AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS IN THE GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST:
Philanthrocapitalism, Governmentality, and Democracy

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Abstract:
Environmental campaigns to save the Great Bear Rainforest (GBR) in British Columbia, Canada faced complex ecological, socio-economic, and political challenges that made traditional models of protected areas unfeasible. Between 2001 and 2007, the Government of British Columbia announced commitments to a series of conservancies, to "government-to-government" negotiations with First Nations, and to ecosystem-based management and sustainable development in the remaining region, supported by a $120 million Conservation Opportunities Fund (COF). This innovative policy solution developed out of complex negotiations between ENGOs, industry, First Nations, local communities, and the province. American charitable foundations funded the campaigns of environmental nonprofit organizations (ENGOs) and contributed substantial amounts to the conservation-financing fund. While their role is frequently noted, it has not been adequately studied. Engaging the scholarly and professional conversations about the neoliberal underpinnings of philanthrocapitalism or venture philanthropy, I argue that the lens of governmentality – the techniques and rationalities of governance that produce and normalize patterns of thought and behaviour – draws attention to discursive as well as financial circulations, to agonistic relations and negotiations, and to processes of inclusion and exclusion. I then trace the circulation of financial resources and discursive representations between foundations and ENGOs between 1997 and 2007. Given concerns that neoliberal philanthropy may narrow ENGO campaigns and conservation solutions to those most amenable to market relations and may institutionalize neoliberal rationalities within recipient organizations, this paper raises crucial questions about the growing adherence to philanthrocapitalism within the foundations involved and the formation, articulation, and inclusion/exclusion of ENGO voices in the process of negotiating the made-in-BC solution.

Keywords:
Neoliberalism, governmentality, democracy, conservation, policy, philanthropy

Potential Conflict of Interest Notification:
The Author was employed as Foundation Relations Manager for one of the ENGOs studied here, in the period of October 2001- June 2004, in Vancouver BC. The initial research into this project began in March 2007. The paper was significantly revised in 2009 for presentation at WPSA. The paper was fully updated and significantly revised in 2014 prior to submission to *Geoforum*.

Highlights:

- Examines American foundation influence on ENGOs and policy in Great Bear Rainforest
- Foundations in the GBR show increasing adherence to tenets of philanthrocapitalism
- Negotiated program support grants bind ENGOs to foundations in agonistic relations
- Financial and discursive circulations both embed and mutate neoliberal philanthropy
- Mutating forms of political space, actors, and accountability exceed liberal democracy

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Great Bear Rainforest (GBR) – 6.4 million hectares of temperate rainforest in the Central and North Coast of British Columbia (BC) – is the site of a decades-long, multi-stakeholder, transnational process of negotiating and implementing a framework for large-scale conservation and sustainable community development. Despite its ecological significance, by the 1990s this region was threatened by old-growth logging, mining, and other industrial uses. Named Great Bear Rainforest by environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs) to build recognition for emergent conservation campaigns (Shaw 2004: 377, 389; Forest Ethics 2006: 1), the region presented challenging circumstances that required new policy solutions to satisfy the provincial government, established forestry actors, ENGOs and coastal First Nations.[1] In 2001, 2006, and 2007, the Government of BC announced conservation policy decisions that were hailed by actors and observers as an important "made-in-BC" solution. These decisions marked significant changes: from clear cut forestry to Ecosystem-Based Management (EBM) and from Class A parks to conservancies (Dempsey 2011; Low and Shaw 2011/2012); from the exclusion of Aboriginal rights, title, and interests to their prominent, if fragile, recognition through government-to-government relations (Low and Shaw 2011/2013; Dempsey 2011; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012); and from hierarchical government to negotiated modes of governance (Shaw 2004; Howlett et al. 2009; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012; Moore and Tjornbo 2012; Affolderbach et al. 2012), both through market-oriented campaign strategies and through the $120 million Conservation Opportunities Fund (COF) supporting sustainable economic

[1] On BC forestry politics see Wilson 1998, Cashore et al. 2001, Magnusson and Shaw 2002, Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004, and Shaw 2004.

development and conservation management.[2] Explanations for these transitions have traced the relationships between the innovative campaigns developed by sophisticated and globally-oriented ENGOs (Shaw 2004; Dempsey 2011); the legal, cultural, and political claims presented by Indigenous rights movements (Davis 2009; Low and Shaw 2011/2012); the spatial and functional "remapping" processes negotiated by stakeholders (Affolderbach et al. 2012); the economic and governance transformations of neoliberalism (Howlett et al. 2009; Hayter and Barnes 2012; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012); and the possibilities and limitations for local democratic decision-making (Shaw 2004; see also Logan and Werkerle 2008: 2099).

This paper focuses on a lacuna in the literature: the frequently referenced but largely unexamined role that American foundations played in supporting ENGO campaigns and the final conservation framework. A core group of American foundations provided substantial negotiated program support to ENGOs who worked on GBR conservation programs between 1997 and 2007. They also provided funds to coastal First Nations (directly and with grants passed through ENGOs) (Davis 2009) and raised funds for the COF (Low and Shaw 2011/2012; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012; Saarikoski, Raitio, and Barry 2013), two of the most significant political developments in the GBR. These foundations utilized both business models of operations (efficiency, investment models, networking, and quantifiable outcomes) and market-oriented program activities and policy solutions (markets campaigns and conservation financing). This model, known as venture philanthropy or philanthrocapitalism, is defined not solely through such practices but by a rationale "distinct from previous ideas about philanthropy" (Holmes 2012: 195). Along with other features of a Fordist economy, such as

> regulation, taxation [and] unionism… traditional philanthropy … a tacit admission that giving back to the community was a compensation for the collateral injustices produced by the system. ... Rather than simply offering

[2] The COF is part of the global use of *conservation financing* as a market-based conservation technique (Roth and Dressler 2012)

> compensation for the systems' flaws, [venture philanthropy] also demands a conversion to that same system's philosophy. Only if we submit to their ideological authority by accepting their quantiphilia will their funds be forthcoming (Bosworth 2011: 387).

This "neoliberalization of philanthropy" concerns "the extension of market logics, discourses, techniques and motives further into philanthropy" (Holmes 2012: 196) but also into the policy fields and NGO communities within which they work (Bartley 2007: 230-231; Guthman 2008: 1244-1245). Analyzing the role of American foundation philanthropy in the GBR is valuable, therefore, "not just because it is a neglected area of analysis, but because it tells us something about the processes by which conservation may be neoliberalizing" (Holmes 2012: 186).

This paper examines the relationship between three of the five foundations[3] that supplied lead gifts to the COF – the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF), The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (Hewlett), and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation (Packard)[4] – and six local and transnational ENGOs that received funding from these foundations,[5] namely Ecotrust Canada, the David Suzuki Foundation (DSF), and the four organizations that comprise the Rainforest Solutions Project (RSP) coalition: Greenpeace Canada, ForestEthics, the Sierra Club of Canada – BC Chapter (SCC-BC), and Rainforest Action Network (RAN). By engaging the scholarly and professional conversations about the neoliberalization of philanthropy, and by tracing the circulation of money and discourses between foundations and ENGOs, I expand the existing literature on the variable neoliberalizations of conservation. Given concerns that neoliberal philanthropy may narrow ENGO campaigns and conservation solutions to those most amenable to profits and market relations (Holmes 2012: 200) and may function as a technique

[3] The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation began granting in BC after 2001, and the Wilburforce Foundation does not publish grants information.
[4] Other American funders in the GBR include the Pew Charitable Trusts (marine and aquaculture program), the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Fund, and the Lannan Foundation (Indigenous communities program). Two other major contributors stopped functioning in the early 2000s: the Turner Foundation due to lost asset value (AOL stock) and the W. Alton Jones Foundation due to internal disputes.
[5] Analyzing the role of American foundation funding of Canadian ENGO campaigns is highly sensitive due to the importance of this funding to ENGO vitality and to recent federal government criticism of the practice.

that institutionalizes neoliberal rationalities within recipient organizations (Guthman 2008: 1245, 1251), this paper raises crucial questions about the growing adherence to philanthrocapitalism within the foundations involved and the formation, articulation, and inclusion/exclusion of ENGO voices in the process of negotiating the made-in-BC solution.

The first section outlines how venture philanthropy and philanthrocapitalism extend neoliberal logics: neoliberal philanthropy, as with neoliberalism more broadly, demonstrates continuities and discontinuities with earlier modes of liberalism (McCarthy and Prudham 2004); patterns and resemblances rather than monolithic and universal processes (McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Hayter and Barnes 2012); and points of friction that result in unique mutations (Hayter and Barnes 2012). Approaching neoliberal philanthropy through the lens of governmentality – the techniques and rationalities of governance that produce and normalize patterns of thought and behaviour – draws attention to discursive as well as financial circulations (Guthman 2008; Holmes 2012), to agonistic relations and negotiations, and to processes of inclusion and exclusion. This approach emphasizes the need to look beyond governance as policy creation and towards variable modes of constitutions of and accountability for political spaces, actors, and authorities.

The second section analyzes the foundations' circulation, in the Great Bear Rainforest, of neoliberal rationales via financial resources and discursive constructions. Using public information, I trace the flow of funding from the foundations in question to ENGO campaign activities, to the COF, and to supporting processes. Further, I trace program priorities and activities as described in annual reports, news releases, and program statements. While designed as strategic documents to communicate institutional capacity, attract high-level and/or grass-roots support, and shape policy negotiations, these documents are politically performative rather than solely strategic. I use these data not to construct a definitive historical narrative of

foundations' actions and influences but to develop interpretive conclusions about the techniques and implications of these circulations of financial and discursive resources. First, the transnational relationships between philanthropic foundations and ENGOs act as a particular instance of the "frictions" (Hayter and Barnes 2012: 202-203) that mutate neoliberal conservation strategies in particular places, though these frictions are not simply "local." Second, negotiated program support, itself an apparent mutation, encourages ENGOs to absorb foundations' priorities into institutional commitments and program practices. Finally, despite evidence of mutual mutation, the substantial resources mobilized by foundations had the capacity to effectively prioritize some ENGO actors within the BC policy network and exclude other ENGO actors from it. While Dempsey (2011: 220) argues that "the successes achieved [in the GBR] depended on … environmentalists departing from ideal ethical/moral positions as a part of their political strategy," this research suggests that such decisions are not purely self-directed strategic choices, but (at best) the results of agonistic negotiations, or (at worst) decisions required to remain within the financial circulations that made campaigns possible. Therefore, financial resources and governmental techniques of the American foundations in the GBR were crucial to ENGO participation in the made-in-BC solution, but also contributed to "bracketing out and excluding broader issues in the region and (more radical) voices and visions" (Dempsey 2011: 220).

The final section discusses implications for claims about the politics, and particularly the *democratic* politics, of the GBR. Wendy Brown (2003) argues that neoliberalism has fundamentally mutated the spaces, actors, and authorities of modern liberal democracy, which suggests that the stakes of the neoliberalization of philanthropy and conservation are very high indeed. Despite the foundations' strong claims of supporting democracy and accountability, the extensive involvement of American foundations in the Great Bear Rainforest campaigns, and the

complexity of the transnational economic and discursive circulations at work, raise crucial questions about how foundations can be held politically accountable: for the constitution of political actors via agonistic power relations; for the constitution of political spaces via processes of inclusion/exclusion; and for the constitution of their own authority when they are outside both state-based and local community-based democratic structures and institutions. While suggestive rather than conclusive, this research sheds light on the profound political problematics posed by contemporary global conservation efforts.

2. NEOLIBERAL PHILANTHROPY AS GOVERNMENTALITY

The large-scale capital supplied by American foundations was crucial for the "made-in-BC" policy solution (Davis 2009; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012). This "outside" funding raises concerns about vulnerabilities in recipient ENGOs to withdrawn funding (Wilson 1998: 59-61; Bernstein 1997: 198-199, 253-254); about direct foreign foundation involvement in domestic policy negotiations (Bernstein and Cashore 2000: 97-98) and democratic accountability in domestic policy formation (Wilson 1998); and about colonial "paternalisms" being reproduced through funding relations with First Nations (Davis 2009: 150, 153). Developing trends in philanthropy increasingly circulate of neoliberal priorities within policy fields, resulting in the perception that institutional philanthropy "favour[s] certain forms of environmentalism which are friendly to capitalism, or at least not directly threatening to it" (Holmes 2012: 189). The risk is not that recipient ENGOs consciously adopt neoliberal priorities, but that neoliberal philanthropy constrains "the thinkable and hence actable" within a field of debate (Guthman 2008: 1242). By understanding neoliberal philanthropy as governmentality, this section develops a framework for analyzing foundations' operating rationales and funding practices in the Great Bear Rainforest.

Charitable foundations are legal entities that receive tax incentives to redistribute assets for public purposes, within restrictions on the types and locations of organizations that can be

funded. They are embedded within both the state and the market, as their capacity is determined by their legal status and the fluctuating values of their invested assets. Foundations of the endowment size studied here are governed by Boards, which set overall areas of interest and over-arching goals, with each program area defining specific geographical areas of operation. Program staff develops the strategies and program requirements, advise applicants on suitable projects and budgets, and submit grant recommendations to their Boards. Such large-scale, institutionalized philanthropy is more common in the US than Canada, for economic, historical, and philosophical reasons (Hewlett 2003: 15), and operates with a higher grants budget. Therefore, while Canadian ENGOs often apply to Canadian foundations, applications to major American foundations are frequently required to finance major campaigns.

Charitable foundations in the American context have been analyzed according to pluralism (Delfin and Tang 2007; Lowry 1999), elitism (Arnold 1999), Gramscian hegemony (Arnove 1980; Fisher 1983; Bulmer and Fisher 1984, Roelofs 2003), and Weberian analyses of religion, capital accumulation, and philanthropy (Hewa 1997; Karl and Katz 1987). There are additional American literatures on foundations as central to democratic culture, formal democratic institutions (O'Connell 1999; Prewitt 1999), and mediating state and capital. The relationship between institutional philanthropy and regimes of capital accumulation is reflected in the shift from foundations created through profits from the industrial manufacturing centers of the eastern US, to foundations endowed by post-industrial accumulation in the west, particularly California and Seattle. This shift highlights foundations' embeddedness in neoliberal transformations in economic and political spaces and practices. Though variably defined, neoliberalism is commonly identified by a set of shared characteristics: privatization, marketization, deregulation, reregulation, and utilization of market logics of efficiency and

competitiveness (Castree 2008a: 142).[6] Research on the neoliberalization of charitable philanthropy links these broad transformations to a new form of philanthropy which assumes: 1) that business models of deregulated capitalism are the most effective and efficient mode of organizing philanthropy and 2) that market techniques and mechanisms form the best possible solution to social, cultural, and environmental challenges (Holmes 2012: 188). This model of philanthropy has been termed venture philanthropy (modeled on venture capitalism) or philanthrocapitalism. While frequently used to refer to the charitable giving of elite wealthy individuals (Rogers 2011), philanthrocapitalism is also prevalent in charitable foundations.

Outlining the value of venture capitalism to philanthropy, Letts et al. (1997: 44) argue that:

> …the venture capital model emerged from years of practice and competition. It is now a comprehensive investment approach that sets clear performance objectives, manages risk through close monitoring and frequent assistance, and plans the next stage of funding well in advance.

Venture philanthropy explicitly replicates the practices of venture capitalism: "demanding clear performances metrics and accountability from nonprofits;" "conduct[ing] due diligence… and monitor[ing] post-grant performance; using "rigorous selection processes;" and "partner[ing] with fund recipients to formulate and execute a strategy for delivering social impact" (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 113). To this list of quantifiable wins, strict evaluation, and negotiated support, Holmes (2012: 193-194) and Rogers (2011: 376) add networking, whereby groups of foundations determine shared philanthropic goals and strategies (eg: Environmental Grantmakers' Alliance); collaborate to "aggregate and direct" grant resources (Hewlett 2005: ix); and facilitate interactions between grant recipients to influence program strategies. Further, "intermediary" institutions increasingly function as "mutual funds," soliciting donors and performing due diligence and evaluation on recipient nonprofits (Kaplan and Grossman 2010:

[6] See also Castree 2008b, Bernstein 2002, and Guthman 2008.

112). As with other financial advisors, these intermediaries receive a proportion of funds to cover administrative costs. This "nascent capital marketplace for non-profits" operates by "measuring the social impact of donations and offering ways to funnel dollars to the most-effective nonprofits" (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 112); it transforms grants from donations into investments that derive profit, whether through self-funding programs or broader social, cultural, or environmental gains (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 115).

Therefore, charitable foundations increasingly are placed within broader processes of economic neoliberalization: their endowments profit from the transnational globalized space of market performance, and their grants are distributed through a transnational practice of investing in global social opportunities. Yet neoliberalism is both a continuation and reconfiguration of liberalism, displaying continuities in some goals and strategies, and radical changes in others (McCarthy and Prudham 2004: 277). Similarly, neoliberalism is not a singular, universal, or monolithic process, but rather a question of patterns, logics, and resemblances that repeat, amplify, or attenuate within specific contexts (McCarthy and Prudham 2004: 276). Insofar as neoliberalism exists in process and policy, it must be worked out in place, and thus is vulnerable to local "frictions" and "mutations" (Hayter and Barnes 2012). Recent work has engaged how neoliberal logics might affect policy processes and decisions in the GBR through opportunity or constraint (Raitio and Saarikoski 2012), and how GBR campaigns and negotiations might affect the instantiation and transformation of neoliberal logics in BC (Shaw 2004). Analyses of the possible role of neoliberal techniques of philanthropy must be similarly attentive to continuities as well as discontinuities, to patterns of amplification and attenuation, and to frictions and mutations.

Further, neoliberalism is not merely the growing influence of the (economic) market over the (political) liberal state, but the discursive spread of a distinct form of rationality that plays out

in economic relations, governance, and subjectivity (Brown 2003). Understanding how neoliberalism operates at this level requires analyses of techniques of *governmentality*. Governmentality studies the "rationality characteristic of the systematic thinking, reflection, or knowledge that is integral to different modes of governing" (Sending and Neumann 2006: 657). It respatializes conceptions of power, from a stable 'thing' that can be lost or won in a policy process, to the circulation of capacities, relations of influence, and generation of conditions. It further reconceptualizes political actors, from pre-existing personal or institutional identities to the *agonistic* constitution of political actors through interactions of mutual effect and multiple affect, redirecting analytical attention to "how certain identities and action-orientations are defined as appropriate and normal and how relations of power are implicated in these processes" (Sending and Neumann 2006: 657). As an analytical tool, governmentality brings particular processes of circulation, constitution, and normalization into focus. It emphasizes that philanthrocapitalism cannot be understood solely through economic terms (arguably, the proportion of grant money provided by explicitly "venture" philanthropists is minor) but through discursive practices of "performance and representation" in the circulation of words and images (Holmes 2012: 199). Charitable foundations increasingly participate in a complex neoliberal economy whereby money is one element of a circulating rationality of efficiency, accountability, and quantifiability (Guthman 2008). Ultimately, this approach enables a distinction to be drawn between *governance*, as processes of policy creation and acts of policy authority, and *governmentality* as the political constitution of spaces, actors, and authorities. This focus shifts the analytical question, from how did policy change happen, to what visions of politics are at stake and who exercises authority over these visions?

In the following section, this framework of a variable and vulnerable neoliberal political economy of circulating resources and rationalities is used to read a range of publicly available

documents that detail the foundations' role as grantors and the purpose and rationality of their grant-making, and to quantify the value and purpose of their grants, as documented in annual reports and grants databases. These sources pose specific complications. Annual reports, for example, satisfy the requirement for evaluation and accountability, yet are also used for strategic networking and positioning, which may lead to the amplification of some aspects of program work and the silencing of others. Likewise, even when grants information is publicly available, legal restrictions on amounts and geographic regions of grants can lead to regranting, whereby funds reach their intended grantee via "intermediary" institutions (Kaplan and Grossman 2010: 112). This practice can make it difficult to identify final recipients and, in this case, made it necessary to cross-reference information from foundations, common intermediaries, and possible recipients. Further research, such as interviews, would be required to build a comprehensive historical account of American foundation participation in the Great Bear Rainforest. However, these documents and databases offer a valuable opportunity to trace the circulation of grant monies and the repetition of philanthropic rationalities, highlighting the mutations and the limits to mutations when neoliberal philanthropy encounters local frictions.

3. AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS IN THE GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST

3.1 Embodying Neoliberal Rationalities

Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) was established in New York in 1940 by the children of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and is connected to a history of family philanthropy. Its mission is "to promote the well-being of all people through support of efforts in the United States and abroad that contribute ideas, develop leaders, and encourage institutions in the transition to global interdependence" (RBF 1999: 13). The Hewlett and Packard Foundations, founded by the

originators of the Hewlett-Packard computer company, are legally and practically distinct entities. The Packard Foundation was founded in 1964 to encourage "integrity, effectiveness, respect for all people, belief in individual leadership, and the capacity to 'think big'" (1999: 3). The Hewlett Foundation was founded in 1966 by David Hewlett with the mission to "promote the well-being of mankind by supporting selected activities of a charitable nature, as well as organizations or institutions engaged in such activities" (Hewlett 1999: iii). Between 1997-2001, each institution transitioned leadership. In 1998, Richard T. Schlosberg III, a Harvard MBA and former CEO and publisher of the LA Times, became President and CEO of the Packard Foundation. In 1999, Paul Brest, former Dean of Stanford Law School and a leading theorist of the role of non-profits in society, became president of the Hewlett Foundation. Stephen B. Heintz, whose background was in government and non-profit management, particularly the intersection of democracy and sustainable development, became president of RBF in 2001. These transitions responded to global transformations: in his first public statement, Schlosberg III claimed "we live in an era of … previously unimagined alliances among the public, private, and independent sectors… Experience, wisdom, organizational structures, and financial capital will cross programs, unite disciplines, and introduce new ways of crafting solutions to the world's problems" (Packard 1998). The flexibility and reach of their financial capital was crucial to the vision of foundation success, with Packard (1999:7) arguing that its position within the high technology industry of California placed it at "the centre of the new global economy."[7]

Between 1997-2007, the language used in all three foundations' literature increasingly mobilizes features of philanthrocapitalism: business models of institutional organization; a

[7] A possible sixth lead funder to the COF is TOSA Foundation (California), created by John P. Morgridge (Cisco Systems). Catherine Muther, who established her charitable foundation after working with Morgridge, describes venture philanthropy as a change from reactionary, hierarchical structures of the past to team-oriented structures of the present. She describes philanthropy as a growth industry in Silicone valley, arguing that "what we're doing is really a reflection of how we learned to do business" (www.3gf.org/news_sb.html).

climate of "investment" and market solutions; negotiated operating support; efficiency, evaluation, and quantifiable wins; and networking. Writing in *Smart Money* (2003), Hewlett president Paul Brest suggests the term "strategic philanthropy," yet his model uses the same language and depends on the same rationality:

> "The essence of strategic philanthropy is that (1) the funder specifies objectives and has a plausible (strategic) plan …; (2) the funder seeks grantee organizations that share its aims, and engages in due diligence …; (3) the funder and its grantees articulate how they will ascertain if they are moving toward their shared objectives; and (4) they take reasonable steps to assess progress and evaluate outcomes. If there is a polar alternative to strategic philanthropy, it is a funder having a vague set of goals or preferences (for example, "protect the environment"…), waiting for organizations with interesting ideas or projects to come knocking, and making grants with little due diligence or agreed- upon objectives, strategies, and milestones." (48)

All three foundations share the commitment to viewing philanthropy through "an underlying model of investment, risk and return [that] provides the basis for making big bets where success is hardly assured but the social payoff is extraordinarily high" (Hewlett 2003: xvii). The commitment to evaluation and accountability is also shared. The Packard Foundation highlights accountability and self-evaluation for themselves and grantees (Packard 1999: 5), and by 2001 created a Director of Evaluation. RBF undertook an extensive internal strategic review process between 2000 and 2002, which culminated in new performance evaluation processes, including a yearly "Statistical Review of RBF Operations." Brest led each Hewlett annual report with an extended essay on project development, analysis, and evaluation for foundations and the organizations they fund (Hewlett 2000: vii-xi). Finally, Brest (2003) outlines the model of negotiated operating support that derives from the venture philanthropic model, highlighting the "essentially contractual nature" of a relationship "where the funder and organization agree on outcomes, strategies, measures of progress, and reporting requirements" (2003: 49). While the risks of this model are that "…the funder must sometimes tolerate 'slippage' between its

strategic focus and the organization's operations, and the organization will bear some loss of autonomy as well as the additional administrative costs of due diligence, evaluation, and reporting," the claimed benefit is that "[a]greement on a strategic plan and the valuation process conduces to the [ENGO]'s achievement of its own goals," (Brest 2003: 50-51).

Thus, though not self-titling as venture philanthropists or philanthrocapitalists, these foundations' processes and priorities adhere to its main tenets. Further, Brest writes that "while [w]e understand our work to be more in the nature of a *craft* than science or economics…. the investment metaphor embodies an *attitude* that presses the staff to use the Foundation's resources as effectively as possible" (Hewlett 2003: xvii-xviii; emphasis in original), implicitly recognizing that the circulation of representations, metaphors, and other discursive objects constitute actors who *embody* philanthrocapitalist rationalities. This raises the risk that foundations may, through negotiated support, be "setting the overall agenda in environmentalism towards less radical forms" (Holmes 2012: 190). To understand how these risks are negotiated in the Great Bear Rainforest, it is necessary to trace the relationships amongst actors and the financial and discursive resources that they circulated, and observe possible mutations as well as constraints to these mutations.

3.2 Circulating Neoliberal Rationalities

In 1997, after four years supporting Clayoquot Sound conservation campaigns, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, through the "leadership" of Program Officer Michael Northrop, initiated foundation involvement in the Great Bear Rainforest (RBF 2003: 12). The six ENGOs studied here used the substantial financial and institutional support of RBF, Hewlett, and Packard to pursue research, campaigns, negotiations, and innovative policy alternatives for the GBR.

They developed new strategies, techniques, and alliances, particularly incorporating lessons from Clayoquot Sound (Shaw 2004; Low and Shaw 2011/2012; Dempsey 2011). Ecotrust Canada focused on developing conservation economies (Ecotrust Canada 2000: 2), including mapping the relationship between cultural and natural resources with the Heiltsuk and Haisla Nations. The David Suzuki Foundation, through their Pacific Salmon Forests (PSF) project, focused on biodiversity research, public communications, and political, legal, and technical support to Indigenous communities through the Turning Point Initiative (later called Coastal First Nations).[8] When PSF ended in 2001, DSF focused on assessments of ecosystem-based management standards in land-use plans and logging permits, and on marine conservation. They also continued to support Coastal First Nations until at least 2007 (Low and Shaw 2011/2012). By developing shared goals and a unified negotiating body, the Coastal First Nations transformed the overall context of the GBR campaign (Low and Shaw 2011/2012; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012). The Raincoast Solutions Project (RSP) united international markets campaigns (Rainforest Action Network and ForestEthics); community grassroots organization and advocacy (RAN, Greenpeace Canada, and SCC-BC); conservation-based development for First Nations and non-indigenous communities; and participation in land-use planning processes. The cooperative relationship developed between RSP and five major forestry companies operating in the region, known as the Joint Solutions Project (JSP), negotiated internal agreements over logging practices, protection areas, and development timeframes based on compromises acceptable to all parties. The decision between the ENGO and industry members of JSP to call a moratorium on logging and the international markets campaign and begin serious negotiations, created a second significant shift in the political climate (Shaw 2004; Howlett et al. 2009; Raitio and Saarikoski 2012; Saarikoski et al. 2013).

[8] coastalfirstnations.ca/about

This work was supported through conservation strategies at each foundation. In the late 1990s, under its "Sustainable Resource Use" program, the goal of Rockefeller Brothers Fund in BC was "sound environmental stewardship at the intersection of ecological, economic, and cultural concerns" (RBF 1999: 23). It funded market-based efforts to increase sustainable wood products, litigation to establish First Nations' legal rights, and sustainable development alternatives in First Nations communities (RBF 1999: 25-26). In 1998 the Packard Foundation began granting to ENGOs in the GBR through a five-year Cascadia marine conservation program (including connected watersheds and old-growth forests), in "pivotal sites where human talent, financial capital, and environmental needs now intersect to offer opportunities for achieving maximum benefit" (Packard 1998: 15). The goal was "to protect the ecological integrity" of the coastal temperate rainforest and to fund scientific research as the basis for conservation policies. From the late 1990s, Hewlett granted to GBR campaigns under the "Rural Communities and the Environment" strategy, which "supports organizations working on the integration of rural community development and environmental protection through technical assistance, scientific research, and demonstration projects of regional significance" (Hewlett 1998: 30). This program emphasized economic growth, not just maintenance, and supported "community-based problem solving that achieves economic development objectives without sacrificing environmental values" (Hewlett 2000: 20). At the midway of the 10-year study period, each foundation reformulated its program goals and priorities. In 2003, RBF developed new program guidelines that emphasized collaboration between government, business, and civil society, and a new strategy for BC to support conservation and sustainable use of coastal temperate rainforest (RBF 2003a: 6-7). In 2002-2003, Hewlett redefined its grants in the region as "permanently protect[ing] vast tracks of wilderness areas" and "promoting collaborations to build sustainable economies" (Hewlett 2002: 25-27). After 2003, Packard restricted their focus to

marine conservation, and grants to GBR campaigns were funded under their "Special Opportunities" program.

Over the ten years studied, these three foundations invested substantial financial resources to support ENGO conservation visions for the Great Bear Rainforest (figure 1). Between 1998 and 2007, RBF funded Ecotrust Canada ($1.2 million total), DSF ($675,000), SCC-BC ($330,000), ForestEthics ($295,000), and RAN ($400,000).[9] It also contributed $1 million to the COF and supported Tides Canada Foundation ($100,000). Beginning in 1999, Packard granted to Ecotrust Canada ($300,000), DSF ($1.55 million), RSP jointly ($2.68 million), and ForestEthics ($725,000). It also provided funds directly to Coastal First Nations ($175,000 in 2006), to American organizations to support GBR campaigns,[10] and to Tides Canada, Tides US, and the COF (combined nearly $9 million). From 1999-2007, the Hewlett Foundation funded Ecotrust Canada ($750,000), DSF ($1.8 million), RSP jointly ($3 million), and ForestEthics ($700,000). Hewlett also provided funds to American organizations in support of the GBR campaign,[11] to Coastal First Nations ($340,000), and to Tides Canada, Tides US, and the COF (a combined $3.5 million).

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[9] As per annual reports, online grants databases, and other public financial information. Best efforts have been made to compile complete grants listings. Flow-through grants have been cross-referenced where possible; in all cases, funds were tallied for final known recipient. The awards for ForestEthics and RAN are designated for unspecified markets campaigns, which likely include, but are not clearly restricted to, GBR campaigns. Hewlett grants to DSF from 2004 onwards include funds for Coastal First Nations, which may have supported DSF staff, been passed through to CFN, or some combination. The nearly complete absence of grants to Greenpeace suggests that all funds flowed to them via other organizations, whether RSP or Tides Canada/Tides US. All grants figures are in American dollars, with the value in Canadian funds dependent on exchange rates when grant cheques were received.

[10] Including: 1) The Nature Conservancy (Seattle, WA), 2005, $24,000 "to implement an EBM framework for the GBR;" 2) Spitfire Strategies (Washington, D.C.), 2007, $19,000 "to support strategic assistance around the GBR announcement." (Packard on-line database).

[11] Including: 1) Tides Foundation (San Francisco, CA), 2007, $1 million "for short term support to allow start-up and implementation plans to proceed on the Great Bear Project." Tides Foundation does not undertake program work, and the grant is not designated to the COF, so likely regranted. 2) The Nature Conservancy (Arlington, VA), 2004, $345,000 to support the GBR fundraising campaign (to raise COF fund). 3) Trust for Public Land (San Francisco, CA), 2004, $1.25 million to support conservation financing program. Trust for Public Land is listed as providing technical support to the campaign to develop a conservation financing framework that would work in BC. (Hewlett on-line database)



While this substantial funding supports Wilson's (1998) concern about ENGO vulnerability to funding withdrawal, the relations created between foundations and ENGOs, and amongst ENGOs, are more complex. Grant descriptions suggest that the specific conditions of the Great Bear Rainforest and the institutional structures of recipient ENGOs required foundations to accept a hybrid form of *negotiated program support*: funds were directed to specific project work rather than general revenue, but with the same requirements of negotiation, evaluation, and accountability. Multi-stage application processes, characterized as "professional" (RBF 2004: 11) or even "arduous" (Hewlett 2003: xix), involved detailed paper proposals and in-person meetings between ENGO management and foundation program staff (Hewlett 2003: xix; RBF 1999: 17). ENGO boards and executives have primary responsibility for grant negotiations (Young 2011: 567; Asproudis 2011: 148), while staff provides support on program details, application and report writing, and accounting. Grant approval depends on fit with Board-defined program goals and on due diligence to establish strategic analysis of the context, perceived viability, and organization track record, but also on the "individualized, intuitive

assessments" (Hewlett 2000: vii), "special qualities of judgment" (Hewlett 2003: xix), and "considerable responsibility and authority" (RBF 2004: 13) of the program officers, who then "follow projects along throughout the life of the grant and evaluate the project at the end of the period" (RBF 1999: 18). The program officer is both a repository of foundations' considerable institutional knowledge (Hewletter 2000: ix) and a central figure in grantee/foundation relationships (RBF 2001: 4). The significance of negotiations and evaluations of these investments, through both institutionalized processes and highly personalized relationships, cannot be overstated.

ENGOs cooperate to achieve shared conservation goals, but also compete with each other for financial resources and policy influence in pursuit of these goals (Asproudis 2011: 143, 148). As substantial, multi-year grants provided the financial security to engage in the GBR as long-term actors, ENGOs faced significant internal pressure, and potential inter-organizational competition, to negotiate support from these foundations. Further, the "arduous" application processes required investment of significant executive and staff resources with no guarantee of securing funds and with the risk of being redirected from their own program priorities to those of the grantors (Brest 2003: 50-51). These negotiations created pressure not just to succeed in funding applications but, more importantly, to succeed in building strong relationships with foundations' program officers and thereby shape funders' conservation goals and strategies. ENGOs can therefore be understood as dual advocats: on one hand, they aim to influence specific policies to be formalized by the BC government; on the other, they have to influence the "policy" of foundations, as this determines grant priorities and their own viability as grant recipients. This raises the likelihood of a secondary form of policy "competition" between ENGOs, this time centred on funding networks rather than government.

While the hybrid form of negotiated program support in the Great Bear Rainforest can be considered a local mutation of a primary feature of philanthrocapitalism, its competitive structure is central to its function as a technique of agonistic subjectivization, whereby neoliberal rationalities and practices are constituted, circulated, and mutated. The foundations circulated their commitments to a funding model of business operations and social investments that balance risks and potential rewards, and parallel formulations circulated through ENGO operational and program rationale: from claims about the "entrepreneurial" era that requires a foundation to be "sleek and efficient in its organizational design, prone to judicious risk-taking to achieve important ends, and committed to rigorous assessment and evaluation" (Packard 1998: 5); to Ecotrust Canada's model of "capitalizing the conservation economy;" to ForestEthics or RAN's emphasis on quick-moving markets campaigns. Further, foundations increasingly articulate the case for Great Bear Rainforest conservation according to a business rationale that evaluates the territorial scale of conservation against the financial scale of investment:

> The opportunities for large-scale wilderness protection in [GBR] are enormous…. The scale … the biological significance, the time-limited opportunity, the imagination, foresight, and commitment of the Canadian environmental organizations, the commitment of Canada's indigenous peoples (First Nations) to sustainability, and the continued strength of the American dollar all provide compelling rationales for continued work in Canada (Hewlett 2003: 26-27).

In the same year, Ecotrust Canada stated that it intended to reinvigorate itself as an organization by increasing the scale of its activity to match the scale of the conservation opportunity. More importantly, this rationale becomes increasingly financialized, with both the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Hewlett Foundation emphasizing the scale of the conservation victory (transformed land-management practices over an entire 6.4 hectare region) for the overall cost of the COF (only $60 million to foundations and individuals, and an additional $60 million to governments). Thus, ENGO programs not connected with the COF risked becoming located outside the crucial networks of circulation and negotiation.

The emphasis on business models of operation and investment is intensified by the foundations' emphasis on program deliverables, concrete "wins," and quantifiable outcomes, which increasingly circulate through some ENGO program articulations and institutional practices. The foundations emphasized their intent to fund ENGO campaigns that presented crystal-clear articulations of purpose, strategy, tactics, and markers of success, on the scale of the whole region. The focus on evaluation and demonstrable outcomes can encourage organizations to analyze projects and change unsuccessful activities, but it also forecloses programs that do not present quantifiable "successes." The features of the GBR campaigns that became associated with JSP/RSP – protected areas in a status acceptable to First Nations and a conservation fund to support sustainable development work – most directly satisfied this demand. If achieved, the campaign would offer concrete "wins" that program officers could easily explain to board members. Soon after each of the foundations highlighted their commitment to importing performance evaluation techniques from the business sector, Ecotrust Canada committed, with the support of funding from the Canadian J.W. McConnell Foundation, to undertake an extensive organizational evaluation process every two years. However, its activities remained limited, in terms of communities it worked with and its focus on conservation economies (without pursuing large-scale protection). The David Suzuki Foundation had a clear strategy in supporting the unification of First Nations to become a central actor in conservation planning and in supporting the development of sustainable marine economic development to take the pressure off forest resources. Further, it emphasized the need for a stringent EBM framework outside the proposed conservation areas (DSF 2000). However, because it lacked a clearly defined, tangible project end-point, the success of the DSF campaign program was difficult to evaluate.

Tracing the flow of grants provides evidence of a shift in funding over the ten years studied, towards higher grant values and greater centralization of grants to organizations

involved in the COF (figure 2). The funding to Ecotrust Canada fluctuates but remains fairly consistent. DSF receives a greater proportion over the first years, followed by a greater proportion of funds going to RSP jointly, its member groups, or the conservation and sustainable development framework, in which they were key negotiators. Both the Tides Foundation in San Francisco[12] and the Tides Canada Foundation in Vancouver[13] play increasingly important roles in the dispersal of funds, operating as pass-through organizations and performing the accumulation and accountability roles of the "mutual fund." Following the flow of directed finances and discursive representations makes visible how negotiated program grants might affect policy negotiations by providing or removing the capacity of ENGOs to commit time and resources to multi-year campaign strategies. There are two examples, the first suggesting that financial and discursive circulations can conjoin within agonistic relations to strengthen ENGO voice in the policy field, the second suggesting that disjunctions within these complex relations may result in weakened ENGO voices.

[12] www.tides.org
[13] tidescanada.org



First, the technique of negotiated support and the resulting vision of conservation financing forged a powerful relationship between Rockefeller Brothers, Hewlett, and Packard Foundations and the Rainforest Solutions Project. From the material reviewed here it is impossible to know whether RSP presented a clear analysis and campaign plan that convinced foundation staff of the viability of conservation financing in BC; or whether program staff at these foundations were committed to conservation financing to leverage sustainable development in some areas *and* conservancy status in others and looked for a group that was willing to take it on; or some combination thereof. However, Hewlett's emphasis that strategic philanthropy consists in negotiating with ENGOs to undertake foundation-driven solutions, rather than the "polar alternative" of waiting for viable program proposals, suggests the leading role of foundations in developing the conservation financing model. Evidence supports this reading: as early as 2002, Hewlett Foundation provided funding to the American Trust for Public Land to develop legal mechanisms, financing models, and communications strategies for conservation financing, and in 2003 claimed that "with strong commitments to the Trust for Public Land and

The Nature Conservancy, the Foundation continues to support technical assistance for public finance strategies" (Hewlett 2003: 27). The conservation-financing model developed for the Great Bear Rainforest was unique to the context, with the COF established through a complicated combination of provincial and federal funds, foundation investments, and public fundraising managed by these foundations. However, Hewlett's experience in public conservation financing, and the timelines of its articulations, are close enough to the timeframes of the development of the details of COF as a core aspect of the BC policy solution to suggest that this crucial element of the Great Bear Rainforest solution (Raitio and Saarikoski 2012) was developed through the relationships with Hewlett and its network of core funders.

Alternatively, negotiations over ecosystem-based management (EBM), another key aspect of the GBR conservation framework, suggest how policy perspectives may be opened and closed by shifting circulations of financial and discursive resources. The focus on "winnable" standards for EBM has been called "strategic" (Dempsey 2011), however, there is evidence of a conflict over the "politics of definition" (Wilson 2001: 98-99) of EBM between DSF and RSP. RSP stated that it would like higher standards but was willing to live with ones that were acceptable to all parties, whereas DSF repeatedly criticized developing EBM standards as insufficient to ensure species diversity. That one vision of EBM standards came to prevail in this context, and another vision was foreclosed, can be most easily explained by the emphasis that RSP placed on forging a solution that both industry and First Nations could accept, support, and implement: "Do you feel right putting animal and plant welfare ahead of human welfare? We don't, and with your contributions, ForestEthics has been working with labor unions and timber companies in British Columbia to create a future that works for everyone" (Forest Ethics 2006: 7). However, the correlation between the direction of funding and the capacity of some ENGOs to take more dominant roles in crucial policy debates, such as EBM definition, suggests at

minimum that foundations' decisions regarding who to fund and decline, in what values, over what time-frames, and for what activities, can be a significant factor in the inclusion into or exclusion from formal policy negotiations and informal networks of circulation. Further, stringent EBM standards require removing humans from the center of resource management priorities, and thus shift from anthropocentric to biocentric management (Wilson 2001: 97). Wilson's subsequent contention that markets are not "up to the task of designing and implementing ecosystem management" suggests that a commitment to strong EBM standards is incompatible with market logics of quantification and privatization, raising the risk that foundation funding helped diminish the presence of actors that threatened market prioritization.

The relations of influence between foundations and ENGOs are mutual. The pressure on ENGOs to maintain relationships with foundations affects ENGO capacity and focus: the intensive process of securing negotiated support shapes specific campaign priorities, strategies, and activities, and shortfalls between anticipated and approved budget requests can limit intended program activities. Further, negotiated support that emphasizes quantifiable outcomes brings additional risks. On the one hand, a project that achieves a policy "win" may be viewed as completed, leaving funders free to "invest" elsewhere, regardless of the challenges of implementation. On the other hand, a project that cannot demonstrate "success" may cause a foundation to implement its exit strategy, as "an organization's effectiveness must be continually demonstrated as new challenges appear and new institutions arise to address them" (Hewlett 2001: xii). In other words, the foundations studied here were prepared to divest themselves of their ENGO relationships should organizational operations or program outcomes no longer appear efficient, effective, targeted, and quantifiable. Yet the pressure on foundations to achieve conservation goals through the work of ENGOs necessarily shapes the forms and outcomes of foundation investments. Even though ENGO actors are encouraged, though financial pressure

and discursive techniques, to constitute themselves as "appropriate" subjects, the agonistic nature of governmentalized relations draws attention to the mobility and mutability of these rationalities and the practices they support. ENGOs involved in the GBR campaigns have developed as nimble, sophisticated, highly strategic actors, adept at reading and adapting to changing circumstances and conditions of possibility (Shaw 2004), in part through the demands of navigating and negotiating these intense relations. Therefore, evidence suggests that location within networks of financial and discursive circulations offers significant gains along with the risks, while exclusion or marginalization from these networks may avoid these risks but constrain capacity. Local frictions may generate mutations, but philanthrocapitalist features such as financial resources, negotiated relationships, and inter-ENGO competition place significant constraints on what mutations are possible.

4. CONSERVING THE GREAT BEAR RAINFOREST/MUTATING DEMOCRACY

This research highlights the shifting notions of democratic accountability operating through the GBR: the claims to democracy that circulate through foundation and ENGO statements are at odds with the political spaces, actors, and authorities generated and circulated by their own practices. The traditions of liberal democracy are linked in historically contingent ways to formal structures and processes within state governments and to informal practices claimed by grassroots and community-based self-government. Labeling the conservation framework of the Great Bear Rainforest a "made-in-BC" solution invokes this liberal democratic tradition by implying the central role of BC communities and actors in developing the framework and the role of the BC government in legislating the framework. However, this study suggests that the political economy of financial resources and neoliberal rationalities, even when locally mutated, generates different possibilities for and limits to democracy.

All three foundations perceive themselves as supporters of democracy. RBF President Heintz argues that philanthropy – and the Tocquevillean democratic culture/civil society that it supports – ensures healthy capitalism: philanthropy imposes restraint and redistribution on a financial structure that threatens the public good. Further, referencing the dual grassroots/government conceptions of democracy within modern liberalism, he argues that "more than a system, a process, or a set of institutions, democracy is a culture, a way of thinking and behaving in society… the culture of democracy is sustained *by the experience of community*" (RBF 2001: 7; emphasis added). Hewlett suggests that "a vibrant democratic society requires an array of strong nonprofit institutions that allow citizens to come together to express and further their various concerns and interests…these institutions, which constitute the core of 'civil society', contribute to pluralism and polyarchy and provide important checks on the power of government and the private sector" (Hewlett 2001: xi). Packard further claims that "[i]n many ways, private programs are more effective than those of government. By using private funds for public purposes, programs of this type [foundation grants] channel the personal commitment of millions of individuals who participate as volunteers or donors" (Packard 1998: 1). Finally, Heintz notes that foundations have a responsibility to govern themselves democratically and hold themselves publicly accountable for their actions (RBF 2003: 17-18). By nurturing community through providing financial support for social programs, by limiting the excesses of capital accumulation, and by modeling accountability, foundations therefore claim to be supporting democracy at its most fundamental level.

Similar claims to democratic legitimacy recur throughout the Great Bear Rainforest: RAN describes their activities as developing "sustainable and democratic economies" (RAN 2006: 4), and Ecotrust, DSF, and SCC-BC emphasize "place-based" or "community-based" economic development processes driven by local concerns and interests. The importance of this

democratic element in policy development, at both the community and the state level, is underscored by early criticisms that the Joint Solutions Project was undemocratic. JSP needed to appear "democratized" if its solutions were going to be acceptable to other campaigners, local community members, and the province at large (Shaw 2004: 382). This need to emphasize that inclusive community and government processes underlie the final agreements is highlighted again in the review document produced by RSP (2007: 1-2).

Prior analyses of American foundation funding in forestry conservation in British Columbia have argued that foundations remained external from direct policy actions, and thus were sensitive to democratic politics as a domestic concern (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). By claiming that "[w]ith RBF support and encouragement, environmental groups in BC have made the coast their primary conservation objective" (RBF: 1999: 25), this indirect role is confirmed. However, other references detail direct participation by foundation staff in government-level meetings and negotiations. One report states that "[an RBF staff and trustee trip to the Great Bear Rainforest] concluded with a productive meeting with the newly elected premier of British Columbia that has generated a new level of cooperation among foundations and government agencies" (RBF 2001: 4). Another report two years later states that "over the past two years, the RBF has participated in further negotiations that have produced a plan, endorsed by government, logging companies, conservation organizations, and the indigenous communities to protect the entire 21 million acre area" (RBF 2003: 13). These references are isolated, as expected from sensitivities to democratic legitimacy. Further, as fundraising appeals, they characterize RBF and its partner foundations as well-positioned to achieve the conservation plan they are promising to their foundation peers. Despite these qualifications, it is clear that foundations participated in negotiations as direct actors. The "public-private partnership" of the GBR solution (Hewlett 2005: x) therefore includes the partnership between government and foundations' capital

investments. This "partnership" suggests the further proliferation of agonistic relations through financial and discursive circulations that exceed grants to ENGOs, which makes it crucial to pursue further investigations about the accountability of political actors constituted through these interwoven transnational relations.

Further, this highlights the shifting and proliferating political spaces constituted through the complex networks of financial and discursive circulations: crucial negotiations and possible mutations happen outside the traditional democratic space of domestic policy processes (Raitio and Saarikoski 2012). Shaw (2004) suggests that major decisions were made by actors and in spaces that are not governed by sovereign authorities, and this study raises further questions about the spaces of authority, or of multiple overlapping authorities, that operated in this campaign. This highlights the importance of drawing the analytical distinction between formal *policy* authority and other spaces and forms of *political* authority, for:

> …although the agreements announced by the provincial government on 4 April [2001] were results of government-sponsored processes, we should be attentive to the ways in which it was convenient for all parties involved for this to appear to be the case. … The real locus of control, or political authority, is not nearly so clear cut (Shaw 2004: 382).

Thus, while the state may ultimately decide and institutionalize public policy (Howlett et al. 2009), the processes of determining the framework of the possible policy solutions creates a diversity of spaces as political. It becomes just as crucial, therefore, to trace the spaces constituted through the political economies of foundation activities: from the recognized but largely unscrutinized financial markets of philanthropic capital investments, to the paths through which discursive constructions of conservation priorities and policies are circulated, to the spaces of inclusion and exclusion that result from the competitive pressures of negotiated support.

Finally, it becomes crucial to continue investigations into the long-term commitment and ongoing oversight of foundations in a region far from the funding base. This case opens

questions about the forces that encourage foundations to stay or move on. Beyond the ecological value of the region and the personal attachments of staff or Board, foundation commitment to the Great Bear Rainforest is maintained through the financial value of the conserved land and the substantial financial investments that have already been made: the Great Bear Rainforest is a good financial deal, 6.4 million hectares for only $60 million in private funds. Despite foundation and ENGO references to shared participation in and accountability to formal structures of state-based democratic politics and informal processes of a local democratic polity, the commitment of foundations to the Great Bear Rainforest required a shared prioritization of the business models of operation and market-based mechanisms of conservation that define philanthrocapitalism. These investigations, therefore, require ongoing theorizations of that way that political accountability is potentially reconfigured by techniques of governmentality that operate through agonistic political relations and proliferating political spaces.

5. CONCLUSION

Despite the loudly announced policy victories in 2001, 2006, and 2007, the conservation of the Great Bear Rainforest is not assured, though it is perhaps greatly advanced. This paper addresses a considerable gap in analyses of the GBR by focusing attention on the relations between core ENGO actors and the foundations that provided substantial financial and institutional support. The paper outlines techniques of neoliberal philanthropy and traces the circulation of financial resources and representational practices within the agonistic relations between foundations and ENGOs. While suggestive rather than conclusive, this research highlights that venture philanthropy needs to be understood as institutions, discourses, and daily practices that increasingly circulate neoliberal rationalities, reconfiguring recipient organizations and being subtly reconfigured through spatially diverse frictions. Further, the complex political economies

of foundation funding raise crucial questions about inherited notions of democracy as a particular configuration of political space, political actors, and political authority. The politics of what constitutes democracy, and how it should relate to equally contingent notions of conservation, local community, state, and economic development, are being reconstituted through complex negotiations with neoliberal rationalities. We therefore need to develop new theorizations of democratic practice and accountability, in order to analyze adequately the political implications of the Great Bear Rainforest. This work has begun in many fields, and studying philanthropic foundations is an important addition to this work.

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The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation

Annual reports from 1999 onwards are available at: http://www.hewlett.org/AboutUs/AnnualReports
More recent grants are available through the grants database: http://www.hewlett.org/Grants/

David and Lucile Packard Foundation

Annual reports not available online. Annual reports in hard copy for years 1999, 2001, and 2002 were obtained from the David Suzuki Foundation office.
More recent grants are available through the grants database:
http://www.packard.org/searchGrants.aspx?RootCatID=3&CategoryID=226

INTERNET RESOURCES AND LINKS – ENGOs

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2001: http://www.davidsuzuki.org/files/DSF=ARfinal11.pdf
2002: http://www.davidsuzuki.org/files/General/DSF-AR2002.pdf
2003: http://www.davidsuzuki.org/files/General/DSFAnnualReport2003.pdf
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1999: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/1999report.pdf
2000: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/ECAR2000.PDF
2001: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/ECAR2001.pdf
2002: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/ECAR2002.pdf
2003: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/ECAR2003.pdf
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Financial Statements:
2000: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/FS123100.pdf
2001: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/2001AF.pdf
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Performance Report (McConnell Foundation funding)
2002: http://www.ecotrustcan.org/pdf/ECAR2002.pdf
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2002: http://forestethics.org/downloads/annual_2002.pdf
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2001 winter: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-links/publications/forest-views-winter-2001.pdf
2002 spring: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-links/publications/forest-views-spring-2002.pdf
2003 spring: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-links/publications/forest-views-spring-2003.pdf
2004 fall: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-links/publications/forest-views-newsletter-fall.pdf

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Sierra Club of Canada – BC Chapter

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2001: http://sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/AR_2001.pdf Page 1-2, 8-end
2002: http://sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/SCC_BC_02AR.pdf

2004: http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/SCBC_annualreport_05.pdf
2005: http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/publications/annualreports/BC%20Foundation%20Annual%20Report%202005.pdf

GBR info from website
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=6&als%5BURL_ITEM%5D=f35c8788614ee7c5fef24c5ffc2e988a
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http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=965&als[URL_ITEM]=55cbb7e080ccc47309e1d23f3acc599e
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=967&als[URL_ITEM]=3d4bdd3f4b3801c5302a9956c1fc82e5
http://www.sierraclub.ca/bc/programs/wildlands/issue.shtml?x=966&als[URL_ITEM]=61355ba4c3a13fdd79f833b15681a6a8

Rainforest Action Network

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2000: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2000.pdf
2001: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2001.pdf
2002: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2002.pdf
2003: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2003.pdf
2004: missing due to change in fiscal year
2005: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2005.pdf
2006: http://ran.org/fileadmin/materials/executive/annual_reports/RAN_AnnualReport2006.pdf

INTERNET RESOURCES AND LINKS – OTHER

Coastal First Nations (Turning Point Initative)

2005 December: http://sierraclub.ca/bc/aa-bc_upload/fd5c29a62a2f2c66bdb73ed43cec4361/TP_ENGO_statement_dec05.pdf (Joint statement with RSP)

COFI/CFCI

Coast Forest Conservation Initiative. 2007. "CIII Funding Announcement." Available at: http://www.coastforestconservationinitiative.com/pdf7/Media_January_21_2.pdf; accessed on February 27, 2007. [this is a compilation of media coverage of the February 2007 conservation announcement by BC; CIII, Conservation Investment and Incentives Initiative is the term used with American foundations to designate conservation financing].

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Figure 1


Total Funding 1997-2007
Total Funds (USD)
9,000,000
8,000,000
7,000,000
6,000,000
5,000,000
4,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
0
DSF
ET
RSP
FE
GP
SCBC
RAN
TP/CFN
Tides Canada
Tides US
COF/CEF
Recipient Organization
Packard
Hewlett
RBF

Figure 2


Recipient Organization Funding by Year
Total Funds (USD)
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Grant Year
DSF
ET
RSP
FE
GP
SCBC
RAN