outsiders). In part, this was likely due to the no-nonsense, but caring attitude of the workers, particularly Jane and Ray who were among the elder workers. However, it was also due to working with the young people and showing them that you can interact without shame forming an ever-present and unspoken threat.

Jane told me young men often act aggressively when they first attend, seeking to assert their dominance. The problem, according to Jane, is that dominance and aggression is used to cover insecurity and prevent attacks on the self. By seeking to establish dominance, the individual is performing the power relations and identity that protects them and disempowers others. The first call for Jane or the workers is to stop the behaviour by talking or spending time with the individual. What is stressed is not simply that they will not tolerate that behaviour,\textsuperscript{87} but that it is not needed, as no one will seek to harm them. The point is to make the individual feel safe, realising that, on the one hand aggressive behaviour does not achieve dominance, but also that they

\textsuperscript{85} Lim: Black male, early twenties, former attendee, now volunteered at the project and worked as a music promoter, had been in gangs when younger.

\textsuperscript{86} Such as from the police, drug related or area/post code related feuds.

\textsuperscript{87} Although this depends on the individual in question - for those most aggressive and angry, rules are not set down hard and fast as this tends to prompt resistance.
are not under threat at the project.

Indeed, the success of building this sense of security is found in the reference to the project being like a family, which came up a number of times, or Jane being called ‘aunty’. The project also functioned to replace some roles and provisions normally supplied by nuclear family structure. The most obvious was that of cooking a hot meal each evening for any that wanted it. This provision functioned to support working parents who may not have the time, and for more serious situations where young people could not always get this at home due to issues such as drug addiction, or simply a lack of money.

10.2.2. Trust and Support

Similarly, the youth workers provided advice and support for any personal issues the young people might face. In part this functioned pragmatically to give help to young people who might have nowhere else to go, or prevent unnecessary involvement with crime and violence. However, tied in with this was the cultivation of positive relationships and emotional connections between worker and attendees. Young people felt comfortable coming to them and saw them as someone who would listen and respect them. From what I saw during my time at the project, the fact that the young people were taken seriously was a part of what translated the workers’ power in that space into legitimate authority.

For instance, I repeatedly saw young people speak to selected workers about issues they had. On one occasion some of the teenage boys had an issue with another boy at school over an issue of disrespect. Although it was unclear as they were not speaking to me, from what I could grasp violence was expected from the young man, and the group thus felt they should retaliate first. This is potentially a serious issue due to the possibility of an escalation in the seriousness of the violence.

Not only did the project run classes that sought to show how such escalation might occur, during my time living in Haringey I have overheard on more than one occasion, young men talking of ‘shanking’ or stabbing others for similar acts of disrespect. While I cannot comment on whether the young men I
overheard had real intent or were simply talking, the important point to note is that this call to utilise violence, sometimes deadly force, in response to disrespect is common. However, the boys at the project took this issue to Lim to discuss how to handle it, because they trusted and respected him. As far as I was aware, the issue was resolved without violence.

Similarly, Jane has also attended court, dealt with police, and spoke on behalf of a number of young people who had been arrested, including Mark. The reason young people could go to Jane was because the combination of strength, support, and respect she treats them with:

They feel comfortable approaching her, cos she can tell them, ‘look what you done is right, what you done is wrong. I’ll help you out, I’m not against you, however, try to fix your problem’. And she’ll show them how to (Lim speaking of Jane)

Problems may also be relatively ordinary, but for disadvantaged children these can escalate due to the lack of adults willing or able to help the children. When young people have more serious on-going issues and troubles, for instance at home, the project also takes up the role of social worker. The project will assign one of the workers as a ‘mentor’, who will focus on that young person and give them someone to talk to, visit them at home, and importantly, in contrast to the state, provide a trusted adult to intervene or mediate for them.

The point in noting this is not to simply highlight that young people had access to advice and assistance from experienced individuals, sustenance they might otherwise lack, or indeed simply a place off the streets. What is important to highlight is the affective impact of these relations and provisions; that the young people felt cared for, secure, and had positive relations with adults. The result is two-fold: firstly, such relations resist the disrespect felt from legitimated society, but also opens the possibility that self-worth can be built in spite of the disadvantages these young people faced.

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88 Mark: black, male, early twenties, former attendee, later volunteered at the project.
10.2.3. *Self-Esteem and Positive Identities*

The project operated on this logic: that the feeling of being cared for, emotionally rewarded, and respected is foundational to any attempt to prevent the rejection of legitimated society. If young people are able to let their guards down, to open themselves to judgement from adults without fear of shame, and thus receive rewards for success, they can begin to build aspirations and positive identities through legitimated society.

This is perhaps the simplest, but paradoxically most neglected, point in the passive understanding of education. The youth project enabled young people to have what Robertson (2002: 76) calls ‘mastery experiences’. This is the act of carrying out a practice and generating a sense of achievement through, on the one hand being socially rewarded; and on the other, a feeling they are good at something. And so it is through the affective responses to good practice that a sense of self-worth and a positive identity can be attached to, and generated through the legitimated social order.

My time at the youth project demonstrated the importance of this relation through to the visible success they were having. This positive and affective reinforcement was observable in simple interactions, such as workers helping attendees with homework. The workers sought to empower the young person to achieve the goal themselves, guiding them with the process and enabling them to achieve it themselves. Furthermore, the young person was not put down for failing or struggling but encouraged to continue, and was rewarded with praise for their achievement.

However, perhaps the most telling incident I observed came when I was standing in the foyer chatting to Lim and Polly. A young white woman, aged around 16, walked in and proclaimed excitedly ‘I got an A’. Both Lim and Polly reacted with genuine excitement and pleasure, much like one might expect from a parent, and hugged and congratulated her. The young woman then left to tell others in the project, at which point Polly turned to me smiling and told me that when the young woman had first come to the project she had been
failing in school and was getting involved in drugs and gangs.\textsuperscript{89}

Simply put, the fact that adults were showing they cared, giving emotional reward for achievement, while at the same time not shaming young people if they struggle, was developing aspirations within the legitimated society. Education was being shaped as something not simply ‘boring’ and potentially shameful, but enabling a process of positive identification through ‘good practices’ and self-esteem.

More than simply facilitating social reward and respect, by enabling young people to carry out educational practice themselves workers at the project were also empowering young people by enabling them to act and generate mastery experiences. While Arendt’s notion of power is to ‘act in concert’, this is underpinned by the capacity to act (Arendt, 1970: 44). The belief in one’s capacity to act is essential for self-worth and a fundamental aspect of a sense of achievement; without it one can have no confidence in the self-in-the-world. In other words, the distinction between teaching, on the one hand as the passive absorption of knowledge, and on the other as enabling the student to act efficiently, is one that relates to empowerment and the self-esteem and shame nexus.

The joy of the young woman was not simply a factor of social esteem provided by the workers, but a joy stemming from her own capacity to act in ways she thought not possible. She had gone from failing in educational practice, to succeeding – an act of performance by which she became someone in control, someone capable. It is through this process that the youth project was enabling young people to have aspirations within the legitimated system: “we try to build that confidence up for them to actually say to themselves, ‘yes I wanna do this’” (Lim).

10.2.4. Role models

As we have already noted with the youth workers, and particularly Jane, the

\textsuperscript{89} From what Polly mentioned, this appeared to be the young girl Lim had spoken about in our interview who had given up on education, due to pressures at home and school, and begun to get involved in crime. However, I did not seek to confirm this with Lim as he had been unwilling to identify her previously.
adults provided role models for the young people who were within the legitimated system. Similarly, for Steve there was a general absence of adults within the legitimated system for young people to look up to. Instead, as we saw previously, drug dealers who can afford fast or flashy cars are often the ones admired and emulated.

Yet workers at the youth club were clearly admired and respected by the young people there. This was visible in the behaviour of young people in the examples already provided, such as by seeking them out for advice, and telling workers of their successes and thus seeking their approval. Simply the fact that all the workers were from Hackney, many also attended the project, and grew up in similar contexts, also makes it easier for young people to identify with them. Simply put, unlike representatives of the system, such as teachers, the police, or myself, the workers were ‘like us’.

However, a role model is obviously not just someone you can identify with, but someone you aspire to emulate. One particular example occurred as I observed the aforementioned boxing class. During the class a number of the young men did not want to participate and paid little attention to the instructor. Although disguised, the young men’s resistance appeared to be due to a fear of looking weak in front of their friends. On noting this Lim joined in and, by going first, joking with, and encouraging the younger men, he managed to get each one to at least give it a try. As some found they were good at it, they willingly took part.

Lim’s relationship with these young men was in part produced by his experience of gangs and violence, which the young men could understand and appeared to make him a figure of respect. Nevertheless, it was not something he simply achieved by who he was or what he had seen. Rather it was the effort he put into these young people, and the willingness to give them his time and attention that shaped him as someone they felt affection for, respected, and gave his actions legitimacy in their eyes. This was also what I saw with Jane; her position as a dominant but also caring figure made her admired and respected, and her actions achieved credibility because of this. In other words, these workers performed their identities within the power
relations of society, and in doing so opened up the possibility of young people identifying within the legitimated system.

The point is that these people to some extent functioned like a bridge between the world of exclusion and legitimated society, having their feet in both worlds and demonstrating to the young people that they can cross this gap, and by playing a positive role in these young people’s lives, gave legitimacy and value to doing just that.

10.2.5 The Project versus Neoliberalism

People like Jane, Steve, and Ben are those who have come to realise the damage being done to young people through disempowerment and disrespect. Each have decided to work within and resist the structure, by seeking to mitigate and overcome the dispositions to reject the social order. Thus, each of these individuals have sought to empower themselves in order to empower young people to resist the disrespect and low self-worth imposed upon them.

Observing the youth project’s methods and successes in keeping young people on ‘the straight and narrow’ (Carla), gave insight into how structural exclusions were intersecting in the experience of young people and generating individualised resistance. However, as we have discussed above, the project also revealed how it was managing to counter the increase in disempowerment and disrespect produced by neoliberal policies and individualistic ontology.

Although unformulated, the project functioned on a radical model of education in which emotion or affect is central. This may have been almost accidental in that the project simply sought to provide what they felt young people lacked. But in doing so, they have managed to reverse the aversive response produced by repeated instances of shame. Simply put, by offering security the defensive barriers erected to avoid shame can be lowered, and the young people can now express themselves without fear. The positive impact of praise and esteem meant young people found educational practice rewarding and built confidence. Similarly, by empowering young people to achieve tasks
or goals themselves, they could have mastery experiences and perform positive identities through legitimated forms of practice.

It was by these forms of interactions that the youth project had helped send a number of young people to university, two of whom had previously been involved in gangs. It was by these factors that the young woman who achieved an A had turned her educational performance around and begun to positively identify herself through the legitimated social sphere.

However, it was not simply through practice that the project provides resistance against neoliberalism, but also by what it displays. Simply put, the youth project demonstrated the fallacy of ‘criminality, pure and simple’. The success with young people from difficult backgrounds provides strong evidence against the notion that it is the morality of the individual that push them into crime. Instead, their ‘morality’, so called, is an effect of power, a consequence of the disrespect and disempowerment imposed upon the individual.

Unfortunately, rather than recognising the value of these projects and local expertise, we are seeing a reduction. Again, we find neoliberalism at the core. The youth project itself used to have three bases around Hackney in the mid-2000s, the largest of which had around 70 young people attending. By 2014 the site I conducted research at was the only one, and serves around 30 young people in total. The project also used to run a number of weekend activities, which had now been reduced or stopped. For instance, there had been a reduction in coach trips/holidays the project had offered around or even out of the country. The project still runs, albeit at a reduced rate, a weekend program called ‘mixing postcodes’, where young people from different areas/estates are brought together in an attempt to remove/diminish the cultural conflict lines that generate violence.

Polly explained the reduction of what they could offer came with a shift to a neoliberal model of funding, or ‘Big Society’. While previously the project had been funded principally through the council, today they had to compete with other organisations for private funding. Indeed, prior to 2011 the cuts that were imposed by Cameron’s coalition government imposed a massive
reduction in youth services, impacting heavily on areas which need them most (Cooper, 2012: 21).

The ‘Big Society’ or neoliberal model, as Atkinson, Roberts and Savage explain, “is nothing but a giant Trojan horse for precisely the kind of individualism [Thatcher] espoused – that is, it is not for the state to provide support, care or education for people; it is up to individuals themselves to look after their own interests” (2012: 10). Of course, precisely what is lacking in these communities are the economic and cultural capitals to do just this.

Thus, rather than Big Society’s’ claimed products of ‘community cohesion’ and ‘growth’, what we have been seeing is an increase in the exclusion and an escalation in disrespect, in part caused by the crippling of valuable enterprises such as the youth project. However, as the reader might have noted, the discussion of the project has lacked one of the key issues discussed throughout this thesis. Indeed, this focus is one which might provide resistance to neoliberalism’s monopolisation of power and capital – that of countering individualisation through Politicisation. Here we find the limits of the youth project.

10.3. The Limits of Resistance

Mark’s experiences highlighted the limits of the youth project in dealing with the structural disadvantage imposed by the social order. Mark was the youth worker at the project who had expressed an individualised outlook, blaming racism in the police on the individual officers. When I interviewed him he spoke briefly of prior involvement with gangs and crime at a younger age. This again, was the fault of himself and bad choices. However, with the help of the youth project he had ‘got out’.

Whether or not he was telling the truth, a few months after I had finished my research, Mark was arrested for carrying large amounts of cocaine, and then tragically a few days later shot and killed in a drug related argument. Given Mark’s reticence during the interview, we cannot know the extent to which his continuation or return to criminal activity was driven by status, economic need,
the failure to find either in legitimated society, or a mixture of these. Of the adults at the project, Mark was the most resistant to me. His agreement to be interviewed was clearly because Polly had asked him, and the impression I received was that he neither trusted nor saw value in speaking to me.

In turn, in contrast to Lim, for instance (who came from a similar background of gangs and crime), Mark did not seem to be achieving within legitimated society. When speaking of getting out, he did not, as others had, mention what he was doing now, and the only mention of his personal life to me related to having his first child. Thus his return or continued involvement in drug dealing may have related to economic and status concerns.

The lack of details regarding Mark’s life means we should not employ this as strong evidence, but rather indicative of the limits of the project’s approach. The example of Mark did suggest that the failure to engage in legitimated society was related to both an anger and mistrust towards the system, and, continued social and economic exclusion. Thus the example of Mark points us to a number of issues, firstly, the limits of the reach of the project and of the resistance it can provide, and secondly, the lack of Politicisation going on in these communities and broader society.

10.3.1. The Limits of Education

Despite the successes the project may have in generating dispositions to engage, it cannot counter the structural disadvantages altogether. While individuals may generate aspirations and identities within legitimated society, it does not necessitate that these will be fulfilled and may simply delay or diminish the impact of the inevitable exclusion. One issue is that while the disposition or drive to engage may be produced by the project, and they may enable young people to overcome the initial lack of knowledge or knowhow; they cannot counter the lack of middle-class cultural capital, nor can they be expected to provide an education equivalent to that which privileged schools offer.

Indeed, the project is not, nor can it be, a school, but should be understood as ‘picking up the slack’ left by society’s failure of these young people. Unless
the education system begins to acknowledge the complex ways in which structural disadvantage can impact on young people, society will continue to reproduce its own failure. If the education system does change, then organisations such as the youth project can provide an invaluable service in supporting those areas in which long-term exclusion has embedded the problem.

10.3.2. The Limits of Employment

Moreover, we should note that despite the difficult task the project has, they will still send young people out into a hostile employment environment. Employment opportunities offer little in the way of economic and social reward. As we saw in Hackney and Haringey, not only are there high levels of unemployment meaning higher competition for all positions, in recent years low-paid work has been on the increase as neoliberal regulation has again weakened the position of labour in favour of business.

While, even if we ignore structural disadvantage, across the board higher levels of aspiration amongst young people in general are not matched by available positions, with an over subscription of “about three ambitious young people for each job” (Croll, quoted in Yates et al., 2011: 7). The neoliberal logic that the ‘solution’ to ‘the underclass’ or ‘NEETs’, is to overcome ‘low ambition’ through focusing on the individual (Avis, 2014: 64), or through the ‘right training’ (Yates et al., 2011: 2) simply put, does not just miss the point, but misses the target.

Better training requires a willingness in the individual to engage, and this will not be achieved through the penalisation and stigmatisation imposed upon these communities. The youth project works with individuals and its successes are generated through the practices which replace penalisation with patience and care, enabling an individual to learn to generate self-worth through legitimated practices. Secondly, and most fundamentally, this neoliberal logic blatantly ignores that no matter what ‘improvements’ may be made to an individual, these individuals remain excluded by the social and economic structure.
Unless the manifold means of generating disrespect are at least diminished, and genuine opportunities for economically and socially worthwhile employment are created, the impact of even genuine attempts, such as the youth project, will at best be to limit the damage being done, not to fix the problem. However, this leads us further down the rabbit hole for why, given the discussion so far, should we expect the structure to change? Is it not in order to protect the social hierarchy that logics of exclusion emerge in the first instance? Thus, it would seem that the problem that emerged in the 1980s, the shift to individualised resistance, is neoliberalism’s tour de force, for what it achieves is the prevention of meaningful forms of resistance coming from below.

10.3.3. Individualisation and the Death of Democracy

The project functions to overcome that which neoliberalism and its individualised logic hides. It responds to the exclusion concealed by the meritocratic logic and aims to put young, socially and economically excluded individuals on a closer footing to those higher up the social hierarchy. However, it does not seek to overturn or counter this logic, and thus fails to articulate or produce a means by which the structure could change. Simply put, while they may help out individuals who have been impacted by exclusion, they are not attempting to prevent that initial exclusion.

This should not be taken as a criticism against the project for two reasons; firstly, individualised logic permeates much of society and there is no reason to expect better from the project; and secondly, they cannot be held accountable for not solving all of society’s problems – to do so would be to return to the blame game, similar to that of ‘criminality’, and ignore the impressive resistance they provide to the problematic social order. Nevertheless, we must consider the emergence of individualised resistance and what this implies for the larger failure in society.

As the easy acceptance of the ‘criminality’ explanation in 2011 demonstrates, if substantial change is to be brought about it requires Politicised resistance that will contest neoliberal framings. This not only makes the repeated discursive framing of ‘rioters’ by the dominant classes more difficult, it creates
actors who will offer alternative framings, such as we saw in the 1980s. As Honneth (1995) argues, Politicised and collective forms of resistance require identities that connect the experiences of disrespect of the individual with others, through an understanding of the structural cause and injustice of their conditions. They also require a means to articulate and overcome the anger and disrespect through a means that is understood as plausible and worthwhile.

By doing so individuals, such as Mark, might have understood their experiences of disrespect, as not being rejected due to inferiority or being a problematic individual, but being rejected due to injustice. This is of course, not a simple thing. Without the positive role of workers at the project, this acknowledgement might generate a similar rage, low self-worth, and use of violence that we saw in Sheldon Thomas in Brixton 1981: “Why does everyone hate blacks?” (2012: 117). Thomas would later be guided and supported by Bernie Grant, enabling him to build a positive sense of self and with that constructive resistance through working with gangs. Thus, these two factors together seem to offer the possibility of turning disrespect and disempowerment into their opposites through meaningful collective identities and resistance.

Unfortunately, this notion of Politicising through education was lacking in the project and elsewhere during my research. Indeed, despite those from the elder generation (over 30) that I spoke to focusing on racism and the broader context of exclusion, none were explicitly attempting to pass on a notion of a struggle or a collective identity, or seeking to educate young people in a Political manner. The classes that the project offered were about developing the individual, or about preventing issues related to violence, crime, or conflict with police. Indeed, as previously noted, when looking around at charities who do similar work with excluded young people, the discourses were all very individualistic, focusing on notions like ‘leadership’ and personal skills.

This was much as Nick described how he saw the problem: previously the exclusion and explicit racism had made the black community ‘tighter’, but ‘ownership of the battle’ had never been passed on. Thus we see the paradox
that as explicit logics of exclusion shrink from the scene, collective identities necessary to constructively resist disempowerment and disrespect disappear. With this loss, so do we lose the capacity to reorganise power relations that seek to protect and reinforce themselves.

Indeed, while democracy, due to space, has not been an explicit focus of this thesis, the reader might recognise its presence just beneath the surface of the discussion. For a functioning democracy we need a Politicised population, not simply to prompt engagement, but to contest growing inequality and ossifying concentrations of power. The youth project gets us halfway by producing individuals willing to engage, rather than simply turning away. However, alone it is not enough, and without Politicisation and the retreat of individualisation, disempowerment and disrespect will be expanded. The drive to action inherent in shame and anger will be unable to be expressed through the legitimated system, and the cause of these emotions will go unresolved. The anger and discontent will build, bubbling below the surface, waiting for an iconic moment that enables it to breach in acts of violence.
11. Conclusion

11.1. Power and Criminality

The thesis began by noting the complex and multiple roles of power implicated in rioting and the need to reconceptualise how we go about thinking and analysing such aggregations of event. The response of power to the acts involved in rioting often functions to delegitimise rioters, and protect and maintain the current social hierarchy. In 2011 and in the 1980s Cameron’s and Thatcher’s ‘criminality’ were just such acts of power.

Analyses of riots that have sought to counter such perspectives have often engaged in a debate by arguing rioters’ actions are actually ‘political’, and thus represent a claim for justice (e.g. Penny, 2011; Reicher & Stott, 2011). Yet, while riot actions may be political, as we saw, the spontaneity and socially excluded experiences of the rioters means that political action is often pre-reflexively excluded as plausible or worthwhile. Moreover, whether the actions are political or seek justice or not, has little to do with whether there is genuine discontent and society is failing to reproduce its conditions of production.

Arguing against criminality and for political action is to engage on the terms set by the politicians who wish to delegitimise. It plays into the hands of proponents of the criminalising discourse because often rioters’ actions are clearly not ‘political’ or claims for justice. Whether an individual can or cannot articulate themselves ‘politically’ is irrelevant to the social problem that underpins the resistance. The lack of political action is only relevant because it is indicative of the extent to which the agent has been excluded from the practices of power. The less ‘political action’ is occurring, the greater the extent of individuals who have given up on the social order as a means to overcome or resolve their anger and shame.

By framing rioters as immoral, politicians in the 1980s and 2011 sought to remove any questions regarding the state and social order’s role in producing the rioting. By arguing that the riots represent political action, we only fail to
step outside the language of legitimation, and thus accept the ontology of the powerful, rather than subvert it epistemologically. The problem was then, that we could not counter ‘criminality’ and explore the violence through these terms.

Instead of engaging in the political-criminal debate, we should step outside through the concept of the ‘Political’. The capitalised Political refers to the organisation of social life and the social hierarchy, rather than simply action. Thus the term highlights the power relations within society, the distribution of resources, and importantly, how the social hierarchy is shaped and maintained by power, such as the discourse of criminality. In this light, all riots are political because they respond to and reorganise power relations within society.

11.1.1 ‘The Riot’

To critique criminality, we also needed an approach that could incorporate power relations that the discourse sought to exclude. In other words, we needed to reconceptualise the notion of a ‘riot’; a concept produced through practice and the need to compartmentalise, simplify, and in some instances, to condemn. ‘The riot’ as a concept has many problems for analysis. Most obviously it aggregates what is potentially a multitude of different types of acts, individuals, and motives, into one singular event and actors. The result can only be a loss of nuance and homogenisation.

The term also imposes unnecessary temporal and spatial limits. ‘The riot’ is not just a single, but singular event. This is problematic because there is no particular reason to draw a line according to immediate events, other than that our attention moves away. Thus the 1980s saw ‘riots’ and 2011 saw a single ‘riot’, despite a remarkably similar spread to the 1980s. That it was simply social media that enabled a quicker spread is generally left unrecognised.

Indeed, that the 1980s and 2011 saw notable similarities in terms of iconic events, locations, demographics, and the targeting of police, is not acknowledged. Rather because we examine ‘the riot’ rather than the problem
of which riot actions are a symptom, these strikingly similar series of events are considered distinct.

Finally, like ‘criminality’, the emphasis of ‘the riot’ is implicitly on the actions of the rioters; this is not to say that any analysis that utilises the concept of the riot will ignore the social structure, but rather attention is directed to a greater extent to the individuals. What is lacking is a fuller understanding of the complex ways in which structure – as a set of repeated and patterned interactions – connects to, and makes agency’s ‘necessary scene’ (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 45).

What the notion of ‘the riot’ achieves then, is to remove the actions from the social order in which they occur. Thus rather than explain this process, we seek to explain the ‘the riot’. By rejecting ‘the riot’ as the object of analysis, and reconceptualising a riot as a symptom of social breakdown, we could move beyond these limitations.

11.2. Bridging the Gap: Shame and Self-Esteem

11.2.1 The Importance of an Affective Theory of Resistance

The value in developing a theory of action/resistance in contrast to ‘the riot’, is to avoid the unnecessary limits imposed by the latter concept, and to enable us to embed riotous actions, or resistance, within the processes of power that constitute the social order. Moreover, to counter the discourse of criminality would require revealing the structural causes of agency in a way that could explain why we were seeing apparently ‘apolitical’ behaviour. Theories of riots tend to fail to adequately develop this connection, leaving an explanatory gap or assumption, which results in problems.

Keith’s (1993) analysis of the 1980s riots provides a more nuanced and insightful account of rioting than many ‘riot’ approaches, by examining in detail the relations and interactions between black communities and the police. Despite this, the gap manifests. Without explicitly incorporating emotion, specifically shame and self-esteem, Keith fails to realise the impact of broader
power relations between the dominant white groups and super-exploited black
groups. What Keith does not recognise is the impact these exclusions and
mistreatments might have upon dispositions towards white authority, and
therefore the police. Subsequently, without examining the impact of these
broader exclusions, Keith also fails to understand how society’s stereotypes
and hierarchy are implicated the over-policing he analyses so well.

Simply put, without considering affect in a theory of action/resistance we will
always struggle to escape the terms set by the discourse of criminality or
indeed, ‘the riot’. This is because emotion is what gives social structure
meaning or relevance, and thus explanations of why social structure produces
resistance will be unable to understand the nuanced and indirect ways in
which it impacts upon and inheres in agency.

11.2.2 Disrespect, Disempowerment, and Resistance

Research at the youth project was particularly informative in bringing out role
of emotion. As we saw, the project was enabling young people to resist the
disrespect of the social order in a myriad of ways, each of which operated
through generating a positive sense of self. Consequently, it became apparent
that if we are to connect resistance to the larger power relations of the social
order, this must occur through emotions as the drive and ‘necessary scene’
for agency (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 45).

However, this required a further development that enabled us to understand
power as shaping the possibility or form of affective expressions. Indeed, if we
are to understand how the social order shapes behaviour, of which resistance
is just one sub-type, we must do so by understanding power as, in part, a
form of influence that operates on and through affect.

This connection between structure and affectively driven resistance came in
two interconnected forms: firstly, emotional responses of shame and self-
esteeem, and secondly, the repeated and patterned acts of disrespect and
disempowerment that produce these emotions. Emotions underpin rationality
and choice at the pre-reflexive level as they both inform us about what we are
experiencing, and dispose us to respond to it in certain ways.
How we respond to situations is not a matter of free will, but of the ontology that shapes certain types of action as plausible and worthwhile. These are both shaped by the structure in two ways; first, in how it impacts upon us, and second, in how we can utilise those structural relations to express affect and perform action. Thus we act from a certain subjective position in relation to the social structure that shaped us.

We began with Bourdieu’s (2000; 2003) general structural framework and notions of dispositions, but developed the possibility of resistance through Scheff’s (2000) theorisation of shame and Honneth’s (1995) notion of expressive action and disrespect as the source of struggle. However, while Scheff speaks mainly of shame, and Honneth tends to avoid this language in favour of structural acts such as ‘disrespect’, a fuller theorisation required self-esteem as shame’s necessary contraposition. In other words, we could not understand disrespect and disempowerment as simply a negative experience – shame – but as an absence of a positive – self-esteem. In turn Butler’s (2004; 2011) notion of performativity complimented Honneth’s expressive understanding, and provided greater nuance in the understanding of how power relations or structure function not just to shape experience but to create the possibilities of action.

By merging these theoretical perspectives, we can say that social structure or acts of power shape our experiences, which in turn produce emotional responses. These responses say something about the experience in relation to our expectations of self, and how we should and feasibly can, respond to it. With regards to resistance, a shameful experience is to feel that the self is judged inadequate and unvalued; it constructs approaching interactions that are similar as potentially shameful and thus disposes us to avoid or alter such interactions. If we cannot avoid them by ‘fitting in’, an individual may reject the authority of those judging them, while shame that cannot be overcome produces anger, prompting action to re-establish self-worth and re-organise relations of power.

From a structural perspective, disrespect functions as an interaction in which an individual is devalued in some form. Disempowerment is similar in that it
removes the individual’s agency, thus functioning to demonstrate the inadequacy of the individual as a human, and removes the capacity to generate self-worth through action. Thus acts of disrespect in conjunction with disempowerment function potently to produce shame and inhibit the resistance and overcoming to this within the legitimated social order.

By building this approach, rioting and riot acts are removed from their reifying and delimiting constructs. Instead, analysis reveals how resistance is generated as individuals seek to counter disrespect and overcome disempowerment in order that they can develop a positive sense of self. However, through forms of disempowerment the legitimated social order refuses this possibility, thus emotions seek expression outside of, or by reorganising the power relations that inhibit this. Consequently, expressive resistance is achieved through performing with power relations in acts that reposition the self in relation to the social order, and function as a form of identification. Politicised resistance for instance, seeks to reorganise the social order in prevent relations of power that produce disrespect, understood as ‘injustice’ (e.g. equal pay).

11.2.3. Criminality or Individualised Resistance?

However, while this enables us to understand how resistance is generated, it cannot explain how similar experiences may manifest as different forms of resistance. As Honneth (1995) pointed out, how resistance manifests in behaviour is not determined by emotion alone but by forms of identification. The difference between collective forms of resistance and individual was found in whether Politicised identities were operational.

Politicised forms of identity incorporated structural understandings of the social order, and thus enabled individuals to understand the origins of any disrespect experienced. By realising the structural origins of disrespect through Politicised identities, cause can be located outside of the self and discontent can be formulated as ‘injustice’. Through this understanding of being wronged, the excluded group have the potential to articulate an alternative ‘future’ and act in ways that not only seek to bring it about, but collectively reassert their self-worth through the performance of agency and
positive identities. Consequently, shame can be limited or overcome through rejecting valuations imposed by the legitimated social order as unfair, and developing alternative forms of positive identification (e.g. black power). This is possible due to potential for social valuation, empowerment, and thus self-esteem and belonging generated by those grouped in similar positions.

Individualised forms of identity, on the other hand, while performative and expressive of the same socially structured position, lack structural or Politicised understandings. Disrespect is felt but its origins are not recognised in the same way. Instead the blame inherent in disrespect is accepted and internalised as a feature of the self. Without the understanding of structural origins, so resistance will struggle to articulate change to the social order. In turn, lacking a project or notion of injustice by which to re-articulate identity, only violence is left as a means by which to re-articulate power relations and overcome shame and release anger.

The value in this theoretical development is that, in contrast to the immoral individual in ‘criminality’ whose actions demonstrate they are only out for themselves, here we see how it is that riots, politicised or not, are always about resistance to power. ‘Criminality’ or violence purged of their normative and moral connotations, are ‘politics’ for those who have no other means by which to overcome and express shame and anger. It may be argued to be ineffective, but individualised resistance derives from the same structural production of disempowerment and disrespect as any other form of resistance. In other words, ‘criminality’ is Political.

This is also fundamentally important for understanding what collective violence is, and the problem that underlies the symptom. Violence as a form of resistance to power is reserved for those who are disempowered and disrespected (Arendt, 1970). Unable to articulate discontent as injustice, unable to create a project and collective identity to resist the shame and low self-worth, the excluded turn to other means that adequately express or overcome the shame and anger. For some this might be an engagement in crime and the possibilities of a positive identity this offers. Yet, even for those
who do not engage in crime, violent acts may offer the most effective way to overcome their discontent.

11.2.4. *Education and Employment*

This understanding of individualised resistance countered Keith’s (1993) argument that attacks on the police meant over-police was the only or primary cause. Because Keith had not theorised how power and exclusion impacted upon individuals, he failed to consider that behind the clear target selection, other relations of disrespect and disempowerment were generating resistance. These relations were spilling over through a general repressed anger, and through the rejection of the authorities of the legitimated and white social order and hierarchy. Thus we could make sense of the data that revealed in both the 1980s and 2011 we had an over representation of excluded groups. These were not individuals rioting because everything was fine but for the oppressive policing, rather the police formed the tip of the iceberg – the most tangible and obvious form of disrespect.

Disempowerment and disrespect come in many forms for super-exploited groups, and shame and anger does not stay within easy and clear categories related to particular experiences. Thus we found that in both the 1980s and 2011 there was a context of disrespect in everyday life occurring through education and employment. It was not simply the negative impact, but the lack of possibility of self-worth in these practices that was generating rejection and resistance.

Thus we saw how social and economic exclusion might produce experiences of disrespect and disempowerment through disadvantage and stereotypes in educational practice and employment opportunities. This was facilitating a rejection or stereotyping of those who held markers of legitimated society. In particular, this was demonstrated through the response of young people and some workers to my researcher identity (white, middle class appearance, researcher) in which a lack of trust was clearly displayed. This adapted approach emphasises not only that to understand resistance we need to expand beyond what appears immediately present in actions (or ‘the riot’), but that to prevent the reoccurrence of these symptoms we need to
reconceptualise how we think about and practice the reproduction of the social order.

11.3. Situational Analysis

In addition to arguing for a shift away from the notion of ‘the riot’ to an affective theory of resistance, the thesis sought to incorporate a relatively novel method of analysing situational dynamics through video footage. Despite the usefulness of the approach developed by Collins (2008) and Nassauer (2012), their notion of situational analysis is undercut by their theoretical grounding, which argues for treating all violent actors as universal subjects and seeking explanation in the situation alone.

The thesis, however, re-appropriated this method as a means to provide a counter-narrative and connect social structure in action. The above theoretical approach marries well with the notion of situational analysis. ‘The riot’, rather than a thing in itself, becomes analytically understood as a series of ‘situations’. The dynamics of these situations are performances and affective expressions of the social structure which the analyst can ‘read’ or utilise as evidence of the construction of agency.

Thus, connecting with the broader theory, the actions or resistance of rioters are expressive (Honneth, 1995) and performative (Butler, 2004; 2011) acts that respond to the organisation of power and the construction of self-worth and shame that this produces. By developing an account of the role of the Political in the actions of violence against the police, we could ‘make sense’ of riotous actions in a way that other forms of qualitative and quantitative data cannot alone achieve. By utilising emotional displays, body language, and questioning who the individuals are interacting with, how, and to what end, the analyst can tie in a broader understanding of social structure, power, and the produced experiences of rioters with the particular actions. And in particular, we can show how naïve individualism is not only wrong, but was implicated in 2011.
11.4. Mapping out Society’s Failure

We now turn to the discussion of the substantive contribution of the thesis. While it has been noted that rioting is always connected to the organisation of power and social hierarchy, the thesis sought to explore the context related to the emergence of violence in 2011, specifically that directed against the police. This was chosen in part because the police function as part of the social hierarchy’s apparatus of power, and in part because this form of resistance had been pushed into the background by the discourse of criminality.

The theory of resistance applied to violence against the police necessarily drew attention to the 1980s due to the similarities in action, location, and socio-economic context. However, it became apparent that the emergence of the intentional targeting of police as an act of resistance, beginning in the 1970s, also revealed a particular historical process of change resulting in differences in the resistance. Most obviously was the shift in the role that race and racism were playing, alongside a movement from Politicised to individualised resistance. This particular historical moment or process could be labelled neoliberalism.

11.4.1. Neoliberalism: The Expansion of Disempowerment and Disrespect

Coinciding with the emergence of collective attacks on police, and also the increase in individualised resistance, neoliberal means of regulation emerged in the 1970s, and arrived as the dominant social and economic ideology particularly in the 1980s with Thatcher’s Conservative government. As we saw the regulation of the market removed the possibility of an empowered white working class by regulating in favour of business. The impact was to disempower labour through the destruction of unions, increase the ‘flexibility’, or vulnerability of those who sold their labour, and thus expand the super-exploited class.

Thus, the white working class were having the rug pulled out from under them, but the super-exploited black group had yet to even reach the rug.
Changes in the market shifted the material and power relations, thus expanding the super-exploited group through an influx of the white poor. While perhaps too early to have a significant impact on the ethnic make-up of the 1980s riots, this explains the expansion of white rioters in 2011.

However, it does not explain why, despite the still disproportionate involvement of black individuals, notions of black identity seemed largely absent. Nor can it alone explain why the manner of resistance appeared to be changing. What emerged from this period of change was an increasingly individualised ontology, which connects with the rioting in two ways: by changing the stereotype or modality of exclusion, and by changing the way individuals understood themselves within society.

11.4.2. From Black to Underclass: A Coherent Logic of Exclusion

Alongside and within neoliberalism's changes to the market and education, a broader epistemological shift occurred that functioned to consolidate changing conditions. Neoliberal policies created individually competitive systems where failure was attributed to the 'free' individual unencumbered by social structure. In other words, neoliberalism produced an individualised logic or ontology that diminished structural understandings. One way this impacted was in the changing form of stereotypes, or the modality of distinction by which the social hierarchy is justified.

The modern (neo)liberal state justifies itself through the notion of a meritocracy; no individual should be impeded from achieving their potential by structural factors. As we saw logics of exclusion that reference structural factors, such as racism or class, become a moral contradiction in the meritocratic society. This meant that racism was becoming increasingly frowned upon. However, attempts to prevent racism, such as Racial Awareness Treatment, all handily ignored the problem that sat behind and produced racism – inequality.

Logics of distinction that are utilised to exclude groups of individuals do not simply exist because of individual prejudice, but emerge to justify exclusions that maintain the social hierarchy. Indeed, as we saw inequality was not
decreasing but expanding. Thus, the repression of racism only inhibited the form of expression, and ignored what creates prejudice – the drive to maintain and justify one’s situation of privilege, and thus the other’s disadvantage.

As neoliberal policies did not remove inequality but expanded it, a new form of stereotype was required that corroborated the narrative of meritocracy and individualism, rather than contradicting it. At the same time this new logic would have to justify the social and economic position of the super-exploited group. Thus emerged the ‘underclass’, the ‘chav’, or as we saw the legitimated and apparently morally neutral category of the ‘NEET’. These concepts all focus on the individual and their behaviour, and seek to hide the structural cause of the individual’s social position.

Thus while prior to the 1970s British society clearly had a social hierarchy and exclusion, justified through notions of race and class, in the neoliberal ‘society’ the position of the super-exploited group has become a matter of poor choice, of not working hard enough, and of the individual’s immoral nature. It is not a coincidence that this logic is the very same found in discourses of politicians post-riot: “These riots were not about race […] government cuts […] or poverty […] this was about behaviour” (Cameron’s, 2011).

11.4.3. Changing Stereotypes, Logics, and Resistance

Vulnerability, disempowerment, and poverty may create a situation where individuals are encouraged to compete against others in similar positions of insecurity, lose faith in collective political action, and resist in individualised or ‘criminal’ forms. However, neoliberalism and individualism exacerbates this by hiding the structural relations that produce these conditions.

Tied into the new ‘underclass’ stereotype, a further way in which this individualised ontology had an impact was in how individuals understand themselves within the social order. Critiques of neoliberalism tend to assume that because it argues individuals are self-interested actors, it produces actors that are simply self-interested (Barnett, 2010). However, the affective theory of resistance provides a more nuanced account, enabling us to understand how the individualised logic interacts with shame and shapes the possibilities
of action.

In a world where class, race, or poverty no longer ‘impact’ upon your opportunities, but where education and market based relationships are increasingly competitive; where self-worth is established through personal achievement and the display of material goods in a universal consumer class, the self becomes understood as the origin of cause and thus inadequacy. Without a structural understanding shame and social judgement is more difficult to resist because there is no cause or resolution outside of the self.

Rather than simply increasing self-interest, individualism increases ontological insecurity. This may of course, manifest in increasingly competitive or egoistic behaviours, but it may also manifest in anxiety or increasing rejection of the legitimated social order and its authorities. Coupled with this increased difficulty in overcoming shame, is the loss of Politicised identities with which to perform resistance.

‘Race’ and ‘class’, as structural concepts, had functioned both as forms of distinction and exclusion, but also as modalities of identification and thus resistance. Because it was by ‘race’ that black people were excluded, so resistance to disrespect and disempowerment could be generated around and through positive notions of ‘blackness’, through collective ‘black’ movements and organisations, and through a different source of social valuation and belonging.

However, neoliberalism’s shift to a meritocratic justification resulted in disguising the structural logic of distinction in a moral cloak and removing all structural referents. Of course, how can one resist against something that one cannot see? Thus, in 2011 we saw some acknowledgement that people were being harassed by police because they were black, but as Mark argued, this was because of racist individuals, not systemic discrimination. Moreover, despite the profiling of black youth refers to a relatively recognisable, tangible, and acknowledged act, the system remains relatively un-implicated. Or what about disrespect in school or employment? Rather than inequality and injustice, the individualised ontology experiences this as failure of the self.
In other words, neoliberalism corners the excluded in a double-bind: firstly, the structural exclusions that oppress them no longer arrives in the recognisable form, but as we saw with the police, profiling arrives as the ‘experience’ of the officer, or disadvantage as the ‘failure’ of the student. Secondly, not only is disrespect more difficult to recognise, the individualistic and meritocratic ontology inhibits the framing of disrespect and disempowerment as an injustice.

The impact of these shifts meant that collective or Political identities increasingly failed to offer a plausible means to perform with power relations in way that would resist the imposed stigma and feelings of powerlessness. Thus, as we saw in the 1980s, there was the beginnings of a shift from Politicised rebellion to individualised violence, and by 2011 we almost exclusively seemed to see the latter.

11.5. Attacking the Police: The Tip of the Iceberg

Thus we return to attacking the police. It is not coincidence that the police were harassing excluded communities in both the 1980s and 2011. As Wacquant (2010) put it, the police constitute the final ‘buffer’ between them and the social order. It is through the police that the ‘threat’ posed by the super-exploited group to the social hierarchy, is kept under control.

The first broader relation to highlight is that through the production of stereotypes of ‘criminality’, super-exploited groups are positioned as dangerous and need to be ‘policed’. The police in both periods operated on the stereotypes of the day and functioned to keep (the social) order. Thus the police tend to focus on the individuals stereotyped as a threat to that order, and public spaces in which they move.

Relatedly, the mainstream responses to the rioting in which the penal system is viewed as the only resolution to the immoral nature of the rioters, is also not coincidence. Rather, without any structural cause or resolution, the discourse of ‘criminality’ requires over-policing and logically forwards harsh penal responses. Simply put, in the 1980s the stereotypes of black communities, particularly of young men in estates and areas of concentrated poverty, led to
invasive and oppressive policing. In 2011 the same process was occurring in many of the same areas, however this time the operational lines were drawn along the looser and unspoken notion of the underclass.

Thus, whereas previously skin colour had been the core marker by which distinctions were drawn, more recently, we see a shift in emphasis whereby skin colour remains important but not core, and a greater emphasis is placed on youth, and style of dress. Again, it is not coincidence that the changing forms of exclusion generated by the social order are those the police operate upon.

The place or geographical area that police focus on is also important with regards to stereotyping and the experience of exclusion, and indeed, forms a key mechanism by which over-policing and broader exclusions operate together. The impact of social and economic exclusion, of course, means that young people with no economic capital are forced onto the streets in order to have fun, be with friends, or simply avoid issues at home already generated through a cycle of disrespect and deprivation.

It is in this space that those who have likely experienced rejection, failure and exclusion through the social order’s stereotypes, are further criminalised and targeted by police. Interactions with police in these circumstances contribute to the sense of shame and low self-esteem produced in broader relations, and are often understood as insulting and degrading through the judgement, hostility, and even violence young men experience. Moreover, it is during a hostile stop and search that disempowerment takes its most extreme form, as the individuals loses control over their own body.

11.5.1. Violence as politics

In other words, the police constitute the final, physical, and thus most tangible means by which individuals are disrespected by the social order. As a result, it should not be surprising to find that attacking the police functions as an obvious and tangible means by which shame can be overcome and anger can be expressed. Indeed, in both the 1980s and 2011 we saw the same sense of release and anger as rioters overturned relations with police.
In both periods the use of violence against police was ‘politics’ by other means. Individuals attacking the police were disempowered to the extent that no form of legitimated action presented itself as a reasonable and effective means by which they could resist disrespect. They were disempowered by the individualistic ontology, excluded from legitimated practice, and disrespected by a system that for many has repeatedly reinforced the notion that they are not good enough. Simply put, ‘political action’ as a possibility was meaningless and absent; however, the possibility of overturning relations with the police through violence offered a plausible and effective means to overcome and release their discontent.

By reversing those power relations, by putting the police in the position the rioters inhabit in the everyday, by ‘violat[ing], just as they violate us’ (Prasad(c), 2011) they were able to cleanse themselves of the sense of inferiority and release their anger: “we felt really good like we’d just achieved something” (ibid). As the video footage revealed, rioters were able to express the repressed anger that had been pushing for action and resolution. Once the ‘opportunity’ presented itself, rioters could perform the power relations as they desired in the everyday, experiencing pleasure through the release of anger and performing beyond their expectations of a positive sense-of-self.

Importantly, not all those who attacked the police in 2011 appear to identify themselves as ‘criminals’ or were criminals. However, both criminal acts and opposition to police – in the everyday and the riots – constitute acts of individualised resistance. By violating the police as they had felt violated, by breaking their rules in front of them, by damaging their – or society’s – property, rioters drew on the anger and discontent generated through and beyond relations with the police, and demonstrated the new power relations in which they were dominant, they were superior.

In turn, with an increasing number of individuals resisting and expressing anger, the realisation of common cause and the possibility of collective action and empowerment was realised. Rioters then united to reverse power relations with police, and establish their position of dominance through performing the new power relations. Albeit only for a moment, the super-
exploited group acted “together in a way that they rarely can” (Arendt, 1970: 83).

11.6. Discussion: The Affective Social Order

The thesis here has sought to offer a new approach and understanding of rioting that enables us to better understand these acts as an indication of a failing within the social order. Of course, this was not a complete explanation of why so many individuals chose to attack the police and there are other ways in which this research could be expanded. More focused ethnographic approaches to certain issues could get to the meat and gristle of shame producing interactions, and develop greater nuance to the thesis’ broader discussion.

In particular, issues such as gender and masculinity, given the predominance of male rioters, would usefully expand the affective perspective developed here. In particular, masculinity’s commonly associated norms of dominance and control seem relevant when considering disempowerment and disrespect. Indeed, the theorisation of resistance through shame and self-esteem would seem to fit well with the notion of gender identity, and could also contribute to Butler’s (2004; 2011) theorisation of gender performance. In particular, it would be interesting to explore the extent to which the emphasis on the self implicit in many Western conceptions of dominant masculinity, inhibits the understanding of injustice and thus connects to violence. Yet while there were indications of such a concept of masculinity in my research, a combination of insufficient evidence to develop this explanation and the complexity of other factors, this was set aside.

Nevertheless, the thesis has sought to bridge the gap between social structure and action, and more specifically resistance, as a means of exploring the social order’s production of its own breakdown. In doing so I have examined the functioning of the social order on an affective level. Indeed, core to the argument here is that the failure or success of a social order, depends on the extent to which it offers the possibility of achieving the fundamental existential concern, that of self-worth.
To disrespect and disempower individuals is to exclude them from generating subjective value in the legitimated social order, and ultimately to generate the affective drive which might result in the rejection of that social order. Opportunities for economically worthwhile and socially valued forms of employment are fundamentally important if individuals are to continue to engage. It is not a matter of laziness or poor choice; these are at best effects of power. It is a matter of creating the dispositions to engage, of creating the possibility of performing positive self-worth through practice.

Moreover, the affective and performative theorisation of action and resistance enabled a fuller understanding of the way in which social and economic exclusion functions as part of the social hierarchy and impacts upon behaviour. Structural inequality generates prejudice which functions to seek to maintain these relations of privilege and disadvantage, by justifying the position of the exploited group. There is nothing objective about racism, nor is it necessarily tied to certain markers like skin colour; racism is about the need to put the other down. Or simply put, it functions to maintain the social hierarchy. By understanding this we can understand the shift produced by neoliberalism and individualism from a predominantly black super-exploited group, to an expanded multi-ethnic super-exploited group.

11.6.1. The Paradox of Individualised Resistance and the Breakdown of the Social Order

Indeed, it is neoliberalism's individualised ontology and the production of individualised resistance that provides the greatest threat to the social order and democracy. For the paradox of individualised resistance produced through the re-arrangement of the market, education, and the emergence of consumerism, is that the more individuals are excluded the less the social order pays attention to them. To put this another way, in the neoliberal language of ‘politics’ and ‘criminality’, only those who speak in the language of the dominant can even begin to make a claim for justice.

Those disempowered by the neoliberal order have not simply been excluded from the practices of power, but pre-reflexively or ontologically disempowered by removing the possibility of understanding the causes of their discontent.
Thus, these individuals cannot speak in the language of the powerful because it does not make sense, and has never been a plausible means by which to express anger and resolve shame.

The use of violence against the police is inherently Political because rioters responded to and sought to reorganise the power relations of the social order in the only way that made sense. We do not have to valorise such actions as the new revolution to acknowledge their origins. Indeed, the relevance of their inability to articulate anger in ‘political’ terms does not relate to their ‘nature’, rather it reveals the dire failure of democratic society to create a system and populous that can alter problematic and ossifying power relations. The paradox of neoliberalism is that individualised resistance should function as a dire warning of the system’s failure; yet instead it is this form of resistance that is ‘criminality, pure and simple’.
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Clip 5: Hackney footage, YouTube
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