

**Between Dislocation and Domination:
Palestinian Dual Marginality and
Identity Construction in
East Jerusalem 1993-2017**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis adopts a bottom-up, qualitative approach to Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem and asks how the new politics and altered geography of the city since Oslo are recreating Palestinian subjectivities and redefining Palestinian struggle. I make the case that East Jerusalemites are doubly marginalised, first as Palestinians spatially and politically dislocated from the West Bank, then as residents of Israel, inside the politics and economy of the state but permanently excluded from the national project. Distanced from both state projects and from the discursive structures through which Palestinian identity was constructed after 1967, East Jerusalem residents are redefining from below what it means to be Palestinian in ways that are unfamiliar to Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories.

Drawing on the vocabulary and theoretical contours of discourse theory, I problematise the top-down optic favoured by mainstream academic approaches which essentialises identities and privileges an occupation/resistance binary. I suggest that a ground-level approach to everyday practices in East Jerusalem sheds light on the extent to which existing nationalist and resistance discourses have either lost or changed meaning for Palestinian residents and makes evident the complexities of domination which are not visible from an elevated perspective. I suggest that the view from the ground in East Jerusalem is significantly underexplored and that from this position, the assumptions underlying existing analytic approaches to Palestinian identity and struggle are called into question.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Viewed from on high, de Certeau (1984) reminds us that the opaque mobility of the city becomes fixed in a transparent text and its vast complexity is made readable. From this elevated perspective, Jerusalem is a polarised city, the object of competing national projects and an urban frontier in the intractable ethno-national conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. From this vantage point, issues of borders and sovereignty are fundamental and identities appear necessary and fixed.

Mainstream studies, which typically approach even quotidian practices in East Jerusalem from the broader perspective of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, privilege a top-down analytic optic which often fails to challenge the essentialist representations of identity favoured by nationalist discourses. Rarely is the praxis of everyday life uncoupled from a binary analytic framework that objectifies antagonism and anticipates resistance. I make the case here that this approach produces a distorted understanding of quotidian practices in East Jerusalem, within which meanings are imposed and the everyday adaptations demanded by Israeli domination are significantly underestimated.

In this thesis, I offer an alternative perspective, that draws on the praxis of everyday life in the city and the meanings that residents themselves attach to their quotidian experience. I emphasise East Jerusalem's divergent political trajectory and make the case that this constituency's dual marginality has implications for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city which cannot be fully explained within an occupation/resistance binary.

While demonstrating that macro-level processes impact significantly on everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem, my point of departure from the existing literature is to analyse these top-down factors from the bottom up, by considering their meaning *on the ground, from the perspective of those on the ground*. A bottom-up analysis of everyday practices sheds light on the extent to which existing nationalist and resistance discourses have either lost or changed meaning for Palestinian residents and makes evident the complexities of domination which are not visible from a top-down perspective. I suggest that the view from the ground in East Jerusalem is significantly underexplored and that from this position, the assumptions underlying existing analytic approaches to Palestinian identity and struggle are called into question.

1 The Complexities of Domination

There is broad international consensus, in official discourses at least, that the future of the occupied Palestinian territories should be settled in accordance with United Nations resolutions and through direct negotiations between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The international community rejects the legality of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and repudiates unilateral moves to alter the status or ethnic balance of the city.¹ I argue below, however, that the quotidian reality is quite different. From a ground level perspective, East Jerusalem Palestinians are residents of Israel, whose everyday lives are conducted within the borders, politics and economy of the Jewish state. The

¹ For a fuller discussion of the legal issues surrounding Jerusalem see LAPIDOTH, R. 2002. Jerusalem: Some Legal Aspects. *In*: BREGER, M. J. & AHIMIER, O. (eds.) *Jerusalem: A City and Its Future*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. For a summary of the positions held by key international players on the future of Jerusalem since 1967, see p229-258 of DUMPER, M. 1997. *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967*, New York, Columbia University Press.

prospects of (and local support for) a Palestinian capital in the city have receded so far, that residents no longer experience the occupation as temporary and are increasingly concerned with ways to improve their lives and livelihoods within the context of long term Israeli rule.

This disparity, between East Jerusalem's international legal status on the one hand, and the everyday experience of its residents on the other, presents academic researchers with complex challenges. Not least among these is how to build new 'facts on the ground' into their analysis without appearing to accept or endorse them. Dumper (2002) addressed this problem when he argued for a shift in the focus of academic research after Oslo to reflect the improbability of a complete Israeli withdrawal to Jerusalem's 1967 borders. In seeking to redirect the focus of study, Dumper recognised that he ran "the risk of affirming and contributing, at least intellectually, to the trend that runs against Palestinian interests and may be accused of providing support to an Israeli perspective for a solution" (Dumper, 2002: 7).

I argue here that mainstream academic approaches to East Jerusalem continue to privilege an international legal perspective that has little everyday relevance for Palestinians in the city. The routine treatment of East Jerusalem as part of the occupied Palestinian territories, despite the quotidian experience of residents inside Israel, means that researchers continue to 'bracket out' circumstances in the city as temporary and awaiting resolution.² This framing of the East Jerusalem

² I draw here on Yiftachel's argument that the routine treatment of Israel as democratic and Western leads to the 'bracketing out' of the refugee issue from analyses of Israeli politics. See page 293 of YIFTACHEL, O. 2012. Naqab/Negev Bedouins and the (Internal) Colonial Paradigm. In: AMARA, A., ABU-SAAD, I. & YIFTACHEL, O. (eds.) *Indigenous (in)Justice: Human Rights Law and Bedouin Arabs in the Naqab/Negev*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

context allows Israel to claim sovereignty over the city, integrating it into the state's legal and security apparatus, while simultaneously denying full rights to Palestinian residents and constructing them as an external minority and a threat to the state. In this sense, I suggest that a shift in the academic focus to reflect the everyday reality in East Jerusalem might more effectively preserve the Palestinian presence in the city than existing approaches that sustain the conditions of ambiguity in which that presence is being eroded.

A top-down optic also empowers the researcher, rather than the subject, to identify the source of oppression and the behaviours that constitute resistance (Rose, 2002). In positing Israeli domination and Palestinian resistance as objective positions which are somehow prior or external to the data, researchers limit their own analysis of the everyday actions and practices through which subjectivity and struggle are enacted in East Jerusalem. Insufficient attention is given to internal Palestinian political complexities or to the multiplicity of projects in which residents are involved. The meanings that subjects attach to their own actions and experience are overlooked within this framework, which interrogates everyday Palestinian life for evidence of resistance in order to counterbalance assessments of Israel's disproportionate power. The everyday ways in which residents adapt to Israeli rule encourage speculative debates about processes of normalisation or Israelification, misreading behaviours that manifest significant power inequalities as straightforward political preferences.

This practice also creates a false impression of equivalence between the forces of oppression and resistance that obscures the depth of domination in East Jerusalem and the myriad ways in which Israeli power penetrates everyday practices. I argue that a top-down optic overlooks the extent to which East

Jerusalem residents repeatedly negotiate their agency and their identity vis-à-vis the structures of power or how systemic power relations can be 'internalised', thereby shaping the individual's sense of self and of their future possibilities (Maiguashca, 2013). Few studies address the adaptations demanded of East Jerusalem Palestinians within the context of long term occupation or the extent to which the experience of residents inside the Israeli state informs their positions within internal Palestinian struggles, personal and political.

Finally, I suggest that within this top-down analytic framework, antagonism is objectified and the contingency of discursive structures through which identities are constructed is overlooked. I argue below that the dual marginality of East Jerusalem Palestinians is recreating subjectivities and producing new modes of struggle in the city. In the narrow space in which East Jerusalem Palestinians are able to enact meaningful agency, I find that their rejection of Palestinian Authority leadership and legitimacy is influencing attitudes towards and perceptions of Israeli rule that potentially distance them from Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories.

In relationships of power, I recognise that the subordinate may have cause to be ambivalent about resisting, while the dominant side often has much to offer, though always at the cost of continuing in power (Ortner, 1995). Existing scholarly approaches that privilege a domination/resistance binary fail to recognise the emergence of new subjectivities and mobilisations in East Jerusalem arising from the altered political geography of the city since Oslo, and the situation of residents between dislocation and exclusion. In this sense, they are denying residents their own form and moment of agency. I argue below that understanding resistance requires recognition of the multiple projects in which subjects are engaged and

of those which they choose to construct and enact in a particular historical moment. The complexities of domination are made visible by a re-reading of everyday Palestinian practices within a theoretical framework in which identities are recognised as temporary and strategic and the way in which people *act* sheds light on the choices they face and the decisions they are making about their own identity.

2 Research Objectives

The dominant discursive articulation of Israeli-Palestinian relations relies on binary distinctions which essentialise identities on both sides, objectify antagonism and anticipate resistance. Academic studies which address the issue of East Jerusalem from the admittedly important perspective of borders and sovereignty, none the less fail to challenge these binaries and overlook the complexities of domination and the contingency of discursive structures through which identity is constructed.

This thesis begins with the phenomenon of East Jerusalem's divergent political trajectory and makes evident the dual marginality of residents, first as Palestinians spatially and politically dislocated from the West Bank and then as residents of Israel, inside the politics and economy of the state but excluded from the national project. East Jerusalem Palestinians live with chronic insecurity *inside* Israel's de facto borders, but beyond the limits of inclusion in the national project. Settlements and the separation Barrier have isolated the urban centre from its former West Bank hinterland, while Israeli measures aimed at ethnic control of the city have effectively erased organised Palestinian political life in the city and criminalised opposition to Israeli sovereignty.

The Palestinian nationalist movement, meanwhile, has failed to project an inclusive political imaginary with plausibility or appeal for the East Jerusalem constituency. The Palestinian Authority is excluded from power in the city by the terms of an agreement to which the PLO assented and that launched Palestinians from East Jerusalem and the West Bank on altogether different political trajectories. Spatial and political dislocation from the occupied territories, as well as the 'outsider' perspective of Palestinian Authority rule that this has imposed, have contributed to the reorientation of Palestinian subjectivities away from the Palestinian political centre towards inclusion in Israel. Yet even Palestinian residents who seek to improve their lives and livelihoods within the context of Israeli domination, are confronted inside Israel by structural barriers and everyday manifestations of their otherness and exclusion.

Distanced from both state projects and from the discursive structures through which Palestinian identity was constructed after 1967, Jerusalem Palestinians are unwilling to relinquish their existing rights and status inside Israel in exchange for a version of statehood that fails to meet their minimum personal and nationalist expectations. The altered political landscape since the end of Oslo, the collapse of Palestinian authority in the city and construction of the separation Barrier, are reshaping Palestinian subjectivities in East Jerusalem and producing new modes of struggle and mobilisation.

In this thesis, I set out to challenge the assumptions underlying mainstream interpretations of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem and to make visible, through a ground level, bottom-up analysis, the depth of Israeli power in the city and the emergence of new subjectivities and modes of struggle. Throughout, I draw on a range of critical approaches, in particular the basic concepts and

vocabulary of discourse theory, to frame my argument. Recognising that structural power limits, but does not determine the subject, I seek to locate the contracting space in which agency is meaningful in East Jerusalem and to explore how, within that space, Palestinian residents are acting out their identity. Circumstances of dislocation and domination limit the opportunities for Palestinian agency, but it is also clear that the forms it does take in East Jerusalem are not always recognisable within mainstream discourses which essentialise Palestinians as one side in an objectified conflict.

3 Thesis Structure

This thesis is structured into seven chapters. In Chapter II, I set out to establish the divergence of East Jerusalem's political trajectory from that of the West Bank. I position the arguments presented here in relation to the existing body of knowledge on East Jerusalem and locate this area of investigation within the relevant theoretical literature. Adopting a funnel approach, I move from a broad typology of the material on East Jerusalem towards a narrower discussion of the Israeli project in the city and the collapse of Palestinian political institutions. I then focus in on the literature that is most relevant to the specific research questions addressed in my thesis and set out how this study intends to contribute to these works.

In Chapter III, I describe and evaluate the qualitative research methods employed in the course of this project and the methodology underpinning these choices. I address questions of reflexivity and positionality and consider the challenges of undertaking fieldwork in East Jerusalem. I emphasise the vital role played by issues of access and trust in this study and consider how these have influenced both its potential and its limitations.

The core argument set out in this thesis is constructed over Chapters IV, V and VI, in which I present, analyse and theorise my empirical data, collected from in-depth qualitative interviews undertaken in East Jerusalem in 2016. Chapters IV and V address the dual aspects of this constituency's marginality, first as Palestinians whose divergent political experience alienates them from the national leadership and from mainstream nationalist discourses, second as Israeli residents who, annexed to the Jewish state, experience structural exclusion, exceptional arrangements and everyday discrimination.

In Chapter IV, I focus on the bifurcation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, arguing that separation is contributing to the reorientation of everyday Palestinian life in the city away from the occupied territories and towards Israel. First, I set out to establish the physical and political dislocation of East Jerusalem residents from the West Bank and from mainstream Palestinian nationalist narratives emanating from the occupied territories. I then move on to consider the implications of this liminality for Palestinians in the city. I argue that East Jerusalem Palestinians no longer experience the occupation as temporary and find that few can imagine challenging, let alone replacing Israeli hegemony. I also demonstrate that East Jerusalem residents experience complex and sometimes contradictory feelings towards and relationships with Israel and its citizens that are not shared by West Bankers whose political milieu is altogether different. Finally, I argue that exclusive Israeli power in East Jerusalem is defining the limits of Palestinian political imagination in the city and diminishing the political horizon of its residents. Within this context, I make the case that East Jerusalem Palestinians are pursuing individualised 'improvement of life' tactics which reflect the contracting space in which agency has meaning.

In Chapter V, I change perspective, addressing the second aspect of this constituency's marginality, this time as an excluded minority within the Israeli state. East Jerusalem residents who recognise the robustness of Israeli rule and are acting to improve their prospects within it, none the less find that 'normal life' is beyond their reach. First, I locate Palestinian exclusion at an ideological level, arguing that East Jerusalem residents are trapped by the ethnocratic regime between territorial inclusion and political alienation. Second, I highlight the ways in which state power is deployed in East Jerusalem to further Israel's colonial ambitions and to maintain the othering of Palestinian residents. I highlight the use of exclusion and informality as well as more insidious surveillance and control tactics and the reliance on collective punishments which underline the otherness of East Jerusalem Palestinians in the Israeli state. Third, I address the ways in which these manifestations of Israeli power are experienced by East Jerusalem Palestinians, paying particular attention to feelings of otherness and permanent temporariness. Finally, I recognise that Israeli-Palestinian relations in East Jerusalem are not isolated from the national conflict or the enduring impact of Palestinian dispossession.

Together, Chapters IV and V delineate the new political environment of East Jerusalem since the end of Oslo, defining the site of Palestinian identity construction in the city. In Chapter VI, I move beyond the praxis of everyday Palestinian life towards a broader discussion that addresses how Palestinian identity in the city is shaped by the experience of Israeli power and the absence of a Palestinian liberation discourse with plausibility for this constituency. Drawing on a robustly anti-essentialist understanding of identity rooted in discourse theory, I consider the ways in which power shapes the opportunities for agency

and how East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting their subjectivity and struggle within the context of dislocation and domination.

First, I problematise the main assumptions which underpin existing analytic approaches to East Jerusalem, highlighting the need to de-centre resistance, de-essentialise identities and de-totalise the agent. Here, I also detail the way in which discourse theory can be applied to shed light on the emergence of new political subjectivities and the process of identity construction within the context of discursive dislocation. Next, I set out my core argument with regard to the constitution of Palestinian political subjectivities in East Jerusalem. I find that while residents continue to define themselves within the nationalist idiom (Bowman, 2007), the composition of their 'Palestinian' identity is being determined from below by their adaptations to the circumstances of dislocation and domination in the city and the contracting space in which self-direction is possible. The actions of residents make visible the emergence of new subjectivities in the city that are distanced from both the Palestinian political leadership and from mainstream nationalist discourses. These are obscured, however, within a top-down optic which privileges essentialised representations of identity and objectifies Israeli-Palestinian antagonism.

Third, I move on to consider Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem. Rejecting the term 'resistance' which is often too narrowly defined in relation to Israeli occupation, I outline three modes of struggle in the city that reflect the multiple subject positions from which Palestinian act. First, residents are struggling against Israel's colonial project in East Jerusalem to remain, as Palestinians, in the city. Second, I make the case that residents are struggling to protect and preserve their existing rights and status within East Jerusalem against any

encroachment by the Palestinian Authority in the city. Third, I draw on the 'improvement of life' attitude outlined in Chapter IV to suggest that Palestinians in East Jerusalem are struggling to achieve a 'normal' life which, in the annexed city, is always in view but constantly out of reach. Finally, I recognise that while discursive dislocations threaten identities, they are also the foundations from which new subjectivities emerge. In this regard, I look at the political dynamics influencing identity construction and ask how they are shaping what it means to be Palestinian in East Jerusalem and what mobilisations this might take. I focus in particular on the mobilising potential of an urban rights discourse and on the relationship between oppression and radicalisation of identity.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

I argue in this thesis that East Jerusalem's divergent political trajectory has implications for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city which are obscured within mainstream analytic frameworks. I make the case that East Jerusalemites are doubly marginalised, first as a Palestinian constituency dislocated from the political centre, then as Israeli residents excluded from the state project. In Chapters IV and V, I examine in detail how Palestinian residents *act* in East Jerusalem and how they frame their everyday experience. In Chapter VI, I problematise the assumptions underlying existing approaches to Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in East Jerusalem and set out an alternative interpretation rooted in the accounts of residents themselves and in a robustly anti-essentialist conception of identity. In this chapter, I provide essential background to these discussions, drawing heavily on both existing studies of East Jerusalem and on the relevant theoretical literature. Crucially, I aim to shed light on the political dynamics that set East Jerusalem on its divergent trajectory and which underpin the discussion of everyday life and practices in the city that follows.

I separate the modern history of Jerusalem here into distinct chronological periods: the decline of Ottoman rule and the era of the British mandate up to 1948; the division of the city between Israeli and Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967; and the period since 1967 in which the city expanded under Israeli rule. Within the latter period, the years between 1993 and 2000 are loosely understood here as the Oslo period and the years since 2000 as the post-Oslo period. While the

Annapolis Conference in 2007 marks in some ways the last gasp of the Oslo process, I argue that on the ground in East Jerusalem at least, Palestinian confidence in the potential for an equitable resolution of the conflict had petered out some time before this. Indeed, Israeli efforts to limit the activity of key Palestinian political institutions in the city began in the mid-1990s and the alienation of East Jerusalem residents from mainstream Palestinian nationalist narratives to some extent mirrored this process. Physical dislocation from the West Bank as a result of the separation Barrier compounded the city's political isolation from 2002.

In the first section below, I take an overview of East Jerusalem research since 1990, establishing key themes in the literature and highlighting dominant analytical approaches. I also set out some of the key theoretical concepts on which these studies draw. Next, I locate my discussion of Palestinian subjectivity in the city within the body of theoretical material on identity in general and the key texts addressing Palestinian identity in particular. The specific focus of this study on Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem reflects a central premise of my argument, that Israel's claims to sovereignty over the Eastern part of the city, and its integration into the political, legal and security apparatus of the state, have set East Jerusalem on a social and political trajectory which is divergent from that of the West Bank. I emphasise this divergence with the West Bank above that of East Jerusalem with other Palestinian constituencies since the literature continues overwhelmingly to define the West Bank as the natural hinterland of Jerusalem. While Gaza's divergent Palestinian experience is fully acknowledged in the literature, that of East Jerusalem is not yet fully recognised for reasons which I addressed in Chapter I.

Third, I address the political bifurcation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the circumstances in which this separation came about and how it is addressed in the existing literature. I describe Israel's colonial project in the city and consider the way in which it is represented, including the debate over the state's ambitions in East Jerusalem and how its success or failure should be measured.

Next, I discuss the decline of Palestinian politics in the city, tackling in particular how existing works interpret the Palestinian leadership vacuum and how accounts of the collapse of Palestinian political life pay insufficient attention to the normative potential of Israeli power. I will also consider here the contribution of studies detailing the impact of enduring occupation in East Jerusalem on Palestinian life in the city and the provision of important services such as health care and education.

Finally, I come to the specific research questions posed in this thesis. How are physical and political dislocation from the West Bank and discursive alienation from mainstream nationalist narratives shaping the site of identity construction in East Jerusalem? How does Israel's Judaizing project in the city influence the subjectivity and struggle of East Jerusalem Palestinians who are constructed as an external minority in the Israeli national discourse?

1 Overview of East Jerusalem in the Literature

The sanctity of Jerusalem within the three main monotheistic religions sheds light on the city's long history of conquest, conflict and bloodshed. In the contemporary

period, Jerusalem retains its religious and symbolic relevance, but it is competing nationalist claims to the city that today lend urgency to much of the research.³

Taraki (2006) notes that the bulk of scholarship on Palestine since 1948 adopts a macro-level approach, addressing the impact of war, dispossession and occupation on the Palestinian polity, economy and society. With the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987, the focus broadened slightly, but this top-down approach remained unchallenged. The circumstances and conditions in which Palestinians in the occupied territories lived out their lives began to draw academic attention, but still rarely were Palestinians considered as anything other than one-dimensional political subjects who resisted or otherwise challenged the occupation. Taraki concludes that “the internal dynamics, stresses, and contradictions of the social groups and communities within which people live out their lives, or the sensibilities and subjectivities of individuals as they negotiate their mundane existence away from the barricades, have not received much serious attention from most researchers” (Taraki, 2006: xi). In the same vein, Abowd (2014) recognises in the introduction to his study of *Colonial Jerusalem* that few ethnographies have been written about “the daily, lived dimensions of intercommunal encounters and conflicts that have comprised this urban centre” (Abowd, 2014: 9).

Academic interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was renewed by the Oslo process, resulting in a proliferation of studies that addressed the Holy City’s past,

³ For an absorbing account of the city’s turbulent history, focusing on the interconnected concepts of mythology, symbolism and the sacred, see ARMSTRONG, K. 1996. *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths*, New York, Knopf. For a study which links historical conflicts over Jerusalem to 20th century events, see also BENVENISTI, M. 1996. *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, Berkely, University of California Press.

present and future (Dumper, 2014).⁴ The Madrid Conference (1991) produced few tangible results, but the secret talks which began in Oslo in January 1993 set in motion more than a decade of on-off negotiations that permanently altered the dynamics of the conflict. Oslo reoriented the focus of research on Israel and the Palestinians towards the key issues of sovereignty and conflict resolution, yet after years of negotiations, intense academic interest and considerable international pressure, Israelis and Palestinians failed to reach agreement on the core issues which divided them. As the peace process stalled, the future of Jerusalem and its holy sites emerged as the primary obstacle to a durable resolution. The collapse of negotiations at Camp David in 2000 redirected the academic focus, this time towards the obstacles to peace, the impact of 'facts on the ground' and the viability of the two-state solution.

The end of Oslo coincided with the collapse of Palestinian leadership in East Jerusalem and construction of the separation Barrier, separating the city from the West Bank. The failure of the peace process and the altered political geography of East Jerusalem encouraged a more multi-disciplinary approach to the city's problems, resulting in a number of edited collections that tackle the issue from a range of useful perspectives. Foremost among these are those by Misselwitz and

⁴ In 1990, the Institute for Palestine Studies launched *The Jerusalem Quarterly* in Ramallah and this vast, eclectic range of articles has grown into an essential resource for historians and political scientists alike. Human rights and civil liberties organisations, as well as United Nations bodies such as UNRWA, OCHA-oPt, and UNESCO, have produced a wealth of well-researched reports over the last two decades addressing the detrimental impact of Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem on basic Palestinian freedoms including movement, access to healthcare, education and housing.

Rieniets (2006) and Breger and Ahimier (2002). Both offer well-researched insights from academic specialists.

Salem (2006) classifies the literature of the post-Oslo period, including that by Palestinian and Arab writers on Jerusalem, into six main categories. Each of these, he suggests, is underpinned by the sovereignty paradigm, a defensive position taken to prove or protect the rights of one side or the other over the city. The majority of studies fall into Salem's first category, that of political scenarios. The second category comprises descriptive studies, detailing what is happening on the ground, particularly with regard to settlement expansion, and describing the status of the social, economic and education sectors. The third, fourth and fifth categories outlined by Salem comprise legal studies, historical studies and works dominated by urban planning issues respectively. The sixth, smallest category, addresses people's needs and processes of adaptation in East Jerusalem and are generally descriptive, focusing in on a particular segment of society such as the elderly, the sick or the very young. I suggest that while all of these categories are significant, the sovereignty approach that dominates existing work obscures the extent to which top-down processes influence the construction of identity at ground level.

I argue that the sovereignty paradigm relies on essentialised identities and objective antagonism, and overlooks the impact of long term occupation and Israeli colonialist policies on individual subjectivities. It also fails to take account of the absence of Palestinian leadership in the city and the changing urban reality on its Palestinian residents, how they interact with the matrix of power and the processes by which they construct their identity. Rarely does the post-Oslo literature address the impact of the Israeli project in Jerusalem or the alienation

of residents from mainstream nationalist narratives or locate the question of identity in East Jerusalem within the context of dislocation and discrimination that exists there. I suggest below that the Palestinian experience in East Jerusalem is informing both their attitudes towards the occupying power and the position of residents in relation to internal Palestinian struggles, thereby reinforcing the structures of power in which they act. The structures in which identity is constructed shape the moment of identity production and are also transformed by that moment (Holland, 2001).

While the sovereignty paradigm locates debate over the future of East Jerusalem firmly within the framework of objective antagonism between two competing nationalist narratives, the complexities of domination demand an alternative, ground level analysis that takes account of the impact of the city's particular circumstances on the process of Palestinian identity construction there. Below I look at several approaches which dominate the recent literature on East Jerusalem. Through this study, I aim to build on these works and contribute to them.

1.1 Contested Cities

In the post-Oslo period, East Jerusalem has been extensively investigated within the framework of 'divided' or 'contested cities' (Bollens, 2000, Dumper, 2014, Hepburn, 2004, Klein, 2005, Pullan, 2011, Pullan, 2013b, Yacobi, 2015, Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). Hepburn (2004) identifies the contested city as "a major urban centre in which two or more ethnically-conscious groups – divided by religion, language and/or culture and perceived history – co-exist in a situation where neither group is willing to concede supremacy to the other" (Hepburn, 2004: 2).

Focusing in detail on six cities - Gdansk, Trieste, Brussels, Montreal, Belfast and Jerusalem - he explores the ways in which such problems have occurred, how they are managed and how they might be resolved. The conclusion raises a number of interesting comparative questions, but Hepburn's contribution is in essence a collection of detailed case studies rather than a unified theoretical framework for future study.

Building on this contribution, the ESRC Conflict in Cities project (2007-2012), brought together a multi-disciplinary team of academics to investigate how the nature and dynamics of conflicts over state identity and territory manifest themselves in divided cities and how these cities and everyday urban life are used within the wider conflict. The project identified divided cities as arenas of intensified ethno-national conflicts, with particular attention paid to the role of architecture and the urban fabric as a backdrop for everyday activities and events.⁵

Focusing in particular on Jerusalem and Belfast, the working papers and publications arising from this project have made a significant contribution to the extent and direction of contemporary research on East Jerusalem. The project also takes a more theoretical focus, considering in particular the commonalities of causation in divided cities. Anderson (2008) locates Hepburn's contested cities category at the centre of a broader continuum with 'state-divided' cities at one end and 'ethnically-divided' ones at the other, and relabels the category 'ethno-nationally divided cities' which combine the problems of both ends. Arguing that there is a missing general literature, Anderson begins to lay a theoretical

⁵ <http://www.conflictincities.org/aboutus.html>

groundwork of ethno-nationally divided cities, focusing in particular on the role of the contested peripheries of empire in the historical origins of ethnically divided cities.

In Jerusalem, as well as Belfast and beyond, politicised ethnic divisions were pre-national in origin, Anderson argues, but it was mainly towards the end of empire that ethnic divisions were transformed into ethno-national ones. The Ottoman and British empires were directly relevant to the creation of the ethno-nationally divided city of Jerusalem and Israel, Anderson claims, is today as much, if not more, an imperial as a national project – at once the “‘client state’ standard bearer of US imperialism in the Middle East and also imperial in its own right” in terms of its occupation and aggressive settlement policy (Anderson, 2008: 13).

There is also a significant body of literature addressing the frontiers of contested cities in general and those of East Jerusalem in particular (Dumper, 1997, Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999, Pullan, 2011, Pullan, 2013a, Pullan et al., 2007). Despite Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and its designation of the 'reunified' city as Israel's eternal capital, Klein has argued that Jerusalem is still very much a frontier city, that “East Jerusalem remains the east-looking metropolitan centre of the West Bank” and that the city's deep ethnic-national, social, economic and political divisions must be recognised (Klein, 2008).

Frontiers between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem undoubtedly persist, but a number of recent studies emphasise their essential ambiguity. Weizman (2007) describes frontiers as “deep, shifting, fragmented and elastic territories” in which the “distinctions between the 'inside' and 'outside' cannot be clearly marked” (Weizman, 2007: 4). Busbridge (2014), meanwhile, focuses on the “dynamic of blurred separation in the city” and recommends a re-examination of the frontier

in Jerusalem as “a site of conflict, contestation and dispossession”, but also one that “binds the settler and native together.” Pullan (2011) describes the frontier as “a place of contradiction, where the ‘wild’ and the ‘tamed’ do not cancel each other but play out different roles, sometimes in reciprocity, and with different levels of impact” (Pullan, 2001: 17). Frontiers are places of increased constraint, surveillance and special security measures, but lawlessness is never fully controlled or else the frontier would cease to exist and ‘the other’ would no longer be alien or feared. Pullan points to intensive Israeli settlement activity around Jerusalem and notes that radical planning of the frontier has dominated the city since 1967. She argues, however, that Israel’s Judaisation project in East Jerusalem and a programme of aggressive ideological settlement in and around the Old City are creating new frontiers at the core of occupied Jerusalem (Pullan, 2011).

The ‘divided city’ paradigm has dominated critical research on Jerusalem over the last two decades (Shlomo, 2017: 224). Much as recent governmentality perspectives argue that top-down processes that have taken place in the city during this time beyond the scrutiny of the divided city approach (Shlomo, 2017a), I adopt a bottom-up approach here, arguing that unobserved changes are taking place in terms of Palestinian subjectivities in the city.

1.2 Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict

Jerusalem has also proved a useful case study for analysts of urban policy and planning in contested cities and their contribution to contemporary Jerusalem studies has been substantial. A number of important works have addressed the relationship between governing ideology and urban policy in today’s contested

cities. Bollens (2000) contrasts divided cities in which conflicts are addressed within accepted political frameworks with polarised cities where governance is often viewed by a substantial segment of the ethnic minority population as artificial, imposed or illegitimate (Bollens, 2000: 9-10).

In these polarised or contested cities, the governing ethnic group may limit the territorial expression of the minority through the deliberate expansion of the dominant group's urban space at the expense of that of the subordinate group. These issues deflect attention from the root causes of conflict. "In the urban setting" Bollens argues, this means that "issues of sovereignty and autonomy become reducible to issues over neighbourhoods and suburban growth" (Bollens, 2000: 15). Yiftachel's revision of critical urban theory to take account of the structural exclusion of marginalised populations in new urban colonial contexts highlights the way in which Bollens' separation of divided and polarised cities might be blurred. Identities might be radicalised and struggles transformed from *agonistic* into *antagonist* "when marginalised groups become politically aware of the impregnable barriers to their equality and inclusion" (Yiftachel, 2009a: 254). This is discussed in further detail below.

Since 1967, Israeli planning and development policies in East Jerusalem have been designed with the aim of enhancing Israeli control over the whole city. Central government ideology has dominated the goals and strategies of local planning and municipal objectives have been shaped by perceptions of the national interest in relation to politics, demography and security. In terms of the Palestinian response to this policy, Bollens argues that self-interest has taken priority over the public interest. According to one West Bank urban planner interviewed by Bollens, "occupation, fragmentation, and the absence of a national

authority have deprived the Palestinian people of the opportunity to develop a framework of public interest” (Ibid: 116). Bollens identifies four tactics of Palestinian resistance to Israeli control over Jerusalem – the electoral boycott, sumud (steadfastness), ‘illegal’ construction, and community activism and protest (Ibid:118) – but concludes that these tactics are reactionary. A more “pro-active set of strategies aimed at countering Israeli expansionary policies in Jerusalem” is required (Ibid: 136).

However, Bollens also finds that governing ideology does not always translate straightforwardly into urban policy. A dominant ethnic group that attempts to penetrate an antagonistic ethnic population geographically in order to fragment the minority’s sense of community might, paradoxically, reduce the security of the majority. For example, in bringing antagonistic groups closer together spatially, Bollens argues that Israeli expansionism in East Jerusalem has increased tensions as well as Jewish vulnerability. More territory produces fear as well as off-limits areas for Jewish Israelis and results in less genuine authority. This prompts additional unilateral action to maintain political authority, further exacerbating tensions and so on. Bollens concludes that “in the end, Israeli urban policy that has facilitated Israeli domination of the urban political landscape may be creating the very conditions of Palestinian extremism and antagonism that it set out to suppress in the first place” (ibid: 115).

More recently, the link between urban planning in East Jerusalem and Israel’s geopolitical goals in the city has received significant attention, particularly, though not exclusively, from a new generation of Israeli political geographers (Braier, 2013, Chiodelli, 2012, Jabareen, 2010, Legrand and Yiftachel, 2014, Rokem,

2012, Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002). Their work is significant and is discussed in more detail in section three below and is revisited throughout the thesis.

1.3 The Spatialities of Power

Overlapping the literature on divided or contested cities, is the body of theoretical work on the spatialities of power in urban arenas with high levels of ethno-national conflict. Recognising that cities are at the epicentre of many existing ethno-national and religious conflicts, Pullan (2013b) suggests that “the spatial ramifications of conflict in urban centres extend well beyond the notion of territory” (Pullan, 2013: 19).

Space is understood here not in relation to bounded territory, but in terms of the human experience. “We are always within a situation, not standing outside of it... Rather than fixed boundaries, the view from within the situation means that the horizon is viewed from within a particular vantage point and moves as we move... While modern geometric notions that see space in terms of territory are prominent, a more practical and grounded experience of space exists in terms of how we carry out our everyday lives, oriented by a moving horizon” (Pullan, 2013: 20).

The urban space of East Jerusalem is politically produced; it is inseparable from the ethno-national imperative of the Israeli state that is best described within a settler-colonial framework. Within this study, I investigate the interactions between the state meta-narrative of Judaisation and the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who exist within the politics and economy of the state beyond the desired limits of inclusion in this colonial project.

Central to this project are three related theoretical claims derived from Lefebvrian approaches to space. First, space is a social product that reproduces power relations. Lefebvre (1991) asks if it is conceivable that the exercise of hegemony leaves space untouched. “Could space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations?” Concluding that the answer must be no, he argues that ideology amounts to rather little without a space to which it refers. “What we call ideology only achieves consistency by intervening in social space and in its production and by taking on body. Ideology per se might be described primarily as a discourse upon social space.” Cities and their landscapes are not just there, but rather they are a product of socio-political relations and struggles for power (Nolte and Yacobi, 2015).

Second, social space as a means of control, domination and power, also escapes in part from those who would make use of it (Lefebvre, 1999: 26). Dominant groups may produce social space, but they do not always control it. Within the representational ‘lived space’ described by Lefebvre, the possibilities for resistance and reorganisation may emerge (Fisher and Mennel, 2010). Oppositional ideologies may exist among subordinate groups, however loosely articulated, which ensure that hegemony is never complete (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2002). Urban space is not shaped unidirectionally from above therefore, but rather, by living the space produced from above, subordinated groups have the power to subvert its intended meaning and purpose. By examining the use of space in their everyday lives, we might see East Jerusalem Palestinians as political subjects with agency and the potential to produce counter-hegemonic or anti-hegemonic meanings of their own.

De Certeau (1984) points out the fundamental inversions brought about by the users of space. Spatial practices can be diverted from their intended aims by the use made of them, not simply through rejection or transforming them from within, but in the many different ways of using such practices in the services of rules, customs or convictions foreign to the coloniser. In this way, it is possible to transform the dominant order and make it function in an alternative register.

Third, space has a normative effect. “Thanks to the operation of power, practical space is the bearer of norms and constraints... As a body of constraints, stipulations and rules to be followed, social space acquires a normative and repressive efficacy – linked instrumentally to its objectality – that makes the efficacy of mere ideologies and representations pale in comparison.” (Lefebvre, 1991: 358) Central to this thesis is an exploration of the extent to which the colonially produced space of East Jerusalem, which reproduces the ethno-national principles of the state, shapes the behaviour of East Jerusalem Palestinians and ultimately influences their sense of self and their future possibilities (Maiguashca, 2013).

This three-part concept facilitates an analysis of the manner in which space is appropriated by the powerful who seek to reinforce the hegemonic narrative (Yacobi, 2009). Lefebvre’s understanding of the social production of space provides a theoretical basis for understanding how East Jerusalem Palestinians live the city from below and how the space in which they live is not neutral, but ideologically constructed. It also lays the foundations for a micro-scale analysis of how the structures of power can be both reinforced and subverted from below.

Recent research undertaken by Israeli academics such as Yiftachel, Yacobi, Shlomo, Shtern and Braier offer sophisticated and insightful interpretations of the state's colonial project and its impact on urban space. These accounts inform much of the analysis that follows. Through this thesis, I aim to build on and add to this body of knowledge by considering the implications of these colonial processes for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in East Jerusalem.

1.4 Critical Urban Theory

Derived from the writings of Lefebvre, Harvey, Marcuse and Castells, critical urban theory emphasises the “politically and ideologically mediated, socially contested and therefore malleable character of urban space” (Brenner, 2009: 198). It is grounded on an antagonistic relationship to existing urban formations, insisting that alternative, more just forms of urbanisation are possible, though they may be suppressed by dominant practices and ideologies. In short, critical urban theory requires the critique of ideology as well as the critique of power, inequality and injustice within and between cities (Brenner, 2009: 198). It is this that distinguishes *critical* urban theory from ‘mainstream’ urban theory.

In his study of the Arab-Jewish city, Yacobi (2009) draws on Lefebvrian thinking to analyse the way in which “space is appropriated by those in power who are motivated to reinforce the hegemonic narrative” (Yacobi, 2009: 11). Lefebvre's theoretical proposals also facilitate consideration of the way in which marginalised populations approach space and produce counter-hegemonic meanings of place (ibid: 11). However, Yacobi finds that Lefebvre's argument overlooks important aspects of social space, while marginalising issues such as gender, ethnicity and migration. Yacobi aims to go beyond the one-directional

understanding of political power as the defining factor in the shaping of space and suggests instead an analysis of “the ways in which structures of power are encouraged by the powerless” (ibid: 12). By linking Lefebvrian thinking with postcolonial theory, Yacobi aims to challenge conventional understandings of Israel’s socio-political polarities and shed light on “the spatial counter-products of and their role in the production of space.

In his study of Bedouin Arabs in Israel’s Beersheba metropolitan region, Yiftachel (2009a) posits two main theoretical arguments that are of relevance here. First, he argues that most critical urban theories have not sufficiently accounted for the causes and implications of a new political geography, characterised by ‘gray spacing’ and informality, and for the emergence of new urban colonial relations. For Yiftachel, the new geography locates the politics of identity at the centre of urban regimes, alongside but by no means subsumed under the class or civil engines of change typically emphasised by critical urban theory.

Second, Yiftachel maintains that this new geography is recreating subjectivities that do not revolve solely around the state’s central power. The new politics, he claims, frequently distances identities and sources of mobilisation from the state, “signalling the fragmentation of the apparatus of power ‘from below’” (Yiftachel, 2009: 248). While these often begin with struggles for ‘insurgent citizenship,’ there is potential for them to transform into struggles for multiple sovereignties. As such, Yiftachel concludes, there is a paradox in that the central power which uses gray spacing as a tool of control is undermined by the process it initiated. Political identities and processes are distanced from the state and breed political radicalism which is channelled into projects of alternative identity.

Critical urban theory often assumes as its point of departure the basic condition of formally equal citizenship and political membership and colonial relations are notably absent from the debate over the formation of urban social relations (Yiftachel, 2009a). Yiftachel (2009) therefore argues that a new critical urban theory is required that includes the forces shaping the new colonial order marked by informality and 'gray spacing'.⁶ This is an extremely valuable concept that I will return to frequently below.

Yiftachel (2009a) defines 'gray spacing' as the practice of indefinitely positioning populations between legality and full membership and eviction or worse. It refers to "developments, enclaves, populations and transactions positioned between the 'lightness' of legality/approval/safety and the 'darkness' of eviction/destruction/death. Gray spaces are neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-permanent margins of today's urban regions, which exist partially outside the gaze of state authorities and city plans" (Yiftachel, 2009a: 250).

Roy (2011) welcomes Yiftachel's conceptualisation of gray spacing as an example of the new itineraries of research and analysis being charted in the field of urban studies which are helping to disrupt, from within, the study of subaltern urbanism. For Roy, gray spacing makes evident the flexibility of sovereign power and offers a way of analysing the manner in which state power formalises and criminalises different spatial configurations. For Roy, gray spacing, along with other emergent concepts such as peripheries, urban informality and zones of exception, is what Chantal Mouffe describes a 'constitutive outside', that is an

⁶ Following other scholars in the field, I retain Yiftachel's use of the US spelling of 'gray' rather than the British spelling 'grey' in order to maintain consistency with other works.

outside that by being brought inside introduces a 'radical undecidability' to the analysis of urbanism (Mouffe, 2000).

East Jerusalem continues to receive considerable academic attention, but rarely is the micro-level impact of top down processes considered from the perspective of those on the ground without essentialising Palestinian residents as resisters of external domination. The urgency of issues pertaining to sovereignty and borders means that top-down approaches to East Jerusalem continue to dominate the existing literature. Studies which emphasise Israel's asymmetrical power and the harnessing of urban planning to the state's colonial ambitions are increasingly cognisant of ground-level processes, but none the less broadly emphasise, in response, the agency of oppressed populations and acts which define the limits of state control.

Rarely, do they dare to consider the normative impact of lived space on Palestinian subjectivity and struggle. Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) note that "even the important recent work on cities within ethnonational conflicts (Benvenisti, 1996; Bollens, 1999; Dumper, 1997) has tended to privilege issues of national control and territory." Salem (2006) argues that "unless the issue of citizens' sovereignty versus formal sovereignty is tackled, people's adaptations to occupation cannot be analysed." I suggest in the chapters which follow that the privileging of a top-down analytic optic distorts interpretations of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem and severely over-estimates the opportunities for Palestinian agency in the city. I suggest that it also obscures the multiple subject positions occupied by East Jerusalem Palestinians and the multitude of potential meanings and motivations which inform their actions.



Map No. 3584 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

Map 1: Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories (United Nations, January 2004).

2 The Emergence of Palestinian Identity

In this section I locate the issue of Palestinian subjectivity formation within the literature on Palestinian identity in particular and processes of identity construction in general. In Chapter VI, I draw on the vocabulary of discourse theory to discuss Palestinian subjectivity and identity in East Jerusalem, and these terms are touched on here, but addressed in greater detail below.

In his seminal work on Palestinian identity, Khalidi (2013) emphasises that several overlapping identities operate in the way that Palestinians have come to define themselves as a people. These identities are not necessarily perceived as contradictory by Palestinians themselves, but are not always accurately understood by others. The existence of such overlapping perceptions of identity is unsurprising, he argues, where new national narratives have historically developed amidst the existence of many separate loyalties.

Khalidi chronicles the emergence of a uniform Palestinian identity through three historical stages. In the first stage, before the First World War, this identity was confined to a relatively restricted stratum, composed mainly of a new, middle class, urban, educated elite. Within this circle, however, as throughout the wider population, “the new sense of Palestinian identity competed and overlapped with Ottomanism and Arabism, as well as older religious, local, and familial loyalties.”

In the second stage, broadly correlating to the period of the British mandate from the end of World War One to just before the catastrophic events of 1948, the sense of a Palestinian identity spread to include the entire political class. Their losing struggles against the British and Zionists deepened this feeling, making it the chief category of identity for many Palestinians. Kimmerling (2000) argues that

“if one wants to single out one major factor that shaped and built the Palestinian collective identity and made the Palestinians into a people, but at the same time contributed to their failure – we can point to the role of the British Mandatory power” (Kimmerling, 2000: 63-4). The spread of education and literacy as well as the expansion of the press during this period, also ensured that the elements of Palestinian identity were transmitted to the wider population. However, differences of outlook remained in Palestinian society, particularly between the urban and rural populations, the well-off and the poor, and the literate and the illiterate.

In the final stage, these differences were largely expunged by the events of 1948, which proved a “great leveller” among the Palestinian population. The refugee crisis affected both urban and rural communities and in the UNRWA camps all children received an education, meaning literacy levels across the population increased significantly. The shared experience of the Nakba (catastrophe) and the turbulent events of its immediate aftermath completed the process of identification.

Bowman (2007) notes, however, that the Nakba initiated nearly a decade long cessation in the elaboration of Palestinian identity. Khalidi also acknowledges the apparent hiatus in manifestations of Palestinian identity during the 1950s and 1960s, in part explained by the devastating impact of events between 1947 and 1948 and partly due to the appeal of pan-Arabism. With the territorial division of Palestine between Israel, Jordan and Egypt and the flight or expulsion of much of the Arab population, there no longer seemed to exist a central locus of Palestinian identity. Bowman describes this as the “loss of reference points around which to reconstitute identities.” As a result of the diverse experience of Palestinians after

1948, “communities in the various milieu of Palestinian life began to reconstitute themselves in relation to their settings rather than with reference to a shared ‘Palestinian’ identity” (Bowman, 2007: 124-5)

However, Khalidi notes that a generation of nascent Palestinian nationalist groups was developing during this period, clandestinely at first, and more openly in the mid-1960s. The resounding defeat of pan-Arabism in 1967 revived particularist Palestinian nationalist movements and facilitated Fatah’s rise to dominance over Palestinian politics. Bowman argues that as a guerrilla organisation committed to military attacks on Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was able to represent the common ambition of Palestinians in exile and under occupation to fight back. “For the first time, there was an objective correlate to Palestinians’ disparate desires for restitution” (Bowman, 2007: 126). Crucially, it was the PLO’s claim to represent all the diverse Palestinian constituencies dispossessed by the creation of Israel that made it a successful symbol for Palestinian national identity. “Its programme was solely that of reinstating a Palestinian national entity on the territory of Mandate Palestine, and it made no effort to articulate the nature of that future entity save to say that it would be ‘Palestinian.’ ‘Palestinians’ were able to recognise themselves as addressed by the oppositional rhetoric of the PLO insofar as that rhetoric did not specify any particular identity to its addressees other than their recognition of themselves as somehow striped of their rights by the antagonism of the ‘Zionist entity’” (ibid: 126).

Cohen (2011) suggests that Israel’s conquest of East Jerusalem in 1967 occurred “in the midst of a process of strengthening of Palestinian national identity” among the city’s inhabitants (Cohen, 2011: 6). If there was a sense within the local political leadership that Jerusalem remained an inseparable part of Jordan (or at

least that internal disagreements should be settled at a later date), the Fatah movement was in no doubt that Jerusalem was the capital of Palestine. Cohen puts the organisation's rapid mobilisation and reorganisation in East Jerusalem and the West Bank after the defeat of June 1967 down to its concern that a political agreement might be reached that would see Israeli forces withdraw and the newly occupied territories returned to Jordan (ibid: 7).

When the Palestinian National Council restructured its composition in July 1968, Fatah representation increased and in February 1969 Yasser Arafat was elected from among the movement's leaders to head the PLO. Cohen maintains that "these developments meant the strengthening of the unique Palestinian identity and led to greater support for the PLO in East Jerusalem as well" (ibid: 8). It was not until the 1980s, however, that Fatah began to organise politically in the occupied territories and to develop its socio-political network, later known as the *Tanzim*. Among this network's founders in East Jerusalem was Faisal Husseini who, limited by an Israeli restraining order to the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem for a five-year period (1982-1987), devoted himself to local action. (ibid: 12-13).

East Jerusalem Palestinians were highly active during the early weeks of the first intifada, but Israeli security forces responded severely and participation subsided somewhat thereafter relative to the West Bank. Commercial strikes, stone-throwing, the burning of vehicles belonging to Jews and attacks on other symbols of 'Israeliness' continued, however, though the result was a decline in service provision to Palestinian resident as well as a reduction in the enforcement of Israeli law (Cohen, 2011). The leadership's call for Palestinians to detach themselves from Israeli institutions was more complex for East Jerusalem

residents than for Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories. Cohen maintains that “the Intifada raised the level of tension and violence between Jews and Palestinians living in the city, while revealing at the same time, the uniqueness of East Jerusalem, and the differences between it and the other regions occupied by Israel in 1967” (Cohen, 2011: 16).

When political negotiations between Israel and the ‘internal’ Palestinian leadership were eclipsed by the secret Oslo channel, the PLO’s willingness to compromise on the issue of Jerusalem clinched the deal. For Cohen, “there is no doubt that excluding Arab Jerusalem from the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority increased the distance between Jerusalem residents and the residents of the West Bank, reinforced their status as being connected to Israel no less than to the Occupied Territories, and augmented the creation of a unique Jerusalem Palestinian identity” (Cohen, 2011: 18).

Bowman points to a wider dislocation arising from the Oslo agreement. In the Palestinian nationalist imaginary before this, he claims, “all Palestinians were ‘the same’ insofar as all of them – as Palestinians – could recognise their true selves as mutilated and denied by the violence of the Zionist enemy.” The diverse experience of Palestinians was ‘fixed’ in relation to antagonism with Israel, and the specificities of each constituency’s circumstances defined their mode of struggle. However, it was the progress towards a settlement with Israel, brought about by the success of the first intifada, which shattered the broad consensus by raising the possibility of an actual state and with it questions about what that state would look like.

In the context of fragmentation and dispersion, and without generalised characteristics which define all Palestinians, members imagine their co-nationals to be those who experience similar antagonisms to them. “They are unlikely to recognise as ‘like themselves’ others who suffer from different forms of assault on their identities, insofar as those other assaults are not the same as those they see constituting a ‘Palestinian’ identity” (Bowman, 1994).

Thus, Bowman concludes that “at the moment the boundary dividing the antagonist from the object of its violence breaks down, the consensus on identity discursively structured around that antagonism loses its coherence. The wide field of Palestinian experience was ‘fixed’ by the perceived antagonism which made the various experiences of those who occupied it coherent in nationalist terms. When perceptions of the nature of that antagonism are transformed by events such as the Oslo agreement, various occupants of the formerly ‘sutured’ field find that former enemies have become allies and, respectively, that former allies appear as antagonists.” This apparent disappearance of the “constitutive antagonism,” he argued, would “only lead to new searches for matrices of identification” (Bowman, 2007: 128).

Bowman (2007) suggests that “national identity is an historical construct which emerges from a reformulation of one’s relation to a social field rather than something essential and non-contingent.” Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s definition of antagonism as a radical threat to the socially constructed subjectivity of the individual which disrupts a previously constituted identity, Bowman stresses the role of perceived violence from an ‘other’ in the formulation of national identity. National movements emerged in Mandatory Palestine and pre-dissolution Yugoslavia only when antagonisms between the groups occupying these

territories required it. I consider below the extent to which us and them boundaries are blurred in the post-Oslo period and how far the externalisation of East Jerusalem Palestinians within Israel (and Palestinian efforts to 'exclude the excluder') are preventing fuller integration in the absence of a two-state solution.

In Chapter VI, I provide a fuller explanation of the discourse theory approach to identity construction touched on by Bowman and on which I draw below. Throughout this thesis, I argue that identity is contingent, fluid and strategically constructed. Holland (2001) maintains that identities are always vulnerable to change and subject to improvisation. Through this process, identities make a modicum of self-direction possible and, as such, provide opportunities for the mediation of agency. The sites of the self, therefore, are plural, even competing.

In this thesis, I lend support to the view that the space in which subjectivities are constructed both shapes identity and is itself transformed by that moment of identity production. In this sense, agents operate within and upon power structures. Grossberg (1996) has urged a relocation of the study of identity within the context of modern formations of power, suggesting that questions of identity should be rearticulated to include the possibility of constructing historical agency and to let go of notions of resistance that assume the subject stands entirely outside of and against established power structures. This thesis will approach identity as a construction, emphasising that it is always an unfinished process, improvised through social practice in historically specific contexts (Holland, 2001). I locate the site of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem within the context of de facto Israeli control and the narrowing opportunities for political agency. A bottom-up perspective provides far greater scope for unsettling

essentialised identities and recognising the recreation of subjectivities in circumstances of dislocation.

3 East Jerusalem's Divergent Political Trajectory

The diversity of the Palestinian experience is widely acknowledged within mainstream studies, but the political trajectory of East Jerusalem Palestinians - after 1948 and since 1967 - is seldom distinguished from that of other West Bankers who found themselves first absorbed by Jordan and then occupied by Israel. The literature documents local identities in Palestine, but typically emphasises the nationalist narrative that binds them together. In this section, I set out to make clear that Israel's colonial, Judaising ambitions in East Jerusalem have established this Palestinian constituency on a tangential political trajectory which I will later argue has significant implications for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city.

3.1 From Partition to Occupation

In May 1948, the last remaining mandatory forces withdrew from Palestine, drawing to a close a period of British rule that had effectively begun in 1917. In the conflict that escalated as British authority waned, a United Nations plan to establish Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum*, administered by a special international regime, was stillborn. Revisionist historical accounts of the period conclude that in Jerusalem it was the Jewish side that seized the initiative in May 1948, violated the agreement and launched a vigorous offensive to capture the Old City. Transjordanian forces responded in kind and after more than a week of fierce fighting, the Jewish Quarter surrendered to Transjordanian forces (Rogan and Shlaim, 2007). At the end of the conflict, the 56% of mandate Palestine

allocated to the Zionists in the UN plan had expanded to 78% and Jerusalem was divided into separate Israeli and Jordanian controlled territories. The boundary known as the Green Line was officially recognised by Israel and Jordan in the 1949 Armistice agreement.

Dumper (1997) describes the marked divergence between Israeli controlled West Jerusalem and Jordanian controlled East Jerusalem during the 19 years of partition. Population numbers in East Jerusalem remained static while investment in infrastructure and services was neglected by a Jordanian government unwilling to support the development of a 'Palestinian' capital in Jerusalem at the expense of the Jordanian one in Amman. The Jordanian government worked "persistently and vigorously" to establish Amman as the kingdom's only political and economic centre, purposely holding back Jerusalem's development, depriving it of any political power base and abolishing its limited administrative independence (Benvenisti, 1996: 32). In this context, East Jerusalem "declined into a provincial backwater" (Dumper, 1997: 21). The Jordanian government stripped the city of the status it had enjoyed during the mandate period, targeting in particular the traditional authority of local notable families (Rekhess, 2008).

By contrast, during the same period the Western side of the city was appointed capital of the fledgling Israeli state and its Jewish population doubled in number to 200,000. Unlike other Israeli cities, however, West Jerusalem was heavily dependent on government investment and public sector employment. There was, of course, no access to holy sites on the Jordanian side of the divide and the western part of the city had little to offer tourists or industry. Thus, while one side of Jerusalem was starved of government investment, the other seemed only to survive as a result of it (Dumper, 1997: 21). This situation was dramatically

altered by Israel's victory in the Six Day War. Territorial gains brought all of mandatory Palestine including East Jerusalem under Israeli authority in 1967.⁷

3.2 The Israeli Project in East Jerusalem

Israeli rule in East Jerusalem is framed by the state's ethno-national project in the city. Defining the aims of this project, the practices involved and their implications for Palestinian residents and for the peace process is a recurring theme in the Oslo and post-Oslo literature. It is directly relevant to an understanding of Palestinian politics and identity in East Jerusalem and sheds light on the failure of the Palestinian national leadership to project a nationalist narrative with plausibility for its constituency there.

Here, I outline the collection of Israeli policies and practices that define the state's project in East Jerusalem. I consider the treatment of the Israeli project in Jerusalem in the existing literature and assess the arguments regarding its success or failure. I then move on to explain how this thesis intends to go beyond these arguments, linking the Israeli project in Jerusalem to the hegemonisation of the Palestinian political imagination and the atomisation of Palestinian society.

The strategic impetus of the Israeli project in East Jerusalem is broadly defined as the Judaisation and de-Palestinianisation of the city and both municipality and state have been resolute in their pursuit of these goals (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). This twofold policy – to promote Zionist expansion while limiting Palestinian growth – involves the expansion of Jewish demographic, territorial, political and economic control of Jerusalem alongside severe restrictions on Palestinian development, expansion and growth.

⁷ The Golan Heights were also captured, from Syria, and the Sinai Peninsula, from Egypt.

The Israeli project in East Jerusalem began immediately following the 1967 victory that brought East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli military occupation. From that moment on, “Israel embarked on a campaign to manipulate the demographic and geographic realities of Jerusalem in order to consolidate its claim of sovereignty over the entire city” (Isaac and Khalilieh, 201: 109). Below, I focus on three key aspects of this policy – territory, demography and planning.

3.2.1 Territory

While sovereignty over Jerusalem is contested now as it has been in the past, the physical borders of the city have not remained constant in the modern period. Dumper (1997) explains that the Palestinian territories are being fragmented “by the wedge of an ever-expanding entity” labelled Jerusalem, but which geographically bears little resemblance to the historic city. Indeed, there is no sense in which the boundaries of the modern city as defined by Israel can be understood as a pre-existing entity that was ‘re-united’ by Israel’s victory in 1967 (Lustick, 2000).

On 27 June 1967, approximately 70 sq. km of territory including the Old City and around 28 adjacent West Bank villages were unilaterally annexed to the state of Israel, transforming Jerusalem from a city of 37 km² to one of around 120 km², larger than Tel Aviv and Haifa combined. The capital was declared united and while Israeli legislation avoided explicit use of the term annexation, this “semantic ambiguity” did not obscure the reality (Dumper, 1997: 39). Amirav (2009) maintains that the decision to annex Jerusalem’s holy places and Old City to Israel and to demarcate the new borders of the city was made in haste, with little

consultation and with excessive self-confidence. None the less, the Israeli state promptly began an intensive project to preclude the possibility that Jerusalem could be re-divided in future.

Benvenisti (1996) highlights the connection between the act of designating Jerusalem's boundaries and the nationalist-religious sentiments they evoke, noting that in the period after 1967, the optimal boundaries of Jerusalem, including westward expansion, "were not to be determined according to the criteria of economy of scale or efficiency of service delivery to its citizens, but in conformity with national parameters." Since all territory within the municipal boundary is imbued with Jerusalem's sanctity by the religious establishment, the designation of territory as 'Jerusalem' strengthens the spiritual and nationalist ties of Jews to the land (Benvenisti, 1996: 51-2). Weizman notes that the delimitations of the new city "sought to 'unite' within a single metropolitan area the western Israeli city, the Old City, the rest of the previously Jordanian-administered city, 28 Palestinian villages, their fields, orchards and tracts of desert, into a single 'holy', 'eternal' and 'indivisible' Jewish capital" (Weizman, 2007: 25).

As the borders of Jerusalem expanded, the state also acted to reconfigure the urban character of the city to meet Israeli national goals. Before the ceasefire was even reached, Israel undertook the destruction of the entire Maghariba Quarter, located immediately in front of the Wailing Wall, in an act that made explicit the military's determination that it would not retreat from this occupied area (Weizman, 2007: 37). The forcible removal or expulsion of the Palestinian population of the Jewish Quarter and its archaeological reconstruction after 1967 embodies the state's attempt to synthesise religious and nationalist traditions and to impose a Zionist ideological interpretation of history onto the urban fabric of

Jerusalem (Ricca, 2007). Israel would use biblical archaeology “to validate the claim that Palestinian vernacular architecture was in fact Jewish at source” (Weizman, 2007: 38-9).

Archaeology continues to be used as a political and ideological tool in the city and EU representatives in East Jerusalem have repeatedly expressed grave concern at the strategy to consolidate Israeli control over the Holy Basin and detach it from its Palestinian surroundings by imposing a single, hegemonic Jewish narrative on archaeology and tourism in the Old City.⁸ The rezoning of land for specific uses, restrictive controls on land use and land confiscation have also served Israel’s Judaising intentions while aggressive, ideologically-driven settlement construction in and around Jewish residential neighbourhoods has brought the radical urban frontier to the historic centre (Pullan, 2011).

3.2.2 Demography

The Palestinian population of East Jerusalem was not annexed in tandem with the land in 1967 and Israel’s efforts to manipulate the demographic balance in the city in favour of its colonial ambitions are well documented in the literature. Dumper notes that “to a large extent, the attainment of demographic parity or even superiority in the annexed areas points to the Israeli government’s overwhelming success in meeting its strategic aim of making its control over the city irreversible” (Dumper, 1997: 81).

⁸ Unofficially published annual report by the EU Heads of Missions in East Jerusalem, 2014. See also PULLAN, W. & GWIAZDA, M. 2009. *Designing the Biblical Present in Jerusalem's 'City of David'*; PULLAN, W. & GWIAZDA, M. 2011. Jerusalem's Holy Basin: Who Needs It? *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, 17, 172-179; PULLAN, W. & STERNBERG, M. 2012. The Making of Jerusalem's 'Holy Basin'. *Planning Perspectives*, 27, 225-248.

Immediately following its conquest, the Israeli state conducted a population census on the newly occupied territory. Only Palestinians physically counted within the annexed area of East Jerusalem at that time were granted legal status in the city. Regardless of any family ties, origin in the city, land ownership or habitual residence prior to the census, those who were counted elsewhere in the Palestinian territories and those outside the country at the time of the count, including any who had fled the war, were systematically excluded from legal status within Israel. Approximately 30,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who were absent at the time of the 1967 Israeli population census lost their right under Israeli law to return and live in the city.⁹

Palestinians who were present for the census were granted 'permanent resident' status in the State of Israel, the implications of which are described in detail below. The separate legal status of Palestinians in occupied East Jerusalem – as residents of the state but not full citizens - is regulated by the Entry into Israel Law (1952) and the Entry to Israel Regulations (1974) which give wide discretionary powers to the Israeli Minister of Interior in the grant of various types of visas to enter and stay in Israel. Permanent residency can only be passed on to children in particular circumstances.

The precarious legal status of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is well documented and its detrimental impact on Palestinian family life in the city has been explored in the publications of a range of governmental, human rights, civil liberties and humanitarian organisations, local and international. Residency status can also be revoked and in this way the Israeli authorities have used it as a further means of

⁹ http://www.civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/joint_ngo_report_-_east_jerusalem.pdf

demographic manipulation since 1995.¹⁰ HaMoked, the Israeli Centre for the Defence of the Individual, reveals that between 1967 and 2013 the Israeli state revoked the residency status of 14,309 Palestinians from East Jerusalem. Interior Ministry statistics show that 4,577 Palestinians from East Jerusalem were stripped of their residency in 2008 alone.¹¹

A report prepared by the European Union Heads of Mission in Jerusalem in 2014 found that restrictive measures continue to apply to the residency status of East Jerusalem Palestinians, linked to Israel's official demographic policy that aims to prevent Palestinians exceeding 40% of the total municipal population.¹² According to the US State Department, meanwhile, the continued Israeli practice of revoking the identity cards of Jerusalem residents amounted to forced exile to the occupied territories or abroad.

3.2.3 Planning

From the earliest days of the occupation, planning tools and regulations were employed by the state to further its geopolitical ends in the city (Benvenisti, 1996, Bollens, 2000, Braier, 2013, Jabareen, 2010). From the early 1970's onwards, urban planning in the city ceased to exist, replaced by political planning, the sole focus of which was to tighten Israel's hold on the annexed areas. Amirav, himself a former advisor to Teddy Kollek and Ehud Barak, is unequivocal: the two guiding principles of Israeli policy in East Jerusalem since that time have been the

¹⁰ Zink suggest that this policy was overturned in 1999, but that revocations continued in a modified fashion. See ZINK, V. 2009. A Quiet Transfer: The Judaization of Jerusalem. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 2, 122-133. In fact, this policy was accelerated in the mid-2000s, peaking in 2008.

¹¹ B'Tselem http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_statistics

¹² See the Jerusalem Master Plan 2000 that was ratified by the Jerusalem Municipality in 2007.

achievement of maximum territorial control and the attainment of demographic hegemony so as to ensure an overwhelmingly Jewish city. While Israel's demographic ambitions are clearly outlined in political masterplans, in local policies "these intentions are camouflaged within the techno-professional language of planning" and "implemented by manipulating seemingly mundane categories" (Weizman, 2007: 49).

The demographic threat was keenly felt. The 1978 Master Plan for Jerusalem, cited by Amirav, states that "any part of the city that is not settled with Jews is in danger of being detached from the territory of Israel and delivered to Arab rule, and therefore the administrative ruling regarding municipal jurisdiction must be translated into action by means of construction in every part of this territory, beginning at its farthest edges" (Amirav, 2008). This policy also necessitated a reduction in the scope of Palestinian settlement and territorial control in East Jerusalem. In order to achieve this, Israel adopted a 'blatantly discriminatory' policy designed to shrink the Arab grip on territory in East Jerusalem while simultaneously encouraging them to leave the city. Amirav cites former Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek who wrote in 1994 that "whatever the governments of Israel could do to make life difficult for the Arabs in East Jerusalem, they did; whatever they could do... to prevent them from developing, from expanding, from building, from improving the quality of their housing, they did" (Amirav, 2009: 74). Thus, Weizman concludes that "horizontally limited by the green zones around them, and vertically by a 'preservation' policy, the Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jerusalem were transformed into an archipelago of small islands of conjured 'authenticity' within an ocean of Jewish construction" (Weizman, 2007: 51).

In August 1980, Israel's 'Basic Law: Jerusalem' constitutionalised the redrawn city as the 'united and complete' capital of the state of Israel, although reference to the exact municipal borders was excluded. According to Dumper, the new Basic Law did not legislate any particular changes, but was rather a "mere legalism" that "underlined the political reality" already in existence (Dumper, 1997: 41-42). The international community, upholding the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), has consistently refused to recognise the legality of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and remains committed to Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territory and the pursuit of a negotiated settlement of the territorial issue.

3.3 Swallowed but not Digested?

According to Musallam (1996), Faisal Hussein identified three aims underlying Israeli policies towards East Jerusalem. The first, to cause Palestinian institutional identity, activity and presence in the holy city to wither away. This would ensure Palestinians dealt only with Israeli institutions in the city and accustom them to not dealing with Palestinian institutions. The second, to isolate East Jerusalem from its Palestinian milieu by detaching Palestinians in and around the city from the wider Palestinian community. Palestinian commerce and trade would have to look for markets in Israel. The third, to isolate the city internationally, accustoming the international community to dealing with the Palestinians without Jerusalem and to dealing with Jerusalem as a city dominated by Israel.

Musallam contrasts these aims with the official Israeli position, enshrined in a letter from Shimon Peres to Norwegian minister Johan Holst, committing Israel not to interfere with Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. This letter,

Musallam claims, was the *sine qua non* for Palestinian approval of the Oslo agreement, while Israeli government actions negated the spirit and text of the commitments it offered within it. Instead, Israel escalated its campaign to exclude the Palestinian Authority from the city at the municipal, national and international levels.

In terms of the holy places, Israel sought to promote the role of Jordan. Musallam claims that even Arafat was surprised when the 1994 Washington Declaration that ended the belligerency between Jordan and Israel declared: "Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines" (cited in Musallam, 1996). While Israel intended that the agreement drive a wedge between Jordan and the Palestinian leadership, the 'concession' which saw Christian holy sites omitted from Jordanian jurisdiction was further intended to diversify the custodianship of Jerusalem's holy places and divide the Muslim and Christian leaderships of the city.

The Israeli state's ambiguous legal position on East Jerusalem – part of the 'united capital' of Israel, but with key limitations on its jurisdiction – allows for full territorial control of the city but does not require the assimilation of its Palestinian population. This ambiguity has led to debate over the limits of Israeli hegemony in the city and the opportunities for the assertion of Palestinian autonomy in particular jurisdictions. In 1993, Lustick argued that the belief of Israelis in the immutability of the expanded boundaries of Jerusalem was not hegemonic (Lustick, 1993). Support for the claim that 'united Jerusalem' would forever remain under Israeli sovereignty, he maintained, was unlikely to withstand the political

logic of peace. On the eve of the Oslo process, he wrote it was simply that “a carefully cultivated fetish of ‘united Jerusalem’ has so far deterred public examination of the options that exist.”

Dumper (2014) agrees that Jerusalem is a city of multiple fragments rather than of just two parts. It is the many crisscrossing and overlapping borders of Jerusalem as well as the local and international constraints on Israeli power in the city that combine to explain the resilience of Palestinians there after decades of occupation. Dumper stresses the significance of Lustick’s fundamental point, that Israel has treated East Jerusalem differently. This, he claims, sets it apart from the rest of Israel and infuses the Palestinian enclaves with “a sense of difference based on political and legal realities” (Dumper, 2014: 64). In Chapter IV, I revisit this issue, arguing for a reformulation of the hegemonic boundary debate to take account of the impact of enduring occupation on East Jerusalem residents themselves. In this sense, I argue, a hegemonic boundary may perhaps have been crossed.

The creation of facts on the ground prompted a shift in academic and activist focus towards Israeli policies and actions in East Jerusalem and their political and humanitarian impact on Palestinians in the city. The significance of these policies is most frequently understood within the context of the sovereignty paradigm and the extent to which they impact the viability of the two-state solution. However, Israeli attempts to consolidate the occupation of land without the absorption of people are also key to understanding the complex situation in which Palestinian Jerusalemites live and the way in which they frame their everyday actions.

The literature is divided over how far Israel has succeeded in realising the hegemonic Jewish-Israeli narrative of a unified Jerusalem. Rarely, however, is the issue considered from the perspective of East Jerusalem residents and the way in which they frame their own experience of Israeli rule. The failure of Oslo and the apparent intractability of the Jerusalem problem has prompted significant research into alternative paths to a resolution of the issue. The viability of Palestinian statehood with a capital in East Jerusalem is challenged by those who emphasise the devastating impact of the Israeli project in East Jerusalem on the prospects for Palestinian sovereignty in the city. Others, meanwhile, downplay the impact of Israel's expansionist policies.

Nolte and Yacobi (2015) examine official Israeli representations of Jerusalem's Light Rail project (as a neutral, modern and efficient means of transportation for the Jerusalem 'metropolis'), demonstrating that these form part of a wider strategy to strengthen the state's physical and discursive control over the 'unified' city. However, beyond official attempts to control representations of space in the public discourse, the literature asks how real Israeli control over East Jerusalem actually is. Klein (2008) argues that after forty years of Israeli occupation, Jerusalem remains a frontier city. Israel's annexationist project has failed and the Jewish state has developed a series of strategies to overcome and disguise the failure, not recognising that the goal is unattainable. East Jerusalem remains the east-looking metropolitan centre of the West Bank, he concludes, and those who seek to reunite Jerusalem and achieve Israeli dominance in its geographical space are doomed to fail (Klein, 2008).

In Chapter IV, I challenge the claims that East Jerusalem remains the metropolitan centre of the West Bank or that the city remains entirely eastward

looking. Very real ties undoubtedly remain and there are concrete ways in which East Jerusalem remains outside Israeli governmental and administrative norms. However, Klein's analysis relies on an uncritical acceptance of the constancy of historically contingent circumstances, reflecting a not uncommon agenda in the literature – particularly on the Israeli Left - to demonstrate the continued viability and pressing necessity of a redivision of the city. Klein argues, therefore, “for accepting the unavoidable partition of the city into separate Palestinian and Israeli municipalities due to its social, economic, and geographic realities” (ibid: 54). I suggest that these realities are changing, not simply as a result of ‘facts on ground’ but because Palestinian subjectivities in the city are constantly renegotiated and remapped in relation to the structures of power and the multiple projects in which residents are engaged.

Amirav (2009) also argues that after 40 years of occupation, not one of the five national goals set by the Israeli state for Jerusalem has been achieved. From 1970 onwards, urban planning in Jerusalem became a political weapon focused on the sole objective of tightening Israel's grip on annexed areas. Amirav cites the 1978 Master Plan for Jerusalem which, he claims, retroactively explained the rationale for a building programme in East Jerusalem that was by then almost complete: “Any part of the city that is not settled with Jews is in danger of being detached from the territory of Israel and delivered to Arab rule, and therefore the administrative ruling regarding municipal jurisdiction must be translated into action by means of construction in every part of this territory, beginning at its farthest edges.” This policy of expanding Israel's territorial control was accompanied by a simultaneous policy of shrinking the Palestinian hold on the city. Despite these combined tactics, however, Amirav concludes that Israel has failed to achieve any

of its goals in East Jerusalem and that it doggedly pursued a clearly failing policy for more than 40 years.

Larkin and Dumper (2012) also argue that “there is no sense in which the Zionist imaginary of a Jewish city has been achieved or is irreversible.” Their argument stresses, however, that the significance of Israel’s creation of facts on the ground is “the contradiction that lies at the heart of the Israeli project in Jerusalem.” This, they claim, is that “Zionism as an ideology which promotes Jewish nationalism, is also an ideology of exclusiveness that is unwilling to incorporate non-Jewish groups into its political and cultural sphere... Promoting Zionism in Jerusalem has led, on one hand, to the colonization of Palestinian land and property and, on the other hand, leaves non-Jewish groups in the margins where they are left to provide their own services and support systems.”

The success or failure of the Israeli project in East Jerusalem relates directly to questions regarding the viability of a re-division of the city. In this thesis, I intend to address the ongoing Judaisation of the city not from within the sovereignty paradigm, but from the perspective of Palestinian identity and agency in the city. How hegemonic does Israeli rule in East Jerusalem feel for Palestinians? How does the conflict and its manifestations affect the everyday life of East Jerusalem Palestinians and to what extent do existing approaches rely on the notion of an objective Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem that is resilient to the Israeli project there? How do East Jerusalem Palestinians, as active agents, individually and collectively, cope, adapt or resist? In Chapter V, I argue that informality and exception, which are often referenced in support of the argument that important exclusions to Israel rule remain, are in fact part of the working of Israeli power in

the East Jerusalem that facilitates the exclusion of residents while territorial objectives are met.

4 The Decline of Palestinian Politics in East Jerusalem

Notwithstanding the success or failure of Israel's hegemonic project or the need to reframe this question, the post Oslo period has without doubt witnessed the near total collapse of Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem. Israeli policies and practices contributing to the strangulation of the city and its dislocation from the West Bank are well documented. These have been instrumental in reorienting Palestinian political life in Jerusalem away from the occupied territories and the Palestinian national leadership there.

This section will look in more detail at Palestinian responses to the Israeli project in East Jerusalem, the impact on Palestinian politics in the city and its consequences for this Palestinian constituency. I argue that the crisis of leadership has led to the 'atomisation' of East Jerusalem Palestinians and left a vacuum that is readily filled by other groups and affiliations, including Islamic organisations supported by the Islamist movement inside Israel (Larkin and Dumper, 2012, Salem, 2006) and grassroots Islamic activism in the city. It will also examine the individual (horizontal) strategies of East Jerusalem Palestinians to adapt to occupation and leaderlessness which are often overlooked.

4.1 The Collapse of Palestinian Leadership

A 1995 PASSIA report on the dynamics of Palestinian resistance in Jerusalem (Latendresse, 1995) challenges deterministic approaches that paint Palestinians as victims and emphasises the dialectical relationship between Israelis and

Palestinians in the city. It resists definitions of the 'destructuring/restructuring' of East Jerusalem as the straightforward consequence of Israeli interventions, arguing that the transformation of various structures is as much the result of Palestinian opposing actions; through survival and resistance, Palestinians have taken part in the process of transformation. Essential to the continuation of the Palestinian presence, the author claims, is the survival of existing Palestinian institutions and associations in the city and the creation of new ones.

Through an analysis of the practices of resistance in East Jerusalem between 1967 and 1994, Latendresse identifies two parallel strategies developed by Palestinians to preserve their presence in East Jerusalem. First, non-cooperation with the municipality. Second, the protection of social, economic, religious and cultural institutions that existed prior to 1967 – for example, the Chamber of Commerce, al-Maqassad Hospital, the Jerusalem Electric Corporation – and to establish new ones, to help defend Palestinians against the integrationist policies of the municipality.

There is merit in Latendresse's argument. In this context, the 'return' of the PLO at the expense of the local, 'inside' leadership signalled the beginning of the end for existing strategies to preserve Palestinian Jerusalem. The fact that the 'outside' PLO was ultimately compliant in the exclusion of Jerusalem from the proposed interim phase of the Oslo process overcame what had been a major stumbling block for the Israeli side (Dumper, 2002). Under Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin (1992-95) and Shimon Peres (1995-96), the Israeli authorities tolerated a low level of Palestinian Authority activity in East Jerusalem (ICG, 2012: 3). Despite the Oslo provisions that forbade such activity, during this period the PA managed to establish a wide network of organisations in East Jerusalem, political,

social, cultural, economic, religious and professional (Rekness, 2008). Foremost among these was Orient House, which under the leadership of Faisal Hussein, became “the PLO’s political address in East Jerusalem” and enabled the city to “emerge as the centre of gravity of Palestinian political activity” (ICG, 2012). Under Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-1999), however, Israeli policy towards PA activity in East Jerusalem hardened and Orient House in particular was targeted.

In the following years, Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem took a series of fatal blows. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, the death of Faisal Hussein in May 2001, the permanent closure of Orient House by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in August 2001, the arrest of PA Jerusalem Affairs Minister Ziad Abu Zayyad a month later and the closure of a number of Palestinian institutions in the city suspected of ties with Ramallah (ICG, 2012) are widely recognised as important turning points in the fortunes of Palestinian authority in Jerusalem. A comprehensive report by the International Crisis Group in 2012 found these to be steps from which Palestinian political life in East Jerusalem failed to recover. “Israel banned national activity in the city, and no alternative leadership was able to take root” (ICG, 2012: 4).

Israel’s marginalisation of traditional sources of authority in Jerusalem left Fatah in the city fractured and fragmented. One interviewee told ICG that “Fatah per se doesn’t really exist in Jerusalem. Omar Shalabi [Fatah’s Secretary General in Jerusalem] has a small group of ten or fifteen people who work with him. That’s it. The rest are just ordinary people who might label themselves Fatah, but that doesn’t mean they consider themselves loyal to the movement’s elected leadership” (ICG, 2012).

The success of Hamas candidates in Jerusalem in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections was a political high point for the movement which can be attributed in large part to its works on the ground in the community. All factions, however, have experienced a downturn in popularity in East Jerusalem as each fails to project a national narrative with any sustainable relevance for residents and their activities are suppressed by Israel. This is discussed further in Chapter IV.

4.2 Social Implications

The suppression of organised political life in East Jerusalem has contributed to the atomisation of Palestinian society in the city and the necessity of individual solutions to collective problems. The absence of structures of authority that possess legitimacy for the community is another factor. The 2012 ICG report maintains that East Jerusalem is suffering a social crisis resulting from the collapse of the urban leadership, the ineffectiveness of the PA in the city and the tensions fuelled by the second intifada. The report highlights the rise of drug-related crime and the rapid proliferation of organised criminal gangs, many of which operate through the strongest clans in the city: “The city’s large families to some extent filled the authority gap, but they could not stop the dissolution of the social fabric and even became one of its agents” (ICG, 2012: i).

Dumper (2013a) explains that Israeli policing priorities in East Jerusalem are directed principally towards the maintenance of public order rather than law enforcement. This type of policing does not tolerate any activity perceived as ‘subversive’ or a threat to public order. A significant operational effect of this approach, Dumper argues, is the concentration of Israeli policing in areas around

the commercial centre of East Jerusalem and in particular inside tourist-related sites in and around the Old City. This has led to the effective suspension of policing on the periphery, facilitating the flagrant operation of criminal gangs.

In Palestinian communities that lie on the eastern side of the separation Barrier but still within the Jerusalem municipality, the problem of policing is particularly acute. The Palestinian Authority has no jurisdiction and its police and security forces are not allowed entry. Israeli police forces are reluctant to go there despite the fact that residents live inside the municipal boundary and pay municipal taxes. Within Palestinian communities on the Israeli side of the wall, the situation is little better. Thrall (2014) claims that crime is pervasive and Israeli security forces, largely comprising paramilitary units, tend only to enter these areas in response to a perceived threat to Jewish Israelis. The Israeli security presence, he argues is “there essentially to quash dissent and prevent attacks on settlers rather than to protect Palestinians” (Thrall, 2014).

The opportunities for political participation in East Jerusalem have been limited by the criminalisation of Palestinian political parties and their activities – Israel’s internal security agency, Shin Bet, is mandated with counter-terrorism and intelligence activities as well as combatting ‘political subversion.’ According to a former security official interviewed by the ICG in 2011, political subversion includes lawful opposition to Israeli control in Jerusalem (ICG, 2012: 1). Since all Palestinian parties oppose the occupation, Thrall explains, “they and their activities have, in effect, been criminalised” (Thrall, 2014).

The criminalisation of opposition to Israeli authority in Jerusalem is one element of what this thesis suggests is a broader effort to depoliticise East Jerusalem

Palestinians and as such minimise the challenge they represent to the Israeli project in the city. The benefits of residency, including social security, health insurance and freedom of movement, are understood as the incentive for 'good behaviour.' The chairman of the Israeli Movement for Strengthening Jerusalem, Arie Hess, told the ICG in 2011 that satisfying Palestinian material needs in Jerusalem helped to minimise their politicisation: "The investment in paying national insurance to East Jerusalem's Palestinian population is the best security policy we have and is worth every shekel." Another interviewee, a former defence official, added that Israeli policy encouraged Palestinians "to focus on their income rather than their national project" (ICG, 2012: 1).

Salem (2006) argues that even before the collapse of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem after 2000, the move away from inclusive resistance towards state building during the Oslo years resulted in the exclusion of the population from decision-making and a loss of collective identity. This was replaced by fragmentation and atomisation; Palestinian Jerusalemites "found themselves obliged to find individual ways to cope with the realities" of life in the city and "began to look after their own interests in a very atomised way" (Salem, 2006: 8).

Palestinians in East Jerusalem are fearful of losing their residency rights in their own city as well as the social security benefits and health care for which they pay and which are far superior to those available in territories under the limited control of the Palestinian Authority. Dislocated from the national leadership and from the national narrative it espouses, they lack political leadership or inspiration.

Meanwhile, the cost of living is as high for Palestinians in Jerusalem as for Jews in the city, but wages are lower and services are not evenly or equitably

distributed. Haaretz reported in June 2016 that 82% of East Jerusalem residents lived under the poverty line in 2014 (rising to 86.6% among children), compared to 22% of Israelis as a whole and 48% across all communities in Jerusalem. The figures, issued by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics and the National Insurance Institute, demonstrated that the Palestinian poverty rate in East Jerusalem had worsened dramatically since 2006, when the figure stood at 76%. Haaretz speculates the separation Barrier had caused severe damage to businesses that relied on West Bank customers and also raised the cost of living in the city as a result of fewer cheap imports from the West Bank. The upsurge in violence during 2014 may also be contributing to rising poverty statistics, with a sharp drop in tourist numbers and tighter checkpoint security making imports from the West Bank more difficult and the prices in Jerusalem higher as a result. Despite greater poverty among Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, the Workers Advice Centre in the city maintains that only 7% of East Jerusalem families receive income support benefits, compared to 10% of Jewish Israeli families (Hasson, 2016b).

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI, 2012) argues that “the gravity of the situation in East Jerusalem is the product, first and foremost, of Israeli policy making... The cumulative effects of annexation, neglect, rights violations, and the completion of the separation Barrier have led to an unprecedented deterioration in the conditions of Palestinian East Jerusalemites” (ACRI, 2012: 2). ACRI points out that the relative strength of the neighbouring West Jerusalem economy leads many Palestinian residents to seek employment there. As well as language and educational disparities that exclude Palestinian residents from many jobs, “Palestinian job seekers face additional obstacles stemming from the political

situation and the particular circumstances in Jerusalem.” Social and cultural tensions impact everyday life and “at times of political crisis, social tensions mount and there have been extreme cases of physical violence as well as demands made upon Jewish business owners not to hire Arab workers” (ACRI, 2012: 8).

With the Israeli state committed to a Zionist project that neglects the welfare of Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem and limits the activities of their national institutions, Palestinian NGOs in the city provide a “critical minimum level of welfare provision” (Dumper, 2014: 134). Dumper defines the emergence of Palestinian civil society organisations as a form of resistance to the encroachments of the Israeli state. The Palestinian Welfare Association, for example, cited by Dumper, has had considerable success in the field of property renovation and restoration in the Old City.

There is a well explored link, however, between the discourse of development and the depoliticisation of resistance. Tabar’s case study of the reconstruction of Jenin refugee camp following Israel’s invasion in April 2002 underlines the depoliticising impact of the technical ‘professional’ vision of international aid agencies and argues that the donor aid system established to support the Oslo process disrupted the national movement by “helping to sever the ties between social movements and organisations and the national struggle.” Tabar (2012) cites Ferguson’s study of the development apparatus in Lesotho in which he argues that international aid agencies seek to exclude politics from “even the most sensitive political operations and insist on framing these matters as technical problems.” He describes these bureaucratic agencies as ‘anti politics machines,’ arguing that they depoliticise marginalised populations by promoting professional and technical responses to inherently political issues of powerlessness. In East

Jerusalem, the professionalization of NGOs and the necessity of their conformity to a non-political ideal, combined with Israel's criminalisation of political opposition to its sovereignty in the city, are stripping this constituency of locally-constructed liberation discourses.

4.3 Palestinian Political Participation

The theoretical literature on voting behaviour highlights the difference between non-voting and boycotting in elections, while Bollens argues that hegemony can be achieved by one side if the other rejects its legitimacy and refuses to cooperate with its authority (Bollens, 2000).

East Jerusalem Palestinians are entitled to participate in Israeli municipal (though not national) elections as well as in Palestinian legislative council elections. While turnout in East Jerusalem has been higher in PLC elections, a top-down perspective recognises that the boycott of engagement with Israeli institutions and voting in Israeli elections has largely held since 1967. The non-participation of East Jerusalem Palestinians in Israeli municipal elections equates, from this perspective, to a "total rejection of Israel's occupation and annexation of East Jerusalem" (Badil Resource Centre, cited in Bavli and Gerver, 2010). In Chapter VI below, I challenge perceptions that Palestinian non-voting in Israeli municipal elections is an unambiguous, politically motivated boycott, as opposed to non-voting which is rooted in a range of factors beyond rejection of Israeli occupation. Indeed, the increasingly ambivalent attitude of East Jerusalem residents to Israeli rule in the city further undermines an ethically absolute interpretation. Just as non-participation in violent resistance does not necessarily equate to a moral refusal

(Kelly, 2008), so too the non-participation of Palestinians in elections is potentially more complex than a straightforward moral boycott.

According to Cohen (2011), towards the end of the 1990's, political life in East Jerusalem was characterised by passivity. "The conflicting interests of the inhabitants – situated between Israel and the PA, between local and national Palestinian leadership, between personal interests and national struggle – transformed the absence of action into the default option" (Cohen, 2011). As far as Cohen is concerned, "the Oslo years brought about an almost absolute standstill of political activity in Jerusalem."

This understanding of the absence of Palestinian political activity during Oslo and after might be challenged if we relocate our conceptualisation of the political within the realm of the everyday. This is addressed in detail below. Accusations of Palestinian political passivity in East Jerusalem must also be situated within the context of the criminalisation of political activity by the state and deliberate atomisation of society that encourages Palestinians to focus on their individual material needs.

Cohen has offered a further theory regarding the political behaviour of Palestinian Jerusalemites in his study of Fatah Jerusalem's activities during the al-Aqsa intifada (Cohen, 2013b). Cohen considers the minimal participation of Fatah Jerusalem members, in contrast to Fatah members from other Palestinian cities and towns, in suicide attacks on Israeli civilians during the second intifada. A crucial factor in explaining this behaviour, he claims, was the relationship between Fatah Jerusalem and the Israeli peace camp. That is not personal relations between Israelis and Palestinians, but, rather, the joint political struggle and a joint

vision for the city. Cohen undertakes a detailed analysis of the participation of East Jerusalem Palestinians in armed resistance during the second intifada, critiquing a range of explanations for their role. Rejecting the essential tenets of contact theory, that people who know each other are less likely to kill each other, Cohen posits the argument that rather than dialogue and individual encounters between Jewish Israelis and East Jerusalem Palestinians, it was a shared vision and joint political activity towards these goals that influenced the rejection by Fatah Jerusalem of indiscriminate killing. Jerusalemites had developed their own practices of resistance that were built on sumud, NGO activities and popular joint struggle.

4.4 Religion as a Ready Alternative

Larkin and Dumper (2012) have examined the growing involvement of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel (IM) in Jerusalem, focussing on how the al-Aqsa mosque is employed as a symbol of political empowerment and as a focus of religious renewal. They conclude that in the absence of Palestinian political leadership in East Jerusalem, the IM is contributing to the establishment of a new form of Palestinian Islamic resistance that crosses political and territorial divides, and which challenges Israel from both within and without. A 2012 ICG report also addresses the emergence of the Northern Branch of the IM, headed by Sheikh Raed Salah, and the group's potential to mobilise East Jerusalem Palestinians, usually in protest of perceived infringements of Islamic sovereignty over the Haram. Salah is not without Palestinian critics, but with traditional leadership structures undermined if not destroyed, this charismatic figure has broad appeal. However, his repeated arrest, release and re-arrest means that this movement struggles to maintain its presence and influence in the

city. Local mobilisations, particularly in relation to protection of the Haram al-Sharif by the Murabiteen, have gone some way towards eclipsing the influence of the IM.

Salem (2006) has also suggested that a domestic society revolving around the mosque is filling the political vacuum in East Jerusalem. Hamas' success in the 2006 PLC elections, despite the fact they were unable to run an electoral campaign in the city, is attributed to their existing social and welfare networks in East Jerusalem and their willingness to go door to door to garner support. The failure of Hamas to consolidate and build on this victory, however, is addressed below. The 2012 ICG report explains the growing centrality of the Haram al-Sharif to Jerusalem's politics. Restrictions on collective Palestinian activity in the city mean that the Haram is now one of the few sites in which Palestinians can gather freely in large numbers, while increased Jewish nationalist activism directed at the Temple Mount is perceived as a growing threat to Muslim control of and access to the Haram and East Jerusalemites have responded. East Jerusalem's Muslims are also alarmed by controversial archaeological and restoration works conducted in and around the Haram by Israel and the Jordanian Waqf.

This thesis will locate the Islamic identity of East Jerusalem Muslims within the context of overlapping and competing subject positions, the holiness of the city's Muslim shrines, the collapse of Palestinian politics in the city and the absence of secular leadership. The perception of a Jewish threat to the-Haram al-Sharif ensures that this issue has huge mobilising potential for Palestinian Muslims. While this might potentially trigger wider nationalist conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, clashes over the installation of metal detectors in 2017 made clear that locally generated and religiously inspired resistance to Israeli encroachments

on the Haram do not necessarily correlate to nationalist mobilisation against occupation. Without a nationalist liberation narrative to struggle *for*, successful mobilisation over the Haram soon petered out once its immediate objectives were achieved (See Chapter VI).

5 Palestinian Adaptations to the Israeli Project

Israeli hegemony in East Jerusalem is shaping the Palestinian political imaginary and the space in which identity in the city is constructed. Cohen (2011) addresses directly the issue of Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem since 1967, arguing that a unique political discourse has emerged in the city as a result of the formation over many years of a distinct Jerusalem identity. In Cohen's analysis, a combination of "factors have combined to create a different type of Palestinian, a sort of hybrid between an Israeli Arab and a Palestinian from the territories" (Cohen, 2011: xix). These factors include Israel's declared annexation of East Jerusalem as well as its deep intelligence-gathering penetration of the city; the more frequent contact East Jerusalem Palestinians have with Jewish Israelis; the physical barriers separating the city from the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and the special legal status of East Jerusalem Palestinians in Israel and the benefits this entitles them to (Cohen, 2011: xviii).

The emergence of a distinct East Jerusalem Palestinian identity is a key theme of Cohen's work and there has been significant media interest in the apparent 'normalisation' of East Jerusalem residents under Israeli rule. In 2011, a rare survey of Palestinian opinion in East Jerusalem was found to demonstrate "a real discrepancy between what policy-makers here [in the US], in Israel and in the territories assume about the Palestinians of East Jerusalem and *what they*

actually want" (Mozgovaya, 2011)¹³. Asked to choose between full citizenship of a Palestinian state, or citizenship of the state of Israel with all the rights and privileges attached to that, 30% of East Jerusalem respondents chose Palestinian citizenship, while 35% chose Israeli citizenship and another 35% declined to answer or said they were undecided.

Asked what they would do if it was decided that their neighbourhood in Jerusalem was to be brought under Palestinian sovereignty, 40% of Palestinian respondents said they were likely to move to an area inside Israel compared to 37% who said they would not move. If the situation were reversed, and their neighbourhood of Jerusalem was to become part of Israel in a future settlement, 27% said they would likely move, against 54% who said they would not. Among those who favoured Israeli citizenship in these scenarios, freedom of movement inside Israel, higher income, better employment opportunities and access to Israeli health care were cited as their top considerations.¹⁴ The Pechter findings were lent credibility by a 2015 poll, conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion, which similarly found that 52% of Palestinians living in East Jerusalem would prefer to be citizens of Israel with equal rights, compared to 42% who said that they would choose to be citizens of a Palestinian state (Pollock, 2015).

The notion that East Jerusalem Palestinians are undergoing a process of Israelification has received significant attention and a number of newspaper and web articles have begun to explore the idea of what East Jerusalem Palestinians really want (Abu Toameh, 2012, Barakat, 2012, Hasson, 2012). The increasing

¹³ My italics

¹⁴ Pechter Middle East Poll conducted in partnership with the US-based Council on Foreign Relations, 2011.

number of Palestinian Jerusalemites applying for Israeli citizenship, the trend towards Israeli high school exams and Hebrew language studies, changing shopping habits and a rise in the number of East Jerusalem youths joining the Israeli police force or applying for national service have all been proffered as indicators of the 'Israelification' of Palestinian Jerusalem. More often than not, such trends are perceived as confirmation that East Jerusalem Palestinians know 'what side their bread is buttered,' that they recognise the value of the health care and social security benefits that come with their Israeli identity cards and value these above their national identity.

Some reports point to other, less quantifiable factors too. "For example, there is the pronounced presence of Palestinians in the centre of West Jerusalem, in malls, on the light-rail train and in the open shopping area in Mamilla, adjacent to the Old City's Jaffa Gate. These people are not street cleaners or dishwashers, but consumers and salespeople. Another phenomenon is the growing cooperation between merchants in the old city and the municipality." While most of these changes are occurring below the radar of the Israeli public, "it is very possible that Jerusalem has already chosen the binational solution" (Hasson, 2012).

For many years, the acquisition of citizenship has been taboo, but East Jerusalem Palestinians are now increasingly open about and accepting of Israeli citizenship as the only real security available to them. A 2012 report by the International Crisis Group on the decline of Arab Jerusalem recognises that attitudes appear to be changing. It claims that East Jerusalem Palestinians are increasingly cognisant of the permanence of Israel's occupation of their city: "with the Palestinian leadership in disarray and largely ineffectual, some believe a

meaningful Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, has become little more than a fantasy” (ICG, 2012). The upward trend in Palestinian applications for Israeli citizenship is discussed in detail in Chapter IV, but the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported in 2012 that there had been a significant upsurge in applications over the previous two years, even though the number of successful applications had dropped.¹⁵ According to the Gatestone Institute, the Fatah Minister in charge of the Jerusalem Portfolio, Hatem Abdul Kader, attributed the rising number of applications for Israeli citizenship to the failure of the Palestinian Authority and neighbouring Arab states to provide sufficient support East Jerusalem Palestinians. While I reject the Gatestone Institute’s conclusion that East Jerusalem residents obviously prefer to live under Israeli rather than Palestinian rule, it is clear that there is considerably less stigma attached to Israeli citizenship today than there was in previous decades. This is discussed in detail below.

Cohen concludes that the dislocation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank is part of a broader process to divide the Palestinian people and territory. Israel’s ultimate goal, he claims, is “that this will eventually lead to a weakening of the Palestinian national identity” overall. “In a way, all this could be considered a giant experiment in the construction of identities.” Palestinian national identity, as distinct from Arab national identity, took only a few decades to construct and might just as quickly disintegrate (Cohen, 2011: 129).

Cohen presents an interesting argument, but ultimately, he fails to address the demographic paradox of Israeli attempts to weaken Palestinian national identity.

¹⁵ Haaretz, 21 October 2012, ‘3,374 East Jerusalem residents received full Israeli citizenship in past decade’

While elements within the Israeli political or religious establishment may find this prospect appealing, the more significant problem then become what to do with a large non-Jewish population brought inside Zionist state. Ultimately, the model of a Jewish democratic state cannot sustain a significant non-Jewish population. Demonstrating the problem Cohen (2011) discusses the semantic debate over whether or not East Jerusalem should be described as occupied territory. Israel applies its own laws there, while the annexation is widely held to be invalid in international law. Cohen concludes that the existential reality is that the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are occupied. He makes the distinction therefore, that “when using the word ‘occupation’ I am referring to the people and not necessarily to the territory” (Cohen, 2011: xi). This paradox centres upon the exclusionary nature of Zionism as a Jewish nationalist ideology that has led to the colonisation of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem, but for which the absorption of non-Jewish populations is not only undesirable but ultimately untenable.

This contradiction presents a problem for Israel, which it has sought to overcome by subjecting East Jerusalem Palestinians to a regime of control rather than inclusion. I will explore in this study the possibility that Israel’s territorial ambitions and policies have led to the dislocation of East Jerusalem Palestinians so thoroughly from their nationalist narrative that Palestinian identity is being reoriented, temporarily at least, towards Israel, which is unwilling to accept them. According to Escobar (cited in Jean-Klein, 2001), we should approach quotidian practices and performances as influential in the “collective production of novel political and cultural identities” and in the production of nationalist-cum-national subjectivities and communities.

Yousef (2011) recognises the deteriorating spatial reality felt by Palestinians in the East Jerusalem and argues that the emotional experiences of everyday life influence individual attitudes. This 'social hum' is highly significant, he claims, because "it can confirm or alienate people's narratives from the official discourse" (Yousef, 2011: 45). Spaces therefore become "sites of identification, and everyday life becomes an incubator of change in attitudes and behaviours" (Ibid: 45-46). Yousef details the fragmentation and dismemberment of the urban fabric of East Jerusalem from the Palestinian territories during the Oslo period, and hints at the discriminatory practices of the municipality which leave East Jerusalemites under no illusion about integration into Israeli society. "Feeling helpless and alienated at the level of national politics, negotiations and the promised peace," he says, "Palestinians in Jerusalem give more weight to the problems of their daily urban existence. This is leading not to normalisation with Israel, as such, but towards what one of Yousef's interviewees describes as a "normalisation of resistance" (Ibid: 51). The East Jerusalem situation, Yousef concludes, is generating new challenges.

Yousef offers an engaging insight into the alienation felt by many young East Jerusalemites from the national narrative and hints at the atomisation of Palestinian society. In focusing in on those East Jerusalemites who are reframing 'normalisation' and the struggle for civil rights vis-à-vis the municipality as a new 'narrative of resistance,' Yousef leaves much unsaid about those who are still "flying in all directions, following their own paths without meaningful patterns" (ibid: 50). This thesis will explore in more detail the alienation of East Jerusalem Palestinians from the national narrative and the emergence of new subjectivities among residents who also find themselves outside the Israeli national project.

The political isolation of East Jerusalem from the national leadership in Ramallah is leading some Palestinians in the city to seek out new opportunities. The ICG argue that after more than 40 years of boycotting the Israeli state, a small but growing number of East Jerusalem Palestinians are looking for ways to engage it (ICG, 2012: 16). However, I make the case here that in the fragmented and atomised environment of East Jerusalem, and in the absence of collective understandings of key signifiers, that these efforts are very much individualised. The actions of many residents “reflect a process of atomisation, whereby individuals become preoccupied with their own interests and try to find some kind of solution to their problems, rather than pursuing collective action” (Salem, 2011: 69).

Salem (2006) addresses the post-Oslo period as ‘imposed inclusion without integration’. While the pre-Oslo period from 1967 to 1993 was characterised by adaptation while resisting among East Jerusalem people, factions and political leadership, the period from 1993 until 2006 in East Jerusalem argues that the paucity of studies on the social, communal and psychological ways in which East Jerusalem Palestinian cope with the Israeli occupation of the city is problematic because “it leaves space for different claims over the political orientation of the Palestinian Jerusalemites. Few studies have sought to explain the impact of occupation on Palestinian Jerusalemites or “to explain systematically how the Palestinian Jerusalemites perceive their current and future relationships with Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in the Diaspora; or how the Oslo process, which postponed negotiations on Jerusalem to a later stage, has influenced these perceptions” (Salem, 2006: 1).

Beyond the competing claims over what Palestinian Jerusalemites really want, lies the sovereignty paradigm which Salem argues dominates the debate over Jerusalem. The point of departure for Salem is that “unless the issue of citizens’ sovereignty versus formal sovereignty is tackled, people’s adaptations to occupation cannot be analysed” (Ibid: 2). For Salem, adaptation means “all those types of voluntary and compulsory (i.e. forced, or imposed) actions taken by the Palestinian Jerusalemites in regard to their relations with Israeli official authorities in the city” (Salem, 2011: 3).

Mitchell (1990) has challenged much of the theoretical literature on resistance, arguing that the popular distinction between persuasion and coercion acts as a “single, master metaphor” that limits the value of most power and resistance studies. Mitchell highlights James C. Scott’s study of everyday forms of peasant resistance, in which Scott sets out to determine whether power works by persuading the populace of its legitimacy or simply by coercing their actions. To what extent, he asks, are elites able to impose their own image of a just social order, not simply on the behaviour of non-elites but on their consciousness as well. Mitchell takes issue with Scott’s analysis, arguing that the complexities of domination do not fit the binary opposition between a physical and a mental form of power. Attempts to make them fit, he claims, arise for the desire to present “certain political groups as self-formed political subjects, meaning political subjects who preserve against an essentially physical coercion a space of mental autonomy” (Mitchell, 1990: 573).

Mitchell’s critique attributes the persistence of the persuasion-coercion metaphor in part to the everyday conception of the person as a unique and self-constituted site of autonomy. From this perspective, we are required to consider the exercise

of power as “an external process that can coerce the behaviour of the body without necessarily penetrating and controlling the mind.” In this way, much of the literature on power and resistance seeks to portray the oppressed or neglected as genuine political subjects, self-formed and internally autonomous. The complexities of domination, exploitation and control, however, can never properly be reduced to an artificial binary between these two forms of power. Throughout this thesis, I emphasise the coercive power of domination, not simply on the behaviours of East Jerusalem Palestinians, but on their sense of self and their perceptions of what is possible. In this sense, I argue that identity is constituted through everyday social practices which are enacted within existing power structures.

6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have identified key analytical approaches to the study of East Jerusalem since Oslo and located this study within the relevant theoretical literature. I have tried to make clear how annexation and the terms negotiated by the PLO at Oslo have set East Jerusalem on a divergent political trajectory and to consider how Palestinian residents are impacted by Israel’s Judaisation project in the city. In the following chapters, I explore in detail how dislocation from the occupied territories combines with permanent, structural exclusion from the Israeli project to shape the site of Palestinian identity construction in the city and discuss how subjectivities are being recreated within that space as residents adapt to conditions in the city.

CHAPTER III

METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

In this thesis, I explore the dual marginality of East Jerusalem residents and ask how it is shaping Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city. How do East Jerusalemites experience dislocation and exclusion? How do they frame these experiences and what meanings do they attach to their everyday choices and actions? How do dominant theoretical approaches understand the praxis of everyday life in East Jerusalem and what alternative interpretations are possible? These questions raise a number of methodological issues upon which I reflect in this chapter. How, for example, can I know with any certainty that my interpretation of the meaning East Jerusalem residents attach to their everyday practices comes close to their own? What is my role in the shared construction of knowledge? By recognising the structural constraints imposed by Israeli power in East Jerusalem, do I risk reinforcing or reproducing this construct? How am I personally positioned in relation to this research and what implications might this have had during both data collection and data analysis?

I do not arrive here at conclusive positions on all of these issues, but aim to set out how I have approached them in the course of this research. First, I describe and reflect on my choice of research methods and then move on to discuss the final sample on which this study is based. Following this, I address the question of reflexivity and position myself in relation to the research. Finally, I discuss the question of objectivity in the field and during the writing up process.

1 Research Design

In this section I set out the data collection methods employed in the course of this project and the past experience that informed it. I explain and problematise the sampling techniques underpinning the study and discuss the final sample upon which it is based.

1.1 Retrospective Participant Observation

During each stage of this study, from conception, through data collection and analysis to completion, I have drawn on my experience of total immersion in the research setting acquired over a sustained period, from June-2008 to November 2011. Throughout these three and a half years, I lived in the Old City of Jerusalem, within and as part of a Palestinian family. I spent one month, at the end of 2008, in the UK, but was otherwise permanently resident in East Jerusalem, fully immersed in a Palestinian setting. This period afforded me the opportunity to observe from the inside the daily activities and every day cares and concerns of a Palestinian Jerusalemite family. While in no sense did I regard them at the time as research subjects, there is no doubt that my experience then informs this study.

Bulmer (1982) refers to this “experience recollected in academia”, as retrospective participant observation, concluding that “a number of distinguished studies have been conducted (at least partially) retrospectively, after the event” (Bulmer, 1982: 254). Bulmer offers Ned Polsky’s 1969 study of poolroom hustling (Polsky, 1969) as a prime example of retrospective participant observation. While Polsky’s research was ostensibly carried out over an eight-month period in 1962-3, his work was essentially “grounded in and inseparable from his own experience

in poolrooms.” Polsky had frequented poolrooms for more than 20 years and “he knew and had played regularly with several of the hustlers who were the subject of the research” (Bulmer, 1982: 254).

Retrospective participant observation reverses the conventional research role sequence. The established ‘academic researcher → total participant (researcher) → academic researcher again’ progression thus becomes ‘total participant (non-researcher) → academic researcher → retrospective observer (researcher).’ As a total participant in the second sequence, the observer is entirely immersed in the setting to be studied, but has not yet developed a research interest in it.

Bryman (2004) addresses the ethical dimensions of such a retrospective ethnography. Even within a universalist approach to research ethics, he argues, “retrospective covert observation, which occurs when a researcher writes up his or her experiences in social settings in which he or she participated but not as a researcher” may be acceptable (Bryman, 2004: 508). Bulmer is unambiguous. No deception of research subjects is involved and no breach of informed consent takes place during such covert ethnographic observation “since no scientific study was in view at the time the study was carried out” (Bulmer, 1982: 255).

Much of this study is grounded in and inseparable from my past immersion in the research setting. For three and a half years I participated in the daily life of a Palestinian home and family, through feasts and fasts, births and bereavements, but more importantly through the ebb and flow of everyday life in East Jerusalem. In this sense, at least, this study is in part a retrospective ethnography.

According to Schatz (2014), “ethnography helps ensure an empirically sound, theoretically vibrant, epistemologically innovative and normatively grounded

study of politics.” Ethnography is defined by two core principles. Most academics equate ethnography with participant observation, where immersion is regarded as the defining characteristic of this approach. A second core principle identified by Schatz, however, is an ethnographic ‘sensibility’ that “cares to glean the meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and political reality” (Schatz, 2014: 4-5). This sensibility to the meanings that East Jerusalem Palestinians attach to their everyday experience goes to core of what this study hopes to achieve. In order to protect the complete anonymity of participants, I avoid direct references to events, experiences or conversations which relate directly to this period of participant observation. There is no doubt, however, that both the ethnographic experience and the ethnographic sensibility underpin this study.

1.2 In-Depth Interviews and Informal Conversations

The retrospective participant observation detailed above informed and in part facilitated my subsequent fieldwork and data collection, undertaken over two months during 2016. In March-April 2016, I conducted twenty qualitative interviews with East Jerusalem residents, some of whom I had known for many years, others who I met in the course of my research. Interviews were semi-structured and questions were open-ended, allowing in-depth responses and allocating a degree of authority to the interviewee.¹⁶

¹⁶ Like any other conversation, interviewing involves a dynamic of power and control. In an interview context, this is loaded in favour of the interviewer. See SOSS, J. 2006. Talking Our Way to Meaningful Explanations: A Practice-Centred View of Interviewing for Interpretive Research. In: YANOW, D. & SCHWARTZ-SHEA, P. (eds.) *Interpretation and Methods: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe Inc.

Kelly (2010) argues that qualitative interviews are of most value when the researcher aims to achieve insight into the world of others, when she “wishes to gain an understanding of how participants view, experience, or conceptualise an aspect of social life” (Kelly, 2010: 309). While participant observation permitted me to observe a broad range of settings, behaviours, and interactions that would not otherwise have been accessible, in-depth interviewing offered a method by which to explore the meanings that individuals themselves attached to these choices and actions. As an observer, I had formed, to some extent, my own interpretation of the behaviours and practices I witnessed. In the interview context, the interviewee was able to select their own stories and was more centrally positioned as the interpreter of their own experience (Soss, 2006: 142). Through in-depth interviewing I also hoped to gain access to the detailed personal narratives of East Jerusalem Palestinians who are doubly marginalised and whose experience is excluded from dominant nationalist discourses.

Soss (2006) argues that “interpretive research, in particular, requires the pursuit of thick descriptions and this means working hard to encourage elaboration, clarification, reflection, and illustration” (Soss, 2006: 136). In this activity, the researcher conducting in depth interviews carries the experience away from that of an everyday conversation and the dynamics of power and authority, present in all conversations, is magnified in an interview context.

Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2006) suggest that interview questions are typically framed from the researcher’s perspective and may guide the respondent to frame their response in line with the interviewer’s expectations. By contrast, they argue that storytelling retains the storyteller’s point of view and with it “much of the ambiguity, contradictions, and complexity of social life.” In essence, they

are “the embodiment of the storyteller’s interpretations” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2006: 329-30).

However, I maintain that the interview setting also offers opportunities for storytelling. Recognising that my questions, however open-ended, were authored by me, I encouraged respondents to share their own personal narrative as thoroughly as possible and to organise their own priorities in responding. I resisted overtly political lines of questioning which might guide the interviewee towards the familiar discourses of occupation and resistance typical of most conversations between Palestinians and unfamiliar ‘ajaanib’ (foreigners)¹⁷. I also sought to avoid questions that directly probed the interviewee’s feelings on issues familiar in the national discourse and instead spent much of the interview discussing the interviewee’s family, education, work and everyday life in the city and allowed them to interpret that experience themselves. As a result, I felt that the interview provided a valuable platform for storytelling; the terms in which respondents framed their experience and the stories they chose to tell to give it meaning to me might also be regarded as a personal narrative and the embodiment of their own interpretation.

In this context, in-depth qualitative interviews forefront the agency of individuals and “offer an excellent way to map the conceptual world of participants in ways that illuminate both coherence and inconsistency.” During the course of interviews, disjuncture, ambivalence and inner conflict “bubble to the surface as individuals traverse complex issues” (Soss, 2006: 143). This was very much the

¹⁷ After a number of years lived in East Jerusalem and having visited the occupied territories including the West Bank and Gaza on a score of other occasions, I was familiar with (and impressed by) the proficiency of most Palestinians in the English-language vocabulary of the occupation.

case during my interviews. I frequently felt that respondents were navigating challenging issues about their own agency and identity for the first time and more than once interviewees themselves recognised and acknowledged the internal inconsistency of their statements. Rather than causing them to feel defensive or confused, however, this ambivalence was generally met with wry amusement and raised arms that suggested this somehow captured the essence of the East Jerusalem problem. As Maynes et al. (2008) observe, read carefully, personal life stories provide “unique insights into the connections between individual life trajectories and collective forces and institutions beyond the individual”, thus offering “a methodologically privileged location from which to comprehend human agency” (Maynes, 2008: 3).

All interviews were conducted in English, but respondents occasionally reverted to Arabic in order to express themselves accurately or if they could not recall specific words in English. My understanding of spoken Arabic was often good enough for me to offer the word they were looking for and for the interview to continue in English. On occasion, the interviewee spoke at length in Arabic and while I followed the gist of their meaning at the time, I always undertook a fuller translation after the interview. On odd occasions, a third party who was present in the home or office was called in by the interviewee to help translate their thoughts into English.

Interviews lasted between one and a half and three and a half hours. Most took place in the home or workplace of the interviewee, while a small number took place at my accommodation in the Old City. Almost all were audio recorded, though the conversation sometimes continued after the recording was ended. Bryman (2004) notes that this is the point at which some interviewees choose to

'open up' (Bryman, 2004: 333). Fortunately, this was rarely the case during my interviews. One interviewee refused to be recorded, but allowed me to take detailed notes.

2 Sample and Participant Selection

The target population of this study is East Jerusalem Palestinians and the inclusion criteria were left deliberately broad. Participants were required to be in possession of a valid Israeli identity card, compulsory from the age of 16 in Israel, which identified them as a permanent resident or citizen of the Israeli state. Such cards are blue in colour and are clearly distinguishable from the green identity cards issued by the Palestinian Authority to Palestinians officially resident in the West Bank.

While Israeli identity cards issued since 2005 no longer explicitly state the official ethnicity of the holder (for example Jewish, Arab, Druze, or Circassian), participants were required to have obtained residency status in Israel directly, or indirectly in the case of those born after 1967, through the acquisition and annexation of Palestinian territory by Israel following the 1967 war. Participants were required to be officially resident in Jerusalem. The official address of residents is recorded on their identity card. Palestinians in possession of Israeli residency status whose official address was registered in Jerusalem, but who in reality were resident day to day in the West Bank, were also eligible for inclusion. Participants were also required to be aged 18 or over and to be able to give their full and informed consent.

Individuals who lived in Jerusalem and identified as Palestinian but who did not possess permanent residency status in Israel were excluded. So too were

individuals identifying as Palestinian and resident in Jerusalem but whose Israeli citizenship was acquired as a result of Israel's acquisition of Palestinian territory before 1967, for example, Palestinian Israelis from within Israel's 1948 borders. Children under the age of 18 were excluded from participation, as were other individuals considered at risk or vulnerable.

2.1 Access and Trust

As a trusted member of a local Palestinian family which I had known for almost fifteen years before coming to live with them in 2008, I acquired 'insider' access to the practice of everyday life in East Jerusalem. Family members spoke openly in front of me, argued in front of me, and shared equally their sorrows and their celebrations with me. Their friends soon became my friends and we would sometimes socialise together. Meanwhile, my circle of close acquaintances also grew as my daughter made new friends at school in the Old City and at the YMCA in East Jerusalem where she took part in after-school activities. When my son was born at the Palestinian Red Crescent Hospital on the Mount of Olives in 2009, the number of people I knew and spoke to regularly seemed to grow exponentially. It is through these relationships that I began to perceive a disjuncture between public and academic representations of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem and the way in which Palestinian residents framed their everyday activities and struggles in private.

This awareness developed later into a research proposal, to test the extent to which such a disjuncture existed and to consider its implications for Palestinian identity and struggle in the city. Thomas (1993) notes that the critical ethnographer should not set out to gather data to prove a point. However, it is

appropriate for the researcher to identify a concrete problem through first-hand experience of a setting and then to seek to establish through data gathering if the problem in fact exists. This is very much the approach undertaken here, but returning to Jerusalem as an academic researcher, the main problem I faced was how to achieve the level of trust required to approach personal and sensitive issues with Jerusalem residents beyond my circle of close family and friends.

As discussed below, East Jerusalem Palestinians live with a level of fear and insecurity that discourages openness with strangers, or even acquaintances. Achieving a level of trust with respondents sufficient for them to share with me personal and often incriminating details that could see their residency rights in Jerusalem revoked was always going to be challenging. Providing a sufficiently safe environment for the mother of a young Hamas martyr, for example, to tell me without hesitation that she would rather live under Israeli rule than that of the Palestinian Authority, was not something I would have been able to achieve alone.

Seeking out and gaining the trust of “the ordinary practitioners of the city” who live “below the threshold at which visibility begins” (de Certeau, 1984: 93) became my main challenge. Lefebvre (1991) notes that “the silence of the users is indeed a problem – and it is the entire problem” (Lefebvre, 1991: 365). Power aims to control space entirely and “no space can or may be allowed to escape domination, except in so far as appearances are concerned” (Lefebvre, 1991: 387). As I discuss in detail in Chapter V, “Palestinians experience a generalised feeling of being watched and surveilled” (Zureik, 2016) and, with the stakes so high, this is particularly acute in East Jerusalem.

Shtern (2017) points to a “fundamental difficulty in collecting reliable data on East Jerusalem residents” who are reluctant to cooperate, particularly with Israeli researchers. Suspicion leads to a refusal to participate or to answers intended to pacify the researcher (Shtern, 2017: 8). This was also a concern in seeking to gain the confidence of residents. Trust thus became a key factor in my fieldwork and I relied on a snowball sampling technique to gain access beyond my own circle of acquaintances. I began my interviews with a small number of key informants on whom I then relied, not only to put me in contact with other potential respondents, but to establish a level of trust between us sufficient to make the interview of value to the overall aims of the research.

Atkinson and Flint (2001) note that “the main value of snowball sampling is as a method for obtaining respondents where they are few in number or where some degree of trust is required to initiate contact.” Once the interview had taken place, a respondent was then able to introduce me more widely with the assurance that they had already taken part. This technique of ‘chain referral’ extended the insider or group member status I held within a small circle to a much broader group (Atkinson and Flint, 2001).

While Atkinson and Flint (2001) recognise the problems of snowball sampling, in particular with reference to issues of generalisability, they conclude that snowball-based methodologies offer a valuable means of accessing groups located outside mainstream research. “The real promise of snowball sampling lies in its ability to uncover aspects of social experience often hidden from both the researcher’s and layperson’s view of social life” (Atkinson and Flint, 2001).

2.2 Sample

My sample size of twenty in-depth interviews reflects the very time consuming nature of this method, but also the sensitivity of the subject matter and the inherent difficulties of reaching a population that is usually inaccessible to researchers without the benefit of insider status. While East Jerusalem Palestinians are not entirely absent from the academic literature, the way in which they themselves frame their everyday experience is generally overlooked within mainstream studies that typically rely on descending methodologies or which reify essentialised identities. Alternatively, “ascending methodologies, such as the use of snowball techniques, can be used to look upwards and locate those on the ground who are needed to fill the gaps in our knowledge on a variety of social contexts” (Atkinson and Flint, 2001).

While the sample here is not large, I argue that it quickly reached a point of saturation. Mason (2010) notes that “there is a point of diminishing return to a qualitative sample – as the study goes on more data does not necessarily lead to more information” (Mason, 2010: 1). I began the interviewing process with the expectation that I would find a diverse range of opinions on key issues such as Palestinian leadership, adaptation to occupation and Israeli governance. Instead, I found a startling degree of consensus that is nowhere reflected in the mainstream literature. As the interviews progressed, respondents shared a plethora of personal narratives and stories, but from the outset there was surprisingly little variation in terms of interviewees’ views on key political issues. Mason concludes that sample size should follow the concept of saturation as defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), “when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation” (Mason, 2010).

This is not to claim that the sample presented here is representative of the East Jerusalem Palestinian population as a whole. I do not attempt to reflect the opinions of all Palestinian residents or to capture the quotidian experience of every individual. I believe I have done sufficient, however, to demonstrate that the preoccupation of mainstream studies with top-down issues such as borders and sovereignty fails to take account of the divergent experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians and the potential implications of their dual marginality for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city.

Within the snowballing method adopted, I sought to vary the sample as broadly as possible. In order to access as best I could the unique personal narratives of a broad range of residents, I aimed to avoid altogether interviews with East Jerusalem Palestinians who spoke on behalf of a faction, local NGO or political grouping, or whose views on the political situation in the city were already in the public domain. My concern was that such individuals might struggle to let go of either their public persona or the dominant discursive articulations of Palestinian life in East Jerusalem with which I was already familiar and which they might expect to be of primary interest a British researcher. In the event, my sampling methods led me to only one such figure, who, in the nicest possible way, confirmed these fears. Beyond my interviewees, in informal conversations too, those for whom dealings with the international NGO community or media were a familiar occurrence seemed less willing or able to engage with the more personal and seemingly mundane issues that were of interest to me. Rather, I found that they anticipated and rarely deviated from a more familiar set of concerns that produced an equally familiar vocabulary and narrative. Interviews and conversations were far more natural with residents who were not professionally

involved with international journalists or NGOs. These interviewees often found more personal ways to connect with me, either as women, as mothers, or as academics, for example.

While I was ultimately reliant on key informants and those I had already interviewed to lead me to new respondents, as we discussed potential participants I was able to shape the sample to some extent with reference to factors such as gender and social background. In this way, I achieved a pleasing balance of male and female respondents (nine male and eleven female) and a broad mix of professional and non-professional interviewees (twelve non-professional and eight professional). The final sample also reflects a wide age range. Forty percent of interviewees were aged between 18 and 30, a further 40% were aged between 31 and 55 and the final 20% were aged 55 and over.

It was rather more difficult to ensure a balanced representation of respondents from different geographical locations throughout East Jerusalem. While many East Jerusalem Palestinians remain in or close to family homes, building restrictions and the high cost of living in the city mean that many others have little choice but to relocate to less expensive neighbourhoods, particularly those in the seam zone or outside the separation Wall. As such, there is significant movement of East Jerusalem residents within the municipal boundaries of the city and even beyond. While areas such as Beit Hanina, Shufat, the Old City, Tur and Abu Tur are well represented in this sample, neighbourhoods such as Issawiya are less so. This absence is to some extent compensated for by the informal contacts I made with Palestinians who had moved to Issawiya due to the relatively inexpensive cost of renting property. Among these were a number of non-professional, newly-wed couples unable to afford homes nearer the commercial

centre. The relative isolation and deprivation of an area such as Issawiya is significant, but the main advantage of capturing a good geographic spread among the respondents would be to achieve a sense of the concerns of particular neighbourhoods with regard to possible outcomes for East Jerusalem in future negotiations or unilateral Israeli actions. Residents of the Old City, for example, might confidently predict that Israel would never relinquish control of their neighbourhood, while Palestinians in more outlying areas, closer to the borders of the West Bank, might have good reason to wonder whether jurisdiction over them could be ceded to the Palestinian Authority in a future settlement.

By far the most serious problem I encountered with regard to sample was my relative inability to access East Jerusalem's Christian community. The genuinely warm relationships I had established with Palestinian Christians over more than three years living in East Jerusalem could not overcome apparent communal suspicions or replace the trust extended to me through key informants. As Muslim Palestinians, my key informants often had Christian acquaintances, but not sufficiently close it transpired to build a bridge between them and me on such difficult and intimate issues. I was consistently told by East Jerusalem Muslims that there were no tensions between communities, but Palestinian Christians in the city were often more circumspect. Only one of my interviewees was able to persuade a Christian acquaintance to speak to me, but even then, he refused to allow me to record the interview. I approached a number of my Christian acquaintances myself. The shopkeeper, for example, whose mini-market I had frequented almost daily for three and a half years, whose home I had visited and whose son I had assisted with his visa application to the UK, agreed to participate, but then withdrew. The bookseller on Salah ad-Din Street who agreed to chat to

me informally, but refused to be interviewed and intimated that few Christians would be willing to participate without understanding more fully why I was interested in these issues and what the information would be used for.

Dumper (2014) notes that the Christian community in Jerusalem is in steep decline. In 1946 Christian Palestinians comprised over 19% of the population of the city, yet by 2010 this figure was estimated to have fallen to less than 2% (Dumper, 2014: 111). According to my sole Christian informant, even this statistic is inflated since many Christians registered as resident in East Jerusalem in fact now live abroad, but take steps to preserve the appearance of living in the city in order to retain their residency status. The reluctance of my Christian acquaintances to engage with this study reflects in part the importance of a trusted intermediary in securing participation and the absence of sufficient trust between them and myself or my informants. In total, six Christian Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem whom I approached to participate refused outright, in contrast to only one Muslim Palestinian resident. It might be fair to conclude, therefore, that the trust and temporary insider status I was able to achieve through my key informants with their Muslim contacts did not extend to Christian Palestinians with whom we were acquainted.

While Christian Palestinians are therefore slightly under-represented in this study, the candid contribution offered by the one Christian respondent who did agree to take part and the data accumulated through many informal conversations with Christians in the city suggest that my analysis might not have been significantly different had I found more to take part.

3 Data Analysis and Representation

In this section I address the theoretical and epistemological positions that underpin this study. I examine the question of what knowledge is and how it is produced and position myself and this thesis within this debate. I consider the type of knowledge created through ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviewing, then move on to consider my own role as researcher in the construction of knowledge. Finally, I reflect on the issue of researcher objectivity.

3.1 Theoretical Framework

Throughout this study, I seek to problematise interpretations of everyday life in East Jerusalem that are rooted in mainstream discursive articulations of Palestinians as one side in an objectified conflict. I aim to shed light, as far as possible, on the meanings that individuals themselves attach to their everyday experience and to situate these within a new analytic framework that recognises the everyday as a relevant site for the discursive construction of identities.

Discourse theory, which is centrally concerned with the way in which social agents obtain and live out their identities, offers a useful framework within which to analyse the impact of dislocation and domination on the constitution of political subjectivities in East Jerusalem.¹⁸ The analysis offered here is not a rigorous discourse theoretical case study and is not intended to be such. Discourse theory is 'problem-driven' rather than 'method' or 'theory-driven' in the sense that it is

¹⁸ This approach is rooted in the research programme pursued by the Essex University programme in Ideology and Discourse Analysis and which has come to be known as the Essex School. The discourse theoretic approach which has emerged from this school is rooted in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, in particular LACLAU, E. & MOUFFE, C. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, Verso.

the empirical phenomena under investigation which drive the study. That is very much the case here. I set out at the start of this project with the aim of understanding a specific problematised phenomenon and found significant value in the application of discourse theory as a theoretical perspective, but not as an exclusive one. To this extent, I draw on the underlying assumptions and concepts of this approach among others, but do not exhaustively apply all of its conceptual elements.

Discourse theory is not a 'one-size-fits-all' approach that can be applied a priori to all problems (Howarth, 2005), but it is well suited to a specific range of research problems, including the constitution of political identities and the establishment of political frontiers. These are especially relevant to this study. Discourse theory seeks to provide new interpretations of specific issues by problematising existing accounts and making visible processes or phenomena that were previously obscured by dominant theoretical approaches.¹⁹ This is also a central aim of this study.

In sections of this thesis, I draw on a problem-driven discourse theoretic approach that begins with a political issue in the present and which seeks to analyse and critique the historical and structural conditions within which it emerged. For Howarth (2005), "problem-driven discourse theory not only constitutes new objects of inquiry through interrogating particular phenomena... most importantly,

¹⁹ Discourse theory is distinct from discourse analysis in that the former operates at an ontological level as a range of necessary theoretical presuppositions– for example, the contingency of identity and the primacy of politics – while discourse analysis is more narrowly defined as a toolkit or set of techniques for analysing language in context.

it begins with and challenges the political circumstances within which such theories emerge and operate.” I come back to this final point below.

There is a recognised methodological deficit within discourse theory (Howarth, 2005, Karakatsanis, 2012, Torfing, 2005), derived in large part from its anti-epistemological stance. Within discourse theory, “the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought... What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108).

Since discourse theory holds that there is no extra-discursive truth – that truth is not part of an external reality, but a feature of language that is always local and flexible – it rejects the notion of a general set of methodological rules. According to Torfing, an unfortunate consequence of this anti-epistemological stance is that discourse theory has effectively “thrown the methodological baby out with the epistemological bathwater” (Torfing, 2005: 27). While a universal method consisting of rigid methodological rules is problematic, this should not prevent discourse theorists from addressing methodological questions as they present themselves within problem-driven studies (Torfing, 2005: 28).

The practice of ‘doing fieldwork’ is only just starting to gain attention among discourse theorists (Howarth, 2005, Karakatsanis, 2012, Müller, 2011, Torfing, 2005). There is no single statement of the discursive method, but discourse analysts may collect qualitative data from a range of textual sources and make good use of in-depth interviews and other ethnographic forms of investigation

(Howarth, 2010: 140). For Howarth, “primary documents, in-depth interviews, newspaper reports, observed and unobserved social practices, images, quantitative data, even buildings and historical monuments, are grist to the mill of problem-driven discourse theory” (Howarth, 2005).

Since discourse theory emphasises the value of subjectivity in explaining social reality, in-depth interviews offer a valuable source for generating primary texts. Howarth recognises the difficulties common to interviewing, for example, retrospective rationalisations and hyperbolic representations as well as the methodological difficulties of accessing information that is deliberately or unintentionally hidden. Meanwhile he argues that “a critical reflexivity about one’s own theoretical assumptions and research project, while adopting an ‘ethos of openness’ to the other, are useful ways of guarding against the temptation to reduce the other’s discourse to familiar and self-serving purposes.”

3.2 Reflexivity

Such an approach locates the researcher centrally as an active participant in the process of data gathering and in the presentation of data to an audience. Following this approach, it is essential therefore to consider the position of myself as researcher in the intersubjective creation of knowledge. Fontana and Frey (2005) recognise that the researcher is not a “neutral tool” but rather “a person, historically and contextually located, carrying unavoidable conscious and unconscious motives, desires, feelings and biases” (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 696). Following this, I accept Geertz’s claim that “what we call data are really our own construction of other people’s construction” (Geertz, 1973: 9).

Such a recognition requires a reflexive response. Reflexivity is defined by Shehata (2006) as “being self-conscious about fieldwork and the role of the ethnographer in the production of knowledge” (Shehata, 2006: 246). The power of the traditional ethnographer in the construction of knowledge is clear from the outset as she repeatedly decides in the field what to make note of. Even in recorded interviews, the researcher selects what to recount. From the choice of research topic, through the formulation of questions and the interview process to the decisions I have made about what to recount here, I have been an active participant in the construction of this data rather than a straightforward conductor of knowledge.

Karakatsanis (2012) argues that discourse theory, on which I draw in Chapter VI, needs to reflect more on methodological issues and to devise a creative, self-reflexive approach to the researcher’s presence in the field. “Being *there, in the field of research*, tracing, connecting, finding links and access to, recording and collecting, ‘material’ i.e. enacting the bodily performance of gathering those ‘discourses’ to be analysed as parts of a problem is also an active part of the problematisation procedure itself” (Karakatsansis, 2012: 11).

Throughout this project, I have tried to reflect on my role as observer and researcher and to identify the multiple variables which might influence encounters in the field as well as my interpretation of them. Knowledge gathered through in-depth interviewing is intersubjectively created and power-laden; the ethnographic encounter enacts power relations, but its position within power structures is also complex and potentially counter-hegemonic (Clifford, 1986: 9). A range of factors might influence the mutual construction of knowledge, including language, location and timing, as well as the way in which my own identity is interpreted by

interviewees. The relative significance of each of these factors during my fieldwork depended very much on the specifics of each encounter.

While it is important to recognise that interviews are implicated in power relations, I avoid the reification of cultural difference or the essentialisation of identities. Through various subject positions, I occupied the position of both 'insider' and 'outsider' in relation to interviewees, be it as a friend (or a friend of a friend), a woman, a parent, an academic, or a British person with experience living in East Jerusalem. Indeed, for Abu-Lughod (1989), "to recognise that the self may not be so unitary and that the other might actually consist of many *others* who may not be so 'other' after all is to raise the theoretically interesting problem of how to build in ways of accepting or describing differences without denying similarities or turning these various differences into a single, frozen Difference" (Abu Lughod, 1989: 277). Ultimately, it was the interviewees' understanding that I had shared in some way in their experience in East Jerusalem and that I was broadly sympathetic to Palestinian national aspirations there that secured me access to them in the first place and which was most formative during our encounters.

If there is perhaps one area in which the perception of 'cultural difference' was influential, however, it was in my conversations with male participants. Reading the transcripts and listening again to interviews after my fieldwork, I detected a slight but discernible (to me) difference in my approach to male interviewees that rather took me by surprise. In some, though not all, of these conversations, I recognise myself as a more passive participant than in others and these interviews are perhaps less conversational than those with female informants. In this sense, I came to recognise that I had perhaps brought to the interviews my own constructed understanding of the 'cultural difference' in power relations

between men and women in East Jerusalem and the extra 'sensitivity' I felt was required as a result of my 'foreignness.'

3.3 Objectivity and Partiality

In order to gain access, to build trust and to position myself openly with interviewees, I or my key informants made participants aware of my precise relationship to the city and to the issues addressed by my research. Following Fontana and Frey (2005), I aimed for rapport with interviewees rather than a professional sense of detachment or neutrality: in treating the other as a human being and asking them to reveal them self, it becomes impossible to remain an objective, faceless interviewer; the interviewer is also a person and must disclose them self (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 373-4). In the spirit of being equally open with my audience, I offer here a very brief biographical note.

I visited Jerusalem for the first time in 1990 when I was sixteen years old, on a tour organised by the Federation of Zionist Youth. As an undergraduate, I studied Arabic then History, specialising in the Early Islamic period and the Modern Middle East. While at university, I met and married a Palestinian from East Jerusalem. I went on to complete a Master's degree in the International Politics of the Middle East, then worked in a number of roles that took me often to the region, in particular to East Jerusalem, Gaza, the West Bank and the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. When, in 2008, we learnt that my husband's residency rights had been revoked, we relocated with our young daughter to East Jerusalem in order to re-establish our family's centre of life in the city.

This background sheds light on my immersion in the setting over a number of years, but also raises questions about researcher objectivity and positionality.

Rejecting any claims to objective knowledge, I recognise that “ethnographic truths are thus inherently *partial* – committed and incomplete” (Clifford, 1986: 7). Following Clifford and Abu Lughod, I argue that all knowledge is also positioned. From this perspective, the notion that any researcher stands outside the subject of their research is untenable as it become clear that “every view is a view from somewhere and every act of speaking a speaking from somewhere” (Abu Lughod, 1991: 468).

Abu Lughod focuses on feminist anthropologists and ‘halfies’ – “people whose national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or parentage” (Abu Lughod, 1991: 467). While feminist and halfie researchers cannot avoid the issue of positionality, the persistence of concerns regarding their partiality suggests that the researcher is still defined as one who should stand apart from the Other. What Abu Lughod makes clear, is that “what we call the outside is a position *within* a larger political-historical complex. No less than the halfie, the ‘wholie’ is in a specific position vis-a-vis the community being studied” (Abu Lughod, 1991: 468). Thus, it is dubious to maintain that the relationship between self and other is ever innocent of power.

I acknowledge that I am also politically positioned with regard to the implications of my findings. I argue that the researcher should do more than seek simply to understand or interpret the world, but should also aim to challenge both existing interpretations and the political circumstances within which they emerge. Research can thus be “simultaneously hermeneutic and emancipatory” (Thomas, 1993) and in this sense, I adopt a broadly critical theoretical perspective. For Lather, “doing critical inquiry means taking into account how our lives are mediated by systems of inequality” (Lather, 2004: 205). In line with this, I hold

that both the social construction of knowledge and the methods used for gathering empirical data are “inescapably tied to issues of power” (Lather, 2004), and that there is no “trans-historical, culture-free, disinterested way of knowing” (Lather, 2004: 207). In challenging the top-down optic through which East Jerusalem is commonly viewed, a central aim of this thesis is to make visible the impact of deeply asymmetrical power relations on Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city.

4 Conclusion

In this chapter I set out to describe the methods employed in the course of this study and the theoretical perspectives which underpin them. I have shed light on some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of discourse theory and demonstrated how a broadly discourse theoretical approach may be applied to problematise existing accounts of Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem and to articulate alternative interpretations. The everyday is a relevant site for the discursive construction of identities and the ethnographic approach adopted here has generated significant data which reflects the importance of subjectivity in the constitution of political identities. I have also reflected on my experience as a researcher in the field and the nature of the ethnographic encounter.

I have made it my goal to present a ground-level perspective from East Jerusalem that sheds light on the impact of top-down processes and geopolitical concerns on the everyday lives of Palestinian residents and the space in which they understand their agency to have meaning. Having lived in East Jerusalem, immersed in a Palestinian setting, I had a sense of the divergence between mainstream discursive articulations pertaining to East Jerusalem and the

observable reality around me. Yet during my fieldwork, I was still surprised by the extent of this disparity as well as the willingness and the ability of residents to communicate it. This signalled to me the rootedness of these views in the everyday discourse of East Jerusalem despite their absence from the Palestinian nationalist discourse and the academic literature. Recognising that subjectivity is how people act and that identities are constituted through everyday practice, this also directed me towards a more theoretical discussion of Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in East Jerusalem and their relevance to the wider issues that dominate the existing literature.

CHAPTER IV

EVERYDAY PALESTINIAN LIFE IN THE DISLOCATED CITY: EAST

JERUSALEM RESIDENTS AS AN ISOLATED PALESTINIAN

CONSTITUENCY

To all intents and purposes, East Jerusalem Palestinians live inside Israel's de facto borders, physically and politically dislocated from the West Bank and its residents. Mainstream academic approaches typically emphasise a form of Palestinian agency enacted through efforts to subvert and resist. However, the ground level perspective adopted here makes visible the extent to which the experience of dislocation from the occupied territories has penetrated quotidian practices and shifted the space in which Palestinian agency is meaningful. As the bearer of norms and constraints, practical space has normative and repressive efficacy beyond that which can be achieved through ideology alone (Lefebvre, 1991). While East Jerusalem Palestinians refuse to positively acquiesce in or give legitimacy to Israel's occupation, none the less the state and its institutions are pervasive and engagement with them is an inextricable fact of life for most in the city.

In this chapter, I explore how this Palestinian constituency's divergent experience of Israeli occupation impacts everyday life and decision making in the city, laying the foundations for a detailed discussion of Palestinian subjectivity in East Jerusalem in Chapter VI. First, I explore the extent and implications of East Jerusalem's physical and political isolation from the Palestinian inside. I address East Jerusalem's physical dislocation, arguing that the 'hard' borders of this many-bordered city (Dumper, 2014: 5) are reorienting everyday life in the urban

centre away from Jerusalem's traditional hinterland and fostering a sense of isolation within this Palestinian constituency. Despite broad international rejection of the legality of Israel's annexation, the quotidian experience of Palestinians in East Jerusalem leaves them in no doubt that they live very much inside the Israeli state.

I also detail the collapse of Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem and the atomisation of a community which finds itself physically separated and politically alienated from the body politic. While these processes might yet be reversible, the enduring reality of Israeli political rule in East Jerusalem and the everyday experience of its Palestinian residents are shaping conceptions of what is realistic. They also have a discernible impact on Jerusalemite experiences of and attitudes towards the West Bank and West Bankers (and vice versa).

Second, I argue that the prospects of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem have receded so far (Dumper and Pullan, 2010) that Palestinian residents of the city no longer experience Israeli occupation as temporary (ICG, 2012) nor engage with the Israeli state straightforwardly as an occupation authority. Rejection of the leadership in Ramallah as an illegitimate and ultimately undesirable political authority, leaves Palestinians in Jerusalem with no plausible alternative to an occupation which has already lasted 50 years and to which there is no foreseeable end. For most Palestinian residents, it is impossible to see how challenging, let alone replacing, Israeli state hegemony in East Jerusalem is possible (Yiftachel, 2009a).

Third, I will make clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians experience a matrix of complex and often ambivalent feelings towards and relationships with Israel and

its Jewish citizens. The quotidian experiences out of which these entangled feelings emerge differ from those of West Bank Palestinians whose political milieu is altogether dissimilar and who experience occupation day to day through the conduit of the Palestinian Authority. Here, I challenge mainstream Israeli and Palestinian nationalist discourses which typically favour essentialist representations of identity (Sherwell, 2006). Much of the existing literature on East Jerusalem, which takes as its starting point the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, accepts these representations at face value and as such gives insufficient attention to the implications of East Jerusalem's spatial and political dislocation for Palestinian subjectivities in the city.

Fourth, I will conclude that the subject positions adopted and everyday choices made by individual agents are restricted (though not determined) by power relations and that the particular power complex in which East Jerusalemites operate is defining the limits of their political imagination and diminishing their political horizons. Isolated and criminalised but determined to remain in the city and not entirely without opportunity, East Jerusalem Palestinians are pursuing individualised strategies aimed at achieving a 'normal' life for themselves and their families and improving their material prospects where possible. While the first intifada period was characterised by "suspension of life" strategies (Jean-Klein, 2001) and the second intifada period witnessed a shift towards "affirmation of life" tactics (Junka, 2006, Richter-Devroe, 2011), I will argue that a combination of factors in East Jerusalem in the post second intifada period have produced an individualised "improvement of life" attitude among Palestinians in the city that has little to do with the resistance/normalisation binary and much to do with the power complex in the city and the opportunities for agency.

1. The Inside, Outside: Physical and Political Dislocation

In this section, I discuss the physical and political dislocation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank and begin to explore the impact of this separation on Palestinian life in the city. Addressing first the spatial reality, I focus on the separation Barrier which isolates East Jerusalem from its traditional hinterland. Israeli settlement construction in and around East Jerusalem, as well as the use of national parks to encircle the city's historic inner core (further restricting land use by Palestinians) are tremendously damaging to the viability of a future Palestinian state and to the territorial contiguity of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. However, I focus here on the separation Barrier since this is the most tangible manifestation of the everyday dislocation experienced in East Jerusalem and that which impacts the quotidian practices of residents as opposed to the feasibility of statehood. Reviled and rejected by East Jerusalemites and West Bankers alike, the separation Barrier none the less has normative impact on both communities, the frequency with which they encounter each other and their understanding of the other.

1.1 The Barrier in the Jerusalem Area

Israel's separation Barrier (also known as a separation Wall or Fence) starts at the northern end of the West Bank and roughly traces the Green Line south, generally on the Palestinian side of the boundary and often cutting deep into the West Bank, annexing large portions of land. The impact of this Barrier on individuals and communities across the West Bank and East Jerusalem is well documented. In particular, United Nations bodies, local and international human rights organisations and other NGOs have published a wealth of detailed reports


and studies relating in particular to the human rights violations arising from the Barrier's construction.²⁰ Here I will provide only a brief summary of the general issues relating to the Barrier in the Jerusalem area before proceeding to examine how Palestinian residents in the city frame its impact on their everyday life and attitudes.

The Government of Israel approved construction of a separating Barrier in 2002 following a spate of bomb attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians. While security considerations thus underpinned official Israeli justifications for the Barrier, its construction also facilitated the annexation of additional occupied Palestinian territory (a further 160km² in addition to 70km² annexed in 1967), enforced Israel's de facto political borders and produced a new urban geopolitics in Jerusalem (Yacobi, 2016).

In the Jerusalem area, the Barrier disregards both the Green Line and the Israeli-defined municipal border, dramatically impacting the geography and the economic and social life of the area (UNOCHA, March, 2011). In the context of East Jerusalem, Yacobi (2016) links construction of the separation Barrier to a shift away from urban ethnocracy towards a more radical policy of apartheid.

A brief typology of East Jerusalem Palestinians with reference to the Barrier demonstrates that its presence and the route it takes do not impact the city uniformly.

²⁰ See, for example, LEIN, Y. & COHEN-LIFSHITZ, A. 2005. *Under the Guise of Security: Routing the Separation Barrier to Enable the Expansion of Israeli Settlements in the West Bank*. Jerusalem: Bimkom and B'Tselem; UNOCHA, O. 2011. *Special Focus: Barrier Update*; UNOCHA, O. March, 2011. *East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns. Special Focus*.



Map 2: (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs in the occupied Palestinian territories, UN OCHA oPt)

East Jerusalem Residents on the 'Israeli' Side of the Barrier: The majority of East Jerusalem Palestinians live on the western side of the Barrier on land directly administered by the State of Israel. These Palestinians possess Israeli issued identity cards which are blue in colour. They are regularly required to provide detailed evidence of their everyday life in East Jerusalem, for example when amending their ID cards (required upon marriage or for the addition of a child) or renewing their Israeli issued travel document (Laissez-Passer). East Jerusalem residents have full access to all of historic Palestine, but must access the West Bank through designated crossing terminals along the Barrier.

East Jerusalem Communities on the West Bank side of the Barrier: A conservative estimate by ACRI, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, indicates that more than 120,000 Palestinians with Israeli identity cards live within Jerusalem's municipal boundaries but on the West Bank side of the Barrier, cut off from schools, healthcare and other services to which they are entitled and for which they continue to pay through compulsory municipal taxes (Thrall, 2014). These Jerusalemites suffer daily violations of their rights as Israeli residents. Other than the police and military personnel who staff the checkpoints at the entrances to these neighbourhoods, no Israeli authority has a presence there. The Jerusalem municipality on the whole prohibits its employees from entering these villages and offers no solution for residents who lack municipal services and who effectively reside in a security vacuum, susceptible to growing lawlessness and crime.

West Bank Communities on the 'Jerusalem' side of the Barrier: Arising from the deviation of the Barrier from the Green Line, an estimated 3,870 West Bankers now find themselves living on the western side of the Barrier (UNOCHA-

oPt, November 2013). Palestinians in these communities do not possess residency rights in Israel and are not entitled to live within Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. Their access to urban centres on both sides of the barrier is severely restricted and their lives are perpetually complicated by road blocks and police checks. A special regime of coordination mechanisms and Israeli-issued permits is required simply for them to continue residing in their current location, impeding their freedom of movement and access to services.

East Jerusalem residents seeking better quality of life across the Barrier:

Construction of the Barrier prompted an exodus of residents with Jerusalem identity cards from suburban communities cut off from the urban centre by the Barrier into neighbourhoods on the 'Israeli' side. While the value of land and property on the West Bank side plummeted, this reverse migration to East Jerusalem created an increase in population density and a demand for property on the 'Jerusalem' side of the Barrier that sent prices soaring. The exorbitant cost of renting in East Jerusalem and the overall cost of living in Israel mean that a significant number of Palestinians, still officially resident in the city, in fact live on the Eastern side of the Barrier, often crossing the checkpoints daily to reach work and school. Others, married to West Bankers who do not possess residency rights in Jerusalem, choose to live together on the West Bank side of the Barrier, particularly in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods such as Kufr 'Aqab, which are cut off from the centre by the Barrier. Those residents who live on the West Bank side of the Barrier go to extraordinary lengths to preserve the appearance of permanent residency in East Jerusalem and live with the added insecurity that their status could be revoked if their deception is discovered by the Israeli authorities. There are no official figures for the number of Palestinians in this

situation, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the numbers are not insignificant.²¹

I have selected as the population of this study those Palestinians who are resident in East Jerusalem, who possess a blue Israeli identity card and who live day to day on the Western side of the Barrier. Also included are a small number of East Jerusalem residents who in fact live day to day in the West Bank, but who maintain the pretence of permanent residency on the western side of the Barrier and of centre of life in the city.

1.2 The Barrier and Everyday Life

Today, physical barriers and a repressive permit regime preclude the free movement of West Bank Palestinians across Israel's de facto borders into Jerusalem. Approximately four million Palestinians from the occupied territories are prohibited from entering the city unless they have Israeli-issued permits, which are notoriously difficult to obtain (UNOCHA, 2014). Palestinians who possess Israeli residency status are permitted free movement between Israel and the West Bank but, in reality, are subject to the same checks, queues and delays that beset West Bankers with permission to cross.

In addition to the physical barriers that separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank, Israel operates a 'centre of life' policy which necessarily orients the

²¹ As well as interviewing a number of East Jerusalem residents who live semi-permanently on the West Bank side of the Barrier, I was unable to locate several potential interviewees because there was never anyone at home at the small Jerusalem address where they were supposed to live. Neighbours confirmed informally that they lived semi-permanently elsewhere, maintaining this address for official residency purposes only.

everyday life of East Jerusalem Palestinians away from the West Bank. By making the residency status of Palestinians in the city conditional on their ability to provide detailed evidence that their life is based in Jerusalem rather than elsewhere in the occupied territories or abroad, East Jerusalemites live with the fear of their residency status being revoked if they live, work or go to school beyond the Barrier. Such a policy contributes to the vulnerability of East Jerusalem Palestinians and to the weakening of ties between Jerusalem and the West Bank.

In this section, I explore the extent to which, for the majority of East Jerusalem residents who live, work and study in the city, the impediments to free movement between Jerusalem and the West Bank are influencing behaviour and attitudes. There is little evidence to suggest that East Jerusalem residents have devised tactics to circumvent Israel's isolation of their city from the West Bank. Rather, the data collected here indicates that those for whom travel between East Jerusalem and the West Bank is not a daily necessity, are increasingly reluctant to subject themselves to the inconvenience and humiliation it entails.

Nasser, for example, owns a successful fashion retail business in Salah al-Din Street. His work occasionally requires him to travel to the West Bank, but he is reluctant to go because the journey is difficult, time consuming and often humiliating. If he can avoid it, he will.

“The way to there is very hard, it's very complicated. Because there is a Wall and a checkpoint and because the people, you know, they are not intelligent, they are passing from here and from there and they are fighting along the way and I don't like it. Sometimes, when I need to go, when I *really* need to go, then I go, but I

am suffering a lot if I go... I am going for only one hour or one and a half hours and I am fed up to be there. And I am saying, when I get back to Jerusalem, thanks God, really, thanks God! I am saying every time like that!”

Hanan, a headmistress in East Jerusalem, was born in Ramallah and acquired a blue identity card through her marriage to a Jerusalem resident. The couple wed in 1984, and lived together in Ramallah until 1989 despite the fact that both worked in Jerusalem. The relative freedom of movement prior to the outbreak of the first intifada allowed them to remain close to family in the West Bank while retaining easy access to Jerusalem.

“We came every day to Jerusalem and sometimes, you know, we came in the morning to Jerusalem to work and then we went home, ate and relaxed a while and thought, ‘Okay, let’s go for a drive’ and we would go back to Jerusalem! It was only 20 minutes... So we were living as if it were the same city, Ramallah and Jerusalem. It was nothing. The people in Jerusalem if they wanted to eat ice cream they would go to Rukab²² in the evening. Now, Rukab? What? I don’t want to eat ice cream! I will stay here! Anything you want to do just to go outside Jerusalem, you remember that there is a checkpoint. You say, Qalandiya, no way! I will not go!”

Dr Sharif is from a long-established Jerusalem family. He also visits the West Bank less now than in previous years.

“We go to the West Bank, but not often. Qalandiya is miserable. It can take two hours to cross 100m... In the West Bank, they are living more comfortably than

²² Rukab is a popular ice cream restaurant in Ramallah

us, but if they see our cars with the yellow number plates, the price of everything is going up for us. If something costs \$10, it will be for us \$20 dollars immediately. We don't feel that we are, you know. Well, the West Bank is something else now. This is from politics."

Khalid owns a number of small businesses in East Jerusalem. When construction on the Barrier began in 2002 he moved from al-Ram to Beit Hanina in order to protect his residency rights and to avoid the delays that the Barrier would add to his daily commute. He still travels often to al-Ram to visit family, but does so late in the evening when the crossing is clearer. Before the Barrier, he explains, the journey from Beit Hanina to al-Ram took only around ten minutes or so on foot. Now, during the day it can take over an hour by car.

This is not to say that all travel by East Jerusalem Palestinians to the West Bank has ceased. Jerusalem residents retain the right of free travel between Israel and the West Bank and clearly, despite the obstacles, many still make the journey there, be it to visit relatives, to attend weddings or funerals, to shop and even to work. It is clear, however, that for many Palestinians, their attitude to visiting the West Bank is changing. The fluidity of the pre-first intifada period described by Hanan is gone and the effort of crossing the Barrier now usually warrants a purpose. Several interviewees pointed to the fact that many goods are less expensive in the West Bank. For shopping and recreation, Ramallah and Jericho offer a familiar 'Arab' experience at much lower prices than East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the relative ease of access to Jericho means that this is increasingly a preferred destination for an afternoon or evening out. Despite its greater distance from Jerusalem, the quality of the roads and the relatively minor checkpoint on this route means that it is quicker and less stressful for East

Jerusalemites to go there than Ramallah. The tensions in East Jerusalem at the time of my research also contributed to the popularity of Jericho as a destination for East Jerusalem Palestinians in search of recreation. Interviewees who would previously have had no hesitation visiting destinations inside Israel to enjoy their leisure time said that, while tensions were high, they felt more unwelcome or uncomfortable on the beach at Jaffa than they had previously. Jericho offers an Arab environment without the challenges of crossing Qalandiya.

West Bank universities also remain a popular destination for post-Tawjihi students from East Jerusalem who wish to pursue undergraduate study (Tawjihi is the name of the Palestinian matriculation exam, sat in East Jerusalem and the occupied territories. The Israeli equivalent is called Bugrut). Significantly lower fees, a Palestinian environment, insufficient Hebrew language skills and the fact that most Jerusalem Palestinians complete Tawjihi rather than Bugrut all ensure that Palestinian universities remain popular with East Jerusalem students over Israeli institutions.

Examples such as these, however, reinforce the conclusion that East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting to the spatial reality imposed by the Barrier rather than devising tactics to subvert it. East Jerusalem Palestinians continue to travel to or study in the West Bank, but where this occurs it is generally because there is something available there that is not available or is more expensive inside Israel. Existing research emphasises the way in which Palestinian movement through exclusively Jewish areas, making strategic use of their amenities, transgresses the efficacy of borders (Baumann, 2016). A similar approach to the movement of East Jerusalem residents into and through the Palestinian space of the West

Bank might shed light on the extent to which quotidian practices are being shaped by Israeli-imposed boundaries.

1.3 Background to East Jerusalem's Political Dislocation

The de facto boundaries of the Israeli state delimit the extent of the Palestinian Authority's political influence. While at the periphery this border is sometimes blurred by disjunctive and conflicting boundaries, throughout the main body of the territory defined as East Jerusalem there is no room for confusion over where political power resides. East Jerusalem Palestinians live under Israeli rule, well beyond the political reach of the Palestinian Authority. The factions have all but ceased to exist as a political force in the city and no alternative leadership has been allowed to take root (ICG, 2012).

Jerusalem's traditional elite, already absent or in decline by the end of the mandate period, collapsed in 1948.²³ In the period following the defeat of 1967, the newly emerging internal leadership of Jerusalem struggled against both Israeli rule and the national leadership in exile which upheld the importance of Jerusalem as a national symbol and future capital, but would not give succour to alternative loci of power.

The Oslo process solidified the triumph of the outside leadership over that inside the territories, but also dealt a severe blow to Palestinian political organisation in

²³ For a fuller discussion of Palestinian political organisation in Jerusalem in the period before 1948 see ABOWD, T. P. 2014. *Colonial Jerusalem: The Spatial Construction of Identity and Difference in a City of Myth, 1948-2012*, Syracuse University Press; ANDERSON, J. 2008. From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts: A Framework for Studying 'Divided Cities' in 'Contested States'- Part 1. *Divided Cities/Contested States Working Papers*; KHALIDI, R. 1997. *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*; KLEIN, M. 2001. *Jerusalem: The Contested City*, C. Hurst; PAPPE, I. 2010. *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700-1948*, London, Saqi Books.

East Jerusalem. The Oslo Accords introduced limited Palestinian self-government to the occupied territories, but, in principle, prohibited Palestinian Authority activity in East Jerusalem (ICG, 2012). The 1993 Declaration of Principles made clear that “Jurisdiction of the Council [Palestinian Authority] will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations... It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest” (MFA, 1993).

The PLO negotiating track supplied Israel with an unmissable opportunity to secure Palestinian compromise over the future of Jerusalem. Lustick (1993) argues that “[t]he single most important reason that Rabin shook hands with Arafat on September 13, 1993, was that the delegation from the territories, with whom he much preferred to reach an agreement, refused to accept postponement of the Jerusalem question.” Former Israeli diplomat Dore Gold agrees that “one of the reasons that Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was willing to pursue a secret negotiating track with the PLO in Oslo... was precisely because the PLO was willing to exclude Jerusalem from any interim self-governing arrangements for the Palestinians.” Gold contrasts Arafat’s position with that of the local Palestinian delegation to peace talks in Washington (in preparation for the 1991 Madrid Conference), led by Faisal Husseini, which insisted that East Jerusalem be included in any future Palestinian government (Gold, 2007).

In protracted negotiations over the terms of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres promised “not to hurt existing Palestinian

institutions in East Jerusalem, including the Orient House, in exchange for Arafat giving in to his demand to remove the city from the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority... Thus, while the Palestinian delegation in Washington was, with the encouragement of the PLO leadership, presenting tough positions on the Jerusalem question, the same leadership was making its position more flexible in the secret Oslo channel” (Klein, 2001: 150).

Musallam (1996) agrees that the commitment made by Peres not to interfere with Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem was fundamental to securing PLO assent to the Declaration of Principles, but describes in detail how the Israeli government reneged on the deal (see Chapter II). While the interim period should not, in theory, have allowed either side to pursue actions which might prejudice the outcome of final status negotiations on issues such as Jerusalem, in reality the situation proved very different. While both sides entered a race to determine the future of East Jerusalem (Klein, 2001), the preponderance of Israeli power in the city provided it with an overwhelming advantage.

1.4 The Palestinian Leadership Vacuum

The downward spiral in the fortunes of Palestinian political authority in Jerusalem from the mid-1990s onwards produced a leadership deficit in the city from which there is no sign recovery. On the contrary, this vacuum has deepened since the 2006 election which confirmed East Jerusalem’s disaffection with the status quo.

Usher (2006) described the Hamas victory in Palestinian Legislative elections in January 2006 as “nothing short of epochal” (Usher, 2006: 20). Overwhelmingly, he claimed, Palestinians were not voting for armed resistance or for political Islam. Rather, they were giving voice to their disillusionment with negotiations

with Israel that appeared to bring a meaningful peace no closer; their appreciation of Hamas' role as civic provider and vanguard position in the armed resistance; and above all, "revulsion from a decade of Fatah's misrule of the PA" (Usher, 2006: 21). Hamas won an absolute majority in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, securing 74 seats out of a total of 132. By comparison, the ruling Fatah party, which had dominated the first Palestinian Legislative Council, won only 45 seats. Thirty-nine thousand East Jerusalem Palestinians cast a ballot in the Jerusalem district and while support for Hamas on the national lists was slightly lower than average (41% in Jerusalem compared to 44.4 nationally), Fatah proved significantly less popular in Jerusalem than elsewhere in the occupied territories, securing only 35% of the Jerusalem vote compared to 41.4% nationally. Centre-left parties proved more popular in East Jerusalem than anywhere else (Cohen, 2011).

Despite its success in Jerusalem in 2006, winning all four of the district seats it contested, Hamas was unable to capitalise politically on its victory; the firmness with which Israel dealt with the party's elected representatives (revoking their residency rights) delivered a powerful message to East Jerusalem. According to a prominent Islamist educator in Jerusalem, interviewed by the International Crisis Group in 2012 (ICG, 2012), Israel all but destroyed the Palestinian factions in the city. "The factions might be present in the sense that people identify with certain positions or ideologies, but today it makes no sense to try to figure out how the political pie is divided among Hamas, Fatah and anyone else. The question has no meaning... The factions cannot hold activities. There is nobody you can point to as a leader" (ICG, 2012: 7). Moreover, revocation of the residency rights of the city's elected representatives served as a reminder to all

East Jerusalemites, if such were needed, of their underlying vulnerability and insecurity.

The data collected here supports this contention that today there is no individual or group offering effective leadership to East Jerusalem Palestinians. It also attests to the antagonism between them and the leadership entrenched in Ramallah. Israeli actions and policies have stifled Palestinian political activity in the city, but East Jerusalemites clearly regard the Palestinian Authority as complicit in this collapse. They are forthright in their rejection of the PA as a worthy or effective leadership (for all Palestinians) and consistent in the view that there is no political authority to which East Jerusalemites can turn.

Summa, a junior doctor, was vehement. "I do not accept the Palestinians or the Israelis. I don't prefer either. Nobody. I will not choose any of them. We don't have a leader that deserves this place or anyone who deserves to lead us." Ahmad, a graduate engineer, was equally clear. "No one. We have no one. If you want to find someone in Jerusalem who tells you that the Palestinian Authority is a leader for them, try finding someone who is paid to say this. Abu Mazen represents only himself."

Hanan, the school headmistress, also explains why she feels East Jerusalem Palestinians are without leadership.

"I don't consider any of them my leader because they don't discuss my issue... My father's house [inside Israel's 1948 borders] is a place for mentally ill people now. It's a very beautiful home so they thought it would be a good place for a rehabilitation centre... I need a leader who is aware that Palestine is not only in Nablus or Khalil [Hebron] or Ramallah. That there are also people who are

Palestinian from Haifa, Yaffa, Akka and that these people, we should discuss their right to return to their homeland. Nobody is talking about that. They only want to keep the West Bank as Palestine. The West Bank is not *Palestine*! No leader is willing to talk about our rights. No leader is aware that there is Palestinian people who need their problem to be solved.”

Even those who had enjoyed a long association with Fatah said they were now disillusioned. “I was part of Fatah from when I was ten years old, during the first intifada. I was in jail in 1992 to 1993. After I got out of jail I was involved in Fatah in al-Ram but after the peace, here I took the side of Fatah that opposed Oslo. When the second intifada began, there was no Oslo anymore and Fatah was one again. But after Arafat died, all the situation with the Palestinian Authority changed. Now the Palestinian people are cut, between Hamas and Fatah, between Gaza and West Bank, between Jerusalem and West Bank. Now Abbas is dictator of the Palestinian Authority. The most safety for the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank is for the Palestinian Authority to leave and return it to the Jewish. It is better for everyone. The Palestinian Authority is part of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank. They will not allow us to have a leadership in Jerusalem because if we love him in Jerusalem then the people of the West Bank will love him too and the PA will not allow this. It’s a game for them. They are playing with Jerusalem.”

Ziad, a postgraduate student at the Hebrew University, was vigorous in his rejection of the PA, but offered an unusually positive perspective on the Palestinian leadership vacuum in the city.

“Abu Mazen does not represent me. I represent myself. East Jerusalem people have no leaders... Year after year the PLO moved away from the resistance route towards the peace route and year after year they were slowly killing the Jerusalem case. So now... we don't have a leader in Jerusalem. And this is a positive thing. We have our own ideas... Netanyahu has not found a solution to deal with the Jerusalem people. If there was still Orient House, he would make some argument or conversation with them and agree a solution. If there is no leadership, there is no one to give away our rights or our land. Without Orient House, he [Netanyahu] has to sit with every one of us, all three hundred thousand, to agree a solution... Abu Mazen doesn't represent me and he doesn't represent any Jerusalem people. If you do a questionnaire for everyone, you won't find any East Jerusalem person who loves the PA... They are not negotiating with Israel; they are *giving* Jerusalem to Israel.”

The decline in Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem was accelerated by the exclusion of the city from the interim phase of the Oslo process. Israel may bear greater responsibility for the collapse of Palestinian politics in East Jerusalem, but the rancour of its residents is reserved largely for the Palestinian Authority which many believe has abandoned the city.

1.5 Relations Across the Barrier

From the previous section, it is clear that, in addition to the imposition of severe restrictions on the free movement of West Bank Palestinians, the Barrier between Jerusalem and the West Bank also serves to deter Palestinians on the western side from undertaking unnecessary travel to destinations inside the West Bank. Construction of the Barrier has also contributed to an escalation in the number of

East Jerusalem Palestinians seeking work in West Jerusalem. Yacobi (2016) records that since 2011, almost 50% of East Jerusalem's labour force has been employed in the Jewish sector in West Jerusalem or in other Israeli cities. Thus, "while Jerusalem remains a colonial city, its strategy has also been transformed by neoliberal economic restructuring."²⁴

Next, I turn to the impact of physical and political dislocation on relations between Palestinians in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. How do East Jerusalemites understand and frame their growing isolation from Palestinians in the West Bank? In this section, I explore the attitudes of East Jerusalem residents and conclude that conditions on the ground are influencing social attitudes and relationships.

Hanan does not claim that East Jerusalem's isolation from the West Bank has set the city on an irreversible trajectory, but she does acknowledge that family relations and social life are negatively impacted. "If you want to go to a wedding in Ramallah, for example, you say 'Oh, I have to cross Qalandiya and I will stay for an hour there, so I won't go.' In this way, you hurt the relationship between you and the one who invited you to the wedding."

Fenster and Shlomo (2011) demonstrate that the frequency of social gatherings between East Jerusalemites and West Bankers has diminished considerably since construction of the Barrier, which also disrupts patterns of everyday life in areas such as marriage, mourning and burial ceremonies. At the quotidian level, the Barrier disrupts the functioning of the people and institutions which

²⁴ Citing a 2015 Hebrew language report on East Jerusalemites in the Israeli labour market, Yacobi reveals that since 2000, the number of Palestinian workers in the city has increased from 40,000 to 70,000, while a significant gap in the average income between Jewish and Palestinian workers has been maintained.

characterise a “normative modern urban lifestyle” (Fenster and Shlomo, 2011). The different civil status of East Jerusalem residents and the associated benefits of residency, moreover, are contributing to a sense of social detachment and deepening the “social otherness” of relations between them and the West Bank (Fenster and Shlomo, 2011).

The data collected here supports this conclusion. Qudar says she would not marry a man from the West Bank as the risk to her residency and the complications it would involve would be too great. Those I interviewed who were already married to West Bankers spoke of the social differences as well as the difficulties they encountered.

Saha is well placed to consider the ways in which attitudes on both sides are shifting. She was born and raised in Jerusalem’s Old City, but when she was in her mid-teens, her family moved to the West Bank side of the Barrier where they could afford a larger property and enjoy a better quality of life. Saha remained at school in Jerusalem, crossing the checkpoints daily. She went on to study Dentistry at a West Bank university and lived in the West Bank throughout her undergraduate degree. After graduating, Saha married a Palestinian with a West Bank ID. They live now in Ramallah, but Saha travels several times a week to and from Jerusalem where she works as a kupaṭ ḥolim dentist.

“I don’t think that the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Palestinians in Jerusalem are feeling like one group. There is different thinking now. I see the different thinking between both sides. Some of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem they are thinking like Israelis, a few they are thinking like Palestinians in the West

Bank and many are not thinking at all... I think that there will be a big problem between Palestinians if they will be all together in future.”

Sara is also a Jerusalem resident. Like Saha, she is an observant Muslim who wears the hijab. Her husband is originally from Hebron, but she warned him when they married that she could never live there.

“People in the West Bank are much different in their way of thinking. Especially about the girls and boys. I am serious. A woman from Jerusalem cannot live in the West Bank. She would have to leave a lot of her rights. I can’t live there. Okay, not all the West Bank is the same. Hebron has a different mentality. Everything is forbidden for the girls. It is very strict. It’s different in Ramallah, Ramallah is more open-minded because a lot of people in Ramallah came from America. Bethlehem is different again. You can’t say all the places are the same. But they don’t think like us [in Jerusalem].”

Sara also felt that West Bankers had many misconceptions about life in Jerusalem.

“They say we are lucky because we have rights to go to places they can’t go to. So they can’t go to the sea, for example, until they have a permission from the Israelis to travel. So, they think that we are always going on a vacation, that it’s always summertime! They think our life is so easy. Our life is hard. We have a lot to pay, I can’t let my children walk alone because in our street because there are Jews, there are tourists. There [in the West Bank], they allow their child to walk in the street from two years old. They feel it is safe. The mum she can feel relaxed. It makes her life easy. But we can’t. Our life is really hard here.”

Others echoed this sense that West Bank attitudes towards East Jerusalemites are changing and that West Bankers have a false impression of life in the city. A number of interviewees related experiences in which their nationalist credentials or commitment had been directly challenged by a West Banker simply because they are from East Jerusalem. Summa is 25 years old. She was born in East Jerusalem and lived there until she was 18. After studying Medicine at a West Bank university, she took the Israeli equivalence exam to work in Israel. She went on to complete her training year (*staj* in Hebrew) at an Israeli hospital near Tel Aviv. While she applies for residency positions in Israel, she lives at home with her family who now, for financial reasons, live on the eastern side of the Barrier.

“West Bank Palestinians have a bad idea about Palestinians from East Jerusalem, they think that we are like the Jewish, that we don’t have any religion, that we don’t have any relation with Palestine and we say okay to the Israelis to do whatever they want and we are integrated with the Israelis. They think we look down on them and that we don’t have morals, or that we have bad morals. Once, when I was at university, there were student elections and one of the student representatives saw me voting and saw that my ID was blue. He said, ‘You are from Jerusalem!’ He said I was Yehudi [Jewish], ‘Inti Yehudi!’ Because there is separation and they can’t mix with us, they don’t know us anymore.”

I asked Summa if she agreed that East Jerusalemites look down on West Bankers.

“Actually, I see that we are lower than them. They have education, they have money. People from Jerusalem are *jahaleen*, *yane* ignorant! They are lower educated. If you look at teenagers in Jerusalem, a large percentage don’t go to

university or even finish Tawjihi. They go to the Israeli side to work, just to make money. In the West Bank, they continue their education, they go to university, they do sub-speciality, and so on. They have more money and they live their life well. I see in Nablus and in Ramallah, for example, they are comfortable more than us.”

George is a Christian Palestinian and an officially registered guide who leads tours throughout Israel visiting Christian holy sites. He agrees that lack of familiarity is largely to blame for the growing cleavage between East Jerusalem Palestinians and West Bankers. He says you can see the differences in the way they dress and the way they eat. “They say to us, ‘You take *arnona* from the *Yehude!*’ They mean *tutmeen* (social security) but they say *arnona*, which is the council tax we pay to the Israelis. They are totally ignorant about us and about our lives in Jerusalem.”

As a Christian, George is pessimistic about the future. “There has been very serious damage in the Palestinian community as a result of the separation from the West Bank. This crack can never be repaired. I am sorry to say this to you, but it all started with the English. Since the mandate the Palestinian community has been divided into groups. It’s still divide and rule.”

Ziad is 27 years old. As an undergraduate, he also experienced the negative attitude of some West Bankers to East Jerusalem Palestinians, but he believes that this situation could change.

“I studied in Bir Zeit. I was in the West Bank and I was often told I was close to Jews. They would say that I am not Palestinian and that I have forgotten the Palestinian case. And maybe some Jerusalemites look down on West Bankers,

but as Hegel said, when there is a big disaster that comes upon all the people, all the people think about one thing, to survive. After the Abu Khdeir case all the Palestinians are on one side, West Bankers and Jerusalemites.²⁵ They believe now that they have the same enemy, which is Israel... Secondly, in past years when I was at Bir Zeit university, West Bankers would say to Jerusalemites 'you are not resisting, you are just going to Tel Aviv, swimming in the sea.' But after the case of Abu Khdeir we proved we are in the same boat... Now when I go to Ramallah or to Bethlehem they say, 'Oh, you are from Jerusalem, you did this, 1,2,3, to resist. And I do so for West Bankers too, 'Oh, you did so and so to resist.' The disaster came and now we are the same. It has melted the borders between us."

As a student in the West Bank, Ziad had felt that there were divisions between East Jerusalemites and West Bankers as a result of the separation, based largely on misunderstandings arising from their unfamiliarity with the world in which the other lived. However, he felt strongly that the case of Abu Khdeir had brought Palestinians together.

Despite Hazen's optimism, the data suggests that many East Jerusalem Palestinians do in fact discern a widening gulf between themselves and Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories as a result of their divergent social and political trajectories. Some already feel the differences quite keenly, claiming for example that the social norms recognised and respected by East

²⁵ At the beginning of July 2014, days after the bodies of three missing Jewish teenagers were found in the West Bank, a 16-year-old East Jerusalem Palestinian, Muhammad Abu Khdeir was kidnapped and burnt alive by Jewish extremists on the outskirts of the city. The murder triggered an upsurge in violence that has been described as the 'silent' or 'knife' intifada. See THRALL, N. 2014. Rage in Jerusalem. *London Review of Books*. London. At the time of my fieldwork in March 2016, the series of unconnected attacks by individual Palestinians on Israeli targets, usually with a knife or vehicle, was ongoing.

Jerusalem Palestinians at the Haram al-Sharif are not understood by West Bankers visiting the city's Islamic holy sites. Osama complained that during the holy month of Ramadan, when Israel sometimes permits larger than usual numbers of West Bankers access to Jerusalem, their presence is disruptive and their behaviour on occasion inappropriate. Osama says that when Ramadan ends, or Israel revokes the right of access for West Bankers, there is a sense among Jerusalemites that al-Aqsa can now "get back to normal." Rana also felt that when West Bankers visit the Haram they fail to adhere to the customary etiquette or to respect the sanctity of the compound, shouting, swearing and smoking cigarettes or argileh "like they are on holiday."

Such attitudes notwithstanding, during periods of confrontation or raised tensions, East Jerusalem Palestinians are generally keen to distance themselves from Israel and to show solidarity with Palestinians elsewhere in the Occupied Territories. During Israel's military assault on Gaza during the summer of 2014, for example, many East Jerusalem Palestinians chose to boycott Israeli retail stores and where possible, to avoid purchasing Israeli products.

However, even East Jerusalem individuals and institutions actively seeking to preserve or strengthen ties with the West Bank sometimes find that this is harder said than done. In a light-hearted anecdote, Hanan, the headmistress of an all-girls school in East Jerusalem, explained that when tensions between Israel and the Palestinians were high, her staff agreed that they should show solidarity with Palestinians in the West Bank, despite the loud protests of their students.

"Last year we thought that we shouldn't go to the Israeli side as usual for the annual school trip. So, we went to Jenin area. They [the students] were so angry

at us that we chose to take them to Jenin. 'What is in Jenin?' they cried... We explained to them that it is Arab, that the place you are going to it is really nice, that we want to give our money to the Palestinians, not to the Israelis. On the other hand, it is irony, we faced so many problems! We had a reservation there [in Jenin], we made an agreement with them that we would be the only school there, but so many buses came with large groups of *shabab* [young men]. So, we told them to come back to school, don't enter there. And the company had to compensate us. And where did we go after that? Ramat Gan in Israel! So, we tried [to support the West Bank], but we did not succeed."

The disappointment of Hanan's students at the prospect of a trip to Jenin reflects the popular view among East Jerusalem Palestinians with access to both Israeli and Palestinian operated sites that Israel offers superior recreational facilities and the potential for a far more satisfactory leisure experience. Indeed, East Jerusalem Palestinians are increasingly looking beyond the fact of occupation as an explanation for Palestinian shortcomings and often hold social and political practices in the West Bank responsible. Such assumptions are felt to be validated when attempts such as this to show support for West Bank enterprises backfires.

1.6 Summary

In this section I have addressed the way in which East Jerusalem residents frame the impact of their physical and political dislocation from the West Bank on everyday Palestinian life in the city. Familial ties remain and East Jerusalem residents continue to access the West Bank for goods and services unavailable, inaccessible or overly expensive within Jerusalem. However, it is clear from the accounts of East Jerusalem residents that their physical separation and political

alienation from the West Bank are influencing practices and perceptions in the city. In the following section, I look at how the experience of leaderlessness and dislocation is compounded by the longevity of Israel's occupation and its perceived unassailability in the city.

2. The Limits of Palestinian Political Imagination

East Jerusalemites, sceptical of the plausibility of Palestinian demands for statehood with a capital in East Jerusalem, increasingly define Israeli rule in the city as a long-term reality. In international legal terms, Israel's territorial annexation is not recognised nor are its claims that 'united' Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish state (UN Security Council Resolutions 252, 267, 471, 46, 478). In reality, however, little has been done to arrest the proliferation of Jewish settlements in and around occupied East Jerusalem or to counter Israeli measures which serve to isolate and undermine the Palestinian presence in the city. Almost two and a half decades after the Declaration of Principles, a two-state solution has never seemed more distant. At present, Israeli rule in East Jerusalem is simply a reality and few in the city can imagine challenging its hegemony.

Moreover, after two decades of Palestinian governance in the West Bank, viewed by East Jerusalemites from the outside, this constituency now questions the desirability of a two-state solution. Many in the city recognise that in a in which they would be required to settle for a truncated Palestinian entity that fell significantly short in terms of both their national ambitions and their existing rights and opportunities as residents of Israel.

2.1 Reframing the Hegemonic Boundary Debate

A key theme in the literature since Oslo is the extent of Israel's success in 'unifying' Jerusalem under its control (Dumper, 2014, Klein, 2008, Lustick, 1996, Lustick, 1997). Eschewing the top-down analytic optic through which this debate usually takes place, but not wishing to discard it altogether, I seek to reframe the hegemonic boundary issue to account for the impact of Israeli power on Palestinian opinion and to ask whether a boundary has been crossed in terms of Israel's hegemonisation of the political imagination in East Jerusalem. Can East Jerusalem Palestinians, isolated and atomised, imagine replacing, or even challenging Israeli power in the city? I explore Palestinian political horizons in East Jerusalem, taking account of the extent to which everyday life is entwined with Israel, the failure of the national movement to project an inclusive liberation narrative and rejection of the PA.

Lustick has written extensively on official Israeli attempts since 1967 to project 'united' Jerusalem as the immutable capital of the Jewish state. He argues consistently that this hegemonic project has failed to take root in Israeli public opinion. Writing at the start of the Oslo period, Lustick argued that while "the failure to integrate expanded Jerusalem into the collective Israeli psyche was not for want of trying" the fact remains that "Israeli beliefs in the immutability of expanded Jerusalem are not hegemonic" (Lustick, 1993).

In 1996, Lustick urged that the problem of Jerusalem be treated as typical in its exemplification of the politics of hegemonic construction and deconstruction. He concluded that "the fetish of expanded Jerusalem has not yet achieved hegemonic status within Israeli politics", arguing that the refusal of Palestinians

to normalise as citizens or permanent residents and their participation in the intifada had “transformed the Arab sections of the city into zones of unfamiliarity and fear” (Lustick, 1996).

After the collapse of Oslo at Camp David in 2000, Lustick further argued that Israel’s campaign to present ‘Yerushalayim’ as its united and indivisible capital “was successful in some ways, but ultimately failed as a hegemonic project” (Lustick, 2000). An examination of the gap between official Israeli platitudes and the emotional and political realities would reveal the extent of Israeli flexibility on the future of Jerusalem.

Dumper (2014) argues for a disaggregation of the functional, political and social borders of the city, claiming that while the incongruence of these boundaries leaves many areas of occupied East Jerusalem in a twilight zone, it also, importantly, also suggests areas of greater flexibility over a negotiated agreement on the city” (Dumper, 2014: 6). A central theme of his approach here is “the tension between the attempt by the Israeli government to assert its political control over the new borders and its ability to consolidate a hegemonic presence in the eastern part of the city” (Dumper, 2014: 10)

Amirav (2009) argues that after 40 years of occupation, not one of the five national goals set by Israeli policy makers for Jerusalem after the 1967 was achieved. Klein (2008) also claims that Israel’s annexationist project has failed and that Jerusalem remains very clearly a frontier city.

Lustick’s exclusive focus on Israeli public opinion as a measure of the success of the hegemonic project in Jerusalem fails to take account of its impact on Palestinians in the city who are cast in the one-dimensional role of resisters.

Dumper pays greater attention to the impact on Palestinians themselves, highlighting Israel's partial and incomplete annexation, important Palestinian jurisdictions left intact and the evidence of Palestinian autonomy in these areas which challenges the presumption of Israeli sovereignty in the city (Dumper, 2014). In Chapter V, I discuss how informality and sub-formality as manifestations of Israel's colonial regime facilitate control of East Jerusalem and account for these pockets of autonomy. Here, I argue that the hegemonic boundary debate should be reframed to take account of the extent to which Palestinian political horizons in East Jerusalem are shaped by exclusive Israeli rule. The ground level perspective adopted here makes visible these trends, which are typically obscured within mainstream approaches that privilege top-down processes.

2.2 Part of Israel as a fact of Life

Conceptualising the notion of hegemony in part as the power to define what is realistic (Mitchell, 1990), I situate East Jerusalem Palestinians' accounts of their own experience within the context of existing power relations in the city. In the following chapter, I address specific aspects of Israeli power and control in East Jerusalem, the extent to which it has penetrated the praxis of everyday Palestinian life in the city, how surveillance impacts the constitution of subjectivities and how the criminalisation of opposition to Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem limits the opportunities for political participation. Here, I make the case that East Jerusalem Palestinians, though not entirely without hope in the occupied city, do not see a practical or plausible route to liberation.

Rooted in the Muslim faith of the majority of Palestinians is the abstract belief that all of historic Palestine will ultimately be recovered and returned to Islamic rule.

This faith is discordant, however, with the quotidian experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians who day to day appear to see no way of realising either the Palestinian nationalist imaginary of statehood or the divinely promised end to their subjugation.

Aisha tried to explain this apparent paradox to me:

“I do believe one day it will happen; in our religion, we have a story about that. But I know the reality is something different completely and I don’t think it will ever happen. I don’t see how it will ever happen.”

Hanan is a practicing Muslim and while she accepts Qur’anic revelations as truth, she is not optimistic about the future. She holds out little hope that her family will ever be able to claim the properties lost to her family in 1948.

“It’s a whole state, a powerful state. Where is it going to go? This is the reality... Like the Armenians and the Kurds, we will always have hope, but where are their states? For me, I don’t have any hope that this land will return to me or to my children. In Arabic, we say it is ‘min sab3 al-musta7eelat’, it means it’s the seventh level of impossibility!”

The data collected overwhelmingly demonstrates that while East Jerusalem Palestinians retain an abstract belief that restitution will one day come, in reality they see little prospect of an end to Israeli rule in East Jerusalem. Years of stop-start negotiations have yielded few positive results, organised Palestinian politics in the city have ceased to exist and the threat of imprisonment, deportation or

death deters most from engaging in even peaceful political protests.²⁶ The spate of individual acts of violence perpetrated by young East Jerusalem Palestinians against Israeli targets while this research was underway in 2015-16 reflected Palestinian opposition to Israeli policies on the ground, but also the atomisation of East Jerusalem society, the absence of collective understandings of resistance and the preponderance of Israeli power. Moreover, the protests that ensued after Israel installed metal detectors at al-Haram al-Sharif in 2017 demonstrated the mobilising potential of al-Aqsa mosque (discussed further in Chapter VI), but also made plain the absence of a political agenda for East Jerusalem Palestinians to which the gathering momentum could be harnessed.

2.3 Pre-Intifada Nostalgia

East Jerusalem Palestinians are disillusioned with peace efforts after years of fruitless negotiations with Israel during which time they have witnessed a marked deterioration in their spatial environment. However, many also question what was really achieved by the intifadas. Even before construction of the Barrier commenced, by the 1990s an “ever-tightening noose” of checkpoints ensured that it was already difficult for West Bankers to gain access to Jerusalem (Dumper, 2014). Many East Jerusalem residents nostalgically recall the period before the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 as a time when there was free movement between Jerusalem and the West Bank and when it was sometimes possible to forget that there was an occupation.

²⁶ Not one of the East Jerusalem Palestinians interviewed formally or informally during the course of this research had ever taken part in a demonstration, march or any other form of peaceful political protest against the occupation. In Chapter V I address the mobilising potential of religious issues such as al-Aqsa.

Nasser is almost 70 years old and recalls with clarity the period before Israel's conquest in 1967. When he speaks of better days past, however, it is the period before the first intifada about which he reminisces.

Nasser began his career in the fashion industry when he left school in 1968. By 1975 he was importing high end *haute couture* fashion from London and Paris and exporting it throughout the West Bank. His own fashion retail business in East Jerusalem thrived until the first intifada. After that he lost many Israeli customers and everyday life in Jerusalem changed significantly. He still has Jewish friends and a small number of Israeli customers, but it's not like years ago. "It feels like old friends that a long time ago would come and pass here. Before the first intifada we were really so close friends to each other in Jerusalem, Palestinians and Jews, and we forget there is occupation, you know. It's like we lived in France, like in any European country. It was open, free, but now..."

The second intifada also brought crisis to Jerusalem and impacted Nasser's business relationships. "I was working with very, very good people before the intifada, first and second, and we be close friends to each other because we forget that we are in occupation. Still, till now, we have friends, we were in Europe together, and we go out together... but now it's very few. Before, it was the same life we were living and working, but now it's not the same."

The second intifada had a dramatic influence on the direction of Nasser's business and meant that his passion for haute couture had to take a back seat. "The people here, after 2000, after the second intifada, people became more religious. Before they were wearing short skirts and short sleeves, but then they became more conservative. Now what can we do, we need to change [suppliers]

because in Europe there is no long sleeves and long skirt and long dresses. It was the same everywhere here, in the West Bank, in Jerusalem, throughout Palestine. The way it was we moved towards Turkey because they have a lot of things, long sleeve, short sleeve, even evening wear, but its conservative, very conservative. That's what we look for now because the customers they are asking for this. After this intifada, it became more conservative, more religious because the people they are suffering a lot... The mentality changed, they are asking God for help, they go to pray, they wear long sleeves. Fashion is very conservative now. Lately we didn't see one girl or one lady she comes here with a short skirt. Maybe in two months we haven't seen it here. Just maybe the Christian people come now with a short sleeve or a short skirt. In this you can see now the difference between Muslim and Christian.”

Dr Sharif also sees little hope for the future. The 'knife intifada' which still simmered in Jerusalem as we spoke demonstrated the frustrations of the people, but would achieve nothing in his view. Life gets worse with intifada, he said. The first intifada brought Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, while the second brought the Barrier and Separation from the West Bank.

“Look, the first intifada, how many people died? A lot. So, after that who came? All the corrupted from all the countries came here with the Palestinian Authority. So, we see them with their big cars. Their families, they never dreamed about this; they were living in Europe. The simple people who died for Palestine, they have nothing. So, from where to have hope? There is corruption in the Palestinian Authority, it is all corruption. And they have Abu Mazen and he is 82 years old and he is stuck in power and even there is no state. They work just to take money from the Authority and they buy a house. A lot of young people died in the

intifadas and they never look to them. These people don't do anything for Jerusalem, not even for the West Bank. These people [in Jerusalem], they are out of struggle. There is no struggle here, no revolution... Okay, for Jerusalem they will struggle, but why struggle? For what they have in the West Bank?"

Despite Israel's proclivity for collective punishment in response to armed resistance, East Jerusalem Palestinians remain broadly sympathetic to the perpetrators of these isolated knife attacks. Many share the concerns of those who act in the name of al-Aqsa, for example, and I was repeatedly told that the individuals responsible were simply resisting in their own way. Ruby says that Palestinians must make intifada sometimes if only to remind Israelis that this is Palestinian land, but she is in no doubt that after two intifadas, life in Jerusalem is more difficult than before. "Intifada tells the Jewish that this is our land, but really life was better before 1987. They were not stopping and searching everyone then. Before the PA, life was okay here, it was better." Ruby says that what she really wants is to live in Jerusalem with the Israelis, for the Barrier to come down and for West Bankers to be allowed to come to Jerusalem to pray and to shop.

Most East Jerusalem Palestinians regard acts of violent resistance as a natural symptom of occupation, even a necessary one to remind Israel that they have not abandoned the struggle. However, few point to any positive outcomes either from the intifadas or from isolated attacks on Israeli civilians. East Jerusalem Palestinians may hope ultimately for an end to Israeli rule, but very few speak of the Palestinian Authority as a realistic or even desirable alternative, while many nostalgically recall the pre-first intifada period when the occupation was less keenly felt.

Crucially, this data does not signal Palestinian satisfaction with the status quo ante. Rather, it highlights a significant disjuncture between the quotidian experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians, which locates them very much within the Israeli state (albeit in agonistic or antagonistic relationship), and the analytic standpoint of much of the academic literature on East Jerusalem which regards Jerusalem as a divided or polarised city and remains tied to the occupation-resistance binary.

2.4 Focus on Hebrew language acquisition in East Jerusalem

In this section I focus in detail on patterns of Hebrew language acquisition as a gauge of Palestinian adaptation in East Jerusalem to the reality of long term Israeli rule and improvement of life tactics. Despite the ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity of the communities comprising Israel's Jewish population, Hebrew is, without doubt, the predominant language of the state, from both a top down and a bottom up perspective. English also has particular significance in Israel, due to the fact that Hebrew is rarely understood beyond Israel, the close connections between Israel and the rest of the world and the unofficial status of English as the principal international language (Ben-Rafael et al., 2006).

Arabic, while officially the second language of the state after Hebrew, in fact has legal status beyond its real socio-political significance (Saban and Amara, 2002). The official status of Arabic in Israel is manifest in a number of obvious ways. Primarily, it is the language of instruction within the Palestinian educational system. In addition, time is allotted to Arabic programming on public radio and television, currency and postage stamps are inscribed in both languages and,

following a Supreme Court ruling, Arabic also appears on many road signs around the country (Ben-Rafael et al., 2006).

In practice, however, Arabic is significantly disadvantaged as an official language vis-à-vis Hebrew and “the status accorded Arabic in Israeli law is still devoid of any practical significance in Israeli public life... The main significance of the status of Arabic in Israel appears, then, not with regard to the society as a whole but to the extent of protection it affords to the internal life of the minority” (Saban and Amara, 2002).

Yet Palestinian Israelis make up a significant proportion of the overall population. In figures published on the eve of Israel’s 68th Independence Day in May 2016, Israel’s Bureau of Statistics recorded a population of 8.5 million residents, of whom 74.8% are Jewish and 20.8% are Arabs (CBS, May 2016). The vast majority of Palestinians living within Israel’s 1948 borders, particularly those in the under 50 age group, are fluent in Hebrew. Ninety percent of the employed Palestinian population in Israel work outside their own community and come into daily contact with Jewish Israelis. As such, “[Israeli] Palestinians are undergoing a far-reaching process of language and cultural exposure concurrently with modernisation and urbanisation” (Ben-Rafael et al., 2006).

Unlike Palestinian citizens of Israel living within the state’s 1948 borders, East Jerusalem Palestinians are not typically fluent in Hebrew. Nor is Hebrew a dominant language in Palestinian public spaces in East Jerusalem. Ben-Rafael et al. (2006) have undertaken comparative research into the linguistic landscapes

(LL)²⁷ of a number of homogeneous and mixed Israeli cities as well as of East Jerusalem, taking into account top down and bottom up flows of linguistic landscape elements in which “the former are expected to reflect a general commitment to the dominant culture while the latter are designed much more freely according to individual strategies.” While Hebrew was predictably the predominant language of Jewish localities, (in nearly 100% of LL items, with English second and Arabic occurring in less than 6% of the LL items), a more surprising result was found in mixed Israeli-Palestinian areas inside Israel, where Arabic appeared in only 70% of LL items. Paradoxically, in Palestinian localities there was a stronger presence of Hebrew-only items in bottom up items than in top down LL items (40% compared to 3.9%). Though Palestinian Israelis might be expected to resist the majority language and to assert their identity through the use of Arabic while the state insists on Hebrew, in fact Palestinians in Israel appeared willing to adapt to the Hebrew speaking majority while the state either tolerates the use of Arabic or lacks official policies to restrict it.

These findings from Palestinian localities inside Israel contrast starkly with those from East Jerusalem where Arabic is the dominant language, appearing in all LL items. English came in second position, appearing in about 75% of items and Hebrew was hardly present at all. The authors of the research conclude that “while Palestinian Israelis follow a basic accommodation pattern to their minority status, non-Israeli Palestinians in East Jerusalem make use of a strategy of resistance, by denying the official language of the country any status in bottom-

²⁷ Linguistic landscape (LL) refers to objects that mark the public space in a given territory and is comprised of both public and private signs. Ben Rafael et al’s work draws on earlier LL works and on broader sociological theory.

up LL, using Arabic instead as their first and primary linguistic marker” (Ben-Rafael, 2006: 25).

A simple walk through any neighbourhood in East Jerusalem will confirm these findings; in terms of the public space, Arabic is overwhelmingly the predominant language, with English second (English is pragmatically employed in tourism in particular) and Hebrew barely in evidence at all. As residents of the Israeli state, however, East Jerusalem Palestinians encounter Hebrew daily and are severely disadvantaged if they have no grasp of the language. While Hebrew language learning is absent from the Palestinian Authority curriculum followed by many schools in East Jerusalem, the evidence suggests that demand for Hebrew language tuition is growing.

Osama points out that to make sense of his mobile phone bill or to understand prices in the supermarket, he needs to be able to read Hebrew. In addition, all official forms required by the Interior Ministry need to be completed in Hebrew. East Jerusalem Palestinians will queue for hours to get seen at the Dakhaliya, for example to add a child to their identity cards or to register their new marital status (in contrast to the West Jerusalem office, the East Jerusalem branch of the Interior Ministry runs largely without appointments). They are then usually given a form to fill in, which must be completed in Hebrew. Outside the office are always Hebrew-speaking Palestinians at makeshift desks who, for a fee, will complete the form for you.

The data collected here suggests that East Jerusalem residents are increasingly cognisant of the benefits of Hebrew language acquisition and are acting on this at an individual level. A range of justifications for Hebrew language acquisition

are proffered and it is not uncommon to be told that it is advantageous, even a religious obligation, to learn the language of one's enemy. It is more than plausible, however, that the benefits of learning Hebrew are more commonly practical ones.

Ilaiyan (2012) demonstrates clearly that Hebrew language learning among East Jerusalem Palestinians does not correlate to an interest in Jewish or Israeli culture or in the language itself independent of its practical utility. Hebrew language skills are generally acquired by East Jerusalem Palestinians in non-formal education for the purposes of employment or to communicate with Israelis in everyday life; they learn Hebrew for its practical value (Ilaiyan, 2012). It does not necessarily follow, however, that once acquired this is all East Jerusalem Palestinians use their new Hebrew language skills for. Rana, for example, learnt some Hebrew in high school. She has tried to maintain and improve it for practical purposes, but also tries often to watch the television news on Israeli channels and to receive Hebrew language news alerts through her mobile phone. She says that it is good to know what the Israelis are thinking and how they understand and interpret events.

Few Palestinian secondary schools in East Jerusalem give priority to Hebrew language learning. The Israeli media, however, has reported increased interest in Hebrew language learning among East Jerusalem residents and a growing demand for Israeli university places. In order to study at an Israeli higher education institution, Palestinian students need to have succeeded in Israeli matriculation exams or be willing to undertake a preparatory programme in Hebrew language.

In 2015, the funding committee of the Council for Higher Education in Israel approved the first Hebrew University preparatory programme for East Jerusalem Palestinians. Aimed at Palestinians who have passed Tawjihi rather than Bugrut, the move came in response to the growing demand by graduates of East Jerusalem high schools to attend Israeli higher education institutions. According to Haaretz, Hadassah Academic College, which has run a similar programme for more than a decade, receives between 800 and 1,000 applications each year, from which it accepts 50 applicants (Hasson, 2015).

Haaretz has also reported an increase in the number of East Jerusalem students seeking to take the Israeli matriculation exam, Bugrut, rather than the Palestinian Tawjihi. According to Municipality figures, 1,900 Palestinian students took Bugrut in 2015, with the number expected to rise to 2,200 in 2016 (Hasson, 2015). While these figures still constitute only about 5% of all Palestinian high school graduates in East Jerusalem (Kashti and Hasson, 2016), they must also be understood within the context of the limited number of places currently available. In addition, few East Jerusalem high school students are sufficiently fluent in Hebrew to pursue such an option.

Ahmad studied civil engineering in Jordan. He graduated a few months before I met him and had begun a temporary job in Beit Hanina while studying Hebrew in a formal setting. He previously attended the Ibrahimiya school in East Jerusalem, where he was taught only very basic Hebrew and even this, he says, in a half-hearted fashion.

“The thing is that they don’t care about the Hebrew language, I don’t know why. This is a very negative thing in our schools... to be realistic here we are living in

a city, in a country that half of the population are talking in a language that those who don't speak it will not be able to communicate, to get his rights and the things he can have or can get. Okay this is the language of the occupation but we have to learn it in order to start to develop our rights and our needs and the things that every people under occupation can have, but you have to ask for it in the language of the occupier... It is difficult to take your rights, it is a very hard thing. I know people with flowing Hebrew but they don't have their rights... The language is the beginning. After that we need to start teaching people about their rights. A very large number of the rights we choose to neglect because we don't want to have a headache about them, we don't want to get involved with them. Some people they refuse to accept the rights because they are delivered by the Israelis so they say I don't want it. In every city under occupation [the occupier] has to give its duties to the people its occupying. The free movement for example."

Hanan's school in East Jerusalem teaches Arabic, English and German, but not Hebrew. The staff recognise the importance of Hebrew to their students, but have not found the will nor the means to get started. Simply recruiting the staff required to introduce Hebrew lessons at the school would require significant expenditure, but the problem appears to be one more of apathy or energy.

"We tried but we couldn't find. We didn't put it in our mind really to do it and we don't have the teachers and besides we teach German as well as English... We said Hebrew, it will be more effort for the girls, we need the budget for the teachers' fees; so it's in our mind, but we postpone it. Though we are convinced that it is a must to learn it. Any paper, for telephone, for the arnona, for driving license, for anything, it comes in Hebrew, no English at all. So, we need it. If we

want to go to their hospitals to speak to their doctors, we have to know their language.”

Finding the will and resources to introduce Hebrew language classes to secondary education in East Jerusalem is difficult, but increasingly it seems schools are making the effort in response to local demand. Palestinian Authority official Nasser Shaath told the Independent newspaper in 2013 that the introduction of Hebrew lessons to some municipal schools was “part of the attempt to totally de-Arabise and de-Palestinianise Jerusalem.” However, municipal officials said that the introduction came at the request of Palestinian parents who wanted more higher education and job opportunities for their children (Lien, 2013, Lynfield, 2013), while a report in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz also found that demand was rising as a result of the separation Barrier and the difficulties attached to higher education in the West Bank (Hasson, 2015).

3. Ambivalence Towards Israel

In this section I argue that East Jerusalem Palestinians experience complex and often ambivalent feelings towards and relationships with the Israeli state that are generally overlooked within top down analytic paradigms that forefront issues of national sovereignty over those of individual agency. Residency status within Israel draws East Jerusalemites into a more direct relationship with the occupying state than that experienced by West Bank Palestinians and their proximity to Israelis also ensures that they have more frequent encounters with the Other. Moreover, residency within the de facto boundaries of the Israeli state places East Jerusalem Palestinians in the position of external observer in relation to the

Palestinian Authority and leads inevitably to the drawing of comparisons between Israel and the PA.

In Chapter V below, I address the marginality of East Jerusalem Palestinians as residents of the Israeli state and explore the everyday humiliations and deprivations of Israel's colonial project in the city from the perspective of its Palestinian residents. In this section, however, I seek to disentangle the matrix of feelings experienced by East Jerusalemites who have complex and sometimes contradictory attitudes towards the occupying state. First, I examine the perceived benefits of residency. Second, I consider the comparisons drawn by Palestinians in Jerusalem between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Third, I address the positive attitudes held by East Jerusalem Palestinians towards particular aspects of the Israeli modus operandi and finally, I look at personal encounters between East Jerusalem Palestinians and Israelis and the impact of these encounters on Palestinian attitudes and political opinions.

3.1 The Perceived Advantages of Residency

In contrast to West Bankers who experience occupation through the conduit of the Palestinian Authority, residency status inside Israel draws East Jerusalem Palestinians into direct relationships with the occupying state. Palestinian life in the city is regularly framed by observers in terms ethno-national conflict, a discriminatory urban colonial regime, state violence and demographic manipulation²⁸. Such approaches draw much needed attention to the desperate

²⁸ See in particular YACOBI, H. 2016. From 'Ethnocracy' to Urban Apartheid: The Changing Urban Geopolitics of Jerusalem/AI-Quds. *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal*, 8.

circumstances of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but rarely observe these conditions from the ground where day to day life is also inextricably entwined with much more mundane Israeli state and municipal practices. Such daily interactions cannot be fully understood within the occupier/occupied binary, but must be addressed within the relationship between state and resident.

Permanent residency status in Israel, as discussed above, falls significantly short of citizenship. However, as permanent residents, East Jerusalem Palestinians have rights and freedoms within the Israeli state that are not shared by Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories. For example, East Jerusalem Palestinians have the right to free movement throughout Israel and the occupied territories²⁹ and are entitled to live and work in Israel without need of special permits. Permanent residents are entitled to vote in Israeli municipal elections, though not in national elections to the Knesset, and East Jerusalemites are also permitted to vote in Palestinian elections in the West Bank.

Like all other residents of the Israeli state, East Jerusalem Palestinians over the age of 18 are required by law to be covered with the National Insurance Institute and to pay regular insurance contributions. In exchange for the proper payment of compulsory insurance contributions, Palestinians in East Jerusalem become eligible for a broad range national insurance benefits including child benefit, disability allowance and age-related pensions.

²⁹ This freedom is limited by a range of factors including official Israeli practices that discriminate against Palestinians as well self-imposed Palestinian boundaries. For example, I have met many East Jerusalem Palestinians who have lived all their lives in the Old City, but who have never wandered into the Jewish Quarter. In times of unrest, East Jerusalem Palestinians might refrain from making their usual trips to the beach at Jaffa or to shopping malls in West Jerusalem, be it out of fear or solidarity.

Under the State Health Insurance Law, moreover, as of 1 January 1995 every Israeli resident has health insurance coverage. All Israeli residents aged 18 and above must pay health insurance contributions to the National Insurance Institute together with their national insurance contributions. All insured residents must register with one of Israel's health maintenance organisations (HMOs) known as *kupot holim*, and the HMO is required by law to provide the insured person unconditionally with a standard 'health basket' of essential services.

Health insurance and social security benefits are frequently cited, within the Israeli media in particular, as material incentives for East Jerusalem Palestinians to wish to remain under Israeli rather than Palestinian Authority jurisdiction. Palestinians in East Jerusalem do indeed appear to value these services, health insurance in particular. For the majority of East Jerusalem Palestinians, access to primary health care and the quality of care they receive is equal to that of Israelis. Moreover, the quality of primary health care in Israel is significantly higher than in the West Bank.³⁰

While they value the quality of health care they receive, few East Jerusalem Palestinians regard this benefit of Israeli residency as anything more than a service for which they pay heavily. Despite the economic disparities between East Jerusalem Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, all pay equally for health and national insurance. The evidence indicates that participation in Israeli insurance schemes is broadly regarded as compulsory and unrelated to questions of resistance or normalisation.

³⁰ Interview with Dr Sharif

There are exceptions. George holds a somewhat unconventional view that the material benefits associated with Israeli residency negate the right of East Jerusalem Palestinians to describe themselves as occupied. During our conversations, he seized indignantly on my use of the term 'occupation' to describe the existing regime in the city.

"This is not occupation! What occupation gives money to people? You can't describe what is happening here as an occupation. If you want to call this an occupation, stop taking money from them, stop driving cars with the yellow [license] plates, stop paying your national insurance and your taxes. They can't confiscate everyone's ID. There are 230,000 Muslims and Christians in this city. Tell them to throw out their IDs, to do '*isyaan madani* [civil disobedience]. That would be occupation."

George's attitude diverges somewhat from more mainstream views, but it highlights the complexities and ambiguities of the relationship between East Jerusalem Palestinians and the Israeli state, which is at once occupier and provider. Osama also drew attention to the contradictions implicit in the relationship between occupier and occupied in East Jerusalem. "Many of those old men who call themselves *Murabiteen*, they sit at al-Aqsa all day to show the Israelis that this place is not for the Jewish, to demonstrate that it is for Muslims only. But in the mosque, you can hear them complaining about how long they had to queue to collect their pension or moaning because it is lower this week than it was last week. They take money from Sheikh Raed Salah to resist Israel and then they take their pension from Israel too."

Israeli media reports which underline the value East Jerusalem Palestinians put on their blue identity cards frequently identify the health and social security benefits of residency as decisive issues. The problem, however, is more complex. The inferiority of services and infrastructure in the Palestinian administered territories compared to those in Israel is undeniably linked to decades of occupation and under investment, but East Jerusalem Palestinians do not appear to hold Israel solely responsible for this disparity. Many also point to Palestinian Authority corruption and mismanagement as significant factors in the West Bank's failing infrastructure and in their determination not to lose their residency rights in Israel.

3.2 Comparisons between Israel and the PA

The data collected indicates that East Jerusalem Palestinians are critical of Palestinian Authority governance in the West Bank and that few would welcome unilateral Israeli action or a negotiated settlement of the Jerusalem issue that brought them under PA jurisdiction.

Some commentators have sought to locate these attitudes within the wider context of the Arab Spring and movements to throw off the leadership of undemocratic regimes in the Middle East.³¹ There may be some merit in this view, but there is also no shortage of justifications closer to home for such opinions. While rejection of the PA is not itself an endorsement of Israeli governance, the situation of East Jerusalem Palestinians allows for some interesting comparisons. In East Jerusalem, corruption within the PA is a key cause of concern. This is not

³¹ This idea was given voice by Raja Shehadeh at a book launch in East Jerusalem in April 2016.

of course a uniquely Arab phenomenon and most East Jerusalemites are aware that many of Israel's leading politicians are themselves also plagued by corruption allegations. The difference in Israel, it seems to many Palestinian residents, is the recognition that corruption is a problem and the existence of mechanisms to tackle it. Sara explained:

“Why is it that the laws in Israel have the right to ask anyone in the government where did you have this money from... We couldn't find this in the Palestinian Authority. You will never hear in the PA that even one is in jail because of this. There is no Arab country where you will find this. We don't know where the money goes. We just hear that someone from the Palestinian Authority has a new villa.”

George, arguing that “the Palestinian Authority is all about corruption even before they get a state,” related a joke on a similar theme:

“There was once a meeting in London for ministers from all over the world. An Arab minister was invited to the home of a British minister. It was a large, beautiful home, like a palace. The Arab minister asked the British minister, ‘How can you afford a home such as this?’ The British minister winked and pointed to a bridge in the distance. ‘You see that bridge? We were given £10 million to build it, but only spent £5 million on it.’ The Arab minister thought about this and some time later, when the British minister visited his country, the Arab minister invited him to see his own new home. The Arab minister's villa was larger and even more beautiful than the British minister's home in London. So the British minister asked the Arab minister, ‘How did you afford to build a home such as this?’ The Arab Minister smiled and said, ‘Ah, I also took £20 million to build a bridge.’ The British minister looked around and said, ‘What bridge?’”

The sentiment expressed in this joke was shared by a number of other interviewees. Hanan explained:

“So most of the Europeans and Americans and Arab world they are trying to help by giving money, money, money to the Palestinians to repair the Palestinian state and their independence but where is the money? You can see only peanuts. And most of the money is stolen. How should I believe in our government if they are stealing [from] the poor people?”

I asked Ruby if she supports the demand for a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem. “No! We want to stay with the Jewish people. It is difficult to live in Jerusalem and to have Muhmud Abbas in Jerusalem... All the Palestinian people know that he brings a lot of money from outside, but nobody sees anything from the money. Yanee, they bring money for the Old City, this is money for us, for the electricity to help us in the Old City, but nobody knows where this money did go... I don't like the Jewish, but I am born here and I live here with the Jewish people. Maybe if a leader comes who is better than Abbas then maybe we could live with Palestinians, but I don't think so, they are all the same. It is better for us with the Israelis.”

3.3 Respect for the Israeli Modus Operandi

Following on from the contrasts drawn between Israel and the PA in the previous section, here I explore the respect expressed by many East Jerusalem Palestinians for aspects of the Israeli modus operandi. East Jerusalem Palestinians may retain oppositional authenticity while allowing that the hegemonic culture has something to offer (Ortner, 1995). This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter VI. Here I argue that without prejudicing broader

Palestinian objections to Israeli rule, the data collected indicates that those who live inside the Israeli state (and who observe the occupied territories as well as neighbouring Arab countries from the outside), reject occupation but simultaneously approve of aspects of the system it imposes.

Sara explained:

“Abu Mazen is not our leader. I don’t know other persons to say this one or that one [is better]. In our life in Jerusalem I see that the Jewish leaders, when they put a law or decide that they should forbid something, they are successful. They have the way to lead the people. I am not 100% with them, but I like the way they are ruling the people and they give the people the right to say yes or so no... I think it is good to have this in our life, it improves *us* in our lives.”

Many East Jerusalem Palestinians are comfortable acknowledging aspects of the Israeli *modus operandi* of which they approve without feeling that this compromises or contradicts their rejection of the occupation. Most examples cited by Jerusalem residents related in some way to the Israeli *niz’aam* or system. Rana, for example, painted a vivid picture of one aspect of everyday life, banking.

“At the [Israeli] bank, there is a system, you take a number. But if you go to Ramallah, to an Arab bank, they are on top of each other. And if you know someone it helps. You can be waiting two, three, four hours, then someone comes and he goes in front of you. In an Israeli bank no, thankfully this would not happen.”

Many interviewees expressed approval, even admiration, of Israeli organisation and efficiency, contrasting it with their experiences in the West Bank. Ruby said:

“In Jerusalem, the life is more easy than in the West Bank. First, we have *kupot holim* and *tutmeen al watani*; they pay to us money, the Jewish people. Also, we have the best water and the electricity, they don’t cut it. In the West Bank, we speak the same language, but they won’t help us like the Jewish people. In Jerusalem if you pay everything, the electricity and the water, they look after you. In the West Bank if someone knows you he will help you, but if he doesn’t know you, he won’t help you. You will have to pay him too. But in Jerusalem there is the law. You pay, you take. Good electricity, water, phone... There is good law here. If you want to cross the street, you wait for green. And the driving is good. There is law and this is good for us and for the Jewish people. In the West Bank, there is no law... If you cross the road maybe an accident will happen because there is no law when they drive. In Jerusalem, it is the best here.”³²

Nasser spends his time between his homes in Jerusalem and France. He is very open about his Israeli citizenship and has a great deal of respect for Israel, despite his anger and revulsion at Israeli actions towards the Palestinians in recent years.

“Look, the security here, in Israel, it is the best. The security, international security, it is very secure here in Israel. But security for the Arab people here, you cannot - I cannot - complain at this time. Look at the government here. They have a law. If you are going by the law... except these problems, like they kill Abu Khdeir or they kill someone like this, still everywhere I think you have these things. But we are talking about the security, still there is security here. Security from

³² Conversely, West Bankers complain that when East Jerusalem residents (identifiable by their yellow license plates), drive in the West Bank, they think that the Palestinian police have no authority over them and drive recklessly as a result.

international, security from the Jewish, they are good in Jerusalem, in the West Bank I don't know, it's not so [good], but in Jerusalem... you can feel the security, it's much better than Jordan, much better than Syria, much better than anywhere for the Arab people. But there is something, you feel it. You must take care, still a little bit afraid... because of the conservatives, fanatic people there is in Israel, they do bad things, but security... I feel very secure here... There is law in Israel, if you are going by the law its perfect. If you are going with everything, you pay, you say, if you be correct in the law, by the law, if you are going with everything it's okay. Except what I told you happens here and there... Look, there is a few problems, but still, I say frankly, if they ask me you can live in the Arab countries or you can live here in Israel, I prefer to live here.”

3.4 Personal Encounters with the Other

Israelis and Palestinians share East Jerusalem's contested urban space, but rarely inhabit the same residential space. Where Israeli settlers have moved into Palestinian areas, they live separately within them. A micro level analysis, however, makes evident that flows of people, culture and capital are more frequent than many other studies allow.

Cohen (2013a) notes that the overwhelming majority of Jewish-Palestinian encounters occur within Israeli space and institutions. He categorises occasions of contact as “economically driven encounters that take place in labour-market contexts and in shopping centres; encounters in public institutions, for example, government offices, the municipality, hospitals and institutions of higher education; and encounters at recreation and tourism sites. This is in addition to

encounters with security personnel while walking in the streets of West Jerusalem” (Cohen, 2013: 137-8).

Jerusalem is defined as a frontier or a contested city, segregated along ethno-national lines with clear – if multiple and not always visible - boundaries separating Israelis from Palestinians. A number of recent studies, however, have sought to emphasise the fluidity of these boundaries and the emergence of new spaces of encounter between Israeli and Palestinian (Busbridge, 2014, Dumper, 2014, Nolte and Yacobi, 2015, Shtern, 2016). For example, Nolte and Yacobi (2015) argue that official Israeli representations of the Jerusalem light railway are clearly part of a broader hegemonic narrative that seeks to project Jerusalem as a modern, unified city. They note, however, that the railway does none the less serve both Jewish and Palestinian neighbourhoods, bringing occupier and occupied into close proximity are creating a new space of encounter.

The emergence of neoliberal spaces of consumerism, invested with the potential to destabilise the sectarian spatial logic of the contested city and enable temporary same status encounters, have also received specific attention (Shtern, 2016). While uneven power levels between Palestinians and Israelis produce inequality in almost all spheres of life, the existence of privatised centres of encounter such as retail shopping centres “enables non-violent space sharing and temporary same status encounters between consumers that undermine a status quo of unequal power relations, political oppression, hate, fear and mistrust” (Shtern, 2016). This process can reinforce Israeli occupation through partial normalisation on the one hand, and undermine ethnocentric values on the

other, by diluting the identity of public space.³³ Ultimately, however, these are temporary and spontaneous encounters. Moreover, the terms of engagement are not always clear. As Shtern notes, the presence of Palestinians in West Jerusalem's parks and malls is not necessarily a sign of voluntary social mixing, but possibly a reflection of the absence of facilities in East Jerusalem.

The focus here is on more fixed encounters and the data collected indicates that many East Jerusalem Palestinians are either already engaged in employment or educational activities which bring them into far more regular, less spontaneous encounters with Israelis or open to the opportunity to do so. These pursuits have less to do with actively subverting intended meanings or uses of space and significantly more to do with taking advantage of the opportunities available to improve lives and livelihoods.

Yacobi and Pullan (2014) demonstrate that due to their location on the front line of contested space, frontier neighbourhoods such as French Hill in Jerusalem, enable interactions that undermine the "demographic homogeneity" intended by the colonial project. Affluent Palestinians in search of better housing, services and quality of life, most of them Israeli citizens with fluent Hebrew, are increasingly attracted to Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem that offer easy access to neighbouring Arab districts. This phenomenon is less common among

³³ In some respects, such encounters only temporarily and selectively transform ethnic division into a class one since such inclusion is only possible for the middle classes on both sides. For more on this, see SHTERN, M. 2016. Urban Neoliberalism Vs. Ethno-National Division: The Case of West Jerusalem's Shopping Malls. *Cities*, 52.

Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, but it is an option that many will consider.³⁴

None the less, East Jerusalem Palestinian encounters with the Other are more numerous and more varied than macro level analyses generally allow for. Among those interviewed for this study, the relationships between Israeli and Palestinian were varied, from those between (Palestinian) doctor and (Israeli) patient to those between fellow students and (Israeli) employer and (Palestinian) employee.

Hanan's account of a remarkable series of meetings between her family and an Arabic-speaking Israeli soldier in Ramallah in the late 1960s demonstrates that even during those very troubled times, there were positive encounters. More importantly, perhaps, Hanan recalls these memories with enormous pleasure, despite the bitterness of the circumstances.

"In 1967, I was seven years old. We had a blue Volkswagen car. When we were at home in Ramallah during the war, an Israeli soldier came and he found my mother. My mother and my aunt's houses are close and were all sitting in my aunt's house. He found my mother and he said in Arabic 'For whom is this car?' She told him, this is for my husband. He asked her to call him and she said, 'Farouk!' And he [the soldier] also started calling 'Farouk!' When my father came, the soldier asked for the keys and he took the car. They had no military cars to go around Ramallah. He took our car, drove in Ramallah and when there was no fuel left he switched it off, put it aside, left the keys inside and that's it. After things calmed down, they came, the local people, they told my father your car is in this

³⁴ I encountered a number of people who rent or who had considered renting in increasingly mixed but less affluent neighbourhoods such as Talpiyot.

street. Then, later, another time, he [the same Israeli soldier] came again and said 'Farouk, give me your car!' My father gave him the car, but this time the soldier put fuel back and returned it to our home. Then after a while, we met him again. There was a checkpoint at the end of al Bireh, a long, long time ago. This is 1968 or 1969. When he saw my father, he treated him so well and usually had a joke with him. 'Don't you want to sell your car Farouk? I want your car!' My father of course says 'No, I don't want to sell my car!' And one day, my mother – because my grandmother lived in Cairo and we would go every summer to visit there – we crossed the bridge and we found that a soldier came and carried our bag, not letting my mother carry it, and began to joke with us. He reminded us that he is the same soldier!"

The Israeli soldier in Hanan's story was a Sephardi Jew and she believes that their shared Arabic language and culture allowed a degree of warmth and respect despite the circumstances. With huge influxes of Jews from other parts of the world, however, and the low position of Sephardi Jews in Israel, Hanan believes the situation has changed.

"After that the Israeli policies tried to show up differences between Jews and Palestinians. Nowadays, I don't think it is easy to bridge between the two nations. When I was at university in the late '70s, early 1980s, I was in Bir Zeit University, some of us - majority of us - was believing that at some point we should live two nations in one state. Because no way to push out the Jewish people from here, Jewish people who their fathers were born here. This is all Palestine with all these nations. But now there is no Jewish people, I don't hear about these Jewish people, who can say their grandfather was born here... Now you can feel the hatred from their side."

Sara explains that in East Jerusalem, living with Jews is simply a fact of life.

“We work side by side with them. I don’t have a problem to have Jewish people in my life. At least I am born here and he is born here. This is not my problem. My life has to pass and his life has to pass. All of my husband’s work is with the Israeli soldiers, with Israeli schools. He works with Israelis every day. He speaks Hebrew. He studied Graphic Design at the Hebrew University. Years ago, they would give students from the West Bank permission to study in Jerusalem. When my daughter will be an age to go to university I will send her to study at the Hebrew University. I have no problem to do this. They will finish higher education with a good certificate from a good university. I don’t care what is the religion of the university.”

The data collected suggests that peaceful, even cordial, interactions with Israelis are relatively common and generally unproblematic for East Jerusalem Palestinians. Hanan’s family lost everything in 1948 and she insists that no peace with Israel is possible until her land is returned to her. She has taught her children to remember this injustice and to carry the memory of it with them. Yet she speaks proudly of her daughter’s positive experience working in an Israeli office and of enduring the friendships she had made there.

“It’s not easy and yet when you have a human in front of you, you can’t treat him bad if he doesn’t treat you bad. We are all human. In the end, forget Jew, forget Palestinian, we are human and human.”

4. Seeking Normality

Everyday life in contested urban situations is rooted in praxis, “simply what people in cities do” (Pullan and Baillie, 2013). In this section, I aim to demonstrate that many East Jerusalem Palestinians are actively pursuing ways to improve their lives and livelihoods in the city within the confines of long term Israeli rule. I explore the decisions residents are making with regard to education, family and employment, consider how individuals understand and frame these choices, and seek to locate them within a broader analytic framework that recognises the structural limitations on individual agency but which locates the subject inside structures of power. Such an approach acknowledges that structural constraints shape the space in which identity is constructed, but also recognises that this space is itself transformed by that moment of identity construction (Holland, 2001). In this sense, we must ask how everyday Palestinian actions and choices in East Jerusalem are shaped by top down processes and how these in turn might reproduce or reinforce Israeli hegemony.

First, I argue that top down analytic frameworks fail to take account of the divergent political landscape inhabited by East Jerusalem Palestinians and the disparate challenges of their quotidian experience vis-à-vis that of West Bankers. Locating Palestinian subjectivity and struggle within a critical framework that recognises the ways in which everyday life is mediated by systems of power and inequality, I seek to demonstrate that East Jerusalem Palestinians who remain steadfast in the city despite tremendous pressure to leave are also looking for ways to improve their lives and livelihoods. I argue that these choices draw them into more ambiguous relationships with the Israeli state and potentially help shape the space in which identity is constructed. I conclude that everyday

Palestinian life in East Jerusalem reflects this constituency's political and spatial isolation, the preponderance of Israeli power in the city and the failure of the Palestinian leadership to project an inclusive nationalist narrative. It also manifests a straightforward desire on the part of individual East Jerusalem Palestinians to lead a 'normal life,' which comes at a cost for collective mobilisation. The preponderant influence of the domination-resistance binary imposes meanings on everyday Palestinian life in the city which, viewed from the perspective of those on the ground, are contestable.

4.1 A Framework for Analysing Everyday Life in East Jerusalem

Mainstream academic approaches to everyday life in East Jerusalem are typically framed by macro-level processes which essentialise identities and impose analytic binaries such as occupation and resistance, resistance or normalisation, that obscure the complexity of quotidian life in the city. Meanwhile, individual adaptations to long-term Israeli rule and the internal politics of this Palestinian constituency are broadly overlooked and the extent to which Israeli power limits the opportunities for Palestinian agency is underestimated.

Recent studies of everyday Palestinian life and struggle draw on de Certeau's distinction between the "strategies" of the powerful on the one hand and, on the other, the multitude of "tactics" - articulated in the quotidian practice of 'the other' - which constitute "an art of manipulating and enjoying" (De Certeau, 1984).

While strategies are "organised by the postulation of power" and privilege spatial relationships, tactics are determined by the absence of power; they are temporal rather than spatial, operating in isolated actions, taking advantage of opportunities and, in turn, depending on them. In short, tactics are "an art of the

weak” (De Certeau, 1984). Thus, tactics as defined by de Certeau, “use, manipulate or divert a given situation as a means of adapting but not succumbing to conditions on the ground... so that life becomes a form of survival or resilience, or in some cases, resistance” (Pullan and Baillie, 2013).

Life as resilience or continuous struggle is manifest in the Palestinian nationalist theme of *sumud*, or steadfastness, which denotes a strong determination to remain on the land. The theory and praxis of *sumud* have evolved and adapted, from a refusal to leave the land despite the hardships of occupation during the 1970s to a more active refusal during the second intifada period to allow roadblocks, checkpoints and the separation Barrier to preclude everyday travel and the routines of normal life (Hammami, 2005, Richter-Devroe, 2011, Rijke and van Teeffelen, 2014).

In the post-second intifada period, the debate over *sumud* has centred upon whether efforts to lead a normal life under occupation constitute normalisation or resistance (Richter-Devroe, 2010). The divergent political reality in East Jerusalem, however, produces challenges quite distinct from those facing Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories and it follows that the meaning attached to signifiers such as normalisation, resistance and *sumud* is not uniform across Jerusalem and the West Bank. The evidence collected strongly indicates that Palestinians in East Jerusalem see no conflict between their resistance (for many manifest in their struggle to remain in Jerusalem despite pressure to leave) and their efforts to improve their lives and livelihoods long term within the context of Israeli rule.

Ziad's framing of his own experience demonstrates that quotidian life for East Jerusalem residents is inextricably linked with Israel and that as a result, attempts to label everyday practices as normalisation or Israelification are meaningless.

"My resistance is to be here in Jerusalem and not to melt, not to integrate. On the other hand, I live in Jerusalem and if I live in Jerusalem it has to be like this. And you should not forget that living in Jerusalem itself is a big thing because Israel wants us to leave Jerusalem. I would never work in social security, but I have to use it. Education and health are outside of politics. If I am a doctor, I will treat every patient equally. If I am a professor, I teach every student equally. These things are separate from politics... I am living in Israel. It's an occupation, but I am living here and in every single detail of my life I am dealing with them."

Everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem cannot be fully understood through a top-down binary analysis that takes insufficient account of the dual marginality of residents and their tangential experience inside the Israeli state. A new framework for analysing the praxis of everyday life in East Jerusalem must therefore recognise the divergent political landscape of East Jerusalem and the disparate challenges experienced by its Palestinian residents. It must also acknowledge the extent to which the praxis of everyday life in the city is mediated by power and inequality and give sufficient consideration to the structural constraints on individual agency. Finally, a bottom up framework must take full account of the internal politics of this Palestinian constituency, their dislocation from mainstream nationalist narratives and their dislocation from the leadership in Ramallah. Distanced from the Palestinian Authority and not willing or able to engage fully with the Israeli state, East Jerusalem Palestinians remain mindful of

the national struggle but intent, meanwhile, on improving their lives and livelihoods in the present.

4.2 From 'Suspension' and 'Affirmation' to 'Improvement' of Life

In this section I explore the everyday life of East Jerusalem Palestinians in the post-second intifada period. De Certeau recognises that there are possibilities for even the powerless individual: “without leaving the place where he has no choice but to live and which lays down its law for him, he establishes within it a degree of plurality and creativity.” Thus, using tactics “one can create for himself a space in which he can find ways of using the constraining order of the place or of the language” (De Certeau, 1984). Within mainstream academic studies dominated by top-down binaries, these opportunities are broadly interpreted within the context of and harnessed to the national struggle. I argue, however, that in East Jerusalem since the second intifada, the space for agency and creativity has been largely used by individuals to improve their own lives and livelihoods within the context of enduring Israeli rule.

Jean-Klein's 2001 seminal study of everyday activism during the first Intifada described the collective Palestinian practice of suspending everyday routines and joyful activities as a form of self-nationalisation that affirmed the injustice of occupation (Jean-Klein, 2001).³⁵ In the second-intifada period, the turn back to enjoyment of life as resistance and the pursuit of normality demonstrated dissatisfaction with earlier narratives regarding the route to national liberation and signalled a determination to enjoy temporary pleasures in the present rather than

³⁵ This practice is discussed in greater depth in Chapter VI.

in a future that might never materialise (Junka, 2006, Kelly, 2008, Richter-Devroe, 2011).

This transition from 'suspension of life' strategy in the first intifada to 'affirmation of life' tactics during the second reflects shifting structures of power as well as the diminution of collective understandings of resistance as Palestinian territory and community fragmented (Richter-Devroe, 2011). Thus, according to Richter-Devroe (2011), "going to an Israeli settlement to relax, or to Haifa to the beach, or across the West Bank to visit friends and family... is, as de Certeau demonstrates, a tactic to temporarily subvert established power configurations." In the context, therefore, of Israeli policies of spatial dismemberment and enclavisation (Falah, 2005) and the atomisation of Palestinian society, "affirmation of life" tactics are "practiced predominantly on the individual (rather than collective) and ideational (rather than action-oriented, practical) level" (Richter-Devroe, 2011).

Junka (2006) connects this transition from collective action to individualised attempts to temporarily subvert existing power structures with the hybridisation of Palestinian subjectivities between the two intifadas. This shift, she claims, is indicative of the extent of Palestinian disempowerment. Neither the suspension of life strategy of the first intifada nor the affirmation of life tactics of the second intifada can be interpreted in straightforward terms as 'resistance.' Rather, Junka argues, "they must be understood instead as indicative of the changing matrix of power relations within which Palestinian subjectivity is constituted" (Junka, 2006: 423).

In the post second intifada period, the evidence from East Jerusalem suggests a further shift, away from 'affirmation of life' towards an individualised 'improvement of life' attitude. While East Jerusalem Palestinians continue to seize opportunities to visit the beach or to holiday over Eid, these occasions are not demonstrably imbued with political significance or framed by East Jerusalemites themselves as acts of resistance. Spontaneous and temporary opportunities for enjoyment, including those which occur within Israeli space, are regarded by East Jerusalem residents as part of normal life and not as a substitute for it.

The data collected indicates that while East Jerusalem Palestinians have not abandoned resistance, they have redefined it (see Chapter VI below). In the context of long term Israeli rule, many are using the existing order to improve their prospects and situation, rather than waiting for improvements in the national condition which seem indefinitely postponed. This mode of struggle represents an adaptation to de facto Israeli rule, rather than an attempt to subvert it.

Summa explains that she has chosen to practice medicine inside Israel, rather than in East Jerusalem hospitals or in the West Bank, because her career prospects and earning potential are far greater in Israel. "Hospitals in Israel, medical education and medical facilities in Israeli hospitals, are much better than in the Palestinian ones. Also, they pay more money than the Palestinians. I know my friend who works at al-Maqassad, for on call they give them 400 NIS, not much.³⁶ In Israel they pay from 800 to 1000 NIS. It doesn't compare. They give much more money... The problem is the Palestinians don't have money. Because of this they don't have enough CT, MRI, all the equipment they don't have... And

³⁶ Al-Maqassad is a Palestinian hospital in East Jerusalem that is not part of the Israeli health insurance scheme.

you know, if you want to make a sub-speciality, I want to do now radiology; after that I will make a sub-speciality. I have places, I have a chance in Israel. But on the Palestinian side they don't have sub-specialities, they don't have the quality, the ability to do sub-specialities, because they are still building themselves."

Summa refuses to integrate socially with Israelis but recognises reluctantly that that Israel offers her a far more rewarding career path and much better prospects. "Here, like this, that is better for me. Society and culture in the West Bank is similar to ours in East Jerusalem but organisation, regulation, rules and opportunities are better in Israel. It becomes about best interests. Thinking of myself. For my own best interest, I choose to work in Israel."

At the isolated margins of two conflicting state projects and in the absence of a plausible nationalist narrative, East Jerusalem Palestinians are steadfast in their commitment to remain in the city, but are also thinking about their own interests and ways to improve their material prospects. Yet even the extent to which this might be considered a choice freely made within the limitations of their predicament is open to debate. As referenced in Chapter II, Israeli efforts to depoliticise East Jerusalem Palestinians in order to minimise the threat they pose to Israeli authority there extend to policies which require them to focus their struggle on material concerns rather than the national project.

There is significant debate regarding the extent to which the tactics of the weak confer agency on the dispossessed. This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter V, but I refer here to Bayat's thesis that the struggles of the urban disenfranchised transcend survival strategies and rather are "surreptitiously offensive," seeking improvement in their own lives. This "quiet encroachment of

the ordinary” is marked by “quiet, atomised and prolonged mobilisation with episodic collective action – an open and fleeting struggle without clear leadership, ideology or structured organisation.” They are not conscious political protests, but rather the actions of “structurally atomised individuals” driven by the force of necessity – the necessity to survive and live a dignified life” (Bayat, 1997)

In Chapter II, I discussed the growing atomisation of East Jerusalem Palestinians. While challenging the extent to which everyday life is cast as resistance and confers agency, I argue below that East Jerusalem Palestinians, isolated, insecure and leaderless, are exploring ways to not only survive, but to make the most of their circumstances and to improve their lives and livelihoods and those of their families.

Salem (2006) offers a useful approach, focusing on the adaptation of East Jerusalem Palestinians to the ‘internal occupation’ of their city during the Oslo and post-Oslo periods. With the concentration of power in the Palestinian Authority and Orient House, popular participation in resistance weakened and the role of Fatah as a source of collective identity in Jerusalem gave way to fragmentation and atomisation. In this atmosphere, Salem argues that four types of adaption model emerged. First, forced adaption, paying compulsory municipal taxes, taking Israeli professional licenses or voting in Palestinian elections despite Israeli limitations. Second, voluntary affiliation in order to gain benefits, such as joining the Histradut, applying for Israeli citizenship or voting in Israeli municipal elections. Third avoidance of the negative influence of Israeli exclusion policies, for example, hiring a lawyer to achieve family unification, registering an NGO according to Israeli law, or withdrawing from Palestinian politics due to fear of the consequences. Fourth, adaptation through rejection, for example by joining

a faction as an activist or through the practices of many East Jerusalem Palestinians who struggle to remain in the city despite the pressures to leave.

For Salem, the first and third adaptation models include all Palestinian Jerusalemites, the second is the choice of a minority, while the fourth suffers from the absence of national and institutional structures and the atomisation of East Jerusalemites who are required to find individual ways to cope with the realities of life in the city.

Adaptation offers a useful framework for analysing Palestinian attitudes and behaviours. The deteriorating spatial reality, characterised by shrinkage, dismemberment and fragmentation, requires Palestinians to adapt; it offers context for the atomised, individual responses of residents to the collective problems of East Jerusalem, for the inward orientation of this constituency and for the prioritisation of everyday urban concerns over national goals (Yousef, 2011). One interviewee, Ahmad, gave voice to this feeling that that the occupation is “psychological, it’s programmed and designed to make people just focus on some things to make people forget what really matters.”³⁷

Khalid told me that “the people are thinking now just about the life. They will not think about the situation and the politics for the future. The man, he just thinks about this day. How much it will cost to feed my family. If you ask anyone in Jerusalem, the problem for him is money. They are afraid because if anyone writes anything on Facebook now, he will go to jail. In the first intifada, all of the people in Palestine took part, from the baby to the old woman. I was ten years

³⁷ See also ICG 2012. *Extreme Makeover? (II): The Withering of Arab Jerusalem. Middle East Report*. Jerusalem/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

old when it started and I was throwing stones and when I was 15 years old I went to jail, for one year, for burning a police car. Now I just worry about how much is the rent and how much is the food.”

Though structurally atomised, there is some evidence of collective action of a sort among East Jerusalem Palestinians. This is rarely political; in fact, none of my interviewees had ever taken part in a demonstration, few had voted in Palestinian elections and only one had voted in Israeli municipal elections. It is evident, however, in a range of everyday practices.

The extremely high cost of living in Jerusalem and the limitations of Palestinian construction mean that families are increasingly opting to share overcrowded accommodation in order to prevent those who could not otherwise afford to live in the city from losing their residency rights. George says that this is particularly evident in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City. There, he says, “so many people just live in one house, crowded, to keep their residency... My friend is a Muslim, he lives in the Muslim Quarter and... he has his own family and his extended family living with him. I am sorry to say this, I am just giving you an example, but he can’t even sleep with his own wife. The family are living too close together, the neighbours are too close.”

It is also common practice for families living in East Jerusalem to allow even distant relatives who hold residency but reside permanently in the West Bank to be registered for official purposes at the East Jerusalem address. In this way, East Jerusalem Palestinians who for one reason or another live elsewhere in the occupied territories hope to prove to the Israeli authorities that their centre of life remains in Jerusalem. This practice goes beyond the mere formality of listing

them at the address. Electricity, water, telephone and arnona bills are often held in different relatives' names, meticulously filed and passed around as required to anyone who needs to renew a travel document or change the details on their ID card.

Collective action also includes covering for a neighbour who rents a small property in East Jerusalem, but who lives day to day in the West Bank, when an official visitor calls; passing word through the streets of the Old City that the Israeli tax inspectors are in the market so that shopkeepers can haul in their wares and pull the shutters down; telling official callers on the home telephone that a distant relative who actually lives in Ramallah has just popped out and will be back soon. These everyday practices demonstrate a shared antagonism towards Israel and the persistence of joint action against its authority. While significant in their way, however, I avoid here overstating the impact these actions or imposing intentionally subversive meanings. On the whole, agency is atomised and directed towards one's own self-interest.

East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting individually in a multitude of ways to the political reality and in many cases these go well beyond a struggle for 'bare life' or attempts at mere survival. George's mother came to live with him and his family after the death of his father, but the home he rented was not large enough for them all. It was important to George to remain close to the Old City where he had lived all his life, but he also saw an opportunity to escape the suffocating familiarity of the Christian Quarter in which he felt there was no privacy. George rented a property from a Jewish landlord and moved into a religious Israeli neighbourhood within walking distance of the Old City. He has had no problems

at all with his Jewish neighbours. Even during the Gaza war in the summer of 2014, relations were not strained.

“When the sirens sounded in Jerusalem, my wife was worried so we took our kids and sheltered in the staircase with the other families. We all waited together. It was friendly. They have no problem with me, I am a good neighbour.”

When I asked George if he felt that relations would be so cordial if he were a Muslim Palestinian, he was certain that the situation would not arise. His Israeli landlord would not rent the apartment to a Muslim. For George this was regrettable, but he denied that there was a conflict for him there.

“Okay, so they won’t rent to Muslims and I know that there are good Muslims who won’t make trouble, but how do they know who is good or not? I don’t need to justify this decision, even to myself. I have to have a roof over my children’s heads, to be safe and comfortable. That is all that I need to worry about.”

In Chapter II, I also discussed the impact of long term existence in the gray space. Leaderlessness and persistent insecurity, combined with Israeli carrot and stick policies, have contributed to the atomisation of Palestinian society in East Jerusalem. Individuals and families are navigating their own course through exceedingly difficult terrain and the result appears to be a focus on individual self interest and, indeed, prosperity.

Israeli journalist Nir Hasson argues that a process of Israelisation is taking place in East Jerusalem, the most advanced phase of which appears in Palestinian applications for Israeli citizenship. Attorney Amnon Mazar, who specialises in citizenship applications, tells Hasson that “the shame barrier has fallen... People

have reached the conclusion that the PA will not be their salvation and that Israel is a cornucopia. So they do it for their personal benefit.” While some experts see the separation Barrier as responsible and others point to the deadlock in the peace process, in-fighting among the Palestinian factions or the influence of the Arab Spring, “everyone agrees that the driving force behind these developments is not love of Israel, but a desire to survive. “It may be simply due to the fact that, after so many years of occupation, a generation that was born into the situation prefers to look for its material future rather than raise the national flag”, Hasson concludes (Hasson, 2012).

Others agree that the ‘shame barrier’ in East Jerusalem has fallen and that residents are either more resigned than previously to long term Israeli rule in the city or more willing than previously to admit it. A 2015 poll by the Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion found that 52% of East Jerusalem Palestinians would prefer to be citizens of Israel with equal rights, compared to 42% who would choose to be citizens of a Palestinian state. This result, the Centre claims, confirms and extends a trend first observed in 2010, when one third of East Jerusalem Palestinians picked Israeli over Palestinian citizenship and repeated in 2011 by which time the proportion had risen to 40% (Pollock, 2015).

Despite their disdain for Israel, it is not unusual to hear East Jerusalem Palestinians compare the Palestinian Authority negatively to the Israeli government. Ahmad explained:

“Some of the people I know, they prefer to live under the Israeli authorities, under the occupation, because they are allowed to enter any place, they are allowed to travel to anywhere, they have health insurance, they see what Israel is doing in

its streets and its buildings and its environment, while if they enter the West Bank they see the differences. Israel is working on the land and the state, there is no doubt about that, but I can't simply accept that they are superiors... the Palestinians have the ability to accomplish something but the self-pity is quite bad, that we are under occupation, that we can't do anything, we just have to accept it, they are providing us with what we need, so why bother, why claim our rights. No, we must claim our rights from Israel.”

There is perhaps evidence of a growing understanding among East Jerusalem Palestinians that as residents and tax payers they have rights and are entitled to demand a minimum level of service provision. However, participation in municipal elections or politics in Jerusalem remains extremely low. While the public discourse has softened on issues such as citizenship which brings with it tangible benefits, there is little interest or support among East Jerusalemites for a greater engagement in the electoral process in the city. While some argue that participation would imply recognition of Israeli sovereignty, the majority of those who are aware of their right to vote (it is evident from this research that in fact many are not, see Chapter VI) simply do not believe that anything could be achieved.

In other ways, Palestinians do engage with Israeli institutions and practices, though it is clear that these moments often do more to blur the distinction between normalisation and resistance than to clarify it. Braier (2013) draws attention to an upsurge in Palestinian efforts to legitimise informal housing in East Jerusalem through engagement with professional urban planning. In the post-Oslo period this “has resulted in a proliferation of independent ‘spot-zoning’ plans submitted to the Israeli planning authorities, mostly for the purpose of lifting the threat of

potential demolition from existing homes” (Braier, 2013: 2701). In 2011, 163 independent plans submitted by East Jerusalem Palestinians were reviewed by an Israeli planning committee of which 60% were approved. This contrasts markedly with only three authorised plans in 1994 and 12 in 2002. Braier demonstrates that the multitude of independent plans submitted by Palestinians destabilises the pretence of professional neutrality underpinning the committee’s rationale. He also suggests, however, that precisely because professional planning is embedded within the ethnonational state project, attempts by East Jerusalem residents to work within the Israeli bureaucratic system to protect themselves or to challenge power relations risk enforcing or reproducing existing power structures. Moreover, the proliferation of individual submissions by Palestinian residents to save their own homes is indicative of the growing atomisation of this constituency and may come at expense of community claims and collective political mobilisations.

On the whole, East Jerusalem Palestinians looking for improvement in their lives do not pursue these goals collectively or through political routes, relying instead on individual strategies. Crucially, however, this must be understood as a choice rooted in the existing power complex and not within a resistance/normalisation binary perspective.

When East Jerusalem residents speak today about what might improve their lives, normality and equality are most frequently mentioned, while Palestinian statehood is rarely spoken of and an end to the occupation is no longer as straightforward as it once seemed. Khadija explained her hopes for a better future:

“Not to have the checkpoints, not to have these fights and they forced on us a lot of things, like the border closed and these things. And to live a normal life. My kid does not have to see that soldier every time [he goes out]. When we go to see my family every day they don’t have to see these soldiers... I would feel comfortable if my child can get to an Israeli university and not have that treatment that I did. Like, you have something different from others. I would love if they treat him equal to others... And when they come to Aqsa mosque, it’s a holy place for Muslims. They come inside, why do they do this. This makes us crazy! And things like they make it different when they close the roads, and the way they treat us is very hard. When you walk in the street and see the kids they search them. I want these things to end.”

Summa’s wishes could not have been clearer. Palestinians, she said, simply want to live in peace, but not peace with the Israelis, she was quick to add “Peace with themselves. To have a family, to work on the Israeli side and take home a respectable salary, to have a house, a car, children, to live in peace.”

5 Conclusion

In this chapter I set out with four main goals. First, to establish the physical and political dislocation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank and to explore how this impacts individuals’ framings of their own everyday experience. Second, to make clear that Israeli hegemony is shaping the Palestinian political imagination in East Jerusalem and orienting East Jerusalem residents away from the West Bank, while rejection of the PA is also defining the political horizon for Palestinians in the city who can see no end to the occupation. Third, to establish that East Jerusalem Palestinians experience complex, often ambivalent feelings towards and relationships with Israel which are obscured within dominant

theoretical approaches. And fourth, to demonstrate from a ground level perspective that power relations in the city are influencing individual choices and that within the structural confines of Israeli domination, East Jerusalem residents are acting individually to improve their own lives and livelihoods.

While the separation Barrier enforces East Jerusalem's physical isolation from the West Bank, it is the divergent social and political experience of Palestinians on the western side of the Barrier that entrenches this divide. The collapse of Palestinian political leadership in East Jerusalem and the failure of the authority in Ramallah to project an inclusive nationalist narrative with plausibility for the East Jerusalem constituency compounds the sense of isolation and abandonment felt by East Jerusalemites who can see no credible, even conceivable, way to challenge Israeli power in the city. The Palestinian Authority remains deeply unpopular with East Jerusalem Palestinians who question its legitimacy and who are in no hurry to see a two-state solution that permanently concedes East Jerusalem to Israel or else draws the city into the political orbit of an authority they regard as self-interested and corrupt. In this context of marginalisation from the Palestinian milieu, East Jerusalem Palestinians are acting individually to improve their own lives and livelihoods in the city and to establish a 'normal life' within the framework of existing power relations. I describe this as a move away from the 'affirmation of life' position of the second intifada towards an individualised 'improvement of life' attitude post-Oslo. Palestinian residents are by necessity adapting to the reality of enduring Israeli rule, learning Hebrew and seeking out employment opportunities that offer them better pay and prospects. This circumstance also reflects the atomisation of this

Palestinian constituency, for whom mainstream nationalist discourses have lost meaning.

In the next chapter I investigate the other side of East Jerusalemites' dual marginality, this time as residents of the Israeli state who despite their apparent readiness to adapt to the conditions of long-term Israeli rule, experience exclusion and discrimination inside the Jewish state. Israel's criminalisation of counter-hegemonic articulations leaves its Palestinian residents in what appears to be a state of suspended political animation. Trapped between an unpopular national authority on the one hand and the internal colonial project of the Israeli state on the other, East Jerusalem Palestinians are leaderless and atomised and increasingly reliant on individual solutions to their collective problems.

CHAPTER V

EVERYDAY PALESTINIAN LIFE IN THE ANNEXED CITY: EAST JERUSALEM RESIDENTS AS A MARGINALISED COMMUNITY INSIDE ISRAEL

In Chapter IV, I addressed the marginality of East Jerusalem residents who, as an isolated Palestinian constituency, find themselves cut off from the body politic and beyond the authority of the national leadership. I examined the deteriorating spatial reality in East Jerusalem and demonstrated the alienation of personal Palestinian narratives in the city from the official nationalist discourse. I addressed the complex and often ambivalent feelings East Jerusalem Palestinians hold towards Israel and made the case that spatial and discursive dislocation are disrupting orders of meaning for Palestinians in the city. Finally, I looked at the ways in which East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting to the reality of long term Israeli rule in the city and discussed how these adaptations are interpreted within mainstream analyses.

I made the case that everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem goes beyond 'bare life' (Agamben, 1998, Boano and Martén, 2013, Hanafi, 2009) or a straightforward struggle for survival. East Jerusalem Palestinians are subjected to a catalogue of spaciocidal policies (Hanafi, 2009) and steadfastness is required of all those who remain in the city despite the judaising ambitions of the state. However, many Palestinians are also exploiting the education and employment opportunities available to them as permanent residents of Israel to advance themselves and their families within the existing power structure. The resistance/normalisation binary fails to adequately explain everyday Palestinian

life in the city and I suggest instead that East Jerusalemite attitudes and behaviours are better understood within the context of highly asymmetrical power relations and Israeli rule as a hegemonic social imaginary.

In this chapter, I explore the other side of the East Jerusalem constituency's double liminality, this time as non-Jewish residents inside the Israeli state. Despite the territorial annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel and official pronouncements on the immutability of the unified city, Palestinian Jerusalemites are permanently positioned outside the limits of imagined inclusion in the state project (Yiftachel, 2009a). In Chapter VI, I consider the implications of this exclusion for Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in the city. Here, I explicate the impediments to Palestinian inclusion within Israel and explore the everyday manifestations of otherness and insecurity experienced by residents. I argue that East Jerusalemites who seek to improve their prospects within the context of de facto Israeli rule are drawn, in various ways, into closer relationships with the Israeli state, economy and society, but ultimately find that inclusion, equality and security are outside their reach. Together, the dual aspects of their marginality, first within the Palestinian milieu, then within the Israeli one, are shaping the site of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem that is explored in Chapter VI.

In this chapter, I situate Palestinian exclusion first at a structural level, within the context of Israeli ethnocracy and the twin processes of Judaisation and de-Palestinianisation that constitute a "hegemonic meta-narrative" for Israeli ambitions in the city (Yiftachel, 2006, Yiftachel, 2012). As non-Jews within the de facto boundaries of the Jewish state, East Jerusalem Palestinians are the outside

brought inside, permanently trapped by the ethnocratic regime between territorial inclusion and political alienation and oppression.

Next, I address the workings of state power in East Jerusalem where administrative ambiguity, informality and exception combine with more coercive and overtly punitive measures to normalise occupation and facilitate Israeli objectives in the city. Following on from the discussion in Chapter IV, I challenge the view that exception and informality signal the incompleteness of the hegemonic project. Rather, I argue, they represent a mode of control which becomes a normalised aspect of the system. This facilitates the managed exclusion of permanently marginalised groups with minimum friction while broader territorial objectives are pursued (Shlomo, 2016a, Shlomo, 2016b). I also highlight how frontier construction and the othering of East Jerusalem Palestinians 'legitimises' the use of various surveillance and control mechanisms which also serve to advance the state's agenda.

Third, I explore personal Palestinian accounts of everyday life in the city and examine how Israeli strategies for the control and management of East Jerusalem are experienced by its residents. Repression and discrimination operate alongside informality, exclusion and gray spacing, fostering insecurity and a sense of transience that places 'normal' urban life in full view but ultimately out of reach. I do not attempt to provide a thorough survey of the oppressive and discriminatory practices of the Israeli state or to catalogue all the abuses and degradations experienced by residents. Rather, I aim to construct a sense of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem from the particular perspective of its residents who seek to lead 'normal' lives within the existing power structure.

Finally, I acknowledge the perception that antagonism and distrust are mutual and pervasive and ask how this contributes to the exclusion of East Jerusalem residents inside Israel. Despite the tangential experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians and the complexity of their interactions with Israel, events within the wider Israeli-Palestinian arena continue to impact significantly on the way in which they understand and narrate their own experience. The frequent cordiality of everyday encounters with the 'other' in Jerusalem is inconsistent with the sense of enmity felt by many Palestinians towards the Israeli state. I examine the role of memory as well as ongoing injustices in sustaining this antagonism and consider the importance of antagonism in maintaining the essentialised identities on which mainstream nationalist discourses are based.

1 Permanent Exclusion

In this section I juxtapose the territorial inclusion of East Jerusalem within Israel's de facto borders with the permanent, structural exclusion of its Palestinian residents from full participation and equal status within the state. Drawing on Yiftachel's theory of ethnocracy, I argue that as an ethnocratic state, Israel positions non-Jewish populations permanently outside the limits of imagined inclusion, bringing the outside inside and implementing a range of strategies aimed at their transfer, management or control. The ethnocratic nature of the state regime provides structural context for the personal narratives of East Jerusalem Palestinians (discussed in section three below) who experience feelings of temporariness, insecurity and fear.

1.1 The Ethnocratic State

The classification of Israel as an ethnocratic state, driven by the twin logics of Judaisation and de-Arabisation, sheds light on the structure of exclusion in East Jerusalem and the quotidian episodes of inequality and discrimination experienced by Palestinian residents. Ethnocracy implies the rule or government by one particular ethnic group, or *ethnos*, usually in a situation where there is at least one other significant ethnic group (Anderson, 2016: 1). According to Yiftachel, it is “a type of regime that facilitates and promotes the process of *ethnicization*,” which is defined by expansion and control. Within the ethnocratic state, “struggles over the process of ethnic expansion become the central axis along which social and political relations evolve.” But the term ethnocracy refers to more than the straightforward dominance of one ethnic group over others; “it also denotes *the prominence of ethnicity* in all aspects of communal life.” In this sense, ethnicity is legitimised as a tool for “group stratification and marginalisation” within the ethnocratic state (Yiftachel, 2006: 295-6).

Ethnocracy is generally contrasted with democracy, or rule by the *demos*, the people, within a given area (Anderson, 2016: 1-2). An ethnocratic state is neither properly democratic nor purely authoritarian (Anderson, 2016, Yiftachel, 2006). Rather, it is best defined as a political regime that facilitates the expansion and control of a dominant ethnic group within a contested territory. The democratic element within an ethnocratic state is not simply “ideological camouflage” (Anderson, 2016: 5) since the dominant *ethnos* demands for itself genuine democratic politics and political institutions. Within an ethnocracy, however, these democratic elements are “disproportionately and sometimes exclusively available to the favoured *ethnos*.” It is this political cleavage between ethnic groups which

defines the state as ethnocratic as opposed to democratic (Anderson, 2016: 5-6).

Yiftachel has pioneered the concept of ethnocracy as a tool “for analysing *national* ethnocratic regimes in contemporary national states which claim to be ‘democratic’” (Anderson, 2016: 3)³⁸. He locates the Israeli state firmly within this category and his observations are clearly rooted within a critical Southern perspective. This approach challenges the manner in which modern social science presents the viewpoints, perspectives and problems of metropolitan society as universal knowledge, factoring out those derived from the global periphery (Connell, 2008). These are key themes in Yiftachel’s work and I return to them below.

Alternative approaches to Israel, more tolerant of the tension between democracy and the state’s self-proclaimed Jewish character, are rejected by exponents of the ethnocratic model. The ‘ethnic democracy’ model formulated by Smooha (1990), for example, claims that “the democratic and Jewish characteristics of the state coexist” (Smooha, 1990: 205). As an ethnic democracy, Smooha contends that Israel extends individuals political and civil rights and minorities certain collective rights, while allowing institutionalised dominance over the state by one particular ethnic group.

³⁸ The concept of ethnocracy has also been explored and expanded ‘downwards’ in terms of urban ethnocracy and the ‘ethnocracy’, as well ‘backwards’ and ‘forwards’ in relation to imperial ethnocracy and shared or post-conflict ethnocracy. See ANDERSON, J. 2013. Imperial Ethnocracy and Demography: Foundations of Ethno-National Conflict in Belfast and Jerusalem. In: PULLAN, W. & BAILLIE, B. (eds.) *Locating Urban Conflicts: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Everyday*. Hants: Palgrave Macmillan; ANDERSON, J. 2016. Ethnocracy: Exploring and Extending the Concept. *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal*, 8; YACOBI, H. 2009. *The Jewish-Arab City: Spacio-Politics in a Mixed Community*, London, Routledge; YIFTACHEL, O. & YACOBI, H. 2003. Urban Ethnocracy: Ethnicization and the Production of Space in an Israeli ‘Mixed’ City. *Society and Space*, 21, 673-693.

Shafir and Peled (1998) give support to the ethnic democracy model, expounding a theory of simultaneous, competing citizenship discourses which ultimately allow the ethnic democratic state to maintain its stability. While endorsing their observations on the long-term stratification of citizenship, Yiftachel rejects their overall argument on the grounds that Israel does not meet the standards of liberalism and republicanism on which their support for the ethnic democracy model rests.

Yiftachel maintains that the nature of Israeli governance, in the territory and towards the population under its control, makes evident the fact that Israel is not a democracy at all, let alone a liberal one. Rather, he concludes, Israel occupies a grey zone, combining democratic and non-democratic structures and practices, which are best understood as ethnocratic. Israel had proclaimed itself a Jewish state from the outset, but expressed its determination that all inhabitants would receive “complete equality of social and political rights irrespective of religion, race or sex” (Knesset). It was the state’s ethnic *Jewish* rather than its *Israeli* character, however, that was enshrined in subsequent legislation and practices. By the mid-1960’s Israel’s ‘Jewishness’ had become a constitutional fact and revisions made to the Basic Law on the Knesset in 1985 and 2002 ensured that “any democratic struggle to change the state’s Zionist character would be almost impossible” (Yiftachel, 2006).

If Israel’s Judaisation project over Israel/Palestine has come to form the main basis of the regime, nowhere is Israeli ethnocracy more apparent than in East Jerusalem. The Israeli project in the city – to maximise Jewish political, demographic, territorial and economic control – is manifest in a range of policies and practices deigned to ensure the permanent territorial inclusion of East

Jerusalem and long term management of the excluded population. Despite Israel's unified capital rhetoric, Jerusalem has become an exemplar of the ethnocratic city (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2002); while Israeli leaders and decision makers seek to portray the city as integrated, modern and democratic (Yiftachel, 2006; Nolte and Yacobi, 2015), Palestinian residents experience discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion.

1.2 Internally and Externally Constructed Minorities

While Israel's Judaising impulse in East Jerusalem manifests the ethnocratic principles of the regime, ethnic relations within the state are more complex than a straightforward Jewish/non-Jewish binary suggests. An examination of the broader ethnic challenges facing Israel exposes deeper divisions which also make visible the extent of Palestinian exclusion. This analysis provides context for the impediments encountered by Palestinian residents who are adapting to de facto Israeli rule and seeking to improve their lives and livelihoods within this context.

Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) adopt a three-tier model of the Israeli settler society in which the founding or 'charter' group – Ashkenazi Jews – gained dominant political, cultural and economic status during the critical formative period of the new state. The second group, non-Ashkenazi Jews, are 'immigrants' who joined the 'founders' in the national settlement project but from an inferior economic and cultural position. The third group, indigenous Palestinian Arabs, are excluded from the process of nation-building, remain permanently 'trapped' in their inferior status and experience broad discrimination.

This three-tier model offers a useful framework for the critical analysis of ethnic relations in Israel's mixed urban spaces. Yiftachel expands elsewhere on the essential differences between minority groups within an ethnocratic state. Within the ethnocratic system the dominance of the principal ethnonational group is premised upon the exclusion, marginalisation or assimilation of minority communities (Yiftachel, 2006). This problem is particularly acute at an urban level, which Yacobi describes as a 'double trap' for Palestinians in mixed Arab-Jewish cities. In an ethnocratic state which allocates rights and resources according to an ethnic hierarchy, Palestinians are further discriminated against in a city that declares itself to be 'mixed' but denies Palestinian identity and planning needs (Yacobi, 2009: 108).

Yet it is apparent that not all minorities are treated equally - there are those regarded as internal and those which are constructed as external. "A critical difference exists between those considered part of the historical, religious or even genetic community, and others whose presence is portrayed as mere historical coincidence, or as a danger to the security and integrity of the dominant ethnos. These discourses strip external minorities of a means of inclusion in to the meaningful collective spaces of institutions of the nation" (Yiftachel, 2006).

East Jerusalem Palestinians appear to recognise that their readiness to participate, even at a superficial level, in Israeli society is made more difficult by that society's own diversity and internal stratification. Summa, who struggled initially to "fit in" as a junior doctor in an Israeli hospital explained that "with the doctors, it isn't easy, because of different cultures. The Israeli society is not Israeli, they are from Russia, they are from Britain, they are from Yemen, from all over the world. It's not a single culture, so it's difficult to integrate with them. There

is not one way you can behave with Israelis that will allow you to integrate with them because they are all so different. And in the hospital, there are different departments; for example, internal medicine, they are mostly Russian, the ER is Russian too. How do I integrate with them? They cannot integrate with each other!”

The first five months of her stay year were very difficult for Summa, travelling from the West Bank to Tel Aviv every day. Then, a two-month rotation in a department where for the first time she experienced overt discrimination, pushed her to the point of quitting. It was eventually this sense that Israelis lacked cohesion or a shared sense of belonging, however, that she says convinced her to stick with it. “When I said to myself no, I don’t want to continue, I was standing on the ward and I looked around and I thought, no, they are not from here. They are not one society; they are not one culture. They are not from here. Yane, we are Palestinians, we are typical and the same as each other. They are not, they are mixed... This is my place. Okay, I don’t love them, but this is my place, it’s not theirs, so I have to continue.”

Neither are East Jerusalem Palestinians convinced that Israel offers greater democracy to its Jewish citizens than it does to others. Ziad argued that Israel does not even qualify as an ethnic democracy since there is also division and discrimination within the dominant ethnos.

“No. Let’s talk about the Jews in general. We have Jews from maybe the West - Canada and America, Western Europe - and we have Jews from the East. Ashkenazi and Sephardi. They do have racism between them, I’ve seen it with my eyes. Between the Russian and the American, between the American and the

Moroccan. They have racism... There is no democracy here at all. I believe if there is no democracy for all society then there is no democracy at all.”

Ziad highlighted the treatment of minority groups to reaffirm his argument that there is no democracy in Israel. “Let’s compare it to Germany or England or America or Canada. There is no comparison between them. Okay, no democracy is perfect, but the country should be working to be perfect, towards being more democratic, all the time, every day, every year. As Germany is working to be more and more democratic. Israelis do not work like this. Israel is about separation, not just for Palestinians. For example, we have the Ethiopians. They are Jews, but they are very racist with them. Very racist. The Palestinian is the highest level with no democracy, they tend to be killed. But the Ethiopian they are trying to make them a proletariat.”

The internal stratification of Israeli society is thus recognised by East Jerusalem Palestinians who also perceive their position at the lowest stratum of this structure as the most vulnerable level to occupy. While non-Ashkenazi Jews encounter discrimination within Israel, and many such communities exist at the peripheries of society, ultimately their difference is constructed as internal and the barriers to their inclusion are not regarded as insurmountable. Palestinian residents, who are not without opportunity within Israel, are none the less positioned outside the imagined limits of society and find that internal Israeli divisions hamper their attempts to make inroads through imitation of the hegemonic culture.

Postcolonial theory regards mimicry as a central part of the process of creating a negotiated “third space” in which the rigid dichotomy between coloniser and colonised is subverted (Bhabha, 1994). Yacobi (2009) argues that, while useful,

the concept of a third space takes insufficient note of the material dimensions of the postcolonial reality and the everyday practices that produce the built environment. His conclusion, that the third space challenges hegemonic perceptions but fails to transform them, reflects the experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians.

The marginality of Palestinians inside Israel and their consequent vulnerability is made evident by the violence experienced by members of other ethnic groups when they are mistaken for Palestinians. This threat is particularly pronounced during periods of heightened tension between Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories. An article in the Jewish-American magazine *Forward* in 2015 claimed that as violence spiralled in the region, the climate of fear was pushing Israelis to extremes and that those bearing the brunt of this behaviour, aside from the Palestinians, were “the ‘others’ of Israeli society: African asylum seekers and Mizrahi (Arab) Jews” whose darker complexions meant they might be mistaken for Palestinians (Samuel, 2015).

In one such mistaken identity case, a Mizrahi Jew was attacked with a knife in Haifa in October 2015 by a fellow Israeli who believed him to be a Palestinian.³⁹ Reporting the crime, the Israeli newspaper *Maariv* listed several other incidents in which Mizrahi Jews had been attacked or come to fear for their safety due to their Arab appearance. Days after the Haifa incident, a Palestinian gunman attacked the Be'er Sheva bus station.⁴⁰ A dark-skinned bystander, 29-year old Eritrean asylum seeker Abtum Zarhum, was erroneously identified as the

³⁹ The victim, Uri Rezken, was stabbed in the back but survived the attack.

⁴⁰ The attack took place on 18 October 2015, killing an Israeli soldier and wounding several others.

Palestinian assailant and was shot then repeatedly beaten by a mob.⁴¹ CCTV evidence of the attack showed that the critically injured Zarhum was subjected to a violent assault by nine bystanders including members of the security forces, prison officials and soldiers. A bus driver is seen throwing a chair at him and he is spat upon, verbally abused and photographed by passers-by. Members of the Israeli prison service are seen also assaulting the injured man with a metal bench. Zarhum was not attended by medical personnel until 16 minutes after he was shot and died of his wounds in hospital hours later (Ben Zikri, 2015, Lazareva, 2015, Samuel, 2015). Incidents such as these highlight the marginality of non-Palestinian 'others' in Israeli society, but also importantly underline the fact that their vulnerability is greatest with they are mistaken for Palestinians.

Insecurity and fear mean that many Palestinians inside Israel's de facto borders abstain from resistance activity or political action, but this apparently does little to neutralise the perceived threat posed by Palestinians inside Israel. Klein (2008) argues that from an Israeli perspective, the demographic problem presented by Palestinians persists even if they are not politically active under Israeli rule. In this analysis, it is not the actions of Palestinians but their essential otherness that threatens Israel by the very fact of their presence and difference. Yacobi and Pullan (2014) reach a similar conclusion in their study of internal Palestinian migration into Jerusalem's colonial neighbourhoods, established soon after the 1967 war. In this instance, they argue, the primary factor behind Jewish racism towards Palestinian interlopers in French Hill is not their racial difference but rather their presence in the urban space of the majority group and their movement

⁴¹ Around 34,000 Eritreans who have fled persecution are currently seeking asylum in Israel. These applications are routinely denied and the Israeli Supreme Court has twice affirmed that they treatment violates fundamental laws relating to human dignity and freedom.

through social and territorial boundaries. The authors cite a report by the Israeli Institute of Democracy examining the extent of Jewish tolerance for neighbours who are 'other', including Palestinians, foreign labour and gay couples. The survey reveals that the most troubling neighbourly relationship for Israelis is that with Arabs (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). Reaching a similar conclusion, Israeli philosopher Adi Ophir argues that the Palestinian's "very presence, let alone his attempt to speak back to power, is conceived as a form of resistance. He is not punished because he transgresses the law, he is oppressed because he is present where he is not supposed to be" (cited in Salem, 2011).

Fear of the Other is an essential component of the discourse of urban politics (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014), particularly in contested cities, and it plays a central role in Israeli (and Palestinian) identity construction more broadly. Here, East Jerusalem Palestinians pose a threat to Israel's Judaising ambitions and to its self-identification as both a Jewish state and a democratic one. This point also lends credibility to the argument, discussed in more detail below, that Palestinian resistance and/or violence are anticipated by - indeed essential to - Israel's colonial ambitions and national identity. The hegemonic state project is ultimately contingent on the success, not of strategies aimed at the absorption of the Palestinian minority, but on those employed to sustain its exclusion and facilitate its control.

2 The Workings of Israeli Power in East Jerusalem

The praxis of Israel's colonial project in East Jerusalem manifests the exclusionist ideology of the state. Palestinian residents live within the de facto borders of Israel's 'united capital' and operate under the legal jurisdiction of the state. None

the less, they experience an assemblage of informalities, exceptional arrangements and discriminatory practices which evidence their unassailable otherness within the ethnocratic state and perpetuate their exclusion.

Yiftachel argues for a revised critical urban theory that acknowledges the presence of permanently excluded populations which are outside the intended reach of hegemonic projects, but whose members live day to day within the politics and economy of the city. The traditional concept of the hegemonic state project takes for granted the intention of the dominant ethnonational group to incorporate the peripheries, but this has limited applicability within urban colonial situations such as East Jerusalem. Crucially, the working of power in this context is premised on “structural, impregnable, exclusion.” This urban colonial setting is thus characterised by “the permanent presence of groups existing outside the limits of ‘society’ and hence beyond the nets of imagined incorporation and control cast by hegemonic or governmentality projects” (Yiftachel, 2009a).

East Jerusalem Palestinians represent a demographic impediment to the exclusionary Israeli-Jewish national identity and to the successful Judaisation of territory under Israeli control (Yiftachel, 2012). As such, they also lay bare the tensions within Israel’s ethnocratic political system which represents (and perhaps even regards) itself as democratic while actively pursuing the legal, spatial and cultural ethnicization of public and civil spheres (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003).

Israel’s colonial praxis in East Jerusalem manifests these contradictions (Jadallah, 2014). Control over the city and realisation of the state’s geopolitical ambitions there are pursued through a combination of purposeful actions and

practices aimed at the management and manipulation of Palestinian space and population. Shlomo (2016a) provides a general conceptual framework for Israeli rule in East Jerusalem centred around dual modes of logic that create both a 'colonial' moment and a 'governmental' moment. While more punitive 'colonial' manifestations of state power are well explored in the mainstream literature, much less attention is usually given to the urban processes and governmental arrangements through which Israeli rule in East Jerusalem is normalised.

In this section I examine key aspects of the implementation of Israeli power in East Jerusalem before moving on in section three below to consider how the experience of these practices is framed by Palestinians on the ground. I look first at the more pernicious Israeli strategies for control and management of the East Jerusalem population as residents of the state, rooted in policies of exception, ambiguity and informality. In this context explore the governmentality perspective put forward by Shlomo and assess how it might contribute to our understanding of East Jerusalem. I then focus in on three key manifestations of the state of exception, namely residency, planning and education. Next, I discuss the Israeli surveillance and control mechanisms employed in East Jerusalem which form part of the process of othering and put normal life out of reach. Finally, I examine the use of collective punishment by the state in pursuit of its colonial ambitions. Combined, these disproportionate measures reflect - and in turn reproduce - the 'otherness' of East Jerusalem Palestinians on which the success of the colonial project depends.

2.1 Informality and Exception

Legal and administrative amendments adopted by the Knesset in June 1967 facilitated the immediate extension of Israeli law and governance throughout the newly expanded Jerusalem municipality.⁴² Today, Israel asserts its legal jurisdiction over East Jerusalem, but despite official representations of the city as physically and discursively united under its authority, the state continues to permit the operation of institutions and systems which deviate from Israeli norms in terms of both method and outcome (Shlomo, 2016b).

Dumper (1997) has argued that Israel's simultaneous but contradictory approaches in Jerusalem since 1967 arise from its dual aim of entrenching Israeli control in the city while seeking to make that control more tolerable by permitting anomalies. Thus, "the Israeli government found that it was obliged to accept restrictions and ambiguities with regard to the full application of its law and administration," particularly with regard to the administration of the holy places, the Sharia courts and the waqf system (Dumper, 1997: 42).

The functional independence of these systems may have emerged from grassroots Palestinian resistance to Israeli domination in the immediate post-conquest period, but the administrative ambiguities tolerated by Israel also facilitated the stabilisation of occupation and continue to serve the colonial project. While legal and administrative exceptions are usually ascribed either to the strength of Palestinian opposition or to the discriminatory nature of Israeli policies, Shlomo argues that "in East Jerusalem we find a different type of

⁴² The amendments were made on 27 June 1967 to the Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law and the Municipal Corporation Ordinance (Amendment) Law.

governmental exception... manifested in the State turning a blind eye to adversarial government arrangements in order to achieve the normalisation and stabilisation of rule” (Shlomo, 2016a: 428).

While functional autonomy persists in some areas, these administrative anomalies do not reflect the strength of Palestinian resistance or opposition. Rather, the consistent deviation of state and municipal practice in East Jerusalem from Israeli norms signals the regime’s intention to maintain its rule in the city while minimising Palestinian inclusion and opportunity. Exceptional arrangements are, on the whole, inferior arrangements which facilitate neglect and normalise an impression of otherness in regard to East Jerusalem Palestinians. This, in turn, serves the colonial ambitions of the state project in the city.

A governmentality perspective sheds some light on the way in which exception and informality in East Jerusalem allow urban systems to maintain their functional inertia while serving the geopolitical objectives of annexation. It offers a framework for the analysis of urban relations in colonial situations that recognises the ways in which state power may be deployed to regulate and control everyday life and identity among marginalised populations. Shlomo (2016a, 2017b) provides the most thorough interpretation to date of Israeli rule in East Jerusalem from a governmentality perspective. Jerusalem, he claims, has been extensively investigated and analysed within the framework of the divided, polarised or contested city and such accounts offer valid political and spatial interpretations of the ethnonational urban context. Less attention, however, has been devoted to the governmental modalities that allow East Jerusalem to function under Israeli administration. Shlomo’s argument rests on the premise that “the exception of

governmental arrangements in East Jerusalem, which lie outside governmental and Israeli norms – and in some cases even Israeli law – is a key feature of Israeli control over the city, which facilitates the stabilisation of the Israeli project of ‘unifying’ the city under Israeli sovereignty” (Shlomo, 2016a: 429).

This analysis combines Foucauldian governmentality with a complex reinterpretation of Agamben’s ‘state of exception’. While conventional understandings of exception focus on the suspension of legal rights and the exposure of the individual to violence, Shlomo defines the governmental state of exception as the localised application of state practices and methods which are incompatible with the legal, political or administrative norms of the territory. In East Jerusalem, exceptional governmentalities are a mechanism for the preservation of the pre-occupation urban order with the aim of reducing friction with the Palestinians, avoiding the need for significant investment and normalising Israeli rule.

While the annexation of East Jerusalem brought the entire city under Israeli sovereignty, the application of Israeli law and administrative norms is in reality partial and discriminatory, comprising an essential component of Israeli domination in East Jerusalem. Shlomo seeks to examine the resulting regime by deconstructing Israel’s ‘colonial governmentality’ in the city into two distinct logics, or moments, of rule – colonial and governmental. “The colonial moment represents the imperative logic of annexation... mainly through demographic and colonisation policies” while the governmental moment is derived from the imposition of Israeli law in East Jerusalem and the fact that annexation “requires Israel, at least to some extent, to conduct the population’s life” (Shlomo, 2016a: 432).

Shlomo makes clear that how the urban colonial regime operates is contingent upon local and geopolitical circumstances. The Oslo-period transition from Jordanian influence to Palestinian Authority control over many of these institutions and systems marked a shift in the political landscape and posed a tangible threat to the colonial project. The challenge to Israeli sovereignty in the city prompted a firmer response. The state of informality and exception that he describes was facilitated during the first three decades of Israeli occupation by Jordanian then Palestinian involvement in the city's administrative arrangements. In the post-Oslo period, the politics of governmental exception in East Jerusalem are subject to a new political constellation which lead to an arrangement that Shlomo labels sub-formalisation.

Shlomo (2017b) recognises that the sub-formalisation processes evident in East Jerusalem in relation to public transport systems are characterised by extreme deviation from the standards and practices applied throughout Israel. While formalisation has been analysed as a means of achieving urban rights, Shlomo is clear that the mode of formalisation evident in East Jerusalem – what he dubs sub-formalisation – offers little potential for a shift in power relations. “Sub-formalisation is therefore more akin to a problem-solving process in highly contested and politicised environments than to a means for marginalised groups to mobilise or assert their urban rights” (Shlomo, 2017: 272).

While the Foucauldian concept of governmentality offers insight into the power of elites to assimilate and co-opt the subaltern, it fails to explain colonial settings in which subaltern groups are beyond the limits of inclusion in the hegemonic project. Yiftachel (2009a) argues that “the mechanisms of co-optation and governmentality often lack the intention, will or capacity to incorporate colonized

groups.” Shlomo offers a persuasive interpretation of the colonial and governmental logics that informed Israeli rule in East Jerusalem during the first three decades of occupation and his revised Agambenian approach and colonial governmentality perspective do much to overcome this limitation. In this analysis, governmental exception aims at control and management of the urban colonial population rather than its absorption or assimilation, allowing the state to pursue its broader objectives while preserving existing power hierarchies. Shlomo’s governmentality framework also transcends the border and sovereignty approach to East Jerusalem studies that dominates mainstream contemporary research.

On the other hand, governmentality perspectives on East Jerusalem are intrinsically top-down. As such, Shlomo’s powerful and nuanced deconstruction of Israeli state power in East Jerusalem offers relatively little insight into the way in which these processes are experienced by East Jerusalem residents or how they might influence Palestinian subjectivities in the city. In the face of Israeli colonial urbanism in East Jerusalem, Shlomo simply states that the Palestinian side is “characterised by efforts to resist their forced inclusion within state apparatuses and to retain their urban identity by separatism and resistance to Israeli rule” (Shlomo, 2016b: 429).

2.1.1 Residency

The most overt manifestation of Israel’s exceptional practice in East Jerusalem is the national status held by Palestinians in the city. As discussed above, despite official tropes pertaining to Israeli sovereignty over the unified city, the vast majority of East Jerusalem Palestinians are in fact residents not citizens of the Israeli state, a status that is both conditional and inferior.

As a result, underlying the relative normality of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem is the very real, present and persistent threat of expulsion and exile. The revocation of Palestinian residency is a tool of demographic manipulation for the Israeli state that facilitates its colonial objectives in the city. It is also regarded by East Jerusalemites as a means of criminalising otherwise unexceptional practices and behaviours. The Israeli project in the city is spaciocidal, an ongoing dynamic between Israel's ethnocentric ideology and the ability of Palestinians in the city to withstand it. For Hanafi, therefore, the situation of East Jerusalem Palestinians "is the epitome of exclusion/inclusion: included by virtue of the unilateral Israeli annexation of their city and excluded from municipal services, master plans, and civil liberties big and small; they live in a segregated city in which they are residents, but not citizens" (Hanafi, 2009).

Despite the fact most were born in the city, East Jerusalem Palestinians experience feelings of transience and insecurity that are not imagined. Qudar's parents are both from Abu Tur, but as their family grew, their home there became overcrowded and increasingly unsuitable. When they had saved enough money, Qudar's parents purchased land and built a second, more spacious home in al-Izariyeh, only a few miles away but beyond Israel's separation Barrier. The family came to spend more and more time at their property in al-Izariyeh and they believe that someone, probably someone they know, informed on them to the Israeli authorities. When Qudar's younger sister turned 16 and was required to come off her parents' ID cards and apply for her own, the application was refused on the grounds that the family did not meet the criteria of residency. Faced with the possibility that their residency rights in Jerusalem would be permanently revoked, the family returned to their small property in Abu Tur and spent the next

two years struggling to prove their residency there in order to obtain an Israeli identity card for their daughter.

Permanent residency is a precarious status that differs substantially from citizenship, most notably in the sense that it is conditional. It conveys only limited rights to Palestinians and can be revoked by the Israeli Interior Ministry if residents are not deemed to meet the appropriate criteria. Essentially, this means that East Jerusalem Palestinians are required regularly and repeatedly to supply the Israeli Interior Ministry with detailed evidence that their residency in the city is a daily reality. Each time a resident seeks to renew a travel document or identity card or to register a birth or a marriage, documentation must be supplied demonstrating that their centre of life is in Jerusalem, that they have lived there for seven consecutive years and that they have not left the city for any extended period.

On these occasions, individuals must provide copies of electricity bills, landline phone bills and Arnona payments in their own name registered to a Jerusalem address going back several years. The standard of proof is high and if the full range of conditions are not met, residency may be revoked, in effect preventing Palestinians from remaining in the city of their birth.⁴³ The statistics relating to the loss of residency are startling. Between 1967 and 2012, the residency of more than 14,500 East Jerusalem residents was revoked by the state, the majority of these revocations occurring since 1995. In 2008 alone, 4,577 Palestinians were stripped of their residency; between 2006 and 2011, 7,000 out of 293,000 East

⁴³ The state also punitively revokes the residency of the family members of East Jerusalemites accused of terrorist offences. Give example from 2016/17. 13 Family members lost residency status.

Jerusalem Palestinians lost their residency rights, as many as in the previous four decades combined (ICG, 2012).

Apologists argue that since Israel captured the city in 1967, East Jerusalem Palestinians have had the option of applying for Israeli citizenship. If Israeli citizenship is sought, however, all other nationalities, including Jordanian, must be forfeited (this is not the case for Jews from overseas seeking Israeli citizenship) and the individual must swear loyalty to the occupying state. For decades, naturalising as an Israeli citizen has been perceived as an act of betrayal, even collaboration, that gives legitimacy to Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem and undermines Palestinian claims to the city. Today, however, there is evidence that Palestinian attitudes are shifting. Israeli citizenship offers a degree of security to East Jerusalem Palestinians who fear the loss of their residency rights and who are distrustful of Israeli ambitions in the city. In the absence of a credible Palestinian alternative to Israeli rule, moreover, and with a growing sense among East Jerusalemites that the occupation is no longer temporary (ICG, 2012), Israeli citizenship seems less an act of betrayal than a reasonable option that is available to the individual if their circumstances require it.

This is supported by the data collected, though a degree of ignominy still surrounds the issue of citizenship in the public discourse. Nasser does not think that the subject should be taboo any longer. He is open about the fact that he, his wife and his children all received Israeli citizenship many years ago. This in no way diminishes his Palestinian identity he says; it was a pragmatic decision made to facilitate the international travel that his occupation required and it was not a choice that he has ever regretted or attempted to conceal. He is also convinced,

however, that far more East Jerusalemites possess Israeli citizenship than will openly admit to it.

While East Jerusalem Palestinians are still perhaps reticent about publicly professing their readiness for Israeli citizenship, there appears to be a broad and unreserved consensus that if citizenship was unilaterally imposed on residents by the state it would be accepted with little hesitation. For East Jerusalem Palestinians, if it came, in future, to a choice between citizenship in a Palestinian state without Jerusalem or Israeli citizenship in Jerusalem, Israeli citizenship would overwhelmingly prove the preferred option. Among those with misgivings on religious or nationalist grounds, there is a discernible sense in which imposed citizenship would be defensible, even welcome. The frequency with which this argument is given voice is indicative of Palestinian uncertainty over Israeli ambitions in the city. More importantly, however, it reflects the absence of an inclusive nationalist narrative with plausibility for East Jerusalem and the choices individual Palestinians are contemplating as they adapt their own struggle and subjectivity.

Ruby told me that she has never felt the need to apply for Israeli citizenship, but that she can see nothing wrong with doing so and that she would readily accept it were it imposed on her. In her late 40s and unmarried, she has lived her entire life in the same apartment in East Jerusalem and has worked for the same Palestinian employer for more than 20 years. She has never felt directly that her residency is under threat or had the desire to travel much beyond Jerusalem, so her Israeli residency status has never limited her or given her cause for concern. If circumstances changed, however, she says that she would have no qualms about applying for citizenship.

“It is not wrong. Why wrong? Some people maybe they think so, but whoever says it’s wrong, he is the one who has a passport! Believe me, walla. They all have it. Why wrong? It’s not wrong. We live here in Jerusalem with the Jewish people, it’s not wrong to take the Jewish passport. If I take the passport to make my life easy it does not mean that I want the Jewish people to still take my land. I have the Israeli hawiyeh and I still feel Palestinian. What is the difference? If I take the passport I still am Palestinian, I still feel Palestinian and they still know I am Palestinian.”

The evidence suggests that Ruby’s position is not uncommon. Rana explained that she is planning to apply for citizenship. She is divorced, without children and she would love to travel more. Israeli citizenship, she says, is the only way to make this dream possible. Rana was uneasy about her decision at first and has delayed actually making the application, but she feels strongly that she is entitled to a normal life and believes that an Israeli passport would facilitate this. Saha, meanwhile, is married to a West Banker and has two children. Her husband has permission to remain in Jerusalem for now, but she sees complications ahead for her children. She doesn’t want to apply for Israeli citizenship, but she is worried about the future and the insecurity of her situation takes a heavy toll on her. She says with certainty that she will take Israeli citizenship if that is the only way to secure her family’s future in Jerusalem, regardless of what the future holds for the West Bank.

However, the acquisition of Israeli citizenship is not as straightforward as the official position suggests and many argue that the process is deliberately difficult and opaque in order to discourage Palestinian applications. Osama experienced the revocation of his Jerusalem residency and the cancellation of his I.D. card

after several years living in the United States. He returned to Jerusalem in 2010 to re-establish his residency and after a lengthy legal struggle his rights were restored in early 2015. He applied for Israeli citizenship almost immediately, but has received no information about his application since that time. There is no official timetable for the processing of applications and no recourse to any state body when delays occur or applications are rejected. Osama's lawyer has pursued his application with the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, but to date they have only stated that it is pending and that there is no further information.

Osama's is by no means an isolated case. The *Times of Israel* reported in September 2016 that 14,629 permanent residents of East Jerusalem had applied for Israeli citizenship since 2003 (Lieber, 2016). Between 2003 and 2013, Interior Ministry figures supplied to the Israeli newspaper showed that citizenship was denied or delayed in about half of applications. In the three years since, however, the paper reports that the processing of citizenship applications has come to an almost complete standstill. "Between 2014 and September 2016, of 4,152 East Jerusalemites who applied for citizenship, only 84 were approved and 161 were rejected. The rest of the applications are pending – formally, still being processed" (Lieber, 2016). In the first nine months of 2016 alone, 1,102 East Jerusalem Palestinians had requested citizenship, while only nine applications had been approved. Thrall (2017) also notes that for those who have applied for Israeli citizenship, approval has been scarce, recording that in 2015 only 2.9% of applications were approved.

While the processing of Palestinian applications for Israeli citizenship has not kept pace with demand, East Jerusalem Palestinians speak by contrast of the ease and speed with which they believe foreign Jews seeking to make Aliyah are

granted citizenship. The Israeli government website offers a detailed breakdown of the process of making Aliyah and acquiring citizenship, the support available and the timetable involved. Few Palestinians are in any doubt that the delays, prevarications and rejections experienced by East Jerusalem residents seeking citizenship, and the opaqueness of the process, form part of a broader strategy employed by the state to marginalise Palestinians and wear them down.

Moreover, East Jerusalem Palestinians are not convinced that Israeli citizenship is a panacea for all their problems. While many in Jerusalem accept that citizenship offers greater security than residency from Israel's ethnocentric project in the city, there is also a feeling that ultimately it will do little else to improve their lives. Jamal claims that citizenship would actually bring him very few benefits; it doesn't bring your neighbourhood better roads or services or speed up the queues at checkpoints or prevent soldiers from stopping you. In the end, he says, wherever you go in Israel, your name and your face is your ID, not your passport. This argument was supported by the views of another Palestinian, a young man from Issawiyeh, who told me that it is okay to take whatever you can from Israel, to speak Hebrew, to get a passport, to work for them. There is no danger of assimilation or integration, he says, because to them he will always be just a Palestinian. Even if he was in danger of forgetting who he is, they would not let him. Even if the acquisition of Israeli citizenship provides some security, there is broad agreement that it addresses only one aspect of the problems facing East Jerusalem Palestinians.

2.1.2 Planning

Planning is another field in which deviations from Israeli normative practice in East Jerusalem are tolerated to the disadvantage of Palestinian residents. Israel's colonial project in the city has received growing attention in the past decade and its deconstruction has benefited hugely from the attention of a range of academic disciplines and theoretical frameworks. The analytical perspectives introduced by urban planners and political geographers in particular have shed light on planning and informality as manifestations of the urban colonial context evident in Israel's mixed cities and in East Jerusalem (Braier, 2013, Jabareen, 2010, Jadallah, 2014, Legrand and Yiftachel, 2014, Misselwitz and Rieniets, 2006, Pullan, 2011, Yiftachel, 2009b, Yiftachel et al., 2004, Bollens, 2000). Often informed by significant explorations of the concept of urban informality undertaken from a critical Southern perspective, these studies have brought into focus the political production of urban space and the complicity of planning in sustaining inequality and discrimination. Viewed from this perspective, politics and space in East Jerusalem, and as such politics and planning, are inextricably linked.

Jabareen (2010) notes that while public planning is typically regarded as a positive force in the urban environment, it has a dark side which can be harnessed to the geopolitical ends of the regime, producing spaces of risk for marginalised groups. Roy (2009) goes further, arguing that planning cannot be a solution because "it is itself implicated in the production of planning crisis." At the ethnocratic frontier, therefore, the 'dark side' of planning is not anomalous, but rather is an integral facet of the colonial project. In unequal urban situations, planning becomes an essential regime tool for control of excluded or marginalised

groups. The urban fabric created in this way is thus external to professional planning and to the rule of law and the preservation of these conditions allows the suspension of professional norms (Braier, 2013: 2713).

This introduces the concept of gray spacing, identified by Yiftachel as the growing urban informality in which partially incorporated populations, spaces and activities are positioned by a hostile regime between the 'whiteness' of legality/safety and the 'blackness' of eviction/death. For Yiftachel, the combination of relevant spatial policies which comprise urban planning are often implicated in both the existence and the subsequent criminalisation of gray space. Because these zones are neither integrated nor eliminated, they exist partially beyond the gaze of the state authorities and municipal planners, but also subject to pejorative, criminalising discourses and vulnerable to 'corrective action' and violence. The concept of gray spacing captures the state of 'permanent temporariness' experienced by East Jerusalem Palestinians.

"The disjuncture between actual tolerated reality and its 'intolerable' legal, planning and discursive framing, puts in train a process of 'gray spacing', during which the boundaries between 'accepted' and 'rejected' constantly shift, trapping whole populations in a range of unplanned urban zones, lacking certainty, stability, and hence development" (Yiftachel, 2009a). This brings into view the process by which ethno-national antagonism and social exclusion push residents to act 'illegally', thereby reproducing patterns of inequality, essentialising collective identities and reinforcing otherness. In this way, "the process of marking an urban place as 'ethnic' and simultaneously classifying it as 'illegal' reproduces patterns of segregation and inequality" (Yacobi, 2009: 6). The selective absence of planning is also itself an aspect of planning and in such settings, planning is

harnessed to the management of significant inequality and what has been described as a system of “creeping apartheid” (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003).

Ambiguity, exception and informality are thus part of the planning design which sustain difference and reinforce exclusion. Here, I follow Roy’s definition of the term informality as “a mode of production of space defined by the territorial logic of deregulation. Inscribed in the ever-shifting relationship between what is legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized, informality is a state of exception and ambiguity” (Roy, 2009). Informality is not, then, a set of practices which exist beyond the reach of planning, but rather a variant of planning that designates some activities as authorised while denying legal status to others which are essentially no different. It is this ethnocratic planning approach which allows the Israeli regime to represent itself as equal and democratic while denying Palestinian residents basic rights and services (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003).

Adopting this Southern, critical perspective, it becomes clear that urban informality and gray spacing in East Jerusalem are regime tools which facilitate state control and the management of inequality. The official Israeli imaginary of a unified Jerusalem has been pursued since 1967 through a deeply partisan approach to boundary drawing and urban planning. That planning centres upon geopolitical strategies designed to manipulate demography, confiscate Palestinian lands and exclude East Jerusalem Palestinians from any strategic planning for the city (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). These three political strategies – the politics of demography, the politics of geography and the politics of exclusion – are manifest in Israeli public planning in Jerusalem and in particular in the Jerusalem Masterplan (Jerusalem Plan No.2000, 2004) and have resulted in

dramatic spatial and demographic shifts that have a detrimental impact on the lives of Palestinians in East Jerusalem as well as their political future in the city (Jabareen, 2010).

As a result of the planning restrictions on Palestinian construction and housing, East Jerusalem residents are faced with the choice of building illegally or moving to more affordable residential areas beyond the separation barrier or beyond the municipal borders. Both scenarios involve the criminalisation of everyday life for ordinary residents of the city and the perpetual sense of insecurity and fear that accompanies this. Saha's parents both work full time and have funded all four of their children through their undergraduate studies, two at universities in the West Bank and two overseas. When their family was young, they built an additional storey for themselves atop the family home in East Jerusalem. Obtaining approval for the construction was impossible, but with few options available to them, they chose to build rather than move outside the city. The family were heavily fined and the new storey was eventually demolished. By this time, other relatives had moved into their vacant rooms in the family property below and they were left with a choice, to spend all their income on a small apartment in the city or move outside where they could live in comfort and save for their children's education.

Saha's parents' situation is unexceptional. Illegal construction is the only option for many in East Jerusalem and when the authorities catch up with them and their homes are marked for demolition, it is increasingly common to find residents demolishing their own homes rather than pay the fee charged for the municipality to do it. Illegal Palestinian construction in East Jerusalem is a direct product of Israeli urban policy (Chiodelli, 2012). As such it is also a key feature of Israel's

spaciocidal colonial project “that targets land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the ‘voluntary’ transfer of the Palestinian population, primarily by targeting the space upon which the Palestinian people live” (Hanafi, 2009: 107).

This sense of the “planned illegality” (Chioldelli,2009) of Palestinian construction challenges approaches which emphasise the way in which the users of the city are able to manipulate and divert the intended uses of space (de Certeau, 1984 30). In his study of late nineteenth century Colombo, Perera (2009) identifies a process of ‘familiarisation’ through which subordinate populations inhabit, reshape and rewrite the spaces of the coloniser. Made possible by the incompleteness of formal urban systems, “the act of occupation by the subordinates itself changes the (assigned) spaces and subject positions.” The occupation of space, therefore, is at once “a form of adaptation, questioning, resistance, and transformation.” For Perera, the everyday acts of space-making by the subaltern “expose the incompleteness of hegemony of dominant classes.” Denied the luxury of open political organisation, the subordinate population is not oppositional to existing spatial or social arrangements, but is apathetic or compliant with authority while simultaneously seeking to improve their livelihoods in ordinary ways. Such ‘resistance’ is different to open anti-colonial struggle, but has transformative capacity for the subject.

Recognising Israel’s informal and exceptional practices as part of the colonial project and ultimately subservient to its ambitions, calls into question those approaches which seek to emphasise Palestinian agency and seek out ‘resistance’. Gray spacing, informality and exception are not limited to the spheres of urban planning and spatial control. In other realms, particularly education which is discussed below, Israel tolerates the presence of Palestinian

services and systems which constitute an arena of Palestinian separatism within the state (Shlomo, 2016b) but which also expose East Jerusalemites to delegitimising discourses and ultimately inferior practices.

Roy (2009) suggests that to those who favour a Gramscian perspective, it is apparent that counter-hegemony is anticipated within the very structures of hegemony and that they in their turn rehearse the elements of hegemony. The question arises, therefore, of whether exception and informality evidence the incompleteness of hegemony or serve to sustain it. Shlomo's exceptional governmentality perspective, discussed in detail above, argues that the exception of governmentality arrangements in East Jerusalem facilitates the stabilisation of the Israeli project in the city, which centres on 'unification' under Israeli sovereignty. In Chapter VI, I will address this issue, introducing the concept of the constitutive outside and arguing that counter-hegemonic resistance is anticipated by Israel's hegemonic state project and essential to its success.

2.1.3 Education

Viewed as a site of political conflict and resistance, Educational provision makes clear the competing interpretations of Israel's exceptional practices in East Jerusalem. Dumper's detailed study of Jerusalem's competing borders examines the incongruence of the Israeli state and municipal borders with the educational border in East Jerusalem which follows the Armistice Line of 1949 (Dumper, 2014). In terms of the curriculum, Palestinian education in Jerusalem mirrors that taught to students in the West Bank and Gaza. After fifty years of occupation, Dumper argues, this failure to establish a uniform, integrated education system throughout Israel, extending to the annexed territory of East Jerusalem,

represents a “spectacular blunder by the Israeli political establishment with long-term implications for Israel’s hold on the city” (Dumper, 2014: 75).

Drawing on the body of work on urban informalities outlined above, Shlomo offers a contrasting interpretation of East Jerusalem’s educational provision in which deviation from standard Israeli practices is a technology of control that perpetuates social inequality and additionally facilitates the normalisation of structural discrimination in service provision. Dumper and Shlomo agree that Israel acted unsuccessfully to impose state administration throughout East Jerusalem in the early years of the occupation, including in the field of school curricula. The Israeli Ministry of Education’s (IME) attempt to replace the Jordanian curriculum with an Israeli one already in use in Palestinian schools in Israel in 1967, resulted in widespread strike action and a massive drop in enrolment levels in municipal schools. Palestinian resistance to the move arose both from the conviction that education is essential to the preservation of national identity and religious values, and from the practical concern that without a Tawjihi qualification, students would be denied access to higher education institutions in the West Bank and other Arab states (Cohen, 2011, Dumper, 2014, Shlomo, 2016b).⁴⁴

By 1972, the number of Palestinian children enrolled in Jerusalem’s municipal secondary schools had dropped by 65% and by as much as 85% in some of the city’s most prestigious municipal schools (Dumper, 2014). Israel eventually backed down and in 1974 it formally reinstated the Jordanian curriculum in

⁴⁴ The Israeli matriculation certificate, bagrut, was not accepted by higher education institutions in the West Bank, Gaza or neighbouring Arab states therefore East Jerusalem students would not be eligible to apply.

municipal secondary schools and extended this policy to primary schools in 1981. Shlomo notes that “while Israel saw the enforcement of its curricula and educational control as a central manifestation of its sovereignty in the annexed areas, the result on the ground was empty schools, throwing the entire ‘unification’ logic into doubt.” The result was a combination of parallel educational systems comprising IME-funded public (municipal) schools as well as Palestinian private schools entirely independent of state agencies (including UNWRA and al-Waqf operated schools).

In one sense, the existence of private, potentially adversarial schools operating beyond state control suggests the incompleteness of the hegemonic project and the persistence of Palestinian separatism. From another perspective, however, the complexities of school provision in East Jerusalem conceal the institutionalised under-development and neglect of the Palestinian educational infrastructure in the city (Klein, 2001, Shlomo, 2016b).

The Jordanian curriculum was replaced by a Palestinian one in 1994 and demand for municipal school places continued to rise. By the mid-1990’s, around half of all Palestinian school children were enrolled in municipal schools or schools recognised by the municipality and by 2011 this figure had risen to 73% (Dumper, 2014)⁴⁵ Underfunding and under-development, however, have led to a severe shortage of classrooms in East Jerusalem - an estimated shortfall of 1,600 in

⁴⁵ Erection of the separation Barrier prompted a large influx of East Jerusalem Palestinians to the city who had previously been resident in the West Bank. This increased demand for school places. In addition, growing poverty in the city means there is a higher demand for public school places.

2015 - and a secondary school dropout rate of 17% compared to 4.2% for Hebrew education in Israel itself (Shlomo, 2016b).

The deviation of East Jerusalem educational provision from Israeli professional and administrative norms is determined to a significant degree by the ethno-national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and reflects Palestinian attempts to resist Israeli occupation and defend an independent national and cultural identity. Shlomo notes, however, that while colonial powers have not typically imposed their full administrative and judicial systems on colonised populations, Israel insists on its full sovereignty over annexed East Jerusalem. The tolerated deviation of Palestinian education in East Jerusalem from Israeli norms is thus identified as a technology of control intended to convey the unity of the city. “On the one hand, this enables the state to continue its offensive policies of neglect and discrimination against the Palestinians. On the other hand, partial and sub-formal administrative containment may provide a view of seemingly full governmental control over both the space and the population” (Shlomo, 2016b).

Dumper argues that in failing to implement a balanced, respectful Israeli curriculum in East Jerusalem schools, Israel has squandered an opportunity to draw two generations of East Jerusalem Palestinians into the Israeli worldview. An alternative, critical viewpoint, however, allows for the interpretation that Israel’s tolerance of this exception conveniently masks sub-standard, discriminatory practices and serves to perpetuate the otherness of this constituency. Even in recent years when Israeli public opinion has brought pressure to bear on the IME to formalise the failing educational system in East Jerusalem, the state and municipality have responded with a series of exceptional solutions. These include morning and afternoon school shifts, recognised but not

formal schools and the rental of sub-standard private or commercial property for use as classrooms, all of which continue to deviate from Israeli norms (Shlomo, 2016b).

Perhaps most interesting in this regard is the fact that Israel knowingly tolerates an alternative educational curriculum which “generates a set of values and behaviours perceived as subversive by the Israeli state agencies” (Shlomo, 2016b). This is consistent with the view that counter hegemony is anticipated within the structures of hegemony (Roy, 2009) and that as a constitutive outside, is the very condition of its existence (Mouffe, 1992).

The data presented in Chapter IV indicates that the longevity and entrenchment of Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem is fuelling demand for Hebrew language tuition post-Tawjihi. Fluency in Hebrew is increasingly regarded as a gateway to better jobs, salaries and opportunities. There are a number of factors behind this. Physical dislocation from the West Bank, exacerbated by the separation Barrier, makes access to West Bank universities more difficult and also cuts East Jerusalem residents off from potential employment opportunities there. In addition, the Israeli labour market offers higher wages and for graduates in professional roles the opportunities for promotion and self-development are significant greater. While the West Bank and neighbouring Arab states remain popular destinations for undergraduate study, many East Jerusalemites are looking for alternatives and while they may not have any ideological objection to Israeli higher education, few leave secondary school with the language skills to make this a viable option. In Chapter IV, I demonstrated that there is growing demand from Palestinians for the opportunity to sit the Bugrut exam as opposed to Tawjihi, though the number of places available is limited. The data collected

indicates that a small but growing number of East Jerusalem schools are switching from Tawjihi to Bugrut to meet demand. In the context of the discussion above, therefore, the question becomes how accessible Israeli education is to East Jerusalem residents who wish to enhance their employment and career opportunities in Israel.

2.2 Surveillance and Control in East Jerusalem

In addition to the practices of informality and exception detailed above, Israel maintains a matrix of surveillance and control in East Jerusalem that is predicated upon the construction of Palestinian residents as an external minority and a threat to the security of the state. This discourse relies on and in turn reproduces the otherness of Palestinian residents and provides 'legitimacy' for the use of invasive surveillance and control mechanisms by state institutions. Abujidi (2011) argues that the intended effect of the Israeli surveillance network in the occupied territories is "to fragment time and space in such a way that it becomes impossible to lead a normal life" (Abujidi, 2011: 333).⁴⁶ As such, these techniques compound the marginality of East Jerusalem Palestinians within the Jewish state, but also impact everyday life in much more intimate ways.

⁴⁶ Surveillance strategies form part of a broader control matrix which Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem argues demonstrates "sweeping disregard for the lives and security of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and for their right to maintain a normal life." During confrontations over the installation of metal detectors at al-Aqsa compound, the group says that "the Israel Police treated Palestinians as if they were enemy soldiers rather than as a civilian population for whose wellbeing and security it is responsible. This conduct is part of the way Israel controls East Jerusalem: Israeli authorities view the Palestinian residents as an undesirable presence, people who are worth less, with all this implies" B'TSELEM 2017. *Playing with Fire. Israel's sweeping disregard for the wellbeing and security of East Jerusalem residents has led to four fatalities and dozens of injuries, and disrupted the lives of tens of thousands of residents.* Jerusalem.

Surveillance is broadly understood as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction” (Lyon, 2007: 14) and Israel employs a range of non-technical (requiring direct contact) and technical (requiring no direct contact) surveillance methods in order to achieve and maintain control over Palestinians (Halabi, 2011: 200). Braier (2013) notes that “the urban spaces of East Jerusalem are subject to tireless surveillance, manifested through various methods of observation and documentation, such as mapping, categorizing, photographing and archiving” (Braier, 2013: 2713).

Contemporary surveillance and control mechanisms in Israel/Palestine are increasingly understood within a colonial or postcolonial framework. Surveillance as a feature of power is intricately connected to the process of othering, by which the self-identification of the colonial authority is configured through the denigration of the other (Zureik, 2016). Thus, according to Ashcroft et al. (2013), it is through surveillance that “the identification, objectification and subjection of the subject are simultaneously enacted: the imperial gaze defines the identity of the subject, objectifies it within the identifying system of power relations and confirms its subalterneity and powerlessness” (cited in Zureik, 2016:14).

Drawing on the extensive literature detailing these methods, I argue here that aggressive Israeli surveillance and monitoring strategies penetrate everyday Palestinian decision making in East Jerusalem and that, in this way, Israeli control is exercised on a quotidian level. As Zureik makes clear, “as a feature of power, surveillance in everyday life is involved in the constitution of subjectivities at the level of desire, fear, security, trust and risk – all of which ultimately impact human dignity and individual autonomy” (Zureik, 2016: 12).

Surveillance methodologies in East Jerusalem bear comparison with the techniques employed by Israel during the period of military government from 1948 to 1966, at which time Palestinians within Israel's state borders were subjected to multiple methods of political control (Jiryis, 1976, Korn, 2000, Zureik, 2011). According to Korn, the Israeli state made no attempt during its early years to influence or alter the attitude of Palestinians now living within its borders and nothing was done to encourage them to identify with the state. "The apparatuses that specialised in dealing with the Arab population and the use of various techniques of control, supervision and manipulation, were designed to ensure 'correct political behaviour' and different types of obedience, dependence and cooperation" (Korn, 2000: 168). In the contemporary period, too, I argue that Israeli policies are aimed deliberately at the management of control of East Jerusalem Palestinians as a 'constitutive outside', rather than their absorption, which would be damaging to the desired demographic balance in the city and counter to the ethnocratic principles of the regime.

Moreover, according to Korn, various methods of political control were elaborated by Israel during the military government period, including the construction of a social reality in which the military government was "perceived as an 'all-seeing, all-knowing body' even when it's presence was not always evident" (Korn, 2000: 168). In East Jerusalem, today, though traditional surveillance methods are now supplemented by far smarter technologies, the perception remains among residents that the state benefits from an extensive network of paid agents and informers, much like that on which the perceived panoptic reach of the military government was predicated. In the East Jerusalem context, the sense that Israel

see's everything and knows everything influences the choices residents make and the level of personal insecurity with which they live.

Many of the policies detailed earlier in this chapter describe the way in which everyday Palestinian practices are criminalised and systems of surveillance contribute to this, leading to a general sense of insecurity and even paranoia. Indeed, Spurgeon Thompson argues that paranoia "is the inevitable result of living with intense state surveillance" (cited in Zureik, 2016: 12-13). The sense persists in East Jerusalem that there is very little that residents can do which the Israeli authorities will not know about.

This leads to a significant level of self-censoring. Osama says that he is careful on Facebook and other social media platforms not to get involved in politics or even to 'like' comments made by friends which are critical of Israel. It's not that he doesn't agree with them, but he is convinced that such conversations are monitored; having lost his residency once, he is now especially cautious. Other East Jerusalem residents say that they would not participate in demonstrations or protest against Israeli actions in the city for fear that the authorities would find out. Many residents who live outside Jerusalem's municipal borders say they have no choice, but experience high levels of insecurity and fear as a result, which results in sometimes irrational concerns about surveillance and a general sense of mistrust.

One interviewee told me about her sister who is married to a West Banker. He has permission to live in Jerusalem, but this must be renewed regularly and each time the family must demonstrate that their centre of life is in the city. They are unskilled and on low incomes and can't really afford to live in the city, but if they

move to the West Bank, their application for family unification which has been pending for several years would be finally refused. So, they rent a small, run down property in Wadi Joz at a significantly reduced price because the Palestinian landlady is unwilling to declare the income and pay tax on it. This means that while the property is cheap, and the family can afford to remain in East Jerusalem, they have no bills in their name, no rental agreement and no documentary evidence to demonstrate their residency to the Interior Ministry. In order to get around this, they use the sister's address on official documents and the sister allows them to keep one of the utility bills in their names. This arrangement worked for some time, but on their last visit to the Interior Ministry, officials there were fully aware of their situation, knew both addresses and the name of the landlady in Wadi Joz. Israeli policies in the city are criminalising ordinary families who struggle to cope in exceptional circumstances. In this case, the family lived with fear and suspicion for some time and ultimately accepted that the Israeli authorities simply know everything that goes on.

This sense is compounded in the Old City, where hundreds of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras comprise a system known as 'Mabat 2000', which provides 24-hour surveillance of every street and public alleyway. An Israeli trade magazine article described Mabat 2000 as the Israeli Mer Group's flagship project, one of the most advanced and largest of its kind and a showcase for the firm's projects around the world. Mer group owner Haim Mer told the magazine: "Mabat 2000 in the Old City in Jerusalem was established at the end of 1999 and has been upgraded several times since. It operates around the clock... The police needed a system in which 'Big Brother' would control and would allow for an overall view of events in the Old City area... The project includes hundreds of

cameras that have been installed on the streets of the Old City, stations for switchboard operators and commanders, online screens and viewings of tapes...” (Aharony, 2009).

CCTV in civilian residential neighbourhoods puts everyday Palestinian life under 24-hour surveillance. Halabi challenges the extent to which use of the Mabat 2000 system is properly regulated⁴⁷ and argues that “CCTV systems, especially those operated without regard for policy or limits, can be disconcerting and insidious” (Halabi, 2011: 212). Dumper (2013a) notes that cameras near settler enclaves in East Jerusalem are operated by private security firms and Israeli civil rights organisations have complained that these are often directed towards private Palestinian homes or their private spaces (Dumper, 2013: 1256).

Old City residents also claim that the police are selective in their interventions. One interviewee told me that when a fight broke out between a Palestinian shopkeeper and a Russian tourist on a busy thoroughfare near Jaffa Gate, close to the police station, Israeli police were on the scene within minutes. By contrast, he says more frequent violent confrontations between Palestinian shopkeepers on the same street have been allowed to continue until serious injuries had required a medical intervention at which time the police arrived with the ambulance personnel.

Beyond the more obvious manifestations of surveillance, however, are those technologies that facilitate the control of space, the management of mobility and

⁴⁷ Halabi was unable to obtain any evidence of a code of practice specifically relevant to the Old City CCTV surveillance system and contrasts this with the detailed code of practice developed and published online by the City of Westminster in relation to the extensive CCTV system deployed in London’s West End. See HALABI, U. 2011. Legal Analysis and Critique of Some Surveillance Methods Used by Israel. In: ZUREIK, E., LYON, D. & ABU-LABAN, Y. (eds.) *Surveillance and Control in Israel-Palestine*. Oxon: Routledge.

the collection of information. Lyon (2011) highlights identification systems – population registration and identity cards - as a nexus of power in Israel and the occupied territories. Paradoxically, they are “both a means of social control and exclusion, and a desired means of access and inclusion.” The identity card is the foremost surveillance tool available to Israel, regulating mobility and residency, without actually bestowing any rights. For East Jerusalem residents, it allows the individual a sense of free movement, while facilitating the monitoring of movement and the control of space.

Israel’s control of the Palestinian use of time and space is “legitimised and facilitated through surveillance in the form of closures, checkpoints, the so-called separation wall, restrictions on mobility, and land use” (Zureik, 2011: 18). Through colonisation, “Palestinian space shrinks, time slows, and mobility is constrained” while Israelis have “freedom of movement and expansion through space and control of time” (Peteet, 2008: 14). This links to Amal Jamal’s concept of ‘racialised time’ (cited in Zureik, 2011) in which the Jewish experience of time is depicted as dynamic and vital while that of Palestinians is static and empty. The Palestinian experience of travelling north from Jerusalem along route 90 to the Galilee manifests this difference. Despite their Israeli licence plates, Palestinians crossing the Jordan Valley checkpoint on this route are stopped for long periods and required to empty their vehicles to pass the contents through security checks, while Jewish and overseas travellers are generally waved through. The delays can be so lengthy that many Jerusalemites prefer to travel along the coastal road which adds hours, but can save time. At Ben Gurion too, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are routinely held for long periods and questioned at length on their return to Israel from a trip abroad.

2.3 Collective Punishment

Collective punishment is also employed as a method of control in East Jerusalem, underlining for residents their exceptional treatment within the state. The United Nations has raised concerns about Israel's use of collective punishment measures, prohibited under Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (ICRC, 1949), which penalise residents for crimes they did not commit and for which they are not criminally responsible (UNOCHA, 2017). While Israel cites the need for deterrence and prevention, there are two additional elements to this practice of relevance here. First, particular aspects of Israel's collective punishment practice also support the Judaising ambitions of the state. These include the use of ID revocation and house demolition as collective punishments for those related to someone who has committed a criminal act. Second, collective punishments have been recognised as part of Israeli-initiated "friction activities," designed to provoke a response from residents of East Jerusalem.

On 8 January 2017, Fadi al-Qunbar, a Palestinian from the Jabal al-Mukaber area of East Jerusalem, carried out a ramming attack near his home, killing four Israeli soldiers and injuring 15 others. The perpetrator was shot and killed at the scene, but the following day, thirteen members of his family received notice of proceedings to revoke their residency in East Jerusalem with immediate effect (UNOCHA, 2017). Since the family holds permanent residency status rather than citizenship, they have no right of appeal to Israel's High Court of Justice. Commenting on his decision, Israeli Interior Minister Aryeh Deri said, "Let this be known to all who are plotting, planning or considering carrying out an attack, that their families will pay a heavy price for their actions and the consequences will be severe and far reaching" (Abebe, 2017).

In addition to the revocation of residency, the Jabal al-Mukaber neighbourhood from which the attacker came was seemingly targeted for collective punishment in the week following the attack. Between 9 and 16 January 2017, approximately 240 households living in 80 buildings in the area received notice from the Jerusalem municipality of planning and zoning violations, putting them at risk of demolition and forced eviction (UNOCHA, 2017). In addition to deterrence, collective punishments of this nature, which target the homes and residency of East Jerusalem residents, are understood by Palestinians as a tool of Israel's wider demographic policy in the city.

East Jerusalem Palestinians are also subjected to disproportionate police tactics which they argue are not deployed against Jewish Israelis. During a period of raised tensions in October 2014, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) complained to the Jerusalem District Commander of Police about the use of disproportionate measures in the Issawiya area of East Jerusalem. ACRI pointed to the extensive use of stun grenades and tear gas in crowded residential neighbourhoods as well as increased usage of 'skunk spray vehicles', causing widespread damage to property and upsetting the daily routine of thousands of residents (ACRI, 2014a). Skunk repellent is a foul smelling, nausea-inducing liquid, sprayed with force from police vans over streets and buildings. According to the testimony of witnesses in Issawiya, during the summer 2014, "police indiscriminately sprayed the skunk liquid towards houses, people, restaurants brimming with people and in crowded streets, causing harm to innocent residents. Evidence suggests that in some cases the skunk repellent was arbitrarily used with no apparent justification and in the absence of any public disturbances" (ACRI, 2014b).

The unprovoked use of skunk spray links to the findings of an internal Jerusalem police department report which revealed that Israeli border police had “initiated friction activity” in the Issawiya neighbourhood in 2016 in a deliberate attempt to provoke violence in East Jerusalem. The report came to light after the family of a 12-year-old Palestinian boy, Ahmad Abu Hummus, was shot in the head by police with a sponge bullet during riots in Issawiya in January 2016. The police report demonstrates, however, that “whatever ‘riot’ Israeli forces were controlling on 6 January 2016 occurred after Israeli Border Police forces entered Issawiya that day. According to Haaretz, ‘the reports indicate that on January 6 there were no incidents in Issawiya that day’” (Robbins, 2016)

According to the Israeli paper, reports made by 10 different police officers present at the ‘clashes’ on the day of Abu Hummus’ injury, confirmed that events began with a “friction activity” or an “initiated friction activity”. According to one officer, “during the afternoon shift we launched an activity in Issawiyah to create friction with the residents” while two other policemen said they “were asked to come to the Menta gas station in Issawiya for a friction activity in the village” and that they were briefed before it began (Hasson, 2016a)

Collectively, these measures appear to demonstrate first, that the Israeli authorities exploit acts of violence by Palestinians to impose collective punishments on East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, and to further the Judaising ambitions of the state. Second, they lend support to the argument that Palestinian resistance or counter-hegemony is anticipated within the structures of Israeli hegemony, and essential to preserving the otherness of East Jerusalem residents who might otherwise have distanced themselves from the national struggle.

3 Everyday life from a Bottom-Up Perspective

So far in this chapter I have focused on the structures of power in East Jerusalem and the workings of Israeli domination in a range of contexts. In this section, I shift the focus downwards as I seek to understand the daily interplay between Israel's colonial project in East Jerusalem and the residents who exist beyond the limits of inclusion but within the everyday politics and economy of the city. I argue that this dynamic is not clearly visible from above. Rather, the impact of these top-down processes is best observed at ground level and through the meanings and framings that individuals attach to their experience of them. Here, the nexus between state power and individual subjectivity becomes apparent and the potential for new mobilisations and identities is made visible.

East Jerusalem Palestinians experience Israel's colonial project in the city in myriad ways and no single episode or encounter defines that experience. Rather, the evidence suggests an accumulation of individual and collective moments which acquire discursive significance and establish a commonality of meaning among residents that comes to represent a shared experience of occupation. This commonality notwithstanding, the impact of Israel's colonialist policies and the punitive suppression of Palestinian political activity are weakening the social fabric of the city, disrupting collective understandings of resistance and eroding the opportunities for collective action. The East Jerusalem constituency lacks both a plausible vision of Palestinian national liberation and the legitimate, organised leadership required to realise one. Distanced from both state projects and internally fractured, Palestinian residents are thus navigating East Jerusalem's gray space individually, making the analysis of their everyday practices all the more urgent.

3.1 Everyday Experiences of Difference and Exclusion

In Chapter IV, I argued that many East Jerusalem Palestinians are exhibiting an individualised ‘improvement of life’ attitude, on the one hand, in which they reject the legitimacy of Israeli occupation, but intend to maximise the opportunities available to them on the other. In this section, I focus on the experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians who, despite their regular engagement at some level with Israelis or Israeli institutions, experience feelings of marginalisation and exclusion. The standard resistance/normalisation binary is unhelpful in situations of domination where the occupied, oppressed or marginalised population is neither welcoming of nor in open revolt against the colonial power. ‘Israelification’ receives significant media attention, but it has little meaning for Palestinian residents who, despite their adaptations, are regularly reminded of their otherness and exclusion.

George is a Christian who lives in a Jewish neighbourhood. Everyone keeps themselves to themselves, but he says he gets along well enough with his Israeli neighbours. He is clear, however, that integration is not possible. “We can’t mingle with Israeli society; they will never absorb us. They have a different way of thinking. Carrying their IDs or working with them doesn’t mean you will be integrated with them. There is an invisible border that everyone can see.”

The data collected here suggests that George’s experience is not untypical. Viewed from on high, the everyday actions of choices of many residents lend credibility to claims that an ‘Israelification’ of East Jerusalem Palestinians is taking place. The personal narratives of these individuals, however, reveal a contrasting

picture in which even those who are adapting to the reality of long term Israeli rule experience discrimination and marginalisation.

Many interviewees said that they felt uncomfortable using services intended for Jewish Israelis. Sometimes it was Israeli citizens also using the service who made them feel nervous or out of place, for example when travelling on Israel's Egged bus services. Often, however, East Jerusalem residents seeking to access Israeli services are informed by Israeli members of staff that these services are not intended for them. Osama says that after many years lived in the United States, he appreciates the organisation and efficiency of Israeli administrative systems more than he did before. When he returned to Jerusalem and wanted to open a bank account, he preferred to go to the Jaffa Street branch, only ten minutes' walk from his home. "They have lots more desks and the queues there are always shorter. There are chairs to sit on when you are waiting and it is open longer hours. It's in West Jerusalem, okay, but it is also closer for me than the East Jerusalem branch." When Osama took all his papers along to open an account, he was told by the cashier that Arabs have to use the branch on Salah al-Din Street. "I asked him if he was for real and said to show me where it was written down like this. He said it wasn't written down, but that Arabs always prefer to use the East Jerusalem branch. He told me that anyway, no one in the Jaffa Street branch speaks Arabic, even though we were already talking in Hebrew! I said that I didn't prefer to go to the other branch and in the end, when I refused to leave, he said okay and we opened the account."

Nor does it seem that this was an isolated incident. When Rana's GP referred her to a consultant about a medical problem, she was automatically given an appointment at the Beit Hanina clinic. The date was some months off, however,

and Rana asked the practice receptionist if there was anything available sooner. “The receptionist told me that there might be an appointment before that one, but it would be in West Jerusalem and it was unusual to refer Palestinian patients there. I asked her to try because I didn’t want to wait, so she called them and they also said that I have to go to the Beit Hanina clinic. I asked why and the Jewish woman just said that Arabs go to Beit Hanina. I kept asking why and in the end, she said she would give me an appointment. There was no reason why, it’s not written down anywhere that we can’t use their clinics. They just want to keep us away from them.”

These examples suggest that efforts are made to maintain a separation between Jewish Israelis and East Jerusalem Palestinians, reinforcing the argument offered above that it is the Palestinian presence where it does not belong that is most unpalatable to Israelis. Beyond this, even East Jerusalem residents who occupy responsible and respected positions within Israeli organisations or institutions, find that once outside of that environment they are subjected to discriminatory practices.

Saha, for example, is an experienced kupa holim dentist who works full time at a dental practice in Jerusalem. She has an excellent education, a young family and a successful career, yet she says she feels the weight of the occupation every day. Despite regular, cordial encounters with Israeli colleagues at conferences and on training courses, where she says she is always treated as a professional, Saha is adamant that as a Palestinian she can never really feel safe in Israel. She tells me that after finishing work one evening, she went to her car to drive home, but discovered that her vehicle license plates had been stolen. Saha reported the theft to the police immediately, but she says an investigation

was promptly opened in which she was treated from the outset as the suspect rather than the victim. She was taken to a police station and interrogated at length. "They did not think of me like a dentist or a doctor, as a respectable person. Just as a Palestinian. They questioned me, shouted at me. They said that I had given the ID plates to a Palestinian to do something bad. I was fasting that day and I should have finished the fast at six o'clock, but they did not let me drink water for many hours. I was crying the whole time." Saha's car was impounded and she was only released in the early hours of the next morning. After that, she had to return to the police station every day by bus to try to get her car back. On the fifth day, she broke down and shouted at the police officer in charge of her case, complaining about the treatment she had received. He eventually released the car, but told her that it was only because she was a dentist with *kupat holim* that she has not gone straight to prison on the first day. "I was the victim, not the criminal! A Jewish person would be treated differently for sure."

In divided cities within contested states, where the legitimacy of the state authority controlling the city is itself in question, policing and security are considered particularly challenging (Dumper, 2013). However, while Israel's overall authority lacks legitimacy in East Jerusalem, both from an international and a legal perspective, Palestinian residents in the city rely entirely on Israeli policing for the maintenance of order and for their protection under the law. Saha's account demonstrates that while residents recognise the legitimacy of the Israeli police and legal system (mainly because they are the only ones available to them) they are none the less regarded with suspicion and hostility.

During demonstrations over the installation of metal detectors at the entrance to the al-Aqsa compound in July 2017, B'Tselem reported that Israel had repeatedly

shown “sweeping disregard for the lives and security of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, and for their right to maintain a normal routine. The Israeli police treated Palestinian residents as if they were enemy soldiers, rather than as a civilian population for whose wellbeing and security it is responsible. This conduct is part of the way Israel controls East Jerusalem: Israeli authorities view the Palestinian residents as an undesirable presence, people who are worth less, with all this implies, including the use of lethal force.”

East Jerusalem Palestinians experience otherness and insecurity irrespective of their individual circumstances or the extent to which they engage with or participate in the prevailing system or society. In the following section, I focus in depth on Ziad, whose account in many ways exemplifies this exclusion.

3.2 Case Study: Ziad

Ziad is a confident, articulate and hard working young man from an educated Muslim family in East Jerusalem. His father was an electrical engineer and his mother has a BA in Islamic Studies. He is the youngest of four siblings, all of whom are educated to Masters level. Ziad is in his late-twenties. He has an undergraduate degree from Bir Zeit University and is currently studying for his Master’s Degree at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He also works part-time at the National Library, housed on the campus of the Hebrew University, and as a teacher at a school in East Jerusalem.

Ziad is a high-achiever with much going for him. He is intelligent and amiable and it is difficult to imagine anything other than a bright and successful future for him. During our conversations, therefore, I was initially puzzled by the apparent disparity between his privileged education, impressive confidence and obvious

ambition and the vivid portrayal of himself as vulnerable, disadvantaged and oppressed.

“I literally face death every day. If I walk in the street and put my hand in my pocket, maybe I will be shot with five bullets. Not just me. All Jerusalem people are facing death every day. If I am going to the Hebrew University institutes, or to my job in the Old City, on the road I am facing death. They are directing all the politics and all their power to send me away from Jerusalem and away from Palestine in general.”

Despite the heightened tensions in Jerusalem at the time of our meetings, I felt that Ziad was talking to me as an outsider, drawing on the familiar narratives of occupation and subjugation typically shared with foreigners in order to convey to them the bitterness of the Palestinian situation. Peteet (1991) notes that interviewees might regard the researcher as “a foreigner to whom by telling their story they would be conveying it to the West” (Peteet, 1991: 16). In order to surmount the role of external observer conveying their plight, “requires persistence in probing” and encouraging participants to go beyond formal discourses or those reserved for visitors (Peteet, 1991: 17).

After some years living in the Old City I felt that this one-dimensional depiction did not reflect the full picture of Palestinian life in East Jerusalem. So, I suggested to Ziad that in fact he had quite a good life in Jerusalem, that he was a student at one of the best universities in the world, that he had good job prospects, that he was free to work and to marry and to start a family if he chose.

“You say that I have some rights here, to work, to have a career and an education, but for me in every second I know that all of this can vanish... Just a shout beside

me from a Jew and [he shouts in Hebrew and makes the sound of gunfire]. If I travel from Beit Hanina to here, there are maybe three barriers where I can be searched, where they can take the humanity from me. So, this is not a freedom, it's not a freedom *at all*. You say that I have some democracy here, but if you look at me, I have a residency here and a temporary laissez-passer from Israel and a temporary passport from Jordan, not citizenship. What am I? I am nothing. In the real world, I am nothing. Everything I have can be lost in a second."

Ziad's views were genuinely held, I felt, and they demonstrate starkly the sense of insecurity and fragility that result from the long-term marginalisation of Jerusalem residents. And for Ziad, these are problems unique to East Jerusalem Palestinians. "There is a difference between me as a Jerusalemite and other Arabs in occupied Palestine [Palestinians citizens of Israel living inside the 1948 borders]. Since they are living in Israeli society from when they are born, they are facing the same problem, but with a different colour maybe. But since I am Jerusalemite I face the problem without any colouring... The problem is related to the area, to Jerusalem... If you are going to Tel Aviv or Haifa or maybe Majd al-Krum in the very north of occupied Palestine, they are not facing the same problem. They are not. There is no separation between Arab and Jew. There is no separation. Maybe they have the same school, maybe they have the same building to live in. Just in Jerusalem I felt this problem. Now, when I came to meet you here, an Israeli soldier told me 'Where are you going, open your bag!' If I were in Haifa they won't tell me like this. He won't. Maybe he will need to search and he will say please, can you show me what is in your bag. Here no, 'Just do it, just do it, because I told you to do it!'"

Ziad also spoke from experience of the discrimination Palestinian residents face inside Israeli companies. “I was working in Ramallah for a group working as an outsourcer for Intel in Jerusalem on the Israeli side. I worked as an outsourcing engineer with the Palestinian company for three years. After this I asked Intel Israel, should I work with you directly, and they told me no... we haven't positions now, but I know what is the real reason. After this they brought a [Jewish] student to be a manager over me. He is a student and he is above me even though I have three years' experience with Intel.”

“You know, the CEO of Apple, his right-hand man is one of the Nazrut, a Palestinian from Nazareth. He studied in the Technion for his Bachelor Degree and his Master's Degree. I know him personally. In Israel, he was working at IBM. He was one of the managers, one of the regular managers there. After he went to America he became one of the big men in the world. He is the vice president of Apple. You can google him. Here we have borders... you will not have a big position here to be a manager over a Jew... I am an engineer. Maybe if I am here and I have the science and the abilities to be a manager, I won't be a manager, I will be an engineer. But because of my abilities if I was in other countries than Israel, maybe in England or the US, I will be a manager... Even if I have a PhD certificate they [Jewish Israelis] won't be happy for me to be their manager...”

Ziad also works part time as a cataloguer at the Israeli National Library, based at the Hebrew University. There is a large team of Arabic speakers (some students, others in full time employment) cataloguing books and documents in Arabic, but they have a full-time Jewish Israeli manager who doesn't speak any Arabic. “I have been working for about eight or nine months cataloguing many, many kinds of books. For the past four months, I have been working with the stolen books.

During the second intifada they invaded in 2002 the West Bank, invaded Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus. Whenever they went to the mosques, the universities, the personal libraries, they were stealing the books. How do I know? I have the box of the books. I just open the books and see that, oh, this is the stamp of the library 1,2,3 from the mosque in the West Bank. I know the mosque which was containing this book! But they have stolen them and I am cataloguing them! There is a big conflict for me, but I have the hope that I am cataloguing these books for us. Not now maybe, but after years. I have the hope that this library will be Palestinian one day.”

Ultimately, it is in this way that Ziad justifies the extent of his everyday participation in Israeli society, despite the frequent reminders of Palestinian exclusion. “I am paying a small amount to gain the big thing, that is the logic here... I am using their tools... I know indirectly I am making something positive for Israel, but only indirectly.”

3.3 Municipal Discrimination

Beyond a general sense of temporariness, insecurity and fear, East Jerusalem residents also experience more tangible manifestations of discrimination. A main grievance relates to unequal municipal spending on East Jerusalem neighbourhoods and discriminatory practices in regard to housing and construction.

A detailed report published by UN OCHA oPt in 2011 found that East Jerusalem had suffered systematic neglect of its basic infrastructure, housing and development needs since 1967. More than one third of East Jerusalem had been appropriated for Israeli settlement construction and only 13% was zoned by the

Israeli authorities for Palestinian construction, thereby offering Palestinians the possibility of obtaining a building permit.⁴⁸ With much of this land already built-up, the number of permits granted to Palestinians failed to meet the demand for housing.

Moreover, strict zoning in Palestinian areas limits construction density, reducing the quantity and size of structures built on a given plot of land. In Palestinian residential neighbourhoods, the permitted 'plot ratio' is often half (or in some cases much less) than that allowed in neighbouring Israeli settlements or in West Jerusalem. For example, the settlement of Pisgat Ze'ev has a construction density of 90-120%, while the nearby Palestinian neighbourhood of Beit Hanina has a construction density of 50-75%. Likewise, the settlement of Ramat Shlomo has a density of 90-120%, while Shu'fat has a density of 75%. According to UN OCHA, such discrepancies have resulted in situations where Palestinian families are unable to legally add an additional storey to a family home while an adjacent settlement is permitted to construct multi-storey buildings.

In addition, the application process was found to be opaque, expensive and excessively complicated. As a result, unauthorised Palestinian construction is widespread both inside and outside the 13% of East Jerusalem zoned for Palestinian construction. Those who build 'illegally' face the threat of demolition, displacement, fines and possibly imprisonment. This contributes to the

⁴⁸ According to OCHA, of the 70.5km² of land in East Jerusalem, 35% (24.5km²) has been appropriated for Israeli settlements. Most of this was previously privately owned Palestinian property. A further 35% (24.7km²) has approved planning schemes and the remaining 30% (21.3km²) has not been included in any plan. More than half of the lands approved for planning (15.5km²) are designated as 'green' or 'open' areas where no construction is allowed. This leaves only 13% of the total East Jerusalem area (9.2km²) available for Palestinian construction and much of this is already built-up. UNOCHA, O. March, 2011. East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns. *Special Focus*.

criminalisation of East Jerusalem Palestinians for actions behaviours which, for those inside the dominant ethnonational group, are entirely legitimate. Jamal wanted to build and could afford the permit so he made an application.

“I applied to build in Beit Hanina. I am almost three years in the system and I have paid all money according to that system, but still I have to wait. A Jewish man wouldn’t have to wait like this. They are trying to minimise the population of Jerusalem in any way. So they make our life difficult by housing, by building, by movement. There is a system, you cannot see that system, you don’t see it, but it is to make Jerusalem Palestinian people tired... You see how dirty the street is here? They don’t clean it. But if you don’t pay to park the municipality come and give you a fine. No, first clean the street then come and make me a fine. It’s like paying protection [money] and that’s what it is.”

Jamal admitted that there were material advantages to permanent residency status, but he was clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians pay heavily for these benefits. “We are first class tax payers. We don’t get this all for free. And what we pay we don’t get back the 100% service like our neighbours on the Israeli side... Have you been to West Jerusalem? Have you been to King George Street, for example? We pay the same rates as King George Street people pay. Go and see what is the difference between there and here [Bab al-Zahira]. If you look at the services, we have got social security or whatever, we pay for that. It costs a lot. The space you are sitting in - I am paying for that. It’s not a favour. A business in the West Bank, you know how much less taxation he pays than I do? A lot! Most of the schools here they are controlled by the municipality of Jerusalem because the education is their responsibility. If you just go across the schools, if you go and see a school on the East side and the West side you don’t believe that it’s

the same system running the two schools... Here in Jerusalem we are very close to the Israelis and we are first class tax payers, but we are second class citizens. We don't get what we pay for, not like the Israelis do."

According to Ortner (1995), "the question of the relationship of the individual person or subject to domination carries the resistance problematic to the level of consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality and identity" (Ortner, 1995: 183) I will address this issue in greater detail in Chapter VI. Here, I suggest that the individual adaptations demanded by Israeli rule in East Jerusalem evidence the value of a ground-level perspective, which makes visible the contingency of identity and the contextual nature of agency. With Ortner, I argue that each historical moment constructs its own form of agency as individuals act upon and within the structures of power (Ortner, 1995).

4 Israeli-Palestinian Antagonism

In Chapter IV, I demonstrated that personal encounters between East Jerusalem Palestinians and Israelis are frequent and that these encounters are often cordial. Many East Jerusalemites, such as Saha and Summa, work day to day beside Israeli colleagues with whom they are on good terms. Many others, including Osama and Ahmad, have pursued formal Hebrew lessons, taught by Israeli teachers, whom they have come to respect and occasionally befriend, at least for the duration of the course. Hanan fondly recalled the Israeli soldier who had shown her father such respect.

While occasionally tense, on an individual level such quotidian encounters are not, by necessity, antagonistic. However, everyday life in East Jerusalem is not immune to the vacillations of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and

Palestinian residents of the city remain mindful of the grievances of the Palestinian collective. In this section, therefore, I situate everyday Israeli-Palestinian encounters within the context of mutual animosity and distrust and examine the role of memory and discrimination in perpetuating these conditions. Despite their acknowledgement of the need to adapt to enduring Israeli rule, East Jerusalem Palestinians find that the wider conflict is never far away.

4.1 “They hate us and we hate them.”

Despite the frequent cordiality of everyday encounters between individual Palestinians and Israelis, the public discourse in East Jerusalem still to some extent reflects the familiar binarised identities of mainstream analysis. In private, Palestinians are more open about their ambivalence towards the Israelis they meet, but also less guarded about their anger towards Israel.

Ruby’s account reflects some of the complexities of the situation:

“We live with the Jewish people and I am happy to live with them yanee, but we say in Arabic, the Jewish people are *'adu abui wa jiddi*. It means the Jewish people are enemies for my father and my grandfather. Okay, they make good things for us in Jerusalem, but this is our enemies, I don’t like them. They stole our land. We don’t like them... I am afraid to be friends with any Jewish people. You know, if the Palestinian people know I am friends with anyone Jewish they will think something bad about me, because this is my enemy. No, I can’t. There are kind ones of them, a lot of kind, they come to my shop, I help them, I laugh with them, but I can’t be friends with them. No. One man, Jewish, he sent to my Facebook a friend request, he look very nice, handsome, but I am afraid. He sent it maybe three times, saying that he wants to be friends with me. I have a lot of

friends on Tango. He saw me through Tango, but it is difficult to be friends with him. I can't."

The data collected indicates a reluctance among many East Jerusalem Palestinians to allow everyday encounters with Israelis or relationships with Jewish colleagues to develop beyond a superficial level. This was voiced by the husband of one interviewee, a West Banker married to an East Jerusalem woman, as a fear of allowing oneself to become too familiar with them. "I live here in Jerusalem now and I am allowed to work here, but I don't want to work with them. If I work with them maybe I will start to like some of them and before I can stop it, maybe I will become more like them. When we start to see them as normal humans, it will be harder to hate them."

Many of these accounts appear to fit the category of identity building described by Castells (2010) as 'identity for resistance'. This important element of identity building "constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialise the boundaries of resistance." Castells names this form of identity construction as "*the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded*". That is, the building of defensive identity in the terms of dominant institutions/ideologies, reversing the value judgement while reinforcing the boundary" (Castells, 2010: 9).

Social media presents unique challenges for East Jerusalem Palestinians whose work or education bring them into personal contact with Jewish Israelis. For some, applications such as Facebook allow the opportunity to preserve and sometimes develop relationships arising from real life encounters. Hanan's

daughter, for example, worked for ten months gaining valuable experience at an Israeli office in Petach Tikvah before leaving to study Computer Science at New York University in Abu Dhabi. “From the beginning, she told them no politics for me. She treated them as human beings and they treated her as a human being. And she had the most wonderful relationship with them. Except for one, who wouldn’t even say good morning to her. But all the rest were normal, Jewish, educated people. She had the most great time with them and she has kept them as friends through Facebook.”

For many East Jerusalemites, however, Facebook friendship requests from Israelis encountered in real life are problematic and for some accepting them would be out of the question. Summa worked as a trainee doctor for one year at an Israeli hospital and got on well with the other *stajarim* (trainee doctors) who were mainly Jewish Israelis. As colleagues, she generally found them to be warm and supportive, but when it came to friendship requests, she felt she had to draw the line.

“Okay, you can say I have Israeli ‘friends’ but it’s not like mixing with Arabs. I don’t wish to enter Israelis into my society. There were many *stajarim*, they got together on Facebook, but I didn’t accept their friend invites. Because I don’t want them, I don’t want friendship. Something superficial, okay, but something deep, no. Because different culture, different background, because if we live 100 years with them we will not be brothers or friends. You can’t - I can’t - accept this. Not because of my religion or anything, but even the Arab doctors [Palestinians from within Israel’s 1948 borders] at the hospital, the residents, they seem to be friends with the Israelis in front of me and I see that they are integrating in a good way

with them, but they don't accept them on Facebook. It's only superficial relationships."

Summa's experience also reflects the 'exclusion of the excluder by the excluded'. "Sometimes, when every day you are working in a team, sometimes you forget that he is an Israeli. He is a doctor; he is my friend. When I sit and think, I try to remind myself that he is my enemy, but in the work, no. Sometimes at work he is a friend, we are eating with each other, going together to make a tour of the wards."

Summa also felt that the enmity was mutual. "Their minds are worse than us. They don't love us at all. They don't prefer to integrate with us. They don't want to see us in the hospital, because sometimes we take their opportunities to make a specialism, because maybe we are cleverer than them. So sometimes they don't want us to be there because we take their place."

Other East Jerusalem Palestinians have accepted Facebook friendship requests from Israelis they have met in person, but subsequently find that access to the photos, status updates and comments on each other's pages puts strain on their real-life relationships. Khadija has made Israeli friends, but also sees the challenges involved in sustaining these relationships:

"Some Israelis have no problem to deal with you or to be a friend with you. But in the end, whatever friendship you have, there is a point that he knows that we are enemies. And the same goes for me, absolutely. They came here, they took our land. However much I want to be friendly, in the end I know that all the suffering we live is from them."

Khadija was born and grew up in the Old City. She wanted to be a speech therapist so after Tawjihi she began the Mechina, or preparation, year at the Hebrew University with the intention of pursuing her undergraduate studies there. This course is mainly taken up by Jews from outside Israel, many of whom go on to make Aliyah.

“I had a lot of Jewish friends from there [the Hebrew University], but in the end, they come here to live in Israel and you can’t change what someone believes. Till now I have four good friends from there, Americans. They came to my wedding. But the one I am so friendly with, she finished this year and they moved her to Ashdod. There she became friends with [an Israeli] man who hates Arabs so much. And she told me I can’t talk to you anymore because he told me not to. He’s a soldier. We’re friends on Facebook and we chat sometimes on Messenger, but last time I talked to her was in Gaza war [2014]. She lives in Ashdod near the border. I put on Facebook a post about kids who were killed on Eid in Gaza. This was very hard for us. And I posted about this. And she sent me a message saying, ‘What do you think about that Khadija?’ I said ‘What do I think? They are children. They have nothing.’ And she started talking about her side and how they live in fear with rockets above their head. And she tried to convince me they also have the right to live in peace and that they feel very afraid. We are still friends on Facebook, but it’s very difficult now.”

This type of experience does not seem to be uncommon among those who are open to accepting such requests in the first place. Ziad had a similar experience.

“There was one Israeli student who I met about two months ago. I was in the library studying and I was listening to Beethoven. He saw this and we got into a

long conversation about classical music. It was good. After this, he added me on Facebook and I accepted him. I have no problem with this. But after that I saw his pictures on Facebook with the Zahal, the Israeli army. He had been in Gaza, he was at Zikim, a military place near the Gaza border. He had been there. You are killing my people, so why are we friends on Facebook? No, we are not friends. Maybe we can talk together till the morning, maybe we can work together on a project to reach Nobel Prize, no problem with me, but we are not friends. We are not friends. Because I am pretty sure that whenever you have the opportunity to hurt me, you won't hesitate. That's the problem. And he knows this."

Relations between East Jerusalem Palestinians and Israeli Palestinians from within Israel's 1948 borders are rarely more congenial. East Jerusalem's de facto inclusion within Israel's 1948 borders distances its residents from Palestinians in the West Bank, but also underscores the differences between this constituency and Israeli Palestinians. As citizens of the state, Israeli Palestinians enjoy greater personal security and are afforded more rights, while their proficiency in Hebrew and familiarity with Israeli lifestyles positions them favourably with employers. Israeli Palestinian migrants in East Jerusalem are also overwhelmingly middle class and disproportionately well educated, comprising a "young, educated, modern elite, differing substantially from the typical profile of Israeli Palestinians throughout Israel" (Masry-Heralla and Razin, 2013: 1008).

A considerable number of Israeli Palestinians have migrated to East Jerusalem since 1967, many drawn initially to the city's higher education institutions.⁴⁹ For

⁴⁹ Masry-Heralla and Razin (2013) estimate that the number of Israeli Palestinian migrants in Jerusalem was between 6,000 and 9,000 in 2009. Yacobi and Pullan (2014) suggest that around 7,200 Palestinians lived in Jewish neighbourhoods of Jerusalem at the end of 2008, the

female graduates in particular, permanent migration to Jerusalem after higher education has particular appeal (Arar et al., 2013). However, social interactions between Israeli Palestinian migrants and Palestinian residents of the city are limited. Masry-Herzalla and Razin (2013) describe Israeli Palestinians in East Jerusalem as “being neither part of Jerusalem’s Jewish society nor of East Jerusalem’s Palestinian society,” representing “an extreme example of the double periphery faced by Israeli Palestinians throughout Israel” (Masry-Herzalla and Razin, 2013: 1003).

They describe the ‘middleman minority’ attributes of Israeli Palestinians in East Jerusalem as profound. The middleman concept relates to groups “functioning as economic and political intermediaries between the rulers and the population, but regarded as outsiders by both” (ibid: 1018) and this marginality is evident in the education and residential choices made by Israeli Palestinian migrants in the city. “The employment profile of Israeli Palestinian migrants in Jerusalem is of a white-collar middle class, who highly depends on middleman functions, serving close to 300,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians” (ibid: 1013) and Masry-Herzalla and Razin argue for the centrality of these middleman factions as a pull factor for Israeli Palestinian migrants in East Jerusalem. This middleman position, however, distances Israeli Palestinians from East Jerusalem residents, facilitating their growing movement into Israeli residential areas (Yacobi and Pullan, 2014) and defining the nature of the interactions. Weingrod and Manna (1998) also emphasise the ‘broker’ role played by Palestinian Israelis in East Jerusalem, arguing that particular ‘strategies of identification’ are required in the context of

majority of whom were Israeli citizens. Many more, they suggest, may have moved into East Jerusalem residential neighbourhoods.

their own dual marginality. Not entirely accepted by either Palestinians or Israelis, the majority choose to live “along the seam” between Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalem (Weingrod and Manna, 1998). East Jerusalem residents frequently express negative attitudes towards Israeli Palestinians, arising from the fact that their sites of encounter often encompass this middleman function. For many Palestinians in East Jerusalem, their primary encounters with Israeli Palestinians take place within antagonistic settings such as the Israeli Interior Ministry or the Jerusalem Municipality. Masry-Heralla and Razin also suggest that tensions between educated East Jerusalem residents and Israeli Palestinian migrants have grown steadily since the early 2000’s, “with the latter blamed for taking potential jobs from the former, particularly in education and welfare.” They maintain that “in Palestinian neighbourhoods they are distinct because of their adaptation of Israeli behaviours and lifestyles, and are also accused of snatching jobs from Palestinians and pushing rents upwards” (Masry-Heralla and Razin, 2013: 1017). Weingrod and Manna (1998) recognise that the dual marginality of Israeli Palestinians in East Jerusalem does have some positive potential, but suggest that this could only be realised in circumstances of reduced conflict. Their position as part of yet also partially outside of each camp leads to a lack of trust on both sides which allows them no mediator role.

4.2 Outstanding Grievances

The data also indicates that outstanding grievances, related in particular to loss of land, remain a key source of anger and mistrust among East Jerusalem Palestinians. This was most apparent among those whose families had experienced dispossession directly in 1948 or in 1967. Many of these informants

indicated that the restitution of their family's stolen land or property would bring closure to their grievances with Israel and allow them to live peacefully with Jewish neighbours. Among those whose families had not personally experienced dispossession, the loss of Palestine as a whole became a primary source of resentment and only its full recovery could end the enmity. Memory plays a significant role, in this sense, in sustaining Palestinian anger towards Israel.

In 1948 Hanan's family lost land and property in both Ramle and Wadi Hineh. Her grandfather's house is now an institution for mentally disabled Israelis. She still finds talking about their dispossession very upsetting. Hanan showed me photos of her family home in Wadi Hineh, nostalgic images from another time in which her grandfather is a young man with his arms folded, leaning proudly against his car. In the photos, her father is just a child, standing by his father's side.

"We lost everything. We had dignity. They were wealthy, then suddenly they had nothing. It's very painful. My daughters know everything, they always saw these pictures." When Hanan took her daughters to visit the home in Wadi Hineh, they were stopped by an Ethiopian security guard who told them that they did not have permission to enter. "It's our home, we don't need permission!" her daughter told him.

"We used to live in dignity and then suddenly we have nothing. Now everywhere on the whole earth you can find members of my family there. My mother now can't go to visit her house in Ramle because she doesn't have the Israeli ID, but I can go because I am a resident. I take my daughters and we go. To remember."

Hanan is married to her first cousin and her husband is one of 44 grandchildren with a claim to the property. However, of them all, only he has Israeli residency

and the right to reclaim the property. Most of his cousins live abroad, in Canada, America, Egypt, Switzerland. If her husband claims his share, the remainder would go to the Israeli government, confiscated under the absentee property laws. So they leave it unclaimed.

“I am angry. I don’t have any hope that one day this will return to me or to my children... As for me I have no hope to return to Wadi Hineh, I am sure 100% that the Israelis have no intent to treat us well, as a human, because they want in one way or another to kick us out from the country.”

Nasser lives comfortably in Shu’fat, but his parents were from Katamon and Talbieh, now in West Jerusalem. They owned two houses there which were lost in 1948 when his parents fled the fighting and took refuge on the eastern side of the city. “After 1967, my father showed me where he was born and exactly where he bought another house and where he had a grocery store that still he has the *facture* [receipt] for. It’s in Katamon, in West Jerusalem. And still, till now, we go to see our house, where my father was born and where he bought the other house and shop. They started again here [in East Jerusalem] and they built themselves up here and started from nothing. And we grew up and we helped them. And that’s the situation. The Jewish they took everything from us.”

Nasser’s family prospered in East Jerusalem and he is more philosophical about the property they lost, but still he reminds his children, and their children, about what was taken from them. The sadness and anger surrounding dispossession, despite the realisation that what was lost is now surely gone for ever, is sustained across generations with the result that historical grievances are maintained as present day realities.

Anderson and O'Dowd (1999) acknowledge that borders are rarely democratically produced and that for territorial democracy to work, the undemocratic origins of borders need to be 'forgotten'. They recognise, however, that "[t]he problem with contested borders is precisely that 'origins' remain a live issue and cannot be 'forgotten'" (Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999: 596). In East Jerusalem, appeals to democracy do not work "precisely because the territorial basis for the exercise of democracy *is the issue*" (ibid. 596), but also, in this case, because democracy would not support the ethnic exclusion of Palestinian residents that is essential to the preservation of Israel's Jewish identity.

4.3 Everyday life as politics

For many of my interviewees, politics was a surprisingly difficult subject. East Jerusalem Palestinians are voracious consumers of news and the political situation at large is closely followed and widely discussed. However, without lacking in knowledge or awareness, residents often have little to say about Palestinian politics in the city or their own views.

Recent studies have found that the cumulative effect of Israeli policies aimed at the depoliticisation and subjugation of East Jerusalem residents has been the "virtual eradication of organised Palestinian life in the city" (ICG, 2012). Certainly, Palestinians who even a decade ago were openly for Hamas or for Fatah are now far more apathetic about factional politics. Disillusionment with Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and the absence of a nationalist liberation narrative with plausibility for the East Jerusalem constituency, are also significant factors. Palestinian Jerusalemites also fear the loss of their residency rights or the demolition of their homes if they engage in any kind of opposition

activity and even those inclined towards political participation do not find a worthy scene of engagement (Cohen, 2011).

However, depoliticisation was not a concept that interviewees recognised as relevant to them. While none were actively engaged in any form of organised political activity or participation, many acknowledged that, for East Jerusalem Palestinians, politics is not something you choose to opt into or out of. The popularity of the factions may have dissipated and few residents may demonstrate or take part in elections, but most recognise that politics is none the less a part of their daily lives. Dr Sharif explained that there is no Palestinian political party or movement for East Jerusalem residents to support, but “whether we are interested or not, we are living in politics. I step outside of my home and I am in politics. I can’t avoid it, but why vote?”

Khadija also spoke of the feeling that East Jerusalem Palestinians live politics, however much they try to distance themselves from it. “A lot of the time my kids ask me questions and I don’t want to show them these things, but you can’t put them in cotton wool. A lot of the time, if there is news on the television, I tell my husband ‘change the channel, they don’t have to see this,’ they don’t have to see it, you know? Not because I’m selfish, not because I don’t want them to know about the history, about Filastin, about these things, but because there is time. They *will* know. They will know the whole story. We live it. For me, my family always tried to take me apart from this, but you always find yourself in it.” Aisha agrees. “I don’t think a normal life is possible actually, because Jerusalem is really the point, for the Israelis and the Palestinians also. All of them fight for it.”

It is also the case, that the wider conflict impacts on everyday Palestinian life in the city and the way in which residents relate to Israel and Israelis. Despite the physical dislocation and tangential political realities, East Jerusalem Palestinians none the less remain deeply connected to the national cause and events beyond the city are often keenly felt. Hepburn (2004) argues that, while local politics are also shaped by local factors, Jerusalem remains central to the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the point that “the city politics of Jerusalem are in an important sense an extension of national politics”.

Cohen (2011) also suggests that “just as events in Jerusalem, especially, but not only, on the Haram, affect the entire Palestinian public, so do events in the Israeli-Palestinian arena affect the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem... the political system and Palestinian reality in Jerusalem are not free standing, but rather an inseparable part of the overall relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.” In addition to quotidian journeys, Palestinian leisure mobility into and through ‘Jewish’ space is seen as undermining boundaries and Israeli control (Baumann, 2016). During relatively peaceful periods, East Jerusalem Palestinians make frequent use of the superior facilities and resources available to Jewish Israelis and often speak in supercilious terms about Palestinian leisure provision in the West Bank. During periods of heightened tensions, East Jerusalem residents, out of fear or solidarity, are often more hesitant to access Jewish space.

5 Conclusion

In Chapter IV, I argued that East Jerusalem Palestinians, physically and politically dislocated from the West Bank, are increasingly ambivalent about Israeli rule in the city and are acting to improve their prospects within existing power structures.

In this chapter, I have made the case that despite this apparent shift in attitudes towards Israel, East Jerusalem Palestinians experience exclusion and discrimination within the Jewish state.

The ethnocratic structure of the state combines with everyday manifestations of Israel's colonial project in the city to leave Palestinian residents in no doubt that despite their forced inclusion, they are permanently positioned outside the limits of 'society'. Even those who seek to improve their prospects within the context of de facto Israeli rule, find that inclusion, equality and security are ultimately beyond their reach. I have explored here the ways in which Israel's Judaising policies, in addition to strategies aimed at the managed exclusion of Palestinians, are experienced by residents, for whom 'normal life' is in full view but ultimately out of reach.

In chapter VI, I argue that the structures and strategies of power detailed in Chapters IV and V are shaping the site of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem and ask how the dual marginality of residents is shaping the emergence of new subjectivities in the city.

CHAPTER VI

SUBJECTIVITY AND STRUGGLE IN EAST JERUSALEM

Acknowledging the discursive construction of national identity, Bowman (1994) argues that the scattered fate of Palestinians after 1948 resulted in “the construction of a number of different ‘Palestines’ corresponding to the different experiences of Palestinians in their places of exile.” Decades of dislocation and dispersion have engendered different senses of what it means to be Palestinian, to the extent that these varied communities might no longer recognise another’s conception of ‘Palestine’ or each other as allies in the pursuit of national liberation.

This diversity of experience applies equally to those Palestinians whose exile is lived out ‘inside’ Israel and the occupied territories and to East Jerusalem residents whose social and political milieu has undergone dramatic change over the last two decades. Israel’s colonial enterprise in East Jerusalem began immediately after occupation, but gathered pace in the mid-1990s, establishing a new politics and an altered geography for this Palestinian constituency.

Inside Israel’s de facto borders but beyond the limits of inclusion in the state project, East Jerusalem residents live with a perpetual sense of impermanence and the persistent threat of elimination. Their quotidian experience inside the politics and economy of the Israeli state diverges from that of Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories and from that of Palestinian citizens of Israel within its 1948 borders. Dislocated from the West Bank and devoid of Palestinian leadership or a liberation narrative with any practical plausibility or appeal, East Jerusalem residents are doubly marginalised. With little expectation of

challenging Israeli hegemony, they are individually engaged in daily, non-heroic struggles to survive in the city, to safeguard their existing rights and status, and to lead a 'normal' life.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that these factors are shaping the site of identity construction in East Jerusalem and engendering a particular sense of what it means to be Palestinian that corresponds to this experience. I find that while East Jerusalem residents continue to frame their identity within the nationalist idiom (Bowman, 2007), key discursive signifiers (for example, occupation, statehood, resistance) have lost or changed meaning and that political frontiers in the city are not always located between Israelis and Palestinians. The everyday practices through which individual residents enact their identity are redefining *from below* - rather than from the political centre - what it is to be Palestinian in East Jerusalem, in a process of individual self-nationalisation (Jean-Klein, 2001) that demonstrates this constituency's distance from the essentialised identities privileged in mainstream studies. The bottom-up approach undertaken here makes visible this phenomenon, which is generally obscured within a top down analytic optic.

I locate this discussion of identity formation in East Jerusalem within the broader context of Palestinian dislocation from the discursive structures through which identity was constructed after 1967. The PLO's success in fixing the wide field of Palestinian experience to a single identity rested on the nebulousness of the national entity it strived for. It was the common experience of dispossession resulting from the creation of the state of Israel and the shared antagonism towards that state which gave cohesion to the Palestinian national community until Oslo. The PLO's decision to negotiate a compromise settlement with Israel,

and its efforts to transform the abstract concept of 'Palestine' into an actual state, destabilised the consensus on identity, previously sustainable only because of its amorphous designs beyond the restitution of Palestinian land (Bowman, 2007). The Oslo agreement in this way destabilised the discursive structures through which identity had been constituted in East Jerusalem, while the concessions made by the PLO over Jerusalem established the city on a tangential political course within which new political subjectivities would be shaped.

In Chapters IV and V, I detailed the specific structures and strategies of power evident in East Jerusalem and explored the terms in which Palestinians in the city frame their own experience of dislocation and domination. From the data presented, it is already evident that East Jerusalem residents experience more ambivalence towards Israeli rule and greater resistance towards the Palestinian Authority than mainstream studies typically allow. Meanwhile, they are constructed as an external minority inside Israel and excluded from full participation and equal status within the state. Here, I ask how this experience is shaping Palestinian identity in the city and what it suggests about the multiple projects in which residents are engaged and the contracting space in which individual agency is meaningful. I investigate how East Jerusalem Palestinians are adjusting their subjectivity and struggle within the matrix of power in East Jerusalem and suggest that existing scholarly approaches that privilege essentialised identities overlook the implications of these adaptations.

Throughout much of this chapter, I follow a broadly discursive theoretical mode of investigation to shed light on the problematic assumptions that underpin existing approaches and to frame my own empirical conclusions. Discourse theory offers a problem-driven approach that begins with an object of investigation, identified

independently of the theory, and which aims “to produce new interpretations either by rendering visible phenomena previously undetected by dominant theoretical approaches, or by problematising existing accounts and articulating alternative interpretations” (Howarth, 2005). Discourse theory is particularly relevant to the constitution of political identities and the establishment of political frontiers through processes of othering (Howarth, 2005, Norval, 2000). As such, I draw frequently here on its vocabulary and theoretical contours to explore the scope for Palestinian agency and the ways in which Palestinian identity is adapting to the city’s spatial and political transformation since the mid-1990s.

I also draw in this chapter on Howarth’s advice with regard to the structure of a discourse theory investigation: “A typical discursive study would begin with a critique of existing theoretical and empirical positions, from which it would develop an alternative framework of analysis with which to problematise and address a given object of analysis. This elaboration would involve a deconstruction of the problematic assumptions structuring existing approaches and the articulation of appropriate concepts and logics from the discursive approach. The study would then present the substantive empirical conclusions and arguments produced by the application of the theoretical framework to the problem explored” (Howarth, 2010: 141).

Loosely following this format, I begin below by developing the critique of mainstream scholarly approaches to East Jerusalem begun in Chapter I. Focusing on the problematic assumptions upon which many such studies are based, I aim to unsettle identities and reintroduce a sense ambiguity to the interpretation of everyday life, highlighting in particular the tangential experience

of Palestinians in the city and the meanings that they themselves attach to their actions and choices.

Second, I focus directly on the site of identity construction in East Jerusalem, arguing that the actions of residents make clear the emergence of new subjectivities that are distanced from both the Palestinian political leadership and from mainstream nationalist discourses.

While residents continue to identify as Palestinian, they are shaping the composition of that identity from below. Structural constraints limit the opportunities for self-direction in the city, but in the contracting space in which their agency is meaningful, Palestinian residents are adapting to enduring occupation and seeking to improve their future prospects within the context of continuing Israeli rule. In this way, residents are articulating their Palestinian identity in line with their experience, but in ways that may not be recognisable to Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories. I argue that this has direct implications for political and scholarly approaches to the wider conflict and its resolution.

Third, I turn my attention to Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem, arguing that modes of resistance there in the post-Oslo period manifest the multiple subject positions held by residents as well as their dual marginality, which locates them outside the state project of both sides. The way in which East Jerusalem Palestinians frame their own struggles reflects the divergence of their political experience and their asymmetrical relationship to Israeli power. In the annexed city, dislocation and domination are undermining collective understandings of resistance and new individualised interpretations are emerging in which the

frontiers between 'us' and 'them' do not necessarily overlap with those between 'friend' and 'enemy'.

Finally, I recognise that while discursive dislocations threaten identities, they are also the foundations on which new identities are constructed (Laclau, 1990). In this context, I consider these new subjectivities and possibilities for future mobilisation in East Jerusalem, focusing on the barriers to Palestinian inclusion in Israel and the link between oppression and the radicalisation of identities.

1 Analytic Framework

In this section, I problematise three of the main assumptions that underpin existing explanatory approaches to East Jerusalem and outline an analytic framework that supports the discussion below. I take issue with mainstream scholarly positions which are concerned less with the particular relationship East Jerusalem residents have to Israeli power, than with identifying resistance and reading into it the incompleteness of Israeli hegemony or the resilience of an objective Palestinian identity.

Maintaining that structural power limits, but does not determine, the possibilities for mediating agency, I argue that the praxis of everyday life in East Jerusalem must be understood within the context of complex power relations in which Palestinian residents are situated inside, rather than outside and against, established structures. I detail the need for an analytic approach which de-essentialises Palestinian identity, decentres resistance and de-totalises the agent, allowing for a discussion of Palestinian subjectivity and struggle in East Jerusalem in which identities are understood to be contingent and the praxis of everyday life is examined from the perspective of those on the ground and not from above.

1.1 De-essentialising Identity

Popular Palestinian (and Israeli) nationalist discourses typically favour essentialist representations of identity (Sherwell, 2006) which define the limits of inclusivity and give substance to territorial claims. From a Palestinian perspective, these binaries help to prevent 'normalisation' and to maintain pressure for nationalist goals set by the political centre. From an official Israeli point of view, the perpetuation of a distinctive self/other dichotomy helps to sustain the ethnocentric vision of the state and to facilitate the non-inclusion of East Jerusalem Palestinians in the hegemonic project while simultaneously Judaising the urban space they inhabit.

Mainstream academic approaches also rely heavily on dominant discursive articulations that privilege top-down issues such as occupation, sovereignty and borders, producing a polarisation of identities and locating the future of East Jerusalem and its residents firmly within the framework of two competing nationalist narratives. These approaches perpetuate an impression of inevitable ethnic conflict and objective antagonism, downplaying the historical contingency of discursive structures through which identity is obtained and glossing over the extent to which everyday practices in East Jerusalem require regular adaptation (Pullan and Baillie, 2013). Uncoupling the praxis of everyday life from a top-down analytic framework sheds light on the extent of Palestinian disempowerment in the city, the alienation of residents from official nationalist discourses and the narrowing field of opportunity for agency.

I argue that the essentialised identities on which ethnocentric and colonial relations are constructed are not objective knowledge. A bottom-up approach allows the researcher to interpret actions in terms of the subject's own understanding of

what they are doing and why, demonstrating the way in which identity is constituted through everyday social practice. I posit here that systemic power relations are internalised at an individual level, thereby influencing the subject's sense of self and of their future possibilities (Maiguashca, 2013). In this way, identity is also revealed as strategic and temporary. The shrinking space in which agency is meaningful for East Jerusalem becomes the site of subject formation in the city. Top-down approaches also understate the manner in which systemic power relations are internalised by the individual, shaping their sense of self and influencing the strategic construction of new subjectivities. The establishment of a 'them' and 'us' through the construction of political frontiers is an essential component of identity formation. The frontier does not overlay a real, natural identity, however, but must be regarded as fluid and contingent. Thus, the formation of frontiers does not reflect identities, but is constitutive of them (Norval, 2000). In circumstances of structural dislocation, these identities fall into crisis and subjectivities are reconsidered. I suggest below that the political frontiers in East Jerusalem are no longer exclusively those between Israelis and Palestinians.

1.2 De-Centring Resistance

Next, I problematise the over-reliance of mainstream academic approaches to East Jerusalem on a domination/resistance framework. I argue that a binary analysis which begins with occupation and anticipates resistance underestimates the scale of oppression in East Jerusalem, the depth of Palestinian disempowerment and the presence of multiple and overlapping subject positions, not all of which are oppositional. I suggest instead that the nature of Palestinian resistance in East Jerusalem should be approached as a diagnostic of power and

the opportunities for Palestinian agency, and that Palestinian framings of their own self and struggle should be forefronted.

Recent decades have witnessed an explosion of academic interest in quotidian forms of resistance and the everyday ways in which marginalised communities appropriate space and subvert its intended meanings (Bayat, 2007, De Certeau, 1984, Mitchell, 1990, Perera, 2009, Pullan and Baillie, 2013, Richter-Devroe, 2011, Scott, 2005, Spivak, 2005). The everyday has become the site of agency in politics and particularly so in circumstances of oppression and domination (Richmond, 2009, Richter-Devroe, 2011). It is the level at which hegemony functions, but also that which it is contested (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015).

Subaltern studies have sought in this way to reclaim power for marginalised groups and to recuperate the urban poor as subjects with unique political agency (Roy, 2011). Emphasis on power and the production of space also highlights the multiplicity of ways in which its everyday users are able to appropriate or challenge meanings (De Certeau, 1984, Lefebvre, 1991). Deeply asymmetrical power relations in East Jerusalem have focused scholarly attention on the range of temporal tactics employed by the weak, in particular the everyday ways of operating by which the users of space manipulate, divert and re-appropriate its intended meanings (De Certeau, 1984). In this way, the occupation/resistance binary has come to dominate systems of signification for understanding Palestinian actions and behaviour and it becomes tempting to read resistance into every aspect of Palestinian daily life.

This politically motivated impulse is often well intentioned and may be felt to empower Palestinian residents and invest them with agency. This interpretation of everyday Palestinian life, however, often results in one-dimensional portrayals

of East Jerusalem residents whose role is vaguely-defined and limited to 'resisting' a complex and exhaustively detailed matrix of Israeli strategies. I offer here two examples. First, Shlomo (2016a) describes the occupation of East Jerusalem as a form of colonial urbanism, characterised on the Israeli side by a complex constellation of legal ambiguities and exceptional governmentalities. Palestinians, however, are defined merely by their "efforts to resist their forced inclusion within State apparatuses and to retain their urban identity by separatism and resistance to Israeli rule."

In the second example, Jadallah (2014) describes in detail the colonialist construction of urban space in East Jerusalem, paying close attention to the state's attempts to deconstruct and re-narrate the history of the other and to eliminate alternative sovereignties. Palestinians, meanwhile, are said to hold "competing discourses" and to "consistently resist these attempts at reconstructing history," through quotidian practices that "can be read in the urban space" (ibid: 93). These include graffiti and symbolic protests including solidarity activism, vigils, lawsuits, marches, and the memorialisation of key figures or events in the national struggle (ibid: 82). Nowhere in her analysis does the author consider what these informal and largely ineffectual modes of resistance reveal about the depth of Israeli power in East Jerusalem or the extent to which it has penetrated Palestinian decision-making.

Over emphasis on resistance to occupation as a framework for understanding Palestinian actions prevents a full and thorough exploration of the structures of domination in which they are situated. Abu Lughod suggests that those who sense something admirable in resistance tend to look for it hopefully as confirmation of the incompleteness of systems of oppression. Studies which are

motivated more by the urge to identify resistance than to examine power over-romanticise resistance and give insufficient consideration to the depth and complexity of forms of domination (Abu-Lughod, 1990).

Researchers operating from a Southern critical perspective have also challenged attempts to locate transformative agency within spaces of dispossession. Roy (2011) calls for a disruption of approaches which “celebrate the habitus of ‘slumdog cities’ and assign unique political agency to the mass of urban subalterns.”⁵⁰ She also takes issue with academic approaches, such as Bayat’s ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ which assign undue agency to subalterns who are able to exploit informality to improve their condition. Rather, urban informalities should be understood in terms of the “ever-shifting urban relationship between the legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorised and unauthorised” which is “the site of considerable state power and violence” (Roy, 2011: 233).

I demonstrate below that East Jerusalem Palestinians are engaged in multiple daily struggles. A binary analytic framework which essentialises identity and seeks out resistance fails to recognise that the process of subjectification takes place within complex and overlapping power relations. Following Foucault, I argue that power structures the conditions of possibility within which agents make choices. An exploration of these choices and how they change therefore reveals much about strategies and structures of power (Abu-Lughod, 1990, Foucault, 2000, Junka, 2006).

⁵⁰ For example, Roy questions the account of one journalist who found the hours spent in Mumbai’s Dharavi slum to be among the most uplifting of their life; expecting to find a neighbourhood characterised by misery, the observer discovered instead “a bustling enterprising place, packed with small-scale industries defying their circumstances to flourish amid the squalor” (S. Crerar, *The Times*, 2010, cited in Roy, 2011).

Framing practices in terms of resistance limits the analysis of social practices and even reinforces the same forms of power that resistance seeks to undermine. For Rose (2002), therefore, the issue is not to discount the effects of power, but to reconsider how to conceptualise the experience of it. Without an articulation of intent to resist, moreover, Rose argues that the researcher rather than the agent identifies the source of oppression as well as the practice enacted to resist it. Resistance studies undermine the value of their analysis by seeking to fix it within this binary distinction.

1.3 De-Totalising the Agent

Finally, I argue that structures of power are multiple and overlapping and that the privileging of top-down issues essentialises Palestinians as either passive victims of domination or steadfast resisters of occupation, while paying insufficient attention to the multiplicity of subject positions they hold. In practice, many studies continue to assume that the frontiers, or sites of contestation, in East Jerusalem are always located between Israelis and Palestinians. The possibility that Palestinian individuals or groups might be engaged in contestations not exclusively based on their antagonism to Israel continues to be overlooked.

I argue here that East Jerusalem Palestinians simultaneously occupy a range of subject positions and may be involved in multiple projects. Over-reliance on ethnonational motivations to explain everyday actions (and the emphasis on everyday practices as a site of resistance) obscure this diversity. There is agency beyond resistance even in situations of oppression and the subject positions from which agents act do not remain static; as the field of possibility shifts, so too does the site of subjectification and struggle. In East Jerusalem, resistance to occupation is criminalised, Palestinian politics are obsolete and residents find that

there is little to struggle *for*. In this context, the site of subjectification has shifted and Palestinians are enacting their agency in ways that challenge essentialised notions of identity and shed light on their complex relationship to the structures of power in the city.

Quotidian practices may possess a multiplicity of meanings and motivations, many of which are potentially overlooked within situations of ethno-national conflict in which oppression and resistance are assumed to be objective realities. Mouffe (1993) asks how we can expect to “grasp the multiplicity of relations of subordination that can affect an individual if we envisage social agents as homogeneous and unified entities?” Since a multiplicity of subject positions constitute a single agent, she argues that it is essential to develop a theory of the subject as a “decentred, detotalised agent, a subject constructed at the point of intersection of a multiplicity of subject positions between which there exists no a priori or necessary relation and whose articulation is the result of hegemonic practices.” It is in this sense that identity is never definitely established, always retaining instead a degree of ambiguity and openness (Mouffe, 1993).

I also argue in this context, that Palestinian politics in East Jerusalem and the politics of external domination may have points of convergence as well as contestation. Ortner suggests that in a relationship of power, the dominant group frequently has something to offer and the subordinate may have grounds for ambivalence about the resisting relationship. “Subordinated selves may retain oppositional authenticity and agency by drawing on aspects of the dominant culture to criticise their own world as well as the situation of domination” (Ashi Nandy, cited in Ortner, 1995: 190). I make clear in Chapter IV, that residents do draw on Israeli governmental and administrative practices to critique the

leadership of the Palestinian Authority and that they are disinclined to resist Israeli occupation while there is no vision of Palestinian liberation for which they are willing to struggle.

Nor, moreover, is there ever a single, unitary subordinate. Resisters do more than simply oppose domination and their own endogenous struggles, political and domestic, must be brought to light. “Overall, the lack of an adequate sense of prior and ongoing politics among subalterns must inevitably contribute to an inadequate analysis of resistance itself” (Ortner, 1995: 179). The urge to “sanitise” the internal politics of the dominated, Ortner claims, must be understood as fundamentally romantic. “Resistance studies are thin on the internal politics of dominated groups... thin on the subjectivity - the intentions, desires, fears, projects – of the actors engaged in these dramas” (Ibid: 190). There is a reluctance within East Jerusalem studies, perhaps a “failure of nerve” (Ibid: 190), to acknowledge that the “urban-geopolitical rupture” (Shlomo, 2017: 225) experienced by East Jerusalem in the post-Oslo period might equally have contributed to the rupture of Palestinian subjectivities in the city.

1.4 Identity and Subjectivity in Discourse Theory

In this section I outline the way in which the terms ‘identity’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘discursive dislocation’ are understood within the discussion below.⁵¹ Following the theoretical contours of discourse theory, I posit that the identity of subjects and objects is conferred by socially constructed systems of meaningful practices,

⁵¹ I refer to ‘discursive dislocation’ here to distinguish this discussion from the physical dislocation of East Jerusalem.

rituals and beliefs that are articulated together into discourse⁵². This understanding of discourse is not limited to language, but involves all social practice.⁵³

Discourse involves the fixing of meanings within a particular domain and the removal of ambiguity surrounding those meanings. While discourses are presented as a totality in which closure is achieved, these formations are always contingent and historically constructed; they never produce a 'sutured totality' and as such remain vulnerable to forces (and meanings) excluded in their production and to the dislocatory impact of events outside of their control. Due to the contingency and ultimate unfixity of discourse, identity is always unfinished and in process, and at all times ambiguous and open (Howarth, 2010, Howarth et al., 2000, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Mouffe, 1993).

Subjectivity is understood within discourse theory as a sense of self, located within the individual before identities become fixed within discourse. It refers to the way in which people *act*. In this sense, subjectivity accounts for the agency of the individual, while subject positions capture their positioning within a discursive structure. In short, subject positions are located within discourse, while subjectivity is located within the individual.

⁵² The following summary of discourse theory is derived from the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantelle Mouffe and the development of these ideas by the so-called Essex School of discourse theorists. See in particular HOWARTH, D. 2010. *Discourse. Concepts in the Social Sciences*, Buckingham, Open University; HOWARTH, D., STAVRAKAKIS, Y. & NORVAL, A. J. 2000. *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*, Manchester, Manchester University Press; LACLAU, E. 1990. *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London, Verso; LACLAU, E. & MOUFFE, C. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, Verso.

⁵³ This is the main basis of the distinction between discourse theory and discourse analysis. See HOWARTH, D. 2005. Applying Discourse Theory: The Method of Articulation. In: HOWARTH, D. & TORFING, J. (eds.) *Discourse Theory in European Politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Political subjectivities reflect the decision-making process of the subject and are formed by the identification of agents with political projects and their associated discourses. Once these subjectivities are fixed into subject positions within a particular discourse, they confer identity. Identity might thus be described as subjectivity's singular 'fixing' at a particular moment, where identity is an ideological construct formulated within various power structures in order to provide the individual with a sense of belonging (Anishchenkova, 2014).

Discourse theory recognises frontier formation as a *sine qua non* of identity formation. (Norval, 2000). Identities are constructed by an externalisation of the other through the drawing of political frontiers. However, the construction of frontiers is an ambiguous process; frontiers do not exist as the closed, internal moments of a political discourse, but, "rather, the constitutive outside, brought into being through the drawing of boundaries, functions as both a condition of possibility and as a condition of impossibility of identity and objectivity... the constitutive outside of any order has the capacity to put into question the very identity which is constituted through its externalisation" (Norval, 1994).

The contingency of discursive structures within which individuals acquire their identity is made visible through the process of dislocation. Agents are compelled to act, to make choices and to reconsider their subjectivity when dislocations disrupt identities and discourses; that is, "when social identities are in crisis and structures need to be recreated" (Howarth et al., 2000). Dislocation threatens existing identities and "creates a lack at the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions." Thus, it is a lack of meaning in the structure from which new political subjectivities emerge. With discursive structures destabilised and social identities in crisis, the political subject is forced to take decisions and to

identify with projects that seem capable of mending the structure. It is in this process of identification that agents emerge and subjectivities are created which, once formed and stabilised, become the subject positions which locate the subject within discourse.

1.5 The Everyday as a Site of Identity Construction

Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Howarth argues that “if the concept of subject position accounts for the multiple forms by which agents are produced as social actors, the concept of political subjectivity concerns the way in which social actors *act*” (Howarth et al., 2000). In this section, I make the case that the everyday social and political space in which East Jerusalem Palestinians live and act is an appropriate site for exploring the articulation of new subjectivities not yet captured within discursive structures that are typically predicated on essentialised identities and which presuppose antagonism as an objective relationship between them.

Howarth (2010) notes that the multiple qualitative methods used by discourse analysts to generate and gather empirical data resemble those employed by historical, ethnographic and anthropological researchers. Discourse theorists supplement the narrow textual modes of investigation typically associated with discourse analysis with “in-depth interviews and ethnographic forms of investigation such as participant observation and by investigating the structural features of the contexts that limit, but do not determine, social and political possibilities” (Howarth, 2010: 140).

Discourse theory offers a valuable framework for exploring and interpreting the articulation of new political subjectivities. Below, I draw on its language and theoretical precepts to suggest that the disruption of existing discursive structures

through which identity was constructed in East Jerusalem after 1967 and the new political landscape that emerged as a result of Oslo, have reintroduced ambiguity to once partially fixed meanings, destabilising identity and recreating political subjectivities.

While this approach has not previously been used to analyse the situation of East Jerusalem Palestinians, it has been applied to other Palestinian communities, such as the Bedouin communities in the Naqab. Yiftachel draws on a range of post-colonial theories and Gramscian-inspired approaches⁵⁴, including the discourse theory outlined by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), “to interpret the dynamic of oppressive ‘gray spacing’ and identity transformation” within this community and to investigate “the development of new political subjectivities among excluded groups, particularly in urban colonial situations” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 253). He suggests that this complex process of articulation “is composed of dozens of practices, movements, discourses and mobilisations” (ibid: 256).

Müller (2011) maintains that since identities cut across different systems of signification, including social practice, micro-contexts and the everyday become relevant sites for the discursive construction of identities. While agents are not always linguistically able to express the entirety of their social knowledge, it is none the less communicated in their daily activities. In this context, therefore, I argue that the praxis of everyday life in East Jerusalem and an understanding of how Palestinian residents themselves frame their quotidian experience, may offer

⁵⁴ Yiftachel defines these Gramscian-inspired approaches as those which “perceive the making of identities as part of a ceaseless political process,” in contrast to Marxian or liberal theories which regard identities “pre-political.” See YIFTACHEL, O. 2009a. Critical Theory and ‘Gray Space’: Mobilization of the Colonized. *City*, 13, 246-263.

some indication of the articulation of new political subjectivities in the city which have not yet become fixed within discourse.

2 Identity Construction in East Jerusalem After Oslo

In this section I present, analyse and theorise my main findings with regard to identity construction in East Jerusalem and the political dynamics influencing the emergence of new Palestinian subjectivities in the city. I draw on the bottom-up analysis of everyday Palestinian life presented in Chapters IV and V, and the way in which residents frame their own behaviours, to demonstrate that new, creative subjectivities are emerging in East Jerusalem in which the us/them relationship is more ambiguous than elsewhere in the occupied territories and contestations are no longer exclusively Israeli/Palestinian. East Jerusalem Palestinians are adapting to their dislocation and to the permanent postponement of national liberation and are striving to improve their prospects within existing power structures. Exclusion from the Israeli national project, meanwhile, limits the opportunities for participation and suggests that more radical mobilisations may lay ahead. These new subjectivities are made visible by a bottom-up approach which recognises that identity is historically contingent and constructed through everyday practices.

First, I argue that the circumstances of dislocation and domination in the city, combined with the PA's failure to project an inclusive nationalist discourse, are re-orienting Palestinian subjectivities away from the occupied territories towards Israel. If the PLO's commitment to a negotiated settlement with Israel shattered the consensus on Palestinian identity (previously constituted in relation to antagonism with the Zionist state), then the concessions it accepted on East Jerusalem set this constituency on its divergent political trajectory, shaping the

space in which attempts to suture the discursive dislocation would take place. The experience of East Jerusalem Palestinians, inside the Israeli state but excluded from full participation, has engendered a particular conception of what it means to be Palestinian in the city that is at odds with the essentialised Palestinian identity on which mainstream academic approaches typically rely. Recognising subjectivity as the way in which people *act*, and acknowledging that identity is constituted through everyday practices, I argue that, in the post-Oslo period, Palestinian residents are adapting individually to de facto Israeli rule and buttressing their status in the occupied city against any potential encroachment of Palestinian Authority jurisdiction over them.

Next, I highlight the fact that, despite the reorientation of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem away from the occupied territories, residents continue to define themselves within the nationalist idiom. From a top-down, binarized perspective, greater Palestinian engagement with Israel is interpreted within the context of normalisation or Israelification. I make the case here, however, that key discursive signifiers have lost or changed meaning and that residents are reinterpreting collective labels in individual ways. While few in the city experience any difficulty reconciling their own actions and choices with their national identity, the shared sense that others in the city are losing theirs reflects the dislocation of residents from the political centre and from the mainstream nationalist narrative that underpins most scholarly approaches to the conflict and its resolution.

Finally, I suggest that East Jerusalem Palestinians are reshaping the composition of Palestinian identity in the city *from below* through the creative act of identification. This transformation is unfinished and part of an ongoing political

process. Analytic paradigms which fail to take account of these changes are of little value in addressing the challenges that face this constituency.

2.1 New Subjectivities in East Jerusalem

I argue here that exclusive Israeli power, the collapse of Palestinian politics in the city and an unpopular national leadership, are orienting Palestinian subjectivities in East Jerusalem away from the occupied territories towards deeper engagement with and participation in Israel. I locate this argument within the context of East Jerusalem's divergent political trajectory, deeply asymmetrical power relations in the city and the contracting space in which Palestinian agency is meaningful.

East Jerusalem Palestinians live inside Israel's de facto borders and within the ground politics and economy of the state. Dislocated from the Palestinian milieu, residents generally frame the practice of everyday life in the city with reference to the situation of domination and the necessity of adaptation. Ziad says that health and education are "outside of politics" and that, in most other areas, there is simply no choice but to follow Israeli laws and to engage with its institutions. "I live in Jerusalem and, if I live in Jerusalem, it has to be like this... I am living in Israel. It's an occupation, but I am living here and in every single detail of my life I am dealing with them."

Residents agree that some level of cooperation with the state is mandatory and unavoidable in the annexed city. Paying arnona to receive municipal services or making social security contributions to receive health care, for example, are obligatory on all residents and citizens. Rana explains that as Israeli residents,

Jerusalem Palestinians are inside, not outside, the legal and administrative structures of the state:

“If you want to open a bank account or have a telephone at home. If you need to travel abroad or have an operation. In all these things, there is no choice, you have to go through them [the Israeli authorities]. It is the only way to live or to get anything done. And not only that. There are consequences if you do not do as you have to. It’s the law, we can’t ignore it just because we don’t like them. If we don’t do these things we will suffer, not them.”

Top-down processes significantly impact quotidian practices in East Jerusalem and deeply asymmetrical power relations limit the opportunities for individual agency. However, it is evident from the data presented above that the praxis of everyday life in the city goes beyond a straightforward struggle for survival. Notwithstanding the hardships and degradations of occupation and the poverty of Palestinian residents relative to their Jewish neighbours, East Jerusalemites are looking beyond ‘bare life’ survival strategies towards deeper, non-essential and voluntary interactions with the occupation regime to improve their prospects within it.

These interactions also go beyond the surreptitious methods described by Bayat, through which the marginalised seek to better their lives and to generate opportunity within the context of informal life. In many ways, East Jerusalem residents do seek to improve their lives within circumstances of informality, through illegal building, for example, or by taking advantage of the lack of municipal enforcement in spatially excluded enclaves such as Kufr ‘Aqab, to live with West Bank partners without risking the loss of their own residency (Baumann, 2016).

However, deeper engagements with and attempts to gain entry to formal Israeli life are also apparent. Higher education or professional opportunities inside Israel are increasingly permissible to Palestinian residents who regard them as necessary and justifiable in the pursuit of a better quality of life. More East Jerusalemites are seeking out Hebrew language instruction after Tawjihi in order to access education and employment opportunities inside Israel. There is also growing demand within East Jerusalem schools for the opportunity to follow the Israeli Bugrut curriculum, which allows young Palestinians to leave secondary education with a qualification recognised inside Israel and accepted by Israeli universities.

These should be interpreted as strategic decisions, reflecting the reality that, to all intents and purposes, East Jerusalem residents live inside the Israeli state. Palestinians returning from study 'abroad' – even when only as far away as the West Bank – experience frustration when their professional qualifications are not recognised by Israeli employers and their lack of Hebrew language skills places them at a disadvantage to Jewish graduates. Those who wish to remain in East Jerusalem are also required to earn a salary commensurate with the high cost of living in the city, which employment within the Israeli economy is more likely to offer.

Following Foucault, I suggest that in any relationship of power, the subject is always "faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available" (Foucault, 2000: 342). In the post-Oslo period, East Jerusalem Palestinians are acting to improve their lives and livelihoods within the context and structures of de facto Israeli rule and, as a result, they are drawn into non-essential, voluntary relationships with the

state, its people and institutions. New subjectivities are emerging as a result of these creative adaptations to Israeli rule which, crucially, offer Palestinian residents a means of actively participating in complex and dynamic power relations in their context (Ho and Tsang, 2000). Residents are responding in individual ways to the circumstances of dislocation and domination, making decisions that are limited by structural factors, but ultimately intentional and self-generated. In discourse theoretical terms, this is the site of subjectivity. It is in this space that agency is enacted and new subjectivities are formed when dislocations occur and individuals are forced to make choices.

The trend towards 'improvement of life' within the context of Israeli rule manifests power inequalities in the city, the alienation of this constituency from mainstream nationalist narratives and the sense of permanence that the occupation has acquired. In one sense, therefore, individual advancement and material concerns are filling the vacuum left by the collapse of Palestinian politics in the city. From a bottom-up perspective, however, it is also apparent that East Jerusalem residents are choosing deeper participation in existing power structures as a way of protecting their status and opportunities within them, and, crucially, to buttress themselves against any encroachment of PA jurisdiction over their lives and their city. This understanding of Palestinian subjectivity in East Jerusalem is at odds with the essentialised identity that is imposed within a domination/resistance binary. It also raises questions about the 'Palestinian' identity of East Jerusalem residents.

2.2 Loss of Collective Understandings of Identity

Despite changing patterns of behaviour, East Jerusalem residents continue to identify robustly as Palestinian. From a top-down perspective, this fact obscures

the dislocation that has taken place. It is apparent, however, that while individuals experience little difficulty reconciling their own choices with their national identity, they none the less believe that others in the city are losing touch with theirs. I suggest here that this phenomenon should be explained with reference to the dislocation of East Jerusalem from discursive structures, the loss of collective understandings regarding identity and the creative space that this has opened for individual interpretations of what it is to be Palestinian in the annexed city.

Several interviewees spoke of their right to a 'normal' life to justify their choices. Others, said that they are simply using Israeli tools to further their own education or to increase their earning potential. Ziad explained that when he catalogues Palestinian books for the Israeli national library, which he recognises from their markings as stolen from a West Bank home or mosque, he tells himself that one day this will be a Palestinian national library, that he is cataloguing these texts for a future Palestinian state. Summa intends to pursue her chosen specialism in an Israeli hospital and hopes that this will lead to further opportunities to train in a sub-specialism of her choosing. She knows that this will take many years and that, in the meantime, she will continue to treat Israeli patients in Israeli hospitals, but she tells me that this is acceptable because one day she will be able to use all this knowledge and training to help Palestinians.

These accounts indicate that when it comes to non-essential manifestations of advanced participation, residents continue to rely on culturally available discourses to construct a nationalist rationale for their actions. There could be many reasons for this. It may reflect an individual or collective unease with such choices or, alternatively, the participant's perception that I as an 'outsider' would not understand their motivations or be able to put them in context.

Few East Jerusalem Palestinians experience any discomfiture over their own identity or nationalist ‘credentials,’ yet there clearly exists a shared concern that others in the city are ‘losing’ theirs to varying degrees or that a general diminution of Palestinian identity in East Jerusalem is occurring. Despite a shared understanding that non-essential engagement is justifiable in pursuit of a better quality of life, the atomisation of East Jerusalem Palestinians ensures that there are few collective understandings about how far is too far in terms of participation and if there is a point at which a line needs to be drawn.

The circumstances of domination in East Jerusalem are influencing the choices made by Palestinian residents, drawing them into relationships with the state that are unfamiliar to, and frequently misunderstood by, Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories. The absence of Palestinian leadership or a nationalist discourse with any plausibility or appeal for this constituency is further shaping the perception that liberation is indefinitely postponed, leaving residents with little to struggle for beyond their own best interests under Israeli rule.

This pattern of behaviour is often discussed within the ill-defined context of ‘normalisation’ or ‘Israelification’ among East Jerusalem residents (Bulle, 2009, Salem, 2011, Yousef, 2011, Hasson, 2012, Kelly, 2016, Mozgovaya, 2011, JTA, 2017). It also signals the distance that has emerged between this constituency and Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories (Fenster and Shlomo, 2011). Cohen suggests that a new generation of East Jerusalemites matured during the Oslo years that viewed the Palestinian Authority as “a neighbouring entity, rather than a source of authority and identity, and regarded its population as Palestinians of a different species rather than partners in a common fate” (Cohen, 2011: 36).

Ziad's level of non-essential interaction is high in relation to other interviewees, yet he is secure in his own choices and says that all Palestinians resist in their own way. He is concerned, however, by the trend among young East Jerusalemites to leave education to take up unskilled employment in Israeli hotels and restaurants.

"This is the major change. I believe it's the most important detail in the Jerusalemite social life. Because for a guy who can earn a thousand dollars in a month, this is very attractive for him. Especially because his father, the educated father, is also earning \$1,000 in a month. So, the young guy is thinking to himself, why should I go to university, study a long time to graduate, to earn \$1000 if even now I can earn that much... Maybe a guy of fifteen years old can earn \$1,000 in a hotel. At 15 he does not have the logic to know what is positive and what is negative, what is Palestinian and what is Israeli. So, when he is 15 years old and dealing with Jews and Israeli society he is going to easily melt."

Interestingly, Ziad has no difficulty reconciling his own educational and professional interactions inside Israel with his Palestinian national identity, yet he questions the behaviours of others whose interactions are different and, arguably, driven more by economic necessity than career advancement. As the headmistress of an East Jerusalem school, Hanan is also alarmed by the perceived decline in the strength of Palestinian identity among young people in the city.

"This is a problem! We [head teachers in East Jerusalem] had a meeting last week in the Frere school and we've been talking about this, that we are all facing students who are lacking for their Palestinian nationality, for their Palestinian identity, because they are living in Jerusalem. They are losing it, slowly, slowly

every year and every year we are seeing that the students have less and less emphasis for Palestine.”

Hanan explained that the parents of many of her students are employed by Israelis. Many educated mothers, for example, are entering the workforce and taking up employment in Israeli-funded schools. The children understand from a young age that salaries are significantly higher if you are employed by Israelis. Hanan explains that as a head teacher in one of only two East Jerusalem schools that refuses a relationship with both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Ministry of Education, and receives no funding from either, her salary has suffered. “Since 1995 till now, it’s 21 years, and I have only 7,000 shekels my salary. If I am in a school funded by the Israelis, my salary will be more than 12-15,000 Israeli shekels. So, there is a lot of difference between the two salaries. Many of the students their mothers are teachers in the Israeli schools. They know that their mother has a big salary. So, they can’t say something wrong about the Israelis. They are doing well with Israelis.” Hanan points to further evidence of the normative impact of Israeli occupation. “Sometimes, for example, they use the word Israel. They say ‘Yeah, we went to Israel to the beach.’ No! I tell them, you went to Yaffa! It’s not Israel! It’s a Palestinian occupied country. But it doesn’t matter for them.”

Summa, who works in an Israeli hospital treating Israeli patients, also explained that she felt many East Jerusalemites were losing their connection to Palestine.

“When I finished university [in the West Bank] I went to a school in Jerusalem to start learning Hebrew. The students that were with me in the class, I was shocked by them. They are from East Jerusalem, but they don’t have relations to Palestine. They don’t have relations with their religion, with their Arabic, they have

no belonging, yanee, they belong to Israelis. They have low education level. I believed at that point in the opinion of the West Bankers, that we are not belonging to them... It was the time of the war in Gaza and all the Palestinians stopped buying products from Israel, you know, there was a boycott, we stopped some things. One time we were talking about this and she said, one girl with us, 'Why? No! *Yanee*, we live with them, we work at their places. *Yanee*, its normal. They are with us.' No belonging, they lost their relation now. Their relation to Palestine."

Discourse theory emphasises the contingency of discursive structures through which subjects obtain their identity. When dislocations occur, this contingency is made visible, identities and discourses are disrupted and a lack is created at the level of meaning. While East Jerusalem Palestinians do not struggle to justify their own position vis-à-vis the Israeli state and can account for the level of engagement they consider acceptable for themselves, their concern is aroused when others exhibit similar patterns of behaviour. This unease is indicative of the dislocation of this constituency from the discursive structures through which identity was previously constructed and demonstrates a loss of meaning and collective understandings about what it means to be Palestinian in the annexed city.

The apparent disparity between how East Jerusalem Palestinians perceive themselves and how they regard each other is also reflected in the fragmentation of Palestinian identity more widely. As indicated above, decades of dislocation and dispersion have engendered different senses of what it means to be Palestinian (Bowman, 1994). This situation appears to be worsening over time. Barakat (2012) stresses that "though we continue to believe the dream of a

unified Palestinian identity, the reality is that this identity has become more fragmented among the different statuses that each one of us holds.”

This problem is mirrored in the attitude of West Bank Palestinians towards East Jerusalemites (as experienced by East Jerusalem residents) discussed in Chapter IV. It is also evident in the views expressed by East Jerusalem residents about Palestinian citizens of Israel within the 1948 borders. Ahmad had experienced very little personal contact with Palestinians from inside Israel's 1948 borders before he went to university. As he made new friends, he was surprised to learn that their lives were not as he had imagined them.

“The small villages of '48 are in a very bad situation. Palestinians can't get the right education because they can't afford it, racism is high there. Every piece of the Palestinian community has its sufferings and some of their sufferings they are getting from us because we say they are traitors, they stayed, they are dealing with Israelis too much and all this crap. But when we talk to them, most of them have this sense of Palestinian root that is built in them. My opinion about them has changed tremendously.”

It seems, therefore, that while each Palestinian constituency identifies itself as Palestinian, the effect of territorial fragmentation and demographic dispersion is that these communities now struggle to recognise each other as such. Each group appears to regard its own Palestinian experience as the 'authentic' one. Moreover, it is evident that in East Jerusalem, where the lines that distinguish the occupied from the occupier are present, yet more blurred than elsewhere, residents are navigating their paths in atomised ways and identifying individual solutions to their collective problems. Existing discourses have lost or changed meaning in the East Jerusalem context and new collective understandings have

not emerged. While many interviewees agreed that simply remaining in the city constitutes a powerful form of resistance, there was less of a consensus around how Palestinians who do survive in the city should live their lives there. Individuals appear to be secure in their own choices, but there is an apparent lack at the discursive level which would allow East Jerusalem Palestinians to locate their subjectivity within discourse. On the other hand, this is creating a space for new, individual interpretations.

2.3 Shaping Identity from Below

In this section, I suggest that the divergent political experience of East Jerusalem residents does not threaten Palestinian identity in the city, but rather that it is shaping the composition of that identity, from below, through the creative act of identification. East Jerusalem residents continue to identify themselves as Palestinian, but distanced from the political centre and isolated from the Palestinian milieu, they are redefining through their everyday practices what this means in the context of the annexed city.

Laclau and Zac (1994) argue that “an active identification is not a purely submissive act on the part of the subject, who would passively incorporate all the determinations of the object. The act of identification, on the contrary, destabilises the identity of the object” (Laclau and Zac, 1994: 14). From this perspective, the essentialist definitions of Palestinian identity privileged by mainstream academic approaches are misrepresenting this constituency and denying them the particular form of agency they have constructed in relation to their context. I suggest here that it is necessary to consider the composition of identity itself as continuously being remapped and re-negotiated in relation to the experience of being Palestinian in a particular set of circumstances (Sherwell, 2006). In this

context, “the everyday becomes a distinguishing element of Palestinian identity particular to specific locales” (Sherwell, 2006: 438).

I make the case, therefore, that the act of identification does not automatically impose on the subject all the determiners which comprise that identity; by identifying themselves as Palestinian, East Jerusalem residents do not accept an external set of identity markers as their own that are unambiguously recognisable to others who also accept them. As such, Bowman concludes that “[t]he nebulosity of the term ‘Palestinian,’ which enables it to serve as a label of identity for all Palestinians, simultaneously renders it incapable of providing any sense of the distinguishing characteristics which would allow Palestinians in milieu where they suffer from particular antagonisms to recognise their situation as ‘like’ that of other Palestinians in different situations.”

Allowing that the act of identification is always “an individualised interpretation of a collective name and not a perfect imitation of a social category” (Ho and Tsang, 2000) decentres essentialist interpretations of Palestinian identity and reintroduces a sense of ambiguity to our understanding of the everyday practices through which it is constructed. It also sheds light on the multiple subject positions occupied by East Jerusalem residents and the various projects in which they are simultaneously engaged. The Palestinian Authority has failed to project an inclusive nationalist discourse with plausibility or appeal for East Jerusalem Palestinians and their rejection of its legitimacy informs their relationship with Israeli power just as their experience inside Israel informs their position on internal Palestinian struggles.

The relationship between East Jerusalem residents and Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories is complex, as is that between Palestinian residents

and the Israeli state. The data already presented highlights the ambiguities and ambivalences which are part of everyday Palestinian life in East Jerusalem. Distanced from both national projects, Palestinians in the city none the less remain closely connected to both states, often leaving them with a sense that their identity is in crisis. Summa says that East Jerusalem Palestinians experience a sort of schizophrenia. "I study from Palestinian textbooks, but I live in Israel and I work on the Israeli side, but no, I have to take a special licence from the Israelis to work with them because I studied in the West Bank which is not Israel, so am I with the Palestinians or the Israelis? Really, I feel I have schizophrenia... I am a Palestinian, but politically I am not a Palestinian or an Israeli. For Israel, I am a resident in this country, but I need citizenship to be Israeli. But I am not Palestinian because I do not have their ID and they have no power here. I am not Jewish and they want Israel to be recognised as a Jewish state so I am not really part of Israel. Abu Mazen wants a state in 1967 Palestine, but for Israel, Jerusalem is not part of the 1967 borders anymore, so I am not a Palestinian? What can I do?"

In this important sense, the site of identity formation might constructively be regarded as one of *indeterminacy*, "an open space for considering a variety of ways in which the relation between self and other may be conceived. *From this site, it becomes possible to think of social division in terms other than the friend/foe relationship.*" (Norval: 2000: 223) While politics and identity remain essentially concerned with the formation of frontiers, of an 'us' and 'them', this perspective suggests that these do not have to be friend/enemy relations. For Norval, "the relation between 'the self' and 'the other' is infinitely more complex than any dichotomous distinction allows" and, "as Derrida argues, the outside infects the inside and *vice versa.*"

East Jerusalem Palestinians continue to identify as Palestinian, but just like diasporic Palestinian communities or Palestinians in Gaza or Israel, the different circumstances in which they live are engendering different senses of what this means in their particular circumstances. This has the negative effect of distancing these Palestinian constituencies from each other, but it has also focused some scholarly attention on the potential emergence of a unique Jerusalem Palestinian identity that is more local than national in character.

Permanent exclusion is a structural element of most ethnocratic states and colonial settings in which the state has no intention or desire to assimilate marginalised communities (Yiftachel, 2009a). The alienation of East Jerusalem Palestinians from existing discursive structures and their impregnable marginality inside Israel has raised the possibility that national identity might give way to a more localised sense of belonging and mobilisation. In some instances, this is discussed in relation to the popular 'Right to the City' discourse, discussed below, while Cohen points to the divergent nature of the Palestinian struggle in Jerusalem, more regular contact between Jerusalem Palestinians and Israelis, their special legal status and the physical barriers separating them from the rest of the territories. He claims that these factors have "combined to create a different type of Palestinian, a sort of hybrid between an Israeli Arab and a Palestinian from the territories" (Cohen, 2011).

The data collected here does not support the suggestion that Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are evolving a unique political identity that is more local than national in character. There is unmistakable evidence of a distinct East Jerusalem Palestinian experience, and this has significance for the articulation of new subjectivities. There is also a clear attachment among East Jerusalem

Palestinians to the city in which they live. The evidence suggests, however, that this attachment is complex and derived from a range of overlapping and not mutually exclusive subject positions.

Many interviewees, for example, stressed the importance of free access to the al-Aqsa mosque. There were ties of family, memory and faith. For others, the connection was not so much to Jerusalem itself as to the access to all of historic Palestine that their residency rights in Jerusalem afforded them. It was in fact the broader connection to Palestine that made their Jerusalem residency so valuable, particularly for those who had lost land or property inside Israel's 1948 borders. It is impossible to compartmentalise these motivations and they are sufficiently numerous and overlapping to cast doubt on any attempt to define a uniquely Jerusalem identity.

Moreover, the influx of Palestinians holding Israeli residency into East Jerusalem from the West Bank as a result of the Barrier and the threat to residency, attests to the significance of the right to live in Jerusalem when that right came under threat, but also indicates that when it was not perceived to be threatened, day to day residency in the city sometimes took second place to quality of life.

2.5 Summary

In this section, I combined empirical data with theoretical context to offer a detailed analysis of the dynamics of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem since the end of Oslo, the collapse of Palestinian leadership in the city and the construction of the separation Barrier. Existing scholarly approaches which fail to recognise the strategic recreation of Palestinian subjectivities in response to this new political geography in effect deny East Jerusalem residents their own form and moment of agency.

I set out first to identify the space in which Palestinian agency is meaningful and where subjectivities are recreated through the choices and actions of individuals when their identity is in crisis. I made clear the destabilisation of identities in East Jerusalem, arguing that this process is made visible by the city's political and spatial dislocation from the West Bank and by the disruption of discursive structures through which identity was obtained during the first two decades after 1967. Physical, political and discursive dislocation are shaping the site of identity construction in East Jerusalem, creating a lack of meaning within existing discourses and giving rise to the emergence of new subjectivities among East Jerusalem residents. In this context, I made clear that East Jerusalem Palestinians are pursuing non-essential relationships with Israeli institutions in an attempt to secure their status within existing power structures, buttress their position inside Israel against PA claims to speak for them, and achieve a better quality of life.

In section four below, I suggest that while dislocation threatens identities, but by the same token it is the foundation on which new ones are constituted (Howarth et al., 2000). The space of meaningful agency in East Jerusalem is shrinking, but within it Palestinian residents are making strategic decisions and acting out their identities in new ways that may lead them to identify with alternative political projects and the discourses they articulate. First, I consider how Palestinians in East Jerusalem are adapting their struggle in the city post-Oslo.

3 Modes of Palestinian Struggle in East Jerusalem

I address in this section the impact of dislocation and exclusion on modes of Palestinian struggle in the city. I argue that the way in which East Jerusalem Palestinians frame their own struggle reflects the divergence of their experience

as residents of the Israeli state, the particularities of their relationship to Israeli power and the failure of the Palestinian nationalist movement to project an inclusive political imaginary with plausibility for this isolated constituency. Crucially, I argue that resistance to Israeli occupation is no longer the main explanatory paradigm for Palestinian politics in East Jerusalem or even for Palestinian struggle in the city more broadly. A fuller understanding of 'resistance', not limited by a binary top-down perspective, requires consideration of the overlapping subject positions occupied by East Jerusalem residents and the multiple projects in which they are involved. A closer examination of the way in which residents frame their own quotidian practices demonstrates that their conscious struggles are directed as much against the encroachment of Palestinian Authority power in East Jerusalem as they are against Israeli attempts to remove them from the city.

Political and territorial fragmentation, combined with punitive Israeli counter-measures, have reduced collective acts and understandings of resistance across the occupied territories, resulting in a "plurality of competing narratives and forms of resistance." (Richter-Devroe, 2011). East Jerusalem's isolation and the particular relationship of its residents to Israeli power are undermining the discursive structures which inform collective Palestinian understandings of *what* to resist as well as of *how* to resist. This is evidenced by the emergence of a separate narrative of struggle in the city, discussed below, that manifests the atomisation of this constituency as well as their dual marginality. The de-essentialisation of identity and reintroduction of ambiguity to our approach to everyday life in East Jerusalem facilitates a fresh examination of Palestinian struggle in the city.

In order to explore the dynamics of power in East Jerusalem, I adopt the term struggle here rather than resistance to capture the complexity and ambiguity of these relationships and with the aim of distancing this analysis from the dichotomising assumptions typical of mainstream approaches to everyday Palestinian life. Rejecting depictions of power as a straightforward top-down or bottom-up trajectory (Maiguashca, 2006, Maiguashca, 2013) and recognising it instead as a connection involving a “mutually implicated interplay” (Spicer and Fleming, 2006), I aim below to demonstrate the plurality of structural power and its relational aspects. In discussing Palestinian struggle, I hope also to distance this analysis from the impression, implicit in dominant discursive articulations of Palestinian resistance, of East Jerusalem residents as pre-formed and predictable individuals as opposed to agents whose identity is constituted through social practice and the process of acting out their struggle. I favour the term struggle which allows for antagonism, but also manifests the indeterminacy of the site of identity formation. While resistance implies a broadly outward focus and implies antagonism, struggle allows for greater complexity and ambivalence as well as more adversarial us/them relations.

Below, I identify three modes of Palestinian struggle evident in East Jerusalem, based on the data collected here. First, is the ‘outward’ struggle to remain in Jerusalem, despite Israel’s colonial project in the city and the pressure on residents to leave. Second, is the ‘inward’ struggle of East Jerusalem residents to remain outside the control of the Palestinian Authority. Third, is a personal struggle to live a normal life within the context of de facto Israeli rule.

3.1 Struggle to Remain in Jerusalem

East Jerusalem Palestinians consistently define their 'resistance' in relation to Israel's Judaisation project and their active resolve to remain steadfast as Palestinians (and often as Muslims) in the city despite the hardships this entails. This mode of struggle takes account of the multiple strategies employed by Israel to undermine the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem as well as the internal colonial (or ethnocentric) regime and discriminatory practices imposed on those who remain. It also acknowledges the perceived readiness of the leadership in Ramallah to negotiate further concessions over East Jerusalem to Israel, that are unacceptable to and unendorsed by its Palestinian residents. East Jerusalem Palestinians frame this steadfastness in terms of their nationalist resistance (*muqaawma*) and also, for Muslim residents, with reference to their religious obligation to defend the borders of Islam (*riibaat*). For most East Jerusalem Palestinians, it is also a very personal struggle to remain on one's own land or in one's own home.

This form of struggle manifests Palestinian resistance to Israel's Judaisation project in East Jerusalem, but it does not embody the discursive struggle to throw off Israeli occupation. Crucially, residents who identify this as their mode of resistance seek to sustain the Palestinian presence in the city, but do not uniformly agree on how to live in the annexed city. Ziad has a clear view of his own struggle, but emphasises the individual construction of everyday oppositional practices in East Jerusalem. He says that his own mode of resistance is to remain resident in Jerusalem despite the pressure to leave, while at the same time not 'melting' into Israeli society. For Ziad, this refusal to assimilate does not preclude regular, voluntary engagement with Israeli

individuals and institutions, but he accepts that the struggle of others in the city may look different. “I study at the Hebrew University and yes I work there too, I have also learnt Hebrew, but I am not integrated socially or politically... Everyone resists with his own shape of resistance. I resist occupation by getting a good education and by staying in Jerusalem. Others resist by staying in Jerusalem and maybe some social resistance not to melt, maybe some do knife attacks, but we are all the same level of resistance. We all want to end the occupation. That is the first priority for all of us, but we work for it in our own way.”

It is unambiguously clear to residents that to live in East Jerusalem is, to all intents and purposes, to live inside Israel and that, as such, some degree of interaction with the state is unavoidable. Ziad believes that it is the responsibility of each individual to determine for him or herself where the line between participation and normalisation should be drawn. “This is a creation for Jerusalemite people and it is different for every person. Maybe this is not scientific or objective, but I believe it is different for each person. Everyone knows what is right and wrong for them.”

Khadija expressed a similar sentiment. “Simply, if I am just here, live here, to be here, not to move, not to go to live in the West Bank, not to emigrate, this is my resistance. This is first. The second thing, raising my children in a good way, making them good people, this is also resistance. I can’t say about kids who throw stones or use knives, or about Hamas, I can’t say about them that this is not resistance, because I do respect them. Because they resist in their way. Each one of us has something they feel is their resistance. My way is being here, to show them that I am a Palestinian, a Muslim, to show them that I care about Jerusalem, about al-Aqsa, I care about Palestine. This is my resistance.”

Khadija explained that having a family has altered her perspective on the course of struggle that is most appropriate for her. “We never forget, for me I never forget, but there is another life; my children need me. I would love to go and sit everyday with the women at al-Aqsa (the *Murabitaat*), but on another side, I have kids to raise, a family to care about. I never forget what they did to us, but you have to make yourself not think about it to let life go on. I know it is really selfish to try to make yourself forget that people are suffering, but in the end, how can I help them? I believe in something inside and there is a time it will show up, but you have to wait; everyone has a different way to show what they believe in. Maybe if I raise my kids well, care about my family, raise them in a good way, that shows them that we exist, that we are here in Jerusalem, that we’re not moving. At the end, every one of us wants what’s the best for their family.”

The Islamic dimension of this mode of struggle is significant. The religious importance of the city’s holy sites features heavily in individual narratives of Muslim residents’ resistance, while in Jerusalem the obligation to defend the borders of Islam raises Palestinian attachment to the land beyond a straightforward national struggle. For some, it is also regarded as a duty which the Palestinian Authority and many West Bankers have failed to fulfil. Summa explains:

“I can’t accept the Palestinian leaders or their ways of life. The Palestinians in the West Bank, they don’t have the same relation say with al-Aqsa, with the religion of the land, like we do. In East Jerusalem, many leave school and go to make money working with Israelis and mixing with Israeli culture, but somewhere in their mind or in their heart they have this relation. They have al-Aqsa. The Israelis can take everything, but there are some lines they cannot pass. These lines are

muqadas, *yane*, holy. In East Jerusalem, we have this relation with al-Aqsa, with this land, with Jerusalem. We know that this is our land. We work on the Israeli side because of money, but this land is something in our soul. In the West Bank, they have lost this relation. A student at my university [in the West Bank] said to me once that it is my responsibility to look after Jerusalem and al-Aqsa. I told him no, it's not only my responsibility. Allah put me in Jerusalem and you in Jenin, but Jerusalem is your responsibility also. It is a responsibility for all Muslims. But their society and their relation to the land changed after the second intifada. It became about money, more money. Money and building. The external appearance of the cities changed. Their priority changed. I tell them now that they don't deserve this land. They don't deserve Jerusalem or al-Aqsa. If al-Aqsa is on the Israeli side, I will stay on the Israeli side."

Riba is a religious duty incumbent on Muslims, but for Christian Palestinians the individual's relationship to Jerusalem is also an important one. George explained that many Christians have already left Jerusalem and that their numbers will continue to decline, but he was adamant that their bond to the city was no less profound than that of their Muslim neighbours.

"It is definitely not because Christians are having less attachment to the land and the city that they leave. The Christians were here for centuries. The Muslims came in 637. Only Jesus was from this land, not Muhammad, not Moses. Of the pilgrims who come to Jerusalem, 90% of tourists are Christians. So be clear Christians are deeply attached to the land, it is our land."

Greater numbers of Christians leave the city, he claimed, because Muslims have more support from outside to stay and because they are more willing than Christian Palestinians, or secular Jews, to accept a lower quality of life in order

to remain. “The Christian mentality in Jerusalem is different. When you think about the future of your family, safe places to live, jobs, employment, a passport just to know who you are at least, then you think about leaving. If a Palestinian moves away, he can leave and still visit. He can live elsewhere and still keep this attachment.”

Beyond religious imperatives, this dimension of the struggle in East Jerusalem is also linked to the Palestinian concept of *sumud*, or steadfastness, which manifests a robust determination to remain on the land. The meanings attributed to the nationalist conception of *sumud* have varied “dependent on the communicative situations in which *sumud* discourses circulated as well as the larger needs and contexts of the time” (Rijke and van Teeffelen, 2014). It is apparent in the contemporary context of internal fragmentation, however, that the multiple and overlapping understandings of *sumud* must be understood not only in relation to time, but also to location and the divergent experiences of Palestinians within Israel, East Jerusalem and the occupied territories. In the annexed city, the struggle is also to resist the normative aspects of Israeli rule.

This mode of Palestinian struggle, therefore, reflects the particular status of Jerusalem’s holy sites in Islam and contemporary conceptualisations of the nationalist notion of *sumud* that require Palestinians to remain steadfast on the land and to retain their national identity (Cohen, 2011). Equally, however, it manifests the perception of Palestinian residents that the struggle for Jerusalem has been abandoned by the national leadership and the sense that this responsibility is now theirs alone. It is also valuable as a diagnostic of Israeli power in the city in that it reflects the narrowing space in which resistance to occupation is possible.

Even lawful demonstrations by Palestinian residents of their opposition to Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem are classified as political subversion which is the remit, in addition to intelligence and counter-terrorism, of Shin Bet, the Israeli Security Agency, also known as Shabak (ICG, 2012). In this context, Dumper (2013a) notes that policing in East Jerusalem “does not tolerate any activities that are perceived as ‘subversive’ or threatening to public order, including demonstrations of opposition and left-wing movements in East Jerusalem.” This has led to a blanket suppression of all forms of Palestinian protest in the city and a policing regime which corresponds more closely to an occupying army than a law enforcement agency (Dumper, 2013: 1261). Even Palestinian political parties that oppose the occupation are considered unlawful as a result of which all Palestinian political activity in the city is effectively criminalised (Thrall, 2014, Thrall, 2017).

Like many other East Jerusalem Palestinians, Rana explains that she fears the consequences of protesting against the occupation. “I like to stay in the middle. I feel afraid from these things, demonstrations. I just want to be safe. I don’t want to make anything against them, because I want to feel safe in my life. Not to go to a prison or a court. I just want to go to my work and come back to my home.”

Despite living close to the site of a Muslim cemetery threatened by construction of a Museum of Tolerance in the Mamilla district, neither Rana nor anyone she knows took part in the protests largely organised by the IM Northern Branch (ICG, 2012, Reiter, 2014). Fear and apathy appear to form part of the problem.

Cohen (2013a) points out that many more Israelis than Palestinian participate in ‘joint’ struggle against the occupation. Among a range of explanations offered for this, including lack of trust in Israeli activists and lack of faith in the ability to effect

change, Cohen also highlights the likely absence of a shared agenda. While Israeli demonstrators chant that Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah are Palestine, the Palestinian residents of these neighbourhoods are themselves far less certain that Palestinian sovereignty is what they actually want. This fact further demonstrates the distance between East Jerusalem residents and the Palestinian nationalist narrative that emanates from the political centre and on which mainstream peace efforts are based.

3.2 The struggle to remain outside PA Jurisdiction

If the first component of Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem is to survive as Palestinians in the city – as the outside brought inside – then the second element, of equal significance to residents, is to safeguard their status as Palestinians outside the reach of the Palestinian Authority. To persist as the inside, outside. This aspect of the struggle is most overlooked within existing academic approaches and embodies the failure of the Palestinian national leadership to project an inclusive liberation strategy with plausibility for East Jerusalem Palestinians.

Importantly, it also signals the rejection by this constituency of any future settlement, negotiated on their behalf, by a leadership with no mandate to represent them, that surrenders their existing rights and freedoms under de facto Israeli rule in exchange for a quasi-state that falls far short of both their personal and their national aspirations. In this sense, the struggle denies Palestinian Authority legitimacy in East Jerusalem and manifests the rejection by residents of any strategy that seeks to bring East Jerusalem Palestinians under the jurisdiction of the leadership in Ramallah.

This component of Palestinian struggle in East Jerusalem also centres around the efforts of residents to maintain their current status within the Israeli state. The reasons for this are worthy of further exploration. Health care and social security are frequently lauded as the perquisites of Israeli residency but, as noted in Chapter IV, these are services for which East Jerusalem residents pay amply. A more compelling factor is the preference expressed by many Palestinian residents for what might broadly be described as the Israeli *modus operandi*, or what is locally referred to as Israeli *nizam*, or organisation. Cognisant of the discriminatory and often exceptional application of Israeli laws and regulations to East Jerusalem detailed in Chapter V, none the less Palestinian residents frequently express their respect for Israeli organisation and value the rights and freedoms that the society offers them. Sara explained: “The Palestinian government don’t care about the people, in contrast to the Israeli government. Everything they care about is the people. They don’t treat us as Israelis, but in the end if I am a Palestinian in the West Bank, I will not have the same good treatment there that I have here, now, from the Israel government. The Israeli government works in a right way.”

Aisha is equally clear that she would not exchange her existing rights as a resident of Israel for a future, in Jerusalem, under the Palestinian Authority. “Staying with the Jewish is much better. Sorry for that, yanee. We say that not because we love them, but because we see what’s happened in Ramallah. Palestinians have Ramallah, the Surta [Palestinian Authority] has it, but we see what’s happened in the West Bank. The life, the society. Everything. The Jewish are much more organised. The system, the life is much better here. This is because we have Abbas in Ramallah.”

As residents of the Israeli state, East Jerusalem Palestinians also retain access to all of historic Palestine and this freedom of movement was a recurring factor in the statements made by interviewees. It also preserves a vision of national liberation that has been abandoned by the Palestinian national leadership. Saha was clear that she would never accept a two-state solution with a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. "Palestine is not only Jerusalem and the West Bank. Palestine is all of Palestine... I want to see Jerusalem without Israelis, without restrictions, all the people can go to Jerusalem, but I want some restrictions from the Palestinians themselves... I want Jerusalem exactly how it is now, but without Israelis. I want the system here but without Israelis... but the Palestinians don't like systems... In the end, they [the Israelis] will leave, but when they will leave I don't know... realistically, I think the situation will not change in the next ten, twenty or thirty years, you know. I think the situations and the systems [in Jerusalem] now maybe they will be suitable for my son more than [life under] the Palestinian Authority. This situation will be better for my child, from an educational status, from a medical status, from a financial status. From many sides, this situation now may be best for my children."

Suad is a widow in her mid-fifties. She was born and raised in East Jerusalem and retains her blue Israeli-issued identity card, despite the fact that she has lived in the West Bank for almost three decades. Her husband was a West Banker and her grown-up children have only Palestinian Authority ID's. Suad's second son was martyred almost two decades ago after Israeli soldiers came to her West Bank home to arrest him and he was shot attempting to flee. His younger brother, then only a teenager, was arrested and spent much of the following decade in an Israeli prison. Suad is deeply religious and her status as the mother of a martyr

is one that she and those in her community take very seriously. She has strong political views and does not try to hide her loathing of Israel. None the less, she is clear that if her hand was forced and she had to choose between her life in the West Bank and retaining her Jerusalem ID, she would not hesitate to move back to Jerusalem.

Suad's attachment to Jerusalem is in part a religious one, but she also laughs nervously as she tells me that she would rather live with the Jews than under the Palestinian Authority. "The Palestinians, Abbas and those like him, are worse than the Jews." She would even take an Israeli passport if that was what was required to remain in the city. "No, it's not haram. For sure they will never see me as equal to them, but I will take it just to come and go easily. May I could travel abroad. It will be difficult to live in Jerusalem just because of my children [who do not have permission to visit Jerusalem], but my soul is here." She would also like to understand and speak Hebrew better and is planning to study it online. We must speak their language to understand everything, she says.

In any future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Suad is also clear that she would reject a two-state solution in which East Jerusalem came under the power of the Palestinian Authority. If there is to be two states, she would choose to be in Jerusalem under Israeli leadership, not Palestinian. With a different leader in Ramallah, she says, perhaps she would change her mind, a Hamas leader, for example, but under Abbas and his kind, she would rather stay with the Jewish. "Life before the first intifada was better than this. Anything is better than the situation now. We used to have lots of Israelis come and visit our home. My father had so many Israeli friends. Every Friday we would go to visit someone. In the past, there was more communication between Jews and

Palestinians. We need like a ceasefire where things go back to how they were. It won't be a permanent solution, nobody would accept it, we cannot allow ourselves to become like the Israelis, Muslims but Israelis, but my children used to be able to come with me to Jerusalem, to visit their family here, to pray at al-Aqsa. Now I must come alone and if I want to live in Jerusalem I must live alone.”

Like many other East Jerusalem Palestinians, Suad wishes for a return to the relative freedom of the pre-first intifada period. As discussed in Chapter IV, however, this nostalgia must be located within the context of Israel's preponderant power and the hegemonisation of Palestinian political horizons by the state. Moreover, Suad's sacrifice is recognised across the Palestinian political spectrum and she retains oppositional authenticity when she draws on positive aspects of the occupation regime (particularly in relation to their own, Jewish constituents) to critique the Palestinian leadership.

In this sense, the Palestinian experience in East Jerusalem is informing the position that residents take on internal Palestinian struggles and at the same time reinforcing the structures of power in which they operate in the annexed city. Their resistance to the encroachment of Palestinian Authority influence in East Jerusalem is leading them into closer relationships with the Israeli state and its institutions, in an effort to consolidate their position within existing power structures in a moment of joint production (Holland, 2001).

3.3 The Struggle For “Normal Life”

Lastly, I argue that East Jerusalem Palestinians are also struggling in a broader sense to achieve a 'normal life' in East Jerusalem despite (and in large part due to) their political and spatial dislocation on the one hand, and the oppressive

policies of the Israeli state on the other. Distanced from both state projects, East Jerusalem Palestinians are doubly marginalised. While the first two modes of Palestinian struggle make clear that there remains much to struggle *against*, the absence of an inclusive Palestinian political/liberation strategy with meaning for East Jerusalem residents, combined with the effective criminalisation of Palestinian nationalist activity in the city, ensure that East Jerusalemites find very little to struggle *for*. As Dr Sharif explained, there is no revolution in Jerusalem, no great struggle. Residents will continue to fight for their right to remain in the city, but beyond that, the doctor asked, what is there to struggle for? Certainly not for what they have in the West Bank was his frank conclusion.

Tamari (2013) has explored the evolving usage and meanings of normalcy or normality, terms that he uses interchangeably to describe the routinization of everyday life and a “negation of violence and yearning for order in daily life” (Tamari, 2013:48). In East Jerusalem, I suggest that the struggle for peace with Israel is abandoned or postponed and has been replaced by an individualised struggle for a ‘peaceful’ life for oneself and family. As Summa explained, most East Jerusalem Palestinians want to live in peace. Not peace with the Israelis though, she was quick to add, but “peace with themselves. To have a family, to work on the Israeli side and take home a respectable salary, to have a house, a car, children, to live in peace.”

During the ‘affirmation of life’ period, the search for normal life implied resistance and an anti-normalisation stance; “that is, living a normal life was seen as the *sine qua non* of resisting Israeli rule” (Tamari, 2013: 59). In the late post-Oslo period, this ambition is less imbued with nationalist qualities and reflects a much more atomised response to the collective problems faced by East Jerusalem

residents. 'Peace' is not only elusive; it is also problematic in the sense that Palestinian attitudes and aspirations on the ground in East Jerusalem are not represented at a discursive level.

Palestinian residents are increasingly looking for ways to minimise the extent to which the occupation encroaches on their everyday life. While observant Muslim women are easily identified by their clothing, Osama explained that he and many other he knows are actively seeking to look "less Arab" when moving around East Jerusalem and into Jewish space, in an effort to avoid encounters with Israeli police. Bauman (2015) notes that Palestinians who commute to work through Arab areas by bicycle risk being mistaken for Jews since cycling is perceived to be an unusual activity for Palestinians. Similarly, Osama says that when he needs to travel through Israeli space, he often travels by bicycle, since he is less likely to be considered Arab and stopped by police in this way. Since 2014, he says, his younger friends are consciously wearing Israeli fashions and popular Israeli hairstyles in an effort to look less Palestinian.

There are other, more tangible manifestations of this attempt to normalise life under occupation. Like George, East Jerusalem residents are increasingly willing to move into Jewish neighbourhoods in search of a better quality of life, better facilities and more privacy (Baumann, 2016, Yacobi and Pullan, 2014). As demonstrated in Chapter IV, Palestinians in the city are avoiding non-essential journeys through checkpoints and across the barrier in order to avoid the delays and humiliations that these often entail. In this sense, the desire for normality is not synonymous with a willingness to normalise relations with Israel, but it is indicative of the absence of a relevant resistance discourse. Tamari suggests that the decisive moment in the conflict discourse between normality and resistance

was construction of the separation Barrier. “The conditions of creating normalcy for the Israeli public, through a regime of segregation and insularity, was predicated on making life abnormal for Palestinians through a system of separation, confinement, and control. In this process, the vocabulary of coexistence and of normalcy itself has been subverted and trivialised” (Tamari, 2013: 59). Tamari is correct that normality for Israelis has been sought at the expense of that available to Palestinians. The data collected here, however, suggests that Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are also adapting to the regime of insularity imposed on the city by the Barrier to achieve a more normal life.

3.4 Summary

Grossberg suggests “rearticulating the question of identity into a question about the possibility of constructing historical agency and giving up notions of resistance that assume a subject standing entirely outside and against a well-established structure of power” (Grossberg, 1996). Following Foucault’s assertion that resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power, I argue in this thesis that identity and struggle are negotiated vis-à-vis power structures and the opportunities for agency. In East Jerusalem, the possibilities for resistance to Israeli occupation are limited not only by Israel’s hegemonic presence in the city, but also by the absence of a plausible Palestinian liberation discourse and, more importantly, the rejection by Palestinian residents of the national leadership which gives them grounds for ambivalence towards Israeli rule.

The space of resistance is constructed within complex power relations and the struggles undertaken by East Jerusalem Palestinians must be viewed within the

context of existing power structures and the points of convergence as well as contestation between them and the occupation regime.

4 Potential Futures

East Jerusalem's altered political landscape has implications for Palestinian identity and struggle in the city which I have begun to explore above. New understandings of what it means to be Palestinian are evident and how residents relate to both the Palestinian leadership and to the occupation regime has changed. The disruption of identities compels the subject to act and to assert their subjectivity in new ways. While dominant articulations of Palestinian identity have taken place around the nodal point of 'occupation' since 1967, this signifier has lost or changed meaning for this constituency as the likelihood of a Palestinian capital in the city recedes and the prospect of Palestinian Authority rule loses its appeal.

The new political geography evident in many contemporary cities, characterised by 'gray spacing' and the proliferation of informalities, is recreating subjectivities among excluded groups and distancing identities and mobilisations from the centre of power (Yiftachel, 2009a). While the critical literature offers various concepts to account for the assimilation of subaltern populations, Yiftachel recognises that these "fall short of explaining the development of group relations and collective subjectivities, in colonial settings, where subaltern groups are often cast as too different, too hostile or too geographically distinct, to be included within the limits of societal hegemonic projects" (Yiftachel, 2009a: 255).

The dislocation of East Jerusalem Palestinians on the one hand, and their permanent exclusion on the other, make these situations particularly acute. Most recently, it seems that East Jerusalemites, between two centres of power and

distanced from both, are using the shrunken space in which a modicum of self-direction is possible to improve their material prospects through and within existing power structures. It is uncertain how long this situation can or will last, but the alternatives are worthy of exploration.

In this section I consider possible futures for Palestinian subjectivity and mobilisation in East Jerusalem, grounded in current academic trends and in the data collected. First, I consider the self-nationalisation argument put forward by Jean-Klein in relation to the first intifada and ask if this has any relevance for the post-Oslo period. In what sense might the rearticulation of Palestinian identity at the political periphery, described above, influence identity at the centre and how could this impact future relations and mobilisations. Second, I highlight the growing interest in the Right to the City concept and assess the potential for an urban rights discourse in East Jerusalem that recognises the distance of residents from both centres of power and the possible emergence of a particularly local identity. Finally, I consider the relationship between oppression and radicalisation and address the potential for radical mobilisations in East Jerusalem, in particular relating to al-Aqsa mosque.

4.1 Shaping Palestinian Identity from the Political Periphery

Jean-Klein's essay on the first intifada addresses the scholarly denial of authentic nationalist production in everyday life, where it is assumed that nationalism is acted out, but never initiated or co-authored. While resistance studies concentrate on locating authentic forms of political activism and transformative agency in everyday life, similar investigations into everyday nationalism focus on the fundamental inauthenticity of these practices. For Jean-Klein, the message of these studies is that practices of nationalism in everyday life are nothing more

than “enactments of values and ideas manufactured and manipulated by political centres” (Jean-Klein, 2001).

Challenging the assumption that everyday political acts are by definition subaltern and oppositional, Jean-Klein argues that agency at the everyday level can have multiple objectives and effects and can be both oppositional and hegemonising. Thus, she concludes that the Palestinian practice of suspending everyday life was a form of domestic self-nationalisation as well as a form of resistance, that had hegemonic as well as liberatory overtones. This calls for a readiness to recognise everyday performances as influential in the collective production of identity and in the production of national subjectivities.

Self-nationalisation, Jean-Klein argues, is a “process wherein ordinary persons fashion *themselves* into nationalised subjects, using distinctive narrative actions and embodied practices that are woven into the practices of everyday life.” The self-nationalisation of Palestinians during the first intifada, therefore, was “nationalist as well as resistant, hegemonic as well as subaltern, and everyday as well as orchestrated. It complemented organised efforts and in some way acted alongside them, yet it was a self-initiative that was not attributable in any simple way to formally organised national centres.”

What does Jean-Klein’s study of everyday self-nationalisation offer our understanding of agency and subjectivity in East Jerusalem? At the start of this chapter I noted that essentialised identities are favoured by mainstream nationalist Palestinian discourses emanating from the political centre (Sherwell, 2006). Having established the disconnect of East Jerusalem Palestinians from the dominant nationalist narrative, however, I suggest here that East Jerusalem Palestinians, distanced from the political centre, are able to step back from the

essentialising discourses manufactured there and shape their own subjectivity and struggle. Certainly, East Jerusalem residents enjoy greater freedom than Palestinians elsewhere in the occupied territories to express their rejection of the Palestinian Authority and their dissent from the nationalist discourse. While they do not necessarily enjoy similar freedoms in relation to their rejection of occupation, none the less their 'outsider' status with regard to the occupied territories affords them a perspective and a position unavailable to Palestinians in the West Bank.

While East Jerusalem Palestinians may appear apathetic from a top-down perspective, it is possible that their self-nationalisation could have a significant impact on intra Palestinian politics and identity. The fact that East Jerusalemites continue to identify as Palestinian despite their dislocation and the colonial pressures acting upon them, is potentially destabilising Palestinian identity and shaping it from the political periphery by contrast with the essentialised identity expounded by the political centre.

4.2 An urban rights discourse?

While I made the case above that a unique 'East Jerusalem Palestinian' identity is not evident, in this section I consider the opportunities for Palestinian mobilisation around their municipal rights. Distanced from both the Palestinian and Israeli state projects, there is growing academic and civil society interest in the potential rallying of East Jerusalem residents around an urban right discourse or the increasingly popular concept of the 'Right to the City.' One aspect of this argument focuses on Palestinian non-participation in Jerusalem's municipal politics and the potential improvement in Palestinian living conditions and urban

rights that might be brought about by their involvement. The ICG's 2012 report on East Jerusalem questions the continued wisdom of the "default Palestinian strategy, strongly urged by the leadership... to boycott all voluntary contact with the Jerusalem municipality." While this policy made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, the ICG argues, today this boycott is "a product of inertia" rather than deliberation and is now little more than "a symbolic form of politics that covers for what in fact is an absence of politics" (ICG, 2012: 29). The report concludes that a range of options exist that "potentially would enable Jerusalemites to command better services and therefore improve their living conditions – thereby augmenting their staying power in the city and not submitting to difficult conditions and fleeing – in addition to re-establishing some sense of political community" (ICG, 2012: 30).

The ICG makes a strong argument, grounded in the realities of the East Jerusalem's political dislocation. Its recommendation for greater voluntary participation in municipal politics, however, is deeply contentious. Dumper, for example, underlines the significant strategic costs to the Palestinian community of formal engagement with the municipality. Palestinian participation in Israeli municipal elections and the potential election of Palestinian representatives, he argues, "would both cast a mantle of normality over the occupation of East Jerusalem and also loosen the ties which connect East Jerusalem to the West Bank and Gaza even further" (Dumper, 2013b).

On the other hand, Yousef (2011) suggests that a generation of young East Jerusalem Palestinians is already emerging whose members have earned Israeli professional qualifications, who understand their rights vis-à-vis the municipality, speak better Hebrew than their parents and are confident in their interactions with

the Israeli authorities. Excluded from both Israeli and Palestinian politics at the national level, the daily urban struggle has taken on greater significance for this generation, who are starting to demand their urban rights and the services for which they pay heavily. These Palestinians “do not look at participation in the municipal elections as a form of normalisation that grants legitimacy to the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. On the contrary, they re-frame it as a narrative of resistance” (Yousef, 2011: 50). Yousef argues that the political and spatial reality in East Jerusalem is generating new challenges of Palestinian residents for whom “improving living conditions is becoming a vital necessity for a vibrant Palestinian presence in Jerusalem.”

Regardless of the merits or otherwise of such a perspective, there appears as yet to be little firm data to support it. While many younger East Jerusalem Palestinians appear through their everyday actions and choices to be redefining the limits of acceptable engagement or participation, far fewer recognise the relevance of municipal politics or are willing to vote in Israeli municipal elections. While the incumbent Nir Barkat won 46.9% of the Palestinian vote in 2013’s mayoral elections - 90% higher than the Palestinian vote he received in 2008 – Palestinian voter turnout of only 0.7% meant that Barkat in fact received only a 0.3% of the total eligible Palestinian vote. Of 157,382 eligible Palestinian voters in East Jerusalem, a total of only 1,101 turned out in 2013 (Seidemann, 2014). Despite the potential gains of widespread participation, East Jerusalem Palestinians do not, on the whole, vote in local Israeli elections.

While voter turnout in Jerusalem’s 2013 municipal election was poor overall (with only 36% turnout among all eligible voters, 7.2% lower than in 2008), the reasons for such minimal Palestinian participation are complex and largely beyond the

scope of this thesis. Based on the data collected here, however, I would argue that it is far too simplistic to continue to portray Palestinian non-participation in Israeli municipal elections as an unambiguous politically-motivated boycott. While the official Palestinian position remains that participation in Israeli municipal elections would not be in the Palestinian national interest and a political boycott may historically explain low Palestinian participation, a ground level perspective indicates that not all residents actually frame their non-participation in municipal politics as politically motivated.

While only one interviewee admitted that he had previously participated in Israeli municipal elections (and then only once), more than half of participants in this study said they were unaware of their eligibility to vote in Israeli municipal elections. By the end of our conversations and despite my attempts to persuade them otherwise, many interviewees remained adamant that as residents of Israel, as opposed to citizens, they were ineligible to vote in municipal elections. Those I was able to convince received the news with clear surprise. Notwithstanding these differences, respondents were unanimous that there was no point in a Palestinian voting in Israeli municipal elections. Osama explained:

“Okay, maybe we can, vote, but why? Why would I vote? Do you think they would allow the municipality to be full of Palestinians? Do you think that anyone we vote for can change anything for us? Maybe if it would make any difference I would vote, maybe not. But I know it is a waste of time. Nothing can change here, so why do it?”

Within a top-down analytic framework, Palestinian non-participation in Israeli municipal elections lends credibility the sense of a united Palestinian position against Israeli domination in East Jerusalem and an official boycott that finds

support at grassroots level. From a ground level perspective, however, the view is quite different. Certainly, few East Jerusalem residents wish to confer legitimacy on a system in which their participation is considered pointless. The crucial factor here, however, appears to be the perceived futility of participation by Palestinians when they recognise that their exclusion is an inherent feature of the structure. Unfamiliarity with their rights as Israeli residents in some cases, combines with extreme apathy arising from the sense that nothing can change. This may constitute a boycott of sorts, but it is not indicative of a politically principled abstention arising from a collective rejection of the regime.

Critical urban theorists are developing the Lefebvrian concept of the Right to the City as an exigent demand by the oppressed and alienated for a just and equitable urban space (Marcuse, 2009). Alkhalili et al. (2014) ask how applicable the concepts expressed in 'the right to the city' are in "a context of territorial occupation where the elements of space and citizenship are in constant alteration?" (Alkhalili et al., 2014: 259). In the context of East Jerusalem's peripheral neighbourhoods, such as Kufr 'Aqab, the authors are sceptical that a space of such lawlessness and continuous abuse of power could be a place in which residents were empowered to claim their right to the city. Yacobi also asks if it is possible "to establish a liberating urban project within a planning and civil system that operates under an ethnocentric national logic" (Yacobi, 2009: 108), concluding that "conflict and struggle for the right to the city are phenomena inherent in the production of urban space" (ibid: 116). Yiftachel draws on the concept, but takes it further, arguing that "the right to the city should be buttressed by more materialised and politicised notions such as 'planning citizenship', urban sovereignty and group's self-determination" (Yiftachel, 2009b). Recognising the planning process as a powerful governing tool with which the authorities can

“legalise, criminalise, incorporate or evict (Yiftachel, 2009b: 96), Yiftachel argues that to have any value the right to the city must “respond to the very material deprivations and exclusions experienced in gray space, against which a rights-based approach may not suffice” (Yiftachel, 2009a).

4.3 Radicalisation and Insurgent Identities

Adopting a neo-Gramscian inspired approach, Yiftachel argues that new mobilisations and insurgent identities are articulated when marginalised groups resist subordination and oppression. Conceptualising the process of radicalising identities as “oscillating between *agonism* (the articulation of difference within the leading value system) and *antagonism* (the articulation of difference outside the main value system)” he claims that “when marginalised groups become politically aware of the impregnable barriers to their equality and inclusion, and when they can marshal enough resources to act, their agonistic opposition is likely to shift to antagonistic radicalism” (Yiftachel, 2009a: 254).

This links to Yiftachel’s call for a revised critical urban theory that recognises the development of new subjectivities within colonial situations in which excluded groups are beyond the intended reach of the society’s hegemonic project. In such cases, it is not the intention of elites to assimilate minorities (or ‘governmentalise’ them), but to sustain their exclusion through gray spacing and informality, while subjecting them to delegitimising, derogatory and criminalising discourses and violence (Yiftachel, 2009a, Yiftachel, 2009b). However, “communities subject to ‘gray spacing’ are far from powerless recipients of urban policies, as they generate new mobilisations and insurgent identities” (Yiftachel, 2009a:25) and “use their territorial and/or political exclusion to develop a strong sense of identity and mobilise persistent struggles” (Yiftachel, 2009b: 96). In this sense,

communities which become aware of their permanent, structural exclusion, can be expected to undergo a “gradual, yet conspicuous process of radicalisation” (Yiftachel, 2009: 256).

I have argued above that Palestinian subjectivities in East Jerusalem are being recreated in response to the circumstances of dislocation and domination in the city in the post-Oslo period. How evident is it, however, that these identities and their attendant mobilisations are radicalising? The upsurge in violent acts against Israelis in Jerusalem from mid-2014 has not materialised into a full-blown intifada as many observers anticipated. It has, however, challenged perceptions of East Jerusalem residents as passive and detached from the national struggle. More importantly, it hints at the sense of injustice and frustration experienced by residents. However, the absence of leadership or coordination behind these attacks also reflects the atomisation of this constituency and the failure of the national leadership to project a plausible national liberation strategy.

In this sense, Yiftachel’s distinction between counter-hegemonic and anti-hegemonic radicalisation is helpful. Inside Israel, he argues, “Bedouin radicalisation appears more as *anti-*, than *counter-*hegemonic, principally because this peripheral community has no ability to imagine challenging, let alone replacing, state hegemony.” Certainly, the sporadic and disorganised nature of violent Palestinian ‘resistance’ in the post-Oslo period suggests that this too is more anti- than counter-hegemonic as a consequence of this constituency’s inability to imagine genuinely challenging the state’s authority.

Thrall (2014) argues that what the rise in protests and violent attacks since mid-2014 most closely resembles is not the first or second intifadas “but the surge in

uncoordinated, leaderless violence that preceded the outbreak of the First Intifada.” Tamari (2013) describes a dramatic rise in the mid-1980s in knife attacks perpetrated by politically-unaffiliated militant youths against Israeli settlers and business interests in Palestinian urban centres. “This campaign,” he claims, “was the enraged, raw violence of a subdued and disarmed society” (Tamari, 2013: 52).

Thrall draws a number of comparisons between the knife campaign of the late 1980s and that of 2014 onwards. “Then, as now, such violence was blamed wrongly on the PLO leadership. Then, as now, that leadership appeared defeated and in decline. The PLO had been ousted from Lebanon, Israeli settlements were expanding, and Palestinians didn’t see how their leaders could achieve the national movement’s goals. As in 2006, local nationalist leaders in the West Bank came to power in 1976 in elections whose results Israeli sought to undo. These legitimate leaders were toppled and deported, and more compliant, unelected figures were put in their place. Then, as now, with no organised leadership in the West Bank and Gaza offering a clear strategy of national liberation, sporadic assaults on Israelis, not attributable to any political faction, were on the increase.”

The crucial difference between the mid-1980s and 2014-2015, Thrall concludes elsewhere, is that “Palestinian civil society had become much weaker, and so, too, had the likelihood of coherent political organisation of the kind that emerged soon after the First Intifada began. The groups that were active then have been supplanted, either by the institutions of a Palestinian Authority whose existence is premised on close cooperation with Israel, or by NGOs whose foreign funders make assistance conditional on the pursuit of apolitical projects or vague peace-building strategies” (Thrall, 2017: 155-6).

The collapse of Palestinian leadership and institutions in East Jerusalem has significant impact on the mobilising potential of this constituency. However, East Jerusalem residents also face an additional complication, rooted in their dual marginality. In the absence of a credible liberation discourse, and more inclined to protect and preserve their current status inside Israel than to give support to a Palestinian national project from which they are excluded, the position assumed by residents in relation to one naturally informs their attitude towards the other.

Palestinian Jerusalemites are constantly negotiating their sense of agency vis-à-vis Israel's hegemonic reach in the city and their rejection of the Palestinian Authority. The reignition of tensions in 2014 amply demonstrated this process. The prolonged period of instability that followed gave pause to those who might argue that East Jerusalemites have abandoned the national struggle, but in the opinion of most commentators, there was no organised political involvement, stemming instead "precisely from the absence of Palestinian political leadership, unified or otherwise" (Thrall, 2014). Certainly, there is little to suggest that Palestinian acts of resistance today manifest any commitment to the PA's resistance paradigm. A close associate of President Abbas, former Religious Affairs Minister Mahmoud al-Habash, was roughly attacked by crowds of worshipers at the Aqsa mosque in late June 2014. Analysts described it as an internal Fatah attack on the presidency of Mahmud Abbas as well as a broader demonstration of the dissatisfaction of East Jerusalem Palestinians with the national leadership. In a further demonstration of East Jerusalemite anger, a PA governor was shouted out of the mourning tent of the family of the murdered Palestinian boy Muhammad Abu Khdeir the following month. East Jerusalem has witnessed sustained unrest since June 2014, but the failure of this anger to

translate into organised popular resistance reflects the absence of leadership in East Jerusalem.

4.3.1 Mobilisation around al-Aqsa

Even those studies which emphasise the acquiescence of East Jerusalem Palestinians to Israeli rule, their political passivity in the post Oslo period or the absence of leadership in the city, recognise the political and religious symbolism of the Haram al-Sharif and the potentially incendiary dimension that the perception of interference by Israel adds to the conflict. Thus, Cohen notes that “if indeed passivity is the central characteristic of political life in East Jerusalem, al-Haram al-Sharif is the exception” (Cohen, 2011: 71). It’s sanctity, he claims, is able to mobilise even those who seek otherwise to avoid political confrontation.

In the context of modern Burma (Myanmar), Thawngmung (2011) argues that religious spaces provide a platform to subvert legal restrictions on associational activity, leading marginalised communities to capitalise on exemptions for groups with purely religious functions and to open their places of worship to clan associations and educational services. “Quotidian efforts to negotiate official legal barriers are significant forms of politics because they bring to view complex aspects of social life and legal manoeuvres typically occluded by macro-political concerns” (Thawngmung, 2011).

While the space offered by the Haram has been used for political mobilisation, the shared sanctity of the site itself between Israelis and Muslim Palestinians adds an additionally incendiary dimension to any perceived transgression of the

status quo.⁵⁵ Larkin and Dumper (2012) explore the growing politicisation of al-Aqsa compound within the broader context of Israel's Judaisation project in East Jerusalem and as "a dynamic symbol and site of Israeli-Zionist domination and Palestinian-Muslim resistance." The vacuum created by the collapse of secular Palestinian political authority in East Jerusalem is increasingly filled by an "emphasis on 'sacred resistance' and Islamic discourses as a means of protecting the Palestinian presence and their rights within the city." The authors focus in particular on the emergence of the Islamic Movement in Israel's Northern Branch as a key actor in East Jerusalem, which has employed al-Aqsa as a symbol of political empowerment and a focus for religious renewal.⁵⁶

The ICG's 2012 report on East Jerusalem offers four reasons for the growing significance of al-Haram in the politics of the city. In addition to the exploitation of the site for political gain by individual politicians such as Islamic Movement in Israel's Northern Branch leader Shaykh Raed Salah, the authors identify the Aqsa complex as one of the few venues where Palestinians can gather in significant numbers and where they retain a degree of control. With Jewish Temple Mount activism on the increase, they also regard Muslims in the city as reacting to a perceived threat, while finally "controversial archaeological and restoration works conducted by Israel around the Esplanade, and by the Jordanian Waqf on it, have fuelled tensions" (ICG, 2012: 15).

⁵⁵ For a full explanation and history of the status quo, see DUMPER, M. 1997. *The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967*, New York, Columbia University Press; DUMPER, M. 2002. *The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict*, Lynne Rienner Publishers; ICG 2015. *The Status of the Status Quo at Jerusalem's Holy Esplanade*. Jerusalem/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

⁵⁶ Shaykh Raed's subsequent arrest and imprisonment by Israel defused rising tensions to some extent.

The ICG report emphasises the individual dimension of the religious duty to protect al-Aqsa and this reflects the findings of my own research. It is not uncommon for Palestinian residents to prioritise their religious affiliation before their national identity when asked to consider their sense of self. This is unsurprising, particularly in a city such as Jerusalem in which religion occupies such a central position and where both Christians and Muslims, in divergent ways, feel that their connection to the city is under threat. Both religious and national identity here invest the individual's connection to Jerusalem with a significance that elevates it beyond a simple local identity. All of the Muslims interviewed in the course of this study expressed their commitment to protect the Haram from perceived threats from Israel. Most believed that these threats were real and were sceptical that they might be used by one or both sides to serve their political ends. Equally, however, participants were clear in their own minds that this was a religious duty; the overlap with sites of political contestation was obvious, but not the mobilising potential was strongly religious.

The ICG (2015) report on the status quo at Jerusalem's holy esplanade rightly notes that "there is no quicker path to major conflagration than violence there" (ICG, 2015: i) and this was amply demonstrated by upsurge in public protest in East Jerusalem surrounding the installation of metal detectors at an entrance to the Haram al-Sharif in 2017. The sense of closure to these protests, however, once the Israeli authorities were perceived to have conceded to their demands, supports the disconnection between this struggle and the nationalist one. On the one hand, there was no leadership in place to re-channel the momentum achieved once the immediate objectives had been achieved; on the other hand, neither was there a cause to harness it to. Between both state projects, East

Jerusalem residents appear broadly convinced that there is currently nothing worth struggling for that improves on what they have now.

5 Conclusion

In chapters IV and V, I highlighted the dual marginality of East Jerusalem Palestinians, described how residents are adapting to the new political landscape and shed light on the way in which they frame their actions. Together these factors shape the site of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem. In this chapter, I set out to explore this space and to investigate the ways in which it is influencing Palestinian subjectivities and struggle in the city.

First, I drew attention to the assumptions which underpin existing approaches to East Jerusalem and how these limit our understanding of the everyday, where subjectivities are created. Next, I outlined a discourse theoretical approach to identity construction and applied this to the data collected from East Jerusalem. I concluded that residents continue to identify as Palestinian, but that they are reshaping the composition of that identity from below in ways that are not necessarily recognisable to other Palestinians as similar to their own. Next, I discussed how Palestinian resistance in the city is also adapting to the dislocated environment, outlining three modes of struggle which reflect the multiple subject positions occupied by East Jerusalemites and the way in which they inform each other. Finally, I addressed some of the most popularly cited futures for Palestinian identity and mobilisation, concluding that East Jerusalem residents lack a plausible national liberation discourse which makes their struggle – and the sacrifice of their existing status – worthwhile.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

I began this thesis by recognising the divergent political trajectory of East Jerusalem Palestinians who live as residents, but not full citizens, inside Israel's de facto borders, beyond the reach of the Palestinian Authority. The PLO's decision to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel disrupted the discursive structures through which Palestinian identity had been constructed since 1967 while the concessions it was willing to make on the issue of East Jerusalem established the city on a tangential path that distanced residents from the political leadership in the West Bank and from the Palestinian milieu.

I made the case that the East Jerusalem constituency is doubly marginalised, first as a result of its dislocation from the occupied territories, then as an excluded minority, inside the politics and economy of the Israeli state but permanently positioned outside the intended reach of the national project. I found that dislocation from the occupied territories has contributed to the reorientation of Palestinian subjectivities away from the Palestinian centre towards inclusion in Israel, but that even Palestinian residents who seek to improve their lives and livelihoods within the context of Israeli domination, are confronted by structural barriers and everyday manifestations of their otherness and exclusion.

Within this context, I set out to address the opportunities for Palestinian agency in the city, the way in which identity is constructed and the potential for mobilisation. I asked how these factors are shaping the site of Palestinian identity construction in East Jerusalem and explored, within this space, how residents are adapting their subjectivity and struggle. I made the case that dislocation and

domination are engendering a particular sense of what it means to be Palestinian in East Jerusalem that corresponds to this experience. While East Jerusalem residents continue to identify themselves within the nationalist lexicon, the everyday practices through which individual residents enact their agency are redefining *from below* - rather than from the political centre - what it is to be Palestinian in East Jerusalem, in a process that demonstrates this constituency's distance from the essentialised identities privileged by mainstream studies. I suggested that the bottom-up approach undertaken here makes visible this phenomenon, which is generally obscured within a top down analytic optic in which the praxis of everyday life is interpreted from a binarized perspective that objectifies antagonism and anticipates resistance.

In Chapter IV, I make clear the physical and political dislocation of East Jerusalem residents from the West Bank and discussed the implications of this liminality for Palestinians in the city. I argued that East Jerusalem residents no longer experience the occupation as temporary and that few can imagine challenging, let alone replacing Israeli hegemony. I made clear that residents are increasingly ambivalent towards Israeli rule, in large part connected to their disconnection from and disillusionment with the Palestinian political leadership. In this context, I make the original argument that East Jerusalem residents are pursuing individualised 'improvement of life' tactics which reflect the contracting space in which their agency is meaningful.

In Chapter V, I addressed the other side of the East Jerusalem constituency's dual marginality, this time as an excluded minority within the Israeli state. Even residents who seek to improve their prospects within existing structures of power in the city, find that the 'normal life' they seek is outside their reach. First, I located

Palestinian exclusion at a structural level, emphasising how East Jerusalem residents are trapped by the ethnocratic regime between territorial inclusion and political alienation. Next, I described how Israel uses informality and exclusionary strategies to reinforce the otherness of Palestinians inside the state and further its colonial objectives.

Finally, in Chapter VI, I outlined a robustly anti-essentialist conception of identity construction to consider the ways in which power shapes the opportunities for Palestinian agency in the city and how residents are adapting their subjectivity and struggle to long term occupation. I problematised three of the main assumptions which underpin existing analytic approaches to East Jerusalem and set out how discourse theory can be applied to shed light on the emergence of new political subjectivities and the process of identity construction within the context of discursive dislocation. I found that the actions of residents in the city make visible the emergence of new subjectivities that are distanced from both the Palestinian political leadership and from the mainstream nationalist discourses on which existing academic approaches to conflict resolution are based.

1 Theoretical Implications

Throughout this thesis, I have drawn on a range of critical theories, in particular the theoretical contours of discourse theory, to examine the impact of dislocation and domination on Palestinian subjectivities in East Jerusalem. Adopting a qualitative, bottom-up approach, I have tried to make visible the way in which dominant discursive articulations of Israeli-Palestinian relations depend on binary distinctions which essentialise identities on both side, objectify antagonism and anticipate resistance.

The discourse theoretical approach does not anticipate my findings, but is intended to compliment them and to ground them within an analytic framework that emphasises how new interpretations of phenomena are possible when we make visible the assumptions that underpin dominant approaches. Every view is the view from somewhere, and the ground level perspective I have offered here is simply one more among many. I argue, however, that it is an under-explored position that has much to add to our existing understanding of East Jerusalem.

The ground-level, bottom-up approach adopted here is compatible with discourse theory in that this theory is 'problem' driven, rather than 'theory' driven and is best used to shed light on a problem that is specified independently of the theory.

In one way, the emergence of a particular sense of what it is to be Palestinian, rooted in the specific experience of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, simply adds one more to the many 'Palestines' described by Bowman (see Chapter VI). On the other hand, Jerusalem's unique significance to the ethno-nationalist project of both sides makes an exploration of this specific manifestation of Palestinian identity particularly relevant. Since the theoretical conception of identity construction on which I rely emphasises the ultimate contingency and fluidity of identities, however, I must also emphasise here that while this thesis highlights an ongoing process of identity construction in East Jerusalem, that is resulting in subjectivities which distance Palestinian residents from the occupied territories, this is of course vulnerable to external factors and is not static. Indeed, while residents were openly ambivalent towards Israeli rule, this attitude is very much related to the absence of a credible, plausible Palestinian alternative. The emergence of such a force will have a potentially dislocatory effect on processes of identity construction in the city.

2 Political Implications

I have made the case here that the view from the ground is an under-explored perspective in the existing literature on East Jerusalem and I hope that I have gone some way towards addressing this gap. I also suggest that a bottom-up approach to the impact of geopolitical processes sheds light on the distance that has emerged between the nationalist discourse espoused in Ramallah and the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem whose quotidian experience locates them squarely within Israeli power structures.

Israel and the international community recognise the Palestinian Authority as the only body with legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people, but the PA is prevented by the terms of the Oslo Accords and by Israeli law from operating in East Jerusalem or extending its jurisdiction there⁵⁷. East Jerusalem Palestinians are permitted to vote in Palestinian legislative elections, but in 2006 their democratically elected representatives were jailed by the State of Israel and their residency rights in the city were revoked.

Israel's systematic assault on Palestinian political institutions and political life in East Jerusalem, combined with the failure of the PA to assert its authority in the city and the absence of an organised local leadership, have left East Jerusalem Palestinians isolated and disempowered. They are not adequately represented by the PA which, though empowered to negotiate on their behalf, in fact has no jurisdiction over them, is not in reality accountable to them, and has ultimately left

⁵⁷ At the end of 1994, the Knesset passed the 'Implementation of the Agreement on Gaza and Jericho Areas (Restriction of Activity)' law designed, its first paragraph reads, "to prevent Palestinian Authority or PLO diplomatic or governmental activity or anything similar within the borders of the state of Israel that was not consistent with respect for the sovereignty of the state of Israel." COHEN, H. 2011. *The Rise and Fall of Arab Jerusalem: Palestinian Politics and the City since 1967*, Oxon, Routledge. p27-8.

many feeling abandoned. There is of course significant international interest and involvement in efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict and in the East Jerusalem question in particular. The United Nations and its member states have been consistent in their refusal to recognise Israel's annexation of the city and in their commitment to Jerusalem as a final status issue in a negotiated settlement.⁵⁸ However, without due consideration of the ground level perspective, that locates East Jerusalem, to all intents and purposes, firmly inside Israel, negotiations over sovereignty will be rooted in a single Palestinian nationalist discourse that has lost or changed meaning for the East Jerusalem constituency.

Throughout this thesis, I have sought to capture the view from the ground in East Jerusalem, investigating the way in which residents *act* and the meanings which they attach to their social practice. From this perspective, I demonstrate that Palestinians in the city are more ambivalent and their motivations more ambiguous than a top-down optic allows. The bottom-up perspective adopted here makes clear that, to all intents and purposes, East Jerusalem Palestinians live inside the de facto borders of the Israeli state and as part of the ground politics and economy of the city. I have also demonstrated above that Palestinian residents are adapting their subjectivity and struggle to this reality in ways that deepen their dislocation from the occupied territories.

This choice of perspective has political implications. Once we stop structuring our analytic approaches to East Jerusalem around the nodal point of occupation, which 'brackets out' the situation as temporary and unresolved, and begin to

⁵⁸ Australia's decision in June 2014 to stop using the term 'occupied' when describing Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem caused an international backlash, causing Prime Minister Tony Abbott to offer assurance that there had been no change in Australian policy.

consider East Jerusalem as part of Israel, the state regime starts to look less like ethnocracy and more like apartheid. Several respected scholars in the field have begun to address this controversial issue (Anderson, 2016, Yacobi, 2016, Yiftachel, 2009b). Urban apartheid, Yacobi claims, is not a chance occurrence, but a product of ideology and policy. The emerging apartheid regime in East Jerusalem, he concludes, “is a result of intentional policies that aim to secure Jewish control in the vast majority of territory and resources in the Jerusalem metropolitan area, restricting Palestinians to small parts of the city and denying them their future” (Yacobi, 2016: 112).

Yiftachel has argued that gray spacing results in a process of “creeping apartheid” in which “membership in the urban polity is stratified and essentialised, creating a range of unequal urban citizenship(s)” (Yiftachel, 2009b: 93). This is not simply about discrimination, but “the consequence of deeply embedded institutional, material and spatial systems which accord unequal ‘packages’ of rights and capabilities to the various groups, as well as fortify the *separation* between them” (Ibid: 94). Yiftachel describes this process as ‘creeping’, however, because Israel retains substantial democratic elements (Anderson, 2016: 8). However, if we let go of East Jerusalem’s de jure status and base our analysis on its de facto position, as an integral part of the Jewish state as Israel claims it to be, then we start to see Israel as an apartheid state. In this way, as I made clear in the introduction, our efforts to maintain East Jerusalem’s separateness from Israel is in fact obscuring the Palestinian experience in the city and the extent to which Israeli domination is limiting the opportunities of Palestinian self-direction.

3 Limitations and Possibilities for Further Study

This thesis is undertaken very much from a Palestinian ground level perspective in East Jerusalem and while, in this sense, I hope to have made a valuable contribution to an unexplored aspect of the literature, the ideas presented here are intended to build on existing works rather than contradict them. Jerusalem is in many ways a divided city. What I have sought to do here is to emphasise the contingency of identities and to acknowledge the possibility that, in trying highlight an injustice, it is possible to underestimate its most serious implications.

I locate the divergence of East Jerusalem and the West Bank within the context of fragmentation across the occupied territories, as a result of both intentional Israeli practices (including settlement construction and mobility regimes) and internal Palestinian divisions. In highlighting this separation, I have focused on its impact on everyday Palestinian life and identity construction in East Jerusalem only. A similar study, that shed light on the attitudes of West Bankers or Gazans towards East Jerusalem and the implications of Palestinian territorial and political fragmentation on identity and national cohesion across these areas would make a valuable contribution to the existing literature. Travelling myself between a besieged Gaza and the relative tranquillity of Jerusalem on more than one occasion, underlined the vastly different experiences of Israeli rule and of being Palestinian that these two constituencies endure.

It is also important to note here, however, that it is possible to overstate difference between East Jerusalem attitudes and those of West Bankers, particularly in regard to the Palestinian Authority and the prospects of a two-state solution. Without a similarly detailed ground-level study of opinion elsewhere in the

occupied territories, it is impossible to know how far attitudes diverge. What is clear, is that beyond the political jurisdiction of the Palestinian leadership, East Jerusalem residents have more freedom to express dissent.

A recent survey of Israeli and Palestinian opinion indicated broad scepticism on both sides regarding the prospects for a satisfactory settlement of the conflict. The public perception among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza was that the viability of a two-state solution was waning due to settlement construction. The poll also demonstrated widespread distrust of the Fatah leadership (58% in Gaza and 51% in the West Bank) and growing support for armed resistance. Interestingly, only 28% of Palestinians polled said that continuation of the occupation and settlement activity was the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today, compared to 31% who believed that poverty and unemployment were most pressing (2017, Hoffman, 2017, Research, 2016).

This data points to certain parallels between public attitudes in the West Bank and the opinions of East Jerusalem Palestinians who contributed to this research. What is evident from the discussion of subjectivity and struggle below, however, is that East Jerusalem Palestinians, politically and spatially disconnected from the Fatah leadership and PA rule, are in a potentially more powerful position than West Bankers to act upon their disapproval of the Palestinian Authority, for example, and to consolidate their position away from it. In short, they have an alternative which their compatriots in the West Bank do not and for many in East Jerusalem, it appears that this alternative may currently be the lesser of two evils.

The bottom-up approach adopted here also means that I have paid little attention to the complexities of Israeli party politics and their impact on national policy towards the occupied territories in general and East Jerusalem in particular. While

right wing Israeli governments have, on the whole, given more support to settlement activity and more proactively pursued residency revocation as a means of 'quiet transfer,' it remains that the spatial-demographic struggle continued, and perhaps even increased, during the Oslo period. While some procedures perhaps changed during Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's second term in office between 1992 and 1995, the state none the less continued to support aggressive ideological settlement activity in East Jerusalem during this period and through the incumbency of Binyamin Netanyahu and his successors (Cohen, 2011). While East Jerusalem residents are aware of and often follow the Israeli political process, few are of the opinion that a 'dove' as opposed to a 'hawk' in the Prime Minister's office has any bearing on their own status or security. For this reason, participants in this study made no reference to Israeli party politics and they receive very little attention here.

This thesis relates to everyday Palestinian life and identity construction in East Jerusalem within the context of dislocation and exclusion that exists there. It is rooted in my deep immersion in a Palestinian setting over a number of years and in the in-depth interviews conducted with Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem in 2016. Nowhere in this work, therefore, do I examine the views of Israelis or attempt to consider these phenomena from an Israeli perspective. This was not, and could not have been, within the scope of this study since I had neither the space nor the access to trusted informants to make this possible.

Existing works have begun to address these areas of study. Yacobi and Pullan (2014) consider the attitudes of Israeli residents of French Hill, for example, who find that increasingly numbers of middle class Israeli Palestinians and now East Jerusalem Palestinians, are looking to their neighbourhood for a better quality of

life. Baumann (2015) notes that the settlements were conceived as an exclusively Jewish space, but suggests that an estimated 4,500 Palestinians (mainly, though not solely from within 1948 Israel) are seeking to overcome restrictions on the sale or lease of land to Palestinians to seek a better quality of life there. These phenomena would benefit from a thorough analysis from both perspectives.

In Chapter VI, I drew substantially from discourse theory to construct an analytic framework within which it is possible to locate the site of identity construction in East Jerusalem and trace the emergence of new Palestinians subjectivities in the city. I have only skimmed the surface of the theoretical potential of East Jerusalem as a case study for discourse theorists and I strongly recommend that further study in this direction is undertaken by a more expert political theorist. As I made clear in Chapter VI, the everyday is a suitable site for considering the discursive construction of identity and qualitative interview data offers much for the discourse theorist to work with. Discourse analysis, as distinct from discourse theory, requires greater concentration on all forms of discourse, including written, and would require a better grasp of Arabic than I have.

Following Edward Said, I suggest in conclusion, that “the construction of identity... involves establishing opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us’” (Said, 2003: 332). The dislocations experienced by East Jerusalem Palestinians have contributed to this continuous process of reassessment and it is clear that subjectivities are being recreated. With them, the differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’ are revealed to be strategic, fluid, and not necessarily antagonistic. A ground level perspective makes visible these phenomenon, but

also requires that the researcher acknowledge the changes that are already underway as a result of Israel's asymmetrical power in the city.

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